THE HARVEST OF AMERICAN RACISM
The Politcal Meaning of Violence
in the Summer of 1967

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

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PREFACE

The events of this past summer are now history, though still very much alive in our memories and very much a part of our present. We have mounted a research effort to amass information on an incredible range of social phenomena and have carried out our mission at breakneck speed, driven on by the urgency of the current racial crisis in the United States.

The data developed by the Commission and its staff, though lacking in completeness, nevertheless represent a usable body of knowledge by which to guage what exactly happened to the United States in the summer of 1967. Our task has been that of the historian, and the materials from which we have worked rival those normally relied upon by historians in accuracy and precision. Our approach has been an inductive one. Viewpoints and the approaches of the social and political scientist rather than preconceptions were brought to the data. Despite the grave nature of the crisis under study, we found excitement in the discoveries of social-reality to which the data led us. The method employed was that of a systematic analysis of over twenty-six civil disorders occurring in twenty-three cities, the review of scientific studies, the application of social and political

theory and research wherever it was called for, and finally the exercise of collective judgments as to what needed to be stressed; what it all meant.

It is these judgments which comprise the body of this document, and it is on them that we, in good faith, rest our case.

THE RIOT PROCESS

The term "riot" has been popularly used as a shorthand for the civil disturbances which have occurred in American cities for the past three years. But a careful look at the activities taking place within different cities indicates that a broad range of events have come to be broadly classified as riots. They can range from anything between a group of excited teenagers breaking some windows after a dance to a general social upheaval.

One question to consider is whether the disturbances are to be seen just in terms of what Negro participants are doing, or in terms of what everybody in the community is doing, i.e., Negroes, police, political officials, courts, ordinary white citizens. Where collective violence between Negroes and other community groups is threatened or does occur, the problem of maintaining community law and order may not only mean finding ways of re-channeling Negro protest into non-violent tracks, but in restraining public officials from misusing their powers. In some cases the lack of restraint by agents of social control has led to tandem or back-to-back riots.

There is a further problem in determining when disturbances have taken on riot proportions, and when a general insurrection is in progress. Disagreements between civil authorities as

to what constitute the transition points from a "minor" disturbance," to a "riot" to an "insurrection against public authority" are endemic to their trying to bring disorders under control.

For our purposes, the dilemma in interpreting the basic character and meaning of the disorders which occurred in different cities may hinge on whether a small disorder, quickly contained by the police, was in fact a localized incident or whether it was an incipient rebellion kept localized by actions on the part of civil and police authorities.

The problem of categorizing events is further complicated when we attempt to define them in terms of the intentions and attitudes of various participants. These can vary considerably according to the phases of a disturbance and the effects of actions that have come before. Depending on the response of authorities, it is possible for a disturbance which begins with some minor hell-raising by Negro youths, to evolve into an essentially political confrontation between the Negro community, or some segments of it, and civil authorities. On the other hand, a disorder which begins with highly focused and specific political acts, may draw in many people interested not in protest but in looting, letting off steam, or a wide range of other activities.

The melange of activities in the disturbances, and

especially in the largest ones, creates a kaleidoscope of images. In this gallery of riotous action and counter-action, some activities can be seen as politically purposeful and focused, others as opportunistic (e.g. organized criminal gangs systematically looting stores, or policemen using the disorder to give free rein to anti-Negro hostilities) and others as random events (people getting caught up in the excitement and not exactly certain what they are doing or why).

A crucial problem confronting authorities is determining which of the faces of disorder is the most central to a disturbance and acting on that basis. Interpreting a drunken crowd as political protesters, or a political crowd as a bunch of criminals, can obviously lead to inappropriate control efforts.

Some of the disorders were more imagined than real. It is important to distinguish between actual collective violence by Negroes and Negro violence as perceived by white authorities. There is a good deal of evidence to conclude that in some cities white anticipation of Negro violence led to heavy-handed uses of official force that did in fact provoke incidents.

Another problem is distinguishing between serious conflict and what might best be called "ritual posturing" or staged conflict. Disturbances in some cities consisted of little

more than Negro and governmental participants going through stylized actions, behaving according to how they thought people in their circumstances ought to behave in a riot.

From these initial observations it becomes quite clear that the task of defining a riot is as thorny a problem as determining its causes. The dynamics of the various disorders we have studied indicate a variety of governing principles at work. The way these combine provide us with a broad picture of the various patterns of disorder that occurred in different cities.

I. The General Upheval

A disturbance may develop over a period of time into an upheaval which draws in all segments of the ghetto population and includes an extraordinarily wide range of activities. The most salient feature of these riots is a form of generalized rebellion on the part of certain sectors of the Negro community -- particularly those who are young, northern, urbanized, and ambitious -- against white control of Negro areas.

This was the pattern in Detroit and Newark, as well as in Watts. The violence on the part of Negroes, beginning with an angry reaction of a growing crowd to a police incident, and expanding into general and widespread direct action against white property and authority, revealed deeply rooted

processes of social change that were brought out into the open in a general upheaval. Specific changes such as the growth of collective purpose and racial solidarity among Negroes, a growing desire for ownership and control of the areas in which Negroes live, the rise of militant Negro leadership groups, and the emergence of youth as the major articulate social force in the Negro community, are laid bare in the development of these disorders. In such cases the violent actions of various participants: (a) the attack on police or white property by bands of youth activists, cheered on by a massive audience, (b) the futile efforts of police to contain the disturbance in its early stages, and the (c) reciprocal patterns of violence over the course of the disorder by Negroes and control authorities, evidence basic breaks in established patterns of race relations.

To explain the course of such upheavals requires that we place primary emphasis on Negro relations with city institutions prior to the disorder and the specific dynamics of confrontation between police and the sector of the Negro community which is in rebellion. The two combine in ways which give this type of disorder its distinctive and politically significant character.

The magnitude of these disorders both reveals and contributes to a major institutional crisis. Massive amounts of property are destroyed. The court system is overwhelmed by

thousands of arrestees. Police order breaks down with the impossible demands posed by the scale of the violence and the surfacing of deeply rooted anti-Negro attitudes. Guardsmen too find it difficult to maintain discipline.

If the disturbances go on for several days looting may become a matter of necessity. Many poorer people live a "hand to mouth" existence. With normal institutionalized processes of exchange no longer in operation, reasonable behavior may involve going down to a nearby and familiar market to see if there is any milk or meat still around for one's family.

The crucial element in the growth of this type of disorder is the way in which events, once started, feed on preexisting institutional conflicts between Negroes and white authorities so as to escalate confrontations and cause the violence to spread.

In the largest disturbances two distinct phases can be distinguished. The first is a period of rising and expanding black rebellion in which police tactics inflame aggressive action by rioters on the one hand, and undermine police order on the other. The rioters in this phase achieve more than a competitive parity with the police.

Many of the police become subject to the same principles of crowd behavior that motivate the Negro rioters. Rumors, prejudices, and preconceptions feed into each other as

determinants of police behavior as well as that of Negro activists. Discipline is seriously impaired. The desire to vent individual hostilities, to re-establish police authority, and avenge police honor become dominant motives.

As Negro violence begins to abate, a new phase of disorder is inaugurated. This is the period in which control authorities begin to re-assert their dominance. It is also a period in which much of the lawlessness comes from police and guardsmen.

As a general principle, the following proposition about the dynamics of the largest disorders in our sample of cities can be advanced. Those disorders which had the greatest amount of violence were characterized by widespread, and aggressive action by ghetto Negroes which overwhelmed the police in the first phase and evoked a harsh retaliatory response in the second.

Since Detroit is a conspicuous example of this proposition, it will be useful to describe the basic steps in this city through which the behavior of Negroes and white authorities cycled into a general social upheaval.

A. Detroit

I. A Police Arrest Mobilizes an Angry Crowd

The Detroit disturbance began with an early Sunday morning police raid on an after hours club generally referred to as a blind pig. A party sponsored by a neighborhood civic

group was in progress for two soldiers returning from Vietnam and two going away. The police raid was apparently based on faulty intelligence in several respects. The most important from the standpoint of later developments was the lack of enough equipment to arrest almost twice as many people as they had expected to find. While the police single-mindedly pursued the goal of arresting some 80 people on a major commercial street in a densely populated area in the middle of a "long hot summer," a crowd began to gather. It took the police officer present over an hour to complete the arrests and transport people to the police station. In the interim the mood of the crowd had become angry. Many of the people in the club were well-known in the community. There was roughness in the police arrests. People in the crowd said that the police wouldn't do such things in a white area. A member of the crowd, a young man, with no known connections to any organizations, harangued the crowd against the police, urging them to riot. As the last police car left, a rock was thrown through its rear window. With the police gone, a milling and and angry crowd of several hundred people remained on the streets with an agitator to show them the way. This he shortly did by throwing a rock through a store window, and holding a camera high for all the crowd to see. The Detriot riot was on.

2. Aggressive looting expands as police stand by. As looting spread police returned to the scene but did nothing to stop it. More and more people joined in as the word spread that the police were permitting looting. Instead of withdrawing to a perimeter until sufficient force could be mobilized to sweep the streets, many police officers stood in the streets as isolated individuals or in pairs, while around them people freely looted. In some cases officers talked and joked with looters.

The reasons for the permissiveness of the police are not entirely clear, but a number of factors seem to have been involved. The department was undermanned at the time, and an isolated officer would have taken a great risk in trying to arrest people -- given the cathartic mood of the crowds, a mixture of hysterical joy and vindictive anger. Moreover, the departmental policy had been to avoid the use of extreme force if possible. There is also some evidence to suggest that police inaction at this stage was itself a defiance of authority -- a carry over from the recent police strike, which the mayor called the "blue flu."

Whatever its sources the sight of uniformed officers passively allowing people to walk out of stores with looted goods generated great excitement. With daybreak, thousands of people from all parts of the surrounding community were drawn into the spree. With friends and neighbors participating

in the sacking of 12th street, with normal psychological and social restraints removed, great numbers of normally law-abiding people were irresistibly drawn in. A carnival atmosphere developed in the streets as everybody -- women, children, old people included -- indulged in acts of material gain that previously only existed in the realm of fantasy. Some organized shoplifting groups also began to move in to take advantage of the situation.

At the time that many were enjoying themselves, however, *others* were angry, believing that the behavior of the police indicated contempt for the Negro community. Others knew that a massive crackdown would inevitably follow and began to plan their actions accordingly. Still others were emboldened to begin fire bombing looted stores.

3. The police crack down; massive firebombing follows.

With a major police effort in the late morning to re-establish control of the streets, violence entered a new and ominous phase. An elite riot squad, equipped with bayonetted rifles, was brought in to sweep the streets. From a permissive inaction the police policy had suddenly changed to vigorous and aggressive control tactics. A drunk too slow to move out of the way of police bayonets was stabbed in full view of hundreds of people. Pictures show his intestines coming out of his mouth. As word of the event spread, the crowds

became furious.

Further, the sweep tactic was ineffective in that the crowds were so large they continually filled in behind the police. The response of Negro youth activists to the attempt to re-establish police control was aggressively competitive rather than obedient and submissive. They saw the police as an occupying power and viewed the tough stance of the police as a challenge. Great numbers of fires were set by roving bands, false alarms were turned in, fire hoses cut.

Police riot training had prepared them for controlling street crowds of limited scope contained within limited geographical areas. It had not prepared them for the possibility of highly generalized and purposive attack against authority and property by bands of intensely motivated youths.

4. The military crackdown. With the loss of control by local police the necessity for state and federal troops had become apparent. There were some dilemmas however in calling in Michigan state police and National Guard troops. The state police, while professional, did not include a single Negro. The National Guard, on the other hand, were a mixture of young and older men, not very well disciplined. The preference was for well-trained army troops, but according to law these could only be committed when state resources had been exhausted. A proposed effort to mobilize community leadership to patrol the streets with police was rejected with the concurrence of

Negro middle class leadership in favor of a reliance on a military solution. The evidence indicated that the disorder having progressed thus far, groups of Negro youths were intent on burning the whole city down if they could.

With the introduction of National Guard troops, and removal of restraints on the use of weapons, violence escalated on the side of both rioters and authorities. Firebombing and looting escalated, reaching a peak on the second night of the disturbance. At the same time there were reports of sniping. Many reports were unconfirmed; in some instances police and guard units were firing at each other. No policemen, guardsmen, or firemen were killed by snipers during the disturbance, and few were injured this way. But there was some Negro sniping; and rumors which exaggerated it, together with word of other attacks on control forces, made police and guardsmen understandably anxious and afraid. Unfamiliar with the community, many of them harboring anti-Negro prejudices, National Guard troops in particular were quick to use their weapons. In one instance a "flash from a window," (the lighting of a cigarette) brought 50 caliber machine gun bursts from a National Guard tank which killed a 4-year old child.

Throughout this period the magnitude of the event severly overburdened existing facilities. Since there was not room for most arrestees in the jails, many were locked

in buses awaiting trial under highly unsanitary conditions.

Virtually all rights normally allowed to prisoners were abrogated. Guards sometimes exploited the situation by throwing small amounts of food into buses and watching prisoners scramble for it.

Co-ordination of National Guard and police efforts were difficult. At one point two battalions of guard troops were "lost" in the riot area. When federal troops finally arrived en masse early Tuesday morning and authority transferred to the federal level, the commanding general ordered that National Guard weapons be unloaded, yet, some 90 per cent of the guardsmen kept their guns loaded even after the order was given.

6. The breakdown of order among control agents. By midpoint in the riot week the police commissioner and the top echelon of police department administration had for all intents and purposes lost control of the officers on the street. Police were generally fatigued from overwork under extremely trying conditions. There was also a growing desire for vengeance, particularly with the increasing number of acts of violence directed at police and fire department personnel by rioters.

As Negro-initiated acts of lawless violence declined, those of the police increased. Policemen on the street discontinued wearing their badges, and tape was placed over

scout car license plates and numbers so as to assure anonymity for officers. Outright atrocities by police and guardsmen and indiscriminate shootings and beatings occurred. One notorious example involves the killing of three Negro teenagers at the Algiers Motel. They were in a room with two white girls. The boys, unarmed, were shot from a range of 15 feet and shot more than once. They were killed while kneeling or lying on the floor. One policeman has been indicted for murder.

The area chairman for the Mayor's Committee on Human Resources Development, reported witnessing the following: during daylight hours when the curfew was not in effect guardsmen were attempting to clear a street by shouting obscenities at bystanders and firing over their heads if they did not quickly obey orders to move -- even if they were standing on their own property. In this situation an unarmed man, walking down the street in broad daylight, was shot down by a guardsmen without cause.

The regular army troops, in contrast to the police and guardsmen, maintain discipline. This may be explained by a number of factors. They are trained in large-scale operations and subject to daily discipline. They were the last to arrive on the scene and hence the freshest. And they were for the most part stationed in the east side, where the level of violence was relatively low.

As the week wore on and the death toll among Negroes mounted, Negro violence ground to a halt. Official violence tapered off and stopped too. All parties were exhausted, large areas in the ghetto had been reduced to charred rubble, forty-three were dead, and major institutional relations were in disarray. The upheaval had come to an end.

The stages of development in the Newark riot corresponded to those in Detroit in many important respects. The arrest and beating of a Negro cab driver mobilized a large and angry crowd in front of the police station. While police in Detroit were permissive in the first stage of the riot, those in Newark were both indecisive and punitive. The crowd in front of the station was aggressive, some of its members bombarding the station with bricks, bottles and molotov cocktails. Fed up with remaining passive in the face of attack, police rushed into the crowd, laying on with their clubs. The crowd backed off, the police withdrew to the station, and the crowd reassembled. This minuet was repeated

several times, each time increasing the crowd's contempt for the police and its own sense of power.

While police in Detroit were permissive toward looters in the first stage, those in Newark had already lost control of the situation where the looting started. As violence escalated by a process of action and reaction, the second day police discipline began to crack. According to the police director, there was "an inexhaustible supply of those bastards to go into those stores again and again." On the third day as looting fell off -- there was little left -- police and National Guard violence increased. Police retaliation was spurred by the shooting of one officer, and further complicated by the fact that a longstanding political battle between Negroes and Italians was carried into the streets (most of the police being Italians).

Guardsmen in Newark acquitted themselves no better than those in Detroit, some of them shooting systematically into Negro-owned stores in obvious retaliation for the destruction of white stores by Negroes, others firing wildly at buildings thought to contain snipers.

The large number of deaths in Newark, as in Detroit, came as a result of massive police and National Guard fire power as the upheaval moved into its final stage.

II. The Riot as Political Confrontation

The general upheavals in Detroit, Newark, and Watts

represent one extreme among the cities in which disorder occurred. These riots were so massive, events were so much beyond the control either of authorities or Negro leadership, the behavior on both sides was pervaded by so many different emotions, that no single line of analysis can be adequate.

Other disorders, while having many similarities to these three, were less complex. In a number of other cities disturbances took the form of political confrontation, in which goals and processes were more explicit, form and structure more evident. Cincinnati, Plainfield and New Brunswick, New Jersey (as well as Engelwood, New Jersey, which will not be considered here) all had highly political riots. Each disturbance differed from the other in important ways, but they all shared the common quality that violence was being used in a quite instrumental way to achieve political ends.

1. Plainfield. The Plainfield riot is best interpreted as a focused political rebellion by racially and politically conscious ghetto youth in which violence was used deliberately and often rationally for the purpose of achieving political recognition. Before the riot in Plainfield there had been a long period of growing demands by Negroes and persistent low responsiveness on the part of authorities. In the summer of 1966, for example, a riot threatened by ghetto youths, was

only deterred when the mayor went into the Negro area to meet with them, promising a swimming pool -- one of their major demands. The swimming pool was not forthcoming; nor was action on other conspicuous grievances.

When the disorder in Plainfield occurred in July 1967, ghetto youths were in the forefront, providing direction and initiating activities. Throughout the disorder their behavior showed a high degree of organization, leadership control, rationality, and collective purpose. They alternated violence with meetings, and showed a willingness to bargain and negotiate with authorities when they thought it would do them any good.

On the first evening of the disorder, which began with a police incident, a spontaneous street meeting was held in which grievances of both a local and national character were discussed. The youths were persuaded by a local Negro politician (whom they also criticized for not being able to get anything accomplished) to meet with the mayor the next day. The youths agreed and violence ended for the evening.

After an unsuccessful meeting with the mayor, in which ten militant youths walked out, window breaking, looting, and some burning began. The major outbreak occurred the following day when the county police broke up a meeting at a park where the youths were selecting representatives to present demands to the mayor, grievances which they were in the

process of putting on paper.

That night forty-six carbines were stolen from a local manufacturer, many of them ending up in the hands of the youthful rebels. The arming of the ghetto with these and other weapons led to a standoff between rioters and authorities. For about a day state authority over the ghetto was absent, and militant youths exercised a loose control. The guns became a bargaining tool for a young militant, previously unknown to local officials; he offered to try to turn them over in exchange for a sign of good faith from the city administration -- the release of twelve prisoners. The prisoners were released, though the Negro leader could not deliver the carbines. A cleanup campaign by ghetto residents followed the riot. In the aftermath their activities have become even more explicitly political, their first victory being the defeat of an anti-loitering amendment. The militant who bargained for the release of the prisoners has become a major political force in the Negro community.

2. Cincinnati. The Cincinnati riot is also best understood as political confrontation, in this case between large segments of the Negro community and an unresponsive and vacillating white leadership. The riot unfolded as a political response to prior conflicts and unrecognized Negro demands. The events of the riot itself, mirror in an almost

one for one fashion the immediate conditions from which disorder sprang.

The arrest on a loitering charge of a Negro man protesting the conviction of his cousin as the "Cincinnati Strangler" led to a Negro rally which combined the following elements: protest against the loitering law; protest over the conviction of the man's cousin; protest against Cincinnati's courts; and protest over the civil rights aspects of the case.

The Negro militant leader who organized the protest rally and subsequent rallies which keyed the beginning of the riot each night had two months earlier spoken for 200 community representatives who appeared at a city council meeting to protest lack of recreation facilities. He had warned the council then that by refusing to act on grievances and presenting obstacles to Negro organizations, the council was creating a mood in which Negroes believed that the only way to get a hearing was to "throw a rock at a cop."

On the first evening of disorder, the initial direct action was that of Negro youths stopping delivery trucks in a Negro area. This combined the elements of protest against (a) the failure of local businesses to employ Negroes -- the explicit demand of the youths being that Negro drivers be hired for deliveries in Negro areas; (b) the general failure of the white city leadership to provide jobs for Cincinnati's

vast army of unemployed Negro youths; and (c) the sudden cancellation of a job fair, disappointing hopes that had been precipitously raised.

The initial acts of violence -- window-breaking and looting -- followed immediately on the heels of a debate at the first protest rally over the loitering law. After a middle-class community leader spoke in defense of the law, youths spun away from the crowd to begin the first night of rioting. This had the ingredients of a revolt by the militant young against their more conservative elders, a tension that had been brewing for some time within the Cincinnati Negro community.

The importance to militants of blocked political access was evident. For three straight days selective violence by youths in the evening was followed by a lull during daylight hours when adult Negro leadership made demands. On one occasion, an unknown caller made a bomb threat against city hall. On another occasion, the third day of the riot, when the city council agreed to hold an open meeting to air grievances, a packed gallery of angry Negroes spoke against the government in such militant and emotional terms, that police were stationed outside the council chambers to guard it. Over the course of the riot three separate lists of overlapping demands were presented by various leadership groups to the city administration. These

were clearly political attempts to exploit the disorder to achieve victories on issues that both preceded the violence and evolved out of it.

A summary of Cincinnati's disturbance should emphasize the extent to which it manifested the classical characteristics of a spontaneous political riot. In this case, a number of sectors of the Negro community, acting in concert, showed a high degree of coherence in the overall organization of the various protest activities. Over the course of events, the actions of youths and adults can be seen as meshing into each other in coherent and connected, though not formally planned, ways.

3. New Brunswick. New Brunswick, one of the New Jersey cities that experienced a disorder in the wake of the Newark upheaval, had a highly political riot. It was the most rational, most pointed, and best-organized riot in our sample, as well as the one with the happiest ending. It reflects several processes:

(1) The Carry-Over Effect from Newark. With a range of articulated grievances in the Negro community and some tension over the release of a couple who had shot at Negro teen-agers, some youths, aged 12-18, stimulated by news of the Newark and Plainfield disorders, decided that things weren't all that good in New Brunswick either.

(2) Stylized Role Playing. With great deliberateness

and planning beforehand they marched down a business street breaking some windows. After all the pre-planned targets had been hit the "riot" broke up for the evening.

(3) An Effective Political Response

The next day, following the "script", there were meetings between the police and city council, the poverty organization and the city council, the youngsters and the mayor. In the evening a crowd of 150-200 young adults aged 18-35, not to be outdone by the youngsters, gathered for an open-air meeting. A crisis nearly occurred as the police armed with rifles arrived in force. The newly elected lady mayor arrived in the nick of time and pulled the police out of the area, whereupon the crowd came to City Hall for a half-hour address by the mayor and an airing of grievances. The mayor responded to the demands of the young people announcing a poverty grant over the radio. The youths in turn went on the radio "to tell their soul brothers and sisters to cool it." And that ended the series of events in the New Brunswick disturbance.

III. Official Anticipation as a Cause of Disorder

While many cities showed a pattern of riotous Negro action followed by official responses, in other cities, the dynamics of the disturbances proceeded in the opposite direction. The first act of aggression came from the city administration

or police, with the Negro response tending often to be defensive, protective, or retaliatory. Most of these disturbances have been small.

Ghetto upheavals may be fueled by the failure of authorities to take the beginnings of disturbance seriously. But disorder also emanates from a reverse process in which authorities precipitate confrontation by anticipating violence where none is imminent and by over-reacting to minor incidents.

The link between the major ghetto upheaval and disorders following the principle of authority over-reaction is that the former clearly acts as a trigger to the latter. Nearby violence in a major urban center seems to lower the necessary threshold for violence in smaller cities by creating the expectation of a Negro riot. Rumors of small incidents may trigger dormant preconceptions among whites which have built up over time.

A climate of anxiety is produced by stories of planned violence, fears conditioned by previous disorders or civil rights activity, and fears of outside agitators and conspirators.

The anticipation of violence and over-reaction on the part of white authorities, more than the contagiousness of ghetto outbreaks, explains in large part the spread of violence from large urban centers to outlying communities.

After the Detroit upheaval, eight other Michigan cities reported disorders. After the Newark riot, fourteen cities in the surrounding area had some sort of disturbance.

In at least two-thirds of the fifteen cities studied in which disorders occurred shortly after major riots, the immediate precipitant of disorder seems to have been a police action prompted by ghetto violence elsewhere. In all fifteen cities, police over-reacted to violence at home. An extreme example is Milwaukee, which mobilized 4,800 National Guardmen, 800 policemen, and 200 state police after about 150 youths broke windows and looted after a dance. In all the New Jersey towns, over-response was clearly evident. In Englewood, police outnumbered participants three to one. In Jersey City, 400 armed police occupied the Negro area several days before the disorder occurred. In most cases, relations became strained as the appearance of armed police patrols increased the liklihood of confrontation with Negro residents. The most frequent citizen demands were for police withdrawal and/or a less visible show of arms. In six of the seven New Jersey "satellite" cities, removal of police from the ghetto signalled an end to violence. Rumors of violence often become self-fulfilling prophecies when credited and responded to with a visible show of force and fear.

The errors in judgment that a climate of fear in the white community produced was evident in many New Jersey cities,

especially where officials reacted to rumors that Stokeley Carmichael was bringing carloads of Negro militants into the community, although Carmichael was in London at the time. Planning for disorder by New Jersey police departments, even before the Newark upheaval occurred, showed similar elements of irrationality in the face of uncertainty.

On June 5, 1967, the police chiefs of at least 75 New Jersey communities met in Jersey City. They discussed rumors of planned violence by various militant groups who reportedly intended to kill Jersey City police officers in their homes and foment disorder in other New Jersey communities. Jersey City, Newark, and Elizabeth were said to have "Triple A" ratings for violence over the summer. Plans to coordinate control efforts were established, and the chiefs were informed of the procedures for calling in the state police and National Guard.

Thus, a month and a half before Newark erupted, there were rumors of planned violence and counter-plans were designed. Riot control training was held in a number of communities. In one instance Negro residents became alarmed and angered when tear gas used in a practice exercise drifted into the Negro section of town. Whether the rumors of planned violence were solid or merely a product of the preconceptions of city officials is difficult to say. In any event, rumors existing prior to the Newark riot were confirmed in the minds of officials when Newark erupted, and the fears of anticipated violence in other New Jersey cities came into play.

The extreme effects of white anticipations of Negro violence, however, are most clearly seen in Cambridge, Maryland. In this city local officials were able to turn an appearance by H. Rapp Brown, a speech attended by a relatively small crowd, into a community disaster. They assumed beforehand that Brown was there in Cambridge to lead local Negroes in a pillage of the white community. When a minor fire broke out at a local school that had been a focal point for Negro grievances, local officials refused to send fire equipment into the Negro area believing that a plan was afoot to trap and immobilize fire equipment, thus leaving the downtown business section to the mercy of rioters. As a result the fire grew and spread, consuming the major portion of the Negro business district in Cambridge.

While the anticipation of Negro violence on the part of authorities seems to be the major factor in the proliferation of disturbances in the vicinity of big city riots, another factor to consider is the network of kinship and friendship relations between Negroes in major cities and outlying areas. For many it may have been literally true that "the brothers" in Newark or Detroit were "getting some action." Many people in Grand Rapids have relatives in Detroit, and the reports that some of these relatives were killed in the Detroit riot increased tension and the potential for violence in Grand Rapids.

Negroes in northern New Jersey towns have relatives in Newark; many work in Newark and live in the surrounding communities. Phone calls out of Newark's riot sections into surrounding areas in northern New Jersey more than doubled the weekend of the Newark disorder, although most businesses in the city were closed and so normal business calls were not being made. The volume of calls in Michigan cities experiencing disorders rose from six to thirty-one per cent over the previous week, despite delays, many incompleted calls, and high telephone company personnel absences. This is not to say that the calls themselves were inflammatory--most were probably only to assure friends and relatives that no one had been hurt in Newark or Detroit--but the existence of social and family ties in these large cities increases the likelihood of identification with participants in the disorders

IV. The Riot as Expressive Rampage

While many of the riots examined had a pronounced rational and political component, others, insofar as they were initiated by Negro aggressive actions, were predominantly expressive rampages. The rewards derived in such outbursts derived more from the expression of pent-up feelings and emotions than the idea of achieving some rational, collective purpose.

For some outbursts, involving youth especially, behavior can take the form of a kind of "Fort Lauderdale Spree." Observers in Milwaukee described this as the basic form of the Milwaukee riot in which a crowd of youths left a dance and began breaking windows in the nearby area. In the Negro university riots that took place at Negro schools in the late spring of the year, the quality of collegiate exuberance was also present. They occurred around final exam time, and had many of the elements that traditionally go into outbursts of college students at that time of the year. They became more serious events though after a harsh police response was provoked.

Another model of expressive rampage is that which is popularly conceived of as a riot of "riff-raff" or criminal elements of the community. In popular lore, periods of unrest are likely to encourage criminals to go on a binge, looting, pillaging, and burning their way down the streets pretty much at random. In two disturbances studied, the hoodlum or vice element was prominently involved. However, in one of these cities, Grand Rapids, the behavior of the vice elements was highly rational, expressing more anger at poverty workers who were causing them trouble and upsetting their dominance in the community than anything else. Only in the first Dayton riot in the summer of 1966, does the image of random, meandering destructive behavior by a drunken criminal crowd seem to have validity.

In Dayton, a drunken "bar crowd" including many "hustlers" and "petty criminals," bearing a general resentment against the Dayton Vice Squad, responded to the killing of one of their fellows (presumably by a white man) and went on a spree.

Their behavior was unfocused and disorganized. There was a total lack of political orientation or direction. Attempts to organize the wandering street mob into a meeting failed. Efforts to draw up demands which would give political focus to the events broke down because people were too wrapped up in being angry, drinking, breaking windows, and milling about for their own sake.

There were, however, elements of racial protest as background to the disorder, the outburst taking place immediately after a States Rights Party convention brought white night-riders and firecracker throwers through the streets of the Negro community. But attempts by the mayor to negotiate with a civil rights leader in the crowd proved fruitless since the other people had no demands they could

articulate. The riot's most significant political aspect was its aftermath which produced increased community activity, as well as fact-finding studies to find out its "causes." This led to an unearthing of many real community grievances.

V. The Race Riot

Finally there is a type of riot which was conspicuous for its absence. This was the traditional race riot which has often marked American history. While in some instances whites were looking for trouble, ready to take up the banner of fighting Negroes and defending white property, white vigilantism was restrained by police practices that generally prevented white outsiders from coming into Negro areas. Only in Newark and Cincinnati of the northern cities, did white crowds pose the possibility of a genuine threat. Also, while a few whites in some cities were treated categorically by Negroes in some instances, Negro hostility rarely had lethal consequences.

VI. General Considerations on the Spread of Disorder

Besides the basic processes which define each of our types of riots, there are other processes which are more general in their contribution to the spread of disorder. One factor that needs to be emphasized as a major source for aggressive ghetto upheavals, political rebellions, and anticipatory white responses is leadership competition within the Negro community.

Leadership competition between the Negro militants opposed to the Mayor of Newark and the group of conservative Negro leaders who supported him played a role in preventing an effective counter-riot response to the developing Newark crisis. In Cincinnati, the first outbreak of violence followed a speech by a Negro conservative at a protest rally which supported an anti-loitering law and angered Negro youths. In Dayton, an intense controversy between militants and conservatives over the funding of an anti-poverty program produced conditions in which people were looking for an excuse to riot, particularly after the conservative faction tried to cut away a particularly popular program for being too controversial. In Cambridge, tensions began to mount as two newly-forming Negro groups, one conservative, one militant, began to compete for the leadership role left vacant since Gloria Richardson had left town.

In Detroit, a developing indigenous community organization leadership of a very militant character was threatening established middle-class leaders who were well-incorporated into the Detroit political system.

During a disorder itself, a competitive sense among Negro youths may become a powerful impetus to keeping the violence going. In Newark some youths did not want to stop the riot because the score in deaths stood "25-2" with the police and guardsmen leading. Within various groups on the street, people are quite conscious of the heroism and daring exhibited by young men. For Negro youth, challenging the police with taunts and dares can involve a dangerous and dramatic competition.

Evidence in our data indicate that cros-city competition is significant too. Cities that have already had major upheavals acquire symbolic value and become standards for comparison in other disturbances. For some participants there is a quite explicit desire to outdo New York, or Watts, etc. A Negro girl in Newark asked a reporter, "Was the Harlem riot worse than this?" and assured that it was not she cried "that's good, that's great!" Distinctive features of several major disburbances during the summer of

1967 can in part be attributed to the excitement generated among young Negroes that they were either doing something in a riot that had not been done before or that they were doing it bigger and better than had been done in the past.

The notion that outside agitators spread violence as they moved from city to city requires careful examination. Two of the best know Negro idealogues, Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown are widely thought to have been responsible for much of this year's ghetto violence. Yet of 55 cities listed by the FBI in which disturbances occurred between January 1, 1967, and August 1, 1967, only six had disturbances around the time that Brown or Carmichael were there. And in only three of these does there seem to be any connection between their appearance and the onset of violence.

In Cambridge, Maryland, the most notable effect of Brown's appearance was to foster precipitous action on the part of local authorities. In Dayton, Brown appeared in the context of a highly flammable situation in which, according to most observers local youths were "looking for an excuse" to riot.

Agitators such as Brown and Carmichael are usually brought into cities as "headliners" invited by local groups looking for popular support. Objective examination

indicates that they are very low on the list of causal factors in the recent disorders. The classic instance of this lack of influence is Jersey City, where H. Rap Brown spoke during the first night of disorder. The people listening to Brown were not on the streets when violence erupted, and when someone announced that the police were coming, the audience got up and went home.

Finally occurrence of disorders in time and place must take into specific account the role of the news media. While news media broadcasts around the country do play an important role in communicating information about riots, how one goes about it, what reasons people give to reporters on why they riot, etc., the media are crucial also in determining when latent tensions will surface into a riot. In a few cities the role of the media, either in teaching people stylized ways of responding, or in actually setting up confrontations, is so significant to the action of people that one is tempted to add another category of riot. This is the category of the "Media Riot."

While several cities in our sample indicate a media riot tendency, only one city shows strong characteristics along the media riot dimension. That was Tucson, in which a second night of "rioting" seems to have been planned or staged for the press. There was even reported sniping at two or three media vehicles.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CRISIS: THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

Grievances of Negroes Against the Police: Legitimate or Imaginary?

A central question to emerge from the study of disorders in American cities in the 1960's is not why there has been so much violence thus far, but why there has been so little. Earlier periods of American history were considerably bloodier, and most major American cities have seen labor or ethnic riots that would make the present racial disturbances seem tame indeed. If we compare America to other countries with intense racial tensions that have experienced racial massacres in recent history, it is surprising that so few citizens have thus far been injured in racially based disputes. There are clearly powerful restraints in American society which keep its citizens of different color and ethnic background from going at each other "tooth and nail."

Since the police have been a direct party, and the better armed one, in all of the civil disturbances that have occurred, an explanation of the low degree of overall violence must focus on restraints in their behavior. Among our sample of cities, which is weighted toward the high violence end, in only one-third of the cases did

police fire their weapons at citizens during the course of a civil disorder. The Cincinnati police department stands out as something of an extreme model in this respect. Although confronted with rioting crowds of thousands of people, with the situation out of control, there was forbearance in the use of arms. Nobody was killed, and a potential for bloody confrontation such as occurred in cities like Newark, Detroit, or Los Angeles, was averted. In most of the cities where guns were fired by policemen at some point in a disturbance, these would be extraordinary exceptions to a general pattern of extreme police restraint within the event.

This image is in contrast to one extreme view that the police tend to be unrestrained in violent disorders. That image is false. Were the streets of American cities really sites of internal war, were the police really dominated by anti-Negro sentiments as a criteria for action during disturbances, the casualty rates would be many times greater than what they have been. Considering the provocation that policemen must contend with, their lack of training in handling violence stemming out of political neglect, the emotional pressures that they feel when they fail in their task of maintaining order, the persecution feelings

generated in the role of a police officer -- the sense of being a minority group -- unwanted and unloved, a basic conclusion is that in most cases of disturbance policemen act with a surprising degree of discipline. Policemen as individuals in a group specializing in violence, with few exceptions, have an abhorrence to using violence, and often do not sleep well, when their job requires it. That they have done as well as they have thus far in containing situations and restraining passions that would easily overwhelm ordinary citizens, is a testimony to the quality to be found in professional law officers in many American police departments.

Nevertheless there are exceptions to this general view. It cannot be overlooked that police in many cities acted in ways as to encourage, rather than contain the spread of violence. It must also be noted that the basic character of relations between police departments and a Negro community often hinders their effectiveness in controlling disorders. While answers can only be tentative and partial at this time, an examination of the role of the police in the disorders reveals some of the problems the guardians of law and order face in maintaining it.

When one considers that the ghettoes are not only black, and generally poor, but that they also account for a disproportionate amount of a city's crime, it is easy to see why many beleaguered police officers become antagonistic toward and wary of ghetto residents, and why many ghetto residents in turn are antagonistic towards the police.

According to the National Crime Commission Report, personnel of some 75 per cent of the police departments in the country show evidence of strong racist attitudes.

One of the major complaints of ghetto residents against the police is that they really do not protect Negroes against crime -- Negro or white. A poll taken by John Kraft in New York indicated that inadequate police protection was second only to housing as a major grievance among ghetto Negroes. Corrobating evidence for this contention comes from a study of the Cleveland police department's response to complaints which indicated that the police too considerably longer in answering Negro calls than in answering white.[1]

Not only are many police departments more willing to countenance crime in the ghettoes than in the white areas, in some cases they also participate in it. Ghetto

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[1] U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report on Cleveland, Ohio.

residents are usually well aware of police corruption, and many a Negro youth has first-hand knowledge of which officer gets a payoff from whom -- where and when. Corruption in police departments is nothing new, but when combined with a growing sense of race pride among Negroes, it can result in the authority of the police being undercut drastically. One youth in Watts said, "The police used to be a man with a badge; now he's just a thug with a gun."

In some cities police activity frequently disrupts daily patterns of life in the ghetto. Ordering groups of youth on street corners to move on, breaking up small crap games, enforcing repossessions and evictions, police often harry and distract ghetto residents. Some large cities such as New York and Detroit employ stop and frisk practices which enable police officers to search people whom they consider suspicious without charging them with any violation of law. Los Angeles has a system of "field reports" which permits an officer to require that any person give information about himself to be entered on a standard form and put in police files. It is fairly common knowledge that the burden of such practices falls disproportionately upon Negroes. This daily harrassment is sometimes combined with verbal abuse which further

angers and unsettles Negroes in the ghetto. One of the images frequently encountered in the Commission's studies is that of the police as intruders who too often appear at the wrong time and for the wrong reason.

In a general sense, the police are both agents and symbols of white authority in the ghettoes. As agents properly fulfilling their role, they nevertheless can come into conflict with ghetto Negroes because some of the laws they enforce are manifestly detrimental to the basic interests of many ghetto residents. For example, credit arrangements sanctioned by law often entail exhorbitant interest rates and especially victimize those not acquainted with printed forms and legal detail. A man can pay for a television set twice over and still have it repossessed for failing to make a payment.

There are also cases in which police officers do not properly fulfill their role, to the detriment of ghetto residents. And there are enough documented cases of physical as well as verbal abuse by police to provide some basis in fact for the charges of police brutality frequently heard in ghettoes. As in some areas of the South, part of the problem in getting these cases acknowledged is that they rarely come to trial and hence have no legal standing.

If one accepts the notion that only the perception of police brutality is real enough to be counted on, then the problem confronting policymakers is merely one of impression management. Once the myth is dispelled, the problem disappears. On the other hand, if physical abuse by police is a fact, no amount of impression management will do the job; rather, police reform is called for.

While ghetto residents have many real grievances against the police, they also use police as scapegoats. As conspicuous reminders of dominant white authority, police often take the brunt of much hostility that might more logically be directed at the larger society and its less visible institutions.

Because Negro grievances against police, though perhaps exaggerated, nevertheless have a real basis in fact; because police are in many cases disruptive to ghetto life, creating disorder; because respect for the police in the ghettoes and particularly among Negro youth is almost nil, it may be argued that they make less than ideal agents of control in the current racial crisis.

How Police Practices Can Precipitate Riots

These factors have played an important role in the precipitating incidents in many of the disturbances

studied. In Newark, Plainfield, Dayton, Grand Rapids, and Bridgeton, New Jersey, Negro perceptions of police brutality were central to the beginning of the violence. In four of the five cases, the evidence for Negro contentions seems compelling. In Dayton, for example, a white officer shot a middle class Negro man to death, claiming afterwards that he had mistaken the bulge in his coat pocket -- a pipe -- for a gun. The officer's claim was somewhat undermined by the fact that after the shooting he left the scene, to return shortly with a pistol, which he placed in the victim's hand.

In other cities, disruptive police activities played a prominent role either in starting the violence or in escalating it once started. In Detroit, it was a raid on an after-hours place in which a group of Negroes, including some leaders of neighborhood associations, were holding a party for two Negro soldiers about to be sent to Vietnam and two just returned. In Cambridge, Maryland, Rockford, Illinois, and several cities in the "Jersey string" the large-scale mobilization of police forces in anticipation of Negro violence had a great deal to do with provoking the violence (which in all these cases was minimal). In Cambridge, a deputy sheriff fired two shots toward a small group of Negroes walking toward

the town's Negro-white dividing line. In Rockford on an ordinary Friday night, police began clearing the streets in the ghetto at 1:00 A.M., closing time for the bars. It was in reaction to these efforts to clear the streets that the first bottles and bricks were thrown. The escalation of a riot by disruptive police action was evident in Plainfield, New Jersey, where the biggest night of violence was precipitated by county police breaking up an orderly meeting of Negro youths assembled to air grievances and select representatives.

The fact that complaints against police are numerous among ghetto residents, particularly the youth, also figures prominently in the disturbances. It underlies many cases of resistance to arrest which sometimes serve as the initial spark. In the Dixie Hills disturbance in Atlanta it was the effort of police to subdue a young man and his sister that drew a crowd which then began throwing rocks and bottles. To go beyond our sample, resistance to arrest also provided the spark in Los Angeles (Watts), Philadelphia and Rochester, among others. In other cases not included in this sample, disturbances have emanated from a situation which police engage in a tug-of-war with a crowd trying to free an arrestee. In almost every disturbance examined there has been considerable evidence

that Negroes on the streets either as active participants or as spectators do not regard the presence of the police as legitimate. Rather, they are seen simply as a group of ordinary men -- perhaps meaner than most -- with no special authority.

Considering the full range of riots since 1964, it seems that the National Guard receives considerably more respect from ghetto residents than police -- in part because they are seen as representing the Federal government, in part because they have not been compromised by a history of conflict with Negroes in the ghetto, and in part because they represent a vastly superior force. At the same time it should be noted that as the disorders become more numerous, more intense, and more political, respect for the National Guard is declining. And matters are not helped any when guardsmen as jumpy and trigger-happy as some of those in Detroit, or as vengeful as those in Newark who walked the length of a city block shooting up Negro stores, are sent in to quell a riot.

Traditional Police Views of Crowds: An Obstacle to Civil Peace?

Another factor which sometimes limits the effectiveness of police forces in their efforts to control disorders is the view held in many police departments that all rioting

crowds are wild and irrational, and the rioters themselves are nothing but criminals, hoodlums, "riff-raff." This view of the riots is the one most frequently advanced by police officials interviewed. Of course, a riot is lawless, but it is begging the question to rely upon this self-evident fact as an explanation of events; and neither the behavior nor the composition of riot crowds generally supportsthis view.

It is clear that the classical conception of crowds, characterizing them as whimsical, unprincipled, irrational, and wild so distorts reality as to be of very limited value. In disturbances examined for this study, many different kinds of crowds were involved. At one extreme, the crowd rioting in Dayton, Ohio, in 1966 was a close approximation of the traditional concept -- drunken, raucous, and opportunistic. Of those arrested in this Dayton disturbance, two-thirds were charged with drunkeness, almost half had prior felony convictions. But even here the violence started as a protest against a perceived instance of racial injustice -- the shooting of a Negro, it was thought by white men. At the other end of the spectrum were the well-disciplined and purposeful "crowds" of youths in New Brunswick and Englewood, New Jersey, who obviously had made plans to create disturbances as a means

of impressing their political demands upon local authorities. Although arrest data do not allow an assessment of employment or educational status of arrestees from these two disturbances, it is a fair guess that these youths were not drawn from the lowest levels of society, as the Negro communities in which they lived are two of the most prosperous in New Jersey.

For the purposes of this analysis, a rough distinction can be made between crowds which have little collective purpose and solidarity, and those which have a great deal. Of the disturbances studied so far, those in which the former predominate are usually best seen as inarticulate outbursts of frustration; those in which the latter predominate, as political disturbances, whose intent is to gain both political recognition and concrete benefits.

If an incoherent outburst of frustration is treated as a political riot by public authorities, the efforts are likely to prove futile. In Dayton, 1966, for example, the mayor bargained with the man who claimed to be the leader of the riotous crowd, only to discover that the man was completely unable to "deliver" control. In effect, the crowd was not interested in making demands and was without political leadership. Under the circumstances,

only a technical approach to riot control -- e.g., one emphasizing appropriate police tactics and weaponry -- could be effective. On the other hand, a purely technical approach to a political riot may be equally ill-advised. Since public authorities in each of the clearly political disturbances examined have been at least willing to meet with representatives of the rioters, there is no example of an effort to contain this type of violence entirely by technical means. But perhaps the nearest example of this approach is seen in the Plainfield disturbance where county police, insisting upon the letter of the law, broke up an orderly meeting at a park because the youths in attendance had failed to secure a park permit.

The chief reason why a technical approach alone cannot be relied upon in all cases is that different disorders and their participants manifest vastly different levels of collective rationality.

Where youths, in particular, are on a "lark," there is evidence that window breaking and dancing being substitutable -- a disorder may be quelled as easily by a rock-and-roll party in the streets as by police repression.

If a riotous bar crowd on the streets is dispersed, its members will probably end up back at the bar in days to come, caught in the same old rut. But if a political crowd is suppressed, many of its members will meet in

apartments, on the streets, or in teen hangouts to talk about what steps to take next. The political crowd has a collective purpose which if blocked in one direction will show up in another. As long as some police commands remain insensitive to the nature of crowds they are called upon to control, the likelihood of isolated instances of black terrorism in the next few years cannot be ruled out.

Crowd Control Tactics By Rioters: Their Impact On Police Discipline.

Very often ghetto riots involved two distinctly different types of control efforts. The more obvious is the attempt of authorities to effect a return to the status quo ante. The less obvious is the effort of many riot activists to demonstrate their own power and efficacy by controlling some segment of the riot action -- not so much in telling other rioters what to do as in keeping police, firemen, and police officials off balance.

The latter is a negative control, intended to keep the situation open and amenable to Negro initiatives more than to establish any routine. In Detroit, Newark, and Watts, among others, there was evidence of patterning in false fire alarms. Some of these would draw fire engines into

one area at the same time that large fires were beginning to burn in others. False alarms were also turned in (and real fires set) to draw firemen into ambushes of bricks, bottles, or occasional sniper fire. The taunting and harrassment of policemen, too, is an example of efforts by rioters to exercise control. Police officers are put on the spot, torn between their professional obligations and their personal inclinations.

When the regular agents of social control are distracted, drawn at a frantic pace from one section to another, and effectively neutralized, the rioters have control of the ghetto streets by default. This is the point at which the word spreads as it did in Watts, Newark and Detroit that the rioters have "beat the police." It is also the turning point of the big riot, ushering in the most dangerous and destructive phase. For it is at this point that the police, humiliated by their own inefficacy, prepare to turn the tables, and with the help of the National Guard, to retaliate. On this day -- the third or fourth -- the death toll begins to mount sharply as agents of social control begin to kill rioters, bystanders, the uninvolved, and occasionally each other.

Crowd Dispersal: An Effective Police Tactic?

Traditional riot control tactics are based on certain assumptions about the character of crowds, as mentioned before, and on the assumption that unruly crowds constitute the chief problem confronting authorities. Considering the recent ghetto riots, neither set of assumptions is necessarily valid. The character and composition of crowds has already been dealt with. As was pointed out above, the utility of a strictly technical emphasis on crowd control in dealing with all types of disorders is open to question.

In the cases examined a crowd has been present at the beginning of each riot; it seems to be prerequisite to getting the riot started. There is something about the size and intensity of a crowd acting in defiance of authority which breaks the balance of routine and creates a sense of the extraordinary. A Harlem youth, describing his reaction to seeing a crowd about two blocks away at the beginning of the 1964 riot, said: "First I thought, 'Something's happening!' Then I thought, 'Man! The lid's off!'"

If it is generally true that a crowd is necessary to create the air of collective permissiveness that draws

others into a riot, it follows that the formation of a crowd in the first place should be prevented. Many police dpeartments, recognizing this, now respond to calls without sirens whining and lights flashing. On the other hand, it is a practice in many large cities for police to answer fairly routine calls with massive force. It is not uncommon to see half a dozen or more squad cars arrive on the scene within five minutes to arrest an obstreperous drunk. The reasoning is that enough officers must be on hand to leave no doubt as to who is in charge. At the same time, it must be recognized that the more cars, the more likely a large crowd is to assemble.

Although the original formation of crowds should be discouraged, it does not follow that a crowd already formed should be dispersed, by police action. Given the fact that respect for police in the first place is minimal, initiatives which tend to embroil officers with members of a crowd -- particularly where physical contact is involved -- can easily lead to the first barrage of bricks and bottles. In Englewood, New Jersey, the efforts of police to force Negro bystanders into houses, whether or not they were the right house, caused great indignation and sparked a violent reaction by young Negroes. In

Rockford, Illinois, police tried to clear a late-night bar crowd off the streets, provoking the first instances of rock and bottle throwing.

After the initial acts of violence by members of a crowd, efforts to disperse it may entail three distinct dangers, depending on the circumstances. First, if police strength is not adequate to control a street after it has been cleared, the efforts to disperse the crowd are simply inviting trouble, not the least because it demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the police. In Newark when members of an angry crowd were pelting the police station with rocks, bottles, and a few fire bombs, the police made several sorties into the crowd, laying on with their clubs, and each time withdrawing back to the station. This seesaw motion demonstrated the crowd's parity with the police and still left the rioters in control of the street.

The second difficulty with crowd dispersal, again depending on the circumstances, is that even if police have sufficient strength, the dispersal may cause an escalation of the violence. In New Haven, after the first instances of Negro violence the mood of the crowd was still tentative. A small crowd walked down the center of the street toward

police lines, followed by a much larger crowd on the sidewalks. When they reached the perimeter, police laid down three canisters of tear gas. The crowd ran quickly down the street breaking windows and starting to riot in ernest. To accurately assess the alternatives open before the tear gas was fired, we need more information about what went on at the police lines as the crowd drew near. Was it possible that the members of the crowd would have been talked out of trying to break through the police lines, if indeed that was their intention? There was a second line of police behind the first: might they not have been used to better effect?

A third difficulty with crowd dispersal is that the scattered members of the crowd may do more damage than the crowd itself. It's somewhat as if a man were to stamp on a burning log trying to put out the fire, only to see sparks and embers scattered over a wider area. The riots in both New Haven and Milwaukee spread this way and in the opinion of a New York City police investigator who examined the police tactics in Milwaukee, the small scattered bands of rioters presented the police with a more difficult situation than the original crowd, which was not very destructive and could be kept in view.

The foregoing is not to suggest that crowd dispersal never works. In a number of cases, it was decisive in ending the disturbances, though in each case the crowds and the disturbances themselves were small. Several of

these disturbances were largely the product of policing in the wake of larger riots. Englewood, New Jersey, police and their reinforcements had little trouble with the Negro crowd confronting them because they outnumbered the "rioters" three to one (300 to 100).

The emphasis of crowd-control in traditional police training for riots is probably overdone. While the pressure of a large crowd in the streets is nothing for police to rejoice over, it may be preferable to the alternatives, especially if the crowd is not particularly violent. Often the risks of dispersal -- escalation and spread -- are greater than the risks of simply containing the crowd but keeping an eye on them.

The Perimeter Approach: A Safeguard Against Over-Commitment.

To judge from the 20 cases under examination, the early establishment of a perimeter to contain the violence seems to be safer as a first step than an effort to saturate the area and clear the streets. It leaves open the possibility that once contact with police is broken, the potential for violence in the crowd will peter out, as happened in Tucson. It gives police a chance to build up their forces, information about the cause of the disturbance, make plans, and stay cool, as they did in Dayton 1966,

Tampa, and Phoenix among others. It should be pointed out, however, that the disturbances in Dayton and Tampa did not end when police broke contact with rioters to set up a cordon, the tactic simply enabled police to make the most effective use of available manpower at the time.

The cordon tactic also assures that police will not over-commit themselves, thus preventing a major tactical error. For, in taking on more than they can handle, police both provoke rioters and demonstrate their own impotence. In a number of cases, single police officers have been placed in a riot area to protect one or more stores. An officer in these circumstances finds himself in an almost impossible position if confronted with a crowd determined to break into the store. He is alone and without authority in the eyes of the crowd. If he risks shooting he may be killed himself, if he does not, he has no way of stopping the crowd. More often than not, he will sensibly crack a few jokes with members of the crowd, then look the other way as they pour through the windows.

A great danger of over-commitment lies in the fact that police place themselves in a situation in which their own frustrations and antagonisms become enormous, producing erratic behavior, causing a breakdown in professionalism and discipline, and in too many cases turning individual officers

into avengers of their personal and departmental pride. The number of innocent deaths in Detroit, Watts, and Newark, and the circumstances under which they occurred provide compelling evidence of such a breakdown among many members of the police and National Guard.

Counter-Rioters: Their Role in Quelling Disturbances.

In many cities active counter-rioters have played an important role in dampening the disturbances. In Tampa, Florida and Elizabeth, New Brunswick, and Plainfield, New Jersey, police were ordered out of the disturbance area and ghetto residents patrolled the streets persuading others to go home. In all four cases the tactic worked, but in some of the disturbances outside our sample it has been unsuccessful. In West Side Chicago in the spring of 1966, police withdrew from a disturbance area only to find that the neighborhood leaders could not really control those who were supposed to be their followers.

The decision whether or not to withdraw should be based on a number of assessments of the situation. Are the police under the circumstances more likely to provoke violence than to restrain it? Are the Negro leaders who offer to cool things down really the leaders of those who are rioting? If so, is their leadership likely to be effective in this crisis situation, as opposed to more routine times?

In each of the four cases in which the tactic was successful the counter-rioters differed. Those in Tampa, called "white hats" because of the helmets they wore, were themselves young riot leaders co-opted by the city administration in the midst of the event, given helmets, a pep talk, and official blessings, and turned out onto the streets to settle things down. Many of them went about their new job with zeal, using physical force if necessary to put down rioters. Dayton, Ohio also mobilized Negro youths as counter-rioters, but it is not clear whether the police withdrew from the disturbance area. To judge from the evidence in these two cities, and in Chicago, Atlanta, and Boston, where similar units have been formed, the white hats -- if that may be used as the generic term -- are young, tough, and dispossessed. Economically and socially they seem to be well below the average for ghetto residents. Like the Mobile Guard in ninteenth-centry France, and a good many other counter-revolutionary forces, they seem to be composed of young members of an underclass who are bought (in this case by the bestowal of prestige rather than money) by public authorities and turned against the rebels.

The counter-rioters in Elizabeth called the "Peacekeepers" resembled the white hats in that they wore

public symbols of authority -- armbands -- while trying to cool down the disturbance. But they differed from the white hats in that they were not predominantly youthful, nor predominantly members of the underclass. They represented a wider range of age and social class. In New Brunswick the counter-rioters were in effect the same youths who had been causing the disorder. When it became clear to them that the mayor would listen and respond to their older representative and that the police would be withdrawn, they simply refrained from making any further disturbance. Finally, in Plainfield, the emergent leader of the politically oriented youth in that riot apparently directed the patrolling of ghetto streets after authorities had agreed to withdraw police and to release a dozen prisoners.

In several cities the efforts of counter-rioters were frustrated by police and authorities, or by mixups among all parties concerned. In Milwaukee police arrested several young Negroes who were trying to cool things down and who had letters from the state director of industrial and labor relations to confirm their purpose. The police also turned down the request of the Milwaukee CORE leader that they withdraw while he tried to persuade the youthful participants in the disturbance to go home.[2]

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[2] From the evidence available, it is not clear that he could have controlled the youths, though it might be argued that little would have been lost in trying.

In Cincinnati, despite an agreement between the mayor and Negro leaders that the latter would be given badges and allowed to go into the riot area to help quiet things down, police refused to recognize the badges and arrested many of these counter-rioters. The arrest of counter-rioters (not only those with badges) occurred frequently during the course of the riot, apparently because police officers regarded the situation as a police problem and guarded their jurisdiction closely. The arrest of counter-rioters in other cities also seems to involve an insistence by police on their jurisdiction and competence, both of which are points of considerable sensitivity, especially in the current racial crises.

In New Haven, the leaders of the Hill Parents Association in the disturbance area had persuaded members of a crowd which had broken some store windows to sweep up the glass and debris in the street. But the truck bringing brooms from downtown did not get past police lines.[3] As the brooms did not arrive the leaders of HPA were unable to hold the crowd.

Civil Authorities and Police: Who Is Responsible?

In many respects the police behave the way they do because civil authorities and the people who are most

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[3] There are conflicting stories as to why the trucks did not enter the area.

influential in a community want the police to behave that way. This is not to say that respectable white citizens are in favor of police corruption, unfair treatment of Negroes, or bad services in Negro areas as a matter of explicit policy. Rather they have other concerns, the attainment of which may have the secondary consequence of encouraging law officers to engage in actions which will aggravate their relations with the Negro community, and estrange Negroes from local government. The processes by which this may occur are varied, but they produce the same results.

In Dayton, for example, where many influential whites share a strong traditional morality, there is an equally strong interest in the prosecution of vice. Major news stories are sometimes focused around Negro vice, much to the anger of Dayton's many middle class Negro citizens. "Why," notes a prominent banker,"should a policeman tip his hat to a whore?" Policemen in Dayton do not tip their hats to whores. Rather, the department's vigorous vice-squad has zealously pursued the harrassment of the limited petty vice in the Negro community to such an extent that the behavior of vice-squad officers became a <u>cause celebre</u> throughout the Negro community. Two out of

Dayton's three civil disorders over the past year were in part precipitated by the behavior of vice-squad officers. The most recent disturbance mentioned earlier began after a plainclothes vice-squad officer, dressed in a fez and guarding a shriner's convention, shot and killed a middle class Negro government employee.

While the occurrence of this specific act, and the immediate release on his own recognizance of the law officer who did the shooting, may not be the direct responsibility of white leadership, nevertheless, many Negroes perceived elected officials as being politically and socially responsible for the climate and conditions in the police department that made the slaying possible. One prominent conservative Negro leader after the slaying, expressing a disillusionment widespread among many middle class-Negroes, indicated that he was through trying to "convert" the white power structure and that after the slaying he too, "wanted to throw a brick through a window."

Cincinnati provided an even more direct example of how policies of city authorities effect police practices in ways as to place the police in the position of being enemies of large segments of the Negro community. Prior to the June, 1967, disturbance, grievances against police brutality were not a major issue among Negroes. The

department had a reputation as one of the more professional departments in the country, and the policy was one of limiting the use of weapons in making arrests in Negro areas out of deference to good relations between the police and the Negro community. There were some tensions over the enforcement of an anti-loitering law and insufficient police service in the Negro community, but physical brutality per se was not a major issue.

Following the June upheaval, however, which had strong political overtones, the civil authorities responded by announcing a "get tough" policy including the removal of the long-standing restraint on the use of weapons. This strategy, supposedly for the purpose of preventing riots in the future, had several immediate consequences in the form of incidents between the police and the community in which Negroes charge that the police have become too free in the use of their weapons. Hostility and hatred for the police is growing where little existed before.

In Plainfield, New Jersey, the site of another major upheaval, physical brutality was a long-standing issue and one on which Negroes could expect little help from civil authorities. The mayor adamantly refused to take seriously Negro complaints, while within the Negro community, the issue was so pervasive, that the street lore included a "ten most wanted list" of Plainfield's

most brutal policemen. Efforts by the Human Relations Commission to investigate charges by interviewing accused policemen was roundly rejoined by the mayor as an example of "gestapo tactics." The general orientation of civil authorities seemed to reflect the idea that investigation of Negro grievances in the matter of police practice would only undermine the morale of the police and the community's respect for law and order.

In Newark, many incidents preceded the big explosion between Negro ghetto residents and the predominantly Italian police force. Frequent complaints from Negro organizations about police brutality and harrassment, finally generated a response from the Italian mayor during the Newark crisis, that he would aks the FBI to intervene in assessing the validity of brutality complaints, something which is not in their power unless Federal law is violated. The resistance to a serious examination of Negro charges of physical brutality can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the mayor and the majority of police are members of the same tightly-bound ethnic community which has been struggling to maintain its precarious political hold over a city which now has a majority Negro population.

Whatever the specific causes, the attitudes of civil authorities in many cities are crucial determinants in

underpinning police practice and providing it with direction. In some cases, of course, police autonomy can be so considerable that civil authorities are highly limited in their abilities to affect any aspect of police jurisdiction. Or liberal attitudes by police leadership and civil authorities on the race issue may be confronted by intransigent attitudes at lower echelons.

The National Guard: A Tool of Local Police or a Buffer Against Violence?

The relationship between local police and state and national control forces, particularly the state police and the National Guard is also a critical issue in the control of disturbances. Some police departments would clearly like to have a reservoir of state and national troops available at their disposal. These would be used at the discretion of police department leadership, in the event that routine police force is unable to contain disturbances. The underlying assumption is that the proper function of state police and military power in all cases is to buttress that of local law officers.

Organizationally and tactically, this may mean such practices as assigning three or four guardsmen to accompany a policeman as he goes about his job of making arrests.

For all intents and purposes the policeman has been given three or four extra guns, while the guard has been fragmented from an independent command unit into a collection of smaller groups and individuals, often acting in isolation.

If a police department is highly professional, and skilled in handling civil disorders, with police order and discipline intact, this may not cause too many problems. In other cases, it can stimulate excessive and illegal repressive activities as policemen, desiring revenge, and wishing to show their guard associates how "tough" they really are with law breakers, do rash things in the name of law and order.

On the other hand, guard personnel, particularly if they are untrained and inexperienced in disorders, can give full vent to trigger-happy dispositions if they are isolated from the central authority of their military commanders. Through rumor processes, poor information channels in distinguishing when a shot is coming from a sniper or coming from other officers, and the release of personal inhibitions, they can be drawn into the same disorder-creating activities that afflict the police.

A crucial problem in the disposition of national guard and state police forces, thus, is whether or not the

local police are one of the central agencies of disorder that needs to be controlled. In Cambridge, Maryland, only independent and highly professional state police and national guard commands prevented a police-initiated bloodbath against Cambridge Negroes in the aftermath of minor disorders following a speech by H. Rapp Brown. The disorder itself had flowed primarily from exaggerated fears (and a state-of-seige mentality among white officials) that a planned attack by Negroes on the downtown business section was in the offing. The wounding of a police officer by youths enraged the town police chief.[4]

Only the refusal of the state police and national guard commanders to support precipitous police action prevented an escalation into bloody racial confrontation. Their judgment in this instance reflected a disgnoses that the best control to disorder was to control the local police.

Correct Diagnoses and Common Sense Flexibility: Preventing Police Irrationality

It is of course one thing to say that the agents of social control should keep their heads and maintain

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[4] The youths themselves were terrified they were under attack, as a police car drove up with guns sticking out the window. Earlier in the evening the Negro community had developed a sense that they too were besieged as instances of "white-night-riding" followed two shotgun shots fired by a deputy sheriff toward H. Rapp Brown as he walked toward the dividing line between the black and white areas with a group of young Negroes behind him.

discipline in a situation which appears to them fundamentally chaotic, without rhyme or reason. It is another to be able to do it. Rumors spread among police as among rioters, and the inability to define the situation in reasonably accurate terms leads to irrational projections of ingrained attitudes on the part of police as it does on the part of rioters. This is especially true in the largest riots. The fact that many police harbor deep racial prejudices, when combined with the traditional conception of a riotous crowd as inherently irrational, anarchic and probably nihilistic, often gives rise to both an exaggeration of the dangers confronting them and an exaggeration of the tendency to respond violently. Almost all investigations of sniping in the recent riots have reached the conclusion that police and Guardsmen greatly exaggerated how widespread it was. There are numerous cases of control forces riddling buildings with machinegun and small arms fire in the belief that a sniper was firing from this or that window -- was it on the third floor or the fifth? -- from the roof top or from a doorway. And yet the number of caught and convicted snipers can probably be counted on one hand.

Since it is a very risky business at this stage in the game to draw up contingency plans for riot control, the emphasis in training police and National Guardsmen should be less on tactical proficiency and more on the inculcation of attitudes, the maintenance of discipline under stress, but most importantly, education as to the character of the riots themselves. If training of this sort is successful police and guardsmen should feel more on home ground during a riot and better able to keep their heads. A realistic assessment of the riot situation is the first requirement for effective control. The second is common sense.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO VIOLENCE

The disturbances of summer 1967 are different from one another in a good many ways, but they also have many features in common. One of the most significant of these is the fact that in almost all of the disturbances Negro youths and young adults in the age range of about 15 to 30 have played a predominant role. In some, this tendency toward the involvement of youth has been so pronounced that few participants are over the age of 21 and a good many are in the 12-to-15 age range.

When it is recognized that the average age in most of the country's ghettoes is under 20 years, the extensive participation of youth in riots becomes more significant. The average citizen of the ghetto is about 20 years old, and so is the average rioter. In terms both of numbers and initiative, Negro youths constitute a profound social force in the ghettoes. This fact cannot be overemphasized since there is a radical break in continuity between today's Negro youth and their parents. Though certainly a feature of white society, this gap is much more pronounced among Negroes. Negro youths are rejecting the compromises and subservience of their elders and developing a racial pride

which has probably at this point become self-sustaining. Consequently, they make greater demands upon the larger society and press them with more vigor. And, on the whole, society has not responded.

Despite their importance as a social force, Negro youths have almost no access to the established political system. The same, of course, could be said of white youths, but, as noted, there is much less of a generational gap among whites than among Negroes. Despite student protests in the universities, white youths, much more than Negroes, are willing to accept the society which others before them have fashioned.

Negro representation in politics is, with few exceptions, the monopoly of older men, almost all of them middle class. They do not, and perhaps cannot, represent the interests of Negro youths. The classic conditions of rebellion are thus evident in the ghettoes today: a major social force, independent in its thinking, imaginative ready to take the initiative, and increasingly aware of its own potential, is virtually locked out of political power. When established political relations no longer reflect predominant social forces a rising class -- in this case Negro youth -- is inclined to take matters into its own hands.

The rejection of moderate and established Negro leadership by youths reflects a common pattern in the development of social movements. In colonial countries, for example, the old nationalist leadership, intent on maintaining good relations with the metropolitan power while pressing slowly for independence, was swept aside after World War II as the movement acquired a mass base. The new leaders demanded immediate independence and were much less amenable to working within the established system to achieve their aims. In some colonies, the metropolitan powers got out in time to avoid massive bloodshed; in others, a revolutionary underground developed; in still others there was widespread rioting against the colonizers.

For militant and aggressive Negro youths, the local Anti-poverty agencies up till now have provided one of the few channels of access to authority, and this may well have been their most important function. As the poverty program applies to the ghettoes, it might be more realistic to stress maximum feasible participation of the young than of the poor, because the poor as such are not much of a social force; the young are.

Adequate representation of the interests of Negro youth would in itself have some value, as it would accord

recognition and legitimacy. But there are obvious limits to the value of representation alone. For, as established Negro leaders have discovered, the most ordinary demands of pluralistic politics, when made by a Negro representative, can become racial issues. A routine matter, such as a city council vote on paving a street, ceases to be a discrete item in the bargaining process and becomes part of the larger issue: whether or not whites are giving in too much to Negro demands. Under these circumstances, agreeing to pave the street may be seen as the opening wedge in an endless series of demands by people who are not really part of the game anyway. And since whites on the council are invariably in the majority, they can close ranks along racial lines to reject the demand.

Since the riots started in 1964, the actions of youthful Negro participants have become more pointed and more political. In that year, the riots were mainly negative reactions to instances of perceived police misconduct and to the circumstances of ghetto life in general. In subsequent years, Negro demands have increasingly been incorporated in the riots themselves, and as has been pointed out earlier, instances of bargaining between rioters and authorities have grown in number as have attacks on public buildings.

Table I categorizes riots in terms of their political content.

TABLE I

1967 riots with pronounced political content	1967 riots with some political content	1967 riots with little or no political content
Cincinnati, Ohio	Atlanta, Georgia	Bridgeton, N. J.
Detroit, Michigan	Dayton, Ohio	Elizabeth, N. J.
Newark, New Jersey	New Haven, Conn.	Jersey City, N. J
Plainfield, New Jersey	Tampa, Florida	Paterson, N. J.
Engelwood, New Jersey		Cambridge, Md.
New Brunswick, New Jersey		Gr. Rapids, Mich.
		Milwaukee, Wisc.
		Phoenix, Ariz.
		Rockford, Ill.
		Tuscon, Ariz.

As indicated by Table I, six disturbances occurring during the summer of 1967 had a marked political component. In Detroit and Newark, this component is less visible than in other cities because of the magnitude and complexity of the events. But it is there, nevertheless. To take one indication, a study of riot participants conducted by the University of Michigan concluded after extensive interviews in Detroit

that "rioters" (were) much more likely than the noninvolved to consider failure of the political structure as a major cause of the rioting."

A comparison of cities which had political disturbances with those in which events were more diffuse and expressive indicates that political disorders are more likely to take place in cities which have a sizeable Negro middle class. This was true in five of the six cities with pronounced political disturbances, the notable exception being Newark. The four cities whose disorders had some political content also had a sizeable Negro middle class.

With the exception of Newark, again, the political disturbances took place in fairly stable Negro neighborhoods, where the rate of unemployment was relatively low, income and education relatively high. In 1960, the median income for Negroes in Engelwood, N. J., for example, was $5700, the highest of any Negro community in the metropolitan area. In Detroit, the center of the fiercest activity in the riot was an upper-middle class neighborhood; and it is significant that most of the rioting took place in the more stable and economically secure West Side ghetto rather than in the depressed East Side.

Why have the political riots occurred in cities with a sizeable Negro middle class? It is difficult to be

certain, but several reasons may be suggested.

Because it is educated, articulate, and involved in political activities, the middle class tends to raise the level of political awareness in a Negro community. This is especially true in the case of Negro militants and activists, for the most part disaffected members of the middle class. Furthermore, the presence of a large middle class usually means that Negro political representation in that city will be in the hands of an old, established leadership which blocks the access of militant youths to the political process. Finally, because of the level of education and political awareness in this class, the involvement of a significant number of middle class Negroes -- especially youths -- in a riot may well help to turn it in a political direction. The uneducated and unemployed usually lack the perspective necessary to give a riot political focus.

Without exception, the ghettoes that have had political disturbances were characterized by a considerable degree of political awareness before the outbreaks, and most of them were quite militant. Newark has been the center of black nationalist activity in the country for several years. And as far back as 1963, Mayor Cavanagh flew home to Detroit on

a moment's notice to lead a massive civil rights demonstration of some 200,000 marchers because he feared that otherwise the demonstration would fall into the hands of black radicals. Cincinnati has had a good deal of nationalist activity, and in all of these cities militant Negro youths have been generating political issues with which to confront authorities.

School issues have been among the most prominent ones raised by Negro youths. Young Detroit Negroes boycotted Northern High School in the ghetto after the white principal disciplined the editor of the school newspaper for printing editorials critical of the administration. In Plainfield, Negro students boycotted the school cafeteria; in another incident some of them carried on a campaign of intimidation against white students after a white teacher was thought to have treated a Negro student unfairly. In New Brunswick, youthful rioters demanded that a number of Negro students expelled by a prejudiced principal be reinstated; the demand was met.

The number of confrontations in public high schools between white and black students, and between black students and school authorities, has increased rapidly in the past few years.[1] These confrontations are part of the larger

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[1]Thirteen instances in the fall of 1967 alone.

tendency among Negro youth to challenge both white authority and white society as a whole.

Of the six disturbances with an important political component, those in Detroit, Newark, Cincinnati, and, to a lesser extent, Plainfield, were intensely violent and involved the participation of many whose motives were not political. Those in New Brunswick and Engelwood were low-intensity incidents, clear-cut in terms of the action and the participants, and characterized by a high degree of political rationality.

The difference between these two types of political disorders probably stems from the fact that New Brunswick and Engelwood do not have a large Negro underclass to disrupt the political "niceties" of these two very formal disturbances. Plainfield does have something of an underclass, to judge from the poverty statistics, and a good many of its members participated in the biggest night of rioting, thus compromising the clear-cut political form that events would otherwise have had. Moreover, in these three small cities, there is not the diversity of social types that is found in most large cities. Consequently, the riots in the large cities, Cincinnati, Newark, and Detroit were "messier" and more

complex than those in the three New Jersey towns.

As observed, political riots are more likely to take place in cities which have an established Negro middle class and in areas which are relatively stable and moderately well-off, e.g. solid working class and above. They are also more likely to take place in areas where most of the Negro residents were either born or raised in the North. These "Northerners" have been quicker than their Southern counterparts to reject the old attitudes of subservience and racial inferiority. In three of the four cities which had disturbances with some political content -- Atlanta, Dayton, and New Haven -- an interesting pattern of development is evident. Atlanta's first and second disturbances, in the summer of 1966, took place in two of the poorest and least stable Negro neighborhoods in the city -- Summerhill and Boulevard. In the summer of 1967, the site of the disturbance moved to the Dixie Hills area, which is more stable and less impoverished than either Summerhill or Boulevard. And this fall another disturbance occurred, this time in the Vine City area, a stable and moderately well-to-do section. In Dayton, participation in the three disturbances since the summer, 1966 has moved away from involvement by a small

disorganized bar room crowd toward activity by Negro youth, who are becoming increasingly political. In New Haven, even throughout the course of one disturbance, the trouble starting in the poorest and least stable Negro section of town -- (the Hill area) -- spread to other more established Negro neighborhoods. Common to all three of these cases is a movement upward in the socio-economic position of the participants, suggesting that the political component in each may be increasing.

Nonpolitical disturbances usually take place in ghettoes or ghetto areas that are poor, unstable, and Southern in composition. They are new ghettoes, which sprang up largely after the Second Work War. The Negro population of Milwaukee, to cite one case, has increased ten-fold since 1940. Migrants to the new ghettoes move into areas in which there are few established patterns for daily urban life. The first migrants find few, if any, kinfolk to help them along. Under these circumstances, Negro communities are slow to develop, and the ghettoes in question become repositories for the dislocated and disenfranchized. Militancy and race pride, like community, are slow to develop; apathy and resignation are prevalent. Many Negro residents in these areas lack the perspective necessary for political consciousness. Consequently the uprisings which take place there, while a gut reaction to perceived and real injustices, are likely to be expressive outbursts with a large admixture of opportunism. They have a minimum of common solidarity and deliberateness and are likely to spend themselves in a short time.

The position of a city's most powerful groups on race issues appears to be a significant determinant of the character of ghetto violence. Table II correlates the racial stance of the elites -- i.e. their willingness to accommodate racial change -- with the degree of intensity and political content

TABLE II

Racial Stances of Elites Correlated with
Intensity and Political Content of Disturbances

Liberal		Moderate		Conservative	
* Detroit	high intensity high intensity	* Cincinnati	high intensity high political	o Jersey City	low intensity low political
+ N. Bruns.	low intensity high political	* Newark	high intensity high political	o Bridgeton N.J.	low intensity low political
New Haven	middle intensity middle political	* Plainfield	high intensity high political	o Cambridge	low intensity low political
o Paterson	low intensity low political	+ Engelwood	low intensity high political	o Rockford	low intensity low political
		o Elizabeth	low intensity low political	Tampa	middle intensity middle political
		Atlanta I, II	middle intensity low political	Milwaukee	middle intensity
		Atlanta III	low intensity middle political		low political
		Dayton I	middle intensity low political		
		Dayton II, III	low intensity middle political		

Some combinations:
* High intensity - high political
o Low intensity - low political
+ Low intensity - high political

See footnote 2/ on next page.

in different disorders.

The major point to emerge from this categorization is that the racially conservatives cities have had a disproportionate number of low-level disturbances, and none that are either very intense or highly political. Moderate cities, on the other hand, have had a disproportionate number of high-intensity, highly political disturbances. The implication is that the consistent repressiveness of the conservative cities inhibits ghetto violence, whereas the middling position of the moderate cities permits it.

Part of the problem is that moderation in cities doesn't always signify the presence of a consistent position on racial matters. Often it is the product of a jumble of contradictory tendencies which emerge in different ways and at different times, conveying the impression that local government is erratic and unstable. Newark's mayor after being elected with substantial Negro support, began shifting his political base to the Italian minority of which he is a member. Newark's police department is reactionary and racist, the city's poverty program progressive and liberal. Cincinnati's business elite is paternalistic, its police

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[2](Phoenix, Tuscon, and Grand Rapids have not been included in the table because they seem to have no clear cut racial position vis-a-vis Negroes. Tuscon and Phoenix have small Negro populations and in-migration has not been rapid. Phoenix has a conservative elite; Tuscon seems to be more pluralistic. Grand Rapids has not experienced much in-migration, and information on its elite is lacking.)

department fairly liberal. In a recent referendum (1959) Cincinnatians voted to establish at-large elections, the net effect of which was to decrease the number of Negro representatives in local government. Atlanta's liberal-progressive facade covers a massive edifice of segregation; one might say that Atlanta is Birmingham with its clothes on.

Negro expectations, of course, are likely to be higher in a moderate or liberal city than in a conservative one, and Negroes are more likely to be represented in local government. The significance of the latter for ghetto violence is that it combines an illusion of progress but with few tangible gains. It's the same old story: Negro demands, promises of action by white authorities, no action.[3]

While erratic racial policies and the illusion of progress may encourage ghetto violence, it is not safe to infer that the institution of consistent repressive policies is a useful or permanent antidote to riots. The Negro populations in the conservative cities are for the most part disorganized and apathetic; they have been slow to develop race consciousness and militancy. But in the ghettoes of cities such as Newark and Detroit militancy is widespread and

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[3]Survey interviews in Detroit indicate that rioters consider broken promises the biggest cause of their disaffection with the political system.

intense. Political reverses in Cincinnati and Newark were among the causes of the riots there; repression on a day to day basis could easily lead to retaliatory black terrorism.

Up till now, white retaliation in the riots has for the most part been the province of the police, but already there are forebodings that white citizens -- particularly blue collar workers of ethnic origins -- will again begin to play a collective role in the violence as they did in East St. Louis (1917), Chicago (1919) and Detroit (1943). (See page 91). In face of this possibility, a civic-minded business elite, such as in Dayton or Cincinnati can be an important force for moderation in the positive sense of the term.

Newark, Jersey City, and Milwaukee are the three large cities in this study most seriously polarized along racial lines, and all three have sizeable blue-collar and ethnic populations. Jersey City and Newark have no substantial middle class of either race. Milwaukee's business men still exercise considerable influence in politics, but less so than in the past, and the political importance of the ethnic bloc is growing.

THOSE CAUGHT UP IN THE RIOTS: WHO THEY WERE AND WHAT THEY DID

Different Roles in a Civil Disturbance

In the popular view, a riot is considered a senseless expression of irrational, animalistic drives. Under the influence of alcohol and/or a powerful agitator criminals, people from broken homes, "riff-raff," and outsiders or recently arrived rural peasants are thought to lose all self-control and to go on a nihilistic rampage of lawlessness and destruction, while personally aggrandizing themselves through looting. The crowd is seen to be of a like mind, each member in it behaving in essentially the same way. And it is often argued that active rioters constitute a tiny group of people completely unrepresentative of Negroes in America the overwhelming majority of whom strongly disapprove of the riots.

A close examination of riot activity in twenty cities and surveys done after the disturbances in Watts, Detroit, and Milwaukee suggest that these popular images widely miss the mark as descriptions of the characteristics and behavior of people caught up in a disturbance. Behavior in a riot is complex and patterned. The characteristics of those involved do not correspond to the popular image. There is variation both between cities and within cities with respect to the kinds of behavior displayed and the

characteristics of those participating. Furthermore, in any one city, as a riot progresses, changes over time in activity and the character of participants may often be noted.

In several important respects, a riot is no different from any other kind of collective action. Social roles and patterned interactions are evident.[1] People with certain characteristics and attitudes seem more likely to play certain roles than others. To those acting out roles, their behavior makes good sense; rational motives emerge (or are already present) to explain their behavior. Participants in a riot develop sets of mutual expectations on the basis of which they respond to each others' behavior. The course and development of a riot is very much dependent on this interaction.[2]

Among the most important roles that may be identified in a riot are those of rioters, counter-rioters, the

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[1] The appearance of those exploiting the temporary breakdown of controls for economic gain, i.e., looters, occurs in disasters such as floods, tornadoes, wartime; and the tactics employed to prevent or curb such behavior are quite similar to those adopted during riots.

[2] In the case of what we have called media or contagion disturbances, this focus on roles is especially important. Here, both potentially active rioters and the police "expect" a riot, and re-enact conventional riot roles communicated through the media.

uninvolved, and the formal agents of social control.[3] These larger groupings may be further broken down into a number of more specific roles. For example, the uninvolved, by far the largest group, include those who leave the area altogether; those who remain in their homes; and those who are on the street as spectators, but do not loot, burn, or snipe. Among active rioters we can distinguish breakers, looters, arsonists, and those attacking social control agents. Sometimes one can distinguish agitators or symbolic leaders, and where the riot is of a political nature, negotiators.

There are three available sources of information on the basis of which estimates of participation in a disturbance can be made: eyewitness accounts, arrest lists, and social science surveys. Each provides an approximation of who the participants were and what they did. Eyewitnesses, whether they be police officers, news reporters, rioters, or spectators provide reports of only a fraction of what occurred, that part of the action which was directly observed. No one person was able to be in the midst of the dozens of groups or crowds on the street at one time. In addition

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[3] Because the agents of social control are treated elsewhere in the analysis, they will not be considered here. These role characterizations refer to types of behavior not to persons. Just as we find some of the same people moving from the role of active rioter to that of active counter-rioter, so we find isolated instances of people moving from the role of policeman to that of looter and arsonist.

eyewitnesses tend to misjudge the characteristics of participants they see; for example, Negro youths in the streets are often presumed to be drop-outs, delinquents, unemployed. Arrest lists have built-in biases too. The initiators, the cutting edge of the disturbance, are often the fleetest of foot and may never get caught; while many of the uninvolved -- onlookers, curiosity seekers, alcoholics, fugitives from justice, even motorists -- may be swept from the streets once police are able to re-assert control over an area and enforce curfew edicts. Nevertheless, arrest data do provide a sample of who was on the street at a given time. Such information, however, is treated with caution in the discussion below. Finally, the interview surveys of samples chosen from the population at large furnish the best available and most complete data on participation. These too are subject to certain technical limitations, especially since we have surveys from only two cities in which major disorders occurred and not from the many disturbances of lesser magnitude. From all three sources, it has been possible to piece together a composite picture of the various types of participants.

Are They All Negro?

A common belief is that in the recent disturbances, those rioting were Negroes, while those trying to stop the rioting were whites.

This is by no means an iron-bound rule. Many Negroes were active in counter-riot roles, appalled by the destruction and fearful for their own lives and property. At the same time, in various cities throughout the United States whites, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Indians were involved and were arrested for riot connected offenses. In Detroit alone more than 800 whites were arrested. During the Grand Rapids disturbance 30 per cent of those arrested were white. Almost one-quarter of those arrested in New Haven were white, while about ten per cent were Puerto Rican.

At the same time, it should not be assumed that most of the whites and others were rioting together with Negroes, though this, too, has happened in more instances than is generally recognized. There was some cooperative looting among whites and Negroes in Detroit, and in New Haven a sizable number of Puerto Ricans and whites were involved in crowd activities with Negroes. For the most part, though, riot-related arrests of whites were made for looting outside the riot area, riding through the area armed, refusing to recognize a police perimeter, shooting at Negroes, etc. Sometimes white civil rights activists were also caught up in the net of arrests which represented a police crackdown on all persons in the streets.

Often whites arrested in the vicinity of the riot area were anti-Negro and came looking for trouble. This seemed to be particularly true of some young whites from lower status backgrounds, with an image of themselves as self-appointed defenders of the white race.

In adopting vigilante roles, they provoked and attempted to retaliate against Negroes. In New Haven, at least two carloads of armed whites were caught in the curfew net. A carload of whites in Plainfield was picked up, and it was discovered that they had one of the 46 carbines stolen from a local manufacturer, together with expended cartridges. This sort of night riding is fairly common in the larger riots. There were also reports in Plainfield, Dayton, and Cincinnati of white toughs gathering at the perimeters of the riot areas.

Among the total group arrested in Detroit, only 13 per cent were white. However, this group accounted for 35 per cent of the assault and battery charges, 31 per cent of the concealed weapons charges, 27 per cent of the arson charges, and 26 per cent of the felonious assault charges. In New Haven 53 per cent of the weapons charges and 25 per cent of the assault charges were filed against whites. It is evident from these figures that the whites

arrested were considerably more intent on inflicting bodily harm than were Negroes. These data fit a more general pattern which makes it clear that the hostility of Negro participants is directed more at white authority and property than at white people per se.

Rioters, Counter-Rioters, Spectators, and the Uninvolved: How Many Were There?

It has repeatedly been asserted that only a fraction of the Negro community in cities experiencing large disturbances participated in the rioting. For example, the McCone Commission estimated that only two per cent of the Negroes in south-central Los Angeles participated in the Watts riot.[4] Our best estimates of the extent of participation come from the sample surveys, and these clearly disprove the assertion that only a small minority was involved.[5]

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[4] Violence in the City, McCone Report.

[5] Survey data underlying several of the conclusions reached in this section are based on structured interviews with probability samples drawn from Detroit and Los Angeles Negro populations, as well as interviews in Milwaukee. The Detroit study was carried out by Professor Nathan Caplan, University of Michigan, under contract to the NACCD. Professor Caplan's Negro interviewers were in the field literally before the ashes cooled. Findings are based on responses of a representative sample of Negroes living in the riot-affected areas. The Los Angeles (Watts) data come from an unpublished analysis of Riot Participation by David O. Sears and John B. McConahay of Harvard and the University of Indiana. It is based on data collected in the Los Angeles Riot Study in November of 1965, a study conducted by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of UCLA, coordinated by Professor Nathan E. Cohen.

In Los Angeles 15 per cent of the adult Negroes (over age 15) were estimated to have been active in the riot, and in Detroit 11 per cent were found to be active. The fact is that participation has been very widespread, reaching, for example, an estimated 30,000 persons in the Watts riot and 60,000 in Detroit. Others, though, helped to clean up the mess, and salvage what could be saved from the destruction (e.g., giving coffee to the soldiers, helping those who had been burned out of their homes, helping put out fires or call the fire department, etc.). In Detroit about 15 per cent said they had acted in this way, while in Milwaukee, 13 per cent said they had. Hence, though only a small minority (three per cent in Milwaukee and five per cent in Detroit) physically tried to interfere with the rioters, a substantial number did try to soften the riot's effects.

Therefore, in Detroit, at least, Negroes engaged in counter-riot activity were about equal to the number involved in destructive rioting.

In all of the 20 cities that had disturbances of any size, some Negroes played prominent counter-riot roles. These varied from leaders actively trying to clear the streets with bullhorns to people protecting firemen, to

serving coffee to control personnel, to simply phoning in reports of riot behavior. Anti-poverty workers, ministers, and Negro-elected officials seemed to predominate among those playing the most active counter-riot roles. Although in at least six of the cities analyzed, young men from the streets were reported effective as counter-riot forces.[6]

Counter-riot activities are relatively better documented in Detroit than in the other cities investigated. By 9:00 A.M. Sunday (very early in the riot) at least 30 people from the Human Relations Division were on the street trying to quell rumors. In one area members of a block club armed themselves to protect fire fighters.

An excellent example of counter-riot activity may be seen in the case of a liquor store owner who had given uniforms and a meeting room to a group of juveniles. During the disorder these young men sat in front of his property and protected it from would-be looters and arsonists.

The Detroit fire chief reported that his men had been harassed in their work on major commercial streets, but in residential areas they received a great deal of popular support. People who were helping the firemen were more likely to be older and homeowners.

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[6] Dayton, Tampa, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Plainfield, and Englewood.

Family ties no doubt led many parents to exercise counter-riot control over their children. In one city (Cincinnati) many Negro youths were not present at high school graduation exercises because their parents forbade them to leave the house during the disturbance.

An example of how neighborhood ties may stimulate counter-riot activity can be seen in the case of a Negro woman who saw two boys wheeling a rack of clothes out of a cleaning establishment and recognized her own dresses. The boys were persuaded to put the clothes back.

Significant anti-riot activity came from Negroes involved in the poverty program and similar neighborhood programs. In many cities there were reports of anti-poverty officials trying to cool things. In spite of these reports, some have accused poverty workers of playing the part of agitators in fueling the disturbances. Yet a survey of 32 cities that saw disturbances last summer reveals that out of 30,565 employees of directly funded OEO activities, only 15 persons were arrested, and four of these had been convicted as of November.[7]

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[7] OEO Report on 32 cities which had experienced disturbances in the summer of 1967.

In Detroit 15 out of approximately 1,500 youths involved in a Neighborhood Youth Corps summer-job-program and three out of 300 youths involved in a job upgrading program were arrested.[8]

While a sizeable minority were involved as rioters or counter-rioters, the majority were uninvolved. In Detroit this constituted 63 per cent of the Negro adults, and in Milwaukee, 75 per cent. These persons must not be thought to have been hostile or even indifferent to the rioting. Most of them readily report having watched criminal activity take place. In Watts, for example, 54 per cent of the respondents, rioters and spectators alike, reported having personally witnessed stores being looted. And among those who viewed much criminal activity (e.g., for the most part looting and burning of stores) but did not actually participate in the riot, only a minority reported being out of sympathy with the rioters. So the non-participating spectators tended to support and encourage the rioters, rather than oppose them.

Who Were They?

A variety of stereotyped views of the rioters have been common in the press, official reports, and lay opinion. Let us consider the most outstanding of these in turn:

1. The poverty hypothesis. Perhaps the most common view had been that the rioters were mainly the poor, uneducated,

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[8] A Department of Labor study of a sample of 500 Detroit riot arrestees revealed that 81 or 17 per cent had at one time or another participated in a Federal training or poverty program.

deprived, and so on. Supposedly, they had nothing to lose by the destruction, and rioting represented just another aspect of their generally anti-social attitudes. On this point the evidence from our surveys is very strong and unequivocal in its message. Those who participated in the riots for which we have relevant data, were just as likely to be well-educated, employed, of substantial income, of white collar occupational status, as those who did not riot. In both Detroit and Los Angeles, income level, educational background, employment status, parental education, and self-defined social class were as high as among those who had not been involved in the rioting. Even more people with relatively high educational status (e.g., some college) were found among those who rioted as among those who did not.

One version of the "riff-raff" theory holds that an "underclass" of Negro poor exists, and that its members are most discontent, disorganized, and prone to violence. Certainly many Negroes live in unconscienceable squalor and poverty, but poverty alone is not a sufficient explanation for all riot participation. Proportionally, such people were no more active in the rioting than those who were better off; in fact, if anything, the poorest Negroes tend to have been the <u>least</u> active in the rioting (though this is largely explained by the fact that the least educated, lowest income Negroes tend often to be elderly, and for that reason less likely to be caught up in the action).

The finding that reported participation is unrelated to economic status should not be interpreted as meaning that economic discontents do not contribute to riots. On the contrary, as will be indicated below, a sense of relative economic deprivation is extremely important. The implication, rather, is that poverty alone is not sufficient to explain riot behavior.

While rioters did not differ from the uninvolved in economic or status terms in either Detroit or Los Angeles, the counter-rioters in Detroit were marked by their higher social status. Among males, for example, almost half the counter-rioters had incomes over $10,000 per year, while only one-fifth of the rioters did. Evidently a financial stake in society promotes action on behalf of its preservation.

2. The migration hypothesis. Another common notion has been that the rioters were predominately those who were among the most recent migrants to northern and western industrial cities from rural southern background. Presumably these persons would be the least equipped to move into a satisfying and productive life because of inadequate education, irrelevant work experience, and so on. This hypothesis is not borne out by the data available.

Those most active in the Detroit and Los Angeles rioting had been native-born in those areas. Among the migrants to

Los Angeles, those who had arrived in childhood were the most likely to riot (although no such difference appeared in Detroit); and those who were most active had arrived in the period 1946-1960, rather than the most recent migrants. It should be noted that the differences in this respect are very strong and very striking; for example, of young Negro rioters in Detroit, 95 per cent had grown up in Detroit, while only 27 per cent of the uninvolved had grown up in that city.[9]

Counter-rioters in Detroit, too, were also most likely to be raised in the North. Evidently the impact of growing up as a southern Negro too often creates a resigned, passive, withdrawing individual who takes no part at all in events that affect the community.

3. Negro family structure. The Moynihan Report popularized the notion that a major part of the Negroes' problem stems from fragmented family relations. Specifically, the common (relative to whites) pattern of a mother's serving as the head of a household, with no adult male permanently present, is supposed to lead to children who are unable to meet the

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[9]Over 80 per cent of a Detroit arrestee sample studied by the Department of Labor had lived in Detroit over five years. Of the young men (15-24 years) arrested in the two Atlanta disturbances, 64 per cent were born in Georgia cities, as opposed to 36 per cent who migrated from rural Georgia to Atlanta. In New Haven, of those aged 14-25 years old arrested, only seven per cent were southern-born Negroes and four per cent born in Puerto Rico.

demands of urban life. Such family patterns may have negative effects, but riot participation is evidently not among them. In Los Angeles people raised in mother-only households were no more active in the rioting than those raised in father-mother, or father-only households. Data on family structure are not as yet available for the Detroit sample.

4. Youth. Participation in the riot was very clearly the province of youth, though by no means exclusively so. In the Los Angeles survey, 68 per cent of the active rioters were age 29 and below (though only 36 per cent of the adult population was that young); and in Detroit, 60 per cent of the active rioters were aged 24 or less. Note that in both cases, no one under the age of 15 was interviewed, so it is likely that those figures are somewhat of an underestimate of youth participation. Arrest data also support the prominent role of the young. In the 1966 Atlanta disturbance, 61 per cent arrested were under 25; 50 per cent in the 1967 disturbance; and for New Haven, 55 per cent were under age 26.[10]

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[10] In Detroit 59 per cent of all Negro male arrestees were under the age of 25; in the 1966 Atlanta disturbance 61 per cent were under 25 (50 per cent in the 1967 disturbance); in New Haven 55 per cent were under 26; and for four New Jersey towns (Elizabeth, Paterson, New Brunswick, Englewood) those under 25 constituted 83 per cent of all arrested; and in Plainfield, where there was extensive looting, 47 per cent were below the age of 25.

5. Sex. Traditionally men have taken the most active part in riots. This was true in both Watts and Detroit. However, differences between the two cities were not as striking as might be thought. In Los Angeles 62 per cent of the active rioters were men, while in Detroit, 63 per cent were men. Arrest data suggests an even more prominent role for men. For example, in New Haven 96 per cent of arrestees were male; in the 1966 Atlanta disorder 94 per cent of Negroes arrested were male. In Los Angeles young women tended more often than men to be spectators; however, both in Detroit and Los Angeles, those who were completely uninvolved, staying home and seeing nothing of what happened, tended to be the older residents, particularly the older women. Counter-rioters in Detroit tended also to be women more often than men but were distributed throughout the entire age range (and being younger, in general, than those who were not involved at all in the rioting).

In the two major cities considered, therefore, riot behavior is not unique to the poor Negro; it is engaged in by Negroes of all economic levels in roughly the same proportion. It is not restricted to the recently urbanized Negro; rather, it seems to be most common among those who have grown up in northern urban settings. Rioting is not unique to the Negro who comes from a broken family situation but occurs about

equally with all kinds of family backgrounds. And it is most common among the young, especially young men.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the riots in Los Angeles and Detroit cannot be taken as representative of all the civil disturbances that have occurred since 1964. As has been pointed out, the character of the different disturbances has varied widely, and available evidence indicates that the participants differed too. In San Francisco, 1966, more than two-thirds of the adults arrested for offenses related to the riot were under the age of 25; whereas in Los Angeles, two-thirds of the adults arrested in the Watts riot were over 25.

Unlike the riots in Detroit and Los Angeles, the disturbance in Dayton, 1966, drew most of its participants from the lowest social and economic strata. Half of those arrested for riot-connected offenses had previous felony convictions, and over two-thirds of them were arrested for drunkenness, a fact which checks with almost every available eyewitness report. The riot in Buffalo, to the extent that we can judge from arrest statistics, also drew predominantly from the underclass. Forty-two per cent of those arrested for offenses related to the disturbance were unemployed.

Discontents of Riot Participants

Paramount among the expressed reasons for discontent among the participants in the two cities studied are economic problems. In Detroit rioters were more antagonistic toward almost all varieties of local business than were non-rioters. Likewise, in Los Angeles rioters expressed much more "consumer discontent" than did non-rioters, in terms of feeling overcharged, receiving goods of mediocre quality, having problems with credit and cashing checks. The centrality of economic problems is also suggested by the fact that rioters in Detroit were more likely than non-rioters to attribute the riot to economic causes.

The second area of discontent that is closely related to riot activity is hostility toward various aspects of local government.

1. Police malpractice. The clearest anger is directed toward the police. In Detroit over half the respondents cited police "brutality" as a major cause of the riot, and it was the most widely cited cause. In Los Angeles, too, police malpractice was the grievance most widely aired and was considerably more common among rioters than among non-rioters.

2. Disappointment with local white politicians. In both Los Angeles and Detroit general distrust of political officials was much higher among the rioters than among the non-rioters. Those who said they distrusted elected officials were three times as likely to be active in the Watts riot as those who said they trusted such officials.

The precise focus of this discontent should be emphasized. It is true that general expressions of distrust were more common among the rioters than non-rioters (and considerably more common among Los Angeles Negroes than Los Angeles whites). But distrust was keenest with regard to local officials and agencies. Los Angeles rioters were especially antagonistic toward the mayor, the police chief, and toward local service agencies, such as the State Employment Bureau, the Aid to Dependent Children Program, and the Bureau of Public Assistance. Moreover, they were especially likely to feel that racial discrimination was common with respect to schools, welfare administration, the fire department, and so on. And they were especially likely to feel that the local newspapers did not cover Negro news fairly.

In contrast, rioters and non-rioters in Los Angeles had equally highly favorable opinions toward the Federal government, the President, Congress, the Democratic party, the Governor, and so on. Both rioters and non-rioters had highly optimistic expectations about the fledgling federal anti-poverty program. So in Los Angeles, at least, the contribution of political disenchantment seemed to be specific to local officials and agencies.

Moreover, it appeared to be specific to white politics. And the critical feeling appeared to be that the white political

structure was unresponsive to Negro needs. This is consistent with the problem of political access discussed earlier.

Racial Attitudes

To what extent are the riots simply an expression of anti-white hostility? This is not the same question as asking whether or not they are an outcome of "black consciousness," or more positive identification with being black. It is possible that heightened black consciousness can only come at the expense of favorable attitudes toward whites, but it is also possible that the two can exist quite compatibly side by side.

1. Anti-white attitudes. The data on this point are not very clear. In Los Angeles and Detroit alone, most Negroes did not express strongly anti-white attitudes. However, riot participation was generally higher among those rejecting whites. In Los Angeles respondents who said they did not trust whites, or who felt some distaste at the idea of going to a mainly-white party, or the idea of someone within their families marrying a white person tended to be more active in the riot. In Detroit those who felt that civil rights groups would do better without whites were likewise somewhat more active in the riot.

2. Black consciousness. In Detroit rioters were much more favorable to being black than were non-rioters. One

striking example is that 54 per cent of the rioters thought Negroes were smarter than whites, whereas only 26 per cent of those not involved in the riot took this view. This same kind of difference resulted from a variety of questions about stereotypes, e.g., who behaves better, who is braver, more dependable, etc. In Los Angeles those who have pro-black answers to the question, "What do Negroes have that whites don't?" tended to be more active than those who gave anti-black answers.

These findings suggest that the rioting may have changed some Negroes' attitudes toward their race for the better. For others, anti-white and pro-black attitudes perhaps contributed to their activity.

3. Nationalism and the conspiracy theory. One common view, at least among whites and officials, is that the riots come from a conspiracy by outside agitators, Communists, or black nationalists. Few respondents from the two surveys take this view.

First of all, only a rare respondent mentions this as a cause of the riots. In Los Angeles only two per cent gave any political answer at all (e.g., Muslims, Communists) to the question, "Who supported the riot?" About a quarter of the Detroit sample thought that black nationalism had "a great deal to do with causing the riots." In interviews with over 500

riot arrestees in Detroit, less than three per cent attributed the riot to "outside agitators."[11]

Second, only a minority appears to be sympathetic to black nationalism, at least in its more organized and formal forms. Attitudes toward such groups (e.g., toward the Muslims) tend to be related to activity in the riot, though. That is, those who are most favorable to the Muslims are also most active in the riot. About a third of the Detroit arrestee sample preferred black power leaders, though a half viewed Martin Luther King as their favorite spokesman. It is very doubtful that membership in a black power organization accounts for this relationship; rather, it seems most likely to be a case of the general positive relationship between black consciousness and riot participation.

Finally, it should be clear that the findings in these studies of the cities where the two largest riots occurred, 1965 Watts riot and the 1967 Detroit riot, yield findings that are almost identical in detail as well as in principle. This occurs despite the vast differences between the cities and the considerable difference in time. Such agreement in the relationship of social background and attitudes about riot participation makes it unlikely that factors, such as conspiracies

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[11]"A Profile of 500 Negro Males Arrested in the Detroit Riot," U. S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, August 1967.

unique to each city, were able to exercise a widespread or decisive influence over exactly who participated in the riot.

Riot Participants and How They View the Riots

Three views about the general Negro community's opinions of the riots have been common among officials and whites: (1) only a small minority of the community approves of the rioting, whereas the vast majority condemns it as a lawless outrage; (2) the community views the rioting as sure to lead to disastrous effects, especially in terms of ruining all that the Negro has painfully accumulated and progressed, especially in terms of potentially lost white good will; (3) the community interprets the rioting as random criminality, with no purpose, and without any significance in the Negro's fight for equality. The data indicate that each of these stereotypes is mistaken.

Twenty-four per cent in the Detroit and 27 per cent in the Los Angeles sample saw something to gain from the riots. About 50 per cent in both cities was unfavorable.

Two general views of riot effects appear to be prevalent. In retrospect, Los Angeles respondents viewed the effects of the Watts riot with some optimism. For example, 38 per cent thought the riot would help the Negroes' cause, and 24 per cent thought it would hurt. This optimism was particularly marked in terms of the expected effect upon white opinion.

Only eight per cent in Detroit and 12 per cent in Watts expected the riot to make whites less sympathetic to the problems of the ghetto Negro. Despite prevalent reports of a white backlash after the Watts riot, Los Angeles whites surveyed did not react in a totally negative manner. Seventy-nine per cent of the sample expected more white awareness of Negro problems.

However; Negroes generally do not think that riots or violence are productive strategies. Only three per cent in the Los Angeles sample recommended violence was what "Negroes must do to get what they want." The twenty-four per cent of the Detroit Negro sample who saw more to gain than lose by violence still represents a minority opinion.

The general consensus does appear to be that riots will recur, however. In Detroit, a few days after the riot, eighty-four per cent said they thought it would happen again. In Watts, two months after that riot, 34 per cent said they thought it would, and only 27 per cent thought it would not.

Finally, the survey data reveal a general feeling that the riots represented meaningful protests against injustice. For example, in Los Angeles 62 per cent agreed that it was a "Negro protest." And according to 64 per cent of the Negroes, the targets "deserved attack." The political tone of a number of the 1967 disturbances, and the fact that some of them

developed in response to specific abuses, confirms this notion. Even some non-leadership segments of Los Angeles white society rejected the notion that riots are simply random, repulsive and criminal outbreaks. Fifty-four per cent of these saw the Watts riot as a directed protest.

The main purpose of the riot, according to the Los Angeles ghetto, was to call attention to Negro problems. Less commonly, the purpose was cited as being a simple expression of hostility (e.g., revenge), or a way of improving conditions.

Summary

The general picture of the rioter which emerges from the Detroit analysis is that of a young, northern-born male, who is extremely dissatisfied with his current economic situation, particularly when he compares it to that of whites. The rioters are extremely high on group pride or black consciousness and have thoroughly rejected the old stereotypes of Negro inferiority. They are extremely discontent with the existing political structure and with the nation as a whole and are in fact unwilling to fight for it even in a world war. They see the causes of the riot in the depressed economic conditions of the Negro and the failure of the political system to do anything about it. Arrest and eyewitness accounts suggest that

these youths were the most active participants in the other 19 cities, as well.

The counter-rioters are the most economically successful of the three groups, and it is clear that they aspire to if not already belong to the middle class. They are well-satisfied with their own economic situation and since they believe their own success was the result of hard work, do not see the economic situation of other Negroes as a major source of discontent. They are more dissatisfied with white political structure and with white attitudes toward Negro rights than the non-involved, but they are even more highly committed to defending the existing system. They are most likely to view the riot as the acts of deviants who are threatening their hard-earned status or property. They are highly committed to traditional Negro leadership and extremely low on black consciousness. Again data derived from the Commission's studies are consistent with this finding.

The non-involved who are similar to the rioters on objective indices of social class and economic situation differ in that they are older, generally southern-born and much more willing to accept the economic situation of the Negro without complaint. Despite their poverty relative to whites, they see Detroit as a better place to live than other northern cities and believe that Negroes are as happy as whites. They are optimistic about the future of rights for Negroes and

consequently seem little inclined to do anything which will effect that future. They do not see the economic or political systems as major sources of discontent and certainly not as major causes of the riot. They prefer to view the riot as a result of the acts of isolated individuals, young toughs. These people seem to have continued the passive acceptance of Negro inferiority which existed under slavery and segregation in the South.

Though the Los Angeles data are not categorized in terms of rioters, counter-rioters, and the uninvolved, the picture that emerges there resembles that in Detroit in most respects. Participants in Los Angeles were somewhat older than those in Detroit, but otherwise the rioters in both cities were fairly representative of the larger Negro population in terms of employment, income, urbanization, and family background. Los Angeles and Detroit, together with Newark, are the cities which most clearly have experienced general ghetto upheavals, and as the violence proliferates from one year to the next, there is no reason to think that the future will prove them a-typical.

URBAN VIOLENCE: AFTERMATH

The seriousness and extraordinary nature of the events occurring during a time of civil disorder fosters a tendency to see these events as if they had no antecedents and no consequences.

While such a view is useful in dealing with certain questions, it obscures the social process aspects of urban violence. From this latter point of view, the violent acts of small groups or individuals are part of the collective process. Regardless of whether this disorder is random or purposive, organized or isolated, collective participation in disorder has profound consequences for the community. And how the community responds to disorder in its midst has a bearing on whether future violence is likely to occur.

Civil disorder has both short- and long-run consequences which affect the community as a whole, as well as various sub-groups within it. The present discussion will focus only on short-run consequences at the local level.

Two Views of Post-Riot Events

There are two dominant conventional views as to the likely consequences of civil disorder.

The Negative View: No One Wins and Negroes Lose

The negative view argues that no one wins in a riot and that Negroes will lose more than others. Most people killed

and injured are black, and black homes and neighborhoods are destroyed. Jobs are lost and there is a decline in consumer services, as fearful white businessmen refuse to return to the ghetto and new Negro businesses fail to fill the void.

In addition, urban violence is seen to result in a polarization along racial lines with both the black and white backlash.[1] Ill-will and hatred build up. The racial mask obscures issues and persons; race becomes the salient fact of social life. Effective communication and cooperation across racial lines to improve social conditions comes to a halt.

Fear and misconceptions on both sides abound. Negro anger is increased by the actions of the agents of social control during the disturbance. Many even fear genocide or massive retaliation by whites. Whites fear Negro incursions into suburbia and demand the guilty be punished. Cries for retribution emerge from both sides. Negroes and whites, partly in the name of self-defense, increasingly arm themselves. Violence triggers more violence. Negroes become sophisticated in the use of violence and the police become more repressive. Future violence is likely not only to involve Negroes against the police, but Negro and white civilians.

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[1]The Gallup Poll reports that the proportion of whites agreeing that the Johnson administration is pushing integration too fast increased steadily from the February (1964) figure of 30 per cent to 40 per cent in August (1965) to 50 per cent in September (1966). This is particularly striking in view of the increase in de facto segregation during that period.

On the part of whites, suppression of violence becomes the over-riding concern; while concern with black grievances diminishes or disappears altogether. Even if communication is not completely broken and some of those with power are willing to initiate change, they refrain from doing so for fear of rewarding the rioters. The moral nature of society's concern with civil rights shifts. The aggrieved party is now the dominant majority. A reign of white and black terror is made more likely, perhaps an Armageddon is seen to loom on the horizon, with the victory (or at least lesser defeat) going to the dominant group as a result of its superior technology.

The perspective just described reflects one aspect of conventional wisdom regarding the social consequences of violence. Here constructive change is thought to emerge only out of playing the game according to the rules. Violence not only fails to bring about constructive change, it leads to a worsening of conditions or total racial convulsions. The race is to the swift, and the spoils are to those who don't illegally rock the boat.

Some Positive Views

Another perspective of conventional wisdom, while not necessarily sanctioning violence, holds that under certain conditions, violence may have positive consequences, especially

for improving communications between the contesting groups and for the establishment of a climate in which bargaining can more readily take place.

Violence as warning system. It has been suggested that the violence serves as a warning system, much like the cries of a sick man calling for help. Collective acts of civil disorder are seen to have a vital communications function, shaking society and its leaders into an awareness of the actual conditions under which black people live[2] which drives some blacks to revolt. Thus, new channels of communication are developed and increased efforts to solve social problems emerge.

Violence as political struggle. Another view which emphasizes positive consequences sees riots as essentially political events. This view, which plays down the communications functions of riots ("whites knew all along how bad things were") sees violence as offering a kind of power to otherwise powerless people.

While poor blacks don't have many votes, much money, or extensive political skills, they do have the power to disrupt society. Violence is seen as giving them a weapon which, once used, is more powerful as a threat than in its

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[2]Seventy-nine per cent of Los Angeles whites report being more aware of the problems of Negroes following the Watts riot. R. Morris and V. Jeffries, "The White Reaction Study," UCLA.

actual use. Thus it is suggested that riots, in making this kind of power manifest, are useful in bringing about change. Here, coercion by blacks and the fear of future uprisings forces action out of those not otherwise inclined to deal with social problems.[3] This view holds that even if violence is spontaneous and not subject to manipulation, it may still have this function of stimulating social change.

To summarize the views of conventional wisdom: People have agreed that (a) urban violence will not help bring about constructive social change but will lead to a worsening of the Negroes' situation, to racial polarization, and possibly to a race war; (b) urban violence will help bring about constructive change by alerting society to the magnitude of the racial problems and by the bargaining power which blacks gain from threats of future violence.

Post-Riot Conditions in the Cities Analyzed: A Mixed Picture

When we test these two general, abstract views of the consequences of riots against the actual short-run consequences of civil disorder in 20 cities, neither one holds up well as

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[3]This is a kind of political power fraught with danger for all sides. To the extent that it is successful, and in the absence of alternatives, the threat of violence and a little violence once in awhile tends to become institutionalized as a way of affecting social change, and orderly group life becomes increasingly more difficult. To the extent that these tactics are not effective, and in the absence of alternatives, a violence born of despair and frustration, and less subject to control, may emerge. In both cases society is the loser.

a generalization. The short-run consequences of violence for the cities analyzed have been highly varied.[4] Some cities experienced a dramatically heightened polarization, some did not; some experienced improved communications and instituted massive remedial programs, some did not. The point here is that there was neither an across-the-board heightening of polarization and backlash nor a widespread improvement in communication or massive new efforts to deal with community problems. For a majority of cities it still seems to be business as usual, perhaps with an increase in expenditures for riot-control equipment, perhaps with an additional program to create jobs, but by-in-large no major changes in either of the predicted directions.[5]

There seems to be a kind of social inertia operating here which inhibits radical movement in either of the predicted directions, at least on the part of those in positions of power. Efforts designed to control future violence either by improved control techniques or by making changes in the system tend not to go beyond traditional means. Just as there is

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[4]Since these cities have different social, cultural, political, and economic characteristics and had different kinds of disturbances, this finding is not surprising.

[5]It should be kept in mind that this discussion of polarization and change refers to a relative and not absolute condition. In any absolute sense, the disturbances have led to remarkably little polarization and, less remarkably, even less change.

talk of non-lethal "humane" riot-control devices, so there is talk of providing a few jobs for Negroes. Both of these consequences are similar in that they represent minimal kinds of change over past behavior.

Taking the cities in their entirety, there is not much evidence that a bloody reign of terror and white repression will soon be on us, nor is there much evidence that fundamental and deep-lying changes will soon be made in the structure of our local communities. Some of the same factors that inhibit massive social change -- such as traditional values and a plurality of interest groups -- also inhibit a reign of terror and polarization.

Four Types of Cities: The Relation between Polarization and Change

Although pronounced polarization and positive social change are generally absent, there were, in most cities, tendencies in one or both directions. The cities analyzed may be usefully grouped into one of four types according to whether or not there has been increased efforts at communication and change, and whether or not polarization and backlash have occurred.[6]

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[6]The UCLA study of Watts found that seven per cent of whites owned guns before the disturbance and an additional five per cent reported buying guns during the disturbance.

In the first type, we find some efforts of change and an apparent improvement in communication across racial lines and often within racial groups, accompanied by polarization of attitudes among some sub-groups of the two races. The second type shows no increased efforts at change but an increase in polarization. A third type of city shows increased efforts at attacking problems without much evidence of polarization or backlash. A fourth type shows no appreciable change in either direction, that is, no evidence of backlash or polarization and no evidence that the riot has led to increased community awareness of racial problems.

TABLE I

TYPOLOGY OF CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN VIOLENCE

Polarization of Racial Attitudes	Increased Communication and Some Efforts at Change	
	Yes	No
Yes	I. Detroit A Newark A Plainfield B Cincinnati A Milwaukee B	II. Cambridge B Jersey City E
No	III. Atlanta B New Haven D Grand Rapids B Tampa B New Brunswick A	IV. Rockford D Tucson D Phoenix C

Letter = type of disturbance

This scheme or typology is descriptive rather than explanatory. Why a city falls into one box rather than another is probably a function of a great many factors, such as the ethnic composition of the city, its economic and political character, the scope and the intensity of the disturbance experienced, and more remote factors such as its local and regional history and geography. Nevertheless, an examination of the different groups of cities does suggest some generalizations about the disturbances. For example, small to medium sized cities with low-level disturbances in which the officials and the police significantly over-reacted (IV) tended to show no response in either direction. Cities where the disturbances were distinctly political in tone tended to initiate positive changes (creation of jobs, defeat of anti-loitering laws, new recreational facilities, etc.) after the riot (I, III). There would also seem to be an indication that the greater the political content of the disturbance, the greater its intensity and destructiveness.

Cities where the disturbance was of major proportion and intensity (I) moved both toward polarization and toward increased efforts of change and accommodation. Significantly, type I cities are among the largest cities in which disorders occurred. Perhaps a city must be of a given size and complexity before it can move in both directions at the same time.

Cities such as Cambridge, with a traditional racist character, and Jersey City, with powerful white ethnic populations, were most likely to show increased polarization unaccompanied by increased efforts at social change.

Cities with small- to medium-sized riots such as Atlanta, New Haven, and Grand Rapids, with relatively progressive local governments, or Tampa, with a somewhat benovalent, paternalistic white ruling class, were more likely to show increased efforts of change without, however, an increase in polarization (III).

Complexities and Variation in Response to Violence

A more detailed consideration of the four post-riot types of cities will make clear some of the complexities and variations in response to the violence. For example, although a riot may lead to little in the way of immediate social change, it may create conditions which indirectly aid in bringing about that change. The emergence of new Negro organizations and leaders, and increase in political awareness, and the increased solidarity and unity found in some Negro communities as a result of the disturbances all make effective Negro political action more likely.

This broader sense of identification within the Negro community may help to minimize the intra-group rivalry and factionalism which have long inhibited ghetto communities

from making an united attack on their problems. Thus the UCLA study of Watts reports a pronounced post-riot increase in the willingness of Negroes in Watts to participate in civil rights demonstrations.

In some cases, the disturbances seem to have encouraged a sense of community which extended beyond ones own ethnic group. In Jersey City, for example, there seems to be increased cooperation between Puerto Ricans and Negroes. In Tucson, however, where jobs promised to Negroes were taken by Mexicans, tensions between the two groups increased.

This growing unity and political consciousness among ghetto dwellers that often followed the disturbances may be channeled into working for change directly within the system or into legitimate protest activity. In Atlanta, for example, the disturbance was followed by a boycott on stores believed to have unfairly inflated their prices and reduced the quality of their goods. In Milwaukee, the disturbance was followed by non-violent demonstrations for open housing. In Atlanta, 60 young men have formed a group called the Atlanta Young Men's Civic League, whose primary concern is the prevention of future riots. Most of these young men, described as "young toughs," have criminal records. In Tampa, more than 100 of the young men who had been rioters one night became counter-rioters the next, and their leaders are now paid by the city to act as liaison

between the city and the ghetto communities. Dayton has also attempted to include potential rioters into the system by giving them recognition as the white hat patrol. In both cities, however, too close an identification with the white business community may inhibit the effectiveness of these groups.

In Milwaukee, Plainfield, and Detroit, the militant Negroes' presumed ability to control violence and to speak for the poor has thrust them into positions of leadership. In all three cities, militants have been included on committees of the establishment concerned with change, sometimes -- as in Detroit -- over the protests and resentment of more moderate Negroes who feel that they are the real leaders of the Negro community.

To what extent this kind of protest activity and limited but direct participation in the political process will inhibit further violence is not clear. But it is clear, however, that there is no iron law which says that violence must lead to more violence. The question of whether or not violence will follow violence seems to be, in large part at least, a question of how the initial violence is dealt with and of the consequences of violence. The unduly repressive behavior of police or others in cities such as Detroit, Newark (and Cincinnati in the aftermath of its riot) has intensified bitterness and probably

increased the chances for future violence. Some cities have continued to experience sporadic violence, usually initiated by Negroes but sometimes by whites. The chances for further violence would also seem to be greater in those cities where post-riot changes and concessions to Negroes turn out to be temporary or illusory.

Several cities showed increased concern with Negro problems immediately following the riot: study groups were set up, jobs and job training were promised, city services improved, temporary jobs were found. In one city, young people were supplied tickets to a baseball game; in another, they were given a rock and roll dance and hotdogs.

After days or weeks of peace in good order, however, the sense of urgency generated by the riot diminishes; the recommendations of study groups are ignored, promised jobs are not forthcoming, city services decline to their earlier low-level, and temporary jobs run out. The hot dogs are eaten and the dance music stops. Basic community problems remain unchanged. Concessions or positive gains often turn out to be empty or short-lived, and reveal themselves as minimal, stop-gap measures designed to temporarily keep the peace.

The Prospects for Further Violence

Although communities may buy short periods of racial and social peace in this fashion, the disillusion and despair

that flow out of the destruction of newly heightened hopes and expectations can only generate, in the long run, greater tensions and greater chances for subsequent violence. It ought to be noted, in this connection, that some city officials have been hindered from making promises or delivering on promises already made by a widespread white resistance to any programs or efforts that would appear to "reward the rioters." Indeed, this slogan has become the single, most effective public relations weapon in the arsenal of those who have all along opposed social change.

So far, there seems to be a tendency for a city to have only one large disturbance and then perhaps a series of sporadic incidents. Perhaps a large initial disturbance has a carthatic effect and the air is somehow cleared, with riot participants coming to feel that the message has been put across. In addition, the negative personal consequences of a large disturbance may turn the ghetto community against further violence. Fear of retaliation from the police also inhibits large-scale violence. This may be particularly true of cities such as Plainfield, Newark, and Dayton, where there has been a marked hardening of police attitudes. On the other hand it may set the stage for even more bitter upheavals which are better organized.

Dramatic signs of backlash and polarization, such as increased gun sales and the stealing of guns from stores, have

been noted around the country, but most especially in the cities grouped under category I. Cincinnati is described as an armed camp. In Detroit, black militants may be seen wearing 50 calibre bullets ("devil chasers") as pendants around their necks. White hate groups are urging whites to organize and arm, black counterparts are urging Negroes to do the same. Many whites and blacks have already done so. Also in Detroit, a prominent black militant group threatens to burn down the city if its plans for reconstruction are not followed.

In Milwaukee, a white man is circulating a petition to put Negroes in concentration camps and getting signatures. Softer and probably more general forms of backlash and polarization are evident in decreased public contributions to the Community Chest, as seems to have happened in Plainfield, and in a lessening or even withdrawal of white support for groups -- Urban League, NAACP -- traditionally associated with attempts to improve the condition of the Negro.

Despite these developments, however, the view that disturbances lead inevitably to polarization, to a hardening of attitudes always and only along race lines, is an oversimplification that does not square with the facts. Polarization has not occurred everywhere nor has it always taken the

same form. Technically, post-riot polarization occurs only among certain segments of the society -- the police, certain white ethnic groups, black militants, etc. For other groups, a riot may bring an increased awareness of the need for inter-racial cooperation as evidenced by cooperative efforts of white liberals, businessmen, and moderate Negro leaders in New Haven, or by Negro militants and white militants in Newark and to a lesser extent in Milwaukee. In such cases, segments of the white and black communities are polarized not only with respect to each other but also with respect to the more moderate or more radical segments of their own communities. Paradoxically, therefore, a disturbance which pits blacks and whites against each other may lead to increased inter-racial cooperation among certain segments of the two communities.

Some Psychological Consequences of Urban Violence for Negroes

Violence has important implications for individual participants as well as important consequences for the relations of social groups, but these are harder to get at and have not yet been explored systematically. In general, however, the evidence gathered from interviews of black participants in the disturbances and from more general studies suggests that psychological consequences for the individual black participant

are, on balance, positive consequences. It is important to keep in mind, however, that while the overall psychological implications of violence for the individual black participants may be "positive," there may at the same time, be negative consequences as well, especially from the point of view of the larger society. Such would be the case, for example, with the growing acceptance by individuals of violence or disorderly behavior as a normal and legitimate form of social protest.

Considerations of the psychological implications of violence with the individual black participant typically focused on the enhanced self-image of the participants -- on the new way he learns to look at himself and the new way in which he thinks he is seen by others. This seems to be especially true of young men for whom, in a society which in many ways denies them their manhood, feelings of personal worth and masculinity may be enhanced by defying and striking out against what he views as a repressive social order. A Negro psychiatrist, H. Jones, in writing about Watts rioters, suggests that the riot there was seen as "an opportunity to achieve dignity and self-respect." Frederick Hacker, a white psychiatrist who also wrote about the Watts rioters, arrived at a similar conclusion.

This theme is a recurrent one and pervades materials collected from many of the riot cities. Over and over again,

Negroes reported feeling the riots had positive effects, that participating in the riots made them "feel good." Many reported experiencing a feeling of camaraderie and unity they had never experienced before. In some communities, strangers stopped to say hello and occasionally to chat. One young man who has emerged as a black leader in Plainfield reports:

> You see how things are changing? It used to be that one black man couldn't stand to see another black man do something. We were all jealous of one another and each one tried to pull the other man down . . . Since the riot we aren't niggers anymore, we're black men, and most of the black community have learned this.

Others stressed pride in the fact that Negroes were finally standing up to whites and refusing to be oppressed. They feel the riots offer proof that Negroes were men capable of strong concerted action. A Detroit rioter says that the riot made him proud of being a Negro. "I felt like a first-class citizen," he said.

A study of Detroit residents, directly following the disturbance there, found that those who participated in the riot were least likely to see Negroes as less intelligent or less dependable than whites.

There is a certain irony in the fact that those who "gain" the most from a riot (a more positive self-image, a chance to release pent up agression) are not likely to be those most hurt by it.

SOME POST-RIOT CONSEQUENCES IN SELECTED CITIES ACCORDING TO TYPE

Type I - Increased Polarization and Efforts at Change

NEWARK

There is marked polarization within and between racial groups. Attitudes have hardened and tensions are high. Both Italians and Negroes are reported to be arming, the Italians more rapidly than the Negroes. There was a recent cross burning. Police brutality is reportedly worse after the riot. The police are reportedly very bitter, feel misunderstood, and have pulled the police athletic league out of the poverty program. Petitions have been circulated to recall the mayor and the mayor has rejected the principle of grass roots citizen participation in the decision-making process.

The human relations director has been threatened with violence by whites and some Negro leaders have been similarly threatened by black revolutionaries. Thus polarization may threaten conflict within the two groups themselves, as well as inter-racial conflict between the two groups.

Important white business and insurance men, traditionally not much concerned with problems of the poor, have become interested in improving police-community relations and are taking a more active part in dealing with community problems.

CINCINNATI

Cincinnati has been described as an armed camp. The whites, led by Appalachian migrants, are armed; and a race riot is expected by some. A police perimeter separated whites and Negroes during the last disturbance.

Bitterness and fear have increased in the Negro community. Negroes believe that police are more likely to shoot now and that a previous ban on police use of firearms has been lifted. Some Negroes have lost their jobs.

The city manager has called for a "get tough" policy, and a prominent civic leader and member of the relatively progressive committee of 28 wants the city to throw the radicals in jail and to be on guard against rewarding the rioters. The police chief blames the disturbance on Negro organizations and feels the police were not tough enough. The city budget for next year boasts an extra $500,000 for 50 new policemen, but a request to add two men to the police community relations unit has been denied.

Militant Negroes are reported closer together under the newly formed United Black Brotherhood. The riot is said to have increased the sense of community among black people and to have raised the level of political consciousness. An Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee was established by Negro leaders to negotiate with city leaders in the wake of racial violence.

After the riot a Negro was hired as an administrative assistant to the mayor, and additional jobs for Negroes were discovered on the city payroll. Several new employment programs have been created. Some Negroes seem to feel that the traditional leaders have failed and that the more militant leaders have at least had some minor successes. Negroes are said now to be making demands rather than requests. One significant change is the role that police neighborhood centers play in funneling complaints of the local residents. Lacking other points of access to government, Negro residents are placing pressure on police to act as communication intermediaries.

A series of small incidents have continued, particularly in high schools, following the major disturbance. Sporadic window breaking and firebombing are reported.

DETROIT

One important consequence of the riot has been the establishment of the New Detroit Committee, a broadly based non-government group consisting of industrialists, business, professional, and civic leaders, and black militants.[7] The committee has promised 4,000 jobs, criticized the police,[8]

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[7] One NDC black member is awaiting trial on charges of inciting to riot.

[8] The New Detroit Committee said the police department is "the personification of all that is deficient, intolerable, or sick in the system with which the Negro feels he must cope."

and offered support for an open housing law. Traditional job qualifications are being waived.

The establishment of the New Detroit Committee marks perhaps the first time that powerful whites have agreed to work actively with militant nationalist leaders.

The riot has increased the unity of the black community, and middle-class whites are reportedly more involved with the problems of the poor since the riot. The process of black identification has speeded up and a parallel increase in political awareness has been noted. A seventeen-year-old girl feels that the riot has had the important effect of teaching the police and the white community that black people are not afraid. Various black groups have reportedly decided to stop denouncing one another in public. The push for black power has been supported by an increasing movement toward the development of black corporations, cooperatives, and other black-owned enterprises.

Negro minister Albert Cleage, previously unsuccessful in bids for the Governorship and membership on the school board, has used the riot to develop a broader political base. Reverend Cleage's rise to power has been aided materially by the extensive publicity given him by the white press.

After the riot Cleage formed the Citywide Citizens Action Committee, a broadly based black organization designed to

serve as the political arm of the Black Christian Movement. The CCAC has been holding bi-weekly meetings in various parts of Detroit. Membership is reportedly growing rapidly. While militants hold most of the leadership positions, the organization includes moderates as well. The organization stresses self-determination for black people and threatens to burn down everything built up in the gutted areas unless the new construction conforms to their plans.

A rival organization known as the Detroit Council of Organizations has been formed by more moderate Negroes. This group claims to represent 350,000 Negroes.

Polarization among segments of the white community is also in evidence. A priest with an integrated church reports that whites are now more bitter and are less willing than before to cooperate with Negroes. A petition to recall the mayor was circulated after the riot by a white conservative councilwoman. She has about one-third of the signatures needed for a recall election.

Only half of 460 food stores affected by the riot have returned to business according to the Associated Food Dealers of greater Detroit.

A white militant who leaped to prominence in the aftermath of the riot is a man named Lopsinger, whose chief concern is arming other whites. He wants to make guns available at

bargain prices, particularly automatic weapons. His philosophy, he states, is to kill or be killed. He wants everyone to "stay in their place." He blames the disturbance on police permissiveness.

The activities of people such as Lopsinger on one hand and black radicals on the other have increased anxieties among both groups in the city. Gun sales have reportedly tripled in Detroit since the July disturbance. There is apparently fear among many Negroes that whites treat all Negroes the same because they are unable to distinguish the lawless from the law-abiding. There is fear of retaliation against all Negroes because of the activities of a few. According to some reports Negroes are being trained in terrorist techniques.

The Detroit Police Department has updated its riot equipment and requested almost $2,000,000 to spend on new arms, communications, facilities, and armored personnel carriers.

There have been robberies of stores and pawnshops with large numbers of firearms stolen.

Police-community relations have grown worse since the riot. One incident involved a Negro child reportedly beaten by police. In another, the beating and arrest of a prostitute and a pimp became a cause celebre. This arrest reportedly was witnessed by a Negro woman who was then also reported to have been arrested and beaten by police.

People have been disillusioned by the lack of forceful action against those involved in the Algiers Motel incident, where three Negroes were murdered. Many are bitter over the way law officers behaved during the disturbance, the injuring of innocent people, and the treatment of those arrested.

Protest activity has continued. A rent strike is now on. There was recently a disturbance at a new high school. Firebombings have been reported. The first month following the riot, there were 142 incendiary fires, as against a normal average of 40.

MILWAUKEE

White hostility toward Negroes has hardened dramatically in Milwaukee. There is fear in the white community that the "lawless individuals" involved in the racial disturbances thus far "have not yet had their day." A George Wallace supporter has been nominated to fill a vacancy on the school board. An ex-policeman and Birchite, hated by Negroes and believed by them to be a racist has been nominated by an alderman to fill a vacancy on the anti-poverty board. The sale of guns is reported to have gone up in the white community, but to have gone down in the Negro community.

White reaction to the open housing marches following the riot has been very unfavorable. On the predominantly Polish

southside, on the second day of their marches, Father Groppi and the demonstrators were met by crowds of unruly whites, estimated at between 6,000 and 13,000. Marchers were stoned, spat upon, and cursed. One group of white youths chanted, "We want slaves," and another, "Niggers for sale or rent; shoot 'em for fifty cents."

This backlash is countered by a small group of liberals, a more sizeable group of moderate businessmen, the two moderate papers, and -- to a lesser extent -- by the unions, whose former liberalism has been severly compromised by the racism of many of their members. A leading newspaper opposes the school board candidacy of the Wallace supporter. Many in the above group have been pushing for open housing in the hope that this will encourage the return of peace and quiet to their city.

There is cooperation among this group and militant Negroes. The Episcopal Church gave the militant Northcott House in the ghetto $21,500 for organizational work and leadership training.

Some positive steps have been taken since the disturbance. A police community relations man has been appointed. Various proposals and promises of programs have been made. A grass roots "command" has been appointed to a special committee of the Common Council, which is reportedly about to come out for open housing.

Evidence of increased unity among black organizations and the possibility of more effective political action by Negroes may be seen in the formation of a new federation embracing most of the existing organizations in the ghetto. The new federation, called Common View, was established to give the ghetto a single coherent organization capable of speaking for the Negro community and of bargaining with the mayor. The mayor has met with the group and has accepted some of their proposals. The effectiveness and durability of this group is doubtful; a CORE leader has already pulled out, complaining that it is too moderate.

PLAINFIELD

The most significant thing about the Plainfield aftermath is the assumption of Negro leadership by a young militant and an increased unity of the local black community. The militant has started a new group called Youth Action Movement. He is cooperating with and perhaps controlling the old line Negro middle-class leaders.

Negroes have made some definite advances since the riot. The mayor has proposed a Town Meeting Program, designed to open up communications between all segments of the community and City Hall. Furthermore, two Negroes were appointed to public posts, one to the City Housing Authority and the other

to the Board of Adjustments. The NACCP had been pushing the Housing appointment for some time. A successful tavern boycott was carried out. The school board has approved the presence of a third party when parents of a child meet with school officials, a measure sought by NAACP. A full-time Negro counsellor has been hired for the coming school year. Negroes were in the majority when the City Council turned down, by a vote of 9 to 1, an anti-loitering law fought by Negroes.

Police attitudes seem to have hardened against Negroes. Police are bitter about the death of a fellow officer and about the way the riot was handled generally. They are especially concerned by the strong influence wielded by a state human relations official who made several of the crucial decisions during the disturbance. Police morale is reportedly low, and the chief is said to be held in disrespect by the rank and file officers.

Some whites see the riot as having been instigated by outsiders. Many are reported tense. They are said to feel let down over the failure of police to maintain law and order. White contributions to the Community Chest are down and, according to the mayor, there now prevails an attitude of "let them help themselves." Many Plainfield attornies were reported unwilling to represent riot arrestees.

The Negro community sees itself as more sophisticated about urban violence. According to one report, people have learned "you can't fight guns with sticks and rocks, and if a next time comes it is necessary to have better equipment and be better organized." The police have recovered few of the 40 carbines stolen from a local factory.

Type II: Increased Polarization, No Change

CAMBRIDGE, MARYLAND

In a city such as Cambridge the question of white backlash is not especially relevant. The great majority of whites and the white power structure are overwhelmingly pro-segregationist. In such cities a violent uprising isn't needed to increase segregationist sentiment. Such sentiment is the status quo.

The Cambridge disturbance was defensive and does not seem to have led to an increase in cohesion in the general Negro community. Leadership is still fragmented.

There seems to be some polarization between the two communities, although they were very far apart to begin with. The Assistant Chief of Police says, "When you tell a darkie to do somethin', you've got to mean it." An unconfirmed report states that the police chief is laying up arms and is prepared to deputize whites en masse should the occassion arise.

Negroes are afraid of white retaliation and large scale killing; many whites are reported as having a "state of seige mentality." There have been a number of arson incidents since the disturbance.

JERSEY CITY

The political situation is polarizing. The mayor continues to stress the need for the use of force and has received national publicity for his actions during the riot. He is seen to have a "MIGHT makes right" attitude and to believe that agitators, not social conditions, cause riots. The city apparently does not recognize the need to deal immediately with ghetto problems and refuses to cooperate with the local anti-poverty agency, according to agency staff. The city also reportedly refused to cooperate with the Federal Housing Authority, which promotes citizen participation in city planning.

Although the mayor has been meeting with militant whites and Negro clergymen to discuss community problems, police-community relations are poor. Most grievances are still unarticulated in the ghetto. Jersey City police officers have been enrolled in a riot-control training program.

The Negro former director of the poverty agency says the mayor and governor are causing further polarization of the

Negro community, that they are "sowing the seeds." He says that they are forcing the Negro to the position where there is only one course he can take and only one side he can be on. He believes that more Negroes are willing to risk the "loneliness of the revolutionary" with their lives.

The mood in the ghetto is reportedly one of extreme fear. The mayor keeps saying a riot could break out again at any time, and if it does, he promises more force. Negroes are armong for self-defense, and possibility of a real race was between the police and Negroes exists.

It is believed that the mayor had the police arbitrarily arrest people who were thought to be trouble-makers during the disturbance. Trials are viewed by Negroes as forces and miscarriages of justice.

Some (small) militant groups and individuals have begun to be very vocal and critical of the political leaders in the city. The Bergen Neighborhood Organization Council condemned the mayor for unnecessary police action, calling him a racist and demanding his removal from office. The Committee for the Exposing of Fraudulent, Irresponsible, and Unconcerned Leadership of the Lafayette Area (membership unknown) passed out a throw-sheet entitled "Good-bye, White Daddy," which said, "The time for self-appointed great white fathers has passed," and called for the removal of a county ward leader. Criticism

of the Negro councilman brought this response: "Hell, you didn't put me in in '61 or '65. You were in jail then. I have spent thousands of dollars fighting for you since the 1920's and you don't scare me now." The Negroes responded by saying, "You're an old man resting on your laurels." An unsigned leaflet passed out by militant Isaih Rawley charged that the mayor had declared "hunting season on black people." Of the Negro councilman the leaflet said, "He is the man from UNCLE -- TOM." There is great polarization in the city, and there is great fear.

Type III: Change but No Polarization

TAMPA

Whites and middle-class Negroes seem more aware of problems. There have been some efforts at job training and placement. A lessening of polarization may have occurred, owing to the increased recognition of problems by a paternalistic government.

"Young hoodlums" who participated in the beginning violence were converted into a counter-riot force by authorities. These young men, formerly outside the system, have been somewhat brought into it.

GRAND RAPIDS

The business elite seems a little more aware of ghetto problems. A newly established chamber of commerce study group organized a program to provide 1,000 jobs in three months. However, only 80 Negroes have found jobs through this program.

Power has been reshuffled among competing Negro groups. Vice elements gained some concessions from city hall, compromising earlier changes gained by poverty leaders. There does not seem to be high expectation of violence. More likely perhaps is violence by vice elements against the poverty groups which have been trying to clean up the community.

ATLANTA

Atlanta, with its relatively liberal administration, stands out in its immediate reaction to the disturbance. On the third morning of a four-day disturbance nearly ten city agencies came into the riot area to construct sidewalks, replace lights, fix sewers, clean streets, and pick up garbage. These activities were continued after the disturbance, but after about a month they petered out and the Dixie Hills area receives the same low level of service now that it received before the disturbance. A few industries made a visible effort to hire Negroes since the disturbances, but the number hired has not

been significant. Playgrounds were built in the area, and on the third day of the disturbance tickets were distributed to an Atlanta Braves' game and other recreational events.

The city claims that their actions were unrelated to the disturbance; that all of the plans for this action had been made before the disturbance.

Two new groups have formed as a result of the disturbance: The Ministerial Volunteers, a group of mostly white ministers and lay people who are dealing with the drawing-up of programs for education and police-community relations. The other is a group called the Atlanta Young Men's Civic League, composed of about 60 members who were described as "young toughs," most of whom have criminal records. The Civic League is dedicated to the maintenance of law and order and will oppose SNCC in an attempt to prevent riots in their areas. A thousand riot area residents (Dixie Hills) signed a petition soon after the disturbance declaring that they believed in law and order and had no sympathy with the rioters.

Following the incident, stores in the riot area (and elsewhere) thought to be unfair to Negroes were picketted and boycotted.

NEW BRUNSWICK

The riot in New Brunswick brought forth youth leadership of the black community and the establishment of communication among the youth, poverty agency, administration, and business community. New Brunswick represents a highly politicized situation in which the youth leaders were recognized and several of their important demands were met. There seems to be a heightened sensitivity and awareness of what the lives of the Negro youth are like on the part of the liberal mayor. In turn, there is respect for her and her administration for responding in a responsible political manner and for delivering on promises.

After the disorder the youth center was reopened, the city rented an armory for use as a Neighborhood Center, the business community donated five portable swimming pools for use throughout the city a month and a half after the disorder. Several expelled students have been reinstated in school, and the principal, who is a focal point of Negro discontent, is reportedly being watched. A boat was donated for use as a recreation center for adult and senior citizens. Two brothers who own a barge company persuaded a friend of theirs to donate it and towed it to the city. The business community is raising $75,000 for job training ($25,000 from the Johnson and Johnson Pharmaceutical concern).

There is dialogue and a degree of trust in the city because the administration is trying to deliver. Both sides are highly sensitized to the possible future use of violence and both sides seem to be making an honest effort to avoid it. Importantly, the administration is perceived as really caring about the welfare of all its citizens and not simply concerned with forestalling disorder.

Type IV: No Polarization, No Change

TUCSON

An early minor reaction was short-lived. City authorities listened to grievances and came up with 200 temporary jobs. Jobs were not among the top priority of grievances but even these temporary jobs were taken by Mexican Americans. The youth that the city talked to were not those in the riot area.

ROCKFORD

No one in Rockford considers that Rockford had a riot and people reportedly feel that Rockford has no problems. There was nothing much to respond to.

Negroes are intimidated by whites and fearful of a white reaction to any disorder. They reportedly try to avoid trouble.

PHOENIX

The mayor and city administration reportedly don't want to give Negroes anything, although the mayor did not make use of his reported get tough policy he used as an election issue.

Thirty-eight mostly temporary jobs have been provided. Tension is reportedly high and rock-throwing incidents have occurred since the riot.

AMERICA ON THE BRINK: WHITE RACISM AND BLACK REBELLION

Five years ago racism in America was widely regarded as a Southern problem; today it has become evident that racism is a national problem. In degrees of greater or less intensity it is manifest in a substantial majority of the white population. It pervades our major institutions--some to a greater extent than others--and is one of the chief determinants of action in the society, economy, and polity. For Negroes it is an ever-present force, a fact of daily life which infuriates, annoys, humiliates, and harrasses. There is no need here to offer proof that Negroes in America--North and South--are second class citizens in fact, if not in law. Common sense observation and hundreds of volumes on the subject make that abundantly clear.

Five years ago the issue posed by the Negro movement in the South was citizenship in the political and legal sense of the term. Today the issue has become citizenship in what peculiarly defines American society: its urban, industrial, and affluent character. About three-quarters of the Negroes in the United States live in the cities, and about half the total in cities outside the South. The proportion of Negroes in every large city grows constantly, and reliable estimates indicate that half of the ten largest cities in the country will have black majorities by 1980. One has only to look at the public school enrollment today

to see the face of the future: 52 per cent of the pupils in Chicago are Negro, 56 per cent in Detroit, 75 per cent in Newark, 88 per cent in the District of Columbia, and so on.

The growing black population of the cities is young, increasingly urban, energetic, and aggressive. Negro youth, who in a statistical sense are the average citizens of the ghetto, have already become the major social force in the ghettos, and their numbers continue to grow. They are increasingly race-conscious and militant, rejecting the attitudes and social stance of their elders. The generational gap between Negro youths and their parents is enormous. And white society still finds itself unable even to take seriously their demands of the parents.

Negro youth are in the forefront of a massive urban black movement which will settle for nothing less than complete equality. The movement is beginning to take on organizational form; the number of militant groups grows daily.

When the expectations of a minority are not met on an individual basis and as a matter of course, they become collective demands in the political arena. Yet today the channels of access to political decision-making are largely blocked to Negroes. In a democratic society with a racist

majority, racism infuses politics as it does other spheres of action. The fate of local referenda on open housing, civilian review boards, and a variety of other racially sensitive issues leaves no doubt as to the will of the white majority.

In an increasing number of cities at-large elections undercut the political strength of the ghettos by placing electoral decisions in the hands of this white majority. And as the proportion of Negroes in all large cities grows, white political and civic leaders begin to talk about putting government and politics on a metropolitan basis. To be sure, there are advantages to be expected from metropolitan government, not the least of which is a more adequate tax base. But it should also be recognized that this shift will once again dilute the political power of urban Negroes, who already are a majority in Washington and Newark, and soon will be in many other cities.

Lack of political access is particularly striking in the case of Negro youth, a fact which is even more compelling because it is they who are more insistent that their demands be met and readiest to take violent action if they

are not. Negro youths are virtually without formal representation in government. Negro representatives are older and much too moderate to sepak for the youth. Nor, with few exceptions, are less formal channels open to them. So the traditional prerequisites for rebellion are present: a rising class--in this case Negro youth--increasingly aware of its interests and confident of its power, is locked out politically and sees little chance of making itself heard by the normal means. For these youths ghetto riots are first of all a way of getting a hearing.

Under the circumstances, only a spark is required to set off a riot. Ordinarily the police have been able to provide it with relative ease. It is no coincidence that one of the most conservative (reactionary) and racist institutions of white society is in constant conflict with the most race-conscious and aggressive force in the ghetto. In the recurrent clashes between police and Negro youths the shock troops of the white society meet those of the black. And as often as not these days, one of these clashes is likely to cause each side to call forth its partisans in increasing numbers.

Negro youths, of course, have been in the forefront of the current ghetto riots. While most of the disorders begin

with police incidents, their meaning goes well beyond this. Of the many different tendencies evident in the outbreaks, the most salient and increasingly the predominant one is the political. At one level the riots reflect simply a demand for recognition; at another the violence takes the form of political confrontation, a sort of pressure group politics in which the pressure is Negro violence; at the highest level they have a tendency to become out and out political rebellions--efforts to abrogate, though not to overthrow, the power of the state.

The focus of Negro antagonism in the riots is white authority and white property: mainly the police and white stores. Their antagonism is directed at white dominance over Negroes rather than at white people per se. The impulse toward indiscriminate attacks on whites has been notably absent. In only one of the riots examined has a white civilian been killed by a Negro rioter; of the few police officers and firemen have only one of them unquestionably been killed by Negroes.

Despite their destructiveness, the riots have on the whole been characterized by considerable restraint on both

sides. Police and National Guardsmen in Newark and Detroit killed most of the more than 80 people who were reported killed in riots this summer. But in two-thirds of the cities examined they did not use their guns. For Negro participants the riots represented an effort to break in the door of American society, not to burn down the house. Urban, industrial, and affluent America is being confronted violently by a growing number of Negro youth who have been raised in this setting, have accepted its basic values, and want their share. In demanding to be taken seriously they are simply demanding that America live up to its ideals.

It would be a grave error to assume that the riots are just a temporary abberration, the product of an anachronistic class of Negro migrants which will soon be assimilated to urban life. Indeed, evidence from the two largest riots--Watts and Detroit--indicates that the impulse to violence is likely to become more common, rather than less, as the Negro's transition to urban industrial life from rural, agricultural backgrounds is completed. In these two cities (and certainly in others though we lack extensive data on participation) the rioting was not localized among the migrants, the impoverished, and the disoriented. In many ways it was most common among those whose experience represents the Negro future rather than the past: young, Northern, urban, and industrial.

The Alternatives for American Government: A Nation on the Brink

Given the situation which has been described, the alternatives presently facing American society are three, and only three. One possibility would be to continue down the same course, retaining the illusion that the violence which is occurring is only a temporary event in American history, civil disorder a bad nightmare that will naturally go away of its own accord.

The hope for a natural and spontaneous diminution of civil disorder, however, is the hope of reversing history. Such a point of view fails to understand that recent violence in the cities of this country is an aberration only in the sense that American racism as a basic dimension of the present dilemma is an aberration. The violence we see today is a consequence of a confrontation between a social order dominated by whites and a growing Negro movement which has been developing at a rapid pace since World War II.

The idea that Negroes would "either get into the house or burn it down" has long been expressed in Negro protest literature. That more and more Negro youths also feel this way is not a matter of chance, as we have shown, but is a response to their particular situation in the society. Unless that position is changed -- one way or another -- increasing civil disorder can be viewed as the natural state of American society in the future, and race war the legacy for generations yet unborn.

To continue down the same course means to continue with presen political policies in dealing with Negro grievances. Across the country the predominant policy on racial matters, although not articulated, is "tokenism." On a scale which places conservatism and repression of the Negro Movement at one extreme and total acceptance of the Negro Movement at the other, the vast majority of America's local governments can best be described as being in a "middling" position. The orientation has been to do just enough to "get the Negroes out of our hair" and no more.

Few types of political responses are more likely to accelerate Negro aggressiveness in the present circumstances. Quite the contrary, token concessions, providing small poverty grants, investigating a few complaints of police brutality, promising a few more jobs, throwing a few more rock and roll parties can be expected over the next years to increase the sense of injustice and the recourse to violence among Negro youth.

First, only a small number of people directly benefit from "token" concessions. What about all those people who do not get those small number of jobs generally provided through poverty or temporary employment programs? The laudits given to those programs in the press not withstanding, how do the people feel wno don't make it? And what about those Negroes who cannot enjoy the new access and mobility provided to the

small but rising Negro middle-class? How happy are they? Does not a quite natural increase in jealousy and resentment occur when some rapidly gain privileges while others are left behind?

Secondly, the fact that whites are basically more concerned about making the Negro problem go away than in really doing something about Negro problems has led to a breaking of promises many Negroes have been given. Pressed by other priorities considered more important, or lacking the means to establish and carry out actions of benefit to Negroes, white leadership in most communities, even the most liberal ones, have done little (a) to find out what Negro priorities really are, or (b) to assure that these will be implemented in programs. Lacking a basic commitment to Negro goals, the energies of whites devoted to black interests does not persist beyond an immediate crisis. "Oh yes, we are working on it, but these things take time," becomes a dominant motif of white actions. But promises made and promises then broken become a basis for frustrated disappointment and a sense of betrayal. Negro youth, in particular, not having the experiences or resignation of their elders, react like typical young people anywhere and do not respond well to the idea of having their hopes played with capriciously, or being cheated.

Thirdly, the ad hoc character of white responses -- that they are only made under pressure -- generates the attitude that the white man only understands pressure and force. Quite unfortunately for civil peace in many communities, this is usually a realistic assessment of what it does take to make white leadership move. The basic question for many youths then becomes: how tought do you have to be with "the man" before he will listen to you and take you seriously. Does it take burning his city down to make him care? Then that is what it may have to be. American society is giving the youth lessons in the use of violence for political purposes.

Fourthly, "moderation," as a description of contradictory policies and attitudes where whites cannot make up their minds about when and where to draw a line, or where government works at cross purposes can generate a powerful impetus for revenge. The limbo between equality and subjugation is not a happy one. A man does not know his place. Negro youth today are just not interested in being moderately discriminated against, moderately free from arbitrary police practice, moderately skilled, moderately unemployed, and moderately unsure of what their future holds in store. The reality of millions of ghetto youth is discrimination, arbitrary police practice, lack of skills, low employment, and tremendous uncertainties as to whether

there is a place for them within the white-dominated economy which influences so much of their lives.

The situation presented by the moderates, or liberal approach to the race issue, in many areas, has become an intolerable threat to personal freedom and security. At least in totally repressive communities and societies, there is none of the vacillation and inconsistency that prevent people from knowing the situations under which they are likely to be insulted. In such societies people can make plans to avoid such dangers, and their hopes remain limited.

White moderation is the stuff out of which black rebellion is made. Aggressiveness toward white authorities may be a basic characteristic of Negro riots. But it is also a fundamentally conservative and defensive aggressiveness: An effort to find security and dominance in a "homeland," thus making irrelevant the worry as to whether the white man will really let him be free. As has been shown, the dilemma of a city which is either liberal or moderate on race issues, or is becoming so, is that it has all those ambiguities which produce revolutionary sentiments and violent action on the part of a rising subordinate group. On the one hand, such cities are unwilling to repress Negro communities through the use of violence. Such behavior would violate basic middle-class values, minimizing the use of violence in civil disputes. It would also be inconsistent with officially pronounced values

that deny the validity of a society which is in fact built on social principles supporting racial hierarchy. On the other hand, such cities are unable -- while they repeatedly make promises to aspiring Negro youth -- to come through with their promises, at least in the time that Negro youth find tolerable.

Few situations are more likely to produce contempt for a hypocritical social order, as well as a lack of fear of it. We are thus now witnessing the development of a situation in which a still small, but growing minority of the Negro population, feels it legitimate and necessary to use violence against the social order. A truly revolutionary spirit has begun to take hold among some: an unwillingness to compromise or wait any longer, to risk death rather than have their people continue in a subordinate status.

This percentage is probably larger this year than it was the year before and is larger than it was ten years ago. It will be larger in the future. When we consider that 20 men, dedicated, committed, willing to risk death, and with intelligence and imagination could paralyze an entire city the size of New York or Chicago, the future looks grim indeed, if the riots are allowed to continue. They will spew out individuals who will become professionals. These will, in time, become better organized and knowledgeable in the use

of violence. The support that youthful Negro activists have received from wide segments of the Negro community during the Watts, Newark, and Detroit disturbances, if continued into the future, would mean the irreparable fractionation of whole cities into enemy camps.

As the struggle for power continues, as whites no longer feel protected within their segregated suburban castles, as the consumption goals which presently dominate the lives of most Americans become threatened or relegated to secondary priority, as white racial domination of urban areas is threatened, we will in fact see civil warfare on the streets.

We have not yet had race riots in the classical sense, but that possibility looms as very real, and it is problematical whether they will be avoided in the future. As disappointment in police efforts grows, and threats to Negro encroachments on white property and neighborhoods is increasingly a matter for anxiety, the rise of white vigilantes and self-defense leagues can no longer be considered a theoretical possibility. There are movements already underway in some cities. The most vicious conflicts in American history have taken place around the question of racial dominance, and it will be surprising if at some point in the future there is not a genuine race riot which will equal or surpass the horror of the post-World War I riots, or the one which struck Detroit in 1943. What has kept some of the disturbances that have

occurred thus far from being race riots is that the police have been successful in keeping whites out of Negro areas and vice-versa.

Confrontations of the type we have seen thus far are feeding on the basic contradictions in the existing situation. Violence will become more and more frequent; ghetto riots will, perhaps, be better organized; and the results will be considerably bloodier than they have been thus far. It will be amazing if a city such as Chicago does not have an upheaval which will outstrip Detroit as Detroit was greater than Watts. The beginnings of guerrilla warfare of black youth against white power in the major cities of the United States: that is the direction that the present path is taking this country. The history of Algeria or Cyprus could be the future history of America.

The Future America: A Garrison State?

The first alternative, then, of continuing along the same path is no choice at all. There are then only two choices: (1) Harsh and ruthless repression of the Negro Movement; (2) highly accelerated racial change.

To be blunt, a stable civil society requires that the monopoly of legitimate violence rest in the hands of the government. That monopoly is now being threatened in a way that it has not been since the Civil War.

One solution which might conceivably handle the possibilities of civil war featuring prolonged urban guerrilla struggles, would be a policy of extreme repression. This would have to feature the arrest of major radical leaders, the slaughter of great numbers of people during a riot, the "setting of examples" ala military occupations (i.e., blowing up houses where snipers are believed to exist), the stationing of large military units within cities on ready call to quell any sign of disturbance. This will be effective in maintaining some semblance of order in a society in which different racial groups genuinely hate each other. It has worked before. It will work again. The question is whether Americans want to live in the kind of society that will require.

It will require the suspension of many civil liberties not only for Negroes but for whites as well. The south African experience with apartheid demonstrates this. In America which has allowed a greater level of social and educational development of its Negro citizens than has South Africa the situation will be complicated by the skill bank and energies for resistance which are already existing within Negro communities. Very likely too, the millions of

young Negroes will not passively accept a white garrison state. As young French-educated Algerians fought a war of attrition against the French, so we might expect to see young militant American-educated Negroes refusing to accept the military occupation of Negro areas. Preferring to die on their feet, than living on their knees they will, ala guerrilla movements in other developing areas, go underground, surfacing periodically to engage in terrorist activities.

It will also be a tragedy if such a solution is adopted since the central characteristic of these youth is that they are motivated by a strong sense of idealism as far as American values are concerned. They accept those basic values, but experience bitter anger against a society which prevents their realization. Other dominant powers have repressed movements by subordinate groups who have revolted against their masters in the name of the latters' own espoused values. In Hungary in 1956, young students and workers carried out an uprising against the Russian-supported government, spontaneously forming democratic councils, articulating their actions in terms of the values and ideals, that their Russian overlords had taught them. They were brutally repressed by a power more interested in maintaining its

hegemony than in anything else. The choice for white America thus boils down to a choice as to whether they are willing to act like the Russians did in Hungary.

Accelerated Change: A Way to Save America

There is another alternative to the grim picture painted above. That is the use of resources only available to the Federal government, which will move the whole society through rapid change so quickly that people have neither the desire nor the energy for violent protest. It means the construction of activities that can involve great numbers of people, particularly the youth of the ghetto, on a continuing basis. Such activities must provide them with a clear sense of a future which combines the elements of order and power.

1. The Poverty Program

In this respect the lessons to be learned from the behavior of poverty program personnel in recent upheavals is highly significant. With few exceptions, those who have been involved on a continuing basis in the poverty program do not participate in riots. In fact they were a source for

substantial counter-riot activity in many cities. The potential for a greatly extended poverty program to provide access and tools to Negro youth to improve the situation of their people generally is enormous. The poverty program can provide a channel for upward mobility within the society at large for many youth. The poverty program can become a significant device for the political incorporation of militant Negro youth into American life.

To be truly effective however will mean the transfer of power on real decisions about program policies to the young militants in ghetto areas. This may be politically unpalatable to many local white politicians and some conservative Negroes as well. But it is consistent with a concept of government which places the well-being of the whole community over the vested interest of entrenched local power groups.

In this instance, the well-being of the whole community requires the recognition of Negro youth as a major power bloc. Since local government has shown no willingness to do this, then the federal government must.

Such incorporating action, of course, is in accord with the American tradition of pluralistic politics. Violent ethnic struggle followed by political incorporation has been a cornerstone of American history. To be sure, Negro history differs radically from the history of other American groups which came to this country voluntarily and during periods when the social structure was more fluid. But there is no reason to believe that actions taken at this time which will politically recognize the reality of Negro youth as a major social force in this country will not lead to a shift from a politics of violence to that of a more orderly kind.

Many former middle-class militants in the civil rights movement became involved in the early poverty programs, switching their activities from the picket lines and confrontations with local government to attempting to develop programs. So we can expect to see Negro youths resort less and less to violence if their aspirations for power and the development of their own areas can find fulfillment in extensive and expanded poverty programs which they direct.

This will also have the advantage in that the priorities of the people in the ghetto will have an opportunity to be developed. The problem of finding a solution to the present crisis first of all requires finding out in concrete ways what it is that people really want and what it is they will really accept. Too often, the development of programs has stemmed from white preconceptions of what basically needed to be changed in Negro communities. The people there have in some instances had no hand in determining what is good for them.

To get out of the present crisis requires a willingness to invest in groups within the Negro community who can find the answers, who will develop programs, who will create organizations, an effective and coherent force for government to deal with. The government should seriously consider the funding of programs for economic and political development designed by major militant organizations who have indicated a commitment to maintaining civic peace. This is one way of assuring that the political-economic answers to the crisis in American cities will be forthcoming.

The consolidation of the Negro community, as one aspect of the political problem cannot be overemphasized. The central dilemma of urban Negro communities until recently is that they have been internally fragmented and unable to

muster effective positive force in city politics. White political behavior designed to encourage such fragmentation has been greatly responsible here. But so have internal organizational and social class splits among Negroes.

With the new wave of race consciousness among Negro youth, and the lack of effective organization to make demands felt, with increasing racial competition within the community, violence will become more and more probable unless the government takes steps to encourage such consolidation as will allow collective bargaining with somebody who has real power. The basic dilemma of many governments now is that during periods of crisis they do not knowwhom they can talk with. There are few who can turn riots off after they start. Government resources can be used as a lever for various militant factions within the Negro community to come together and work in co-operation rather than at cross-purposes both in developing the Negro community and in containing violence.

All this of course will require an opening of the white power structure. While American society may be truly pluralistic on other issues, around the race issue there has been a tendency for whites to close ranks. In a basic sense a white power structure does confront Negroes.

All the basic tools of power in the community with the exception of not being bound to refrain from violence is outside of their hands. How willing white America will be to share the powers of the society with Negroes, to allow those powers to be used for Negro advancement, is the major problem.

One way that the Federal government can open up the white power structure is to refrain from the temptation to allow white elected officials to exercise veto power over federal government programs. Permitting such veto power is tantamount to taking sides in a community dispute between entrenched political groups and a new social force; the latter, unless it is politically incorporated, will continue to use violence as a rational tool, or as a nihilistic substitute for other kinds of power.

To open up the white power structure requires another kind of program: This is a massive educational effort directed toward the white communities of this nation to bring home to them the realities of Negro life. The gap of ignorance that stands between white perceptions of reality and what the real situation is among Negroes is phenomenal. This gap if allowed to continue will only lead to further incorrect diagnoses of community problems.

The magnitude of the problem is such that even in so-called liberal communities city elites are so far out of touch with young Negroes that they are unable, as was the case in Detroit, to know that the situation in the city was building for a major explosion.

It is admittedly quite difficult to deal with the emotional basis for racism. The problem has perplexed mankind for sometime. But to the extent that white attitudes toward Negroes are based on sheer lack of knowledge and information of a realistic nature, then high school programs in race relations, regular TV programs on the race question, programs directed toward government officials, can all do their part in reducing the tremendous information gap that presently exists. Group stereotypes must be broken down and people seen as they are in daily life. What is needed is a massive effort in which major media directly participate on a continuing basis.

Finally, there needs to be a new mission for police departments. What is required is the development of a new kind of police and a new conception of the policeman's role. That role must focus on the policeman as a buffer against violence. In periods of social upheaval such as the present in which citizens have a predilection to take their political

grievances into the street policeman need new kinds of training. Law officers must learn to understand the kind of crowds they are dealing with. For example, they must become sensitive to the differences between political and expressive crowds. They must learn how to feel comfortable with large groups of people protesting their grievances.

The authority of the policeman ultimately rests on the awe and respect which the agent of public order earns. It is not based on the effectiveness of his use of weapons alone. What we need is a new movement in police practice which emphasizes the nonmilitary aspects of the policeman. The policeman must be seen by people as distinguished, the kind of man who is worthy of their support. He needs to be highly paid as is commensurate with the magnitude of the problems that now need to be solved. Then perhaps the policeman will become in the eyes of Negro youth "the man with the badge," instead of "the thug with the gun."

Besides the development of a new role for the police there is anincorporating function which it can serve in ghetto communities. Some police departments are already taking steps in the direction of becoming an information channel between the Negro community and the civil government.

Such departments in setting up neighborhood centers ostensibly designed to deal with local complaints about police practice find themselves providing clearinghouses for municipal complaints over a wide range of conditions, not just those directly bearing on police practice.

As a vehicle for the political incorporation of many Negroes, unfamiliar with how to get information relevant to their problems, a well-developed neighborhood police center program in large cities can do much to restore civil peace. It will also make all government agencies aware of their mutual dependency on each other. Policemen carry the brunt of the failure of other agencies. They are the ones who are forced to risk their lives when the political and administrative mechanisms of the city fail to do their job. And their interests should be seeing to it that the rest of government does not put them into this dilemma. The police in other words should service the concerns of the poor as well as that of the middle class and the rich.

The Reservoir of Good Will

Finally, although we have painted the choices confronting America in stark terms, it must be emphasized that appropriate action at the present time can save the situation from deteriorating further. What our data indicates is that while there is a willingness by youth to engage in violence or express nihilistic sentiments toward whites to get things done, there is also an enormous reservoir of pro-social civic attitudes. These attitudes, the commitment to American values, underly the bitterness and resentment against the resistance by white authorities to Negro progress. In many ways the local governmental and service apparatus remains the most persistent and emphatic reminder to the young Negro that he is thought of as an inferior species.

Despite the demeaning effects of these reminders, the socialization of Negro youths provides a continuing source of basic attitudes that are supportive of and loyal to the broader features of American society. Negroes at the present time, even those who engage in violence, are not willing to reject whites, American society, or American institutions. But because this is the case now doesn't mean that it will be in the future. Major race riots, continued governmental inaction, more frustrated hopes, will produce a bitterness which will in fact lead to a general condemnation of society.

There is still time for one nation to make a concerted attack on the racism that persists in its midst. If not, then Negro youth will continue to attack white racism on their own. The harvest of racism will be the end of the American dream.