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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

182

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 c letter	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Wheeler secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	1 p	03/15/67	A
#2d memo	re: Game Requirements (U) secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	5 p	03/10/67	A
#3 report	Game Documentation Secret Exempt 3/5/13 per NLJ 12-124	212 p	04/67	A
#4 report	Message No 1 secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	12 p	04/06/72	A
#4a report	Message 1, move III Secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	6 p	05/20/72	A
#4b report	Message No. 3 secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	1 p	05/20/72	A
#5 report	Message No. 1, Move No. II secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	8 p	05/06/72	A
#5a report	Message No. 2, Move No. II secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	1 p	05/06/72	A
#5b report	Message No I, Move II secret <i>open 12-9-86 NLJ 85-346</i>	7 p	04/25/72	A
#6 report	re: war games secret Exempt 3/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-62	11 p	04/25/67 undated	A
#6b report	re: war games confidential <i>open 9-20-12 NLJ/RAC 12-62</i>	8 p	undated	A
#7a report	cover secret <i>open 12-18-89 NLJ 85-181</i>	1 p	04/67	A
#7b report	Fact book secret	1 p	04/67	A
#7f report	re: war games secret	4 p	undated	A
#7-L report	re: war games secret	2 p	undated	A
#7-N report	re: war games <i>sanitized 12-18-89 NLJ 85-181</i> secret	95 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Agency File
JCS, BETA War Games -- SM Keeny
Box 32

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

282

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7 p report	re: war games sanitized 12-18-89 NLS 85-181 secret open 11/12/13 per NLS 12-124	13 p undated	A
#7 v report	re: war games secret open 12-18-89 NLS 85-181	3 p undated	A
#4 c notes	re: Move III possibly classified information open 12-26-89 NLS 85-187	2 p 5/8	A
#5 c notes	re: Move II possibly classified information "	4 p 5/2	A
#6 c notes	re: Move I possibly classified information "	4 p 4/25	A
#2 letter	To Gen. Wheeler from Walt Rostow open 12/11/02	1 p 4/28	

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Agency File
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After signature and date, please return to Mr. Keeny. Thank you.

2

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

March 28, 1967

Dear Bus:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in the forthcoming BETA I and II-67 politico-military games. I regret that my schedule will not permit me to attend.

I should like to designate Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of my staff to participate in my stead on the Senior Policy Team.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Walt
W. W. Rostow

General Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc/bm, NARA, Date 11-15-07

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

SMKeeny:jb:3-28-67
bcc: WWR (2) *with orig (to Keeny)*
SMK file & chron
SMK comeback copy ✓

2a

Mr. Keeny:

Lois said to draft a letter for Mr. Rostow's signature saying he can't go but that you will go in his ~~stead~~

She said it's Bus. (Dear Bus:)

j 3/27

3/27/67 2-b

Mr Keen,

Do you want to write
a memo. designating
yourself

LN

3/28 Quite late return of sample of 107 to be sent
to Ruth Banta 3/29



~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

952

2-c

15 MAR 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-346

By ig, NARS, Date 12-9-86

Dear Walt:

You are cordially invited to participate with me in BETA I and II-67, two politico-military games to be conducted concurrently between 20 April and 16 May 1967 in the Pentagon. Both games will deal with the subject of strategic weapons deployment by the United States and the Soviet Union and will focus particularly on problems associated with anti-ballistic missile systems. As usual, knowledgeable and responsible officials from all interested departments and commands will participate. There will be one senior meeting each week, between 1400 and 1530 hours, on the following Tuesdays: 25 April, 2 May, and 9 May. A final critique will be held between 1400 and 1530 hours on Tuesday, 16 May.

In addition to your own participation, I hope you will provide one member of your staff to serve on an action-level team. The administrative enclosure contains detailed information regarding the games for use by your point of contact.

The Joint War Games Agency is prepared, at your convenience, to brief you on the purposes and scope of BETA I and II-67 and to obtain any suggestions you may wish to make in shaping this exercise.

This is the first senior-level, interagency game since the SIGMA exercise last September and I hope that it will be equally successful.

Sincerely,

Buc

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
Not automatically declassified.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
COLD WAR DIVISION

2-d

10 March 1967

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Authority NLS-85-346

By ig, NARS, Date 12-9-86


MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIAL COORDINATING BETA I
AND II-67

Subject: Game Requirements (U)

1. (S-NF) General. BETA I and II-67, two concurrent, senior-level, interagency, politico-military games, will be conducted in the Pentagon during the period 20 April to 16 May 1967. These games will explore implications of strategic weapons deployments by the United States and Soviet Union, with emphasis on anti-ballistic missile systems. This memorandum contains essential administrative information.

2. (S-NF) Team Structure. BETA I and II-67 game participants will be divided into four playing teams and a single control element. Each game will include a United States (Blue) and Soviet (Red) team which will be divided into senior and action-level components. Control will represent third nations, treaty organizations, fate, nature and other influencing factors.

3. (U) Player Nominations. Addressees are requested to nominate participants and confirm their TOP SECRET security clearances to the Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency, by telephone prior to 10 April with written confirmation to reach this agency prior to 14 April 1967 (contact Lt Colonel Barber, USA, OXford 5-7683 or 7-9860). An allocation of spaces for action and senior-level teams and the control element is outlined in Attachments #1 and #2. Action-level players should be nominated from the rank of Lt Colonel/Commander to Major General/Rear Admiral (or civilian equivalents) who are highly knowledgeable on the subject indicated. Rank is secondary to expert knowledge.



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4. (U) Schedule. Teams will meet according to the following schedule in locations indicated:

a. Action-level players.

(1) 1000 hours for Red Team members and 1400 hours for Blue Team members on 20 April, Room BC-942A, the Pentagon, for pre-game briefings.

(2) 0930-1730 hours on 25 April, 2 and 9 May, Room BC-942A, the Pentagon, for team deliberations.

(3) 1030-1200 and 1400-1530 hours on 16 May, Room 5C-1042, the Pentagon, for action and senior-level critiques.

b. Senior-level players.

(1) 1400-1530 hours on 25 April, 2 and 9 May, Room BC-942A, the Pentagon, for team deliberations. Guides will be available at the Pentagon River Entrance.

(2) 1400-1530 hours on 16 May, Room 5C-1042, the Pentagon for senior-level critique. Guides will be available at the Pentagon River Entrance.

c. Control players.

(1) 1000 hours on 24 April, Room BC-942A, the Pentagon, for pre-game briefing.

(2) 0930-1600 hours on 27 April, 4 and 11 May, Room BC 942A, the Pentagon, for control meetings.

(3) 1030-1200 and 1400-1530 hours on 16 May, Room 5C-1042, the Pentagon, for action and senior-level critiques.

5. (U) Pre-Game Research and Documentation.

a. Suggestions of operating officials in planning research, conducting interviews, and assuring that significant parts of the problem are explored are actively sought by the Joint War Games Agency. BETA project officers will contact your organization during the next few weeks to collect comments and suggestions along the following lines:

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~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

(1) Suggestions for reading -- studies, intelligence documents, reports, plans (both official and unofficial), books, magazines, and other pertinent source material.

(2) Suggestions on persons to be interviewed.

(3) Ideas for introduction into the initial scenario or for control use during the game, to enhance the interest level and overall value of the exercise.

b. A Fact Book, containing administrative details and background material relating to the games, will be distributed to each player a few days before the pre-game briefing.

6. (U) Security.


a. The titles of the games BETA I and II-67 are unclassified when mentioned without reference to the subject which is classified SECRET NOFORN.

b. Game deliberations will be conducted at the TOP SECRET level.

7. (U) Contacts.

a. The game project officer, Lt Colonel Lyle E. Mann, USAF, OXford 5-3705, should be contacted on matters of game substance.

b. Player nominations and related questions should be directed to Lt Colonel Ransom E. Barber, USA, OXford 5-7683.


THOMAS J. McDONALD
Colonel, USA
Chief, Cold War Division

4 Attachments

1. BETA I & II-67
Senior Policy
Teams (Tentative)
2. BETA I & II-67
Action-level
Teams (Tentative)
3. Tentative Game
Structure
4. Game Sched. Calendar

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

BETA I AND II-67
SENIOR POLICY TEAMS

AGENCY	RED 1	BLUE 1	RED 2	BLUE 2	TOTALS
WHITE HOUSE	1	1	1		3
STATE	1	1	1	1	4
TREASURY		1			1
CIA	1			1	2
ACDA		1		1	2
USIA			1		1
DEFENSE	1			1	2
OSD/ISA			1		1
OSD/SA				1	1
DDR&E	1				1
JCS	1 (CJCS) 1 (SAAC)	1 (J-5)	1 (J-3)	1 (CJCS) 1 (-SSG)	5
ARMY		1			1
NAVY			1		1
AIR FORCE	1				1
MARINE CORPS				1	1
DIA		1			1
NSA			1		1
COMMANDS		1	1	1	3
TOTALS	8	8	8	8	32

BETA I AND II-67
ACTION-LEVEL TEAMS

AGENCY	RED 1	BLUE 1	RED 2	BLUE 2	CONTROL	TOTALS
WHITE HOUSE	1	1	1			3
STATE	1	1	1	1	1	5
TREASURY		1			1	2
CIA	1	1	1	1	1	5
ACDA		1		1	1	3
USIA			1		1	2
OASD/ISA	1		1			2
OASD/SA				1	1	2
DDR&E	1	1				2
JCS	1(SAAC)1(J5)	1 (J-3)	1 (J-3)	1(SSG)1(J5)	1 (SSG)	7
ARMY		1				1
NAVY			1			1
AIR FORCE	1					1
MARINE CORPS				1		1
DIA	1			1		2
NSA			1		1	2
COMMANDS		1	1	1		3
CONSULTANTS	1	1	1	1	1 1	6
TOTALS	10	10	10	10	10	50

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
BETA I and II-67

2-e

GAME STRUCTURE

BETA I-67

BETA II-67



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Attachment #3

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BETA I AND II-67

GAME SCHEDULE

APRIL 1967

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
17	18	19	20	21
			Pre-Game Briefings <i>for Action level players only</i> 1000 - Red 1400 - Blue	
24	25	26	27	28
Pre-Game Briefing 1000 - Control	<u>Move I</u> 0930-1730 action level <i>players</i> 1400-1530 seniors		0930-1600 Control Meeting	

MAY 1967

1	2	3	4	5
	<u>Move II</u> 0930-1730 action level 1400-1530 seniors		0930-1600 Control Meeting	
8	9	10	11	12
	<u>Move III</u> 0930-1730 action level 1400-1530 seniors		0930-1600 Final Control Meeting	
15	16	17	18	19
	<u>Critiques</u> 1030-1200 action players 1400-1530 action & seniors			

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Attachment #4

For Dec, May 9, 1967

WORKING PAPER

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

FROM RED II TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

REFERENCE First Scenario
Projection

MOVE NO. II

DTG 061705 Apr 72

I. ESTIMATE

A. Military situation

1. Strategic equation is less favorable than our intelligence estimates led us to believe. There is a gap between the first and second strike capabilities of both sides but ours is wider. Hence the United States has a superior first strike capability militarily.

2. This is counterbalanced to a considerable extent by the unattractiveness of the issue. Five to ten million casualties are likely to be unacceptable to the United States if the issue is national nuclear armament for the FRG. It is certainly unacceptable to Western Europe. Our problem is to keep issue focused on FRG.

B. Political situation

1. Assets

a. US reaction to our blockade and bombing reluctant and general. We seem to have seized the initiative.

b. US seems opposed to FRG nuclear program. They also are anxious to stop program.

c. Disarray in NATO seems complete. FRG isolated. NATO did not consider our bombing an aggressive act requiring invocation of NATO guarantees.

d. Berlin blockade working well. Being interpreted as specific move against FRG as we hoped.

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Authority NLS 85-346

By ing, NARS, Date 12-9-86

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

B-II-10 (RED)

Page 1 of 12 Pages

e. Our issue -- FRG nuclear program -- is popular both at home and abroad.

2. Liabilities

a. FRG nuclear program still not completely destroyed. FRG has 20-40 nuclear devices and ability to rebuild to status quo ante in six months.

b. US may accelerate arms race placing us at even greater strategic disadvantage.

C. Likely US actions:

1. Pre-empt.

2. Assume high-risk policy.

3. Attempt to quiet the situation and cooperate with us.

4. Withdraw from Europe.

We estimate US will combine 2 and 3 seeking negotiated end to crisis, coupled with tough stands to maintain credibility.

D. Estimate of Chinese situation

1. We can handle minor border disputes by present posturing of forces.

2. Twenty-five ICBMs are potential blackmail weapon against both US and Soviets.

3. This situation does not affect present European crisis.

4. We can use this state of affairs to hold out prospect of collaboration with the USA in dealing with threats versus non-nuclear nations by nuclear countries.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Minimize US response to our moves against the FRG. Avoid challenge that would force US to consider first strike.

B. Continue to apply pressure to bring about discontinuance of FRG nuclear program. Focus moves on this issue.

C. Continue to exploit NATO disarray. Don't provide cause celebre that might bring NATO into lock step.

III. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

A. Continue to escalate crisis. Mount peace move and prepare to follow with another strike.

B. Clinch present gains. Further military action not to be taken -- too risky -- forces US to embark on high-risk course or strive for even greater strategic superiority. Maintain hard appearance but seek conciliation.

C. Back-peddle with all haste on basis we're overextended.

We elect to exercise Option B with following overall themes:

1. Vis a vis US:

a. Only obstacle to detente is FRG nuclear program.

b. Germany is threatening world peace for third time in this century.

c. Need to cooperate rather than face nuclear holocaust.

2. Vis a vis Europe:

a. Same as a. above.

b. Same as b. above.

c. Separate US and Europe on high-risk policies short of all-out war.

d. Tie Europe and US on all-out war to cause Europe to act as brake on the US.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Note to US:

a. Condemnation of FRG militarist mentality and ambitions which have again brought the world to brink of war. THAT IS SOLE ISSUE.

b. Soviet readiness to negotiate all earlier Soviet proposals and:

(1) general de-escalation in the arms race; strategic weapons freeze -- both offensive and defensive systems (these discussions would cover, if necessary, NATO ABM issue).

(2) worldwide security arrangement as well as European security arrangements (include US in the discussion of the European settlement as a concession from prior Soviet position).

c. Reiterate already stated willingness to end the Berlin Blockade if the FRG gives up its nuclear program.

d. Suggest to the US that it is in the US/Soviet interest to eliminate the 40 German nuclear weapons that they have carried off in trucks. Propose that the US do whatever possible to neutralize the threat these weapons pose and agree to accept US assurances that the weapons present no threat.

e. Acknowledge that the FRG possess a limited nuclear capability against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. State that the USSR could not tolerate the use of FRG nuclear forces. Any such FRG action would require an appropriate Soviet nuclear response. Extend unequivocal assurance that:

- (1) our response will be limited to the FRG and controlled in application,
- (2) we will take every possible step to avoid damage of any kind to any other nation, and
- (3) we will continue to consider the crisis to be a German problem, which does not involve a threat to the security of any other NATO nation.

f. Offer by the Soviet Premier to meet any-time, any place with the US President for unconditional negotiations on measures to lessen tensions in the world, and assurances to nations that feel threatened by nuclear weapons.

g. Offer to send high-level team to the US for discussions of the problem; team ready to leave in two days.

h. Soviet assurance that it will conduct no more atmospheric nuclear tests.

2. Note to other NATO nations

a. Same as US note.

b. (To nations that have disassociated from FRG): We note your actions with gratification and are pleased that by your enlightened action you have spared your people from the destruction that a nuclear exchange (caused by FRG problem) would involve. (To nations who have not disassociated from FRG): It would be in your interest to do so since nuclear war over German nuclear problem would be a holocaust for all involved.

c. Acknowledge that the FRG possess a limited nuclear capability against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. State that the USSR

could not tolerate the use of FRG nuclear forces. Any such FRG action would require an appropriate Soviet nuclear response. Extend unequivocal assurance that:

(1) our response will be limited to the FRG and controlled in application,

(2) we will take every possible step to avoid damage of any kind to any other nation, and

(3) we will continue to consider the crisis to be a German problem, which does not involve a threat to the security of any other NATO nation.

d. Soviet readiness to negotiate all previous proposals plus European security arrangements (with US included in the talks), including measures to lower the level of the armed confrontation in Europe.

e. Same as US note g., i.e., send high-level team.

f. Same as US note h., i.e., no atmospheric tests.

3. Note to FRG

a. Continuing intolerability of FRG nuclear weapons program.

b. If FRG renounces the program, destroys its warheads under supervision and converts to a safeguarded exclusively peaceful program, good relations and cooperation can be re-established to mutual benefit and the Berlin blockade will be lifted.

c. If not, the FRG must face the full consequences.

d. Some of the urgency has disappeared but in the absence of favorable FRG decision and action the urgency will return.

e. The USSR issues the following solemn warning to the FRG lest it consider using nuclear weapons. Any use by the FRG of nuclear weapons against the USSR or any nation of the Warsaw Pact will result in nuclear retaliation against the FRG by the USSR. That retaliation will be in a ratio of three to one to the disadvantage of the FRG. The very existence of the West German nation will be at stake.

Upon delivery of the note, the USSR breaks diplomatic relations with the FRG.

4. The GDR sends notes to the Western nations drawing the sharp contrast between its peaceful policy and that of the FRG and proposing establishment of diplomatic relations.

5. The SED appeals to the SPD.

B. Military

1. Maintain Berlin civilian blockade. Posture forces to prevent NATO/US intervention -- two divisions along autobahn. Complete defensive preparations for Berlin.

2. Maintain strategic posture at high level and reinforce border areas with air and ground forces from USSR.

3. Initiate long-range program for strategic programs, both offensive and defensive.

4. Call meeting of Warsaw Pact Ministers of Defense to consider other means of improving posture.

5. Inform Americans that should they attack we can prevail and will recognize no restrictions or restraints in our response. (Although we do not so state, by this we mean use of chemical and biological weapons.)

6. Conduct long-range air exercises in the Far Eastern USSR.

7. Increase flights over Norwegian Sea and announce breakthrough in submarine detection capability.

C. Psychological. Several themes and sub-themes will be employed.

1. Isolate West Germany as the Sole Threat to Peace.

a. Appeal to the nostalgia of US-UK-French-Soviet alliance against German Fascism in World War II.

b. Stress West German perfidy is once more, for the third time in the 20th century threatening the world with war.

c. Propaganda support for the UK and France for their disassociation from West German nuclear arming and thereby applauding UK and France for reducing the threat of nuclear conflagration, which propaganda implicitly carries the Soviet position that Soviet retaliation against the UK and France and the West Europeans is a matter for Europeans to consider seriously.

d. Scare campaign about the whereabouts of the 20-40 nuclear weapons.

2. The USSR desires peace, loves peace, and does not want war.

- a. West German fascists and revanchists have violated the commitments under NATO.
- b. The Soviet action (iron bombing) was purely surgical and non-aggressive.
- c. The USSR desires no territory and desires merely to return to the status quo ante re West German nuclear armaments.
- d. The burden is directly on the US and the West to take concrete steps to reverse the West German move to develop nuclear weapons.
- e. Treat Communist Chinese missile firings indirectly, without specifically mentioning Communist China, as indicative of the developing threat to peace initiated by the West German move.

3. The USSR desires disarmament

- a. Call for a European Security Conference and/or a Summit Conference with the US to discuss all outstanding problems raised by the West German "threat".
- b. Resurrect Rapacki-type plans for a neutral Europe and nuclear-free zones in Europe.
- c. Have East Germany announce their renunciation of any development of nukes.
- d. Hold out vague promises of detente and de-escalation of the arms race if West Germany desists (even though we proceed with military developments intended to reduce the strategic balance of power that is now prevailing against us).
- e. Accept US offer to use man-on-moon achievement only for cooperation for peaceful exploitation of outer space.

4. Berlin blockade

a. Insist that the Soviet move was purely a defensive "diplomatic" reaction to West German movement into nukes, necessitated also by West Berlin's refusal to disassociate itself from the West German move.

5. Complete absence of any Soviet media propaganda references to:

a. US-UK aircraft losses.

b. Any further iron-bombing of West German facilities.

c. Possible NATO ABM deployments, in order not to unite NATO powers by haranguing against a possibility that is not yet a certainty.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. If FRG uses nuclear weapons against any type of target.

1. FRG will be delivered an ultimatum that any use of remaining nuclear weapons will result in full nuclear response by USSR.

2. USA will be notified that use of remaining FRG weapons would result in Soviet nuclear response against FRG only and not against USA or other NATO allies. A similar note would be dispatched to all NATO countries.

3. Should this deterrence fail, USSR will retaliate on a similar target (or targets) 3 to 1 to insure destruction and demonstrate control and restraint by Soviet political leadership. The objective in this instance will not only be to reduce chance of escalation but demonstrate, by shock effect, that the USSR will not be bled by a secondary power while the US is undamaged.

B. If the US indicates they intend to send a civilian convoy under military escort down the autobahn in an effort to break the Berlin blockade. (We will not resist a purely military convoy which breaks our administrative level restriction to level before blockade). Reaction:

1. We send a note to US indicating that such action on their part holds grave threats to the peace of the world and that we will not permit the convoy to pass.
2. We send note to NATO urging that they disassociate themselves from the proposed US action highlighting the threat this holds to the peace of the world.
3. If, following dispatch of the note (1 above), the US does in fact dispatch the convoy we will use all passive measures (such as blowing bridges, barracades, harrassment, etc.) to stop convoy.
4. If 3. is unsuccessful, we then use conventional military forces.
5. If US uses tactical nuclear weapons to force the autobahn and break the blockade, we will use troop reinforcements and ADMs to counter this action.
6. The rationale for the above is that use of nuclear weapons by the US can only damage them politically and would redound to our favor in the eyes of world opinion respecting the crisis if it does not in fact break blockade.

C. If US mounts single conventional or nuclear air attack across the Curtain.

1. No military reaction except defense.
2. Diplomatic notes and other means to emphasize danger to world peace and to threaten full retaliation in the event of more strikes.

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

D. If FRG mounts conventional air strike across Curtain.

1. Retaliate in kind announcing to world action is directed purely at FRG. For example, strike all-FRG fields only -- not jointly used airfields -- in response to raid on our fields.

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

B-II-21 (RED)

Page 12 of 12 Pages

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

WORKING PAPER

FROM CONTROL TO RED AND BLUE

MESSAGE 1

REFERENCE Red and Blue
Second Move Messages

MOVE III

DTG 200930 May 72

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

BETA II - 67

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-346

By ig, NARS, Date 12-9-86

It is now 20 May 1972

On 6 May, the USSR dispatched strong notes to the US, the NATO countries, France and the FRG stating that they were ready to negotiate a security settlement in Europe to lessen tensions in the world and to reassure nations that felt threatened by nuclear weapons. However, they stated in the plainest language they could not tolerate FRG control of nuclear weapons. The USSR made clear that FRG use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union or any other Warsaw Pact country would be answered at a 3 to 1 ratio, directed only against West German targets. It was clear, however, that if West Germany renounced its nuclear program, cooperation could be reestablished and the Berlin blockade lifted.

After delivering its note to Bonn, the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with West Germany and warned other nations of Western Europe to remain aloof from FRG actions or face the consequences.

The USSR assured the United States that it would conduct no more nuclear testing in the atmosphere and was anxious to conduct meaningful discussions. It offered to dispatch a high-level negotiating team to Washington and to hold a summit meeting anytime, anywhere to conduct "unconditional discussions."

During this period, the United States informed the Soviet Union that any further attacks on the Federal Republic of Germany would be casas belli. At the same time, however,

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

Page 1 of 6 Pages

it became clear to Moscow that the US was attempting to halt the German nuclear program. While warning Strauss not to attack installations in East Germany, the United States guaranteed to take all actions necessary to defend Allied rights in Berlin and to defend FRG territory under multilateral NATO nuclear defensive arrangements to be worked out in the Nuclear Planning Group. The United States also offered to make ADMs* and ABMs available to the North Atlantic Council under multilateral control. It made private representations to Argentina to discontinue support for the German nuclear program.

In Europe the United States reinforced with both ground and air units. By 8 May, two Army brigades and four fighter-bomber wings had closed station in West Germany while one Marine division was embarked and steaming toward Bremerhaven. US demonstrations of force -- Second Fleet exercises in the North Sea, SAC air alerts and SSBN deployments -- were clearly perceived in Moscow. A proposed Allied attempt to breach the Berlin blockade with a flight of civilian aircraft under heavy US fighter escort was deferred pending the outcome of diplomatic talks.

The Soviet Union maintained its strategic posture at a high level and reinforced border areas with ground and air forces. Two divisions were deployed to blocking positions along the Autobahn to counter possible NATO initiatives. The USSR called a meeting of Warsaw Pact Ministers of Defense to consider means of improving the communist strategic position.

Senior US officials publicly reaffirmed the urgency of US/USSR negotiations to end the arms race and reduce tensions. They stressed that meaningful negotiations were contingent upon Soviet abandonment of their aggressive course in Europe. They also suggested that the US was considering summoning an urgent meeting of the General Assembly to discuss the threat to world peace posed by the Soviet's actions.

In diplomatic exchanges the Soviets expressed their desires for peace, disarmament and willingness to call for a European Security Conference. The USSR resurrected Rapacki-type plans for a neutral nuclear-free Europe. At the same time that they had East Germany renounce nuclear development, the Soviets conducted a "scare campaign" on the whereabouts of the 20-40 nuclear weapons reported still to be in FRG hands.

* Atomic Demolition Munitions

The Soviets stated that they had no desire for territory and wanted merely to insure the halt of FRG nuclear weapons. They said their "iron-bombing" of the German facilities was purely non-aggressive and that the blockade of Berlin related entirely to the nuclear issue.

The United States sent senior officials to Japan and India to reassure them vis-a-vis the Chinese tests and to Berlin to convince Berliners of US determination to defend the city.

Sentiment in the US was a mixture of resentment over German actions and desire to support an ally against a long standing protagonist.

Considering the pressures from all sides and the lack of Allied support for counteraction to the Soviet "surgical operation", Strauss announced, on 9 May, that for the sake of peace and future European security and to maintain economic interests of the EEC, he was prepared to call a halt to the German national nuclear effort and reopen his facilities to EURATOM inspection if satisfactory arrangements were made for FRG security through guarantees for the multilateral nuclear defense of Europe. He further stated that the FRG had no nuclear weapons; the 40 trucks seen leaving nuclear facilities prior to the Soviet strike carried key scientists, files and equipment.

Although military forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain continued to maintain a high state of readiness, an atmosphere of restrained relief and optimism began to pervade Europe. Nations of the West privately expressed gratification to Washington on the measured and responsible way it had reacted to the crisis. The NATO countries backed the US position on the nuclear arming of West Germany and indicated a willingness to participate in multilateral discussions on future arrangements for the defense of Europe.

The French dispatched and published a message to Moscow congratulating the Soviets on their moderate reactions in the crisis and expressing pleasure over the lifting of the Berlin blockade and discontinuance of further military actions.

Within West Germany, there was severe resentment over the lack of support by its NATO allies and a deep sense of chagrin. On "The Right", much of this was directed against

Strauss for backing down. In an atmosphere of increasing acrimony, the Social Democrats called for dissolution of the Strauss government, appointment of a coalition caretaker government and immediate national elections. West Berliners were greatly relieved by the lifting of the blockade.

* * * * *

While the crisis in Europe held the focus of world attention, developments in Asia received little notice, particularly growing instability on the Korean Peninsula. The number and size of patrol clashes along the 38th Parallel mounted during April. On the 25th of that month a regimental size retaliatory sweep was conducted by South Korean ground forces. North Korea responded with a division-sized attack which breached the South Korean lines in two critical areas and negotiations broke down in Panmunjom.

The US pressed the ROK Government for moderation in view of already serious US commitments in Southeast Asia and Europe but the Park Government demanded immediate airlift from Vietnam to Korea of the Korean Marine Division and the rapid sea movement of the two Korean army divisions still operating in that country.

During the proceeding months, intelligence regarding the North Korean political situation indicated increasing factionalism among the leadership. It appeared that pro-Chinese elements in the government had seized the opportunity afforded by the border clashes and Moscow's preoccupation in Europe to establish a closer relationship with Peking. Since 15 May, intelligence reports have indicated massive Chinese troop movements in Manchuria and the entry into North Korea of several Red Chinese armies. On 18 May, North Korea and Red China launched a coordinated ground and air attack into South Korea. Defenses which had been considered impregnable were penetrated in four places and an estimated three Red Chinese armies plus North Korean elements threatened to overwhelm the two US divisions guarding the traditional invasion route to Seoul.

Since 1968 South Korean forces had been drastically reduced because of US military aid cuts and pressures to strengthen the civilian economy. The twelve ROKA and two US divisions in South Korea had, since 1970, keyed their defense plans almost entirely to the early use of nuclear weapons. This doctrine had been widely discussed in military journals and apparently not been overlooked in Peking.

The Chinese have announced that they will use tactical nuclear weapons against the US divisions in South Korea if the United States takes the nuclear initiative. This announcement included a thinly veiled threat that "the US aggressors should think long and hard before they use their nuclear arsenals against Peoples' China or its allies because no place on the earth is so remote as to be secure from quick and just retribution."

In Tokyo, the Asahi Shimbun has reported Red Chinese nuclear blackmail pressure on the Japanese Government to preclude continued US use of bases in Japan or Okinawa.

Intelligence regarding the rationale for the Red Chinese attack into South Korea provided raw material for several theses. The most probable appears to be that Peking seized upon Soviet and US preoccupation with their Western European confrontation to redress a growing imbalance in their influence vis-a-vis the USSR in Asia.

Rumors of disturbances and major unrest in Western China, particularly Sinkiang Province, continue to filter out of Hong Kong and Macao. Although some of the reports are contradictory, there is a growing feeling among Western Sino-logists that a Moslem autonomous movement is being exploited by anti-Peking elements. One Czech reporter has been quoted in a Prague journal on the possibility of "Two Chinas" -- pointing out that most of Red China's nuclear capabilities are located in areas where autonomous rumblings appeared to be growing.

The US Commander in Korea has messaged CINCPAC that the US Corps has three alternatives and a decision is necessary within the next 12 hours:

- a. Arrange for naval evacuation of all US forces from Inchon on an emergency basis with probable high casualties and loss of virtually all materiel.
- b. Stand and fight and be overwhelmed by what appears to be a five to one numerical superiority and growing enemy air strength.

c. Use tactical nuclear weapons to relieve the pressure.

It appears that the bulk of the Red Chinese air force and ten field armies have been committed along with the entire North Korean military and naval establishment in a drive to capture Seoul.

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WORKING PAPER

4-6

FROM CONTROL TO RED II

MESSAGE NO. 3

REFERENCE Red Second Move
Message

MOVE NO. III

DTG 200930 May 72

On 12 May, the US press clarified stories that a high-level inspection team had found defects in the US ABM system that "cast doubts on its overall effectiveness." The stories related that US casualties in the event of a Soviet second strike would be on the order of 20 million, rather than the 5-10 million reported previously. It was also reported that a well-planned first strike by the CPR would produce millions of casualties, i.e., no less than 10 million and possibly more. Soviet strategic experts confirmed the figures as essentially correct. The experts also held that a US pre-emptive strike against Chinese strategic forces would substantially reduce US casualties. Nevertheless, there was no assurance that all of their nuclear capabilities could be located and destroyed and the possibility of the United States suffering several millions of casualties, even after a pre-emptive US nuclear strike against China, could not be discounted.

On 14 May 1972, a delegation of Chinese Moslem leaders arrived in Frunze, Kirghizia with assurances that they had sufficient backing of the population of Sinkiang-Uighur to assume control. They reported considerable unrest throughout the autonomous region and outbreaks of violence in Urumchi. They stated the people were prepared to create an autonomous republic under the suzerainty of the Soviet Union and requested immediate Soviet backing -- troop support and diplomatic recognition. Their plea was passed to Moscow where the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) confirmed the strength of the movement plus rioting in Urumchi. (The GRU had been playing a strong covert hand in the movement for 15 years). However, the GRU estimated that Soviet military intervention would be required to drive loyal CPR Army units from the region.

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Authority NLS 85-346

By inf, NARS, Date 12-9-86

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 85-187

NARA Date 12-20-89

4-c

Accomplished role in Europe. New situation

-X-X-X-X-X-

European Objectives:

(1) to continue to work against reconstruction of NATO, including multilateral programs. Etc. Etc.

Far East.

Danger - (1) US may escalate FE conflict to include USSR

(2) escalation of arms race

(3) destruction of China

Opportunities:

(1) Long exhaustion war b/w China & US

(2) Elimination of Chinese

(3) USSR as peacemaker.

(4) US + China both lose support

(5) Fragmentation of China.

US Option


(1)(2)(3) In Scenario

(4) Retrograde to Peace

(5) Preemptive strike against Communist China.

Show US victory might be best.

In which USSR was peacemaker



5C1042

However, there is enough chance of US preemptive strike that we want to dissociate ourselves.

Objective - To prevent major US victory & also a US attack which might involve US.

?

Reduced state of alert to convince US we were not going to get involved.

If US uses tactics, would intensify diplomatic offensive - If TNs against prop, would state this would involve Sino-Soviet pact. World ignore Sinking crisis

For Junes, May 2, 1967
WORKING PAPER

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

Authority NLS 85-346

By ing, NARS, Date 12-9-86

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE AND RED

MESSAGE NO. 1

REFERENCE INITIAL RED AND

MOVE NO. II

BLUE MESSAGES

DTG 060930 May 72

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

BETA II-67

It is 6 May 1972. Following Soviet detonation of a massive nuclear weapon in the exo-atmosphere, the United States increased its SAC Airborne Alert. On 26 April 1972, the President stated, in a TV address, that the Soviet action was "a violation of the Nuclear Tests Ban and Outer Space Treaties". The statement implied that further Soviet nuclear detonations would cause resumption of similar testing by the United States. The President made it plain that the Soviets could not win an arms race with the United States and reasserted the reliability and superiority of US strategic forces. He went on to denounce Soviet moves in Rumania as aggression. In the same speech, the President indicated that technical preparations were being completed for the launching of an imminent US manned landing on the moon. The speech concluded with emphasis on US desires for peaceful exploitation of space.

A number of carefully couched and highly informative articles appeared in the US press stressing its willingness to enter negotiations with the Soviets with a view to ending the arms race. It was apparent, however, that this would be impossible if the Soviets proceeded with nuclear testing. US editorials and articles, obviously based on "deep background" briefings by the US Administration, pointed up the US dilemma if Germany persisted with a national nuclear program. In this event, it was clear that the US nuclear guarantee was at stake.

On 29 April an article appeared in DER-STERN stating that the US Ambassador to Bonn had asserted that the United States

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or

B-II-1 (Red)

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had no choice but to "engage in basic re-examination of US policy toward Germany if the Germans persisted with their nuclear program". The article asserted also that the United States was proposing that NATO examine alternatives to the German nuclear program, particularly a NATO ABM. The article ended on a cynical note regarding an alleged US insistence that, in any multilateral solution, Europe would have to bear its share of the costs.

A US Naval Board of Inquiry was convened to investigate the POLARIS submarine tragedy. Preliminary reports discounted Soviet involvement in the incident and indicated the disappearance was probably the result of an accident.

The US Secretary of Defense issued a statement announcing significant redeployment of US forces "from Southeast Asia" indicating improvements in political stability in that area and of peaceful US intentions.

Reuters reported extensive US preparations for the initiation nuclear tests at Kwajalein, as well as accelerated production schedules on the POSEIDEN submarine program. The US Navy also announced a recent Defense decision to build and deploy a prototype sea-based ABM as well as to develop the capability to deploy additional sea-based ABM units if required.

In a private note to the Soviet Union the US President dealt both with the Soviet nuclear shot and Soviet protests over the German nuclear program. He made it clear that the US attitude toward both testing and the Germans would be strongly influenced by whether the Soviets conducted more tests. He intimated that the United States could scarcely apply hard pressures on the Germans when the Soviets were acting in such a provocative manner. The note held out prospects of talks on world security problems including Germany, if the Soviets were more cooperative, but the US made no specific offer for negotiations. The US note made it clear that the next move was up to the Soviets. It indicated that the note would only be published if the Soviets published their own.

Reliable sources in Japan reported that the United States had indicated a willingness to open talks with the Japanese on the possibility of a sea-based ABM to protect Japan.

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or
B-II-2 (Red)

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It was apparent that diplomatic notes, received by France and the other NATO allies on 25 April, from the USSR had caused major internal dissension and debate. (France had already indicated that it would withdraw from NATO completely if there were further moves toward a multilateral nuclear capability and had long been strongly opposed to any control of weapons or unilateral nuclear capabilities by the FRG). A senior French official stated that the French Government "will no longer support the FRG against external aggression and denounces strongly 'German perfidy' in breaking its word to the Western European Union regarding manufacturer of nuclear weapons". The French Government demanded effective Euratom inspection of German nuclear facilities. Other NATO allies reacted in a similar manner.

On 25 April, Soviet strategic and Warsaw Pact forces were brought to full alert and began deploying to forward positions. Reserves were called up and mobilization initiated.

On 27 April, the Soviets dispatched separate diplomatic notes to the NATO countries, France, the United States, West Germany and the Senate of West Berlin as follows:

1. France and the NATO countries -- "We note that the Federal Republic of Germany is embarked on a nuclear program in violation of the obligations undertaken in connection with the FRG participation in NATO and the 1954 commitment. The USSR regards this as a grave threat to the peace and stability of Europe and the world. We hope that your government will take effective steps to prevent this provocative action on the part of the FRG." The notes went on to point out that, if the FRG renounced its nuclear program, the framework for European security would have been formed.

2. The note to the United States cited the West German action and appealed to the United States, as a major world power and fellow World War II victor, for cooperation and support in stabilizing the grave world situation through exerting all means possible to force the FRG to renounce its nuclear program. The note also pointed out that the USSR hoped for a detente, resumption of talks on stopping ABM deployments and reaffirmation of the Tests Ban Treaty. All of this was made contingent on the halt of the FRG nuclear weapons program.

3. The note to the Senate of West Berlin also cited the German nuclear program and asked the Senate to disassociate itself from this action on the part of the FRG.

4. The note to Bonn stated that if the FRG continued its program, the USSR would be forced to consider "appropriate actions to protect its national interests and security".

On the 29th and 30th of April, a rising wave of world resentment had apparently failed to persuade the FRG to stop its nuclear program. Intelligence indicated that the program was advanced, that the FRG had employed "break through" centrifuge techniques and fissionable materials provided by Argentina. Strauss categorically refused to give ground on West Germany's right to defend itself in a proliferating world. It was apparent that he had strong popular support as the spirit of nationalism reached a fever pitch throughout West Germany.

On 1 May, in separate notes to the Berlin Senate and to the various interested nations, the Soviets announced that since Berlin has refused to disassociate itself from the illegal FRG nuclear program, it has become necessary to impose a selective blockade of West Berlin. This blockade will not interfere with allied military access to Berlin at the rate which prevailed before the crisis. Civilian access will be cut off. Supplies necessary to prevent starvation, disease, etc., will be supplied by East Germany upon request from the Berlin Senate. The blockade will end, either when Berlin disassociates itself from the FRG and its illegal nuclear program, or the FRG gives up nuclear armament.

On 1 May, making clear that the move was related strictly to the FRG nuclear armament issue, the Soviet Union instituted a civilian blockade of Berlin. On that same day, the USSR published a message which had been forwarded to all NATO nations containing the following points:

1. Profound regret that the NATO nations had failed to act effectively to stop the FRG nuclear weapons program.
2. Assurance of Soviet desire for a peaceful solution to the crisis.

3. Offer of the following additional concrete proposals for reduction of tensions and preservation of peace; all contingent on an FRG renunciation of its program and safeguarded conversion to a peaceful nuclear program only.

a. Negotiations on mutual reduction of foreign troops stationed in the two Germanies.

b. Negotiations for expanded technical and cultural exchange programs.

c. Discussions of world food and population problems.

4. Call for a conference of NATO nations and France, with the nations of Eastern Europe, to reach agreement on the above and earlier positive proposals of the USSR for peace and reduction of tensions. All the above contingent upon FRG renunciation of its nuclear weapons program.

5. Reassertion of the absolute unacceptability of the FRG nuclear weapons program to the USSR and all peace loving states.

The note ended with the comment that the FRG was "playing with fire and by fire they would be burned".

Strauss called for full support under NATO and implementation of "LIVE OAK" plans to relieve the Berlin blockade.

The move clearly divided world opinion. Some segments claimed that the USSR was obviously tearing up every rule in the book while others pointed to the limited nature of the blockade as evidence the Soviets had but one thing in mind -- the immediate halt of the nuclear arming of West Germany -- and that was reasonable.

There were increasing indications that the West was no more enchanted with the prospects of a nuclear armed Germany than were the Russians. The ECONOMIST, in London, glibly called for Wilson "to start laying the groundwork for a renewed shuttle bombing of Germany" . . . the headline to the article read, "History Repeats Itself . . . Et Tu Brute?" The publication was severely castigated in Parliament.

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In his May Day address in Moscow, Shelepin galvanized the Soviet people for action. He cited the text of a note from the Senate of West Berlin which refused to disavow the FRG nuclear program. He recognized that a considerable segment of the world reviled the prospect of a nuclear armed West Germany but pointed out the ineffectiveness of diplomatic approaches and emphasized that the USSR stood at the most significant crossroads of its history. He concluded his two-hour speech with a thinly veiled threat of direct action.

In immediate response to the speech, the US President transmitted, via the Washington-Moscow hot line, the message that the United States "would invoke its guarantees under the NATO Treaty" if the USSR intervened by force.

At 0730 on 5 May 1972, the USSR announced formally, via hot line links with the NATO countries, that it would mount a conventional attack against West German nuclear facilities in two hours. The declaration extended assurance that the USSR would seek no objective beyond "a narrow and surgical operation." The USSR stated that it recognized the risk that its actions might be misunderstood and was, therefore, issuing formal declarations of intent. The text concluded that "no operation to save the life of an individual or a nation is either painless or without risk."

At 0930, the USSR successfully executed conventional air strikes against ten critical FRG nuclear installations in a mountain redoubt in the West German military area. Ten Soviet aircraft were lost. In hot pursuit over East Germany, the FRG lost three interceptor aircraft, the US three aircraft, and the British one aircraft. Damage estimates to the plants indicated 50 to 60 per cent damage with recuperative time of six months. However, it was reported that some thirty covered trucks were observed leaving the installations prior to the strike. Unconfirmed reports indicated the trucks carried 20 to 40 nuclear weapons. The trucks have not been located.

In hastily summoned allied conferences, West German representatives urged an immediate retaliatory allied or FRG air strike against Soviet air bases in Germany. Allied support for such a move was totally lacking and several governments warned the FRG it was unacceptable.

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or
B-II-6 (Red)

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~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

France reacted to the Soviet "surgical operation" by saying it regretted Soviet resort to force and loss of life, and called for an immediate cease-fire and European conference to settle long-term security parameters. It added that major responsibility for the disaster must, however, be borne by the FRG which violated the international agreement with France.

Other NATO allies reacted similarly. The United Kingdom, which had long feared resurgent German military power without allied control, indicated that since West Germany had violated its solemn word to the WEU, and since the Soviet strike was a specific response to FRG provocation, it did not indicate a Soviet intention to commit aggression or to persist in incursion of this NATO treaty area. It was not therefore, a call for defense by the NATO allies. The UK did not consider the Soviet action to fall within the definition of an aggression calling for automatic NATO response.

Canada declared that its forces, both in Europe and at home, would maintain strict neutrality until further notice. Italy, the Benelux and Scandinavian allies announced that they accepted the concept of a conference to establish a framework of European security as a final settlement of World War II. All NATO powers, however, warned the USSR that they would continue to react under NATO principles to any further or continuing aggression across the "Iron Curtain".

The Senate of West Berlin predictably rejected Soviet approaches and blockade action and reiterated adherence to the FRG. West Germany was in a highly emotional state, with wild rumors rampant and fear of imminent war conflicting with resurgent nationalism. Strauss seemed able to maintain political control of the armed forces and supporting industry and called for full support under NATO.

It is apparent that an atmosphere of intense frustration and even despair is building up in West Germany. The apparent unwillingness of Germany's western allies to support German retaliatory action against the Soviets has created a cabinet crisis in Bonn and near-riot conditions in Munich and the Ruhr. The editorial tone of most of the German press appears to support the Strauss government's position and even liberal publications carry a note of isolation and great apprehension.

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or
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In Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces faced one another in an atmosphere of grim tension although non-FRG military aircraft and vehicles continued to move without interference between West Germany and Berlin. Civilian movement was completely blocked.

In response to a high-level request for reassessment of relative US/SU strategic power relationships, intelligence reported:

In the light of proven short-comings of the TALLINN system and newly refined test data regarding US hardened warheads, penaids and individually directed MIRVs, there is virtually no question but that the United States enjoys a major strategic nuclear advantage.

On the most conservative basis it is asserted that:

A first nuclear strike by the USSR would result in 30 to 50 million Soviet casualties and 20 to 30 million US casualties.

A first strike by the United States would result in 100 to 120 million Soviet casualties and 5 to 10 million US casualties.

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or
B-II-8 (Red)

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5a

WORKING PAPER

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

FROM CONTROL TO RED II

MESSAGE NO. 2

REFERENCE INITIAL RED AND
BLUE MESSAGES

MOVE NO. II

DTG 060930 May 72

Since early April, the Soviet Union and Communist China have been involved in a succession of minor border disputes along the border of Siberia and, within the last few days, along the border adjacent to Vladivostock and Korea. Intelligence reports that CPR initial operating capability, with long-range rockets, is expanding somewhat more rapidly than had been expected.

On the sixth of May, the Chinese fired two long-range missiles, the first over India into the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, and the second over Japan deep into the Pacific Ocean. Intelligence sources held that the Chinese ICBM inventory numbered 25 launch vehicles capable of 6000 nm range, 4000 pound payload and a CEP of less than 3.5 nm.

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Authority NLS 85-346

By ig, NARS, Date 12-9-86

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

B-II-9 (Red)

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WORKING PAPER

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

BETA II

5-8

FROM RED II TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. I

REFERENCE Initial Red II
Scenario

MOVE NO. II

DTG 251705 Apr 72

I. ESTIMATE

A. Military

1. Strategic. No politically useful superiority exists for either side. United States has superiority in delivery vehicles but not enough for first strike because:

a. It cannot eliminate our assured destruction retaliatory capability.

b. Its decision-making process makes first strike unlikely.

USSR cannot destroy US retaliatory capability.

2. ABM. Existing ABM deployment is irrelevant to issue. With four US and three Soviet cities protected, ABM does not affect retaliatory capability.

3. Conventional capability. USSR is superior on central front in Europe.

4. Trend. Trend of arms race is against USSR.

B. Political situation

1. Liabilities. USSR has suffered a series of defeats:

a. A communist state has been defeated in Vietnam.

b. A communist government has been overthrown in Cuba.

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By ing, NARS, Date 12-5-86

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

A-II-12 (RED)

Page 1 of 7 Pages

c. Soviet protege has been defeated in Middle East through initiating use of nuclear weapons.

d. Need to use troops in Rumania.

2. Assets

a. Demonstrated toughness -- 100 megaton bomb.

b. Troops used in Rumania.

c. Disarray in NATO -- France out of it.

d. World-wide fear of German nuclear rearmament.

C. German Issue

1. US will support FRG nuclear arms program up to but not including significant risks of nuclear warfare.

2. Bloc will seek closer ties with Moscow.

3. Most NATO countries will oppose nuclear weapons for FRG.

4. Situation presents opportunity to divide the West, unite the communist world and appeal to the uncommitted.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Reverse current trend of setbacks -- e.g., Southeast Asia, UAR-Israeli conflict, and FRG nuclear weapons program.

B. Restore cohesiveness of communist movement and improve USSR image among neutralists.

C. Stop FRG nuclear weapons program.

1. We have a fear of a nuclear armed FRG.

2. We see the issue having serious divisive effect on NATO and the West -- we should exploit.

3. Failure of USSR to stand on this issue will seriously erode Soviet position throughout communist movement in particular and in Eastern Europe. This is our Cuba.

D. Head off US seizing our 100 MT burst as excuse for embarking on test program.

III. STRATEGY

A. Employ a highly orchestrated scenario of offering conciliation and negotiation of the FRG arms program followed by a show of force. Entire series of moves is designed to focus on FRG and its program. Direct confrontation with US and NATO allies to be avoided. General moves as follows:

1. Bring strategic forces to full alert and forward deployment.

2. Diplomatic notes calling for W. Europe support to bring about stop to FRG program. Note to Senate of W. Berlin ~~calling~~ for it to disavow nuclear policy of W. Germany.

3. Impose blockade on civilian traffic to and from Berlin to minimize confrontation with US. Allow military traffic at administrative level.

4. Renewed efforts for negotiated end to FRG program.

5. Announce intent to pre-emptively destroy FRG nuclear facilities.

6. Drop conventional weapons on FRG nuclear facilities -- highly surgical.

7. Accelerate program of offensive weapons production and development in an attempt to maintain assured destruction capability in face of continued US ABM deployment.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. First step: Posture strategic forces worldwide, deploy the long-range air forces, deploy nuclear and other submarine forces, bring Warsaw Pact forces to maximum alert status, call up reserves and mobilize.

B. Second step: Send separate and differential diplomatic notes to the NATO countries, France, the US, West Germany and the Senate of West Berlin as follows:

1. France and NATO countries -- We note that the FRG is embarked on a nuclear program in violation of the obligations undertaken in connection with FRG participation in NATO and the 1954 agreement. The USSR views this as a grave threat to the peace and stability of Europe and the world. We hope that your government will take effective steps to prevent this provocative action on the part of the FRG. Note would also point out that if the FRG renounces nuclear weapons, the framework for European security will have been formed. Additionally, offers of discussions on technical cooperation, cultural exchanges, release of prisoners, etc.

2. US -- Cite FRG action and appeal to US as a major world power and fellow victor in World War II for cooperation and support in stabilizing the grave world situation through all possible means the renunciation by the FRG of its nuclear weapons program. Note to point out that we hope for a detente, but this requires US influence upon FRG. Offer to resumption of talks on negating deployment of ABM's and reaffirmation of limited test ban.

3. Senate of West Berlin -- Cite FRG action and ask senate to disassociate with this action on the part of the FRG.

4. FRG -- Cite FRG action and say insistence on this provocation course of action requires the USSR to consider appropriate actions to protect its national interests and security.

C. Third step: Blockade of Berlin

1. In separate notes to Berlin Senate and to the various interested nations announce that since Berlin has refused to disassociate itself from illegal FRG nuclear program, it has become necessary to impose a selective blockade of West Berlin. This blockade will not interfere with allied military access to Berlin at the rate which prevailed before the crisis. Civilian access will be cut off. Supplies necessary to prevent starvation, disease, etc. will be supplied by East Germany upon request from the Berlin Senate. The blockade will end either when Berlin disassociates itself from the FRG and its illegal nuclear program or the FRG gives up nuclear armament.

2. Worldwide propaganda relates the forthcoming move strictly to the FRG nuclear armament issue. After two days, institute blockade.

D. Fourth step: The USSR sends a message to all NATO nations and publishes it. The message contains the following points:

1. Profound regret that the NATO nations have failed to act effectively to stop the FRG nuclear weapons program.

2. Assurance of Soviet desire for a peaceful solution to the crisis.

3. Offer the following additional concrete proposals for reduction of tensions and preservation of peace; all contingent on an FRG renunciation of its program and safeguarded conversion to a peaceful nuclear program only.

a. Negotiations on mutual reduction of foreign troops stationed in the two Germanies.

b. Negotiations for expanded technical and cultural exchange programs.

c. Discussions of world food and population problems.

4. Call for a conference of NATO nations and France with the nations of Eastern Europe to reach agreement on the above and earlier positive proposals of the USSR for peace and reduction of tensions. All the above contingent upon FRG renunciation of its nuclear weapons program.

5. Reassertion of the absolute unacceptability of the FRG nuclear weapons program to the USSR and all peaceloving states.

6. Warning that unless satisfactory measures are taken and acceptable progress is made toward the elimination of the FRG nuclear weapons program, the USSR will be forced to take direct action to excise this cancer from the body of the FRG.

7. Assurance that the USSR would seek no objective beyond this narrow and precise surgical operation. That it recognizes the risk that its actions could be misunderstood and is, therefore, issuing this formal declaration. But that no operation to save the life of an individual or a nation is either painless or without risk.

8. The USSR hopes that surgery will not be necessary. The path to a peaceful solution, beneficial to all is open. But if it is not taken the responsibility for the consequences will lie upon the Western nations.

E. Fifth step: Selective iron bomb strikes to eliminate or seriously degrade the nuclear capability of the FRG.

1. Concept of operation: These strikes would be conducted on order of the highest Soviet political authority under conditions of maximum security. Objective of these strikes would be to damage these facilities to a degree that would make it obvious to all observers that the USSR is willing to take great risk to accomplish its objectives. Damage to other installations and civilians will be minimized, however, defense suppression necessary will be accomplished. Strikes will be accompanied by diplomatic notes along the lines of the next paragraph. Announcement of strikes will be made

to the press following successful accomplishment. The United States will be informed via MOLINK as soon as reaction by US forces to the strikes is no longer possible. Soviet forces will be at maximum alert to insure retaliation should the US reaction be to execute the SIOP.

2. Discussion of feasibility and details of tactics: Assuming that the target system to be attacked is scattered and consists of ten critical installations, individual sorties will be planned with maximum ECM support, attacks will be made at low level and sufficient sorties planned, based on defense analysis to insure success.

3. Diplomatic actions: All of the NATO countries and the neutrals would be informed of the discrete and limited nature of these strikes, stressing that the strikes are defensive in nature and limited in objectives to bring about the elimination of the FRG nuclear arsenal. Further, it would emphasize that the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions in Europe, and that every attempt will be made to solve the problem on the diplomatic level prior to ordering the strikes. The Soviet Union will give a formal pledge that it intends no territorial advance.

V. CONTINGENCIES

Reactions to contingencies provided in IV above.

SMK's notes from MOVE II, May 2
Wissman
Conter
Nagano
Wendt
Stuessel
Davis

20-40 devices

DECLASSIFIED

II

5-c

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 85-187

By sig NARA. Date 12-20-89

Kissinger: Situation

Big gap b/w I + II strike situation.

Both sides want to avoid I strike by other - & to escalate to point where I strike plausible. Black mail against Europe excellent. Also issue of nuc weapons for Ger places low threshold on acceptable carnage in US or West Europe.

^{Aspects}
We conclude we have intention - since US has opposed Ger nuc program & has been equivocal in exchange - Disarray in NATO - all disoriented from Ger. Berlin blockade working.

Liability. Strategy balance more unfavorable than we had thought. Germs have 20-40 devices. US may escalate an race.

China - We can handle - Some blackmail - doesn't affect Germs - Gives a possibility of common interest.

U.S.-

- ① May preempt
- ② Blackmail
- ③ Man call for debate

2

④ May withdraw from Europe

Will combine 2+3 with emphasis on 3.

Objectives:-

1. Neutralize US responses.
- 2. Stop FRG nuclear program
3. Exploit existing NATO disunity.

To U.S. Only FRG stands btm US-SSR + Detente.

To Europe:

Above + Separate Europe from US except if US precepts where Europe is a hostage

- I. Compensate military moves + offer of detente
- II. Clinch our game by fence to FRG + conciliatory to rest of world
- III. Back-peddle

Phase II:-

Political -

1. Note to US holding FRG responsible -
give up blockade of FRG give up program -
Major detente offers - US to help
get FRG to give up 20-40 atom bombs -
will meet anywhere anytime with US -
offer to send high level team to US -
No further administration talk.

2. Note to NATO: Similar -
Congratulates them on dissociation from FRG

Continuing considered -

US bombing of An Fields or convoy
to Berlin - We would take very
relaxed position & call on them
to cool US off, Some if demonstration
of US for nuclear weapons.

3. Note to FRG. If bombs destroyed, blockade
will be lifted - If not, will face full
consequences.

4. GDR appeals to SDP to form united front.

Maintain high level strategic posture.

If US sends a convoy, we let first
three & stop next. On stop point.
We believe France & probably ~~not~~ UK,
would not go ahead.

