U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 21

(21a)

It is Thursday, March 30, 1972. Much has happened since my last tape in November of last year after I had returned from a trip I took at that time out to East Asia. First, on the personal side, on February 4 I suffered a heart attack and spent some three weeks in the hospital and since that time have been home gradually recovering and I'm still at home at the time of making this tape. The indications are that I am making a complete recovery and I hope to be able to go back to work during the next few weeks.

You know, this is one of those things that you assume happens to other people but it's not going to happen to you. I didn't recognize the signs of my having heart trouble but fortunately I saw a doctor soon enough and that was the doctor in the Department and I was immediately hospitalized and had very good care and things are going well for me. At the present time I'm out walking twice a day a little and I hope within the next month or so to be able to resume regular exercise. One of the problems I have is that as a result of this I've given up smoking. Even before this, I have for a long period, ever since Saigon, held my weight down by very strenuous dieting. With giving up smoking and no exercise I've really had to lower my food intake to the point that I'm hungry most of the time. I hope to be able to get back to more normal eating when I can get back to more normal exercise.

During this period I've heard from literally hundreds of people all around the world, first from people who had previously had heart attacks and recovered from them, beginning with former President Johnson, LBJ, through others. I've heard from Hubert Humphrey right in the midst of his primary

campaign in Florida, and, of course, President Nixon. One of the big jobs the office has had is keeping track of messages that I've received and replying to them. It's really somewhat overwhelming to know that so many people are....Well, at least that I'm known to, or have so many people who are concerned about me, people I like to think of and I'm sure are friends.

The first week I was in the hospital, I was in the intensive care and the last two weeks I had a room to myself....I had a color TV in the room and I was able to watch the winter olympics in Japan and then I was able to watch the visit of the President to Peking. The television on that was excellent and having nothing to do except to watch the television I saw the evening programs and the morning programs and the whole thing. As I told Al Jenkins who went along and Marshall Green who also went along, I'm sure I saw more of what was going on than they did. Of course, they were in the meetings. The correspondents and TV people were out on the street.

Since returning home I've been having my office, usually Bob Beaudry, who's my principal assistant now who replaced John Getz, been having him come out in the morning with the daily summaries and the telegrams to keep me up to date on what's happening and in the afternoon I've had at least one of the assistant secretaries....Well, I shouldn't say at least one. I've had one of the assistant secretaries come out and spend about an hour or so with me keeping me up to date on what's happening as far as their field is concerned. I've not been trying to do any real work but simply to keep abreast so that when I do go back, I'll be able to pick things up.

It's been a long, long gap in the Department. The Secretary's been away, of course, on the Peking trip part of this time. Jack Irwin's been away. On the whole, though, my absence has fallen on the shoulders of Jack Irwin and I offered at the beginning of this, not knowing how long this was going to take,

to resign if they wanted me to, if the Secretary wanted me to do so so he could fill the job with somebody else but he's been holding the job open and very insistent that they want me to come back and I'm glad of that because I do feel I still have some work left in me and I enjoy my work and from what I can see now my health is going to be good enough to permit me to resume a full schedule again.

During the period before I left, I was working on a number of matters that I might mention. One--there were a number of controversial things that arose during this period. On the major side, as far as major problems were concerned, the principal one was, of course, the war between India and Pakistan. Well, I first should say the revolt in Bangladesh, that is formerly East Pakistan, then the war between India and Pakistan, and the dangers arising out of that. I'll come back to that later.

Another important element, of course, was preparations for the trip to Peking and the trip to Peking and the handling of our friends and allies with regard to that trip. Because I was in on the early preparations for that but, as I have noted, the trip actually took place during the time I was in the hospital.

Another area that's intrinsically not very important but which cost me a great deal of time and a great deal of work, which I was directly involved in handling was the whole question of the British ability to reach an agreement with Malta to maintain British presence on that island. I'll come back to that.

There was also the visit of Prime Minister Sato to San Clemente. The problem of whether or not he was going to see the President prior to the visit to Peking and the preparations for that trip. And then I had odds and ends, tag ends you might say, of our agreement in Spain, which I had negotiated in

'70. Implementation of that was falling down in some areas. It was getting to the point that I had to get back into that and I'll come back to that.

Also during this period we had the renewal of the base agreement with Portugal regarding the Azores and entering into a new agreement with the Bahrein for our Naval forces there. I was not too directly involved in either one of these negotiations but I did get deeply involved in defending these agreements, entering into these agreements as executive agreements, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was insistent that they should be entered into as treaties.

Also during this period, continued efforts I was making to keep Radio Free Europe, RFE, and Radio Liberty, Radio RL, as it's called, going against the almost single-handed effort of Senator Fulbright to sabotage these agreements. Well, I think I'll go back and start with a brief review of the Malta situation first.

Malta is a very small country, intrinsically unimportant, but its position as a possible unsinkable aircraft carrier for the Soviets in the middle of the Mediterranean makes it important. I don't know anything on which I spent more time during the past year than this very, shall I say annoying, pesky problem. To go back, early last year when the President made a visit out in that area, including a visit of the Sixth Fleet, when the President came back, he had me and Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird in for a brief discussion of his trip but particularly Malta; he turned to me and said that he wanted me to do everything possible to make sure that things didn't go bad in Malta. What he had in mind at the time was there was an election upcoming in which the incumbent, Warner, the Prime Minister, was being challenged by a man named Mintoff. And we were anxious to see that Mintoff didn't win. Mintoff was very erratic, had a very erratic left-

wing background. The President also made it clear that he was not very impressed by our ambassador there in Malta who is a political appointee and he wanted me to see if I couldn't make some change on that.

Well, the British, of course, had been in Malta a long time. We had a number of conversations with the British and examined all possibilities for giving assistance to Warner, giving assistance to him, but there was very little we could do and Mintoff won the election by a very small margin. I did not think it wise to try to get a change of our ambassador just at the time of the elections but I did have the deputy chief of mission changed at that time.

Well, Mintoff came in. He made demands on the British, very, very exaggerated demands on the British quite soon, the British retaining their base there and this is the negotiation that went on for a long, long time. I won't go into the details except to say that Mintoff was a very erratic individual. He would give an ultimatum to the British. Our ambassador there would be very impressed with this, which was quite clearly in my mind a bluff. These had always come on weekends so I had a lot of weekends taken up with Malta and Mintoff. On the one hand, the President was very anxious that the negotiations not be broken off, understandably so, and he was prepared to support the British in paying a high price for staying there. My concern was that I did not feel that we could support a high price in the Congress and I always felt that Mintoff was primarily bluffing and that the thing to do was to let the British call his bluff. Thus, throughout these weeks and months I was caught between White House pressure not to take irrevocable steps. At the same time you couldn't take irrevocable steps without. . you couldn't call his bluff without taking irrevocable steps and the British desired to call his bluff and tried to hew down the line between these two areas. We agreed that as far as we were concerned we were not interested,

that we would like to have our American Naval vessels be able to call at Malta but our purpose was primarily negative. We were prepared to give up having our vessels called there if we could keep the British there and thus obtain our purpose, negative purpose, which was to keep the Soviets out of there. Obviously, the Soviets' military position would be improved very greatly if they could get a position in Malta in the middle of the Mediterranean.

Mintoff bluffed, threatened. We twisted the British arm to raise their offers. We agreed that we would not seek to have our vessels go in and the Italians were also involved; the Germans were also involved; and these negotiations went on for weeks, months, with continuous threats from Mintoff as to what he was going to do.

Well, finally this last week Mintoff signed an agreement with the British which is reasonably satisfactory. However, we're having to contribute about nine million dollars to this agreement for which we get nothing except the Soviets out and I'm sure there's going to be a problem of defending this in the Congress. In this regard, the President, understandably so and those around him in a situation of this kind are not too conscious of the problems of the Congress in these things because the White House is not the one that has to deal with the Congress on these things. It's we at State and Defense that have the problem of dealing with the Congress and thus we tend to have congressional problems much more in mind than does the White House.

Oh, I should mention that as far as all this is concerned that eventually we got a change of ambassadors and my former staff and special assistant staff aide, John Getz, was appointed as ambassador to Malta and is now there. John worked for me in Bangkok, has worked for me all three years here and I have high regard for him but carefully stayed out of the seeking to promote him for an ambassadorship. This was done by the administrative side of the

of the Department and naturally I was very happy to go along. I'm sure that the situation is going to be in much better hands with a professional like John there.

Now, to return to the East Pakistan, West Pakistan, Indian situation. The situation had become much more acute as it flared up. While I was on my trip out to Asia in November, Jack Irwin was primarily handling it as far as the sudden flow into the Department is concerned and I was very content to let it stay that way because this was a difficult problem for which there weren't any easy answers. However, then Jack had to go to Europe shortly after I got back and so the early part of December I also got involved in the affair. And subsequently Jack Anderson, the news columnist, published some papers which were the minutes of the meetings of the WSAG, the Washington Special Actions Group, which we had on this subject. Those papers bring out quite accurately that the President was very strongly leaning toward, if you will, bias toward Pakistan in this situation. We also in the Department as a whole tended to be sympathetic to Pakistan. However, we felt that the situation in East Pakistan was hopeless. That is, it was hopeless for West Pakistan to try to hold it. Therefore, the best thing to do was for West Pakistan to cut its losses as quickly as possible. However, the President didn't want us--the United States--in any way to be responsible for what happened.

Well, all of this created a lot of stress and strain between the White House and the Department, Ken Keating in our mission in New Delhi, Pakistan, It's a long, complicated story.

The President saw the Indian attack upon the Pak forces in the East Pakistan, in which India was supported by the Soviet Union as an effort by the Soviet Union to extend itself into the Indian Ocean area more firmly and surround China. And considering the relations he was seeking to establish

with China, he wanted to demonstrate that we were not a paper tiger in this situation. He also wanted to demonstrate this to the Soviet Union as well and he was very conscious of what he felt was a moral, if not a legal, obligation that we had with Pakistan. Well, as far as the obligation was concerned, we had said things to Pakistan in the past but Pakistan and ourselves had separated and gone quite separate ways in the years since those things had been said and we didn't feel the same sense of obligation as the President felt in the situation. However, we both agreed. We all agreed, both State and the White House, that Indian objective in this situation was to take advantage of the Pak mishandling of East Pakistan in order to destroy Pakistan if it were possible to do so. Destroy it not only by severing off East Pakistan but to destroy West Pakistan as well.

In this we entirely agreed. It seemed clear to us from everything that we had-intelligence information we had - that the Indians ... after taking control of East Pakistan, were planning an attack on West Pakistan, particularly in the Kashmir area in which they would be able to destroy the bulk of the West Pakistan army and having destroyed the bulk of the West Pakistan army that this would mean a fragmentation of West Pakistan and its virtual destruction, its destruction as a unified country, even in the West which has always been an Indian objective.

To prevent this we took a number of steps. We spoke in very stern terms to India,also to the Soviet Union, also sent carrier ships,task force,into the Indian Ocean, trying to dissuade or deter India from attacking the West after it finished in the East. In this we were successful.

One of our you might say major instruments in this was the United Nations and in this we were able to obtain overwhelming support in the United Nations and India got virtually no support except from the Soviet Union. On the whole it was a very successful political operation. The thesis we used, of course,

was that India was not entitled to take advantage of the internal difficulties that Pakistan was having in East Pakistan in order to invade East Pakistan with Indian troops. That such a principle was indefensible and could not be supported and surprising the degree to which the countries around the world saw the issues in those terms, which were the correct terms, and voted against India. It was interesting that India which had had this pose of higher morality during all these years, and which had such a strong hold for so many years over the so-called non-aligned world, neutrals, were not able to gain any support for its position.

As a result our relations with India are now very strained and our policy has been subject to much criticism on the grounds that we have quote, lost, unquote, India. Emotionally I have no difficulty with our policy. I've always found the Indians most irritating on the national level and my answer is we never "had" India. Throughout these years of massive aid to India, massive assistance to India, India has consistently on a political level opposed us on every side. Now, we don't expect to buy votes. We don't expect gratitude but India seems to go out of its way, has gone out of its way in almost every situation that arose involving us to oppose us even though the issue may not have been of any real importance to India. The feeling has been that India opposes us for the sake of opposing us. Thus, I'm not too concerned about that situation. Frankly, I feel that we have devoted a disproportionate share of our foreign assistance funds to India throughout the years. However, the whole episode did nothing to improve relations between ourselves over in State and Henry Kissinger over in the White House. There were two incidents in the affair that contributed to this. One was that Kissinger gave the press on the record--I think it was on the record but I don't remember the background, a long detailed account of the development

of the situation between Pakistan, India and ourselves and some of the statements he made were simply not true, simply could not be supported and he became incensed that we wouldn't support them and we were obviously incensed that he would ask us to support something that wasn't true. I won't get into the details of the misstatement of the facts. He was simply too enthusiastic in trying to defend the position we were taking in the situation, the position which was entirely defensible on its own merits without misstating the history of the case.

(21b)

Another situation was that Jordan and Pakistan had asked Jordan for some assistance in aircraft. We, because these were American aircraft, because we were not selling arms to Pakistan at the time, legally we could not authorize Jordan to assist Pakistan with these aircraft. We explained this to the White House, to Kissinger. We also postponed giving an answer to Jordan. The next thing we knew we had reports that Jordanian planes were in Pakistan. This, as we knew it would, had surfaced in the press and we were concerned about the situation we faced in the Congress with Jordan on this.

Well, to make a long story short, it turned out that Dr. Kissinger had, through back channels, made it clear to the Jordanians that we would not object to their furnishing the planes to the Paks. But he had not told us in the State. And this is the kind of a situation, of course, which leads to ill-feeling. And to the lack of confidence. It is incredible to think that, that these planes could be furnished to Pakistan without it becoming known. We were sympathetic to them being furnished. Had we known the situation, we would have been entirely sympathetic to working out the best means of defending the action. But not knowing about it, we almost came to a very serious situation. Well, partially worked out I think. But, it still left a legacy of hard feeling.

During this period, we also worked on the preparations for the President's trip to Peking. And the trip took place during February, while I was in the hospital. Having a TV in my room, I was able to watch the TV coverage in full. And it was very spectacular. As far as the preparations were concerned, Henry Kissinger spent many weeks, well, many months over a period of time, talked to me about working together and making preparations. At his request, I assigned Al Jenkins to do the work and Al went with him on his second trip there. But, we never heard anything. So the Secretary took it in hand and we, together with Al Jenkins and Marshall Green, who was assistant secretary, the Secretary and myself worked in doing up the positions for the trip. We were handicapped by the fact that even at that time, we didn't have, and we never have had, really, a full read out from Henry on what took place between himself and the Chinese on these previous trips. However,we did most of the preparation for the trip and the Secretary finally took this up with the President, took this up with Henry, and most of the preparation that was used. There was only one real issue. And it was the same issue that existed back in 1954 and '55, when I was talking with them. That is, would they agree to put the question of Taiwan aside, and would they agree that the question of Taiwan and their relationship with Taiwan would be solved only by peaceful means. Throughout the period I was talking with them, '54 to '58, particularly after '55, the position I took was, "Let's agree to disagree about Taiwan, but let's agree that we're not going to go to war about it." Well, the so-called Renunciation of Force--they always stoutly opposed this. And when I saw the communique that was finally worked out from the President's trip, I was frankly disappointed. It seemed to me that the Chinese had not advanced at all beyond any of the positions they were taking back in 1955. And it was also disappointing that

they didn't even release any of the prisoners. As far as what will come out of the trip, there were a lot of atmospherics and we may get a little trade and a little travel's now taking place, but in general I think it fair to say that the Chinese can take a great deal of satisfaction in that they have not moved from any of their positions. They have been absolutely firm about them, they've stood on them as they told me when I was talking with them in 1955, "We can wait. You'll be coming to us." And, in fact, that is just about what has happened. I wasn't against the trip. I think anything that reduces tension, use that phrase, that overworked phrase, between ourselves and China is to the good. . . and it was a spectacular show. And it undoubtedly worried the Soviets somewhat. But, looking back on it even in the light of what happened, I still don't think it was a particularly good idea for the President to make the trip. If he was to make it, I think we should have bargained much harder to get something out of the Chinese. We got nothing out of the Chinese on this at all, absolutely nothing that I can see. They got the tremendous coverage of the President's trip and the fact that the President paid the pilgrimage, if you will, to the Middle Kingdom, to the capital of the Middle Kingdom. I think it was well for him to do so if we got something out of it. But we didn't. We didn't get any release of the prisoners, we didn't get any change of position as far as Peking is concerned on Taiwan; we, well, what we got out of it was very, very small indeed. Publicly, of course, I'm supporting it.

We always have to support the President. I'm surprised that it's been as well-received as it has back here. Of course, the Democrats are not in a good position to criticize it. And the Republicans for the most part have to stick with the President. So the criticism has been solely

from a very few of the right-wing Republicans. However, I think that we may live to regret the statements that were made with regard to "all Chinese" agree that Taiwan should be a part of China. That certainly doesn't cover the Taiwanese. And I think the Taiwanese are going to oppose it, and I think the natural course of events is going to be that the Mainlanders who are now on Taiwan and the Taiwanese, as a process not as an overnight development, but as a process, are going to move more and more toward an independent Taiwan. Personally, I don't see why there shouldn't be an independent Taiwan. I don't see why we have to concede to Peking on this. We certainly, I think, should not concede to Peking using any force to take it over. Well, we haven't conceded to it, but we've come fairly close to it.

Also I'm sorry to say that with the way the trip worked out, it served to excaberate relations between the White House and State rather than improve them. I was hoping that, with the Secretary of State going along, Marshall Green, Al Jenkins of the Department and several other officers of the Department going along, that it would serve to bring us closer together. However, the fact that the Secretary was deliberately, publicly, very blatantly excluded from the President's meeting with Mao, Mao Tse-tung; the fact that the Secretary was quartered separately from the President; the fact that neither the Secretary nor anybody else from the State Department sat in on any of the meetings between the President and Chou En-Lai, whereas White House people sat in on the Secretary's meetings with the Foreign Minister. All these things served to point up the differences between us, and as far as public position was concerned, served to indicate that the center of gravity, indicate even further than it has in the past that the center of gravity in foreign affairs is not in the Department of State. This is a very unhealthy atmosphere that has grown up. The way that Henry Kissinger handles things over at the White House tends to give the impression -- both on the inside and on the outside

of government that there is a competition between the White House, Henry and the NSC staff, and the State Department and that we are working against each other and rather than working for the same boss for the same purpose. Henry just cannot stand to have anybody else have any real role in things. Now part of this may stem from the President, this may be the way the President wants to handle it, but all I can say is that the State Department as an institution is suffering very greatly under this and will be a long time recovering.

Except for matters that I may be handling myself, as far as the big issues are concerned, I frankly feel that I have less real influence and am less informed and less involved than at any time since I first came back to the Department as a lowly Deputy Assistant Secretary in Far Eastern Affairs, back in the early 1950's. The whole atmosphere is one of competition between the White House and State rather than working together. The whole atmosphere is one in which instead of being anonymous assistants, the White House staff is grasping every opportunity to get publicity, to get credit, and to discredit State. And the atmosphere is very unhealthy.

During this period, Robert Ingersoll has been appointed Ambassador to Japan and will be going out next week. When it became clear that, oh, last summer, almost a year ago, that we probably should change ambassadors in Japan, our candidate in the State Department, my candidate, certainly the fairly outstanding candidate in every way was Marshall Green. However, we were never able to sell this to the White House, the White House looking for a non-career political appointee. And many of them were suggested. Some of them incredibly bad suggestions. And we were able, fortunately, to discourage them. Bob Ingersoll seems to be a very able, able man. If we were going to have a non-career appointee--I think it's wrong to have one, as far as

Japan is concerned; if we're going to have one, I think he's probably about as good as we can find. I like him very much personally. As I've told him, his success or failure is the success or failure of the country and we all want to do all we can to make his mission a success. Of course, the President may turn out to be right on this. With all our problems with Japan, our problems of trade and the economic side; with the attitudes I've talked about in this country, hostility to Japan particularly in the business community and on the Congress; with the old myth that never dies that the State Department and the Foreign Service are, quote, soft on the Japanese and the way to deal with them is to pound the table. Perhaps the appointment of a businessman may serve to mitigate some of these attitudes here in the United States. If they do so, why, I think it will be a considerable gain. And perhaps this might, this just might be the result. It may be the result the President is seeking.

Incidentally, I just talked with your uncle Bill and he's been out in Hawaii buying some, looking at some land which I'm going in with him to buy. And then he's going, he's leaving Rand Corporation and coming back here to Washington next week to work for the General Research Corporation. I'm very much looking forward to having him back here.

This is Monday, April 10, 1972. I'm going to try something a little bit new here, as far as these tapes are concerned. And that is to try to do something in the way of a daily or I hope almost daily record.

I've returned to the office today for the first time since my heart attack on February 4 and for only a half day. I'm supposed to work for four hours a day this week. I left here at 8:30 and went in about a quarter of nine, planning to come home at 1:00. But the Secretary was having a lunch so I stayed for the lunch and left after the lunch and came home. I thought I was strong and I thought I would be ready

for a full day's work and I didn't do anything very strenuous today, but nevertheless I must confess that at the end of the morning I was ready to come home. I didn't do much today. I have throughout this period since I came back from the hospital had the office coming in, my staff, Bob Beaudry, coming in and briefing me, bringing me the morning telegrams. And also having an assistant secretary in the afternoon so I could keep up to date with what's going on. This morning, when I went back, the problems I haven't dealt with, the problem I became involved in was first that Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary Green feels that he is being called upon to take too large a share of the 5 percent cut we were instructed to take last year and I've been trying to go into that and see what I could do about that if anything needed to be done. The problem is not, of course, whether such a cut hurts him or not, but if we reduce the amount of the cut that he's being required to take, who takes a greater cut? And this is not easy to decide. Another problem was space, the problem of our space cooperation with Europe. This involves Eurosat, the European Satellite, or Aerosat I should say, the Aerial Satellite Communications. It's the project for launching a new satellite to take care of communications between aircraft and aircraft control and all that type of thing. It also involves our space cooperation with Europe. That is the European participation in the postApollo program, which I have over the last year engaged in long series of negotiations with the European Space Council. M . LeFevre, Minister LeFevre, on their side and myself on our side. And then there is the problem of our launching a communications satellite for European net. All these things get involved together. Part of the problem here is getting our government to speak with one voice. There was initially a lot of enthusiasm for these projects in the government. Now there is some drawing back by the, quote hard-headed types, unquote, who look askance at Europe getting any benefits, particularly any technological

benefits out of these arrangements. And then there is a group that's represented by those who would have the United States draw back and be more autarchial. In part this involves Tom Whitehead in the Office of Telecommunications Policy in the White House who is not very bright about these things. Peter Flanigan is a very able and very sincere fellow on these things, but he tends to look at it from a narrow point of view. I don't say that these fellows don't have a point of view that should be recognized, but the problem has been that they are very late in the game and we've not been speaking and do not seem to speak to the Europeans with one voice.

At the lunch today we discussed the situation in Vietnam. I said it seemed to me that the North Vietnamese were now making an all-out effort and I expected this effort to be continued up to the maximum of their capabilities. If in their estimate, their reading of the situation, they felt that the the South Vietnamese had not stood up very well, then I would expect them to return and try the same thing again next year. If on the other hand they failed at the South Vietnamese, with our aerial help have stood up well, then I think they're going back to protracted warfare. One thing I'm clear on, I don't expect them to go to negotiations under either event. And for us to go back to negotiations at this time would of course be an admission of defeat. The Secretary asked what we felt could be done that the President was not now doing. What options there were. I said, and I think it was pretty well agreed around the table, that there really weren't any options except for us to increase...do what we were doing, and that is increase our air support. I did point out that one option, I wasn't advocating it necessarily, but that the one option that we had open was to blockade the port of Haiphong. I do feel that this might be worthy of consideration. However, there was nobody who advocated returning ground forces into Vietnam. I myself said, and I feel, that if the South Vietnamese are not able to,

well using the vernacular, to hack it, quote-unquote, what with the training and equipment they're now givenand our air support, then I feel that the cause is hopeless and I feel that nobody would really fault us for even accelerating or divorcing ourselves further from the situation. However, it's still far too early to say that it's hopeless thus far. The reports seem not too bad. Well, that's about the word today. I'll cut this off now and try to keep this diary day by day for a while and see how it goes. (21c)

This is Tuesday, April 11. I've been to the office again this morning. This morning at the staff meeting, oh, we discussed a number of items but one of the more important ones is the efforts by the Foreign Service Association and some of those on the Hill to establish a grievance procedure for Foreign Service Officers that would virtually destroy discipline in the Service. I have a hard time understanding some of the young officers. Perhaps I'm getting old. And all these concepts that "We're labor and the rest of the Department is management; there's an inbuilt conflict between us" I find just absolutely unacceptable. Well, I'll see what I can do about it.

I also had a long meeting with Nelson Gross on narcotics business and how that's going and our efforts to coordinate that and I think I can be of some help on that. It looks like the South Vietnamese are doing better and the situation in Vietnam looks better. I'll be attending a WSAG, that is Washington Special Actions Group, meeting on that tomorrow. Although I feel well, I don't know. I do get tired and I don't quite understand why and whereas I felt the doctor was probably being overcautious in saying that I should only work half a day during the course of this week, I think he's probably right. It is taking me a little time to get back into the swing of things.

Today's Wednesday, April 12. I've been at the office half a day again today involved primarily on Vietnamese matters. With the Secretary tied up with an OAS meeting and Jack Irwin at a Santiago, Chile UNCTAD meeting, I've been having to deal with the other matter today.

We had a briefing; I was briefed in the Department on the military situation which at the present moment looks encouraging. It looks like the South Vietnamese are holding much better than many of us feared that they might. We had a meeting over at the White House with Ken Rush and Admiral Moorer and Henry Kissinger. Bill Sullivan went along with me and merely reviewed the situation. The only real action that came out of it was that it was agreed that I would call in the French charge and indicate to him that we were not happy at all with the call that the French government has issued today in Paris for renewal of negotiations, or renewal of the talks. I pointed out to them that the other side had broken off the talks and then launched this invasion and were now demanding that we come back to the talks without any indication on their part that they were interested or prepared for any serious negotiations. And, therefore, for the French government to call for renewal of the talks at this time was very one-sided and simply falling into the position of the North. Well, obviously, they don't agree about it, but at least we let them know that we were not happy. The French government is certainly prepared not to be helpful, I must say. I find them very, very difficult to deal with.

I also talked to Dave McKillop about the American Foreign Service Association position on an amendment to the Foreign Service Act on the grievance procedure. I pointed out that,if they supported the present amendment, I was sure that the Secretary and the President would have no choice but to veto it, because it went entirely far beyond simple redressing of grievances. It really got at the very heart of the discipline and order in the Service and the Secretary's

and the President's authority over the Service. I told him that I was very concerned that the Association was getting itself into a position in which they had a confrontation of that kind, it certainly couldn't help them or anybody else. I've got to work further at this tomorrow. That is all for today.

Today's Friday, April 14th. I have been to the work this morning. Well, as a matter of fact, I worked till about two o'clock and am now home. The Secretary and the President went to Ottawa yesterday evening. Jack Irwin's away, so I've been in charge of the Department today and will also be in charge tomorrow. It's been fairly active but not too much so. I called in the Icelandic ambassador and said that if they go ahead with recognizing Hanoi at this time, it's going to have a bad effect on our relations with Iceland. He promised to phone the foreign minister right away and tell him about my representations. I've got to call back now to say that he's got a reply and will be seeing me in the morning.

I also had a call from the Secretary who's in Ottawa who is very concerned and properly so about appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee on Monday morning in support of our security assistance bill. He's fearful that with public reaction and general reaction now to our response to the North Vietnamese invasion to the South being what it is, that is it's been good, and surprisingly good, that if he appears at the Foreign Relations Committee Monday morning, it will give our opponents such as Fulbright and Church and others a platform from which to try to stir up opposition to what we're doing. I've been talking and working trying to think of some way that it would be feasible for him to get out of appearing. It's not a question of his handling himself -- he can do that very well indeed -- but giving others a platform to try to stir people up. But I haven't been able to think of any good way of getting him out of it or getting it postponed without doing

more damage than good and particularly doing damage to the bill which is of great importance to us.

The White House has decided that the Treasury will do a study on trade matters and the effects of lowering tariffs. In this regard, I am very concerned about the degree to which the Treasury is taking over not only financial policy but trade policy. John Connally is very aggressive. His theory of operation, internationally, is to have enemies. If you don't have enemies, you need to make some enemies and treat people rough in order to ride over oppositon. Well, I have no problem with being tough. I have no problem with being tough on negotiations but Connally's view of the world as being divided up into trading blocs which have trade wars with each other will bring us right back to the thirties. I greatly regret the Department is losing its hold on the economic side of things. It's partially a matter of people and it's a matter of competence and aggressiveness in dealing with these things and we're losing out fast. You can't separate economics and politics. They're so intermixed they've got to be dealt with together and we have a trend now going which we are no longer given let's say what I think is a proper voice in handling these matters and I fear for the future if this trend continues. Well, that's my worry for today. That'll be all for today.

Today is Monday, April 17. It's been a fairly eventful weekend. On Saturday night, oh, about nine o'clock as I was looking at TV, the TV shows were interrupted to say that we had bombed Haiphong and Hanoi. Shortly thereafter I received a telephone call from the Department saying that this announcement was being carried from Saigon. I knew nothing about it whatsoever. Even though I was a member of and attended the Washington Special Actions Group, the so-called WSAG group, on Thursday, no word was given to me about this. And I must say this profoundly disturbs me because this is

obviously the type of action upon which there should have been some exchange of views. The President should be entitled to have whatever views there were to be expressed on the subject and whatever decision he reached, ordinary prudence should indicate that we should plan how we should handle it.

This is just another illustration ofthe fact that communications is breaking down in the Administration and that the President and Henry Kissinger are making decisions without any real consultation.

On Sunday morning I called the Secretary. Well, I should say that Sunday morning--I refused to do anything Saturday night--on Sunday morning I received a call from the Department that two Soviet vessels had been damaged. I called the Secretary and we met at the Department and I spent most of Sunday--well, up to the middle of the afternoon--at the Department with the Secretary. The Secretary had scheduled long before, or rather the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had scheduled long before, a hearing on the AID bill, the security assistance bill for Monday morning, that is this morning and the question was preparing the Secretary for that hearing. It was obvious that the hearing would center around the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, rather than around the subject of the hearing and the question was preparing him for it. We called the Pentagon and got briefers over and went over the whole attack. The Secretary and I agreed that, as far as we were concerned, we would have recommended against the action because it could not have any direct effect upon the attack that's now taking place in the South and could only have very indirect effects upon the course of the war. The philosophy of the President apparently on this is to discourage the Soviets from supporting the North Vietnamese because of their interest in the summit meeting with the President and getting something accomplished there. The President may be right, but I doubt if that's the case. I don't think the Soviet Union is going to cancel the meeting, but I don't think that actions

of this kind are going to discourage the Soviets from supporting the North Vietnamese nor do I feel that the Soviets have the capability of requiring or getting the North Vietnamese to call off the offensive and the attacks on the South.

Even though the Secretary was intellectually and himself against the action, he made a perfectly magnificent appearance in defense of the action in the Foreign Relations Committee this morning. He was on TV live, radio also, for about three hours and although there were many hard, tough questions that could have been asked, the chairman, Fulbright, repeated his old record. He sounded querulous, a sour old man, not very much comprehending what was going on in the world and the Secretary handled him magnificiently. As I told the Secretary afterwards, the response in the Department was excellent. Many of the younger officers who've had some questions about the Secretary, some questions about the standing of the Department, who listened to the program, as I told him, to the hearing.. As I told the Secretary, they had nothing but praise for the way he handled himself. I think he gained very much in the way of standing and prestige within the Department itself and nationally. I'm really proud of him.

Today in the Department I also called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Hogen--the Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs was also here--and discussed with them the President's trip to Moscow and told them that I wanted to initiate really in-depth consultations with them on the trip. I explained to them what we had in mind with respect to the trip and invited their comments and their questions. Hogen's going back tomorrow for Tokyo and I expect to hear from him shortly. I spent almost an hour and a half withthem on this in an effort to try to restore some of that sense of confidence and some of that sense of intimacy that previously existed between ourselves and the Japanese and particularly the Japanese foreign

office which I think is going to be so very important for the future of our relations with Japan. This is all for today.

This is Saturday, April 22. It's been several days, I know, since I've recorded. During the past few days, the subject that's occupied me most heavily, both in terms of time and also in terms of interest or emotion if you will, has been this subject of grievances in the Foreign Service. This bill that has been passed by the Foreign Relations Committee in my view directly--well, you'd only have the result of destroying the Foreign Service because it turns in effect the management of the Foreign Service and the Department over to people outside, to a separate board, outside of the Department and beyond the control of the Secretary.

I talked with the President of the Foreign Services Association and the Chairman of the Board of Directors and tried very hard to get them to shift their position on this but they refused to do so, do not seem to be able to do so. Therefore, I'm organizing a movement outside of the Association to try to disavow them and make it clear how the Foreign Service feels about the bill. As I told them and as the Secretary's now said, it's truly up to the Foreign Service itself to decide what kind of a Service it wants. If they want to have procedures which in effect turn over control to non-Foreign Service people, non-State Department people, well, then they're becoming just the civil service, not even the civil service. And it's difficult for me, as I say to them, to understand how they can propose, support a measure which says quite clearly that they have no confidence in the Secretary of State and at the same time expect the Secretary of State to have confidence in them. Well, it's a subject upon which I feel very deeply and, as I told them, unless this can be corrected I'm going to...I would resign the Service. I wouldn't live in a Service organized the way that's proposed by this bill. However, I have hopes that we're going to be able to get it changed.

Other things I've been dealing with on substance. Well, I've been pretty busy. Under Secretary Irwin left last Thursday so I've been having to take over his work also. At the same time I've been trying hard to keep the level of my work tolerable as I'm supposed to do. I'm not supposed to get myself emotionally involved but I must say this grievance procedure and discussions I've had with some of the members of the ssociation on that really raised my temperature. One night I felt so worked up I simply had to take a sleeping pill to get to sleep.

I'm going to work now only at 8:30 and I've been trying to get away at 4:30 or five. Also I try to take a little siesta or nap of fifteen minutes or so after lunch. Well, these are all ideals. To one degree or another, I get one or the other of them done. But I'm feeling well.

The enemy attack in Vietnam, of course, is the big issue. As I told the Secretary this morning when we were talking over the phone, in reading the report the Secretary of Defense sends to the President every day on this and the other reports from the Defense Department and reading the newspaper, it's hard to believe that they're talking about the same war. Newspapers are very pessimistic. Defense reports,I would say,are fairly optimistic. I am afraid the truth lies somewhat in between. I'm afraid the situation is very serious. We have during this period--well, let's see, it was last weekend; I guess I've already mentioned the Hanoi and Haiphong bombing. I had a newspaperman in today, or the other day,rather, asking me for my rationale and explanation of all this, what I thought would happen to the summit meeting scheduled in May. I said that reading what some of his colleagues were writing these days, I had the impression that some newspapers and some columnists were frustrated that Moscow and Peking were not reacting more vigorously and more violently to the actions that we were taking in Vietnam. They were all, as usual, predicting doom. They were all, as usual, predicting

that the summit meeting wouldn't take place but thus far the Soviets have behaved in a very sober frame of mind on this, as has Peking and thus far there are no indications that the Soviets intend to call off the summit meeting which is now scheduled for May 22. They, of course, have their own reasons for wanting to have such a meeting and the problem is, you know, not to push that so hard, not to overplay our side on this thing. I think the President is a little inclined at times to play these things up to the hilt. Well, he's done fairly well at it,but I do think that there is a tolerance point beyond which the Soviets cannot go. That is, I mean there's a point in our actions against North Vietnam that could be reached under which the Soviets would feel obliged to cancel the summit meeting. It's a matter of fine judgment as to where that point might be. As I was telling a newspaperman also,though it is quite clear that it would certainly be undesirable for the President to go to Moscow in the wake, in the face of a defeat in South Vietnam so it's important that we do what's necessary down there from the air that will prevent a collapse there, yet not do so much that the Soviets would feel obliged to cancel the summit meeting. Well, that's the situation as of the moment.

It's raining hard today, a cold April day.

I guess I should say that I rearranged my schedule, so I now expect and hope to be out to Santa Barbara for your great-grandmother's ninetieth birthday. This will be a great occasion and I hope she's going to be in good condition for it. That is all now.

This is Sunday, April 30. During this past week, I've been principally involved in three major matters. The first was Vietnam. We've had a WSAG, that's the Washington Special Actions Group, a WSAG meeting every day on Vietnam. Some of it was, oh, just to show activity but some of it we were trying really to deal with the affairs over there. The situation looks fairly

grim, but by no means hopeless. The North has really attacked en masse. During this past week, they've particularly been striking at Kon Tum and Quang Tri. We get stories that the South Vietnamese aren't doing very well but at the end of the day, the South Vietnamese are still holding on and I'm feeling slightly more optimistic than I did previously. We are, of course, looking at the situation in the light of the summit visit. It turned out at the beginning of the week that Henry Kissinger had been over in Moscow dealing with the Soviets on the matter and there's been a lot of publicity about this and the hope is that the Soviets will exercise their influence on Hanoi to get Hanoi at least to cut back on the level of its attacks. I'm not very optimistic that this can be done, but it remains to be seen. Certainly there are no signs of it thus far.

We have also been discussing the question of again trying to get a cease-fire and whether a cease-fire would be to our advantage. In general, the military tend to look upon all the problems of the cease-fire in which they're entirely right. I've been an opponent of the cease-fire through the years, but I must say if we could get a cease-fire at this time it would be to our advantage because continuing hostilities as they are is certainly not going to improve our position. Of course, the President is caught in a dilemma. On Thursday, he announced that he was withdrawing more American forces from Vietnam. At the same time, we're sending more aircraft over there and doing more on the sea and in the air and on one hand, we are threatening Hanoi, if you will, and trying to frighten or make the Soviets concerned about the situation there. At the same time, we're withdrawing our ground forces. It's a dilemma that is fairly hard to handle.

The other issue I've been dealing with is the SALT talks, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Gerry Smith, our delegate at those talks, is back here and we have been discussing the position we should take in order to try to get an agreement by the time of the summit meeting. Frankly, these SALT talks have been very badly handled. I don't mean from the standpoint of our negotiators, but this Administration came into office three years ago; we could have gotten an agreement that would have perhaps put some ceiling on the Soviets. During these three years while we have fiddle-faddled and had thousands of pages of studies that nobody read, the Soviets have been building away both at land and at sea until they now have great superiority over us. Superiority in numbers, superiority of course really doesn't mean too much in this field. We have the superiority in the number of warheads because we have MIRVS. The Soviets have a superiority in number of missile launchers and, of course, none of this means anything if you ever actually launch the missiles but it's what people think the facts are and whether people think we're inferior and whether we've lost the place that we once had in the world and whether we ourselves think that. So there's a great deal of psychology involved in this.

Again, here, Henry Kissinger talked to the President and negotiated.... (21d)

...with Breshnev on a SALT agreement to be concluded prior to the summit meeting. We had been working at this and come to the conclusion that it was probably not possible for us to get anything better. It hopefully will set some sort of a ceiling upon the Soviet construction of both land based and sea based missiles. The big block up to the last seven to eight months on this...Well, no, back to May 20, I guess, the agreement that Kissinger worked

out with Dobrynin on May 20 of last year. . The big hassle since then has been whether submarines, that is nuclear powered submarines, what we call SLBM, would be included. In that May 20 agreement, they were quite clearly left out. The Russians certainly had every reason to think that we were not going to insist on them. We now have been insisting on them. And now they've come forward with a formula that would include submarines but permit them to have a considerably higher ceiling on submarines than ourselves. This will be very hard to defend, difficult to defend in Congress, but I think it can be defended on the grounds that if such a ceiling is not set, it would be possible for the Soviets to go ahead with even the larger number of submarines.

We ourselves have no plans for building any additional submarines at this time and will not be building any until we build the ULMS, which should come into being about 1978. The ULMS are underwater, large missile submarines.

The other issue I've been dealing with this week is the grievance procedure of the Foreign Service. I believe I mentioned in my last, last time, that we have a small number of soreheads, gripers, if you will, in the Service who wanted to establish by law a procedure, a grievance procedure, which would really cut the Secretary of State out, which I felt very strongly would really destroy the Foreign Service.

Well, all of this is a part of this whole posture of thinking of the Service as labor and thinking of the Department as management and thinking of the confrontation between the two. It's entirely foreign to my own thinking and I fear for the Service if this continues. Well, I tried to find some middle ground and tried to mitigate and see if we couldn't deal with this situation. These fellows had been playing on the Hill with politicians up

there, particularly Bill Fulbright and some of them who want to embarrass the Department. The Foreign Relations Committee has approved legislation that is absolutely impossible. It would really destroy the Foreign Service.

I've been working at something else and got some officers started to do a compromise proposal under which we would agree to have some legislation but in general terms with which we could live and terms that would not destroy the ability of the Secretary to discipline and to run the Service. Well, this has been fairly successful. The group circulated a letter on this suggesting an alternative procedure. This letter has been addressed to me as the Senior Foreign Service Officer and I, in turn, have transmitted it to the Secretary and the Secretary in turn is going to transmitit to the Hill. I hope, in some way, that this will mitigate the problem of this legislation and we can at least build a backfire in the Senate.

On Monday, last Monday, I had another examination by the doctor, and my health is coming along well and a week from tomorrow, that is, on May 7, he says if I continue to do well, I can play nine holes of golf if I use a cart. Well, it will be good to be out again. I'm walking though, taking care of myself. I'm walking at least an hour a day and I'm eating very lightly to hold down my weight and find I have to eat very very little or my weight starts going up. I'm hungry most of the time.

Well, this is all for this time. I'm signing off for April 30.

This has been an active week. Oh, I should say first, this is Saturday, May 6. This has been an active week. We had special action groups every day. On the diplomatic front, Henry Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese representative, in Paris on Tuesday and got no place at all. There was simply a very hard line on their part. On Thursday we broke off, Ambassador Porter broke off the open talks also. The history of this is that after our bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, the Soviets said that

they wanted to talk with us and they were getting concerned about the situation prior to the summit meeting scheduled for May 22. And at their request and suggestion, Henry Kissinger went to Moscow where he spent three days talking with Breshnev, Gromyko primarily. And they gave us to understand, or gave some grounds to understand, that the North Vietnamese, or they would seek to have the North Vietnamese, be more forthcoming so as to reduce the extreme pressure prior to the summit meeting on May 22.

They agreed to and did send a representative to Hanoi and we agreed that Le Duc Tho would return to Paris; we would meet with him there. They sent their representative to Hanoi, the Soviets did. Le Duc Tho did come to Paris. Henry met with Le Duc Tho this last Tuesday and there was absolutely no change whatsoever. So we've gone back to the Soviets now. And I'm waiting for a call from the White House right at this moment as a matter of fact, to go back down there and see what kind of reply the Soviets get.

I, myself, could never quite understand how the Soviets would feel that they could promise a movement on the part of the North Vietnamese. Because it didn't seem to me reasonable that the North Vietnamese would agree to call off their offensive in the South, just at the time it was still making considerable progress and particularly during this last week. This last week, they have captured Quang Tri, the first provincial city they've captured. They've taken possession of the whole province, and are now gathering for the attack on Hue. They got Quang Tri, of course, less because of the strength that they had than because of the breaking of the South Vietnamese third division which when attacked, panicked and ran under bombardment without the North ever mounting any land attack against them

and this caused the Marines, the South Vietnamese Marines, also, to have to retreat. It's a story of very poor leadership. We don't have all the details yet but it looks like the general in command of the 3rd division was among the first, if not the first, to cut and run.

President Thieu has now made some considerable changes in the command of Military Region I there in the North and they're trying to rally the troops to take a stand and hold Hue. If the North is able to capture Hue, it'll have profound effects in Saigon as well as in this country and would be a major victory for them. So we're making every effort to avoid that happening. We sent out more armament. As a matter of fact, under the President's instructions, we have flown in tanks even though the South Vietnamese don't have crews to operate the tanks. We're also deploying additional forces, air forces, to Thailand.

At the same time, we're continuing to reduce our troops in the South part of South Vietnam. In short, I would say that the situation at this moment looks serious but not yet desperate.

I've also had meetings throughout the week, every day during the week on the grievance procedure for the Foreign Service, trying to establish some middle of the road position, maintain the middle road position, that will be sensible as far as the Service. I'm very concerned, nevertheless about the Service. Well, I've spoken about that before. I see grave dangers ahead for it.

Tuesday I gave a lunch for Bui Diem, the departing Vietnamese ambassador. Bui was Ky's man back in 64 or '65 when I was in Saigon. I got to know him very well then. We went through a number of coups together. He's been here some years as ambassador and has done a first class job. He was a little embarrassed to learn just before the lunch that he's now going to stay on here for some time but nevertheless, I had the lunch at the Blair

House. Some of the people in the government as well as some members in the Congress were there.

I've been trying to get out of the office at decent hours in the evening but it's turned out to be fairly difficult. Nevertheless, I am getting away around six o'clock or a little after. I've had, oh, large numbers of appointments. I've just been seeing a great many people every day. I start out with a calendar that looks fairly easy but before the day is over, it has really piled up.

Today is a beautiful day. One of those days that Washington can produce with the azaleas and the dogwood out full. I wished I had had more time to get out today. Tomorrow, tomorrow's Sunday, I hope to have my first game of golf since I became ill and the weather prediction's good so I'm looking forward to it. That's all for today.

This is Sunday evening, May 7, about nine o'clock in the evening. I just repeated the last recording I'd made here which I see I'd signed off on Saturday evening saying I'd hoped to play golf today. Things didn't turn out to be quite that way and while it's still fresh in my mind, I thought perhaps, I might recount a little bit insofar as I can, just how things go on a day like today.

As I said, I was hoping to go out and play golf. About fifteen minutes before seven this morning, I received a telephone call. It turned out to be the Secretary of State's aide on the other end of the line and then the Secretary saying that the statement they had made in Bonn they hoped would not be misinterpreted. They realized that the objective was to low profile this but it was very difficult for them to do anything other than they had done.

I was a little baffled by this. Frankly, I didn't know what they were talking about at the moment. But it became apparent to me that the Secretary had been ordered, instructed, to return to Washington immediately, and they were supposed to keep this so it didn't attract too much public attention. But obviously as the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and others in the German government had arranged affairs for them today, it was not possible to cancel without saying something. And they had simply said that the Secretary was returning and this was all, and they hoped it wouldn't become too much of a sensation.

Well, I was utterly baffled but I heard what the Secretary had to say. He knew that I would be going to some White House meetings today. He knew it before I did. And he wanted me to explain that he had tried to handle it as best he could.

I'd waited all day on Saturday for a call to a White House meeting. And finally I'd been told that Henry Kissinger wanted to see me at nine thirty on Sunday morning. This was all I knew; I didn't know what it was about. But of course I immediately connected that with what the Secretary had said, and told him of course I would try to explain this.

Well, this was about a quarter to seven. Seven o'clock, I turned on the radio and it was a religious program. At seven thirty, I turned it on again and there was another program. At eight o'clock, I heard on the radio that the Secretary had interrupted his visit to Europe and was coming back.

I got down to the White House at nine thirty, as arranged, and met with Henry Kissinger. He told me the plan that was being contemplated by the President under which we would carry out the interdiction of sea supplies, everything that was coming into North Vietnam, as well as what was coming in by land from China. He said that the President was unhappy, they were all unhappy, with the fact that the Secretary, having interrupted his trip in Europe, which was to explain the present summit meeting in Moscow,

had received so much publicity. And I pointed out the obvious fact that with his having meetings scheduled in Bonn that day, big entertainment, Paris the next day, Rome the next day, Madrid the next day, this could hardly not become the, you know, public matter. And Sunday morning, being a slow time for news, obviously it had received top billing.

Well, Henry explained to me for the first time the plans for a blockade. Obviously a blockade or cutting off supplies by sea has for many years been a possible option. But he explained to me what was in contemplation and that there was going to be a meeting on Monday morning on this.

He explained that the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, had a concept under which seaborne traffic into North Vietnam would be stopped and to prevent this being substituted by landborne traffic from China, they would also engage in a heavy, what the Air Force calls interdiction operation on the railways and the roads from China.

We talked about this for some time. He was trying to explain to me what the concept was. And I said that given my experience in Korea, given my experience in Vietnam, given the fact that although I was well known, notorious, if you will, hawk on Vietnam, I just did not see how it could work. I just did not see how it could produce the results that the President wanted to achieve from it.

First, I couldn't see how it could achieve any short term results as far as South Vietnam and the situation there was concerned. And as far as the long term results were concerned, I simply did not accept the statements, the estimates, that were made by the Air Force and the Navy as to what they could do about preventing the introduction of supplies by land from China.

After a lot of discussion, I told Henry that for whatever value the President might give to my judgment, or whatever value it might have, I strongly advised against this course of action. Not because I didn't want

to see the Vietnam War won, not that I was afraid of taking risks, but I just did not think this course of action would produce the results that the President hoped to achieve.

Henry indicated to me that he agreed with me. He indicated that in addition to his skepticism of the results that could be achieved, he saw this as, you might say, jeopardizing the possibility of a summit conference with the Soviets. I'd already mentioned that. He said that the President felt that there was about a 50-50 chance of cancellation of the summit conference. His own estimate that the odds against it were about 95-5. And I said I'd put them almost 100-100 but we nevertheless agreed on that.

I said I felt that inspite of all the difficulties, that people would say that what we had done for South Vietnam was reasonable, all that could be expected. And if, with our sea and air support, South Vietnamese forces could not now defend themselves, I really felt that there was really little more for us to do in that. In fact, I didn't think there was any more for us to do. And that this measure would really not deal with that problem.

I recalled from memory an estimate prepared by a very respected CIA officer which in effect said that as far as seaborne commerce is concerned, that it is entirely within their capabilities, for all of this to be replaced by landborne commerce from China. And this was also my own instinct on it.

It was agreed that I would get together with the Defense Department lawyer, the principal one, and the State Department lawyer. And assuming that the action was decided upon, make the best possible case on it. Well, I came back to the Department and I got them together and we worked at this for several hours. There were many permutations. It became quite clear that there was no precedent for any action of this kind and, as I said tonight in another meeting at the White House, our friends and supporters will say that we're trying to develop new international law. Our opponents will say

that we're violating international law. There's never been anything quite like this. Traditional international law, if you have a blockade, you have a prohibited list, a contraband list, and you stop ships and you search them to determine whether or not they're carrying contraband. To do this would have meant direct confrontation between American destroyers, say, and a Soviet vessel. And the Soviets, for their own purposes and I wouldn't blame them for this, would decide that they would bring about this confrontation and the captain of the destroyer would have been left no alternative but to sink by gunfire the Soviet vessel.

In the quarantine with Cuba in 1962, we had the basis of the OAS resolution at that time. Earlier in the Korean situation, we had the U.N. resolutions. Here, after conversations, discussions I had with the lawyers, it became quite clear that we had no real grounds on this except self defense. In other words, article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

The concept that had been developed was that we would mine the North Vietnamese ports. We would announce that they had been mined and we would announce that we were trying to stop anything coming in by sea and that any vessel trying to send anything across the beach would also be bombed and we would try to prevent lighters coming in from vessels anchored outside, coming in across the beach.

This was different from a blockade which follows from a declaration of war or is based upon a declaration of war. It was also different from a quarantine such as we declared in the Cuban case. In both blockade and in the quarantine case, we had lists of articles which could not be introduced. But we didn't try to make it a complete blockade, to do that a complete interdiction. So as far as international law, custom was concerned, this would be completely unprecedented.

I worked at this. I got the Defense Department lawyer and our own lawyer Jack Stevenson together and we worked at this a good part of the afternoon and drew up the best defense of this that we could which, to repeat myself, had to be based upon the broad grounds of collective defense. The problem was that we were declaring everything contraband and were letting nothing come in. As far as the collective defense doctrine was concerned, up to this time at least, what you declared contraband, what you wouldn't permit to come in to the country, had to bear some proximate relationship to the offense. And the offense of course was very clear. The offense was the open, virtually open, conventional attack by the North upon the South.

I went out to the airport to meet the Secretary. He came in at four o'clock. And I rode with him back to his home, briefing him on what had happened. He had not been informed. He had not been consulted nor had he had an opportunity to express his views. As I explained to him there was an NSC meeting scheduled for Monday morning, that is tomorrow morning, at nine o'clock at which he would have an opportunity to express his views.

At the same time, a WSAG, that is Washington Special Action Group meeting, had been scheduled for five thirty this evening. I met the Secretary at four o'clock. I called on my radio phone from the car back to the office and found out that it had been rescheduled for six o'clock. And for the first time, I was permitted to bring somebody else into the operation with me and it was agreed that I would have William Sullivan, who was in charge of the Vietnamese Task Force, attend the meeting with me.

I rode with the Secretary from Andrews back to his house. I had Bill Sullivan meet me at the Secretary's house. I briefed him on the way back from the Secretary's house to the Department. At the Department I met with the State and Defense lawyers that I had working on this problem and then had

to go to the meeting. The theory of the meeting was that we would not be discussing the pros and cons of the action but rather working down a check list on how we would handle the questions assuming that the action would be taken.

(21e)

(Interruption)

You heard the telephone ring there on the tape. It turned out to be a newspaper man calling me for guidance, an AP correspondent, asking how he should write the stories for tomorrow morning's press. The Secretary of State coming back, meetings at the White House today, what was in contemplation, was it felt that the summit trip to Moscow was going to be canceled, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Well, I tried to fend him off and told him, very genuinely, that decisions were not made, he should not go too far out on a limb on speculating. I said that it was entirely possible that the Secretary of State would return to Europe tomorrow and that everything would go on as it was and that he shouldn't reject this as a possibility in the stories that he was writing.

Tonight, at six o'clock, we have a WSAG meeting. I had had the Defense and State lawyers working at this to prepare me a draft of a kind of a statement that they felt should be issued. Their choice on this, of course, was that in his speech the President would spell this out in detail or he would deal with things in a very general way and he would have to spell it out subsequently but, of course, the issue was that we had to tell the world exactly what we were doing, particularly when you got into the Marttime field. People had to know what the rules were and as I pointed out at the meeting, knowing what was in contemplation we tried to do the very best we could but we must expect to be severely attacked. There was really nothing to say except we were trying to establish new international law or we were inviolation of international law.

You just couldn't get around this issue and that what we were doing was based upon the broad grounds of a collective self-defense. The problem was, of course, we were trying to stop everything, food, medicine and everything else from coming into North Vietnam and under the self-defense doctrine what you did had to bear some proximate relationship to the ability to defend yourself.

At the meeting, Tom Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, outlined the concept, putting magnetic mines in the channels into Haiphong and putting other mines into the smaller ports. Kissinger and all of us asked him some very hard questions. I should back up a little bit and say that during my talk with Kissinger, he indicated that he was very skeptical of the whole operation, he had been trying to persuade the President against it. He felt that this would draw Peking and Moscow closer together and do great violence to the whole scheme that he'd had in his mind of dividing these two and carrying out policies with Moscow and Peking and that the whole thing would go down the drain. I believe Henry. I might say that when I talked to the Secretary on the way in, he did not have any confidence that this really was the view of Henry. At the time I was talking with Henry, he said to me that we had to rely on Secretary Rogers to try to change the President's mind on this. I asked him what the view of Secretary Laird, the Secretary of Defense, was on this and he said that Laird had lost his credibility because he was always on every side of the problem and I think that's true, I'm sorry to say.

Well, going back to our WSAG meeting tonight at the White House, Tom Moorer, Admiral Moore, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I rate as a good friend. I have high respect for him and generally Tom and I are able to find a meeting of the minds. But I must say that Tom's explanation tonight of the concept, the military concept, of this operation did not give me any

greater confidence in it; quite the opposite. For example, in the rules of engagement, draft rules of engagement, that they'd worked out, they said that any foreign or any minesweeper, including, of course, a Soviet or a Chinese minesweeper that went in to try to sweep the mines that we were proposing to seed would be fired upon and sunk by American Naval ships. Well, when I really probed at this they weren't quite so sure about that and suggested that instead of sinking--I pointed out that this would be sinking a Soviet Naval vessel as opposed to a merchant vessel or ship--that perhaps they might seed other mines in the channel if, as and when Soviet and Chinese minesweepers were able to sweep them out of the channel. Well, this whole area was kept very open.

It also turned out that over the years, they've been carrying out some mining of all these minor ports except Haiphong and that the results have been very minimal. I also pointed out that I did not accept the thesis that you could interdict the land supply routes from China and that even if you did do so, it would require a great diversion of air power, which was already heavily engaged in South Vietnam and where we were already reducing our attacks on Ho Chi Minh trail because we simply didn't have enough air. I pointed out that to remove air from attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail and remove it from attacks on tactical targets in South Vietnam and move it to North Vietnam to try to interdict the lines from China would be moving to have less effect upon the immediate situation in the hopes it might have the best effect, a better effect on the long-term situation.

Well, Tom's reply to me on this was, "Well, what other suggestion do I have to win the war?" And I said I really didn't have another suggestion. I thought that we had done what we should do by the South Vietnamese and the real test was how the South Vietnamese now held themselves and how they behaved in South Vietnam and that if they were able successfully to defend

Hue and defeat the North Vietnamese I thought the course of the war could change very materially. If they were not, the actions that we were taking I didn't think would have much effect on the situation.

Well, it turned out during the course of the meeting that Dick Helms, the director of CIA, had really not been informed of what was contemplated, quite clearly had not had an opportunity to express his views and he very strongly questioned the operation. This leads me to ask myself who has advised the President on this, how the President has come to his decisions and on the matter of this almost transcendental importance to the country, how decisions could be made without really taking into consideration the views of those who have something to contribute to the decision. I'm afraid that this brings back some shadows of the Bay of Pigs back in 1961, in which President Kennedy took decisions upon very imperfect advice, very imperfect information, imperfect because there was some concept that the whole thing was so sensitive that you couldn't talk to people about it who were able to give you advice on the situation.

This has been a rough day. I'm tired tonight. I'm more tired than I should be, I know, in my condition and, well, I came back to the office. I called the Secretary, briefly outlined the situation to him and suggested that Bill Sullivan who was present with me throughout the meeting should go out to see him in order to brief him more fully and I also at the WSAG meeting said that Bill would be the principal from the Department during the night and I wanted to get to bed and get my sleep in order that I could keep on. I've gone into a lot of detail, perhaps more than I should, but at a period when we are making another crucial decision in the life of this country, after a drink or two, may I confess I came home and to a little dinner, I thought I would try to get this down so that perhaps someday somebody could have a feel of the way it was, on Sunday, May 7, 1972. And I'm signing off.

Monday, May 8. I talked yesterday about the consideration that was being given to new moves in Vietnam, that is, the mining of the ports, an attempt to close the ports and close supplies to North Vietnam. This morning at nine o'clock the NSC--National Security Council--meeting started on this. I met with the Secretary before the meeting again and waited all morning for some sign of what the decision would be. In the meanwhile I and Bill Sullivan and Jack Stevenson,our legal adviser,worked at trying to prepare the best case possible in the event the decision was to go through with this and prepare the messages from the President to Chiefs of State, Presidents and so on that I knew he would want to communicate with in the event that he made the decision to do this. We prepared a circular telegram to other countries, prepared a message to the President of the Security Council, that would make our justification for this and try to set the legal basis. My rationale on this was that in the case of blockade and such formal action as that, it was normally handled by presidential proclamation. We were not going to, or what was being contemplated was not a formal blockade in the old sense of the term. Therefore, we had to have something in the way of an exact definition of what we were doing and our justification for it that went beyond the general language which the President would naturally use in a speech. Therefore, we prepared a transmission to the President's Security Council on that. We worked all morning on this. I worked very, very hard. The Secretary came back somewhat after noon. The meeting had been adjourned. We had lunch with him and he said the decision was in doubt but he thought that it would be that the President would make a decision to go ahead.

Backing up on this, I had a feeling that whereas the President obviously had thought deeply about this, anguished about it, that the formal machinery of the government, the CIA, State, Defense, others who have the job of trying to give the best advice they can, really had not been called fully

into play because the President is so concerned about security. One of the great difficulties Presidents have, and I sympathize with them on this, is being able to consult with his advisors and get the best advice of their organizations without having leaks on what he's thinking about. This is a serious problem. Well, in this situation there was really not the orderly presentation of views. Oh, some papers were prepared. They were prepared by the Pentagon, by the Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. State was never asked to contribute to this until I met with Henry Kissinger yesterday morning. I had a chance to brief the Secretary of State, Secretary Rogers, when he got back from Bonn last night and he went into the meeting this morning.

Well, as I say, the Secretary came back from the meeting, and said that the issue was still in doubt but based on my talks with him in the morning and talks that I know he'd had, I had a little feeling that the decision really had been made and that the NSC was being called in simply to debate it and act as somewhat of a front for the decision. Perhaps this is unfair, but I have this feeling.

Well, during lunch, oh, I would say about 2:30 or quarter of three, the White House called the Secretary and the Secretary said that the President had reached his decision and it was to go ahead with the action. A WSAG meeting, which I was, of course, the principal on the State side, was called for 3:30 to work out the final handling of the decision.

A comment on several things. First, the decision...all our preparations for it, the messages to foreign chiefs of state, the messages to the Security Council, Soviets and others, were all based on the assumption or based on the statement by the military forces that the mines that would be sowed in the harbors would not be activitated. That is, they would activitate automatically 72 hours after being sown so that there would be three full days for ships to leave the harbor. During the meeting--I forget exactly how it came up--

but this was questioned again. I questioned it. I said that we were putting this to the Security Council, we're putting this to other governments. Was this exactly right now? We couldn't have any mistake. If we said they had 72 hours to leave the harbor and it turned out to be a shorter time, obviously we would be at fault. Well, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Tom Moorer, for whom I have great respect and personally very much like, had his aide go out and make some phone calls about this and his aide came back and said, 72 hours was just an average. Some mines will go off sooner, some mines will go off later. Those that would go off sooner would go off up to 58 hours after they'd been laid. Well, I must say this produced, well, almost consternation. It certainly produced consternation on my part because we'd drafted everything on the basis of the President's speech, our messages, everything had been drafted on the basis of their assurance that there was this 72-hour period. Well, we frantically worked at changing the President's speech. We worked at trying to change the messages we'd made and all I can say is that we've now proceeded on the basis that there will be 58 hours, minimum of 58 hours, after the mines have been sown, which is already started, 9:00 as of tonight. And I hope it's right. All of this serves to make me even more doubtful as to whether all of this will have its effect.

A final word tonight, as I go to bed deeply troubled over the possible consequences of all this. On this of course all I can say is that in the past some of the consequences that I and my colleagues in State have foreseen have not come about.In the Cambodia operation, Lamsun 719 operation into Laos, the President in general turned out to be fairly well right, although neither operation came up to what we'd been led to expect by those who'd recommended them. After the meeting today, which I had to deal with a lot of detail,this is,

oh, how many times--back to Korea, the Cuban missile crisis, all during the Vietnam War, various operations--I always seem to be involved in these crises operations, trying to work out scenarios, see that the proper telegrams go out, see that the proper word gets out. I've gone through a lot of these now, and first it's a matter of high policy and next it's a matter of a lot of detail and seeing you don't slip up. That when you send a message under the name of the President out to another president, that what the President actually says in his speech or what's actually done doesn't contradict what he said in his letter to another president. Well, it's all this type of thing. It becomes a matter of a lot of detail as well as high policy.

Well, what I'm coming to is, as I said yesterday I think, Henry Kissinger indicated to me--we had a long talk about this--that he was opposed to the action that had been taken, and although I often doubt his word, I think that in this case he was really honest about it because he sees, the same as I do, the direction in which we have been working with respect to Peking, Moscow and elsewhere tending to be jeopardized by this action of mining the ports, closing off North Vietnam. After the meeting today, he walked out with me and we talked about this. He wanted to make sure that I had indicated to Secretary Rogers his views because he said he did not like to indicate them in an open meeting with the President and he didn't want to indicate opposition to the President. He wanted to be sure that I had indicated these to Rogers and I said that I had and this led to some discussion between us and I asked him who really had encouraged the President to take this action. Because I had a real feeling that rather than being the oh, you might say, the instigators of the action, Admiral Moorer, the chairman of the Chiefs and the Chiefs did not have any great enthusiasm for it, but rather that they had been told to come up with something in the way of a military plan that would help end the war, and I respect them for that. And they were supporting

the plan to the best of their ability without real conviction. And thus, I asked Henry what his estimate was. Who really inspired the President to come up with this action. And his answer to me was that it was John Connally and John Mitchell who were pushing the President on this.

Their concern was, I gathered from what Henry said, from the Secretary, well, I have a feeling--they were concerned about what I might call the right-wing vote in the states. Henry and I agreed that as far as the middle is concerned, the action would do a great deal to jeopardize the President's position in the election. I said during the course of our conversation, this was out on the sidewalk next to my car as I was leaving, I said to Henry that up to this point, and I thought that there was just no question about the President's ability to get re-elected in November, but I greatly feared, as far as the domestic situation was concerned, I greatly feared that this could well reduce his chances of getting elected. Of course, the Democrats still haven't nominated anybody so it's not really clear, but I didn't think that taken in purely narrow terms of his election prospects in the United States that he had improved it.

Internationally I thought it was almost certain to destroy the prospect for the summit with Moscow and do a great deal to jeopardize the policy that he'd adopted. As I said, up to now, although there have been problems between NSC, Henry Kissinger, Secretary Rogers, State Department and so on, as far as the substance of foreign policy is concerned, I felt that the substance was good. And I thoroughly approved and supported everything that had been done, putting aside the way the decisions had been reached on what was going to be done. But on this I had real doubts. Henry also indicated he was depressed. We both agreed that we could be facing very difficult days ahead. And we both agreed, and of course I'd previously agreed to all of this, that Secretary Rogers, that we had our doubts, we'd expressed our doubts, the President had

reached his decision, and now it was up to us to do our very best to see that the decision was carried out in the way that would be the most helpful to us. And that's what we're doing.

I got all the telegrams drafted tonight, arranged for all the ambassadors to come in, and we had various people briefing various groups of ambassadors. I listened to the President's speech because he was drafting on it right up to the very end, and I wanted to make sure that what I had put...the words I had put in his mouth in his communications to other chiefs of government as to what he was going to say was in fact what he did say. And because I had worked away at drafting this and some of it involved some very delicate drafting. Well, I'm happy to say that it seemed to work out all right.

I came home early because I worked a long time yesterday, I worked today and I'm somewhat tired. I'm trying to take care of myself so I can still stay around. I've talked at greater length than I should. I'm rambling along here late in the evening, but perhaps this might give those who come after me some feel for how decisions at a period like this have been made. The little role that I've had in them, perhaps my misgivings are entirely mistaken. I hope everything works out all right because the President's failure at this will not be the President's failure; a failure on this will be the failure of the country. And of course, this is what we're all trying to avoid and we're all working for the country. Well, I'll sign off for this evening.

(21f)

Well, some of the dire things that I feared from the mining of Haiphong had certainly not taken place. The Soviets have only made a mild protest. They're continuing to go ahead with preparations for the summit. The Chinese statements have also been relatively mild. And astonishing to me, the opposition in this country has been very mild. In fact, the public

opinion show that the President has had overwhelming support for this move. All I can say for this is that I was wrong. I was badly wrong. And many others were wrong also and the President was right. I was telling Henry Kissinger the other day, we were both agreeing, "I will be very, very slow to second guess the President on his reading of public and domestic and international opinion." He does amazingly well. He guessed right on Cambodia. He guessed right on Laos. And he certainly, thus far, guessed right on this and we've been wrong.

Now, I don't think I'm wrong over the long run in the sense that, as I told Henry to tell the President on my behalf, I just don't think it's going to work. I think that the North Vietnamese are going to be able to bring in supplies overland from China both by rail and by road sufficient to keep them going. I think that the Air Force, as it often has done in the past and not only the Air Force itself but the Navy, has oversold the President on what it can accomplish by bombing and my own guess now, and I will venture this, is that six months from now they're still going to be fighting. We are still going to be bombing and people are, again, going to be very discontented with the action, with the whole affair.

Now, of course, I can turn out to be wrong on that also. But I must say that's the way I feel about it now. Perhaps I'm trying to rationalize my own position but I don't think so. I think the facts support me. The only thing on the other side is even though physically they may not be able to bring in what they need overland, through China, nevertheless the psychological effect of the action we've taken might have a discouraging effect on Hanoi and just might lead them to take some action to reduce, deescalate the war.

Well, you know, in all these situations the White House—Henry Kissinger's, the President's —is always accusing us of leaking. In this case, I must say, the Department has behaved magnificiently.

On Tuesday the Secretary had a staff meeting at which he laid out an excellent rationale for the action that had been taken, asked for support of the President. I followed up with each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Bureaus to make sure that they followed up with their staffs and get reports from them. And the Department has held together well. People have supported the action. The leaks that have come out about the possibility of the Soviets cancelling the summit, the possibility of Chinese action, all this speculation--have come directly out of the White House. And a good part of them have come from Henry Kissinger himself. I know for a fact that some of the Marvin Kalb stories resulted from a dinner Henry had with Marvin Kalb even though Henry denies that he's been a source. In this regard, some time ago here, Scotty Reston had a very laudatory piece on Henry, properly laudatory in many ways. I kidded Henry a little bit about it the next morning. He volunteered to me that he hadn't seen Scotty Reston for months. I know that was a lie. I know from solid sources that he had had dinner with Scotty just a few days before. Why he does those things I just don't know. He is a brilliant and an able man but he just tries to be a little too clever at times.

Today I had my first game of golf since I became ill, that is, the first game since last January. It was a beautiful day. I played with Marshall Green, Ambassador Kim, Don Jo Kim, and Jack Stevenson, our legal advisor. It was a beautiful day. I played somewhat better. I played badly, you know I don't play golf well. I played somewhat better than I thought I might. And all I can say is I really feel good tonight. I used a cart, an electric cart, so I didn't get tired and it was a real lift to me and I've never felt happier or better than I do this evening. I'm hoping to play again tomorrow if the weather holds.

Well, I think this is all for this week, the week that was, in many ways. And we'll see what the week that comes brings forth. Over and out.

This is Sunday, May 21. The past week has not been too eventful. A number of things happened.

First, Monday, May 15, marked the return of the administration of Okinawa to Japan. The Vice President went to Japan to represent us at the ceremonies there. And the Japanese chargé here gave a dinner that evening. I received a very nice telegram from Miki, the former Foreign Minister, noting that the two of us had really initiated the negotiations on the reversion back in 1967 at the time that I was there as ambassador. Otherwise, I didn't hear anything from anybody else. However, I met that day with a group of Japanese correspondents, news and TV correspondents here, that is, I met with them on the 15th. As nothing was being done here, they wanted to meet with somebody and I had a background meeting with them and discussed on background the events leading up to the day. I pointed out that my own association with the question of Okinawa went back to 1946 when I was consul in Yokohama when I sent one of my officers, I think the first was Doug Overton, down to Okinawa to so some consular work down there and he came back with a quite disturbing report on the way things were being handled. And I wrote to the Department about it at that time and from that time on, I was involved one way or the other with Okinawa over the years. Not too often in this business that you get to see something through from beginning to end but in this case, for better or for worse; I think for better, I have been able to follow this through to the point that the area was returned to Japan.

The other event of the week was a domestic one but with international repercussions was the resignation of John Connally as Secretary of the Treasury. Although this has been somewhat rumored, it caught everyone by surprise, including Secretary Rogers. There've been various rumors that John Connally

would take his place as Secretary of State which I didn't give much credence to at this time,but of course were not very pleasant for Secretary Rogers. And I had the impression that he didn't expect this at this time. There is a story that the end of this Administration if Nixon's re-elected, that he will replace Rogers with Connally. I obviously have mixed feelings about this. Connally's theory of operation, particularly his theory, his political theory that to operate in politics you have to have enemies, and if you don't have enemies, why, you create enemies in order to have somebody with whom you can spar, and his theory on international economic affairs that we've got to set outselves up in blocs in order to oppose the European bloc,all disturb me greatly. However, as Secretary of State, he would certainly be a strong one,but I don't think there would be,well, it's quite clear to me, there wouldn't be room in town for both John Connally and Henry Kissinger operating in the same field.

In this regard, Henry has again told me that he plans to leave at the end of this Administration. That he recognizes the harm that's been done to the institution of the Department by the organization, the way things have operated. He wants to discuss with me how things should go the next Administration. I have a hard time believing that he will leave at the end of the Administration. I would not be too surprised to see Secretary Rogers replaced. He's been a good Secretary of State insofar as the President is concerned, but with the shift of the center of gravity on foreign affairs over to NSC staff, this, of course, has created trauma in the Department. But, after all, foreign affairs are not being run for the benefit or the morale of the Department of State or the Foreign Service. And as far as the results are concerned, certainly the President has conducted a brilliant foreign policy in many ways. I thought that this action in mining Haiphong harbor would meet with strong

resistance both domestically and internationally. I thought for sure I said 95-5, both Henry Kissinger and I said this to each other, that the summit with Moscow would be called off. Well, it hasn't been called off. The President left on Saturday for the summit.

I thought sure that there would be a strong domestic reaction but the polls show that the majority of the people are supporting the President. Thus I have to admit that I was wrong, that the President has a very, very keen sense for these things and his sense is far better than any of his advisors including myself.

As far as the mining is concerned, it thus far is effective. I didn't feel that it's over the long run going to be effective because I felt it would be entirely possible to replace what's now going in by sea, by overland from China. Thus far this doesn't seem to be happening. The Air Force seems to be doing a relatively effective job on the railroads and nothing much is moving by truck.

I expected the Soviet vessels which were bringing in big bulk items--petroleum products and food and so on into Haiphong--would land their cargos in China and then they'd be brought down overland. But the interesting thing is, thus far, that they are not landing in China. We had a report yesterday that the Chinese have permitted two Polish ships which were destined for Haiphong, to land in China. But turned down a third Polish ship and the report was, and it was a fairly reliable one, the report was--well, it was the Polish ambassador, actually, in Peking, was the source of it--his report was that Kosygin had directly asked Cho En Lai for permission for the Soviet vessels to land their cargos in China. The Chinese had turned them down. If this is true, it would be truly remarkable and might really mean a real, real turning point in the war.

Well, all I can say is it sounds too good to be true at this moment. But perhaps it might be.

We've had WSAG meetings all during the week, every day, and carried business there. I had a little feeling that the President hoped and expected something to happen with respect to Vietnam before he took off on Saturday for Moscow. But nothing did happen. At the present time he has put the pressure on the Department of Defense to ship as much to Vietnam as it can; this is in the way of military supplies for the South Vietnamese. So that if a ceasefire were to take place that would inhibit our ability to ship, that we would have as much on hand as possible.

I have a little feeling that he still expects something to develop. There may be things going on of which I'm not aware. And this could be the case. All I can say is thus far nothing has happened. Frankly, I just don't see why the North Vietnamese at this time are under any compulsion to come to any agreement. That their supplies are being cut off, of course, that's one thing. But I still think they could keep themselves going with what they get from China. And they have some successes on the ground in the South. Of course, their losses are very heavy. But I don't see any reason for them now to call a halt. But again of course I could be wrong.

Well, yesterday, Saturday, it rained all day so I didn't get my golf in. This morning, Sunday, it rained and I was not able to use a cart so I walked for seven holes. I took it very easy. Bob Murphy, Bob Cleveland, Ambassador Kim and I played and it was very pleasant out there. This was the first time that I've walked that distance. And thus far I seem to have gotten away with it. Well, this is over and out as far as this week is concerned or rather last week is concerned. Over and out.

This Wednesday evening, June 14. It's been almost three weeks since I've recorded. I see I don't have much space left on this reel so I'll cover things relatively fast.

During this period, I went out to California on Sunday, May 28. I took my grandsons down to Marineland on Memorial Day, Monday, the 29th. Tuesday the 30th in the evening, I spoke at the dinner for the big contributors to OXY, called the President's Circle of Occidental over at the Huntington Hotel.

On Wednesday morning I went up to Santa Barbara. I took my mother out for a long ride which she enjoyed and on Thursday June 1, we joined her in celebrating her nintieth birthday. We had a great time and she had some presents. We had flowers, we had cards. And I took her to the Biltmore Hotel for lunch;they had a cake for her. And it really felt good and I think she felt good about it. On Friday I again took her for a long ride before going back to Los Angeles on Friday evening.

On Saturday I had a game of golf in Los Angeles and on Sunday, June 4, I came back to Washington. I was acting Secretary most of that week from June 5 with all the activity that goes with that.

On Wednesday, June 7, there were the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee on Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. Senator Fulbright and I had our usual confrontation. He's frustrated with me and I'm frustrated with him. I had the satisfaction after the meeting that his own committee had voted him down and supported the position that I was taking.

This week has also been a busy week. One of the problems on the personal side, I began to get a little pain back in my chest again,angina,and the doctors advised me not to try to exercise quite as heavily. I've been taking what do you call them, nitroglycerin pills and that seems to help. Yesterday I went up to Newport to the Naval War College and spoke at their National Global Strategy seminar up there. They had an audience of about a thousand. I spoke on the new environment in international affairs particularly the multipolarity. I wrote a speech on the multipolarity that's developed and I got a very good response.

This morning I got in the office, Dean Rusk was there waiting to see me and we had a nice chat. This afternoon I've been up to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to testify with Admiral Zumwalt on the necessity of getting some new legislation that would enable our nuclear powered vessels to get into foreign harbors. People are just no longer willing to accept our word on this.

Well, that doesn't cover everything I suppose during the week. I really should go back and do more detail on this. There's been so many, many things happening, but not of great moment.

Today was announced again that Henry Kissinger's going to go to Peking. This was arranged privately through their channels without any reference to us or to the embassy in Paris which was supposed to be our channel to the Chinese. It makes everything we do, everything our people do in this regard, look like more and more of a charade. I get a little tired of it. And the President as I say, can run things the way he wants but as far as these big issues are concerned, the State Department and our role seems to have so little pertinence to the big issues that it hardly seems worth while paying much attention to them. But I'm feeling a little, oh, I suppose depressed on that this evening. I shouldn't let that influence my judgment.

I'll note that during this past week, on Wednesday, June 7, I had General Vang Pao for lunch. He is the Lao, of should I say Meo, general in Laos. One of the great soldiers of Southeast Asia, a person I admire very much. If we had more General Vang Pao's, our situation down there would be much easier.

I see I'm at the end of this tape so it will be over and out. Over and out.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 22

(22a)

I took my last tape down to the office, so I forget exactly where it let off, but I'll go back to June 12, the week beginning June 12. I know I've fallen behind here a little bit. I haven't been getting my tapes done as regularly as I had planned.

As a few footnotes:

We have had very heavy rains here during the past week and the biggest flood in Washington since 1936, and, as far as the east coast as a whole is concerned, the whole coast has virtually been flooded. The weather bureau has been saying it's the biggest single disaster in American history. We've escaped quite well here in Washington. The Potomac's been a little out of its banks, but not too badly so. Richmond, down in Virginia, Harrisburg, up in Pennsylvania, some of these places have suffered much worse.

Next, I've had to curtail my activities a little bit, or at least my exercise, during the last couple of weeks because I was getting a little angina pain when I walked. Well, having been in all week with no exercise, today was the first time I've had a chance to get out. I walked for about an hour and a half and was very pleased that I got no angina at all. Tomorrow, I hope to play a little golf.

Another footnote, a very sad one for me, is that I got a letter from Jennifer yesterday saying that she and Mike are getting a divorce and she's coming back here. I suppose it's the best thing. Ten years now they've tried this. It's been off and on. I feel deeply for her. I also feel deeply for Mike, because I like him as well. And I'm going to be telephoning her tonight to see what her plans are more definitely. It's going to be

very sad, though. Although, of course, I'd love to see her and I'd love to see Patty, but I hate to see their marriage broken up. It's going to be very tough on Jenny, coming back here as a divorcee with a child.

I also might note that I'm in the process of having these and all my previous tapes copied. My thought is that I want to leave one set of tapes with the family-- that is, I still think that Brad Zerbe, my grandson, would be the best custodian of them-- and the other with a library of some kind. I haven't decided what to do with them. The Kennedy Library has been after me for what they call my papers and the Johnson Library has also been after me. And perhaps these tapes now are extensive enough that they have some historical value. And I would leave a set together with the rest of my papers to some such library when I can work something out on it.

During this past week or the week before -- let's see, where I am right now -- well, yes, the week before, that is on the 13th of June, I went up to Newport to the Navy War College for their annual National Strategy Seminar. They have about a thousand altogether attending that. I gave a speech up there, together with questions and answers. This marks my first really public speech,resumption of public speaking, since I was ill. I went up in the morning and did my speech and came right back. And I felt all right. I think I'm coming along all right.

During that previous week, Jack Irwin was away the whole time. The Secretary was also away part of the time so I was in charge. Otherwise, it was just the Secretary and myself. But it wasn't a bad week. I'm trying to think of what there was of really outstanding importance and there really wasn't anything, looking at my calendar of those days. I was busy. I was seeing lots of people, but we had no real crisis.

During the week, on the 14th, I testified, along with Admiral Zumwalt, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, where I'm trying to get legislation that will permit us to make commitments to foreign governments with respect to our liability for accidents arising out of visits of our nuclear-powered Naval vessels. This marks quite a big switch. Admiral Rickover has finally come around to the point of supporting this. Over the years, he has been insisting that it was not necessary. And over the years, more and more countries have been refusing to permit our nuclear-powered vessels to enter their ports, unless we would agree to absolute liability to anything involved in nuclear accidents. Well, with the number of countries increasing, we've still taken this position. Both Admiral Rickover and the Navy have been forced to shift their position and I hope we can now get legislation that will cover this.

On events in Vietnam, there hasn't been anything particularly outstanding except the situation seems to be going reasonably well. The Communists have not been able to make any gains of any significance and it seems quite clear that they are hurting more and more from the bombing of the North and the mining of the ports.

Last Monday, I had lunch with Ed David, the President's science advisor, who had just finished a trip to Taiwan and Japan, as well as Korea. Out of out our talk grew a recognition on the part of both of us that we really need better thought-out national policy with respect to the export of technology. I'm going to get to work at this in the Department. The problem is, of course, that we have no real national policy. We have people in the government now who say that we should, in effect, close down on the export of technology or demand very high political price for it. Then there are

those who feel that we should let the natural economic processes work. Part of the problem arises in government developed technologies such as in aerospace and nuclear energy, to a degree in electronics, where technology which has been developed at the expense of the government in many cases is being used by private firms and sold by private firms abroad with the government only taking security into consideration and getting nothing else out of it. I don't know whether the government can or should get anything more out of it than simply the profit of the firms but, nevertheless, we have in the past looked at this whole problem solely from the standpoint of security -- that is, whether the technology being exported would adversely affect our national security. But we haven't looked at it from the standpoint of profit to the government, our political objectives and our economic objectives. And I plan to get something started with that.

On Monday, the 19th, also, Max Taylor, Max and Diddy Taylor had a retirement dinner, farewell dinner I suppose you might call it, for General Westmoreland who is being retired as Chief of Staff of the Army. Interestingly enough, they had Clark Clifford there. We kept carefully off of the subject of Vietnam, though. And thus had a pleasant evening.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, we've had a couple of WSAG meetings at which we discussed the whole question of what equipment, additional equipment, we're going to give to the South Vietnamese. We have two objectives in mind here. One is what lessons have we learned from the present offensive with respect to changing, perhaps, some of the types of equipment we're giving them. The second is, if there should be a ceasefire, having as much equipment in place in South Vietnam as possible so as to cover the possibility that an agreement might provide some limitations on what might be supplied. We have not come to any very startling conclusions on this. The principal

issue that emerges, of course, is air, with the North having MG 21s, the question of what kind of an aircraft we should furnish the South. We've been furnishing them A1s and F5s which are not a match for the MG 21s. On the other hand, if we give them F4s, which would be a match for the MG 21s, it is an enormous expense, not only to us but also to them, in operation and maintenance. And, also, it takes a lot of manpower to operate and maintain them. On the other hand, if we don't give them a plane that can match the MG 21, then it means that either as a deterrent, or in the case of actual operations, we will have to maintain a substantial air presence in that part of the world until the situation is stabilized.

On Thursday, we had a somewhat unusual, but very pleasant dinner at Tom McKnew's; he's at National Geographic. Had all the U. S. Navy CNC's from all the fleets around the world in for a dinner, together with Admiral Zumwalt. Your mother and I were the only, I might say, civilians present again. The previous week we were the only civilians present at this big Army dinner. It's nice to be accepted by both the Army and the Navy.

Yesterday, Friday, I testified for the Aeronautical and Space Science Committee in the Senate in support of the agreement that we had reached with the Soviets on space in Moscow, in particular with the project for a rendezvous of the Soviet spacecraft and an American spacecraft during 1975. I gave it strong support and, because I do feel that it's useful, although it's going to be very expensive as well.

Well, I'm going to close this off at this point. Over and out.

This is Sunday, July 2, 1972. It's been a fairly active week. The Secretary's been away on his trip to the SEATO meeting at Canberra, then to Jakarta, and he's making stops in Europe and North Africa on the way back.

He's at Yemen today. As he won't be back until at least July 10 and Jack Irwin left yesterday,Saturday morning, again I'm alone in charge of the Department.

On Thursday evening, the President had a press conference and at the press conference, he said we'd arrived at an agreement on having a meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris on July 13. I knew nothing about this whatsoever. Neither did Jack Irwin and again, it's one of those instances on which we haven't been kept informed. I asked Henry Kissinger about it the next day. He said that the Secretary had been informed, and Bill Porter had also been informed in Paris. He apologized for not letting us know and said that we were going to have to quote keep close together on this if the meetings go ahead. I thoroughly agree, but exactly why it was arranged, how it was arranged, I just don't know. I personally am very much inclined to doubt the usefulness of it,and I feel fairly clear in my own mind that nothing's going to come of it. Seems to me that there's absolutely no reason for the North to enter into any kind of agreement to call this thing off until after the election. That is, if McGovern wins the election, they get everything free. So there's no point in their bargaining anything less in the interim. Although there are signs - intelligence, that they may be shifting their position, and, hopefully, I could be wrong. There are signs that they may, that they're talking with their cadre about a ceasefire and also they're talking about a settlement that would still leave Thieu as President of South Vietnam. If they would make such a shift in their position, it would be possible to arrive at some arrangement. They could be hurting more than we know. Our own best estimates at the time are that they are able to get enough supplies, particularly when they complete this pipeline to China. They are able to get enough supplies by pipeline and by road and by barge to continue the war. And the real Achilles heel, their real

weakness, more is probably in manpower. They undoubtedly have taken very heavy losses in trained manpower in the South, and there are some signs that their morale may be down.

During the week, we also had a meeting, DPRC meeting-- that is, Defense Program Review Committee meeting-- again, trying to tackle this problem of our strategic forces and getting a better rationale for them, and deciding really what we want out of them. This gets to be an intellectual exercise. I have great difficulty with these kinds of exercies and, as I said at the meeting, when I see these great concepts, assured destruction, counterforce, a deterrent in all this, when I see them translated into hardware, then I can really come to grips with it. It was agreed that the Defense will seek to do that better than they have in the past.

The Chiefs always want to have this an objective, a war outcome that will be substantial -- let's see, what is the term -- a war outcome that will be relatively favorable after a nuclear exchange. Most of the rest of us have great difficulty in trying to translate that into any meaningful terms. I suppose that only a hundred million Americans and a hundred and twenty five million Soviets get killed, that's relatively favorable, but it's awfully hard to use the term favorable in a situation of that kind.

We have also had meetings, WSAG meetings, the Washington Special Actions Group, with regard to Vietnam. I've had a group working on contingency planning to try to anticipate the various possibilities, what the other side might do. Bill Sullivan and Sy Weiss have been working at this for me. The present time the thing that the other side could do that would cause us the greatest difficulty would be to make an offer to trade our prisoners for a complete withdrawal and a cessation of all military action by us throughout Indochina.This could have powerful appeal in this

country, and I'm somewhat surprised that they haven't put forward such a proposal.

I'm also having considerable difficulty over our position in COCOM with respect to the export of, in their terms, strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. The British and other Europeans want to be able to export communications equipment; that is, telephone equipment. And also the French want to be able to sell to the Chinese a cable, underseas cable, of a couple hundred kilometers, not a very big thing. As usual, Defense digs in its heels. It still is thinking in terms of economic warfare against the Soviet Union, although those days are long since past. And as usual, or that's not fair to say -- well, I should say though, this case as well as the case of the law of the sea, Defense's normal reaction is to dig in its heels and say if the State Department will be tough enough, why, everybody else will go along. The result is that the United States is always coming up with too little too late and we lose much more than we would if we would have entered into reasonable dialogue and reasonable compromise. I've been talking with Ken Rush about this. It gets very technical and we both agree that we have great difficulty in coming to conclusions in our own mind. Part of the problem is that this fellow, Warren Nutter, over in Defense, the Assistant Secretary of International Security Affairs, is such a narrow-minded, narrow-visioned fellow that even his own staff and chiefs and everybody have an enormous difficulty dealing with him. Ken Rush, I find very able; however, both of us are pretty busy to try to get into the details, particularly technical details of this kind. It's an area in which I particularly miss Dave Packard, who could understand the technology and quickly grasp the broader implications.

Friday, the 30th, I went to the reception General Westmoreland had for his retirement. This marks, you might say, another generation of military personnel with whom I've had contact retiring. Westy had his limitations, but he certainly was a good soldier, great division commander, corps commander, Army commander. I'm afraid that he was not quite as great as Chief of Staff, but being Chief of Staff takes quite different qualities.

I believe that I mentioned in my last tape that we got a letter from Jennifer, but in case I didn't, I'll mention it again because it's very much on my mind. We got a letter from Jennifer that she's getting a divorce and she and Patty are coming back here. I'm very, very sad that the marriage didn't work out, and I feel sorry for her.

I'll close this off at this time. Closing out.

This is Friday, July 7, 1972, about nine o'clock in the evening, and an incident occurred this afternoon and evening that I want to record.

Earlier in the afternoon, we received an intercepted message indicating that the North Vietnamese intended to execute ten American prisoners tonight our time, tomorrow morning, that is, July 8, Vietnamese time. I received this message and turned it over to one of my staff to immediately get to work on. And this evening they came to me with a plan that had been discussed with junior officers in Defense with which I was not very satisfied. So I got in immediate touch with Mel Laird, Secretary of Defense, and we agreed that, given the time element in this, we should override all other considerations and we should immediately make an appeal by letting North Vietnam know that we knew what they had planned. We agreed we should immediately make a public appeal by statement from the State Department in my

name telling North Vietnam that we knew what they had planned and appealing to them to withhold the execution of these ten American prisoners in Quang-Tri province in the northern part of South Vietnam. I worked out, with my own staff, a statement on this. I agreed on it with Secretary Laird and then I gave it to the White House liaison officer who remains here in Washington, Colonel Kennedy. No blame whatever attaches to him in this, but I called him rather than call San Clemente,where the President was,directly,because I knew Kennedy had previously been involved in this. I gave him the text of the statement that we proposed to make which would in some ways be in the name of the President as it would say that the President had instructed me to take action with the North Vietnamese to try to prevent this tragedy.

My thought was to communicate this to the North Vietnamese at Vientiane because it was morning, their time, in Vientiane, and then in Saigon through the International Control Commission,and then subsequently in Paris. But the real appeal would be this public appeal that we would make immediately on the radio. Because, given the fact that the information we had indicated that executions were to be carried out on July 8, Vietnamese time, and it was already early morning, July 8, Vietnamese time, I saw no way of getting this appeal to the North Vietnamese except by public broadcast which would carry the public statement that we were making.

Well, it took several hours to get hold of San Clemente on this. Apparently, Henry Kissinger was having one of his press conferences or meetings with the press out there. I did not talk to him directly; finally the word came back through his man here, that is, Colonel Kennedy, Dick Kennedy, that they wanted absolutely nothing done. They wanted no public statement made; they wanted no representations made through any of our

channels and the word was that Henry would handle this in his own way through his own channels.

I said to Colonel Kennedy I wanted to be very clear that the record, as far as I was concerned, would show this. I called Secretary Laird, Secretary of Defense Laird, and repeated this to him. He had not yet heard anything from them. And we both agreed that we'd done everything possible that we could do. But tonight the fate of these men rests very, very heavily on my conscience. And I've never been more upset, disturbed the way things are being handled than I have tonight. I don't know. . . Well, Henry has his own channels which are divulged to no one. I know . . I have a notion what these channels are.I'm sure that they're not swift enough to have an effect on this decision. And, as far as I'm concerned, I've done my best. I hope the channels he has, I hope that what he's able to say will save the lives of these men. I don't say that what I could have done would have saved them. But certainly I am deeply distressed tonight. Over and out. (22b)

This is Sunday morning, July 23. I can't remember exactly when I last recorded. I played back a little of it and I know I was talking about the incident of this report of some American prisoners are going to be executed by the North Vietnamese, but I don't have the exact date of it. So I'll back up here a little.

During these past two weeks, the Secretary came back from his trip to Asis and the Middle East and Rome and then was here just a day and then went on to San Clemente. And he came back, oh, I guess it was the 19th. The President also came back from San Clemente on the 19th. Henry Kissinger made another one of his trips to Paris for private talks with Le Duc Tho. He briefed

me some on them. It's quite clear that these people really know how to deal with him because, as Henry told me, one thing that impressed Henry apparently was Le Duc Tho said that he would never make peace with Henry because he enjoyed seeing Henry so much. Henry can be pretty hardheaded, but obviously this kind of personal flattery touches home with him.

Looking at my appointment book, I see it's been pretty full. I gave a lunch for Sunthorn, the departing Thai ambassador. Sunthorn was Minister of France when I was in Thailand, '58,'59,'60 period and is very able. He has not been very successful as ambassador here. In general, outside of Thanat Khoman, Thais just don't seem to be able to get people that are very impressive in their diplomatic service. I also gave a lunch for Takeshi Watanabe, President of the Asian Development Bank. He's a long-time friend and will be retiring shortly. He was the first president of the bank and has done a great job in building it up.

Yesterday I went over to the Defense Department to see Deputy Secretary Ken Rush on the whole question of COCOM. This has been something that has been plaguing State and Defense over the years. COCOM is an organization in which we coordinate . . .

(Interruption)

That phone ringing was a message from the operation center of the Department saying that a message came in from Tokyo this morning asking that we embargo the release of the President's invitation to Prime Minister Tanaka until nine-thirty tonight. We previously suggested seven o'clock tonight. And we've sent back a message confirming that this would be done.

At this point, I might say that the President decided that he wanted to meet with the new Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, and a meeting has been

arranged for August 31 and September 1 in Honolulu. I'm very pleased with this. Tanaka seems to be getting off on a very good foot. He's showing quite a bit of imagination and a great adeptness at his job and I think it's going to be very important that we establish good relations with him. I'm very pleased that the President will do this. I previously felt that he probably wouldn't want to have any visits until after the election, but the President is making an exception in this case. Tanaka is obviously delighted.

Back to COCOM, which is the organization in which we and the Western European, the members of NATO and Japan, coordinate our efforts to prevent strategic goods going to the Communist bloc. This has been a long thorn in flesh back here with the Defense Department refusing to accept the fact that the world's moved on and what was strategic ten or fifteen years ago is not necessarily strategic today. The State Department, of course, being somewhat more biased in the other direction,of not wanting to have controversies with our allies. Well, a particular issue has been going on now for over two years on which this found a focus. This was the issue of the export to Eastern Europe by Western European countries of multiplex equipment for commercial telephone lines. The Defense Department claims that this was strategic because it meant poor communications in the bloc; we pointing out, in turn, the fact that there was no high technology involved. A lot of countries can manufacture the equipment and the fact that the Eastern bloc countries want to buy some of it abroad doesn't necessarily indicate any ulterior motive on their part.

Well, this has gone on for several years now. Several months ago, the British ambassador was in to see me about this, protesting our position on this. Ken Rush and I had been talking about this for some time. So yesterday Ken Rush and I sat down, together with two advisors on each side,

and we worked out something that satisfies both parties. My staff people are very, very pleased with it. His seem to be pleased. And I hope that this will remove one of the sources of irritation between State and Defense.

As a matter of interest, in answer to the question, "What do I do all day?", I might go down my calendar here for just one day and give a little notion of what I do.

This is Wednesday, July 19. I arrived in the office at twenty minutes of nine. I read the morning summary, the top morning telegrams that had been culled out by my staff. Had a briefing on what was in the New York Times. And then at nine o'clock, Secretary Irwin and I met with Ted Elliott of the Secretariat who briefed us on what was upcoming, what had happened overnight and the actions to be taken that day. Then we had a briefing by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on overnight intelligence since the end of the day. At nine thirty, we had a staff meeting. End of that at ten o'clock, I had a meeting with SCI on the whole question of what kind of a policy we would adopt with respect to pricing of nuclear fuel that we were exporting abroad. The issue was that, up to now, our agreements for enriched nuclear fuel have read that we will not charge foreign countries any more than we charge domestic users. The Atomic Energy Commission wanted to change that so as to permit us to charge if we wanted to in the future -- it will be a long, long time in the future before we will be able to do so -- and instead insert a most favored nation clause. That is, we would say to each of them we wouldn't charge them any more than we would charge other countries.

Our people have been taking a pretty strong line against this. Frankly, I could see that they had a point, and the point involved of course our ability to sell at nuclear power plants abroad. That is, if countries thought we were going to discriminate against them, they would be less anxious to buy.

However, I listened to what they had to say and agreed that I would call Jim Schlesinger, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and discuss the matter with him.

At eleven o'clock, Mr. Yager, who used to work in the Department, and is now working for the Research Analysis Corporation, came in with two of his colleagues to discuss with me a study they were doing on the return of the administrative rights of Okinawa and why it went so smoothly without the resistance that was expected from Defense and the services and the Armed Services Committee. I explained to them the preparation that had gone into it and the fact that I take considerable pride in this. I pointed out that not everything is in the written record and I did this much over a period of several years, by personal talks with CINCPAC and the various chiefs.

At twelve thirty, I finally got hold of Jennifer in Bangkok and had a talk with her about her arrangements and what she was doing.

Then Watanabe of the Asian Development Bank came in. I kept him waiting about twenty minutes while I was talking to Jennifer and then I took him up for lunch upstairs.

At two thirty, John Hubble, an editor of the New York Times, Hanson Baldwin, who used to be defense editor of the New York Times, came in to see me about a project they're doing for the Readers Digest. They're trying to do a book on crisis management and how crises are managed with the government. I promised them my cooperation and we had some talks about this. Well, it wasn't just crisis management; I shouldn't say that. They were talking about the possibility of what the situation would be if we had a crisis, say, 1975/76, with the Soviet Union considering the fact that our defense establishment is being so drastically reduced,

whether we would be able to do at that time what we could do in the past. They're going to do up a fictionalized account, trying to make it as realistic as possible. I told them I thoroughly agreed with the necessity of keeping before our people the importance of maintaining our conventional strength. I gave them a speech that I had made on this subject.

At three-thirty, the Finnish Ambassador came in to pay a farewell call on me.

Continuing July 23, 1972, at four o'clock I had a meeting with a number of people in the Department seeking to set up a study of what our policy should be toward the export of technology. This is an interesting subject. It involves the export of U.S.government technology or U.S. government-originated technology, for example, in space. When McDonnell Douglas sells a space vehicle to the Japanese, they're in fact selling a technology that was developed at the expense of the U. S. government. The same is true of Atomic Energy Commission and so on.

Then you have the old question of the export of, you might say, commercial technology in which security considerations are not involved. Well, over the years, we've tended to control this primarily on security grounds. But that is, we export if we think the security permits, and we don't permit its export if we don't think it permits. But we haven't looked at the other economic, political aspects of it very closely. There is much criticism that we have been, quote, giving away or selling for a song, our technology, and this has enabled Japan, for example, to make the strides that it has that some people say at our expense, so on, and so on.

I don't think much of this is true, but I do entirely agree that we should look at the question of licensing our export of technology in a broader point of view than just security. We should look at the economic and political aspects as well. At the present time, we don't have the

machinery to do so and so I've asked that this study be set up.

At five-thirty, I had a meeting with Marshall Green and Dick Erickson, working out a reply to the Japanese approach to us with respect to their policy in seeking to establish relations with Peking. This of course is a very important subject at this time, and I am working with them on the reply we would make. The Japanese have approached us with their plans and have invited our comments. Incidentally, I got that message made up -- I also got the Secretary's approval on it because I thought it was important that he be involved -- and sent it over to the White House Thursday. I spoke personally to Henry Kissinger about it, but here, as of Sunday, it has not yet gone out, and it's very important that it do so.

Five-forty-five, I met with William Sullivan, Bill Sullivan, who is chairman of the Vietnamese Task Force on plans for the WSAG meeting to be held the next day. And we discussed the Paris negotiations, the situation on the ground in Vietnam and measures that we're taking there.

Then I cleaned up the rest of the telegrams that I had on my desk, and I left at six forty-five. Well, that's a lot of telephone calls in between, of course; a lot of other people just poking their heads in. But, in general, that's a fairly typical day at the desk at which I sit.

We've been having a real hot spell. I'm going to play golf at one o'clock; I have a cart, I couldn't possibly walk in this kind of weather. But, incidentally, the doctor says I'm doing fairly well, as far as my heart is concerned. I'm still getting some angina, but he said I shouldn't worry about that too much. Hopefully, by the end of August, I should be back pretty much as I was.

But I think I'll sign off at this point and get out.

This is Tuesday, August 8. During the preceding week, the Secretary's been away all week. Jack Irwin and I have been alone; well, Jack Irwin was away for a day also, so I was in charge. But there have been no major events during the past week. It's been the normal routine of business, and nothing has been very notable. But it keeps us busy.

Today I testified before the subcommittee on Security in Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. My testimony was the closing of a series of hearings that they've had, including former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and others. I was the only Administration witness they've had. They are going to publish these hearings, and it's on general -- our foreign policy, security policy, as we look down ahead. I was very honored to be asked to be the only Administration witness, and I worked very hard at my testimony on this and prepared a statement over a period of the last ten days in which I take considerable pride. I had assistance from Marshall Wright in the Congressional Relations Office, a very able Foreign Service Officer; Les Brown in the Office of Political and Military Affairs; Bob Beaudry, my assistant; and myself. But,in the end, I can honestly say that it was really my statement, and I regarded it somewhat as a testament. It may well be my last -- well, I don't know that I should put it that way -- my last such statement, and I put it in terms of my own very considered personal views, on our foreign policy and our foreign relations.* We had a question and answer session, and this also gave me an opportunity to say some things that I wanted to say about my attitude towards foreign affairs, and our role, that is, the role of Foreign Service Officers, in our foreign affairs. I dealt with

*This was published by the Department in November, 1972, as No. 8685 entitled "Prospects for a More Rational World."

some things, I felt, fairly satisfactorily, other things, less satisfactorily, and it was a long, fairly exhausting, although not unfriendly two and a half hour session. I hope I can get a tape of it -- I think it was taped, it was a public session -- to illustrate and set forth my own views on foreign relations and foreign affairs, and how a hearing of this kind goes.

Today is your Uncle Bill's birthday. We were going to celebrate it today, but it didn't quite work out. And so tomorrow we are going to have a celebration. I'm taking your Uncle Bill, your Uncle Stephen, your Great Aunt R'Ella and Uncle Gerry, Don Westmore who works with me in my office, Bob Ruenitz who worked with me in Tokyo and is now leaving the Service. We're all going out on the Chief of Naval Operations barge -- it's called a barge, it's really a yacht -- tomorrow evening for a little party for Bill. Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, offered me some time ago the use of his barge, and I accepted it to take them all out on a party. So we're looking forward to a good party tomorrow evening.

I have very good news from your Great Grandmother in Santa Barbara. I had a letter today from the lady who looks after her business affairs, and she says that she's doing very well, very sprightly, and this indeed makes good news. So I feel pretty good tonight, after a good, hard, congressional hearing, all the work that goes into this, all the concentration it takes while you're up there answering questions, having come back to the office and dealt with some things today.

Incidentally, one of the things I dealt with this evening before I left was the question of a licensing of General Electric Company to engage in a joint project with the French, semi-governmental corporation, in building

a jet aircraft engine, a commercial jet aircraft engine. This gets into the whole question of our technology; the relationship of our technology with Europe and other countries, the price and policies which we should adopt with respect to sharing our technology with others, where the advantage lies, how we should handle these things, becomes very, very interesting. This is a question of whether we should seek ourselves to develop what is known as a ten-ton engine, that is, a twenty-thousand pound thrust engine, in order to maintain the almost monopoly that we have on aircraft engines, but which is very costly as far as government funds in its development, or whether we should share this and permit the French government and a French company to participate in this, and also share in the profits. There are also security aspects to this. Questions aren't easy. Our instinctive reaction, of course, is to share, but if we're going to share, it means that others share with us as well. And, particularly as far as the French are concerned, it's by no means clear that they're willing to share with us. So it's very hard to work out policies on these questions. We're trying hard to do so. I spent about two hours this evening or late this afternoon with the people that are best informed on this, trying to work out policy on this.

Well, it keeps you young, keeps you alive, gives you challenges to deal with. And, as I often say, that's what we're paid for.

Over and out.

This is Sunday, August 13. It's around noon. I'm going to leave this evening to go out to SAC, Strategic Air Command, at Omaha. I haven't been out there for some years to see what they're doing. I'll be going out with General Meyers, who's the commander out there. Spending tomorrow,

Monday, there; then Tuesday, I'm going over to NORAD at Colorado Springs, the North American Air Defense Command. General McKee, Seth McKee, who was commander of U. S. forces in Japan when I was there, is there. And then I'm coming back on Wednesday afternoon, Wednesday evening here, which is your grandmother's birthday, and we're going out that evening.

Yesterday or last night, Senko-San, our maid, cook, helper, whatever else, everything else for us, gave a party here at the apartment for your grandmother, a little premature, a little bit ahead of time, but Saturday's a much better time to do it than any other day. And it was also Uncle Gerry's birthday at the same time. Your Uncle Bill had just had his birthday previously, so in many ways, it was a three-way birthday party. Senko-San organized this thing herself, invited everybody. She had about forty or forty-five people here, and it was a real party. It was entirely her own idea; she arranged everything herself. And I must say she's a wonderful, wonderful person. We owe a great deal to her.

While I'm on this theme, we owe much to the people who have worked for us. Had a housekeeper when we were in Prague; then when we came back from Thailand in 1961, Suntharee came with us. She was faithful, loyal, an excellent cook, cheerful, and she worked for us until I went to Saigon. Senko-San, who we now have, was our housekeeper in Tokyo, the housekeeper for the residence, and she came back here with us when we came back in 1969. She's a wonderful cook; she's a fine seamstress; she's a thoroughly nice person. We owe a great deal to her.

I also owe a great deal to my secretaries I've had. Well, I have had some wonderful girls that worked for me. The two who are working for me now, Elinor Murphy, who's my principal secretary, was my secretary in Japan

and then she came back here with me. Martha Watts, who's also with me, started working for me in 1950 when I was in Northeast Asian Affairs in the Department. She's worked for me on and off for years. I often say these two girls -- they aren't girls, they're women -- know more about me than I know about myself, and I don't know what I would do when I retire without having them to take care of my affairs.

Wednesday night, I gave Bill a birthday party. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, sometime ago urged me to use his barge; it's really a yacht, they call admirals' boats barges. He urged me to use it, and so I took Bill and his girlfriend and Stephen, Bob Ruenitz, Don Westmore, Aunt R'Ella and Uncle Gerry-- let's see, how many more were there? We were about ten or twelve. We went down the river to Mount Vernon on it, had stewards along to serve dinner. It was a beautiful evening and we had a very good time.

(22c)

During this past two weeks, I've been working with making preparations for the meeting of the President and the new Japanese prime minister, Prime Minister Tanaka, at Honolulu at the end of this month, actually August 31 and September 1. The principal issues are economic issues and Bill Eberle, William Eberle, the Special Trade Representative for the President, has been working at these primarily. He's been over to Japan and he's come back here. We're trying to get a package together that will give us something to say at Honolulu. I'm very concerned that unless we're able to show some shift in the balance of payments picture with Japan that it's going to find its reflection in political attitudes in this country towards Japan. In spite of the revaluation of the yen and the other measures that have

been taken, the gap in trade between us is continuing to grow. At the present time, it looks like the gap for 1972, for this year, is going to be about 3.6 billion dollars. Of course, we are not seeking any exact balance, bilateral balance, but we've got to do better than that. The Japanese are still reluctant to have their own domestic and political problems,and it's very difficult for them to take dramatic steps. I keep telling them they don't even get credit for what they do because of the begrudging way in which they do it. But they say, given their society, given their organization of the government, this is the only way they can do it.

I'm very encouraged, though, by Tanaka and by Ohira as Foreign Minister. Tanaka is a new element in Japanese politics. He is to break with the Yoshida tradition. He also wants to break with the bureaucratic tradition. He is not a college graduate; he's a self-made made and tends to be somewhat impetuous. But a little impetuousness and decisiveness on the part of the Japanese government would be very useful at this time. Well, we'll have to see what we work out.

Bill Eberle and I and the Department work very well. Even though he's in the White House staff, he finds his greatest difficulties over there. The great . . . well, shall I put it this way, there's really no organization over there. You've got John Ehrlichman dealing with so-called domestic affairs; you've got Peter Flanigan dealing with international economic affairs; you've got Henry Kissinger dealing with national security affairs. And, of course, you can't separate out economic and security affairs. They're all mixed up together. There's all the pulling and hauling between the various elements. Talk about bureaucracy and bureaucratic squabbling,

I think it's as bad in the White House if not worse than it is anyplace else in town. There's nothing to draw them together, short of the President. I was telling Bill Eberle the other day when we were talking about this that first there is no secretariat over at the White House. There's no central point to which communications come, no follow-up on communications. Each of these people handle their own affairs more or less in their own way , and we in State and I in particular have often found myself in a position of trying to coordinate these people over there.

Of course, in addition to these people I've mentioned, you have such people as Ed David, the science advisor, you have Tom Whitehead on telecommunications policy. He really, I find, very, very difficult, very shortsighted. Well, you've got other special assistants of course scattered around over there. It's become a great bureaucracy of its own without the merits of being well-organized.

I'm taking off at this time for these three days because it's been a long time since I've been off. Then the following week, both the Secretary and Jack Irwin are going down to the Republican Convention in Miami, so I'll be all alone again. The Secretary's probably going out to San Clemente. The President will be going there after the Republican Convention. I'll probably be going out there also. At the present time, I'm planning to go to Honolulu to the meeting there of the President and the Prime Minister. I frankly don't relish these meetings particularly, tagging along on them, because there's usually very little to be done. Actually, people think a lot more goes on at these meetings than in fact takes place.

However, with a new Prime Minister and in trying to keep my hand in affairs with Japan, I think I'll probably go along on this meeting, if it's

clear I'm going to have a proper place, a respectable place in the meetings. I'm not protocol conscious, but if I'm just going out there to sit and twiddle my thumbs, I have no interest in that whatsoever.

Well, I think this is about the point to close this off. So that closes off this portion ending August 13.

This is Saturday, August 26, about noon. Since my last recording on August 13, I took a trip out to Omaha, SAC base there, and then from there over to Colorado Springs at NORAD. I went out on Sunday evening with General Meyer and his wife;he's commander of SAC. I spent Monday morning in briefings, Monday afternoon we played golf, Tuesday morning I also spent in briefings, Tuesday morning primarily on our reconnaisance programs around the world which are, for the most part, operated by SAC, and which, I'm of course very much concerned back in Washington. Then on Tuesday, about noon, I took a T-39 over to Colorado Springs and was met there by General Seth McKee, who was commander of U. S. forces in Japan when I was in Japan. I'm very fond of both he and his wife, Sally. Seth took me immediately out to play some golf at the Broadmoor Golf Course there at Colorado Springs. I must say it was beautiful. That evening we had dinner at the Broadmoor with the new Canadian deputy in NORAD and his wife. Then the next morning, I spent in briefings at NORAD in the rock at Cheyenne Mountain, in the dug-in area there.

It's a great organization, wonderful communications. Trouble is, they haven't got much left to command. The idea of course is air defense. And with the emergence of missiles, air defense has become less and less a priority. As General McKee said, and I think it's largely true, a Soviet

bomber could roam pretty much at will over the United States, but the question is, why would they want to do so. It seems quite clear that they wouldn't. But the limits now in the SALT agreement on the ABM, the anti-ballistic missile, also doesn't leave them much to command. So they're a great headquarters, wonderful setup, but without much to command.

I left there about noon again by T-39 and flew back to Washington. We had to stop and refuel in Kansas City, because it was so hot in Colorado Springs that the altitude couldn't take enough fuel for a non-stop flight.

Your grandmother met me out at Andrews in Washington. This was her birthday, Wednesday, August 16, and we went directly from there out to Wolf Trap in Virginia to see a performance by the Vienna Folk Opera Company. Very, very pleasant. First time I've been out to Wolf Trap and we enjoyed it very much. So the first part of my week was fairly busy.

The last part of that week I was involved primarily working with Bill Eberle on the package we're trying to get together for the meeting with the Japanese in Honolulu.

Monday the 21st, I met with Henry Kissinger,who had just come back from his Paris-Saigon-Tokyo trip, to discuss what had happened on that trip. In part with regard to Vietnam, it doesn't yet look like there's any breakthrough there. And in part, to discuss his meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka in Japan, the principal purpose of which was to emphasize to Tanaka the great importance to the President of having something substantial to show and the redress of our adverse trade balance with Japan. I also met on Monday with Bob Thompson, Sir Robert Thompson, the Britisher who was so long associated with Vietnam and who I knew out there. He's been on a trip to Southeast Asia, talking to leaders there about Vietnam. As I told him, I felt I needed a little bucking up myself on Vietnam. I'm discouraged that

with the closing of Haiphong and the bombing of the rail lines and the roads, that, starting back in April now, there's thus far no real sign that this is having any real effect upon their ability to continue the attacks in the South. They're using heavy ammunition, rockets, mortar ammunition, at the greatest rate in history. They show no sign of any shortage of supplies, and they keep coming.

My own feeling is that, whereas it's costing them more and more of an effort, as far as their military needs are concerned, they're probably coming across the border now from China by truck, and we are not able to do very much about it. Again, it's an excellent illustration of the limitations of air power in a situation of this kind. It goes back to what I have often said to both the Navy and the Air Force, the Navy Air and the Air Force, on the enormous need that we have for a weapons system and a doctrine that will permit us to carry out something approaching a land blockade. With what we have now we just can't do it in spite of the expenditure of effort. And I keep looking for signs of a reduction of the North's effort in the South. Certainly their manpower losses must be very large and should be felt by now, and the time must come, of course, that they are going to feel it. But thus far, the signs are not very great. Must give them credit. They certainly are tenacious; they certainly are ingenious. And they certainly do have some kind of a spirit that keeps them going. As I often say, though, I don't think it's Communism as much as it is the inherently aggressive nature of the Tonkinese, of the North Vietnamese, and their feeling that they have the divine right, if you will, to rule not only all of Vietnam, but all of Indochina. So the war still continues to go on, and the end is not yet in sight.

Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese with whom Henry talks, has gone back to Hanoi. It looks like they really are debating what their future course of action should be. They clearly are not getting the diplomatic support from Peking and Moscow that they previously were getting, and they are publicly complaining about it. But thus far this has not stopped them.

This past week was also the week of the Republican Convention. Both Secretary Rogers and Jack Irwin were down at Miami for the Convention, and I was in charge of the Department again all week up to Thursday. It's been a fairly busy time. I've been working again on the preparations for Honolulu. As Al Haig has said and Henry also, the President is looking to me for this, for handling this whole meeting, and what I'm doing is, as I always like to do in these things, start with the end, that is, the communique you want to come out with,and then work back from there. We've been doing that in this meeting and the issues emerge when you sit down to write the communique. The negotiations on this are being carried out by Ambassador Bob Ingersoll out in Tokyo, but of course in close consultation with us and instructions from here. And it's coming along fairly well. I'm torn in a situation of this kind. I want to put the best face that I can on what the Japanese are doing, limited though it is, in order to reduce protectionist pressures here. I do this not for the sake of Japan, but for our own sake. I'm very worried about turning back the clock and going back to protectionism. I think it would be such a great tragedy. As I tell the Japanese, they should look upon what we're discussing not in terms of concessions to the United States, but rather in terms of their interests in preserving their markets in the United States and in preserving the kind of a world trade structure in which they can best thrive and survive.

This afternoon, Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Ushiba, Bob Murphy and I are having a golf game to give the Secretary a chance to talk with Ushiba. There has been a little toing and froing. Ushiba claims that Henry Kissinger invited or asked him to come out to San Clemente on Tuesday, this coming Tuesday, for a go-around on the communique. Henry says he flatly did not. Whatever the facts are of the matter, I've got Ushiba turned off on that now. I'm going out probably on Monday evening, and will be briefing the President out at San Clemente on Tuesday. The Secretary will be arriving on Tuesday evening, and then we go to Honolulu on Wednesday, have our meeting Thursday,and Friday noon there will be a change of command ceremony in which Admiral Gaylor will take over from Admiral McCain as CINPAC. Then we'll come directly back.

Your grandmother is going out with Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and his wife on Thursday to be there for the change of command ceremony, and then your grandmother will probably stay a couple of days. I don't know when I'm going to get to see her there. It'll just be a few minutes, I suppose, at the change of command ceremony. On the other hand, I suppose I could stay over for a few hours more and come back commercial, but I want to come back to California to give me a chance to see you and your mother and your great grandmother up at Santa Barbara, and then come back to Washington on Monday, Labor Day.

Well, I think this about all that I have at this time, so I will sign off at this time. Over and out.

This is Wednesday evening, September 6. The last time I talked I was talking about going out to Honolulu for the conference out there. And I've been there and back and a lot has happened during that period.

I went out on Monday night to Santa Monica, commercial, and stayed all night there. Then I took a helicopter from there down to San Clemente, the western White House, and worked there on Tuesday trying to straighten things out and get ready for the meeting in Hawaii. Then on Tuesday night, I met the Secretary who had come out during that day, and we stayed all night down at the Newporter Inn at Newport Beach, a place I used to spend Easter weekends down at the yacht club down there back when I was in high school. On Wednesday, I went with the President on the President's plane out to Honolulu.

I see I'm down to the end of this tape, and perhaps I should let what I really have to say go until the next tape. I will do that. There doesn't seem to be much time left on this.

I had a good trip and an interesting trip and, in many ways, what I thought was a satisfactory trip, and I'm now back home here in Washington. Your grandmother is out in Bangkok. Well, that's the way things go.

We also had a very eventful Labor Day weekend here with the kidnapping and murder of the Israelis by the Arab terrorists in Munich. This has kept me up late last night, but I thought I had better make this tape while things were fresh in my mind.

(22d)

This is Wednesday evening, September 6, 1972. I don't have the number on this tape because I failed to number my last one. My last one started in June of this year and ran through September, but I don't have a number on it. I started this September 6 tape on the previous tape, and will finish it on this one.

On my previous tape, I spoke about the plans for my going out to Hawaii for the meeting with the new Japanese Cabinet, Prime Minister Tanaka, Foreign Minister Ohira, and for the meeting between the President and the Secretary of State and our officials with the Japanese government. This was a new government and one of the primary objectives of the President was to get acquainted. This Tanaka government represented somewhat of a surprise; it was a break with the tradition of the Yoshida governments, the Ikedas, the Satos, the Kishis, those that had come up during the post-war period; although Tanaka had been a minister of finance at one time, he was really out of the tradition. In one sense, he was out of the Japanese tradition in that he was not a university graduate, nor had he come up through the bureaucracy, and in another sense, he represented a break with the Yoshida tradition, which had considerable in the way of an emotional attachment to the United States. I really didn't know Tanaka when I was in Japan. He did not circulate around very much. I really first met him a year ago when he was here as MITI minister, Minister of International Trade and Industry, for the Cabinet committee. And he impressed me at that time as being an old-time Japanese, and I didn't feel too comfortable with him. But he was elected Prime Minister; he has shown a freshness of outlook; he has had great popularity in Japan. And it was obviously important for the President to become acquainted with him.

As usual in these kind of meetings, we worked at preparing the communique and what you're going to say; you bring out the issues and sharpen the issues and don't leave them for a compromise at midnight or one o'clock in the morning,when you're trying to draw up the final communique. This meeting was also preceded by a meeting between Bill Eberle,the special trade representative,

and the Japanese Nakasone the previous month in trying to work out a trade deal that would somewhat mitigate the effects and the reactions here of the very adverse balance of trade that is continuing between ourselves and Japan during this year.

Well, I went out a week ago Monday evening to the West Coast and your mother, Judy, and you boys met me at the airport, and I stayed all night in Santa Monica. Then the next morning I took a helicopter down to San Clemente, the Western White House. I spent most of the day there, working on the communique, working on other questions such as the Soviet vessels to lift grain out of the United States on the grain deal, and a number of other matters. The atmosphere around the White House staff is always hectic; down in San Clemente,it's even more hectic than usual, because they operate in very small quarters, and they're very tight. It's very hard to work down there, but the President enjoys it.

I had a long talk with Henry Kissinger about the upcoming meeting in Honolulu, with regard to what would come out of that. During the course of the meeting, a call came in that Bill Eberle, who was then in Maine, wanted to come out to the meeting in Honolulu; I had previously talked to Eberle,who indicated that he didn't have much interest in the subject. It was quite clear that there was not much for him to do there, and also that if he did come out, the Prime Minister would be very embarrassed at not having brought along his minister of trade and industry. So, whereas a couple of days ago, General Haig, Al Haig, had indicated to me that they were firmly against Eberle coming out, they indicated then out at San Clemente that they didn't know what to do and they wanted my advice. I gave my honest advice, which was that I didn't see anything,really, for Eberle to do in Honolulu or in Hawaii and that I would advise against it.also on the grounds

that I felt that the Japanese, and the Prime Minister particularly, would be embarrassed in that, if Eberle showed up, he would have felt that it was necessary for his minister of international trade and industry, Nakasone, to show up. I don't know what they said to Eberle; I fear they may have put the responsibility on me for his not coming, presumably I will hear about this in due course. I would be sorry, because in fact I have great respect for Eberle. He tends to exaggerate things a little bit; even though he's nominally in the White House staff, he doesn't have much entree and is still learning his way around town, and in dealing with the bureaucracy around town.

Well, the thing I want to record here is that Henry Kissinger made it very plain to me that he did not expect that Secretary Rogers would remain on as Secretary of State in the new Administration. He implied that this was very much the President's view. He also made it clear that he expected to stay on, at least for a few years. This is quite contrary to previous indications or statements that he had made to me, that he intended to leave at the end of this term. But, as I always told him, I knew that he was doing what the President wanted him to do; he was doing it the way the President wanted him to do it; I knew that he enormously enjoyed it, and I just couldn't possibly see him leaving at this time. I repeated that at this time.

What he said to me was that he wanted me to know that, as far as the President was concerned, I could, as he termed it, have any job I wanted, and what would I like to do. I said I was, of course, flattered by the President's confidence in me; as far as jobs, I was somewhat torn. After Japan, there was really no job of comparable importance or interest. Japan was overwhelmingly the most important post that we now had in the Service.

I felt that Bob Ingersoll was doing an excellent job there and I would in no way want to encourage any thought of moving him in order to make way for me, even though it was thought that it would be wise for me to go back there again. Henry asked me about India and I said, "I don't like the Indians." And I said I really didn't know what I wanted to do, that as far as I was concerned, as long as I was healthy, as long as I felt I was able to make a contribution, and as long as people wanted me around, I would be glad to stay around. As far as my present job was concerned, if the Secretary of State was replaced, the new Secretary would undoubtedly want to make his own selections, and I wouldn't want to stand in his way. In response to this, Henry said that he and the President would obviously have an influence on this, and they felt that I had quote,"held the Department together" during these somewhat difficult years, and they would be very, very pleased to see me stay on. Well, I don't know what to say about this.

Henry also talked to me about his feeling that the personal style of diplomacy the President and he had carried on needed to be more institutionalized. I said I agreed, that the important first priority, of course, was the foreign policy. I thought this had been excellent. And secondary to this was the institution of the Department. I felt the institution of the Department of State had suffered very grievously, and that I would like to do something about this. Well, Henry professed that he wanted to talk to me on how we could better institutionalize things. He said that he did not feel that the present organization, well, the personalized aspects of it, were good and healthy for the country, and that we needed to get back to building up the institutional framework which could continue. I thoroughly agree with this; I wish I really felt that he and the President felt that

way about it. I am really concerned about the institution of the Department, not in a bureaucratic sense, but the fact of the matter is that the institution is gradually deteriorating and gradually going downhill, because the institution -- that is, the Department and the people in it -- do not feel that the boss, the President, has confidence in them. This whole question of loyalty, as I was discussing the other day, of course, is a two-way street. The boss, the chief, has to give to his subordinates a sense of his loyalty to them and his confidence in them, if in turn he is to receive loyalty and confidence from them. And, in this, I think that somehow or other, this Administration has failed, and it grieves me greatly, because people come and go, but institutions are important. I think the Foreign Service and the State Department have a body of expertise, a body of people who are dedicated to the welfare of the country, and I don't think they are being fully utilized. I wish I could do something about it. What I'll do. . . . I take it,now at this point, that it's given that Secretary Rogers will not stay on. Who the replacement will be, assuming Nixon wins, and I think he will, I just don't know. Names that are being talked about are Nelson Rockefeller and John Connally, but I'm not sure what it'll be. I'll just have to wait and see. Obviously, I've not spoken about this to anybody and will not do so.

In this connection, Monday night the White House, Al Haig, called up with the announcement for us to send out a telegram that Henry Kissinger was going to Moscow on Thursday of this week; on the way, he was going to stop and see Chancellor Brandt. I also know that he's planning to go back to London and Paris and meet with the Viet Cong back there; I shouldn't

say the Viet Cong -- the North Vietnamese. I know that Secretary Rogers was only told about this in a very general way; nobody else in the Department knew about it. And again, it's one of those personal blows to the Secretary, and one of these blows to the institution of the Department. Not that the President shouldn't send Henry to Moscow, if he wants to send him, but at least give the Department of State some sense that the President has some confidence in them and that our advice is being heard. It may not always be accepted, but at least we have an opportunity to express our view.

Well, to go back to Honolulu and the meeting there: we, the Secretary and I and Marshall Green went out on the plane with the President to Honolulu, and we had a discussion on the way out, with regard to the meeting. I should have said -- you know, I never quite know how much of Henry to believe -- but he said that the President was really very pleased that I was going out; he wanted me to really take full charge of the meetings, and that he liked me, but he quote "didn't like" unquote Marshall Green. I find this very hard to understand, because Marshall is a very, very able officer, and much in the way of the concepts and the ideas that the President has adopted in the so-called "Nixon doctrine" that really originated with Marshall. But that's neither here nor there.

We arrived in Honolulu late in the evening. Clare Boothe Luce had a reception for the President on our arrival; we took a chopper over to her place. It was enormously hot, and I became somewhat faint there for the first time. The President's doctor gave me a pill that revived me somewhat. We then choppered from there out to the hotel where we were staying, about forty-fifty miles from Honolulu, in Kuilima. We had about thirty minutes there for a shower, and then we choppered back to Hickam to meet the Prime Minister, and then we choppered from there back to Kuilima.

The next day, that is, on Thursday, the Japanese party came out by chopper and we started our meetings at one o'clock, ran through a good part of the afternoon, had dinner that evening. The meeting started out with the President and Prime Minister Tanaka, together with Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Ushiba, the Japanese Ambassador, in one group, and the Secretary and Foreign Minister Ohira and a number of us in another group. The Japanese didn't want it that way, didn't like it that way. Prime Minister Tanaka does not feel at home in foreign affairs; he made it clear that this is a Tanaka-Ohira government and not just a Tanaka government. But, nevertheless, the President insisted on his private meeting with Tanaka. This is the way he likes to do things, and I can understand this. But it doesn't fit in well with the Japanese sense of how these things should be handled. Nevertheless, the Secretary and Ohira and a number of us met with the Foreign Minister for about an hour and a half or two hours. Then the President and the Prime Minister joined us, and we had about another hour of general discussion, and then adjourned. We had dinner that evening, a very small dinner, and it was very convivial. The next morning we opened with separate meetings again, and then I and Bob Ingersoll, Ambassador Ingersoll, left to have a press conference while the meetings were still going on. This is one of the rare occasions at the summit meetings at which Henry Kissinger has not done a press briefing. In this case,the President asked me to do it, and I think it came out very well. I had remarks to the effect what a refreshing change it was to have somebody from the Department of State doing the press briefing, instead of the White House. Well, this is the way feelings go. The press was good, both the American and Japanese press, and I thought things had come out very well until last night, Henry

Kissinger called me up from the White House and said the President was furious with Tanaka and the statements he was making with regard to the security treaty. I expressed genuine, utter bafflement as to what he was concerned about, and it turned out that it was an article by Dick Halloran in the Sunday New York Times in which Dick had let his imagination run a little wild, and the press summary over at the White House that is done up for the President always exaggerates these kinds of problems. The President had read it and had reacted very strongly to it. As usual, when it comes to the Japanese, whenever anything goes wrong, it's always Alex, your friends and your clients that have done wrong. In this regard, Henry Kissinger, obviously, has no respect for the Japanese. He speaks of them in very, very disparaging terms. The Japanese are conscious of this. The President, to some degree, does so, and the Japanese are also conscious of this. And this is one of the aspects of our relations with Japan that worries me the most, because there's a feeling in Japan that, in spite of his background in Japan, in spite of his knowledge of Japanese, that the President is not very sympathetic or understanding of the Japanese, and that Henry Kissinger despises them. And I think it's true. Henry has an utter fascination with the Chinese. Chou En-Lai, who is obviously a very attractive man, is quite different from the Japanese, and obviously flatters Henry in a way to which Henry responds, and this obviously influences his attitudes. Things aren't going well with the Japanese because of this. I think this meeting went reasonably well. I gave a press conference on it, on the record, in which I said that Tanaka and the President got along very well, which they did; that's entirely true. But somehow or other, Americans

find it very, very difficult to treat Japanese on the basis of equality and respect that gains the respect of the Japanese. I wish that I could find some way of turning this around.

Well, we had our meetings there, and then on Friday, a little after noon, we took a chopper back to Hickam, where there was the change of command ceremony of Jack McCain, Admiral McCain, who was leaving as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, that is CINCPAC, and Admiral Gaylor, Noel Gaylor, who is taking over his place. It was a terribly hot day, and the sun was really out. And Jack McCain, who is very emotional in any event, was really under great strain, particularly conscious of the fact that he was leaving the command with his son still a prisoner in North Vietnam. At times, I thought he wasn't going to make it, during the reading of the citation, the President giving him his medal, the President making a speech, and then Jack having to get up and ask for his flag to be hauled down and getting the salute. Jack enjoyed the job, and he obviously and understandably hated to leave it.

I met your grandmother there. Your grandmother had come out the previous evening with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Moorer,and his wife, and when I drew up with the Presidential convoy at the reviewing stand, she was already seated, and they had a seat for me alongside of her. I whispered to her somewhat during the ceremonies and then when the ceremonies were over, I had to get in the convoy and go roaring back to Hickam Field again, leaving her there. But I'd made arrangements for her to go from Honolulu on to Saigon with Ambassador Bunker and his wife. And then she was going on to Bangkok to see your Aunt Jennifer and your cousin Patty, and she should be there by now.

I came back from Hickam in the back-up plane. The President had taken Jack McCain and his wife along with him on his plane to El Toro. I got to El Toro and there was Jack and his wife and the Secretary. The Secretary was changing over to my plane there to go on to Washington. I and Jack and his wife had a talk about old times there before Jack got on his plane to go back to Washington.

Then I drove into Santa Monica and went to bed about one o'clock. I went up on Saturday with your mother, Judy, to see your great-grandmother in Santa Barbara. Your mother, Judy, took a bus back. I stayed on overnight in Santa Barbara, taking my mother for a drive around the country and then came back to Santa Monica on Sunday and stayed overnight there. On Monday I went to see my long-time and good friend, Glenn Cunningham, and then took a plane back to Washington on Monday afternoon, arriving here on Monday evening. I am now back to work.

On my arrival back here, there was the news of the Arab terrorists in Munich kidnapping the Israeli athletic team there, the Olympic team. Last night for a time, the news was that the terrorists had been killed and the hostages, Israeli hostages, had been released. Then came the shocking news about ten-thirty last night that all of them were killed. Well, we live in a world of violence. It is at times depressing and the old thing of man's inhumanity to man is greater than anything that's known elsewhere in nature. Man is a person of extremes. When man is good, he is very, very good indeed. The great saints of the world have been produced by man. The great criminals of the world have been produced by man. The senseless slaughter of people has been brought about by man. Other species, other animals, if you will, slaughter for a purpose. It seems that man only slaughters in a senseless

way, because of hatred. I suppose hatred is a product of emotions. Emotions can be good. You can have emotions to love, you can have emotions for good. And on the other side of it, the other end of the spectrum, you can have emotions of hatred. Perhaps that's the yang and the ying the Chinese talk about: the opposite extremes that dominate man.

Well, it's been a sad day, a sad day at the Olympics and a sad day for mankind. And, I don't know, perhaps each of us, all we can do is try to make the world a little bit better because we've lived in it, but we have a difficulty controlling ourselves and it's hard to see the results of what we do. But somehow we should learn to manage things a little bit better. (22e)

This is Sunday, September 17. I believe that I mentioned in my last tape that your grandmother had gone out to Bangkok to see your Aunt Jennifer and your cousin Patty. She is still there. I've received several letters from her, and she says it's been very bad weather. It's been raining hard and the city's flooded. The last letter I received from her indicated that she was leaving somewhat earlier than she had anticipated.

During the period since my last tape,we've had some things going on. Let's see, I'm looking through my calendar here. On the 6th, I did a TV program for Japan. One of the things I worked at on the 7th, Milton Eisenhower and a group that we had appointed to study methods of keeping Radio Free Europe, RFE, and Radio Liberty, RL, going met at the Department, and I met with them to discuss with them how we could keep these radios going. The point I made to them was that I think they have been great assets in opening up communications with both Eastern Europe and with the Soviet

Union and I don't think that they should be prematurely liquidated. Most other people don't either. However, there a few in the Senate: Senator Fulbright and Senator Case who say that they are relics of the cold war and should be liquidated. I have a hard time following them. Their position is that we have made very considerable strides in "reducing tensions" between ourselves and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. My point is that we've made these strides not in spite of, but rather because of the strength we've maintained in NATO, because of the communications that we have maintained through these radios and the other policies that we have been supporting during these years; and we shouldn't hasten to change these policies or reverse these policies prematurely.

I also, during this week -- well, let's see, where am I? Last week on September 8, I had lunch with Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations. Isee I had dinner with the Georgetown University Study Center group. I see that I had lunch with Milton Eisenhower and his group on the radios. I see that I attended a reception at Georgetown University for the master's program in foreign service. Been a long time since I'd been over to Georgetown; they have a new building and a very nice one.

Then on the following week -- what was it I've been doing? Well, I had a meeting on the rice situations in Southeast Asia. All of a sudden, we're short of rice. Last year, we had an excess of rice. It's a question of what we're going to do about that. I had a meeting with Ed David, Dr. David, the President's science adviser, and Herman Pollack, my own people, and how we were going to handle the visit of von Danoni [?] the science minister, the minister of education in science in West Germany who is coming here to talk with us about participation in the post-Apollo program. He did come and I

had a good talk with him. I found him a very able fellow. He said that the policy of the German government on which they had decided was that they were not going to continue to put their money in what's known as Europa II and Europa III; that is, the European launcher program. They wanted to participate with us in the post-Apollo program; that is, the program for developing a space center and space transportation system. However, France was continuing to oppose this on two grounds: first, that they could not depend on the United States for launch facilities for European satellites, and, secondly, that France wanted to launch its so-called symphonie satellite which would give it the capability to produce TV programs and cultural programs and communicate as far as Quebec. Obviously, Canada has no enthusiasm for this. Also they could reach Latin America and Franco-phone, Africa.

Well, we made it clear that we would not launch such a satellite. None of France's allies, friends in Europe, are interested in investing hundreds of millions of dollars to enable France to do this. What the Germans hope to do is to agree to disagree with the French. Obviously, the Germans are sensitive to their relations with the French at this time of the development of the common market with England; the others are just in the process of coming in and they don't want to sacrifice their relations there. Thus, they are seeking some help. I made it clear that we would not modify the policy on launches for Europeans and others that was set forth in my letter just a year ago now, September of last year, to Minister LeFevre of the European Space Council. However, I was prepared to recommend to the President that he dress this up in some rhetoric that would make it more attractive, and we're in the process of doing this at this time.

I also had a meeting with Gilbert Jones, who's now chairman of the board of the IBM World Trade Corporation,on their desire to sell computers, fairly advanced computers, to the Soviet Union. This question of sales of computers to the Eastern bloc as well as to China is becoming more and more complicated and more and more difficult, because so-called experts differ a great deal on what the facts are with respect to the competency within the block to produce computers, what the importance of computers are, as far as military developments are concerned, and what the relative merits of computers produced by other Western countries are, as compared with ours, and this whole question of how much we should sell. I, myself, am more and more inclined to the view that the policy of withholding exports is producing very little in the way of results, and I, myself, am strongly in favor of liberalizing the policy. However, the Department of Defense takes a very rigid view on this, in particular, and it's very hard to get agreement.

Thursday, the 14th, I had a very pleasant afternoon. The Board of Directors of COMSAT, Communication Satellite Corporation, invited me to play golf with them and join them for dinner at their meeting, which I did. I played with Frank Fitzsimmons, the President of the Teamsters Union. George Meany was also there, Mel Laird, the Secretary of Defense and others. We had a very good time, and I enjoyed it. It is good to get acquainted with people outside of my own circle.

All during the week, Henry Kissinger was away in Moscow and Western Europe, meetings with the North Vietnamese in Paris. Saturday he came back and gave a press conference which was very heavily covered. During the course of it, he made clear that, while the Soviet foreign minister and the Soviet ambassador to the United States were present at what he called these

twenty-one hours of meetings with Brezhnev in Moscow, neither the . . . well, of course, the Secretary of State wasn't present nor was the American ambassador in Moscow present. Just those two indicate the problems that we're having, the way the Department of State as an institution is gradually being eroded. That's a bureaucratic problem, I suppose, but I regret seeing these developments and I feel very uncomfortable with regard to them.

Coming down to the end of this Administration, I don't know whether Secretary Rogers is going to continue or not. In some ways, I have a feeling that he probably will not. Who the new secretary will be or whether he will want me to stay on or what he'll want to do remains to be seen, but I'm being very relaxed about it. I can go whichever way that seems best. I'd be sorry to quit this business I've been at so many years, but maybe it's time that I do so.

Well, I think I'm about down to the end of this side. I've had your Uncles Bill and Stephen to dinner with me out at Chevy Chase Club this evening. It was a beautiful evening and, you know, they're good sons. I'm very proud of them, and I know that you'll be proud of them as uncles. Very pretty out there at Chevy Chase in the evening. Chevy Chase has cost me quite a little money, but it's so pleasant out there playing golf and being able to go out there for dinner in the evening. It's a style and a way of life that's perhaps beginning to disappear in this country, but still I think that there's something to be said for not losing it entirely. Well, in any event, I'll enjoy it while I have it.

I will call this off at this point and I'll turn it over. This will be over and out as far as this side of the tape is concerned. Over and out on Sunday, September 17, 1972.

Yesterday we had a meeting on narcotics attended by all of the State Department officers concerned and our embassies abroad who are dealing with narcotics problems. The meeting was opened by the President and one of my staff officers said to me after the President spoke; my officer, with some degree of surprise, said, "He's really serious about this, isn't he?" And I said, "Well, I'm amazed that anybody that's been in the Department the last year and a half or two years had any doubt about the question about whether the President was serious about it." He is serious about it, and I don't blame him. The narcotics problem, particularly the heroin problem, is a frightening phenomenon. Just this last week, a prominent professor who had escaped from the Nazis was stabbed and killed on the street in New York by a narcotics addict. Two days later, right in the same block, another man was stabbed, still living but badly hurt. It's not only the damage that the addicts do to themselves, but the more important thing is the crime that it generates.

In the evening, I hosted a buffet, a reception and a buffet, for all the State Department officers attending the meeting.

The main thing I've been working on during the week was the whole Aerosat question. For a year and a half, we and the FAA, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, have negotiated an agreement with Europeans to launch an experimental aeronautical satellite. That is, a satellite that would be used for communications between aircraft as well as in aircraft control. This has been a source of great controvery with Tom Whitehead--Clay Whitehead is the way he's listed-- who works under Peter Flanigan over in the White House. Tom's title is Office of Telecommunications Policy. Tom repudiated this agreement that had been worked out

on some very doctrinaire grounds and, since that time, we have not been able to get a decision within the government on how we could move ahead. The passions were high on this. Resentment in the Department and in the Department of Transportation against Whitehead were high. Europeans have also been very unhappy with us on this. Things have just been blocked.

We discussed with the Secretary bringing the issue to the President. The Secretary's feeling was that it was such a complicated issue that we would not want to do this until after the election when the President could concentrate on it better. Peter Flanigan was stoutly opposed to this and wanted to get the issue resolved, because he finally began to understand how harmful this had been in our relations with Europe, particularly in the space field. It became mixed up and complicated with the German effort to obtain European cooperation with us in the post-Apollo field. I think I talked in my last tape about my meetings here with von Danoni[?]the German Minister of Science.

Well, Peter Flanigan came over to see the Secretary and the three of us had quite a discussion about it. And I suggested that the thing to do was to try to get our differences refined down to the point that the President would be able to understand them if we were going to put the issue to him. Volumes and volumes of papers and memos have been flying back and forth on this. As our staff people tried to put down the issues and discussed it with me, I became more and more convinced that the issues weren't all that great and I talked to Peter Flanigan. Peter Flanigan then talked to his people, and I think between the two of us, we were now arrived at a compromise that will enable us to go ahead. It depends on the ability of COMSAT, the Communications

Satellite Corporation, to sell the Europeans on its concept for the building of the satellite and its operations.

The issue really was that Whitehead, supported by Flanigan, insisted that the sole test in bidding on building the satellite would be price; that, in effect,there should not be any room for a joint venture with Europe. That is, Europe should not be able to participate in the building of the satellite. Well, they've come off that now, and Europe, I think, is also going to compromise its position some. I'm very hopeful that we can get the thing finally resolved.

During the week, also I've met with Jeeb Halaby and talked about the Council on U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations. I think I mentioned David Rockefeller discussed this with me. I've also discussed it with Carl Girstacker. Now that Jeeb Halaby is no longer President of Pan American and,in anyevent has been chairman of the Council for two years, we're seeking a new chairman. I had hoped that they themselves would resolve this issue, but they're looking to me to resolve it and come up with my suggestions on who I think should be the next chairman. Well, this gets very complicated as it gets involved in the business bureaucracies; if you will, it's between businesses and business organizations, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, other people, National Association of Manufacturers, the California Japanese Group, et cetera,et cetera, et cetera.

During this week, we've also had the difficulties in Uganda. Uganda some weeks ago ordered all persons of Asian extraction out of the country. This has created great hardship. Then there have been internal disorders and it appeared our Americans might be in danger there. The country's being

run by General Amin, who's a former sergeant and boxer, who seems to be completely irrational and I must say that there's a streak of savagery there that's very frightening. Not that whites are always benign in treating their own people, but in Uganda as well as previously in Burundi, there's a streak of real savagery that's very frightening. There are about a thousand Americans here and about seven thousand white British also. The fear has been that the country was just going to collapse and could go into an orgy of murder, particularly directed against the whites. We've been discussing what we could do and it is not very much. There's been pressure from the White House for us to work up some contingency plan for using military force. I've discussed this with the Chiefs of the Joint Staff who both agree that, if the situation becomes really dangerous, that bringing in a few American troops in the middle of Africa, trying to rescue Americans in Uganda would be the one thing that would make sure that none of the Americans would get out. It would inflame the situation. It's one of these situations in which there's no good answer.

Guinea also is making noises again, directed against whites, but it's not too different from what it's been in the past and this is nothing particularly new.

Your grandmother, my wife, Patricia, has been out in Bangkok, also seeing your Aunt Jennifer and cousin Patty. Aunt Jennifer's having some problems and difficulties in her marriage. It looks like it's breaking up, for which I am very sad. Your grandmother's coming back tonight, and your Uncle Bill and I will go out and meet her at Dulles. She's ran into apparently some fairly heavy floods in Bangkok, not too pleasant there, but she's

very pleased she went, as I am too. I think it was good for Jennifer that she was able to go. She came back by way of Hong Kong, Tokyo and Honolulu and California and Santa Monica where she's seen you and has gone up to see your great grandmother, my mother.

Well, that's all for today. It's noon on Sunday. I should have dated this, I suppose. Noon on Sunday, September 24. I'm going out to Chevy Chase now. I've a golf game out there at one o'clock with Ambassador Murphy, Tyler Wood and Justice Clark. Then I'm going out to meet your grandmother at the airport. This is all for now. Over and out.

This is Sunday, October 1. Your grandmother came back from Bangkok and California last Sunday evening, and Bill and I went out to meet her.

The week's been pretty active. Been many visitors. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, were having their meetings here during this week so there's been considerable activity in connection with that even though I didn't directly participate in the meetings. I did meet with the Korean foreign minister and had a good session with him. Incidentally, I'm playing golf with him and with Bill Fulbright, the ambassador, this afternoon here. I also had new ambassadors coming in, swearing in some of our ambassadors.

I had a meeting with Tom Clauson. I went to a dinner he had and I had a meeting with Tom Clauson, President of the Bank of America, again trying to work out something with this Advisory Council on U.S.-Japanese Economic Affairs, trying to persuade him to take the job when Jeeb Halaby leaves it at the first of the year. I'm very, very interested in this operation. I'm taking great pride in it, and I'm urging him to take the job or give me some better suggestions on who might take it.

I went up to New York on Thursday evening to the meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in which Secretary Rogers spoke. We arrived very late. The plane, the shuttle we took up was crowded and traffic was bad and we arrived very late, but arrived in time for the dinner. And we came back the next morning by train, the Metroline, which is much more comfortable. The Secretary did very well and received a very good reception.

Also on Friday, I had a long meeting with Henry Kissinger on his last meeting in Paris with the North, and I'm doing some work in preparation for his next meeting. I've got three men now working at it for me: Bill Sullivan and Walt Cutler in the Department and George Carver from the CIA. I'm working at this on a very close-hold basis. It doesn't look like any breakthrough particularly, but perhaps we'll make a little progress around the fringes.

Also saw my doctor this week and had a good examination. Things aren't going quite as well as I had hoped or he had hoped. He gave me a test of an electrocardiogram after exercise and it was quite clear that I still have a fairly low tolerance; that is, I cannot stretch myself too far. I hoped that I would be back to where I was previously, but it's not yet been borne out. I feel a little disappointed by this, but not discouraged.

This is the first time Henry Kissinger and the President had really taken me into confidence on the Paris meeting, and I feel somewhat better by having some participation in it. I have much more for this week.

I have to write Jennifer about her problems with her marriage and divorce in Bangkok. I've been working at this some. I haven't quite decided what to do, but tomorrow I'm going to have to try to get something off.

Well, let's see. I think I'll close this out at this time.

This is Monday, October 9. Today has been a holiday. I went to work in the morning and then I played golf at noon. I've just come home and it's a little after six o'clock. We're going out to dinner tonight at Admiral Fleck's, who's giving a dinner for Admiral Hoshinot who's here from Japan. Hoshino a longtime conservative in Japan, a very, very nice fellow. I don't quite know; maybe I shouldn't have gotten myself involved in this dinner, but I have.

Well, during the past week, I got quite a few things done. First, I finally resolved this whole conflict over the aero-satellite, and got Tom Whitehead and Peter Flanigan to back down on this. We got a compromise position in which COMSAT is going to try to enter into a contract with ESRO in Europe. Then if they do so, we'll enter into a contract here. Sort of a roundabout way of doing things, but it maintains the White House doctrine on keeping the government out of business and letting private enterprise take over. I'm in favor of private enterprise, too, but some of these things get pretty doctrinaire. Nevertheless, this has been a difficulty between ourselves and Europe now for over a year and a half; a situation in which we negotiated an agreement with the Europeans in good faith, clearly without ad referendum, but then after we negotiated it, we repudiated it and we haven't looked very good.

Also got resolved this week the question of a top level presidential statement on our launching satellites; that is, using U. S. launch facilities to launch satellites for others. After eighteen months of dispute back and forth, there was finally put out, in the name of the President, a policy that was identical to that that had gone out over my name about eighteen months ago to the European space community. So we got that out of the way.

I also, during this week, have been talking with Henry Kissinger about his weekend meetings with the North Vietnamese in Paris which are now going on. As I believe I mentioned, I worked with Bill Sullivan and Walter Cutler and George Carver from CIA, working on a cease-fire proposal that Henry could table with the North Vietnamese. Henry says he doesn't expect them to accept it. He doesn't expect any breakthrough. The issue of coalition government still remains paramount. But still if we could get away some of the underbrush on a cease-fire, why, that would be an advantage.

I've held this very, very closely. Only the Secretary was informed; I kept him informed, of course, of what I was doing, but nobody else. The word from Paris is that Henry's extended his stay there by another day, so tomorrow will be the third day of meetings. I hope this means that he's making a little progress, but I don't expect to know anything until after he gets back, if then. There's always a problem of our being informed of what's going on; the degree to which he plays these things close to his chest. Which, of course, is not entirely his own doing; it fits in with his own way of doing things, but nevertheless the President's understandably very sensitive on the security of these things. However, after almost forty years of being discreet and being able to show I'm discreet, I don't like the idea that I cannot be trusted with information that's useful and needed in my work. Maybe I'm making a little breakthrough on this, but I don't know.

Well, let's see. I don't know that I have much more to say. I think that's about all. Maybe this may be a crucial week with regard to Vietnam. I still doubt it, but we'll wait and see.

Over and out.

This is Saturday, October 21, Saturday evening. It's been a very active time since I last recorded on October 9.

Last Thursday night, October 12, I received a call from the hospital in Santa Barbara that my mother had again fallen and broken her other hip. I immediately got the first reservation I could, nine o'clock the next morning, for Los Angeles. I picked up a car there, picked up Judy and we drove up to Santa Barbara to see her. She was, of course, in a state of considerable shock and sedation and considerable pain. But we spent several short periods with her in the hospital. Then also saw her doctor as well as the surgeon that they purposed to have operate on her. I decided that there was no other choice really except another operation which would install a steel joint that would give her some opportunity of getting up and around. The chances of her surviving the operation are pretty good, but recovery was a question. But, nevertheless, I decided to go ahead with it. So she was operated on the next morning; that is, Saturday morning.

I and Judy went to see her early in the morning, about seven o'clock and spent the hour with her before they took her to the operating room and that seemed to give her considerable comfort. After she came out of the anesthetic in the afternoon in the recovery room, I also visited her there and then visited her that even. Then they brought her back upstairs that evening, Saturday evening. I arranged a private room for her and also arranged for the nurse who she's so fond of who will be with her at Samarkand, Breeda Murphy, to take care of her.

I had several calls from Washington during the meanwhile. Henry Kissinger had returned from Paris and wanted to meet with me on Friday.

Then I had calls with he and Bill Sullivan who were planning to go back to Paris on Monday morning and they wanted to see me before they left. Well, for all these reasons as well as my feeling that I really was not going to be able to be of much more help to Mother, I returned to Washington on Sunday evening, the 15th.

On Monday morning, I had breakfast with Henry and Al Haig at the White House and Henry reviewed with me where he then stood in the talks in Paris and the plans to go back with a counter-offer, counter-proposals, and then to go on to Saigon to gain Thieu's assent if they could.

Well, the proposition they had received in Paris was obviously full of many holes and obviously the cease-fire mechanism could not work very well. There was a complicated formula, four member joint commissions; that is, the GVN and the U.S. on one side and the PRG and the North Vietnamese on the other side and then a two member joint commission of the PRG and the GVN, and then a four member international commission of Poland, Hungary, Canada and Indonesia on our side. They'd refused to accept Japan. I find a little difficult in these cases to understand how they can insist on getting stooges of their own to occupy these kinds of positions and then we cannot have whom we choose. But,nevertheless, that wasn't the argument.

The main thing was that they seemed to be falling away from their insistence upon Thieu leaving in the establishment of a tri-parti-government before a cease-fire could go into effect. In this standpoint, it appeared a very considerable move away from their previous positions, and it did look like they were interested in obtaining a settlement that would be more closely corresponding to ours.

Well, during the week, the Secretary and I have been going over to the White House to read from the communications on the subject of Henry and the exchanges in Paris. Al Haig has been a real tower of strength in this. It's quite clear that Henry's been pushing ahead a lot faster in many ways than many thought it was wise to do, but,obviously, he was also seeking to get an agreement.

There were some disputed elements still left in the agreement, but he decided to go out to Saigon to see if he could sell it to Thieu. What's been happening in the last few days is that he has been twisting Thieu's arm very hard to accept it. Thieu has stoutly opposed on the grounds that to set aside areas from Communist control in the South would really be giving up the sovereignty of areas in the South and that there was no provision for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. Henry has been very provoked and I gather that they've had some very vigorous discussions with Thieu. Henry was prepared to go ahead in spite of Thieu, or let's say in spite of his opposition.

The President is taking the position that he will not force Thieu into an agreement, that, if Thieu is unwilling to accept. He wants Thieu's willing agreement, because he doesn't want to have a confrontation with Thieu, of course, at this time. And also, he doesn't want to have Thieu's recriminations if and when the agreement breaks apart.

The situation at the moment this afternoon is that the North is supposed to come back with modifications of their position, particularly making unilateral statements with regard to what they will do with respect to Laos and Cambodia. And Henry is seeing Thieu again. Thieu has refused to see him all day yesterday. But he is seeing Thieu again at eight o'clock

this evening our time, eight o'clock in the morning Saigon time. So we're really coming down to the crunch in the next few hours, possibly, on this.

Meanwhile, we have been trying to ship in as much in the way of military equipment in South Vietnam as we could so that, if the agreement comes into effect which would not permit additional equipment, only replacement, the South Vietnamese would be in as strong a position as possible. This has required us going to the Koreans, the Chinese and the Iranians to ask them to give up their F-5 aircraft, so that we can send them into the South. Of course, the South can't operate them and that means that they're going to sit there and rust for the next year or so. But it does mean that we'll be able to replace them with more modern aircraft and thus raise the base or level of their military equipment. We're also sending in much in the way of tanks and guns. We're having trouble getting these tanks out of Japan because of the problem of hauling them over the roads there. I have taken on this operation myself, with the assistance of just two or three men in the Department. I have been holding it very tight and very close, and I think we've done a pretty good job at it.

It remains to be seen how it works out. The Shah in Iran has come through with some thirty-two aircraft. The Chinese, Taiwan, Chiang Ching-Kuo has really behaved with great dignity, and I must say with a very forthcoming attitude. I'm very impressed with the way that the Chinese on Taiwan have handled themselves through this difficult period for them. Now here we come to them with a request that, in effect, asks them to turn over, give up their whole air force at a time that we're negotiating with their mortal enemy in Peking and at a time that Japan is withdrawing recognition from them. They've suffered a lot of arrows of outrageous fortune, but they've behaved with great dignity.

As the Secretary was saying this morning-- he was away yesterday and I went out this morning to bring him up to date on where things stood-- he came into the office with some prejudice against the Taiwanese, the Chinese on Taiwan, and he's learned, though, over a period of time, to have great respect for them and, as he said, real emotional attachment to them. I find myself feeling the same way.

Well, this has been a very busy time. I've been working all day today, Saturday, and I've just come home. Besides the work on the Vietnamese situation, I, of course, have been seeing a lot of people and doing a lot of other things. Incidentally, I might mention that I called up Chip Bohlen and went over to see him on October 11. He's now completed four operations. I felt I wanted to visit him. I was very pleased to see him up and around and, although he's aged in his face a great deal, he's still vigorous and has told me that he's now finished his book and it's ready to go to the publisher. I'm sure that it will be good.

George Kennan just came out with a new book. George is a good writer, but, as we all agree who know him, he's a very poor ambassador. George is a good idea man and George, as I was telling somebody here the other day, is one of these people that writes memos to himself or for the record more than with any thought of what they're going to accomplish. I frankly just don't like people who try to do their work in the light of how it's going to appear when they write their memoirs. And this I hold very much against George as I hold against fellows like Ken Galbraith, who are vain and self-centered. A little of that's all right, but they really don't contribute much to the world.

Well, I think I'll cut this off at this point. There's a lot more I should be saying, I know. Perhaps I should be going into more detail than I have. But maybe I'll make another try at it tomorrow.

This is Sunday evening, October 22. I made a recording yesterday afternoon on this in which I was talking about the situation in Vietnam and my hope and expectation that we would be able to arrive at a settlement there.

Last night, about one-thirty in the morning, I got a call from General Haig at the White House saying that President Thieu in Saigon had agreed to the settlement and that Henry Kissinger was on his way to Phnom Penh to sign, to get Long Nol on board. The plan was to make the announcement of the settlement on October 27 and the cease-fire would go into effect on Saturday, October 28, and the agreement would be signed on the 31st of October.

Well, this all sounded very good. And, as I believe I mentioned in my previous recording, we were working very hard in the Oepartment to get the agreement to the Koreans, Taiwanese and the Iranians to turn over aircraft to us, F-5A aircraft, so that we could send them into Vietnam before the cease-fire went into effect and thus establish a base against which we could make replacements.

I had some calls during the night with respect to our negotiations both in Seoul and in Taiwan on this, and this morning I slept in a little bit late. I called about nine o'clock to the operation center to find out what the situation was with regard to the negotiations there. I was told that things had gone quite well in Taiwan, but had not gone so well in Korea. And I was therefore going down to the Department to see what needed to be done.

Just before I left, I got a call from Secretary Rogers asking me whether I'd had a call from General Haig or not. I said, no, I hadn't had any calls since one-thirty in the morning. He said, well, he thought I'd better come out and see him, which I did. It turned out that he had had a call from General Haig passing on a message from Henry Kissinger that President Thieu had completely reversed his position, and the whole deal was off.

The Secretary and I discussed what we could do in this situation and there wasn't very much. As I pointed out to him, we're here faced with somewhat the problem of what Dean Rusk used to call the tyranny of the weak. We could say that we would go it alone without Thieu; that is, we could stop our bombing, stop our support of South Vietnam, and ask the North to release to us our prisoners. This, of course, is pretty much the position that George McGovern has been taking. We could try to bring pressure on Thieu to force him to accept the arrangements that we had reached, but the only way that we could really make this pressure effective was to say that we would withdraw support unless he came along with us.

Well, this, of course, would open Thieu and the country up to the coup from the right wing as well. It's had many resemblances to 1964-65 when Max Taylor and I were there.

Well, to make it short, I went down. I drove the Secretary down and we went down to the Department. We talked with General Haig and I talked to Admiral Murphy, the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, with whom I've been working. And we decided that the only thing to do was simply to make a clean breast of it and call off the efforts that we have been making to get the other countries to help us with aircraft and make the best

explanation we could.

I had hoped that we'd be able to walk back slowly from this. But it's very difficult, in the complicated military command structure with all their orders,to walk back slowly. So we finally said that we would call it all off.

The message, I got agreement the message we sent to Korea would indicate that we were very disappointed in the haggling attitude that they took towards us at this time when we were seeking their help.

On the other hand, Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taipei showed up very, very well. And they've handled themselves very well. I must say they made a lot of marks as far as I was concerned and, I know, as far as the Secretary and others were concerned.

Also, the Shah in Iran responded very, very well.

The Japanese also responded well. And I think that they made marks with us.

Well, tonight all the effort is all finished and I don't know where we go from here. The difficulty is, of course, that Henry Kissinger went too far in talking with the other side without having the agreement of Thieu. And this is the old problem of our spending more attention to our enemies than we do to our friends. If we throw Thieu over at this time, it's going to be very bad for the President politically and internationally, it's going to be very bad. So we've got ourselves in a very difficult situation. I'm not assessing any blame. Everybody's been working hard at this. But it's very disappointing and particularly very disappointing evening tonight. Where we go from here, I frankly don't know. There is indication. . . Well, Henry Kissinger sent in a message from out there indicating that we

should throw over Thieu or ignore him and go our own way. But that's easier said than done. And this is an emotional reaction which I feel we should resist. I don't know what the answer is, but I know that the answer is not to throw over, ignore or try to put him aside. Perhaps I shouldn't say that. If it in fact would bring about a change, that would be all right. But it is doubtful that it would do so.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 23

(23a)

This is Saturday, October 28, 1972. I am continuing these tapes. In my last tapes, I talked about the efforts that were being made to arrive at a peace settlement with North Vietnam, but I'm not exactly sure how much detail I went into. I think I might go back over this just a little and summarize where I think we are as of today.

A summary of the events was contained in a press conference that Henry Kissinger gave on Thursday, in which he did a superb job of handling a very difficult situation. In that summary, he pointed out that the real breakthrough came on October 8, when the North Vietnamese finally agreed that a political settlement to their satisfaction need not precede a cease-fire, but rather a cease-fire could come first and then the political settlement. This marked a major change in their position and they've also pretty well abandoned their position that there have to be fundamental changes, before a cease-fire,in the government in South Vietnam.

In general, although it's confused understandably in a situation of this kind, there have been major concessions on their part that indicate that they are really desirous of bringing this war to an end or so it would seem. So for the first time in many years, we have some hope ahead of us. However, the problem now is more the problem of the government in South Vietnam and President Thieu than anything else. I'm very concerned about this. I spoke yesterday to both the Secretary and Henry on this and, of course, there's no division of opinion on the fact that this is important. In fact, our main problem now is no longer with the North in spite of their threats as to what

will happen if we don't sign the agreement on Tuesday as they're still demanding et cetera, et cetera. It's going to be very hard for them to back up from where they are. It's going to be very difficult to bring Thieu along. With the wisdom of hindsight, and I'm not sure even hindsight, I think if we at State had a little more role in this thing, we might have been able to advise a little bit better; with the wisdom of hindsight, we should have been working harder than we were at bringing President Thieu along because, after all, it is their country. But we were so focused upon, and understandably so the problem with North Vietnam that there was an assumption that once we could get the kind of an arrangement with them that we felt was satisfactory that the South Vietnamese would have no choice and Thieu would have no choice but to go along.

At the present time, Thieu is speaking out very strongly against the agreement, but he's still leaving the door open to coming along. From one standpoint, he's playing his cards very well. He has spoken out very strongly which obviously has struck a responsive chord in the South. He's had almost unanimous support in the assembly and he's coming to the point of the great national hero who stood up against both the United States and North Vietnam. I should say that many of the things he said, of course, are straw men. If at a suitable time in the next few days, certainly by our election here on November 7, if Thieu says that the United States and North Vietnam recognize the validity of these points and there is now an agreement with which he can go along, then he could become quite a national hero and his position would really be very strong in the country. However, as to the Vietnamese, I might say, as a people,the deputy chief in their embassy here said to Bill Sullivan yesterday that while he thought the agreement was good and he'd go along with it, he was concerned about the self destructive and the suicidal tendencies

in Saigon,and I feel the same way. The Vietnamese feel the very same concern. I'm afraid Thieu may carry it too far. The real issue we're up against is if, say, by November 8, the day after the election and Nixon's been re-elected, Thieu really finally refuses to go along, then what do we do? We certainly are not going to be able to -- things leak, of course -- the one thing we can do is get ourselves out in a bilateral deal with the North, stop our bombing and get our prisoners back and try to continue to supply the South. However, under those circumstances, I doubt that we would be able to get support from Congress for the appropriations and, thus, we would be put in the position of cutting off all supply and support to the South Vietnamese after all these years of battle and losing the very thing that we've been fighting for. To me, this is inconceivable. However, there's going to be a strong temptation to do something at this time if Thieu hasn't come along by then.

Well, I still am not satisfied that we're doing what we can and should do. We put Thieu on a real spot. When Kissinger, Sullivan, Abrams, all of them went out with a lot of publicity to Saigon, obviously to get Thieu to come along with the agreement, he was obviously put on a tight spot and his back is up and he's resisting it. We could have done much better, I think, if we'd worked much more quietly and not put him on such a public spot. However, I come back to the question of what happens if he doesn't go along. We have sent some pretty strong instructions to Ellsworth Bunker, but he's understandably being very resistant to seeing Ellsworth. Henry told me yesterday that he's prepared and going over with the President a very strong letter for the President to send immediately after it's clear that he's been re-elected, that is, the President's been re-elected, for him to send

immediately, maybe the same night, to Thieu, which would in effect say, "Either come along with us or else." However, it's the "or else" part of it that's the most difficult. This has been a very difficult and very crucial time. As I say, I just don't know where it's going to come out.

In the meanwhile, I should note that the Secretary, myself and Bill Sullivan in the State Department are being informed and dealing with this. This is creating some stresses and strains elsewhere in the Department, understandably so, but in spite of the releases by the North, press conference and all that, there are still many very delicate matters to be handled.

Oh, I might mention that this morning the Japanese ambassador, Ambassador Ushiba, came in to see me to say that Japan hoped to be a member of the international conference that would be called after the cease-fire. And I had to tell him very bluntly and frankly that we'd tried very hard to get Japan in as a member of the International Supervisory Commission. He knew we and Japan had talked about this over the years and Japan had also thought a great deal about it and we thought it was natural. To our surprise-- I shouldn't have been surprised, but I was--this was vehemently rejected by the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese vehemently rejected Japan even being a member of the conference. So I, in effect, was telling Ushiba that these thoughts that Japan has had some times in the past, that it could play a broker role between ourselves and North Vietnamese, certainly were not borne out by the facts. And it's going to be a humiliation for Japan not to be a member of the conference.

Again, as far as the conference is concerned, we are in the peculiar position of European countries really having no direct interest or concern in the area and carrying a prominent role. The members of the conference

as it now stands will be five permanent members of the Security Council. Of course, that brings in UK and France, ourselves, the Soviet Union and China. Then the three other members of the Paris conference, that is, North and South. . . well, the government of Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government; the National Liberation Front or the PRG, as they call themselves, the People's Revolutionary Government; and the North Vietnamese: those three. Then the four members of the International Supervisory Commission; that is, Canada--incidentally, Canada's not at all happy at being back in this role again--Canada, Indonesia, Hungary and Poland, and then the Secretary General of the U.N. for thirteen. Neither Cambodia nor Laos are included, but they understand this and accept it because they perfectly well recognize that if the legitimate governments in both those governments are included, the other side will insist that Sihanouk or his elements in Cambodia be included which is certainly what Lon Nol doesn't want and in Laos that the Pathet Lao would be included, so there's a good rationale for not including Cambodia or Laos in the conference. Thailand also will not be included, but it accepts that.

However, the result of all this is that the thinking that we've had in the past of trying to bring about a greater sense of responsibility by the Asian states themselves for the events in the area and participation by Asian states in events in the area is just not being realized. It's quite a blow for Japan to have Communist China a member of the conference and for Japan not to be. I didn't do the negotiating on this myself, but I wish that we could have done something about Japan. However, Bill Sullivan assures me that he and Henry hit hard at this. There was just no possibility

unless India were to be included. If we include Japan, the other side would ask for the inclusion of India, and, from our standpoint, it's just not worth the price, that is, the price of having India with its hostility towards us; its general position in the conference would be so adverse to our interests that it's just not worth having them in order to have Japan in.

I have been working at what is known as Enhance Plus, that is the effort to rush equipment and supplies, military equipment and supplies, into Vietnam before a cease-fire takes place, that we've been planning to send over the next six months. This is a big operation. Our role in it is trying to borrow from other countries. Well, let me put it this way: as a part of the supply effort, there was a plan to furnish 126 additional F-5E aircraft to Vietnam. These aircraft have not yet been manufactured, so what we're doing is seeking to borrow from Korea, Taiwan and Iran, 126 aircraft from their air forces and put them in Vietnam so that when the F-5Es are available, we can send them in as replacements for these F-5As. Iran has cooperated wonderfully with us on this. So has China. However, Korea and President Park have dug in their heels and are trying to bargain with us on this. I have been very, very unhappy. First, the way we've handled it, we were trying to get everything in by November 1. We went into a rush program. Then we told the countries, "Never mind, back off. We may want to get back at you." Now we've gone back at them again: "Get everything in by November 20." Then we shift from November 20 to November 15. So we're climbing up these hills and we're climbing down these hills, and it makes it very, very difficult to get the cooperation of the governments. But, in any event, they're now coming back.

President Park has dug in his heels and has refused to give us any aircraft unless we give him F-4s in exchange. We have offered to send in two squadrons of U.S. F-4s to fill the gap until we're able to supply the replacement aircraft for the F-5s, but he's refused to accept this. I yesterday recommended and the President agreed to his sending a letter to Park on this which was very strong, just about as strong as I thought we could make it. To my intense disappointment, Park came back this morning with a flat refusal, in spite of everything Bill Porter, our ambassador over there, was able to do. Now I'm trying to find out whether or not we do have the wherewithal to give in, at least in part, to his blackmail but, in any event, Park is certainly not making any numbers with me nor anybody else in town. It's very unusual on his part. It's in part the pattern, I don't know, of his actions just last week in declaring martial law, wiping out the constitution and trying to rig things so that he can be re-elected and in fact will be able to re-elect him for life there. Very short-sighted and, as I told the Korean ambassador here, I certainly have to take back or at least modify many of the words of praise I've been saying about Korea in speeches here around this country. I'm afraid that they're in for a time of trouble. The ambassador here also agrees. Having done that and knowing that the resistance he set up here on that, knowing the resistance that this will set up in Congress for appropriations for him, it's very short-sighted on his part to take this somewhat dog-in-the-manger attitude with respect to turning over some of these aircraft to us on which we're guaranteeing replacements and also giving him U.S. protection during the period, until the replacements arrive. It's a very reasonable position we've taken, and I'm terribly disappointed that he hasn't come through.

We're also having some problems in getting out of Japan some tanks we had under repair there, getting them down to the port for shipment. This has become a nasty, well, not a nasty problem; it's become a difficult problem, and I think we're on the road to resolution of that.

Well, I got word yesterday that Mother has been moved back to the Samarkand and seemed to be somewhat better.

I think this is about all for now. However, I might say this. I very firmly know that Henry Kissinger very much hopes to be Secretary of State in the next Administration. He hopes to get a Deputy Secretary that would take off the burden of seeing ambassadors and doing all those formalities that Secretaries of State are called upon to do. He says he very much wants me to stay in my present position to run the Department. Well, it's going to be interesting to see what happens. I very much doubt that he will be Secretary in spite of the job that he's done. I don't know what's going to happen to John Connally. John will either be Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense. If he's Secretary of State, there simply isn't room in this town for both John Connally and Henry Kissinger in those kinds of jobs. I don't know what I'm going to do. I'm just going to wait and see what happens. I do think it's likely that Rogers will be replaced. Rogers has been a fine person, a fine gentleman, a fine man, but I think that it's likely that there will be a change. This is my own feeling and,in some ways, it might be good. If we get a stronger man in the Department, a man more willing to stand up and fight the bureaucratic battles and Washington here, it will be good for the Department. But, of course, the issue is not what is good for the Department of State. The issue is what is good for the United States.

Well, I think that's all I'll say at this time. Over and out. The end of Saturday, October 28, 1972.

This is Saturday, November 11, 1972. Since my last tape, I've been very heavily involved with the negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Henry Kissinger and Bill Sullivan and I have been going over the agreement, seeking to find ways we can improve it, seeking to find ways in which we could meet President Thieu's points and also have some chance of negotiating it with the North.

It's going to be very tough. Thieu is still standing out adamantly. We have been holding this very tight. The Secretary and Bill Sullivan and I are the only two in the Department that have been involved. This gets to be a little embarrassing with Jack Irwin and Marshall Green, but I think that. . . well, it's agreed that we will hold it tight. I'm pleased in one way that the President has agreed to Henry bringing Bill Sullivan and myself into this. This is the first time one of these really delicate operations that the Department has been this deeply involved.

The last I talked was on October 28. At that time, the North was demanding that we sign on October 31. There were some exchanges with the North on this and I know of a letter from the President Pham van Dong, which I haven't seen, which gave me the impression they were going to sign. Well, it's quite clear to me that Henry expected the South, the Vietnamese and President Thieu,to go along and the fact that they wouldn't go along came as somewhat of a surprise. Al Haig, General Haig, had said that they would not go along, and he has much better understanding of them than does Henry. The chemistry between Henry and President Thieu is not good.

But we got by the election. The election was an overwhelming victory for the President, and the day after the election on November 8, Al Haig was sent out to Saigon to see what he could do with General Thieu, President Thieu,

I should say, and he's still out there as of this evening. The first report I had was that Thieu had not committed himself. He had listened to what Al had to say. I'm very anxiously waiting to hear what the outcome is.

Another meeting with the North has been arranged for a week from Monday, that is November 20, in Paris. And the whole question is whether or not we're going to be able to go to that meeting with a position, a consolidated position between ourselves and Saigon or whether we're going to be split. If it's split, it's going to be a very desperate situation. I find it very difficult to see how we can make a separate agreement and the South would have any chance of surviving. If we make a separate agreement--stopping the bombing and withdrawing our own, getting back our prisoners--I'm quite clear that whatever we may want to do, Congress is simply going to cut off all assistance to the South. The South has a capability perhaps of committing suicide and this is going to be a very critical time in the next few weeks.

We're involved in the usual business of inter-bureaucratic or bureaucratic hassles over the shape of our post-agreement structure, office , in the South. The intelligence people have come up with maximum demands. They want to send in eight hundred people, that would be the DIA and the agency. I instructed our representative yesterday at the meeting to try to cut this down and to give various options, but they're going to protect themselves by saying that eight hundred is what they need and, if they can't have it, well, if they can't have overflight rights and, if they can't have this and they can't have that, they can't do their job. It's not the kind of an approach that I like and I don't know whether Dick Helms is responsible for this or not, responsible for this kind of an approach, but I'm disappointed with him if he is.

We're also having difficulties working out with Defense. These are genuine difficulties. The question of maintenance of equipment in South Vietnam, no longer being able to use American military personnel, how we can enter into contracts or rather how the South Vietnamese government can enter into contracts with companies for this maintenance. Also the question of supply. It's a little hard for everybody to get through their heads that we are getting out and,after all these years of involvement, I find it a little hard myself to think in those terms, but we're having to do so. We've had considerable pressure on the Canadians to get them to come along to the International Control Commission. They're making difficulties on this; part of it is understandable because they just had this election up there and there's no government that has any majority, and it's hard for them to act.

The President went down to Key Biscayne after the election and yesterday stories came out of Key Biscayne that John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman and Henry Kissinger were down there reorganizing the State Department and reorganizing the foreign affairs community. This is a very unkind and cruel thing to do to Bill Rogers. If I were in his place, I think I would find it very difficult to stay on. Henry has called me and said he wants to talk to me about personnel on Monday morning. I have a little feeling it may not be quite so out of the question now for Henry to possibly become Secretary, and perhaps I'll know more about his on Monday morning. Puts me in a very difficult position. I obviously am loyal to and will be loyal to Bill Rogers as long as he's Secretary, and I find myself in between himself and Henry on a great many of these things and find myself in a somewhat difficult position.

As I said previously, I don't know what I'm going to do, whether I'll stay on or whether I'll quit. I'll judge as to whether or not there seems to be anything useful for me to do and whether I'm wanted and will, if I'm not convinced of that, why, then, I'll retire, although I find it hard to let go. But I'm going to have to let go one of these days. I need to reconcile myself to the fact and make up my mind on it.

Your grandmother Pat's stepmother, Florence Tillman, died this morning. She lived out in Hyattsville. She'd been ill--and very seriously ill--for a long time and it's probably just as well that she passed at this time.

Well, I don't know. I think maybe that's about all for this time. It's, as they say, an interesting time, and I'm still around. Over and out. November 11, 1972.

This is Wednesday, November 15, 1972. There have been in the last two days a few things that I want to record. First, yesterday I and Bill Sullivan went over to a meeting just between ourselves and Henry Kissinger and Al Haig over at the White House to, one: get some information on exactly what had happened on Al Haig's trip and conversations and meetings with President Thieu the previous weekend out in Saigon and next: to get the understanding and the views of the President as transmitted through Henry on what he wanted to do with respect to the futherance of the negotiations with the North Vietnamese that we have been discussing.

(23b)

On the first, although Al Haig had brought back a letter from President Thieu to President Nixon, we were not given a copy of it, but it was clear that no real conclusion had been arrived at and that Thieu was still being ambiguous with regard to his position. But Al Haig felt

that, in the end, he might well come along. And it was the decision of the President to move ahead, plunge ahead, some might say, with our negotiations with the North and leave it up to Thieu as to whether or not he would come along. Well, we had a discussion of the details of the amendments that we would seek in the agreement. The Secretary, Secretary Rogers, called me during the course of the meeting--he was going up on a speaking engagement to Philadelphia-- to ask me what had happened. It's really a remarkable situation in which the Secretary of State is not informed of the negotiations, really the most monumental or difficult problem this country has to face, and he has to hear about it through a subordinate such as myself and a subordinate such as Henry Kissinger and Al Haig. It puts me in a very difficult and a very awkward situation, and it's not one that I enjoy at all.

Well, this morning we had a meeting of the WSAG scheduled. And we discussed some of the less important matters, I would say, really. As has now become the case in WSAG, we discussed the report of the Intelligence Committee under Dick Helms, that is, the committee which was to make recommendations with regard to what would be required in the way of post-agreement intelligence in the area. The Intelligence Committee had come out, as usual, with its maximum demands and, in effect, said that they can't do the job unless they're given the maximum. Any cutback from the maximum will be the responsibily of the others. For example, they had insisted that they would have to have SR-71 overflights of North Vietnam at least on a weekly basis. They would have to have overflights of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, both for signals intelligence and for photography. We pointed out that overflights of the North, of course, were not going to be possible.

Overflights of the South, we agreed, could be possible and we were not really able to object to them. We said they could carry them out if they did it discreetly. Well, I'm sure that we're going to be charged with bad faith on many of these things. Also there was a discussion as to whether or not the military materiel that we and the South Koreans are going to turn over to the South Vietnamese when we leave would be legal. That is, we've carried out, the military has carried out a transfer, quote, transfer of title, unquote, but, obviously, we can't turn the materiel over, the guns over until we leave. And this would be during the sixty day period for withdrawal, and whether this would be legal or not. I also discovered, somewhat to my astonishment, that our twenty, some twenty military installations, including MACV headquarters have been signed over to the embassy out in Saigon. I'm still trying to find out more about that.

I pointed out that if the intelligence community, AID and military or the Defense Department want or keep the number of people in the area, that is, in South Vietnam, that they are now estimating, we will have an establishment of something over four thousand people out there, well, between three and four thousand. To me, this is utterly unacceptable. Well, we'll have a difficult job in trying to scrub this down, as we say. As usual, they'll be unwilling to do so and, as usual, it will be up to us in State to take the onus for scrubbing this down to a reasonable level.

After the meeting, Bill Sullivan and I and Henry and Al had a meeting alone in which we discussed what the situation would be and what we could do if President Thieu, in the end, finally decided not to go along. This is a horrible prospect to contemplate. I said I really found it very, very difficult to comtemplate because it was so horrible. There was some

discussion of what we could do and there was also discussion of the fact that President Thieu and the South Vietnamese are perfectly capable of committing suicide. And the situation we would face at that time. . . . Well, it was agreed that we would work on trying to see what kind of an agreement we could work out, if Thieu would not go along and we and the North Vietnamese would enter into a bilateral agreement. We, in general, agreed that the North Vietnamese would be willing to enter into a bilateral agreement with us to exchange our prisoners for the cessation of hostile acts by us in Indochina, but, most important of all, for cutting off all supplies to South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese government. We agreed that, of course, this would be the end of the South. We also agreed that, even though we of course would resist any such demands on the part of the North, nevertheless, when Congress came back, it would probably force a position of that kind on us. And therefore we would be in a position of undermining, abandoning everything that we fought for over the years. Well, it's a situation that really gives me nightmares.

After this meeting, I had a meeting alone with Henry Kissinger at my request, at which I asked him what was going on with regard to these reports that were coming out of the White House about Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman and himself, quote, reorganizing the State Department, reorganizing the foreign affairs community. I said this was profoundly disturbing to me and to the Foreign Service and, whereas the President could, of course, do what he wanted to do, I hoped that whatever decisions he made would be based upon the facts of the situation rather than some of the myths with regard to the Department. And I gave him some charts that we had worked up

in the Department with respect to the decreasing role of the State Department and the Foreign Service abroad. As I pointed out to him, we were becoming one of the lesser of the agencies abroad. I also said that I was disturbed that the President was laying all this emphasis, even the day after election, upon the resignation of all the Presidential appointees, and this attack upon, quote, bureaucrats, unquote. I said that I found it very disturbing that the President would seem to regard the appointments which he himself had made as President as now being adversaries, and that he would regard the bureaucracy, particularly the Foreign Service, as adversaries. I said that I and other members of the Foreign Service really wanted to serve the President; we wanted to be loyal to him, but this was a two-way street. And if the President was going to adopt the attitude that we were adversaries and enemies, obviously, the Foreign Service would turn this way. As Henry said, while it is somewhat of an anomaly, the President still regards the Foreign Service as being hostile to him, although when he meets them individually, he likes them and respects them. Henry said that I, above all, had his respect and liking. Bill Sullivan, the President now accepted, even though he had some reservations with regard to what he felt were Bill's relations with Averell Harriman. We both agreed that we were in a very difficult position, the Department's in a difficult position and it was really anomalous and difficult to understand why the President would appoint someone as Secretary of State who he was not really willing to use as his Secretary of State.

Well, we fenced around on this somewhat. From the conversation, I have an impression that it is not at all certain that Henry is going to be appointed Secretary of State. Nor is it certain as to what is going to

happen to Bill Rogers. Henry had previously indicated that he wanted to discuss personnel appointments in the Department with me. But we both agreed that this was impossible under the present situation, because so much of it depended on who was going to be Secretary of State and what his role was going to be. I pointed out to Henry. . . well, we both agreed that Henry's present role is impossible. Henry said, and I agreed with him, that, if the things that the President has done are going to have any lasting effect, they have to be fed into the institutional machinery of the government. They can't depend on a single person. And for this it is then important that the machinery of the Department and the Foreign Service be built up as an institution. I pointed out and Henry agreed that it was impossible for him to continue as chief negotiator and at the same time have the position of trying to determine the policy. I pointed out that there had not been policy decisions on many other areas for many months, and that the foreign policy machinery was floundering in the absence of policy decisions. I also pointed out that one of the problems has been, as far as the Foreign Service and the State Department are concerned, that there hasn't been any feedback from what the White House has been doing, in large part. People don't know what they should be doing. I pointed out that the Foreign Service will respond if it's given the challenge,and that, as far as morale problems are concerned, we don't have morale problems in our difficult posts and the people that are under stress and strain. Our problems arise with the people who are not being challenged and the people who don't know what they are going to do or what they are supposed to be doing. He said he was going up on Friday to begin talks with the President. (Interruption-telephone)

I asked him to point out to the President my concerns, our desire to work these things out in a way that was satisfactory to him and the hope that we would be given some opportunity to comment on what he proposed before it was put into effect. He could accept or reject our comments, but nevertheless, I felt that he should have them. Henry said that, as far as the stories from Key Biscayne, this was what really set much of this off-- a story that he, Henry Kissinger and Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman were reforming the foreign affairs community. Henry said they just had a brief discussion down there during the evening about some of the top appointments, and there were certainly no discussions about reformation or reorganization, I should say, of the foreign affairs community. But nevertheless, in the compulsion to put out news from Key Biscayne, this story came out and it really had no foundation.

Henry also said that he was shocked the day following the President's election that the President called in all the members of the White House staff and asked for their resignations. He said that he himself was not affected, because he had previously been asked to stay, but he found this somewhat surprising and the White House found it somewhat shocking and also somewhat shocking that the day of the President's victory, big play was made of the announcement that he had asked for the resignations of all those that he had appointed during the Administration. I pointed out and he agreed that, after all, these are the people that had been serving him. Whatever record he had made, they certainly had had a role in it, and to treat them as if they were hostile was hardly the way to obtain the loyalty of people that he was seeking.

Well, we agreed that I would not be in any position to talk about appointments and personnel matters for the time being. I pointed out that as long

as Bill Rogers was Secretary I was serving him; of course, I served the President, but nevertheless I was serving him and felt a loyalty to him and it would not be proper for me to make recommendations that had not gone through him. Well, tonight I feel myself really caught in the middle between these things. We will see what will happen. I don't know, I don't know. I have no question whatsoever with regard to the election of the President. As I've said over and over again, things that he's done in foreign affairs, we all approve. The Foreign Service Officers are overwhelmingly in favor of his policies. There's certainly no sabotage among them. There is certainly no opposition, even, to him. In general,people in the Foreign Service and the State Department feel that he's done well. What we'd like to do is help him do better. But if he's going to straight-arm us and treat us as if we could not be trusted, treat us as if we were adversaries, he's going to create adversaries where none should exist. My concern is how we, not for our sake, not for his sake as an individual, but how we can really work together so that we can better accomplish those things that we have set out to do. I'm not sure who there is around him that is influencing him in these directions.

The so-called political elements in the White House tend to be, in my experience and observation, not very credible, not very laudable people. And I think some of them consider themselves hardheaded, tough politicians; all bureaucrats are their enemies and they're disloyal to the President. And they feed this kind of a line to him. These are the fellows that carry out wire-tapping of the Watergate, trying to create cheap and amateurish sabotage of the opposite party. There are these elements also around the President which are very unhealthy, very unhealthy for him, very unhealthy for the party and very unhealthy for the country. And I feel that there is

somewhat of a struggle going on between those elements and what I like to think of as the more constructive elements in the country.

Well, that's all I'll say this evening. Good night.

This Sunday afternoon, November 19, is a cold and rainy Sunday. I went out this morning to play a little golf and quit after nine holes, because my feet got wet and I got cold and the doctors warned me about not getting too much exposure to cold. So I'm back home now. I've just been by and spent a little time with R'Ella and Gerry. R'Ella and I talked over Mother's financial situation and also her physical situation, and I'm going to get hold of her trust tomorrow and make arrangements for an increase in payments, so as to take care of the nurses which she now has.

Friday I spoke in the morning at the Foreign Service Day, the day for the retired officers in the Department and dropped in and gave them a roundup on the foreign affairs during the past year. I spoke very informally without any notes to them. Then I went up in the afternoon to Valley Forge to a meeting that the American Bar Association was having up there with various Europeans on American foreign policy. I did a TV show and I spoke about an hour and a half with questions and answers. Then I did a radio show and then I did a press interview for an hour, or a press conference, I suppose I should call it. I stressed, although it's not doctrine, I stressed--you might say that in my TV show I may get some reactions to this as well as my press conference--that I felt that if we were going to have a real CSCE conference, which is a Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe, the thing that we really have to discuss is the whole question of the posture of the Soviet Union, which still maintains this remarkable pretense that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is entitled to support,

direct control and be the center for communist parties in other countries which are dedicated to the overthrow of the governments with which the Soviet Union is maintaining relations. I just find this absolutely incredible that we let this pass. And the trouble is that the Europeans say that it will irritate the Soviets, contrary to the spirit of detente. Even our own Department because of the opposition of the Europeans, and particularly our area of European Affairs is not anxious to push this.

But I went out very strongly and publicly on this. Hope I can get some reaction. I don't know why we shouldn't challenge the Soviets on it. I also talked to the MBFR, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction upcoming negotiations and pointed out that it is going to be very difficult and complicated, even more so than the SALT negotiations. Of course, one of the reasons for MBFR is not that we particularly want it, but that, in view of the pressure in Congress for reducing our forces in Europe, we feel, one: on the one hand, that we have to show that we're trying to negotiate some reduction. And at the same time, if in any event, we're going to have to reduce, we get something for it from the other side. But our position is so weak; the other side, the Soviets, of course, know the position in our Congress, and I doubt if we're going to be able to get very much, because they know we're going to be forced into it in any event before too much longer. As I pointed out in my talks up there, the asymmetries in the situation are very evident. The Soviets pull-back a couple of hundred miles back to their own borders in Europe is quite a different thing from our pulling our forces back across the Atlantic. Thus, because of the basic asymmetries in the situation, you have to have an asymmetrical agreement.

But negotiating an asymmetrical agreement is not the easiest thing to do.

Last night, Saturday, I spoke at the Phi Beta Kappa association here in Washington. This means I've had three speeches and all these press interviews and all that in less than two days, probably pushing myself a little too hard and I'm going to have to ease up. I enjoy getting out and seeing people. I enjoy talking. I must say, according to my wife, well, according to Gerry and so on today, the retired officers certainly received what I had to say to them very enthusiastically. And of course I have enough ego to like to hear that people like what I do. But I'm afraid I'm going to have to ease up a little bit in the physical side.

Saturday morning, I spent all morning with Bill Sullivan and Marshall Green. I finally got Marshall Green initiated,you might say, into the Vietnamese negotiations to a reasonable degree,somewhat reluctant on Henry's part, I understand in part because of the President's view on this thing. But I pointed out that with Bill Sullivan going off with Henry to Paris, we needed to have somebody other than myself in the Department that was involved, so Marshall was there. We had a long discussion of what Henry is going to seek in his discussions with Le Duc Tho, which start tomorrow.

He's got a terrific package. I just don't quite see how he's going to do it. At the same time, we're getting very, very bad sounds out of Saigon. Ellsworth Bunker's meetings with Thieu--well,yesterday we had the report on it--were bad. We're coming down to the moment of truth here. And I don't know. It's awfully hard to say what's going to happen. Very portentous. The fact of the matter is that we've gone so far that we just can't back up now. I'm very clear on that. Even if we would try to back up, I think with the new Congress coming in that they would tie our hands.

Our real controversy with Thieu comes down to his insistence that there be firm arrangements in the agreement for the prompt withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces in the South. Well, this is obviously the ideal; obviously what we'd like to see and, obviously, if we'd had an overwhelming military victory, it's something that we could command. But we're not in that position. However, Henry feels. .well, Sullivan does, too, and I do, too, that we built into the agreement an arrangement under which the forces will be withdrawn from the South over a period of time and that Thieu is going to be in a good bargaining position to get them withdrawn. However, he doesn't see that.

In simple terms, the situation, as we see it, is this: that if Thieu refuses to go along with the agreement that we're now negotiating, we are going to be forced into trying to enter into a bilateral agreement with the North under which our prisoners will be returned in return for our stopping the bombing and the withdrawal of our forces. Now the North is going to insist that we also agree to cut off all economic and military assistance to the government of the South. The fact of the matter is that, even if we hold out against that, which I hope, certainly hope and expect we would, that is, we would refuse to cut off assistance. Well, the problem is this: when the Congress comes back in January, all of us are convinced that it will legislate a requirement that will require us to cut off aid. Thus, the situation with which Thieu is faced is, he can agree with what we are doing now, continue to have our military and economic support, continue to have our support on obtaining the withdrawal of the Northern forces in the South, and work this out over a period of time or he can be left with the situation in which we've withdrawn, we've stopped our bombing and our air action

throughout Vietnam, Congress cuts of his military and economic assistance, and he's left all along with no support and the Northern forces still in the South, which is clearly the worst of all possible worlds, it seems to us, as far as he's concerned, the South is concerned.

Yet, this seems to be the course he's taking. Whether he is or not, whether he's simply still bargaining hard, and we can respect him for bargaining hard, and his hard bargaining is gaining him a large degree of support and popularity in the South. If after bargaining hard, gaining popularity and support in the South, at the last moment he finally comes along with us on this, he could be a great hero and this could all work out very well. What none of us know is whether he's bluffing--oh, I shouldn't say bluffing--whether or not he is playing a very, very hard bargaining game, or whether he's determined in the end to go it alone, in what seems to us to be committing suicide in doing so. Well, his committing suicide is not very attractive from our standpoint, either. After all the lives and treasure over the years we've invested in the South, to see it all go down the drain is not an attractive prospect.

(23c)

Well, it's about as tough a situation and about as tough dilemma as I've ever seen. I just don't see any answer. If, in the end, he refuses to go along, as I said in our discussion yesterday, the final thing that we could do, I suppose, is to publish the text of the agreement in the South, make it, explain what the agreement involves and why we think it's advantageous in the hope that there will be those in the South that will see the advantage and bring pressure on Thieu to accept the agreement or change the government. However, we're very clear in our mind that we're

not going to encourage any coup. We certainly are not going to get ourselves into the position that we got ourselves into with Ngo Dinh Diem [?] back in 1963. But publishing the agreement and, I might say, entering into a public relations campaign to support it would be our last resort before a final and complete break with Thieu. I don't know that it would be successful. I doubt, frankly, that it would be successful. Nationalism in the South is now strong. People there like to see Thieu stand up to both the Americans and the North, making him something of a hero as I mentioned, and so it may not bring the results that we seek. But I don't know what would do so. Well, this is the situation that we now face.

I also, during this past week, had some private talks with Henry Kissinger about the whole personnel situation in the Department in general terms. I told him, obviously, as long as Secretary Rogers was Secretary, I'm going to be loyal to him and I'm not going to work behind his back. What I have tried to point out, though, and I gave him information on it, is the degree to which the State Department has been reduced both in its strength and in its role abroad as compared with other departments and agencies. In many ways, we're the minority now abroad.

Secretary Rogers went up to Camp David, was summoned up there on Friday afternoon. Henry went up there on Friday. I don't know what passed. I don't know whether the President asked the Secretary to stay on or whether he indicated to him that he was being replaced. I had a little feeling that Henry might possibly be appointed Secretary of State. Incidentally, curiously enough, George Ball, in an article in last week's Newsweek, recommended just this. I have a little feeling that that was possible. However, just

on the basis of my feelings of the situation at the present time, I'm not so sure that that's taking place and I just don't know what's going to happen. I keep myself loose and flexible. If the situation is such that I don't feel I'm going to be able to work comfortably in it, why, then I'm in a position to retire. On the other hand, if I feel I can work comfortably in it and I'm still wanted, I'll do that. I, in short, am relaxed about what happens to me personally.

As far as the President's concerned, the stories are still coming out of firing lots of people, changing lots of people, major reorganization. Well, a major reorganization would be good. There are plans, there have been plans for a couple of years for a major reorganization of the domestic agencies, so as to group them into a more logical framework, that is, logical in light of present-day needs. And I hope that can be done, but everything is still very uncertain at the present time and, frankly, I just don't know what's going to happen. However, I do hope that the present period of uncertainty ends as quickly as possible because this is not good for anybody.

Well, over and out.

This is Wednesday, November 29. First, on the personal vein, on Saturday evening, November 26, we received a telegram from Hong Kong from Jennifer saying that she and Patty were in Hong Kong and would be arriving in Los Angeles on Monday the 27th. I don't know when I've ever been quite so relieved. My concern over her ability to leave Thailand with Patty has been very, very great over the past weeks. I was very concerned that Mike might take some step that would prevent Patty from leaving. I was concerned that Jennifer would not be able to handle it. I believe, as I've said previously, I had talked to Polk Sarason [?], one of the members of what they call

the National Executive Council, about this. I also employed a lawyer, Al Lyman, to help with this, but nevertheless Thai laws were such with regards to the rights of the father,giving no rights virtually to the mother, and I was concerned that some way or the other, he'd be able to block Patty's leaving. Well, I've seldom been happier than when I received that telegram that she was in Hong Kong and would be arriving in Los Angeles on the 27th. She called me, late in the evening of Monday the 27th, after they had arrived in Los Angeles. I talked to her and to Patty and, oh, it was wonderful, being able to talk to them and to know that they were all right. And again she called last night and your Uncle Bill is also out there. They're going to come back here on Saturday, December 2, and, of course, I'm looking forward to seeing them.

Well, my own affairs. . . Yesterday afternoon, the Secretary talked a little with me about what I had suspected previously, that he'd been asked to stay on as Secretary and was going to do so. He also confirmed to me that the President wanted to change Jack Irwin as Under Secretary and that Jack was going to be offered the ambassadorship in Paris, but this had not yet taken place. Ken Rush, who is now Deputy Secretary of Defense would become Deputy Secretary of State and, of course, yesterday it was announced that Elliot Richardson, who had been previously Under Secretary of State and then became Secretary of HEW, had been offered and had accepted Secretary of Defense. Obviously, all of us are very, very pleased to see this because he's a very able individual.

Then the Secretary talked with me a little bit about my own future. He said I stood very high in the eyes of the President and he wanted to do whatever I wanted to do and, if I were to leave my present job, what would

I like, because he would try to do anything that he could for me. We talked about various possibilities. I said it was very hard to find anything as interesting as I was doing. Obviously, I couldn't go back to Japan. We both agreed that I would not want to go back to Vietnam under the present circumstances. I said they had tried to kill me there three times, and I didn't want to go back and live under that kind of an environment again. I said, as far as India was concerned which was another Class 1 post, my problem was that I just didn't like Indians, and so I wasn't particularly attracted by that. I made it clear that I was perfectly prepared to retire. I'm now within a few months of being 65. I've been in the Service longer than most people. I've risen to higher rank than most people, and I have no real regrets; I would have no real regrets about leaving although, as I said, I don't know anything else I'd rather do.As long as I'm in good health or reasonable health and people want me around, I'd be glad to stay around. There isn't anything else that would interest me as much. But, above all, I didn't want to become a placement problem and I didn't want to hang around longer than I was wanted.

Well, the Secretary said that I was very, very much wanted. There was nobody in the career Service who stood higher in the eyes of the President than myself. I've also heard this from other people and so, with due allowances, I tend to accept it. Well, we talked then about what I might do and I suggested ambassador to NATO. It's always been a political appointment and, as far as I was concerned, I would be interested in serving in Europe, I would be interested in serving in that environment. The Secretary also was very attracted by this. I said I didn't want to leave as being known as just an Asian expert. Well, this evening we talked about it again.

He said he'd mentioned to Bob Haldeman the question of my going to NATO and didn't know what the President's desires were with regard to the NATO job. We also talked about my taking on for a time simply being called and taking on the job as Ambassador-at-Large and see what developed. I said that would be all right if there was really something to do and I wasn't sure whether there would be anything to do. Anyway, he made it clear that in January the President wants to make a clean sweep in the Department and, in that regard, wants to appoint Bill Porter to take my job. As I told him, I can't think of anybody that I know who would be more qualified than Bill, and I'd be very pleased to see him take my job, or take the job that I'm now in.

I don't know what I'll do. I think that if the NATO job does not come up, I might accept an ambassadorship-at-large for awhile and see if there's anything to do. In that regard, I think the government, the White House and the Department needs somebody who's free to engage in negotiations. One of the problems in the organization between the White House and State has been that Henry Kissinger in that job has been engaged in negotiations and trying to coordinate policy, with the result that negotiations have taken the top priority and policy guidance is almost totally lacking in other fields. And the government is really floundering in so many fields,because of the lack of policy guidance.

Henry himself has talked with me about it. I pointed out that, apart from personalities, whoever's in the job he is in just cannot do both things, that is, engage in prolonged negotiations and still act as the policy coordinator for the President. One of them has to suffer and Henry suggested that, because of the regard the President has for me, I might be

able to be the negotiator. Well, I'll see. I'll see what happens.

I somewhat regret leaving my job. It's been four active years. I think that they've been fairly productive years. At the same time, I get a little tired. At the same time, I feel myself walking this tightrope between the Secretary and Kissinger and the President. Today was a good example. There was an article by Stew Hensley here at UPI. Bill Sullivan mentioned it to the Secretary at this morning's staff meeting and the Secretary said, yes, he'd had a backgrounder with Stew. . . well, he didn't say when but that he'd informed the President of the backgrounder. Both he and the President had high regard for Stew. The Secretary looked at the article and said that some of it appeared to be what he had said and other things appeared to be from other sources.

Well, I didn't pay much attention to it. I came back to my office and there was a call from Henry Kissinger for me, but when I returned it, he was out. Meanwhile, Henry had gotten hold of Bill Sullivan, and Bill said that Henry was furious about the article, undermining his negotiations. It showed the Department couldn't be trusted and he, Henry and the President had confidence in myself and Bill Sullivan, but this kind of thing meant that we were going to be cut out of it, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Well, Bill talked to John King who is in the press office and he said that about ten days ago the Secretary had had this backgrounder and that he'd also informed the President. Well, when Henry called Bill, Bill said that the Secretary said he'd done this and informed the President. Henry called him back and said that, with Bob Haldeman, he'd checked the President's phone calls and that there had not been any call recently from the Secretary to the President and, in effect, said the Secretary was a liar. Bill very

properly said that it was very hard for him to accept, that is, calling the Secretary a liar. Bill called me and said that he checked with John King. John King said that it had been about ten days previously that the Secretary had seen Hensley and, in the meanwhile, Hensley had gone away and the Secretary had been away. Then Hensley had come back. He'd had a meeting with John Scali of the White House staff and he said that much of what he had printed in the article had come from John Scali. Well, Henry finally got hold of me and calmed down a little bit, and I told Henry to check with his own staff and particularly with John Scali. We exchanged words on this. Henry also said that stories were continuing to come out of the State Department that he had messed things up and things had only got on the road when the State Department people got into it, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. I said I didn't accept this. I said that, one, if he had any evidence that anybody in the State Department was saying this--and he'd previously intimated to me that he had--if he'd let me know I would immediately go after it, But he never let me know. I also said that the reporter for Newsweek who was involved in some of these stories had definitively said that none of this was coming out of the State Department. It was coming out of the White House staff and I told this to Henry.

Well, the thing subsided. Our conversation subsided a little bit on this note, but this kind of unpleasantness--the keeling, the hauling between himself and Rogers, Henry's super-sensitivity, trying to walk this tightrope between himself and the Secretary--has got kind of tiring. And so, leaving my job--I obviously have regrets on it--nevertheless, in some ways, it will be kind of a relief, because I feel I have been under great strain and have

been walking this tightrope over the years and, obviously, it would be nice to have a little more time to myself. Well, we'll see how things work out. We'll see what happens. The President's making a great show of sweeping things clean, new people, new faces. He appointed a labor leader from New York as Secretary of Labor today, but I don't think it's going to impress many people. I'm surprised that he really hasn't made some change either with Rogers or with Kissinger, this continual pulling and hauling between them, the friction between them cannot continue. Perhaps Presidents think this is a good way of doing things, but I'm not sure that it is.

Yesterday Henry Kissinger and I talked about the very serious situation we're facing with Thieu if South Vietnam refuses to go along with the present agreement. I said I just felt we were at the point of no return, that the possibility of Thieu not going along was so horrendous that it would be hard for me to face it. If, in fact, he really did so in the end, I just didn't see any alternative to our making a bilateral agreement with the North and, in that event, I thought that the North would demand that we cut off all aid to the South. I didn't think that we could agree to this, but in fact when the Congress came back, I thought the Congress would cut off aid and it would mean the very destruction of everything that we'd been fighting for. It's a very, very difficult situation. Well, I talked to the Secretary when I came back about this and said that I'd urged on Henry that we have a meeting of himself, myself and Bill Sullivan to talk about this in a coherent form, because this was too important an issue to be dealt with in a casual manner as had been done today. Well, I began to raise this with Henry today and he said to put it off till tomorrow, but the stresses and strains between himself and Rogers are so great, I'm not sure what kind of a discussion we can have of this.

Meanwhile,I talked to the Secretary about making the effort to deal with this, by his going out to talk to Thieu at the time that Henry was negotiating in Paris, and the Secretary trying to persuade Thieu. I felt that the Secretary was very good at dealing with this kind of thing.Secondly, I thought it would be well to involve the Secretary and the Department more deeply in this. I spoke to the Secretary and the Secretary agreed to it. At his request, I put it up to Henry myself as my suggestion. Henry called back today to say that he, quote, had explored this, unquote, and it was not received enthusiastically.

Well, I think this is about all for this evening. It's time to sign off. Your Aunt Jennifer, your cousin Patty, Uncle Bill are all going to be here on Saturday. It's going to be wonderful to see them. We'll see what happens as far as the future's concerned. I don't know what's going to happen to me, but things have always worked out well in the past. I'm sure they're going to work out well in the future and, as your Uncle Stephen says, "That's the way the ball bounces, Dad." I'm not quite sure which way the ball's going to bounce for me now, but as long as I can maintain my health and my energy, I want to do something that's useful. The idea of just completely retiring repels me. The idea of teaching school...well, I could do that or go with some of these research firms around town. I might do that. But nothing is as exciting or interesting to me as the type of thing in which I've been engaged.

Well, I'll sign off at this point. Over and out.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 24

(24a)

On the last tape, I was talking about the possibility, even the probability, that I may be going back out to Saigon. I was talking about the work that we were doing during the previous week in negotiating with the North Vietnamese as well as with the South Vietnamese. We're in a real bind on this. The difficulty is in some ways that we are dealing with Vietnamese on both sides, the North and the South, and we find ourselves somewhat in between. There are some similarities to the situation back in 1953 when we were negotiating the Korean armistice and found ourselves again caught in between. You'll recall that the South Koreans never signed the armistice, and Syngman Rhee, who was then President, tried his best to prevent the conclusion of the armistice. Same thing seems to be going on today with the South Vietnamese.

I've often talked about the parallels between the South Vietnamese and the South Koreans, or let me say, between the Vietnamese and Koreans rather than just South Vietnamese and South Koreans. I think maybe I may have touched on this somewhat earlier in these tapes, but at the risk of repeating myself, I point that in the light of my experience, as people, they're very, very similar, have very many similar characteristics. First, they are courageous, intelligent, energetic, and, above all, highly individualistic, with little faith or trust in each other. I know of no two peoples that are more individualistic than the Koreans and the Vietnamese. I'll come back to that.

Well, I might note in this regard that it is my understanding that before World War II there were some twenty three separate independence.

organizations here in the United States; even those living here were unable to get together. And my own experience in Vietnam during the time I was there subsequently is that they find it very difficult to talk with each other. One of the roles that we Americans had to play was to get them in to just talk with each other. They are very reluctant to do so. Well, this is a part of their individualism.

As far as their history is concerned, it's very similar in the sense that during the colonial period, the colonial power, Japan in the case of Korea and France in the case of Vietnam, sought to denationalize them. Korea was a more homogeneous people, had been more of a single nation than had Vietnam. Vietnam, of course, was only for a brief period before the colonial period, a single nation. But nevertheless, they, the colonial power, sought to denationalize these people. Now, of course, the French administered Vietnam in three separate units, the Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China, and this served to accentuate the regional differences in Vietnam, which were very much stronger than those in Korea.

But going back to the similarities. In the postwar period, they were both divided countries; in Vietnam, somewhat later than Korea, but still divided as a result of the circumstances of the Second World War. Conventional wisdom was that in each case that the non-communist part, South Korea first and then South Vietnam, had no chance of surviving. But they did survive and they survived magnificently, because they had single-minded S.O.B.s in charge with regard to both men in one sense. Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Diem in South Vietnam, who held the countries, the areas, together by sheer force of will. In each case, they stayed on too long. In each case,

they were thrown out by conventional military coups; in each case, the conventional military coup was followed by personal struggles between the military officers involved and then gradually an officer emerged, Park Chung-Hee in Korea and Thieu in South Vietnam, who sought to come to terms with the political realities of the country. And this is what's now going on.

Chronologically, these events had come sooner in Korea than they have in South Vietnam, but I do see the similarities. Well, the similarities carry on to the negotiation at the end of the war. Syngman Rhee was determined that he was not going to agree to any ending of the hostilities there until the North was consolidated into the South. We were not that willing to fight for that, and we had a very tough time. Syngman Rhee's one effort to sabotage the negotiations was to release the prisoners, the Korean prisoners, in the South. And as a result of this, the armistice was delayed over a considerable period. In Vietnam, Thieu is demanding that specific provision be made for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and that it be made very specific that the Council of National Concord that is to be established under the agreement does not have any governmental role and that it will be a two party, that is NLF and the GVN, rather than three party.

Well, the issue here is not really the words of the agreement. The issue here is really whether or not the North wants to, for its own purposes, call off the action in the South for the time being. And, as I say, if they do, it doesn't make much difference; the exact words of the agreement are not too important. If they don't we can have all the words we want in the agreement and it's not going to mean anything. For example, the 1962 Lao agreement

was excellent from the standpoint of drafting, but it was never observed from the first day, because the other side didn't want to observe it. Well, we're engaged now in a real confrontation between ourselves and Thieu, between ourselves and the North. We're coming into a very crucial period and I don't know quite where it's going to come out. Thieu now is a great national hero. He stood up to the United States; he stood up to the North; he has the support of all the non-Communists--well, virtually all the non-Communist elements in the South. And it would be easy for him to say at this point that he stood up to us, he stood up to the North, and now his points have been accepted. He could easily do this. And he can become a great hero. The struggle in the South is going to be primarily a political struggle. The military equation is overwhelmingly in favor of the South. The question is the political struggle. In this, the Southerner, Thieu among them, have an inferiority complex with regard to the Communists and the North Vietnamese. He now has an opportunity to take the political offensive and, if he grabs it, I think that the future could be very bright in South Vietnam. The real question is whether or not he will grab it. Well, that's the situation we're facing as of this evening, Sunday evening, and it's very crucial. Henry, the Secretary and I, Bill Sullivan--we've discussed what we're going to do if Thieu refuses to go along.

Well, I feel that,as far as the United States is concerned, we've reached the point of no return. I find it very hard to visualize the situation if we go ahead with the agreement and the South does not. Nevertheless, I don't think we have any choice. What we've tried to make clear to Thieu. his emissaries and everybody around him is that the Executive has no choice in this. President Nixon has no choice. If it's clear and it would be clear,

that the GVN, Government in Vietnam, is blocking or preventing an agreement, I have no question that within days or at least weeks after the Congress comes back in January, they'll cut off all military and all economic aid to South Vietnam and leave it utterly stranded. And the President can't do anything to prevent this. This is not a pleasant prospect. It's a real nightmare as a matter of fact. All I can say is that it's so much of a nightmare that I find it impossible really to face it. And all I can hope is that we will not have to face it.

Well, during this past week, I went down to Cape Kennedy to see the launch of Apollo XVII. (Interruption: telephone)

That phone ringing was your Uncle Bill giving me a call; he just arrived back in town.

Well, as I said, I went down to see the launch of Apollo XVII. As you know from these tapes, I have been involved in the space program since 1961 when I came back here and was a member of the Space Council at the time, State Department representative on the Space Council. The then-Vice President Lyndon Johnson was chairman. Bob McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; and Jim Webb, who was administrator of NASA. This was a group in which we planned and discussed the whole moon program. And I am the only one still on active duty around. And, although I had seen some other Apollo launches, I wanted to see this somewhat for sentimental reasons because it will be the last journey to the moon during my lifetime probably and also it was going to be a night launch, which made it very, very spectacular.

I flew down there and the launch was put off about two and a half hours. It was supposed to go off at 9:53 and actually it was around 12:30

before it finally went off. It was spectacular beyond belief. Your Uncle Bill went along with me.

I was invited by Jim Fletcher, the administrator of NASA, and they invited me to go over to Orlando after the launch and spend the night there and then come back the next morning. This sounded very attractive to me. However, there were some six hundred thousand other people down there. The traffic was also fantastic beyond belief. We left the launching site at Cape Kennedy about one in the morning on a bus, a sightseeing type bus, with stiff seats. We finally got into Orlando about 5:30 in the morning, spending all night on the bus, nothing to eat and nothing to drink; we were crowded in following taillights of cars. At one time, we were about two hours making about three miles. It really is sort of a nightmare in my memory. I got to bed about ten minutes of six. Got up again at 7:30, went out. . . we were driven out to take a chartered plane back. We got on the plane at 9:30. The plane pulled away from the ramp twice and had difficulties each time of one kind or another and went back. Finally about ten minutes of eleven, we took off and I arrived back at Andrews about 12:30, very, very tired. I'm really having a hard time taking this type of thing.

But I had a meeting scheduled with the Foreign Service Officers that we had designated to go out to Vietnam in the event there was an agreement. We have identified all the Vietnamese-speaking officers, the officers particularly with experience in Vietnam,to go out there for not to exceed a six-month period to observe the ways the thing is developing to see whether or not, as I said to them, the whole thing's going to fly or not going to fly. We want to send officers around to each of the provinces to report from the

provinces. And, as I told them, they, as Foreign Service Officers, of course are best equipped to do this kind of a job. If the agreement works, if it flies, as I say, then they can quickly go to a more conventional type of organization in the country. If it doesn't fly, then we've got new decisions to make and it's very important that we have the judgments of these officers on what is taking place.

I was told before the meeting that we might contemplate some difficulty. I'm told that one officer wanted to bring his lawyer to the meeting. However, I met with them. There are about fifty in the Department in this category. I met with them and, groggy though I was-- I'm not sure I was entirely coherent-- I explained to them the origin of the project of sending them out, the concept under which they would be operating, to assure them that they would be able to report factually and honestly. I must say I was very, very pleased with their attitude. They had a lot of questions, of course, and they were good, honest questions. And I certainly detected no reluctance on their part to go. As I pointed out to them, I knew that some of them had had questions with regard to our policy in Vietnam. For those that had had, this was a chance to help make peace in Vietnam and see that peace was established there. I put the whole thing in terms of a transition from war to peace. I also told them, though, I was very disappointed that after we sent out the notices on a various restricted basis, just to alert them to the possibility that they might be asked, within less than twenty-four hours it had come to the New York Times's attention, or somebody called the New York Times correspondent to tell him about it. At the staff meeting the next morning, I pointed out that this is the great problem of the Department: its inability to maintain security. And in this particular case, we couldn't blame anybody else. We

had good solid reasons for not wanting this to become public immediately, and I'd hoped that it might at least have seventy-two hours without becoming public. But, as a matter of fact, it was less than twenty-four hours.

I've often talked to young officers--well, I've talked to them in the Department as I talked to them at this staff meeting about the problem the President and the Secretary and senior officers have in taking the Department and officers in the Department into their confidence, drawing on their skills with regard to sensitive matters, because of their very bad record in security. It's not that they are deliberately violating security. It's just that people feel that they have to talk. And, in this case, I was very disappointed. Nevertheless, I'm very, very pleased with the attitude of the officers.

I'm also pleased and very, very proud of your uncle and my son, Stephen, who, although he doesn't speak Vietnamese and didn't have to do it, volunteered for service. And in view of the long background that he had in Vietnam, his excellent French, we're going to find a place to use him. He's a very fine officer, and I'm very, very proud of him.

On Friday, the Soviet members of what's known as the Dartmouth conference came in to pay a courtesy call on me. Yuri Zhukov was the leader of them. I had assumed that this would be just a courtesy call. They had wanted to see the President; the President was up in Camp David. The Secretary was over at NATO, so they had to settle for me. Well, this turned oút to be a pretty unpleasant experience. Zhukov apparently had his speech ready in good old Stalinist tradition, going down the line of all the sins, supposed sins, of American foreign policy, and went after me on this. I became fairly provoked and I'm afraid this got a little acid. I must say I find some of

these old time Soviets terribly difficult to deal with. I'm struck by the fact of how naive some of our people are with regard to them. They seem to run after them and fawn on them, and I find this very, very hard to take. Obviously, we have to get along with the Soviets. Obviously, we're going to seek means of doing so. But I think fawning on them is certainly giving them the wrong impression. I feel some of our officials do the same. There's somewhat of a tendency, because the Chinese and the Soviets have been our enemies--not just this Administration--to run after our enemies in efforts to deal with them and to forget our friends. Or let's say relatively to ignore our friends. I find this a very bothersome aspect of our attitude.

I also on Friday had lunch with the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. This is Governor Rockefeller, Frank Pace, Bob Murphy, Gordon Gray. . . well, the rest of the group. I talked to them about my own view of intelligence, the disproportionate effort that I feel was being made in the covert field as compared with the overt field. I pointed out that of all U.S. government representation abroad--I'm not talking about military forces where we have military forces--we are now at the point where about only seven percent are substantive Foreign Service Officers and the remainder are in administration and from other departments and agencies. I feel the whole thing has gotten very, very much out of balance. They didn't deny this. I gave them some figures that really surprised them on this. But, on their part, they feel that the Department, the State Department, does not take a sufficiently vigorous approach in directing the intelligence community. Perhaps we don't. I agree that perhaps we could be more vigorous, and I'd be glad to see us become more vigorous, but of course this has to stem from the Secretary in the first place, and in the second place, the present

concentration of power in the White House on these matters makes it very, very difficult for the Department to assert itself. As I pointed out, over a year ago a NSC Intelligence Committee had been formed. It had had one meeting that lasted about twenty minutes. Another meeting was scheduled last week and was canceled. As a result of which, the Committee has done virtually nothing. Dick Helms, the director of Central Intelligence, has done up, for the first time, a comprehensive study of the whole intelligence community, well, that is, the strategic side or the national government side. But nobody's met on it and no decisions have been made on it, although this is an immense portion of our government. Budget running well over three billion dollars a year, close to four billion dollars a year.

We've got to get ourselves a better sense of priorities with respect to these matters. There's been a tendency over the years to give absolute priority to anything labeled national intelligence or defense intelligence and, as I pointed out, except for strategic weapons in the Soviet Union and some things of that kind, 90 percent of everything we know comes through the overt channels: Ambassadors talking with Prime Ministers, Foreign Service Officers talking with people in the foreign office, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And, for the most part, as I said, I rarely find that the more esoteric and covert aspects of intelligence add very much to that. Usually, if anything, it tends to confirm what we already know. Yet, because that's labeled intelligence, it tends to fascinate people and money tends to be poured into it. I don't say we shouldn't pour money into it, but I think we've got things out of proportion.

Well, I've talked too long for this evening. I think it's time that I turn this off and go to bed. Signing off.

This is Wednesday, December 13, in the evening. Just a few notes before I go to bed tonight.

First, on Monday, the Secretary asked me whether I would be interested in becoming the negotiator for the SALT talks, that is, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This surprised me somewhat and my initial reaction was negative, because I said I had no desire to becometoo closely associated with ACDA. I knew that ACDA had a somewhat negative reputation particularly over in the Pentagon and also among some people on the Hill, and I was not clear that I wanted to become associated with that. Not because I disagreed, but I just was wondering whether or not I could be useful. Well, we talked a little bit about it. He said that there was some thought that it ought to be a younger man to go to Saigon. I said my own first choice still remained Saigon.

I thought about this overnight, over Monday night. And yesterday I told him that, one, I wanted to be sure that they were not trying to make a job for me simply out of sympathy or because they wanted to make a job, but they really wanted me, that is, he and the President. And two, that I would do the SALT job, even though I gave first preference to the job in Saigon, I would do the SALT job if I could do it genuinely as an Ambassador at Large, responsible to he, the Secretary, and the President,and not just working as an arm of ACDA, and that I would want my own backup in the Department of State rather than in ACDA.

Now, I have nothing against ACDA at all. In fact, and I made this clear to the Secretary, given the responsibilities that they had been given, Gerry Smith and these people in ACDA had done a great job. I feel they've

been very unfairly treated by the President. I feel that they've not been given the credit to which they're entitled. But, knowing these prejudices, I wanted to have myself somewhat divorced from them. And I determined that, under the law, that that would be possible. So it was left with him that my first choice would still be Saigon, because I thought that was something I could really put my teeth into. And if that didn't work out or for one reason they didn't want me, I'd be very receptive to the SALT job. Obviously, it's of enormous importance.

I think I have a certain amount of credit over in the Pentagon and I think I have some on the Hill, so I feel maybe I could do a job on it. And it interests me.

Today the Secretary told me that he had talked with Dean Rusk about other things. Dean Rusk said he couldn't understand why in the world I'd want to go back to Saigon. The Secretary, Bill Rogers, said that he knew I was energetic and he was worried that I wouldn't pace myself in Saigon in that heat and that the SALT job would be a place where I could perhaps work out better. And I said--I wasn't trying to be dramatic-- but I said, "I know we can't live forever. And I want to be doing something if I possibly can in which I'm involved and interested." And [I said that] I was still interested in Saigon, but I was not going to insist on that.

Well, later on this morning, he called me in and said that he'd been talking with Scoop Jackson, Senator Jackson, who is very unhappy with ACDA and very unhappy with the way the disarmament talks were going. He had mentioned the possibility of my being involved in the talks and Senator Jackson had been very receptive to this. Well, so it looks at the moment I may be shifting from Asia to strategic arms talks with the Soviets, but this is still wide open.

(24b)

On the Vietnamese side, yesterday I heard nothing. The Secretary heard nothing. This morning, General Haig called me and we had a little difficulty getting together, but we finally got together and he told me there were still three major hangups in Paris. The first was on the DMZ, the demilitarized zone. The second was with respect to the composition of the Council of National Reconciliation and Unity. And the third was with regard to the number of DOD, Department of Defense, civilian employees who would remain. Henry had not been able to resolve these issues and Henry was coming back tonight with the issues still unresolved and [Haig] gave me the text of the announcement on this. Bill Sullivan was staying behind to work on the protocols. He said that there was still a major gap in the concepts between ourselves and Hanoi with respect to the international supervisory machinery.

I passed this all on to the Secretary. Well, I should have mentioned late last night Al, on behalf of the President, had asked for suggestions of ourselves in Defense on sanctions that we could take against Thieu in order to force him into line. Some of our people--I suggested Walt Cutler who coordinated it--worked on this during a good part of the night and, as requested, had the paper over this at eight o'clock there this morning. Not very impressive; there's not much we can do.

Al told me today that he had argued with the President this morning strongly against taking such sanctions as was clear that this should only stiffen Thieu's back; Thieu was in a mood to commit suicide, you might say, and that we would only be doing the North's job for them in using these means to bring down Thieu and that the President finally agreed that we would not seek to use this type of sanction. I told Al that I thoroughly agreed.

As a commentary, the Secretary, Bill Rogers, knew nothing whatsoever about all of this until I told him this morning. He's not been involved. I must say I find it very, very hard to understand how the President treats him. It's very, very humiliating for the Secretary of State to have to learn about some of the greatest decisions that are being made from a subordinate such as myself and not to have been able to participate in the decisions in any way. Not that he would disagree with the decisions. Obviously, he would have agreed with the one this morning. But it doesn't give him any opportunity to participate. The question is: Why does the President want a Secretary of State in whom he doesn't repose greater confidence and on whose advice he seeks? I find this very baffling.

Well, it's a turbulent period. This morning the paper was carrying the story that all the assistant secretaries in the Department of Labor had been discharged. And, let's see, where was it that a large number of others had been discharged? I and the Secretary were talking about this this morning. It's very hard to understand. We have a career Service. These, of course, assistant secretaries are not career officers. They were appointed by this Administration for this Administration. And the Secretary showed me a note from Bob Haldeman enclosing a little column from Ray Cromley, I think it was, saying that the President felt, and the White House felt, that much of the Administration, many in the Administration, had been disloyal to the President, and he was going to get rid of them. (Interruption: telephone)

That was Bill calling from California. He's out there and will be coming back Friday.

Obviously, as I was saying, this question of loyalty works two ways. If the people working for the President feel that he has no confidence in

them, he's ready to throw them out in the street at any moment, obviously this is going to influence their attitude towards him. This question of loyalty has to work two ways. I very, very much feel that he has sort of a paranoia on this whole question of loyalty, quote, unquote, to him. And this is really working against him. I'm sorry to say this, but of course this comes, I suppose, from his background in which he's fought to get where he has and everybody's been against him all the time that he's been going up, and it also comes from this little group of pretty small-minded men there around him. They're not big, broad-minded men. And I think they feed him--I'm talking about John Ehrlichman, I'm talking about Bob Haldeman who are nice enough fellows, and I have no problem with them, but running a country of this size is somewhat beyond their ken. I think they help influence the President in his attitudes. They're seeking more and more to concentrate more and more power in the White House. Well, it's all right. The President should be able to run things the way he wants to run them. But, obviously, they don't have the capacity to run them. I'm somewhat concerned at the way things are going. No personal complaint on my part, because certainly they've been very good and very generous to me.

Well, I think this is about enough for tonight. I'll say over and out.

This is Sunday afternoon, December 17. I've stayed home because I've had a cold and I'm trying to get over that.

Well, quite a few things have happened. Kissinger came back Thursday night. Friday, he spent a lot of time with the President. He was also over and filled in the Secretary. And yesterday morning, he gave a major press conference in which he said that arrangements in the deal that he had worked

out with the North Vietnamese had, in large part, fallen apart by new demands on their part. At the same time, we were having our differences with Thieu, the GVN in Saigon. He had a difficult line to put across to the degree that he said that the deal the North Vietnamese were offering was not acceptable to us to, of course, adjust to that and that they had walked back on what they had previously said. He laid great emphasis on this. Of course, this just goes to prove Thieu's point that they cannot be trusted. And to the degree that he says Thieu has to sign, then he has to say, "Well, the deal is satisfactory." Well,this is a difficult role. He had a real dilemma. He handled it about as well as he could. However, he did say for the first time publicly that if and when we are able to arrive at a deal with the North that the President considered satisfactory, we'll sign regardless of Thieu. The only trouble with that is, it can't be done.

The agreement that has now been worked out depends for its execution upon the cooperation and support of the South Vietnamese. Without their cooperation and support, there's no agreement. Conceivably, we could work out a deal under which we'd stop the bombing and,in return, they'd release the prisoners. And of course this would result in ending all aid to the South--I've gone through this before--because of the attitude of Congress when it comes back. But that isn't the kind of deal that we've worked out. It would take a new negotiation with the North in order to arrive at that kind of a deal.

Al Haig is going out today, I guess it is, yes, to see what can be done in Saigon. I don't see that there's going to be much to be done because the arrangement we now have with the North is not even as good as that that we had previously. Far from improving the agreement, the agreement is not

even as satisfactory as it was a couple of weeks ago. Well, this presents the President with some real dilemmas, real problems. And I feel very deeply for him on it, because they're not easy to answer. It seems quite clear that Henry--well, not just Henry--people have been too optimistic. And the North is now playing on that optimism and, if they can play on it hard enough, they're going to be able to get us to do their job of bringing about the downfall of Thieu, except that I don't think it will happen at the present time. I think Thieu is just too popular now in the South.

Well, it's a very mixed up affair.

Friday I spent the time down at the National War College, what they call their Distinguished Alumni Day, for a seminar there.

The previous day I'd given a lunch for the Japanese who were here for the policy planning talks.

This is still Sunday, December 17, 1972.

I was saying that the day before that, on Wednesday, I had gone down to Charlottesville for the final afternoon of the Policy Planning talks with the Japanese foreign office. The Air Force gave me a helicopter to get down there and Ambassador Ushiba went along with me. I always enjoy those talks. It is one time we have the opportunity for real free interchange. A tradition of free interchange has grown up in those talks. I always enjoy being a little provocative and getting discussion going and the Japanese respond very well. And I enjoy it.

The question I used on them to get the discussion going this time was: "What would be the reaction of Japan if the United States were to announce its intention of renouncing the Security Treaty?" I said, I think

this whole security relationship between us gets discussed entirely too much in terms of Japan doing us a favor by permitting us to protect them and have our bases there. And I like to try to get it turned around, and I use this method of doing so. They all said, of course, that Japan would be enormously shocked and begged us not to do so and so on. I said, "Well, they shouldn't assume that this couldn't happen sometime, if our people feel that Japan is so grudging in carrying out the mild obligations that it has under the treaty, that it isn't worthwhile continuing." This could happen. I don't think it's going to happen, but I think it's good to get them a little concerned about it.

Well, this will be over and out for this time.

Well, this is Christmas day, the evening of Christmas day. Where shall I start?

Tomorrow Jennifer and Patty leave to go to Santa Monica. It's going to be very quiet here without them. It's certainly been nice having them.

Last night, Christmas eve, we had a big dinner. In addition to us, of course, Jennie, Patty, R'Ella and Gerry, Warner and Debby, Betty Warner, Stephen with Judy Rodes and Judy Rodes' brother, David, and Bill, of course. We opened all our presents and ran late. Then Jennie and I sat up and talked until about three o'clock, so I slept in a little bit this morning.

The Secretary left on Friday for the Bahamas over the holidays. Jack Irwin had already gone to Vermont. So I've been in charge, and I've had two things happen. One was a catastrophic earthquake at Managua. However, the Department's organization swung into action fast on it. A task force was established and it took very little effort on my part personally.

However, on Saturday while I was out playing golf, I got a telephone call from the Department that the President had read a statement or a press account of the statement made by Prime Minister Palme of Sweden in which Palme apparently compared the bombing we were doing in North Vietnam to the Nazi atrocities of World War II. I was asked to call the Swedish ambassador in, which I did, and I told him that I found this entirely unacceptable, which I did. I told him that I couldn't think of any precedent in history, really, for a prime minister, head of government,of a friendly state, making a statement of this kind with regard to another state with which it wanted to maintain relations. I said I could only conclude that Sweden did not attach much value to its relations with the United States and therefore our charge in our embassy, John Guthrie, who was here in the States, would not be returning. I also told the Ambassador that, although we had given agrement for his successor and who's to come here in January, I did not feel it would be useful for him to come at this time. I gave him a very hard line on this. I regretted doing so somewhat as he's just leaving and personally I like him. But I treated him pretty roughly.

Incidentally, I got a call from Key Biscayne that the President was very, very pleased with the way I handled it. Yesterday, the Ambassador got a reply, but the reply was simply an explanation of his remarks along with a message to the President in no way apologizing or even expressing any regret that there had been a misunderstanding or alleging a misunderstanding even. I heard him out and said I'd report to the President and just left it at that. I think we should leave it a little impasse for the time being.

I understand from our embassy in Stockholm that the foreign office there is pretty unhappy and I think that's good, because we needed to get them a little concerned about our relations. I must say I find the Swedes very, very difficult to understand. I've always told them that with Vietnam so remote from their own concerns and interests, it's difficult for me to understand why they always attribute to the North Vietnamese the best motives. I find them very, very hard to deal with in this.

Well, I had my physical examination, I saw my doctor on Monday. The heart's coming along all right, but I had some bleeding in my upper colon. I'm going to have to have an examination to see what, if anything, is wrong.

Well, let's see. It's been a great Christmas.

I talked to Bill Porter finally. We were able to get together on a secure phone. We talked about our plans and he hoped to be back here on January 10. I told him that I hoped to leave here on the 19th and, even though he hasn't been confirmed, by that time that he will be able to take over the desk and I can leave. I am very much looking forward to driving down to Florida and then taking a plane over to St. Croix to stay for a week with Jack and Polly Logan over there. I'm really looking for some time off. I've gotten to the point now, when this phone rings, I sort of shrink. I don't know, maybe my nerves are getting a little bit on edge. I don't think so too much, but I've had four years pretty steady go at this. Of course, before that, my three years in Japan when I had no vacation or leave in between. The last real vacation I had was thirty days I took when I came back from Saigon in 1965. And I'm looking forward to having a little time now to myself before I take on new jobs.

Well, this has been a very merry and happy Christmas for me, so I think I'll sign off at this point.

This is the evening of Tuesday, January 2, 1973. A new year has started. My last recording was on Christmas Day. From just before Christmas Day until yesterday, throughout this week, previous week rather, I've been Acting Secretary. Secretary Rogers was down in the Bahamas. Jack Irwin was up in Vermont. And I had the responsibility of the Department. Fortunately, it was a fairly quiet time, but we had a number of things happen, some of which I was involved in and some of which I was not.

We had the problem with Malta. Mintoff is the prime minister of Malta; he was making his usual year-end noises about expelling the British. And I was taking the position that we should call his bluff as the British wanted to do, because I was convinced that appearing to give in to his blackmail would no longer be profitable. If we called his bluff, he may well decide to pull back. I think that's likely. And if not, why, they may throw him out. But just like last year just at this time, I found the White House, quote--I say the White House because I've never been quite clear how much the President himself was involved in this, but we've never been able to put across to the President the question of how you deal with Mintoff. And when I wanted to send out messages that would call his bluff, support the British in doing so, the White House as always, and this time in particular, compromised on this and didn't want to go either one way the whole way or one way or the other. As a result, we've got by January 1 without the thing being decided clearly.

During the week, among the things I've had to handle was a very

outrageous statement by the Swedish Prime Minister comparing the United States with the Nazis during World War II. I was asked by the President to call in the Swedish Ambassador on this subject and deliver a very stern protest. I had no, let's say reservations at all in doing so, because I thought what he had said was absolutely outrageous. And I did call him in. I guess maybe I covered some of this in my previous recording. But, in any event, during this past week, I think after my last recording, most of this has hit the press and got considerable publicity. However, the big event, the biggest event, has been that on Friday afternoon, Dick Kennedy, Colonel Kennedy, asked to come over to see me and Bill Sullivan. He said that understanding had been reached that we and the North would go back into serious negotiations with respect to Vietnam. We would stop the bombing of the North at the 20th parallel, and this would be announced at ten o'clock on Saturday morning. This was indeed good news.

That evening the President called me and said that he was concerned on how to inform Bill Rogers who was down in the Bahamas and keep him informed on this. I told him that I did not feel that the communications to Rogers,who was in Aleuthia, was sufficiently secure to pass this information on to him. I'd simply send him a telegram saying that there would be an important announcement at ten o'clock on Saturday morning which I knew would please him and suggest that he listen to the announcement. [I said] that I had decided that because communications were not sufficiently secure, that this was the best way of handling it.

Well, about a quarter of nine on Saturday, I got a call through the Navy, through Patrick Air Force Base, that the Secretary was trying to reach me, and the connection was very poor. We didn't get together until the

the Secretary went to the telephone office in Aleuthia and reached me about fifteen minutes before the announcement was made. The security on it not being as important at that time, I explained to him what had happened.

Since then I've had further talks with Dick Kennedy and have been briefed on the exchange of messages between ourselves and the North. It seems quite clear again, as I pointed out to the Italian Ambassador who was in today, that the President has called these things pretty well. The President has a good appreciation of the situation. He has a good appreciation of the toughness of the people with whom we're dealing. And while some of the press, including the Italian Ambassador Ortona when he was in today, talked about this in terms of we stopping the bombing as if we'd given in to the pressure and stopped the bombing and then resumed negotiations.

I pointed out to him the fact that it was quite the opposite. The fact was that the other side had undertaken to enter into serious negotiations again, and we had then stopped the bombing which is quite a different picture. I explained to him, as I explained to the Dutch Ambassador last Friday, that in 1968 we'd had many people who told us that if we'd only stop the bombing, nice things would happen, but never been very specific. President Johnson had stopped the bombing; we finally got together around the table in Paris; four years had gone by and no real progress was made on an agreement. Then the great '72 attack, spring of '72 attack, came from the North. Then we mined Haiphong and started the bombing of the North again and also the private talks and then the story was that, if we'd only stop the bombing again, nice things would happen. We stopped the bombing and they stopped really meaningful negotiations. We started the bombing again and now they say they're ready for serious negotiations. And we shall see.

I said to the Dutch Ambassador, before I knew the decision the President had made, that as far as I was concerned, my own view would be that we should not again stop the bombing until we'd had an agreement. However, the President has decided to do so. But the one thing I have pointed out to the Dutch, I also pointed out to the Italian today is that I think the other side now recognizes that the President is prepared to start bombing again unless we're able to get the satisfactory agreement. And, even after we get an agreement, I think it's important that we maintain a posture of being willing to go back to bombing again as a deterrent against breaking the agreement.

I said to both the Italian and the Dutchman that the NATO countries above all should appreciate the importance of deterrence. I don't know where the South Vietnamese, Thieu's, going to stand on this. We'll have to see what kind of agreement we can get and then we'll see where we go from there.

The Secretary, Secretary Rogers, came back from the Bahamas on Sunday night. And Bill Sullivan, who was carrying on so-called tactical talks over in Paris, and I met with the Secretary for about an hour Sunday night, that's New Year's Eve. Bill Sullivan went over yesterday, that's New Year's Day, to Paris to open up the talks. And the Secretary is back now, somewhat to my relief, although I think I managed things fairly well and think I managed them in a way the Secretary and the President would like.

Tonight I had a call from the Secretary that the White House may tomorrow want to make the announcement of my appointment as Ambassador at Large at the same time they announce Gerry Smith's resignation as director of ACDA, is accepted. I said I was prepared to have these announced at the

same time if it was made very clear that I was not taking Gerry's place in ACDA. I wanted to make it very clear that I am not an ACDA partisan. I'm not going to be running ACDA, but rather I'm going to be acting on behalf of the whole government.

(24c)

The New Year's started off pretty well. On Saturday, we had the announcement of the resumption of talks in Paris. On Sunday, the Redskins won the national conference football championship here in a game with the Dallas Cowboys. And Monday was a perfectly superb New Year's Day. Temperatures in the sixties, sun shining, and a beautiful day out on the golf course. So the New Year has started off very well. We will hope that it finishes up the same way.

Over and out.

This is Sunday, January 7, 1973. I stayed home today and didn't play golf because it was too cold. It was 18 degrees this morning, according to the radio. The doctors warned me not to subject myself to too severe cold. It was cold yesterday. I played nine holes of golf with Bob Murphy, Marshall Green and Wynn Brown. It would have been all right except it was windy, so I quit after nine holes.

Last night, Don Westmore of my office and his wife had a nice little party over at their place with just the office there. I have very nice people in the office, I must say, and I'm sorry to see an office like this break up.

On Thursday, the New York Times published an article saying that I was going to take Gerry Smith's place in the Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union. The article said that Smith had been treated very badly by the

Administration. This is right. I entirely agree. So does the Secretary. I've never quite understood it, because Gerry very faithfully carried out his instructions, very faithfully carried out his orders. The deal with the Soviets that was most criticized was the one that Henry arranged here with Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, that it, the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons which permits the Soviet Union to continue to increase the number of their submarines. I don't say he could have gotten any different agreement, but it was severely criticized. And Smith wasn't responsible for it at all. In meetings, Henry used to treat Gerry with great disdain at times; and also the President as well. And in Moscow at the time of the signing of the agreements there, he was almost completely ignored. I'm surprised that he stayed on as long as he did.

Well, the Times'article points out that it was felt that he was treated badly and then it went on to say that I was going to be appointed to take his place as a negotiator, but would not head up ACDA. This is, of course, correct. I think I've said previously on this tape that my thought is that part of Gerry's problems arose from the fact that he was looked upon, I don't say rightly so, as a special pleader for ACDA, at the same time, the negotiator. I hope by divorcing myself from ACDA, I will have more freedom of action and in fact will be able to get agreements or get positions here in the government that could not be achieved if they were held out only as ACDA positions.

The New York Times editorial today, the Sunday editorial, is praising Gerry and rightly so. And it says that, while I'm a good tough career officer and a good negotiator, they fear that I will not have the same zeal as Gerry did for reduction in armaments. That, of course, is not true. I'll go about

it in my own way and see if I can do a better job than Gerry was able to do from the position he occupied, a better job in bringing along the Chiefs and the Department of Defense, and the Congress, particularly the Armed Services Committee.

Elliot Richardson called me on, I forget, Tuesday, well, the first part of the week. We had a long talk, first, with regard to SALT, then with regard to his organization for SALT over there. He also sought my views on some of the personnel appointments, particularly the assistant secretary for ISA. We discussed a number of people and I came down quite strongly in favor of--and I think he was receptive to the idea--Dick Rubottom, who is a career Foreign Service Officer, who was let go by Johnson. I don't remember exactly why; something going on down in Argentina. We were going to offer him a position in this Administration; then he got in a very bad automobile accident and spent almost a year crippled, or in the hospital. Now he's head of the University of the Americas in Mexico. But I know he wants to come back. I very much hope that he might be appointed to ISA. We also talked about retaining Paul Nitze for the disarmament negotiations. I said, from my standpoint, I personally very much hope that he could be retained and kept on, because I have great regard for Paul. I think that he's an excellent representative for Defense, somebody with whom I could work, and we could work together. Elliot and I talked about the virtues of having Paul back here as opposed to having him on the delegation. As I told Elliot, I feel about seventy-five percent of the job is, in fact, back here, that is, getting the government together on positions that can be taken in the negotiations; about twenty-five percent is perhaps negotiating with the Soviets. Perhaps that

isn't the proper proportion, but my point is this: that a big part of the job is back here. Elliot talked about setting up an ad hoc organization in Defense. Gardner Tucker, the present systems analysis man, has been the focal point in Defense on disarmament matters. ISA has not been in it at all. And there's some virtue, I think, in setting up an ad hoc organization. However, as Elliot pointed out, and I'm sure would be the case, the Chiefs do not favor it. Well, on Friday, Paul Nitze himself called me and we talked about this. I told him, from my standpoint, I very much wanted him, very much hoped that he would stay on , but that I was in no position to commit the White House on this. I did not know what their attitude might be. I knew that they wanted to have a new image, you might say, a new face on the negotiations, but, as far as I knew, it certainly didn't extend to Paul. However, I was in no position to offer him anything at the moment, until I'd checked this out.

I spoke to Henry Kissinger Friday evening at the White House party they were having for Al Haig. I gathered from him that the President may have some reservations with regard to Paul. I don't know why. I was very sorry to hear it. I passed this on to Elliot Richardson on Saturday morning and suggested that before making a firm offer to Paul that he be sure to check it out, because it would be embarrassing to make an offer to him and then have to withdraw it. I also had a long talk with Phil Farley, who is the deputy in ACDA, a career officer, formerly head of political military section of the Department. And when I came back in '69, I agreed to release him to go to ACDA, because I did feel that the job was so important. He is now somewhat at sea, but as I told him, I hoped he would stay on. ACDA's

budget is being cut by one-third, but they have two hundred and fifty people. On the surface, it seems too many to me and Phil agrees that they can take this cut, as far as people are concerned. It's hard on their morale, but I don't think it's going to have much effect on the negotiations, or on their ability to take positions.

I've also been dealing during this past week with the Malta situation. Mintoff is again making demands on the British. I'm trying to find a position that I think we can take a stand on. This arises over the devaluation of the British pound; Mintoff wants to be reimbursed. We and the Italians and the others, the other non-British are offering to pay him, in effect, the same amount of dollars as we would have paid if the pound had not been devalued. This will not fully meet his demands, but is some gesture towards him. What I'm trying hard to do is to get approval from the President to make this a final stand; that is, if he doesn't accept it that we just say that this is it, and we're not prepared to go any further or give in to any further blackmail from him. So we'll see what happens. The President has always been very reluctant to do this. I don't see that we're going to resolve this until we really play brinksmanship with him as the British want to, and see whether or not he takes it. If he doesn't take it, why, then, hope that the economic loss that the Island will suffer as a result of the departure of the British will eventually bring about Mintoff's downfall. He is a very, very hard man to deal with. However, part of the problem here is, as I told the Secretary on Friday, the British really want to get out of Malta and the Maltese really want them out. So what we're trying to do is to keep two very unwilling partners together, and this is a hard thing to accomplish.

I went to the memorial service for President Truman on Friday; after that, the Secretary had a lunch for foreign guests. I saw some people I hadn't seen for a long time: Paul Martin, who used to be minister of external affairs up in Canada, is now senator there, with whom I did a lot of negotiating on Law the Sea problems, was there; and C.K. Yen, the Vice President of China, a very fine person; and Romulo, Foreign Affairs Minister of the Philippines; and a number of others as well.

As a footnote, Thursday night the Korean Ambassador had a party to the Korean Prime Minister, Kim Chong Pil, who was here, the Foreign Minister also. As an amusing little footnote, Passman and I spoke to each other there, and Passman said that he's just been out to Thailand, and they were doing a great job out there. I said I thoroughly agreed; I said that they'd been very good friends of ours. Then he said to me, "Well, you remember when I--remember those battles?" Well, how was it he put it? In any event, he recalled the visit he made when I was there about 1958-59. At that time, he was being very critical of the Friendship Highway which was then being built. He called it the road that began nowhere and ended nowhere. When he arrived, I tried hard to get him up to see it; told him,"Here's my car-- we were at the airport--"we can get up there in an hour. Let's go up and see it." And he said, "No." In effect, if he saw it, he might have to change his mind. Well, the other evening he said, "Remember those bad old days when I was against foreign aid?" And I said, " I sure do." "Well," he said, "those days are over now. I'm giving the President my full support. He's doing a great job." I must say the President has done a great job in bringing Passman around.

I'm still hoping to get away on the 19th and get down to the Virgin

Islands, down to St. Croix, for a week. Planning to drive down; I hope to leave here on the 19th, drive down to Miami and then take a plane over to St. Croix on the 23rd and then come back on the 30th and get back here around the 5th, is my present plans.

The next SALT meeting which I'll have to attend is now scheduled for Geneva on February 27. I feel that this is a little bit early; hope that I'll be able to extend the date a little bit so as to get better prepared. I also, of course, will have to have my hearing and be confirmed in my job as Ambassador at Large. On Tuesday, I'm doing a TV program with Dina Clark. We'll see how that works out. Tomorrow I'm having an X-ray, barium examination of my lower intestines. The last examination indicated a little bleeding, and the doctor didn't think it was anything alarming, that probably it was arising from the drug that I was taking. But nevertheless, I have to have this examination tomorrow. Today I'm entirely on liquids, all day. Have the examination tomorrow.

Jennifer and Patty are in Santa Monica. She seems to be getting well settled there. Bill's in his new house in Virginia, and the world goes on.

Over and out.

This is Monday, January 15. Well, I was just listening to the last part of my last recording. The physical exam I had was very strenuous, but turned out all right.

On Monday the 8th, the White House also made its formal announcement that I was to head the chief delegate of the SALT talks and, during this week, I've been enormously busy trying to organize my staff for the SALT talks. The word is I'm supposed to have a new image as compared with the previous

talks. At the same time, I have to have some institutional memory and I've been trying to find out how I can organize these things, at the same time carrying on my work as Under Secretary. I had hoped this week, on the 18th, to turn over my job to Bill Porter, and on the 19th to leave town. But it doesn't look like it's going to work out. I was just so much hoping to have some leave this time. The Foreign Relations Committee has not yet acted on the nominations of new appointees,and the Secretary's theory is that, until they are confirmed and sworn in, Jack Irwin and I retain our present posts and have to stay on the job. I'm not happy about this. I really don't think, technically, that it's correct, and I hope to find some way of getting away, because I face the beginning of the SALT talks with the Soviets on February 27. I don't have much time to prepare for them and also get my delegation together for the talks.

On Sunday, yesterday, I did a program on TV, Dina Clark's "Moment With." I'd promised her for four years I was going to do this, and it worked out fairly well. She had us over there for lunch in order to look at the program. I had taped it on Tuesday, and I've got some nice comments on it.

Today, I had a long session with the White House fellows before they went on a trip to Japan and to the Soviet Union and to Europe, and so I'm gradually trying to work myself out of this job. But I don't know when I'm going to be able to do so. I've selected my staff aide for the SALT talks; I've also selected the executive secretary. And I very much want to keep Paul Nitze on board from the Defense Department, but I don't yet have political clearance from the White House for doing so. There's also no director of ACDA yet appointed, so I have my problems on that. Well, I see, I'm

getting down to the end of this tape; there are a lot more things I could discuss, I suppose, at this time, but perhaps I'll leave it here and sign off and see what happens.

Also had a meeting this week with Dr. Eisenhower, Milton Eisenhower, on the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty problem with which I've been working. In talking with Bill Porter about the job that he's taken on, i realize how varied the many things are that I've been engaged in, and how interesting the past four years have been. I'm afraid that I've not done justice to them on these tapes, but at least I've tried to suggest some of the areas in which I've been working. Some of the problems and some of the slavery, if you will, here in Washington.

I don't know, I guess maybe I should call it off at this point, see whether or not I'm going to be able to get myself a little vacation before I start a new career here in SALT, and this remains to be seen. I'm somewhat disappointed at my ability to work this out, as I very much wanted some time off and Jack Irwin did, too, but Jack has had a lot more time, a lot more vacations than I've had. I wish he'd volunteered to stay around while I took some time off, but he doesn't show any signs of doing so. (24d)

It's January 15, 1973. I just finished off tape 20 on this same date and I was saying then that I hoped very much it was going to be possible for me to take a little vacation. We've been invited down to the Virgin Islands by Jack and Polly Logan before I got too deeply involved in the SALT talks to which I've now been appointed. But looks like I'll probably not be able to do so. This is a little discouraging to me. I really think that, technically, it would be possible for me to do so, but the Secretary's taken

the position that until Jack Irwin's successor, that is, Ken Rush, and my successor, Bill Porter, have been confirmed and have taken their oaths, that both Jack and I remain technically in our positions and should remain on board. I'm going to take this up again tomorrow because my point is that, even though technically I'm still Under Secretary, it's possible for me to take leave as such, and it's possible for Bill Porter to come on as a Foreign Service Officer and carry out many of the functions I've been carrying out.

If I don't take leave at this time, I don't know when I'll get it as the next talks with the Soviets on the SALT are scheduled at Geneva on February 27. There have been virtually no preparations in this government for the talks. My staff from the other agencies is still not decided because I have to wait to hear what Elliot Richardson is planning to do with regard to organizing Defense on this. I've talked with him about it and we've talked about personalities. I very much hope that Paul Nitze is going to be able to stay on. I expect and hope that the JCS, the Chiefs, will change their representative and I've talked to Admiral Moorer about this.

As far as ACDA, the disarmament agency,is concerned, they still don't have the new head appointed. Until he's appointed, I really have no way of knowing how they're going to handle it. My problem is I'm supposed to present a new image that's more compatible with those who are more skeptical with regard to the agreements we made on SALT. In this regard, it is anomalous, if you will, that the agreement which is most subject to question, that is, the ability of the Soviets to continue to increase their nuclear ballistic missile submarine force, was not negotiated by SALT negotiators or Gerry Smith, but rather negotiated directly between Henry Kissinger and Dobrynin. One of the problems I'm going to have is to what degree I'm really

going to be the negotiator on this and to what degree things will be done behind my back.

Well, over the weekend word came, an announcement out of Paris came, that Henry Kissinger was on his way back to report to the President at Key Biscayne,and General Haig was asked to come down there to meet with them. Today the announcement was made that we've stopped all bombing of North Vietnam. General Haig is on his way to Saigon to explain everything to President Thieu. The Secretary says that he's talked with, quote, the White House, unquote, over the weekend and they don't want to say anything. Meanwhile, Bill Porter, Marshall Green and I who have been dealing with these affairs have not the slightest idea what kind of an agreement may have been worked out in Paris. We're very, very much in the dark, and I suspect that the Secretary's considerably in the dark, although today the announcement also came out that Henry Kissinger had talked to Senator Mansfield as well as to Senator Scott, explained the situation to them. So we're in the anomalous position of the Senate, the North Vietnamese--and if the North Vietnamese know it, I'm sure the French--and when Al Haig gets there, Saigon, is going to know much more about what's going on than any of us. I find this a somewhat difficult position to accept, and very hard to carry out responsibilities.

In the meanwhile, the President has taken a very rough attitude towards all those countries that have been criticizing us. I think that their criticism comes even from the Dutch, the Canadians and people like that, as well as even the Germans. The German Minister of Finance made a critical statement over here in the United States. I think that they're really stupid on this, and I find it very hard to put up with it. And, of course, the President

gets very impatient with this. Tuesday, the Canadian Ambassador wanted to come in to see me. We were instructed by the White House that we were not to receive him above the desk officer level and I had to turn down the Canadian Ambassador Marcel Cadieux, who I've been associated with over the years. I had to turn him down, had to tell him I couldn't see him. We're taking a very, very hard attitude towards all the criticism that we're receiving. Well, as the Secretary said at this morning's meeting, "If this all works out and we're able to bring about an agreement in Vietnam, of course, this will all be forgotten. If it doesn't work out, then we have a real job of repairing our associations around the world and explaining why it didn't work out." And this remains to be seen. You've got to admire the courage of the President. You can understand his impatience with those who are criticizing what he's trying to do. As I said to the Swedes, well, I said to some others that have come in to see me previously, the supposition that we Americans enjoy making war, that the President enjoys making war, and that we're not as earnestly seeking peace as they think we should is just unacceptable. Obviously, putting everything else aside, whatever ideas or attitudes they may have towards Americans, the political imperatives are that we seek peace. The President is certainly doing so. And we don't enjoy being lectured by countries who have no responsibility in the situation. However, as I also pointed out today as we were discussing this in the Secretary's office, we of the United States, back in the thirties before World War II, were inclined also to take this very lofty attitude, lecture other countries as to what they should do and express pious sentiments which had no relationship to the realities of the situation then prevailing.

Well, I think I've gone on long enough for tonight. We'll see what happens in the next forty-eight hours. I think I'll make this over and out.

This is Sunday, January 21. It's been a fairly active week. As I think I said previously, I had hoped to turn over my job to Bill Porter on Friday morning. . . well, leave Thursday night and turn over my job to him on Friday morning, my feeling being that he could still assume the position, well, assume the desk, even though he had not been confirmed, just as I did back in 1969 when I was two or three weeks on the job before I was ever confirmed. Obviously, I was careful not to use the title and also as far as legal matters were concerned, I was careful not to use the title and also as far as legal matters were concerned, I was careful not to sign things that I was not authorized to sign, but, nevertheless, I felt that the Secretary would probably want the new team--he and the President would want the new team on board at the time of the inauguration.

So this is the basis from which I have been planning. I had planned to leave on Friday morning with your grandmother and Senko-San to drive down to Florida. Just take a real vacation and then fly over to St. Croix for a stay of a week over there with Jack and Polly Logan, play some golf, and then fly back, and then drive back again. I was planning about two weeks or so of a little vacation in here. Well, it didn't work out. The Secretary may well have to leave tomorrow or the next day to sign the agreement with the North Vietnamese, and with Jack Irwin having already left, it would have meant that the mantle, if you will, of the Acting Secretary would have descended fairly far down the line, further than the Secretary wanted it to descend. He, therefore, asked me to postpone these arrangements and stay

on as Under Secretary, first, because I'd been involved for so long of course with the Vietnamese affairs, and he wanted me around for that, and, next, if he had to leave before Bill Porter was confirmed, then I would be able to assume the position of Acting Secretary.

The story's been, of course, and it's quite true that Bill Fulbright has been dragging his feet in his usual fashion with respect to confirmation because of his unhappiness that the Secretary has not appeared for a public hearing up there in which he, Bill Fulbright, would try to show how bright he is and castigate the Secretary publicly on the Vietnam War. It's very cheap, really very cheap politics, but this is the kind of thing to which he descends, being more interested in his own image than he is in the country as a whole. I find it pretty disgusting. Well, as a result of this, the Foreign Relations Committee had not held any hearings on new nominations in the Department. The story was that last week the Foreign Relations Committee didn't even hold a hearing because Senator Fulbright was traveling in the Caribbean. Why the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee should be traveling in the Caribbean just after Congress convenes again is beyond me, but that's the way he acts. However, the last word that we have is that the hearings on Ken Rush and Bill Porter and Bill Casey will be held on Wednesday. And the hearings on myself and some of the others will be held on Thursday of this week. If that's the case, then we should be able to have our confirmations by the end of the week or the first part of next week. And then I'll be able to get rid of my present job and turn it over to Bill Porter and get to work full-time on SALT. I've been trying to do both things in the meanwhile.

I've had some discussions with Elliot Richardson, the new Secretary

of Defense; with Paul Nitze who has been the Defense representative on the SALT negotiations who I hope will be able to stay on; with Phil Farley and Sy Weiss; Ron Spires; and I had a long discussion with Henry Kissinger on this also. The more I have gotten into this, the more unhappy I am that we do not have any clear idea of where we would like to end up in SALT. As I often say in dealing with international negotiations, I like to have a pretty clear idea of where we want to come out, the communique or whatever it is, and then when we know where we want to come out, then you can work back from that. In the case of these SALT negotiations, it's evident that we do not have any clear idea of where we want to come out. And so it's going to be a matter of ad hoc negotiations, cautiously treading our way down to a corner, and once we reach the corner, looking around the corner to see whether or not we can or want to try to go around it or step back. It's a very unsatisfactory situation, very unsatisfactory situation for a negotiator. But, nevertheless, I'll probably have to put up with it. As I told Henry I very much want to use Paul Nitze, and Elliot Richardson does also. But Henry feels that the President has some concerns about Paul Nitze. I just can't imagine what they might be. Of course, he's a Democrat, but that's really not the issue in a negotiation of this kind. He's going to check this out and let me know sometime during the course of the week.

I've also been trying to get my executive secretary of the delegation lined up. I've chosen John Ausland, who's now DCM in Oslo; however,he has many desires of his own. He wants to be stationed in Geneva and he wanted to have the title of minister, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. If this goes on much longer, I'm simply going to drop him and try to find somebody else, but it's not going to be easy to do so.

Let's see what else I have been doing during this week. Let's see, the Japanese Ambassador Ushiba just came back and I had a long talk with him about the situation in Japan and the disappointing results of the elections as far as the LDP, the Government Party, was concerned. I had a meeting with George Ball on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I'm still working on trying to get support for them. I noted that Jack Irwin has been away much more than I have and perhaps he could stay on instead of myself, but the Secretary made it clear that he wanted me to stay on, even thoygh Jack Irwin was leaving.

I did a TV spot for distribution in this country on SALT. I suppose I mentioned on my last tape that I'd done a program on foreign affairs with Dina Clark on Sunday, January 14. I got quite a few compliments on it. I think I did fairly well. The program, though, only has local distribution and has no real national impact at all. I wish I could have a tape of it. I do think I did the program quite well.

On Friday, I went over and called on Prime Minister Sato, former Prime Minister Sato, and had a long talk with him over the situation in Japan and relations between the countries. Felt like old times; Jim Wickle was interpreting for me, and Sato and I, of course, have spent many, many hours with each other. And we had said, it was sort of natsukashii; it was sort of sentimental to be coming back again to talking with each other. One of the interesting things he said was that, with respect to the losses of the LDP party in the last election and the unexpected gains of the communists, Japanese communists, the interesting thing is that people voted for the communists because in that way they felt that they could vote for independence, independence from the United States, independence from China, and

that the Socialist Party is of course tied to Peking. It also has a very unrealistic policy called unarmed neutrality, whereas the Communists don't talk about unilateral disarmament on the part of Japan. They do talk about independence; there was dissatisfaction with the rate of inflation in Japan and, therefore, the Communists had had considerable appeal, contrary to the situation in the past.

When I was over at the White House this morning waiting to see Henry Kissinger, I saw a number of people come in: Don Kendall of Pepsi-Cola and David Kennedy. I pointed out to Don that the rate of inflation now in Japan is much higher than ours and that I had hopes that during the first quarter of this year that this rate of inflation in Japan would result in showing a turn in the trade balance between ourselves and Japan. Not that it would turn around, but that the gap would be somewhat reduced.

It's been an active week, heading down towards the end of this job that I'm on. I'm not unhappy at seeing the end of it. It's going to be interesting to take on another job. Yesterday, of course, was inauguration day. Although we had tickets, I didn't fancy sitting out in the cold watching either the inauguration or the parade, and I went out and played golf. I watched the actual swearing-in as of noon. Last night Shelby Davis, our ambassador in Switzerland, invited us to dinner and then to the ball, so-called Inauguration Ball. We had a very pleasant dinner. The ball was an absolute mob scene. We went to the one at the Museum of Science and Technology. You just couldn't move. We were in Shelby Davis' so-called box, couple of two by fours, little platform with some eight chairs on it. He paid a thousand dollars for this. And lights, crowd, noise. I find it very hard to understand why people feel that this is enjoyable, but I suppose for

people from out of town to say that they were at the same ball with the President -- there were five balls and the President can only put in a very brief appearance at each, of course -- I suppose means something, but I find it fairly baffling. We left our coats in the car so as not to have the problem of trying to recover them when we left. Then it took a little time for the car to show up and the wind was blowing. It was down below freezing, so we got pretty cold standing there, but we got home about 1:30 this morning.

I went out to Chevy Chase at 10:00 and played twenty-seven holes of golf and got away with it very well. It was quite chilly; it was freezing, but there was no wind and it was very, very pleasant. I do enjoy really getting out in the open.

Well, I think I'll make this over and out as far as this evening. Over and out.

I see my last recording was on January 15. Today is Thursday, January 25. It's been an eventful ten days. First, of course, was the inauguration on January 20 of President Nixon for his second term. Just two days after that, on January 22, the death of President Johnson. Then on Tuesday evening, January 23, the announcement by President Nixon of the successful conclusion of the negotiations with North Vietnam for the cease-fire in South Vietnam as well as in Laos and in Cambodia. Then, today, Thursday, the 25th, the funeral services here for President Johnson, which I attended. It is now six o'clock in the evening.

So many things to go back over. I hardly know where to start. As far as the inauguration is concerned, I did not attend. It was a fairly cold and windy day and, although I had invitations, I felt that sitting in

the cold would not be good for me, so I played golf, watched the actual swearing-in itself on TV. Then that evening, I went out to dinner at the invitation of Shelby Davis, our ambassador in Switzerland, and then we went to the ball at the Museum of Science and Technology. I found it to be an incredible crush--thousands of people. You just couldn't move or do anything. I understand that Ambassador Davis paid a thousand dollars for the little so-called box of eight chairs in it that we had. The crush of people was literally so great that you just couldn't move around. I said to your grandmother that if they packed cattle in a car that way, or a truck, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals would protest. And I don't mean that entirely as a joke. Maybe I'm getting old, but it seems to me that these things are sort of outmoded, but nevertheless people come. I suppose the large part--I saw very few people I knew--most of them are out of town people who have contributed, I suppose, worked in the campaign and don't get a chance to get close to the President. Well, there were five balls that night. The President made brief appearances at each, and it was a lucky visitor indeed that would have any opportunity to get close to him.

I also might say that Prime Minister Sato, former Prime Minister Sato, came here as the personal guest of the President for the inauguration and on Friday, the 19th, I called on him. We had a long talk about affairs in Japan. We talked about the economic situation and the fact that inflation there is going up much faster than here,which should help in the trade picture. As far as the election was concerned, the LDP party lost fairly heavily in the last election; the Communist party gained. He explained this by saying that the person now, a Japanese now, can vote for the Communist party; he's voting

for independence. [He said] that the Communist party has broken its ties with Peking; its ties with Moscow are not very clear to the people. It doesn't have the unrealistic policy of the socialists of unarmed neutrality. On the whole, it does not encourage violence, and for those people who want to vote for an independent Japan, that is, a Japan that has no ties to either the United States or China, the Communist party offers a good out and is fairly attractive. And, of course, a large part of the vote is a protest vote against the inflation. Well, he and I had a long, long talk, about an hour and a half, and I enjoyed seeing him again. It was somewhat like old times. It was good,as we both said,to be able to sit down and talk that way. Mrs. Sato came in at the end of the talk and gave me a present for your grandmother. The Prime Minister was planning to give me a lunch in my honor on the 23rd, but that turned out also to be the only day on which Secretary Rogers could give a lunch. Thus, the Prime Minister's lunch for me was canceled out. But, of course, I attended the lunch of Secretary Rogers. At the time we were giving the lunch, we knew that Henry Kissinger had arrived at an agreement in Paris; not only Henry, but our delegation there. But we were unable to say anything to him about it.

Well, the next thing, of course, is the agreement on Vietnam. It's obviously a monumental accomplishment. And Henry Kissinger deserves full credit. Bill Sullivan and George Aldrich from the legal section did the negotiation and drafting of the protocols. Henry did the negotiating and drafting of the main points of the agreement. Bill Sullivan, also, of course, worked with him on that. So it was a real team effort, and Henry gave full credit to State participation in this at his press conference and spoke very glowingly to both Bill Porter and myself who had helped on it on the help

Bill Sullivan and George Aldrich had been to him. Speaking of Bill Sullivan, I had known--well, the President spoke directly to me once about it--about the President's suspicions that Bill Sullivan was, quote, a Harriman, unquote, man because he worked faithfully for Harriman in the Laos negotiations. The President is now convinced and Henry is now convinced that, as a real professional, able and loyal officer, Sullivan gives his loyalty to wherever he's working for. And I'm glad to see this. My hope is that he will get a good post. Well, I've been assured that he'll be getting the Philippines, which I think is very appropriate and a good post for him which he will enjoy. (24e)

The agreement itself is just about as good, I might say, I think it's in many ways better than I would have thought it possible to negotiate. The North has given up most of its major principles and, as we say, if both sides really want to stop this war, this agreement is the way to do it. If they don't want to stop it, no amount of drafting an agreement is going to change things. Secretary Rogers is leaving tomorrow for Paris to have the signing ceremony on Saturday, and then coming right back. It's a little anomalous that he's signing an agreement in which he had so little to do with the negotiations, but he's a good soldier, too. And all we can say is that it's not important who does what, what agency does what. What's important is what's done, and what's been done is a great historic job of work. It'll remain to be seen during the next few weeks how it's going to work out.

Your Uncle Stephen has volunteered to go to Vietnam with the extra group of officers that we're sending there to observe conditions during the early part of the agreement. He's a fine officer and a fine fellow, and I certainly am proud of him. I hope that he can get promoted.

Today, as I said, I went to the funeral services for President Johnson. They were very moving and very simply done, but very moving. Of course, admission was only by invitation. I was one of the few people in this Administration who also was appointed in Johnson's Administration. He appointed me three times: he appointed me as a Deputy Ambassador in Vietnam; then when I returned from there, he appointed me back to my old position as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs; then in 1966, he appointed me as Ambassador to Japan.

I was reminiscing about President Johnson today with the Secretary and others, and the thing that impressed us about him was that he was, in many ways, bigger than life. Whatever he did, he did it more vigorously and in a larger way than anybody else. If he was being mad, he could get madder than anybody else. If he was being kind, he could be kinder than anybody else. If he was being crude, he could be cruder. If he was being gracious, he could be more gracious. He was big physically, also. He was a big man, a man with big ideas, big physically, big and somewhat overpowering in everything that he did. The effect he had on people was indicated by a State Department officer I was talking to today, who formerly worked over in the NSC during Johnson's time. He said that he simply couldn't go to the funeral, because he simply couldn't control his emotions if he did. He's a relatively young fellow. He said that he worked for Johnson; he didn't know if Johnson even knew who he was; he'd taken some visitors in to see him. But he did not have any direct or had very little in the way of direct association. He was on Walt Rostow's staff. He didn't think Johnson even knew him. And then one night at a dinner for visiting dignitary, Johnson stopped the line and talked to his wife, that is, this officer's wife,

spoke very appealing to her on how much he appreciated what her husband was doing for him, what a sacrifice he knew it was for her, how he knew he was unreasonable and demanding, but nevertheless, this officer always came through. And he said he was just overwhelmed by it, and from then on, he was Johnson's slave--well, that isn't the word, but he just had enormous affection for him.

Talking about that Johnson reminiscing, I think I probably have included in these tapes some place--if not, I should have included my first contact with him as Vice President, when he made his trip to Southeast Asia and I dealt with him at that time. He took Frank Meloy, my staff aide, along with him and, when he came back, he wanted to keep Frank. Frank did not want to go on his staff, so I said no to him--that is, to the President, then Vice President. He tried several times and I said, no, of course, politely. Johnson never forgot that, but at the same time he, obviously, never held it against me. Then when he sent me to Vietnam, I remember that night that we talked about this. We were having a reception at the Indonesian Embassy and he was present, and he spotted your grandmother across the room. He didn't know her too well; he didn't know her very well, as a matter of fact. He went over and spoke to her about how enormously grateful he was that I was taking this job; he knew what a sacrifice it was for her and all this, and in the most gracious terms. Then he said he wanted her to know that he would see to it that she got what she wanted, which everybody that was standing there listening knew was to go to Japan. Then later on, he could get into a towering rage over rumors that I was going to be sent to Japan. But he, of course, was the origin of

them. And with all due credit to him, I eventually went to Japan, although his habit had been when any rumor got out about anybody getting a job or a position, he would change it or cancel it, just to show that the papers were wrong. But, in my case, he carried through.

My last talk with him was when I came back here at the end of '68 to talk about taking the present job. After it was agreed that I'd do so, I called up Walt Rostow and said I'd simply like to pay my respects to President Johnson before I left. He invited me right over and I went over. Even though I was going to work for Nixon, he invited me right over. We sat down in a little room off the main office there, the Oval Room--I have a picture of that--and talked just about an hour, over an hour, it was. Just reminiscing and talking about things. We were not close personal friends, but I really felt close to him at that time; felt sorry for him, of course, too, sad, because he had not been able to finish the Vietnam War.

And the anomalous thing and the tragic thing in many ways is that he died just two days before this agreement was entered into. I do so wish that he would have been able to have lived to have seen this agreement, because he devoted such an enormous amount of energy to the war. I'm afraid those who advised him perhaps--well, I suppose I shouldn't say perhaps--obviously, we didn't advise him too well. And if, with the wisdom of hindsight, perhaps we could have avoided some of the situations which we got into. But there was never any recrimination from him against anybody. He was a big man, he was a kind man. He could be a vindictive man, too. I'd go back to what I said: he was bigger than life, in just all aspects of his character and everything that he did.

Because of his funeral and death, we still have not had the confirmation hearings on the new nominations, so I'm still Under Secretary, and with the Secretary going away tomorrow, I'll again be Acting Secretary. I've been up to my neck in work, carrying on my old job and also trying to get ready for the SALT talks, and I'm trying desperately to get away for a little holiday. I'm asking the Soviets to postpone the opening of the next round on February 27 to the middle of March, and I'm waiting on their reply.

Well, this is all.

Today, February 6. Well, quite a bit has happened since my last tape on Thursday, January 25. First, where shall I start? Let me go back.

To go back chronologically, as I said, with the Secretary gone, I became Acting Secretary. And on Friday, I saw some of the visitors that had been here for President Johnson's funeral service the morning of the 25th. I went to the church, and it was a very impressive service. I'm sure that he would have approved.

Then on Friday, I saw some of the foreign visitors that had come here for the funeral: the Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malek; the Chinese, that is, the Taiwanese vice president; and a number of people during that time. I also had sent over to me, and I took on Bill Shinn, William Shinn, a Foreign Service Officer, to be my personal assistant for the SALT talks. He speaks Russian. He had been working over in ACDA. He has a family here and this presents some real problems, but I was very favorably impressed by him. He agreed that he would come on board to stay with me during this first round.

On Saturday, I had the Soviet, the UK, the Polish, the Hungarian, the Indonesian, the Canadian ambassadors in to invite them to the conference

on Vietnam following the cease-fire for February 26. We had a lot of discussion as to where we should have this conference. Most of us in the Department were strongly opposed to Paris, because we felt that the French had behaved very badly throughout the whole thing, and I still feel that they have. However, for reasons of his own, part of which was his hope that Mitterand would not be elected in the coming elections in France, the President decided to overlook this and give in to the pleadings--and I can only call them that-- of Pompidou and Schumann to hold the conference in Paris. It was left that the Secretary was going to tell Pompidou of this on Saturday morning,before signing the agreement, and then on Saturday morning our time, I would invite the other countries in who were going to be asked to participate in the conference and tell them the date of the conference and the place, which would be Paris.

Well, I got down to the office in the morning and there was a flash telegram from the Secretary saying that, in spite of what the French had said, there had been demonstrations,and very objectional demonstrations, at the time of the signing of the agreement. And he had told Schumann that he would not agree to holding the conference in Paris under these conditions. The South Vietnamese, the Foreign Minister Lam had also said that he would refuse to be subjected to this situation, in which the French communists and the leftist Vietnamese in France were shouting and hollering and putting on, insulting him as they came into the meeting. I'd already set up for all these ambassadors to come in,and so I simply gave them the date and the participants for the conference, but without any place. The Secretary's telegram said that he'd call Schumann about this. Schumann thought we'd

got overly excited, and then Lam, the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, had gone to see Schumann, and Schumann had become somewhat alarmed at how far the French police had let the situation get out of hand at the time of the signing of the agreement in the morning, and he apologized. I must say I get very disgusted with the French. I find them very difficult to deal with. They put on tremendous poses, and this fellow Schumann, the Foreign Minister, I find very, very repellent. Well, Alphand, who used to be ambassador here and is now deputy foreign minister, I've often said, is about the most repellent individual I've ever met or ever had anything to do with. There's not many people that I think are really evil at heart, but I link him right along with Krishna Menon as being really, really evil at heart. But nevertheless, I don't know, Kennedy; to a less degree, Johnson; now Nixon, feel that they have to pay some deference to the French. I don't feel it at all. I wish that we would treat them--well, what shall I say?--with the disdain that they ask for and that they deserve. Well, that's, I suppose, neither here nor there.

But, in any event, as Acting Secretary, one of my last acts, I suppose, and the last act I'll ever have as Under Secretary, I invited those people to the conference, giving them the date but not the place.

The Secretary came back on Sunday night, and I worked away on Monday, Tuesday, then on Wednesday--let's see, on Monday, Ken Rush had his hearing; then on Tuesday, Bill Porter had his hearing; then on Wednesday, we had the confirmation hearings on the Foreign Relations Committee. The first one up that day was Jack Irwin and then Bill Casey, and then myself was third. And then this despicable character, Hemmingway,[?] who had been fired out of the Service, was also there to oppose Jack Irwin. George McGovern asked a

whole series of questions of Bill Casey about some ITT case and Casey's relations with the Staggers Committee on this. It's quite obvious that Casey was well prepared; Casey's answers were good, and McGovern was not laying a finger on him, but McGovern is just somewhat like a dog at the bone, he just couldn't help but keep gnawing at it, trying to get off a bit of something. So as a result, I didn't come on till about twelve-thirty. People were getting hungry by then, and I got very little in questioning. The chairman, Bill Fulbright, made his usual cracks about me and the Vietnam War. He asked me whether I had had a chance to express my view with regard to the results of the bombing in December, and I said that I had. He said he didn't suppose that he needed to ask me what my views were, and asked me what I thought, and I said I thought the results spoke for themselves. And he dropped it at that. Then he questioned me on why we'd asked for some postponement of the SALT talks in Geneva, and I said that he'd delayed the holding of the confirmation hearings--in effect I said this--and the sooner he could get to work on confirmation hearings and get Bill Porter reported out and confirmed, I would be able to get to work on SALT. There'd been such long delays in their doing this that I had not been able to get to work on SALT, and then therefore I'd asked for some extension of the time before the hearings, moving them up from February 27 to March 12. He obviously didn't enjoy my saying this, but I must say I find him very, very difficult to deal with. He irritates me and I irritate him, and that's that.

In the evening of Wednesday, that same day, the President had a small dinner for former Prime Minister Sàto. There was a small group of us there. It was only Sato, the Ambassador, a couple of members of Sato's party, the Secretary, Bill Rogers, Ken Rush, let's see, Henry Kissinger--

and the, what's her name? Anyway, the Nixon daughter that's married to the Eisenhower boy [Julie], and Don Kendall. It was a small party, really a family dinner, and it was really a good time, fun time. One of the nicest and easier and most informal dinners I've ever been at. We had the dinner in the Blue Room at the White House and we had a good time. I had a chance to talk to the President at some length, and with Sato, and it was sort of like a family party.

Well, we had expected that, after the hearings which ended on Wednesday, that the Senate would not hold its Executive Session to report them out until the following week, that is, on Tuesday, and that it would probably be along towards the end of the week, February 7 or 8, before the confirmation would be given by the Senate. Therefore, I was getting so concerned about my falling behind on SALT that I talked to Bill Porter, and he and I talked to the Secretary, and it was agreed that over the weekend of February 3 that, de facto, even if we hadn't been de jure confirmed, I would move out of my office; Bill Porter would move in, so I could get to work on my job. Well, on Thursday afternoon, because John Volpe was going as Ambassador to Rome and had a party that was going to be held on Sunday in his honor as ambassador, he talked to some of the Senators and--this is the way things go in this town--within an hour, the Foreign Relations Committee had met and reported out all those that were up for confirmation, including myself. And within another hour they had all been confirmed on the floor of the Senate, so this really caught us by surprise, as far as I was concerned and as far as Bill Porter was concerned, a very favorable surprise.

On Thursday afternoon, your Uncle Stephen, who had volunteered for further service in Vietnam,left and I took him out to the airport. And on Friday morning, I'd already arranged to go up to call on some of the Congressmen on the Hill, that is, Zablocki, I think first, and Scoop Jackson, Senator Jackson. So while I was gone, I suggested that they simply move my pictures out of the office and move down to my new office, and Bill Porter move in. And that's the way the change took place.

On Monday, the 5th, that is, yesterday, I took my oath as Ambassador at Large. I did not want any ceremony, but your grandmother came down and held the Bible, and I had a few people in and took my oath in my own office.

I have gone to work now at SALT. I had a long talk with Senator Scoop Jackson on Friday. He quite clearly, and I've known this previously, has very close contact with the President. He has some very strong hawkish views on SALT, some of which are difficult to reconcile. He is not any more logical than anyone else. On the one hand, he thought we should not be in any hurry to move to a new agreement; on the other hand, he's worried about the Soviets building up as fast as they do. At the same time, he thinks that pressure is going to be on the Soviets to reach an agreement with us, but he thinks this pressure is primarily going to be because of Soviet concern over the economic situation, their desire for trade with us and most-favored-nation treatment. I pointed out to Scoop that he was using these economic pressures in his political campaign--well, it's still a political campaign--to try to get greater liberalization of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. You can only play these cards, you know, once or twice. You can't keep playing them. And he agreed to that. He talked very vehemently about some of the people previously involved in the SALT delegation, I think

somewhat unjustly. And we had a long talk about personalities in the Senate and personalities in the Defense Department. He talked very vehemently over the failure of the Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, to develop a strategy for the United States in the situation. I said that I wished that I had had a better sense of where we wanted to end up in these talks, what we were really shooting for, instead of getting bogged down in details. He most heartily agreed with me on this and said, and I think properly so, that in fact these SALT talks are in many ways driving the whole strategic posture of the United States, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff are paying little attention to this and seem to have little interest in it. Bud Zumwalt and Tom Moorer are the only ones who seem to pay any attention to it. Jack Ryan of the Air Force has no comprehension of what's going on and, in fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are really not carrying out their responsibilities to give us a real in-depth sophisticated thinking with regard to the strategic posture of this country. It's a hit and miss proposition. This was particularly brought out out on a meeting yesterday of the verification panel, in which Roy Allison, General Allison, who represented the Chiefs, and Paul Nitze, who was representing the DOD, got into very vehement arguments over some of the situations existing.

In this regard, I've been hoping that Paul Nitze could continue in the SALT talks. Elliot Richardson, the new Secretary of Defense, and I agreed on this, but I understood, and it was quite clear, that the President was somewhat unhappy because Paul had declared himself a Democrat and not willing to change this. I talked to Henry Kissinger about this over a period of several weeks. He said that this had to be cleared out with the President

personally. I kept pushing him on this. On Saturday, he finally got the President's agreement to have Paul continue with the SALT talks. I've very pleased with this, because I have high respect for him and I think he can do something on them.

As far as the Joint Chiefs representation, Roy Allison, General Allison is concerned, I feel he must be changed, and I was assured that this is going to take place. I might say just a few notes on this. I'm determined to break up the previous situation under which representatives of the Chiefs, Defense and others--well, the others, I should say, were looked upon as plenipotentiaries and independent delegates. I'm determined that I'm going to deal with this as I would deal with a mission abroad, that is, in which I stand in the position of an Ambassador abroad representing the whole government, not any particular agency, acting under instructions of the President as transmitted through the Secretary of State, and the other members of the delegation are not delegates, they are members of the delegation supporting the operation. Each of them previously had their own staffs. I'm going to insist that this be changed. And I'm going to try to bring about a great degree of coherence and discipline within the group. Well, we'll see how I succeed.

Well, I think there's enough probably for tonight. I've talked perhaps a little bit too long.

This is the end of this taping On Tuesday, February 6. I'm still hoping to get out to California, leaving on Friday the 16th, February 16, and I hope to stay about two weeks. But we'll see whether or not it will be possible.

Over and out.

(24f)

This is Tuesday, February 13, just a week after my last taping. And I'm still in the process of trying to establish or form my delegation to the SALT talks. It's worked out that Paul Nitze is going to be going with me about which I'm very pleased, and so is Elliot Richardson, the Secretary of Defense. But the representative of the Joint Chiefs is still not decided. Scoop Jackson, Senator Jackson, wants an Army Officer who is now in Europe and he's not immediately available. And I and Secretary Richardson and Paul Nitze want the Naval Officer, Admiral Michaelis, but we need to get him on board very soon, because it's not going to be very much longer before I leave. But Henry Kissinger has sent back word from China that he doesn't want to have any move made on this until he comes back and talks to Scoop Jackson. The Army Officer is a favorite of Scoop Jackson's, but if we want to give him the veto to work this out, I'm just not going to be able to get my delegation together. I've worked at this today talking to Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense, and Scowcroft, General Scowcroft, who's handling Henry's office in his absence. We got a message off to Henry tonight urging that we get going on this. I think this is one of the indications of the degree to which, you might say, things, power, influence and so on have become centralized in Henry Kissinger's office and with Henry Kissinger himself, and the degree to which the President depends on him.

Last night, the Japanese Ambassador gave a dinner for us which was very pleasant, that is, Ambassador Ushiba. And it was a kind of a sentimental occasion. It was also the night on which the dollar was again devalued by some ten percent. And I think this was a good move. I don't

see any choice in it. But we've got to find a better way of handling our affairs as far as the financial end is concerned.

I feel that, as I say sometimes, that these financial matters become too important to leave to the experts. We've had Paul Volcker traveling around the world in a special plane dealing with these matters. Paul is a very good man. But over the years, we and other countries have tended to let these matters be handled as technical, financial matters and they've become too important for that now. We need to have a higher degree of statesmanship, if I can use that term, in dealing with these matters than we've had in the past. And I'm afraid neither we nor anybody else are handling them very well.

During this past week, I've also called on Senator Tower, Senator Symington, and I've got some other calls left. I think I'm calling on Senator Dominick tomorrow. I think it's just about as Scoop Jackson said to me. He said, "You don't have to worry about the doves; they'll be pleased with whatever you can do. You have to worry about us hawks and our attitudes on these things." And I think that's somewhat right. Symington, well, is not really entirely coherent, but with the tragic shooting of Senator Stennis by some robbers, Senator Symington has become the acting chairman of the Armed Services Commitee in the Senate. And this is a real tragedy as far as this country is concerned, because whatever one may feel about his views and his politics, he really is no longer rational, although my meeting with him went fairly well. I don't try to argue with him. I get the usual lecture that I have listened to some ten years now around the world, here in Washington, about our balance of payments. And it's true, our balance of payments is a problem, but it becomes like a

broken record, as far as he's concerned.

I am planning still to take off this Friday for California and see your great-grandmother and also see you children and have a little time out there. I feel, as I said to correspondent Bob Keatley of the Wall Street Journal who was in today, somewhat like a boy out of school. For the first time in, well, I don't know how many years, twenty, twenty-five years, I find myself in a job that's not a line job. That is, I'm not in the chain of command either as an ambassador or in the chain of command back here in Washington. I don't have to worry about the phone ringing at night and having to make some quick decision. I don't have to worry about being called off the golf course to give a quick answer. The job I have is well-defined, in many ways, but it's not the emergency action type of thing with which one has to deal. And I find this very refreshing for a time, although I must admit I feel somewhat. . . well, what is my term. ..left out of it by being out of the line of action. When I got to the Secretary's staff meetings, I refuse to sit at the table. He invited me to sit up at the table, but I sat in the back row off the table because I no longer am in the line and I like to sit back and just listen to what's going on without having any real responsibility for it. It is, you might say, a sense of irresponsibility on my part. But, for the time being, I'm enjoying it.

Well, I think this is probably enough tonight, so I'll sign off. Over and out.

This is Sunday, March 4. My last recording was on February 13. February 14, I continued my calls on those in the Senate and the House that

are interested in SALT affairs. I called on Senator Dominick on the 14th. I think I mentioned I also called on Senator Muskie, as well as on Senator Jackson, Senator Symington, Doc Morgan inthe House and Zablocki in the House. In each of these cases, I took the approach that, as I was just entering on the job, I didn't have much to tell them, but I wanted to get their views. And all of them were very careful not to give me any views, as a matter of fact, so that they couldn't be charged later or proven wrong later.

Scoop Jackson told me, and I think he's right, my problem's going to be primarily with the hawks and conservatives such as himself. Those that are what you might call more dovish on the issue will have no choice but to accept whatever agreements the President is able to reach. But those on the right who are more conservative on the issues are going to be the ones that can be more critical. Thus, I'm spending more time with them.

On February 15, the Swiss Ambassador gave a party for us, and then on the 16th, I left for California. We left, arriving there on Friday. On Saturday, I took you kids over to Marineland and Sunday I took you all to Busch Gardens. Monday I took you all out to Magic Mountain.and, although I'd planned to do considerable golf playing, I found that taking you kids around was about as much exercise as I needed.

On Tuesday, we went up to see grandmother and stayed over Tuesday night and Wednesday. I found her having a cold, not feeling well, and I would say there's been considerable deterioration from when I last saw her. I'm quite concerned about her. Before going over on Tuesday, I saw her trust officer.

Thursday, I spent all day at the Rand Corporation with Freddy Ikle, Fred Hoffman, Al Wolstadder, Don Rice, talking about SALT matters. Sy Weiss

also came up from the Department. I found this particularly interesting and, by the end of the day, I must say that some of my thoughts were beginning to develop a little more than they had in the past.

On Friday, I looked after some of the Medicare business of your great-grandmother. Saturday and Sunday . . . well, I was planning to stay out there somewhat longer, but I had a number of telephone calls and they urged me to come back for a verification panel meeting on Tuesday, which I said I couldn't do, because I wanted to go back up and see your great-grandmother at that time, which I did. Judy went with me and I found grandmother somewhat improved, although still in bed. Her cold had improved a little bit, but she's obviously aging fast. The arteries are hardening and this is affecting her memory, and she just isn't as alert as she was. I'm worried as to how long she may last.

I came back on Thursday afternoon from Los Angeles and went to work here on Friday. Finally got an agreement and approval for the representative of the Joint Chiefs, General Rowny. I had hoped and Paul Nitze had hoped and also Admiral Moorer had hoped, that we'd get Admiral Michaelis, but we found that Senator Jackson--Admiral Moorer went to see him--was absolutely adamant on having General Rowny to replace General Allison. It's somewhat strange when a senator can dictate an appointment such as this, but the Administration obviously owes him a lot, and he recognizes they owe him a lot, and he was very rigid about General Rowny. So he has been appointed, although I still haven't been able to get the announcement.

The personnel people in the White House also wanted to appoint Phil Farley, acting director of ACDA,a member of the delegation. I argued strongly against this and they agreed that Phil should stay here as the

back-up and that Sid Graybeal from ACDA should go along. While out there, I also talked on the phone with Harold Brown, president of Cal Tech, who will be going along, at least part-time as a member of the delegation. So my delegation's beginning to shape up.

We had a verification panel meeting on Friday at which I think some progress was made on getting the position with which we can live and which we can support. I will not try to detail it here. We are going to have an NSC meeting on Thursday and then I hope to talk to the President about his own thoughts following the NSC meeting. I had planned to leave here on early Friday morning, so as to have Saturday and Sunday in Geneva prior to our first meeting with the Soviets on Monday. However, it may not be feasible for the President to see me until Friday, so this may mean that I'll have to postpone our departure until Saturday.

Well, we're in the process of getting away from here now, taking on a new job, and we'll see how it goes.

I see I'm almost down to the end of this tape on this side. I will want to give this to Bill to be reproduced before I leave, so I will call this off, I think, at this time, even though the tape isn't quite finished. Incidentally, this last section I'm doing on a new recorder that Bill gave me last night, a Panasonic one which has a built-in microphone and which he thinks will provide a better quality recording than the one I was using previously. Well, we'll see how this reproduces.

This will be over and out on March 4, 1973.