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U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 25
Side 1

This is U. Alexis Johnson, March 17, 1973, in Geneva. I arrived here on Saturday, March 10, in the evening to begin the SALT talks.

Before speaking of them, perhaps I had better back up to the preparation for those talks after I arrived back in Washington and the leave I took out in California.

I came back early from California so as to be present for what is called the Verification Panel meeting on Friday, March 2. Then I worked the following week in the Department, seeing various people and attended an NSC meeting, the President and the members of the NSC, on Thursday, March 8. On Friday, March 9, I had further discussions and then left on Saturday, March 10.

One of my principal problems was in getting my delegation together. In this regard, I don't know that I recalled on my last tape the fact that General Allison, Roy Allison, who was on the previous SALT delegation, was very much persona non grata to Senator Jackson as well as had offended some other people. He is very able, I didn't get to know Roy very well, but he is very able. But, obviously, he had to be changed.

Well, I should back up and say that I very much wanted Paul Nitze, who was on the previous delegation, to continue on my delegation. There was considerable discussion of this back and forth, the White House political staff in particular, because Paul was a Democrat. But I finally did get agreement on that. Paul and I both agreed, as well as Admiral Moorer, that to replace Roy Allison, we wanted Admiral Michaelis. And the recommendation on this was sent to the White House by Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense.

I tried hard to get action on this and so did he, but this was while Kissinger was away on his trip to North Vietnam and also China and I was unable to get any action on it because they said that Senator Jackson wanted General Rowny, Ed Rowny. I felt and Admiral Moorer felt that Jackson wasn't wedded to him, but nevertheless eventually it was worked out after Henry had returned that Moorer would go up to see Jackson and discuss it with him. He found Jackson absolutely adamant in insisting that it should be Rowny. Well, Admiral Moorer's not happy about this. Too, Jackson's important. Our President obviously needs his support on this and other things. But it is making a bad precedent to, in effect, let a senator dictate the appointment.

The White House wanted Phil Farley to be the ACDA representative. I argued about this. I say the White House, I am talking about the political side of the White House, not the NSC side. I pointed out that Phil Farley was acting director of ACDA and it was important to keep him in Washington. I also wanted to keep him there as backup for my delegation. And so they eventually agreed that Sid Graybeal would represent ACDA. It was also agreed previously that Harold Brown, Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air Force, President of Cal Tech, continue to be on the delegation.

They only got General Rowny back from NATO, where he was the Deputy Mil Rep, a few days before we had to leave. So he really wasn't able to prepare himself for the meetings.

I want to make clear that I didn't know Rowny. I certainly had no reason to object to him at all. It was the principle of the thing, though, that bothered me greatly.

Well, we had a special plane that took off at six in the morning from

Andrews and arrived here in Geneva at eight o'clock on Saturday evening.

I got my delegation together on Sunday and we discussed our preparations for our meetings. And then I met privately, paid a call on Minister Semenov on Monday. We had a plenary meeting on Tuesday. On Thursday, I went over to brief the North Atlantic Council. Friday, yesterday, we had another what we call a plenary meeting, a smaller group.

Well, I suppose I should go back, though, to the NSC and the preparations in Washington. It was quite clear that agreement could not be reached between the agencies in Washington on the course that we should adopt.

Of course, the last agreement, the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons, left the Soviet Union with having a big superiority in numbers of launchers, both ICBM and SLBM launchers, which in part was offset by our superiority in MIRVS, warheads and bombers. However, over a period of time, the Russians, with their greater number of ICBMs and the greater throw weight, will be able to develop MIRVS and will be able to have at least on paper a great superiority over us.

The issue, as I pointed out, is not to know what the facts are, is not exactly what the military balance is, but the issue is what the people think the facts are. The issue here is probably more important on the political side than on the military side. And a development in which it appears that the Soviets have a great advantage over us is obviously going to have profound effect, not only in our own country, but also both in Japan and Western Europe. Therefore, the question is negotiating something that will reduce this advantage. Now the Soviets are as well aware as we are of the importance of this, and it's not going to be easy to talk them out of it.

There are two approaches that can be taken to this. One is that we would try to persuade them over a period of time to reduce their number of launchers and their throw weight to our level. The other is that they would agree not to MIRV their missiles, particularly their big missiles. Well, neither one of these are very negotiable, and there is even violent, strong disagreement on them in Washington. The Chiefs, in effect, the Joint Chiefs want us to reach an agreement under which we would only get an agreement on the number, the overall aggregate number of delivery vehicles, that is, the ICBMs and SLBMs and bombers, and this number would be fixed at the Soviet number which is higher than than our number, so we would have the right to build up to it. This, of course, is not arms limitation, this is arms expansion, and it is quite clear that we could not even get the appropriations to do so. The other, as I said, is to try to get them to agree to not MIRV particularly their bigger missiles. This might be somewhat easier to negotiate. But it remains to be seen. But the point is that I have been sent here with instructions simply to mark time. No decisions were reached and I have been instructed to mark time and try to find out what the Soviets think without putting forward any positions of my own.

Then in a month of so, we are to have another NSC meeting, or whether we have an NSC meeting or not, the President is to reach a decision on which of these courses to adopt. So I am faced with the somewhat difficult situation of trying to mark time with no positions of my own. However, I am greatly assisted by the fact that the Soviets haven't put forward any positions of theirs yet either really. We are just in the early sparring stages and it remains to be seen what will happen.

I am trying to adopt the posture of not appearing to be anxious for an agreement, not appearing to be in a hurry, and letting

the Soviets be the ones that are more anxious to have an agreement than we are. There are several incentives for them. First, Brezhnev is making a visit to the States this year. Next, they will be anxious that the interim agreement not be allowed to expire and thereby bring about the possibility of our renouncing the ABM agreement; they seem to be anxious to keep that alive. The third element that works for us is a more amorphous one, nevertheless important one, one that I can't play here, that is, that, while it is now very hard to get appropriations for defense matters in the United States--they are somewhat in an anti-military mood--if the American people come to feel that we are seriously second-rate, seriously deficient, seriously behind the Soviet Union, the pendulum can swing wildly in the United States. And if we were to start to build up, even though it might not make much military sense, if we were to start to build up and enter into a real race on offensives weapons, with our technological, industrial and financial-economic base, we could of course almost smother the Russians I would say in numbers, for whatever meaning that would have. The Russians wouldn't want to see that happen. Part of my problem is getting this idea across. This is not something I can do, of course, across the table here, but it's something that has to be implicit, something that has to come out of the United States in attitudes there to get it across to them.

Well, we'll see what happens. I have been criticized by those who were very anxious, you might say the disarmament people have been very unhappy with my appointment. They don't think I am sufficiently committed to what they call disarmament. On the other hand, people like Senator Jackson and the Chiefs have welcomed it.

I am going to be hardnosed about this. I don't have anything to

gain particularly and I am anxious not to be put in the position of having to make an agreement for an agreement's sake and want to do only what may seem sensible. I personally don't expect anything really to develop in the way of being able to get an agreement for at least a year or more. But I think that we should not be impatient. We should be willing to sit them out. And just because they turn something down, I don't think that means we necessarily have to come forward with something new. Above all, I don't want to get negotiating with ourselves before we negotiate with them.

Well, this is about all. We have an apartment here in an old apartment in Geneva and we are getting settled here again. I think I will make this all for this time.

Over and out for March 17, 1973.

This is Sunday, April 1, 1973. I have been having meetings here since my last recording on March 17. In fact, I have gotten fairly busy. I had not anticipated I was going to be as busy as I have been.

Normally, we meet the Soviet delegation alternately in our office and in their office on Tuesdays and Fridays. The meetings are usually fairly formal. We make a statement to each other to get things in the record and then, after the meeting, we break up into private conversations;and these conversations have been going on for an hour or an hour and a half, between Semenov, the Soviet delegate, and myself. And even after that, well, we have had lunch, let's see, last Wednesday the 28th, he had a lunch for the American members of the delegation at the Soviet Embassy, an enormously elaborate affair, heavily overdone. Well, in any event, the lunch started at one o'clock. We finished eating about three-thirty and then he took me off into a side room for a conversation that lasted until five-thirty

while the rest of my staff and his staff were cooling their heels outside. He has also had me for a dinner, but mercifully, he avoided talking business at that time.

Well, let's see, what other meetings have we had? Well, we have been meeting for hours and hours. In general, the situation at the moment is this: that they have been renewing their old proposals, many of which are extreme, as I told him. Such things as disarming our B-52 bombers, that is, taking nuclear weapons off of them. Not inclined to be considered serious proposals back in Washington or by me, for that matter. But they have been going through a whole series of proposals and the one thing, though, that he has been pushing is the time element, that is, he has never explicitly said so--some of his staff have said so-- but they are assuming that Brezhnev is going to come to Washington in June and that he is going to want to have some further agreement on SALT to be signed at that time.

I in turn have been very relaxed about this. I have been taking a very broad position. I have been saying that we have to get agreement on numbers. What I said to him very bluntly last Friday was that he had to be absolutely clear that, whereas we could accept the unequal numbers in the Interim Agreement, it was absolutely impossible for us to do so in the permanent agreement. What I have been seeking is a permanent agreement in which we would have what we call equal aggregate numbers of strategic vehicles, that is, ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, that is, an overall single total that would be the same for both sides. And then within that total there would be a subtotal for ICBMs and a subtotal for what we call ICBM throw weight.

Well, as the Soviets have many more ICBMs than we do and also have very

much more in throw weight than we do, this implies that they will have to reduce or we will have to come up to their numbers. One of the anomalous things in my position has been is that Washington has not permitted me to say that we would like to have their numbers reduced, just because of the opposition of the Joint Chiefs to this position. So I have had to take a pretty broad general position.

This is getting very frustrating to him as he is looking for a specific agreement that can be signed at the time that Brezhnev is there. Well, I don't mind this particularly. I like the position of the pressure being on him rather than on me and I am hoping that this is going to work in a favorable direction.

The big issue at the present time, issue in Washington, is whether we should seek some limitations by them on MIRVs, that is, multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles. We have a lead in that over them. One reason we accepted the Interim Agreement was that our lead in MIRVs would, in large part, offset, as we felt it, their lead in numbers of missiles and throw weight. We have, as a matter of fact, about 7000 warheads compared to the 2500 warheads that they have. Of course, ours are smaller, but they nevertheless can create very effective damage. However, it's expected that they will,in time, be able to develop their MIRVs themselves with their greater throw weight;that will give them an advantage over us.

Well, one of the curious things in the situation is that the Chiefs, our Joint Chiefs, say that, on the one hand, they feel our MIRVs are very important; on the other hand, they are not too concerned about the Soviets developing MIRVs; and all they want is an agreement that would set a ceiling on the total number of delivery vehicles, that is, bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs

at the Soviet level which is above our level, that is at about 2500, and permit us to build up to their level.

Well, first, we are not going to be built up to their level and, next, this would be an agreement for increasing arms rather than decreasing arms. My own strong view,and what I am going to be urging to Washington, is that we try hard to exploit the situation in which the Soviets are now seeking an agreement that could be signed at the time of Brezhnev's trip to Washington that would inhibit or prevent them from MIRVing their SS-9s or their big missiles.

My concern is the political situation. It is not so much that these weapons are going to be used, but it's what people think about them. If they develop MIRVs--and they're going to do that--and they install MIRVs on their larger missiles, in particular the SS-9, at some point they could come up and say--we'd probably say if for them because we're the ones that leak these things--that, instead of our having 7000 strategic warheads and they're having 2500, in fact, with their MIRVing, they are going to have 15,16,17000 warheads while we still have 7000. This would have great effect in NATO,as well as in Japan, as well as in our own country.

I think it is worth an effort to see whether we can't negotiate something that would inhibit this growth on their part. I think that the one thing, the bargaining leverage, we have is that they know that, if it really became a race, we could build a lot faster than they could, and I think they want to inhibit our development of MIRVs. The curious thing, of course,has been that I have had no authority whatsoever to talk about MIRVs, and they are tbe ones that have been raising the subject and pressing it on me. My instructions have been to find out what they think. But

it's awfully hard for me to go much further in finding out what they think without being able to put forward some positions of my own.

Well, I have had some exchanges with Washington on this and had a private exchange over the last few days with Henry Kissinger and suggested that I come back and we have a meeting on this subject and see if we can't get some decisions as to whether or not we want to move ahead. I would be perfectly prepared not to, but I do think we need to exploit the situation of their desire to have something at the time Brezhnev arrives. If we cold shoulder them completely and if we give them nothing on SALT at the time of Brezhnev's visit, then when he leaves, then that leverage is going to be lost. I think we ought to try to exploit that leverage to some degree at least at this time to see if we can't get something that is to our advantage. I have suggested that I come back the weekend before Easter, that is,the week of April 16 and see what we can work out at that time. I am hopeful that I can come back at that time and that I can get some additional decisions.

In fact, I have been doing what it was contemplated that I do when I came here and that was to simply mark time and hold the fort until we were able to make decisions. I have been doing that now for three weeks, this coming week will be four weeks I have been doing that. I can continue to do it if I have to, or if it's wanted that I do so, but I would obviously be very much more comfortable if I had a better concept of the lines we would want to pursue.

Getting the Soviets to reduce as far as ICBMs down to our level is very, very nice, but I don't think that it is going to be in the realm of practicality in the short term, at least, for them to dismantle a large part of their missile force any more than it is for us to dismantle a part of our

force.

I am concerned that,on this whole approach to SALT,the Chiefs' military service attitude on this is primarily to seek to defend their existing programs against what they feel are threats from SALT rather than try to frame these issues in constructive terms, that is: Where would we like to be ten years from now? Where do we think it would be to our interest to have the Soviets ten years from now? Within the realms of the possible, of course. And how do we try to get there? I would be very much more comfortable with a plan of that kind.

Our whole present philosophy, the whole program upon which we are now working is based upon assured destruction, that is, the theory that if it is perfectly clear to each side that the other side has the capability of destroying it and destroying its civil population, no matter what it might do, why, this will deter the outbreak of war. And for this, what you need to have is penetrability, that is, weapons that can penetrate. That was part of the theory of the ABM agreement, that we would not build things that would prevent weapons from penetrating. And the other is suvivability, that even though one side would strike first, the other side would have enough weapons left in order to destroy the opponent.

Well, this all presupposes rational men. It's the whole theory of deterrence that's been developed by, well, everybody, academicians, the military people and others, since the development of nuclear weapons. And I haven't a better theory. But I must say I find myself very uneasy and very uncomfortable with a doctrine that contemplates wiping out total populations, men, women, children, cities and everything else. Perhaps there is nothing better, but I am uneasy with it and I feel many of my

colleagues are more uneasy with it. I wish that we could develop a theory or develop a case that seemed to make more sense. It is sensible, I suppose, assuming you have rational people. What happens if you don't have rational people? Well, the thought's too horrible to contemplate, and I have no better theory to offer at the moment.

So I think I will close this off at this time. This is April 1, 1973. I'll stop this portion of the tape at this point. Over and out.

This is Sunday, April 15, 1973. The last two weeks have been fairly vigorous in our negotiations, but they have not gotten any place.

I, some weeks ago, wanted to make a counter-attack on the Soviet position with regard to what they call our Forward Based Systems. They take the view that aircraft that we have in Europe that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons--they don't have to be carrying them--that is, such aircraft as F-4s and Pershing missiles and all aircraft we have on carriers, should be counted in the strategic equation, on the basis that they are capable of hitting the homeland, or hitting the Soviet Union itself. However, weapons that they have to counter our weapons, all their hundreds of MR IRBMs their thousand medium bombers and so on should not be counted. Well, this is an absurd position. I felt that, instead of letting the Soviets continue to push us to say that this has to be counted in the strategic equation, we should make it clear that we think that the balance is with them on this, rather than with us, and they certainly are not due any compensation on it.

Well, it's been an interesting exercise. I did up two teams, a red team and a blue team in my own delegation. Had the blue team write a counter-attack on this position of the Soviets, had Sid Graybeal do that. Then I had

Paul Nitze heading a team to attack that position, so that we could test it out and try to develop as good and as strong a position as we could. Having gone through that process, we then refined what had been done in the delegation and then did up what I felt was a very good statement. I sent that back to Washington and have not yet received any firm reply on it. In fact, in the five weeks now I have been here, I have not received a single instruction from Washington beyond the basic one I was given originally, except one negative one. At one time, I wanted to say that we felt that equal levels should be achieved between us by the Soviets reducing down to our level the number of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very strongly opposed to mentioning even any reductions for the Soviets. So I was instructed not to do that.

Other than that, I have never received anything in the way of an instruction from Washington. Well, I sent this statement back and asked for their reaction to it back there. Strangely enough, State was, I suppose, lukewarm, you might call it. The Chiefs, the Chiefs of Staff, were stoutly opposed, very flimsy grounds; they felt if we made a statement, we would inevitably get into a discussion of the subject and they were stoutly opposed to doing it. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Elliot Richardson, was very strongly in favor of our doing so.

Well, there's been an impasse on this, and I never have gotten the authority to make this statement. Incidentally, in this regard, I have not sent back any of the statements I have made for a quick clearance. I have acted entirely on my own here, within the terms of my instructions, telling people what I had done after I had done it, except in this case. This involved an issue on which I knew there were strong feelings in Washington and I felt

it better to get them signed on before I did it,so I sent it back to them. I have also sent back a proposal to try to break things open a little bit.I've suggested that we try to reach a deal with the Soviets on MIRVs. Our concern has been that the Soviets will MIRV the big SS-9 weapons of theirs. And I think it is possible that we might make an arrangement under which they would MIRV not more than 550 of their light ICBMs, that is, the same number of Minuteman that we are MIRVing, and agree not to MIRV the SS-9.

Well, the Chiefs are stoutly opposed to this. They want really no ceilings at all. The position of the Chiefs is that we should have one single overall aggregate ceiling on all strategic weapons, that is,one number for ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic or heavy bombers. The Soviet number for that now is 2500; our number is about 2200. What the Chiefs want to do is to get an agreement for 2500 so that they would be able to build up to that. Well, I just don't think there is any chance that they are going to be able, one, to get the appropriations for it, and I think it would be very hard to defend such an agreement as an arms control agreement, rather it would be an arms expansion agreement. So I do think that there might be something to be done on the MIRV issue. I do think it would be some net advantage of it. One thing I'm very clear on, I don't feel we should seek an agreement for agreement's sake, and I'm not doing that. We should seek only those things that are clearly of net advantage to us.

Well, this I sent back some weeks ago, as a proposal; I said there could be other proposals on the thing, but I thought that we needed to really think through our positions on these things. I have been, incidentally,in back channel correspondence with Tom Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and exchanging views with him on this. I've also written to Bud

Zumwalt, CNO, Chief of Naval Operations,saying that I wish that he would take a more active interest in this field, because I think he's one of the few men there that have the capacity really to look at these things from a broad point of view. And I suggested to him--I did this before I left and I've written to him again--I said I so much hoped that the Chiefs could look at this whole SALT negotiation not in terms of trying to defend existing programs against onslaughts from SALT but rather in terms of really the type of a posture we would like to see ourselves in, and the Soviets in, ten years from now, the type of a posture that we think would really make sense for both of us and then work toward it. We don't have that sense now. I've also been in back channel communication with Henry Kissinger and have been exchanging some views with him on these things. And it's agreed now that there will be an NSC meeting or whatever kind of meeting is needed next week, in Washington.

So I'm going back on this coming Tuesday with my delegation to Washington. Expect to spend about two weeks there, and have something in the way of new or additional instructions before I come back. I've had no embarrassment with my present instructions. I've been pushing on the Soviets a very simple proposition of equal aggregates of strategic weapons, that is,an equal total of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers, a sub-ceiling for numbers of ICBMs and a sub-ceiling for the throw weight of ICBMs.

Well, the Soviets are way ahead of us on this, in all these numbers, and my problem is I really have no real incentive to push them down to a lower number at the present time. I don't have any difficulty with the formula itself, but I'm not getting any place with it nor am I going to be able to get any place with it. Well, perhaps we should sit tight on this.

Perhaps we shouldn't try to move off this position, and hope that the Soviet concern over continuing the ABM agreement at the expiration of the Interim Agreement, that is, four years from now, will be so strong that they may be willing to agree to more equal numbers. Of course, it's this more eqqal number issue, well, it's the Jackson Amendment and concerns Senator Jackson and others on the Hill. They want to have the appearance of equality.

Well, at the present time, we have fewer delivery vehicles, but we have many thousand more warheads because of our MIRV superiority. Now, we are going to lose that eventually; the Soviets will be able to MIRV as well. And, with their greater throw weight, they are going to be able to have more MIRVs than we have. Therefore, apart from what the military importance of MIRVs may be, I've been taking the position that it's important for us to do all we can to keep down the number of Soviet MIRVs. Because the day that it's announced that the Soviets have 14-15 thousand or whatever it is number of warheads as compared to our 6 or 7 thousand, this is going to have big political effects in Europe and Japan.

I think maybe I've said this before and I may be repeating myself,but it's an issue upon which I feel very strongly.

I just received a telephone call tonight from your Great-Uncle Gerry, Gerry Warner, who had a call from Santa Barbara that your Great-Grandmother seemed to be failing somewhat. Her heart is not acting right, and she's very weak. The nurse said, quote, not to worry, but she just wanted to let us know what was going on. Well, it's possible that she's on her way down, but this remains to be seen. I will be taking an Air Force plane back from here on Tuesday afternoon and arriving in Washington on Tuesday evening, so, as I told Gerry, he could tell them out there, if necessary, I could

continue on my way and go right on out to Santa Barbara from Washington, if that seemed desirable. However, I'll wait on further word from him or further word when I arrive as to whether it is going to be desirable for me to do that. But I'm afraid. . . well, she's had her ups and downs before. She's got enormous spirit, enormous drive, and I wouldn't assume that she isn't going to come back up again. Of course, I hope and pray that she's going to be doing so.

It's been a beautiful day here today. I played golf out at Evian with General Rowny. Your grandmother came out together with Elinor Murphy, my secretary, and after golf, we had lunch at a very fine one star French restaurant out there and enjoyed ourselves. The Alps, the mountains, were just absolutely glorious today. Your grandmother is going back with me on Tuesday, probably will be staying some time in Washington; Senko-San, our Japanese housekeeper, is also going back with her. I'll be coming back here in about two weeks, staying in the apartment with Lena, the Italian maid, who speaks a little French, a little Italian-French, and I speak a little American-French.

May 15. Listening to my previous recording, it's been almost exactly a month since my last recording. I have a tremendous amount to record since then, both personal and official. I hardly know where to begin because these have been very eventful days in my life.

As I mentioned in my last recording, I was returning back to the States during that following week. In fact, I had my meeting with the Soviets on Tuesday morning, the 17th of April, and then I left immediately with your grandmother, on a special plane, and with some members of my delegation for

the United States. We flew directly from here to Washington, arriving Tuesday evening, Washington time, about seven o'clock or so, I suppose, on Tuesday, April 17.

I went to the Department that day to catch up a little, to see the Secretary,and meet with my group. And then that evening, that is, Wednesday the 18th, I received a call from the hospital that your great-grandmother was failing very fast; they felt that she might not last out the night, and just wanted to let me know about it. I called your mother, Judy, and told her about this, and she said that she would go immediately up to Santa Barbara to be with her. That night I didn't sleep well and worried about her, and I called early in the morning and talked to the night nurse and they said that she was still alive. Judy had been there and was there, and I decided immediately then that I would go immediately out to Santa Barbara which I did on Thursday; well, Thursday noon, I guess it was, the plane I got, and got a car and drove immediately up to Santa Barbara. Your mother was there. Your great grandmother seemed to be conscious; she couldn't talk, but her eyes followed me around and she seemed to be conscious that I was there. I persuaded your mother to go on back to Los Angeles and I would stay there, which I did. I stayed till late that evening. Breeda Murphy her nurse, stayed with her for a time. There didn't seem much that I could do so I went back to the motel I was staying at and went to bed; came back again early in the morning and she seemed to be about the same. But I could see that it was not going to be too long, so I talked to the hospital there and, through them, I got in touch with a lawyer and I talked with the trust and I did all the things that I thought should be done, if she were going to pass on. If she did not, well, there would be no harm done. I went out to

see the lawyer and did some of those things in the morning and then went to lunch and came back about one or one-thirty or so. And Breeda Murphy, the nurse, said, "She's not going to last the afternoon." See, previous to this, the doctors and the nurses in the hospital had said that she wasn't going to last the next night. She had. But Breeda had been with her all these years; Breeda understood her, had a very good understanding of her, and Breeda said she wasn't going to last the afternoon--or the night, I think, is the way she put it. Well, I stayed there with Breeda. I held Mother's hand. Breeda and I sat there and talked about all kinds of things. I must say she was an enormous comfort to me. I could see, although I had not had much experience at this, I could see that Mother was passing away. Her breath was getting slower and slower, and she was obviously much less conscious; her eyes were open, but she was not conscious of what was going on around her.

Your Great Aunt R'Ella was on the way out from Washington. She had had to be up at Buffalo, taking care of her daughter who had been ill up theee. I knew she was due in about one-thirty or two o'clock, and I kept hoping that she would get there,even though it wouldn't make that much difference. Well, your great-grandmother just started breathing slower and slower; her pulse got lower and lower; her limbs got colder and colder. Finally about five-thirty, she no longer was breathing. Breeda said her heart had stopped. We called the head nurse; she called the doctor, and he said that she had gone. Your Great Aunt R'Ella arrived about five minutes later. It didn't make much difference actually; as far as my mother was concerned, she was not in a position to know she was there. I think she knew that your mother was there previously. I think she knew I was there, and I think she knew

when she started to go that I was there. I cannot be absolutely sure of this. But she passed peacefully, quietly, in dignity, and I think that is the way she would have--well, it's the way I would want to have it happen, and I am sure that it is the way that she would want to have it happen.

Obviously, it was a matter of tremendous distress for me as well as for your great aunt, but, after all, she had lived a long life and a rich life, full life, and obviously she was not in any great pain or distress. I think that's the way we all should go. There was some discussion, not any real discussion among the doctors and the nurses as to whether they should try to artificially prolong her life, but we all agreed that that would not be the thing to do nor the thing that she would want.

When I got the first call the previous Sunday in Geneva that she was seriously ill, your grandmother said, "She's not going to pass away until you get there," and she said, "She's not going to pass away until Good Friday." I merely pass it on as a fact; I never quite believe these things, but the fact was that she did pass away at five-thirty p.m. on Friday, April 20 -- Good Friday.

In accordance with her wishes, I had previously arranged for her to be cremated. I asked that she be dressed in a dress that your mother had made for her, just shortly before and a ribbon put in her hair before she was cremated. And that's the way she went to the cremation. On Monday, we had a simple ceremony at the Grandview Cemetery in Glendale in which her ashes were buried on top of those of your great-grandfather, my father. You were there, your mother, and Jennifer and Patty, Uncle Glen from Glendale, Uncle Bill, and, well, let's see, the Kelseys. I made very little announcement of it. We just had a small ceremony at the grave with the minister from the

Glendale Presbyterian Church. I know that's the way she wanted it, and that's the way we did it.

I left immediately after the ceremony to come back to Washington. I had a very active time in Washington that following week. I was back here to make arrangements and discuss my instructions for the next round of my SALT talks. I had planned on having two weeks, but, of course, with your great grandmother's passing, this time was shortened, and things were very compressed. It had been agreed before I went to Geneva that my instructions were only interim and that I would need new instructions. We had three Verification Panel meetings at which Tom Moorer and Bill--oh, what's his name? Bill Clements, he's Deputy Secretary of Defense--took very extreme positions on one side. Bill Porter, who was talking in the absence of Ken Rush in State, took a fairly extreme position on the other side, arguing for an unconditional MIRV ban. I refused to go along with the State position; I refused to go along with the Defense position. I took the position that, as the negotiator, I was simply asking for instructions; I could give my advice on what I thought was negotiable and not negotiable, but I was not going to get into the position of taking any partisan position. Well, we had three very acrimonious meetings, I would say, in which no decisions were made; obviously they were not. Then, let's see, that went through that week . . .

In any event, on Wednesday the 2nd of May, I took a special plane with my group back to Geneva, still without having instructions on what I was supposed to do. I got back here on Wednesday night. On Thursday morning, I received a message from Henry Kissinger that he was on his way to Moscow

and would like to see me in Copenhagen. On Friday morning, I arranged a military plane up to Copenhagen and met Henry up there, spent about an hour and a half with him and then came back here to Geneva and had a meeting late that afternoon with the Soviets.

At that meeting, I presented a larger part of new instructions that I had received on a permanent package proposal for an agreement. Then on Tuesday, I got word--well, Henry Kissinger sent me a message that he would like to see me on Thursday in London to report on his conversations in Moscow. So I left here Wednesday evening, went to London, had quite a long breakfast meeting with Henry on Thursday morning, May 10. Then at noon, I went over to Brussels and briefed the North Atlantic Council on what we intended to do with regard to what the Soviets called forward based systems, that is, our nuclear capable systems in Europe. That turned out to be a very viggrous session. Then I came back to Geneva by T-39 that evening and had a meeting at ten o'clock that morning with my Soviet counterpart. . . well, at ten o'clock I met with my Soviet counterpart, Semenov, and briefed him on what I was planning to table at eleven o'clock at the meeting with them, on a MIRV proposal, a MIRV freeze. Then we had the meeting at eleven o'clock at which I made my formal proposal.

Well, that about leads me up to today, I suppose, May 15, Tuesday, May 15, we had another meeting today, in which I included in my proposal that I'd made previously the arrangement that I'd discussed with the North Atlantic Council on the previous Thursday, with respect to a non-proliferation clause. Well, I won't go into all the details of this.

The real question is the fundamental kind of relationship we are going to enter into the Soviet Union with on this whole question of nuclear weapons.

Kissinger made it clear to me that he got no place in Moscow on this. They really aren't willing to face up to anything to replace the Interim Agreement. The Interim Agreement gave many advantages to the Soviet Union. Numbers of ICBMs, throw weight of ICBMs; it put no limits on qualitative improvements. that is, MIRVing their ICBMs. They have a lot of advantages and they're not prepared to quickly give them up. What I've been tasked with here is an effort to try to obtain an agreement that is more acceptable to us over the long term, that is, a permanent agreement. It's quite clear that the President is prepared to accept something less than the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to push for or even the Defense Department wants to push for. And I find myself torn between the conflicting pressures and I'm trying to walk down a line here that will keep my delegation together and do what I think is right, and still at the same time do what the President wants.

This has been a period during which, to divert to the Watergate scandals, as they're called--even the Swiss TV here every night has a long play on them--the Watergate scandals in the States are going on. We have two former members of the Cabinet whom I knew quite well, as a matter of fact, John Mitchell and Maury Stans, indicted for crimes. We have Bob Haldeman, who really controlled the gates to the President, was really the most powerful man in the White House in many ways, who has resigned his job. John Ehrlichman has resigned his job. It's a very traumatic period. I don't know what to say about it. I'm torn. Some of the things they were doing, you might say, were in the realm of what some might call practical politics in the States. On the other hand, what they did and the way they did them carried a very high risk as compared to the gains and, as one who has been accustomed to dealing with these things in terms of our relations abroad and our activities

abroad, I think it is very doubtful that they should have gone into them. It became very clear, of course, that they weren't very well carried out because they were caught. In one sense, one can charge them with being stupid, putting aside the moral aspect. I do not ignore the moral aspects, but I am inclined to give higher priority or emphasis to the fact that they just didn't do things very well. I may be charged with being cynical, but, nevertheless, that is the way I feel about it.

The whole question-- well, one of the questions is whether the President really knew what was going on, or didn't know what was going on. I don't know how important that is. If he did know what was going on and was seeking to hide it, I suppose you can make a moral or a legal case that he should be impeached. But I can't think of any greater tragedy to the country. It wouldn't be a personal tragedy; it would be a national tragedy for the President to be impeached at this time. On the other hand, you can say that if he didn't know what was going on, he should have, and, in any event, he has to accept responsibility for appointing people to jobs in the White House, appointing people who were not very competent. And I think perhaps that's the most serious charge against him.

However,there's something around Nixon, I don't quite know what. In his early days, he was called "Tricky Dick." In his running for Congressman in California, running for Vice President, there was this problem about his special campaign funds then. He's always been struggling to come to the top. All politicians have to, and this is accepted. But he's had all these setbacks and he's struggled harder almost than anybody else. There's a certain aura around him, if you will, that the means justified the ends, to a very considerable degree. And I'm confident--well, I know; I've felt it--that

whatever they did, whether they told him or not, justified in the cause of building him up and getting him elected. Now, this isn't such a great sin, as far as politicians are concerned, but it went a little bit beyond what we've normally been accustomed to or known about.

You had these two sides to his character: this absolutely almost ruthless drive to get ahead at almost any cost, I would say, almost any cost; the other side, of course, was himself as a statesman, his openings to China, his openings to the Soviet Union, the great initiatives that he's taken. The one side of his political life that's been successful has been his foreign affairs. To this, you have to give Henry Kissinger a very large measure of credit for being a driving force. At the same time, you have to give the President a very large measure of credit for recognizing the wisdom of the recommendations that Henry made. It's also curious in this, well--it's interesting in this that the people that were one time closest around him, John Mitchell in particular--John Mitchell sat with me on the Forty Committee--are now being the ones that are being indicted and disgraced, and that Bill Rogers, who was somewhat disdained and looked down upon as not being an effective force in the Administration, was the man principally to whom the President turned when these troubles came.

Well, the fact of the matter is of course that everybody, including the President, instinctively recognized that Bill Rogers was truly a man of character and integrity, as compared to people like John Mitchell and Maury Stans, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and the people around him who were very opportunistic. And when these opportunistic individuals got caught up, he turned to people like Bill Rogers who had character and integrity and to people like Elliot

Richardson who was Under Secretary when I first came into the Department, then became Secretary of HEW, then became Secretary of Defense and has now been appointed Attorney General.

I had made an appointment to see Elliot over at the Defense Department the day before the announcement of his appointment as Attorney General was made. I thought probably he would want to call this off. But, nevertheless, he asked to see me and I spent over an hour with him, first, talking about SALT matters and then talking about the problems that he faced as Attorney General in trying to restore confidence in the government. Well, it was a very interesting conversation. I suppose I should detail it. I just might make a few footnotes. There are all these talks about wiretaps now, wiretapping people by the Administration. Early in the Administration, once when I was over at the White House with the Secretary, the question came up with regard to an Officer in the Department, well, I'll tell that it was Bill Sullivan. And the President called Bob Haldeman for a copy of the wiretap on a correspondent for a foreign paper. He read the wiretap to us. It seemed to indicate that Bill Sullivan was dealing with--well, I shouldn't use that term--was still maintaining an association with Averell Harriman. And I must say hearing that what was said certainly seemed innocent to me and certainly in support of the Administration, but the President took it as indicating that Bill Sullivan's loyalties were with Averell Harriman rather than with himself. Very difficult for a politician to understand how we in the Foreign Service can be loyal to individuals and loyal to our country without renouncing old friendships.

Well, my only point is this: back at that time, it became quite clear to me that there was very extensive wiretapping going on. The President

said to me that, well, they were tapping _____'s phone because he was suspected of being a Foreign Intelligence Agent, but this didn't seem . . . well, he could have been, but this didn't seem very likely to me. But, from that and other things, I was quite clear from the beginning of the Administration there was very extensive wiretapping going on, and I assumed that it included my own phone as well as others and I always operated on this assumption. As a matter of fact, one time, I forget in what connection, Henry Kissinger told me that he assumed that his phone was being tapped. Well, this was the kind of unhealthy atmosphere that existed and I think it's well that it's been called to a halt now.

One of the great tragedies is that in the case of Ellsberg, who was just a simple thief who stole papers from the government, has now been acquitted because of very bad mishandling of his case. I remember when this first came up. Secretary Rogers said, "The thing to do is just to treat him as a common thief who stole from the government," which was entirely true. But the Justice Department, John Mitchell, of course, tried to weave the charge of national security, a violation of national security around him. It was very obvious that Ellsberg was an utterly immoral, most despicable type of individual who was ignoring all ethics, morals and everything else for his own personal aggrandizement. But to try to weave the charge of violation of national security, with our very poor laws on the subject, around him was very, very difficult to do. And it finally turned out to be impossible, and he's finally now been released. And, of course, it's an open day on stealing from the government. It is a very, very sad day indeed when this happens. Lawyers, doctors, congressmen, judges, newspaper people--above all, newspaper people--are entitled to have their

confidences, but government is not entitled to. And it's going to be very difficult and it's going to take some time before there can be some restoration of morality and ethics in the government, and that people don't feel that they have an open day to go out and steal any papers. . . . or rather take any papers home that they want to and try to sell them to the newspapers.

It's very hard to carry on governmental affairs under these circumstances. It's very hard to convince a prime minister or foreign minister or president or anybody else that they can talk with some degree of confidence to the U.S. government. Our foreign relations are going to suffer from this for a long time until we get some restoration of a sense of balance in dealing with our affairs.

Well, I think I've talked enough tonight. There are many things I could have said. I should have perhaps gone into the SALT talks in more detail than I have, but perhaps I can do that later. I had almost thirty days time to bring this up to date and there are many things that I've missed, but I simply wanted to get it up to date.

Your grandmother is still in Washington. Your Uncle Bill is going to get married next month, and I may get back, I don't know. The summit conference between Brezhnev and the President will take place in the middle of June. I didn't say that Henry Kissinger and I talked about what might come out of that conference; we discussed the communique and the text that he had been working on in Moscow. I had been working on those texts also, and giving him suggestions on that. Like any well-ordered conference, all these things, of course, are decided beforehand by the staffs, and it is very rare that anything is left for decision by the principals. But people have great difficulty understanding this, and it's important for people to understand that

this is the way that well-ordered affairs between States are worked on.

Well, I'm going to close out now. I've talked a little bit too long tonight and I'll try to bring some of these things up to date as I go on, again at my next round on this. This is Tuesday, May 15, 1973. U. Alexis Johnson. Closing out.

This is Sunday, May 20. Listening to the last part of that last recording, I think perhaps I should correct it a little bit. I hear myself saying that in any well-ordered conference, everything is decided by the staffs before the conference meets. What I should have said is through the staffs; obviously, staffs on both sides are working for and on behalf of their principals; obviously, they are doing what their principals want them to do. So, when I said decided by the staffs, I meant that it was decided through the staffs; I certainly didn't mean to imply that the principals had no role in it, because they obviously do.

Well, let's see, my last recording was on Tuesday. I'd had a meeting then with the Soviets. On Thursday, Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, sent a Vice Admiral [H.E] Shear to see me. He's Director of Submarine Warfare, and he gave me a long briefing in some new developments in his field which are very revolutionary. I obviously cannot give any of the details here, but it's very considerably revised some of my thinking with respect to submarines and missiles at sea. At the meeting on Friday with the Soviets, I tried to outline as clearly as I could the position that I was taking, that is, there was a trade-off between MIRVS and aggregates of missiles and their throw weight. I said that, as far as we were concerned, if we approached adequacy or if we approached equality with regard to the numbers of ICBMs and their throw weight, then we would be

less interested in MIRV restrictions or we would be prepared to come closer to equality in MIRV restrictions; to the degree that we did not approach equality in ICBM numbers or throw weight, then we felt that we needed to maintain the asymmetries in MIRVs which are in our favor. And, of course, it's at the previous meetings that I've put forward my proposal for freezing MIRVs where they are, which would freeze them in our favor. But we would also be willing to freeze Soviet numbers and Soviet throw weight in their favor , so that these two things would balance off.

Well, the Soviets are showing a little interest. I had invited Mr. Semenov previously; he had spoken to me about a desire to get together sometime without our wives just to get better acquainted. And I had invited him for lunch, just the two of us, together with our interpreters following the meeting on Friday. It was my understanding and impression from him that he wanted to not talk business, that is, business in the sense of SALT, but rather just to talk generalities about the two countries, which I enjoy doing with him. And it was on that basis that I invited him really. Well, after the lunch, he pulled out several sheets of typewritten notes from his pocket and started reading from them. They were primarily on FBS, the Forward Based Systems, what they call Forward Based Systems, and laid a great deal of emphasis upon Rota and Holy Loch and the importance of our withdrawing from there. We had almost a three hour talk. We talked almost until five o'clock.

I see that this is about running out and think I better stop at this point. But I told him he was trying to sell the same horse twice; we had already given him a superiority in submarine numbers in the Interim Agreement. And we went round and round and round. I don't know whether we got any place or not, but at least he may have understood my position better.

Well, I've been out playing golf today. I didn't do very well, I don't know why. I just didn't feel up to it.

Tomorrow I'm making a speech at the American International Club here and I'm going to base it primarily upon the remarks I made at the Zablocki Committee last year and just give them generalities. As I've warned them, I'm not prepared to talk about SALT.

It's been a nice day here. I'm planning to go over to the Paris International Air Show the week of June 1. The Air Force has offered to fly us over there.

Side 2

Recording on Sunday, June 3, 1973. I should number this reel, but my last reel is down in the office and I don't know what the number is, so I will have to leave the number off of this.

It's been about two weeks, I think, around May 15 since I last recorded, around that; May 20.

Well, during this period, there have not been any major developments. I have been continuing presentation to the Soviets of the rationale behind our proposals for what we call equal aggregates and for a MIRV freeze. Over two weeks ago, I sent to the Department, sent to Washington, a draft of an agreement on the MIRV freeze, that is, for what we call the provisional agreement. I worked this out very carefully; I brought a man from the States, Ralph Earle, who had previously worked for Defense on these matters. And I had a good draft. I had hoped to present this the following week, because I felt that it would be good tactically, place us in a good position, of course, to not only set forth the outlines of the type of thing that we had in mind on MIRVs, but to set forth a draft agreement itself.

Well, I still have not been able to get clearance from Washington to table the draft. Everything I've done, including this draft, runs into the fact that the Defense Department, primarily Bill Clements, Deputy Secretary, who seems to have no understanding of these matters, and the Chiefs, represented by Tom Moorer who does have understanding of it, are trying still to resist, and resist the instructions that we are operating under. I have my instructions; I think they're good instructions; I have no trouble understanding them, and I am carrying out my instructions. But everything that gets back to Washington for approval means that the Defense and the Chiefs seek to use the text of these things in order to get the instructions changed. They simply don't accept the instructions. That fact is, of course, of the matter: they don't want any MIRV agreement. The fact of the matter is the Chiefs don't want any agreement on SALT. They look upon it as something to be resisted rather than something that can be used in a positive way.

Well, I think I've talked about this before, but I'm getting to feel very bitter with regard to their attitudes. The problem is that, in the absence of Henry Kissinger, nobody in Washington will make a decision, or can make a decision. There is no way of getting a decision. State takes one view, Defense takes another view, and the Chiefs take another view. And you have an impasse and the sad fact is only Henry Kissinger is the one that can make decisions or get decisions on these matters. People complain about his position. People complain about his usurping their power. But the fact of the matter is nobody else takes hold and, therefore, an increasing amount of things have to go to him, particularly on this SALT matter. With Henry having been away in Paris negotiating again with the North Vietnamese and then accompanying the President to Iceland for his meeting with Pompidou,

decisions just haven't gotten made.

In the meanwhile, we are now marking time. The Soviets have no instructions to respond to us. I have fully carried out my instructions; I have nothing more really to say. And I am very clear in my own mind that trying to find new ways of saying the same thing is a mistake. We've said what we have to say;let's not confuse things by trying to find new ways of saying them. We find ourselves often in these things negotiating with each other. I remember during the Vietnamese War everytime President Johnson, of course, had a speech, he wanted to say something new. I'm not saying this in criticism of him; it's just an inevitable fact. He wanted to say something new about it and so, as a result, we kept whittling away at our own position, trying to find new ways of saying the same thing. And, obviously, each time we do so, we whittle down our position a little bit to make it sound a little bit better. Well, I'm determined not to do that.

I very much want to declare a recess at the present time. It's quite clear that the Soviets are not going to receive any instructions prior to Brezhnev's visit which begins on June 16. Certainly they aren't going to receive any instructions during the visit. Therefore, I don't see any use to meet until after the visit and see what happens and see what instructions they receive. However, I've been reluctant to propose a recess. As Semenov raised the question of a recess with me last Friday, I reported this to Washington and I hope that I may receive instructions to call for a recess. But I want to table the draft of this agreement on MIRVs before any recess. I sent in a strong telegram Friday saying I certainly hoped to be able to table this on Tuesday, but I'm sure that they're probably not going to be able to get anything out. Well, it's getting to be kind of a discouraging business.

I want to get home, too, because your grandmother is not feeling too well and she's going to go to a hospital for some tests on Monday, and I'd like to be there. Your Uncle Bill is getting married on June 23 and I, of course, want to be there for that.

Dr. Harold Brown is back here, but he will be going again on Monday because there obviously isn't much for him to do.

I don't know; there isn't much more to say. Well, I might note on here that last Friday I received a private message from Henry Kissinger, giving me the last revised text that the Soviets had given him for a declaration to be made by the President and Brezhnev at the time of the Brezhnev visit. The Soviets have accepted none of the suggestions that we have made in a positive way. I pointed out to Henry that, if this declaration is to be of any use to us, it should serve to advance our negotiations in some way or the other. I previously suggested language that would help advance the issue on what's known as the Forward Based Systems, the Soviet insistence that we count our dual capable systems in Europe, as well as carriers and so on -- advance that in some way. We want to put that aside--well, put it aside in the sense of saying that we would not try to circumvent an agreement on central systems, that is, on ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, heavy bombers. We would not try to circumvent an agreement on that by non-central systems. The other thing I wanted to push forward and get a little advance on on such a declaration would be on the MIRV question. Well, the mild language we've suggested on both of them, they've turned down. They have taken out one section that's very objectionable to us, that's on restraint. They still retain a section that's the non-transfer, that's a very broad thing saying we would not use allies or wouldn't try to circumvent an agreement by what we do

with third countries.

Well, you can't argue about the principle, but the fact of the matter is they're trying to get at our relationships with the UK on Polaris and SLBMs, with our ability to furnish nuclear warheads to our NATO allies, trying to get at dual capable aircraft, F-4s for example, in NATO and Japan. And, as I told Henry in my reply to him, a clause such as that being sprung cold on our allies, would create consternation among them. There's nothing whatever in the agreement that serves our purposes. This is very negative. And I told him that I thought he ought to take a very tough line with them on getting this out. If we get this out, the agreement is, at the best, going to be anodyne, but with a slight leaning, well, some leaning towards the Soviets. It certainly is not going to advance positions that we have taken with regard to SALT.

Henry wanted a reply right back. He said he was seeing Dobrynin when he got back from Iceland on Saturday, and wanted to have my views. I gave it to him. I don't know what will happen. I'm sure the State Department knows nothing about what's going on with regard to the negotiating of this declaration. If I tried to bring State into it, of course, it would simply mean that I would be shut off, and I think it's important that I know what's going on. And I think I can be of some help, also. I must say I think Henry's done fairly well in keeping me informed.

Oh, something else has happened I suppose I should recount here. A series of articles by a man called John Newhouse on SALT has come out. The articles are very detailed, containing information that even members of the delegation didn't know. He obviously has had full access to all the most sensitive records on SALT. He told Paul Nitze that they'd been made available to

him by the White House, said he'd even listened to tape recordings of Verification Panel meetings. I didn't know that the meetings were being taped. I'm not sure that they are. Well, he says that he did, and he says the information was made available to him by Henry Kissinger's office and he had full access to everything. And I must say, reading the articles,it sounds like it to me. Somewhat tongue in cheek, I sent a message to Henry Kissinger saying that I was sure that he must be as appalled as I was at seeing these articles come out;with all this detail, it certainly jeopardizes our ability to work with the Soviets, certainly shows that we cannot keep confidences with them. Well, I said, I'm sure he must be as appalled as I was; what was there I could say except that the Soviets knew that we had continuing trouble with leaks, and in any event, what was there that Henry could tell me about where it came from and what was being done about it. Henry came back with a message to me saying that he had not seen Newhouse and refused to have anything to do with him and, to the best of his knowledge, quote, unquote, no member of his staff had had anything to do with him. Well, I just don't believe it. Oh, I should say, Newhouse said that he had sent his manuscript to Henry to read but never received any reply from Henry on it. Well, this is the type of thing in the Administration that is not good. It's a type of trickiness again that is very, very unhealthy; makes it very unpleasant to work in many ways.

During this period, of course, all the Watergate business has been going on and the press is full of that. I have little doubt about the accuracy of most of this. I do feel that it was very much the atmosphere with which the President surrounded himself;Ilm sorry to say it, but that's, I'm afraid, the way it was. I'm afraid Maury Stans and John Mitchell were

not men of much character. One thing that's emerged out of this is that Bill Rogers and Elliot Richardson, whatever else people may say about them, emerge as men of character and integrity. And it's going to take a long time to restore people's faith in the presence of those qualities as far as their national government is concerned. It's been a very sore blow to the whole relationship of government to the people, not that people don't realize and expect that politics is politics and everything is not entirely clean and aboveboard. But they expect certainly that, when a man has been elected as President, to the Presidency, something in the way of high standard of performance, quality and integrity from him. The Watergate type of thing just shakes people's confidence in the government and is going to have its effects and reverberations for many years to come.

Well, I think that's all. This is Sunday, June 3, ending this portion of the tape by U. Alexis Johnson.

This is Tuesday evening, June 26. I made my last recording in Geneva on Sunday, June 3.

Taking it chronologically from there, it became quite clear to me the following week that the Soviets were not going to get any instructions to deal with this before the summit meeting. Therefore, I sent a back channel message to Henry Kissinger saying that I didn't see much use in our meeting any further; we had laid out our proposals; I did not think it useful to try to find new language to express them. As I told him, every time we, in a speech or in a presentation, try to find a new way of saying things, we tend to negotiate with ourselves. I thought it best to leave things where we had put them. Therefore, I suggested that we recess until after the summit

meeting. I received Henry's agreement to that during the course of the week, oh, I guess that was about June 6 or so, June 5, maybe.

I put that up to Semenov, through Bill Shinn and Chulitsky and he said he couldn't reply to me. I suggested that we recess on Friday, June 8. He said he did not think he could get a reply back by that time. On Saturday, June 9, he replied that they agreed, and we agreed to recess on Tuesday, June 12. In our private meeting on June 12, I said that I felt we ought to resume our meetings as soon as possible, but I didn't think it was going to be useful to do so until he received instructions to reply to the proposal that we had put on the table. He did not argue with this, said that he thought it was going to take them considerable time to get the instructions and that my suggestion of meeting in July would probably not be practical and that they would not be able to meet during August which was very important to them as a vacation month. Therefore, he suggested that it would probably be September before we could meet again. I said that I thought that it would be desirable to meet before that if we could, but that I would wait on word from him as to when it would be possible for us to meet again and that we would deal with this through diplomatic channels.

On Friday, June 8, he gave a lunch for all the members of our delegation and his delegation over at the residence, or over at the Soviet mission. I avoided all substantive discussion because it was obviously no use to talk with him until he had received instructions to reply to our proposal. And, until he had received instructions, all he could say would be to try to stall for time.

I tried to get hold of your Uncle Stephen who was over in England to tell him that I was going to go back on June 12 and that I had space in my

plane for him and would like to have him go along with me. He, incidentally, was on leave from Vietnam. He was at that time stationed at Nha Trang and had planned to visit me on the 15th and 16th of June. He had telephoned me from England when I was on my way back from a dinner; I had been up to Ackersons. I telephoned him back as soon as I got back, but was unable to reach him. Well, to make a long story short, I never did make contact with him; I tried through his contact over in the Embassy and thought that, in any event, he could ride back to Washington with me and we'd get a chance to talk. But I never heard from him.

I left immediately after our meeting on Tuesday, got back to Washington on Tuesday evening. Wednesday morning, he called me from London and said that he had to be back in Nha Trang on the 20th of June and, therefore, it was impossible for him to attend his brother Bill's wedding here on the 23rd of June. So I missed him. Well, I came back, as I say, left immediately after the meeting on the 12th; I had an Air Force plane, special plane, nice trip back, got back here late in the evening.

I went down to the office on Wednesday morning, the 13th. I talked to Henry Kissinger over the phone with regard to the state of the declaration on SALTthat would be made at the time of Brezhnev's visit. And he sent Hal Sonnenfeldt over to see me to brief me on this. Well, no, let's see now, what date was it? I don't have it down here. Well, the next day or two, I went over to see Henry. He showed me what they were planning and I told him that it seemed harmless to me and then on Saturday he sent Hal Sonnenfeldt over to see me, I guess it was. Let's see, that's the day that Brezhnev arrived. I'm sorry I don't have the notes here, but, in any event, it's quite clear that as a result of all the negotiations that had taken place

that the declaration that we were going to make on SALT did not, in any way, advance our position. On the other hand, the Soviets had agreed to drop all their positions, and the declaration was very anodyne. I said that I saw no objection to it; I didn't see that it really advanced our cause very much. Frankly, I was disappointed with it, but, on the other hand, I was pleased to see that things that would be in the Soviet's favor in it had also been dropped. I talked about that declaration on that Saturday, June 16, with Hal and with Henry. Then on Monday, I met with my delegation, but was not able to tell them much about it. Oh, on Monday, Monday evening, I saw the Secretary and briefed him on the state of the declaration on SALT. At that time, he told me that there was also another agreement or declaration that was being considered. Oh, I tell you, I should have gone back. General Scowcroft called me from the White House I guess it was on Thursday and said they wanted me to brief on the declaration on SALT after it had been signed and also to brief on what they called the peaceful uses agreement on nuclear energy. I told them I had never heard of peaceful uses; what was it all about? And he said that somebody over in our Soviet Affairs had some information on it. Well, running this down, apparently this was again one of those things in which the Soviets had done the first draft and given it to Henry when he was in Moscow. He had brought it back and given it to the Atomic Energy Commission who'd worked it up in great secrecy and had not said anything to the Joint Committee or anybody else. When I saw the text of it, I saw that even though when you read the fine print it was harmless, it was one of those things that could be easily misinterpreted. I called Scowcroft back and told him that, trying to brief the press or the Congress on this, they could cut me to ribbons

because I really wasn't familiar with all the details and couldn't answer the questions;and in any event, I thought it very important that the Atomic Energy Commission, the AEC, brief the Joint Committee on this as quickly as possible, because, otherwise, I was sure the Joint Committee would climb up the wall, as I expressed it. I had been told by our European Affairs people that the Atomic Energy Commission had been seeking permission from the White House to brief the Joint Committee, but had not received it. Well, in about half an hour, I received a call back from Scowcroft saying that they agreed that, one, that I should not try to do the briefing on it, and, two, that they had authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to brief the Joint Committee on it. So I got that little chore accomplished.

Well, on Monday evening, I told the Secretary the state of the play, so far as I knew it, on both of these items, that is, the declaration to be signed on the SALT agreement and the agreement on the peaceful uses. Actually, the peaceful uses agreement was again a pretty empty document really. It simply agreed or said that we would cooperate together in unclassified fields on advance research on high energy physics, on fast breeder reactors and on fusion power. This was only, you might say, putting an umbrella over what we were already doing. It contained statements about the possibility of joint projects of one kind or another, but there was nothing firm in it on this. This was left for future agreement. Frankly, it was very much a window-dressing agreement and hardly worthy of signature by two heads of government. But both of them were obviously seeking desperately for things that they could sign. The agreement on SALT,as I said, was really not of any substance, and the best I can say for it was that it didn't sacrifice any of our positions.

Then the Secretary spoke to me about another agreement to be signed on Friday

with regard to the nuclear-- he had not seen the text; it had simply been very hastily explained to him that there was to be an agreement on this subject. I pointed out to him that over the years, of course, the Soviets had been trying to obtain from us what's called a no first use agreement, that is, in case they were overrunning Western Europe with conventional means, we would not threaten or use nuclear weapons. I pointed out the danger of this to our relationships with the Alliance, if this was the case. And he asked me for the data on which we had--well, should I say, the text of whatever we had said in an authoritative way to NATO with respect to our willingness to use nuclear weapons in case Europe was being overwhelmed by conventional attack. I told him to get hold of Sy Weiss, which we did, and to get the text of the Athens guidelines which were governing in this regard.

Subsequently, I might say that, following this up, on Thursday when I went over to join with Henry in briefing the press and the Congressional leadership on the SALT agreement, Henry spoke in very vigorous terms about the Secretary having said something to me about this subsequent agreement on Friday on nuclear war, and that as usual, quote, the seventh floor, unquote, to the Department was trying to prevent and sabotage what they were trying to do. Well, I. . . how shall I say it? The agreement on SALT was signed. I was invited to the signing. Prior to that I had joined with Henry in the press conference on this. As usual, Henry did all the talking and I was not involved except to sit there. We were cut short on the briefing of the Congressional leadership, because we were first late at the briefing of the press and the Congressional leadership was slow in showing up. At that, I very quickly in about seven or eight minutes explained the present state of the negotiations at SALT and then Henry filled them in on the declaration. Then we went into the big East Room for the signing. Again, this was a

pretty empty declaration. It really didn't accomplish very much, except atmospherics and atmospherics are important.

I would say the SALT declaration, the original text of it was Soviet text; we worked from the beginning in trying to clean up and make acceptable the Soviet text. The declaration on consultation in event of the threat of nuclear war, again was very clearly--well, Henry told me it was a text that had been given to him in Moscow. And again the language was very clearly Russian language, Soviet language, and he had considerable work in bringing it around to something we could accept. I might say also that the communique that was issued finally on Monday, this last Monday, again bore the very clear evidence of Soviet draft.

The visit of Brezhnev was really unprecedented in anything I've experienced. Streets were blocked, Pennsylvania Avenue was blocked, the street was blocked in front of the Soviet Embassy; the President spent hours and hours and hours in conversation with him. According to Secretary Rogers, the President really got kind of bored with Brezhnev, but Brezhnev handled himself fairly well. But my point is this: that I felt that, first, with Kissinger and then with the President, they treated Brezhnev who, after all, over the years has been a declared ideological enemy at least of the United States, with such deference that I found it a little repellent. We've never treated a chief of a friendly State in such extravagant fashion: banquet at the White House, meeting after meeting, a cruise on the Sequoia, trip together on the President's plane out to San Clemente, another trip with Hollywood stars out in San Clemente, time spent together up at Camp David. It was really an extravagant show. I'm thoroughly in favor of doing what we can to improve our relations with the Soviet Union, but I find that such

extravagant behavior, what I could only call extravagant behavior, towards an individual such as this--personally he looks to me like a thug, Brezhnev, that is, although he handled himself well here--is. . . well, you know, we really treat our enemies better than our friends in many ways. I suppose maybe it's the old story of the son who's the sinner coming home and being received in a way that his brothers were never treated. Nevertheless, I find it extravagant and I find it somewhat repellent. And, personally, I just don't think that it works. I think that we should treat them courteously, friendly, but I think with some reserve and avoid the extravagances of language and treatment that he was shown. Our friends are not encouraged to think that it's useful to be a friend to the United States. As far as the Soviets are concerned, I think we look kind of soft-headed and soft-minded on this. It's very remarkable that this should be done by Nixon, with his own background of past-past history. He's done well. Henry's done well with it. But I think that they're a little bit awed by you might say the power of the Soviet Union, or of Brezhnev. And I think they are a little bit naive, you might say, oh, perhaps they aren't really naive, but they certainly give the impression of being naive in accepting the professions of this man. I think the Soviet Union is changing. I think a lot of changes are taking place. I think it's important that we do all we can to develop our relations with them and to reduce tensions. I have no question about that whatsoever, but I don't think that we make progress on this by appearing to them to be naive and taken in by everything that they say.

Well, the declaration, as far as I'm concerned, the declaration on SALT has now been issued and says that we should try to get an agreement to be signed in 1974 in effect. I don't think it's too much of an exaggeration

to say that the agreement that Brezhnev and the President signed says that, "Well, we haven't been able to agree about this, but we'll tell our negotiators to go back and get to work and try to develop something for us by 1974." Brezhnev is gone, and the city's settled back a little bit to normal. The President is out in San Clemente.

This fellow, John Dean, has been testifying yesterday and today with respect to the Watergate crisis. It's quite clear that, although his record is certainly not clean and although he's young and he's naive, he's very much damaging the President, he's damaging the Administration. And one is torn between a desire not to see the country suffer for the lapse of the President and at the same time one has to be in favor of having the truth come out. I don't know how much truth there is in what Dean is saying, but I feel that it's probably fairly substantial. But then many people are asking, "So what?" What happened was the bugging of a telephone; this is not so unusual or so unknown. I've been involved in matters of this kind abroad, never here in the States. I've never thought of it as any particular sin, even though it might be illegal in the technical sense. The cover-up, the involvement of other members of the White House and people in the whole operation, of course, is the thing that leaves a bad taste. And I think it's probably true that, as the Gallup Poll showed last week, most people felt that the President was aware of this; most people felt that the President was involved in trying to cover it up. But the majority of those that said this said that they didn't see that what had been done was all that heinous a crime, and I also think that's true. It shouldn't have been done; I'm not trying to condone it. If it was to be done, it should have been done in a lot more able way. One can fault them as much for stupidity as for amorality in this.

Well, I hope to get away about the middle of this month. I've told the Soviets I'm prepared to go back when they are ready to go; I don't know when I'll hear from them. I'm working with my delegation and the group here in Washington on preparing for our next meetings. But if we do not meet again and do not resume our meetings in July, I hope together with your grandmother to take a little trip. Perhaps get in the car and drive, although the gasoline's getting short now, drive out through Kansas and out to California to see you all, and get ourselves a little vacation for the first time in as long as I can remember. I really find myself somewhat underemployed and footloose and fancy free. It's going to be a good feeling to get away and I'm looking forward to it.

This is the end of this recording on June. . . (tape ends abruptly)

It is the evening of Thursday, July 19. Since my last taping on June 26, there has been very little of real substance to take place.

First, as far as the Soviet summit meeting is concerned, they all went out to San Clemente and stayed there. Brezhnev left from there. The President and Kissinger stayed out there, so I was not able to get much of a read-out on what actually happened until they returned which was on -- when was it they came back? Well, it was the first week in July. I don't see the date here, but in any event, Henry invited me over and I had quite a long talk with Henry Kissinger on what had happened at the summit with respect to SALT which was virtually nothing, except that Brezhnev agreed that he would take a personal hand in it. Henry said that Brezhnev said that, when he replied to us, he wanted to make a counter-proposal which he would do through Dobrynin here in Washington to Henry, and Henry promised to keep me informed. Meanwhile, in order to keep the overt record straight, I called Dobrynin

and, referring to my conversation with Semenov before I left, said that I wanted to repeat that I was ready again to meet in Geneva at any time. I had suggested to Semenov that we ought to meet in the middle of July, but he, in turn, hesitated on that and had said that he thought it would probably be September. But I said that I wanted to have it clear that I was prepared to meet at any time and I was waiting on the Soviet proposal for resumption of our meetings. Dobrynin said he would get in touch with Moscow and let me know.

I have been doing some work and, actually, have felt somewhat underemployed because it hasn't been too much and I've been taking some afternoons off and playing a little golf and taking a few lessons.

Today we finally had a Verification Panel meeting on SALT in which we discussed the situation. The briefing made it clear that the Soviets are moving quite fast with MIRVs; it may well be that they're increasing the size of some of their present missiles; they've got a major program, obviously, going on their land-based missiles. The question is really what they're up to. It was said at the meeting it seems they are moving beyond an objective of assured destruction, and the CIA were tasked to-- they've been tasked previously--but they were again tasked with coming up to an answer to the question of how Grechko, the Minister of Defense, is defending and supporting this program at the Central Committee, what is it they are up to, what is it they are saying about this. There are many things that we don't understand. They seem to be camouflaging some of their missiles. Admiral Tom Moorer had some questions from the Chiefs about the principles on SALT that were signed at the summit meeting. Most of them seem fairly self-evident to me, but Henry patiently answered all of them.

He indicated that someone, presumably the Chiefs and/or Defense Department, were indicating to some members on the Hill that they were less enthusiastic about the principles. And Henry properly pointed out that, if anybody's going to badmouth the principles, let the Soviets do so, rather than anybody from our side. In fact, there's nothing to badmouth on them. As is known from these recordings, I participated in them. They don't advance in the negotiations, but they certainly do us no harm and, in some ways, there's an advantage in getting Brezhnev signed on to trying to get an agreement by 1974. I do think that this is an improvement.

However, it's quite clear that, again as always, the Chiefs just are constitutionally, emotionally--have great difficulty in bringing themselves to any arms control agreement and would prefer that SALT would go away. I don't know if I said on my last recording that I had had a long talk with Admiral Zumwalt who understands these things better than anybody else over there, pointing out that instead of taking this negative attitude that the Chiefs take, instead of trying to drag their feet carrying out instructions, that they should look at SALT from a positive point of view of what we can and should be seeking to accomplish. But this is very difficult for them. I'm sure that Grechko and the Soviet military probably feel the same way. There's probably more community of interest--what they feel is a community of interest between our military and the Soviet military than there is between our military and the political direction of the country and the Soviet military and their political direction of the country. I'm sure that if the two military people get together that they would agree on many things. . . well, agree that they don't want to have an agreement; each want to be free to pursue their own line. Well, those days are gone.

During the course of the discussion, we agreed that with passage of time and the Soviets obviously working hard to develop their MIRVs, our proposal for a provisional agreement on MIRVs is becoming less and less viable. However, I said that I thought that what was going to happen was that the Soviets would come back, after some little more time on testing, with what they would regard as an agreement for equality on MIRVs. And, while accepting our non-circumvention formula or some formula of that kind for Forward Based Systems, they would still insist upon the asymmetrical numbers for the overall central systems. The question was then going to be whether it would really be in our interest to have such an agreement. There was general agreement around the table, in particular by Henry, that this was what they were likely to do, and that we really need to take a look at what we were seeking to accomplish in this phase of SALT. I've said this a number of times. As a negotiator, obviously I would like to negotiate an agreement, but there are things that are worse than having no agreement. I myself am finding it very hard to see what kind of an agreement could emerge out of this that would really be in our interest. Obviously, we can get some kind of a cosmetic agreement. This is always possible, but I think it would be wrong to try to get just a cosmetic agreement. The problem is going to be how we are going to get an agreement that's really going to be in our interest. You know, people say, let's put a stop. . . that both sides want to put a stop to this acceleration and competition in arms. But it's much easier to say than to do.

Well, I find myself for the first time in many years with a little time on my hands. I don't expect the Soviets are going to--well, I still haven't received any reply, but I don't expect they are going to want to meet again

until September. As I said today, my instructions are good; I don't need much more out of Washington. I do need to have some discussion of what our concept is or what we feel the content is of our proposal on non-circumvention. That can be taken care of later. Therefore, on Sunday, my present plan is that we're going to get in our car. I had wanted to fly, but your grandmother likes the drive. So we're going to get in our car and drive across the country, first time since, oh, 1965, I suppose, since I've driven across. But this time we are going to take it easy. We're going to stop in Kansas and see my cousin Verna there that I haven't seen for so many years, and then drive on out to California and take our time. I'm going to keep in touch with the office and be prepared to fly back, if anything develops that requires my presence here.

I guess I covered in my previous tape the wedding of your Uncle Bill and Toni. Yes, that was on the 23rd; my tape was on the 26th, so I must have covered that.Well, they came back from their honeymoon; Toni had to come back early because of her son here, and we had her over to dinner on I guess it was Tuesday evening. I must say she's very, very nice and I'm very fond of her. Your Uncle Bill will be coming back tomorrow evening. One reason I'm not leaving until Sunday is that I want to see him after he gets back here. He's working out in California. Well, we'll see what works out. I'm going to take a little time off, get away from the Washington atmosphere. Now it's nothing but Watergate, Watergate, Watergate.

I must say it's appalling. In many ways, I find it difficult to work for an Administration that has engaged in the practices they've engaged in. The trouble is much of it is not only unethical, but it's stupid. How the President could have surrounded himself with these people, some of them, I

just don't understand. The whole issue now seems to be whether or not the President knew or didn't know about the Watergate break-in and about the cover-up and all this. I really don't think that that's so much of an issue. In many ways, I think that it's a moral issue, but I think people are getting kind of tired of it. I think people now are beginning to feel a little bit that perhaps the President is being picked on. Maybe he is and maybe he isn't. I really don't think, you might say in the purely intellectual sense, that he is being picked on. I think it's well to bring all these things out. At the same time, we have got to call a halt at some time. We've got to either decide he's going to remain as our President--and I think that people agree that, certainly in foreign affairs, he's been a good President--or he's going to be impeached or removed as our President. We can't keep this in the air. I must say I get a little--looking at some of the hearings-- fed up with the hypocrisy of some of the senators that are mouthing these things, holding the hearings. Some of the questions are good. Senator Ervin is obviously an honorable man. But the pious, holier-than-thou attitudes that they take toward the witnesses,the way they badger some of the witnesses, certainly doesn't make a good impression as far as the Congress is concerned or the Senate's concerned. I think maybe many people feel that way and I think perhaps sentiment is going to begin to turn more in favor of the President. I certainly hope so. He's the only President we have;we've got to support him; we've got to live with it. And we've got to go on.

Well, this is all for now. This is U. Alexis Johnson, July 17, 1973. Over and out.

This is Saturday, September 15, 1973. It's been almost exactly two months since my last recording, July 17. These have been two months

which have been filled with a great deal of events, personally, but not very much officially.

First, on the official side, I asked, pressed through Ambassador Dobrynin here for the resumption of our talks in Geneva. But did not get any reply. He indicated that he felt it would probably be September before they would be prepared to talk again.

So, at the suggestion of your grandmother who wanted to drive, we took off on a trip to drive to California. We left here on Sunday, the 22nd of July, and went down to the Greenbrier at White Sulphur Springs; spent two days there, very pleasant on those beautiful golf courses. Then we went through Kentucky on to Missouri and Kansas, to Lindsborg, Kansas, where we saw my cousin, Verna,and spent two days there. Then we went to Colorado Springs and from Colorado Springs, we went to Durango. Never been in Durango before, and I wanted to see the Mesa Verda Park and that part of Colorado. We arrived in Durango one evening and your grandmother was not feeling very well, so we decided to stay over a second day. We drove to Mesa Verda Park during the day. That night she became very ill, and I finally took her to the hospital there in Durango during the middle of the night and got a doctor. He diagnosed her problem as gall bladder problem. This would have been Tuesday, the 31st of July, I guess; yes. I was very concerned about her and, of course, she was concerned, too. To make a long story short, eventually they decided that they would have to operate on her which they did on Saturday, August 4, to remove her gall bladder. Of course, this was a very difficult and painful experience for her. However, the hospital there was first-class, the doctors seemed very competent, and the operation went well. She stayed in the hospital until the 14th of August when we

moved out. She moved to a motel for recuperation.

You and your two brothers and father and mother drove from Santa Monica out to Durango and, while your mother stayed with your grandmother at the motel, you and your brothers and your father and I went up in the high country of the Rockies there. I had arranged with a wrangler or hunting guide to take us up to some high country. And he brought up horses and we had two and a half days and two nights up there, camping at about 11,500 feet. His name was Art Thompson and his wife was with him. We rode the horses on up higher. I was very pleased that physically I had no problem. You boys enjoyed yourselves. So we had a good time over the weekend.

Then we went back and you drove on back to Santa Monica. Oh, I should have said that your Uncle Bill came out from Washington while your grandmother was in the hospital. Your Uncle Stephen was in Paris, and he called from Paris and we talked from there. Your Aunt Jennifer and Patty wanted to come, but it was just not feasible for us to arrange any way.

Well, after about a week's recuperation in the motel, you and your family drove back to Santa Monica. And then we took three days to drive from Durango to Santa Monica, driving slowly. We spent about a week in Santa Monica, seeing you all and visiting Jennifer and Patty and visiting other people there.

Then we drove back to Washington, taking it slowly, taking six days going back. I drove the whole way. Actually, I drove about 8,500 miles from the time we left Washington until we returned. You know, I like to drive fast, My only problem was that I threw the tread off the tires and had to keep buying new tires, but otherwise we had no difficulty. We got back to Washington on Tuesday, September 4; we drove over Labor Day.

During the trip, while I was driving from Durango to Los Angeles, in fact, driving through Kingman, Arizona, I heard that the President was going to give a press conference. I listened to it, live, on the radio, and he announced that he had accepted Bill Rogers resignation as Secretary of State and Henry Kissinger had been appointed in his place. When I got to Lake Havasu where we were staying the night, I sent a telegram to Bill Rogers telling him how much we were going to miss him,which I really meant, and what a great job I thought he had done, particularly in gaining friends and respect for the United States abroad. And I sent a telegram to Kissinger saying that I wished him well, of course, and I've tried to do everything I could to support him and I was sure the Foreign Service would do so.

While I was in Santa Monica, the President came out to San Clemente and Henry Kissinger asked me to come down to see him in San Clemente which I did and spent, oh, I don't know, three hours or so during the morning with him, talking about the organization of the State Department, talking about personnel. I said several things to him. I said, first, I thought, as far as organization was concerned, the most important thing was to have somebody as executive secretary in whom he had full confidence and that, similarly, somebody in the press as his press spokesman, and the assistant secretary for congressional relations; I felt that those were the most important jobs. Of course, the deputy senior officers are important, but those were key jobs. I said that, as far as the next three and a half years were concerned,I felt his problems were not going to be primarily with Defense and Defense problems, the liquidation of the war in Vietnam, but rather, looking ahead, that the primary problems in foreign affairs as well as domestic affairs were going to be the financial, trade and energy problems. I felt that the Department was not well

organized, the government was not well organized, the White House was not well organized to deal with these problems. As I had often said, the line between foreign and domestic affairs had disappeared, particularly in this area, and there needed to be some mechanism to do a better job than had been done in the past in sorting out the issues in a way that the President could make a decision on them. I told him that I had urged, when Secretary Rogers was still there, that Tom Pickering be made executive secretary of the Department. He'd worked very closely with me on some of the most sensitive matters during the time I was Under Secretary and, whereas Henry had to pick his own man and have confidence in him, I told him that I felt he ought to take a close look at Tom Pickering. He indicated that he had met him and was favorably inclined, but,of course, didn't make any commitments. We also talked about some other personalities, and I gave him a list of the Grades 1 and 2 Officers in the Department that I thought were the most competent and should be considered for jobs as changes were made. I told him that I felt that the real problem was going to be whether or not he could give the Department and the Foreign Service a sufficient sense of participation in things to really enlist them. If he could do so, he could depend on their loyal and full support. However, given his own propensity for playing things very close to his chest, I felt that he had to watch this and do what he could to give a larger sense of participation to the Department. I said that I felt that the time of the highly sensitive matters, such as the trip to China and the trip to the Soviet Union, the war in Vietnam, those things which were,obviously,of such great sensitivity that the President and himself dealing with them felt the need to play them very, very close to the chest, I felt that that period had largely passed. The problems that we were going to be facing

during the next three and a half years were those in which it would be necessary and desirable to enlarge the participation in the foreign affairs community and specifically in the Department, in order to get their best judgment and work on these things. Well, we had a very good conversation, and I must say he said all the right things. I said that, as far as I was concerned, the day he was sworn in and went into that office, he would no longer be Henry to me, but he would be the Secretary of State, that I felt it important to maintain the--well, I put it this way: The Secretary of State, historically,has been the second most important job in the United States government, next to the President. It's been occupied by a long line of distinguished predecessors. I had great respect for the institution, and I thought it important to do everything possible to maintain the institution. As far as I was concerned, the day he went in that office, he would no longer be Henry to me, but he would be the Secretary,Mr. Secretary, and I thought he should encourage that on the part of everyone.

Well, this is going to be quite a change, quite a change. A position that has been occupied over the years by what you might call the epitome of the WASPS:the white,Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment in the United States is now going to a foreign-born, German-born, German Jew. I don't think we should inject these matters of race and so on in it, in the office, but obviously it does get injected somewhat. Publicly, there's been great opposition to him. I'm going to do everything I can to make it work. I never indicated anything else to anybody in the government. I talked to the Officers in the Service about making it work. And I think, in general, this is welcomed in the Department, because they feel that they again will be a part of the action. The thing that concerns me, frankly, is that I'm just not sure--in fact, I

know that, at times, Henry's just not entirely honest. I think I've mentioned previously some occasions in which he has just flatly not stated the truth and stated untruths and knew that they were untruths. I have never surfaced any of these matters, don't intend to do so. But, if and when he ever gets caught up by the Congress or by the foreign countries with which he's dealing in an untruth, it can well destroy him and it can do enormous damage to the country. I just hope that this doesn't happen, because of all the elements that are essential in dealing with diplomacy, foreign affairs, as you will, the most important is probity and confidence of people in you. I hope that Henry will earn that confidence.

As far as my SALT talks are concerned, he has had some discussions with Dobrynin during the interregnum, and I'm meeting with him on Tuesday. I'm going back to Geneva on this coming Thursday morning, stopping by Brussels to meet with the North Atlantic Council first and then going on to Geneva on Friday; after my meeting Friday with the NAC, then going on to Geneva Friday afternoon. Your grandmother is coming with me. She's made a very good recovery.

It's quite clear why the Soviets did not want to talk again until September. I should have said that, during the course of my trip, I finally received a reply from them suggesting the date of September 24 for renewal of our talks, and I accepted that. During this period, the period of July and August since the summit conference, they've been carrying on a very intensive testing program in which they are testing a whole new family of ICBMs, four different ICBMs, and also testing on three of these four ICBMs, testing MIRVs. So that the proposals that I made in May on MIRVs are very largely overtaken; however, I'm not going to make any new proposals. They accepted the fact, before we

left, that the ball's in their court to reply to the proposals I've made. And I'm not asking for any new instructions. My plan is to try, if they don't make a response, to push them to make a response, and after we get a response, then decide what position we should take. During this last week, I met with a number of people on the Hill, I met with the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on disarmament which is chaired by Senator Jackson. I met with Clem Zablocki of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and I had lunch at his invitation with Senator Muskie and Senator Case to discuss SALT. These conversations have been very satisfactory. They have not criticized any positions we've taken. And I have had an opportunity to point out what the President said in his State of the Union Message on Monday, that is, we can't expect people to negotiate for what they can get free. And in this regard I have supported the maintenance of a strong defense establishment and especially the necessity or what I felt was the importance in general of supporting the Defense budget that has been submitted. I said I was not trying to go into detail with specific programs, but I felt it very important that the Soviets recognize, whether we have an agreement or not, we're going to be prepared to do what's necessary to maintain parity with them. And only if they're convinced of that will they be willing to reach an agreement on parity at perhaps a lower level.

Well, I've got many things ahead. The outline of an agreement is certainly not clear, and we're going to have a difficult time.

Incidentally, I should have said that during the summit meeting here, that is, when Brezhnev was here, there was a declaration issued on the SALT talks which had largely been negotiated beforehand by Kissinger with Dobrynin. I'd participated in that; Kissinger had kept me fully informed. It really

didn't say anything except that we would try to reach an agreement in 1974. There's some questions as to whether this puts more pressure on us than it does on the Soviets, as I said on the Hill. It, of course, doesn't require anybody to agree to anything they don't want to agree to. But there was not really any fundamental talk between the President and Brezhnev, at least as far as SALT was concerned. They did not settle any of the outstanding issues. They are still just about where they were left at the time that we adjourned our talks in June.

I think I'll make this over and out at this time. U. Alexis Johnson on September 15, 1973.

This is Sunday, October 14, 1973, Sunday afternoon. I am in our apartment here in Geneva at #9 Avenue Bertrand. We have a different apartment than we had previously, a very nice one overlooking the park here, large and very, very pleasantly furnished.

This is my first recording since I left the States to come over here. I see my last recording was on September 15. I left Washington, together with your grandmother, on Thursday morning, September 20, on an Air Force plane together with the other members of the delegation. We stopped in Brussels to let me and Paul Nitze and General Rowny off, and then the plane went on with your grandmother and the rest of them on to Geneva. I stayed overnight in Brussels and then brief met with the North Atlantic Council the next morning. I stayed with Don Rumsfeld, our Ambassador over there now. I met with them the next morning to bring them up to date on where we stood; I didn't have much new to tell them, of course, because there had not been any meetings since I last met with them. But I made a review very similar

to what I had given on the Hill, and it was very well received. We had what I thought was a very good meeting and probably the best meeting that we've had. They, of course, still remain very nervous about what we are going to do in SALT.

Then I took a T-39 and came on to Geneva on Friday and we moved into our apartment here on Saturday and had our first meeting on Tuesday, September 25. At that meeting, I took the position that I still didn't have much to say, that I had made my proposals in May and it was up to them to reply to them. Semenov was obviously stalling for time, and for the first few meetings in September and the first part of October, it was pretty much a stall, with his saying that they were going to present proposals--well, I'm not sure he said proposals, but they were going to say some further things, but holding off until. . .let's see, it was the meeting on Tuesday, October 9, that he presented a draft treaty. He called me the previous evening and asked to come over and see me and told me that he was going to putting on the table a proposal or treaty at the meeting the next morning,and then he would be speaking further to it.

The draft that he tabled on Tuesday, the 9th, looked very comprehensive and it was very comprehensive, but it was extremely one-sided; it was taking all the most extreme Soviet positions,and held virtually nothing that would be acceptable to us. But I think this is the usual Soviet way of doing things. Some in Washington, particularly in the Defense Department, said they were shocked at the draft. I said they shouldn't be shocked. It didn't contain anything other than what he's been telling us as far as their substantive positions are concerned. And it's the Soviet way to put something on the table that contains their maximum positions. I've said that the only way to

deal with this is not to try to negotiate from their draft, but rather to put a counter-draft of our own on the table, which also has some positions from which we can bargain and then we can work together and see whether or not we can't arrive at a common point of view. In fact, this is what Semenov himself has suggested to me, sort of a rug merchant approach that I don't like very much, but I don't see any other way of doing it. I still think there are fundamental differences that are just not going to be reconciled at this time. They still want to retain the same numbers as they have in the Interim Agreement for ICBMs and for SLBMs, which gives them a big advantage in those weapons. And they want to reduce the armament on our bombers, which is our advantage. And, of course, the big thing, to withdraw all of what they call our Forward Based Systems, that is, all weapons systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons which are stationed abroad, including all aircraft on carriers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Well, this would leave them in just an overwhelmingly favorable position and be very nice for them if they could get it.

Andrews and arrived here in Geneva at eight o'clock on Saturday evening.

I got my delegation together on Sunday and we discussed our preparations for our meetings. And then I met privately, paid a call on Minister Semenov on Monday. We had a plenary meeting on Tuesday. On Thursday, I went over to brief the North Atlantic Council. Friday, yesterday, we had another what we call a plenary meeting, a smaller group.

Well, I suppose I should go back, though, to the NSC and the preparations in Washington. It was quite clear that agreement could not be reached between the agencies in Washington on the course that we should adopt.

Of course,the last agreement, the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons, left the Soviet Union[and assumed the Soviet Union]with having a big superiority in numbers of launchers, both ICBM and SLBM launchers, which in part was offset by our superiority in MIRVS, warheads and bombers. However, over a period of time, the Russians,with their greater number of ICBMs and the greater throw weight,will be able to develop MIRVS and will be able to have at least on paper a great superiority over us.

The issue, as I pointed out, is not to know what the facts are, is not exactly what the military balance is, but the issue is what the people think the facts are. The issue here is probably more important on the political side than on the military side. And a development in which it appears that the Soviets have a great advantage over us is obviously going to have profound effect, not only in our own country, but also both in Japan and Western Europe. Therefore, the question is negotiating something that will reduce this advantage. Now the Soviets are as well aware as we are of the importance of this, and it's not going to be easy to talk them out of it.

while the rest of my staff and his staff were cooling their heels outside. He has also had me for a dinner, but mercifully, he avoided talking business at that time.

Well, let's see what other meetings have we had? Well, we

uation at the moment is this: that they have been renewing their old proposals, many of which are extreme, as I told him. Such things as disarming our B-52 bombers, that is, taking nuclear weapons off of them. Not inclined to be considered serious proposals back in Washington or by me, for that matter. But they have been going through a whole series of proposals and the one thing, though, that he has been pushing is the time element, that is, he has never explicitly said so--some of his staff have said so-- but they are assuming that Brezhnev is going to come to Washington in June and that he is going to want to have some further agreement on SALT to be signed at that time.

I in turn have been very relaxed about this. I have been taking a very broad position. I have been saying that we have to get agreement on numbers. What I said to him very bluntly last Friday was that he had to be absolutely clear that, whereas we could accept the unequal numbers in the Interim Agreement, it was absolutely impossible for us to do so in the permanent agreement. What I have been seeking is a permanent agreement in which we would have what we call equal aggregate numbers of strategic vehicles, that is, ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, that is, an overall single total that would be the same for both sides. And then within that total there would be a subtotal for ICBMs and a subtotal for what we call ICBM throw weight.

Well, as the Soviets have many more ICBMs than we do and also have very

colleagues are more uneasy with it. I wish that we could develop a theory or develop a case that seemed to make more sense. It is sensible, I suppose assuming you have rational people. What happens if you don't have rational people? Well, the thought's too horrible to contemplate, and I have no better theory to offer at the moment.

So I think I will close this off at this time. This is April 1, 1973. I'll stop this portion of the tape at this point. Over and out.

This is Sunday, April 15, 1973. The last two weeks have been fairly vigorous in our negotiations, but they have not gotten any place.

I, some weeks ago, wanted to make a counter-attack on the Soviet position with regard to what they call our Forward Based Systems. They take the view that aircraft that we have in Europe that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons--they don't have to be carrying them--that is, such aircraft as F-4s and Pershing missiles and all aircraft we have on carriers, should be counted in the strategic equation, on the basis that they are capable of hitting the homeland, or hitting the Soviet Union itself. However, weapons that they have to counter our weapons, all their hundreds of MR IRBMs their thousand medium bombers and so on should not be counted. Well, this is an absurd position. I felt that, instead of letting the Soviets continue to push us to say that this has to be counted in the strategic equation, we should make it clear that we think that the balance is with them on this, rather than with us, and they certainly are not due any compensation on it.

Well, it's been an interesting exercise. I did up two teams, a red team and a blue team in my own delegation. Had the blue team write a counter-attack on this position of the Soviets, had Sid Graybeal do that. Then I had

Glendale Presbyterian Church. I know that's the way she wanted it, and that's the way we did it.

I left immediately after the ceremony to come back to Washington. I had a very active time in Washington that following week. I was back here to make arrangements and discuss my instructions for the next round of my SALT talks. I had planned on having two weeks, but,of course, with your great grandmother's passing, this time was shortened, and things were very compressed. It had been agreed before I went to Geneva that my instructions were only interim and that I would need new instructions. We had three Verification Panel meetings at which Tom Moorer and Bill--oh, what's his name? He's Deputy Secretary of Defense--took very extreme positions on one side. Bill Porter, who was talking in the absence of Ken Rush in State, took a fairly extreme position on the other side, arguing for an unconditional MIRV ban. I refused to go along with the State position; I refused to go along with the Defense position. I took the position that, as the negotiator, I was simply asking for instructions; I could give my advice on what I thought was negotiable and not negotiable, but I was not going to get into the position of taking any partisan position. Well, we had three very acrimonious meetings, I would say, in which no decisions were made; obviously they were not. Then, let's see, that went through that week.....

In any event, on Wednesday the 2nd of May, I took a special plane with my group back to Geneva, still without having instructions on what I was supposed to do. I got back here on Wednesday night. On Thursday morning, I received a message from Henry Kissinger that he was on his way to Moscow

whatever they did was, whether they told him or not, justified in the cause of building him up and getting him elected. Now, this isn't such a great sin, as far as politicians are concerned, but it went a little bit beyond what we've normally been accustomed to or known about.

You had these two sides to his character: this absolutely almost ruthless drive to get ahead at almost any cost, I would say, almost any cost; the other side, of course, was himself as a statesman, his openings to China, his openings to the Soviet Union, the great initiatives that he's taken. The one side of his political life that's been successful has been his foreign affairs. To this, you have to give Henry Kissinger a very large measure of credit for being a driving force. At the same time, you have to give the President a very large measure of credit for recognizing the wisdom of the recommendations that Henry made. It's also curious in this, well, --it's interesting in this that the people that were one time closest around him, John Mitchell in particular--John Mitchell sat with me on the Forty Committee--are now being the ones that are being indicted and disgraced, and that Bill Rogers, who was somewnat disdained and looked down upon,as not being an effective force in the Administration,was the man principally to whom the President turned when these troubles came.

Well, the fact of the matter is of course that everybody, including the President, instinctively recognized that Bill Rogers was truly a man of character and integrity, as compared to people like John Mitchell and Maury Stans, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and the people around him who were very opportunistic. And when these opportunistic individuals got caught up, he turned to people like Bill Rogers who had character and integrity and to people like Elliot

Richardson who was Under Secretary when I first came into the Department, then became Secretary of HEW, then became Secretary of Defense and has now been appointed Attorney General.

I had made an appointment to see Elliot over at the Defense Department the day before the announcement of his appointment as Attorney General was made. I thought probably he would want to call this off. But, nevertheless, he asked to see me and I spent over an hour with him, first, talking about SALT matters and then talking about the problems that he faced as Attorney General in trying to restore confidence in the government. Well, it was a very interesting conversation. I suppose I should detail it. I just might make a few footnotes. There are all these talks about wiretaps now, wiretapping people by the Administration. Early in the Administration, once when I was over at the White House with the Secretary, the question came up with regard to an Officer in the Department, well, I'll tell that it was Bill Sullivan. And the President called Bob Haldeman for a copy of the wiretap on Henry Brandon, London Times correspondent. He read the wiretap to us. It seemed to indicate that Bill Sullivan was dealing with--well, I shouldn't use that term--was still maintaining an association with Averell Harriman. And I must say hearing what had to be said certainly seemed innocent to me and certainly in support of the Administration, but the President took it as indicating that Bill Sullivan's loyalties were with Averell Harriman rather than with himself. Very difficult for a politician to understand how we in the Foreign Service can be loyal to individuals and loyal to our country without renouncing old friendships.

Well, my only point is this: back at that time, it became quite clear to me that there was very extensive wiretapping going on. The President

not men of much character. One thing that's emerged out of this is that Bill Rogers and Elliot Richardson, whatever else people may say about them, emerge as men of character and integrity. And it's going to take a long time to restore people's faith in [the presence of] those qualities as far as their national government is concerned. It's been a very sore blow to the whole relationship of government to the people, not that people don't realize and expect that politics is politics and everything is not entirely clean and aboveboard in any sight. But they expect certainly that, when a man has been elected as President, to the Presidency, something in the way of high standards of performance, quality and integrity from him. The Watergate type of thing just shakes people's confidence in the government and is going to have its effects and reverberations for many years to come.

Well, I think that's all. This is Sunday, June 3, ending this portion of the tape by U. Alexis Johnson.

This is Tuesday evening, June 26. I made my last recording in Geneva on Sunday, June 3.

Taking it chronologically from there, it became quite clear to me the following week that the Soviets were not going to get any instructions to deal with this before the summit meeting. Therefore, I sent a back channel message to Henry Kissinger saying that I didn't see much use in our meeting any further; we had laid out our proposals; I did not think it useful to try to find new language to express them. As I told him, every time we, in a speech or in a presentation, try to find a new way of saying things, we tend to negotiate with ourselves. I thought it best to leave things where we had put them. Therefore, I suggested that we recess until after the summit

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know that, at times, Henry's just not entirely honest. I think I've mentioned previously some occasions in which he has just flatly not stated the truth and stated untruths and knew that they were untruths. I have never surfaced any of these matters, don't intend to do so. But, if and when he ever gets caught up by the Congress or by the foreign countries with which he's dealing in an untruth, it can well destroy him and it can do enormous damage to the country. I just hope that this doesn't happen, because of all the elements that are essential in dealing with diplomacy, foreign affairs, as you will, is probity and confidence of people in you. I hope that Henry will earn that confidence.

As far as my SALT talks are concerned, he has had some discussions with Dobrynin during the interregnum, and I'm meeting with him on Tuesday. I'm going back to Geneva on this coming Thursday morning, stopping by Brussels to meet with the North Atlantic Council first and then going on to Geneva on Friday; after my meeting Friday with the NAC, then going on to Geneva Friday afternoon. Your grandmother is coming with me. She's made a very good recovery.

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I am sending three copies of the first of the SALT talk series, tape 25. It will probably be easier for you to make any necessary corrections on one copy and return it in the envelope I've enclosed.

There seem to be two accepted spellings, Semyonov and Semenov, so sometimes these things are a little confusing.

JK

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 26
Side 1

U. Alexis Johnson, speaking in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 14, 1973. This is a continuation of the previous tape in which I was discussing the draft treaty on SALT that the Soviets put forward at our meeting of October 9.

What I was saying was that one thing that is going to prove pretty attractive to a lot of people is their offer to. . . well, they say in the draft to stop or ban the development of a new generation of submarines, missile carrying submarines and new types of bombers. This would mean the stopping of our Trident program, the stopping of our B-1 program. In turn, they would stop any programs of their own in this field. The fact of the matter is they probably don't have any really active programs at the present time, except possibly one in the submarine field. So this would stop our Trident and our B-1 programs, but it would not stop their program of deploying, testing and deploying these four new missiles, ICBM missiles that they are working on at the present time. So, in many ways, it's one-sided. On the other hand, it offers the first chance we've really had, I think, to put a ceiling on the development of new missiles, albeit in a form that is somewhat unfavorable to us, but I don't think entirely so.

Well, I don't know that there's much more to say. As I said in my previous tape, I think the only way of dealing with this is to develop a counterdraft with negotiating room in it. I have suggested this to Washington, but have not heard anything. But I have told them that I'm going ahead and preparing a draft here myself for approval. In fact, what I have in mind is that it's going to be necessary for us now to go back to Washington. It's going to be not too hard to prepare a draft that has a lot of negotiating

room in it, that is, takes fairly forward and extreme positions, as far as our positions are concerned. What's going to be difficult is to get instructions that will enable me to negotiate from it.

I have some ideas as to what might be accomplished. What I would hope to put across--I haven't really discussed this yet--but I think the one thing that I might stand some chance of putting across is a phasing out,down by them of their big SS-9 missiles, say over a period of ten years. Keeping fifty of their replacement missiles for that which are MIRVed, the SS-18,this would give them equality in MIRVs. We, in turn, have fifty Titans which we would be entitled to MIRV if we want to. So this is balanced. And in turn for their phasing down the two hundred and fifty eight of their SS-9s, we would phase down B-52s as our B-1s come on the line. So we would reduce our number of bombers from what could be in the 1980s a total of around six hundred, we'd offer to reduce our bombers down to a total of about two hundred. So we would be reducing bombers and they would be reducing SS-9s. They are very concerned about the bombers, so I think a deal of this kind just might stand some chance.

But still <u>the</u> big block that there's just no way around yet is this whole question of what they call FBS, our Forward Based Systems. They are going to continue to demand their withdrawal and, if they don't get their withdrawal, then continue to demand compensation in the central systems, that is, in ICBMs, SLBMs, for what they feel is their vulnerability to the FBS. And this is going to be a long time before it is overcome. I very much doubt that we're going to get any agreement in 1974. But perhaps we can find some way of refining out the differences.

Well, I think I'll close off at this point. Over and out.

This is Wednesday, October 24. On Monday, I finally completed the counterdraft treaty that I believe I've spoken about previously, which I want to table with the Soviets. In this draft, I deliberately took hard and strong positions, forward positions to give me negotiating room to negotiate from, rather than just putting down on the table what we think are fair proposals and the Soviets start whittling away from there.

Well, this we worked at very hard. It was really a real delegation effort. I had the full support of every member of the delegation. There were a few dissents, but it was very carefully done, and, as I say, a very forward and a very hard position. And I tried to make it very clear that this is a position from which we would retreat, a position that has obviously got built into it elements from which we could move.

I should also say that I sent Ralph Earle back yesterday to be there to explain the treaty. I sent private messages to Admiral Moorer and to Jim Schlesinger as well as to General Scowcroft over in the NSC. I had Boris Klosson also telephone State. And I asked them all to please defer judgment on it until after they got a full explanation because it's complicated, all the parts are interdependent with each other, and a hasty reading will just not give the full import of it.

Well, this is the kind of discouraging thing you get. General Rowny said he had called and talked to people in the Joint Staff last night, and they had accused him of quote, selling them out, unquote, the draft was entirely too soft and they couldn't possibly accept it, and they were going to so advise Admiral Moorer. They wouldn't even accept it as a final position, and it's not intended to be that. Well, as I said to him; in the Joing Staff particularly,

there is a certain degree of competition among each other to see who can be the toughest and the hardest. As a result of which, they take these extreme positions, and nobody listens to them at all because they are such extreme positions.

I am very disappointed to hear this, but I suppose I shouldn't be too surprised. I have asked authority to ask for a recess, so I can go back myself along with the delegation and deal with this. What I want to do is get approval for a counterdraft by the end of November, come back here right after Thanksgiving, table the draft and give our exposition of it before Christmas recess. And then be prepared to come back the early part of the New Year to get to hard negotiations on it.

Of course, the problem is going to be not only getting the draft approved and I hope to do that now, but the problem is eventually going to be getting negotiating instructions that will give us some elbow room. I don't think, as I've said previously, that we're going to get an agreement this year or next year even, but I think it's useful to try to define out some of the issues and see if we can't get the issues defined to the point that there could be a top level political decision that would make a breakthrough on this at such time as it may be desirable to do so.

Well, the other things that have happened this week: The whole Watergate affair. On the one hand, the President defying the courts and then firing Cox and firing Elliot Richardson and Ruckelshaus, and then reversing himself this morning to turn the tapes over to the court doesn't make things look too good. All I can say is that I'm enormously relieved that he did turn them over because it seemed to me quite likely that there would be a real impeachment move and that we could be paralyzed for months and months while

impeachment proceedings went on. The President hasn't handled himself too well in this situation.

On the other hand, in the Middle East, the fighting there, Henry Kissinger has done a brilliant job, getting over to Moscow, getting their agreement to a common front in the Security Council, and getting a cease-fire. First time I can recall, first time, certainly, in the last twenty or twenty five years that the Soviet Union and the United States have taken a common position on an issue in which their interests have been heretofore different. It's a very brilliant job. The problem now is going to be whether or not it can be made to stick.

Well, I hope to get back home next week. I hope I can get agreement that I should call for a recess because I'm just marking time here now. There's nothing, really, I can do until I get back, get approval for tabling a counterdraft or other instructions that will enable me to start talking with the Soviets again.

Well, this is all for now. Over and out.

This is Tuesday evening, November 6, 1973. Listening to the end of my previous recording, in which on October 24 I was hoping to be able to get instructions to go home and work out a counterdraft, I'm still in Geneva and, obviously, this did not work.

I was trying to get the instructions so that I could ask for the recess last Friday, November 2. On either Tuesday or Wednesday, October 30 or 31, I got a call from Owen Zurhellen in ACDA who was doing my back-up, saying that they were agreeable, that is, the Secretary Henry Kissinger was agreeable to my recessing any time I wanted to. And so Tuesday, October 30, I asked the secretary of the delegation, John Ausland, to get hold of his

opposite number over in the Soviet delegation and put the proposition to him that we would recess on Friday. I had Paul Nitze, the Defense man, call Washington to see if we could get an airplane and set all the machinery in motion to recess after our meeting on Friday, November 2. John Ausland was unable immediately to get hold of the Soviet counterpart, and about an hour and a half or two hours later, Zurhellen called me again and said that the signals had been changed, that Hal Sonnenfeldt had reached Kissinger and reclamered the decision, got him to reverse it. He said that I was free to again reclamer to Kissinger and try to reverse it again if I wanted to do so. This again is an incident of Hal Sonnenfeldt sticking his finger in affairs, creating problems and difficulties; I find him about--I find him the most difficult and disagreeable man on Henry's staff. He's been over in the State Department and Foreign Service, but he's always one to create difficulties if he possibly can. And again, he intervened here to do so.

Well, I didn't feel that the issue of when we would recess was so important as to my going personally to Kissinger. And so, as we had not yet reached the Soviets, I said I would not reclamer the decision again. We were on the phone three or four times during the afternoon to Washington and again this is the old situation in which Washington confusion manifests itself. I know they're busy back there with a lot of other things.

In any event, to go on, I officially asked by telegram for agreement that I should recess on November 17, that is after our Friday, November 16 meeting. And just today I finally received instructions to do so, and I've put this to the Soviets. Semenov is going to Moscow and waiting for a reply, but I see no reason that they should change this.

I suggested that we plan to resume again in December, early December,

although I recognize that, given the situation in Washington, it's very unlikely that we are going to receive any instructions by then. I'm merely doing this in order to make it appear that we are not recessing for too long. I have not suggested any definite date for resuming; in fact, I think it's going to be likely that when the time comes close, I'm going to ask for an extension of the time and suggest that we not resume until January if we're able to do so then.

In this regard, the situation in the Administration has gone from bad to worse. Since my last tape, it's now turned out, according to the White House, that two of the tapes over which there has been so much dispute allegedly do not even exist. This has caused the President's status and people's trust in him to drop to an absolute low, and even his strongest supporters are now saying that he, obviously, should resign or should quit, should be removed. It's quite clear, whatever the rights and wrongs of it are, that the United States, American people, politicians, his supporters simply do not want him any longer as President. Therefore, at the present time, they are pushing ahead with the confirmation of the nomination of Ford, Jerry Ford, as Vice President. I hope we can get over this just as fast as we can. I think the best outcome at this time would be to get Jerry Ford confirmed as Vice President as quickly as possible, for the President then to resign and Jerry Ford to become President. This is a fantastic situation in which the Vice President has resigned and is being put on probation rather than going to prison for crimes, most or a large number of men around the President are being tried for crimes for which they can go to prison and some of them have already gone to prison. It appears, rightly or wrongly, that the President has been involved in some of these things and that he himself is far from being above reproach, even as far as his own personal affairs are concerned. He shows an incredible insensitivity. After

all this, he ran off down to Key Biscayne to his house down there and he gets himself photographed out on a yacht with the two cronies of his, Bebe Rebozo so-called;Hauftenpot[?] I'm not sure I can pronounce his name--but these millionaire friends of his during the time of the greatest crisis really in American history--greatest crisis revolving around our government and the Presidency. There's nothing like it in history.

So, as far as my business is concerned, it may well be that,one, he is going to continue to be involved in these affairs to the degree,in trying to rescue himself, fighting for his political life, to the degree that he is not going to be able to do anything else. And, therefore, this business of SALT will go by the board. Or he will resign and the new President will come in and he will take some time to determine what direction he wants to go. So I feel that it's very unlikely that we're going to be able to make any progress here for a long time to come. I shouldn't put it in terms of progress; I really don't think the Soviets are interested in any real progress at the present time, but rather that I'll be given a position from which I can work. At the present time, I've run out of my instructions, I've run out of positions, and I need something against which I can work.

I should go back to say that the counterdraft proposal which I made was very rudely received by a couple of Kissinger's White House types, Bill Hyland and, oh, what's the name of the other fellow. . . But I sent Ralph Earle of my delegation back to explain it; they treated him very rudely and very roughly. However, he did manage to have as I'd hoped an interdepartmental meeting of the Verification Panel working group at which he explained the concept that we had in mind. But I'm reconciled now to the fact that it's not going to be possible to obtain agreement to table such a proposal.

They are working back there on so-called options, a very crude and very unsatisfactory method of approaching this problem. It ignores the negotiating reality,it oversimplifies the issues, and I'm very concerned that they are going to--well, they won't adopt them,the President is going to have to approve it--adopt one of these options. And then we're going to be given this to negotiate. I feel that, even though the counterdraft that we drafted here is a going-in position and somewhat extreme, nevertheless it's defensible. It provides a framework against which these options can be measured. It also provides a checkpoint on all of the other issues that have to be considered at the time that we go in with a position. Thus, I hope that it is going to be used as a basis for looking at and determining a future position, if and when we arrive at one.

Last Friday, I hit quite hard at the Soviet position for the first time I spoke--I've been keeping quiet saying it's up to them to explain their position--and pointed out how completely unilateral, how completely unequal, and how completely unreasonable their position was; it was really not a basis from which we could negotiate. Today I made a statement on throw weight and ICBMs. I'm going to make a statement this coming Friday on stability, and I'm gradually leading up to the following Friday in which I'll tell them that I find that their draft is a completely unacceptable basis upon which even to negotiate. I, by all means, don't want to be forced into the position of negotiating from their draft because I really can't arrive at any point that would be at all satisfactory, starting from their draft. We have to start from a new draft or find some way of leaving their draft behind.

Semenov had your grandmother and I over to lunch today. We had the meeting from twelve to, oh, about one o'clock. Normally, our meetings are

from eleven to twelve, but he asked us to postpone it today. He made a statement on so-called FBS, Forward Based Systems and also on throw weight. There was nothing very remarkable in it. Then I picked up your grandmother and we went back there for lunch at two o'clock. Here's a man that's quite sophisticated; he knows art very well; he's spent long years in the service; he's lived abroad; and they gave an absolutely, well, how shall I describe it, gross lunch. At least five or six courses, four or five wines, just a complete overabundance of everything. I suppose it goes back to the days when they didn't have much food and they now have to demonstrate that they can serve a lot of food. In any event, it was--oh, it was all right, we laughed and joked across the table, but it wasn't a sophisticated, if you want to call it that, lunch.

He told me beforehand that he had some things to say to me and these were going to take about two hours-- I don't know what in the world he could possibly have in mind, I don't know what there is left to say--and suggested that our wives separate, that your grandmother go home. Then he and I could sit down together. Well, lunch didn't get over until after four o'clock, and we both agreed it was entirely too late to start then. So it's agreed that I'll go over on Thursday and see him.

Well, this is about where we stand at the present time. This is over and out on Tuesday, November 6, 1973, U. Alexis Johnson.

This is Sunday, November 25, 1973. I'm here in Washington in our apartment.

The meeting that I spoke about on Thursday, November 8, that Semenov wanted to have with me revolved around his saying that, if we would agree to their position on Forward Based Systems, FBS, that they would agree to aggregates.

He didn't quite say equal aggregates. He said aggregates of central systems with due allowance for the British and French submarines. It took him about one hour to make his initial presentation. And then I responded to that, and we went back and forth for about two and a half hours. It didn't advance our negotiations at all, except that he seemed anxious to try to get ahead. He pled with me not to talk about theories anymore, but to talk about the practical aspects of their brief and get down to cases, making counterproposals.

Well, I don't recall in that last tape whether I said I was seeking to return to the United States that weekend of November 9. But, as Kissinger was away on the Middle East affair and also the trip to China, it was quite clear we couldn't get anything done back here. It was agreed that we would postpone our departure, and I actually left on Friday, November 16. We had our usual Friday meeting and then I left immediately after the meeting. We flew directly to Andrews and came directly to the apartment. We sent Senko-San ahead by commercial plane and she got here a few hours ahead of us and was ready for us here.

During the past week, I have been trying to arrive at something in the way of a view and a consensus on what we should be doing next. We had a Verification Panel meeting which Kissinger chaired at the White House on last Friday. I spoke to him, I met with him briefly before that. The Verification Panel meeting was, ostensibly, to consider a number of options that the working group had been working on. These options were. . . well, let me put it this way: they took bits and pieces of the problem, that is, the whole strategic problem, and tried to put them together in various ways. Actually, we paid no attention to them at the meeting. He's had the bureaucracy working back here on these so-called options. My own feeling is that

he did this as to give them something to do and to see what they come up with. I, during the week, had worked out a proposal that I thought that we could go back with. I worked it out in the form of an instruction to me, and it contained the elements that I felt we would not necessarily be able to immediately negotiate, but it would be a good basis for negotiation. The principle I set forth was a very simple one, that is that we should seek over a ten-year period to achieve a level of two thousand launchers for each side, that is, ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. This would mean reductions on both sides, so that we would have an equal aggregate at numbers. We should also seek to achieve a roughly equal aggregate of throw weight, factoring in bombers at about half their actual carrying capacity. That's in order to make allowance for the fact that they are not as timely, of course,cannot deliver a weapon as fast as an SLBM or and ICBM. So we would seek to have approximately equal aggregate numbers, equal aggregate throw weight and approximately equal aggregate numbers and throw weight of missiles equipped with MIRVs. This would be the broad, broad approach we would take. To accomplish this would require the Soviets to reduce their large missiles, what we call the modern large ballistic missiles, their SS-9s and 18s. And I would hope that over a period of time that they could be reduced down and out. We, in turn, would reduce the number of our bombers, a reduction of one bomber for one SS-9.

I don't expect that they would accept this, but it gives us a good position to go in on, a good defensible position. I think, as I told Kissinger, that, in order to put through such an arrangement, it would probably be necessary for us to agree to forego the Trident submarine, the boat; it would not be necessary for us to forego the missile; we could still have the C-4 missile, the four thousand mile range missile in the Poseidon boats. But we would

forego the boat. I've become more and more skeptical myself about whether the enormous cost of the Trident is really worth it. It's putting a lot of eggs in one basket, and it doesn't offer all that great an advantage over the C-4 missile in the Poseidon boats. The Trident missile, the D-5 missile, has a range of about six thousand miles as compared to four thousand miles for the C-4 missile. Of course, this would give the boat a larger cruising area--area in which it could cruise--and,to that degree, would make it less vulnerable or make it more invulnerable, you might say. But the costs are enormous. It's putting a lot of eggs in one basket. A boat would carry twenty four missiles and we'd only build ten of them at a cost of several billion dollars. Thus, I think we could well consider making the Trident a part of the deal, if we could get the Soviets to destroy their big missiles. These are real, real beasts, and with MIRVs in particular,I think,could be very destabilizing.

I put this proposition to Henry, left it with him; I've told him I've discussed it with nobody else and that, if it at all conforms to what he thinks the President would like to have, why, then I told him that I felt there was a reasonable chance that we could get considerable degree of consensus around it in the bureaucracy. As far as my own delegation is concerned, I told him that I had discussed various elements of this with them, and I felt most of my delegation would support such a deal. However, I have not discussed the Trident. The Trident is something down the road and it's something that we need not make any decisions on at the present time.

Kissinger said that he is still planning to go to Moscow in January and would like to have me go with him. I left it with Semenov in Geneva that we would try to reconvene the middle of December, but would set the exact date through diplomatic channels. I actually doubt that we are going to be in a

position to do so, and I know that they would not want to come back with just a short time before New Year's. I, frankly, also do not relish the idea, so I imagine that it would work out that we won't go back until January. But how we fit in the Geneva meeting, how we fit in any new proposal, how we fit in a trip to Moscow still all need to be worked out.

Well, this is about all I have for now. I think I'll close off at this point. Over and out.

This is Saturday, December 8, 1973, U. Alexis Johnson speaking.

I finally was able to get to Henry on Tuesday, December 4, and got his agreement that we put off any SALT meetings with the Soviets at Geneva until, as I put it to the Soviets, at or after the middle of January. I called Ambassador Dobrynin and asked him to pass this message on. He said he had just had a message from Semenov on which he was about to call me asking what my plans were. And so he was sure he would be very receptive to this change. I haven't got final confirmation from them, but there's no question that they will agree to it.

Henry has gone off again now to a NATO meeting, Middle East, be gone for ten days, two weeks. Nothing will be done on SALT while he's gone,and so I more or less sit twiddling my thumbs. I am going to have to go to a hearing of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Scoop Jackson, on Thursday of this coming week. He had made a speech this last week on SALT; the word is he wants me to come up there together with my delegation to comment and discuss his speech. I told him I'm not prepared to do that. I am prepared to discuss what has gone on in Geneva as I have been in the past, but, as far as discussing his speech and discussing future policy, he should have the

the representatives of the agencies here in Washington dealing with policy to deal with that. I'm only one element in that and I certainly don't want to get myself in the middle between the Administration and Jackson who is clearly running for President on this issue. Of course, he wants to get me into it, not that he has any ill motives towards me personally. We get along very well, but he's finding ways to attack the Administration whenever he can.

During this past week on Tuesday, the only time I've seen Henry really, he called me in along with Bill Porter and, oh, George Vest, Dean Brown and Nat Davis. He was in a fury about some articles that appeared in the paper, allegedly leaking the substance of negotiations, attacking him, allegedly. .. Foreign Service Officers in the Department allegedly criticizing him. He is just super-sensitive on these issues. And at the time of high crisis and great pressure, he spent about an hour going over the issue. He behaved very badly, I must say. He said that he could get along without the Department and he could go back to the White House and carry on foreign affairs there without the Department. And [he was] making rash and threatening statements of that kind which don't set very well with me. I get a little tired of it. I do admit, though, when it comes to negotiating with others, he certainly does a great job. He's in many ways a genius, I have to admit to that.

Well, there's not much more today. I played golf today with Secretary Rogers, former Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Kim of Korea who is now going back as Foreign Minister and Ambassador Ingersoll who has come here as the new Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. I wanted he and Ambassador Kim to meet each other. We had a very, very pleasant day. This is an example, of course, of the kinds of problems that we have. Kim is going back as Foreign Minister; he'll certainly be the best foreign minister they've had in a long time.But

Henry was unable to make time to see him before he left, and the President also has refused to see him. This was during a week when the President and Henry were paying a great deal of attention,time and effort on [Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania. That's perfectly all right, but we certainly give some of our friends the impression that we pay a lot more attention to our enemies or former enemies or adversaries than we do to our friends. And I'm afraid that this will result in difficulties in the future.

Well, I haven't much more at this time. Monday, I'm talking to the Industrial College down at the Department. We're having a lunch for Ambassador Kim. I'm going over to see Chip Bohlen, Ambassador Bohlen, on the evening of Monday. He's very ill and becoming more ill all the time. I respect him and like him and I just want to see him. I feel very badly about his physical deterioration. He has had cancer of the bowels, a very, very common ailment; it gets many people: I hope I can escape it.

Well, this looks like it's down at this end of the tape. I think I will just sign off at this point and not put any more on this, but rather let it run out and turn it over.

This is U. Alexis Johnson on Saturday, January 26, 1974. I see that my last recording was on December 8 of last year.

At that time I spoke of going over to see Chip Bohlen the following Monday which I did, and we had a good visit. He was in obvious pain, lying down on the couch; he came downstairs; but was mentally entirely alert. We had a discussion of an hour or an hour and a half, I suppose, of SALT and the Soviets and my business. That's the last time I saw him. A few weeks later, he was dead. They had the service here for him; he was cremated and buried in Philadelphia.

During the month of December, there was some work done on the SALT talks, but Henry Kissinger being away a good part of the time, not much was accomplished. I informed the Soviets we would not be able to meet in December as I had originally proposed, and proposed that we meet sometime in January. I said I would give them two weeks' notice. Well, during January, it also became clear that we were not going to be able to meet, so I said, "Let's plan the first part of February." Within the delegation, I planned, as the planning figure,on February 5. But we were not able to meet that. And so last week I finally proposed that we resume the meetings on February 12, leaving here on February 7. I'm waiting forea reply from the Soviets, but I don't anticipate any difficulty with them on that date.

The problem has been that Henry Kissinger has been away a good part of the time on the Middle East settlement. He did, unquestionably, a brilliant job in bringing the Israelis and the Egyptians together, so-called shuttle diplomacy; it's one of the great coups of history. He's a remarkable man, there's no question about that. I still feel a little bit unease that he's flying a little bit high, too high, but perhaps I'm wrong about this. But I do feel, still, an unease in spite of his brilliance.

Well, we had a so-called Verification Panel meeting earlier in January on SALT matters, and I also talked privately with Henry, gave him some of my ideas as well on how I thought things ought to be handled. I might say that the issue really was whether or not that we would go back and seek an agreement just on MIRVs that could be signed at the time of the President's visit in the summer of this year, or whether we should go back and propose a comprehensive agreement that would include MIRVs. I strongly felt that we should propose the comprehensive agreement. In the first place, we had in

the June 21, '73 summit statement said that the two countries would, during 1974, seek to achieve an overall agreement. With the Soviets having tabled a proposal,extreme though it was for an overall agreement, with our having asked for the recess, coming back, I felt it was incumbent on us at least to make a proposal for an overall agreement.

I gave him some of my ideas of what I thought might be in it. It was agreed at this meeting that we should propose a comprehensive permanent agreement with a MIRV element. The idea of proposing a separate MIRV agreement or an earlier MIRV agreement, of course, is that the MIRV question is time-sensitive and much more so than anything else.. So there's a logic, an inner logic, in trying to get an agreement on that subject without waiting for an agreement on everything else. And also, from a political standpoint, when the President makes his trip to Moscow this summer, it would give him something to sign. So, what's been done: I put forward and circulated my proposition for a comprehensive agreement. In the meantime, the so-called working panels and others have been working at the MIRV portion of the agreement, and there's a wide range of views on what should be contained therein.

In general,the situation still remains much as it was, that is,the Chiefs, the Military Chiefs, want an agreement that constrains them just as little as possible. And, therefore, of course, constrains the Soviets as little as possible. Therefore, it is as meaningless as possible. This is particularly true with the MIRVs; their proposition on MIRVs in fact calls for a big increase in the number of U.S. weapons and MIRVs, rather than any decrease. I, on the other hand, feel that we certainly should be proposing decreases. And we can see where we come out. But I think that we'll all be better off if can find a lower level; at least that's the purpose of the arms control talks.

I talked quite frankly with Admiral Zumwalt a couple of times. Well, I've also talked with some of the other Chiefs, telling them that, it seemed to me, they took an all too defensive attitude toward SALT; they looked upon it as something against which they needed to defend themselves. Thus, while they were always taking extreme positions and always getting ignored, I pled with them to find some way of approaching SALT from a positive point of view, giving their ideas on where a balance between our two countries should be in the 1980s because that's what we're talking about and taking a more positive approach to this. Well, as a result of all this, Bud [Zumwalt] said why didn't I talk to the Chiefs together. He said,"You know, we Chiefs don't even talk about this among ourselves. All we do is look at staff papers." I said I'd be willing to do so, but I didn't want anybody in the back row and I didn't want anybody taking notes. I wanted to have a real so-called "hair-down" session with them.

I was invited by them to meet with them on Monday, January 7, along with Jim Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense. Just the two of us, the four Chiefs and the secretary of the General Staff. We had about a two hour session which I felt quite satisfied with. But I don't see much in the way of results. Well, the trouble is with the institution. The staff people feel they have to outdo each other at being tough, and then the Chiefs get together with their staff people behind them; they have to outdo each other in being tough. And they come up with these extreme and even absurd positions.

Last Thursday,we had an NSC meeting on SALT; it was not to be a decision meeting, simply a briefing meeting. And it went exceedingly well. We were there about two and a half hours, and the President was actually present about two hours of that time. There was the President, Ken Rush from State, Bill Colby

Carl Duckett from the CIA, Jim Schlesinger, Bill Clements from Defense, Admiral Zumwalt represented the Chiefs as Admiral Moorer had to go to the funeral for Louis Strauss, the Vice President, Ford, was there. Henry Kissinger did not sit in the chair of Secretary of State, but rather sat across the table in his role as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. There was an excellent discussion, one of the best meetings of its kind I've ever attended. The President was in good form. He was obviously holding the meeting to demonstrate that he could deal with these subjects, and he did exceedingly well. He talked about, well on SALT, for example, he got across a very good message to the Chiefs and to Defense to the effect that they couldn't expect any large increases in funds for strategic weapons and, whereas we had to use our leverage, much of our leverage with the Soviet Union was uncertainty with regard to what we could do and would do in this field; in fact, we shouldn't plan on anything that would call for great increases. This is a message that very much need to be gotten across. He expressed concern about continued leadership in the Soviet Union, what would happen after Brezhnev, whether some thugs, as he described them, who were around the Kremlin would take over. He also expressed concern about the continued leadership in China, what would happen about Chou en-Lai had passed on, and what the relationship between the two countries might be, between the Soviet Union and China, and, in turn, our relationship with the two of them. He talked in a very philosophical way about the future and our relations and our roles. He said that Brezhnev had told him that he--Brezhnev--felt that China was going to be a danger to the Soviet Union in ten years. The President said he thought it was going to be longer than that; ten or fifteen. We agreed that China could be a danger to the Soviets in ten, but it would be at least fifteen or twenty years before they could present any danger to us.

But he was quite realistic about it. He told me to play to the hilt with Semenov the fact that he, the President, had been a strong, vigorous anti-Communist at one point, he was somewhat unpredictable and the Soviets should be concerned as to how he might react to various situations, and therefore the thing to do was to get an agreement with us. I told him I had no problem on doing that and would certainly do so. Well, anyway, it was a good meeting.

As I mentioned, we are now planning to leave here February 7. I'll stop in Brussels to brief the NAC if I have instructions. But I'll meet with the Soviets on February 12. I hope we can get our instructions completed well before I leave. We are planning to have another Verifications Panel meeting next Wednesday, and I see the shape of what's coming out. The President talked about having another NSC meeting before we leave, but I don't see how that's going to be possible. Well, that's about all.

Oh, on the business side, the District of Columbia tax people are harassing me for income tax, claiming I'm a legal resident, domiciled in the District. I'm claiming I'm not. This may go to court. We'll see what happens on it. I have always maintained my legal residence in California and still claim that that's the case, and I have a valid claim to that.

Jennifer and Patty came here during the middle of January--oh, what was it, around January 12, I guess it was-- for four or five days. Jenny took some time off from her job. And we went out to dinner. I took Patty and Jenny around to museums on Sunday. Oh, we had a wonderful time. It was so good to see them.

Well, I think this is about all for this time. I'll sign off here. U. Alexis Johnson, signing off on Saturday, January 26. Over and out.

This is Saturday, February 23, and I'm in Geneva, Switzerland. I was just listening to the end of my previous recording on January 26.

To pick up one item left dangling there, I said I was having difficulty with the District tax people. I prepared a brief on my claim not to be liable for tax and I went down to see them and had an interview with them and, in short, they accepted my position that I was not liable.

Well, I talked about the NSC meeting that we had. Then the following Wednesday, we had a Verification Panel meeting, and it was quite clear from that there was a large lack of any common approach to the whole question of SALT, this session of SALT. To keep people busy, Henry gave them some more studies to do. And it seemed quite clear that we were not going to be able to make our schedule of starting the meetings again on the 12th of February which I'd had in mind. So I again postponed them until the 19th of February. Well, what happened was we had another Verification Panel meeting and, at that, Henry came up with the idea of, proposed the idea that we not make any specific proposals, but rather that we simply discuss some general principles, such as equal aggregate numbers, equal aggregate throw weight of central systems, limitson throw weight of MIRVed ICBMs and a few things such as that, without making specific proposals, but try to get some of these concepts across to the Soviets prior to his visit there, that is, Henry's visit there in March.

Henry and I also had a long private talk on this. He feels that the Soviets have. . . one, Brezhnev is having very little to show for detente. They feel very bruised and injured over the fact that they have not had any role in the Middle East settlement. We have not passed the most favored nation treatment--Congress has not-- for them. And, in fact, Henry's view is that, looked at from the Soviet point of view, they've got very little out of detente and, therefore, this is not a time to be, shall I say, too vigorous with them,

because it will cause real trouble for Brezhnev and what we've got to do is try to work up to this and see whether or not we can get a situation on which Brezhnev will be willing to overrule his generals and get an agreement on SALT that we can live with.

Henry says that he wants me to go with him to Moscow in March. He assured me that he was not necessarily feeling under great pressure to get a SALT agreement for the President to sign in June. As he pointed out, the President, of course, his popularity's now way down. A SALT agreement to be signed in June might lift him up a little bit,but not very much. Therefore, he's prepared to have us go about this in an orderly way and not try to get an agreement for an agreement's sake in June. He has a feeling that perhaps the pressure may be on Brezhnev to get an agreement. If so, why, of course, that would be to our advantage and we should use it. I suggested to him, as far as something to be signed in June, we might well propose to the Soviets an amendment to the ABM treaty, in which we would each renounce the right to build the second ABM site, or this could be done by declaration and need not necessarily be an amendment to the treaty. He thought well of that. Well, we'll wait and see what happens.

Well, the result was I left Washington on last Saturday, just a week ago, with my delegation and flew directly here to Geneva. We had not, at the time I left, had our instructions. Henry asked me to try a draft of instructions which I did the evening before I left. And Defense and the Chiefs objected to parts of it, so when we left, they still had not been agreed upon. So I arrived here on Monday. I went over and called on Semenov I was able to talk to him only in very broad terms about what my plans were. On Tuesday, I made a very broad presentation, still without instructions. And, finally,

on Thursday, we finally got our instructions which show some hasty drafting and have ambiguities and some contradictions in them. Well, we can carry them out, but, in spite of the three months we spent in Washington, we ended up with having instructions which still need to be clarified. However, there is enough in there for me to be able to go ahead. And I'm doing so.

I made a general speech on Tuesday. Last Friday, yesterday, I made a statement on equal aggregate numbers of central systems, that is, SLBMs, ICBMs and heavy bombers. On this next Tuesday, I'm making a statement on the equal throw weight for MIRVed ICBMs. This is our central theme and the theme that I'm going to be pushing.

Defense and the Chiefs are not happy with some parts of the instructions. They do not particularly like the part that says we feel there should be equal aggregate throw weight for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the contention being that you can't equate bombers and missiles, and there's really no way of factoring in their bombers as far as throw weight is concerned. Well, this is a problem that's been inherent from the beginning. I felt that we've had to include bombers in this and we, obviously, have difficulty in translating this into specifics.

This coming Wednesday I'm going over to brief the North Atlantic Council over at Brussels. I'm just going over in the morning and coming back in the afternoon.

Well, we're back in our apartment here in Geneva, the one that we had previously. Senko-San went over on Friday evening, got here Saturday noon, so she got the apartment ready for us when we came in on Saturday evening.

I think this is just about all for now, so I'll sign off. This is U. Alexis Johnson signing off on Saturday, February 23, 1974, in Geneva, Switzerland. Over and out.

Side 2

This is Saturday, March 16. I've just been out, had a golf game over at Divon with Ralph Earle and General Rowny. It rained and it was windy and a little cold, so we only played fifteen holes. But it was good to get out, in any event.

Since my last recording on February 23, we have been laying out to the Soviets propositions that we brought here with us, that is, certain what we call principles or concepts that we're asking them to accept. And, then, we are telling them, that when they've accepted them then we can go on from there. But there's no use talking in details unless they accept the concepts.

We actually have no expectation of them agreeing to them here. The whole idea was to try to get across the idea of controlling MIRVs on ICBMs by throw weight. That's our primary thing to get across, as well as an equal aggregate number of what we call central systems, that is, ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. We've suggested that this initially be 2350 and then that there be gradual reductions from that over a period of years, but we've not named any figures. We've also said that we feel there should be a substantial aggregate--we don't say equal aggregate--in the throw weight of all the elements, the ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. And on this--well, I don't say we've made any progress on any of these issues. The whole idea was to try to get them to understand our concepts here, get it across to Moscow before Secretary Kissinger makes his trip there. The idea is that he will make a trip there prior to the President's visit and could see whether or not there is any hope of getting the Soviets to accept any of the propositions that we have put forward and then see whether we can go on from there. I don't see any possibility of our being able to reach an agreement that could be concluded at the time of the President's visit, assuming that comes in June or July.

But I do see some possibility that Kissinger could have some discussions there. He says he wants me to go with him. I hope that I do go because I would like to be in on the discussions, then carry those a little further, say, to discussions of some principles between Brezhnev and the President and then turn that back to us for a negotiation of an agreement to be concluded in 1974. Kissinger has in mind and I think the President does, too, also something that he could conclude at the time he's there. However, Kissinger has said to me that he feels that this is not a very strong possibility and that it would really do so little to help the President in his present difficulties that we certainly shouldn't enter into an ill-conceived agreement on our part. However, he wants to and I think the President wants to enter into a separate agreement on MIRVs, particularly on ICBM MIRVs. I think that that would be a mistake. I think that they are time-sensitive subjects, but I think that we would use up so much trading goods in getting an agreement on MIRVs that we wouldn't have enough left to get the comprehensive agreement.

Personally, I am very much in favor of a comprehensive agreement. The JCS also are very concerned that there would be a separate MIRV agreement, and they are pushing hard for a comprehensive agreement. Well, it will remain to be seen how this works out.

Kissinger was supposed to go to Moscow on March 18, that is next Monday, but that's been postponed. I've been waiting on word as to what the date is. I heard on the radio last night that they've now set on March 25, that is a week from Monday. But I still have received nothing from Washington to confirm that.

Paul Nitze of my delegation has gone home for a short period. He was

nominated as Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. . . . well, I shouldn't say he was nominated.. Secretary Schlesinger wanted to name him to that. I agreed because I felt that the International Security Affairs, ISA as it's called in the Defense Department, had fallen into such low estate it's virtually non-effective during the preceding four years-- Warren Nutter was an absolute disaster in that job--that it was so important that that job and that office be built back up again that,much as I hated to lose Nitze, still I would be prepared to see him leave if he could go back to that job. It would be a great act of patriotism on his part. It's a job he held fifteen years ago. Since that time he's been Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and it would be a real public service. Well, what's happened is this: Goldwater has taken out against him, alleged that he's soft on Communism and that he assisted McNamara in the unilateral disarmament of the United States, et cetera, et cetera. It has many of the echoes of the McCarthy period. It's outrageously unjust. I agreed and Paul called Schlesinger and they agreed that the only thing for him to do was to go home and see if he could do anything about it. I don't expect the White House would make any fight. First, Paul's a Democrat. I had difficulty even getting him on my delegation. But, with some of the changes now in the White House, they may not be quite so psychotic on this whole subject of Democrats. But,nevertheless, I doubt that they are going to want to take on a fight. I think that he could get confirmed. I think only Goldwater and Thurmond and a few of those right-wingers would vote against him. I think he would be very much confirmed and I very much hope he can be.

Dr. Harold Brown,who used to be Secretary of the Air Force and is now President of Cal Tech, is also on my delegation and has arrived here this week,

very fortuitously just as Paul left. And it's always good to have him here. He has fresh ideas, new ideas, and I find it very helpful to work with him.

Back to our negotiations with the Soviets, I've been working with my own staff here on this whole question of how we could verify a MIRVed ICBM agreement, that is, how could you tell whether or not the Soviets were observing the agreement. It turns out that this is pretty tough. I think that we've made a proposal here that it's going to be very, very hard to find a way of verifying. Only if the Soviets will stop testing their SS-18 which is their big missile, as well as their SS-17 and in effect only MIRV and deploy their SS-19, does it look like we are going to have a chance for reasonable verification. But, even then, it looks as if the only way the thing's going to work out is whether we have an overall aggregate between ICBM and SLBM MIRVed missiles in which the larger throw weight of our SLBMs offset the larger throw weight of the Soviet ICBMs. In that event, I can see the possibility of an agreement which would leave us about an equal aggregate overall MIRVed throw weight, but it would mean the Soviets would have two or three times the land base, that is, the ICBM MIRV throw weight that we would have. We've laid such an amount of emphasis on this that I think we are going to have real trouble, real trouble with the Congress, real trouble with people who follow these things closely. They'll say that we gave the Soviets--and this is always the term, give; of course, it isn't up to us to give; if we don't have an agreement, they can build anything they want to-- we conceded to the Soviets a two or threefold advantage over us in throw weight land based missiles and these are the ones that we've been emphasizing in return for our being able to get an equal aggregate. People are going to say that that's not a very good deal.

In spite of all the work that was done in Washington, it is quite clear to me now that people really hadn't thought through this question of verification

before we made this proposition. Well, in justice to them, I might say I think the Joint Chiefs had, to a degree, but they never explained their case very much. They, in general, had been against a MIRV agreement because they said that it could not be verified. Well, it may turn out that they'll be right. In any event, we have a lot of work ahead of us.

I think I'll sign off at this point. This is Saturday, March 16, in Geneva, Switzerland. Over and out.

This is Saturday, April 13, almost a month since my last recording, and I'm at my apartment here in Washington.

As far as the meetings in Geneva are concerned, during March, we completed our presentation of our concept to the Soviet Union. Well, in time prior to Henry Kissinger's meetings in Moscow--let's see, was that the 18th he started?--well, it was in March in any event.

Before I left Washington, he'd said that he wanted me to go with him to Moscow when he went. I had assumed that I would be going. I got word from my office that they had asked to put my name on the list for a visa, and it seemed to me clear that I was going. I had planned to fly directly to Moscow and meet him there. Then, two days before, or the day before, yes, the day before I was going to leave, I got word from him that Brezhnev had asked that I not come, that he did not want any of his delegation there and wanted to keep the meetings very small. I don't know whether that's true or not, but it probably is so. Anyway, it didn't make much difference.

So we suspended our meetings of the delegations in Geneva and then, on his way out from Moscow, Henry sent me a message outlining in brief what had happened, the position that the Soviets had taken, making it clear that he hadn't gotten very far. So I suggested that the delegation come on home.

Henry got home and left almost immediately, got married and left almost immediately for Mexico for a honeymoon. In reply to my message that I thought we ought to go home because we had nothing to do in Geneva, Scowcroft said that Henry wanted us to stay there because, in view of the stories that the Moscow meetings had failed, he didn't want it to appear that we were breaking off also in Geneva, even though we weren't meeting. I said,of course, if they wanted us to stand by, we'd stand by, but we had no instructions to do anything.

Well, I took advantage of the opportunity to go down to Rome for a few days with your grandmother. Then I went over to Stuttgart and was briefed by EUCOM over there. And then we made a trip to Madrid, going down on Thursday and coming back on Sunday. First time I'd seen Rome, first time I'd seen Spain, Madrid. I finally saw the Torrejon, the Spanish base upon which I'd worked so hard.

I made another plea to go home and to make a long story short, the morning that Henry got back from Mexico, he approved our going home, and I was able to set up a ride with Stan Resor of the MBFR delegation coming from Vienna. So we left on Thursday, April 11, and arrived back here the same day, of course.

Yesterday, April 12, I went to the office and also attended the funeral of Bob Murphy's wife who had passed away the previous day. I am just trying to catch up on what they are planning. In the meantime, Kissinger issued a statement yesterday to the press; he issued two statements saying that he did not see any possibility of achieving a comprehensive permanent agreement during the course of 1974, certainly not before the President's visit in June. I'm glad he said this because I certainly believe that that

is correct. This is somewhat counter to the President's statement when he was in Paris for the funeral of Pompidou, when he, the President, saw Podgorny. He issued a quite optimistic statement which baffled me because I couldn't see the basis of it. I think what Kissinger has now said is correct. I don't see the possibility of a comprehensive permanent agreement during 1974. He is still holding out hope for some MIRV agreement. This seems to me to be very difficult. He has a lot of Verification Panel working groups at work on various aspects of the Russians' proposals.

Incidentally, it's quite clear that he debriefed me more than anybody else in this message that he sent to me. And it was only last week that the rest of Washington got debriefed on what went on in Moscow. It's pretty difficult to see how we are going to work from that, but there are elements which we can seize upon and from which we can try to build out into a position that would be more attractive. However, it's going to be a long, hard job.

I don't know what our role is going to be in Geneva until there has been a conceptual framework established, that is, some agreement on what we are trying to do. Then it can be negotiated in Geneva. But the conceptual framework has to be agreed upon between Henry and Brezhnev or the President and Brezhnev. And then there's going to be lots of work to be done. I'm looking forward to . . .

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 27
Side 1

This is U. Alexis Johnson, Saturday, June 22, 1974. My last tape was on April 13, 1974. Thus, it's been a period of over two months since I've made a tape. However, during this period very little, very little has happened, as far as my official business, SALT, is concerned.

On the personal side, we went out to California the first part of May and spent about a week there with Judy, Jennifer and the grandchildren. Then I went on up to Seattle and made a speech for a foreign policy conference up there.

During this period, as far as business is concerned, Kissinger has been involved in the Middle East negotiations and has been back to Washington only very intermittently. Then the President made his trip to the Middle East. And so here we come, with the summit conference in Moscow taking place next week and very little in the way of preparations having been done for it and virtually no advance as far as the SALT business is concerned.

The first and the only real discussion we've had of SALT was at a meeting we had on Thursday with the President, an NSC meeting. We had a discussion of the ABM Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and also of SALT.

But perhaps before going into that, I should say that during this period, however, Paul Nitze, representative of the Department of Defense, has resigned from the delegation, with a public statement deploring the situation in the White House and, in effect, saying he did not see how a viable and a good agreement could be made. I might say in this regard that Nitze has been talking about resigning for some time, because of his fear that the President would make an improvident agreement in connection with the Moscow summit. I have been arguing the other line and have been having him hold off at least for a

time, my point being that with the President's present situation, it's very unlikely that he would make an improvident agreement. Because, one, people don't understand the subject that thoroughly and it would gain him very little credit, you might say, among the doves; but an improvident agreement would gain him a great deal of blame, if you will, among the hawks, the conservatives in the Congress and particularly the thirty four senators to whom he has to look to to block any effort to convict him if he's impeached. Well, I thought I had Paul held off on this, but I did not. He came over a week or so ago and showed me a letter that he had written to the President and he asked to see the President. And I know he didn't get to see him, and I know he didn't get to see Kissinger. And I know that Kissinger was very provoked with the letter and, presumably, the President was also. And I'm sure, well, I know word of that got back to Paul. So he just quit. I regret this very much because I have high regard for him as an individual and unique in the background that he brought into the job. And, personally, I like to have around me persons with varying points of view, particularly somebody like Paul who has a, well, shall I say, conservative point of view--I don't mean this in any discreditable way--but still is informed, intelligent and thoughtful. There will just be nobody to replace him. I told Jim Schlesinger over at the White House on Thursday that I expected that he was going to give me an opportunity to express my views on whoever he nominates to replace Paul.

Well, how do I go about this?

Briefly, as far as the Moscow summit is concerned, there's substantial agreement that we will write a protocol to the ABM Treaty under which both parties will agree not to build the second ABM site, although they will be able to exchange sites, that is, they will only build one site. We have our

site now protecting the ICBM and the Soviets have theirs protecting the Moscow area. We wrote that upon notification to each other, each would be able to close down one site and build another one, although it's very unlikely that either side would do so. So there's not much argument about that. There's been some argument; the Chiefs feel that protocol of this kind should expire with the Interim Agreement in '77. But I think it's pretty well agreed and I'm pretty well satisfied it's going to be worked out that it will be of indefinite duration. Of course, along with the ABM Treaty, it's subject to review every five years and it's also subject to renunciation by either side.

On the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, I'm not directly involved. But the Soviets have been pressing for a comprehensive--well, I shouldn't say pressing;they say that they're willing to enter into a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have said that we are willing to enter into one when we are able to verify it, and we're not able to verify it. So the Soviets have come along and said that they would be prepared to enter into a Threshold, that is, a treaty under which each of us would agree not to explode nuclear devices having a yield above a certain level. Now the level is very much the issue. We say the level should be defined by the seismic signal, that is, the strength of the seismic signal. The Soviets say that it should be defined by the yield. Well,we've come around to the point of accepting the fact that it should be by yield. But in order to define yield or determine yield, you can only do that through seismic signals, so you've come around in a circle somewhat. However, the Soviets have taken a position that there should be a quota on explosions within this limit. They say there should be an upper ceiling and a lower floor, a lower floor say around five or ten kilograms of yield, an upper floor around a hundred kilograms, and each side should

have a quota, be able to make only a certain number of explosions within those parameters in the course of a year. We have opposed the quota provision thus far and it seems to me, logically, we must do so. Because if you can define the upper limit, that is, presumably, based on our ability to confirm or verify explosions at those levels. Then if you go to a lower limit, below that, you have in effect said that you can verify at a lower level. And, therefore, it does away with the argument that you must have a higher level in order to verify it.

We discussed this at the meeting, you might say at the meeting of the NSC and of course the President. Had Kissinger, Schlesinger, Bill Clements, Tom Moorer, Joe Sisco from the Department and myself; oh, and Bill Colby, of course,from the CIA and Ken Rush in his new hat as, what is it, economic counselor to the President. Well, I did not enter into the Threshold discussion. I should have mentioned there's also the question of how you handle peaceful nuclear explosions. The Soviets want to leave them entirely outside of the Treaty and handle that on the side in a confidential basis. That's not practical.

Well, in brief, it looks to me like it's going to be very difficult to have anything ready for signature in Moscow at the time of the President's visit. Incidentally, the negotiations are being carried on on this by our Ambassador in Moscow, Walt Stoessel, together with some technical experts that were sent from here. And unless we're willing to concede and I hope not too much, or Brezhnev is so anxious to get something that can be signed, I doubt that it's going to be possible to complete an agreement in time for signature in Moscow.

Let me say that I think each of us have all the nuclear weapons we can

possibly develop, all the nuclear weapons we can possibly find any use for. And, again here in this test ban business, we're more in the realm of the politics and psychology of it than we are in the practical and military aspects. At the meeting on the Test Ban, Schlesinger said that, from a purely military point of view, he did not feel that the Threshold Test Ban was desirable. However, if there was to be a Test Ban, the lower threshold was the advantage of the U.S. He had serious doubts about the desirability from a military point of view, but he felt that we had already crossed that bridge. In effect, he was putting it to Kissinger and the President to say that they felt the political considerations overruled the military considerations which I think is very unfair and puts them in a very difficult position. At the same time, Schlesinger said that improvement in weapons technology is no longer a driving force in the strategic relationship between ourself and the Soviet Union, and he felt that a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty even would not do any great damage to the U.S. So he finds himself on various sides, recorded himself on various sides of the question.

Now in SALT, Kissinger made a presentation in which he pointed out that our lead in the number of warheads we had in 1972 has grown from about two to one now to about three to one, that as far as our emphasis upon throw weight is concerned, it's been our choice not to build larger missiles and that the problem is how we can constrain the Soviets in what they otherwise might do. The President talked on this, saying that he also was strongly for some agreement. He said that in the case of no agreement, we can be confident that the Soviets will exercise to the maximum of their capabilities, but, given the mood in this country, it's not likely that we would do so. Therefore, we have to consider a reasonable proposal, if it constrains what

the Soviets would otherwise do and, if this could be accomplished, we have gained something. Schlesinger made a presentation saying that he felt that it was undesirable for both sides to increase their MIRVed ICBMs and, therefore, he made a proposal that the President attempt to sell Brezhnev on a proposal that both sides would have no more than what he called 2500 strategic vehicles, that is in overall aggregate, ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, and that both sides would discuss reductions in the future he Soviets would agree to deploy no more than 360 MIRVed ICBMs. He suggested this could consist of some 60 SS-18s, and 300 19s. And in turn the U.S. would agree to deploy no more than 550 MIRVed ICBMs, that is the Minute Man III, and stop production. In return for this, that we would be willing to extend the Interim Agreement up to 1979 or '80. Kissinger pointed out that we'd already made substantially this proposition to the Soviets sometime ago and that they had turned it down. Schlesinger said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for the Chief of Naval Operations, that is, Admiral Zumwalt, would support this. He said that Admiral Zumwalt wdid not support it and had written a letter on June 17 to that effect. Admiral Zumwalt's position was that we should go only for a permanent agreement which he outlined. The President said, in effect, that therefore what Zumwalt is saying is that he prefers to have no agreement. And he said he felt this was a, quote, cheap shot, by Zumwalt, and presumed that, on his retirement, he would go out and attack the Administration on this, having put himself on record with his letter to the President. The President was quite exercised about this.

In response to a question from the President as to what I thought the Soviet reaction would be, I said that I felt they would come right back with saying that we also have to do something about SLBMs, that is submarine

launched missiles; this was the field in which we were ahead and this was the field in which the Soviets were behind. Schlesinger said, well, he thought maybe we might have to do something about the submarine launched missiles, but he didn't say what. In connection with this, he said that we had of course undertaken our fractionation of missiles, that is, our MIRVs, in response to our fears that the Soviets were building the ABM; with the ABM threat now removed, our missiles were so highly fractionated that they had passed the point of utility. Well, he said I shouldn't have quite put it that way, but that there was really no point in having missiles, under the present situation, highly fractionated say as the Poseidon, with its ten or fourteen warheads.

The whole discussion was a good discussion, in the sense that some of the issues got out on the table. Obviously, no decisions were made, and no decisions really could be made. Equally obviously, without some major shift in the Soviet position, it's going to be very difficult to arrive at any conceptual framework for a subsequent SALT agreement. Certainly no SALT agreement's going to be signed at the summit.

I still have the feeling that a sensible agreement for us at this time, both militarily and politically, would be to propose that we would agree with the Soviets to extend the Interim Agreement not beyond 1979 in exchange for their agreeing not to test further the MIRVed version of the SS-18. They already show some signs of keeping their options open on this. This 18 is the big missile. They've tested that missile more in the single warhead version than they have in the multiple warhead version. I don't think it's entirely beyond question that we could get some agreement from them on that. And I'd like to see that pushed. I have suggested

this a number of times, but we did not discuss it in detail at the NSC meeting. And then I think we should go on and negotiate for the permanent agreement. Kissinger,however,doesn't seem very enthusiastic about this. I also differ from Kissinger on this in that he feels that the Soviet position on the Forward Based Systems is very solid, and I think he feels that they have something of a case. I told him, just as I've told Semenov, I said that when I came into SALT. I thought that they perhaps had a case on this,but the deeper I've gotten into it, the more convinced I am that they do not have a case. In fact, it's very interesting that, if you take the total number of strategic vehicles, that is, ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers on both sides, take the total number of what the Soviets call the FBS, that is, tactical weapons, our F-4s, our Honest Johns, 104s, the allies have, our A-6s and A-7s on our carriers; you take all of those on our side, then all the MIIRBMs and medium bombers on the Soviet side, and add all these together, you come out with a figure on both sides that's very, very close to being equal, whatever meaning that may have. I do not think that the Soviets have a case on the FBS. What I would do--and I'm prepared to argue and I'd like to see us argue and debate it with them. What I have proposed is that, as a concession to them on their position on the FBS, we would agree that, as long as we have Polaris submarines that are based in Holy Loch and Rota, we would count the launchers on them at 150 percent of their actual number. That would recognize the fact that they can remain on station longer because they are deployed forward. Then, at such time as they are withdrawn from there which they will be, we'd be entitled to build up to that additional number of launchers. I think this would be a defensible agreement here, I think it would be a concession,if you will, to them that would help resolve

this FBS problem, but I would not go any further than this.

Well, I've talked a long time. I think I will end this here. Let's say I've had very, very little to do the last two months. I've become very impatient, having nothing to do, although I understand the reasons. I see nothing for me to do at Moscow and hope and expect not to go there, because I don't see that I can accomplish anything there. And so I'm planning next Tuesday to take off on a little drive to New England. I never have seen that part of the country.

Your Uncle Stephen left this morning for Laos. He had been staying with us the last three weeks. He left here by car to drive out to California to see all of you out there, and then he's going to ship his car from there and take a plane into Laos via Europe. I'm very, very sad to see him go. He's a good fellow and I'm concerned over the fact that he hasn't gotten promoted faster in the Service. I've tried to stay out of it completely, but I fear that being my son has probably not helped him and probably injured him as far as the Service is concerned, because everybody is very sensitive to seeming to favor my son. And I'm afraid this worked the other way, as far as he is concerned.

Your other uncle, Bill, has announced to us this week that he is going to go to work in Santa Barbara and is going to move out there, along with Toni, his wife, and Matthew, his stepson. Toni is expecting a child soon. Your Grandmother was looking forward to her being here when she had the child. And we're both sorry to lose them, It's been very, very nice to have them here. So this means that none of our family will be around us here for the time being.

Well, I'll sign off on this. This is U. Alexis Johnson on Saturday, June 22. Over and out.

This is Tuesday, August 6, 1974. Since my last tape on June 22, at the end of June, your Grandmother and I took a trip to New England. I had never been in New England before and we took the slow trip up through Northern Pennsylvania, then the Berkshire Mountains and Massachusetts, then over to Rockwall and Deep Haven Camp in New Hampshire along the lake there, then up to Bangor, Maine, then down to Boston, then on back home. We took a leisurely trip and we enjoyed it very much. We got back before July 4.

Your Uncle Bill and his wife left on the 8th of July for Santa Barbara.

Last week I went out to Chicago where I talked to the Mid-America group out there at an off-the-record luncheon at the Borg-Warner offices there. I talked to them about SALT. And then that evening, went on to Portland, Oregon, where the JACL, Japan-American Citizens League, were having their national convention. There was a large group, about 1200, there for the dinner. I got there just in time for dinner. They gave me an award for what I have done for the Japanese-Americans, as well as relations with Japan. It was a beautiful plaque, but in addition to the plaque, there was also a check for a thousand dollars. Senator Inouye was the speaker and he spoke very glowingly about me at the end of his speech. And, on the whole, it was a very heartwarming occasion, and I deeply appreciated it.

The next morning, on Friday morning, the 26th of July, I went down to Los Angeles and stayed that night with Jennifer. Then on Saturday, I went down to San Clemente and had a long talk down there with Secretary Kissinger. I also saw Al Haig and Ron Ziegler. Kissinger and I talked about SALT and the future conduct of SALT. He said he thought we ought to get started again the first part of September and I said I agreed on that. He feels that we are going to have to talk general principles the first part

of the talk. Preparation for his going to Moscow in October--he says that he's going to insist that I go with him at this time. The last time the Soviets said they did not want to have Semenov, my opposite number, present at the talks, so it was agreed that I wouldn't go. He said the Soviets say the only way they can handle this SALT situation is for Brezhnev to make a decision, and then for that decision to be passed down and then we can be able to negotiate on the basis of Brezhnev's decision. They say that Semenov and the bureaucracy really don't have the flexibility or the capability of negotiating from the bottom up, you might say, that is, from proposals that we make at Geneva. So I told him I could understand that and so I'm content with that.

The problem is, though, what kind of an agreement we are going to be able to make. My own feeling, as I told him, is that the Soviets are not going to be willing to negotiate seriously on a comprehensive agreement until they feel that they've overcome their inferiority, particularly on MIRVs. And also I think that they are going to be inclined to wait until after the '76 elections to see who they are going to be dealing with in the future. Henry agreed on the first point; on the second point, he said he felt that they thought that they could get a better deal at this time and it was important for us to do something on this with which I entirely agree, as soon as we can. We both agreed that with what he termed a wounded President it complicated matters a great deal. Well, this is the first long, leisurely talk I've had with him in recent months and I found it very useful.

He also talked to me about general things in the Department, his unhappiness at the way the recent Cyprus crisis had been handled in the Department, and asked me to explain to some key people how I used to manage things in the

WSAG, as Department man in the WSAG, and how I did up scenarios and managed things in general. He expressed great unhappiness with Joe Sisco's performance as well as Henry Tasca's in Athens; he praised Art Hartman in EUR for his handling. But he was unhappy with the leaks that came out of the Department, particularly with regard to Greece. I told him that it seemed to me in these situations, one, it was important to have a single man put in charge, and he agreed that he hadn't done that. Joe Sisco had gone off on a mission to the Middle East, he, Henry, had gone out to San Clemente, and it wasn't clear who was in charge. I also told him and he accepted the fact that it's up to the Assistant Secretary to enforce discipline on the men in his own bureau, but, at the same time, it's important to have a flow of information and guidance downward, so people know what really is desired. And, if they know what's desired, I think that they will loyally cooperate. We discussed some other personnel matters, but I won't go into that.

A White House car drove me back to Santa Monica and then Bill and Toni met me there and we drove up to Santa Barbara and I spent Saturday afternoon and Sunday in Santa Barbara and came back by bus to Santa Monica Monday. I spent the rest of Monday and Tuesday and Wednesday; let's see, I came back here on Thursday to Washington. I stayed with Aunt Jennifer. I saw Dean play his first tennis tournament and I must say I was very impressed. I was sorry to miss seeing you play, Brad, and was disappointed to hear that you had lost,but I hope that things go better for you next time.

Miss Murphy, my secretary, Elinor Murphy, while I was gone went to the hospital with a bleeding ulcer and she's going to have to be there for some time and again go out for an operation. So she will not be able to go back with me to Geneva if we go back in September, but I expect to take Martha Watts with me instead.

Talking of Geneva and talking of these things, though, yesterday the President's statement with regard to the material which he had withheld from the courts and from the Judiciary Committee came out. And this seems to me to be just about the final blow to the President, and the sooner we can have the impeachment or the sooner he resigns, the better. It's a great tragedy. As far as SALT is concerned, I wonder whether it's going to be worthwhile our going back in September with the Presidency in the situation that it now is. I don't know what it is, there seems to be some fatal defect in his character. He has strokes of brilliance, but everything he's done in regard to this Watergate and these other matters turns to ashes, and it's not only a tragedy for him but a tragedy for the people around him. I don't know what the number is now, but scores of people that have been around the White House, worked in the White House, are now going to prison. This is a terrific indictment. And, of course, the Vice President, Vice President Agnew, has just pleaded guilty to crimes. All I hope is that this self-examination that is now going on is going to, in the end, result in our being somewhat stronger and better than we are now. It can have that effect over a period of time,but at the present time, it's a great tragedy. And I'm not at all certain I want to continue to try to negotiate on SALT, but I'm willing to wait for a few weeks and see what happens.

Well, this is over and out at this time on Tuesday, August 6, 1974. Over and out.

This is Thursday, August 15, 1974. I last spoke on Tuesday, August 6, and was making some observations with regard to the effects of the President's statement the previous day--President Nixon's statement.

Well, the rest of that week turned out to be very historic and very eventful, both for the country in political terms and also for us in personal terms. As I said on August 6 when I was talking, I saw that it seemed to me very, very difficult for the President to carry on. Well, little did I realize how fast things were going to move. On Thursday night, August 8, after a day of rumors, a build-up of tensions, Nixon made a statement announcing that he was going to resign the following day, and that the Vice-President Ford would be sworn in as President. It was a very statesman-like statement, I thought. There were many who felt that he should have needed more mea culpa,that is, admitted to his misdeeds and crimes. My reaction to it was it was such a great tragedy, unprecedented tragedy in our history, you simply couldn't ask a man to humiliate himself anymore than he did, admitting that he no longer could act as President. It was quite a statesman-like statement. As I also said and many observed,it's very hard to reconcile that statement with the record in the transcripts of the tapes; it seems to be two different people talking, which establishes that, while he may not be psychotic, there is certainly a very genuine schizophrenia in Nixon's character. Well, in any event, it is all history.

Ford was sworn in and immediately went to work very energetically. It's quite clear that Henry Kissinger is having a major role in advising him in his first moves in foreign affairs, receiving foreign ambassadors, messages to foreign governments, even before the day was over, made a deep impression. He also on Tuesday the 13th invited and had all the sub-cabinet members, that is, all Presidential appointees,to the White House to the East Room, quite a large aggregation when you see them all together, and spoke to us briefly and shook hands individually with everybody as they passed through the

receiving line and had a picture taken. Well, this was a nice gesture.

There's a whole new mood in the town and in the country, I think, with some, well, much relief on the part of everybody and the feeling that, while Ford may not be brilliant, he is a solid citizen and we need a period perhaps with a little less brilliance and a little more solidity in the country. So I feel a little more optimistic at the present time.

It now looks as if we may go back to Geneva in the middle of September. I hope, before we go, that we can have a really thorough review on SALT matters with the President and get some firm guidance, directions, at least to the town on the directions that he wants to go. Because this is one of the most important things outside the economy that he has to deal with.

Well, this, I guess is just about all for this time. Oh, I'm sorry. The big news was that on Friday, the same day that Ford was being sworn in, your Grandmother fell down the escalator at Woodward and Lothrop and is very lucky to be alive. Fortunately, she didn't break any bones. And that same evening, Friday evening, we got the call from your Uncle Bill that Toni had had a baby girl. So everything seemed to happen on that Friday. It was an eventful day in the life of the country and an eventful day in the life of the Johnson family. Your Grandmother left yesterday to go out to California to see you all and also to see the new baby.

Well, I'll make this over and out.

Before going to bed this evening, I thought I might record a little vignette that happened during the course of the evening.

Today I've been meeting with the General Advisory Committee on disarmament, I suppose it's called. Anyway, it's the General Advisory Committee

on arms control questions. We discussed in very considerable depth what we might do in regard to strategic arms. And tonight we had dinner at Fred Ikle"s, the director of ACDA. Members of this committee are a somewhat heterogenous group, but still very distinguished individuals: Dean Rusk, the former Secretary of State, to whom I feel very close; Bill Scranton,the former Governor of Pennsylvania; Ed Clark, a close friend of LBJ's who was Ambassador in Australia and who's a Texan; Harold Agnew, the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory; Senator [Gordon] Allott, former Senator from Colorado; JohnMcCone,who was former Director of CIA and prominent in California politics. Let's see, well, quite a few important people.

The point of this vignette that I'm recording at this time is that Bill Scranton, that is, Governor Scranton, has been asked by President Ford to come in and help him in reorganizing and setting up the White House. And he and John McCone and I got in a conversation this evening about the problems of doing so and the problems that Ford faces. One of the things that Bill Scranton pointed out to John McCone was that, now with Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President and with the connections that Ford has in the Middle West, the Eastern Establishment, so to speak, and the Middle West are very well represented in the new Administration, but the West is very poorly represented. Of course, in Nixon's Administration, many of the people surrounding him, the Bob Haldemans and the John Ehrlichmans, the people in general who surrounded him were from the West Coast. But now with Ford, there is really nobody representing the West Coast. And Bill Scranton was saying that he felt it was important that, from the standpoint of Ford and the success of his Administration, that there be somebody in the Administration, the Ford Administration, who represented or could speak for, in one way or the other,

the West Coast and bring West Coast considerations to bear in the Administration. We pointed out that Weinberger in HEW, of course, in part fulfilled this function, but not to the degree that it really needs to be filled. And so Bill Scranton asked John McCone tonight to think by tomorrow morning how the West Coast could get a better representation in this Administration and who that person should be. Obviously, John McCone, as Bill Scranton well knows, has his own ambitions, but I really don't think John McCone would expect to fulfill such a role. Therefore, it will be interesting to see what suggestions John comes forward with and to what degree these suggestions may be accepted. In any event, I think,with Bill Scranton as former Governor of Pennsylvania and a member of the Eastern Establishment,it's interesting that he would recognize this lack in the Administration and point out the importance of it being fulfilled. And I entirely agree that it should be fulfilled.

I'll not talk anymore tonight about SALT. I gave the group today my thoughts on what we might reasonably expect to do in SALT. I said I did not think that it was reasonable to expect that any agreement that called for either side to stand down existing programs or draw away existing programs was going to be successful and that the thing we might aim for was we might seek to establish a ceiling on a projection of existing programs, that is, if we project existing programs into the next five or six or seven years, where might we both be? I pointed out that we might be in fairly good balance, as far as throw weight which some people attach importance to, as far as warheads which other people attach importance to, and that perhaps we might seek to say that projecting these programs at the point that they cross in which we find ourselves fairly close to equilibrium in some of these indices, we will

agree that we will not go any further than that. And rather than trying to stop the present programs, rather than trying to destroy existing systems which is very, very difficult in both countries, we will say that we will go to this ceiling and then we will stop and try to turn down and reduce from that point. This will not require either party to sacrifice existing programs, but it will give people some sense of feeling that we are trying to set a ceiling on this, rather than let this competition between us go on unrestricted. And that, having reached that ceiling, that we will try to turn things down. This will enable the Defense establishments on both sides to carry out their existing programs, but also, as far as future programs are concerned, it will require them to take into consideration an agreement in this nature.

Obviously, it's not very dramatic. Obviously, it's not going to cause any fast turn-around in existing and strategic programs. But, realistically, it is perhaps about the best that we can expect to find. The question is: Is it worthwhile having an agreement on such a basis? I feel that it is. I don't want to over-emphasize the importance, but I think it would be useful for both countries to say, "We're going to go this far and no further, and when we get to that point, we're going to start at least downward, establish the principle of going downward."

Well, I won't go into any more details this evening, but my thoughts have developed somewhat along these lines and I laid these thoughts out to the Committee today.

In this connection, a couple of weeks ago, at Kissinger, the Secretary of State's instructions, I approached the Soviets through Dobrynin, their ambassador here, and said that we proposed to resume the talks in Geneva

during the week of September 16. Previously, it was publicly announced that we were going to try to begin the talks in August, but that was obviously impossible. Now, today the word comes that it's not going to be possible to have meetings, it's not going to be possible to get the decisions, prior to resuming September 16. And, therefore, we are going to have to postpone them further. My answer to this is that this has always been the situation that we've faced and that postponing them even further is going to mean that people are going to put off the decisions even further. Therefore, I'm holding very strongly to saying that if we are committed now to holding the talks to beginning the week of September 16, that any decision now again to defer them, push them off even further, will have its own repercussions as far as our relations with the Soviets are concerned, and that I would not want to take the responsibility for doing it. And, in any event, if we do put them off, we're not going to be any better ready two weeks or three weeks from then than we will be now, because people will simply postpone making the decisions.

Well, we'll see how this works out, but at the present time, it looks very discouraging, as far as our having any real guidance on the directions that this government wants to go in the next two weeks, as will be necessary if we're going to begin our meetings in Geneva in the week of September 16.

This is all I have to say tonight. Over and out.

This is the evening of Sunday, September 15. Tomorrow morning at eight o'clock I leave from Andrews for Geneva. We have our first meeting there with the Soviets on Wednesday, the 18th. A week ago Friday, the 6th, we had a Verification Panel meeting in which we had a preliminary discussion on Geneva. This last Friday, the 13th, we had an NSC meeting. There was the President, George Brown, Henry Kissinger, Jim Schlesinger, Bill Clements from

Defense, Bill Colby from the CIA, Fred Ikle from ACDA, Bob Ingersoll from State and myself. It was a very good meeting. It went on for about two hours and the broad outlines of what we can do in Geneva were somewhat agreed upon. It is going to require me to walk the tightrope. As I said at the end of the meeting, I realize there is going to be a tightrope between showing openmindedness and flexibility and a willingness to take a new approach, and at the same time not walking back on anything that we have said in the past. I said I was going to need tolerance from all those in the room because I was sure I would not please everybody; to which Henry replied that I had had much experience in balancing on both sides of the rope.

Well, the President was very gracious to me. He spoke very glowingly of me at the beginning of the meeting, and also at the end. He had as his theme that we are going to explore with them and indicate a willingness to explore some new approaches. The President is also going to give me a letter to that effect that I can make available to the Soviets. But we are not going to make any new proposals because we're far apart on being able to get agreement here on new proposals. The idea is to have at least two more NSC meetings between now and the end of October, and then Henry will go to Moscow with broad outlines of a proposal. The idea is that if we can get any receptivity there, then we will take that up at Geneva and try to negotiate an agreement on the basis of those broad outlines. He said he wants me to go with him to Moscow. Well, it remains to be seen how that works out.

In any event, I'm going back, going to work, and, whereas I don't have all I would have liked to have had, I feel that I have something with which to work.

At the end of the meeting Henry asked me to give him a draft that he could show to the President of what I thought my instructions should be. I, of course, enjoy doing this because I think this is the way things should be done. So I did write a draft and made it available to him yesterday afternoon. My hope is that he could possibly get it to me on Tuesday before I pay my courtesy call on Semenov, and certainly before my meeting on Wednesday. However, I'm very doubtful that he's going to be able to do so because, of course, he's going to have to show them to Jim Schlesinger, and I'm sure there are aspects that Schlesinger may not like. Then he's going to have to show it to the President and get the President's approval. So I may well be starting the meetings without having any instructions. But that is not an unusual situation.

The meeting was in some ways strange, as is this whole business on SALT. The President said he wanted to have it clear that he felt that we should seek to get an agreement, that is, we should not take positions that make it impossible to get an agreement. He did not mean that we should get an agreement on <u>any</u> terms, but rather our position should not be so extreme as on the face of it to make it impossible to get an agreement.

Defense has a bias on this; if you will we all have our biases. Defense builds up the strength of the Soviet side, and, of course, the Soviet military build up the strength on our side. This is one of the basic problems. Defense build up and emphasize, I don't say they mis-state, but they emphasize those aspects of the Soviet forces which emphasize their strength while emphasizing our inferiority.

Well, on the one hand, you can say that this makes it appear that you cannot get an agreement or we should not get an agreement unless we get massive cutbacks on the Soviet side. On the other hand, Defense paints such

an alarming picture of the direction that the Soviets are going that it could well be said that almost anything we could get to slow down the pace of the Soviet development would be worthwhile. So I think they argue against themselves to some degree on this.

My own view is, and I put forward a proposition to this effect, is that we really cannot hope to materially influence the already established programs of both sides; what we could hope to do is to extend the time during which they are deployed so as to stretch out the time. What we can hope to do is to reach an agreement that would have influence on programs not yet adopted and, whereas this is not a very exciting prospect, I think that it is a realistic prospect, and, over the long term, a prospect that is worthwhile.

I will cut this off now and take this recorder along with me to Geneva and, if anything develops there of particular interest I'll of course set it forth. So I go forth again and we will see what happens.

Over and out.

This is Saturday October 5, in Geneva. I've been here now almost three weeks, engaged in talks with the same Soviet as previously, Semenov. The first week I was here, I had received no instructions, but was going ahead on my sense of the NSC meeting we had had, and what I felt was the general trend back home. I had no great difficulty as the first day I opened with a more or less broad introduction, and then went in on reductions. And eventually I got my instructions and they were very, very good instructions; as a matter of fact much to my surprise I've had no difficulty following them.

What I have been doing is laying them out. I have been talking about essential equivalence between the two sides. I've proposed that the two forces reduce their size gradually over the period of the agreement, that is, until 1985, to a common point, that is, to an equal point. I've also spoken on throw weight

and have said that we are willing to make an allowance for bombers in throw weight which is a considerable concession to their point of view. And then on MIRVs, I have said that we would be willing to deal with both current and future MIRVs, which should be of interest to them because we are ahead in technology. As I've told them, my object here was to explore with them various ideas, various concepts, put forward our concepts and try to get their concepts. Thus far, it's quite clear that they have instructions not to change anything that they've said in the past. He has made several speeches about FBS, Forward Based Systems, in which he has just repeated what he had said in the past. He's said to me directly and he's had it passed through his staff that he's very disappointed that I won't talk about Forward Based Systems. What I've said to him is, "Let's agree to disagree and let's go on with these other things." But it's quite clear that he has very little with which to work.

Well, I'll be going over week after next, the 17th, I've agreed to go over to brief the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, over in Brussels.

Henry Kissinger is scheduled to be in Moscow off October 23 and I'm going to get a message off to him this coming week, suggesting that I come back to the NSC meeting prior to his departure, possibly going directly back from Brussels. And then I would hope to go with him to Moscow and we will see what works out there. If we arrived at anything approaching a meeting of the minds there, then we could come back here and go to work. If there isn't any meeting of the minds, then there's obviously no use in meeting back here. If it's desired that meetings be kept up for appearances sake, I think I'll probably decide to pull out of this because I wouldn't be interested in doing that. But perhaps in Moscow we may be able to make some breakthrough; however,

I'm still very skeptical, because I just don't see that the Soviets have any great incentive to enter into an agreement, particularly at this time. They are perfectly happy with the Interim Agreement. And, in looking ahead, they see our economic troubles in the States and they may well estimate that the threats that we've made to match them if they continue their build-up, we'll not be able to carry out. And they may well be right. Thus, I am somewhat bearish at the present time on the possibility of an agreement, but we will see what happens.

Over and out. This is U. Alexis Johnson, Geneva, Switzerland, on Saturday, October 5, 1974. Over and out.

This is Monday, October 28. Since my last recording on October 5, I've been back to Washington and come back to Geneva.

I went back to Washington for an NSC meeting on Friday, October 18, and then came back here on Wednesday, the 23rd. On October 17, my birthday, I left here early in the morning by a T-39, military plane, to go over to Brussels. Over there, I briefed the North Atlantic Council on our talks up to the present time, and had lunch with some of the permanent reps on the North Atlantic Council. After lunch, I got in touch with Andy Goodpaster, who was retiring as head of SHAPE. I had intended to go down to see him, because Andy's been a good friend of mine, but we were just unable to make connections because I had to leave. He got in from Washington around one o'clock; he'd had an operation, a minor operation, back in the States. I had to leave at four o'clock for New York, so we were just unable to get together. However, I told him how regretful we all were, the way he was being replaced, actually seemed very, very bad handling. I'm told and told on good authority that he learned through the British. . . well, what happened is this: We approached

the allied governments with regard to replacing him with Al Haig, but said nothing to Andy about it. Andy learned through the British that he was being replaced, and the British were told that he was retiring when he had no intention of retiring. Well, it was pretty bad handling. I'm sorry to see this happen because Andy deserves well from not only the government but also the Republicans. He was one of the strong men in the White House during the Eisenhower Administration and is a fine, fine man. Al Haig is a good replacement; Al is certainly a good man, but he's going to have an up-hill row to hoe for a while. But I'm sure he appreciates it and will do his best at it.

Well, I left Brussels at four o'clock on a commercial airline, that's a Sabina with General Rowny with me. We flew to New York and from New York, went over to JFK,went over to LaGuardia and got the shuttle down, got in to Washington about ten o'clock in the evening. So it had been a very long day. I had sent Jack Mendelsohn,my staff aide,on ahead of me, and he had gotten what information he could and briefed me Friday morning.

Then Friday afternoon we had an NSC meeting on SALT which was very restricted. The President,of course, was there. Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Schlesinger, Bill Colby of the CIA, Fred Ikle of ACDA and myself; Dave Jones representing the Joint Chiefs, the JCS. Don Rumsfeld,who is just taking over as an assistant in the White House, was also present as an auditor. Well, we have a very, very spirited meeting and it was a very discouraging meeting in many ways because no consensus emerged out of it at all. The Chiefs have taken the position that all we needed was equal aggregate numbers of strategic central systems, and numbers are probably the least meaningful of all. Jim Schlesinger is pushing very hard for a position that would require major reductions in the throw weight of Soviet missiles; in fact, a complete restructuring of their forces. He agreed that it would take

a long time to negotiate, even if it could be done and that to successfully negotiate would require scaring the Soviets with bigger programs of our own and we'd end up with larger forces than even would otherwise be the case.

Then there was a State option attacked also which is more or less that of offsetting asymmetries, that is, we would permit a somewhat larger number of central systems to the Soviets in return for having a somewhat larger number of MIRVs ourselves. Well, Bill Colby threw a real spanner into the discussion when he said that he thought that the requirements for collateral constraints for verifying a MIRV limit were so severe that they couldn't be negotiated except possibly for large missiles, and therefore, there was just no possibility of getting an agreement on MIRVs or he, in effect, said there would be no possibility of getting one. Henry Kissinger professed to be completely surprised by this news. I knew that the collateral constraints that they were asking for were very severe, but I never heard them expressed in quite those strong terms.

There was strong debate all around, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Colby on MIRVs and I entered into it on occasion. The meeting ended with there clearly being no consensus.

On Saturday, I had lunch with Jan Lodal, who is the NSC man working on SALT and Hal Sonnenfeldt. We discussed the situation then. I gave them some of my ideas, including a way to handle Forward Based Systems. I also gave Henry Kissinger a note on this. On Tuesday, before I went back, I spoke briefly with Kissinger and he expressed himself as being very downcast not only with regard to SALT but with foreign policy in general, pointing to the Congressional cut-off of aid to Turkey which was tying his hands. On SALT, it was agreed that he would send Bill Hyland from Moscow to brief me.

Bill's due here tomorrow.--and that I would probably come back, I probably should come back as quick as Henry finishes his present trip, that is, some time during the course of next week,for another NSC meeting on SALT.

In the meantime, out of Moscow they've announced now the meeting between Ford and Brezhnev for November 23/24 at Vladivostok. Where that's going to fit into the whole picture, I just don't know.

There's really nothing to be done here further, in Geneva, at the present time, pending new instructions. I'm hoping that I can recess and go back to the States with the delegation until we can work out some real instructions. If not, well, I'll see, I'll see what happens, but I don't fancy sitting here, simply filling in time.

Well, that's the situation at the present time. I think that I'll close out at this point. This is Monday, October 28, 1974, in Geneva.

Over and out.

This is Saturday, November 30, 1974. My last recording on this tape on October 28, I said that an officer was coming from Moscow to brief me on the results of Henry's visit there, Henry Kissinger's visit there at the end of October. He did that and, as far as I could tell, briefed me quite fully. But it didn't sound very encouraging. It was quite clear that Brezhnev was not going to make any concessions in any event to Kissinger while he was there. But I think with what we've been doing at Geneva, in laying the groundwork, and what Henry was doing in Moscow, we laid the groundwork for Brezhnev to confer with his people and work this out with the Soviet bureaucracy and to give a reply to President Ford when they met in Vladivostok was more or less the context.

Side 2

So I finished off my meetings in Geneva and the Soviets readily agreed to a recess. And so I left Geneva on Tuesday, November 5, and returned directly by an Air Force plane to Washington and have been in Washington since then. There has been very little, as far as my business is concerned, taking place in Washington because it was quite clear there wasn't much to do except wait for Brezhnev to give his response to President Ford in Vladivostok. And, after seeing what that was, we would have to reform and regroup and take a look at where we stand.

During the interval, I have been meeting with quite a few people. Two things I might note. One is that Len Marks has talked with me about writing a book, encouraged me to write one and has put me in touch with a publisher. I am a little skeptical as to the whole proposition. In many ways, of course, I would like to write. I have the normal share of ego. I'm not quite sure what I want to write. I'm afraid, though, interesting though my life has been to me and the few people around me, I'm not sure it would make a very exciting diplomatic memoir, but,nevertheless, we'll see.

I had Elliot Richardson over the other day for lunch. He's in the process of writing a book and we talked a little bit about the process.

The other thing is that an apartment opened up in the Kennedy-Warren Apartments here on Connecticut Avenue and we decided to make the move over to Kennedy-Warren at the end of the year. As I told the agents here, I'd very much prefer to stay but, if they were going to continue to go ahead with their trying to make this into a condominium, I was not interested in getting involved. They said they could not give me any assurance that they were not going to continue that, and so I made the decision to move. Frankly, I think this project here for turning it into a condominium is going to

collapse. Most of the people will have moved out and I think the whole community we had here is, in effect, being destroyed for very narrow. . .well, simply for the sake of speculation which is not going to be successful. So everybody's going to lose. In any event, we're going to move to the Kennedy Warren at the end of the month, end of December.

Well, as far as Vladivostok is concerned, a communique has been published and I received a message from Kissinger, the same message that he sent to Jim Schlesinger and General Brown on the results of the meeting there. Kissinger's due back today and on Monday morning, we're going to have a meeting with the President and the members of the NSC to discuss the outcome.

In brief, it looks very encouraging. If the outcome had been negative, I was prepared to resign, quit, because I didn't want to get involved any further. But I'm now prepared to go ahead. I think there's something really to work at and I'm looking forward to doing so. The big breakthrough has been that the Soviets have agreed to abandon their insistence upon having a compensating asymmetry in their favor because of what they call the Forward Based Systems, that is our aircraft in Europe, Korea and carriers and because of what they call third country factors, that is, the British and the French submarines. They've abandoned this and they've agreed to the principle of equal aggregates in strategic offensive arms, that is, ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. And the figure is 2400, which means a little reduction on their part. The figure for MIRVs is 1320, an equal figure for both sides. As far as the overall aggregate is concerned, at 2400, this is a principle that the Chiefs and Senator Jackson and others have been looking for for a long time. I, frankly, have been a hard-liner on it. There were those who said we needed to make concessions to them

on Forward Based Systems in order to get equal aggregates. I always felt that it would not be necessary and that we should continue to take a firm stand on this and that eventually they would come around. Frankly, though, I was not sure that they would and also I thought it was going to take much more time than this. So when Kissinger says that there's been a breakthrough, I agree. There has been a real breakthrough, that this fundamental position that they've held over the years has now been abandoned by them. Speculate on why. The figure on MIRVs is 1320 for each side; it's a high number. All you can say about it is that it's lower than the Soviets have the capability of going and lower than the number our intelligence people estimated it would probably go to. So it does set a cap on what they are going to do on MIRVs. Of course, the criticism of people is going to be that we, quote, permit, unquote, the Soviets to go to these numbers. As a matter of fact, of course, without an agreement, there would be nothing to stop them from going to any number that they want to. Well, the criticism of the agreement is, largely, that it doesn't go far enough, it should cover more things, it should be more detailed. And, obviously, this would be nice if we could get it, but we had the choice, it seems to me, between taking what we could get and getting a benchmark here from which we can work towards reduction and towards other agreements or letting this chance go by the board and possibly, well, I think very likely, having the situation in which the perfect, really, is the enemy of the good. In trying to get the perfect, we do not achieve even the good.

So I'm satisfied that this is the right thing to have done and I'm looking forward to going back to Geneva to try to spell this out. We have a lot of work ahead of us. One of the principal items is going to be the verification

of the MIRV limitations. This is going to be very complicated and very difficult and is going to need a lot of work. But I'm looking forward to it.

In the meanwhile, I don't know whether I mentioned on here, I had the offer some time ago to be Commissioner General of our Expo-75 on Okinawa, the oceanic exhibit. And I was interested in this and they've been holding off making any decision until I saw whether I was going to continue on SALT. After this agreement at Vladivostok, I said that, obviously, SALT had a higher priority and that I did intend to continue with it. And, therefore, very regretfully turned down the opportunity for the Expo-75 on Okinawa. It would have been a lot of fun to have done, because I am interested in oceanography and the sea. This is going to be a big exposition and I would have very much liked to have joined in it. Well, in any event, I'm not going to.

My present outlook is that I'll be returning about the middle of January if we can get all our preparations done here, official preparations. Then returning to Geneva about the middle of January.

Incidentally, on February 16, your Uncle Stephen and Judy Rodes are planning to be married and on FEBRUARY June 14, your Aunt Jennifer and Lee Bishop are planning to be married. So I'm sure that your grandmother is going to want to get to Southern California for that, and I am too. So we will just have to see. Well, obviously, she'll get there and I'm going to try to get there very much. I am going out to California probably this coming week just for a couple of days. Then I'll be coming back and then we're planning, both of us are planning to go out to spend Christmas with all of you in Santa Monica and Santa Barbara. We're very much looking forward to that.

I'll say over and out at this time. This is U. Alexis Johnson on Saturday, November 30, 1974, in Washington, D. C.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 28
Side 1

This is U. Alexis Johnson. It is Saturday, January 25, 1975. This will be my first tape of 1975.

Since my last tape, we decided to move from our previous apartment at 2101 Connecticut to 3133 Connecticut, the Kennedy-Warren Apartments. We did this because at 2101, they were saying that they were going to go condominium and I had no interest in buying an apartment in the old building in that area. So we were fortunate in getting a place here in the Kennedy-Warren which is somewhat smaller. We started moving before Christmas. I did a great deal of the moving of all the books and dishes and all that type of thing myself and found it a lot more strenuous than I had planned on. We had to get rid of lots of things because the apartment here is smaller. We started moving, as I said, before Christmas; Christmas we went out to spend in Santa Monica with you, Brad, and Jenny and Dean and Craig, your mother and father. We spent a few days there and had a very good time, and came back and finished moving by the first of the year.

I'm now getting ready to go back to Geneva, leaving on Thursday, January 30. As far as the business here is concerned, we have been working on positions that will be taken at Geneva to implement the Vladivostok agreement. And that's coming along quite well. I'm quite satisfied the way things are coming.

There are three major issues, I would say. The first is a very genuine misunderstanding that arose at Vladivostok, and this is whether the provisions at Vladivostok that said that air missiles, air in surface missiles, with a range of over six hundred kilometers shall be counted in the overall aggregate of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The Soviets understand this to cover both

ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Henry Kissinger says that there was ambiguity in the conversations at Vladivostok. Sometimes the President said ballistic, sometimes he did not. And there's room for a very genuine misunderstanding. In any event, the Soviets have been put on notice that we will not accept a six hundred kilometer limit on cruise missiles, air to surface cruise missiles, ALCMs are what they're sometimes called:ALCMs, but are going to be seeking a three thousand kilometer before they would be counted or banned. As I know the Soviets set great stock on limiting the range of our cruise missiles off our bombers, so that bombers would not have a stand-off capability, I'm sure that this is going to be a very tough issue at Geneva and is not going to be settled quickly or easily.

The next issue is the verification of the MIRV limits. This is very complex and detailed. The limits need to be symmetrical because the rules that we will apply to the Soviets, that is, if any silo that can accept a MIRV missile will be counted as containing a MIRV missile, if applied to us would mean that all of our Minuteman silos, all thousand of them, would be counted as MIRVed, when in fact, only five hundred of them are MIRVed. The fact of the matter is that our Minuteman III MIRVed can be put in the same silos as the Minuteman II which are not MIRVed and there's no distinguishing difference. So we're going to have quite a hassle on this, I think, at Geneva, and it's going to have to end up in something in the way of asymmetrical counting rules, as we say.

Another issue that's likely to arise is the whole question of mobile missiles, that is, land based missiles, mobile land based missiles. I would like to see us see these be stopped but the Soviets are very clearly developing the mobile land based missiles. And the Vladivostok agreement very

clearly does not prohibit them, so I don't think we will get very far with that.

Another issue at Geneva is going to be what bombers will be counted. On our side, it's fairly well agreed that the B-52 and the B-1 if and when it's built would certainly qualify as heavy bombers; whereas, on the Soviet side, they have the Bear and the Bison, but they've just developed a new swing wing bomber that's certainly a very formidable weapon and, in many ways, should be classified as a heavy bomber. We are going to go in to push for it being so classified. I doubt that we will be successful, and I know that Kissinger doesn't want to see us get hung up on this too hard. But, nevertheless, there's a lot to be said for counting it,although it seems the Soviets are assigning the bomber to their naval aviation and are also signing it to tactical aviation and its mission seems to be primarily a peripheral mission, that is, against China and Western Europe. But, particularly with air to surface missiles, it could be quite a formidable strategic weapon against the United States.

Well, these are some of the issues that we are going to have to be dealing with at Geneva. We've had several Verification Panel meetings and we're going to have an NSC on Tuesday or Wednesday before I leave. So I feel fairly confident and fairly good about going into this round of meetings. This will be about my last official business. If I'm successful in carrying this off and getting an agreement written, I think I'll probably retire at the end of that and end with this as being my last job in the Foreign Service. But that's some months down the road yet and remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, I've put a protocol on my will giving all my private papers

including my tapes to the LBJ Library at Austin, Texas. The director of the Library was up the other day and got copies of all my tapes which they are going to start transcribing.

Well, I think this is all for now. I'll make my next recording in Geneva. Over and out.

This is Sunday, February 9. Well, to go back to where I was: On Wednesday, January 29, we had an NSC meeting on SALT, with the President, Jim Schlesinger, Henry Kissinger, George Brown, Bill Colby and myself for about two hours, going over the problems that we were going to face, the questions that we were going to face in Geneva and how to handle them. There was nothing of any real controversy except one item which I'll mention, and we had a very good review on it.

We spent most of the hour on verification questions, that is, verification of MIRVs, and massaged the list down to fairly manageable proportions. One question upon which there was an issue was that Kissinger and I also felt that the cost was not too great, thought it would be well not to deploy some fifty Minuteman III that were going to deployed at Grand Forks Minuteman Field. Because if we were to work out a system of verification of MIRVs with the Soviets that would involve declaring complexes,that is, all MIRVs in a single complex, all weapons in a single complex would be declared to be MIRVs, this would complicate it, because these fifty would be the firstMIRVed weapon in this field. Thus, we would have to count all of them if we came to anything of that kind. Well, Jim Schlesinger strongly argued against it, but the President decided to hold up the deployment. It wasn't a very serious matter; actually, it's just a couple of hundred thousand dollars cost to do so. And I suggested it would be well to wait six weeks, two months, to see how things came out here in Geneva before we decided how to handle it.

Well, two days after we arrive here, the news comes out in the paper that we had held up. And then the next day, the news comes out that we've decided to go ahead. It makes us look a little foolish there. Our inability to maintain security of any kind in this government is one of the greatest crosses that we have to bear in our international affairs.

We left early Thursday morning by Air Force plane, arrived here Thursday evening. I called on Semonov on Friday, the 31st, so that we were able to say that we had begun negotiations in January. We did not discuss any real substance. I suggested that we meet on Monday, February 3, for our first plenary meeting with the delegations. He topped me on that, as I said, by suggesting that we meet the next day, that is, on February 1.

At that February 1 meeting, he did what I said, before leaving the States, I thought there was a good fifty-fifty chance that he might do, and that was to table a full draft agreement containing, you might say, extreme positions on their part. I won't go into detail on all the positions, except to say that it went far beyond the Vladivostok aide-memoire and communique there.

In this connection, when we were discussing our own strategy and tactics here, Kissinger, in particular, stressed that he did not want to complicate the negotiations here by introducing extraneous elements, that is, elements that were not dealt with in Vladivostok, and to keep it simple so that we could get the agreement quickly and easily. Well, the Soviets certainly didn't pursue that strategy. They've gone to the other extreme, introducing elements that were not present at all in Vladivostok, such as limiting us to ten Trident submarines, prohibiting all air to surface missiles on aircraft other than bombers, the tying of future negotiations on

reductions to reductions in Forward Based Systems, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. It's a very, very extreme document.

It also flagged one of the major issues that we have here and that is at Vladivostok, there was real ambiguity and apparently real misunderstanding as to when they were talking about air to surface missiles on bombers, whether they were talking about just ballistic missiles or whether they were talking about both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. There was an effort to resolve this in working out the aide-memoire, but it was not resolved. The aide-memoire is ambiguous on it. And this is one of the problems with summit meetings of this kind which are inexact. The Soviets take the position that the range limit, that is, the aide-memoire says that air to surface missiles above six hundred kilometers in range will be counted within the 2400 aggregate as strategic missiles. Our position is that that is true only of ballistic missiles and it's not true of cruise missiles. Well, the issue on that is joined.

In any event, I left here and came here without any instructions, formal instructions. Henry told me, as I was leaving, that he hoped to get instructions to me by Monday. As a matter of fact, for my meeting on Saturday and then my meeting on Tuesday and Thursday--I've had four meetings without any instructions whatsoever. So I had to stall. However, finally, last Thursday afternoon, our instructions came in and I've been working on them and will be presenting the first part of our position on Monday, in our meeting tomorrow. I'll present the other, the second part of it on Wednesday and then on Thursday morning, I'm planning to go, with your Grandmother, to London and from London to Los Angeles in order to be there Friday for your Aunt Jennifer's marriage to Lee Bishop and then for your Uncle Stephen's marriage to Judy Rodes on Saturday.

It's remarkable they're both getting married in Santa Monica. They're getting married on successive days. They're both getting married in the same church. And neither one knew of the plans of the other. It's a pure coincidence and a very remarkable coincidence. Well, I'll be coming back here right after the wedding on Sunday, so I'll get back here Monday evening.

Meanwhile, Kissinger's scheduled to be here on Sunday and Monday in connection with the Middle East. I imagine he may be a little irritated when he learns that I'm not here, but there really isn't anything to be done on SALT. So I'm just not going to stay around on the chance that he might want to see me. I'm going to send him a message saying that, if he wants to see me, he can see me in London when I come back through there and he's also going to be there at that time.

Well, SALT's really joined now; the issue's really joined. We have something definite to work on and I'm hopeful that we can work out a treaty. One of the problems I have is that Washington still doesn't want me to table a draft of the treaty. As I tell them, this is the only way to really get down to concrete negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviets are just not interested in talking in general principles and exchanging views. They're just not up to that kind of a thing, and what I want to do is table a draft of a treaty and negotiate from our draft rather than being forced to negotiate from the Soviet draft. Well, my instructions say that I can submit a draft for Washington approval and I've been working on one. I think I have a pretty good one, but I know it's going to take me some time before they give me authority to table it. Actually, I could have saved several weeks here, I think, and I'd have been in much better tactical position if I'd been able to do as I wanted to do and that was to table a draft right at the

outset of the negotiations. As it is, I'm at a disadvantage with his having tabled one. Well, it's a tactical disadvantage and, in the end, may not be too important, but I think we could have moved negotiations further and faster if I had been able to table a draft. I didn't want to table a final draft; I wanted to table one from which I could negotiate towards what we want finally to achieve. And I'm still hoping to be able to do that.

I think this is all for now. I'll say over and out for this time. This is U. Alexis Johnson in Geneva, Switzerland, on Sunday, February 9, 1975. Over and out.

This is Saturday, February 22, 1975, in Geneva, Switzerland. Since my last recording on February 9, personally I've had an active time and so has your Grandmother.

We left here on Thursday, February 13, took a plane to London and then took a plane from London directly to Los Angeles, although we had to refuel in Winnipeg. Through your Aunt Jennifer's arrangements, we were able to get a very low cost fare, but it meant that we had to go tourist. It was twelve to thirteen hours from London to Los Angeles. The plane was crowded and I must say it was pretty tiring. I got along all right, but your Grandmother found it very trying; she found it very hard to get in and out of the chairs.

We got into Los Angeles late Thursday evening. On Friday morning, I met with the Rand Corporation and had lunch with them and then that evening, your Aunt Jennifer had her wedding to Lee Bishop. It was a very, very nice affair in the Methodist Church there in Santa Monica and had a reception afterwards. I'm very fond of Lee. I think that he's good for her and she may be good for him,and I hope this works out well.

The following day, we had the wedding of your Uncle Stephen and Judy Rodes at two o'clock in the same church by the same pastor. This was a remarkable coincidence. Both of them had arranged their weddings without the knowledge of the other, and I won't go into any details of this. But it was very, very good to see Stephen who had come from Laos and Judy, his fiance, now his wife, had come from Washington,and they both went back to Laos.

On Sunday, I left and came directly back from Los Angeles to London, a non-stop flight, and then over here, getting here Monday evening because of the change in time.

I had my meeting the next day, that is, on Tuesday, with the Soviets. I had another meeting Friday with the Soviets and we're beginning to face up to things a little bit. Some of the issues that I had raised, they are beginning to respond to. I had raised the issue of including the Backfire in their heavy bomber category; I raised the issue of getting a better definition of heavy missiles. And I also said that we do not consider that cruise missiles are covered in the Vladivostok understanding, but only the ballistic missiles.

Well, all of these are good issues and strong issues. And they responded and, in turn, on Friday we responded again. On Friday, they gave a speech that rejected our proposal with respect to monitoring or verifying MIRV deployments. Then Semonov and I had a head-to-head conversation on this after the meeting. And it's quite clear that the issues are getting joined in a very direct way.

Tomorrow, Sunday, I'm leaving early to go over to Brussels by military plane. I'm going to have a little golf game over there, and then on Monday,

I meet with the North Atlantic Council. I'm going down Monday afternoon to have lunch with Al Haig, who is now commander in SHAPE, and then come back late Monday afternoon.

Your Grandmother stayed on in California, as she needed some dental work done and she was very tired. She stayed with her dear friend, Mrs. Kelsey. This weekend she's supposed to be up at your Uncle Bill's and Aunt Toni's, and her plan is to come back through Washington to Geneva, but I have not yet got her exact plans because Jennifer is working out her schedule and her tickets.

Well, I think this is about all for the time being. I was just bringing this up to date a little bit to say that, as far as SALT is concerned, we are finally beginning to come to grips with things. I should have said that this last week after I got back,I finally got back to Washington the text of a proposed draft treaty that we have been working on in the delegation. I started to work on this many weeks ago. And I have now gotten agreement in principle at least that we are going to table a draft. Washington has reacted to the draft that I'd sent back. I've sent Tom Graham, legal advisor with the delegation, back with the treaty to help expedite things and explain it. It's somewhat complicated, but I think it's a good treaty. We've worked hard at it, and I think we go into this negotiation better prepared than any negotiation we've thus that far had on SALT. But it remains to be seen how far we are going to be able to get with the Soviets and how far Washington is going to stick on insisting that we get a good treaty rather than a hasty treaty.

I should have mentioned, I suppose, that while I was in Los Angeles this previous weekend that Henry Kissinger was here in Geneva for a meeting

with Gromyko. I perhaps should have stayed here, but the meeting was at least billed as being primarily on Middle Eastern problems, and I didn't see anything to be done. So I sent a message to Henry saying that I had these two weddings that I was going to go to and was sorry I wouldn't be able to get to see him. The publicity that he put out on the airplane and elsewhere after he left here indicated that he had a lot of conversation with Gromyko with regard to SALT. He may have had, but I don't believe it was anything different from what I've been carrying out in my instructions. Of course, the problem always is that nobody knows exactly what Henry does say to anybody else, because he does not keep people to keep notes and he refuses to pass on word, but thus far I have no reason to think he hasn't told me anything that's important. It is a little irritating to maintain very strict confidence here on our talks, refuse to give any of the substance to newspapermen and then have Henry give out the full details, in fact, a full outline of our instructions and exactly what we are doing with the Soviets and have it published in the press. It certainly doesn't help my negotiations with the Soviets, but I suppose it helps Henry's public image and that's what he's interested in.

Well, over and out.

This is Wednesday, February 26. This last weekend, well, that is on Sunday morning I went to Brussels to have a meeting with the North Atlantic Council there on Monday, the 24th. I went over early in a T-39, an Air Force T-39, and had a golf game over there which I enjoyed. It was a beautiful day and then on Monday morning, I had a meeting with the North Atlantic Council at which I briefed them on my meetings here.

After finishing that meeting, I took a helicopter and flew down to

SHAPE to meet Al Haig and have lunch with him. Al, of course, I've known for a long time. He was a captain, I think it was, in the Eighth Army while I was over in Yokohama. Then, during the time that he was Henry's assistant and then on through the time that he became the principal assistant to Nixon after the breaking of the Watergate scandal. Al is now,what is his title? [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] Well, anyway, he's commander at SHAPE, that is the Supreme Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe. There was a lot of criticism of his getting that job, but I have great regard and personal respect for Al, and I wanted to make contact with him again. I got down there about one o'clock. We talked alone and we had lunch alone. I left about two-thirty. We talked briefly about the problems in the area, in which it looks that Portugal is in very shaky condition. The situation in Turkey, with the Congress having cut off military aid to them--not only cut it off but also taking a vindictive posture, refusing to let the Turks even have delivery of things that they have purchased in the United States, I'm afraid prohibiting them even from having delivery of those things for which not only ourselves but other members of the Alliance have paid, that is, the NAD&E,the North Atlantic Defense. . .oh, what is the name? Anyway, it's the North Atlantic Air Defense equipment that we've tried hard to sell to Turkey some years ago. Well, the Turks, understandably, feel very injured. As I was telling Al, of course, my first experience with them was when I was dealing with the Korean War at which time I recognized that the Turks are very tough people, and I think the action the Congress has taken here in response to domestic, political pressures from Greece is not going to redound to our benefit; certainly. Because the Turks are a proud people, they are a stubborn people, and they're not going to knuckle under to this type of thing. Well, it's been a terrible mistake.

I briefed Al on SALT and we agreed that we needed to keep in closer touch on these matters. Then we chatted some and he talked to me some about the Watergate days in the White House. It's up to him to tell his own story on this, but I was interested in talking with him because I told him that I had great sympathy for him and I had great admiration for the way that he had handled himself. Of the things that emerge that are somewhat new to me but not entirely so were that, first, he and some of those involved when he first came in tried to write a white paper that would tell the story. They went to Nixon and told him it had to be the whole story, there couldn't be things coming out later that would invalidate the story. They thought that they had the story and then the exposure of the tapes, the fact that tapes had taken place took place,and Nixon had said nothing about this. Incidentally, in my asking him how the tapes got to be installed, Al said that in the early days of the Administration, when there was a big controversy between Bill Rogers and Henry Kissinger as to who would sit in on Nixon's meetings with government leaders who were visiting him, that is, foreign government leaders, and Henry was slipping in the back door in order not to let Bill Rogers know about it, and then the President would see somebody that even Henry didn't know about, there was great pressure brought on the President to keep some record of these conversations. It was finally agreed that a taping system should be installed, and Bob Haldeman did this. And Haldeman, knowing that Nixon would not be able to remember to shut the things off and on, installed a voice actuated tape so that it would go on when voices appeared. And this thing continued to exist. After it was surfaced and at that time before it was surfaced, even most of those in the White House knew nothing about it, Haig said he tried hard to in the few immediate days,

immediately thereafter, tell Nixon that what Nixon should do would be to destroy the tapes, but he had to do it himself. He said that, on the one hand, Nixon took the position that the tapes were his only defense and he took the attitude that the tapes would support him and defend him. And it was only with great difficulty that they got Nixon to listen at all to the tapes and realize how much damage they could do to him. He said that Agnew also told him that he had to destroy the tapes, but that Len Garment said that, if he destroyed the tapes, he would denounce him and quit the White House. Well, there was a lot of discussion. In any event, Nixon made the decision not to destroy them.

Al agreed that even the family, even Pat Nixon and the girls, were never told the facts by Nixon until the very last. We both agreed, of course, that it was a great tragedy. Well, I'm not trying to repeat what Al has to say; he has his own story. He did say that he felt that at one time it was very close to Nixon attempting to pull a coup, that is, to put Congress out of its. . . well, should I say, to dissolve the Congress or make it impossible for the Congress to, well, his words were to pull a coup against the Congress. It was only with great difficulty that he was dissuaded from doing so. I didn't go into the details of how it could have been done. I suppose maybe by having the military occupy the Capitol or something of that kind, but that's pure speculation on my part.

Al talked about the great strain of the six months in which you had a President that was close to impeachment and you had a Vice President who was subject to a criminal imprisonment for criminal offenses and you had a Speaker of the House, the next in line, who was an alcoholic. The country was really in great danger at that time and I must say that everything

I know about it, nothing as compared to his, indicates the same situation. It was probably the direst period in our history. We both spoke of Elliot Richardson and the great courage and character that he showed during this period. Well, I don't intend to go on anymore on this.

We came back on Monday and I had my next meeting today with the Soviets here. We dealt with the question of verification of MIRV deployments. I made a very strong statement. He made a very strong statement on his side. And, as I reported in my telegram after the meeting to the Department, we really joined the issue. This is good. My expectation is that we will not be able to settle it. My expectation is that, if we're really serious about this question of MIRV verification--it seems to me we have to be, apart from the merits of it--we're not going to be able to get Congressional approval for the agreement unless we are able to show that we can verify the agreement by our own national technical means, if we are serious about it. My own feeling is that the Soviets are probably not going to give way in this unless and until they are convinced that there can be no agreement unless they accommodate themselves to some degree to our position. So this is likely to be one of the last, if not the last issue, coming down to the summit. I don't expect to be able to settle it here. It will not be settled unless and until the President and the President through Kissinger makes it clear to the Soviets that this will be the difference between an agreement and no agreement, as I feel that it should be.

Well, this is all for now. I'll sign off. I heard from your Grandmother that she expects to leave California and come to Washington on March 10, and then come here about a week later. I'm very anxiously looking forward to her return. At the same time, I'm concerned about whether I

am concerned about whether I should ask for an Easter recess here. I know the people in the staff who are separated from their families would very much like to get home. On the other hand, I feel that from the substantive standpoint, we should stay here and continue to work.

I should have said that during this last week after I got back, I transmitted to Washington the text of the proposed draft agreement that I would table for the Soviet Union and am now waiting for Washington's reaction to it. I think, as I've said on these tapes, I felt very much that we should do this right at the outset and I've been placed in the somewhat disadvantageous tactical position, not probably strategic position, but disadvantageous tactical position, because the Soviets immediately tabled their draft as I anticipated they would. And I've had some difficulty in avoiding a discussion of that. Now I'm waiting on Washington's reaction to my draft. I think it's a good draft; we worked hard at it. If we can table it, I think it's going to help us better to come to grips with the issues here.

Well, over and out for now.

This is Saturday, March 22, in Geneva. Subsequent to my last tape in which I spoke of the draft agreement that we'd sent back to Washington, I got exceedingly prompt approval on it with only very few changes. And we were able to table the agreement on March 5.

At the same time, I proposed that we set up three working groups: one a drafting group on which Boris Klosson and Ralph Earle would represent my delegation; and a verification group, particularly the question of MIRV verification, which Dr. Harold Brown when he was here, Dr. May, Michael May, who would represent the delegation; and a working group on what was to be included in the aggregate and the definitions of it which General

Rowny would head up. Within a week after making this proposal, Semenov entirely agreed to it and we now have the working groups also operating.

Last week we had three plenary meetings and we had five working group meetings, so we had nine meetings. This week we had two plenary and some six working group meetings and then we had a private meeting also between Semenov and myself. So we are now at a very active stage of negotiations. We have really not got down to any of the crunch issues yet, except that I told him both privately and in the plenary meeting that, as far as their effort to re-introduce the Forward Based Systems, third country nuclear forces, was concerned, we felt it was contrary to the Vladivostok agreement, and we would not agree to do so. And I told him that was under instructions. He seemed to take it in good spirit.

The main issue we have is the question of MIRV verification. One big change that was made in my draft back in Washington was to give us a very much hardened position on verification, an extreme position which we really could have no hope of having accepted. But the word to me was they wanted to demonstrate to Senator Jackson that we were taking a tough stand with the Soviets. Personally, I feel it's much better to take a stand on which we are going to be able to prevail rather than to take an overly tough stand, if you will, one that we really don't need for national security purposes, and then have to withdraw from it. And, of course, it will be known that we have withdrawn from it, at least to some degree.

The other issue is the inclusion of the Backfire bomber, their Backfire bomber, a heavy bomber, and a major question which we still haven't come to grips with at all is the inclusion of cruise missiles. Our position at the present time is that the Vladivostok agreement talked only about ballistic missiles

on aircraft and did not talk about cruise missiles in any way. However, we are going to have to come to grips with the cruise missile issue. I have some general guidance on it, contingency guidance, that I haven't been authorized yet to implement. In fact, I don't think it's time yet to implement it. I am trying to work out a scenario for implementing it, a negotiating scenario.

This is still March 22, 1975, in Geneva. I was talking about the instructions that I have received with respect to our SALT negotiations here and saying that I still have contingency instructions that I have not yet implemented. My instructions are very good and I have no problem with it. If they will give us time to work things out, if they will not feel the time pressure in Washington for the visit of Brezhnev is such that we have to make concessions in order to get agreement, but rather have the shoe on the other foot, as I think it is up to the present time, I think we can get a good agreement out of this. I have no reservations about that.

Your Grandmother returned home last week. She stayed about three weeks in California after the weddings and then spent a week in Washington and then came on back here, arriving here last Tuesday. She's had a much easier trip than the trip going.

Back to SALT, I had hoped and expected that we were going to get a recess around May 1. Many of the staff here have their families at home and people who have been at this now would like to get home, and I thought the Soviets from the sign he had given me were going to propose a recess about May 1, so they'd get home for that big holiday on their part and May 9, the thirtieth anniversary of the ending of the war in which they're going to have a big show. However, yesterday he walked back on this entirely. It's an illustration of the problem of doing business. I was quite clear that he was going

to ask for a May 1 recess. Yesterday he brought up the subject, and it took me almost a full hour of probing and questioning and trying to get at his circumlocutions to finally come to the conclusion that he was under instructions now to drop the idea and not go back to Moscow at that time. I confirmed this with him. It just gradually dawned on me as he was talking that maybe that's what he was driving at. And that turned out to be the case. So I think that we will be staying here through at least the first part of May.I think it's going to be useful to have a break both for morale purposes for the staff and also to reassess our position about the middle of May, and I hope that we can work things towards a point that will be possible for us to go home at that time for about two weeks and then come back to try to finish things up.

I, of course, keep strict secrecy on the talks here. Well, the story came out of Jerusalem the other day that we had now tabled a draft. This was the first information. Obviously, Henry Kissinger had given this out on the plane and, well, there have been other leaks out of Washington. It makes it very hard to enforce discipline on the staff on these things when they see these leaks coming out, without even any warning to us. There's been a big story in the papers the last few days about a ship called the Glomar Explorer which was seeking to recover a Soviet submarine that had blown up, from the bottom of the Pacific,from great depths in the bottom of the Pacific. This was a considerable shock to see this thing out in the papers.

I was involved in this program and consulted on it for several years back in the Department when I was on the Forty Committee. And I was opposed to it. I thought it was politically sensitive and that the risks weren't worth the gain. All we could hope to get out of it was some very old Russian warheads and possibly some Russian old-time code books or something of that

nature. And to spend the three hundred and fifty million dollars that we'd spend for that seemed to me just not worth it, not worth the risk.

Well, it's now all surfaced again. It demonstrates that there is really nothing that we can keep secret in the government. I must say it seems like a hopeless proposition to try to run a government under these circumstances,and I'm afraid the cumulative effect of all this is going to be to greatly weaken the CIA, and we need a vigorous and effective CIA. I'm afraid also the present Director, Bill Colby,is going to be a fall guy for much of this and I think very unjustly so. I don't know where they'll get another director. It really should be a career job; it shouldn't be a political job. When I say career job, I think that if you are going to bring in somebody from the outside to head it that it should be a non-political, and he should stay at it for a period of years and not treat the job as a political job. Thus, I'm been very pleased that during recent years, Dick Helms first and then Bill Colby have been the directors. Of course, the difficulty in some ways with a career officer in the job is that it's probably more difficult for him to stand up to unreasonable demands from somebody such as Nixon and Nixon's staff. Perhaps a politician could have stood up much better, but I suppose the lesson is that they couldn't, considering the numbers of politicans, John Mitchell as Attorney General, and so on that got involved with Nixon and the Watergate and all that unsavory mess. I suppose there's no particular advantage in having a politician as opposed to a career man. In any event, I am very, very sorry to see all this come out. I hope that it doesn't do any damage to our negotiations, and I just don't think that it will, probably.

Well, I think this is all for now. We had our forty-third wedding anniversary yesterday and last night, Elinor Murphy, my secretary, and Jack

Mendelsohn, my assistant, took us to dinner at the L'or Du Rhone. We had a very, very pleasant time. Over and out.

This is Sunday, April 27, U. Alexis Johnson speaking. I'm still in Geneva. We will be going home for about a three weeks recess on Wednesday, May 7.

Well, a great deal has been happening since I last talked, most of it in Southeast Asia which is not now my direct concern, but is a tragedy that is overwhelmingly in my mind, as it must be in the mind of every conscientious American. First, the tragedy at Cambodia and its fall. Then, now Saigon is surrounded and it appears Saigon's situation is hopeless. This, of course, was inevitable in many ways. We entered into the Paris Accords which had some very specific provisions about what would and would not be done. And then Congress passed legislation that was signed by the President saying that no matter what they did in violation of the Accords, that they should have no concern about our responding in any way. And so they have responded. And they've been given overwhelming equipment, overwhelming supplies, overwhelming organization, and the South has just not been a match for them. It's a failure from the standpoint of we, having trained and equipped the Southern forces, giving them air power. . . One thing it shows is that air power has little pertinence in a situation like this. And the North even having no air power has been able to overwhelm the South. Of course, what we did to encourage the North to attack and discourage the South from resisting, so inevitably, there's been the loss of morale down there and the raise of morale in the North. And the whole tragedy could have been foreseen.

What we have, in effect, I'm afraid have said now to the world is: we'll help you as long as things don't get too tough, but when they get tough, we're

going to pull out and leave you to your own devices. It's a tragedy beyond comprehension. As I say, of course, many of these people are people that I know and I know that their lives are going to be lost. And they're people that wanted to live their own lives and live a free life, they didn't want to be under Communist control. We gave them some help. When the going got rough,we pulled out. At least during my time left around here, our position in the world is never going to be the same.

I haven't seen any direct reflections of it in our SALT talks here, but I wouldn't expect that. But there certainly are going to be reflections in the Soviet attitude toward us, the Chinese attitude toward us, and, of course, the attitude of all our allies. We now have, in effect, classified our allies into various categories, according to those that are important and those that are less important. And nobody knows when we will decide that they will be less important than they previously were, and,thus, the whole confidence upon which our postwar relations have been based is being very badly shaken.

As far as SALT is concerned, we haven't had too much in the way of major developments. We've had our working groups going ahead, pedalling away at the outer fringes, well, I shouldn't say pedalling, I didn't mean that; pecking away, I should say, at the language and some of the issues, outer fringe issues, and been making some progress on that. As far as the major issues are concerned, they, of course, still remain. And the question is when both sides are going to start to come to grips with them.

I suggested this recess to Washington and they agreed and the Soviets have agreed. My hope is that during the recess both sides will be able to look at their position and decide what moves they want to make. I personally would like to see us go for a ban on both land and air mobile ICBMs. It

seems to me that this makes a lot of sense. I'd also like to see us go for a ban on cruise missiles above, I don't know, fifteen thousand, fifteen hundred kilometers range. I think we need to maintain cruise missiles as bomber armament, but I think if we could put a ban on testing development of cruise missiles, it would be very desirable. And I think it could be verified. If we don't put a ban on cruise missiles, we're simply going to leave ourselves open to the charge, and a very valid charge, that while we've closed some doors maybe on escalation, we've opened up an entirely new field of strategic competition between the two sides. So, in general, I tend to be in favor of somewhat more restrictive measures than some do. On the other hand, there's a lot to be said for mobile missiles as being more invulnerable than fixed land based missiles and, therefore, stabilizing. But, somehow or the other, I just can't feel that ICBMs and transport aircraft being tossed out of the backs of transport aircraft as strategic weapons make very much sense.

I guess that's about all. We've been working hard, and it's quite clear that. . . one of the interesting things is that my idea in forming these working groups--I think I spoke about them in my last tape-- was that they would work ad referendum to Minister Semenov and myself. And we, in turn, would work ad referendum to our governments. But some of them have gone as far as they can. I've been urging that Semenov and I see if we can't get further with them, but it's quite clear that he doesn't want to deal directly with me on some of these more complicated issues. He prefers to leave this at the working group level rather than dealing directly with me on it. I would really like to come to grips with him on some of these things but, so far, I've been very disappointed that I haven't been

able to do so.

Well, tomorrow your Aunt Jennifer goes to the hospital for an operation on her spine and we all have her very much in mind.

This is over and out for now.

This is Saturday, June 21, 1975, and I'm in Washington. Following my last recording on April 27 in Geneva, the week beginning the 28th we were not able to work much because of the Soviet holiday, May 1 holiday.

But, nevertheless, the drafting group, Mr. Klosson and Mr. Earle, on our side and Arbatov and Smolin on the Soviet side continued to work at trying to develop a joint draft text prior to our departure.

We also proposed during that week a recess beginning on May 7, I got authority from Washington to propose the recess. He said he would let me know by the end of the week whether they agreed or not, and they finally agreed.

However, a very curious event took place on the last two days, that is on Tuesday, May 6 and May 7. The definitions group, General Rowny and General Trusov had worked on the question of definitions of ICBMs, SLBMs, et cetera, to be included in the agreement. They had struck an impasse in that they would not include some of the definitions that we wanted, of course, such as a heavy missile which was understandable. But they wanted these definitions based upon launchers rather than on missiles, that is, instead of defining an ICBM, they would define an ICBM launcher. They, of course, saw that by agreeing to define an ICBM, they were weakening their case against defining a heavy ICBM in a way that we desired. In any event, all this came to an impasse between General Rowny and General Trusov, and it was agreed that it would be referred over to the working group. Arbatov

and the working group said that he had no authority to discuss it and, in effect, said they would withdraw their agreement to include a section on definitions unless we conceded to their point of view on this. They took a very, very hard line. Well, the afternoon of the 6th, Semenov asked for a private meeting with me and we had a meeting. He told me, though, that he was going to be accompanied by Smolin and I said I wanted to be accompanied by Earle. We had a long meeting, going around on this subject, and arrived at the compromise agreement on how the issue was going to be handled. This was in the afternoon. At dinner that evening, he had me for dinner, and after the dinner, he asked to talk; it was just a private dinner, just with the wives. He asked to talk and reading from notes, he in effect said that he disowned the agreement that he had reached in the afternoon, that his delegation had refused to agree to it; in effect, said that he couldn't speak for his delegation. I became really angry and I also let it be shown that I was angry at his repudiating an agreement that he had reached with me. And I told him that, as far as I was concerned, we could just drop the whole idea of a joint draft text and let things stand where they were unless he was prepared to reach a reasonable compromise with me. We talked the thing through and my suggestion was that we simply include all of their text in brackets, include all of our text in brackets and, thus, we would each simply set forth our views without any attempt to compromise on it, that is, our text with respect to this particular article on definitions, so neither side need prejudice its position. To my great surprise, he said that he was not able to agree to even this without consulting his delegation. It was quite clear from the context of his remarks that this meant consulting General Trusov and General Belitsky. . The matter was left that he would

consult them and let the working group know the following morning what the decision was. Well, we had agreed on a plenary meeting for the following morning before our departure. So I sent Klosson and Earle over to the Soviet Mission for their meeting with the Soviet working group without knowing what had been agreed upon. But I instructed them to maintain a hard position and, unless the Soviets would agree to the compromise that he and I had worked out the previous evening, we would just drop the whole idea of having a joint draft text. Well, I went over to the meeting, the working group meeting was over at the Soviet Mission and also our plenary meeting was over at the Soviet Mission. So I followed them in about an hour to go to our plenary meeting and went there without knowing what, if anything, had been decided on. I met Klosson and Earle outside the meeting hall and they said that the Soviets had agreed, the Soviet working group had agreed to the proposal I had made the previous evening. The text was typed during the course of our meeting and, thus, we finally ended up with a joint draft text; to be sure, with many brackets in it, but still it's the first step towards getting the agreement, and, having done so, we've been able to dispose of considerable of what I might call the underbrush. We had our plenary meeting and then I left immediately following the meeting for Brussels where I met with the North Atlantic Council, the NAC, and that meeting I found very unsatisfactory. I had briefed them on what had been done up to the present time. They, in turn, the so-called Petronini group, Italians, Germans, British, I guess that's it primarily, had done a paper exhorting us on what we should or should not do in SALT, primarily focusing upon so-called non-transfer of issue. So they spent about an hour reading this paper to me exhorting us as to what we should or should not do.

I found it very distasteful and a great waste of time. I had taken a small military plane over to Brussels.

Then the big plane with the rest of the delegation came behind. I went out to the airport and met them and went on back to Washington the same evening, arriving about eight o'clock. So May 8 was a pretty big and a pretty long day.

On Saturday, May 24, we finally had a Verification Panel meeting at which Henry briefed us on his talks with Gromyko in Vienna. He reported that, in their formal meetings, Gromyko would take a very hard line, exactly paralleling what Semenov had given me in Geneva. Then, in their private meeting, Henry said that he told Gromyko that, if there was going to be a SALT agreement, we would have to have something satisfactory on verification of MIRVs in particular, and if there was no SALT agreement, there would be no summit meeting. It was up to them, as to what way it went. Henry also told them what I'd been authorized to tell them but had not thought wise in my negotiations to tell them and that is that,if they wanted to ban airborne mobile ICBMs, they would have to consider other kinds of mobile ICBMs, obviously this means land based and the two should have to be considered together; and we wanted to know what their position was on that. And he gave them the position also that if we were to agree to any limitations on cruise missiles, the cutoff point, that is, the point at which they would become counted as strategic missiles would have to be much more than six hundred kilometers that was established for ballistic missiles. And he gave them the figure of three thousand kilometers as the cutoff point. And he told them that it was expected that they would have to consider this back in Moscow. Oh, I should say in that connection, Gromyko said that they

would need more time to consider this and, therefore, the date for resumption of the meetings that I'd agreed upon with Semenov, that is, June 2, would have to be extended to June 23. And that was agreed upon.

Skipping ahead, yesterday I was planning to leave today, that is, on Saturday, the 21st, for Geneva to resume the meetings on Monday, June 23. A little after noon, a call came from Voronsov the Soviet charge, to Kissinger, saying that for technical reasons they needed more time and suggested July 2 for the resumption of the meetings. I called Voronsov back. He said they wanted to keep this confidential. I pointed out the absurdity of trying to keep it confidential because it was well known-- we had already announced-- that we were going to resume on June 23 and it was known that I and the delegation were leaving on the following morning. So it was finally agreed that we would make an announcement that by, quote, mutual agreement, unquote, the talks were postponed, the opening of them was postponed until July 2. But I told him that we would tell the press in background in answer to any queries that this was at the Soviets' request.

Up to this time, we have heard nothing from the Soviets as to their position. It was expected that we might get something prior to our going back, something through Dobrynin, Ambassador Dobrynin, prior to our going back. It remains to be seen whether or not this further postponement means that they are going to give us anything here in Washington. In many ways, I wish they would give us an indication of the positions that they are going to take. It would thus be possible for us to have good consideration of it before we go to Geneva and give us a chance to develop a well-considered position here in Washington, rather than my having to simply receive their position in Geneva and then wait several weeks for that Washington reaction to it.

I should say that, during this interval, Grandmother and I went out to California and saw all of you out there. I told you about these tapes that I was doing. I was not able to be there for your graduation from high school which was shortly after I left, but I was able to see you play your last game of tennis as a high school student in a tournament up at Ventura. Your Aunt Jennifer seems to be getting along very well, although she was in considerable pain yet, but the operation in general had been successful. I was very pleased to be able to talk directly with the surgeon and see her. I think that it was a very good idea to carry this out, and I am so very pleased with the way her husband, Lee Bishop, is encouraging her and helping her. He seems to be a very, very fine person.

Last week, I was asked by the President to go out to represent him at the State funeral of former Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo. I was supposed to leave here Friday morning and get there Saturday afternoon. The plane, though, was very late, ten hours late, so I didn't get out of here until Friday evening and got there at one-thirty in the morning, Sunday. The funeral services were on Monday. I spent Tuesday there and then came back on Wednesday. It gave me an opportunity to see Japan and I saw Prime Minister Miki, who was foreign minister during the time that I was there, also Ohira, who is now Finance Minister Fukuda who is now Deputy Prime Minister and head of Economic Planning Agency--I have a great deal of respect for him. And then some of my longtime friends, Shimoda, who is former Ambassador here who is now a supreme court justice. Incidentally, he took me through their new supreme court building which is perfectly magnificent, one of the finest things I've seen. I don't like the looks from the outside. It looks almost like a Mayan architecture which

doesn't fit in very well with Tokyo, but the interior is magnificent. Ambassador Asakai, I had a game of golf with him, played terribly, and also with Jim Hodgson,our Ambassador. I don't know, I guess it was the jet lag or I don't know what it was, but I played very badly. Also saw former Ambassador Takeuchi and Ushiba and a number of people they had in for dinner for me on Tuesday evening. It was a real good-time dinner, I really enjoyed it. Wednesday before I left I had asked to call on Mrs. Sato making clear that I was not insisting, because I knew the strain she was under. But she accepted my offer with great alacrity; in fact,I'd made it clear I wanted her to know I'd offered, but I would entirely understand if she didn't feel able to receive me. But she did and we had a long talk, a very pleasant talk at her home and I paid the obeisance before the shrine for him and so on. I felt good that I was able to make the trip. It was the first time in three years I've been to Japan and I like to keep up my contacts with it. One thing I noticed was that they've improved pollution control enormously; Tokyo was so much clearer than it was the last time I was there. Also, traffic handling was good. Ambassador Jim Hodgson and his wife there seem to be doing a very good job. I was saddened to see the old chancery had been destroyed and a new building going up, but I suppose that's progress even though the new building is a very uninspired, modern Foreign Building Office structure. It's simply not in the same class as the old building, and I think the old building could have been preserved. In fact, when I was there, I worked out a plan with Tony Raymond, the architect for the old building, to preserve the old building and still build an addition that would take care of our needs. But. . . well, that's that.

Then, as I mentioned, I was all prepared today to be on my way to Geneva,

but here I am, still in Washington. We are now planning to leave on Monday, June 30. Frankly, I welcome the additional time. We really need more time for consideration here and I think the time can be used usefully.

It remains to be seen what the Soviets come up with on verification. It's very hard to see how we're going to resolve this. It's in many ways as much a political problem, that is, being able to satisfy our Congress and our people that we've got a valid agreement as it is a national security problem. Given the numbers of missiles involved, MIRVed missiles, 1320, the cheating would have to be very massive to be of any national security importance, and it also, of course, would have to be surfaced at some time. So there are many inhibitions against it but,nevertheless, we're going to have to have an agreement that we can demonstrate as our term goes adequately that they're verifiable.

The issue of cruise missiles is still up. I still am torn on this, I fear that the way things are going we are going to have a position that will permit cruise missiles up to very considerable ranges and I think this is going to open us to criticism and justifiably so. On the other hand, I have great difficulty in seeing how cruise missile limitations can be verified. In fact, I've appeared, while I've been back here, at one Armed Services Committee, that is House Armed Services Committee hearing and one House International Affairs Committee hearing on SALT and have discussed this subject somewhat. People here are torn on cruise missiles. Those who want to see the B-1 bomber built feel that it would be better to ban cruise missiles because, if we permit cruise missiles, they would be mounted on B-52s and this would extend the life of the B-52s, and thus will inhibit support for the B-1 bomber. Well, I myself, at the present moment on this,

feel that we should probably permit cruise missiles on aircraft up to a range of fifteen hundred or two thousand kilometers, as a penetration aid for bombers but should have a much shorter range limit on submarine launch or sea launched cruise missiles. The problem with my position on this is that it's impossible to distinguish in testing between sea launched and air launched missiles. And, therefore, verification of a shorter range limitation on sea launched cruise missiles becomes very difficult. Well, we'll see how this comes out. It's well worth a lot of thought and consideration and I hope that this additional week will give some time for high level consideration here in the government on this.

Well, this is over and out for this time. This is June 21, 1975, in Washington, D. C.

I am going to add on a postscript to this. This is still June 21. Last Thursday, the day after I came back from Tokyo, I did about a two-hour tape recording for the Truman Library on my recollections of Truman and relations with him, particularly during the Korean War. I will be getting a transcript of that to be edited, but I wanted to note in this tape that I had done that recording.

This is now definitely over and out.

This is Sunday, June 22, 1975, still in Washington. One item I forgot on my recording yesterday which I probably should have mentioned is the whole question of the investigations of the CIA that are now being carried out, primarily by the so-called Church Committee, that is Senator Church is Chairman of the Committee in the Senate on this. It's quite clear that he is using it for--I don't say there isn't some sincerity there, but he's using it for his own political purposes. He manages to get a headline every

day or so out of it and there seems to be very little concern over preserving the CIA as an instrument of policy. I'm sure our Soviet opposite number, KGB, are delighted with what is going on; and whereas I don't think they inspired this or encouraged it, I certainly feel that they will do anything they can to develop anything that will reduce the effectiveness of the CIA. I had a call on Friday from Dean Rusk who was expressing this same concern. I told him I fully shared it.

On last Thursday, I got word--well, I was out of the office, but the Committee called and asked that I appear before them before I went to Geneva. At that time, of course, I was going on Saturday, so I told them there would be only Friday and I didn't have time to do so. They said they wanted me to appear in connection with hearings concerning Castro. I said I didn't know exactly what they had in mind, but if it was anything concerning alleged assassination plots against Castro, I could say categorically that I never heard or knew of any such plot or discussed any such plot. Dean Rusk also, in calling me, said that he was satisfied that he had never, ever heard of anything of that kind discussed or planned. And, if there had been, he certainly would have had to have gone to the President--President Kennedy--at the time. So I said of course we were planning things that would bring down Castro and that was one of our objectives at the time, and some of the things we were planning probably ultimately would not have been or could have turned out not to be very good for Castro's health, but assassination was certainly not the objective. The objective rather was the regime itself.

Well, I thought I ought to mention this before I close off this tape. I'll close this tape off at this time. This is June 22, 1975.

Side 2

This is Saturday, July 12, 1975. U. Alexis Johnson speaking. I'm in Geneva, Switzerland. I forget at exactly what point I left off in the last tape, but at the risk of repeating myself, we were scheduled to leave Washington on Saturday, June 21, to resume our meetings in Geneva on Monday, June 23. On the afternoon or about noon of Friday, June 20,just shortly before Senko-San, our maid, was due to depart for Geneva, Kissinger got a call from Voronsov the DCM at the Soviet Mission. And in turn, he turned it over to me and I called Voronsov back; he said they wanted to postpone the commencement of the talks for a few days until Wednesday, July 2. I asked him what the reason was and he said he didn't know, simply that the telegram said for quote, technical reasons, unquote. I said that we would agree. He said they wanted to keep it confidential, but I pointed out that it was absurd to try to keep it confidential. Everybody knew that we were due to arrive the next day, that is, on Saturday,in Geneva. The press was informed, hotels and everything else, and it would be impossible to keep it confidential. But I said I would agree that we make a low key announcement that the talks had been postponed by mutual agreement until July 2, but if we were asked, we would say that this was at the request of the Soviet Union.

So we had another week in Washington that I was not expecting. And we left on Monday, June 30, arriving here of course the same day, for resuming our talks on July 2. I'll come back on that.

Before leaving, during the course of that week, I did have a meeting with Secretary Kissinger in which it was agreed that we would see what the Soviets had to say when we got here. In the light of Kissinger's talks with Gromyko in Vienna earlier in the month in which he indicated that there was some give on our part on cruise missiles and we expected them to do something more as far as verification was concerned and we asked them

what their views were about banning. . . well, let's put it this way: They had proposed banning airborne missile ICBMs. We said that both land mobiles and airborne should be treated the same,and what was their view on this. It was agreed that when I went back, we would consider that the ball was in the Soviet court and hope to get some replies and some reaction to them out of these talks in Vienna. And then we'd decide where we go. In any event, Kissinger was coming to Geneva on July 10. He would be seeing Gromyko here again, both in connection with SALT and the Middle East and the CSE conference as well, and then we would compare notes.

Well, I went without any instructions. I made it very clear when I met with them here that I did feel that the ball was in their court. I made a couple of statements reiterating our positions on the key issues, that is, primarily verification particularly of MIRVs, the Backfire bomber being included in the aggregate, the fact that cruise missiles were not included in the Vladivostok understanding, but I said that if they were to be included in the new agreement, it would have to be on a basis different from that of ballistic missiles. I made a statement also on the importance of a better definition between light and heavy ICBMs. He, in turn, said nothing on these subjects except to reiterate their previous positions. He made a few small procedural moves. He agreed to include in the text of the agreement an article on the Standing Consultative Commission. He also introduced a slightly changed article on their part on definitions. He tried to make this appear that he was moving on peripheral issues. On Wednesday, July 9, at that meeting, he in effect said to me that he thought we ought to deal with peripheral issues and leave the key issues for a decision at the summit. So that was the way things stood when Kissinger arrived.

In his talks with Gromyko, I was skeptical as to whether Gromyko would make any move or not, but Kissinger feels that he did. He seemed, the first time, to indicate a better understanding of our problem on verification on MIRVs and also on mobile missiles as well. He did not make any movement on cruise missiles. But there was a little forward movement.

I met Kissinger when he arrived. He and Gromyko had dinner that night to which I was not invited, but neither was Semenov. The next morning I met with Kissinger who debriefed me on the dinner. Then he had lunch with Gromyko, and then I met Kissinger again in the afternoon, following the lunch, and he debriefed me again, giving me the flavor of the talk. Henry was fairly encouraged and he is going back to Washington to discuss it with the President.

He feels that they're moving on MIRV verification. I hope he's right. He feels that the key to any breakthrough is our position on the cruise missiles, and he feels that this needs to be examined. I should say that at my last meeting with him in Washington, I strongly urged that our position be re-examined. I feel that it really hasn't been given full consideration and, before we plunge into a position which would open up the long range cruise missiles for competition by both sides, I think we ought to take another look at it. There is a justification, of course, for cruise missiles, longer range ones on bombers as penetration aids, but I wonder whether it's going to be worth the cost. We're going to be charged politically, and I think properly so, with developing an agreement that not only doesn't put a cap on the arms race, as they say, but opens up new areas of competition.

Well, Henry is going back to discuss these things with the President. They'll probably have some meetings to which I hope and expect to be invited back there on the subject.

In the meanwhile, I suggested that we could work at some of the peripheral

issues here, but I needed some instructions on that, and he let me write up, well, I wrote up in connection with Jan Lodal on his staff--together we wrote up a draft instruction which he said he'll take up with the President as quickly as he gets back, and hopefully I'll get this by Tuesday.

So the situation is that we seem to be having a little movement. The Soviets obviously continue to appear to be very desirous of having a summit meeting in the fall. I hope that we can continue to play on this and that we can play hard-to-get and maintain a posture that we're less anxious than they are because I think that this should pay off, but it remains to be seen what'll come out of this, but it does look like a little movement.

I should say that most of the time taken up here with the CSCE meeting and the last minute hitch on that. The plan is this: I should have mentioned this, if the CSCE can finish up, and MALTA, Dom Mintoff . from MALTA is holding that up, there should be the CSCE summit at Helsinki on July 30, and the plan would be for Brezhnev and Ford to discuss SALT at least briefly up there and after Brezhnev discusses it, hopefully he's going to be in a position to go back and do what's necessary to make some moves on their side. If the CSCE summit doesn't come off, why then all bets are off and I don't know what the scenario might be. I presume it might be Henry going to Moscow to meet Brezhnev, but I'm not quite sure that will take the place of a meeting with Ford, that is, a preliminary meeting. I'm very concerned of course that these summit meetings are not well prepared and time is short, and decisions get made without full consideration, so I hope that we can refine the issues down just as clearly as possible so

that when it does come to a summit meeting that the issues are well understood at least by President Ford and he's in a position to do some real bargaining with Brezhnev on it.

Well, this is about all for now. It's a beautiful day here, and I've just been out playing golf. Over and out.

This is Sunday, August 3, 1975. Since my last recording, that I guess was July 12, there have been a number of developments. First the Helsinki summit meeting, the CSCE meeting, did take place, and President Ford and Brezhnev did have a discussion yesterday morning, Saturday morning, there on SALT, and Jan Lodal, the CSCE man who deals with SALT, was sent by Kissinger and Ford down to see me here and debrief me. He arrived late last night, and I spent most of the morning with him. He said that contrary to the stories that were given out in the press, when Brezhnev first met Ford on the 30th, I guess it was, July 30, when he called at the Embassy on Ford, there was no real discussion of SALT because Brezhnev said he wasn't prepared. He had brought along with him several of his experts on SALT and it was arranged that they would have a meeting yesterday, that is on August 2, before they both left Helsinki. That meeting took place.

According to Jan, the whole discussion was very confused, with there being no orderly presentation by either party, either side, of positions. There was talk back and forth, somewhat disconnected. Brezhnev had a piece of paper in front of him that he kept looking at and scribbling on, but he really didn't seem to have mastered his subject. Ford had a clearer idea of his subject, but the two of them never engaged in any real discussion. Part of the problem was, apparently, that Brezhnev never really put forward a position and, according to Jan, the

way the conversation went, Brezhnev was never really encouraged to put forward a coherent position on their part. They would talk about cruise missiles for a moment and then about Backfire and then the talk would switch back to ballistic missiles on aircraft other than bombers, and so on back and forth. It was a very, very confused exchange that lasted almost an hour past its appointed time, with nobody very clear on exactly what happened. However, one thing that was clear is that Brezhnev did not make any concessions, did not make any moves of any significance, and the whole situation was left in a state of considerable suspense.

Summarizing it, they agreed on what we call some of the cats and dogs--that is some of the items to be banned such as missiles on the sea bed and intercontinental ballistic missiles, land based cruise missiles, and a few items like that, but nothing of any real significance. Ford, he said, defended the position of the Backfire very stoutly, and this is building up into a major issue. The fact of the matter is that at Vladivostok Backfire doesn't seem to have been discussed. The background press conference after Vladivostok, Kissinger said that it was not included, and then when they returned and were getting debriefed, it appears that the Backfire's a much more formidable bomber, at least as far as its capabilities are concerned than were originally thought. We've now gotten ourselves in a situation in which the Backfire's also become a public issue in the United States. I am perfectly sure myself that the Backfire's the one issue that's not negotiable with the Soviets. I'm perfectly sure that the Soviets are not going to stand down a hundred or two hundred ICBMs or SLBMs in order to accommodate the Backfire within the

2400 aggregate, and I just don't think this is possible. On the other hand, it's going to be very difficult to defend omitting the Backfire. When I first talked about this before I came over here, Jim Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, was very relaxed. He thought it would be all right to try to see if we could get the Backfire. Kissinger also felt the same way. But I know at that time that Schlesinger felt that we would probably have to abandon it, and I know Kissinger did. But now it's got into a political situation in which Backfire and its inclusion will be somewhat a test of our manhood, I suppose, in the negotiations, and it's going to be very difficult to get out of it. I suggested before, and I suggested today to Lodal that we try to work out a noncircumvention clause, that is that although the Backfire would not be included in the 2400.. I think most of us feel that the Soviets did and do look upon it as primarily a peripheral problem, but it's also undeniable that it does have characteristics of what could be an intercontinental bomber. But I think perhaps we might get something in the way of noncircumvention, that is, that they would not build a tanker fleet for it or they would not arm it with long-range air-to-surface missiles, or they'd not build advanced bases in the Soviet Union which train for intercontinental attack. Something of that kind. And settle for something of that nature on it. This would also be combined with their desire to have something on what they call non-transfer, that is that we will not transfer strategic weapons to third countries, and I think that we could have a single noncircumvention clause which would cover the Backfire on their side in so far as we're concerned and cover nontransfer on our side so far as they're concerned. But really very little thought has been

given to this.

The cruise missile issue is linked to MIRV verification, and as there was no resolution of cruise missiles at Helsinki, the whole verification question remains up in the air as well. The plan is for Kissinger to go to Moscow in early September for another discussion and then possibly to have another discussion with Gromyko when he comes to the U.N. in September. But the whole outlook now to me is that it's going to be very, very difficult and very unlikely that we're going to be able to achieve an agreement much before the end of the year. Even that is doing to be difficult.

Meanwhile we don't have too much to work on here, but nevertheless it's important I recognize to give the public the impression that we're moving ahead, and thus a recess would be difficult. I might say that on Friday, I had a long private meeting with Semenov, primarily on the subject of information exchange, and upon notification, advanced notification of acts that they were going to take to change their systems. These are all things we learn in any event.

Well, it was a very, very unpleasant meeting, and as I said in my telegram, there was not the slightest sign of progress. The meeting was over three and a half hours long. I find it utterly exhausting, this type of meeting. When he gets backed into a corner, then he starts reciting the Bible or reciting some philosopher or some saying, trying to wiggle out of things, and I try very hard to keep him to the point. This makes him angry, of course, and I get angry when he won't keep to the point. Our anger is well-concealed--well, I shouldn't say too well concealed. It's under the surface; we maintain the proprieties with eachother

but I must say that on occasions of that kind, I find him very, very difficult to deal with. I very much would hope to make some progress here on information exchange. There is certainly no reason why the Soviets shouldn't tell us what we're going to learn anyway from our national technical means of verification, and thus facilitate the work. As I told him, we're going to be managing, both of us, the two aggregates, the 2400 aggregate and the 1320 aggregate on the MIRVs. It's going to be a very complicated process. The more information we can exchange on this, the more we are going to be able to build confidence and the more we're going to be able to make the treaty a viable one. However they have absolute paranoia about giving out any information of anything involving their military. For example on the Backfire, I keep talking about the Backfire bomber. We don't even yet know the name that they call it. They refuse to let us know. Ford and Brezhnev had a discussion on this, and Ford said to Brezhnev, "You know, if we're wrong about this being a heavy bomber--see, our contention is that it has at least the capabilities of the Bison which is our Miyashichev bomber which we both agree is a heavy bomber. If we're wrong about having characteristics of the Bison, a heavy bomber, why, tell us what are the facts about it." And Brezhnev comes out with the same thing that I get here. "We tell you that it's not a heavy bomber. It's a medium bomber. Period." So there can be no further discussion. Well, the whole thing gets very frustrating but it's important and we'll continue to work ahead at it.

Lodal goes back to the States now. Kissinger and the President get back the next week and I hope to get an instruction on some additional items--more or less peripheral items--on which we can work for the next week or so.

Well, this is over and out for this time. This is Sunday, August 3, 1975. Over and out.

This is Tuesday, September 9, 1975. Since my last recording on August 3, there have been no dramatic developments. We did receive instructions finally to table some bans, agree to some bans upon such things as intercontinental cruise missiles. This is the first time we've mentioned cruise missiles. And ballistic missiles on water-borne vehicles other than submarines as well as ballistic missiles on sea beds or inland waters, as well as missiles in orbit, including FOBS, the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System.

Today at our plenary meeting, I tabled agreement language on these issues. I've also been having discussions with him on portions of the agreement not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement, entering into effect at the time the ratifications are exchanged on this agreement, rather than waiting on everything on everything until October 3, 1977. He's now indicated agreement in principle with this, and I have also today tabled some agreement language to cover this issue.

However, we've been spending a good part of our time and our effort on the whole question of defining what we mean by impeding verification. We want to make it clear that anything they deliberately do to impede verification, particularly impeding verification of testing, is within the terms of the agreement. They are very stoutly resisting this, and we've had some very spirited, if I can say so, exchanges on the subject. We're now down to talking business on it, and I kept plugging away on it, and he now seems willing to accept the principle that we should define what we mean by impeding verification, but we're a long ways from being able to agree upon any language.

On some other issues, oh, they're peripheral in nature, we've been making progress. We are gradually reducing the number of items of you might say a support peripheral nature that remain between us, so if and when the decisions are made upon the big issues such as cruise missiles and Backfires and mobiles, these are the three remaining big issues, that we'll have the framework of a fairly well thought out agreement in which to put them, and I feel that our framework is coming along in fairly good shape.

I had hoped to get a recess for a couple of weeks so that the staff and myself could go home about the time that Kissinger's supposed to meet with Gromyko for the next round, and I am awaiting instructions, but Washington -- I had a private exchange with Henry on this--he wants to keep up the appearance of working here as well as the substance of working, so what I've done is let members of the delegation and staff go home one by one for a week or ten days and then come back again, and meanwhile we keep meetings going. I'm planning to leave myself now on this coming Thursday to go to Brussels to brief the North Atlantic Council on Friday. This will be the first time I have briefed them since May 7, and then go on back the same day to Washington, arriving there on Friday and spending about a week. I previously committed myself to going to Japan and briefing <u>them</u> the next time I brief the North Atlantic Council, so I suggested that the offer at least be made to them that I do so, but I haven't yet gotten the reaction of Washington. Embassy Tokyo is very enthusiastic about my doing so. This will be a pretty strenuous trip if I do that. It means I'll leave here, I'll get back to Washington on Friday and then I'd have to leave the following Saturday for Tokyo, getting

there on Sunday, briefing them on Monday, and then on Tuesday, taking JAL across the Russia line to Paris and back here to Geneva, so as to get here Tuesday night for a meeting on Wednesday morning.

I am anxious to get the Japanese involved in this. I think it's important before we reach final agreement that we talk with them in some detail about it so that they do feel that we really have informed them and kept them engaged in this. I talked to Togo, the Vice Minister, when I was there about doing this, and like always, they say they're a little hesitant because they don't feel that they know enough about it to ask the right questions. I pointed out to them that they talk very glibly about the nuclear umbrella. It seems to me that they should have a better understanding of what the nuclear umbrella is all about and what we are doing and are not doing about it. So we'll see whether or not I go on to Tokyo. I think it's probably quite likely that I'll do so.

Your grandmother went home on Thursday to go ahead. She was transferring planes. She left here on Air France and then was taken by TWA from Paris to Dulles, and TWA here assured me that everything was arranged for her to have a wheelchair and be taken care of in her transfer in Paris as well as met in Washington. Well, none of it happened. There was nobody to meet her. There was no wheelchair in Paris. She tried to use the moving sidewalk--their escalator, and she fell and hurt herself fairly badly on this, so I spent most of the weekend on the telephone talking to people who were staying with her, helping her out there, as well as to the doctor, and yesterday decided that the thing to do is to send Senko-San back to help her. So I sent Senko-San back on very short notice. My word today from

Peggy Branigan, my secretary, is that she's feeling very much better now, and Senko-San did arrive last night, and I know it's a comfort for her to have her there. I don't know whether she'll come back with me--she certainly won't come back with me if I take the long way around, but I hope she'll come back here not long after I come back because it's nice having them both here.

Well, I think this is about all for this time. We're still awaiting the big decisions on the big issues. As I understand, there's to be a Verification Panel meeting tomorrow in Washington. I hope that while I'm back there, there will be an NSC meeting so that I can get the feel of the way things are going back there. We have some very tough issues. This Backfire issue is a very tough one. It's quite clear that as far as the Soviets are concerned, it's not negotiable. They never would have agreed to the 2400 aggregate if they thought that Backfire was going to be included. In fact, in these background statements, right after Vladivostok, Kissinger said that it was not included. But then he agreed that a try could be made to get it included. I don't think he realized, I know I didn't realize, where this was going to lead us. The fact is now that it has led into a big public confrontation, and it's going to be extremely difficult for us to give up the Backfire as it's going to be extremely difficult if not impossible for them to give it to us. So I think the Backfire's really going to be the crunch issue.

The cruise missile issue is also important, but I think that they're beginning to move in Washington toward a fairly sensible position rather than just leaving all cruise missiles open for competition. They seem to be moving toward a position in which we would agree that those above

a certain range, both at sea and at land, would be banned rather than permitted, and it seems to me that this makes sense.

Another issue, of course, as I mentioned, is the mobile issue. The Soviets have proposed banning air-borne mobiles, that is cruise or ballistic missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers, and we have proposed permitting land mobiles. Well, the two of them obviously have to go together. I hope that we can agree on a ban on both of them because I don't think we have anything to gain from mobiles. I think the Soviets, in view of their larger territory, the difficulty of verification, and in general their ability to deal with greater secrecy on these matters, I think there is greater opportunity for the Soviets to cheat on this than almost any other system. Of course, the argument for mobiles is that they contribute to invulnerability of missile systems, and anything that contributes to invulnerability contributes to stability. This is the argument I myself often make. Instinctively, I can't help but feel that trying to limit some of these new developments such as mobiles and such as long range cruise missiles, is going to be in our interests. For the moment, like many of these things, it seems we might have something more to gain by leaving it open because of our greater technological capability, but then the Soviets catch up with us and then we have to go on to something else. We can't stop technological progress, of course, but I think that it's going to contribute to greater stability between us if we can reduce at least the areas of competition in this strategic missile field.

Well, this is all for now. I'll sign off. This is Tuesday, September 9, 1975. Over and out.

This is Saturday, October 4, 1975. Since my last recording on September 9, a considerable number of things have happened which I will try to recall and recount as best I can.

First on Thursday, September 11, I had a meeting with the Soviets, a plenary meeting with the Soviet delegation, and then I left that evening for Brussels, stayed all night in Brussels, and on Friday morning at 9:30, briefed the NAC--the North Atlantic Council. We started about 9:30. I finished about 11:30 and then got a 12:00 plane -- a Sabina plane-- to New York and then got the shuttle plane down to Washington the same evening, so it made a fairly long day.

My briefing of the North Atlantic Council was without any great moment or great developments in it, except that in the briefing, I was authorized to state by the Department that prior to tabling any formula on noncircumvention for handling the Forward Based Systems or prior to tabling anything with respect to what the Soviets call nontransfer, that is transferring weapons or components or blueprints of what they call strategic weapons to third parties would be forbidden but prior to tabling anything on that, that we would consult the North Atlantic Council. That assisted me a great deal with them. It's a commitment that I hope that we will be able to keep in full.

Well, as I say, I went on back to Washington, had not a very pleasant trip down. I must say landing at Sabina at the International Arrivals terminal there in New York, is, oh, a terrible experience, but I don't know why people put up with it. And the crowds and the officials are so brusque. Oh, everything is handled badly. I hate to go through New York. I took a taxi from JFK over to La Guardia to take the shuttle down and

the radar had gone out, and it took us over two hours, and I finally got home about seven, seven-thirty. Your grandmother met me at the airport and it was good to see her and mighty good to get home. On the following day, Saturday, I did a little work. Saturday and Sunday I got out on Chevy Chase with my old pal Marshall Green, who was back from Canberra, Bob Cleveland, for some golf and had a very good time at that. Oh, in the morning, Saturday morning, Tom Graham came over to brief me and bring me up to date on what he'd found out was happening.

The following week I met with most of the people involved in my business, that is with Dr. Ikle of ACDA, George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Jan Lodal, who does the NSC work, Bill Colby of CIA. But in any event, I had met with them to talk with them about how things were going and found the town in great shambles. A great deal of distrust and suspicion between Defense and State, between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, and everybody distrusting everybody else and everybody on the Hill of course very distrustful also. So it was a very bad atmosphere.

On Wednesday, we had the NSC meeting with the President for somewhat over two hours. The word that I had prior to the meeting was that both Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff are taking a very hard line on the Backfire issue, saying that the Soviets wanted the SALT agreement so badly that they would even give way on the Backfire. My own position was that I thought it was the one issue that was nonnegotiable as far as the Soviets are concerned, that is, if they included the Backfire in the 2400 aggregate, it meant that they would have to stand down a comparable number--that is 250 or 200 ICMBs and SLBMs, and I just didn't think they were about to do that. Therefore

our job was to try to find some middle ground to be recommended to the President. It was a tough thing to recommend, tough thing to deal with, because for the old conservatives, you might say, on the Hill, anything less than counting the Backfire in the 2400 aggregate is going to be looked upon as a surrender to the Soviets, and as far as the cruise missile issue is concerned, anything that leaves the cruise missiles open for development is going to be looked upon by the other wing of the Congress as meaning that we're entering into an agreement for competition in strategic missiles in a new area of strategic missiles rather than reducing competition. So the issues were very, very tough.

I talked to George Brown particularly about this, and he seemed very receptive to the thought that we should be trying to find a middle ground that could be at least recommended to the President rather than the Chiefs and DOD taking a hard-nosed attitude that no matter what we did, the Soviets would have to agree to it.

Well, at the NSC meeting, to the great surprise of everybody, Jim Schlesinger came forward with a very complex proposal for having a sublimit on the number of Backfires and then in turn, we would have an equal number of longer range sea-launched cruise missiles--SLCMs, and there would be all kinds of collateral constraints, including that the Soviets would agree not to talk again about Forward Based Systems, which of course was nonsense. They'll talk about what they want to talk about. You can't keep people from talking about what they want to talk about. But, at any rate, it marked a little movement, and I was very, very encouraged to see it, even though I thought that the scheme was very impractical.

As far as mobiles were concerned, he also--that is Schlesinger proposed that we agree to leave land mobiles open so that when our fixed land-based silos become vulnerable we could move to mobiles.

Today when I went over to France to play golf over at Evian, I bought some new batteries and have them in here now, so this is late Sunday afternoon, October 5. It's been a beautiful day. I had a very nice golf game out at Evian with Ralph Earle who's the ACDA representative on the delegation, for whom I have a great deal of respect and am very fond.

Tonight I'm going to dinner at General Rowny's. He called me up and his wife invited me over for dinner tonight. It's a welcome change from having to cook for myself.

Well, to go on from where I recall I left off yesterday, I believe I was talking about land mobiles. At this NSC meeting, Jim Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, said that he felt that we should keep open the option for deploying land mobiles so that we could do this if and when, at such time the fixed land-based ICBMs became more vulnerable. He said that he thought that this would be negotiable with the Soviets to which the President very quickly responded that it was not negotiable with him, that he just did not feel that the land-mobile ICBM would be politically viable in the United States. He recalled that back some many years ago, the Air Force had come forward with the proposition of putting mobile ICBMs on railroad cars and hauling them around the country, and that obviously aroused less than enthusiasm

in the Congress and in the country, and there was a proposition for hauling them around on trucks which equally left the people with little enthusiasm. But he interjects quickly that Schlesinger had little opportunity to explain that the present Defense concept is somewhat different. They have various concepts for deploying land mobiles in government-owned land. One of the concepts is to build a series of shelters and move them around between the shelters. Another concept is to have pools of water of which you would haul them in and out of. Water makes a very good protection against blast. And there are other such concepts being discussed. But he never had any chance to really present this to the President, so the land-mobile issue is sort of shunted aside. I believe as I've noted previously, the Soviets have proposed banning air mobiles, ICBMs, and we've not reacted to that except to say that we feel that land mobiles and air mobiles are related to each other and must be considered together.

The Soviets are really waiting for a reply from us on this. We may come out that they don't have to be considered together. Our position may be that we will be willing to ban air mobiles because of their expense but want to keep open the option for the land mobiles. One of the arguments against land mobiles is the difficulty of verifying how many are deployed on the Soviet side, but there are those who feel that this is manageable, that the margin of error is not all that important, and if the Soviets would stand down some of their large and heavy throw weight ICBMs in favor of glider land mobiles, why, this would be desirable. And in any

event, the theory is that land mobiles are much more invulnerable than fixed ICBMs, and the theory of course is invulnerability of forces on both sides contributes to stability.

Well, back to the NSC meeting. At the meeting, to the surprise of everybody, Jim Schlesinger presented a proposal for having a sublimit on the number of Backfire bombers, say, two to three hundred, in return for which we would deploy two to three hundred sea-launched cruise missiles--SLCMs of between 300 and 1500 kilometers range. It's very strange numbering, but he had some rationale behind it. And he had other ideas, including that in exchange for this, the Soviets would agree not to again bring up the subject of Forward Based Systems. Of course, this is utter nonsense because the Soviets are going to bring up what they want when they want to, and you can't prevent them from bringing it up, but we can refuse to talk about it as we've done, but they certainly are going to bring it up. In any event, this showed some flexibility on Schlesinger's part. I haven't gone into all the details. It was a tremendously complicated proposal and very difficult for us even at the table to understand, much less to try to get it across to Gromyko and in turn for Gromyko to get it across to the Polit Bureau. See, all this was is anticipation of the President meeting Gromyko the following day, that is on Thursday--the NSC meeting was taking place on Wednesday. Then Kissinger was seeing him again on Friday and then would be seeing him at New York, so it was a question of what was going to be said to Gromyko, not that Gromyko could make any decisions, but rather for him to take the message back with him to Moscow.

Well, it was all very, very welcome that Schlesinger was off his hard line that if we simply insisted that the Soviets must count the Backfire in the 2400, why they would eventually do so. I believe, as I've previously said in this tape, that also is about as nonnegotiable a matter as you could possibly get because this would require the Soviets to stand down some two, three hundred, or whatever number of Backfire they were producing, to stand down SLBMs and ICBMs in order to make way for the Backfire, and it's quite clear that they are not about to do anything of that kind. However, it did show some effort to find the middle ground. Kissinger seized on it and there was some discussion, and it was agreed that Schlesinger and Kissinger would get together and see if they could work out a proposition that could be put to Gromyko, for Gromyko to take back with him.

During all of this, George Brown, who's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, sat there without saying anything. My presumption was, and I think the presumption of those at the table was that he was not objecting at least to what Schlesinger was putting forward. Well, later I learned that the Chiefs had heard nothing about this, and they tried very hard to develop a reclama on the whole thing to the President after it had been put up at the NSC, and so there was considerable feeling between the Chiefs and Schlesinger.

Then, to cap it off, Schlesinger and Kissinger did get together for breakfast on Friday to discuss what they were going to put to Gromyko. I thought when we left the NSC that nothing was going to be put to Gromyko until the President returned from his trip West on Monday. However, apparently Kissinger did not wait for that. Well that's another story--well, I shouldn't

say another story. Kissinger did put together a proposition. He showed it to me on Friday evening after he had talked with Gromyko, and indicated that he was going to put it to Gromyko the following Monday, I guess it was, in New York.

Well, it turned out that Schlesinger felt that what Kissinger put to Gromyko was not what he and Kissinger had discussed, and Kissinger had left out many of the caveats that Schlesinger had attached to the proposition. Thus feelings were running high between Schlesinger and Kissinger, and between the Chiefs and Kissinger and Schlesinger, and it's all in great confusion, and it's a great, great tragedy that this is happening right at this particular time at home because we're now coming down to the point that in the next few weeks, decisions really have to be made as to whether we're going to get a SALT agreement or not, and to have the town divided as it is is very, very unfortunate. I don't see how the President can really come down on any decision when he's got so many different forces to contend with. All of these forces have their own supporters on the Hill, and when this gets to the Hill, it's going to be very, very difficult to get support for whatever proposition he puts forward. In any event, a proposition of this kind was put to Gromyko. Gromyko has taken it back to Moscow, and we're now waiting on a reply.

I talked to Kissinger after his meeting on Friday evening with Gromyko, and at that time Gromyko was still giving him a very hard line, as he said, almost identical with what I was getting from Semenov here in Geneva. But that's about all Gromyko can do, of course, because he has little confidence and no authority in this field.

Well, I left Washington on Saturday morning and went to Tokyo, arriving there, of course with the day change, Sunday evening. I think I had said that this all came about because when I was out there in June to Sato's funeral, representing the President, I had said to Togo who was then the Foreign Vice-Minister, that if after one of my briefings of NAC and the North Atlantic Council, they would desire me to do the same thing in Tokyo, I'd be pleased to do it because our principle was to treat Japan and the North Atlantic Council on the same basis so far as it was possible. They later sent me a message saying that they would very much welcome this. Well, when this quick trip came up to go home, I felt that I was obliged to make the offer to the Japanese because I had briefed the North Atlantic Council, but I told them I'd only have the one day, Monday, September 22, if they wanted me to do it. Well, they said they wanted me to do it. So I flew from Washington via San Francisco, took the non-stop Pan Am to Tokyo Sunday. Monday I met with Japan's Self-Defense Agency people.

Well, first I should say, the Foreign Office people had a luncheon for myself and the Self-Defense Agency people at which we had a good discussion, and then afterwards I met with the Self-Defense Agency people. They have a new Vice-Minister that's very impressive--Kubo. Very glad to see the Defense Agency obtaining greater confidence than they've had in the past. And then subsequent to that, I met with the Foreign Office people, the Vice-Minister and so on, and had a long session with them. And that night I went out to dinner. The Public Affairs Counselor at the Embassy was having a dinner for some visitors, and I went out to that.

Then the next morning I took the JAL plane flight from Tokyo to Paris, via Moscow, and then from Paris back here to Geneva. I left Tokyo at 11:00 in the morning and got here about 6:30 in the evening. It's a non-stop flight from Tokyo to Moscow. I found it very, very tiring. The first time I'd ever been across the Soviet Union, and naturally I didn't see much. I saw the Moscow airport. Some of the Foreign Office--Soviet Foreign Office people were down to meet me, although I had not told them my plans or asked for anything, but they were down to meet me and took me to the VIP room which it was very courteous of them to do.

So I got back here on Tuesday evening after having left the previous Friday, going around the world. It was pretty strenuous for me, but I came through it all right. Your grandmother stayed behind in Washington so as to attend the dinner by the Emperor and the Empress which was this last Friday. I understand that she and Bob Murphy went together to the dinner. She's coming back with Senko-San, leaving on Monday, coming in here this next Tuesday morning. It will be good to have them back.

Well, I think this is about all for now. I'll sign off. This is Sunday, October 5, 1975, U. Alexis Johnson speaking. Over and out.

This is Sunday, November 16. Since my last recording on October 5, over a month ago, very little of major substance has happened here with respect to my negotiations with the Soviets. We have been working away at the joint draft text of the agreement. We have succeeded during the past six weeks in resolving a considerable number of problems, and we now have a joint draft text or are rapidly completing it. In my mind, a joint draft text that I think is in very good shape. It's removed a lot

of ambiguities and adds things that were not in the Interim Agreement. We've got such things as rapid reload prohibited, systems based on the sea bed, systems in orbit or partial orbit; we have definitions, we're working on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, these things, MIRVs, these things are coming along very well.

In fact, I'm just marking time. We're having only one plenary meeting a week and then two drafting group meetings a week. I'm not pushing any of it because, until the issues on cruise missiles and Backfire bomber as well as land and air mobiles are settled, there's not much point in trying to push ahead too fast and have nothing left to do here during that period. Wouldn't be good politically for us to have to recess because we had nothing to do, and going along slowly enables us to I think do a better job. However, it's tough on morale. People don't have enough to do, including myself. I don't have much to do now, and I'd be much happier if I had more to do.

However, in the other theater, you might say, in the other stage, very considerable has happened and it's all been bad and negative. First, the Soviets have responded to the proposition that we made to them September 21 which in shorthand terms, I think I mentioned in here, was what I discussed when I was back in September, and at that time I said it didn't seem to me to offer much promise, and was too complicated for anybody, including the Soviets, to understand. Nevertheless, it was offered. It was primarily a proposition of Jim Schlesinger and Fred Ikle, although Fred I don't think takes very much pride in his authorship of his portion of it at this time. The proposition primarily was that we would limit our bombers equipped with ALCMs--that's air launched cruise missiles having

a range of up to 2500 kilometers, or say between 600 and 2500 kilometers. We would limit the number of our bombers equipped with ALCMs to three hundred, and we would ban ALCMs above 2500 kilometers. The other portion of the offer was the so-called Hybrid-Systems offer. We would agree to limit our FB1-11s, our total of FB1-11s, and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of up to two thousand kilometers--I should say both these ALCMs and sea-launched cruise missiles, that is SLCMs, were nuclear warheads. We would limit them to three hundred if in turn the Soviets would limit their Backfire and SLCMs to three hundred. Well, the Soviets have turned this down flat now and say that this is not any proposal for limiting armaments but for increasing them --it's not entirely true of course--and it's completely illogical to limit things, for us to try to limit things which need not be limited, that is what they call their medium bomber Backfire, and not limit cruise missiles. I should say our proposition on cruise missiles also left conventional war-headed cruise missiles and so-called RPVs--remotely piloted vehicles, completely uncontrolled, and it's virtually impossible to tell the difference between nuclear war--well, it <u>is</u> impossible to tell the difference between a nuclear war-headed cruise missile and one that's not, and so in effect, it left the whole cruise missile thing open.

The Soviets have turned it down flat. They have given us no counter offer, and things are now at an impasse. During the course of this, last weekend, there occurred the so-called Sunday Afternoon Massacre, in which Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, Colby, Director of the CIA, were dismissed and Henry Kissinger was removed from his job as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Don Rumsfeld was given the Defense

job, and George Bush, the CIA job. Along with this, Elliot Richardson is given the Secretary of Commerce job, and Brent Scowcroft is given the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs job at the NSC.

Well, this is going to make it even more difficult to get a SALT agreement because Secretary Schlesinger's been looked upon as fairly hard line, but a fairly reasonable man, and if he had remained in office and the President had overruled him on a position or he had been brought around to support a position, why the conservatives, or the hawks, whatever you want to call them on the Hill, could have been brought along as Schlesinger was being brought along. However, with Schlesinger out, now everybody's going to look with a much more jaundiced eye at any agreement with the Soviet Union, and this is going to make it even more difficult to get an agreement. So at the present moment, I'm very pessimistic at the possibility of getting an agreement between now and the end of 1976 when we have our elections, and it's very regrettable. Technically it's not too bad because the Interim Agreement will remain in effect until October 1977. My own thought is in order to prevent just a complete collapse, that what we might do is simply put SALT in hibernation so to speak, during 1976, and we could do this by initialling what we have thus far achieved as far as an agreement is concerned, and agreeing to put off a cruise missile, Backfire negotiation until the beginning of 1977 when a new administration comes in. I think this is probably going to be the most practical thing to do.

President Ford has lost a great deal of prestige in this country as a result of what's been looked upon, and I think properly so, as an

ill-timed and not very well thought out political move. In fact the politics of it seems to be bad--oh, I should have mentioned that during the course of the weekend also Nelson Rockefeller announced that he would not run for the Vice-Presidency, so a lot's gone on. And I know Don Rumsfeld fairly well--he was in NATO, and he's a good man, but that has very little to do with it. He's simply going to be a lame duck and up against some very, very tough problems.

George Bush who was formerly chairman of the Republican National Committee, is being very heavily criticized as the Director of the CIA. I know him somewhat. He was up at the UN. He's now in China. He's primarily a politician. That doesn't mean he isn't an able person, but the concept of putting a person who's primarily a politician in charge of CIA is not being very well received. CIA hearings both in the Senate and the House are still going on. We still have this masochistic self-destructive movement, apparently, to destroy ourselves, and destroy our intelligence organization in both places. Both Church in the Senate and Pike in the House are trying to squeeze every bit of publicity that they can out of it without regard for the consequences. It's a pretty childish performance on the whole, pretty discouraging performance.

Well, this is all for now, I think. I hope maybe I can get the delegation home for Thanksgiving. I'm working at that, but I'm now quite sure. In any event, I'm certainly going to take a recess at Christmas and get home for a while even though we may have to come back here in January, but as far as SALT is concerned, it looks like it's coming down to an end, at this time at least. When it resumes, I certainly will not be involved in it. Over and out.

This is Sunday, December 7. Since my last tape, things have changed considerably. I spoke in my last tape of trying to get the delegation home for Thanksgiving. I thought I had this all arranged. I got approval from Washington to do it. I had asked General Rowny whether he thought he could set up a plane, and he said he thought he could. So when I got approval, I had him check on the plane and he said a plane was available over in Frankfurt and we could leave the next day. So I went right over to see Minister Semenov and told him I planned to take a recess. He was not at all happy about it, but he really had no choice but to accept. And then it turned out that the plane wasn't there, that the plane wasn't available, but I'd already told him that I was taking the recess. We had already made a public announcement on it, so I had no choice but to leave. So I left on Friday the 21st, I guess it was, November 21st, I left by commercial plane with your grandmother and arrived back in Washington. I had no great enthusiasm for going, myself, but I painted myself into a corner on it.

Well, it turned out to be very, very fortunate. I turned out to be back there for a very good, very active week. First Don Rumsfeld has just been sworn in as Secretary of Defense, and I had a chance to talk with him at very considerable length about SALT. He was obviously involving himself deeply, and studying it. Then we arranged, we had two verification panel meetings which in spite of the changes in the government, Henry continued to chair. One of them was on Wednesday, November 26, and the other one was on Friday, November 28. Both of them were very good meetings, and Rumsfeld showed a flexible approach to the problem, and it seemed to me that the Chiefs in the person of George Brown, were showing a flexible approach, to

find some way of taking account of the Backfire, but still getting off the business of trying to count it, insist that it be counted in the 2400, and also taking a reasonable approach, I would say, on cruise missiles. As a matter of fact, to me the sensible thing on cruise missiles would be to ban all of them--both nuclear and conventional, say above six hundred kilometers, ban all testing. It's the only thing that's verifiable, and over the long run, I think we stand more to gain from it. There's a great feeling that we're ahead now and that technology and cruise missiles can be very helpful to us in bomber penetration, and the Navy has wild ideas of using cruise missiles on ships and submarines as strategic weapons, but my feeling is that, of course the Soviets will also have to compete with us on it and we'll open up a whole new area of competition. However, if we were to, as the opponents would say, concede to the Soviets on the Backfire, that is not count it in the 2400, and also on the cruise missiles, why, I don't think it would be manageable. Incidentally, it's interesting that the Soviets of course have not sought to ban land-based cruise missiles below the intercontinental range.

Well, the meetings were very good, and there seemed to be a general consensus emerging around getting something in the way of assurances from the Soviets on the Backfire, in connection with a noncircumvention clause, perhaps, and getting agreement from them on the 2000--2500 kilometer range for air-launched cruise missiles, but keeping other missiles, well, I guess probably at about the same range as for sea-launched cruise missiles, but not going over that, and including conventional as well as nuclear,

because it's impossible to tell the difference between them. So it looked like something like a consensus was emerging around that. It was left that a working group would work up a paper on this to send to Henry and the President in Peking, so they could consider it on their way back and then Henry and Don Rumsfeld are to get together in Brussels this next week, and then Henry will make a trip to Moscow on December 18 and 19 to see what kind of a proposition that can be worked out. As far as the timing on it is concerned, the Soviets are no longer pressing for getting this decided before the Party Congress at the end of February. The President seems relaxed carrying it over into the new year. Therefore it looks as if--if Henry is able to get anyplace with Brezhnev in Moscow in December--we may have a very, very active period during January and February. The difficulty still is that General Rowny tells me that after I left the Joint Chiefs of Staff are still taking a very rigid position on including Backfire in the 2400 aggregate. Of course, this means no agreement, but I don't think they're going to be able to maintain this position, but it will give a lot of ammunition to the opponents of the SALT agreement. So we have some difficulties ahead, but it looks like I'm probably going to have considerable work to do so I'll be staying on for the time being.

I might mention that while I was home, Henry asked me if I would be interested in going as ambassador to Peking. I said I didn't feel your grandmother's health was up to it. In any event, I'm not terribly enthusiastic about it because there's not much to be done there. I would really rather stick with SALT, so that way the matter's left this way.

I think, when I go back, I'll tell him that I think we can probably handle the health problem. If they still want me, why, I'd be willing to go. It would be interesting for a time, interesting to see it, but from the standpoint of the work to be done there, there isn't much to be done. So from that standpoint it doesn't interest me very much.

Well, I came back on Sunday, November 30. General Rowny and Ralph Earle who'd gone over came back with me,and your grandmother stayed on in Washington. I hope to return to Washington for a Christmas recess beginning December 18. I have proposed a recess to him beginning that date, suggesting that we resume our meetings on January 12. I am still awaiting a reply from him on that, so I don't know quite what will happen, but I'm certainly going to get home for some period at Christmas and New Years.

Well, this is all for now. Over and out.

This is Wednesday, December 17. Listening to the last part of that tape about the possibility of going to Peking, I perhaps should say that in order not to be misunderstood, it's not that there isn't an enormous amount to be done in terms of relationships between ourselves and the mainland Chinese, but under present circumstances, particularly with the Secretary of State that we have, the way he plays things closely to his chest, there isn't very much for an ambassador in Peking to do, and most of the business gets done through the Chinese liaisonmission in Washington, and my guess is that that will continue. And as far as getting a feel and reporting what's happening in the country, the diplomats there are extremely limited in their ability to travel, extremely limited in seeing people--they see people

only on the most formal occasions, and for these reasons, I don't think there's much to be done there.

Well, I spoke about a recess. The Soviets agreed to a recess, and we're beginning a recess tomorrow. I have a plane coming in today, and we'll all be going home tomorrow, and it's scheduled from tomorrow until January 12. However, with Henry now having postponed his trip from December 18th and 19th as originally scheduled, until after the middle of January, I don't know whether it's going to be worthwhile our coming back here on January 12. That will have to remain to be seen. His problem is of course getting a position that the U.S. can put forward. As I was saying to General Rowny today--we were talking about this Backfire issue and we were talking about the so-called bomber variant issue, that is their Bison bombers, things like this that we put forward as bargaining chips--I don't like that word, but let's say to strengthen our bargaining position and be able to use, take on a life of their own and people say that you can't give them up, and then they become matters of principle. This has certainly been the case with both the Backfire issue and the cruise missile issue as well as the bomber variant issue. Obviously the Soviets thought that we were going to agree that they had about 140 heavy bombers and this should be counted against their aggregate. In fact, this is the number that we've used and published over the years as being the number of their heavy bombers. Now we come along and want to add 100 to 120 so-called variants, that is tankers. We have a good case for saying that they can be quickly converted to bombers and should be counted, and add 350 or 400 or whatever number of Backfires they're going to have by 1985, and they feel that they've been had, that this wasn't

the understanding on which they entered into the 2400 figure, and I think that's right, so we've got some rough days ahead of us on this, and I don't know what kind of position we can get that will be reasonably negotiable. I'm as willing as anybody to take a tough stand on things that we should take tough stands on, but these I think are very, very doubtful positions. Jim Schlesinger was prepared back last January to accept some assurances as far as Backfires were concerned that they wouldn't furnish them with tankers and that they wouldn't put them at Forward Bases and things of this kind that would give us some assurance.

The idea that a Backfire is going to fly from the Soviet Union on a straight line through the United States at high altitude the whole way and drop its bombs on some target with fifteen or twenty minutes of fuel left to land in Cuba to me is still absurd. In theory it's possible, but it's not a realistic prospect. And I think it's not a national security problem but rather a political problem that we've helped build for ourselves.

Monday I went over to SHAPE headquarters over in Belgium. General [Joseph M.] Heiser stopped by for me and took me over to SHAPE and I met there with General Haig, who is now the Supreme Commander, of course, a fellow I've known a long time, and General Heiser to simply talk about SALT. I told General Haig that if he wanted to get a position in on cruise missiles, now is the time to do it because the die is going to be cast fairly soon. General Heiser certainly is no enthusiast about cruise missiles of any kind. He thinks it's a lot of nonsense, but obviously many of his colleagues don't agree with him.

Well, I don't know anything else. I had a plenary meeting today at

which we sort of wrapped up a few things. I'm having a private meeting with him tomorrow before I leave. We talked about one silly little thing that came up today, well it came up yesterday in the drafting group about translating a Soviet phrase. They agree that our translation of it is proper, but they don't mean it that way, so they want us to put it down the way they mean it and I said, "You know we can't do that. We'll put it down the way it says. If you want to put a footnote on saying that this is what you mean, you're of course entirely entitled to do that." Well, we'll see tomorrow whether or not he still hangs on this, hangs tight on this. If he does, it simply means that we won't have an agreed joint draft text, but that's not too serious a matter.

Well, I'm looking forward to getting home. The weather has been cold and rainy here--Geneva at its worst, and I'm looking forward to a little California and seeing all you grandchildren as well as my two daughters and my son and my two sons-in-law, and my daughter-in-law. It's going to be good to get away from here for a little while.

Well, I'll close this off at this point. Over and out.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 29

This is U. Alexis Johnson; my first recording of 1976. It is Sunday, January 18. I am here back in Washington. We left Geneva for a Christmas/New Years break on December 18. I had a meeting in the morning with the Soviets at which nothing substantial took place, and we left that afternoon by Air Force plane and came directly back to Washington.

On December 18--I don't have my calendar here, it doesn't show my dates. At any event--oh, that was a Thursday, that's right, and on Monday, the following Monday, we flew out to California to spend the Christmas and New Years holidays out there. We spent two weeks there, spending part of the time staying with Bill, Toni, and Tiffany over in La Canada, part of the time with Jennifer, Patty, and Lee in Santa Monica, and the remainder of the time with Judy and Mace and you three boys in Santa Monica also.

After the fog and the cold and the rain of Geneva, I was looking forward to really having some sunshine, and I must say, we were not disappointed. It was beautiful all the time that we were there.

While we were there, we had a lot of fun. I took you kids out to various things, down to Disneyland. I took Craig down to the music Center, and we had a nice dinner down there. And Bill and Toni and Craig and I drove down to San Diego and saw the San Diego Zoo. And in general, we kept ourselves well occupied.

We returned on Monday, January 5--that's right, yes. When I left Geneva, it was agreed that we would resume our meetings there on Monday, January 12. While I was out in California, Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, telephoned and said the Soviets wanted to postpone the resumption of the

meetings until January 27 or 28, in view of the postponement of Secretary Kissinger's trip to Moscow. I'll come back to the business side of this. And I agreed.

Continuing the personal side, your grandmother's condition seemed to worsen during the Christmas holiday period out there, so when we came back, we saw her doctor here, Doctor Mella, [illegible], who decided to change her treatment to a new drug that she thought might be of help to her, but this turned out to be almost a catastrophe. She almost immediately became completely helpless, and on Monday--last Monday it was, Monday, January 12, I had to take her to the hospital and took her to Fairfax hospital where Dr. Mella practices. She continued this new drug there for some days, and this last Thursday, finally decided that this was not working at all. Your grandmother became disoriented as far as time is concerned and became utterly helpless. So last Thursday evening, she changed back to the old drug with a little addition, and she's shown a remarkable improvement in this time. She's a long ways from where she was when she came back here at the end of November, but she's certainly much better than she was a couple weeks ago, and I hope that she's going to be able to come home inside of the next few days.

Well, now, to business. As I mentioned, one of the proposals was that Kissinger would go to Moscow during December. When I came back here, we had a Verification Panel meeting and NSC meeting. We had an NSC meeting, let's see, I guess it was on Saturday before I went to California. It was quite clear that there was <u>wide</u> difference of views, particularly between Joint Chiefs and in part, Department of Defense and the rest of the community over the position that we should take with the Soviets. So it was decided

to postpone his visit until January, and we would in the meanwhile work at our positions.

As I've mentioned previously, the issue revolves primarily around the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Backfire bomber, the Soviet's Backfire bomber, be counted in the 2,400 aggregate of Soviet central systems. Everybody, that I know, believes that this is entirely impossible. I characterize it as a black and white issue, one that's clearly nonnegotiable as far as the Soviets, and as far as the issue is concerned, the Backfire, although it does have extreme range flown under. . . . maximum range for economy, for cruise, it could barely get from some of the northern Soviet bases across the United States and down to Cuba. It is, as Colby in the CIA said, most unlikely to be assigned into an intercontinental role. I did considerable work on this, looking up the background of it, and it was quite clear at the time of Vladivostok, the Backfire really hadn't emerged into much of an issue insofar as intelligence estimates had covered it and posture statements by the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff up to that had covered it. They had always said that <u>if</u> the Backfire were refueled, it could constitute a threat, a strategic threat, to the United States. But of course, it doesn't have a refueling fleet at the present time. But then it was recognized that if our case on this was based on being refueled, then we would be open to Soviet counterattack on our Forward BasedSystems because we have many, many aircraft which if refueled could constitute a strategic threat against the Soviet Union. Therefore, we switched to taking a position that we were not basing our case on its refueled capability but rather on its <u>un</u>refueled capability. That leads to

this extreme position that we've taken.

I went along with this at the time we were doing the debating on it. I really never thought that it was going to emerge into the issue that it has. I came in January '75 when I was preparing to come back to Geneva, discussing the whole SALT posture alone with Jim Schlesinger, who was then Secretary of Defense. He was quite relaxed about the Backfire. He said, you know, if we could get something to assure us that it won't be refueled or that it won't be stationed at these Arctic bases, and so on, that this is about all that we can expect and ask for. But then it gradually built up into, we gradually did such a good job of debating with the Soviets on it, one of these cases in which we convinced ourselves that a negotiating position we were taking for negotiating purposes becomes nonnegotiable on our side, and thus we find ourselves confronted with this situation.

On the cruise missile side, of course, we are seeking to obtain maximum flexibility for ourselves. Well, I missed the Verification Panel meeting that was held Monday. I was coming back from California.

But we had an NSC meeting. Let's see, the NSC was on Thursday, January 8. It started at four o'clock and ran till after 6:30--over two and a half hours. Frankly, one of the best NSC meetings I've ever attended. The President was heavily involved, asked lots of questions. Everybody had a chance to have their say, and it was thoroughly explored, explored the issues laid out for the President and the problems that he has. It's quite clear that the President had no enthusiasm for the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was that we should seek to get the Soviet's agreement to including Backfire in the 2400, and that

we should have some small restraints on our cruise missiles. This is the subject in which the Soviets are most interested. One of the most significant ones would be that we would count bombers carrying cruise missiles above six hundred kilometers as being MIRVed. But, in fact, very few restraints on cruise missiles, and those restraints would only be on nuclear armed cruise missiles. Conventionally armed cruise missiles would be completely unrestrained, and I think, as I've previously mentioned, it's entirely impossible to tell the difference between them, so it's really a position of no restraint on cruise missiles and very severe restraint on the Soviets on Backfire--obviously a nonnegotiable position. If we couldn't get that, then the Chiefs proposed we sign up what we've already obtained and defer the whole question of negotiation on Backfire and cruise missiles until at least next year. It's a very strange position going from one extreme to the other extreme because signing up now what we have, of course, means that the Backfire is <u>not</u> included in the 2400 aggregate, and why they think it could be included later on is still beyond me.

Henry said he would not go to Moscow with the position of this kind. And most of those at the table--might mention, at the end of the discussion including the Vice-President, Vice-President Rockefeller--are going with what we called Option Three which was the limitation on the number of Backfire, but outside of the 2400 aggregate, and also somewhat corresponding limitation on the number of our missiles, cruise missiles. Some extreme statements were made. Might say that the President opened the meeting by saying that he felt that this issue on SALT was the most important decision that he would be called upon to make during this present Administration, and

that he would need the support of everybody--and he underlined everybody--that was in the room for any decision that he did make.

General Brown made the statement that by 1985, the Backfire would have thirty or forty percent of the total equivalent megatonnage of the whole Soviet strategic force if you include the Backfire in the strategic force. He said that the Soviets could use their missile force to knock out our fixed land based missiles. Then they could clean up with the Backfire--quote, clean up, unquote, then still have a large missile force in reserve, although he wasn't able to answer the question:what would they do with the reserve, what was the point of having a reserve. The President noted that he had not been really informed about, nor had people raised the question of the Backfire, before he had gone to Vladivostock in 1973 and that he indicated that he was somewhat disturbed at this being raised at this late date.

As Kissinger pointed out, it's easy to come up with positions that are not negotiable, but it's harder to come up with positions that are negotiable. Well, let's see, I was going over my notes here. Oh, at one point, the President asked why, if the Backfire's so important, the Soviets are going to have it either in the agreement or outside of the agreement, if it's that important, he's surprised that the Joint Chiefs have not come up with any recommendation to do anything about air defense, about which we do not have, of course. Kissinger pointed out that under any of the options, including even the Chiefs' options, if the Chiefs' theories are correct, that we should have air defense. Brown said, of course, we should have some air defense. Rumsfeld said that the President

hadn't seen their new budget yet. I might say, throughout the discussion, Rumsfeld pretty much held his counsel, didn't indicate any particular view of his own. Brown based his case on the Backfire primarily on the difficulty of obtaining ratification on the Hill if the Backfire was not included. Frankly, I just can't [help] but come to the conclusion on all this that the Backfire is being used as a means of preventing a SALT agreement. In their heart of hearts, the military--and I don't say this as a discredit to them, maybe they're right--just feel that we shouldn't have a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. They would prefer an open--you might say, to leave the entire business open. They proceed somewhat on the assumption, I think, that under an open situation, they would be able to obtain the appropriations from the Congress. . . they would be able to greatly increase the appropriations from the Congress, and would be able to maintain the superiority--or what would be perceived as superiority over the Soviet Union. Many, I think including the President, are very skeptical that we could obtain that kind of money for a strategic program, and therefore that it's better to put a ceiling on the Soviet program, put a ceiling on our own, and that we are better off, both strategically and politically, with an agreement. Of course, a good agreement. And, of course, this is where the difference lies: what's a good agreement and what's a bad agreement. But in general, we're better off with an agreement than we would be without one. And that seems to me to be a sensible case, and I think that the proposals that we put forward for collateral constraints, might say, on the Backfire, and I think very importantly, restraints also on the cruise missiles because we may have a lead now, we do have some lead on cruise missiles, but over the

long period, the Soviets are also going to get cruise missiles, and to open up a whole new area of strategic competition here is not in our interests of the interests of anybody else.

Navy's become very interested in cruise missiles. I think that they talk about the larger Soviet fleet now, the necessity of standing off and being able to fire at Soviet vessels at long ranges, they're talking up to fifteen hundred miles, even. I've pointed out to them that it seems to me that we have more to lose on this than to gain because we're the ones that need to keep the sea lanes open, and the Soviet Union with the long-range cruise missile capability that can attack the merchant vessels that we need to maintain our supplies and supplies to our allies is not going to be in our interests.

Towards the end of the meeting, a really good discussion of it came up, and I was very glad to see it because the subject's generally been avoided. That is the whole question of the definition of a cruise missile that's to be included, and that is the question of whether or not we are only limiting nuclear armed cruise missiles or are we limiting conventionally armed as well; as I previously said, there's no way to tell the difference between them. And while verification of any cruise missile agreement is very difficult, it becomes an absurdity if conventionally armed cruise missiles are not also included.

Well, the way the matter was left, the President would consider what had been said, and what happened was that, well, at the meeting, George Brown said that the Chiefs could not support Option Three--Option Three is the option that I was talking about that most of the others were supporting. Chiefs could not support Option Three unless there had been a real try in

obtaining Option Four, thus implying that if there was a real try in obtaining Option Four, why, they could support Option Three. I pointed out, of course, that at Geneva, we have over this whole last year been pushing on Option Four, that is, including the Backfire in the 2400 and the President pointed out that he had taken a very hard tough line on this with Brezhnev at Helsinki, and he supported Option Four, and the question was what more was there to be done about Option Four. Nevertheless, they wanted another try at Option Four.

Obviously from a political standpoint, if Henry was instructed to do Option Four and failed to get it, then the Chiefs would always be in a position or the critics would always be in a position to say that he didn't push hard enough and if there'd been another negotiator or a better negotiator, why, he could have gotten Option Four; thus relieve themselves of responsibility on it. Nevertheless, that's the way it was left.

I got back to my office and talked to one of my contacts over at the Chiefs, and he said that Brown was under instructions from the Chiefs under no circumstances to support Option Three, and he had done so only on his own initiative. And they were writing a letter to the President to explain their position. They also subsequently claimed they cut down Rumsfeld to support this position. Well, a small meeting was held, I know, with the President and, well, no, let me put it this way. After an NSC meeting on another subject on--when was it, last Thursday I guess it was, the President announced his decision or said that he thought we ought to go for variation on Option Four which he set forth. And then there was a small meeting held between Rumsfeld, Brown, Kissinger, and the President in which, again, according to my information, Brown did not indicate quite

the strong opposition to Option Three that the other Chiefs had instructed him to support, so there was a little confusion. So the matter's now left that we have put-Henry's put-Option Four in effect, to the Soviets, but we're to have another NSC meeting tomorrow. Henry leaves tomorrow night for Moscow, and the meeting tomorrow's primarily to cover what fallback positions, if any, he's to take. I must say, going to Moscow only with Option Four looks to me like a pretty futile exercise, and I'm not very optimistic about what the future will bring forth. The matter's left that he will return here on Sunday the 25th. We're due to leave for Geneva on the 27th for a meeting on the 28th. I pointed out to him that if there are no results out of his Moscow meeting, it's pretty useless for us to go back to Geneva and play charades, because that's about all that there will be left for us to do. And the decision should be made in Moscow as to whether or not the meetings will be resumed in Geneva on the 28th or whether there will be a further deferment. Frankly, from a personal point of view, because of your grandmother, I hope that there will be some further deferment.

Well, that's all for now. Tomorrow or the next day, well, I will try to record what happens at the meeting tomorrow. Well, this is over, over and out. U. Alexis Johnson.

January 18, 1976. This is Friday, January 23. U. Alexis Johnson speaking. This has been a very active but not very productive week as far as SALT is concerned. There have been two NSC meetings, totalling about five or more hours, one on Monday, the 19th of January, and then one on Wednesday, the 21st of January, a trip by Henry Kissinger to Moscow and he's now on his way back. The Monday meeting was designed to

review with Kissinger before he left that night the instructions he'd have and the program that he'd undertake. It turned out to be a very confused meeting on which my own comment was, after it was over, I was glad that I was not Henry because I wasn't sure what I was authorized to do or not to do.

In accordance with the previous meetings, Henry said he planned to start from what we called Option Four and that is counting the Backfire in the 2400 aggregate as modified by the President so that only the Backfires built after October 3, 1977 would be included in the aggregate. And also that we would be prepared to drop our position on the 115 Bison and Bear variants, heavy bombers. This is, in effect, the position that he put to Dobrynin for transmittal prior to his trip. Then he said that he had no hopes that the Soviets would really accept this, but he would do his best and communicate to the President on what the results had been and seek further instructions. I'll come back to this later.

Then there was a long discussion by him of Option Three which verbalized that there would be an upper limit on Backfires, but they would not be included in the aggregate, and there would be an equal aggregate on surface ships entitled to have SLCMs -- that is, sea-launched cruise missiles only. And he thought that this would be a good position and if it was not successful, then he would think in terms of going to Option One which was a deferral. There was then a long and confused discussion. I might say that at the meeting, George Brown, Chairman of the Chiefs, Don Rumsfeld, and Bill Clements from Defense, Fred Ikle from ACDA, the Vice President, Bill Colby from the Agency, and myself. In the discussion of a deferral option, that is

just putting the whole thing off, stopping where we are, in effect, and putting it all off. Henry reported that Dobrynin had said that their deadline, the Soviet deadline, was Ford's term. That is, they wanted to have a new SALT agreement during the course of this term, and that they were not prepared to any option that would put it off to the next term or the next administration.

The Vice President said that he'd been talking to some scientists, obviously Edward Teller among them, and he was all enthusiastic for long-range cruise missiles, and he said that the scientists felt that with the growth of civil defense in the Soviet Union and their ability to destroy our land-based ballistic missiles that we were getting in a position of inferiority, and that the answer to this needed to be the long-range cruise missiles, that is, substituting intercontinental cruise missiles for ICBMs. I said to him that I just couldn't understand this. It took cruise missiles a long time to get to their targets. It seemed to me the answer to any vulnerability which we felt with respect to the fixed land-based ICBMs was in mobile ICBMs rather than in intercontinental cruise missiles. He had been briefed, apparently on the SIOP by General Dougherty at SAC their estimates now were that, with the Soviet military defense program, a maximum effort on our part would destroy only fourteen million people or only five percent of the population. It would destroy the cities, but the population would have been evacuated. Whereas a hundred and forty or a hundred and fifty million Americans would be destroyed by a Soviet attack. Frankly, I feel that the Vice President is a little naive in embracing all of this because obviously the ratios are not that bad.

And the idea that the Soviets would be able to completely evacuate all of their cities and care for the people in their countryside and then say to us, in effect, "Go ahead and destroy our cities and our industry because if you do so, we're going to be able to kill at lot more Americans that you kill Russians." It's just not rational, not the way people would behave.

There was some discussion of land-based missiles, medium range, that is, say, two thousand--twenty-five hundred kilometers, in Europe, and General Brown indicated some interest in that. Kissinger said that he favored the cruise missiles in Europe, they were clearly not a first-strike weapon. Brown said , in response to a question, that he hadn't looked at this.

In response to the Vice President, Colby said that the civil defense program of the Soviet Union is directed primarily at protecting their command structure rather than protecting their population, to which the Vice President replied that according to the briefing he had, their civil defense program involved, was handled by forty flag officers, as he called them, the forty thousand troops who were assigned solely to civil defense.

Clements said that he agreed that cruise missiles were fast-moving technology and that he agreed with Teller that this was a whole new frontier that we should keep open for ourselves.

Then there was a discussion of what kind of a ratio you would have between ships, surface ships carrying cruise missiles and Backfire. General Brown said that he felt that there ought to be some ratio to which Henry replied that, understandably, that he couldn't say, "We think there should

there should be some ratio, and this needs to be worked out." We ought to give them an idea of what kind of a ratio that we had in mind.

Henry pointed out that in September we had proposed to the Soviets a 275 ceiling on Backfires in return for which we would count 75 FB 111's and 200 sea-launched cruise missiles and 225 heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs. Rumsfeld said that he had never seen the September proposal. This is the first that he had heard of what it contained, and Brown indicated also that he was not familiar with it. Brown said that he felt that there shouldn't be any limit on the number of SLCMs on a ship to which the President said he felt we ought to offset the number of SLCMs to the Backfire. How many ships could we equip with SLCMs, towhich Rumsfeld said that he could not reply. Kissinger pointed out that there was no strategic doctrine for the use of SLCMs on surface vessels, and the Soviets were certainly not going to agree that there be three hundred ships in order to offset three hundred Backfires. The President suggested the possibility of fifty ships having a total of 750 launchers to offset the three hundred Backfires. Brown said that this would be entirely disproportionate, that you can't equate a launcher, a single cruise missile launcher with a Backfire bomber which carries eight bombs.

At this point it became clear that people were talking about launchers on ships rather than the number of missiles on ships, and talking virtually in effect, of an unlimited reload capability. Then there was long discussion of the whole verification problem, and President asked if you have ALCMs on heavy bombers. why do you need the SRAMS. To which Brown replied that it was too early to say that ALCMs would help the bomber penetrate.

What they could do would be to help the bomber coming behind to penetrate, but it would not help the bomber that was carrying the ALCMs. This was somewhat surprising and new to some of us, but I could see what he meant.

Then there was a discussion of the difference in ability to verify the difference between conventionally armed cruise missiles and nuclear armed cruise missiles. At this point, the Vice President came in again with his support of intercontinental cruise missiles, and obviously, the discussion was very, very confused. Kissinger was obviously very, very unhappy, and at one point here said that he was not going to be the fall guy, and he must have something besides Option Four which had previously been put to Dobrynin, and he couldn't simply talk about a ratio of ships to bombers, what were we in fact talking about. The President pointed out that Option Four was more restrictive than Option Three on SLCMs and Henry pointed out that the difference between Option Four and Option Three in one way of counting is only sixty-five Backfires, and the President said that it seemed to him that Option Four was less advantageous militarily than Three. Option Four, it should be clear, is what Defense and the Chiefs were supporting.

There was a mention of mobile ballistic missiles, and then Henry also pointed out that as far as the Vice President's position was concerned, if we kept to the ban on land-based cruise missiles above fifty-five hundred kilometers, we could within the limits up to fifty-five hundred do most of the technology for an intercontinental missile, cruise missile, if we thought that was a good idea.

The President asked the Chiefs to do some work and, in summarizing. . . and Kissinger wanted to note that the trip was at the Soviet request. If the

Soviets took Option Four, of course there would be no problem, but if they did not take it, he would need some alternative, and this would be required by Wednesday night, Moscow time, in order that Polit Bureau could consider it that night, and he could deal with Brezhnev on it the next day, on Thursday.He pled for some flexibility and latitude. If we're just simply going to stonewall the Soviets, he said, it would be better for him not to go, as it would probably be counterproductive. At which point, the President said that he felt that Kissinger should have flexibility, and the President said that he felt that it was important to have the best agreement that we could get, that he was not prepared to play politics with the issue, and he felt the political side of the question was secondary to getting a good agreement. Henry made some remarks about his resentment of the fact that all the criticism that had been made of SALT I, nobody, and he was looking at Defense and the Chiefs, was making any defense of that agreement, and that the mythology's growing up that it was a bad agreement, and he felt that someone other than himself should be defending it because everybody had supported it at the time.

Well, that was about the end of this meeting. If my account of it is confused, it's because the meeting is confused, and it was on this note that Henry left that night for Moscow.

I'll close this out at this point, and turn over this reel. Over and out.

This is side two, still January 23, 1976. U. Alexis Johnson.

The meeting on Wednesday evening, the 21st, was held as a result of a message from Henry which reported that, in effect, Brezhnev had turned down the Option Four that

had been put up to him, although he was attracted and would accept the idea of heavy bombers carrying ALCMs being counted in the 1320 MIRV total, against the 1320 MIRV total, and with a kink that B-52s would count as one but B-1s would count as three. And Brezhnev proposed that all land and sea cruise missiles above six hundred kilometers be banned. This was contrary to their previous position where they had not proposed any ban on land-based missiles below fifty-five hundred kilometers.

Henry said that he was going to go back, planned to go back with an idea of a 250 Backfire ceiling, twenty-five surface ships on our side with SLCMs he did not mention what he would do about ALCMs.

Well, as George Brown and Rumsfeld were in Europe for the nuclear planning group meeting, the meeting's attended for Defense by Clements and for the Chiefs by Jim Halloway, and Ed Rowny sat back of Jim. The meeting opened with Halloway saying to the consternation obviously and the great unhappiness of the President, and surprised everybody else in the room, that the Navy had no program whatsoever at this time for cruise missiles on surface ships. All the previous conversation up to now, of course, at other meetings had all been based on the assumption that the Navy had a program and was anxious to pursue it, and that the only possibility that he saw of getting any SLCMs on surface .. ships would be by the end of '82, and that we might be able to get two four-launch pods, that is, a total of eight launchers on our present nuclear-powered ships. And then, he said that the SLCMs that were being designed and developed at the present time could not go into the torpedo tubes of surface vessels. Up to now, of course, everybody had been assuming--all the studies and everything had been made, that torpedo

tubes on submarines and on surface vessels were, if not the same, that the same-sized missile could be accommodated But he said that the twenty-one inch diameter for the SLCMs , that were being developed was driven by the twenty-one inch diameter of submarine torpedo tubes, and that the torpedo tubes on surface ships were only thirteen inches. This came as an absolute surprise, as the President said.

And then there was the discussion of what could be done to maybe increase the number of surface vessels that would carry missiles. Clements said that he found it entirely unacceptable to try to balance off a few surface ships against several hundred Backfires, and Admiral Halloway pointed out also that we could of course take ships that were now being built and redesign them, particularly the Spruance class destroyers to accommodate SLCMs, but this would mean either taking off their guns or taking off their chopper pad and entirely changing their mission. And he also said that there could be no reload capability. But we could have SLCMs installed in our attack submarines somewhat as a strategic reserve, and this could be done in seventy submarines by 1982. Up to now, of course, both sides, both Soviets and ourselves had been talking in terms of banning long-range cruise missiles in submarines, so the Navy program was quite opposite and contrary to everything we'd been discussing and had been considering.

Then Admiral Halloway made a long attack on [what was] called Option Three, at the end of which the President said all the arguments he had made were just as applicable to Option Four with the JCS supporting it, and he didn't see how in the view of the argument he was making that Defense could propose

or support Option Four.

The whole thing broke up in considerable confusion with Clements taking a hard line against what Kissinger was proposing. There was not any discussion of ALCMs, that is, of how long-range cruise missiles and heavy bombers would balance off against the Backfire. I thought, why, I mentioned it on the side to General Scowcroft, I thought once of mentioning it, several times of mentioning it, but I expected that Defense or the Chiefs were going to bring up the importance of ALCMs to which they've given top priority previously, and which I think most people feel is the strongest case for a cruise missile. But ALCMs never even got mentioned throughout the course of the meeting. So it broke up upon this note. Nobody really pointed out that Kissinger's message in effect said that he was going to do that, he was going to make the proposal that he was mentioning at the meeting that evening at the Kremlin, so that I read the message that in fact, he had already done it. But I thought it the better part wisdom to not point that up.

The Vice President again made his usual pitch for unlimited range, intercontinental range, cruise missiles, but there wasn't much discussion of that. The President was obviously very upset, very unhappy, and after the meeting lasted about two hours, gave no indication of what he intended to do or what instructions he intended to send to Kissinger, and I do not know what he sent.

Today the press report that the meetings broke up with agreement only that there would be a definition of a heavy missile and there had been pretty much agreement on that previously. I don't know what the details

are. Then the newstickersare carrying accounts that the Soviets had made a counterproposal, a fairly startling one I don't quite understand, which proposed reducing the number of systems, strategic systems from the Vladivostok of 2400 down to 2150, and not counting the Backfire. I just don't quite see how all this works out. I called General Scowcroft at the White House to ask him whether or not he'd heard whether we were supposed to go back to Geneva, and he said he had no answer on that. He called Brussels and said that the agreement was that we would go back to Geneva to resume the meetings on January 28. I pointed out that I noted some of these tickers on these reports coming off Kissinger's plane as to the counterproposals the Soviets had made and so on,and Scowcroft professed not to have heard of this at all. Apparently they had received no reports on this, and appeared to be fairly ignorant as to, not well informed on what Henry had finally proposed even. So I can see a big misunderstanding, a lot of friction building up here, between Henry and the Department of Defense and the JCS, and the President being frustrated and I can see problems also here building up between the President and Henry. So I don't know quite where it will all come out. But I'm planning to leave Tuesday to go back to Geneva. I don't know what my instructions will be except to work out a heavy missile definition. This is pretty simple. We've already had one on the table for a long time, and the Soviets either accept it or not. There's not much to argue about. There're a few little details to be cleared up, but I don't know really where we go from here. I don't see that we can go anyplace very much, and I'm not very happy at the idea of playing charades over in Geneva for a time. . .for any extended period, however I will go back to see what

will happen. I hope tomorrow to get a fuller account from Bill Hyland on Henry's party, who's returning directly here, of what's gone on, and then on Monday to be able to talk to Henry and get some background, some guidance, as well as to the President. Well, we'll see what happens.

Over and out.

This is Saturday, January 24. I've heard no further word, and I've decided that rather than complete this tape by taking it to Geneva, I will leave it here. So this is the end of this tape, and I'll take a fresh tape with me to Geneva when I go there next Tuesday, the 27th.

Over and out.

This is U. Alexis Johnson. It is Sunday, February 8th, 1976, and I'm in Geneva, Switzerland.

I believe in my last tape which I left back in Washington, I reviewed the NSC meetings that we'd had on SALT matter up to and during the time that Kissinger was in Moscow. He returned from Moscow on Sunday, January 25th. And I had a debrief on Monday with Bill Hyland who had gone with him and I had also had a brief conversation with Henry as well as with Brent Scowcroft and I returned to Geneva on the following morning, that is, January 27. I had a private talk with Semenov on Wednesday afternoon. He arrived late Wednesday afternoon, the 28th. We had a plenary meeting on Friday the 30th. Then during this last week, we had a plenary meeting on Tuesday the 3rd; we had a private meeting on Thursday the 5th, and then we had a plenary meeting on Friday the 6th.

In brief, what had happened in Moscow was that the only thing upon which any agreement had been reached was that if we would agree to their defining the enlargement of silos, agree to a thirty-two percent increase in volume on the enlargement of silos, then they would agree with us that throw weight should be used in the definition of a heavy missile, so that we would use their term, "launching weight," and they would use our term "throw weight," so there would be "launching weight" or "throw weight." Whichever was the greater would define a heavy missile. That is, the difference between anything larger than the largest light missile, so called, at the date of signing of the treaty, that referred to the Soviet SS-19, would be called a heavy missile. This was of considerable value and very useful, I thought, because many people felt that throw weight was a better way of defining things. I might note I did a little research on this and, as far as I could find out, the term "throw weight" which became very important to many people in SALT II had never been used really by us in SALT I. The term "volume" was used there. As far as I could find out, we were the ones that went for the term "volume." But, nevertheless, "throw weight" had become important, we had laid great emphasis on it here; so agreement on that was important.

It was agreed that I would go back to Geneva and attempt to write treaty language that would cover this agreement. It was also agreed that I would seek to put a ceiling on heavy missiles, that is, that they wouldn't build anything with a throw weight or launch weight larger than their SS-18. And I introduced that.

We seem to be making fairly good progress on this, and I think that the next week or so, we will have treaty language on this drafted. There are a number of other peripheral items waiting for resolution,

but the big items--what you do about the Backfire and what you do about the cruise missile--were not decided at the Moscow meetings.

Henry came back with a proposition from the Soviets under which they said that if they received a, well first, they conceded to us that we could have twenty-five hundred kilometers, that is ALCMs, air-launched cruise missiles, of not over twenty-five hundred kilometers range mounted on heavy bombers. This was a big breakthrough, far different from their previous position on six hundred kilometers. We said that if they would count the Backfire, at least the Backfires manufactured after October, 1977, in the 2400 aggregate, we would agree that bombers carrying such ALCMs would be charged against the MIRV quota. They, however, stoutly resisted against having the Backfire counted. And Brezhnev made the statement that the maximum radius of the Backfire was 2200 kilometers at 10,000 meters altitude.

This is very difficult to understand because it's our view that it's much longer than that. However, if he's assuming a supersonic leg at some point in there, of course, it could bring it down to 2200 kilometers very easily.

Then they shifted their position on land-based missiles. Previously they had proposed and we had agreed to a ban on land-based cruise missiles above 5500 kilometers, that is, what we define as intercontinental range. And they said nothing about land-based missiles below that range. However, at Moscow, they proposed that all land-based missiles above six hundred kilometers be banned. I've not yet heard anything from Semenov here about that. And continued to propose that SLCMs, that is sea-launched cruise missiles, above six hundred kilometers should be banned on both

surface vessels and submarines.

But the major thing was that if we would agree to the cruise missile bans that they proposed, that they would agree to reductions in the aggregate, mentioning a figure of 2300 or even lower. This was very surprising.

Well, back home now, they are struggling with what reply to make to the Soviets on this proposition, and there's to be an NSC meeting this coming Thursday on the subject. My information is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Oepartment of Defense is proposing that we turn down any proposition that doesn't count the Backfire in the aggregate. I feel this would be a big mistake. I've always felt that it was nonnegotiable to begin with. I've never felt that it was really a genuine strategic issue, and I think if we could now get an agreement that would also include some reductions as well, it would be a major step ahead. On last Friday, I did up a message to the President giving him my views. As I told him, I tried to avoid being a fifth wheel in this proposition so as not to complicate his life, but I felt at this point that it was incumbent on me to let him know what I felt, at least, and so I sent him a message on the subject in which I laid out the premises on which I based my judgements, and my conclusions. I said that from the beginning of SALT II, three of our major announced objectives had been to have equal aggregates with no compensation to the Soviets for what they call Forward Based Systems,to have throw weight used as a measure of the limitation on missiles, on the growth of missiles, limitation on the size of missiles, and reductions below even the equal aggregates of 2400 that were agreed on at Vladivostok. With all three of these now attainable, I said that it seemed to me that an

agreement that would incorporate these elements would clearly be in our interests and would be defensible. I suggested that as the Soviets had not agreed, well, let me put it this way, that as our proposal for counting heavy bombers with ALCMs in the aggregate was based upon Soviet acceptance of counting some Backfires in the 2400 aggregate, I felt we would be justified in withdrawing the proposition that we count such heavy bombers in the MIRV aggregate, that is, the 1320 aggregate. I said that the only strategic role to cruise missiles that I could see was in penetration of bombers, our heavy bombers, against unconstrained Soviet defenses. As far as the sea-launched and land-launched cruise missiles were concerned, I felt that we should not think of them in strategic terms but rather in tactical terms, and by all means I did not feel that we should seek to develop a situation in which we, and then of course, subsequently the Soviets, would develop cruise missiles, land-based cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles, as a fourth arm in our present strategic triad. So they should be looked at solely from the standpoint of the tactical requirement. I thought that six hundred kilometers on sea-based, both for submarines and surface ships, made some sense, although I didn't know what the exact figures should be. As far as the land-based were concerned, I felt that they should be determined by the requirements of what I call the land battle, battle area, in Europe, and six hundred kilometers reaches all of the Warsaw Pact countries up to the border of the Soviet Union. It seemed to me sensible that this should be determined by the tactical requirements, and I felt that we ought to try to get reductions down to about twenty-two hundred. Well, these are the

views I passed on to him. I'm now waiting to see what happens. The program is that after the NSC meeting on Thursday, a message will be sent to the Soviets, giving our counterproposal, if you will, prior to Kissinger making another trip there to discuss it with them which I presume will be necessary, and then we'll arrive at decisions as to whether or not we're going to go ahead or whether we're going to postpone further negotiations, in one way or the other. I think we have a good opportunity now to get a good agreement here, and I hope that we can grasp it

Well, this is all for now. Over and out. This is U. Alexis Johnson. It's Sunday, February 8, 1976.

This is Sunday, April 25, 1976. Listening to my tape, I see my last recording was on Febrary 8, so there's been a long gap, but not much has happened during that gap.

First, the hope that I had on February 8th, that the President would feel himself able to reach a decision that would enable us really to move forward to get an agreement, was not realized. The Chiefs and the Department of Defense took a very strong position on the Backfire. Fred Ikle of the ACDA, Disarmament Agency, confused things by taking a position that cruise missile range limits were not verifiable. To a degree, it's true, but it certainly wasn't very helpful at the time. So Kissinger found himself in the position of being the sole proponent of what would be required of an agreement at this time. Of course, and this is too bad, because the substance of his position is good. It's not a bad position. It needs to be supported. The trouble is the way he's handled things, the secrecy with which he's

handled things, the suspicions and resentments which have been created, resulted in the fact that he is the only proponent of the policy on disarmament as well as other policies.

So a dusty reply went back to the Soviets, which they of course have turned down, and so the thing has now been at an impasse for the past few months. As far as our work here is concerned, we have been able to get some things done. We've got the agreement on silo dimensions, that is, that they shall not be enlarged more than 32 percent. This clears up an ambiguity that was in the Interim Agreement. We've got agreement in substance upon heavy missile definition. The only thing holding that up is that Department of Defense is still insisting that we talk about a non-heavy, versus heavy missile rather than light missiles versus heavy missiles. The Interim Agreement uses the term "light" and "light" was used at Moscow. There's a point that the SS-19, their new missile, is certainly not light in the sense of the term that was used in 1972, but it really doesn't make any difference. It was the term that was used, and I could get that provision or that article sewed up any time that I'm prepared to use "light" instead of "non-heavy". However, the subject was again brought up at the last Verification Panel meeting last week, and the Department of Defense again took a strong line against accepting "light." And also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to add a word that's superfluous, but would be nice to have, respectively. . . . . the term "respectively." I won't go into the details of it, but they wanted to add it, and between "respectively" and "non-heavy" and "light" any progress has been blocked on this. Not only on this, but on putting a ceiling on the heavy missile definition--on the size of the heavy missile. The Soviets have said they will not move ahead on that until the definition is agreed on the "light"

versus "heavy" missile. It's, you know, a bargaining position on their part. I'm not going to get them to move off of it. I have a little feeling that things like this, stands are taken at home by people who just don't want to see us move ahead on these things. Neither one of these issues, questions,have any substance whatsoever, but they do successfully block moving ahead.

We have been working on other definitions, definitions of MIRV. We've tabled our whole MIRV verification package, and I've got fairly good dialogue going on definition of an ICBM. The issue there is really whether we're going to talk about the capability of a launcher rather than the intent of a launcher. The intent in building a launcher to launch only an ICBM. It's not too important as far as the present ICBMs are concerned, but it could become of some importance if mobile land based missiles are permitted.

We've also been having a fairly good dialogue, to my surprise, on the MIRV verification. I thought the Soviets here would probably take the position they couldn't talk about that until the cruise missile issue was settled, but we've got some dialogue going on it. And we've made progress on the--not on the text of the agreement, nothing dramatic, but pretty slow and steady progress, so if and when decisions get made on the Backfire and the cruise missile issue, we have the text of a pretty carefully worked out agreement on which the decisions could be based. However, it doesn't look like those decisions are coming up any time soon.

With the campaign now in full swing at home, with Reagan attacking the President for being soft on the Communists, and the SALT agreement coming under more political attack, and not only from Reagan but also from Jackson, the President's obviously not in any position to now make

any decisions on this. However, if Reagan seems to be fading, and if the President gets the nomination, and if somebody other than Jackson gets the Democratic nomination, the President might feel in the position to move ahead.

In the meanwhile, I should say that I went back to New York and to Washington on April 1. Well, I was in New York on April 1. Some six, oh, eight months ago, the New York chapter of the Association of the U.S. Army said they wanted to have a banquet and give me their award for distinguished service. General Westmoreland urged this on me and I agreed, thinking that I would probably be back in the States at the time. However, it turned out of course, that I was back over here. But nevertheless, having committed myself and them having made a big thing out of it, I did go back and I gave them a speech, and they had a banquet at the St. Regis Hotel, and I gave them a speech, and they gave me the presentation, and it was all a very, very pleasant evening. I have a tape with the proceedings which I will keep with the rest of my tapes. It's General Westmoreland's presentation to me and my speech and all the things that went on that evening. They, in part, made the tape because your grandmother couldn't come and so they did the tape and I was able to play it for her when I got back here.

I went down to Washington for just a couple of days. I only saw Bill Hyland and Hel Sonnenfeldt, , Fred Ikle. I didn't see Kissinger. I was scheduled to see him, but on a Monday. I was there for Friday and Monday, only two days. Well, one and a half days really, and he had some big flap on, and he cancelled out not only mine but a lot of other appointments, but there really wasn't much I could do with him.

Now, I have got agreement. I go back for a three or four week recess

the latter part of May. There're more studies going on, and there's supposed to be an NSC meeting in May, and in any event, people here are a little weary and so am I, so I hope to go back the first part of May and come back here the first part of June. I put this proposition up to Semenov on Friday. As usual, he wanted to put all the responsibility on me for suggesting a recess, and he ostensibly grudgingly goes along because he feels we ought to continue to work. Actually, he's very, very happy to have me do it, and I can see that he is, but this is their usual style. I'm waiting on his reply now.

Well, I can't think of anything more at the moment. We had a heavy snow yesterday, Saturday the 24th, amazingly, but today it turned nicer, and I've been out to Evian and had a nice golf game with General Rowny out there. Well, this will be over and out for now. This is U. Alexis Johnson on Sunday, April 25, 1976.

This is Saturday, May 1, 1976 in Geneva. This has been a very unpleasant week, and I think that it will probably mark the beginning of the end of my identification or work with SALT. Many things have contributed to this, and I'm not going to quit in a huff or try to make a sensation out of it. In fact, I'll probably come back here until they can get a replacement, but the work has become more and more trivial. The recommendations that I made to Washington that would enable us to move ahead on those things in which we are interested, that is, the heavy missile definition, the Defense Department throws in language blocks on it that have no significance at all. Also, this is blocking us from working on the heavy missile cap, so we can make no progress on that. As far as definition of throw weight, which is involved in the heavy missile definition, we get more

and more technical about this. I'm not against being technical, but we do have a possibility, well, I think we could get an understanding which would be reasonable on the meaning of throw weight, but we insist on crossing every possible imaginable "i" and dotting every "t" to coin a phrase, that it's just awfully hard to put this across.

As far as the big picture's concerned, the way the political situation is going in the States, I don't see any chance of any real breakthrough. I assume that they will want to keep talks going here, both sides will to their own purpose. What's led to a souring on my part, in particular, is that with the agreement of Washington, I suggested a recess to the Soviets from the 5th of May until the 2nd of June. The Soviets agreed to this, and then through General Rowny, I made the usual request for a plane to carry the delegation back, and to my astonishment, the request was turned down, turned down flat by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bill Clements who I know holds no liking for me in any event, but I don't think it was taken out of purely personal spite. The request went directly to him, and we had a telephone conversation about it in which he said he was turning it down flat, and he sent me a letter in my office in Washington saying that in order to justify a plane, it had to be in the national interest and that commercial transportation was not available. I expressed some astonishment that the Department of Defense doesn't consider SALT talks in the national interest. As far as commercial transportation is concerned, there is no direct transportation to Washington, and I have all the classified material that the delegation needs to carry with us in order to be useful back there, and the only sensible way of transportation is by special military aircraft. The difference in cost is about, they figure it out, is between tourist

rates going commercial, and the plane, figuring in all costs, they throw in everything to make it sound as costly as possible, about two thousand dollars. Well, this is the first time for seven years, SALT delegations have had military planes. They brought us over here, and then, to change the rules in the middle of the game after having brought us over here, infuriated me. I had fairly strong words with Bill Clements over the phone on this. I then went to Brent Scowcroft and Bill Hyland in the White House and finally they were able to persuade Bill Clements to change his mind just for this one return trip. Well, this means if we're not to have military planes any longer, it means your grandmother's way will not be paid over here. I'm already putting out about eight hundred to nine hundred dollars each round trip out of my own pocket for the transportation of Senko-San, the maid, and I simply can't afford also to pay for your grandmother's travel as well, and I'm not going to work over here without her. So on this basis when I return, I'm going to say that I feel that it's time to make a change, and that I am willing to come back myself for whatever time it's necessary for them to bring about the change. Now, although I have no intent that this will happen, I feel quite certain when the other members of the delegation know what I'm doing, I think they also all are going to terminate as well. Many I have been holding on, simply asking them to stay on, in part as a favor to me, and they've been discontented and wanting to quit because they don't see enough work here, so I think they may quit too, so we may have a situation in which the whole delegation quits. I don't want to bring that about in any dramatic way, and want to try to handle it in a way that would do the least harm, but this is my thinking now.

In addition to the airplane, they've taken away my communicators. I'm going to have to close down the communications section, except for the secure phone. I started out with four communicators here, and now we're down to one. I've had no representation funds for the first half of this year. I've had no help. They promised me some help when I came over here, helping out on Senko-San's travel, but in two years I've had no help on that. So things are just, interest is dying out in SALT, I guess, things are just beginning to, to my mind, are running downhill.

This, as I say, has been a bad week. Perhaps when I get home, if they're anxious to have me and they want to change some of these rules and make it more attractive for me to stay, why, I'll be willing to consider it, but at present time, I think I'll do this. Your grandmother's not too happy here. It's really not anything material for her to do. She's the wife of a head of the SALT delegation, but she's not got the same position she would have if I were an ambassador at a post abroad, and it leaves her in sort of an anomalous position here. People are nice to her, it isn't that, but she would like to go home too. So I guess maybe we will. Perhaps I should have accepted the opportunity I think I mentioned that I was asked about going to Peking. Perhaps I should have done that, but perhaps it's also time for me to retire and try to find something else.

Well, this is the way it is Saturday, May 1, 1976 here in Geneva. Over and out.

This is Sunday, May 30, 1976, and I'm in Washington, D.C. My last talk was on May 1. I was feeling fairly well down in the mouth at that time about SALT in general, about my role in it as an individual. As it worked out, I finally did get a plane to bring the delegation back, and we left on Thursday, May 6, returning directly here to Washington.

Here in Washington, people were very preoccupied. The White House was preoccupied with the primary contest, particularly the primary contest in Michigan, was concerned about the number of contests that the President had lost to Reagan, and they were in a state of somewhat disorder and also some concern about that. I found that a project over in the Secretary of Defense's office, apparently Don Rumsfeld himself, to establish what he called a new group of negotiating experts to negotiate, I should say technical negotiating expert group's I suppose the proper name for it, to negotiate about Backfire and cruise missiles and also about data exchange, was still fairly lively over in Defense. I talked around town on this. I talked to Bill Hyland and Brent Scowcroft over in the White House, Hel Sonnenfeldt in State, Fred Ikle in ACDA, and made it clear that as far as I was concerned, if they went through with anything like this, I was finished, and I thought the rest of the delegation would be finished. Well, by this time now, the whole idea has faded. Apart from my own attitudes on it, it's just simply a bad idea, and I was certain that the Soviets wouldn't play on it, in any event. The idea that they would set aside their negotiating delegation and set up another negotiating delegation to negotiate in Geneva on some of these issues was entirely out of the question.

In this connection, I'd heard mention that Rumsfeld had in mind Bob Seamans--Dr. Seamans' director of ERDA and former Secretary of the Air Force--to head the delegation, this expert delegation. I fortunately saw Seamans at a party and we arranged to get together, and I went over to see him, and briefed him on SALT and told him what I knew about this proposition and he himself quickly saw the impracticability of it. I also talked to Harold Brown--Dr. Brown, and Seamans was going out to California in any event to give a speech at Cal-Tech, so he and Harold Brown talked about it. So I think I've got that project pretty well torpedoed; well, I know it's torpedoed, at least for the time being.

During most of the time I've been here, there's been little activity within SALT. Henry Kissinger's been away on a long trip through Europe, and the working group have been working away at the same old issues. One thing I did get, before Kissinger left on his trip, I got him to agree that I would propose to the Soviets that our session that resumed on June 2 would be a session that would last only sixty days, that is, until July 30. I told him that there was under the best of circumstances, not work for any longer period than that for the delegation. Even that would require some decisions back here in Washington, and that I felt that it would be good not to be in session during August, and leave the question open as to when we would resume after July 30. This, as I pointed out, would give complete flexibility to both sides to resume or not to resume whenever they desired, at the same time preserving the gains that we achieved up to now. He approved this and I put this to Moscow through Ambassador Dobrynin here. What I suggested was that when Semenov and I have our private meeting, to resume negotiations on June 2, at the end of that meeting we will announce that this--what we will call "summer session", unquote, of SALT will continue until July 30, and

I expect that they will approve. They really haven't much choice but to approve. Whether they approve the announcement or not remains to be seen. My point in making the announcement at this time was that this would not open, if we wait until shortly before July 30 to make the announcement, which would be about the time of the Democratic Convention, that it would be subject to misinterpretation, could be subject to an interpretation of a breakdown of SALT, and it would be better to make the announcement now rather than make it at that time. So I hope that they go along with this.

In the meantime, I have been trying to get a few things done here. I need some decisions here on some minor wording problems, and I hope to get those. I had a long talk yesterday with Henry Kissinger about SALT. He, of course, confirmed my own views that there's nothing possible in major decisions between now and the Republican Convention, but we both agreed that if the Democratic nominee is Carter or Humphrey, and the President is renominated in August, then it would be entirely feasible, possible, and in fact, good politics for the President to vigorously attack the SALT question between then and the election. Of course, this is going to require, Henry said, a Secretary of Defense that's willing to--quote--"take on" the Joint Chiefs.

At the present time, I'm very clear in my own mind that there are those over in the Pentagon--I'm not sure in the Chiefs', I think more likely in the Secretary of Defense's office--who are determined to sabotage SALT and do everything they can to prevent its success. I think they're doing this primarily by leaking various materials. I think this is a disgrace, myself. If they can't support the President on this, why, they should at least keep their mouths shut. The honorable thing to do would

be to resign, but at least they should keep their mouths shut for the time being.

There's not a question of getting a soft agreement versus a hard agreement. It's a question of whether there should be any agreement at all. I think that there should be. The President--I didn't see him this time, but those immediately around him said that he's more interested and concerned about getting a SALT agreement than almost anybody else in town, at the present time, and is determined to go ahead with it. So I'm going back this Tuesday. Your grandmother's staying here and then going out to California to visit you. I'll only be gone sixty days this time,so I'll get along by myself this time, and your grandmother will spend part of her time here and part of her time in California.

Well, this is about all for this time. What else should I say? Well, as you see, I'm sticking with SALT. It's quite clear that they want me to stick with it, and as long as there's any possibility of something being done, I would of course very much like to be in on it. So I guess I'm in on it at least until the elections, and then we'll see what happens then.

Well, I see I'm down to the end of this tape. I really ought to let this tape run down so that I can turn it over. Well, I'll sign off at this point then, and then we can turn in over to the other side for the next round. This is U. Alexis Johnson, May 30, 1976 in Washington, D.C. Oh,I might say, I had my regular physical examination. I'm still in pretty good shape except my blood pressure's a little bit high. I'm trying to cut down on salt to see whether or not that will help out. Well, this is over and out.

Tape Number Two of this tape. U. Alexis Johnson. Side Number Two.

I'm in Geneva, back in Geneva, Switzerland, and it's Wednesday, June 23. I came back here as scheduled on June 2, arriving here in the morning after an overnight commercial trip from Washington and via New York and Zurich. I had an informal meeting with Semenov that afternoon and then we agreed to have a members meeting the following day, that is, on the 3rd. Since that time, we've been very active. We've probably, I feel, been making more progress than we have in any similar time that I can think of in the past.

In the first place, I put to him my proposition for announcing at the beginning of our meetings that they would continue until July 30. This was the proposition I had transmitted through Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to him at Moscow before we came back. He was very unhappy with this, obviously. As usual does not want to take the responsibility for any recesses, but also was obviously unhappy at the idea of a recess at that particular time. He was very insistent on whether or not I could commit myself to resuming meetings in September, and I said whereas I knew that it was the desire of the President to continue these meetings and resume them just as quickly as possible, until the political conventions were over in the States, it seemed like a good time to recess, and it would be impossible for me to make any commitment as of this time. Well, he went back to Moscow that afternoon and came back to me again and finally agreed somewhat reluctantly, but didn't want to make any public announcement of it. So the situation at the moment is that we've not yet announced it, although it's confirmed that we will recess as of July 30. In fact, I want to go back July 29th, on Thursday the 29th, to have a meeting with the NAC at Brussels, and then go on to Washington that day because they want me to have a meeting with

the General Advisory Council on Friday the 30th, back in Washington.

I hope soon after I get back to get out to California. Your grandmother stayed home this time, and she's going to California the middle of next month to be there when Bill and Toni expect to have their baby. They're going to call it Alexis whether it's a boy or a girl, and obviously, I also would like to get out there.

As far as our progress here is concerned, I have been able to make one major breakthrough, and that is to get agreement on the definition of a heavy missile and the ceiling on the heavy missiles, and also agreement on the definition of throw weight. I think I mentioned previously, these have long been blocked by the insistence of the Department of Defense that we use the term "non-heavy" instead of "light" even though by so insisting, they were blocking agreement on the very thing that they had attached high importance to over the years.

I discussed this, of course, when I was home, and finally I got instructions saying that I was authorized to change non-heavy to light. I got this one day--I delayed a day in implementing it--it was a week ago from now that I had a long private meeting with Semenov and, at the beginning of that private meeting, I made the proposition that I would agree to the word "light" in the heavy missile definition if they would agree to, otherwise to the definition, as well as to the heavy missile ceiling and the "throw weight" definition. He promptly agreed to the conditions.

As soon as I got back to the office, almost as soon, I got a call from Bill Hyland at the NSC asking me whether I had implemented the instruction. He said that he was in deep trouble on it, and was very

concerned about it. Obviously Rumsfeld in the Defense Department was trying to protest it to the President. Rumsfeld was then in Africa. I was glad to be able to tell him that I had already implemented this because it was quite clear that he was going to tell me not to do so if I hadn't already done so. Well, I did implement it. The Soviets came through handsomely the next day with the text of the agreements that we had been seeking, and the whole thing has worked out very fine. It marked a considerable breakthrough.

On some of our other issues also, on our ICBM definition we're having a breakthrough, and on the whole complicated question of MIRV verification, we've finally got a dialogue going now. I've tabled all of our position. The Soviets in a long private meeting that I had last Thursday with them, gave me some language that they were suggesting which doesn't meet all our requirements but moves the things forward, and we're getting a real dialogue going on the subject.

If we can get the MIRV thing settled, and the verification thing settled, and we get the ICBM definition settled, I think we could quite promptly get the SLBM definition settled. It would complete, in large part, the text of the agreement on those things that can be completed, unless and until we get the decisions on what is going to be done with respect to the mobile missiles, both airborne and land based missiles, and with the Backfire bomber.

I still feel that the Chiefs and Defense are seeking ways to stall progress--is the only way I can say. I say this very reluctantly, but I think that, I've really come to the conclusion that they really don't want an agreement and are seeking to prevent even the progress that we just have achieved, and it is very clear from example on things like a definition

on the heavy missile issue, and I'm sure many of the same things are going to come up in the MIRV verification. Not that they might not have some kind of a point, but they seem to, any time that we get to the verge of progress, then the heels get dug in and any move on our part to get agreement, they always resist very strongly. So I have a quite unpleasant situation in that regard.

Well, I don't know that there's much more to be said at the present time on my talks. The weather here is very hot and I'm doing my own cooking. That has enabled me to keep away from salt. Tonight and the next couple of nights, I have to go out to dinner, but otherwise, I've been doing my own cooking and taking care of, and doing my own dishwashing, and in general going back to living alone, although I have a maid that comes in once a week and does some cleaning. I get good news from your grandmother in Washington. She seems to be well and getting along all right. Well, I think I'll shut this off here at this point. Over and out.

This is Saturday, July 24 in Geneva, Switzerland. Since my last recording on June 23, a number of things have happened. One of the most important and joyful ones was the arrival of Alexis Maria Cavanaugh Johnson, your cousin. She was born on, just after midnight of the Bastille Day, July 14. I got the word, Bill had called my secretary in Washington, and she in turn called here to my communicator, and he gave me the word when I came home in the evening from a party. I called Toni right away at the hospital and had a good talk with her. She seemed to be in good spirits and was planning to go home the next day. I must say I'm amazed at her. She's a great gal.

Your grandmother had gone out to California with Mrs. Kelsey just a few days before this, so she was in California when Alexis was born. I'm naturally flattered at having her named Alexis. However, I wonder though if she's going to really use the name, or whether she'll use Maria or what she'll do. Well, that'll be up to her.

Over the 4th of July, I went up to Berlin and had a most interesting time up there. I went up on Friday the 2nd of July and stayed with Scott and Dean George, our State Department man up there. Friday evening, the John Sherman Coopers invited me over to East Berlin to a reception July [4], an Independence Day reception they were having over there. They threw an enormous party for several hundred people with a big tent that they got from India, a sit down dinner. I met the East German foreign minister and some of the other party types over there. There still is sure a big contrast between East Berlin and West Berlin. It's not as great as it was, of course, but it's still very great.

The following day, on Saturday, the Georges, we drove all around Berlin. One thing that struck me was the fact that after CSCE conference in Helsinki and talk of detente and all this, they are building the wall--rebuilding the wall, in fact, building a new wall that's higher and stronger than the old wall. It sure is a commentary on their system. And I was struck by the fact, I hadn't quite realized that the wall went all the way around the city of West Berlin. Well we drove, had a good tour around West Berlin, and then that evening, Georges gave a reception for me to which the mayor came and all the brass of the Army and so on, and that was very, very enjoyable.

The following day, Sunday, was the big Fourth of July parade by the American Forces there, and they put on a very nice show. I was honored by

being the senior American present. Apparently, well, I was the senior American present, with Ambassador Hillenbrand in Bonn not being up there. I was seated next to the mayor and they put on a big show, and the West Germans, West Berliners really turned out en masse. Monday before I left, an Army pilot up there gave me a chopper tour of the city. We were going to go out for about forty-five minutes, an hour, turned out to be over two hours. He really knew his city well and made a very, very interesting time. Well, you could see the reconstruction on the wall, you could see the minefields, and the towers and the dogruns, and all the paraphernalia that it still takes for the East Germans to keep their people under control.

Well, as far as business is concerned, it's been discouraging. During the past week in particular, I have been trying to get ahead on the MIRV portions of the treaty, particularly the MIRV verification portions. The problem of course is how do you tell whether a launcher has a MIRV missile in it or not, and the only way we can tell is from the looks of the launcher, and associating that launcher with what we've seen MIRV missiles tested. The Soviets claim that our approach to this would result in counting launchers as MIRVs that in fact are not MIRVed, and that they will not put up with this. But I had some hopes for some time that they were moving toward us on this, and that perhaps we could find some common ground. However, during this past week, I've had long talks in which I've tried to tie Semenov down to what he actually means by their approach on this, and he always slips out from under me and refused in effect to give any answers.

Last Monday He brought General Trusov with him to the meeting, and I had Ralph Earle with me, and I really pushed at them, and finally

Trusov in effect said that they entirely reject anything along a type rule, that is we'll have to see a MIRV missile installed in each individual launcher before it can be counted as MIRVed. Well, this sets us way back from where I hoped that we were going, and it's going to make things very much more difficult because we're quite clearly far apart on this. Also, as far as the heavy missile definition, heavy missile cap is concerned, that's still held up by their unwillingness to agree to a little common understanding on a technical point in the throw weight definition. It's not a very important point, but it's something that should be taken care of, but they're flatly refusing to do so, so I'm not getting that.

I'm going back on Thursday, on Wednesday rather, the 30th of this month, this following Wednesday, we'll have a plenary meeting during the day and then I go over in the afternoon to Brussels to meet the North Atlantic Council in the morning and then go on back to the States that afternoon. I'll be going back commercial. There's another disappointment. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency agreed to pay the full cost of a military plane which would enable us to, as we have been doing in the past, to fly directly to Geneva to Washington, carrying all our classified material and so on with us. It makes it a lot easier. And I think I said that last time I was turned down on the plane by Deputy Secretary Clements because he said it would cost more than going commercial. Actually I got figures together that show that, carrying thirty people, we could actually save money by using a military plane. And then ACDA agreed to pick up the full cost of a military plane, including the cost even of transporting the military personnel and Department of Defense personnel on it, and also got the approval of the White House, General Scowcroft, to put forward the proposition.

This was put up to Defense. I couldn't see any reason why it wouldn't be approved because it doesn't cost them anything, in fact, it saves them money, but Bill Clements has a, obviously, a great dislike personally for me as well as for SALT, and he turned the thing down flat, saying under no circumstances would he commit any military plane to be used for the SALT delegation. It's very vindictive and nasty attitude on his part, but it's fairly typical of him. He is certainly the worst Deputy Secretary of Defense that we've ever had. It's typical of the way he handles other things also, and is typical of his attitude on SALT. He's obviously hostile to it. He's become enamoured of cruise missiles now, brags how he has persuaded the Navy and the Air Force to accept cruise missiles even though they didn't want them, and in general is taking a hostile attitude toward SALT as well as toward the SALT delegation. This makes it very, very unpleasant. It's not that I can't travel commercial, but it means that we have to fly through New York, lay over in New York, and then to Zurich and then down to Geneva, and do it all night rather than flying in the daytime as we could by military plane, and it's very, very tiring. It also means I have to pay, if your grandmother's going to come along, I have to pay the cost of her travel. So I don't know what I'll do about this. If it wasn't towards the end of the Administration and if I didn't think we might be able to do something in the fall, I think I would quit now, but I would like to see this thing through really if it's going to be possible.

We've agreed to reconvene on September 21 here. Of course that date is flexible. But I hope maybe we can make it and I hope that President Ford will make the decisions that will be necessary to move ahead on getting

an agreement. He's going to have to step on some toes to do it, but perhaps after the nomination he will be willing to do it. As far as Carter, incidentally of course, the big news has been that Jimmy Carter has been nominated as the Democratic nominee since my last tape. This was the middle of this month. And the signs indicate that he stands a strong chance of being elected. If Ford is nominated, or whether he's nominated or not, my own feeling is that he's going to make a strong try to get a SALT agreement before the election and in any event, before the end of his term in January of next year. And my own estimate is that I don't think that Carter will make a partisan issue out of this, and so I'm very much hoping that the President will make a strong drive on this, make those decisions it's going to take to get an agreement, because I think we can get an agreement that's worthwhile, and would be useful. We don't want to overstate the importance of it, but each little step forward in this field seems to me to be worthwhile and I think we have the opportunity of taking such a step if he feels that he can make the political decisions on the remaining issues, that is on Backfire and cruise missiles in particular, that will be required in order to get an agreement.

Backfire I've always said from the very beginning was nonnegotiable issue. The Soviets think they were had on this. They had no reason to think that when they agreed to the 2400 aggregate that we were going to charge them with more than 140 heavy bombers, because that's the figure we've always been using in our public statements, statements by the Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and so on. And if the Backfire is charged against the heavy bomber, it means that they're going to have to destroy ICBMs and SLBMs to make room for the Backfire, and they certainly aren't going to do that.

On the other hand, the cruise missile issue--there's more negotiating elbow room in this. I think it's largely a matter of deciding what we ourselves really want, and I think we'd have a reasonable chance of negotiating it with the Soviets. It tends to get talked about as if we're the only one who have cruise missiles or will have cruise missiles, and I keep urging the importance of recognizing that the Soviets will acquire them also. It's a complicated issue and it's not easy to know the answers. As I was saying to a group of newspapermen last night, of course there's schizophrenia even in the Services over the cruise missiles. Those who want to see the B-1 bomber built, well, let me put it this way: those who do not want to see the B-1 bomber built say that the way to keep the B-52 bombers alive is to mount long-range cruise missiles on them. Well, this is not very much favored of course by those who want to see the B-1 bomber built, so you've got a schizophrenia in the Air Force over whether we should go for long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles or not. And then the Navy, as far as the Navy side is concerned, there are those who say that long-range cruise missiles can take the place of airplanes operating from carriers. And of course, this isn't looked upon with very much enthusiasm by those who want to see the large carriers continue. So there's a schizophrenia there in the Navy as well. So there're lots of pros and cons on it.

One thing I'm clear on, the cruise missile is not much of a strategic weapon except possibly as a stand-off weapon on aircraft, but it's more a tactical weapon, but the problems of verifying any limitations on it, the problems of controlling it, are very great. It's a very, very tough

decision for the President to make.

Well, this will be all that I will record this time. I'll take this tape home with me when I go on Wednesday. There's going to be an NSC meeting Friday on SALT which I hope to attend. I'll be getting in Thursday night and then have the NSC meeting on Friday. Then the following week, that is, the first week of August, I hope to get out to California to see you all and see my new granddaughter, Alexis, as well as my wife, and have a little time off. I'm ready for it. These last few weeks, I really have been working hard, and I find it very, very frustrating trying to deal with the man I have to deal with here. Well, this is all for now. Over and out. This is Saturday, July 24, 1976 in Geneva. Over and out.

This is Sunday, September 19, 1976 in Washington, D.C. Tomorrow morning I leave for, to return to Geneva for my first meeting there on, a private meeting on Tuesday the 21st, and then I have a plenary on Wednesday, the 22nd. After the plenary on Wednesday, I'm going directly to Tokyo to represent the Department from Washington, dedicating the new chancery there, and then I'm coming back, probably on Saturday or Sunday, so at least I'm back in Geneva on Monday. So I have a lot of travelling during the past week.

To bring up to date on what's happened since July 24th recording that I've just listened to, the NSC meeting that I spoke about took place on Friday, July 30. There was a general review at that meeting, but nothing was decided. It was interesting that Kissinger took very little lead, took very little initiative at the meeting. Most of the initiative was with the President. It's quite clear that the center of gravity, so to speak, with respect to SALT, has passed from Henry to the President. I was hoping at

the meeting, given the President's interest, that he might feel it possible to--what I call--"bite the bullet," that is, make some of the tough decisions that he needs to make to get an agreement. Obviously the Soviets also have some tough decisions to make. But that he would be prepared to make those decisions after the Republican Convention if he was nominated.

Well, I went out to California in a fairly optimistic frame of mind. I saw my granddaughter and approved, and saw all the new children out there, including you, Brad. You were up in a camp, up in a Pentecostal camp up in the San Bernardino. I also talked with you about getting into Occidental. And we stayed with Jennifer and Lee. Patty was away back in Bangkok. Then we took a drive up to the Bay area and saw our friends up there, many of whom had had heart attacks. Al Zinkand and JohnEmmerson just had an operation on his heart. Dick Service had just had a heart attack. We went from one to the other, it seemed to me, but nevertheless we had a nice time. We saw Craig up there playing with the orchestra up there at Carmel. We came back to Los Angeles and then we came back here, let's see, what was it, been back about three weeks now, I guess it is. Yes, it was after the first of September when we came back, and nothing particularly has been happening here as far as the business side is concerned, and I'm going back largely to mark time although there are issues that, as I'm going to say to Semenov that must be dealt with in any event, and the important thing is that we deal with these issues and get them out of the way so that when other decisions are made, we'll be in as good a position as possible to act on the agreement.

The decisions I have in mind as far as Geneva is concerned are very particularly, the MIRV verification, what we call "deliberate concealment measures," and then I hope to get the throw weight definition and the definition of a heavy missile and the ceiling on a heavy missile out of the way also. So there are some things to be done, but I'll wait and see what, if anything, they brought back with them. But in large part, I'll be marking time until November 2.

If the President is reelected, and I would be very pleased to see this happen, and it seems to me that he's gaining strength, if he's reelected, I would expect him to go to work fairly vigorously on SALT as soon after the election. If he's not reelected and Carter's elected, then I would assume that we would adjourn the SALT talks sine die with it being left open to the new Administration as to what they might want to do to renew them.

I spoke about the fact that Ford has not felt able to make the decisions that were needed on his part, decisions that were needed both on Backfire and Cruise Missiles, would be viewed by some at least over in the Pentagon--not by everybody--but he would be attacked in the Pentagon on it, he'd be attacked by the Reaganites on it, and of course, he'd be attacked by Scoop Jackson and that group in the Democratic Party. And obviously, the balance being as close as it is, he's in no position to take on any such attacks prior to the election, so I perfectly well understand why he is deferring any action, at least until after the election.

So if he's not reelected, and as I say the talks are then adjourned sine die, of course I will submit my resignation to the new administration. It would be up to them as to whether or not they want to keep me. I would think from their standpoint that it would be desirable to have a whole new

team, and I would very cheerfully resign and be ready to quit. On the other hand, if they want me to stay on, I'd be prepared to do that.

I might say, during this interim I made a trip down to Austin, Texas where I spoke at the university there and met the faculty members there and saw Elspeth and Walt Rostow and Sid and Gladys Weintraub and also met with the people in the LBJ Library who are working on the transcripts of these tapes. I think they've done a remarkable job. I was surprised at the length of them. I had not realized that I'd talked quite as much as I had. At the same time I was pleasantly surprised as to how well they read, and I think they can be possibly useful. I'll decide what I do with them after they finish them. I had held out previously beginning with the SALT talks, I've now sent those tapes down to them and they'll be working on those transcriptions.

Well, this is over and out until I get to Geneva.

This is Sunday, October 17, 1976, and incidentally, my sixty-eighth birthday.

I returned to Geneva on Monday, September 20 by special aircraft. This time ACDA paid for it, and had a private meeting on Tuesday the 21st with Semenov. Then on Wednesday the 22nd, we had a plenary meeting. I left right after the plenary meeting for Tokyo, going there by way of Athens, Bangkok, and Hong Kong; because of the time difference, arriving in Tokyo the evening of Thursday the 23rd. We had the ceremony dedicating the new Embassy building on Friday morning. I spoke briefly at that on behalf of the Department. I found the new Embassy to be not quite as forbidding or, shall I say unpleasant as I expected it to be, but it's very

modern. I think we could have done much better, but nevertheless, there it is. I stayed Saturday and Sunday, leaving, let's see now, Friday afternoon we went out and Saturday, Sunday, yes. I saw some of my former friends there. On Friday Ushiba had a dinner for me, former Ambassador Ushiba. Then on Saturday, I had dinner with Morita, the president of the Sony Corporation. He had a few people there that I knew. Of course he had Jim Hodgson, our ambassador, and he had Tom Gates from Peking, Tom is a former Secretary of Defense; he's our liason officer in Peking. Now he seemed to be a little bit under the weather to me to the best I could see. I never had any chance really to talk with him, and Admiral--no, was he at the dinner? I guess he wasn't. In any event, the new CINCPAC was staying at the residence also.

I left on Sunday afternoon, returning by way of Moscow. I thought I was going back by way of Alaska and the Pole, but it turned out I came back by way of Moscow and Copenhagen. From Copenhagen I had to get down to Basel, and then from Basel, I came down to Geneva. So it made it a pretty long trip. I was pretty tired when I got back. A little too much travelling for me.

Wednesday we had a meeting. Thursday the 30th I gave a lunch for the Soviets at the, well, Tuesday I had a meeting right after I got back, that's right. Wednesday we had a plenary meeting. Thursday I gave a lunch at the mission for the Soviets for a smaller group. Then on, let's see, that following Sunday we were out, on Friday the 8th I went with Jack and his wife, Liz Howard, we left from here to go down to Florence, went down by train to see Florence while your mother flew up to Berlin to stay with Scott George up there and see them. This was a long weekend because of the Monday holiday for Columbus Day.

I had a good, strenuous time down at Florence. I'd often wanted to see it. I must say, it's a long, hard train trip down there, and Italian trains seem to be very relaxed about time and I thought we were going to miss our connections a couple of times, but the connecting trains were also late so we managed to get there, and it was quite a sight.

Now as far as business is concerned, there has been very little. I've had virtually nothing in the way of new instructions. The Soviets are marking time. I shouldn't say virtually nothing in the way of new instructions. I should say I have nothing in the way of new instructions. It's been up to me to take off from where I left off, and we have been hashing over the same ground, MIRV verification, the question of defining throw weight, and the heavy missile definition, deliberate concealment measures with respect to verification and so on. We've gotten no place at all.

On the 2nd of course, the election takes place and we'll see what happens then. If Ford is not reelected, then I would assume that the talks would be indefinitely suspended here and that I'd go home and see whether or not they accept my resignation before inauguration or whether they want me to stay on until inauguration and see what the new administration wants to do. But at the present moment, as far as SALT is concerned, it's been very slow going.

Just reading an article in the October issue of Foreign Affairs saying that cruise missiles make a new SALT agreement virtually impossible. That along with other things I think--a really meaningful SALT agreement impossible--and I think that along with some other things is pretty much the truth as far as the situation at the time being is concerned. I think I've said previously, everybody--both sides of course--are trying to make a

SALT agreement that is as meaningless as possible as far as they're concerned.

Well, I think I'll make this over and out at this point.

This is Sunday, October 31. This last Friday on the 29th, I finally wound up almost a year's work here. Finally got agreement on heavy missile definition, heavy missile cap, throw weight, enlargement of silo dimensions, a whole package I've been working on all year. At the last minute General Rowny wanted to add something to the package that had been worked out with the Soviets. There was no question in my mind and in the mind of every other member of the delegation that to seek to add what he wanted to add would have blocked agreement. I'm sorry to say I fear perhaps that might have been the purpose. We had a very vigorous exchange during the delegation meeting. I refused to accept his recommendation. He in turn became very concerned about this and very exercised about it, and I just made it clear that I was making my decision and I was going to proceed on the basis of my decision. I felt that what he was seeking to add, and the other members of the delegation agreed with me, was entirely unnecessary as far as the purposes of the agreement were concerned. It was simply a matter of defining and defining and defining and defining down, and you just have to stop someplace in defining.

So I proceeded ahead on the basis of my judgement. He insisted, I thought very unwisely from his standpoint, and the others did also, on reporting his suggestion or his recommendation--reporting to Washington his recommendation, and reporting that I had refused to accept it. It was entirely his right, and it's the right of any member of the delegation to have reported his own views, and I don't object to that, but for him to report that he made a recommendation which I and the other members

of the delegation also refused did not seem to me to be very much in his own interests, but nevertheless we so reported it. But also nevertheless I went through with the package with the Soviets and that part of the agreement is now wrapped up and finished and I feel that after all these months of work, I feel some sense of satisfaction at having been able to complete what is after all an important part of whatever package, SALT package, is going to be worked out.

Well, this is all for October 31. Stop.

Introduction by General Westmoreland to a speech by Ambassador Johnson on receiving the Distinguished Service Award from the New York Chapter Association of the United States Army, April 1, 1976, St. Regis Hotel, New York City

. ... . was also attended by Bob Hope, and after the banquet was over, people came up to the head table to talk and asked for Bob's autograph, and I was regaled in uniform with epaulets and decorations and I thought I looked very military, and this little old lady came up to me and said, "I'm so pleased to meet you. I never thought I'd have the opportunity. I've seen you so many times on television." But she says, "You don't look like you do on television. You look much younger." And I said, "Lady, I just can't explain that at all." And she took a deep breath and she says, "You are Bob Hope, aren't you?" (laughter)

Well, ladies and gentlemen, this evening I have the unusual honor to welcome, I would say, and introduce preliminary to turning this lectern back to Colonel J. Markel, an unusual gentleman with a remarkable record, and of course I refer to the gentleman on my right, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson.

This gentleman was born in Kansas less than three score and ten years ago, and upon graduation from college--a college that I'd never heard of till I read his biography--he entered the Foreign Service in 1935, and he studied at Georgetown University. His first assignment was as a language officer in Tokyo. But in 1937 he found himself the Vice-Consul in Seoul, Korea, and in 1939, in Tientsin, China, and later in Mukden, Manchuria in 1940 where he was interned by the Japanese at the outbreak of World War II. Now after he was exchanged as an internee in late 1942 he was returned to Rio de Janeiro But he was a man who was indispenible in the Far East, and in 1945, he found himself as consul in Manila in the Philippines. When the Japanese surrendered, he found himself on General MacArthur's staff, serving

again in Japan and Korea. He was decorated with the Freedom Medal for his work in the repatriation of the prisoners of war and the civilian internees. He was assigned to Washington as Deputy Director and later Director of the Northeast Asian Affairs in the Department of State, and later he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at which time he was also a member of the U.S. delegation to the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco. President Eisenhower appointed U. Alexis Johnson in 1953 as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, during which time he served as coordinator the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, and later as U.S. representative to the talks with Communist China which took place at the ambassadorial level.

In 1958 he was appointed Ambassador to Thailand and the U.S. representative to the SEATO council. From Bangkok, he was moved back to Washington as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and thence to Saigon where he and I were colleagues, Mr. Johnson having been designated as the Deputy Ambassador to Ambassador Maxwell Taylor. We had some very interesting experiences together at that time, but I saw at firsthand the diplomatic skill of this man. I saw him demonstrate his wisdom and I also observed at firsthand his unusual personal courage. We had some sticky and somewhat frustrating days together.

Another tour as Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs in Washington was in the offing after he left Saigon, but he returned to the Far East again to be Ambassador to Japan. Can you imagine one man through a lifetime being Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to Thailand, and to Japan, each being very significant? In fact, the latter two were major diplomatic posts. In 1964 he was appointed to the highest rank in the United States Foreign Service: Permanent Career Ambassador, and during that same year he

received three very significant and very high awards: the National Civil Service League's Career Service Award, the Rockefeller Public Service Award in the Field of Foreign Affairs,and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service. I think I can say without reservation that within the Foreign Service of the United States, U. Alexis Johnson is considered the number one pro.

Now as Ambassador at Large, he serves as chief of the U.S. delegation to the United States and Soviet negotiations on strategic arms limitations. Now U. Alexis Johnson has been not only a workhorse, a man who has worked behind the scenes quietly and unassumingly, but he has been a blue-ribbon winner on a fast diplomatic track. U. Alexis Johnson. I've often wondered what the U. stood for. Frankly I don't know. And I'm not sure that he knows. Could it be the U for Ulysses, considered the wildest [?] and the willerest [?] of Greek leaders? Certainly the wisest could well apply. Could it be the U for urbane, unswerving, unsullied, unpretentious, unfaltering, unequivocal, undaunting, unaffected, unbiased, unafraid. I can say from personal knowledge all of these adjectives apply to his character, and to his very attractive and beloved wife, Pat. Not unadorned but always unruffled, and the mother, of course, of four children. Now perhaps his parents were interested in astronomy, and the U stands for Uranus, the most distant known planet or Ursa, the two well-known constellations, one known as the Big Bear and the other as the Little Bear. But judging from his record of assignments, ubiquitouswould be appropriate indeed. But I vote for Sir Thomas More's imaginary island where perfection was achieved in government, in law, and social regulations. I mean U--Utopia. That is since Alexis Johnson has moved our civilization by virtue of his sterling and long and dedicated service, and his wisdom add a little bit

further to that dream of man. And that is still what he strives to do in Geneva is move man and civilization to that dream of Sir Thomas More that imaginary island that he designated as Utopia.

So ladies and gentlemen, it would seem I'm sure quite obvious to you, thatI am proud to welcome U. Alexis Johnson to our midst, those of us who are closely associated with the United States Army. So it is my pleasure to turn him over to our president, Joe Markel [?], with this introduction, the distinguished Ambassador at Large and our chief negotiator for strategic arms limitations, those important talks now taking place in Geneva. I give you Joe Markel who will in turn present an award to U. Alexis Johnson. (Applause)

Joe Markel: Mr. Ambassador, I have the privilege and great honor to present to you this plaque from the Association of the United States Army, New York Chapter, which reads: "Distinguished Service Award, presented to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson in recognition of his dedicated service as Ambassador at Large, chief of the United States delegation to the United States- Soviet negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Japan, Thailand, Czechoslovakia, Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, statesman in pursuit of peace, and staunch supporter of a strong national defense. New York Chapter, Association of the United States Army, 1 April 1976." (Applause)

Mr. Ambassador, if I may, before the microphone is turned over to you, read a telegram addressed to me, with a request that I please convey this message to Ambassador Johnson at the Distinguished Service Award banquet this evening. It reads: "Dear Alex, I am delighted to know you are receiving the Distinguished Service Award tonight for four decades of

dedicated and outstanding service. Few know better how much you have given, how much you have sacrificed for your country. Your career is itself a definition of distinguished public service. It has always been a pleasure and an honor to work with you and I hope to continue to do so for some time to come. My heartiest congratulations . Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger, Department of State, Washington, D.C." Congratulations. (Applause)

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: You better let me have that. I might need it some day.

JOE MARKEL: I suppose that after reading it, I might add another possible meaning of the U: unexcelled. (laughter) Ambassador Johnson. (applause)

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: I don't know what you do when on one evening you have the distinguished soldier, former Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, and Henry Kissinger saying pleasant--they're nice to hear--pleasant things about you. (And in writing [from audience]) And in writing also. (laughter) You know, you wonder, it makes you wonder a little bit maybe what have I done wrong?

I must say, you know Westy and I used to have some shall we say discussions back in Saigon, like we had in Washington. He never quite said <u>all</u> those things all the time during the course of our discussions back there, but all I say is I am deeply grateful and honored to be asked by President Markel to be here this evening, and I hope that Westy meant all he said in any event, but anyway, it's very nice to hear it. And I'm also deeply honored to have a great--I agree, a great Secretary of the Army, Bob Stevens. Looked at from my standpoint across the river, Bob was really one of our great secretaries of the Army, and of course we in State

Department borrowed this fellow Charlie Saltzman who did a little work for us also over in State and is long remembered there. It so happened that without getting into the details of how titles are held in State, that Charlie at one time--we had two Under Secretary slots, and one of these slots was in Planned Administration, sometimes Economic Affairs, sometimes Political Affairs, but in any event, while I was Under Secretary for Political Affairs, well, Charlie Saltzman's picture was on my wall as being one of the successors and I was in his line of succession at the State Department.

It's hard to know how to talk to a group such as this. In fact, when I was first invited by your president to appear this evening, I wasn't too clear--Westy endorsed it, and I said, "Well, if Westy endorses it, why, it must be all right," and so I accepted, and then I learned I was still going to be in Geneva. Then I learned from your president I was also invited to make some remarks this evening, and so I was trying to think about what I should say, and I was telling President Markel and Westmoreland beforehand that one of the things I thought I might talk about this evening was something that's been very close to me over the years, and that is this whole problem of how you integrate and deal with foreign affairs and military affairs and the ways that our government can deal most effectively with this. I think you did mention, Westy, didn't you, that I was in Tientsin, China one time in this, and my introduction to the, first introduction, really, to the practical aspects of integrating foreign affairs and military affairs came in about three o'clock one very dark morning in the freight railroad yards in Tientsin, China of 1939, three o'clock in the morning in 1939, at which

time I found myself with Lieutenant Colonel Hawthorne who was Commander of the Marine detachment there, the Marine garrison there. Those were the days we had, you know, American garrisons stationed in China. Marines had replaced the old Fifteenth Infantry that was there at the time, and I found myself with Colonel Hawthorne about three o'clock that morning, stumbling through the darkened railroad yards, trying to trace down the source of some sporadic rifle fire. We climbed between the cars, and we climbed over the rails, and we tried to follow the shots and eventually Colonel Hawthorne and I came upon two very badly frightened young Marines charged with riding guard on a small freight shipment that was being moved from Peking to Tientsin and that had not been unloaded yet, and they were standing guard on the car. Using my loudest, not my best, Japanese, as you heard, I was supposed to be able to speak Japanese, using my loudest, and if not my best Japanese, I eventually through at least the sound of my voice established contact with an equally frightened Japanese corporal who was running a patrol through the yards, and he and the Marines were exchanging fire with eachother. This resulted in my arranging the first ceasefire of my career. (laughter)

Subsequently I participated in a number of other ceasefires, including Korea in 1950--53, and Indochina in 1954, but it none of them was I able to exceed the personal fervor which I entered into the negotiations for that first ceasefire. (laughter) However, I came pretty close to it on a number of occasions. In 1964- 1965 in Saigon when Westy and I were serving there together and when this or that South Vietnamese officer or pilot would take it into his head, to feel the urge to change his government during the middle of the night. (laughter) And we had a number of such occasions. However, I wouldn't want to give the impression that my career has been

confined to ceasefires. However, it was out of experiences such as this as well as my own exposure to World War II in the Philippines and Japan, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and so on that I evolved my special interest in doing all that I could to assist in relating foreign affairs and military affairs in a way that would best serve the interests of our country. This of course is a two way street that demands as much of the military in understanding and taking into consideration the whole gamut of foreign affairs concerns as it does of the foreign affairs establishment in understanding and taking into consideration the whole gamut of military affairs. Another way of expressing the relationship is to repeat the truism that there are no strictly foreign affairs to the exclusion of military affairs and vice versa. Both are only parts of a single system whose objective is the promotion of the security and well-being of all the more than two hundred million people of these United States. And first and above all, their very physical safety. I've always looked upon this as the obligation I undertook when I entered the Foreign Service. It is no less the obligation of those who serve in the Armed Forces.

Now, diplomacy is not trying to make foreigners happy, although civility and good manners can be just as important in international affairs as they are in personal relations. Diplomacy is the hard-headed business of looking after and promoting our national interests, that is, our self interests. This does not mean being blindly selfish or having no moral standards, nor does it mean ignoring or riding roughshod over the interests of others in international affairs any more than it does in our individual affairs. Far from it. Our individual self interests in clean and safe streets, good schools, and healthy environment, are certainly not contrary to the interests of our neighbors. In fact, whether we particularly

like our neighbors or not, we and our neighbors do have a large area of common interests in these things, and we band and act together to realize them. To a large extent, this is what diplomacy in foreign affairs is all about. It is trying to identify and maximize the areas of common interest between countries and then doing something about them. To the degree that common interests between countries can be identified and acted on, we have good relations, and to the degree that this cannot be accomplished, relations are less good. It is not a business in which the choices normally lend themselves to the western movie version of the good guys in the white hats and the bad guys in black hats. It would all be very simple if this was the case.However, the fact is that as we look at them, most of the countries of the world wear hats of varying shades of gray. It is also true that it is usually simpler to make enemies than it is to make friends. To the degree that we can manage our affairs so as to have good relations, we have national security. To the degree that we do not have good relations, we need military forces to deter or deal with those who may have the will and the capability to do us harm. Thus in the imperfect world in which we live, diplomacy and military strength are fingers of the same hand. A national commitment to search for peace not backed up by military strength would not be a policy at all. It would only be a pious expression of hope. On the other side, military strength not backed up by realistic and rational foreign policy objectives would be a blind monster.

To my mind, the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 were excellent demonstrations of how diplomacy and military capabilities were orchestrated by a skillful president to achieve important national security purposes without resort to violence. Without deft diplomacy,

our strength would not have been enough to save our people from tragedy. But without our strength, the most brilliant diplomacy could not have met those blunt challenges to our security.

Vietnam demonstrated that no matter how worthy and important a policy objective may be, to carry out a prolonged and trying task at that time, it is essential to obtain and to maintain in spite of any obstacle, a broad consensus among our people. In addition, I do not feel that it reflects any discredit on the personal qualities of the many who bravely served and the many who died there to suggest that both our foreign affairs and military institutions could well examine much more intensively than they have thus far the ways in which they could act more effectively in a complex military environment such as was represented by Vietnam.

On a somewhat different plane, I feel that the SALT talks, in which I have the privilege of participating, are a clear demonstration that diplomacy and military strength are not contradictory, but very much complement each other. The job is to orchestrate them in a balanced and prudent manner, not letting shouted slogans for or against one point of view or another replace thoughtful deliberation.

This year we as a nation are in the throes of those rites to which we subject ourselves every four years in preparation for the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. It seems to be our tradition that in carrying out these rites, hyperbole becomes the norm of political discourse. I thus feel it fitting on an occasion such as this to try to take an objective stock of where we as a people stand in the world, and some of our positive accomplishments as a nation, particularly during the past three decades. Accomplishments in which the political leaders from both parties have shared, and to which both our diplomatic and military

establishments have been able to make their contributions. It now often seems fashionable to question our motives and accomplishments in this post-war era. I find this extraordinary. As to our motives, I will simply note that Winston Churchill, an observer with some experience in these matters, characterized American efforts in the early post-war years as what he called "the most unsordid act in history." To my mind, our accomplishments speak for themselves. Our bitterest enemies of three decades ago are now among our closest friends, and surely it's better to have strong friends than to have strong enemies. The dreadful prospect of another world war, this time with weapons of all-encompassing destructive power, seems less likely. The American people have prospered to an unprecedented degree during this period, and American science and technology and productivity remain the model for the rest of the world. More than seventy free countries have come into being in the remarkably and largely peaceful liquidation of some four hundred years of colonial history. A new sense of interdependence of nations has grown in only a few decades from being a bitterly disputed premise to a commonplace statement of the obvious. We have kept the nuclear genie in his bottle, and we have made significant progress in establishing international limits which lessen the nuclear threat to mankind and enhance the potential of the atom's beneficial use.

We have made a singular contribution to the economic recovery of the world from World War II, and have witnessed record-breaking levels of prosperity in large parts of the world. We have helped create an international economic system which has resulted in an explosion of trade between nations on a scale unprecedented in history, with inmeasurable benefits to the people of the world, notably including our own.

Now these are not negligible accomplishments. They are in fact historic accomplishments. I do not think that we need to be apologetic or defensive about them. Rather I think our country should be proud of them. The fact that we've had some failures, the fact that we still face serious problems, give no basis for denial of our accomplishments. Although brought about by causes largely beyond our influence or control, I think it also important to note that whereas a decade or so ago, it appeared that we were going indefinitely to face a hostile and united bloc of over one billion people covering most of the Eurasian land mass, today the unity of that bloc is broken, and those on its peripheries seem increasingly self-assertive. Thus, while we certainly have no cause for complacency, neither should we let the hyperbole of the moment lead us to despair.

In closing, I want briefly to comment on the seeming tendency of some to proceed from the assumption that we can be active at home or abroad but not in both areas because we lack the resources, the energy, and the talent. Second is an often implicit assumption that we have broad freedom to choose between domestic and foreign affairs, and that our internal problems can be solved in isolation from the rest of the world. To my mind, both of these assumptions are completely wrong. I find it impossible to accept the concept that a nation of over two hundred million people and over a trillion dollar economy is too poor and too exhausted to provide for and to manage both its foreign and its domestic problems. I reject even more the thesis that we have the freedom to choose. I'm sure I do not need to spell out to this group that the degree to which our domestic prosperity and security depend on good management of <u>both</u>

our domestic and our foreign affairs. The first question is not what can we afford. It is what does our well-being require.

[End of Tape 29. See Tape 30, Side 2 for a complete recording of the speech and for a transcript of the rest of the speech.]

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 30

Side 1

This is U. Alexis Johnson, Sunday, November 28, 1976 in Washington, D.C.

My last recording was, I see, on October 31 on a previous tape. Since that time a number of things have happened to the country as well as to myself and the SALT talks. First, Carter was elected over Ford by a very small majority, but he was nevertheless elected and will be assuming office. It was quite clear immediately after his election that the Soviets were simply marking time, although they professed a willingness to talk. They actually were not dealing with matters in a substantive way and were making no progress. This I expected. They were waiting to see, of course, to deal with the new President. However, in accordance with their normal pattern, they would never ask for a recess; therefore I pushed hard on Washington for a recess because it was quite clear that we were not accomplishing anything further at Geneva, and I finally got agreement to a recess with the date of resumption, according to our announcement, to be subject to mutual consultation In other words, that they would not resume during this Administration, and it would be up to the new Administration as to when they would want to resume.

However, we did get some useful work done in the interim.
I proposed that we recess on Friday the 19th. He suggested instead Saturday the 20th and I agreed to that. What we did get accomplished during that period was the working out of the--you might say, the conforming of our joint draft, the text, both in the English and the Russian, so that we will be working from the same text.

We recessed on the 20th, on Saturday. Sunday the 21st, I took a military plane over to Brussels and briefed the North Atlantic Council on Monday the 22nd and then came back to Geneva. When the recess was agreed to, I asked for a plane

in the normal way. And in the light of the letter that they had sent to ACDA saying that they would furnish a plane at the end of the session for our return, well, to my intense surprise, they turned us down. Again Bill Clements' office on this, saying even though the letter said this, they didn't mean it really, and under no circumstances would they furnish us an airplane. Well, we had a lot of baggage and we had all our classified files and there was a big mess, but ACDA, Fred Ikle in particular, back here in Washington, went to TWA and very fortunately we got a quick charter from TWA, leaving on the 24th, Wednesday the 24th, so everybody'd get back before Thursday the 25th, Thanksgiving. We had a very comfortable flight back, and the fact was that it cost us less than it would have cost us for a military charter. And I was able to bring fifty people along, and I was able to bring along the families and wives of other people on the delegation who had brought them over here commercially, so everybody was very delighted at that.

I have written a letter to the President reporting on the results of the negotiations and the remaining items to be dealt with at Geneva, together with position papers on the remaining outstanding items. I took that letter over to the White House on Friday and also sent copies to Secretary of State, incidentally who's in Acapulco and who will not be coming back until the end of next week, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Director of ACDA, and the Director of CIA. I think it's a pretty good letter and I think it summarizes what we've done in a very good way, and when you put it all down, what we have accomplished over there is quite significant and certainly is something on which people will be able to build, no matter what they may want to do.

I myself am perfectly relaxed as I am saying, correctly so, if the new Administration is really serious about wanting to push ahead to get a SALT treaty and are able to make the decisions to do so. In many ways, I'd like to finish this up, having been at it over three and a half years now, and I would like to see it to

its end. On the other hand, there may be an argument for having some new people at Geneva, and if so, why, I'd certainly have no quarrel with that. So what I'm doing is setting off this week with your grandmother and Senko San, our maid, by car to drive by slow stages out to California, be there over Christmas and then come back sometime during January. By that time, hopefully, the new Administration will have an idea of what it wants to do.

Well, that's about all for now. I haven't anything else to add at this time, so this is over and out. November 28, 1976.

This is Sunday, February 6, 1977. If things go as now planned, this will be my last tape as a Foreign Service Officer, but more about that later. Let me go back to where I left off. I said that I was planning a trip out to California after I came back from Geneva. I did have that trip, and a very delightful one indeed it was. We left here by car on Friday, December 3, together with Senko San, car packed with gifts and things that we were bringing out to the children. It was the coldest December 3 morning in history--they said this on the radio as I was leaving town. It was extremely cold through all of Pennsylvania and across the Midwest and Kansas and on down into Texas as well. But I kept ahead of the snow. I was able to carry out my first purpose in stopping in Lindsb rg to see my cousin, Verna, Mrs. Arthur Olson. Her husband, Arthur, was obviously very, very ill. He was virtually a vegetable. He was in the house and he joined us at the table and tried to eat a little bit, but obviously was failing very, very fast, to Verna's, of course, enormous distress But we both agreed that she was reconciled to the fact that he was not going to be able to recover, and, although she wouldn't say so, it was quite clear that the sooner the end could come, the better it would be. In fact, it did come within a week to ten days, I guess it was after we were there. But I nevertheless was so glad that I had stopped by to see her. I feel very close to Verna, and

she was very appreciative of my visit. And it was good to see Falun again and Lindsborg, and then I drove from Lindsborg, I stopped and had lunch with her brother--my cousin, Lloyd Forsse in Wichita and saw what he was doing in the way of house building. We stopped that night in Oklahoma City. The next day, we went on to Emory, Texas to see your Uncle Stephen's wife's--I guess that's the best way I can describe it,your Uncle Stephen's wife's parents, Pete and Lillian Rodes. He has a bank in Emory, Texas which is near Dallas. We stayed there a day and a half, I guess it was, yes. And the day following our arrival there, we drove over to Tyler, Texas and Mr. Flynn, they call Tubby Flynn, gave a lunch for me in Tyler which had many of the senior people of Tyler, both business, banking, and politics--judges and so on, about forty-five, fifty, and I talked with them about SALT and got a very good response.

From Emory, the next day, I went on to Lubbock, Texas and then on up to Albuquerque where I visited Jack Howard and his wife. We spent the day going up to Sante Fe. And then on Monday, he took me over to the Sandia Corporation, of which he is executive vice President up there. They're the ones who design our nuclear weapons, and showed me what they were doing on the safety side, in particular--that is, safety of weapons and also safeguard weapons against seizure by any hostile person, including terrorists, and I found what they were doing on this very encouraging, but it's very discouraging how slowly it permeates into the system through the services into the system on our handling weapons and how long it takes to re-do weapons of course to make them safer than they are now.

Let's see, that was on Monday. From there, we drove up to Holbrook and then the next day to Barstow and then the next day on into Los Angeles, where we stayed with Mrs. Kelsey, Mrs. Lillian Kelsey. I'll not go into detail about Los Angeles. You were there, and I must say, it was I believe the nicest visit I've had. You children were all out of school so we had a chance to get

acquainted. You and Craig and Bill and I played golf a number of times, and your grandmother gave bowling balls to Patty and to Dean and Craig, and I took them bowling and taught them how to bowl, and then we made visits, drove with Senko San down to Marineland. And, oh, I don't know. We really got around a great deal and saw a lot of people, saw Margaret Smith Miller, a longtime friend from high school whose husband had died in the meanwhile, and Glen, and found ourselves fully occupied and had a thoroughly great time. I really, really enjoyed it.

I drove back by the southern route, by way of Tucson, El Paso, and then to Austin, Texas where I spent a day at the LBJ Library going over what they have done in transcribing my tapes and also discussing with them the agreement on my deed of gift of my papers to the Library and the way we will handle things.

Then drove on back through Mississippi and Atlanta and on up to Washington. We had very severe rain for one day from Monroe, Louisiana across to Atlanta, but outside of that, we had no bad weather the whole trip. We had not the slightest difficulty with the car. Oh, I should say, on our way back, Mrs. Kelsey also rode with us, and she and Senko San sat in the back seat and they shared motel rooms at night, and they became very well acquainted and seemed to enjoy eachother's company very much. We enjoyed having her along.

I drove some 8100 miles on the trip. Obviously I didn't keep to a straight line except coming back, I came back fairly directly. I drove a good part of the time out in California, going from Culver City where we were staying with Mrs. Kelsey, well, near Culver City, over to Santa Monica up to La Canada. . . we covered, took a lot of miles, I found. I met my namesake, Alexis, and I must say, she's a great gal and quite a precocious child, both mentally and physically, and TAJ is coming along beautifully, and gee, she's a sweet girl. And it was so good seeing her as well as getting acquainted with Patty better.

I took Patty out to her riding lesson. I was really impressed by the way she rides. I did so many things, I won't try to recount them; really, you know all about them. But I enjoyed myself very much and we got back here on January 11.

I caught up with what had been going on in the office. Not very much. The old Administration wasn't doing anything obviously on SALT, and the new Administration hadn't taken over.

On Monday, I asked for an appointment of course to see Mr. Cy Vance. Incidentally, I might say while I was out there, the announcement came of the appointment of Cy Vance as Secretary of State and Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense. As you know. Harold Brown had been on my delegation, so he knew SALT very well. Cy Vance, I've also known. They've both been over in Defense. I was very, very pleased by both appointments as both men know each other well and it should start relations off with the two sides of the River on a very good footing by very able people, so I was very pleased to see this.

And I frankly hoped and expected that I would have some role in whatever they were going to do. However, I'll come to that later.

I had an appointment with Vance for Tuesday afternoon, January 18. I flew down to Montgomery,Alabama, to the Air University down there on Monday, the 17th, in a T-39 to give a talk on Tuesday morning. I woke up Tuesday morning and the town was snowed in. I gave my talk, but the plane that was to take me back was unable to land because they had no snow removal equipment on the field there on Maxwell Field. Finally, they took me in a 4 by 4 over to a commercial airport which opened up in the afternoon, and I got a commercial flight back. But I missed my appointment of course with Secretary Vance. I did see him the next day and, as I told him, one of the most unlikely stories I'd heard since I came back to Washington was that someone had missed an

appointment with him because of a snowstorm in Montgomery, Alabama,but that's the way the weather's been. I should say that it's turned very, very cold. We're having the most severe winter in history here thus far, but that's another story.

He told me that they did not want to make a decision yet as to who would do the negotiating in Geneva. They had offered the job of director of ACDA to Paul Warnke. Paul I've known. He was over in ISA in the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. Paul is the one who is generally credited with turning Clark Clifford around on the Vietnam War. I know Paul's attitude on many of these things, and I thought he'd be an excellent appointment for ACDA as I feel that there needs to be a vigorous voice, a vigorous, active and responsible voice in ACDA to balance off other voices and to give the President the varying points of view and to ask the right questions that need to be asked with regard to these very complicated arms limitations matters.

However, he said Paul was insisting that he also head up the delegation to do the negotiating at Geneva as well. I felt this was wrong, as I told him, I don't think that one man can do adequate justice to both jobs, but, nevertheless, that was their decision. So the matter was left at [this]: he said that if Paul did not take the job, they agreed that the job should be split as it had been in the past, but they didn't want to make a decision on who the negotiator would be until the director of ACDA came and was appointed, which was perfectly understandable.

I must say that, at the time he was talking to me, it appeared that Warnke was probably not going to take the job. So I accepted that and I, more or less, twiddled my thumbs through the Inauguration which took place during cold but clear weather, and after the Inauguration until this last week.

Dn Tuesday, February 1st, the papers started to come out with the story that Paul Warnke was again considering the job. And [Secretary] Vance

asked to see me and told me that they had made another approach to Paul because they wanted him for the job. He still insisted on holding the two positions, that is the negotiator at Geneva and director of ACDA, and he now agreed to take the job on that condition. I said that as I had told him, I was no problem on this, that if this is the way they wanted to manage it, there obviously was no place for me on it and I thought the best thing I could do would be to retire. After all, I'd been some forty-two years in the Service and I was long past retirement time. He said that he regretted I'd retire, but they really had nothing immediate for me and did not oppose my doing so. So I immediately started the wheels turning to retire as of February 28th, and those wheels are now turning and this is my expectation.

I've made some contacts on things I might do. I've contacted American U. and George Washington and G.W. about possible teaching positions, and giving me something to give me an office. One thing I need, I need an office from which I can work. I want to go to work on a book, I've decided. I've also talked to the Center there at the Smithsonian -- the Woodrow Wilson Center at the Smithsonian Institute. I have a meeting arranged with them next week. I've told everybody I'm in no hurry. I'm not under any financial pressure. I don't have the money I would like to have, but nevertheless, I'm not under any great pressure, and what I get at the time of retirement is, in a way, a lump sum payment for my overcontributions. That is, contributions that I made after thirty-five years of service to the retirement fund. I get those back with three percent interest and then I get a settlement on my accumulated leave. I'm negotiating on what basis that will be paid with me. So I get fairly satisfactory settlements, and my retirement runs a little over thirty thousand dollars a year, so I'm not under any great pressure. And frankly, I'd like to, oh, I don't know, not do

too much, sort of loaf around a little bit, not do too much for a few months, and then next summer or next fall, really plunge into things. I have a magazine writer who's interested in working with me on a book so in spite of what I've said in the past about not writing a book, perhaps I'll try my hand at it and see what I can do. It'll take me probably four or five months to see whether or not I can come up with something that I think is worthwhile.

As I've said, my ideal, the kind of a thing that I would like to do is Bob Murphy's Diplomat Among Warriors which I think is a very fine balance in terms of writing a memoir and also contributing to history without getting into personalities or muckraking or "now-it-can-be-told"-- that type of thing. Your Aunt Jenny called me and said that she and her husband, Lee were thinking about all of us making a trip out to Hawaii in April or May. That sounds great to me. I told her to go ahead. I'd certainly like to do something like that.

The Secretary said that he wants to have a little ceremony for me when I retire on February 28th, and I told him of course I'd be pleased to go out with some dignity.

Incidentally, I should say that I long ago accepted an invitation to speak on February 25 at the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. I've confirmed this to them, and I'll be going down there with your grandmother on the 24th, on Thursday the 24th. I've agreed to a dining-in with the Air Force officers at the air base down there. Then on the 25th, I make a speech, and they're going to have a review for me, and then there's going to be a dinner, et cetera. And General Westmoreland's down there. They're giving a dinner for us. Andy Goodpasture's down there. George Signius is president of the Citadel. So as I told them over the phone the other day, I'm really looking forward to this. This will be what I will call really my last hurrah,

but it'll be nice to have at this particular time.

So this is over and out until I decide that there's something worthwhile putting on to it again. I assume that that will probably be a little time. Oh, I should have mentioned that the new Administration had its first meeting on SALT matters on Thursday, February 3. I was very pleased to be invited, even though I had announced that I was going to resign. I was given my old seat at the table there in the Situation Room, as SALT negotiator. There was only a small group present. The President came and spoke in a very impressive way for about thirty or forty minutes on SALT. I was very impressed that he didn't have a single talking point in front of him. He knew the details of the subject well. He had some what I would consider a little far out ideas, but he made it clear that these are only ideas and he wanted people not to be inhibited in their views or in examining them by what he was throwing out in the way of questions. He spoke very impressively. He was very, very pleasant.

He called on Cy Vance who said that he thought the Soviets did want an agreement, but everybody agrees that to know what they want and what we want is not necessarily the same thing. Then he called on Harold Brown. And I was pleased and flattered that he called on me next. I was not quite prepared for this. I had planned to sit quietly and audit it, but I told him that I thought it important to recognize, I said, from my own experience I could assure him that the Russians were tough, hard negotiators and that, whereas they, I agree, probably want a SALT agreement, what we've got to keep in front of them is that the consequences to them of not having a SALT agreement are greater than having a SALT agreement. That is, I said that in the absence of a SALT agreement, we've got to keep in front of them that fact that these and I said "crazy American" are capable of doing almost anything, that we have to keep in front of them that we do have the technological and economic base

to smother them, to use that term, if it comes to that, in a real strategic arms race, even though it might not make much military sense, and I thought this was one of the big incentives that needed to be maintained to reach the kind of an agreement with them that we want to reach.

Tell you what I think I'll do. I'm going to give a talk at the International Club here on Thursday over in the Cosmos Club on SALT, then I'm going to make my speech down at the Citadel on SALT, and I'm going to try to carefully lay out as objectively as I can the factual situation with regard to the whole SALT question and SALT balance and strategic balance between us and so on, and that speech will be a definitive statement of the situation as I see it as of now, and should be referred to if there's interest in what my views are as of now on SALT.

Well, this is over and out, as I said until I decide that there's something worth putting down again. Over and out. U. Alexis Johnson.

This is Tuesday, April 26, 1977. I was just listening to the recording I made on February 3 and there's not much to add to it except to say that on February 28, Secretary Vance presided at a farewell party or retirement party for me. It was given on the eighth floor and we'd invited, oh, I suppose there were three or four hundred people there. He said very extravagant things about me. Phil Habib also spoke very well. We said good bye to everybody, and it was a very moving occasion, and I spoke briefly. But now that it's over, I must say I have no regrets about it.

Dean Rusk called me from Atlanta saying that he was sorry that he was not going to be able to be there, but he said, "Alex, you know when it happens, you're going to feel a sense of real exhilaration." And I must say that I do feel that sense of exhilaration. I'm sleeping at night now without sleeping

pills for the first time in a long time, not that I was taking them regularly before, but I used to have to do it a little bit. And I feel great. I've got a consultant agreement with a think-tank over in Virginia, BDM, I'm working with them. I gave a speech on SALT, a speech I spoke about in my tape to the Detroit Economic Club the first part of April. I also had an article, an interview in the U.S. News and World Report issue of April 4 on SALT which got quite wide circulation. I've taken on an agent in New York that I hoped would book some more SALT speeches for me because I want to get around on it as much as I can. I've got things that I think are worth saying, but thus far I've had no subsequent bookings on it.

Vance gave me the Department's Distinguished Honor Award at the ceremony, and I must say that the citation on it, I'm just going to read because I think it's very pleasant, I must say. "U. Alexis Johnson, " the citation says, "has made a towering contribution to the conduct of American foreign policy during his forty-two year career, years in the course of which he more than any other single officer has shaped our relationship with the nations of Asia and during which he has become the preeminent exemplar of leadership and service to the nation in the field of international affairs." Even though it may be a little overstated, it's nevertheless nice to hear.

I don't know whether I mentioned that Don Rumsfeldt before he left as Secretary of Defense also gave me the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service which is their highest civilian decoration and which citation there says that "As U.S. Representative and Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks With the Soviet Union, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson has made an outstanding contribution to the advancement of the United States national security interest. He has brought to bear on all aspects of the complex SALT negotiations his vast experience in planning and executing

U.S. foreign policy. His expert negotiating skills, his wise judgment, and his unparalleled perceptions of the interdependency between foreign relations and a strong national defense. Through forceful leadership, ingenuity, and fairness, he has welded the U.S. delegation into a vital, persuasive instrument of U.S. security policy. Ambassador Johnson's universally acknowledged diplomatic stature has made him a respected spokesman for U.S. government SALT policies among our NATO and other allies. The President and members of the National Security Council have continuously sought and heeded his wise counsel in the formation of SALT decisions. He has been unstinting in the time and effort that he has devoted to the SALT negotiations, often at great personal sacrifice." Again, maybe that's a little overstatement, but it's a nice note on which I think to end these recordings which cover my services in the government, so I will at this point say, "Over and out."

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Tape 30

Side 2

Introduction by General Westmoreland to a speech by Ambassador Johnson on receiving the Oistinguished Service Award from the New York Chapter Association of the United States Army, April 1, 1976, St. Regis Hotel, New York City

(applause)

GENERAL WESTMORELAND: Thank you, Colonel Markel, Secretary Stevens who I would like to particularly recognize because Bob Stevens in my book was one of our great Secretaries of the Army. He carried the Army banner proudly and high during one of the difficult periods that the Army went through. (applause)

Other guests on the dias, distinguished guests, and distinguished guests in the audience, and in that regard, it does one's heart good to see in the audience this evening that wonderful man, that wonderful New Yorker, the most patriotic men I think I've known: Dr. Gilbert Darlington.

(applause)

Now ladies and gentlemen, after that build-up that my good friend Joe Markel gave me, I must say I'm reminded of an experience that I had in this great state of New York a few years ago. I was at a banquet--and a very large one--which was also attended by Bob Hope . . .

[For transcript, see Tape 29, pages 56 - 68. Transcript below is continued from Tape 29, page 68.]

. . . The first question is not what can we afford. It is what does our well-being require. We are not a poor and underdeveloped economy. If, however, our people believe that they are too poor, too inept, or too distracted with domestic problems to deal with the world abroad, then this too is a reality our foreign policy must reflect.

I would suggest that our problem is not in fact caused by a shortage of either material or psychological resources in our society. It is rather a problem of will and of confidence. American society has always demonstrated that it will invest in those things which it considers are important to it. Peace is important to it.

However, we must recognize that there has been a widespread effort to instill a lack of confidence among our people in the operations and institutions of our government, both civil and military. It is my hope that this effort has now passed its climax, and that we can seek to move back towards that mutual relationship of confidence without which a free government and a free society cannot long exist. This is a task requiring the very best of our leadership, the very best of all of our institutions, and the very best of each of us as individuals.

To go back to what I was saying about common interest in discussing foreign affairs, it is a task in which every conscientious American has a common interest, and the success of which can only benefit the rest of mankind. It is institutions such as yours that give me confidence that this effort is being effectively pursued.

Again, Mr. President, Westy, the rest of you, my sincere thanks for the honor that you have bestowed on me this evening which I will long remember. And also thanks to you for giving me this opportunity to share these few thoughts with you. Thank you all very much. (applause)

JOE MARKEL [?]: It isn't often that a group such as ours, or indeed any group, anywhere, has an opportunity to profit by an experience as rich and unexcelled as our guest of honor has had. I remember, Mr. Ambassador, some fifty years ago, when the world, indeed the world of diplomacy, was so simplistically thought about

to state that upon the receipt of the Woodrow Wilson peace promise given to Elihu Root in 1925, I recall so well hearing him say that, with good will and good intent, the problems of the world are approached. There is no difference between peoples which may not be resolved peacefully. But where the will and the reason is lacking, there is no difference between nations which may not be made the cause for war. How simple the world we had then. All that mattered was the will and the mind of man. So complex, however, has the world grown; so small has it contracted that we need so much to be reminded far more often than we are of the basics, the points made by Ambassador Johnson tonight. We are deeply grateful to you for opening avenues of thought by your very clear expressions born of tremendously rich experience, and it is not you who has been honored by us: it is we who have been honored by your presence, and we are very deeply grateful to you for coming. (applause)

And now I might say, we've had dessert of an ingesting kind, and we've had dessert of an intellectual kind, political kind, diplomatic kind. We have an extraordinary man who is the treasurer of our organization. What he can come up with, one can never tell, but it's always good. And so, if you look at your tables and you find a couple of American flags implanted upon the Declaration of Independence, it's the kind of thing he just comes up with. And there it is, and those of you who feel that your grandchildren and children and your friends would feel happier if they could also enjoy them, don't hesitate to take them home. You may.

But you'll also notice some figures, like so, in various different forms and shapes, and believe it or not, these are baked products made by companies of which this extraordinary man is the head. And you can eat them! And they're delicious, he says. So . . .

[End of Side 2]