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11

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 11

(11a)

I was beginning to tell, at the end of the last tape, the story of the first Soviet Sputnik and Czech nostalgia for the old days of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Not that they would really want to restore it, but there was some nostalgia for it.

After the Soviets had launched their first Sputnik this Czech teacher was instructed to tell her class about the wonders of the Soviet scientific endeavor. Here was this Sputnik now going over their head; in a few years they would be able to travel to the moon, and then some more years they would be able to travel to Mars and Venus. It was going to be a great wonderful Communist world indeed, with travel to outer space. When she finished, the little girl in the back of the room put up her hand and stood up and said, "Teacher, when are we going to be able to travel to Vienna?"

It's now July 21, 1965. Secretary of Defense McNamara, Cabot Lodge, who has again been designated as ambassador to take Taylor's place out here, and several other persons from Washington completed yesterday evening a five day visit here. The issues were whether the United States should commit more troops and more military force to this situation here. We have had long, very thorough and very frank discussions, and the decisions have been made to do so. I wrestled very deeply with my conscience before I agreed to this decision. On the one hand, the weakness here, the inherent weakness of the government and the society is such that it's extremely difficult to foresee a favorable outcome. On the other hand, we are already deeply committed, and the costs of losing, however one might define losing,

are so very great, not just in terms of Southeast Asia or this little sliver of territory of Vietnam, but the costs of losing in terms of our world-wide position are such that, as an American whose interest is and must be to protect the interests of the United States, I cannot come to any other conclusion than that we must commit more force here.

My own feeling is that unless we do so, the Chinese Communist position in Africa will be enormously strengthened, as well as the Chinese Communist position in every communist party around the world. And I fear that unless we're able to defeat this war of national liberation theory that's being carried out here, we'll be paying a much heavier price for a generation to come. Whether this is the right decision or the wrong decision, only history can tell. I shrink at the thought of tens of thousands of American men being engaged here, the thousands of casualties that we undoubtedly will have, but nevertheless I have just not been able to come to any other conclusion. All of us here feel the same way about it.

Although Cabot Lodge, Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara have all made it clear they would be very happy if I would decide to stay here with Lodge, they have not asked me to do so, and I have not offered to do so because I just feel that it would not be possible for me to work effectively with him. I feel it is probably well that somebody like himself is coming back out and giving this another try, but in my heart I don't feel that the ideas that he has can really be successful. But I hope him all the best. I would have been very happy to have stayed on as ambassador myself to replace Taylor. There was considerable talk of this, and I know that many favored it. But the President made the decision that he needed a national political figure to share the, let's say, burden of the campaign here and the situation here, and he's the one that must make the ultimate decisions. I respect his

decision.

I personally feel that I could do something here. Each person has his own style. Each ambassador must decide for himself how he's going to work, and it's hard for anybody else to have any real influence on it. A man must be himself. Max Taylor was himself, and hewas a very fine person to work with. As far as basic policy was concerned, we never found ourselves in any disagreement, and we worked very closely together. However, he just didn't have the warm, or shall I say the sympathetic disposition to influence the Vietnamese, and thus I don't feel did quite the job that could have been done. On the other hand, Cabot Lodge has very little understanding of the military situation, and in spite of his somewhat flamboyant manner I don't feel has very much understanding of the Vietnamese. He's inclined to patronize them, and patronizing, I think is the worst mistake that we can make in our business. I have enough ego and confidence in myself to think that I could have perhaps--I don't say turn the tide here--but worked effectively with these people. I thus leave here with very mixed feelings. It's a tough job. It's physically a tough job. They have made three attempts now to kill me, and they would undoubtedly make others. Nevertheless, one regrets leaving a tough job in the middle. I would have been glad to have given it a try if I were given the authority to do so, but another decision having been made, from a personal standpoint I can't say that I will regret leaving here.

The Secretary and the President and McNamara have asked me to come back to Washington for at least a year to resume my old position, which primarily is liaison between State, the CIA and Defense, and I have agreed to do so. They have assured me that in a year or less I will be appointed as ambassador to Japan. I'd be happy to go back to Japan, but I don't feel

too strongly about it. However, your grandmother very, very much wants to go back to Japan. I think she's going to be somewhat disillusioned. Nevertheless, she's taken a great deal throughout my career; she's been very patient, understanding, philosophical, and it would give me also personal satisfaction, of course, to go back as ambassador to the post at which I first started in the Foreign Service. Thus I expect to return home shortly to resume my previous job as Deputy Under Secretary, and then I hope by next year that I will be able to go abroad again, with your grandmother, as ambassador to Japan.

The morale of the mission here is very low at the thought of Lodge returning. He's a fine man, a very able man, and I tremendously respect the motives that led him to return here; however, he's very much a lone operator who really doesn't know how to use his staff. As he left here just a little over a year ago, he's very well known here, and many people are already seeking to quit. However, as I tell them, it's their duty to stay on and give him loyal support. If his thoughts and his ideas are to be given a real test, they must have loyal support. His thought is primarily that you can set up a political machine or a political organization in the provinces that will strengthen the fabric here. My own feeling is that it's very, very difficult to do anything in the political field in the provinces until there's greater strength in the political field here in Saigon, and that a political organization and political strength in a country such as this must flow from Saigon down. However, I would be happy to see somebody make a try at doing things differently than we have done.

Taylor and I have, I think, established a course and a policy that can bring about success, but I must admit that we have not had a great deal of success during the past year except in two fields. First, I think we've been successful in establishing a smooth running American organization here

in Saigon, in which for the first time all the elements of the organization are moving down the same road together. I think also the actions that have been taken by the United States during the past year have given new heart to the Vietnamese, in spite of the Viet Cong successes. Up to the beginning of the bombing in North Vietnam last February 7, the terms of the political discussion here were increasingly in terms of whether they should continue the war. Since February 7 the terms of the discussion have been primarily in terms of how best they could carry on the war. This I feel has been a very marked and major change in the whole attitude here.

However, I should go back to Prague and the summer of 1955. In the early or middle part of July I received a message from Secretary Dulles saying that he was contemplating proposing the opening of negotiations or conversations, or talks I think is the word that was very carefully used, with Communist China and proposing me as the U.S. representative, and would I accept. I was somewhat startled at this proposal, but of course said that I would be glad to do so if he wanted me to do so. Towards the end of July he told me that the proposal had been made through the British to Peking, and they were awaiting their response and asked me to return most urgently to the United States. Without being able to tell anyone, even your grandmother, as well as members of my staff, what it was all about, I got on the plane to return to the United States, going from Prague as I recall it to Brussels. I took a Sabena plane, as I recall it, from Brussels to New York.

We landed at Manchester just for a refueling stop. I picked up a British newspaper there, and the big headlines were that the United States and Communist China had agreed to resume talks and that I had been selected as the American representative. This was the big headline in the paper.

Needless to say, I was somewhat startled because of all the secrecy, and I didn't know that the news was being released at that time. As I arrived in New York, one of the--I don't remember--officials came on the plane and called out my name and asked me to come out and, as I came out, there was a big crowd of photographers and they thronged all around me. I was hustled into the press room there at the international airport in New York, and all the questions to be expected at a time like that were thrust at me. For the moment I was a national celebrity. Fortunately, I was in the position to be able to say that I was really not able to say anything of substance until I had gone to Washington and had conferred in Washington.

As I recall it, I only had one day or perhaps it was two days in Washington. Secretary Dulles went over the draft instructions that he had written up for me, and I made some suggestions and changes. He approved them and gave me my written instructions. As expressed in the terms of the communiqué that was issued between Peking and Washington at the time, we were to discuss the return to our respective countries of the nationals in each country. This was a euphemism for talking of the American prisoners in China and the famous, at least to me what became the famous phrase, "and other practical questions." However, my oral instructions were much more important in many ways than my written instructions.

My oral instructions that Dulles gave to me privately without anybody else present were that he wanted me to keep the conversations going just as long as I possible could. Orally I also asked for and received from the Secretary and subsequently from the President when I saw him, their authority discreetly to carry out within my own discretion whatever informal and private contacts that I could with the Chinese in order to become acquainted with them, with the purpose of probing their intentions in an atmosphere

that would not be possible within the formal meetings.

I asked to see the President before I left. I remember that Dulles said to me, "Well, the President . . ." I do not want to quote him exactly; however, the effect of his remarks were that he was handling this; the President really didn't have very much to do with it and didn't know too much about it. However, he was agreeable to my seeing the President if I wanted to do so. He took me over to the White House; the two of us went over to the White House to see President Eisenhower. We had a fairly desultory discussion which made it clear that what the Secretary had told me was right, that the President didn't have too much to do with it, and although he probably approved the broad general outlines of what Dulles was doing, he was not taking a very direct, personal interest in it. This certainly was a great contrast with what I'll relate later of my experience with President Kennedy, as well as with President Johnson.

I had the feeling that there were several motives in Dulles' mind, although he never expressed them completely. One was that the summit conference in fall of 1955 was upcoming, and he didn't want to have the issue of Peking attendance raised at that conference. Also Dulles, I had a feeling, within himself was not entirely in sympathy with the completely rigid line toward no contacts with the Chinese Communists and wanted to establish something in the way of communication, something in the way of a safety valve. The tension in the Taiwan Straits at this time was very high, and there appeared to be real danger of a direct clash between ourselves and Communist China. At the same time, he was trying to handle it in a manner that would not give substance, or not give a base for charges against the Administration by what--well, I might call the fanatics on

Chinese policy in the United States.

After this very brief and hurried preparation, I took off for Geneva, arriving there late on the evening of July 31, it having been agreed that our conversations would begin on the morning of August 1. I was, of course, very tired and exhausted and thinking of conversations that I had to begin the next day which could be of very critical importance. About three or four o'clock in the morning the telephone in my room rang. The operator apologized for waking me up, but said that Krishna Menon of India wanted to talk most urgently with me. Krishna Menon came on the phone and said that he had just arrived in Geneva and had to see me most urgently, and could he come right over. I, having had some dealings with him previously up at New York in the United Nations during the Korean affair, said I was sorry, that he would have to wait to see me until the morning. As I recall it, I made an appointment for him for about eight or eight-thirty at the office. He showed up promptly and insisted on keeping me in the conversation. I was unable to get rid of him until I finally told him that I had fifteen minutes, or ten minutes, whatever it was, to get to the Palais to open the conversation with the Chinese, and I just had to leave. Thus, without being able to really get my thoughts in order, I left for the conversations.

Krishna Menon, as usual, was entirely centered in himself, his own theories on the Chinese, impressing me with the great efforts that he had made to get the American flyers out of China and with his so-called wisdom on the whole question. Krishna Menon is one of the few men that I have met, noncommunist or communist, that I thoroughly disliked and distrusted. He's one of the few men that I would say was really evil. I'm prepared

to think well of people as a rule; perhaps I'm too naive about this, but I'm prepared to think well of them. I try to understand their point of view, put myselfin their position, because this is the only way that you can deal with people. But Krishna Menon was one man with whom I found this entirely impossible. I really very advisedly say that I think he was an evil man. He also was the vainest man that I've ever met in my experience.

Before going into some detail with respect to my conversations, I'd like to make a few general observations. As I previously remarked, tension in the Taiwan Straits was very high at the time the conversations began. During the course of the conversations, this was very remarkedly reduced and remained at a low level until we had broken off our conversations at the end of 1957. In the spring of 1958 the tension again rose very high in the Taiwan Straits and was not again reduced until my successor, Jack Cabot, had resumed the conversations. I do not want to ascribe too much to cause and effect, just with respect to these conversations, but I do think that the purpose that Secretary Dulles had in mind of reducing the tension somewhat was accomplished by the conversations.

Also, although people often say that they were useless and ask me how I could go on for so long and wasn't it terribly frustrating--which it was in many ways--I might note that when I began the conversations some seventy-six Americans were in prison or under house arrest in China, and within a relatively short time, as I recall it, it was five or six months, this number had been reduced by four. Again, I don't ascribe this entirely, certainly, to my own powers of persuasion. But the general situation, the fact that the conversations and whatever persuasions I was able to exercise did succeed in freeing at least some seventy-two

Americans--some would have undoubtedly been freed in any event, or I think probably would have been freed--of course this was a source of satisfaction.

I also believe that it was useful in just giving us a little better feel of the Chinese Communist attitudes. It was also useful in answering the critics who said that there were no contacts between the United States and China. As I've often pointed out, at least from the time I began the conversations in 1955 until 1958, we had much more in the way of direct formal diplomatic contact between the United States and Communist China than any country which had established diplomatic relations with them up until that time. Most of the countries which had established diplomatic relations and had representatives in Peking saw very little of them and had very little in the way of substantive conversations. We met regularly and frequently, over seventy, as I recall it seventy-four or five times, up to even six hours at a stretch, so this ran into hundreds of hours of conversation. And thus, as I've always said, anything the Chinese Communists wanted to say to us there was and, at the time I'm saying this, still remains a channel for communication with them.

As far as the details, the so-called diplomatic history of the conversations are concerned, before I left Geneva in 1957 I and my colleagues did a draft of a white paper giving the full details blow by blow of the entire series of conversations. This draft as of last year was still in the Department of State, is still classified. My hope is that it can be released, because I think it sheds much light upon the question of our relations. However, it has not yet been released. Let me put it this way: if this white paper has not been issued at the time this is heard, there's certainly no reason that it could not be declassified and consulted

in the Department of State, because various elements of it have long since become public. But it has not been put together in the same way and in the same accurate sequence as put forward in this white paper.

Through our respective staffs, we'd agreed upon the meeting room and worked out the arrangements with the United Nations officials at the Palais des Nations, and so, as I recall it, we met at ten o'clock on the morning of August 1, 1955. From the outset I tried to establish as easy an atmosphere as I could. I can't remember, I guess that I must have entered the room first, or arrived first, and as he entered the room I made a particular point of shaking hands with him and exchanging some pleasantries and trying to establish an easy atmosphere. Our first dispute was over whether the press were to be admitted to the meetings. He insisted that the press be present or fully briefed on the sessions. I countered with the fact that I was here for serious discussions, not to make propaganda to the press, and thus I suggested that our discussions be private, that no official stenographic record be kept, and that the only thing that would be binding would be any statements or agreements that we entered into in writing. After considerable discussion he agreed to this.

I also took the position that the first order of business were the nationals of each side detained by the other side, and that I would not entertain discussion of "other practical matters" until this had been resolved. He never formally accepted this, but in fact acquiesced to this position because he had no other choice. He attempted to put me on the defensive at the outset of the meeting by noting that just a couple of hours before the meeting had begun they had released a number of American flyers that had come down over China. I cannot at this moment remember the exact

number, but as I recall it, it was some twelve or fourteen aviators that had been off course and came down over China.

(11b)

The question of our nationals occupied the next six weeks, culminating, finally, in what became known as the agreed announcement of September 11, 1955, just some ten years ago, not quite ten years ago. I'm now speaking on Saturday, August 7, 1965. The Americans in China, who were there at the time, some sixty that were left, were all either in prison or under house arrest. My effort, of course, was to obtain their release. As far as Chinese were concerned, there were of course thousands of Chinese that had been in the United States over a period of many years. However, the group in which he was particularly interested were the students that had gone to the United States from the mainland after the end of the Second World War and remained there. There were some five thousand such students. Of those, as I believe I previously mentioned, we had during the Korean War issued restraining orders to prevent the departure of a few who had technical knowledge, such as the rockets, and nuclear energy, and so on, that could be of help to China. I was authorized, and finally informed him that we were prepared to release the restraining order on all these remaining students--as I recall it, there were some forty or fifty-- and in turn that they would let the Americans out of prison in China. We had long and involved arguments about this, and we finally negotiated the agreed announcement.

This was proposed by me in order to avoid signing the same piece of paper with him: he made a statement, and I made a parallel statement. Up to this moment, some ten years later, this is, in fact, the only agreement that has ever been entered into between China and the United States,

between Communist China and the United States. There was much discussion over how we would establish that people who wanted to leave were in fact able to leave; I finally agreed to India representing Chinese in the United States who claimed they were being detained, and he agreed to the United Kingdom representing the United States in China. The agreed announcement itself did not specifically mention prisoners, but it was clearly understood between us that they were the ones that we were talking about.

Upon the issuance of the agreed announcement, they did release some Americans, but then, as time went on, the releases became slower and slower, until finally, there were four left, and four still there. One of them, Bob McCann, who I'd known well when I was in Tientsin before the war, has since died, but a new one, Bishop Walsh, has been arrested, so that it still remains four.

At this point, I might tell an interesting sidelight on dealing with them. Some year or more after the agreed announcement had been made, they were still holding our prisoners and still making wild charges about our keeping the Chinese in the United States from leaving, all of which I was able to disprove. Finally, in desperation one day, my talking about American prisoners and his taking the position that prisoners had to serve their sentences, he raised the question of Chinese imprisoned in the United States. This had never come up before, but he raised it. I didn't know too much about it, so probably was not able to handle it too well in the debate.

He raised it again. And so finally, I worked out with Washington a suggestion that we permit any Chinese, no matter what their crime, who were in prison in the United States, to return to China if they desired

to do so. This involved elaborate arrangements; it involved a census of prisoners, both in federal and state prisons. We didn't keep, of course, such a census then. It required that we had to go through each prison to determine who was under arrest. As I recall it, we finally came up with a total of some eighty or ninety prisoners of Chinese nationality who were in state or federal prisons in the United States. THey were there only for two crimes, as it turned out, one was murder and the other was narcotics violations.

The Department then went to each state governor and got the governor to agree that he would commute the sentence to expulsion from the United States, if the prisoner decided he wanted to return to Communist China. We also got the President's agreement to do the same, as far as federal prisoners were concerned. We worked out an arrangement under which the Indians--Indian government, the Indian Embassy in the United States--would interview each prisoner and determine whether or not he desired to return to Communist China. This took many weeks of very patient work in Washington and we finally had the whole thing worked out so that I was in a position to present it one day. I felt fairly good about this. I thought I really had him on the spot, and I made the whole presentation.

His reaction was immediate and very angry. What he said we had done was, in effect, to go through prisons in the United States; determine what Chinese prisoners did not want to return to China. Then having done this, we would give the Indians a list of these prisoners; they would go through the prisons, discover that none of them wanted to return to China; thus, as we did--as he alleged we did--with the Chinese prisoners in Korea, we would seek to use this to inflict a propaganda defeat upon them. It simply

shows how their minds work.

Well, as it turned out, of course, his worst suspicions were justified, at least in his own mind. They having refused the Indians permission to carry this out on their behalf, or have anything to do with it, we having gone this far, what we did was have the American Red Cross go through and interview each prisoner. As I recall it, from the ninety prisoners, there were four who said that they would like to return to China, would accept commutation of their sentences. The rest would rather stay in prison than return. Then when it came time to put four on the boat and ship them, as I recall it, three of them backed out. So one finally went.

However, this happened some time later. Our talks started out in August, every day and then we met every other day; and then, every third day, up to September 11; then, after September 11, we met every other day for a while. Then we finally settled back to a weekly schedule, and I was able to commute back to Prague, coming down for the meetings in Geneva. This meant I spent my weekends in Prague and most of my week in Geneva. I would have to come down on a plane that would arrive in Geneva Tuesday night. I would spend Wednesday doing my work, answering mail, correspondence in Geneva. We would have our meeting Thursday morning. Thursday afternoon, I would get off my report. Then Friday morning, as I recall it, the plane left about five o'clock in the morning. I would take the plane to Prague. I did this for about two years.

He also began to commute from Warsaw. So very often, we were on the same plane. Sometimes we would get weathered in at Zurich and would be staying at the same hotel. Often in the winter mornings, winter of 1955-56, we would be the only passengers on the plane from Geneva to Zurich at

five o'clock in the morning. So we used to see a great deal of each other. He spoke enough English that we could communicate. I never tried to do any serious business with him in English. We talked about generalities most of the time--Chinese language, and people we had known in China, and this type of thing--but kept a friendly, civilized relationship.

Sometimes his wife was along. He'd previously been married to a German girl; then married this Chinese girl, who I understand had been a movie actress, very nice appearing girl. Sometimes my wife was along. Other times, oh, on a few occasions I would drive from Prague down to Geneva, but it was a long, hard haul, and I didn't try to do it too often.

During this early period, I took the initiative in inviting him to a private dinner, at which we only had our interpreters present. He subsequently invited me also to a dinner. I invited him to be my guest when the Boston Symphony Orchestra was in Geneva. He invited me to see the Peking Opera. These were the social occasions we exchanged. I was, of course, using this to try to learn as much as I could and probe him, and discover whether, in private conversation, I could detect anything different than in the meetings, and in general, use all the arts of the trade to see what I could do in the way of finding out whether there was any way of improving relations between us. However, pleasant though he was individually, it was quite clear that the official hostility was very deep. And I never tried again in any social exchanges with him because there just wasn't anything to be accomplished at them.

When we began the discussion of other practical questions, quote, unquote, I put forward a proposition that there be a mutual renunciation of force with respect to Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. The essence of my

proposition was that we agreed to disagree, but we agreed not to fight about it. I put forward the proposition that we each maintain our positions with respect to the legal status of Taiwan, but that we agree not to go to war about it. This produced an argument that lasted over the remaining three years that I talked with him. This argument, of course, had many variations; but in essence, he maintained a rigid position that Taiwan was Chinese territory and that the only problem with Taiwan was United States occupation. If we would get out, why, the problem would resolve itself.

I, of course, maintained the position that Taiwan was an independent entity, it was under our protection, under treaty, and we could not and would not abandon it. However, it was the subject upon . . . Well, let me put it this way: whereas most of our discussions were usually fairly calm, plain, when it came to this subject of Taiwan and whether it was a part of China or not, he was obviously deeply and emotionally involved and used to get quite emotional in talking about it. In essence, his position was that China could wait, they had lots of time, and that someday the United States would come around to their point of view. This was, in essence, their position on other subjects we discussed, such as the exchange of newsmen. As long as the United States was against it, he was for it, and then when we finally shifted our position, he became against it.

As diplomats, of course, the difficulty we were both in was that China, above all, did not want to enter into any modus vivendi with the United States, and neither country was willing to make any major concession towards a modus vivendi. However, although at times during the conversations, I felt a little more flexible position on our part might be useful, the ultimate result, I came to the conclusion that there was no reasonable concession that the United States could make that would produce any funda-

mental change of attitude on the part of Peking. I started out, of course, in the conversations optimistic, thinking I might be able to do something in finding some chink, some possibility of some understanding, but as the conversations went on, I became more and more disillusioned with the possibility. In fact, there seemed to be nothing thst would produce any change of attitude, except the withdrawal of the United States from the Western Pacific, and this, of course, was unthinkable.

It was a great tragedy. China and the United States, in some ways, seem to be implacable enemies. I think we Americans look upon the Chinese as probably being more an enemy than we do even the Soviets. Perhaps, over the long term, this is true. However, it's a great tragedy for both great peoples, and we need to find some way out of it. Americans feel more and more uneasy at this; more Americans are probing, and thinking, and trying to find some way; and I am in thorough favor of this. However, it's very hard for me to see how anything that we could do, any act that we could take, short of capitulation, could produce any change in Peking. My own philosophy is that if and when there is some shift of attitude in Peking, I think it will become apparent, and I would then be ready to be very responsive to it, but in the meanwhile, I just do not see any moves that we, on our part, could usefully make, unilaterally.

Bearing in mind my instructions from Dulles to keep the conversations going as long as I could, several times I became concerned that we were reaching a breaking point and that they--the Chinese--might break them off. I always had the problem, on the one hand, of not making any concessions to them that would sacrifice any of our interests, and on the other hand, that we keep stringing them out and keeping the conversations going.

So I had to walk down this tightrope. When I left, I believe I mentioned when I started the conversations, Dulles said that if I was still talking at the end of the year, he'd consider it a big success. I never dreamed that I could keep them going, or talking that long. And in fact they kept them going for over three years. I need not really have worried, I finally came to the conclusion, because for reasons which I never fully understood, they seemed to attach even more importance to the fact of the conversations than we did. They also, apparently, considered them important to keep going. However, it took me some time to come to that conclusion, and I had several nervous meetings at which I didn't know whether they were going to be broken off or not.

He in good Communist fashion--well, I shouldn't say "communist." I suppose it's anybody--but particularly in Communist fashion, was always anxious to have the last word. As the conversations were private, this didn't make too much difference, and I didn't pay too much attention to it. But when it would come close to the meeting, of course, he would say he would hope that I would think over carefully what he'd say; and I'd say I'd hope he'd consider what I'd say; and we'd have a little byplay, and then stop, leaving him with the last word.

However, one day--I don't recall quite why--my back got up at this and I decided that I wouldn't let him have the last word. We'd met around ten o'clock, as we usually did. As I recall, it was about twelve-thirty, close to one, when we got to this point. And he put in the last word; and then I topped that and then he tried to put in the last word again and I topped that. And off we went again until, as I recall it, three or three-thirty; it was five or five and a half hours when it became evident that his bladder was not as big or as strong as mine, and he finally cried, "Uncle," and let me have the last word.

After that, I never had any trouble again. We never had to fence at the end of our meetings. He always insisted that I leave the room first to face the newspapermen. We would have agreed upon an innocuous communique simply saying that we had met and were going to meet again on such-and-such a date. I would give this to the newspapermen and parry their questions, and then he would follow me out. When we arrived, he was usually in the meeting room before I was, although this was not invariably the case. We always shook hands and said, "Good morning," and a few pleasantries before we sat down to our meeting.

I was very impressed with their desire to keep the meetings going. When it came time for me to take my leave in December of 1957, there had been some discussion of my transfer. I had stayed on at Prague for four years, which was far longer than the normal time there and always hesitated because of the problem of carrying on those meetings. When it came time for me to say that I was leaving, he became very upset and was not willing to accept the idea that my assistant Ed Martin would be available in the meanwhile until somebody else was appointed. I had strongly urged that I be able to inform him of the selection of somebody else at the time that I was terminated, but the Department was not able to do so. And thus, this was left vague and indefinite. He was obviously very upset at this, very upset at the idea of the meetings being broken off. At that time, I finally realized how strongly they desired to keep the meetings going, although they may seemingly have made very little attempt to make much use out of them as a channel of real communication between two governments.

I said good-by and cut this off in December of 1957; went back up to Prague and on Christmas Eve, got my orders to go to Bangkok. We

invited the diplomatic corps in to a small reception, as I recall, about December 28th or 29th. We had our things packed without saying anything to anybody. At the reception, we went around and said good-by to everybody when the hour was up; shook hands, went out and got in our car and left for Nurenberg. It was one of the easiest and best farewells I've ever had. I hate to see these long, strung-out farewells.

We drove over to Frankfurt, as I recall it, and left my car there to be shipped; flew to Paris, arriving there on New Year's Eve and stayed with John and Dorothy Emmerson and had New Years' Eve in Paris, leaving on New Years' Day for New York. Or was it the day after? I guess maybe it was the day after. On my way to Bangkok, I got down to Washington, and they wanted me to be at Bangkok, so to speak, yesterday. There was the problem of my Senate confirmation. I did the consultation I needed in Washington. I then drove out to Omaha; flew back one morning to Washington for my Senate hearing; flew out again the same afternoon. Then we drove on down to Los Angeles. By prearrangement, when I got to Los Angeles, I got the telegram from the Department that I had been confirmed. I went out that evening in Glendale. We had stopped in Glendale; found a justice of the peace; took my oath as Ambassador. It was a woman justice of the peace. She seemed to be quite impressed at taking the oath of an Ambassador and wouldn't charge me anything for it. I took my oath as an Ambassador, and got on a plane the next morning and left for Bangkok.

I left your grandmother behind to take a more leisurely trip out by ship. I arrived in Bangkok that, let's see, early part of January of 1958, and began, what I've often said, probably the three happiest years, certainly the most pleasant years of my career. I've often said that

I've never had a better post and never expect to have as good a one again. Contrary to the barrenness of my work, as far as the years I spent in Prague were concerned, I felt that in Bangkok I was able to make a real impact upon affairs. I was able to see the results of my work, and I had the satisfaction of feeling that I was making a real contribution. I also had the satisfaction of working with people for whom I grew to have a great deal of affection and fondness. They have their weaknesses, the same as any other people, but I've never worked among a people with whom I felt more at ease or more at home. And those years there, I thoroughly enjoyed.

I came on the heels of an ambassador who had not been very happy there, who had not been very well accepted; also on the heels of a coup in which there had been a radical shift in government. The new man that came in, Marshall Sarit, had been reputed to not be very friendly towards Americans, and those around him were reputed not to be very friendly. Thus, I had the job of trying to turn this around. At the time I went there, Marshall Sarit himself, actually, was ill in Walter Reed Hospital and Thanom Kittikachorn had just taken over as Prime Minister from Pote Sarasin. However, Thanom was just nominally Prime Minister, with the real power residing in the hands of Sarit. There also was still in existence the trappings of parliamentary government, with an assembly and all the problems that went with that. The assemblymen were blackmailing Thanom and the government was having a hard time making a go of it.

After I had been there some months, Sarit came back, threw out the assembly, removed Thanom, although they remain close friends and Thanom is again Prime Minister. Sarit took over the direct reins of government himself.

As I have said, he was an old reprobate in many ways. He led a very dissolute and disordered personal life. But in my personal dealings, my official dealings with him, I grew to have a great deal of affection for him. Never during the years that I was there--and we dealt with many difficult subjects--did he ever tell me one thing to get me out of the office and then have his people do something else. Once he had given me his word, he always carried it out. Most of our understandings, I'd say almost all of them, were oral. He didn't like to have things in writing. I didn't require things in writing. And thus we were able to establish what I think was an effective working relationship that was in the interests of both our countries.

Thailand has now had some seven years of relative political stability--I shouldn't say relative--real political stability, without a parliamentary government. However, it is not a government that is selected by the people.* This is not the time, now, to start a dissertation on the philosophy of government. I would like to go into that a little bit on my next reel I do have some observations on that as far as these underdeveloped countries are concerned.

Tape says: However, it is a government that is accepted by the people.

12

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 12

(12a)

At the end of the other side of this reel I was saying that I wanted to make some observations on the question of government in these underdeveloped countries. I feel that it's one of the great tragedies that, for historical reasons having to do with their mother countries, or I should say their countries which held them as colonies, most of these countries have grown up with the concept of the parliamentary system of government, that is, the parliamentary system as it is used in the United Kingdom and in Europe. This is one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, of all systems of government to operate. It has really never operated well outside of England, the United Kingdom, and the English speaking dominions. It demands, first, a very sophisticated electorate. And also, it demands two or certainly not more than three, but basically a two-party system.

Each of these new countries which were under European or British colonial domination have adopted the parliamentary system. It never did operate even in the more sophisticated European countries such as France, Germany, and Italy. In the wisdom of our forefathers, we had the very good fortune that they devised a system which I call a strong executive system; that is, an executive that is not entirely dependent upon a congress or upon a parliament and is able to exercise a certain amount of discretion and, if it so chooses, to govern strongly.

On the contrary, each of these countries, when they have adopted a representative system, adopted the parliamentary system, and it's worked

very badly. This was true in Thailand when I first went there. They had a parliament, but the parliament simply used its position--the individual members of parliament--to blackmail the government.

My own theory is that each of these countries, in their own way, are seeking to develop a strong executive system of government. The strong executive is fine, but of course, there must be some system for orderly change when the executive has outlived its usefulness. We devised such a system. I'm not saying, and I do not say to these people--I've discussed it often with many of the government leaders in this part of the world--I do not say that our system is ideally suited to them. Unquestionably, it is not. Many of the Latin-American countries adopted a system similar to that of the United States, but it obviously has not worked well in many of them. But each in their own way, in my theory, are grasping, groping for, rather, a strong executive system that will give them the firm direction that these countries need and yet be reasonably responsive to the wishes of the people. A parliament is not necessary to do this. Popular elections are not necessary to do this. The most basic need of the government is, as our Declaration of Independence phrased it, the consent of the governed. This consent can be expressed in many ways.

Government with parliaments may well not have it, often do not have it. Governments without parliaments may well have it. And thus, these countries have still not solved the problem of governing themselves. And it's probably still going to take a generation or more until they evolve something that is suited to their needs and not merely a copy of a European or an American system.

When I was a boy in Kansas I had heard the word Siam and insofar as I knew anything about it--and I knew very little about it--Siam was a

fabulously far off, fabulously colorful land, in more modern--at least in my time--terminology, somewhat of a Shangri-la. It bore little relationship to the reality in which I lived. When I arrived in Bangkok and presented my credentials, when, with all the ceremony that goes with it, at that time at least, in the Grand Palace--the Great Throne Room of the Grand Palace with the King on this throne down at one end of the room, all of the honor guards and the courtiers lined up at one end, and myself entering at the other end of the room--I walked forward through this Great Hall--and I was still young enough, if you will, still impressionable enough to get a really emotional thrill out of this--the thought that I, boy born and grew up in Falun, Kansas, would one day be presenting my credentials to the King of Siam, was something farthest removed from my imagination. And it was emotionally one of the great experiences of my career and my life. I don't think that anything else could quite compare with it. The Court at Saint James, or the Court at Tokyo, are all more or less well known and mundane, but presenting my credentials as Ambassador of the United States of America to the King of Siam, the King of Thailand, in the Great Throne Room of the Grand Palace, was an emotional experience which I will never forget. After I had done so--or while I was doing so--I sometimes stood in a little bit of awe of what had happened.

It is not my purpose, grandchildren, to moralize to you. Each of us has to decide what we're going to do, what kind of a life we're going to live, and how we're going to live it. All I can say is just don't assume that anything is impossible. I am a very ordinary man with very ordinary accomplishments. I don't say this with any false modesty. I well know my own limitations. I've had good fortune and good luck. I'm not attributing it to any particular virtue on my part, except to say that if you pick

something, if you pick a career, if you pick a job and keep at it, don't assume that anything is necessarily impossible. But as I often tell incoming Foreign Service classes: in the Foreign Service, as well as in any other career, don't assume that there's any perfect, infinite justice. Some have the breaks, and some don't have the breaks. The important thing is that when the breaks come, that you're able to take advantage of them. They may come your way, or they may not. They have come my way, in large degree, and I think that I have been ready and able to take advantage of them. Some of my colleagues probably, undoubtedly in many ways, are more capable than I and have not had the breaks. Others have had the breaks, but fell flat on their faces. Thus, all I'm saying--I said I wouldn't moralize--but I do just want to say keep working away, keep plugging away at whatever you decide to do, and do your honest, level best. I've always called the shots the way I see them. I've never tried to dissimulate. When I don't know an answer, I say I don't know an answer. When I've seen a situation in a certain way, I have given my honest opinion and given my honest advice. And I think, above all, people respect an attempt, at least, at honesty and sincerity, whether they respect your intelligence or not.

When I went to Thailand I of course knew that we had fairly large programs there, and one of the things to which I made up my mind was that before I became too immersed in the day-to-day routine, I would get out and see our programs and see what was going on in the country. I asked the staff to lay out a plan of travel for me, so that I got out at least once a week to some area where I would be able to observe, at first hand, what we were doing. This took considerable arranging, and the staff laid out a program which I approved. This meant that when I got up in the

morning, I was not able to change my mind and say, "Well, I just don't quite feel like it today." I had to carry it through. I carried out a number of trips and found, to my surprise, that I quickly became known in Bangkok and also in the government as the fellow that was seeing more of the country than many of the Thais knew. I thus saw that this was not only good for me to see what was going on, but it was also good relations. Thus, throughout the time I was in Thailand, I carried out a very extensive program of travel. As I recall it, I visited some sixty--visited in some way--at least sixty of the seventy-two changwats or districts, in the country.

I used to capitalize on this in talking with the government officers and believe that I was successful in encouraging them, for the first time, to really get out and visit their own country. I found these trips physically exhausting at times. I would normally fly to some central point; then, go by jeep or truck or whatever else was available around the area. I also did a great deal of helicopter traveling; it would be very, very tiring but nevertheless I found it very satisfying. The people in the countryside I found uniformly friendly and very responsive to somebody showing some interest in them.

I would normally stay with the changwat -- or district--governor if I was staying overnight, which I often did and this was also a very interesting experience. I found most of these governors to be very capable people. They had a good career service in the Ministry of Interior, administering the provinces; most of these men were very interested in these jobs. When they were informed that the American Ambassador was visiting them, this created a certain amount of commotion, and there would always be the problem of what an American Ambassador would eat. In

my experience, the governors--I'm talking about the more remote provinces, of course--would call in the local domestic science class and the local domestic science teacher and they would put their heads together about what they thought ought to be served to an American Ambassador. The domestic science teacher and the domestic science class would take over the governor's kitchen.

The American Ambassador would arrive. They would have prepared a six, seven or eight-course meal. I would sit down to the table and the first course would be served; I would see these little girls poking their heads around the corner of the kitchen, giggling and looking to see whether or not I would eat it. What did you do? You ate it, obviously. You did the same with the second course, third course, fourth course, and fifth course, and each time, the girls peeking around the corner, and giggling, and watching to see what the American Ambassador would do.

I must say, I was never able to disappoint them. They were such hospitable, kindly people that I felt that I had to show that I appreciated what they had done but, of course, this was no help at all for my figure. Whoever advised them told them that American ambassadors ate bacon and eggs for breakfast. So very dutifully, before they would leave in the evening, they would fry bacon and eggs and leave them on the steps outside the door so I would be sure to have them when I got up in the morning. This took a little doing to get them down sometimes.

One thing that impressed me with the Thai people, and even in the most remote villages, one always felt a sense of self-respect and dignity. There was never the frantic pawing, or should I say curiosity, about some stranger from the outside that one finds in India and China and even in the days that I was there previously in Japan, but rather a sense of great

personal dignity. They were interested in seeing somebody from the outside and somebody with a white face. They received him courteously and in a dignified manner but always with a great deal of self-respect and, I would say, a feeling of equality that was very refreshing. One felt that they were not looking at you through the eyes of a brown man looking at a white man, but rather as looking at you man to man, either liking you or accepting you as a man and being hospitable to you simply because you were a stranger. I always found this attitude very refreshing. The children would, of course, run up, but also with a certain sense of dignity and always with smiles on their faces. I never served any place in the world where people smile more spontaneously, or easily, or more from the heart.

I grew to have a great deal of respect for the Buddhism of Thailand, which is the Hinayana or Theravada Buddhism, the same Buddhism of Cambodia, Burma, and Ceylon. I saw Thais in all aspects, of course, in happiness, in sorrow, in grief in the family and on at least one occasion, I was considered, or treated rather, as an intimate member of the family in a death in the family. If the purpose of religion is to help reconcile man to his state on earth and to give him a philosophical or serene outlook on life, I know of nothing that does it better than the Hinayana Buddhism of Thailand. It seemed to me that in times of grief, losses, and tragedies in the family, it enabled them to look upon death with a philosophic detachment--perhaps that isn't quite the word--but with a philosophy that gave them comfort and gave them strength. There was, of course, grief but nevertheless, the grief was controlled, not uncontrolled as I've seen in some other countries, and people realized that death, just as birth, is an inevitable part of life and accepted it; they also realized that the living must go on.

In another vein, that has very little or nothing--I should say nothing--to do with Buddhism. I might tell the story of the murder of the Minister of Agriculture. The Minister of Agriculture was an exceptionally fine man that I liked very much. I considered ourselves to be very close friends. I had made many trips with him. In fact, on the weekend before his death, he and the Foreign Minister and I had taken the trip up to Pucha Dung, which is a large and unique mesa-type formation in Thailand. He was murdered by his second wife, who happened to be the sister of his first wife. Having a number of wives, one official and others unofficial, was not unique at all. It was quite the common thing in Thailand. But to have a second wife, or any wife, murder a husband was a very unusual circumstance. In any event, she had shot and killed him.

I was seeing, happened to be seeing, Marshall Sarit early the next morning on, of course, entirely another matter, in an appointment which had already been arranged. Sarit also had liked the minister very much, and Sarit had been up during the night of the murder trying to find out what had gone on. He was grief-stricken, as I was really grief-stricken; and we were exchanging views with regard to it, and he remarked to me that, "Well, this just proves"--that is, Marshall Sarit remarked to me--"this just proves that you should never have two wives." And I said that I thoroughly agreed. Then he went on and said, "Well, probably, my reasons, my conclusions are a little different than yours. You should have three or more." When you come to think of it, the eternal triangle is always dangerous, but when it moves out of the triangle into the square, into larger groups, why, it is not as dangerous. The Minister's obvious mistake was that he was involved in a triangle and thus, came to grief. Marshall Sarit, having had more than three, was able to speak against some

background of knowledge and conviction on this score.

As I said, during his prime, Marshall Sarit would do away with four to five bottles of Scotch during the course of a day--this is what led him to Walter Reed and the operation on his liver--and would also have three to four women each day. By the time he got back from Walter Reed, and I first knew him well, he had given up the Scotch, but he still had the women, although his powers were somewhat waning. The story was--and I believe it--that he used to pay the girls to say what a great man he was, how effective a man he was. This, of course, was not out of the tradition of the East, or even the Middle East, or even Europe in those days. To rule, you had to establish that you were more than an ordinary mortal in all the aspects of life, including your virility as a man, and being able to establish your virility as a man helped establish your right or your ability to rule, if you will. Of course, this was behind much of the polygamy in the courts of the Near East, and the courts of the East as well, as well as in the mistresses of the rulers of Europe. A man who claimed to rule had to establish the fact that he was above the ordinary run of man and that he had more than the ordinary man's ability in this field as well. The more women that he had in his harem established the greater a man he was. And so polygamy was not just particularly among the rulers. It was not just a matter of individual choice, individual lust, if you will, but rather a means of establishing their right to rule.

The King of Thailand in my time, King Phumiphon, had broken with this, and I had every reason to believe that he and his Queen, Queen Sirikit, led what we'd call a model family life. Speaking of them, I became very, very fond of them. During the period prior to Sarit, under

Pibul, the King had been kept very much in the background. Sarit showed the political acumen of bringing the King to the forefront and using him; the King and the Queen were very great assets.

The King, as is well known, was born in the United States, but left when he was very, very young. He came from a tradition of real public service. His father had been studying medicine at Harvard in Boston at the time that he was born; his mother had been studying nursing, and the King was born in Boston. His father returned to Thailand and literally--I believe it to be true--worked himself to death as a doctor in Thailand. His mother, The Queen Mother, was still living when we were there. The great tragedy that hung over the family was that the King's brother, who was King in 1946, was found killed, murdered, in 1946. It's a great mystery of Thailand. The King talked to me about it at great length. Others have talked to me about it at great length. But who murdered him and how was still never clear. As a result of his brother's death, the King came to the throne.

He was a very earnest young man. He had a reputation as a jazz player, and he was a player of jazz music and a very good one. He also had done some composing. His Queen is one of the most lovely people I've ever met, and I was always extremely fond of them. Both of them were very patriotic. Both of them worked very hard at trying to be good monarchs. I've often said that one of the great differences between Thailand and here in Vietnam, from which I'm now talking, as well as many other countries in which I've served, is that the monarchy, and particularly the people occupying the monarchy, formed a symbol of national unity. Even though he was a constitutional monarch, with little real power, the fact that he was there was known by everybody. Whereas governments would come and go, the people

of Thailand always looked to the King and to the Queen as being their symbol of a nation. It gave them a sense of being a nation-state, which is a very powerful force in any country.

I'd say one of the most, if not the most, enjoyable experiences of my career was in 1960 when I accompanied them to the United States on their state visit. To go back, 1958, when I went out, as sort of a routine part of my instructions, I was asked to inform the King that we would hope that sometime he and the Queen might visit the United States. He heard what I had to say and expressed the hope that he might also and I heard nothing further from him until 1959. He called me in one day and said that he had been thinking about this, and he had decided to visit the States and hoped that he might go without the next three months, as I recall it. I explained to him our schedule on state visits was made up some time in advance and that it might take somewhat longer to work out a visit for him. However, he insisted that he had decided, that he and the government had decided that he should make a series of visits abroad, and that his first visit outside the Far Eastern area should bethe United States. I went back to Washington with this. They came back in some horror and alarm, saying that the President's schedule was entirely filled, it would be impossible to receive him, and to try to stall him off. There,ensued an exchange between myself and Washington over a period of eight or nine months in which I insisted that having made the gesture to him, we just could not turn him down and that they had to come through with agreement on the visit.

Finally, early 1960, Washington agreed to -- very reluctantly, it seemed to me at the time,very grudgingly, although I tried to keep this from the King; of course, this is one of jobs of an ambassador--they agreed to a visit in June, as I recall it, of 1960. The King then told me that he would

like to spend some time unofficially in the United States; I communicated with Washington about this, but got the very unsatisfactory reply: they were really not able to do anything about it.

About this time, Henry Kearns, who was then Assistant Secretary of Commerce, came out to Bangkok; and knowing that he lived in Southern California, I put the problem to him. Mr. Kearns very generously offered his house to them in Southern California; and thus, it was arranged that they would have their official visit and also a private visit, bringing the children with them.

I went home ahead of their arrival for a SEATO meeting, and then, went out and met them in Honolulu. Before the visit, we had many long talks about it. The King was very nervous, and the Queen was very nervous. They wanted to know the right things to do and the right way to behave and were very concerned as to how they might do. I always tried to reassure them, and very genuinely so, by saying that they should just be themselves, just do what came naturally to them. Because, knowing they were kindly, gracious people, I knew that this could never be wrong.

(12b)

I, as I said, met them on their arrival in Honolulu. The Governor and CINCPAC, who was then Admiral Felt, treated them very graciously. Mr. and Mrs. Dillingham, who have both passed on, entertained them. Mr. and Mrs. Walker also entertained them. And for the first time, the King had to make a speech in English. We had many discussions about this. But he did exceedingly well. I remember the first night they arrived. I had arranged--they were staying in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel--for them to have their meal upstairs if they wished, while I would eat with the rest of the party downstairs in the main dining room. We had just started to seat ourselves

when the King and Queen came down and joined us. And this set the pattern for this viist.

We flew from Honolulu to Los Angeles; and at Los Angeles, we went to the Kearns' house, where they installed themselves with their children. I spent a few days with them around Los Angeles. We had one day of official visits, the usual business at Hollywood: going through the studios, the lunch in Hollywood, and the dinner at the Biltmore by the Mayor. One of our concerns, and his concerns, before he left, was this question of the film, movie that had come out, not too long before, about The King and I--I shouldn't say "about The King and I." The title of it was The King and I. And it had been barred in Thailand. At our lunch in Hollywood, the King took the initiative, in his little talk after lunch, to raise the subject and said that he, the King, just wanted to talk to them about The King and I; and very gracefully explained that while he perfectly well understood that this was a very sympathetic picture, in American eyes, of Thailand, had done much good in Thailand, to show it in Thailand itself would have created misunderstandings because of their attitude toward the monarchy. In short, he dealt with it in a very graceful way and never again in Hollywood, or throughout his trip, was the question of The King and I raised.

We had the usual round in Washington: with the dinner at the White House, the dinner at the Anderson House by the Secretary of State, Christian Herter, and the return dinner by the King and Queen. It all went off exceedingly well, both of them charming the city and the people. Washington had become very blase, of course, about state visitors, but this couple really did a very exceptional job for their country. The Eisenhowers and the King and Queen were, of course, of two different generations. And one of my regrets has been that the King and Queen were not able to meet Jack

and Jackie Kennedy. I feel sure that the Queen and Mrs. Kennedy would have been instantly taken with each other. I just would have liked to see the two of them together. But, of course, this never came to pass.

I spent many hours of conversation with both of them, particularly, with the King in Bangkok on various occasions. We used to discuss the whole wide range of subjects from international politics to the education of children. They had three girls and one boy, and were very devoted to them; and the King was particularly interested in the education of his children. This was particularly appropriate as his great-grandfather, King Mongut, back in the 1840s, being interested in the education of his children, had brought Anna Leonowens out from England in order to educate, particularly, the Crown Prince at that time, who become King ChulalongKorn. King Mongut was a man who rose far above his place and time and deserves a real mark in history. At the time, the other kings and rulers, nobles of the Far East, were resisting the advance of the West, trying to hold to the status quo. King Mongut saw the way the world was moving, and he moved with it. And in turn, King ChulalongKorn moved with it. And it was in a very large degree due to the wisdom and foresight of these monarchs that Thailand was able to maintain its independence all through the years of colonial expansion; the only country in Southeast Asia, and in fact, the only country in the Far East except Japan, that was able to do so.

Having escaped colonialism, the Thais also escaped the penalities of having been a colonial country. I've never served in a place in which I feel there was less racial consciousness. They had no chips on their shoulders. They felt under no necessity of proving themselves to anybody else. They felt confident in themselves. And they felt a strong sense of national identity; and this without being belligerent about it. Thus, they

had a certain sophistication towards international affairs which made it much easier to deal with them, talk with them on a basis of equality, than the newly independent countries which felt under the necessity of asserting themselves. This, of course, is a common characteristic of any newly independent country. We went through a similar phase at the time that we got our independence.

Not having gone through the struggle for independence, the countries surrounding Thailand, the other countries in the area, did not feel the strong identity of view with Thailand; and in turn, Thailand did not feel a strong identity of view with them. They were considered somewhat of a sport, to use the biological term, in the area and to a degree, this operated to their disadvantage. They were not taken too seriously. There was a tendency to deprecate them in the surrounding countries. And in turn, this was somewhat absorbed even in the United States. And one of the problems I had, throughout my term as Ambassador, was to urge my own government of the United States to take them seriously. As they had not fought a hopeless war against the Japanese, they had not stood up to the Japanese very vigorously at the time they came in, as the British had not been able to offer them any support, nor had we, there was somewhat a tendency to say that they wouldn't fight.

As I always used to say, "The Thais looked after Thailand. And for this, they had to be respected." They were not fighting for anybody else. They were looking after their own interests. And on this, I always used to urge that we had a common identity of interest with them. I never had any doubt that if the challenge were to come, and if they felt that they had some reasonable chance of facing the challenge, that they would fight very well, indeed, for Thailand. The theme that I used to use was: They had maintained

their independence. Their interest was in maintaining their independence. The interest of we, the United States, was that they should maintain their independence. And thus, we had a sound common basis of interest. In other words, a common interest which transcended sentiment and transcended any eleemosynary motives on our part. It was a self-respecting relationship between us.

I always avoided use of the term "aid" or "assistance" with the connotations of inferiority and superiority thatthose terms had. I always used to talk in terms of our working together for our common interests, each contributing what we best could contribute to the other. I found that this hit a very responsive chord. One of the things that led me to do this, was that, when I first arrived there, everyminister that I would call on went through, what seemed to me, a little formalistic set speech about their gratitude for American aid and assistance. This went against my grain; as it didn't seem to me to be entirely sincere; it didn't seem to me to be self-respecting. They seemed to do it because they felt the Americans expected it of them. It always made me very uncomfortable, because I did not expect gratitude and I didn't feel that the United States should expect gratitude for what ever we were able to do. We were not there to receive gratitude. We were there doing whatever we were doing because we thought it was important to us to be doing it. In turn, it was important to Thailand. And thus, we had a self-respecting basis for our relationship. I tried to stress this theme throughout the time that I was there.

Perhaps this is the time for me to make another point with regard to my own personal philosophy of foreign relations and foreign representation, American representation, abroad. I feel very much that we do not gain

anything by trying to, quote, "go native," unquote. My feeling is that when we are living abroad, we should pay a decent respect to the opinions and the customs of the country in which we are living, but the people, the country in which we are living do not expect us to act as other than Americans. They certainly don't expect us to, quote, "go native." And I don't think that we gain any respect by this.

There are certain things, obviously, that you don't do. In other words, you pay respect, pay a respect to their local customs. But above all, at all times, you act as an American. As I used to tell in-coming Foreign Service classes, I think a great deal of esoteric nonsense is written about this business of cultural empathy and antipathy. What is kind, decent, in one society is going to be kind and decent in another society. A smile in one society will serve the same place as a smile in another society. You don't try to act other than what you are. You certainly don't patronize the country in which you are living and the people with which you are living. An American who is able to enjoy effective and friendly relations with other Americans and with his neighbors, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, is going to be able to enjoy effective and friendly relations with his neighbors abroad.

Popularity is a very cheap and ephemeral thing. Above all, what I feel American representatives abroad should seek to obtain is respect. With respect, you're able to work effectively. You may have a cheap popularity by copying local customs to an extreme degree and trying to act something other than what you are; but my own observation and feeling is that this does not necessarily equate with, nor gain you, respect.

Related to this is a point that Chip Bohlen often made, which I share and I feel is very sound--and that is that ambassadors should remember that

they're representing one government to another government and their effectiveness is determined by the degree to which they're able to influence the other government. They are not running for office in a foreign country. Their primary purpose is not personal popularity. Their primary purpose is to adequately and effectively represent the United States government to another government. This may not always make them popular, but popularity is not the primary purpose of their mission.

The basic difficulty that I had in Thailand was that, after we had succeeded in establishing effective relations with Marshall Sarit, and with the Thai government, and they had adopted a friendly attitude towards us, there is a certain tendency in Washington to take them for granted and to pay more attention to the less friendly countries who created more problems for us. My problem was always to urge that we not take them for granted and that a valued friend was worth preserving more than trying to influence a declared enemy. Not that I had anything against trying to turn enemies into friends; in fact, this is our function. But in doing so, we should be careful not to lose our friends.

This problem presented itself in several practical ways. There was always the problem of the level of our military and economic assistance to Thailand. There was always the tendency to feel that, well, Thais are our friends, so that they can take a little cut in order that we can make something available elsewhere. It also rose in connection with our rice sales, our surplus rice sales. Thailand, being a large exporter of rice, was very interested in the market for rice. Yet, we were seeking to use, understandably so, our rice surpluses to influence other countries, such as Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. And although we made professions to the contrary, this undercut the Thai market and undercut the Thai ability to

support themselves.

Another problem was that the Thais had managed their currency, their financial transactions, in a very able manner. So that they had a fairly good reserves. And the argument always was that as they had good reserves, they didn't need much help, and countries which had not managed their affairs so well needed more help. I always had a hard time answering the Thai question on this, "Would you help us more if we managed our affairs less ably?" In other words, is the American policy to reward mismanagement?

Another problem that confronts every ambassador abroad is the slowness of the American response, particularly in the fields of economic cooperation and military cooperation. Our bureaucracy is so muscle-bound that we find it very difficult to act with any degree of responsiveness. It takes years and years, seemingly, for us to make up our minds to do something. We have two extremes. In the case of a flood or a natural disaster--I experienced this in Thailand during the cholera epidemic--we can act with very impressive speed and at a very impressive scale. However, on normal things, we act very, very slowly and what at one time starts out as a asset in our relations, due to the slowness of our response, eventually becomes a liability.

This is particularly true of the AID program. I was very, very frustrated with our AID program. I thought that it was a generally sound, but one of the amazing things to me, always, was that, considering the degree to which we are a free enterprise country, the degree we developed as a free enterprise country, we insist upon prior planning and studies ad nauseam on almost any foreign project, instead of utilizing our good judgment and moving ahead on things. After all, sometime, we have to make up our mind. But we take an exceedingly long time to do so.

We also talk a great deal about efficiency and economy in personnel, but it's astounding the number of people that we need to send abroad to carry out our programs. I fought this very hard in Thailand and finally took a very firm stand on this and maintained it up to the outbreak of the Lao affair in 1961. The position I took was that we had a certain number of Americans in Thailand and there was a certain tolerance in Thailand with respect to numbers of Americans. We could have a large number of Americans for a short period of time, to over simplify it, or we could have a smaller number of Americans for a longer time; it was up to us to make the choice. I made the latter choice and took the position that I would not agree to any additional Americans coming into the country--that is, American official personnel--unless there were corresponding cuts elsewhere. You have to deal with this in terms of projects and programs. And my view was that if new programs and projects were considered to have a higher priority than older ones, why, then we cut out some of the older ones. In effect, this meant that if JUSMAG [Joint United States Military Advisory Group] wanted to bring in twenty-five more people, JUSMAG had to cut twenty-five people off some place else, or get USOM [United States Operations Mission] or one of the other agencies to cut off twenty-five people. I maintained a very firm line on this. I maintained it in the embassy. And to my mind, it is the only way of dealing with this problem of proliferation of Americans abroad. You must do it by programs. You must do it by cutting out something that is less important in order to do something that is more important.

It's not that Americans abroad don't work hard. They, for the most part, do work hard, and to each of them, what they are doing is the most important thing there is. This is as it should be. It is up to somebody higher up to make the decisions on what needs to be cut out. The Ambassador

can initiate this, and I did initiate programs in this field, that is, cutting out programs in this field. But Washington also must carry a considerable responsibility on this. And the problem in Washington is getting somebody who will make the decisions as between the competing departments, and bureaus, and agencies, take the responsibility for those decisions.

This is not easy to do, short of the President. It is, in a very real sense, short of the President, the responsibility of the State Department. As I'll later relate, I feel very much that, although this is not a popular role, this is a role that the Department should assert more vigorously than it has. When I was back there, I tried to get us--and with some degree of success--to assert the role. Obviously, it is not a popular role. Obviously, you are hurting somebody or somebody feels that they are being hurt or injured, and as far as each of the departments' agencies in Washington are concerned, they naturally feel that whatever they are doing is the most important thing that there is. However, judgments must be made, and short of the President, my own feeling is that the only place that these can and must be made is at the level of the State Department.

I'm sorry to seem to be pontificating, because I don't like people who pontificate. But I did, at this point, want to get down a few of my own thoughts and conclusions.

Looking at it as objectively as one is ever able to look at one's self objectively, I feel that I was successful in my mission in Thailand. I enjoyed my work there; I had a fine staff who cooperated very effectively; I had pleasant people with whom to work, people who were responsive to one's approach; and it's the one time in my career that I have felt that I, as an individual, was able to have some direct personal influence upon

the course of events. And from this, I naturally derive satisfaction. Because it is from such a conviction that one derives a sense of satisfaction with one's work and happiness from one's work. I'm down close to the end of this tape, so I will defer talking further about Thailand at this time. This is the end of Tape Number Six, the end of Tape Number Six.

13

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 13

(13a)

This is the beginning of Tape Number Seven, Tape Number Seven, by U. Alexis Johnson.

It is now Thursday, September 2, 1965, and I have less than two weeks to remain here in Vietnam. Henry Cabot Lodge has arrived, and I'm waiting on my successor. He has been appointed, but has not yet arrived. My own plans are to leave here on September 15. I have been asked to make a speech in Japan,the JiJi Press Association on September 16, and will do so, and then proceed directly to the United States.

Your grandmother, my wife Patricia, since my last recording, has fallen and has broken her elbow. She has had an operation. I have been in touch with her several times by telephone, and she's had to have a pin put into her elbow to set it and is having great difficulty. I wish I were home with her and am looking forward to being home as soon as I can possibly can.

I've not done more on recording on these reminiscences, because I have been working on the speech I am to make in Japan. I've written this all myself,because I want to get down my own thoughts and impressions and get the problem here down in my own way. My thought being that I will be able to use this speech, with variations of course, as I'm called upon to speak in the United States.

As I left off the last recording, I was discussing Thailand, which, as will readily be perceived, I was very fond of and which I greatly enjoyed my service. I promised a few more comments on Thailand; and at the risk of

duplicating something I may have already said, I'll make a few general observations on it.

First, the country was extremely fortunate in having escaped the colonial period and having maintained its independence during that period. This, as well as their own native character and the Buddhist religion, I think, is in large part responsible for the fact that the Thai are as tolerant as they are. I've never served in a place where I had less sense of race. I never felt conscious of my white skin, as I have in other places of the Far East. This led them to accept and to treat you as a man-to-man, rather than first looking upon your different race and adjusting to that. And I always found that I was able to talk more directly to the Thai than to any other Far Eastern people with whom I've been able to deal.

As a personal note, while I was there, our youngest daughter met a young Thai man by the name Maitri. He was known as "Mike". Maitri Mojdara. M-A-I-T-R-I. Last name, M-O-J-D-A-R-A. She became acquainted with him there. He had recently returned from the States, where he had obtained his masters degree in mechanical engineering at MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also had worked in the States. My son Bill also met him; the three of them, then later the two of them, used to go out considerably. This finally, after a year and a half, and her return to the United States, and then her return to Thailand, led to the marriage of Jennifer and Mike on December 1, 1963. I have been able to get over and see them, on occasion, while I have been here in Saigon. They now have one child, my granddaughter and your cousin, Patricia Maria Mojdara. They seem very happy; and although I naturally had my misgivings about such a marriage, I'm very happy to say that it's, thus far at least, turned out exceedingly well. Mike is a fine man. The more I've seen of him, the more I like him,.

And he certainly is a fine husband and a fine father.

It's an anomaly of our present law, as it exists, that my granddaughter is not an American citizen. If her mother Jennifer had been the daughter of an Army sergeant, her child would have been an American citizen. However, as she lived abroad with me at the time I was Ambassador in Czechoslovakia and the time in Bangkok, she doesn't have the residence requirements for transmitting citizenship to her daughter, who was born abroad. I've arranged for a special law to be introduced in the Congress to correct this, in so far as Jennifer is concerned. As of this time, it has passed the Senate, and I'm very hopeful that it will pass the House.

When the election of 1960 came along, I was very torn as between Nixon and Kennedy. Frankly, I had grave doubts, concern, about Nixon as a President. I only met him a few times and knew not too much about him personally, but I somehow felt that there was some essential element of character that was lacking. At this point, I might interject that Nixon has just arrived here in Saigon this afternoon. Lodge is having a reception for him tomorrow, and I'm having him to dinner Saturday evening. At the same time, I retained enough of my old Protestant prejudices to have concern about electing a Catholic president. However, during the course of the campaign, and seeing the very able and excellent way, I felt, that Kennedy handled the religious issue, I gradually came around to Kennedy and was very pleased when he was elected. To my surprise, and I know to his own surprise, Kennedy selected Dean Rusk--who had been Assistant Secretary at the time I was his deputy in Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department back in 1951 and '52--as Secretary of State. Shortly after the Inauguration, I received a message from the Secretary asking if I would come back as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. Although I was very loath to leave

Thailand, and I had no particular desire to take on the very prickly job of Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, I felt that, as a career officer and also as a friend of Dean Rusk, I could not say, "no." And I said, "yes."

Some days went by; I understood that my nomination was going up to the Senate and then to my surprise, I received a message asking if I would take the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. I was very flattered at this and very attracted by it. This has traditionally, normally, with a few exceptions, been the senior career job in the State Department. This is, the senior job held by a Foreign Service Officer. Although I was far from being senior in the service, I had been asked to take the job and naturally, I was honored by it and accepted it. I was nominated and at the same time, the annual SEATO meeting was scheduled to take place out in Bangkok in March, and the Secretary asked me to stay on until that was over and he came out for the meeting.

Laos was still very much an issue at that time. I was very pleased to find that Dean Rusk, for the most part, agreed with my own views with respect to Laos and took a very firm position that we should not permit the Communists to advance any further into Laos. He returned; we packed up and I returned to Washington, arriving in Washington on a Sunday morning, right at the height of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

I, of course, had known nothing about this. Not wanting to bother the Secretary, I called the Under Secretary, Chester Bowles. He invited me over to his house and I went over to see him there Sunday afternoon. He was obviously not working, obviously not involved in events, and this came as a great surprise to me with the things that were moving in Cuba. As always, he was very kind, generous, thoughtful. I had never known him

before, but I found him a very attractive person. He talked a great deal, and it was quite obvious that he conceived that my position would be his immediate deputy. This was not in accordance with my own ideas of the way the job had previously operated. Although called Deputy Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs had traditionally been the career man in the Department and he had traditionally operated across the board, particularly coordinating the work of the geographical and other divisions of the Department, and also working directly with the Secretary. Not that I ever thought that I would by-pass the Under Secretary, but I never conceived myself in the role of being simply the Deputy to the Under Secretary, although, of course, that was implied in the title.

As I recall it, I saw the Secretary, Dean Rusk, on Monday morning, but his mind was very obviously on the situation in Cuba, and I only had a brief conversation with him. I quickly sensed that there was not a complete rapport between he and Chester Bowles. I had a feeling that he, Chester Bowles, was not Dean Rusk's choice for his Under Secretary and that they were operating somewhat independently of each other. Chester Bowles was working on the question of appointments, appointments of ambassadors abroad. He had some very brilliant ideas and he had some very poor ideas. And the Secretary obviously didn't approve of some of them, but didn't quite know what he should do about them.

Not that Bowles was playing politics. On the whole, I think the appointments of ambassadors that were made by the new Kennedy Administration were more free of political bias than any that had been made by any previous administration. Some of them were exceptional choices. I think one of them was Ed Reischauer to Japan. I'd known Ed for a long time, back to pre-war days. I knew him as a professor, and I never quite saw Ed as an

Ambassador. But Ed has most thoroughly proved himself as a very brilliant choice.

On the other hand, [James] Gavin to Paris turned out to be a very poor choice. And while many will dispute about it, I feel that Ken Galbraith to India was also a very poor choice. Ken is a very vain man. He saw things revolving very much around himself, personally. He used to write for effect and style, rather than trying to objectively present a point of view. And I think Galbraith was a very unfortunate choice as Ambassador to India. Another one was Kennan, George Kennan to Yugoslavia. George Kennan, although a Foreign Service officer with long experience, was very self-centered, and again, saw things very much as revolving around himself, personally. What Tito did, or what Congress did, he felt reflected on him as an individual. And whereas Kennan is a very brilliant intellect, has done some very fine writing on foreign affairs, as a diplomat, I then, and I still consider him to be a very indifferent diplomat.

With Ken Galbraith I had the experience of his attacking me personally to the President, upon an issue which he took a very emotional point of view, and then, three or four months later, found himself completely retreating from the point of view that he had taken. Fortunately, the President never took Ken Galbraith very seriously; it never did me any harm and I don't think it did Galbraith any good.

I found, when I got into the Department, that people found it very difficult to get decisions out of Chester Bowles and were looking for me to do something about it. Chet Bowles would call a group into his office to talk about a telegram. He would guide the conversation around to something utterly outside the telegram and after an hour, and lectures, very good lectures, very sound ideas often, the group would leave Chet Bowles

with still no decision having been made as to what should be done. I ran into this when Dean Rusk was out in Bangkok at SEATO. We received a telegram from Chet Bowles, at that time, going into a long philosophical discourse on Southeast Asia, having little to do with the problem at hand, saying that he had discussed this with several persons and he was just putting forward some ideas. The Secretary was very baffled as to whether or not this really represented the President's point of view. Dean had not, at that time, yet established a close working relationship with the President, and he decided to go back on it and ask some questions. And it turned out that this was just late-in-the-afternoon musings of Chet Bowles.

Considering his background, it was astounding to me to find that Bowles was such a poor administrator and such a poor man at making decisions. And this had immediately reflected itself down into the Department, as well as out into the other departments. He was sitting on various White House committees, and early after I arrived there, efforts were made to shift some of these assignments to me. I found my position very difficult. I, frankly, liked Bowles very much. At the same time, I found it difficult to deliberately seek to go around him, and I found it difficult that people were seeking to use me to find a way around Bowles to the Secretary, as well as a way around him to get things done. I did not want to antagonize Bowles. After all, he was my nominal superior, and my own sense of discipline in an organization is that you give faith and loyalty to your superiors.

I had only been in the Department a few days and was having a meeting, as I recall it, with some of the Assistant Secretaries, when my secretary said that President Kennedy was on the line. I picked up the phone, and it was the President. I had not yet even met him up to that time, and he asked me about the situation in the Dominican Republic. Having just come from

Bangkok, and not yet having got my feet in the ground, I knew literally next to nothing about the situation in the Dominican Republic. However, it was at this time that plots and counter-plots were being carried out, or started, against the then-President Trujillo. Naturally, I was somewhat taken aback by having a call directly from the President on a subject that I knew nothing about. I could do nothing but tell him that I didn't know anything about it, but I would look into it as soon as I could and call him back. Which I did.

Now, this was the period in which we had a Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs working outside the State Department framework. We also had our Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. And in some ways, it was typical of several things with respect to Kennedy: the first, his impatience and lack of understanding of the traditional organizational framework which, for better or for worse, did exist; secondly, his desire, with respect to a new appointee, to put him on his toes and to show that he the President, was directly interested in things; next, Kennedy's impatience with traditional organizations. All the Presidents, all the time I had worked in the Department previously, would deal with the Secretary of State. And the Secretary of State would, in turn, deal with those below him. However, Kennedy liked to go directly to the source of information, although there was certainly no reason to believe that I was any particular expert on Dominican Republic affairs.

A few days after this, came my first meeting with Kennedy, although it was in a large group. He called a meeting at the White House, the Cabinet Room, with the senior officers of State, and Defense, and the CIA, as an aftermath of the Bay of Pigs action. In this, he made it very clear that he took responsibility for the decisions that had been made; he wanted

no backbiting, no recriminations, and no post-morteming on this, and no attempt to assess the blame on the other fellow. It was a very impressive performance, and I certainly went out of there with the conviction--although I had had nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs--that the only thing to do, and the proper thing to do, was for everybody to support the President on this.

As I recall it, it was the same afternoon, or the next morning, that Chet Bowles called me in his office and showed me--he said very privately, just for me--a memorandum that he had written, opposing the Bay of Pigs invasion. I later learned--and it became quite common gossip and eventually arrived in the newspapers--the Bowles had shown this to a considerable number of people. And from this dated the very definite cooling in his relations with Kennedy. In my mind, it was certainly very poor judgment on his part.

Immediately on my arrival in Washington, I was asked to join what was known at the Tuesday Luncheon Planning Group. This was primarily hosted by George McGhee, who was then Chairman of the Planning Council, and included Mac Bundy from the White House, Joe Fowler who was then Under Secretary of the Treasury, Ros Gilpatric who was Deputy Secretary of Defense; and--oh, let's see--the Joint Chiefs--Andy Goodpaster, I think, had come back by then, Paul Nitze who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and two or three others. I can't quite remember the names at the moment. This was my first meeting and acquaintance with Mac Bundy, who, over the years, I have grown to have a great deal of respect for. It was also the time of the new staff in the White House. Together with Mac Bundy, there were considerable numbers of persons: Dick Goodwin, and Arthur Schlesinger, Michael Forrestal, and others, who were surrounding the President, and who were kibitzing in a very irresponsible

way, it seemed to me, in foreign policy.

After one of these luncheons, I told Mac Bundy that, as far as I was personally concerned, if he or anyone else in the White House said that this was the desire or the wish of the President, these were naturally our instructions, and we would carry them out. However, in the absence of a definitive word that this was the instruction or the wish of the President, I would take comments coming from people who said they were calling from the White House as being no more than their own personal comments and would simply take them into consideration in whatever we were doing. Mac Bundy thoroughly agreed with me on this, and this is the relationship that I established with the White House staff and, I think, was understood thoroughly by them.

However, to more junior officers in the Department, it was always a problem of their being impressed or intimidated--whatever word you want to use--by some so-and-so calling, or some individual saying that he was calling from the White House and suggesting that such-and-such be done and this becoming the Bible. It was an attempt to offset this that I took the position that I did. It's at this time that I was asked to join the special group, which was known as the Special Group 54-12. Chester Bowles had been serving on this: and after some maneuvering, it was agreed that I would serve on this in the position of representing the Department of State. This was formed after the Bay of Pigs action to guide the work of the CIA. Mac Bundy, was Chairman; the Director of CIA, who was at that time Allen Dulles;the Under Secretary of Defense, Ros Gilpatric; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as questions involving the Joint Chiefs arose, was an ad hoc member; this group was formed to pass upon all projects proposed by or proposed to the CIA in the action field. I

served on this throughout the three years that I was in Washington and even at this time, they are not things that I am able to discuss, except to say that they involve the most sensitive aspects of United States operations abroad in all fields. This was a difficult position for me, representing State People, of course, would come up with ideas which had obvious problems for us, and my position was often that of having to say, "no", although I tried to avoid taking a completely negative stance. In fact, I proposed many projects and strongly supported many projects.

(13b)

However, somewhat facetiously, I became known among the group as Dr. No. If we were unable to arrive at agreement within the group, it then went directly to the President and I know of no case in which my position was not supported. When we met with the President, of course, it was the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of CIA, as well as Mac Bundy. And after hearing the arguments out, the President always supported the positions I had taken. Of course, in taking positions I considered desirable, I would obtain the views of the Secretary of State; but, knowing him well, knowing the problems in most cases, I took views on my own initiative, trying to represent as best I could the foreign policy interests of the United States without regard to my own personal predilections. The position that I always took, and the question that I always raised, was whether the risks were worth the possible rewards. In many cases, they were, and I supported them. In other cases, they were, and I didn't support them. However, this involved me in the totality of our most sensitive operations and relations abroad and was a very broad experience for me.

After the Bay of Pigs, the President asked General Taylor, Maxwell

Taylor, to leave his position as, I believe, Executive Director of the Lincoln Center in New York, and anyway, come down as his personal military advisor. His first job was to look into the Bay of Pigs action and make his recommendations with respect to that. General Taylor and I, having been together in Japan as Japanese students back in 1935 and having maintained some contact with each other, we had the basis of a personal relationship. I had some participation in General Taylor's work with regard to his recommendations on the CIA and the intelligence community arising out of the Bay of Pigs action. And then the President asked General Taylor to form a Special group, parenthesis, Counter-Insurgency, end parenthesis--it is different from the 54-12 Special Group--to consider actions the government should take with regard to subversive insurgency throughout the world.

The President had very much in mind the situation existing in Laos and in Vietnam: the fact that we were evidently ill-prepared, and ill-trained, and had not done very well in these situations as well as in the situation in Cuba in which a very small revolutionary nucleus had been able to overthrow the government. I was selected to represent the Department of State on this group, which was composed, as I recall it, of General Taylor as chairman, Ros Gilpatric as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Allen Dulles, and subsequently John McCone, of the CIA, Ed Murrow of USIA, the director of AID--oh, let me , well, in any event, later became--Dave Bell, and, very importantly, Bobby Kennedy. Bobby had taken a great interest in this subject and even though he was Attorney General, he served on this committee. This was a somewhat heterogeneous group. However, I think we were able to accomplish some things.

There was, from the outset, the philosophic difference on what the

group was; that is, whether it was in itself an executive agency, apart from the government departments, or whether we, who were representing the government departments, were simply representing our departments and our actions took place through our departments. Bobby Kennedy never quite brought himself around to the idea that this was a discussion, coordinating group representing the departments, as opposed to being an executive agency, in itself, which gave direction to the departments. We had many discussions on this subject. Our terms of references were heavily discussed, but I took the view that the group could have no meaning, or no reality, except insofar as it represented the departments and the participants in it took action through their departments, as opposed to holding themselves out as another agency --, as something apart and above their departments.

I'm not quite sure the President always understood this. The President was inclined to feel that he could put somebody in charge of something, and this person would be able to give directions to the departments, and the departments of the government would have to carry them out. This ignored the realities of the departments in Washington. It ignored the realities of the responsibilities of the Secretaries heading those departments, who had to dispose of their personnel and their funds, and who had to make the decisions on them. This is something they could not delegate to anyone else. This conflict of philosophy in the special group, counter-insurgency, continued to a greater or lesser degree throughout the period I was there. However, for the most part, it was accepted that we were acting for and on behalf of our departments.

When General Taylor left his position as chairman of the group and advisor to the President, to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question arose as to who would take the position of chairman. It was

quite clear that Bobby Kennedy, himself, very much wanted to be chairman. However, the whole operation of the group was so deeply involved in foreign affairs that it was evident that if Bobby did become chairman, he would, one, carry out his concept of the group having an executive character of its own, and, two, it would cut very deeply into the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. It was, therefore, decided, after discussion with Dean Rusk, with Mac Bundy, and with the President, that I would assume chairmanship of the group. This put me in a little anomalous position, as I was junior, as far as official rank was concerned, to all the other members of the group, and a little anomalous also in that one of the members of the committee was also a member of the Cabinet. Above all, he was the brother of the President and very, very sensitive and concerned in looking after the interests of the President. I don't say this as criticism at all, but simply as fact.

This made my position somewhat difficult, and I tried to hew a line between having the group carry out what I felt were its proper responsibilities and also let Bobby feel that he was participating in a meaningful way. Bobby, thoughtful and generous person though he could be, when it came to the President's interests or what he thought were the President's interests, could be a very difficult man; he also could be a very difficult man, particularly, with subordinates. He used to bore in very, very hard. He, in particular, bored in on Fowler Hamilton, who was then Director of AID, and subsequently . . . Oh, what was his name? Fowler Hamilton's Deputy? He bored in very, very hard on them. And at times, he would have other individuals reporting from the departments, reporting on this, that, or the other. Bobby would assume very much a prosecuting attorney's manner and place me in a difficult position and also place the

individual concerned in a very difficult position because it was a little hard to talk back to him considering the position that he held.

One particular occasion, Bobby got angry and disgusted with what somebody, who was in from AID, was reporting with regard to a certain situation. I must say, I don't blame Bobby for getting impatient with him. The fellow was doing a pretty poor job of it. However, Bobby stood up and slammed back his chair and stomped out of the room, slamming the door. I felt badly at this, because I felt I should have done a better job of protecting the individual who was appearing; I immediately discussed it with Mac Bundy and, also, the Secretary, and asked to be relieved of the responsibility. After some discussion, it was agreed that Averell Harriman would take it over and, hopefully, would be able to handle the situation better than I found it possible to do. However, with all due fairness, I don't think Averell was able to keep things under better control than I was. I don't want to exaggerate this. It was not a serious problem but it was something that bothered me; I don't think the group did as well as it could have done.

My own thesis always was that the group, instead of being centered in the White House, should really be centered in the State Department. I had hoped to get that carried out but at the time I'm saying this, it is still centered in the White House. Among the things we did in the group was to set up training courses in what I called internal defense, rather than counter-insurgency, and I particularly was interested in taking advantage of it to set up training courses for personnel of other departments that were going to the field. My own theory being that, rather than expect the ambassador to wave a wand over a group of men coming from disparate backgrounds--commanders of troop units in the field, or journalists coming

into USIS, or businessmen coming into USAMS--the concept of the team effort--and the coordinated approach to problems--should be started back in Washington. So that each senior person going into the field would at least have the beginnings of a common approach, common understanding, and a particularly common understanding of where their aspect of things fit into the whole.

Out of this grew the Senior Seminar in the Department of State under the chairmanship of the Department of State, at their side, I think that this has been quite successful. It is far from perfect, but for the first time, we have something in the way of a coordinated orientation program in Washington for people going to the field.

Training programs were also undertaken throughout the military services to give the military a concept of the approach that was necessary to subversive insurgency; that it just could not be a straight military approach, but that it had to be a coordinated political, economic, and social, as well as military, approach.

One of the other results was a great strengthening of the police training program in AID. When the new Administration came in with some of its theoretical concepts upon the place of AID--some of them feeling that politics should intrude into AID, and you should have a pure economic approach to AID, and that police programs just didn't quite belong in AID--police programs, which AID had traditionally been carrying on abroad in a small way, were heavily downgraded. One of the results of our work was my appointment as chairman of the inter-departmental task force to look into the whole question of the police program. As a result of this, the decision was made to keep it in AID, rather than transferring it over to the Department of Defense, as some in Defense wanted; but also an organi-

tional as well as personnel, strengthening of the whole program in AID.

We also established the Inter-American Police Academy in Panama. This has subsequently been transferred to Washington. We also took away from the International Police Chiefs Association in Washington the very indifferent training program that had been carried out for police officers coming from abroad for training in the States and established a police training academy. In this, I was able to get the cooperation of the FBI and Department of Justice.

One of my responsibilities for the Department was liaison with the FBI on policy matters. Traditionally, the Department and the FBI had eyed each other warily and kept each other considerably at arm's length. I tried to establish a personal relationship with Hoover, as well as his principal subordinates, and gradually, over a period of time, developed what I feel were much more effective working relationships between the two departments. This obviously involved a lot of things: espionage by diplomats, particularly Soviet bloc diplomats in the United States; the handling of cases on this; and the proper handling of these matters so as to take all U.S. interests into account, rather than just the interests of the FBI. On this, I think we established mutual confidence and demonstrated that by working together, both of us could serve our respective portions of U.S. interests much more effectively. I do feel that I was able to establish much more effective relations between the Department and the FBI, although I would not call them ideal.

Another aspect of my responsibilities was relations with the CIA. Having known Allen Dulles, and having known many of the men in the agency over a long period, I was able to start from the basis of a good personal relationship and establishment of much more effective working relationships also.

In this connection, the CIA had, over the years, been accused of freewheeling. Some of this was justified. Some of it resulted, in my own opinion, from a lack of willingness on the part of the State Department to assert itself and a lack of willingness on the part of our ambassadors abroad to assert themselves. I feel that I was able to establish a much more effective relationship and control over the operations of the CIA without creating friction.

As far as I was personally concerned, during the three--somewhat more than--three years that I was in the job in Washington, I don't know of a single case in which the CIA undertook an operation without the knowledge or approval of the Department. At least, no case ever came to my attention. I'm talking now of that we call primarily political action operations abroad, as opposed to intelligence operations. Throughout the time I was there, the whole question of our role with respect to intelligence operations was never entirely clarified, but in that, I feel that we also established better relations.

One of my concerns, and a continuing concern, is the fact that over the years we have, in our establishments abroad, given so much cover--as it's called in intelligence--cover to CIA personnel, that our embassies have become all too closely identified with CIA. One of the things which I've worked hard on is to try to get the CIA to move out from official cover into private cover. However, this is very difficult for them, but it's something that's worthwhile in the long run both for themselves and for ourselves. Where we have been excluded from a country officially, it means that CIA, also, for the larger part, gets excluded; we simply do not maintian the type of intelligence coverage that we should. We've become so enamored, I often feel, of gadgets. The U-2, for example, the U-2 was a great

feat and I think it was well worthwhile. But we Americans do not seem to be at our best inthe hard drudgery, dangerous drudgery of just plain old-time espionage; it's important that we improve on this.

Throughout this period I was, of course, involved in our reconnaissance satellite program, the development of what was then known as the Oxcart Program, the super reconnaissance plane. I was also the State Department member of the Space Council, of which then-Vice President Johnson was Chairman, and became quite well acquainted with him at that time, as well as in handling the Washington end of his first trip to Southeast Asia in 1961. On that trip, I sent with him Frank Meloy, who was then my staff aide. The Vice President became very fond of Frank--as he should, because he was very able--and tried to persuade me and him to let him come to the Hill and join his staff on the Hill. I didn't want to lose Frank. I really didn't think Frank could be fully utilized up there, and Frank didn't want to go. So I just put the Vice President off. As an example, though, of his technique, he and Lady Bird had Frank around to their house several times and tried to persuade Frank he should go. But the Vice President, every time he saw me, tried to urge me to let him go, but I took a stand against this. He accepted this in good humor, but he's never forgotten it. He often reminds me of the fact that I wouldn't let him have Frank Meloy.

One of the thrusts of my efforts throughout this period was to establish a stronger voice, if you will, by the State Department over Defense Department plans and budget; my feeling being that in this modern day, we cannot, as I've often said to those in the Defense Department, afford to have war plans. We must have political military plans. In this day, with our forces strung around the world, it makes little sense for the

Defense Department to make plans for bases, and weapons and deployments in a vacuum. They must be made in the light of the political realities of the situation and in the light of overall U.S. foreign policy. For example, such things as whether we should build more carriers, or should we depend on land bases; what is the outlook with respect to land bases; what are the costs, both in dollars and political costs of developing land bases, as opposed to the flexibility of the carrier. As you can see, I feel strongly that carriers have a very definite place in a limited war. I was also the proponent of establishing a carrier fleet in the Indian Ocean area and was successful in getting several cruises through the Indian Ocean area. Surprisingly enough, I encountered resistance from the Navy, even to this; the Navy being concerned that it would degrade its strategy or its role in all-out nuclear warfare. However, that role was already being lessened by the fact of the land-based missiles and the Polaris, and being degraded, as far as carriers were concerned, by Polaris and land-based missiles. The Navy has finally come around to the point of recognizing the role that it should have and the role that carriers can have for less than all-out warfare. It's during this period that I became known over at the Pentagon as Admiral Johnson.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, in October of 1963, I was able to put into practice my own theories on the welding together of political-military policy. I'll talk more about the Cuban Crisis later. At this point, I might note that I was one of the fourteen individuals who were directly involved in it from the beginning and directly involved in all the meetings with the President on it, and one to receive from President Kennedy one of the calendars, marking off those days, that he gave to those that were most closely associated with him.

Many theories and much debate, of course, went on during those tense days. When I finally made up my own mind on the course of action to be adopted, which was the quarantine course that eventually was adopted, instead of writing long papers and arguments and putting forth theories, what I did was to develop a very simple outline that I called a scenario in which I set down in chronological order the political, diplomatic, and military moves to be made to carry out the quarantine plan. In other words, I put down on a single sheet of paper what I always felt should be the essence of a political-military plan to cover a given situation, melding the two together so that the one complemented the other. This scenario that I worked out together with Paul Nitze was seized upon by the President and others that were dealing with the problem and became the basis not only for the decision that was made but also for carrying out the whole operation. It worked out the timing of our military moves, the timing of our evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo, the timing of the President's speech, the timing of our moves in the Security Council, the timing in the movements of our ships. It was the government-wide plan for carrying out the whole operation. Of course, the outline plan which I drafted had to be modified and refined--I having done it simply off the top of my head--but the essence of it was maintained and with only a few refinements, it was the plan that was, in fact, carried out. I'm very proud of this. I feel that it is the way that we must act in the world today, and it also maintains the control that the President must have in these situations. As I've said to War College classes, in these days when the President of the United States has virtually unlimited power, he is always going to ask for and obtain virtually unlimited control. The day of assigning a mission to a military officer abroad and letting him go his own way has long since passed.

I'm down to the end of this side of the tape. This is the end of the first side of Tape Number Seven by U. Alexis Johnson. The end of the first side of Tape Number Seven.

14

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 14

(14a)

This is the second side of Tape Number Seven by U. Alexis Johnson.

Playing back the first part of this tape, I find that I recorded it at Saigon on September 2, 1965, just shortly before I left for Washington. It is now August 11, 1967, almost two years later, and I'm sitting in my office here in the residence in Tokyo, so I have much upon which to catch up.

First, I did carry out my plans for my return to the United States, stopping in Tokyo on the way to make a speech at the Research Institute at Japan, often called the Jiji Institute. This was a very large audience, with the Prime Minister and most of the members of the cabinet present, and I gave them the best I could on Vietnam. As I said previously, I used this as a basis for my talks elsewhere in the United States, and while I have a written copy of the talk, my best copy probably is an off-the-record talk which was recorded at the Air War College on January 17, 1966. The Air War College at Montgomery recorded my talk there. I have included that tape with my other tapes here, so that gives as broad a picture and as extensive a picture as I can of the way I was looking at Vietnam at that

time. I don't feel that I now have much to change at this time in the views that I expressed at that time.

Incidentally, after returning to the States, during the somewhat more than a year that I was back there, I suppose I must have given fifty or sixty speeches at various places around the country on Vietnam.

However, to get back to my trip back: I stopped at Lansing, Michigan, and picked up a new automobile there and then drove down to Washington, arriving on a weekend. Your mother still had her arm in a cast from breaking her elbow but was getting along much better, so we made plans for leave. I went back into the Department on Monday, September 20, and saw the people there, of course, and then I saw the Secretary. I'd already agreed to take my old job back. I told him, though, that I would like to have some leave before going back to work. He asked me how much, and I said thirty days. He swallowed a little at this, but cheerfully, relatively cheerfully I should say, agreed. So I stayed in the Department until the end of September, I think it was September 30. Yes, looking at my diary here--I have an office diary--September 30.

I then took off on a month's leave, in which we drove down to Asheville, North Carolina, and then out to the West Coast and then up to Oregon, and then back by way of Omaha. Your great-grandmother, my mother, met us in Omaha and then drove back with us to Washington. I had my nomination hearing before the Senate on September 23. They were very kind to me and confirmed me the next day. I, of course, met with everybody in Washington, with Secretary McNamara and the Secretary and the President and Mac Bundy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Well, going through my calendar here I see I was seeing just about everybody in those two weeks before I took

off on leave. We went about a little over a week of our leave down at Asheville, North Carolina, with some people who became very, very good friends of ours, the Gaylord Davises , who had a place right on the golf course down there. They and the members of the golf club just couldn't have been more hospitable, and I spent a very enjoyable time there, only giving one speech. I gave a couple of speeches out in the Los Angeles area and then one up at the University of Oregon, but otherwise I spent most of the time on leave, coming back into the Department, taking up my job on Monday, November 1.

It was almost as if I had never been away. Many of the same problems were on the desk, and I was able to step right into things and start working again with no difficulty. There was all too much, of course, as usual to be done. In addition to my job in the Department, before I returned the Foreign Service Association had also re-elected me--I had previously been president of the Association--as president of the Association. During my time there I tried to devote as much time as I could to the Association as well.

When I came back on the job the Secretary assured me that the plan still was that I was to go as ambassador to Tokyo whenever Ambassador Reischauer left there. The Secretary and I both agreed that Reischauer was doing a good job. There was certainly no reason to try to push him out, and we didn't seek to do so. However, Reischauer himself made it clear that he wanted to leave. Later on, when this became known, a few senators strongly urged him to stay, and there were efforts made to make him stay. But he wanted to leave, and even though there were many rumors with regard to my appointment to Tokyo during the time that I was in Washington, never-

theless, contrary to his normal rule, the President eventually did nominate meto the job. By his normal rule, I mean that whenever there was a leak about an appointment the President was inclined to shift appointments, I think partially just to demonstrate to the press that they were wrong, or whoever gave out the leaks that they were wrong.

I stayed in the Department almost a year. I was nominated for Ambassador to Japan in August, had my hearings then, but did not get away until the middle of October. I took some leave en route in Honolulu, and of course made speeches, and finally arrived in Japan on Saturday, October 29, just a year and a month from the time that I'd taken up my job back at the Department.

I find it hard to pick out highlights right at the moment of that year in the Department. It was a very active time, with my going out of town almost once a week, as a rule, to make speeches. I found it very a strenuous time. One of the problems I faced was the fact that having been in Vietnam and so intimately associated with it, I tended inevitably to get drawn into it much more than I otherwise would have. William Bundy was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Leonard Unger was coordinator of Vietnamese Affairs at the time, and I tried hard not to get into their jobs or interfere with them. But inevitably I got called upon a great deal with regard to Vietnam, and of course I had my responsibilities, in any event, and interest with respect to Vietnam.

This was the year during which we started our big build-up of forces there. Looking back upon the history of this whole affair, I must say that at the time that General Taylor and I recommended the bombing of the North back in February of 1965, or the bombing was undertaken in February of 1965, and we brought the first ground forces in, I never conceived that we would ever commit the amount of force that we now have there or that we would be forced

to commit it.

I am not being critical of the fact that we have done so. In fact, I don't see that we've had much choice. However, if we failed in any way in this, I feel that we failed in not foreseeing what the other side could and would do and seeing the build-up that this required. Our commitments of forces have been piecemeal, in the sense that each decision has been a logical decision that has followed on the next one.

For example, at the time we started the bombing, shortly thereafter, the first ground forces that we introduced were the Marines to protect the airfield at Danang. General Westmoreland and the Air Force had made a strong case for bringing in Hawk missiles to protect the airfield, and as these missiles had to be stationed outside the perimeter of the field on hills surrounding the field, they made a strong case for bringing in Marines to protect the Hawks. And so with the first ground forces that were brought in the concept was only that they were there to protect the missiles, which were there to protect the airfield. Then the 173rd Battalion of the Army was brought in down around Bien Hoa, and in each of these cases we hoped that what we were doing was going to be enough. However, as the year went on it became increasingly clear that it was not enough, and so we were forced gradually to commit additional force. Looking back on it, I think where we fell down was not making clear at any point along the line to the President the decisions that he might eventually face. The whole thing just sort of crept up on us, and it crept up on him, with each decision following the other decision.

Looking back on it I don't know, though, with the wisdom we had at the time, whether it was possible for us to foresee the way things were

going to go, or to make the decisons that the President was facing clearer, or clarify the decisions that he was going to have to make in the future. This has been part of the problem. I think all of us expected, hoped and expected that our forces were going to be more effective than they are. This is no derogation of the forces themselves; the men fought well. But somehow we have not developed a means of bringing all of our enormous power and machinery to bear upon an enemy of this kind. We're still in the process of doing so. I don't know where we could have done better, except I share the general feeling that we should have and should now be doing better with what we have than we are.

This is a very frustrating affair, of course, for everybody involved. The other side is showing great tenacity and also great courage. I, at this time, characterize the real problem of the war as not being one of bombing of the North or pacification in the South, but rather convincing Hanoi that we mean to stick with this just as long as they are going to stick with it. I don't think we have convinced them of this. I think our tradition of free press and free speech tends to mislead them on this. I think they tend to see a reflection of their experience with the French in 1954 and are hoping and expecting the same thing again from us; that is, if they stick with it, we're going to be forced to reverse course.

I must say that at this point I wish that I felt in my own mind completely satisfied that they are wrong. However, I do have some fear that the frustrations of the war are going to bring about an attitude in the United States that might force some reversal of course and less than a satisfactory settlement. I think this would be a great tragedy, because

I am convinced that if we could only convince them that we're going to stay with this, I think that we could have peace inside of a week. However, I've got off on the subject of Vietnam, as I usually do. As I travel around Japan, as I talk to people here, I find that whatever subject I start out with, inevitably I'm ending up talking about Vietnam.

Tokyo here is an excellent point to keep track of things. Almost everybody from Washington and everybody from Saigon stops over here. Of course I know most of them, and in some ways, I'm able to keep even closer track of things here than I would if I were back in Washington. I thus find it a very good and a very interesting post from that standpoint. However, I need to get back to my year in Washington and try to talk about this a little bit.

I have my office calendar in front of me here, and I'm going to look through it to try to pick out some of the highlights, other than Vietnam. Of course, Vietnam was always involved throughout the year that I was there. (Interruption).

Looking over my office calendar for that year back in Washington, I've decided that my estimate of fifty or sixty speeches during that year was very modest. It seems to be at least two or three speeches a week, in and out of Washington, along with briefings. During that year, particularly after the departure of Tom Mann, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, during the absence of the Secretary and George Ball, the Under Secretary, I was quite frequently for relatively short periods Acting Secretary. As such I attended some Cabinet meetings, and for the latter three or four months of my time in Washington I was also, in effect Acting Under Secretary; that is, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, carrying

out much of the work that Tom Mann had been doing prior to the appointment of his successor, who was appointed only shortly before I left.

I find that I was nominated by the President to do my job here in Japan on July 25. I didn't have my Senate hearing until August 23. I was confirmed on August 31, and I didn't leave for here until October 14. I of course, was anxious as I could be to get away as soon as I could. However, the Secretary was very reluctant to have me leave, and I finally only did leave at the time there were a number of other changes in the Department. In addition to Foy Kohler, our former ambassador in Moscow, being appointed to take my place, George Ball also left about the same time and was replaced by Nick Katzenbach. After many months of being vacant, the second Under Secretary's job, which Tom Mann had occupied, was filled by Gene Rostow, the brother of Walt Rostow.

One of the early questions I dealt with of a fairly major nature after I returned was working with General Taylor on this whole question of the coordinating function of the Department of State. Both of us were deeply impressed, particularly during our period in Saigon, with the fact that our government really wasn't organized to deal efficiently and effectively with things that cut across many departments and agencies, particularly something such as the war out in Vietnam. General Taylor obtained a mandate from the President to seek to bring about some reorganization in this regard, and I worked very closely with him on what eventually became the establishment in the Department of State of the SIG, or the Senior Interdepartmental Group, and the IRGs, that is the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary. We worked very hard at this whole program, and it was announced over at the White House, I believe, about March.

There are many philosophical points involved in this. Everybody agreed that the Department of State should be the point short of the President which should have the coordinating role, but of course everybody is jealous and concerned with their own problems and with their own departmental positions. A great deal of the discussion turned around whether the words in the directive should be "coordination" or "direction." Traditionally, the Department has had a coordinating role as far as foreign affairs are concerned, but coordination is something quite different from direction. However, it became very clear that whereas the Secretary of State and those he designates, including ambassadors abroad, can have a veto over somebody doing something abroad, that is,they can tell them not to do something, it is not possible for the Secretary of State or for an ambassador specifically to direct somebody else to spend money. This goes back to the autonomy of our departments, and goes all the way back, of course, to the whole appropriation process, including the committees in the Congress. Thus, no matter how many words and how strong words the President may use with regard to the role of the Secretary of State, there are always limitations on what he can do.

Another factor in our working this out was the personality of Dean Rusk, the present Secretary. He is not--and I'm glad to say this, I think it properly so--a bureaucratic in-fighter. He has great respect for the positions and prerogatives of his colleagues in the Cabinet, and he does not seek power either for himself or for the Department. He prefers to work indirectly. Personally, I'd be glad to see him a little more assertive in this regard, but that's the way he is. And he's a great Secretary of State without any question.

So we finally worked out a presidential directive which provided for the establishment of the authority of the Secretary of State, within the limits of law, to direct foreign activities abroad and set up the machinery with the Senior Interdepartmental Group, with the Under Secretary as chairman. I had great hopes for this. There was considerable thought and some urging that I should be chairman of this group, but I pointed out that it needed to be at a higher level, and this meant at the under secretary level. George Ball, while he went through the forms of using the machinery, really never got the full use out of it, and we never really got the committee working the way it should. On one issue I recall that involved the Department of Defense, under my urging he did make a decision. The decision was taken. The decision was agreed to at the Group, but then when the Secretary of Defense heard about it he immediately went to the President, and this served to undermine the authority of the Group.

As far as the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, that is, those chaired by the assistant secretaries, some of them worked relatively well and some of them did not work too well. It's a matter, of course, of personalities, individuals, and the willingness of people to assert themselves. I've tried to point out that for this machinery to work well it is necessary for those in the Department working with it to take a broad point of view, and not to look at things simply from a parochial State point of view, to look at them from the standpoint of the President. I wrote an article for the Foreign Service Journal on this, in which I set forth my views. It's not a matter of State claiming any particular superiority over any other department, but I do feel that State is the one point short of the President that must assert itself on his behalf. Insofar as it operates within the framework of the President's policies and ideas,

of course, it can be effective. However, I think that we have still fallen far short of the potential that we have for really coordinating and directing activities abroad. It's much better than it was, but I still think it could be much better than it is.

During this period, I, both as Acting Secretary and then as somebody involved heavily in Vietnam, saw considerable of the President, occasionally having small lunches with a few others at the White House with him, and became well acquainted with him. In this regard, I want to say that I have very high respect for the way he operates. He tends at times and likes apparently to give the impression of operating impulsively, but of all the presidents--well, there haven't been so many, Truman and Eisenhower, really, and Kennedy, of course, were the ones that I'd known previously and seen operating directly--I've worked with, I don't know of anyone who worked harder at his job. He was more willing to read, study, to listen, to hear opposing points of view, and when he made decisions to make clear-cut decisions. From this standpoint he was--was, I should say still is--a very satisfactory man with whom to work. As far as his decisions are concerned, as I've often said, I can in no way fault him. I think that the decisions that he has made are sound decisions. The fault, if such it be, is not what he does but the way he does it. He has a way of irritating people, or not making himself as effective as he could because he, too often I fear, appears to be, even though he may not be, acting for effect and straining for effect.

During this period, I made the trip in February of 1966 with the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense out to the first of the Honolulu meetings on Vietnam, which was attended by then-

Chief of State Thieu and Prime Minister Ky. This was very hurriedly gotten together. However, I think it turned out to be a quite useful meeting, although again I think here the President handled it so that it seemed as if he were working for effect rather than results. This was a very strenuous time, working all the way out on the plane and all the time out there and working all the way back. We had a midnight meeting with the Vice President at Los Angeles on the way back, and then the Vice President was sent on his way out. It was a very strenuous time indeed.

I might note, going through my calendar, that one of the things I did on Vietnam of which I am not particularly proud was a "Face the Nation" program on November 28, 1965. I have a film of that program. The reason I am not proud of it is that the panel, as they told me before we started the session, were trying to get a headline out of me, trying to trap me into saying something that I wasn't willing to say or able to say. Thus we sparred with each other throughout the session, rather than really getting out the information that I felt should be gotten out.

(14b)

They were trying to get me to say that we couldn't make peace in Vietnam even if we wanted to. Of course I shouldn't say <u>even</u> if we wanted to, we couldn't make peace in Vietnam because the Vietnamese government was so opposed to the making of peace. This is not true, and I tried to deal with it in the best way that I could.

December 8, 1965, I received the Rockefeller Public Service Award, which was by no means empty, for it carried with it ten thousand tax-free dollars. This is administered by Princeton University, but the support of it is by John D. Rockefeller III, who I know well. I used two thousand dollars of it to pay off the money I'd borrowed when I returned back to

Washington and put the other eight thousand dollars into a mutual fund which hasn't done too badly; it hasn't done too well, but it's gone up a little bit since I put the money in it.

In February Mac Bundy left the White House, and this resulted in a period of considerable confusion, with nobody over there really taking his place. I had great respect for Mac Bundy. We worked very closely and effectively together, and I very deeply missed his going. In June of '66 Dick Helms took over the CIA as director of CIA. Dick and I had long worked together and were good and close personal friends, so this very much facilitated work between the Department and CIA, and my role in that. I have great admiration for Dick Helms, and I think he's done a fine job there.

Throughout the period that I was back there this time, one of the perennial issues with which I found myself forced to deal was the whole question of Africa, particularly South Africa and black Africa, our attitude toward South Africa in particular. I felt that under Governor Williams as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and even later with Joe Palmer as Assistant Secretary, there was a certain tendency in the Bureau to treat South Africa as if it really wasn't their responsibility, but rather a pariah which they should attack at every opportunity. Whereas I had no sympathy for the racial policies of South Africa, I felt that it was important for us to maintain as cooperative a relationship as we could in the fields that we could maintain it, instead of taking what I often felt was simply a vindictive attitude towards them on anything that came up.

The issue arose over a number of things. One of those primary issues was over whether we would supply, or re-supply, or should I say supply the refueling of a small research reactor that they had bought from us some

years previously. There was a strong feeling that we should "punish" them by refusing to supply the fuel. Eventually it was agreed that if France were to apply international atomic energy controls, that is, IAE controls to the uranium fuel that South Africa was selling them, that we would supply the fuel for the reactor. However, this was completely beyond the control of South Africa. I felt our fuel policy was very shortsighted, my own feeling being that if we intend to make ourselves a trusted source of techniques and fuel, for not just experimental reactors such as this but also for power reactors, we are not going to be able to use our control over the supply of fuel as a political weapon in dealing with other countries. Because no country is going to be willing to put itself at our mercy for its fuel, and above all its energy resources, if it feels that we are going to act in a--oh, what shall I say--a somewhat arbitrary manner for short-term political gains every time the question of supplying fuel comes up.

Going back to the question of general philosophy, while I had great personal liking and respect for Governor Williams, and of course I also have it for Joe Palmer, I felt that in the Bureau there was a certain tendency to feel that anything that the white man in Africa was involved in was somewhat suspect, and if the black man was involved in it, why, it deserved our sympathetic ear at the very least. I tried not to look at things along racial lines, and I tried to act as a certain balance on this. I don't particularly criticize Williams or Palmer on this. It certainly was necessary that black Africa get a good hearing, and they were strong exponents of its point of view. I think it important in our government that we have strong exponents of what may at times be an unpopular point of view. However, I found myself arbitrating, intervening in dealing with a larger number of what I would call small African problems than anything else.

I was also at this time heavily involved in all the discussions with the Disarmament Agency on disarmament matters, particularly the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and also the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other such questions. There was always a certain amount of pulling and hauling between the Disarmament Agency and myself, representing the rest of the Department, on these things. The Disarmament Agency, having its direct access to the Secretary, was a little impatient at having other points of view put forward. I have full sympathy, again, here for the Disarmament Agency and the job that Bill Foster has done there. I don't know of anything more important in the world than being able to do something genuine with regard to disarmament, and I think that certainly it's been wise to establish a separate agency that has made this its responsibility. However, enthusiasm for disarmament cannot replace the realities that exist, and I always felt it very important to see that the Secretary was fully presented with all other points of view. On the whole I maintained, I feel, reasonably good relations with the Agency and was able to carry out what I felt were my responsibilities for seeing that the Secretary was fully presented with all points of view.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, the issues in which I was most deeply and continuously involved were the issues of the bombing and bombing policy. On this there were hours and hours of discussion with the Secretary, with the President, with the Joint Chiefs and with all the differing points of view involved. My own view on bombing, from the beginning, had been that we undertook it in February of 1965 as the one thing that we could clearly do that still left us flexibility of action, but which would demonstrate to the people of South Vietnam the fact that we were with them, and as a means of halting what was then the very serious downward slide in the whole

country. Thus I make no apology for the fact that we had, at least I did, a strong political motive. Having gone through the Korean War, I was under no illusions as to what the bombing could do, or what the Air Force could do, with respect to halting supplies. However, I did feel that it could inhibit and somewhat raise the costs and act as some incentive on the North to bring about an earlier end to the war. On the latter, perhaps I was wrong.

I never did feel that a mass bombing of North Vietnam was wise, nor did I feel that a mass bombing of North Vietnam would break the morale, so to speak, of the population. The country being very heavily agricultural, what could be done by bombing, as far as the economy of North Vietnam, was obviously very limited. With this in mind, the argument of course always was around to what degree the bombing should be extended into the northern part of North Vietnam, to the supply lines from China, to Haiphong and the Hanoi area, and to what degree it should be concentrated in the south. The view that I consistently took was that while I could see some value in bombing some targets around the northern part of the country, that is, around the Hanoi-Haiphong area, I never felt that it would have any value in breaking the morale of the North. I felt that its material effects would be limited. Thus, in general I tended to take the view, and expound the view, that we should concentrate on the southern part of North Vietnam, that is on the supply lines into the South. Rather than scattering our effort over a larger part of the country, I felt that it was always wise, both from the standpoint of the material effects we were seeking as well as from a political standpoint, to concentrate our efforts in the South.

Each week we would have a discussion of the bombing targets for the coming week, and one of the jobs that I had was to discuss this with Defense

in order to get their point of view, discuss it with the Secretary. Usually the targets were decided at meetings between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and, ultimately, with the President. I still feel that this is the way it should be done. In an action of this kind, I do not think that it can be left just to the military men to decide what should be bombed from a military point of view. Because we are obviously seeking not only military effects, but we are also seeking political and psychological effects, and obviously the latter are of equal importance with the military effects. Also, we always, at all times, very much have to bear in mind, and the President above all has to bear in mind, the possible consequences of various courses of action. An enlarging of the war is certainly not in our interests.

As I've told the Air Force in many discussions, I think that they tend to do themselves a great disservice by overstating what they can do. I don't minimize what they can do, I don't minimize the heroism of their men who have performed admirably, but I think they tend to overstate what they can do. Also, I've told them that I feel that, both from the standpoint of the Air Force and the air arm of the Navy, one thing that we need very, very badly is a weapons system and a doctrine that does not require the enlarging of the area of hostilities in everwidening concentric circles. This is not a doctrine that can stand up in the future any more than it has in the past.

No President of the United States is going to likely enlarge the area of the war, and enlarging the area of the war in these limited actions is likely to be very counterproductive. I told them that what I feel that we need above all is something in the way of a weapons system and a doctrine that would enable us to establish what I call a land blockade; that is, a

system which would enable us to prevent the movement of men and materials across a given area. If this could be done, I think that we could have very much more hope of success of fighting limited wars of this kind, and confining China within its borders until it decides to live at peace with the world, than we do have with a doctrine that requires us continually to enlarge the area of hostilities. I don't think it's beyond our genius and our capability to design such a system. I've talked about it many, many times, and I hope eventually that we can arrive at such a system.

One of the anomalous facts in this Vietnamese affair is that we find ourselves with weapons systems, particularly in the air, that are designed for the next war, that is,in the sense of being designed for a nuclear war or a war with a highly sophisticated enemy. This is contrary to our previous history, when we've usually found ourselves with a weapons system and military force designed to fight the last war. It makes little sense to be using three and four million dollar, highly sophisticated, electronically controlled aircraft in the environment in which we are operating in Vietnam, particularly in South Vietnam. A much cheaper and slower plane, I think, could do the job very much better. I am very impressed with the job that the T-28's have done in Laos, and the A-1s, A-1Es and A-1Ds, the old Navy propeller driven aircraft, I think have performed much better in South Vietnam than have the new, more modern and faster jet aircraft.

One of the things to be noted is that our ground forces entirely did away with their conventional antiaircraft weapons, on the thesis that they were not effective against jet aircraft. But the Viet Cong in the South and the North Vietnamese in the North have demonstrated that conventional antiaircraft can still be highly effective against jet aircraft. Whereas the A-1, for example, can take a great deal of punishment and still

come back to its base, the modern jet fighter plane is so crammed with plumbing and electronic gear that a hit almost any place makes it very vulnerable. Thus our modern jet aircraft have turned out to be much more vulnerable to ground fire than anyone had anticipated. I'm not saying this in criticism, I'm just pointing out what seems to me to be a fact. Also, our modern jet aircraft, as far as the guerrilla war such as that going on in the South is concerned, are not able to hover or to stay around a target, keep a target in sight the way that a slower and more maneuverable aircraft is able to do.

After I returned to Washington I immediately went back into the work of the 303 Committee, which I'm not able even now to discuss in detail. After Mac Bundy's departure, I in effect became chairman of that Committee and dealt with all of those matters. All I can say is that during the time that I was on the Committee, I don't know of any big or bad slips on our part. I should say one of the subjects I also dealt with, in which I was very interested, was our whole science office in the Department. I made great efforts to strengthen this at the time I was there.

I had been responsible for setting up the science office during my 1961-62 period in the Department, partially in response to the pressures from the President's science advisory board and then from others in the scientific community, but we'd never been able to find a first-class scientist who was willing to accept the position. I continued my efforts during the time that I was back there, because I felt it was very important that this aspect of our work be strengthened. My feeling--well, I should say the feeling of Secretary Rusk and a feeling which I shared--was that we in the Department needed a very strong science section to give us an independent view of what was going on in the scientific world. As the

Secretary often said, "We have one half of the academic community, that is the scientific half, hurling us into the future, and the other half digging over the dead bones of the past." Such things as atomic energy and space and the exploration of maritime resources and all these things obviously have a very strong foreign policy context.

However, I was very disappointed that the scientific community, having urged us to set up this office and properly so, was never able to come up with a first-class man to head it. In default, we had an acting scientific officer in charge of it, Herman Pollack, who I think did a first-class job. But I was very disappointed that we were not able to get a first-class man out of the U.S. scientific community to head it. Strangely enough, most of them seemed to be very status conscious. They were not willing to come into the Department unless they were assured that they would be given the direct ear of the Secretary of State, that they would have at least the status of an Assistant Secretary of State. As I used to point out to them, not so much depended on titles and charters as their personal competence. The Secretary of State would be willing to listen to them no matter what their title was if they had what they took, but they could not create, in effect, a "treaty" with the Secretary of State. They had to work within the framework of the established framework of the Department, and I felt that the proper man could do so.

Well, for the moment I will turn from this phase to my assignment to Japan. Of course, I would not be honest if I did not say that being appointed as ambassador to Japan had a great deal of sentimental satisfaction to me. At the time I was language officer out here in my first post the ambassador was so far above us that although we can hope maybe someday to occupy the job, actually, looking at it realistically, there seemed little

chance of the possibility of doing so. Finally, after all these years of having started my career in Japan as the lowest of the low, that is, a language officer, at the very bottom of the heap here, to come back here as ambassador to this great country had a great deal of emotional and sentimental satisfaction attached to it. It's seldom that it's given to us human beings to realize our ambitions in the same way. I realized full well that the Japan to which I came back was a far different Japan than that to which I was first assigned; however, I had confidence that I would be able to do the job.

Ed Reischauer had done a job that very much needed doing here, and had done it very well; that is, establishing relationships with the Japanese intellectual community, the Japanese people in general, and getting out and making himself known and establishing a sympathetic relationship with a broad range of people here. His predecessors, MacArthur, Allison particularly, had confined themselves to the very narrow range of the leadership here. I'm not criticizing them for this, I think this was important at the time they were here. I think the job that Ed Reischauer did was important at the particular period in time that he was here, and I think he did it superbly. However, that period had somewhat passed, and it was felt that a different style could perhaps be useful here. Of course, my style was different from anyone else. Each of us are our own individuals, and as I've said, I tried to be myself and tried not to pose as something else.

I can't do the kind of a job that Ed did with the intellectual community here, but I felt then and I think I've been successful in establishing a relationship of confidence with the leadership and the business community in the country without alienating others. I've tried to establish as broad a relationship as I possibly can without taking as bold, shall I

say, a public posture as Ed did. I've tried to work more quietly, and instead of giving a large number of speeches and television interviews I've tried to work with small groups, talking to small groups, and seeing as many small groups across the whole political and intellectual spectrum as I possibly can. I feel that up to the present time I've been reasonably successful in doing so.

We arrived here, as I said, at the end of October, and moved into this beautiful residence. I think it's the finest residence that we have in the Foreign Service. I already had a very fine staff established here, people with whom it was easy to work. One of my problems was replacing my long-time friend, my longest-time friend in the Foreign Service, the best man at our wedding, John Emmerson, who had been Deputy Chief of Mission here for many years and was due for a transfer. It would, obviously, because of our close friendship, be somewhat difficult for us to work together. I was very fortunate in obtaining David Osborn as my Deputy Chief of Mission. I see I'm getting down to the end of this tape, so I will stop it at this point and go on with Japan and what I've been trying to do here and the problems that exist on the next tape, which will be tape number eight. This is the end of tape number seven.

15

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 15

(15a)

This is Sunday evening, August 13, 1967. I completed the second side of tape number seven yesterday, on Saturday, and I'm now turning to this tape number eight, addressed to my grandson, Brad Zerbe.

I've now been in Japan here for some ten months, and it is probably time for me to review what has gone on thus far and somewhat of what I see with respect to the future. First, as a personal note, I should say that we had a wonderful Christmas last Christmas, with our daughter Jennifer and her daughter, our granddaughter, Patty, coming up from Bangkok and my mother coming out from Washington. We were all here together at the time, and it was a very enjoyable Christmas. Patty was just a little over two years old and was emerging into a personality, and she is a very good combination of the heritage on our side and the heritage from her father. She is a beautiful looking girl, very graceful in her actions, and I became very fond of her, as I'm sure you will, Brad, when you learn to know her. It was a great joy to have her around the house, and it was a great joy to have my mother here at the same time.

They went back after, oh, I guess it was about four or five weeks. Your Aunt Jennifer was very active when she was there. Mother went back--my mother, your great grandmother--after about six weeks, went back by ship to the States. I'm looking forward to having Jennifer and her Patty and your mother and you three boys, Brad, Greg and Dean Alexis, all out here next summer, that is in the summer of 1968, to take you up to Lake Nojiri, where we spent two summers here, in 1936 and 1937, and which your mother

remembers very fondly. I think it's a very fine place for children, where you can swim and sail. I hope that I'll have the opportunity to show you a little about sailing up there.

Now, to come back to my job here in Japan. As I mentioned, I think Ed Reischauer had done a very fine job of re-establishing communication, as he called it, with the mass of the Japanese people. He spoke all around the country; he appeared on television programs, and in general made himself well known. My style, of course, is not his style, and I felt that a different style is needed here at this time. Japan has now become a major power in the world, a major economic power. At the present time it is second or third, probably, in steel production. It produced 40 per cent of all ships produced inthe world last year. It's already passed Germany as a producer of automobiles. Its gross national product last year was over one hundred billion dollars, and it's become a very major power. It has recovered much of its sense of confidence. My own feeling is that relations between our two countries now need to be put on a mature basis of two great countries dealing with each other in a sense of maturity and with a mature fashion. Thus, I look forward to more normal diplomatic practice, more normal diplomacy with them, working through their government. This doesn't mean that I don't need to know as much as I can about the country.

Going back, of course I studied the Japanese language back in 1935 and '37. I was not a very good student, but nevertheless I was able to get through the course fairly well. And I used the language up until 1942 fairly extensively. During the 1945-49 period when I was consul general at Yokohama, this was under the occupation period, there were few Japanese in Yokohama, and I myself used Japanese very little. Thus, it's really been about twenty-five years since I really used the language, and I've forgotten it very badly in the meantime. Thus, one of the first things I

did when I arrived here was again to study the language, starting right at the beginning and going right on through. I've got to the point now where I can handle social and normal conversation fairly well, but I do not yet try to deal in complex technical subjects.

One of the things that has impressed me is that coming back to a language after twenty-five years you realize how much new vocabulary there is in the world in every language, including our own. The whole post-war period of economic relations, with the World Bank and balance of payments and gold flow and the type of thing that we heard very little about before the war; the United Nations, with its blocs and all the complexities of the United Nations; our whole security treaty organization and everything that goes with this; all the military terms, missiles and rocketry and atomic weapons and supersonic planes and jet aircraft and all this type of thing--all this is new. Then of course everything with regard to space is all new. There's a whole new vocabulary in the world which each of us, knowing our own languages, have gradually grown up with, but coming back to another language you realize how little you know about it. Thus, I'm only making slow progress in Japanese. I take thirty minutes of very intensive instruction every morning before work, and this is of some help to me. I wish I had more time.

However, to go back to my approach with regard to this job here. I feel that my job, first of all, is to represent the United States government to the Japanese government and to work with the Japanese government. I've thus made a special effort to become as well acquainted as I can with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and the other senior members of the government. I've called on all of them, and I've had most of them to the residence for a meal of one kind or another, so that I'm able to get

to know them as well as possible. At the same time, I've tried to travel as much as I can in the country. I have visited all the areas where we have consulates: the Kansai area, that is Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area; the Nagoya area; Kyushu, where I visited Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and the new city of Kitakyushu; Sapporo, in Hokkaidoi; of course, Yokohama I've seen a great deal of. I've also been over to Niigata, and--let's see-- I think I also mentioned Nagoya as well. I'm trying to get out to the other areas now, where we have our cultural centers.

My normal practice at each of these places is to try to meet with as many small groups as possible, leaving it to the consul and the consul cultural center to arrange these meetings beforehand. They set up a series of small meetings, starting early in the morning as a rule, with labor leaders, political leaders, with the university people, with the business people, the chamber of commerce people, some of the religious leaders and so on. I usually try to have at least an hour or an hour and a half meeting with ten, twelve, or not more than fifteen people, at which we sit around the table and talk about things as frankly as we can. I find that most Japanese respond quite quickly to this, contrary to their attitudes in the pre-war period. I find that I'm able to get some very useful conversations going, which I think helps me understand them, and also I'm able to get our points of view across. I found this very strenuous, but I've also found it very interesting.

At the same time, at each of these places I usually have to give a speech to the local Japan-American society. I've tried to make these speeches as noncontroversial as possible and also to talk not just about U.S.-Japanese relations, but to try to talk more about the world outside, the food-population problem, the whole question of the developing countries

and so on. My feeling is that this country is still very insular; they still look very inward, and they need to have their sights raised to the world around them. They talk considerably about this, but they still don't have a very broad view of the world. Their aid programs, for example, are still very commercially oriented, rather than looking at the larger issues that face them.

As far as the issues that have faced me since I arrived here, the major one, I should say, is Okinawa and the whole question of whether or not the administration of Okinawa should be returned to Japan. In some respects this is an artificial issue, but it's also a genuine issue, in that every Japanese politician must say that he wants the administration of Okinawa returned, and every Okinawan politician must say that he wants to return to Japan. My own suspicion is that at the present time the Japanese government really doesn't want to have Okinawa returned to it as long as the Vietnamese affair is continuing, because this would involve them in responsibilities with regard to Vietnam to which they do not wish to face up. The whole, shall I say, anti-militarism that arose after the Second World War is still very strong here. Article IX of the Constitution is still very much an article of faith.

It is curious, but I think understandable to those who know the Japanese, that whereas they fought so fiercely during the war, when the surrender came on September 2, 1945, they did an absolute 180 degree turn. I explain to visitors that this is understandable in light of the Japanese emotionalism. I've never known a people, I've felt, who were more emotional than these people, and like most emotional people, they can be subject to extremes. We Americans, of course, are also emotional, but I think these people are even more emotional. To me, the picture of a Japanese officer

cutting off the head of a prisoner with his sword and then fifteen minutes later weeping over the falling cherry blossom is an entirely comprehensible one in Japanese terms. Prisoners we captured during the war would, after a few hours or a few days, usually cooperate 105 per cent with us, to the degree that no American, or few American prisoners, would consider cooperating with the enemy. However, this is a part of the emotionalism. They left their old world behind them; they felt a new life had begun. This was true of this nation on September 2, 1945. They'd gone through the war, they'd done their best, it had led them to disaster, and thus they started out on another course.

Thus this desire not to get involved in war again is still very strong here. When they look at Okinawa with realistic eyes, they recognize that our bases and our military posture down there could possibly again involve them in war, and they shrink back from that. Yet at the same time, they want the administration of Okinawa returned to Japan. My own approach on handling this has been to point out that this is really not an issue between Japan and the United States, it's an issue for Japan itself to resolve. Japan itself must decide what kind of a military presence they want the United States to maintain out here, both from their own immediate standpoint and from the standpoint of the rest of East Asia. Once they determine that, then we can discuss the question of Okinawa in much more realistic terms. In other words, I'm trying to put the problem back to them. I have thus carefully avoided making any public speeches with regard to Okinawa.

I think that the Japanese are beginning to debate the question of Okinawa in much more realistic terms, and I think that they're going to come to the decision that they want the United States to maintain an effective

military presence there. As I tell them, if they don't want us to, the United States cannot remain, will not remain, in this part of the world. I want to get them to worry and concern themselves a little bit with what we are going to do in this part of the world. Just yesterday morning, on Saturday morning, I had a long talk with Matsuoka, the chief executive in Okinawa, and I put this very much in these terms to him. However, the Okinawa question is becoming increasingly important. And I expect that--well, I know that . . . Let me put it this way: I had a long official talk with the Foreign Minister on this about five or six weeks ago. He is going to the United States in September for the annual Cabinet level conference, and of course is going to discuss it with the Secretary of State. Then the Prime Minister is scheduled to go there in November, and he will want to bring back something with respect to Okinawa, and I also should say the Bonin Islands, that is Ogasawara, at the same time.

I'm trying very hard, and I'm communicating frequently with Washington to try to get a position in line here on this for our government. My own feeling is that there's really no military reason for us to retain a special relationship with respect to the Bonin Islands, that is Ogasawara, any longer, and that they should be returned to Japan with our having the same military base rights there as we have elsewhere in Japan. Actually, our base arrangements in Japan here have worked very well. We are doing, in Japan here, everything that we reasonably could ask to do. Yokosuka is the home port of the Seventh Fleet, a good part of the ships are repaired there; Yokota air base out here is on the main transit line to Vietnam; a large part of our helicopters and aircraft damaged in South Vietnam are being repaired by Japanese aircraft companies here; and in general we're being able to operate very freely and very effectively from Japan. The

question of Iwo Jima, which is a part of the Bonins, the Ogasawara chain, that is volcano islands, is somewhat an emotional one for Americans. The suggestion I've made is that we ask the Japanese to designate the whole island of Iwo Jima as a military base, under our present security arrangements with Japan. We actually are doing very little there.

The whole philosophy of the Navy with regard to the Bonins is that if we lose Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, it's important to have an area upon which we can fall back. I think this is absolute nonsense. If we lose all that area, we certainly are not going to be able to make any defense from the Bonins. We're not going to try to maintain a presence out of there. As far as Okinawa is concerned, I feel that Okinawa remains a military asset to us as long as we have the support of the Japanese. The important thing is to maintain as much as we can the support of the Japanese population and the Okinawan population. If the population down there were to turn against us, the bases would be of little value to us. They've been a very complacent population thus far. It's amazing that we have been able to run an area with a population of one million people with an American military officer in charge for more than twenty years after the end of the war. What has worked in the last twenty years is certainly not going to work during the next twenty years.

Thus, I feel that it's going to be possible to work out an arrangement with the Japanese, under which we will be able to have freedom of action with regard to the defense of Taiwan and the defense of Southeast Asia, without having our hands tied. However, this is going to take some time. My concern as of tonight is not so much that Japan is going to force our hand, but my concern is that Washington is going to decide that we do want to get rid of the administration of Okinawa; therefore, it's going to push

me to obtain an arrangement with the Japanese much faster than I think the Japanese are going to be able to agree to the kind of arrangement that we want, and I think most people here want.

Another question, a somewhat lesser one which is not amenable to direct diplomacy, is this whole question of American direct investment here in Japan; that is, the ability of American companies to come in and establish factories on their own here in Japan. The Japanese are very, very concerned about this. The principle is entirely on our side, and I keep pressing privately for the principle. I don't think it's useful for me publicly to do so, because I don't feel that the Japanese government can appear to be reacting from pressure from the United States. Like everything it does and like every other government, I feel the Japanese government has got to be able to present what it does in the light of its own interest to its own people.

With respect to this question of capital liberalization, that is American capital coming in here, the Japanese, from their standpoint, are understandably nervous. There has long been, historically throughout modern Japanese history, a paternalistic relationship between the government and business here that's quite different from that to which our business is accustomed. Things are done here not just because they are good for this particular business or that particular business, they are done because the government gives guidance to business in the light of what the government conceives to be Japanese national interest, and business is quite responsive to this guidance. Also, this is a very closed society, as I've previously mentioned, very much a group society. The Japanese work as groups. Your businessmen here work as groups, and they work as a group with the government. They all more or less understand each other. This doesn't mean that

they don't have differences, but they understand each other and they work relatively comfortably together. Their concern is that no matter how well foreign business and American business may attempt to behave here, no matter how well it may try to act as a good citizen of Japan, nevertheless, they are not Japanese and they are not going to act as Japanese.

They are also concerned that the big decisions that will be made with respect to business will be made by boards of directors back in the United States, which are beyond the influence of the Japanese government. They see American capital as being an enormous colossus, waiting almost, in effect, to overwhelm them. As I tell them, of course, they've got to recognize that they're seeking business opportunities in Korea and in Southeast Asia, and to the countries of those areas, Japan appears to be almost equally a colussus. Part of their problem also is that they're very concerned with what they call their medium and small-scale industry here. Their big companies, the Mitsubishis, Mitsuis, and the Kawasakis and so on, are able to compete in world terms, but they have a large amount of small-scale industry here which is very inefficient. They know that it is inefficient. However, it is also politically very potent, and they are thus concerned with American capital and American firms coming in here and in some lines of endeavor putting this small business out of business.

I can understand how they feel about this. Yet I feel, as I tell them, that with the successful completion of the Kennedy Round, with all the opportunities it offers for increasing trade between countries, there not only has to be increasing trade, but there also has to be an increasing free flow of capital. If we and Japan and the rest of the world are going to be able to realize the potentialities of the world in which we now live, we've got to look at this from the standpoint not just of business. Of

course, we have the same problem. We've got to look at it from the standpoint of our populations and how we can raise the standards of living of our populations.

Another thing related to this I've attempted to do since I arrived is to get into a genuine dialogue with the Japanese upon defense matters. We've not had any real discussion of these matters with them in the past, and I'm very anxious that we are able to do so. I raised this shortly after I arrived with the then-Vice Minister Shimoda, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimoda, who is now Ambassador to the United States. I discussed it with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Minister and with Shimoda's successor Ushiba who is now Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Last May I finally established a system under which a career officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that is, the Vice Minister, the Vice Minister in the Japan Self Defense Agency, and in effect the chairman of their joint staff, together with myself as chairman on our side and people from Washington and from CINCPAC, are able to sit down and discuss together such matters as the military importance of Okinawa, the nuclear threat of China, whether we should establish an anti-ballistic missile defense, and all these fundamental issues.

The problem on their side is that they've just not had the organization for doing this. There's also the problem of their maintaining security, because of the lack of any laws in Japan now for preserving Japanese secrets. There is a law under which U.S. military secrets can be preserved, but that's the only law. However, we did have a meeting in May, and we're going to have another one during the course of this month, on August 22 and 23. I hope to get to the point that we can sit down at least once a month for free and informal disucssions of these subjects, because as we move ahead I think it's more and more important that the two countries more fully

understand each other.

I don't know that I have a great deal more to say this evening with respect to Japan. I'm going down to Okinawa to see General Unger, the High Commissioner there, on Wednesday, August 16. That is your grandmother's birthday, and they're giving her a birthday party down there. I'm going down by Air Force T-39. I wanted to go there in any event, in order to talk with General Unger there about the Okinawa problem before I return to the States on August 28.

We're having our Cabinet level meeting on September 13-15. I'm going back on August 28, together with your mother, stopping a day in Seattle to see my cousins Irene and Clyde Lagerstram there and also to get a little rest. Then I'm going on to Washington on August 29, to be back there to discuss matters there before the Japanese arrive.

Your uncle Stephen has just arrived in Washington from Paris on his way to Vietnam, and he's going to be in Washington at that time, as well as your uncle Bill. I'm planning with them to go down to Williamsburg on September 5, to have five days with them before the Japanese arrive there on September 10 and to give me a chance to get acquainted with Bill and Stephen again after some absence. I'm also of course looking forward to seeing my mother, your great-grandmother, in Washington, where she now is. I talk to her quite frequently on the phone, and she seems to be getting along very well. I'm going to end this recording here at this point and will pick it up later.

(15b)

To bring you up to date, or rather to identify where we are, this is now Sunday, May 5, 1968. The last recording I did was on August 13, 1967. So it's been many months since I have put anything on these tapes, and I

felt that it was about time that I should do so. Today we--we being your grandmother, my wife, your Aunt Jennifer and I--went to see a performance by an English company of the musical "Oliver" at the Imperial Theater here, a very magnificent new theater. We've just come home. I have been planning to renew these recordings for some time. In doing so this afternoon here I've been going through my office diaries, that is the diary upon which my appointments have been kept, to try to refresh my memory on what has been happening since I last talked to you.

Very shortly after my last date, that is on August 16, I went to Okinawa, together with your grandmother, for just one day in order to have some time with General Unger, the High Commissioner down there, before I went to Washington. I went down on August 16, which was your grandmother's birthday. General Unger had a party for her down there, and then I returned the next day, at which time we had the commander's lunch at Zama. I might at this point note that one of the things I first did when I arrived here was to try to set up a closer liaison with the American military commanders here. I instituted the system of having lunch with them once a month; that is, with the commander of U.S. Forces Japan, who is simultaneously the commander of the Fifth Air Force, the commander of the U.S. Army forces here, and with the commander of the Navy forces here, together with the chief of staff of U.S. Forces Japan, who is now Admiral Wilkinson, and my deputy minister, Osborn. I use this simply as an opportunity to get together informally with them and talk things over.

We meet in rotation here at the embassy and then out at each of their headquarters and usually have a game of golf afterwards, that is, unless it's here in Tokyo, then it's not possible. In any event, we had our lunch on August 17. Incidentally, we went down to Okinawa on the T-39 of the

Air Force. These planes are very convenient. I learned to like them when I was in Saigon and use the Air Force or the Navy T-39s here very often.

I'll just give a little chronology, and then I'll go back on some of these things. On August 28, your grandmother and I left for Washington, going from here to Seattle, spending a day at Seattle, at which time the Boeing people there showed me their mock-ups of the new giant transport plane, the 747, and also their supersonic transport. I also saw my cousin, Clyde, my cousin Irene and my cousin Clyde's family there. They are on the Lagerstram side of your family, that is on your great-grandmother's side of the family. They are the children of your great-grandmother's sister, Jennie, who passed away some time ago.

From Seattle we went on to Washington. I did the work there preparatory for the joint economic conference between Japan and the United States and also met Stephen, who had arrived from Paris on his way to his transfer to Saigon. I said I had hoped to spend some time with Stephen in Williamsburg, but he had other things he was planning to do at the time and he's not a golfer, so Bill spent the time with us down at Williamsburg. I spent four or five days in preparatory work in Washington, and then Bill drove us down to Williamsburg. The three of us stayed there for some four or five days, it was, until the Japanese group arrived on September 10. Then we had two days with the Japanese Cabinet group there. We took a helicopter from Williamsburg up to Washington, and on September 13 we opened the joint economic conference. I'll go back on this.

After the joint economic conference was over Bill and I went up to Montreal to see the World's Fair up there, and we met Stephen up there. Your Uncle Stephen had previously been stationed in Montreal, so he was very well acquainted around there. I particularly went up to see the World's Fair up

there, because we're having what is known as Expo '70, that is a world's fair, here in Japan, at Osaka in 1970. The question was what kind of an exhibit and what we would do here at that time, and I wanted to get some impression of what things were like up there. We just spent one night overnight in Montreal, and then I returned to Washington. Then your grandmother and I went out to Omaha to see you, Brad, Greg, and Dean; spent as I recall it about two days there. Then we went on to Honolulu, where I met with the Commander in Chief of the Pacific and spent a day or two, and returned back here to Tokyo, arriving on September 28, just a month since the time I left. It was a month that went very fast.

After I got back, again in October, I went to Hawaii to address a national convention of the Propeller Club. That's a group that's interested in our Merchant Marine. I went there one afternoon, stayed overnight, addressed them the next day, and then I came on back here. Shortly after I got back Prime Minister Yoshida, the famous postwar prime minister of Japan, died, and so I was involved with the national funeral that was held for him. Yoshida was a very great man. We had a special delegation come out from the States, consisting of General Ridgway, who was the last commander here prior to the entering into the treaty of peace, and Senator Tower. I had hoped and so had the Japanese hoped for a much more prestigious delegation, but this was all apparently that Washington was able to arrange at the time.

Then on November 8 I left again for Washington, without your grandmother; I went alone, going directly from here back to Washington to prepare for the Prime Minister's visit. I had an opportunity to stop by and see you all in Omaha. I spent a few days in Washington, and then I took the President's plane from Washington back out to Seattle to meet the Prime Minister.

I stopped over for about four or five hours, as I recall it, in Omaha, which is on the way to visit you. You boys met me at the plane, and the crew showed you all through. You were very excited and happy to see the inside of a special plane such as that.

I arrived in Seattle on the Sunday, met the Prime Minister there that evening, and then on Monday flew back with him to Washington, and we had the meeting between Prime Minister Sato and the President. I returned by way of Honolulu. Let's see here, our meetings were I think on November 14 and 15 in Washington, and then I went fairly directly back home, stopping over in Honolulu simply to brief the CINCPAC there, Commander in Chief of the Pacific there, on what had happened. So I was away again from November 8 to November 22.

This brought us into Christmas, or the Christmas or December area. Your Aunt Jennifer and her husband Mike and your cousin Patty all came up here shortly before Christmas. We had a very active Christmas season, with not only all the usual festivities, but on Christmas Day, as we've traditionally done, we held an open house for all the members of the embassy and their wives and their children, to see the embassy residence on Christmas. Then on Christmas afternoon, as we've always done abroad, we had a dinner at which we tried to have all those who don't have families or any other connections for a Christmas dinner. Of course, this becomes very difficult in a very large embassy such as this, but as I recall it we had twenty-four or twenty-six people in at the big table for a real Christmas dinner.

Now, to go back to some of the substance. As far as the joint economic conference is concerned, there were not any real major issues between the two countries. There were on our side our standard, and I don't

mean to deprecate it by using this term, complaints about the Japanese unwillingness to permit American capital, American investments into Japan, their continuing quota restrictions, that is restrictions that establish quotas on our imports on a large number of products into Japan. On their side, they as usual were concerned about "buy American" acts, protectionism in the United States and this type of thing. But they were really not major issues. The conference lasted for three days, and I was deeply impressed by the amount of time Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, spent on this, attending all the plenary sessions, attending all the social events, which included his dinner for the group and the White House, the President's lunch for the group, as well as the receptions and all that type of thing. I felt that given the issues involved that he spent too much time. I think from the standpoint of Japan it was very, very useful, but I felt somewhat conscience stricken that he'd spent the amount of time that he did.

In addition to the time that he spent with the conference, after the conference was over he had a lunch for the Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Miki, on the Saturday. This meeting went on until about four o'clock in the afternoon. Miki also had meetings with Secretary McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, and others. My own feeling was that as far as these conferences were concerned, the useful part of it was the counterparts getting together; that is, the Japanese Minister of Labor getting together with the Secretary of Labor in the States, the Secretary of Commerce getting together with the Minister of International Trade and Industry here and so on. I feel that we could spend far less time on the plenary sessions. The difficulty is, at the plenary sessions the Japanese ministers change so fast and rotate so fast that they tend to become creatures of their own

bureaucracies and give set speeches instead of having the free interchange which was originally contemplated. I think the whole device [of counterparts getting together] was very useful.

Although it was not on the agenda of the conference, the big issue in the background was the whole question of the return of the Bonin Islands to Japan and how we were going to handle the question of Okinawa. I had discussions with the Secretary of State, also with Secretary McNamara, and we also had an NSC meeting with the President on this subject, which of course I attended. In general, the position that I had taken before while I was here was that I did not feel that we were justified in retaining the Bonin Islands. The primary advocates of retaining the Bonin Islands were the Navy. Actually, they were making very little use of them. It turned out that we only had about sixty-five men scattered throughout all the islands. The Navy's position in general was, without too much hyperbole, that if we were to lose Japan, if we were to lose Taiwan in some unforeseen war, it would be very useful to have these islands. Actually, examining the topography of the islands, the use that we were able to make of them, it seemed to me that this was not a supportable position, and the Japanese perfectly well knew that it was not a supportable position.

As far as Okinawa was concerned, Secretary McNamara took the position that he was entirely prepared to turn over administration to the Japanese. The issues on Okinawa were simply these: it was not a question of abandoning our bases there; it was a question simply of whether we would return the administration of Okinawa to the Japanese and our bases there would be put upon the same basis as our bases here in Japan. This would raise only two questions. One was the question of our freedom of action to engage in combat operations directly from Okinawa against other areas of the Far East,

and the other was the question of our freedom to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

In my private talks with Secretary McNamara, he took the position that he would never again engage in hostilities in this part of the world unless we had the support of the Japanese, and therefore it would be entirely feasible for us to bring the bases under the same arrangements as we had here in Japan. That is, we would not engage in combat operations directly from our bases here in Japan without having the support of the Japanese government. He was also not particularly interested in maintaining nuclear weapons there. I took the position that even though this may be entirely true, I would like to have as much freedom of action as possible. Now, while neither of these subjects were in any way on the formal agenda of the joint economic conference, the fact that Foreign Minister Miki was there and we were looking forward to the Prime Minister's visit in November made it inevitable that these subjects would come up.

Secretary McNamara accepted my point of view, that as far as freedom of operations and as far as nuclear weapons were concerned, we should at this time take a very firm line with the Japanese. My own position being that even though we did not choose to exercise our right to store weapons there, still I would like to have the freedom to do so. In his talks with Foreign Minister Miki, therefore, McNamara took a very firm line on the necessity of our maintaining weapons there. Secretary Rusk also did the same. In general, both of them adopted the very same position that I had urged, and thus Miki did not receive much in the way of encouragement as far as what could be done at the time of Sato's visit. Miki, of course, was simply exploring what could be done.

I should say that prior to this, here in Tokyo, Miki and I had had

a number of discussions, as I'd had a number of discussions with the Prime Minister. One of the problems I had at that time, and have had since, is that Miki is also seeking to become prime minister, and thus to a degree is a political rival of the present Prime Minister. I always have great difficulty in Washington getting people to understand the difference between this parliamentary system of government that exists here in Japan and our executive or separation of powers type of government that exists here in Washington. And that is, a foreign minister here is also a member of the Diet, and he also may be a rival, as the present Foreign Minister is, of the Prime Minister, as far as his political position within the party is concerned. Well, we had a large number of discussions on this, all pointing to the possibility of our returning the Bonin Islands at the time of the Prime Minister's visit, but great difficulty in making any real progress with regard to the question of Okinawa. I, of course, discussed these subjects with Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, when I returned there.

After I returned to Tokyo I had a series of meetings with the Foreign Minister, looking forward to the Prime Minister's visit. In these meetings I took the position that there was a possibility of return of the Bonin Islands except for Iwo Jima, which was a very emotional issue as far as Americans were concerned. As far as Okinawa was concerned, I put forward the proposition that had been developed here by us in the embassy, that we should now seek to move toward removing those economic and social differences--by social I mean such things as wages, unemployment insurance, this type of thing--rather than increasing them. So that at the time that Okinawa was returned it could be done as smoothly and with as little difficulty as possible. This, of course, without prejudice as to the question as to when the administration of Okinawa could be returned. We developed here in

the embassy a proposal for establishing an advisory committee to the High Commissioner, formed of a representative of the United States, a representative of Japan and a representative of the government of the Ryukyu Islands, that would advise the High Commissioner with respect to removing these differences and bringing about what the Japanese called "etika," that is a oneness between the two areas.

The Foreign Minister and I had many long discussions on this subject, in which he pressed me very hard. I took the position that no decisions could be made until the Prime Minister arrived in the States and the President was able to make his own decisions. The Foreign Minister was understandably very disturbed at the thought that even though we might return the rest of the Bonin Islands, we would not return Iwo Jima. However, I made it very clear to him that this was not something that could be decided before the Prime Minister's arrival. It was something that had considerable political overtones as far as the United States was concerned, and all I could do was to talk to him about this in a preliminary way. It was quite clear that the Foreign Minister was not clear on what could be accomplished at the time of the Prime Minister's visit. He was not very enthusiastic about accompanying him, because he was not sure what effect that this would have upon his own political fortunes. Several times before the Prime Minister left he said to me, "You know, I wonder whether it is really necessary for me to go with the Prime Minister?" He was obviously seeking for me to say that I did not feel that it was necessary for him to do so. I of course refused to give him any encouragement in this regard, because I felt that differences between he and the Prime Minister were not in our interest . Ultimately, Miki accompanied the Prime Minister to the States.

Well, the situation was that in all my communications with Washington

between the September meeting with the joint economic committee and the Prime Minister's visit in November, I felt that I had been able to work out an agreement upon returning the Bonins. But the whole question of Iwo Jima as being a part of this was left very open. Also, the question of what formula would be used with regard to speaking of Okinawa was left very much open. Previously, the formula with respect to Okinawa had been that we would return administration at such time as the security situation in the Far East permitted. In Japanese eyes, and understandably so and very properly so, this was a very indefinite future. The Prime Minister wanted to have something that would give a more definite time term to this, but I argued strongly against this, pointing out that it was not a question of time, but it was a question of conditions. The position in general I took was that it was up to the Japanese government to decide what kind of an American military presence it desired in Okinawa; that is, whether it desired that we be effective, that we have an effective base down there or not.

In this connection, I discussed in great detail the whole question of a graduated deterrence, and the question even of graduated nuclear deterrents,and the necessity of Japan making up its own mind in this regard. What I did then, what I have since been trying to get away from, is this whole feeling that these arrangements here in Japan, the arrangements in Okinawa, are solely in U.S. interests, and trying to put it in terms of Japan's own interests and Japan deciding where its interests lie in these things, and having once decided that, then finding whether we have a basis to discuss things. Personally, of course, I feel that it's impossible for us to stay in Okinawa without the support of the Japanese government. Therefore, we have to put the responsibility and the onus, if I can use that term,

for what we're doing very much onthe Japanese government. I don't want the Japanese government to be in the position of being able to say, "Well, we can't do anything about it. It's just those Americans." I personally feel that the Americans will not stay in that part of the world unless they do have the active support of Japan. It's in these terms that I've been talking ever since I arrived here.

I'm getting down to the end of this side of the tape, so I'd better stop this and turn it over.

16

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 16

(16a)

While I'm speaking of the conversations with the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and so on, I might note that one of my greatest difficulties in working here in Japan is the impossibility of conversations, or I might say the great difficulty of having any private conversations. It's not possible without very elaborate arrangements for me to meet with the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister without having the press aware of this, and many of our meetings, discussions, have been carried on through intermediaries. When we've had private meetings, we've had to do this in hotel rooms and out at villas and other places. The press here in Japan follows these people very closely, they follow me very closely, and I find it very difficult to have private conversations with the government here. Even when I think it's private, things leak to the press in one way or the other. When I came here I said that I felt that the essence of diplomacy is being able to handle things before they reached the stage of newspaper headlines, and if we were successful in doing so, we were successful diplomats. However, I have found that almost everything I say, everything I do, eventually appears in newspaper headlines here, even though I'd hoped at times that it would not.

Going back to this Okinawa-Bonins issue. In general, I took the position on the Bonins that, as the Japanese very well knew, we had no real immediate security interest in them. We would gain time as far as our position in Okinawa is concerned, if we would demonstrate our good faith by returning the Bonins at such time as they no longer had any imme-

diate security interest to us. This of course ran into opposition, as I've mentioned previously from the Navy primarily. However, as I also mentioned, I felt that before the Prime Minister's visit I had been able to work out a general understanding and agreement within the executive on this subject. However, at the time I left for Washington, on November 8 just prior to the Prime Minister's visit, things were still somewhat open.

The position that the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking on the Bonins was that I should have a firm agreement from the Japanese that we would be able to store nuclear weapons there, or place nuclear weapons there, even though we had none there now, if in the future we decided to do so. I pointed out that contingency under which we would want to do so was extremely remote, and that if such a contingency were to arise any Japanese government would be deeply interested and involved in the same subject as well. But for any Japanese government now to give such a commitment would be fatal to its existence, because the whole question was just so politically sensitive here in Japan. However, I felt that we had an agreement fairly well worked out on the Bonins. However, the evening I arrived back in Washington I was told that everything had been worked out fairly well, except that nobody had yet talked to the key members of the Armed Services Committee in either the House or the Senate. They asked if I would do so the following morning, along with Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs of Defense, Paul Warnke.

I was somewhat startled at this, and of course not too happy at facing these people who could be expected to be generally unfriendly towards the whole concept. However, I had no choice but to agree. The day after my arrival I spent all day going from office to office in the Capitol, and in the Senate and in the House, talking to the various members of the

Armed Services Committee. I was very surprised to find that they were quite sympathetic to the whole concept of returning the Bonins, as long as Okinawa was not involved. By the end of the day I felt that we had had agreement on this and was able to report this. However, in making my arguments on this my principal concern was with respect to Iwo Jima, and whether there would be an emotional reaction towards the return of Iwo Jima. Surprisingly enough, I found very little interest in the subject.

However, my concern was so great, that in my initial presentation to these people that I talked to, I said that we would be able to keep our memorial on Iwo Jima. Actually, I didn't know what our memorial really was at the time, but assumed that it was a memorial that was the same that was across the river in Arlington in Washington, with the Marines raising the flag. So I said that our flag would remain flying over this memorial on Iwo Jima. It was only after I returned and visited Iwo Jima myself that I found out that the memorial in Iwo Jima was very different from that at Arlington. There's only a small bronze replica of that there; however, that is another subject. In any event, I committed myself to the maintenance of the memorial there. This was done on the basis of the conversations that I'd had with the Prime Minister before I left.

Meanwhile, after I arrived in Washington, let me say that I was very vague on the type of a formula we could use in the communique between the President and the Prime Minister as far as Okinawa is concerned. In the meanwhile the Prime Minister had sent a private individual, a professor here who was his confidant, Kei Wakazumi, here to Washington to see the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow, and present to him a proposition under which there would be agreement between the

President and the Prime Minister that "within a few years" a date would be established for the return of Okinawa to Japan. The Foreign Minister had never mentioned a formula of this kind to me, and nothing the Prime Minister had said here had ever raised this in my mind. I should say in this regard that before the Washington visit, I'd had very limited opportunity to have any real discussion with the Prime Minister himself on this subject. My discussions had primarily been through the Foreign Minister, and it had gradually dawned on me that the Foreign Minister was not necessarily entirely representing the Prime Minister on these subjects.

I went out to Seattle, as I mentioned, to go with the President's plane to meet the Prime Minister, and then on the flight back from Seattle I maneuvered things around, not entirely to the Foreign Minister's pleasure, in a way that I was able to have a private conversation with the Prime Minister. We talked for several hours on this whole range of subjects. During this conversation, the Prime Minister raised this formula with me, that is setting "within a few years" a time for the return of Okinawa. I again went through my explanation of my own feelings, that it was not so much a question of time as it was a question of the circumstances under which both governments were able to agree that the administration should be returned. The foreign office officials were, I should say, not aware of this formula. I said to the Prime Minister, well, he should raise it with the President if this is what he wanted to do, but I could not be sure of what the President's reaction would be.

The day after our arrival, that is, the day of his first meeting with the President, the Prime Minister raised this in his private meeting with the President, with only the interpreters present. After the meeting

was over I was going to go back to the State Department, but I walked out with the party to see the Prime Minister off from the White House, and the President grabbed my arm and brought me back into his office and told me what the Prime Minister had done. He said that he told the Prime Minister that this was something to be worked out with Dean Rusk and Secretary McNamara. I had a long private discussion with the President of the whole subject. It was quite clear that the President was very concerned as to what the reaction of the Congress might be as to any such formula. He, the President that is, asked me to clear this out particularly with Senator Russell, and I of course reported this to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and to Bill Bundy, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Well, now things become a little blurred in my mind. We did reach Senator Russell. No, I had Secretary Rusk call Senator Russell about this, and Senator Russell was very stoutly opposed to anything that would set any time limit. We had a meeting that evening with Secretary McNamara and the Prime Minister and several of us. During this time I talked to Senator Russell again about this but got no place on it. And then the next morning we were involved again. The next morning Secretary Rusk was meeting with Prime Minister Sato at the Blair House, and his staff and the State Department staff and myself were trying to work out some compromise formula. We finally worked out a formula, under which the Prime Minister expressed his wish that "within a few years" the date could be set for the return of Okinawa. The President said that he understood the desire of the Japanese with regard to Okinawa, and the whole question would be subject to continuous consultation between us.

Well, there was a lot of playing around with words. I don't have all the words in front of me at the time, but we finally arrived at some-

thing that the Prime Minister seemed to be satisfied with. However, the President had not passed on it. We thus incorporated these words into the final draft of the communique. Then the Prime Minister went over it and met privately with the President. The Secretary and I had had a few words with the President before this meeting, but he had not committed himself. But I was satisfied that the whole thing had been worked out to the satisfaction of both sides, if not the full satisfaction. We were going to have a plenary meeting with the whole party; as I recall it this was set up about five o'clock. The President and the Prime Minister were going to meet at that time, have about thirty minutes alone together, and then we would have a plenary meeting.

The President and the Prime Minister went into the President's office. Secretary Rusk and I and Miki, the Foreign Minister, and others sat out in the Cabinet Room. Finally, the Secretary had to leave because he had another engagement. After about an hour and a half the President came out, the President and the Prime Minister came out. They had their interpreters there of course. It was one of the low points of my life, you might call it. I was sitting alongside the President, in the Secretary's chair since he wasn't there. The President came in and sat down, and the Prime Minister sat down over on the other side. The President said that they had been considering the language that we had worked out with respect to the Bonins and Okinawa, and he felt this just couldn't be accepted. I was really crushed, of course, because I couldn't see what we could do then. My mind really began racing around as to how we could salvage the whole visit, because this would mean a real confrontation between the two countries.

There was absolute silence in the room for, I don't know, thirty seconds, sixty seconds, something like this. Then the President, without

ever looking at me-- he didn't ever look at me at this time--looked across at the Prime Minister. And he said, "I think my ambassador to Japan just had a heart attack, and I think we had better relieve his mind." Of course, what he was saying was that they had agreed upon the text of the communique, and everybody had a very good laugh at my expense, which I didn't mind given all the circumstances. It was somewhat of an indication of the fact that the President and the Prime Minister had personally hit it off very well. And of course from my standpoint that was a very important aspect of the whole visit.

I also felt that it was an indication of the President's attitude towards me, as he knew how hard I'd been working at the whole subject. In fact, he had accepted all the recommendations that I had made. So, on the whole, I felt that the work I'd put into this had been successful, and that the visit had been successful in tiding over what was still a very difficult situation in both countries with regard to Okinawa. Of course the problem was this: every Japanese politician, including the Prime Minister, had to say that they wanted the return of the administration of Okinawa as soon as possible, and every Okinawan had to say that he wanted to be returned to Japan as soon as possible. But in fact all of them recognized the importance of our position there. I've often said privately to the Japanese, "What would you have done if the President had said that we were prepared to return Okinawa to you at the time of the Prime Minister's visit?" They all agreed that they would have thrown up their hands in horror. This is part of the problem of dealing with political realities and part of the problem of dealing with the real realities of the world. Politicians the world over have to deal in what are to them the political realities, but we diplomats have to work with and deal with what are the

real realities of these situations.

Well, I've been talking here a long time now. I'd think I'd probably better stop. I'm going to have to eat dinner fairly soon and resume this at another time. So I will close this recording on May 5, Children's Day I might say here in Japan, and will resume this at a later time.

This is now Saturday, September 28, 1968. I was just playing back the last part of my preceding recording in May, in which I was talking about the Prime Minister's visit to the States and the question of Okinawa. I didn't play it all back, and I don't recall exactly what I said with respect to Okinawa. My thinking on this has developed considerably since that time, so I might make a few additional remarks, on this. First, I feel that with a new administration in Washington next year, that is 1969, and with Prime Minister Sato probably being re-elected by his party as Prime Minister this November, that both governments need to tackle the whole question of Okinawa in earnest during the course of the next year to see whether or not we cannot arrive at the resolution that will be satisfactory to both governments. I am not suggesting that we necessarily accomplish the return of the administration of Okinawa to Japan next year, but at least we arrive at the agreement on the course that we're going to follow. It is clear that what has worked for the last twenty or more years is not going to work for the future.

One consideration I have in my mind is of course the fact that an essentially American military administration in Okinawa over the almost one million people is not viable over the long term. I feel that our present High Commissioner down there, General Unger, is doing a superb job. I don't know of anybody who could do a better job. He has shown to have a

real political sense, and we've worked very closely together. There have been no fundamental disagreements between us. Thus the problem is not the High Commissioner or the way the American administration is being run, but rather the fundamental problem of whether we can maintain our rule indefinitely over an alien population of over one million people, who are not American citizens and do not have the rights of American citizens or participation in American politics of American citizens, but are rather an alien population.

The problem that concerns me is, whereas the Okinawans are an exceptionally complacent people--it's amazing how complacent they've been with the present situation--over a period of time opposition elements which are hostile to us may eventually be able to create such demonstrations, riots, or civil disorder down there that the small Okinawan police force, and not very effective police force, finds itself someday in a position in which it is unable to cope with a situation. The High Commissioner will be faced with the question as to whether or not to use his American troops against the Okinawan population. If it ever comes to a situation like that, and American forces are required to use force against the Okinawan population, we are finished as far as our ability to stay there. General Unger appreciates this thoroughly, and I know it is his nightmare even more than it is my nightmare. On the other hand, if administration were returned to Japan, then the entire very effective Japanese police force would be available to handle these situations without our getting involved in them. They have shown great capability here in Japan itself, great skill in handling demonstrations, and with their ability to call on reserves from the rest of Japan, I feel that we would be in a much more comfortable position if this responsibility were turned over to the Japanese.

There are two issues involved in the return. Let me say first that the issue is not the removal of our bases. This is not the question whatsoever. In fact, we're doing nothing out of our bases in Okinawa that we're not doing out of our bases in Japan except the B-52 raids against Vietnam, which do constitute direct combat operations out of Okinawan bases. The two issues involve first this issue: our ability to conduct combat operations directly out of Okinawa against another area without the consent of the Japanese government. The second issue is the storage of nuclear weapons. Over the period of time since his return from the United States, Prime Minister Sato, on the basis of his understanding that he would not be able to obtain the return of the administration of Okinawa unless he were able to agree to the storage of nuclear weapons there, has been trying hard to overcome what is known here in Japan as a nuclear allergy and obtain a consensus which would permit him to agree to the storage of nuclear weapons. There are many arguments within our own government as to whether we really need to have weapons on Okinawa; however, I've taken a very hard line on this, because our present position in the U.S. government is that we need to have storage there.

The argument I use with the Japanese, and I think it's a valid argument, is that we need to look at this not simply from the standpoint of Japanese internal problems and our problems, but rather from the standpoint of how it will be interpreted in P'yongyang and Peking particularly. I point out to them that any change in our posture which could be interpreted as a change of attitude on our part could be interpreted by Peking and P'yongyang as a lessening of our deterrence and our deterrent ability. We must always look at things from the standpoint of how what we do is going to be interpreted in Peking and P'yongyang. Our purpose of course

is not to wage war, but rather our purpose is to use our forces so as to prevent war.

Another issue is this issue of free use, as it's come to be called; that is, our ability to be able to operate directly, such as we're doing against Vietnam with the B-52's, without the agreement of the Japanese government. The more I've thought about these issues, the more I'm convinced that this question of free use is probably more fundamental and more difficult for the Japanese government than the question of nuclear weapons, and that if this could be decided, the nuclear weapons question would fall into place.

On the one hand, it seems to me very difficult for any government, and especially the government of what is now the third largest industrial power in the world, that is, Japan, to turn over the question of war and peace as far as its territory is concerned to a third power; that is, to ourselves. I fear that this would not be viable over a long term.

From our own standpoint, I find myself in a real dilemma also. One of our purposes, and I consider it one of the purposes of my mission here, is to get the Japanese involved more deeply politically with us in affairs here in East Asia and to get them to take more responsibility. If we were able to get Japanese agreement to free use of the bases, this would perpetuate the present situation in which the Japanese government is able to evade responsibility, avoid making decisions, and simply be able to take the posture of blaming it on the United States, saying that they can't do anything about what we do. Thus, rather than taking increased political responsibility, they would take less.

(16b)

On the other hand, if we did not have free use, that is, if the

Okinawan bases were brought under our present security treaty arrangements with respect to Japan proper, it would mean that the Japanese government would be forced to take the hard decisions that we might want it to take in any future situation in this part of the world, and thus accept along with us political responsibility for what is done. It's obviously attractive from a military as well as a political point of view to be able to make our own decisions, without involving another government and taking the time and effort required to involve another government, but this would enable the Japanese to continue to avoid political responsibility in this part of the world.

Thus, I am more and more tending to come to the thought that the simple application of the present security treaty relationships of Japan proper to Okinawa may be in our best long term interest. I also feel it's consistent with my view that the American people are not likely again to engage in a major conflict in this part of the world unless they feel they have the active support and understanding of the Japanese. In other words, the present mood in the United States, and it's a mood which I share, is that we shouldn't try to "go it alone" in any future situations out here.

As far as the nuclear issue is concerned, if we did not have free use--that is our bases there would be brought under our consultation formula with regard to Japan proper--and we were faced with a situation in which the use of nuclear weapons, at least tactical nuclear weapons, needed to be contemplated, then if Japan was sharing responsibility with us and if Japan had the same concerns as we had we should be able to bring the weapon back in. And this would not require much time.

Thus, I come to the conclusion that this free use question is probably more fundamental than the nuclear storage question. Of course,

this has to take into consideration the effects on Peking and P'yongyang, of their knowing that we've removed our nuclear storage from Okinawa. But at the same time, they're well aware of what we have in Korea itself and what I hope that we will be able to maintain there.

Shortly after coming back from the States from the Prime Minister's visit, the middle of November, I again went to Hawaii to address the Propeller Club there at their request. I'm sure they expected a flag-waving talk from me about maintaining the American Merchant Marine at all costs to the taxpayer, but I gave them a very hard speech about what I felt was the necessity of the American Merchant Marine showing a forward looking attitude, using technological improvements to modernize itself so that it could become more competitive in the world, rather than simply relying on subsidies.

In December, Jennifer and Patricia Maria and Jennifer's husband came up to spend Christmas with us. Her husband Mike went back shortly after Christmas. As you will hear later, Jennifer and Patty stayed on with us through the summer and the visit of Judith and her three boys, and of Stephen and of Bill. But this comes later.

I should now probably say a little bit about the visit of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise. The Navy had long wanted to establish the ability to bring our nuclear powered surface vessels into Japan, just as they had been bringing nuclear powered submarines for some time. I talked about this issue, anguished about it considerably for a period of time, and also of course talked to the Japanese about it. I finally came to the conclusion and recommended that we bring in the Enterprise on its deployment from the United States back to Vietnam in January. This, perhaps in the wisdom of hindsight, turned out to be a bad

decision; however, it was one that was shared by the Japanese government. I made it clear that it was also their choice, and as the time for the visit approached and opposition to it was increased, I gave them every opportunity to indicate any change of mind on their part. But they did not do so. I feel that the Prime Minister definitely wanted the ship to come into Japan.

The ship came off the coast here as it was going to go into Sasebo. We agreed that it would go into Sasebo and not Yokosuka. As it went off the coast, I took some of the foreign office officials and Diet members out by aircraft to land on the ship. We spent a good day on the ship, and I had a chance to talk to the Admiral in charge of the task force, as well as the captain, about the details. It was clear by this time that the Zengakuren, an extreme student movement, as well as others, were going to seek to mount demonstrations against the ship, on the grounds that it--well, how shall I put it? It was not the question of it being nuclear powered, but it became the symbol of nuclear weapons on board American vessels. Of course, we never confirmed nor denied whether American vessels carried weapons. In this respect, the Enterprise was no different than any other carrier in the Navy, but it tended to become a symbol. The opposition took the view that the Prime Minister was permitting the vessel to enter in an effort to overcome the "nuclear allergy" of the Japanese people, and thus sell them on accepting the storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.

This charge I feel was not completely false, and it's unfortunate that both the government and ourselves got ourselves in the position that we did on the Enterprise. The ship entered the harbor at Sasebo in January, I believe around the middle of January, as I recall it. The

Zengakuren students staged some very violent demonstrations, and other parties staged nonviolent demonstrations against the presence of the vessel.

I should have said that when the question of bringing the vessel in was being discussed and known, the mayor of Sasebo came up to me and said that he by all means wanted the vessel to come in to Sasebo. He indicated this directly to me, as well as he had indicated it to others. But after all the rioting and demonstrations and difficulty that resulted, he became somewhat less enthusiastic. He previously thought that he would be able to handle the demonstrations more effectively, but he had not realized how strong the opposition would be. In this connection, I want to say that although there were heavy demonstrations against the presence of the vessel, there was considerable fighting between the extremist students and the police, at no time was any American bothered or injured or disturbed in any way. There was nothing in the way of personal animosity towards Americans.

The day or so after the Enterprise left, the Pueblo incident, capture of the intelligence ship Pueblo was carried out by the North Koreans. I heard of this first through the Commander of U.S. Forces Japan, and he told me of his situation as far as being able to do anything about the vessel andpromised to keep me fully informed. He had no tactical aircraft in Korea that were capable of coming to the rescue of the vessel. In fact, when we first heard about it, that is when he and I first got the messages from the vessel, it had already been taken over by the North Koreans and was on its way into port. So it was very hard to see what could be done.

He deployed some aircraft from Okinawa to Korea, but they were not able to arrive at the site of the vessel in time to be of any help, and so they were not dispatched. In fact, they would arrive there after dark, and

even if they could have gotten there it's very difficult to see what aircraft could have done to have saved the vessel, which was already in the hands of the North Koreans.

There were some suggestions out of Washington after this happened that commanders on the spot had made a decision not to go to the rescue of the vessel. This is entirely false, and it's entirely wrong to blame the commanders here for the action.

Looking back on it--I've had some experience previously with this type of thing--it's just one of those incidents that happen that with the wisdom of hindsight should have been anticipated. But a sister vessel of the Pueblo, the Banner had been operating out here for many years. We'd never had any difficulty with it, and there was certainly no reason to think that there was to be any difficulty with the Pueblo. I found at this time and still find the action of the North Koreans in this very difficult to explain. At the time I'm recording this the crew of the vessel is still in North Korean custody. I've kept in very close touch withthe embassy in Seoul and with Washington on this whole question. They've kept in close touch with me, and I've offered my views with respect to how the matter should be handled.

The difficulty is of course that the North Koreans have the crew. There is no military means of rescuing them alive. The attempt, if it were made, would result in war without any question, and still we wouldn't get the crew back. The North Koreans are asking for an apology from the United States for wrongdoing on our part. I'm convinced upon the basis of everything I know that the vessel did not violate North Korean waters, and it would be very humiliating for us to apologize. However, I think that we have to make a decision as to whether we are just going to write

off the crew and leave them indefinitely in the hands of the North Koreans, or whether we are going to apologize in some way, or seem to apologize. My own view is that it's now amply clear to most everybody that we had not violated the Korean waters, and an apology on our part would be overshadowed by the fact that we got the crew back. Therefore, while it goes greatly against my grain, I don't think that an apology, which we would of course subsequently disavow, would necessarily redound to our harm to any great degree. I am inclined to believe that this is the way we ought to proceed.

To backtrack a little bit, on January 1, the President made a very strong speech on our balance of payments problems and the measures he was proposing to take to handle these. Almost immediately following the speech I received a message saying that a mission headed by Gene Rostow, who is Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was going to come to the Far East to explain the situation and these measures in more detail and would be here in a day or two. This came during the period of the Japanese New Year's holidays, which are very sacred to them. Nevertheless, on receiving this message on New Year's Eve, the night of December 31, because of the difference in time this was January 1 back in Washington, I immediately got ahold of the Prime Minister late in the evening, told him of the proposal and discussed it with him. He received it in very good spirit, and agreed that in spite of the New Year's holidays, he would be glad to see the mission and would call back from their New Year's vacations the ministers that were concerned.

It turned out to be a fairly successful mission. I thought Mr. Rostow handled it very well, and I think it was of some help to us. However, it is a little difficult for us to expect these foreign countries to

receive a mission of high level visitors from the United States in twenty-four to thirty-six hours' notice. We treat them a little cavalierly in these affairs, and of course we're not willing to respond when they want to do something similar. Fortunately this isn't very often, but it doesn't make a good impression. I think that we could handle some of these things in a much more graceful way, while accomplishing our purposes.

During January I also made two visits down to the Bonin Islands. In view of the agreement that had been reached at the time of the Prime Minister's visit in November, we were negotiating on the return of the Bonin Islands, and I felt it would be useful for me to see them myself. I had to make two trips, because the only way of getting to Chichi Jima, where the civilian population lived, was to go to Iwo Jima and then take an amphibian plane up to Chichi Jima. My first trip the weather turned bad, so that we were not able to use the amphibian from Iwo up to Chichi, and we thus spent most of the day on Iwo Jima. I took along Mr. Ushiba, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and some other members of the foreign office. Iwo Jima, of course, was a terrible, desolate looking place. It is very had to appreciate the unimaginable hardships that the men who fought there on both sides must have gone through.

My second time down we were able to get into Chichi Jima and see the people there. There's a population of about two hundred of the old islanders, together with the small Naval establishment there, living in a somewhat Shangri-La atmosphere. I was glad to be able to see it before it disappears. The climate was of course pleasant, and the scenery is beautiful. The Navy took care of all their needs, from schooling to housing materials to medical attention, without any charge to them. The Navy hauled the fish they caught down to Guam to sell for them. Most of them

were employed by the Navy. They paid no taxes and in effect had virtually no government, as they had no disputes. It was a very interesting page in history, and I was very glad to be able to see it. For any who are interested in pursuing this further, the American Heritage magazine about a year ago, that is in 1967, had a very interesting article on the history of the Bonins, and particularly the population on Chichi Jima.

I also during January had another one of our security subcommittee meetings here in Tokyo. These meetings, I believe I indicated previously, I had suggested as a means of finding a forum for a dialogue with the Japanese on defense matters; my purpose being not to lecture them, but rather to have a place with which we could talk defense matters through; my conviction being that if we talked them through, the Japanese would come to about the same conclusions we do, and therefore we would have a sounder basis for discussing defense matters.

I don't know whether I've mentioned it previously or not, but I want to mention it at this point, my feeling being that our military presence in this country has too long been based upon the Japanese acquiescing in what they thought we wanted here in order to make us happy, rather than valuing our presence for its own sake. Thus I've been trying to get out of this context of our making demands on the Japanese and the Japanese reluctantly acquiescing to them, and get to the point where we can reach common decisions on these things and provide a framework in which our presence here will be better accepted and which will provide a better long-run posture for us here. I think that we've been making some progress in this. We had this meeting in January. In June of this year we met in Washington, and then the early part of this month, September, we had another meeting here. This meeting here was the first one the Japanese

were willing to make public. So that these meetings are now established in the public mind, although it's difficult for the press and the public to accept the fact that they are simply places in which we have a free exchange of views and are not negotiating on behalf of governments.

One of the most difficult problems I've had since I came here arose out of the President's March 31 speech of this year on Vietnam, in which he announced the partial bombing halt of North Vietnam and called for peace negotiations, as well as announcing that he would not run as a candidate for President for the coming term. With a liberal assist from the American press, this was interpreted here as the President reversing policy on Vietnam. It was interpreted as an intention on our part to get out of there in any way we could, as quickly as we could, and as the President admitting a mistake in Vietnam policy. Therefore, his non-candidacy was being interpreted as a resignation in good Japanese fashion, as having admitted a mistake in policy. This came as a great shock here in Japan. The press and the opposition universally called on the Prime Minister also to resign, as they interpreted the President had done, because the Prime Minister had supported the President on Vietnam.

I had more difficulty in explaining this than almost anything I've done. I was clear in my own mind that the speech was being misinterpreted, and I spent hours and hours and hours, one evening five hours on a Sunday night, with the Prime Minister going over the whole situation and trying to convince him that this was not the case. I had nothing in the way of instructions or guidance to go on, except what appeared in the speech itself and my own feel for the situation back in Washington. Fortunately, it turned out to be right and events mitigated the whole situation, but if it demonstrated one thing, it demonstrated that the Japanese

did not want us to abandon Vietnam.

Another aspect of it was that given the interpretation that this was a reversal of policy on Vietnam, the sentiment arose that we might also "reverse" policy on mainland China in the same way, without letting the Japanese know beforehand, and thus leave the Japanese out on a limb with regard to China policy. On this aspect I had to work very, very hard with the Prime Minister, members of the government, members of the Diet, liberal democratic party members, press people, trying to show them that the imperatives of the China situation were such that, no matter how they interpreted the President's speech on Vietnam, it was just not possible for any president to radically reverse policy with respect to mainland China in the absence of some change of policy in Peking itself, which was clearly not evident.

In some ways--not as far as the Prime Minister was concerned but as far as some members of the government were --I would characterize the attitude as being one of, "Well, we have criticized you, that's true, on Vietnam, and we wish you would get the war over. We wish you'd find some way of getting out of there. But we didn't expect you to take us too seriously. We've heretofore enjoyed the luxury of being able to criticize the United States, secure in the conviction that the United States would in any event do what was right, but this shakes our faith a little bit." Well, I think this was healthy from this standpoint, and I think whereas it didn't produce any radical shift in thinking here, it has caused the Japanese to be more concerned themselves about America maintaining the American presence in this part of the world. Of course, this is my big objective.

As I tell them, I'm convinced that the American people will not

stay out here indefinitely unless the countries of the area, and above all Japan, wants them. If Japan does want us to remain here, it's important that they communicate the sense of this to the American people, and that they be willing to accept political responsibility for it themselves. In other words, I'm trying harder and harder to get our relationship more on a basis of a healthy equality, rather than the inferior-superior relationship that we've had up until now. I realize Japan has still only a small part of the strength of the United States, but nevertheless they need to stand on their own feet and make their own decisions more than they have in the past.

The next most difficult problem I faced was when in May it was alleged that the American nuclear submarine, Swordfish, which was in the port of Sasebo, had caused some radiation. Actually, the radiation readings that were taken by the Japanese were about what you would get off a wristwatch, but unfriendly elements in Sasebo, as well as here, publicized this as a tremendous threat and charged that the Swordfish had been the source of the radiation. The problem was how we could prove the negative. I spent almost full time at this for weeks. I told the Foreign Minister the problem was it was a non-problem. If you have a real problem, you put your hands around it and do something about it, but this was a non-problem and very difficult to handle. As a matter of fact, I'm still working at it now. As a result of this, we've not had any nuclear submarines come back into Japanese ports yet. But I'm trying to work out other arrangements under which they can do so, and feel that at the time I'm speaking now that I'm very close to success on this.

Also in May, the end of May, I made an extensive trip through Kyushu with your grandmother. This is near the end of this tape, I see.

[Let's] see, do I have much more? No, I guess I don't have. I can't quite see where the end is, but I guess I'd better stop it at this point and will go on with the next tape.

This is the end of Tape Number Eight, Tape Number Eight by U. Alexis Johnson.

17

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 17

(17a)

It is now Saturday, September 28, 1968. I have just finished a part of the end of Tape number 8 and am continuing on from this point.

Through most of the spring I carried on negotiations for the return of the Bonin Islands to Japan. This turned out to be much more difficult than I expected. Although the problems involved were relatively small, the number of inhabitants was small, nevertheless both ourselves and the Japanese were eyeing these negotiations with Okinawa eventually in mind, although we had agreed that these negotiations did not constitute a precedent for Okinawa. This was to keep our options open on that.

One of the problems was that I had taken the position that there should be no balance of payments windfall to Japan with respect to their return. The amount of money was small, but I wanted to establish a precedent as far as Okinawa was concerned. And we finally worked this out by the Japanese buying enough equipment and supplies that we had there to offset the amount of money that the native inhabitants were exchanging for yen, that is, the dollars they had on hand, that they would be exchanging for yen.

I was also very interested in doing all we could to protect the local inhabitants who had been living an ideal existence and who would face real problems when they were returned to Japan. This was a delicate matter of course, as they were Japanese nationals and in theory we had no basis for negotiating on their behalf, but nevertheless I did succeed in getting good arrangements for them.

There were also problems of defining the base areas that we were going to keep and all this type of thing. Throughout this I found Foreign Minister Miki very difficult. I had liked him very much and still like him very much as a person. He's very intelligent and quick and pleasant to deal with, but in this emerged the fact that he finds it very difficult to make up his mind. When I felt that I had the whole package all sewed up so to speak, sent it back to Washington and had obtained approval of the Secretary and the President of the package, then Miki came along and wanted to change some things and I had to start all over, in effect, on some aspects of this. So I found the negotiation extremely difficult, much more difficult than it should have been.

I also found Miki's attitude to be somewhat strange and grudging. Here we were returning territory to Japan and, as I said at the time we reached agreement in principle to do so, I hoped that Japan would make the most out of this to reduce pressures for the return of Okinawa rather than simply having it whet appetite for the return of Okinawa. Miki made strong professions to me in this regard, but when it came to the negotiations and the actual signing of the agreement itself, he took a very strange and grudging attitude towards this. I mentioned this to the prime minister and I think it's in part because of this, but the prime minister and the government arranged a very large public celebration on the return of the Bonins here in Tokyo shortly after the agreement had gone into effect.

I continued to travel around the country. I made almost a week's trip all through Kyushu. This was my second visit to Kyushu. I went over to Kanazawa over on the Japan seacoast, and, oh, I also got up to Chikoku this summer. Up to Morioka, Aomori, then to Hokkaido to Hakodate, Ashigawa, and Sapporo. At Sapporo I was guest of the governor of the

centenary of the opening of Hokkaido. They were very gracious up there. The Emperor and the Empress were there and the prime minister and I was seated alongside the prime minister in all the different occasions. And at the banquet was the only non-Japanese called on to speak. Hokkaido is very interesting. Americans have a very considerable part in its development and they're remembered up there very warmly. It looks entirely different from the rest of Japan with the straight roads and straight streets and square fields, looks much more like many parts of the Midwest than it does Japan. I also should mention the barns and the silos that give it a Midwest appearance.

On each of these trips I make it a practice of giving a speech at the Japan-American Society, and there's usually an active one. Meeting newspaper reporters and giving a press interview and then having the background meeting with the editors of the local press. Of course, meeting the governor and the mayor and the usual procedure is that they give me a dinner. And then I try to meet with local political leaders, students, professors, and businessmen on a background basis and trying to get as free discussion as possible. I find this very interesting and very stimulating, although it gets pretty tiring to change towns and change hotels every day.

In June of this year I went back to Washington for a few days for our Security Subcommittee talks back in Washington. I . . . and the Japanese of course went back there at that time. I arrived in Washington on Tuesday evening--let me look at my records here--on Tuesday evening, June 4, and checked into the Carlton Hotel. Next morning when I woke up I turned on the TV to hear the news, then I went to the bathroom to wash up, and as I was listening with one ear to the news, I realized they were

talking about somebody being shot. And finally discovered that it was the murder of Bobby Kennedy. At this moment, he had not yet died, but it was a terrible shock. I have, as you know from, perhaps from what I"ve said previously in these records, I knew Bobby very well in a business way. We were not close in a family or a personal way, but I saw a great deal of him in a business way, particularly at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and then during the period we were both serving on the special group on counterinsurgency and I was chairman of the committee--or of the group, I should say--and Bobby was a member. And I had some difficulty, some reservations about Bobby in many ways. I would not have been too happy to see him as President, yet it's undeniable that he had an enormous appeal to the youth and represented something very, very good in our lives.

I called Bob McNamara that same morning on some business and of course he was broken up about it. The funeral took place while I was down in Cape Kennedy and I saw part of it on TV. It's remarkable the outpouring of emotion on the part of the entire country. We had our talks in Washington and then I took the Japanese government people, and Ushiba, the vice minister of foreign affairs, Obata, the vice minister of the defense agency, and some of their staff . . . I'd arranged for a trip for them to Cape Kennedy because of our discussions with the Japanese on space matters, as well as military matters, I felt it would be useful for them to see this. We saw the NASA set-up down there, including the preparations for the Apollo moon shot. Air Force also showed us the Titan Three. Very fortunately a Polaris submarine was in port and a friend of mine was, is, the commander of submarines in the Atlantic, and I arranged for them to be shown through a Polaris which was at the dock. So this turned out to be interesting.

I then went back to Washington for a day or two and had meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I met with the Secretary of Defense, and Paul Nitze and of course Secretary Rusk, the President and Walt Rostow. I on all these occasions talked about the necessity of our coming to grips with the question of our unused, or underused, bases here in Japan. The necessity for rationalizing our structure here, and finally arrived at an agreement that an instruction would be sent to myself and CINCPAC to review this whole situation. This instruction was received shortly after I returned and just two days ago CINCPAC and I submitted our report on this in which we were in entire agreement.

Admiral McCain, M-c-C-A-I-N, Jack McCain is the new CINCPAC and I must say that I find him most helpful and cooperative and we're working very closely together. Then I went up to Ottawa to arrange to show to the Japanese SAC out at Omaha. I went up to Ottawa in a special Air Force plane,picked them up there, took them out to Omaha and we went through the whole SAC set-up out there. Then they went on back to Japan and I went back to Washington. I spent a few days there, very heavily involved in meetings, but then quickly returned to Japan without any leave or vacation of any kind because I wanted to be back here at the time General Westmoreland was passing through here. He was on a ship coming from Saigon to go back to his new job in Washington as Army Chief of Staff and offered to be of any help that he could to me here. I wanted to make the best use that I could out of him, so I came directly back from Washington, arrived here at four o'clock or so in the afternoon, gave a big dinner for him that evening. Also arranged for him to speak the next day at the Overseas Correspondents Club, arranged an hour TV program for him, and did various things. May I say that although my staff had

some doubts, some of my staff had had some doubts about this, I didn't feel that there would be any difficulty in his presence here and his whole visitturned out to be very successful with no untoward incidents of any kind.

I should have said that while I was in Washington, Brad, you arrived here in Tokyo with your two brothers and with your mother. Aunt Jennifer and your cousin Patty were already here, so I came back to a big family reunion. Later in the summer, your Uncle Bill came out from Washington for a couple of weeks and your Uncle Stephen came up from Saigon so that all of us were here at one time. Subsequently Mike came up here in August and after spending a few days, he and your Aunt Jennifer and cousin Patty went back. So it really left a big gap when they left and when you all left, the house turned out to be very quiet indeed. We'd spent a week together up at Lake Nojiri. You spent two weeks up there with your mother and brothers. I spent a week with you and we had a good time, I feel, sailing and boating and playing golf and hiking. It was a fine summer. It was the first time, of course, that all my children had been together in seven years and the first time that you cousins have seen each other. Patty and Dean Alexis were three years old at the time and got on famously with each other and I'm so happy that they had the opportunity to get acquainted, as well as you to get acquainted with them. Of course, the small ones won't remember it, but nevertheless I hope that it will have some influence on you.

On August 10 I gave a speech to the Junior Chamber of Commerce meeting here whick I worked very hard. It was the first speech in which I have spoken out publicly on the necessity of Japan taking a more liberal trade policy if it wants a more liberal trade policy on the United States, or should

I say even the maintenance of our present policy. I feel they're being very short-sighted in this. And I also spoke out on defense matters. I worked very carefully at the speech myself and wrote it entirely myself and any who may be interested in what I was saying at the time might be interested in finding a copy of the speech. I considered it the most significant one, if you will, or at least I tried to make it the most significant one since I've arrived here. I discovered that it had been read by all the members of the Cabinet and a good part of the press and been widely used and I think has been helpful. It was the type of speech that I needed to wait for some time to make while here. It didn't contain anything but what I had also been saying privately but it's obviously the type of thing that I had to establish myself here before saying.

I should say that in July, your great-grandmother, my mother decided to move from Washington out to a retirement home in Santa Barbara called Samarakand. I was sorry I was not able to go with her from Washington out there but your Uncle Bill did so and then came on here to Japan and then you and your mother and brothers stopped to see grandmother there on your way back to Omaha. From everything I see and hear it must be a very beautiful place and your great-grandmother seems to be very happy there. This was entirely her own decision as I told her it was up to her to do whatever she wanted to do. She could do what she wanted to do from financial or any other standpoint and I left this entirely to her and she seems to be very happy and, of course, this makes me very happy as well.

I think I will close this at this point or stop this at this point. I've been talking now, I don't know it must be over an hour, hour and a half and I've about talked myself out for the time being so we'll end at this point and carry on at some subsequent date.

It's now Sunday evening, January 12, 1969. I will be leaving Japan in two more days, probably never to come back, at least to be stationed here. I'm returning to Washington to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs but before going into all that I will back up and talk about some of the events leading up to this.

First, in my last installment of this I talked about the efforts I'd made to obtain some adjustment in our bases here and the package that Admiral McCain and I had worked out which would bring about a very much more viable base structure here, I felt. First, it gave up some of the things that we no longer needed, some of the golf courses, some of the frills, some of the things that we were just hanging onto because of sheer inertia and in other respects it provided for a relocation, for example, getting our housing out of Yokahama, getting our chapel center out of the center of Yokahama, doing some of the things that would make us less conspicuous here and also make us more efficient. Some of these things did not involve any expenditure on the part of the Japanese government. Other things involved considerable expenditure on the part of the Japanese government. I had a great deal of difficulty on this base package and I was somewhat disappointed at the initial reaction here. The foreign office was pleased with it, the Prime Minister was pleased but the Japanese Defense Agency felt that we had given them more than they could handle. They actually said, "You know, couldn't you do less than this because if you throw all of this at us we don't have the money nor the organization nor the people to handle it." And it took me a long time before I was able to work all this out. They did not want us to make public what we were prepared to do because they said this would put pressure on them to carry out what we were suggesting. This I had no patience

with but as I said to them, "For far too long you have been able to put the monkey on our back. The Defense Agency was always able to leak here that they wanted to do this or they wanted to do that but the Americans were resisting this so they were always able to place the blame on us." And as I said to them, "It's perfectly understandable that it's going to take you some time to get the money to do some of these things but I'm just not going to put up any longer with this situation in which we seem to be the ones dragging our feet and you're the ones who are pushing us. We're now going to push you and the monkey's going to be put on your back."

Togo, who is head of the North American Bureau here and a very fine man, worked with the Defense Agency on this and was just not able to get any place so finally I had to see Ushiba, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and put it to him very bluntly and he, of course, saw the situation. Thus we were finally able to work up to a meeting which was public just before Christmas. Let's see. I think it was December 23 we finally were able to agree on a meeting. Yes, it was December 23. We agreed on a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee, which was established by the treaty. Admiral McCain came here and we put our package to the Japanese and issued our communique at the end of the meeting, had a joint press conference at the end of the meeting.

We compromised a little bit with the Japanese, with not mentioning some of the things that we were willing to do, but on the whole we were able to put forward a very satisfactory package and make it clear that we were prepared to do and to go much further than the Japanese in readjusting our base structure here.

At this point I might talk just a little bit about this whole question of our security relationship with this country as I see it at this time.

The fundamental problem is that the Japanese really see no threat to themselves. They don't see a conventional threat from the Soviet Union except in the context of a larger war and as far as the nuclear affair is concerned, they look upon our nuclear deterrent as offsetting the Soviet Union. As far as China is concerned, although China is developing nuclear weapons, they seriously don't think China would use nuclear weapons against Japan. They don't see any serious conventional threat from China for a generation or more to come. Of course, they may be right. Thus, they feel under no sense of threat and they look at our bases here more as a nuisance that they have to put up with for the sake of the larger aspects of our relationship, rather than something that's giving them protection. They also tend to look upon our bases as being lightning rods that would involve them in a war or hostilities not of their own choosing and thus our presence here, although not very, let's say, not very prominent, except insofar as the Japanese living around our air bases are concerned; they look upon our presence here as more likely to get them into trouble than keeping them out of trouble and this is one of the fundamental problems that we have to deal with. In fact, our bases here are not very much involved in the direct defense of Japan. However, they are vital to our position in Korea. We could not maintain our forces in Korea without our bases here and in Okinawa as a backup. However, the Japanese are still extremely self-centered. They look upon their problems only in the light of their own immediate interests. They're still very insular people and as far as the security of Korea is concerned, although they have the old saying that Korea was the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, nevertheless they don't take much interest in anything going on outside of their own border. This is the problem we still have to deal with.

Also as far as Korea is concerned, they still have this very strong racial prejudice towards Koreans and public opinion polls here asking what countries you like best, what countries you like least, among the countries liked least is always the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Korea and they're talking about South Korea. The word they use, Konkoko, in these polls means South Korea. Thus, it's very hard to sell and justify our presence here publicly upon the basis of their relationship to Korea. The government understands this, well, I should say some people in the government. The foreign office understands it. The prime minister understands it. But few people outside of that understand it, so this is one of the problems with which we have to work.

I'll come back to the question of Okinawa which has been becoming much more acute of a question here. Well, perhaps I'd better talk about it at this time. Okinawa has a desire, of course, to return to Japan as a prefecture even though prior to the war they were treated--the Okinawans were treated--very badly by the Japanese. They were second-class citizens. Japanese paid very little attention to them. Nevertheless, all that's forgotten and our tenure in Okinawa is beginning to run out. It's more and more difficult to run the island. There were elections in November in which our friends down there, the conservatives, were defeated and the so-called progressives which ranged all the way from just the left of center all the way to the Communist Party were elected. The man that was elected had a great deal of personal popularity. He'd been head of the Okinawa Teachers Association down there and was a very well known individual. It didn't mean that everybody who voted for him was voting against our administration there but nevertheless it made it much more difficult. The name of the new chief executive there is Yara.

I feel that our high commissioner down there, General Unger, Fin Unger as I call him, has handled the situation just about as well as anybody possibly could. However, the idea of an American general running a population of almost one million Japanese--they now consider themselves Japanese--is no longer viable and the Japanese are demanding the return of Okinawa. The Okinawans are demanding their immediate return to Japan and the situation is becoming more difficult. My nightmare and the nightmare of the High Commissioner down there is that this little Okinawan police force may on some occasion be unable to deal with some disorder and the only reserve that we have are American forces. If we ever get to the point where American forces are required to use force against, shoot, kill Okinawans then we're finished. So from that standpoint the quicker we can return the headache of the administration of Okinawa to Japan the better. (17b)

There are only two issues that are involved in this. The, well, perhaps I should make this a little clearer. If Okinawa, the administration of Okinawa is returned to Japan, it means that our bases down there would come under the same arrangements as our bases in Japan. This means that two issues become involved in this. One is that to mount combat operations directly out of Okinawa, such as we are doing there now with our B-52s against targets in Vietnam would require a new agreement with the Japanese. We would no longer have that freedom of action. The second is that we now have the freedom to store nuclear weapons there and under our arrangements with the Japanese here in Japan, this would require the Japanese government, which cannot be given.

Our people, military, I shouldn't say all of them, tend to think that this freedom of use is very important. In fact, increasing demonstrations

are being mounted against our B-52 operations down there; and in fact, we are gradually having our freedom of use eroded. Now one of our objectives with respect to Japan is to have Japan take increasing political responsibility in this part of the world. To the degree that we want them to take increasing political responsibility, we really don't want freedom of use. Freedom of use means that the Japanese would continue to be able to wash their hands and say that, you know, it's these nasty Americans and we can't do anything about what they are doing. While trusting us to do the right thing. However, if we did not have freedom of use, if the Japanese were required to, if we were required to and the Japanese were required to agree to anything that we did. Then the Japanese government cannot avoid political responsibility and would have to take the consequences of these other actions. Thus, in that sense, my own feeling is that we do not want freedom of use. We want a situation in which the Japanese are required to take increasing responsibility.

Another factor in my mind is that it is very difficult for any government and especially for the government of a country that is now, this year, the second economic power in the free world to turn over to another government the issue of peace and war as far as its own territory is concerned.

The nuclear issue is somewhat more difficult. The question with regard to nuclear weapons is not really whether we would use them. In my heart I don't believe that we will, but I do believe that they serve as a very important deterrent against North Korea taking action against South Korea and also a very important deterrent against China. And I'm strongly against anything that would weaken that deterrence. I've talked to the Japanese very much about this whole question of graduated deterrents.

There is a certain feeling here that since we now have the Polaris and the Minute Man that we no longer need nuclear weapons in Okinawa.

But as I point out to them, it's very important to have a wide spectrum of different things that we can do, both in the nuclear and the conventional field. And not be in the position of having to rely on a lot of Polarises and our Minute Men, the use of which would probably unleash general nuclear war. Thus, personally, I feel that it would be important if we could retain nuclear weapons in Okinawa because I'm thinking in terms of how Pengyang and Peking will interpret all the actions we are taking. However, this whole nuclear question in Japan is still very complex and my own feeling at the moment is that no Japanese government could agree to our right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa and survive. From a technical point of view there have been many studies and we probably could remove our weapons on Okinawa, without any great degradation of our military capabilities. However, I have not let the Japanese know this. What I do feel is, that during this year, 1969, we must, the two governments must find a satisfactory solution for this question. I have not in my own mind as yet tried to define the term "satisfactory." I do feel that on our own side the essential element is going to be that our military and Joint Chiefs of Staff not oppose whatever formula we arrive at. Therefore my thought up to the time that I have now been asked to go back to Washington, my thought was that I would carry on conversations here and then I would talk with Admiral McCain in Honolulu and I would talk to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington to see whether or not there could be the beginning of some basis for settling this whole issue. Up to the last few days, and I'll come cack to this, the position that Prime Minister Sato here has been, that during this year, 1969, in this fall, he

wants to visit Washington in November of this year, we should set the date for the return of Okinawa without establishing the commission. I've gone round and round with him on this, also with the foreign office. Previously with Prime Minister Miki. Because I've told him this seems to me an impossible proposition. If the formula, the circumstances are such that having set the date, the Japanese Government is under no, has no incentive, is not being impelled to work with us towards establishing conditions, when the date comes we will have to accept whatever the Japanese is willing to give us. And I pointed out that this is an impossible position for any American administration and I certainly wouldn't recommend it.

On the other hand, if the formula is worked out such that if we've not reached agreement, the Japanese government is obliged at the time the date comes to accept whatever conditions we establish. I told him equally this seems to me to be an impossible position for any Japanese government. Therefore, I've been trying very hard to get them off this formula. In this, I've had the agreementof the professionals in the Foreign Office.

Perhaps to carry on this discussion, this theme of thought, I should point out that after Sato was reelected President of the Liberal Democratic Party in November of this year and thus continues on as Prime Minister, he changed Foreign Ministers. The previous Foreign Minister, Miki, ran against him for Prime Minister and he chose a new Foreign Minister by the name of Aichi. I find Aichi very able man and a man with whom I enjoy working very much. Contrary to Miki, who was bucking for the Prime Ministry himself, Aichi is very close to Prime Minister Sato and when I'm talking with him, I have confidence that he is talking on behalf of the Prime Minister and not at times, as Miki was, as a candidate to succeed the Prime Minister.

Well, I've been taking a very hard line on this whole subject. I've been telling the Japanese that it's up to them to decide whether or not they want Okinawa to remain an effective base-- I underline the work effective-- at the time they take over administrative rights there. It's not a matter of trying to see how far they can bargain us down, it's a matter of looking at their own interests and looking at their interests not only in Japan, but looking at their interests in Korea, Taiwan and the rest of the area. If they want us to remain out here, I told them, it's time they started making this clear to the government in Washington and to the American people. The present feeling, as I told them, is that Japan is trying to force us out both of Japan and Okinawa. And I don't believe this is true as far as the government is concerned, but this is the general impression. And people at home are understandably very impatient with the Japanese. And I told them that they've got to make clear what they feel their interests are and if they want us to stay here, they've also got to make this clear. I've talked very tough to them on this. I have some feeling that I've made a little bit of progress. Because as far as the Okinawa issue is concerned, last Friday I had again a long conversation with Foreign Minister Aichi and he proposed a new formula to me under which when Okinawa is returned, when administrative rights are returned to Japan, in principle the bases down there would revert to the same status as the bases here in Japan. But it would be agreed that for, quote, temporary, unquote, period, we would continue to have our same rights down there both with regard to freedom of use and with the storage of nuclear weapons until the time had arrived that both Governments agreed that the situation in this part of the world had sufficiently improved that it was no longer necessary. This is the first real, hard

formula, the first real, hard thinking the Japanese have put into this whole question. As I told him, I felt that this was something well worth exploring and I was very encouraged. I of course made no commitments. And, when I go back to Washington, though, I will of course continue to work at these questions.

Another question has been this whole question of trade. I had been putting very heavy pressure on them to remove their non-tariff trade restrictions. They have a large number, some hundred and twenty quota restrictions on trade which are entirely outside the GAT framework and entirely illegal under GAT. The point I've been trying to make to them is that if they want to have free access to the American market, they're going to have to demonstrate that they're prepared to give us the same kind of access to their market here as they want to our market in the United States. Otherwise, protectionist pressures in the United States is going to force legislation through Congress which will move in the direction of protectionism. This has been a very tough and hard line, very tough business to sell and I've only had limited success. There was a meeting in Geneva this fall on this subject and then we had a meeting here just after Christmas. So I had the meeting on bases just before Christmas, had the trade meeting just after Christmas; again it's been a very active holiday season. And they made some grudging concessions. Of course, they face the same problem as any other government faces. They recognize the principles involved in these things, but they have their own interests, their own pressures from their own industry, who want to have their cake and eat it too, just as our industry wants to have its cake and eat it too. However, I've made a little bit of progress on this whole trade picture, with their removing some of their trade restrictions. Whether it's

going to be sufficient to hold off protectionist pressures in Congress or not remains to be seen.

My own concern is that the beginning of protectionism in Congress in the United States could set in motion a spiral that would turn down the whole world economic picture. And while history doesn't repeat itself entirely, could set in motion the train of events that would have some comparability to what took place in the 1930's. As far as this country is concerned, I tell my visitors that I have no real concern about its fundamental political orientation. Unless there is a turn-down in the Free World economic situation which they would, of course, be the first to feel. If that happened, you would certainly have the same polarization of politics in the extreme right and the extreme left that took place in the 1930's. I don't know how it would come out, except I feel that the extreme right has a lot of assets here and the extreme right would probably come out on top. I don't think that this would necessarily mean a repetition of their military adventures of the 1930's, because the world has changed, but it would be a very unhealthy situation. Thus, I'm interested in this whole trade picture, not just from the standpoint of the economics of it but also from the standpoint of the politics of it. I do so hope that the whole problem can be resolved by increasing trade, as I tell them, rather than decreasing trade. I feel that it would be such a tragedy for us and for the world if we began to move backward on this. The problem is, of course, some of our industries are now very inefficient. I'm particularly impatient with the steel industry. In the years following the war, it had a sellers' market; it was able to pass on increased costs; it was able to make wage settlements that greatly raised costs, secure in the knowledge that they could sell all the steel they could make. Once the steel industry

was one of the great proponents of freer trade around the world. Then they failed in modernizing their plants and becoming more efficient. Now they're facing competition from abroad and they're becoming protectionist. Of course, much of the competition is here from Japan; low wages do of course have some effect upon Japan's ability to compete. But I think a more important factor is that the Japanese industry is a modern industry, having been built from scratch after the War, having incorporated all the most modern inventions, you have a very highly efficient industry here. It's not just a question of cheap wages, by any means. This is also somewhat true in the electronics industry. The companies here, like Sony and Matsoshita have done a great deal of pioneering in new consumer products in the electronics industry. And our industry simply hasn't kept pace with it in many ways. Lower wages here, I suppose, is part of it. But at heart I suppose I'm really pretty much a free-trader. I think what helps the consumer helps the country on the whole. And this whole idea of self-sufficiency is antiquated. The other side of the coin here is that in Japan, they are trying to maintain self-sufficiency in agriculture. Of course they don't by any means. But they're trying to raise as much food here as possible. This is an inheritance of the old days, when countries thought in terms of self-sufficiency in time of war. But those days are gone. The result is that they have a grossly distorted agriculture industry here. The Japanese consumer is paying twice the world price for rice; he is paying three to four times the world price for meat. And this is contributing to the spiraling cost of living here. A really completely rational economic policy would mean that they would import more food from the rest of the world, lower their food prices here; this would help their wage problem, and they would become even more competitive on the industrial side. However the

government party here is very heavily dependent on the farm vote for remaining in power. And each year the farmers here have learned to rely upon raising support for the price of rice. Until now as I've said, it's gone over double the world price. Raising rice here is now one of the most profitable things that you can do. Actually it doesn't take too much labor and even if you don't get any crop at all, if the crop fails completely, the government pays you seventy percent of what you would have obtained if you had raised a crop. And rice farmers here now are raising rice and then working in the construction industry, in their spare time, which is very heavy. You go up into the northeast area of the country which used to be the very severely depressed area of Japan, and you have new houses, cars, sometimes two cars in front of farm houses, and obviously a very high degree of prosperity.

Well, perhaps I've talked enough about Japan for the moment. Let me talk about myself a little bit. After the election of President Nixon, there began to appear in the press here rumors that I was being considered for a very high job in the new administration. Some of the stories said I was being for Secretary of State and other stories for Under Secretary. I also received letters from friends saying that Mr. Nixon had very high regard for me and I would be offered a, quote, very high position, unquote, in the new administration. However, I heard nothing at all directly about any of this. I took a very relaxed attitude. I've always done what I've been asked to do. I certainly had no desire to leave Japan. And as far as I was personally concerned I had been very happy in my position in Japan.

However, just before New Years, it was on Friday, December 27th, I think, I received a telegram from Secretary Rusk asking if I could return immediately to Washington. And I went back, leaving on Sunday, what was it?

Sunday, December 29th. And as I expected, the purpose was to meet with the new Secretary of State, the Secretary of State Designate, Mr. Rogers, to talk about a new position. I had somewhat expected, from all the newspaper comment and everything that had been said, that I might be offered the position of Under Secretary even though Under Secretary has never been held by a career officer. But, and even though I never knew Mr. Rogers. .However, I saw him immediately after my arrival and he offered me the position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Number Three position in the Department. I said I was not interested in the job, as it had previously been established and would only be interested in it if it were to be put in the line. That is, the job as it had existed as Under Secretary for Political Affairs with George McGhee and Averell Harriman and Tom Mann and Gene Rostow, well I guess those were the ones that were in it, had previously been in it. It had always been somewhat of a fifth wheel in the Department. However, we talked this thing out and it was finally agreed that although it would be called Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in fact it would be somewhat similar to what some people have talked about as Permanent Under Secretary. I will also take to the position the functions that I had as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs back in 1961-64 and then 1965-66. I liked this job because it was in the line,had clear functions. I would take those functions on as well as some administrative supervision. The general concept being that I will be responsible for the operation, running, coordination of the Department. I had never met Mr. Rogers before, but I must say I was very impressed with him as an individual. And as we talked about other positions in the Department and filling these positions, I found that his only real interest was in getting the very best men for the job without regard to the political aspects. This may sound a little trite, but

nevertheless I felt that this was the case. When I would raise questions in regard to some individual politically, he would talk to Mr. Nixon and it was clear that Mr. Nixon was not trying to force anybody onto the Department. Nor was there much in the way of political obligations that had to be repaid. Thus, I am going back to the job very satisfied with the position I've been given. Let me say, I also felt some obligation in this. Because with Tommy Thompson, Chip Bohlen retiring as they are this month, I become the senior officer in the Foreign Service and I felt that it behooved me for the sake of the Foreign Service to do what I was asked to do. When the senior officer in the Foreign Service is offered the senior position, career position in the Department of State, I don't feel that he should say "no." I regret leaving Japan as soon as I'm leaving.I would have liked to stay here for the next two years, I would have liked to have seen this Okinawa business through, I would have liked to see the 1970 treaty issue through. I've enjoyed living here. It's been pleasant; I've enjoyed my associations here, but I had no choice but to accept this position back in Washington and agreed to do so.

I left again the following Sunday, that is, what was it? January-where am I here? I went there on Sunday, December 29 and returned on Sunday, January 5. Stopped by and saw my mother in Santa Barbara overnight and then came on directly back here, arriving back here on Monday because of the dateline. Pretty tired, because going back and forth in one week is pretty tiring. The fourteen hour days, seven day weeks in Washington hold no particular attraction for me. I've had between eight and nine years in Washington. I know what it entails. There is a certain amount of satisfaction, of course, being at the center of things and being involved in the center of things. At the same time there's a some ways more satisfaction of

being boss of your own shop,as I've been here.Feeling your place in the community, feeling your place in the country, feeling that you're doing something important. And if I had not felt really, if I had not felt my obligation to the Service, my obligation to do what the President asked me to do ; otherwise I think I would have pushed very hard for staying here, but I don't feel I could do so. I worked all day New Years with Mr. Rogers on new appointments. Friday night I went over to pay a courtesy call on President Johnson. Found him in a very mellow mood and we had a long talk with each other. Saturday the 4th, I went up to New York with Mr. Rogers.

The President announced the appointment of myself and Mr. Richardson as Under Secretary. Spent about an hour with President Nixon. I've been able to work comfortably with President Johnson, I gained his respect I think. And I have some feeling, some degree of personal liking. Mr. Nixon I've known a little bit but I seem to have a very good relationship with him also. I'm a little at a loss to understand how I've been able to establish these relationships. And I don't want to sound pious about it all, but all I've done is try to do the jobs that I've been given the best way I know how. I've tried to call the shots as I see them and I've never tried to play politics or to cater to any one individual. And there is a certain amount of satisfaction this night of January 13th, to feel that I've arrived at the top of the Foreign Service and going back to the top career position in the Department of State. It will remain to be seen what the future brings forth. Your grandmother Pat is not anymore happy than I am at going back, but she will carry on the job and do her best as she has always done in the past.

18

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 18

(18a)

This is the second side of Tape #9.

I was just saying on the end of the last side that I came back here to Tokyo on January 6. I have had just a week to say my goodbyes and do all I should do to pay a proper farewell here in Tokyo. On Wednesday, January 15, I'm leaving by a T-39 for Saigon, where I will see your Uncle Steve. I'm spending two days in Saigon, the 16th and 17th and I'm leaving there on the 18th, stopping a few hours in Honolulu to talk with Admiral McCain about this Okinawa question, going back to Washington and arriving there the night of January 19, with the inauguration on January 20, ready to go to work on January 20. So this has been a very busy and a very hectic time for me but I was home this Sunday evening and I did want to have the chance to fill out this tape up to this time before I left. We'll see when I get back to it again. (Interruption).

It's now November 30, 1969. It's been about ten months since I arrived back in Washington and much has happened. I'm sitting in the apartment here that we have at 2101 Connecticut Avenue, Apartment 44, but perhaps I should go back to the beginning. When I left Tokyo for Saigon, I was not feeling very well. It had been a very strenuous time in Tokyo getting away from there and I felt ill. I took a T-39 and stopped at Okinawa to confer with General Unger there, felt badly and took some medicine. We stopped at Clark and I was feeling real bad by the time I got to Clark in the Philippines and was really sick when I arrived in Saigon. We blew out a tire at landing and had to sit out in the air field for some time before they could get

somebody out to us to take us in. They got hold of a doctor there right away and I had a high fever and went right to bed and spent almost a week in Saigon, for the most part in bed, and thus not able to accomplish what I wanted to accomplish and did not get back here to Washington until after the inauguration. However, while I was in Saigon I did see, of course, General Abrams and Ellsworth Bunker. I stayed with Ambassador Bunker in his house, the same room that I'd had when General Taylor and I were living there together, and also saw President Thieu and Vice President Ky. I was very impressed with President Thieu and the degree to which he had developed into what I felt was a real politician, since I had known him previously. He talked like a politician. He seemed to have a good grasp of affairs and I was very impressed with him. Leaving Saigon, I was persuaded somewhat against my better judgment and not feeling very well to give a press conference in which I made an anodyne statement, didn't say anything, and then replied to a question. The question was whether or not I was going to make any recommendations to President Nixon on changing or--I forget exactly how it was worded--either changing or abandoning our commitment in Vietnam. Being in Saigon, I felt that I had no choice but to say that I certainly was not going to recommend that we abandon our commitment. The point of mentioning this is that this got picked up by the press services. It was played back in Washington as "new member of Administration recommends no changes in Vietnam." Senator Fulbright, bless his heart, read that and took umbrage and decided that he was going to have what he called a Johnson Day in the Senate.

I perhaps should go on to say now that when I did get back and had my hearings for confirmation they had the full panoply of lights and the TV

cameras and the whole works and I had two full days, three hours one day and almost four hours as I recall it the next day in general being attacked by Fulbright and other members of the committee for my views on Vietnam. The line being that I simply represented more of the same tired old policy. I defended myself as best I could and was eventually confirmed although Senator Fulbright voted against me, the first time any member of that committee ever voted against me in all the many times I've been before the committee on confirmation. However, I could only say what I felt. It was a very strenuous experience, with the bright lights on you, the cameras on you, the senators boring in and the audience in the background. I felt somewhat as if I were under a third degree and being treated as a potential criminal. I don't know why our system is this way but this is the way it is. One reason, of course, that they bored in on me so hard was that as far as the Secretary of State was concerned, Secretary Rogers, he had not had any previous experience or background in foreign affairs as such and neither had Secretary Richardson. I was the third man up and I was the first man to come along for confirmation into which the committee could really get its teeth and they took full advantage of it.

To go back, on my way back from Saigon, I met with Admiral McCain and then very fortuitously with General Unger, who had come in from Okinawa and with General Lampert who was just going out as high commissioner to Okinawa. We had about a two-hour meeting in the airport. Then I went on. I was so tired going directly from Saigon that I stopped overnight in San Francisco and then came on here. I had arranged for a house before I left over in Georgetown to rent until I could find a place that we wanted to live and I moved directly into the house and went directly to work.

Your grandmother came by ship and came later, about a month later, with our maid from Japan.

Getting started with the new Administration, of course, with a new Administration, always presents a certain amount of difficulty and shaking down. I first want to make a general comment, a comment that I've made in response to newspapermen's questions. That is that, as I believe I've mentioned, this is my fourth time back in Washington and the fourth change of administration that I've gone through and I've felt that this one has been very orderly. The President and Secretary of State, others have gone about things in an orderly fashion and we didn't have the frantic aspects that we had during Johnson's Administration nor the disordered aspects that we had at the time that Kennedy came in. Kennedy was a pleasure to work with, lots of fun in many ways, but he had little sense of the bureaucracy. Nixon has a good sense of the bureaucracy and seems to want to work with and through the bureaucracy and for an old bureaucrat like me, this, you know, has its satisfactions.

Next on the foreign policy side, as I've also commented, we've never had a President come into office who had so much background in foreign affairs and knows so many people in foreign affairs and in dealing with him on foreign affairs we don't have to start the briefing or discussion of the subject at the bottom. You can start fairly far up the line. One of the things that bothered me, though, at the beginning of the Administration, was the fact that they largely did away with the Regional Interdepartmental Groups, what we called the IGs, and the Senior Interdepartmental Group, that is, the Under Secretary's committee, which General Taylor and I worked so hard at establishing in 1966 and which I felt was such a very valuable organizational contribution to more orderly affairs here. The President decided that--well, I don't know how much

he decided but any event, eventually there were his decisions, of course--that they wanted to, as they called it, invigorate the National Security Council mechanism and give more authority to the National Security Council organization as such. Dr. Henry Kissinger was put in as special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and he organized the staff and the theory of the case that bothered me a great deal was that the Assistant Secretaries in the Department would continue to maintain their Interdepartmental Groups but they would report directly to the National Security Council. This is still the theory but--and then the Under Secretary's committee was finally somewhat reestablished as a mechanism of the National Security Council, reporting to the National Security Council. I felt that this was wrong then. I still feel that it's wrong. I feel that assistant secretaries, under secretaries should report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State should be the channel to the President. However, we have found ways of working it out and thus far things have been shaken down fairly well.

One of the problems was that Dr. Kissinger, I think wrongly, felt that the State Department was trying to undermine him. I tried to do all I could to make it clear that this wasn't the case and as I've always said we can always work any way the boss wants us to work. After all, it's up to him to decide. Well, this organizational conflict at the beginning created some frictions. It created some concerns in the Department but again this has shaken down.

Another aspect on which I wanted to comment is that I find Bill Rogers--I did then and I still do--a absolutely first-class human being. I was personally very fond of Dean Rusk but I find myself also very fond of Bill Rogers and Bill Rogers and Dean Rusk find themselves very fond of each other.

They're both thoroughly fine men. Rogers has very quickly picked up the job. He is, of course, an intelligent man. That goes without saying but he's also a man with a very good manner towards people. In the initial days, of course, he was somewhat unsure of himself but he's made a number of trips abroad. He's met some 90 prime ministers and foreign ministers up at the U.N. and he's found that he can deal with people easily and well and he can influence them and now has confidence in himself. He has avoided frontal collisions with the Senator Fulbright. Fulbright, of course, has been taking off on him and the President on Vietnam in particular as well as on other subjects. One of the great tragedies is that that committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is no longer carrying out a constructive role in our foreign affairs.Led by Fulbright together with Symington, Gore,some of the others,it has a querulous attitude toward everything that's going on. It's not just a matter that we disagree with the committee or that the committee disagrees with us but no longer has a constructive role in our affairs and this is a great tragedy at this particular time in our history because they could contribute so much. Rather they're always looking for some slip, some mistakes. At the present time the so-called Symington committee hearings are going on looking into our commitments with foreign governments. They tend to treat us and tend to treat the ambassadors they've called back as suspects, looking for something that they can find against them, rather than dealing with them as honorable men working together for the same purposes.

But what I started out to say is that Rogers has been able to avoid thus far a frontal collision with Fulbright because he represents a somewhat shifting target. He refuses to take Fulbright on frontally and I think he's been very wise and very deft in handling this.

In the first six months of the Administration a big part of the job which is still not entirely completed was making the new appointments, the new

ambassadors and filling the positions in the Department. From the very beginning the Secretary has taken me fully into his confidence on this and Richardson, who I also like very much, and we find ourselves very compatible with each other. The three of us have worked very closely together on this whole question of appointments. I might say just a word about ambassadorial appointments. This is an enormous jigsaw puzzle. It's taken a lot of work and a lot of time and our batting average is not as high as it should be. All I can say is that we've done the best that we could. In general the White House has not shot from the hip. Except for the appointment of Walter Annenburg to London and, oh, I suppose you might say John Eisenhower to Brussels, the way the system has worked is this: The working through Peter Flanigan in the White House, the White House has made its political nominations or at least, should I put it this way, it has suggested those names that they would like to have considered for ambassadorial appointments. What we did was this. I got together with the personnel people and the assistant secretaries and came up with our nominations for the career officers. Then Elliot Richardson and I separately interviewed each of the White House nominees for posts, trying to get some feel of their interests and their abilities and at times I said I felt like an employment agency with streams of people coming through. Then Elliot and I got together and tried to reconcile these two lists, taking into consideration the White House desires and the abilities of the White House proposed appointments, the abilities of our own people and come up with a consolidated list which we would then discuss with the Secretary and then send over to the President.

In general, I would say that our batting average has been pretty high. That is, almost all the suggestions that we have made have been accepted. I've not been entirely happy the way that it's come out though. We've not

had any real duds as political appointments but some of them were not too well qualified. And the way it's ended up is we have noncareer people in all but one of our posts now in Western Europe and whereas the ratio of career to noncareer is probably, oh, perhaps a little bit better than it was at the end of the Johnson Administration, we have entirely too many noncareer people in the Western European posts. I don't think this is good either for the service or for what we're seeking to accomplish in Europe. However, this is the way that it has worked out. For various reasons. It was not planned particularly this way but, of course, the number of political appointees who want to take posts in Africa is pretty small and, whereas the number that are willing to take posts in Latin America is a little bit higher, most all of them want the plush jobs in Europe. On the other hand, I must admit that we don't have an overabundance of talent in the foreign services ourselves. Of course, this is a result of the fact that we have had such a high number of noncareer appointees in the past that we have not developed a sufficient number of officers in the Foreign Service to fill all these posts and we get ourselves in somewhat of a vicious cycle. I obviously have nothing against noncareer people in jobs. Some of our great officers have been noncareer people and we obviously need a levening from the outside but I would hope that we could move toward a higher proportion of professionals but each Administration that comes in needs to look to the ambassadorial posts as a part of paying political prices, the price it has to pay for coming in, and thus we've got ourselves in this cycle.

Well, in the Department itself, we ended up with all the geographic assistant secretaries except one and this is Latin America being career officers and I think this has worked out well. We, I worked hard on trying to upgrade and get a prominent scientist for our office of scientific affairs.

I've been involved in that over the years and have been very interested in it but was not successful in doing so. However, we have a very good man in the job.

We have now filled all of the appointment jobs, the presidential appointment jobs, in the Department except for the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and it's urgent that we move ahead with that.

Well, a large part of our early days have been taken up with this whole business of appointments. We have, of course, had considerable business. A lot of things have been going on. As far as I'm concerned, I've participated in the work of the Space group, making recommendations to the President on where we should go after the Apollo program. The Vice President, Vice President Agnew, is chairman of that. I've also taken and been deeply involved in the whole question of the seabeds and that is national authority over the seabeds or let's say the regime for the seabeds. I've often said that when I come back to Washington I find usually the same old problems in just about the same place that they were previously but this whole question of seabeds and who's going to exploit the resources of the seabeds was a brand new one to me and one I find as intractable as any problem I've ever come up against. The geologists tell us that the amount of oil to be discovered in the seabeds is purportedly as great if not greater than has already been discovered on land. There are also the mineral resources of the manganese nodules which have nickel and cooper in them and there's a great deal of wealth to be recovered from the sea and from the seabeds and technology is moving very fast. The oil companies which the Department of the Interior supports wants us to claim for our own national jurisdiction a wide area, that is, down to the abyss of the sea, as under our national jurisdiction. Then the Defense Department, for reasons which are very valid want us to claim only a narrow portion of the shelf, and then there are the internationalists who want to have

us also only claim a narrow portion of the shelf and turn the rest of the seabeds over to some international organization, to exploit the proceeds of which would go to developing countries. We've also, of course, had public statements in the last Administration that the resources of the deep sea should be used for the benefit of all mankind. Now at the present time we are still trying to work out a position for the government. This is very urgent as is the whole question that's also being considered in New York by the United Nations. We're going to have to take a position shortly. Up to the present time I've taken the position, kept the State Department in a position of neutrality on this, saying that we didn't know enough about it to make any recommendations, And this was true.

I've also been very much involved in the whole question of international narcotics traffic. We have an Interdepartmental Group on that and then I'm also a member of what they call the Washington Special Actions Group. This grew out of the experience with the shoot-down of the EC-121 aircraft off Korea earlier this spring, in which there was considerable discussion as to whether or not we should retaliate. The military came up with some plans that I didn't feel were very well developed or very well thought through. As a result of this, the President formed this group with myself on it and Dr. Kissinger and the military, defense and uniformed services to work on contingency plans without taking any position against retaliation in the EC-121 case. I was able to demonstrate without arguing the case that the military plans just were not very well formed and I think in large part because of this the decision was made by the President not to move ahead with any retaliation. I'm now engaged in working up contingency plans involving the military for a number of different areas and this is taking a great deal of time.

The major issue in which I've been involved is that of Okinawa and this, during the course of this month now, has just about been completed. It's not often in our business that we're able to follow through on something over a long period of time and personally see the results of our efforts. But in this case I can. When I went to Japan I felt that it was important that we resolve the Okinawa issue but I always took the position out there that this was not something for just us to answer. It was for the Japanese to answer. What kind of an American presence did they want in the area and what kind of an American presence were they willing to support? They had to look at these things in terms of their own national interests rather than in terms of their doing us a favor by permitting us to be there.

Well, I carried this theme through a good part of the time while I was in Japan and really got them thinking I think to some degree about their security problems. When I came back here, I, as I mentioned, had a number of conversations with CINCPAC, Admiral McCain on the subject. Then I had a series of meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in which I tried to obtain their understanding. The fact that this was not just a political problem, it was also a military problem and unless we were able to resolve the question of jurisdiction or the administration of Okinawa in a satisfactory way, we weren't going to have much longer to stay in our bases in Japan and we would also be forced out of Okinawa. I pointed out that the effort of the opposition down there, of course, was to try to bring about a situation in which there would be a direct confrontation between American troops and Okinawan people and if that ever happened we would have it and all that stood in the way of that was this small Okinawan police force.

Well, to make a long story short, we had a NSC meeting on this in April in which I presented to the President and other members of the NSC the whole

question of Okinawa and obtained a decision to go ahead with negotiations with the Japanese on this and our ambassador out there who had replaced me, Armin Meyer, began those negotiations. Well, I shouldn't say that he did. We really started real negotiations on this when the Foreign Minister, Aichi, back here in June. Then Armin Meyer went out there as ambassador, then Dick Snyder. And we tried to work up something in which the Japanese would recognize that our responsibilities extended not only to the defense of Japan but to the defense of the rest of the area and we needed their support in this.

(18b)

We started, like I always like to do, by negotiating, starting with what we wanted to end up with and that is a communique and the whole negotiation has really been around the communique that would be issued at the time the Prime Minister would visit here, if he did do so. Then Aichi came back here in September. We had the issue of what they call free use, that is, our ability to mount combat operations directly from Okinawa against other areas and the issue of nuclear storage. We resolved the first issue fairly well before the Prime Minister came. The last issue we deliberately did not resolve and left this for resolution between the President and Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was here last week, November 19th and 20th, and a decision was reached that we would remove our nuclear weapons from Okinawa but we retained the right to consult with the Japanese to put them back in if we felt there was an emergency. Frankly, it doesn't make much sense to have nuclear weapons there and there are a lot of reasons for not having them there but the military gave great importance to this.

We had other issues with Japan, the issue of investment and trade, the Japanese quota restrictions on trade and the issue of textiles and then the financial arrangements on Okinawa and everybody wanted to sell Okinawa for their own interests. That is, the textile people said we shouldn't return Okinawa till the textile problem is solved. The finance people said we shouldn't return it until the investment and quota restriction problem was resolved. The Treasury people said we shouldn't return it until the financial problems on Okinawa were solved, et cetera, et cetera. I've been shepherding this through and there were a lot of shoals right up to the last minute. The Defense Department, although it and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they seemed to have understood the issues, nevertheless in the short-sighted way I'm sorry to say that they still have, tried to say that we should try to maintain the status quo. As I always pointed out to them, it wasn't a question of maintaining the status quo. The status quo was rapidly going out from under us. It was a question of getting a better relationship.

Well, a communique was issued last week and whereas this in itself doesn't affect the return, it's agreed that we were going to have to do detailed negotiations to looking forward to the return by 1972 which in large part does dispose of the problem. Prime Minister Sato returned from here very pleased. The President was also very pleased and I received a very nice letter from him yesterday, thanking me for all I had done to bring this about. I do feel that this is one case in which my being personally involved, my being here, was able to bring something about that would not have been possible otherwise and I frankly take a lot of personal satisfaction in this. I'm sure it is the right thing. It doesn't mean that our relations with Japan are always going to be smooth. We're going to have problems with

Japan, increasing problems with Japan but the return of the administrative rights on Okinawa was certainly the right and the proper thing to do and it certainly will help our relations with Japan.

I have been doing a considerable amount of speaking to various groups. My office figured out the other day I've done some 49 speeches to various groups, both in Washington and elsewhere, since I came back in January. This next week I have three speeches to give, one down at Charlottesville tomorrow night, that is Monday. Then I have one at West Point on Wednesday and then I have one to the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Bank here on Thursday. Then I don't have any the rest of December. This business of giving speeches gets to be somewhat of a chore. Of course, I use material in various ways over and over. I don't necessarily write a full new speech each time but it does take a considerable amount of effort. I have not been out of the country since I came back. I've traveled a great deal in the country. When the President was out at San Clemente, I made three trips out there in August and September and then I made a fourth trip out to Los Angeles to give a speech and then two weeks ago, your grandmother and I were out to Monterey where I gave a speech. Each time I've tried to stop by to see your great-grandmother in Santa Barbara and have been seeing her fairly regularly. She is in good health and apparently getting along well there and I must say is a truly remarkable person, considering her age in particular, how active she is and how interested in things she still is.

Well, I've been talking a long time here now. I will think of many other things to say about this period. What I need to do is to get my office diary and bring that home some day and go through it and talk in a little more organized and coherent form on particular issues that have been up and how they've been handled, what we've been doing on them. But I think I'll

stop this here at this point and wait till next time. I also should be getting to work on that speech I have to give tomorrow down at Charlottesville so I'll sign off now. (Interruption)

It's now January 3, 1970. We have entered into the decade of the seventies, although there's considerable argument in the newspapers whether the decade really begins with 1971 or 1970 but popularly, I think most people feel that the new decade has begun.

I have just reviewed what I was saying on the early part of this tape to try to refresh my mind and to pick things up. First, I was talking about Okinawa and my hope that the settlement on Okinawa in which I take great pride would help our relations with Japan over the long run. Too, in the short run, at least this has been borne out. The Prime Minister went back and called for elections on December 27th, Prime Minister Sato that is. And he and his party won a victory in the elections beyond their expectations. Okinawa was a reason for the victory in the sense that it was removed as an issue. That is, Japanese people do not vote very heavily upon foreign affairs issues, except in the negative sense, and Prime Minister, having removed the issue and this thing having been resolved, he was able to get that out of the way. The opposition did not have that with which to attack him and he won many more seats than they had, even he had expected in the election. Thus, I think in the short run at least, it has borne out my conviction that this was an important move in our relations which can have real historical effects. I feel that it's the--well, I guess not only myself--the President also feels that this is the most historical development in the relations between our two countries since the signing of the peace treaty. It is one thing in which I take a great deal of personal pride. I feel that what I did both out in Japan and back here was able to bring this about,

at least somewhat sooner than it otherwise might have and if it had not been brought about at this time, then our relations could have started on a downhill track. As I said, in the previous tape, there's no assurance that they're going to be smooth. Japan is going to become more nationalistic and is thinking already about building nuclear weapons. This is the reason for the delay in signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and there're going to be problems with Japan. I have no illusions about them but they are an enormously able, enormously capable people and I have always felt very deeply that our relations with them should have very high priority.

I also said in the previous portion of this tape that I visited your great grandmother and my mother out in California and that she was still very well which was true but since that time she has deteriorated and I'm very concerned. I called her on Christmas Eve and she seemed to be in fairly good shape and then on Christmas Day she called me when I was at your ,reat-Aunt R'Ella's and she was feeling very low. I talked to her at great length and then I talked with her nurse and I talked with her doctor and I'm afraid that age is really creeping up on her. It's hardening of her arteries that's somewhat affecting her mind, not seriously so but she's having difficulty walking and I'm afraid she's beginning to deteriorate. Naturally, I feel very deeply about this but this is what comes to all of us at one time or another. There's the old saying that--well, many people have said it--"Whatever I am and whatever I hope to be I owe to my mother" but I feel it particularly with respect to her.

I was just making some notes to try to recall some of the things that I wanted, on which I wanted to make a record. I could talk about Okinawa at greater length but I think I've really hit the high points on that and will not try to do so. The follow-up issue I might mention that we have with Japan is a question of the growth of Japanese textile imports here into the

the United States. Our industry feels that they're being severely injured by this. I should say that this is woolen textiles and manmade textiles, that is, synthetic fibers that are now the issue. The Secretary of Commerce has worked at this for a long time. I should go back to say that during the campaign the President made a campaign promise that he was going to do something about this. It was, with the wisdom of hindsight, not too wise perhaps in our relations with Japan but it was a wise thing to do in political terms, in terms of getting support in the Southern states where our textile industry is located.

Secretary of Commerce, Maurice Stans, was given charge of this. He's made two trips to Japan, has done a lot of negotiating with them, and he irritates them a great deal. This was discussed at the time that Prime Minister Sato was here and although it was kept very confidential, he and the President reached an understanding that after...Well, I should say that an understanding on this textile question would be reached after the Okinawa communique had been issued and it would be reached very promptly following the election that the Prime Minister intended to call in Japan. The President has asked me to take on this negotiation and I'm doing so very privately with the ambassador here, Ambassador Shimoda, who's representing the Prime Minister on this. We're having a series--we've each got out political problems. We're having a series of meetings in [inaudible]on the subject but the ambassador and I are working out exactly what happens at each meeting and I hope to get a solution to this very shortly.

I was scheduled next week to Cameroons for the tenth anniversary independence celebrations there. I was anxious to do this because I've never really been in black Africa but I've canceled that trip in order to stay behind and deal with this textile problem. I think if I can get this satisfactorily resolved then I think it's relatively smooth sailing at least for the time being in

our relations with Japan but this is a very important political issue in both countries and takes very careful handling.

I'm very fortunate that the Japanese ambassador here, Ambassador Shimoda, was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time I first went to Japan. He and I have a very close personal relationship. He also has a very close personal relationship to the Prime Minister and between us we are using all the arts of diplomacy, if you will, to handle this question in a way that will not provide a further irritant in the relations between the two countries.

I suppose I should mention at this time that our ambassador in Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, wants to leave. He's been there about three years. He's 75 years old. He's done a perfectly magnificent job. None of us want to see him leave but there's the problem of a replacement for him. The President and I know the military want me to replace him but the Secretary is taking the position that he wants me to stay here. I've taken a perfectly neutral attitude on it, making it clear that I'm willing to go wherever I'm asked to go but I'm not seeking the job and we're now working on another possibility which I hope will go through. I don't have any particular desire to go back there because I think in some ways it would be politically wrong also. To the critics of our policy down there such as Fulbright, of course, I represent everything that's wrong with our policy.

I should have said that one of my early jobs back here was negotiating with the Spanish on the extension of our base agreement in Spain. I had negotiated a five-year extension back in 1963 with the Spanish and came back here and this thing had expired, of course, already by that time. We had not been able to obtain any renewal so I entered into negotiations with them. I found these very, very difficult. In many ways, I've said that I find the Spanish mind more difficult to understand than the Oriental mind. I had

hours and hours and hours of negotiations with their foreign minister and with their foreign ministry man that was handling the details on this and finally worked out a temporary extension for just about a year and a half. This, well, I had to defend before the Foreign Relations Committee and was very severely attacked in the Foreign Relations Committee on this negotiation but it was the feeling here that we needed to continue our base relationships there and I carried out what I was asked to do.

Another negotiation in which I've been recently deeply involved is that of terminating our agreement with the government of Libya for our base at Wheelus. There was a coup in Libya back in September. They're determined to remove all foreign troops from their soil. Both the British and ourselves were there. We had an air base there that was very important to us as a bombing and a gunnery range and the question was trying to get out of there gracefully and trying to maintain some relationship with them. In this, as in so many things that involve the military these days, I find myself and the people in the uniformed services in the military usually very close together but I find that ISA, The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, over in the Pentagon--very difficult to work with. The Assistant Secretary is Warren Nutter, who is simply not up to the job. It's a job that was previously occupied at one time or another by Paul Nitze and Bill Bundy and John McNaughton and Paul Warnke. There've been some great men in that job and they've greatly facilitated the work between State and Defense. However, they're no longer able to do so because they simply don't have competence. This means I have to deal on matters such as this primarily with David Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I find him an absolutely first-class individual, very, very able, comes from a business background entirely, a very wealthy man but obviously the strongest man over in the Department of Defense and in these

matters I work things out with David Packard. I try hard to get the assistant secretaries to deal with Warren Nutter and get problems resolved at that level but they find great difficulty in doing so. Thus, I find more problems than should be dealt with on the level of myself and Packard coming up to that level because they can't be resolved any other way.

I mentioned previously this Washington Special Actions Group on which I was dealing with contingency planning. This has been relatively active. We've been doing some contingency planning for various situations in the Near East. The tension at the present time between Israel and the Arab states is very high but we have very few capabilities in the area if the situation were to blow up. Of course, what we're concerned about is a direct confrontation between us and the Soviet Union in the area. If the Israelis were to start beating up on the Arabs again and they could do so, the danger is, of course, that the Arabs could call on the Soviets for help and the Israel would call on us for help. The hard facts on the matter are as--who was it, Sherman said it anyway, the hard facts of the matter are that the Soviets can get there firstest with the mostest. I have not talked about the Near East. This has been a continuing concern but I have not been doing the direct negotiation on it. We have been trying to divorce ourselves from a policy that's too closely oriented toward that of Israel and restore to some degree our relations with the Arab states and are having some success. However, this Israel situation is a very special one in this country. The Jews and the supporters of Israel in this country, of course, are very powerful and they use their influence and it's a very unhealthy situation in which we are not able to decide our policy simply upon the basis of our own national interest. It's not only a lobby. It's a, well, it's more than that. Israelis and the Israeli Embassy here can call upon Jewish organizations

here in the United States to support them and they have no hesitancy in doing so. Also, in the last few weeks we've had a good example of the strength of what was called the old China lobby. The people in Taiwan want some F-4 aircraft. We don't feel they should have them because they are an offensive aircraft but they've been able to get their lobby stirred up here and they've been able to get congressmen, especially Congressman Passman, working directly for them. They seem to represent Taiwan more than they represent their own country. It's a very unhealthy situation. We were--the Secretary and I were talking about this yesterday about what we can do about it but it has long historical roots. If the United States in each and any of these countries would seek to do what Israel and Taiwan does in trying to stir up opinion in their country, they would give us very short shrift. But it's one of the realities of American politics.

It's been a bad weekend. It snowed at Christmas. I like to get out and play golf even in the winter time but there've been two weekends I've not been able to do so. I have a call in to your Aunt Jennifer , out in Bangkok to try to talk to her and your cousin Patty tonight. We'll see whether or not the call goes through. Satellites are now working and we get very good connections but the circuits are still very crowded.

My days are pretty full and pretty active and sometimes at the end of the day I wonder what I've done but it's been worthwhile, at least I like to think so. I'm enjoying my work and I think I'll close this tape off at this point. And we'll see when I pick up on the next tape.

19

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 19

It is Sunday, March 29, 1970. It has been a rainy Sunday. I had planned to go out and have some golf, but it has not been possible; thus, I'm picking up these tapes. I should have mentioned that it's Easter Sunday, but not very much like Easter. It's cold and rainy. The radio says that it's snowing.

My last tape, I was talking about the settlement with Japan on Okinawa and I was also talking about the textile question. At the time of my last tape on January 3, I was optimistic that we were going to have the textile question resolved, but this has turned out to be one of the most difficult negotiations I've ever undertaken and, as of this moment, we're far from resolution of this. As I mentioned in my last tape, the Prime Minister had agreed with the President on a settlement of this question. That settlement was embodied not only in their conversation, but after their conversations, the Prime Minister sent over by private hand through Professor Yoshida to Henry Kissinger a plan for the settlement of this that was entirely satisfactory to us, but called for carrying out a certain scenario under which we would take a tough line with the Japanese. The Japanese would come back to us and it was all going to be acted through, so that the Prime Minister could bring his own textile industry along and the whole thing settled by the end of the year. That is, by the end of 1969.

Well, it doesn't work. I talked about the Ambassador here, Shimoda, and I am working on this whole program. It turned out that while the scenario that the Prime Minister had sent over to the President was, of course, known

to me--and I was trying to play that scenario--it turned out that it was not known to Shimoda. Apparently, nobody in Japan, except the Prime Minister himself, knew about it. It gradually became clear that the Prime Minister had taken on an obligation here which he was simply not able to deliver on. It's been very tough. I've taken a very tough stand on this because I felt that the President had carried out his part of the bargain, as far as Okinawa was concerned. This had been very important to the Prime Minister. Now, it was up to the Prime Minister to carry out his part of the bargain. I wouldn't call it a bargain. One wasn't conditioned on the other, but having made a commitment to the President, I felt that he should be forced to do all possible to carry it out; a commitment that was very important to the President, not only in our own national terms, but in terms of the President's political interests. Thus, I have been taking a very, very tough stand on this; pushing him into the corner. I probably used up a large part of whatever goodwill that I had accumulated in Japan, and we still have not yet found a settlement. It is a difficult issue. Actually, we're asking Japan to play outside the rules; do something exceptional. Our economic case is not a strong case, but I've looked upon it as a political obligation that Japan undertook, and Japan should be pushed to carry out this obligation.

Maurice Stans, the Secretary of Commerce, takes a very tough line on this. I think I'm gradually moving him around to the point, moving our own industry around to the point, where they're going to be able, willing -- I shouldn't say able--but where they're going to be willing to accept something less than what they were seeking. Well, as I mentioned, the economic case is not strong, and this has now become such a point of issue, that it's very much detracting from the good effects that we had of the

settlement on Okinawa. It's become the major issue between the two countries, and I'm not sure how it's all going to come out. We have been threatening the Japanese, in effect, with unilateral legislative action, on our part, if they do not come through with what we call a voluntary agreement. However, they are, on the one hand, betting that we won't be able to get legislation; and even if we do, that would be preferable to the so-called voluntary action on their part because they wouldn't have any responsibility for it, and they would be free to retaliate against us in the sense of additional restrictions on our trade. This is very dangerous. If this is mishandled, it could start us down the road of retaliation in trade; start us down the road of greater restrictions on trade around the world, which would be harmful for all of us.

Another issue in which I've become involved is, again, the Spanish base negotiations. Early this month, I guess, the new Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo was over here. And they want to enter into an entirely new agreement with this with respectto our base facilities there; they want to encompass this in a wider and a broader agreement, cover cultural matters, exchange and finance, and so on, so as not to give it just the character of their renting bases to us. I don't have any great trouble with the concept, but I find it just as difficult to get this Foreign Minister down to specifics as the previous one. Arguelles is a new Spanish Ambassador, and I'm working with him on this. I'm not sure how far we're going to be able to get, but I think probably we're going to be able to work out something.

Last week, I was up to Ottawa to talk to Canadians about the pollution zones, and law of the sea, and all this. Maybe I might go back just a little bit on this. Canada--this may sound esoteric, but it deals with very

major matters. We have discovered a large new oil field on the north slope of Alaska. One means of bringing that oil out will be through the Northwest Passage, and the large American tanker outfitted for icebreaking, called the Manhattan, made a voyage last year to experiment to see whether or not it would be able to go through that passage. This raised concerns in Canada on two grounds. First, there is this whole business of pollution and concern over pollution. Pollution of the Arctic has emerged as a very major issue in Canada. Obviously, they're concerned about having a large tanker wrecked and spill its cargo. At the same time, there are also very strong chauvinistic elements in Canada that want to declare all the waters in the Northwest Passage, all the waters through the islands up north of Canada, as being interior waters. If they do this, this would create very serious problems of precedent for us in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other areas where there are archipelagos and straits, and gradually, our access to many of these seas will be cut off.

Thus, I went up to . . . Well, I should first say that the Canadians were proposing legislation on this. They came down to see me two weeks ago, just simply to inform me on the legislation they were proposing, which would be very harmful to our interests. I suggested that the President call Prime Minister Trudeau on the telphone on this, and then, it was agreed that I go up there and discuss the matter with them. I went up last Friday--that is a week ago Friday--with a delegation in which I had the Department of Defense, Interior, Coast Guard, Department of Transportation, our own legal people, and so on and spent the entire day discussing the matter with their Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Sharp, and several other ministers, as well as their experts. We had a very good and a very thorough discussion. And, whereas they feel forced by their

political situation to introduce legislation, nevertheless, I think that it's going to be modified in a way that will make it more acceptable to us. If it's not, it will mean, probably, that the Northwest Passage will not be open; or at least, it would be open to only a limited degree. Our oil from Alaska will be transported by pipeline through Alaska down to our West Coast or by pipeline across Canada. It's turned out that in Northern Alaska and Northern Canada, there are probably some of the--well, in Alaska, we already know it, and there are still areas to be developed. Canada's just opening up its areas--major oil reserves of the world. It's going to change the oil picture of the world very considerably.

At the same time, the ecology of the north is, of course, very fragile, and it's perfectly understandable that the Canadians are concerned over preserving that ecology. One thing I came back completely convinced of; that is, that if we want to have these pollution matters handled on the international basis--and I think we must do so; otherwise we're going to have international anarchy--we're going to have to take a much more forward position than we have in the past and be willing to agree to international arrangements which really do protect the coastal states which are subject to pollution by oil, in particular.

A word with regard to your great-grandmother. I think I said in my last tape that I was very concerned about her, which I was. After the first of the year, she seemed to make a very good comeback; and your great-aunt, R'ella, and Uncle Gerry went out and saw her in the early part of February. While they were there, just the day they were leaving, she fell, apparently had a fainting spell. She fell and broke her wrist, and this, of course, has caused her great distress. However, her wrist has healed; but whereas she doesn't seem to have the same troubles she had previously, apparently

arthritis is bothering her very badly. In my telephone conversations with her, she seems weaker and weaker each time. I will be going out in the middle of April to see her.

I might say a word about your Uncle Bill. Your Uncle Bill finished, after over ten years of work, his Ph.D., all the requirements for his Ph.D. degree in nuclear physics and last week, moved out to Santa Monica to go to work for the Rand Corporation. It has been a long, hard road for him. He's certainly done a splendid job at it. I'm really very proud of him, as I'm proud of all four of my children.

Stephen will be coming back from Saigon in July. So we'll have a little hiatus here. We're sure going to miss Bill. He was not only a pleasure to have around, but he's a great fixer. He knows how to use his hands and knows how to do things; he not only kept us operating here, but he kept Uncle Gerry and Uncle Stephen Tillman, their place, fixing their radios, fixing their TVs, doing anything that was necessary. It's going to be lonesome without him. However, he has a fine job out there.

An interesting footnote on this: at the time he began studying nuclear physics, there was an enormous demand for them. By last year, when it was coming close to the time for him to get his degree, the supply and demand situation had changed completely; there were many more Ph.D.'s in nuclear physics looking for jobs than there were jobs for them. Bill became very concerned, and I became very concerned. Just on an off chance that they could work something out or would know about something, I wrote the president of the Rand Corporation, Henry Rowen, who is a friend of mind, and asked him whether they had any suggestions. He shortly sent somebody to interview Bill, and then they asked Bill to come out to California and talk with them, and were quite taken with him and have offered him a very

fine job. I got him the introduction, but Bill got this entirely on his own merits, and I think it's going to be very, very useful, very helpful to him, because it won't be just in his own field. Rand works in an interdisciplinary fashion that I think is going to broaden his experience a great deal.

On Japan, I just might make a footnote. Oh, there have been some papers I've been going through on the issues coming up. In recent years, we've always talked about Japan doing more for its own defense and doing more for the defense of the area without being too clear as to what we wanted it to do. Now, with the increase in its GNP and the increase in its budget, it is beginning to do more, at least as far as its own area is concerned. Now people are becoming worried about this. I don't think that there's too much justification at this stage; but it is one of the dichotomies in our policy that have plagued us and I'm sure it's going to continue to plague us with respect to that country.

Our most recent, immediate crises, if I can call them that, have been in Laos and Cambodia. In Laos, the North Vietnamese have come in in great force and have driven the General Vang Pao's guerrilla forces out of the Plaines des Jarres back up to their main base in Long Tieng. It looked like they were going to overwhelm it. During this past week, we have been having to make the decisions as to whether or not we were going to seek to defend Long Tieng, or whether or not we were going to encourage Vang Pao to abandon it. I didn't feel that it would be possible for him to defend it and felt that to put reinforcements in there would probably be a mistake, as it would built it up to be a much more psychological issue than I really thought it was. However, both the Laotian's Souvanna Phouma and the Thai's General Thanom, Prime Minister Thanom, have wanted to put

additional Thai forces in Long Tieng forces which we would support but which would go in, as we say, sheep-dipped; that is, not as Thai forces as such but as Thai forces masquerading as Lao forces. We had long, vigorous, and hard discussions on this in WSAG. That is the Washington Special Actions Group of which I am a member. Finally, the President made the decision to go ahead with it. We will see whether or not this is wise or not. Whereas, I was originally opposed to the decision, I came around to the point, finally, of feeling that perhaps it might be the best thing to do and, therefore, agreed with it. Of course, the Secretary is also concerned about this, but he agreed we shouldn't oppose it any further.

I have been in and out of so many Lao crises over the years; and as I often say, each year since 1954, when I first had anything to do with Laos, each year we've said that we're losing Laos. Yet at the end of the year, somehow or the other, it manages to survive. I'm never quite sure how. It, of course, is never going to be any bastion of democracy. Our hope is to keep it a buffer area, but with the tens of thousands of North Vietnamese forces now going in there, it's going to be very much more difficult.

Another event in the last few weeks has been the change of government of Cambodia, in which they have thrown our Prince Sihanouk, who was away on a trip at the time. In fact, he was actually in Moscow when the change took place, and General Lon Nol and Sirik Matak--Matak was Ambassador to Tokyo at the time I was there--have taken over and are trying to expel the North Vietnamese forces. There are about 40,000 of them who are in Cambodia, using Cambodia as a refuge and a source of supply for their operations in Vietnam. The problem on this is going to be Cambodia doesn't

push this so hard and so fast that the North Vietnamese forces will attack them and defeat them, which they readily can do. The problem is going to be to play this carefully. This is a little hard to do. Some of our people, particularly on the military side, see a chance to go into Cambodia and wipe out the North Vietnamese forces there. But, of course, that's just the very thing that could push the North Vietnamese back into a confrontation of the Cambodians; get the Cambodians and the North Vietnamese involved, the Cambodians get in dire distress and ask for help from us. And we don't want to have that happen. However, there's been a very encouraging development at the present time. We have to wait and see whether the Cambodians are going to be able to carry it out. If they can, it can have profound effects in Vietnam. As the North Vietnamese are operating in the Delta area of South Vietnam, using Cambodia as their base, if that's denied to them, Cambodia will no longer be an asset and their supply problem will be greatly complicated. So, in Laos, I might say that the last few days, the Vang Pao's forces have been carrying out a very successful resistance to the North Vietnamese there. The events in Cambodia, the way things are going, and in South Vietnam itself, makes me mildly discouraged at the present time. All these things, of course, are interrelated.

Well, I'm trying to think of what else, now, I should cover. I really can't think of anything else at the moment. We had hoped that your Aunt Jennifer was going to come back from Bangkok this spring, but she just feels that she's so tied up and so busy that she can't. It's been six years since she's been back to the States, and I hope to have her come back. However, I'm hoping that your grandmother will be able to go out in July and spend a little time with her. I would very much like to see her

myself, but I haven't any present plans for going there. One never knows. I think I'll cut this at this point. This is about all I can think of at the moment. Over and out.

[Interruption]

This is Sunday, August 23, 1970. Let's see. I don't seem to have this microphone up to enough volume.

I have just been listening to some tapes that your Uncle Bill sent me, and which I am putting in my tape file. One set of them are a series of tapes that I sent to your grandmother, my wife, and to the family during the time that I was in Saigon. These were dictated by me very soon after the events. I've been listening to some of them and I think they're pretty good and pretty interesting from a general historical point of view; I commend them to you or to anyone who's interested in that period. The other is a tape that my mother did with regard to her life and her family. That is, your great-grandmother. It is a very interesting tape, and I also commend that to you.

Well, it's been March since I last talked with these tapes, and a lot of things have happened since then. I've been jotting just a few down here to think of as I go along. I recall that I was talking about my textile negotiations with the Japanese at that time. Well, they finally broke down completely in June, because of the inability of the Japanese to do anything in that field. This has led to a wave of protectionism here in the Congress and in the United States, concerning which I'm very worried.

During this period, we've had the incursions into Cambodia by both the Vietnamese and the American forces; the withdrawal of the American forces. I've been very deeply involved in this whole Cambodian affair,

since it was undertaken in April, and I'm still involved in it. I've also been involved in the negotiation of our new agreement with Spain on our bases there. I have been handling that myself, and it was finally successfully completed. I will come back to that, but that is something in which I take considerable personal pride.

During this period, we've also, of course, had the Middle East crises and now the cease-fire and, hopefully, the beginning of negotiations in the Middle East. I've not been,personally, directly involved in as much of that. I've been involved in various aspects of it, but Joe Sisco, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, has really been handling that and has been doing a superb job.

I've been deeply involved in this whole question of international traffic in narcotics. I'm on the interdepartmental committee on that. We're working very hard in trying to get something, some way of reducing the flow of narcotics into the country.

Also, during this period, in June, Elliot Richardson, who was Under Secretary, resigned and since June, there has not been an Under Secretary. I've been Acting Under Secretary. During a considerable part of the time, for two weeks at one period and now for another two weeks, I have been Acting Secretary. It has meant that I have been carrying three jobs at least, and I've found myself smothered at times.

During this period, also, your mother -- your grandmother,rather, my wife, -- has made a long trip out to Asia. She went out with the Secretary to the SEATO meeting in Manila in the end of June; then went on and spent several weeks with Jennifer in Bangkok, and then she went to Hong Kong, Okinawa, and Tokyo, Honolulu, Los Angeles, where she saw Bill; up to Santa Barbara, where she saw my mother; then out to Omaha to see you all out there. She just got back on August 17, having left on June 28. She had a fine trip, and I was sure glad that she was able to have it.

Bill, your Uncle Bill's graduating, or rather, he's getting his Ph.D. degree in nuclear physics on May 31 here in the American University in Washington. He's now working for the Rand Corporation out in Santa Monica.

On the official side, I've been involved in more committees than I can keep count of. The Washington Special Actions Group, that I think perhaps I mentioned in the previous tape, has become the focus of our operations in Cambodia. That is, it's been the operating agency as far as Washington is concerned with respect to Cambodia. I've been heavily involved with the Defense Program Review Committee that's working on the Defense budget problems for this next fiscal year, and also in looking down the road. I've also been involved with the problem of some of our Foreign Service officers who took exception to the Cambodian affair and, well, I'll come back to that. I don't know how to get about this in an orderly way as possible. Perhaps the best thing to do is to try to take it up somewhat by topics. When I let things go by too long and don't keep notes, I realize that it probably doesn't have too much value as a historical record, but nevertheless, I'll try.

On the Spanish bases, I have worked very hard and very long at this. The difficulty was that the Spanish wanted to have a commitment, a treaty commitment; and what I was trying to do, and finally succeeded in doing was getting an agreement with them without giving them any defense commitment. This was very difficult for them to accept, but it was quite clear that it was neither desirable for us nor could we get a commitment through the Senate. I worked this out as an Executive Agreement and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and particularly Senator Fulbright, took strong exception to this and insisted that it be ratified as a treaty.

However, we refused to do so. There's a long story on this. There are many press releases; there's been considerable bitterness between ourselves and Senator Fulbright and particularly with me on this. He made a speech in the Senate which said, in effect, that I was able to lead the Secretary and the President around by the nose and convince them that they should do this even though they knew better. Of course, this was utter nonsense. I had a very acid hearing with them after we reached the agreement on it; this next Wednesday, I'm having to go up to the Senate again to the Foreign Relations Committee. We're having an executive hearing and an open hearing on this subject, in which I know it's simply going to be a game in which Senator Fulbright is going to try to trap me into saying something that will provide him some basis for making an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill. That Defense procurement bill is what he's working at; that would cut off funds for our establishment in Spain, our military establishment in Spain. I don't think that he'll be successful. In fact, I feel quite sure that he will not, but this makes it very unpleasant.

The whole policy and attitude of Fulbright, in particular, and also some other members of that committee, is simply a querulous, complaining tone. There's nothing constructive about what they're doing; we spend more time, often, I feel, in trying to deal with the committee and trying to answer the committee's letters than we do in doing our business. Fulbright has a way of getting clippings out of the newspapers and he has the newspapers clpped; and this story, or that story, or the other story, he sends it along with a letter addressed to the Secretary, "What comment do you have on this? What comment do you have on that?" And it all gets very difficult. Secretary Rogers has been able to maintain a personal relationship

with him that's fairly tolerable, but this doesn't find any reflection in Fulbright's official attitude; and, as I represent, you might say, the old administration, he tends to take it out on me. At least, I feel so.

The record will show some public statements that I made. Particularly, at the time of the signing of the agreement on August 6 with Spain, I submitted a public statement to the Foreign Relations Committee which contains my position on the agreement. Frankly, I'm proud of it. I think it's one of the toughest jobs I've had as far as negotiating is concerned. I carried it through myself, and I feel proud of what I was able to do.

On textiles with the Japanese, there isn't much more to say than, in the end, they just were not able to do anything. They sent Mizawa, their Minister of International Trade and Industry, here, and their Foreign Minister, at the end of June, I guess this was. And we were hopeful that they were going to come up with something that would enable us to arrive at an agreement. I knew that Secretary Stans at the Commerce Department is taking a very hard line on this, all too tough a line. It's been just not the way to handle the negotiation, but I thought that if I could get the Japanese to come through with something reasonable , I felt fairly confident that the President would be willing to accept it. The first conversations that we had with the Japanese were hopeful. Then, that night, I . . . Let's see, there was a reception, or was there a dinner? Well, I went to an affair at the Japanese Embassy and had a long direct talk with Mizawa. And from that talk, it became, well, it was entirely clear that he wasn't really able to do anything because of their own industry. So that has broken down.

As I mentioned, we have a wave of protectionism now sweeping this country; and I frankly am very, very worried about the future of our relations

with Japan, because there's so much hostility here towards it, based primarily on economic grounds. From now on, the economic problem is going to be the biggest problem that we have betweeen ourselves and the Japanese, and we simply have tofind a way of managing it better. The fault is heavily on the Japanese side. The Japanese just can't quite recognize that they are now grown up and haveto compete on an equal basis. As I tell them, they can't play the game one way here in the United States and expect us to play it another way in Japan. I'm very unhappy about it.

However, the big event of the past few months has been Cambodia. Of course, there's going to be a voluminous historical record on this, and I will not attempt to duplicate it. As is known, or as you know, we had South Vietnamese forces enter Cambodia and tried to destroy, they did destroy some of the sanctuary base areas that the Viet Cong had long maintained there. Then the question arose of using American forces. This resulted in a very vigorous, but a very tightly held debate in the administration. Secretary Rogers argued strongly against it, not on the military grounds out there, but rather on his concern with regard to the domestic reaction. The Secretary of Defense also argued against it on similar grounds, but the President made his own decision on this and we had, what the record will show, almost a domestic explosion on this, particularly among the youth. This was a very, very difficult period. I had been working on this Cambodian affair in the Washington Special Actions Group, as I mentioned, but we were really not brought in. Let me say, the members of that: Henry Kissinger chairs it; Dave Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Tom Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Dick Helms; and myself; with sometimes John Mitchell, the Attorney General at present, formed the group. We were not brought into the debate directly.

The Secretary discussed it with me a number of times; then he told me that the decision was made and there was no point in my arguing it in the WSAG, as we call it, any further. That is, the decision to have American forces go to Cambodia.

The night that they did so--I believe this was April 30--the President made a very emotional speech on the issue. In my own view, one of the mistakes that was made was not treating this in a low-key fashion. I had urged that this be done, but he rather dramatized this very heavily and made a very emotional speech which built it up as far beyond the issue that it should have been. The night of the speech, after listening to it, I went to bed, and about twelve-thirty or a quarter to one, my phone rang and it was the President on the phone. This leads me to the question of our Foreign Service Officers. He had read a ticker that some Foreign Service personnel had sent a letter to the Secretary protesting the Cambodian invasion. And he called me because he tends to look to me as the senior Foreign Service Officer and was in a highly emotional state, talking very vigorously, using very vigorous, and I would say even, well, shall I say, profane language, wanting me to take immediate steps to fire all of these officers. I talked to him at some length and tried to calm him down, and it was left that I was going to give him the names of the officers who had signed the letter. To make a long story short, I succeeded in avoiding doing that; not that the President shouldn't have them, but I was concerned about what would happen in the White House.

I knew that most of these officers are young and naive. On the following Monday, I had all of the Foreign Service Officers--there were some AID people and some other people who had signed it--but I had all the Foreign Service Officers who had signed it in and had a pretty tough talk

with them, explained to them the harm that they had done to the Service and to the Department by this action, how naive they were to think that it was not going to become public.

Then the Secretary and I also had another discussion with the President on the subject. The Secretary and I went over to see him. The end result has been that I've succeeded in avoiding having any of the officers discharged, but have agreed to keep a particular eye on them, which I'm doing. They were all young junior officers; none of them, interestingly enough, had any direct responsibility for East Asian affairs. They were all from other bureaus. But this was a very unpleasant and difficult experience for me.

Now back to Cambodia. I think we covered some lost ground by the fact that all the American forces were withdrawn on June 30 as of the time the President promised. Incidentally, this date was sort of accidentally chosen. It simply grew out of a background press meeting that Henry Kissinger had had during the course of the affair. I had been working particularly hard on trying to find ways of assisting Cambodia in the military assistance field, and also trying to find ways in which we could get the Vietnamese to help and the Thais to help; that is, how we could support them in helping. But we find ourselves in such an absolute strait jacket with regard to the legal requirements, that is, the laws under which we now operate, it's been extremely difficult to find any way to assist these countries. The Cooper-Church Amendment, that's been the subject of so much debate, in fact, would have little practical effect on what we can do because we're already so hamstrung, but nevertheless, the President has taken a very strong line in opposition to it, as a result of which we will not have a foreign military sales bill this year either, or we

won't have this bill. We're trying to find, now, other ways around that. Our whole relationship with the Senate and with the Congress has never been in worse shape, and we're having great difficulty on this.

Well, I think, maybe, at this point, that I should say that, to my regret, I find that President Nixon is tending to move somewhat in the same direction that Lyndon Johnson moved in; that is, tending to shoot from the hip. I think that he was entirely justified on military grounds in this American invasion of Cambodia, or incursion as we called it, very properly, but it sure did tear this country apart. However, he's been willing to live with that. However, he's much more interested, shall I put it this way, he seems much more interested in military affairs than he does in diplomatic and political affairs. He is fascinated with the military. He's fascinated with bombing, and without overstating it, he tends to think that bombing or the threat of bombing can be the answer to many problems. And I'm worried, somewhat worried, and concerned at this point. As an example, when we withdrew from Cambodia, he authorized continuation of bombing in the northeast enemy occupied areas, but had said that, let it be known publicly, or said publicly that we were going to do this. At the same time, though, he authorized support to Cambodian troops, tactical bombing in support of Cambodian troops. I think this is perfectly proper. I think they needed it, but he didn't publicly say he was going to do so. He tended to give the impression that we were only going to carry out interdiction. Now, of course, it's becoming known that we are doing so; that is, carrying out troop support, Cambodian troop support, bombing. Again, this is giving rise to this lack of credibility and suspicion that was so much the problem of President Johnson.

I myself think that we're in so much better shape on these things

if we simply say what we're doing on the whole. There are some areas, of course, in which you have to be discreet. But talking one way and acting another way doesn't gain anything for us, I feel. I think under no circumstances should we make misstatements in which we're going to be caught up, and this again now is happening. I have tried, in all my work, to try to do what I can in this regard, but sometimes my voice is not vigorous enough or effective enough.

I mentioned the Middle East. This has been a great success thus far and this has been entirely a State Department operation of which we can be very proud. As I mentioned, Joe Sisco, Assistant Secretary Sisco, has really been the sparkplug on this. He's had the drive and the energy to push the thing through. He's had the support of the Secretary, and, well, we'll have to wait and see what develops out of it. If nothing else develops, we have lowered the steam pressure, which was becoming very high in the area, primarily because of the introduction of Soviet forces, Soviet pilots, and Soviet surface and air missiles manned by Soviets in the area, and the pressures that were being put on us by the Israelis for increased arms assistance.

A discouraging part of the job here is the enormous domestic political pressure that the Israelis are able to mount on this government. They overplay their hands at times. Secretary Rogers and the President, also, have been very upset by this. We've warned the Israelis to cut back on this, but without too much result. It's amazing that a number of people who are against our involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia seemed to be determined to get us involved in the Middle East. Apart from other considerations,our military capability in the Middle East indicates that we just don't have the power to do much there. As a matter of fact, the thing that I am

concerned about now is that with the cuts in the Defense budget, the increasing cuts in the Defense budget, we are reducing our general purpose forces throughout the world, and at a time when massive retaliation, massive nuclear retaliation has even less viability than it ever had in the past; in fact, it has no viability now with the Soviets having a virtual parity to us or in some ways stronger than we are in the nuclear side at a time that that has taken place, we're reducing our general purpose forces and our ability to deal with these local situations in a localized way.

But I'm concerned that the country is really moving back towards isolationism. It can't. It's impossible for it to move back towards the isolationism that we had between the two world wars. Nevertheless, the trend is in that direction. Of course, the problem is that so much priority is being given to our domestic needs and those needs are undeniably great that Defense, instead of having a first priority--it used to have probably too high a priority--now has such a low priority that it tends to get what's left over after we've taken care of everything else. However, Defense is also in part to blame for this. One of the things that I've been arguing and pushing is that it's important for Defense to build forces that are more useful in these localized wars, forces that are less expensive. In fact, our sophisticated aircraft and our very sophisticated aircraft carriers are simply unsuited to these localized wars. They not only cost a fantastic amount, far more, but they also don't do as good a job as a simpler weapon can do. Well, as I put it, I gave a lecture up at the Navy War College up at Newport on this a couple months ago to their National Strategy Seminar and said that I'm concerned that both the Air Force and the Navy are just pricing themselves out of the market by

insisting on $700,000,000 carriers with a $800,000,000 load of aircraft. They're simply not going to have carriers, or they're going to have very few.

Obviously, we have to have some of the sophisticated aircraft to meet the Soviet threat, but I would like to see us develop weapons systems that can meet the needs of these localized wars. As I told them, weapons systems and doctrines requiring ever-enlarging the theater of hostilities are just not going to work anymore. What we need is a weapons system that can establish something that comes close to what the Air Force calls interdiction. But it's not really interdiction. It's simply harassment, at the present time, and what I call a land blockade. I feel that it's going to be very difficult for us ever to put land forces on the mainland of Asia again, and I don't think we should think in terms of doing so. I think the people of the area can furnish the land forces, but what we can do is give the naval and air support to those forces that they may need; and what we need to do is to develop the kinds of naval and air support, in those areas, that will be effective.

Well, let's see, what else? As I have mentioned, I have been Acting Under Secretary, off and on now. I'm going to be again. But happily, the President's now announced that a new Under Secretary's going to be appointed, Jack Irwin. I'm very, very pleased with this. The Secretary discussed filling this vacancy with me. If I had really wanted it, I think I could have had it. But I really think it's best for it to be filled by an outside political figure, rather than by a career officer. I'm very pleased with the job that I have, and I want to continue the job that I have. Jack--John Irwin is his real name--I've known him for many years; and he, and I, and the Secretary, I'm satisfied, are going

to be able to work very effectively together. The Secretary and I get along fine. We tend to both be low-key, I think. At the same time, the Secretary--he's a politician, of course--likes the limelight. He likes to take credit for things, and I think this is proper that he should; I don't get in his way in doing so and I think he has confidence in me.

I think, in some ways, he's a little relieved that Elliot Richardson is leaving. Elliot was an exceptionally capable man. The Secretary was very, very proud of him. We worked very well together, but Elliot was tending to take some of the public limelight to a degree that I don't think the Secretary found entirely congenial. I don't say this in any discredit to Rogers at all. I'm very, very fond of him. It's just the way people are. I enjoy working with him very much.

There is no use of my talking about it in any detail. There is a certain amount of pulling, andhauling, and friction between himself and Henry Kissinger. The Secretary feels that he should have untrammeled and direct access to the President, and this is perfectly all right. Henry feels that he needs to --and he does need to--know what's going on. And Elliot Richardson tried to smooth the rough edges on this. Since he's left, I've had to do so; have tried to smooth out some of the rough edges and keep relations at a working basis. Personally, I find no difficulty with Henry. He and I seem to be able to work fairly well together, even though Henry still has somewhat of a chip on his shoulder with regard to the Department and tends to interpret things in the wrong way if it's possible to interpret them in the wrong way.

Well, I'm getting down pretty close to the end of this side of the tape. I suppose I should finish this off. Really, if I'm going to make these tapes useful, I see I need to do them more often. I need to do them

when things are fresher in my mind and when I can give a more coherent account. However, hopefully, these rambling remarks--particularly, I'm afraid, they're rambling today--I hope will be of some interest. I've been, as I say, pretty smothered, but I'm keeping my health. I'm trying to play golf once or twice a week on the weekends.

When the President . . . Oh, I should say I'm going to have to go out to San Clemente again. Last trip the President made out there, I had to go out twice. I'm going to have to go out, again, a couple of times, this trip that he's out there. I must say: to my mind, it's an awful waste of time, and it's terribly expensive moving people from Washington out there, back and forth. Some of it is make-work, very frankly. Some of it is to show activity while he's out there. On the other hand, I recognize that he can work better out there in a more relaxed atmosphere. I go back to what I always say, "We'll work the way the boss wants us to work." But I could do with a few less trips to San Clemente. I want to--next time I go out though--I'm going to see my mother, your great-grandmother. She's failing, I fear, fairly fast. Well, I'll close this side now. This is all. Over and out.

20

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 20

(20a)

Listening to the last part of the last tape, I see I made a resolution to try to make these recordings more frequently, but somehow or the other I haven't succeeded and in fact have slipped behind, because it's well over the year since I recorded the first side. It is Sunday, November 7, 1971.

Your grandmother and I are leaving on Tuesday for a trip to Japan then down to Taiwan, and Bangkok, where your grandmother's going to stay and see your Aunt Jennifer and cousin Patty. I'll be going up to Vientiane, and over to Phom Phen and then Saigon and then back here. We'll be gone for about two weeks. This will be the first time I've been outside the country since I came back here in January of 1969. One time last year I had a trip all planned to Africa to a Chiefs of Mission conference there, along with your grandmother, but the Secretary had to make a trip into the Middle East at that time so I canceled out. In general I've been the one that's been staying home taking care of the store, so to speak. I've been acting Secretary for extended periods while Secretary was away and often the Under Secretary also was away, but I'm determined to get away this time. I don't have any great mission, but I'm going out to an international council meeting in Tokyo sponsored by Morgan Guarantee Trust and they're paying my way out there. Chip Bohlen and Bob Murphy are also going along.

In the personal vein, I got ill for the first time in my adult life last December. I got an infection in my prostate gland that took me several months to get over entirely. It didn't entirely incapacitate me, but I felt very badly during the period. Your great-grandmother fell and broke her hip on New Years Day and she was operated on with a steel joint put in, but this has

been a very traumatic experience both physically and mentally for her. She's in the infirmary there at the Samarkand in Santa Barbara. I've been out to see her quite frequently. I've been out several times during this past year. Otherwise, we're in good health. I am home today on Sunday and doing this recording because I went up to Newport on Wednesday to give a speech up there. I had a head cold and the flight on the plane stopped up my ears and I'm staying home trying to doctor myself and get myself in shape for my trip to Japan.

So much has happened during this past year. It is hard to know where to begin. I know that one of the things I was covering in my last tape, the other side of this tape rather, was the textile issue. I might mention that that went without resolution for many, many months and finally David Kennedy, who is former Secretary of the Treasury, when he resigned came over to the Department as an ambassador at large was put in charge of the textile negotiations by the President. Suffice it to say that agreements have finally been reached with Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea, but at tremendous costs. We really had to bludgeon them, give them ultimata, which they deeply resented, and the whole thing has been a history of ineptitude, bad handling on all sides. But I think we have to bear a large share of the blame for it. I recognize that the President had the political commitment to do something on textiles. He felt he had to get it done before the elections in '72, and we went all out in doing it, and it was done, but it's going to leave bitterness behind for years and years to come. The other big events have been the announcement of the President's trip to Communist China next year and this was announced on July 15. On August 15 the so-called new economic policy was announced and these two things together were taken in Japan as--interpreted in Japan or called in Japan rather--the two Nixon

shocks. Japan of course had some of this coming to it. But the difficulty was that they saw the President's trip as marking a reversal of policy, a policy in which they had very closely followed us over the years and we made the announcement with no advance warning or consultation with them. And this has quite badly shaken up the Sato government. It remains to be seen what will happen there. It has also shaken up others.

Another big event was our effort to obtain approval of the General Assembly of the so-called dual representation resolution. That is, a resolution which would have invited Peking to take a seat in the assembly, but at the same time reaffirmed the seat of Taiwan. We did a great deal of arm twisting to get Japan to go along with this and they finally did so very reluctantly. We both worked very hard at it, but nevertheless we were defeated in the assembly. And this also has been a big blow to Japan, because it meant they were following us in a course that resulted in failure.

I might say that one of the reasons the Japanese feel there was a failure was that the announcement was made of Dr.Kissinger's second trip to Peking just at the time the debate was beginning on the dual representation resolution and he was there during the time of the debate. And this caused many countries to feel that we were perhaps double-dealing with them. The fact is, we were not. I argued strenously against the timing of the second Kissinger trip, as did the Secretary, but nevertheless it went ahead. And to what degree it may have contributed to the defeat of the dual representation resolution, it's hard to say. My own feeling is it probably did, at least to some degree.

I'm a little concerned that with the--oh, how shall I put it--with the White House now having its eyes now so much centered on improving relations with Peking, with Henry Kissinger obviously being fascinated with Chou En Lai, who is obviously a very able person, but still he's not all of China.

I have a little feeling that we are getting our priorities a little mixed up. I'm entirely in favor of improving relations with Peking, but I think we have to be very careful that we don't let Peking split us from Japan. In fact, the very announcement of the trip has served somewhat to bring about a split between ourselves and Japan. And our relations are never going to be quite the same again.

There is sort of a spirit of vindictiveness towards Japan. I don't say this is shared by the President, but it's shared by many people here. And I have a little feeling that we are starting to move apart somewhat in the same way as we did in the early 1930s and we've got to bring ourselves back closer together again.

In this connection we finally concluded the Okinawa agreement. We've had the Senate hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee is very favorable to it, and I hope and expect that during this coming week the Senate will consent to ratification of the agreement and this should be of fairly considerable help. Simultaneously the debate is going on in the Japanese Diet over the agreement.

During this period I also concluded the negotiations with Spain for renewal of our Spanish bases agreements. This is one of the toughest negotiations I have ever had. And I really handled it personally and it's a job of which I'm very satisfied. I was able to give the Spanish the feeling that they were getting a lot, and able on the other hand to give the Congress the feeling that they weren't getting very much, and thus I think it was a good agreement and good negotiation. Someday I'd like to go to Spain and see the bases. I've negotiated this base agreement now three different times. I've never even been there or seen the bases.

I've also, during this period, been deeply involved in seeking European cooperation in our post-Apollo manned space program. I've had a number of meetings with the so-called European Space Conference and have been discussing with them giving up their own launcher program in order to join us in the post-Apollo program. One of my big problems on this has been that if they give up building their own launcher, then will we guarantee to launch whatever they want to have launched. We have no conflict on this except on communication satellites in which case France wants to launch satellites that would be communication satellites. These would be directly competitive with the Intelset Satellites, and this we haven't been able to agree to, and won't agree to. But I think I'm splitting off some of the other Europeans from France on this subject and I do think it would mean a great deal if we could get real cooperation going in a complex field such as this.

There is a real question as to how much of a political asset it might be. Managing a space program is pretty complicated;when you bringother countries into it, it becomes more complicated. And perhaps the frictions and the difficulties in carrying out the program may turn out to be greater than the political benefits. In any event, they haven't yet made their decision. We haven't yet made our decision. This is part of the problem of when and how we're going to start building the space transportation system. That is the space shuttle and the space station and the tug. This is a very imaginative and important program, but it's running into our priorities here at home and remains to be seen whether or how fast we will do it.

I think we will do it, but . . . And I'd like to see us do it. I think to sort of resign space to somebody else is not in keeping with our character, but American people are beginning to look at things differently than they did in the past.

An example of this is the blow which we just had the last of last week, in which the Senate defeated the aid program. They're now reconsidering it, but we've had great difficulty in maintaining our foreign aid program and there's a great deal of dissatisfaction. I think entirely unjustified dissatisfaction. People talk about throwing away money and waste. Actually I think the investments we've made in aid, investment in the Marshall Plan, investment we've made in Japan, investments we've made around the world on a whole in aid, have paid off big dividends just in terms of our own self-interest. But there is a great deal of resistance in the country to aid programs.

During this period I was also deeply involved in the negotiations for the definitive Intelsat agreement. This is a definitive agreement for the handling and operation of communications satellites. This was terribly complicated. We had some seventy countries involved and on our side we had the conflict of interests of the Federal Communications Commission, Comsat--Communications Satellite Corporation, and oh others, the Congress and others involved. I had to weigh in at several points in the conference, particularly with our communications satellite company, and this was an example of how negotiating with ourselves is in some ways more difficult than negotiating with others. It is an example of what I often say to young foreign service officers. The fact that in my experience it takes more diplomacy operating here in Washington than it does abroad. In each case the techniques are about the same, in each case the objectives are about the same. You're trying to influence a government toward a certain course of action. When you're at home you're trying to influence your own government. This involves working with a lot of people and exercising influence and persuasion. And it's about the same thing when you're operating abroad. There you're

also trying to influence the government using the arts of persuasion to the best of your ability to try to get a certain course of action. And I must say operating here in Washington becomes terribly difficult, but it's interesting.

During this period also Under Secretary Jack Erwin, John Erwin, came on board as Under Secretary. This served to relieve some of the pressure that I felt all during last summer with no Under Secretary. Jack is a very able man that I've known a long time. Quiet, but effective, and he and the Secretary and I work very closely together and I think quite effectively together and I'm very happy with our personal relationships.

Going back to Japan. Something I have been able to accomplish during this period was to obtain the formation of the Business Advisory Council on trade and economic affairs with Japan. This was formed of private business groups. I took the initiative in this. My concept was that when special problems such as textiles comes along, that we should hear not just from the textile people, but also hear from all those that are interested in the totality of our economic relations. This concept of forming a group that would be advisory to the Secretary on this met with considerable resistance from Maurice Stans. It also met with resistance from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce , who felt that we were trying to move in on their territory, but we finally succeeded in getting it set up with the cooperation of everybody involved. And Jebe Hallaby heads it up. It met just before our September Cabinet level meeting with the Japanese. We had a good exchange with them and in turn a similar, private, non-governmental council was formed in Japan and my hope is that this may lead to dealing with some of these trade and economic problems at the business level, or at the private level, and not permit them to escalate so rapidly at least onto the political level. This

fairly unique institution--and there's now interest in establishing something similar with Western Europe. If I could say so, I'm the one that originated the idea and carried it through, and I've taken considerable pride in it.

This has not been a very satisfactory recording. I've not done what I vowed to do previously, that is to record sooner when things are fresher in my mind. But I wanted to get it going again and I think I'll cut it off at this point. Over and out.

November 25, 1971

This is Thursday, November 25, 1971, Thanksgiving Day. I had planned this morning to have a game of golf with Marshall Green, Ambassador Kim, and Ambassador Brown, but it snowed during the night and so I'm at home. I will be going over later to Gerry and R'ella's for Thanksgiving dinner along with but I thought I would take advantage of this time to do what I said I was going to do previously. That is, try to record while matters are still fresher in my mind.

I returned on Tuesday morning from the trip to the Far East that I had previously mentioned. Your grandmother and I left here on Tuesday, the 9th of November and flew directly to Tokyo, arriving there on the evening of Wednesday of course, with the loss of the day enroute. And I came back here Tuesday, the 23rd. I spent, well, the rest of Wednesday, Thursday and Friday and Saturday in Tokyo. Then went to Taiwan on Sunday and on Monday went to Hong Kong, and arrived in Bangkok Monday evening. I spent Tuesday in Bangkok. Wednesday, the 17th, I went up to Laos. Thursday I spent in Bangkok. Friday I went to Phnom Phen. Saturday I went to Saigon. Sunday I went from Saigon to Honolulu. Laid overnight in Honolulu and left Honolulu on Monday evening, arriving here Tuesday morning. It's turned out to be a much more interesting and in many ways more significant trip that I had anticipated.

I had good meetings in Japan. I had not asked to see anybody there particularly, but the Prime Minister Sato asked to see me and I had a long discussion with him, a long discussion with the Foreign Minister. My stay there coincided with that of John Connally, the Secretary of Treasury, who was also there for part of the time that I was there discussing economic, financial matters with the Japanese.

In Japan, as I expected, they are very concerned over the development of our relations with China, mainland China. And a great debate going on there over the course of their own policy. They feel that we have leaped over them, left them behind, and now they are debating as to how they can catch up and not be left further behind. It's become the major domestic and political issue in Japan. I also, while I was there, met with Ohya, the chairman of their textile federation, a man that I have known for a long time. Discovered him quite bitter, of course, with regard to the textile settlement. They are also, of course, concerned over our economic policy, our surtax on imports and the efforts to get them to revalue their currency. I did a nationally televised TV program while I was there over the NHK network with an interviewer in which I tried to put some of these pressures with regard to China and our economic affairs in better perspective.

On China, I took the line that we had for many years, back even to the time that I initiated talks with the Chinese in Geneva in 1954, been seeking to establish better communications with China. That in establishing, that in now we having succeeded in doing so, and that although, in a fairly dramatic way, it simply is a pursuance of a long time policy on our part. The establishment of communications does not mean that all our problems will be resolved over night nor that there will be a reversal of policy either by Peking or by ourselves. I point out that we have had communications with

the Soviet Union for some thirty-seven years and this hasn't resolved our problems. I have also pointed out that on the security side, the fact that we have been communicating with the Soviet Union has not lessened, and in fact it has increased, the importance of our defense network, our defense arrangements in Europe, and NATO has been a very important element in the development of our relations. I've said similarly in Asia, I expect that our defensive arrangements there and our defense posture of ourselves and the other free countries of the area is going to be an important element in the development of our relations with China.

In talking privately with the Japanese, I said that I did not think they had anything to gain by conceding to Peking demands on them in various fields, and in fact, Peking would not respect them if they did so. I particularly tried to encourage them to continue their relations with Taiwan and the development of their relations with Taiwan, because although the question of relations with Taiwan and the mainland are ones for those two areas themselves
Peking
to settle, we certainly aren't going to gain any respect in the area if we are so fickle as to abandon the relations we've maintained for so long with Taiwan and the people of Taiwan. These are some of the arguments I used there.

In connection with the President's trip and our lack of consultation with the Japanese on this, I pointed out that the difficulty is that we cannot have confidence in the ability of the Japanese government to maintain a confidence. There's so much in the way of leakage in Tokyo to the Japanese press and we've had so many experiences with their leaking things to the press that we're very concerned about our ability to maintain confidence with them. And this is one of the reasons that we have not been able to inform them or tell them or consult with them with regard to the President's plans for a Peking

trip. I had a very vigorous discussion with the Foreign Minister on this subject; he recognized the problem and said that they would seek to correct it, but it remains to be seen what they can do to correct it.

As I said to him, we have our own problems here in Washington with leakage. It's very discouraging at times, but Tokyo is certainly worse than Washington and certainly worse than with any other government with whom we maintain relations. So that is one of our problems in dealing with them.

Taiwan, I, well, the only way I can put it is they more or less threw their arms around me. They were feeling so forlorn and lost and concerned about the situation and I was the first senior official that had been through there in many months that I had very good discussions there with the Vice President, with Chiang Ching-Kuo, with the Minister of Finance and with others. I told them there that it seemed to me that the principal problem they faced and we faced would be the effort Peking would now make to isolate them economically. They've had great success economically, but I was sure that the move now would be to get nations that do not have relations with them, to withdraw most favored nation treatment for them, to expel them from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and from the Asian Development Bank. Get countries to withdraw credits to them and in general to isolate them economically. I felt that this was the danger rather than any military danger from mainland,And in large part, except for Chiang Ching-Kuo, they agreed with me and we discussed how we could work together on this problem. It's a difficult one and I'm concerned about their future.

One notable thing was that even the mainlanders in the government discussing these matters would in one way or another directly or indirectly get around to the point of saying, "You know, if we only called ourselves Taiwan instead of calling ourselves the government of the Republic of China,

some of these problems might be simplified." I told them I entirely agreed, but it was late in the day for that. But the interesting thing was that this would now even be mentioned. A year ago this would have been treason in Taiwan and it does indicate a development in their thinking and a movement towards the possibility of an independent Taiwan. Of course, that is what's feared by Peking. Peking particularly fears an independent Taiwan that has close ties with Japan.

We stopped some eight hours in Hong Kong and saw our very good friends, Dave and Helenka Osborn. Dave is consul general there and I had some good discussions with his staff. And then we went on to Bangkok, arriving there late in the evening. We were met by Mike and Jennifer and Patty and a horde of photographers and reporters as well. We stayed at Ambassador Unger's guest house, which is still the same guest house we had when we were there. It was good to be back, it's a lovely place and I enjoyed it.

(20b)

On the next day I had a fairly light schedule for the first time, got a little bit of rest. The only major thing I did was an audience with the King. I had a talk with him for about an hour, an hour and a half. It was ironical in view of what happened two days later, I opened my conversation with him by congratulating him, or by saying that I thought Thailand could be congratulated on the fact that it had political stability and it was developing political institutions, developing politically in an atmosphere of stability, quite better than most other countries in the world. Two days later there would be the coup. Well, perhaps I shouldn't refer to that now. Oh, I might say that in the conversation I talked to the King also about efforts to plant substitute crops, or substitutes for poppies that were being grown by the mountain people, mountain tribes people in the northern part of Thailand and

Laos and Burma. This whole question of narcotics looms very, very large. And the King had taken some measures to try to experiment with finding other crops for the mountain people to grow. However, I might skip to this point and say that on Thursday following my return from Laos,which I'll speak of later, I had a telephone call immediately from Ambassador Unger saying that he had just had a call from Marshall Dawee saying that Marshall Dawee was in trouble and would Len Unger and myself come right over and see him. This brought back memories of 1958 when Marshall Dawee was sitting over in the corner at the revolutionary headquarters in Bangkok and Sarit was trying to decided whether to shoot him or not. However, Dawee called back a few minutes later and said that he was with the Prime Minister and was at the Prime Minister's residence. Then he told me that there had been some rumors of a coup during the afternoon and Len and I both agreed, Len Unger, this is, that it certainly was not wise for me to go over, but that Len should do so and keep me informed. I went out to Mike's and Jennifer's and Patty's for dinner. Len called me a little while later to say that they had abolished the assembly and declared what they call the Revolutionary Council and were going to rule by martial law.

I had an appointment for the following morning previously arranged with Marshall Thonom, then the Prime Minister. We agreed that we would keep it. The ironic, interesting part of all this was that the steps they took were almost identical to the steps that Marshall Sarit took October, 1958. At the time I was ambassador there, Len Unger, who is now ambassador, was then my deputy chief of mission and John Getz, who was along with me as my aide on this trip, was head of the political section. So it was just the same thing all over again.

Next morning, I went to the government house and met Marshall Thonom who called himself the head of the Revolutionary Council, General Praphat,

Pote Sarasin, and Marshall Dawee. I said to them that it was entirely up to them what they did as far as running their own country was concerned, but I thought it somewhat remarkable that they were the same people that were sitting there in 1958 along with me and they were now sitting there in 1971 and they called this a revolution. I said that this gave entirely a false impression to the outside world, it certainly was not any revolution nor had there been any coup. And this was going to cost them dearly in our aid debate and our aid appropriations which were right at that time under very vigorous discussion in Congress because they would be pictured merely as another military dictatorship taking charge. Well, we had a long talk about this. I gave it to them pretty strongly. Interestingly enough, the day after I left, they changed the name, at least in English, to the National Executive Council rather than the Revolutionary Council. And they also announced that they would draft another constitution, both suggestions which I had made to them and which they accepted.

While I was there, I might say that Thailand received this very calmly. As far as the immediate effects are concerned, they will be very small. They really didn't give it much thought. And it was a very hasty action on their part and they're going to pay for it in the long run. As I told them this was 1971, not 1958. And, as I also told them, it would be very hard for me, as they asked me to do, to persuade the Congress that they had to do this because of their difficulties with their assembly. I said this would not be a very persuasive argument in the Congress. They were having troubles with their assembly. The assembly was blocking the passage of the budget, but of course this is a normal process of government. And as far as the immediate effects, and unquestionably they can get along better without an assembly than with one, but as far as the long range effects, I'm sure that it's going

to increase discontent among the student elements to some degree. And it's going to give the opposition in the Communists a material, ammunition, to use against the government to try to increase the insurgency in the north. Insurgency in Thailand still is very small and everybody agrees that the government is doing a better job in handling it. The disturbing factor is that at the end of each year there seem to be more armed insurgents than there were previously. They're not gaining on the problem. I don't expect Thailand to be another Vietnam. The situation is entirely different. But they need to do a more effective job than they have been doing. I get frustrated at the Thais. I like them very much. As I often say, they can be rascals, but they can be awfully nice rascals too. But there's a certain fecklesness about many of them and whereas in 1958 with Sarit coming in, Sarit was a man of decision. He led a very disordered personal life, but he knew his Thai people very well and his rule was accepted. Thonom is a nice person, but he's a soft person and I'm afraid that he'll not be decisive. And I have very great concern about General Praphat's basic honesty, so I don't know what's going to happen. Nothing dramatic is going to happen soon, but I think they should be able to make greater political progress than they have. Not that they have to form a government in our image or that they have to have a perfect representative government or anything of that kind, but it's still too much a government of generals without enough civilian elements in it.

In this connection, they dismissed all the ministers, including Thanat Khomann, the foreign minister. On that Thursday evening, Thanat had previously invited me to a dinner and he reaffirmed the invitation so we had dinner that evening, along with some of the foreign office types and General Krit, and a few others. After dinner we had a very bitter conversation. Thanat was in

one of his bitter moods. He on the one hand said that he thought what had been done by the military group was justified. At the same time he alleged that we, the United States, had been working against him. I tried to convince him that this was not true because the fact of the matter is we had not been. We had great respect for Thanat, although he can be personally difficult at times. He's been a very major force for regional leadership in the area, as well as leadership in Thailand. And I've always strongly supported him and all of us have always strongly supported him. Yet, he seemed convinced that we'd been working against him, nothing I could say would change it. One remark he made to me which I didn't quite know how to interpret was that I should know, the way that he put it, "Alex, freedom is not dead in Thailand." So I think he is bitter,he's bitter at the generals and we're probably going to hear further from Thanat at some time. I'm certain that he's not out of the picture and I hope that he's not, because I have great respect for him.

In Laos I flew . . . Mac Godley, our ambassador up there, came down to Bangkok and I flew with him directly up to Long Tien, where I met Sisouk the Minister of Defense and General Vang Pao, the leader of the Meos, spending most of the day with them. Very interesting time. Vang Pao a great general. He quit school when he was thirteen years old. He has great difficulty reading, but he's certainly the master of the situation up there and respected by everybody. I flew with him in a helicopter from Long Tien out into the Plaines des Jarres and visited some of the fire bases and his forces out there. The dry season is just beginning and they're expecting the usual annual offensive from the other side, the North Vietnamese again. His military position is much stronger than it was and I think that he's going to be able to make a better fight for it this year than he did in the past.

I then went to Phnom Phen and there I had a long talk with Lon Nol who's now the rime inister and Minister of Defense about their situation there. North Vietnamese forces were only about seven or eight miles from the end of the runway at the airport there and fighting was going on, but nobody seemed too concerned about it; life went on as usual. In talking to Lon Nol I said that throughout my trip I had been asked about the situation in Cambodia and my reply was that eighteen months ago, when the North Vietnamese attacked, Cambodia had virtually no army and it was very doubtful, looked very doubtful at that time whether Cambodia would be able to survive. I had pointed out that Cambodia not only survived, but it was infinitely stronger than it was at that time, whereas Communist strength did not gain very much. Therefore I felt confident of their ability to defend themselves. Lon Nol said he agreed. And seemed half-confident, confident, that they could defend what they then held. He wanted more forces to go on the offensive, to take back territory, but I discouraged him in thinking that he would be able to get additional support from us anymore. Not that it wasn't justified, but we were simply unable to get the appropriations in Congress that would be able to give him more support.

I saw Lon Nol and the Acting Foreign Minister had lunch for me. Coby Swank, our ambassador, had a dinner that evening with both Cambodians and some of the diplomatic corps there. I found it very interesting. I have great respect for the Cambodians. They're tough, tough people. As I told Lon Nol, my own association with them went back to the Geneva Conference in 1954 when they demonstrated greater toughness and got a better agreement than any of the other states that were at that conference.

In Saigon I met President Thieu and had a good talk with him and then of course met all our people there, General Abrams and so on. At dinner in the

evening, the ambassador had people representing various political groupings there. One thing that impressed me was that, oh, for example, the opposition are now talking in terms of working within the political framework. Insofar as as I could determine, that was the general mood there. This represents a vast change from 1964 and '65 when I was there.

The military situation seems reasonably good. I think that given the fact that we've drawn our forces down as far as we now have, there's little purpose in maintaining any large force there, our men don't have enough to do and this is always bad for morale. One thing I'm very clear on is it's going to be very important for us to keep our air power in the area. It's going to be essential for the survival of Laos, essential in Cambodia and I think . . . It's certainly going to be essential in order to limit the number of supplies the enemy can bring down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, most of this air power can and should be stationed in Thailand. Given the maintenance of our air power, I think that the Vietnamese are going to be able to handle the rest of the situation themselves fairly well. If we can give them the economic support that they need, they've taken some very courageous, excellent measures in the economic field, but they're going to need major support from us this year and one of the questions is whether or not we're going to be able to get an aid bill through the Congress that will enable us to give them that support. The whole situation in the Congress is terribly frustrating. I never have seen it in such a disarray and disorder. And it's very, very difficult to understand the people who want to throw away what we've been able to accomplish out there. They seem to want to throw it away. I don't feel pessimistic about the area at all. From Saigon I took a night plane, overnight plane,to Honolulu and met with the people in CINCPAC there, had an afternoon of golf, and then took a plane the next night from Honolulu nonstop

to Friendship Airport and so I'm back here in Washington. I should say perhaps somewhat worse for the wear, but I've been catching up on my sleep. I've found these trips against the sun all night on the plane very tiring.

As far as the situation here is concerned, I'm very concerned about the State Department, the role of the State Department. It's quite evident that the President doesn't have too much confidence in the Foreign Service and State. More and more foreigh affairs are gravitating out of the State Department. John Connally is now the dominant element, not only in the monetary field but in the trade field as well. As far as other major negotiations are concerned, the President handled these things very much himself, along with Henry Kissinger. Secretary Rogers is brought in but he is not a dominant element, except in a few areas such as the Middle East where he has been. This is no fault of Bill Rogers whatsoever, no criticism of him whatsoever. It's the way the President wants to do things. But it's weakening the State Department and I try not to look at this from a narrow, bureaucratic point of view, but I think it's weakening our professional service too. The political appointments made by this administration or the political appointments of chiefs of mission made by this administration have been very indifferent. There have not been any really outstanding men appointed such as David Bruce or Ellsworth Bunker by previous administrations. I'm not against political appointments and I think we need to bring some outside men in, but they've been very indifferent in this administration. Almost all the better posts have gone to political appointees. And we've got sort of a vicious cycle going, I'm afraid, in which the Foreign Service is not producing the men that . . . let's say that are fairly outstanding for the major chiefs of mission jobs. Part of the reason that we're not producing them is that people are leaving because they don't see the opportunity of landing the major jobs. Thus there's

a vicious circle going on here that disturbs me very much. I'm however keeping at my job and as long as people feel that I can be useful I'm glad to be around. I've passed now my 63rd birthday. I'm still in good health, even though I probably smoke too much and . . . But still, I feel good and I have no thought of retiring unless there's clearly no job for me. As long as people want me around and I think I can do something useful, I'm going to stay around. I'd very much like to get another post abroad, but I doubt that that's in the cards, but we will see.

I should have said that your grandmother, your grandmother Pat, stayed on in Bangkok when I left there. She's staying on with Mike and Jennifer and Patty, and will be coming back shortly before Christmas. She'll be spending some time in Hong Kong, then Okinawa, and Honolulu before coming back.

Mike and Jennifer have had a few problems among them, but that seems to have been worked out. Patty is a wonderful little girl. And it was awfully good to see her. The press got pictures of her greeting me, in my arms, at Bangkok and that was published in all the Bangkok papers, much to her delight. She's of course studying Thai, she's in school, she had to study both Thai and English and it's pretty rough to have to learn both at the same time, but of course, if she can do so, and she is doing so, this is going to be a great asset to her.

I am down towards the end of this tape and think I will finish it off at this point, and change my clothes and get ready to go over and have Thanksgiving with R'Ella and Gerry. So this is all. This is the end of this tape.