

SUMMARY ANALYSIS
DECEMBER 20, 1967

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

Prepared under the direction of Robert Shellow, Ph.D.
Assistant Deputy Director for Research

Co-Authors of this report include David Boesel, Louis Goldberg
Gary T. Marx, Ph.D., and David Sears, Ph.D.

Nathan Caplan, Ph.D., Jeffrey Page, and Elliot Liebow, Ph.D.,
served as substantive consultants to the staff and assisted
in writing and editing certain portions of this document.

Neil Smelser, Ph.D. provided consultation on the
overall approach to the analysis. Jesse
Epstein, Oliver Holmes, and Elizabeth
Jameson provided research assistance.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS NEITHER BEEN SUBMITTED TO
NOR APPROVED BY THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

December 20, 1967

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Ghetto Riots and Others: The Faces of Disorder in 1967
 - II. Negro Youth and Civil Disorders
 - III. Police-Community Relations in Crisis: The Problem of Control
 - IV. In the Aftermath of Violence
 - V. America on the Brink: White Racism and Black Rebellion
-

PREFACE

The events of this past summer are now history, though still very much alive in our memories and very much a part of our present. We have mounted a research effort to amass information on an incredible range of social phenomena and have carried out our mission at breakneck speed, driven on by the urgency of the current racial crisis in the United States.

The data developed by the Commission and its staff, though lacking in completeness, nevertheless represent a usable body of knowledge by which to gauge what exactly happened to the United States in the summer of 1967. Our task has been that of the historian, and the materials from which we have worked rival those normally relied upon by historians in accuracy and precision. Our approach has been an inductive one. Viewpoints and the approaches of the social and political scientist were brought to the data. The method employed was that of a systematic analysis of over twenty-six civil disorders occurring in twenty-three cities, the review of scientific studies, the application of social and political theory and research wherever it was called for, and finally the exercise of collective judgments as to what needed to be stressed; what it all meant.

It is these judgments which comprise the body of this document.

GHETTO RIOTS AND OTHERS:
THE FACES OF DISORDER IN 1967

The faces of disorder in American cities in 1967 were many. The term "riot" has been too loosely applied to denote disturbances, often quite varied, which occurred last summer and in the previous three years. It has been used to refer to anything from a group of excited teenagers breaking windows after a dance to a general social upheaval. All were civil disturbances; but only a few warranted the label "riot."

It is misleading also to think of the civil disturbances simply as "Negro riots." For to do so suggests that the immediate responsibility for the course of the disturbances and the extent of damage lies solely with the Negro participants. The disorders in many cases, however, cannot be understood without taking into account the attitudes and actions of many groups in the communities affected.

In some cities the behavior of various official control agents -- police, national guardsmen, and the courts -- in fact constituted official lawlessness: abuses of power in the name of law and order. For the largest disorders especially, the concept of a "tandem riot" -- a riot by Negroes against public authorities followed by a riot of control agents against Negroes -- is very appropriate.

In other cities, "Negro riots" were more imagined than real. In several, white anticipation of Negro violence led to heavy-handed uses of official force that provoked violence which might not have otherwise occurred.

The news media, for their part, sometimes shared in creating a climate in which violence could be expected at any time. Because of their tendency to overdramatize disturbances, even minor incidents came to be seen as major riots. And white citizens, often out of heightened anxiety, aggravated the situation by insisting on "get tough" policies to prevent and quell disorders.

I. PROMINENT FEATURES OF DISORDERS: CLASSIFYING THE "RIOTS"

In considering a sample of 23 disturbances which occurred last summer, it is clear that the particular combination of circumstances in each city was to some extent unique. But at the same time certain characteristics of different disturbances were so similar that it is possible to group the disorders, particularly the largest ones, on the basis of their most prominent features.

A. General Upheavals

A disturbance may develop over a period of time into an upheaval which draws in thousands or tens of thousands of participants from a Negro ghetto, exhausts the resources of local police, severely taxes the capacities of city institutions, and involves an extraordinarily wide range of lawless activities on the part of both Negroes and control authorities. After the disorder has ended an area often looks as if it has been through a state of civil warfare. Such was the case in Detroit and Newark, 1967, and in Los Angeles, 1965. These disorders were so massive, events so much beyond the control of either civil authorities or Negro community leadership, the points of street confrontation between police and Negroes so numerous and widespread, that it is difficult to characterize the whole complex of actions over the course of a disturbance in simple terms.

In all three cases, however, a similar pattern of development stands out: the violence in each went through two distinct phases. In the first, widespread and aggressive action by ghetto Negroes overwhelmed local police forces, leaving them virtually powerless to enforce order in the streets. In the second, reinforced control authorities engaged in harsh retaliatory actions to reassert dominance.

Phase 1: Negro Rebellion

In this phase collective violence was initiated by Negroes. In Detroit and Newark, as well as in Watts, aggressive action by Negroes escalated spontaneously from an initial confrontation with police into a highly generalized rebellion against white authority and white-owned property in the ghetto. In the face of an expanding rebellion, local police lacked the resources to act with the even-handed decisiveness necessary to bring the violence under control; their efforts inflamed rather than quieted Negro participants.

As the ability of police to enforce control of the streets diminished, more and more segments of the Negro community -- older people, women, children -- joined the young men who had been in the forefront. At the peak of this phase there was a euphoric realization among Negro rioters that they had nullified police control over their territory.

Phase 2: Control Force Retaliation

Under the strain of widespread rioting, police order had begun to dissolve; many officers became subject to the same principles of crowd behavior that motivated Negro rioters. Deep-rooted racial prejudices surfaced. The desire to vent individual hostility, to re-establish

dominance, and to avenge police honor became compelling motives. Rumors and preconceptions fed into each other as determinants of police behavior.

Once reinforcements arrived in the form of state police and National Guard units the second phase of disorder was inaugurated. With police discipline severely weakened, a large number of lawless acts initiated by lower-echelon officers coincided with the reassertion of police dominance over Negro rioters. Many National Guardsmen, ill-disciplined and afraid, showed little restraint in using weapons in areas in which they were strangers. This period was characterized by a marked tendency among control authorities to treat all Negroes categorically as enemies. The presence of massive official force, or its withdrawal, or the exhaustion of Negro rioters and control authorities alike, would finally bring the violence to an end.

Patterns of Escalation

Detroit: Phase 1. These two phases of disorder in Los Angeles, Detroit, and Newark -- in part the product of a high level of community polarization prior to the upheaval -- directly emerged as a result of reciprocating hostile actions by police and Negro activists.

In Detroit, the first phase had five escalation points, each occurring within twelve hours from the start

of the disturbance. The initial event was a police raid on a blind pig that mobilized an angry crowd. The second escalation point occurred shortly after the police left the scene, looting beginning as a local agitator broke the first window. This was followed by a period of several hours in which the police, returning to the area, made no visible effort to stop the looting going on under their eyes. Police inaction encouraged a massive expansion in community participation. Then, a sudden and ineffective crackdown -- a sweep of the streets by a tough elite riot squad armed with bayonets -- outraged the community while simultaneously demonstrating police impotence as the dispersal tactic failed. At this point, Negro youths desiring vengeance began a massive firebombing assault, determined to burn the city down if they could. The riot had become totally out of control.

Newark: Phase 1. The steps in the development of the Newark rebellion differed somewhat from the first phase of the Detroit upheaval but paralleled it in basic process. As in Detroit, a police incident initiated the chain of events. In this case, the first step was the arrest and probable beating of a Negro cab driver which initially mobilized a large and angry crowd of Negroes in front of the police station. While the police in Detroit were permissive in the face of the initial stage of looting, those

in Newark were both indecisive and punitive toward the increasingly hostile crowd which literally began to lay w seige to the police station. A cycle occurred which began with the bombardment of the station with bricks, bottles and Molotov cocktails by some members of the crowd. This was followed by a rush of the police toward the crowd, a backoff of the crowd, a police withdrawal to the station, and a reassembly of the crowd to begin the process all over again. Each time this occurred the crowd's contempt for the police and its own sense of power grew.

As the police sweep in Detroit was followed by fire-bombing, so in Newark a period of minor looting followed a police charge which undercut efforts by civil rights leaders to organize a march away from the station. Twenty-five cabdrivers who had transported some people down to city hall to conduct a non-violent protest and picket -- became extremely indignant to find their double-parked cars being ticketed and towed away. News of this police action was rapidly transmitted by cab radio throughout the ghetto.

The difference between Newark and Detroit at this point, however, was that the possibility existed to save the situation through a political solution between the Italian-American city administration and Negro militant leaders. Such a solution did not materialize.

On the second evening, events moved almost directly into a period in which rioting was out of control. When the director of The Human Relations Commission stopped a picket line in front of the police station to announce a concession considered trivial by the crowd Negro youth began throwing stones at the station. The police in turn charged the crowd. Discipline broke down as police beat anybody they could catch who was black (including Negro newspaper reporters, and in one instance a Negro policeman). While police in Detroit were permissive toward looters in the first stage, those in Newark had already lost control of the situation on the second evening when the looting started in earnest. The absence of police in many areas along with widespread looting drew many ordinarily law-abiding people; onto the streets and into the stores.

Detroit: Phase II. With the introduction of state police and National Guard, and the permission to use weapons granted, the character of the riots changed.

In Detroit the removal of restraint on the use of weapons by control authorities, caused violence to escalate on the side of both rioters and authorities. Frequent gunfire by control forces, and some firing of weapons by Negroes led to pervasive rumors of massive Negro sniping activity. Fear and a desire for revenge

led many troopers to see themselves as embattled soldiers in a war situation against an enemy people and they acted accordingly. Lack of command discipline in the general confusion led to situations in which guardsmen became lost, made mistakes, or violated standing orders (e.g., even after federal troops arrived and the commanding general instructed guardsmen to unload their weapons, 90% of the guardsmen did not).

A similar situation occurred for the police. With the top leadership of the police department having lost control over lower echelon officers by mid-week, the latter being fatigued from over work and the arrest procedure having fallen apart, many policemen engaged in irrational and sometimes vengeful acts. It was not until regular army troops arrived, official violence brought under control, and all parties reduced to a state of exhaustion that the disorders finally ceased.

Newark: Phase II. In Newark, the statements of the governor telling Negroes they were forced to choose between "the jungle" and "law and order" was interpreted by some policemen as a license for summary justice. Police retaliation was further spurred by the killing of one officer: ritual acts of revenge were even carried out in his name. As in Detroit, rumors of snipers, lack of coordination between police and guard forces, and

motives of retaliation produced massive onslaughts of gunfire directed at Negro occupied or owned buildings. With a growing retaliatory mood among Negro youth, violence did not end until the governor ordered the guard units withdrawn from the Negro areas.

B. Riots as Political Confrontations

Newark and Detroit are extreme examples of massive disorder in the summer of 1967. A few disturbances showed many of the characteristics of these general upheavals but developed over time in a distinctly political direction. As in the general upheaval, the level of disorder in the streets was quite large. But in these disorders explicit political confrontation between Negro leadership and civil authorities was at least as important a feature of the riot as violent street confrontation between Negro masses and the police. This was true in such cities as Cincinnati and Plainfield.

The use of the term political in these cases is not meant to imply either (a) conspiracy, (b) prior organization to achieve specific political objectives through the use of violence (e.g., intimidating election opponents or forcing a city administration to grant a specific concession), or (c) immediate causes arising out of political issues.

Nor is calling some disturbances "political riots" meant to imply that the general upheavals in Newark

and Detroit lacked a powerful political component. A high level of political grievance on the part of Negroes, and the lack of significant responses by civil authorities contributed greatly to events in Newark and Detroit.

But it would not do justice to the many non-political aspects of generalized chaos in those cities to refer to their disorders as simply political riots. On the other hand, in cities like Plainfield and Cincinnati, the actions of Negro participants became directly focused at civil authorities. In turn, the responses of civil authorities to demands -- particularly the demand for recognition -- dramatically affected the level of aggressive action by Negro rioters.

This proposition is clearly illustrated in the Plainfield disturbance. On the first night of disorder, a local Negro politician tried to steer the youth toward a meeting with the mayor to talk about their grievances. The meeting was held, but was unsatisfactory, the youth leadership representatives walking out twice, a minor riot occurring after the second walk-out. On the next day a meeting they were having in a park to formulate grievances and reduce them to writing was broken up by the police. Shortly thereafter violence rapidly escalated as a policeman was killed by an angry

mob after he shot a youth, and the youths fearing retaliation from the police stole 46 carbines from a gun factory. Later, one of their representatives -- a young man who has since become an important political figure in the community -- attempted to use the possession of the guns as a bargaining tool, offering to exchange them in return for a sign of good faith from the authorities. An agreement was reached and Negro initiated violence ceased, although the guns were not in fact returned. During a two-day period when police were kept out of the area of disturbance, the youths in effect took responsibility for keeping order. In the aftermath, the activities of the youth militants have involved the use of pressure group tactics in council meetings, their first victory being the defeat of an anti-loitering amendment.

Unlike the general upheaval, events although violent were not entirely out of the control of community leaders. The existence of a leadership group among the youth made it possible for authorities to negotiate.

In Detroit where there may have been tens or hundreds of bands of rioters at work, any kind of coherence or control over events was impossible. In Newark, on the other hand, the possibility for a political solution was quickly foreclosed by the severe political polarization between the mayor and the militants.

In the political riots, the rioters were sufficiently organized to "select" their own leadership for purposes of negotiation, or there were leaders within the general community who could act as "spokesmen." Militancy around the conference table often served as a substitute for militancy in the streets.

C. The Riot as Expressive Rampage

All of the ghetto riots involved the spontaneous gathering of an angry crowd in the first phase. But in the expressive rampage of disorder the behavior of rioters gained little focus or direction over time. The mobs wandered the streets, angry, drunken, milling about, lacking leadership or direction, engaged in breaking windows or in random acts of vandalism.

The riot in Dayton in 1966, which preceded two smaller disturbances during the summer of 1967, was of this type. From the start those engaged in the disturbance were a "bar crowd" of petty hustlers and drunks, marginal elements in the community. Efforts by the mayor to reach a "political solution" to the riot by negotiating with a militant civil rights leader on the scene was ineffective because the rioting crowd was mainly bent on drinking and letting off steam. Efforts to organize them into a meeting to express grievance and negotiate failed totally.

The potential for the disturbance in 1966 to evolve in a political direction was slight, but the situation in Dayton has changed considerably since then. At the present time the Negro middle-class is more angry about police practices and the failures of the white power structure, youth more at the forefront, the alienation of the total Negro community from white authority greater than it was before. The two disturbances that occurred in 1967 clearly point to the potential for violence of a more distinctly political character.

D. The Riot as Fulfillment of Anticipations.

While the largest disorders generally began with an aggressive ghetto riot followed by a tough police response, there is another category of disturbance in which the flow of events proceeded in the opposite direction. The first acts of collective aggression came not from Negroes but from control forces -- subsequent Negro responses tending to be defensive, protective, or retaliatory. In such cities as Cambridge, Maryland; Jersey City and Elizabeth, New Jersey, anticipations of Negro lawlessness rather than actual lawlessness itself, led to periods of disturbance.

These would be initiated by precipitous "riot control tactics" or "shows of force" by white authorities. Compared to cities that did have massive ghetto rioting, such disturbances remained fairly minor, although their actual proportions were often greatly exaggerated at the time they occurred.

In Cambridge, Maryland, the presence and speech of H. Rapp Brown had a great effect in stimulating local authorities to acts of disorder against the Negro community. His mere presence evoked images in the minds of white leadership that there was an organized conspiracy afoot to lead Cambridge's Negroes in a rampaging pillage of the town's white business district. His inflammatory speech, though failing to galvanize Negro youth, did over-excite the Negro police officers who heard it. These reported that a riot was underway -- thus confirming

the worst fears of local white officials. At one point, after an injury to another officer, the local police chief wanted to go into the area shooting and only restraints by state authorities prevented bloodshed. Later on, the white volunteer fire department refused to go into the Negro area to put out a small fire that finally spread into a blaze consuming a block of Negro businesses. Their inaction stemmed in part from a fear of a plot to trap fire department equipment in the Negro area thus leaving the downtown area to be burned and plundered.

In a few cities joint expectations held by both Negroes and whites that a "riot was coming" had something of a self-fulfilling character. However, in the absence of truly intense community polarization, the disturbances possessed a staged or simulated quality. The participants seemed to be going through the motions of a riot more than carrying out serious conflict. Lacking was the quality of vengeance and retribution which pervades so much of the behavior on all sides once a disorder is out of control.

Staged conflict in this sense occurred in New Brunswick, where youths put on a disorder in the main street of town. An effective political response by the lady mayor brought a quick end to the disorder. The second night of rioting in Tucson was staged in another sense. Following queries by a newspaper reporter as to where and when they were going to riot that evening, youths put on a minor riot for the benefit of the press.

E. The Riots That Didn't Happen: Incipient Riots and Others

In most of the events in which anticipations of violence played an important role, the level of disorder on the Negro side was so minimal as to suggest calling these disturbances "Negro riots that didn't happen." There were also some low-level disturbances -- incipient riots -- that reflected in germinal form dimensions more fully developed in the largest disorders.

The Atlanta disturbance showed many characteristics in common with certain northern disorders. In Atlanta as in Newark and Detroit, a crowd formed in a community gathering place in a high density area. The scene in this instance was a neighborhood shopping center where police-related incidents had occurred the two previous nights. Stokeley Carmichael was present to urge the crowd to take to the streets. He found an audience which was enthusiastic and willing to take matters into its own hands. But (1) the police immediately moved in with major force and were extremely effective; (2) the mayor quickly responded to the political aspect of the event by beginning visible construction the next day on long-delayed projects demanded by area residents; and (3) a newly formed Negro Youth Corps helped keep the rest of the summer cool.

In a northern city like Dayton, there was a significant potential in its two 1967 disturbances for a major Negro riot. The first disturbance in June followed a meeting protesting the cut of

a grassroots poverty program. H. Rapn Brown was the featured out-of-town visitor at the meeting. He excited youth who were already looking for an excuse to riot.

The second, in September 1967, followed a bitter meeting protesting the release of a vice squad officer after a controversial killing of a middle-class Negro professional. An initially decisive police response and the "cooling effect" of the Dayton White Hats in both cases rapidly cut off the potential for escalation in the disturbance.

Finally, in the category of "riots which did not occur" is the traditional race riot which has often marked American history. The potential nevertheless was there. In Cincinnati, New Haven, Newark, and Cambridge whites were attracted to the scene, ready to take up arms against Negroes and to defend white property. In those cities, where such a threat existed, effective police practice prevented white outsiders from coming into Negro areas, thus aborting the race riot process. In Cambridge where there has been a continuing danger of racial confrontation for several years, the state National Guard acted in its customary role as a buffer against violence.

II. PROCESSES IN DEVELOPING DISORDERS

A. Urban Upheavals and Satellite Riots: The Propagation of Violence

The spread of violence across the land follows the close link between major ghetto

upheavals, or reports thereof, and "satellite" disorders in which authority over-reaction occurs. The former clearly acted as a trigger to the latter. In the wake of a disturbance the size of Newark or Detroit, rumors of small incidents in a local area became magnified as the beginning of a riot. On the white side, a climate of anxiety was produced by stories of planned violence, and fears of outside agitators and conspirators.

After the Detroit upheaval eight other Michigan cities reported disorders. After the Newark riot fourteen cities in the surrounding area had some sort of disturbance. In at least two-thirds of fifteen cities studied in which disorders occurred shortly after major riots, the immediate precipitant of disorder seems to have been a police action prompted by ghetto violence elsewhere.

The Propagation of Disorder in the New Jersey Disorders

In order to illustrate the propagation effect, it will be helpful to examine some of the disturbances in the New Jersey chain. In Englewood police outnumbered participants there three to one. In Jersey City 400 armed police occupied the Negro area several days before the disorder occurred. In most cases relations became strained as the appearance of armed police patrols increased the likelihood of confrontation with Negro residents. The most frequent citizen demands were for police withdrawal

and/or a less visible show of arms. In six of the seven New Jersey "satellite" cities, removal of police from the ghetto signalled an end to violence. Rumors of violence often become self-fulfilling prophecies when credited and responded to with a visible show of force and fear.

Errors in judgment arising out of a climate of fear in the white community occurred in many New Jersey cities. In one city, officials reacted to rumors that Stokeley Carmichael was bringing carloads of Negro militants into the community, although Carmichael was in London at the time. Planning for disorder by New Jersey police departments, even before the Newark upheaval occurred, showed similar elements of irrationality in the face of uncertainty.

On June 5, 1967, the police chiefs of at least 75 New Jersey communities met in Jersey City. They discussed rumors of planned violence by various militant groups who reportedly intended to kill Jersey City police officers in their homes and foment disorder in other New Jersey communities. Jersey City, Newark, and Elizabeth were said to have "Triple A" ratings for violence over the summer. Plans to coordinate control efforts were established, and the chiefs were informed of the procedures for calling in the state police and National Guard.

Thus, a month and a half before Newark erupted, there were rumors of planned violence and counter-plans were designed.

Riot control training was held in a number of communities. In one instance Negro residents became alarmed and angered when tear gas used in a practice exercise drifted into the Negro section of town. Whether the rumors of planned violence were solid or merely a product of the preconceptions of city officials is difficult to say. But these rumors existing prior to the Newark riot were confirmed in the minds of officials in other New Jersey cities once Newark erupted, subsequently becoming the basis for "riot control" responses.

Another force in the proliferation of disturbances in the vicinity of the big city riots is the network of kinship and friendship relations between Negroes in major cities and outlying areas. For some it was literally true that "the brothers" in Newark or Detroit were "getting some of the action." Many people in Grand Rapids, for example, have relatives in Detroit. The reports that some of these relatives were killed in the Detroit riot increased tension and the potential for violence in that city.

The intensity of the flow of personal information from the Newark and Detroit ghettos to outlying areas at the peaks of the riots is indicated by the huge number of out-of-town phone calls from the areas of greatest disturbance. These equalled the top loads for a Mother's Day weekend, one of the busiest days of the year.

B. The Media and the Propagation of Disorder

The majority of people in outlying areas and across the country do not, of course, learn about a riot through immediate personal information. In the modern age TV can bring people hundreds or thousands of miles distant directly to the scene of a major disorder. The effect can often be that of the crowd acting at long distance. This was a typical feature of the non-violent demonstrations of the civil rights movement at its peak. TV pictures of mob violence in the South would spark spontaneous sympathy demonstrations all across the North. And, in many instances, local civil rights movements would indigenously evolve from there.

In the case of the recent disorders, the "crowd at long distance" generated the impression that there was in fact a conspiracy some place for New Jersey to go up all at once. Actually, outbreaks of civil violence were quite spontaneous and unplanned -- information from the media lowering the threshold for disorder all across an area.

One definite effect of the media seems to be the determination in time and place that latent tensions will surface into disorder. The potential for major riots in Plainfield and Detroit led by militant Negro youth had been there for some time. It was the Newark riot that dramatically changed "the mood" in Detroit and helped galvanize Negro youths to aggressive action in Plainfield. They might have "blown" anyway, if not

at that time, then perhaps at a later date. It can be argued that if Newark's riot had not occurred or if information about it was totally suppressed, other cities might have weathered the storm -- at least temporarily. Progress through institutional channels might have kept one step ahead of the chaos breathing on its heels.

C. "Outside Agitators" and the Spread of Disorder

A discussion of the mass media effects in propagating disorder leads to an examination of the actual influence of such nationally known Negro radicals as Stokeley Carmichael and H. Rapp Brown. The answer to questions concerning their role in spreading disorder is by no means simple.

A quick overview indicates that most disturbances occurred without their presence to help things along. Of 23 disturbances examined, in only six were either Carmichael or H. Rapp Brown around the scene at the time. And in only three of these could their appearance and rhetoric be immediately linked with the precipitant of disorder. In the other cities they arrived at the scene after action was already underway. In Cincinnati,

A quick overview indicates that most disturbances occurred without their presence to help things along. Of 23 disturbances examined, in only six were either Carmichael or H. Rapp Brown around the scene at the time. And in only three of these could their appearance and rhetoric be immediately linked with the precipitant of disorder. In the other cities they arrived at the scene after action was already underway. In Cincinnati, for example, Brown's

major role was presenting a list of some 20 demands from a nationalist group to a representative from the Human Relations Commission on the fourth day of the disturbance.

Thus the number of specific situations with which the presence of a national firebrand could be associated with disorder were very few. And considering the large number of communities where Brown and Carmichael appeared which did not have riots, their "riot-batting average," if indeed their purpose was to provoke a disorder on the spot, was extremely low. Nevertheless, Brown and Carmichael do have influence over some events, which stems from the particular way they "lead" people. Their leadership is symbolic rather than organizational. They cannot "command" others to riot -- at least at this time -- by coming in from out of town and passing down "orders" from the top. But as a symbolic focus for hopes and fears they can generate the emotional predisposition which might encourage disorder.

In this respect, a good deal depends on the mood of their audience when they arrive on the scene. In Atlanta, Carmichael's speech to a crowd suggesting that they force the police to work until they "drop in their tracks" brought a tumultuous response. In Dayton the youth were "looking for an excuse to riot" before Brown arrived. However, in Jersey City Negro youth quickly fled a meeting at which Brown was speaking when a rumor spread that

the police were coming. Brown reportedly left town muttering that "the people here aren't ready."

White authorities, as the Cambridge and New Jersey cases illustrate, have often been emotional "followers" of the "leadership" of Brown and Carmichael, in the sense that fears of the influence or presence of the latter generated precipitous actions.

It should be stressed too that the influence process between audience and agitators is a two-way street. In Detroit it was an unknown local man who took upon himself the role of the agitator. But in so doing, he was responding as well to the mood of the crowd and a situation which "commanded" agitation. And while Brown and Carmichael have a utilitarian interest in seeing violence directed against white society's control of Negroes until equality is produced, most of the evidence indicates that crowds use them as much as they use crowds.

Like headliners and public men everywhere, they become tools of community groups in developing motivation and commitment in followers, creating resources, and getting actions going. Thus far, they have been the focal point for a great deal of the emotional energies on the part of both Negroes and whites. It is easier, for example, for whites to see riots as caused by H. Rapp Brown and Stokeley Carmichael with whom they are familiar than with the conditions of local Negro communities with

which they are not. Negroes, for their part -- especially the young -- experience great jubilation in hearing a speaker "tell it like it is" and frighten whites in the process.

Whatever their role at a specific local disorder, however, the major source of influence of leaders like Brown and Carmichael over events is that the media provides them with a national audience. Brown and Carmichael have argued that violence is necessary -- violence is occurring around the country -- both are reported side by side on TV and in the press. Such a recurrent linking of spokesmen for disorder and actual violence produces cause and effect associations which are difficult to dispel. Brown and Carmichael become seen as having the extraordinary and dangerous power to spell-bind Negroes into rioting.

While such a conclusion greatly exaggerates their power, it is also necessary not to underestimate the real importance of their posturing as revolutionaries in the creation of an emotional climate around the country which is conducive to violence. But here too they are not alone. The news media, the political authorities, the reports of the occurrence of actual riots are also central elements in creating a "riot climate."

It would, perhaps, be more appropriate to consider the development of a major ghetto riot, and the appearance of symbolic leaders arguing that violence is legitimate, as but different reflections of the processes of polarization going on

throughout the country. It is the role of "revolutionary spokesmen" created by the militant Negro movement which is significant and not Brown or Carmichael specifically. Previously that role was singularly filled by Malcolm X. Now new men are moving to fill the gap, rushing to keep up with events more than they are guiding them.

The real sources of Brown and Carmichael's influence thus far has been the failure of the white community to make their role irrelevant. Lacking recognition from the white community in other respects, without a place in society for themselves, young Negroes learn quickly that whites are afraid of Brown and Carmichael. When whites fear your power to cause riots they take you seriously: that is the lesson of events. In this respect whites "load the dice." The role of the militant demagogue and activist is rewarded again and again.

D. Initial Conditions in the Spread of Disorder

"Loading the Dice" occurs within disturbances. At any phase, the events that have gone before shape the events that follow. This begins before actual violence erupts. If aspirations have been raised but community issues and conflicts continually find ghetto Negroes on the losing end, if a high degree of community polarization has developed, if racial solidarity and militancy within the ghetto has been growing, if there is a large pool of aggressive and ambitious youth available for confrontation, it may be as difficult to contain a disturbance in its first phase as to contain an atomic chain reaction once the critical point has been reached.

This was the case in Detroit where events happened extremely fast; telescoping in a matter of hours community involvement processes that took three days to develop in Watts. In other cities where a truly explosive potential did not exist, it was very likely that a disorder would have died out of its own accord by the exercise of informal communal restraints without authority controls (e.g., mothers scold sons for rampaging, the youth not being serious about rioting, etc.).

Initial features of a disorder, where it was located, the time of day, who was involved, the weather, etc., also

were important in determining the direction an incipient disturbance was to move. Whether the people who initially became angry and riotous were marginal elements of the Negro community or whether they were stable residents was an important consideration. Disorders that began around or near housing developments, shopping centers, or other places where ordinary people in the community gathered always had an extremely dangerous potential.

Grievances in the Riot Process

Like the question concerning the role of Negro leadership in events, the question of the role of grievances, or the grievance process in disorders, is also complicated. There is a popular model of riot causes which sees a high level of unacted grievances, producing community tensions, which in turn produces riots. This theory is popularly held by people who have programs or ideas that they would like to sell, that would ameliorate tensions by reducing grievances.

But there were cities in which the grievance level in an absolute sense, was very high during the summer of 1967 which did not experience aggressive Negro riots. There were others in which the grievance level was much lower which did have aggressive ghetto rioting.

The importance of grievances in an event seems to be determined less by the level of grievance than the kind of grievance involved. People do not riot for better

schools, but they will riot against the police and government as outside oppressors. Concerns for territory, domination, and anger of "double standards" (social injustice) run like a common thread through most of the largest disorders.

In Plainfield, the "double-standard" issue of a policeman failing to make an arrest Negro youth thought he should have was the immediate precipitant.

In Cincinnati, the issue of "double-standards" in the courts generated a sense of rage as a Negro was sentenced for murder and a white man for manslaughter within the same month. The first act of direct action was the stopping of delivery trucks by youths tired of seeing jobs in Negro areas go to whites.

In Detroit, the failure of a white newspaper to carry news of a Negro Vietnam Veteran's murder at the hands of a white mob, generated outrage as the local Negro newspaper reported the incident, including the miscarriage of the murdered man's pregnant wife, in full detail. Shortly thereafter, a police arrest a few blocks from where the murdered man lived found an agitator haranguing an angry crowd that the police wouldn't do what they were doing in a white area.

In Los Angeles in 1965, the plaintive appeals of a Negro youth that he was not going to let the police take

him to jail, aroused a tug-of-war between local community residents and white police which was the first incident in the Los Angeles riot.

In Newark, a massive urban renewal project which would displace thousands of Negroes became the source of a bitter political struggle between the Italian Political Leadership and Negro militants, and was considered an important "cause" of the riot. Later, the belief of neighborhood residents that the police had not only beaten a taxi-cab driver but had beaten him before they got him to the police station catalyzed a mood of rebellion and

Grievances arising out of leadership competition within the Negro community played an important role in precipitating and shaping several disorders.

In Newark, leadership competition between the Negro militants opposed to the mayor of Newark and the group of conservative Negro leaders who supported him in part prevented an effective counter-riot response to the developing crisis.

In Cincinnati, the first outbreak of violence followed a speech by a Negro conservative at a protest rally which supported an anti-loitering law and angered Negro youths.

In Dayton's June 1967 disturbance, an intense controversy between militants and conservatives over the funding of an anti-poverty program found a militant leader threatening a riot which shortly occurred.

In Cambridge, white fear began to mount as two newly-forming Negro groups, one conservative, one militant, began to compete for the leadership role left vacant for several years after the 1963 demonstrations.

In Grands Rapids, entrenched vice elements in the Negro community, who were being threatened by the rising influence of poverty workers in the community attempted to use the disorder to buttress their declining domination.

In Detroit, a developing indigenous community organization leadership of a very militant character was threatening established middle-class leaders who were well-incorporated into the Detroit political system. The latter were willing to go along with a policy of extreme repression the first day of the disturbance. Since the riot, they have been outraged at the willingness of city leadership to meet directly with lower-class representatives, and have fought increases in power for the militant groups. Finally the grievance process - the effectiveness of the response of authorities to Negro grievances whatever these are - can be a crucial source of grievance itself.

The substantive grievances (neighborhood services, schools, housing, etc.) serve as indicators for measuring just exactly how much white authorities care about Negroes. They become tests of commitment as it were. If there is doubt as to how serious whites are about improving Negro circumstances, grievances can be expected to escalate as more tests are made to confirm how bad the situation really is.

This seems to be extremely crucial for developing a mood of rebellion. By the second evening in Newark, people were way beyond the stage where they would be willing to accept a token concession in exchange for an abatement of anger which had been so long in developing, through so many tests. Once that mood was there a sudden concession itself triggered disorder as Negroes so to speak threw the concession of a Negro police captain back into the faces of the authorities with the attitude "keep it, you can't buy us that cheaply now."

E. The Competitive Process in Developing Disorders

Negotiations at such points fail because many people want combat more than peace. During a disorder itself, a competitive sense among Negro youths may become a powerful impetus to keeping the violence going. In Newark, some youths did not want to stop the riot because

the score in deaths stood "25 - 2" with the police and guardsmen leading.

The Game of Riot: Emasculating the Police

Within various groups on the street, people were quite conscious of the heroism and daring exhibited by young men. For Negro youth, challenging the police with taunts and dares involved a dangerous and dramatic competition. Their goal was to disrupt police order, to make the police "lose their cool," to produce situations in which police worked until they "dropped in their tracks." Much of the behavior of the youth during a riot can be accounted for by this motivation: they are not interested in killing policemen, they are interested in humiliating them. As Negroes have been rendered powerless for so long, as the police have continually disrupted the activities of the ghetto, the disorder becomes the grand opportunity to turn the tables.

The riots in this respect, also serve the functions of "ritual ceremonies" in which manhood is demonstrated. Many acts of confrontation (e.g., laying bear the chest and taunting police to shoot) which have a great intensity and seriousness about them are also dramatic posturing -- open and public proof to both oneself and the police that things have changed. The test has dangers, but afterwards one can never go back to what he was before.

This form of street confrontation with the police, it should be noted is not a new phenomena. If we include the southern non-violent movement, it has been going on for 6 years. In the south during 1962-1965 militant civil rights activists, many of whom were of northern background, became experts in the techniques of disorganizing southern police through non-violent demonstrations.

Negro youth in the north are now the aggressors. Instead of non-violent demonstrations, however, breaking white property, setting fires, and racial taunting have become major aspects of the techniques of breaking up the police.

Much Negro youth crime has always had this quality of testing by street games with authorities. Confronting police and courts in efforts to prove that one does have some kind of place in society -- if only a criminal one -- does have functional basis. Those who have served time return to their old associations with a new status as someone who is really tough and knows the ropes.

What is distinctive now is that this same process feeds into community confrontation. Traditional street testing behavior by Negro youth is channeling into the disruption of city institutions. The massiveness of the disruption in a

riot stems from the fact that a great number of youth are getting their badges of manhood all at once. Previously, this occurred through the orderly and recurrent process of one-by-one confrontation which white institutions easily handled in the past.

Cross-City Competition

Evidence in our data indicate that cross-city competition among youth: "who holds the record, now?" becomes a salient force once control by police is lost. Cities that have already had major upheavals acquire symbolic value and become standards for comparison in other disturbances. For some participants there is a quite explicit desire to outdo New York, or Watts, etc. A Negro girl in Newark asked a reporter, "Was the Harlem riot worse than this?" and assured that it was not, she cried, "that's good, that's great!"

Distinctive features of several major disturbances during the summer of 1967 can in part be attributed to the excitement generated among young Negroes that they were either doing something in a riot that had not been done before or that they were doing better than ever. Negro youths in Newark were quite proud over the fact that they were the "first" to ever lay siege to a police station. As the governor passed by in a National Guard tank, there were heated street side discussions on "How do you get into a tank with a Molotov cocktail?"

There is no reason to preclude the possibility of disruptive acts more consequential than any that have yet occurred. The "first" tank to be fire bombed, the "first" power station to be blown up, are but logical extension of the present pattern of disorder. "We're number one!" after all is an old American tradition.

NEGRO YOUTH AND CIVIL DISORDERS

The majority of the residents in American ghettos today are under 25 years old, and the proportion of Negro youths in the cities is growing rapidly. One has only to look at the figures on public school enrollment today to see the face of the future: 29% of Chicago's population is Negro, but Negro pupils constitute 52% of those in school; Detroit is 37% Negro while the schools are 56% Negro; in Newark Negroes make up 43% of the population and 75% of the school enrollment; and in the District of Columbia they constitute 62% of the population and 88% of the pupils.

Statistics and averages in themselves, of course, do not necessarily denote social or political efficacy; the majority of the white population are also young, but the society is controlled by older adults. Although an inchoate social movement seems to be growing among white youths, especially in the universities, the fact remains that most of them are willing to accept the society which others before them have fashioned. Even the protestors are eventually drawn into the folds of corporate America.

Such is not the case with Negro youth. While many of their activities may be seen as part of a larger more diffuse movement among American youth, their history and position in society have made them a more distinct social group, set apart

from our major institutions. About a fifth of Negro youth drop out of high school before graduating; about a quarter of them are unemployed, and a majority of the rest are employed in low-paying menial jobs.

The generational gap between Negro youth and their parents is much greater than among whites. One of the most frequent complaints of Negro parents is that they cannot control their youngsters. Because of systematic discrimination, Negro parents have been unable either to find adequate positions for themselves in the large society or to open doors to their offspring. And on the whole Negro youths reject their counsels of moderation and reject those aspects of the society which reduced them to virtual impotence. The current riots cannot be understood without recognizing that Negro youths today more than ever are rebelling against the impotence which they see in their parents.

One of the most substantial causes of the generational gap among Negroes is the difference in the life experience of Negro youths and their parents. Most Negro youths today were either born in or grew up in an urban environment. About three-quarters of the non-whites under age 30 in the northeastern United States were born in the North; that is, in northern cities. A large proportion of their parents were

born and raised in the rural South, where the forces compelling Negro submissiveness were greatest. The movement from the countryside to the cities within the South is also very substantial, but as the environment in southern cities is more repressive than in the North, rebelliousness among Negro youth there has been slower to develop.

Not only are Negro youth today urbanized; they have also grown up within the context of an historical experience which has greatly effected their attitudes and expectations. In 1954 the Supreme Court's school integration decision opened a crack in the massive facade of governmental indifference to the injustices suffered by Negroes. The most important immediate effect of that decision was not to bring about integration of the schools, but to foster among many Negroes the sense that change for the better was possible, that collective action was a viable alternative. The emergence of the activist civil rights movement began in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1956 and was greatly augmented by the spread of the sit-ins after 1960. The rank and file of the civil rights movement, as well as much of its leadership, were youths, both black and white.

Although only a small fraction of Negro youths were actually involved in the movement, it has a profound effect on all. The ferocity of white reaction in Birmingham, the bravery of black

activists in Mississippi, the demonstrations in city after city -- all broadcast over television -- became part of the life experience of the present generation of Negro youth. No wonder that in some of the riots the cry, "This is for Birmingham!" is heard.

Negro youths today are increasingly race-conscious and militant. They reject the compromises and social stance of their parents, have a strong sense of their own independence, make greater demands upon the large society and press them with more vigor. In terms of numbers, imagination, and initiative they are the major social force in the ghettos.

Yet the larger society has failed to provide them with a role commensurate with their legitimate expectations. The dreary statistics on employment, education, recreation, and so on, for Negroes are too well-known to need repeating.

When the expectations of a minority are not met on an individual basis and as a matter of course, they eventually become collective demands in the political arena. But today the channels of access to political decision-making are largely blocked to Negroes, and especially to Negro youth. In a democratic society with a racist majority, racism infuses politics as it does other spheres of action: the fate of local referenda on open housing, civilian review boards, and a variety of other racially sensitive issues makes that abundantly clear.

Lack of political access is particularly striking in the case of Negro youth, a fact which is even more compelling because it is they who are most insistent that their demands be met and readiest to take violent action if they are not. Negro youths are virtually without formal representation in government; Negro representatives are usually older, middle class, and much too moderate to speak for them. Nor, with few exceptions, are less formal channels open to them.

Within the past five years there has been an enormous proliferation of local black militant groups in the ghettos. Their rank and file is for the most part composed of politically engaged youths, their leadership drawn from young disaffected members of the Negro middle class. These groups both express and stimulate the growing militancy in the ghettos; it is they above all which give voice to the demands of Negro youth.

Yet in city after city mayors have refused to recognize these groups as legitimate spokesmen and to heed their demands. Local authorities prefer to listen to the older, more moderate Negro leadership, and even then they have made pitifully few concessions. The warnings of violence uttered by the militants were at first regarded as empty threats; now they are regarded as blackmail. The point is long past when mayors and alermen -- and indeed the country as a whole -- can afford to dismiss

the demands of Negro youth as merely the irresponsible mouthings of a bunch of dissatisfied kids.

The classic conditions of rebellion are thus evident in the ghettos today: a major social force, greatly dissatisfied with the status quo, leavened by militant leadership, independent in its thinking, and increasingly aware of its own potential is virtually locked out of political power. When established political relations no longer reflect predominant social forces, a rising class -- in this case Negro youth -- is inclined to take matters into its own hands.

Under the circumstances, only a spark is required to set off a riot. Usually that spark has come from police action. It is no coincidence that one of the most conservative and racist institutions of white society is in constant conflict with the most race-conscious and aggressive force in the ghetto. In the recurrent clashes between police and Negro youths the front line forces of the white society meet those of the black. And today any of these clashes is likely to cause each side to call forth its partisans in increasing numbers.

Little wonder, then, that Negro youths have been in the forefront of current ghetto riots. While other types of people may be drawn in, especially in the larger outbreaks, the youths provide the real momentum. Their preponderance in the recent riots is clearly indicated in Table 1, which shows the number and percentage of riot arrestees age 25 years and under.

NEGRO YOUTH PARTICIPATION: USING ARREST DATA AS AN INDEX

<u>City</u>	<u>Total Arrested</u>	<u>Negroes Arrested</u>	<u>Number 25 yrs. or younger</u>	<u>Percent 25 yrs. or younger</u>
Cincinnati, Ohio: June, 1967	467	396	330	85%
Dayton, Ohio: June, 1967	193	176	100	57%
Dayton, Ohio: Sept. 1967	201	189	140	74%
Atlanta, Georgia: June 1967	12	12	8	67%
Tampa, Florida: June, 1967	39	37	23	65%
Newark, New Jersey: July, 1967	1465	1394	753	54%
Plainfield, New Jersey: July, 1967	148	128	89	60%
Paterson, New Jersey: July, 1967	38	38	33	87%
Jersey City, New Jersey: July, 1967	43	35	28	80%
New Brunswick, New Jersey: July, 1967	56	54	48	89%
Bridgeton, New Jersey: July, 1967	18	9	8	89%
Elizabeth, New Jersey: 1967	96	6	6	100%
Tucson, Arizona: July, 1967	5	5	5	100%
Phoenix, Arizona: July, 1967	208	119	83	70%
Detroit, Michigan: July, 1967	7231	6158	3574	58%

<u>City</u>	Total Arrested	Negroes Arrested	Number 25 yrs. or younger	Percent 25 yrs. or younger
Grand Rapids, Michigan: July, 1967	266	188	115	61%
Milwaukee, Wisconsin: July, 1967*	1566	1566	989	63%
New Haven, Connecticut: Aug., 1967	<u>529</u>	<u>356</u>	<u>187</u>	<u>53%</u>
TOTALS	12,681	10,866	6,519	60%

*These constitute all riot connected offenses committed in the disturbance area with the exception of those related to the mayor's proclamation of a curfew.

Sixty per cent of all Negro arrestees in these disturbances were 25 and under, and it should be noted that the percentage is considerably lowered by the two largest riots -- Newark and Detroit -- whose arrestees, making up three-quarters of the total, were somewhat older than those in the smaller disturbances.

The great majority of arrestees in the recent riots have been male. Of 11,504 arrestees in 21 cities which had riots this summer, 10,223 -- or almost 90% -- were males. The role of women in the riots should not, however, be minimized. They are quite prominent in the larger riots, in which territory is actually secured by the rioters. Surveys in Detroit and Los Angeles indicate that 37% and 38% of the rioters, respectively, were female. Women who participate in riots seem to be more consumer-oriented than men -- they head for the supermarkets and shoe stores. But in many cases they also play an important role in providing moral support for male rioters and often egging them on to further action.

In addition to the fact that most of the rioters were young Negro men, what data there is suggests that most of them were either born or raised in northern cities. In Detroit, over 80% of an arrestee sample had lived in Detroit over five years. According to another survey 95% of the young Negro rioters had grown up in Detroit, in contrast

to 27% of the uninvolved. In Los Angeles, too, those most active in the rioting were Northern-born; and among the migrants surveyed, those who arrived in childhood were more likely to riot than those who arrived later on. In Cincinnati, 74% of those arrested in the riot were born in Cincinnati, 9% in adjacent states, and 17% in the deep South. 55% of the rioters arrested in Plainfield, N.J. were Northern-born, though the riot area itself was predominantly (78%) "Southern" in composition. Grand Rapids seems at first to provide an exception, as only 40% of the riot arrestees were Northern-born. But even here, Northerners are greatly over-represented among riot participants, as only ___% of the Negroes in Grand Rapids were born in the North. Finally, in the two Southern cities studied, Atlanta and Tampa, a solid majority of riot arrestees were city-born.

By supplementing the extensive survey material from Detroit with information in some of the arrest reports and with another thorough survey done in Los Angeles, it is possible to fill out the portrait of the typical rioter.

An important conclusion to emerge from this information is that the rioters were by no means all poor. In some cities, such as Buffalo where 42% of the arrestees were unemployed, the very poor predominated. In others, such as Detroit and Los Angeles, there was no substantial economic

difference between those who rioted and those who were uninvolved. Indeed, one fifth of the participants in the Detroit upheaval reported family incomes of over \$10,000. This does not mean that poverty is irrelevant to participation in riots, but it does mean that poverty alone is not sufficient to explain riot behavior.

While the Detroit and Los Angeles studies show that rioters did not differ economically from the uninvolved, they also indicate that economic discontent is first among the several reasons for the riots cited by the participants. Apparently some ghetto residents were more willing to put up with economic deprivation than others. Although it cannot be stated conclusively evidence indicates that those who put up with the situation are likely to be older and more frequently of Southern origins.

The cause of the riots most frequently cited by both participants and the uninvolved was police brutality. In Detroit over half the respondents mentioned it as a major cause; in Los Angeles, too, it was the grievance most widely aired, and was considerably more common among rioters than among non-rioters.

The third major reason for the riots mentioned in these cities is disappointment at the failure of white local politicians to be responsive to Negro needs. In both cities a general distrust of local officials was much higher among

rioters than among non-rioters. It should be emphasized that it was local officials especially who were distrusted. In Los Angeles both participants and the uninvolved were inclined to take a favorable view toward the Federal government.

Finally, it is evident in both cities that rioters were much more inclined than non-rioters to be race-conscious (though respondents were not asked if they considered this a cause of the riots). This race consciousness was not so much anti-white as it was pro-Negro. Most of those interviewed did not express strong anti-white sentiments. But the difference between rioters and non-rioters in evaluating blackness was quite striking. In Detroit, over half the participants said they thought Negroes were smarter than whites, while only a quarter of those not involved took this view. This difference was also evident in responses to a variety of questions about stereotypes, e.g., who behaves better, who is braver, more dependable, and so on.

The picture of the typical rioter to emerge is that of a young, Northern-urban Negro man who is race-conscious, unhappy about his economic position (though not necessarily poor), angry at the police, and dissatisfied with the unresponsiveness of the local political structure.

It is wishful thinking to suggest that the riots are temporary aberrations, the product of an anachronistic class of Negro migrants which will soon be assimilated to urban life. Indeed evidence indicates that the impulse to violence is likely to become more common, rather than less, as the Negro's transition from rural, agricultural backgrounds to urban industrial life is completed. On the whole the rioting was most common among those whose experience represents the Negro future rather than the past.

At the same time it would be a mistake to see in the riots a massive rejection of American society. They are violent protests against exclusion and indifference, a demand that society, and especially its political leaders, be responsive to Negro needs. They are rebellious against the inequities of the system, not against the system itself. The best evidence is that conventional civic attitudes persist: the Detroit survey indicates a generally favorable evaluation of the Federal government, of the Poverty Program, and of white liberals.

What may be suggested here is that there is a substantial reservoir of pro-social civic attitudes underlying the bitterness and resentment toward the most tangible and immediate symbols of white resistance to Negro progress. Indigenous efforts can tap this reservoir, as happened for example in Watts, where Negro youth patrols helped direct traffic and maintain order during the festival given to

celebrate the second anniversary of the Watts riot.

The riots will not go away of their own accord, but at the same time the rioters themselves and many others like them are a potentially constructive force of great significance. It will require a major effort to provide a context within which the constructive potential of Negro youth can be realized; but if that effort is not made, the probability of larger, more deliberate Negro rebellions and more severe white repression is very strong.

One of the most important steps toward remedying the causes of the riots is opening channels of access to the major social force in the ghettos, Negro youth. A prerequisite to any policy in this area is that they be taken seriously, not dismissed as youthful troublemakers. Then alternative approaches may be considered.

The first is a series of governmental programs which would involve great numbers of Negro youths in activities directly relevant to their own interests. They must decide what those interests are and what those activities shall be. Further, they must have substantial power to carry out those decisions and a large measure of control over the programs themselves. The government, for its part, must be responsive and not unduly bound up in forms.

For militant and aggressive Negro youths, local anti-poverty agencies have provided one of the few channels

of access to authority, and this may well have been their most important function. As the Poverty Program applies to the ghettos, it may be more realistic to stress maximum feasible participation of the young than of the poor, because the poor as such are not much of a social force; the young are.

Certainly it is noteworthy that hardly any of those involved in anti-poverty programs have participated in the recent riots. In Detroit, for example, only 15 out of approximately 1,500 youths involved in a Neighborhood Youth Corps summer job program and 3 out of 300 youths in a job upgrading program were arrested.

A second approach would not stress the incorporation of Negro youths into government programs, but rather would stress governmental responsiveness to independent groups of Negro youths. This form of pressure-group politics might entail the location of agencies in the ghettos for the specific purpose of channeling Negro demands to the Federal government. Such an approach would require a commitment by the government to respond to a wide range of proposals, submitted by independent groups, for programs involving substantial expenditures, to be administered by the groups themselves under loose Federal guidelines.

City governments, one of the main focuses of Negro discontent, must recognize that it is demonstrably in the

interest of the cities that they should be sensitive and responsive to the demands of Negro youth. While the older Negro leadership is not entirely out of the picture, their inability to "deliver" has greatly undermined their position. The resources of city governments are of course very limited, but local officials can take an important step just by recognizing Negro youth as a legitimate political force.

Whatever approaches are adopted, they must stress the autonomy and power of Negro youth. The youth are determined, rightly, to have both, and if they cannot get them within the system, they will continue to find them in the very act of disrupting it.

At this point, a moderate policy is as bad as no policy at all. If the only feasible path is more tokenism and make-shift adaptations, the country might as well save its money. For it is precisely the expectations raised among Negroes by middle-of-the-road liberalism that provided the historical basis for the current ghetto outbreaks. Only fast-paced change or the construction of a garrison state can prevent a widening and deepening of the current Negro violence. America must decide which it will be.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CRISIS:

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

The Negro Community and the Police

A central question to emerge from the study of disorders in American cities in the 1960's is not why there has been so much violence thus far, but why there has been so little. Earlier periods of American history were considerably bloodier, and most major American cities have seen labor or ethnic riots that would make the present racial disturbances seem tame indeed. If we compare America to other countries with intense racial tensions that have experienced racial massacres in recent history, it is surprising that so few citizens have thus far been injured in racially based disputes. There are clearly powerful restraints in American society which keep its citizens of different color and ethnic background from going at each other "tooth and nail."

Since the police have been a direct party, and the better armed one, in all of the civil disturbances that have occurred, an explanation of the low degree of overall violence must focus on restraints in their behavior. Among our sample of cities, which is weighted toward the high-violence end,

in only one-third of the cases did police fire their weapons at citizens during the course of a civil disorder. The Cincinnati police department stands out as something of an extreme model in this respect. Although confronted with rioting crowds of thousands of people, with the situation out of control, there was forbearance in the use of arms. Nobody was killed, and a potential for bloody confrontation such as occurred in cities like Newark, Detroit, or Los Angeles was averted. In most of the cities where guns were fired by policemen at some point in a disturbance, these would be extraordinary exceptions to a general pattern of extreme police restraint within the event.

Considering the provocation that policemen must contend with, their lack of training in handling violence stemming out of political neglect, the emotional pressures that they feel when they fail in their task of maintaining order, the persecution feelings generated in the role of a police officer -- the sense of being a minority group -- a basic conclusion is that in most cases of disturbance policemen act with a surprising degree of discipline. That they have done as well as they have thus far in containing situations and restraining passions that would easily overwhelm ordinary

citizens is a testimony to the quality to be found in professional law officers in many American police departments.

Nevertheless there are exceptions to this general view. It cannot be overlooked that police in many cities acted in ways as to encourage, rather than contain the spread of violence. It must also be noted that the basic character of relations between police departments and a Negro community often hinders their effectiveness in controlling disorders. While answers can only be tentative and partial at this time, an examination of the role of the police in the disorders reveals some of the problems the guardians of law and order face in maintaining it.

When one considers that the ghettos are not only black, and generally poor, but that they also account for a disproportionate amount of a city's crime, it is easy to see why many beleaguered police officers become antagonistic toward and wary of ghetto residents, and why many ghetto residents in turn are antagonistic towards the police.

According to the National Crime Commission Report, personnel of some 75 per cent of the police departments in the country show evidence of strong racist attitudes.

One of the major complaints of ghetto residents against the police is that they really do not protect Negroes against crime -- Negro or white. A poll taken by John Kraft in New York indicated that inadequate police protection was second only to housing as a major grievance among ghetto Negroes. Corroborating evidence for this contention comes from a study of the Cleveland police department's response to complaints which indicated that the police took considerably longer in answering Negro calls than in answering white.¹

Not only are many police departments more willing to countenance crime in the ghettoes than in the white areas, in some cases they also participate in it. Ghetto

¹U. S. Civil Rights Commission Report on Cleveland, Ohio.

residents are usually well aware of police corruption, and many a Negro youth has first-hand knowledge of which officer gets a payoff from whom -- where and when.

Corruption in police departments is nothing new, but when combined with a growing sense of race pride among Negroes, it can result in the authority of the police being undercut drastically. One youth in Watts said, "The police used to be a man with a badge; now he's just a thug with a gun."

In some cities police activity frequently disrupts daily patterns of life in the ghetto. Ordering groups of youth on street corners to move on, breaking up small crap games, enforcing repossessions and evictions, police often harry and distract ghetto residents. Some large cities such as New York and Detroit employ stop and frisk practices which enable police officers to search people whom they consider suspicious without charging them with any violation of law. Los Angeles has a system of "field reports" which permits an officer to require that any person give information about himself to be entered on a standard form and put in police files. It is fairly common knowledge that the burden of such practices falls disproportionately upon Negroes. This daily harrassment is sometimes combined with verbal abuse which further

angers and unsettles Negroes in the ghetto. One of the images frequently encountered in the Commission's studies is that of the police as intruders who too often appear at the wrong time and for the wrong reason.

In a general sense, the police are both agents and symbols of white authority in the ghettos. As agents properly fulfilling their role, they nevertheless can come into conflict with ghetto Negroes because some of the laws they enforce are manifestly detrimental to the basic interests of many ghetto residents. For example, credit arrangements sanctioned by law often entail exorbitant interest rates and especially victimize those not acquainted with printed forms and legal detail. A man can pay for a television set twice over and still have it repossessed for failing to make a payment.

There are also cases in which police officers do not properly fulfill their role, to the detriment of ghetto residents. And there are enough documented cases of physical as well as verbal abuse by police to provide some basis in fact for the charges of police brutality frequently heard in ghettos. As in some areas of the South, part of the problem in getting these cases acknowledged is that they rarely come to trial and hence have no legal standing.

If one accepts the notion that only the perception of police brutality is real enough to be counted on, then the problem confronting policymakers is merely one of impression management. Once the myth is dispelled, the problem disappears. On the other hand, if physical abuse by police is a fact, no amount of impression management will do the job; rather, police reform is called for.

While ghetto residents have many real grievances against the police, they also use police as scapegoats. As conspicuous reminders of dominant white authority, police often take the brunt of much hostility that might more logically be directed at the larger society and its less visible institutions.

Because Negro grievances against police, though perhaps exaggerated, nevertheless have a real basis in fact; because police are in many cases disruptive to ghetto life, creating disorder; because respect for the police in the ghettos and particularly among Negro youth is almost nil, it may be argued that they make less than ideal agents of control in the current racial crisis.

The White Community and the Police

In many respects the police behave the way they do because civil authorities and the people who are most

influential in a community want the police to behave that way. This is not to say that respectable white citizens are in favor of police corruption, unfair treatment of Negroes, or bad services in Negro areas as a matter of explicit policy. Rather they have other concerns, the attainment of which may have the secondary consequence of encouraging law officers to engage in actions which will aggravate their relations with the Negro community, and estrange Negroes from local government. The processes by which this may occur are varied, but they produce the same results.

In Dayton, for example, where many influential whites share a strong traditional morality, there is an equally strong interest in the prosecution of vice. Major news stories are sometimes focused around Negro vice, much to the anger of Dayton's many middle class Negro citizens.

"Why," notes a prominent businessman, "should a policeman tip his hat to a whore?" Policemen in Dayton do not tip their hats to whores. Rather, the department's vigorous vice-squad has zealously pursued the harrassment of the limited petty vice in the Negro community to such an extent that the behavior of vice-squad officers became a cause celebre throughout the Negro community. Two out of

Dayton's three civil disorders over the past year were in part precipitated by the behavior of vice-squad officers. The most recent disturbance mentioned earlier began after a plainclothes vice-squad officer, dressed in a fez and guarding a shriner's convention, shot and killed a middle class Negro government employee.

While the occurrence of this specific act, and the immediate release on his own recognizance of the law officer who did the shooting, may **not** be the direct responsibility of white leadership, nevertheless, many Negroes perceived elected officials as being politically and socially responsible for the climate and conditions in the police department that made the slaying possible. One prominent conservative Negro leader after the slaying, expressing a disillusionment widespread among many middle class-Negroes, indicated that he was through trying to "convert" the white power structure and that after the slaying he too, "wanted to throw a brick through a window."

Cincinnati provided an even more direct example of how policies of city authorities effect police practices in ways as to place the police in the position of being enemies of large segments of the Negro community. Prior to the June, 1967, disturbance, grievances against police brutality were not a major issue among Negroes. The

department had a reputation as one of the more professional departments in the country, and the policy was one of limiting the use of weapons in making arrests in Negro areas out of deference to good relations between the police and the Negro community. There were some tensions over the enforcement of an anti-loitering law and insufficient police service in the Negro community, but physical brutality per se was not a major issue.

Following the June upheaval, however, which had strong political overtones, the civil authorities responded by announcing a "get tough" policy including the removal of the long-standing restraint on the use of weapons. This strategy, supposedly for the purpose of preventing riots in the future, had several immediate consequences in the form of incidents between the police and the community in which Negroes charge that the police have become too free in the use of their weapons. Hostility and hatred for the police is growing where little existed before.

In Plainfield, New Jersey, the site of another major upheaval, physical brutality was a long-standing issue and one on which Negroes could expect little help from civil authorities. The mayor adamantly refused to take seriously Negro complaints, while within the Negro community, the issue was so pervasive that the street lore included a "ten most wanted list" of Plainfield's

most brutal policemen. Efforts by the Human Relations Commission to investigate charges by interviewing accused policemen was roundly rejoined by the mayor as an example of "gestapo tactics." The general orientation of civil authorities seemed to reflect the idea that investigation of Negro grievances in the matter of police practice would only undermine the morale of the police and the community's respect for law and order.

In Newark, many incidents preceded the big explosion between Negro ghetto residents and the predominantly Italian police force. Frequent complaints from Negro organizations about police brutality and harrassment finally generated a response from the Italian mayor during the Newark crisis, that he would aks the FBI to intervene in assessing the validity of brutality complaints, something which is not in their power unless Federal law is violated. The resistance to a serious examination of Negro charges of physical brutality can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the mayor and the majority of police are members of the same tightly-bound ethnic community which has been struggling to maintain its precarious political hold over a city which now has a majority Negro population.

Whatever the specific causes, the attitudes of civil authorities in many cities are crucial determinants in

underpinning police practice and providing it with direction. In some cases, of course, police autonomy can be so considerable that civil authorities are highly limited in their abilities to affect any aspect of police jurisdiction. Or liberal attitudes by police leadership and civil authorities on the race issue may be confronted by intransigent attitudes at lower echelons.

How Police Practices Can Precipitate Riots

These factors have played an important role in the precipitating incidents in many of the disturbances studied. In Newark, Plainfield, Dayton, Grand Rapids, and Bridgeton, New Jersey, Negro perceptions of police brutality were central to the beginning of the violence. In four of the five cases, the evidence for Negro contentions seems compelling. In Dayton, for example, a white officer shot a middle-class Negro man to death, claiming afterwards that he had mistaken the bulge in his coat pocket -- a pipe --

for a gun. After the shooting the officer left the scene, returned shortly with a pistol, and placed it in the victim's hand.

In other cities, disruptive police activities played a prominent role either in starting the violence or in escalating it once started. In Detroit, it was a raid on an after-hours place in which a group of Negroes, including some leaders of neighborhood associations, were holding a party for two Negro soldiers about to be sent to Vietnam and two just returned. In Cambridge, Maryland; Rockford, Illinois; and several cities in the "Jersey string" the large-scale mobilization of police forces in anticipation of Negro violence had a great deal to do with provoking the violence (which in all these cases was minimal). In Cambridge a deputy sheriff fired two shots toward a small group of Negroes walking toward the town's Negro-white dividing line. In Rockford on an ordinary Friday night, police began clearing the streets in the ghetto at 1:00 A.M., closing time for the bars.

It was in reaction to these efforts to clear the streets that the first bottles and bricks were thrown. The escalation of a riot by disruptive police action was evident in Plainfield, New Jersey, where the biggest night of violence was precipitated by county police breaking up an orderly meeting of Negro youths assembled to air grievances and select representatives.

The fact that complaints against police are numerous among ghetto residents, particularly the youth, also figures prominently in the disturbances. It underlies many cases of resistance to arrest which sometimes serve as the initial spark. In the Dixie Hills disturbance in Atlanta it was the effort of police to subdue a young man and his sister that drew a crowd which then began throwing rocks and bottles. To go beyond our sample, resistance to arrest also provided the spark in Los Angeles (Watts), Philadelphia and Rochester, among others. In other cases not included in this sample, disturbances have emanated from a situation which police engage in a tug-of-war with a crowd trying to free an arrestee. In almost every disturbance examined there has been considerable evidence

that Negroes on the streets either as active participants or as spectators do not regard the presence of the police as legitimate. Rather, they are seen simply as a group of ordinary men -- perhaps meaner than most -- with no special authority.

Considering the full range of riots since 1964, it seems that the National Guard receives considerably more respect from ghetto residents than police -- in part because they are seen as representing the Federal government, in part because they have not been compromised by a history of conflict with Negroes in the ghetto, and in part because they represent a vastly superior force. At the same time it should be noted that as the disorders become more numerous, more intense, and more political, respect for the National Guard is declining. And matters are not helped any when guardsmen as jumpy and trigger-happy as some of those in Detroit, or as vengeful as those in Newark who walked the length of a city block shooting up Negro stores, are sent in to quell a riot.

Traditional Police Views of Crowds: An Obstacle to Civil Peace?

Another factor which sometimes limits the effectiveness of police forces in their efforts to control disorders is the view held in many police departments that all rioting

crowds are wild and irrational, and the rioters themselves are nothing but criminals, hoodlums, "riff-raff." This view of the riots is the one most frequently advanced by police officials interviewed. Of course, a riot is lawless, but it is begging the question to rely upon this self-evident fact as an explanation of events; and neither the behavior nor the composition of riot crowds generally support this view.

It is clear that the classical conception of crowds, characterizing them as whimsical, unprincipled, irrational, and wild so distorts reality as to be of very limited value. In disturbances examined for this study, many different kinds of crowds were involved. At one extreme, the crowd rioting in Dayton, Ohio, in 1966 was a close approximation of the traditional concept -- drunken, raucous, and opportunistic. Of those arrested in this Dayton disturbance, two-thirds were charged with drunkenness, almost half had prior felony convictions. But even here the violence started as a protest against a perceived instance of racial injustice -- the shooting of a Negro, it was thought by white men. At the other end of the spectrum were the well-disciplined and purposeful "crowds" of youths in New Brunswick and Englewood, New Jersey, who obviously had made plans to create disturbances as a means

of impressing their political demands upon local authorities. Although arrest data do not allow an assessment of employment or educational status of arrestees from these two disturbances, it is a fair guess that these youths were not drawn from the lowest levels of society, as the Negro communities in which they lived are two of the most prosperous in New Jersey.

For the purposes of this analysis, a rough distinction can be made between crowds which have little collective purpose and solidarity, and those which have a great deal. Of the disturbances studied so far, those in which the former predominate are usually best seen as inarticulate outbursts of frustration; those in which the latter predominate, as political disturbances, whose intent is to gain both political recognition and concrete benefits.

If an incoherent outburst of frustration is treated as a political riot by public authorities, the efforts are likely to prove futile. In Dayton, 1966, for example, the mayor bargained with the man who claimed to be the leader of the riotous crowd, only to discover that the man was completely unable to "deliver" control. In effect, the crowd was not interested in making demands and was without political leadership. Under the circumstances,

only a technical approach to riot control -- e.g., one emphasizing appropriate police tactics and weaponry -- could be effective. On the other hand, a purely technical approach to a political riot may be equally ill-advised. Since public authorities in each of the clearly political disturbances examined have been at least willing to meet with representatives of the rioters, there is no example of an effort to contain this type of violence entirely by technical means. But perhaps the nearest example of this approach is seen in the Plainfield disturbance where county police, insisting upon the letter of the law, broke up an orderly meeting at a park because the youths in attendance had failed to secure a park permit.

The chief reason why a technical approach alone cannot be relied upon in all cases is that different disorders and their participants manifest vastly different levels of collective rationality.

Where youths, in particular, are on a "lark," there is evidence that window breaking and dancing being substitutable -- a disorder may be quelled as easily by a rock-and-roll party in the streets as by police repression.

If a riotous bar crowd on the streets is dispersed, its members will probably end up back at the bar in days to come, caught in the same old rut. But if a political crowd is suppressed, many of its members will meet in

apartments, on the streets, or in teen hangouts to talk about what steps to take next. The political crowd has a collective purpose which if blocked in one direction will show up in another. As long as some police commands remain insensitive to the nature of crowds they are called upon to control, the likelihood of isolated instances of black terrorism in the next few years cannot be ruled out.

The Tactics of Rioters: Their Impact on Police Discipline.

Very often ghetto riots involved two distinctly different types of control efforts. The more obvious is the attempt of authorities to effect a return to the status quo ante. The less obvious is the effort of many riot activists to demonstrate their own power and efficacy by controlling some segment of the riot action -- not so much in telling other rioters what to do as in keeping police, firemen, and police officials off balance.

The latter is a negative control, intended to keep the situation open and amenable to Negro initiatives more than to establish any routine. In Detroit, Newark, and Watts, among others, there was evidence of patterning in false fire alarms. Some of these would draw fire engines into

one area at the same time that large fires were beginning to burn in others. False alarms were also turned in (and real fires set) to draw firemen into ambushes of bricks, bottles, or occasional sniper fire. The taunting and harrassment of policemen, too, is an example of efforts by rioters to exercise control. Police officers are put on the spot, torn between their professional obligations and their personal inclinations.

When the regular agents of social control are distracted, drawn at a frantic pace from one section to another, and effectively neutralized, the rioters have control of the ghetto streets by default. This is the point at which the word spreads as it did in Watts, Newark and Detroit that the rioters have "beat the police." It is also the turning point of the big riot, ushering in the most dangerous and destructive phase. For it is at this point that the police, humiliated by their own inefficacy, prepare to turn the tables, and with the help of the National Guard, to retaliate. On this day -- the third or fourth -- the death toll begins to mount sharply as agents of social control begin to kill rioters, bystanders, the uninvolved, and occasionally each other.

Counter-Rioters: Their Role in Quelling Disturbances.

In many cities active counter-rioters have played an important role in dampening the disturbances. In Tampa, Florida; Elizabeth, New Brunswick; and Plainfield, New Jersey, police were ordered out of the disturbance area and ghetto residents patrolled the streets persuading others to go home. In all four cases the tactic worked, but in some of the disturbances outside our sample it has been unsuccessful. In West Side Chicago in the spring of 1966, police withdrew from a disturbance area only to find that the neighborhood leaders could not really control those who were supposed to be their followers.

The decision whether or not to withdraw should be based on a number of assessments of the situation. Are the police under the circumstances more likely to provoke violence than to restrain it? Are the Negro leaders who offer to cool things down really the leaders of those who are rioting? If so, is their leadership likely to be effective in this crisis situation, as opposed to more routine times?

In each of the four cases in which the tactic was successful the counter-rioters differed. Those in Tampa, called "white hats" because of the helmets they wore, were themselves young riot leaders co-opted by the city administration in the midst of the event, given helmets, a pep talk, and official blessings, and turned out onto the streets to settle things down. Many of them went about their new job with zeal, using physical force if necessary to put down rioters. Dayton, Ohio also mobilized Negro youths as counter-rioters, but it is not clear whether the police withdrew from the disturbance area. To judge from the evidence in these two cities, and in Chicago, Atlanta, and Boston, where similar units have been formed, the white hats -- if that may be used as the generic term -- are young, tough, and dispossessed. Economically and socially they seem to be well below the average for ghetto residents. Like the Mobile Guard in nineteenth-century France, and a good many other counter-revolutionary forces, they seem to be composed of young members of an underclass who are bought (in this case by the bestowal of prestige rather than money) by public authorities and turned against the rebels.

The counter-rioters in Elizabeth called the "Peacekeepers" resembled the white hats in that they wore

public symbols of authority -- armbands -- while trying to cool down the disturbance. But they differed from the white hats in that they were not predominantly youthful, nor predominantly members of the underclass. They represented a wider range of age and social class. In New Brunswick the counter-rioters were in effect the same youths who had been causing the disorder. When it became clear to them that the mayor would listen and respond to their older representative and that the police would be withdrawn, they simply refrained from making any further disturbance. Finally, in Plainfield, the emergent leader of the politically oriented youth in that riot apparently directed the patrolling of ghetto streets after authorities had agreed to withdraw police and to release a dozen prisoners.

In several cities the efforts of counter-rioters were frustrated by police and authorities, or by mixups among all parties concerned. In Milwaukee police arrested several young Negroes who were trying to cool things down and who had letters from the state director of industrial and labor relations to confirm their purpose. The police also turned down the request of the Milwaukee CORE leader that they withdraw while he tried to persuade the youthful participants in the disturbance to go home.²

² From the evidence available, it is not clear that he could have controlled the youths, though it might be argued that little would have been lost in trying.

In Cincinnati, despite an agreement between the mayor and Negro leaders that the latter would be given badges and allowed to go into the riot area to help quiet things down, police refused to recognize the badges and arrested many of these counter-rioters. The arrest of counter-rioters (not only those with badges) occurred frequently during the course of the riot, apparently because police officers regarded the situation as a police problem and guarded their jurisdiction closely. The arrest of counter-rioters in other cities also seems to involve an insistence by police on their jurisdiction and competence, both of which are points of considerable sensitivity, especially in the current racial crises.

In New Haven, the leaders of the Hill Parents Association in the disturbance area had persuaded members of a crowd which had broken some store windows to sweep up the glass and debris in the street. But the truck bringing brooms from downtown did not get past police lines.³ As the brooms did not arrive the leaders of HPA were unable to hold the crowd.

³There are conflicting stories as to why the trucks did not enter the area.

Crowd Dispersal: An Effective Police Tactic?

Traditional riot control tactics are based on certain assumptions about the character of crowds, as mentioned before, and on the assumption that unruly crowds constitute the chief problem confronting authorities. Considering the recent ghetto riots, neither set of assumptions is necessarily valid. The character and composition of crowds has already been dealt with. As was pointed out above, the utility of a strictly technical emphasis on crowd control in dealing with all types of disorders is open to question.

In the cases examined a crowd has been present at the beginning of each riot; it seems to be prerequisite to getting the riot started. There is something about the size and intensity of a crowd acting in defiance of authority which breaks the balance of routine and creates a sense of the extraordinary. A Harlem youth, describing his reaction to seeing a crowd about two blocks away at the beginning of the 1964 riot, said: "First I thought, 'Something's happening!' Then I thought, 'Man! The lid's off!'"

If it is generally true that a crowd is necessary to create the air of collective permissiveness that draws

others into a riot, it follows that the formation of a crowd in the first place should be prevented. Many police departments, recognizing this, now respond to calls without sirens whining and lights flashing. On the other hand, it is a practice in many large cities for police to answer fairly routine calls with massive force. It is not uncommon to see half a dozen or more squad cars arrive on the scene within five minutes to arrest an obstreperous drunk. The reasoning is that enough officers must be on hand to leave no doubt as to who is in charge. At the same time, it must be recognized that the more cars, the more likely a large crowd is to assemble.

Although the original formation of crowds should be discouraged, it does not follow that a crowd already formed should be dispersed, by police action. Given the fact that respect for police in the first place is minimal, initiatives which tend to embroil officers with members of a crowd -- particularly where physical contact is involved -- can easily lead to the first barrage of bricks and bottles. In Englewood, New Jersey, the efforts of police to force Negro bystanders into houses, whether or not they were the right house, caused great indignation and sparked a violent reaction by young Negroes. In

Rockford, Illinois, police tried to clear a late-night bar crowd off the streets, provoking the first instances of rock and bottle throwing.

After the initial acts of violence by members of a crowd, efforts to disperse it may entail three distinct dangers, depending on the circumstances. First, if police strength is not adequate to control a street after it has been cleared, the efforts to disperse the crowd are simply inviting trouble, not the least because it demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the police. In Newark when members of an angry crowd were pelting the police station with rocks, bottles, and a few fire bombs, the police made several sorties into the crowd, laying on with their clubs, and each time withdrawing back to the station. This seesaw motion demonstrated the crowd's parity with the police and still left the rioters in control of the street.

The second difficulty with crowd dispersal, again depending on the circumstances, is that even if police have sufficient strength, the dispersal may cause an escalation of the violence. In New Haven, after the first instances of Negro violence the mood of the crowd was still tentative. A small crowd walked down the center of the street toward

police lines, followed by a much larger crowd on the sidewalks. When they reached the perimeter, police laid down three canisters of tear gas. The crowd ran quickly down the street breaking windows and starting to riot in earnest. To accurately assess the alternatives open before the tear gas was fired, we need more information about what went on at the police lines as the crowd drew near. Was it possible that the members of the crowd would have been talked out of trying to break through the police lines, if indeed that was their intention? There was a second line of police behind the first: might they not have been used to better effect?

A third difficulty with crowd dispersal is that the scattered members of the crowd may do more damage than the crowd itself. It's somewhat as if a man were to stamp on a burning log trying to put out the fire, only to see sparks and embers scattered over a wider area. The riots in both New Haven and Milwaukee spread this way and in the opinion of a New York City police investigator who examined the police tactics in Milwaukee, the small scattered bands of rioters presented the police with a more difficult situation than the original crowd, which was not very destructive and could be kept in view.

The foregoing is not to suggest that crowd dispersal never works. In a number of cases, it was decisive in ending the disturbances, though in each case the crowds and the disturbances themselves were small. Several of

these disturbances were largely the product of policing in the wake of larger riots. Englewood, New Jersey, police and their reinforcements had little trouble with the Negro crowd confronting them because they outnumbered the "rioters" three to one (300 to 100).

The emphasis of crowd-control in traditional police training for riots is probably overdone. While the pressure of a large crowd in the streets is nothing for police to rejoice over, it may be preferable to the alternatives, especially if the crowd is not particularly violent. Often the risks of dispersal -- escalation and spread -- are greater than the risks of simply containing the crowd, keeping an eye on them, and looking for influential leaders with which to negotiate.

The Perimeter Approach: A Safeguard Against Over-Commitment.

To judge from the 20 cases under examination, the early establishment of a perimeter to contain the violence seems to be safer as a first step than an effort to saturate the area and clear the streets. It leaves open the possibility that once contact with police is broken, the potential for violence in the crowd will peter out, as happened in Tucson. It gives police a chance to build up their forces, information about the cause of the disturbance, make plans, and stay cool, as they did in Dayton 1966,

Tampa, and Phoenix among others. It should be pointed out, however, that the disturbances in Dayton and Tampa did not end when police broke contact with rioters to set up a cordon, the tactic simply enabled police to make the most effective use of available manpower at the time.

The cordon tactic also assures that police will not over-commit themselves, thus preventing a major tactical error. For, in taking on more than they can handle, police both provoke rioters and demonstrate their own impotence. In a number of cases, single police officers have been placed in a riot area to protect one or more stores. An officer in these circumstances finds himself in an almost impossible position if confronted with a crowd determined to break into the store. He is alone and without authority in the eyes of the crowd. If he risks shooting he may be killed himself, if he does not, he has no way of stopping the crowd. More often than not, he will sensibly crack a few jokes with members of the crowd, then look the other way as they pour through the windows.

A great danger of over-commitment lies in the fact that police place themselves in a situation in which their own frustrations and antagonisms become enormous, producing erratic behavior, causing a breakdown in professionalism and discipline, and in too many cases turning individual officers

into avengers of their personal and departmental pride. The number of innocent deaths in Detroit, Watts, and Newark, and the circumstances under which they occurred provide compelling evidence of such a breakdown among many members of the police and National Guard.

The National Guard: An Adjunct to Local Police or a Buffer Against Violence?

The relationship between local police and state and national control forces, particularly the state police and the National Guard, is also a critical issue in the control of disturbances. Some police departments would clearly like to have a reservoir of state and national troops available at their disposal. These would be used at the discretion of police department leadership, in the event that routine police force is unable to contain disturbances. The underlying assumption is that the proper function of state police and military power in all cases is to buttress that of local law officers.

Organizationally and tactically, this may mean such practices as assigning three or four Guardsmen to accompany a policeman as he goes about his job of making arrests.

For all intents and purposes the policeman has been given three or four extra guns, while the guard has been fragmented from an independent command unit into a collection of smaller groups and individuals, often acting in isolation.

If a police department is highly professional, and skilled in handling civil disorders, with police order and discipline intact, this may not cause too many problems. In other cases, it can stimulate excessive and illegal repressive activities as policemen, desiring revenge, and wishing to show their guard associates how "tough" they really are with law breakers, do rash things in the name of law and order.

On the other hand, guard personnel, particularly if they are untrained and inexperienced in disorders, can give full vent to trigger-happy dispositions if they are isolated from the central authority of their military commanders. Through rumor processes, poor information channels in distinguishing when a shot is coming from a sniper or coming from other officers, and the release of personal inhibitions, they can be drawn into the same disorder-creating activities that afflict the police.

A crucial problem in the disposition of national guard and state police forces, thus, is whether or not the

local police are one of the central agencies of disorder that needs to be controlled. In Cambridge, Maryland, only independent and highly professional state police and national guard commands prevented a police-initiated bloodbath against Cambridge Negroes in the aftermath of minor disorders following a speech by H. Rapp Brown.

The disorder itself had flowed primarily from exaggerated fears (and a state-of-seige mentality among white officials) that a planned attack by Negroes on the downtown business section was in the offing. The wounding of a police officer by youths enraged the town police chief.⁴

Only the refusal of the state police and national guard commanders to support precipitous police action prevented an escalation into bloody racial confrontation. Their judgment in this instance reflected a diagnoses that the best control to disorder was to control the local police.

Correct Diagnoses and Common Sense Flexibility: Preventing Police Irrationality

It is of course one thing to say that the agents of social control should keep their heads and maintain

⁴ The youths themselves were terrified they were under attack, as a police car drove up with guns sticking out the window. Earlier in the evening the Negro community had developed a sense that they too were besieged as instances of "white night-riding" followed two shotgun shots fired by a deputy sheriff toward H. Rapp Brown as he walked toward the dividing line between the black and white areas with a group of young Negroes behind him.

discipline in a situation which appears to them fundamentally chaotic, without rhyme or reason. It is another to be able to do it. Rumors spread among police as among rioters, and the inability to define the situation in reasonably accurate terms leads to irrational projections of ingrained attitudes on the part of police as it does on the part of rioters. This is especially true in the largest riots. The fact that many police harbor deep racial prejudices, when combined with the traditional conception of a riotous crowd as inherently irrational, anarchic and probably nihilistic, often gives rise to both an exaggeration of the dangers confronting them and an exaggeration of the tendency to respond violently. Almost all investigations of sniping in the recent riots have reached the conclusion that police and Guardsmen greatly exaggerated how widespread it was. There are numerous cases of control forces riddling buildings with machinegun and small arms fire in the belief that a sniper was firing from this or that window -- was it on the third floor or the fifth? -- from the roof top or from a doorway. And yet the number of caught and convicted snipers can probably be counted on one hand.

Since it is a very risky business at this stage in the game to draw up contingency plans for riot control, the emphasis in training police and National Guardsmen should be less on tactical proficiency and more on the inculcation of attitudes, the maintenance of discipline under stress, but most importantly, education as to the character of the riots themselves. If training of this sort is successful police and guardsmen should feel more on home ground during a riot and better able to keep their heads. A realistic assessment of the riot situation is the first requirement for effective control. The second is common sense.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE

Regardless of whether a disorder is random or purposive, organized or isolated, the fact that large segments of a population are caught up in it has profound consequences for the community. And how the community responds to disorder in its midst has a bearing on whether future violence is likely to occur.

Presently there are two beliefs which are popularly held regarding the consequences of urban disorder: (1) It will not help bring about constructive social change but only will lead to a worsening of the Negroes' situation, to racial polarization, and possibly to race war; (2) it will help bring about constructive change by alerting society to the scope of the racial problem and by the bargaining power which blacks gain from threats of future violence.

The Negative View: No One Wins and Negroes Lose

Most people killed and injured are black, and black homes and neighborhoods are destroyed. Jobs are lost. There is a decline in consumer services, as fearful white businessmen refuse to return to the ghetto and new Negro businesses fail to fill the void.

In addition, urban violence is seen to result in a polarization along racial lines a product of both black

and white backlash.¹ Ill-will and hatred build up.

The racial mask obscures issues and persons; race becomes the central feature of social life. Effective communication and cooperation across racial lines to improve social conditions comes to a halt.

Fear and misconceptions on both sides abound. Negro anger is increased by the actions of the agents of social control during the disturbance. Many even fear genocide or massive retaliation by whites. Whites fear Negro incursions into suburbia and demand protection. Cries for retribution emerge from both sides, Negroes and whites, partly in the name of self-defense, increasingly arm themselves. Violence triggers more violence. Negroes become sophisticated in the use of violence and the police become more repressive. Future violence may not only involve Negroes against the police, but Negro and white civilians.

On the part of whites, suppression of violence becomes the over-riding concern; while concern with black grievances diminishes or disappears altogether. Even if communication is not completely broken and some of those with power are willing to initiate change, they refrain from doing so for

¹The Gallup Poll reports that the proportion of whites agreeing that the Johnson administration is pushing integration too fast increased steadily from the February (1964) figure of 30 percent to 40 percent in August (1965) to 50 percent in September (1966).

fear of rewarding the rioters.

The Positive View

Another belief is that though violence is by no means condoned, under certain conditions, violence may have positive consequences, especially for improving communication between the contesting groups and for the establishment of a climate in which bargaining can more readily take place.

Violence as warning system. It has been suggested that the violence serves as a warning system, much like the cries of a sick man calling for help. Collective acts of civil disorder are seen to have a vital communications function, shaking society and its leaders into an awareness of the actual conditions under which black people live² and which drive some blacks to revolt. Thus, new channels of communication are developed and increased efforts to solve social problems are made.

Violence as political struggle. Another view which emphasizes positive consequences sees riots as essentially political events. This view, which plays down the communications functions of riots ("whites knew all along how bad things

²Seventy-nine percent of Los Angeles whites report being more aware of the problems of Negroes following the Watts riot. R. Morris and V. Jeffries, "The White Reaction Study," UCLA.

were") sees violence as offering a kind of power to otherwise powerless people.

While poor blacks don't have many votes, much money, or extensive political skills, they do have the power to disrupt society. Violence is seen as giving them a weapon which, once used, is more powerful as a threat than in its actual use. Thus it is suggested that riots, in making this kind of power manifest, are useful in bringing about change. Here, coercion by blacks and the fear of future uprisings forces action out of those not otherwise inclined to deal with social problems. Even if violence is spontaneous and not subject to manipulation, it may still have this function of stimulating social change.

Testing these beliefs against the facts. Now let us look at what actually happened in 14 of 20 cities which had disturbances in the summer of 1967.

In two, pre-existing racial polarization seemed only strengthened as a consequence of the violence; and few changes if any occurred.

JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY. The political situation is polarizing. The mayor continues to stress the need for the use of force and has received national publicity for his actions during the riot. He is seen to have a "might makes right" attitude and to believe that agitators, not social conditions, cause

riots. The city apparently does not recognize the need to deal immediately with ghetto problems.

Although the mayor has been meeting with militant whites and Negro clergymen to discuss community problems, police-community relations are strained. Police officers have been enrolled in a riot-control training program. Most grievances are still unarticulated in the ghetto.

The Negro former director of the poverty agency says the mayor and governor are causing further polarization of the Negro community, that they are "sowing the seeds." He says that they are forcing the Negro to the position where there is only one course he can take and only one side he can be on. He believes that more Negroes are willing to risk the "loneliness of the revolutionary" with their lives.

The mood in the ghetto is reportedly one of extreme fear. The mayor keeps saying a riot could break out again at any time, and if it does, he promises more force. Negroes are arming for self-defense, and the possibility of a real racial clash between the police and Negroes exists.

Some (small) militant groups and individuals have begun to be very vocal and critical of the political leaders in the city. The Bergen Neighborhood Organization Council condemned the mayor for unnecessary police action, calling him a racist and demanding his removal from office. The Committee

for the Exposing of Fraudulent, Irresponsible, and Unconcerned Leadership of the Lafayette Area (membership unknown) passed out a throw-sheet entitled "Good-bye, White Daddy," which said, "The time for self-appointed great white fathers has passed," and called for the removal of a county ward leader. Criticism of the Negro councilman brought this response: "Hell, you didn't put me in in '61 or '65. You were in jail then. I have spent thousands of dollars fighting for you since the 1920's and you don't scare me now." The Negroes responded by saying, "You're an old man resting on your laurels." An unsigned leaflet passed out by a Negro militant charged that the mayor had declared "hunting season on black people." Of the Negro councilman the leaflet said, "He is the man from UNCLE TOM." There is great polarization in the city, and there is great fear.

CAMBRIDGE, MARYLAND. In Cambridge the question of white backlash is not especially relevant. The great majority of whites and the white power structure are overwhelmingly pro-segregationist. In a city such as Cambridge a violent uprising isn't needed to increase segregationist sentiment. Such sentiment is the status quo.

The Cambridge disturbance was defensive and does not seem to have led to an increase in cohesion in the general Negro community. Leadership is still fragmented.

There seems to be some polarization between the two

communities, although they were quite far apart to begin with.

Negroes are afraid of white retaliation and large scale killing; many whites are reported as having a "state of seige mentality." There have been a number of arson incidents since the disturbance.

Four cities have seen post-riot changes but without significant signs of polarization.

TAMPA, FLORIDA. Whites and middle-class Negroes seem more aware of problems. There have been some efforts at job training and placement. A lessening of polarization may have occurred, owing to the increased recognition of problems by a paternalistic government.

"Young hoodlums" who participated in the beginning violence were permitted by authorities to be converted into a counter-riot force. These young men, formerly outside the system, have been somewhat brought into it.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA. Atlanta stands out in its immediate reaction to the disturbance. On the third morning of a four-day disturbance nearly ten city agencies came into the riot area to construct sidewalks, replace lights, fix sewers, clean streets, and pick up garbage. These activities were continued after the disturbance, but petered out after about one month

so that the Dixie Hills area receives the same low level of service now that it received before the disturbance. A few industries made a visible effort to hire Negroes since the disturbance, but the number hired has not been significant. Playgrounds were built in the area, and on the third day of the disturbance tickets were distributed to an Atlanta Braves' game and other recreational events.

The city claims that their actions were unrelated to the violence in June; that all of the plans for this action had been made before it occurred.

Two new groups have formed as a result of the disorder: The Ministerial Volunteers, a group of mostly white ministers and lay people are drawing-up programs for education and police-community relations. The other is a group called the Atlanta Young Men's Civic League, composed of about 60 members who were described as "young toughs," most of whom have criminal records. The Civic League is dedicated to the maintenance of law and order and will oppose SNNC in an attempt to prevent riots in their areas. A thousand riot area residents (Dixie Hills) signed a petition soon after the disturbance declaring that they believed in law and order and had no sympathy with the rioters.

Shortly after the incident, stores in the riot area (and elsewhere) thought to be unfair to Negroes were picketted and boycotted.

NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY. The limited violence in New Brunswick brought forth youth leadership of the black community and the establishment of communication among the youth, poverty agency, administration, and business community. New Brunswick represents a highly politicized situation in which the youth leaders were recognized and several of their important demands were met. There seems to be a heightened awareness on the part of the sensitive mayor of what the lives of the Negro youth are like. In turn, there is respect for her and her administration for responding in a responsible political manner and for delivering on promises.

Delivery consisted of the following: the youth center was reopened, the city rented an armory for use as a Neighborhood Center, and the business community donated five portable swimming pools for use throughout the city only a month and a half after the disorder. Several expelled students were reinstated in school, and complaints about the principal, who is a focal point of Negro discontent have been taken seriously by the city administration. A boat was donated for use as a recreation center for adult and senior citizens. Two brothers who own a barge company persuaded a friend to donate it and tow it to the city. The business community is raising \$75,000 for job training, \$25,000 of which comes from a local pharmaceutical concern.

Both sides are highly sensitized to the possible future use of violence and both sides seem to be making an honest

effort to avoid it. Importantly, the administration is perceived as really caring about the welfare of all its citizens and not simply concerned with forestalling disorder.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN. The business elite seems a little more aware of ghetto problems. A newly established chamber of commerce study group organized a program to provide 1,000 jobs in three months. However, only 80 Negroes have found jobs through this program.

Power has been reshuffled among competing Negro groups. Vice elements gained some concessions from city hall, compromising earlier changes gained by poverty leaders. There does not seem to be high expectation of violence.

In five cities though a high degree of polarization between whites and Negroes occurred, there were, at the same time signs of change.

CINCINNATI, OHIO. Cincinnati has been described as an armed camp. The whites, led especially by Appalachian migrants, are armed; and a race riot is expected by some. A police perimeter separated whites and Negroes during the last disturbance.

Bitterness and fear have increased in the Negro community. Negroes believe that police are more likely to shoot now and that a previous ban on police use of firearms has been lifted. Some Negroes have lost their jobs.

The city manager has called for a "get tough" policy, and a prominent civic leader and member of the relatively progressive committee of 28 wants the city to throw the radicals in jail and to be on guard against rewarding the rioters. The police chief blames the disturbance on Negro organizations and feels the police were not tough enough. The city budget for next year boasts an extra \$500,000 for 50 new policemen, but a request to add two men to the police-community relations unit has been denied.

Militant Negroes are reported closer together under the newly formed United Black Community Organization. The riot is said to have increased the sense of community among black people and to have raised the level of political consciousness. An Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee was established by Negro leaders to negotiate with city leaders in the wake of racial violence.

After the riot a Negro was hired as an administrative assistant to the mayor, and additional jobs for Negroes were discovered on the city payroll. Several new employment programs have been created. Some Negroes seem to feel that the traditional leaders have failed and that the more militant leaders have at least had some minor successes. Negroes are said now to be making demands rather than requests. One significant change is the role that police neighborhood centers play in

funneling complaints of the local residents. Lacking other points of access to government, Negro residents are placing pressure on police to act as communication intermediaries.

A series of small incidents have continued, particularly in high schools, following the major disturbance. Sporadic window breaking and firebombing are reported.

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY. Here to, there is marked polarization within and between racial groups. Attitudes have hardened and tensions are high. Both Italians and Negroes are reported to be arming, the Italians more rapidly than the Negroes. There was a recent cross burning. The police are reportedly very bitter, feel misunderstood, and have pulled the police athletic league out of the poverty program. Petitions have been circulated to recall the mayor and the mayor has rejected the principle of grass roots citizen participation in the decision-making process.

The Negro human relations director has been threatened with violence by whites while other Negro leaders have been similarly threatened by black revolutionaries. Thus polarization may threaten conflict within the two groups themselves, as well as inter-racial conflict between the two groups.

Important white business and insurance men, traditionally not much concerned with problems of the poor, have

become interested in improving police-community relations and are taking a more active part in dealing with community problems. A number now believe that their own interests are tied with improving ghetto conditions in Newark.

The Newark Star Ledger has editorialized in favor of more support for "responsible leaders" of the Negro community.

PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY. The most significant thing about the Plainfield aftermath is the assumption of Negro leadership by a young militant and an increased unity of the local black community. The militant has started a new group called Youth Action Movement. He is cooperating with and perhaps influencing the established Negro middle-class leaders.

Negroes have made some definite advances since the riot. The mayor has proposed a Town Meeting Program, designed to open up communications between all segments of the community and City Hall. Furthermore, two Negroes were appointed to public posts, one to the City Housing Authority and the other to the Board of Adjustments. The NAACP had been pushing the Housing appointment for some time. An effective tavern boycott was carried out. The school board has approved the presence of a third party when parents of a child meet with school officials, a measure sought by NAACP. A full-time Negro counsellor has been hired for the coming school year. Negroes voted with the majority when the City Council turned down, by a vote of 9 to 1, an anti-loitering law opposed by Negroes.

Police attitudes seem to have hardened against Negroes. Police are bitter about the death of a fellow officer and about the way the riot was handled generally. They are especially concerned by the strong influence wielded by a state human relations official who made several of the crucial decisions during the disturbance. Police morale is reportedly low, and the chief is said to be held in disrespect by the rank and file officers.

Some whites see the riot as having been instigated by outsiders. Many are reported tense. They are said to feel let down over the failure of police to maintain law and order. White contributions to the Community Chest are down and, according to the mayor, there now prevails an attitude of "let them help themselves." Many Plainfield attorneys were reported unwilling to represent riot arrestees.

The Negro community sees itself as more sophisticated about urban violence. According to one report, people have learned "you can't fight guns with sticks and rocks, and if a next time comes it is necessary to have better equipment and be better organized." The police have recovered few of the 46 carbines stolen from a local factory.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN. One important consequence of the riot has been the establishment of the New Detroit Committee, a broadly based nongovernment group consisting of industrialists, business, professional, and civic leaders, and black militants.⁷ The committee has promised 4,000 jobs, criticized the police,⁸ and offered support for an open housing law. Traditional job qualifications are being waived.

The establishment of the New Detroit Committee marks perhaps the first time that powerful whites have agreed to work actively with militant nationalist leaders.

The riot has increased the unity of the black community, and middle-class whites are reportedly more involved with the problems of the poor since the riot. Black consciousness and pride is spreading along with an increase in political awareness. A seventeen-year-old girl feels that the riot has had the important effect of teaching the police and the white community that black people are not afraid. Various black groups have reportedly decided to stop denouncing one another in public.

⁷One NDC black member is awaiting trial on charges of inciting to riot.

⁸The New Detroit Committee said the police department is "the personification of all that is deficient, intolerable, or sick in the system with which the Negro feels he must cope."

The push for black power has been supported by an increasing movement toward the development of black corporations, cooperatives, and other black-owned enterprises.

Negro minister Albert Cleage, previously unsuccessful in bids for the governorship and membership on the school board, has used the riot to develop a broader political base. Reverend Cleage's rise to power has been aided materially by the extensive publicity given him by the white press.

After the riot Cleage formed the Citywide Citizens Action Committee (CCAC), a broadly based black organization designed to serve as the political arm of the Black Christian Movement. The CCAC has been holding bi-weekly meetings in various parts of Detroit. Membership is reportedly growing rapidly. While militants hold most of the leadership positions, the organization includes moderates as well. The organization stresses self-determination for black people and threatens to burn down everything built up in the gutted areas unless the new construction conforms to their plans.

A rival organization known as the Detroit Council of Organizations has been formed by more moderate Negroes. This group claims to represent 350,000 Negroes.

Polarization among segments of the white community is also in evidence. A priest with an integrated church reports that whites are now more bitter and are less willing than before to cooperate with Negroes. A petition to recall the mayor being circulated before the riot by a white conservative councilwoman now has about one-third of the signatures needed for a recall election.

Only half of 460 food stores affected by the riot have returned to business according to the Associated Food Dealers of greater Detroit.

A white militant who leaped to prominence in the aftermath of the riot is chiefly concerned with arming other whites. He wants to make guns available at bargain prices, particularly automatic weapons. His philosophy, he states, is to kill or be killed. He wants everyone to "stay in their place." He blames the disturbance on police permissiveness.

The activities of both white and black extremists have increased anxieties among whites and Negroes in the city. Gun sales have reportedly tripled in Detroit since the July disturbance. There is apparently fear among many Negroes that whites treat all Negroes the same because they are unable to distinguish the lawless from the law-abiding.

There is fear of retaliation against all Negroes because of the activities of a few. According to some reports Negroes are being trained in terrorist techniques.

The Detroit Police Department has updated its riot equipment and requested almost \$2,000,000 to spend on new arms, communications, facilities, and armored personnel carriers.

There have been robberies of stores and pawnshops with large numbers of firearms stolen.

Negroes have been disillusioned by the lack of forceful action against those involved in the Algiers Motel incident, where three Negroes were murdered. Many are bitter over the way law officers behaved during the disturbance, the wounding and killing of innocent people, and the treatment of those arrested.

Protest activity has continued. A rent strike is now on. There was recently a disturbance at a new junior high school. Firebombings have been reported. The first month following the riot, there were 142 incendiary fires, as against a normal average of 40.

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN. White hostility toward Negroes has hardened dramatically in Milwaukee. There is fear in the white community that the racial disturbances thus far "have

not yet had their day." A George Wallace supporter has been nominated to fill a vacancy on the school board. An ex-policeman and Birchite, hated by Negroes and believed by them to be a racist has been nominated by a county supervisor to fill a vacancy on the anti-poverty board. The sale of guns is reported to have gone up in the white community, but to have gone down in the Negro community.

White reaction to the open housing marches following the riot has been very unfavorable. On the predominantly Polish southside, on the second day of their marches, Father Groppi and the demonstrators were met by crowds of unruly whites, estimated at between 6,000 and 13,000. Marchers were stoned, spat upon, and cursed. One group of white youths chanted, "We want slaves," and another, "Niggers for sale or rent; shoot 'em for fifty cents."

This backlash is countered by a small group of liberals, a more sizeable group of moderate businessmen, the two moderate papers, and -- to a lesser extent -- by the unions, whose former liberalism has been severely compromised by the racism of many of their members. A leading newspaper opposes the school board candidacy of the Wallace supporter. Many in the above group have been pushing for open housing in the hope that this will encourage the return of peace and quiet to their city.

There is cooperation among this group and militant Negroes. The Episcopal Church gave the militant Northcott House in the ghetto \$21,500 for organizational work and leadership training.

Some positive steps have been taken since the disturbance. A police-community relations man has been appointed. Various proposals and promises of programs have been made. A grass roots "command" has been appointed to a special committee of the Common Council, which is reportedly about to come out for open housing.

Evidence of increased unity among black organizations and the possibility of more effective political action by Negroes may be seen in the formation of a new federation embracing most of the existing organizations in the ghetto. The new federation, called Common View, was established to give the ghetto a single coherent organization capable of speaking for the Negro community and of bargaining with the mayor. The mayor has met with the group and has accepted some of their proposals. The effectiveness and durability of this group is doubtful; a CORE leader has already pulled out, complaining that it is too moderate.

And finally, in three cities there has been neither polarization nor change.

TUCSON. An early minor reaction was short-lived. City authorities listened to grievances and came up with 200 temporary jobs. Jobs were not among the top priority of grievances; while some of these went to Negroes most were taken by Mexican-Americans and a few whites. The youth that the city talked to were not those in the riot area.

PHOENIX. The mayor and city administration reportedly don't want to give Negroes anything, although the mayor did not make use of his reported get tough policy.

Thirty-eight mostly temporary jobs have been provided. Tension is reportedly high and rock-throwing incidents have occurred since the riot.

ROCKFORD. No one in Rockford considers that Rockford had a riot and people reportedly feel that Rockford has no problems. There was nothing much to respond to.

Negroes are intimidated by whites and fearful of a white reaction to any disorder. They reportedly try to avoid trouble.

THE EFFECT OF THE DISTURBANCES AND
ITS MEANING FOR THE FUTURE

The picture then is a mixed one. The short-run consequences of violence for the cities analyzed have been highly varied.⁴ Some cities experienced a dramatically heightened polarization, some did not; some experienced improved communications and instituted massive remedial programs, some did not. The point here is that there was neither an across-the-board heightening of polarization and backlash nor a widespread improvement in communication or massive new efforts to deal with community problems. For a majority of cities it still seems to be business as usual, perhaps with an increase in expenditures for riot-control equipment, perhaps with an additional program to create jobs, but by-in-large no major changes in either of the two directions.

There seems to be a kind of social inertia operating here which for the moment inhibits radical movement in either of the predicted directions, at least on the part of those in positions of power. Efforts designed to control future violence either by improved control techniques or by making changes in the system tend not to go beyond traditional means. Just as there is talk of non-lethal "humane" riot-control devices, so there is talk of providing a few jobs for Negroes. Both of these consequences are similar in that they represent minimal kinds of change over past practices.

⁴Since these cities have different social, cultural, political, and economic characteristics and had different kinds of disturbances, this finding is not surprising.

Taking the cities in their entirety, there is not much evidence that a bloody reign of terror or white repression is as yet upon us, nor is there much evidence that fundamental and deep-lying changes will soon be made in the structure of our local communities.

We have not yet had race riots in the classical sense, nevertheless that possibility looms as very real. As disappointment in police efforts grows, and threats of Negro encroachments on white property and neighborhoods is increasingly a matter for anxiety, the rise of white vigilantes and self-defense leagues can no longer be dismissed as improbable. There are movements already underway in some cities. The most vicious conflicts in American history have taken place around the question of racial dominance. It is surprising that a genuine race riot equaling or surpassing the horror of the post-World War I riots, or the one which struck Detroit in 1943 did not occur this past summer. What has kept some of the disturbances from being race riots is the up till now, successful police practice of keeping whites out of Negro areas and vice-versa.

In almost half of the cities described above the cleavage between white and Negro citizens is increasing. It is seen in the fear and distrust members of each group have for the other, in the talk and in the preparation for defense.

But most Americans have not made their decision to join one group or the other. Concerned mayors, businessmen, and police officials are striving to avoid further violence, not by rewarding the rioters, but by recognizing the sources of the frustrations of Negroes as that of ambitious citizens who want full participation in a society they believe in: There is no doubt from the results of the Commission's studies that though Negro youth are willing to engage in violence to get things done, they are also an enormous reservoir of pro-social civic attitudes. These attitudes, the commitment to American values, underlie the bitterness and resentment against perceived resistance of white authorities to Negro progress. In many ways the local governmental and service apparatus remains the most persistent and emphatic reminder to the young Negro that he is thought of as an inferior species.

Despite the demeaning effects of these reminders, the socialization of Negro youths provides a continuing source of basic attitudes that are supportive of and loyal to the broader features of American society. Negroes at the present time, even those who engage in violence, are not willing to reject whites, American society, or American institutions. But because this is the case now doesn't mean that it will be so in the future. Major race riots, continued governmental inaction, more frustrated hopes, will produce a bitterness which will in fact lead to a general condemnation of society.

There is still time for our nation to make a concerted attack on the racism that persists in its midst. If not, then Negro youth will be driven to attack white racism in a desperate and violent manner.

AMERICA ON THE BRINK: WHITE RACISM AND BLACK REBELLION

Five years ago racism in America was widely regarded as a Southern problem; today it has become evident that racism is a national problem. In degrees of greater or less intensity it is manifest in a substantial majority of the white population. It pervades our major institutions--some to a greater extent than others--and is one of the chief determinants of action in the society, economy, and polity. For Negroes it is an ever-present force, a fact of daily life which infuriates, annoys, humiliates, and harrasses. There is no need here to offer proof that Negroes in America--North and South--are second class citizens in fact, if not in law. Common sense observation and hundreds of volumes on the subject make that abundantly clear.

Five years ago the issue posed by the Negro movement in the South was citizenship in the political and legal sense of the term. Today the issue has become citizenship in what peculiarly defines American society: its urban, industrial, and affluent character. About three-quarters of the Negroes in the United States live in the cities, and about half the total in cities outside the South. The proportion of Negroes in every large city grows constantly, and reliable estimates indicate that half of the ten largest cities in the country will have black majorities by 1980. One has only to look at the public school enrollment today

to see the face of the future: 52 per cent of the pupils in Chicago are Negro, 56 per cent in Detroit, 75 per cent in Newark, 88 per cent in the District of Columbia, and so on.

The growing black population of the cities is young, increasingly urban, energetic, and aggressive. Negro youth, who in a statistical sense are the average citizens of the ghetto, have already become the major social force in the ghettos, and their numbers continue to grow. They are increasingly race-conscious and militant, rejecting the attitudes and social stance of their elders. The generational gap between Negro youths and their parents is enormous. And white society still finds itself unable even to take seriously their demands of the parents.

Negro youth are in the forefront of a massive urban black movement which will settle for nothing less than complete equality. The movement is beginning to take on organizational form; the number of militant groups grows daily.

When the expectations of a minority are not met on an individual basis and as a matter of course, they become collective demands in the political arena. Yet today the channels of access to political decision-making are largely blocked to Negroes. In a democratic society with a racist

majority, racism infuses politics as it does other spheres of action. The fate of local referenda on open housing, civilian review boards, and a variety of other racially sensitive issues leaves no doubt as to the will of the white majority.

In an increasing number of cities at-large elections undercut the political strength of the ghettos by placing electoral decisions in the hands of this white majority. And as the proportion of Negroes in all large cities grows, white political and civic leaders begin to talk about putting government and politics on a metropolitan basis. To be sure, there are advantages to be expected from metropolitan government, not the least of which is a more adequate tax base. But it should also be recognized that this shift will once again dilute the political power of urban Negroes, who already are a majority in Washington and Newark, and soon will be in many other cities.

Lack of political access is particularly striking in the case of Negro youth, a fact which is even more compelling because it is they who are more insistent that their demands be met and readiest to take violent action if they

are not. Negro youths are virtually without formal representation in government. Negro representatives are older and much too moderate to speak for the youth. Nor, with few exceptions, are less formal channels open to them. So the traditional prerequisites for rebellion are present: a rising class--in this case Negro youth--increasingly aware of its interests and confident of its power, is locked out politically and sees little chance of making itself heard by the normal means. For these youths ghetto riots are first of all a way of getting a hearing.

Under the circumstances, only a spark is required to set off a riot. Ordinarily the police have been able to provide it with relative ease. It is no coincidence that one of the most conservative (reactionary) and racist institutions of white society is in constant conflict with the most race-conscious and aggressive force in the ghetto. In the recurrent clashes between police and Negro youths the shock troops of the white society meet those of the black. And as often as not these days, one of these clashes is likely to cause each side to call forth its partisans in increasing numbers.

Negro youths, of course, have been in the forefront of the current ghetto riots. While most of the disorders begin

with police incidents, their meaning goes well beyond this. Of the many different tendencies evident in the outbreaks, the most salient and increasingly the predominant one is the political. At one level the riots reflect simply a demand for recognition; at another the violence takes the form of political confrontation, a sort of pressure group politics in which the pressure is Negro violence; at the highest level they have a tendency to become out and out political rebellions--efforts to abrogate, though not to overthrow, the power of the state.

The focus of Negro antagonism in the riots is white authority and white property: mainly the police and white stores. Their antagonism is directed at white dominance over Negroes rather than at white people per se. The impulse toward indiscriminate attacks on whites has been notably absent. In only one of the riots examined has a white civilian been killed by a Negro rioter; of the few police officers and firemen have only one of them unquestionably been killed by Negroes.

Despite their destructiveness, the riots have on the whole been characterized by considerable restraint on both

sides. Police and National Guardsmen in Newark and Detroit killed most of the more than 80 people who were reported killed in riots this summer. But in two-thirds of the cities examined they did not use their guns. For Negro participants the riots represented an effort to break in the door of American society, not to burn down the house. Urban, industrial, and affluent America is being confronted violently by a growing number of Negro youth who have been raised in this setting, have accepted its basic values, and want their share. In demanding to be taken seriously they are simply demanding that America live up to its ideals.

It would be a grave error to assume that the riots are just a temporary aberration, the product of an anachronistic class of Negro migrants which will soon be assimilated to urban life. Indeed, evidence from the two largest riots-- Watts and Detroit--indicates that the impulse to violence is likely to become more common, rather than less, as the Negro's transition to urban industrial life from rural, agricultural backgrounds is completed. In these two cities (and certainly in others though we lack extensive data on participation) the rioting was not localized among the migrants, the impoverished, and the disoriented. In many ways it was most common among those whose experience represents the Negro future rather than the past: young, Northern, urban, and industrial.

The Alternatives for American Government:
A Nation on the Brink

Given the situation which has been described, the alternatives presently facing American society are three, and only three. One possibility would be to continue down the same course, retaining the illusion that the violence which is occurring is only a temporary event in American history, civil disorder a bad nightmare that will naturally go away of its own accord.

The hope for a natural and spontaneous diminution of civil disorder, however, is the hope of reversing history. Such a point of view fails to understand that recent violence in the cities of this country is an aberration only in the sense that American racism as a basic dimension of the present dilemma is an aberration. The violence we see today is a consequence of a confrontation between a social order dominated by whites and a growing Negro movement which has been developing at a rapid pace since World War II.

The idea that Negroes would "either get into the house or burn it down" has long been expressed in Negro protest literature. That more and more Negro youths also feel this way is not a matter of chance, as we have shown, but is a response to their particular situation in the society. Unless that position is changed -- one way or another -- increasing civil disorder can be viewed as the natural state of American society in the future, and race war the legacy for generations yet unborn.

To continue down the same course means to continue with present political policies in dealing with Negro grievances. Across the country the predominant policy on racial matters, although not articulated, is "tokenism." On a scale which places conservatism and repression of the Negro Movement at one extreme and total acceptance of the Negro Movement at the other, the vast majority of America's local governments can best be described as being in a "middling" position. The orientation has been to do just enough to "get the Negroes out of our hair" and no more.

Few types of political responses are more likely to accelerate Negro aggressiveness in the present circumstances. Quite the contrary, token concessions, providing small poverty grants, investigating a few complaints of police brutality, promising a few more jobs, throwing a few more rock and roll parties can be expected over the next years to increase the sense of injustice and the recourse to violence among Negro youth.

First, only a small number of people directly benefit from "token" concessions. What about all those people who do not get those small number of jobs generally provided through poverty or temporary employment programs? The laudits given to those programs in the press notwithstanding, how do the people feel who don't make it? And what about those Negroes who cannot enjoy the new access and mobility provided to the

small but rising Negro middle-class? How happy are they? Does not a quite natural increase in jealousy and resentment occur when some rapidly gain privileges while others are left behind?

Secondly, the fact that whites are basically more concerned about making the Negro problem go away than in really doing something about Negro problems has led to a breaking of promises many Negroes have been given. Pressed by other priorities considered more important, or lacking the means to establish and carry out actions of benefit to Negroes, white leadership in most communities, even the most liberal ones, have done little (a) to find out what Negro priorities really are, or (b) to assure that these will be implemented in programs. Lacking a basic commitment to Negro goals, the energies of whites devoted to black interests does not persist beyond an immediate crisis. "Oh yes, we are working on it, but these things take time," becomes a dominant motif of white actions. But promises made and promises then broken become a basis for frustrated disappointment and a sense of betrayal. Negro youth, in particular, not having the experiences or resignation of their elders, react like typical young people anywhere and do not respond well to the idea of having their hopes played with capriciously, or being cheated.

Thirdly, the ad hoc character of white responses -- that they are only made under pressure -- generates the attitude that the white man only understands pressure and force. Quite unfortunately for civil peace in many communities, this is usually a realistic assessment of what it does take to make white leadership move. The basic question for many youths then becomes: how tough do you have to be with "the man" before he will listen to you and take you seriously. Does it take burning his city down to make him care? Then that is what it may have to be. American society is giving the youth lessons in the use of violence for political purposes.

Fourthly, "moderation," as a description of contradictory policies and attitudes where whites cannot make up their minds about when and where to draw a line, or where government works at cross purposes can generate a powerful impetus for revenge. The limbo between equality and subjugation is not a happy one. A man does not know his place. Negro youth today are just not interested in being moderately discriminated against, moderately free from arbitrary police practice, moderately skilled, moderately unemployed, and moderately unsure of what their future holds in store. The reality of millions of ghetto youth is discrimination, arbitrary police practice, lack of skills, low employment, and tremendous uncertainties as to whether

there is a place for them within the white-dominated economy which influences so much of their lives.

The situation presented by the moderates, or liberal approach to the race issue, in many areas, has become an intolerable threat to personal freedom and security. At least in totally repressive communities and societies, there is none of the vacillation and inconsistency that prevent people from knowing the situations under which they are likely to be insulted. In such societies people can make plans to avoid such dangers, and their hopes remain limited.

White moderation is the stuff out of which black rebellion is made. Aggressiveness toward white authorities may be a basic characteristic of Negro riots. But it is also a fundamentally conservative and defensive aggressiveness: An effort to find security and dominance in a "homeland," thus making irrelevant the worry as to whether the white man will really let him be free. As has been shown, the dilemma of a city which is either liberal or moderate on race issues, or is becoming so, is that it has all those ambiguities which produce revolutionary sentiments and violent action on the part of a rising subordinate group. On the one hand, such cities are unwilling to repress Negro communities through the use of violence. Such behavior would violate basic middle-class values, minimizing the use of violence in civil disputes. It would also be inconsistent with officially pronounced values

that deny the validity of a society which is in fact built on social principles supporting racial hierarchy. On the other hand, such cities are unable -- while they repeatedly make promises to aspiring Negro youth -- to come through with their promises, at least in the time that Negro youth find tolerable.

Few situations are more likely to produce contempt for a hypocritical social order, as well as a lack of fear of it. We are thus now witnessing the development of a situation in which a still small, but growing minority of the Negro population, feels it legitimate and necessary to use violence against the social order. A truly revolutionary spirit has begun to take hold among some: an unwillingness to compromise or wait any longer, to risk death rather than have their people continue in a subordinate status.

This percentage is probably larger this year than it was the year before and is larger than it was ten years ago. It will be larger in the future. When we consider that 20 men, dedicated, committed, willing to risk death, and with intelligence and imagination could paralyze an entire city the size of New York or Chicago, the future looks grim indeed, if the riots are allowed to continue. They will spew out individuals who will become professionals. These will, in time, become better organized and knowledgeable in the use

of violence. The support that youthful Negro activists have received from wide segments of the Negro community during the Watts, Newark, and Detroit disturbances, if continued into the future, would mean the irreparable fractionation of whole cities into enemy camps.

As the struggle for power continues, as whites no longer feel protected within their segregated suburban castles, as the consumption goals which presently dominate the lives of most Americans become threatened or relegated to secondary priority, as white racial domination of urban areas is threatened, we will in fact see civil warfare on the streets.

We have not yet had race riots in the classical sense, but that possibility looms as very real, and it is problematical whether they will be avoided in the future. As disappointment in police efforts grows, and threats to Negro encroachments on white property and neighborhoods ^{is increasingly} a matter for anxiety, the rise of white vigilantes and self-defense leagues can no longer be considered a theoretical possibility. There are movements already underway in some cities. The most vicious conflicts in American history have taken place around the question of racial dominance, and it will be surprising if at some point in the future there is not a genuine race riot which will equal or surpass the horror of the post-World War I riots, or the one which struck Detroit in 1943. What has kept some of the disturbances that have

occurred thus far from being race riots is that the police have been successful in keeping whites out of Negro areas and vice-versa.

Confrontations of the type we have seen thus far are feeding on the basic contradictions in the existing situation. Violence will become more and more frequent; ghetto riots will, perhaps, be better organized; and the results will be considerably bloodier than they have been thus far. It will be amazing if a city such as Chicago does not have an upheaval which will outstrip Detroit as Detroit was greater than Watts. The beginnings of guerrilla warfare of black youth against white power in the major cities of the United States: that is the direction that the present path is taking this country. The history of Algeria or Cyprus could be the future history of America.

The Future America: A Garrison State?

The first alternative, then, of continuing along the same path is no choice at all. There are then only two choices:

- (1) Harsh and ruthless repression of the Negro Movement;
- (2) highly accelerated racial change.

To be blunt, a stable civil society requires that the monopoly of legitimate violence rest in the hands of the government. That monopoly is now being threatened in a way that it has not been since the Civil War.

One solution which might conceivably handle the possibilities of civil war featuring prolonged urban guerrilla struggles, would be a policy of extreme repression. This would have to feature the arrest of major radical leaders, the slaughter of great numbers of people during a riot, the "setting of examples" ala military occupations (i.e., blowing up houses where snipers are believed to exist), the stationing of large military units within cities on ready call to quell any sign of disturbance. This will be effective in maintaining some semblance of order in a society in which different racial groups genuinely hate each other. It has worked before. It will work again. The question is whether Americans want to live in the kind of society that will require.

It will require the suspension of many civil liberties not only for Negroes but for whites as well. The south African experience with apartheid demonstrates this. In America which has allowed a greater level of social and educational development of its Negro citizens than has South Africa the situation will be complicated by the skill bank and energies for resistance which are already existing within Negro communities. Very likely too, the millions of

young Negroes will not passively accept a white garrison state. As young French-educated Algerians fought a war of attrition against the French, so we might expect to see young militant American-educated Negroes refusing to accept the military occupation of Negro areas. Preferring to die on their feet, than living on their knees they will, ala guerilla movements in other developing areas, go underground, surfacing periodically to engage in terrorist activities.

It will also be a tragedy if such a solution is adopted since the central characteristic of these youth is that they are motivated by a strong sense of idealism as far as American values are concerned. They accept those basic values, but experience bitter anger against a society which prevents their realization. Other dominant powers have repressed movements by subordinate groups who have revolted against their masters in the name of the latter's own espoused values. In Hungary in 1956, young students and workers carried out an uprising against the Russian-supported government, spontaneously forming democratic councils, articulating their actions in terms of the values and ideals, that their Russian overlords had taught them. They were brutally repressed by a power more interested in maintaining its

hegemony than in anything else. The choice for white America thus boils down to a choice as to whether they are willing to act like the Russians did in Hungary.

Accelerated Change: A Way to Save America

There is another alternative to the grim picture painted above. That is the use of resources only available to the Federal government, which will move the whole society through rapid change so quickly that people have neither the desire nor the energy for violent protest. It means the construction of activities that can involve great numbers of people, particularly the youth of the ghetto, on a continuing basis. Such activities must provide them with a clear sense of a future which combines the elements of order and power.

1. The Poverty Program

In this respect the lessons to be learned from the behavior of poverty program personnel in recent upheavals is highly significant. With few exceptions, those who have been involved on a continuing basis in the poverty program do not participate in riots. In fact they were a source for

substantial counter-riot activity in many cities. The potential for a greatly extended poverty program to provide access and tools to Negro youth to improve the situation of their people generally is enormous. The poverty program can provide a channel for upward mobility within the society at large for many youth. The poverty program can become a significant device for the political incorporation of militant Negro youth into American life.

To be truly effective however will mean the transfer of power on real decisions about program policies to the young militants in ghetto areas. This may be politically unpalatable to many local white politicians and some conservative Negroes as well. But it is consistent with a concept of government which places the well-being of the whole community over the vested interest of entrenched local power groups.

In this instance, the well-being of the whole community requires the recognition of Negro youth as a major power bloc. Since local government has shown no willingness to do this, then the federal government must.

Such incorporating action, of course, is in accord with the American tradition of pluralistic politics. Violent ethnic struggle followed by political incorporation has been a cornerstone of American history. To be sure, Negro history differs radically from the history of other American groups which came to this country voluntarily and during periods when the social structure was more fluid. But there is no reason to believe that actions taken at this time which will politically recognize the reality of Negro youth as a major social force in this country will not lead to a shift from a politics of violence to that of a more orderly kind.

Many former middle-class militants in the civil rights movement became involved in the early poverty programs, switching their activities from the picket lines and confrontations with local government to attempting to develop programs. So we can expect to see Negro youths resort less and less to violence if their aspirations for power and the development of their own areas can find fulfillment in extensive and expanded poverty programs which they direct.

This will also have the advantage in that the priorities of the people in the ghetto will have an opportunity to be developed. The problem of finding a solution to the present crisis first of all requires finding out in concrete ways what it is that people really want and what it is they will really accept. Too often, the development of programs has stemmed from white preconceptions of what basically needed to be changed in Negro communities. The people there have in some instances had no hand in determining what is good for them.

To get out of the present crisis requires a willingness to invest in groups within the Negro community who can find the answers, who will develop programs, who will create organizations, an effective and coherent force for government to deal with. The government should seriously consider the funding of programs for economic and political development designed by major militant organizations who have indicated a commitment to maintaining civic peace. This is one way of assuring that the political-economic answers to the crisis in American cities will be forthcoming.

The consolidation of the Negro community, as one aspect of the political problem cannot be overemphasized. The central dilemma of urban Negro communities until recently is that they have been internally fragmented and unable to

muster effective positive force in city politics. White political behavior designed to encourage such fragmentation has been greatly responsible here. But so have internal organizational and social class splits among Negroes.

With the new wave of race consciousness among Negro youth, and the lack of effective organization to make demands felt, with increasing racial competition within the community, violence will become more and more probable unless the government takes steps to encourage such consolidation as will allow collective bargaining with somebody who has real power. The basic dilemma of many governments now is that during periods of crisis they do not know whom they can talk with. There are few who can turn riots off after they start. Government resources can be used as a lever for various militant factions within the Negro community to come together and work in co-operation rather than at cross-purposes both in developing the Negro community and in containing violence.

All this of course will require an opening of the white power structure. While American society may be truly pluralistic on other issues, around the race issue there has been a tendency for whites to close ranks. In a basic sense a white power structure does confront Negroes.

All the basic tools of power in the community with the exception of not being bound to refrain from violence is outside of their hands. How willing white America will be to share the powers of the society with Negroes, to allow those powers to be used for Negro advancement, is the major problem..

One way that the Federal government can open up the white power structure is to refrain from the temptation to allow white elected officials to exercise veto power over federal government programs. Permitting such veto power is tantamount to taking sides in a community dispute between entrenched political groups and a new social force; the latter, unless it is politically incorporated, will continue to use violence as a rational tool, or as a nihilistic substitute for other kinds of power.

To open up the white power structure requires another kind of program: This is a massive educational effort directed toward the white communities of this nation to bring home to them the realities of Negro life. The gap of ignorance that stands between white perceptions of reality and what the real situation is among Negroes is phenomenal. This gap if allowed to continue will only lead to further incorrect diagnoses of community problems.

The magnitude of the problem is such that even in so-called liberal communities city elites are so far out of touch with young Negroes that they are unable, as was the case in Detroit, to know that the situation in the city was building for a major explosion.

It is admittedly quite difficult to deal with the emotional basis for racism. The problem has perplexed mankind for sometime. But to the extent that white attitudes toward Negroes are based on sheer lack of knowledge and information of a realistic nature, then high school programs in race relations, regular TV programs on the race question, programs directed toward government officials, can all do their part in reducing the tremendous information gap that presently exists. Group stereotypes must be broken down and people seen as they are in daily life. What is needed is a massive effort in which major media directly participate on a continuing basis.

Finally, there needs to be a new mission for police departments. What is required is the development of a new kind of police and a new conception of the policeman's role. That role must focus on the policeman as a buffer against violence. In periods of social upheaval such as the present in which citizens have a predilection to take their political

grievances into the street policeman need new kinds of training. Law officers must learn to understand the kind of crowds they are dealing with. For example, they must become sensitive to the differences between political and expressive crowds. They must learn how to feel comfortable with large groups of people protesting their grievances.

The authority of the policeman ultimately rests on the awe and respect which the agent of public order earns. It is not based on the effectiveness of his use of weapons alone. What we need is a new movement in police practice which emphasizes the nonmilitary aspects of the policeman. The policeman must be seen by people as distinguished, the kind of man who is worthy of their support. He needs to be highly paid as is commensurate with the magnitude of the problems that now need to be solved. Then perhaps the policeman will become in the eyes of Negro youth "the man with the badge," instead of "the thug with the gun."

Besides the development of a new role for the police there is an incorporating function which it can serve in ghetto communities. Some police departments are already taking steps in the direction of becoming an information channel between the Negro community and the civil government.

Such departments in setting up neighborhood centers ostensibly designed to deal with local complaints about police practice find themselves providing clearinghouses for municipal complaints over a wide range of conditions, not just those directly bearing on police practice.

As a vehicle for the political incorporation of many Negroes, unfamiliar with how to get information relevant to their problems, a well-developed neighborhood police center program in large cities can do much to restore civil peace. It will also make all government agencies aware of their mutual dependency on each other. Policemen carry the brunt of the failure of other agencies. They are the ones who are forced to risk their lives when the political and administrative mechanisms of the city fail to do their job. And their interests should be seeing to it that the rest of government does not put them into this dilemma.

X The police in other words should service the concerns of the poor as well as that of the middle class and the rich.

The Reservoir of Good Will

Finally, although we have painted the choices confronting America in stark terms, it must be emphasized that appropriate action at the present time can save the situation from deteriorating further.

Most Americans have not made their decision to join one group or the other. Concerned mayors, businessmen, and police officials are striving to avoid further violence, not by rewarding the rioters, but by recognizing the sources of the frustrations of Negroes as that of ambitious citizens who want full participation in a society they believe in: There is no doubt from the results of the Commission's studies that though Negro youth are willing to engage in violence to get things done, they are also an enormous reservoir of pro-social civic attitudes. These attitudes, the commitment to American values, underlie the bitterness and resentment against perceived resistance of white authorities to Negro progress. In many ways the local governmental and service apparatus remains the most persistent and emphatic reminder to the young Negro that he is thought of as an inferior species.

Despite the demeaning effects of these reminders, the socialization of Negro youths provides a continuing source of basic attitudes that are supportive of and loyal to the broader features of American society. Negroes at the present time, even those who engage in violence, are not

willing to reject whites, American society, or American institutions. But because this is the case now doesn't mean that it will be so in the future. Major race riots, continued governmental inaction, more frustrated hopes, will produce a bitterness which will in fact lead to a general condemnation of society.

There is still time for our nation to make a concerted attack on the racism that persists in its midst. If not, then, Negro youth will be driven to attack white racism in a desperate and violent manner.