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SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL
DISTURBANCES AND RIOTING DURING
THE PERIOD FROM JULY 17, 1964,
THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1964, AND
YOUTH DISTURBANCES SEPTEMBER 4,
1964, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 7, 1964

STATE OF NEW YORK
New York City
July 17, 1964, through July 31, 1964

Following the shooting of fifteen-year-old James Powell, a Negro, in New York City on July 16, 1964, by off duty police officer Lieutenant Thomas Gilligan, several demonstrations occurred in the New York City area culminating in riots which commenced on July 18, 1964, in the Harlem Section of New York City and subsequently spread to the Bedford-Stuyvesant Section of Brooklyn. Powell had attacked Gilligan with a knife. He had a police record for assault and attempted robbery.

New York City police officials believe that a contributing factor to the rioting stemmed from the teachings of Malcolm X. Little, a former leader of the Nation of Islam, a black supremacist hate group, who has a very large following of Negroes in securing what they consider to be their full rights which includes overcoming the white race.

The Progressive Labor Movement, a Marxist-Leninist group oriented toward Red China, was also active prior to the outbreak of violence in Harlem and the Bedford-Stuyvesant areas and once the rioting started the Progressive Labor Movement took advantage of the situation by exploiting the shooting of Powell. The Progressive Labor Movement printed thousands of copies of a leaflet containing a photograph of Lieutenant Gilligan and setting forth the words "Wanted For Murder." These leaflets were distributed in the Harlem area and also alleged police brutality against the Negroes and Puerto Ricans in New York City.

Sources familiar with Communist Party activities in the New York area were of the opinion that the riots and unrest in New York City were not instigated or inspired by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and that the CPUSA was actually caught by surprise when the riots broke out.

**ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL DISTURBANCES
AND RIOTING DURING THE PERIOD FROM
JULY 17, 1964, TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1964**

Individuals active before and during the violence that occurred in New York City have been identified by police officials as William Epton and Jesse Gray.

William Epton is Vice Chairman of the Progressive Labor Movement, who prior to the riots organized several groups in the Harlem area to handle whatever situation might arise in whatever way possible and with whatever weapons were on hand. Epton has also allegedly preached violence and stated that the Negroes must be free, that they were going to kill "cops" and judges, that no revolution can be won by peaceful means and that they would have to fight and would not be fully free until they smash this state totally and completely.

Jesse Gray, former organizer of the Harlem Region of the CPUSA had on July 19, 1964, called for one hundred skilled black revolutionaries who were ready to die to correct what he termed the "police brutality situation in Harlem."

Other sources have attributed the riots and unrest to "young punks" without a stake in the past or much hope in the future and members of various teen-age gangs who rule various neighborhoods.

Various sources have advised that they have no information to indicate that any parties outside the City of New York, either organizational or individual, had any influence or participation in the New York City riots.

**Rochester, New York
July 24, 1964, through July 25, 1964**

During the evening of July 24, 1964, a licensed street dance was held in Rochester, New York, in a predominantly Negro area. At about 11:30 p.m. two officers of the Rochester Police Department arrested an individual at this dance for intoxication and disorderly conduct. A group of bystanders attempted to interfere with the arrest and officers and police cars arrived on the scene. By that time a large mob had gathered and the police were unable to communicate with the mob or disperse it.

Additional aid was then called for from a nearby law enforcement agency but by that time full-scale rioting and looting had erupted. The resultant damage was estimated to be

SUMMARY ANALYSIS FO THE RACIAL
DISTURBANCES AND RIOTING DURING
THE PERIOD FROM JULY 17, 1964,
THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1964, AND
YOUTH DISTURBANCES SEPTEMBER 4,
1964, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 7, 1964

in the amount of some \$600,000 to \$1,000,000. Twenty-nine Rochester police officers, three deputy sheriffs and one New York State Trooper were injured during the rioting.

Contact with responsible public officials and civic leaders in the Rochester area, reveals that the consensus was no individual or organization outside of Rochester had any part in the rioting and that no subversive or racial organization was involved in the instigation of this rioting. It was also the consensus that the rioting and looting got out of hand and went unchecked because the police had no adequate plan for dealing with such a situation and were caught completely by surprise. It was the opinion of responsible individuals contacted that this racial disorder was a spontaneous thing which resulted from the crowd's hostility toward the police who were arresting a fellow Negro.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Jersey City, New Jersey
August 2, 1964, through August 5, 1964

Rioting broke out in Jersey City on August 2, 1964, when the Jersey City Police Department was called to investigate a report of two Negro women fighting at a Negro housing project. According to the police, both women were drunk and when police attempted to break up the fight, other Negro residents of this housing project interfered. Arrests were made and following these arrests Negroes from the near-by area gathered in the street in protest of the arrests. Rioting then erupted and several police officers, rioters as well as innocent bystanders were injured. Rioting of a sporadic nature and looting continued on August 3 and 4 during which time considerable additional damage was done.

A responsible police official advised that while he felt the rioting was of a spontaneous nature, this situation had been building up for several years and resulted from the smoldering resentment on the part of the Negroes in Jersey City regarding inadequate housing, play areas and lack of equal employment opportunities.

Responsible sources advised that the rioting in Jersey City was quickly seized upon by the Negro hoodlum element as a means of expressing their hostility toward the police as well as a means of obtaining material things through looting various business establishments.

ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL DISTURBANCES
AND RIOTING DURING THE PERIOD FROM
JULY 17, 1964, TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1964

City officials met with leaders of the Jersey City Negroes and established civil rights organizations. These leaders alleged police brutality in making arrests was the primary cause of the rioting. No evidence is available to indicate that the rioting was instigated by any organized racial or subversive group.

Paterson, New Jersey
August 11, 1964, through August 14, 1964

Rioting in New Jersey spread to Paterson on August 11, 1964, when police attempted to disperse a disorderly crowd of Negroes which had formed in a section of a Negro neighborhood. This rioting continued throughout the evenings of August 12 and 13 and resulted in considerable damage to numerous business establishments and private property as well as looting.

During the initial stages of the rioting, acts of vandalism did not appear to be directed against any specific racial group; however, on the evenings of August 12 and 13 no instances were reported where damage was incurred by establishments owned by Negroes as the looting and acts of vandalism were restricted to establishments owned by white persons.

It was the opinion of responsible police officials as well as leaders of the Negro community that the rioting and acts of vandalism were primarily carried out by irresponsible Negro males between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. These sources stated there did not appear to be any plan or pattern for this rioting but that it appeared to have been an outgrowth of the rioting which had taken place previously in New York City and Jersey City. No evidence was uncovered to indicate that this rioting was instigated by any organized racial or subversive group.

Elizabeth, New Jersey
August 11, 1964, through August 14, 1964

Rioting broke out in Elizabeth on August 11, 1964, and continued through August 14. Police officials state that this rioting was instigated by young Negro hoodlums who were running wild through the streets harassing police and annoying anyone and everyone on the streets regardless of race. Several

ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL DISTURBANCES
AND RIOTING DURING THE PERIOD FROM
JULY 17, 1964, TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1964

persons were arrested on disorderly conduct charges up until the time the rioting ceased in the early morning hours of August 14. All of the individuals arrested were from the metropolitan Elizabeth area.

Responsible sources advised that there were no outside organizations connected with the rioting and that, in fact, the rioting and vandalism had the appearance of "mischief night" at Halloween.

STATE OF ILLINOIS
Dixmoor (Chicago), Illinois
August 15, 1964, through August 18, 1964

This racial disturbance developed on the afternoon of August 15, 1964, at the Foremost Liquor Store in Dixmoor, Illinois, when a young Negro woman was reportedly caught stealing a bottle of whiskey. In the ensuing argument and disturbance, she broke several bottles of whiskey and the owner had her arrested. Following the arrest, a crowd of Negroes gathered in front of the store and attempted to persuade customers arriving at the store not to make a purchase. The local police who were sent to the scene were unable to disperse the crowd. The crowd grew to approximately one thousand persons who commenced stoning automobiles and in general causing wide-spread damage.

The police and local authorities are of the opinion the riot was caused by long-standing resentment of the people of the area against the owner of the Foremost Liquor Store, one Michael La Pota, who is of the white race. He has been closely associated with the hoodlum element of the Chicago area. Local authorities as well as leaders of the racial movement in this area have stated they believe the riot was spontaneous and was not started by subversives and racists. No information has been developed to indicate any outside element caused or directed the riot.

Because the local police force was unable to handle the early stages of the riot, it was necessary to get additional police from near-by areas as well as the state police. During the riot there appeared to be a lack of communication, cooperation and direction between the various local and state police forces involved. The delay in getting the additional help allowed time for the riot to gain momentum, thus making the crowds more difficult to handle.

ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL DISTURBANCES
AND RIOTING DURING THE PERIOD FROM
JULY 17, 1964, TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1964

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
August 28, 1964, through August 31, 1964

Philadelphia police records indicate that the riot began in the Negro area of north Philadelphia on the night of August 28, 1964, when two police officers were attacked by a Negro male during the routine arrest of a Negro woman who was causing a disturbance. A large crowd of Negroes gathered but with the aid of reinforcements the police were able to remove the attacker and the woman who was arrested from the scene. Shortly thereafter, numerous false "assist officer" calls were received by the police department which brought a large number of police officers back to the original scene and riot activities began with bricks and other objects being thrown from the roof tops at the police. Several police officers reported they had observed Abyssinia Hayes, the leader of a small black nationalist group, in the riot area several times during the night, haranguing the crowd and falsely claiming that a woman had been killed by the police. He was urging the people to retaliate against the police. Hayes was not arrested at that time but was arrested on August 31, 1964, following a police search of his house and was charged with unlawful storage of volatile liquids on his premises. Property damage resulting from the riot and looting was estimated by city officials to be in excess of two million dollars.

There were an estimated five hundred police officers in the riot area during the evening of August 28, 1964, attempting to restore order. They were under instructions to use no dogs, fire hoses or horses. In combatting the looting in the early hours of August 29, 1964, a flying wedge of police officers proceeded through the center of the looting area, driving the looters out with liberal use of night sticks. They attempted to make no arrests but merely made the individuals drop the stolen property. The police were forced to remain in large groups because of the debris and stones hurled from roof tops.

City officials pointed out that the riot occurred in a densely populated area with high concentration of Negroes and an area which produced the most "juvenile crime, adult crime, tuberculosis, venereal disease, unemployment, poverty and other social ills." It is the feeling of the police department that irresponsible hoodlums caused the trouble. The police further

**ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL DISTURBANCES
AND RIOTING DURING THE PERIOD FROM
JULY 17, 1964, TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1964**

pointed out that a large number of Negro juvenile gangs are active in the area. A Negro leader in a public statement attributed the riot to the work of a few hoodlums who used the opportunity to vandalize and loot. A leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People stated the riot began when the Negroes heard a false report that a woman who had been arrested on the night of August 28, 1964, had died.

Police and local officials have stated that investigation failed to develop any evidence to indicate outsiders were responsible for the instigation or continuation of the riot. No information has been developed pointing to any subversive influence in the riot.

N = Nation, New Republic, etc.
R = Time, Newsweek, etc.

President	Incident	Comment
3. Kennedy (1962)	Desegregation of University of Mississippi at Oxford, Miss., by James H. Meredith.	President sent in 16,000 troops.
4. Kennedy (1963)	Demonstrations led by Dr. Martin Luther King in Birmingham, Ala.	President readied troops for use but did not send them to Birmingham.
5. Kennedy (1963)	Desegregation of University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa, Ala.	President signed order to federalize the National Guard but did not use them when Gov. George C. Wallace (D) capitulated.
6. Kennedy (1963)	Desegregation of public schools in Birmingham, Ala.	President signed order to federalize National Guard but did not use them.
7. L.B. Johnson (1965)	Voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery, Ala.	President federalized National Guard to protect marchers.

CIVIL DISORDER CHRONOLOGY

The following is a chronology of civil disorders since 1961 as compiled by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress:

1961

- Birmingham, Ala., May 14** -- A white mob attacked "freedom riders."
- Anniston, Ala., May 14** -- A white mob stoned and burned a bus carrying "freedom riders."
- Montgomery, Ala., May 20** -- A white mob attacked "freedom riders."
- Chicago, Ill., June 27** -- A white mob threatened to destroy a Lutheran Church to which the Red Cross had brought Negro fire refugees; the Negroes were taken to a Negro church. (N)
- Monroe, N.C., Aug. 27** -- A fight occurred between white persons and Negroes after demonstrators, including "freedom riders," began to picket the courthouse.
- McComb, Miss., Nov. 29** -- A white mob attacked Negroes attempting to desegregate the city bus terminal.

1962

- Los Angeles, Calif., April 27** -- A battle occurred between police and Black Muslims after a policeman was attacked when he questioned an individual in the street.
- Oxford, Miss., Sept. 30-Oct. 1** -- A white mob attacked U.S. marshals enforcing compliance with court orders for the registration of James Meredith, a Negro, at the University of Mississippi; rioting was suppressed by federal troops.
- Kinloch, Mo., Sept. 23-25** -- Rioting by Negroes in an all-Negro village occurred after a Negro policeman shot to death a Negro youth.
- Florence, S.C., Oct. 13** -- Negroes rioted when a Negro policeman arrested a Negro woman.
- Washington, D.C., Nov. 22** -- Negro students attacked white spectators and police after a football game at D.C. Stadium.

1963

- Birmingham, Ala., May 12** -- Negroes rioted after a home and a motel owned by Negro leaders were bombed.
- Lexington, N.C., June 6** -- Negroes and white persons battled; racial "high tension" was reported as the cause.

- Savannah, Ga., June 20** -- Negroes attacked police and damaged property after 300 Negro demonstrators were arrested.
- Savannah, Ga., July 11** -- Negroes rioted after 70 Negro demonstrators were arrested.
- Cambridge, Md., July 12** -- White people reacted violently to one of a series of demonstration marches; white persons invaded the Negro area; shooting became widespread throughout the city.
- Charleston, S.C., July 17** -- Negroes attacked police after the latter arrested demonstrators.
- Cambridge, Md., July 20** -- White persons assaulted National Guardsmen in an attempt to invade a Negro area.
- Chicago, Ill., July 29-Aug. 2** -- Sporadic violence by white persons and Negroes occurred after three Negro families moved into a white neighborhood. (N)
- Chicago, Ill., Aug. 12** -- Demonstrators attacked police attempting to clear a construction site of obstructive demonstrators. ✓
- Birmingham, Ala., Aug. 20** -- Negroes attacked police after a bomb exploded in the garage of a Negro leader.
- Folcroft, Pa., Aug. 30** -- White persons protesting against admission of a Negro family into a housing development damaged the family's house and attacked police.
- Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 29** -- Negroes rioted after a policeman shot to death a Negro who attacked him with a knife.

March 1964

- Jacksonville, Fla., May 24 and days following** -- After conviction of Negro sit-ins and shooting to death of a Negro woman by a sniper, Negro gangs fought police, attacked white persons, damaged property; riot marked first major use of Molotov cocktails in race riots. (R)
- Cleveland, Ohio, April 7** -- Negroes attacked police with stones and other missiles after a white minister, demonstrating at a school construction site, was run over and killed by a bulldozer. (N)
- Cambridge, Md., May 26** -- Negroes attacked National Guardsmen with missiles when the soldiers prevented them from fighting with a group of white persons.
- St. Augustine, Fla., June 25** -- Segregationists broke through police line and attacked integrationist demonstrators.
- Henderson, N.C., July 12** -- Negroes and white persons fought when Negroes sought service at a truck-stop restaurant.
- New York City (Harlem and Brooklyn), N.Y., July 18-23** -- After a police lieutenant shot to death a Negro who attacked him with a knife, Negroes attacked police, damaged property, and looted. (R)
- Rochester, N.Y., July 24-25** -- Negroes attacked police, damaged property and looted after police attempted to arrest a disorderly Negro.
- Jersey City, N.J., Aug. 2-4** -- Negroes rioted after police arrested two Negro women for fighting. (N)
- Elizabeth, N.J., Aug. 11-13** -- Negroes attacked police with Molotov cocktails, damaged property; not sparked by any apparent incident. (N)
- Paterson, N.J., Aug. 11-14** -- Negroes damaged property.
- Dixmoor, Ill., Aug. 15-17** -- Negroes picketed a liquor store whose white owner had accused a Negro woman of stealing a bottle; the picketing degenerated into violence in which both Negroes and white people took part. ✓ (R)
- Keansburg, N.J., Aug. 28** -- White persons and Negroes fought after a young white man insulted and attacked a Negro. ✓
- Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 28-31** -- A Negro policeman, later aided by two other officers, forcibly arrested a Negro woman for public disorder; a Black Nationalist leader excited a crowd against the police by charging police brutality; Negroes attacked police, damaged property, and looted. (R)

1965

- New York (Brooklyn), N.Y., Feb. 17-18** -- Hundreds of Negro students taking part in a school boycott conducted by the City-wide Committee for Integrated Schools attacked police with bricks, and damaged property. ✓

Violence - 4

Waterbury, Conn., March 26 -- Negroes attacked police after an officer arrested a Negro youth who, with two others, was blocking a sidewalk and refused to move on when ordered to do so.

District of Columbia, April 23 -- Negroes attacked two policemen when they arrested two Negroes for disorderly conduct.

Bogalusa, La., May 20 -- White persons attacked Negroes attempting to integrate a city park.

Paterson, N.J., May 28 -- Negroes attacked two policemen when they arrested a Negro driver for speeding and hitting parked cars.

Bogalusa, La., May 29 -- White persons fought with Negro demonstrators.

Bogalusa, La., July 17 -- White persons attacked Negro demonstrators.

Danbury, Conn., July 24 -- Negro and white youths fought at a drive-in restaurant.

Sodus, N.Y., Aug. 1 -- Negroes attacked two policemen when they shot in the leg a Negro who had attempted to shoot an officer and had tried to flee after his gun misfired.

Los Angeles (Watts), Calif., Aug. 11-17 -- Rioting broke out after policemen arrested a Negro for drunken driving and resisting arrest and his brother and mother for attacking them, and after arresting a young Negro woman for spitting at them and a man for inciting to violence. Negroes attacked police and firemen with firearms, damaged property with firebombs, and looted.

Chicago, Ill., Aug. 12-13 -- Negroes attacked white persons with bottles, bricks, and rocks, and damaged property. The second night's rioting occurred after a fire truck hit a traffic standard that fell and killed a Negro woman.

Elizabeth, N.J., Aug. 25-26 (one night) -- Negroes broke store windows, hurled fire bombs, and threw rocks and other missiles at fire trucks; an incident said to have sparked disturbances was (falsely) alleged failure of police ambulance to answer quickly emergency call for Negro.

1966

Birmingham, Ala., Jan. 11 -- Negro students stoned police after civil rights workers urged them to leave classes and join a demonstration.

Tuskegee, Ala., Jan. 15 -- Negro students damaged property after a Negro student was arrested for fighting.

Los Angeles (Watts), Calif., March 15 -- Negroes attacked white persons, damaged property, and looted.

Lorman (Alcorn A and M College), Miss., April 4 -- Negro youths attacked police acting to halt a demonstration.

Washington, D.C., April 11 -- Negro students stoned police cars, ambulances, and private cars, and other property after visiting Glen Echo Amusement Park.

Los Angeles (Venice, Willowbrook), Calif., May 8 -- Negroes attacked police with rocks and bottles.

Bakersfield, Calif., May 22-23 -- Negroes throw rocks and firebombs.

Los Angeles (Watts), Calif., May 23 -- Negroes attacked police and white persons after police arrested a Negro for throwing a rock at a police car.

Philadelphia, Miss., June 21 -- White persons attacked demonstrators; later, at least one shot was fired by a white man into a group of Negroes, and Negroes fired back.

Cleveland, Ohio, June 24 -- Negroes threw rocks at cars and damaged other property; white motorists shot and wounded a Negro youth.

Cordale, Ga., June 29 -- Negroes and white youths exchanged gunfire for 90 minutes; tension had risen after a racial confrontation at an integrated swimming pool several days before.

Omaha, Neb., July 2-6 -- Negroes threw rocks at police cars, damaged property, and looted; no initial incident reported.

Des Moines, Iowa, July 4-6 -- Negro youths threw rocks in a public park on two successive nights.

Chicago, Ill., July 12-15 -- Rioting began after police turned off fire hydrants in a Negro area. Negroes claimed hydrants were

left on in adjoining Italian area -- police had turned off hydrants in both areas; but residents in Italian area turned them back on at night. Negroes attacked police and firemen with firearms, firebombs, and other missiles, damaged property, and looted.

South Bend, Ind., July 17 -- Rioting occurred in a Negro neighborhood, involving throwing of stones, bricks, bottles; not evidently sparked by any incident.

Jacksonville, Fla., July 18-19 -- A Negro demonstration developed into a riot in which Negroes attacked white persons and damaged property with rocks and firebombs.

Cleveland, Ohio, July 18-22 -- Negroes attacked police and firemen with firearms, damaged property with missiles and firebombs, and looted. (R)

Brooklyn, N.Y., July 21-23 -- Negroes fought white people and police with firearms, firebombs, and other missiles; rioting was preceded by outbreaks of violence one to two weeks previous. (R)

North Amityville, N.Y., July 28 -- Negroes threw stones and bottles at police after a meeting to improve police-community relations.

Baltimore, Md., July 28-29 -- White youths invaded a Negro area and attacked residents; battles between Negroes and whites ensued. (N)

Perth Amboy, N.J., July 30-Aug. 2 -- Puerto Rican youths threw rocks and bottles in the streets for four consecutive nights; no triggering incidents reported.

Los Angeles (Watts), Calif., July 31 -- Negroes attacked police with bricks and bottles.

Pacoima, Calif., July 31 -- Negroes attacked police with rocks and bottles.

Chicago, Ill., July 30, 31, Aug. 3, 5, 7 -- White people attacked police and marchers demonstrating for open housing with rocks and bottles, and set fire to demonstrators' cars. (R)

Providence, R.I., Aug. 1-2 -- Fighting between Negroes and police occurred on two nights after Negroes held a "black power" meeting.

Minneapolis, Minn., Aug. 3-4 -- Negro youths damaged property on consecutive nights.

Menlo Park, Calif., Aug. 5 -- Negro youths attacked police with rocks and bottles.

Lansing, Mich., Aug. 7-8 -- White youths attacked Negroes, and Negroes reacted by damaging property with bricks and other missiles, throwing firebombs at passing cars, and attacking white youths.

Detroit, Mich., Aug. 9-10 -- Negro and white youths fought each other in a racially mixed neighborhood; bricks and firebombs were thrown.

Grenada, Miss., Aug. 8-10 -- White persons hurled cherry bombs, pieces of metal and other missiles at civil rights demonstrators.

Muskegon, Mich., Aug. 13 -- A large crowd, mostly Negroes, gathered around a police car answering a call at a hotel where Negroes reportedly attacked white persons; a police officer was struck in the face; after police dispersed the crowd, a group damaged property and looted.

District of Columbia (Anacostia), Aug. 13 -- Negro youths roamed streets throwing rocks after arrest of a robbery suspect; Aug. 16 -- Negro youths threw rocks, bottles, fireworks at 11th Precinct Police Station House after police arrested a youth; Negro youths threw bricks at passing cars and buses.

Waukegan, Ill., Aug. 27-28 (three nights, with two riots in one 12-hour period) -- Negroes attacked cars with firebombs (six passengers in a passing car were burned) and other missiles and damaged other property; triggering incident was apparently the arrest of a Negro youth for throwing a bottle in the street.

Los Angeles (Watts), Calif., Aug. 29 -- Negroes attacked policeman who sought to question them; other Negroes attacked policemen when they tried to stop a fight.

Dayton, Ohio, Sept. 1 -- Negroes stoned buses, damaged property, and looted, after motorists, reportedly white, shot to death a Negro.

Jackson, Mich., Aug. 31-Sept. 1 -- Negroes and white men fought each other, and cars and other property were stoned.

Atlanta, Ga., Sept. 6 -- Negroes damaged cars, including two police cars, after a policeman shot and wounded a Negro suspected of car theft; Sept. 10-12 -- Negroes threw rocks and firebombs on three consecutive nights after a white motorist shot a Negro to death and wounded another.

San Francisco, Calif., Sept. 27-28 -- Several hundred Negroes set fires, broke store windows, looted stores and threw rocks at police cars after a white policeman shot and killed a Negro who was running from a stolen car; more than 80 persons injured.

St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 28 -- Negroes threw rocks and smashed store windows after a policeman shot and killed a Negro prisoner.

Oakland, Calif., Oct. 19 -- Negroes smashed store windows, looted, started fires with gasoline bombs and assaulted passersby after a Negro woman was arrested for a traffic violation; 47 businesses were damaged.

Clearwater, Fla., Nov. 1 -- About 400 Negroes engaged in vandalism and threw rocks at cars driven by whites.

Ossining, N.Y., Nov. 1 -- About 400 Negro youths smashed store windows, stomped one police officer unconscious and injured six other police.

Tuskegee, Ala., Dec. 9 -- About 700 Negro students of Tuskegee Institute looted a liquor store, smashed windows and rioted for three hours after the acquittal of a white defendant accused of fatally shooting a student of the Institute.

1967

Omaha, Neb., April 1-2 -- About 200 persons were involved in a disturbance; 21 were arrested.

Nashville, Tenn., April 8-10 -- Several hundred Negro students from Fisk University and Tennessee A. and I. State University rioted on three nights after a Negro student at Fisk was arrested by a white policeman; at least 17 persons were injured and 30 arrested; the disturbance started a few hours after Stokely Carmichael spoke to Vanderbilt University students; two of his aides were arrested.

Cleveland, Ohio, April 16 -- Violence erupted in the predominantly Negro Hough area, with rock throwing, window breaking and looting.

Louisville, Ky., April 20 -- Police fired tear gas into a crowd of more than 1,000 whites taunting open housing demonstrators; the mob threw bricks and bottles.

Washington, D.C., April 28 -- Three white persons riding in a truck which ran out of gas, and a Negro who tried to help them, were beaten by about 60 Negroes in Northeast Washington.

Wichita, Kan., May 11 -- Negroes beat two white school athletes and set fire to a business establishment.

Jackson, Miss., May 12-13 -- About 1,000 Negroes at Jackson State College protested the arrest of a Negro student; the National Guard quelled the disturbance in which one Negro was killed; Willie Ricks of SNCC told the crowd: "An eye for an eye, an arm for an arm, a head for a head, and a life for a life."

San Francisco, Calif., May 15 -- Negro youths roamed the streets, stoning cars; other violence included breaking windows, vandalism and theft and the assault on white students by Negroes in two high schools.

Houston, Texas, May 16-17 -- Hundreds of students at predominantly Negro Texas Southern University rioted after clashing with police while protesting the arrests of student demonstrators; 489 were arrested; one policeman was killed and two others were shot; Carmichael spoke at Texas Southern and at the University of Houston in April or May.

Chicago, Ill., May 21 -- Negroes threw rocks and bottles at police during a two-hour disturbance following a memorial service for Black Nationalist leader Malcolm X; three policemen and other persons were injured and 30 persons were charged with inciting to riot.

Chicago, Ill., May 30 -- White youths reportedly threw rocks at Negro youths in a wooded park and fighting ensued; at least 12 persons were injured and 37 were arrested.

Clearwater, Fla., June 4 -- About 200 Negroes threw rocks and rioted after a white policeman attempted to aid a Negro policeman who was trying to break up a fight between two Negroes.

Riots and Organizers

The issue of outside agitation in ghetto riots was raised by some Members of Congress, Governors, mayors and news commentators. Some said that militant activists, antipoverty workers or Communists contributed to igniting the riots; other persons said that agitators exploited them; still others said that agitators, if present at all, were of negligible importance.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Feb. 18 made the following observation about ghetto riots in 1964-1966:

"Although once underway some riots were exploited by agitators, they were not deliberate in the sense that they were planned at the outset; the best evidence is that they were spontaneous outbursts, set off more often than not by some quite ordinary and proper action by a policeman. They were deliberate in the sense that they were directed, to an extent that varied from city to city, against specific targets."

J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Feb. 16 told a House Appropriations Subcommittee:

"For the most part, the riots and disorders that have occurred in this country since the summer of 1964 were sparked by a single incident, generally following an arrest of a Negro by local police for some minor infraction of the law. Although most of the riots and disturbances have been characterized by spontaneous outbursts of mob violence dominated by young hoodlums, the involvement of other violent, lawless, subversive, and extremist elements became readily apparent as the rioting grew and spread. Communists and other subversives and extremists strive and labor ceaselessly to precipitate racial trouble and to take advantage of racial discord in this country. Such elements were active in exploiting and aggravating the riots, for example, in Harlem, Watts, Cleveland, and Chicago."

He said that Stokely Carmichael, then chairman and currently a field worker of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), had been in "frequent contact" with Max Stanford, field chairman of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a "highly secret all-Negro, Marxist-Leninist, Chinese-Communist-oriented organization which advocates guerrilla warfare to obtain its goals." Hoover also identified the Progressive Labor Party as a "splinter group" of the Communist Party-USA and termed the Nation of Islam "an all-Negro, violently antigovernment and antiwhite organization." He said that the Nation of Islam had a membership of 5,500, while RAM had fewer than 50.

More recently, Hoover testified in closed session before the President's Special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. The Commission chairman, Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner (D), Aug. 1 said Hoover had said that he had "no intelligence on which to base a conclusion of conspiracy" behind racial violence.

Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, current SNCC chairman, were the leading advocates of "black power." Carmichael spent the summer of 1967 abroad, traveling to England, Cuba and, reportedly, Hanoi. Brown toured Negro ghettos, urging Negroes to arm themselves and, if necessary, to burn their ghettos.

✓ **Boston, Mass., June 2-5** -- More than 1,000 persons in a predominantly Negro neighborhood rioted after a group of mothers staged a sit-in to urge reforms in welfare and contended they were beaten by police; 100 were injured, more than 100 were arrested and property damage was estimated at \$1 million.

Philadelphia, Pa., June 11 -- Negroes threw bricks and bottles following a dispute over a rug; four policemen were injured.

Prattville, Ala., June 11 -- Negroes angered by the arrest of Carmichael exchanged gunfire with police for three hours; 10 Negroes were charged with inciting to riot; Carmichael said when arrested: "We came here to tear this town up and we're going to tear it up."

Tampa, Fla., June 11-12 -- Negroes rioted in a 60-block area after a white policeman shot and killed a Negro burglary suspect who refused to halt; two persons were killed, 15 injured and more than 100 arrested; property damage was estimated at \$2 million.

Cincinnati, Ohio, June 12-16 -- Negroes rioted in three predominantly Negro sections, hurling Molotov cocktails, smashing store windows and looting; one person was killed, eight were injured and 365 were arrested; property damage was estimated at \$2 million; on June 15, the third night of rioting, H. Rap Brown arrived and said that the city "will be in flames until the hunkie cops (National Guardsmen) get out." In another speech that day he said that "SNCC has declared war."

Dayton, Ohio, June 14-15 -- Negro youths threw rocks and smashed store windows; four persons were injured and at least 39 arrested; on the night of June 14, Brown urged a crowd to "take the pressure off Cincinnati." The same day, he had told a crowd in Dayton: "How can you be nonviolent in America, the most violent country in the world. You better shoot the man to death; that's what he's doing to you."

Lansing, Mich., June 15 -- About 35 persons engaged in a disturbance after police arrested a disorderly Negro youth; three persons were injured and two arrested.

Atlanta, Ga., June 18-21 -- Rioting in the predominantly Negro Dixie Hills section followed a speech by Carmichael at a rally held to protest the shooting of a Negro by a Negro policeman; Carmichael and SNCC aides were active throughout the riot; Carmichael said: "The only way these hunkies and hunkies-lovers can understand is when they're met by resistance" and he told a rally: "We need to be beating heads." One person was killed, three were injured and at least five were arrested.

Buffalo, N.Y., June 27-29 -- More than 1,000 persons rioted after a rock was thrown at a bus and a woman passenger was injured; more than 100 persons were injured and 240 were arrested; property damage was estimated at \$250,000.

Des Moines, Iowa, July 2 -- About 50 persons broke windows after a fight between Negro youths at a Negro dance; seven persons were arrested.

Cincinnati, Ohio, July 3-5 -- Negro gangs started fires, one of which destroyed a plant valued at \$1 million; 19 persons were arrested.

Kansas City, Mo., July 9 -- Three persons were injured, more than 12 were arrested and several vehicles were damaged in a disturbance.

Waterloo, Iowa, July 10 -- Negroes broke windows and damaged vehicles; five persons were injured and five were arrested in the disturbance.

Hartford, Conn., July 12-13 -- More than 200 persons engaged in a disturbance after a dispute erupted in a restaurant; 11 persons were injured and more than 23 arrested.

Erie, Pa., July 12-13 -- Gangs of youths damaged vehicles after police dispersed Negro youths playing dice on a street corner; two persons were injured and nine arrested.

Newark, N.J., July 12-17 -- Negroes burned and looted following the arrest of a Negro taxi driver; 25 persons were killed, 1,200 injured and at least 1,600 arrested; property damage was estimated at \$15 million; Carmichael was in England, where he said in London on July 25: "In Newark we applied war tactics of the guerrillas."

Plainfield, N.J., July 15-17 -- Looting and vandalism erupted; one person was killed and at least 100 were arrested; about 300 were involved in the disturbances.

Fresno, Calif., July 16 -- About 50 persons were involved in a disturbance; one was injured and property damage was estimated at \$2,500.

Des Moines, Iowa, July 16 -- Two persons were injured and 17 arrested in a disturbance in which windows were broken.

Erie, Pa., July 19 -- Two persons were injured and eight were arrested in a disturbance in which more than \$150,000 in property damage was done.

Cairo, Ill., July 16-19 -- Fire bombs destroyed a warehouse and damaged other property after a Negro soldier hanged himself in the city jail and police brutality was charged.

Minneapolis, Minn., July 19-21 -- Twelve persons were injured and about 40 were arrested in disturbances in which fire damage was done.

Durham, N.C., July 19-20 -- About 300 persons engaged in disturbances in which two persons were injured; minor damage was reported.

NYack, N.Y., July 19 -- About 50 persons engaged in a disturbance in which windows were broken; 18 persons were arrested.

Englewood, N.J., July 21 -- About 100 persons engaged in a disturbance in which windows were broken, police cars were stoned and one fire broke out; at least eight persons were injured and five were arrested.

East Harlem, N.Y., July 23-25 -- Two persons were killed and 150 injured during looting and fire-bombing.

Detroit, Mich., July 23-28 -- Widespread looting and burning occurred; 41 persons were killed and more than 1,000 injured; there were 3,500 arrests, and property damage was estimated at \$500 million.

Cambridge, Md., July 24 -- Two city blocks were destroyed, two persons were injured and at least five persons were arrested.

Pontiac, Mich., July 24 -- Two persons were killed and at least 87 were arrested during fire-bombing and looting.

Rochester, N.Y., July 24 -- Three persons were injured during sniper fire, stoning, bottle-throwing and brick-throwing.

Flint, Mich., July 24 -- More than 100 persons engaged in a disturbance in which arson and vandalism were reported.

Grand Rapids, Mich., July 24-26 -- About 400 persons were injured and more than 100 were arrested during shooting, looting and arson.

Mount Vernon, N.Y., July 24-26 -- Looting and vandalism were reported, but there were no deaths, injuries or arrests.

Toledo, Ohio, July 24-27 -- Several persons were injured and at least 17 arrested during fire-bombing, looting and window-breaking.

Phoenix, Ariz., July 26 -- Property damage estimated at \$34,000 was reported in a disturbance in which 48 persons were arrested.

Chicago, Ill., July 26-27 -- Looting and arson resulted in the arrest of 57 persons.

New York, N.Y. (5th Avenue), July 27 -- About 150 persons engaged in looting and vandalism and breaking windows; 23 persons were arrested.

Youngstown, Ohio, July 27 -- One person was killed, three were injured and seven were arrested in a disturbance in which two buildings were dynamited and three buildings were damaged by fire.

Milwaukee, Wis., July 30 -- Four persons were killed and a number were injured in Negro rioting; the National Guard was sent in and a curfew was imposed on the entire city.

Providence, R.I., July 31-Aug. 1 -- Gangs of whites and Negroes roamed sections of the city and were fought by police riot squads; 23 persons were injured and 14 were arrested.

Washington, D.C., Aug. 1 -- Bands of Negroes began window-smashing and setting small fires in the Northeast section, heavily Negro in population; police moved in quickly and calm was restored before dawn.

Syracuse, N.Y., Aug. 17-18 -- Police used tear gas and fired shots into the air to disperse roving bands of Negroes; a curfew was imposed; five persons were hurt and 34 were arrested.

New Haven, Conn., Aug. 19-22 -- Negro and Puerto Rican youths set fires and broke windows.

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

Description of City

and

Chronology of Disturbances
at JACKSON STATE COLLEGE
May 10-12, 1967

D R A F T

Interoffice Memorandum

This material has neither been submitted to
nor considered by the Commission.

December 7, 1967

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

I. Characteristics of the City.

Location and General setting: Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, is located near the center of the state in Hinds county. It covers 46.5 square miles and is 296 feet above sea level. ~~The annual mean and temperature is 65.8 degrees. Average annual rainfall is 50.49 inches; average snowfall is 2.3 inches.~~ Jackson was slow to recover from the civil war destruction. The recovery from the depression of the thirties was rapid due to a railroad junction and the discovery of natural gas.

Population: Jackson had a population of 144,422 in 1960. Negroes comprised 36 % of this population. OEO estimates the total population at 167,000 for 1966 with a non-white population of 57,807. These figures show a greater increasing white population than of Negro since 1960. ?

Over one half of Jackson's Negro population in 1960 were children and young people. About 43% of Jackson ~~with~~^{white} inhabitants were children and young people. About 51% of Negro children under 18 lived with both parents. 79% of Jackson's white children under 18 lived with both parents.

without more explanation there is no indication whether Jackson is healthy or not

Health: According to HEW statistics, in 1960 the city total of instant mortality rates per 1,000 live births was 36.3 whereas in the poverty area it was 41.3

In fiscal year 1966, there was a total of \$2,094,802.00 funded for the Public Health Programs in the areas of Venereal disease, Tuberculosis, Community Health, Mental Retardation, Immunization Neurology and Cancer.

Government: Jackson has the Commission form of government consisting of a mayor and two commissioners elected by popular vote for a term of four years. The present mayor will soon complete his fourth term in office. There are no Negroes on the Commission.

Education: There are 56 public schools (39 elementary, 9 Jr. high, 6 High schools, and 2 Jr-Sr. high schools) in the Jackson Municipal Separate School District.

According to figures from the Jackson School District, there were an estimated 39,000 pupils enrolled in the period 1965-1966.

Average pupil expenditure in 1964-65 was \$285, in 1965-66 it was \$285.00. According to 1960 Census figures, there was a very significant difference between

the levels of achievement of the white and Negro portions of Jackson's adult population. The median school years completed by the white population was twelve, over four grades higher than the median level of education of the adult Negro population. 12% of adult whites (over 25) and 64% of adult Negroes had ~~8 years of schooling or less~~ *than 9 years of schooling.*

There are 3 institutions of higher learning, *in Jackson,*
 Jackson State College, ^(JSC) Tougaloo College and Milsaps College. All 3 are liberal Arts, JSC is a state supported Negro college with a current enrollment of 2,920. Tougaloo is a predominantly Negro private school of 600 students with a faculty that is 75% white. Milsaps also has an enrollment of about 600 and has no more than 5 Negro students.

Income: Median income of white families was 38% higher than that of non-white families. 60% of non-white families received less than \$3,000 per year income; 11% of white families were in this poverty category.

Economy: Formerly a white collar city, Jackson began to attract industry after the depression. There is diversified manufacturing including glass, textiles, electronic equipment and meat and dairy products.

Employment: Negroes ^{in general} were ~~even~~ participating in the labor force to a lesser degree than whites in 1960. *Although* Negro women were participating in the labor force to a

greater degree than white women. ~~In each case they were having greater difficulty finding jobs.~~ The unemployment rate for Negro men was 3 1/2 times that of white men while Negro women had an unemployment rate 50% greater than that for white women.

more
Negroes
in the
market

41% of employed Negro men and 75% of employed Negro women worked in unskilled occupations or as domestics. Only 57% of employed white men and 10% of employed white women worked in similar jobs.

Housing: ~~Negroes had less of a stake in the community which comes from home ownership.~~ Of the housing units occupied by Negroes, 38% were owner-occupied; some 70% of white - occupied housing was owner-occupied. One-third of Negro-occupied housing was overcrowded; less than 7% of white housing was overcrowded. Only 52% of Negro-occupied housing was sound and had all plumbing facilities; 90% of white-occupied housing met these criteria for adequate housing.

Median rent paid as a proportion of median income indicates that Negroes had to pay about 4.5% more of their income for housing than did their white fellow citizens . Jackson has not applied for federal funds for urban renewal.

Crime: Crime in Jackson is quite low. 95% of all American cities of 100,000 population or more had a higher crime rate than Jackson in 1966. Crime has increased less rapidly in Jackson since 1961 than in most large cities. Jackson has a relatively large police force as measured by the number of law enforcement personnel per 1,000 population. By this measure, only 33% of America's big cities have larger police forces. Jackson presently has 403, policemen, ~~110 cars and vehicles. Their current~~ ~~police budget is \$2,614,799.25.~~ of which number 70 are negro.

described

②

Commissioner Negro Grievances: The grievances ~~which were~~ ^{related} told to inter- *the*
~~viewers~~ ^{fall into} were in two areas; Campus and Town.

The Lynch Street traffic was a longstanding grievance.

It is a busy thoroughfare which divides the campus. One student had been ^{struck} hit by a car, while crossing, several months prior to the disturbance. ^{often} White teen agers sometimes sped through ^{the street} and harassed Negro students *by throwing insults and bottles from their cars.*

by The Jackson State College students were frustrated not only in their inability to act effectively in relationship with the city officials but also with ^{by} the college administration.

According to JSC students interviewed, JCS was academically substandard; ^{the students} they felt unduly restricted in their social life; ^{and} they resented mandatory chapel attendance and restrictions on ^{political} ~~police~~ organizations and activities. On the second day of the disturbance, JSC students presented a list of the above grievances to college officials and included a specific complaint regarding the poor condition of the dining hall and the poor quality of the food which was served there.

menial JSC students reported ~~having~~ ^{finding} difficulty *finding anything but*
employment in Jackson.

Some members of the Negro community and the JSC students interviewed felt that the ten policemen on the Jackson Police Department were only tokens, and a ^{form} type of peace offerings, and not "real" police since they do not arrest whites. *by custom,*

allegations
- 2 -

There were many ^{allegations} claims of police brutality as well as ~~as~~ ~~complaints~~ of lack of response by the police force to requests of assistance from Negroes.

On the third day of the disturbance, a group of student leaders met with the Mayor to request the closing of Lynch Street, the dismissal of a Negro policeman whom they felt was very unfair and brutal, and that the campus Security force of JSC be recognized by other law enforcement agencies. ←

The Mayor said he would reduce the speed ^{permissible} zone through the Lynch Street area. However, [↑] the reduced speed limit is not enforced, thus the grievance persists

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

II. Basic Statistics of the Disturbance at Jackson STATE COLLEGE

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>INJURIES</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>PROPERTY DAMAGE</u>
May 10	0	0	0	0
May 11	1 (Died 5/12)	4	14	500.00* - looted drug store
May 12	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	1	4	23	500.00

* 2 smashed telephone
booths, one signal
light knocked out
and several
police barricades
burned, and on
5/11/67 -
Value UNKNOWN

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON STATE COLLEGE

III. Chronology of the Disturbance of May 10-12, 1967

Wednesday, May 10, 1967: Student elections were to be held on the Jackson State College^(JSC) campus at the end of the week.

Approximately 10:50 P.M.: Students (primarily juniors, sophomores, and freshmen ^{the} as seniors were downtown attending ^{a senior ball}) were milling around after a student political rally when a police car driven by two Negro policemen chased a speeding Negro male student onto the campus.

The officers, while attempting to check the driver's identification, were surrounded by Negro students from nearby dormitories and were told they could not take the student. The students began to throw bottles and rocks at officers and began to march around the campus. The police withdrew and called for reinforcements. The police blocked off streets leading ~~on~~ to the campus. FBI reports estimated that there were 300 to 400 students demonstrating on campus against police action. (Later, Police estimated that the crowd numbered 1,500) The armed ^{police} reinforcements which arrived and parked on Lynch Street which bisects Jackson State Campus.

Thursday, May 11, 1967 1:06 A.M.: One busload of students from Tougaloo College (a Negro Liberal Arts College with ^{approximately} about 600 students located about three miles from Jackson) arrived followed by several cars also containing Tougaloo students. According to FBI sources, the group was lead by the college's white male chaplain.

Telephone booths and business signs were damaged; trash, trash cans, bricks and broken glass were scattered on the streets. One Negro male was struck on the head by a bottle thrown. He was taken to the hospital and released.

Approximately 2:00 A.M.: General Johnson, Commander of the National Guard troops was notified of the disturbance.

Students used the police barricades to start a bonfire on the street adjacent to the college and gathered around it singing.

3:35 A.M.: The campus was quiet. According to students interviewed, students stood out all evening in order to protect the girls' dorms from ^{local} street gangs of Negroes who had attempted to join the fracas ^{and enter the girls' dormitory.}

Thursday Morning, May 11, 1967: Students were milling around and attending political rallies for the student election. The mayor attempted to ^{enter} ~~go on~~ to the Jackson State campus, but was advised not to ^{do so} ~~by~~ the student leaders.

9:00 A. M.: The mayor spoke to students on a street adjacent to ^{the} ~~campus~~. According to FBI reports, about 500 persons heard his speech and he ~~reportedly was~~ shouted down. Some students from Milsaps (a white liberal arts college with about 600 students enrolled) came over and had a peaceful demonstration down Lynch Street in support of the Jackson State students. They left without incident. ~~The Jsc students reportedly were~~ There ~~was some~~ ^{resentment} of the outsiders on campus and Jackson State ^{they} ~~students~~ decided to wear identifying arm bands.

Approximately Noon: Students from Tougaloo began arriving ^{at} ~~onto~~ the campus.

3:30 P. M.: At the request of city officials, Governor Paul B. Johnson ordered the mobilization of the ^{local} ~~350~~ man National Guard unit. The unit was to be on standby to be utilized if necessary at the request of the Jackson Police

4

Department. The Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol also placed officers in the Jackson District on the same type of standby arrangement.

Thursday Evening: Police barricades were not completely effective. Police at times permitted motorists to drive down Lynch Street ^{warning that they proceeded} ~~saying they were to proceed~~ "at their own risk." These cars were stoned and the students attempted to overturn them.

9:00 P. M.: The crowd continued to grow to an estimated 2,000 persons. Small fires were started around the campus. The police fired into the air and into the crowd. Three Negro males were shot, one Benjamin Brown, died the next morning, the other two were not seriously injured.

9:15 P. M.: The National Guard unit arrived on the scene and marched east to west down Lynch Street. The crowd moved ahead of them. Mayor Allen C. Thompson ^{announced} ~~decided~~ a ten o'clock curfew ^{for} ~~in~~ the JSC area.

5
11:21 P. M.: The area was quite.

Friday, May 12, 1:00 A. M.: Between 10:00 p.m. Thursday

and 1:00 a.m. Friday, 14 persons had been arrested, ^{and most of them were charged with}
curfew violations.

1:15 A. M.: Street cleaning crews moved in to clean

the debris. National Guard and police patrolled the curfew area.

Friday Morning: The mayor continued the ten o'clock p.m.

curfew for another evening.

Friday Afternoon: The NAACP asked for permission to hold

a march to city hall. Permission was first denied then

later granted. JSC student leaders met with the mayor

to ask (1) permit closing of Lynch Street, a busy

thoroughfare and one of the main arteries to downtown Jackson;

(2) the ^{dismissal} ~~firing~~ of police officer Ellison Weatherly, Negro

male member of police force; (3) the campus security force

of JSC be recognized by other law enforcement agencies.

6

3:10 P. M.: Twelve Milsap students were joined by nine non-students (total 17 white males, four white females) as they marched around city hall protesting "the murder of Ben Brown."

3:58 P. M.: The group left city hall and disbanded.

6:00 P. M.: A crowd gathers at Pratt Memorial Methodist Church.

7:00 P. M.: Charles Evers, head of Mississippi NAACP led approximately 170 persons from the church to city hall ^{and} arrived

at 7:28 p.m. Individuals joined the march along the route ^{which} arrived arriving with about 350 persons, ~~(seven whites, rest were Negroes).~~ including seven whites.

The Jackson Police Department provided an escort and Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol blocked off intersection along the

way. At city hall, Evers and others made speeches.

7:50 P. M.: The group marched back to Pratt Memorial Church and dispersed at approximately 9:00 p.m.

of what sort?

10:00 P. M.: Jackson Police and National Guard patrolled
the curfew area.

11:00 P. M.: National Guard left vicinity and were on standby.

Saturday, May 13, 1967, 2:00 A. M.: Nine male Negroes were arrested for
curfew violations between 10:00 P.M. Friday and 2:00 A. M.
Saturday.

Saturday Morning: Mayor Thompson lifted the curfew and the
National Guard were dismissed.

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

Description of City
and
Chronology of Disorders

D R A F T

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

This material has neither been
submitted to nor considered by
the Commission.

January 8, 1968

I. Description of the City

Location: Nashville is the state capitol of Tennessee and the principal city of the central part of the state. The Cumberland River runs through the city.

Population: Approximately three fourths of the population is of English stock, with an intermingling of German, Scottish and Northern Irish blood. The present migrant citizens are predominately poor Negroes and whites from the South, and white professionals from the North and East.

In 1960, the population of metropolitan Nashville was 399,743, with 81% white and 19% non-white. Of the 76,832 non-white population, 62% in 1960 lived in centrally located census tracts constituting 22.6 square miles or approximately 5% of Davidson County.

About 47% of Nashville's Negro population in 1960 were children and young people, compared to 43% of Nashville's white inhabitants. About 59% of Negro children under 18 lived with both parents while 76% of the white children did.

The Disturbance Area: The disturbance occurred between Fisk and Tennessee A&I Universities. This area is included in the designated target area (North Nashville) to be benefited by the recently-approved "model cities" proposal. This area, according to the model cities proposal, contains an estimated 46,000 persons, and is bounded on the north, east and west by the Cumberland

River and on the south by the L&N Railroad tracks and a commercial district.

Racial composition in this area has remained fairly constant since 1960, with about 23% of the people white, 77% non-white. The area is marked by blight and slums, with dilapidated and new houses co-existing in the same block. The area principally consists of single family residences. Population density per unit is among the highest in the city (1.1 persons per room).

Problems of the area include poverty, lack of education and job skills (unemployment is twice that of the rest of the city), poor housing, inadequate public transportation, high crime rate (twice that of the rest of the city), juvenile delinquency, insufficient communications and contact with the rest of the community, absence of motivation and a lack of health care and social services. There is also air pollution and unsightly industrial wastes. Family income is low. In 1959, almost half the households had incomes less than \$3,000.

Economy: Nashville has a widely diversified economy; beside State and Federal Government business, the city is a regional center for finance, commercial banking, insurance, and warehousing. No single industry dominates the city. There are over 500 manufacturing establishments, including plants run by Avco, Dupont, Ford, Gates, Genesco, RCA Victor and Western Electrics. Nashville is the center of the western and country music recording industry and is the home of the "Grand Ole Opry".

Employment: Fifty-one percent of employed Negro men and 70% of employed Negro women work in unskilled occupations or as domestics compared to 13% of employed white men and 16% of employed white women.

Income: Median income of white families in 1960 was 60% higher than that of non-white families. Fifty-six percent of non-white families received less than \$3,000 per year income; 29% of white families were in this poverty category. Estimated, per household, median income for metropolitan Nashville in 1965 was \$8,059.

Housing: One-quarter of all Negroes live in over-crowded units with more than one person per room. Forty-three percent of whites live in units built before 1939, and 18% of whites do not have full plumbing facilities, while over two-thirds of all Negroes live in units built before 1939 and only 57% have complete plumbing facilities.

Education: The city has 12 centers of higher education; the three predominately Negro institutions are Meharry Medical College which has trained a high proportion of all Negro doctors, Fisk University, one of the "Negro Ivy League", and Tennessee (Agricultural and Industrial) State University, one of the "Negro Big Ten" public schools. Together these three institutions have over 6500 students.

The median educational level for adult Negroes in Nashville was the eighth grade; that of whites, the ninth grade. Forty-seven and two tenths percent of adult whites (over 25) and 59.2% of adult Negroes had only completed eight years of schooling or less.

Crime: Crime in Nashville is more serious than in most large American cities. Only 3% of all American cities of 100,000 population or more had a higher crime rate than Nashville in 1966, though crime has not increased as rapidly in Nashville since 1961 as in most large cities. Nashville has a relatively large police force as measured by the number of law enforcement personnel per 1,000 population. Only 14% of large cities have police forces larger on a per capita basis than Nashville's. Thirty-five of the 500 man police force are Negroes.

City Government: Nashville is governed by a metropolitan government which in 1963 replaced a separate city mayor - council and county government. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan government is coterminous with the boundaries of Davidson County, with all the powers of cities as well as counties under Tennessee general laws. The Metropolitan government is characterized by a strong mayor as the chief administrator, with extensive appointive powers under the metropolitan charter, as well as strong executive powers in fiscal administration.

Negro Grievances: During the fall and winter of 1966, several student protests about poor food and inadequate dormitory facilities were held at Fisk and Tennessee State University. A broad range of students interviewed maintained that these conditions were caused by white-dominated administrations.

Many complaints were related to interviewers of police brutality and abuse. The response of the mayor to documented cases of police brutality brought by a

group of respected middle-class Negro leaders was to lecture the group that such allegations served only to hurt the image of the police and to hinder recruiting efforts.

Negro interviewees also complained of under-employment and Tennessee A&I students were upset by some white students who persistently drove through the campus throwing insults and bottles at the students.

Several persons whose addresses were listed in the newspapers as a result of demonstrations reported that they were fired subsequently from their jobs, and that their auto insurance arbitrarily cancelled. Fire and theft insurance also was arbitrarily cancelled on a number of Negro businesses. Those affected, especially those in no way involved in the disturbance, felt this to be an unwarranted reprisal.

II. Basic Statistics on the Disturbance

Date	April 8-11, 1967
Deaths	0
Injuries	47
Arrests	94
Property Damage	City estimates range from \$30,000 to \$100,000

III. Chronology of the Disorder of April 8-11, 1967

Friday, April 7, 1967: The Police Department adopted an emergency or riot plan for Friday morning with two riot squads on standby around the clock. The riot squads consisted of ten police officers, two sergeants, a commander and an alternate. This plan was enacted as a result of information the Police received, that Stokely Carmichael was in town and had met with SNCC, SSOC (Southern Student Organizing Committee), and SCEF (Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc.) and that these people were planning to teach molotov cocktail assembly and to conduct neighborhood surveys to determine which establishments were owned by whites and which by Negroes.

Saturday, April 8, 1967

3:00 p.m.: Stokely Carmichael spoke at the Vanderbilt University "Impact" Symposium together with Senator Strom Thurmond, Martin Luther King, columnist Rowland Evans and poet Allen Ginsberg. Police surveillance during this period was extensive, with more than 70 policemen present.

7:00 p.m.: The Negro operator of the University Dinner Club, located at 1728 Jefferson Street, across from Fisk University, summoned police to remove a drunken Negro soldier; some claimed he was simply asleep. Two white officers were directed to the restaurant in a patrol car. About 50 minutes after the original call, the operator of the Dinner Club called and again requested

that police be sent.

When the police arrived in response to the first call, they found that the Negro soldier had gone. The operator of the establishment, however, wished to eject another Negro patron with whom he had quarreled a year earlier. This was done without force, but by at least one account the Negro soldier, who was still in the vicinity, made a number of comments about the sad state of affairs when Negroes received this sort of treatment by white policemen while Negroes were fighting in Viet Nam. Two different policemen - also white - arrived in answer to the second call and removed the Negro soldier, who by that time had re-entered the Club.

Within 5-8 minutes after the arrival of the second car, and while the police were still present, a number of young Negroes, mostly students, appeared and began picketing the University Dinner Club. The signs protested the arbitrary actions of the Club operator and the presence of white police. According to the police, the immediate establishment of a picket line, complete with placards, suggests that this incident was staged by SNCC. The students claim that the signs were made on the spot with materials bought at a nearby dime store. Newspaper reporters and others present affirm that the signs were of a quality that could have been fabricated in minutes. In addition, the residence which is used as a local SNCC Headquarters is only a few houses from the Club. Local SNCC members were present in the group

which began the picket but none of the national SNCC personnel were there at this time. The police who had been called to the Club left the scene.

A squad of riot police arrived in the area and quickly became the focus of increasing attention. The pickets began yelling "Come on; are you going to be a 'Nigger' all your life?" at other students and onlookers, urging them to join their picketing, and the small incident gradually became a pleasantly warm weekend campus "happening." Several of the adult Negroes present sympathetic to SNCC, most notably Reverend James Woodruff, counselled the students to break up the picket line.

Dr. Edwin Mitchell, a Negro community leader and director of the Nashville-Davidson County Human Relations Commission, attempted to bring order to the situation by suggesting that the helmeted police be removed. This request was met within a few minutes.

By this time, the crowd was growing rapidly. The nearby movie theater changed shows and an increasing number of students bringing their dates to and from the campus swelled the crowd of curious onlookers. Their attention was galvanized by the false rumor that a Negro youth had been beaten by the police and taken from the scene.

The operator of the University Dinner Club met with the leaders of the protesting students. They agreed to recess the meeting to go outside in an attempt to disperse the pickets and growing crowd. They were unsuccessful and the milling crowd now covered Jefferson Street to the major intersection with 18th Avenue, North.

Police blockades were set up to block traffic between 17th and 18th Avenues on Jefferson Street.

Approximately 9:30 p.m.: A city bus was allowed into the intersection where the crowd was gathered. Several people began rocking the bus and banging on its side. A young man broke out the window in front of the driver, and a Negro police lieutenant then fired five warning shots into the air with his revolver. This dispersed the crowd momentarily and the bus proceeded out of the area.

The two riot squads of police appeared in the area. They had riot safety helmets, face shields, riot batons and shotguns. They formed a line across the street between the crowd and the downtown section of Nashville. The crowd began taunting the police, hurling their nastiest comments at the Negro police in the riot squad. A static stand-off continued for a few minutes.

10:00 p.m.: A number of rocks and bottles and other missiles began to be thrown from the back of the crowd at the police. The number of Negroes apparently varied from 200 to something like 700 and the composition of the crowd continually changed as students returned to their dormitories and were replaced in the crowd by other students bringing their Saturday night dates home to the campus. Groups of students and relatively young Negroes ranged over an area centered still around Fisk University.

The main zone of activity extended along Jefferson Street from 16th Avenue to 23rd Avenue, North, between Scovel Street and Herman Street. The Negroes sporadically threw rocks and the police responded with shotgun fire over their heads. From time to time the police charged into the crowd but, since its lines were thin and dormitories were near at hand, no wall of unmoving demonstrators confronted the police. Several other riot squads were sent to the area.

There were several reports that a white taxi cab driver drove onto the Fisk University campus and fired several shots into a girl's dormitory. The only corroboration in the official records is a notation that a cab driver was admitted to Madison Hospital a few hours later suffering from "hallucinations" about the rioting. The police established more road blocks to keep whites outside of the affected area. Several carloads of white toughs were apprehended by the police and six were arrested and booked. The police continued their efforts to break up and disperse the milling crowds. By all reports, they used much profanity and abusive language in the course of clearing the streets.

12:00 p.m.: Dr. Edwin Mitchell called a meeting of Negro leaders at his home. Inman Otey was there, along with a number of the Negro business, religious, and political leaders, as well as SNCC leaders Stokely Carmichael, George Ware and Fred Brooks. Also present was Reverend James Woodruff, the Episcopal minister and informal advisor to the Negro militant students. The middle class civil rights leaders and the Black

Power group lectured each other at length. Nothing constructive came from this meeting which lasted almost until daybreak. Many of the older group left during the course of the discussion.

Mr. Otey was stopped on his way home from the meeting by the police for having one tail-light out. Asked to step from the car, he was roughed up and beaten by the police, arrested and booked for resisting arrest.

Sunday, April 9, 1967

Approximately 12:30 a.m.: The police fired several rounds of tear gas at students in the disturbance area. On several occasions, according to Fisk University officials and students, the police chased demonstrators into girls' dormitories and on one occasion broke down a glass door. The police deny entering dormitories. According to one published account of this same incident, students in a Fisk dormitory panicked when police began to fire into the dorm and a group not involved in the disturbance threw a fellow militant student out of the dormitory through a pane of plate glass.

Approximately 1:30 a.m.: One police officer fired a shotgun in the direction of a group of students who had been pelting police with bricks and rocks. He was immediately stopped by other officers. This seems to have been the only instance of police shooting directly at the Negroes facing them.

2:30 a.m.: The crowd had completely dwindled away and many police detachments were withdrawn. Only a dozen Negroes involved in the disturbance were arrested. Four were university students and one was a former student. None were active in SNCC. It was widely believed in the Negro community, however, that there had been "mass arrests."

Approximately 4:30 a.m.: The final incident in the first night of rioting occurred when 21-year old William Reagan, was shot in the neck as he crossed the intersection at Charlotte Avenue and 42nd Avenue. The driver of the car in which Reagan was riding saw three or four white youths speed away from the intersection immediately after the shot was fired. Reagan was taken into a hospital and listed in fair condition after minor surgery. The youths were not apprehended.

Approximately 11:00 a.m.: The police in the area had been reduced to the usual number of two police cars.

The weather continued balmy and there were light showers early in the day. The area remained quiet throughout the morning. Eleven hundred and fifteen Tennessee National Guardsmen were alerted, but they were not assembled or moved.

Noon: The meeting of Negro militants and middle-class leaders reconvened at St. Anselm's Episcopal Chapel. Absent were Carmichael and Ware; they had left town after the meeting the evening before. Also absent were several of the middle-class leaders who had been

at the earlier meeting. Notable by his absence was Avon Williams, attorney for the local chapter of the NAACP.

An article in the Sunday morning Tennessean newspaper featured Williams' comments about the starting of the riot. Williams was quoted in the newspaper as saying in part, "Stokely Carmichael didn't have to be present in town when this started. His bully boys are here and they knew what he wanted." The students felt hurt by this attack. At the meeting, they discussed a number of demands they wanted to make to the city authorities. There were short-range in nature and focused on getting students in jail released and having the police, particularly white police, withdrawn from the campus area.

Dr. Edwin Mitchell, Director. of the Metro Human Relations Commission, said he would contact the authorities about these demands. The students wanted to accompany him, but he refused to take them along, saying it was entirely too delicate and he did not want to make clear whom he would contact. Mitchell was in contact with city officials during the day but no public statement came from these meetings.

Students left the meeting feeling quite frustrated. They put out several hand-bills during the day. One of these attacked the complacency of the Negro middle-class and particularly focused their attention on Inman Otey, Edwin Mitchell and Mansfield Douglas for having sold out their Negro brethern. The second handbill noted a rally to be held at 6:00 p.m. at the Fisk football stadium. At about the same time, Inman

Otey was showing off the bruises he had received at the hands of the police before a large Negro church congregation.

Approximately 3:00 p.m.: The student committee presented their demands to the police department. They met with Assistant Police Chief Donald Barton who had been in charge of the police in the area of rioting the night before. The students requested the release of those still held and also asked that all white riot police stay out of the campus area.

Chief Barton explained that he was unable to help those in jail because they were in the custody of the sheriff. According to the students, they set a deadline of 6:00 p.m. for some reply on their demands. The police say no deadline was set. The students informed one of the reporters for the Tennessean and also the highest Negro official in the police department, Lieutenant Bobby Hill, about their plans to meet at the Fisk football stadium.

During the day the Acting-President of Fisk University met with student groups, including the leaders of the student council and the football team, to enlist their aid in keeping militants off the campus.

Approximately 6:00 p.m.: Several hundred Negro students gathered in front of the gates to the Fisk stadium. The gates were locked and the area patrolled by football team members wearing their jerseys. According to interviewees on the scene, some of the students were armed and had primitive Molotov cocktails. The two groups of

students who confronted each other engaged in a considerable amount of name calling, but no fights occurred. There were no university officials present nor was there any concentration of police in the area. The crowd gradually broke up and drifted off in various directions.

The Fisk campus area was patrolled by what the administration called "trusted students" and apparently almost all Fisk students stayed in their dormitories.

Approximately 8:00 p.m.: Several shop windows were broken; some Molotov cocktails were thrown and there were several instances of minor looting of stores. Most of these were Negro-owned establishments. Post riot estimates place the total loss due to looting at \$300.

Numerous carloads of Negro and white sightseers were in the area and cars were stopped in the slow moving traffic on a number of occasions and rocked by Negro youths. Police patrols in automobiles with riot-helmeted police, six to a car, equipped with sawed-off shotguns, were in evidence throughout a wide area surrounding the campus. Police blocked a stretch of Jefferson Street, routing traffic through rundown residential areas in the neighborhood.

Local residents sat on their front porches and watched the swirl of events around them without ever taking any part. Police got out of their cars and broke up any group of more than five or six persons by threatening them with their nightsticks.

A fire in a deserted shack at 22nd Avenue and Underwood Street attracted a crowd of about 100 neighborhood residents, who circled the fire engines and watched quietly while firemen poured water on the structure. Most of the crowd were children and older people.

The entire Fisk University campus area remained quiet through the evening. A line of students had formed on both sides of Centennial Avenue, a main thoroughfare which runs directly through Tennessee A&I State University. This street is a continuation of Jefferson Street, which runs past Fisk. The A&I students exchanged taunts with sightseers in cars, threw rocks at some cars, and rocked others.

Approximately 9:15 p.m.: City police moved to break up one of these car-rocking episodes and began shooting over the heads of students, in an attempt to disperse them. For the first time during the disturbance, shots were returned by the crowd. The police sought protection behind a low wall and continued to exchange fire with students for about twenty minutes. At this point, the police withdrew from the campus and the firing ceased. Six white youths were arrested at this time at the edge of Tennessee State University. One of them had a pistol.

Police reported that white youths shot several rounds at a police paddy wagon on the edge of the school campus. Several small fires were started on the area adjacent to the University, but police and firemen quickly brought them under control. Police made numerous arrests of persons for loitering and vagrancy. The police estimate that 150 rounds in all were fired in this incident.

Approximately 11:00 p.m.: Several shots reportedly came from a Fisk University dormitory in the direction of the police. Police received permission from the University administration to search the dormitory. No arms were found. Scattered incidents of rock throwing, fires and exchanged insults continued for the next several hours.

Approximately midnight: Another exchange of fire occurred on the A&I campus. Again, no one was hurt.

Monday, April 10, 1967

Approximately 12:30 a.m.: Stokley Carmichael returned to Nashville from a speaking engagement in Knoxville in a rented station wagon with George Ware and Ernest Stevens, both national SNCC workers. Carmichael was dropped off outside the area of the disturbance and the other two proceeded toward the area of the disturbance with a local member of SNCC.

They were stopped at a police roadblock and ordered out of the car. Police thoroughly searched the car and distributed some of the seized SNCC leaflets to newspapermen and other onlookers. They also confiscated a briefcase containing numerous checks payable to Carmichael and to SNCC. The police also pulled a revolver from the briefcase.

The search was conducted in such a way that reporters and other onlookers could not see whether the revolver actually came from the briefcase or had been placed there by an investigating police officer, as was alleged

at the time. Ware and Stevens were booked for "inciting to riot" as a result of their presumed activities on Saturday night. The local SNCC worker was booked on a charge of loitering and vagrancy.

1:00 a.m.: A raid on several homes was conducted by detectives with narcotics search warrants. Arrests were made only at 1720 Jefferson Street. This house is the residence of several SNCC members. The occupants were apparently asleep when police arrived. Several apartments in the house were thoroughly searched and a six-pack carton of 10-ounce bottles filled with gasoline and stuffed with rags was found behind the house. The police say it was dropped from a second story window when the raid began.

A police officer took the bottles into the house to pose for photographs with the bottles in front of a "Black Power" poster. The residents of the house alleged the Molotov cocktails were planted by the police. No narcotics were found. SNCC members believe the police were looking for Carmichael, expecting him to run into the street where he could be shot down.

In all, about 60 arrests were made during the second night of violence. At least 8 were white youths. The rest were either Tennessee State students or Negroes in their 20's, many of whom had been students at Tennessee State and were employed as laborers and unskilled service workers. The only Fisk students arrested were those picked up in the early morning police raid on the residence at 1720 Jefferson. Eight persons were treated at local hospitals for injuries received on the second night of the disturbance.

7:30 a.m.: Stokeley Carmichael left Nashville by plane for New Orleans to fulfill a speaking engagement.

10:30 a.m.: Dr. W. S. Davis, President of Tennessee A&I State University, met with faculty and representatives of all student organizations to present stern warnings against participation by students in riots and to organize a student effort aimed at keeping non-students off campus.

The weather continued unusually warm and sultry for spring; however, rain began and the temperatures dropped steadily. By evening a steady, chill rain was falling.

5:00 p.m.: A crowd, apparently composed of students, began gathering on the Tennessee State University campus and, within an hour, the situation had become as tense as the night before. Crowds also gathered on the main thoroughfare between Tennessee State and Fisk University. School officials asked the police to form one large and more easily controlled group. This the police did and then most police units pulled out of the campus area. Sporadic shots were fired.

7:00 p.m.: Roadblocks were set up around the campus by the police to stop traffic.

7:30 p.m.: Police were dispatched to the Humble Oil Refining Company depot upon hearing rumors that an explosion was about to take place. The first arrests of the evening came when 3 white youths from Sparta, Tennessee were taken into custody. During the next

few hours, several groups of persons were arrested for loitering or possessing arms. All activity seemed to be concentrated in the Tennessee State University area.

Approximately 10:00 p.m.: A stack of new lumber being used to build an annex to the Tennessee State Student Union building began burning. Because the blaze did not threaten to spread to other buildings, the fire department did not attempt to enter the area. They reasoned that their presence might only spark further violence. Soon a group of students formed to pour water on the blaze with hoses while campus security police stood by.

Youths trying to set fire to a Nashville Electric Service pole in the rain were jeered by a group of students because of their blatant stupidity. While there were several reports of shots being fired throughout the evening, the total number of persons involved was never very large and the disturbance of the evening ended soon after 10:30 p.m.

During the evening, the Tennessee House of Representatives was in session. A resolution demanded that Stokely Carmichael be deported from the United States to the land of his birth, Trinidad. Despite the pleas of some that such an action would only serve to make Carmichael more of a hero and martyr and the arguments that such a deportation would be impossible, because Carmichael is a U.S. citizen, the vote to seek deportation was passed by a wide margin on a voice vote.

During the day several Negro individuals and groups pleaded for an end to violence. Mayor Beverly

Briley stated in a prepared statement to the press that "this was not a rebellion of the ghetto; in fact they are the victims of this insurrection." He added that Stokely Carmichael and his aides were responsible for the riot. When asked by a reporter whether slum conditions might also be a contributing factor to the riot, the mayor said, "No, as the rioters had not been slum area residents, but students - those who Carmichael was able to agitate."

Tuesday, April 11, 1967: The riot-affected area was quiet during the day.

1:00 p.m.: The Negro Interdenominational Alliance held an open meeting at St. John's A.M.E. (Afro-American Methodist Episcopal) Church. A number of students and faculty members spoke. Several middle-class Negroes present related personal experiences of police abuse and expressed indignation at the treatment received by blacks in Nashville. The primary object of the meeting was the release of the jailed students. By evening all students had been released.

Tuesday evening police continued to maintain roadblocks at two intersections near the campus of Tennessee State University, allowing only residents of the area to enter. Those entering the campus were asked by city police to show their University identification cards. Outgoing traffic was not halted. No arrests were made during the day or evening and police roadblocks were discontinued on Wednesday. On Wednesday, the first set of trials of those arrested in the area began.

The number of arson caused fires in the riot was set at 19; 12 law officers were injured, and 35 civilians treated

HOUSTON, TEXAS

Description of City

and

Chronology of Disturbance

at Texas Southern University

May 16-17, 1967

D R A F T

Interoffice Memorandum

This material has neither been submitted
to nor considered by the Commission.

December 21, 1967

I N D E X

	<u>Page</u>
I. Description of the City	1
II. Basic Statistics About the Disturbance .	10
III. Chronology of the Disturbance of May 16-17, 1967	11

Description of the City and Chronology
of Disturbance at Texas Southern University
May 16-17, 1967

I. Description of the City

Location: Houston, located in Harris County, is the largest city in Texas and newest of the nation's major shipping centers. It is a tidewater port, 50 miles inland, connected with the Gulf Coast by the Houston Ship Channel, a busy waterway with attendant commercial and industrial activities. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has its Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston.

Population: German migrants once dominated the population and people of German descent still are the major element. In 1960, the population was 938,000. Of this, one-fifth were Negroes and one-twelfth were of Mexican-American descent. OEO estimated the 1966 population to be 1,135,000 with a nonwhite population of 270,631.

Forty-one percent of Houston's Negro population in 1960 were children and young people. About 37% of Houston's white inhabitants were children and young

people. About 61% of Negro children under 18 lived with both parents. Ninety percent of Houston's white children under 18 lived with both parents.

Economy: The Houston Ship Channel, opened in 1915, was the basis for the city's rapid development into a highly industrialized city. From the meager "100 bales" of cotton shipped down the Bayou in 1826, the port of Houston developed into the largest cotton port in the United States and the largest in the world for oil exporting, ranking third in the United States in total exports and third in cargo tonnage.

Employment: Negroes participated in the labor force to a lesser degree than whites in 1960 -- and they had greater difficulty in finding jobs. The unemployment rate for both Negro men and women was about double that for white men and women.

Forty-nine percent of employed Negro men and 75% of employed Negro women worked in unskilled occupations or as domestics. Nine percent of employed white men and 13% of employed white women worked in similar jobs.

Income: Median income of white families in 1960 was 56% higher than that of nonwhite families. Forty-two percent of nonwhite families received less than \$3,000 per year income; 13% of white families were in this poverty category.

Housing: Houston has voted down a zoning ordinance four times. The city therefore has been ineligible for federal urban renewal funds. Of the housing units occupied by Negroes, 42 were owner-occupied. One-fourth of Negro-occupied housing was overcrowded (more than 1.1 person per room); less than 10% of white housing was overcrowded. Sixty-four percent of Negro-occupied housing was sound and had adequate plumbing facilities; 89% of white-occupied housing met these criteria.

Median rent paid as a proportion of median income indicates that Negroes paid about 47% more of their income for housing than did whites.

Education: Rice University, the University of Houston and Texas Southern University (TSU) are Houston's three institutions of higher learning. The first two have

predominantly white student bodies. The placard on the administration building of TSU still reads, "Texas Southern University for Negroes."

Houston has been under a federal court order to desegregate. Students as of now have freedom to choose the schools they attend but transportation is not supplied by the school system.

There are no Negroes on the school board.

There has been a significant difference between the levels of achievement of the white and Negro portions of Houston's adult population. The median number of school years completed by the white population was twelve, over four grades higher than the median level of education of the adult Negro population; 29.2% of adult whites (over 25) and 50.8% of adult Negroes had eight years of schooling or less.

Crime: Crime in Houston is high. Only 31% of all American cities of 100,000 population or more had a higher crime rate than Houston in 1966. Crime has increased at a higher average rate in Houston since 1961 than in most

large cities. Houston has a relatively small police force as measured by the number of law enforcement personnel per 1,000 population. By this measure, 74% of America's big cities have larger police forces.

Grievances: Students who were interviewed complained that the "white power structure" was attempting to close TSU. They also said that the local news media often referred to TSU in the most unfavorable terms; for instance, after the TSU riot they were referred to as the killers of a police officer, though it is yet to be determined who shot the policeman. Negroes interviewed said they felt that five TSU students had already been convicted by the press.

The students and the community members expressed to the Commission staff many complaints of police brutality and verbal abuse of Negroes. The words "boy" and "nigger" on police radios were heard by a Commission staff member as well as many of the "Block Watchers" (Negro employees of the local Community Action Association and other community leaders who have two-way radios and report to the police in times of tension).

TSU student leaders contend that there were police brutality and misconduct during the campus disturbance.

Negroes in Houston have complained that the quality of Negro education was far inferior to that given whites; that desegregation was moving too slowly in the public schools; that in certain schools which Negroes do attend, there were discriminatory practices in the disciplinary procedures against Negroes as contrasted to whites. On the day of the riot there was picketing by TSU students and community members to protest against these practices at Northwood Junior High.

Another grievance was the existence of a garbage dump in a Negro area. A Negro boy drowned in this dump. Negroes interviewed felt that this dump would never have existed in a white neighborhood. There was also picketing by students and others on the day of the riot at the dump area.

Negroes complained that promises regarding the construction of a new school building at the time a school bond issued was voted on were not kept. Last fall, Negro parents kept their children out of school in the northeastern Settegast area and established "community" schools taught by some TSU students and community leaders.

Members of the Negro community complained that there was under-utilization of Negroes in the police force, with regard to recruitment, assignment and promotion. The chief of police was described to the Commission staff as insensitive if not arrogant in his attitude toward Negroes.

Houston has resisted accepting federal funds. This fall, for the first time, the Houston School District accepted federal money to provide more free lunches to impoverished children. Negroes complained that the Head Start Program was almost dropped when the Houston Independent School Board would not accept the OEO guidelines which would have resulted in a greater degree of racial integration. A Catholic organization took over the Head Start Program at the last minute, accepting the OEO guidelines.

Before the disturbance, TSU students had requested: better food in the dormitories; later curfew in the girls' dormitory; the closing of Wheeler Street, the busy thoroughfare which bisects the campus; disarming campus

police; creation of a "student disciplinary board" with powers at least equal to those of the Dean of Students; official recognition of SNCC as a campus organization (granted); extension of library and cafeteria hours until midnight, seven days a week; firing of the athletic director; establishment of an outdoor "relaxation" area; removal of Dr. J. B. Jones (Dean of Students) from the local draft board.

A month before the riot, the NAACP requested: "the establishment of a police community relations unit; appointment of a biracial citizens committee to participate in police training programs, to improve police-minority relationships and to review grievances; improvement of nonwhite utilization in the police department; provision for police officers to prepare for promotions and to better understand human relations problems; adoption of racially mixed patrol assignments; preparations of a public relations program to better acquaint citizens with the duties of a police officer, relationships with the public, law enforcement problems, etc."

Negroes complained that employers and unions did not respond adequately to the need to provide training and employment opportunities for hardcore unemployed.

Additionally, Negroes complained that the city administration had failed to qualify for federal funds for housing improvement (e.g., the city does not enforce its zoning laws), and that the city administration has an aversion to accepting federal funds of any kind.

II. Basic Statistics About the Disturbance.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Deaths</u>	<u>Injuries</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Property Damage</u>
May 16 and 17	1	3	489 persons were arrested, of whom only five were charged	No dollar value available; two dormitories damaged by gun- fire and searching
Total	1	3	489	

III. Chronology of the Disorder of May 16-17, 1967.

Tuesday, May 16, 1967: During the day, police arrested 36 Negroes who were picketing to protest the existence of a garbage dump where a Negro child recently had drowned in a Negro residential area called Sunny Side in south Houston. The same morning on the other side of town, the Sheriff's Department arrested 28 Negro demonstrators at the Northwood Junior High School, the scene of a dispute over allegedly discriminatory application of discipline to white and Negro students.

7:00 P.M.: Criminal Intelligence officers took up special assignments in the vicinity of Texas Southern University (TSU). Members of both of the aforementioned groups of protestors gravitated to the campus of TSU bearing charges of police brutality, profanity and racism.

8:15 P.M.: A crowd of 50 students milled about in front of the TSU Student Union Building where Douglas Wayne Waller, a 21 year old Negro TSU student and Viet Nam veteran, tried to recruit students to go with him to the dump to protest. Interest in the protest was tepid. To gain attention, Waller reportedly slapped one of the students. The student left, remarking that he would be back shortly to take care of Waller. Waller, according to an eyewitness,

left and returned with a pistol.

10:15 P.M.: The crowd had increased to about 150 persons. Five unidentified individuals approached the crowd, stating: "They killed a six year old child out near the Scenic Wood School. What do you intend to do about it?" (Actually a white boy had been shot by another white boy, but a rumor spread that afternoon that a white boy had shot a Negro boy.)

Waller was haranguing the crowd outside the Student Union Building, urging them to join in the protest, when two unmarked police cars carrying four officers pulled up to investigate a report of a disturbance on the campus. A watermelon rind was thrown at the police cars.

10:30 P.M.: An officer arrested Waller, who was the most conspicuous member of the then rapidly disappearing crowd. While Waller was under custody of the police, a pistol was taken from him. He was then taken to police headquarters. The pistol recovered, according to police record, was found to have been stolen. A few minutes later, the unmarked police car, in which Waller had been removed, returned to the campus and was met by a hail of rocks and bottles. A call for assistance was put out by the police and three more police cars arrived.

At this point there were about nine officers present on the campus and eyewitness reports indicate that a substantial force of police was bivouacked at the University of Houston nearby Jeppesen Stadium. The exact size of the standby force remains open to question..

From reports of persons who arrived early in the evening, Wheeler Street was littered with debris.* Students were running around the dormitory area throwing things and generally causing commotion.

10:45 P.M.: The crowd grew; more rocks, bricks and other missiles were thrown at police vehicles.

10:50 P.M.: In response to the hail of thrown objects, officers maneuvered police vehicles so that their headlights illuminated the Student Center Building.

* Wheeler Street is a heavily traveled thoroughfare which bisects the campus and parallels Lanier Hall dormitory and the Student Union. Inconvenience and hazards caused by the traffice on this street had been a long standing grievance of the students. The feeling of the students was particularly intense because traffic was diverted around the nearby university of Houston, whose student body is predominately white. TSU students had on various occasions blockaded Wheeler Street and stoned motorists who attempted to drive through the campus.

11:00 P.M.: Sporadic gunfire from the men's dormitory began. Police returned fire. Officers observed an armed individual run toward the Student Center. Police inspector Weldon Waycott, arrived. He ordered his men to pull back from the dormitory area to allow several Negro student leaders to talk with the students without the presence of the police. This effort at conciliation failed. The Reverend Bill Lawson (arrested at the dump demonstration earlier the same day) had been released from jail and driven to the campus by police for the specific purpose of trying to reason with the students. He found no leaders or spokesmen with whom he could negotiate a truce. Newsmen on the scene and Reverend Lawson all agreed that, at this point, the disorder at TSU amounted to nothing more than collegiate rowdyism at final examination time and was not a riot.

Fifteen minutes later the talks concluded; the police moved back into position and fired whenever they saw a muzzle flash from the men's dorms.

11:30 P.M.: Officer Robert Blaylock, who had arrested Waller earlier, was hit in the upper leg by a small caliber bullet.

11:35 P.M.: Police reinforcements arrived at the scene and firing continued from TSU dorms.

Approximately midnight: Chief of Police Herman Short arrived on campus.

Wednesday, May 17, 1967, 1:30 A.M.: Police officers withdrew to a block away from the dormitory area, at the request of Negro leaders. Negro community leaders went into the dormitory to negotiate with students. Upon their return, they reported to Chief Short that the students were demanding a permanent closing of Wheeler Street. The police chief refused to negotiate on a specific conflict which he believed to be outside his jurisdiction and control.

Students then began to drag construction material into the street, to block Wheeler Street. A tar barrel was set afire.

2:00 A.M.: The police chief ordered his men to go in and "clean up the mess," and the final advance on the demonstrators by the police began. One of the Negro leaders, Reverend Kirkpatrick, accompanied the officers into the area to make a last effort to talk to the students. He retreated when shots came from the junior-senior dorm. The police opened a barrage of gunfire.

2:20 A.M.: Patrolman Louis Kuba, standing near a corner of the Student Union Building fell mortally wounded when a ricocheting bullet hit him in the forehead. Whether the fatal shot was fired by a student or by the police has not been determined. A few minutes later, Patrolman Allen Dale Dugger, approaching the junior-senior dorm, had his face grazed by another bullet. One student in the dormitory was wounded.

3:00 A.M.: Police entered the dormitory, forced all (approximately 480) students out of the building and ordered them to lie face down on the ground to await patrol cars to take them to county and city jails.

4:00 A.M.: The police searched the dormitories and found one 12-gauge shotgun and two .22 caliber pistols.

8:00 A.M.: Officer Kuba died.

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

6

January 25, 1968

Bob:

See especially pages 9
through 19.

David Chambers

2:2 j- 6a

RIOTS IN THE CITY

An Addendum To The McCone
Commission Report

Two Special Reports
by Joseph Boskin, Ph.D.
and Frances Lomas Feldman, ACSW,
Academic Consultants to the
Governor's Commission on the
Los Angeles Riots
Editor: Audrey Rawitscher, ACSW



RIOTS IN THE CITY:

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RIOTS IN THE CITY

An Addendum To The McCone Commission Report

- "A History of Urban Racial Conflicts
in the Twentieth Century"
Joseph Boskin, Ph.D.
- "Public Welfare: Despondency, Despair
—and Opportunity"
Frances Lomas Feldman, ACSW
- Editor: Audrey Rawitscher, ACSW

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CONTENTS

Introduction	v
A History of Urban Racial Conflicts in the Twentieth Century by Joseph Boskin, Ph. D., Associate Professor of History, University of Southern California	1
Public Welfare: Despondency, Despair—and Opportunity by Frances Lomas Feldman, Associate Professor, School of Social Work, University of Southern California	25
Epilogue by Audrey Rawitscher, Assistant Professor, Sociology and Social Welfare, California State College at Long Beach	71

INTRODUCTION

Before the full impact of shock and horror had been felt by most residents of Los Angeles following the riots in August, 1965, California Governor Edmund G. Brown had appointed John A. McCone to head a commission for the purpose of preparing "an accurate chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these events," to "probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots," to consider what "can be done at any level of government or by any agency of the government to prevent a recurrence . . ." The investigation was financed with state and Ford Foundation funds.

To assist the McCone Commission and its staff there were engaged seven academic consultants to supply expertise in such areas as education, employment, health, history, housing, law, and social welfare. The consultants were given freedom in the conduct of their own investigations and in the form and content of the reports they submitted. The only major limitation was time. The Commission was charged with completing its task quickly.

The understanding reached at the outset by the consultants and the Commission was that the consultant reports would be released by the Commission in a companion volume to its own Report. This agreement was not fulfilled.

In December, 1965, barely 100 days after the Commission's inception, its Report was released under the title *Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning?** Some of the material supplied by the consultants had been included; much more had been ignored. Nine copies of the academic consultants' statements were placed in selected repositories throughout the state, for all practical purposes making them unavailable to the public. No reason was supplied for withholding this information other than cost of publication.

Had the McCone Commission Report been entirely factual, this decision might have gone unchallenged. Had the Report been thorough, this decision might have gone unchallenged. Had the Report provided new insight, this decision might have gone unchallenged. Had the Report been entirely accurate, this decision might have gone unchallenged. Had the Report even met its charge by drawing lessons and uncovering causes, this decision might have gone unchallenged.

Such was not the case. After weeks of gathering information and listening to the testimony of hundreds of concerned individuals, the Commission issued a report of about 100 pages whose content could have been produced in substantially the same form before the investigation. Possibly it could have been done better because the area which produced the riot was well known as a locus of social inequity.

* Copies are available from Jeffries Banknote Co., Box 188, Los Angeles, Calif. 90053.

Ironically, the month of the riot had also seen the publication of one of the best studies conducted on urban social disorganization. Even more ironically it specifically included the area of the riot. Reference is made, of course, to the study by the Institute of Industrial Relations of the University of California at Los Angeles entitled *Hard-Core Unemployment and Poverty in Los Angeles*.

The Los Angeles Area Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers had become intimately involved in the riot investigation when Frances Lomas Feldman, then chairman of the Chapter's Division of Practice and Knowledge as well as academic consultant on social welfare to the McCone Commission, called upon the public welfare unit of the Chapter to contribute its ideas and reactions to her exploration. This participation had hardly prepared the Chapter for the inadequacy and distortions about social welfare contained in the final McCone Commission Report which had substantially ignored the Feldman contribution. Obviously something had to be done to bring the facts before the professional and wider community.

This the Board of Directors of the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers undertook to accomplish. Milton Roemer's statement on health was published March, 1966, by the California Department of Health in their monthly *California's Health*. Kenneth Martyn's statement on education had been reproduced by the California State College at Los Angeles Department of Education. A condensation of the Boskin report appeared in the *University of Southern California Alumni Review*, September-October, 1966, issue. The Chapter decided to make available the consultants' reports on the history of race riots and on social welfare and proceeded with the task of publication and distribution.

The statements themselves need no introduction. However, time has elapsed since they were prepared and the Epilogue of this publication indicates subsequent directions.

This material is presented as a demonstration of the ethical commitment of professional social work. It is with deep conviction that the public is entitled to the information and can make good use of it that the endeavor was undertaken by the Los Angeles Area Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers. Prevention of future riots must rest on sound social data. The McCone Commission Report did not supply them.

Audrey Rawitscher, ACSW
Editor

A History of Urban Conflicts in the Twentieth Century

by

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I. Introduction

One of the most profound and persistent themes in American history is the estrangement between Caucasians and Negroes. Despite the plethora of studies into White-Black relationships, few social scientists have delved into the nature and history of race riots and outbursts in the twentieth century. This report is a chronological and analytical study of major riots which occurred in urban communities involving Negroes from 1917 to 1965.

Two different types of riots are examined at length. The first involves the direct clash of Caucasians and Negroes; the second is described by Gunnar Myrdal in *An American Dilemma* as "sporadic and unorganized outbreaks on the part of Negroes with little opposition from whites." A profile of these riots has been drawn on the basis of six factors: 1) What were the precipitants of the riot? 2) What was the nature of the riot? 3) How did the riot develop? 4) How was the riot terminated? 5) Was there an investigation by official groups? Finally, on the basis of an analysis of these riots, an attempt will be made to determine whether patterns of causal and behavioral factor exist.

This report is divided into two main sections. The first part covers the period from 1917 to 1964. With the exception of the two Harlem riots, the main expression of social violence involved persons and groups. The second portion details the numerous outbreaks in the northern and eastern cities in the summer of 1964 and in Los Angeles in the summer of 1965. These were largely directed by Negroes against property and their immediate environment. The 1964-65 riots are explored at greater length because of the availability of materials and investigations but, more importantly, because they were essentially of one basic type of Negro protest. Without exception, these disturbances may be defined as "riots of release and recrimination" directed against police and property.

There is appended at the conclusion of the report an extensive bibliography of sources and materials on the subject of these major urban riots.

II. Riots, 1917-1964:

East St. Louis, 1917

Two race riots occurred in East St. Louis on May 28 and July 2, 1917; significantly at the beginning of United States entrance into the First World War. These were preceded by a year of intense anti-Negro publicity and senti-

ment. These inflammatory charges were directed towards or were about Negroes; namely, that Republican leaders of St. Clair County had imported thousands of Negroes in an effort to recapture the Congressional District in 1916, that local businessmen had imported Negroes to create a vast pool of cheap, unskilled labor, and that Negroes from the area and nearby St. Louis were arming themselves for a massacre of the Whites. The allegation that local industry was recruiting Southern Negroes to bring about a favorable over-supply of unskilled workmen in the face of threatened unionization appears the only one to have had some validity.

The preliminary May outbreak was ignited by a labor dispute at an aluminum plant during which Negroes replaced striking Whites.² Laborers met with the Mayor, demanding that Negro migration be halted. The Mayor, however, did not accede to their demands. At the conclusion of the meeting, inflamed by a false rumor that a Negro had shot a white man, the laborers poured out into the streets and attacked every colored man they encountered. The ensuing riot lasted a day-and-a-half, leaving many persons wounded but none killed. Subsequently, the National Guard was summoned from Vandalia to halt the violence.³ An uneasy peace resulted, lasting through the month of June.

The tension of this situation was broken on the night of July 2, when two plainclothes detectives in an unmarked car were fired upon and killed by unknown assailants as they cruised through the Negro slum area.⁴ The following day, their blood-stained automobile was displayed in front of the police station. Gathering crowds began to mutter ominous threats against the Negroes, and a mass meeting was called. The convocation soon erupted, however, into a mob bent on doing violence to the city's Negroes in a desperate attempt to frighten them into leaving East St. Louis.⁵ Pedestrians were assaulted by small bands of roving toughs armed with stones, clubs, and occasionally, guns. Homes were set afire and waiting snipers shot those Negroes fleeing the flames. Over 200 homes in what was called "Black Valley" were destroyed. This figure would probably have been much lower had not the efforts of the firemen been met with mob resistance. Also, the twelve companies of National Guardsmen dispatched to quell the violence were late in arriving (probably because their sympathies lay

with the whites). In approximately twenty-four hours, 30 Negroes and nine whites had been killed, hundreds wounded or driven from the city, and fire damage of \$373,605 (comprising 244 structures and 44 railroad cars) wrought.

Two official investigations were conducted into the events of the riot. The first was directed towards the questionable actions of the militia. To consider this, the Illinois National Guard convened a Military Board of Inquiry. Its report was never made public. However, both the Commanding Officer of the National Guard units sent to East St. Louis and the entire city and county administrations were sharply criticized by a Congressional Investigating Committee which held hearings in the city from mid-October to mid-November, 1917. Although feeble attempts were made following the Congressional hearings to mediate St. Louis' racial problems, these efforts were largely abortive.

Other legal action following the riots resulted in the conviction of four white men for the murder of Negroes. They were given terms ranging from 14 to 15 years. Concurrently, ten Negro leaders of the community were found guilty of slaying the plainclothesmen whose deaths precipitated the riot. They were all sentenced to 14 years in prison.

Washington, 1919

Washington, D. C. was, in the summer of 1919, a city caught in the throes of sudden, frenzied postwar adjustment. Basically a Southern city, Washington had been inundated during the First World War by thousands of Negroes seeking employment. Returning servicemen resented the migration and, even more, the growingly "independent" attitude of the previously subservient Negro. Consequently, these whites became determined to oust him and return to the prewar status quo. The Negro, on the other hand, was eager to secure the increased opportunity he had newly obtained. This situation was exacerbated by the shortage of jobs and the failure of the government to provide any sort of temporary relief for returning veterans. The situation was accurately described by The Interracial Commission in 1942:

"A week after the Armistice one might have observed a subtle but ominous change. Distrust was awakened. What would be the attitude of the Negro troops when they returned from France? Rumors filled the air, and by the time the soldiers be-

gan to return suspicion and fear had taken deep hold upon both races. Mob violence, which had greatly declined during the war, burst out afresh. In city after city race riots flamed up, with casualties on both sides. The tension tightened everywhere, and with dread suspense the Nation awaited the outcome."

Furthermore, the situation in the surrounding Washington area was tense. The city was ringed with military installations housing idle troops, many of whom were Southerners awaiting separation. The combustible element was introduced when exaggerated press accounts indicated a rapid upswing in the number of Negro assaults upon white women. (Actually, there had been only two such offenses in the two months preceding the riots which broke out on Sunday evening, July 20, 1919.)

Although the Washington Post had previously published an invitation to servicemen to form vigilante committees to halt the alleged wave of criminal assaults, the riot seems to have exploded spontaneously. One July 18, a woman clerk in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing was attacked on her way home from work; this crime was seized upon by restive servicemen as cause for violent action. Late at night, on July 20, servicemen of all branches began attacking Negro pedestrians near the White House. The police arrested the injured Negroes, while dismissing the whites with a warning to disperse. The mobs, however, could not be dissipated. They continued to waylay Negroes throughout the night. Involved in this activity were about 200 veterans and numbers of civilians who acted as scouts, calling attention to Negroes whenever they might appear.

The rioting left four dead (two whites and two Negroes). Despite a quiet day on Monday, July 21, two troops of cavalry plus some infantry detachments, were ordered out late in the afternoon. It should be noted that the ease with which Washington secured military assistance contrasts sharply with the difficulties ordinarily experienced by cities which have to clear through state authorities.

On Monday evening, the riots resumed with renewed vigor. Although orders had been issued by all military commanders in the Washington area to withhold the passes of off-duty servicemen, the ranks of the rioters swelled.

Violence surged beyond control and new troops were called.

Tuesday's activity followed in the same pattern, with the calm of the daylight hours being shattered by tumult at night. Concentrations of cavalry, infantry, Marines and officers of the Home Guard were ordered in to augment the forces already assigned. The sum effectiveness of these troops, however, is open to question. What may have been most directly responsible for choking off the three-day outburst was the sudden, heavy rain which began falling late Tuesday evening. The downpour continued on throughout the night and Wednesday, and the rioting was not renewed.

While property damage was slight, five persons were killed during the melee. Three whites were shot while assaulting Negro homes. Two Negroes died during the fighting. The strongest legal measure taken was the levying of heavy fines for all offenses involving disorderly conduct or violation of weapons ordinances. There was apparently no official inquiry undertaken regarding the Washington riot.

Chicago, 1919

In Chicago, a similar condition of unassimilated Negroes prevailed. Between 1910 and 1920, the non-white population of Chicago increased from 44,000 to 109,000, a percentage growth of 148%. Large numbers of whites had also migrated to the city to work in the war industries. Competition in the static housing market brought the two races into conflict. The traditionally delineated Negro areas were saturated and the pressures for expansion were felt acutely in the white neighborhoods adjacent to the Black Belt.

The predilection of Negroes to vote Republican also stirred feelings of resentment in whites. The Chicago Democratic machine was distressed by the election of a Republican city administration and the machine's adherents reflected the sharpness of their discontent by vilifying Negroes.

On July 27, a brawl broke out at a Southside beach. Whites and Negroes, whose separate use of Lake Michigan was determined at this point by two adjoining stretches of beach, became involved in a rock-throwing fracas when Negroes crossed the imaginary dividing line. A Negro boy had drifted off-shore to a point opposite the white section and, when the fight began, he became the target of the rock-throwers. Whether he was struck or not is unknown, but

he disappeared beneath the water, and the fighting ceased as both whites and Negroes engaged in efforts to rescue him. When it became apparent that the boy had drowned, however, the mood of the Negroes grew ugly.

Subsequent refusals by the white policemen at the beach to arrest the white man whom the Negroes felt was responsible for the boy's death increased the Negroes' anger. When this policeman attempted to take one of the Negroes into custody on the complaint of a white man, the crowd of Negro bathers quickly attacked him. As news of the event was relayed to the nearby Negro ghetto, hundreds converged on the beach and police reinforcements were summoned. While the lawmen were organizing, they were fired upon by a single Negro who was immediately shot and killed by a Negro policeman.

There was no further violence on the beach, but sporadic outbreaks occurred throughout the evening and night. On the next day, it seemed that the agitation had been completely halted. Late in the afternoon, however, whites began attacking Negroes returning from work. By evening, large bands of whites and Negroes were roaming the streets in search of stragglers. A crowd of Negroes gathered outside a Southside apartment house where police were searching for a white man accused of assaulting Negroes. The crowd grew threatening. The police finally became unnerved and fired a volley of shots into the throng; four Negroes were killed and several others wounded.

For the next two days attacks took place in all areas of the city—even in the Loop area where gangs of white servicemen used the riot as an excuse to maim and rob unprotected Negroes. The damage was further increased by a strike of public transportation workers on Monday night. This interruption in service forced many workmen, white and colored, to walk through hostile neighborhoods to get to work.

The reluctance of state and municipal officials to employ the militia to quell the disorder probably acted to prolong the violence. National Guard units had been assembled in Chicago as early as Monday evening, however they were not put into the field until Wednesday. As in the case of the Washington riot, rain seemed to play a greater part in quieting the mobs than did the Guardsmen. By the end of the week the riot dissipated.

Of particular importance here is the new dimension that the Chicago inci-

dent added to rioting. Whites made armed forays into the Negro district in automobiles, and the countermeasures taken by the defenders of this area were manifested in ambushes and sniping from rooftops.

Factors contributing to the widespread death and destruction of the Chicago Riot are manifold. The transit strike mentioned above was of paramount importance. Coupled with this, the small size of the police force limited its effectiveness seriously. A further complication stemmed from the hostility and distrust with which Chicago Negroes viewed law enforcement officers. The vacillation in regard to fielding the National Guard also allowed unnecessary damage to occur before officials took firm action."

In addition to leaving thousands homeless, the week of rioting saw 38 fatalities (23 Negroes and 15 whites) and 537 injuries. The chaos of the situation led authorities to conclude that many injuries probably went unreported for fear of arrest for rioting."

A Coroner's Jury and the Cook County Grand Jury made recommendations of a superficial nature to avert a repetition of the outbreak, but these were fragmentary. A Chicago Commission on Race Relations was formed to investigate the riots, however, and this biracial group produced a thorough, well-documented study of the riots and of race relations in Chicago.

Harlem, 1935

The first of two major Harlem riots was begun by a seemingly unimportant incident at a five-and-ten-cent store on West 125th Street and 7th Avenue on March 19, 1935. A Negro boy stole a knife and was apprehended by store personnel who took him to the back of the store for questioning. When the boy became hysterical they released him from a rear door into an alley. The crowd of shoppers inside the store was unaware of the circumstances and surmised that the boy had been beaten. The presence of a hearse in the alley added impetus to a rumor that the boy was dead."

Within the hour, Negro and white pickets of the Young Liberators League were outside the store with sign reading: "Kross Brutally Beats Negro Child." One of the picketers was arrested for inciting to riot and the crowd which had assembled, began to pelt the police with rocks and bottles. By early evening, only four hours after the precipitating incident, 3,000 Negroes were rioting the streets of Harlem, attacking

whites and breaking store windows." Looting began after dark, the most sought-after item by Negroes being food. Indeed, it is very probable that with seventy percent of Harlem's Negroes on relief at this time, one of the precipitating factors in their motivation to riot was hunger."

Instances of clashes between whites and Negroes were minimal except for the actions of police in curbing looters. The stripping of stores continued through Wednesday, March 20, but was finally controlled by the efforts of police and local Negro leaders."

The dominant controversy over the Harlem Riot of 1935 centers around the question of the degree of Communist and Communist-front group involvement. Charges that such participation was widespread were made at the time by the District Attorney and various New York newspapers. However, little evidence was presented in the way of substantiation."

Negro leaders cited racial and economic discrimination as the primary cause of resentment among the residents of Harlem. When questioned, the rioters stated that the chief source of disgruntlement was the failure of white merchants in Harlem to hire Negro store help. In addition, Negro tenants resented having to pay more for their housing than would be required in other sections of the city for comparable facilities. A previous lawful expression of these sentiments through a rent strike by tenant groups was countered by evictions and by a blacklist which blocked strikers from obtaining other lodgings from white landlords."

After the riot was brought under control, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia appointed an investigatory commission headed by sociologist E. Franklin Frazier to inquire into the causes and nature of the disturbance. Although the results of this investigation were submitted in March, 1936, the report was never made public."

Albeit hundreds of arrests were directly attributable to the March riots, only two people were slain. Both were Negroes. Property damage was extensive in the stores throughout the area and losses due to theft ran high.

Detroit, 1913

Most destructive of the Second World War's racial violence was the Detroit Riot which began on Sunday evening, June 20, 1943, and continued unabated until late Monday night. The Detroit riot differs from the others we have described in that the outbreak of vio-

lence was anticipated. As early as mid-1942, Life magazine had published an article entitled, "Detroit Is Dynamite."

The background for this article was an attempted occupancy of the Sojourner Truth Housing Project by Negroes for whom it was planned." Discrimination in housing particularly irked Negro workers. The consistent flouting of Michigan's Public Accommodations law, the announcement by the Mayor that existing boundaries of racial areas would be preserved, and the dilapidated state of Paradise Valley (the largest Negro residential area) created much hostility."

Housing was not the only source of antagonism between Detroit's Caucasians and Negroes at this time. The administration of federal regulations requiring equal employment standards in defense industries had angered whites. In the months prior to the riot, several unauthorized walk-outs had occurred in automobile plants. (As many as 20,000 men had walked off their jobs at the Packard plant in May.) These were prompted by the up-grading of Negro workers. The presence in the city of a number of leading spokesmen for white supremacy, such as Gerald L. K. Smith, Frank J. Norris, and Father Charles Coughlin, further incensed many white Southerners who had migrated to Detroit since the beginning of the war."

Authorities on the Detroit Riot are not agreed as to the specific event which gave it initial impetus. It is known that on Sunday evening, June 20, 1943, a fight began at the Belle Isle Amusement Park. When police arrived at 10:30 p.m., the bridge leading to the island was swarming with brawling Negroes and whites." The officers were unable to restore order, and within the hour the riot had spread into other areas of the city. By early morning, casualties were being brought into the city's municipal Receiving Hospital at the rate of one per minute." At 3:00 a.m., Negroes began looting stores owned by whites in the Paradise Valley section, and an hour later, whites started attacking Negroes as they emerged from the city's all-night movie theatres in the downtown area.

As the rioting continued through Monday, June 21, the Mayor and the Governor considered and discarded various courses of action. Neither wanted to suspend civil control and declare martial law. Instead, the Governor banned the sale of alcoholic beverages, closed all places of amusement at 9:00 p.m.,

and imposed an optional curfew from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m."

The announcement of the curfew, however, went unheeded by whites. On the evening of the 21st, whites traveling in cars attempted to penetrate the Negro residential areas. These forays were thwarted by snipers and groups of defenders crouched behind hastily-erected barricades. As midnight approached, the Governor ordered troops into the area." By Tuesday, the troops were able to maintain peace. The failure of local authorities to quell the disturbance was apparently the result of manpower shortages and pro-white sentiment. Many documented accounts support this latter view."

An attempt to analyze the Detroit Riot was undertaken by several divergent groups. In addition to court trials involving the persons indicted for the killing of 25 Negroes and nine whites, at least five separate reports were compiled. Governor Kelly appointed a fact-finding committee of public officials. The Recorder's Court Psychiatric Clinic examined the mental and emotional condition of identified rioters. The Mayor appointed a 12-member interracial committee, which later released a report condemning the Negroes and the NAACP. Simultaneously, a study was prepared by a private investigator under the aegis of the Negro leadership of the community. The lack of adequate housing and recreational facilities for Negroes were cited as primary causes for their actions."

Harlem, 1943

The second Harlem Riot was almost identical to the first disturbance in that the attack was directed toward property rather than persons. Newspaper coverage of the time was practically unanimous in this analysis. The genesis of the trouble, however, sprang from an incident involving a white policeman shooting a Negro soldier in the lobby of a Harlem hotel."

While the policeman only wounded the soldier, the version of the episode which spread in the Negro ghetto had the soldier shot in the back and killed. Consequently, a crowd, gathering outside the hospital where the wounded man had been taken, began to throw bottles at the building." Eventually, over 3,000 people massed in front of the hospital. When no news was reported to establish the soldier's condition, the crowd began to move up the street, smashing store windows as they went.

The original incident occurred at 9:00

p.m. By dawn, stores were wrecked and a stretch of 40 city blocks were under attack. At the outset disturbances were confined to the wanton destruction of property. The next day, however, looting began. Harlem residents of all ages were on the street from early morning, swarming through the damaged stores and carrying off merchandise. Little children had their arms full of candy; men and women stole liquor, food, clothing, and appliances; boys and girls took clothing, radios, and sports equipment."

Attempting an analysis of the type of plundering that went on, one student of the riot observed:

In looting, each person took what he or she had wanted, but had been denied or limited in obtaining; and the same principle applies to all aspects of the riot. The poorer classes protested against authority because that was the constant and palpable instrument of denial and suppression; and, of course, the Negroes protested against Whites because the most pervasive and omnipresent fact of Negro life is a denial of the status and privileges of Whites."

Thus, of the 1,234 stores which were looted, only a small fraction belonged to Negroes. In fact, it was reported that when looters were informed that the store under siege was Negro-owned, they ceased their depredations and left empty-handed."

The actions taken by the New York police force under the personal direction of Mayor LaGuardia and Police Commissioner Jack Valentine confined the riot to narrow geographical limits and restricted it to one day's duration." In compliance with the Mayor's request, Negro as well as white M.P.s were employed in rounding up the participating servicemen.

Although people of all ages had been involved in the looting, according to observers, most of those arrested were in their teens and early twenties, 98% of the 500 arrests were made upon suspicion of burglary, the vast majority of suspects being charged only with looting. In actual acts of burglary, five Negroes were killed and 565 were injured. Some of the casualties were due to altercation with the police, but most were the result of cuts from broken glass which hung in shards from the shop windows and littered the streets. Five million dollars' worth of damage was done exclusive of the cost in theft of goods."

As in 1935, Mayor LaGuardia called upon Negro leadership to assist city officials in halting the riots. As a board of strategy, they spent the night with the Mayor, directing operations and cruising through Harlem in sound trucks, calling for peace. It is not clear whether the riot simply burned itself out, or whether knowledge that the police were out in strength discouraged further looting." Whatever the case, quiet was restored on the evening of August 2, 1943.

Urban Riots, 1945-1964

From the end of World War II until 1964, there were several large-scale urban disturbances which reflected social violence. Most of these disturbances were manifestations of what Allen Day Grimshaw has termed "assaults on the accommodative structure" of Negro-white relationships." The most intense conflict has resulted when the minority group has attempted to disrupt the accepted accommodative pattern or when the dominant group has defined the situation as one in which such an attempt is being made."

Several urban racial clashes were initiated by Caucasians who resented attempts by Negroes to disrupt the accommodative pattern by moving into formerly all-white neighborhoods. The Airport Homes Riot in Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1946; the Fernwood Project Riot, also in Chicago, in August, 1947; the Georgia house bombings in May, 1947; and the Cicero riots of 1951; were racial clashes of this type. Between V-J Day and 1948, more than 100 attacks on the person and property of Negroes who moved out of the black ghettos into formerly all-white neighborhoods were reported. Weapons used were bricks, guns, and homemade gasoline bombs called Molotov cocktails."

Racial violence erupted in St. Louis, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; and Washington, D.C.; in 1949 when Negroes attempted to use public recreational facilities reserved for Caucasians' use only.

In July, 1963, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Negroes launched an attack upon discrimination in city construction projects by picketing public buildings, the construction projects, the Mayor's home and office, staging an all-night sit-in in the Mayor's reception room, and battling with police sent to open their picket lines. Many people were injured and a white minister who participated in the protest was killed. At that time, George Schermer, Executive Director of Philadelphia's Commission on Human Relations, commented on the lack

of communication between the police and Negroes: "What the Mayor doesn't realize is that when you talk to the thirty or forty most secure and politically sophisticated Negroes in town, you haven't really talked to the Negroes at all."

Conclusions:

From a survey of these six riots, several general patterns emerge:

- 1) Without exception, some extraordinary social condition prevailed at the time of the outbreak; i.e., it was either wartime, a period of post-war adjustment, or a depression.
- 2) Coupled with extenuating social conditions are the facts that five of the riots began on weekends, in the hot months of June, July, and August. These physical circumstances resulted in the accumulation of a large idle population upon which a riot could draw.
- 3) The role of rumor is important when we consider the frequency with which exaggerated versions of events (or wholly fabricated stories) contributed to already strong antagonisms.
- 4) The frustration felt by Negroes who moved North only to find a more subtle form of discrimination than that which they experienced in the South was a factor in both the Detroit and Harlem Riots of 1943.
- 5) The police have been more widely criticized than any other authority-bearing group involved in these riots. Only in New York did non-partisan observers endorse the conduct of the police. In the other cities, there was much fault-finding in connection with police brutality and discrimination against Negroes, and their concomitant lenience with white rioters.
- 6) The most important variable in the six riots appears to be the factor of aggression. Regardless of the immediate causative factors which initiated the riots, their character was essentially determined by the race of the aggressor group. In the two Harlem riots for instance, the aggressors were Negroes; in the remaining riots it was the whites who attacked Negroes or invaded Negro neighborhoods. In the former, rioting took the form of action against white-affiliated businesses; in the latter,

violence was conducted against Negroes by semi-organized bands of whites. The Harlem Riots, therefore, may be characterized as primarily economic, and only subordinatedly racial. In the other four incidents of rioting, the primary factor seems to have been that of racial prejudice.

III. Riots of Summer, 1964-1965:

In 1964, the Northern ghettos of the United States were beset by rioting, looting, bloodshed and apparent chaos. The violent disturbances occurred at a time when the Negro population was said to be gaining considerably in America because of the pressures of the civil rights movement. What were the elements in Harlem, Rochester, Jersey City, Elizabeth, Paterson, Chicago, and Philadelphia which brought about these riots?

Harlem

On Thursday morning, July 16, 1964, Patrick Lynch was washing the sidewalk in front of his store across the street from the Robert F. Wagner, Sr., Junior High School in Manhattan, New York. In this predominantly white neighborhood, some Negro youths were sitting on nearby steps. A disturbance began when the Negroes claimed that Lynch had annoyed them with a hose. A young boy from the Bronx, James Powell, became involved. Accounts differ as to the events which followed: From out of a neighboring store came off-duty police Lieutenant Thomas R. Gilligan, who fired three shots at Powell and killed him. Some claimed the youth came at Gilligan with a knife; others said he did not. The details would be debated at later hearings; the significance of the incident was quickly inflated.

The next day the Congress of Racial Equality called a demonstration in front of the school. "About 200 Negro teenagers conducted an animated but orderly demonstration." On the same day there was a subway disturbance, frequent recurrences of which had plagued New York City for the past twelve months.

The following day, Saturday, July 18, was extremely hot. Two journalists, Fred Shapiro and James Sullivan, conjectured in their description of the Harlem riots: "There is a definite correlation between heat and Negro riots. If that day had been a cool one, there very likely would have been no riot. But it was a sizzler." James Powell's funeral was held in the afternoon. In the eve-

ning CORE called a rally to protest the killings of civil rights workers Andy Goodman, James Chaney, and Mickey Schwerner in Mississippi. After the Powell shooting, they linked that death to the others in the purpose of the protest. The rally turned into a march on the 28th Precinct Police Station. The people, being angry, began to throw bottles and decried police brutality. The police reacted and entered the neighboring buildings to halt the barrage of missiles. They moved in to break up the crowds, injuring both participants and spectators. The angry crowd attacked cars carrying whites. The evening ended with one dead, 12 policemen and 19 civilians injured, 30 persons arrested, and 22 business places looted.

On Sunday, July 19, another rally was held. Included as speakers were militant Jesse Gray who had been leading the Harlem rent strikes, and Bayard Rustin, organizer of the 1963 Washington March for Jobs and Freedom. After the rally the crowd was agitated again. The violence began anew. Newspapers were the first to be attacked. Bottles, bricks, and Molotov cocktails filled the air for the second night. Bayard Rustin was denounced as an "Uncle Tom" for urging the crowds to return home. James Farmer, national head of CORE, appealed to Governor Nelson Rockefeller to send state troops to the area to stop the violence. Acting Mayor Paul Serevane met with those he knew as the area's civil rights leaders. By early morning there was relative peace again, but not before more than 100 persons had been injured severely enough to seek hospital treatment. And repeatedly, those persons charged the police with brutality.

On Monday, July 20, the Harlem Defense Council and Jesse Gray called for a demonstration at the United Nations building. The Mayor and Police Commissioner Paul Murphy met with civil rights leaders who issued their demand for a civilian police review board. Leaflets circulated through Harlem, stating that "Gilligan the cop [was] wanted for murder." Again that evening rioting began as Negroes hurled bottles at police. Early morning saw the action intensify at Sam's Westside Bar as the police crashed inside. As that scene became calm, the news was heard that rioting had begun in a new section of New York's ghetto, Bedford-Stuyvesant. This area, the largest Negro ghetto in the United States, had a history of conflicts and racial tension which was largely ignored until the riots.

Full-scale rioting commenced in the

Bedford-Stuyvesant community. CORE had called a rally in that area. This quickly degenerated as the crowd denounced the speakers as "Uncle Toms." The crowd turned on the police who were standing by, and the police charged. Bottles, bricks, and looting were prevalent here as they had been in Harlem earlier.

On Wednesday, July 22, CORE went to City Hall to demonstrate, and the Black Nationalists took over the leadership of the crowds in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The NAACP tried to communicate with the people through leaflets written in the language of the ghetto and with speeches about the hard life of the average cop. But the crowd clamored about police brutality and the now familiar pattern of bricks and looting began again. Then it began to rain and the crowds deserted the streets.

The atmosphere was different on July 23. A few incidents occurred, but nothing on the scale of the previous nights. CORE demonstrated at City Hall and was met by counterpickets. The Harlem Unity Committee was formed, representing virtually all points of view and organizations within the civil rights movement. Detectives raided Malcolm X's headquarters and seized a rifle and some ammunition. The Amsterdam News, Harlem's main newspaper, called for a civilian review board though Mayor Wagner had earlier rejected this proposal.

Though the rioting itself was ended, the following weeks saw related events take place: William Epton and Conrad J. Lynn of the Progressive Labor Movement, a Chinese-oriented left group, were arrested on July 25 after planning to lead a march, and charged with disorderly conduct. Two days later, Epton was accused of urging Negroes to kill policemen and judges. The same day five Negro sergeants were sent to Harlem to replace three whites, while Martin Luther King came to town to see Mayor Wagner but ignored local civil rights activists. At the end of the month, the city announced its intentions to find jobs for 20,000 unemployed youths. On July 31, Mayor Wagner again rejected appeals for a civilian police review board, but instead proposed a seven-point program with an economic emphasis. He was sharply criticized by the Harlem Unity Committee after the announcement. On August 5, Epton was charged with criminal anarchy, the first such charge made in New York since 1919. Late in August, Lieutenant Gilligan was cleared by the

Grand Jury of any criminal negligence in the death of James Powell.

Rochester

At the height of the Harlem riots other cities began to suffer similar violence. The first to be affected was Rochester, New York. The riots which broke out here were the culmination of a series of incidents which had angered the Negroes in the ghetto over the past two years. In February, 1963, a Negro was hospitalized after his arrest for a traffic violation and said he had been beaten by four policemen. In the spring of 1964, comedian Dick Gregory and several of his friends were refused service in the bar of the Rochester airport. April of 1964 had seen a rent strike in the area which broke out in rioting. A strong Black Muslim underground had also been developing.

On the night of July 24, police arrested a 17-year-old Negro for drunkenness at a street dance sponsored by a group raising funds for a playground. A crowd of Negro youths rushed to defend their friend, then moved into a nearby business section where they were joined by other Negroes. They began to break store windows, to loot, and to shout at the police. Some white youths came into the area to join in the rioting near Nassau and Joseph Avenues, the heart of Rochester's largest Negro area. Police moved in, using fire hoses, and were attacked with barrages of stones. The car of police chief William Lombard was overturned, as were several other police cars. A 50-block area with a "high rate of crime, a narcotics problem, unemployment, decaying tenements and inferior schools" was hit by rioting.

Rioting broke out again the following day, this time in the other Negro ghetto. This area, relatively new to Negroes, was formerly a white residential community. The other section, violent the night before, was now quiet. A white civil defense worker was killed by a car after being clubbed by rioters. Negro leaders made four demands which were accepted by Mayor Lamb. They asked for a committee to study Negro problems, enlargement of the police advisory board to include Negroes, more Negro social workers, and encouragement of more Negro businesses.

Finally, unable to curtail the rioting, Governor Rockefeller ordered 1,000 National Guardsmen into the area. They carried rifles and bayonets, but no ammunition. This night, July 26, three civil defense workers were killed in a helicopter crash.

The rioting was finally subdued the next day. Negroes had noticeably bypassed Negro-owned stores in their looting. Four men were dead; 350 injured, including 35 police; 800 persons were arrested, three-fourths of them Negroes; estimates of \$1,000,000 damage were made. After several days of relative calm, the limitations on liquor were removed. Subsequently, the city began to return to normality. The National Guard was recalled, leaving 300 state policemen. Later, the city brought in Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation to begin work in the ghetto area.

Jersey City

As the National Guard was withdrawing from Rochester, 200 Negroes in a town where Negroes composed 17% of the population, Jersey City, N.J., were beginning the same pattern of hurling debris, looting stores, and shouting at police. On the night of August 2, police arrested Miss Dolores Shannon on a disorderly conduct charge. A man, Walker Mays, interfered and was arrested on the same charge. They were taken to the 4th Precinct Station.

Forty Negroes soon marched on the stationhouse, charging police brutality. They left after half an hour, but the group soon reformed about 10:00 p.m. at the scene of the arrests, the Lafayette Gardens Housing Project. One hundred police were sent into the area, and the crowd began to hurl debris. Negroes attacked a white woman's car, breaking the windows and beating the three occupants. Sporadic looting began after the main crowd had been dispersed. A three-block area was closed off by authorities.

On August 3, 300 persons again rioted although the Mayor had met with civil rights leaders in an attempt to halt the disturbances. A homemade bomb destroyed a panel truck; three buses were stoned; and a driver beaten. The Chief of Police announced that marauding Negroes were "all over the city, including white areas." The rioting lasted for five hours, its character having escalated since the previous night. The New York Times described the situation: "Sunday night's rioting included much looting of stores; last night's resembled more a small military battle." This second night saw leaflets by a militant group, the Labor-Negro Vanguard Conference, circulated, urging the people not to listen to the moderates who called for a halt to the rioting.

On August 4, 400 policemen were on duty to quell yet another night of un-

rest. Molotov cocktails were thrown and six rubbish fires were set in a vacant building. One policeman was insolent to Deputy City Registrar Robert Slade, a Negro, who was attempting to quiet Negro youths. Ministers also drove through the area urging peace among the mobs. By the next day there was a virtual end to the violence. Shortly thereafter, clergymen, led by Reverend Robert W. Castel, a white Episcopal priest, undertook the reopening and staffing of closed playgrounds in the riot area which the city said it could afford to maintain.

Paterson-Elizabeth

A week after the Jersey City riots ended, two new New Jersey cities saw social upheaval. On the night of August 11, both Paterson and Elizabeth were struck by minor incidents. In Elizabeth, gasoline bombs were hurled and a white man was injured when hit by a bottle. In Paterson, Negroes began throwing stones at cars around 9:00 p.m. but were controlled before midnight.

On the night of August 12, the violence in the two cities expanded. In Paterson it began when teenagers on the way home from a dance threw rocks at a police car. In the Negro slum hundreds of Negroes soon began rushing through the streets, smashing windows and hurling debris at police. Sixteen persons were arrested that night in Paterson.

At the same time, Elizabeth's waterfront center saw 700 Negroes in a four-block section riot, after hit-and-run bombers pitched Molotov cocktails into three taverns. Fires were also set at a diner and a factory. Into the melee came 100 white toughs who battled with the Negro rioters. The police, however, used neither nightsticks nor guns in halting the disturbance.

The night of August 13 was the scene of further disruptions. In Paterson fire bombs and stones were thrown. Mayor Graves personally arrested a man who was about to throw a bottle at the police. But the rioting was less intense than on the two previous nights, and the area was quiet by mid-morning. The Mayor banned dances and demonstrations in the riot area, but said he did not blame civil rights leaders for the riots. He saw hoodlums and criminals as the cause people just seeking to make trouble. In Elizabeth that night six Negroes were arrested after hurling Molotov cocktails at passing cars. It was noted that most of those

who participated in the rioting lived in the low-cost housing projects.

Chicago (Dixmoor-Harvey Area)

No sooner had the problems of New Jersey subsided than another Northern city exploded. In the Dixmoor-Harvey area, just south of Chicago, a Negro woman, Blondella Woods was arrested for stealing a bottle of gin from the liquor store of "Big Mike" La Pota. She accused La Pota of roughing her up, and a crowd gathered in front of the liquor store, chanting "Big Mike must go." Inflammatory speeches were made to the crowd by some of its members. A rock was thrown through the window of the liquor store, and soon about 1,000 persons were rioting. Cars were stoned; some whites were dragged from their cars and beaten. Police marched into the area to restore order, using tear gas. A Negro was shot by a civilian sniper, while a white man accidentally shot himself.

The next night, August 17, the rioting was still on. The liquor store was burned by Molotov cocktails. Gunfire was exchanged between Negroes and the police. A woman was injured when a brick was thrown through a bus. In Dixmoor, an integrated area of 3,000 bordered by the all-Negro community of Robbins and the integrated town of Harvey, no curfew was imposed as elsewhere, but all stores in the area were closed at 6:00 p.m. August 18 was quiet, except that the clubhouse of the golf course caught fire and arson was suspected. Chicago remained tense, fearing outbursts in the larger ghetto areas of the West and South sides, but saw no riots there until 1965.

Philadelphia

Ten days later, on August 25, a Negro couple found their car stalled at an intersection in Philadelphia's Northside ghetto, also known as the "Jungle." Two policemen, one white and one Negro, attempted to move Rush and Odessa Bradford's car, and became embroiled in an argument with Mrs. Bradford. They attempted to arrest her on assault charges. The bystanders became active in the scene and the riot began. In Philadelphia, 27% of the people are Negroes, with 200,000 of them crowded into a 115-block area. The rioting was concentrated in a 12-block area along Columbia Avenue, the center of the Negro business district. By now, the riot pattern was established. Bottles and bricks were hurled, a police car was overturned and a taxi set on fire. Civil

rights leaders could not stop the mob; they were greeted with jeers and cat-calls. Virtually every store on Columbia Avenue was looted.

The night of August 29 was one of further chaos for Philadelphia. Scattered incidents took place, with window-breaking by juveniles the most common act. The Mayor placed a quarantine over 125 blocks and urged people in the area not to go to church on Sunday morning. He also gave orders that police were not to use their revolvers or tear gas unless under severe attack. By August 30, calm was returning. False alarms were common. One Negro was shot by a policeman who said the man had attacked him with a knife. However, Cecil Moore, militant head of the local NAACP, said the police used restraint in their handling of the Philadelphia rioters.

Other Incidents

The cities mentioned above were the only ones to suffer full-fledged riots during the summer of 1964. But other areas experienced minor incidents and severe tension. Prior to the Harlem riots on July 6, about 500 Negroes in St. Louis bombarded policemen with missiles after they had answered a call for a sick woman in a Negro neighborhood. While officers were attempting to break up a fight between the woman's two sons, a crowd gathered. Fifty police were brought in as reinforcements and were besieged by the angry crowd. Four rioters were arrested.

In early August, police were also attacked by Negroes in Kansas City and Cleveland. In Detroit, a white boy was stabbed during scuffling between white and Negro youths at the Michigan State Fair in Kenosha, New Jersey. 200 white and Negro youths battled on August 28. A similar incident took place in Westminster, South Carolina, on August 30. In early June, a policeman was attacked by a mob in Brooklyn after halting a Negro boy from smashing flower pots with a baseball bat. During this entire period, the New York subways were disturbed by marauding Negro youths.

Other tense areas did not see violence. In East Harlem, 25 Puerto Rican men of the East Harlem Action Committee went about urging residents to avoid conflict. The police came into the area wearing "war" helmets, under the assumption that trouble would begin there, and were criticized by the leader of the "peace patrol" for making this assumption. The New York Times also report-

ed a meeting in Buffalo to preserve racial peace and a rally in Newark which remained orderly.

Analysis of the Several Riots

As the violence spread in the summer of 1964, the several cities which faced ghetto uprisings began intensive introspection in search for causes. The analysis which is not yet ended, often revealed a similarity of problems.

Harlem

A study made of the 1935 Harlem riots "listed such forces as community charges of police brutality, overcrowding and rent gouging in tenements, lack of school recreation and health facilities, and discrimination against Negroes in jobs and city services." The same complaints would be heard after the riots of 1964, suggesting that the stop-gap measures taken by the city had had little effect on the essential conditions in Harlem.

Some attempts at improvement were noted during the months preceding the riots. In 1959, after a near riot, a Committee on Harlem Affairs was appointed by Mayor Wagner but dissolved after the Deputy Mayor, who had served as chairman, resigned. In early July, 1964, the Police Department sought to improve its public image by opening 44 play streets to be staffed by the Police Athletic League. On July 15, just before the riots, the city opened a voter registration campaign aimed at minority group areas such as Harlem. These efforts did not strike at the root of the misery in Harlem.

Harlem is an area in which 90% of the housing was built before 1929 and 40% before 1901. Eleven per cent of it is classified as dilapidated, and 33% deteriorating. A survey of slum areas reported on July 15 revealed 183,373 defects in a city-wide block-by-block survey. But the housing conditions are only an example of a vast social depression which the Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, the most active improvement group in the area, described as "not a function of race, but of economic and social deprivation due in part to racial discrimination."

Complaints of police brutality are in the forefront of the rioting. They are too prevalent to be ignored and are heard long before the deeper grievances of the Harlem Negroes. The New York Times reported that such accusations "dominated the conversation among Negroes yesterday afternoon." Said a Harlem housewife:

The real original in Harlem is the cops. They permit dope, numbers, whores, gangsters to operate here, and all the time they get money under the table—and I ain't talking about \$2 neither."

The Amsterdam News commented that "no matter how brutally policemen may treat a citizen of Harlem, there is the feeling that any charge against the policeman will be whitewashed." Such comments indicate that the policeman is not seen in isolation from the rest of the majority community, but that he is the most visible symbol to Harlem citizens of an entire system which appears to operate against them. Whether the police are actually brutal or not is not the real issue. Harlem feels that the white society treats it brutally, and the policeman is the immediate agent of that brutality.

A different kind of protest against the "system" had taken place in Harlem earlier in the year. This was the rent strike led by Jesse Gray, in which 3,000 Harlem families held back rents worth over \$100,000 a month. The people refused to submit any further to the largely white landlords who were accustomed to getting "\$50-\$74 a month for a one-room flat that would rent for \$40-\$49 in a white slum." Said Gray:

... it's time to stop paying rent to keep rats alive and landlords fat ... If private property means that rats can eat my children, then I don't care about private property."

The same economic forces which Harlem people see at work in the exorbitant rents they pay and in the miserable housing they endure are also seen in the fact that the unemployment rate in Harlem is double that for white areas of the city. The complaint goes further: Negroes in Harlem see the businesses around them, the men who make a profit in their neighborhood. They are all white. The Negro's money goes into the hands of a white man, and out of Harlem, Kenneth Clark, City College of New York psychologist who worked with HARYOU, describes the attitude of the community:

When tumult arose in ghetto streets in the summer of 1964, most of the stores broken into and looted belonged to white men. Many of these owners responded to the destruction with bewilderment and anger, for they felt that they had been serving a community which needed them. They did not realize that the residents were not grateful for this

service but bitter, as natives often feel toward the functionaries of a colonial power who, in the very act of service, keep the hated structure of oppression intact."

From childhood Negroes develop a strong distrust of the only white people they frequently encounter: shopkeepers, rent collectors, salesmen, racketeers, and most of all, the policemen who seem to Harlem less a protective force than an occupying army. A survey taken after the riots revealed that the Harlem Negroes were most concerned about their economic plight and low status and placed the blame on "greedy white folks" or "prejudiced employers" or on a desire by whites to exploit the Negro and "keep us down." These several elements point to the validity of one writer's conclusion that "there is little doubt that it was spontaneous, directed primarily against the white businessman in Harlem and the white policeman everywhere." The nature of Harlem reveals a pattern which is reflected in most other areas of rioting: a combination of economic and social grievances complicated and aggravated by racial bias and oppression which result in a feeling of distrust and hatred for a power structure—a power structure that is white.

There are two side issues bearing upon the context of the Harlem riots which should be mentioned. The first is the condition of the government's Poverty Program, which, in theory, would alleviate the misery of the ghetto residents. The second is the persistent charge of Communist instigation. The "War on Poverty" program for Harlem had become a political football prior to the riots. Work was not begun because of a controversy and, as a result, no funds were allotted to the area."

The course of events in Harlem during July, 1964 caused Acting Mayor Paul Serevane to charge that Communist elements were involved. The arrest and charging of the Progressive Labor Movement's William Epton was an aspect of this charge. In light of the conditions described above, the validity of James Farmer's reply to Serevane should be self-evident. He stated:

In a sense, this is an insult to the Negroes in Harlem because it means they wouldn't have enough sense to feel discontent or to feel anger and frustration unless some Communist came along and told them to do it."

A Harlem Negro echoed this conclusion:

It's the rats, the roaches, the fu-

tility, the despair that comes from being kept down, down ... Damn Communism, Damn Socialism, I'm talking about being free."

Rochester

Rochester's ghetto areas contain the basic factors as does Harlem: a surface grievance about police brutality, underscored by undesirable social and economic conditions. Rochester is not a city which has patently ignored its Negroes. It "was proud of its record of promoting racial harmony. Its influential citizens had worked long and hard to build good will between whites and Negroes ... It has tried hard to eliminate de facto segregation of all kinds ... After the riots, City Manager Homer noted the many efforts of Rochester which included a police advisory board (the immediate goal of Negroes in most other riot areas), an open-enrollment program, a 500-unit public housing development, a \$500,000 playground in the Negro area as a result of a new school and property rehabilitation code." Rochester was perhaps the most bewildered of the cities which had riots that year.

A University of Rochester assistant professor of Sociology and Psychiatry, Dean Harper, outlined some of the underlying factors which were not overcome by the city's efforts:

In Rochester ... the tinder was more combustible than in Buffalo or Syracuse where riots could have occurred but did not. In the first place, the Negro population of Rochester has increased at a faster rate than that of either Buffalo or Syracuse ... Second, information from the 1960 census indicates that in respect to income and employment, the Negro is relatively worse off in Rochester than in Buffalo or Syracuse ... Finally, Rochester lacks a Negro middle class. In Rochester Negroes depend more on the white community than do Negroes in many other cities with older and more settled Negro communities. There are few Negro professionals in Rochester and Negro businessmen are almost non-existent. The lack of such a Negro middle class exacerbated some of the other difference between whites and Negroes in Rochester."

Again as in Harlem, crowded conditions, employment discrepancies, and a feeling of subordination to a white au-

thority were present in Rochester. The reaction to this situation is usually expressed in the hostility to the police, who in Rochester as elsewhere, are the symbol of the "system." Two Rochester Negroes stated their feelings on this subject:

Man, I've had hell kicked out of me by white cops busting up a crap game. When I get a chance, I kick the white man back."

There are two sets of law, one for white and one for black. We just took enough of it. Police brutality, that's the name for it."

Rochester made an attempt to meet this problem by setting up a police advisory board, but that effort apparently failed. Only a few cases came to the board, and of those, less than half were ever declared official. The board dealt only with use of excessive and unnecessary physical force, not with attitudes and verbal assault."

The gap between the politicians, white and Negro, and the poor Negroes in the ghetto was also evident in Rochester. The National Youth Secretary of the NAACP commented:

The Negro politicians are not really in touch with the situation, and I'm not too sure they really want to be in touch with the situation. I feel that at this moment they're really concerned about the image of the community and how white citizens will view them politically.

Hannah Storrs, the president of Rochester CORE echoed his sentiments:

One of the problems we have is that the power structure has selected the Negro leaders. Many times they listen to the people who don't even live in the so-called Negro areas."

The people of the community are unrepresented. The white community is as removed from the Negro community as is the leadership of the city. Only 12% of the whites which Harper interviewed cited grievances in the Negro area as a cause of the riots or indicated sympathy with the situation of the Negro."

The reality of the grievances about conditions in the ghetto is evidenced in the participation of many non-criminal persons in the rioting. Harper comments:

... an even larger number of Negroes without police records were arrested. To say that the rioters were nothing but criminals stealing

for their own personal gain is the wishful thinking of those people who also say that there is nothing wrong with Rochester."

Constance Mitchell, Ward Supervisor in the ghetto area, stated that it was the good kids in the area "who first threw bricks through the windows." "Good people do not become criminals overnight. Rather, the outburst was a result of complete frustration Negroes felt in enduring the prolonged misery of the Rochester ghettos."

Jersey City

Jersey City, where the next rioting took place, is no exception to the developing pattern. A joint NAACP-CORE meeting held during the riots heard complaints about police brutality, bad jobs, housing, education, and recreational facilities. The New York Times described the conditions in detail:

Behind Lafayette Gardens (the center of the riot area) is a playground with 14 swings in it and an iron wire fence around it. Weeds grow through the playground's cracked concrete floor, and the fence gate is locked because of an economy move so that the children who want to play there must burrow under the fence . . .

The streets . . . of Ward F . . . looked as if a garbage truck hadn't made its rounds in weeks . . . Most Ward F people are poor. The women who are not on welfare are employed as domestics or in factories or laundries. The men do what little construction work they find, but say they are denied union membership."

In an attempt to rectify the situation prior to the rioting, the Reverend Castle led many of his parishioners to the "steps of City Hall where they dumped garbage and litter 'at the feet of the Mayor' begging for a Ward F clean-up campaign." This action is reminiscent of the pre-riot campaign in Harlem, where disgruntled tenants brought dead rats to court and organized a campaign to send both dead and toy rats to Governor Rockefeller in protest against their living conditions.

The Mayor, Thomas Whelan, related these conditions to the problems of the entire city. He explained that the city is faced with a dwindling economy, that the middle-class is moving out and thus the tax base becoming less able to support the city. The city has also lost much of the railroad revenue upon

which it is dependent. He said the city needs federal assistance, but that the borrowing capacity of the city is too low to secure the necessary funds."

Again the complaint was heard that the politicians, such as Mayor Whelan, have no understanding or sympathy for the particular problems of the Negroes in such a city. The head of the Jersey City NAACP said the mayor is "a typical product of his times—absolutely unable to comprehend what is going on . . . blinded to the fact that this is a group of kids making a protest against terrible conditions in the only way they know."

Paterson-Elizabeth

The complaints are the same in the other two New Jersey cities which were affected by Negro unrest. In many ways, Paterson is similar to Jersey City and Elizabeth. "Negroes have moved into the deteriorating substandard housing once occupied by immigrant factory hands." The whites and the middle-class Negroes have left the area."

In Elizabeth, the grievances are the same as elsewhere: substandard housing, lack of recreation, employment opportunities, and police brutality. Paterson's ghetto area is affected by 20% unemployment."

The charge of police brutality is again first on the tongues of complaining citizens. A Negro youth told reporters:

These cops, they'll stop your car and say 'all right nigger, get out' and you have to swallow that. Then they'll say, 'you niggers get up against that wall,' and they'll smash you in the ribs, and you have to swallow that too.

But other causes are evident, too. The targets in Elizabeth and Paterson were white merchants and policemen. Most of the rioters came from slum homes."

The failure to respond to complaints before the riots was also present in these two cities as it had been elsewhere. Junius Griffin, in the New York Times wrote:

Although the district is almost totally without recreational facilities, and receives what appears to be minimum municipal services, its inhabitants have had little success in placing their demands for improvement before Mayor Frank X. Graves."

The ghettos of Elizabeth and Paterson are no exception to the others. They are characterized by poor economic and social conditions, unemployment, and white-dominated businesses.

Chicago (Dixmoor)

The pattern of the 1964 rioting varied when a small ghetto area south of Chicago erupted rather than the larger ghettos of the West Side or the South Side where the constant clatter of the elevated trains shakes the decaying Negro business section. But Dixmoor had problems. It faced high unemployment and racial discrimination in hiring. Eugene Callahan, director of Chicago's Conference on Religion and Race, pointed out:

There's unemployment because the mills and factories in the Harvey area aren't doing well right now. Hardly any local businesses in Harvey hire Negroes."

The people in Dixmoor-Harvey began their attack with assaults upon a white merchant and turned later against the police, aiming at the same targets rioters elsewhere had pursued. Callahan commented on the significance of this initial target in the Dixmoor riot:

I understand Negroes can't get liquor licenses. Naturally, they resent the fact that right across the street is a white man, running a big liquor store, and he's got a prison record, and he's a big brute besides."

The resentment in Dixmoor which flared into riot was the same combination of racial discrimination and economic depression that sparked conflagrations in other Northern cities. Chicago would be faced with similar explosions in the larger ghetto areas the next year.

Philadelphia

The people in Philadelphia who rioted after an incident involving policemen, live in the "Jungle." The "Jungle" is an older section of the city, where many of the houses are a century old. The once wealthy neighborhood is now crowded with 60,000 poor people per square mile. The New York Times reported:

The children of the Jungle play in narrow streets, between parked cars, on sidewalks, and in junk piles, rubble where homes once stood, and in vacant battered houses awaiting the wrecker's crane."

There is little about the conditions of Philadelphia's North Side that would distinguish it from the other Northern ghettos. People living in a decayed neighborhood. The recognized civil rights leaders were not respected by the mobs who, no doubt, as in other areas,

saw them as pawns of a white authority, removed from the average Negro living in the ghetto.

Los Angeles, 1965

The riot in the Watts area in the summer of 1965—a disturbance which shocked most Caucasians in Los Angeles because they had been largely unaware of the psychological and economic plight of the Negro in portions of the city—had as its source the identical causes which underlay the riots in other cities. Resentment against the Police whom the Negroes regarded as an occupying army, frustration in the ability to find employment, anger at increasing prosperity in which they did not share, bitterness at being economically exploited, and anguish at being kept at the lowest rung of the social ladder, all combined to create the conditions which led to the explosive outburst in the Watts area. It is significant that the Negroes of Watts—and in Northern cities in 1964—did not leave their neighborhood to attack whites but remained within the confines of the community to register the protest. Similar to the riots of the previous year, the Negroes in Watts systematically destroyed the businesses of merchants and of professionals whom they felt were discriminating against them. Although unorganized, Negroes spontaneously converged and attacked stores and shops which had been exploiting them for many years. Unfortunately, other major establishments when the fire raged beyond control. Finally, similar to the nature of the riots of 1964, Negroes experienced a sense of exhilarating release during the melee; they had a sensation that for the first time in many years, white society was cognizant of their presence.

Conclusions:

The patterns of the riots showed remarkable similarity—thrusts at police and white businessmen characterized by the destruction of property with missiles and Molotov cocktails. The areas which spawned them likewise contain similar conditions: immediate complaints—police brutality, poor housing, unemployment, control of economy by white lack of political power, and a blind assault upon the "system" which appear to be the inaccessible origin of the multitude of miseries which Northern Negroes faced.

Each of the riots which took place the summers of 1964-65 was characterized by a kind of desperation. The riot raised a question which seemed peculiar

lar: Why did the violence occur in the North where Negroes do not face blatant segregation as in the South? Why have Southern Negroes (whose oppression is apparently greater) been able to fight for improvements through non-violent demonstrations if Northern Negroes were forced to turn to destructive violence? A variety of factors are included in the answer. They range from the subtlety of Northern discrimination and the apparent progress in an era of prosperity to the depth and complexity of the economic and political problems and the psychological depression of alienation from the power structure. Any solutions to the crisis in the ghettos is infinitely more complex than the crisis itself.

A key element in the Northern Negro's situation is the lack of clarity in his relationship to the white society. Dean Harper, analyst of the Rochester riots explains:

In the South, the Negro knows what he can and cannot do, but in the North, his position is less clear . . . If he applies for a job and is not hired, is it because he is not qualified or because he is a Negro?¹⁰

Civil rights activists note the difference in the protest of the Northern Negro, saying it is "much looser. There is an overabundance of leaders . . . The attack is . . . on a social system based on indifference and a white power structure that is often hard to define."¹¹

Related to this is the lack of obvious legislative recourse in the North. The pressure of the Federal Government through Congress and the courts is evident in the South, but has little effect in the North. In New York, where the riots were most severe, the legislation just passed by Congress was relatively meaningless. The New York Times reported in early July that "essentially every provision of the new Federal law had been previously adopted by the State Legislature. Most of these state laws against racial and religious discrimination are broader and stronger than the Federal Statute."¹² These laws meant little in terms of removing the stigma attached to the ghetto. Gertrude Samuels, writing in the New York Times Magazine, notes this fact:

The North has on its books many laws and directives against job discrimination that have meant well. The cause of the seething unrest is that, in practice, down at the individual level, the laws don't work. Municipalities and state govern-

ments lack the courage to enforce them, and private enterprise is apathetic or worse.¹³

Kenneth Clark makes another point which is significant in the situation of the Northern Negro:

No totally oppressed people ever revolt or rebel. Now I use your word 'revolt' in this sense: The Negroes' revolution comes as a consequence of what white liberals call progress. The closer a human being gets to a goal, obviously the more restive he gets in wanting that goal.¹⁴

Accelerated impatience and the lowering of the threshold of frustration toward remaining inequities, paradoxically increase the chances of racial tensions and ferment and conflict. Failure would reinforce the sense of stagnation and despair and establish as fact the sense of personal and group powerlessness.¹⁵

Thus, the gains which have been achieved by the civil rights movement in the last five years, and not the atmosphere of agitation created by the movement, have heightened the impatience of the Negroes in the North.

Compounding the problem is the relative prosperity of the American society as a whole. The Negro sees whites becoming richer around him. He sees his own condition improve less rapidly. His expectations in sharing the prosperity are naturally high. One sociologist comments:

Negroes are improving their material condition of life but are not doing so at the same rate as whites. This is the perfect situation to create feelings of relative deprivation leading to rebellion.¹⁶

States Clark:

. . . the fact is that in many ways the Negro's situation is deteriorating. The Negro has been left out of the swelling prosperity and social progress of the nation as a whole. He is in danger of becoming a permanent economic proletariat.¹⁷

Moreover, C. Eric Lincoln in the New York Times Magazine points out the small number of Negroes which might be considered middle-class. He estimates not more than 25%, with not more than 5% being in the upper group. Further, he says, other sociologists would argue "that if one applies the full spectrum of the criteria by which the white social situation is measured . . . the Negro middle-class is reduced to 4 or 5% of

the Negro population, and the Negro upper-class vanishes altogether."¹⁸ This economic situation is the result of several factors: the problem of securing a job, with or without discrimination; the reluctance of labor unions to assist, the white ownership of Negro-area businesses, the high cost of living in the slums, and the connection that the Negro cannot help but make between his economic deprivation and his race.

In the areas where rioting took place, the unemployment rates were noticeably higher than in other areas of those cities.

Exacerbating this is the Northern Negro's alienation from the white economic structure and the white ownership of most businesses in Negro ghetto areas. This complaint was heard in many of the riot zones. In Dixmoor, the riot was centered around a white-owned business. Stores and businesses which were owned by Negroes were often left undisturbed in the looting.

This description of the Northern Negro as a member of the lower economic class of the society is compounded by his racial existence as a "second-class" citizen. In an interview, Oscar Handlin states he believes the Negro is basically trying to escape the "slum" rather than

the "ghetto" but that the slums in this circumstance is also the 'ghetto' and he sees the two things together."¹⁹ Kenneth Clark comments also on the seriousness of this combination of economic repression and racial suppression:

The poor are always alienated from normal society, and when the poor are Negro, as they increasingly are in American cities, a double trauma exists—rejection on the basis of class and race is a danger to the stability of the society as a whole . . . The social dynamics of the dark ghettos can be seen as the restless thrust of a lower-class group to rise into the middle class.²⁰

Thus, all of these factors point to a feeling of alienation and powerlessness on the part of the Northern Negro which create in him a resentment of the white community and its "system." In every aspect of his life, he feels the power structure seems to militate against him. The channels for social redress described above are, for the most part, closed. The riots of the summers of 1964-65 would appear, then, to be the result of release and rebellion against the past.

IV. SUMMARY OF STATISTICS ON RIOTS

I. 1917 - 1964

1917 - 1964

City	Date	Killed	Injured	Arrests	Shops Damaged	Amount of Damage
East St. Louis	July 2-3, 1917	48 (39 N; 9 C)	100+	143		\$373,005
Washington	July 20-23, 1919	11 (4 N; 7 C)		100+		Slight
Chicago	July 27-August 2, 1919	38 (23 N; 15 C)	537	229		\$250,000
Harlem	March 20-21, 1935	4 (2 N; 2 C)	100+	121		Million+
Detroit	June 20-23, 1943	83 (24 N; 9 C)	933	1,883		\$2,000,000+
Harlem	August 1-2, 1943	5 (all N)	565+ (all N)	500		\$5,000,000,000
II. Summer 1964						
New York City	July 18-23	1	144	519	541	\$1-2 Million
Rochester	July 24-25	4	350	976	204	\$2-3 Million
Jersey City	August 2-4	0	46	52	71	\$300,000
Paterson	August 11-13	0	8	65	20	\$50,000
Elizabeth	August 11-13	0	6	18	17	Slight
Chicago (Dickmoor)	August 16-17	0	57	80	2	Slight
Philadelphia	August 28-30	0	341	774	225	\$3,000,000+

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Public Welfare: Despondency, Despair and Opportunity

by

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PREFATORY COMMENTS

During the single month of August, 1965—a month marked by violence unprecedented in Los Angeles—public assistance payments totalling almost five and a half million dollars were made to nearly a hundred thousand relief recipients living in the South Central Area (the "curfew" area) of the County: a recipient population exceeding in size the entire population of 36 of California's 58 counties. More than a fifth of these recipients resided in Watts.

A quick glance at these figures may well evoke the reaction "What a lot of money for welfare!" A second, more thoughtful look will disclose that simple old-fashioned arithmetic reduces these large figures to an average of \$55 per month per recipient. If the reader is one who does the family marketing, pays the family rent, and keeps an anxious eye on the rising cost of living indices, he may wonder who can live a month on that sum?

If the reader is one of the taxpayers who resents the fact that some of their hard-earned money must be collected for taxes to pay a share of the five and a half million dollars, he is more likely to react with anger that the recipient "isn't out hustling for himself!"

If the reader is an unemployed man with a family depending on the grant for survival, he too will be angry—with himself, because he is without a job; with the public assistance agency on which he must depend and which reminds him deliberately or inadvertently of his failure; with the world around him, which may no longer have work opportunities for him. His despair may cause him to lash out at the world, at the agency, at himself—or to slink away, from his family, from unrecognized opportunities to improve his situation, and even from himself.

If the reader is a person in public office, he will be torn between his recognition of the importance of keeping his constituents' tax burdens down and, at the same time, appropriating enough funds to meet the basic requirements of the community's needy.

Whoever the reader, whatever the reason, there tends to be an emotional response to the payment of public money for "welfare." And in the aggregate, these emotional responses serve not only to shape the public welfare services that are available; they also affect the use the needy person can make of these services in order to return to a state of self-maintenance.

It is the purpose of this paper to consider the impact of the public welfare programs on the people of the Watts and South Central areas—on those who sought and/or needed financial help that was or was not forthcoming for any of many reasons—and to identify some of the needs of the community and of the programs that warrant attention and remedy. Accordingly, this report will contain three parts. The first will provide a backdrop: some of the elements and philosophies that have contributed to the present form, structure, and scope of the public welfare programs available today in the County and in the Watts Riots Area; what these programs purport to do; and how they are organized to carry out their purposes.

The second part will consider certain factors affecting the effectiveness of the public assistance programs in attaining their goals. The third segment will focus upon some of the program gaps and needs that have particular relevance to the residents of the Watts Riots Area, and will propose specific recommendations for meeting the identified needs.

The material contained in the report reflects not only the more than thirty years of the writer's study, observations, and direct experience in the field of social welfare (and, especially, public welfare). It draws also on interviews conducted either prior to or following the Watts Riots: with individuals and groups who are or have been recipients or applicants; with present and former employees at various levels and classifications in the county and state agencies primarily concerned with the administration and extension of public assistance; with referees in the State Department of Social Welfare who hear appeals from county decisions; with representatives of other organizations, agencies, and departments whose work brings them into contact either with recipients or staff of the public welfare agencies; and with other recognized experts in the fields of economics and social welfare. Some of these interviews were solicited by the writer; others were solicited by the interviewees. At certain meetings the writer was an observer rather than a participant.

Laws, regulations, and official legal opinions (attorney-general and county counsel documents) were examined with regard to their stipulations and interpretations, as were certain sections of state, county, and federal manuals rela-

ance.

There is a paucity of research into attitudes related either to the giving or receiving of public assistance. Such studies as could be identified and reviewed, were. But of particular value were data gathered with respect to research designed to evaluate the effectiveness of an extensive demonstration project being conducted by the Bureau of Public Assistance with funds granted by the State Department of Social Welfare. The Director of the Bureau made available the project materials in order that clues and insights contained in these data might enrich the findings of the Governor's Commission. This demonstration project (Number 220) was initiated in October of 1964 and grew out of the conviction of the Bureau Director that the Bureau of Public Assistance could carry out its functions effectively only if the community's image of the Bureau as a helping agency could be modified so that those needing its services could make full use of them.

The project still in process, has several segments, among which are several having particular relevance here. One provides for the placement of a community welfare consultant in each of four particularly disadvantaged areas (three are in the South Central and Watts regions, and one in East Los Angeles); one segment establishes units of social workers in each of three housing projects where there are concentrations of public assistance recipients (one, and then a second not funded in this project, were assigned to the Jordan Downs Housing Project; one was placed in the Pueblo Del Rio Project; another has been scheduled to be established shortly in the Belvedere area); a third segment of the demonstration called for placement of three Welfare Information workers in disadvantaged areas. Two of the latter had just been appointed to their respective positions and assigned to Watts Area locations when the riots occurred. However, they and the four community welfare consultants had begun (the latter in June) to keep certain records for research purposes. These analyzed records proved to be a valuable source of documentation for the content of the ensuing report.

To illustrate some of the points delineated in this paper, brief case vignettes are used. These represent real people and true situations; precautions have been taken to disguise their identities and maintain confidentiality.

One other prefatory comment is in

order that the information made available to the writer was based on hearsay or feelings rather than on hard facts. But unless such information could be supported by actual case situations or appeared indisputably to be part of a pattern, such material was put aside and not incorporated in this report.

I. PUBLIC WELFARE: PURPOSE, PHILOSOPHY, AND PROGRAM

Its Origins

The history of social welfare in America cannot be separated from the mainstream of the nation's economic, social, political, and cultural history. At every point in time and geography, different social welfare answers to different social welfare needs have been shaped by the readiness of our society—its collective conscience increasingly pricked as an accelerating technology provided the means—to recognize the existence of problems (widowhood and orphans as casualties of advancing industrialization, decimating epidemics of contagious illnesses); to mobilize available resources to deal with these problems (tax funds and voluntary financial contributions as well as the interest and services of community-minded citizens); and to develop specific programs (mothers' aid for the widowed mothers, workmen's compensation for the industrial casualties, public health measures for control of contagious disease, institutions for the wayward, etc.) that would deploy these resources toward resolution of the social problems.

This history has been deeply influenced by the Seventeenth Century English Poor Laws, with their emphasis on localism, less eligibility, work tests for employable persons, legal responsibilities of relatives, and other elements designed to deal with changing economic and social conditions in a plague-ridden agrarian society feeling the first thrust of an industrial revolution.

It has been marked by Victorian attitudes that poverty almost always is the consequence of shiftlessness and character defect, that—except for widows, orphans, and a few specified and readily identifiable handicapped who probably fell in the category of "poor but honest"—such weakness must be punished by giving only enough aid to provide for survival, but not as much as the poorest paying jobs would offer.

It has been modified as attitudes about economic dependency have been exposed to wide-spread economic depressions, to wars, to changing labor markets and opportunities, to the in-

creased goods and services concomitant with an elevated standard of living, to new knowledge about human behavior and well-being—and to increasingly effective modes of communicating such knowledge.

It is a history that has been characterized by shifts from concern only with the protection of society against the "worthlessness" of those not caring for themselves in a land of rugged individualists for whom all kinds of opportunities abound, to rehabilitation of those having some potential for self-care and self-maintenance for their own sakes as well as in the interests of having productive communities and a strong and healthy nation.

Social welfare programs thus have moved from stages concerned primarily with survival needs (food, shelter, clothing—and, now, medical care), to socialization of the individual and family (dealing with deviant emotional, social, or economic behavior for the purpose of aiding the individual to function in our society as a reasonably self-maintaining and socially adequate member of the community, to self-realization or self-fulfillment, whereby the individuals and families can function more nearly at their maximum capacity to lead lives that are both personally satisfying and socially productive and constructive.

Public Welfare Today

Social welfare programs today—and particularly public, tax-supported programs—are the distillate of three and a half centuries of ways of coping with the major social problems that are ever-present in a dynamic and changing industrial democracy. New arrangements have evolved, along with new techniques, for dealing on a large scale with many kinds of problems—either before they emerge or after they have made an appearance. Thus, the social insurances (Old-age and Survivors' Disability Insurance Benefits, Unemployment Insurance Benefits, California's State Temporary Disability Insurance Benefits, Workmen's Compensation) assume the likelihood of economic need if wages of the breadwinner are stopped by reasons of death, disability, work-related injury or illness, retirement because of advancing age, loss of or employment; in accordance with state and federal laws, taxes, paid by the wage earner, or by his employer, or by both, provide certain protections against these common hazards. Public health departments, with the protective aims of preventing ill-health and controlling con-

tagion, provide a variety of health services to children, to mothers, to other adults. Deviant behavior that is disturbing to an individual or his family and/or inimical to the interests of the community, may receive attention from public or voluntary in-patient or out-patient mental health facilities, or from local or state or federal correction agencies. Adults or children, families or individuals, generally have available an array of generalized or specialized counseling and helping services, sectarian or non-sectarian, voluntary or public: family and children's agencies, group work services, medical services, vocational guidance, school guidance, psychiatric clinics and care, etc.

Whether the need grows out of personal or community conditions, or whether there are associated problems of physical or mental illness, or family breakdown, or otherwise limited ability to fulfill an economically independent role in the community—those whose need primarily is money for maintenance generally can turn only to the public assistance agency for the help they require and which, by the mechanism of a means test, they can, in effect, prove they require. Such agencies, frequently extensive, resourceful, knowledgeable about human needs and modern ways of meeting these, are concerned with handling their humanitarian responsibilities effectively and efficiently, but they are, nevertheless, the product of three and a half centuries of cultural attitudes that place high premium on the work ethic, that question the adequacy and honesty of economically needy persons, that view with alarm rising tax rates to maintain some local autonomy, and with equal alarm the assumption by federal and state levels of government of more and more responsibility for social welfare services and which, in so doing, impinge either on home rule (although in California this is psychological rather than constitutional) or on states' rights. The nature and scope of public welfare services: who is served—by whom and in what fashion; how the programs are financed; and their organizational and operational structure; the liberality or restrictiveness of aid and services—all are subject to modification in accordance with cultural and economic factors prevailing in the community and/or nation at any given time, and have tremendous impact upon those whom the programs are designed to aid.

And, perhaps, because its inevitable complexity is further compounded by

myriad internal and external emotional involvements, the public assistance agency (not in Los Angeles alone, but also elsewhere in the United States) is probably the least understood of government activities—not only among the many who rely on it or whose taxes support it, but also by many who work in it.

Public Welfare Defined

Public welfare is a comprehensive term used today for a variety of governmental, social, and financial services to families and individuals. These services may be offered and financed at any level of government, separately or in combination with other governmental agencies. Broadly speaking, the term encompasses such tax-supported activities as public assistance, child welfare services, probation and parole, recreational and educational services, vocational rehabilitation, services for persons with special handicaps, and others. Generally, however, the term "welfare" has come to mean any of the public assistance programs, and to some, child welfare services—just as people talking about their "Social Security" are referring only to Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, and not to the many other titles in the Social Security Act (which includes most of the public assistance programs, too). And it is primarily in the meaning of this colloquial reference to public assistance that the term "welfare" is interpreted and employed in this document.

Public Assistance

There are six separate programs of public assistance, all of which are offered in Los Angeles County and administered by the Bureau of Public Assistance: Old Age Security, Medical Assistance to the Aged, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Disabled, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and General Relief. The first five are contained in the Social Security Act and financed with funds from federal, state, and county sources. General Relief is financed entirely by the County of Los Angeles.

THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

The Depression of the 1930's brought into sharp focus the necessity for this nation to have a system insuring economic security for individuals who, though hard-working, industrious, and saving, nevertheless in a flash could be helplessly confronted with unemployment, loss of carefully husbanded savings, and destitution. It brought to public and legislative attention some in-

controvertible facts: voluntary social agencies could not muster the resources for coping with such problems as they might wish to attack; in many states only a few counties provided financial assistance, and the amount that was available either did not go very far toward resolution of mounting economic and related social problems, or was available to some needy persons and not to others with identical circumstances of need; in some places, only assistance "in kind" was available—fuel or food, but no rent, which created additional problems not only for the needy recipient but also for the landlord dependent upon rents for his own maintenance.

The Social Security Act, with its provisions for social insurance and for public assistance, was the Twentieth Century Congressional answer to Twentieth Century needs. It brought together ways of promoting economic security or social well-being—ways that were already in use, in one form or another, under public or private auspices, in some parts of the United States. The Act was evolved on the premise that certain actuarially sound protections could be developed against the common hazards faced by workers; and that such protections ultimately could, in large measure, be expected to relieve need stemming from loss of employment, death or disability of the family breadwinner, etc. Public assistance provisions were viewed as "a second line of defense"—help to those whose needs could not be met by social insurance either because these individuals had not been productively attached to the labor market or because they could not be covered for other reasons (nature of occupation, size of employing company, etc.).

The Impact of Social Insurance on Public Assistance

Since the inception of the Social Security Act, both the insurance and the assistance provisions have undergone considerable change. For example, in 1939 Congress made the old-age insurance system a family program rather than a program for retired workers alone. It added "dependents" benefits for the wife and dependent children of a retired worker and it provided "survivors" benefits for certain dependents of an insured worker who dies either before or after he has reached retirement age. It has been broadened periodically to cover many jobs that had been excluded at the beginning—such as regularly employed farm and household workers. This program has meant

that many persons who might otherwise have had to turn to public assistance sources for maintenance in their advancing years, could remain completely or partially independent by virtue of the contributions they and their employers invest for their retirement. In 1951 the number of aged beneficiaries of Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance exceeded for the first time the number of recipients of Old Age Assistance; the number of the former has continued to increase until in mid-1965 it was seven times as large as the number of recipients of Old Age Assistance. And nationwide, as long ago as 1944, the number of orphaned children receiving social insurance benefits exceeded the number of children receiving public assistance because the father was dead. This continuing trend has resulted in the fact that the proportion of orphaned children receiving public assistance is now relatively small and, consequently, there is a highlighting of the correspondingly high proportion of child recipients who are not children of deceased (and OASDI-insured) workers.

More and more, as the social insurances have begun to fulfill their objective to provide economic protection, emphasis has been placed on the public assistance goals of helping needy people to live more independently and, in general, to strengthen their family life. In 1956, federal legislation stressed the provision of social services directed toward achievement of this goal. And from time to time, particularly in 1952, Congress has changed formulas to provide higher grants to the States to induce them to take specific measures toward that end.

The Requirements of the Social Security Act

The decision to operate any or all of the federally-aided public assistance programs rests with the state. Once the voluntary decision has been reached, and as a prerequisite to the state obtaining federal grants-in-aid, the state must submit for the federal agency's approval a plan for the administration of each program for which federal funds are requested. The plan must comply with certain requirements set forth in the Act; failure to adhere to these can result in withdrawal of federal funds. Some of these requirements have particular relevance for the Watts Riots Area.

To a marked degree, these requirements are reaction to the aforementioned conditions that prevailed before

the Social Security Act became operable. Some are directed toward statewide operation of public assistance so that aid can be available in equal amounts to every eligible person, regardless of where he lives, and under equal conditions. Thus, state-wide uniformity and equity of treatment are stressed.

State financial participation is required in order to deal with varying capacities of lower levels of government to provide necessary aid funds; any sharing plan must be uniform throughout the state. (In California, the same sharing formula is applied to all counties, although the same formula does not hold for all aids.)

There must be a single state agency either to administer the plan or to supervise its administration by local agencies, and the state rules, regulations, and standards are mandatory. (In California, the State Department of Social Welfare is the "single state agency"; it supervises the county welfare departments—in Los Angeles, the Bureau of Public Assistance—which administer the federally-aided public assistance programs.) The Act also restricts information about applicants and recipients of assistance to purposes directly connected with the administration of the program.

There must be provision for a fair hearing before the state agency for any claimant for assistance whose claim is denied or not acted upon within a reasonable time. And such reports as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare may require, must be submitted.

The Act does not define need; this is left to the states. It does set forth certain limits with regard to eligibility—consideration of resources (but not necessarily what these must consist of, although certain amounts and kinds of income may be exempt); age requirements of no more than 65 years in Old Age Assistance; no residence requirements more restrictive than the maximums in the Act; etc.

The Act does define how payment is to be made, namely in cash and without restriction as to how the money is to be used. This "money payment principle" or "unrestricted money payment" obtains from the importance (in contrast to old Poor Law practices) of giving the recipient freedom to manage his own affairs, thereby helping him to retain the dignity and self-respect essential to his regaining of an independent role. A 1962 Amendment to the Act permits certain "protected" payments to be

made, that is, in kind, and under certain conditions that are necessary to safeguard both the money payment principle and assure that funds intended for the care of needy children are not grossly misused—a deviation carefully piloted by California. Only when assistance is paid in cash or meets the special in-kind conditions, is federal reimbursement forthcoming.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN LOS ANGELES

Of the six programs of public assistance available in Los Angeles County, five fall within the framework of the Social Security Act provisions, as adapted to California by the California Legislature. With regard to these, the State Department of Social Welfare has a supervisory relationship to the Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance. The sixth program, General Relief, is solely the responsibility of the Bureau of Public Assistance under the direction of the Superintendent of Charities and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

Old Age Security (OAS) (entitled "Old Age Assistance" in the Social Security Act) provides financial assistance to persons who have reached the age of 65, have lived in California for at least five out of the last nine years; and have insufficient financial resources to support themselves. "Need" is defined in the California Welfare and Institutions Code: real property not used as a home (there are no limits on the value of any real or personal property used as a home by the recipient and the latter's spouse may not exceed a county assessed value of \$5,000; property reserves (personal property and real property that is not used as a home or is not yielding income which the recipient can use to meet his needs) may not exceed a net value of \$1,200—or \$2,000 for a married couple living together and both receiving public assistance; legally responsible relatives (spouse or adult children) are not providing adequate support.

The intent of this program as set forth in the Social Security Act (Title IV) is not only to provide financial assistance to aged, needy individuals, but also to "furnish rehabilitation and other services to help individuals . . . to attain or retain capability for self-care . . ." The California Welfare and Institutions Code (Sec. 2005) describes the intent of the Legislature "that employment and self-maintenance of aged persons shall

be encouraged whenever feasible" but that no "pressure shall be exercised to obtain his participation."

The amount of the Old Age Security grant is determined in relation to the individual's need, a standard of minimum need that is set by the state, and the amount of income which is not exempted by law. The standard, in accordance with the California Code, as well as the maximum aid that may be paid, is adjusted as increases occur in the cost of living, and such an adjustment (\$2) will occur effective December 1, 1965. Accordingly, the minimum OAS grant of \$109 per recipient will go to \$111 per month. If the recipient has special needs beyond normal living expenses, he may receive additional allowances to a maximum of \$176 per month. The OAS grant together with the recipient's non-exempt income (the Social Security Act exempts certain income from being deducted in determining the amount of need and in 1965 set this at \$50 per month) may exceed \$176 per month only if certain attendant services are required to enable him to remain in his own home.

During August of 1965, in Los Angeles County, 104,573 recipients of Old Age Security were aided by the Bureau of Public Assistance, and were paid an average grant of \$99. The South Central area contained 15,058 of these recipients; 1,103 of them resided in Watts and the average monthly payment to them also was \$99.

Medical Assistance to the Aged (MAA). This most recent of the public assistance programs derives from 1960 Amendments to the Social Security Act, and became operative in California in 1962. Popularly (or unpopularly in some quarters) known as the Kerr-Mills legislation, the purpose of this program is to furnish medical assistance in behalf of aged individuals who are not recipients of Old Age Security, but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical and hospital services.

Eligibility requirements, like those for OAS, are set forth in the California Welfare and Institutions Code, and are similar to OAS except that there are no residence requirements and income requirements are more liberal. The need is not for meeting usual daily costs of living but for meeting costs of long-term care in a hospital or nursing home that cannot be paid from the recipient's own funds. While 11,467 recipients of this form of assistance are in Los Angeles County and \$261 is the average

payment per recipient, a total of 1,303 MAA recipients live in the South Central area, with 115 residing in Watts. The average payment in their behalf amounts to \$260 per month.

Aid to the Blind (AB). The purpose of the Aid to the Blind program is "to relieve blind persons from the distress of poverty, to promote self-care, to enlarge the economic opportunities of the blind, and to stimulate the blind to greater efforts in striving to render themselves self-supporting." Because the blind frequently are at a disadvantage in the employment market and less likely to earn sufficient money for self-maintenance, the movement for public aid or "pensions" to this group began earlier than for others. Likewise, eligibility requirements and grants traditionally have been somewhat more liberal. Indeed, there is a statutory requirement that Aid to the Blind be administered by a separate division, although this division is within the Bureau of Public Assistance. Approximately 4,500 persons meet the legal definition of blindness and are aided in Los Angeles County by this program. Effective December 1, 1965, the cost-of-living increase for this group will be \$3 per month per recipient, raising the minimum grant to \$130 and the maximum to \$180 per month.

(California also has a supplemental program known as Aid to the Potentially Self-Supporting Blind. As an incentive to those needy blind persons who have a plan for achieving self-support but may be too fearful to launch it without the agency's help, property and income exemptions are even more liberal than for AB. Although there are more than 4,000 such cases in Los Angeles, none was identified as living in the South Central Area. There is no federal participation in this program; costs are met from State and County sources.)

Aid to the Disabled (ATD). Enacted by 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act, this public assistance program did not become operative in California until October, 1957. The intent of the federal legislation is the provision of financial assistance "to needy individuals eighteen years of age and older who are permanently and totally disabled . . . to furnish rehabilitation and other services to help such individuals attain or retain capability for self-support or self-care . . ." (Title XIV). The California Welfare and Institutions Code directs the program to persons

whose dependency results from disability, "to encourage their opportunities for independence." The definition of need is similar to that for OAS; so is eligibility with respect to residence. A major distinction is that eligibility necessitates the presence of a major physical or mental impairment that is unlikely to improve, and as a result of which the individual requires regular care or supervision. Furthermore, whereas eligibility with regard to non-disability factors is determined by the county agency, as is true of the other public assistance programs, the determination of disability is made by the State Department of Social Welfare in all instances of ATD. This fact has particular import for the feelings of many persons who are declared by the County to be ineligible on the basis of the finding of disability made by the State.

The same initial reluctance that the legislature evidenced in delaying the establishment of this program is apparent in the fact that, in contrast to other public assistance programs, the Welfare and Institutions Code for several years specifically stated that the ATD provisions were "not to be liberally construed." And today the amount of assistance that may be given lags behind the other adult aids (OAS, AB, MAA). The standard of need set by the State contains a basic amount for food, clothing, household maintenance, and incidentals; to this is added the cost of shelter to a stipulated maximum with some variations possible, depending on whether the recipient lives alone. The December, 1965 cost-of-living increase for ATD recipients will be \$2 and raises the maximum average grant to \$103.

An average monthly payment of nearly \$104 was paid in August, 1965, to the 29,250 ATD recipients in Los Angeles County. Of these 4,995 were being aided in the South Central Area, with 375 of this number residing in Watts and receiving an average monthly payment of \$101.

AID to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). In California, this program is a descendant of earlier state-county financed programs of aid to children who were orphans or half-orphans, abandoned by the father (known or unknown), or whose father's long-term absence because of imprisonment or hospitalization (tuberculosis or mental illness) deprived them of his support. Since the program's inclusion in the Social Security Act of 1935 (as Aid to Dependent Children, or ADC) its corresponding adoption in the California

Welfare and Institutions Code (where it was known as Aid to Needy Children, and it is still often referred to as ANC), the definition of who is a needy child, and the purpose of the program have both undergone considerable alteration.

As the names imply, the program has moved from a focus on the child to a focus on the family. From financial aid to children who, deprived of paternal support by the father's long-term or permanent absence, should have an opportunity to grow up in a "normal" household where economic assistance would assure that the mother could be present to provide the children with care, it has been expanded to include children deprived of support by either parent under specified conditions. From emphasis upon enabling the mother to remain at home with her children, it has turned the spotlight on encouraging her, when feasible, to enter the labor force and leave the care of the children to others. From insistence upon aiding the child only in his own home, or the home of certain relatives, there has been a shift to recognition that the own home is sometimes inimical to the child's welfare and that an out-of-home placement might be desirable in the interest of the child—to an institution, or on court order to a foster family home, or into foster family care without a court order (although for the latter there is no federal funding). Each change has been in response to altered conditions in today's socio-economic climate and our expanding knowledge about the importance of the family to the child and to our society: Children's emotional deprivation can be devastating if either parent is out of the home; mothers in non-needy families do work; foster parents often can give a child the love and care denied him in the parental home; fathers are unemployed for reasons they are not always able to control and even if one is unemployed, the family is better served—as is society—if he remains in the home rather than resorting to desertion to assure the family of economic help.

Today, AFDC may be available to a family with a related child who is in need because the child has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of death, physical or mental incapacity, continued absence from the home or unemployment of his parent. In actuality, as was noted earlier, the OASDI program has been very effective in providing for the needs of orphaned children of parents who had been in covered employment. In 1942, nation-

wide, more than 36% of the children receiving public assistance were orphans. In late 1941, the proportion had dropped to 6.5%—a proportion that held both for white and Negro children. This is of particular interest in light of these facts: the proportion of orphans in the total population of the nation has been dropping steadily (from about 9% in 1942 to 4.4% in January of 1963), but the number in the latter period is larger. Approximately two and three-quarter million children were receiving OASDI benefits (some as children of disabled or retired parents) at the beginning of 1965, while at the same point in time nearly three and a quarter million children were receiving AFDC. A sharp increase had appeared in 1958 in the number of children served by either of these two programs. Another marked increase occurred in 1960, and, since then, there has been a steady rise in both OASDI and AFDC child beneficiaries and recipients. The same pattern has been evidenced in California without taking into consideration the cases that are aided because the family head is unemployed—a program that became operative in California only February, 1964. And the same pattern is discernible in Los Angeles County.

During the month of August, 1965, the Bureau of Public Assistance extended AFDC to 174,190 persons in families in which there was no employed head, and to 21,772 in families with an unemployed male head—a total of 195,962 persons, or approximately 40% of the total California AFDC caseload. A distinction is made between the two groups (AFDC-FG for Aid to Families with Dependent Children—Family Group; AFDC-U for Aid to Families with Dependent Children—Unemployed) because, among other reasons, the latter program is to expire in 1967 per the federal legislation, and some legal differences exist in eligibility factors and handling.

The South Central Area in August, 1965, accounted for 36% of the AFDC-FG recipients in Los Angeles County, and 30% of the AFDC-U recipients. Ten percent of the County's AFDC-FG recipients, or 18,600, were in Watts. The proportion of the County's AFDC-U recipients in Watts was slightly less in August—nine percent, or 2,050. Yet the total South Central Area population is less than ten percent of the population of Los Angeles County. This over concentration of AFDC-FG and AFDC-U cases in South Central and in Watts is

an important index not only to levels of income of these families, and the prevalence of family breakdown, but also to the fact that the adult members of these families have had insufficient coverage (or none) under the social insurances when they have been, if ever, attached to the labor force. This gap may be affecting them not only now, but it will have some influence upon their ability to maintain themselves and their dependents in the future.

According to state law, eligibility for AFDC may be present: if income to the child or family is insufficient to meet the minimum standards of adequate care as defined by the State Department of Social Welfare; if certain property limits are not exceeded (these are lower than for the adult aids); if there is state residence (one year preceding the date of application if the child was not born in California).

Certain eligibility conditions are stressed in the state law: absent parents must be located and responsibility to support the children enforced; disabled parents are to be helped toward restoration of self-support; effort must be directed toward employment of parents able to work; participation of unemployed parents in work experience in public agencies or training to improve capacity for self-support; and children over 16, who are physically able to do so, must attend school or vocational training regularly or be employed and helping support the family.

The amount of assistance is computed on a cost schedule developed by the State Department of Social Welfare and based on the number of children in the home, and whether there are one or two eligible parents. (This will be considered in some detail in Part II.) The Welfare and Institutions Code (Sec. 1511) specifies maxima. During August of 1965, the average payment per recipient in Watts was \$43 if the case were AFDC-FG; this figure is within a few cents of the county-wide average payment for this type of aid. The average payment to AFDC-U recipients in Watts was \$35, whereas the county-wide average in August was \$38.

General Relief (GR). Unlike the categories of public assistance enumerated above, General Relief (sometimes also known as General Assistance) is not mentioned in the Social Security Act. It is financed in Los Angeles County, entirely from county property taxes, and authority for the scope and nature of the program rests with the County's Board of Supervisors. Their policies with

regard to General Assistance are contained in the ordinances comprising the Administrative Code of the County.

Those aided in the General Relief program are families and individuals who for various reasons are not eligible to receive one of the federally-aided categories of assistance—often because residence requirements for categorical aid cannot be met, or the degree of disability precludes ATD. In contrast to the categorical aids (OAS, AB, MAA, ATD, AFDC), General Relief in theory purports to deal with short-term or emergency assistance, but in fact many require such aid for long periods of time. The definition of need with regard to General Relief is much more restrictive than for other aids: an interest in real property with an assessed valuation of \$2,500 or more is disqualifying (and if aid is given to a property owner, a mortgage lien generally is procured); "diligent investigation" must be undertaken to determine if there are relatives with legal responsibility to support an applicant for General Relief; personal property limits are far lower than in any of the other aids. Residence is an important factor, and certain conditions must be met if a non-resident is to be aided. The total of monthly public assistance in this program, "together with all other income for any family or person . . . may not exceed the sum of \$173 per month." (Sec. 150.49 Ord No. 4039). This limitation originally derived from the principle that no recipient of county aid should have a grant that is more than five dollars per month above the wage of the lowest paid county employee—but the lowest county salaries have long since outstripped the above ceiling.

The General Relief program still closely resembles the early Poor Laws of several centuries ago in its retention of localism, relative responsibility, pauper's oath, residence requirements, lesser eligibility, and, frequently, issuance of assistance in non-cash forms.

Of the 2,567 persons who received General Relief in Los Angeles County in the month of August, 1965, 787 lived in the South Central area—86 residing in Watts and receiving the same average grant of \$35 for the month as was true county-wide. Approximately 9,000 other persons in the County were granted temporary emergency aid in the month of August. The total payments for General Relief in the County exceeded \$490,000 in that month.

CHILD WELFARE SERVICES

The primary purpose of child welfare services is to prevent, remedy, or assist in solving problems that result in inadequate care, neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children. To carry out this objective the Bureau of Public Assistance, through its Division of Child Welfare Services, has responsibility for the placement of children who need to be removed from their own homes, or have no homes. Such placements may be in foster families or institutions for short or long-term care; efforts may be directed toward the reestablishment of the home; or referral for adoptive placement, may be made (to the Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, which is also a Bureau within the framework of the County Department of Charities.) The children may or may not be from AFDC families. If they are AFDC children placed under court order, in accordance with the Social Security Act, there may be federal financial participation; if the needed placement is made on another basis, the state and county share the costs in the absence of federal reimbursement. Approximately 6,000 children are being aided under the AFDC-BIH program (Boarding Homes and Institutions); about 1,500 of these are in the South Central Area. The other child welfare service activities are financed by child welfare service funds under Title V of the Social Security Act.

COMMUNITY WORK AND TRAINING PROGRAM

The Bureau of Public Assistance, for a number of years, has had a work projects program for recipients of General Relief; it also has had an employment program for job placements of employable aid recipients. The Social Security Act, in broadening the definition of a needy child to include—until June 30, 1967—one who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of unemployment, stipulates that there must be various provisions (including cooperative arrangements with public employment offices) "looking toward employment of the unemployed parents of such children," and for denying aid to the parent who without good cause declines either to accept employment "in which he is able to engage" or retraining if he is "capable of being retrained." (Sec. 407.) Consequently, the Community Work and Training Program was established in 1964 as an es-

ential adjunct to AFDC-U; it also incorporated the previously existing work-related functions.

For the year ending June, 1965, according to the report of the Bureau Director to the Governor's Commission on the Watts Riots, a monthly average of 5,215 AFDC and GR recipients were involved in some activity of the Community Work and Training Program ("pre-conditioning," on-the-job training, educational services program, or some combination of these); during the same year, an average of 436 recipients were placed in jobs each month. Nearly half of the participants in the Community Work and Training Program came from the South Central Area; however, only 22% of the job placements made each month by this Program's special staff were for residents of the South Central Area.

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXTENDING WELFARE SERVICES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

In Los Angeles County, primary responsibility is lodged with the Bureau of Public Assistance for extending financial assistance and related social services to the economically disadvantaged. While an area office of the State Department of Social Welfare is located in Los Angeles, its relationship to the Bureau of Public Assistance is supervisory—as is true for all eleven southern counties of the state—and no direct service is given to applicants or recipients of aid by the State Department of Social Welfare with respect to the taking, processing, decision-making, or granting of public assistance. (This relationship will be discussed in II.) And, while certain voluntary United Way-supported or other community-supported or church-supported organizations offer some financial assistance to some families or individuals, this generally is for the purpose of meeting special needs or emergencies and, even then, usually on a limited basis. Traditionally, and in fact, it is ordinarily expected that those in financial need will apply to the Bureau of Public Assistance.

The Bureau covers the entire 4,000 square miles of the County of Los Angeles, with its 75 incorporated cities, its many unincorporated areas, and a population in excess of six million persons—more than the total populations to be found in any of 43 states. Of the 6,172 persons employed in the Bureau to carry out its county-wide responsibilities,

about 3,000 are social work personnel engaged in giving direct service to applicants and recipients.

SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY

In addition to the six public assistance programs, child welfare services, and Work and Community Training Program, the Bureau has responsibility for certain other activities: home-finding and licensing with regard to foster home placement of children, recruitment and licensing of family day care homes, licensing of boarding homes for all aged, protective services for children, public assistance medical care, and various kinds of demonstrations that are funded with State and Federal monies and deal with special services for unmarried minor mothers, counseling school dropouts, community organization activities in deprived communities, and others. Some of these public assistance demonstration activities are conducted in conjunction with other community agencies, and some are contained entirely within the framework of the Bureau. A new service is just being initiated within the Bureau: The Food Stamp Program will be operable in December of 1965, both for public assistance recipients and non-recipients with low income.

SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

The Bureau's authority to carry on its activities obtains from several sources, but primarily from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. This is the administrative unit responsible for governmental operations in the County, including welfare activities. Its policies are incorporated in the Administrative Code for the County, and these, together with decisions of the Board and the policies and regulations which channel through the State Department of Social Welfare from the State Welfare and Institutions Code and the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, comprise the Bureau's operating directives.

The Bureau of Public Assistance is one of several bureaus within the Department of Charities, which also contains the Bureau of Hospitals (eight large hospitals and two specialized facilities), and various service bureaus focused, respectively, on adoptions, medical social service, physically handicapped children, licensing, and collections. The position of Superintendent of Charities is defined in the Charter of Los Angeles County, and his functions and the degree of his authority are

determined by the Board of Supervisors and described in the Administration Code.

A reorganization, effective November 1, 1965, provides for two assistant superintendent positions: one will have responsibility for the administration of the Bureau of Hospitals; the other will have responsibility for all welfare activities in the Department of Charities—the Bureaus enumerated above as well as the Bureau of Public Assistance. The present director of the Bureau of Public Assistance will assume the new and broader role; the present assistant director of the Bureau of Public Assistance will act as director of the Bureau of Public Assistance, and be responsible directly to the new Assistant Superintendent. Except to lodge in one administrative person the responsibility for the various welfare functions in the Department of Charities, thereby injecting another high level in the administrative hierarchy, this change in structure is not contemplated as having much effect on Bureau of Public Assistance operation.

Superintendent of Charities	Wesley Hospital
Assistant Superintendent	Rancho Los Amigos Hospital
Assistant Superintendent	Mira Loma Hospital
Superintendent Bureau of Public Assistance	Acton Rehabilitation Center
Adoptions	Harbor General Hospital
Medical Social Service	Olive View Hospital
Physically Handicapped Children	Long Beach Central Hospital
Resources and Collections	Long Beach El Cerrito Hospital
Licensing	
L.A. County Hospital	Warm Spring Camp

BUREAU DIVISIONS

The Bureau of Public Assistance operates through seven major divisions:

The District Division comprises fourteen district and thirteen branch offices through which most of the various assistances (AFDC, OAS, MAA, ATD, and GR) are extended.

The Division for the Blind, in accordance with a statutory requirement that AB be administered by a separate division, serves recipients in four area offices.

The Division of Child Welfare Services is responsible for assistance and placement of children who need care outside their own home, for recruitment and licensing of twenty-four hour and day care family homes, and homemaker services. The services of this Division are administered from thirteen offices.

The Medical Care Division has responsibility for all aspects of the Public Assistance Medical Care Program, through which medical services to recipients are provided by physicians, dentists, druggists, rehabilitation facilities, etc., who are paid for these services directly by the County.

The Training Division has responsibility for induction, in-service training, and other staff development activities with regard to all Bureau staff.

The Rehabilitation Employment Services Division includes the previously mentioned Community Work and Training Program.

To the Administrative Services Division falls the responsibility for budgeting; fiscal controls of various kinds—including preparation of assistance payrolls; personnel; accounting and data processing; administrative research and statistics.

DISTRICT OFFICES AND BUREAU ADMINISTRATION

Fourteen district offices and thirteen branch, or sub-offices, of the district offices serve the various geographic areas in the County. Each district office is administered by a District Director, who is administratively responsible to the Director of Districts but turns for program supervision to whichever of three Deputy Directors carries responsibility for a specific program: OAS, ATD, MAA, and AB; or AFDC, GR, and Child Welfare; or Rehabilitation and Employment, demonstration projects, Economic Opportunity Act activities, and Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act. The Director of Districts, in turn, is responsible directly to the Bureau Director.

In terms of line supervision, then, the District Director is three levels removed from the Director of the Bureau: between them are the Director of Districts—with equal responsibility for line supervision of all districts—and the Assistant Director of the Bureau. With the November shift to a line responsibility of an Assistant Superintendent of Charities, there will be four levels. In

terms of staff supervision, the District Director relates directly to three Program Deputy Directors as well as to the Director of Medical Care and the Director of Training; and some administrative control emanates from the Director of Administrative Services. It is readily apparent that this arrangement does not lead to a high degree of uniformity in operation among districts; nor does it facilitate a reasonably effective degree of control in policy interpretation and implementation.

DISTRICT OFFICE REORGANIZATION

Each district office functions with a high degree of autonomy, some of it delegated, and some of it merely acquired by reason of the complexity of the program and of the administrative relationships. Patterns of organization vary by districts, but in certain respects they are similar. Each has a District Director. Each also has had one or more Assistant District Directors, depending on the size of workload and staff. But some reorganization in this regard is now in process of implementation. This calls for the appointment in each district of a Deputy District Director—a position next in line to that of the District Director, and higher in classification than the former assistant position. The latter are being retitled Program Supervisors and are responsible for specific aspects of district functions, such as AFDC-GR, or intake, or sub-office or branch operations. The line supervisors—each generally supervising five, but sometimes more, social workers—report to the designated Program Supervisor.

Generally, the districts have separate units of staff—usually a supervisor with five workers and a clerk—handling intake functions and approved functions (that is, there has been a determination that eligibility exists, and monthly or semi-monthly aid payments are being made). Clerical arrangements vary with districts: some operate with a central pool, and others assign clerical personnel to particular units or functions. Supportive clerical, budget, and transcribing services usually are in separate units. Administrative services—personnel, accounting, check-writing, etc.—are provided from the Administrative Services Division.

By and large, the extent to which authority and responsibility are delegated within a district to personnel with particular classifications and functions, is at the discretion of the District Director.

Policy is established for most of the programs under the laws and regulations set by the State, or, for County-financed programs like GR, by the Board of Supervisors' enactments and the regulations issued by the Director of the Bureau. Manuals of policy and procedures, as issued by the State Department of Social Welfare and/or adapted by the Bureau Director for County use, as well as those developed within the Bureau for local operation, are available in every district office and in every branch office. So, too, are State and County interpretative and instructional memoranda and bulletins. But the district personnel, in large measure, are guided by the interpretation placed on these by the District Director, and the procedures followed in the Districts, to a considerable degree, derive from such interpretations.

Not all districts have all programs and functions. Volume has been a determining factor in two areas having separate districts for particular aids. Thus, Metro South II, which covers the same geographic area as Metro South I, has only the adult aids (MAA and OAS). Similarly, Southeast II, which is geographically congruent with Southeast I, has the adult aids in that area, while the other programs are concentrated in Southeast I. Metro South I not only has AFDC and GR, but also ATD and single men's cases.

Most of the districts house staff from the Child Welfare Services Division; these employees report to their own Division for supervision. Located in districts, however, are special staff responsible to the district for functions like special or fraud investigation, failure to provide, employment counseling, appeals.

OFFICES SERVING SOUTH CENTRAL AREA

The Watts Riot Area has been served chiefly by two districts: Metro South I and Southeast I. The latter, located in Bell, also has operated two branches, one in Bellflower and one in Compton. Early in 1965, as part of Demonstration Project 220, an out-stationed unit of one supervisor and five workers and a clerk was placed in Jordan Downs Housing Project; a second unit of staff was added later in response to the values already demonstrated by Project 220 but not as part of it. The intake functions for the outstationed units and for the branches were retained in the Bell of-

fice, but within the last month the two branches have begun to handle intake functions also.

Metro South I is housed in the Welfare Services Building near Adams on Grand Avenue in Los Angeles. An out-stationed unit, part of Project 220, was placed in Pueblo del Rio Housing Project in April, 1965. Metro South II also is in the Welfare Services Building, while Southeast II provides adult aid services in the Southeast I area but is located elsewhere in Bell.

Prior to the riots, plans had been initiated to add three offices in the South Central Area, but these are not scheduled to be available before 1967. And prior to the riots, there had been many demonstration projects and specialized services which brought some intensive help to the South Central area: Homemaker Services, training of Home Aides, work with children in danger of neglect, special help to employable mothers, etc. Such special services have been in addition to the range of public assistance services existing county-wide: GR, OAS, AFDC-U, AFDC-FG, AFDC-BHI, MAA, AB, Child Welfare Services, Community Work and Training.

But as was so dramatically evidenced by the fact of the Watts Riots: that such services exist cannot be taken to mean that they are really either available or accessible.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS

It was not intended that the preceding section of this report would present a comprehensive picture of the complex public welfare programs and the equally complex structure through which they are administered in the County of Los Angeles, and, more specifically, in the South Central Area that encompasses the Watts Riots Area. It did endeavor to sharpen awareness of some of the elements that have contributed to the creation of public social services as we know them today—traditional attitudes; economic and social climate; political relationships and interactions of federal, state, and local organizations having the same ultimate objective: to help people toward self-care and self-support through money payments, work training, medical care, and various other social service activities. It did not attempt to delineate the many policies that either encourage or discourage the extension of certain forms of help to needy persons; nor did it try to emphasize either the degree of success (and there is much) of these programs

designed to help needy persons, or the extent of failure (and there is much) of the public welfare system in helping people to reach a better level of social and economic functioning.

Section I did aim (1) to show the legal and quasi-legal fashion in which programs and structure—policies and procedures—categorize groups of needy persons; they are "aged," "disabled," "unemployed," "blind," "medically" indigent, children in families that fall within certain definitions, resident or non-resident, etc.; and (2) to imply that somewhere within this massive system the needy person as an individual human being, and the family as a particular family of human beings with feelings for and about each other and about their appropriate and/or possible role in the wider community, have been merged into an anonymous monolith which even the most dedicated and empathetic social worker or welfare administrator finds difficult to reduce to its component elements.

It is the intent of this segment of the report to focus attention on certain factors that influence the effectiveness of the public welfare organization in achieving its stated twin goals to help economically needy persons with the funds essential for basic maintenance, and to undertake and facilitate social and economic rehabilitation directed toward their achievement of self-care, self-support, and strengthened family life. Again, no attempt has been made to be exhaustive in identifying all—or even most—of the elements that warrant consideration, either within the public welfare organization, or within the disadvantaged communities it purports to serve, with their acute and pervasive problems associated with urban ghettos, ethnicity, mobility, rural origins and adaptations, family life patterns and attitudes, etc.

The factors presented here affect more than an occasional person; they reflect the "rule" rather than the "exception." Some are contained in Federal and State laws and regulations governing public assistance. Some are in the means used to implement these, or in the interpretations placed upon them. Some obtain either from state or county or district organizational and operational arrangements, and some from either the kinds of personnel employed, or the kinds of tasks assigned them, or the conditions under which they are expected to work. Others have to do with real or psychologically-inferred treatment of clients—and with the general and spe-

cific characteristics of the clientele and the relationship of these to the expectations, even demands, of those responsible for policy development and implementation and/or financing of public welfare.

Many of the factors selected for reporting here influence the county-wide program of public welfare, but the effects of some are particularly heightened by the heavy concentration of certain kinds of social and economic problems in an area such as South Central, which encompasses the Watts Riot Area. And, certainly, not all of them are amenable to modification. However, whether they are or not, they need to be recognized for what they are and because they do in fact have an impact both on the person who turns to the Bureau of Public Assistance for aid and on the personnel charged with the responsibility for administering the assistance programs.

The Charges and Expectations

There is a rampant impression among many clients, employees of State and County welfare agencies, ministers and other community leaders that the public assistance program is restrictive, that applicants and recipients are treated harshly and discriminatorily, that more effort is directed toward establishing ineligibility than in helping the needy to aid that is their right, and that there are other practices of like vein that conspire to deny any or enough aid to the needy, that reduce the client's self esteem to a degree that robs him of desire or opportunity to gain or regain a role as a contributing member of society, etc.

At the same time, there is considerable criticism on the part of lawmakers, tax-paying citizens at large, and others—again including staff of these agencies, ministers, and other community leaders—that the high rate of illegitimacy among recipients of assistance, the large proportion of recipient families that are broken by parental desertion or divorce or incarceration in penal institutions or hospitals for the mentally ill, and the number of seemingly employable fathers and mothers in assistance families is evidence that the public assistance laws encourage illegitimacy and other forms of social deviance, and that they serve to perpetuate dependency from one generation to another.

What is the truth? It is a fact that neither side can be supported—but neither can either side be completely refuted. For the evidence does show re-

strictive and seemingly punitive practices, harsh and discriminatory treatment, demoralizing procedures; it does show a rising rate of illegitimacy, of broken families, of unemployed "employable" parents, of severe psychopathology.

But it also shows some other things: One is that there is a widespread belief that public welfare programs should put an end to certain large-scale social problems and that they will succeed in doing so only if the policies which govern them are so designed and delimited that only the most worthy can hurdle the deterring obstacles and, even then, their success must be constantly scrutinized to be sure they are not exploiting an unwitting public for their own selfish purposes. Consequently, the intent and application of some policies, designed to achieve the stated objectives of the public welfare program with regard to individuals rather than society, may be distorted by some special groups: taxpayers anxious to keep the tax rate down and/or imbued with traditional stereotypes about "welfare recipients;" elected public officials who are responsive to their taxpaying constituents; administrators who, whether or not they are influenced by deeply entrenched societal attitudes about dependency, capitulate to the pressures exerted by officials, taxpayers, and others to limit expenditure of local funds; and some personnel, whose educational and experiential preparation for working with troubled and deprived and difficult families may be limited, and whose own beliefs about needy people parallel those in the community at large and are further reinforced by the restrictive or overly-controlling attitudes of those from whom they receive direction.

Another is that the distortions contribute to the first group of impressions mentioned above, and that analysis of the complaints and inquiries by and in behalf of applicants and recipients bears out the fact that there are many elements that impede the attainment of the very goals sought both by those who object to "liberality" and those who oppose "restriction."

It should be noted that the actual number of client complaints tabulated by state and other sources, though numerically large and indicative of serious problems in the extension of public assistance in Los Angeles County, reflects a minute proportion of the total number of persons aided. Granted that many people suffer in silence, that some are not as aggressive or as vocal or have as

many interceding friends as others, and granted that some people with or without justification must always make their feelings known to someone "higher up," these figures are nevertheless significant: During the month of August, 1965, the Bureau of Public Assistance was aiding nearly 50,000 AFDC families on a continuous basis in the County. The Southeast I and the Metro South I Districts, which together encompass the Watts Riot Area, in August of 1965 carried in excess of 30,000 cases on a continuing basis (with more than 20,000 of these consisting of families) and had registered over 2,000 applications for either AFDC or GR. For the three and a half months to mid-October, a total of 480 complaints had been made against the Bureau of Public Assistance. By far the largest numbers were directed against Southeast I and Metro South I, for a total of 321. But whether taken together or separately, and without adjusting for any differences by month, or a larger proportion against Southeast I, these represent but one per cent either of the County-wide family case loads, or of the family case loads in these two districts. However, they cannot serve as an index to the numbers who have sought assistance unsuccessfully.

The South Central Area Clientele

Because the objective of the public assistance programs are geared to helping individuals and families, any consideration of the factors affecting the achievement of the objectives should take into account some of the characteristics of the families being aided.

Family Composition. A special survey was conducted in October of 1965 by the Southeast I and Metro South I districts, of approximately 1,200 AFDC families living in the "curfew" area. The sample did not distinguish between the two major forms of AFDC (Family Groups and Unemployed), but was representative of the whole. It disclosed an average per family of 3.6 children under 20 years of age, compared to an average of 2.9 children per family among AFDC families in the entire county. There were one or more illegitimate children in 69% of the families surveyed in the South Central Area, a figure that also was higher than the county-wide AFDC average of 56%. Neither the South Central Area study, nor the State Department of Social Welfare in its publication, "Characteristics of Recipients of Aid to Needy Children, July, 1962," in using the designation "illegitimate," distinguished between children born of casual relationships or long-standing

stable relationships. The former did note that the mothers are not and never had been married in 38% of the South Central Area families surveyed; the State agency attributed this single status to 10% of the mothers reported in the 1962 county-wide study.

Parents in the Home. In 95% of the South Central Area families the mother was in the home; fathers lived in the homes in 9%. In both instances, the proportions were higher than the county-wide AFDC experience reported for 1962, when 91% of the mothers were in the home with the children, and only 7% of the fathers were. It is not possible to know whether the difference in the latter was affected by the subsequent inception of the AFDC-U program in California; in 1962 the aided fathers were disabled and unemployable. It is of tremendous importance, however, that so few of the aided children are in homes with both parents. Other, national, studies have remarked on the fact that only a minority of Negro children under 18 have lived all their lives with both parents. This pattern seems likely to hold in the South Central Area also and is a point of considerable significance because Negro children—boys, especially—are deprived of a necessary opportunity to identify with a masculine figure who works and has value in the family group.

Parents' Ages. The range in ages of the mothers showed some difference between the South Central Area clients in 1965 and the county-wide client group in 1962. The former, on the whole, are a younger group, with 10% of the mothers under 21 years of age (6% in 1962) and 53% over 30 (62% in 1962). The South Central Area fathers fell into two groups: 22% were between 21 and 30 years of age, and 73% were over 30. (No 1962 data were available for comparison on this point.) How educable are these young mothers and these fathers over 30?

Ethnicity. Ninety-two per cent of the South Central Area recipients were Negro, with the balance evenly divided among Mexican-American and Anglo-American. The county-wide study had shown a Negro recipient ratio of 47%, with the Mexican-Americans accounting for 24%, and the Anglo-Americans for 28%.

Residence. A relatively small proportion of the South Central Area mothers had been in Los Angeles less than five years—15%, compared with 19% of the fathers. Sixteen per cent of the mothers were born in Los Angeles, as were five

per cent of the fathers. By far the largest proportion of each—43% of the mothers, and 47% of the fathers—had been in Los Angeles for ten or more years. And by far, the largest proportion of those not born in Los Angeles had come from Southern states and South Central states: 72%. The implications of this for necessary adjustments from rural to urban patterns of living and working are self-evident.

Property. Although the 1962 study showed that 1.8% of AFDC recipient families in Los Angeles County owned real property, less than 1% in the South Central Area do. Data were not available concerning personal property that might be owned by South Central Area recipients, but it is estimated that the proportions would fall below the 1962 findings which showed 10% of the county-wide caseload owning cars, two per cent with life insurance policies, and less than one per cent possessing cash or securities—with 60% of the personal property valued at less than \$150.

Other Characteristics. The 1962 and the 1965 studies cited above shed no light on certain other characteristics of the South Central Area residents that have particular implications for the kinds of services that would help them to strengthen family life. But based on some of the writer's interviews, certain questions can be appropriately raised. To what extent do these recipients rely on the use of credit as a means of augmenting their assistance grants or gratifying their desires for merchandise that they could otherwise not have? To what extent are they so in debt that, in effect, they must continue to use their credit sources in order to keep "their heads above water"? There is reason to believe that the use of credit for daily necessities is widely practiced and accounts for the fact that some AFDC recipients feel compelled to cash their semi-monthly checks in the establishments of the credit-grantor, who is both assured of some continuous profit from purchases made in the check-cashing process and keeps alert to the capacity of the consumer to reduce his bill.

There likewise is reason to believe that because their credit capacity is questioned in some quarters, many recipients find it convenient to cash their assistance checks in certain markets (particularly in the Watts area). They are expected to purchase some merchandise in exchange for the cashing "privilege." It is not uncommon for recipients in this area to complain that on "check days"—the first and fifteenth

of the month—these merchandisers (especially if they are part of a chain) take advantage of the recipients by "moving" damaged cans, and meat and produce that have lost their freshness in other localities; but the prices are not reduced accordingly.

High Motivation. No definitive data are available about the kinds of problems posed in the South Central Area AFDC families, but a wide array of health and social problems have been evident. From the standpoint of potential for these families to utilize public social services, they may be classified in three fairly general groups: One contains adults who are highly motivated toward economic independence and want and need to help to utilize their interest and capacity productively. Many of these either already have been, or are being helped to make this wish known. Nor do all public assistance workers possess either the opportunity or knowledge or inclination to test the presence of such motivation and capacity. Mr. Thompson is an example of one who had seven successive public assistance workers before such help was forthcoming.

Jim Thompson had been on a Community Work and Training assignment in a park department for two days, performing his manual labor tasks with such ferocious energy that the supervisor urged him to slow down to avoid collapsing from sheer physical exhaustion. "No," Mr. Thompson replied, "This is my first chance in five years at a steady job; I can't stand to miff it!"

This 43 year old Negro father of four children had remained in California after an honorable discharge from the Army, sure that here his opportunities for employment for himself and education for his children were superior to those of the eastern seaboard slums where he had been reared, one of six children in a "relief" family. So that "welfare" would not be his way of life, he worked—as a laundry helper, as a bus boy, as a janitor. Each job ended for him because mechanical means were employed to perform the necessary tasks. He went from odd job to odd job, his Unemployment Insurance Benefits long since exhausted, and building up no credits for additional coverage. Two years ago, his wife nervously ill, his children hungry, his hope dissipated, he applied for AFDC-U. He was beset with abdominal pains whenever the public assistance worker talked with him—in a routine and perfunctory fashion—about what efforts he was making to seek

work; he followed, half-heartedly, various leads the employment worker offered, and never was surprised to find he was not hired.

Mr. Thompson's case was transferred to another worker—the eighth. This one asked Mr. Thompson about his plans, about his hopes for himself and for his family, encouraged him to use the work project as a stepping-stone to being again the respected head of his family. The worker and the client agreed that here was new opportunity: Mr. Thompson seized it. "She respected me," he said, "and I began to respect myself."

Motivation and Limited Capacity. A second group of AFDC families contains persons who may be motivated toward self-care and self-support, but whose intellectual or emotional or physical capacity—or other circumstances like illness of a spouse or child, or children requiring maternal supervision and presence—limit their prospects for obtaining and retaining work at a wage sufficient to meet the family's economic needs. Such families may require both financial and psychological support in order to enable the employed person to carry his responsibilities with some satisfaction to himself that he is at least partially self-supporting; and with some satisfaction to the agency that he is functioning to the limit of his capacity, that he is setting a healthier social and economic pattern for his children, and that the cost of supplementation and service probably is less than full maintenance.

Mr. Jonson has a pattern of deserting his family of four children, ages 3 to 11, and their mother, to whom he has never been married. (She had been married briefly in Louisiana and not divorced.) The desertions occurred during the successive pregnancies, and Mr. Jonson would subsequently return and resume support of the family. He had left school in the fourth grade, having barely learned to read and write. His only steady work has been as a car washer, earning \$1.50 per hour. Vocational tests have indicated little capacity for learning any skill or trade; he has difficulty in following instructions, but once he comprehends them, he works assiduously.

Holding Operations. A third group of AFDC families contains those who, measured by even the widest range of "normal" standards, are severely damaged socially and/or psychologically and who are not very amenable to improve-

ment by known methods, psychiatric or other. The best one can hope for with regard to them is to keep the situation from deteriorating and to endeavor to help the children acquire the kinds of strengths they need to grow into reasonably well functioning adults. Each family in this group requires a special and differential approach and the availability of a high degree of professional skill. It is not really known how many such families are in the South Central Area caseloads, for there has been little opportunity for much other than guessing rather than carefully assessing. An example is Mrs. Denver, the mother of nine children ranging from 3 to 16 years of age.

She has never known her own father; she believes her mother maintained herself and Mrs. Denver and two younger children by "livin' around" and "odd jobs." Mrs. Denver, twice admitted to a State hospital with severe mental illness, had her first child when she was 13; that girl is now 16, unmarried and pregnant, excluded from school and from the AFDC budget because she is not in school. Two boys are considered to be delinquent. Their fathers are unknown, as are the fathers of two other children. Mr. Denver had deserted fourteen years ago; he has not been heard from since. She is casual about her daughter's pregnancy per se, but angry that she is not aided. The girl, however, is upset, not only because she adds to the already heavy strain of the family's management on a "small crumb," but because of the unwanted pregnancy.

On the surface, this third-generation out-of-wedlock pregnancy confirms the prevalent community attitude that this is a "hopeless" situation; yet strong clues are present to indicate that at least this girl would be responsive now to some overtures of help, and that this seriously disturbed mother—who gives her children much love and very little else—could be helped not only to maintain her own status quo, but also to encourage the other children in establishing a constructive relationship with the public assistance worker.

The Public Assistance Workers

How well equipped and motivated and encouraged are the public assistance workers to invest in these clients the agency time and money, and their own interest and energy, in proffering the kind of help that might be used productively by the AFDC recipients?

It is significant that only about 4% of the approximately 3,000 social work positions in the Bureau of Public Assistance are filled with persons who have professional education specific to the field of social work. The proportion of these assigned to the two districts serving the South Central Area is relatively small—and smaller in Southeast I, from which the Watts community is served.

Turnover in social work personnel, with or without social work training, is higher in these two districts than the relatively high county-wide rate. For the fiscal year ending in June of 1965, the rate for the County was more than 35%; in Metro South I it was closer to 40%, and in Southeast I, it was nearly 44%.

Backgrounds. The replacements tend to come from educational backgrounds that only in relatively small proportion are related to the field of social work. In a group of 592 family public assistance workers and supervisors who, in 1963, participated in a special in-service training program on mental health concepts for public assistance workers, 1.2% had masters' degrees in social work, approximately 6% more had had some social work education. While 10% of the others indicated they had had some undergraduate pre-social work majors, a high proportion of the balance came from business administration, theater arts, languages, humanities, sciences, law, etc. Their prior work experience, too, (if any—13% had none) in large measure was in unrelated fields: accounting, law enforcement, newspaper editing, clerical, etc. More than a fourth had been with the BPA less than a year; about 40 per cent had been employed by the Bureau for at least four years.

The diversity in educational and experiential backgrounds brought by much new staff to the BPA's complex structure and demanding assignments with families who present so many complicated problems, is highly significant not only from the standpoint of the kind of in-service training needs that must be met by the agency, but also because these people in large measure are also carriers of the societal attitudes built on traditional values and expectations and stereotypes, and, naturally, begin to function on their jobs in relation to these.

What are these attitudes?

Attitudes. In December of 1964, the American Institute of Public Opinion

released a report on attitudes among "conservatives" and "liberals" with regard to poverty. The survey results showed that those who identify themselves as conservatives tend to blame "lack of individual effort" as the major cause of poverty. Those who identify themselves as liberals are more often likely to blame "circumstances beyond the individual's control." But approximately the same proportion attributed poverty both to lack of effort and circumstances—and a remarkably small percentage expressed no opinion.

The nationwide results, without reference to political views, showed the following: lack of effort, 30%; circumstances, 34%; both, 34%. This clear conviction of 30% that lack of effort is to blame if a person is poor, plus the 34% who believe lack of effort to be at least partly to blame, is a strong reminder of the continued impact of eighteenth and nineteenth century attitudes about the "worthless poor," and a denial (or ignorance) of today's knowledge about human behavior and the reciprocal relationships of such behavior and the social and economic climate in which it is manifest. It adds credence to the complaint of the sporadically employed and unskilled and illiterate separated father of four children, to whose support he was contributing \$18 of the \$30 per week he was averaging as a day laborer, that the public assistance worker told him to "go out and get a job and support those kids!" It adds credence to the hostility of this Watts AFDC family:

Mrs. Miller's husband was recently committed to a State hospital as mentally ill, and Mrs. Miller's 55-year-old mother moved into the home with Mrs. Miller and the four children under eight years of age. The public assistance worker announced to Mrs. Miller that now that the husband was out of the home, she could work. Mrs. Miller had never worked outside her home, and was at a loss as to how to proceed to find either supervision for the children or a job for herself. To the worker's suggestion that the grandmother care for them, Mrs. Miller replied that her mother went daily from Watts to Beverly Hills to do domestic work. The worker proposed that Mrs. Miller find a night job so that the grandmother could care for the children after she returned from her work. When Mrs. Miller protested that the care of active children would be too much for an older woman who worked hard and

spent four hours minimum in going back and forth to her eight hours of work, and that, further, what kind of work could Mrs. Miller do at night, the worker, according to the client, responded with, "If you wanted to be self-supporting, you would be."

It should not be inferred from these illustrations that all public assistance workers in the District covering the South Central Area either hold such attitudes when they are first employed, or that they persist in these convictions. The evaluation of the aforementioned training activity in mental health disclosed that this single intensive training project in itself had affected, positively, the attitudes and performance of more than 70% of the participants.

However, if the employee is supervised by a staff member whose perspective is myopic, or conforming to a district climate that tends to be generally restrictive and focused on limiting expenditures and on ineligibility rather than on eligibility, the worker's "lay" attitudes will be reinforced and operate as a barrier to understanding the problems of the client in order to work toward an acceptable resolution of them.

Intake Personnel. And in Southeast I, another factor has been present with reference to attitudes and knowledge of new personnel: intake, by and large, has been staffed with new employees: this is their first assignment. The negative aspects of this cannot be overstated, even as cognizance is given to the problems created by such a volume of staff turnover. It is to intake that the applicant comes to ask for help. He is usually confronted with some kind of a crisis—already present or in the offing—that precipitates the request. The process of asking for help generally is fraught with various kinds of feelings—in relation to one's own sense of adequacy and self-esteem, in relation to the social or economic problems which contributed to the need, or resulted from it, in relation to a usually high degree of anxiety as to whether the request will be met with help, in relation to the necessity for providing considerable personal information and evidence of need.

It is at the point of this initial contact of the applicant with the agency that the most perceptive and skilled staff should be. It is at this point—of crisis—that appropriate help may prevent the development both of chronic problems and poor ways of coping with them, with the subsequent possible development of other problems emerging

from the inadequate coping devices. It is at this point that the person in immediate need requires immediate help. If ineligibility precludes BPA giving financial help, then the intake worker must be familiar with community resources which can be called upon to provide the necessary help, or he must be prepared to help the client think through how he can handle the reality of the problem confronting him. It is not enough to say "nothing can be done"; nor is it advisable to assume, as will be described later, that no emergency really exists until a third request for help is made. It has been demonstrated over and over that the quality of relationship that is created between agency and client at intake determines not only the continuing quality of the relationship of the client with the agency, but also the rapidity with which he is able to involve himself in the kind of planning that will lead him to self-support and improved social functioning.

And the intake worker's sphere of influence goes beyond the particular client. From the client who believes that he was harshly treated at intake—and whether he was or not is not always the same as how, in that time of stress, he felt he was being treated—neighbors, relatives, friends build an image of agency distrust, punitiveness, lack of understanding, impatience, and hostility. If or when they need to ask for assistance from the agency, they not infrequently protect themselves by approaching the agency with hostility, evasion, and distrust.

This is not to say that inexperienced public assistance workers cannot learn to perform intake functions efficiently, humanely, and effectively. They can—but their initial learning about BPA and about clients and about how to carry out their responsibilities appropriately, should not be undertaken at intake. It is here that the worker's lack of preparation in education or experience stands out most sharply, and has the most devastating effect upon the agency's fulfillment of its helping objectives. It is about their treatment at intake in Southeast I that much of the expressed hostile feeling of South Central Area residents has been expressed. It is also about the repercussions of this situation upon other staff members that agency employees have expressed concern.

Turnover. Public assistance agencies in general have been confronted for a number of years with high rates of turnover. The necessity for adding as

well as replacing staff, constitutes a general problem, for personnel with desirable qualities and required qualifications are in relatively short supply. It behooves public assistance agencies, therefore, to recruit intensively—as they do—and to endeavor to correct some of the conditions that contribute to such personnel leaving.

It has been estimated that the cost of replacement of each public assistance worker exceeds \$600, a costly matter when the annual turnover rate is as high as it has been for Los Angeles County's Bureau of Public Assistance. Many of the reasons for termination of such employment are related to marriage and family matters of women employees. A substantial number, having acquired one or two years of experience in public assistance, use this experience to qualify for better-paying, less-presuring jobs in other county agencies, particularly the County Probation Department. But a not inconsequential number leave because the working conditions are less than comfortable in some offices—not just because of the physical arrangements, but also because of a sense of discouragement stemming from district attitudes and practices that contribute to low morale and a feeling of hopelessness in working with needy persons. This is especially expressed by some who saw employment in the agency as an opportunity to be helpful to people but felt defeated in this ambition by the administrative climate permeating the district operation. Some of these persons, assigned to Southeast I, became fearful in the face of hostile resentment they encountered so frequently among applicants and recipients in the course of their work.

Structural and Operational Factors

The effectiveness with which the Bureau of Public Assistance achieves the objectives which give purpose to the agency's existence is influenced by the way the agency is organized to provide services, and the means it employs in so doing. To a considerable degree, leadership at various levels in the administrative hierarchy and in the hierarchies of the several districts is an overriding factor. The quality of this leadership can serve to communicate to staff a group purpose, a sense of professional identity, and a feeling of worthwhile achievement which is stimulating to personnel and facilitates their endeavors despite obstacles like heavy workloads, physical discomforts, etc.

Or this leadership can transmit other

kinds of attitudes: distrust of staff by failure to delegate certain tasks and by exercising some controls that seem both to display disregard for client integrity and feelings, and lack of confidence in judgment of employees. Such distrust and disregard may in fact be absent, but the organizational arrangements and procedural activities may convey this kind of impression. And if the personnel in key decision-making and policy-interpreting positions are not conversant with the kinds of knowledge and skills necessary to understand and assist in the modification of behavior, and either do not have access to, or do not consult the staff who possess this kind of information, there is reduced likelihood that structure and processes will be adapted to the pursuit of achieving the public assistance objectives of maximizing opportunities that facilitate improved economic and social adjustment. Recognition must, of course, be accorded the existence of laws, regulations, and policies within which the leadership must function, and over which they may have limited or no option. Nevertheless, to personnel in such leadership slots comes considerable opportunity to affect the direction and quality of agency service.

The District Operation

In few other parts of the Bureau of Public Assistance structure is more influence exercised on the form and focus of the agency's services than is true of the District Office. The District Office plays a key role in the interpretation and application of rules and regulations, and in the disbursement of assistance and services. The tone set by the District Director affects all aspects of the functioning in the District. It influences the way various levels of personnel, including the public assistance worker, perceive their job, the agency, and the client. The procedures he establishes or condones for policy implementation vitally affect efficiency and effectiveness of functioning. The interpretations he makes of policies and their implementation likewise influence the lives of clients in fundamental ways. Over some elements that bear on district operation, however, he has no control. In the ensuing discussion, effort will be made to distinguish among the areas that offer him choice and those that do not.

A Subway During Rush Hour. A former public assistance worker with valued experience in the Bureau, to which she had brought tremendous energy and

dedication, responded with a question to the one asking why she had left: "Have you ever been in the New York subway in the rush hour? How would you like to work in the midst of the crowds?"

Some of the district offices, and particularly Metro South I and Southeast I, are strongly reminiscent of a busy subway: gigantic rooms in which public assistance workers try to concentrate amid the clatter of typewriters, click of heels, murmur of voices, ringing of telephones, and general bustle inseparable from dozens of desks and chairs within arm's reach of each other. Workers and supervisors alike are in these large rooms shared by other units of workers and supervisors. Conditions for thoughtful activity or for supervisor-worker conferences leave much to be desired.

The waiting rooms for the clients also tend to be crowded, desultory in appearance and atmosphere, with activity heightened by many children who have accompanied mothers to the offices, and by a general restlessness that is associated with waiting, sometimes for a number of hours. Although interviewing booths are available, the general air of confusion and despair is not conducive to the kind of interviewing that lends itself to completing more than routine tasks or dealing with an emergency.

The quality of office facility is indicative of a lack of regard for the personnel employed therein, and serves, in the instances of many clients, to lower further an already reduced sense of worth by the feeling which one Metro South I AFDC-U father expressed this way: "You look around that office and you know you've sunk to the bottom. The noise, the smell, and the crowds make it clear you're not much good and you don't deserve anything better than what you see right there!"

Locale. The offices, particularly Southeast I, are not located for the convenience of those who must go to them for help. The matter of office location and space is not at the discretion of the Bureau administration; recommendations from the Bureau in this regard frequently are not carried through, for they may not coincide with the interests and objectives either of the Chief Administrative Officer or the Real Estate Management Division of Los Angeles County. The rapid expansion of social work and supporting staff during the last several years has necessitated the procuring of additional space, but the planning and implementation of such plans for additional offices, moves slowly. For example, plans for five new dis-

area offices (two to be located where offices presently exist) have been in process for three years; they have been approved and the expectation is that the offices will be available for occupancy in 1967.

A major impediment to the implementation of plans for adequate housing of offices is money. While there is federal participation available with regard to the office facilities related to the federally-aided programs, the balance is met from County sources and must, therefore, take into account County priorities, availability of funds—and, even, the fact that a particular elected County official has interests in mind of some property-owning constituents.

Another impediment is that those who make the final decisions regarding availability and location of district offices are not necessarily oriented to the giving of welfare services. They tend to use more "objective" methods, such as locating on a map a point centrally situated, regardless of accessibility or public transportation, if any, or other similar considerations.

The consequence is that the Metro South I and the Southeast I District Offices are reached by clients often only with a considerable expenditure of time and transportation costs. Many clients, for example, can reach the Southeast I office only at a cost of \$1.40 per person each way, or the Bell sub-office only by an expenditure of 96¢ each way. A mother with five small children found it necessary to go to the Southeast I office four times, her children in tow each time, before she received the emergency aid she was seeking. Each way consumed one and a half hours and involved four transfers. For the fifth trip, she was transported by a neighbor, who waited three hours to take the mother and children home. Such trips are far from unusual. They may be related to an application for assistance, or they may be on the request of a public assistance worker; usually the cost of the travel is not reimbursed.

Mrs. Richardson was told by the worker that it would be necessary for her to have a report of Mr. Richardson's intermittent earnings so that an adjustment could be made to reduce the grant for the month of June accordingly. The client endeavored to telephone the information to the worker during the worker's two telephone hours during the week, but the line was busy; then it was too late to reach him in this fashion, and no one

was willing to take a message. The check was held; the worker sent the family a note telling Mrs. Richardson to bring the information in at a certain time. She did so; the worker was not available, and another appointment had to be made for the next day. Transportation to all districts is not as costly or time-consuming; and in many, different arrangements are made with regard to office calls.

Another consequence is that the location of the offices, and the several problems in reaching them, reduces the prospect of the recipient keeping as closely in touch with the worker as is sometimes indicated by the nature of his problems, plans, or changing amounts of outside income. The location is a barrier to the use of the district as a center of help for the troubled recipient.

The importance of having the welfare offices accessible to the client population already has been demonstrated in the Project 220 mentioned earlier. Out-stationed offices, each consisting of a supervisor, five workers, and a clerk, have been located in each of two public housing projects (where the Housing Authority is providing space rent-free—for the time being) in which the clientele of the workers live. The workers and clients have come to know each other much better than previously was possible; the recipients increasingly consult the workers, and the effectiveness of their planning has been facilitated; fathers not living in the family home, who had been inaccessible previously, drop in to the office to talk about their plans and their children's needs; adolescents in AFDC families have been turning to the workers for counseling. The location also helps the workers to know quickly the environment and its positive as well as negative effects on the family's functioning, and to take appropriate measures to help the family deal with these. Moreover, these families recognize that the workers care about them and want to know and help them; they move more rapidly toward improved social adjustment.

Staffing. The assignment of new personnel to intake as a policy in Southeast I has already been noted, as has been the fact that each district has a District Director, a Deputy District Director, and Program Supervisors responsible for particular aspects of program operation and supervision (See Part I). It should be mentioned here, however, that qualifications for these positions do not require social work

preparation. This is a serious deficiency. The Bureau of Public Assistance has the express purpose of providing differential services aiming toward social and economic rehabilitation of various kinds of people: those who are adequate to manage their affairs and need only funds for their maintenance, as well as those who are so severely disturbed that no psychiatric clinic would consider them amenable to help. If the Bureau is to carry out its purposes adequately, there is a compelling need to utilize the available knowledge about the meaning and treatment of behavior—a knowledge that some people are fortunate enough to acquire through thoughtful and meaningful experience, but which most can procure only through an appropriate educational program. Since it is unlikely that a high percentage of the sheer number of persons needed in public assistance worker positions can be recruited with such preparation, it becomes especially necessary that those responsible for the supervision of the programs requiring such knowledge, have it at hand, and utilize it to interpret, as needed, ways of working productively with certain groups of recipients, and to assist in the formulation of district policy and procedure that can be applied practically and with more effective and economical results in the light of present behavioral knowledge.

Such professional knowledge is necessary not only at the level of Program Supervisor, but should be present in the person of either the District Director or the Deputy Director. It has long been accepted that district health officers need to be qualified physicians—not because this necessarily makes them good administrators; rather, it is because a certain quality of essential and technical medical know-how can be provided by no other kind of person. The same principle is applicable in the district administration of social welfare programs that, unlike most of these social insurances, is not, and cannot easily be, essentially procedural.

Workloads

The 1962 Amendments to the Social Security Act offer certain financial inducements to states to reduce the family caseloads to a maximum of 60 per worker, and to set the ratio of workers to supervisor at five to one. The objective is to enable the workers to devote sufficient time to the families in their charge to fulfill the goals of economic and social rehabilitation.

By and large, the County agency has

been able to reduce caseloads and to take advantage of the substantially increased Federal sharing in administrative expenses. However, uncovered files—because of vacant positions or absence for vacations or other reasons—in effect require the attention of those workers who are available. To a considerable extent then, the available workers find it necessary to serve more than the number of cases designated by the "yardstick."

Fewer Cases, Less Time. Still another factor operates against the prospect of many workers devoting to more intensive work with families in their caseloads the time "released" by the work load reduction. Caseloads have been reduced, but the amount of procedural and recording detail has been so augmented by Federal and State requirements, that their completion has resulted in workers being more burdened than before the reductions occurred. The consequence is that a high proportion of the workers have less time available for direct work with clients than previously was true.

An intensive study by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1962, revealed that less than 1% of the AFDC cases in the State contained some ineligibility. Despite the fact that this figure represents a small margin of error in so complex a program, HEW instituted a new requirement: AFDC families must be visited twice yearly and a reinvestigation completed on each occasion. The required number of these contacts was doubled by the State relative to AFDC. In effect, then, a complete reinvestigation must be made four times each year on these cases, so that the evidence that indicated the establishment of such a high degree of eligibility, actually led to a multiplicity of procedures that must be followed in order to be sure that this good record would continue!

To insure the fact that caseloads were being appropriately reduced to the number of 60 as a means to enable staff to provide more adequate services, certain accountability procedures were instituted by HEW, and then adapted by the State Department of Social Welfare for use in California. These were still further modified by the County of Los Angeles for specific application by the Bureau of Public Assistance. The net result is that in addition to the quarterly affirmations, each worker must complete a complicated family assessment form. The original idea that this would be a tool to understanding

behavior in the city and to develop a plan for treatment was lost, and only the procedure has remained. The complicated assessment form is completed, the data from it is dictated into the case record, and, for its own accounting purposes, the State Department of Social Welfare requires that an abstract be made of the case plan on each situation. Each of these forms and documents must be completed fully and accurately. In addition, following each contact with the family, a statistical card must be checked by the worker. Workers report that it takes longer to check on this card the various items denoting service than to provide the services which are being noted.

Ask a Silly Question . . . Pressures on the worker to complete a multiplicity of required documents that will insure the issuance of aid in the proper amount lead him often to a preoccupation with these documents, which are carefully checked by the supervisor. In the process of completing the forms, he frequently finds himself unable to listen to the client—especially if he has not acquired interviewing skill that enables him to use the available time to best advantage.

Mrs. Marshal, a tiny, spritely Negro woman of 55 years, complained that she had been denied assistance for herself and three grandchildren for whom she has responsibility. (The father is dead and the mother is in a mental hospital.) She told the community welfare consultant (part of Project 220) that she had been denied emergency assistance as well as an application for AFDC and she felt that both actions had been unjustified. She had been working as a domestic until two weeks ago, and had lost her job and not been able to obtain another, particularly since one of the children had been sick and it has been impossible for her to find anyone to care for them while she was away from home.

On the surface, the community welfare consultant saw no ineligibility, and telephoned the district to ascertain the status of the application. He learned from the worker that Mrs. Marshal had declared that she had \$3,000 in cash. When the community welfare consultant asked her if this was so, she said, "Of course not!" When he asked whether she had indicated she had this, she replied, "I sure did!" She explained that the public assistance worker had a long list of questions on a printed form and

asked them, one after another, without ever looking up from the document on her lap. When she asked Mrs. Marshal if she had any savings put aside, Mrs. Marshal said, "No." Then the worker said, "How much money have you in the bank?" At this point, Mrs. Marshal became angry and said, "\$3,000!" Then she said to the community welfare consultant, "Why should she ask me a silly question like that? You know that if you ask a silly question you can only get a silly answer."

Mrs. Marshal's resentment is not a typical and, in fact, it explains the behavior of a number of clients who make what seems to workers to be bizarre statements, and the unwary worker does not discriminate between those replies that are actually anger and hostility and those that have a basis in fact.

The Matter of Surveys. Tremendous threads are cut into the workers' time with families and the handling of cases by frequent surveys and requests from administrative and other sources for data which have not been accumulated by the agency via any machine arrangement. When there is the need for the agency to have some data on certain characteristics in the caseload, this material must be gathered by a case-by-case survey. If it is necessary to know how many recipients of AFDC might also be receiving OASDI so that there can be an estimate of the amount of time and money that will be involved in making budget adjustments for changes in the OASDI benefits, this information must be gathered by means of a case-by-case survey.

Management of Caseload. In order that the worker be protected in terms of time from extra demands that take him from the performance of necessary work on his caseload—and often this work is procedural rather than client-oriented—various districts have set up arrangements for the handling of telephone calls, or office hours. The worker's time is supposedly protected from the client's personal or telephoned contacts except during the specified hours. The number and frequency of these times vary with the district. In Metro South I, the intake staff have telephone hours on a twice-a-week basis, at which time they can be reached by the applicants; if the intake worker is not available when the applicant calls, a "duty worker" handles these inquiries. Some workers, not on intake, have telephone periods scheduled for two hours a week.

A similar practice has been followed in Southeast I District, where the staff

members are available for telephone calls for a period of two hours a week. In theory again, a "duty worker" or the supervisor takes the call if the answering clerk has the impression that it is a matter of urgency; otherwise, the client is simply asked to call back at the specified time. For many telephone callers this poses a severe hardship, particularly if the reason for the call appears to the client to be an urgent one, as often it is; the check may have been delayed, or a special need may have arisen, such as notice of eviction, illness, etc. The unavailability of the worker for such long periods of time provokes a considerable degree of resentment and hostility in many clients. The fact that the worker is not really accessible is taken as a personal insult.

The heightened feelings of hostility often are compounded by somewhat frequent changes in workers. Perhaps the worker known to the client has left, or been reassigned elsewhere, and the client has not been advised. It is not unusual for the client to be completely frustrated by her inability to find out who the worker is. Inquiries directed by and about clients to the Community Welfare Consultants, have sometimes centered around the fact that the problem confronting the client could not be shared with the worker: the client did not know who the worker was. The reality and scope of this troubling situation can be better understood in light of the experience of some of the community welfare consultants, knowledgeable about agency policies and practices, who have expended as many as seven telephone calls to the Southeast I or Metro South I District in an effort to identify the worker who know has assumed responsibility for a particular client's case; or in the absence of a worker, to learn who the supervisor is.

The established system presupposes the client knows the number of the file to which he is assigned, but this is not information some retain readily. These problems in communication appear to impede the constructive management of a caseload, rather than to protect the public assistance worker in the conduct of activities of service to the public assistance recipient.

Administrative Organization

Central Administration and District. The administrative organization (described in Part I) is a factor that both provides for some flexibility among districts so that they can meet the needs of particular situations in the district

through a relatively high degree of centralized authority, and at the same time serves to be permissive with regard to those districts that, for various reasons, do not accept and apply the philosophy underpinning the public assistance programs. Channels for communication from central administration to district directors are diffused; the consequence is that there is no clear awareness at the central office level of some of the practices that occur at the district level. The span of control of the Director of Districts—fourteen district offices, with several of these having from one to three branch offices—precludes the exercise of very much control over any single district by the person in this position. His authority is dissipated by the fact the three Deputy Directors having responsibility for program do not report to the Director of Districts, but to another person, the Program Director, who in turn, reports to the Director of the Bureau.

No apparent devices have been developed to overcome the weaknesses in this kind of structural arrangement. The District Directors meet in alternate months for several hours with the Director of Districts, and in intervening months, join the central office administrative personnel for a morning of meetings. These infrequent and short periods of time are far from sufficient to permit free discussion of the nature of policies and their application; nor do they encourage any exchange of experiences which would provide an opportunity to central office personnel to be aware of areas of difficulty in the district operations. It is possibly in part this multiplicity in the supervisory relationships between district and administrative office that leads to the kind of policy interpretations that create some of the difficulties discussed in the subsequent section of this report.

Department of Charities. As was noted in Part I, the position of Superintendent of Charities is contained in the Charter of the County of Los Angeles, and the Charter places this position under the direction of the Board of Supervisors; the mandatory provision that he "exercise a general supervision over, and enforce rules and regulations for the conduct and government of the charitable institutions of the County." (Section 2)

Careful consideration should be given to the question of continuing the Bureau of Public Assistance—a complex and cumbersome organization in its own right—as a part of another complex and cumbersome organization. But ask

...the matter of administrative validity and the clarification of the location of authority and accountability for the administration of the federally-aided programs of public assistance, a new point might justify attention to this separation at this time. AB5, the California bill to make the Social Security Act's medicare provisions operable in California, contains this statement:

14608. The Director of a County Agency which administers the provision of this Chapter and also administers medical institutions may not delegate to an employee the decision to authorize or deny aid under this chapter, if he has also delegated authority to that employee to operate or participate in the operations of any such medical institution.

The present interrelationships of the Bureau of Hospitals and the Bureau of Public Assistance, and the fact that medical aid services would be applicable to public assistance recipients with costs payable to the Bureau of Hospitals, raises questions as to whether the County is in danger of some loss of funds if some change is not effected in the structure of the Department of Charities as now constituted.

State Department of Social Welfare. In its role as the "single State Agency" designated to supervise the administration of federally-aided public assistance programs in California, the State Department of Social Welfare is charged with treating all counties uniformly, and with equity. As a consequence, the County of Los Angeles, with its gigantic program of public assistance—approximately 42% of the entire assistance caseload in California—is dealt with very much as just one of the 58 counties.

The size of the County program, and the nature of the problems with which it is confronted, indicate that some special handling might be in order without jeopardizing provisions of uniformity specified by HEW. (There are similar deviations in other states, notably Illinois.) The impact on this County of procedures devised by the State Department of Social Welfare is necessarily different than is true elsewhere, not the least of the differences being reflected in the cost to the County.

Opportunities for involvement of the Bureau of Public Assistance in the development of such procedures and the consideration of their adaptation to the Los Angeles program have been very

limited. Not only is participation by Los Angeles County in program planning and development, to the extent that they affect Los Angeles County directly, not encouraged, there is considerable evidence that there is competition and distrust between these two levels of government charged with the extension of public assistance.

An example is to be found in the matter of the development of regulations and procedures by the State Department of Social Welfare in accordance with decision which are the right of the Director to make, and in accordance with the requirements of HEW. The local agency is resentful of the fact that regulations are received at the local level to be implemented at considerable cost to county government, without any financial participation by the State yet the local agency is not always in a position to understand the intent of these regulations and the cause of their initiation. Some are developed because of the requirements issued in the Handbook of HEW, which is forwarded to the state agencies. The County agency does not receive a copy of this Handbook and therefore is not privy to the considerations that must be taken into account by the State in making a decision as to the plan that it will follow in developing procedures it deems appropriate. The availability of the HEW Handbook to the Bureau of Public Assistance for reference purposes probably would ease some of the strain in relationships for it would provide the local agency with a basis for understanding the demands made upon it by the State agency. On the other hand, there is probably some concern on the part of the State agency that it might be challenged by the County agency in the election of whatever procedure it has selected from among the choices open to it. The question might be raised as to whether a county as large as Los Angeles, with the volume of cases it serves, should not have a right to raise such questions—recognizing that the final decision still remains with the State. Such participation might be painful at times, but probably in the long run would be healthy for both levels of government.

In some respects, the two agencies relate to each other more as competitors than as partners with a common goal. One consequence, sometimes, is the creation of a considerable amount of community criticism directed at the Bureau of Public Assistance. A recent example is this: Early in 1955, the Bureau of

Public Assistance developed a project proposal for the development of a number of child care centers, several of them to be located in the South Central Area, one in Watts. The grant request to the Office of Economic Opportunity was channeled, as is customary, through the State Department of Welfare, which maintains a relationship with the Washington agency. In early October, a telephone call from the State Department of Social Welfare advised the Bureau of Public Assistance that funds had been approved for the establishment of four of the child care centers requested. Almost at once, news was released at the State level that four centers were being established by the State in Watts. No reference was made to the Bureau of Public Assistance, nor was there a correction of the fact that only one of the centers was designated for the Watts community.

The letter of award was forwarded by the State agency to the Bureau of Public Assistance three weeks after this announcement and three weeks after the beginning date of the grant. Furthermore, the letter specified certain revisions to be submitted within 30 days of the receipt of the letter—a period which in large part had already passed. The delay now led to a series of correspondence to adjust the beginning date of the grant so that more than a month of the funding period will not be lost to the Bureau. But more than that, inquiries already had been made as to when the four centers in Watts will be established—and the failure of the Bureau of Public Assistance to establish four such child care centers in this area is being viewed by some as "more broken promises."

The necessity for obtaining clarification of certain policy matters in order that possible adjustment can be made in grants to assistance recipients sometimes results in considerable delay. Such inquiries are forwarded to the Area Office, which is in a position to provide interpretation under certain circumstances. If, however, the interpretation involves a broad question of policy, beyond the scope of the Area Office's function to decide, the inquiry must be forwarded to the Sacramento office for decision. The local County chafes under this process and the delay that the Bureau of Public Assistance faces in providing an answer to the anxious client.

The Welfare Study Commission, in its comprehensive study and report in 1953, proposed a number of simplification

procedures: combination of manuals, modification and reduction in the number of required forms, etc. To date, not only have those recommendations not been implemented, but additional procedures and documentation have been required.

The heavy load of recording and form-completing described in the work load of the public assistance workers, is paralleled at the administrative level in the requirements by State and Federal agencies with regard to reporting and recording. For example, administrative reporting is necessary about characteristics of AFDC recipients. Similar characteristics data are required under Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act, yet these must be handled as separate reports. Since such requirements for reporting originate at the Federal level, it would appear possible that the State Department of Social Welfare, as the single supervising agency, would be able to inquire into the necessity for such duplication, and take appropriate steps or reduce the quantity of such reporting.

Policy Factors

Certain policies which originate at Federal and State levels, or at the County level, are inconsistent with the declared purpose of the public assistance, and consequently, are self-defeating. Certain other policies, as interpreted and applied at the district level, likewise defeat the objectives of the public assistance programs. While a careful study is warranted of each of these two kinds of situations, this report will confine itself to the presentation of only a few illustrations in each of the two groups.

Policy and Intent

"To Help Maintain and Strengthen Family Life . . ." Despite the clear and compelling nature of this statement appearing in Title IV of the Social Security Act with respect to grants to States for aid and services to needy families with children, certain policies have been promulgated and implemented which are directly in opposition to this particular purpose. Since March of 1955, a policy has been in effect—and applied stringently in some districts, particularly Southeast I—known as MARS. This acronym stands for "a man assuming the role of spouse," although in the opinion of some faced with the implementation of this policy, it is more reflective of a man-from-outer-space policy. Section 1503 of the Welfare and

Institutions Code requires that when a needy child lives with his mother and stepfather or an adult male assuming the role of spouse, the income of such male must be considered in establishing the amount of grant. The same section requires the County to determine if the stepfather or such male is able to support the child, either fully or in part, and requires him to do so, if he is able.

An Attorney General's opinion (64/63) issued in January of 1965, resulted in a revision of the regulations issued by the State Department of Social Welfare. These now provide that a recipient of AFDC would be in violation of Section 1575 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if she willfully and knowingly uses any part of the grant for the support of "the man assuming the role of spouse." The opinion also holds that the man assuming the role of spouse should not be included in the family budget unit. Such a man is identified as one who is not the father of any of the mother's children, but is living in the home with her, although they are not married to each other. He is responsible for the support of the mother and her needy children under Section 1508 of the Welfare and Institutions Code; he is excluded from the family budget unit if he is without income. The Attorney General's opinion does not preclude this living arrangement; it only stresses that there is a violation of 1575 when the man does not bring into the family sufficient income to meet his own needs.

If the mother willfully and knowingly uses any part of the grant for the support of a "man assuming the role of spouse," she is liable for prosecution for fraud. Several procedural provisions are developed in line with this policy: 1) If the man is without income and, therefore, not contributing to the maintenance of the family, he and the woman must be notified verbally and in writing that at the end of 30 days he either must be contributing or leave the home; and in the event he is still there and not supporting and consequently presumed to be using part of the grant, the woman will be referred to the District Attorney's office. 2) If, at the end of 30 days, the situation has not altered, then referral shall be made to the District Attorney's office for consideration of whether the woman is liable to prosecution for fraud.

This policy and its implementation raise a number of questions, some of which derive from the societal attitudes mentioned previously. It is evidently moral for the man assuming the role of

spouse to be in the home as long as he is making a monetary contribution. At the point when his funds are not contributed to the family, the relationship becomes immoral. With regard to this point, the Attorney General's opinion advises that the decisive question is whether or not such a person is "essential" to the well-being of the dependent child. The opinion concludes that the man is not essential and it is therefore inappropriate to include him in the family budget unit.

Aside from the issue of morality, some serious questions are posed by this policy with regard to the matter of strengthening family life, particularly as this relates to the Negro family, which is the predominant group in the South Central Area served by the Bureau of Public Assistance. The recently released report "The Negro Family," by the Department of Labor (known as the "Moynihan Report"), along with other recent publications, has placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Negro family faces a fundamental problem because there is no strong male figure in such a high proportion of Negro households.

This statement, supported as it is by census population data, as well as the survey of AFDC families made in the South Central Area, warrants some particular attention from public assistance agencies.

The role of the family in shaping character in the community is well known; no question is raised about the fact that the family is the basic social unit in American life. It is the basic socializing force, and adult conduct in society is learned by the individual as a child. What the child learns in these early years, the kind of care he has, shape his adult behavior and conduct. We know that children today learn the patterns of work from their fathers, even though they may not seek out the same kinds of jobs. We know, also, that white children even without fathers perceive all about them the pattern of men who are working. And we know that Negro children without fathers have greater difficulty in developing a pattern of work, and that there is a greater failure among them than there is among white children without fathers.

It is not unusual for the "man assuming the role of spouse" to be the only adult male with whom a Negro child will have close contact. It is not unusual for the "male who is assuming the role of spouse" to be well and long-established member of the household

and to provide the children, even though they are not his, with considerable love and attention and fathering. For many Negro children, such a male figure offers the only prospect they have for masculine identification, and it is not uncommon for such a male figure to be a stabilizing element in the household.

The conclusion of the Attorney General's opinion that the man is "not essential" is possibly true in many instances; however, there is considerable likelihood that to many children, he really is essential, psychologically and emotionally.

The implementation of this policy by the specification that the woman be referred for fraud investigation would appear to condone punitive action. Moreover, some question might be directed to the consideration of whether this, in fact, is imposing a restrictive practice on the mother if the principle of the unrestricted money payment is to be followed through logically. To say to the mother in such a household that her use of some of the money paid in the form of a grant for the maintenance of the "male assuming the role of spouse" is a violation of law, is also to say that she may not use the money in the way she deems best.

Furthermore, if the additional person in the household is the mother's aunt or another relative ineligible for inclusion in the budget, a similar action would not be indicated; that is, the mother would be free to provide food and shelter to such a person without question being raised. It can only be concluded that the opinion has a moralistic and judgmental quality which will work to the disadvantage of many Negro households, and will remove the opportunity in many for the man and woman to establish a stable relationship that might lead to a permanent and legal union. It is not improbable that similar situations arise in some Mexican-American households, where the relationship of the male assuming the role of spouse with the mother has been of many years' duration and is as stable as though there had been a legal marriage.

Measures that may work in some areas in the giving of help are not necessarily possible or advisable in areas that are predominantly Negro, or something else, such as Mexican-American. The gigantic size of the public assistance agency must still make it possible to recognize differences, for these are present—differences in terms of family

structure derived from a long history of special circumstances, and compounded by economic, educational, and social disadvantages. Now the tenuous quality of the Negro family structure is in danger of being perpetuated by some public assistance policies, rather than the public assistance policies being used to move toward the establishment of a stable Negro family structure more acceptable in our general culture.

"... Continuing Parental Care and Protection." The acknowledged intent of Title IV of the Social Security Act is to "furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation . . . to needy dependent children . . . to help maintain and strengthen family life . . . to attain maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . ." But the Federal and State legislation both provide that the child past 16 who is out of school and not engaged in a training program, is no longer an eligible child and is not to be included in the budget. Matters of general community concern are the school drop-out and the unmarried pregnant girl who also is excluded from school. The 16 year old pregnant daughter of Mrs. Denver, mentioned earlier, is excluded from school because of her pregnancy. She is also excluded from the family budget because she is excluded from school. The consequence is that the family shares its already limited funds—less than the cost standards established by the State, but limited by the ceiling of the participation base. This girl, the third generation to have an illegitimate child, is one who is potentially responsive to social control. The possibility of reaching her and helping her to achieve a better level of social adjustment is considerably reduced by the rejection she feels, and her resentment in being excluded from the budget. Her bitterness is fostered and augmented by that of her mother, who has a long history of feeling abused by society and now uses the evidence of the BPA action to justify the feelings she has long expressed.

Mrs. Williams, the harassed mother of seven, has asked her minister to intercede with the Public Assistance worker to restore 16 year old Johnny to the budget. Her grant, too, is less than the State cost schedule suggests as a minimum grant for a family the size of hers, but the participation base prohibits a larger grant. The consequence is that the already insufficient amount of funds is being spread even more thinly

ness to continue in school because he has problems in learning and is certain that "he couldn't learn nohow" if he were referred for some special training, angered his mother, and she constantly berates him for taking food out of the mouths of the other family members. At the same time, she is very much afraid that he will get himself into serious trouble. To continue to recognize this boy as a member of the family unit works against the strengthening of family life and the provision of continuing parental care and protection.

A Challenge to Family Planning. There is a persistent idea in the community at large that many women who are dependent upon public assistance deliberately bear children out of wedlock for the primary purpose of having additional public funds to care for the additional child. Such an accusation is both unfounded and unrealistic. It presumes, on the one hand, that the mother of many children born out of wedlock is playful enough so that she can compute the additional amount of assistance she will receive and be able to manage well on it. (The unreality of this is attested to by the complexities of grant determination, which many staff members find difficult to understand and master.) On the other hand, it does not take into account that State law (Sec. 1511.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code) sets a ceiling on the amount of assistance available to families of given size. This policy provides for inequity. The State Department establishes a minimum standard of adequate care and, based on these standards, issues a "Cost Schedule for Family Budget Units," which takes into account costs for families of given size and composition. However, the Welfare and Institutions Code disregards this cost schedule, with the consequence that many families do not receive the money required for minimum standards for survival, according to the State's own standard.

There is a further inequity in that the family having some earnings or income that might be applied to special needs has an advantage over those whose needs are the same according to the State standards, but lack outside income. This circumstance tends to keep the assistance income at a level considerably below that recognized as denoting poverty.

What Price Earnings. Several policies originating at various levels of government serve to create problems in terms

of the amount of funds that may be retained by families under certain circumstances. There are differences in the treatment of income. Social Security Benefits, for example, are deducted in their entirety. Earnings from some sources are exempt in part. Earnings under the Economic Opportunity Act have a higher level of exemption. Earnings under Title I or Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act are handled still differently. Not only do these policies provide for unequal treatment of families that may have the same composition, size, and needs, but they are difficult to administer and cause for considerable complaint directed to be toward the public assistance workers and the agency. These have been particularly voluminous in the Southeast I and Metro South I District because of the general difficulty in understanding the reasons for these differences in treatment of income. Since the workers, as well as others in the agency, likewise have difficulty in understanding the rationale for the differentials, they are unable to adequately communicate this knowledge to the client. The client's lack of understanding, and his impatience with the handling of the situation, and the worker's uneasiness about being unable to interpret some things that he does not understand himself, reinforce the annoyance of each with the other.

There is another form of handling of income that creates problems for both worker and client, and this is in relation to the recipient of public assistance who lives in a public housing project. He is affected by policy that emanates from the United States Public Housing Administration. Public assistance recipients who live in public housing projects are required to pay a higher rental than is expected of other tenants. The theory behind this, presumably, is that one public agency—the Housing Authority—should not be subsidizing another public agency. But this policy is discriminatory in that it treats the public assistance recipient differently than it does other tenants with low income, and the effect is felt by the public assistance recipient in several ways. The family affected by the participation base receives less than the State's standard indicates they require to maintain themselves at a minimal level, and yet pays a higher portion of this sub-standard grant for rent. Since some of the earnings of a family member may be considered, in part, to be exempt income, some of these funds may be used to meet the additional needs of the family.

The housing agency, nevertheless, allows the rent.

Mrs. Farmer, the mother of nine children, has been receiving a grant of \$371 per month, an amount more than one hundred dollars below the family's needs, according both to Mrs. Farmer and the State cost schedule. She was assigned to a Neighborhood Adult Participation Project as an Aide, earning \$333 per month. Part of this income is considered as exempt income (a work incentive) and \$25 is attributable to the expense of maintaining the job; the balance is deducted from the \$371. The Housing Authority raised her rent from \$56 to \$114 per month, thus absorbing nearly all of the income that had been declared by the public assistance agency to be exempt as a financial inducement (if one were needed) to continued employment.

Mr. Allen, who had been receiving AFDC-U for eight months, was living in a public housing project, where his rent was \$46 a month. Like Mrs. Farmer, he obtained a job on a NAPP project. Since he was engaged full-time on this activity, the policy decision was made (through the State Department of Social Welfare) that he was not eligible for supplementation, even though the \$333 a month he had received—and considerably less than the State's standard indicated the family required for minimum maintenance. Nevertheless, the Housing Authority raised his rent to \$114 a month. The question posed by Mr. Allen was whether he could afford to keep this job.

Other Policies

A wide range of other policies either by design or implementation act to reduce the health and strength of the family situation. One is the matter of Public Assistance Medical Care, which medical care is limited to AFDC children under the age of 18, or 21 if the child is attending school regularly. Only emergency dental services or rehabilitative services are available to adults in such families, and yet these often are families in which illness may be most serious and make the difference between ability to manage adequately and not.

There are policies that involve procedures having a direct impact on the level of criticism accruing to the Bureau of Public Assistance. Such a policy is the one whereby medical examination for disability is reviewed by the State

team, which determines if there is sufficient disability to qualify for ATD. Indeed, more than half of the appeals to the State Department of Social Welfare are on the basis of such findings of insufficient disability. The decision, however, must be conveyed to the applicants by the local agency, and it is against the district office, that anger and hostility over the decision are directed.

The relatively high degree of autonomy with which the districts function, the organizational arrangements which made inadequate provision for awareness on the part of the central administrative personnel that the district may interpret policy differently than is the intent of the agency, and the personalities and beliefs of the district directors themselves—all contribute to the fact that certain policies as interpreted by them and applied in their districts, may go counter to the intent both of the law governing the program, and of the administration of the agency. Such a situation particularly appears to exist with regard to the Southeast I District and its application of policies that emanate at various levels, including that of Los Angeles County. Only a few examples will be cited here.

The Erring and Errant Father. The implementation of the failure to provide provisions governing AFDC applications calls for the public assistance worker to make an effort to interview the father to ascertain the amount of help that he does or can give to the family. One purpose of this is to create or test the amount of his interest in the family; another is to keep to the lowest level the amount of assistance paid to the family. In the Southeast I District, this is interpreted in a different fashion than is true elsewhere. The responsibility for "producing" the father is placed squarely on the mother, and it is a common practice to require that she bring the man into the office, or arrange for him to see the public assistance worker before any assistance can be given. Or, in some instances, AFDC is discontinued.

Mrs. Barker applied for assistance under AFDC-U for her 5 children and her husband, who has been unemployed for a period of 4 months. The interview disclosed that the 10 year old daughter is not the child of Mr. Barker, was born to Mrs. Barker out of a relationship that she had when she was 15 years of age. She acknowledged that she was aware that the

Whittier area of the County, but she has not seen him for 9 years nor had any contact with him in that period of time. He does not contribute, nor does she believe that he can since he is a farm worker who has a family of his own to maintain. She hears about him occasionally from relatives and, therefore, knows about his present family. However, the child does not know that Mr. Barker is not her father; there has never been any indication on Mr. Barker's part that this child is other than his own. The public assistance worker insisted that until Mrs. Barker brought the father of this girl into the office for an interview, no aid would be forthcoming.

The case of the Fowler family contained some different elements.

Mr. Fowler visited periodically and contributed sums with some regularity, for which adjustments were made in the assistance grant. The worker advised Mrs. Fowler of the necessity to confirm with Mr. Fowler the current amount of his contributions, and asked that Mrs. Fowler arrange to have the man go to the office "as soon as possible." Two weeks later, when the assistance check had not arrived and Mrs. Fowler communicated with the worker in this regard, she was advised that she had not arranged to have Mr. Fowler be interviewed. The worker, in the use of the phrase "as soon as possible" had meant immediately; Mrs. Fowler had taken it to mean the next time that she saw her husband, an occasion which had not yet occurred.

A Sign of Drowning. Under a wide range of circumstances, the person who applies for assistance and appears to be in urgent need of food, may be given an emergency grocery order for this purpose. Such orders are given with some reluctance because if the situation is to be one of categorical assistance, where the cost of aid will be federally- and state-shared, there is no reimbursement for any aid given that is not in the form of cash. All grocery orders come, then, from County funds. The authority for issuing them rests, by County policy, with the District Director. In the Southeast I District, this responsibility has been guarded carefully by the District Director.

In Southeast I, a "rule of thumb" exists with regard to the use of emergency orders. This "rule" is not in writing, but is widely accepted and has

been confirmed by various staff members. It operates on a theory that the first time a person asks for emergency assistance, it can be assumed that he has some resources upon which he can call for the handling of the emergency: relatives, neighbors, credit, etc. If he returns in a few days or in a week, it can be presumed that he was successful in using such resources and that these could be "tapped" for another week. If he returns the third time and still believes himself to be in need of emergency assistance, a grocery order may be issued.

The availability of emergency assistance in this particular district office is a point of great bitterness among clientele and among other agencies who find themselves in the position of trying to assist the client. Public assistance workers in the same district also have commented on the fact that in the face of apparent urgent need, they sometimes have resorted to providing the client with some funds out of their own pockets rather than face the refusal that is almost inevitable on a first request for grocery order.

It should be noted that were the emergency to be met by a cash allowance from the District and were eligibility for categorical aid to be a possibility, such cash emergency assistance would fall within the framework of aid to be reimbursed from federal and state sources. The Southeast I District does not use the petty cash funds for this purpose. Arrangements are possible for the issuance of a check to the recipient within 24 or 48 hours, but this also is reported as being sparingly used—and even when it is, the period pending the arrival of the check, may be one that contains real deprivation for the family.

Guilt Until Proven Otherwise. Policy permits the establishment of assistance on the basis of presumed eligibility. The need is met while the investigation of eligibility proceeds. The presumptive eligibility procedure is a recognition of the fact that the process of establishing eligibility may be delayed and can create undue hardship upon the applicant; furthermore, it offers an opportunity to help the client begin to deal with the problems that are pressing in addition to those that are of a financial nature. The district serving the Watts area tends to avoid the use of the presumptive eligibility procedure, withholding the assistance very often until eligibility has, in fact, been established. This appears to be a reaction to the family pattern extant in that area, and a high

degree of distrust of the motives and statements of the applicants. The consequence is that in this district there is an unusually high proportion of cases which are discontinued without aid being given, and a general community feeling that the district is one that is punitive towards all clients, particularly the Negroes. While it is sometimes true that the too-quick providing of aid may be a disservice to the total family situation (if, for example, the mother and father have quarreled and she wants to use public assistance as a weapon against him), such situations are far fewer than those where the father has left without arranging for the family's food.

Fiscal Factors

Costs of Administration. As has already been noted, the non-federal share of the administrative costs associated with the federally-aided public assistance programs are met from county sources, with no state participation. The costs of administering the GR program are, of course, fully met by local taxes. The largest part of the public assistance administration costs is in connection with personnel salaries—for which \$40 million dollars have been budgeted for 1965-66. The increasing requirements pertaining to the extension of services add to these costs even though the federal share of the funds also has been substantially increased. However, the rising costs of public assistance administration and their impact on the County's total expenditure for County purposes undoubtedly influences the readiness of the Chief Administrative Office and of the Board of Supervisors to look askance at requests for additional personnel, or for additional classifications of personnel, or at requests for salaries adequate enough to induce well-qualified social work personnel to work for the agency.

Similar funding considerations affect matters related to more, and better-located, and more adequate office facilities to meet the needs both of staff and clientele with regard to fulfilling the objectives of the public assistance and other welfare programs. The County's share of costs of administration in the current year of operation are estimated to reach 48% of the total cost, a sum in excess of 40 million County-provided dollars.

The County's share of aid payments for the federally-aided program is about 15% in the current year, or more

than 56 million dollars from local tax sources.

It is appropriate to raise again the questions posed by the Welfare Study Commission in 1963 about the desirability of arriving at a more equitable cost-sharing arrangement between the counties and the State with regard both to assistance payments and administrative costs. The former requires considerable simplification that can best be achieved by a uniform basis being established for the sharing of costs in all of the aid programs. The latter is essential not alone because of the relief it would provide local funding sources, but it probably would result in some reduction in the resistance of local officials to provide personnel and facilities sorely needed; it also would strengthen the position of the supervising state agency in encouraging local welfare departments to improve the quality and extent of their services and related facilities.

Children in Foster Care. Of the 6,500 children who are in foster homes or institutions under the supervision of the Child Welfare Division, only about 250 have been placed by direction of a court and can, therefore, justify federal participation. For the current fiscal year, more than four million county dollars will be expended for this vital form of care for needy children. A change in the Social Security Act would be required to permit federal participation in the financing of such care; nevertheless, this is an important type of service, long and soundly established, and one that the federal government should be accepting—and sharing in—without the requirement of official court action.

General Relief. Still closely identified with old Poor Law arrangements and limitations for meeting needs of indigent persons, this program in Los Angeles County, during the month of August, served approximately 2,500 families (nearly 800 in South Central) for a cost in that month of nearly a half million dollars. There are no data—only strong feelings in the community—regarding the numbers of families denied such help.

Many of the families aided by GR have no legal residence in California for the purpose of qualifying for one of the categorical aids to which, except for residence, they would be eligible. Many, as the study of characteristics shows, came from southern states to which they are reluctant to return, and where the political and civic climate is such that their return appears inadvisable. Many of these persons are refugees from their

former states of residence in much the same way that the Cuban newcomers are refugees, although the latter are aided with federal funds.

Serious question must be raised as to whether the burden for meeting the financial and social needs of the non-resident families should rest entirely on a particular county. Consideration must now be given to the question of whether their problems should not also be viewed as a state responsibility—perhaps even as a concern of the federal level of government.

The high cost of the General Relief program may be one factor that contributes to the distress of individuals and families in need of emergency aid. Since the cost of emergency grocery orders is borne by the County, there is marked reluctance in certain districts—among them Southeast I—to issue this form of emergency aid; therefore, they resort to many devices to avoid the use of these orders (which must be approved, per county regulations, by the District Director). When this reluctance is combined with distrust or disbelief in the existence of an emergency and the unavailability of resources, the result is a gross failure to deal with urgent and immediate need. Perhaps it is the factor of suspicion that influences some District Directors against the use of available cash funds for the meeting of emergencies. In many instances, the use of cash could lead to some reimbursement in cases where eligibility for a categorical aid seems likely; the recipient has greater flexibility in using the cash wisely; and the administrative costs attendant upon the complicated processing of grocery orders would undoubtedly be less.

It should be emphasized that the amount of assistance available to recipients of GR is at a lower level than for recipients of categorical forms of aid, even though needs may be identical. The Administrative Code of the County places a ceiling of \$173 on the monthly grant to any family. Although there are provisions for exceptions, these are not easy to obtain because of procedural and/or attitudinal reasons. This archaic device of making assistance too uncomfortable to allow it to become a way of life warrants examination—and elimination.

Federally-Aided Programs. Reference has been made in other contexts to practices with regard to the assistance grants under AFDC, OAS, ATD, and AB that contribute to considerable anxiety and ill-feeling both among re-

cipients and among community leaders and others. One is the participation base (the Welfare and Institution Code ceiling) used in AFDC in opposition to the State's established standards of minimum needs. Distressed recipients, encountering difficulty in managing on these limited grants, angrily complain about social workers who talk about "base," "state standards," etc.—terms that serve to confuse the client and add to his hostility. But they confuse staff members, too, because of their inconsistencies, which are difficult either to accept or to explain rationally.

Similar problems are encountered with regard to the consideration of income in determining the amount of the grant. Incomes from different sources are treated differently. Some are handled in accordance with specific statements contained in federal law—which are not consistent with each other. The difficulty is almost insurmountable when one tries to explain to one parent that her earnings are to be treated in one way because the source is different than the identical amount of income that her neighbor receives from another source.

As though these inconsistencies were not enough, there is the added problem that occurred this summer when, in accordance with state law, the increases received by beneficiaries of OASDI were deducted from the public assistance grants. Of course, the staff members—who had had to devote many hours in making these grant adjustments, at an administrative cost estimated to exceed \$280,000—were the targets for a tremendous amount of unhappy anxiety and outright hostility. The subsequent and very recent modification of the Welfare and Institutions Code then led to readjustments in the grant—at a dollar cost exceeding the aforementioned figure, and at the cost of further diverting staff time from direct service to clients. It would appear possible to develop a mechanism in the Welfare and Institutions Code that could encompass the likelihood of such Congressionally-developed upward income changes and permit handling of them without expensive duplication of the necessary processes.

Another problem adds to the negative feelings of clients about the Bureau and, specifically, the social workers. Changes that require alteration of various budget documents to assure that the recipient's grant is in the correct amount frequently result either in long delay to effect the adjustment, or an

overpayment, which then must be adjusted within 60 days. These overpayments may be due to error, or inadvertence, or to fraud, or breakdown in communication between worker and client. But they tend to be handled the same way. It is not uncommon for the overpayment to be sufficiently large that, in order to make the adjustment, a check is not issued for as many as two months (and, not infrequently, without advance notice to the client). If, in the interim, there is emergent need which the recipient cannot handle by other means, a grocery order may be issued—the amount of which then must be deducted, and this may contribute to further delay. Some cases were reported (and confirmed) in which as many as four months passed before the amount of the assistance leveled off to an understandable and reasonably regular amount. In one of these instances where overpayment was involved, there had been an assumption that an absent father was providing money, an assumption that proved unfounded. It is of interest to note another inconsistency: underpayments do not have to be adjusted with the rapidity required of overpayments.

Some attention needs to be addressed to less destructive ways of handling overpayments—including some degree of flexibility in developing a plan in accordance with the circumstances in the individual family, and one that can be less costly, in money and feelings, to administer.

Inter-Agency and Inter-Departmental Relationships

In the South Central Area, as in some others of Los Angeles County, there appear to be relatively few AFDC families who are without problems that require the assistance not only of the Bureau of Public Assistance, but also of other governmental and voluntary organizations in the community. Some of the organizations are involved in the handling of client affairs because of legal requirements; others because the nature of the social and economic problems dictate the advisability of such involvement. In many parts of Los Angeles County, social work personnel from the Bureau of Public Assistance—as well as from the State Department of Social Welfare—are engaged in many community activities which focus upon the concerns of people who are needy; they are active in the work of other agencies, they make referral to other

agencies, they interact with other agencies and with community leaders in behalf of the program of the Bureau as a whole, as well as in specific client interests. Their participation in community activities is a positive element in aiding community leaders, agency representatives, and others to understand the policies and operation and purposes of the BPA.

In some parts of the Los Angeles area, however, such reciprocal community participation is not encouraged by the local administrative personnel, although selected members of the staff may be involved with other agencies in the consideration of common interests. A difference in this regard is apparent between the Metro South I District and the Southeast I District, the two primary districts serving the South Central Area. The former participates much more actively than the latter. One of the frequently heard criticisms among agencies and other departments serving the same area is that "no one ever sees the boss of that district," referring to Southeast I. In fact, the Director of that District is active in certain community matters, but the nature of this activity is such that he is not particularly recognized in the context of the work he does for the Bureau, and the lack of visible identification of BPA with efforts to mitigate social problems in the community is interpreted by many as hostile detachment from the area's pressing needs.

The placement of the community welfare consultants—three in the area of the South Central community—has already demonstrated the efficacy of close relationships with other community organizations: the way in which the latter make referrals for agency service or are ready to understand and interpret to others the intricacies of the particular situation that is affected by the complexities of the huge public assistance agency are indicators of the consultants' valuable services to the BPA.

Other organizations serving this same area present a strong facade of hostility to the Bureau. Some of this is clearly related to individual reactions to official agencies of any kind, perhaps heightened by what appears to such individuals to be abusive behavior toward clients. With regard to such individuals—some of whom are professionally trained personnel and some of whom are not—it appears difficult to separate the personal feelings of concern about the situation of the client from an "objective" assessment by them

of the operations of the Bureau in the extension of services. Their resentment or hostility is evident; it often is clear that it has served to underscore the unhappiness of a client who may have turned to such an agency for intercession with the Bureau in his behalf. The presence of such long-standing antipathy to the public assistance agency (directed also against certain other public agencies) is indicative of the importance of the activities of the community welfare consultants in doing an interpretive and communicating job in behalf of public welfare in the area—a task which will, and already is, assisting clients to make better use of the agencies' services.

The material that follows will be devoted to consideration only of certain inter-agency and inter-departmental relationships which have large scale implications for the extension and the effectiveness of public assistance services.

Public Health and Medical Care. A variety of physical ills beset the recipients of public assistance, some causing the recipient to turn to the agency for help, and some having developed subsequently. There is ample evidence of the fact that there is a higher infant mortality and a higher rate of fetal deaths in the South Central Area than elsewhere in Los Angeles County or in the State or in the country. The maternal death rates in the South Central Area also appear to be higher—by more than 100%—than elsewhere in the County. The incidence of tuberculosis, the deaths from this disease, and the reported cases of venereal disease also are at a higher rate than elsewhere in the County of Los Angeles. These facts have particular significance for the recipients of public assistance. Such services as are available to them are offered by the County Health department district that serves the area, but this health center has a limited number of clinics that serve the entire community, and they are not as accessible to recipients as might in many instances be the case.

The size of the caseload, the demands for the completion of routine activities which prevent many of the workers from being able to listen to clients who are having difficulties and feel they must devote what time they have with the client to the completion of forms, the relative inaccessibility of some staff for a variety of reasons—all of these conspire to prevent the worker from knowing the health needs of many of the women and children whom they

serve. It is not unusual for a woman to complete the full period of pregnancy without having consulted a physician or attended a clinic. It is not unusual for many of the young children in the household to have lived several years of their lives without having seen a doctor for immunization purposes or for checking their developmental health needs.

This lack of medical attention in these early years is particularly unfortunate in light of the extant evidence of the development of children damaged by faulty nutrition, by infectious diseases for which the child has not been immunized, and by trauma and abuse associated with unfavorable social and economic conditions—which themselves contribute to unsanitary and unhealthful factors affecting the child. The experiences of the first years of life are of the utmost importance for the development of intelligence. The first twelve months are especially crucial in many ways for all children and particularly those who are socially and economically deprived. If they are unable to take advantage of existing medical knowledge about nutrition, about immunization, about health care, they are prone to handicap in the future: they are unable to develop their capacities as learners in school, subsequently, their ability to become self-supporting individuals in a competitive labor market.

The Public Health District covering the South Central Area does not make information and medication available to public assistance recipients for birth control purposes, although the administrative personnel feel that the availability of such devices is a necessary part of its services. They also express their concern over the need for more clinics, which they are unable to establish for financial reasons, to meet the needs of the pregnant women and the young children in the area.

The lack of outpatient services as well as of inpatient services for other kinds of medical care creates additional hardships. Families who have ill members generally must travel for any medical care they need to one of the county general hospitals at great distances, at great cost, and with tremendous consumption of time. The consequence is that they are either unable or unwilling to make this effort, and important health matters are neglected.

Among the major needs of the South Central Area are additional maternal and child health clinics, prenatal clinics, and outpatient and inpatient medical facilities accessible to the residents

of the area, whether recipients of public assistance or other low-income families.

Mental Health Services. It already has been noted that a substantial number of recipients of public assistance are so emotionally or mentally damaged that they are unlikely to be able to use the specialized help of a psychiatric facility on an outpatient basis, even were such a facility to be available and willing to accept these individuals. But even in a field of service that is already in short supply, there is a disproportionate shortage of mental health services available to recipients of the South Central Area—and, particularly Watts—Area.

The County Department of Mental Health has provided psychiatric consultation to staff members, a service that has been especially productive in assisting some public assistance workers to deal with certain forms of deviant behavior. But such consultative services have been limited to a relatively few hours each month for the entire BPA, despite the Bureau's interest in having more.

Direct outpatient services are even more circumscribed. An extremely limited amount of psychiatric clinic service is available (primarily for approximately three hours per week via a clinic operated by a voluntary group work agency). A service agency recently created by the County Department of Mental Health offers consultation to agency personnel, but rarely direct patient service. The County Department of Mental Health also recently opened a "drop-in" clinic to offer short-term, or crisis, help. While these services are undoubtedly useful, the fact remains that the BPA clientele is disadvantaged by the unavailability of traditional psychiatric facilities for children or adults in the South Central Area.

Law Enforcement. Among other reasons, the federal Uniform Reciprocal Support Act, which is applicable in all instances of mothers seeking AFDC for children whose fathers are not contributing to their support, means that a close working relationship must be maintained between the BPA and the office of District Attorney—and, more particularly, the Failure-to-Provide personnel. The family characteristics of the AFDC recipients in the South Central Area lead to much referral, in accordance with federal, state, and local regulations. Regardless of how this kind of referral is handled, whether well or badly, the cumulative community resentment runs high. Much of this is directed toward the public assistance

personnel, even though the referral is not at the option of the worker. Unjustified as this reaction may be, it contributes to a general feeling extant in the community about the public assistance agency's "punitive" actions. On the other hand, agencies like the District Attorney's office acquire an impression of much fraud among recipients because of the legally required referrals either because a father is out of the picture, or a "male assuming the role of spouse" is in, as described in the segment on policies.

Employment Department. A number of AFDC-U recipients and applicants express anger over "treatment" received when they register for employment at the State Department of Employment. Not enough evidence is at hand for this writer to determine whether this negative treatment is more apparent than real, and whether the recipient is in fact responding with high feeling to job referrals that would take him as many as a hundred miles from home (particularly for farm labor) to earn wages that would not meet the family's survival needs. Some of this feeling is directed also the public assistance worker in instances like Mr. White's, whose wife was far along in pregnancy with a sixth child and who felt that her condition and that of a spastic child in the home requiring special help, prevented him from accepting such work. He was angry with the worker's comment, repeated by the Employment Service interviewer, that he could return home at the end of each week. "How much would be left to eat on?" he asked.

Chief Administrative Office. The various sections within this office have considerable impact upon the scope and effectiveness of the BPA programs and services. This office wields tremendous influence with regard to appropriation of funds, determination of location and financing of additional office space, agreement that additional positions should be allocated, etc. The influence of this office is the greater in light of the fact that the non-federal administrative expenses are paid from County funds. And the direction of its decisions is guided not only by fiscal matters, as it certainly must be, but by considerations of efficiency that are geared to procedural matters rather than to service-to-clients agency objectives.

Anti-Poverty Programs. The Bureau of Public Assistance has developed several proposals for activities and services that might be funded from War on Poverty sources. Some have been ap-

proved—such as the project to establish several child care centers in the South Central Area for which approval was received within the last two weeks. Furthermore, the BPA has worked very closely with other organizations that are part of the anti-poverty movement. This is true particularly of the Neighborhood Adult Participation Program (NAPP). Some of the NAPP aides are being used in various capacities within the Bureau, their activities directed toward improving services to recipients. Many of the NAPP aides have come from the public assistance caseloads (where, in many instances, this employment has served, in effect, to reduce the amount of the client's available income because of rent adjustments made by the Housing Authority in light of this income).

Some barriers exist to the use of such aides, which, although in process of being overcome, nevertheless have brought charges and criticism from some leaders in the NAPP program that the BPA "won't let them into the office," does not share information about other clients, etc. These irate accusation of non-cooperation may have some basis in the lack of understanding that has been evident among many BPA employees—to some degree, a product of poor intra-agency communication. However, much is unjustified and does not credit the legal requirements placed upon BPA to retain a confidential relationship with the recipient and the fact that sometimes troubled individuals do not really want to share their deep feelings (or the facts) with neighbors who are free to use this knowledge if they so choose. Intensive work is necessary on the part of EPA, and has been initiated, to bring about a better understanding and working relationship without the NAPP aides expecting to be present, and even dominating, in each interview involving a person in whom the NAPP aide is interested.

But eminently apparent has been the fact that many AFDC and other applicants and recipients have succeeded either in having needs met or at least being heard only through the intercession of the NAPP aide. This has proved to be particularly true in Southeast I, as well as in certain other parts of the County.

Gaps and Deficiencies

A review of the preceding material, regardless of the extensiveness of the recommendation, makes readily apparent the fact that the effectiveness of the public welfare agency in serving the disadvantaged living in the South Central Area is affected to a marked degree by a variety of factors. One consists of lacks in community facilities available to be called upon by public assistance personnel who need the help of such resources in the resolution of family social and economic problems. Some have been noted above, but additional ones might be mentioned, such as day care centers and licensed day care facilities in the South Central Area.

With regard to the latter, the Child Welfare Division has been engaged in a "crash" program to recruit adequate facilities for child care. With the help of volunteers, the number of day care homes in that area has been increased from fewer than twenty in June to more than 200 in October. These cannot accommodate many children. But many of the homes in the area are physically substandard and cannot meet even minimal licensing requirements necessary for protection of the child to be placed. In many homes, members have records of criminal behavior, and these, too, cannot be utilized. The search for homes continues, however, as a resource to supplement the placement facilities of the current child care centers (which can accommodate, at present, about 2,000 children) and the facilities that will be established with the project funds approved in late October.

In addition to the paucity of community resources that can serve the common purpose of the public assistance agencies (and some of which are further identified in the recommendations in Part III), there are administrative and legal factors that limit or prevent the provision of some helping services to needy persons in the South Central Area. These, too, are noted in the recommendations that follow.

III. NEEDS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The Los Angeles Bureau of Public Assistance, the public welfare agency charged with the responsibility for meeting the basic welfare needs of the economically distressed, extends its services county-wide, but 29 percent of those it serves in its public assistance programs reside in the South Central area—the Watts Riots Area. The responsibility for the direct disbursement of these services rests with this county agency, but most of the services are a tripartite responsibility of federal, state, and county government. Federal, state and county funds finance most of the assistance programs—AFDC, OAA, AB, ATD, MAA; federal and county funds

are used to defray the administration of these. The GR program is financed only with county funds; and only county and state funds defray the costs for most of the children placed in foster and institutional care.

The state must conform to federal policy in order to receive federal financial participation in the public assistance programs and, through the State Department of Social Welfare, is responsible for developing policies and regulations to extend public assistance throughout the state in an equitable fashion. The State Department of Social Welfare has a supervisory relationship to the county agency, which except for the services financed entirely from county funds, administers the welfare programs under the laws and regulations set by the state.

Some other social agencies, mostly of a voluntary privately financed character, operate in the South Central Area also. But by far, the bulk of the basic services are provided by the Bureau of Public Assistance—to meet economic needs and furnish rehabilitation and other social services to families and individuals in order to enable them to attain or retain capacity for self-care and self-support, and to strengthen family life.

A wide range of programs, resources, and services have developed, aimed at achieving goals of improved social and economic functioning. Some of the services are better, numerically and qualitatively, than others. Many are extended with efficient skill and warm interest in helping families and individuals to achieve the program objectives. In some segments of the Bureau, especially in the Watts area, there are special problems related to the providing of adequate services effectively to the people who come to the agency for help. Such special problems reflect deeply entrenched societal attitudes about public welfare programs and those who are aided by them. Although other disadvantaged areas in the county evoke similar societal attitudes, the Watts area poses special social and economic problems that complicate the achievement of the welfare goals—problems concentrated to such a high degree in the South Central area that their very scale precludes that, ostrich-like, they can be overlooked: the composition of the households, which are predominately headed by women, many of whom have not married; a relatively high ratio of children and relatively low level of income from either public assistance

or other sources; the limited educational achievement and paucity of job skills that compound the difficulty of obtaining employment in an already tight labor market; the prevalence of distrust, low self-esteem, deep-seated suspicion which require some modification if social functioning is to be improved.

The dramatic occurrence of the Watts Riots has stimulated considerable examination and reexamination of these traditional attitudes, but they still will constitute a prevalent and important factor in any final acceptance of change by those who make policy and appropriate funds for the conduct of the public welfare programs.

It is, nevertheless, with some degree of optimism, heightened by the fact that some changes already have occurred in personnel and procedures for implementing policy in the South Central Area, that the following recommendations are offered. They are proposed with awareness that some are not immediately achievable; that some require legislative action at the federal, state, or county level; that some have been suggested in the past and have been filed away; that some will meet with opposition stemming from personal, political, or ideological motives. But they are included here because in some way, at some time, they will facilitate the attainment of a goal that encourages adults to become dignified, contributive members of our democratic society, and offers their children opportunity to mature into physically and psychologically healthy adults whose social and economic functioning is satisfying to themselves and to the wider community.

The recommendations are directed toward filling certain gaps in community resources and in kinds and coverage of programs essential for the fulfillment of self-care and self-support goals. Some require legislative and/or administrative attention and action if family life is to be strengthened. It should be emphasized that although these recommendations are derived from consideration of the needs of recipients of public assistance, many would serve other families with low incomes whose social problems closely resemble those of families receiving financial aid from governmental sources.

Gaps in Community Resources Employment for Men, Women, Youth

Recognition should be given to the fact that the public welfare agency has a continuing role in the rehabilitation

and training of those dependent upon public assistance, but that the failure of our economic system to offer jobs that can be filled by the under-skilled and unskilled should be the responsibility of a work-oriented non-relief organization.

1. Accordingly, establish a State-operated public works program at the earliest opportunity to fill the present and future job-gap in our economic system.
 - a) It should be operated in conjunction with the California Employment Service. When the latter is unable to effect successful job placement in the regular labor market, it should take appropriate steps for placement of the potential employee on an appropriate public works activity.
 - b) The public works program should be diversified in nature, with long and short-term projects, capable of productively employing otherwise obsolescing skills of men or women, as well as persons able to do only unskilled work or to provide limited services.
 - c) Project activities should be located both within the disadvantaged community and outside it in locations that are reasonably accessible and do not contribute to segregation of work activities to a few communities.
 - d) Wages should be at prevailing levels for comparable employment, and provisions should be made for social insurance coverage to protect individuals and families from future loss of earnings.
 - e) Provisions should be made for continuity in planning and funding, both to avoid fiscal year-end anxiety and sudden stoppages in activities, as well as to provide regular evaluations to be sure that the public works programs are supplementing, and not substituting for, jobs in the open market.

Medical Care

2. Urge the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health—with financial assistance from State sources, if necessary—to furnish birth-control knowledge and devices to recipients of public assistance, and to other low-income families, where such procedures appear med-

ically appropriate and where, because of their economic status, the parents wish to use birth-control pills or such other devices as are medically recommended.

3. Urge the Los Angeles County Health Department to establish at the earliest possible time, additional prenatal and maternity and child care clinics in locations that are readily accessible by public transportation to women living in Watts.
4. Urge the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to establish facilities for in-patient and out-patient medical care to needy residents of the South Central Area, in locations accessible by public transportation—such medical care facilities to include the full array of medical services now available in other parts of Los Angeles County under public auspices.

Mental Health Services

5. Establish mental health services for adults and children in the Watts area and in adjacent localities in the South Central Area. Such services should be comprehensive—not only for emergencies or short-term care, but on the same sustained pattern as those offered in other areas of the City and County of Los Angeles.

Day Care Facilities for Children

6. Accelerate the search in disadvantaged areas, particularly Watts, for private homes suitable for licensing as foster day-care facilities to serve the very young child, as well as for those who require after-school care and who, because of individual problems, cannot be cared for in congregate settings.
7. Increase the number of day care centers that offer services not only to the parent who needs child care arrangements because of parental employment, but to offer some relief to burdened mothers who, from time to time, need a period of rest in order to remobilize their energies.

Legal Services

8. Make legal services available with particular attention focused on:
 - a) Complex financial entanglements (garnishments, attachments, bankruptcies, etc.)
 - b) Marital situations requiring legal attention.

Family Debt Counseling

1. Urge the Consumer Credit Council of California, with the object of establishing a non-profit family debt counseling service in the South Central Area to:

- a) Provide consultation services to personnel in the Bureau of Public Assistance and other agencies in the area who counsel recipients with complex credit and indebtedness problems; and to
- b) Provide needy persons, directly, with family debt counseling services aiming to assist the family in bringing their indebtedness problems under control.

Facilities for Cashing Assistance Checks

10. Inquire of the State Banking Commission, or the California Banking Association, or the Office of the California Consumer Counsel—or of the Post Office Department—to ascertain the kinds of identification that would be required and the administrative costs and other arrangements that might be necessary to institute a service through banks or Post Offices to cash the monthly or semi-monthly checks for properly identified public assistance recipients. The administrative costs of handling such check-cashing arrangements, designed to protect the recipient from exploitation, should be borne by the public assistance agency as a proper administrative charge, reimbursable from federal funds.

Policies and Regulations

Strengthen Family Life

11. Request a review of the Attorney General's Opinion 64/63 (issued in January of 1955) or, if indicated, a modification of the appropriate sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code (Section 1508 and Section 1575) with regard to "the man assuming the role of spouse," with the objective of:
 - a) Determining the possibility of flexibly interpreting "essential" to include the man who also assumes the role of father in a fairly stable union, even though there is no marriage, and none of the children in the household are his.
 - b) Testing its congruence with the unrestricted money payment principle.

c) Also planning its contribution relative to defining morality in terms of financial contributions.

12. Extend AFDC to the 16 and 17 year old children living in the family home who are not in school and not engaged in a training course, but who none-the-less are in need of maintenance and counseling directed toward improving their social and economic adjustment.
13. Establish a working committee of federal, state, and county welfare department representatives to identify the several federal and state policies and regulations that operate against strengthening of family life, and to suggest legislative and administrative remedies.

Coverage

14. Encourage maximum self-support by supplementing full-time earnings to meet the difference between income and need per the State's standards of assistance, when the bread-winner of the family is working full-time, to the maximum of his capacity, and is achieving his full potential as an earner.
15. Extend Public Assistance Medical Care to the adults in an AFDC family so that medical needs other than emergency dental care and outpatient rehabilitation services (when these are available and accessible) may be provided in order to aid the adult to maintain or regain a state of health.
16. Provide for eye evaluation and necessary appliances as preventive health care measures for children in AFDC families.

Standards of Assistance

17. Revise the provisions in the Welfare and Institutions Code to alter the participation base which sets a ceiling on assistance that may be paid to families of given size at a level below that established by the state as "minimum adequate."
18. Examine the advisability of computing grants to AFDC families on a standard grant basis similar to that used in Old Age Security, with provision for special needs, in order to:
 - a) simplify the process of determining the amount of assistance to be issued to families;
 - b) enable the recipient family to manage more adequately as a re-

sure that assistance is given not only efficiently and economically, but effectively in the attainment of the public assistance goals.

- b) Exert stronger efforts to recruit social work skills at all levels, offering opportunities to present staff for training in any of the many schools available in the state, and offering salaries commensurate with the expectation that these skills will help many people toward improved economic and social functioning.
 - c) Intensify induction and in-service training activities geared toward increasing employees' understanding of the dynamics of behavior and constructive ways of dealing with it, adjusting work loads to permit time and energy to be devoted to such training.
- 39. Urge priority assignment to intake of highly qualified personnel in order to make available the necessary diagnostic skills to begin rehabilitative treatment as soon as an application for aid is made.
 - 40. Expand the Homemaker Service as a regular part of the Bureau of Public Assistance personnel program, and include these employees in the classified service.
 - 41. Extend the use of community welfare consultants from the present four in every densely populated area containing a substantial number of public assistance recipients, with the objective of engaging in community relations work, interpreting services and programs of the Bureau of Public Assistance, and interpreting to this agency the patterns of problems and needs evident in the community.
 - 42. Urge the County to establish the position of Housing Coordinator, and to assign such position to each district serving a disadvantaged area, with the objective of helping recipients to deal with problems of housing that require either assessment and guidance for improving it as a sanitary and safe dwelling, or intercession with a recalcitrant landlord who might be expected to provide necessary repairs and improvements.
- ### Organizational Arrangements
- 43. Urge the State Department of Social Welfare to establish an area office serving only the County of Los Angeles, and to provide staff and mechanisms for:
 - a) Consultation, including sufficient field staff to assure conformity with intent as well as with the letter of policies and regulations.
 - b) Increased opportunity to the Bureau of Public Assistance to participate with the State in the development of procedures applicable to a County with the complexity and size of this one.
 - 44. Examine the advisability of separating the Bureau of Public Assistance from the Department of Charities and establishing this Bureau as a separate department within the County structure, its Director responsible directly to the Board of Supervisors and, within the framework of laws and regulations of the State and of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, accountable to the State Department of Social Welfare for the administration of federally aided or state subvented programs.
 - 45. Strengthen the channels of communication and lines of authority and responsibility between the central administration of the Bureau of Public Assistance and the districts—perhaps through field services—to insure compliance with the purpose and content of regulations, and to maintain constant awareness of the impact of policies and procedures on the efficiency and adequacy of the public assistance services.
 - 46. Urge the reexamination of the district organization in order to provide for appropriate delegations of authorization and responsibility through the hierarchy, so that the giving of aid can be expedited while a reasonable degree of uniformity in policy interpretation and application is maintained.

Epilogue

by

Audrey Rawitscher, Assistant Professor, Sociology and Social Welfare, California State College at Long Beach

EPILOGUE

Audrey Rawitscher, ACSW

The Feldman Statement was sent to the directors of state and county welfare departments and to other individuals and agencies who were concerned with the recommendations made. There is no evidence the state agencies did more than acknowledge receipt. One state official did indicate they were proposing legislation which resembled certain of the Feldman recommendations but had been arrived at independently.

The Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance, on the other hand, attempted to consider each of the recommendations in the light of existing programs, procedures, and policies. Where it seemed appropriate and possible, changes were instituted as rapidly as possible.

The County Board of Supervisors was persuaded to enact nine ordinances which permitted raising the ceiling on general relief so that it was commensurate with that of unemployment compensation and liberalizing the length of time non-residents might be aided. Administration was strengthened and a guiding statement of policy was issued to serve as the foundation for policy and procedure implementation, particularly in the area of emergency aid. A proposal to provide separate administration responsibility for public social services was approved by the electorate. Agency training was adapted to emphasize the client's point of view. Top-level administrative personnel was encouraged to undertake graduate study in social work and three were enrolled at once with full agency stipends. The press reported additional clinics, more transportation, and the appointment of a Coordinator of Community Relations Activity by the Police Department.

But the gains, in large measure, were more apparent than real. Only when an attempt was made to look behind the improvements were the said realities uncovered.

The Bureau of Public Assistance still administered archaic and illogical public welfare legislation. The State Department of Social Welfare had not yet changed from a procedure-oriented to a policy-oriented agency.

The numbers involved in job training and placement were not enough to reduce noticeably the enormous unemployment rate in Watts. The only progress toward providing a local public hospital was some discussion of a method of financing. The Coordinator of Community Relations Activity had no regular staff. Agencies working most closely with the community reported that hostility raged almost unabated.

The question now remains whether fundamental changes will be forthcoming. Present programs require that those in need seek out the help offered. Not only is there no provision for case-finding, but efforts in that direction have been labeled as "encouraging dependency."

The current flurry of programs have about them an illusory quality. They are reassuring in the amount of activity they provoke. But unless they go much deeper and reach out much more, they only provide a bit more service to those already served.

1964-

Philadelphia --

N woman arrested --

NW - Sep 7

Black Nat agitator - woman killed --

Hi Deemity - Hi China Area -

Cleveland - 1966 -

4 killed - 46 injured - ~~140 arrested~~ -

FBI -

June 23 -

get KKKs out dist. fr. of JFK House - get county Center -
some police members of RAA -

Some over road dist. in 1963

Threw Rocks at Cars - broken windows -

W man fr. p. car - hit 10 yr old N in groin -

Remov. W. guy took up 2 N's - police not interested -

Mod. cockles thru fr. rooftops into center of street by 4000 ft.

Damage less than \$1,000 -

Disturbances continue 10 days through - by N. Families -

Distributing leaflets attacking police -

July 18 - be own report glass of water to 'N girl -' (murder)

Sniper report -

1 young N woman + ~~2 others~~ killed, 20 others injured by gunfire -

Small police office injured by rocks

NG called -

2nd man widespread - not at infirmary -

36 yr old N killed by shot - others wounded -

4 police

NG shoot - at car - kill 16 yr old ^{girl} - injure 3 children in car -

↳ backing out of driving - ran over fire hose - argument ensued -

dead

54 yr old N shot by woman fr. car -

21 yr old N shot by W Youth - Vigilante Group -

Mod Cocktails - then by juveniles -

Instruction on how to make leaflets -

JFK lecture on Thos, Black Nationalism - etc -

April 1964 - reflects found to protect ~~the~~ civil rights

Announcement when police fort to close -

Lewis C. Robinson - publicly announced -

~~Spencer~~ Wored not a CP kept the CP below in the past -

L undercover agent for police dept - CP Youth Club member -

approached Robinson - asked if he'd accept help -

NW Aug 1 "Granite warfare" - stated by NA colonel -

N4WR - Aug 22 - End July "Conspiracy" report -

Aug 8 -
NW+WR -- states keeping "secrested" of riots -
NY (SPONGE)

Aug 22 - Stokely -- Negroes not non-violence + patience -
called "Uncle Tom"

Patterns of Riots --

Newark -- MUSLIMS -- July 8 --
Educ Bd Meeting -- June 27 --

Detroit -- Danny Thomas incident --
+ blind pigs --

{ Planned Protest
Staged Incident
or Suspicious
Unusual / Circumstances

Aim of Riot
MOTIVE

Right-wing Activity --

White Rioting (L.A., Detroit, Cincinnati, Tampa,
RW cities)

Jersey Shing

(Totality of Circumstances)

Methodology

Conclusions --

-- The Nature of a Conspiracy --

Surface --

or is exposed --

Clandestine, small group -- difficult to discover --

Action firm
but judicious

No Police ^{Measures} ~~Force~~ -- Adequate -

Risk grows each Summer -

Must convince
Black Americans
dedicated to
justice + to
achievement
of equality.

Root Causes must be attacked -

Cooperation
in achieving
that equality --

1965 - Bogalusa, La.

Los Angeles, Calif.

KBI

Chicago - Ill.

Aug 12 - cony. - small rally protest -- hissl & whiff -

11:30 pm. Fire Truck w/o Tillman goes out of control -

200 thru at car

AET tries to calm

David FO outgun

"Spartacist" leaflets -

"he in concentration camps"

Nat - Aug 30 44

Tomb murder of 11/11/11 -- 5 y old N girl murdered in car - w/ knife -

Along Jackson murder - KKK signs - eggs + tomatoes --

1966 - Los Angeles - Watts II --
Deadwyler -

Omaha -

Friedrichs not off -- police, arrest -
Complain - John, Edward, etc.

Chicago --

Time, NW

~~FB~~

2 gunshots during, on 14-yr old girl (pregnant) ^{shy bullets}
Friedrichs - youth under age - ^{granted} up police -
Cops informed -
NG not, typed - ^{Sprinkler on hydraulic}
Police gunfire - (Sniper)
Police officer wounded - "Gunfire accident."
"Gays!"

FB1

Rumors arrested ^{youth} / beaten -

Not OK -

SLE advise calm --

Not as widespread as at 11th Avenue - ^{anterior} -

2 11-yr olds arrested during police car -

Teenager roaming -

Tension between Mayor Daley & Dr King -

more than 4,000 NB -

533 arrests, 378 Ad, 155 Ju -

8 Police officers shot, 61 injured -

Life --

Chicago - 1966 July 30 - Aug 7 -
Housing Integral Munk - asked by Whites -
(Crazy Youthful)

1961- Chicago --

Wd some N fine refugees --

mm

mm

1964- Jacksonville, Florida

Clash between municipal authorities & N's asking

NW- April 6- desegregation³ . . . Molotov cocktails . .

Woman killed - shot - etc.

Cleveland . . .

Wm. Miller killed - Building Site -

Battle over education -

Court Injunction -

CC May 6-

New York -

Lilligan - "N" boy -

Malcolm X, RLM -

Harlem - Bedford-Stuyvesant -

Police fire over the heads of rioters 1000s of shots -

NW-July, FBI

N+WR, Jul 27

1964

Rochester, NY -

FBI

Police must at street dance -

FBI -

Jersey City -

Time, Aug 14

Female Arrest -

Building up Long Street -

3 Civil Rights Worker beaten
 Ford -- Aug 14 Col shot killed
 in Ga.

R

Salem --

FBI

Police attempt to break up crowd --

NW - Aug 24

FBI

Elizabeth

Teenagers running through streets -

FBI

Chicago - Dixon --

N.W. on Lewis 2074 up in light store -- by La Pote --

Bedford - Styvesant -

FBI - July 13 - N of car arrests N youth - distinct photos -

Next with bus stop, crowd gathering

July 21 - SPONGE pickets app integral of Whitford -
Mayor John Lindsay - meeting w/ N + W residents -

11 yr old N boy shot + killed -- that with -

chase erupts in Whitford - shots fired --

several N teenagers arrested -

Continuing fights all summer N + W youths -

NW Aug 8 - 17 yr old neighbor + friend - friend .25 caliber pistol - disarming
after 11 yr old had gone to see Mayor Lindsay -