


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The end result is a way of thinking that leaves no room for competing systems of thought. Communist propaganda campaigns in the form of mass movements are, therefore, ideological indoctrination campaigns. Such a movement is currently taking place within Communist China.

The current propaganda movement or "cultural purification revolution", as the Chinese call it, is led by Mao Tse-tung in an effort to divert the people's attention from the recent political purges within the Chinese party leadership. Mao is continuing the theme that the Communist people must bury the US imperialists once and for all and, through youth movements, is urging that all signs of Western custom, culture, dress, and style be banned from Communist society. In addition, Chinese Communist propaganda continues to encourage a nation-wide effort toward mobilization, self-sacrifice and preparation for a war which might be launched by the "enemy" at any time.

The emphasis Mao has placed on the present "cultural purification revolution", is an indication of the internal unrest currently being felt by the Communist regime.

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES*

Army

The primary military strength of Communist China lies within its Army of some 2.3 million men, the largest ground force in the world, backed up by tremendous reserves of manpower which include a significant seasoning of veterans and militia. As individuals, members of the Chinese Communist Army (CCA) are excellent military material despite limitations in technical background. A significant though decreasing number of the officers and non-commissioned officers are experienced in both guerrilla and conventional warfare.

China's Army is an infantry force, markedly inferior to US or Soviet ground forces in firepower and mobility. Since China has been producing a fairly wide range of infantry weapons, artillery, and tanks, the CCA materiel has improved. As many as one-third of the combat divisions, distributed throughout China's military regions, have been brought up to strength and fully equipped with modern standardized weapons. Inadequate logistical support remains, and will probably continue, as the single most serious problem confronting the CCA.

Air Force

Similar to the Army, the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) of 148,100 men and Naval Air Force (CCNAF) of 14,500

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men, constitute a primarily defensive force. The air forces are incapable of conducting sustained aerial warfare against any considerable weight of US or Soviet opposition. US intelligence estimates that the Chinese Communists could deploy 810 jet fighters, 130 jet light bombers and 40 prop light bombers to combat in Southeast Asia. The bulk of the Chinese Communists aircraft would be deployed to South China airfields near the NVN border and some might be deployed to NVN bases. Despite its primarily defensive orientation, the fighter force of the CCAF could be used as fighter-bombers, either for close air support or for interdiction.

The bulk of CCAF fighter aircraft consists of about 1,800 obsolescent MIG-15 and MIG-17 jets, including more than 300 MIG-17Ds. The later inventory consists of some 350 MIG-19 and 35 MIG-21 first-line fighters. About 15 percent of this fighter force is equipped with airborne intercept capability. The main element of Communist China's offensive air power consists of an estimated 270 IL-28 light jet bombers. Also included are about 12 TU-4 and 2 TU-16 medium bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Navy

The primary mission of the Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) is coastal defense. The elements of the CCN, being structured and equipped in accordance with this defensive role, possess only limited offensive capability, although some units might be used in brief offensive activity in support of the primary mission. The CCN numbers some 62,000 men with the following major ships: 24 operational submarines and 7 obsolete coastal submarines; 4 destroyers; 5 destroyer-escorts; 26 patrol craft; 2 guided-missile patrol boats; 280 motor torpedo boats; 73 mine warfare ships; as well as the amphibious capability to sea-lift two divisions. In addition, the Communist Chinese have constructed or assembled one G-class ballistic missile submarine for which an SS-N-4 type (350 nautical mile) missile might be available during the 1968-69 time frame.

With extensive Soviet technical help, up to 1960, the Chinese were expanding and modernizing their shipyards and had achieved substantial progress in shipbuilding technology. Soviet withdrawal caused a serious setback in ship component production, both in quality and quantity. Renewed interest in shipbuilding is reflected in construction of new facilities, expansion of old ones, elevation of the shipbuilding administration to ministry status, and solicitation of French, Danish, and British aid.

* Refer to the Joint DIA/JCS Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, July 1966 for supplementary information.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

To date, the Chinese Communists have exploded three nuclear devices. Since the detonations thus far have exceeded predictions, the intelligence community is no longer inclined to set strict limits on their capability to produce nuclear material for weapons. Even if economic stringency tightens, many other areas would likely be cut back before the nuclear program. Research and development in this field continue in full swing.

KEY PERSONALITIES

MAO TSE-TUNG: The supreme leader of the Chinese Communist government, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, he is Chairman of the State Council, Chairman of National Defense Council and of the People's Political Consultative Conference. As the head of the Chinese Communist Party he is Chairman of the Politburo and Central Committee, and a member of the Party Secretariat. Mao is currently the foremost Communist leader in the Far East, and his status has been given official recognition not only by the Far Eastern Communist parties but by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well.

The son of a peasant of moderate circumstances, Mao Tse-tung was born in the village of Shao-shan, Hsiang-t'an Hsien, Hunan Province, near Ch'ang-sha, in 1893. Graduating from the Hunan Provincial First Normal School of Ch'ang-sha in 1918, he went to work in the Peking University Library. It was here that he met with such early Chinese Marxists as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-ch'ao, and some of the Chinese students who were later to become Communist Party leaders; members of the present-day hard-core elite of the Communist Party of China. On July 1, 1921, Mao was present as a representative from the Communist group in Hunan Province at the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai. Having been active in the political organization of workers in 1920 in Hunan, by 1922 he was secretary of the provincial branch of the party, engaging in trade union organization. When in 1924 there began a period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, Mao held positions as a Communist reserve member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Secretary of its Organization Department. In 1925 he held down the position of Minister of Information. His most important work, however, during this period was his revolutionary activities in his home province. These activities came under criticism by the Party's ruling group and following his organization of the Hunan peasant uprising (the fall crop uprising), in September 1927, Mao was expelled from the Politburo. In November 1927, after the break with the Nationalists in July of that year, he set up the first Chinese Soviet at Ch'a-lin on the border of Hunan and Kiangsi. By May 1928, Mao and Chu Te had joined forces

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at Ching-kang-shan, Mao becoming Political Commissioner of Chu Te's Fourth Red Army. For the next six years Mao's status in the Chinese Communist Party is not very clear. Although he was removed from the Politburo in 1927, it is possible that he retained his membership position on the Central Committee. After 1927 the fortunes of the party were mainly in the hands of Li Li-san who in November 1930 was removed from control because of differences with the Comintern. In the meantime Mao carried on his activities among the peasants in Hunan Province. Spreading from the original headquarters at Ch'a-lin into areas in Kiangsi and Fukien provinces, the soviets were brought together into one centrally controlled government in November 1931 when the first All-China Congress of Soviets was convened at Ju-chin, Kiangsi Province. The real headquarters of the party, however, was still at Shanghai. Mao was made Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic which the congress established. From this time on, the Kiangsi Soviet began to assume more importance than the party headquarters in Shanghai. When the party headquarters was raided a year later and closed, the personnel joined Mao Tse-tung's soviet in Kiangsi. Mao continued to hold the chairmanship of the party during the soviet's existence and became the central figure in the Communist Party after the conference held at Tsun'i, Kweichow Province in January 1935, during the Long March. Whether Mao became Politburo Chairman at this time or later is not known but the meeting marks his assumption of complete control over party leadership. Although there have been frequent conflicts with party leaders, Mao's authority has not been seriously challenged since that time.

In July 1935 he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Comintern and thus seems to have enjoyed the Soviet Union's blessing at the time. The Red Chinese forces reached Shensi Province in October 1935 and Mao set up his headquarters, retaining them until he moved to Yen-an in 1937. In 1945 Mao went to Chungking for a short period to negotiate with the Nationalists. At the time of the creation of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949 he established his headquarters in Peking. His first visit outside of China was made at the time of the celebration of Stalin's birthday in Moscow in December 1949. During this visit he negotiated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship which was signed on February 14, 1950.

Mao Tse-tung has written a number of articles and books, some of which have been published in English by the Chinese Communists. In his writings Mao expresses himself generally in practical terms, as one schooled in practical life rather than in theory. An exception to his usual style was made in

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his "On Practice," which deals with abstract philosophical speculations. This work was published in Russian and was highly extolled shortly after the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea; it has since been published in English.

Mao has been described as resourceful, shrewd, sloppy and careless in appearance, a man of plain-living habits and plain speech, who possesses a tireless energy. He apparently has had some training in the Chinese classics for he frequently makes use of fanciful allusion. Mao has had four wives, the first through the usual Chinese family-arranged marriage; the second, a Communist who was killed by the Nationalists; and a third who was divorced in Yenan; the current fourth wife is the former Shanghai Chinese actress, Lan Ping, whom he married in 1939. He has one daughter by his last marriage and at least two sons, now in their late 20's by former ones. His position at the present time is apparently secure.

LIN PIAO: From the standpoint of both prestige and positions of power, Lin Piao is one of the most important individuals in Communist China today. He is Minister of National Defense, a Vice Chairman and Standing Committee member of the CCP Politburo, and the leading Vice Chairman of the CCP-Central Committee Military Affairs Committee. Considered one of the outstanding tacticians in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Lin has in recent years been highly praised in both military and political articles in classified and open PLA publications.

In his heyday Lin Piao was considered one of the most brilliant young commanders of the Communist armed forces. He has been credited with originating the "short attack" and other innovations in guerrilla warfare which the Communists successfully used in the past. Originally brought to the fore as a protégé of Chu Te, Lin helped defend the Provisional Chinese Republic in the 1930's, won the first major Communist battle against the Japanese in 1937, and led troops that conquered Manchuria between 1946 and 1948. An able tactician and strategist, Lin was once described as the "hard headed pragmatic type of military leader" admired by Mao Tse-tung. As the author of "Long Live the Victory of the People's War", a blue print for world revolution, he is ranked with Mao as an international strategist.

As a leader in Mao's recent "socialist cultural purification revolution" and political "purge", Lin has emerged as the possible successor to Mao Tse-tung.

LIU SHAO-CH'II is Chairman, People's Republic of China (PRC); and Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

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Liu Shao-ch'i, the second most powerful man in the CCP until the July 1966 purge, was elected Chairman of the PRC on 27 April 1959. Liu derived his power in the CCP from his relationship to Mao and the CCP, in which he had, since 1956, been the ranking Vice Chairman and, therefore, a member of the all-powerful Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. While theoretically the powers of the PRC chairman are limited, they are, in fact, determined by the power position within the CCP of the individual who holds the chairmanship.

In personality Liu Shao-ch'i lacks the popular appeal of leaders like Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te. A few dissenters have depicted Liu as warmhearted and witty, but he is usually described as aloof, cold, humorless, or severe. Liu has been married twice; his first wife, also a party member, was killed in 1934 by the KMT, as was their son. His present wife, Wang Kuang-mei, has only recently become active in political and social life. Liu has at least three sons and a daughter who is reportedly married to a Spaniard. In 1950 Liu attended an executive committee meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Budapest and in 1952 he led the Chinese delegation to the 19th Congress of the CPSU. Liu visited North Korea in September 1963. His only non-bloc travel was his April-May 1963 visit to Southeast Asia.

TENG HSIAO-P'ING: Previously considered by some sources as a potential successor to leadership of the CCP, he has risen rapidly in both power and prestige within the CCP hierarchy. As General Secretary of the Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and ranking Secretary of the CCP Secretariat, Teng is a key figure in the CCP political machinery. In addition, he holds several governmental positions: Vice Premier of the State Council, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council, and Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). A further indication of Teng's stature is his appointment as acting Premier during Premier Chou En-lai's trip to Africa in December 1963 and January 1964. Teng was also listed for the first time at a National People's Congress (NPC) in November 1963 in his role as General Secretary of the CCP CC and was given a more conspicuous place in the reportage than he had formerly received. Previously he had been listed at NPC gatherings in his lesser role as Vice Premier, and the greater prominence given to Teng indicate his complete elevation to the inner circle of party leadership.

CHOU EN-LAI: Premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC), is the leading Chinese Communist spokesman for foreign affairs and is considered one of the world's most skilled diplomats. Besides his positions as Premier and Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,

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he concurrently serves as a member of the CCP Politburo and its seven-man Standing Committee. Although Chou plays an important role in party affairs, his power is primarily derived from his strategic position within the government apparatus. As Premier, Chou presides over a State Council composed of an increasing galaxy of ministries, commissions, and bureaus which draft laws, formulate administrative measures, issue administrative decisions and decrees, and direct and coordinate all local governments. His position gives him personal control over a huge bureaucratic empire and enables him to place followers in key government positions.

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CHINA, COMMUNIST



LAND: (U)

3.7 million sq. mi.; 11% cultivated sown area extended by multi-cropping; 78% desert, waste, or urban (32% of this area consists largely of denuded wasteland, plains, rolling hills, and basins from which about 3% could be reclaimed); 8% forested; 2-3% inland water

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 772 million; males 15-49, 178,600,000; about 89,400,000 fit for military service; about 7,900,000 reach military age (18) annually

Ethnic Divisions: 94% Han Chinese, 6% Chuang, Uighur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Pu-I, Korean, and numerous lesser nationalities

Religion: most people, even before 1949, have been not seriously religious, but pragmatic and eclectic; most important elements of religion are Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, ancestor worship; about 2-3% Muslim, 1% Christian

Language: Chinese (Mandarin mainly; also Cantonese, Wu, Fukienese, Amoy, Hsiang, Kan, Hakka dialects); and minority languages (see ethnic divisions above)

Literacy: about 22%

Labor force: 327 million (end of 1964); 85% agriculture, 15% other; shortage of skilled labor (managerial, technical, mechanics, etc.); surplus of unskilled labor

GOVERNMENT: (U)

Capital: Peking (Peiping)

Regional breakdown: 21 provinces, 2 centrally governed municipalities, and 5 autonomous regions

Type: totalitarian Communist dictatorship

Branches: control exercised by Chinese Communist Party, through State Council, which supervises over 50 ministries, commissions, bureaus, etc., all technically under the standing committee of the National People's Congress

Government leader: premier of State Council, Chou En-lai; chairman, People's Republic of China (chief of state, a ceremonial post), Liu Shao-ch'i; both subordinate to central committee of CCP, under Chairman Mao Tse-tung

Suffrage: universal over age 18

Elections: elections to the National People's Congress (NPC), a rubber-stamp legislature, are required every 4 years by constitution; both the 1st (Sept. 54) and 2nd (April 59) NPC's had their terms extended for "exceptional circumstances"; the 3rd NPC was convened Dec. 64-Jan. 65

Political parties and leaders: Chinese Communist Party, only effective power, headed by Mao Tse-tung, who is Chairman of political bureau, real locus of power in China, (23 members and alternates) and also chairman of central committee (about 200 members and alternates); central committee is elected by a full Party Congress, which, in turn, must be newly elected every five years, according to the 1956 CCP Constitution; the last Party Congress -- the Eighth -- was held in 1956, and thus a new one is five years overdue

Voting strength: 100% Communist for practical purposes; no political nonconformity permitted

Communists: 18 million

Other political groups: party rule supplemented by a united-front facade of non-Communist parties and mass organizations

Member of: attends occasional CEMA meeting in observer status

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ECONOMY: (Secret)

GNP: US\$72 billion (1965) (in 1963 prices); under \$100 per capita
Agriculture: main crops -- rice, wheat, cotton; normally self-sufficient; food shortages -- wheat, meat; caloric intake, 2,000 calories per day per capita (1965-66); agriculture mainly subsistence; self-sufficient in food until 1960, but grain imports averaged 6 million tons annually (1961-65)
Major industries: iron and steel, coal, machine-building, textiles
Shortages: complex machinery and equipment, highly skilled scientists and technicians
Crude steel: 18 million metric tons capacity (1964); 11 million tons produced (1965), 15 kilograms per capita
Electric power: 12.9 million kw. capacity (1964); 40,000 million kw.-hr. produced (1964), 50 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: agricultural products, minerals and metals, manufactured goods
Imports: grain, petroleum products, raw materials, machinery and equipment
Trade: 1965 exports probably about \$1,955 million; imports probably about \$1,740 million; 34% of total trade with Communist countries
Exchange rate: 2.46 yuan=US\$1 (free world); 4.00 yuan=US\$1 (Communist countries)
Fiscal year: 1 Jan. - 31 Dec.

COMMUNICATIONS: (Secret)

Railroads: about 21,000 mi., of which 370 mi. 3'3 3/8" gage, 30 mi. 3'6" gage, 20,600 mi. 4'8 1/2" gage; mostly single track, less than 1% electrified; government owned
Highways: 325,000 mi.; 1,000 mi. paved, 155,000 mi. gravel, crushed stone, improved earth and soil-aggregate surface, 170,000 mi. unimproved earth, including tracks
Inland waterways: 105,000 mi.; 25,000 mi. navigable by steamer
Pipelines: crude oil, 92 mi.
Ports: 4 principal (Shanghai, Dairen, Tsingtao, Tientsin), 15 secondary, 70 minor
Merchant marine: 177 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 733,660 GRT, 958,558 DWT; includes 13 passenger, 130 cargo, 19 tanker, 15 bulk; fleet was employed almost exclusively in domestic coastal operations until 1961 when limited operation to Southeast Asia commenced; currently, 27 ships are used in international operations to Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe and Japan
Civil air: 95 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 279 total; 163 with permanent-surface runways; 3 with runways over 12,000 ft.; 49 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 191 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 1 seaplane station
Telecommunications: industrial areas served by reasonably adequate facilities for local and intercity needs; first priority is for military needs with limited service for civil use; international facilities are adequate; effective coverage is provided by radio, wired and television broadcasts; 244,000 telephones

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret - No Foreign Dissem)

Personnel: army 2,325,000, navy 142,300 (including 125,000 general services, 17,300 naval air), air force 197,000 (including 120,500 assigned to AC&W, SAM, and AAA units and 76,500 in the air force itself)
Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): army 6,000,000 (militia); navy has no organized reserve; air force negligible
Major ground units: the army has 13 territorial commands and 34 army headquarters, with a total of 160 divisions: 117 combat divisions (106 infantry, 5 armored, 3 cavalry, 3 airborne), 20 border defense/military internal security, 23 artillery (14 field artillery, 3 antitank, 6 antiaircraft), and 11 railway engineer for service support; in addition, the army has 56 independent regiments (engineer, signal, service support) plus miscellaneous units
Ships: 4 old destroyers, 1 ballistic missile submarine, 29 submarines, 4 old submarines, 5 destroyer escorts, 361 patrol, 65 mine warfare, 59 amphibious (excluding 199 mechanized landing craft), 63 auxiliary, and 346 service craft

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DEFENSE FORCES (cont'd):

Aircraft: 3,081 in operational units as follows: naval air force, 455 (353 jet), including 235 jet fighters, 118 jet light bombers, 20 prop light bombers, 6 prop reconnaissance aircraft, 71 prop transports, 5 piston helicopters; air force 2,626 (2,138 jet), including 1,985 jet fighters, 2 jet medium bombers, 151 jet light bombers, 9 turboprop transports, 80 prop light bombers, 40 prop attack aircraft, 13 prop medium bombers, 301 prop transports, and 45 piston helicopters

Missiles: 17 operational SA-2 sites (including 2 training sites) plus 2 R&D sites

Supply: produces infantry weapons and ammunition in substantial quantities, artillery pieces, trucks, some tanks, aircraft, electronic equipment, submarines and small naval ships

Military budget: data lacking to measure cost of military establishment with any precision; current defense expenditures estimated to be on the order of less than 7% of gross national product

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COMMUNICATIONS: (Confidential)

Railroads: 274 mi. standard gage; 240 mi. government owned

Highways: 7,096 mi.; 5,598 mi. paved, or otherwise improved

Ports: 1 principal (Kingston), 10 minor

Merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 11,940 GRT,
11,100 DWT

Civil air: no major transport aircraft

Airfields: 35 total, 32 usable; 10 with permanent-surface runways; 6 with
runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 5 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: telephone system is modern automatic dial type with 51
exchanges; excellent international service by submarine cable and radio relay;
43,100 telephones

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret)

Personnel: army 1,200, air wing 20 (10 pilots), coast guard 30

Major ground units: 1 battalion

Ships: 1 patrol craft (plus 2 inactive)

Aircraft: 5 (2 helicopter, 3 miscellaneous)

Supply: dependent on materiel from U.K. and U.S.


Military budget: for fiscal year ending 31 March 1965, \$4,251,878; less than 3%
of proposed total budget

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LAOS

BACKGROUND

Although independent Lao Kingdoms existed in the 8th and 14th centuries, the Lao people have been dominated by their more powerful neighbors during most of their history. The Khmers (Cambodians) ruled the country from the 11th to the 13th centuries, and the Burmese attacked the kingdom during the 16th century. Later, Lao territory was often overrun by marauders from the area now comprising Thailand and Vietnam, and parts of Laos were either annexed or forced into a tributary relationship.

In the closing weeks of WWII, Indochina's Japanese occupiers persuaded nationalist leaders to declare Luang Prabang an independent kingdom. In September 1945, the proclamation of independence was extended to include Bassac and Sisavang Vong, who had been the King of Luang Prabang since 1903, was proclaimed King of Laos. Shortly thereafter, however, the leaders of a nationalist movement known as "Free Lao" formed a short-lived provisional government, dethroned the King because he was allegedly pro-French, and organized small armed units to resist returning French-led forces. By May 1946, these Free Lao units had been overpowered and the "provisional government" leaders had fled to Thailand where they set up a government-in-exile. Although France reestablished its rule, it accepted the nationalist principle of a territorially united Laos under Sisavang Vong as King, and a provisional agreement of August 1946 gave the new kingdom a considerable degree of administrative authority.

During the next several years Laos progressed toward full independence. A parliamentary system with a popularly elected National Assembly dates from the promulgation of a constitution in May 1947. Under an agreement with France signed in July 1949, Laos became an independent state within the French Union. Thereupon the government-in-exile in Bangkok was dissolved and most of the leaders of the Free Lao movement returned to take part in the Royal Government of Laos.

Under a Treaty of Friendship and Association signed in October 1953, France recognized the Kingdom of Laos as a fully independent and sovereign state. All remaining French administrative powers were transferred to Laos except certain supervisory rights relating to military affairs and economic matters, which finally were given up in late 1954.

The United Kingdom, France, and the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Laos in February 1950, and subsequently the overwhelming majority of the other free-world states

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also extended recognition. Laos became a member of the United Nations in December 1955.

Despite the dominant position of the Lao in the life of their nation; the sizable minorities and their ethnic, cultural, and regional diversities have tended to keep Laos from becoming a national entity or the people from having a national loyalty. The rugged, mountainous terrain or jungle growth of much of the country tends also to keep the population fragmented in small, self-contained communities bound together only tenuously by very poor communications and transportation systems.

Sino-Soviet interest in Laos as a defensive buffer against possible US or pro-Western attack on North Vietnam and South China became evident as early as the 1954 Geneva agreement when the Communists obtained recognition of their de facto control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces. The Communist North Vietnamese have, for several years, used lower Laos as an infiltration route and staging area for the introduction of cadres and material into the Republic of Vietnam. During 1963, the CHICOMs intensified road-building activities in northwestern Laos with a view to obtaining direct and rapid access to the Mekong River and Thailand. Laos is, therefore, of strategic importance to the CHICOMs because it provides over-all access to Thailand and to Communist North Vietnam.

POLITICAL

The Lao Government was divided into three separate political factions by the Geneva Accords of 1962, -- right-wing or the Conservatives, the Neutralists, and the left-wing or the Pathet Lao (Lao Communists). The Government, under Prince Souvanna Phouma, has attempted to maintain neutrality in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. However, internal pressures from the Left supported and supplied by Communist China and North Vietnam, has caused Souvanna to rely on aid from the U. S. and the Rightists in order to resist a complete Communist takeover by force. As Souvanna Phouma becomes more disenchanted with the Communists, it becomes more difficult for him to adhere to his obligations of 1962 and retain a facade of neutralist coalition yet resist Communist military action. As a result, the Neutralist faction continues to weaken. In fact, the continued existence of a Neutralist Politico-Military Force appears more dependent on international necessity than on domestic popularity.

In Vientiane itself as well as in other parts of Laos, Souvanna Phouma is aware of the growing power of the 70,000-man Royal Laotian Army, whose young generals are ambitiously inclined to the view that the country needs a military regime. The emerging leader among these officers is General Kouprasith Abhay, the deputy army commander and chief of the capital military region. In August 1966 Souvanna reported that if he were forced to resign,

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his government would disappear and the Laotian Communists, the Neo Lao Haksat, might set up their own regime in the territory they control.

ECONOMIC

The economy of Laos is the most primitive in Southeast Asia. The few urban centers contain no more than 10 percent of the population. The rest, dispersed in about 10,000 villages or seminomadic communities, exist on the fringe of the market economy, engaging in subsistence agriculture and home crafts and bartering with itinerant traders or neighboring villages for a few essential products not available in their own communities. The internal market for manufactured products is, therefore, small and modern manufacturing industry almost nonexistent.

The primitive nature of the economy and the lack of statistical services prevent precise measurement of the gross national product. Estimates range from approximately \$100 million to \$160 million. It is generally agreed, however, that the level of living in Laos is among the lowest in Asia.

Although agriculture occupies about 90 percent of the labor force, its contribution to national output is smaller than that of the government. The government share is enlarged by heavy defense outlays made necessary by the need to provide for internal security and for at least a modicum of defense against the external Communist threat.

There are few indices available for measuring economic progress in Laos since it became a separate economic unit in 1955. The principal dynamic element in the economy is the U.S. aid program. Commercial activity has risen sharply as imports have been stimulated by aid expenditures and, before the monetary reform of 1958, by accompanying speculation in foreign exchange. Although the basic economy has been relatively untouched by the increased activity in the monetary sector, the growth of Vientiane has been rapid and has resulted in considerable investment.

Inaccessibility of the countryside and failure to participate actively in the monetary economy are major structural barriers to the achievement of greater capacity for self support. An even greater handicap lies in the low educational level.

COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS*

Armed Forces*

* Refer to Joint DIA/JCS Southeast Asia Fact Book, July 1966

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KEY PERSONALITIES

SAVANG VATTHANA, king

King Savang Vatthana ascended the throne of Laos on the death of his father, King Sisavong Vong, on 29 October 1959. His early period on the throne was characterized by inaction and a fear of jeopardizing the position of the monarchy. Despite the King's earlier desire to remain above politics, however, in the last few years he has been increasingly willing to play a more active role to preserve and reinforce national cohesion. The King is scheduled to be crowned in late 1967 or 1968, an event which has been long postponed due to an inauspicious oracle and inadequate facilities for an international celebration.

The King was born 13 November 1907, the eldest son of King Sisavong Vong and Queen Khamouah. From 1916 to 1920 he studied at Hanoi and then went to France where he continued his studies, first in the humanities, then in geography and geopolitics, and finally in law. In 1925 he received his master's degree from the Ecole des Science Politiques in Paris. From 1930 to 1944 he served as Secretary General of the Kingdom of Luang Prabang, and in 1945 was reported as President of the Privy Council of the Kingdom, with some indication that he may have held the post since 1930. He became Crown Prince of Luang Prabang sometime before 1944. Presumably he became Crown Prince of Laos when the Kingdom of Laos was formed in 1946. As Crown Prince he carried out most of the royal duties since at least 1951 because of his father's prolonged ill health. He had taken an active part in political affairs until the early 1950's, having worked successively with the Japanese, the Lao Issara, and the French in the late part of World War II and the immediate postwar period.

Characteristic of the King's early disinclination to intervene in Lao politics was his refusal, following the Kong Le coup of August 1960, to summon the leaders of the contending factions to the conference table. His nonintervention was reportedly the cause of a quarrel with the new Crown Prince Vong Savang. In April 1964, at the time the Revolutionary Committee headed by Generals Kouprasith and Siho attempted to take the government from Souvanna Phouma, the King took a more positive stance. Bulwarked by strong support from various countries, including the United States, the King refused to accept Souvanna Phouma's resignation. He has since, on several occasions, given military advice. He was largely responsible for the orderly designation by constitutional means of a new National Assembly, following popular consultations in the summer of 1965. During 1966, the King has been more intensive in his behind-the-scenes role in Lao politics.

The King is a cultured and intelligent man who has traveled widely. He recognized much earlier than most Lao, and certainly

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years earlier than Souvanna, the danger to national survival posed by the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat.) He told Governor Harriman in March 1962 that to ask the Pathet Lao to participate in a Government of National Union was tantamount to asking the Vietnamese to participate in running Lao internal affairs. He is also one of the few farsighted Lao who favors closer rapport with Thailand. He contends that the Lao and Thai are one race, whereas the Vietnamese and Chinese are of another. He realizes that Chinese and North Vietnamese designs on Laos pre-date Communism. He told Senator Mansfield in November 1965 that the Chinese had an implacable desire to dominate Southeast Asia. His distaste for the Chinese may have been reinforced just after World War II, when he was imprisoned for six months by the Chinese when they accepted the Japanese surrender in Laos. He has been scathing in his criticism of French policy in Laos.

Among his many travels, the King visited the United States intermittently from September 1946 to June 1947 as Lao representative on the French-Siamese Conciliation Commission. He returned to the United States in 1948, 1951, 1952, 1956, and 1963. He has visited France many times; has toured widely in Eastern and Western Europe and in Asia. He visited Moscow in 1963 and in June 1966. He is scheduled to go to Paris in July 1966.

King Savang Vatthana has only one wife; the couple have five children, all of whom were educated in both France and England. The King has a dignified manner but is neither pompous nor patronizing. He is well informed on both domestic and world affairs. He is pleasant and charming and is a gracious host. He is fond of hunting, tennis, and riding, enjoys European classical music, and reads a great deal. He is slow of speech, partly to hide a slight speech impediment. His full official name, used only for the most formal occasions, is "His Majesty Boroma Setha Khatya Sourya Vongsa Phra Maha Sri Savang Vatthana." The official short form is "His Majesty Sri Savang Vatthana" but the title "Sri" is often omitted.

SOUVANNA PHOUMA, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Veterans Affairs, Rural Action, and Foreign Affairs.

With the investiture of the present coalition government on 23 June 1962, His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister of Laos for the fourth time and concurrently assumed the portfolios of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Rural Action. In September 1965, Souvanna obtained approval from the newly elected National Assembly for the continuation of the government, with minor cabinet shuffles, including Souvanna's assumption of the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Having

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served as Prime Minister through the crucial periods of 1951 through 1954, 1956 through 1958, and August to December 1960, he probably has more popular support than any other Lao leader. Although he is opposed to Communism and is intellectually oriented towards the West, Souvanna has, in the past, appeared naive about the nature of Communism and has been overconfident of his ability to maintain a neutral and independent Laos. More recently he has taken a firm approach to the Pathet Lao and has actively cooperated with the conservatives.

Prince Souvanna was born in October 1910. He studied in Hanoi and received degrees in architectural and electrical engineering from the Universities of Paris and Grenoble. From 1931 to the end of World War II he served as a government engineer. He joined the Lao Issara movement after the war and served with the government in exile in Bangkok until returning to Laos in 1950. Souvanna entered the cabinet in February 1950 and was a member of each succeeding cabinet until August 1958, twice serving as Prime Minister. In October 1958 he was appointed Ambassador to France and later was named to serve concurrently as Ambassador to Israel, Italy, West Germany, and Belgium. In April 1960 he was elected to the National Assembly, and he resigned his ambassadorships. In August 1960, following the Kong Le coup he again became Prime Minister until his government was dismissed by royal order. Souvanna then set up a government in exile in Xieng Khouang, which he headed until the formation of the coalition government.

Souvanna has traveled widely and has visited the United States on a number of occasions. His travels have included a tour of Paris, New York City, Washington, London, and Moscow during the fall of 1963. In the spring of 1964 he traveled to North Vietnam and China to gain support for Lao neutrality. Souvanna attended the 20th Anniversary Celebrations of the Bandung Conference in Djakarta in April 1965 and plans to attend the 20th United Nations General Assembly in October 1965.

Souvanna is married to a half-French, leftist-inclined woman, who is politically prominent in her own right. Souvanna speaks French, Thai, and Lao. He understands English but avoids using it.

KOUPRASITH ABHAY, Deputy Commander in Chief, Forces Armees du Royaume; Commanding Officer, Fifth Military Region.

Kouprasith Abhay, promoted to the rank of Major General effective 1 January 1965, is also Deputy Commander in Chief, Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR), and Commanding Officer of the Fifth Military Region (Vientiane). Prior to the General Staff reorganization of August 1965 he served as Deputy for Operations, General Staff. One of the most powerful figures in Laos, Kouprasith has long been identified as the "Sananikone General,"

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a title implying that he serves as the military arm of that wealthy and influential family. Since the coup attempt of 19 April 1964, which was led by Kouprasith and General Siho Lanphoutacoul, Kouprasith has apparently matured politically and his recent actions would seem to indicate that he is not likely to hurt his prospects by making an ill-timed bid for power, although he probably covets the post of Prime Minister:

Kouprasith was born in 1925 on the Khong Islands, Laos. He was educated in Laos and in France. Kouprasith was in Thailand during the Lao Issara movement from 1945 to 1950 and has visited there several times since. Kouprasith supported Kong Le in the August 1960 coup and served briefly as Chief of Staff under the government installed by Kong Le, but later joined the forces with Phoumi to defeat the neutralist forces. Kouprasith served in the Boun Oum government. He has held the posts of Director of National Defense (1956), Lao Military Attache to Paris (1958), Director of Plans and Studies in the Ministry of National Defense (1959-1960), Commander of the Fifth Military Region (1960 and later), Chief of Staff (1960), Military Governor of Vietiane (1961), Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (1965), Deputy Chief of Staff (1965), and Deputy for Operations (1965).

Kouprasith, who is a member of the conservative element in Laos, is a strong supporter of the West. He has the reputation of being extremely honest and loyal to his supporters. He has disclaimed any political ambitions but is a member of Sisouk na Champassak's group of civil servants. He can be very pleasant and likeable, although he has annoyed fellow officers with his arrogance and vanity. He is married and has four children. He and his wife are Buddhists. He is fluent in Thai, French, and Vietnamese and speaks fairly good English.

LEUAM INSISIENGMAI, Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Education, Fine Arts, Sports and Youth.

One of the most influential politicians in Laos, Leuam Insisiengmai was named Deputy Prime Minister in March 1965, retaining the post of Minister of Education, Fine Arts, Sports and Youth which he had held since June 1962. Leuam was also re-elected to membership in the National Assembly in July 1965 and at that time appeared to be emerging as the strong man of the right in the Assembly, attracting independents and many who had been expected to align themselves with a new group led by Sisouk na Champassak. A brother-in-law of Prince Boun Oum na Champassak, feudal southern leader, Leuam derives much of his power and prestige from his support in the south. He succeeded to the position of at least nominal leader of the right-wing politicians on the recommendation of Boun Oum. He replaced General Phoumi Nosavan, an erstwhile colleague, in that role, following the failure of Phoumi's attempted coup

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in February 1965. Leuam was retained in his cabinet positions in the September 1965 reshuffling of the coalition government, and exerted strong pressure for political appointments for his followers.

Although his educational background is limited, Leuam has been assessed as a capable, intelligent, and conscientious public servant. He is a firm opponent of Communism and has advocated a strong policy against the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front -- NLHX). He has opposed the inclusion of NLHX members in a coalition government and criticized United States officials for placing any confidence in the possibility of maintaining a neutral coalition government. In August 1965, however, Leuam was believed to favor continuation of the coalition government under existing conditions. While generally sympathetic to the United States, Leuam is first a Lao nationalist and has not hesitated to criticize United States assistance in Laos.

SOUPHANOUVONG, Deputy Premier; Minister of Economic Planning.

Prince Souphanouvong, half-brother of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, was continued in the posts of Deputy Premier and Minister of Economy and Planning in the September 1965 reshuffling of the coalition government. Under this approach the "Red Prince" retains the portfolio he had held since June 1962, with functions carried out by others on an ad interim basis. The arrangement was worked out to allow Souvanna's government to maintain the facade of tripartite government and to counter Communist contentions that the July 1965 elections for the National Assembly signaled the end of the Zurich and Plain of Jars agreements.

There is much speculation about Souphanouvong's status with respect to the international Communist movement. One of the bitterest opponents of French colonial rule in Laos from 1945 to 1949, he was the ostensible leader of the Communist-inspired and Vietnam-dominated insurrection against the Royal Lao Government.

Whether he is actually a member of the Communist Party or simply a Lao nationalist motivated by personal ambitions, an almost abnormal hatred of Caucasians, and disputes within his family, however, is largely an academic question, for Souphanouvong's actions are clearly controlled by the Vietnamese Communists.

Souphanouvong was born on 12 June 1912 in Luang Prabang. His father, Prince Bounkhong, refused to recognize the legitimacy of his birth. Souphanouvong was raised by his eldest half-brother, the late Prince Phetsarath, and was sent to Hanoi to study at the Lycee Albert Sarraut until 1931. He then studied in Paris at the Lycee Saint Louis until 1934 and at the Ecole

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Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (National School of Bridges and Highways) until 1937, when he received his degree in civil engineering.

During World War II Souphanouvong's sentiments seem to have been anti-Japanese and pro-Petain, but he took no overt part in nationalist activities until 1945, when he met Ho Chi Minh, who succeeded in convincing the Prince of the advantages of a close alliance. After the Japanese surrender, Souphanouvong, determined to oppose the French, returned to Laos on perhaps his first visit since 1921. He organized regional committees and gained firm control of the provinces of Savannakhet and Khammouane. In October 1945 he became Minister of War and Foreign Affairs in the Lao Issara (Free Lao) government, which had been formed by Phetsarath during the previous March. He was also named Commander of the Lao Issara army in December.

From 1946 to 1949 Souphanouvong served in the Lao Issara provisional government as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as the commander of the army. In February 1949 he formed the Lao People's Progressive Organization, a dissident political party. In late 1948 or early 1949 he used Viet Minh funds to hire Chinese mercenaries to harass Luang Prabang province, an action which led to the final rupture between Souphanouvong and the Lao Issara. In May 1949 he was removed from his office in the government in exile. At about the same time, the Viet Minh cut off his subsidies and his mercenary army dissolved. After the dissolution of the Lao Issara government in October 1949, Souphanouvong settled his feud with the Viet Minh and since that time has appeared to be under their control.

Souphanouvong's activities from 1949 to 1953 are obscure, but he apparently spent much of the time in China and North Vietnam. In February 1950 he was reported as the commander of the Western Frontier Command of the Viet Minh forces. On 13 August 1950 the Pathet Lao Resistance Government was formed under Viet Minh auspices, with Souphanouvong as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. He became chairman of the political front formed by the Pathet Lao movement, the NLHX. In July 1951 he went to Peking with his wife and children, and in October 1952 he was again in Peking as head of the PL delegation to the Asian and Pacific Peace Congress. The lack of information on his activities during 1951 and 1953 suggests that he was in China receiving indoctrination during this time.

In the spring of 1953 Souphanouvong launched an invasion of Laos with Viet Minh forces. He captured most of Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, threatened the royal capital of Luang Prabang, and gained control of considerable areas throughout Laos. The Geneva Conference in the summer of 1954 called for

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a cease-fire in Laos, and the PL forces withdrew to Phong Saly and Sam Neua.

In November 1957 under the Vientiane agreements, Souphanouvong became Minister of the Plan, of Reconstruction, and of Urbanism in Souvanna Phouma's cabinet and served until the cabinet resigned in July 1958. With the formation of the Souvanna Phouma government after Kong Le's coup d'etat of August 1960, Souphanouvong issued a series of statements calling for the support of Souvanna's government, negotiations between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Lao Government, and the return of the International Control Commission. Souphanouvong met with Souvanna Phouma from 18 to 20 November, and the two men signed an agreement.

While the civil war continued, Souphanouvong and Souvanna held discussions in Laos and in Switzerland during 1961 and 1962. When the terms on which the national government was to be formed were agreed on in June 1962, Souphanouvong was given his current cabinet assignments. The three factions of the government have been unable to cooperate, however, and the PL has found various pretexts to support its contention that the Geneva agreement is not being enforced.

Within the last few years Souphanouvong's contacts in Communist countries have been extensive. He was reported to be in Hanoi in November 1963 and in June 1964 he was in Peking for the inaugural congress of the Laotian Youth Federation. Souphanouvong again stopped in Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow on his way to Paris in August 1964. In April 1965 Souphanouvong attended the Bandung Conference Anniversary Celebrations in Djakarta and was publicized and feted there as a "leader of the Laotian people's struggle," to the discomfort of Souvanna, who attended as head of the official Lao delegation. Following the Conference he stopped briefly in Burma, North Vietnam, and China.


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LAOS



LAND: (U)

91,000 sq. mi.; about 4% cultivated, 4% pasture, 32% waste, or urban, 60% forested (1962)

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 2 million; males 15-49, 498,000; 250,000 fit for military service; average number currently reaching usual military age (18) annually 20,000; no conscription age specified

Ethnic Divisions: 65% Thai-Lao, 25% Phoutheng; 10% Meo, Yao, and other

Religion: 50% Buddhist, 50% animist

Language: Lao official, French predominant foreign language

Literacy: about 15%

Labor force: about 2/3 million; over 90% agriculture; about 80,000 wage and salary earners of which about 50,000 engaged in manufacturing, construction, and transportation; 4,000 government employees

Organized labor: less than 1% of labor force

GOVERNMENT: (Confidential)

Capital: Vientiane (Luang Prabang royal capital)

Regional breakdown: 18 provinces, 6 of which are newly formed (administrative status not clearly defined)

Type: constitutional monarchy

Branches: king, prime minister, bicameral national assembly; provisional coalition government composed of three "tendencies" -- neutralists, pro-Communist, rightists

Government leader: King, Savang Vatthana; Premier, Souvanna Phouma, neutralist; Deputy Premier, Prince Souphannouvong, pro-Communist; Deputy Premier, Leuam Insixiengmay, rightist

Suffrage: universal over age 21

Elections: national assembly elections held in 1965; constitution calls for new elections every 5 years

Political parties and leaders: Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX-Communist), Prince Souphannouvong; Lao Pen Kang (Neutralist), Prince Souvanna Phouma; Young Nationalists Sisouk na Champassak; Rassemblement du Peuple Lao (RPL), Phoui Sananikone

Voting strength (1965 elections): voting resulted in following seat distribution -- 11 Young Nationalists, 10 Rassemblement Peuple (RPL), 11 Neutralist, 27 independent

Communists: Pathet Lao armed forces 31,000; Communist Party (clandestine) membership about 100; sympathizers unknown

Other political or pressure groups: Communist-dominated NLHX (political arm of Pathet Lao movement) resisting "neutralist" government; insurgent Communist forces pose serious threat to existing government.

Member of: U.N. (IMF), Colombo Plan

ECONOMY: (Secret - No Foreign Dissem)

GNP: US\$150 million (1965 est. in 1962 prices), \$70 per capita

Agriculture: main crops -- rice, coffee, tobacco; 90% self-sufficient; food shortages -- small quantities of corn, cotton, tea, rice imported; major food problem is distribution

Major industries: Phong Tiun tin mines remain sole sizable industry

Shortages: capital equipment

Electric power: 8,000 kw. capacity (1964); 12.5 million kw.-hr. produced (1964), 5 kw.-hr. per capita

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ECONOMY (cont'd):

Exports: US\$1 million (1965 est.); tin ore, cardamon (spice), timber, unroasted coffee, benzoin
Imports: US\$30 million (1965 est.); petroleum products, food grains, metals and metal products, machinery, textiles
Trade: imports from U.S., Thailand, Japan, U.K., Indonesia; trade with Communist countries insignificant
Aid: U.S. -- US\$48 million obligated (FY 1965); all others, US\$12 million
Exchange rate: 240 kip=US\$1 beginning 1 Jan. 1964; open market rate approximately 500 kip=US\$1 (1965)
Fiscal year: 1 July - 30 June

COMMUNICATIONS: (Confidential)

Highways: about 2,900 mi.; 360 mi. paved, 770 mi. gravel, most of remainder unimproved and often impassable during rainy season (April - Oct.)
Inland waterways: about 2,840 mi.
Ports (river): 5 principal (Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Savannakhet, Pakse, Thakhek), 4 minor ports
Civil air: 9 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 226 total, 167 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; 16 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.
Telecommunications: telephone service is limited to a few urban areas; intercity and international service is limited primarily to radio telegraph; one full-time radio broadcast station; no television planned; 1,000 telephones

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret)

Rightwing:

Personnel: army 54,640, air force 1,000 (82 pilots), river flotilla 400, Lao National Police 5,000
Major ground units: 62 battalions (including 18 infantry, 25 volunteer, 13 regional, 6 parachute), 1 artillery regiment of 4 battalion-size groups, 1 armored regiment of 4 company-size groups
Ships: 7 mechanized landing craft, 4 personnel landing craft, 28 small patrol craft, 16 river cargo craft, 1 yard floating dock
Aircraft: 71 (66 prop, 5 helicopters), including 50 in operational units (17 prop transports, 20 prop trainers, 10 prop miscellaneous, 3 piston helicopters)

Neutralists:

Personnel: army 11,560, air force 300 (50 crew personnel)
Major ground units: 6 infantry battalions, 1 armored battalion, 2 special battalions, 1 parachute regiment of 4 battalions, 1 artillery regiment of 2 battalions
Aircraft: 5 prop transports, 4 prop miscellaneous

Communists and pro-Communist: Pathet Lao 30,835, Khamouane Dissidents 1,385, Deuane Dissidents 1,510, NVA 10,000-12,000

Major ground units: 135 infantry battalions (Pathet Lao 100, NVA 21, Deuane Dissidents 7, Khamouane Dissidents 7)

Supply: rightist and neutralist forces dependent on U.S.; Pathet Lao dependent on North Vietnam, U.S.S.R., Communist China

Military budget: for calendar year 1966, \$34,978,000; about one-half of total budget


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CAMBODIA

GEOGRAPHY

Cambodia is a small, compact country that fronts on the Gulf of Siam and is crossed by the Mekong. It is traversed by the best land routes between Thailand and South Vietnam and is one of the few Asian countries producing a rice surplus. Numerous urban centers are only about 30 nautical miles from Saigon, and Bangkok is about 110 nautical miles away.

The total area includes 70,000 square miles, which equates to about the size of Missouri. The maximum north-south dimension is about 275 miles and the maximum east-west dimension about 360 miles. Most of Cambodia is a plain, but at the northern edge of the country, along part of the border with Thailand, this plain ends abruptly at the base of a steep escarpment, the southern edge of the Khorat Plateau. In the southwest, the hills and mountains are covered mainly with tropical rain forest.

POLITICAL

The Royal Cambodian Government is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. The throne has been vacant since the death of King Norodom SURAMARIT in 1960. A Chief of State position was established by the National Assembly on 18 June 1960 for Prince Sihanouk, who was unwilling to resume the Crown after abdicating the throne in 1955. The Sangkum Reastr Niyum (SRN) (People's Social Community), a Socialist-Neutralist party founded and controlled by Sihanouk, occupies all seats in the National Assembly. Despite predominance of SRN, government stability is dependent upon the whim of the mercurial Sihanouk.

The key factor in Cambodia's foreign policy is Sihanouk's concern over his country's security. The traditional animosity between Cambodia and Thailand and between Cambodia and South Vietnam is a major factor in Sihanouk's thinking. His advocacy of the policy of neutralization stems from his belief that this is the only way to preserve some independence for Cambodia and other small countries overshadowed by China.

Relations with Thailand and South Vietnam are bad and, because of current issues between Cambodia and these governments, are not likely to improve in the immediate future. Cambodia and Thailand accuse each other of harboring subversive elements and of conducting of a propaganda war. The main issues between Cambodia and South Vietnam are border disputes

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and South Vietnamese military operations across the border provoked by Viet Cong activities. This latter problem will become increasingly serious if more confirming evidence becomes available and particularly if the Cambodian Government is proved to be involved.

Sihanouk's assessment that China will steadily increase its power and influence in Southeast Asia, and his belief that the best defense against Chinese and Vietnamese domination lies in good relations with Peiping, has led him to pursue an active policy of friendship towards China.

Military Alliances and Agreements: Cambodia has no formal military alliances. It is a "Protocol State" under SEATO and has exchanged mutual defense assurances with Communist China. Military assistance was provided from the US for all three services until its termination in November 1963. Cambodia receives military training assistance and equipment from France; and receives equipment items from USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

ARMED FORCES*

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces consist of small organizations still in the developmental stage. The Army is predominant, but there is a small Navy and an Air Force of which the latter has almost doubled in size in the last six years.

ARMY

Mission: The mission of the 29,000-man Cambodian Army is to assist in maintaining internal security, defend Cambodia against external aggression, develop primitive regions of the country through civic action, and direct a national sports program.

NAVY

Mission: The mission of the 1,400-man Cambodian Navy is the patrol of coastal and inland waterways.

AIR FORCE

Mission: The mission of the 1,200-man Cambodian Air Force is to provide Cambodia with a minimal air defense capability. It supports the army with air transport and tactical ground support. It provides a pool of pilots for civil aviation.

* Refer to Joint DIA/JCS Southeast Asia Military Fact Book dated July 1966 for supplemental information.

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PARAMILITARY FORCES

Provincial Guard: Mission: The mission of the 11,000-man Provincial Guard is to perform normal police operations. These operations are separate from or in coordination with the National Police. Additional duties are the maintenance of public safety in rural areas and the guarding of sensitive points to include borders.

ECONOMIC

The economy of Cambodia is based primarily on agriculture and to a lesser extent on fish and forest products. These sectors provide almost one-half of the gross national product and all of the exports and occupy the major part of the labor force. Farm tenancy is not a problem in Cambodia, where most of the approximately one million peasant farmers own their land. However, land is excessively fragmented and agricultural yields are low.

About three-fourths of the cultivated land is cropped in rice, which is the staple food and is second to rubber as a source of export earnings. Corn is the only other food grain of importance; most of the crop is exported. Fishing is an important subsidiary activity of the peasant population. Forest lands, most of them state-owned, cover about one-half of the total area of the country and are relatively unexploited. Cambodian mineral resources have not been extensively explored.

The French-owned rubber plantations constitute the only major Cambodian enterprises producing exclusively for the market economy. The entire output is exported. Rubber exports comprise about 35% of total Cambodian export sales but represent less than 2% of total world exports of rubber.

Manufacturing industry is limited to small-scale shops and cottage establishments, producing light consumer products and construction materials, and to small plants processing agricultural products.

With the labor force largely engaged in traditional subsistence agriculture, the Cambodian economy tends toward stagnation. The peasant family, the basic production unit, produces too little to permit the level of savings necessary for economic growth. Nevertheless, the Cambodian Government is attempting a program of economic development.

In 1964, the gross national product (GNP) was US \$750 million or US \$120 per capita.

The United States discontinued direct economic aid to Cambodia in 1963. Since that time Cambodia has received economic and military assistance from Communist countries.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Cambodia is used by the Viet Cong as a sanctuary and for temporary military facilities. The Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire attitude in others, and the inability or failure of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers. The Cambodian government has taken an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese situation, but has stopped short of military support.

There is no known agreement between the Viet Cong and Cambodia permitting either permanent or semi-permanent Viet Cong bases to be established on the territory of Cambodia. Nevertheless, there is evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower Cambodian government and military levels.

The Cambodian central government has made some limited attempts to curtail Viet Cong infiltration by increasing border patrols in affected areas. However, these are considered to be only token acts undertaken to maintain a semblance of neutrality since Prince Sihanouk has rejected recent proposals made by a UN Security Council mission calling for international control of the Cambodian/South Vietnam border by UN observers based in Cambodia.

The United States is attempting to reestablish lines of communication and to reopen an embassy in Phnom Penh in a desire to bring Cambodia back to a more neutral position in the Southeast Asia conflict.

A United States demonstration of its ability to maintain a presence in Southeast Asia and a willingness to guarantee Cambodian territorial integrity is expected to bring about a softening of Cambodia's attitude toward the US.

In any political settlement of the Vietnamese war, Cambodia would hope to favorably resolve her border disputes with neighboring countries and to see an expanded International Control Commission with greater ability to protect her national sovereignty. Cambodia would like to see a continued US presence in Southeast Asia as a means of forestalling eventual Chinese dominance in the entire region.

KEY PERSONALITIES

Chief of State - Norodom Sihanouk

Cambodia's emotional, uninhibited, and energetic chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, dominates all aspects of the political scene in his country. His enormous personal popularity with the Cambodian people, based in part on his own shrewdness as

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a politician, in part on Cambodia's relatively stable economic and political status, and in part on the traditional veneration of the monarchy, has allowed him to control the most minute details of Cambodian life. Unwilling to share power or to allow any one person or group to develop too great prestige, he makes and implements most decisions personally. While some dissatisfaction does exist, primarily with regard to his economic policies and Cambodia's increasing estrangement from Western countries, there is no indication of any organized internal opposition to Sihanouk.

Cambodian independence has been Sihanouk's overriding goal, and he has pursued this goal with a fervor which amounts to obsession. Basic to his philosophy are the convictions that the primary threat to Cambodia comes from the bordering countries of Vietnam and Thailand, that Communist China is inevitably slated to become the dominant power in Asia, and that the support he requires will not be forthcoming from the United States, which is so deeply committed to Thailand and Vietnam. Sihanouk has tried for some time to get from his neighbors a guarantee to respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. His attempts to convoke an international conference to secure territorial guarantees have failed, however, primarily because of Chinese and North Vietnamese opposition. Sihanouk's November 1965 proposal for an Organization of Asian Nations to counter the "white imperialist powers" and solve inter-Asian problems seems to represent another tack in this campaign.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk was born in Phnom Penh on 31 October 1922, the son of Prince Norodom Suramarit and Princess Kossamak. Since he was not directly in the line of succession, he was allowed to study at the Lycee Chasseloup-Laubat in Saigon. His studies were unexpectedly interrupted when the French selected him for the throne in April 1941. Cambodia became independent in 1953, and two years later King Sihanouk abdicated in favor of his father. He then formed the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Movement), which immediately won all seats in the National Congress and has continued to be the only effective political party in Cambodia. When his father died in 1960, Prince Sihanouk did not resume the crown, but since that time he has been formally designated as Chief of State. His mother, Queen Kossamak, reigns but does not rule, and Sihanouk has designated one of his sons, Prince Norodom Naradipo, currently at school in Communist China, as his successor in the leadership of the Sangkum.

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Vice Premier; Minister of National Defense
and Sports - Lon Nol

Lieutenant General Lon Nol has served as Vice Premier since December 1963. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces in April 1960. Dignified, sophisticated, frank and competent, he has appeared to be relatively friendly toward the United States. While he is thought to be personally inclined toward the West, he has simultaneously been scrupulous in his support of official Cambodian policy and loyal to Prince Sihanouk.

Chief of Staff, Cambodian Air Force - NGO HOV

Lt. Gen. NGO HOV has been Chief of Staff of the Air Force since 1954. He has had medical training in Vietnam and France and has served as Prince Sihanouk's personal physician and pilot for some years. Other Cambodian officials, particularly those in the military services, apparently do not share Sihanouk's high regard for NGO HOV. As an administrator, he has been strikingly inept.

Inspector General, Forces Armees Royales Khmeres
- Nhiek Tioulong

Lieutenant General Nhiek Tioulong, former cabinet minister, diplomat, and "old guard" Cambodian official, was appointed Inspector General of the Cambodian Armed Forces (FARK) in August 1963. Long in the forefront of Cambodian political intrigue, he has been alternately in and out of Prince Sihanouk's favor, and despite a reputation as a strong monarchist, is occasionally mentioned as a potential leader in moves against Sihanouk. It seems clear that Sihanouk has been somewhat resentful of Tioulong's popularity and not wholly confident of his loyalty, and the Prince's lack of confidence probably has some justification. Tioulong has proved to be an extremely capable, energetic, and self-confident administrator, however, and thus far he has subordinated whatever personal political ambitions he may have to at least semblance of loyalty to Sihanouk. Nhiek Tioulong's relations with US diplomatic representatives in Cambodia were friendly and candid, and he seemed strongly sympathetic to this country and to free world political ideals. While there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, his actions have been governed primarily by his enormous vanity and opportunistic political ambition. A brash and arrogant extrovert and a heavy drinker, he lacks patience and restraint and is often outspoken and surprisingly indiscreet in discussing both his own views and the confidences of others.


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CAMBODIA



LAND: (U)

67,000 sq. mi.; 16% cultivated, 55% forested, 29% built-on area, waste land and other (1963)

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 6.3 million; males 13-49, 1,386,000;
705,000 fit for military service; 60,000 reach
military age (18) annually

Ethnic Divisions: 87% Khmer (Cambodian), 5%
Vietnamese, 5% Chinese, 3% other minorities

Religion: 95% Theravada Buddhism, 5% various other

Language: Cambodian

Literacy: 55% (est.)

Labor force: 2.156 million; approximately 80% agriculture, 16% industry, 4%
unemployed

Organized labor: .5% of labor force

GOVERNMENT: (Confidential)

Capital: Phnom Penh

Regional breakdown: 19 provinces with centrally appointed governors,
3 independent municipalities

Type: constitutional monarchy; Chief of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk;
throne vacant

Branches: bicameral legislature; upper house -- council of kingdom; lower
house -- national assembly; Prime Minister Kantol theoretically responsible
to lower house

Government leader: Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk

Suffrage: universal over age 20

Elections: held periodically, but government party virtually unrivaled

Political parties and leaders: government party -- People's Socialist
Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum), Prince Sihanouk; opposition party --
Pracheachon (People's) Party (a pro-Communist front), Non Soun

Voting strength (1962 elections): People's Socialist Community ran unopposed
Communist sympathizers: probably do not number over 1,000

Member of: U.N., Colombo Plan

ECONOMY: (Secret - No Foreign Dissem)

GNP: US\$750 million (1964), \$120 per capita

Agriculture: mainly subsistence except for rubber plantations; main crops --
rice, rubber, corn; largely self-sufficient; food shortages -- dairy products,
sugar, flour

Major industries: rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products

Shortages: petroleum

Electric power: 45,000 kw. capacity (1965); 83 million kw.-hr. produced (1964
est.), 10 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: \$105 million (1965); rice, rubber, corn

Imports: \$102 million (1965); metals and metal products, transport equipment,
food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, petroleum products, minerals

Trade: 17% with bloc (1964), mainly China; major free world partners are
France, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong

Aid: U.S. -- US\$350 million extended and drawn through 1963; discontinued (1963);

Communist countries -- US\$76 million economic aid extended through
1965, \$50 million drawn; \$12 million military aid

Exchange rate: 35 riele=US\$1

Fiscal year: 1 Jan. - 31 Dec.

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COMMUNICATIONS: (Confidential)

Railroads: 292 mi. meter gage; government owned

Highways: 3,181 mi.; 1,354 mi. paved, 1,212 mi. otherwise improved, 615 mi. unimproved

Inland waterways: 1,220 mi. during high water, 1,010 mi. during low water, 90% of total navigability on Mekong system and Tonle Sap

Freight carried: waterway -- approximately 275,000 metric tons; figures unavailable for roads and highways

Ports: 2 principal (Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville), 4 minor

Civil air: 3 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 64 total, 51 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runway 8,000-11,999 ft.; 9 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 1 seaplane station

Telecommunications: adequate for routine domestic requirements; international service is fair to good; fair coverage is provided by radio and wired broadcast; limited television service; 3,800 telephones

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret)

Personnel: army 29,000, navy 1,400, air force 1,200 (94 pilots), provincial guard 11,000

Major ground units: 28 infantry battalions, 1 royal guard battalion, 1 armored reconnaissance regiment (battalion size), 1 cavalry battalion, 1 parachute brigade (3 battalions), 1 artillery brigade (3 groups), 1 antiaircraft brigade (2 groups)

Ships: 4 patrol, 52 amphibious ships and craft, 11 service craft

Aircraft: 117 (14 jets), all in operational units (3 jet fighters, 9 jet trainers, 12 prop light bombers, 20 prop transports, 44 prop trainers, 17 prop miscellaneous, 7 turbine helicopters, 3 piston helicopters)

Supply: produces only uniforms; remainder mainly from U.S., France, Communist China, and the U.S.S.R.


Military budget: for fiscal year ending 31 Dec. 1963, \$43,000,000; about one-fourth of total budget

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THAILAND

BACKGROUND

Thailand was called Siam before 1939 and also between 1946 and 1949. Its people are principally of an Indo-Chinese linguistic stock who emigrated out of southwest China between the 6th and the 14th centuries. In 1350, a Siamese kingdom was established and its sway was extended to Moulmein, Tavoy, Tenasserim and the Malacca Straits. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it was under pressure from both France and England for trade and extraterritorial concessions and was in danger of losing its independence. It survived the period of European colonial expansion by making territorial concessions when necessary.

POLITICAL

For centuries, the government in Thailand was autocratic in form and authoritarian in spirit. Power was the privilege of a small element that was in no way accountable to the people. At its highest levels, this ruling class was composed of persons who were attributed semi-divine status and considered in every way superior to common mortals. Even lower officials were regarded as a class above mere citizens although, at any time, a citizen with ability and an influential patron could be appointed to office. There were, then, two distinguishable classes with two distinct functions--those who ruled and those who obeyed.

In WWI, Thailand was on the side of Britain and France. In the period following, a rapid movement for parliamentary government took place. In 1932, King Bhumidol Aduldej became a constitutional monarch. A single legislative house was established and the cabinet of ministers made responsible to it. Thailand acceded to the Japanese during WWII and declared war on the United States and Great Britain.

Military leaders have played a dominant role in the politics of Thailand. This role has not gone unchallenged and it has experienced its ups and its downs. The constitution was set aside in 1947 when Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram took over and became premier. In 1957 and 1958 the struggle for power

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came to a head when Sarit Thanaret executed a coup and became the de facto head of the government. Thanaret died in December 1963 and General Thanom Kittikachorn became the Prime Minister.

Although Thailand's government is a constitutional monarchy, with interim constitution, British type parliamentary form of government, martial law has been in effect since 1958.

Today, the economy of Thailand is changing, and so is the political philosophy. Radio and press, while still weak, exercise a considerable influence in distributing political information among the population. Through the medium of a progressive program of education, literacy is growing. Western ideas continue to enter the country through foreign-educated Thai's and through Western technicians and students working in Thailand. All these developments exert continuing and increasing pressure for change. It is too early to say that the political pattern has definitely taken a new form, but it is clear that the old style is changing and that there is genuine tension between the old ways and new ways.

The current government of Thailand is making a satisfactory effort to maintain stability and at the same time achieve essential political and social improvements. Special efforts are being made to improve administrative effectiveness, particularly at the provincial and local levels. By taking remedial action to recover large sums from the estate of the late Marshal Sarit, Prime Minister Thanom has done much to redeem the government's reputation for integrity and to gain public confidence. Both civil and military officials, from the King on down, are taking pains to establish contact with the rural people and unite the country. In these efforts the government is assisted by the national pride of the Thais in their unbroken record of independence and their traditional respect for the monarchy.

While recognizing the need for a strong and effective government, present leaders, at their own initiative, have promised the promulgation of a new Constitution by about the end of 1966. This is to be followed by popular elections to the National Assembly within six months to a year.

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Although Thai bureaucracy has inherited traditions of authoritarianism from the past, a growing corps of competent young civil servants offers promise of continuing improvement.

To cultivate the loyalty of people outside Bangkok, numerous programs for accelerated rural and community development are under way. Farmer's associations are being organized. Educational and community development programs are being promoted among the hill tribes. Three new government-sponsored universities are being established in the north, northeast, and south.

If Thailand's security from aggression can be assured, there is every reason to expect rapid improvement in her political and social welfare in most fields.

ECONOMY

Thailand's per capita GNP now stands at about \$115 to \$120 per annum, following a period of sustained GNP growth at some 6 percent annually, while population growth amounts to over 3 percent per annum. Since 1957, there has been an approximate doubling of construction activity, as well as electrical and water supply. Striking increases have also occurred in the value of added transportation and communications facilities. The manufacturing and mining sector has been expanding at perhaps 10 percent per annum since 1960. Gains in agriculture, which remains the major economic sector, have been less spectacular but nevertheless satisfactory.

Production gains have been accomplished in an atmosphere of monetary stability. The cost of living has been rising at a rate of approximately 1 and $\frac{1}{2}$ percent since 1960. Money supply has been growing at about 7 percent annually and the ratio of demand deposits to total money has risen from 35 percent in 1957 to 45 percent at present, reflecting strengthening of the banking system and growing sophistication in the Thai economy.

Thailand's balance of payments situation in recent years has been characterized by a rising trade deficit which has been more than offset by transfer payments and receipts on capital account. The net result has been the doubling of reserves over a five year period which, as of April 1965, stood at about \$618 million.

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Increasing revenues will be absorbed over the next four or five years by accelerated development program expenditures plus the additional budgetary burden, beginning in 1967, associated with the expanded US assistance program, rising military force levels, improvements in civil service wage scales and an increase in military training costs. These latter items could cause unacceptable inflationary pressures in the late 1960's.

ARMED FORCES*

Army

Mission: The 85,000-man Royal Thai Army is responsible for territorial defense and support of SEATO, with token army and air force contingents assigned to the UN Command in Korea.

Navy

Mission: The 23,100-man Royal Thai Navy (includes 7,500 Marines) is responsible for the defense of the seaward approaches to Thailand (Gulf of Siam) by means of patrol operations, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and the transport and support of marine or other security forces conducting amphibious operations. In wartime this mission would be carried out in conjunction with SEATO forces. A secondary mission of the navy is to assist the army in maintaining internal security.

Air Force

Mission: The 19,600-man Royal Thai Air Force is responsible for the air defense of the country; tactical air support of ground and naval forces; support of counterinsurgency units; and the aerial movement of personnel and equipment.

PARAMILITARY FORCES

Border Patrol Police (BPP): The 6,800-man BPP organization is responsible for patrolling the border to a depth of 15 miles to prevent smuggling. Concurrent activities include intelligence collection, countersubversion, counterinsurgency and civic action in the border areas.

Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (also known as the Special Battalion): The 250-man Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit is responsible for providing mobile force in support of BPP. Its wartime mission is to provide an airborne guerrilla striking force.

* Refer to the Joint DIA/JCS Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, July 1966 for supplementary information.

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COMMUNIST FORCES IN THAILAND

Communist Influence

Small, illegal Communist parties in Thailand are increasingly active as an externally-directed apparatus for subversion. There is no Communist representation in the Assembly. Communist subversion is focused on the economically depressed northeastern provinces where a Laos-oriented population is susceptible to separatist appeals. Anti-government and anti-US propaganda is disseminated by the Peiping-sponsored Thailand Independence Movement and Thailand Patriotic Front and the clandestine "Voice of the Thai People." Radio transmissions from these "Fronts" indicate a coordinated effort by the Chinese Communists, North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, as well as local and exiled Thai Communists to solidify Thai support for Communist objectives. In the northeast, the subversive potential of 40,000 Communist-influenced Vietnamese refugees of the 1945-54 Indochinese War is increasing as a result of Hanoi's suspension of the repatriation program in August 1964. The potential for subversion in the northern frontier is increasing as a result of Thai inability to restrict trans-border opium-for-arms traffic and the use of Thai territory as safe-haven by refugees and armed dissident groups from Burma. There are nearly four million Chinese in the major urban areas and a disaffected Malay Muslim minority of 800,000 in the extreme southern portion of Thailand. Both of these minorities are susceptible to Communist influences. There are an estimated 600 armed remnants of the Malayan Communist Terrorist (CT) organization who retain, with external assistance, a capability for renewed terrorism and subversion in southern Thailand. Most of these CTs are young Thai-Chinese recruits.

RECENT COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

A rash of small attacks against government troops in northeastern Thailand in July 1966 has not been followed up by significant new insurgent activity. However, a report that North Vietnam is providing direct guerrilla training to the insurgents indicates the Communists are laying the groundwork for a more concerted armed effort.

The government is continuing to mount large-scale suppression operations, but with uncertain results. Troops that recently completed a sweep in Patthalung Province in the south failed to establish any significant contact, although a number of suspects were taken into custody. In the northeast, where the insurgency has been strongest, a 1,500-man security operation is under way following statements by a captured Communist that a 50-man band in the area was recently reinforced with Vietnamese infiltrators.

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There have been reports before of North Vietnamese troops in the northeast, but their presence has never been verified. It seems unlikely that North Vietnam would commit regular troops there at this stage of the Thai insurgency, although it may have sent some cadre to assist the weak and poorly led Thai guerrillas. One aspect of Hanoi's role has become clearer, however,

3.3(b)(1)

Deputy Premier Praphat apparently is exaggerating reports of North Vietnamese involvement for domestic political reasons. In June he told the press that documents found on two persons killed in recent skirmishes "proved" North Vietnamese "soldiers" have been infiltrating the northeast. This statement followed other public remarks indicating Praphat is pushing for yet another postponement of a new constitution and elections on grounds that the security situation precludes political liberalization.

KEY PERSONALITIES

IX). BHUMIDOL ADULDEJ, His Majesty the King of Thailand (Rama IX). 3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)

Bhumidol was crowned King of Thailand in May 1950. A younger son, he did not expect to inherit the throne, nor did his interests or education prepare him for it. Since becoming monarch, however, he has shown increasing understanding of his role. Although he has little real power, he has on occasion opposed the tactics of Thailand's more aggressive political leaders.

Bhumidol was born 5 December 1927, in Boston, Massachusetts, were his father, Prince Mahidol Songkhla, was studying medicine. Because King Prajadhipol was childless, his nephew, Bhumidol's older brother, was educated for kingship. Bhumidol lived in Switzerland from 1937 to 1945, returning to Bangkok a year before the assassination of his brother and his own ascendance to the throne.

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Despite 32 years of limited powers, the King is still the symbol of government to most of the population. King Bhumidol is the most revered person in the country. He normally remains aloof from the power struggle between military and political factions.

THANOM KITTIKACHORN, Field Marshal, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Supreme Commander of Thai Armed Forces.

FIELD MARSHAL THANOM was graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1929 and distinguished himself in a variety of command and staff assignments until his appointment as Commander of the First Army in 1954. This assignment placed him in a politically powerful and influential status. He entered politics as the Deputy Minister of Cooperatives during the last phase of the Phibun administration and, following the coup of 1957, became Minister of Defense in the interim Cabinet. In this office, he attracted the personal attention of Field Marshal Sarit, who was instrumental in gaining Thanom's appointment as Prime Minister in 1958. Wrangling politicians and economic difficulties frustrated Thanom from the outset of his administration and he was continually upbraided for his lack of leadership and decisiveness. In the new Cabinet formed by Sarit, after the coup of October 1958, Thanom was made Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. He held these positions until the death of Sarit in 1963 at which time he assumed political leadership of the nation.

Thanom is generally respected by his associates for his honesty and integrity. He is regarded as one of the most effective general officers in the Thai Army and his assumption of power, as Sarit's successor, has met with minimum opposition.

AIR MARSHAL THAWI CHULASAP has served as Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command Headquarters and as Thai military adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) since October 1961. After Thanom Kittikachon became Prime Minister in 1963, Thawi was named Deputy Minister of Defense. He was given the rank of general and admiral in August 1963. In December 1965 Thawi was named Deputy Commander of the Countersubversion Operations Center established to suppress Communist activities in Thailand. Thawi is one of the more colorful officers in the Thai military establishment. He is clever, ambitious, and vain, and he aspires to the office of Prime Minister but has few followers. He is an outspoken friend of the United States. Thawi failed to support Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat's coup in 1957 and was subsequently transferred to an unimportant post. He is alleged to have been involved in coup plotting in July 1964.

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THANAT KHOMAN, Minister of Foreign Affairs since February 1959, is an able, intelligent official with extensive experience in international relations. He has attended almost every session of the United Nations General Assembly since 1951 and currently heads the Thai delegation to the Asian Pacific Ministerial Conference (ASPAC) in Seoul. Thanat chaired the Preparatory Conference for ASPAC, Bangkok, April 1966, and was instrumental in successfully organizing the June meeting.

GENERAL PRAPHAT CHARUSATHIEN, whose influence had declined under the late Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat's efforts to curb his political and financial power, was elevated to a strong number-two position in the government formed by Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachon in December 1963, following Sarit's death. General Praphat was named Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Commander in Chief of Supreme Command Headquarters, and acting Deputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), thus making him second only to Thanom in both the civil and military hierarchies. Effective October 1964 he was promoted to Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, which has further augmented his position in the government. He has also retained his cabinet post as Minister of Interior, a portfolio which may be strengthened by the transfer of the provincial teachers, regarded as both a large and influential group, from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Interior. In addition, Praphat serves as the Rector of Chulalongkorn University, a member of the Board of Directors of the Government Lottery Bureau, Chairman of the Committee for the Economic Development of the Northeast, and as an adviser to the Board of Investments.

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THAILAND



LAND: (U)

198,000 sq. mi.; 22% in farms, 52% forested, 26% other

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 31.5 million; males 15-49, 7,589,000;

3,835,000 fit for military service; about 285,000 reach military age (18) annually

Ethnic Divisions: 80% Thai, 15% Chinese, 5% minorities

Religion: 95.5% Buddhist, 4% Muslim, 0.5% Christian

Language: Thai; English secondary language of elite

Literacy: 70%

Labor force: 88% agriculture, 9% commerce, 3% industry

GOVERNMENT: (Confidential)

Capital: Bangkok

Regional breakdown: 71 centrally controlled provinces

Type: constitutional monarchy, with interim constitution; British type parliamentary form of government; martial law in effect since 1958

Branches: king is head of state with nominal powers; prime minister, with strong personal powers, assisted by council of ministers (cabinet); constituent assembly is rubber stamp, appointed legislative body; judiciary relatively independent except in important political and subversive cases

Government leader: King Phumiphon Adundet; Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, prime minister

Suffrage: universal, but elections discontinued in 1958

Political parties and leaders: banned in 1958; Communist strength unknown but probably small

Member of: U.N. (IAEA, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, IFC, IDA, ICAO, UPU, ITU, TAB, WMO), CEMA, ECAFE, SEATO, Colombo Plan, ASA

ECONOMY: (U)

GNP: US\$3,819 million (1965), \$120 per capita; 70% consumption, 18% investment, 12% government, including defense

GDP: US\$3,819 million (1965)

Agriculture: leading world rice exporter in 1965; increasing diversification in grain crops; main crops -- rice, rubber, corn; almost 100% self-sufficient

Major industries: agricultural processing, textiles, wood and wood products

Shortages: fuel sources, including coal and petroleum

Electric power: 539,000 kw. public capacity (1965); 1,070 million kw.-hr. produced (gross) (1964 est.), 30 kw.-hr. per capita (1964)

Exports: \$623 million (f.o.b.) (1965); rice, rubber, tin, maize, oil seeds, live animals, teak, miscellaneous agricultural produce

Imports: \$731 million (c.i.f.) (1965); machinery and transport equipment, textiles, metal manufactures, POL, chemicals

Trade: major export partners -- Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, Hong Kong, U.S.; major import partners -- Japan, U.S., U.K.; only a little over 1% of 1963 trade with bloc

Aid: U.S. -- US\$434 million extended since 1946, est. \$340 million drawn through 30 June 1964, excluding U.S. military supplies and services; IBRD -- US\$192 million extended through Dec. 1965, est. \$135 million drawn or cancelled by end of 1964

Exchange rate: 20.80 baht=US\$1 (IMF par value)

Fiscal year: 1 Oct. - 30 Sept.

COMMUNICATIONS: (Confidential)

Railroads: 2,277 mi. meter gage; 56 mi. double track

Highways: 7,000 mi.; 2,800 mi. paved, 3,900 mi. crushed stone or gravel, 300 mi. earth

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COMMUNICATIONS (cont'd):

Inland waterways: over 4,000 mi. navigable, on 93 selected waterways

Ports: 1 principal (Bangkok), 1 secondary, 16 minor

Merchant marine: 11 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 24,467 GRT, 34,300 DWT; includes 7 cargo, 4 tanker

Civil air: 14 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 118 total, 100 usable; 19 with permanent-surface runways; 3 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 26 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 3 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: domestic system is generally reliable and adequate; good international facilities; effective coverage provided by radio broadcasts; television reception is limited to the more populous areas; 65,000 telephones

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret)

Personnel: army 85,000, navy 23,100 (including 7,500 marines, 50 naval air and 550 Waves), air force 19,600 (650 pilots), border patrol police 6,800, police aerial reinforcement unit 250

Major ground units: 3 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized cavalry division, 1 antiaircraft division, 1 independent regimental combat team, 1 special forces group of battalion size

Ships: 1 destroyer escort, 31 patrol (plus 2 inactive), 16 mine warfare, 52 amphibious ships and craft (plus 2 inactive), 1 auxiliary and 10 service craft

Aircraft: 359, including 67 jets; army air arm has 61 miscellaneous-type aircraft assigned to tactical units; navy has 1 prop type for antisubmarine warfare; air force has 297 (67 jet, 192 prop, 38 helicopter), including 197 in operational units (43 jet fighters, 13 jet trainers, 22 prop transports, 74 prop trainers, 12 prop miscellaneous, 4 turbine helicopters, 29 piston helicopters

Supply: limited local production of small arms ammunition and personal equipment; most other equipment from U.S.

Military budget: for fiscal year ending 30 Sept. 1966, \$104,037,000; about 15% of total budget

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AUSTRALIA

BACKGROUND

Australia has strategic importance in the Western Pacific region as a Commonwealth nation more closely tied to the United States than to the United Kingdom. It is situated in the Asian world, yet its 11.6 million people are 99% Caucasian and 98% Christian. Although Australia's military commitment in South Vietnam appears to be small, in consideration of the size of her population and the imminence of the communist threat to her security, the Liberal Party government is deeply committed to total support of US policy in Southeast Asia.

POLITICAL

Barring a dramatic event which would cause public loss of confidence in the government, Prime Minister Harold E. Holt and the Liberal Party are assured victory in the November 26 national elections. The opposition Labour Party, led by Arthur Calwell, has not held office in seventeen years. This prolonged failure to achieve political victory has led to policy irresponsibility, fragmentation, and deep left-wing infiltration. Arthur Calwell has been greatly influenced and controlled by extreme left-wing spokesman, Dr. James Cairns, in his political rivalry with Mr. Gough Whitlam who aspires to party leadership. This factionalism and pro-communist policy has cost the party much of its popular support.

FOREIGN POLICY

Australia is the strongest supporter of United States policy in the world today. She was the first nation to publicly support US policy during the Cuban crisis and in the retaliation raids for the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Australia has endorsed United States policy in Vietnam including recent escalation of the war and bombing of facilities in North Vietnam. Her decision to contract for the F-111 aircraft, rather than for a competitive British model, is an example of the closeness of US and Australian military and political policies.

ECONOMIC

Australia is a prosperous country in spite of vast areas which are non-arable. Her estimated \$1860 per capita GNP exceeds that of all nations in the Far East, as well as that

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of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Agriculture accounts for a large proportion of its production but heavy industry and manufacturing have been expanded substantially since World War II.

In 1965, Australia sent only 5% of her exports to Communist China. Trade with the United States, Japan and the Commonwealth accounts for the greatest proportion of Australian world commerce.

MILITARY

Australia has a military establishment of about 59,000 men. The Vietnam force was recently expanded to a Brigade of 4500. Of these, about one-third are conscripts sent involuntarily to overseas duty. This unprecedented use of conscripts for overseas duty in peacetime has become a major political issue in this year's election campaign.

Australia also has contributed to the Commonwealth security forces in Malaysia.

With the lessening of tensions in the Malaysia/Indonesia confrontation and the British policy of military retraction from east of the Suez, Australia is concerned over a possible general abrogation of Commonwealth responsibility in the Far East. Negotiations are currently in progress concerning the establishment of British military bases in Northern Australia.


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AUSTRALIA



LAND: (U)

2,970,000 sq. mi.; 4% arable, 58% desert and pasture, 4% forested, 34% other (1963)

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 11.6 million; males 15-49, 2,758,000;
2,160,000 fit for military service; 104,000 reach
military age (17) annually
Ethnic Divisions: 99% Caucasian, 1% Asian and aborigine
Religion: 98% Christian, 2% animist and others
Language: English
Literacy: 98.5%
Labor force: 4.5 million; 14% agriculture, 32% industry,
37% services, 15% commerce, 2% other
Organized labor: 45% of labor force

GOVERNMENT: (U)

Capital: Canberra
Regional breakdown: Australia (including Tasmania) consists of 6 states and
2 territories
Type: independent dominion within the Commonwealth, crown represented by
governor general; patterned after British system
Branches: parliament (house of representatives and senate); prime minister and
cabinet responsible to house; independent judiciary
Government leader: Governor General, Lord Casey (R. G. Casey); Prime
Minister, Harold E. Holt
Suffrage: universal over age 21
Elections: held at 3-year intervals, or sooner if parliament is dissolved by
prime minister; latest elections (Nov. 1963)
Political parties and leaders: Government -- Liberal Party, Harold E. Holt, and
Country Party, John McEwen (Liberal and Country Parties act as coalition);
Opposition -- Labour Party, Arthur Calwell; Communist Party, L. Shakey
Voting strength (Parliamentary 1963 election): Liberal-Country Coalition,
72 seats in lower house; Labour Party, 52 seats in lower house; no Communist
seats
Communists: 5,000; sympathizers, 50,000 (est.)
Other political or pressure groups: Democratic Labour Party (anti-Communist
Labour Party splinter group)
Member of: U.N. (FAO, ECAFE, UNESCO, ILO, WHO, WMO, ICAO, UPU, ITU,
IMP), SEATO, ANZUS, Colombo Plan, ADB

ECONOMY: (U)

GNP: US\$21.4 billion (FY 1965 est.), \$1,860 per capita; 63% private consumption,
11% government current expenditure on goods and services, 26% investment
Agriculture: large areas devoted to livestock grazing; approximately half of
area used for crops is planted in wheat; main crops -- wool, livestock,
wheat, fruits and nuts; self-sufficient in food; food shortages -- tea, olive
oil; caloric intake, 3,258 calories per day per capita (1962-63)
Major industries: machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles and trans-
portation equipment, food processing, ferrous metallurgy, diamonds, clothing,
textiles, printing and publishing, paper and wood products, mining
Crude steel: 5.4 million metric tons produced (1965), 470 kilograms per capita
Electric power: 7.5 million kw. capacity (1963); 37,077 million kw.-hr. produced
(1965), 3,200 kw.-hr. per capita

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ECONOMY (cont'd):

Exports: US\$2,987 million (1965) (f.o.b.); principal products -- wool, wheat and flour, meats, metals, other minerals, dairy products, cane sugar, fruits; U.K. 19%, other Commonwealth 21%, U.S. 10%, Japan 17%, EEC 14%, Communist China 5%, others 14%

Imports: US\$3,371 million (1965) (f.o.b.); principal products -- petroleum, metals and manufactures, machinery and equipment, textiles, paper and paper products, chemicals and fertilizers; U.K. 26%, other Commonwealth 14%, U.S. 24%, Japan 9%, EEC 12%, Communist China 1%, others 14%

Economic aid: U.S. -- US\$15.4 million authorized through 1964, none authorized since 1960; IBRD -- US\$417.7 authorized through 1963, none authorized since 1962; International Finance Corporation -- US\$1 million authorized through 1963, none authorized since 1960

Military aid: U.S. -- US\$342 million in sales authorized, US\$204 million delivered (FY 1959-65)

Exchange rate: 1 Australian \$=US\$1.12 (official rate)

Fiscal year: 1 July - 30 June

COMMUNICATIONS: (Confidential)

Railroads: 25,582 mi.; 50% 3' 6" gage, 25% 4' 8 1/2" gage, 25% 5' 3" gage; 497 mi. electrified (June 1962); government owned (except for few hundred miles of privately-owned track)

Highways: 566,000 mi.; 82,000 mi. paved, 139,000 mi. otherwise improved, 344,000 mi. unimproved

Inland waterways: 6,800 mi.

Freight carried: rail -- 51.2 million net tons (FY 1959-60); coastal and inland shipping -- 32.6 million tons

Ports: 5 principal (Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Fremantle, Adelaide), 6 secondary, numerous minor

Merchant marine: 118 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 597,734 GRT, 786,500 DWT; includes 2 passenger, 57 cargo, 9 tanker, 48 bulk, 2 specialized carriers

Pipelines: crude oil, 933 mi.; refined products, 930 mi.

Civil air: 160 transport aircraft

Airfields: 697 total, 483 usable; 131 with permanent-surface runways; 13 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 421 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 16 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: very good international and domestic service; 2,500,000 telephones; 100 radio broadcast stations; 34 privately-owned TV broadcast stations

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret)

Personnel: army 29,000, navy 10,100, air force 18,000 (620 pilots), naval air arm 2,000 (excluded from navy total)

Major ground units: 1 infantry division plus 2 battalions

Ships: 1 carrier, 10 destroyer-type vessels (plus 5 inactive), 2 patrol (plus 3 inactive), 6 mine warfare (plus 2 inactive), 11 auxiliary, and 18 service craft

Aircraft: 604 (300 jet), including 108 (36 jet) in naval air, 457 (264 jet) in air force, and 39 (non-jet) in army aviation

Missiles: SAM units equipped with Bloodhounds

Supply: produces light army equipment and ships including destroyers, heavy equipment purchased abroad (U.S., U.K., and Canada)

Military budget: for fiscal year ending 30 June 1965, \$664,840,960; less than 13% of total budget

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weapons capability.

19. British Commonwealth split over Rhodesian problem.

20. Russian and Chinese troops clash on Sino/Soviet border.

21. Strong move by British to reduce the size of their forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

22. Pakistan subsidizes tribal insurgency in NE India, stimulates dissent and insurgency in Indian Kashmir.

23. General Assembly votes to admit Communist China to the UN and to expel the Government of the Republic of China.

24. US takes several actions to keep Communist China out of the UN. First adopts a delaying tactic by inviting a cooperative member to introduce a resolution inviting the Chinese Communists to apply for membership under terms of the UN Charter. Second quietly lets it be known that if the ploy in the General Assy fails, that the US will continue the fight in the Security Council and will not hesitate to use the veto.

25. Chinese communists refuse to come into the UN because of US -USSR domination.

26. New party comes to power in Ryukyus. Calls for reunification with Japan.

27. NATO forces complete pullout from France. New NATO headquarters established in ^{LONDON} Brussels.


28. Chinese reinforces units on Sino-Indian border and calls for talks on border question.

29. Political and economic deterioration in India. India's leaders and people fail to measure up to their country's enormous internal and external problems. Mrs Gandhi accused of selling out the tenets of her father.

30. Chinese press calls for reexamination of Sino/Soviet boundaries established by "unjust treaties" in 19th century.

1. The Soviet Union makes a substantial increase in its military budget
2. Russia shifts ground units to positions opposite Chinese units on Sino - Soviet border.
3. US troop strength in Vietnam passes the 500,000 mark.
4. Soviets ship FAN SONG E radar to North Vietnam. Equipment is accompanied by a large number of Russian technicians and operators.
5. De Gaulle continues to push negotiated neutralism and to call for withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam. Meets in Paris with NVN representatives.
6. Chiang Kai-shek offers three divisions for use in Vietnam.
7. US bombs Cambodian sanctuaries. Threatens to send in troops.
8. US blockades Haiphong. Quietly notifies Russians and Chinese that only food and medical supplies will be allowed through the blockade
9. US troops make *from* into Laotian Panhandle. *+J. present*
10. New Buddhist riots in Saigon and Hue.
11. Nationalists step-up raids against Mainland. Chicomms resume shelling of offshore islands.
12. VC hit Cam Ranh Bay and destroy large quantities of supplies, blow up De Long piers and sink two ships.
13. Senior officer billet in Saigon destroyed by terrorists.
14. Resurgent HUK forces in the Philippines make attack on Clark resulting in extensive damage to facilities, supplies and aircraft.
15. VC sink two ships in Saigon river. Channel completely blocked.
16. Two US bases in Thailand shelled.
17. US makes further reduction of forces in Europe in order to meet its commitments in S.E. Asia.
18. India hints that will soon start development of a nuclear

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POLITICAL

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Prime Minister Sato, which is strongly pro-American, is firmly in control and is expected to remain in power into the 1970's. Recent changes in Cabinet makeup were aimed at solidifying his position prior to party elections in December 1966.

The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) controls only a minority of the seats in the Diet but its strength and influence is growing steadily. Party statements indicate an expectation of accession to power in 1970, but US political analysts see little probability for a JSP political victory in less than eight to ten years. Although the JSP have been vocal in criticism of US policy and have denounced the Japanese-US security treaty, a rise to power by the JSP would probably bring a melioring of their attitude toward the United States. The continued prosperity of Japan is largely attributed to strong political and economic relations with the United States. Any deterioration of these relations could cause severe economic difficulties on the domestic front for the party in power.

Growth of the well organized, militant Buddhist SOKA-GAKKAI party appears to have leveled off. Although this group is the third largest political party in Japan, its primary importance lies in possible unconventional tactics and disorders which party leaders may promote to gain political notice.

ECONOMIC AND TRADE

Japan ranks with Communist China and India as a regional leader of the Asian world. Its industrial productive capacity is more than twice that of India and its gross national product is already greater than Communist China.

Japan has enjoyed a 10% rate of economic growth for the past ten years up until 1965. Last year an economic recession lowered this growth rate to 3% but this is expected to level off at about 5% for the decade ahead.

Japan's GNP for 1965 is estimated at \$78.2 billion (US dollars) or \$799 per capita. These figures compare dramatically with CHICOM GNP for 1965 of \$72 billion (US dollars) or \$95 per capita. The GNP growth rate for Communist China is forecast at 3.4% for the next decade.

Despite a rise in international tensions and an increased communist threat, Japan has been able to concentrate on increasing trade relations with both East and West while devoting

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only 1.1% of her GNP for defense forces. The United States accounts for about 30% of Japanese export and import trade, while Communist countries accounted for only 6% of Japan's trade in 1965. The USSR accounted for 2.5% of Japan's trade last year.

Trade with North Vietnam has increased from \$14 million in 1963 and \$13 million in 1964 to an estimated \$16 million for 1965. This commerce does not include military material and it should be noted that even this increased volume of trade represents less than 1/10 of 1% of the total value of Japanese import/export trade.

Trade with China had been curtailed for some years because of hostile attitudes in Peking but recent negotiations have led to an expansion of trade. Now at a level of about \$600 million per year, Japan-Communist China trade may be approaching the point where further significant increases under current policies may be somewhat more difficult to realize. Factors likely to inhibit this trade are the limited Chinese foreign exchange availabilities, Japanese unwillingness to become unduly dependent on Communist China either as a source of vital raw materials or as a market, the Japanese government's awareness of US sensitivities toward Mainland trade and especially long-term credits to facilitate this trade, as well as a growing concern of the SATO administration over the belligerence and nuclear capability of the Chinese Communists.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Japanese government has managed to maintain an air of normalcy with all nations in the region despite periodic and traditional frictions.

The Japanese are showing an increasing sympathy for the United States position in Southeast Asia while at the same time increasing commerce with Hanoi and Peking. Pressure continues for Japanese autonomy in the Ryukyus even though the Japanese are stubbornly reluctant to increase their share in responsibility for security in Korea and the Western Pacific.

The SATO government recognizes the danger of reducing US freedom of action in the Pacific prior to the time when Japanese public sentiment is willing to accept a regional military security role.

Recent moves to enlarge relations with the North Korean regime have angered South Korean leaders.

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MILITARY

A growing feeling in Japan that it must be responsible for its own security has led to cautious steps to enlarge and improve the Self-Defense Force reserve program, which is now confined to the ground forces.

Prolonged unconcern over the state of the Japanese reserve components has stunted their development and relegated them to an unimportant position in the defense establishment. This unconcern is mainly manifest in budgetary limitations affecting the reserves and competition from private industry in the recruitment of personnel. Moreover, the government has been reluctant to expand the reserves for fear of providing its opponents in the Diet with a pretext to press for reduced appropriations for the active forces.

The Self-Defense Force Law authorizes a 24,000 man reserve for the ground force (GSDF); current strength is 22,600 enlisted men and 100 officers. There has been no authority, heretofore, for reserve elements for the naval or air forces.

Japan has no paramilitary forces capable of making a substantial contribution to defense, although the 130,000 man National Police might be used in a static security role.

The year 1970 could prove to be something of a watershed in US-Japanese relations because in that year the Mutual Defense Treaty becomes subject to revision or termination on one year's notice by either party. A recent Japanese Foreign Office statement, however, attempts to minimize the significance of this date and it is probable that this attitude will persist. Thus, the Japanese will probably continue to accept a US military presence in Japan proper as part of the package which is essential to Japan's national security, although an effort might possibly be made to modify US rights to bases and facilities or reduce US personnel in Japan.

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JAPAN



LAND: (U)

143,000 sq. mi.; 16% arable and cultivated, 3% grassland, 12% urban and waste, 69% forested

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 99 million; males 15-49, 27,392,000;
21,590,000 fit for military service; about 1,181,000 reach military age (18) annually

Ethnic Divisions: 99.2% Japanese, .8% others, mostly Koreans

Religion: most Japanese observe both Shinto and Buddhist rites; about 15% belong to other faiths, including .5% Christians

Language: Japanese

Literacy: about 96%

Labor force: 49 million; 27% agriculture, forestry and fishing, 35% manufacturing, mining and construction, 37.2% trade and services, .8% unemployed; shortage of skilled labor 1.5 million, unskilled .5 million (est.)

Organized labor: 19% of labor force

GOVERNMENT: (Confidential)

Capital: Tokyo

Regional breakdown: 46 prefectures

Type: constitutional monarchy under parliamentary control

Branches: Emperor is merely "symbol of state", but the prime minister, chosen by the lower house of the bicameral, elective legislature (diet), dominates the executive; there is an independent judiciary

Government leader: Prime Minister Eisaku Sato

Suffrage: universal over age 20

Elections: general elections held every 4 years or upon dissolution of lower house, triennially for one half of upper house

Political parties and leaders: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), E. Sato, president; Japan Socialist Party (JSP), K. Sasaki Chairman; Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), S. Nishio, Chairman; Japan Communist Party, K. Miyamoto, Secretary General

Voting strength: (1963 election): 55% LDP, 29% JSP, 7% DSP, 4% Communist 5% independent

Communists: 140,000; sympathizers, 1 million

Other political or pressure groups: Clean Government Party (Komeito), representing the schismatic Buddhist sect, Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), has shown remarkable discipline and strength in local and upper house elections and claims more than 10 million supporters; it has not yet run in a general election for the lower house

Member of: U.N. (IAEA, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, IMF, IBRD, ICAO, IMCO, UPU, ITU, WMO), OECD

ECONOMY: (U)

GNP: US\$78.2 billion (1965 est.), \$800 per capita; 54% consumption, 36% investment, 10% government, including defense

Agriculture: land is intensively cultivated with all possible types of crops, fishing supplies most of animal protein consumption; main crops -- rice, wheat, barley, soybeans, potatoes, fruits; 80% self-sufficient; food shortages -- meat, wheat, feed grains, edible oil and fats; caloric intake, 2,300 calories per day per capita (1964 est.)

Major industries: chemicals, metallurgical and engineering industries, electrical and electronic industries, textiles

Shortages: fossil fuels, most industrial raw materials

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ECONOMY (cont'd):

Crude steel: 53 million metric tons capacity at end of 1965; 41 million tons produced (1965), 420 kilograms per capita
Electric power: 38,059,000 kw. capacity (FY 1964); 176 billion kw.-hr. produced (1964), 1,820 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: US\$8.45 billion (1965); machinery and transport equipment, textiles, metals and metal products, other manufactures
Imports: US\$8.17 billion (1965); fossil fuels, foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, fibers
Trade: (1965) exports -- 34% North America, 13% Western Europe, 29% Asia, 3% Latin America, 5% Oceania, 10% Africa, 6% Communist countries; imports -- 37% North America, 30% Asia, 9% West Europe, 8% Oceania, 5% Latin America, 4% Africa, 7% Communist countries
Economic aid: U.S. -- US\$2,858.5 million authorized through FY 1965, US\$64.8 million authorized (FY 1965); IBRD -- US\$732 million loaned through June 1965; Japanese aid (including reparations) abroad: US\$1.8 billion (1950-65); net official economic aid -- US\$165.2 million (1962), US\$171.5 million (1963), US\$178.4 million (1964)
Military aid: U.S. -- US\$1,075.6 million authorized through FY 1965, US\$29.6 million authorized in FY 1965
Exchange rate: 360 yen=US\$1 (official)
Fiscal year: 1 April - 31 March

COMMUNICATIONS: (Confidential)

Railroads: 17,820 mi.; 320 mi. standard gage, 17,500 mi. predominantly narrow gage (3'6"), 3,340 mi. double tracked, 6,320 mi. electrified; 74% government owned
Highways: national -- 47,220 mi.; 60% gravel, 40% paved; local roads (including principal, general, prefectural, municipal) 1,570,000 mi.; 97% gravel, 3% paved
Inland waterways: approximately 1,100 mi.; sea-going craft ply all coastal "inland seas"
Ports: 5 principal (Dokai, Kobe, Nagoya, Osaka, Yokohama; 2 naval bases, Sasebo and Yokosuka), 28 secondary, over 2,000 minor
Merchant marine: 1,462 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 11,720,982 GRT; 17,777,800 DWT; includes 23 passenger, 952 cargo, 225 tanker, 148 bulk, 114 specialized carriers
Civil air: 120 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 449 total, 170 usable; 92 with permanent-surface runways; 13 with runways 8,000-11,000 ft.; 30 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 13 seaplane stations
Telecommunications: excellent domestic and international systems; over 10 million telephones; 448 AM and 25 FM broadcast stations; 720 TV broadcast and rebroadcast stations

DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret)

Personnel: Ground Self Defense Force 148,400; Maritime Self Defense Force (including 9,100 air arm) 31,600; Air Self Defense Force, 38,000 (1,270 pilots)
Major ground units: 12 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division, 1 airborne brigade, 12 artillery battalions (including 2 mortar battalions), 8 antiaircraft artillery battalions (including 1 Hawk battalion), 3 tank battalions, plus 18 army aviation detachments and 1 army aviation unit
Ships: 30 destroyer-type ships, 7 submarines, 42 patrol, 50 mine warfare, 4 amphibious, 4 auxiliaries, 73 amphibious warfare, 191 service craft
Aircraft: 1,623 (893 jet), including 278 (non-jet) in army aviation, 240 (non-jet) in naval air, and 1,105 (893 jet) in air force
Missiles: Nike-Ajax and Hawk

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THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA:
AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATION

[The Geneva Conference on Indochina, attended by delegates from Great Britain and the USSR (Joint Chairmen), France; the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and the Viet Minh regime, lasted from May 8 until July 21, 1954. The terminating documents were the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam (not signed by the United States or Vietnam) and the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference (adopted by a voice vote). In addition, the United States made a unilateral declaration of its position. This agreement ended the period of French colonial rule and set the stage for today's conflict. Both sides - Hanoi and Washington - have said they are prepared to return to at least the "essentials" of this agreement.]

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN VIETNAM (July 20, 1954)

CHAPTER I. PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND
DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Vietnam [PAV, or Vietminh, forces] to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south. . . .

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

2. The period within which the movement of all forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

3. When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one

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party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

4. The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Vietnam.

5. To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies, and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

6. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

8. Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

9. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement - into, out of, or within the demilitarized zone - of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons,

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supplies, or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

CHAPTER II. PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

10. The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indochina and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Vietnam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces.

11. In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Vietnam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties. . . .

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Vietnam at 8:00 A.M. (local time) on 27 July 1954.

Central Vietnam at 8:00A.M. (local time) on 1 August 1954.

Southern Vietnam at 8:00 A.M. (local time) on 11 August 1954.

It is agreed that Peking mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Vietnam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indochinese theater of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Vietnam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

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12. All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the ceasefire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometers on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

13. From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Loatian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

14. Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

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(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notice shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall be completed within the respective time limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

15. The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;

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(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

(1) The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps not reprinted here annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 meters from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:

meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island

northern coast of the Ile Rouse (excluding the island),
extended as far as the meridian of Champha-Mines.

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(2) The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement):

FORCES OF THE FRENCH UNION

| | Days |
|-----------------------------|------|
| Hanoi perimeter | 80 |
| Haiduong perimeter. | 100 |
| Haiphong perimeter. | 300 |

FORCES OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

| | |
|---|-----|
| Ham Tan and Xuyenmec provisional assembly area. | 80 |
| Central Vietnam provisional assembly area-first installment | 80 |
| Plain des Jons provisional assembly area | 100 |
| Point Camau provisional assembly area | 200 |
| Central Vietnam provisional assembly area-last installment. | 300 |

CHAPTER III. BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

16. With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Vietnam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Vietnam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Vietnam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

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However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Vietnam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon, or by personnel who are arriving in Vietnam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion - or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Vietnam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Vietnam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below:

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Vietnam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Vietnam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

17.(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons, and armored vehicles, is prohibited.

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(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms, and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms, and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2. Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms, and munitions for replacement purposes, provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Vietnam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms, and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Vietnam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms, and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited.

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms, and munitions of all types. In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Vietnam of arms, munitions, and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article.

18. With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Vietnam territory.

19. With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

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20. The points of entry into Vietnam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

- Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laoky, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen.
- Zones to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

CHAPTER IV. PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

21. The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Vietnam, French, and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Vietnam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Vietnam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theater.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence, or the zone of their choice.

CHAPTER V. MISCELLANEOUS

22. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

23. In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves

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service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Vietnam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

24. The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Vietnam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

25. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

26. The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

27. The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring and observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI. JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

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29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up in Vietnam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the regrouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Vietnam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A regroupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation line between the regrouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile Inspection Teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laoky, Langson,

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Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the Mobile Teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Vietnam, the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones, and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding inquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the Inspection Teams, etc.) . . . They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation, and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the Mobile Teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present Agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection, and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan..

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Vietnam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions, and war materiel.

37. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up

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such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in Article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

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If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indochina in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in Article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Vietnamese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of
the People's Army of Vietnam
Ta-Quang Buu,
Vice-Minister of National Defense
of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam

For the Commander-in-Chief of
the French Union Forces in
Indo-China
Brigadier-General Delteil.

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FINAL DECLARATION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
(July 21, 1954)

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel, or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of

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the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July, 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955, onward.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the North and South zones of Vietnam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

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10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the reestablishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are respected.

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THE UNITED STATES POSITION

UNILATERAL DECLARATION PRESENTED AT THE CLOSE OF THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE BY MR. BEDELL SMITH (JULY 21, 1954)

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

Takes Note of the Agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954, between (a) The Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam; (c) The Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam, and of paragraphs 1 to 12 of the Declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954.

The Government of the United States of America

Declares with regard to the aforesaid Agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (Section 4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the Declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a Declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to ensure that they are conducted fairly."

With respect to the statement made by the Representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made

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is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreement will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future...

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GENEVA CONFERENCE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA - 1961-1962

A 14-nation conference with delegations from:

| | | |
|---------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Cambodia | Burma | Great Britain |
| North Vietnam | United States | France |
| South Vietnam | USSR | Canada |
| Thailand | Communist China | India |
| Poland | | |

Laos - 3 delegations - Pathet Lao, Neutralist, Pro-Government Political Parties

Geneva Conference on Southeast Asia:

4 Dec 1961 - Western Powers and Soviet Bloc concluded far-reaching agreement today on how to maintain peace and neutrality of Laos. The Draft Agreement names Britain and USSR as joint, permanent guardians of Laotian neutrality; two co-chairmen are to consult each other and decide what action to take whenever peace or neutrality of Laos is threatened. Agreement also stipulates that formal recommendations of ICC which is to supervise the observance of the cease-fire and Laotian neutrality (Canada, India, Poland) can only be made by unanimous vote, but reports and other decisions can be approved by majority vote. Another agreement will allow France to maintain a military detachment and military advisors, but will not be formally approved by conference until it is approved by coalition Laotian government which the three Princes still have to work out.

Two points of dispute are unresolved by the conference: (1) Western demand that all regular armed forces in Laos, including those now under Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong, must be integrated in Royal Lao Army and all irregular units disbanded; (2) Communist demand that neutral Laos must be specifically excluded from SEATO protection.

11 Dec 1961 - Two new issues settled: (1) Recognize Lao Government right to ask France to supply "a precisely limited number" of instructors for a limited period of time if they are needed for training its Army; also noted French and Lao Governments will conclude arrangement as soon as possible to transfer French military installations in Laos to the Laotian Government; (2) Time limit of 75 days set for withdrawal from Laos of all foreign "regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel" except the authorized French instructors; with provision that withdrawals will be made at designated points in presence of inspection teams of ICC.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN QUESTION

Second Report of the Drafting Committee on the
Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos

In accordance with the instructions given to the Drafting Committee by the Restricted Meeting, the Committee submits to the Restricted Meeting, in the Annex attached to the present Report, an agreed text of the Draft Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos incorporating the texts of the provisions and articles approved by the Restricted Meeting, together with certain drafting amendments inserted by the Drafting Committee.

The Committee draws the attention of the Restricted Meeting to the reservation by certain Delegations in paragraph 5 of the first Report of the Committee.

Annex

Draft Protocol to the Declaration on
the Neutrality of Laos

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of 1961; have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) the term "foreign military personnel" shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials;

(b) the term "the Commission" shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and composed of the

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representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman;

(c) the term "the Co-Chairmen" shall mean the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively.

(d) the term "the members of the Conference" shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961.

Article 2

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than thirty days after the Commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of this Protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These points shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the Commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within 15 days after the points have been determined.

Article 3

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission. The Commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

Article 4

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

Article 5

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the

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French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the Conference, through the Co-Chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

Article 6

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos, is prohibited.

Article 7

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within 30 days after the entry into force of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

Article 8

The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. In addition the Commission shall immediately report to the Co-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this Protocol, all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important information which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Commission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance.

The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference.

The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

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The Co-Chairmen will keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

Article 9

The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commission shall exercise these functions in full cooperation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

Article 10

The Commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol.

Article 11

The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full cooperation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article in accordance with Article 8.

Article 12

The Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may have taken

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place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full cooperation with it.

Article 13

The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Protocol in close cooperation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the Commission all possible assistance in the performance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

Article 14

The Commission functions as a single organ of the international Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question 1961. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in cooperation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission.

Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all recommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

Article 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall conduct investigations (directly or by sending inspection teams), when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions in initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote.

The Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed.

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The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 16

For the exercise of its functions the Commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented. Each member-State of the Commission shall ensure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to perform their duties.

It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

Article 17

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

Article 18

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(a) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in subparagraph (c) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

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(c) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

The Governments of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 percent each.

Article 19

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairmen shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.

Article 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature.

It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States of the world.

Second Report of the Drafting Committee
on the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos

In accordance with the instructions given to the Drafting Committee by the Restricted Meeting, the Committee submits to the Restricted Meeting, in the Annex attached to the present Report, an agreed text of the Draft Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos incorporating texts of the provisions approved by the Restricted Meeting together with certain drafting amendments inserted by the Drafting Committee.

The square brackets in the second preambular paragraph of the text of the Declaration provide for the insertion in the final text of:

(a) the statement on the neutrality of Laos made by the Royal Government of Laos;

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(b) an expression of the attitude of the thirteen other participants in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question to the statement on the neutrality of Laos made by the Royal Government of Laos.

Annex

Draft Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961:

(Taking note of the statement on the neutrality of Laos made by the Royal Government of Laos on ... which provides as follows:

.....
.....
.....)

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva Agreements of 1954;

Emphasizing the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question;

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in Southeast Asia:

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement on the neutrality of Laos made by the Royal Government of Laos on ... that they recognize and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

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2. Undertake, in particular, that

(a) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

(b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;

(c) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;

(d) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;

(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(f) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;

(g) they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;

(h) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(i) they will not use the territory of any country including their own for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other States to recognize, respect and observe in every way in the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present Declaration.

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4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

5. The present Declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement on the neutrality of Laos made by the Royal Government of Laos on ... shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all the other States of the world.

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THE SEATO TREATY

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose people desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist

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armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

Article IV*

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

Article V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

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Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

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3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition to the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

Done at Manila this eighth day of September, 1954.

*(Article IV is the basis for the claim of an American Treaty commitment. It was originally assumed that section 2 of that article was applicable to the war in Vietnam. That section deals with threat "other than by armed attack," and was designed specifically to deal with subversion and internal revolution. It merely commits the parties to consult on measures. Under the new interpretation the action of Hanoi is considered an "armed attack," thus bringing Section I of Article IV into operation. However, even if this premise is accepted, as many have previously explained at length, this article does not commit the United States to use combat forces in support of South Vietnam. The text of the SEATO Treaty was signed in September, 1954, and ratified in February, 1955. The signatories were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States.)

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THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM OF THE NLF

(The official Program of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam as broadcast by Hanoi on February 11, 1961, is the substance of Point 3 of the famous Four Points, although its precise contents have varied from time to time.)

1. To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United States, and to form a national democratic coalition administration.

The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists. The South Vietnamese administration is a lackey which has been carrying out the US imperialists' political lines. This regime and administration must be overthrown, and a broad national democratic coalition administration formed to include representatives of all strata of the people, nationalities, political parties, religious communities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back the people's economic, political, social and cultural interests; to realize independence and democracy; to improve the people's living conditions; and to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

2. To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy.

a. To abolish the current constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration, lackey of the United States, and to elect a new National Assembly through universal suffrage.

b. To promulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, of association, of movement . . . (ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom of belief with no discrimination toward any religion on the part of the state; and to grant freedom of action to the patriotic political parties and mass organizations, irrespective of political tendencies.

c. To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentration camps under any form whatsoever, abolish the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws; and to grant the right of repatriation to all those who had to flee abroad due to the US Diem regime..

d. To strictly ban all illegal arrests and imprisonments and tortures, and to punish unrepenting cruel murderers of the people.

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3. To build an independent and sovereign economy, and improve the people's living conditions.

a. To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen; to build an independent and sovereign economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the US imperialists and the ruling clique, their stooges.

b. To help the industrialists and trades people rehabilitate and develop industry both large and small, and to encourage industrial development, and to actively protect homemade products by abolishing production taxes, restricting or ending the import of those goods which can be produced in the country, and reducing taxes on import of raw materials and machinery.

c. To rehabilitate agriculture, and to modernize planting, fishing, and animal husbandry; to help peasants reclaim waste land and develop production; and to protect crops and insure the consumption of agricultural products.

d. To encourage and accelerate the economic interflow between the town and the countryside, between plains and mountainous areas; and to develop trade with foreign countries without distinction of political regimes and on the principle of equality and mutual benefits.

e. To apply an equitable and rational system to abolish arbitrary fines.

f. To promulgate labor regulations, that is: to prohibit dismissals, wage cuts, fines and ill treatment of workers; to improve the life of workers and office employees; and to fix wages and guarantees for the health of teen-age apprentices.

g. To organize social relief: jobs for unemployed; protection of orphans, elders, and the disabled; assistance to those who have become disabled or lost their relatives in the struggle against US imperialism and its stooges; and relief to localities suffering crop failures, fire, and natural calamities.

h. To help northern compatriots who had been forced or enticed by the reactionaries to go south after the restoration of peace to return to their native places if they so desire, and to provide jobs to those who decide to remain in the south.

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1. To strictly prohibit forcible house removals, arson, usurpation of land, and the herding of the people into concentration centers; and to insure the country folk and urban working people of the opportunity to earn their living in security.
4. To carry out land rent reduction in preparation for the settlement of the agrarian problem so as to insure land to the tillers.
 - a. To carry out land rent reduction, to guarantee the peasants' right to till their present plots of land and insure the right of ownership for those who have reclaimed waste land; and to protect the legitimate right of ownership by peasants of the plots of land distributed to them during the resistance war.
 - b. To abolish the "prosperity zones" and the policy of herding the people into "resettlement centers" and to grant the right of those forcibly herded into "prosperity zones" or "resettlement centers" (disguised concentration camps) (parentheses as received) to return home freely and earn their living on their own plots of land.
 - c. To confiscate the land usurped by the US imperialists and their agents and distribute it to landless and land-poor peasants; and to redistribute communal land in an equitable and rational way.
 - d. Through negotiations, the state will purchase from landowners at equitable and rational prices all land held by them in excess of a given area, fixed in accordance with the concrete situation in each locality, and distribute it to landless and land-poor peasants. This land will be distributed free and will be free of any conditions.
5. To build a national and democratic education and culture.
 - a. To eliminate the enslaving and gangster-style American culture and education, and to build a rational, progressive culture and education serving the fatherland and the people.
 - b. To wipe out illiteracy; to build sufficient general education schools for the youth and children; to expand universities and professional schools; to use the Vietnamese language in teaching; to reduce school fees or exempt fees for poor pupils and students; and to reform the examination system.
 - c. To develop science and technology and the national literature and art; and to encourage and help intellectuals,

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cultural, and art workers to develop their abilities in service of national construction.

d. To develop medical service in order to look after the people's health; and to expand the gymnastic and sports movement.

6. To build an army to defend the motherland and the people.

a. To build a national army defending the fatherland and the people; and to cancel the system of US military advisers.

b. To abolish the pressganging regime; to improve the material life of the army men and insure their political rights; to prohibit the ill-treatment of soldiers; and to apply a policy of assistance to families of poor army men.

c. To remunerate and give worthy jobs to those officers and soldiers who have rendered meritorious services in the struggle against the domination of the US imperialists and their henchmen; and to observe leniency toward those who had before collaborated with the US-Diem clique and committed crimes against the people, but have now repented and serve the people.

d. To abolish all the military bases of foreign countries in South Vietnam.

7. To guarantee the right of equality between nationalities and between men and women; to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and overseas Vietnamese.

a. To insure the right of autonomy of the national minorities; to set up, within the framework of the great family of the Vietnamese people, autonomous regions, areas inhabited by minority peoples; to insure equal rights among different nationalities, allowing all nationalities to have the right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or change their customs and habits; to abolish the US-Diem clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities; and to help the minority peoples to catch up with the common level of the people by developing the economy and culture in the areas inhabited by them, by training skilled personnel from people of minority origin.

b. To insure the right of equality between men and women, so women can enjoy the same rights as men in all fields: political, economic, cultural and social.

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c. To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners residing in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietnamese nationals abroad.

8. To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.

a. To cancel all unequal treaties signed with foreign countries by the US henchmen which violate national sovereignty.

b. To establish diplomatic relations with all countries irrespective of political regime, in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the Bandung conference.

c. To unite closely with the peace-loving and neutral countries; and to expand friendly relations with Asian and African countries, first of all, with neighboring Cambodia and Laos.

d. To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance or forming a military alliance with any country.

e. To receive economic aid from any country ready to assist Vietnam without conditions attached.

9. To establish normal relations between North and South Vietnam as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.

The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify the country by peaceful means. The NLFSVN undertakes the gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones of all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending the national reunification, the governments of the two zones will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the peoples or favor war, nor to use military forces against each other; to carry out economic and cultural exchanges between the two zones; and to insure for people of both zones freedom of movement, of livelihood, and the right of mutual visits and correspondence.

10. To oppose aggressive war and actively defend world peace.

a. To oppose aggressive wars and all forms of enslavement by the imperialists; and to support the national liberation struggles of peoples in various countries.

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b. To oppose war propaganda; and to demand general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

c. To support the movements for peace, democracy, and social progress in the world; and to actively contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

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THE HONOLULU DECLARATION

(The following is the text of a joint statement issued by the governments of the United States and South Vietnam on February 8, 1966, at the conclusion of the Honolulu Conference between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.)

PART I

The Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America jointly declare: their determination in defense against aggression, their dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam and their commitments to the search for just and stable peace.

In pursuit of these objectives the leaders of their Governments have agreed upon this declaration, which sets forth:

The purposes of the Government of Vietnam,

The purposes of the Government of the United States,

And the common commitment of both Governments.

PART II. THE PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Here in the mid-Pacific, halfway between Asia and North America, we take the opportunity to state again the aims of our Government. We are a Government - indeed a generation - of revolutionary transformation. Our people are caught up in a mortal struggle. This struggle has four sides.

(1)

We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil. We are the victims of an aggression directed and supported from Hanoi. That aggression - that so-called "war of national liberation" - is part of the Communist plan for the conquest of all of Southeast Asia. The defeat of that aggression is vital for the future of our people of South Vietnam.

(2)

We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people. We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future; that he has respect and dignity; that he has the opportunity for himself and for his children to live in an environment where all is not disappointment,

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despair and dejection; that the opportunities exist for the full expression of his talents and his hopes.

(3)

We must establish and maintain a stable, viable economy and build a better material life for our people. In spite of the war, which creates many unusual and unpredictable economic situations, we are determined to continue with a policy of austerity; to make the best possible use of the assistance granted us from abroad; and to help our people achieve regular economic growth and improved material welfare.

(4)

We must build true democracy for our land and for our people. In this effort we shall continue to imbue the people with a sense of national unity, a stronger commitment to civic responsibility. We shall encourage a widened and more active participation in the contribution to the building of a free, independent, strong and peaceful Vietnam. In particular, we pledge again:

*To formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including an electoral law.

*To take that constitution to our people for discussion and modification.

*To seek its ratification by secret ballot.

*To create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government.

These things shall be accomplished mainly with the blood, intelligence and dedication of the Vietnamese people themselves. But in this interdependent world we shall need the help of others:

To win the war of independence; to build while we fight; to reconstruct and develop our nation when terror ceases.

To those future citizens of a free, democratic South Vietnam now fighting with the Vietcong, we take this occasion to say come and join in this national revolutionary adventure:

*Come safely to join us through the open-arms program.

*Stop killing your brothers, sisters, their elders and their children.

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*Come and work through constitutional democracy to build together that life of dignity, freedom and peace those in the North would deny the people of Vietnam.

Thus, we are fighting this war. It is a military war, a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution.

PART III. THE PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

(1)

The United States of America is joined with the people and Government of Vietnam to prevent aggression. This is the purpose of the determined effort of the American armed forces now engaged in Vietnam. The United States seeks no bases. It seeks no colonial presence. It seeks to impose no alliance or alignment. It seeks only to prevent aggression, and its pledge to that purpose is firm. It aims simply to help a people and government who are determined to help themselves.

(2)

The United States is pledged to the principles of the self-determination of peoples, and of government by the consent of the governed. It therefore gives its full support to the purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South Vietnam and to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction. The United States will give its full support to measures of social revolution, including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam.

(3)

Just as the United States is pledged to play its part in the worldwide attack upon hunger, ignorance and disease, so in Vietnam it will give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight.

We have helped and we will help them - to stabilize the economy, to increase the production of food, to spread the light of education, to stamp out disease.

(4)

The purpose of the United States remains a purpose of peace. The United States Government and the Government of Vietnam will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum. The world knows the harsh and negative response these efforts

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have thus far received. The world should know, too, that the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam remain determined that no path to peace shall be unexplored. Within the framework of their international commitments, the United States and Vietnam aim to create with others a stable peace in Southeast Asia which will permit the governments and peoples of the region to devote themselves to lifting the condition of man. With the understanding and support of the Government of Vietnam, the peace offensive of the United States Government and the Government of South Vietnam will continue until peace is secured.

PART IV. THE COMMON COMMITMENT

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again:

To defense against aggression,
To the work of social revolution,
To the goal of free self-government,
To the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease,
And to the unending quest for peace.

—Honolulu, February 8, 1966

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CRISIS
CHRONOLOGY

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CRISIS CHRONOLOGY

- 111 B.C. Vietnam conquered by the Han begins a thousand years of Chinese Domination.
- 939 A.D. Chinese driven out.
- 1406 Vietnam occupied by the Ming.
- 1427 Chinese driven out. Formal suzerainty maintained with China.
- 1500 Beginning of the period of Vietnamese conquest of the south with the overrunning of the Kingdom of Champa and parts of Cambodia.
- 1615 First Catholic mission established.
- 1630 Beginning of period with Vietnam divided along lines very similar to today with the Trinh lords in the north and the Nguyen in the south. The Dutch back the north and the Portugese back the south with artillery and advisors.
- 1772 Tay-son rebellion leads to defeat of both Trinh and Nguyen but begins a period of bloody civil war. This ends when Nguyen Anh backed by superior French artillery opens on era of European military and political intervention in Vietnamese affairs.
- 1800 Begins period of reunification, xenophobia and persecution of Christians.
- 1840 Extensive massacres of Catholic priests and followers.
- 1858 French capture Taurane.
- 1873 French capture Hanoi.
- 1884 French protectorate established.
- 1913 End of last Vietnamese resistance to the French.
- 1940 France surrenders to Nazi Germany. A request for the release of aircraft and other equipment already purchased by the French to the commander of French forces in Indochina is denied.

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- 1941 Beginning of Allied assistance to Vietnamese nationalists and Vietminh in resistance to the Japanese.
- 1944 Vo Nguyen Giap's guerrillas cross from China into Vietnam.
- 1945 Japanese overrun Vichy French forces in Vietnam with brutal effectiveness. Requests for American assistance are not met. Chennault wrote "The American government was interested in seeing the French forcibly ejected from Indochina so the problem of post-war separation from their colony would be easier... while American transports avoided Indochina the British flew aerial supply missions for the French all the way from Calcutta..." Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai repudiates protectorate agreement with the French.
- 1945 Vietminh seize power in Vietnam after the Japanese withdrawal. Arriving with victorious Chinese armies and American advisors, they quickly collect large quantities of arms and ammunition. A "People's Democracy" is established while the country is still occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, British, and French forces as well as American observers.
- 1946 French and Vietnamese negotiate fruitlessly. Fighting begins spurred by massacre of several thousand civilians by guns of French cruiser. Indochina war begins. "Oil Slick" method of pacification followed.
- 1947 "Operation Lea" launched to destroy Vietminh and capture Ho Chi Minh. Major military offensive is ineffective and exposes the countryside to extensive infiltration by guerrillas.
- 1949 Red China becomes important sanctuary for support of the Vietminh forces.
- 1950 Major Vietminh offensive with well armed and trained forces leads to greatest colonial defeat for the French since Montcalm died at Quebec.
- 1951 Series of tactical errors by Giap results in decisive victory for de Lattre and encourages US support of the French. Vietminh strategy shifts to capture of the highlands.
- 1952 Salan mounts the largest offensive of the war on Giap's bases but fails.

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- 1953 Giap invades Laos. Dulles promises major US aid and talks about breaking Communist aggression "by the end of the 1955 fighting season." French commander secretly informs his government that the best that could be hoped for under the circumstances was "a draw". End of Korean fighting releases CPR resources for commitment in Vietnam.
- 1954 French commander informs his government that defeat is likely unless massive US aid is provided. Consideration given to committing US forces in air strikes but Congressional views are divided. Dien Bien Phu falls. Geneva agreement signed. Country divided along the 17th parallel.
- 1955 US agrees to provide aid to South Vietnam. SEATO organized. Economic crisis in North Vietnam leads them to request aid from CPR and USSR. Ngo Dinh Diem comes to power in RVN.
- 1956 French withdraw from Vietnam. North Vietnamese intellectuals purged in "Hundred Flowers Campaign." Peasants ruthlessly suppressed by DRV troops in Truong Chinh's home province.
- 1957 French trade with Vietnam increases sharply after military withdrawal in 1956. Satisfactory economic progress being made in South Vietnam. US Advisory group building powerful conventional force to oppose DRV military forces.
- 1958 "Spontaneous" liberation movement initiated in South Vietnam against Diem regime actually sparked and supported from Hanoi which now sees little chance for reunification under the Geneva agreement and needs resources of the south.
- 1959 Viet Cong movement gains strength controlling several portions of the country and commanding important peasant support.
- 1960 USSR and DRV reach economic and technical assistance agreement.
- 1961 CPR-DRV economic assistance agreement reached. Massive famine in DRV sees peasants storming the granaries and a compromise in rigid government policies allowing farmers to retain a larger share of their produce. High level US survey teams recommend shift in RVN military orientation toward coping with guerrilla warfare rather than major conventional forces.

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- 1962 Hanoi radio announces the founding in South Vietnam of People's Revolutionary Party. US Military Assistance Command Vietnam created. Articles critical of Diem regime appear in US press. Viet Cong activities continue to expand in South Vietnam.
- 1963 Viet Cong show increasing willingness to stand and fight sometimes in battalion strength. Buddhist demonstrations against religious persecution lead to RVN forces firing into crowd in Hue and storming pagodas in Saigon. Coup by military junta headed by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh overthrows Diem government in November.
- Jan 1964 A military Coup organized by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh ousts the government of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh.
- Jan-Jul 64 US advisory and logistical support to South Vietnam continues to increase at a rapid rate.
- Aug 1964 Destroyers Maddox and Joy are attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Retaliatory strikes are mounted by US aircraft against four PT boat bases in NVN plus the POL storage facilities at Vinh. President Johnson's message to Congress; joint resolution passed by the Congress and signed by the President "To promote maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia."
- Fall 1964 Numerous coups and countercoups upset any semblance of political stability in South Vietnam.
- Jan 1965 South Korea sends 2,000 military advisors to South Vietnam.
- Feb 1965 US aircraft strike targets in North Vietnam in response to a VC attack of a US outpost. President Johnson indicates that further developments depend on Communist response.
- Mar 1965 US Marine battalion arrives in South Vietnam for security duty at Danang. US discloses that it is providing the Army of South Vietnam certain types of non-lethal gases.
- Apr 1965 President Johnson stresses US willingness to participate in "unconditional negotiations" and suggests \$1 billion aid program for Southeast Asia.
- May 1965 US stops bombing missions on North Vietnam for a period of six days.

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Jun 1965 US military strength in South Vietnam passes the 50,000 mark. A new government under Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky announces a series of measures including a formal declaration of war and severance of diplomatic relations with France although maintaining consular ties.

Jul 1965 US troops participate in their first major attack of the war.

Aug 1965 US formally affirms its adherence to the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war.

Fall 1965 The US military build-up continues apace with the scope of US military operations constantly expanding. Serious disagreement with the US policy in Vietnam ranges from demonstrating "peaceniks" to serious scholarly discussions.

Oct 1965 Pro-Communist coup attempts to take over Indonesia. The coup is crushed by the military.

Dec 1965 As an extension of a Christmas truce, the US discontinues bombings of North Vietnam.

Jan 1966 President Johnson sends "flying squads" of peacemakers on missions overseas seeking every possible means of negotiation as the moratorium on US bombing NVN continues. Operation Matador serves to confirm the existence of a Viet Cong sanctuary in Cambodia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee opens public hearings on the subject of the war in Vietnam.

Feb 1966 Premier Ky and President Johnson meet in Honolulu. After a hiatus of 37 days during which no progress is made toward meaningful negotiations, US bombing raids on NVN are resumed.

Mar 1966 Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi is relieved from command of I Corps and removed from the Directory. President Johnson signs into law a bill authorizing US participation in an Asian Development Bank and pledges 12 million dollars for the construction of a hydroelectric plant on the Mekong in Laos. President Sukarno agrees to hand over effective government power to the anti-Communist military leadership headed by Gen. Suharto.

Apr 1966 Buddhist rioters in Saigon and Danaŋ inspired by Thich Tri Quang call for the ouster of Ky.

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May
1966 Prince Sihanouk openly admits that the Viet Cong are using Cambodia for "rest and relaxation" between battles. Forces loyal to Ky assault and overwhelm rebel forces in Danang.

Jun
1966 Buddhist rioters burn the US Consulate in Hue.

Jul
1966 US fighter-bombers attack major oil storage facilities in Hanoi and Haiphong. Ho threatens to try US pilots as war criminals. Prime Ministers Wilson and Gandhi's trips to Moscow are met with the Soviet line that Vietnam talks or negotiations hinge on Hanoi.

Aug
1966 US build-up in South Vietnam reaches 285,000. Suharto signs an agreement to stop the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia.

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PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN SEA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

"It is the unswerving policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its 'military alliance' with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace and justice loving Governments and peoples in the world.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is of the view that the above expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and

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it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam." (April 8 Speech by Mr. Pham Van Dong. The Four Points).

VIET CONG

"1. The United States imperialists are the saboteurs of the Geneva Agreements, the most brazen warmonger and aggressor and the sworn enemy of the Viet-Nameese people.

2. The heroic South Viet-Nameese people are resolved to drive out the US imperialists in order to liberate South Viet-Nam, achieve an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral South Viet-Nam, with a view to national reunification.

3. The valiant South Viet-Nameese people and the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army are resolved to accomplish to the full their sacred duty to drive out the US imperialists so as to liberate South Viet-Nam and defend North Vietnam.

4. The South Viet-Nameese people express their profound gratitude to the whole hearted support of the peoples of the world who cherish peace and justice and declare their readiness to receive all assistance including weapons and all other war materials from their friends in the five continents.

5. To unite the whole people, to arm the whole people, continue to march forward heroically and be resolved to fight and to defeat the US aggressors and the Viet-Nameese traitors." (March 22: Five Points Contained in a Statement by the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese Liberation Front).

CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

"Fighting against imperialist aggression, the Vietnamese people have been engaged in wars for more than 20 years. It goes without saying that they desire peace. However, as President Ho Chi Minh has said: 'Real peace can by no means be dissociated from genuine independence.' The four-point stand of the Government of the DRV and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front are the basis for guaranteeing the independence of Vietnam and realizing peace and reunification in Vietnam.

Among others, the two most essential points are: The immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military forces in Vietnam and the recognition of the South Vietnam National Liberation

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Front as the sole legal representative of the people in Southern Vietnam. But the United States has rejected them and continues to expand its war of aggression against Vietnam. In these circumstances, the Vietnamese people have no alternative but to fight resolutely through to the very end. The struggle of the Vietnamese people is just and is bound to triumph in the end. The Chinese people firmly support the heroic people of Vietnam." (Speech by Chairman of the CPR Lin Shao-Chi, Rangoon, April 17, 1966).

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

"The 23d CPSU Congress considers that the Vietnamese question can be resolved only on the basis of the recognition of the just demands of the DRV Government and the NFLSV. The United States must immediately cease its bombings of the DRV and other aggressive actions directed against the DRV. The US armed forces and those of its allies must be withdrawn from the territory of South Vietnam. The NFLSV must be recognized as the only lawful representative of the population of South Vietnam. The US Government must discontinue any kind of interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam and must strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements." (Declaration on Vietnam Adopted at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, April 8, 1966).

WARSAW PACT

"The parties to the Warsaw Pact, signatories of the present statement, confirm most resolutely their stand on the Vietnamese question.

The American Government must immediately stop the aggressive war in Vietnam, must respect the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, national independence, territorial unity and integrity, envisaged by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Proceeding from the fact that the right to decide their affairs belongs to the Vietnamese people exclusively, the parties to this meeting fully support the four-point program of the government of the DRV and the five-point program advanced by the NFLSV, which are a just basis for the political settlement of the Vietnamese issue. They fully conform to the 1954 Geneva agreements, meet the interests of peace in southeast Asia and all over the world.

The United States must embark upon the road of strict observance of the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, must stop the

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aggression against the DRV, putting an immediate and unconditional end to air raids on its territory, stop the armed intervention in South Vietnam, withdraw its forces and the troops of its satellites from South Vietnam, dismantle all American war bases in this country, recognize the NFLSV as the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, recognize the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their destiny without outside interference and to decide themselves the question of national unification of peaceful lines." (Declaration of Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, Bucharest, July 7, 1966).

DECLARATION BY THE SEVENTEEN
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

"Pursuant to the final declaration of the conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries held in Cairo in October 1964.

We, the undersigned Heads of State or Government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in South-East Asia and in certain regions in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in the United Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace.

We solemnly reaffirm the right of people to self-determination and the principle that all States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force.

We reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

We express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the right of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences.

We are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam.

We are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing

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situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. We therefore make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any precondition so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and of the declaration of the conference of non-aligned countries held in Cairo.

We invite the Governments of all countries interested in the maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal.

MOHAMMAD YOUSUF
Prime Minister of the Royal
Government of Afghanistan

MARSHAL ABDUL SALAM MOHAMED
AREF
President of the Republic of
Iraq

AHMED BEN BELLA
President of the Democratic
People's Republic of Algeria

JOMO KENYATTA
President of the Republic of
Kenya

DUDLEY SENANAYAKE
Prime Minister of Ceylon

MAHENDRA BIR BIKRAM SHAH DEVA
King of Nepal

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS
President of the Republic
of Cyprus

GENERAL MOHAMAD AMIN EL-HAFEZ
President of the Syrian Arab
Republic

HAILE SELASSIE
Emperor of Ethiopia

HABIB BOURGUIBA
President of the Republic of
Tunisia

DR. KWAME NKRUMAH
President of the Republic
of Ghana

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER
President of the United Arab
Republic

SEKOU TOURE
President of the Republic
of Guinea

JOSIP BROZ TITO
President of the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
Prime Minister of India

DR. KENNETH KAUNDA
President of the Republic of
Zambia

March 15, 1965

The signature of Dr. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda, was added subsequently.

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FRANCE

"The French Republic considers the war brought in from outside and led from outside in Southeast Asia to be evil , and holds itself ready to participate actively in an international negotiation which would try to put an end to it, as was the case at Geneva in 1954. But, in order that such a negotiation might begin and reach results, it is undoubtedly necessary that we first return to that which was accepted and put into application twelve years ago, that is, to an effective termination of foreign intervention and to the neutrality of the states of the region. It is no less necessary that there be arranged a joint guarantee of the states concerned and, particularly, of the five principal world powers." (Statement of President de Gaulle after July 12, 1966 Formal Dinner in Honor of King of Laos).

INDIA

"There can be no military solution in Vietnam; there is no alternative to a peaceful settlement. The parties must be brought to the negotiating table within the framework of the Geneva agreements. Instead of debating how this can be done, the two cochairmen--Britain and the Soviet Union--should immediately convene a meeting of the Geneva conference. We will appeal for an immediate end to the bombing in North Vietnam. This should be closely followed by a cessation of hostilities as well as of hostile movements and actions on all sides throughout Vietnam in full observance of the Geneva agreements.

It is quite possible that any new round of Geneva conference talks will be prolonged and many weeks of tortured negotiations might pass before a generally acceptable formula is patiently hammered out. Meanwhile, it would be necessary for the International Control Commission to safeguard a standstill arrangement. India as a member and chairman of the commission will be willing to accept whatever additional responsibility this might entail.

It is necessary to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam and also insulate that unhappy country from every foreign interference so that the people of Vietnam determine their own future free of external pressure.

Looking further ahead, it might be desirable for the Geneva conference to guarantee the integrity and independence of a neutral Vietnam and, indeed, of the neighboring states of

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Laos and Cambodia, as envisaged by the Geneva agreements. The Geneva powers could also underwrite a rehabilitation and development plan for all three states to repair the grim ravages of war. Such a settlement would be a victory for all, and the more so for the brave and long-suffering people of Vietnam." (Prime Minister Gandhi's July 7, 1966 Speech on "Person-to-Person").

UNITED KINGDOM

"In view of what has been said, I remind the House that the guide-lines for the proposed Commonwealth Peace Mission included the following statement, which, I repeat, was agreed on by all Commonwealth Prime Ministers:

(a) a suspension of all United States air attacks on North Vietnam;

(b) a North Vietnamese undertaking to prevent the movement of any military forces or assistance or material to South Vietnam;

(c) a total cease-fire on all sides to enable a conference to be convened to seek a peaceful solution;

(d) the objectives of such a conference might be to:

(i) end the war in Vietnam;

(ii) secure the withdrawal of all foreign military presence from Vietnam and the neutralization of the area;

(iii) establish, for a period, an international peace force, under the auspices of the Geneva Agreement, to safeguard peace in Vietnam;

(iv) establish principles for the eventual unification of the country through free and internationally supervised elections.

That was a clear statement." (7 July 1966 Statement of Prime Minister Wilson Before House of Commons).

UNITED STATES OFFICIAL POSITION ON VIETNAM

"The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes can go into peace in South-east Asia:

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1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet Nam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Viet Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said 'The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem.'

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped." (Released by State Dept. on January 7, 1966).

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