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SIGMA I-66

GAME DOCUMENTATION

PREPARED BY

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEPTEMBER 1966

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SIGMA I - 66

12-27 September 1966

GAME DOCUMENTATION

Prepared by

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SIGMA I-66

GAME DOCUMENTATION

Foreword

This volume comprises the second volume of documentation for SIGMA I-66, a senior-level, interagency, politico-military game conducted in the Pentagon during the period 13 to 22 September 1966. The first volume, a Fact Book, was published prior to the game. The Final Report of SIGMA I-66 containing a Game Summary, a Commentary and a transcript of the Critique has been published as the third volume. A documentary-type, video-film summary of SIGMA I-66 is available for selective presentation on request.

The object of SIGMA I-66 was to examine some of the major issues, problems and questions associated with a de-escalation of the war in Vietnam.

The teams in SIGMA I-66 represented the United States (Blue), Republic of South Vietnam (Green), National Liberation Front (Black), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Brown), Peoples' Republic of China (Yellow), and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Red). A Control Group (White) represented other countries, fate, nature, and internal dissidents.

This documentation consists of six different initial scenarios, team move messages and scenario projections by Control.

SIGMA I - 66

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SIGMA I-66
INITIAL SCENARIO

The Scenarios for SIGMA I-66 are not intended to suggest that de-escalation of the war in SEA is either desirable or likely. These are aimed at illuminating some of the problems and opportunities which may be associated with moves toward a reduced level of hostilities. They are entirely hypothetical.

INITIAL BLUE SCENARIO

THE UNITED STATES

13 September 1967

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON: The last year has seen major allied military successes, escalation of the air war and persistent political and social frustration in Vietnam. On 9 September, the President prepared a major message which has been personally carried to Moscow by Ambassador Harriman.

No answer has been received as yet from the Russians, but during the last several hours a secret message from Ho Chi Minh, relayed to the White House by President deGaulle, has announced North Vietnam's unilateral decision to halt hostilities. Ho demands reciprocal action by the United States.

In Vietnam, American, RVN and other Free World regular forces exceed 800,000 men aggressively carrying the war to the enemy. Diseased, tired, and hungry -- morale among the Viet Cong is low. South Vietnamese and Northerner, regular and guerrilla, the enemy's troops are all weary. Recruiting has become coercion; volunteers include thirteen year olds. Desertions have increased, and thousands of dispirited people seek sanctuary through Saigon's "Open Arms Program". Allied forces continue massive air and ground blows -- pouring tons of bombs on suspected VC/NVN sanctuaries, launching swift, murderous assaults on communist forces wherever they concentrate, but South Vietnamese desertions continue to be higher than those of the enemy.

The Viet Cong seek to avoid spoiling engagements, to elude US search and destroy forces and concentrate their efforts on securing support of the civil population. United States air losses are mounting sharply as industrial targets around Hanoi and Haiphong are taken out.

BACKGROUND EVENTS: Encouraged by results of the September 1966 elections in SVN, US hopes for resolution of the conflict began to rise. Despite VC terror and Buddhist opposition, the 80% turn-out exceeded most predictions and provided a wide spectrum of representation in the Constituent Assembly. That body went deliberately to work framing a new constitution for the war-ravaged country.

Prior to the US elections, a prominent opposition spokesman stated, "The recent elections in SVN indicate popular support for the war. The time has now arrived to achieve decisive military victory even if it requires escalation of our efforts. After the enemy has been defeated, we can devote our tremendous resources to social and economic development in Asia -- unhindered by VC terror".

Counter-arguments centered on the need for immediately dealing with real social and political ills in South Vietnam but the Congressional elections of November 1966 reflected substantial gains by the "Hawks".

In October, the United Nations General Assembly voted to seat Red China. Before the issue reached the Security Council, Peiping refused membership declaring that the UN was a tool of Washington and Moscow, and that it would not participate in an organization which recognized the "so-called Chinese government on Formosa".

As the Southwest Monsoon ended, allied search and destroy operations were accelerated in the highlands in operations characterized by NVN reluctance to engage. Superior American mobility kept communist units off balance and on the defensive despite increased NVN infiltration from the north.

Efforts to launch a really effective program of Revolutionary Development in South Vietnam received high-level backing and major ARVN units were shifted to pacification of areas which had already been cleared of the enemy.

Even as Australian units achieved new successes on the battlefield, anti-war pressures were mounting in Canberra. The Australian elections resulted in a narrow Liberal Party victory and reinforced Labour's efforts to restrict Australian contribution to the war.

During December, as the Ky Directorate and the newly elected Assembly sought to cope with mounting problems of inflation, economic dislocation and an inept bureaucracy at all levels, civil dissatisfaction kept pace with rising costs. Price riots wracked Saigon, Danang, and Hue.

As the year ended, the arrival of a Soviet mission in Hanoi led by Kosygin and Colonel General Uvarov (Anti-Aircraft Missile Troop Commander) created speculation that more sophisticated Soviet missiles and radar would soon be used to counter American air blows. Voices were raised in the American Congress and press expressing fear that these developments would lead to a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. A prominent commentator pointed out that time to achieve a settlement was rapidly running out.

In January and February, torrential rains swept the Red River Delta wiping out half of NVN's rice crop. The accompanying lack of visibility cut sharply into American visual reconnaissance capabilities and the renewal of good flying weather saw a large increase in US air losses.

Hanoi propaganda broadcasts alleged that the chief reason for flooding in NVN was American bombings, an assertion quickly denied by the Department of State.

It was obvious that Hanoi had taken advantage of bad weather to introduce improved Soviet missile and radar equipment around Hai Phong and Hanoi. A perceptible increase in NVN infiltration during January and captured documents indicated elements of three NVN divisions were moving south of the 17th parallel.

The Indian five-year elections in February gave Mrs. Gandhi the narrowest of victories, demonstrating the strength of factions alienated by her pro-American policies. Also, in February, the British Defense White Paper announced major cuts in British forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

In March 1967 elections were conducted throughout SVN under the new constitution. A government modeled on the style of the French Fifth Republic with a strong president and popular assembly emerged. General Ky surrendered his position as Premier but continued as commander of the air force. The new President, Dr. Dang Van Sung, assumed his responsibilities amid an air of optimism that greater impetus would now be put behind the Revolutionary Development Program. Inexperienced administrators, a lack of technically qualified personnel, and the inherent problems of managing an administration which had been drastically changed ten times in a few years compounded the problem. VC terrorism and pressure continued even in areas close to Saigon, and there were some who felt the problem of governing the country to be insoluble.

In March, American military operations reached a new peak, both in South Vietnam and in the air over North Vietnam. The Americans initiated offensive operations with the 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions in the Delta, during which a battalion of the newly arrived US 9th Division was hit in the bloodiest ambush of the war. By month's end, however, the VC/NVN sustained over 2,500 dead and twice this number of wounded in American attacks at Tuy Hoa, Quang Tri and Vinh Long.

By April, over 500,000 American troops were operating in South Vietnam and the air offensive in the north had been expanded to include all railroad marshalling yards except those in urban centers. NVN infiltration into SVN had kept pace, however, and in April, a major attack was conducted against the base at Cam Ranh Bay, killing 325 US personnel, destroying masses of supplies, sinking both a tanker and an ammunition ship; smashing a De Long Pier.

As the weather improved the numbers of US air sorties continued to increase and on May Day, North Vietnamese MIGs took to the air in what appeared to be an all out challenge. In two days of heavy fighting the US lost 20 aircraft. United States aircraft retaliated with massive fighter-bomber strikes against NVN airfields destroying 30 MIGs on the ground -- literally wiping out North Vietnam's air Capability.

At the same time US/SVN elements employed naval gunfire against coastal radar sites and launched a marine commando raid against Tiger Island returning with captured components of a Soviet TALL KING radar.

June brought grim reminders of problems elsewhere in Asia. Sabotage at Clark Field in the Philippines reflected growing Huk strength in that country. In Thailand a mortar attack by elements of the "Thailand Patriotic Front", severely damaging the US supply depot at Korat and the air base at Udorn. This led to retaliatory US air strikes against North Vietnamese hydroelectric plants at Thac Ba and Ban Thac. Soon afterwards, the Air Force was authorized to reduce the dimensions of areas restricted from air attack in the vicinity of major North Vietnamese urban centers.

Concurrent with exposure of a major black-market scandal in Saigon, involving prominent government officials, and a rash of Buddhist inspired demonstrations during July, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units massed to a multi-division attack near Hue aimed at cutting South Vietnam across the neck.

This appeared to be a major offensive.

Assisted by sudden clearing in the weather, US Marine, Army, Air and Naval forces, including Guam-based B-52s dealt Giap's forces a crushing defeat. Over 1000 prisoners were taken in a week-long battle. The enemy left wounded as well as dead in a pell-mell retreat toward the Laotian border.

In Washington, announcing the military victory, the Secretary of Defense hinted strongly that the US force buildup in Vietnam had reached its peak. "From here on", he said, "it is a question of determination and perseverance". His remarks were aimed at anti-war elements, whose attacks on the Administration were becoming more and more shrill as Presidential elections neared.

American air attacks escalated in North Vietnam in spite of mounting losses to new Soviet weapons and in late June heavy blows were dealt to the steel plant at Thai Nguyen and three coal mines -- the first major industrial strikes of the war. Increasingly, American press coverage cited Soviet AA contributions to US losses.

Following the removal in July of an ARVN Corps Commander for embezzlement and a press expose of corruption by officials in Delta provinces, a governmental crisis developed in Saigon. The split between civilians and the military flared into open, and fear of a military coup against the civilian government led to repressive measures which further reduced the effectiveness of the armed forces. An American brigade moved into Saigon to help maintain order.

During August, as American air strikes against communications centers, industry and ports slowly mounted, US air losses from SAM and anti-aircraft artillery kept pace.

Meanwhile, the cost of living index in the United States climbed sharply as the expenses of the war in Vietnam soared. Returning servicemen and US news media became increasingly critical of South Vietnamese corruption and government ineffectiveness. US press stories focused on the unequal sacrifices of US military units and ARVN preoccupation with "pacification".

Elements of Korean, Australian, New Zealand, South Vietnamese and American forces were moved into positions south of the DMZ as an international shield against invasion.

Throughout the summer months, the Pathet Lao intensified their activity in the Lao Panhandle and intelligence reports indicated a NVN buildup in adjacent areas. Rumors of an impending seizure of the airfield at Tchepone were rampant in Vientianne.

Red China exploded another nuclear device in August. Initial analysis characterized it as a high yield weapon with relatively little contamination.

NATO Headquarters was relocated in London and in a Strasbourg speech DeGaulle renewed his call for a neutralized Southeast Asia and withdrawal of American troops.

After lengthy negotiations, conducted in secret, Hanoi and the United States finally reached an understanding regarding a limited exchange of war prisoners. Acting through the Canadians, several North Vietnamese sailors, captured at sea by the US Navy, were exchanged for an equal number of seriously wounded American flyers shot down over Vietnam. Similar negotiations are underway regarding the possibility of additional exchanges of prisoners.

During the early days of September, American opinion was sharply divided and the principal differences were reflected within the Administration. Sentiment for further escalation of the war against North Vietnam ranged from accelerated and wider strikes against industry, ports and communications routes to imposition of a naval blockade. Counter-arguments were raised in favor of unilateral peace moves based on US military successes.

Ambassador Dobrynin met with Secretary Rusk in September and stated that the Soviet Union might be in a better position to press Hanoi to negotiate if the US would extend greater recognition of the German Democratic Republic for example -- allowing the DRG to control the Berlin access routes.

In a meeting with top national security advisors on 1 September, the President determined to afford Moscow another opportunity to cooperate in heading off further escalation. He decided to forward the following note to Kremlin leaders by personal emissary.

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

. . . It is increasingly clear that the material and technical support provided to the Government of North Vietnam by your government is one of the primary factors contributing to the continuation of this bloody conflict. As you are aware, it has become necessary for Free World forces in Southeast Asia to engage targets of industrial as well as direct military significance under conditions which bring weapons under the influence of Soviet citizens in North Vietnam into direct confrontation with those of the United States. This is an increasingly hazardous situation which I, for one, deeply regret.

"For that reason, Mr. Chairman, as well as for reasons of common humanity, I ask you to review the current policies of the Soviet Union and discontinue your physical support of Hanoi's program. Further, I ask you once again to use what influence you have at your disposal to help create the necessary conditions for discussions aimed at a just settlement of this terrible conflict.

"Unless the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics faces its responsibility as a world power and presses its fellow communist regime in Hanoi to negotiate an end to this bloody war, the great strides toward mutual understanding that you and I have labored arduously to achieve will be lost forever"

Flying in the Presidential Airplane, Ambassador Harriman was received in Moscow shortly after a reported visit by North Vietnamese leader Le Duan.

He presented the President's note and in a strongly worded personal statement to the Chairman, Governor Harriman indicated that pressures in the United States were building up to a point where it would be increasingly difficult to contain the conflict within present limits. He stated that without doubt, the

next step would be a Free World quarantine of North Vietnam which would block all imports other than food, relief and medical supplies and that this would inevitably involve a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Following the Labor Day weekend the French Ambassador in Washington pointed out that the Hanoi government had asked Paris to serve as a third party, delivered the following extract of a note from Chairman Ho to President De Gaulle.

"I make the following offer for an immediate cease-fire and preliminary talks which, I prayerfully hope, will lead to a settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia:

1. My government has authorized me to secretly direct the immediate withdrawal of all NVN forces from SVN and adjacent areas. At the same time, I have respectfully requested our friends of the NLF to cease hostilities.

2. My government has further authorized me to seek a cease-fire, followed by preliminary talks with Washington, hopefully leading to negotiation of a mutually acceptable settlement.

3. In return, it is imperative that the United States government:

a. Immediately announce a cease-fire in Vietnam, including cessation of bombing attacks in the north.

b. Immediately announce a schedule for withdrawal of all US forces from Southeast Asia.

c. Guarantee the peoples of Vietnam, through the National Liberation Front, an opportunity to participate in truly "free" elections for a government of their own choice."

It is 13 September 1967 and the President has assembled a select group of advisors in his office.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM US TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

DTG 131700 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE

A. Within general framework that Ho's note is genuine and that situation has moved into the pre-negotiating, exploratory discussion phase, we estimate that:

1. GVN will consider that the over-all situation in SVN is making modest progress toward improvement in the military, political and economic spheres; that any initiative on the part of Hanoi is a sign of weakness and must therefore be viewed with suspicion; that they should be wary of possible bilateral US - Communist negotiations which might end up in a unilateral decision on the part of the US to cut or end its participation in the war. Thus we would expect that the GVN would be initially wary of any negotiating situation, would resist being drawn into early negotiations, but would probably go along with a negotiated solution of the conflict once they were convinced their freedom and national interests were protected.

2. VC will obey orders issued from Hanoi (the Lao Dong Party); would welcome a respite from the war; is suffering from morale problems within their armed forces.

3. NVN, while still intent on gaining control over SVN and while still confident that one day such control will be established, also needs a breather from the air bombardment and from the strains imposed by the requirement to support PAVN divisions in SVN. They would, therefore, be receptive to negotiations provided these would lead to an early end of the bombing of NVN. Moreover, they would hope that once the US could be persuaded to stop the bombing campaign, the pressure of US and world public opinion would inhibit its resumption.

4. The CPR would probably resist any move toward the negotiating table on the grounds that it was inconsistent with their basic philosophy of the inevitable victory of "wars of national liberation".

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-10 (BLUE)

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5. The USSR will not oppose, but will not actively foster negotiations. Their political position within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute would make them play a more passive role such as serving as the channel for communications or as an "honest broker" in mediating the dispute.

6. US Allies: The Koreans and Thais would be nervous over any move toward negotiations, but the rest of our allies would be delighted.

7. France would welcome negotiations which they would foresee leading to an eventual US withdrawal from SEA. They would expect, in these circumstances, to see strong forces of nationalism emerge which would preserve the political identities of the SEA countries even though they might be within the Chicom sphere of influence. In this case the French would hope to resume commercial and cultural relationships which would leave them in a favored position over the long pull. Having concluded that NVN will inevitably gain control over SVN, their policy is directed toward exploiting this unavoidable trend in such a manner as to improve their general strategic position, to include their long term relationship with USSR.

II. OBJECTIVES

US objectives remain to:

1. Convince NVN that it is not in their national interest to continue the war in the south.
2. Maintain US influence in SEA.
3. Establish a viable, non-Communist SVN.
4. Create an environment within which SEA nations can grow into modern, developed societies in peace.
5. Contain Communist China within its present boundaries.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS

A. The strategies open to the US boil down to three:

1. Reject Ho's proposal out of hand as containing no basis for negotiation.

2. Accept Ho's proposal as a starting point for serious negotiations.

3. Initiate a dialogue with Hanoi which would lead to a US counter-proposal, while maintaining US military pressure on both NVN and the VC.

B. The US team will pursue the latter strategy.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Notify Ho through the French that we have received his note, that we are interested in discussing the matter further on a secret, bilateral basis directly with the DRV at a place and time convenient to him.

2. Inform the President of the GVN of the contents of Ho's note, explaining that we intend to explore it in secret on a bilateral basis until we can determine whether it is sincere or not. We will keep the GVN fully informed and will look forward to joint US - GVN negotiations with Hanoi if the proposal warrants further serious consideration. Stress to the GVN the importance of keeping knowledge of those negotiations limited to one or two key GVN officials.

3. Do not notify our other allies at this time.

4. Provide the US negotiator with a list of questions concerning Ho's proposal which would be designed to clarify Hanoi's real intent. (See Tab A).

5. Recognizing that the DRV and the VC are "hurting" as a result of US/GVN military pressure, adopt a tough negotiating position in any discussions with Hanoi.

6. Negotiations should be limited to the territory of VN (both N and S) and Laos.

B. Economic

In order to create a more favorable climate within the DRV for the negotiations, have the President or other high US officials reiterate (without reference to the secret negotiations) his wide-ranging economic development and reconstruction proposals contained in his Baltimore speech.

C. Psychological

Prepare US public opinion for the possible initiation of formal negotiations, by high level official statements emphasizing that negotiations do not mean early withdrawal of US forces or an end to US commitments to help SEA nations defend their freedom.

D. Military

Until a specific and formal cease fire is signed, maintain US/GVN military pressure against NVN and the VC in SVN at current levels.

E. Executive Branch Action (To be taken by Control).

Pending clarification of Ho's position through the detailed questions attached at Tab A, undertake urgent Executive Branch analysis of:

a. Acceptable terms of a cease fire which would guarantee that "the writ of the GVN" would extend throughout SVN.

b. Terms of a guaranteed amnesty for VC during and after the cease fire, supervised as required by the US or an ICC.

c. The advisability of tabling a specific counter proposal to Ho's note which would provide for the quid pro quo set forth in Tab B.

d. A procedure for verifying the withdrawal of DRV forces from SVN and Laos.

V. CONTINGENCIES

IF

US WILL

A. GVN -

Rejects initiative

Continue to explore negotiations on a bilateral basis with NVN.

Negotiates unilaterally with VC.

Seek to determine the extent of the negotiations and support them if consistent with US objectives.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B. VC...

Continue hostile acts despite Ho's public request to cease hostilities and even though NVN withdraws its forces.

Treat NVN in context of our proposal (Tab B) and continue pressures against VC.

C. NVN -

Is acting in good faith (contingent on proof) on basis of satisfactory answers to the questions (Tab A).

Proceed with negotiations.

Is not acting in good faith.

Materially increase present level of military operations against NVN.

D. SOVIET UNION -

Refuses to assist U.S. in bringing Hanoi around.

Continue with direct bilateral approach to Hanoi.

Further escalates its support of NVN.

Consider implementation of Harriman quarantine threat.

E. FRANCE

Is using the Note as a ploy to influence our actions in SVN.

a. If overture remains SECRET, do nothing.

b. If overture has leaked, employ contingencies in F, below.

F. GENERAL

Proposed initiatives leak and are no longer secret.

a. Set facts before the public.

b. Restate US objectives.

c. Gradually increase military posture until meaningful agreement is reached.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-14 (BLUE)

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TAB A

QUESTIONS WHICH US NEGOTIATOR SHOULD USE
IN SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF HANOI'S INTERPRETATION
OF HO'S PROPOSAL

1. What does "cease-fire" mean? When would it go into effect?
2. What system would be used to validate withdrawal? (mechanics of inspection, etc.)
3. Will the GVN be able to execute its authority throughout the entire area of SVN during the cease-fire? (commerce, travel, police, armed forces patrol)
4. What is proposed timetable of NVN and US action to bring the hostilities to an end?
5. Can NVN guarantee VC cooperation?
6. What will be status of NLF in the final negotiations?
7. What does Ho mean by withdrawal from adjacent areas? Does this include Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand?
8. What kind of election is Ho talking about?
9. What does Ho mean by withdrawal of US forces from SEA?

TAB A

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

TAB B

DRAFT COUNTER PROPOSAL TO HO'S NOTE FOR
EXECUTIVE BRANCH

1. If North Vietnam will publicly announce (and in fact execute under some form of impartial inspection) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and adjacent areas to North Vietnam and will publicly request the NLF to cease hostilities, the US and South Vietnam will suspend military activity against North Vietnam, including bombing.

2. The South Vietnamese and Free World Forces will make no move to impede or harass withdrawing North Vietnamese Forces and, if requested, will be willing to provide assistance to facilitate their withdrawal to North Vietnam.

3. The US and South Vietnamese Governments are prepared to sit down with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government to arrange the modalities of broader discussions through which a mutually acceptable solution of the situation in Vietnam may be negotiated.

TAB B

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-16 (BLUE)

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SIGMA I-66
INITIAL SCENARIO

The Scenarios for SIGMA I-66 are not intended to suggest that de-escalation of the war in SEA is either desirable or likely. These are aimed at illuminating some of the problems and opportunities which may be associated with moves toward a reduced level of hostilities. They are entirely hypothetical.

INITIAL GREEN SCENARIO

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

13 September 1967

The View From Saigon: This is the capital of a nation torn by political dissension, weakened by corruption, and weary with a war that it no longer controls. The top leadership is striving mightily to cope with its many problems but in spite of major allied victories, coup rumors are rampant.

Since election of the new civilian government in February 1967, the influence of once powerful military leaders has been somewhat reduced. Nevertheless by virtue of command over large forces many military leaders continue to affect government policies.

For months, the ARVN has been committed largely to pacification programs as United States and other Free World forces carry the brunt of search and destroy operations. By April 1967, United States forces in South Vietnam had built to one-half million men.

Charges and counter-charges of embezzlement and corruption between military and civilian elements in the South Vietnam government have led to dismissal of some top military commanders, the arrest of several prominent speculators and contributed to weakening of popular confidence.

Inflation has mounted since December 1966, despite a concerted effort by the United States to increase the import of consumer goods. Black market activities are extensive. Riots in Saigon and Da Nang and general lawlessness in rural areas have been sparked by rising food prices and resentment over extortion and bribery charges against lower echelon SVN officials.

South Vietnam virtually has become an occupied country. There are feelings that United States forces have conducted some military operations without prior consultation with SVN authorities. Resentment over this and the American domination in foreign policy decisions has been magnified by some members of the government. Friction has developed from American suggestions aimed at tighter control of resources and efforts to improve efficiency in internal Vietnamese affairs.

The continued, long-term support of the government of the Republic of Vietnam by the United States, Australia and the Republic of Korea is now viewed in some quarters as questionable.

Background Events: Hawks in the American Congress, impatient with the progress of the war, have advocated major escalations to achieve a decisive military conclusion. Vocal anti-war elements in the United States hope to gain control in the 1968 Presidential elections. Little regard for the political and economic objectives of South Vietnam is shown in public debate in the United States. In the opinion of many in the government, the United States and the Republic of Korea show greater concern with the containment of Communist China than with the preservation of the integrity of the South Vietnam government. Many South Vietnamese do not desire to become involved in America's struggle with China over dominance in the Asian world.

Although the Australian Liberal Party won the elections in Fall 1966 by a slim majority, the strong showing by Labour Party candidates indicated a general disenchantment by the electorate with the government's war policies.

In September 1966, the South Vietnamese election of a constituent assembly was conducted despite VC terrorism and Buddhist opposition. A turn-out of over 70% of the electorate produced an assembly representative of a wider array of contending factions than any previous Saigon government. In the months that followed, a parliamentary structure emerged, similar to the French pattern, including provision for a strong Chief of State.

The March general elections resulted in the election of Dr. Dang Van Sung as President and Chief of State and the establishment of a national assembly which included an anti-military bloc. General Ky stepped down but continued as Air Marshall.

The United Nations General Assembly, by a close vote, in October, agreed to seat Red China. However, Peiping angrily refused membership unless the Nationalist Chinese were expelled.

As the Southwest Monsoon ended in Fall 1966, United States search and destroy operations were accelerated and massive drives were launched against NVN concentrations

in the highlands. ARVN forces emphasized pacification of already cleared areas during this period, hence their casualties were low in comparison with allied forces.

In December 1966, a high level mission including Premier Kosygin and the deputy to the Soviet Air Defense Chief (Colonel General Uvarov, Anti-Aircraft Missile Troop Commander) traveled to Hanoi. Intelligence speculation presumed that talks concerned increased Soviet assistance in the form of equipment and technical support.

In early 1967, half the North Vietnam rice crop was lost to major flooding caused by typhoons. Propaganda broadcasts from North Vietnam blamed the disaster on American bombing of dikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

During January and February 1967, American visual reconnaissance sorties were severely curtailed along coastal areas of North Vietnam by unusually bad weather conditions. When normal sortie rates were resumed, air losses to anti-aircraft missiles mounted.

During this period, intelligence reports indicated that three NVN divisions were moved into positions above the demilitarized zone and a heavy buildup was reported in adjacent areas in Laos.

In India, Mrs. Gandhi was narrowly reelected as Prime Minister despite growing opposition to her "pro-US" policies.

In early Spring, for the first time, the United States assumed major responsibility for military action in the Delta region. The US 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions were deployed into the IV Corps area. One battalion of the 9th Infantry Division sustained heavy losses in an ambush by regular NVN units.

The Chieu Hoi program continued to attract large scale VC defections, which placed a strain on the inadequate rehabilitation facilities. The increased numbers of VC defections were about evenly matched by desertions from the ARVN.

ARVN casualty figures had been low due to a sharp drop in communist military pressure against South Vietnamese forces and because of the emphasis on the pacification program. In spite of this, low morale and weak implementation of government policies greatly reduced the effectiveness of the army.

In stepped-up action by US forces, major elements of three NVN divisions were severely mauled in March during search and destroy operations near Tuy Hoa, Quang Tri and Vinh Long. Eighteen hundred NVN troops were killed in the action according to American reports.

An additional US aircraft carrier was deployed to the Pacific in Spring; six additional USAF squadrons were deployed in Thailand, and the total US forces in South Vietnam reached 500,000 by April.

ROK forces in South Vietnam were boosted to a total of 50,000 men.

North Vietnamese infiltrations into all corps areas were accelerated to maintain the same force ratios as in 1966.

In April, US aircraft struck against all major railroad marshalling yards in North Vietnam, sparing only those located in major urban centers.

Also in April a major VC guerrilla raid on US facilities at Cam Ranh Bay exacted heavy US losses, including 320 dead, large quantities of supplies destroyed, a tanker and an ammunition ship sunk and the De Long piers heavily damaged.

In May, MIG-21's intercepted US air missions in all-out attacks over North Vietnam. The United States lost 20 aircraft in two days. In retaliation, the United States struck with massive raids against NVN airfields, destroying at least 30 MIGS on the ground and damaging airfield facilities, thus crippling recent NVN efforts to strengthen the air defense fighter force.

The US Navy conducted coastal bombardment of NVN radar sites and, in a joint US/SVN commando raid by Marines against Tiger Island, captured intact a Soviet TALL KING early warning radar installation.

In June, guerrilla attacks by insurgency forces (identified as the Thailand Patriotic Front) severely damaged the US supply depot at Korat and the air base at Udorn with heavy mortar fire. USAF planes retaliated with air strikes against three hydroelectric power plants in North Vietnam.

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In August, China exploded another nuclear device. A yield several orders of magnitude greater than previous tests, with relatively low atmospheric contamination, indicated a degree of technological sophistication not expected for several years.

In a speech at Strasbourg, President de Gaulle renewed his call for neutralization of Southeast Asia and the immediate withdrawal of American troops.

French-American relations continued to cool as NATO headquarters were moved from Paris to London and arrangements were completed for the removal of all US forces from France.

Throughout the summer months, the Pathet Lao intensified their buildup in the Lao Panhandle. Agents have reported substantial NVN buildup in areas adjacent to the Panhandle. As infiltration continued from North Vietnam, rumors spread of an impending seizure of the airfield at Tchepone along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Throughout August, the United States conducted restrikes against all useable airfields in North Vietnam, inflicting severe damage.

Continued high losses of American pilots to Soviet built SA-2 missile installations has caused President Johnson to inform the Kremlin through Ambassador Harriman that the United States will impose a naval quarantine on North Vietnam unless Moscow discontinues military support of Hanoi. The note stated that only food and medicine would be allowed into the country. Essentially the same information has been given to the Chinese.

This month, the crisis in Saigon broadened, with rumors that a powerful group within the administration had secretly dispatched an emissary to establish a dialogue with the National Liberation Front. The frustration of this faction over American attempts to dictate all aspects of Vietnamese affairs have led to proposals to end the fighting, form a "popular front" with the NLF and demand American withdrawal. The exact terms of the proposal have been shrouded in extreme secrecy. Indications are that the group has sufficient political power and military support to seize control of the government if a favorable NLF response is forthcoming.

It is now 13 September 1967.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM GYN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

DTG 131700 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. The Viet Cong, with Hanoi's approval, will: respond favorably to a proposal to end the fighting and form a popular front to demand US withdrawal, solicit popular and international support for the proposal, concentrate terrorism against US forces, and use any transitional period to improve politico-military posture. US withdrawal under such terms, without even the need for international negotiations, would be highly advantageous to the Viet Cong.

B. The DRV will: seize upon dissident group's overture, propagandize for a popular and international demand for US withdrawal, and use any transitional period to infiltrate more troops. US withdrawal under such terms is highly advantageous to DRV as Hanoi would want its control of NLF to project its power throughout SVN.

C. The Chinese Communist will: support NLF/DRV efforts to exploit the new situation, intensify international pressures for US withdrawal, and resist US expansion elsewhere in Asia. US withdrawal under such terms would achieve major Peking objective.

D. The Soviet Union will favor the development, although cautiously. It will be receptive to alternatives serving the preservation of their power position in Asia and will protest quarantine set down by US but circumvent it. US withdrawal under such terms would present USSR with threat of intensified Chinese competition in Asia.

E. The US military position in SVN, despite increased pressures at home and abroad to withdraw, remains strong. The US is likely to maintain anti-communist posture in Southeast Asia and seek ways to maintain dominant presence in SVN. The US has a number of options and major asset which give it a strong bargaining position. From US standpoint, having such a negotiation proposal succeed would represent the worst possible outcome.

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A-8 (GREEN)

Page 1 of 6 Pages

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Insure survival of the present GVN, maintaining its legitimacy, preserving the alliance with the US and Free World forces and to continue prosecution of the war within politically tolerable limits.

B. Make all efforts to regain the political initiative by increasing domestic support and to expand international assistance and sympathy for the GVN cause.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES

A. Take immediate action to retain control of the overall elements of legitimate government and inform US of the nature of the crisis arrived from action of dissident group coupled with general situation -- economic and political.

B. Retain close cooperation and consultation with US in order to obtain support. Coordinate positions, particularly regarding negotiating posture, and gain more options. Take advantage of leverage which present SVN government legitimacy gives us.

C. Regain national support through improved economic and sociological programs (e.g. anti-inflation, government reorganizations and public information).

D. Improve psychological counter offensive through intensified amnesty overtures to supplement an improved Chieu Hoi program.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political/Psychological

1. Have President Sung declare national emergency, obtain emergency powers from Assembly, recall "moustacheless" Marshal Ky and name him Premier with wide powers over armed forces. Strengthen cabinet by including incorruptible, reliable military officers in senior positions. Ky's stature among the people has risen since his voluntary departure from the government, and his reputation for incorruptibility serves him well.

2. Take immediate steps to identify and apprehend members of groups which have made overtures to the NLF.

3. Inform US of grave crisis confronting SVN, ascertain its capability to help and what price it would wish in return,

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and propose a program of drastic internal reforms designed to restore control over situation and regain initiative, including:

a. Generous amnesty program to VC including substantial material inducements to accept reintegration with economic life of SVN.

b. Expanded and more selective Chieu Hoi program based upon successful operations thus far.

c. Selective quiet approaches to NLF leaders personally known to members of government, exploring possibility of drawing them away and exploiting NLF/Hanoi frictions and suspicions arising from Southern-Northern rivalries.

d. Improved arrangements for ARVN/US consultations between military commanders and planners with more assertive ARVN combat role.

e. Withdrawal of US Brigade from Saigon and its replacement by ARVN units subject to ARVN remaining unified and loyal to the regime.

f. Arrange, with US approval, for responsible GVN officials to have quiet talks with Soviets and Poles. Talks stressing risks of US-Soviet confrontation (e.g. US warning of Haiphong quarantine) and danger that if current NLF/Hanoi contacts bear fruit, Soviets may be faced with disequilibrium in Southeast Asia and dramatic gain of NVN/Chinese power.

g. Coordinate policies and approaches on negotiating positions.

B. Economic

Continued inflation exists from increasing VC, GVN, USG, and civilian demand for domestically produced goods and services. Rising insecurity, particularly in the Delta, decreased domestic production, continued inefficient operation of the ports, as well as military demands on port capacity, make it impossible to import sufficient goods to meet demand.

1. Devalue the piaster to increase the purchasing power sopped up by imports.

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2. Put ceiling on GVN and US expenditures. Limit spending to highest priority programs only. In order to be certain that they at least will be carried out and to contain the inflationary pressures.

3. Expand port capacity in order to get as many imported goods in as possible.

4. Raise GVN military and civil servant salaries to restore purchasing power parity of this group and remove its opposition to devaluation.

5. Raise tax collections recognizing, however, that the GVN is not strong enough to collect from sizeable groups of influential people and that GVN administration is weak, so that any improvement will be slow.

C. Military

1. Replace Saigon US brigade with ARVN unit.

2. Appoint General Ky as Prime Minister for Defense.

3. Reconstitute part of ARVN forces to constabulary units.

4. Retain remaining ARVN forces into units operating with US units.

5. Increase military pay.

V. CONTINGENCIES

IF

1. NLF refuses to negotiate with secret neutralist minority group of GVN.

2. NLF accepts proposal to negotiate.

THEN

Crisis posed is passed and no further action is called for.

GVN will immediately negotiate with US to start preemptive peace offensive and negotiations involving Geneva signatories, purge GVN of neutralists, and bring anti-neutralist military leadership group into position of greater power in GVN.

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IF

3. US refuses peace offensive strategy:

4. US refuses to support purge:

5. GVN cannot obtain US or GVN military backing for purge:

6. US accepts peace offensive strategy:

THEN

GVN must depend on purge to forestall neutralists.

GVN will carry out anyway, provided it can get cohesive GVN military backing.

Game is up

GVN will play for:

a. Multilateral negotiations (e.g. renewed conference of 1954 Geneva Accord states)

b. Retention of largest possible US troop presence either in present positions or in regrouped zones where they can guarantee maximum GVN population control.

c. A large ICC or UN Emergency Force presence to police any ceasefire and enhance GVN population control.

d. Integration of VC units into ARVN to police their demobilization and loosen VC discipline and authority.

e. NLF representation in National Assembly and possibly NLF control of several non-strategic ministries, but no real NLF power over important policy or administrative machinery.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

IF

7. US withdraws large
part of US forces:

THEN

GVN will insist on

a. Larger ICC or UNEF
presence.

b. US political and
financial support for en-
larged ARVN/RF/PF and Rural
Constabulary.

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A-1.3 (GREEN)

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SIGMA I-66
INITIAL SCENARIO

The Scenarios for SIGMA I-66 are not intended to suggest that de-escalation of the war in SEA is either desirable or likely. These are aimed at illuminating some of the problems and opportunities which may be associated with moves toward a reduced level of hostilities. They are entirely hypothetical.

INITIAL BLACK SCENARIO

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

13 September 1967

THE VIEW FROM TAY NINH PROVINCE. There is tenuous hope today at Headquarters of the National Liberation Front (NLF) -- more than has been felt for months. Those who kept the faith may now be vindicated but there is no time to philosophize. In the early hours this morning an emissary, the brother and close confidant of the RVN Defense Minister, arrived here from Saigon. He states that he has been secretly authorized to begin negotiations for agreement aimed at ending hostilities between the Saigon regime and the NLF, creating a Popular Front Government and demanding early foreign troop withdrawals. It is the widest crack to date in South Vietnam's political structure. If it had been longer appearing it might have been too late.

Diseased, tired, and hungry -- morale among Liberation Front forces is low. Southerner and Northerner, regular and guerrilla, the troops are all weary. Recruiting has become coercion; volunteers include thirteen year olds. Desertions increase, and thousands of dispirited people seek sanctuary through Saigon's "Open Arms Program." The Americans continue massive air and ground blows -- pouring tons of bombs on suspected NLF sanctuaries, launching swift, murderous assaults on NLF forces wherever they concentrate, but Government desertions are higher than the Front's.

NLF elements fighting in South Vietnam seek to avoid American spoiling attacks, to elude enemy search and destroy forces and to concentrate on the real war -- the struggle for support of the civil population by all possible means. This has not been the policy followed by North Vietnamese (NVN) forces to their bitter cost.

BACKGROUND EVENTS. In September 1966, NLF guerrilla efforts were aimed at impeding the SVN elections. Persuasion, terror, and threats were used to frustrate Saigon's encouragement of a large turn-out. Fraudulent counting and government lies combined to pad the results but the real facts were apparent to the people. Instead of the high figure claimed by Ky in the Western press, no more than 30 percent of the electorate really support the government. However, in order

to placate world opinion, the so-called Constituent Assembly which emerged, included a wider spectrum of political representation than any previous SVN government. In the following months, the puppets dutifully devised a blueprint for parliamentary government led by a strong President -- similar to that of France. Ky and his Directorate, meanwhile, continued discharging orders of their American masters.

In October the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to seat the Chinese People's Republic. Before the issue reached the Security Council, Peking angrily rejected the proposition unless the Chiang Kai-shek faction was expelled.

In November, the American elections saw an upsurge in the number of "hard-liners" elected to Congress, the money-interests stirred public emotions "to end the war quickly."

In Australia, the Liberal Party won a limp victory but their margin over Labour was so slim as to constitute a major restraint on future Australian efforts in Vietnam.

During December, the leadership of the Liberation Front was engaged in bitter disagreement with Hanoi over strategy. The Central Office for South Vietnam (COFSVN), recommended efforts to strengthen village and regional political and military infrastructures. Their objective was to further develop the strength and capabilities of Liberation Forces in small units -- scattered and elusive -- avoiding confrontation with the Americans -- hitting only weak and exposed SVN elements -- concentrating on terror and subversion. Giap disagreed, his views prevailed and the decision was made to launch a main-force summer offensive to cut South Vietnam across its neck south of Hue.

While inflation, logistical and administrative problems inundated Saigon and the American command, popular dissatisfaction was vented in South Vietnam through riots and demonstrations in the cities. Much was said in Saigon and Washington about "winning the hearts of the people", but the real American interest lay in military victories. Powerful search and destroy operations were launched with over half the American and Korean maneuver battalions constantly in the field. SVN forces were largely relegated to "pacification efforts" supporting a poorly administered "Revolutionary Development Program" in areas considered cleared.

At that same time, a high level Soviet mission was in Hanoi, providing improved radar and missile defenses for the capital. Little was done by either the Soviet Union or People's

Republic of China (PRC) to advance the struggle in South Vietnam. Instead of heeding COFSV advice, the high command began implementing Giap's plan.

In January and February, torrential rains swept the Red River Delta wiping out half the rice crop. The accompanying lack of visibility cut sharply into American visual reconnaissance capabilities contributing to the buildup of improved Soviet missile and radar equipment. From that point on, American air losses mounted even as NVN divisions began massing along the DMZ and infiltration into South Vietnam expanded.

The Indian five-year elections in February gave Mrs. Ghandi the narrowest of victories, demonstrating the strength of factions who had been alienated by her pro-American policies. Also, in February, the British Defense White Paper announced major cuts in British forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

In March, general elections were held in Saigon under the new constitution and Dr. Dang Van Sung, an eminent civilian, was elected President. Ky stepped down but continued to serve as Commander of South Vietnam's Air Force. Although the Government included more civilians than ever before, it was quite obvious that the military clique would continue to exercise real power. American military operations reached a new peak both in South Vietnam and in the air over North Vietnam. The Americans initiated offensive operations with two divisions in Military Regions #8 and #9 in the Delta during which a battalion of the newly arrived US 9th Infantry Division was cut to pieces in the bloodiest ambush of the war. NLF satisfaction was short-lived. At month's end, the Liberation Front sustained over 2,500 dead and twice this number of wounded in American attacks at Tuy Hoa, Quang Tri and Vinh Long. These losses spurred Ho to continue his relentless demands for increased Chinese and Soviet economic and material support. The shortage of fuel for NVN motorized equipment had become one of his greatest concerns.

By April, over 500,000 American troops were operating in South Vietnam and the air offensive in the north had been expanded to include all major railroad marshalling yards except those in major urban centers. NVN infiltration into South Vietnam had kept pace, however, and the strengthening of local Liberation Front forces continued on a nation-wide basis. A major attack was conducted against the American logistics base at Cam Ranh Bay, killing 325 of the enemy, destroying masses of supplies, sinking a tanker and ammunition ship, and smashing a De Long pier.

In May, NVN MIGs mounted an all-out effort against US air missions over the country, destroying 21 American planes in two days. This was another blunder by Hanoi and the Americans responded with saturation attacks against all NVN airfields, destroying 30 MIGs and literally wiping out North Vietnam's air capability.

Later in May, enemy naval elements attacked newly improved radar facilities along the coast of North Vietnam with gunfire. A surprise commando raid by US, Korean and SVN marines smashed or captured radar equipment on Tiger Island.

During June, while disease and sagging morale slowed Liberation Front activities, the enemy also had difficulties. Sneak attacks by Thai insurgents caused damage to the American supply installation at Korat and to the air base at Udorn. The American press blossomed with stories from American soldiers, disgusted with corruption and inefficiency in the South Vietnamese government and condemning the unequal sacrifices required of American fighting units. The American cost of living soared and criticism of the Administration became sharper every day.

As US air losses mounted, the Americans launched powerful attacks against North Vietnamese hydroelectric plants. Western European as well as Communist and third-world opinion became increasingly apprehensive as the war in Asia escalated. Washington was flooded with appeals for peace.

While Western press media headlined a new black-market scandal in Saigon, the Americans pressed for negotiations through every diplomatic channel. Their President reiterated willingness to announce a withdrawal timetable for his forces if Hanoi would do the same and it was apparent that enemy desperation was growing.

In July, Buddhist monks formed for demonstrations against rising prices and corruption in Saigon and Hue even while the buildup of Marshal Giap's forces was completed. Against the advice of many -- both in South Vietnam and Hanoi -- his divisions prepared to cut the country in two.

American intelligence was better than anticipated. Bad weather, upon which Liberation Forces had depended for concealment, unexpectedly cleared up. US marine, air-mobile, air and naval forces were thrown into a giant spoiling attack while Guam based B-52s pounded NVN jump-off positions. Concurrent NLF irregular efforts were opposed by Popular Forces and ARVN units which offered unusually strong resistance. In a week of fighting, three NVN divisions -- the cream of North Vietnamese

regular forces -- were thrown back, leaving not only dead but wounded, as well, to the enemy. NVN and NLF units withdrew toward the Laotian border in confusion as enemy air maintained a drumfire of destruction. Veterans of Dien Bien Phu were stunned at American mobility, communications and murderous ferocity of US air and artillery. The enemy claimed over 1,000 prisoners.

In Washington, announcing the military victory, the Secretary of Defense hinted strongly that the US force buildup in Vietnam had reached its peak. "From here on," he said, "it is a question of determination and perseverance." Anti-war elements were the target of his remarks for it was apparent those forces were coalescing and would become more shrill as Presidential elections approached.

American air attacks escalated in North Vietnam (in spite of mounting losses to sophisticated Soviet weapon systems), and in late June heavy US blows fell on the steel plant at Thai Nguyen and three NVN coal mines -- the first such strikes of the war. Increasingly, American press coverage cited Soviet contributions to US losses.

Throughout the summer months, the Pathet Lao intensified their build-up in the Lao Panhandle.

In Saigon, allied military victories during July were overshadowed by a governmental crisis which followed removal of a Corps commander for corruption. Rumors of coups and counter-coups swept the capital and an American airborne brigade moved into the city to maintain order.

During August, as American air strikes against communications centers, industry and ports slowly mounted, US air losses from SAM and anti-aircraft artillery kept pace.

Also during August, enemy Headquarters announced deployment of Korean, Australian, New Zealand, South Vietnamese and American military units along the south side of the Demilitarized Zone as an international shield against invasion.

That month, China detonated another nuclear device. The civilian headquarters of NATO shifted from Paris to London and De Gaulle called again for neutralization of Indo-China, "before the fateful hour has passed."

After lengthy negotiations, conducted in secret, Hanoi and the Americans reached an understanding regarding a limited exchange of war prisoners. Acting through the Canadians, several

North Vietnamese sailors, captured at sea by the US Navy, were exchanged for an equal number of seriously wounded American flyers, shot down over Vietnam. Similar discussions are believed to be underway regarding the possibility of additional prisoner exchanges.

On 3 September, orders were received at COFSVN from Hanoi requiring the exfiltration of two NVN divisions from dispersed positions in South Vietnam and Laos back to North Vietnam. It was understood that they would be given an opportunity to reorganize and refit for next year's campaign. Nevertheless, defeatist rumors began to spread. Orders have also been received from Hanoi to immediately curtail all offensive operations in South Vietnam.

In early September there were rumors of high level conferences in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow and a report that Giap has killed himself but throughout most of South Vietnam the Liberation Front, through its cadres and solidly entrenched infrastructure, holds a powerful grip on the situation. The Americans have won their battles but the people of South Vietnam still do not support the puppet regime in Saigon.

This morning a respected emissary from Saigon communicated secret proposals which should end the struggle. He indicated that there is sufficient disaffection, within the National Assembly to permit a rapprochement between the Liberation Front and the government. This is caused by growing frustration over military attempts to dictate all aspects of Vietnamese life. The emissary is speaking for a majority group which has the power to seize control, demand American withdrawal and conduct free elections. When agreement has been reached, key elements of the ARVN are prepared to arrest their commanders, join forces with Liberation Front and announce a new Popular Peace Government in South Vietnam.

It is now 13 September 1967.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM VC TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

REFERENCE SIGMA I-66

MOVE NO. I

DTG 131700 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. General: The Black Team considered that COSVN is basically responsive to guidance and control from Hanoi. We expect to differ at times with their assessment and recommendations but under almost all circumstances we will do, at least on the surface, exactly as told, reserving the right to argue and perhaps to stall. If Hanoi's instructions are too fundamentally in contradiction with our own perception of our interests, we may "comply" and yet "sabotage" those instructions. We would not withhold from Hanoi any information on a move, i.e. by Saigon, being confident that Hanoi had multiple channels for keeping itself current. Under present (1967) circumstances a number of COSVN leaders are uneasy about Hanoi's attitude.

B. Hanoi (NVN) will probably be agreeable to a suggestion from COSVN that the overture from Saigon be explored. Hanoi is discouraged by the failure of its strategy, pursued at great cost through 1965, 1966, and 1967, and the costs in terms of PAVN losses and damage from the US bombing of NVN. However, Hanoi remains confident that the war can be won and is ripe for a shift to a different, more flexible, longer-term strategy.

C. Saigon (GVN) is obviously badly divided but it is at least possible that the offer is both genuine and realistic that a coup can and will succeed. It can be expected that intrigues, pro-peace and anti-US sentiment, and efforts to reach local accommodations with the VC all will grow. The VC task is to take advantage of these trends. There is real danger, however, of the plot being exposed to the ARVN die-hards and to the US and of their taking pre-emptive action.

D. The US still hopes for "victory" but its military successes have not really paid off politically and it

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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might welcome a way out. Its general posture on negotiations and on the "independence" of the GVN are some hindrance to overt US intervention against the projected coup, but such intervention must definitely be planned against as perhaps a 50-50 possibility.

E. USSR/CPR. The COSVN is not particularly concerned with possible moves by China and the USSR. In any case the Team doubts that either capital can move in such a way as to affect decisively the Saigon situation.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Our basic objective is to gain a position from which the Communists can dominate and control SVN.

1. Part and parcel of this is to force the withdrawal from Vietnam of US and other foreign forces.

2. Obtain a guarantee against further use of Allied military force against or in Vietnam.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES

A. Continue to maintain control in areas we dominate and try to expand control in contested areas.

B. Continue to strengthen guerrilla forces, emphasizing training and combat readiness.

C. Try to expand influence in government ranks, both urban and rural.

D. Seek to bolster position and reputation of NLF as a force which can be dealt with and which can assume responsible role in coalition government.

Do this in such a way as to prevent the impression that VC are about to take over completely; intent is to assuage fears of those who foresee personal hardship if VC are included in government.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Notify Hanoi immediately of the emissary's contact. In our message indicate to Hanoi that it is the interests

of both the VC and Hanoi to quickly explore the proposal. Unless otherwise directed we propose to explore it, at once. In the process we hope to obtain specific data on 2 and 3 below.

2. Probe the GVN terms to determine compatibility with announced NVN/VC objectives, such as Pham Van Dong's 4 points.

3. Immediately verify the ability of the GVN representatives to accomplish its promised actions. We will seek names of those involved, military units which may be involved and other data such as plans of the coup plotters.

4. We plan to conduct initial negotiation with the emissary in general terms and do not plan to specify any specific additional conditions before proceeding with negotiations.

B. Economic

1. Continue current activity of disrupting rural pacification and economic stabilization programs by diverting economic and financial resources to VC.

2. Surface scandals alleging widespread complicity of prominent or wealthy Vietnamese in facilitating diversion of economic resources to VC. In particular, dramatize for US audiences allegations of Vietnamese corruption and complicity as a factor in VC ability to obtain US aid and DOD supplies.

C. Psychological

1. Three major propaganda campaigns are required for implementation at once. Each campaign will utilize all media, with special emphasis on face-to-face propaganda. Campaigns are:

a. Convince the SVN people that accommodation and coalition with the "front" is possible and desirable. Stress the theme that Vietnamese problems should be settled by the Vietnamese.

b. Convince GVN military forces that total concentration on "peaceful pacification" is to their advantage. Push the theme that all Vietnamese should avoid inflicting casualties on the suffering SVN people. Further encourage ARVN disaffection and desertion.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

c. Bolster VC morale. Push the theme that the VC are winning and that victory will be shortly in our grasp.

2. Prepare a new proclamation, announcing the program of the NLF and stressing amnesty for all under peaceful conditions.

3. Torment and encourage demonstrations for peace in SVN and incite demonstrations against the US presence, the draft, the high cost of living and large military operations.

D. Military

1. Request NVN to hold NVN armed forces in SVN to keep pressure on the US/FWMAF. Specifically to not exfiltrate two divisions at this time.

2. Selective application of military pressure against GVN military forces coupled with accommodations in other areas where we are aware of disaffected ARVN elements.

3. Maintain a continuing pattern of VC/NVA actions against the US/FWMAF.

4. Step up the guerrilla operations against US/FWMAF base areas and forces. Such actions to be low investment actions, such as terrorism, mortar attacks, LOC interdictions, small ambushes. Refrain from large-scale actions.

5. Improve military positioning in the vicinity of Saigon to support coup attempts. Simultaneously infiltrate Saigon heavily with operations to strengthen our apparatus there toward the same end. Prepare plans for rapid build-up of forces in the vicinity of Saigon to block US/FWMAF actions to block or frustrate coups.

6. Conduct intensive programs to retrain, refit and retain all elements to strengthen and otherwise enhance our military capabilities for future operations.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. Hanoi instructs COSVN to reject the proposal to negotiate with GVN dissident group. In this event COSVN will argue with Hanoi, asking it to reconsider in view of

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the possible major advantages to both COSVN and Hanoi if such a coup succeeds and in view of the difficulties faced by the VC and NVN. Rather than refuse to negotiate COSVN will try to postpone its answer and try to keep the door open for further contacts with the dissident group.

B. If Hanoi orders COSVN not to negotiate, COSVN will comply but ask that Hanoi reconsider and accept earlier COSVN proposal for a change in strategy.

C. If Hanoi orders COSVN not to negotiate some elements in COSVN may argue against the acceptance of Hanoi's order especially in view of Hanoi's own proposed withdrawal of two divisions and other indications that Hanoi may be preparing to engage in actions not favorable to the NLF. While the emissary may be officially informed that COSVN will not negotiate the splinter group may secretly try to make arrangements to keep contact with the GVN dissident group in the hope that it may win greater influence if the proposed coup succeeds.

D. Hanoi will ask for its representatives to participate in any discussions or negotiations; COSVN will agree to such a request.

E. The GVN may uncover the conspiracy and destroy it before it has an opportunity to seize power. COSVN will exploit this politically and in the psychological war in order to further disorganize and weaken the GVN and ARVN. It will try to win the cooperation of dissident ARVN units.

F. The coup may be prevented because of presence of US forces in Saigon and elsewhere because the US has learned of the proposed coup. COSVN will mount a political and propaganda campaign designed to turn the population and ARVN against the Americans, organize disorders and demonstrations against the GVN and the US and push its appeals based on themes of nationalism, peace, and reform.

G. The US may take over the government in Saigon. COSVN would see this as a major opportunity to rally the population and ARVN against the US by launching with renewed vigor a national campaign for the liberation of Vietnam from US colonialism. It will ask ARVN to join forces with the VC and for an intensive sabotage, terror and non-cooperative campaign aimed at US forces. It will try to organize and provoke incidents in which US forces fire on Vietnamese civilians and demonstrators.

H. The offer to negotiate may be a trap designed to help certain GVN groups to gain power while weakening the VC. Therefore, COSVN will ask that:

1. The negotiations be kept secret.
2. It be given the names of all major GVN conspirators, so as to be able to contact them directly or to blackmail them.
3. Prepare to disclose to the US and Vietnamese public the GVN conspiracy so as to disorganize the GVN and undermine VN public and foreign confidence in the GVN.

I. If it appears that the dissident GVN group controls in fact substantial forces and may be capable of winning power, COSVN in its negotiations with that group will seek agreement on:

1. A cease-fire between VC and ARVN forces loyal to the new regime.
2. Assurance that until elections are held the VC continue in control of its area and armed forces.
3. Offer cooperation and support to the GVN dissident forces in their attempted coup.
4. The new regime is to demand an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of US forces as well as the cessation of US air actions in North and South Vietnam.
5. Demand that the new regime and ARVN refuse cooperation and assistance to US forces and that ARVN cooperate in VC efforts to interfere with US moves and lines of communication.
6. Amnesty for VC captives in GVN jails and for GVN personnel supporting the new regime.

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SIGMA I-66
INITIAL SCENARIO

The Scenarios for SIGMA I-66 are not intended to suggest that de-escalation of the war in SEA is either desirable or likely. These are aimed at illuminating some of the problems and opportunities which may be associated with moves toward a reduced level of hostilities. They are entirely hypothetical.

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INITIAL BROWN SCENARIO

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

13 September 1967

The View From Hanoi: This has been a difficult year for North Vietnam (NVN) in spite of Ho Chi Minh's superhuman efforts. Enemy military offensives in the south, involving over 800,000 regular United States (US), South Vietnamese (SVN), Korean (ROK) and other foreign forces; the steady escalation of air attacks, now destroying Hanoi's hard-bought industrial base, and the loss of half of North Vietnam's rice crop to typhoons have taken a terrible toll.

Diseased, tired, and hungry - morale among Liberation Front forces is low. South Vietnamese and Northerner, regular and guerrilla -- the troops are weary. Recruiting has become coercion. Volunteers include thirteen year olds. Desertions have increased and thousands of dispirited people seek sanctuary through Saigon's "Open Arms Program". The Americans continue massive air and ground blows, pouring tons of bombs on suspected NLF sanctuaries, and launching swift, murderous assaults on NLF forces wherever they concentrate, but government desertions are higher than those of the National Liberation Front (NLF).

The Western imperialists also grow impatient and tired of their costly attempt to colonize South Vietnam, however, they are too heavily committed to withdraw without great loss of face. They fight on, despite their losses, but it seems only a matter of time until burgeoning anti-war factions gain predominance. When that happens, as it did in Paris little more than a decade ago, the people's victory will be won in Washington, the imperialist stronghold itself.

The moment has clearly arrived in Hanoi for political initiative. Orders have been dispatched to Liberation forces in South Vietnam to discontinue offensive operations.

Background Events: In September 1966, NLF guerrilla efforts were aimed at impeding the SVN elections. Persuasion, terror, and threats were used to frustrate Saigon's encouragement of a large turn out. Fraudulent counting and government lies combined to pad the results but the real facts were apparent to the people. Instead of the high percentage turn-out claimed by Ky in the Western press, no more than 30 per cent of the electorate really supported the government. In

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order to placate world opinion, the so-called Constituent Assembly which emerged included a wider spectrum of political representation than any previous SVN government. In the following months, the puppets dutifully devised a blueprint for a parliamentary government led by a strong President -- similar to that of France. Ky and his Directorate, meanwhile, continued discharging orders of their American masters.

In October, the UN General Assembly voted to seat the Chinese People's Republic. Before the issue reached the Security Council, Peking angrily rejected the proposition unless the Chiang Kai-shek faction was expelled.

In November, the American elections saw an upsurge in the number of "hard-liners" elected to Congress, as the money-interests stirred public emotions "to end the war quickly".

In Australia, the Liberal Party won a limp victory and their margin over Labour was so slim as to constitute a major restraint on future Australian efforts in Vietnam.

During December, the leadership of the Liberation Front was engaged in a bitter disagreement with Hanoi over strategy. The Central Office for South Vietnam (COFSVN) recommended expansion of efforts to strengthen village and regional political and military infrastructures. Their objective was to further develop the strength and capabilities of Liberation Forces in small units -- scattered and elusive -- avoiding confrontation with the Americans -- hitting only weak and exposed SVN elements -- concentrating on terror and subversion. This was the concept of ants fighting elephants. Giap disagreed, his views prevailed, and the decision was made to launch a main-force summer offensive to cut South Vietnam across its neck south of Hue.

While inflation, logistical, and administrative problems inundated Saigon and the American command, popular dissatisfaction was vented in South Vietnam through riots and demonstrations in the cities. Much was said in Saigon and Washington about "winning the hearts of the people" but the real American interest lay in military victories. Powerful search and destroy operations were launched with over half the American and Korean maneuver battalions constantly in the field. SVN forces were largely relegated to "pacification efforts", supporting a poorly administered "Revolutionary Development Program", in areas considered cleared.

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At the same time, a high-level Soviet mission was in Hanoi, providing improved radar and missile defenses for the capital. Little was done by either the Soviet Union or People's Republic of China (PRC) to advance the struggle in South Vietnam. Instead of heeding COFSVN advice, the high command began to implement Giap's plan.

In January and February 1967, torrential rains swept the Red River Delta, wiping out half the rice crop. The accompanying lack of visibility cut sharply into American visual reconnaissance capabilities, contributing to the buildup of improved Soviet missile and radar equipment. From that point on American air losses mounted, even as NVN divisions began massing along the DMZ and infiltration into South Vietnam expanded to about 7,500 per month.

The Indian five-year elections in February gave Mrs. Gandhi the narrowest of victories, demonstrating the strength of factions alienated by her pro-American policies. Also, in February, the British Defense White Paper announced major cuts in British forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

In March, general elections were held in Saigon under the new constitution and Dr. Dang Van Sung, an eminent civilian, was elected President. Ky stepped down but continued to serve as Commander of South Vietnam's Air Force. Although the government included more civilians than ever before, it was quite obvious that the military clique would continue to exercise real power. American military operations reached a new peak, both in South Vietnam and in the air over North Vietnam. The Americans initiated offensive operations with two divisions in Military Regions #8 and #9 in the Delta during which a battalion of the newly arrived US 9th Infantry Division was cut to pieces in the bloodiest ambush of the war. NLF satisfaction was short-lived. At month's end, the Liberation Front sustained over 2,500 dead and twice that number of wounded in large American attacks at Tuy Hoa, Quang Tri and Vinh Long. These losses spurred Ho to continue his relentless demands for increased Chinese and Soviet economic and material support. The shortage of fuel for NVN motorized equipment has become one of his greatest concerns.

By April, over 500,000 American troops were operating in South Vietnam and the air offensive in the north had been expanded to include all major railroad marshalling yards except those in major urban centers. NVN infiltration into South Vietnam had kept pace, however, and the strengthening

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of local Liberation Front forces continued on a nation-wide basis. A major attack was conducted against the American logistics base at Cam Ranh Bay, killing 325 of the enemy, destroying masses of supplies, sinking a tanker and ammunition ship, and smashing a De Long pier.

In May, NVN MIGs mounted an all-out effort against US air missions over the country, destroying 21 American planes in two days. This was another blunder by Hanoi and the Americans responded with saturation attacks against all NVN airfields, destroying 30 MIGs and literally wiping out North Vietnam's air capability.

Later in May, enemy naval elements attacked newly improved radar facilities along the coast of North Vietnam with gunfire. A surprise commando raid by US, Korean and SVN marines smashed or captured radar equipment on Tiger Island.

During June, while disease and sagging morale slowed Liberation Front activities, the enemy also had difficulties. Sneak attacks by Thai insurgents caused damage to the American supply installation at Korat and to the air base at Udorn. The American press blossomed with stories from American soldiers, disgusted with corruption and inefficiency in the South Vietnamese government and condemning the unequal sacrifices required of American fighting units. The American cost of living soared and criticism of the Administration became sharper every day.

As US air losses mounted, the Americans launched powerful attacks against North Vietnamese hydroelectric plants at Thac Ba and Ban Thac. Western European, as well as communist and third-world opinion became increasingly apprehensive as the war in Asia escalated. Washington was flooded with appeals for peace.

While Western press media headlined a new black-market scandal in Saigon, the Americans pressed for negotiations through every diplomatic channel. Their President reiterated willingness to announce a withdrawal timetable for his forces if Hanoi would do the same and it was apparent that enemy desperation was growing.

In July, Buddhist monks formed for demonstrations against rising prices and corruption in Saigon and Hue even the build-up of Marshal Giap's forces was completed. Against the advice of many, -- both in South Vietnam and Hanoi -- his divisions prepared to cut the country in two.

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American intelligence was better than anticipated. Bad weather, upon which Liberation Forces had depended for concealment, unexpectedly cleared up. US Marine, air-mobile, air and naval forces were thrown into a giant spoiling attack while Guam based B-52s pounded NVN jump-off positions. Concurrent NLF irregular efforts were opposed by Popular Forces and ARVN units which offered unusually strong resistance. In a week of fighting, three NVN divisions -- the cream of North Vietnamese regular forces -- were thrown back, leaving not only dead but wounded, as well, to the enemy. NVN and NLF units withdrew toward the Laotian border in confusion as enemy air maintained a drumfire of destruction. Fuel shortages again caused severe problems. Veterans of Dien Bien Phu were stunned at American mobility, communications and the murderous ferocity of US air and artillery. The enemy claimed over 1,000 prisoners.

In Washington, announcing the military victory, the Secretary of Defense hinted strongly that the US force buildup in Vietnam had reached its peak. "From here on," he said, "it is a question of determination and perseverance". Anti-war elements were the target of his remarks for it was apparent those forces were coalescing and would become more shrill as Presidential elections approached.

American air attacks escalated in North Vietnam (in spite of mounting losses to sophisticated Soviet weapon systems) and in late July, heavy US blows fell on the steel plant at Thai Nguyen and three NVN coal mines -- the first such strikes of the war. Increasingly, American press coverage cited Soviet contributions to US losses.

Throughout the summer months, the Pathet Lao intensified their buildup in the Lao Panhandle.

In Saigon, allied military victories during July were overshadowed by a governmental crisis which followed removal of a Corps commander for corruption. Rumors of coups and counter-coups swept the capital and an American airborne brigade moved into the city to maintain order.

During August, as American air strikes against communications centers, industry and ports slowly mounted, US air losses from SAM and anti-aircraft artillery kept pace.

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Also, during August, enemy Headquarters announced deployment of Korean, Australian, New Zealand, South Vietnamese and American military units along the south side of the Demilitarized Zone as an international shield against invasion.

That same month, China detonated another nuclear device. The civilian headquarters of NATO shifted from Paris to London and De Gaulle called again for neutralization of Indo-China "before the fateful hour has passed".

After lengthy negotiations, conducted in secret, Hanoi and the Americans reached an understanding regarding a limited exchange of war prisoners. Acting through the Canadians, several North Vietnamese sailors, captured at sea by the US Navy, were exchanged for an equal number of seriously wounded American flyers, shot down over Vietnam. Similar discussions are underway regarding the possibility of additional prisoner exchanges.

On 3 September, secret orders were issued to the COFSVN by Hanoi, requiring the exfiltration of two NVN divisions from dispersed positions in South Vietnam and Laos, back to North Vietnam. It was indicated that they would be given an opportunity to reorganize and refit for next year's campaign. Orders were also issued to immediately curtail all offensive operations in South Vietnam.

Throughout most of South Vietnam the Liberation Front, through its cadres and solidly entrenched infrastructure, holds a grip on the local situation. The Americans have won their battles but the people of South Vietnam still do not support the puppet regime in Saigon.

Le Duan was dispatched to Moscow, on 4 September, with a brief stopover in Peking. He informed Chou En Lai and Gromyko that Ho Chi Minh had decided to de-escalate hostilities. He explained that Ho had issued secret orders directing exfiltration of two NVN divisions and initiated a demarche to Washington, through De Gaulle, asking for a halt in hostilities.

The personal visit to Moscow was reinforced, after initial misunderstanding, by the following cable from Ho:

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

Dear Leonid:

I find it distressing that you should deem it necessary to question the accuracy of the statements made by my personal representative. Due to the importance of the situation, however, I will explain personally the plans of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

1. Increased military pressures from the US have made it imperative that the DRV seek a respite in its war to free the people of South Vietnam. The DRV intends to seek negotiations as "the one step back" of Lenin's grand design. Our ultimate purpose remains unchanged.

2. I have ordered the withdrawal of two NVN divisions and requested the National Liberation Front to cease hostilities.

3. I intend to begin secret discussions prior to negotiations, through a private demarche to Washington, through De Gaulle.

4. I will demand an immediate US announcement of a cease-fire, a US force withdrawal schedule, and a US agreement to conduct truly free elections in South Vietnam.

I fervently hope that the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue its invaluable support during this phase of my continuing struggle to reunite my country.

HO

The following message was passed to President De Gaulle for the President of the United States:

Mon Cher General:

You have repeatedly suggested a willingness to act as intermediary between the Western intruders and the People of Southeast Asia in arrangement of preliminary talks and subsequent negotiations toward a settlement of our mutual problem.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

With this private communique, I propose to offer you such an opportunity.

I make the following offer for an immediate cease-fire and preliminary talks which, I prayerfully hope, will lead to a settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia:

1. My government has authorized me to secretly direct the immediate withdrawal of all NVN forces from SVN and adjacent areas. At the same time, I have respectfully requested our friends of the NLF to cease hostilities.

2. My government has further authorized me to seek a cease-fire, followed by preliminary talks with Washington, hopefully leading to negotiation of a mutually acceptable settlement.

In return, it is imperative that the United States government:

1. Immediately announce a cease-fire in Vietnam, including cessation of bombing attacks in the north.

2. Immediately announce a schedule for withdrawal of all US forces from Southeast Asia.

3. Guarantee the peoples of Vietnam, through the National Liberation Front, an opportunity to participate in truly "free" elections for a government of their choice.

With sincere gratitude and best wishes for your continued health, happiness and success, I remain,

Your humble servant,

Ho Chi Minh
President, DRV

The time is now 13 September 1967.

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM NVN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

DTG 131600 Sep 66

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. GVN -- It is assumed that the military will predominate as an indigenous political force in SVN and that this force will oppose negotiations with Hanoi. The military, however, will worry about loss of US support in the new situation but will be induced to meet the new challenge from Hanoi. There is a possibility that the political situation in SVN will fragment as a result of the Hanoi proposal and that a coup or coups will take place.

B. NLF -- The COPSVN will be reassured by Hanoi, regarding the new turn of events, and will use the respite to maintain and resupply its forces and to build up the concept of the NLF as the spokesman for the people of SVN.

C. CPR -- The Chinese are not interested in a direct confrontation with the US but are opposed to negotiations between Hanoi and the US/SVN. This position could cause Hanoi some difficulties, especially with respect to supplies arriving overland from China. However, the Chinese could be induced to go along, with Hanoi's assurance that it was adopting Lenin's strategy of "one step backward," and that political, as well as military steps could be used to achieve a Hanoi victory in SVN.

D. USSR -- The Soviets are strongly opposed to war with the US, desire the introduction of stability into the area and would thus favor negotiations. They would also favor the vigorous pursuit of political objectives in SVN and would probably oppose the resumption of military hostilities. If the latter should occur, the Soviets probably could be induced to support military effort by recognition of its role as a leader of the communist world.

E. USA -- The US is capable of maintaining and if necessary, increasing military pressure against the NLF and Hanoi. The US would be subject to very strong pressures from within and without the US, to agree to a cease-fire but would probably hold out for some sort of quid pro quo to insure that Hanoi had, in fact, withdrawn its forces. Some sort of ICC might be also considered here.

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II. OBJECTIVES

1. Reunify Vietnam under Hanoi control.
2. Gain period of respite for military and economic rehabilitation.
3. Maintain a political/military base in South Vietnam to protect and extend our position.
4. Induce withdrawal of foreign military forces from Southeast Asia

III. STRATEGY

Hanoi's basic strategy would be to use the period of the cease-fire to pursue vigorous political objectives in the south: namely to cause disarray amongst the Free World Forces (FWFs) and SVN government to encourage and support the NLF in its efforts to create confusion among political, economic and social groups in SVN, while at the same time, moving vigorously in the "grey areas" to exert or consolidate its influence and to be prepared to resume military operations in the event the political strategy was not successful. No particular time frame is considered for this activity but it is recognized that the longer the absence of military activity the more difficult the resumption of this activity, especially from the standpoint of world public opinion -- also, the longer the pause in military activity, the greater the problems of NLF morale, assuming of course, that Hanoi is not winning the political struggle.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Exert strong efforts to alienate the Buddhists, labor, youth groups and intellectuals from the SVN government and the US.
2. Insist on the withdrawal of all US forces inasmuch as Hanoi withdrew all its forces.
3. Exert every effort to have the USSR and CPR support the basic strategy underlying the cease-fire.
4. Push hard for the NLF as the only representative of the SVN people.

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B. Economic

1. Exert efforts for stepped-up economic aid from the USSR and CPR, especially food.
2. Repair communications and transportation facilities, industrial plants, utilities, irrigation systems, airfields, etc.
3. Disperse and stockpile materiel and supplies and re-supply NLF forces in SVN.

C. Psychological

1. Make big play of fact that this is Hanoi's peace initiative, to influence world opinion and to keep pressure on the US to meet the NVN demands.
2. Use US allies or De Gaulle, for example, to pressure US for a settlement on NVN terms.
3. Play up violations of the cease-fire, however minor, to put the US in a bad light and force it to give in to Hanoi demands.
4. Reassure NLF that Hanoi objectives have not changed -- only tactics -- and that NVN is still determined to reunify Vietnam under Hanoi control. Back up these assurances by tangible means with military and other supplies. Use other tactics, as appropriate, to keep USSR and CPR in a mood to continue support of Hanoi.

D. Military

1. Pull back two divisions to NVN for regroup, resupply, rest and preparation to resume the conflict if required.
2. NLF main forces pull back, to secure areas, for purposes of resupply, regroup and rest.
3. NLF should maintain control of its areas and extend control into "grey areas" where appropriate and feasible.

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V. CONTINGENCIES

1. If CPR does not go along with cease-fire and possible negotiations, NVN must ask USSR for increased aid, including shipment of materiel, supplies, food, etc., with object of playing off the USSR against the CPR.

2. If USSR is unhappy over the possibility of a resumption of military operations, in the event NVN political moves are unsuccessful, NVN must play on the split between the USSR and the CPR to keep the support of both sides.

3. If the GVN were to refuse NVN's offer of a cease-fire and possible negotiations, it would play into NVN hands by creating divisions between the GVN and USA -- NVN would try by every means, to widen this division.

4. If the NLF refused to agree to the cease-fire and possible negotiations, NVN would have to exert the requisite pressure to bring them along with it -- this could include the removal of certain NLF leaders and their replacement with those more amenable to NVN's position

5. If the US refused to stop bombing or military actions or withdrawal of its forces because of skepticism over NVN motives, NVN should, through secret emissaries, give the US assurances of NVN good faith or otherwise provide evidence that NVN is sincere.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

SIGMA I-66
INITIAL SCENARIO

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A-1 (YELLOW)

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INITIAL YELLOW SCENARIO

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

13 September 1967

The View from Peking: On 5 September 1967, Le Duan arrived in Peking and announced to Mao tse-tung, Lin Piao and other top Chinese leaders that Ho Chi Minh had decided to end the fighting. This decision was based on a series of disastrous military defeats in South Vietnam, fuel shortages, destruction in the North from American air attacks and a precarious food situation. The North Vietnamese leadership felt that this change in tactics, along with continued subversion in the South, would bring ultimate victory. Secret exfiltration orders had been given two NVN divisions and the NLF had been requested to halt hostilities. Le Duan stated that Hanoi was secretly informing President Johnson of these facts through the French, and offering to hold secret talks preliminary to negotiations. As quid pro quo, Ho was demanding that the US publicly announce a cease fire, including cessation of bombing in the North, prepare US forces withdrawal schedules as promised in President Johnson's September 1966 Detroit speech, and agree to free elections in the South.

During this last year the CPR leadership was plagued with increasing problems and pressures both at home and abroad. At home, serious shortages continued in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. Within the Party, dissension between "hard" and "soft" liners over Vietnam steadily increased. This dissension helped spark a struggle for power which ended with major changes in the Chinese hierarchy and the advancement of Lin Piao to the position of Mao's heir apparent.

A number of setbacks in the CPR's attempts to sow seeds of revolution among both Asian nations and the newly emerging African states contributed further to Peking's frustration. An added problem stemmed from the growing split with Russia, which deterred the revisionists in Moscow from acting in concert with the CPR to support Hanoi's struggle. In reaction against Russian intransigence there have been numerous delays in Soviet shipments being sent to North Vietnam across the China Mainland.

Peking has also had setbacks in relations with the North Vietnamese. She has been consistently, if subtly, criticized for delaying the arrival of Soviet goods and for not joining

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Hanoi fully in the struggle. Chinese leaders are still stung by North Vietnamese praise of the Soviet Union at the 23rd Party Congress - an event which Peking studiously avoided - and by Giap's trip to Moscow in August 1966.

The problems and hazards of growing military escalation in Vietnam continued to preempt the attention of Chinese leaders. The rigidity of the Chinese position on negotiations has consistently exceeded that of Hanoi despite the risk of escalation to the point where China herself might become directly involved. Even in the face of US successes, Peking has remained convinced that the social and political disarray in South Vietnam and continuation of present NLF/NVN tactics would in the end result in a Communist victory.

In South Vietnam, diseased, tired, and hungry -- morale among Liberation Front forces is low. South Vietnamese and Northerner, regular and guerrilla, the troops are weary. Recruiting has become coercion; volunteers include thirteen-year olds. Desertions have increased, and thousands of dispirited people seek sanctuary through Saigon's "Open Arms Program." The Americans continue massive air and ground blows -- pouring tons of bombs on suspected NLF sanctuaries, launching swift, murderous assaults on NLF forces wherever they concentrate, but government desertions are higher than the Front's.

NLF elements fighting in South Vietnam seek to avoid spoiling engagements to elude enemy search and destroy forces and to concentrate on the real war -- the struggle for support of the people. This has not always been the policy followed by NVN forces, to their great cost.

Background Events: In September 1966, NLF guerrilla efforts were aimed at impeding the SVN elections. Persuasion, terror, and threats were used to frustrate Saigon's encouragement of a large turn-out. Fraudulent counting and government lies combined to pad the results but the real facts were apparent to the people. Instead of the high percentage claimed by Ky in the Western press, no more than 30 percent of the electorate really supported the government. In order to placate world opinion, the so-called Constituent Assembly which emerged included a wider spectrum of political representation than any previous SVN government. In the following months, the puppets dutifully devised a blueprint for a parliamentary government led by a strong President -- similar to that of France. Ky and his Directorate, meanwhile, continued discharging orders of their American masters.

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A-3 (YELLOW)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

In a bitter meeting in late October, the General Assembly finally agreed to seat the People's Republic of China. Peking promptly rejected the offer and stated that China would not join until the Formosa clique had been expelled. In a New China News Agency report, Lin Piao stated that the CPR would never become a member of an organization dominated by the United States and the Soviet revisionists.

In November, the American elections saw an upsurge in the number of "hard-liners" elected to Congress and the Senate as the money-interests stirred public emotions "to end the war quickly".

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While inflation, logistical and administrative problems inundated Saigon and the American command, popular dissatisfaction was vented in Vietnam through riots and demonstrations in the cities. Much was said in Saigon and Washington about "winning the hearts of the people," but the real American interest lay in military victories. Powerful search and destroy operations were launched with over half the American and Korean maneuver battalions constantly in the field. SVN forces were largely relegated to "pacification efforts" supporting a poorly administered "Revolutionary Development Program" in areas considered clear.

Later in December, a Soviet mission consisting of Kosygin and Colonel General Uvarov, (anti-aircraft missile troop commander) paid an unexpected visit to Hanoi where agreement

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was reached for introduction of the SAM 2 and the FAN SONG E radar system. As was to be expected, the CPR was not informed of this visit in advance.

In January and February, torrential rains swept the Red River Delta wiping out half the rice crops. The accompanying lack of visibility cut sharply into American visual reconnaissance capabilities contributing to the buildup of improved Soviet missile and radar equipment. From that point on, American air losses mounted even as NVN divisions began massing along the DMZ and infiltration into South Vietnam expanded.

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A-5 (YELLOW)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

In May a MIG interdictory effort by NVN resulted in US strikes which virtually destroyed the NVNAF. Later in May, enemy naval elements attacked newly improved radar facilities along the coast of North Vietnam with gunfire. A surprise commando raid by US, Korean and SVN marines smashed or captured radar equipment on Tiger Island.

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American intelligence was better than anticipated. Bad weather, upon which Liberation Forces had depended for concealment, unexpectedly cleared up. US marine, air-mobile, air and naval forces were thrown into a giant spoiling attack while Guam based B-52s pounded NVN jump-off positions. Concurrent NLF irregular efforts were opposed by Popular Forces and ARVN units which offered unusually strong resistance. In a week of fighting, three NVN divisions -- the cream of North Vietnamese regular forces -- were thrown back, leaving not only dead but wounded, as well, to the enemy. NVN and NLF units withdrew toward the Laotian border in confusion as enemy air maintained a drumfire of destruction. Veterans of Dien Bien Phu were stunned at American mobility, communications and the murderous ferocity of US air and artillery. The enemy claimed over 1,000 prisoners.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-6 (YELLOW)

Page 6 of 8 Pages

In Washington, announcing the military victory, the Secretary of Defense hinted strongly that the US force buildup in Vietnam had reached its peak. "From here on", he said, "it is a question of determination and perseverance." Anti-war elements were the target of his remarks for it was apparent those forces were coalescing and would become more shrill as Presidential elections approached.

American air attacks escalated in North Vietnam (in spite of mounting losses to sophisticated Soviet weapon systems) and in late June heavy US blows fell on the steel plant at Thai Nguyen and three NVN coal mines -- the first such strikes of the war. Increasingly, American press coverage cited Soviet contribution to US losses.

Throughout the summer months the Pathet Lao intensified their buildup in the Lao panhandle.

In Saigon, allied military victories during July were overshadowed by a governmental crisis which followed removal of a Corps commander for corruption. Rumors of coup and counter-coups swept the capital and an American airborne brigade moved into the city to maintain order.

During August, as American air strikes against communications centers, industry and ports slowly mounted, US air losses from SAM and anti-aircraft artillery kept pace.

During August enemy Headquarters announced deployment of Korean, Australian, New Zealand, South Vietnamese and American military units along the south side of the Demilitarized Zone as an international shield against invasion from the North.

That month, China detonated another nuclear device. The civilian headquarters of NATO shifted from Paris to London and De Gaulle called again for neutralization of Indo-China "before the fateful hour has passed".

After lengthy negotiations, conducted in secret, Hanoi and the Americans reached an understanding regarding a limited exchange of war prisoners. Acting through the Canadians, several North Vietnamese sailors captured at sea by the US Navy were exchanged for an equal number of seriously wounded American flyers shot down over Vietnam. Similar discussions are believed to be under way regarding the possibility of additional exchanges of prisoners.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

The Chinese Embassy in Moscow has reported that Ambassador Harriman has arrived in Russia for important talks with Brezhnev. Rumors are circulating in the Russian capital that the Americans are going to impose a quarantine on all shipping into North Vietnam.

It is now 13 September 1967.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-8 (YELLOW)

Page 8 of 8 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CPR TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 1

REFERENCE Initial Yellow Scenario

MOVE NO. I

DTG 131700 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. North Vietnam

1. Needs a change of tactics.
2. Will maintain the same ultimate goal of dominating all Vietnam.
3. Will revert to Phase-one operations.
4. Will negotiate.
5. May try to exploit Sino-Soviet differences.

B. National Liberation Front

1. Is hurting badly.
2. Will accept NVN change of tactics.
3. Will demand place at conference table.
4. Fears isolation and sell-out by Soviets or Chinese.

C. United States

1. Will publicly accept negotiations and press for early conference.
2. Will accept other terms but will drag feet on cease-fire.
3. Will refuse to totally withdraw from Vietnam.
4. Will ultimately accept NLF participation in negotiations.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-9 (Yellow)

Page 1 of 3 Pages

D. Soviet Union

1. Will support Ho's proposal for peace negotiations.
2. Will aid NVN in order to strengthen Soviet influence.
3. Will call for joint consultation with Hanoi and Peking.
4. During negotiations will urge the NLF to seek peaceful path to power.

E. Government of South Vietnam

1. Will initially oppose negotiations but will ultimately be forced into negotiations by the United States.
2. After being forced to accept negotiations will not agree to NLF participation.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Long range

To increase our power and influence in Asia relative to the US and USSR and ultimately expel the US and USSR in order to bring to power genuine Marxists - Leninists.

B. Limited objectives

1. Insure a government in Hanoi, which is sympathetic to the long-range objectives and policies of the CPR.
2. Prevent the military collapse or surrender of North Vietnam and the Liberation Front.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS

Support Ho's offer for preliminary discussions but sabotage any possibilities for successful conclusion of any negotiations. Counterbalance, to the maximum extent possible, existing Soviet influence in North Vietnam and frustrate any Soviet attempts to increase their influence.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

1. Control Ho's moves during preliminary discussions with the Americans and during any subsequent negotiations.

2. Insist that there be no Soviet participation in any negotiations.

3. Insist on National Liberation Front representation in any SVN government.

4. Insist on CPR participation in any negotiations.

B. Economic

Promise massive economic aid to North Vietnam (rice, etc.).

C. Psychological

1. Attack through all media unreliability of Soviets and treachery of US.

2. In connection with movement of troops to borders (see paragraph D 1.) excite US fear of massive land warfare in Asia and put pressure on Ho to stay in line.

D. Military

1. Mass additional troops (at least 5 divisions) on NVN border.

2. Move Navy IL-28's into position to threaten Taiwan Straits and Gulf of Tonkin.

V. CONTINGENCIES

Specifically the contingency identified and the proposed China position is:

1. If the Soviets propose a joint Moscow-Peking-Hanoi conference, China will reject this proposal. We do not believe that the Soviets have a valid sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. Secondly, we believe that the Soviets will act in concert with the United States to weaken the NVN position and simultaneously continue to surround China.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-11 (Yellow)

Page 3 of 3 Pages

SIGMA I-66
INITIAL SCENARIO

The Scenarios for SIGMA I-66 are not intended to suggest that de-escalation of the war in SEA is either desirable or likely. These are aimed at illuminating some of the problems and opportunities which may be associated with moves toward a reduced level of hostilities. They are entirely hypothetical.

INITIAL RED SCENARIO

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

13 September 1967

The View From the Kremlin: On 7 September 1967, Le Duan arrived from Hanoi after a stop in Peking. He informed Gromyko at the Foreign Ministry that Ho Chi Minh had decided to de-escalate hostilities. He stated that Ho had issued secret orders directing exfiltration of two NVN divisions from South Vietnam. (The Main Intelligence Directory holds these to be the same units that were mauled in an action against US forces during the month of June.) Ho is making a demarche through the French to Washington. Le Duan made it clear that Giap had fallen from influence. To obtain further clarification, Podgorny cabled Ho directly, asking for a clear statement of his intentions.

On 9 September 1967, US Ambassador Kohler delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry stating that President Johnson asked Brezhnev to receive Ambassador Harriman as his personal representative on a matter of urgent importance. The note further requested permission for USAF Aircraft Number 26000 (the US President's Boeing 707), to penetrate at Riga on a direct flight from Washington, with clearance to land at Moscow VIP Airport Vnukovo II.

Permission was granted, Harriman arrived at 1700 yesterday (12 September 1967), and is scheduled to meet with Brezhnev at 1000 today in the Kremlin.

Over the last year, the war in Vietnam has continued and the US buildup has reached 500,000 troops. The ground war has not gone well for NLF and NVN forces, but US escalation of the air war has been blunted by introduction of more sophisticated PVO (Soviet Air Defense) equipment and better trained PVO technicians.

The Soviet people are increasingly restive over the possibility of the USSR becoming too involved in Vietnam. Talk of sending "volunteers" to help Ho Chi Minh has quietly been dropped from party organs as such talk caused cynical jokes. Communist membership is at a new high although Party hacks have been heard to complain about decreased quality. Komsomol enlistment lags due to cynicism among Soviet youth who strive to imitate Western fads with long hair and vulgar dances.

The economy progresses well although foreign exchange and lagging GNP growth cause some concern. Increasing production of consumer goods is beginning to meet demand. Libermanism which has solved many production problems has been "rectified" with the Marxist doctrine to the satisfaction of most Central Committee members. Brezhnev and Kosygin have forged a harmonious partnership.

In Vietnam, diseased, tired, and hungry -- morale among Liberation Front forces is low. South Vietnamese and Northerner, regular and guerrilla, the troops are weary. Recruiting has become coercion; volunteers include thirteen year olds. Desertions have increased, and thousands of dispirited people seek sanctuary through Saigon's "Open Arms Program". The Americans continue massive air and ground blows -- pouring tons of bombs on suspected NLF sanctuaries, launching swift, murderous assaults on NLF forces wherever they concentrate but government desertions are higher than the Front's.

NLF elements fighting in South Vietnam seek to avoid these spoiling engagements, to elude enemy search and destroy forces and to concentrate on the real war -- the struggle for support of the civil population by all possible means. This has not been the policy followed by NVN forces to their great cost.

Background Events: In September 1966, NLF guerrilla efforts were aimed at impeding the RVN elections. Persuasion, terror, and threats were used to frustrate Saigon's encouragement of a large turn-out. Fraudulent counting and government lies combined to pad the results but the real facts were apparent to the people. Instead of the high percent claimed by Ky in the Western press, no more than 30 percent of the electorate really supported the government. In order to placate world opinion, the so-called Constituent Assembly which emerged included a wider spectrum of political representation than any previous SVN government. In the following months, the puppets dutifully devised a blueprint for a parliamentary government led by a strong President -- similar to that of France. Ky and his Directorate, meanwhile, continued discharging orders of their American masters. In October that General Assembly of the United Nations voted to seat the Chinese People's Republic. Before the issue reached the Security Council, Peking angrily rejected the proposal unless the Chiang Kai Shek faction was expelled.

In November, the American elections saw an upsurge in the number of "hard-liners" elected to Congress as the money-interests stirred public emotions "to end the war quickly".

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

That month the first class of DRV aviators to graduate from the MIG-21 school at Vasilkov (south of Kiev) numbered twenty-five.

In Australia, the Liberal Party won a limp victory but their margin over Labour was so slim as to constitute a major restraint on future Australian efforts in Vietnam.

During December, the leadership of the Liberation Front was engaged in a bitter disagreement with Hanoi over strategy. The Central Office for South Vietnam (COFSV) recommended expansion of efforts to strengthen village and regional political and military infrastructures their objective was to further develop the strength and capabilities of liberation forces in small units -- scattered and elusive -- avoiding confrontation with the Americans -- hitting only weak and exposed SVN elements -- concentrating on terror and subversion. This was the concept of ants fighting elephants. Giap disagreed, his view prevailed, and instead of heeding COFSV advice, the high command began implementing Giap's plan. The decision was made to launch a main-force summer offensive to cut South Vietnam across its neck south of Hue.

While inflation, logistical and administrative problems inundated Saigon and the American command, popular dissatisfaction was vented in the cities through riots and demonstrations. Much was said in Saigon and Washington about "winning the hearts of the people" but the real American interest lay in military victories. Powerful search and destroy operations were launched with over half the American and Korean maneuver battalions constantly in the field. SVN forces were relegated to "pacification efforts" supporting a poorly administered "Revolutionary Development Program" in areas considered cleared.

At that same time, Kosygin travelled to Hanoi accompanied by Colonel General Uvarov (Anti-Aircraft Missile Troop Commander). An agreement was reached to provide the DRV with our latest model radar for the SA-2 system (FAN SONG E) plus early warning radars (Tall King) on the proviso that Soviet technicians henceforth exercise operational control over the entire DRV air defense system. These new equipments, along with a sizeable number of SA-2 missiles, were flown to Hanoi in January on AN-22 aircraft (huge aircraft introduced at 1965 Paris Air Show and similar to C-5) transiting New Delhi with an advertised cargo of food and medical supplies. This cover story was effective. The new missile and radar equipment was installed under the cover of weather that reduced enemy air activity over the DRV.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-4 (RED)

Page 4 of 9 Pages

In January and February, torrential rains swept the Red River Delta, wiping out half the rice crop. The accompanying lack of visibility cut sharply into American visual reconnaissance capabilities contributing to the buildup of improved Soviet missile and radar equipment. From that point on, American air losses mounted even as NVN divisions began massing along the DMZ and infiltration into South Vietnam expanded.

The Indian five-year elections in February gave Mrs. Ghandi the narrowest of victories, demonstrating the strength of factions who had been alienated by her pro-American policies. Also, in February the British Defense White Paper announced major cuts in British forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

In March general elections were held in Saigon under the new constitution and Dr. Dang Van Sung, an eminent civilian, was elected President. Ky stepped down but continued to serve as Commander of South Vietnam's Air Force. Although the government included more civilians than ever before, it was quite obvious that the military clique would continue to exercise real power. American military operations reached a new peak both in South Vietnam and in the air over North Vietnam.

The Americans initiated offensive operations with two divisions in Military Regions #8 and #9 in the Delta during which a battalion of the newly arrived US 9th Infantry Division was cut to pieces in the bloodiest ambush of the war. NLF satisfaction was short-lived. At month's end, the Liberation Front sustained over 2,500 dead and twice this number of wounded in American attacks at Tuy Hoa, Quang Tri and Vinh Long. These losses spurred Ho to continue his relentless demands for increased Soviet economic and materiel support. The shortage of fuel for NVN motorized equipment had become one of his greatest concerns.

By April, over 500,000 American troops were operating in South Vietnam and the air offensive in the North had been expanded to include all railroad marshalling yards except those in major urban centers. NVN infiltration into South Vietnam had kept pace, however, and the strengthening of local Liberation Front forces continued on a nation-wide basis. A major attack was conducted against the American logistics base at Cam Ranh Bay, killing 325 of the enemy, destroying masses of supplies, sinking a tanker and an ammunition ship, and smashing a De Long pier.

In May, DRV graduates of Vasilkov flew an all-out effort to intercept US air missions over the DRV. They acquitted

themselves well downing 21 US aircraft in two days. The MIG-21 proved to have a particular advantage in close quarters due to its cannons. US aircraft retaliated in a mass raid against DRV airfields destroying 30 MIGs and literally wiping out North Vietnam's air capability.

A US/SVN commando raid against Tiger Island led to the capture of a Tall King radar although Soviet technicians escaped by torpedo boat. The intelligence loss was minimal as all Tall Kings deployed to North Vietnam are modified to have different characteristics from those used by Soviet defense.

During June, while disease and sagging morale slowed Liberation Front activities, the enemy also had difficulties. Sneak attacks by Thai insurgents caused damage to the American supply installation at Korat and to the air base at Udorn. The American press blossomed with stories from American soldiers disgusted with corruption and inefficiency in South Vietnam and the unequal sacrifices of American fighting units. The American cost of living soared and criticism of the Administration became sharper every day.

As US air losses mounted, the Americans launched powerful attacks against North Vietnamese hydroelectric plants. Western European as well as communist and Third-world opinion became increasingly apprehensive as the war in Asia escalated and Washington was flooded with appeals for peace.

While Western press media headlined a new black-market scandal in Saigon, the Americans pressed for negotiations through every diplomatic channel. Their President reiterated willingness to announce a withdrawal timetable for his forces if Hanoi would do the same and it was apparent that enemy desperation was growing.

In July, Buddhist monks formed for demonstrations against rising prices and corruption in Saigon and Hue even while the buildup of Marshal Giap's forces for his summer offensive was completed.

American intelligence was better than anticipated. Bad weather, upon which Liberation Forces had depended for concealment, unexpectedly cleared up. US marine, air-mobile, air and naval forces were thrown into a giant spoiling attack while Guam based B-52s pounded NVN jump-off positions. Concurrent NLF irregular efforts were opposed by Popular Forces and ARVN units which offered unusually strong resistance. In a week of fighting three NVN divisions -- the cream of North Vietnamese regular forces -- were thrown back, leaving not only dead but wounded, as well, to the enemy. NVN and NLF

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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During August, as American air strikes against communications centers, industry and posts slowly mounted, US air losses from SAM and anti-aircraft artillery kept pace. That same month the US Headquarters in South Vietnam announced deployment of Korean, Australian, New Zealand, South Vietnamese and American military units along the south side of the Demilitarized Zone as an international shield against invasion.

The Chinese exploded another nuclear device. Sources in Ulan Bator reported that the device was dropped from a Tupolev 16 (medium bomber) and developed a yield several orders of magnitude higher than previous tests with very low atmospheric contamination.

The civilian headquarters of NATO shifted from Paris to London and DeGaulle called again for neutralization of Indo-China "before the fateful hours has passed."

After lengthy negotiations, conducted in secret, Hanoi and the Americans reached an understanding regarding the

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-7 (RED)

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exchange of war prisoners. Acting through the Canadians, several North Vietnamese sailors captured at sea by the US Navy were exchanged for an equal number of seriously wounded American flyers shot down over Vietnam. Similar discussions are believed to be underway regarding the possibility of additional exchanges of prisoners.

In early September, throughout most of South Vietnam, the Liberation Front, through its cadres and solidly entrenched infrastructure, continued to hold influence in the countryside. The Americans have won their battles but the people of South Vietnam still do not support the puppet regime in Saigon.

DeGaulle reiterated his call for the neutralization of Southeast Asia in a speech at Strasbourg.

Ambassador Drobrynin, in Washington, was instructed to inform Secretary Rusk that the Soviet Union might be in a better position to press Hanoi to negotiate if the US would extend greater recognition of the German Democratic Republic such as allowing the DRG to control the Berlin access routes. The response was bland.

It is now 1030 Moscow time, 13 September 1967. A cable has been received from Ho Chi Minh and Ambassador Harriman has tendered a note from the US President to Brezhnev in a Kremlin meeting. The texts of these two communications are reproduced below.

Ho Chi Minh Cable to Brezhnev:

"Dear Leonid

I find it distressing that you should question the accuracy of the statements made by my personnel representative. However, due to the importance of the situation, I will explain personally the plans of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

1. Increased military pressures from the US have made it imperative that the DRV seek respite in its war to free the people of South Vietnam. The DRV intends to seek negotiations as "the one step back" of Lenin's Grand Design. Our ultimate purpose remains unchanged.

2. I have ordered withdrawal of two NVN divisions and requested the National Liberation Front to cease hostilities.

3. I intend to begin secret discussions prior to negotiations in a private demarche to Washington through DeGaulle.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

4. I will demand an immediate US announcement of a ceasefire, a US force withdrawal schedule, and US agreement to conduct truly free elections in South Vietnam.

I fervently hope that the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue its invaluable support during this phase of our continuing struggle.

Ho"

President Johnson's letter to Brezhnev:

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

. . . It is increasingly clear that the material and technical support provided to the Government of North Vietnam by your government is one of the primary factors contributing to the escalation of this bloody conflict. As you are aware, it has become necessary for Free World forces in Southeast Asia to engage targets of industrial as well as direct military significance under conditions which bring weapons under the influence of Soviet citizens in North Vietnam into direct confrontation with those of the United States. This is an increasingly hazardous situation and one which I, for one, deeply regret.

For that reason Mr. Chairman as well as for reasons of common humanity, I ask you to review the current policies of the Soviet Union and discontinue your physical support of Hanoi's program. Further, I ask you once again to use what influence you have at your disposal to help create the necessary conditions for discussions aimed at a just settlement of this terrible conflict.

Unless the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics faces its responsibility as a world power and presses its fellow communist regime in Hanoi to negotiate an end to this bloody war, the great strides toward mutual understanding that you and I have labored arduously to achieve will be lost forever."

In a strongly worded personal statement to the Chairman, Ambassador Harriman indicated that pressures in the United States were building up to a point where it would be increasingly difficult to contain the conflict within present limits. He stated that without any doubt, the next step would be a Free World quarantine of North Vietnam which would block all imports other than food, relief and medical supplies and that this would inevitably involve a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is now, 13 September 1967.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-9 (RED)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM USSR TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. 1

REF. Initial Red Scenario

DTG 131700Z Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. US Position

1. Despite US military successes in South Vietnam in summer 1967, the basic political position of the US has deteriorated, and the US leadership now faces a real and immediate crisis of decision whether to de-escalate the war at cost of substantial concessions on the one hand or to escalate the war with serious risk of direct confrontation with the USSR on the other hand.

2. We estimate -- in light of pressures on the US administration to enter the presidential elections with tangible peace results and in light of US reluctance to increase its material commitments -- that the US will be prepared to make important concessions to get negotiations started.

3. At the same time, we estimate that there is real danger of a US decision to escalate along the lines indicated by Harriman if the terms of negotiation are presented too inflexibly from the communist side.

4. Specifically, the US will probably balk at Ho Chi Minh's 4th point unless it is somewhat modified to give the appearance of reciprocity.

5. Finally, the US will be placed in a difficult position to resist pressures for negotiation from both domestic and world opinion once it becomes known that North Vietnam has indicated its willingness to entertain negotiations. By the same token, the US will undoubtedly welcome the good offices of the Soviet Union as an "honest broker", and will therefore be amenable to paying a price for same.

B. Chinese Peoples Republic

1. Peking is fully aware of the crisis in Hanoi and of Ho's message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Our intelligence

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-10(RED)

Page 1 of 7 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

has not received reliable information on CPR intentions. The basic attitude of Peking dogmatists is assumed that of opposing termination of hostilities short of total US withdrawal without conditions. So long as Mao clique remains in power, hostility toward USSR also must be presumed.

2. In specifics, Peking dogmatists may try to further their Chauvinistic line by following alternate courses of action:

a. Greatly increase military support to NVN by introducing large numbers CPR combatant troops or conceivably offering nuclear weapons to NVN.

b. Attempt to thwart possibilities for negotiations, denigrate Soviet peace efforts etc.

c. Attempt to seize power in Hanoi from the true leaders of the DRV.

d. Offer to resolve differences with Soviet Union to form united anti-imperialist front to defeat US.

e. Try to seize initiative from USSR in negotiations by overtures to US.

3. While all of these alternatives are not mutually incompatible, the second is most likely. The first and the third directly threaten the Soviet position in NVN and eliminate the possibilities for fruitful negotiations with the US for these reasons, they must be taken into account. The fourth and fifth are less likely, but should be borne in mind.

C. DRV Position

1. Military reversals suffered by the NVA in South Vietnam, destruction caused by air strikes in DRV, and increased belligerence on part of CPR have convinced DRV of the need for a cease fire and negotiations. The DRV situation gives USSR more leverage than before in its influence over DRV. Ho Chi Minh's preconditions for negotiations are subject to some compromise. Nevertheless, DRV basic objective - unification - remains constant but now to be achieved by non-military means.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-1.1 (RED)

Page 2 of 7 Pages

D. Viet Cong Position

1. The Viet Cong probably calculates that it can continue to pursue its political objectives under the terms of Ho's letter.

2. It will seek for itself at negotiations a strong, if not dominant position among the South Vietnamese factions and will look to the USSR and the DRV to achieve this for it.

3. It will continue to pursue its program of political action in the countryside, and will look to the DRV, and indirectly to the USSR, to provide logistical support for this program. Terror and small unit actions will probably be de-emphasized at least in the early stages of negotiations.

4. The Viet Cong will probably oppose elections under international aegis, and will seek Soviet support to prevent or dilute foreign supervision. Failing this, it will use force to bring about favorable results.

E. Republic of Vietnam Position

1. The Government of SVN, bolstered by the success of US forces, the reluctance of the NLF to engage in large scale engagements and the withdrawal of two NVN Divisions, will attempt to persuade the US not to enter into negotiations but to escalate the war and carry on until final victory. The Government will attempt to disrupt negotiations by creating incidents and publicly advocating invasion of the North to secure Vietnam re-unification. It is not expected that the RVN will be successful in influencing or preventing the US from entering into negotiations. Nor will the SVN Government be able to continue the war on its own.

II. USSR OBJECTIVES

A. Avoid direct confrontation with US forces which might lead to war.

B. Isolate CPR from NVN and strengthen Soviet position in world communist movement.

C. Act as NVN intermediary, advisor and protector in negotiations.

D. Assume "peace-maker" role in order to (a) enhance Soviet prestige throughout the world, and (b) to specifically advance USSR image and influence throughout SEAsia.

E. Decrease US influence throughout SEA.

F. Force as many concessions as possible from US.

G. Produce "detente" atmosphere which will lead towards further weakening at NATO and diffusion at WE unity.

III. STRATEGY

A. To take advantage of the opportunity to become a broker between the US and North Vietnam in order to get negotiations under way.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. With US: Tell Harriman:

a. On question of Soviet assistance to DRV which is discussed in President's letter, the USSR reserves to itself the right to determine what aid it will provide.

b. On question of quarantine: Obliquely refer to countermeasures. State that quarantine would make it very difficult to work for peace.

c. Then tell Harriman that question of peace has immediate importance:

(1) Have learned that the DRV is interested in talks.

(2) Chinese will try to block talks. It is necessary to show DRV that US is genuinely interested in peace by an immediate indication of interest in talks with Hanoi.

(3) If the US is interested in negotiations, the USSR will act as a middleman. In that capacity the USSR will transmit to Hanoi the US position, and in turn will transmit Hanoi's response to the US maintaining necessary secrecy of the dialogue.

d. Harriman will ask for specifics:

(1) Will not mention Ho's letter but show vague awareness of Ho's willingness to talk.

(2) Will state that DRV's 4 Points and Viet Cong's 5 Points no longer a sticking point.

2. To DRV: Need to displace de Gaulle as middleman:

a. USSR to cable Hanoi with these questions:

(1) Will you accept Soviet good offices?

(2) Will you take same steps you ask of US?

(3) Are you ready for private talks with US leading to eventual negotiations?

b. Suggest to Hanoi the use of publicity to place pressure on US.

c. Assure DRV of continued economic and military aid.

3. To CPR: If Hanoi responds favorably to questions (2a (1), (2) and (3)), inform Chinese that DRV has requested USSR to approach the US concerning possible preliminary talks on the Vietnam war.

B. Military

1. At this stage of the negotiations, and pending outcome of the exchange of letters with Hanoi and Washington we will:

a. Continue build-up of NVN air defenses.

b. Replace aircraft destroyed by US air attack on NVN airfields.

c. Provide equipment for rebuilding of NVN air bases.

C. Psychological

1. Continue world-wide campaign against US bombing of DRV and calls for ending of bombing.

2. Prepare for briefings of world Communist Party leaderships in order to enlist their support vis-a-vis Hanoi to get the negotiations moving under Soviet direction - Make clear that this Soviet activity as an intermediary is at Hanoi's request.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. If Hanoi rejects our offer to act as mediator, we will accept the NVN's desire to have France present a demarche to Washington and will exploit this course of action to further the Soviet image as a peace-loving nation.

B. If Hanoi refuses to agree to a cease-fire and to publish a withdrawal schedule, the situation reverts to that prevailing before the soundings for negotiations.

C. If negotiations are not begun and the US imposes a quarantine, we should prepare to do the following:

1. Announce large-scale naval maneuvers in Pacific.

2. Announce large-scale Warsaw Pact exercises in Eastern Europe and begin a graduated harassment of access routes to West Berlin.

D. If the US escalates the SEA war further, we will then reassess our position.

E. If the DRV agrees to a cease-fire and negotiations, we should:

1. Make public the fact that the DRV has agreed to negotiate with US and that Alma Ata is a suitable place for such talks.

F. If CPR offers military aid to DRV, we should attempt to dissuade Hanoi from accepting it, pointing out that Hanoi's independence would be threatened and that escalation of the war would surely ensue.

G. If CPR offers to join USSR in united front against US to save NVN, offer should be officially neglected and unofficially ridiculed.

H. If CPR offers to participate in negotiations, USSR should try to keep them from playing a major role.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

I. If the CPR invades NVN and/or attempts to overthrow Ho's regime:

1. USSR will issue stern warning to CPR.
2. Alert divisions for movements into Central Asia, the Maritime Provinces, and possibly Outer Mongolia.
3. Wait and watch for US reaction.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A-16 (RED)

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MOVE II

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171500 Sep 67

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

WORLD NEWS

During the last four days, peace rumors have dominated discussions regarding the war in Southeast Asia. It is widely believed in Saigon, and throughout South Vietnam, that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces have discontinued offensive hostilities and that NVN forces are withdrawing from SVN to NVN. Journalists from American as well as other nations have given eye-witness accounts of such withdrawals, and US officials in SVN, have been quoted, off the record, confirming aerial observation of ground movements toward the north.

ICC members in SVN unofficially confirmed the initiation of withdrawal of all NVN forces from the south, corroborating a unilateral halt in offensive action by the Viet Cong.

Washington, so far, has refused to comment upon rumors of peace overtures from Hanoi but a rash of stories are circulating in world capitals regarding an alleged cessation of hostilities, ordered by both Hanoi and the Viet Cong in hope of reciprocal United States action. There has been no official indication of a discontinuance or, for that matter, even a letup in Free World military action. Both the ground and air war continue to be pressed in Vietnam.

In a feature story in this afternoon's NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, however, eye-witness testimony from GIs and junior officers of the US 1st Air Mobile Division allege that North Vietnamese units withdrawing to the north had been under observation but had not been attacked for two days although they were highly vulnerable to ground and air strikes. Field commanders scoffed at this and the Pentagon denied the story.

US carrier pilots operating from Yankee Station in the South China Sea report heavy anti-aircraft fire over targets in

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North Vietnam. The US Department of Defense announced loss of two Navy and one Air Force aircraft during the last week. No planes were lost to missiles, which continue to be employed in defense of NVN targets.

Asked whether he believed that there was a tacit cease-fire in effect, one Texas Lieutenant JG said, "If that flak they were throwing up today was for an armistice, they sure were having one hell of a celebration".

The President conferred with Congressional leaders in a secret meeting at the White House last night and is understood to have exchanged heated remarks with some senior Senators. There has been no statement or even unattributable leak to this moment on the nature of the dispute. Speculation is rife that there is a bitter battle going on within the Administration over whether or not to discontinue air attacks against North Vietnam.

There have been rumors in Paris that President deGaulle has served as an intermediary in initiation of a dialogue between Washington and Hanoi. These rumors have been officially denied by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and by State Department spokesmen in Washington.

Acting on the belief that firm peace proposals have been made by the Communist side, various peace groups in the United States and around the world have initiated demonstrations and mass meetings. A barrage of messages has descended on government leaders demanding both an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam and the cessation of US offensive action against the Viet Cong.

It has been announced, within the last hour, that Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom will arrive in Washington tomorrow for consultation with the President.

The leader of the Australian Labour Party has roundly criticized the United States for continuing to bomb North Vietnam in the face of a clear desire by the Communist side to discontinue hostilities. He quoted reports from members of the Australian Forces in Vietnam that the National Liberation Front, and their supporters from North Vietnam, were withdrawing, avoiding military contact and awaiting similar action by Free World Forces so that peace talks could begin.

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He bitterly criticized Washington for apparent unwillingness to fulfill the pledge which had been made on so many occasions that the United States would "engage in negotiations to end the war without preconditions of any kind" and called for withdrawal of Australian forces from SEA.

In Saigon, three days of civil struggle between the SVN government and internal conspirators, accused of planning to seize control of the country and negotiate a settlement with the Viet Cong, have ended as rapidly as they began. In a swift roundup of alleged plotters, including perhaps a score of members of the National Assembly itself, the RVN government purged its ranks. Declaring a State of National Emergency under Article VII of the new constitution, Dr. Sung discharged his Minister of Defense and replaced him with Air Marshal Ky. He invested Ky with special emergency powers as Premier which made him effectively the head of State until relieved of this authority by the National Assembly; this decision was ratified by a hastily assembled mid-night session of the National Assembly.

As US airborne forces rumbled out of Saigon (at Ky's request) in an obvious move to avoid involvement in the Vietnamese power-struggle, Ky's elite body guard was moving in along with paratroop and Special Forces units, arresting scores of officials at all levels of government on charges of coup plotting.

The US Embassy and COMUSMACV maintained a strict hands-off, no-comment position but one US aircraft is alleged to have buzzed a compound manned by a battalion of ARVN infantry which refused to turn in its arms after being surrounded by RVN paratroops. In a fire-fight which took place before the buzzing, several mortar rounds, fired by the dissidents, had fallen in the COMUSMACV #2 (J-5) compound.

Hanoi, Peiping and other Communist radio and information media have initiated an around-the-clock barrage of vituperation aimed at the United States in a hundred languages. The basic theme is the same: The people of Vietnam are tired of the war. They wish peace. The Liberation Front has discontinued fighting and Ho Chi Minh has offered peace but the Americans have arrogantly refused his offers and are stepping up their murderous attacks against defenseless women and children.

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Two prominent, moderate members of the National Assembly who had been elected during the nationwide elections of February appeared in Phnom Penh today and castigated Ky and his supporters as "tools and henchmen of the Americans, who sacrifice the blood of their countrymen to fight a foreign war".

Prince Sihanouk echoed their allegations in a radio broadcast condemning the United States for not accepting the "Generous peace offer being made by the National Liberation Front".

In three incidents during the last two days, US forces have been involved in fire fights with troops wearing ARVN uniforms who attacked American vehicles and compounds. In one case a young US corporal was released following a brutal beating after being told in English by an officer in ARVN uniform to, "Go home. The people of Vietnam have had enough bleeding in a struggle for American imperialists."

Ambassador Dobrynin, of the USSR conferred briefly this afternoon with Secretary of State Rusk and is believed to have delivered a strongly worded note from the Kremlin. An authoritative source, close to the Soviet Embassy who requested that he not be identified, stated that US/Soviet relations "for the next one hundred years may well be determined during the next few fateful hours".

Walter Lippmann, who resumed writing his column after an extended visit to Southeast Asia and Western Europe, wrote a scholarly review today of events leading up to the present situation. He pointed out mistakes and over-optimism on both sides which had contributed to escalation. He concluded somberly stating that, "The hundreds of American pilots who have been shot down by Soviet weapons in North Vietnam and the thousands of Americans who have died under fire from Chinese weapons in South Vietnam are only the vanguard of millions who may suffer horrible and untimely ends as this remote struggle engulfs the world's mightiest powers. If an effort is not made to settle this stupid war, little more will be required to ignite all of Asia and then the world in thermonuclear holocaust. This is a moment for statesmanship and a clear grasp of history."

In a syndicated article in LIFE, a prominent columnist suggested the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons on the real perpetrators of aggression in Asia -- North Vietnam and Red China.

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Reports by foreign correspondents from Hanoi indicate that Red China has begun moving military forces up to the North Vietnamese border. An Indian reporter, just arrived from the North Vietnamese capital, quoted a confidential remark of a high ranking officer that the DRV high command was concerned that the Chinese army was preparing to enter the country "in a protective occupation".

Similar reports are circulating in Taiwan, Hong Kong and elsewhere but there has been no confirmation from United States official sources. The US Secretary of Defense refused to comment on the subject when questioned on the Pentagon steps, and smilingly elbowed his way through a crowd of reporters.

In Chicago, prominent civil rights leaders shifted the theme from their own cause to make a plea for the restoration of "hard won civil liberties in South Vietnam where another dictatorship is being established to perpetuate the war". Calling upon President Johnson to support constitutional government in South Vietnam, an impromptu protest march was begun. It ended in the Loop amid disorders and arrests of both marchers and hecklers including Lincoln Rockwell and three of his Storm Troopers.

Radio Hanoi announced that US Navy planes had destroyed one hospital and part of an orphanage in the suburbs of Hanoi and flooded foreign press media with photographs depicting casualties in pitiful detail.

US public affairs officers in Vietnam issued statements detailing military actions during the past twenty-four hours. They reported the same number of search and destroy operations as were conducted during the last period but there has been a delay in release of US, RVN, other Free World and enemy ground casualty figures.

Press attempts to extract official statements from the foreign ministries of America's principal allies, have for the most part, been turned away with crisp "No comments". In Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, guarded statements were issued by high ranking officials indicating hope that the United States and her allies intend to continue military pressure against the communists until they had been decisively beaten, and would not accept another "phoney peace" such as the one at Panmunjom.

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Arriving at his new office in a white flying suit, looking even more debonair without his mustache, Marshal Ky said of the enemy, "It is a proverb in every culture to beware of the wounded jackal. That is when he may be most dangerous. Kindness is a luxury we can no longer afford."

Late editions of Saigon newspapers announced a governmental decree raising military and civil service salaries by 30 per cent including a statement by the Finance Minister that a special task force was being organized in the government to audit income tax returns.

At the conclusion of his address to the Economic Club of New York last night, Secretary Rusk stated, "Negotiations in Southeast Asia, if and when they are initiated, do not simply mean the end of hostilities. The American people and the American government have learned from long, bitter experience at conference tables from Yalta to Panmunjom that in Communist minds negotiations are merely an extension of the conflict. If and when we succeed in bringing the other side to a conference table, we must be wary and alert that we do not lose the fruits of military gains which have already been purchased at such a heavy price." In closing, the secretary reiterated that the President's Baltimore proposals for wide-ranging economic development and reconstruction in SEA remain a major US goal.

Official Government Information

On 13 September, the French Ambassador in Washington pointed out that the Hanoi government had asked Paris to serve as a third party in discussions with the United States and delivered the following extract of a note from Chairman Ho to President deGaulle:

"I make the following offer for an immediate cease-fire and preliminary talks which, I prayerfully hope, will lead to a settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia:

1. My government has authorized me to secretly direct the immediate withdrawal of all NVN forces from SVN and adjacent areas. At the same time, I have respectfully requested our friends of the NLF to cease hostilities.

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2. My government has further authorized me to seek a cease-fire, followed by preliminary talks with Washington, hopefully leading to negotiation of a mutually acceptable settlement.

3. In return, it is imperative that the United States government:

a. Immediately announce a cease-fire in Vietnam, including cessation of bombing attacks in the north.

b. Immediately announce a schedule for withdrawal of all US forces from Southeast Asia.

c. Guarantee the peoples of Vietnam, through the National Liberation Front, an opportunity to participate in truly "free" elections for a government of their own choice."

The US notified Ho through the French that it had received his note and is interested in discussing his proposal further on a secret and bilateral basis directly with the DRV at a place and time convenient to Ho. As the result of this and other approaches through the USSR and directly between representatives of the US and DRV in other capitals, a secret meeting was conducted between emissaries of the two countries on 16 September. The US representative provided a list of questions concerning Ho's proposal as follows:

1. What does "cease-fire" mean? When would it go into effect?

2. What system would be used to validate withdrawal? (mechanics of inspection, etc.)

3. Will the GVN be able to execute its authority throughout the entire area of SVN during the cease-fire? (commerce, travel, police, armed forces patrol)

4. What is the proposed timetable of NVN and US action to bring the hostilities to an end?

5. Can NVN guarantee VC cooperation?

6. What will be the status of the NLF in the final negotiations?

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7. What does Ho mean by withdrawal from adjacent areas? Does this include Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand?

8. What kind of election is Ho talking about?

9. What does Ho mean by withdrawal of US forces from SEA?

Ho Chi Minh's representative stated that the Hanoi government was willing to publicly announce the withdrawal of all NVN forces from South Vietnam and Laos and that the NLF had already ceased hostilities. The DRV is willing to allow impartial verification of the troop withdrawal. In return, the governments of the United States and South Vietnam will be expected to immediately discontinue all military activity against North Vietnam, including bombing. Public announcement by both sides should be considered as evidence of good faith.

It is generally understood in intelligence circles that the NVN is actually withdrawing elements of at least two NVN divisions but is continuing the infiltration of supplies and replacement equipment to its forces in SVN. In fact, a French journalist reporting on discussions with Vietnamese military spokesmen quoted an official as saying, "After all, the Americans are continuing to support their forces in South Vietnam. We could hardly be expected to deny our South Vietnamese brothers requisite medical and relief supplies."

US and allied reconnaissance has confirmed the fact that three squadrons of IL-28 BEAGLE Bombers have been redeployed from Central China to bases in Southeast China and that Red Chinese troops are massing on the North Vietnamese border.

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FROM CONTROL TO US

MESSAGE NO. 3

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171700 Sep 67

In a meeting with the Hanoi contact it was strongly implied that the primary objective of North Vietnam in any negotiations will be the withdrawal of all US forces from Vietnam and surrounding countries as a quid pro quo for Hanoi withdrawing all of its forces, and the acknowledgement by the United States of the National Liberation Front as the only representative of the SVN people

Yesterday Gromyko passed the following message to Ambassador Harriman at a meeting in Moscow:

"The USSR rejects the language of your letter as inconsistent with universally accepted norms of diplomacy. The USSR reserves to itself the right to determine what aid it will provide to nations seeking to defend themselves. Any US attempt to quarantine the DRV will evoke thoughts of countermeasures and frustrate arrangements for peaceful negotiations.

Of immediate importance is the question of peace. The USSR has learned that the DRV is interested in talks. We feel that the CPR may attempt to block talks, therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate that the US is genuinely interested in peace by an immediate response to the DRV overture. If the US is interested, the USSR will act as a go-between maintaining the necessary secrecy of the dialogue."

At a secret meeting in Saigon last night, Ambassador Lodge assured Premier Ky that the United States government intends to obtain iron-clad guarantees before concessions are made to Ho. Pointing out that his government is under great pressure to discontinue the air attacks against NVN and to halt the ground war, the Ambassador added, "There is no intention of taking the pressure off Hanoi until we are satisfied they are sincere." Marshall Ky replied that his government is opposed to de-escalating the war and that now is not the time to negotiate. As the meeting progressed, Premier Ky passed on the following information:

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a. Two major figures in the commercial community in Saigon and Hue have been identified as accomplices in a gigantic diversion of US economic and logistical shipments to the VC. The exposure resulted from authentic evidence provided by a VC defector.

b. It is obvious to the GVN that the VC, through their agents, are attempting to stir up active riots and demonstrations among Buddhists, militant groups, students and labor unions. To date, firm actions by the authorities (curfew, etc.) have prevented major incidents.

c. With the opening of business on 18 September the piaster will be devalued in a massive move to counter the disastrous inflation which undermines the South Vietnamese economy.

d. Premier Ky stated that he would count upon unqualified American support to quickly restore Saigon's control over the political situation throughout the country and that this would require rather drastic action including the removal of some prominent moderate figures.

e. He intends to expand both the amnesty programs for the Viet Cong and selective quiet approaches to NLF leaders to draw them away from the Liberation Front.

f. He expressed his appreciation for US cooperation in the rapid withdrawal of the US airborne brigade from Saigon.

g. The GVN proposes establishing a ceiling on GVN and US expenditures to limit spending to only the highest priority programs pointing out the present effort to advance so many disparate programs on an accelerated basis was resulting in the total defeat of all projects. He said that this competitive effort to "build Rome in a day" was contributing in a most serious manner to inflationary pressures.

h. Several RVN regiments are being redesignated as constabulary units -- in effect a National Gendarmerie which could cope more effectively with internal security problems as police forces rather than as combat units.

A suggestion by Ky that responsible GVN officials initiate quiet talks with the Soviets on a bilateral basis was diplomatically discouraged by Ambassador Lodge who indicated

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that communications channels were presently loaded. Ky responded with a statement that the RVN government would favor multilateral negotiations (e.g., renewal conference of 1954 Geneva accord states) if preliminary talks actually lead to formal negotiations.

A secret report prepared by a Special Select Committee cautions the President that the North Vietnamese "peace proposal" could be a cynical attempt to take the heat off North Vietnam, to de-escalate military action in South Vietnam so that the Viet Cong could rebuild their units and proselyte new members, to force a reduction or possible withdrawal of Free World forces and to divide the United States and its allies. It is the considered judgement of some of the most responsible and knowledgeable men in government that Hanoi has no actual intention of withdrawing all of its forces or ever permitting free elections in South Vietnam. They recommend, rather than making further overtures toward Hanoi to begin discussions, that Ho and his government be made the real target of the Free World war effort.

In a second report, a special interagency working group presented a recommendation that the United States insist that, in any negotiations over the war in SEA, the discussions encompass a far wider settlement than just Vietnam and Laos in order to insure that all the countries of this rich strategic area have an opportunity to develop into modern societies in peace and freedom.

The following US policy statement is on the President's desk awaiting approval:

"If North Vietnam will publicly announce and, in fact, execute under some form of impartial inspection the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and adjacent areas to North Vietnam and will publicly request the NLF to cease hostilities, the US and South Vietnam will suspend military activity against North Vietnam, including bombing."

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FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 8

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 Sep 67

In addition to responding to other material contained in first scenario projection and in individual messages from Control to your team, it is requested that you determine your national position on the following subjects. It is requested that your views be presented in a manner which briefly but clearly indicates to Control your initial bargaining position and your final fall-back position.

1. Preliminary (pre-negotiation) Discussions:

- a. Your pre-conditions for such discussions, if any.
- b. Your position with respect to principle participants. (US/GVN and NVN; GVN and DRV; VC and GVN; etc.).
- c. Site for discussions.
- d. Observers.
- e. Intermediaries (?)

2. Formal Negotiations:

- a. Pre-conditions for negotiations (suspension/reduction of hostilities or buildup; embargo; etc.).
- b. Forum (Geneva '54, '62; United Nations; Asian Conference; bilateral).
- c. Participation (including observers).
- d. Secret or public; open or closed.
- e. Time limits to obtain acceptable agreements.
- f. Scope of negotiations (North and South Vietnam; Indo-China; Mainland Southeast Asia; Asia).

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3. Cease-fire:

- a. Explicit definition.
- b. Pre-condition for "cease-fire".
- c. Is freedom of movement for GVN and other forces in RVN required? What restrictions? Are there excluded areas?
- d. Is a freeze-in-place acceptable? Under what circumstances? Types of military and para-military forces to be included and time limits.
- e. Any requirement for a warning period before imposition of freeze-in-place.

4. Inspection and Control (Safeguards):

- a. Supervisory element (ICC, United Nations, Asian Nations).
- b. Reconnaissance and surveillance (by whom and where). State requirements under situations of reduction or suspension of hostilities; force withdrawals; embargos; referenda or elections.
- c. Resolution of disputes.

5. GVN Sovereignty:

Restructions on GVN access to country to restore law and order and deal with residual VC and banditry.

6. Withdrawals:

Acceptable quid-pro-quo for withdrawal or neutralization of NVA/VC and US/FW/GVN forces; acceptable rate of withdrawal.

7. Status of NLF/VC:

Acceptable status of NLF/VC in negotiations, in cease-fire, in post-hostilities environment.

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8. Communist/US Withdrawal from SEA:

Acceptable Communist/US presence in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand (troops, bases, and sanctuaries).

9. Elections:

Requirement for free elections:

- a. South Vietnam.
- b. North Vietnam.
- c. North and South Vietnam as prelude to unification.

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FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 9

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171750 Sep 67

The secret meeting of emissaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was held on 16 September 1967 in Prague, Czechoslovakia at the Ambassador level.

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM US TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171800 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE

A. The initial estimate in Message 1, Move I remains essentially the same.

B. The developments culminating in the secret meeting of US and NVN emissaries on 16 September 1967 in Prague allow us to refine our estimate as follows:

1. NVN and the VC are hurting from GVN/FW military pressure and genuinely desire to de-escalate the war.

2. Pressures from world opinion impinge more on the US than on NVN. US public opinion is an important factor operating on the US government's negotiation stance.

3. Leaks that preliminary discussions are in progress can and probably will occur.

4. Despite the CHICOM build-up near the NVN border, intervention by Communist China is unlikely.

5. Ky's return to the political scene promotes stability in SVN for the present. GVN cooperation, though not assured on every negotiating point, is expected as discussions proceed.

II. OBJECTIVES

US objectives remain as stated in Blue Message No. 1, Move I.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS

A. The strategies open to the US boil down to three:

1. Break off the Prague discussions.

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2. Continue Prague discussions seeking specific answers to the U.S. nine questions before committing United States to any course of action (military actions against both NVN and VC/PAVN in SVN continue).

3. Accept Ho's 16 September proposal upon his agreement to our "verification of PAVN withdrawal procedure" (see Tab A), and firm up date/hour for simultaneous US announcement of suspension of bombing and DRV announcement of initiation of verified DRV troop withdrawal from SVN and Laos, together with DRV announcement that NLF had already ceased hostilities.

B. The US team will pursue the latter strategy.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. US Ambassador in Prague meets at once with DRV Ambassador, presents troop verification procedures (Tab A), and announces that upon DRV's acceptance of these procedures (reasonable adjustments will be accepted by the US, but not drawn-out negotiations over details), US is prepared to agree upon early date for simultaneous public announcements from Washington and Hanoi, as per the DRV's proposal of 16 September

2. Without prejudicing the action in sub paragraph 4.A.1, above, our Ambassador is instructed to press for an early answer to our nine questions which we tabled at the 16 September meeting.

3. Defer, for the time being, any reply to the Soviet offer to act as mediator between the US and the DRV.

4. Keep GVN fully informed (on a highly restricted basis) of progress of the negotiations and seek their continued cooperation.

5. Inform our Allies, through diplomatic channels, of the progress of the negotiations. Give priority to those Allies whose troops are fighting with us in SVN.

6. Authorize our Ambassador in Prague to suggest (if he considers it appropriate) that if the DRV is faced with

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the threat of a "protective occupation" by CPR troops, that the USG would be prepared to entertain a DRV request for assistance in maintaining its territorial and political integrity.

B. Economic

1. Accelerate shifting responsibility for maintaining law and order away from GVN military forces towards the strengthened constabulary.

2. With the GVN, immediately begin firming up plans for:

a. Redeploying military forces to fill the vacuum at the village level in order to support expanded revolutionary development activities.

b. Stepping up AID support in formerly contested and VC dominated areas.

c. Shifting the activities of military units from military operations to civic action.

d. Setting up a new Ministry of National Development to carry out long-range goals to meet the hopes and aspirations of all sectors of the SVN community, including former VC.

e. Using the revolutionary development cadre as a means for meeting the short-range needs of the people of SVN.

C. Psychological

1. Secretary Rusk makes a speech restating the US desire for a settlement on Vietnam while at the same time flagging the dangers of an over-hasty cease-fire. No new points should be raised; the main emphasis should be that the US is constantly exploring all avenues to peace.

2. US government prepares a contingency statement for use by the President in event of a leak which:

a. Confirms that US and NVN are discussing de-escalation.

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b. Gives NVN credit for making the first move and tells what has been proposed.

c. States that the NVN proposal has merit and could lead to desirable de-escalation.

d. Points out that, in view of importance of issues and lessons of Korea, US feels it is prudent before stopping bombing to get reasonable satisfaction on several practical questions which we have asked NVN.

3. US government prepares a statement for use by the President to announce cessation of bombing when agreement is reached. Clear statement with GVN and Allies who are prevy to discussions. Text attached as Tab B.

4. GVN/FW launch a massive psyops campaign in SVN emphasizing:

a. Amnesty (Chieu Hoi) for VC/NVA members.

b. Opportunities for reconstruction in SVN once there is peace.

D. Military

1. Inform all US/GVN/Allied troops of the agreed verification and PAVN troop withdrawal plan (Tab A).

2. Maintain current level of military effort until President issues his public statement of specifying the exact date/hour the agreement becomes effective.

3. Maintain aerial surveillance over NVN, Laos, and SVN as a part of the withdrawal/verification plan. Air surveillance over NVN to be conducted at high and medium altitudes.

4. Institute strategic deployments of land, sea, and air forces to offset the CHICOM build-up on the border of NVN.

V. CONTINGENCIES

IF

The GVN refuses to cooperate in negotiations.

US WILL

Proceed unilaterally.

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IF

Ho refuses proposed
course of action and/or
offers a counter-proposal.

Negotiations are leaked
by NVN or third party.

CHICOMs intervene in NVN.

US WILL

Maintain current level of
military action; study the
counter-proposal; be pre-
pared to independently
release information on
negotiations to public if
world and US pressures
dictate.

Be prepared to immediately
confirm by appropriate
release.

Await development of degree
and type of intervention.
Be prepared to take appro-
priate diplomatic and/or
military action.

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TAB A

WITHDRAWAL AND VERIFICATION CONCEPT

Attached map delineates specific routes of guaranteed safe conduct and aerial/naval ports of embarkation for the withdrawal of NVN forces (map omitted for game purposes) from SVN and Laos. Modifications of this map to conform to the existing tactical situation on the ground at the time of the withdrawal are acceptable provided they are coordinated in advance. US/GVN forces cannot be responsible for the safety of PAVN troops unless they effect their withdrawal over the pre-designated routes/airfields/ports.

Verification will be determined initially by submission by the NVN of a list of specific units to be moved over designated routes or through designated ports. Confirmation will be made at points of egress.

All NVN forces are to be withdrawn from SVN and Laos within one month following the joint announcement.

Aerial surveillance over SVN, Laos and NVN will continue until such time as the USG and GVN are satisfied that withdrawal is complete.

TAB A

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TAB B

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

Representatives of the governments of North Vietnam and the United States have agreed to bring hostilities in Southeast Asia to an end. This accord was finalized today after a series of meetings that began in Prague on 16 September. I have informed the Congress and our Allies that military actions against North Vietnam, including the bombing, will terminate at _____ hours on _____

The authorities in Hanoi have agreed to withdraw their forces from both South Vietnam and Laos. The withdrawal of these forces will be verified by control procedures over designated routes and points of egress. These withdrawing forces will be provided safe conduct to the borders of North Vietnam. In addition the Viet Cong terminated hostilities against the Government of South Vietnam and Free World Forces. The United States will immediately engage, in consort with the Government of South Vietnam, on a massive reconstruction, renewal, and rehabilitation program to insure the viability of that democratic regime.

TAB B

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TAB C

BARGAINING POSITIONS (IN RESPONSE TO
CONTROL MESSAGE NO 8, MOVE II)

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>												
1. Pre-negotiating discussions.	Not addressed by US team since these points were covered in Move I.													
2. Negotiating positions.														
a. Pre-conditions.	(1) Issuance of announcements. (2) Continued DRV compliance with initial withdrawal announcement. (3) Continued cessation of hostilities by VC in South.	Minor violations would be protested, but tolerated.												
b. Forum	Conference of primary participants (Asian locale).	Asian Conference Forum (Asian locale).												
c. Participation	DRV, GVN and US	<table><thead><tr><th><u>PARTICIPATION</u></th><th><u>FREE WORLD</u></th><th><u>COMMUNIST</u></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Should participate</td><td>US GVN</td><td>NVN CPR USSR</td></tr><tr><td>Couldn't deny if insist</td><td>Korea Australia New Zealand Philippines</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Observer</td><td>Thailand Laos</td><td>NLF</td></tr></tbody></table>	<u>PARTICIPATION</u>	<u>FREE WORLD</u>	<u>COMMUNIST</u>	Should participate	US GVN	NVN CPR USSR	Couldn't deny if insist	Korea Australia New Zealand Philippines		Observer	Thailand Laos	NLF
<u>PARTICIPATION</u>	<u>FREE WORLD</u>	<u>COMMUNIST</u>												
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Observer	Thailand Laos	NLF												
d. Secret or public; open or closed	Public/closed	Listen to counter-proposals.												

TAB C

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

e. Time limits.	US reassess progress at end of 3 months.	Listen to counter-proposals.
f. Scope	North and South Vietnam (to include Mil withdrawal from Laos).	Listen to counter-proposals.
3. Cease-Fire		
a. Explicit definition.	Cessation of hostile acts by both sides as evidenced by measurable decline in incident statistics with GVN right to administer South Vietnam according to its own laws and procedures.	If confronted with a demand for a final cease-fire agreement, agree to study communist proposal.
b. Pre-conditions.	Evidences of substantial progress in settling major issues.	Listen to counter-proposals.
c. Freedom of movement.	Yes.	Listen to counter-proposals.
Restriction.	No.	
Excluded areas.	No, except for regroupment areas and withdrawal routes.	
d. Freeze in place.	No.	Listen to counter-proposals.
Circumstances.	None.	
e. Warning period.	None.	Listen to counter-proposals.
4. Inspection and Control.		
a. Supervisory element	No permanent supervisory element would be useful after the NVN withdrawal. Maximum world press coverage.	Asian nation.

TAB C

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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b. Recon and Surveillance	US/GVN ground and air surveillance over GVN. US air surveillance over NVN and Laos.	NVN air surveillance over SVN. Dis- continue US air surveillance of NVN.
c. Resolution of disputes.	Joint Military Commis- sion with representa- tive from Communist and Allied sides to settle disputes during NVN with- drawal phase; major dis- putes reconvene confer- ences.	Asian nation super- visory element.
5. GVN Sovereignty	No restriction in physical access or in GVN right to punish future violations of GVN sovereignty.	Listen to counter- proposals.
6. Withdrawal	<u>NVN will:</u> (1) Indicate which units it is prepared to with- draw. (2) Withdraw all forces so indicated within one month following the joint announcement. (3) Agree to inspection at points of egress. <u>US will:</u> (1) Formally renounce any intention of maintaining permanent military presence in SVN. (2) Immediately withdraw air components primarily concerned with NVN bombing. (3) Agree to withdraw ground forces as circum- stances warrant and GVN so desires.	Maintenance of US in-country force of no more than three divisions in post hostility period.
7. Status of NLF/VC.	(1) Negotiators can be admitted as part of DRV delegation.	If demand is made by other side, listen to their

- (2) In cease fire: GVN will undertake to recognize organized VC units as combatants and work out with their commanders satisfactory local cease-fire and demobilization arrangements. specifics (let negotiations break down later if necessary)
- (3) GVN will have to be forthcoming on amnesty program whereby, at a minimum, VC who turn in weapons will be permitted to resume position in society and held liable only for future offenses.
- (4) NLF status as acceptable organized party is matter for GVN to decide.

8. COM/US withdrawal from SEA

Discussion limited to VN (S&N) & Laos. No NVN military forces in Laos or SVN (or Cambodia). US disengagement as outlined above, *major combat units to be withdrawn from Thailand.

Listen to counter-proposals.

9. Elections

- (1) Elections to be held in SVN in accord with GVN laws. Except VC can participate even if NLF not recognized as a party.
- (2) Conference not competent to address, internal NVN politics.
- (3) US willing for VN to be reunified if this is the freely expressed desire of VN people, as expressed initially by SVN referendum on this subject after peace is restored.

Listen to counter-proposals.

*NOTE: Final team review recommended deleting "major combat units to be withdrawn from Thailand."

TAB C

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171500 SEP 67

1ST SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-1 (BLUE) thru B-8 (BLUE), Following Tab
"Move II".

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1 (GREEN)

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM CONTROL TO GVN

MOVE NO. II

DTG. 171735 Sep 67

On 14 September, Ambassador Lodge informed the GVN of the contents of the Hanoi governments peace proposal explaining that the United States intended to explore it in secret on a bilateral basis until it can determine whether it is sincere. Premier Ky was advised that the GVN would be kept fully informed, and if the proposal warrants further serious consideration, he should look forward to joint US/GVN negotiations with Hanoi. Ambassador Lodge stressed the importance of keeping knowledge of the negotiations limited to one or two key GVN officials.

In the conversation with Ambassador Lodge, Premier Ky voiced strong objections to any lessening of military actions against North Vietnam or against VC/NVN forces in South Vietnam at this time. Although he realized the great effort and cost expended by the United States in coming to South Vietnam's assistance, and was very appreciative, Premier Ky pointed out that it was the people of South Vietnam who have had to bear the brunt of the effects of the war. Now, when their suffering was so near to bringing them victory, was not the time to reduce the pressure on the enemy.

Ambassador Lodge replied: "The United States government intends to obtain iron-clad guarantees before concession are made to North Vietnam. The United States government is under great pressure to discontinue the air attacks against North Vietnam and to halt the ground war, but there is no intention of taking the pressure off until we are satisfied that the other side is sincere."

A suggestion by Ky that responsible GVN officials initiate quite talks with the Soviets on a bilateral basis was diplomatically discouraged by Ambassador Lodge who indicated that communications channels were presently loaded. Ky responded with a statement that the GVN government would favor multilateral negotiations (e.g. renewed conference of 1954 Geneva accord states) if preliminary talks actually lead to formal negotiations.

Premier Ky reassured Ambassador Lodge that he would count upon unqualified American support to quickly restore

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-2 (GREEN)

Page 1 of 2 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

Saigon's control over the political situation throughout the country and that this would require rather drastic action, including the removal of some prominent moderate figures. He also intended to expand both the amnesty programs for the Viet Cong and selective quiet approaches to NLF leaders to draw them away from the Liberation Front. He expressed his appreciation for US cooperation in the rapid withdrawal of the US airborne brigade from Saigon.

In a major reorganization of its security forces, the new South Vietnam government announced the immediate reconstitution of several ARVN regiments to constabulary units to cope more effectively with internal security problems as police forces rather than as army combat units.

Reports from Saigon indicate that the VC, through their agents, are attempting to stir up active riots, demonstrations among Buddhists, militant groups, students and labor unions, but to date, the new Ky government has minimized these events by firm enforcement of local curfews and continued marshall law.

Two major figures in the commercial community in Saigon and Hue have been identified as accomplices in a gigantic diversion of US economic and logistical shipments to the VC. The necessary evidence was provided by a VC defector and appears to be iron-clad.

Premier Ky has informed American officials in Saigon that, with the opening of business tomorrow, the piaster will be devalued in a massive move to counter the disastrous inflation which undermines the South Vietnamese economy. Ky also proposed to put a ceiling on GVN and US expenditures to limit spending to only the highest priority programs. He pointed out the present effort to advance so many disparate programs on an accelerated basis was resulting in the total defeat of all projects. He said that this competitive effort "to build Rome in a day" was contributing in a most serious manner to inflationary pressures.

Today, the Saigon government received a secret offer of direct military assistance from the Chinese Nationalist government in Taipei. A fully equipped infantry division of the CHINAT Army was offered initially for use in SVN with the implication that greater assistance would be provided if desired.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-3 (GREEN)

Page 2 of 2 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 8

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 SEP 67

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-12 (BLUE) thru B-14 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move".

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Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 9

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171750 Sep 67

The secret meeting of emissaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was held on 16 September 1967 in Prague, Czechoslovakia at the Ambassador level.

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B-5 (GREEN)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM GVN TO CONTROL MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE

A. GVN has strengthened its position internally, but is now faced with a bold political ploy by DRV and with significant US interest in peace settlement.

B. VC will observe a cease fire, but improve military posture and intensify political effort, attacking GVN legitimacy and promoting U.S. withdrawal, a "freeze-in-place" and Viet Nam - wide elections.

C. DRV, through Ho's offer of partial withdrawal and temporary cease fire, expects to achieve immediate cessation of bombings, early U.S. withdrawal, preservation of VC main forces at tolerable political cost.

D. The Chinese Communist, as results of their military deployment, are in improved position to influence negotiations directly. Their future moves depend partly upon U.S. actions and NVN progress toward goals. They will generally support Ho's initiative but will employ wide range of pressure, including against DRV, to assure that outcome does not violate their objectives of driving U.S. from Viet Nam unconditionally.

E. Soviet Union appears to be giving exceptionally strong support to Ho proposition, which it evidently feels is major move toward settlement on terms compatible with its interests.

F. U. S. range of options has been limited by Ho initiative and by domestic criticism of Administration's policy. U.S. willingness to negotiate directly with Hanoi is disturbing, and GVN fear that U.S. may prematurely relieve pressures on NVN and VC before such reduction is to GVN advantage.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-6(Green)

Page 1 of 9 Pages

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Insure that the prerogatives and sovereignty of the GVN are observed in all particulars in the initial bilateral talks, in the broad negotiations which may follow and in the terms of the peace agreed upon by the participating powers.

B. Insure that the rights of the GVN to enter into any future military or economic arrangements with other nations will in no way be impaired by the terms of the peace agreement.

C. Maintain the present government of The Republic of Vietnam and continue with successes already achieved.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES

A. (New) Continue current efforts to stabilize the economy and the political situation in SVN.

B. (New) Maintain pressure on United States during pre-negotiations discussions and formal negotiations to provide complete information on intentions and proceedings so that GVN can act or react in time to protect its sovereign interests.

C. (New) Continue all possible military and political activity during discussions and negotiations to keep pressure on VC/NVA until validation of withdrawal is achieved. Urge United States and COMUSMACV to do likewise.

D. (New) Maintain martial law and present cabinet until formal negotiations reach acceptable state of agreement.

E. (New) Develop and propagandize the details of a modified amnesty program for VC to be put into effect upon achievement of successful negotiations.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political/Psychological

1. Inform the Chinese Nationalists that while their offer of an infantry division is deeply appreciated, we do not believe that the introduction of Chinese Nationalist

troops is necessary at this time. We nevertheless take note of their readiness to give this additional help, and should circumstances require, may raise the question again.

2. Inform the United States that we fully endorse their opening of bi-lateral discussions with Hanoi on the terms for a peace settlement. We assume we will be kept fully informed of the course of the talks, that if the issue of the NLF's participating in these preliminary talks should arise we would expect the U.S. to reject any such move. We note the Hanoi representative has not been responsive to the nine questions posed by the U.S. and we assume that before further progress toward formal negotiations can be made, the U.S. will have to receive satisfactory replies on these vital points. We would further state that: (1) we do not intend to discontinue military actions and do not expect the U. S. to do so either; (2) nothing will be done in these talks which would impair the functions of the government in SVN or the GVN's right of self-defense if attacked; (3) no cessation of military construction; and (4) nothing will be done to recognize the NLF or grant it representation.

3. Develop a set of negotiating positions on major issues, in consultation with the U.S., designed to protect our interests and gain the maximum advantage from any negotiations, particularly with respect to breaking up the VC infrastructure and assuring effective international supervision of provisions on cease fire, withdrawal and cessation of infiltration. (see separate detailed listing of negotiating positions.)

4. While maintaining martial law, place on trial the two accomplices in the diversion of U.S. economic and logistical shipments to the VC and have severe sentences (short of death) meted out.

5. Make further efforts to draw leading NLF figures away from the Front, exploiting NLF suspicions about Hanoi's apparent dilution of its support for the NLF. Ho Chih Minh's dropping of the proviso that the NLF is the "sole genuine representative" of the South Vietnamese people with which the U.S. must negotiate, his failure to refer to the NLF program as the basis for settling South Vietnamese internal affairs, and his

assumption of the prerogative to speak for the Viet Cong without having its representatives present, represents a betrayal of Southern VC elements and a capitulation to great power chauvinism. Under these circumstances, the government of South Viet Nam extends the hand of reconciliation to patriots misled by Hanoi, and urges them to take up a constructive peaceful life under assurances of personal security and economic assistance.

B. Economic

1. Following up its other economic moves, the GVN urges the U.S. to join with it in moving ahead on development of the Mekong Delta, as a mark of their readiness to switch to peaceful activities in SEA and to heal the wounds of war. It suggests an international conference to set up an expanded executive body, to elicit pledges of funds, either untied or tied to specific projects, and to organize an international peace corps, ostensibly for development, but also to establish as great an international presence as possible throughout SEA, in order to verify the peace or provide convincing witnesses if there are violations.

2. Offer rice and medicines to NVN, for relief purposes following the flood there, possibly under ICRC or UN auspices.

C. Military

1. Continue military operations including assumption of responsibility for the city of Saigon and deployment of reconstituted constabulary units to critical provinces.

2. Urge U.S. to continue bombing targets in NVN, SVN, and along infiltration routes in Laos.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

BARGAINING POSITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Preliminary discussions		
a. Pre-conditions:	GVN expects: (1) U.S. to respect GVN sovereignty and avoid impairing the normal functions of government (maintenance of law and order and defense). (2) U.S. ARVN to continue military actions. (3) U.S. to refuse to recognize the NLF during preliminary discussions. (4) GVN finds NVN answers to U.S. questions unsatisfactory and wants satisfactory answers before formal negotiations can start. (5) No timetable on withdrawal in advance of substantive negotiations; this could be one item on formal agenda but not a pre-condition for talks to begin.	Not negotiable
b. Principal participants:	Exclude NLF; include GVN	Exclude both
c. Site:	Accept Prague	
d. Observers	None	Those appointed by Secretary General of UN
e. Intermediaries:	None	

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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BARGAINING POSITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS CONT'D

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
2. Formal negotiations		
a. Pre-conditions:	Same as 1a above	
b. Forum:	Geneva 1954 plus troop contributing countries: South Korea, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand	Geneva, 1962, or Geneva 1962 plus troop contributing countries plus NLF.
c. Participation:	Same as 2b. No Observers	
d. Secret or public:	Secret	
e. Time limits:	Three months	Five months
f. Scope:	Indochina	North & South Vietnam
3. Cease Fire:		
a. Explicit definition:	No significant level of NVA or NLF/VC incidents. Freedom of village government to operate without coercion.	
b. Pre-conditions:	Withdrawal of NVA troops through agreed points of egress where count can be validated. Satisfactory number of VC weapons turned in (See 6 below).	

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

BARGAINING POSITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS CONT'D

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
c. Freedom of movement:	For both U.S. and GVN troops to validate absence of NVN forces and incidents everywhere in SVN.	For police (with freedom of otherwise "frozen in place" U.S. and GVN troops if violations) everywhere in SVN.
d. Freeze in place:	See 3c	
4. Inspection		
a. Supervisory element:	U.S. and GVN troops and police	1954 ICC (Poles, Indians, Canadians) expanded to include Japan & Indonesia (or Burma or Pakistan for Indonesia), with new terms of reference and an expanded deployment of teams utilizing helicopters & jeeps.
b. Reconnaissance:	No limits on freedom of movement, if ICC should have own transport. Investigation should be automatic following complaint and criteria for what constitutes an investigable complaint should be liberal. Units should be stationed widely and required to visit all villages at least once a month without advance warning.	

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

BARGAINING POSITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS CONT'D

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
c. Resolution of disputes:	If ICC, eliminate veto, decide by majority vote and provide for minority report.	
5. GVN sovereignty	No limitations. Permit GVN/other country (including U.S.) unilateral defense treaties permitting stationing of troops in SVN.	None on police, or for U.S. & ARVN if violations occur.
6. Withdrawal	NVA withdrawal and cessation of infiltration of weapons, men & supplies in return for cessation of U.S. bombing of NVN & further U.S. build-up. VC turn in agreed number of arms in return for agreed U.S. withdrawal (e.g. half of combat troops) within year after signing agreement and remainder one year after plebiscite (See 9 below). Non-combat troops (e.g. engineers, medics) would be exempted from withdrawal and would be invited to remain by GVN in order to help with national reconstruction.	
7. Status of NLF/VC		
a. In pre-negotiations:	Excluded	
b. In negotiations:	Excluded	Include; see 2b.

BARGAINING POSITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS CONT'D

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
c. Cease fire	Required to turn weapons	
d. In post hostilities	Amnesty for any acts committed before signing of agreement	Allowed to compete as political party subject to police control over illegal activities.
8. Communist/U.S. withdrawal		
a. VC	Dissolution (See 7)	
b. NVA	Withdrawal (See 6)	
c. U.S.	Withdrawal (See 6 & 5) or transfer to Thailand and advance Pacific bases	
9. Elections		
a. SVN	No special elections for representative bodies needed as regular ones provided in constitution	
b. NVN	Call for separate inter-nationally supervised general election by secret ballot in North & South Vietnam in order to establish democratic institutions.	Oppose either without supervision as a free election
c. Unification	Hold plebiscite in SVN only under ICC observation on issue of reunification vs. self-determination, independence & freedom	

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171500 SEP 67

1ST SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-1 (BLUE) thru B-8 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move II".

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 6

FROM CONTROL TO VC

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171730 Sep 67

The COSVN notified Hanoi of the overtures from dissident elements in Saigon regarding talks leading to formation of a Popular Front Government. It is apparent that the conspirators in Saigon who made these overtures have now been apprehended and the movement, at least, temporarily crushed.

COSVN messaged Hanoi requesting reconsideration of withdrawal orders for two NVN divisions. In response Hanoi sent the following message to COSVN:

"The DRV has decided to take 'one step backward,' to Phase II, in line with the teachings of Comrade Lenin. In order to maintain morale, the COSVN will assure the NLF that proposed negotiations are merely a pause intended to allow time for strengthening Liberation Forces while exploiting political opportunities. During the period of negotiations the NLF will receive sufficient supplies to re-equip its forces and restock its depots. Further, the NLF will discontinue overt offensive actions against the US and will, instead, initiate maximum effort to ensure its inclusion as a party to negotiations. The NLF will engage in no offensive military operations, though use of selective terrorist activities may be useful in reaching our ultimate objectives."

It has been rumored that Ho will make a small change in COSVN leadership if there is signs that COSVN leaders are reluctant to obey Ho's directives.

During the past few hours it has become apparent that some members of the new Ky regime, including the Minister of Information and Open Arms Program, are interested in keeping communication channels open to the NLF.

Two former members of the RVN National Assembly have been given sanctuary by the Liberation Front. They complained that the high-handed action by members of the military clique in Saigon is usurping civilian authority and has triggered widespread public resentment. Many moderates in Saigon have been completely alienated by Ky's action and by US reluctance to end the fighting.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

After taking over the government Prime Minister Ky imposed martial law throughout the key cities in SVN in order to deter demonstrations and NLF terrorist activities.

Since a NLF defector has given information, previously closely held by the NVN/NLF as to certain black market operations, it has become necessary to exploit this subterfuge earlier than planned. Through the NLF news agency in SVN and other front representatives throughout the world, COSVN has surfaced the scandals of complicity and profiteering by wealthy Saigon and Hue Vietnamese in facilitating diversion of economic resources to the NLF. These reports have stirred up interest in the US press and focused attention on diversion of US aid to SVN to profiteering ventures.

In spite of Ho's authorization for selective terrorist activities, morale throughout the NLF is sagging and NLF defectors have increased over the past four days. Since the US/GVN has offered amnesty to NLF defectors, many feel a better life is in store for them on the other side. Further, COSUN considers that Ho's actions were directed at relieving NVN from US bombing at the expense of the NLF which is left to bear the brunt of US search and destroy operations in SVN. Even though Ho has ordered the NLF to withdraw and cease-fire, this has not kept US/FW forces from pursuing and killing them.

Ho Chi Minh has informed the leaders of COSVN, through clandestine radio communications, that he has received a message from chairman Mao that the five CPR divisions along the NVN/CPR border will give NVN a stronger hand in negotiations and will play upon the US fears of expanded land war in Asia. In addition, this message warned that if any revisionism creeps into the NVN government it must be stamped out. CPR will increase its shipment of rice to its Vietnamese brothers.

Ho has informed COSVN that he has accepted Premier Kosygin's offer to conduct talks with US through the offices of the USSR if the US can be persuaded and if the CPR can be induced to concur. Kosygin assured Ho that the USSR will continue to provide economic and military aid to NVN.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 8

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 SEP 67

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-12 (BLUE) thru B-14 (BLUE) , following Tab
"Move II".

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B-4 (BLACK)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 9

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171750 Sep 67

The secret meeting of emissaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was held on 16 September 1967 in Prague, Czechoslovakia at the Ambassador level.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM VC TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171755 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. General: The situation has become more favorable for us. Even though the GVN elements favorable to a compromise have been thwarted, the image of the U.S. support of a GVN determined to destroy the insurgents has been tarnished. An opportunity now presents itself to foment actions which could force a cessation of and eventual withdrawal of U.S. military presence.

B. Hanoi (NVN) is inclined to push for the cease fire because of war weariness at home, and because this would tend to stop the raids on NVN without exposing the NLF to bearing the brunt of U.S. military blows alone. Hanoi is, however anxious to retain control over COSVN and to forestall CHICOM intervention and "protective" occupation.

C. Saigon (GVN) is suffering as a result of the counter coup. The mounting pro-peace pressures against the U.S. may well force the Americans to promise prematurely to withdraw. On the other hand, strong U.S. support for the present hard-line GVN may increase its puppet image and strengthen relative sympathy if not support for the NLF. Therefore, GVN elements will still be vulnerable to political warfare and offers of negotiations and compromises. Possibly additional high level defections will occur.

D. The U.S. must seriously weigh the comparative costs of continuing to wage war in the face of growing demands for peace induced by the apparent cease-fire on the part of the communists.

1. U.S. cannot ignore signs of retreat in the allied camp e.g. Australia.

2. U.S. is sensitive to world-wide pro-peace pressures to stop the war and will be forced to demonstrate reliability of President Johnson's repeated declaration of unconditional discussions.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-6 (Black)

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3. US will be reluctant to recognize the NLF as a participant to discussions or negotiations.

4. US will probably agree to negotiations but will try to retain positions (including bases) in SVN.

E. CPR is not in position to intervene at this time. CPR can unsettle those groups who fear CPR military intervention and who would step-up their peace demands as a result of positioning 5 CPR divisions on the CPR/NVN border.

F. USSR is not in position to intervene meaningfully in negotiations at this time.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. The basic objective of the NLF remains that of exploiting the situation to gain a position from which the Communists can eventually dominate and control SVN.

B. A major element of the above objective is to force the withdrawal of the US and other imperialist forces and obtain a guarantee against further use of allied military force against or in SVN.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS

A. Exploit divisive tendencies which are exacerbated in the present situation by taking action designed to alienate:

1. As many Vietnamese as possible from the US presence.

2. As many Vietnamese as possible from GVN hard-liners who oppose discussions with the NLF.

B. Give added emphasis to non-military capability to wage subversive warfare.

C. Pursue actions which establish credibility of the NLF independence of NVN to enhance acceptability as a representative of the SVN people and as a participant in settlement negotiations.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Message to DRV emphasizing how important it is that Hanoi continue to insist without backing off, on a US cease-fire and continue pushing for US withdrawal. Message would also underscore importance of NLF representation at peace talks.

2. Continue to maintain covert channels, as possible, to GVN. The purpose is to exploit GVN internal frictions, keep open possibility of a deal with GVN if negotiations stall, also to protect the NLF position as against DRV.

3. Offer to exchange prisoners with the view of using the exchange as a pressure point on the Allies, especially the US. Tell Hanoi of our plan to do this and work in coordination with DRV if possible.

4. Offer to Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and ethnic minorities to help guarantee their independence in return for their support of NLF negotiating position. Careful handling of this will avoid later embarrassing entanglement.

B. Economic

1. Halt or slow NLF tax collections for a period in order to create good will for NLF and encourage longing for peace. Possibly also loosen hold on road nets to peaceful travel and ease economic hold on cities to build good will and show extent of VC control.

2. Initiate blackmail operations against any GVN officials engaged in war profiteering in order to force their cooperation with the NLF and its objectives.

3. Convince GVN officials suspicious of working out a settlement that the US AID "pie" for personal gain will be even bigger in the post-war period.

C. Psychological

1. Continue and step up the campaign to mobilize world opinion for peace in Vietnam -- urge all peace-loving governments and people to call on the US to cease-fire and abandon its aggression against the people of SVN. Dramatic press conference of Front leaders in Phnom Penh offering to negotiate anywhere with US leaders.

~~SECRET~~ -- NOFORN

2. Encourage the SVN people to demand an end to the war -- forment demonstrations for peace -- encourage families to appeal to soldiers to cease-fire -- encourage strikes in ports to halt supplies to US forces -- encourage refugees to demand safe conduct to home villages -- push the theme "return to village, home, and family".

3. Encourage formation of a broad "national front" -- appoint new members, the dissident members of national assembly -- encourage all who oppose the Ky government and US to announce their adherence to the principles of peace, freedom and reform -- encourage support of minorities (Hoa Hoa, Cao Dai, Montgnards.) Hint at large Buddhist role in the front.

4. Bolster morale of VC -- explain to cadres the tactic of cease-fire to achieve eventual withdrawal of US and foreign forces.

5. Undermine the confidence of the elite and members of the Ky government in US willingness to continue support. Leak to selected circles that the US is holding secret talks with NVN, France, and USSR aimed at a sell-out.

6. Campaign against US forces, with the theme that peace is just around the corner -- why die now -- protect yourself.

D. Military

1. Accept the NVN view that a stand down of military offensive operations is desirable to allow time for strengthening liberation forces while exploiting political opportunities.

2. Direct our forces not to engage in offensive military operations. Hold what we have. Move "main force" units, where required into secret zones and if necessary into Laos and Cambodia.

3. Direct a sizeable number of guerrillas to take advantage of the greater freedom of movement and access to GVN controlled areas and melt temporarily back into the population with a view to reducing our visibility and strengthen our control of the countryside.

4. Use the period of stand down to rest, regroup and rehabilitate our forces, stockpile supplies and rebuild VC secret bases and zones.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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Page 4 of 11 Pages

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. GVN disintegrates; more instability and coup attempts; disorders and riots in cities; more GVN officials clandestinely offer to deal with COSVN. Response: COSVN encourages all these developments.

B. GVN consolidates; moves to sabotage negotiations, force US to disavow peace track; GVN exposes US pressure, denounces "sell-out" by US State Department, orders ARVN onto general offensive. Response: COSVN maximizes publicity on GVN-US differences, proclaims adherence to "peace", avoids military action, even retreating to Cambodia under pressure.

C. Hanoi reverses position on negotiations, breaks off talks, sends PAVN back south. Response: COSVN obeys orders to renew military pressures though some personalities defect to Cambodia.

D. US refuses negotiations, maintains military pressures. Response: COSVN tries to avoid engagements, maximize costs to US -- political and military -- of its intransigence. Asks more aid from Hanoi.

E. US halts bombing of North but maintains pressure in South. Talks to Hanoi while refusing contacts with Front. Response: Maximum pressure on Hanoi not to abandon VC. Maximum appeal to South Vietnamese to oppose war which only US now wants. Defensive posture in military area.

F. China crosses into NVN in force. Hard-line elements assume control in Hanoi. Response: Hard-liners in COSVN also encouraged but many defections and no enthusiasm for Chinese troops in SVN.

BARGAINING POSITIONS*

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Preliminary discussions:		
a. Pre-conditions.	1. NLF representation at the negotiations. 2. Support of Ho's announced three points: cease-fire, scheduled US withdrawal, imposition of NLF program for control and development of SVN. <u>Note</u> : DRV would be asked to suggest that the US initiate withdrawal of 2 divisions to match the NVN withdrawal, as a display of faith. 3. No additional forces to be added into SVN. 4. GVN must cease action to punish those members of the GVN who were purged following their contact with the VC to establish negotiations.	1. and 2. are hard positions and would be retained. 3. and 4. represent fallback positions for use as negotiating capital.
b. Participants.	1. VC direct with GVN on matters primarily of South Vietnamese concern. 2. VC/DRV with US/GVN on main matters of negotiated settlement. 3. Some attempts at direct prisoner exchange with the US are in order.	Position #2. is acceptable.

*NOTE: Throughout the contacts arranging preliminary discussions and formal negotiations the VC would establish a general position that: we are not surrendering, we have in fact won the political war; we are the true representatives of the Vietnamese people and must be dealt with as such. We will exploit negotiation to serve our own ends by consolidating our political infrastructure and maintaining a relatively independent role in order to get the US forces out of SVN. We will exploit any break between the US and the GVN during the course of negotiations.

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
c. Site	1. Hue 2. DALOT within SVN. 3. Zone C Tay Minh - Location for VC/GVN bi-lateral discussions of exchange of political and military prisoners held in South Vietnam. 4. May publicly announce from Phnom Penh or Hong Kong that we will talk to anyone concerning a settlement. Limited to as few as possible in an effort to make it a Vietnamese affair.	
d. Observers		
e. Intermediaries	Key GVN officials known to be sympathetic to our cause would be used for VC/GVN contacts namely the Information Minister.	
2. Formal Negotiations		
a. Pre-conditions	Termination of all US/FWMAF land, sea, and air combat operations. 2. Agreed schedule of withdrawal for US forces to include token withdrawal of two U.S. divisions matching the current NVN gesture. 3. Stand down of all ARVN, Regular and popular Forces and National Police. 4. Grounding all combat aircraft not engaged in resupply or humanitarian flights.	Position #1 must be held

BARGAINING POSITIONS CONT'D

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
b. Forum & participation	1. Prefer bi-lateral VC/GVN but recognize that it will initiate as VC/DRV - U.S/GVN and gradually move toward the former. 2. If U.S. insists on Free World participation then Viet Cong will request equal participation by other communist-Southeast Asian countries. 3. Would initiate a new forum and not use Geneva as a basis.	
c. Secret or public	1. Favor secret negotiations with GVN on select matters. 2. Favor open public negotiations with a view to expansive U.S. facilities and GVN failures and demonstrate our true position as representatives as the bulk of the Vietnamese population. 3. Make a "circus" of the operations.	
d. Time limits	1. Prefer no time limits or as long as possible to wait for U.S. elections, gain time for installing infrastructure. 2. We can always start our combat operations after the U.S. withdraw.	
2f. Scope of negotiations	Deal with SVN as the major problem and introduce idea of a later conference removing all of U.S. presence from Mainland Southeast Asia.	

ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

3. Cease fire

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| a. Definition | Termination of conventional land, sea and air operations, to include regular, para-military and national police forces. |
| b. Pre-conditions for cease fire | Forces on combat operations such as sweeps return to base areas. Operators Market Time and Game Warden terminate. No offensive action initiated. Viet Cong forces return from contested area 3. Agree to discuss person exchange issues. VC must agree to all cease fire conditions. |
| c. Freedom of movement - & freeze | No combat actions units freeze, but population moves freely. Units not to be warned but will be given 48 hours to reassemble on home stations. |

4. Inspection & control

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| a. Supervision
& | Vietcong see no need for such a system but will accept the ICC as a mechanism, particularly to check on movement of US/FWMAF forces now conducting operations. |
| b. Recon. & Surveillance | No border surveillance is necessary. |
| c. Resolution of reports | See no need for a separate group. Vietnamese can handle own problems besides this leads to protraction of negotiations. No arbitration desired. |

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
5. GVN sovereignty	We do not recognize it. No access will be given to the current version of GVN. We want first to establish a coalition government as a consequence of legitimate free elections. We are not bandits, we have in effect won our war.	
6. Withdrawals	1. Must withdraw major U.S. weaponry to include ships, aircraft, helicopters and artillery as priority move. 2. Quid-pro-quo between US/FWMAF and NVN forces is acceptable.	
7. Status of NLF	1. We hold to the NLF as the means of integrating the South Vietnamese into a legitimate government representative of the Vietnamese people. Through elections we hope to position our representatives in key power positions. Our objectives is to weaken the power of residual GVN representatives in urban areas and strengthen our hold in the country side. 2. We may modify our NLF position but very slightly and under great pressure preferring first to get alien forces out of SVN and then as Vietnamese solve our own political problem.	

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
8. Communist/ U.S. withdrawal	We will ask for a reduction of U.S. bases in Thailand and for the continued presence of the U.S. in SEA to be dis- cussed at the Conference. We will give few concessions on withdrawal claiming we are not involved in "wars of national liberation".	
9. Elections	South Vietnam - yes North Vietnam - Defer to NVN North & South - Wait and See	

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171500 SEP 67

1ST SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-1 (BLUE) thru B-8 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move II".

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 5

FROM CONTROL TO NVN

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171730 Sep 67

The COSVN notified Hanoi of the overtures of dissident elements in Saigon regarding talks leading to formation of a Popular Front Government. It seems that a brother of the SVN Defense Minister came personally to the NLF indicating that he could muster sufficient backing, among political and military leaders, to effect a coup. He felt that the government which would emerge would be amenable to NLF participation on a Popular Front basis.

Unfortunately, it is apparent that the conspirators in Saigon, who made these overtures, have now been apprehended and the movement, at least, temporarily crushed.

The COSVN messaged Hanoi requesting reconsideration of Ho's withdrawal orders for two NVN divisions. Hanoi replied with the following message:

"The DRV has decided to take 'one step backward', to Phase II, in line with the teachings of Comrade Lenin. In order to maintain morale, the COSVN will assure the NLF that proposed negotiations are merely a pause intended to allow time for strengthening Liberation Forces while exploiting political opportunities. During the period of negotiations the NLF will receive sufficient supplies to re-equip its forces and restock its depots. Further, the NLF will discontinue overt offensive actions against the US and will, instead, initiate maximum effort to ensure its inclusion as a party to negotiations. The NLF will engage in no offensive military operations, though use of selective terrorist activities may be useful in reaching our ultimate objectives."

As an afterthought, President Ho mused aloud that it might be necessary to make a small change in COSVN leadership if that organ showed any further reluctance to obey his directives without question.

During the past few hours, it has become apparent that some members of the new Ky regime are interested in keeping communications open to the National Liberation Front. A brother of one of Ky's close confidants has contacted the

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Page 1 of 3 Pages

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COSVN to suggest this as a means of increasing NLF influence. This demarche could be considered a mere ploy of the wily Ky to influence some of the NLF membership into coming over to his side.

Two or three former members of the RVN National Assembly have been given sanctuary by the Liberation Front. They indicate that the high-handed action by members of the military clique in Saigon, in usurping civilian authority, has triggered widespread public resentment. They further declare that many moderates in Saigon have been completely alienated by Ky's action, as well as US reluctance to end hostilities.

In spite of Ho's authorization for selective terrorist activities, morale is sagging and NLF defections have increased over the past four days. Further, many in the NLF feel that Ho's actions were directed at relieving NVN from US bombing at the expense of the NLF which is left to bear the brunt of US search and destroy operations in SVN. Even though Ho has ordered the NLF to withdraw and cease-fire, this has not kept US/FW forces from pursuing and killing them. Since the US/GVN has offered amnesty to NLF defectors, many feel a better life is in store for them on the other side.

A NLF defector has revealed to the Ky government, information held in confidence by Hanoi, implicating several prominent members of the Saigon and Hue communities in a vast black-market effort to divert supplies to the NLF. It was intended that this information be held as blackmail to maintain an uninterrupted flow of US materiel to the NLF. It was, also, intended that this information be leaked at a more opportune time to create further disarray in the US/GVN camp. The US press has made a grand splash of this story.

To date, no information has been leaked which might reveal communist intelligence knowledge of the fact that Taipei has secretly offered a CHINAT division or more to Ky and that this information is held closely by Chiang and Ky from the Americans.

Chairman Mao conveyed the following message to President Ho Chi Minh:

"Negotiations with Hanoi-Peking participation can be very useful. Five CPR divisions upon your border should give you a stronger hand in negotiations, playing upon US

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

fears of expanded land war in Asia. Our negotiating team should exclude all revisionist elements. Should any revisionism creep into your government it must be stamped out. The CPR is pleased to increase its shipments of rice to its Vietnamese brothers."

In a tense meeting between the CPR's Ambassador to Moscow and Le Duan, it became very clear that the feeling in Peking is one of supreme confidence that Hanoi is under sufficient pressure, with 5 CPR divisions poised upon its northern border, to guarantee Peking a predominant voice in negotiations. Further, a blunt threat made it clear that little problem was expected by Peking at its insistence of Soviet exclusion from negotiations.

President Ho Chi Minh received the following message from Premier Kosygin:

"Will you accept good offices of the USSR in proposed talks with US? Will you take the same steps that you have asked of the US? Are you ready for private talks with the US, leading to eventual negotiations? There may be some advantage to publicizing your offer, along with actual de-escalation of the conflict, to mobilize world opinion for more favorable negotiations. The DRV can be sure that the USSR will continue to provide economic and military aid. In particular, air defense, replacement aircraft and reconstruction of air bases will receive highest priority. The US may balk at the fourth point of your message to Brezhnev unless it is modified slightly to give appearance of reciprocity."

President Ho Chi Minh sent the following message to Premier Kosygin:

"The DRV would be pleased to accept your offer of good offices if the US can be persuaded and if the CPR can be induced to concur. There exists some question as to CPR motives in shifting 5 divisions to DRV border. Desperately need additional food supplies due to rice crop failure though much of deficit may be met by CPR aid."

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 8

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 SEP 67

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-12 (BLUE) thru B-14 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move II".

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 9

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171750 Sep 67

The secret meeting of emissaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was held on 16 September 1967 in Prague, Czechoslovakia at the Ambassador level.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM NVN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE SIGMA I-66

DTG 171800 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. GVN - There is political confusion in SVN and dissension in government ranks, also, coups and disturbances between US and SVN soldiers. Several SVN representatives have been in touch with the NLF. Ky has received a secret proposal from Chiang Kai-shek for use of a Chinat division or more in Vietnam, but Ky will continue to take his orders from the U.S.

B. NLF - The NLF is concerned about NVN motives, is bearing the brunt of US military actions and is discouraged. This is evidenced by increased rate of defections to the US/GVN side. NVN may have to consider changes in NLF leadership cadre if they are not amenable to Ho's orders. The NLF will obey.

C. CPR - The CPR does not want the USSR to participate in the negotiations and has moved five divisions to the NVN border to insure that the CPR has a prominent voice in developments. NVN must reassure the CPR that NVN is adopting proven MAO strategy in order to maintain the flow of CPR assistance to NVN. Soviet pressure will prevent CPR intervention.

D. USSR - The Soviets are eager for negotiations and continue to support NVN with equipment, etc. Have offered NVN their good offices but NVN chose an independent course with the Americans by opening discussions in Prague. NVN must keep Soviet help coming, and rely on the USSR to deter the CPR.

E. USA - The war party is in power in Washington but pressure is mounting on the regime to cease military action. This pressure is causing dissension in the political ranks. The US continues the attack against NVN, but not for long.

II. OBJECTIVES

No change.

III. STRATEGY

Basic strategy continues to be to obtain a cease-fire so NVN can build up its forces and those of the NLF, as well

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as pursuit of political war in SVN. To obtain the cease-fire, NVN must continue to marshal world opinion to pressure the USA to cease its military operations connected with the Vietnam conflict. If the US continues to refuse to cease military actions in the face of world opinion, NVN will threaten the US with renewed hostilities with the prospect of outside help. NVN should also increase, where possible, the role of the NLF in SVN to the extent that they would eventually become the spokesman for the people of SVN. This will become a part of NVN's general political offensive in the south.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Publicize the fact that Chinat troops were offered to the SVN government by Chiang to exploit disarray among FWF's.
2. Send an emissary from Ho to the NLF to clarify his strategy; also, to Moscow and Peking for the same purpose. Shape the message to the realities of the USSR/CPR/NVN relationships.
3. Work to alienate the GVN armed forces from their leaders.
4. Leak the fact that a Ky confidant was in touch with the NLF.
5. Tell the Soviets that their assistance, in greater measure, may be required if a cease-fire is not accomplished.
6. Thank the CPR for its support, especially rice, and assure the CPR that NVN is adopting the MAO dictum in its basic strategy.
7. Send letters from Ho to the Pope and to Harold Wilson to mobilize their efforts behind the NVN peace offensive.
8. Seriously consider sending some captured American airmen home as a gesture of NVN's peaceful intent.

B. Economic

1. Assure a continued flow of economic assistance from the USSR, CPR and other friendly countries.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C. Military

1. Continue to build up and resupply our military forces and those of the NLF.

D. Psychological

1. Play on world fear of a wider war.

2. Invite US newsmen to NVN to show them our returning soldiers.

3. Try to initiate labor disorders in Australia.

4. Send an emissary to the UN to dramatize our desire for peace.

5. Mobilize anti-war groups throughout the world to press the US for a cease-fire.

V. CONTINGENCIES

1. If NLF leaders tend to rebel against the cease-fire strategy, the DRV will remind NLF leaders that the CPR and USSR favor the "one step backward" move as a political means of out-maneuvering the GVN/US. If necessary, remove and replace them.

2. If the GVN, under Ky, refuses to support the US cease-fire conditions, the DRV will launch an all-out campaign to widen the GVN/US official breach. If the GVN, under Ky, supports continued US delaying tactics in agreeing to a cease-fire, the DRV will play dissident elements in SVN against the GVN, i.e., encourage strikes, riots, and anti-US incidents.

3. If the CPR threatens to renege on its offer of aid, the DRV will remind the CPR of the mutually-agreed long range communist objective, i.e., to unify Viet-Nam under communist control. In this case more aid will be sought from the Soviets.

4. If the USSR places conditions on its oft-repeated promises of help, the DRV will likewise remind the USSR of the objective to which the USSR also is committed -- a unified Viet-Nam under communist dominance. The Soviet desire for leadership of the world communist movement will serve NVN well to (1) prevent CHICOM intervention and (2) to obtain increased assistance from the USSR.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Preliminary Discussions		
Prague discussions are considered to be preliminary discussions.		
2. Formal Negotiations		
a. Pre-conditions	a. (1) Cease-fire followed by withdrawal of all US forces from SEA. (2) Pending withdrawal, US forces to move into enclaves. (3) US cease base construction in SE Asia. (4) US aid and CIA operations cease in SVN.	a. (1) Cease-fire and a schedule of withdrawal of US forces from SEA. (2) Cease-fire and a schedule of withdrawal of US forces from SVN.
b. Type	b. Bilateral to include NLF.	b. Geneva '62

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

<u>BARGAINING POSITIONS</u>		
<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
c. Participa- tion	c. NVN, US, SVN Rep that is acceptable to NLF.	c. NVN, US and other nations that support NVN and SVN as agreed to by either side.
d. Secret or public; open or closed	d. Public - closed.	d. None.
e. Time limits	e. None.	e. None.
f. Scope	f. South Vietnam.	f. None.
3. Cease-fire		
a. Explicit definition	a. Cease all offensive mili- tary activity on a specific date.	a. None.
b. Pre- conditions	b. None.	b. None.
c. Movement, restrictions excluded areas	c. No movement by mil. units. Re- stricted to present areas.	c. None.
d. Freeze	d. Freeze in place acceptable pending withdrawal out of country or into enclaves.	d. None.
e. Warning period	e. No -	e. None.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
4. Inspection and control		
a. Supervisory element	a. None required.	a. Reconstituted ICC.
b. Recon and surveillance	b. None required.	b. ICC as reconstituted.
c. Resolution of disputes	c. By participants- No third parties.	c. None.
5. GVN Sovereignty		
a. Restrictions	a. GVN access only to areas they now control.	a. None.
6. Withdrawals		
a. Acceptable quid-pro-quo	a. Lock, stock & barrel; everything US & Free World goes!	a. Limited MAG to assist in closing bases. No more than 100 personnel for period of six months.
b. Acceptable rate	b. Maximum 6 months.	b. None.
7. Status of NLF/VC		
a. Acceptable status in negotiations, in cease-fire or in post-hostilities	a. Sole representative of SVN people.	a. Also agree to representative of "puppets" acceptable to NLF.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>INITIAL POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
8. Communist/US withdrawal from SEA		
a. Acceptable	a. All <u>foreign</u> forces and bases must go.	a. All foreign forces and bases must go from SVN.
9. Elections - Requirement for free elections		
a. South Vietnam	a. Yes.	a. None.
b. North Vietnam	b. No.	b. None.
c. North and South Vietnam as prelude to unification	c. No.	c. None.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171500

1ST SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-1 (BLUE) thru B-8 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move II".

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 7

FROM CONTROL TO CPR

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 Sep 67

After some initial confusion, Mao's orders to move five Chinese divisions to positions along the North Vietnamese border were rapidly carried out. Within less than a week all divisions had taken up positions in the vicinity of Lao Cai, Ping-hsiang, Mong Cai and Ching-hsi. Division commanders were instructed to be prepared to move into North Vietnam.

During a tense meeting in Moscow between Le Duan and the CPR ambassador to Russia, Le Duan was given the following information to transmit to Ho Chi Minh:

"We agree that the time is ripe for you to change tactics and negotiate with the Americans. In order to strengthen your hand during preliminary talks with the United States and during subsequent negotiations we have moved five of our finest infantry divisions to your borders. We are also preparing to ship you sufficient rice to replace the rice which was recently destroyed. More rice and other items which you may require will be provided to you as the need arises. We expect to sit at your side during any negotiations. The Soviet revisionists do not have your interest at heart. They must, therefore, be excluded from any talks."

A wave of consternation swept the Chinese leadership following reports that Chiang Kai-shek had secretly offered to provide South Vietnam with at least one fully equipped infantry division to assist in the fighting in South Vietnam. The fact that neither Chiang nor Ky has informed the Americans of this move may be an indication that Ky is giving serious consideration to accepting the offer.

Peking has received copies of an exchange of messages between Hanoi and Moscow. The following message was sent to President Ho Chi Minh by Premier Kosygin:

"Will you accept good offices of the USSR in proposed talks with US? Will you take the same steps that you have asked of the US? Are you ready for private talks with the

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

US, leading to eventual negotiations? There may be some advantage to publicizing your offer, along with actual de-escalation of the conflict, to mobilize world opinion for more favorable negotiations. The DRV can be sure that the USSR will continue to provide economic and military aid. In particular, air defense, replacement aircraft and reconstruction of air bases will receive highest priority. The US may balk at the fourth point of your message to Brezhnev unless you modify slightly to give appearance of reciprocity."

Ho Chi Minh's reply to Kosygin was as follows:

"The DRV would be pleased to accept your offer of good offices if the US can be persuaded and if the CPR can be induced to concur. There exists some question as to CPR motives in shifting five divisions to DRV border. Desperately need additional food supplies due to rice crop failure though much of deficit may be met by CPR aid."

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 8

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 SEP 67

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-12 (BLUE) thru B-14 (BLUE), following
Tab "Move II"

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 9

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171750 Sep 67

The secret meeting of emissaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was held on 16 September 1967 in Prague, Czechoslovakia at the Ambassador level.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM CPR TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE First Scenario Proj

DTG 171700 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. North Vietnam

1. Needs a change of tactics.
2. Will maintain the same ultimate goal of dominating all Vietnam.
3. Will revert to Phase one operations.
4. Has initiated direct discussions with the US and may attempt to negotiate bilaterally with the Americans.
5. Will try to exploit Sino-Soviet differences, but appears to be leaning toward the Soviets at this point.

B. National Liberation Front

1. Is hurting badly.
2. Will accept NVN change of tactics.
3. Will demand a place at the conference table.
4. Fears isolation and sell out by Soviets and the CPR.

C. United States

1. The US is clearly encouraged by the NVN initiative for discussion and will attempt to exploit this to exclude the USSR and CPR. Meanwhile, it will maintain military pressure on North Vietnam until it has exacted satisfactory conditions from Hanoi.
2. The US will attempt to restrict participants in discussions and to transform discussions into actual negotiations meanwhile continuing to exploit military pressures.
3. The US will refuse to totally withdraw from Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-6 (YELLOW)

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4. The Americans will accept NLF participation in negotiations in return for GVN representation.

D. Soviet Union

1. Will support Ho's proposal for peace negotiations.
2. Will aid NVN in order to strengthen Soviet influence.
3. Will attempt to influence negotiations in a manner which will exclude the CPR.
4. During negotiations will urge the NLF to seek a peaceful path to power.

E. Government of South Vietnam

1. Will continue to oppose negotiations but will ultimately be forced into negotiations on US terms.
2. The GVN will not accept the offer of GRC troops.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Long Range

To increase our power and influence in Asia relative to the US and USSR and to ultimately expel the US and USSR in order to bring to power genuine Marxist-Leninists.

B. Limited Objectives

1. Insure a government in Hanoi, which is sympathetic to the long range objectives and policies of the CPR.
2. Prevent the military collapse or surrender of North Vietnam and the Liberation Front.
3. Assert CPR influence in present discussions and gain access to any subsequent negotiations.
4. Impede the progress of negotiations.
5. If negotiations are broken-up insure that the US bears the greatest, if not all the blame.
6. If negotiation proceed, assure that the ensuing agreement recognizes the role of the NLF in South Vietnam and allows it sufficient latitude to continue its programs.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS

Persuade NVN to acknowledge our vital interest in the present discussions and our firm intention to participate in any ensuing negotiations.

Continue to counterbalance, to the maximum extent possible, existing Soviet influence in North Vietnam and frustrate any Soviet attempts to increase their influence.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Send a high-level military mission to NVN for the announced purpose of consulting with Hanoi on security problems of mutual interest.

2. Inform Ho through the military mission, that he must insure the CPR presence at all further discussions or be faced with movement of five Chicom infantry divisions into North Vietnam.

3. Continue to advocate no Soviet participation in any negotiations.

4. Continue to insist on National Liberation Front representation at the conference table and in any SVN Government.

B. Economic

1. Continue to promise massive economic aid to North Vietnam.

2. Prevent movement of all Soviet aid across our territory to North Vietnam.

C. Psychological

1. Continue to charge the Soviets with preparing to collaborate with the imperialists in betraying the Vietnamese people and accuse the US of seeking to gain a permanent lodgement on the Asian mainland.

2. Emphasize Soviet obligations to China under our Mutual Security treaty.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

3. Arrange for leaks alleging US preparations for intensifying military actions against NVN including the possibility of an invasion.

4. Publicize the arrival of a military mission in Hanoi for joint consultations with NVN.

D. Military

1. Overtly take necessary action to prepare for redeployment of five infantry divisions into NVN.

2. Interdict supplies from USSR to North Vietnam, transitting the CPR.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. If Ho refuses to meet demands of CPR mission, move all five divisions from border into NVN. Simultaneous with movement of these divisions into NVN announce a willingness to negotiate and stress the limited objectives of the move (only to the Vinh area); withdrawal of troops would be an item to be considered during negotiations.

B. If Ky accepts GRC offer of troops, announce that our forces will attack and destroy GRC troop carriers enroute to Vietnam.

C. Preliminary (pre-negotiation) Discussions)

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Preconditions	Endorse Hanoi's suggested pre-conditions and in addition demand that all US advisors be withdrawn from ARVN units.	Back Hanoi's fallback position as necessary in order to get CPR into act.
2. Participants	CPR, US, NVN, NLF	Agree to add the USSR as an observer. If this fails agree to let the USSR participate as a full member.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-9 (YELLOW)

Page 4 of 10 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
3. Site for discussions	Plaine des Jarres	Phnom Penh or Paris
4. Observers	None except as a fallback listed above in (2)	None
5. Intermediaries	None	None

D. Formal Negotiations

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Preconditions	Embargo on the deployment of US and lakey forces and material into SEA Withdrawal of one division of US troops	Give in on the requirement to withdraw one division.
2. Forum	Participants include those listed under (D 3.) and members of an International Peace Committee (F 1)	Geneva '54 powers with addition of NLF and the US
3. Participation	CPR, NVN, NLF, US	Will allow others to come in as necessary to insure full participation of NLF
4. Secrecy	Secret and closed negotiations	Public sessions for announcement of agreed positions only.
5. Time limits	None, the more protracted the better.	None
6. Scope	All of mainland Southeast Asia including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, & Thailand.	Eliminate Thailand

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B-10 (YELLOW)

Page 5 of 10 Pages

E. Cease-fire

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Explicit definition	Termination of all firing and maintenance of present positions. All military and paramilitary operations throughout SEA must cease by US/Lackey forces. Such actions as patrolling and repositioning of forces are also prohibited. Included are bombing reconnaissance, naval gunfire, Market Time Ops, Chieu Hoi program Psywar activities etc.	Eliminate the Chieu-Hoi program from cease-fire definition.
2. Preconditions for cease-fire	Public announcement by the US and GVN accepting conditions listed in (E 1) above.	At least termination of air attacks on NVN.
3. Freedom of movement required.	Freedom of movement is to be opposed.	Limit military activity to areas held on 17 Sep 67.
4. "Freeze in place" acceptable	Yes, indefinitely for all forces.	Yes for duration of negotiations.
5. Warning time requirement	Implement simultaneously with public announcement of cease-fire (E 2).	None

F. Inspection and Control (Safeguards)

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Supervisory Element	An International Peace Committee	Call for an Afro-Asian committee free

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
	composed of Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and Cuba.	from the control of the UN or other international organizations. Cuba would be dropped and if necessary replaced by Guinea.
2. Reconnaissance and surveillance.	Total cessation of all recon and surveillance activities.	To be allowed within SVN only.
3. Resolution of disputes.	Referred to supervisory elements with right to veto by any member.	None.

G. GVN Sovereignty

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Restrictions on GVN access to country to restore law and deal with residual VC and banditry.	De Facto recognition of NLF sovereignty in those areas of SVN controlled by the NLF. The GVN will only be allowed access to areas under its firm control as of the date of the cease-fire.	No GVN intrusion but will authorize members of the International Peace Committee to enter areas under NLF control.

H. Withdrawals

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Acceptable quid-pro-quo for withdrawal or neutralization of NVA/VC and US/Lackey forces; acceptable rate of withdrawal.	All forces other than indigenous must leave SEA including specifically SVN, Laos, and Thailand prior to 1 January. Inasmuch as NVA has already returned two divisions, U.S. must	Accept minor slip-page on dates.

ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

show good faith by removing two divisions immediately. At least 1/3 of all US ground and air forces based in SEA should leave by 1 November, second 1/3 of all US forces must leave by 1 December and all remaining US and lackey forces must be out by 1 January '68. All US and lackey naval elements must leave the Gulf of Tonkin and other territorial waters of VN and cease its air and sea operations against VN and provocations against innocent shipping by 1 October, 1967.

2. Quid-pro-quo

All NVA forces also out of SVN by 1 Jan. VC will return to homes and peaceful pursuits.

I. Status of NLF

ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

1. Acceptable status of NLF in negotiations in cease-fire, in post-hostilities environment.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
a. Negotiations	NLF must have a separate seat during negotiations.	NLF must have representation on NVN delegation.
b. Cease-fire	Should cease overt military ops.	None.
c. Post-hostilities environment	NLF should have at least 50% representation at all levels of government, i.e. Assembly, Cabinet, Province, District, and Local.	Some lesser % representation in govt.

J. Communist/US Withdrawal from SEA.

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Acceptable Communist/US presence in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand (troops, bases, and sanctuaries).	Asian Communist presence is certainly necessary where it represents the people. (This would exclude USSR presence). No U.S. presence in SE Asia is acceptable.	None.

K. Elections

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Requirements for free elections.	The CPR will support Hanoi in its desire to guarantee the peoples of SVN,	Accept elections in SVN only under the supervision of the "International Peace Committee".

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-14 (YELLOW)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

through the National
Liberation Front,
an opportunity to
participate in truly
"free" elections for
a government of their
own choice, as a pre-
lude to unification of
North and South Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-15 (YELLOW)

Page 10 of 10 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171500 SEP 67

1ST SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-1 (BLUE) thru B-8 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move II".

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1 (RED)

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO USSR

MESSAGE NO. 4

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171705 Sep 67

The following message was transmitted to President Johnson:

"The USSR rejects the language of your letter as inconsistent with universally accepted norms of diplomacy. The USSR reserves to itself the right to determine what aid it will provide to nations seeking to defend themselves. Any US attempt to quarantine the DRV will evoke thoughts of counter-measures and frustrate arrangements for peaceful negotiations.

Of immediate importance is the question of peace. The USSR has learned that the DRV is interested in talks. We feel that the CPR may attempt to block talks, therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate that the US is genuinely interested in peace by an immediate response to DRV overture. If the US is interested, the USSR will act as a go-between maintaining the necessary secrecy of the dialogue."

The following message was transmitted to Ho Chi Minh:

"Will you accept good offices of USSR in proposed talks with US? Will you take the same steps that you have asked of US? Are you ready for private talks with US leading to eventual negotiations?

There may be some advantage to publicizing your offer and de-escalation of the conflict to mobilize world opinion for negotiations. The DRV may be assured that the USSR will continue to provide economic and military aid. In particular; air defense, replacement aircraft, and reconstruction of air bases will receive highest priority. The US may balk at your fourth point unless modified lightly to give the appearance of reciprocity."

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-2 (RED)

Page 1 of 2 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

A proposal from the Republic of France has been received calling for a joint USSR, CPR and RF guarantee of NVN independence.

The United Kingdom has proposed that we, as co-chairmen, call for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference to settle the Vietnam problem.

President Ho Chi Minh sent the following message to Premier Kosygin:

"The DRV would be pleased to accept offer of good offices but for serious doubts here over US and CPR willingness. US is apparently pressing for direct bilateral discussions. CPR insisting on primary role in negotiations to the absolute exclusion of the USSR. Peking has deployed five divisions to forward positions along our common border without stating their motives.

New subject . . . Flooding of rice crop has created desperate food shortage here. Request immediate shipment of food. Although much of the deficit may be met by the CPR, your aid is urgently required.

New subject . . . NLF has reported an approach from a high-ranking moderate in the Saigon Government who alleged that he could rally a majority willing to join with the NLF in the formation of a new Popular Peace Government. Now it is apparent that this movement has been detected in Saigon and brutally crushed."

On this day, intelligence sources reported that the Saigon government had received a secret offer of direct military assistance from the Chinese Nationalist government in Taipei. A fully equipped infantry division of the CHINAT Army was offered initially for use in SVN with the implication that greater assistance would be provided if desired.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-3 (RED)

Page 2 of 2 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 8

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171745 SEP 67

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page B-12 (BLUE) thru B-14 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move" II".

UNCLASSIFIED

B-4 (RED)

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 9

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171750 Sep 67

The secret meeting of emissaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was held on 16 September 1967 in Prague, Czechoslovakia at the Ambassador level.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-5 (RED)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM USSR TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 2

REFERENCE FIRST SCENARIO
PROJECTION

MOVE NO. II

DTG 171615 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The estimate remains unchanged with two exceptions:

A. Whereas it originally appeared that USSR could win concessions from US in exchange for services as "honest broker", the Prague discussions make this seem less likely.

B. The possibility of Chinese military intervention in North Vietnam now seems increased due to CPR deployment to border of NVN.

II. OBJECTIVES: Unchanged.

III. STRATEGY: Unchanged.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political -- Since the DRV and US seem interested, we will encourage them to engage in preliminary bilateral talks. We will offer to serve as intermediary and in any other manner which will facilitate negotiations.

1. Meanwhile, we should proceed on the assumption that the US and DRV will agree to formal negotiations and therefore we should begin laying the groundwork for a conference. We favor the framework of the 1954 Geneva Conference, and should consult with the UK on tactics and procedures for drawing the potential participants into accepting this forum.

2. We should transmit the following message to the DRV:

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-6 (RED)

Page 1 of 12 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

a. Our views regarding preliminary and formal negotiations and the various subjects under each.

b. Report that we are taking immediate steps to meet its rice requirements.

3. We should tell France that this is not the appropriate time to issue a statement guaranteeing NVN independence.

B. Military -- Alert divisions in Central Asia and the Maritime Province, move an airborne division to OSH from PSKOV and conduct naval maneuvers south of Korea and east of Shanghai.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. If Hanoi refuses to agree to a cease-fire and to publish a withdrawal schedule, the situation reverts to that prevailing before the soundings for negotiations.

B. If negotiations are not begun and the US imposes a quarantine, we should prepare to do the following:

1. Announce large-scale naval maneuvers in Pacific.

2. Announce large-scale Warsaw Pact exercises in Eastern Europe and begin a graduated harassment of access routes to West Berlin.

C. If the US escalates the SEA war further, we will then reassess our position.

D. If CPR offers military aid to DRV, we should attempt to dissuade Hanoi from accepting it, pointing out that Hanoi's independence would be threatened and that escalation of the war would surely ensue.

E. If CPR offers to join USSR in United front against US to save NVN, offer should be officially neglected and unofficially ridiculed.

F. If the CPR invades NVN and/or attempts to overthrow Ho's regime:

1. USSR will issue stern warning to CPR.

2. Wait and watch for US reaction.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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Page 2 of 12 Pages

SECRET - NOFORN

VI. USSR POSITIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS (IN RESPONSE TO CONTROL MSG 8).

A. Preliminary (pre-negotiation) Discussions:

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Pre-conditions for Discussions	None - since secret discussions are underway.	
2. Principle Participants	US and NVN	
3. Site for Discussions	Attempt to move current negotiations to Moscow.	Accept Prague
4. Observers	Attempt to inject USSR observers into current discussions.	Limit discussions to principle participants only
5. Intermediaries	Offer to act as intermediary between US and NVN	Accept present channel for discussions between US and NVN Ambassadors.

B. Formal Negotiations:

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Pre Conditions	USSR will accept DRV pre-conditions provided that DRV does not come under CPR control or other influence inimical to Ho leadership. We presume that: (a) Ho will accept	The USSR can accept whatever terms DRV accept. USSR can not accept worse terms.

SECRET - NOFORN

B-8 (RED)

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<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
	mutual condition for cease-fire with US, (b) Ho will insist on cease-fire before negotiations, (c) Ho will insist on unrestricted right to receive shipments from other countries. (USSR will urge Ho to maintain there positions.)	
2. Forum	USSR favors Geneva 1954 forum.	If Ho and DRV strongly favor some other, USSR could accept it, provided USSR could monitor proceedings closely.
3. Participants	Geneva 1954 participants with US and VC as full participants (See #7)	USSR could accept changes DRV desires with same provision as in B2.
4. Closed/open	Secrecy is impossible. Closed sessions are useful for bargaining, open for obstruction and propaganda. Both should be acceptable to USSR.	DRV position must be supported.
5. Time limits	There is no pressing need for Soviet Union to insist on any time limit provided adequate observance of pre-conditions continues.	

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
	Attempts by Americans to pressure DRV to accept short time limits should call forth strong Soviet support to DRV.	
6. Scope	The USSR prefers that negotiations consider threat to world peace posed by American presence in all of SEA and that all American "positions of strength" in area will be eliminated.	If USSR ally, the DRV, prefers a more limited scope, USSR will not have any major objection.

C. Cease-Fire

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Definition	(a) Cessation of all bombing attacks and overflights of DRV territory.	No Fallback
	(b) Cessation of all combat operations in SVN, including recon, by GVN and US forces in SVN, and by US naval and air forces operating against Vietnam from territory outside Vietnam.	Drop conditions on recon, insofar as SVN concerned.
	(c) Both sides will retain arms during cease-fire.	No Fallback

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

B-10 (RED)

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<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
2. Pre-condition	Both sides shall publicly announce their commitment to cease-fire, under agreed conditions.	No Fallback
3. Movement of forces	(a) Any GVN and US forces that may be deployed into demilitarized zone will be withdrawn, effective upon cease-fire.	No Fallback
	(b) No new deployments of GVN and US forces will take place within SVN after cease-fire commences.	Non-combatant movements (medical, admin, etc) will be accepted.
	(c) No buildup of forces from outside Vietnam will take place after cease-fire.	Prepare to give on this point, if question of SU mil aid to DRV raised.
	(d) Similarly, no further movement of DRV forces into SVN will take place after cease-fire.	No Fallback
4. Freeze-in-place	(a) Temporary freeze in-place is acceptable, but withdrawal to their base areas of all GVN and US combat forces deployed in field will commence within two weeks of cease-fire and be completed within four weeks.	Freeze-in-place without withdrawal to base areas, if strong objections made by other side, which is likely.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
	(b) VC will remain-in-place in all areas presently under their control. (We ignore presence of any DRV forces in SVN; this is left up to Ho)	Local tactical withdrawals to break contact.
5. Warning Period	No warning period required.	

D. Inspection and Control (Safeguards):

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Supervisory element	ICC-3 members (Communist, western, neutral). Reports and recommendations to co-chairmen must be unanimously agreed upon.	Reports can be made upon agreement of 2 of the 3 members; these are not binding on ICC and co-chairman need take no action.
2. Surveillance	(a) If conference meets while US forces are still in SVN, ICC will investigate violations of cease-fire and report such violations to conferees. To implement this, present ICC terms will remain in DRV and SVN, new teams to be placed in major urban areas of SVN near port facilities, airfields, and major military installations.	ICC teams will be empowered to travel through SVN and, on an itinerary agreed upon at least 48 hours in advance, to investigate reports of DRV or VC hostile actions.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

(b) In accordance with time-table established for troop withdrawal, ICC will have powers of inspection and verification throughout SVN, to monitor the withdrawal of US forces, and to supervise the turning over of all installations to ICC control pending elections.

ICC team will verify withdrawal of DRV troops. This verification will be determined in consultation with the DRV government.

(c) Upon completion of US withdrawal, the functions of the ICC as regards military activity will be limited to periodic inspections and surveillance of ports and airfields in SVN to determine that the US has not reintroduced its forces.

An ICC team will be established at the DMZ to verify that the DRV has not reintroduced troops.

(d) Elections: The ICC will be given full authority to supervise elections in SVN. The registration of parties and candidates, the method of balloting, and the maintenance of the polling places shall be the responsibility of the ICC or its appointed representatives.

The ICC will supervise the balloting in SVN, the modalities of the election having been worked out with SVN authorities and Front officials together.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
3. Resolution of Disputes	All disputes shall be resolved by the senior representatives of each of the three members of the ICC. All reports and recommendations shall be based on the unanimous decision of these representatives.	Reports can be issued by 2 of 3 members; neither these reports nor their recommendations shall be binding on the ICC or the co-chairman.

E. GVN Sovereignty

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. GVN Sovereignty	(a) Freeze-in-place would also apply to GVN access to areas controlled by VC - No access until a political settlement has been made. (b) Amnesty for all VC - (Analysis - VC members will merge into civilian population - therefore will be no "residual banditry", etc. Arms will not be collected by GVN.)	(a) Some civil GVN units (telephones, health, food supplies, etc.) would have access throughout country. (b) DNG matter of amnesty.

F. Withdrawals

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Withdrawals	Following signing of agreement:	

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

(a) DRV forces will be withdrawn from SVN within 30 days.

US/FW complete withdrawal can extend through period longer than 100 days.

(b) US/FW forces will return to bases within 30 days.

(c) US/FW combat forces will leave SVN within 100 days after arriving at bases.

(d) DRV will accept political refugees (i.e. VC) into DRV territory.

(e) Other VC forces will merge into population.

G. Status of NLF/VC:

BARGAINING POSITIONS

ISSUE

POSITION

FALLBACK POSITION

1. In negotiations

Expand Geneva framework to include NLF/VC as a full and equal participant (according to recognition as a de facto government).

Combined NVN/NLF delegation providing US/SVN delegations are combined.

2. In Cease-fire

Not applicable (NLF will abide by cease-fire).

Not applicable

3. In post hostilities environment

Recognize NLF/VC as a de facto government in SVN

(a) Coalition SVN/NLF government.

(b) NLF receive certain positions in present SVN government.

H. US Withdrawal from SEA:

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Acceptable US presence in Vietnam, and Thailand.	(a) Withdrawal of all combat forces from Vietnam within 6 mo.	(a) Accept a more gradual withdrawal with all actions completed within 2 years.
	(b) Withdrawal of all combat forces from Thailand within one year.	(b) Hold to withdrawal schedule but eliminate demand for withdrawal of forces from Thailand.
	(c) Withdrawal of all support elements and equipment from Vietnam within 1 year.	
	(d) Withdrawal of all support elements and equipment from Thailand within 18 mo.	

I. Elections

BARGAINING POSITIONS

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. South Vietnam	A new government must be elected in SVN within 60 days of troop withdrawal. This election will be supervised by the ICC, which will register candidates, determining who may run. No members of the present government or ARVN officers may run. Existing political parties	ICC will work out modalities of elections with a group of South Vietnamese made up of SVN officials and Front members. Candidates, including present ARVN officers, will be approved by these 3 parties, who will share the supervision of the elections.

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
	will be banned, but the Front may run its own candidates. Maintenance of polling places and counting of ballots will be under ICC supervision. ICC will investigate reported irregularities. All reports must be unanimous.	
2. North Vietnam	No elections	No Fallback
3. N and SVN	Balloting in North to be supervised by present DRV authorities. In South, election supervised by ICC and coalition emerging from election. (a) election to be held within 2 years of peace settlement.	ICC supervision, North and South.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 10

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG 11930 Dec 67

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 1 December 1967

On 19 September the United States government announced the suspension of air attacks against North Vietnam based upon the withdrawal of NVN units from South Vietnam. Since that time there has been hard intelligence to the effect that major elements of four NVN divisions have been withdrawn from South Vietnam.

Secret, bilateral negotiations have continued in Prague between United States and DRV emissaries at the ambassadorial level. While specific agreements on the details of a "cease-fire", withdrawal time-tables and many other subjects have not been agreed upon a number of events have taken place in SEA which have greatly raised hopes for peace around the world.

In addition to the withdrawal of NVN units from SVN it is evident that the NLF/NVN have discontinued offensive operations in SVN and sought to avoid military contact with US/RVN forces. Although the United States has generally maintained the tempo of aggressive patrolling, the enemy has succeeded in avoiding major engagements and eluded large scale search and destroy operations. As it became increasingly clear that the communist side was sincerely interested in de-escalating the conflict in SVN, pressures upon the US/RVN to moderate the level of offensive operations mounted, and by 15 October most of the probing into so-called grey areas and long-held VC sanctuaries was being conducted by RVN constabulary units and police. Efforts by RVN administrators to enter areas previously considered hostile have succeeded, however, and US/RVN pacification and Revolutionary Development programs have been drastically accelerated, particularly in areas which have long been under RVN control.

In an effort to increase the economic and political stability of the SVN government, the newly established Ministry of National Development has commenced to vigorously

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C-1 (BLUE)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

execute a joint United States/Republic of Vietnam program of reform and rehabilitation. These measures include the strengthening of constabulary forces, expanding the revolutionary development program and shifting military units to civic action projects in an attempt to meet immediate needs of the people.

As the US stepped up AID programs in formerly contested areas of the country, Ky cracked down on government officials suspected of diversion of US economic assistance, funds and logistic shipments. Severe sentences have been meted out.

Following up other economic moves, the GVN has urged the US to join in the development of the Mekong Delta, the establishment of an international development fund and the organization of an international peace corps.

Premier Ky answered Hanoi's charges of his crimes against humanity by publicly offering to ship rice and medicines to the famine stricken Vietnamese people of the Red River valley. Hanoi ignored the offer.

The DRV has invited large numbers of foreign, including US, news media representatives to North Vietnam. TV and newsreel scenes of NVN veterans receiving heroes' welcomes in Hanoi are commonplace. The ICC has officially confirmed movement of major "volunteer" elements from South Vietnam under conditions which have convinced virtually everyone, who wanted to be convinced, that the DRV was actually pulling out all its forces.

Announcements by Hanoi keyed to the United States statement regarding suspension of the air attacks have been couched in terms which avoid admitting that regular NVN forces had ever been committed but clearly convey DRV desires to discontinue the conflict in SEA.

In South Vietnam, unrest and dissatisfaction at the reimposition of tight military control by the Ky regime led to massive overtures by many factions, including principal moderate leaders, for US support in re-establishing constitutional government. It became apparent that Ky's power base was unstable in the face of student, union, Buddhist and moderate opposition and under US urging, Ky withdrew many of the emergency measures which has been imposed, such as martial law, early curfews, prohibitions against assembly and rigid censorship. By early November it was public knowledge

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

that a dialogue was being conducted between key members of the National Assembly in Saigon and moderate leaders of the NLF and the first fruit of these discussions was the exchange of prisoners that was announced on 5 November. Over a thousand VC and RVN prisoners were paroled and returned to their homes.

Also by this time, a degree of cooperation was developing at the hamlet and village level between RVN and NLF political and technical cadres and the level of incidents, especially terrorist incidents dropped to a level approximating that of 1959.

The NLF sought backing from the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and other ethnic minorities with offers of autonomy, discontinued collection of taxes from the peasants and drastically curtailed other levies on internal transport and business activities. Evidence began to mount that the NLF was preparing to enter into the main-stream of political life in South Vietnam, cooperating in efforts to lay the basis for popular elections--perhaps under ICC supervision. The United States Embassy was aware serious discussions in this direction were being conducted with RVN and NLF representatives moving closer to agreement

Meanwhile, psychological operations intended to lure away Viet Cong members were expanded by the RVN into a massive campaign. Amnesty programs and opportunities for reconstruction have been explained to a wider audience as VC forces returned to the villages.

In an English language news broadcast from Hanoi, the North Vietnamese Govt. announced that it had received reliable information concerning a Taiwan regime offer to the Ky regime of a fully equipped infantry division for use against the freedom loving people of Vietnam. In a hastily arranged meeting with Ambassador Lodge, Ky acknowledged receiving the offer but stated that it had been politely turned down.

As popular sentiments against American intransigence grew, leftist elements in Australia initiated labor disorders and demonstrations. These disorders coincided with demonstrations and work stoppages in port areas.

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On 21 September news reports from New Delhi stated that the Chinese divisions on the border of North Vietnam had begun to pull back into the interior of China and that an emissary from Hanoi to Peking had reassured the Chinese that the North Vietnamese would not enter into negotiations with the United States unless the Chinese were seated by their side. New Delhi also reported that official Hanoi circles cynically discussed a United States offer of assistance in maintaining their political and territorial integrity should the DRV feel threatened by a Chinese "protective occupation".

On 26 September while Moscow was strongly protesting the Chinese interdiction of Soviet aid to NVN the Chinese reminded the Soviets of their obligations under the 1950 Sino Soviet Mutual Defense Pact.

On 30 September, Radio Peiping made clear in a remarkable polemic that the CPR is not opposed to negotiations ending the imperialist takeover of the peoples of Vietnam. The Chinese stated, however, that in any negotiations the NLF must be a participant and that the European powers including the USSR must be excluded. The CPR promised massive aid to the DRV and stated that there was no need for any further aid from other so called socialist states. The CPR went further, to accuse the USSR, in light of its encouragement to the US to enter negotiations, of collaborating with the US "to dictate another European settlement of the SEA question to the detriment of the Asian peoples". The CPR called the US bombing pause a hoax and merely an attempt by the US to lull the DRV into a sense of false security while secretly preparing to launch an invasion of the DRV. It was further claimed that any negotiations aimed at ending the US military presence in SEA would be meaningless, for the US intended to remain forever; "The only way they will leave is when the peoples of Asia rise up and throw the imperialist devils into the sea".

On 5 October the UK and USSR issued a joint communique stressing that as co-chairmen they would be prepared to reconvene the Geneva talks should either the US or DRV request it.

Public acclaim at the move toward peace in SEA included congratulatory messages to President Johnson from prominent world figures, favorable statements in Congress and assurances of support from the governments of the UK, France and other Western European nations.

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Private warnings of premature relaxation of pressure were delivered not only by the RVN but by South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

Pressures on Congress and the President to "bring the boys home" were somewhat tempered by candid and effective speeches by Administration spokesmen who reiterated Rusk's warning that all could still be lost by a premature acceptance of terms which had not been thoroughly explored.

By 1 November it was apparent at Prague that some difficult bargaining lay ahead on matters of primary interest but that the DRV was anxious to shift from the bilateral discussions conducted in secret to a public forum. Although US demands for a complete statement regarding NVN force levels in SVN had never been completely met, sufficient information was provided to indicate good faith. It was in the area of a formal cease-fire that Hanoi's position was difficult to pin down. In repeated efforts by the US emissary to establish an initial bargaining position, the DRV representative alluded to the fact that a de facto cease-fire was in effect based on tacit understanding and that the legal specifics of the question could well be deferred until formal negotiations were begun. He agreed that it should be high on the agenda.

On 3 November, the United States unilaterally announced withdrawal of three US Air Force squadrons from South Vietnam (to Clark AFB) in what was widely regarded as a concession to critics of continued US/RVN air patrolling over both North and South Vietnam.

On 10 November, rumors of US intransigence in the face of DRV proposals for a major international conference had begun to spread and pressures were mounting for announcements regarding such a meeting.

On 12 November, following agreement at Prague, simultaneous announcements were made in Washington and Hanoi that the US and DRV had agreed to meet for formal negotiations at Rangoon on 25 November, that invitations were being extended to the Government of Vietnam and that representatives of the National Liberation Front would be present. It was indicated that the Governments of the Republic of Korea and Australia would participate on the Free World side and that both the USSR and CPR would be invited to participate on the communist side.

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(Taking cognizance of possible elections in South Vietnam it was stipulated that a new government which was acceptable to the majority of the people of South Vietnam as indicated in the elections might assume a place at the table in lieu of both the present GVN and NLF. This element of the discussions was held in private by the parties concerned but is becoming something of an open secret).

During the last week, a number of developments have raised serious doubts on the US side regarding the desirability of proceeding with formal negotiations: Surveillance has built up significant evidence that NVN infiltration of supplies and equipment into SVN is continuing at September levels. There is hard intelligence that two NVN divisions have been rehabilitated and re-equipped and are engaged in tough combat training in sanctuary areas along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border; during the last two days three GVN administrators have been killed in alleged VC ambushes in I Corps area while visiting formerly hostile villages. The Communist side alleges that these incidents have been fabricated by Ky and his adherents to sabotage the peace. A 1st Air Mobile Division unit in a routine patrolling sweep was fired on near the Iadrang Valley and in the fire-fight that ensued, killed a score of VC regulars who had been defending a heavy cache of ammunition.

Viet Cong cadre have launched a non-violent campaign to disrupt the GVN amnesty programs and to demoralize ARVN troops. Refugees have been encouraged to demand safe conduct and transportation to home villages. Families have been encouraged to urge their sons to "return to village, home, and family." Americans have been confronted with a "why die now?" campaign.

During the extended pause the VC defection rate has been rising. Most of the defections seem to stem from a swelling apolitical attitude within the cadres. Many seem to feel that neither the GVN nor the NLF is prepared to meet their real needs.

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During the past month, American aerial reconnaissance has revealed that North Vietnam has taken advantage of the pause in bombings to repair damaged facilities at major airfields and industrial plants. A sharp increase in the number of Soviet registered ships arriving in Haiphong has coincided with discovery of new MIG-21 aircraft at fields near Hanoi and intelligence reports of increased numbers of advanced Soviet surface-to-air missiles at strategically important locations.

As agreed upon during the preliminary discussions at Prague, formal negotiations were begun on 25 November at Rangoon with all eight principal participants present - US; GVN; Korea; Australia/NZ; NVN; NLF; USSR; CPR.

The conferees agreed to rotate the chairmanship every two weeks, alternating between Communist and Free World participants. The USSR was selected to provide the first chairman and Australia the second.

Four subcommittees have been formed to consider the first four items on the agenda.

1. Formal agreement covering cessation of hostilities including the implications of GVN internal sovereignty.
2. Withdrawal and/or neutralization of troops now in SVN.
3. Elections within SVN.
4. Supervision, enforcement and guarantees.

The subcommittees will attempt to reach an accommodation between the various positions, after which each agenda item will be presented for plenary consideration.

Progress to this moment has been hardly discernible although the DRV and the representatives of the NLF have captured world headlines with speeches castigating Ky and the United States.

NOTE: Initial bargaining positions of the various countries are shown at Tab A.

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TAB A

BARGAINING POSITIONS

A. FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS

1. Time Limits:

US -- US reassess progress at the end of 3 months.

GVN -- Three months.

NVN -- None. (Just drag on.)

VC -- Prefer no time limits or as long as possible to wait for US elections, gain time for bolstering infrastructure. We can always start our combat operations after the US withdrawal.

CPR -- None, the more protracted the better.

USSR -- There is no pressing need for Soviet Union to insist on any time limit provided adequate observance of pre-conditions continues. Attempts by Americans to pressure DRV to accept short time limits should call forth strong Soviet support to DRV.

2. Scope:

US -- North and South Vietnam (to include Mil withdrawal from Laos).

GVN -- Indochina.

NVN -- South Vietnam.

VC -- Deal with SVN as the major problem and introduce idea of a later conference removing all of US presence from Mainland Southeast Asia.

CPR -- All of Mainland Southeast Asia including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

USSR -- The USSR prefers that negotiations consider threat to world peace posed by American presence in all of SEA and that all American "positions of strength" in area will be eliminated.

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B. CEASE-FIRE

1. Definition:

US -- Cessation of hostile acts by both sides as evidenced by measurable decline in incident statistics with GVN right to administer South Vietnam according to its own laws and procedures.

GVN -- No significant level of NVN or NLF/VC incidents. Freedom of village government to operate without coercion.

NVN -- Cease all offensive military activity on a specific date.

VC -- Termination of conventional land, sea and air operations, to include regular, para-military and national police forces.

CPR -- Termination of all firing and maintenance of present positions. All military and para-military operations throughout SEA must cease by US/Lackey forces. Such actions as patrolling and repositioning of forces are also prohibited. Included are bombing, reconnaissance, naval gunfire, Market Time Ops, Chieu Hoi program, Psywar activities, etc.

USSR -- (a) Cessation of all bombing attacks and overflights of DRV territory. (b) Cessation of all combat operations in SVN, including reconnaissance, by GVN and US forces in SVN, and by US naval and air forces operating against Vietnam from territory outside Vietnam. (c) Both sides will retain arms during cease-fire.

2. Freedom of Movement:

US -- Yes.

GVN -- For both US and GVN troops to validate absence of NVN forces and incidents everywhere in SVN.

NVN -- No movement by military units. Restricted to present areas.

VC -- No offensive actions; units freeze in place but population moves freely. Units not to be warned.

CPR -- Freedom of movement is to be opposed.

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USSR -- (a) Any GVN and US forces that may be deployed into demilitarized zone will be withdrawn, effective upon cease-fire. (b) No new deployments of GVN and US forces will take place within SVN after cease-fire commences. (c) No buildup of forces from outside Vietnam will take place after cease-fire. (d) Similarly, no further movement of DRV forces into SVN will take place after cease-fire.

3. "Freeze in Place" Acceptable:

US -- No.

GVN -- For both US and GVN troops to validate absence of NVN forces and incidents everywhere in SVN.

NVN -- Freeze in place acceptable pending withdrawal out of country or into enclaves.

VC -- No offensive actions; units freeze in place but population moves freely. Units not to be warned.

CPR -- Yes, indefinitely for all forces.

USSR -- (a) Temporary freeze in place is acceptable, but withdrawal to their base areas of all GVN and US combat forces deployed in field will commence within two weeks of cease-fire and be completed within four weeks. (b) VC will remain in place in all areas presently under their control (We ignore presence of any DRV forces in SVN; this is left up to Ho).

C. SAFEGUARDS

1. Supervisory Element:

US -- No permanent supervisory element would be useful after the NVN withdrawal. Maximum world press coverage.

GVN -- US and GVN troops and police.

NVN -- None.

VC -- VC see no need for such a system but will accept the ICC as a mechanism, particularly to check on movement of US/FVMAF forces now conducting operations.

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CPR -- An International Peace Committee composed of Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and Cuba.

USSR -- ICC-3 members (Communist, western, neutral). Reports and recommendations to co-chairmen must be unanimously agreed upon.

2. Reconnaissance and Surveillance:

US -- US/GVN ground and air surveillance over GVN. US air surveillance over NVN and Laos.

GVN -- No limits on freedom of movement, if ICC should have own transport. Investigation should be automatic following complaint and criteria for what constitutes an investigable complaint should be liberal. Units should be stationed widely and required to visit all villages at least once a month without advance warning.

NVN -- None.

VC -- No border surveillance is necessary.

CPR -- Total cessation of all reconnaissance and surveillance activities.

USSR -- (a) If conference meets while US forces are still in SVN, ICC will investigate violations of cease-fire and report such violations to conferees. To implement this, present ICC terms will remain in DRV and SVN, new teams to be placed in major urban areas of SVN near port facilities, airfields, and major military installations. (b) In accordance with time table established for troop withdrawal, ICC will have powers of inspection and verification throughout SVN, to monitor the withdrawal of US forces, and to supervise the turning over of all installations to ICC control pending elections. (c) Upon completion of US withdrawal, the functions of the ICC as regards military activity will be limited to periodic inspections and surveillance of ports and airfields in SVN to determine that the US has not reintroduced its forces. (d) Elections: The ICC will be given full authority to supervise elections in SVN. The registration of parties and candidates, the method of balloting, and the maintenance of the polling places shall be the responsibility of the ICC or its appointed representatives.

3. Resolution of Disputes:

US -- Joint Military Commission with representative from Communist and Allied sides to settle disputes during NVN withdrawal phase; major disputes reconvene conferences.

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GVN -- If ICC, eliminate veto, decide by majority vote and provide for minority report.

NVN -- By participants - No third parties.

VC -- See no need for a separate group. Vietnamese can handle own problems besides this leads to protraction of negotiations. No arbitration desired.

CPR -- Referred to supervisory elements with right to veto by any member.

USSR -- All disputes shall be resolved by the senior representatives of each of the three members of the ICC. All reports and recommendations shall be based on the unanimous decision of these representatives.

4. GVN Sovereignty:

US -- No restriction in physical access or in GVN right to punish future violations of GVN sovereignty.

GVN -- No limitations. Permit GVN/other country (including U.S.) unilateral defense treaties permitting stationing of troops in SVN.

NVN -- GVN access only to areas they now control.

VC -- We do not recognize it. No access will be given to the current version of GVN. We want first to establish a coalition government as a consequence of legitimate free elections. We are not bandits, we have in effect won our war.

CPR -- DeFacto recognition of NLF sovereignty in those areas of SVN controlled by the NLF. The GVN will only be allowed access to areas under its firm control as of the date of the cease-fire.

USSR -- (a) Freeze-in-place would also apply to GVN access to areas controlled by VC - No access until a political settlement has been made. (b) Amnesty for all VC - (Analysis - VC members will merge into civilian population - therefore will be no "residual banditry", etc. Arms will not be collected by GVN.)

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5. Withdrawal:

US -- NVN will: (a) Indicate which units it is prepared to withdraw. (b) Withdraw all forces so indicated within one month following the joint announcement. (c) Agree to inspection at points of egress. US will: (a) Formally renounce any intention of maintaining permanent military presence in SVN. (b) Immediately withdraw air components primarily concerned with NVN bombing. (c) Agree to withdraw ground forces as circumstances warrant and GVN so desires.

GVN -- NVA withdrawal and cessation of infiltration of weapons, men & supplies in return for cessation of US bombing of NVN & further US build-up. VC turn in agreed number of arms in return for agreed US withdrawal (e.g. half of combat troops) within year after signing agreement and remainder one year after plebiscite (See 9 below). Non-combat troops (e.g. engineers, medics) would be exempted from withdrawal and would be invited to remain by GVN in order to help with national reconstruction.

NVN -- Acceptable quid-pro-quo: Lock, stock and barrel; everything US & Free world goes! Acceptable rate: Maximum 6 months.

VC -- (a) Must withdraw major US weaponry to include ships, aircraft, helicopters and artillery as priority move. (b) Quid-pro-quo between US/FWMAF and NVN forces is acceptable.

CPR -- All forces other than indigenous must leave SEA including specifically SVN, Laos, and Thailand prior to 1 January. Inasmuch as NVA has already returned two divisions, US must show good faith by removing two divisions immediately. At least 1/3 of all US ground and air forces based in SEA should leave by 1 November, second 1/3 of all US forces must leave by 1 December and all remaining US and lackey forces must be out by 1 January '68. All US and lackey naval elements must leave the Gulf of Tonkin and other territorial waters of VN and cease its air and sea operations against VN and provocations against innocent shipping by 1 October, 1967. All NVA forces also out of SVN by 1 Jan. VC will return to homes and peaceful pursuits.

USSR -- Following signing of agreement: (a) DRV forces will be withdrawn from SVN within 30 days. (b) US/FW forces will return to bases within 30 days. (c) US/FW combat forces will leave SVN within 100 days after arriving at bases. (d) DRV will accept political refugees (i.e. VC) into DRV territory. (e) Other VC forces will merge into population.

6. Status of NLF/VC:

US -- (a) Negotiators can be admitted as part of DRV delegation. (b) In cease fire: GVN will undertake to recognize organized VC units as combatants and work out with their commanders satisfactory local cease-fire and demobilization arrangements. (c) GVN will have to be forthcoming on amnesty program whereby, at a minimum, VC who turn in weapons will be permitted to resume position in society and held liable only for future offenses. (d) NLF status as acceptable organized party is matter for GVN to decide.

GVN -- In prenegotiations: Excluded. In negotiations: Excluded. Cease fire: Required to turn in weapons. In post hostilities: Amnesty for any acts committed before signing of agreement.

NVN -- Sole representative of SVN people.

VC -- (a) We hold to the NLF as the means of integrating the South Vietnamese into a legitimate government representative of the Vietnamese people. Through elections we hope to position our representatives in key power positions. Our objective is to weaken the power of residual GVN representatives in urban areas and strengthen our hold in the country side. (b) We may modify our NLF position but very slightly and under great pressure preferring first to get alien forces out of SVN and then as Vietnamese solve our own political problem.

CPR -- (a) Cease-fire: Should cease overt military ops. (b) Post-hostilities environment: NLF should have at least 50% representation at all levels of government, i.e. Assembly, Cabinet, Province, District, and Local.

USSR -- In negotiations: Expand Geneva framework to include NLF/VC as a full and equal participant (according it recognition as a defacto government). In Cease-fire: Not applicable (NLF will abide by cease-fire). In post hostilities environment: Recognize NLF/VC as a de facto government in SVN.

7. Communist/US Withdrawal from SEA:

US -- Discussion limited to VN (S&N) & Laos. No NVN military forces in Laos or SVN (or Cambodia). *US disengagement as outlined above.

GVN -- (a) VC: Dissolution (See 6). (b) NVA: Withdrawal (See 5). (c) US: Withdrawal (See 5 & 4) or transfer to Thailand and advance Pacific bases.

NVN -- All foreign forces and bases must go.

VC --

CPR -- Asian Communist presence is certainly necessary where it represents the people. (This would exclude USSR presence). No US presence in SE Asia is acceptable.

USSR -- (a) Withdrawal of all combat forces from Vietnam within 6 mo. (b) Withdrawal of all combat forces from Thailand within one year. (c) Withdrawal of all support elements and equipment from Vietnam within 1 year. (d) Withdrawal of all support elements and equipment from Thailand within 18 mo.

8. Elections:

US -- (a) Elections to be held in SVN in accord with GVN laws. Except VC can participate even if NLF not recognized as a party. (b) Conference not competent to address, internal NVN politics. (c) US willing for VN to be reunified if this is the freely expressed desire of VN people, as expressed initially by SVN referendum on this subject after peace is restored.

GVN -- (a) SVN: No special elections for representative bodies needed as regular ones provided in constitution. (b) NVN: Call for separate internationally supervised general election by secret ballot in North & South Vietnam in order to establish democratic institutions. (c) Unification: Hold plebiscite in SVN only under ICC observation on issue of reunification vs. self-determination, independence & freedom.

NVN -- (a) South Vietnam, Yes. (b) North Vietnam, No. (c) North and South Vietnam as prelude to unification, No.

VC -- South Vietnam - Yes, North Vietnam - Defer to NVN,
North & South - Wait and See.

CPR -- The CPR will support Hanoi in its desire to guarantee the peoples of SVN, through the National Liberation Front, an opportunity to participate in truly "free" elections for a government of their own choice, as a prelude to unification of North and South Vietnam.

USSR -- A new government must be elected in SVN within 60 days of troop withdrawal. This election will be supervised by the ICC, which will register candidates, determining who may run. No members of the present government or ARVN officers may run. Existing political parties will be banned, but the Front may run its own candidates. Maintenance of polling places and counting of ballots will be under ICC supervision. ICC will investigate reported irregularities. All reports must be unanimous.

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FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 12

MOVE NO. III

DTG 12200 Dec 67

To a query from the Blue Team, Control responded that the current constitution of the Republic of Vietnam (recently drafted by the Constituent Assembly), calls for a term of five years for the President but provides only three years as the tenure for members of the National Assembly. These officials are to come up for re-election on a staggered basis with one third of the seats being contested in Provincial elections every year. The first such election is presently slated for March 1968.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM US TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG 012400 Dec 67

I ESTIMATE

Analysis of overall situation by US Team at game time (1 Dec 67) indicates that:

1. US/GVN still remain in the best net strategic position. This permits US negotiators at Rangoon to maintain their tough negotiating position.

2. Under a situation of a de facto cessation of hostilities time is working for the US/GVN. Therefore, US is under no compelling pressure to reach an early conclusion of the negotiations. Moreover, Communist side favors protracted negotiations. (See Control Message No. 10, Tab A, paragraph A1.)

3. Since negotiations are expected to be protracted, US Team has selected period between July-October 1968 as optimum time for conclusion of negotiations from US point of view. (This takes into account, among other things, the domestic political consideration of the US elections in November, 1968, See Figure 1, this message, page 8.)

4. Serious policy differences exist between the Communist members at the Rangoon Conference, which weaken their negotiating flexibility. These are susceptible to exploitation by the Free World members at the Conference.

5. The de facto cessation of hostilities permits US/GVN forces within SVN to redeploy in such a manner as to increase their capability to react to re-escalation of the conflict, while at the same time lending credibility to the US negotiating position that it is seriously seeking an end to hostilities in SVN and SEA.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Basic national objectives: No change. (See US Team Message No. 1, Section II.)

B. Tactical Objectives. (Within time span of next year):

1. Use these twelve months to our best advantage by:

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- a. Helping to consolidate and strengthen the GVN position in SVN.
- b. Deterring or delaying any improvement of DRV/NLF capability to re-escalate the conflict.
2. Bring the Rangoon negotiations to a successful conclusion within the optimum time frame (July-October 1968).
3. Maintain and increase the US/GVN psychological initiative.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS: The US/GVN intends to take advantage of the de facto cessation of hostilities by undertaking two major strategies, one in the field of national and SEA development, the other in the military field:

A. SEA Development: Construct an E-W paved highway/rail-road system running generally along Route 9 from Dong Ha through Tchepone and Savannakhet, linking up with the Thai road/rail network at Muang Ubon. (See Map A.) Target date for completion of project, 1 December 1968. This project will have priority call on all in-country civilian (RMK-BNU) and military engineering (50 US Army engineer battalions) resources.

B. Military Redeployments Within SVN (See Map B)

1. Regular ARVN forces will be deployed to guard the western GVN border and to establish a powerful blocking force in Quang Tri Province, south of the DMZ.
2. All GVN/Regional Forces and Popular Force units will be integrated into the National Constabulary and deployed throughout the country so as to provide a minimum of one reinforced platoon permanently stationed in each of the 2500 villages of SVN.
3. US/FWF will consolidate in the vicinity of their present base areas (continuing normal external reconnaissance and patrol activities).
4. A two division US air mobile task force will be based in the Danang area as a quick reaction force to respond to any Communist threats or interference with the construction of the E-W road/rail project.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political: See negotiating strategy as adopted by the US representatives on the four subcommittees at the Rangoon Conference: i.e.

<u>Subcommittee</u>	<u>Tab</u>
1	A
2	B
3	C
4	D (Issued separately)

B. Economic

The Government of Vietnam will announce in the next few days the establishment of a five year National New Society Program to begin on 1 January 1968. This plan will be announced on the basis of its prior review and technical indorsement of the program by a respected international organization. This program is designed to meet the hopes and aspirations for a better life for all sectors of the SVN community, including former VC, as well as benefit neighboring SEA countries including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

The chief points of this New Society program are:

1. The establishment of a National New Society Planning Commission, chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of key National Ministries, effective 1 January 1968.

2. The designation of the Ministry of National Development as the Executive Agent of the New Society Planning Commission with jurisdiction over all Ministries as necessary to carry out National plans.

3. The National New Society Program will include major programs in public works, health, education and agriculture. The most important of these are:

a. The New Society Land Reform Program which will redistribute land to farmers with no holdings over 25 hectares allowed. The law has already been drafted and presented to the SVN Premier.

b. The New Society Farmer's Program which includes a new plan for a Farmer's Credit Program based on the successful and enthusiastically received An Grang model, a new

Farmer's Development Program which includes a number of sub-programs aimed at increasing a farmer's real per capita income by 20% a year for each of the next five years, a new Farm Youth Program, and the planned establishment of National Farm Centers for training advice and assistance in each of the nation's 252 districts.

c. The New Society Education Program planned to guarantee elementary schooling to all Vietnamese children by 1969 and secondary schooling to 75% by 1973. Four National Agriculture and Technical colleges for rural youths are to be constructed in Cantho, Dalat, Pleiku, and Danang with construction to begin in early 1968. Training of instructors in US Land Grant Colleges.

d. The New Society Health Program which will call for the building and rehabilitation of a provincial hospital in each province by December 1968, and the construction of district hospitals in each of the districts by 1973. Nursing schools will be built as adjuncts to the National Agriculture and Technical Colleges in each of the four national areas.

e. The New Society Public Works Program aimed at constructing village roads and bridges, irrigation dams and canals, government buildings and port and harbor rehabilitation throughout South Vietnam. SVN and FWF units will be used as emphasis is shifted from military operations to civic action.

f. National Mekong Delta Development Program which becomes SVN's input to the United Nations development plan. The Premier has invited the UN Mekong Delta Committee, the SEA Development Bank, and appropriate officials from Laos, Cambodia and Thailand to meet in Saigon on March 1st, 1968 for preliminary planning. Indications are the invitation will be accepted by all parties involved.

g. The New Society Business and Trade Development Program designed to increase in-country business development and private enterprise and open up trade channels with other SEA nations for mutual benefit. Trade Missions will be organized and sent to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines in order to both discover markets for the expected increase of production and exports of SVN raw materials and industrial products and to invite other SEA nations to invest in the new future of SVN.

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4. The means to carry out the New Society Program include:

a. Using Revolutionary Development cadre for development purposes rather than security forces. A new training program for the cadre was announced.

b. The use of Constabulary to maintain local security in conjunction with redeployed ARVN forces while US forces maintain security of population centers and principal government facilities.

c. SVN/FWF will be used as available in civic action roles.

5. Financing of the program will be provided chiefly by international organizations, free world nations and the United States. An expected increase in internal revenues and decrease in the military expenditures will allow for impressive GVN financial inputs to the program.

Cost Estimate - New Society Program

I. Land Reform Program	\$50 million
Farmer's Program	\$20 million
Education Program	\$30 million
Health Program	\$40 million
Public Works Program	\$50 million
Business & Trade Development	\$10 million
	<hr/>
	\$200 to 300 million
II. Economic Stabilization	<u>\$400</u> to <u>500</u> million
	\$600 to 800 million
III. To be funded by:	US (AID)
	UN
	Asia Development Bank
	IBRD
	Other Free World Countries

GOAL: 50% US Financing

C. Psychological

Pursue two lines at once, both of which will strengthen US position in negotiations:

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1. Peace

a. Maintain forward looking public posture regarding negotiations.

b. Exploit dramatic moves linking countries of SE Asia (e.g., ROAD TO LAOS).

c. Publicize massive reconstruction aid program within SVN (with help of US AID).

d. Maximize peaceful moves in other areas (UN, New Geneva Disarmament proposals, etc.)

2. Preserving Security in SVN. This phase should be preceded by at least one major peaceful statement under 1 above.

a. Publicly announce US intelligence findings on NVN buildup, reinfiltration and supply operations into SVN; update with periodic public statements as new NVN moves occur. (i.e. keep alive image of a tricky, insincere NVN.)

b. As US makes new military moves in reaction against NVN moves, publicly announce them, citing prior NVN moves as justification.

c. Give full publicity to any withdrawals of US military units from SVN.

d. In justifying this program, re-state basic US objectives in Vietnam (defeating aggression, preserving freedom), remind world audiences how much blood and treasure we've spent, and say all we seek is prudent, reasonable means to be sure a fair settlement is attained.

D. Military

1. The most important military consideration during the proposed time frame, and due to the indefinite nature of the negotiations, quite simply, is not to be caught out of response posture.

2. In the prior move we made certain strategic deployments to offset the ChiCom buildup and contingencies involved with the retrograde movement of the NVN.

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3. In this move we propose a possible strategic relocation of certain units to Okinawa and Hawaii with associated repositioning of the Carrier Task Force. Strategic relocation could include moving forces from SVN to Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan if the political and climates permit.

4. Tactically we propose those moves addressed in the committee report on "Withdrawal and/or neutralization of Troops now in SVN." (TAB B).


V. CONTINGENCIES (None listed herein, but the US Team is prepared to respond to a breakdown of negotiations, etc).

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C-24 (BLUE)

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FIGURE 1



LEGEND:

- _____ Scenario Portrayal (Intensity of Conflict)
- Scenario Trend (Intensity of Conflict)
- - - - - US Team Trend Objectives (Intensity of Conflict)
- X X X X X X Development Intensity

NOTE: US Team actions in this paper are designed to make the Intensity of Conflict curve approach US Team Trend Objectives curve and also cause the Development Intensity curve to rise dramatically.





TAB A

COMMITTEE 1 - CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT

A. Postulates

1. Seek to preserve advantages of present situation through protracted (at least 6 months) bargaining.

2. Failure to reach agreement (pending any further change in national objectives) is better than conclusion of a defective agreement.

B. Negotiating Objectives (In descending order of priority)

1. Avoid:

a. "Freeze-in-place"

b. Use of "cease-fire" as term in formal agreement.

2. Maintain:

a. Right of US/FWMAF forces to conduct same activities as GVN forces, because "acting in support and at request of GVN."

b. Principle that traditional concepts of freeze-in-place and regroupment are not meaningful under conditions of "wars of liberation."

c. Proposition that de facto cessation of hostile acts permits work of other committees to go forward despite absence of formal cease-fire agreement.

C. Accept (in descending order, at rate required to keep negotiations going - slowly).

1. Cessation of (overt) reconnaissance over NVN.

2. Principle that initiation of fire (ground, naval or AA) or incidents/terror violates spirit of conference and constitutes breach of agreement when it is concluded).

TAB A

3. Retention of arms (e.g., PAVN carry them home) but stress proposition that turning in a weapon is only automatic key to VC amnesty.

4. Military evacuation of DMZ.

5. As agreed by GVN, formation of ARVN/VC, ARVN/PAVN and/or ARVN-US/VC-PAVN commission and teams to investigate incidents.

6. International supervision of ICC type or modification to include USSR provided team reports (investigations and reports to be on majority basis) are published by commission without reference to conference chairmen or other higher body.

7. No introduction of additional US units.

8. Limitation on repositioning of units larger than battalion size.

D. Hold against (in descending order)

1. Limitation on operations of police and para-military and ChiCom hostilities.

2. Limitation on ground and air reconnaissance by US/ARVN (open skies).

3. Rotation of US troops.

4. Limitation on Market Time.

5. Limitation on admissible means of punishing enemy initiation of hostile acts.

6. CPR Peace Committee proposal.

7. ICC (or equivalent body) role in SVN elections.

TAB A

TAB B

COMMITTEE 2
WITHDRAWAL AND/OR NEUTRALIZATION OF
TROOPS NOW IN SVN

Intelligence confirmation of withdrawal of elements of four NVN divisions from SVN, and NLF/NVN disengagement in SVN requires a careful appraisal of comparative action by the US Free World Forces.

Although the US has made a token force reduction, three USAF squadrons to Clark Air Force Base, it is evident additional actions by the US are necessary to enhance our negotiating position and influence world reaction concerning our intentions.

The following US/Free World Force actions are recommended:

1. Introduce Australian, New Zealand, Korean, and Philippine forces into the pacification/civic action role to augment the GVN constabulary/ARVN.
2. Increase US Military Advisory efforts to ARVN/VNAF units to increase their effectiveness.
3. Stop conventional reconnaissance over NVN relying upon other means to provide necessary intelligence. Continue conventional reconnaissance in SVN, Laos, and Cambodia.
4. Consolidate main US forces in the following base areas: Danang, Chu Lai, Pleiku, An Khe, Qui Nhon; Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang; Saigon, Bien Hoa; Can Tho, Binh Tuy.

Strategic location in the areas above will permit fast response to new hostilities should they occur, or provide ready response for, or blocking actions for, NLF/NVN concentrations, e.g., Cambodia.

(This regroupment will not curtail required main force search and patrol.)

5. Be prepared to withdraw up to (relocate to Okinawa, and Hawaii with possibility of Thailand and/or Philippines) three US Army and one USMC division.

TAB B

6. Be prepared to withdraw three (3) PACAF based squadrons to Okinawa and Japan, and alert three (3) TAC squadrons for withdrawal.

7. Increase military aid/assistance to Thailand/Laos from SVN resources listing this as withdrawals from SVN.

8. Insist upon withdrawal of NLF/NVN units from Cambodia.

9. Insist upon a complete statement of NVN forces withdrawn and remaining in SVN for verification purposes. Be prepared to identify and query NVN representatives, based on US intelligence of NVN forces remaining in SVN and Cambodia.

10. Call for immediate halt to NVN resupply into SVN on threat of US forces intervention.

(Use available reconnaissance, ground and air, to determine extent and utilization of NVN infiltration of supplies and equipment routes, storage points, etc.)

TAB B

TAB C

COMMITTEE 3
ELECTIONS WITHIN SVN

A. US, with GVN, should firmly resist pressure for special elections in SVN to constitute new (i.e., coalition) government.

B. US should encourage GVN to take position -- and should support it in the position -- that GVN is legal, internationally recognized government of SVN. Its process of governmental structure and selection of officials is laid out in its constitution, drafted by a Constituent Assembly elected in September 1966 in nation-wide elections as open and free as Communist terror and harassment would permit. This constitution provides that one-third of the GVN's National Assembly is to be re-elected in March of 1968. These already scheduled elections will provide an entirely adequate forum for the expression of South Vietnamese political sentiments in this new political situation.

C. GVN should also be encouraged (if necessary, pressured) to take the line that although it does not recognize NLF claims to sovereignty nor -- in light its past performance -- is GVN prepared to accept it as legal political party, GVN is prepared to extend amnesty to individuals who have participated in NLF activities and permit them, as individuals to participate in national political process (i.e., future elections at local, provincial and national levels), so long as they abide by laws and regulations of GVN as legal SVN government. (Persons who take advantage of these amnesty provisions and abide by GVN law can participate in March 1968 National Assembly elections as voters or candidates.)

D. Conference will not address self to internal NVN politics but will call on Hanoi to allow NVN people to express their political views in free, unpressured, democratic manner.

Fallback: The above positions should be most firmly adhered to. GVN should stonewall on special elections soon after negotiation is completed to create "coalition" government. It should also refuse to recognize NLF as political party. If pressured, however, it can fall back to position that amnestied individuals who have been in NLF may, if they wish, group together in new party so long as

TAB C

new group, in organizing and requesting legal status, abides by and conforms to applicable GVN law and regulations. Such a party, if organized, may participate in political process on equal basis with other SVN parties so long as it continues to stay within GVN law. If amnestied individuals organize themselves in time, their new party may participate in the March 1968 National Assembly Elections.

Reference to NVN elections offered as bargaining counter and can be dropped.

E. On Reunification, US should encourage GVN to espouse theoretical desirability of eventual political union of all Viet peoples. However, GVN and US should stonewall on any time-linked NVN/SVN referendum. Instead, GVN should insist, with US backing, that prior conditions on any such referendum must be:

1. Restoration peace to SVN.
2. Free and open plebescite within SVN on issue of whether or not unification with north desired by SVN people.

Fallback: The above position should be stuck on but, under pressure, GVN (and US) could accept stated, if reasonable, time frame for SVN referendum (say within two years from date formal agreements or conference take effect).

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TAB D

COMMITTEE 4 - SUPERVISION, ENFORCEMENT AND GUARANTEES

Proceeding on the basic premise:

1. Negotiations are expected to be protracted.
2. North Vietnam is seriously hurting and is genuinely anxious to consummate military actions and/or armed hostilities.
3. United States is in a strong bargaining position and hence able to maintain a tough negotiating position.
4. United States/GVN will exploit the nation building process within SVN and utilize the time interval during negotiations to further strengthen their position militarily, economically, politically and psychologically. In essence, this will be accomplished through military redeployments (in strategic context) and an ambitious New Society Program.
5. USSR/CPR basic political philosophies are somewhat tenuous and any action and/or events which can be brought to bear in aggravation of this relationship is favorable to United States interests overall.

SUPERVISION, ENFORCEMENT AND GUARANTEES

Supervision - No permanent supervisory element would be useful after the PAVN has satisfactorily completed withdrawal from SVN. Within SVN redeployment of military forces (RVN/US) (MAP B), including constabulary and GVN freedom of movement/control throughout SVN would provide approximate controls.

Fallback - In the event a control mechanism is demanded by the CPR/USSR negotiations, an all Asian Committee should be pressed for. It is estimated that the Communist delegation may have internal friction as to nation membership and voting procedures (and this condition should be exploited); however, no serious roadblocks are apparent. United States interest in protracting negotiations would also be served and in turn, be in consonance with a favorable world image.

TAB D

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Enforcement - The use of Constabulary to maintain local security in conjunction with redeployed ARVN forces (while US forces maintain security of population centers and principal government facilities) should provide adequate enforcement capabilities.

Fallback - Air surveillance over NVN and Laos may be sticky, particularly on a protracted time basis; however covert surveillance could be continued as well as pressing for an "Open Skies" SEA policy. It is estimated that "Open Skies" in SEA would attract favorable world opinion and perhaps strain USSR/CPR relations to a degree.

Guarantees - United States should reiterate its stated policy that it has no intention of maintaining U.S. military forces in SVN indefinitely. That forces present are at the request of and in support of the GVN host government in a "peace-keeping" role. In return, NVN's verifiable withdrawal of PAVN forces from SVN, together with other tangible expressions of good faith should provide the basic framework.

Within SVN the VC incident level will provide an acceptable indicator. A GVN offer of amnesty to the VC (in return for arms) should assist in accommodating GVN/NLF differences.

In general, guarantees are a function of the ultimate cease fire or cessation of hostilities agreement (TAB A), as well as election conditions within SVN (TAB C). Rationale, favored positions and fallback positions are essentially the same.

Overall, United States in-country presence together with strategic positioning of forces in Pacific proximate to SEA provides tangible and continuing evidence to the negotiating nations of US intentions to keep the peace.

TAB D

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 10

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG 11930 DEC 67

2ND SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page C-1 (BLUE) thru C-16 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move III".

UNCLASSIFIED

C-1 (GREEN)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 12

MOVE NO. III

DTG 12200 Dec 67

To a query from the Blue Team, Control responded that the current constitution of the Republic of Vietnam (recently drafted by the Constituent Assembly), calls for a term of five years for the President but provides only three years as the tenure for members of the National Assembly. These officials are to come up for re-election on a staggered basis with one third of the seats being contested in Provincial elections every year. The first such election is presently slated for March 1968.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM GVN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE GVN MSG #2

DTG 012400 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE:

A. GVN has stronger internal and negotiatory positions, but is confronted with problems of effectively integrating VC and guarding its sovereign prerogatives in US negotiating process. GVN can maintain control of country for time being and at moment reckons it has good chances of emerging successfully from national assembly election involving VC.

B. VC infrastructure is weakening and possibly significant pattern of accommodation to GVN is indicated though sporadic terror is disturbing. VC will shift emphasis to political effort toward eventual domination of the government although, at moment, it would not win a majority in a national assembly election. VC is not likely to revert to military action for the time being.

C. DRV, having achieved first of three goals, will press on. DRV bona fides proposals are in serious question, in view of its rigid negotiating position and other menacing activities not in consonance with peaceful professions.

D. CPR will try to turn Rangoon talks into marathon propaganda forum.

E. USSR -- no essential change; continues to support negotiations, but ominous moves to aid NVN militarily arouse grave suspicion.

F. US will not withdraw military presence soon and will seek to maintain influence in SVN and in SEA. It appears firmly committed to negotiated settlement.

II. OBJECTIVES: (previous objectives are valid (A,B,C)).

A. No change from Move II.

B. No change from Move II.

C. No change from Move II.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

D. Maintain, as closely as possible, previous negotiating positions.

E. Maintain pressure on US to support their stated negotiating positions, bringing them as close to ours as possible.

F. Seek Korean and Australian (NZ) support of SVN negotiating positions.

G. Propagandize SVN cause to world capitals through diplomatic channels and world news media.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES:

A. (Same as Move II.)

B. (Same as Move II.)

C. (New) Continue all possible military and political activity during negotiations to achieve validation of NVA withdrawal and VC cessation of terrorist activity. Pressure US to do likewise.

D. (New) Maintain strong support of Premier Ky in actions of law enforcement including prosecution of cleanup of graft and corruption.

E. (Same as Move II.)

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES:

A. Political:

1. Ask US to protest through bilateral diplomatic channels Soviet dispatch of additional MIG-21s and advanced missiles to NVN, and urge that US slow up its scheduled troop withdrawals pending satisfactory Soviet response.

2. Request US to amend its position under withdrawal item that it will renounce intention of maintaining permanent military presence in SVN. We would ask that advisors and non-combat troops be exempted from this renunciation.

3. Request US to amend its position on a supervisory element for withdrawal to provide for US/GVN troops and police or an expanded, reinforced ICC.

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B. Economic:

Announce a program of veterans' benefits, including:

1. Schedule of lump sum retirement payments, payable at age 55.
2. Preference in hiring for government jobs.
3. Registration for priority assignment to vocational training and secondary and university education programs.
4. Registration for priority assignment of abandoned land and land to be opened up for settlement in the Highlands.
5. Announce voluntary contributory retirement program, open to everyone, and a resettlement loan program, available to everyone able to show a need (veterans, refugees, former Viet Cong, displaced persons not now registered).

C. Police Actions:

1. Continue probes into "Grey" areas and long-held VC sanctuaries with constabulary and police units.
2. Conduct continued reconnaissance and air surveillance of South Vietnam particularly along border areas.
3. Transfer all ARVN units to constabulary units.
4. Maintain other military operations (and suggest similar action by US) at current levels (19 Sep - 1 Dec 67) until further clarification of the intent of the last week's VC/NVA military actions.

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BARGAINING POSITIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 1

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Definition of cease-fire.	Cessation of all hostile acts.	None -- cannot accept positions of NVN/VC/CPR/USSR.
2. Freedom of movement/acceptability of freeze-in-place.	Complete freedom for US and GVN troops. Concur with USSR requirements for all from DMZ.	None at first. After several months in which progress in negotiations detected, perhaps freeze positions of optimally placed regular forces.
3. GVN sovereignty.	No restriction. Can concur with USSR position on amnesty except arms must be turned in.	None. VC refusal to recognize GVN weak in view of evidence of weakening of their infrastructure.
4. Time limits.	Three months and then assess progress.	Extend to five months if progress in country and at negotiations offset the threat from NVN.

BARGAINING POSITIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 2

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
Withdrawal and neutralization.	<p>1. GVN -- withdrawal and cessation of infiltration of weapons, men & supplies in return for cessation of US bombing of NVN & further US build-up. VC turn in agreed number of arms in return for agreed US withdrawal (e.g. half of combat troops) within year after signing agreement and remainder one year after plebiscite (See 9 below). Non-combat troops (e.g. advisors, engineers, medics) would be exempted from withdrawal and would be invited to remain by GVN in order to help with national reconstruction.</p> <p>2. Neutralization: No deviation on sovereign responsibility to maintain law and order throughout SVN and will utilize police and paramilitary forces to accomplish this end and -- where opposition force is encountered -- such ARVN or US forces as may be necessary. Freeze in place is thus unacceptable.</p>	

BARGAINING POSITIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
Elections in SVN.	<p>Elections must be held in accord with existing GVN law providing for ballot on 1/3 of the members of the National Assembly annually each March. No disenfranchisement of NLF members as individuals or limits on their offering themselves as candidates will be imposed. We assume that the NLF will not want to run as such, but would not bar it as we see advantages to its members being so identified on the record.</p> <p>Elections of village councils would also continue under existing law as RD cadre were able to prepare them under the normal routine of pacification.</p> <p>The Soviet position on elections is absolutely unacceptable on any of its points, i.e., timing (60 days after troop withdrawal), ICC administration, worsened terms of reference for the ICC and disqualification of members of present GVN.</p>	<p>If the NVN/NLF were sufficiently forthcoming in meeting our demands under the other three headings and in observing the terms of agreement, we would be prepared to concede a special election for all members of the National Assembly within one year of signing the agreement, assuming continued GVN progress, NLF deterioration, and assessment that the NLF could not win an election at this time. At the same time, we would demand free elections in the North, under ICC (modification as indicated elsewhere) observation.</p>

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BARGAINING POSITIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 4

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FALLBACK POSITION</u>
1. Supervisory element.	US and GVN troops to supervise withdrawal. We question US position that no permanent supervisory element would be useful, and seek clarification of the US reasons for taking this position. We see no basis for bargaining with NVN and little with VC, on this issue.	Expanded ICC including Japan and Indonesia and excluding India as chairman.
2. Reconnaissance and surveillance.	We attach cardinal importance to continued surveillance, in conjunction with US where appropriate, of SVN, NVN, Laos; we maintain our criteria for effective functioning of an expanded ICC. We see no grounds for compromise with NVN or VC on this issue. Soviet position is also unacceptable.	None.
3. Resolution of disputes.	We hold to our position that expanded ICC should be run on majority rule as to decisions with right of minority reports and elimination of veto. We would consider US concept of Joint Military Commission. We cannot accept NVN and VC opposition to third parties or to arbitration.	

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TAB A

NOTE: The following is in answer to referenced Control message in the hypothetical situation that such a meeting of moderate SVN and NLF leaders could occur. It is not a meeting or action that the GVN team would take or recommend as part of game play in response to game scenario.

GVN - NLF NEGOTIATIONS

The following is rationale by moderate GVN for agreement with moderate NLF faction on: (1) national elections; (2) formation of Popular Front Government; and, (3) seeking early withdrawal of all foreign forces.

A. General:

1. We note that items for discussion follow Communist rather than our own demands, and while willing to discuss these points, we would wish firm NLF agreement on seeking international guarantee of SVN's neutrality and territorial integrity. We take a risk that no effective foreign intervention to deter NLF takeover and conclusion of alliance with Hanoi would be forthcoming, but we would expect that our own and allied political groups motivated by common national interests in working for an independent South Vietnam, would avert this danger, at least for the short run.

B. National Elections:

1. Severance of VC connections with North Vietnam.
2. Dissolution of VC military, para-military, and propaganda apparatus, and acceptance of GVN control in all VC areas.
3. Indefinite deferral of discussions on reunification pending reconstitution of effective stability in South.
4. VC to participate in political process as one of many co-equal organizations, competing on same terms with others and enjoying no special prerogatives on claims to legitimacy.
5. Qualifications for election to National Assembly would include at least 7 years proven residence in SVN (aimed at re-grouped Southerners and Northerners infiltrated to SVN).

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C. Popular Front Government:

1. Premier would have full authority to dispose of cabinet seats. He would head a broad Laos-type coalition.

2. NLF would receive ministries in proportion to their representation in National Assembly. We estimate they might win 23 seats in the National Assembly and thus would be entitled to 4-5 cabinet seats.

3. In addition, certain ministries would be reserved to GVN moderates, i.e., Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, and Information.

4. Policies. Foreign aid would be accepted from all sources; US, and UN assistance would not be excluded.

D. Withdrawal:

1. A series of carefully conceived political, military, and economic bench marks would determine whether the planned schedule of troop withdrawals could proceed. Among these would be VC compliance in turning over arms, disbanding paramilitary organizations, and NVN compliance in halting infiltration. Subject to these provisos, US combat troops might be asked to depart within six months after March '68 elections, and non-combatant troops after one year. We would not agree to foreclose option of asking non-combatant troops to remain on longer or of requesting non-combat training and advisory personnel to remain.

Note Bene: We remain skeptical that any set of measures can be framed to prevent an NLF takeover under these circumstances and question particularly the assumption that a moderate NLF faction could exist or function effectively, while remaining within the NLF.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 10

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG 11930 DEC 67

2ND SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page C-1 (BLUE) thru C-16 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move III".

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 11

FROM CONTROL TO RVN/NLF

MOVE NO. III

DTG. 12025 Dec 67

While negotiators are meeting at Rangoon in an attempt to resolve the destiny of South Vietnam, moderate elements of the GVN and the NLF are conducting a clandestine dialogue. Both groups include men who genuinely resent foreign dictation over Vietnamese affairs. Both groups include men whose ideological attitudes are subordinate to a gut feeling that the war should be ended quickly, outside influence reduced, and a popular government created which includes all shades of Vietnamese opinion.

It is requested that in addition to consideration of the bargaining situation in Rangoon that you develop a rationale for agreement between the RVN and NLF aimed at conducting national elections in SVN, forming a popular front government in SVN and seeking the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from your country.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-2 (Black)

Page 1 of 1 Pages

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FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 12

MOVE NO. III

DTG 12200 Dec 67

To a query from the Blue Team, Control responded that the current constitution of the Republic of Vietnam (recently drafted by the Constituent Assembly), calls for a term of five years for the President but provides only three years as the tenure for members of the National Assembly. These officials are to come up for re-election on a staggered basis with one third of the seats being contested in Provincial elections every year. The first such election is presently slated for March 1968.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM VC TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG 012400 Dec 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. General: Developments are mixed in their impact on us. There are clear opportunities in Saigon but the US/GVN forays against us and the decline in our cadre morale are serious problems.

B. Hanoi (NVN) seems in accord with our "low posture" strategy. In fact, they have gone too fast in some ways, not pressing hard enough for a real cease-fire before negotiations.

C. In Saigon (SVN) political action promises to be fruitful. War weariness and anti-Americanism are undercutting Ky and the Americans. Nevertheless, the ARVN generals still hold power and seem capable of crushing civilian opposition.

D. The US has an ugly choice: it can push military operations only at great political cost in SVN and at home, yet it faces erosion of its allies (Ky and the generals) if it allows political life to develop freely and the VC to remain secure in their bases.

E. The CPR can be relied on for diplomatic support against the US and for pressure on Hanoi not to sell us out.

F. The Soviets have remained helpfully firm so far and are not likely to abandon us -- that would throw us (and Hanoi) into the Chinese camp.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Self-preservation -- by maintenance of secure areas from which US/GVN power is barred.

B. Expansion of influence -- no longer by military but rather by political action, aimed at obtaining US withdrawal.

III. STRATEGY

Political action -- only defending ourselves in the military sphere -- in order to expand our political base and gain non-communist allies. Eroding the power of the generals and waiting the Americans out, probably for 1-2 years.

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IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. At Rangoon negotiations: (See Tab B also)

a. The primary NLF objective is to preserve control over its area in SVN. The NLF expects the negotiations to be very protracted and likely to be inconclusive, but hopefully, they will weaken the US will to continue their presence in South Vietnam.

b. The NLF delegations charges the US and GVN with numerous and continuing aggressive actions against the Vietnamese people and the NLF forces, and with trying to provoke a resumption of the war. The NLF delegation warns that unless the US and GVN cease all hostile activities, including the use of constabulary and police forces and of overt and covert agents and officials in the Liberated areas, the NLF will be forced to defend the peaceful people and to take appropriate actions to put an end to these provocations.

The NLF delegation's position is that a temporary effective cease-fire, freeze-in-place of forces, cessation of all air and ground reconnaissance activities and of all GVN efforts to extend their area of control and influence are necessary pre-conditions for a genuine negotiation.

c. The NLF communicates this position to the world press.

d. At the same time the NLF delegation proposes to the DRV, CPR and USSR delegation to stage a joint walk-out on the negotiation to protest the continuing aggressive US/GVN activities and to demand that such activities cease during the negotiation. The NLF delegation suggests to the other communist delegations that they agree to announce that the walk-out would last as long as the US and GVN have not given evidence of willingness and progress in the implementation of a de-facto cease-fire.

e. If the DRV and CPR and USSR delegation do not agree to a walk-out the NLF delegation asks that they stand firm on their previous negotiating position and fully support the NLF demand for an effective de-facto cease-fire.

2. The NLF lets it be known that the "moderates" are in control of COSVN and that some of the hard-core leaders have left for Hanoi. Several have been sent to Phnom Penh

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on their way to Hanoi so as to give substance to these reports.

3. The defected National Assembly representatives presently at COSVN are ordered to launch, with NLF support, the organization of a country-wide National Peace Movement designed to unify all the Nationalist, peace and democratic elements in the country. The NLF will join this movement but will try to broaden its leadership by the inclusion of prominent moderate civilian leaders and leaders of various groups who oppose a renewal of the war, US presence, military rule and corruption. Attempts will also be made to have the religious and ethnic minorities represented. The platform of the movement will be: "The Vietnamese must settle their own affairs, the foreign military forces must leave, US permanent bases to be turned over to Vietnamese control, the Ky government must leave and be replaced by a constitutional government." The movement will also have a broad program for social-economic reform, justice and honesty in government.

4. The NLF initiates work on plans to organize a broad Popular Peasant-Worker Party, as a means of participating in GVN politics and elections. The PPW Party will not be under overt Communist control and the Communists, while seeking to control it, will de-emphasize their dominant role in it. In this manner the Communists will attempt to organize the rural population and the urban workers.

B. Economic

1. Appeal to the business community that it is in their distinct interest to press for "peace" and a coalition government. Benefits to them are:

a. Substantial reduction on elimination of NLF tax burdens.

b. The stigma of dealing with the NLF will be removed, old scores will be forgotten and normal Asian business practices encouraged.

c. The US has promised enormous economic AID after the war is over. The "pie" will be large and juicy.

2. Begin land reform in NLF areas and start to confirm titles. Explain that if peace comes, the landlords will want to return. Purpose to solidify popular support for the NLF.

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Page 3 of 8 Pages

C. Psychological

1. Foster a world wide campaign to reinforce the Rangoon "walk-out." The basic theme - that peace negotiations have been sabotaged by the US and their lackeys in SVN. Explain to world that NLF in good faith ceased-fire, but the US continues sweeps throughout the country with great loss of life and suffering of innocent Vietnamese. The US has unmasked its real purpose to permanently enslave Vietnam. All peace-loving peoples and governments, including the United Nations must demand that the colonialists cease-fire at once. The NLF has been patient but time has run out. The NLF cannot stand-by idly when the people are suffering. In connection with the campaign invite the world press to look for themselves and expose the US and its lackeys.

2. Initiate a campaign to push the theme that the GVN, the NLF and all patriotic Vietnamese want to end the war now. Demand a coalition government to permit Vietnamese to solve their own problems. "Join the National Peace Front" is the theme.

3. Forment demonstrations for peace throughout Vietnam. Encourage intellectuals and other prominent elite to speak out for peace. Insure "Yankee go home" banners appear throughout the country. Organize marches of women and children to US areas to demand that they leave Vietnam.

4. Announce that the NLF is confirming land titles in VC territory. True land reform is underway -- encourage GVN to follow suit and break up holdings of the generals and profiteers.

D. Military

1. Continue defacto cease-fire, however, undertake more aggressive defensive tactics against probes of constabulary and police in our areas.

2. Stage harrassments and demonstrations to force US troops to fire on people and populated areas.

3. Continue selected terrorism and assassinations against RVN administrators in areas where pacification and RD programs are being accelerated.

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4. Continue regrouping, training and consolidating our forces, stock piling supplies and rebuilding bases. Continue political seminars to keep up morale-- stressing role of NLF forces in event of US withdrawal and formation of coalition government.

V. CONTINGENCIES

A. DRV prevents walkout. Response: COSVN participates, but tries to keep talks limited to consideration of agenda item #1: a formal cease-fire agreement.

B. Rangoon talks break down; US and ARVN renew full-scale military action against the N. L. F. Response: We defend vigorously, request DRV help, including troops if necessary. Initially, no major offensive military action. Work to arrange side deal with GVN. (See Tab A) If all fails, consider renewal of offensive action.

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Page 5 of 8 Pages

Tab "A"

Rationale for Establishing a NLF/GVN Dialogue

1. We would make the point to the GVN moderates that the Americans have not supported GVN interests much better than the DRV has represented ours. Therefore, we must together, arrive at the best solution for SVN through mutual discussion -- not unqualified reliance on the machinations of our previous sponsors in Rangoon. The real failure of SVN is at stake and we have but a weak voice, that will not be heard at the conference table and we should not silently acquiesce to another Geneva. Geneva should serve as a warning to all Vietnamese as to the dangers of seeking outside arbitration of our problems.

2. As VC, we will offer to work with GVN moderates to erode the existing ARVN control of national province and district levels of government. In return we promise:

a. Demoting "hard corps" members within our ranks who persist in a struggle to their death.

b. Weakening the ties of our movement with Hanoi and COSVN.

c. De-emphasis of the NLF party machinery and adopting a new broad front political movement based upon:

(1) Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems;

(2) Rejuvenation of Nhan Das (Social Justics) and the true social revolution we undertook to bring to SVN.

3. We visualize that our joint peace movement will gradually merge into a joint moderate political party oriented on establishing a legitimate government which will truly represent the legitimate aspirations and grievances of the Vietnamese people.

4. We will recommend a joint conference to determine the possible cabinet slot for an integrated coalition government. Integration of military forces and disposition of weaponry will be worked out to our satisfaction.

5. Jointly we will make every effort to appeal to such persons as Dang Van Sung, to support our return to civil government. We will erode ARVN's control of political positions

throughout the countryside pointing out their appointed status and subservience to Ky's military machine. Our program admittedly may take considerable time and care in execution but we dare not count on Rangoon to advance our common interests for peace in Vietnam.

6. We will offer and seek complete amnesty for participating political and military forces and individuals.

7. We will accept continued economic assistance and faster joint enterprise, to support our new political movement.

8. Hold out for Montagnards, Hoa Hao and Cas Dai participation in our discussions as co-equals.

9. Ask for unilateral termination of ARVN/RF/PF/ National Police activity. Remove static artillery from the countryside to permit freedom of movement of the rural population.

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Tab "B"

COSVN Position on Rangoon Agenda

1. Seek to keep sessions limited to consideration of this item until formal agreement on it is reached.

2. See this as second priority Demand complete FW withdrawal, but agree to delayed timetable. Demand loose terms for the neutralization of Communist forces.

3. COSVN is negative, but willing to agree to them if it is price for US withdrawal.

4 We want strict controls on US/GVN, loose as possible on Communists. Prefer no foreign supervision, but not absolutely negative on it.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 10

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG 11930 DEC 67

2ND SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page C-1 (BLUE) thru C-16 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move III".

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C-1 (BROWN)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 11

FROM CONTROL TO RVN/NLF

MOVE NO. III

DTG. 12025 Dec 67

While negotiators are meeting at Rangoon in an attempt to resolve the destiny of South Vietnam, moderate elements of the GVN and the NLF are conducting a clandestine dialogue. Both groups include men who genuinely resent foreign dictation over Vietnamese affairs. Both groups include men whose ideological attitudes are subordinate to a gut feeling that the war should be ended quickly, outside influence reduced, and a popular government created which includes all shades of Vietnamese opinion.

It is requested that in addition to consideration of the bargaining situation in Rangoon that you develop a rationale for agreement between the RVN and NLF aimed at conducting national elections in SVN, forming a popular front government in SVN and seeking the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from your country.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-2 (Brown)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 12

MOVE NO. III

DTG 12200 Dec 67

To a query from the Blue Team, Control responded that the current constitution of the Republic of Vietnam (recently drafted by the Constituent Assembly), calls for a term of five years for the President but provides only three years as the tenure for members of the National Assembly. These officials are to come up for re-election on a staggered basis with one third of the seats being contested in Provincial elections every year. The first such election is presently slated for March 1968.

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM NVN TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE SIGMA I-66

DTG 012400 Dec 67

I. ESTIMATE

A. General

Things are looking relatively good from the standpoint of NVN/NLF basic objectives. The principal elements of NVN strength in the current situation are:

1. NVN/NLF military postures are basically intact and are being re-supplied and retrained.
2. Enemy opposition, especially the GVN, is in great political confusion.
3. NVN has been able, at least for the present, to bridge the split between the CPR and USSR so that both appear to be working in NVN's interests.
4. NVN's economy is being rebuilt by massive infusions of aid from the USSR and CPR.
5. Steps are being taken to broaden the political influence of the NLF in the south under NVN guidance. The principal emphasis is on getting the NLF to work with SVN provincial and district leaders in all facets of urban and rural life.
6. World pressures continue to build upon the US toward withdrawal of its forces and these pressures are abetted by US domestic pressures to "bring the boys home".

On the other hand, the DRV recognizes that it has substantial problems to overcome before it can achieve its final objective -- i.e. reunification of Vietnam under Hanoi control. One problem is the increased rate of NLF defections to the enemy. NVN is uncertain, at this point, about the principal factors motivating these defections but believes the development has serious implications for NLF morale. These defections must be countered by positive action. On the NVN/NLF part there is a rejuvenated political indoctrination program

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and a continuing analysis of this problem. The other problem is the continued presence of US forces in SVN. Skillful playing on the theme of "Yankee Go Home" and achievement of a firm role in the SVN political scene, should enable the NLF to construct an environment which will force US withdrawal. This campaign can be complemented by a world-wide propaganda effort, picturing the US as a force impinging on the sovereignty of SVN. It may take some time to get the Americans out but the DRV is confident that it will prevail in the end.

B. GVN -- Ky is still "sitting on a political powder key." His political base is eroding rapidly and both he and his military colleagues will increasingly be forced to follow US directives.

C. NLF -- Although the NLF military influence has decreased somewhat, its political and psychological influences in SVN are on the increase, especially with respect to its efforts to infiltrate labor, intellectual, religious, military and sect groups. The NLF will continue to strive to divide the military junta leadership. NVN recognizes, however, that it must take positive action to improve morale in the rank and file of the movement in order to sustain dynamic NLF effort.

D. CPR -- NVN expects the CPR to "go along" in the negotiations, at least, for the time being as long as NVN is gaining favorable political points. The CPR probably does not expect the negotiations to be protracted and will very likely pull out if NVN does. It seems improbable that the CPR would see any gain in walking out now but, the CPR may become a troublesome problem for NVN later, i.e. if NVN appeared to be leaning too much toward the Soviets or appeared, to the CPR, to be seeking NVN objectives in a way which would reduce the exercise of CPR political influence in the political area.

E. USSR -- The Soviets seem relatively satisfied with the present state of affairs. They will continue to support NVN. If NVN decides to break-off negotiations and resume hostilities, it can anticipate trouble from the USSR, especially if such resumption promises a widening conflict. At the moment, however, the political phase of NVN's strategy appears to suit Soviet interests and their support is anticipated in the negotiating course set by NVN.

F. USA -- The US is in negotiations with little or no prospect of agreement. However, while their military strength

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remains essentially unimpaired, it appears unlikely to NVN that the US will be able to translate its military power into actions in support of US objectives in SVN. The US psychological and political base is eroding and there appears little the US can do to arrest this development short of resuming hostilities. It seems most improbable to NVN that the US would take this action because of the strong domestic and international pressures being exerted on it to maintain peace in the area. NVN also perceives mounting domestic pressures in the US to "bring the boys home" and this should further tie its hands. The US is, also, exposed to pressures from its allies who, on the one hand, want the US to remain in SEA and put up a strong front to the CPR, out of fear of later CPR attacks upon them (i.e. Thais, Phils, etc.). On the other hand, there are those US allies who want it to withdraw its forces in order to promote peace in the area (i.e. UK and A/NZ). The NVN can expect US opposition in forthcoming NVN/NLF political offensives in SVN through stepped-up aid by the US to SVN to counter NVN/NLF efforts. This US aid can be countered by devising means of using US economic assistance for NVN/NLF purposes. The US has the military capability to resume hostilities but it is improbable that it can do so in the face of domestic and world opinion.

II. OBJECTIVES

The NVN basic objective of reunifying Vietnam under Hanoi control remains unchanged and fundamental. Having succeeded in obtaining objective number 2 (i.e. a respite or cease-fire), NVN must now shift emphasis to objectives number 3 and 4 (i.e. maintain and expand the NLF military/political base in SVN and induce withdrawal of all foreign forces from SEA, respectively).

III. STRATEGY

NVN must gain political control in SVN as rapidly as possible, for to do so will hasten withdrawal of US forces. As NVN moves toward this objective it can play on the theme of "Vietnam for the Vietnamese" and an "All South Vietnamese Government" and induce leading politicians in the south, through bribes and persuasions, to call for the removal of US troops from Vietnamese soil. NVN could further give force to this effort by formally requesting the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam when the NLF eventually controls the government in Saigon, under the direction of NVN. As an interim measure

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NVN should work toward immobilization of US forces by creating conditions which will require them to withdraw to enclaves. If the US refuses to retreat to enclaves or to leave SVN, the DRV can use this refusal as a peg upon which to base a resumption of hostilities if, by doing so, it would be in NVN's best interests. During this period NVN/NLF could resort to an infinite number of political and propaganda moves to pressure the US into leaving. To repeat, it would be NVN's ultimate goal to get the Americans out of SVN by creating political conditions, already underway, which would force their removal. Meanwhile, NVN can live with the US immobilized in enclaves. Once the US is out of SVN the final objective is not far away.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

A. Political

1. Buy off SVN officials -- spend large sums of money, received from the USSR and CPR, to build up political strength in the south and to create more political confusion and disarray.
2. Fight to oppose the seating of the GVN representatives, loyal to the Ky regime, at negotiations. Any GVN representation must be acceptable to the NLF. In this connection, NVN's objective would be to "spin-out" or prolong negotiations and not to negotiate in order to come to an agreement, unless such agreement is on NVN's terms.
3. Continue to send letters to the Pope, Harold Wilson, other leading world figures, including the UN Secretary General, reiterating that the only hope for real peace and security in SEA is through removal of all foreign military forces from the area.
4. Offer a disillusioned but popular ARVN general an appointment as head of a large NLF unit. This can result in further confusion and division of loyalties among ARVN troops.
5. Propose that the US be censured in the UN for continuing aggressive patrolling activities and provocative air surveillance over North Vietnam.
6. Surface NLF politicians to function as legitimate politicians in the south to push the concept of the NLF 10 Point Program and work to form a National Democratic Coalition Administration, (see TAB A), or National Reconciliation Administration.

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B. Economic

Promote NVN economic assistance programs, in long-held areas of SVN, through the NLF as supervisors of the program. This facade would enable the NLF to take some credit for US aid in many areas. An effort should also be made to make all aid a joint effort so the NLF can work to claim as much credit for it as possible.

C. Psychological

1. Accuse Ky of graft by charging him with taking profits from his race track and banking them in a private account in a Swiss bank -- show credible documentary evidence of this charge -- forgery is easy.

2. Discredit US civilian and military personnel with accusations of irresponsibility, interference in internal Vietnamese affairs, and moral turpitude. In this connection, spread trouble between US and ARVN soldiers by disguising some NLF volunteers in ARVN uniforms and having them fire upon American soldiers.

D. Military

1. Continue selective assassinations of competent and well known supporters of the Ky regime.

2. Recruit and continue to build-up forces. Retrain forces in areas under NLF control.

3. Stockpile supplies in areas where military operations may be resumed.

4. Continue defensive military action in NVN, i.e. shoot down US aircraft intruding into sovereign NVN airspace.

V. CONTINGENCIES

- A. If the US resumes hostilities, NVN/NLF will first cry "foul" and "aggression" and secondly, take defensive military action. If necessary, NVN will, finally, deploy forces to the south, however, NVN must avoid an offensive or aggressive posture, as long as possible, placing full responsibility for resumption upon the US. NVN can, also, claim that it will, if necessary, call upon its more powerful neighbors for help.

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B. If the CPR attempts to dominate NVN in negotiations, demanding that NVN do things against its best interests, NVN will try to reassure the Chinese, procrastinate, and as usual, call upon the USSR to exert pressure to counter CPR attempts at domination of NVN.

C. If the CPR tries to subvert the Hanoi government or the NLF in order to gain complete control, or gain resumption of hostilities, or otherwise act against NVN's wishes, NVN will call upon the USSR to counter Chinese moves in order to retain control of the world communist movement or retain the balance, at least.

D. If Ky, in desperation, unilaterally resumes hostilities, NVN will call upon the US to control its puppet. This would provide NVN with a golden opportunity to discredit the Ky regime and the US. The NLF could handle the military actions Ky initiated with its current forces but the political gains would surpass any military gains achieved.

E. If the hard-core cadre of the NLF begins to crumble through disillusionment and NLF defections continue to increase, and if NVN concludes that this development might ultimately result in question as to NVN's ability to control the NLF, then NVN would seriously consider timely resumption of hostilities.

VI. NEGOTIATIONS

Following are NVN/NLF initial positions on the four points of the agenda, plus fall back positions:

1. Formal agreement covering cessation of hostilities: Both sides must abstain from renewal of hostilities and there can be no intrusions into areas controlled by the other side, however, there should be a free individual (non-military) access to the other's side.

Fall back -- NVN/NLF would allow the other side to fly in specified corridors to supply their isolated units (until withdrawal is completed).

2. Withdrawal of troops, etc: All foreign troops must be withdrawn from SEA.

1st Fall back -- All foreign troops must be withdrawn from SVN.

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2nd Fall back -- NVN/NLF will be flexible on timing of withdrawal. There is room here for the enclave concept to be used. Tactic: While proposing this, NVN/NLF could mount a "peace offensive" making the point that the US has already said, many times, that it wants to "retain no troops and no bases in SEA." Make max effort to hold the US to this statement.

3. Elections -

The NVN/NLF will not accept any framework for elections proposed by the GVN, as presently constituted. NVN will insist on elections as called for in the NLF 10 Point Program (see TAB A). Conditions for elections in SVN must be in accordance with the will of the Vietnamese people

Fall back -- Let the SVN people decide, for themselves, who should represent them on the four sub-committees constituted by the Conference for Negotiations. The NLF representative has already been designated. Tactics: The objective here is to "spin-out" negotiations -- not break them off -- in NVN/NLF efforts to use negotiations as a vehicle to allow time for promotion of political objectives in the south. NVN/NLF must not lose sight of the necessity of keeping these "spin-outs" under constant review so the NVN/NLF can act appropriately in negotiations when they appear to be moving in a direction incompatible with NVN/NLF best interests.

4. Supervision -

The NVN/NLF side would favor an International Peace Committee as proposed by the CPR, or an ICC with one reliable communist member.

Fall back -- No supervision is required since all the world will know when the US withdraws. Tactics: If the US demands surveillance points to control withdrawal of NVN "volunteers" from SVN and Laos, NVN will simply deny that it has ever had any forces in Laos and that it has already withdrawn 2 "volunteer" divisions from SVN and "individual volunteers" of 2 other divisions, who had gone to SVN upon their own initiative. If the US persists, NVN will challenge the US to prove NVN hasn't pulled all "volunteers" out of SVN.

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TAB A

*For game purposes,
consider this the
updated version

NFLSV PROGRAM ENUNCIATING MAJOR AIMS,
MADE PUBLIC IN FEBRUARY, 1961*

(The ten-point program of the NFLSV was radio-teletyped by VNA in English to Europe and Asia on February 11, 1961. VNA stated that the program of the "newly founded" NFLSV had "recently" been released by LNA (Liberation News Agency), the official organ of the NFLSV. Listing of the ten points is prefaced by mention of the struggle of the South Vietnamese people against Japanese and French domination, and the crimes perpetrated by the cruel and dictatorial United States-Diem rule.)

" . . . The NFLSV undertakes to unite people of all walks of life, all social classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, religious communities, and patriotic personages in South Vietnam, without distinction of their political tendencies, in order to struggle and overthrow the rule of the US imperialists and their henchmen, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, and realize independence, democracy, life improvement, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"The program of the NFLSV includes the following 10 points:

"1 -- To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United States, and to form a national democratic coalition administration.

"The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists. The South Vietnamese administration is a lackey which has been carrying out the US imperialists political lines. This regime and administration must be overthrown, and a broad national democratic coalition administration formed to include representatives of all strata of the people, nationalities, political parties, religious communities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back the people's economic, political, social, and cultural interests; to realize independence and democracy; to improve the people's living conditions; and to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

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"2 -- To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy.

"To abolish the current constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration, lackey of the United States, and to elect a new National Assembly through universal suffrage.

"To promulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, of association of movement . . . (ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom of belief with no discrimination toward any religion on the part of the state; and to grant freedom of action to the patriotic political parties and mass organizations, irrespective of political tendencies.

"To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentration camps under any form whatsoever, abolish the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws; and to grant the right of repatriation to all those who had to flee abroad due to the US-Diem regime

"To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen; to build an independent and sovereign economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the US imperialists and the ruling clique, their stooges

"To help northern compatriots who had been forced or enticed by the reactionaries to go south after the restoration of peace to return to their native places if they so desire

"5 -- To build a national and democratic education and culture

"6 -- To build an army to defend the motherland and the people.

"To build a national army defending the fatherland and the people; and to cancel the system of US military advisers

"To abolish all the military bases of foreign countries in South Vietnam.

"7 -- To guarantee the right of equality between nationalities . . . ; to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and overseas Vietnamese.

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"To insure the right of autonomy of the national minorities; to set up, within the framework of the great family of the Vietnamese people, autonomous regions areas inhabited by minority peoples; . . . to abolish the US-Diem clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities

"To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners residing in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietnamese nationals abroad.

"8 -- To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.

"To cancel all unequal treaties signed with foreign countries by the US henchmen which violate national sovereignty.

"To establish diplomatic relations with all countries irrespective of political regime, in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence as put forth in the Bandung conference.

"To unite closely with the peace-loving and neutral countries; and to expand friendly relations with Asian and African countries, first of all, with neighboring Cambodia and Laos.

"To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance or forming a military alliance with any country.

"To receive economic aid from any country ready to assist Vietnam without conditions attached.

"9 -- To establish normal relations between North and South Vietnam as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.

"The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify the country by peaceful means. The NFLSV undertakes the gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones of all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending the national reunification, the governments of the two zones will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the peoples or favor war, nor to use military forces against each other; to carry out economic and cultural exchanges between the two zones; and to insure for

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people of both zones freedom of movement, of livelihood, and the right of mutual visits and correspondence.

"10 -- To oppose aggressive war and actively defend world peace.

"To oppose aggressive wars and all forms of enslavement by the imperialists; and to support the national liberation struggles of peoples in various countries.

"To oppose war propaganda; and to demand general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

"To support the movements for peace, democracy, and social progress in the world; and to actively contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world"

~~SECRET~~ .. NOFORN

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TAB B

DOCUMENT NO. 23

APRIL 8 (1965): SPEECH BY MR. PHAM VAN DONG
(THE FOUR POINTS) IN NORTH VIET-NAM (EXTRACTS)(¹)

It is the unswerving policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the US government must withdraw from South Vietnam all US troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases there, cancel its "military alliance" with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the US government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving Governments and peoples in the world.

(¹) As reported by the Vietnamese New Agency

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favourable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a UN intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

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MESSAGE NO. 10

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG 11930

2ND SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page C-1 (BLUE) thru C-16(BLUE), Following Tab
"Move III".

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 12

MOVE NO. III

DTG 12200 Dec 67

To a query from the Blue Team, Control responded that the current constitution of the Republic of Vietnam (recently drafted by the Constituent Assembly), calls for a term of five years for the President but provides only three years as the tenure for members of the National Assembly. These officials are to come up for re-election on a staggered basis with one third of the seats being contested in Provincial elections every year. The first such election is presently slated for March 1968.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM CPR TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE SECOND SCENARIO
PROJECTION

DTG 012400Z Dec 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. North Vietnam

1. Is moving rapidly toward accommodation with the US.
2. May not revert to Phase I.
3. Will not accept US aid.
4. USSR influence is dominant in Hanoi.
5. CPR influence is severely limited.
6. Pro-CPR elements are present in DRV leadership.
7. Re-equipping and reconstituting of military units during the bombing pause has compensated for heavy battle losses sustained during combat last summer. This advantage is offset by NVA evacuation of some SVN territory.

B. National Liberation Front

1. Is following Hanoi's leadership.
2. A schism in NLF leadership is probably developing over the course of future strategy.

C. United States

1. Will maintain its aggressive posture in SEA for subsequent attacks against CPR.
2. Will attempt to reach formal agreement on Vietnam.
3. Will exploit Sino-Soviet split during the Rangoon Conference.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-3 (YELLOW) Page 1 of 6 Pages

D. Soviet Union

1. In Rangoon negotiations will:
 - a. Strive to minimize CPR influence.
 - b. Sell-out NLF interests in South Vietnam.

E. Government of South Vietnam

1. Will take a harder line than the US at Rangoon.
2. Will agree to a coalition including the NLF.

II. OBJECTIVES:

A. Long Range - To increase our power and influence in Asia relative to the US and USSR and to ultimately expel the US and USSR in order to bring to power genuine Marx-Leninists.

B. Limited Objectives:

1. Frustrate the Rangoon negotiations.
2. Reassert CPR influence in SEA.
3. Subvert mainland SEA Communist parties to adopt our revolutionary views.

III. MAJOR STRATEGIES OR OPTIONS:

A. Participate in negotiations with the intention of withdrawing at a propitious time, attacking the negotiations as being under revisionist control.

B. Seek to maintain revolutionary groups in GVN thus forcing breakup in negotiations.

C. Induce individual delegates from NVN, NLF and USSR to leave the Rangoon Conference when we withdraw.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES:

A. Political

1. Continue with negotiations maintaining hard line and set stage for eventual withdrawal from Rangoon Conference.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

2. Actively subvert other communist delegates particularly NVN & NLF to follow CPR lead in withdrawing from Conference.

3. Withdraw at time calculated to achieve maximum disruption taking true revolutionaries with us.

4. Call rump Conference in Phnom Penh inviting Asian revolutionary representatives.

B. Economic

1. Lift the embargo on the movement of Soviet aid material across our territory to North Vietnam.

2. Continue the supply of massive aid to North Vietnam as long as Hanoi continues to cooperate with us at Rangoon.

C. Psychological

1. Publicize civil defense activities in China gradually building up to crescendo coinciding with our withdrawal from Rangoon Conference.

2. Accuse US of aggressive activities, not abiding by cease fire agreements and continuing preparation for the invasion of NVN and the CPR.

3. Accuse Soviet revisionists of being in league with the US and seeking to partition Asia into Soviet and US spheres of influence.

4. Leak information of CHICOM troop build-up on South China border.

5. Coordinate propaganda with activities and demands of our delegation at Rangoon to establish a record of US intransigence.

6. Simultaneous with withdrawal from Conference issue statement justifying our action as support of genuine Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary peoples of SEA.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-5 (YELLOW) Page 3 of 6 Pages

D. Military

1. Concurrent with the deterioration of negotiations re-deploy force of 35 Divisions to staging areas on South China border.

2. Immediately activate logistics forces in North Vietnam as military units.

3. Order civil defense exercises throughout China and with practice alerts in South China beginning immediately.

4. Upon withdrawal from conference deploy a 5 Division force from KUNMING military region through Burma to Thai border.

V. CONTINGENCIES:

A. If US retaliates militarily against China for the limited military actions we plan, we would move in greater strength into N. Vietnam, Laos and Burma.

B. If NVN Government does not cooperate with our strategy, we would institute a coup against Ho.

C. If the Rangoon Conference does not breakup with our departure, we will continue to attack it and attempt to subvert it.

D. If efforts are made to have us rejoin the Conference, we will demand US concessions.

E. If Cambodia refuses to host the conference, we will hold it in Peking.

F. If the Rangoon Conference reaches an agreement, we will denounce it and continue support of the SVN revolutionaries.

VI. CPR NEGOTIATING POSITION AT THE RANGOON CONFERENCE:

A. Subcommittee I: Cessation of Hostilities

1. The CPR delegation will insist upon implementing a cease-fire before proceeding to take up the agenda. The cease-fire is to be announced immediately by Saigon and the US and will include the following elements:

- a. Cessation of all firing.
- b. Termination of all military and para-military operations.
- c. Termination of all reconnaissance.
- d. Cessation of naval gunfire.
- e. Cessation of Market Time operations.
- f. Cessation of Chieu Hoi operations.
- g. Cessation of psychological warfare operations.
- h. Limitation of Saigon regimes access to those areas which were under its firm control as of the date the Rangoon Conference began.

2. The CPR Delegation is granted authority to yield only on our demand for cessation of the Chieu Hoi program.

3. Once the committee agrees to a cease-fire, the CPR delegation will demand that conference arrangements for cessation of hostilities take the form of a simultaneous announcement by all parties with forces in SVN, pledging not to resume military operations and to fully implement the conferences final decisions on a Vietnam settlement.

4. The CPR delegation is to forcefully resist all attempts to have the conference decisions embodied in a formal agreement to be signed by all participants.

B. Subcommittee II: Withdrawal of Troops

1. The CPR delegation will take the following stand on the withdrawal of troops in SVN:

a. Initially, will demand withdrawal of US and GVN forces to base areas within 2-4 weeks after cease-fire; NLF troops are to remain in areas under their control; presence of NVN forces in SVN is to be ignored by CPR delegation.

b. Subsequently, US must show good faith by withdrawing two divisions immediately. All remaining US ground and puppet forces must withdraw within 100 days after date conference adjourns. This is to include imperialist vessels in

the Gulf of Tonkin and other territorial waters. If the time limit is turned down, the CPR will accept the NVN position on withdrawal, namely, all forces to be withdrawn within 6 months. The CPR will also demand that US and puppet forces withdraw or destroy all war materiel and that they demilitarize all military bases in SVN.

C. Subcommittee III: Elections in SVN

1. The CPR delegation is instructed to support North Vietnam's initial position, i.e. elections in South Vietnam only, no elections in North Vietnam and no "all Vietnam elections".

2. As a fallback position, the CPR delegation is authorized to accept elections within 60 days. No present Saigon regime or Vietnamese officials or South Vietnamese Army officers are to be permitted to participate in the elections. Existing political parties are to be banned. The NLF is to be allowed to enter its candidates in elections. There is to be no international supervision of the elections.

D. Sub-Committee IV: Supervision and Enforcement

1. The CPR will initially insist on establishment of an International Peace Committee (IPC), consisting of Burma, Cambodia, Cuba and Pakistan. The fallback position will be an Asian Peace Committee (IPC) minus Cuba).

2. The CPR will also insist on a peace-keeping force supplied by the IPC which will remain in Vietnam until unification.

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 10

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG 11930 DEC 67

2ND SCENARIO PROJECTION

CROSS REFERENCE

See Page C-1 (BLUE) thru C-16 (BLUE), following Tab
"Move III".

UNCLASSIFIED

C-1 (RED)

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MESSAGE NO. 12

MOVE NO. III

DTG 12200 Dec 67

To a query from the Blue Team, Control responded that the current constitution of the Republic of Vietnam (recently drafted by the Constituent Assembly), calls for a term of five years for the President but provides only three years as the tenure for members of the National Assembly. These officials are to come up for re-election on a staggered basis with one third of the seats being contested in Provincial elections every year. The first such election is presently slated for March 1968.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-2 (RED)

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

FROM USSR TO CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 3

REFERENCE SECOND SCENARIO
PROJECTION

MOVE NO. III

DTG 011615 Sep 67

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. US Position

1. Despite US military successes in South Vietnam in summer 1967, the basic political position of the US has deteriorated, and the US leadership now faces a real and immediate crisis of decision whether to de-escalate the war at cost of substantial concessions on the one hand or to escalate the war with serious risk of direct confrontation with the USSR on the other hand.

2. We estimate -- in light of pressures on the US administration to enter the presidential elections with tangible peace results and in light of US reluctance to increase its material commitments -- that the US will be prepared to make important concessions to keep negotiations going.

3. At the same time, we estimate that there is real danger of a US decision to escalate if the communist side is too inflexible.

B. Chinese People's Republic

Peking has gotten a seat at the conference table where it will be an obstructionary force. It will support NVN in maintaining a hard line and attempt to denigrate Soviet efforts. The Chinese, however, can be deterred from entering the war if military action resumes.

C. DRV

Hanoi's intransigence is a real problem, but the USSR has some leverage to apply and NVN can probably be induced to bend enough to keep negotiations going.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-3 (Red)

Page 1 of 7 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

D. Viet Cong

1. The Viet Cong probably calculates that it can continue to pursue its political objectives during negotiations.

2. It will pursue its program of political action in the countryside, and will look to the DRV, and indirectly to the USSR, to provide logistical support for this program.

3. The Viet Cong will initially oppose elections under international aegis, and will seek Soviet support to prevent or dilute foreign supervision. Failing this, it will seek to gain an important role in supervising the election.

E. RVN

The situation there appears to be deteriorating rapidly so that real opportunities are available for the VC to increase their political influence throughout the area.

II. OBJECTIVES

A. Avoid direct confrontation with US forces which might lead to war.

B. Isolate CPR from NVN and strengthen Soviet position in world communist movement.

C. Act as NVN intermediary, advisor and protector in negotiations.

D. Assume "peace-maker" role in order to (a) enhance Soviet prestige throughout the world, and (b) to specifically advance USSR image and influence throughout SEAsia.

E. Decrease US influence throughout SEA.

F. Force as many concessions as possible from US.

G. Produce "detente" atmosphere which will lead towards further weakening of NATO and diffusion of WE unity.

H. To keep the parties at the conference table and to prevent a resumption of the military conflict.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-4 (Red)

Page 2 of 7 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

I. Support the NVN position but persuade Hanoi to compromise if necessary to prevent a negotiation break-down.

J. If negotiations do break down, attempt to get parties to adhere to the cease-fire.

K. If the cease-fire is broken, try to persuade combatants to keep military action at a low level.

III. STRATEGY: Unchanged.

IV. SPECIFIC MOVES

In order to induce Hanoi to accept compromises -- if that is necessary, explain to the North Vietnamese that a negotiated settlement would open up opportunities for political action, a tactic which almost brought victory before the U.S. intervened on a large scale. Victory, we believe, can be achieved by political means, and Soviet assistance will be forthcoming in that field. Point out that U.S. patience may have worn thin and if the fighting is resumed the Americans would probably employ nuclear weapons. In that event, we would have to reassess the situation in the light of the higher level of conflict and reduced Soviet capabilities -- because of logistic problems -- to render extensive military assistance. Finally, point out to Hanoi that it now has an opportunity to create a situation in which the U.S. will leave SEA to communist political activity, and this opportunity may never come again.

Encourage the U.S. to be forthcoming in the negotiations by:

a. Showing great cordiality wherever contact is made with U.S. officials.

b. Showing positive interest in concluding the air lines agreement.

c. Expressing interest in enlarging the scope of cultural exchanges.

d. Expressing interest in concluding a non-proliferation treaty.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-5 (Red)

Page 3 of 7 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

V. USSR, AS RANGOON CHAIRMAN, WILL PUSH FOR FOLLOWING COM-PROMISE SETTLEMENTS:

A. Cease-fire & GVN Internal Sovereignty

1. Cease-fire

a. Definition

(1) Cessation of offensive military activity by fixed date.

(2) Avoidance of other acts of violence except in self-defense.

Supervision & Enforcement: A Joint Military Commission of immediate parties (NVN, VC, GVN, US) will be formed to check observance of cease-fire and refer any unsettled disputes to Rangoon Conference principals.

b. Freedom of Movement of Military-Paramilitary Forces.

(1) This will be governed on a territorial basis as follows:

Area A - VC - controlled territory. Within this area, VC will enjoy freedom of movement.

Area B - GVN - controlled territory. Within this area, GVN forces will enjoy freedom of movement. US combat forces will remain in barracks and bases.

Area C - Contested territory. Both sides will withdraw forces from this area.

(2) The extent of respective areas above will be determined by the ICC, subject to agreement of Rangoon Conference principals.

(NOTE: This will keep negotiations going for a long time, while the de facto situation will be cessation of combat operations while determination of areas is taking place. This is in accord with our preferred strategy of prolonging cessation of active hostilities while political penetration is advanced).

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-6 (Red)

Page 4 of 7 Pages

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

Supervision and Enforcement: Same as for cease-fire. ICC responsibility limited to drawing up map of respective areas.

c. Freeze-in-Place:

(1) With regard to military-paramilitary forces, as under Freedom-of-Movement above.

(2) With regard to population, free to move.

(NOTE: This will allow NLF considerable mobility).

Supervision and Enforcement: Same as for cease-fire.

2. GVN Internal Sovereignty:

a. A mixed Commission for Administration of Disputed Territory (MCADT), to include representatives of the NLF, should be set up without delay to supervise orderly administration of Area C, effective upon agreed determination of this Area and pending eventual formation through elections of a government reflecting all political elements in South Vietnam.

b. Guarantee: The principals of the Rangoon Conference will guarantee the MCADT until the need for its functions has terminated.

(NOTE: The underlying strategy here is to maintain the de facto territorial position of the NLF without direct challenge to sovereignty of GVN government, meanwhile utilizing the time and fluid situation ahead to advance our political penetration in order to replace present GVN government with one no longer dominated by the United States).

3. Withdrawal and/or Neutralization:

a. The Soviet Union does not foresee a major problem in arriving at agreement between the US and DRV on troop withdrawal as such. Such withdrawals should follow the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, we believe, and the positions of both parties are not incompatible with them. Of course, the agreement must involve US and NVN acceptance of a specific schedule leading to the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-7 (Red)

Page 5 of 7 Pages

b. To encourage prompt withdrawal of US forces, DRV and VC should agree to VC turning in arms in proportion as the ARVN troops are demobilized.

c. During withdrawal period US and DRV forces will remain in barracks or other limited areas, avoiding involvement in local political, administrative and peace-keeping matters. DRV should be willing to accept international supervision (for type of which, see below) of these conditions.

d. The supervision of withdrawal and neutralization should be conducted by a joint US/DRV military commission along the lines of the 1954 settlement. In addition a commission of international character similar to the ICC might be an appropriate reference in minor disputes. Major disputes should be referred to the Rangoon Conference which alone could consider problems of enforcement.

4. Elections:

NVN

US

- a. Supervision: Either by international body such as 3 member ICC, or by a committee made up of Front and SVN officials approved by Rangoon Conference.

SVN Control

——To reconcile: A commission made up of representatives of an international body, SVN officials, and Front officials.

- b. Candidates: Registered by supervisory committee. Front can run as a party. Existing parties banned. SVN officials and ARVN officers banned.

Front members can run.

——To reconcile (fallback) all South Vietnamese can run; as many political parties as possible.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

c. ^{NVN}~~Balloting~~: Under control of supervisory committee, which will investigate and rule on complaints

No US ^{US}~~objection~~.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

C-9 (Red)

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~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 13

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. Last Move

REFERENCE SIGMA I-66

DTG 25 1200 Dec 67

THIRD SCENARIO PROJECTION

Since suspension of the air attacks against NVN on 19 September, the conflict in Southeast Asia has rapidly de-escalated. By mid-November hostilities were reduced to approximately the level of 1959. Most of the world seemed convinced, (US intelligence non-concurring) that all North Vietnamese forces had been withdrawn from South Vietnam. Although there have been occasional terrorist incidents and several small unit confrontations, a de facto cease-fire has clearly been accepted by both sides.

Viet Cong main-force units have withdrawn into sanctuary areas. Two North Vietnamese divisions along the Cambodian border limit activities to intense training and many members of the National Liberation Front have shifted from military to civilian roles, in some cases, cooperating with GVN representatives at the hamlet and village level.

The majority of the US/FW forces have consolidated in their base areas while GVN Regional and Popular forces (now converted into National Constabulary) are deployed to provide a security platoon in each SVN village. Regular ARVN forces have been redeployed to guard the western GVN border and into blocking positions south of the DMZ. While US/FW forces maintain a vigilant alert, (including a two-division air mobile task force at Danang), reduced levels of air and ground reconnaissance have not led to major clashes with the enemy.

Now that the level of Viet Cong harassment, interdiction and terror has abated, the US/GVN has stepped up Revolutionary Development both in areas long held by the government and "grey areas".

While it is obvious that the Viet Cong will fight to defend sanctuaries and bases, it is equally apparent that the communist side has shifted emphasis from the military to the psychological arena. RVN forces, government administrators, and US patrols move freely in key areas but the National Liberation Front builds its political strength with the propaganda theme, "Vietnam for the Vietnamese."

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D-1

Page 1 of 5 Pages

The Viet Cong are spending large sums of Russian and Chinese money to bribe GVN officials; a number of South Vietnamese politicians, covertly affiliated with the NLF, have advanced the concept of a National Reconciliation Administration. The NLF is working to "soften" its image in South Vietnam by relaxing taxes, tolls, and coercive measures. At the same time every effort is being made to discredit Ky through charges of graft and embezzlement.

On a world-wide basis, the DRV and her communist allies hammer hard at the theme that it is the US/GVN which seeks to continue the war through persistent refusal to discontinue air and ground patrolling. This idea has been picked up, magnified and is receiving considerable support in the US from "end the war" factions.

US/RVN casualty rates have dropped virtually to zero. Some draftees are asking their Congressmen to be brought home without delay "since the war is obviously over" but the Administration has headed off this kind of pressure, by lucid explanations of the need. Stress has been put on assuring security of the Southeast Asian Economic and Social development program which is just now swinging into gear. The US government has also obtained western press cooperation in highlighting communist measures to build up Viet Cong military posture in the event hostilities are renewed.

The presence of two NVN divisions on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border is an open secret which Washington only softly exploits, for the real thrust of United States policy is the massive infusion of economic aid, not only into South Vietnam but also into neighboring Asian countries. In SVN, drastic land redistribution, farm credit increases, expanded teacher education, public works and trade programs have been accelerated with Free World support. Road and railroad construction has become a primary mission for most US Army engineer units in country, with emphasis on lateral routes across the northern neck of SVN and Laos into Thailand. This project is linked to strategic development of all Southeast Asia with economic implications for Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia but its immediate function is to provide a barrier to communist infiltration from North to South Vietnam. This has not been lost on the communists who seem to have mixed feelings about this commitment of Free World resources.

While attempting to divert the vast US transportation and supply complex from support of active military operations to

economic development, no small task in itself, the United States has been concurrently committed to a formidable psychological struggle. This has been the need to look forthcoming and peaceable in intent at the Rangoon peace conference without caving in to communist pressures for a de jure "freeze-in-place" cease-fire. It was suspected after the first week's meetings that the level of communist terrorism and harassment had been cut back drastically only to encourage such a settlement.

In effect, the struggle in Vietnam has been converted, at least temporarily, from a military conflict and the vast resources of the United States are being committed to a program that compares in urgency and hope to Europe's Marshal Plan. That the communist side has not yet renewed hostilities is widely viewed as proof that they do not believe the United States can accomplish enough in time in spite of dramatic promises.

Negotiators at Rangoon have argued long and hard in their four separate committees but it is believed that the communist side is determined to achieve a formal cessation of hostilities and some progress in troop withdrawals before progress will be permitted in questions of guarantees or elections.

It is widely held that some officials in the Ky government remain opposed to settlement now and are anxious to see the talks derailed. It is also believed that the NLF negotiators backed by the CPR and probably by the NVN are preparing to stage a walk-out from the conference to protest continued US patrolling and unwillingness to sign a freeze-in-place agreement. Many believe that they are awaiting a shooting incident between VC and RVN or US forces to serve as the pretext for such action. It could put the onus for frustrating progress toward peace on the United States. The Americans reiterate the vital necessity of GVN/US freedom of movement but with enemy quiescence, skepticism is mounting.

The Soviet Union, alone among the communist countries at Rangoon, seems genuinely interested in negotiating a settlement. In its role as Chairman during the first two weeks of the conference, the USSR made every effort to cut down polemics, encourage a forthcoming attitude by both sides and privately indicated willingness to make concessions to the United States on non-proliferation, airline ties, and cultural exchanges. Hanoi has also received Soviet pressure toward accommodation and reminders that continued economic and logistic support depends upon cooperation.

Both the NLF and the GVN have maintained interest in a secret, intermittent dialogue between them. On the Communist side the discussions are regarded as a channel for penetration and subversion, on the GVN side there is hope of obtaining information and encouraging defection. Both groups have a purely cynical view toward these contacts and the NLF has been trying hard to encourage wishful thinking by the other side about possible reconciliation.

The NLF has worked through less doctrinaire members of the organization, while shifting known "hard-liners" to the back-ground. This ploy has been reinforced by having well known Hanoi adherents stop in Phnom Penh "on the way back to Hanoi" and express their disgust. Recently defected National Assembly Representatives have been encouraged by the NLF to woo former colleagues into an "All Vietnamese Settlement". Plans are well underway to create a Popular Peasant Worker Party with a minimum of covert communist direction for purposes of eventually participating in GVN elections.

NLF spokesmen are secretly stressing disenchantment with Hanoi's support of their effort while alluding to similar dissatisfaction at American domination within the GVN. NLF "conspirators" are pressing for a conference to discuss a coalition government, amnesties, joint cooperation, etc.

GVN leaders are not being taken in by this line. Instead they believe firmly that the VC infrastructure is weakening and that the GVN could win an election -- even with VC participation. The GVN leadership believes however that there are non-communist groups in SVN who would be willing for the VC to participate in the political process and might even allow them to sit in the National Assembly and cabinet. Even these moderates however would be expected to insist upon prior dissolution of the entire NLF military, para military and propaganda apparatus, severance of connections with Hanoi, stringent residence requirements for elected office, and tight control over the number and type of cabinet posts which could go to the NLF.

The GVN leadership feels that despite any presumed safeguards, moves in this direction would be fraught with danger of a communist take-over and they reject the idea that a moderate NLF faction even exists.

Red China has publicly announced the shift of thirty-five PLA divisions to "staging areas in South China". Red Chinese leaders have privately decided that, coincident with a projected communist walk-out from the Rangoon Conference, five Red Chinese divisions will move rapidly from South China across eastern Burma to the Thai border. This will be a military demonstration somewhat similar to that against India a few years ago. It is intended to restore Red China's power image.

The Chinese accuse Moscow of revisionism and collaboration and seem as dedicated to destroying the conference as the Russians are for it to succeed -- eventually. The CPR is pushing for a rump or rival conference of Asian nations at Phnom Penh as part of a frantic and possibly paranoiac attempt to upstage Moscow and the United States.

The United States has had the Chair at Rangoon for one working day. There are expectations that the Communist delegations will walk out tomorrow. The big questions are whether the de facto cease-fire will hold up and whether the US will pay the price for continuing negotiations which the NLF/DRV demand.

Pressures to accept a Soviet "compromise" agreement are pouring into Washington on Christmas eve from men of good will around the world.