

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 5

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>Sanitized per RAC 9/2012 9-18-14</i>	7/17/64	A
#2 airgram	Deptel A-1 to Caracas S 2 p <i>open 3-25-94 NLJ93-423</i>	7/7/64	A
#2a rpt	"Policy and Action Paper" S 10 p <i>same sanitization per RAC-NS 8/22/02 Sanitized 3-25-94 NLJ93-423</i>	6/4/64	A
#2b memo	NSAM 297 C 2 p <i>open 10-14-94 NLJ93-424</i>	4/22/64	A
#3 cable	Caracas 1642 C 1 p <i>open 4-6-06</i>	6/20/64	A
#4 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 7 p <i>Sanitized 4-21-94 NLJ93-422 same sanitization per RAC-NS 8/22/02</i>	5/19/64	A
#5 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 1 p <i>SANITIZED per RAC 7-22-03</i>	4/30/64	A
#7 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>EXEMPT per RAC 7-22-03</i>	4/28/64	A
#8 cable	USCINCSO SC3253D S 2 p <i>open 4-6-06</i>	4/25/64	A
#9 cable	Caracas 1389 C 2 p	4/26/64	A
#10 cable	Caracas 1373 S 2 p <i>Sanitized per RAC, 9/2012 9-18-14</i>	4/23/64	A
#13 cable	Caracas 1345 C 1 p <i>open 4-6-06</i>	4/17/64	A
#14 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>EXEMPT 4-7-22-03 per RAC</i>	4/7/64	A
#15 cable	Caracas 1292 C 2 p <i>open 4-6-06</i>	4/6/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. I, 11/63-7/64

Box 74

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17 cable	Santiago 823 C 1 p	3/30/64	A
#19 cable	Caracas 1236 C 1 p	3/24/64	A
#20 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p	3/9/64	A
#21 airgrm	Caracas A-518 C 8 p	2/29/64	A
#22 cable	Caracas 1107 C 3 p	3/2/64	A
#23 cable	Caracas 1048 C 2 p	2/19/64	A
#25 cable	Deptel 272 to Tegucigalpa S 1 p	2/3/64	A
#26 cable	Caracas 951 S 2 p	1/31/64	A
#27 cable	USCINCSO SC1540EA S 2 p	1/31/64	A
#28 cable	Duplicate of #27		
#29 cable	JCS 4627 S 1 p	1/30/64	A
#30 cable	Deptel 664 to Caracas S 2 p	1/30/64	A
#31 cable	Deptel 560 to Caracas C 3 p	1/29/64	A
#32 cable	Deptel 614 to Caracas C 5 p	1/17/64	A

open 4.6.06

Sanitized 7-22-03 per KAC

open 4.6.06

open per RAC. 9-18-79

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35 cable	Caracas 790 <i>sanitized 7-22-03 per PAC</i> C 1 p	12/27/63	A
#36 rpt	Intelligence Information Report C 2 p <i>sanitized 7-22-03 per PAC</i>	12/24/63	A
#37 cable	Caracas 761 C 1 p	12/20/63	A
#38 cable	Deptel 546 to Caracas C 1 p	12/20/63	A
#39 cable	Caracas 755 <i>sanitized per PAC, 9-2012. 9-18-14</i> S 1 p	12/18/63	A
#40 cable	Caracas 753 C 2 p <i>open 4-6-06</i>	12/18/63	A
#41 cable	Caracas 732 C 1 p	12/13/63	A
#42 cable	Deptel 518 to Caracas C 1 p	12/13/63	A
#43 cable	Caracas 721 C 2 p	12/11/63	A
#44 cable	Caracas 719 C 2 p	12/11/63	A
#45 cable	Caracas 718 <i>sanitized 7-22-03 per PAC</i> S 2 p	12/11/63	A
#46 cable	La Paz 747 C 1 p <i>open 4-6-06</i>	12/6/63	A
#47 cable	Caracas 686 S 2 p	12/5/63	A
#48 cable	Caracas 684 C 2 p	12/5/63	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49 cable	Caracas 682 <i>open per RAC, 9-18-14</i> S 2 p	12/5/63	A
#50 cable	Caracas 681 " " " " C 1 p	12/5/63	A
#51 cable	Caracas 681 C 3 p	12/5/63	A
#55 cable	USUN 2376 <i>open per RAC, 9-18-14</i> C 1 p	12/5/63	A
#56 cable	Caracas 672 <i>open per RAC, 9-18-14</i> S 1 p	12/4/63	A
#58 cable	Caracas 670 S 1 p	12/4/63	A
#59 cable	USIRA Caracas 030430Z S 2 p <i>open per RAC 9/15/11</i>	12/3/63	A
#60 cable	Caracas 665 <i>sanitized per RAC, 9/20/12 9-18-14</i> S 2 p	12/3/63	A
#60a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>exempt per RAC 722.03</i>	12/3/63	A
#62 cable	Caracas 659 <i>sanitized per RAC, 9/20/12 9-18-14</i> C 3 p	12/2/63	A
#64 cable	Caracas 656 <i>open 4.6.06</i> C 2 p	12/2/63	A
#77 rpt	Intelligence Information Report C 2 p <i>exempt per RAC 722.03</i>	11/29/63	A
#83 cable	Port of Spain 212 <i>open 4.6.06</i> C 1 p	11/28/63	A
#85 cable	Caracas 627 <i>open per RAC, 9-18-14</i> C 1 p	11/28/63	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#96 rpt	Intelligence Information Report C 2 p <i>Sanitized per RAC 7-22-03</i>	11/25/63	A
#97 cable	Caracas 530 <i>Open per RAC 9-18-14</i> C 5 p <i>sanitized 3-25-94 NLJ 93-423</i>	11/5/63	A
#99 memo	Read to Bundy <i>open 4-6-06</i> C 1 p	5/4/64	A
#102 memo	Ball to President C 1 p	4/15/64	A
#102a rpt	Talking Points C 1 p	undated	A
#102b rpt	Bio Sketch C 2 p	undated	A
#105 memo	"Visit of Betancourt to U.S." C 1 p	3/19/64	A
#108a memo	McCafferty to Smith S 1 p <i>open 8-25-09</i>	1/31/64	A
#108b cable	Caracas 947 S 2 p	1/30/64	A
#108c memo	Dungan to Vance <i>open 4-6-06</i> S 1 p	2/5/64	A
#113a memcon	"Conversation with Dr. Caldera" C 4 p <i>open 3-25-94 NLJ 93-423</i>	1/14/64	A
#100 memo	Chase to Bundy C 1 p <i>open 3/1/06</i>	4/27/64	A

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/USSR/CHINA/CUBA

25X1A

DATE OF INFO. MAY-JUNE 1964

DISTR. 17 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

1. KHRUSHCHEV'S ASSISTENCE THAT THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY
SLID WITH THE USSR IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
2. DENIAL OF CUBA AS A TRAINING SITE FOR VENEZUELAN
GUERRILLAS

25X1A

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

793

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

25X1X

1. ACCORDING TO A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO
COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA) THE SIXTH
PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HELD IN APRIL 1964, DECIDED TO TAKE
A NEUTRAL POSITION IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS
AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTIES. THE PLENUM AGREED TO SEND TELEGRAMS
TO THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA EXPRESSING THE HOPE OF THE PCV THAT
THE CONFLICT WOULD BE SOLVED THROUGH CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
COMMUNIST POWERS HELD IN A MARXIST-LENINIST SPIRIT. THE PLENUM
ALSO DECIDED TO SEND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
ANOTHER ONE TO CHINA TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~XXXXXXXX~~ OGI ONE OCR ORR XXXX
FBI INS

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 001-74-6-1
By h, NARA, Date 9-18-14

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

IN 29793

PAGE 2

2. WHEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PCV CENTRAL COMMITTEE WENT TO MOSCOW FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH PLENUM, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV PRESENTED A DOCUMENT WITH A LIST OF ALL THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WHO HAVE SIDED WITH THE SOVIETS. HE DEMANDED THAT THE VENEZUELAN SIGN IT IN THE NAME OF THE PCV. WHEN HIS DEMAND WAS REFUSED, KHRUSHCHEV FLEW INTO A RAGE. AND THE FOLLOWING DAY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE WAS USHERED OUT OF HIS HOTEL, TAKEN TO THE AIRPORT, AND TOLD TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY FOR VENEZUELA. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE KNOWN THE WISHES OF THE SOVIETS TO THE PCV CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

3. LATER, ANOTHER PCV CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE WAS SENT TO MOSCOW AND SAW KHRUSHCHEV. THE LATTER EXPRESSED THE CONCERN OF THE SOVIETS OVER THE DELAY OF THE PCV IN TAKING A POSITION IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. HE TOLD THE PCV REPRESENTATIVE BLUNTLY THAT HE WOULD NOT PERMIT VENEZUELAN TO BE TRAINED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CUBA SINCE THE SAFEGUARDING OF CUBA REQUIRES THAT NO LATIN AMERICANS BE GIVEN POLITICAL OR MILITARY TRAINING THERE.

4. FIDEL CASTRO HAS INFORMED THE PCV THAT IN THE FUTURE CUBA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE VENEZUELAN TRAINEES.

5. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA BECAUSE OF THE INSISTENCE OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV THAT THE PCV ALIGN ITSELF WITH THE SOVIETS. COMMENT: THE PCV

25X1A

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET <i>(When Filled In)</i>	CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS	25X1A	N 29793
	NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM	[REDACTED]	

CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS DOMINATED BY THE HARD-LINE, PRO-VIOLENCE FACTION).

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT

25X1A

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET	CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS	NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
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XEROX FROM QUIC COPY

AIRGRAM

Handwritten notes and signatures in top right corner.

AMR	REF	LT
ARA	EUP	TR
NEA	CU	TRA
E	P	HO
SS	FBO	HO
AGR	COM	FRE
INT	LAR	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

Vertical handwritten notes:
A-1,
NO.
TO
Amembassy CARACAS
7 PM 5 41
JUL 7 1964

~~SECRET~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amembassy CARACAS

Copy 61 Series B S
2 Pages, 67 Copies

JUL 7 2 46 PM '64

FROM : Department of State

DATE: **DECLASSIFIED**

SUBJECT : Policy and Action Paper

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-423

REF

By ~~1-8~~, NARA, Date ~~2-28-94~~

Enclosed are (1) a Policy and Action Paper for Venezuela, reviewed and approved by the Latin American Policy Committee in its meeting of June 4, 1964, (2) Minutes of the LAPC meeting, and (3) a copy of National Security Action Memorandum No. 297, which is referred to in the LAPC minutes.

Distr.

ARA
ARA/CV
O/MP

The first two documents should be considered as the approved current and comprehensive statement of U. S. policy objectives and lines of action with respect to Venezuela, until such time as the Department or the Embassy concludes that revisions are necessary. Plans for the preparation of National Policy Papers through calendar 1965 do not include Venezuela.

The Policy and Action Paper is substantially the same as pages 3 through 10 of the revised Internal Defense Plan proposed in A-461 from Caracas, January 31, 1964. As you know, the Special Group (C.I.) now requires only that the Ambassador periodically submit a letter report on the internal security situation in Venezuela; there is no requirement for a current Internal Defense Plan.

The Policy and Action Paper, in addition to providing guidance to all elements of the U. S. Mission for their planning and programming, also provides the basis for updating the CCPS at an early date. The Policy and Action Paper and the CCPS should be considered as separate but obviously related documents. Proposed / changes

~~SECRET~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: ARA:JMFrev:ahh 7/6/64

Contents and Classification approved by: ARA - Robert W. Adams

Clearances: ARA/CV - Mr. Lancaster

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy CARACAS - 2 -

changes in the Policy and Action Paper should be submitted to the Department through regular channels and will be considered by the LAPC as required. Any recommendations growing out of the revision of the CCPS, other than those dealing with changes in the Policy and Action Paper, may be submitted to the Department for action through a CCPS Program Book or such Washington channels and means, including the LAPC, as may be appropriate.

BALL (ACTING)

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

POLICY AND ACTION PAPER FOR VENEZUELA

I. OBJECTIVES

LATIN AMERICAN POLICY COMMITTEE
APPROVED
DATE JUN 4 1964 BY:
<i>J. H. Key</i> EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

A. Long Term U. S. Objectives

1. Internal Development

(a) Political

1. The evolution of political institutions in Venezuela that are compatible with those of the Western democratic world and provide for an orderly transfer of power from administration to administration in accordance with periodic and free elections.

(b) Economic

1. Sustained economic growth that reaches all sectors of the Venezuelan society and that provides a growing contribution to the economic fabric of the hemisphere.

(c) Social/Cultural

1. The adoption of further social reform measures that meet the aspirations of the Venezuelan people and provide opportunities for the individual inherent in a free society.

(d) Security

1. Internal security forces in Venezuela able and willing to maintain law and order and to resist successfully threats to constitutional authority.

2. International Relations

(a) Political

1. Continued Venezuelan support of U. S. foreign policy objectives with regard to key international security

/ issues

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Authority RAC-NLJ001-074-6-2
By is, NARA, Date 8-8-02

issues in international forums including the U. N. and the OAS.

(b) Economic

1. A bilateral trading relationship designed to meet the economic needs of both countries and to strengthen political ties between the U. S. and Venezuela.

B. Short Term U. S. Objectives

1. Internal Development

(a) Political

1. Maintenance of a parliamentary and political base for the Leoni administration sufficiently broad to achieve stability and to enact the legislation necessary to achieve the other objectives set forth herein.

2. Maintenance of the stability of this new Constitutional Government, which may continue to be threatened with communist insurgency and right-wing military action.

(c) Social/Cultural

1. An increasing respect by the people of Venezuela for the human values inherent in individual freedom, national independence, and economic and social progress.

(d) Security

1. Willingness of the Venezuelan armed forces to play a constructive role in the growth of constitutional government including, when called upon, the suppression of insurgency fomented by opponents of the democratically elected government.

2. A decline in communist strength and influence and the prevention of Venezuela's conversion into a beachhead for the propagation of such strength or influence elsewhere in this hemisphere.

/ 2. International

2. International Relations

(b) Economic

1. A U. S. and multilateral assistance effort designed to encourage and support recognized Venezuelan governments in rapidly carrying out sound reform and development programs that will achieve orderly economic, social and political growth.

(d) Security

1. Continued Venezuelan cooperation in the isolation of a Castro regime in Cuba. 1,3
(c)(5)

II. U. S. COURSES OF ACTION

1. Internal Development

(a) Political

1. Continue to emphasize U. S. support for democratically-elected governments through (a) public statements by U. S. officials, and (b) private conversations with leading politicians, Venezuelan military officers, businessmen, journalists, students, teachers, and other public opinion molders.

2. Avoid statements both in public pronouncements and private conversations that could be construed as supporting a particular party or individual.

3. Identify and encourage democratically-oriented and socially conscious leadership, which may be politically inactive, to take constructive part in the political life of Venezuela.

4. Improve legislative support for democratically-elected administration by encouraging a coalition of democratically-oriented parties and by encouraging non-extremist opposition parties to cooperate constructively in the legislative process.

/ 5. Encourage

5. Encourage the Venezuelan Government to maintain, within constitutional bounds, political pressure against the Communist and MIR parties and their potential allies, preventing them from having a legal, overt apparatus as cover for their subversive and insurrectionary activities.

6. Through available mass media, seminars, and private conversations, attempt to (a) strengthen the confidence of the Venezuelan public in their present system of constitutional, democratic government, and (b) convince Venezuelans that their aspirations for economic growth and social justice can best be achieved under an open society. Also discreetly emphasize the threat of the communist movement which seeks to destroy political independence and to impose a system that flouts the dignity of the individual and human rights, impedes economic and social progress, and retards the general welfare.

7. Enhance Venezuelan knowledge about the United States and its foreign policy.

8. Engender respect and appreciation for the cultural, social and scientific achievements made in the Western world by free societies committed to the general welfare of their members.

9. Stress the accomplishments and programs of the Alliance for Progress as the positive answer to Castroism.

10. Help Venezuela in the further development of a free labor force in support of democratic governments and political institutions.

11. Discreetly encourage and help pro-democratic or neutral students and teachers to build Venezuela's future on a firm base of progressive democracy by thwarting extremist efforts.

(b) Economic

1. Assist in the development of needed civil service legislation and an effective cadre of public administrators and instructors to train middle and lower level public servants.

/ 2. Assist

2. Assist Venezuela in training government labor officials to provide effective government labor services and strengthen labor-management-government relations.

3. Help improve the quality of leadership in the free labor movement through training programs designed for Venezuelan labor leaders.

4. Encourage the Venezuelans to take further action, within the limits of political feasibility, on fiscal reforms such as improved and expanded tax bases and better collection rate, unified exchange rates, development of a more effective local capital market, including a better market for Venezuelan Government obligations.

5. Urge Venezuela to continue and intensify its efforts to stimulate private investment and private enterprises.

6. Encourage the Venezuelan Government to create a climate of security for beneficial foreign private investment by clearly enunciating and pursuing policies that will dispel fears of nationalization, discrimination, or unfair competition from public enterprise. Encourage local businessmen to support this objective as well as refrain from advocating discriminatory measures against foreign capital.

7. Encourage and assist the Venezuelans in obtaining sound private managerial assistance for its government-owned industries and enterprises in order to demonstrate that competent private management may be an effective and politically feasible way of improving the operation of state enterprise.

8. Urge the Venezuelans to accomplish those aspects of their Four-Year Plan which are reasonable goals for achievement.

(c) Social/Cultural

1. Urge the Venezuelans to intensify efforts to accelerate private and public non-paternalistic social development programs with emphasis on local responsibility and initiative.

/ 2. Encourage

2. Encourage active participation in Venezuela's development of non-government U. S. interests such as Ford Foundation, Creole and other local Foundations, U. S. labor organizations, U. S. cooperative associations, Accion, etc.

3. Concentrate U. S. assistance effort primarily in the fields of development of human resources, rural development, including particularly agrarian reform, housing and community development.

4. Provide essential development and technical assistance not readily available from third country or international organizations or of particular concern to the U. S. (such as public safety and agrarian reform); utilize loans rather than grants for social development projects.

5. Expand U. S. Peace Corps program in Venezuela to the extent that projects requested by the Venezuelan government are consistent with U. S. country objectives and programs and can be carried out within the Corp's available resources.

6. By means of AID, Food for Peace, and Peace Corps programs, continue progressive social development efforts in direct impact projects in the fields of housing, education, agrarian reform, health, and community services.

7. Encourage the employment of Venezuelan military forces, without detriment to their primary security mission, on projects which contribute to economic and social development.

(d) Security

1. Utilizing contacts between Venezuelan military officials and U. S. personnel as well as those U. S. programs capable of reaching the Venezuelan military, influence them to (1) give positive support to democratically-elected government; (2) understand the advantages to international communism which result from coups or attempted coups against constitutional order; (3) combat communist infiltration and influence within their own ranks and (4) recognize the importance of active participation in hemispheric security.

/ 2. Urge

2. Urge the Venezuelan government to maintain its armed forces at approximately their present strength.

3. Encourage the Venezuelans to improve training of the Armed Forces, with priority emphasis on counter-insurgency training, including intelligence, and to take advantage of U. S. training opportunities by full attendance at courses of instruction offered by the U. S.

4. Persuade the Venezuelan military against excessive or unnecessary acquisition of military equipment and against expansion of the armed forces leading them to concentrate principally on general internal security, including counter-insurgency capability as well as surveillance and intercept capability (both air and surface) utilizing annual allocations from the MAS program as necessary.

5. Urge the Venezuelans to modernize and standardize (along U. S. lines) the equipment of the armed forces, with special emphasis on up-grading capabilities to counter insurgency and maintain internal security, within a ceiling for the armed forces of approximately 10 per cent of the national budget and such foreign credits as may reasonably be expected to be repaid by the GOV.

6. During the period of emphasis on insuring stability of constitutional government and countering communist insurgency maintain and improve Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities to the extent that this does not divert resources from paragraph 5 or increase the current percentage of the armed forces budget devoted to ASW.

7. Facilitate training for Venezuelan military personnel in Venezuela and/or at U. S. installations.

8. Expedite the delivery of equipment to the Venezuelan armed forces under the bilateral military credit program.

9. Develop in the armed forces a mapping capability both for military and economic purposes.

10. Assist Venezuela with improvement of its police forces, including intelligence capabilities, through the expanded AID public safety program and through timely help

/ in the procurement

in the procurement of needed police equipment.

2. International Relations

(a) Political

1. Encourage and support Venezuelan initiatives in international organizations against the Castro regime in Cuba.

2. Discourage Venezuela from pursuing either bilaterally or through international organizations its claim to the disputed territory on the British Guiana border, when such activity would tend ultimately to irritate U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

3. Encourage Venezuela to support U. S. basic objectives in the U. N., the OAS, and other international organizations.

4. Encourage the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor and its affiliates to enlarge their contacts with ORIT and the International Trade Secretariats to augment the possibilities of establishing trade union leadership training programs, improving collective bargaining techniques.

(b) Economic

1. Oppose discriminatory or unreasonable restrictions on U. S. shipping or air carriers with due consideration for legitimate Venezuelan interest in developing and protecting its own national carriers.

2. Encourage the Venezuelans to make training facilities available to other Latin American countries and to provide assistance to other less developed Latin American countries.

(c) Social/Cultural

1. Stimulate help for Venezuela, as requested, for continued technical assistance from OAS, UNTA, UNSF;

/ capital

capital assistance for social and other development needs from IDB, IBRD; import of U. S. goods and services (consistent with 4 above), from ExIm Bank; and assistance from other free world countries.

(d) Security

1.3
(a)(5)

1. [REDACTED]

2. Encourage the Venezuelan Armed Forces to give their active support to the Inter-American Defense Board.

3. Reports

(a) Political/Labor

1.3
(a)(5)

1. Intensify efforts [REDACTED] concerning conspiratorial activity against the government, collaboration of non-communistic left leaders with communist and MIR leaders in political planning or subversive activities (including dissident military officials), and the identification of crypto-communist or crypto-MIR agents who have penetrated other organizations.

2. In the light of the 1963 election results and the resulting composition of Congress, [REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5)

[REDACTED]

Continue also to interpret current and impending political developments in terms of their implications for U. S. policy.

3. [REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5)

4. [REDACTED]

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1.3
(u)(5)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 22, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 297

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Latin American Military Aid

The President has today approved determinations with regard to military aid to Latin America.

In administering these funds and planning future programs, the President wishes to insure that our policies, MAP and otherwise, are directed toward the following general objectives:

1. Military expenditures by the host country which are consistent with and proportionate to expenditures for social and economic development.
2. The maintenance of a military establishment in the host country which is realistic in terms of our estimate of its potential missions.
3. The establishment of elite units which might be used in U.N. peace-keeping assignments.
4. Continued emphasis on civic action and internal security missions, the latter to be realistically defined.
5. Definition of a clear relationship between military internal security missions and police functions and a rational pattern of U.S. funding for same.
6. Emphasis in training and by other means on the role of the military in a modern democratic society.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-424
By lig, NARA, Date 10-12-94

7. Avoidance of sophisticated and expensive prestige equipment in our grant or sale programs except where specifically justified. In this connection, host country purchase from other sources of non-essential prestige equipment is to be actively discouraged.

The President desires, by 1 August 1964, a brief analysis and report on the military situation in each country and the changes, if any, to which our policies are being directed. These reports should measure the existing situation against the above general objectives and other relevant factors. The reports should be prepared under the general direction of the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs with the cooperation of other agencies.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan
Mr. Chase
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files
~~NSC~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUNDY SMITH
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE 1642 JUNE 20 NOON

REF: DEPTTEL 1160

AGREE EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE MINIMIZE VENEZUELAN REACTION TO PROSPECTIVE CUTS IN OIL IMPORTS TO US, IF THEY CANNOT BE AVOIDED, AND BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT WE STAY WITHIN SPIRIT OF KENNEDY-BETANCOURT COMMUNIQUE CALLING FOR PRIOR EXCHANGE INFORMATION (NOT JUST NOTIFICATION) ON CHANGES AFFECTING VENEZUELA. THEREFOR CONCUR VISIT ASSISTANT SECRETARIES JOHNSON AND KELLY WITHOUT PUBLICITY AND WILL SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT LEONI AND MINISTER OF MINES FOR TUESDAY JUNE 23. AS DOCTORS HAVE NOT YET AUTHORIZED MY RETURN TO WORK, DCOM AND PETROLEUM ATTACHE MAY TAKE MY PLACE. WOULD ALSO SUGGEST MATTER BE TAKEN UP WITH VEN EMB WASHINGTON AND THAT WE BE GIVEN AMPLE PRESS MATERIAL IN ADVANCE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF REVISED PROGRAM.

WOULD WELCOME INFO ON PROSPECTIVE CUTS AND REASONS THEREFORE. WOULD ALSO STRONGLY URGE FURTHER REVIEW TO SEE IF THEY CANNOT BE AVOIDED. AS DEPT AWARE, APPROVED INTERNAL DEFENSE PLAN AND OTHER COUNTRY PLANNING DOCUMENTS GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO NOT CUTTING VENEZUELAN OIL IMPORTS, WHILE VENEZUELAN FOUR YEAR PLAN RELIES ON ANNUAL 4PERCENT INCREASE PETROLEUM RESOURCES, OF WHICH ONLY 1.7 PERCENT BEING ACHIEVED THIS YEAR. THUS CUTS, IN ADDITION TO CREATING ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT US-VEN REALTIIONS AT TIME MOUNTING AGITATION FOR REVISION TRADE TREATY AND OTHER EVIDENCES RISING NATIONALISM, WOULD ALSO BE BLOW TO OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES HERE. STEWART
GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:32 PM, JUNE 20.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 1:37 PM, JUNE 20.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *ng/csm* NARA, Date *3-1-06*

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Vandy

1.3(a)(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

LENNANDER
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4

COUNTRY VENEZUELA
DATE OF INFO. APRIL, 1964

SANITIZED
Authority RAC-NLJ001-074-6-3
By is, NARA, Date 8-7-02

DISTR. 19 MAY 1964
1.3(a)(4)

SUBJECT

CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIFTH PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

[Redacted]

REF [Redacted] IN 85625

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

[Redacted]

1.3(a)(4)
1.3(a)(4)

1. THE FIFTH PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA) WAS HELD IN OR NEAR CARACAS FROM 17-19 APRIL 1964 WITH PROBABLY LESS THAN HALF OF THE 80 MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ATTENDING. TOPICS WHICH WERE COVERED INCLUDED:

- A. A CRITTTICAL ANALYSIS OF PCV POLICY AND ERRORS PRIOR TO THE 1 DECEMBER 1963 NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN VENEZUELA;
- B. AN EVALUATION OF THE ELECTION RESULTS;
- C. THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN VENEZUELA;
- D. ELECTION OF A NEW POLITBUREAU; AND
- E. THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE PCV.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

EXO 1.3(a)(4)

2. MAJORITY APPROVAL, WITH SOME OPPOSITION, WAS OBTAINED FOR A POLICY OF CONTINUING AND DEVELOPING ARMED STRUGGLE TO "REMOVE" THE PRESENT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND TO "CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A PATRIOTIC GOVERNMENT". IT WAS ARGUED THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF RECENT YEARS HAD SHOWN THERE COULD BE NO OTHER WAY TO ESTABLISH A PATRIOTIC GOVERNMENT. PRESENT TASKS OF THE PCV WERE GIVEN AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARMED STRUGGLE WOULD BE PROLONGED SINCE THE ENEMY WAS STRONG AND THE PCV TEMPORARILY WEAK. ANY MILITARY UPRISINGS OR REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPTS SHOULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE PCV.

B. THE ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD BE DIRECTED NOT ONLY BY THE PCV BUT BY ALL FORCES MAKING UP THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION). A NATIONAL POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMITTEE AND SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE CREATED AS WELL AS A GENERAL STAFF OF THE FALN.

C. THE POLICY OF ACHIEVING THE UNITY OF ALL OPPOSITION POLITICAL FORCES WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY THE FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FLN, NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT).

D. PLANS OF THE PCV AND JUVENTUD COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (JCV, COMMUNIST YOUTH OF VENEZUELA) AS REGARDS ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES WERE TO BE IN ACCORD WITH THE FALN. RULES REGARDING COMMUNIST RELATIONS WITH THE FALN WERE TO BE ESTABLISHED.

E. INCREASED ATTENTION IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE GUERRILLA FORCES

WHICH SHOULD BE REINFORCED WITH ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL. THE GUERRILLAS ARE A SPECIFIC MEANS OF ARMED STRUGGLE TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST PETROLEUM AND IRON MINING INSTALLATIONS OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN VENEZUELA.

F. FALN ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE BASED ON COORDINATED PLANS FOR ALL FALN FORCES.

G. FALN PERSONNEL SHOULD RECEIVE BETTER EDUCATION IN REGARD TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY MATTERS. AT THE SAME TIME THE STRUCTURE OF THE FALN SHOULD BE IMPROVED WITH REGARD TO MILITARY AND IDEOLOGICAL MATTERS.

H. WORK AMONG THE MASSES HAS BEEN A GREAT WEAKNESS OF THE PARTY AND THIS WORK SHOULD BE IMPROVED RADICALLY. THE PARTY IS TO EXPLOIT THE FEELING IN THE MASSES WHICH FAVORS PEACEFUL STRUGGLE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS SINCE THIS DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE CONCEPT OF ARMED STRUGGLE. HOWEVER, THE MASSES MUST BE PREPARED FOR THE INEVITABLE RENEWAL OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND ARE TO BE GIVEN TASKS RELATED TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE, SOLIDARITY WITH POLITICAL PRISONERS, ETC.

3. THE ARMED STRUGGLE WILL BE RENEWED AFTER CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN CREATED WHICH WILL MAKE IT APPEAR TO THE MASSES THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS FORCED THE FALN INTO THE ARMED STRUGGLE BECAUSE NO POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR PEACE. THE POLITBUREAU OF THE PCV WILL PUBLISH A SERIES OF INCREASINGLY INFLAMMATORY ARTICLES ADVOCATING THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, PARTICULARLY THE IMPRISONED CONGRESSMEN, WHICH WILL BE SUPPORTED BY AGITATION AND PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS. THE NEWSPAPER LA EXTRA CONTROLLED BY THE PCV WILL AID IN THIS CAMPAIGN.

THE EXPECTED REPRESSIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN THE FACE OF THIS CAMPAIGN WILL LEAD TO CLASHES WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY JUSTIFY THE RENEWAL OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE BY THE FALN. THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT IN THE MEETING ABOUT WHETHER THE ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD BE RENEWED IMMEDIATELY, WITH THOSE IN FAVOR ARGUING THAT EVERY DAY THE ARMED STRUGGLE WAS DELAYED REPRESENTED A VICTORY FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER A MAJORITY AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO START UNTIL CONDITIONS EXISTED WHICH THE MASSES COULD UNDERSTAND. THEY ARGUED THAT FALN ACTIVITIES SHOULD APPEAR TO BE A REPLY TO THE REPRESSIVE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN AN UNJUSTIFIED CHALLENGE TO THE GOVERNMENT.

4. THE PLENUM APPROVED PCV POLICY BEFORE THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER 1963 OF SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SINGLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF ALL THE OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES OF "LEGAL OPPOSITION". HOWEVER, THE LEGAL OPPOSITION VIEWED THE PCV AS A STUMBLING BLOCK TO THEIR CHANCES FOR GAINING POWER AND NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. PCV CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEGAL OPPOSITION WERE UNNECESSARILY PROLONGED SO THAT WHEN THE PARTY FINALLY DECIDED TO ABSTAIN FROM THE ELECTIONS, IT WAS SO LATE THAT PROPER INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT GIVEN TO PARTY MEMBERS IN TIME. ARMED STRUGGLE TACTICS IN THE MEANTIME WERE NOT USED TO HEIGHTEN THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY BUT CONSISTED OF AN ERRONEOUS EMPHASIS ON SENSATIONALIST WARFARE IN THE CITIES. AFTER 30 SEPTEMBER 1963

THE ARMED STRUGGLE WAS "DELAYED", WHICH FAVORED THE GOVERNMENT. LACK OF CORRECT PLANNING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, VIOLATION OF RULES OF CONSPIRACY AND UNDERESTIMATION OF THE ENEMY LED TO SERIOUS SETBACKS FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

5. THE ELECTION RESULTS SHOWED THAT A MAJORITY OF PEOPLE VOTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE VICTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS A DEFEAT FOR THE PCV, THE DEFEAT WAS REGARDED AS "TRANSITORY".

6. THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN VENEZUELA WAS DESCRIBED AS ONE IN WHICH THE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM HAVE DECIDED TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI, WHICH IS BASICALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT OF ROMULO BETANCOURT. THE UNION REPUBLICANA DEMOCRATICA (URD, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION) HAS MADE A PACT IN THE CONGRESS WITH THE ACCION DEMOCRATICA (AD, DEMOCRATIC ACTION) PARTY

AND HOPES TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT IN A COALITION.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS DURING ITS FIRST MONTHS IN OFFICE DECREASED IT REPRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE PCV AND MOVIMIENTO DE IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA (MIR, MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT) AS A TACTIC TO LESSEN OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. THERE IS NO FRONTAL OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE CRISIS IN THE ARMED FORCES EXISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT STABLE BECAUSE OF CONTRADICTIONS IN ITS MAKE-UP.

THUS IT IS CORRECT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION IF AT THE SAME TIME THE STRATEGY OF ARMED STRUGGLE IS MAINTAINED.

7. DURING THE PLENUM THE VIEWS OF POMPEYO MARQUEZ, WHO IS UNDER ARREST, WERE PRESENTED. HE ADVOCATED A HALT TO ANY MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL A COMPLETE REVISION OF THE PARTY COULD BE CARRIED OUT BECAUSE HE BELIEVED CONDITIONS SUCH AS THE CREATION OF A PROPER ATTITUDE AMONG THE MASSES DID NOT YET EXIST. THIS VIEW WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY PLENUM. TEODORO PETKOFF, WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, ADVOCATED SUCH EXTREME VIOLENCE THAT HIS ATTITUDE WAS TERMED "LEFTIST AND NON-MARXIST" BY THE PLENUM WHICH REJECTED HIS VIEWS. ON THE OTHER HAND, RODOLFO QUINTERO QUINTERO PROPOSED THAT ALL MILITARY ACTIONS BE STOPPED SINCE HE BELIEVED SUCH ACTIONS COULD DEGENERATE INTO SIMPLE TERRORISM. HE ADVOCATED THAT PARTY WORK AMONG THE MASSES WAS FUNDAMENTAL, BUT THIS VIEW WAS ALSO REJECTED BY THE PLENUM.

8 A COMMISSION WAS APPOINTED TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF WHAT POSITION THE PCV SHOULD TAKE IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. THE COMMISSION WAS TO MEET AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLENUM AND REPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS TO THE POLITBUREAU.

9. A NEW POLITBUREAU WAS ELECTED DURING THE PLENUM. AMONG THOSE RE-ELECTED TO THE POLITBUREAU WAS ALBERTO LOVERA. RAMON ESPINOZA AND FREDDY MUNOZ WERE ELECTED AS NEW MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU. [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)
COMMENT: THE POLITBUREAU ELECTED IN 1961 AT THE THIRD PCV CONGRESS CONSISTED OF 15 MEMBERS AND 8 ALTERNATES. ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS RECEIVED ABOUT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS BELIEVED TO BE IN CARACAS AREA AT THE TIME OF THE PLENUM, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS

(When Filled In)

WERE AMONG THOSE WHO ATTENDED THE FIFTH PLENUM: DOUGLAS BRAVO MORA, RAMON ESPINOZA, EDUARDO GALLEGOS MANCERA, JOSE MANUEL JIMENEZ, FERNANDO KEY SANCHEZ, ARGHELIA LHAYA DE MARTINEZ, CARLOS AUGUSTO LEON, ALBERTO LOVERA, RAFAEL E. MARTINEZ, TRINO MELEAN, FRANCISCO MIERES, HECTOR MUJICA, FREDDY MUNOZ, PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ, LINO PEREZ LOYO, TEODORO PETKOFF, RODOLFO QUINTERO QUINTERO, DOMINGO SANCHEZ, RAMON ANTONIO VILLARROEL, AND CRUZ VILLEGAS.

10. PRIOR TO THE PLENUM AN "ENLARGED POLITBUREAU" HAD BEEN FUNCTIONING. NEW MEMBERS OF THIS ENLARGED POLITBUREAU INCLUDED RAFAEL E MARTINEZ, DOMINGO SANCHEZ, LINO PEREZ LOYO, TRINO MELEAN, AND CRUZ VILLEGAS. IT HAD ALSO BEEN PLANNED BEFOREHAND TO REMOVE FRANCISCO MIERES FROM THE POLITBUREAU DURING THE PLENUM BECAUSE HE HAD NOT BEEN PERFORMING HIS PARTY WORK SATISFACTORILY.

11. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PCV CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S FIFTH PLENUM DECIDED UPON RESOLUTIONS TO CONCILIATE THE HARD-LINE FACTION REPRESENTED BY POMPEYO MARQUEZ AND THE SOFT-LINE FACTION REPRESENTED BY PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ. THE RESOLUTIONS CONTAIN THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE OVER-ALL TACTIC OF ARMED STRUGGLE BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO ATTEMPT TO GAIN MASS SUPPORT WHICH THE PCV HAS LACKED.

12. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

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5

COUNTRY

VENEZUELA

[Redacted]

DATE OF INFO.

[Redacted]

DISTR. 12 MAY 1964

SUBJECT

DECISION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA TO CONTINUE THE POLICY OF ARMED STRUGGLE

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

[Redacted]

IN 80552

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

[Redacted]

1. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED AT ITS FIFTH PLENUM MEETING IN LATE APRIL THAT ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE ROAD TO THE VENEZUELAN REVOLUTION. THE PCV DECIDED ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE PRINCIPAL POLICY OF THE PCV, AND THAT ALL ELSE WILL BE SUBORDINATED TO IT AND THAT IT WILL BE PROLONGED. HOWEVER, THE PCV CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED, ^{THAT} ALTHOUGH ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE PRIMARY POLICY, EMPHASIS WILL NOT ALWAYS BE PLACED ON IT.

2. [Redacted] DISSEMINATION: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCOS, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ-001-074-6-4
By rg/cbm, NARA, Date 3-1-06

1. ~~Mr. Dungan~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

Wesley

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Wenny Bundy

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Rec'd: April 30, 1964
10:34 p.m.

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FROM: Caracas

ACTION: SecState 1411

DATE: April 30, 5 p.m.

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FOR MANN AND MEDICAL DIVISION FROM HILL

Doctors express themselves as well pleased by Ambassador Stewart's progress following latest electrocardiogram. Present expectation is that he will remain in bed until approximately May 15, in house until latter part of month. He should then be allowed come into office for few hours day for next several weeks and thereafter gradually increase activity. Written report has not yet been prepared. Ambassador has not yet been told full scope damage but is being familiarized with probably schedule for coming weeks.

STEWART

LM



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INCOMING MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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MASTER FILE

Venezuela

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FM USCINCSO

TO RUEAHQ/DIA

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 RUCKHC/CINCLANT
 RUCSBR/SAC
 RULPAK/COMUSARSO
 RULBCR/COMUSNAVSO
 RUEANF/COMUSAFSO

~~SECRET~~ SC3253D. SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN VENEZUELA

1. THIS MESSAGE IS SUMMARY OF UNEVALUATED INFORMATION ON GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN VENEZUELA OBTAINED IN DE-BRIEFING LT COLONEL KEITH COOKUS, USAF, MEMBER OF THE JOC MOBILE TRAINING TEAM IN VENEZUELA. (SEE EMBTEL 1373 DTG 232226Z APRIL 1964)

2. COLONEL ANTONIO DEROSA ALUZUSALSE, DIRECTOR OF THE JOC, VENEZUELA, STATED TO U.S. JOC MTT MEMBERS THAT TWO SUBMARINE LANDINGS OF ARMS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS NEAR MACHURUCATO AND PUERTO LA CRUZ. NO SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS WERE MADE DUE TO LATE RECEIPT OF INTOMATION PRECLUDING SUFFICIENT REACTION TIME.

3. A GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMP REPORTED NEAR CARIPITO IS ESTIMATED TO CONTAIN 280 GUERRILLA TRAINEES. LT COLONEL COOKUS STATES THAT ON 19 OR 20 APRIL 1964, A 21 MAN RECON PATROL LEAD BY A LIEUTENANT WENT INTO THE AREA AND HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE.

4. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY

COG.....DIA-6

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-7 J5-1 SACS-5 NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 CSA-2
 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 OSD-15 FILE-1 (62)SO

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 By ra/cbu, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

LT COLONEL COOKUS FROM VARIOUS VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES MEMBERS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL OF THE MOBILE AND CREOLE OIL COMPANIES. THIS INFORMATION IS UNCONFIRMED BUT LT COLONEL COOKUS CONSIDERS IT RELIABLE.

A. ANOTHER GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMP, LOCATED NEAR VALLE DE GUANAPE, HAS BEEN REPORTED BY MOBILE OIL COMPANY SECURITY PERSONNEL.

B. GUERRILLA SABOTAGE OF THE MENE GRANDE OIL COMPANY PIPELINE HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING PATTERN: 1 INCIDENT IN DECEMBER, 2 INCIDENTS IN JANUARY, 3 INCIDENTS IN FEBRUARY, 9 INCIDENTS IN MARCH, AND 8 INCIDENTS FROM 1 TO 15 APRIL. INITIAL ATTEMPTS OF SABOTAGE WERE POORLY CARRIED OUT. EACH SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT WAS MORE SUCCESSFUL AND SHOWED AN IMPROVED TECHNIQUE IN BLASTING AND CUTTING PIPELINE. THE MOST RECENT ATTEMPT WAS THE BLOWING UP OF A PUMPING STATION ON THE MAIN PIPELINE NORTH OF EL TIGRE 18 APRIL 1964 IN WHICH 2 OF THE SABOTEURS WERE KILLED. THE DEAD MEN WERE IDENTIFIED AS LOCAL RESIDENTS. THE MENE GRANDE OIL COMPANY HAS NO SECURITY FORCE AND HAS BEEN AN EASY TARGET FOR THE GUERRILLAS.

C. A VENEZUELAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REPORT INDICATED THAT DURING THE PAST WEEK A SMALL CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT LANDED AT AN AIRFIELD NEAR SAN JUAN DE LOS MORROS (SOUTH OF MARACAY) TO REFUEL. VENEZUELAN MILITARY SURVEILLANCE TEAM AT THE FIELD SEARCHED THE AIRCRAFT. BAGGAGE WAS FOUND TO CONTAIN MANY GRENADES AND SEVERAL SUB-MACHINE GUNS. MAKES OF WEAPONS WERE NOT REPORTED.

5. GUERRILLA ACTIVITY HAS BEEN MARKEDLY INCREASED IN THE EASTERN AREAS OF VENEZUELA AS A CONSEQUENCE OF VENEZUELAN SECURITIES AUTHORITIES COUNTERING GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE FALCON STATE.

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James
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY 1389 APRIL 25 1PM

PRESIDENT LEONI CAME TO SEE ME FRIDAY NIGHT. HE FEELS VENEZUELAN PROTEST AGAINST CUBA WILL BE FAILURE. BASES THIS FEELING ON FOLLOWING:

1. FALCON BRICENO'S IN ARGENTINA, CHILE INDICATED DESIRE THESE COUNTRIES FOR "UNANIMITY" OPINION, WHICH LEONI CONSIDERS KISS OF DEATH;
2. PRESIDENT LEONI IS PERPLEXED BY RECENT EVENTS INVOLVING US, RUSSIA AND CUBA. HAS FEELING BUT HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF NEW RAPPROCHMENT US-USSR IN COLD WAR AND WHEN TWO GREAT POWERS DO THIS LITTLE GUYS HAVE NO CONTROL OVER CIRCUMSTANCES. HE IS AT LOSS ASCERTAIN HOW VENEZUELAN RESOLUTION WOULD BE AFFECTED BY ANY CHANGE IN US-CUBAN RELATIONS, WHICH CONGJECTURED BY PRESS.
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PAGE TWO RUESRS 432 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PARENTHETICALLY, I ASSURED LEONI THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH COUNTERMENDED THOSE CONTAINED DEPTTEL 714 FEB 13.

3. LEONI AND GOV HAVE NO HOPE THAT BRAZIL WILL BREAK WITH CURA OR USSR. LEONI ENTERTAINED NO HOPE OF REAL BRAZILIAN INITIATIVE ON CUBAN RESOLUTION IF GOV HAD RECOGNIZED NEW REGIME.

ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH ENTERS INTO PRESENT SITUATION IS NAGGING DOUBT ON PART LEONI ADMINISTRATION WHETHER US POLICY RE LATIN AMERICA IS CHANGING. LEONI, FOR EXAMPLE, MENTIONED WHEN HE SAW ME THAT SOME RIGHTIST ELEMENTS HAD TAKEN HEART AT OUR QUICK APPROVAL NEW BRAZILIAN REGIME AND WERE TALKING OVERTHROW

- ~~BU~~
- ~~BE~~
- ~~BR~~
- ~~CHAS~~
- ~~DUNCAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JETTUP~~
- ~~JONSON~~
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- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *kg/cbu*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1389, APRIL 25, 1 PM: FROM CARACAS

HIS REGIME AT SOME LATER DATE. SPEAKING REALISTICALLY, LEONI SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS OFF TO GOOD START AND DID NOT ANTICIPATE TROUBLE BUT THAT VENEZUELAN RIGHTIST DEVELOPMENT WAS MORE RECENT THAN THAT HE REPORTED TO ME ABOUT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

DESPITE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S CATEGORICAL STATEMENTS AT INAUGURATION CIAP, HIS ADMINISTRATION'S DETRACTORS KEEP ENOUGH PROPAGANDA COMING LATIN AMERICAN'S WAY SO THAT REITERATION OF OUR AIMS IS CONTINUING NECESSITY.

CFN 714 13 3

PAGE THREE RUESRS 432 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LEONI WANTS MFM EVEN THOUGH NOTHING IS DONE ON CUBAN RESOLUTION WORTH MENTIONING. HE IS OF OPINION THAT, EVEN IF OAS DOES NOT TAKE PROPER ACTION AGAINST CUBA, THERE SHOULD BE AMPLE DEBATE AND SOME NOSE COUNTING. HE SAID QUITE FRANKLY THAT FAILURE BY OAS TO ACT WOULD NOT MEAN VENEZUELA'S PULLOUT BUT HIS COUNTRY'S FAITH IN THIS ORGANIZATION WOULD HAVE ENDED.

IN LIGHT LEONI'S UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT COURSE OF US POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA, WHICH ARE SHARED BY MANY LEADING FIGURES HERE, IT MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL IF SPEECH BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MANN, ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 6 WERE DELIVERED AS SOON AS OPPORTUNE, WITH VIEW CLARIFYING AND DEFINING US POSITION.

STEWART

GP-3

BT

CFN 6

NOTE: DISTRIBUTION COORDINATED WITH SS-0

No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-001-074-6-6-0
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Verizon 10

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AMEMBASSY CARACAS

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USIA

ACTION DEPT PRITY **1373** INFO PRITY USCINCSO UNN FROM CARAC
APR 23-6PM

NSC

INR

JOINT EMBASSY/USMILGRU MESSAGE

CIA

NSA

AT REQUEST CHIEF JOINT DEFENSE STAFF, DIRECTOR OF JOINT OPERATIONS
CENTER (COL. DEROSA) BRIEFED CHIEF OF OUR JOC MTT AS FOLLOWS:

OSD

DIA-25x1

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

RMR

(1) VEN. ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, [REDACTED]
INDICATED AT LEAST TWO SUBMARINE LANDINGS OF ARMS ESTIMATED 6 METRIC
TONS, MADE WITHIN LAST TWO WEEKS NEAR MACHURUCUTU (BETWEEN CARACAS
CFN 1373 23-6PM (1) 6

PAGE TWO RUESRS 391 ~~SECRET~~
AND PUERTO LA CRUZ--10 DEGREES 15' N - 65 DEGREES 65'W). NATURE
THESE ARMS NOT BEEN MADE KNOWN TO US NOR WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN
TRACED.

DIA-25x1

(2) SOME INTELLIGENCE SOURCES INDICATE TRAINING BASES FOR GUERRILLAS
HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN MOUNTAIN AREAS NORTHWEST CARIPITO. THESE
ARE NOW BREAKING UP INTO GROUPS 16 TO 17 MEN AND MOVING INTO INTERIOR
[REDACTED] MOVEMENT OF ARMS AND PERSONNEL WEST
TO EAST.

ON BASIS OF ABOVE, BRIEFING OFFICER STATES GOV WILL SEND "GOVERNMENT
TO GOVERNMENT" REQUEST FOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY TO IDENTIFY TRAINING
SITES AND, IF POSSIBLE, CATCH SUBMARINE SURFACING. GOV DESIRES
SECURITY FOR THIS OPERATION AND SUGGESTS U-2 COVERAGE FOR THIS PURPOSE
AND TO ASSURE HIGH QUALITY PHOTOGRAPHY.

~~SECRET~~

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No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-001-074-6-6-0

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 001R-74-6-1
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 9-18-14

No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-001-074-6-6-0

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1373, April 23, 6 p.m.

WE ARE REQUESTING CHIEF JOC MTT AND OTHERS CONCERNED TO:

(1) ASSURE ANY "GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT" REQUEST FROM GOV OF THIS NATURE HAS CLEARANCE MIN. DEFENSE AND POLITICAL AUTHORITIES;

(2) SUPPLY SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE IN ORDER THAT WE CAN ADEQUATELY EVALUATE INFORMATION GIVEN IN BRIEFING. AT PRESENT, NO ELEMENT OF COUNTRY TEAM HAS SUFFICIENT INFO TO CONFIRM OR DENY WHAT BRIEFING OFFICER STATES AND FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING UNDERTAKEN. CONSEQUENTLY, THIS MESSAGE IS ONLY TO ALERT INTERESTED COMMANDS AND AGENCIES OF POSSIBILITY OF REQUEST.

COMUSNAVSO NOW VISITING VENEZUELA HAS BEEN INFORMED.

LT. COL. COOKUS, JOC MTT, RETURNING APRIL 24 WITH COMUSNAVSO AND WILL BRIEF USCINCSO ON RETURN.

GP-3

STEWART

BT

CFN10 15 N 65 65 W (2) 16 17 (1) (2) 24 GP-3

~~SECRET~~

No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-001-074-6-6-0

1. ~~Mr. Dungan~~

11

2. Return to Bromley Smith

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓
WN 11a

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Action

Control: 18709
Rec'd: April 22, 1964
9:44 PM

SS

FROM: Caracas

Info

ACTION: Secstate 1364 Priority

DATE: April 22, 5 PM.

Ag # 3 dist 8/12/64

EXDIS

FOR MANN AND MEDICAL DIVISION FROM HILL

Ambassador Stewart today was diagnosed as having suffered a heart attack (coronary or mio-cardial infraction) affecting interior wall and part of the left side of the heart. He has been ordered to remain in bed for at least three to four weeks and to carry on reduced activities thereafter. He is in the hands of Embassy medical doctor Rafael Castillo and Doctor Alberto Guinand. They report his condition as generally good and see no immediate problem. Mrs. Stewart, who presently in Miami, being notified.

On recommendation of doctor Ambassador has not yet been told of full extend of his condition, nor has Mrs. Stewart, who will be advised upon her expected return this week.

STEWART

CC-10.

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AIRGRAM

BL 23-7 VEN

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A-40 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NO. HANDLING INDICATOR 12

TO : Department of State 1964 APR 17 AM 9 51
 INFO : CARACAS, MARACAIBO
 FROM : Amconsul, Puerto La Cruz DATE: April 14, 1964
 SUBJECT: MIR Terrorists Expose Their Hand
 REF :

RM/AN
 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
 BRANCH

Free

The direct involvement of activists of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in sabotage operations against the Mene Grande Oil Company was revealed dramatically early the morning of April 11 when two young members of that illegal party were killed while setting up timed shape charges on Mene Grande and Mobil Oil Company pipelines 33 kilometers south of Puerto La Cruz.

The explosion which killed the two youths also perforated one of the six pipe lines which parallel both sides of the El Tigre-Anaco-Puerto La Cruz highway. Although some crude petroleum was lost the hole in the pipe line was repaired within a few hours.

Victims of the blast were Ramon Armando AMUNDARAY, 18, of Puerto La Cruz, and Ildemar Antonio RUIZ Fermin, 20, of Caripito, Monagas. The latter, although he has been living with his mother at Caripito and was buried at Maturin yesterday, is the son of Ismael RUIZ, presently Secretary-General of AD in the State of Anzoategui and a member of the Puerto La Cruz Municipal Council. Cedulas de Identidad were found on the youths. Ruiz carried a false identification card as well with the name Francisco de Paula HERNANDEZ Vargas. A 9 mm Browning pistol, with the serial

Exempted from automatic decontrol erased, was...

By *J. James Wick*
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 In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: FWHerron/hh

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

- ~~BUNDY SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KEENY~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~MOODY~~
- ~~REEDY~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

erased, was found near the scene of the blast. Blood stains encountered by the police near the scene give weight to the belief that one other youth was injured and that he was removed by companions who escaped in a vehicle.

Apparently the saboteurs were in the last stages of their operation -- having affixed the shape charges, and wired the alarm clocks, to five of the six gas and petroleum pipelines (two of which belonged to the Mobil Oil Company and four to the Mene Grande Company) -- when the shape charge near the youths was accidentally activated. The time was 2:30 a.m. National Guardsmen, the DIGEPOL and other police units were on the scene in a short time and deactivated the five shape charges which were in place. A Mene Grande crew quickly repaired the damaged pipeline.

In spite of the deaths, saboteurs kept up their campaign against Mene Grande. On Saturday night, April 11, at 7:30 p.m. Discharge Station No. 3, slightly west of El Tigre, was set afire. One 5,000 barrel tank was destroyed; one will require repacking and rebuilding and the third will have to be rebuilt.

MIR and FALN supporters appear to be surfacing and are commencing open agitation. In the past few days wall signs have appeared in Puerto La Cruz proclaiming the fourth anniversary of MIR. Last week the Director of the Barcelona Liceo Cajigal complained that MIR agitators who were demonstrating among the students were outsiders. The evening of Friday, April 10, subversive, mimeographed sheets were distributed at El Tigre.

Yesterday, April 12, at Caripito at a baseball stadium, FALN slogans were raised in public. Feeling was reported to be running high in that locality out of sympathy for the dead youth, Ruiz Fermin. An oil company official from Caripito said that rumors were rife and that Creole was taking precautions and preventive action.

A Venezuelan official in the Industrial Relations Office of Mene Grande at Puerto La Cruz who has consulted with police and high officials of the State of Anzoategui says that members of the gang with whom the dead youths were associated are known and can be arrested. He questions whether the officials have the will, or the political backing at a high level, to follow through on this matter.

Nonetheless...

Nonetheless, Consul Bruno, who called at DIGEPOL headquarters in Barcelona this morning, found intense activity. Ramon Amundaray, father of one of the dead youths, was being questioned at the time. Other interviews were scheduled. A DIGEPOL official said that Caracas had ordered a full investigation.

That some of the relatives and close friends of the dead youths knew about their involvement is illustrated by a letter found on Amundaray which had been written by Ramon Amundaray of Cagua, State of Aragua, April 7, 1964. The letter said in part:

"For how long will you and your brother (Carlos) follow blindly a cause which exploits you to the depths of your being, which poisons your soul and conscience with the baldest of lies and turns you into the slaves of powerful masters? Upon you the activists rest the gravest risks and dangers. Although the prominent leaders and their families voice their evil doctrine, they do not go nor do they send their families to the trenches. You should understand this ironical truth. When an activist fails, the prominent leaders abandon him to his lot. There are many examples of what I say." (Letter signed by father).

Recent events seem to strengthen the view which has been held consistently by Manuel VILLAL, DIGEPOL Zone 8 chief, that sabotage activities are being organized by MIR-FALN-Communist elements.

Francis W. Herron
Francis W. Herron
American Consul

cc: AmConGen, Ccs. (1)
Political Section, Ccs. (1)
Venezuelan Desk Officer (1)
Amconsul Maracaibo (1)

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Janey 13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUNDY-SMITH
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DUNGAN
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KOMER

1964 APR 17

SAUNDERS

SMITH

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1345 INFO USCINCSO UNN FROM CARACAS
APRIL 17, 5PM

AS PART OF PROGRAM TO REDUCE RECENT WAVE OF EXTREMIST SABOTAGE OF MENE GRANDE COMPANY'S INSTALLATIONS IN EASTERN VENEZUELA (EMBTCL 1319 AND PREVIOUS), THE COMPANY'S PRESIDENT TOM LUMPKIN HAS ASKED ME TO OBTAIN A TEAM OF EXPERTS FROM OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (OSD/ARPA) SUCH AS VISITED CREOLE INSTALLATIONS HERE IN JULY 1963 TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED SECURITY.

LUMPKIN STATES MENE GRANDE HAS SET ASIDE 1 MILLION BOLIVARES
CFN 1345 17 5 1319 1963 1

PAGE TWO RUESRS 293 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(APPROX. \$222,000) TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH HIS REQUEST WOULD AFFORD VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO HELP MENE GRANDE SEE THAT THESE FUNDS SPENT EFFECTIVELY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO OVERALL COUNTER INSURGENCY EFFORT IN VENEZUELA. I THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND TEAM BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WHEN ARPA TEAM IS HERE IT WILL ALSO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS LAST YEAR'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO CREOLE AND OTHER COMPANIES. THESE HAVE PROVED VERY VALUABLE IN DETERRING SABOTAGE. TEAM WILL ALSO HAVE CHANCE TO OBSERVE INNOVATIONS, SUCH AS SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT DEVELOPED BY CREOLE, WHICH MAY HAVE APPLICABILITY IN OTHER AREAS.

GP-3. STEWART
BT
CFN \$222,000 3

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *xy/cbm*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Mr. Bundy

- BUNDY-SMITH
- ALEXANDER
- BELK
- BRUBECK
- CHASE
- DINGEMAN
- DUNGAN
- FORRESTAL
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- SAUNDERS
- SMITH, WM. Y

54
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:
Rec'd:

4799
APRIL 6, 1964
7:16 PM

FROM: CARACAS
 ACTION: SECSTATE 1292
 DATE: APRIL 6, 6 PM
 EMBTEL 1270.

Henry

BETANCOURT HAS POSTPONED DEPARTURE FOR APRIL 10 OR 11 AND WILL GO DIRECTLY NEW YORK WITH TWO ATTACHES NAMED REFTEL. INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON WILL SPEND ABOUT WEEK RESTING IN OR AROUND NEW YORK. HE ASSURED ME HE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON ON APRIL 20 AND THIS DATE CAN BE USED FOR PROGRAMMING. LENGTH OF STAY IN WASHINGTON WILL BE SHORT BUT MAY EXTEND OVER 48 HOURS HE ENVISAGED SINCE WILL HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY REST IN NEW YORK AREA.

PRESIDENT IS PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED FROM ROUND OF FAREWELLS AND I ANTICIPATE HIS PRESENT DEPARTURE PLANS ARE MORE FIRM THAN HERETOFORE. HE STILL COUNTS ON TEJERA OBTAIN HOTEL RESERVATION IN NEW YORK BUT NOT HEARD FROM AMB ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS.

IT APPEARS IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC STATUS TWO BODYGUARDS BE (#) ARRANGED BEFORE NEW YORK ARRIVAL AND I RECOMMEND RECEPTION CENTER DISCREETLY GET PARTY THROUGH CUSTOMS WITHOUT DELAY.

ASIDE FROM BETANCOURT'S DESIRE SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON, SECRETARY RUSK AND ASST SECRETARY MANN, THESE ARE PROJECTS WHICH BETANCOURT HAS AGREED UNDERTAKE WHILE IN WASHINGTON:

1. WILL GIVE TAPE-RECORDED INTERVIEW FOR JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY, DETAILS OF WHICH CAN BE FINALIZED WITH AMB. TEJERA (SEE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MARCH 23 LETTER TO BETANCOURT);
2. WILL ADDRESS NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE IF TIME PERMITS (ORAL AGREEMENT OBTAINED FROM BETANCOURT LAST WEEK; AGAIN TEJERA SHOULD BE CONSULTED);

3. HAS/
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 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
 By *ng/cha*, NARA, Date 3-1-06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1292, APRIL 6, 6 PM, FROM CARACAS.

3. HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS WRITE ON PERMANENT BASIS PROLOGUES FOR IMPORTANT WORKS TRANSLATED BY USIS BOOK PROGRAM; IMMEDIATELY WILLING DO PROLOGUE ON TED DRAPER'S BOOK ON CUBA AND FRENCH BOOK "SUR STALIN", WHICH HE THINKS ARE WORKS WITH STRONG APPEAL LATIN AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS (MORE DETAILS BY LETTER).

PLEASE PASS AMB. BROWN IN NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE.

GP-2.

STEWART

FR/21

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Mr. Bundy

- 16 ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
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- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y~~

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Control: 1055
 Rec'd: APRIL 1, 1964
 9:05 P.M.

FROM: CARACAS
 ACTION: SECSTATE 1270
 DATE: APRIL 1, 7 P.M.

EMBTEL 1222.

BETANCOURT INFORMED ME LAST NIGHT HE WILL DEPART FOR NEW YORK APRIL 7 OR 8. HE HAS ASKED AMB TEJERA TO OBTAIN ACCOMMODATIONS FOR HIMSELF AND TWO BODYGUARDS MANUEL MENDOZA AND RAUL ARISTIGUIETA IN GOOD BUT SMALL HOTEL IN NEW YORK FOR REMAINDER OF WEEK AT LEAST. HE WILL NOT STAY AT PARIS HOTEL, AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED. HE ASKED WHETHER CITY NEW YORK WOULD PROVIDE SPANISH-SPEAKING GUARD AS HAD DONE IN PAST.

DECISION TAKE TWO BODYGUARDS INFLUENCED BY FACT HE TRAVEL ARMED ONLY IF CLOAKED WITH DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, STATUS WHICH HE WANTS SHUN.

BETANCOURT'S IDEA GOING NEW YORK FIRST IS PERMIT AMB. TEJERA SUFFICIENT TIME ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON. TOLD ME DID NOT PLAN REMAIN IN WASHINGTON OVER 48 HOURS.

ARISTIGUIETA SPEAKS ENGLISH AND I MENTIONED TO HIM IMPORTANCE KEEPING DEPT POSTED ON BETANCOURT'S ITINERARY, AS WELL AS DESIRABILITY OF CHECKING IN WITH POLICE WHEN PARTY HIT NEW YORK CITY.

BETANCOURT PLANS AFTER WASHINGTON VISIT STILL NEBULOUS. WILL PROBABLY HAVE SOME IDEA OF ITINERARY BEFORE HE LEAVES VENEZUELA OR AFTER HE ARRIVES WASHINGTON. MEANWHILE HE IS IN CONTACT WITH AMB TEJERA WHO SHOULD BE ABLE INFORM DEPT IN ADVANCE OF BETANCOURT'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON.

STEWART

HLL/25

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of Sta

Mr. Bundy

Venezuela

17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34
Action

Control: 22187

Rec'd: SMITH MARCH 30, 1964

12:10 PM

ARA FROM: SANTIAGO
Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 823

SS INFO: POLAD CINCSO UNNUMBERED
G POLAD CINCLANT UNNUMBERED
SP

L
H DATE: MARCH 30, NOON

SAL
ADPS
CAP REF: DEPCIRTEL 1793 AND EMBTEL 816
IO

ADD P USIA NSC INR CTA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY
AIR GP-3.
RMR
HMR

I TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AGAIN EVENING MARCH 29 ON VENEZUELAN INITIATIVES. HE AGAIN INDICATED THAT RESOLUTION ON CUBA GETTING SYMPATHETIC STUDY. INSISTED EVEN MORE FORCEFULLY THAT HE THOUGHT INITIATIVE ON MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND THOSE ARISING FROM GOLPES UNFORTUNATE AND INAPPROPRIATE. HOPED SUBJECTS COULD BE KEPT STRICTLY SEPARATE AND LATTER NOT PURSUED. SPOKE AGAIN OF INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES HERE THAT MIGHT BE CREATED BY CUBA RESOLUTION BUT UNDERSTOOD NEED OF ACTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SAUNDERS
SMITH, WM X

COLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ng/ebm*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

ARA-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-37
NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State *RECEIVED 2 MAR 12 43*

INFO : CARACAS, MARACAIBO

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION

FROM : Amconsul, Puerto la Cruz

DATE: March 29, 1964

SUBJECT : Political Developments in Eastern Venezuela, March 1964

REF :

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1. Summary
2. Status of Governorships
3. Case of Pedro Manuel VASQUEZ
4. Extremist Activity in Anzoategui
5. Trends at University of Oriente Nucleos
6. Political Notes

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- CHASE
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- SMITH, WM. Y

1. Summary:

Even in Easter Week politicians had their concerns in Eastern Venezuela. Except for the States of Monagas and Bolivar and the territory of Delta Amacuro, the waiting game was still on to determine who would be the new Governors and who would find favor in their administrations. The Municipal Councils by decree and exhortation to merchants were trying to keep the price of fish, cheese, milk, and other basic foodstuffs within bounds for the duration of the period so that a happy mood would prevail. And in Barcelona, the capital of Anzoategui, strong political pressures were being brought against the private electric power company PROGRECA to come to quick agreement with CADAFE so that the extended blackouts might end and the angry public mood would subside. Unhappily, too, extremists were still active with the business of sabotage in Anzoategui oil fields. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Exempted from automatic decontrol

By *Herbert [Signature]*

2. Status of Governorships:

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In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

FWHerron/HHHymans/hh

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

2. Status of Governorships:

President Leoni has named Governors for three of the six federal entities in this consular district. Dr. Dario RODRIGUEZ Mendez, who had been Governor of Monagas under the Betancourt Administration, has been confirmed in his position. The new Governor of the State of Bolivar is Dr. Pedro BATTISTINI, an independent lawyer formerly a member of AD who was President of the Principal Electoral Council of the State and is now a Ciudad Bolivar municipal councillor. Appointed Governor of Delta Amacuro is Martin Antonio RANGEL, deputy for Delta Amacuro in the National Congress for the period 1958-1963 and re-elected last December as AD deputy for another five years; he is the youngest of the Governors so far appointed, being aged 35. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Case of Pedro Manuel VASQUEZ:

For five months Pedro Manuel Vasquez, a member of MIR, was held under arrest in El Tigre by orders of the Ministry of Interior. Recently he was released (see Consulate's A-34, March 13, 1964) so that he might attend his father's funeral in Caracas. Presumably he will not be re-arrested and charges will not be preferred against him as an extremist agitator. On March 21, 1964 Antorcha of El Tigre printed a letter sent to Edmundo BARRIOS, the editor, in which Vasquez stated he would remain faithful to his Marxist philosophy and "revolutionary convictions." He added: "So that Venezuela may free itself from its criollo and foreign exploiters, the road open to them must be shown to the people: the pathway of struggle, of revolutionary perseverance. We must not lose our heads through desperation nor in folly. Nor should we succumb to cowardice or agree to conciliation." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: In January, on the occasion of President Betancourt's visit to the Oriente, Antorcha requested the release of Vasquez. The question now is whether Vasquez, and others like him, mean to carry forward the "struggle" within the law or in defiance of it. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Extremist Activity in Anzoategui:

Extremists continued to concentrate their acts of sabotage on Mene Grande installations in the State of Anzoategui (see Consulate's A-34, March 13, 1964; A-32, March 3, 1964; and previous). Preoccupation due to the failure of police and National Guard authorities to curb the capability of the saboteurs is growing. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Neither the police nor the National Guard have the mobility needed to set up surprise roadblocks in the broad areas where the saboteurs can strike. Manuel VILLAEI Cabello, Chief of Zone 8 of the DIGEPOL, recently announced the release on orders of the Ministry of Interior of several key figures who had been detained in connection with acts of terrorism, including Pedro Manuel Vasquez (see Section 3). On March 19 Villaei acknowledged to newspaper correspondents that he would be reassigned to another Government post, but outside the DIGEPOL organization. A shake-up of the DIGEPOL is expected. Also, the feeling is that Government policy towards the ideological leaders of the extremists (members of the Communist Party and MIR) may be under review. Under

su circumstances...

such circumstances vigorous police action without convincing evidence of crime cannot be expected. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Trends at University of Oriente Nucleos:

The various nucleos of the University of Oriente are beginning to grow. As they increase in importance demands for autonomy are beginning to be heard and political influences intrude. During recent trips to the Agricultural School in Jusepin and the nucleo at Ciudad Bolivar evidence of the foregoing was encountered. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The students' bulletin board at Jusepin was covered with statements calling for autonomy and for rule by the "general assembly" of the nucleo (made up of students and professors). The Rector and the present staff of professors were accused of being an "annex" of officialism, meaning the AD Party. One thesis on the board was a defense of Marxism and a castigation of capitalism. It argued that Marxism was a philosophy through which nationalist objectives could be achieved; whereas capitalism was alien and exploitative in its essence. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

At Ciudad Bolivar it was reported that both COPEI-oriented students and those of the Marxist variety were competing with each other in radical political concepts and that both were calling for autonomy from a Rector and an administration resident in and influenced by Caracas and the AD Party. Students of the School of Medicine, with an enrollment of 150, are said to be dominated by Marxists. The smaller School of Mines and Geology, with about 35 students, is more COPEI-oriented. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

The campus and buildings at Jusepin were donated by the Creole Foundation. The campus and many of the buildings of the School of Mines and Geology at Ciudad Bolivar are the gift of the Orinoco Mining Company (a subsidiary of United States Steel). (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Political Notes:

The COPEI Party organization in Barcelona is being sued for rent payment by the landlord of the house it uses as headquarters. Local COPEI leader Enrique BARRIOS Barrios stated that his party had always paid its rent for several months at a time and ascribed the present legal difficulty as a move to disgrace the Party in the public eye. He also added that his Party might seek less expensive quarters since it is not a party of "the rich." (UNCLASSIFIED)

During the first days of April, the VPN (Vanguardia Popular Nacionalista), made up of URD dissidents, will take the necessary steps to legalize its position as a political party in this State. A youth organization of this new party has

also been established...

also been established for Anzoategui. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Another new party, the PRN (Partido Revolucionario Nacionalista), formerly AD(Op), will take steps to legalize its position in Anzoategui once a new Governor is named and has taken possession of his office. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The ever-increasing blackouts in Barcelona, which have plagued that city for the past weeks, climaxed with total darkness for more than two days recently. Besides inconvenience caused to the inhabitants of the city, much economic loss was sustained, particularly by the food industry; meat and other perishables had to be destroyed for lack of refrigeration. The private electricity company PROGRESCA, which is being urged to come to an agreement with CADAFE so that the latter can take over electric power service in Barcelona, was blamed for the situation. When CADAFE was authorized by the Municipal Council to provide electricity, it was discovered that the lines set up by PROGRESCA were too feeble to resist CADAFE's voltage, and thus blackouts continued intermittently as lines melted. The Council is seeking a speedy solution of this situation, particularly since the public's patience is rapidly becoming exhausted. Thus an economic problem has also become an important local political issue. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Francis W. Herron

Francis W. Herron
American Consul

cc: Amembassy, Ccs. (1)
AmConGen, Ccs. (1)
Political Section, Ccs. (1)
Economic Section, Ccs. (1)
Amconsul Maracaibo (1)
Venezuelan Desk Officer (1)

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Venezuela

19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IMMEDIATE 1236 MARCH 24, 9:25 AM

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USIA

NSC

DREW PEARSON COLUMN CONTAINING ALLEGATIONS RE ASST SEC MANN'S
POSITION AT CHIEFS MISSIONS CONFERENCE ON DICTATORSHIPS
APPEARS THIS MORNING'S PRESS AND WILL DOUBTLESS ADD FURTHER
URGENCY TO LEONI ADMINISTRATION DESIRE FIRM U.S. STATEMENT
IN FAVOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. EDITORIAL
IN AD'S LA REPUBLICA BERATES US FOR CONTRADICTIONS IN U.S.
POLICY.

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

DEPARTMENT WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS LEONI'S FIRST REQUEST
OF US, THAT IT WAS TRANSMITTED BY OFFICIALS WHO HAVE COOPERATED
ON CUBAN AND OTHER MATTERS, AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT
WE PROVIDE EARLY ACTION OR ANSWER.

ARMY

GP-3. HILL

NAVY

BT

AIR

CFN: 363 1236 1234 DREW PEARSON 3

RMR

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PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 9:54 AM MARCH 24TH

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By kg/cdm, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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[Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

20

25X1

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

[Redacted]

1

DATE OF INFO.

[Redacted]

DISTR 9 MARCH 1964

SUBJECT

PLANS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION TO INTERFERE WITH THE INAUGURATION CEREMONIES OF RAUL LEONI

GAUNDERS
SMITH, WM. Y

5X1

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

[Redacted]

3X1

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

[Redacted]

1

1. [Redacted] THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) STILL PLANNED TO DISRUPT THE INAUGURATION OF RAUL LEONI AS PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA ON 11 MARCH BY CUTTING OFF ELECTRIC POWER AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE CEREMONIES IN THE NATIONAL CONGRESS BUILDING.

25X1

2. [Redacted] COMMENT: THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA) ALSO PLANNED A SERIES OF PROPAGANDA AND PROTEST ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE NEW GOVERNMENT DURING THE TWO WEEK PERIOD BEFORE THE INAUGURATION BUT FEW OF THE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT OR RECEIVED COVERAGE IN THE NEWSPAPERS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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[Redacted]

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [Redacted] OCI ONE OCR ORR [Redacted] EXO FBI

SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ-001-074-6-8

By kg/cbm, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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SECRET (When Filled In)	CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		IN 3548g
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PAGE 2

HAS TAKEN EXTENSIVE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT THE FOREIGN DELEGATIONS, THE NATIONAL CONGRESS BUILDING, AND OTHER STRATEGIC SITES SUCH AS ROADS, BRIDGES, AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS IN THE CARACAS AREA.)

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3. [REDACTED] DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET	CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS	[REDACTED]	25X1
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Wenny *B...* *5* *22*

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SS
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 1006
Rec'd: MARCH 2, 1964
11:15 P.M.

FROM: CARACAS
ACTION: SECSTATE 1107
DATE: MARCH 2, 11 P.M.

19

LIMDIS
FOR MANN FROM AMBASSADOR

I AM QUITE CONVINCED THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN VENEZUELA, WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE GRANT AID PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HAS PROMPTED A HARD-HEADED AND SOUND INVESTMENT TOWARD ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH STANDS IN FOREFRONT OF ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS COUNTRIES IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY.

THAT PRES. BETANCOURT, WHO CERTAINLY REPRESENTS TYPE OF REFORM-MINDED LEADER WITH WHOM WE CAN WORK, FULLY APPRECIATES ROLE OF VENEZUELAN MILITARY IN THIS ACHIEVEMENT AND SUPPORTS US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS WAS FULLY EVIDENCED DURING HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON LAST YEAR. AFTER HEARING BETANCOURT'S VIEWS IN FAVOR OF PROGRAMS, PRES. KENNEDY ASKED HIM TO REPEAT THEM TO SENATOR MORSE AT STATE DINNER. SUCH ENDORSEMENT FROM DEMOCRATIC LA LEADER SHOULD WEIGH STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF CONTINUANCE MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

BETANCOURT DOES BELIEVE MAP PROGRAM SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS OF ADVISING AND ASSISTING VENEZUELAN MILITARY AND HAS SHOWN HIMSELF SENSITIVE TO EVEN ANY APPEARANCE OF US MILITARY INTRUDING ON SOVEREIGNTY OR DEALING DIRECTLY WITH VEN. MILITARY ON NON-TECHNICAL QUESTIONS IN DISREGARD OF PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES. HE HAS LONG-STANDING DISTRUST OF PENTAGON ON

/POLITICAL

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By *ng/Am*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

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-2- 1107, MARCH 2, 11 P.M., FROM CARACAS

POLITICAL AND POLICY MATTERS AND IT IS MUCH TO CREDIT OF OUR MILITARY, WHO HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT THESE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THAT HE HAS COME TO RELY ON OUR HELP.

FOR MY PART, I BELIEVE THAT VENEZUELA OFFERS THUS FAR CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF HOW MILITARY CAN BE BROUGHT AROUND TO SUPPORT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT UNDER GOOD LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND JUDICIOUS ASSISTANCE FROM US. BETANCOURT REGIME DID NOT SURVIVE BY IGNORING OR REBUFFING MILITARY, NOR DID WE CUT BACK ON AID. ON CONTRARY, BETANCOURT ASSIDUOUSLY COURTED MILITARY WHILE WE GREATLY INCREASED OUR INFLUENCE THROUGH MISSIONS, GRANT TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND CREDIT SALES. HAD THIS NOT BEEN DONE, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER BETANCOURT COULD HAVE WITHSTOOD PRESSURES FROM RIGHT AND LEFT, BOTH OF WHICH AIMED AT PROVOKING COUP AGAINST HIM.

FOLLOWING ARE MY ANSWERS TO NUMBERED QUESTIONS:

1. WHILE OUR MAP PROGRAM DOES HELP INFLUENCE LOCAL MILITARY TO BE PRO-US AND PRO-WEST, BELIEVE MAP AS WHOLE COULD GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. IN LA IN RECENT YEARS, THERE HAVE BEEN TOO MANY OFFICERS WHO WERE GENUINELY PRO-US AND PRO-WEST BUT WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY INCULCATED WITH THE DUTY OF A SOLDIER TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION.

2. AS COMMUNIST FAILURE TO PREVENT ORDERLY TRANSITION OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH ELECTORAL PROCESS SHOWS, THE ABILITY OF VEN. MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY HAS NOTICEABLY IMPROVED IN PAST FEW YEARS AND GREAT DEAL OF CREDIT DUE OUR MAP AND PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM.

3. WHILE PROGRAM FOR VENEZUELA GENERALLY ADEQUATE, I HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED THAT ALLOCATION FOR MILITARY CREDIT SALES BE INCREASED FROM \$10 MILLION TO \$20 MILLION FOR NEXT SEVERAL YEARS TO ALLOW VENEZUELA COMPLETE MODERNIZATION NECESSARY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES.

4. AS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1107, MARCH 2, 11 P.M., FROM CARACAS

4. AS INDICATED ABOVE, I FIRMLY BELIEVE MAP AS OPERATED IN THIS COUNTRY HAS REDUCED RATHER THAN HEIGHTENED POSSIBILITY MILITARY TAKEOVER.

5. AS US DOES NOT SUPPLY GRANT AID EQUIPMENT FOR CIVIC ACTION, QUESTION NOT APPLICABLE. HOWEVER, VEN. ARMED FORCES SHOWING INCREASED INTEREST IN CIVIC ACTION TYPE ACTIVITIES.

6. BELIEVE BALANCE BETWEEN COUNTER-INSURGENCY, CONVENTIONAL, CIVIC ACTION AND POLICE FORCES IN VENEZUELA GENERALLY ADEQUATE ALTHOUGH FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN ORGANIZATION AND IN COMMAND AND CONTROL NECESSARY.

7. THERE IS NO DUPLICATION HERE IN AID ASSISTANCE TO POLICE AND DEFENSE ASSISTANCE TO MILITARY.

8. OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES HAS NOT FOSTERED UNDESIRABLE ARMS BUILDUP IN VENEZUELA.

9. AS WE ARE NOT EXTENDING GRANT AID, DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR MAP COULD BE REDUCED WHETHER OR NOT PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES INCREASED.

10. AT PRESENT WE ARE NOT SUPPORTING OR ENCOURAGING EXCESSIVELY SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, WE MUST GUARD AGAINST ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERLY ELABORATE SURVEILLANCE AND INTERCEPT OR ASW CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SUCH EQUIPMENT.

11. VENEZUELA IS ALREADY ON MAP CREDIT SALES PROGRAM.

12. MAINTENANCE OF CREDIT SALES LEVEL AT \$20 MILLION IS BEST MEANS WE HAVE TO INFLUENCE VEN. TO PURCHASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM US RATHER THAN THIRD COUNTRIES.

GP-3.

STEWART

DLW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Venezuela

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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CAP
AID 1048 FEB 19-6PM

P
USIA WITH CONVENING OF NEW CONGRESS LESS THAN FORTNIGHT AWAY AND PRESI-
NSC DENT-ELECT LEONI'S INAUGURATION SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 11, NEGOTIATIONS
INR BETWEEN HIS AD AND CALDERA'S CHRISTIAN SOCIAL COPEI FOR A COALITION
CIA GOVERNMENT ARE DEFINITELY NOT GOING WELL WITH THE RESULT THAT THERE
NSA IS INCREASING SPECULATION COPEI WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN EXECUTIVE
OSD BRANCH IN EARLY DAYS NEXT ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOTHING
ARMY YET IN NATURE OF DEFINITE FINAL BREAK AND COOLER HEADS EACH PARTY
NAVY ARE MAKING LAST MINUTE EFFORTS HEAL THE BREACH. THERE ARE ALSO
AIR INDICATIONS THAT SOME OF PRESUMED DIFFICULTIES ARE MERELY NEGOTIATING
AGR TACTICS. EVIDENCE OF DIFFICULTIES IN TALKS INCLUDE COPEI POSTPONE-
RMR MENT NATIONAL CONVENTION ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED JANUARY 24 (NOW SET FOR
FEBRUARY 27), LEONI AND CALDERA PRIVATE TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR, IN-
CREASINGLY BITTER PRESS COMMENTARIES, AND NEW RUMORS TO EFFECT THAT
BETANCOURT BEING ASKED TO MEDIATE DIFFERENCES.

BASED ON CONVERSATIONS LEADERS BOTH PARTIES ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL
STATEMENTS AND PRESS "LEAKS" EMBASSY WOULD MAKE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT
OF SITUATION:

LEONI AND AD WILLING AND EVEN DESIROUS HAVE COPEI PARTICIPATE IN
GOVERNMENT. THEY NOT HOWEVER READY MAKE UNDERTAKING TO EFFECT COPEI
AS PARTY WOULD HAVE PRIOR VOICE IN ALL MAJOR INTERNATIONAL, MILI-
TARY, ECONOMIC DECISIONS, THESE BEING CONSIDERED BY LEONI AS PRE-
ROGATIVES OF PRESIDENT. IN BEGINNING AD OFFERED COPEI ONLY TWO MIN-
ISTRIES, NOT INCLUDING AGRICULTURE WHICH AD FELT COPEI HAD USED TOO
MUCH TO ITS ADVANTAGE DURING PAST FIVE YEARS. COPEI APPEARS ADAMANT
IN WANTING RETAIN CONTROL AGRICULTURE. AD TOLD COPEI IT ONLY WANTED
TWO MINISTRIES ITSELF WITH REMAINDER TO BE FILLED BY QUALIFIED IN-
DEPENDENTS BUT COPEI CONSIDERED MANY OF INDEPENDENTS MENTIONED BY
AD TO BE AD MEMBERS OR SYMPATHIZERS IN "INDEPENDENT" CLOAKS. ALSO
IT APPEARED TO COPEI THAT AD WAS RESERVING TO ITSELF THE AUTONOMOUS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By sp/ctm, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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-2- 1048, February 19, 6 PM, from Caracas.

AGENCIES WHICH HAVE AS MUCH POWER AS MINISTRIES TOGETHER WITH MOST OF THE SECOND ECHELON IN THE ACTUAL MINISTRIES. IN ADDITION COPEI, THE ONLY PARTY TO HAVE GAINED STRENGTH IN THE ELECTIONS, FELT THAT TO BE OFFERED LESS THAN IT HAD BEFORE WAS A SLAP AT THE COPEI ELECTORATE AND WAS AN UNDESERVED INSULT TO THE PARTY. CALDERA TOLD US FOR EXAMPLE THAT OF THE 29 IMPORTANT PATRONAGE POSITIONS BEING FILLED IN THE STATE OF TACHIRA, A LONGTIME COPEI STRONGHOLD, 27 HAD GONE TO AD AND ONLY TWO TO COPEI.

SHOULD COPEI NOT FORMALLY ENTER GOVERNMENT IT FAIRLY CLEAR THAT THE ALTERNATIVE AD HAS IN MIND IS AN ADMINISTRATION IN WHICH CABINET AND OTHER TOP JOBS WOULD BE FILLED BY AD AND QUALIFIED INDEPENDENTS. URD WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE, THERE BEING A FEELING IN AD THAT URD SHOULD PROVE ITS NEW RESPECTABILITY BY PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION FOR A YEAR OR SO AFTER WHICH URD MIGHT BE INVITED IN. URD PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION WITH AD WOULD GIVE THOSE TWO PARTIES MATHEMATICAL CONTROL OF THE CONGRESS AND OF COURSE IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT ENOUGH INDEPENDENTS IN THE USLAR AND LARRAZABAL CAMPS WILL VOTE FOR REASONABLE LEGISLATION TO GIVE AN AD-INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT A WORKABLE MAJORITY.

SHOULD COALITION NOT BE WORKED OUT, COPEI WOULD NOT GO INTO VIOLENT OPPOSITION, BUT, FREED OF COALITION RESPONSIBILITY, COULD BE EXPECTED ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT ON ELEMENTS OF POLICY WITH WHICH COPEI DOES NOT AGREE (EDUCATION, ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY, EXECUTION OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ETC.) IN ANY EVENT, FAILURE OF AD AND COPEI TO GET TOGETHER WOULD CERTAINLY CLOUD THE ATMOSPHERE AS THE LEONI ADMINISTRATION GETS UNDER WAY, ESPECIALLY AS BREAK WOULD DOUBTLESS BE FOLLOWED BY PURGING SOME COPEI JOB HOLDERS.

GP-3

HILL

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

January 24

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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

987 FEB 5 7PM

REF: EMBTEL 986

COUNTRY TEAM FULLY SHARES CHAMBER'S CONCERN AND BELIEVES AMENDMENT, SHOULD IT BECOME LAW, WOULD HAVE SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR POSITION AND INFLUENCE HERE. WITH COST OF LIVING HIGHER THAN IN US, VIRTUALLY ALL NON-GOVT SALARIED AMERICANS WORKING IN VENEZUELA WOULD BE AFFECTED, OBLIGING AMERICAN BUSINESS HERE EITHER INCREASE THEIR SALARIES, THUS PUTTING US AT DISADVANTAGE WITH COMPETITORS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH GENERALLY DO NOT TAX THEIR NATIONALS ABROAD, OR FORCING IT SECURE ESSENTIAL IMPORTED SKILLS BY HIRING THIRD COUNTRY
CFN 987 5 7 986

PAGE TWO RUESRS 085 L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E
NATIONALS REPLACE AMERICANS. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED OVER EFFECT ON MANY AMERICAN NATIONALS UNDER CONTRACT TO VENEZUELAN INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSISTING IN DEVELOPMENT GUAYANA, (STEEL MILL, GURI DAM, ETC.) THE TAX INCENTIVE IS POTENT AND OFTEN DECISIVE FACTOR IN RECRUITING SUCH TECHNICIANS. DRASTIC AND UNFORESEEN CHANGES IN TAX STATUS OF THESE AMERICANS, MANY LIVING UNDER FRONTIER CONDITIONS, CANNOT BUT AFFECT MORALE AND EFFICIENCY, AND MAY LEAD MANY TO RETURN HOME TO SAFER AND LESS RIGOROUS LIFE, PRECISELY AT TIME WHEN WE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGING GREATER FLOW ABROAD PEOPLE TO ASSIST LDCS. SINCE IMPORTED SKILLS ARE NEEDED THERE WILL BE INCENTIVE TO REPLACE THEM BY PEOPLE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WHO OF COURSE CAN BE COUNTED UPON FURTHER TRADE THEIR OWN HOMELAND NOT OURS.

003398
1964 FEB 5 PM 7 31

- ~~BUNDY-SMIT~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SALINGER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGI~~
- ~~SMITH, WM.~~

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-2- 987, February 5, 7 p.m., from Caracas.

WE ARE LIKEWISE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE VENEZUELAN REACTION TO ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE US TAX TAKE FROM THIS COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN NATIONALISM IS ALREADY AROUSED BY PANAMA CRISIS. MINISTER FINANCE OTERO MADE CLEAR HIS DISPLEASURE AT TIME US TAX REVISION TWO YEARS AGO AND FINANCE MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY THAT IF THE US IS GOING TO TAX AMERICAN'S SALARIES HERE AT RATES HIGHER THAN THOSE PREVAILING IN VENEZUELA, MEASURES WILL BE STUDIED

PAGE THREE RUESRS 085 L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E
TO RAISE VENEZUELAN TAX BURDEN ON SUCH PEOPLE TO US LEVEL.
SUCH A CONTINGENCY WOULD CLEARLY NOT CONTRIBUTE TO
AUSPICIOUS CLIMATE IN WHICH DEVELOP OUR RELATIONS WITH
LEONI GOVERNMENT.

IN LIGHT FOREGOING AND SERIOUS CONCERN EXPRESSED BY THE CHAMBER, ONE OF MOST ENLIGHTENED AND PATRIOTIC GROUPS OF ITS KIND WHOSE MEMBERS CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY OF THEIR TIME AND SUBSTANCE IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS AND FURTHER OUR OBJECTIVES HERE, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE HAVE THIS PROVISION DELETED FROM BILL, AT LEAST IN SO FAR AS IT MIGHT AFFECT RESIDENT THIS AND OTHER AFP COUNTRIES. STEWART
BT

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ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

It was brought to the attention of the Archives staff that document #25 (State 272 to Tegucigalpa) appears to be misfiled in the National Security File (NSF), Country File, "Venezuela, Volume 1" and should be in the NSF, Country File, for Honduras.

Upon investigation, we found that another copy of this document is filed in the NSF, Country File, "Honduras, Volume 1," Box 57, so we have left document #25 in this folder.

Regina Greenwell
Senior Archivist

October 21, 2013

James
006 25

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

54
Origin ACTION: Amembassy TEGUCIGALPA ²⁷² PRIORITY

ARA
Info: FBI AMBASSADOR FROM MANN

FEB 3 7 56 PM '64

SS
G Department notes that there are various recent reports
SP about plotting by liberal party members against the Lopez
L regime. Please give us your estimate whether attempt
CAP will be made by these elements to overthrow Lopez and
P if this seems probable, your estimate of their strength
USIA and chances of success.

077

NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
Our understanding is that alleged liberal party plotting is being headed by responsible anti-communist elements. Is this correct?

~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
~~ALEXANDER~~
~~BELK~~
~~BRUBECK~~
 CHASE
~~DINGEMAN~~
~~DUNGAN~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~SALINGER~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SCHLESINGER~~
~~SMITH, WM. V.~~
Aside from alleged plotting by these liberal party elements are there any other conspiracies under way which have reasonable chance of success? If so, are any of these controlled or influenced by communists?

Assume you agree that we should be careful not to become embroiled in internal plotting which involves no foreseeable risk of communist takeover. Please confirm.

GP-1

END

RUSK

Drafted by: ARA:TCMann/ps 2/3/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ARA - Thomas C. Mann

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ng/cdm* NARA, Date 3-1-06

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY

Venezuela 27

O P 310510Z

FM USCINCSO

TO RUESRS/COMUSMILGP VENEZUELA
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 RUEHCR/SECSTATE
 RUECW/CNO
 RUCKHC/CINCLANT
 RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 RUESRS/USAIRA CARACAS
 RULBCR/COMUSNAVSO
 RUEANF/COMUSAFSO

~~SECRET~~

. SC1540EA.

- A. CINCLANTFLT 221702Z JAN 1964.
 - B. CINCLANT 292034Z JAN 1964.
 - C. USAIRA CARACAS, MSG C-10, DTG 301414Z JAN 1964.
 - D. SECSTATE 220045Z JAN 1964.
 - E. CINCLANTFLT 302348Z JAN 1964.
- ALL PASEP.

1. REQUEST COMUSMILGP VENEZUELA ADVISE AMBASSADOR, USAIRA AND OTHER US AUTHORITIES WHO NEED TO KNOW OF SHIPPING ANALYSIS OPERATIONS REFERRED TO IN REFERENCE A IN ORDER THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES MAY BE ADVISED OF ACTIVITY IN PROGRESS BEYOND VENEZUELAN TERRITORIAL LIMITS.

2. SHIPPING ANALYSIS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE VALUABLE DATA FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE SEA SURVEILLANCE AND INTERCEPT OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES. OPERATIONS INCIDENT TO THE ANALYSIS STARTED ON 24 JANUARY AND ARE SCHEDULED TO BE MAINTAINED FOR SEVEN DAYS.

ACT.....J3-7

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J4-2 J5-1 SACSA-1 DIA/CIIC-2 NMCC-2
 JSSC-1 JRG-2 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-8 OSD-15 (WHITE HOUSE)-3
 RRA-1 FILE-1 (58)TWG

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
 By JS NARA, Date 7/14/93

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO.	DTG
WU/ADJ <i>CEH</i> CEH	1 2	SC1540EA	310510Z JAN 64

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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3. REFERENCE A DIRECTS THAT SURFACE UNITS NOT PATROL SOUTH OF A LINE FROM ARUBA TO BLANQUILLA. TO PRODUCE A MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS OF SHIPPING IN THE AREA PRESCRIBED IT IS NECESSARY THAT AIR PATROLS OPERATE SOUTH OF THAT LINE. REFERENCE A SPECIFIED THAT SUCH AIR PATROLS WERE AT ALL TIMES TO REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. NOTE THAT REFERENCE D STATES THAT THE ABOVE RESTRICTION ON SURFACE UNITS IS AN OPERATIONAL DECISION WITHOUT SUCH DECISION IN ANYWAY CONSTITUTING A LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF US SHIPS TO OPERATE IN AND TRAVEL THROUGH WATERS WHICH THE US HAS REGARDED AND CONTINUES TO REGARD AS INTERNATIONAL.

4. INVESTIGATION REPORTED IN REFERENCE B INDICATES THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF VENEZUELAN LAND BOUNDARIES, AND THAT THE APPROACH OF ONE SP-2E TO WITHIN TWO MILES OF THE VENEZUELAN COAST WAS INCIDENT TO INVESTIGATION OF SUBMARINE CONTACT.

5. US NAVY AIR AND SURFACE UNITS IN ABOVE OPERATIONS AND FOR ROCKWALL ARE OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF US EFFORTS TO ASSIST CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY VENEZUELA, TO STOP THE CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF ARMS AND SUBVERSIVE PERSONS FROM CUBA INTO THOSE COUNTRIES. DUE TO THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THE US HAS PLACED ON SUPPORTING HER OAS ALLIES IN THESE OPERATIONS IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY FOR THE US ATLANTIC FLEET TO DIVERT AIR AND SURFACE UNITS FROM OTHER IMPORTANT UNDERTAKINGS.

6. WHILE IT APPEARS THAT VENEZUELAN TERRITORIAL AIR SPACE HAS, IN ONE INSTANCE, BEEN VIOLATED, THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. MUST WORK IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY SUCCESS IN THE IMPORTANT TASKS BEING PURSUED. AS INDICATED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF REFERENCE B AND IN REFERENCE E CINCLANT AND CINCLANTFLT ARE STRIVING TO COOPERATE, TO OBTAIN ANY FUTURE VIOLATIONS OF TERRITORIAL AIR SPACE AND AT THE SAME TIME TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE IMPORTANT OPERATIONS NOW UNDERWAY.

GP-4
BT

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES 2 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO. SC1540EA	DTG 310510Z JAN 64

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Venezuela

28

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TO RUESRS/COMUSMILGP VENEZUELA
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RUEHCR/SECSTATE
RUECW/CNO
RUCKHC/CINCLANT
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUESRS/USAIRA CARACAS
RULBQR/COMUSNAVSO
RUEANF/COMUSAFSO

Authority Group 4
By JP, NARA, Date 7/14/93

0 2 2 8 9 9
JANUARY 31, 1964
1:49 A.M. 021

I M M E D I A T E

~~SECRET~~ SC1540EA

- A. CINCLANTFLT 221702Z JAN 1964.
- B. CINCLANT 292034Z JAN 1964.
- C. USAIRA CARACAS, MSG C-10, DTG 301414Z JAN 1964.
- D. SECSTATE 220045Z JAN 1964.
- E. CINCLANTFLT 302348Z JAN 1964.

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PAGE 2 RULPC 22 ~~SECRET~~

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-2- SC1540EA, DTG 310510Z, JANUARY. FROM: USCINCSO.

PAGE 3 RULPC 22 ~~SECRET~~

COAST WAS INCIDENT TO INVESTIGATION OF SUBMARINE CONTACT.

5. US NAVY AIR AND SURFACE UNITS IN ABOVE OPERATIONS AND FOR ROCKWALL ARE OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF US EFFORTS TO ASSIST CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY VENEZUELA, TO STOP THE CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF ARMS AND SUBVERSIVE PERSONS FROM CUBA INTO THOSE COUNTRIES. DUE TO THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THE US HAS PLACED ON SUPPORTING HER OAS ALLIES IN THESE OPERATIONS IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY FOR THE US ATLANTIC FLEET TO DIVERT AIR AND SURFACE UNITS FROM OTHER IMPORTANT UNDERTAKINGS.

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GP-4

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O JANUARY 31 - 1:55 A.M.
PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE JANUARY 31 - 2:15 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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Venezuela

29

PRECEDENCE	
ACTION	IMMEDIATE
INFO	PRIORITY

FROM: JCS
 TO: USCINCSO
 INFO: CINCLANT
 COMUSMILGRP VENEZUELA
 US AIRA CARACAS VENEZUELA

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS Distribution plus White House State SecDef OSD(ISA)

Coordinated State Mr. Cummings ISA Capt. Sanborn

~~SECRET~~ JCS 4627

From JCS, J-3, Joint

Staff, sends.

Subject: Alleged Flight Violations (U)

Ref: a. CINCLANTFLT 221702Z Notal; b. CINCLANT 292034Z Notal; c. USAIRA CARACAS VEN 301515Z Notal

1. Request provide COMUSMILGRP VENEZUELA with refs so that US authorities in Venezuela can advise Venezuelan authorities of activity in progress beyond Venezuelan territorial limits.

2. Operations implementing ref a commenced 24 Jan and are scheduled to be maintained for a period of seven days. Gp-4

ZFF-1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
 By [Signature], NARA, Date 7/14/93

DATE	TIME
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MONTH	YEAR
Jan	1964
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASES	SIGNATURE
	HARRY B. STARK Captain, USN J-3	53084		<i>John L. Chew</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		TYPE MSG	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	NAME AND TITLE
SECRET		Multi	Gp-4	JOHN L. CHEW Rear Admiral, USN
				Vice Director for Operations KLH 302300Z

DIST. CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-7 J4-2 J5-1 SACSA-1 DIA/CIIC-2
 NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-8 OSD-15
 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 RRA-1 FILE-2 (59) (STATE)

~~SECRET~~

JCS 4627

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy CARACAS IMMEDIATE 664

INFO: POLAD CINCLANT PRIORITY
POLAD USCINCSO PRIORITY

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

Embtel 944.

Regret Embassy not informed re shipping analysis exercise in which Neptune involved. Copies relevant messages being re-
~~XXXX~~ peated to COMUSMILGRU.

Given GOV sensitivities, air elements involved in exercise being instructed stay north line of island chain. These instructions conform to operational directive previously given surface vessels, and on same basis, namely without in any way constituting limitation freedom our aircraft to operate in air space which US has regarded and continues to regard as international.

Emb may express regret about one unintentional/approach being to ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Venezuelan coast (See CINCLANT's 292034Z/re-
peated to COMUSMILGRU). FYI However, we are disturbed by

Venezuelan

1/30/64

Drafted by: ARA/EST:DFMargolies:CCA:JHCrimmins

Telegraphic transmission and
Classification approved by:

ARA/CCA - Mr. Crimmins

Clearances:

J3 JCS - Capt. Stark (subs.)
DOD - Col. Haig (subs.)

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Venezuelan Air Force orders cited Air Attache's C-10. Request full clarification, END FYI.

GP-3

END

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Venezuela

31

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Origin
ARA

ACTION: Amembassy, CARACAS 560

JAN 29 1 15 PM '64

Info:

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DEPTEL 616

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ng/ctm, NARA, Date 3-1-86

We believe that improved foreign exchange position of Venezuela offers opportunity for Venezuela to inject new strength and direction into Alliance for Progress by offering financial assistance to its partners. This might appeal to Venezuelan Government as means of obtaining favorable notice in Latin America and of adding to its prestige as major country in hemisphere. US Congressional and public reaction would be highly favorable and this development would facilitate our task obtaining Alliance funds from Congress during current session.

Betancourt has in past indicated that his thinking was turning in this direction. Stephansky recalls that at time Paz visit in September 1962 Betancourt spoke to Paz of assistance from Venezuela to Bolivia, although nothing definite came of it. Betancourt also stated in conversation with Bell, Moscose and Ambassador at IDB meeting April 1963 that he envisaged role Venezuela in near future as capital contributing country. Members of US delegation recall that Betancourt included reference to this idea in public remarks during IDB Conference, although such statement

Drafted by: ARA:EST:DFMargolies:ed 1/28/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ARA - Mr. Mann

Clearances: LA/DP/RSternfeld
AA/LA - Mr. Rogers
REA - Mr. Carwell

ARA/LA - Mr. MOSCOSO

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We recognize that action by Venezuelan Congress would be required before GOV could embark upon program of foreign aid, Betancourt as lame duck chief executive and Leoni as president-elect facing divided Congress which he can control only through alliance with other parties may both feel statements on this subject inopportune at this time.

However, if foregoing appears to CT to have merit, request Ambassador to pursue this proposal with Betancourt and Leoni at earliest opportunity,

BALI.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Venezuela

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ACTION: AmEmbassy CARACAS 614

INFO: USCINCSO FOR POLAD

JAN 17 6 20 PM '64

Washington inter-agency working group is preparing case study on Venezuelan terrorism. It will deal with terrorism as extreme-leftist insurrectionary technique employing intimidation, crime, violence, sabotage and guerrilla activities; but will exclude longer term political, social and economic aspects which constitute broader problem of counterinsurgency. Study will develop basic conclusions from Venezuelan experience which could be applied to other countries faced with terrorist threat.

Following are working group's preliminary conclusions which are transmitted for Country Team's consideration and comments. Your reply should be cabled no later than January 24.

A. NATURE OF THREAT

1. Terrorism is important tactical device of extreme-leftists for overthrowing government, and when problem first becomes evident it should not be underestimated or underrated. If counter measures are not already underway host government should initiate them immediately with our assistance.

2. Popular support not essential to successful terrorist urban operations and terrorists do not require sympathetic climate for their activities.

B. MEASURES

Drafted by: ARA:EST:SMoskowitz:abh 1/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ARA:EST - Mr. Margolies

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJDD/R-74-6-3
By [Signature] ARA Date 9-18-77

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B. MEASURES FOR COUNTERING THREAT

1. An efficient and professional police organization is essential for countering urban terrorism.

2. Where several separate police forces exist they should be placed under a unified command. Where political situation makes this unfeasible, an arrangement for centralized police coordination should be created by establishing Central Operations Center for centralized communications facilities, and coordination of operations and control.

3. Where poor police morale has greatly handicapped police efforts, these can best be corrected by instilling confidence through effective training, strong government (including military) support, improving communications between agents and headquarters, eliminating or easing regulations (e.g. automatic arrest for shooting someone in line of duty) which inhibit police performance of duties and improving professional leadership.

4. A most effective training device for raising morale and improving efficiency is organization of a specially trained police strike force which can demonstrate effective police operations.

5. Appropriate military forces should be assigned role in urban anti-terrorist activities, if possible. Where this is not possible, host government should keep military well informed of government's anti-terrorist plans and activities, particularly its efforts to improve police capabilities, so military does not misjudge government's intentions.

6. Effectiveness

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6. Effectiveness of U. S. Public Safety Program depends to great extent on support it receives from Embassy Country Team. Continuous and frequent high level diplomatic contact and consultation may be necessary to get host government to take necessary measures for improving police capabilities. Continuous across-the-board approach to all host government public safety agencies and parent ministries by appropriate country team members may be required to generate support for our program to improve police capabilities.

7. Public Safety surveys and studies by U. S. technicians should be initiated whenever it becomes apparent that terrorism may become a problem. These surveys and studies should continue as problem unfolds so that no time is lost in developing program for effectively countering it and getting host government's support.

8. It is essential to achieving an effective police organization for practical training to cover all important aspects of public safety such as criminalistics, training, organization, mobility and communications.

9. Ability of U.S. Government to deliver needed police equipment promptly to host government and to provide it with public safety technicians on short notice will greatly enhance the possibilities of our being able to get the host government to accept our proposals. This will also improve confidence and morale of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ police agencies and U.S. technicians who are working with them.

10. Good Washington backstopping and inter-agency coordination is essential to rapid action on field requests. Pre-existing arrangements with U.S. police agencies for rapid recruitment of qualified technicians and stockpiling of a minimum

of essential

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of essential weapons, transportation and communications equipment will greatly enhance Washington's ability to meet field requests.

11. Private industry in host country can contribute to anti-terrorist efforts by developing techniques for industrial security and making them known for training and information of others.

G. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. Effective anti-subversive intelligence capability is essential for countering terrorism and must cover all aspects of intelligence including centralized or coordinated collection, research, analysis and dissemination.

2. Effective counter-intelligence is also necessary since terrorist agents are planted within the government's security forces and in other key government agencies.

3. There should be close coordination of intelligence between Country Team and host government concerning terrorism and other subversive activities.

D. CUBAN AND OTHER FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS

1. While not indispensable, a nearby (or contiguous) foreign base for training, supply and psychological support can greatly enhance the capacity and success of the terrorist operations.

2. Terrorist techniques will gradually improve and become increasingly sophisticated, probably with foreign guidance and assistance. Terrorists are quick to learn from experience and will readily adapt their training and equipment to draw the greatest possible benefit from their operations.

3. Effective

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3. Effective travel and immigration controls and procedures are essential to prevent or inhibit international movement of subversives to and from foreign bases for training and other assistance.

4. Effective multi-lateral or bi-lateral air and surface surveillance and intercept procedures and operations are essential to prevent or inhibit subversive movement of supplies from foreign bases to terrorists.

5. To dramatize to other American States serious nature of terrorist threat and to attain multi-lateral support for measures to counter this threat, it is essential for host government to establish and maintain continuous record of evidence showing Cuban, Soviet or Chinese Communist involvement in terrorist activities and to trace terrorist travel, propaganda, arms and supplies and funds to Cuba, Soviet bloc or Communist China. END

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Venezuela
603
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

XMB
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Origin
XMB
Info

ACTION: Amembassy CARACAS 613

JAN 17 6 20 PM '64

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The following will be released 12 noon, Wednesday, January 22, Washington time.

The Export-Import Bank of Washington today announced authorization of a \$10.5 million Alliance for Progress credit in favor of the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayano (CVG) of Venezuela. Harold F. Linder, Eximbank President, said the credit will be used to purchase United States steel mill equipment.

The CVG is a Venezuelan Government institution created to develop and industrialize the Guayana territory in southeastern Venezuela. It is building and operating a major integrated Orinoco Steel Plant at Matanzas where a wide assortment of steel mill machinery financed by the Eximbank credit will be installed. The American equipment will help the Orinoco Plant to reach planned capacities of 550,000 metric tons of finished products per year and an annual ingot capacity of 750,000 metric tons. In addition, the new equipment will permit some diversification of output. The Koppers ^{WOS} Company of Pittsburgh ~~has been~~ retained in 1961 as technical advisor for the plant's completion and its current operation.

The Guayana area is rich in resources such as iron ore, coal, hydro-electric power and navigable rivers. Plans are well under way for developing all of these assets into an integrated industrial region to counterbalance the industrialized north-east area of Caracas. A key to this development will be the Orinoco River highway

Drafted by
~~en:m~~
Clearances

XMB: *EW*
ENWolfe:amo 1/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by AID/AA/DFPE - H. Parr Johnson *1/17/64*

State:ARA - Mr. Woolf *[Signature]*

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~~BRX~~

bridge made possible by an Eximbank loan of \$18.6 million to Venezuela in 1963.

The Eximbank credit to CVG for steel making equipment is to be repaid over a period of seven years commencing in 1966.

RUSK

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

Control:
Rec'd:

6377
JANUARY 10, 1964

ARA

FROM: CARACAS

3:00 BUNDY SMITH

Info

ALEXANDER

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 832 PRIORITY

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BRUBECK

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LONDON 16

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DATE: JANUARY 10

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JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE

KILDUFF

KLEIN

KOMER

SAUNDERS

SCHLESINGER

SMITH, WM. Y.

IN PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WITH VISITING AMERICAN AND CANADIAN JOURNALISTS, PRESIDENT BETANCOURT WAS ASKED HIS VIEW OF BRITISH BUS SALE TO CUBA. "IN REALITY," HE SAID, "MAINTENANCE OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA IS NOT COOPERATION WITH FREE WORLD." HE REFERRED TO VENEZUELAN COMPLAINT NOW BEFORE OAS OF CUBAN ARMS SHIPMENTS, ADDING THAT "OUTBOARD MOTOR (ON BOAT FOUND NEAR ARMS CACHE) IS FROM CANADA AND IT HAS BEEN PROVEN THAT IT WAS ONE OF FIVE UNITS WHICH WERE SOLD TO CUBA." HE SAID ARMS WERE TO BE USED IN FALN PLAN CALLED "OPERATION CARACAS": "IN DOCUMENTS WE FOUND STREETCORNERS HAD ALREADY BEEN PICKED FROM WHICH BAZOOKAS, RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS WOULD BE FIRED. CUBAN REGIME VIOLATES PEACE OF AMERICA AND IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT FENCE BE BROKEN TO SELL BOATS AND BUSES. THESE BILATERAL DEALS HAVE PRODUCED RESENTMENT IN PEOPLE OF VENEZUELA. REACTION COULD BE TO ALLOW THEM TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TRADING WITH CUBA OR TRADING WITH VENEZUELA, COUNTRY WITH GREATEST EXPORT CAPACITY IN LATIN AMERICA."

ASKED ABOUT OAS ACTION ON VENEZUELAN COMPLAINT, BETANCOURT REFUSED PREDICT OUTCOME, BUT SAID "NO GOVERNMENT OF LATIN AMERICA CAN ELUDE ITS RESPONSIBILITY, HIDING BEHIND PARAPET, NOW SO WORM-EATEN, OF NON-INTERVENTION, WHEN THERE IS UNANSWERABLE CASE OF INTERVENTION, AND OF WORSE FORM OF INTERVENTION: ARMED INTERVENTION BY AN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST A COUNTRY OF AMERICA. I THINK THAT NO GOVERN-

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-2-832, JANUARY 10, FROM CARACAS

MENT OF AMERICA WILL BE ABLE TO EVADE ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS MFM."

WHEN PAUL KIDD OF ONTARIO SPECTATOR POINTED OUT CANADA, WHICH BETANCOURT HAD CRITICIZED FOR BOAT SALE, IS NOT MEMBER OAS, BETANCOURT REPLIED, "IT IS MY OPINION THAT CANADA, LIKE JAMAICA, LIKE TRINIDAD-TOBAGO, OUGHT TO JOIN, OR CAN JOIN, IF THEY SO DESIRE, OAS." HOWEVER, EVEN NON-MEMBERS HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO FREE WORLD. "IT IS NOT COMPREHENSIBLE THAT COUNTRIES THAT ARE WITHIN FREE WORLD, THAT FORM PART OF NATO, TRADE WITH GOVERNMENT THAT IS ACTIVELY PROMOTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN HEMISPHERE. IT WAS KNOWN THAT FROM CUBA WENT OUT THE TRAINED ACTIVISTS, TRAINED NOT IN IDEOLOGICAL MARXISM, NOT IN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINES, BUT IN PRACTICAL WAYS OF BLOWING UP PIPELINES, DESTROYING BRIDGES, BURNING FACTORIES, COWARDLY ASSASSINATING OFFICIALS AND SIMPLE PRIVATE CITIZENS. IT WAS (ALSO) KNOWN THAT MONEY WENT OUT FROM CUBA TO FEED THESE TERRORIST GROUPS, BUT UNTIL NOW WE DID NOT HAVE, AS HAS NOW BEEN ACQUIRED, SUCH CONCRETE AND INVINCIBLE EVIDENCE THAT ARMS WERE ALSO EXPORTED. THEREFORE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA HAS TURNED INTO RISK OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION FOR ALL THE HEMISPHERE, AND IT IS INCONCEIVABLE HOW THERE CAN BE GOVERNMENTS THAT IN FACE OF THIS REALITY WASH THEIR HANDS LIKE PILATES. THIS IS A RISK AND A DANGER FOR ALL AMERICA AND FOR ALL THE FREE WORLD."

IN ANSWERING ANOTHER QUESTION ABOUT ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, BETANCOURT SAID "POSITION OF (PRESIDENT) JOHNSON IN ENERGETIC CONTINUATION OF POLICY INITIATED BY MARTYRED PRESIDENT KENNEDY SEEMS TO ME VERY POSITIVE. ONLY YESTERDAY, BEFORE CONGRESS, HE RATIFIED POLICY OF CONSTANT PREOCCUPATION WITH LATIN AMERICA." BETANCOURT SAID THOMAS MANN APPOINTMENT WAS GOOD. "I HAVE KNOWN HIM SINCE 1947. HE IS A MAN, APART FROM OUR PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP, OF GREAT CAPACITY FOR SERVICE, WITH FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF PROBLEMS OF AMERICA."

STEWART

NAR/22

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INC. AIRING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Venezuela 35

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Action

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1963 DEC 27 PM 4 35

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Info RR RUEHCR
DE RUESRS 440 27/2038Z
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SS FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DEPT 790 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO POLAD CINCLANT UNN
FROM CARACAS DEC 27-4PM

[REDACTED] PRESS REPORT THAT SEVERAL POLITICAL PRISONERS
ESCAPED EARLY MORNING DECEMBER 26 FROM TACARIGUA (CARABOBO
STATE) PRISON, BUT STILL LACKS INFORMATION ON HOW MANY OR
WHO. ESCAPEES SAID BY LEFTIST CLARIN TO INCLUDE EX-NAVY COI AND-
ER PEDRO MEDINA SILVA, FALN OFFICIAL AND CO-LEADER OF PUERTO
CABELLO REVOLT OF JUNE 1962; EX-ARMY MAJOR MANUEL AZUAJE ORTEGA,
FALN OFFICIAL AND FORMER CASTRO LEON SUPPORTER; EX-MARINE LT.
CFN 790 27-4PM 26 1962

PAGE TWO RUESRS 440 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COMMANDER VICTOR HUGO MARALES, ONE OF PUERTO CABELLO REBELS;
EX-ARMY CAPTAIN AMERICO SERRITIELLO, CURRENTLY LEFTIST AND
FORMERLY CASTRO LEON SUPPORTER; AND GERMAN LAIRET, COMMUNIST
AND FORMER ALTERNATE FEDERAL DEPUTY. IF THIS LIST ACCURATE,
ESCAPE RANKS WITH SEPTEMBER 16, 1963, ESCAPE (EMBTel 316) AS
ONE OF MOST SERIOUS DURING BETANCOURT ADMINISTRATION.

GP-2
HILL
BT
CFN 16 1963 316 GP-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority RR-NLJ-001-074-6-10
By kg/ebm NARA, Date 3-1-06

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

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CLASSIFICATION -- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

36

25X1

25X1

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

MIT

SUBJECT CONTINUED PLOTTING BY EXILED VENEZUELAN MILITARY OFFICIALS

DATE DISTR. 24 DECEMBER 1963

ALEXANDER

BEIK

~~BRUNEL~~

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

~~CHASE~~

~~LONGMAN~~

REFERENCES

IN-86516

~~LONGMAN~~

~~BEIK~~

FAL

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DATE OF INFO.

15X1

PLACE & DATE ACQ APPRAISA

SOURCE

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1. EXILED VENEZUELAN [REDACTED] BELIEVE THAT PLANS FOR THE COUP IN VENEZUELA WHICH WAS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE BY 15 DECEMBER 1963 WERE BETRAYED BY MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN ARMY WHO WERE TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE COUP. HOWEVER, FORMER COLONEL ROBERTO CASANOVA, FORMER COLONEL CARLOS PULIDO BARRETO, AND FORMER MAJOR JOSE I. GUTIERREZ PLAN TO RETURN TO VENEZUELA TO WORK WITH OTHER MILITARY OFFICIALS IN AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A COUP IN EARLY 1964.

2. OSCAR TAMAYO SUAREZ, WHO HAS LONG BEEN INVOLVED IN PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA, IS NOW IN VENEZUELA AND IS ACTIVELY PLOTTING WITH MILITARY OFFICIALS THERE. FORMER MAJOR FRANCO MCLINA IS ALSO IN VENEZUELA AND IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MILITARY COUP. [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION -- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

25X1

25X1

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ-001-074-6-11

By kg/cbm NARA, Date 3-1-06

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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

IN86516

PAGE 2

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR [REDACTED], CINCLANT, CINCSC,
[REDACTED] FBI, AND I&NS.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

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(15-20-44-4

[REDACTED] CONTINUATION [REDACTED]

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

37
Venez

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

014750

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~ECKEL~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KILDUFF~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

1963 DEC 20 PM 3 47

53
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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRITY (761) DEC 20-3PM

REF: EMBTEL 739, DEC. 16; DEPTTEL 517

MINISTER OF MINES AND HYDROCARBONS PEREZ GUERRERO INFORMED ME THIS MORNING THAT VENEZUELAN POSITION COMING OPEC MEETING IN RIYADH WOULD BE THAT OF MODERATORS AND OF MODERATION. VENEZUELA STANDS READY TO HALT ANY UNREASONABLE OR EXCESSIVE DEMANDS ON INDUSTRY BY OTHER OPEC MEMBERS. FULLY EXPECTS TO FIND THAT INDUSTRIES' POSITION WILL HAVE IMPROVED OVER POSITION REPORTED IN BEIRUT MEETING. HE OPINED INDUSTRIES' "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" OFFER
CFN 761 20-3PM 739 16 517

PAGE TWO RUESRS 366 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AT THAT TIME OF ABOUT ONE-QUARTER (1/4) OF AMOUNT IN INCREASED REVENUE SOUGHT BY OPEC TO BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE. HE VOLUNTEERED VIEW U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOW OF INTEREST TO OPEC MEMBER GOVERNMENTS ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRY IN PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AN ERROR. SAID HE PLANNED RETURN FROM RIYADH VIA EUROPE TO SEE "FRIENDS" AND EXPLAIN VENEZUELAN ROLE IN OPEC. I INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN HE WILL VISIT LONDON TO SEE OIL COMPANY OFFICIALS AND GENEVA TO SEE REPRESENTATIVES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

COMMENT: IT IS MY OPINION THAT IF COMPANIES MAINTAIN RIGID ATTITUDE VENEZUELA WILL SUPPORT OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES IF THEY PROPOSE PUNITIVE MEASURES OR TAKE ACTION TO PRESSURE COMPANIES FOR BETTER TERMS. IF FLEXIBILITY IS SHOWN VENEZUELAN ROLE AS MODERATOR MAY BE VERY HELPFUL. PEREZ GUERRERO SAID VENEZUELA STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED WITH COMPANIES OPEC COUNTRIES WOULD LIVE UP TO BARGAIN WITHOUT CHISELING AND VENEZUELA WILL INSIST ON THIS POINT.

GP-3
STEWART
BT
CFN 1/4 GP-3

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rg/cbm, NARA, Date 3-1-06

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Venezuela
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INDICATE: COLLECT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HUNDY SMITH
DEC 20 7 13 PM '63

43

Origin ACTION: Amembassy CARACAS

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Info:

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Substance reftel conveyed Venezuelan Ambassador and Economic

L

Minister by Assistant Secretary Johnson and Assistant Secretary Kelly.

H

ARA

They seemed pleased at indications resumption growth Venezuelan

CAP

petroleum exports to United States.

UIB

AID

Ambassador stated Minister Mines Guerrero intended return home via

P

USIA

visit Washington around January 6 and desired discuss mutual oil problems

INR

with USG that time. This suggestion welcomed by Johnson and Kelly. When

COM

INT

Ambassador asked if previous US-Venezuelan oil discussions at technical

TRSY

level could be resumed ~~by~~ Johnson replied that this would be up to

RMR

GOV to propose.

During general discussion oil market overseas Ambassador expressed hope that outcome Riyadh OPEC meeting would result Middle East govts receiving higher revenues on grounds this ~~2~~ would firm oil market and also consolidate govts these countries.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *Mf/cba* NARA, Date *3-1-06*

Drafted by: *AFE*

E:FSE:AFensor:bjr 12/20/63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: E - G. Griffith Johnson

Clearances:

Interior - Mr. O'Leary *AFE*
ARS - Mr. Margolis *AFE*

OR - SNeher

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DOS REVIEWED 25-Jun-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Henry
39

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~~SECRET~~

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1963 DEC 18 PM 6 40

Action RR RUEHCR REFER TO CIA

ARA DE RUESRS 346 18/2235Z
R 182230Z ZEA

Info FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC

SS STATE GRNC

G BT

~~SECRET~~

SP 755 DECEMBER 18, 6:10 PM

ADPS LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

IOP EMBTELS 744, 750

INR PRES BETANCOURT HAS APPROVED USE OF PEAK TO HELP PREPARE REPORT
CIA ON CUBAN SUBVERSION. I ASSUME THAT PEAK IS THOROUGHLY CONVERSANT
RMR WITH INFO AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON AND CAN ADVISE WHAT NEW
PERMISSIBLE MATERIAL MAY BE INCLUDED IN VENEZUELAN REPORT.

032

25x1

CFN: 346 755 744 750

PAGE TWO RUESRS 346 S E C R E T
FOMIN INFORMED ME MININT MANTILLA WAS GRATEFUL OFFER PEAK'S
SERVICES. THIS IS IMPORTANT, SINCE MANTILLA WILL BE KEY MAN
IN PUSHING REPORT SINCE COL. MARTIN MARQUEZ ANEZ, SIFA HEAD
AND OUR CLOSEST LIAISON, IS BEING ORDERED BY PRESIDENT
TO GO TO US FOR OVERDUE OPERATION ON BACK (EMBTel 751). PRES
TOLD ME MARQUEZ ANEZ FINALLY HAD TO ENTER LOCAL MILITARY
HOSPITAL BECAUSE OF CONDITION.

I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT NEED FOR URGENCY IN PREPARING REPORT
AND HE ASSURED ME WORK WOULD BE DONE DURING CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS.

I WISH TO URGE THAT ALL MATERIAL THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE IN
WASHINGTON BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY IN ORDER THAT WE MAY MAKE
BEST USE PEAK'S SERVICES IN DRAFTING A REPORT SO CONVINCING
THAT AUTHENTICITY UNDENIABLE.

GP-1. STEWART

BT

CFN: MANTILLA MARTIN MARQUEZ ANEZ SIFA 751

CIA REVIEWED 27-Jun-2012: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED
Authority: NLJ001R-74-6-4
By: HA, NARA, DAE, Date: 9-18-14

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Downy
- BUNDY-SMITH
- ALEXANDER
- BELK
- BRUBECK 40
- CHASE
- DINGEMAN
- DUNGAN
- ECKEL
- FORRESTAL
- JOHNSON
- KILDUFF
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- SAUNDERS
- SCHLESINGER
- SMITH, WM. Y.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45
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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS

1963 DEC 18 PM 9 32

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DEPT 753 INFO SANTO DOMINGO 26 FROM CARACAS DEC 18-5PM

MIGUEL ANGEL MIOLAN, PRESIDENT OF BOSCH'S PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO WHO IS HERE ON BRIEF VISIT FROM PUERTO RICO, CAME IN THIS MORNING AND MADE FOLLOWING POINTS.

1. PRD LEADERSHIP DESIRES US, DESPITE RECOGNITION OF TRIUMVIRATE, TO KEEP UP PRESSURE FOR EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. HE INTERPRETED PASSAGE IN NEWSPAPERS STORY AS INDICATING US WOULD CONTINUE TO WITHHOLD AID FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE STRESSED THERE WOULD BE NOT ONLY DISILLUSIONMENT WITH US IN CFN 753 26 18-5PM 1.

PAGE TWO RUESRS 339 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOM REP AND HEMISPHERE, BUT TRIUMVIRATE WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME DICTATORSHIP OF WORST SORT UNLESS CONSTITUTIONALITY RESTORED.

2. WAY TO RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS FOR CONGRESS TO RE-CONVENE AND ELECT NEW PRESIDENT TO FINISH TERM OF EX-PRESIDENT BOSCH, WHO RECOGNIZED HE COULD NOT COME BACK. ALTHOUGH SUCCESSION CONSTITUTIONALLY WOULD FALL ON PRD MEMBERS WHO WERE PRESIDENT OF SENATE, PRESIDENT OF CHAMBER DEPUTIES, ETC., HE THOUGHT PARTY WOULD AGREE ON A POLITICAL "NEUTRAL", AS LONG AS HE WERE NOT ANTI-PRD. HE INDICATED PERSON SUCH AS READ BARRERA, FORMER MEMBER COUNCIL OF STATE WHO IS NOW AMBASSADOR TO UK, MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE BUT UNDERSTOOD READ HAD REJECTED OVERTURES IN THIS SENSE BY SOCIAL CHRISTIANS. WHETHER ELECTED PRD-CONTROLLED CONGRESS WOULD CONTINUE FOR REST OF TERM WAS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED.

3. HE WAS MEETING TODAY WITH REPRESENTATIVE AD AND COPEI WITH VIEW HAVING REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH OF THESE PARTIES PROCEED TO DOM REP TO SURVEY SITUATION AND SEE IF SOLUTION COULD BE WORKED OUT. HE THOUGHT AD EMISSARY WOULD BE ALIRIO GOMEZ WHO HAS CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH PRD'S MAXINO ARES, AND GONZALO GARCIA BUSTILLOS MIGHT REPRESENT COPEI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/...* NARA, Date *3-1-06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 753, DECEMBER 18, 5 P.M. FROM: CARACAS.

4. PRD SOUGHT A PACIFIC RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY AND HAD
CFN 2. 3. 4.

PAGE THREE RUESRS 339 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INSTRUCTED ITS MEMBERSHIP NOT TO JOIN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AS
THIS WOULD PLAY INTO HANDS OF COMMUNISTS. SOME YOUNGER PRD
MEMBERS HAD WANTED TO START "DEMOCRATIC" GUERRILLA MOVEMENT SO
AS NOT TO LEAVE THIS FIELD ACTIVITY SOLELY IN HANDS EXTREMISTS,
BUT PARTY HAD NOT APPROVED THIS.

5. HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED AND RIDICULED PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S
CLAIMS OF COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST TENDENCIES IN PRD. HE EX-
PLAINED BOSCH GOVERNMENT HAD ONLY ALLOWED COMMUNISTS TO ACT
PEACEABLY WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND COMMUNISTS HAD NOT
PARTICIPATED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN
APPLICATION OF LAW. HE VIEWED ANTI-COMMUNIST POSITION OF PRESENT
GOVERNMENT AS MERE WINDOW DRESSING, SAYING THAT PRD'S LEADERS
WERE PERSECUTED AND DRIVEN INTO EXILE AND ITS PROPERTY SEIZED
WHILE VERY FEW CASTRO-COMMUNIST LEADERS PICKED UP.

6. HE WANTED TO RETURN TO DOM REP LEGALLY TO CONTINUE PACIFIC
FIGHT FOR RESTORATION DEMOCRACY AND SOUGHT OUR HELP. HE SAID
HE WAS ALSO WRITING TO AMBASSADOR MARTIN AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON
IN THIS SENSE. I UNDERTOOK TO RELAY THIS INFORMATION TO DEPART-
MENT AND SANTO DOMINGO. DURING REMAINDER OF CONVERSATION MIOLAN
REITERATED ACCOUNT BOSCH HAS GIVEN OF SEPT. 25 COUP, VIZ LOSING
PARTIES STARTED CONSPIRING FROM DAY THEY LOST ELECTION.

GP-2

STEWART

BT

CFN 5. 6. 25 GP-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1963 DEC 13 PM 10 31

CAP AMEMBASSY CARACAS
P TO SECSTATE WASHDC
USIA STATE GRNC
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CIA 732 DEC 13-7PM

NSA

OSD G-2, VENEZUELAN ARMY, HAS NOTIFIED EMBASSY THROUGH ARMY MISSION
ARMY THAT IN MEETING OF FALN IT WAS DECIDED TO KIDNAP "THE SECRETARY"
NAVY OF THIS EMBASSY OR ANOTHER OF ITS RANKING OFFICERS BEFORE
AIR DECEMBER 24 TO MAINTAIN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC IN STATE OF
O TENSION DURING CHRISTMAS, AND THAT MOVEMENTS OF SAID SECRETARY
SY ARE BEING CHECKED.

PER NO FURTHER DETAILS OR CORROBORATING REPORTS YET AVAILABLE.
SCA EMBASSY TAKING MEASURES TO INCREASE VIGILANCE AND SECURITY OF
SCS PERSONNEL AFFECTED.

RMR GP-2
STEWART

BT
CFN 732 13-7PM G-2 24 GP-2

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E.O. 15292, Sec. 3.4
By *hgf/bm*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

42

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin
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ACTION: Amembassy CARACAS 518 IMMEDIATE

Dec 13 8 27 PM '63

Info:

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

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CODE ROOM: Repeat Deptel 135 to San Jose, Control 4465,
of October 8, 1963, to Amembassy CARACAS.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ng/cbm* NARA, Date *3-1-06*

Drafted by:
[Signature]
ARA/GAP:EMRowell/esr

12/13/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

[Signature]
ARA - Mr. Cottrell

Clearances:

OAP - V. Lansing Collins
EST/V - Mr. Moskowitz

S/S - ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Mr. McKesson

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Dungan

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

43

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~~BRUBACK~~
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~~DUNGAN~~
~~ECKEL~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
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~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SCHLESINGER~~
~~SMITH, WM.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action PP RUEHCR
 DE RUESRS 247 12/0230Z
 ARA P 120220Z ZEA
 info FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RULPC/POLAD USCINCSO
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P R I O R I T Y

L ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 721 RPTD INFO PRIORITY POLAD USCINCSO
 ADPS POLAD USCINCLANT UNN FROM CARACAS DECEMBER 11, 10:05 PM

CAP POLLERI-ALLEN SUBCOMMITTEE AND MIL ADVISERS REPORTED FULL
 EUR COMMITTEE THIS A.M. RE VISIT TO PARAGUANA. TRIP USEFUL IN
 MC OBTAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH LOCAL AUTHORITIES
 AID HAD FAILED ELICIT FROM WITNESSES AND HELPFUL IN FURTHER
 P EDUCATION CHILEAN MIL ADVISER AND URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR WHO,
 USIA BY BEING MORE EXPOSED TO FACTS, BECOMING INCREASINGLY CON-
 NSC VINCED. SINCE SOME ATTENTION CENTERED ON JOHNSON OUTBOARD
 INR MOTOR FOUND IN BOAT WHICH BELIEVED USED IN LANDING ARMS CACHE,
 CIA CFN: 247 721

NSA PAGE TWO RUESRS 247 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSD WHICH PROVED OF CANADIAN ORIGEN, COMMISSION CABLED CANADIAN
 ARMY COMPANY DIRECTLY FOR FULL INFO AND FACIO AND ALLEN INFORMED
 NAVY CANADIAN AMBASSADOR HERE WHO INFORMING EXTAFF AND PROMISED
 AIR COOPERATION GOC.
 RMR

THIS P.M. FULL COMMISSION WITNESSED CHEMICAL TESTS ON ARMS
 PICKED AT RANDOM FROM ARMS CACHE BY COMMITTEE MIL ADVISERS /
 WHICH SHOWED QUITE CLEARLY SERIAL NUMBERS AND CUBAN SHIELD.
 MIL ADVISERS ALSO SELECTED SEVERAL FAL RIFLES AND UZI MACHINE
 GUNS TO BRING BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER TESTS BY U.S.
 OR OTHER ORDNANCE TECHNICIANS.

DURING INTERVIEW DEFMIN AND SIFA HEAD THEY INDICATED DOMINICAN
 MADE SAN CRISTOBAL CARBINE AND ITALIAN MADE GARAND RIFLE HAD
 BEEN TAKEN FROM DEAD GUERRILLAS. SINCE THESE WEAPONS OF TYPE
 SOLD TO BATISTA AFTER U.S. EMBARGO, GOV CHECKING WITH RESPECTIVE
 COUNTRIES TO VERIFY THESE CORRESPOND TO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA.

IN MEETING MIN DEF QUESTION OF TRACING U.S. ARMS AGAIN AROSE.
 MIN DEF INDICATED PROBLEMS OF TRYING TO TRACE SUCH WEAPONS

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
 By g/cba, NARA, Date 5-1-06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 721, December 11, 10 p.m., from Caracas

SINCE THEY WERE AVAILABLE ALL OVER WORLD. HE STATED GOV HAD REQUESTED USG FOR TRACER BJT HAD NOT PUSHED TOO HARD SINCE US IS OAS MEMBER GOVERNMENT AND COMMITTEE COULD GO DIRECTLY TO GUS. ALLEN EXPLAINED STEPS WE HAD TAKEN TO EXPEDITE RESPONSE, CFN: EXTAFF SIFA SAN CRISTOBAL GARAND FAL UZI

PAGE THREE RUESRS 247 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MAKING CLEAR WE HAD NO RESERVATION TRYING TO OBTAIN INFO. WEIDMANN AT THIS STAGE SAID COMMITTEE PREFERRED GOV OBTAIN INFORMATION SINCE IT HAD INITIATED INQUIRY AND COMMITTEE WOULD AWAIT RESULTS, CONFIDENT U.S. WOULD GIVE FULL COOPERATION. IN VIEW DETERMINATION ALL MEMBERS COMMISSION AND MIL ADVISERS TO PRESENT FULLY DOCUMENTED CASE AND IN VIEW DETAILED NATURE INVESTIGATION BELGIAN ARMS, IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT GUS PROVIDE AS COMPLETE, RESPONSIVE AND DETAILED ANSWER AS POSSIBLE TO GOV REQUEST FOR INFO RE U.S. ARMS.

GOV HAS FORMED INTER-MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUP UNDER TEJERA TO DEVELOP FULL VENEZUELAN CASE COVERING CATEGORIES EVIDENCE MENTIONED YESTERDAY'S REPORT.

SINCE PREPARATION FULL CASE LIKELY REQUIRE SOME TIME, OTHER MEMBERS COMMISSION INCLINED ADHERE PLAN LEAVE FRIDAY AND RETURN LATER IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, DECISION DATE RETURN AS YET UNTAKEN.

GP-3. STEWART
BT
CFN: TEJERA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Venezuela 44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

55 53
Action
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R 112230Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

007716

1963 DEC 11 PM 7 42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
719 DECEMBER 11, 6:10 PM

IN PAST THREE DAYS I HAVE PAID COURTESY CALLS ON ALL SEVEN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES SEPARATELY TO TENDER CONGRATULATIONS ON EXEMPLARY WAY VENEZUELA HAD UPHELD DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN ELECTORAL PROCESS. I FOUND THEM TO A MAN DISPOSED TO ACCEPT OVERALL ELECTORAL RESULTS AND TO USE LEGAL MEANS TO CHALLENGE WHAT SOME CONSIDERED INDIVIDUAL IRREGULARITIES. TREND OF THEIR REMARKS INDICATE THAT SERIOUS TALKS ABOUT COALITION OR COMBINATIONS WILL NOT GET UNDER WAY UNTIL AFTER NEW YEARS AND THAT DEFINITE PACTS OR ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT TO BE EXPECTED UNTIL LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY.
CFN: 245 719

PAGE TWO RUESRS 245-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ELATION OF CALDERA AND COPEI LEADERSHIP AT THEIR INCREASE IN VOTES WAS OUTSTANDING FEATURE THIS ROUND OF VISITS. CALDERA EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO JOIN GOVERNMENT BUT INDICATED BOUT THAT AD WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SUFFICIENT CONCESSIONS TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE, HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY OF PARLIAMENTARY WORKING ARRANGEMENT SHORT OF COALITION IF AD WOULD SUPPORT KEY COPEI PLATFORM PLANKS SUCH AS HOUSING AND FAMILY SUBSIDIES. FOR HIS PART, AD'S LEONI (WHO IS TO BE PROCLAIMED PRESIDENT-ELECT THIS WEEK) APPEARED SOMEWHAT INCLINED THINK PRICE COPEI WOULD ASK TO PARTICIPATE IN COALITION WOULD BE TOO HIGH AND INCLINED NOT TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT WITH VILLALBA'S URD IF LATTER WOULD PURGE LEFTISTS. HE INDICATED AD'S EARLIER INCLINATION TO CONTINUE GOVERNING WITH COPEI HAED BEEN BASED ON EXPECTATION AD WOULD GET HIGHER AND COPEI LOWER PERCENT OF VOTES THAN PROVED TO BE CASE. HE ASSURED ME, HOWEVER, AD WOULD CONTINUE HARD LINE TOWARDS COMMUNISTS AND WOULD NOT CONSIDER ALLOWING THEIR REHABILITATION. FOR AT LEAST YEAR TO PROVE GOOD FAITH EVEN IF THEY WERE TO ABANDON TERRORISM.

MY IMPRESSION FROM THESE INTERVIEWS ARE, IN SUM, THAT ALL

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By sp/ku, NARA, Date 31-de

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 719, DECEMBER 11, 6:10 PM FROM CARACAS

PAGE THREE RUESRS 245 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ORGANIZED POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE CURRENTLY MINDED TO TRY MAKE
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC WORK WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF ELECTION
RESULTS, BUT THAT IT WILL BE SOME WEEKS BEFORE PARTIES
THEMSELVES WILL HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF ALIGNMENT IN LEONI
ADMINISTRATION.

GP-3 STEWART
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FILE COPY

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SMITH, WM. Y.


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ACTION IMMEDIATE 718 USCINCSO FROM CARACAS DEC 11-5PM
DEPTEL 505

EMB AND ALLEN-BOWDLER AGREE ON PROPOSED FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION:

25x1, X6



(2) UPON RECEIPT SUCH INVITATION (PRESUMABLY ORALLY), WE WILL NOTIFY DEPT IMMEDIATELY. EXPERTS SHOULD THEN COME AS CONSULTANT TO US ARMY MISSION AT INVITATION GOV, NOT OF OAS COMMISSION.

(3) VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES WOULD THEN NOTIFY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE OF RESULTS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AS OUTLINED PARA 1 ABOVE AND STATE FINAL RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN DEFINITIVE REPORT RECEIVED FROM US.

(4) AS VEN MILITARY HAS ALREADY TOLD COMMITTEE REPLY FROM US BEING AWAITED, WE SHOULD RECEIVE AND FORWARD TO MIN DEFENSE AS SOON REPLY TO USARMA IMMEDIATE O 100048Z.

SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ-001-074-b-12
By mg/kbu NARA, Date 3-1-06

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-2-, 718, DECEMBER 11, 5 P.M., FROM CARACAS

25x1, X6



GP-1
STEWART
BT

CFN 1956-58 1961 (2) (3) 1 (4) 0 100048Z GP-1

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0, DECEMBER 11, 1963, 5:08 P.M.
RELAYED WHITE HOUSE, 12/11/63, 5:10 PM

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 747, DEC 06, 7 PM 1963 DEC 6 PM 8 39

VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE

SOME INDICATION THAT BOLIVIAN GOVT HAS IMPRESSION, PERHAPS ATTRIBUTABLE TO RECENT NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON NOT LIKELY BACK VENEZUELA INITIATIVES AGAINST CASTRO IN CURRENT CRISIS.

BELIEVE YOU SHOULD DISCREETLY CONVEY TO BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, WHICH WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN MY ASSERTIONS TO PAZ ON THIS POINT, SHOULD HE BRING UP PROBLEM.

GP-3 HENDERSON
BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *sg/cbm*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

Control: 3643
Rec'd: DECEMBER 5, 1963
10:14 PM

ARA

Info

FROM: CARACAS

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 686, DECEMBER 5, 7 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 686, INFORMATION USCINCSO, CINCLANT UNNUMBERED.

WHEN I RAISED WITH PRES BETANCOURT TODAY POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATIVE APPROACH BY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES TO COMMUNIST INSURGENCY PROBLEM NOW RPT NOW ELECTIONS ARE PAST (DEPTEL 473), HE INDICATED:

A) HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY TROUBLE FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES TO GOVTS PLANS WHICH FEATURE MAJOR DRIVE TO WIPE OUT GUERRILLAS IN WEST STARTING TOMORROW, CONTINUED ARREST OF FALN LEADERS (INCLUDING ARREST COLONEL MONCADA VIDAL ABOUT WHICH HE JUBILANTLY PHONED ME LAST NIGHT), AND CONTINUED POLICE EFFORTS AGAINST URBAN TERRORIST BANDS.

B) HE AND COPEI LEADER RAFAEL CALDERA WOULD WORK ACTIVELY WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT LEONI TO CONSTRUCT AN AD-COPEI AGREEMENT, WITH SOME INDEPENDENT PARTICIPATION, WHICH WOULD ALSO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL CONGRESS DURING NEXT ADMINISTRATION. HE BELIEVED SUCH COMBINATION WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN TAKING FIRM MEASURES AGAINST COMMUNIST EXTREMISM AND WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED IN THIS BY LEGAL OPPOSITION PARTIES. URD VILLALBA, FOR INSTANCE, WAS BITTER ABOUT HIS POOR ELECTORAL SHOWING BLAMING IT ON LEFTISTS EXTREMISTS IN PARTY WHO CONTROL NEWSPAPER "CLARIN". HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE PROBLEM WITH USLAR PIETRI'S SENATOR AND DEPUTIES, MANY OF WHOM ARE CONSERVATIVE BUSINESSMEN.

IN GENERAL, IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT IS FOR-MOMENT THINKING IN TERMS OF INCREASING PRESSURES ON GUERRILLAS AND TERRORISTS WITHIN PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK; THAT HE BELIEVES RECENT EVENTS SUCH AS KILLING OF GUERRILLA LEADER DOUGLAS BRAVO AND CAPTURE MONCADA FOLLOWING

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~~SECRET~~

- BUNDY-SMITH
- ALEXANDER
- BELK
- BRUBECK
- CHASE
- DINGEMAN
- DUNGAN
- ECHE
- FORRESTAL
- JOHNSON
- KILDUFF
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- SAUNDERS
- SCHLESINGER
- SMITH, WM.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By sg/cbm, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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-2- 686, DECEMBER 5, 7 PM, FROM: CARACAS

ARREST OF EXTREMIST CONGRESSMEN INDICATE PROGRESS IS BEING MADE;
AND THAT HIS PRINCIPAL TASK IS TO HELP ERECT POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
WHICH WILL ASSURE STABILITY DURING REMAINING MONTHS HIS ADMIN-
ISTRATION AND DURING NEXT ADMINISTRATION AS BEST MEANS OF PROVID-
ING POLITICAL BASE FROM WHICH TO FIGHT COMMUNIST INSURGENCY.

GP-3.

STEWART

GLB/22

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Bundy 48
Staff Summary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 3645
Rec'd: DECEMBER 5, 1963
10:14 PM

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FROM: CARACAS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 684, DECEMBER 5, 7 PM.

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 684, INFORMATION USCINCSO, CINCLANT UNNUMBERED.

RE DEPTCIRTEL 1016, DEPTELS 4479, 480

PRES BETANCOURT BEAT ME TO DRAW TODAY BY MAKING CLEAR HE DID NOT CONTEMPLATE A NAVAL AND AIR BLOCKADE OF CUBA IN SENSE OF STOPPING INCOMING SHIPS, AS THIS WOULD BRING DIFFICULTIES WITH USSR, BUT WAS THINKING OF A "REVERSE" BLOCKADE TO PREVENT OUTWARD SHIPMENT FROM CUBA OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO LA COUNTRIES. HE STATED VENEZUELA WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING AMERICAN STATE APPROACHING NATIONAL WATERS IN HOT PURSUIT TO GIVE LOCATION OF SUSPECT SHIP TO VENEZUELAN FORCES (SIMILAR TO ARRANGEMENT WHICH, I REMINDED HIM, HAD BEEN MADE IN CASE OF 1959 CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF PANAM) BUT REITERATED HIS STRONG OPPOSITION TO STATIONING OR STAGING FOREIGN MILITARY UNITS IN VENEZUELA TERRITORY.

PRES ASKED ME DISCUSS DETAILS AND PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED WITH FORNMIN FALCON BRIGENO, WHO IS NOT TO BE FOUND THIS AFTERNOON. I DID, HOWEVER, GO OVER REMAINING POINTS OF CIR 1016 WITH BETANCOURT WHO FAVORED:

1. BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA BY REST LA STATES HAVING THEM,
2. ANY MEASURES WHICH WOULD FURTHER DIMINISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS, ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THESE UNIMPORTANT SO FAR AS LA COUNTRIES

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By *rsj/cbm*, NARA, Date 5-1-06

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-2- 684, DECEMBER 5, 7 PM, FROM: CARACAS

CONCERNED,

3. AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE BREAK IN COMMUNICATIONS,

4. COOPERATIVE SURVEILLANCE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

PRESIDENT APPEARED GENERALLY FLEXIBLE IN HIS POSITION, AND INDICATED VENEZUELA HAD NOT BEGUN AS YET CONSULTING OTHER COUNTRIES. I SHALL TRY TO GET MORE FROM FALCON AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

GP-2.

STEWART

CC-22.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Handwritten signature

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1963 DEC 5 PM 2 17

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ACTION DEPT PRITY (682) ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINGSO POLAD
CINCLANT FROM CARACAS DEC 5 12NOON

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

JOINT EMBASSY-MIL GROUP MESSAGE

FOLLOWING INITIAL DEBRIEFING (EMBTel 681) COLONEL CHENAULT
ADDED FOLLOWING TO RESTRICTED GROUP IN MY OFFICE:

1. HE WAS IMPRESSION FALN WENT THROUGH THREE STAGES ABOUT
WHAT TO DO WITH HIM DURING HIS CAPTIVITY. DURING FIRST
TWO DAYS, THEY APPARENTLY INTENDED ONLY PUBLICITY STUNT
CFN 682 5 12NOON 681 1.

PAGE TWO RUESRS 125 ~~SECRET~~

AND EARLY RELEASE. DURING SUBSEQUENT FOUR DAYS THEY CONSIDERED
FOSSIBILITY OF KILLING HIM AND DUMPING BODY NEAR EMBASSY.
DURING LAST TWO DAYS, THEY HAD REACHED DECISION TO RELEASE HIM
AND WERE URGING HIM TO EAT, ETC, PREPARATORY TO HIS PUBLIC
APPEARANCE. THEY THREATENED HIM WITH LIQUIDATION IF HIS CAPTORS
OR GUARDS ARRESTED.

2. THROUGHOUT CAPTIVITY, FALN TRIED IMPRESS ON HIM DETERMINATION
TO FORCE MILITARY MISSIONS OUT, STATING AMONG OTHER THINGS THEY
HAD EYE ON COL. BURDELL, CHIEF ARMY MISSION, AND CAPT. WALKER,
COMMANDER US MIL GROUP.

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Authority NLT 001R-74-6-5
By aj ARA Date 9-18-14

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2-, 682, December 5, Noon, From Caracas

CHENAULT HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOUSE WHICH IS UNDER GUARD FOR REST. WE SHALL MAKE DECISION ABOUT PLANS FOR HIS IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY LATER IN DAY.

I AM ABOUT TO SEE PRESIDENT BETANCOURT AND SHALL RAISE WITH HIM QUESTION SECURITY MILITARY MISSION PERSONNEL AND ESPECIALLY CHIEFS OF THREE MISSIONS. CAPT. WALKER WAS TO HAVE HAD MEETING IN MINISTRY DEFENSE ON THIS SUBJECT THIS MORNING BUT IT WAS TEMPORARILY POSTPONED DUE CHENAULT'S RELEASE.

GP-1

STEWART

BT

QFN 2. GP-1

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

James
SD

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1963 DEC 5 PM 12 36

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBACK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNN~~
- ~~FORESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KILGUST~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHIRSHINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 681 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO POLAD
CINCLNT FROM CARACAS DEC 5 11AM SECTIO TWO OF TWO

RELEASE: EVERY DAY OR SO CHENAULT WAS TOLD HE MIGHT BE RELEASED THE NEXT DAY. FINALLY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON HE WAS TOLD "HE FALN GENERAL STAFF HAS CONCEDED YOUR LIBERTY." ONE OF THE GUARDS WAS CHANGED, AND THE NEW MAN WAS SAID TO BE AN EXPERT IN ENGINEERING PRISONER RELEASES. LAST NIGHT THE NEW MAN AND ONLY ONE OF THE OTHERS WERE ON DUTY AND IT WAS EXPLAINED THIS WAS IN ORDER NOT TO EXPOSE THE OTHERS DURING THE RELEASE. AT 5:15 TODAY THEY BLACKED CHENAULT'S HAIR WIT SHOE POLISH, DISGUISED HIM WITH A TAPED-ON MUSTACHE, AND TAPED HIS EYES AGAIN. AT APPROXIMATELY 5:30 THEY LEFT THE APARTMENT, GOT INTO A CAR N DROVE FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES. AFTER PARKING, THE GUARDS TOLD CHENAULT TO BE QUIET FOR FIFTEEN MINUTES. THEY THEN LEFT HIM IN THE CAR AND PRESUMABLY ENTERED ANOTHER CAR WAITING CLOSE BY. AFTER SOME MINUTES CHENAULT RIPPED OFF THE TAPE, FOUND HIMSELF IN THE CHAGUARAMOS SUBURB OF CARACAS, WALKED TO THE NEARBY SANTA MONICA AREA WHERE HE WAS ABLE TO HAIL A CAB. HE ARRIVED AT HIS HOME SHORTLY AFTER 0600.

GP-3
STEWART
BT
CFN 5/30 15 0600 GP-3

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12/5/63, 1:07 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12/5/63, 1:12 PM

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Authority NSJ001R. 74-66
By Ag ARA Date 9-18-74

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True as per 52

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~LANGEMAN~~
- ~~BUNGAN~~
- ~~EDWARDS~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KILDUFF~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

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1963 DEC 5 AM 11:14

BT
 UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (680) INFO ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD USCINCO
 POLAD USCINCLANT FROM CARACAS FIFTH

FOLLOWING IS PRESS STATEMENT MADE THIS MORNING BY COL. JAMES
 K. CHENAULT.

"IT IS A GREAT FEELING TO BE FREE AGAIN. I WAS RELEASED,
 UNHARMED, AT DAWN TODAY, AFTER EIGHT DAYS OF CAPTIVITY.
 I WAS HELD IN SOME SECTIONS OF CARACAS I CANNOT IDENTIFY, ONLY
 THAT IT SEEMED TO BE A WELL-POPULATED AREA. I WAS GUARDED
 CONTINUALLY, BUT RECEIVED REASONABLY GOOD TREATMENT CONSIDERING
 THE CIRCUMSTANCES. I HAD TO REMAIN IN BED, IN PYJAMAS, AT ALL
 TIMES EXCEPT TO USE THE BATHROOM. I WAS KEPT IN A MODEST ROOM,
 ALWAYS WITH TWO GUARDS. I WAS URGED TO READ BOOKS ON COMMUNISM.

SOME PRINTED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT I REJECTED THEM. AT ONE
 POINT, ONE OF MY CAPTORS HAMMERED AWAY AT ME CONTINUALLY IN
 AN ATTEMPT AT POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, DESCRIBING THE VIRTUES
 OF COMMUNISM.

"I LEARNED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON I WOULD BE RELEASED TODAY.
 AT 5:15 THIS MORNING MY EYES WERE TAPED AND MY HAIR BLACKENED
 WITH SHOE POLISH. THEY PUT ME INTO A LATE MODEL CAR AND DROVE
 ME A SHORT DISTANCE, LEFT ME IN THE CAR, AND TOLD ME TO WAIT
 FIFTEEN MINUTES BEFORE LEAVING. I TOOK THE TAPE OFF MY EYES
 AFTER THIS TIME AND FOUND I WAS IN LOS CHAGUARAMOS. I WALKED
 TWO BLOCKS, CAUGHT A TAXI, AND WENT TO MY HOME.

"LET ME REPEAT THAT I AM GREATLY PLEASED TO BE BACK SAFE.
 I HAVE NOTHING BUT PRAISE FOR THE WONDERFUL WAY MY WIFE
 RUTH AND OUR THREE CHILDREN BEYAVED DURING THESE DAYS OF
 STRAIN." STEWART

BT
 NOTE: PASSED W.H. 11:25 AM 12/5/63,
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Department of State

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Action
ARA

Control: 2962
Rec'd: December 5, 1963
7:03 a.m.

Info

FROM: Caracas

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 678, December 5, 7 a.m.

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ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT 678, DEPT ARMY, DEPT NAVY, DEPT OF AIR, POLAD USCINCSO, POLAD USCINCLANT UNNUMBERED

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President Betancourt telephoned me last night to inform me that ex-Colonel Juan de Dios Moncada Vidal, longtime anti-government plotter and presently one of FALN major leaders, was captured last night. No publicity being given to capture last night. None anticipated until government has finished interrogating Moncada.

STEWART

DLW

NOTE: Passed White House, 7:18 a.m., December 5.

Advance copy to S/S-0 at 7:10 a.m., December 5.

Passed OSD, CIA, 7:30 a.m., December 5.

- ~~—BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~—ALEXANDER~~
- ~~—BELK~~
- ~~—BRUBECK~~
- ~~—CHASE~~
- ~~—DINGEMAN~~
- ~~—DUNGAN~~
- ~~—ECKEL~~
- ~~—FORRESTAL~~
- ~~—JOHNSON~~
- ~~—KILDUFF~~
- ~~—KLEIN~~
- ~~—KOMER~~
- ~~—SAUNDERS~~
- ~~—SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~—SMITH, WM. Y.~~

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Department of State

Venezuela

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Wire by dest

Action

Control: 2957
Rec'd: DECEMBER 5, 1963
6:56 A.M.

~~ARA~~

Info

FROM: CARACAS

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 677, DECEMBER 5

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ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT 677, DEPT ARMY, DEPT NAVY,
DEPT AIR, POLAD USCINCSO, POLAD USCINCLANT UNNUMBERED

COLONEL CHENAULT RETURNED TO HIS HOUSE 0600 THIS MORNING IN
GOOD HEALTH. PLEASE INFORM HIS FATHER IN CORPUS CHRISTI,
TEXAS. MORE FOLLOWS.

STEWART

DJS/22

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 7:03 A.M., 12/5/63

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 7:05 A.M., 12/5/63

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Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 2376 DEC. 5, 8:30 PM

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VENEZUELA

FBI

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

1. DR. WALTER KRING, MINISTER AT UNITARIAN CHURCH OF ALL SOULS IN NEW YORK, A FORMER NAVY CHAPLAIN FAVORABLY KNOWN TO AMB PLIMPTON CALLED TODAY AND REPORTED TO USUN OFFICER AS FOLLOWS:

HE WAS APPROACHED TODAY BY AMERICAN WOMAN WHO REQUESTED ANONYMITY BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT. THIS WOMAN ASKED DR. KRING TO GET HER STORY INTO PROPER CHANNELS. SHE WOULD NOT HERSELF GO TO FBI. SHE IS IN LOVE WITH A FORMER RAF FLYER, CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER OF WAR" WHO HIRES OUT TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER AND WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN HONDURAS COUP. HER FRIEND LEFT TODAY, MEANS UNKNOWN, FOR AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HE TOLD HER HE WOULD FLY TO VENEZUELA ON SATURDAY 7 DEC IN CONNECTION WITH A PRO-CASTRO COUP ABOUT WHICH SHE WOULD READ IN THE SUNDAY PAPERS. HE TOLD HER HE WOULD RETURN NY BY CERTAIN DATE IN NEAR FUTURE.

2. DR. KRING SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY WOMAN'S UTTER SINCERITY AND NORMAL BEHAVIOR. HE BELIEVED SHE WAS CONVINCED OF TRUTH OF HER STORY AND OF HONESTY OF HER FRIEND. SHE HAD APPARENTLY AT SOME EARLIER DATE CONTACTED FBI IN CONNECTION HER FRIEND'S PARTICIPATION OR KNOWLEDGE OF HONDURAS COUP BUT LATER RETRACTED HER STORY BECAUSE SHE FELT IT SEEMED TOO IMPLAUSIBLE AND SILLY.

GP-3. STEVENSON

BT

CFN 2376 5 8:30 1. 7 2. GP-3

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Authority NLS 001-76-6-B

By ly ARA Date 9-18-14

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Department of State

Venezuela

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~~SECRET~~

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 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
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1963 DEC 4 PM 2 27

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ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE (672) ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO
POLAD CINCLANT INFO CINCSO FROM CARACAS DEC 4 2PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

TIME CORRESPONDENT GARCIA, INTERVIEWED FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS IN MY OFFICE TODAY, GAVE FURTHER DETAILS ON HIS INTERVIEW WITH COL. CHENAULT. THESE DO NOT CHANGE CONTENTS EMBTEL 665 EXCEPT HE WAS APPARENTLY BEING HELD IN APARTMENT HOUSE IN NORTH-CENTRAL CARACAS RATHER THAN IN MODEST HOME. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP DETAILS TO ATTEMPT PINPOINT LOCATION.

GP-1
STEWART
BT

CFN 672 4 2PM 665 GP-1

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 11/4/63 2:40 P.M.
" ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 11/4/63, 2:35 P.M.

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Authority NLJOCIR-74-6-8

By by ARA Date 9-18-14

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Department of State

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Action

ARA 00 RUEHC
 Info DE RUESRS 92 04/1715Z
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 G FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
 SE INFO RUEPC/DEPT OF ARMY
 H RUECW/DEPT OF NAVY
 CAP RUEAHQ/DEPT OF AIR
 AID RULPC/POLAD USCINCSO
 RUCKHC/POLAD USCINCLANT
 STATE GRNC

~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
~~ALEXANDER~~

~~BELK~~

~~CONTROL:~~ 2399

~~RECD:~~ IAN DECEMBER 4, 1963

~~12:48 PM~~

~~STAL~~

~~ON~~

~~UFF~~

~~SMITH~~

~~KOMER~~

~~SAUNDERS~~

~~SCHLESINGER~~

~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

BT
UNCLASSIFIED IMMEDIATE (671) FOURTH

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS:

OFFICIAL RESULTS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 12 NOON.
 LEONI 637,000 (32.6 PERCENT), CALDERA 413,000 (21.1 PERCENT),
 VILLALBA 370,000 (18.9PERCENT), USLAR 308,000 (15.7 PERCENT),
 LARRAZABAL 175,000 (9.0 PERCENT), RAMOS 47,000 (2.4 PERCENT),
 BORREGALES 6,000 (.3 PERCENT), TOTAL 1,956,000 (63 PERCENT
 OF ESTIMATED TOTAL).

STEWART

BT

CFN	671	12	637,000	32.6	413,000	21.1	370,000	18.9	308,000	15.7
	175,000	9.0	47,000	2.4	6,000	.3	1,956,000	63		

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:55 PM, 12/4/63.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 1:01 PM, 12/4/63.

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Department of State

Janet 59

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~~SECRET~~

- ___ BUNDY SMITH
- ___ ALEXANDER
- ___ BELK
- ___ BRIDGEMAN
- ___ BRUNSON
- ___ DINGEMAN
- ___ DUNGAN
- ___ EGRETT
- ___ FORRESTAL
- ___ JOHNSON
- ___ KILDUFF
- ___ KLEIN
- ___ KOMER
- ___ SAUNDERS
- ___ SCHLESINGER
- ___ SMITH, WM. Y.

Action

Control: 981

Rec'd: DECEMBER 3 1953

3:11 A.M.

ARA

Info

FROM: USAIRA CARACAS

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: DTG 030430Z DECEMBER (AIR FORCE MESSAGE)

L

H

ADPS

IMMEDIATE

CAP

MC

AID

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT ARMY, INFORMATION IMMEDIATE JCS, DEPT AIR, 1127 FLDATYS FT BELVOIR, CINCSO, USAFSOCOM, CINCLANT, WHITE HOUSE, STATE DEPARTMENT

P

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INR

THIS MSG IN FOUR PARTS

RMR

PART 1. COL ADRIANZA CS VENAF TODAY REVIEWED REPORTS OF RECENT AIRCRAFT AND BOAT INCURSIONS INTO VENEZUELA:

(A) AFTER LOCATING VEN NAVY RADAR EQUIPPED SHIPS NEAR CORO (1125N 6945W) WEEK OF 17 NOV NO FURTHER INCURSIONS WERE OBSERVED IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, 4 AIRCRAFT INCURSIONS WERE MADE WEST OF LAKE TOCARIGUA (1030N 6555W) SINCE 22 NOV DROPPING WHAT WAS PRESUMED TO BE ARMS ON A STRIP NEAR THE LAKE AND ALSO NEAR SAN JOSE DE GUARIBE (0950N 6550W).

(B) VEN AGENTS IN CURACAO (1210N 6900W) HAVE INFORMED HIM THAT COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FILING FLIGHT PLANS FOR PERU AND BRAZIL HAVE RETURNED TO CURACAO AFTER ABOUT THREE HOURS FLIGHT TIME CHANGING THEIR FLIGHT PLANS ON THEIR RETURN. HE BELIEVES THESE AIRCRAFT ARE DROPPING SUPPLIES IN VENEZUELA AND HAS ASKED THROUGH VEN FONMIN COLLABORATION OF DUTCH AUTHORITIES IN CURACAO. (C) A TWIN ENGINE CESSNA WAS DISCOVERED TO BE TAKING OFF FROM LA CARLOTA AIRFIELD CARACAS (1035N 6350W) LANDING AT NIGHT AT THE AIRSTRIP NEAR LAKE TACARIGUA PRESUMABLY PICKING UP ARMS AND FLYING THEM BY OVERLAND ROUTE TO CORO. THIS AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN SEIZED BY VEN AUTHORITIES BUT PILOT HAS NOT BEEN APPREHENDED. (D) ADRIANZA HAS INFORMATION LEADING HIM TO BELIEVE THAT IN VICINITY OF BLANQUILLA ISLAND (1150N 6435W) SEAGOING VESSELS WERE OFFLOADING ARMS TO SMALL BOATS WHICH

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~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS 0012 074-6-10
By *gj*, NARA, Date 9/13/11

~~SECRET~~

-2- DTG 030430Z DECEMBER (AIR FORCE MESSAGE) FROM
USAIRA CARACAS

BOATS WHICH DELIVERED THE ARMS TO BEACH NEAR THE AIRSTRIP CLOSE TO LAKE TACARIGUA. THEY WERE THEN DELIVERED TO THE REGION NEAR CORO BY THE CESSNA. HE HAS REPORTS OF BOATS MAKING NIGHT LANDINGS ON COAST NEAR POINT PIRITU (1005N 6505W) (E) THREE ARMED T-6 AIRCRAFT AND 2 ARMED B-25 AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN LOCATED AT CORO AIRFIELD FOR THE PAST TWO WEEKS TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE VEN NAVY SHIP RADAR WHICH IS CAPABLE OF GIVING ALTITUDE SPEED AND DIRECTION OF AIRCRAFT."

PART II. WHEN ADRIANZA WAS VEN ATTACHE TO CUBA 1960 HE SAW A C-46 WITH FOUR INTERNAL FUEL TANKS WHICH DOUBLED NORMAL RANGE. HE SAW THE C-46 TAKE OFF WITH A FULL FUEL LOAD AND 35 FULLY ARMED SOLDIERS.

PART III. ON 25 NOV AFTER BEING INFORMED BY GENERAL GOMEZ SECRETARY TO JOINT STAFF OF CLANDESTINE ARRIVAL AND TAKEOFF OF AIRCRAFT FROM A NON STATE RECOGNIZED STRIP NEAR LAKE TACARIGUA THE AIRA RECONNOITERED THE AREA THOROUGHLY BY AIR AND IDENTIFIED A FEW UNPREPARED FIELDS WHICH COULD BE USED AS LANDING AREAS.

PART IV. COMMENTS:

ADRIANZA WAS POSITIVE IN HIS ASSERTIONS CONCERNING THE ABOVE AIRCRAFT INCURSIONS BUT APPEARED LESS CERTAIN OF THE SHIP AND BOAT MOVEMENTS.

DJS/26

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 3:23 A.M., DECEMBER 3, 1963

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Department of State

Venezuela 60

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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

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1963 DEC 3 PM 1 20

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INFO RULPCR/CINCSO
RUEPCR/DEPT OF ARMY
RUECW/DEPT OF NAVY
RUEAHQ/DEPT OF AIR
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RUCKHCR/POLAD USCINCLANT
STATE GRNC
BT

024

~~SECRET~~ - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 665 INFO CINCSO ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD
CINCSO POLAD CINCLANT UNN FROM CARACAS DECEMBER 3 - 1PM

WIFE OF TIME CORRESPONDENT MOISES GARCIA JUST CALLED ON ME AT
REQUEST OF HER HUSBAND TO REPORT HE HAD BEEN TAKEN CLANDESTINELY
TO INTERVIEW AND PHOTOGRAPH CHENAULT LAST NIGHT AND FOUND HIM
GENERALLY WELL, BUT WAS NOT GIVEN TIME OF RELEASE.

GARCIA WAS PICKED UP BY CONTACT, DRIVEN AROUND THREE HOURS BLIND
FOLDED, AND TAKEN TO MODEST HOUSE IN CARACAS AREA WHOSE EXACT
LOCATION HE WAS UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT. HE FOUND CHENAULT BEING
CFN 665 3 1PM

PAGE TWO RUESRS 65 SECRET

REQUIRED TO STAY IN BED IN PYJAMAS AND GUARDED BY THREE MEN.
CHENAULT TOLD GARCIA HE WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT SITUATION, BUT WAS
BEING WELL TREATED, BEING PROVIDED WITH CIGARETTES AND CIGARS,
ALLOWED TO USE BATH FACILITIES AND TO PLAY VENEZUELAN CARD
GAME. HE HAD DEVELOPED PAIN IN AN ARM AND DOCTOR HAD BEEN
BROUGHT IN WHO PRESCRIBED MEDICINE WHICH RELIEVED CONDITION.

THIS WAS SUBSTANTIALLY ALL MRS. GARCIA KNEW. SUGGEST GARCIA
BE CONTACTED THROUGH TIME AND DEBRIEFED. IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT
THAT ABOVE STORY BE REGARDED AS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED NOT ONLY
TO PROTECT SOURCE (WHO WILL BE IN TROUBLE WITH BETANCOURT)
BUT ALSO TO PROTECT CHENAULT.

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Authority NLJ 001R-74-6-11

By Ly, NARA, Date 9-18-74

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 665, December 3, 1 P.M., From Caracas

PRIOR TO RECEIPT ABOVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE WERE:

1. DURING COURSE LAST NIGHT THREE CARACAS NEWSPAPERS RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALLS FROM MEN IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES AS FALN SPOKESMEN WHO STATED CHENAULT WAS ABOUT TO BE RELEASED AND, LATER WAS RELEASED.



25X1

PAGE THREE RUESRS 65 SECRET

2. EMBASSY [REDACTED] AND MILITARY MISSIONS REMAIN IN DAY AND NIGHT CONTACT WITH VENEZUELAN AGENCIES WORKING ON CASE. STEWART

25X1

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 1:28 PM, 12/3/63.
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 1:20 PM, 12/3/63.
PASSED DEFENSE FOR JCS 1:40 PM, 12/3/63.
PASSED CIA
HANDLED LD PER S/S-O

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Venezuela
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1963 DEC 3 PM 6 00

FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHCR/ SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEPCR/ DEPT ARMY
RUECW/ DEPT NAVY
RUEAHQ/ DEPT AIR
RULPC/ POLAD USCINCSO
RUJCKHC/ POLAD USCINCLANT
STATE GRNC
BT

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PRIORITY 667 DECEMBER 3, 5:10 PM

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS

OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS ARE NOW BEGINNING TO FIT INTO PATTERN INDICATED YESTERDAY BY THE UNOFFICIAL RETURNS. SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL'S LATEST OFFICIAL RESULTS REPRESENTING 1,307,000 VOTES (ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF ESTIMATED TOTAL) SHOW FOLLOWING: LEONI 418,000 (32 PERCENT); CALDERA 295,000 (22.6 PERCENT); VILLALBA 239,000 (18.3 PERCENT); USLAR 217,000 (16.3 PERCENT); LARRAZABAL 100,000 (7.7 PERCENT); RAMOS 31,000 (2.4 PERCENT).

IN ADDITION TO DEVELOPMENTS ALREADY REPORTED, IT NOW RPT NOW CLEAR THAT COPEI AND CALDERA, IN GREATLY INCREASING THEIR PERCENTAGE OVER 1958 AND SURPRISING POLITICAL OBSERVERS WHO FELT USLAR WOULD CUT INTO COPEI'S STRENGTH, HAVE MOVED INTO A FIRM SECOND PLACE ON THE VENEZUELAN POLITICAL SCENE. COPEI'S SHOWING HAS ASTONED EVEN RABID MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AND WILL CERTAINLY GIVE THAT PARTY A COMMANDING POSITION IN ANY COALITION NEGOTIATIONS WITH AD. AD BASED ON THE LATEST FIGURES WILL HAVE
CFN: 075 667 1,307,000 40 418,000 32 295,000 22.6 239,000 18.3
217,000 16.3 100,000 7.7 31,000 2.4 1958

PAGE TWO RUESRS 075 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
TO DEAL WITH COPEI IF IT EXPECTS TO GOVERN AND COPEI'S PRICE WILL BE A HIGH ONE.

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-2- 667, DECEMBER 3, 5 PM, FROM CARACAS

URD'S POOR SHOWING WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HASTEN THE PLINTERIZATION OF THAT PARTY WHICH HAS BEEN STAVED OFF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE ELECTIONS. URD WILL HENCEFORTH BE A MUCH LESS IMPORTANT FACTION ON THE POLITICAL SCENE.

FURTHER COMMENTS LATER WHEN THE OFFICIAL TALLY IS COMPLETE AND EMBASSY HAS HAD A CHANCE TO ANALYZE THE STATE-BY-STATE RETURNS.
STEWART
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Venezuela 62

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IMMEDIATE (559) DECEMBER 2, 7:35 PM

INR

CIA

JOINT EMBASSY-MIL GROUP

NSA

CHENAULT KIDNAPPING

OSD

ARMY

THE FOLL IS THE SITUATION REGARDING CHENAULT KIDNAPPING AS OF 1800 TODAY:

NAVY

1. NO INFO RECEIVED FROM GOV OR OTHER SOURCES RE PLANS FOR HIS RELEASE.

AIR

2. EMBASSY, AID, 25x1 HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT THROUGHOUT DAY WITH POLICE, 25x1

SCA

25x1 AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO ASCERTAIN WHAT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN SEARCH FOR COLONEL CHENAULT, TO URGE INTENSIFICATION THESE EFFORTS AND TO OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE THAT MIGHT BE OF VALUE. THE ELECTIONS HAVE APPARENTLY SOMEWHAT DISTRACTED VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS' EFFORTS, BUT WE ARE AWARE THAT THEY HAVE SEVERAL HOUSES UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND PTJ BELIEVES IT HAS IDENTIFIED KIDNAPPERS WHOM, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT LOCATED.

RMR

3. WE HAVE DEVELOPED COORDINATED PLANS OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN UPON COLONEL'S RELEASE; THESE INCLUDE (A) IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION OF RELEASE TO WASHINGTON AND PANAMA, (B) PROMPT DEBRIEFING WITH RESULTS TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON AND PANAMA

PAGE TWO RUESRS 047 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE PLUS ANY INFORMATION OF VALUE TO VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES, (C) BRIEF NEWS CONFERENCE FOR U.S. AND LOCAL CORRESPONDENTS. PROMPT PERSONAL CARE (INCLUDING MEDICAL IF NECESSARY) FOR COLONEL HAVE BEEN ARRANGED AND PLANS FOR HIS IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL BE DEVELOPED IN LIGHT INFO THEN AVAILABLE.

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Authority NLJ001R-74-6-12

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By h, NARA, Date 9-18-74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 659, DECEMBER 2, 8 PM, FROM: CARACAS

4. EMBASSY RECEIVED TWO ANONYMOUS CALLS TODAY; FIRST IN BROKEN ENGLISH STATING THAT THE COLONEL WOULD BE SHOT THIS AFTERNOON. THE SECOND INFORMANT REPORTED THE FINDING OF AN UNCLAD BODY IN AN APARTMENT HOUSE WHICH HE SAID HAD A PHYSICAL RESEMBLANCE TO COLONEL CHENAULT AND ADDED THAT THE POLICE PATROL CARS WERE ENROUTE TO THE SCENE TO VERIFY THIS. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS WITH POLICE FAILED TO VERIFY THAT ANY SIMILAR REPORT RECEIVED BY THEM.

25x1

6. RANKING MILITARY OFFICER, WHO ALSO AFFIRMS LATEST INFO IS THAT CHENAULT IS WELL, STATES WORD HAS BEEN PASSED TO FALN THAT REPRISALS WILL BE TAKEN IF ANYTHING HAPPENS TO HIM,

7. EARLIER IN THE DAY A CONTACT IN THE NATIONAL GUARD REPORTED

PAGE THREE RUESRW 047 CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE
TO THE EMBASSY THAT A HOUSE IN WHICH COLONEL CHENAULT WAS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED WAS UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE BUT THAT THE INVESTIGATION WAS BEING CONDUCTED WITH CAUTION IN ORDER TO AVOID INJURY TO COLONEL CHENAULT.

8. COMMITTEE OF THE VENEZUELAN RED CROSS HEADED BY ITS PRESIDENT SENORA DE ALVAREZ CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON TO NOTIFY HIM OF THE RECEIPT ON NOVEMBER 29 OF A LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 27 FROM FALN LEADER EX-COLONEL MONCADO A VIDAL DEMANDING THAT IN EXCHANGE FOR CHENAULT FOR 42 WOMEN POLITICAL PRISONERS (SEE EMBTEL 637) NOW HELD BY GOV. IN DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS A DECISION TO BE MADE BY GOV BUT THAT IT SEEMED LIKELY SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD ONLY INVITE FURTHER KIDNAPPINGS. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE VENEZUELAN RED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 659, DECEMBER 2, 8 PM, FROM: CARACAS

CROSS SHOULD FORWARD LETTER TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS GENEVA TO WHOM IT WAS ADDRESSED TOGETHER WITH A STATEMENT OF THE ILLEGAL AND NON-BELLIGERENT CHARACTER OF THE FALN. THIS WOULD BE DONE TELEGRAPHICALLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE PRESIDENT BETANCOURT THROUGH VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

GP-3 STEWART

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 9:27 PM 12/2/63

RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 9:35 PM 12/2/63

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1963 DEC 2 PM 7 47

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IMMEDIATE (658), DECEMBER 2, 6:40 PM

WITH ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF ELECTORAL COUNT (UNOFFICIAL) AVAILABLE IT IS CERTAIN THAT RAUL LEONI IS VENEZUELA'S PRESIDENT-ELECT. EMBASSY EXPECTS HIS PLURALITY TO CREEP UP ABOVE THIRTY FIVE PERCENT BUT DOUBTS IT WILL HIT FORTY PERCENT ALTHOUGH BOTH LEONI AND PRESIDENT BETANCOURT FEEL IT WILL.

TELEVISION IS ALREADY REFERRING TO LEONI AS THE WINNER DESPITE THE FACT THAT OFFICIAL FIGURES OF THE SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL, I. E. THIRTEEN PERCENT OF THE VOTE AND LARGELY IN FEDERAL DISTRICT, STILL SHOW USLAR AS THE LEADER AND THE ONLY REMAINING

PAGE TWO RUESRS 045 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
QUESTION IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE IS WHO WILL WIN THE THREE-CORNERED RACE FOR SECOND PLACE. EMBASSY ANTICIPATES THAT USLAR WILL CONTINUE TO SLIP AS RETURNS COME IN FROM THE INTERIOR BUT AS OF THIS MOMENT USLAR, VILLALBA, AND CALDERA ARE EACH FLUCTUATING BETWEEN 17 AND 21 PERCENT OF THE UNOFFICIAL TOTAL.

BECAUSE OF SLOWNESS OF OFFICIAL COUNT EMBASSY DOUBTS IT WILL HAVE ANY CLEAR READING OF COMPOSITION OF NEW CONGRESS FOR ANOTHER DAY OR TWO. IT PROBABLE THAT AD, WITH MORE THAN 35 PERCENT OF VOTES, WILL WIN MAJORITY OF SENATE AND WILL GET 40-45 PERCENT OF CHAMBER SEATS. AD WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO MAKE SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT WITH COPEI AND/OR INDEPENDENT ELEMENTS, I.E. USLAR, IN ORDER HAVE MANAGEABLE CONGRESS.

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-2- 658, DECEMBER 2, 7 PM, FROM: CARACAS

MAJOR SURPRISES HAVE BEEN SIZE OF USLAR'S VICTORY IN FEDERAL DISTRICT AND NATIONWIDE WEAKNESS OF RAMOS GIMENEZ. STEWART

BT

CFN: 45 658 60 17 21 35 40 45

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 December 2, 1963, 7:51 PM.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 7:50 PM, December 2, 1963.

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Department of State

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FROM: CARACAS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 656, DECEMBER 2, 6 PM

REF: EMBTEL 1206 MAY 3, 1963 AND AMBASSADOR STEWART'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT DATED MAY 13, 1963.

AS TIME IS APPROACHING FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION ON 1964 PETROLEUM IMPORT QUOTAS I BELIEVE IT IS CONVENIENT TO RECALL OUR COMMITMENT TO REVIEW IN ADVANCE WITH VEN-GOV SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO BE MADE IN U.S. PETROLEUM IMPORT PROGRAM WHICH MAY AFFECT VENEZUELA, AND STRONGLY RECOMMEND DEPT'S FULL SUPPORT OF POLICY WHICH WILL PROTECT POSITION OF VENEZUELA AS TRADITIONAL PRIME SUPPLIER OF CRUDE PETROLEUM AND PRODUCTS TO THE UNITED STATES, OBSERVING FULLY BOTH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE KENNEDY-BETANCOURT JOIN COMMUNIQUE THIS WOULD APPEAR PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND DESIRABLE IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S DEDICATION TO A REAFFIRMATION AND CONTINUANCE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S POLICIES.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WERE VALID FOR PAST DECISIONS ON THESE PROBLEMS STILL EXIST TO SIMILAR OR EVEN GREATER DEGREE. PETROLEUM PRODUCTION 1963 IS BARELY HOLDING LEVEL WITH 1962, WHEREAS VENEZUELA'S FOUR-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF FOUR PERCENT ANNUAL INCREASE. INDUSTRY IS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN MARKETS IN 1964, IN FACT ONE OF LARGEST PRODUCERS HERE ANTICIPATES DECLINE IN ITS SALES TO EUROPE.

IF THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE CORRECT, VENEZUELA MUST LOOK FOR, AT VERY LEAST, A RETENTION OF ITS TRADITIONAL SHARE OF US AND CANADIAN MARKETS. ANY MEASURES WHICH WOULD TEND TO RESTRICT NORMAL ACCESS OF VENEZUELAN PETROLEUM TO THESE MARKETS WOULD

Control: *Henry* 912
Rec'd: DECEMBER 2, 1963
10:02 PM

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *sp/om*, NARA, Date *3-1-00*

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BE FELT
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-2- 656, DECEMBER 2, 6 PM FROM CARACAS

BE FELT ACUTELY. VENEZUELA IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO ANY FURTHER MEASURES OF DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOR OF CANADIAN PETROLEUM.

LOSS IN ANTICIPATED PETROLEUM REVENUES WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED FROM OTHER SOURCES AND OIL INDUSTRY MIGHT BE CONSIDERED PRIME SOURCE OF ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT. THIS COULD UPSET PRESENT PRECARIOUS COMPETITIVE PRICE POSITION OF VENEZUELAN PETROLEUM IN WORLD MARKETS. ALSO, POLITICAL PRESSURE FOR A COUNTRY OR HEMISPHERIC QUOTA COULD BE EXPECTED TO BECOME SHARPER.

WHILE EMB BELIEVES BASIC POSITION VENEZUELAN ECONOMY EXCELLENT, WITH GOOD PROSPECTS FOR NEW INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION IF STRONG, MODERATE COALITION GOVT SUCCEEDS BETANCOURT'S RENASCENT CONFIDENCE WOULD ALL TOO EASILY BE SHAKEN IF IMPRESSION WERE TO ARISE THAT SPIRIT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND VENEZUELA HAD IN ANY WAY LESSENEED.

VENEZUELA IS BOTH THE TOP TARGET FOR CASTRO COMMUNISM AND CLEARLY THE LEADER IN LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION THERETO. YESTERDAY'S ELECTORAL PROCESS WAS A RINGING DEMONSTRATION OF A PEOPLES DEDICATION TO DEMOCRACY IN THE FACE OF FRUTHLESS EXTREMIST THREATS AND PRESSURES ON VOTERS TO ABSTAIN. THE COMING MONTHS, DURING WHICH THE GOVERNING COALITION IS BEING RESTRUCTURED AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES ARE BEING HAMMERED OUT ARE LIKELY TO BE CRUCIAL FOR OUR INTERESTS, AND WE SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF THE GOV'S PRO AMERICAN POLICIES. PETROLEUM MATTERS ARE AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN REGARDED HERE AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND DECISIVE SINGLE INDICATION OF OUR FRIENDSHIP AND IT CONTINUES TO BE VITAL THAT THEY RECEIVE MOST CAREFUL AND FAR-SIGHTED HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE KENNEDY BETANCOURT JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

GP-3.

STEWART

LLN/26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State *per*

65

UNCLASSIFIED

35

Action

ARA

ESA061RSA056

Info

OO RUEHC

DE RUESRS 027 021851Z

SS

ZNR

G

O 021849Z

SP

FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS

CAP

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

AID

RUEPCR/DA WASHDC

P

RUECW/CNO WASHDC

USIA

RUEAHQ/CUSAF WASHDC

NSC

RULPC/CINCSO

INR

RUCKHC/CINCLANT

CIA

STATE GRNC

NSA

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 652 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO

OSD

FOLAD CINCLANT FROM CARACAS SECOND

ARMY

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS:

NAVY

UNOFFICIAL RESULTS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1:45 PM. LEONI 431,000

AIR

(31.9 PERCENT), VILLALBA 272,000 (20.1 PERCENT), CALDERA

RMR

262,000 (19.4 PERCENT), USLAR 250,000 (18.5 PERCENT), LARRAZABAL

103,000 (7.6 PERCENT), RAMOS 33,000 (2.4 PERCENT), BORREGALES

2,500 (.1 PERCENT), TOTAL 1,353,000 (45.7 PERCENT OF

ESTIMATED VOTES CAST). STEWART

BT

CFN 652 1:45 PM 431,000 31.9 272,000 20.1 262,000 19.4 250,000

18.5 103,000 7.6 33,000 2.4 2,500 .1 1,353,000 45.7

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12/2/63, 2:15 PM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12/2/63, 2:20 PM

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1963 DEC 2 PM 2 16

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66

35

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Action ZCZCSCAT020
 ARA 00 RUEHCR
 DE RUESR5 026 02/1646Z
 Info ZNR
 0 021644Z
 SS FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 SP RUEPCR/DA WASHDC
 CAP RUECW/CNO WASHDC
 AID RUEAHQ/CUSAF WASHDC
 P RULPC/CINCSO
 USIA RUCKHC/CINCLANT
 NSC STATE GRNC.
 INR BT
 CIA UNCLAS ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 651 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO
 NSA POLAD CINCLANT FROM CARACAS SECOND

000543
 1963 DEC 2 PM 12 15

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS:
 UNOFFICIAL RESULTS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 11:45 AM. BOREGALES
 2,120, .2 PERCENT; CALDERA 171,344, 16.9 PERCENT; LARRAZABAL
 87,104, 8.6 PERCENT; LEONI 310,996, 30.7 PERCENT RAMOS 28,808,
 2.8 PERCENT; USLAR 196,898, 19.4 PERCENT; VILLALBA 217,425,
 21.4 PERCENT; TOTAL VOTES 1,014,695.

THIS REPRESENTS ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL VOTE. STEWART
 BT
 CFN 651 11:45 AM 2,120 .2 171,344 16.9 87,104, 8.6 310,996
 30.7 28,808 2.8 196,898 19.4 217,425 21.4 1,014,695

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12/2/63, 12:14 PM
 NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12/2/63, 12:17 PM

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~ECKEL~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KILDUFF~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, W.~~

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Department of State

Handwritten: J... 67

36

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- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
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- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
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- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
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- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

Action ZCZSCAT017
 00 RUEHCR
 ARA DE RUESRS 015 02/1442Z
 Info O 021440Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 SS RUEPCR/DA AASHDC
 G RUECW/CNO WASHDC
 S P RUEAHQ/CUSAF WASHDC
 H RULPC/CINCSO
 CAP RUCKHC/CINCLANT
 AIDA STATE GRNC
 P BT

000426
 1963 DEC 2 AM 10 24

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

NSC ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 649 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO POLAD
 INR CINCLANT FROM CARACAS DEC 2 10AM

CIA VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS

NSA LATEST UNOFFICIAL RETURNS AS OF 0530 BASED ON 850,080 VOTES OR
 OSD MORE THAN 25 PERCENT: LEONI 29 PERCENT, USLAR AND VILLALBA 21
 RMR PERCENT, WALDERA 15 PERCENT, LARRAZABAL 9 PERCENT, RAMOS 3 PERCENT.

LEONI ISSUED VICTORY STATEMENT AT APPROXIMATELY 0830.

PRESIDENT BETANCOURT TOLD EMB AT PORT THAT LEONI HAD A SURE

32 PERCENT AND WOULD GO OVER 40 PERCENT WITH SCATTERED
 CAMPESINO VOTE COMING IN OVERWHELMINGLY FOR LEONI. STEWART

BT
 CFN 649 2 10AM 0930 850,000 25 29 21 15 9 3 0830 32 40

Advance copy to S/S-0 12/2/63, 10:26 a.m

Passed White House 12/2/63, 10:30 a.m.

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 ARA DE RUESRS 015 02/1442Z
 Info O 021440Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 SS TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 G RUEPCR/DA AASHDC
 S P RUECW/CNO WASHDC
 H RUEAHQ/CUSAF WASHDC
 CAP RULPC/CINCSO
 AIDA RUCKHC/CINCLANT
 P STATE GRNC
 USIA BT

000426
 1953 DEC 2 AM 10 24

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

NSC ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 649 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO POLAD
 INR CINCLANT FROM CARACAS DEC 2 10AM

VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS

LATEST UNOFFICIAL RETURNS AS OF 0530 BASED ON 850,080 VOTES OR MORE THAN 25 PERCENT: LEONI 29 PERCENT, USLAR AND VILLALBA 21 PERCENT, WALDERA 15 PERCENT, LARRAZABAL 9 PERCENT, RAMOS 3 PERCENT.

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BT
 CFN 649 2 10AM 0930 850,000 25 29 21 15 9 3 0830 32 40

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Venezuela
→ *Mr. Bundy* 69

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~BUNGAN~~
- ~~ECKEL~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KILDUFF~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y~~

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Action VV EUB042REB071
 OO RUEHCR
 ARA DE RUESRS 010 021159Z
 0 021149Z ZEA
 Info FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 SS INFO RUEPCR/ARMY
 G RUECW/NAVY
 SP RUEAHQ/UIR
 CAP RULPC/USCINCSO
 AID RUCKHC/USCINCLANT
 P STATE GRNC

000306
1963 DEC 2 AM 7 56

- USIA
- NSC
- INR
- CIA
- NSA
- OSD
- ARMY
- NAVY
- AIR
- RMR

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ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 647 INFO ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCLANT
POLAD CINCISO FROM CARACAS DECEMBER 2 7:30AM

ELECTION RESULTS 0700 DEC 2

VOTE COUNT, BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL, PROCEEDING MADDENINGLY SLOWLY.

LATEST "OFFICIAL" FIGURES, WHICH HAVEN'T CHANGED FOR TWO HOURS, BASED ON 175,000 VOTES OR SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 5 PERCENT OF TOTAL, GIVE USLAR 35 PERCENT, LEONI 17 PERCENT, LARRAZABAL 17 PERCENT, AND CALDERA AND VILLALBA 13*PERCENT THESE FIGURES OBVIOUSLY BASED LARGELY ON FEDERAL DISTRICT WHERE USLAR WAS EXPECTED RUN STRONG.

LATEST UNOFFICIAL FIGURES BASED ON 355,000 VOTES, GIVE LEONI 26 PERCENT, USLAR AND CALDERA 21 PERCENT, VILLALBA 17 PRCENT, AND LARRAZABAL 10 PERCENT. THESE FIGURES REFLECT MORE VOTES FROM INTERIOR THAN OFFICIAL COUNT.

EMBASSY'S HESITANT CONCLUSION THIS EARLY STAGE IS THAT USLAR IS RUNNING BETTER THAN EXPECTED IN FEDERAL DISTRICT BUT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE PICKING UP MUCH IN INTERIOR, RAMOS ON NATIONWIDE BASIS IS RUNNING EVEN WORSE THAN EXPECTED, VILLALBA A LITTLE WORSE THAN EXPECTED. IT EVIDENT LEONI WILL WIN BUT SIZE OF PLURALITY STILL VERY MUCH UP IN AIR.

BT
CFN 355,000 26 21 17 10

Advance copy to S/S-0 12/2/63, 7:59 am
Passed White House 12/2/63, 8 am
*Confirmed as 15 percent

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Venezuela

70

46-48

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Action

Control: 90

ARA

Rec'd: DECEMBER 1, 1963
11:51 P.M.

Info

FROM: CARACAS

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 646, DECEMBER 1, MIDNIGHT.

L

H

CAP

IMMEDIATE

AID

P

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT 646, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, POLAD CINCSO,
POLAD CINCLANT UNNUMBERED.

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

SCA

AS OF 1130 IMPOSSIBLE IDENTIFY ANY ELECTORAL TREND. AS OF
THAT TIME "OFFICIAL FIGURES" REPRESENTED ONLY THREE-QUARTERS
OF ONE PERCENT. AT SLOW RATE OF ELECTION RETURNS EMBASSY
BELIEVES NOTHING DEFINITE WILL BE APPARENT AT LEAST UNTIL
0600 AT WHICH TIME NEW REPORT WILL BE CABLED "IMMEDIATE."

RMR

STEWART

BA/22.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O DECEMBER 1 - 11:52 P.M.
PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE DECEMBER 2 - 12:05 A.M.

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Department of State

Venezuela

71

46-48

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Action

Control: 91

Rec'd: DECEMBER 1, 1963

11:54 P.M.

ARA

FROM: CARACAS

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 645, DECEMBER 1, MIDNIGHT.

L

H

CAP

IMMEDIATE

P

USIA

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT 645, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, POLAD CINCSO,
POLAD CINCLANT UNNUMBERED.

NSC

INR

CIA

CHENAULT KIDNAPPING

NSA

OSD

SCA

UNITED PRESS RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL THIS AFTERNOON FROM
"FAMILIAR" FALN VOICE STATING IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT ANYBODY
FROM FALN HAD SAID CHENAULT'S LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER IF
PRISONER SWAP DIDN'T GO THROUGH. NO INDICATION HOWEVER WHEN
THE COLONEL WOULD BE RELEASED.

RMR

CALLER ALSO CLAIMED THAT IF LEONI WON ELECTIONS FALN WOULD
"GO ALL OUT" TO CREATE A "BLOOD BATH".

STEWART

BA/22.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O DECEMBER 1 - 11:55 P.M.
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72

53

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Action
P

Info

ZCZCSCAT 010

SS 00 RUEHCR
G DE RUESRS 006 02/0129Z
O 020125Z ZEA

SP EMBASSY CARACAS

ARA TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

CAP RUEPCR/DA WASHDC

USIA RUECW/CNO WASHDC

NSC RUEAHQ/CUSAF WASHDC

INR RUCKHC/CINCLANT

CIA STATE GRNC

NSA BT

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RMR

000075

1963 DEC 1 PM 8 55

ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 644 ARMY NAVY AIR POLAD CINCSO POLAD
CINCLANT FROM CARACAS DEC 1 9PM

AT APPROX 2000 UPI PHOTOGRAPHER CARL WARNER FROM MIAMI WAS SHOT
AS HE WAS FOLLOWING ELECTIONS RETURNS IN UPI'S OFFICE
ON NINTH FLOOR OF OFFICE BUILDING IN PLAZA CANDELARIA. HE WAS
QUICKLY TAKEN OFF TO HOSPITAL; LATEST REPORTS ARE HE WAS NOT
SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.

SEVERAL AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WERE WORKING AT UPI OFFICES AT
TIME. SHOTS EVIDENTLY CAME ACROSS SQUARE AND MAY HAVE BEEN
CFN 645 1 9PM 2000

PAGE TWO RUESRS 006 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DIRECTED AGAINST UPI WHICH HAD MOST ELABORATE ELECTION RESULTS
COVERAGE OF ANY OF NEWS AGENCIES. POLICE AND MILITARY ARRIVED
ON SCENE QUICKLY.

ELECTION RESULTS ARE COMING IN SLOWLY. AS OF 2100 THERE IS
NO DISCERNIBLE TREND.

NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS CHENAULT. STEWART

BT

CFN 2100

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PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9:00 PM, 12/1/63.

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Venezuela

73

53

UNCLASSIFIED

Action
ARA

Control: 74

Rec'd: DECEMBER 1, 1963
6:27 PM

Info
SS
G
SP
CAP
AID
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR

FROM: CARACAS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 643, DECEMBER 1.

IMMEDIATE

NATIONAL ELECTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM.
IN CARACAS ISOLATED OUTBREAK OF SHIPING LEFT ONE DEAD. BOTH
CONSULATES AND EMBASSY EYEWITNESSES REPORT URBAN TRAFFIC LIGHT
BUT BUSINESSES OPEN. VOTING ORDERLY.

STEWART

CC-22.

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- 74*
- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
 - ~~ALEXANDER~~
 - ~~BELK~~
 - ~~BRUBECK~~
 - ~~CHASE~~
 - ~~DINGEMAN~~
 - ~~DUNGAN~~
 - ~~ECKEL~~
 - ~~FORRESTAL~~
 - ~~JOHNSON~~
 - ~~KILDUFF~~
 - ~~KLEIN~~
 - ~~KOMER~~
 - ~~SAUNDERS~~
 - ~~SCHLESINGER~~
 - ~~SMITH, WM. Y~~

39

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Action

ARA

Info
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USIA

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RMR

O 011620Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 RUEPCR/DEPT OF ARMY
 RUECW/DEPT OF NAVY
 RUEAHQ/DEPT OF AIR
 RULPC/POLAD USCINCSO
 RUCKHC/POLAD USCINCLANT
 STATE GRNC

000052

1953 DEC 1 PM 12 07

BT
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 IMMEDIATE (642) DECEMBER 1, NOON

SITUATION REPORT 1200 DECEMBER 1ST

NO RPT NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS CHENAULT CASE

VOTING STARTED THIS MORNING IN ORDERLY FASHION. POLLS ARE CROWDED, WELL GUARDED BY MILITARY. STREETS ARE BLOCKED OFF IN VICINITY POLLING PLACES SO THAT TRAFFIC CANNOT PASS IN FRONT OF POLLS. VOTERS ARE WAITING IN LINE THREE TO FOUR HOURS AT PRESENT TIME.

CONSULATE MARACAIBO REPORTS HEAVY TURN-OUT AT POLLS THERE. THAT CITY QUIET TOO.

NO REPORTS ANY TROUBLE INTERIOR.

LAST NIGHT TOP MILITARY OFFICERS HELD NATIONWIDE RADIO-TV DISCUSSION ROLE ARMED FORCES ELECTORAL PROCESS. MINISTER DEFENSE BRICENO AND HEADS OF ARMY, NAVY, AIRFORCE, AND NATION GUARD EMPHASIZED SUPPORT ARMED FORCES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS AND URGED CITIZENS VOTE IN TRANQUILITY AND SAFETY, PROTECTED BY ARMED FORCES. BRICENO STATED "THERE WILL NOT BE DISORDER, THERE WILL NOT BE CHAOS, THERE WILL NOT BE CIVIL WAR, THERE WILL NOT BE POPULAR INSURRECTION."

RUMORS FLASHED AROUND CITY ABOUT 1100 TO EFFECT SNIPERS HAD FIRED ON BETANCOURT AS HE TOURED CITY AFTER VOTING. PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE OFFERED QUICK AND FLAT DENIAL.

NEW SUBJECT: CHRISTMAS PACKAGES SUPPOSEDLY CONTAINING BOMBS SENT TO POLITICAL LEADERS LAST WEEK (EMBTCL 606) CONTAINED ONLY FAKE DUDS, ACCORDING TO POLICE. STEWART

BT

CFN: 2 642 1200 1100 606

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O at 12:15 PM, DECEMBER 1,
 PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 12:30 PM, DECEMBER 1.

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UPI A43

DAY LEAD VENEZUELA
BY JOSE A. VALBUENA

SUMMARY

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

CARACAS, NOV. 30 (UPI)--THE CAMPAIGN FOR TOMORROW'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WOUND UP LAST MIDNIGHT WITH NO SIGN OF THE OUTBREAK OF CASTRO-COMMUNIST VIOLENCE THAT HAD BEEN EXPECTED.

PEOPLE TURNED OUT BY THE THOUSANDS TO ATTEND THE OPEN-AIR POLITICAL MEETINGS WHICH WERE HELD ON ALMOST EVERY CORNER IN DOWNTOWN CARACAS. SOME RUSHED FROM ONE MEETING TO ANOTHER, TRYING TO ATTEND AS MANY AS POSSIBLE.

THE CITY QUIETED AT MIDNIGHT, THE LEGAL DEADLINE FOR CAMPAIGNING HEAVILY-ARMED TROOPS AND POLICE PATROLED THE STREETS IN THE DARKNESS, BUT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE REPORT OF ANY COMMUNIST EFFORT TO ENFORCE THE "TERROR CURFEW" THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD THREATENED AT MIDNIGHT.

CASTRO-COMMUNIST LEADERS HAD SAID THAT ANYONE CAUGHT IN THE STREETS AFTER THAT HOUR WOULD BE SHOT BY SNIPERS.

THE COMMUNISTS DID BLOW UP AN ELECTRIC TRANSFORMER HERE, BLACKING OUT SOUTHERN DISTRICTS OF THE CITY, AND THEY SET OFF THREE NOISE BOMBS IN THE "OIL CAPITAL" OF MARACAIBO. SUCH HARASSMENT HAS BEEN GOING ON IN VENEZUELA FOR MONTHS AND LITTLE NOTICE WAS TAKEN OF THE BOMBINGS.

NO ONE WAS INJURED BY ANY OF THE BLASTS. DAMAGE WAS DESCRIBED AS "OF REGULAR PROPORTIONS," MEANING IT WAS MINOR.

THE GOVERNMENT DEALT ITS LEFT-WING FOES A HEAVY BLOW LAST NIGHT THROUGH THE ARREST OF SEN. DOMINGO A. RANGEL, ONE OF THE NATION'S TWO MOST WANTED TERRORISTS.

RANGEL, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FELLOW-TRAVELING "MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR)," WENT UNDERGROUND TWO MONTHS AGO, WHEN PRESIDENT ROMULO A. BETANCOURT ORDERED THE ARREST OF LEFTIST CONGRESSMEN WHO HAD BEEN USING THEIR PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY AS A SHIELD FOR UNDENIED PARTICIPATION IN THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT TERROR CAMPAIGN.

THERE WAS NO LATE WORD OF THE FATE OF U.S. ARMY COL. JAMES K. CHENAULT WHO WAS KIDNAPPED BY TERRORISTS EARLY WEDNESDAY.

THE COMMUNISTS SAID AT FIRST THE KIDNAPPING WAS A "PROPAGANDA GESTURE" AND THAT CHENAULT WOULD NOT BE HARMED. LATER, THEY SAID HE WOULD BE RELEASED TODAY--OR PERHAPS "EARLY NEXT WEEK"--IF "EVERYTHING IS ALL RIGHT."

YESTERDAY, THE REDS SUDDENLY DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF 70 WOMEN WHO THEY SAID ARE IN GOVERNMENT JAILS AS A CONDITION FOR CHENAULT'S RELEASE. THEY COUPLED THIS DEMAND WITH A THREAT TO ATTACK OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS IN VENEZUELA IF THE GOVERNMENT STOOD FIRM AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS.

THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN TRYING FOR WEEKS TO FORCE CANCELLATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION--A GOAL SET FOR THEM BY FIDEL CASTRO IN BROADCASTS FROM HAVANA.

THEY APPARENTLY DID NOT HOPE THEIR TERRORIST EFFORTS ALONE WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SABOTAGE THE ELECTIONS. THEIR STRATEGY WAS TO CREATE SUCH CHAOS THAT THE ARMY WOULD OUST BETANCOURT AND CALL OFF THE ELECTION.

THE CAMPAIGN WIND-UP LAST NIGHT INCLUDED SUCH PICTURESQUE EVENTS AS A TORCHLIGHT PARADE BY HUNDREDS OF YOUNG SUPPORTERS OF THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY.

HORSEMEN REPRESENTING A DISSIDENT FACTION OF THE GOVERNING DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY ALSO APPEARED IN THE STREETS.

RAUL LEONI, THE OFFICIAL DEMOCRATIC ACTION CANDIDATE AND THE MAN CONSIDERED MOST LIKELY TO BE VENEZUELA'S NEXT PRESIDENT, SPOKE AT A THREE-HOUR MEETING HERE.

JOVITO VILLALBA, LEONI'S STRONGEST OPPONENT, AND OTHER OPPOSITION CANDIDATES ALSO ADDRESSED RALLIES OF THEIR SUPPORTERS.

LL602AES

UPI A43E

Venez

75

- ~~—BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~—ALEXANDER~~
- ~~—BELK~~
- ~~—BRUBECK~~
- ~~—CHASE~~
- ~~—DINGEMAN~~
- ~~—DUNCAN~~
- ~~—ECKEL~~
- ~~—FORRESTAL~~
- ~~—JOHNSON~~
- ~~—KILDUFF~~
- ~~—KLEIN~~
- ~~—KOMER~~
- ~~—SAUNDERS~~
- ~~—SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~—SMITH, WM. Y.~~