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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
COLD WAR DIVISION

3 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. W. W. Rostow, White House

Subject: Final Report, BETA I & II-67 (U)

Forwarded is a copy of the Final Report of the senior-level, politico-military games, BETA I and II-67.

Additional copies of this report, the Game Documentation and the Fact Book are available upon request to this office. (OXford 5-3705 or 5-3715).

Thomas J. McDonald
THOMAS J. McDONALD
Colonel, USA
Chief, Cold War Division

Attachment
a/s

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BETA I & II - 67

FINAL REPORT

PREPARED BY

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

APRIL 1967

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BETA I AND II-67

25 APRIL - 16 MAY 1967

FINAL REPORT

Prepared by

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-2494-67
12 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PARTICIPANTS OF BETA I & II-67

SUBJECT: Final Report

Enclosed is a copy of the Final Report on the politico-military game, BETA I & II-67.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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BETA I & II-67

FINAL REPORT

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BETA I & II-67

FINAL REPORT

Foreword

This is the Final Report on BETA I & II-67, two senior-level, interagency, politico-military games conducted in the Pentagon during the period 25 April to 16 May 1967. The first volume, a Fact Book, was published prior to the game. A second volume, Game Documentation, contained the initial scenarios, team messages and scenario projections. This third volume includes a revised list of game participants, a transcript of the video-film summary and commentary of BETA I & II-67, post-Critique comments of the Game Director and several game participants, transcripts of the Senior Critique and extracts from the Action-level Critique.

The object of BETA I & II-67 was to examine some of the major issues, problems and questions associated with strategic weapons deployment, with particular emphasis on anti-ballistic missiles.

In addition to this report, a classified, documentary-type film summary of BETA I & II-67 is available upon request.

GAME SUMMARY

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BETA I & II-67

VIDEO TAPE SUMMARY

(Off-stage voice)

The following is SECRET -- Not for Foreign Dissemination. The material is hypothetical; based on two politico-military games conducted in the Pentagon between 25 April and 16 May 1967.

(BGen James D. Kemp, USAF, Chief, Joint War Games Agency)

BETA I & II were senior-level, interagency games intended to explore the subject of [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(5),(6)

The BETA I and II worlds were drastically different from one another in order to examine varied psychological and political implications. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(5),(6)

The technological and military assumptions, [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(5),(6)

In each game, one team represented the United States and another the Soviet Union. A single Control Group represented all other nations, fate, nature, and influencing factors.

Senior participants for BETA I and II included representatives of interested departments, agencies and commands and recognized authorities from the academic community.

Now, I would like to introduce our Game Director, Mr. Seymour Weiss, Director for Combined Policy, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.

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3.3(b)(5)(6)

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(Mr. Seymour Weiss, Department of State, Game Director)

Control attempted to limit its involvement to action which might logically have been taken by other countries and to insertion of other influences designed to keep the games moving forward. We tried hard not to pre-empt decisions of the teams themselves. Nevertheless, several critical injections were made by Control; hopefully, consistent with the philosophies and contingency guidance expressed to Control by the teams.

By its second move, BETA I depicted a situation in which the United States no




The game staff will now summarize BETA I and II.

SUMMARY OF BETA I

(LCol Walter S. Seadler, USAF, Game Staff Representative)

During 1967,



Although the Soviets did not respond formally, in the months that followed, intelligence appeared to bear out these assumptions.

3.3(b)(5)(6)

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3,3(6)(5)(6)

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The thaw in East/West relations continued as Soviet leaders cooperated in negotiations leading to a settlement in [REDACTED]

By 1970, the Institute of Strategic Studies in London appraised the relative US/Soviet position as one "of strategic parity". While the United States had greater numbers of [REDACTED] the Soviets had a monopoly on [REDACTED]

In late 1970, in the atmosphere of detente, [REDACTED]

In the United States, [REDACTED]

1971 marked the renewal of strained [REDACTED]

Also, in 1971, the [REDACTED]

3,3(6)(5)(6)

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3.3(b)(5), (6)

CASUALTY PROJECTIONS




FIGURE 1

In late 1971, [REDACTED]

On 21 April 1972, at [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(5), (6)

As the United States protested to Moscow, all rail and highway traffic from [redacted] was held up. On 22 April, a [redacted]

The next day, [redacted]

[redacted] The Americans pulled back and dug in.

During the night, the East German Army seized West Berlin in a lightning move. [redacted]

Within 24 hours, [redacted]

While condemning [redacted] actions, the [redacted] intentions.

The United States mobilized. Two American mechanized divisions were flown into [redacted] and fitted out with pre-stocked equipment.

At 0600 on 3 May 1972, [redacted] the Third US Armored Division launched an attack toward [redacted] -- were dropped northeast of that city.


Soviet and [redacted]

[redacted] were pinned down.



Meanwhile, [redacted] formally proposed a political settlement establishing [redacted] guaranteed by the [redacted]

The Secretary of State described the [redacted] proposal as impossible to consider under the circumstances. The Secretary of Defense announced plans for civil defense exercises including [redacted] to be started in two weeks.



Page A-7 sanitized in entirety.

3.3 (b)(5)(6)

The United States, with substantially reduced strategic forces, responded in kind.

SUMMARY OF BETA II

(LCol Ransom E. Barber, USA, Game Staff Representative)

BETA II also opened on 25 April 1972. Unlike the BETA I world, attempts in 1967 to forge an agreement regarding arms control had been unsuccessful.

The war in [redacted] escalated, with the United States imposing a naval quarantine. [redacted] opinion generally opposed US war policies but, in [redacted] there was relief that a US/Soviet rapprochement had been blocked by events [redacted]

In early 1968, the United States embarked on production and deployment of the [redacted] as evidence mounted that the Soviet Union was continuing to construct new, hardened

[redacted] Work continued in the United States on [redacted]

aids.

During the summer of 1968, hard-line elements in the Soviet Politburo accelerated development of MIRVs, depressed orbit ICBMs, [redacted]

Communist China came under new leadership with the death of Mao. Managers and technicians assumed positions at all levels of the hierarchy. The Chinese continued development of thermonuclear weapons and missiles.

In North America, the [redacted]

[redacted] of reference.

In response to the first test of an ICBM-delivered nuclear weapon by the Chinese Communists, [redacted] announced initiation of a nuclear weapons program.

[redacted] on the crest of increasing [redacted] demands for greater influence in [redacted]. He had a clear mandate to embark on a more independent foreign policy.

In an attempt to meet [redacted] and to placate the [redacted] without completely alienating the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to sponsor [redacted] staff echelon.

In early 1970, incontrovertible US intelligence indicated that the Soviet Union was committed to achieving strategic nuclear superiority. It also had been confirmed that the [redacted] complexes.

In the Middle East, [redacted] were being pressed with outside help.

Although [redacted] increased trade with both the Soviet Union and Red China, it continued its defense treaty with the United States and showed an interest in acquiring an [redacted]

[redacted] made secret advances to the United States for support in development of a [redacted] pointing out that there were nine members of the nuclear club and that [redacted] in a proliferating world.

Pages A-10 and A-11 sanitized in entirety.

3.3 (b)(5)(6)

3.3(b)(5), (6)

Other allies reacted along similar lines. The unwillingness of [redacted] allies to support retaliatory action against the Soviets created a cabinet crisis in [redacted] and near-riot conditions in [redacted]

Control informed both teams that a [redacted] by the Soviet Union would result in [redacted] US casualties, while in a [redacted] by the United States, American casualties could be held between [redacted] Soviet casualties in the event of a [redacted] were estimated between [redacted] and in a [redacted] between [redacted]

CASUALTY PROJECTIONS





FIGURE 3

3.3(b)(5), (6)

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3.3 (b)(5)(6)


3.3(b)(5)(6)



CONCLUSION

The following material was prepared by the Game Staff after the critiques of BETA I & II-67. It is based upon comments of participants during and following the game.


(Col Thomas J. McDonald, USA, Game Staff Representative)




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3.3(b)(5), (6)



(Commentator #2)



(Commentator #3)




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3.3(b)(5),(6)

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(Commentator #1)



(Commentator #2)




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
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3.3(b)(5), (6)

(Commentator #3)



(Commentator #1)



3.3(b)(5), (6)

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Mr. Seymour Weiss Department of State, Game Director)

As one of the participants said at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, contributed by so many knowledgeable and responsible people in the preparation and conduct of BETA, was well spent.

In addition to raising new questions, the very fact that this particular game, designed to assess the implications of alternative strategic postures on US national policy, was held, is in itself significant. In past crises, we have taken for granted the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States and accepted the fact that this superiority provided implicit support for US crisis management. We have not had to use games of this kind to look at the implications, for US and allied interests, of enemy high nuclear threat levels.

With the growth of Soviet strategic power, however, and the initiation of new defensive as well as offensive strategic systems, it behooves us to analyze possible politico-military effects of a relatively lessened US superiority upon our ability to maneuver successfully through the shoals of international crises.

BETA II was, also, significant in that it was the first attempt in such a game to consider implications of a Chinese nuclear threat against the United States. Though more a problem of future concern, recent events suggest the need for very careful analysis of the implications of this threat to US security and of the means at our disposal to neutralize it.

(Off-stage voice)

This briefing was prepared with the assistance of the Display Systems Branch, National Military Command System Support Center, the United States Air Force Television Center and the United States Navy Photographic Center.

The written Final Report of BETA I and II-67 includes full transcripts of both the Senior and Action-level Critiques, as well as post-Critique comments by a number of participants.

You are reminded that materials discussed in this presentation are classified SECRET -- Not for Foreign Dissemination.

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COMMENTARY

BETA I & II-67

GAME DIRECTOR'S COMMENTS

Two key policy issues which were surfaced during the final Critique of BETA I and II-67 seem worthy of reiteration in this report. These issues went beyond those projected during Control group discussions. Both are interesting and seem deserving of further consideration.

The first deals with attempts to strike a posture of strength when dealing from a position of weakness. The essential point here is that the Blue team, in part to demonstrate its resolve, and hopefully to communicate a warning to Red of its serious intent to resist Red transgressions, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Critique disclosed that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In part, as a result of the Blue actions, the Red players claimed they were influenced in their decision to [REDACTED] feeling that in view of the incautious Blue response, the danger existed of a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] even though this did not seem to be the most rational course of action for Blue to take. 3.3(b)(5),(6)

With the usual general caveats about avoiding overly-precise generalizations or conclusions from the game play, it is interesting to speculate upon the broader implication that might be implicit in this interchange of moves and motives connected therewith. As mentioned in the Critique, one is at least inclined to wonder whether apparent demonstration of resolve to escalate in the nuclear field, when attempted by an adversary manifestly inferior in its strategic capacity, carries the message intended. In one sense it might be argued that Blue did convey the message to Red that it, Blue, was prepared to go to very great lengths to protect its position. While surprised, and maybe even impressed with Blue's fortitude, the Red team, rather than being deterred from pursuing its own ends, escalated the play perhaps more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case.

This is not necessarily intended as an argument in support of the logic of either team's actions. In fact, it seems probable that in real life both teams would have been much

more cautious even though the stakes were high. Be that as it may, it does seem that there is an interesting strategic policy issue here which should be identified and which is worthy of further analysis.

The second item involves the relationship of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] In his concluding remarks at the Action-level Critique, one participant made a point which probably did not come out as sharply in the Senior Critique later in the day. To paraphrase those comments, he said he had had occasion to go back and look at [REDACTED] remarks the day after the [REDACTED] ended. The President had emphasized that the US public should not conclude from that particular crisis that the Soviets would back down in all circumstances. The President noted in particular that, in the [REDACTED] the United States had a distinct local military advantage and the issue of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The conclusion, as it applied to the game, was that the Blue team had perhaps in retrospect not accepted realistically the effect of the 1972 local superiority in [REDACTED] in relation to [REDACTED] which the Red team enjoyed, nor the fact that the issue of [REDACTED] had clearly been signalled as being of vital interest to the Soviet Union. The implications of his remarks were that a clearer recognition of these facts might have caused Blue to act more prudently.

This seems a rather significant reaction. The significance, perhaps relates to the fact that in the early 1960's and through the current period, US strategy in relation to [REDACTED] has accepted the existence of a Soviet local military superiority, but has relied upon a recognition by the Soviets of US willingness to employ its strategic superiority -- as a drastic last resort -- in order to protect the US vital interests in [REDACTED] In short, it is interesting to speculate on the significant relationship which on the face of it may exist between (i) the willingness of a nation to assert that it has a vital interest, thereby putting its prestige and international position on the line, and (ii) the military power which it feels it can bring to bear to prevail in the protection of that vital interest. While in retrospect this may appear to be perfectly self-evident, in view of the fact that the strategic balance has altered considerably since the early days of 1960 when US policy toward [REDACTED] was first formulated (although not nearly as drastically as portrayed in the BETA Game), one wonders

whether the efficacy of previous strategic assumptions and concepts in relation to [REDACTED] remain as valid today as they did when formulated. More broadly, as was brought out during the Critique, one wonders the extent to which, as a generality, the assertion of national vital interests is in fact a variable function of national power. If this is the case, how, if at all, is the changing US-USSR strategic balance affecting both our alleged vital interests and our ability to successfully back up our commitments in support of those interests?

[REDACTED]

SEYMOUR WEISS

Director for Combined Policy
Office of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

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GAME PARTICIPANTS' COMMENTS

The following comments were provided by BETA participants after the Action-level and Senior Critiques, conducted on 16 May 1967. Texts have been edited only to exclude duplicate material summarizing the games.

* * * * *

CONTROL TEAM MEMBER: " .. The following general observations flow from the game play and my analysis of it, as detailed in the remainder of this paper:

It turned out, surprisingly, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
phase of BETA II.

3.3(b)(5),(6)

In fact, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] age, it

[REDACTED] or
could it mean that the desperation of nuclear weakness produces blind spots?

3.3(b)(5),(6)

The teams tended to make their decisions rather simply, looking mainly at one or two factors and often neglecting the others. Systematic and full consideration of all factors was not the rule.

In BETA I, there was a fatal miscalculation by both sides of the others intent, culminating in a nuclear exchange which

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neither side wanted. There was also a difference in atmosphere; i.e., a feeling of tension for both teams in BETA I, contrasted with a more relaxed mood in BETA II.

[REDACTED]

The Soviet teams used psychological tools effectively in both games, but the US teams did not.

[REDACTED]

In searching for explanations of the unexpected results of both games, one factor might be the amount of time available to the teams. I could not help but think of the contrast between these games, where the senior teams spent a total of

[REDACTED]

These considerations suggest arranging the senior game sessions to get more discussion time, perhaps by playing the whole game in one full day.


A related matter is the amount of

[REDACTED]

These considerations point toward more crisis games for senior players, with a bit more time devoted to each"

In BETA I, play starts in 1972.

[REDACTED]



BETA I ends in an irrational cataclysm which neither side wanted nor intended. There are two major questions:

(1) Why did the

(2) Why did the

On the first question, it seemed to the US team that they must do something and there was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This really meant that they put such a high value on restoring the US image of strength and resolve that they were willing to take high risks to do it. The team explained this in terms of a better bargaining position, but prestige and reliability toward allies, probably also, played a role. One implicit factor may have been that team members were accustomed to the real 1967 world. [REDACTED]

-- which did not come about.

On the second question, regarding the Soviet imputation to the United States of an intent to attack, which in fact did not exist, the [REDACTED]

A strong

3.3(b)(5)(6)

minority in the Soviet team argued, on the other hand, that the [redacted] was not a signal of US intent to attack the Soviet Union and that, by carefully refraining from striking Soviet territory, the [redacted]

[redacted] it would have done so already.

Thus, the assessment of the US team agreed with that of the minority of the Soviet team -- [redacted]

[redacted] The final outcome is a cogent demonstration of how swiftly [redacted]

The [redacted] of BETA II was a striking case of victory, going to the weaker side, [redacted]

[redacted] responded vigorously. [redacted]

The interesting issue in the [redacted] phase was why the United States [redacted]

[redacted] There was a split in the US team on this: the majority felt that the [redacted]


3.3(b)(5)(6)

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3.3(b)(5), (6)

BLUE II TEAM MEMBER: I believe that the central problem running through BETA II was how the




In the final move of BETA II, the Blue team faced another major war



* * * * *

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: These games reaffirmed the fact, to me, that our strength overseas, both militarily and politically, stems only from the strength we have at home.



3.3(b)(5), (6)

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B-9

Insofar as the game itself and for future wargaming of this type, I believe that more intelligence should be given by Control. It became obvious to all of us that many of the actions that we took were based on no intelligence. I believe that some intelligence would have been available to both the Blue and Red teams which would have permitted us to take quite different actions than some of those which we found we had to take and that those actions would have averted the [REDACTED] which ended the exercise.

[REDACTED]

* * * * *

RED I TEAM MEMBER: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Red I concluded [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I believe this point is worth deeper exploration than was feasible at the Critique.

* * * * *

BLUE II TEAM MEMBER: BETA II proved rather unexpectedly stimulating, probably because the participants were well informed and gave the issues serious and enlightened consideration.

3.3(b)(5), (6)

There are, undoubtedly, many practical limitations affecting the playing of this sort of game. At the risk of underestimating them, may I suggest that longer consideration of initial moves would produce a more useful result. Should the allocation of two days for the first move, with only two moves to the game or should, somehow, circumscribing the first moves so that, in effect, the first two moves would be equivalent to BETA II's first move, be feasible, then increased familiarity with game procedures and more time to formulate positions might be conducive to deeper insights.

It seemed surprising, indeed, [REDACTED]

Finally, I thought that the introduction of [REDACTED] into the problem, led to a trivial third phase that provided little enlightenment on the grave issue of the effect of [REDACTED]

* * * * *

BLUE II TEAM MEMBER: I do not feel that the discussion at either Critique adequately answered the Director's question as to what effect having, or not having, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I believe that the majority of my team felt very comfortable and bold under the [REDACTED]

On the contrary, [REDACTED]


33(b)(5), (6)

[REDACTED] are very high. [REDACTED]

The Critique did not emphasize the degree to which the fact that a [REDACTED]

The games, also, impressed me with the fact that, once nuclear action was started, even on a low key, it would be very difficult to control or to prevent rapid escalation of the use of more nuclear weapons.


[REDACTED]




* * * * *

CONTROL DIRECTORATE MEMBER: I believe the team captain should be specifically instructed not to reflect his own feelings and interpretations into messages to Control. His doing so might result in a tendency to distort consensus.

At times, Control appeared to abandon all plausibility for dramatic impact value, which tends to distract from overall "realism" desired during game play.



* * * * *



3.3(b)(5), (6)

Page B-14 sanitized in entirety.

3.3 (b)(5)(6)

3.3(b)(5)(6)

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* * * * *

RED I TEAM MEMBER: I disagree with the statement that the
"Soviet team" by the prospect of



* * * * *

CONTROL DIRECTORATE MEMBER: Red I was playing chess
based on strategic superiority. Blue I, however, was playing

3.3(b)(5)(6)

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[REDACTED] As a result, Red I's chess strategy was stalemated, but in the process Blue lost the game of [REDACTED]

To the best of my knowledge, [REDACTED]

In retrospect, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] especially in Blue I's calculations.

Blue I's [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the Blue team had greater influence than the game "facts of life".


* * * * *

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: It was clear that the Blue I team [REDACTED]

Although the Blue I team [REDACTED] it believed in each move that it

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3.3 (b)(5)(6)



* * * * *

RED I TEAM MEMBER: The BETA I-67 game was both interesting and valuable. The caliber of the team members was very high and not the least of the benefits was meeting and working with people from other agencies. Following are a few of the specific points brought out in the debriefing session which may not have received enough emphasis:

The Red I team was constantly surprised by what we considered desperate moves by Blue I.


In the debriefing, the Red I team was characterized as taking



One of the objectives of the Red actions was to attempt to



While the distinction about the source of the weapons used by Blue I in their last move may have been artificial, there was, however, an important point. The Red I team




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* * * * *

RED I TEAM MEMBER: The space treaty does not present any legal barrier to the use, by the Soviets, of non-nuclear weapons or other measures against space devices which they (the Soviets) construe as offensive.



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[REDACTED]

The Soviets

cannot be concealed.

These adjustments

[REDACTED]

* * * * *

RED I TEAM OBSERVER: It would be helpful if a map were included in the scenario projections any time a geographic point or name is used. The scenarios, when read in offices and away from the JWGA wall maps, need the map references to complete the story. Reference is made to the types of maps included in the Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Bulletin.

I don't consider that enough attention, in the game or real life, is paid to the inherent dangers posed by "scavenger" nations. Even though they can only become

[REDACTED]


to counter them.

The potential power postures of Southern Hemisphere nations is another area which seems to be quite often neglected; for

instance, [REDACTED] with its expanding economy and strategic geographical position. It is realized that, in the time available, the entire world can't be played but the various facets can be considered for different games.


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RED I TEAM MEMBER: The Red I team perspective indicated that the BETA I game should alert us to the dangers actually inherent in the Berlin situation.



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* * * * *

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: It appeared very difficult for the seniors to orient to the game scenario in the short time during which they played. All players, naturally, approached the game, each day, from a "real world" environment, which tempers interpretation of the scenario. I suggest a longer period be allocated for the first move in such games. Perhaps, by carrying over action play to the morning of a second day and asking

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I enjoyed the opportunity to participate and I believe that I will continue to profit from the experience.

* * * * *

BLUE II ALTERNATE TEAM MEMBER: The results of BETA II imply that a "non-zero sum" game solution to conflict was achieved -- that is, [REDACTED]

I do not believe that the results imply that an [REDACTED] The multiplicity of reasons indicating the undesirability of, lack of necessity for, and risks associated with such a move -- given the particular situation -- would not, in all likelihood, have been offset by the [REDACTED] Aside from a relative [REDACTED] if necessary.

The game mechanism could, perhaps, be improved by attempts to better simulate each side's decision-making processes, as contrasted with better simulations of the scenarios, which

always profit from improvement, of course. In particular, the following techniques would have made me feel that the decision-making process was more "real" and, therefore, more meaningful:

a. Assigning "roles" to members of each side; for example, the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State and Defense, etc. This might involve establishing role relationships between senior and staff players as well.

b. Allowing a larger and more flexible utilization of time; for example, more total time in discussions but broken down into smaller segments more closely spaced.

* * * * *

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: The entire BETA exercise provided one of the most intellectually stimulating periods I have witnessed. It is remarkable that this participation and personal motivation could be induced in such a diverse group of players.


I am recommending that as many action officers as possible, in Air Force Plans, take advantage of the TV presentation, when it is available, and see for themselves how the best laid military plans can go differently than one anticipates.

* * * * *

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: For two decades, the question has been debated as to whether or not a



In BETA I, the use of



in BETA I was not intended as a device

to cause the other side to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] may also be plausible.

The play of BETA I highlighted several areas of great importance to the United States in the maintenance of its military and political posture in Europe. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

* * * * *

BLUE I TEAM MEMBER: In BETA I, the Blue team had as an objective, the negotiation of a new status for [REDACTED] and, if possible, the negotiation of a settlement to the entire [REDACTED] problem. However, the Blue team was convinced that meaningful negotiations could not take place until the moves [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had been redressed and the United States appeared to

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[redacted]
[redacted] Given the extremely favorable relatively casualty figures; plus the indications of US desperation, I feel the Soviet pre-emption was quite logical.

Also, on BETA I, casualty figures given to the Soviet team at the beginning of Move II, in the event of a Soviet first strike, assumed [redacted]

The following are some discussions that took place during the Red II deliberations:

a. In the first move, the Red team questioned whether the strategic advantage enjoyed by Blue II would restrict options available to the Kremlin. [redacted]

[redacted] Ergo, Red II did not expect the United States to [redacted]

b. Seniors of Red II questioned the efficacy of iron bombing [redacted]

c. Discussion arose, during the first move, as to which side was more prepared to accept casualties; the Soviets, because of [redacted]

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their conditioning by history -- [redacted]
or the United States because it doesn't know what it is to
see its [redacted] No agreement was reached.

d. In the second move, the Red team saw the opportunity
to hold [redacted] even though the United States held
a decided edge.

[redacted]

e. In the third move, there was considerable debate over
a Soviet act against [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] nation unless threatened directly by that nation.

f. In the third move, the Red II team discussed, at length,
the estimate of US actions. The team felt that the United
States [redacted]

[redacted]

g. Other debates among the Red II players addressed matters
of timing and the wording of notes. Some clever ideas fell
out of these discussions, [redacted]

[redacted]

In their second move message, Blue II stated, "If the Chinese
Communists [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] but reserved judgment

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[REDACTED]

(This was discussed in Critique).

[REDACTED]

There exists a strong [REDACTED] feeling, between the United States and the Soviet Union, while the possibility of war by miscalculation is very real. In fact, many Soviets would suggest that a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It is worthy of note that the Red II team planned [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(5), (c)

CRITIQUE

BETA I & II-67

SENIOR CRITIQUE

The following comments are extracts from the transcript of the Senior Critique of BETA I & II-67:

* * * * *

GENERAL KEMP: Mr. Secretary, Gentlemen, unfortunately we just received word that General Wheeler has been called to the White House. Unless he makes it late, we'll have to do without the Chairman this afternoon.

I want to welcome you to the Critique of BETA I & II. The interest and cooperation that we've had from all of your agencies, in preparation for the game, was certainly very much appreciated. The high-level of attendance and the high-spirited play we had during the course of the game should give us many interesting, thought-provoking questions to discuss here this afternoon. Before we start, I want to remind you the principle purpose of the game was consultative, to illuminate some of the major issues and problems, and to raise questions for us to delve into later. As usual, we hope that some new insights have been gained and that better perspectives have been suggested to the players. Without anything further, I'll turn it over to Colonel McDonald, Chief of the Cold War Division, for a few preliminary remarks before we turn it over to the Game Director.

COLONEL McDONALD: Gentlemen, in defense of the initial scenarios that provided the springboard for the exercises, I think we should say that basically it was an attempt to play a politico-military game and to examine subjects related to the ABM question in a political-military context. From the very beginning, we had no idea of playing a technological kind of game or doing the sort of thing that one does with operations analysis, or with war games, and I think this is an important distinction that we finally came fully to grips with in about the middle of the second move. In BETA I, the United States did not have an [REDACTED] and the Soviets did. In BETA II, we sought to convey the idea that the United States had a strategic advantage, including an effective [REDACTED]. While it might have been very nice if we could have had similar situations in both the games and only altered one

3.3 (b)(5)(6)

3.3(b)(5)(6)

or two parameters -- [REDACTED] -- we were not playing the operations research kind of game to arrive at definitive conclusions or specific answers. So, we played basically two different worlds.

The BETA I world and the BETA II world were drastically different and we hoped, thereby, to encompass as much peripheral material and related subject matter as we could. We initially established a situation of parity, except for the [REDACTED] in BETA I. We gave the United States a very marked strategic superiority in BETA II. However, in the very first Control projection, to keep the game from turning into a war game -- (it was beginning to look a little bit that way, with the concentration on weapon options, mixes and hardening detail) -- Control provided each team with some firm assumptions on comparative first strike casualty figures. These gave the US an inferior strategic situation in BETA I including the lack of an [REDACTED] and it gave the United States a definitely superior situation in BETA II, [REDACTED]

To head off detailed discussion here, of the military deployments behind those figures, it should be understood that they were only intended to represent the view the teams supposedly had of their own and of their opponent's posture. This was intended, and I think it was accepted as sort of a shorthand way, by the various participants -- however, lacking in realism -- to describe the relative strategic positions. The figures were not produced on the basis of a systems analysis although they were intended to represent the results of that kind of analysis.

Gentlemen, the security classification of the discussion this afternoon may not exceed TOP SECRET. The game was played at the SECRET level. There are TV cameras recording the discussion. Everything that is recorded will, of course, be transcribed without attribution and nothing that is said in the room will go outside with respect to anybody's opinion or position. With that, I'd like to introduce Mr. Seymour Weiss, the Director for Combined Policy in the Office of Political-Military Affairs of the Department of State, our Game Director.

MR. WEISS: Thank you very much Colonel McDonald. Gentlemen, I'd like to begin our critique this afternoon with very brief summaries of the two games. I think this will facilitate the understanding of those who played on BETA I of what the BETA II scenario involved and vice versa; this should help our subsequent discussion.

Before having these briefings, however, I would like to make one or two general introductory remarks. In this connection, may I first thank our distinguished group of consultants who participated on Control and on each of the teams, Professor Lincoln Bloomfield of MIT, Professor Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago, Professor Tom Schelling of Harvard, Dr. Joseph Coffey of the Bendix Corporation, Dr. Thomas Wolfe and Mr. Daniel Weiler of RAND. Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the Chairman's Staff Group, participated as a member of the Game Directorate and Mr. John Ausland, State Department Special Assistant to J-5, JCS, served as one of the Team Captains. In addition, Professor Henry Kissinger, Harvard, played a very active and constructive role in the game but, unfortunately, he is not able to be with us here today; he's in Czechoslovakia filling certain commitments that he had previously undertaken.

Secondly, as a general comment let me, if I may, say a word or two about Control's involvement in the game. Traditionally, Control is sort of fair game for all players -- my own participation on action teams, in the past, has certainly suggested this to me. I would say, however, in defense of the participation which Control attempted to inject into the game that we did, wherever we could, attempt to reserve our involvement and to limit the degree of manipulation in advancing the scenario. We, of course, did play third countries, a hand of fate, world opinion, etc., and though you may not have always recognized this to be the case, when you looked at the results of our handiwork, we really attempted to restrain ourselves -- to lean over backwards, not to pre-empt play of the game. Nevertheless, I'm sure you'll appreciate that in meshing the wide variety of considerations which the teams brought to bear, we had to decide, in certain circumstances, how you would have responded to situations where perhaps you gave us only general guidelines, or we otherwise had to inject aspects which were designed to keep the teams focused on the central consideration, namely the effect of the positive strategic balance, rather than permitting a drift to other important though relatively less central issues.

In this connection, for example, when the BETA II game seemed to focus more attention of both the Red and Blue teams on the issue of [REDACTED] for a national [REDACTED] rather than on the US/USSR confrontation, we took the liberty of injecting the [REDACTED]. We feel this was very profitable and we only regret that there was not more of an opportunity to have several moves on that game and to equip you with a [REDACTED] which could have played the game rather than Control.

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In any event, I must say that we all felt that all of the seniors took these interjections on our part in the spirit that they were intended, that is, as stimulants to the gaming of the strategic balance. We, of Control, are very grateful for your forbearance. Now, without more delay, I would like to ask for our two summary briefings. Cdr Benn, I believe you have the first one.

Summary of BETA I: See page A-2.

Summary of BETA II: See page A-8.

DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, with your permission, I would like to identify what we on Control thought were some of the more significant issues which were raised in the BETA I game. I hope you will address these, but I urge that you by no means limit yourself to consideration of the questions that we raise. Please raise whatever issues you deem to be of particular significance. I do suggest, however, as a means for proceeding in an orderly fashion, that we attempt to limit ourselves initially to the issues which are relevant to BETA I and then we will follow this by considering the issues relevant to BETA II. Let me then turn to the BETA I game.

The object of our game was to assess the effect of a given strategic balance on the teams' response in a particular political-military crisis situation and, more specifically, to assess the effect -- to the extent that this was possible -- of an [REDACTED] BETA I, I think, raises some interesting questions in the foregoing connection. First of all, in the face of what was intended to be a highly adverse strategic balance, the Blue team, nevertheless, resorted to the use of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Red team, enjoying the benefit of the aforementioned favorable strategic balance, responded to the Blue moves in kind -- that is, with the use of [REDACTED] the Red team was prepared to employ its [REDACTED]

I think it would be interesting to hear our senior players comment with regard to some of the following questions: First of all, what implications can be drawn from the Blue team's initial use of [REDACTED] To what extent, for example, does it indicate that when faced with a desperate situation in which other alternatives seemed most unacceptable -- in this particular game the alternatives which were considered by the Blue team as quite feasible would result in the probable

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political loss of Europe -- in those circumstances, are desperate means, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, more likely to be resorted to?

Secondly, to what extent did the Blue team concern itself with the probabilities of, and consequences of, escalation before using its [REDACTED]

Thirdly, with regard to the Red team, to what extent was it influenced in its willingness to take very vigorous and bold actions by its [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which appeared able to negate the Soviet [REDACTED] Would the fact that Blue had no way of [REDACTED] have made an important difference? I think this is one series of questions I'd like to come back to in just a moment. There is another area somewhat related.

[REDACTED] In a similar vein, Blue thought to improve its relative political bargaining position by employing [REDACTED]

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3.3(b)(5), (c)

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[redacted] precisely, did it expect to improve its position by this act? For example, did this imply a judgment on Blue's part that Red would not reply in kind; or alternatively, if Red were to reply in kind, how did Blue feel that its negotiating position would have been improved? In any event, it would be interesting to hear some comments as to the advantages which the Blue team felt an improved negotiating position might have derived for them in terms of the risks which they were prepared to accept.

[redacted]

In response to the actual contingency which it faced -- namely, [redacted] -- the Red team did choose to [redacted]. Now, again, I think there are a number of interesting questions. I wonder, for example, how the Red and Blue players assessed the [redacted]

[redacted]

I think this is, perhaps, sufficient to indicate the wide range of questions which the game seemed to us to illustrate.

I wonder, now, if we might return to the initial question -- namely, that which revolved around the initial use of [redacted]


[redacted] I wonder if we can have some comments on this question? I would just suggest that the Captain of the Blue Action Team might want to address himself to this.

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
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BLUE I: I can obviously speak only for myself which may well have been the case even during the game. I won't succumb to the temptation to fight this scenario and particularly the last move which some of us have grave doubts about; but for the sake of argument, and for the sake of discussing what did happen, I will stick to what happened in the game.

We understood clearly that the main purpose of this exercise was to push a simulated United States team to the wall to see what might happen in a world of shrinking options for the United States. I guess we gracefully fell into the hole that had been dug for us.




As a result of our estimate of the problem, we took a firm stand that reflected, first of all, the very American view of the moral nature of a political commitment and this permeated our entire position -- up to the point when we were about to abandon it -- I might add.



Now, the strategy we adopted, including the use of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We couldn't prevail

3.3(b)(5), (c)

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Now, on the third move, the lower half of the team, I am forced to say, [REDACTED] I'd like to suggest to the game managers that the installation of a hot-line in the basement might well have brought about a [REDACTED] If we had known what the Soviet moves were, during that move period, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I think, was the story of the game.

I would finish by expressing my own view that President [REDACTED]

I think the United States, in this game, tended to see negotiations as something that only takes place either when the enemy is defeated or when we are defeated, rather than as another means of achieving political victories, or stalemate, or buying time.

I think we misjudged and underestimated the use of diplomacy as part of our strategy and we failed to see that it is not

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exclusively a function of military power as Nasser, I think, proved in 1956 when he negotiated "flat-on-his-back" and won -- in a sense.

So far as the [redacted] the obvious answer to me is that if [redacted] the Russians would not have [redacted] I'm not persuaded of this, but I'm more impressed by [redacted] than I was four weeks ago.

DIRECTOR: Thank you very much. I'd like to hear from other members of the Blue team. Before we do this Dr. [redacted], you might want to just comment briefly on this point.

RED I: It's quite obvious to everyone that Red held most of the good cards in this game. I don't think that, in light of this situation, as structured, that the Reds behaved with any [redacted] On the contrary, I would make this point -- it was sort of necessary, as we went along, to constrain ourselves from really taking more ambitious bites than we actually did in light of the kind of situation in which we found ourselves -- which, if a good simulacrum upon reality, might give all of us a good cause for reflection.

I suppose the basic element, that underlay our position throughout, was the feeling that the United States was simply not in any position to exercise its strategic options and that the costs were so great that the United States was not likely to do this.

Second, the US local position in [redacted] both militarily and politically, was so poor that we had major advantages there, so that the real problems for us, in a sense, were problems of judgment, timing and just how far to push the Americans. There were two considerations in this respect, at least, that we faced from time to time. One was the feeling -- this was partly a function of the time frame the scenario gave us -- the feeling that from somewhere around 1974 on, the United States, [redacted]


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The second consideration was that we had little discussion about the irrational element in decision-making. I think we all felt that, on a rational calculus, the United States had no business behaving in the kind of way that, in fact, she did behave in this crisis. We were also aware that she had a great deal of prestige and position and much at stake and that she might act in a somewhat desperate way. I think that was one of the considerations that led us to kind of ease off from time to time.

Now, the obvious question is -- is this the behavior of Americans or is this good simulated Soviet behavior? I find it rather difficult to give a good answer to this question. I think that it's perhaps one of the most important questions that arise out of games like this and it underscores what, for me, is a lacuna in our knowledge. How does this Soviet decision-making process work and how, in circumstances like this, are the Soviets apt to respond? Every once in awhile, we had to ask ourselves, once we had made a decision, "Is that a Soviet decision or is that an American decision?"

That is the thing that is left with me after this game and I think, in my previous game experience, is probably the most important thing that has come through -- this necessity for us to somehow or other find a better way to get a handle on, not only the machinery of Soviet decision-making, but the spirit of it as well.

DIRECTOR: Thank you. I must say one of the interesting facts that impressed itself upon me, which seems to have emerged from the game and from this immediate exchange here, is this. The Blue team's



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In fact, in this game, the ultimate consequences of the Blue action was apparently to persuade the Reds that they ought to exercise their strategic option somewhat sooner than might otherwise have been the case. I wonder if we can hear from other members of the Blue team on this aspect? I know that you had a number of interesting observations during the time I sat in your group. I wonder if you'd like to comment?

BLUE I: Well, I might discount some of the comments that were made by our Chairman because I'm not sure that we went through all of the thought-process with which he credited us. (LAUGHTER) I must say that I didn't attend the first meeting. In looking at the scenario for the second, I almost didn't attend that either (LAUGHTER) because I think we found ourselves in a situation where we had a loss. The question was "what kind of loss?"

As far as my own thinking was concerned, I just had to refer back to the mission that had been given us. In the scenario it's very simply stated by the President that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (LAUGHTER). It put us, from the point of view of domestic psychology, in an almost impossible position with the type of reaction that you get from the United States public when some element of the US forces are in jeopardy. I think a combination of the two factors, the position in which the limited commitment the US force found itself on the Elbe, coupled with the fact that, if we were to restore Berlin, we had to make a very dramatic move in the context of the scenario, led me to propose that we use [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Would you care to comment on the extent to which your group explicitly focused on the probabilities of escalation and the extent to which this figured in your decision-making process? Perhaps your associates might want to join you.

BLUE I: [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: _____, did you want to comment on this?

BLUE I: _____ said, he didn't know whether the decision, the Red team took, was an American or Soviet decision. I think on our side, I don't know whether it's an American decision or a Blue decision. I have a hunch that if the 90-minute period we had, had been either 30 minutes longer, or 15 minutes shorter, we might have done something very differently. (LAUGHTER) I was almost persuaded by _____ to accept the diplomatic wisdom and prudence of a military man to take our losses and spend 10 years recovering the position, that had slipped away from us, by patience. In the last five minutes, having committed myself to the interest in some kind of nuclear activity, I went along with the proposal that, _____ I think that, if the group dynamics of the meeting had gone differently, we might have done very differently.

I'd like to emphasize what _____ said; "we did this with the _____ because we couldn't think of anything else to do that was active and military". We were confronted with the choice between accepting the loss of _____ and doing nothing -- what _____ referred to as negotiating from weakness, (I would have said there was nothing to negotiate) -- expecting that's all the Red team would go for, while wondering whether anything could be reconstructed out of _____ wondering what we would look like all around the world and suffering an enormous diplomatic and spiritual loss. Between that and doing something, we asked, "What can we do that isn't ridiculous?" What we ended up, perhaps, doing was one of the several possibilities, all of which were ridiculous.

In judging whether we were smart in thinking _____ posed the risk of wider escalation, so that the Red team should have "chickened out," and yet not too much risk could be wise to take; there is no way of telling that from the game. Either the use of _____ and was a mistake, or it doesn't lead to general thermonuclear war and, in retrospect, it doesn't look risky. If we want to end up saying; "it might have led to nuclear war, but didn't", it remains arguable. I think it's clear that what we did, with Blue and Red, if not Americans and Russians, could lead to something perfectly awful, which it did. Where the greatest blunder was made, I'm not sure. I suspect it was taking _____ before the game opened. (LAUGHTER) The GDR or the Russians surely wouldn't have taken _____ as they did, if they had known that, four weeks later, they were going to have to

3.3(b)(5), (c)

[REDACTED] So together, the scenario writers, the Blue team and the Red team blundered into a rather dreadful war and I think we should recognize the fact that, together, we've compounded an awful lot of mistakes.

Now, the question of whether our strategic inferiority led to the difficulty -- I should have thought that our strategic inferiority would have saved us from this enormous Red team act of misjudgment. They must have thought that we were with some likelihood going to [REDACTED]

I was glad to see that there was, at least, a minority on the Red team to perceive that we were either so [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Thank you [REDACTED].

BLUE I: I think there's a scenario paradox, actually, because in the seizure of [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] This tended, I think, to color our thinking a great deal. This was discussed perhaps more than any other single point.

DIRECTOR: Let me comment on that [REDACTED]. It somewhat surprised Control as well. I think it should be quite clear

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that this was an action which the Red team itself chose. They exclusively chose to inject their forces in the path of an anticipated Blue advance. One wonders whether that sort of action was related, at least in part, to a feeling of confidence that they had such an enormous strategic advantage that they could take very grave risks, feeling that the Blue team would have to back down. I just wanted to make it very clear that it was not a Control injection. I wonder if we can now ask the members of the Red team if they would like to comment on a number of these points?

RED I: I'd like to comment on the point that was made by _____, which I think is erroneous. Red was very concerned to try to keep the exchanges in _____



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BLUE I: We figured, I think, just the opposite.

DIRECTOR: Mr. _____, would you like to comment on that?

RED I: I'd like to make just three very brief comments. One of them directly relating to _____'s comment. First of all, I'd like to say that, as a Red team member, I think one of the things that impressed me, looking back at the game, is that I would have done the same thing all the way through without the _____

The second point I'd like to mention is that of the rationale for the minority position on the last decision, as to pre-empt or not. In the first place, I did not feel that it was necessary because Blue had chosen to react without attacking the Soviet Union itself and without bringing its own territory directly into play. This suggested that there was not any real danger of a Blue strategic _____

The third comment I'd like to just toss on the table is one of self-criticism for the Red team. I don't believe we ever came up with -- the fact is that we didn't really discuss very much -- what our answer might have been to one of the alternative Blue strategies which I heard referred to in passing as

something that perhaps you discussed. This was the idea of cutting your losses, drawing back at the line, not attempting to fight it out in [REDACTED]

which we in Red would not have had the resources to keep pace with and match.

Obviously, any game can't be played in all of the various alternative ways, but it would have been interesting, I think, to see how that kind of situation would have developed. Similarly, we had set as one of our objectives on keeping the United States from building up its [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] really provided any effective way of helping to bring that particular objective around.

DIRECTOR: Thank you very much _____, Dr. _____.

RED I: I'd like to make two comments; one which is partly a comment on _____'s point, and one which is a question imposed originally. Were our actions motivated by [REDACTED]

I think, in general, our actions were usually completely motivated, in a potential Soviet [REDACTED] In terms of talking about our [REDACTED]

Now, I can't completely agree with _____ on the fact that the [REDACTED]

It was in our message exactly

where we drew it; when they used [REDACTED]
I can't defend that particular point but it seemed like, if
it wasn't at that point, it would have been a little bit be-
yond that. We might as well do it!

DIRECTOR: Thank you very much for those interesting com-
ments. I wonder if we could ask for a clarification on one
point. The Blue team members have commented, [REDACTED], I
think, specifically, that the moves or the options which
seemed opened to Blue were [REDACTED] under the
best of circumstances [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as you saw it?

BLUE I: Well, I don't know that I'm in a good position to
comment on this because I tended to be in the minority all the
way through. (LAUGHTER).

BLUE I: We adopted all your positions. (LAUGHTER).

BLUE I: Except for one. First, I was a "dove" and then I
was a "hawk" in the sense that I was very dubious about going
[REDACTED]

Actually, you gave us a scenario that said that the seizure
of [REDACTED]
essentially; whereas, chances would have been very good, if we
developed it correctly, that we could have used this to bring
the alliance back together, possibly including the French.
Anyway, there were a few diplomatic possibilities.

In phase one, our diplomatic position was awfully stacked
against us, but the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in fact, this is the way it turned
out.


In phase two, we had no diplomatic position of any kind;
we were much worse off than we were at the beginning -- even

with that scenario. There we took a kind of half way action [REDACTED] Now, I understand from the Red side that you had made the decision that if we did that, you would have [REDACTED] We lose even with that decision which I don't think was a good Russian decision anyway. (LAUGHTER) We were going to do it, using the hot-line and everything else to announce our limited objectives, anyway. In the second phase, we were really on the run and the war was over unless we did something to try to redress the balance and play on the Soviet reluctance to go that last stage, particularly if we could have hoped that, somehow, we would have redressed the balance a little [REDACTED] In the end, I do think the Red decision to preempt, anyway, was one that likely wouldn't be made in the Kremlin. But, once committed on this track, then I think we never had a negotiating position, unless we had been willing really to go further than we did. Just using the tactical nuclear weapons to try to get into Berlin was not enough.

DIRECTOR: Those were interesting remarks. I wonder if we can get just a little further clarification on one of the points that you made, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I wonder if we can get some exchange between the Red and Blue members? _____?

[REDACTED]



BLUE I: As you said earlier, that even without the ABM superiority, we would have made the same decisions.

RED I: It was not because of the actual change of balance that would have been effected but what it would have seemed, in that case, to suggest as to Blue's intent. The fact that Blue was willing to take the



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DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, as much as I would like to permit this part of the conversation to continue, we really ought to turn to BETA II.

BLUE I: Let me ask you one question about the game. Did anybody ever consider making these contingency plans available to the other side? e.g., "If you do this to me, I'll do that to you."

DIRECTOR: Not as far as Control was concerned. There was, I think at one point, a suggestive leakage but it didn't materialize.

RED I: May I say about a minute and a half worth?

I think there were a couple of significant points on our side that have not been mentioned. First and foremost on

[REDACTED]

The reasons being, principally, that this would be an attack on Russian territory and that this would redress the principal element of our strategic superiority -- so, we had practically no argument on our actions. I don't quite understand how a "hot-line" would change that decision much either.

There are a couple of things that I think were left off. The first instance, we felt that, in the original situation in the scenario, the [REDACTED] was a tremendous step forward for us; world opinion within the communist world was behind us as it had not been for a long time. The second thing that consolidated world opinion against the United States was when they fired the [REDACTED]. A majority of us felt, I think, that there was an element of desperation there, that had to be watched, on the side of the United States. The biggest debate, I believe we had, was determining what was the threshold whereby we would [REDACTED]. We agreed, after a lot of discussion but without unanimous agreement, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Thank you.

BLUE I: May I make one more comment on this?

DIRECTOR: I'm going to have to ask that this be the last comment, however, on this game.

BLUE I: I think that it's important to recognize, the different players on these teams were motivated quite differently.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] me as a very important outcome of this game.

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Whereas, you had one team who would assess this as being significant and of very supreme importance, the other tended, in a way, to downgrade it completely. The other comment, I think, that comes out of the game and is very important, is the whole question of communication between teams. I think a lot of what happened, really would have been avoided, and the whole situation would have been resolved to both sides favor or a better solution than we had, if communication between the two sides had been improved.

DIRECTOR: Thank you very much. I'm sure we share a common frustration of not being able to go on further. There are certainly a number of very interesting areas we haven't touched on in the BETA I game. Let me, however, dive into the BETA II game and raise what, perhaps, was the central message that came across to Control and ask for some reactions to it.

In the second move message, the Blue team stated -- and here, if you'll permit me, I'll quote --



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BLUE II: I think when we actually got up against it, we had time to consider it more carefully than we had in the second move. In the second move, we were playing essentially a

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We did consider a lot more carefully in the third move.
[REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Dr. _____?

BLUE II: At least on that round.

DIRECTOR: Do you want to comment further on that line?

BLUE II: [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: In fact, there was a fairly extensive discussion in your group with a suggestion that a pre-emptive attack be made. Was there not?


BLUE II: There was. There was complete disarray within the group on what to do. I think we had one vote for each. We had six players and six different arguments.

DIRECTOR: I don't know whether anybody who played on that game would like to speak on the motivation which suggested that

a pre-emptive attack should be made. I'm sorry that _____ isn't here. I know that he participated in this discussion.

BLUE II: He was fierce!

BLUE II: They had the misfortune to have a politician on the team and I think that I reacted with a typical politician's reluctance to change the course of events. There was one part in the scenario of BETA II that did not impress me. I think the Russians are not bad politicians. My contact with them has impressed me that they have a pretty good understanding of human nature. In other words, in 1972, we were behind them, technically speaking, and by 1974 we might catch up. This would impel



BLUE II:



they would quit at this moment. I don't know why this point of view was never given a play, and of course, I don't know what the action group did do to this point of view after the senior group retired. _____ and I were a little hawkish here, and I think that this was for good reason.

DIRECTOR: _____

BLUE II: Each time we do something we get more committed and, therefore, are willing to stand more risk. The argument in the game wasn't: "Should we limit how far we are going to go if everything up to that point is unsuccessful?" The argument was: "How far do we go in the first step?" Mr. _____'s first step was really, in effect, more peaceful than anybody else proposed. He was going to send a message. The question was, what do we do with it at the next point? Some of us argued that we should go with it step-by-step. _____

DIRECTOR: Let me just carry this one step further but in a somewhat opposite direction and along the long line of Mr. _____'s comment. Control pretty heavily loaded the deck so that the Blue team would have been _____

Do you feel that, under the circumstances that existed, you would have opted for

a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or do you think you were determined that you would not repeat that particular approach to the solution of that problem? I know there was some discussion in your team on this, Mr. [REDACTED].

BLUE II: There was no discussion in the senior team of the possibility of [REDACTED] There was a brief discussion at the action level. Now, had you given us a better conventional situation, personally, [REDACTED]

BLUE II: You posed two questions; i.e., there might have been a conventional response, but it wouldn't have gone as far as fighting the whole war with [REDACTED]


DIRECTOR: I recognize that distinctly, Mr. [REDACTED].

CONTROL: I must say the teams really outstripped the expectations of Control because we surely felt that, if we did give them a [REDACTED] in this case they'd use it and that's the reason we made clear that it was not available. I think that it's apparent to everyone that the games can only test a very little bit, but there are many choices of context that you could select which would be relevant and I think the game is successful if we just end up with more questions than we started with. I suspect that this game is already marked by its success just in this way.

[REDACTED]

I think that the argument about the attack on [REDACTED] is an interesting one for several reasons: one, [REDACTED]

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Two alternatives that were examined in BETA II were, namely; how would we behave where our troops were at risk and could

[REDACTED] we expected some. There was a difference in behavior; I'm still not clear as to just why there wasn't a difference in behavior in those two circumstances. Surely we can conclude nothing about all of these others.

BLUE II: I don't remember seeing those contingencies!

DIRECTOR: I regret that we're not going to be able to satisfy the curiosity which, I think, all of us around the table have for these very interesting questions which raised. I'm reluctant to keep this distinguished group any longer, because we're beyond our allotted period of time.

I would simply make one final comment before turning this back to General Kemp. This was the first attempt that we've made, in these politico-military games, to assess the strategic inter-relationships. In itself, this may have some considerable relevance. This is to say, in past periods the overwhelming US strategic superiority has been taken for granted.

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We didn't have to have games, presumably, in order to see where they would come out. With the growth of the Soviet strategic forces, the current high-level of their offensive missile deployment, and their initiation of an [REDACTED] I would say that it clearly behooves us to analyze the possible political-military effects of a relatively lessened US superiority.

In the same vein, this is our first attempt to consider the implications of a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

GENERAL KEMP: Thank you. I'd like to leave with a couple of notes of caution. One, of course, is quite obvious. There were serious enough [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I think we all understand the problems in the inference of that situation.

We have not explored many of the problems that the Director mentioned at the start of the meeting. We will attempt, in the Joint War Games Agency, to highlight the problems which we have missed, as well as those that we have discussed here. We will give a great deal of study to them and present them in the Final Report and, also, in the film summaries that will be made. We expect these to be ready for viewing the latter part of June or July. We'll invite senior officials from your agencies to see these summaries, sometime in that time period.

In the absence of General Wheeler, I'd like to express my appreciation to Mr. Weiss for the action as Game Director, to all of the participants in the game, and particularly to the consultants that came in from out of town and, finally, to the three CINCs and their staffs (CINCNOAD, CINCSAC and CINCLANT) who participated throughout the game. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

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BETA I & II-67

ACTION-LEVEL CRITIQUE

The following comments are extracts from the transcript of the Action-level Critique of BETA I & II-67.

* * * * *

DIRECTOR: I wonder if we can turn to the question of the initial use of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I wonder if we may have some comments on this question just to kick it off? Perhaps the Captain of the Blue action-level team would like to give us the insights that he gained?

BLUE I: This is a form of Divine retribution for me because I've always managed to stay off teams and run Control Groups, thus doing everything I could to make life agonizing for American teams to see how far they could be pushed and how much we could make them sweat. For years I've tried, in my games, to force the teams over the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I think what you really want is a mood of self-criticism, particularly since our team was rather sharply divided. I don't know whether this can be said during the Senior Critique this afternoon, but I'm certainly going to say it this morning. (LAUGHTER). The Blue team wasn't divided vertically; it was divided horizontally. Maybe you can advise me how to handle that statement this afternoon.




Now, without fighting the scenario or fighting Control, I guess the only technical question about the game, before I make any further comments, is: "Would the Soviet team have [REDACTED] to make a fourth move, so to speak, instead of having Control make it for them?" I'm not sure that question is worth too much discussion. We should assume that the Soviet team would have [REDACTED] otherwise there's nothing to discuss -- Blue would have won. Assuming that Red would have [REDACTED] then, let me address myself briefly, and others can comment, as to what happened in fact.


The United States took the



Why the Red team didn't follow their own doctrine in this matter, I'll never know.

DIRECTOR: Yes, you will! (LAUGHTER).

BLUE I: Given this general move, which we had and which was the basis for our positions, we took a very firm stand on the  which reflected three things: First, a very American sense of the moral nature of our political commitments and, I think, this is as important as the strategic exchange ratio in the American view of things. Secondly, confidence, as I've just explained, that the Soviets would remain deterred from any calculation of, or deliberate launching of, a  the Soviet Union and the United States  -- we were wrong about that.



I think, in reading their messages, that they were trying to play a rather low posture strategy, once they grabbed what they set out to grab, but we wouldn't get down to low posture with them.

I don't think we were wrong because, rationally, the Soviets took a completely different view of the situation. I

think our strategy failed because both sides mis-perceived or misunderstood the nature of the particular moves

as it were, that I quarreled with a moment ago.

So far as the first use was concerned, the United States team preferred

That was a long road.

We almost

I then went back and read what

Perhaps I'll stop here but


DIRECTOR: Thank you very much for your very provocative comments. I'm sure they will stimulate a number of thoughts but I think we ought to give the other team a crack back at you. Go ahead, Red I.

RED I: I should observe at the beginning that, since I wasn't on hand for the last move, I'm going to have to call on whoever was Captain of our team, during that period, to fill you in on why Red I went to the automatic pre-emptive strategic attack.


Let me say to the earlier points that, throughout the game, the

Isn't that correct?

Underlining the selection of our strategy, we were really very much surprised that the United States didn't adopt the strategy of We




RED I: To begin with, there was a difference of opinion, as you noticed from our Red moves. There were those who felt that we did not have to use pre-emptive action at this stage of the game; however, generally, I think we felt that, when





DIRECTOR: I think that's interesting. Could you amplify on just one point? You said that you thought the Red team had a general feeling of confidence from its ABM protection, as portrayed in the scenario. Did you discuss that protection as distinct from the overall strategic advantage you were given?

RED I: Yes, we had quite a discussion about the



In this, I believe, I reflect the opinions of most of the team members.

RED I: I want to comment on an




The point made by the Seniors was that we would needlessly

people.


expose ourselves to a possible failure. Our original proposal was for a much wider demonstration and, of course, on that basis you had a great deal more to lose than you had to gain. We felt we could stage the demonstration with Warsaw Pact observers in a number of ways so that we wouldn't expose ourselves to any particular risk and still gain the benefits of the political exploitative method.

DIRECTOR: One of my colleagues has a comment.


DIRECTORATE: In this connection, I noted that one of your




RED I: The ground rule, under which we worked, was that we had warning of the



Maybe that was the wrong ground rule.





DIRECTORATE: That isn't really an



were thought to be degraded by the "Reds".

DIRECTORATE: That was already in consideration, in weighing the difference between a



 My impression, and I'm not going to argue the

point because it is somewhat debatable. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This did not have any apparent effect on the Soviet decision to retaliate. I find it a bit difficult to reconcile this, in consideration of the emphasis which the Red team has suggested was given to the effectiveness of their [REDACTED]

RED I: I think we were constrained here, to some extent by the fact that the [REDACTED] was not affected by this particular play of the game, which means somewhat later.

DIRECTOR: This could be the influence of Control. It is an interesting point; however. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I'm sorry, but I didn't get any insights as I wasn't able to sit in on both teams simultaneously, but I don't know how you felt. I wonder if we could just have an exchange on the significance of that question?

RED I: I think the significance is that the attack on the [REDACTED]

BLUE I: This is referring to the question of the attack on [REDACTED]

RED I: I know, but I'm relating that to an attack from, as opposed to the [REDACTED] those two cases.

BLUE I: I think the issue probably is whether the strategic calculations were wrong or whether the political calculations were wrong. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In that case, your military

moves would be very different. [REDACTED]

RED I: I think, seriously, if you had done what you indicated. If you had changed the [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: I think that's an important point. Do you want to comment on this?

DIRECTORATE: I really think that the strategic calculation has to be made more precisely and I think Mr. [REDACTED] is quite right. [REDACTED]

RED I: I think we also felt that it was very difficult to distinguish a pre-emptive attack from an [REDACTED]


BLUE I: We were going to phone you! (LAUGHTER).

DIRECTOR: Mr. [REDACTED], did you want to comment on this?

BLUE I: I would like to comment on another point to bring out another debate which really lay underneath our difference in views within the Blue group. First of all, I think the strategic inferiority permeated our whole thinking. We clearly understood that we were in an inferior position and, at least through the first two moves, our principal objective was to try to get ourselves into a better bargaining position.


The strategy of diplomacy really predominated in our first two moves. During the first move, there was one member, and

only one member of the team, that wanted to use




that third move. when we got to

DIRECTOR: Let me just clarify one point here. It was clear that the Blue team resorted to the use of a



I wonder if any of the Blue team members would comment?

BLUE I: This wasn't very fully developed but, I think, one viewpoint envisaged two possibilities. One was that this



Even at that point, it seemed a better negotiating position than we were in at the end of

Move II. We felt that both sides would want to call a halt and there would be just as much pressure on the Soviets, to call a halt, as there would be on us. What we didn't envision was the Red response that actually occurred.

DIRECTOR: Col _____?

BLUE I: I think it's important that not only were we feeling inferior in our strategic posture but it was a basic underlying assumption that, once in this inferior position, we would not be able to catch up. There was nothing to be gained by procrastination.

DIRECTOR: You mean within the emergency period as distinguished from the longer term.

BLUE I: No, I mean in the longer term. We saw no advantage in having a war two years later.


DIRECTOR: That's interesting because we perceived it exactly the opposite.

RED I: I think, perhaps, we've exaggerated the importance of



RED I: I think we underestimated the Blue moves every time.

BLUE I: Incidentally, on that point, one of the things we noted on the Blue team was that there wasn't any marked advantage to Red therefore,



DIRECTORATE: I think it should be brought out that there's quite a difference between BETA I and BETA II in this respect.

The sudden discovery, in both cases, that the [REDACTED] better than it appeared was dictated by the fact that Control noticed it in two scenarios in BETA I and BETA II. In one case, only Red had it and in the other case both had it. In neither case is it effective at all. It is a little hard to see, then, how you were going to test the consequences of the [REDACTED]. The assumption was, therefore, made in both games and both scenarios that the [REDACTED] but it meant something quite different in BETA I. It was not really terribly effective and [REDACTED]

RED I: We tended to take the higher ends of the uncertainties as the possible outcome.

DIRECTOR: I think the point that the Red player just made is very significant. As I understand it, you said you were surprised by the aggressiveness of the Blue move at each stage of the game. Now, partly, this was intended by Blue. [REDACTED]

I'm not sure that's necessarily the conclusion to be derived, but it's certainly one of the implications.


RED I: One point, alluded to several times, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] until the final move.


RED I: I not only think that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For three


straight moves, it seemed to us, the



DIRECTORATE: I think this is a related comment. It seemed to me that, from both the course of play and specifically from what has been said here, that each side tended to act under the impression that




BLUE I: I don't think it quite worked like that. The scene was viewed in two very different arenas by the Blue team. I think.




This is all the United


States thought it had, in terms of the consensus that the Blue team reached. I tried to suggest, before, that I'm not convinced of that myself in retrospect.



DIRECTOR: I wish we had more time to examine that question and other issues but, perhaps, that can come up in our afternoon session. I do want to exercise my prerogative as Director to make just one last comment on BETA I then switch our attention to BETA II. This goes back to something a Blue I member said, in his initial comments, which struck me rather forcefully, having been rather directly involved, as I was, in helping to pull together the



I hope you'll make your point again, during the Senior Critique, and if you do, I'll promise to make mine again, because this afternoon we'll have some of the Seniors who were deeply involved in the game and to whom I was reporting at the time we were



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DIRECTOR: Perhaps, just for a point of departure in BETA II, could we have some comment on the reasons why Blue chose not.

I wonder whether the Blue team would like to comment on its point of view?

BLUE II:

DIRECTORATE: On Control, we just heard summaries of the discussions the Blue team was having and there were two changes really.


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DIRECTOR: Let me come back to you in one second. There was a related comment from the other side of the room.

BLUE II: I was on the third move and, in some sense, your questions are inseparable. I think I can say something, at least.



DIRECTOR: [REDACTED]

BLUE II: Well, before we could answer that question, we'd have to go down the list of other US interests.

DIRECTOR: You didn't discuss this with your group though?

BLUE II: No, we started to discuss it but, of course, in this situation you can say [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Would anybody else like to comment on this?

BLUE II: I'd like to second the position that we felt the situation, [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: I wonder if members of the team would just speculate a bit about the next move. As I recall it, your [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I'm not sure whether this cuts across the question that was originally posed.

BLUE II: I'd like to take a crack at that to get things a little bit in balance from what's been said so far, if you'll pardon my saying so. For one, I don't think the Blue team ever, very seriously, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I think, also, the main body of the opinion on the team reflected the view that, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Do you want to comment on that?

DIRECTORATE: The last comment, really, is relative only to whether Blue pondered the move they said and not whether they made it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I'd be interested in a comment though on this fact:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I'm curious about that.

DIRECTOR: That's a good question. Do you want to take a crack at that?

BLUE II: I can't talk in detail about what someone else has said.

DIRECTOR: Well, I think you can put the general question though, individually, without speaking for others. Do you feel that you would have been inhibited in that situation [REDACTED] I think, in the simplest terms, is the essence of the question.

DIRECTORATE: [REDACTED]

BLUE II: [REDACTED]

DIRECTORATE: [REDACTED]

BLUE II: That is, certainty of their responding. As you know, the definition of pre-emption means that you expect, in high probability, [REDACTED]

DIRECTORATE: [REDACTED]

CONTROL: I'd like to ask the Blue team a few questions. In your contingency move, Move II, what casualties did you really assess the United States would have?

BLUE II: I think this is the answer to both your question and the previous question. It's a little hard to compare Move II and Move III [REDACTED]

CONTROL: [REDACTED]


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BLUE II: That's quite right.


RED II: I was fascinated at the extent to which the teams had been thinking differently.

I'd like to ask the Blue team a question and that is:



DIRECTOR: May I ask for some fairly brief responses? We're beginning to run over our allotted time and I don't want to keep you all too much longer, although there are many other interesting questions.

RED II: I think it's interesting to note the difference in the way




The US team, on the other hand, thought that what had

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just happened in Europe was the reason/



DIRECTOR: That's interesting. We have time for one more brief question.

DIRECTORATE: At the risk of flogging our already staggering horse, may I ask a related question and, perhaps, we can even answer it by a show of hands, which is the quickest and least subjective?




Would you raise your hands?

BLUE II: I don't think there's anybody. (LAUGHTER)


DIRECTORATE: How many would not have changed their opinion of the undesirability of a pre-emptive attack even if you had a better ABM system?

BLUE II: I don't think the ABM system has the slightest effect on our decision.


DIRECTORATE: Some of you, for reasons of the positions of your Agency, find it hard to accept the hypothesis of an



BLUE II: What do you mean by



DIRECTORATE: I mean, what Mr. McNamara puts in the posture statement as



BLUE II: No. Give me a number!

DIRECTORATE: That's it, it's on the order of either nothing [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Now, suppose they were your expectation in one case; and in the other case, it was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Now, would that have any effect, at all, on your decision [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: I see different shakings of heads.

BLUE II: I personally would still have made a [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: We're going to be in a position to further explore some of these questions this afternoon with the Seniors. I hope a good number of these same questions will come up for additional discussion. It is perfectly obvious that we can only scratch the surface in the time available to us this morning.

I would like to make one final comment, though, before turning this meeting back to General Kemp. I think there was, maybe, some significance to be drawn from the fact that this is the first game, as far as I am aware, in which we have attempted to game the affect of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In the same vein, I think this was the first attempt to consider the implications [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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In any event, I'm sure all of us could submit variables to both games, to those that Control played around with, and perhaps we can have additional games to examine some of these. Now, let me turn this meeting back to General Kemp.

GENERAL KEMP: First, gentlemen, at the risk of running into the problem of definitions, I'd like [redacted] and express his appreciation, as well as my own, for the participation of those people who might not be here this afternoon.

I'd like, also, to say that, obviously, we're going to end up this afternoon with a great number of unanswered and undiscussed questions. Along those lines, I hope that our review of the game and the final video presentation, plus the Final Report, will consider many of these items and I'd like to urge again that all of you take a look at our video presentation; probably in late June or sometime in July. Tom, do you have anything else to add?

COLONEL McDONALD: Just a reminder that those pieces of paper in front of you are intended for your use in writing down the other thoughts that remain in your mind right now. I believe we'll put them into the Final Report.

DIRECTOR: Thank you all very much.

GENERAL KEMP: Thank you, gentlemen.

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The BETA - 67 games were prepared and conducted under the supervision of Colonel Thomas J. McDonald, USA, Chief, Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with extensive assistance from many personnel of the participating agencies and commands. The Project Officer was Lt Col Lyle E. Mann, USAF, Member, Politico-Military Branch, CWD.

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
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