

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION  
ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

December 20, 1967

Bob:

I asked Chick to have a few team people read the revised version of your paper (i.e., the version that the Commission saw). They focused almost entirely on specific facts that appeared questionable. I pass along the pages that they had questions about; a few seem clearly worth checking.

  
David Chambers

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : David Chambers

DATE: December 8, 1967

FROM : Charles Nelson

SUBJECT:

1. Attached is the revised Conot paper. We have marked several points of fact and a few of interpretation which have been seriously questioned by team members.

2. We have not indicated on this copy where we lack information to verify statements in the paper. Nor have we included supplemental information given in our first comments. On reading the revised paper, we note that many of our comments, and suggestions had not been used. Our first draft can be checked for these.

3. About methods for checking factual assertions, I believe that between Conot's people and our team members we could establish the source for the facts stated.

most of



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Robert Conot

A SHORT NARRATIVE HISTORY, PROFILE,  
AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF THE  
SUMMER OF 1967

Please note the following pages:

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*Revised*

attempting to operate within the framework of the nation's laws, were jailed and prosecuted with impunity by those who opposed the laws.

As more and more of the workers suffered serious injuries and death, and little was changed as a result, more and more began to believe that in a confrontation between moral persuasion and violence, violence would be the victor.

The turning point was reached in the summer of 1963.

*Wasn't it the summer of '64 & the COFO experience - ?*  
The most massive demonstrations the South had seen began in Birmingham, Alabama. The white response was a series of bombings that inflamed Negroes. Retaliation against whites in the form of rock-throwing and burning of white-owned property began. A series of bloody battles was fought with the police. The culmination came in the quiet of one Sunday morning. As a group of Negro children sat in Sunday school, a bomb exploded beneath the church. Four young girls were killed. No one was tried for the murders. The sacrifice had achieved virtually nothing. Birmingham remained as white supremacist as ever.

Yet, all over the nation, Birmingham had forged a bond among Negroes. Psychologically they had marched with the marchers, suffered with the injured, and become more and more embittered at the authorities.



"The white power structure will not 'willingly' yield to the democratic concept of 'majority rule'."

*Weren't they  
asked by  
then?*

*Their point:  
integration  
& impossible  
irrelevant*

By the spring of 1967, such extremists as Stokely Carmichael and H. "Rap" Brown were saying: "You can't turn your back on violence, because you can't live in America if you're black and be non-violent." Proclaiming ever more stridently that America was conducting "genocide" against the black man, their goal was to convince white America that a revolution was in the making, and Black America that white America would respond to black grievances with a policy of suppression and violence. Only if they could create a climate in which revolution would feed on anger, bigotry, and fear, and violence could they hope that their words would be heeded by the masses; that they themselves could attain the stature of leaders.

The trap had been baited and set. The question remained, would it be sprung?

into his car and drove him to the hospital. He died shortly thereafter.

As officers were leaving the scene, a storm broke. Beneath the pelting rain, the spectators scattered. When an officer went back to check the area he found no one on the streets.

A few minutes after 7:00 P.M., the Selective Enforcement Unit, tired and sun-parched, reported in from the races. A half hour later a report was received that 500 persons were gathering. A police car was sent into the area to check the report. The officers could find no one. The men of the Selective Enforcement Unit were told to go home.

The men in the scout car, had not, however, penetrated into the Central Village Housing complex where, as the rain ended, hundreds of persons poured from the apartments. At least half of them were teenagers and youths. As they began to mill about, old grievances, both real and imagined, were resurrected: discriminatory practices of local stores, advantages taken by white men of Negro girls, the kicking in the face of a Negro by a white man, as the Negro lay handcuffed on the ground, the lack of recreation facilities, the blackballing of two Negro high schools by the Athletic Conference, the shooting of one of two handcuffed Negro youth by a police officer. *This happened after the riot.*

When Officer Oates returned to the area it was seething with teenagers and young adults. Attempting to convince them to disperse of their own accord, he assured them a complete

There was no Negro on the City Council; none on the School Board; none on the Fire Department; none of high rank on the Police Force. Four out of every ten Negroes lived in shacks with broken window panes, leaking gas, and holes in the walls through which rats scampered. Rents were fifty to sixty dollars a month. Recreational facilities were few. Those that did exist lacked equipment and supervisors. Young toughs pre-empted and intimidated the children who tried to use them.

*see figures  
all 3-5%*  
In the schools, the majority of Negroes never reached the eighth grade. Of ~~every 1,000~~ <sup>3-5%</sup> Negro students who were graduated from high school, only ~~28~~ could attain the minimum passing score on the State's college entrance examination.

A difference of at least three-and-a-half years in educational attainment separated the average Negro and white youth. Fifty-five percent of the Negroes in Tampa were working in unskilled jobs. More than half of the families had incomes of less than \$3,000 a year. The result was that 40 percent of the children lived in broken homes, and the city's crime rate was among the top 25 percent in the nation.

Although the meeting between the residents and the officials broke up without concrete results, the Governor believed it had enabled the residents to let off steam.

That evening, as National Guard troops supplanted local forces in maintaining a perimeter and establishing roving patrols,

• anti-poverty workers went from door to door, urging citizens to stay off the streets.

A reported attempt by Black Muslims to incite people failed. Although there were scattered reports of trouble from several areas of the city, and a few fires were set -- a goodly proportion of them in vacant buildings -- there were no major incidents.

✓ <sup>Twelve</sup>  
(~~Three~~ youths were arrested when discovered with a cache of molotov cocktails. They were white. They were the only firebugs caught during the riot.)

All during the next day false reports poured into Police Headquarters. Normal, everyday scenes took on menacing tones.

— Twenty Negro men, bared to the waist, and carrying clubs, were reported to be gathering. They turned out to be construction worker

Mayor Nuccio continued, with uncertain success, to meet with residents. At their suggestion that the man most likely to carry weight with the youngsters was Coach Jim Williams, he placed a call to Tallahassee, where Williams was attending a Coaching Clinic.

An impressive-looking man with graying hair, Williams had been the football coach at the high school serving the central city. A year earlier he had become an assistant coach at Louisiana's Southern University.

It was almost 48 hours after the shooting of Martin Luther King that Williams arrived in Tampa. Together with another coach he was

CINCINNATI

*mod* —→ In October, 1965, a series of assaults on and murders  
*lasted* of middle-aged white women *began which* had generated an *increasing* atmosphere of  
*very fr.* fear in the city. ~~Although the newspapers were generally~~  
*-not* ~~restrained in their treatment of the case.~~ *disagree* When it became  
*in fact* known that the tentative identification of the "Cincinnati  
*papers* Strangler" indicated him to be a Negro, a new element of  
tension was injected into relations between the races.

In December, 1966, a jazz musician named Postel Laskey was arrested and charged with one of the murders. In May of 1967 he was convicted and sentenced to death. Although two of the principal witnesses against Laskey were Negroes, many persons in the Negro community felt that because of the charged atmosphere he had not received a fair trial. They were even further incensed when a white man, convicted of manslaughter in the death of his mistress, received a suspended sentence.

Despite the fact that the cases were dissimilar, there was talk in the Negro community that the difference in the severity of sentences was indicative of a double standard of justice for white and black.

Following Laskey's conviction a drive began in the community to raise funds for an appeal. Laskey's cousin, Peter Frakes, began walking the streets, carrying a sandwich

✓ saying "Cincinnati guilty - Laskey innocent."  
board advertising the "~~Laskey Freedom Fund~~." After warning  
him several times about his activities, police arrested  
Frakes on a charge of violating the city's ~~anti-loitering~~  
~~ordinance~~ against obstructing pedestrian traffic. ✓

INSERT  
on p. 20  
A major portion of the Negro community looked upon the  
~~anti-loitering~~  
ordinance as an anti-Negro one. Between January and June,  
1966, of some 240 persons arrested under it, 170 had been  
Negro.

Frakes was arrested at 12:35 A.M. on Sunday morning,  
June 11. That evening, concurrent with the commencement of  
a Baptist Convention, Dr. Martin Luther King spoke ~~in one~~ <sup>at two</sup>  
~~of the~~ <sup>second</sup> churches. Following the speech it was announced that  
a meeting to protest the Frakes arrest and the anti-loitering  
ordinance would be held the following night <sup>on the grounds of</sup> ~~at~~ a junior high  
school in the Avondale District. ✓

Without realizing the implication, Cincinnati over  
the years had been making protests through political and  
non-violent channels <sup>by not responding to them.</sup> more and more difficult. It seemed  
more and more futile to the young, militant element in the  
Negro community to abide by accepted procedure.

Although the city's Negro population had been rising  
swiftly -- in 1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 resi-  
dents were Negroes -- there was only one Negro sitting on  
the City Council. In the 1950's, with a far smaller Negro

population, there had been two. Negroes attributed this to the fact that the city had ~~abolished its proportional representation system of election,~~ <sup>changed from a district to an at-large election of the nine councilmen,</sup> thereby diluting the

his was before R. was let out. —> Negro vote. When a Negro <sup>had</sup> received the largest total vote of any of the councilmen -- traditionally the criterion for choosing ~~which of the councilmen was to be chosen~~ <sup>the</sup> mayor -- tradition was cast aside and a white man was picked for mayor instead.

Although 40 percent of the school children were Negro, there was only one Negro on the Board of Education. Of 81 members of various city commissions, only one was a Negro.

Picketing the construction site of a new city convention hall, to protest lack of Negro membership in building trades unions, produced no results. When the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, who had led the Negroes in the Birmingham march of 1963, staged a protest against alleged discriminatory practices at the County Hospital, he and his followers were arrested for trespassing. Sentenced to jail, the Rev. Shuttlesworth had his sentence suspended. Placed on probation, he was kept under the court's jurisdiction, and was thus prevented from leading further non-violent protests.

Traditional Negro leaders drawn from an affluent and conservative middle class became more and more discredited as grandiose promises degenerated into petty results. Of

The police department mobilized its forces for a possible disturbance. However, because of complaints from Negro militants that the police themselves were an inciting factor -- some months earlier, following a speech by Stokely Carmichael, a crowd had gathered and burned the car of a plainclothesman -- it was decided to withhold the police from the immediate area of the scheduled protest meeting that evening.

It appeared as if this policy might be rewarded until, toward the close of the rally, a wealthy Negro real estate broker arose to defend both the police and the anti-loitering ordinance. <sup>INSERT</sup> <sup>rom p. 16</sup> The largely youthful, militant audience was incensed. When the meeting broke up a missile was hurled through the window of a nearby <sup>drug store and a fire was set</sup> ~~church~~ <sup>A small fire was</sup> ~~set in the street~~ ✓

The police were able to react quickly. There was only one major confrontation between them and the mob. Little resistance was offered.

Although windows were broken in some two dozen stores, there was virtually no looting. There were 14 arrests, some of them not connected with the disturbance. Among those arrested was a ~~former~~ <sup>who is now</sup> community worker, studying for a doctorate at Brandeis University. Called to the area to help get people off the streets, he was charged with loitering.



The next morning it was stated by the judge of the Municipal Court, before whom most of the persons charged were to be brought, that he intended to mete out the maximum sentence to anyone found guilty of a riot-connected offense. Although the judge intended the statement to act as a deterrent against further violence, to many persons in the Negro community it appeared further evidence of discriminatory justice.

1 points removed from Mon. night riot as well as well as Tues. d.m.  
Tuesday morning a list of 11 ~~demands~~ <sup>points</sup> and grievances ~~stemming from the Monday night meeting~~ was presented to the municipal government. Included were demands for repeal of the loitering law, release of all prisoners arrested during the disturbance, full employment for Negroes, and equal justice in the courts.

Municipal officials agreed that the city council would consider the ~~demands~~ <sup>points</sup>. Officials, however, rejected the call that they attend an open-air meeting of residents in the Avondale section that evening. City leaders did not want to give stature to the militants by acknowledging them as the de facto representatives of the community. Yet, by all indications, the militants were the only persons with influence on the people on the streets.

Mayor Walter H. Bachrach declared that he was "quite surprised" by the disturbance because the council had "worked like hell" to help Negroes.

## ATLANTA

As "Rap" Brown arrived in Cincinnati on Thursday, June 15, to attempt to exploit the riot situation there, SNCC's home base of Atlanta, Georgia, was beginning to ferment. Rapid industrialization following World War II, coupled with annexations that quadrupled the area of the city, had made Atlanta a vigorous and booming community. Pragmatic business and political leaders gave to the city the reputation of the "Moderate stronghold of the Deep South."

Nevertheless, although <sup>de jure</sup> integration of schools and facilities has been accepted, the fact that the city is the headquarters for both civil rights organizations and segregationist elements, makes the modus vivendi between the races a tenuous one.

The rapidly growing Negro population, which, by the summer of 1967, had reached an estimated 44 percent and was scattered in several ghettos throughout the city, was maintaining constant pressure on surrounding white residential areas. Blockbusting tactics were frequently and successfully utilized. On one occasion the city barricaded a road to prevent movement between white and Negro areas. The city police were constantly under pressure to keep marches and countermarches of civil rights and white supremacist organizations from flaring into violence.

followers. Approaching a police captain, Carmichael asked why there were so many police cars in the area. Informed that they were there to make sure there was no disturbance, Carmichael started dancing up and down, clapping his hands and singing words to the effect that there might have to be a riot if the police cars were not removed. When Carmichael refused to move on as requested, he was arrested.

Residents were bitter about their inability to get the city government to correct conditions and make improvements. Petitions would be acknowledged, but not acted upon. Because elections were on an at-large basis, only one of the 16 aldermen was a Negro, and many black wards were represented by white aldermen.

Demands for a swimming pool, for an access road to a nearby city park, for rodent and pest control, for better lighting and better garbage collection, had been to no avail. As the residents mingled and discussed their grievances, it was decided to organize several committees, and to hold a protest meeting on the following night.

Upon his release from jail Monday morning, Carmichael declared that the black people were preparing to resist "armed aggression" by the police by whatever means necessary.

Shortly thereafter in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center, which had been closed down for the day, a <sup>man who had been drinking,</sup> ~~drunk~~, using a broom handle, began to pound on the bell of a burglar alarm, trying to stop its ringing.

When officers responded and requested him to stop hitting the bell, the <sup>man</sup>~~drunk~~ complied, and <sup>blows were exchanged.</sup>~~began hitting the officers.~~ In the ensuing scuffle several bystanders intervened. One of the officers drew his service revolver and fired, superficially wounding the <sup>man</sup>~~drunk~~.

Tension rose. Approximately 250 persons were present at the evening's meeting. When a number of Negro leaders urged the submission of a petition of grievances through legal channels, the reception was tepid. When Carmichael took to the podium, urging Negroes "to take to the streets and force the police department to work until they fall in their tracks," the response was tumultuous.

The press quoted him as continuing: "It's not a question of law and order. We are not concerned with peace. We are concerned with the liberation of black people. We have to build a revolution."

As the people present at the meeting poured into the street they were joined by others. The crowd soon numbered an estimated 1,000. Fifty of these began throwing rocks and bottles at the 40 police officers on the scene.

Reinforced by approximately <sup>160</sup>~~200~~ other officers, police, firing over the heads of the crowd, quickly regained control. Of the ten persons arrested, six were 21 years of age or younger, and only one was in his thirties. ✓

The next morning city equipment appeared in the area to begin work on the long-delayed projects demanded by the citizens. It was announced a Negro Youth <sup>Patrol</sup>~~Corps~~ would be established along the lines of the Tampa White Hats. ✓

SNCC responded that volunteers would be selling their "Black brothers out," and would be viewed as "Black Traitors," to be dealt with in the "manner we see fit."

Nevertheless, during the course of the summer the 200 youths participating in the corps played an important role in preventing a major outbreak.

Another meeting of area residents was called for Tuesday evening. At its conclusion 200 protesters were met by 300 police officers. As two police officers chased several boys down the street, a <sup>molotov cocktail</sup>~~cherry bomb or incendiary~~ ~~device~~ exploded at the officers' feet. In response, several shots emanated from police ranks, which, in that vicinity, consisted mostly of Negro officers. ✓

The discharge from one shotgun struck in the midst of several persons sitting on the front porch of a house. A 46-year old man was killed. A 9-year old boy was critically injured.

~~Due to the efforts of neighborhood workers who circulated through the area, and the later appearance of~~  
The area was quiet and

~~Mayor Allen,~~ no further violence ensued. When H. "Rap" Brown, who had returned to the city that afternoon, went to other Negro areas in an attempt to initiate a demonstration against the shooting of the Negroes on the porch, he met with no response. Atlanta, <sup>police controlled</sup> ~~had weathered its crisis~~ the city's first 1967 disorder.

only a high school education, and almost 80 percent of school children in the system were Negro, the issue of how to obtain the secretaryship, a lucrative and powerful position, quickly became a cause celebre.

Joined with the issue of the 146-acre medical school the area of which was triple the original request -- expansion regarded by the militants as a ploy to dilute political power by moving out Negro residents -- the Board of Education battle brought on a dire confrontation between the mayor and the militants. Both sides refused to budge from their positions. The impasse was complete and unresolvable.

Into this impasse stepped a Washington Negro named Roy Osborne. A flamboyant, 42-year old former wig salesman who called himself Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed, he presided over a mythical "Black Liberation Army." Articulate and magnetic, Colonel Hassan <sup>was able to get</sup> ~~proved to be a one-man~~

~~He brought~~ Negro residents flocking to Board of Education and Planning Board meetings. The Colonel was not afraid to speak in violent terms, nor to back his words with violent action. In one instance he tore the tape from the recorder, so that there would be no record of the

✓  
Hassan  
is still  
overpld

Lofton and Curvin decided that, in order to move the crowd out, they would organize a march on City Hall immediately instead of waiting until the following day.

The protesters now had been augmented by an estimated 25 cab drivers who, upon hearing of Smith's arrest, had decided to stage a rally of their own. They began taking

on passengers for the short trip to the City Hall. ~~As~~

? The police charged again and Curvin climbed to the top of an automobile, <sup>as</sup> rocks started

flying. Someone yelled: "Man, get off that damn car!"

Automobiles were set on fire. It was approximately midnight when a fire engine, arriving on the scene, was pelted with bricks and bottles. The police, their heads protected by World War I helmets, sallied forth in full force. The marchers, who were still in the process of forming, were scattered. A few minutes later down the street the first liquor store was broken into.

However, only a few stores were looted, and, by about 2:30 A.M., the disturbance appeared to have run its course.

The next afternoon the Mayor described it as an isolated incident. Invited to appear before and talk to the people at a protest rally being organized at the housing



✓  
city  
as a  
egro  
(unlabeled)

Everywhere there was the same inequality with regard to education, job opportunities, income, and housing. Everywhere there was the same lack of representation of Negroes on the local government. In six New Jersey communities with sizeable Negro populations, there were a total of only five Negro Councilmen. In a half dozen school systems in which Negro children composed as much as half of the school population, there were only a total of six members of the Board of Education. In <sup>virtually</sup> none of the municipal governments did a Negro hold a key position. In each of the ghettos the Negro felt himself surrounded by an intransigent wall of whites.

In four suburban cities -- Bloomfield, Harrison, Irvington, and Maplewood -- forming an arc about Newark, out of a total population of more than 150,000, only 1,000 were Negroes. In the six cities surrounding Plainfield, out of a population of more than 75,000, only 1,500 were Negro.

Two northern New Jersey communities, Jersey City and Elizabeth, had had disturbances in 1964. The view from Jersey City is that of the New York skyline. Except for a few imposing buildings, such as those of the high-rise New Jersey Medical Center, much of Jersey City is a collection of nondescript and deteriorating houses, fleshed out with factories and cut up by ribbons of super-highways and railroads.

As one of the principal freight terminals for New York

feared that if the violence were not curbed it would turn into a bloodbath.

One worker discovered several youngsters siphoning gasoline into soda bottles from a truck in an alley. He managed to talk them out of the Molotov cocktails.

The confrontation between the police and the mob of teenagers was progressing toward a climax when a chicken fluttered out of the shattered window of a poultry market. One youth attempted to throw gasoline on it and set it afire. As the gasoline sloshed onto the pavement, the chicken leaped. The flames merely singed its feathers. A gangling six-foot youth attempted to leap upon the chicken. The bird was too quick for him. As it darted out of his way, he slipped and tumbled against a tree.

The stark unwitting comedy broke the tension. People laughed. Soon they began to drift home.

The following day tensions in the area mounted again as police patrolled the 36 square blocks with 220 men, some of them stationed on rooftops. Early in the evening the mayor agreed to meet with a delegation of 13 community leaders. When they entered his office, the <sup>city director and the</sup> chief of police was already present. The mayor read ~~him~~ an executive order to: "Shoot to kill. . . . Force will be met with superior force." An officer's deviation from this order, the mayor said, would be cause for dismissal.

before Newark. As part of this expectation they had tested tear gas guns on the police firing range, situated in the middle of the Negro residential area. The wind had blown the tear gas into surrounding houses. The occupants had been enraged.

The day following the outbreaks in Elizabeth and Jersey City, police began warning the businessmen in Englewood to prepare for a riot.

On Friday, July 21, on the report that crowds were gathering, police issued a general alarm. <sup>Two hundred-twenty</sup> ~~Three hundred~~ police officers from <sup>31</sup> surrounding communities <sup>and county police</sup> were brought into the city. As rumors of an impending riot swept the city numbers of curious citizens began gathering at street corners.

At 9:00 o'clock that evening a fire truck responded to an alarm. It was pelted with rocks. As policemen arrived to provide protection, some members of the bands of unemployed Negro youths who regularly hung out at street corners began breaking store windows. The windows damaged apparently were selected at random. A paint store window was broken but a jewelry store window was left untouched. There was no looting. Police, sealing off the area, quickly contained the disturbance.

Abortive attempts at revenge against three businesses accused of shoddy practices continued for one or two nights.

DETROIT

On Saturday evening, July 22, while the Black Power Conference was still in session, the Detroit Police Department raided five blind pigs. The blind pigs had had their origin in the days before World War II, when they had served as private social clubs for affluent Negroes who, because of discrimination, had been unable to gain entrance to public night spots. Gradually, as public facilities opened their doors to Negroes, the character of the blind pigs had changed, and they had become illegal drinking and gambling spots.

The fifth blind pig on the list, the United Community and Civic League at the corner of 12th Street and Clairmount, had been raided twice before. Once ten persons had been picked up; another time, 28. A Detroit Vice Squad officer had tried but been unable to gain entrance to the blind pig shortly after ten o'clock Saturday night. When, on his second attempt, he was successful, it was 3:45 A.M. Sunday morning.

✓ The Tactical Mobile Unit, the Police Department's crowd control anti-riot squad, had been dismissed at 3:00 A.M. Since Sunday

are heavily populated with Negro citizens. There they tend to view each person on the streets as a potential criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is reciprocated. Indeed, hostility between the Negro communities in our large cities and the police departments, is the major problem in law enforcement in this decade. It has been a major cause of all recent race riots."

At the time of the 1943 riot, Judge Edwards told Commission <sup>interviewers</sup> ~~investigators~~, there was "open warfare between the Detroit Negroes and the Detroit Police Department." As late as 1961, he thought that "Detroit was the leading candidate in the United States for a race riot."

There was a long history of conflict between the police department and citizens. Detroit's 1943 race riot, in which 34 persons died, was the bloodiest in the United States in a span of four decades. During the labor wars of the 1930's union members had come to view the Detroit Police Department as a strike-breaking force.

Judge Edwards and his successor, Commissioner Ray Girardin, attempted to restructure the image of the department. A Citizens Complaint Bureau was set up to facilitate the filing of complaints by citizens against officers; but there are

indications that in practice it worked little better than less enlightened and more cumbersome procedures in other cities.

2V According to ~~expert~~ information provided to the Commission, the very nature of Detroit's trial board procedure tends to favor the accused officer. Officers are reluctant to testify against fellow-members of the department and some who have done so in the past have found themselves ostracized.

Lately, following the advice of attorneys with regard to the rules against self-incrimination, officers have refused even to make statements to Department investigators. In certain precincts investigators for the Citizens Complaint Bureau have been made to feel so unwelcome that they are reluctant even to go to the stationhouses.

On 12th Street, with its high incidence of vice and crime, the issue of police brutality was a recurrent theme. A month earlier the killing of a prostitute had been determined by police investigators to be the work of a pimp. According to rumors in the community the crime had been committed by a Vice Squad officer.

Approximately at the same time the killing of a 27-year old Negro Army veteran, Danny Thomas, by a gang of white youths, inflamed the community. Coverage by the city's major newspapers, which played down the story in hope that the

come out alive. I am convinced it would have turned into a race riot in the conventional sense."

Many of the police officers were being used to guard key installations in other sections of the city, in fear that the disturbance on 12th Street might be a diversionary tactic. Belle Isle, the recreation area in the Detroit River that had been the scene of the 1943 riot, was sealed off.

In an effort not to attract people to the scene, some broadcasters cooperated by reporting no news of the riot. As a result, numerous police officers had to be detailed to protect the 50,000 spectators that were expected at that afternoon's New York Yankees-Detroit Tigers baseball game.

Early in the morning a task force of community workers had gone into the area to dispel rumors and act as counter-rioters. Such a task force had been singularly successful at the time of the Kercheval incident in the summer of 1966, when scores of people had gathered at the site of an arrest. Kercheval, however, was a higher-income area, with few stores, that also happened to have the city's most effective police-community relations program. By the time the members of the task force were able to inject themselves into the situation on 12th Street, it already had gotten out of hand.

The movement from a serious to a critical stage apparently

began when a ~~rumor~~<sup>report</sup> threaded through the crowd that a man had been bayoneted by the police during an attempt by them to sweep the streets. Missiles were thrown at officers. By 1:00 P.M. the first of the serious fires had been set. An hour later smoke was billowing upward from at least four different locations. Firemen were harrassed and pelted with rocks.

The Michigan State Police, who had been alerted earlier, were requested to come to the city's assistance. Shortly after 3:00 P.M., even as State Police were arriving, the riot spread from 12th Street into other business districts.

There was no lack of the disaffected to help spread it. Although not yet deteriorated to the point of Newark, Detroit, like Newark, was losing population. Its prosperous middle class whites were moving to the suburbs and being replaced by unskilled Negro migrants.

Between 1960 and 1967 the Negro population rose from just under 30 percent to an estimated 40 percent of the total. Those who moved out were the most vigorous, revenue-producing portion of the population, leaving behind numbers of the old and young, who were less productive, yet cost the city more in terms of services.

In a decade the school system had gained 50,000 to 60,000 children. Fifty-one percent of the elementary school



plans for the improvement of the neighborhood. In order to meet the need for recreational facilities, which the city was not providing, they managed to raise \$3,000 to purchase empty lots for playgrounds. Although opposed to urban renewal they agreed to co-sponsor with the Archdiocese of Detroit a housing project in which the block clubs would have equal control.

When the riot broke out the residents, through the block clubs, were able to organize quickly to seal off the area. Youngsters, agreeing to stay in the neighborhood, participated in detouring traffic. Even though many persons identified with the rioters as far as a rebellion against the system was concerned, only two small fires -- one of them in an empty building -- were set. There was no violence.

Many of the National Guardsmen when they arrived in the city were tired, having traveled 200 miles on trucks from their summer encampment. For some, the city was unfamiliar territory occupied by an unfamiliar people. Without training in their role as auxiliary law enforcement personnel, the Guardsmen were unable to cope with the situation with which they were faced.

A Detroit newspaper reporter who spent two days riding in the command jeep of one column, told a Commission <sup>interviewer</sup> ~~investi-~~  
~~gator~~ of machine guns being fired accidentally, street lights

were arming themselves. One shot a fellow fireman; another shot himself. A National Guardsman and a fireman were felled by high caliber bullets whose origin it was impossible to determine.

The Chief of Police in Highland Park, a separate political entity surrounded by the city of Detroit, recalled that one sniper proved to be an old white drunk, shooting from the top of an apartment building.

Unverified reports received by Commission <sup>interviewers</sup> ~~investigators~~ tell of street gangs roaming the city, firing a shot here and a shot there, then disappearing before the arrival of police. National Guard gunfire killed one woman when she stood silhouetted in the window of a motel.

A four-year old girl was shot to death when troopers opened up with machine guns in response to the flash of a cigarette being lighted.

Of the 43 persons who were killed during the riot, the Wayne County Prosecutor's office was able to issue warrants in only six of the cases. In eight no action was taken or recommended, because no suspect was found or the homicide was accidental. In 29 deaths, the ruling was either one of justifiable homicide, or there was insufficient evidence upon which to base any charge.

Approximately one and a half to two years before the

advised her that he was changing the locks on the house. At 8:45 P.M. he called her again and told her that the tenants had returned and he had refused to let them in. He also asked Mrs. R. to send the family's watchdog for protection. ?

At approximately the same time the National Guard received information that: "Three unidentified white men had broken into the house, forced the occupants thereof out at gunpoint, and hauled in boxes of guns and ammunition with which they were going to start sniping, sometimes after dark."

At 9:05 P.M. a National Guard column with two tanks pulled up in front of the house. A National Guard captain said that he saw a flash in an upstairs window, and shouted a warning to the occupants. Neighbors report they heard no such warning.

✓ (i.e.,) (the owner, his brother, & a friend)  
The three men were on the second floor of the house when a barrage of fire was unleashed against it. As hundreds of bullets crashed through the windows and ricocheted off the walls, they dashed to the third floor. Protected by a large chimney, they huddled in a closet until, during a lull in the firing, they were able to hang a pink bathrobe out of the window as a sign of surrender. They were arrested as snipers.

The firing from rifles and .50 caliber machine guns

Under such circumstances even the slightest injudicious behavior of the police was likely to act as a triggering mechanism. A major police action, such as the shooting of the youth in Tampa, was, in fact, involved only infrequently. In some instances, the role of the police tended to be merely a supplementary one.

For example:

In Cincinnati the chain of events was initiated by complaints about the purported double standard of justice, and the actual spark was struck by anger at a middle class Negro's defense of the system;

In Atlanta the chain of events was initiated by a Negro security guard's detention of a Negro;

In Plainfield the chain of events was initiated by the refusal of an off-duty police officer to treat a Negro-upon-Negro assault as serious.

In some cities, mostly the smaller ones, both the residents and the police became so convinced that a riot was about to take place that this very expectation, like the buildup of opposing armies along a hostile border, tended to lead to a clash.

The riots that have taken place in the United States over the course of the past several summers, may be traced

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In fact, every effort should be made to contain the protest within the bounds of political expression. Although at loggerheads with her police department, the Mayor of New Brunswick, New Jersey, was vindicated in her use of political means to solve the crisis.

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Police must be able to act swiftly enough and in large enough force to seal off the area in which the crowd has gathered, and to prevent it, as much as possible, from scattering into business streets where longstanding grievances against commercial practices are likely to be transformed into the physical acts of window-smashing, looting and firebombing.

Simultaneously, since aggressive action by the police will almost surely aggravate the anger and resentment of the Negro crowds, the police should make every effort to avoid playing the role of agents provocateur.

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that numerous witnesses have spoken of sets in. At this

stage of a riot hopes of containment must be abandoned, and

all force possible marshaled to restore law and order, <sup>though restraint</sup> must still be exercised in the use of firearms.

It was the swift movement of the riot from Stage 1 to 3 and the failure of the authorities to recognize the fact that contributed to making the Detroit riot the most destructive. As rioters and looters were roaming unmolested up and down 12th Street and spreading out to other sections of the city, counter-riot teams of community workers were still moving through the neighborhoods, trying to dampen rumors and asking people to cool it.

This was activity appropriate and effective for the first stage of a riot, not the third. Simultaneously municipal authorities were continuing to proceed with a plan of operations that had been effective in the Kercheval incident the year before, when only a small number of persons within a limited area had been involved.

The fact that the Detroit riot reached, within a time of two to three hours, the stage that it had taken the Los Angeles riot, two years before, 36 hours to arrive at, points up the necessity for municipal authorities to increase the speed and effectiveness of their response.

## **II      THE RIOT PROFILE**



For an America that had become accustomed to the Negro's acceptance, by and large, of the inferior status assigned to him, to his passive non-violent response to acts of violence perpetrated against him, and to his never-ending reliance on legal redress to enjoin compliance with national laws that in some sections were being ignored or evaded, the revelation that Negroes would advocate responding to force with force was a startling one.

The demagoguery and braggadocio of "Rap" Brown's declarations: "We built this country up, and we can burn it down," created among whites a mood of fear and anger and a readiness to believe that organized rebellion was throbbing in the heart of every city. Many young militant Negroes, conversely, had become disenchanted with an evolutionary process that appeared to hold little promise for them in their lifetimes. Believing they had nothing to lose, they accepted the philosophy that riot was a legitimate means of protest, and that the looting of white businesses and destruction of white property in the black ghettos was, in fact, not a criminal act, but just retribution for "exploitation."

As the summer of 1967 approached, therefore, a climate had been created in which much of white America expected riots, and in which many young Negroes were willing to oblige.

Under such circumstances even the slightest injudicious behavior of the police was likely to act as a triggering mechanism. A major police action, such as the shooting of the youth in Tampa, was, in fact, involved only infrequently. In some instances, the role of the police tended to be merely a supplementary one.

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The riots that have taken place in the United States over the course of the past several summers, may be traced

through six identifiable stages. These are:

- (1) Embryonic
- (2) Out of Control
- (3) Community Involvement
- (4) Massive Response
- (5) Breakdown of the Social Order
- (6) Control

The vast majority of the riot situations never reached the third stage. In only three cities, Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit, did a riot pass through all six stages.

1. Embryonic The focal point for the commencement of every riot has been a high density area. In the majority of cases this has been at or in the vicinity of a housing project. Where a housing project has not been involved the location has been some other centralized one where a large number of people could gather quickly.

In Atlanta it was a shopping center surrounded by overcrowded apartment buildings.

In Detroit -- as in Grand Rapids -- it was a main business thoroughfare, noted for the prevalence of vice, from which overcrowded apartment houses and residences were set back on both sides, and which, even under normal circumstances, is filled with numerous people.

The focal area, therefore, has always been a natural gathering place. And whereas the specific incident involving the police has often been of a secondary nature in precipitating the riot, the presence and actions of the police have contributed significantly to attracting the large number of people from which a pool of rioters could develop.

While people are, naturally, drawn to any scene of excitement, the ennui and dreariness of the ghetto tend to multiply the drawing power of an event interrupting the routine. One of the great problems of fire departments in ghetto areas is the numerous small grass and garbage fires set, and false alarms turned in by kids for no other purpose than to see fire engines roll down the street.

In almost every case it may be found that, as a result of the weather, more people than usual were in the streets. In 17 cities examined, the average temperature on the day the precipitating incident took place was 87 degrees, 6 degrees above normal for that date.

The longer the police remained in the area and the more flamboyantly they, or the fire department did so -- with sirens turned on and flashing red lights -- the more they served as a magnet for people.

In Los Angeles, since the Watts riot, it has become standard procedure for the police and firemen to move in and

out quickly and silently, without the use of sirens, when a potential riot condition exists.

Once numbers of residents have gathered, the assembly takes on the air of a neighborhood meeting. As descriptions of the police action on the scene are passed from mouth to mouth they become magnified and distorted. Other actions of the police in the past which, as a result of the inadequacy in police procedure for handling grievances, have never been resolved and have thus been left festering in the minds of the people, are brought up. Soon the current incident is inextricably interwoven with those of the past.

Information is exchanged regarding the practices of merchants and landlords, and the injustices and indignities, both real and fancied, suffered by the people. At this juncture the gathering may be regarded as a massive gripe session, lacking an outlet for the expression of the gripes.

If a significant official, such as the mayor, to whom the gripes may be directed, arrives on the scene, violence may usually, for the moment, be averted. If no such figure arrives, but some kind of indigenous leadership emerges from the assembly, a meeting with municipal authorities is usually sought.

The most significant exception to this process occurred in Detroit, where the action of rioters leapfrogged, almost

completely, the initial stage.

The reaction of the police at this point is crucial. The reflex reaction is to disperse a crowd, especially if it is an obviously hostile crowd, from the fringes of which occasional rocks are thrown. The standard concept of law enforcement is to break up an illegal demonstration or march. There has been a failure to recognize that such tactics are not applicable to ghetto gatherings.

In the traditional demonstration or march, diverse people from diverse areas unite to protest against one specific object or one specific policy. When such a march is broken up, the physical unity of the group tends to be dissolved. As people are scattered they return to the diverse areas and pursuits which are their norm.

The dynamics of the ghetto gathering are entirely different. Since such gatherings tend to be political meetings of the most primeval, grass-roots nature, to disperse them is to disperse frustrations that have not had an opportunity for release. Since the people are native to the area in which they are gathering, to disperse them is the opposite of useful. When police in one city shouted to demonstrators: "Go home!" the retort was: "We are home, you go home."

The folly of police action in breaking up such

incipient political meetings was most dramatically demonstrated in Plainfield and Newark, where police directly inhibited the political process, and immediately thereafter witnessed the commencement of widespread violence.

In fact, every effort should be made to contain the protest within the bounds of political expression. Although at loggerheads with her police department, the Mayor of New Brunswick, New Jersey, was vindicated in her use of political means to solve the crisis.

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In Los Angeles in 1965, for example, the actions of two Highway Patrol officers in dragging a young girl whom they

believed, erroneously, had spit on them, out into the middle of the street, transformed a potentially dangerous situation into a critically explosive one.

2. Out of Control: If a crowd is frustrated by (1) The failure of municipal government to make meaningful response or (2) the actions of the police, they will almost surely move into the second stage, consisting of intensified rock-throwing and window-smashing, followed by looting and burning. This is the commencement of the riot proper.

As far as has been determined, the initial participants in this activity consist almost totally of male teenagers and young adults, few of whom are over the age of 25. There is some evidence that initial attacks tend to be discriminate and made against those stores and businesses whose proprietors have incurred the most resentment of the residents.

It is at this juncture that the police have the last opportunity to control the situation. If they are unable, because of a lack of sufficient manpower, either to make arrests or to cordon off the area, riot activity will, most likely, spread to other areas of the Negro ghetto.

There is evidence, although at this moment not conclusive, that in some cities criminal elements have begun to take advantage of the situation to systematically rob stores.



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that numerous witnesses have spoken of sets in. At this stage of a riot hopes of containment must be abandoned, and all force possible marshaled to restore law and order.

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The fact that the Detroit riot reached, within a time of two to three hours, the stage that it had taken the Los Angeles riot, two years before, 36 hours to arrive at, points up the necessity for municipal authorities to increase the speed and effectiveness of their response.

As massive numbers of extra-urban law enforcement personnel --state police, National Guard and, in Detroit, Federal Troops -- are injected into the chaos of a riot, they have, in the past, -- themselves tended to exacerbate the confusion. Young National Guardsmen, many of them unfamiliar with cities or their Negro inhabitants, were plied with rumors of snipers and guerilla warfare and a population in rebellion. As they were injected into darkened areas, the most innocuous actions of the populace began to take on sinister meanings for them. Reflections in a window were interpreted as sniper fire. A man lighting a cigarette was thought to be a fire bomber. The behavior of a drunk driver was interpreted as a kamikaze assault.

As police began using gunfire in their attempt to capture looters, and National Guard troops used their weapons for such diverse purposes as shooting out streetlights and firing at cars that failed to halt at roadblocks, reports of sniper fire spiralled upward in number. Even as looters were cleared from the streets and fires were being controlled, the intensity of the major riots incongruously heightened. In every case the death toll rose precipitately. In every case the impression was implanted that numbers of the deaths were due to sniper fire; although law enforcement officers, who,

logically, would be the target of such snipers, escaped virtually unscathed.

5. Breakdown of the Social Order As the atmosphere of fear and chaos continued, some of the safeguards that society has constructed to insure the maintenance of order, and to make every person accountable for his actions, began to show signs of cracking. Arrests were made if a person was seen carrying a bag of groceries or had a suitcase of clothes in his car. People swept up en masse in the streets disappeared for days into detention facilities.

In Newark some police officers, adopting the behavior of rioters whom they had been arresting, engaged in the destruction of property. In Detroit, a police officer with an excellent record committed at least two criminal acts. In a motel, several officers, in their determination to interrogate suspects, began playing "a game," and before the game was ended, three persons had been shot to death.

Law enforcement officers began to act upon wild tips -- as in the case of the Muslim Mosque shooting in Los Angeles or the sniping reported from the house on "L" Street in Detroit -- as if they came from the most reliable of sources.

Media of mass communications reported rumors and on-the-spot items without checking on them, and by the very nature

of their being broadcast, they tended to assume the authority of fact.

6. Control As the successful implementation of curfews by large numbers of law enforcement personnel successfully cleared the streets of affected cities, and fire discipline was restored to troops and police, the number of incidents reported rapidly diminished. In no case did the withdrawal of troops lead to a resumption of riotous activity.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Located as they have been, at the bottom of the ladder, Negroes have been the last to benefit from the revolutionary technological and economic changes that have altered America's social structure in the past 50 years. At a time when 75 percent of America's high school graduates are going on to college, in many ghetto schools 50 percent or more of the pupils are dropping out. Until 1954 the southern schools the Negro had attended had been forced to operate on a fraction of the budget of the white schools. Teachers with inferior educations, working in inferior facilities, had produced inferior-educated pupils. As these pupils flocked and continue to flock to urban areas in one of the great migrations of history, they have been unable to compete. As their sons and daughters enter big city schools these schools, geared largely to the education of middle class children, began to have difficulty coping with the new arrivals.

The American educational system, a major factor in the growth of American affluence, began to show signs of cracking under the stress. The average Negro youngster in the 12th grade is performing at a 9th grade level.

The animosity of many American labor unions towards the Negro, an outgrowth of battles between unions and management in which Negroes were frequently used as strike-breakers, aggravated the Black man's problems in job training and employment.

Statistical studies have shown a direct relation between low employment-low income and family breakups and illegitimacy irrespective of race or nationality. In 42 percent of Negro families and 23 percent of white families with incomes under \$3,000 the man is missing from the household. Ninety-two percent of Negro families and 96 percent of white families whose income is \$7,000 or more are intact.\*

Similarly, there is a direct correlation between broken families and school dropouts. Various studies have indicated that anywhere from 27 percent to 45 percent of dropouts come from broken homes. \*\*

Thus, a repeating cycle sets in:

Inferior Education → Low Income → Family Break-up →  
Low Employment      Illegitimacy

Dropouts → Inferior Education

The effect on major cities has been catastrophic.

\* Social + Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States, October, 1967.

\*\* School Dropouts. Research Division -- National Education Association.

Traditionally cities have been able to absorb an influx of underskilled and undereducated people, because the cities themselves were still expanding, and because the nation was in an earlier stage of industrial development, in which an amplitude of low-skilled jobs were available.

A generation ago an upwardly mobile family, when it moved, tended to move from one section of the city to another. Today the move is most often from the city to the suburbs. The most vigorous, revenue-producing portion of the population is, therefore, lost.

As Negroes moved into the cities to begin occupying the deteriorated and dilapidated housing that other groups reaching affluence were moving out of, the cycle in which families of migrants were entrapped began to transfer itself to the cities.

Migrants ———→ Low Employment ———→ Low Revenue ———→  
                                    Low Income                                      High Crime

Greater Demand for Municipal Services ———→ Increase in Tax Rates →  
Deterioration of Tax Base

Acceleration of Middle Class Flight ———→ Replacement by Migrants

In this process, such cities as Newark and Detroit have lost their viability. Schools and services deteriorated. Such programs as urban renewal -- which have failed to take into account that, although slums may be razed, one cannot raze the people that inhabit them -- have frequently created more problems than they solved.

As the complaints of citizens, more and more of whom



were black, increased proportionately with the city's inability to meet such complaints constructively, anger and frustration mounted on both sides. Since municipal officials and the purveyors of municipal services are mostly white, and the complainants mostly black, the agony of the city began to take on the antagonisms of race.

#### THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

As cities are, literally, contracting upon themselves, the black core within them is expanding rapidly. Whether by design, such as a changing from a district to an at-large system of elections, or by accident, this growing concentration of black people has been largely disenfranchised. A check of 17 Eastern, Southern and Midwestern cities that were involved in disturbances during the summer of 1967, and which have Negro populations ranging from 9 percent to 52 percent, revealed them to have a total of 16 Negro councilmen (the total number of councilmen in each city ranged from 5 to 30), 16 members of the boards of education (in school systems that were as much as 76 percent Negro), and, with the notable exception of Detroit, virtually no Negroes in key appointive positions.

Not only, therefore, was the normal evolutionary process of minorities gradually being fused into government, and learning the disciplines and responsibilities thereof, being frustrated, but the ghetto populations had no one on whom they

could apply political pressure -- threatening his defeat in the next election if he failed to be responsive.

That in present circumstances municipal officials have been largely unresponsive, has been amply documented by Commission investigators. In one relatively small city, for example, the mayor, who had been in office more than a decade, averred himself to be "shocked by conditions" when he visited the Negro ghetto. The inability of the Newark government to visualize or adjust to the changing realities was a major contributing factor to the tensions in that city. The problem is aggravated by the fact that not only are the most restless and most militant Negroes primarily young, so that they have had little opportunity to participate in the political process, but many of them have no conception of how that process works.

A youth in Plainfield, in the belief that this was standard procedure, complained that: "The Negroes had only recently learned that the Council had not even forwarded the list of grievances to the Federal Government in Washington."

Under such circumstances the question, "Where are the Negro leaders?" asked oftentimes during the riots, takes on almost comic connotation. In fact, the middle class Negro whom whites have tended to identify as the Negro leader is, to the Negro masses, no more acceptable as a spokesman than the president of General Motors would be to the United Auto Workers.

By their reaction to violence municipal authorities have, in fact, reinforced the impression that the militants are right: that petitions may be ignored, but the use of power cannot. In Los Angeles following the riot it was discovered that with the expenditure of some effort more than 10,000 jobs could be made available to ghetto residents. In Atlanta, grievances that had gone unanswered for months suddenly were responded to with alacrity. In Detroit militants were, for the first time, included in the city's planning. Everywhere the persons who suffered the greatest loss of prestige were the Negroes who had counseled moderation. Moderation had been responded to with platitudes; militancy with results.

The very gains that the middle-class Negro has made during the past fifteen years has served to alienate the black masses from him. For these masses the civil rights drive appeared to be largely an alliance between liberal whites and the middle class Negro, its achievements benefiting the middle class.

For a man, wondering whether he had enough money to buy the next meal for his family, the question of whether or no he could eat in an expensive white restaurant was academic. Traveling for a few hours on a segregated bus might be tolerable, but living under a white thumb in a decrepit shack was intolerable.

The very achievement of integration has tended to have the opposite of the desired effect. In Los Angeles, after the fire department was integrated, the percentage of Negro firemen declined to a third of what it had previously been. In Cincinnati, the number of Negroes on the police force slipped to little more than half that prior to integration. Following integration of the New Jersey National Guard, Negroes began to vanish from the ranks.

As the middle class Negro gained ground and the nation congratulated itself on his advances, to the lower class Negro the gap appeared to grow wider and wider, and he felt less and less identification.

#### RIOT PROCLIVITY

The more a municipality's viability has deteriorated and the larger its Negro population has become, the more likely -- it may be postulated -- it is to experience a riot. Newark underwent a cataclysmic shift in population, from more than 65 percent white to 62 percent Negro and Puerto Rican, between 1960 and 1967. The most enlightened of administrations could not have coped with a situation in which demands had far outstripped resources.

In Detroit, counting the number of whites who left the city and the number of Negroes who replaced them, there

was more than a 30 percent shift in population between 1960 and 1967.

Under such circumstances the police, as the most visible and authoritarian sign of white power, become a crucial factor. No matter with what good intentions, few, if any, of the major cities appear to have solved the problem.

Although, beginning in 1961, major efforts were made in Detroit to establish better police-community relations, Commission investigators were told that the process never reached the grass roots level; that practical difficulties prevented the patrolman in the squad car from sitting down across the table from the youth who was likely to throw rocks.

In one city where officers were compelled to attend a community relations course, it was referred to by them as "Nigger loving school." In another city that had, presumably, instituted a comprehensive community relations program, the Director of Police told Commission investigators that he did not see "much basis whatsoever to the various complaints of Negro groups as to their social and economic conditions." A captain called the program "a crock." Another captain declared that there was no doubt in his mind that "many of my men say 'you black fuck'." However, he added that he did not consider that this constituted abusive language because, in the vernacular of the community, the word "mother-fucker" is regarded as "hello."

In another city the Chief of Police told Commission investigators that "the majority of officers approach the Negro family with the same courtesy as a white family." The Deputy Chief, directly contradicted him, declaring that you have to use a "double standard" in dealing with Negroes. He explained that: "When you go into their homes, for example, you have to adjust to the situation," that "you cannot use the polite language that you would use in a white middle class home. You have to make a show of force, otherwise you would not be understood," because "politeness is construed as weakness."

Consequently, the police have neither the image nor the support in the Negro community that they do in the white. Because of the high Negro crime rate the law enforcement officer tends to view every black person as a suspect. Yet the overwhelming majority of victims of Negro crimes are Negroes -- in one Detroit precinct, where 78 percent of identified assault offenders were Negroes, 76 percent of the victims were Negroes and the complaints of the victims is that the police fail to respond expeditiously; and when they do arrive, are apt to regard the crime not as seriously as a similar offense committed in a white area. As a result the police tend to be looked upon more as a force of occupation than a keeper of law and order.

As greater and greater areas of a city become inhabited by Negroes, precinct stations become bastions, the primary allegiance of whose defenders is not to the citizens, but to each other. Problems of police recruiting become critical.

Whites are reluctant to enter a profession in which the expectation is one of daily stress and antagonism.

Negroes are reluctant to enter a profession, the community view of which is negative, and in which Negro officers traditionally have been isolated.

It is the police, therefore, who, as a constant irritant, are most likely to inflame the Negro community.

#### AVAILABILITY OF OPTIONS

The recourse to violence, whether by the action of an individual, the institutionalized process of a nation's engagement in war, or the haphazard eruption into riot by a mob, traditionally tends to come as a last resort, when other options have been exhausted.

For example: For the poverty-stricken individual in a rural area the option remains to move to the city. For the resident of a small city the option remains to move to a larger city. For the people living in an area that overtly practices discrimination, the option remains to move to an area which, purportedly, does not. For the inhabitants of a city whose government is unresponsive, the option remains to elect a government that will be more responsive.

If, then, this new government proves unwilling or unable to materially improve the conditions of the people, the availability of nonviolent options has been exhausted.

In the three cities with major riots: Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit, Negroes had voted overwhelmingly for a "liberal administration" which they expected to produce

change. When this expectation proved unfulfilled, the probability of a riot became great.

In Los Angeles and Newark the explosion came five years after the election; in Detroit, six.

#### RUMORS AND SNIPERS

As a result of the riot climate that had been created, much of the nation's press was ready to seize upon any disturbance and describe it as a "riot." Acts of violence and destruction committed by rioters, amplified in some cities by the massive and inappropriate response of National Guardsmen and law enforcement officers, was then further exaggerated by reporters and headline writers, until the population of the United States could believe itself, reasonably, to be faced with a state of civil insurrection in which organized guerilla bands were roaming city streets.

Rumors proliferated and sometimes had their origins in the most unexpected places. In Grand Rapids, two carloads of vacationing families were reported to be guerilla reinforcements rushing to the city. In Tampa, a Trailways bus loaded with Negroes was viewed in the same light. In Los Angeles, postal employees, arriving for a convention, were reported to be "hordes of Black Muslims." In Detroit a person with a bow and arrow was reported as a "sniper."

The sheriff of one community in New Jersey related to Commission investigators "A trick," which, he felt, "helped calm things down some." The Sheriff said that he had gotten



hold of one of his people in New York City and asked him to call one of the militant Negroes in \_\_\_\_\_. He said he asked this caller to say that that night there was going to be a showdown between people from New York City and the \_\_\_\_\_ police department, that he was bringing a lot of Negroes with guns over from Harlem, and that they were going to shoot it out with the \_\_\_\_\_ police department and it didn't make any difference who or how many people got killed. The Sheriff said that the man who had been called went immediately to the \_\_\_\_\_ police department and that he also spread the word that people should keep off the streets that night because there was going to be serious trouble from outsiders. The Sheriff believes that this "trick" had resulted in the quietest night of the whole week.

Although the devastating effect of rumors during war-time has been amply documented, there has been a failure to recognize that the spread of rumors could be even more injurious during a period of potential civil disturbance. Reporters unfamiliar with and inexperienced in the coverage of riots often accepted as fact second and third-hand accounts and expressions of opinion. Any person injured by gunfire from an unknown source, was shot by a "sniper." Officials played statistical games which turned bad situations into seemingly catastrophic ones. Impressive figures on riot injuries were compiled by such devices as listing poison ivy as a "riot-connected" injury.

One city's fire department listed 82 injuries, including such as "Fell on hand, injuring right little finger,"

"Pain in back, fell over and couldn't straighten up," and, "Fell off apparatus which moved." Only two of the men were injured by missiles and none by sniper fire, yet the overriding impression created was that many of them had been hurt as a result of direct acts against them by the populace.

A representative sample of the repertorial distortions:

TAMPA, Fla., June 13 (AP) -- Rampaging Negroes burned and looted Tampa's sprawling slums Monday for the second night, battling with about 1,000 heavily-armed police and National Guardsmen." . . . .

"Police repeatedly were pinned down by shipers throughout the night and early morning hours. A cruiser reported at 2:00 A.M. it was receiving sniper fire from two sides."

The fact: In Tampa on the second night there was only scattered, light action.

"CINCINNATI, Ohio, June 14 (AP) -- National Guardsmen -- bayonets and machine guns ready -- reinforced police today after "huge bands of marauders" had scattered racial violence, fire, looting and vandalism in Cincinnati."

The fact: The trouble was confined to individual carloads of youths riding about here and there in various sections of the city.

"ATLANTA, June 20 (UPI) -- One man was killed and three persons were wounded tonight in gun battles between Negroes and police as violence broke out for the second night."

The fact: There was no gunfire by Negroes.

The Detroit News on Saturday, July 15, reported from Newark:

"Negro rioters in hit-and-run guerilla-type attacks, spread racial violence to four nearby towns today while snipers shooting

from ambush positions fought several gun battles with National Guardsmen and police." . . . "Negro youths in the riot sector told newsmen that Black Muslims took part in the violence and they mix lye with molasses -- and 'when they throw it at the cops, it sticks.'"

The Fact: There were no such hit-and-run guerilla-type attacks; there were no gun battles from ambush; and there was no molasses thrown at the police.

On July 26th the Detroit News reported:

"Three unidentified Negro youths were killed in a gun-fight behind the Algiers Motel, Woodward and Virginia Park.

"The bodies were found on the ground floor of the Algiers Manor, a three-story annex to the motel.

"Police and Guardsmen were called to the scene about midnight when sniping began from the Manor.

"Homicide Detective Edward Hayes said shots were coming from the roof and windows on all floors.

"Police and Guardsmen were pinned down for several minutes before the firing stopped."

The fact: There is no evidence that anyone fired out of the motel. Two of the youths were shotgunned down by police, and the death of the third is still being investigated. Murder charges have been filed against one officer.

On July 24th The Detroit News reported from Englewood, New Jersey:

"Police and Negro snipers exchanged heavy gunfire last night and early today as racial violence hit this New York

City suburb for the fourth straight night.

"Snipers set up a three-way crossfire at William and Jay Streets in the heart of the Fourth Ward Negro ghetto, and pinned down 100 policemen, four reporters and a photographer for more than an hour."

The fact: Kids set off a number of firecrackers.

The lead story in the July 27th edition of the Philadelphia Inquirer read as follows:

"DETROIT, July 27 (Thursday) -- Two National Guard tanks ripped a sniper's haven with machine guns Wednesday night and flushed out three shaggy-haired white youths. Shipers attacked a guard command post and Detroit's racial riot set a modern record for bloodshed. The death toll soared to 36, topping the Watts bloodbaths of 1965 in which 35 died and making Detroit's insurrection the most deadly racial riot in modern U. S. history." . . . .

"In the attack on the sniper's nest, the Guardsmen poured hundreds of rounds of .50 caliber machine gun fire into the home, which authorities said housed arms and ammunition used by West Side sniper squads.

"Guardsmen recovered guns and ammunition. A reporter with the troopers, said the house, a neat brick home in a neighborhood of \$20,000 to \$50,000 homes, was torn apart by the machine gun and rifle fire.

"Sniper fire crackled from the home as the Guard unit approached. It was one of the first verified reports of sniping by whites." . . . .

"A pile of loot taken from riot-ruined stores was recovered from the sniper's haven, located ten blocks from the heart of the 200-square block riot zone.

"Guardsmen said the house had been identified as a storehouse of arms and ammunition for snipers. Its arsenal was regarded as an indication that the sniping -- or at least some of it -- was organized."

The fact: Except for the National Guard's attack upon the house, the entire story is a fiction. There was no crackling sniper fire, no pile of loot, and, except for one old .22 caliber rifle, no storehouse of arms and ammunition. The circumstances surrounding the attack upon the house have been described elsewhere.

The overall effect of day after day of such reports beneath glaring banner headlines: "GUARD RIDDLES SNIPER'S HAVEN IN DETROIT," "TANKS MOVE INTO DETROIT'S 'ALL-OUT WAR' AFTER LETHAL SNIPERS ROUT GUARD, POLICE," "MORE RACIAL TERROR," and, "GUERILLA WAR RIPS 12th," was devastating.

Although, in three cities in which a total of 100 deaths occurred there has yet to be one verified sniper,\* apparitions of snipers were everywhere. A Detroit newspaper reporter wrote that: "A rifleman gave me a short course in sniper warfare in city streets.

\* Three persons are awaiting trial on sniping charges in Detroit.

"'Watch for houses with one screen off a window on the second floor,' he said matter-of-factly. 'And keep your eye peeled for second floors where one window has the shade down and the other is open a crack.'

"'Can you spot them by muzzle blasts when they fire?'" I asked.

"'No, not any more,' he said. 'They've gotten smart. They open the window a little, move way back in the room and then fire.'

"'They can snipe away for hours and you can't see them. We were even taking fire from burning buildings last night.'"

European newspapers began calling American cities "Riotsville, U.S.A." The Communist Press reveled in the violence, and exploited it to the hilt.

#### CONSPIRACY AND ORGANIZATION

The Commission is conducting a continuing and extensive investigation into the question of organization in the riots. To date no evidence of a conspiracy has been found. Empirical tests tend to indicate the unlikelihood of such a conspiracy.

Riots did not take place concurrently in major cities so as to create the greatest possible strain on law enforcement agencies. In most communities the issues were local, and in many of them militant Negroes attempted to bring about a solution of the problems by political means.

Conspirators, if they existed, were utterly inept. In Cambridge, Maryland, they scheduled Rap Brown's visit for the same night that the local unit of the National Guard held its weekly drill. Nowhere were industrial installations attacked, even though in Los Angeles manufacturing plants -- including one producing napalm -- worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were left unguarded. In Newark the Telephone Exchange controlling an entire section of the Eastern Seaboard was left untouched.

From Los Angeles to Plainfield fire chiefs reported that if Molotov cocktails had not been made in the most amateurish fashion their effect would have been far greater.

On a number of occasions black militants complained, both to newspaper reporters and Commission investigators, that they had been caught unprepared by the riots and therefore had not been able to exploit them.

The evidence is overwhelming that there were no "outside agitators" in any of the cities. In one community an official described a young Negro militant as "an outside agitator," only to discover that he had lived in the city all of his life.

In fact, rioters have concentrated almost exclusively on vandalizing and destroying businesses dealing in consumer goods that were useful, negotiable and could be transported easily. Highly flammable installations, such as gasoline stations, which would be a logical target if massive destruction were the principal intent, have escaped virtually unscathed.

Before the summer of 1967 H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael set the trap. Their intent was to convince Negroes that only by uniting and separating themselves from the white community could they escape the genocide being planned for them. It was their contention that America would never willingly grant equality to Negroes, but that the response would be one of violence.

Hence, the greater the violence that was reported, the more grist was manufactured for their mill. They interpreted the reports of scores of snipers as evidence that the black man was uniting and had reached the stage of guerilla warfare. The reaction of authorities with massive force was, for them, proof that the campaign of genocide had gone into effect.

Everywhere that Commission investigators went they were told by white and black, high and low, that the riots had polarized the community. Everywhere middle class Negroes began identifying with the rioters. Everywhere the feeling was becoming prevalent among Negroes that all other options had been used up, and that now militancy was the only possible recourse.

A Negro businessman in Detroit expressed himself in sympathy with the rioters, even though two of his stores had been sacked.

A Negro police officer in Atlanta said he believed riots were a good thing because they appeared to be the only way to shake whites out of their apathy and call attention to the problem.



Questioned about his reactions, an arrestee in Detroit who, after being swept up on the streets, spent days in a fetid, improvised jail subjected to the verbal and physical abuse of officers said: "(Before the riot) I was really a passive person -- hard-working -- trying to reach this goal, trying to get that degree. That's what I wanted. And I wasn't messing with nobody. I didn't break no laws or nothing -- went along to people. I got too much resentment inside me, or bitterness now to let it (his treatment during the riot) happen again -- to let somebody say to me, 'You have to do this.'"

"If there was another riot, you know what I think I'd do? I think I'd blow up police stations. I'd go killing this time. Oh, I'd go killing . . . . I'd kill. That's what I'd do. Man, I ain't against all white folks, man, but they don't stand by and let that happen. Yeah, that's what I'd do first -- I'd set more bombs and booby traps in the world. Kill them, just like that. I'd do it. Personally I hope there's not another riot. Because this time it's gonna go farther than it was -- it's going to spread. It's going to cause a lot of destruction -- everywhere."

As disillusion has spread among the Negroes, the philosophy of the extremists has gained more credence. Partially as a result of the Black Power Conference in Newark,

there is growing communication between Black Power adherence all over the nation. There appears, concomitantly, to be a growing unity. It would be unwise to believe that this unity may not be translated into action if the events of the summer of 1967 are repeated.

A former railroad engineer who has become a leader of the militants in Newark, and, following the riot, visited Czechoslovakia, told Commission investigators recently:

"I will make any kind of a commitment even with the devil himself if it means bringing about meaningful change for Black people. For Black people to enter the mainstream of American life, be it Communist, Socialist or whatever. The supposedly democratic process and the American way of life has not proven to me and to other Black people that it can deal effectively with the changes necessary to bring about conditions favorable to Black people."

January 9, 1968

MEMO FOR ROBERT CONOT

From Research (Moss) *Rum.*

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in Detroit that "hundreds were killed but their deaths  
were never reported"?

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Robert Conot

DATE: January 11, 1968

FROM : Roger Waldman *RW*

SUBJECT: New Brunswick Profile

In preparing for possible depositions, I ran across the following possible discrepancies in the New Brunswick profile.

1. The profile says small groups of teenagers began breaking windows and that then a crowd gathered. Amos' interview indicates that a crowd of 200 or 300 teenagers gathered at 10:00 p.m. and walked down the street breaking windows. The Seawright and Young People interviews give the same version. Lt. Brokaw <sup>225</sup> eventually confirmed this by stating that all groups converged at 9:00 and that window breaking began at 10:00. Per contra, Chief Petrone states that between 9:00 and 9:30 reports began to come in that windows were being broken and that groups of 15 to 20 were gathering on street corners. The FBI report speaks of groups of 50 to 60 teenagers breaking windows, but places them in time between 11:00 and 12:20.

2. The profile says that all persons picked up on the first night were released on their own recognizance or low bail. The source of this (via the FRR) is the "New Brunswick Story," which does not mention the size of bail. The public defender stated that the bail for one man was \$5,000, and that all others were released on ROR.

3. The profile states that the Mayor, the City Commissioners and Negro youths drew up a statement attacking segregation, discrimination, etc. The source of this fact (via the FRR), the "New Brunswick Story," says that the youth drew up the statement and presented it to the Mayor and the Commissioners.

4. The profile states that on the second night the police twice wanted to disperse the crowd. There is no evidence of this in the record. The first confrontation appears to have been a show of force by the police, and the only evidence is that the chief did not want to pull the police back. As for the second confrontation, that at the police station, there is no indication in the interviews or the FRR that the police wanted to disperse the crowd or that they were overruled by the Mayor. The only disagreement mentioned is that with respect to admission of the crowd to the jail.



5010-108

*Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. David Chambers

DATE: January 18, 1968


FROM : *RW*  
Roger Waldman

SUBJECT: Newark Profile

I saw your memorandum to Bob Conot relaying Bill Smith's feeling that the Newark profile was biased.

Having examined the 275 affidavits made available to us by the Newark Legal Services Project, and having been part of the Newark field team, I think I am in a position to say that the Conot profile was very restrained. If anything, the profile has a pro-police bias.

I would suggest that rather than water down the profile, the affidavits be made available to Smith.

*To*   
cc: Robert Conot

*I retreat  
DLC*



5010-108

*Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Robert Conot

DATE: January 11, 1968

FROM : Roger Waldman *RW*

SUBJECT: Englewood Profiles

Following are my comments on the Englewood Profile.

1. The profile lists the first incident as the pelting of a fire engine. The transcript (p. 4), and a newspaper recap written on October 24 indicate that the first incident was the throwing of a rock through Foti's window.

2. The profile indicates that the response of the youths to the arrival of the police was the throwing of rocks through windows, windows selected at random. The transcript (pp. 488) indicates that the primary initial target was the police (The sitrep indicates eight officers were injured and six police cars damaged). The windows you refer to are on Palisades Avenue, two blocks from the initial incident, and thus probably were broken after or possibly at the same time as the initial barrage.

3. The profile states that the police "quickly contained the disturbance." The inference is that it was minutes. The October 24 newspaper recap, however, indicates that the initial incident was at 9:00 p.m., that the initial disturbance was contained in a few minutes, that the Mayor arrived at 9:30, that police were withdrawn at 9:55, and that they were ordered back in at 10:30, met renewed violence, and only then achieved control.

4. The profile indicates abortive attempts against three businesses continued for one or two nights. It appears there were only two such businesses--Fotis and Sirenos, and the police sitrep lists them as being looted as late as July 25, four nights later. Further the attempts were hardly abortive.

5. The profile states that abetted by the authorities, the press magnified the nature of these manyfold and lists the sniper report as an example.

I have checked the press reports, and believe the July 25 press report of gunfire on the night of July 24-25 is the only exaggeration. The exaggeration, however, was not quite as great as you draw it.



5010-108

*Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

Investigation did not show that the cross fire had consisted of firecrackers. It showed that it consisted partly of firecrackers, but Lt. Ryan (see July 24-25 FBI Report), one of the sources of the firecracker correction, also maintained that there were some real gunshot coming from the park, and Chief Lo Presti and Lt. Clark, the other sources (see July 25-26 FBI Report), also stated that gunfire came from the park. The exaggeration was that the newspaper reported volleys instead of random shots, and even there the paper covered itself by reporting a high police official's statement that he believed the shots were fired in the air, not at police.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Robert Conot

DATE: January 11, 1968

FROM : Roger Waldman *RW*

SUBJECT: Englewood Profile

Following is a comparative chronology of the Englewood disturbance from Saturday, July 22 on:

## July 22

### FBI

2 Molotov cocktails  
4 fires  
Gunfire from and into park

### Sitrep

3 stores, 1 tavern damaged  
50-60 firebombs  
10 windows  
5 police cars  
Gunfire reported throughout night

### Newspaper

7 fires  
Many incidents of rock throwing  
Gunfire

### October 24 Newspaper Article

As in sitrep, but nothing on gunfire

## July 23

### Sitrep

Police fired upon  
Police car stoned  
Several molotov cocktails  
Sirens fired and looted  
Fotis looted



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FBI

Fires set  
Activity regarded unconnected  
No group activity

Newspaper

Last night routine, only major item a fire.

Newspaper October

Firebombs  
Fotis and Sirenos looted

July 24

FBI

No unusual activity  
Firecrackers reported as gunfire  
Fotis market fired. When police responded, were subject  
to shots from park

Sitrep

Reports of gunfire  
Blue Moon window broken  
Garage fired

Newspaper

Big sniper story  
Headline story--FIRING THREAT TO DISCUSSION

October

Gunfire

July 25 - Mayor on radio

FBI

No incidents of racial disturbance (Harrington)  
Food market fired

Sitrep

No serious incidents  
Looting of Fotis  
Report of gunfire  
Sirenos fired

January 9, 1968

MEMO FOR ROBERT CONOT

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SPIVAK

Tab 1 -- Preface

Page 3:                   Para. 1. "and then summed up, etc." -- the word "then" should be deleted in that the basic three questions came ahead of the 14 specifics.

Page 5:                   Para. 2. Re public safety, would it be better, so that we are not accused of playing footsy about the control of riots, to say directly: ". . . have set forth how we believe the police and other forces can best secure the public safety of our cities."

And in final sentence, should the word "only" be added, so as to say: "We have said what we believe not only to stop riots but to end injustice."

Page 6:                   Para. 1. In mention of white and black organizations, should there be more specificity, so that readers won't feel we're talking only about the NAACP.

And in final sentence, 2nd para., we may be misunderstood in saying the recommendations probe "no deeper" than, would it be better to say the recommendations probe deeply in order to reach the problems that remain. Or something else of a positive nature.

SPIVAK

Tab 2 -- Introduction

Page 2:                   End of para. 1. "Whites responded with mob violence and terrorism." Shouldn't we qualify that? Some whites? or Many whites? or At time whites? or Frequently whites?

Para. 2. Talking of "twice federal troops had to be sent into Southern states to enforce desegregation." We should say the troops were sent in, not that they had to be, which is a matter of judgment. And we might also mention the use of U. S. Marshals in a rather severe struggle to get Negroes admitted to the University of Alabama when Governor Wallace barred the way? I don't recall whether troops were sent, as well, but I don't believe they were.

Page 3:                   Para. 2. "The shock of the slayings could not be offset by the enactment a few weeks later of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Maybe not, but this is an editorial statement which is highly generalized. Could it not be: The shock of these slayings, and of other violence directed against Negroes and supporters of their rights over the years, could not be offset alone by the enactment, etc. Or something like that.

Page 4:                   Para. 3. "'Black Power' now became the slogan," etc. As Roy Wilkins said at a past meeting, Black Power didn't become the slogan until 1966.

Page 6:                   Para. 2. 20 cities? or 23?

Para. 3. Analyzed by specialists?  
Specialists in what?

SPIVAK

Tab 7 -- Northern New Jersey

- Page 1:                   End of para. 1. At variance how?
- Page 2:                   Para. 1. "Everywhere there was the same  
inequality" etc. This makes for balanced  
sentences, but it is absolutely true?  
Or is it overgeneralized?
- Para. 2. Again, I question use of  
"only" in front of the numbers.
- Page 4:                   Para. 3. Is it a documentable fact  
that it is the number of parochial  
schools which really have slowed the  
white exodus?
- Page 5:                   Top of page. "An old-line political  
machine." This is true, but machine  
is a nasty word. How about old-line  
political organization. And as for its  
giving Negroes little opportunity for  
participation, I would bet they have had  
their share of ward heelers too. Why  
not: The County in which Jersey City  
is located is run by an old-line  
political organization in which Negroes  
have had little significant influence or  
positions of leadership. (Again, if  
we can substantiate it.)

SPIVAK

Tab 8 -- Plainfield

- Page 1: Next to last para. "The . . . city government has failed to realize the change in character which the city has undergone." realize? or respond to?
- Page 3: Next to last line. "only 5"; again "only" is editorializing.
- Page 7: Para 2. Was it really because liquor stores and taverns were an "unhealthy influence" that they were attacked? Or was it because they were owned by whites? Or even because some folks wanted booze?
- Page 9: 2nd full para. Was it really that the police were unable to provide protection? Or were they unwilling? Or, if we are unsure, might we simply say that the fire department stopped responding to alarms because there was no police protection.
- Page 11: 6th line from bottom. Do we really need "former newspaper boy" to identify the Negro? It really is irrelevant. He might have been a former something else, too, and being a newspaper boy had nothing to do with his handing out weapons.
- Page 14: End of 1st para. "he believed" -- Ylvisacker or Hughes?

**SPIVAK**

**Tab 9 -- New Brunswick**

**No adverse comments.**

SPIVAK

Tab 11 -- Statistical Analyses

Page A1: Line 2. Between 60 and 160 disorders in the Spring, Summer and Fall. In the Preface, page 2, the reference is to "over 50 cities; in the summer." Should we coordinate numbers, or frames of reference?

Page A3: In listing of Harlem, do we want to specify East Harlem?

Page A9: Bottom of page. Was there any reply by New Jersey police to these charges?

Page A11: Para. 31 "only 13 were considered . . . serious." Strike "only."

Page C7: Again, strike the "only" with respect to tear gas gases and the number of cities.

Page C8: Knock out "only" re 3 disorders, and re 3 of 17 cases.

Page C13: In "Participants" paragraph, wasn't Linward Cathcart a counter-rioter in Plainfield who was countable among the young Negro militants?

Pages D1 thru D6: This entire section has a pessimistic tone that might get us in minor trouble. It indicates that no matter how much force of negotiation there was, rioting ensued or resumed. The statistics are there, I agree, but maybe the wording might be revised to point up the fact that the force or the negotiation, as the case may be, is needed although it does not always have the desired effect.

Page E2: Bottom. Should we cite which city was unable to supply detailed arrest data?

SPIVAK

Tab 11 -- Statistical Analyses (Continued)

- Page E3:                    Para. 1. "Puerto Ricans were involved only in 4 disorders." It's still, perhaps, 4 too many. Can't we eliminate the only? Also, after listing Puerto Ricans and then saying "other races" it would be better, instead, to say "other ethnic groups" or "other ethnic extractions." Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans, i.e., are not races but nationalities.
- Page E5:                    Para 2. "The sex of 31 arrestees . . . was undetermined." I would make that "not stated" or "not recorded."
- Page E6:                    In "Employment Status" paragraph -- since such large percentages list themselves as employed -- but since jobs is considered such a key issue -- it might be noted that the type of employment, or duration, or wage scales was not recorded. Otherwise, a statistical paragraph like this could be held up as a partial refutation of the theory that more ghetto jobs are needed to curb rioting.
- Page E8:                    Bottom of page. The reference to 36 hours changes quickly to 48 hours.
- Page F2:                    Re Newark and the media, might we say that in at least one documented case New York or network TV urged the Negro youth to throw a rock.
- Page F3:                    Re the UPI Atlanta story, something seems to have been left out, in re the hit and run guerrilla tactics.

SPIVAK

Tab 11 -- Statistical Analyses (Continued)

- Page H16:                    Para. 2. "There is . . . a widely held view that Negroes are lazy, shiftless, etc." The fact that this view exists widely may be denied by many. Could we not say instead that there has been built up, in this country, a caricature of the Negro as a lazy, etc.
- Page I3:                    I'm not challenging it, but am curious. Has Mayor Maier been in office 7 years or more, as next to last paragraph says?
- Pages J4 and J5:           In paragraphs listing Negro grievances, use of the word "the" in such things as "the abuse of persons" indicates we are charging that this is true. How about adding the word "alleged" or saying complaints of" as on p. J8, or simply eliminating the "the." The same applies on pp. J6, J7, J8, J9, and J10, especially on the latter page with respect to racism. Also, pp. J12 and J15. This is handled better on p. J14, with reference to "the belief that" etc.



SPIVAK

Tab 3 -- Tampa

Page 7:

Last para. "Negroes . . . had no one to represent them in positions of policy or power, and no one to whom to appeal for redress of grievances." Shouldn't this be: . . . had no one of their own race to represent them in positions of policy or power, and no Negro officials to whom to appeal for redress of grievances. (Otherwise, it could be said that the Negroes, like the whites, were represented by the regular officials and could carry appeals to them.)

Page 9:

End of para. 2. "the only firebugs caught." Were they actually firebugs? We don't say that they actually set any fires. How about potential firebugs?

End of para. 3. Re reference to Molotov cocktails, since there are various references throughout the report to these, would it be in order to have a footnote here describing what a Molotov cocktail actually is?

SPIVAK

Tab 4 -- Cincinnati

Page 3:

Para. 1. We may run into trouble -- and I seem to recall that we already may have with Mr. McCulloch -- over the description of Cincinnati's elective process, the reference to "only" one Negro councilman, and the reference to election of a white mayor. The Congressman did not share the writer's concern about some of these matters.

Pages 8 and 9:

We seem to imply that the mayor should have met with the militant (bottom of p. 8). Should we make such a judgment at this place in the report? And didn't Kriegel indicate that quite possibly a mayor ought not to have gone to such a meeting?

Page 9:

1st full para. "As in many other cities, municipal officials, whose contracts were generally with the small percentage of middle-class Negroes, appeared not to realize the danger presented by the pent-up frustrations of a ghetto population mired in poverty." Incontrovertible, but are we ready to name the "many other cities" if challenged? And is it a case of not realizing or not responding.

The word "only" is often a judgemental, editorial word. It should be eliminated on the last line of this page (only 11 fires), and possibly also on the top line of page 10 and in the last paragraph of page 10 with regard to injuries.

SPIVAK

Tab 5 -- Atlanta

Page 1:

We make a point of SNCC's home base being Atlanta without -- at this stage -- having recorded for posterity anything about the organization or its importance or lack of it. Perhaps a footnote here, and at prior reference to Rap Brown, referring the reader to subsequent chapter on Organizations, might be in order.

Page 2:

Says Atlanta has 85 Negro police officers. Page 8 has 300 police officers on hand at riot scene and several shots fired "from police ranks, which consisted mostly of Negro officers." Which is it?

SPIVAK

Tab 6 -- Newark

Page 1:

Para. 2. Can we back up the "growing opposition to Mayor Hugh Addonizio's Administration" as a personal matter, involving him specifically? Or can we drop his name at this point and bring it in on page 3, para. 2? If we are going to single out a political figure in this way, we had better document it.

Para. 2, 2nd sentence. Was it really because of tension that Kelly called the meeting? Or was it because of general concern over a long, hot summer?

Final sentence. Is it accurate that "nowhere did the city administration seem less aware" of tension? If this sentence refers only to northern New Jersey, it is vague. If it is a national reference, wasn't Mayor Lee unaware of tension? Mayor Cavanagh?

Pages 2 and 3:

A question may be raised as to why, if Negro constituents and their white Councilmen were on Opposite sides (top of p. 3) the Negroes didn't vote the rascals out of office.

Also, in the police reference at bottom of page and extending into page 4, this probably is handled okay. But you may want to take another look as to whether the Sons of Italy may raise hell about our implying that even "a minority" of their paisanos are sadists.

Page 4:

Last para. This could be interpreted as snide, in that perhaps "no complaint was ever heard of again" because no one's civil rights technically were violated.

SPIVAK

Tab 6 -- Newark (Continued)

- Page 7: Para 2, last sentence. "Residents frequently discussed the problem of organized crime and the influence of the Mafia upon the life of the city." How are we so sure about a general reference to what residents of the ghetto frequently discussed? Which residents? How many?
- Page 10: The writing here seems to be jumpy. Was something left out?
- Page 12: Mid-page. "sores festering." Aside from being a cliché, isn't this a bit overemotional?
- Page 15: 4th line from bottom. "World War I helmets." This should be World War I type helmets. We don't know that they actually were left over from the Great War.
- Page 16: Para 2. "Other observers reported that the Mayor seemed unaware of the seriousness of the tensions." Again, can we document our charge against the Mayor? Must we leave it with unnamed "observers?" Are there any quotes from Addonizio himself, in his testimony or in his interview with our staffers, which might either bear this out or at least balance the charge.
- Page 20: 1st full para. "The Governor decreed a 'hard line' in putting down the riot. He refused to see local Negro leaders . . . until Saturday morning." Whose quote is "hard line"? This paragraph implies crassness and cruelty on the part of Governor Hughes. Again, can we document it, or at least balance it -- beyond the final sentence quoting a state aide as saying the meetings were too late to do any good.

SPIVAK

Tab 6 -- Newark (Continued)

Page 29:

The story about the men having their parcels kicked open is a touching one, especially with the Vietnam veteran involved. But the question still remains: were they looting, or weren't they? We imply that the cops were beasts without really nailing down the innocence (and I assume they were innocent) of the Negroes.

SPIVAK

Tab 10 -- Detroit

- Page 4: Line 5. In a government report, do we want to use the word "pimp" or do we want to say "procurer"? I suppose either is all right, but it's worth considering.
- Page 6: Maybe, in line 10, the "only" is okay. It's only that I have an aversion to words like only, every, everywhere, and all, where they can't be backed up.
- Page 12: Para. 1. "There was even talk of asking for Federal help." Since this is one of the most controversial areas, in toto, of the 1967 riot picture, we had better be careful in every detail. Who did the talking about asking for Federal help? Who raised the idea? Who agreed, etc.? And who expressed concern about the lack of Negroes on the State Police force?
- Cavanagh -*
- Para. 3. "Although not yet deteriorated to the point of Newark, Detroit, like Newark, was losing population." Do we really want to say deteriorated? Or would hard-pressed or some other word be more appropriate?
- Page 13: Para. 2. "The strong union structure had created ideal conditions for the working man" etc. The word ideal may be too strong or at least too all-encompassing here. What about relatively ideal, or outstanding, or excellent, or relatively good -- and for many or most working men, rather than the-working man in toto.

SPIVAK

Tab 10 -- Detroit (Continued)

Page 13:

Bottom of page. I am sure the reference to apprenticeship training is true, and I personally think it should stay in there. But I point to it as a potential hot potato (i.e., the Meany-McCurdy exchange over this very issue at a Commission hearing.)

Page 14:

1st full para. Re the high school diplomas, is it that they were regarded, or often were regarded as less than valid?

Last para. ". . . the Negro population was still under-represented." Do we mean proportionately under-represented? And here -- as in other places where this spectre is raised -- will we be subject to challenge as suggesting that there should be proportionate representation: i.e., that 15 percent of Congress should be Negro, 15 percent of the Cabinet, etc. This sounds like the system of Cyprus!

Page 16:

Line 3. Does the "heat of the afternoon" have anything to do with spread of the fire?

Para 2. By "residents" do we refer to Negro residents, or white, or both?

Page 18:

*Quote*

Para. 2. "When Governor Romney flew over the area that evening, it appeared to him the city had been bombed." Can we quote Romney instead of paraphrasing? I say this because (though I think I remember Romney's being quoted publicly on this) he can be slippery at times and we cannot let him accuse us of brainwashing him.



SPIVAK

Tab 10 -- Detroit (Continued)

Page 18:

Also, in this same paragraph, should we not say how and when, and under what circumstances Romney arrived at the scene? Was he asked by Cavanagh? Did he arrive independently? What did he do besides fly over the city? (All of this, I assume, is in his testimony to the Commission.)

Pages 18 and 19:

Does the long quote overlapping these two pages raise a far-out possibility of implying our own advocacy of "true revolt" rather than looting, etc. Does this make the True Revolter come out as Mr. Nice Guy?

Page 20:

Para 1. "Shortly before midnight the Governor declared a state of public emergency." Do we have his proclamation? Did he do it at his own initiative? At Cavanagh's request? What did Romney say? Where was Romney when he did it? I feel strongly that we should nail down anything we say about Romney, to avoid even the most minor questions later.

Page 22:

Line 1. A cue ball? Or an ordinary billiard ball?

Bottom of page. The implication here is that by 2:00 a.m. Monday, Cavanagh and Romney "had decided to ask for Federal assistance" -- but that the Mayor didn't call Hubert Humphrey until 11:00 p.m., 21 hours later. THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUES IN THE REPORT -- ONE THAT IS LIKELY TO POP UP AS A RECURRING POLITICAL ISSUE ON THE PART OF ALL SIDES INVOLVED -- AND WE'VE GOT TO BE CLEAR-CUT IN ANYTHING SAID ABOUT THE ROMNEY TIME-TABLE. A FOOTNOTE SAYING THAT DETAILS ARE SET FORTH IN THE VANCE REPORT IS NOT ENOUGH, AND WE WILL BE ACCUSED OF DUCKING A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE. We don't have to

SPIVAK

Tab 10 -- Detroit (Continued)

settle -- or pretend to settle -- the issue. But we MUST BE PRECISE. This is handled all right on page 23, as far as style is concerned, but with some exceptions which I will note.

Page 23:

Mid-page. "local forces" unable to handle the situation? or local and state forces?

Next to last para. "He (Romney) and the mayor decided to reevaluate the need for federal troops." My impression is that Cavanagh says he never faltered or re-evaluated -- and I think Romney claimed something like this in his testimony too, though at his press conference on the night involved he was quoted otherwise.

Last para. "Contact between Detroit and Washington was maintained throughout the early morning hours." I thought that contact broke down -- at least between Romney and Washington. I'm not at all sure about this, but in any event, if contact was maintained, who was in contact with whom?

Lines 3 and 4. We kind of gloss over the re-request for troops -- a highly controversial issue. And we note a time for arrival of Vance and Throckmorton at Selfridge AFB, but not for the arrival of the paratroops, or how many, etc.

SPIVAK

Tab 10 -- Detroit (Continued)

- Page 25: Bottom of page. Is there any documentary backup that can be cited for the white man shotgunning Edmonds to death? Is our statement based on witnesses? On official police records? On what?
- Page 26: Line 3. You might smooth this out by saying the officers fired their shotguns three times, rather than three shots from their shotguns. (sports fans might scoff) And do we know what finally happened to the two women, after they were in the hospital weeks later? This is left dangling.
- Page 27: Mid-page. "The young troopers could not be expected to know what a danger they were creating," etc. Yes they could be expected to know. It would be more accurate to say that the young troopers did not know etc.
- Page 32: Mid-page. Do we want to call it an air of normalcy or of normality.
- Page 33: Para. 1. I don't challenge the effectiveness of the Federal troops. But is it true, as I have heard claimed, that they were assigned to the least volatile area anyway? And in the second paragraph, do we need "only" with respect to the 201 rounds?
- Page 34: Line 6. Again, normalcy or normality?

SPIVAK

Tab 10 -- Detroit (Continued)

Page 40:                    Para. 2. "Dozens of cases of police brutality emanated from the station" etc. Perhaps our depositions now will back this up. But -- to avoid being accused of making wild, unsubstantiated (at least on the surface) charges, couldn't we just as well say that dozens of cases of alleged police brutality or dozens of charges of police brutality, etc., emanated.

Page 41:                    Para. 2. The charge of indiscriminate shooting by police and guardsman is a highly general one. Can it be backed up by example or by footnote or even by saying that witnesses said this.

Page 42:                    2nd full para. There is a flat assertion here that three youths were "shotgunned to death by police officers in the Algiers Motel." Since this case is still pending, shouldn't we say they were shotgunned to death, allegedly by police officers; or were described as having been shotgunned to death by police officers. Anything to soften this and not seem to be making accusations that could jeopardize the processes of justice.

*Whe*

Page 44:                    Bottom of page. To clarify the bottom line, so it doesn't look like 20 or 21 police officers were killed, should we not say that Actions by police officers accounted for 20, and very like, 21 of the deaths -- rather than the officers accounting for them.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Robert Conot

DATE: February 19, 1968

FROM : *RW*  
Roger Waldman

SUBJECT: Changes in Englewood Profile

Page 1-87. After the first sentence of the third paragraph, a sentence should be added to reflect the fact that in the week immediately preceding the riot, there were very strong rumors that a disturbance would break out on Friday, July 21.

Page 1-89. The paragraph at the top of the page indicates that the police returned to guard firemen who were putting out two small fires. Lieutenant Ryan's testimony (9) indicates that the police responded to the report that Molotov cocktails were being thrown at Sireno's and Foti's Market. The police report says the same thing.

On the same page, the second sentence of the second paragraph indicates that a scuffle broke out between the officers and a number of persons. This scuffle occurred earlier in the evening, when the police reported the first time. (Clark, page 34) The sentence should be deleted and either placed in its proper sequence or left out altogether.

dcl



5010-108

*Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

P. 15 Word "mistress" Condemns Woman.

P. 15. - Was the "Fund" a "Community wide" fund?

P. 16 - Was Frakes arrest for "loitering"?  
Think it was for blocking sidewalk traffic.

P. 16 - The meeting was under a shade of Lincoln on Street Corner at edge of school yard. - Not in the building -

P. 19. - "Wealthy" Negro Real estate Man - "Well to do" -

P. 18 - Last Sentence - Police were called, but my understanding was that a Negro Dentist had talked the youth in to talking in an office down the street. - (before police arrived),

P. 19 - Plain Clothes Man's Car was possibly turned over, but don't think it was turned.

Dr. Green

to the Greek Stand, a hangout for kids, where, he discovered, plans were being formulated for the throwing of rocks and molotov cocktails that evening. Coach Williams began to talk to them; began to attempt to convince them that protest could take responsible forms.

In another part of the city a physician and an attorney, both Negroes, began similarly to attempt to turn the youths into constructive behavior. The idea of a Youth Patrol, which would take over responsibility from police for patrolling the trouble area, was formulated. White armbands -- and later white hats -- were chosen for the purpose of identification. Sheriff Beard decided to take a chance on the White Hat Patrol.

During the next twenty-four hours 126 youths, some of whom had participated in the riot, were recruited into the patrol. Of the leaders, four-fifths were high school dropouts.

On Wednesday, the inquiry into the death of Martin Chambers was concluded. Upon the verdict that the officer had fired the shot justifiably and in the line of duty, apprehension rose that trouble would erupt again. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the verdict was not to their liking, the White Hats continued to keep order.

On Monday, June 12th, while Tampa was still smoldering, discontent erupted in Cincinnati, 940 miles to the north. The issue there, too, was a killing.



# United States Senate

## MEMORANDUM

Re efforts of community  
leaders in Newark to reach  
Hughes, talk with

Greg Farrell and Neil  
Peterson of DOJ

Ylvisaker's staff

(Peterson is now city Mgr  
of New Brunswick.

Ray Krieger

# United States Senate

## MEMORANDUM

Did The staff interview either  
the author, photographer, or inter-  
viewees in LIFE's article on  
snipers in Newark? This sort  
of thing ought to be included  
or we'll be accused of white-  
wash or. ignorance/incompetence on  
issue of snipers. Include it,  
then explicitly place it in perspective  
through the other vignettes on  
Police-Board wildness.

# United States Senate

## MEMORANDUM

SNCC > should be  
KKK > written out

# United States Senate

## MEMORANDUM

p 22 Comments on Ray Brown

- 1) Should be H. "Ray" Brown
- 2) The language is prejudicial  
i.e. → "attempting to capitalize"  
and "rehashing"



# United States Senate

## MEMORANDUM

58 "frequently" - ~~fact~~ <sup>suggests facts</sup> Can we  
really document

61. next to last line: what  
does "them" modify - workers  
64 "unemployed" Negro youths -  
everyone?  
really fact or editorializing  
ing

# Introduction

①

In the summer of 1967 a former second-string football ~~player~~ <sup>and choir singer</sup> named Hubert Geroid Brown, threatened America with destruction.

"We ~~built~~ <sup>built</sup> America up and we can burn it down," he shouted in city after city. How was it ~~possible~~ that a nation ~~that~~ <sup>which</sup>, during the course of the past two decades, had concerned itself more with the equality of ~~■~~ its minorities than ever before, could have simultaneously engendered a "Rap" Brown? ~~as he came to be known. ■■■■~~

In 1954 the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Topeka vs Brown, had ruled that separate but equal facilities are inherently unequal, and that schools would have to be desegregated with all deliberate speed. ~~On-December-1-of-~~  
~~1955-a-Negro-se-~~

On December 1 ~~of~~ 1955 a Negro seamstress named Rosa Parks, was arrested when she refused to give up her seat to a white man on a Montgomery, Alabama bus. When the news spread through the community, a young Negro minister named Martin Luther King, Jr. organized a boycott of the bus line. It was the first implementation of the doctrine of non-violence in the civil rights struggle. It demonstrated to Negroes that, as a people, they had power that they lacked as individuals. As the case slowly wended its way ~~■~~ through the courts, they stood firm despite intimidation, threats of violence, and use of violence by whites. Houses in the Negro section were shot at and bombed. Only the will of Dr. King prevented Negroes from retaliating to violence with violence.

~~By the time~~ <sup>By the time</sup> ~~when, 12 months later,~~ the Supreme Court of the United States, 12 months later, ruled segregation ~~an~~ <sup>in</sup> public facilities unconstitutional, a significant change was in the

process of taking place in relations between the races. As ruling after ruling of the Supreme Court placed Federal Law and the Negro side by side, the civil rights drive gained legality and statute. <sup>R</sup> As <sup>Negro</sup> ~~the~~ saw that by unity he could obtain ~~the~~ power, ~~he lacked as an individual, the~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~Negro~~ acquired both self-respect and militancy. ~~As~~

~~As~~ a Negro janitor in Montgomery told a reporter: "We got our head up now, and we won't ever bow down again -- no, sir -- except before God!"

'Rap' Brown was a ten-year old in Baton Rouge, Louisiana when the Supreme Court delivered its ruling ~~on~~ on integration of the schools. Yet, during the next ten years, the schools he attended were totally segregated. The son of an oil refinery laborer and a dietician, Brown, like his older brother and sister, attended the high school affiliated with Southern University in Baton Rouge. Like his ~~h~~ older brother and sister, he went on to the university. In 1960 he was a high school senior, considered by his teachers to be introspective and quiet, yet very much oriented toward the struggle for equality.

When students at Southern University organized a sit-in at lunch counters ~~in the city~~ <sup>an</sup> in order to attempt to integrate them, Brown's brother was one of the leaders. In order to end the demonstration, Louisiana State authorities threatened to cut off funds for the university unless the demonstrations were curbed. The president of the university, a Negro, capitulated. Several students were expelled. In protest, scores of others, including Rap Brown's brother, transferred elsewhere. ~~Rap~~ Rap Brown, himself, however, <sup>attended</sup> ~~stayed in~~ Southern University until 1963, when he became a coordinator in Alabama for the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).



SNCC had been formed in Atlanta in 1960 under the aegis of Dr. King in order to coordinate the activities of various civil rights organizations. It had at its inception been firmly committed to the doctrine of non-violence, and the goal of integration. Many of its workers were white. Yet the winds of change that ~~had~~ had been expected to blow ~~across~~ across the nation were not blowing. In the South there were hardly more Negro children in white schools than ten years previously. Elsewhere the principal effect of integration was to turn all-white schools into all-black schools.

~~As the drive for Negro equality continued~~  
~~In the South, busses were burned, demonstrators~~  
were beaten and jailed, and civil rights workers were abducted and murdered. ~~Civil rights workers~~ <sup>Members of civil rights organizations</sup>, attempting to operate within the framework of the nation's laws, were jailed and prosecuted with impunity by those who opposed ~~these~~ <sup>the</sup> laws.

As more and more of the workers suffered serious injuries and death, and little was changed as a result, more and more began to look upon the doctrine of non-violence as fallacious. More and more began to believe that in a confrontation between moral persuasion and violence, violence would be the victor. The turning point was reached in ~~1963~~ <sup>the summer of</sup> 1963.

The most massive demonstrations the South had seen began in Birmingham, Alabama. The white response was a series of bombings that inflamed Negroes. Retaliation against whites in the form of rock-throwing and burning of white-owned property began. A series of bloody battles were fought with the police. ~~The culmination came~~ <sup>The culmination came</sup> ~~In the quiet of~~ one Sunday morning, as a group of Negro children sat in Sunday School, a bomb exploded beneath the church. Four young girls were killed. No one was ever tried for the murders. The sacrifice had achieved

(X)

virtually nothing. Birmingham remained as white supremacist as ever. Yet all over the nation Birmingham had forged a bond among Negroes. Psychologically they had marched with the marchers, suffered with the injured, and become more and more embittered at the authorities.

In the November, 1965 issue of the Michigan Law Review, the Honorable George Edwards, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and former Police Commissioner of Detroit, wrote: "Episodes like those experienced ~~like~~ <sup>in</sup> Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, in Oxford and Neshoba County, Mississippi, add to the police problems in every section of the country.

In the April, 1965 issue of the "Liberator," the organ of the militants, the disaffection had grown to the extent that a writer declared: "Either black people will be destroyed or the white American Government will be destroyed. It is a life or death struggle. This further illustrates that we have only one alternative: United for self-defense warfare now, or perish!"

Four months later, in August, a combination of haphazard ~~and unrelated~~ circumstances plunged Los Angeles into the bloodiest American domestic turmoil in two decades. Within a period of two days, with virtually no organization, and relatively little effort, Negroes overwhelmed the police and infused the fibers of the nation's third largest city with fear. Negroes everywhere seized upon the riot as a demonstration that Black Power was both viable and practical.

The April 22, 1966 issue of the Black Muslim newspaper, "Muhammed Speaks," headlined "Coming: Bloody Conflicts in the Cities?" The ~~thesis~~ thesis of the article was that, as major American cities attained a black majority, "The

5

white power structure will not 'willingly' yield to the democratic concept of ~~in~~ 'majority rule.'"

By the spring of 1967, Stokely Carmichael and <sup>4</sup>Rap Brown were saying that "You can't turn your back on violence, because you can't live in America if you're black and be non-violent." Proclaiming ever-more stridently that ~~in~~ America was conducting "genocide" against the black man, they were themselves in the process of killing SNCC. Its white supporters had either been expelled or <sup>had</sup>deserted. Its supply of funds was rapidly drying up. Only if Carmichael and Brown could <sup>simultaneously,</sup> convince ~~the~~ white America that ~~xxxxxx~~ a revolution was in the making and Black America that white America would respond to black grievances with a policy of suppression and violence, could they hope that their words would be heeded by the masses; that they themselves <sup>e</sup>would attain the stature of leaders. The trap had been baited and set. The question remained, would it be sprung?

# TAMPA

In Tampa the temperature had reached 94 degrees.

A humid wind ruffled the bay where thousands of persons had watched the hydroplane races. Since early morning the Police Department's Selective Enforcement Unit, designed as a riot control squad, had been employed to keep order.

At 5:30 P.M., a block from the waterfront, a photo supply warehouse was broken into. Forty-five minutes later, as gathering clouds were shadowing the sun, two police officers spotted three Negro youths as they walked near the State Building. As the youths spotted the officers, they ducked into an alley. The officers gave chase. As they ran, the suspects left a trail of photographic equipment scattered from the yellow paper bags <sup>they were carrying.</sup>

The officers <sup>then,</sup> ~~submitted~~ a general broadcast over the police radio. As other officers arrived on the scene, a dangerous game of hide and seek began through and around the streets, houses, and alleys of the neighborhood. <sup>When</sup> ~~the~~ Negro residents of the area adjacent to the Central Village Housing Project became aware of the chase, they began to participate. Some attempted to help the officers in locating the suspects. [R. C. Oates, one of the 17 Negroes on the 500-man Tampa police force, spotted 19-year old Martin Chambers, <sup>base to the waist,</sup> wriggling away from him beneath one of the houses. Oates called for Chambers to come out and surrender.

Ignoring him, Chambers emerged in a running crouch from the opposite side of the house. A white officer, J. L. Calvert, took up the pursuit. Rmx

Pursuing Calvert, in turn, were three ~~Negroes~~ young Negroes, all spectators. Behind



one of the houses a high cyclone fence created a two-foot wide alley, ~~running some~~ twenty-five feet <sup>in length.</sup>

As Chambers darted along <sup>the fence,</sup> ~~its length,~~ Officer Calvert rounded the corner of the house, <sup>Calvert</sup> ~~and~~ yelled <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ him to halt. Chambers ignored him, Calvert, who had flunked his last marksmanship test, raised ~~and aimed~~ his .38 revolver and fired. Chambers, <sup>the</sup> ~~a .32 caliber~~ slug entering his back <sup>and</sup> ~~passing~~ completely through his body, raised his hands over his head, clutched at the cyclone fence, and requested to be taken to a hospital.

~~The three youths behind Officer Calvert seeing~~  
 2 <sup>When</sup> ~~Coming upon the scene,~~ the three youths running behind Officer Calvert <sup>came upon the scene</sup> assumed Chambers had been shot <sup>standing</sup> ~~in this~~ <sup>in which they saw him.</sup> position. Rumor quickly spread through the neighborhood that a white police officer had shot a Negro youth who had had his hands over his head and was trying to surrender. <sup>The</sup> ~~Although an ambulance was called~~ <sup>that was summoned</sup> it became lost on the way, ~~and~~ <sup>As</sup> minute following minute, stretched into a quarter hour and then beyond, the ever-gathering crowd viewing the bloody ~~pulsing from the~~ critically injured youth, became ever-more belligerent.

Finally, the Reverend M. L. Newman told police they'd better get the boy out of there, ~~and~~ Officer Oates loaded <sup>Chambers</sup> ~~him~~ into his car and drove him to the hospital. He died shortly thereafter.

As officers were leaving the scene, the storm broke. Beneath the pelting rain the spectators scattered. When an officer went back to check the area he found no one on the streets.

A few minutes after 7:00 p.m. the Selective Enforcement Unit, tired and sun-parched, reported in from the faces.



A half hour later a report was received that 500 persons were gathering. A police car was sent into the area to check the report. The officers could find no one. The men of the Selected Enforcement Unit were told to go home.

The men in the scout car, had not, however, penetrated into the Central Village Housing ~~complex~~ where, as the rain ended, hundreds of persons ~~had~~ poured from the apartments at least half of them were teenagers and youths. As they began to mill about, old grievances, <sup>both</sup> ~~the~~ real and imagined, were resurrected: ~~discriminatory~~ discriminatory practices of local stores, advantages taken by white men of Negro girls, the kicking in the face of a Negro by a white man, the lack of recreation facilities, the blackballing of two Negro high schools by the Athletic Conference, the shooting of two Negro youths handcuffed ~~together~~ by a police officer.

When Officer Oates returned to the area it was seething ~~it was seething~~ with teenagers and young adults. Attempting to convince them to disperse of their own accord, he assured them a complete investigation would be made into the shooting. He believed himself to be making headway when an hysterical girl appeared, ~~running this way and that~~ crying that the police had killed her brother. Her appearance galvanized the crowd, ~~xxx~~ Rocks were thrown ~~xxx~~ police cars <sup>driving</sup> ~~that drove~~ into the area <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ stoned. The police, relying on a previous experience, when, after withdrawal of their units, the crowd had dispersed ~~of its~~ ~~consequence~~, decided to send no more patrol cars <sup>in</sup> ~~into~~ the ~~area~~ vicinity.

AT Approximately the same time the recall, which had been issued earlier by the Police Department, began to show results. <sup>AT</sup> ~~and by~~ 11:30 p.m. officers <sup>moved back</sup> ~~began moving~~ into the area. ~~which~~ by this time, ~~was~~ engulfed <sup>in</sup> ~~by~~ a full-fledged riot. riot, highlighted by the flames of burning buildings, it was,

Falling power lines whipped sparks about ~~the fires~~  
~~of the blacked out area,~~ as the skirmish line of officers ~~as it~~  
 moved down the street; ~~as scattered shots~~ <sup>The popping noise of, presumably, grenades</sup>  
~~came~~ <sup>direction of the</sup> ~~from the~~ housing project, ~~the~~ officers did not  
 return the fire.

It was announced over a public address system that anyone caught armed would be shot, the firing ceased. Then, and throughout the succeeding two days, law enforcement officers refrained from the use of firearms.



No officer, nor any civilian, suffered a gunshot wound during the riot.

~~Returning from St. Petersburg~~ a young white couple, Mr. + Mrs. C. I. driving along the expressway, were startled by the fire, <sup>Deciding</sup> ~~decided~~ to investigate, <sup>they</sup> ~~and~~ took the off-ramp right into the midst of the riot. The car was swarmed over, <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ its windows <sup>were</sup> shattered, <sup>C.D.</sup> ~~the man~~ was dragged ~~out~~ into the street.

~~As he emerged from a bar, J. E. + a 19-year-old Negro fruit-picker, saw fists flailing at the white man as he lay on the ground.~~

As he emerged from a bar <sup>in which</sup> ~~where~~ he had spent the evening, 19-year old <sup>J.E.</sup> ~~James Campbell~~, a Negro fruit-picker from Arkansas, was as surprised by the riot as Mr. and Mrs. C. D. <sup>Rushing toward</sup> ~~Catching sight of fists flailing away at the white man and the young woman trapped inside the Mercury stationwagon, he rushed towards it,~~ interposed himself between <sup>her</sup> ~~the car~~ and the mob. <sup>As with</sup> ~~helped Mrs. C. D.~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~behind the wheel, then as~~ she was able to drive off, <sup>with</sup> ~~with~~ rocks and beer cans smashing at <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ windows, pushed through to where the white man lay <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ with <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ hoots and jeers of rioting youths ringing in his ears, <sup>J.E.</sup> ~~helped~~ him, also, to escape.

By one <sup>a.m.</sup> ~~one~~ police officers and sheriff's deputies had surrounded and blocked off an area several blocks ~~square~~ square. <sup>begin</sup> ~~firemen entered the area~~ to extinguish the flames which <sup>by this time</sup> ~~had spread~~ to several other establishments from the three businesses in which they had, originally, been set. <sup>Control was soon re-established.</sup> ~~No resistance was met, and a half hour later law enforcement personnel had reestablished control.~~

Because of the absence of the Chief of Police, Governor Claude Kirk placed Sheriff Beard ~~was placed~~ in charge of the combined forces of the police and sheriff's departments <sup>by Governor Claude Kirk.</sup> For the next twelve hours the

situation remained quiet but tense. Rumors <sup>became</sup> ~~were~~ as abundant as flies in a stable. By the afternoon of Monday, June 12, the sheriffs and police' forces had both been fully committed, the men were tired, there were none in reserve.

As a precautionary measure the Sheriff decided to request that a contingent of the National Guard be made available to the city.

Late <sup>in the</sup> ~~morning~~ afternoon Mayor Nick Nuccio and Governor Claude Kirk met with the residents of the Central Park Village area. It was a tense meeting, charged with hostility, in which ~~almost~~ every speaker, both white and Negro, was booed and hissed. Although there had been no massive resistance to the integration of schools and facilities in the city, and officials prided themselves <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ the supposedly good race relations, the fact that Negroes, who make up almost 20 percent of the ~~city's~~ population, have had no one to represent them in positions of policy or power, and therefore felt that they had no one to whom to appeal for a redress of grievances, had built up frustrations to the boiling point. ~~Then~~

There was no Negro on the City Council; none on the School Board; none on the all-white Fire Department; and none of high rank on the Police Force. ~~Four out of every ten~~ <sup>Negroes</sup> ~~lived~~ in shacks <sup>broken</sup> ~~with~~ window panes, leaking gas, and holes in the walls, <sup>through which rats scurried,</sup> ~~rented~~ <sup>Rents were</sup> ~~fifty and~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~sixty~~ dollars a month. Recreational facilities were ~~inadequate~~ <sup>few</sup> and those that did exist lacked equipment and supervisors, ~~so that they became the~~ <sup>dominion</sup> of young toughs, preempted and intimidated the children, Education who tried to use them.



Education provided by the schools was so limited that the majority of ~~these Negroes~~ <sup>Negroes</sup> never reached the eighth grade. Of every 1,000 Negro students who graduated from high school, only 28 could attain the minimum passing score on the State's college entrance examination, ~~and many fewer actually went~~.

A difference of at least three-and-a-half years in educational attainment separated the average Negro and white youth, ~~on the street~~ <sup>as a result</sup>. 55 percent of the Negroes in Tampa were working in unskilled jobs, more than one half of the families had incomes of less than \$3,000 a year. The result was that ~~fully~~ 40 percent of the children lived in broken homes, and the city's crime rate ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> among the top 25 percent in the nation.

Although the meeting <sup>between the residents and the officials</sup> broke up without ~~any~~ concrete results, the Governor believed it had enabled the residents to let off steam. That-evening,--as-National-Guard

That evening, as National Guard troops supplanted local forces in maintaining and perimeter and establishing roving patrols, anti-poverty workers went from door to door, urging ~~residents~~ <sup>citizens</sup> to stay off the streets.

A reported attempt by Black Muslims to incite people failed. Although there were scattered reports of trouble from several areas of the city, and a few fires were set, a goodly proportion ~~in~~ of them in vacant buildings, there were no major incidents. (Three youths were arrested when discovered with a cache of molotov cocktails. They were white, they were the only fire bugs caught <sup>during</sup> the riot.)

All during the next day, false reports poured into Police Headquarters. Normal, everyday scenes took on menacing tones, twenty Negro men, bared to the waist, and carrying clubs, were reported to be gathering. They

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impressive-looking graying hair,

An ~~offspring~~ man with ~~thin nose~~, crooked

chin, and ~~no~~ ~~antennae~~ projecting from his

~~head~~ Williams had been the ~~city~~ football

coach at the high school serving the central

city. A year earlier he had become ~~an~~ ~~assistant~~ assistant

coach at Louisiana's Southern University, the

same school Ray Brown had attended.

turned out to be construction ~~workers~~ workers.

Mayor Nuccio continued, with uncertain success, to meet with residents. At the <sup>12</sup>suggestion of ~~residents~~ that the man most likely to carry weight with the youngsters was Coach Jim Williams, he placed a call to Tallahassee, where Williams was attending a Coaching Clinic. ~~xxx~~ *Inset*

It was almost 48 hours after the shooting of Martin Chambers that Williams arrived in Tampa. Together with another coach, he went to the Greek Stand, a hangout for kids, where he discovered plans were being formulated for the throwing of rocks and molotov cocktails that evening. One of his football players at Southern University, J.L.C. was a resident of Tampa. Coach Williams enlisted his aid.

In another part of the city, a physician and an attorney, both Negroes, began similarly to attempt to turn the youths into constructive behavior. The idea of a Youth Patrol, which would take over responsibility from ~~the~~ police for patrolling the trouble area, was formulated. White armbands and later white hats, were ~~used~~ *chosen for the* ~~purpose~~ of identification. Sheriff Beard decided to take a chance on the White Hat Patrol, ~~as it came to be called.~~

During the next twenty-four hours 126 youths, ~~were~~ some recruited-into-the-patrol of whom had participated in the riot, were recruited into the patrol. Of the leaders, ~~of-the~~ four-fifths were high school dropouts.

On Wednesday, the inquiry into the death of Martin Chambers was held. <sup>upon</sup> ~~when~~ the verdict was ~~announced~~ that



the officer had fired the shot justifiably and in the line of duty, ~~there was~~ <sup>rose</sup> apprehension that trouble would erupt again. ~~However,~~ <sup>Nevertheless,</sup> despite the fact that the verdict was not to their liking, the White Hats continued to keep order.

On Monday, June 12th, while Tampa was still smouldering, discontent erupted in Cincinnati, 940 miles to the north. The issue there, too, was a killing.



(10)

(1) Cincinnati

In October, ~~of~~ 1965 a series of assaults on and murders of white women <sup>had</sup> generated an atmosphere of fear in the city. Although the newspapers were generally restrained in their treatment of the case, when it became known that the tentative ~~of~~ identification of the strangler indicated him to be a Negro, a new element of tension was injected into relations between the races.

In December a jazz player named Postel Laskey, was arrested and charged with one of the murders. In May of 1967 he was convicted. ~~He was convicted~~ and sentenced to ~~the electric chair~~ death. <sup>Although two of the principal witnesses against Laskey were Negroes,</sup> Many persons in the Negro community felt that because of the charged atmosphere he had not received a fair trial. They were even further incensed when a white man, convicted of killing his mistress, received a suspended sentence. <sup>Despite the fact</sup> Although the cases were ~~entirely diff~~ not at all alike, there was talk in the Negro community that the difference in the severity of sentences was indicative of the double standard of justice for white and black. ~~(Two of the principal witnesses against Laskey were Negroes)~~

Following Laskey's conviction a <sup>drive</sup> ~~fund~~ began in the community to raise funds for an appeal. Laskey's cousin, Peter Frakes, began walking the streets, carrying a sandwich board advertising <sup>the "Laskey Freedom Fund."</sup> ~~for him~~. After ~~tw~~ warning him several times about ~~this~~ <sup>his</sup> activity, <sup>ies</sup> police arrested ~~him~~ <sup>FRAKES</sup> on Saturday, June 10, <sup>on a charge of</sup> ~~for~~ violating the city's anti-loitering

ordinance. ~~This ordinance was looked upon by~~ a major portion of the Negro community <sup>looked upon the ordinance</sup> as an anti-Negro one. ~~loitering law.~~

Between January of ~~1966~~ and June, 1966, of some 240 ~~arrests~~ <sup>under it,</sup> 170 had been Negro.

~~(Sign Frakes was carrying was for the "Lasky Freedom Fund.")~~

Frakes was arrested at 12:35 A.M. on Sunday morning, June <sup>11</sup>~~12~~. That evening, concurrent with the commencement of <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ Baptist Convention, Dr. Martin Luther King spoke in one of the churches. Following the speech it was announced that a meeting to protest the Frakes arrest and the anti-loitering ordinance would be held the following night at a junior high school in the Avondale District.

Without realizing the implication ~~of a number of~~ <sup>over the years</sup> ~~unrelated occurrences,~~ Cincinnati <sup>more and more difficult,</sup> had been making protests through political and non-violent channels. It seemed more and more futile to the young, militant element in the Negro community <sup>to abide by accepted procedures.</sup>

~~Although in 1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were~~

Although the city's Negro population had been rising swiftly, and in 1967 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes, there was only one Negro sitting on the City Council <sup>with a far smaller Negro population, there had been two.</sup> ~~compared to two in the 1950's,~~ This was due to the fact that the city had changed from District to at-large election of the nine councilmen.



Although 40 percent of the school children were Negro, there was only one Negro on the Board of Education. Of 81 members ~~in~~ of various city commissions, only one was a Negro.

When ~~the~~ Reverend <sup>Fred</sup> Shuttlesworth, who had led the Birmingham march of 1963 ~~the~~ against alleged discriminatory practices, Negroes in ~~1963~~ staged a protest at the County Hospital,

he and his followers were arrested for trespassing. *The Rev. Shuttlesworth*

*PP* Picketing at the construction of a new <sup>city</sup> Convention Hall, to protest lack of Negro representation in building trades unions, produced no results.

Traditional Negro leaders drawn from an affluent and conservative middle class became more and more discredited <sup>as</sup> ~~and~~ grandiose promises generated into petty results. Of 2,000 job <sup>openings</sup> ~~talked~~ about for young Negroes in the spring of 1967, only 65 materialized. Almost one out of <sup>every</sup> 8 Cincinnati Negroes was unemployed ~~and~~ <sup>two</sup> out of every five Negro families were living on the border of poverty or below.

A study of the West End <sup>district</sup> of the city indicated that one out of every four Negro men <sup>living there</sup> was out of work. In one public housing area 2 two-thirds of the fathers were missing from the home. Of private housing occupied by Negroes, one-fourth was overcrowded and half was dilapidated.

In the 90 degree temperature of Monday, June 12th, hundreds of Negro kids <sup>roamed</sup> ~~were roaming~~ the streets. The two swimming pools available to them could accommodate only a handful. In the Avondale Section, which had, up to a few years <sup>before,</sup> ~~ago,~~ been a prosperous middle class community, Negro youths watched white workers going to their jobs in white-owned stores and businesses. One <sup>youth</sup> began to count the number of delivery trucks being driven by

*seems to say, "I see no serious progress and am glad on probation, for this device the court kept him under the jurisdiction, and prevented him from leading further, nonviolent protests."*

13  
 Negroes. During the course of the afternoon, of <sup>the</sup> 52 ~~there~~  
~~was only one.~~ Trucks he counted only one had a Negro driver.

<sup>The youths set up a line,</sup>  
 Impromptu picketing ~~began~~ and trucks were prevented  
 from making deliveries. The police were called. Although,  
 for the moment, trouble was avoided, dissatisfaction <sup>hung like a</sup>  
<sup>Damocles sword</sup> ~~left dangling~~ in the air. The police department mobilized  
 its forces for a possible disturbance <sup>however</sup>, because of  
 complaints from ~~certain~~ Negro militants that the police  
 themselves were an inciting factor <sup>some months earlier</sup>,  
 following a speech by Stokely Carmichael, a crowd had  
 gathered and burned the car of <sup>a</sup> plainclothesman. It was  
 decided to withhold the police from ~~the~~ immediate area  
 of the ~~meeting~~ <sup>scheduled protest meeting that evening.</sup>

It appeared as if this policy might be rewarded  
 until, toward the close of the ~~protest~~ rally, a wealthy  
 Negro real estate broker arose to defend both the police  
 and the ~~Anti-Loitering Ordinance~~. The largely youthful,  
 militant audience was incensed. When the meeting broke  
 up a missile was hurled through <sup>the</sup> a window of a nearby  
 church, ~~and~~ <sup>a</sup> small fire was set in the street. The police  
 were able to react quickly. There was only one major  
 confrontation between them and the mob, ~~and~~ <sup>little</sup> resistance  
 was offered.

Although windows were broken in some two dozen stores,  
<sup>virtually no</sup> there was ~~little~~ looting. There were 14 arrests, ~~and~~ some  
 of them not connected with the disturbance. Among those  
 arrested was a former <sup>community</sup> ~~social~~ worker, studying for a doctorate  
 at Brandeis University. Called to the area to help get



people off the streets, he was charged with loitering.

The next morning it was stated by the Judge of the Municipal Court, before whom most of the persons charged were to be brought, that he intended to mete out maximum sentences to anyone found guilty of a riot-connected offense. Although the Judge intended the statement to act as a deterrent against further violence, to many persons in the Negro community it appeared further evidence of discriminatory justice.

Tuesday morning, 11 demands ~~were presented to the municipal government~~ stemming from the Monday night meeting were presented to the Municipal Government. Included were demands for the ~~repeal~~<sup>repeal</sup> of the loitering law, release of all prisoners arrested during the disturbance, full employment for Negroes, and equal justice in the courts.

<sup>Municipal officials</sup> ~~It was~~ agreed that the City Council would consider the demands. Officials, however, rejected the ~~demands~~<sup>call that they</sup> to attend an open-air meeting of residents in the Avondale Section that evening. City leaders did not want to give stature to the militants by acknowledging them as the de facto representatives of the community, yet, by all indications, <sup>militants</sup> they were the only <sup>persons with</sup> ~~ones who could have influenced~~ on the people on the streets.

Mayor Walter S. Bachrach <sup>declared that he</sup> was "quite surprised" <sup>by</sup> the disturbance because the Council had "worked like hell" to help Negroes.

When no city official appeared at the meeting that evening, the throng that had assembled quickly ~~became rest-~~  
~~less and~~ began to mill about. Shortly before 7:00 P.M.

rocks began to be thrown ~~and~~ at 7:15, according to the Chief of Police, "All hell broke loose."

Looting ~~begin~~ <sup>commenced,</sup> fires were set, firemen were stoned. Like fragments of an exploding bombshell, the riot ~~quickly~~ spread to other sections of the city. Vehicles were stoned and burned ~~x~~ a paper company was set afire and damaged extensively. Although the police force was ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> maximum strength, the confusion and rapidity with which the disorder spread made it apparent that city police would not, alone, be able to cope with it.

Shortly before 10:00 P.M., after a request for aid to surrounding communities, a call was put in to the Governor asking for mobilization of the National Guard.

At 2:30 A.M. Wednesday <sup>of the National Guard</sup> the first units appeared on the streets. There was a policy of restraint in the use of weapons, ~~and~~ few shots were fired. ~~Although~~ <sup>Even though</sup> ~~there were~~ scattered incidents <sup>occurred</sup> for three days ~~thereafter~~, <sup>the arrival of the National Guard, the riot,</sup> ~~the main force of the riot had been dampened.~~ <sup>never again threatened to get out of hand.</sup>

Of the 107 persons arrested Tuesday night, <sup>when the main disturbance took place,</sup> 75 were <sup>Despite</sup> 21 years of age or younger. <sup>SAMS</sup> Although there had been fears of a clash between Negroes and ~~some~~ white Southern Appalachian ~~migrants~~ whose economic conditions paralleled those of the Negroes, <sup>a</sup> such ~~a~~ clash never developed. Fewer-

Fewer-than-a-dozen-persons,--about-equally-divided between white and Negroes,--required-hospital-treatment

<sup>of</sup> ~~While~~ 63 ~~persons~~ reported injuries, only 12 were serious enough to require hospitalization. <sup>the total of</sup> Of ~~1~~ 404 persons <sup>during the riot,</sup> arrested, 338 were 26 years of age or younger.



(16)

(1) Atlanta

## ATLANTA

As ~~While~~ Rap Brown ~~was busying himself in Ohio, SNCC's~~ arrived in Cincinnati on Thursday June 15, to attempt to exploit the riot situation there, SNCC's home base of Atlanta, Georgia, was beginning to ferment.

Rapid industrialization following World War II, coupled with annexations that quadrupled the area of the city, ~~had~~ made Atlanta a vigorous and booming community. ~~xx~~ Pragmatic business and political leaders ~~have given~~ <sup>gave to</sup> the city the reputation of the ~~xxx~~ "Moderate stronghold of the Deep South."

Nevertheless, although integration of schools and facilities has been accepted, the fact that the city is ~~both~~ <sup>headquarters</sup> both the ~~stronghold~~ for civil rights organizations and ~~segregationist~~ <sup>makes</sup> elements, ~~has made~~ the modus vivendi between the races a tenuous one.

The rapidly growing Negro population, which, by the summer of 1967, had reached an estimated 44 percent and was scattered in several ghettos throughout the city, was maintaining constant pressure on surrounding white residential areas. Blockbusting tactics were frequently and ~~xxxx~~ successfully utilized.

One occasion the city barricaded a road to prevent movement between a white and Negro areas. The city police were constantly under pressure to prevent keep marches and countermarches of civil rights and white supremacist organizations from flaring into violence.

Following the fatal shooting of a Negro by a police officer in September of 1966, only the dramatic <sup>appea-</sup> ~~appearance~~ of Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., in the ~~ghetto~~ <sup>ghetto</sup>, without police protection, ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> averted ~~an incident~~ a riot.

~~The head of the Atlanta Ku-Klux-Klan recently boasted that Georgia has~~ <sup>Boasting that</sup> the largest KKK membership in

the country

on June 4, 1967

On ~~June 4, 1967~~, the Klan, ~~flowing its muscled~~ <sup>sections. Only</sup> marched through one of the poorer Negro ~~communities~~.  
A massive police escort ~~prevented~~ a racial clash.

~~Although the city has made some progress,~~ <sup>the city</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>made</sup> has served more to reduce the level of inequality than to create equal conditions among blacks and whites. Different pay scales for black and white municipal employees performing the same jobs <sup>only recently</sup> had been eliminated.

According to Mayor Allen, 55 percent of municipal employees hired in 1967 were Negroes, <sup>and Negroes now</sup> ~~who~~ make up approximately 28 percent of the city work force. Of 908 police department employees, 85 are Negro, one of the higher percentages among major city police departments <sup>in the nation.</sup>

~~Yet every~~ <sup>are, in fact,</sup> indications ~~that~~ that the economic and educational gap between the black and white populations <sup>is</sup> ~~may, in fact, be~~ increasing. The average white Atlantan is a high school graduate; the average Negro Atlantan has not even graduated from grammar school.

The median income of a Negro family is less than half the white's \$6,350 a year, and 48 percent <sup>of Negroes</sup> ~~earn~~ less than \$3,000 a year. (50) percent of the men work in unskilled jobs, and many more Negro women than men, 7.9 percent as against 4.9 percent of the respective work forces, <sup>hold</sup> well-paying, white collar jobs.

Living on marginal incomes in cramped and deteriorating quarters, <sup>one-third</sup> of the housing was overcrowded and more than half deteriorated, <sup>families</sup> were breaking up



*rate. In approximately*  
~~but~~ at an increasing ~~pace~~ ~~and an estimated~~ four out of  
 every ten Negro homes the father was missing. *In the case of families*  
*living in public housing projects, more than 60 per cent of the fathers are missing.*

The Mayor estimated there ~~are~~ 25,000 jobs in the city  
 waiting to be filled because people don't have the education  
 or skills to fill them. Yet overcrowding in Negro schools  
 has forced the scheduling of extended ~~and~~ double sessions.  
 Whereas the white high school student attended classes six and  
 a half hours a day, the Negro attended only four and a half hours.  
 In one case, elementary school children were forced to  
 attend classes in a church. Although Negroes comprised  
 60 percent of the school population there there are 14 white  
 high schools compared to ~~nine~~ 9 Negro.

~~In the case of families living in public housing pro-~~  
~~jects, more than 60 percent of the fathers are missing.~~

One of the daily papers in Atlanta still advertises jobs  
 by race, and <sup>in</sup> some industrial plants there are still Negro  
 jobs and white jobs, with little chance for advancement *by Negroes.*

<sup>has</sup> A major industrial plant, with a work force of 26,400,  
~~has~~ 1,910 Negro employees.

It was shortly after 8:00 p.m. on Saturday, June 17 *that*  
~~when~~ a young Negro, <sup>E.W.</sup> carrying a can of beer, attempted to  
 enter the Flamingo Grill in <sup>the</sup> Dixie Hill Shopping Center, ~~in~~  
 Atlanta. When a private Negro guard told <sup>the youth</sup> ~~him~~ he could not  
 enter, ~~with the beer,~~ a scuffle ensued. Other officers came  
 to the guard's aid <sup>E.W.</sup> the young man received support in the person  
~~from~~ of his 19-year old sister, who flailed away at the officers  
 with her purse, ~~as well as~~ another 19-year old Negro ~~the~~ youth

~~was~~ ~~enter~~ entered the affray <sup>All three</sup> were arrested.

Although some 200 to 300 persons had been drawn to the scene of the incident, when police asked them to disperse they complied. The next night, Sunday, an even bigger crowd was hanging around. [Because the area is isolated from the city in terms of transportation, and there <sup>are</sup> ~~was~~ few recreational facilities, the shopping center <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ a natural gathering place. ~~During the~~

During the course of the evening Stokely Carmichael, and several followers appeared wearing plaid shorts, a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, sun glasses and sandals, ~~and~~ <sup>appeared together with several followers.</sup> ~~Carmichael~~ <sup>Carmichael</sup> approached <sup>the</sup> Police Captain ~~and~~ <sup>asked him</sup> why there were so many police cars in the area. Informed that they were there to <sup>make sure there was</sup> ~~receive~~ no disturbance, Carmichael started dancing up and down, clapping his hands and singing that there might have to be a riot if the police cars were not <sup>re</sup> ~~removed~~. When Carmichael refused to move on as requested, he was arrested.

Although there were no further disturbances, there was much bitterness among residents about their inability to get the ~~City~~ Government to correct conditions and make improvements. Petitions would be acknowledged, but never acted upon. Because ~~the seven City Aldermen were elected~~ <sup>elections were</sup> on an at-large basis, there ~~was~~ only one of 16 Councilmen ~~who~~ was a Negro, and many black wards were represented by white councilmen.



Demands for a swimming pool, for an access road to a nearby city park, for rodent and pest control, for better lighting and better garbage collection, had been As the residents mingled and discussed their grievances, it was decided to organize to no avail. A protest meeting ~~was organized~~ for the following night. Upon his release from jail Monday morning, Carmichael declared that the black people were preparing to resist "Armed aggression" by the police by whatever means necessary. Shortly thereafter <sup>in</sup> the Dixie Hills Shopping Center, which had been closed down for the day, a drunk <sup>using a broom handle,</sup> ~~for amusement~~ began to pound on the bell of a burglar alarm ~~with a broom handle~~. When officers responded and requested him to stop hitting the bell, ~~with the broom handle~~, the drunk complied and began hitting the officers ~~instead~~. In the ensuing scuffle several bystanders intervened <sup>2</sup> one of the officers drew his service revolver and fired, superficially wounding the drunk ~~who was then taken into custody.~~

Tension rose. Approximately 250 persons were present <sup>at</sup> that evening ~~at the~~ meeting. ~~a number of Negro leaders~~ When a number of Negro leaders urged the ~~submission~~ <sup>submission</sup> of a petition of grievances ~~the reception was tepid~~ through legal channels, <sup>When</sup> the reception was tepid. Carmichael took to the podium, <sup>urging</sup> ~~so~~ Negroes "to take to the streets and force the Police Dept. to work until they fall in their tracks." <sup>The response was tumultuous.</sup> The press quoted him as continuing: "It's not a question of law and order. We are not concerned with peace. We are concerned with the liberation of black people. We have to build a revolution."

As the people present at the meeting poured into the street they were joined by others, the crowd soon numbered an estimated 1,000. ~~An estimated~~ 50 of these ~~participated in~~ rocks and bottles throwing at the 40 police officers on the scene.

~~When police fired over the heads of the crowd and~~  
~~were quickly~~ reinforced by 200 other officers, police, *firing over the*  
*heads of the crowd,* quickly regained *control.* ~~command of the situation.~~ Of the ten persons arrested, six were 21 years of age or younger, and only one was in his thirties. ¶

The next morning city equipment appeared in the area to begin work on the long-delayed projects demanded by the citizens. It was announced a Negro Youth Corps would be established along the lines of the Tampa White Hats. SNCC responded that volunteers would be selling their "Black brothers out," and would be viewed as "Black Traitors," to be dealt with in the "Manner we see fit." Nevertheless, during the course of the summer ~~more than~~ *the* 200 youths participated *ing in the corps* and played an important role in preventing a major outbreak.

*Wednesday* Another meeting of area residents was called for ~~that~~ evening. At its conclusion 200 protesters were met by 300 police officers. As two police officers *chased* ~~were chasing~~ several boys ~~through the or~~ down the street, a cherry bomb ~~for motorcycle accident~~ exploded at their feet. In response, several shots emanated from police ranks, which, in that vicinity, consisted mostly of Negro officers.

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(7)

The discharge from one shotgun struck in the midst of several persons sitting on the front porch of a house, ~~observing the disturbance.~~ A 46-year old man was killed, a 9-year old boy was critically injured. ~~Due to the~~ <sup>appearance of Mayor Allen, and the</sup> efforts of neighborhood workers who circulated through the area, urging the restoration of order, ~~as well as the appearance of Mayor Allen and~~ <sup>no further violence ensued.</sup> ~~Police Chief Herbert Jenkins, the situation was kept under control.~~ (continued)



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Atlanta (continued)  
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~~The average age of the eight persons arrested was 19.~~

no P

When H. Rap Brown, who had returned to the city that afternoon, went to other <sup>Negro</sup> areas ~~of the city~~ in an attempt to initiate a demonstration against the shooting of the Negroes on the porch, he met with no response. Atlanta had weathered its crises.

## NEWARK

Newark was just approaching it. At a tumultuous meeting of the Planning Board that lasted until four o'clock in the <sup>of that same Wednesday night,</sup> morning, speaker after speaker from the Negro ghetto arose to denounce the city's intent to turn over 150 acres in the heart of the Central Ward as a site for the State's new medical and dental college.

Such was the growing opposition to Mayor Hugh Addonizio's administration by the black residents of the city that both the Planning Board and the Board of Education had ~~both~~ been paralyzed. Tension had been rising so steadily throughout the Northern New Jersey area that, in the first week of June, <sup>head of the State Police,</sup> Col. David Kelly had met with chiefs of police of most of the municipalities to draw up plans for state police support of city police in riot situations. Nowhere was the tension greater than in Newark. Nowhere did the city administration seem less aware of it.

Founded in 1666, the city rises from the salt marshes of New Jersey <sup>where the Passaic River opens into Newark Bay, a</sup> ~~directly across the Hudson and Passaic Rivers from~~ <sup>part of the Greater New York City ~~Metropolitan~~ complex</sup> Manhattan. Although its population of 400,000 still ranks it 30th among American ~~cities~~ municipalities, for the past 20 years ~~the~~

the city has been collapsing upon itself like <sup>a balloon from which the air is</sup> ~~air~~ seeping ~~from a balloon~~. By the 1950's it had built up <sup>vast</sup> areas of dilapidated housing than any other city of its size <sup>in the nation</sup>. ~~was~~ Steadily <sup>its</sup> ~~losing~~ population <sup>moved</sup> to the suburbs.

In the late 1950's the ~~movement~~ <sup>movement became</sup> began turning into a rout. Between 1960 and 1966 80,000 white residents fled the city. Replacing them in areas where living conditions were so bad that, according to a prominent member of the County Bar Association, "People would be kinder to their pets," were Negro migrants, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. In ~~the~~ six years the city <sup>switched</sup> ~~changed~~ from 65 percent white ~~majority~~ to 52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban. ~~its government, however, yet, by the~~ spring of 1967 the second major city in which America's minorities had become a ~~majority~~ <sup>minority</sup>, ~~remained~~ <sup>remained</sup> almost ~~totally~~ white ~~government~~.

On both the City Council and the Board of Education, 7 of 9 members were white. On other key boards the ratio was the same or worse. In the Central Ward, over which the medical college controversy raged, the Negro constituents found themselves on opposite sides of ~~the~~ <sup>and</sup> their white Councilmen <sup>a</sup> ~~on~~ almost every crucial issue. <sup>lacked the ability to respond quickly enough</sup> The municipal administration ~~was unable~~ <sup>to</sup> to navigate the swiftly changing currents <sup>it</sup> even had/exercised the utmost astuteness, it lacked the financial wherewithal to significantly <sup>a</sup> ~~effect~~ the course of events.

In 1962 seven-term Congressman, Hugh Addonizio, had forged an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow long-time Irish control of the City Hall. ~~The~~ chunky athlete who had been ~~the~~ third-string quarterback during Fordham's football heydays, <sup>he</sup> had compiled a distinguished war record. ~~Addonizio was considered~~ <sup>Addonizio,</sup> a liberal in Congress, <sup>When he</sup> became Mayor, ~~he~~ opened his door to all people. Negroes who had been excluded <sup>from</sup> the previous administration began



to be brought into the government. [ Nevertheless, ~~the~~ progress was slow. As the Negro population bounded upward, more and more of the politically oriented found ~~the progress~~ inadequate. ]

The Negro-Italian coalition ~~quickly~~ began to develop strains over the issue of the police. The police were largely Italian; the persons they arrested, largely Negro. Community leaders agreed that, as in most police forces, there ~~were~~ <sup>was</sup> a small minority of officers who abused their responsibility. This, conversely, gave an aura of credibility to malefactors who screamed, "Brutality!" every time they were caught.

In 1965 Mayor Addonizio, acknowledging that there ~~were~~ <sup>was</sup> "a small group of misguided individuals" in the Department, declared that "it is vital to establish once and for all, in the minds of the public, that charges of alleged police brutality will be thoroughly investigated and the appropriate legal or punitive action be taken if the charges are found to be substantiated."

Pulled one way by the Negro citizens who wanted a Police Review Board and the other by the police, who adamantly opposed it, the Mayor decided to buck all complaints against the police to the FBI for investigation. ~~for~~ Since the FBI was not conceived as an agency to investigate municipal police departments, and could act only if there had been a violation of a person's civil rights, it quickly became clear that a complaint, after being filed, would ~~never be~~ <sup>not</sup> heard of again. [ Nor ~~would~~ <sup>was</sup> there ~~be~~ much redress for other complaints. The city had no money with which to redress them.



The City had already reached its legal bonding limit, yet expenditures continued to outstrip income. \$200 million was needed for new school construction. ~~the city spent 20 times more than some of the surrounding communities~~ health and welfare costs were 20 times as great as for some of the surrounding communities. Cramped by ~~its~~ <sup>its</sup> small land area of 23 square miles, one-third of which was taken up by Newark Airport and unusable marshland, the city had nowhere to expand. ~~So~~. Taxable property was, in fact, contracting as land was cleared for urban renewal and then lay fallow year after year. Property taxes had been increased beyond the point of profitable return.

By the fall of 1967 they were to reach \$776 on a \$10,000 house -- more than double that of suburban communities. As a result, people were refusing to either own or renovate property in the city, ~~any longer~~. 74 percent of whites and 87 percent of Negroes rented the places in which they lived. Whoever was able to move to the suburbs, moved, yet continued to work in the city. During the daytime Newark more than doubled its population. As a result it was ~~forced~~ <sup>financially</sup> forced to provide services for people ~~contributing nothing~~ <sup>contributing nothing</sup> to the city ~~while its~~ <sup>yet the city's</sup> per capita outlay for police, ~~and fire~~ <sup>continued to increase</sup> ~~services~~ <sup>By 1967 it</sup> protection and other municipal services <sup>was</sup> twice that of the surrounding area. ~~It spent considerably less on education, yet in its schools were 78,000 children, 28,000 more than in the 1950's.~~

Consequently, there was less money to spend on education. Newark's per capita outlay on schools was considerably less than that of surrounding communities. Yet within the City's school system are 78,000 children, 28,000 more than in the 1950's.

~~In almost 20 percent of the population,~~ most school buildings ~~were~~ <sup>are</sup> over 50 years old. ~~20,000~~ <sup>are on</sup> pupils ~~were in~~ double sessions. ~~the~~ dropout rate ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> estimated to be as high as 33 percent. ~~over half of the~~ <sup>the</sup> adult Negro population ~~has~~ less than an 8th grade education. [The resulting ~~vicious~~ cycle of high unemployment, family break-up, and crime, was present in all its elements. ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> estimated 20 percent of young Negroes were without jobs. ~~40~~ <sup>40</sup> percent of Negro children lived in broken homes. ~~As a result,~~ despite the fact that Newark maintained the largest police force of any major city, it also had the highest crime rate.

Under such conditions a major segment of the Negro population became more and more ~~politically~~ militant. Since they were largely ~~excluded~~ excluded from positions of traditional political power, they made use of the anti-poverty program, in which poor people were guaranteed greater representation, as a political springboard. ~~When it became known~~

When it became known that the Secretary of the Board of Education intended to retire June 27, the militants proposed the City's Budget Director, a Negro, ~~for the~~ with a Master's Degree in accounting, for the position. The Mayor, however, had already decided upon a white man. Since the white man had only a high school education, and almost 80 percent of the school children in the system were Negro, the issue of who was to obtain the Secretaryship, a lucrative and powerful position, quickly became ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> cause célèbre. [Joined with the issue of the 146-acre medical school site, the area of which was triple the original ~~area~~



~~request~~ <sup>request, an expansion</sup> ~~and was~~ regarded by the militants as a ploy to dilute black political power, <sup>by moving out Negro residents -- the Board of Education both</sup> ~~the issue~~ brought on a dire confrontation between the Mayor and the militants, <sup>both sides</sup> refused to alter their positions, <sup>the</sup> impasse was complete and explosive.

In <sup>to</sup> this impasse ~~in the Spring of 1967~~, stepped a Washington Negro named Albert Roy Osborne, <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>42-year old</sup> flamboyant former wig salesman who called himself Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed, <sup>he</sup> ~~and~~ presided over <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ mythical "Black Liberation Army." Articulate and magnetic, Colonel Hassan ~~proved~~ <sup>He</sup> proved to be ~~more~~ a one-man show, <sup>who</sup> ~~who~~ brought Negro residents flocking to Board of Education and Planning Board meetings. The Colonel ~~was~~ not afraid to speak in violent terms, nor to back his words with violent action, <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ once instance he tore the tape from <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ tape recorder, so that there would be no record of the meeting. For good measure, one of his lieutenants smashed the recorder against the wall.

As it became more and more evident <sup>to</sup> ~~that~~ the militants, <sup>that,</sup> though they might not be able to prevail, <sup>they</sup> ~~they~~ could prevent the normal transaction of business, they ~~militants~~ began to taste victory. Throughout the months of May and June, speaker after speaker warned that if ~~a white man were~~ the ~~named the~~ Mayor continued to persist in naming a white man as Secretary to the Board of Education, and in moving ahead with plans for the medical <sup>school</sup> ~~college~~ site, ~~violence~~ violence would ensue. The Administration played down the threats.

[The state police set up a command post in the Newark armory.

On June 27th, when a new Secretary ~~was~~ was to be named, the militants, led by CORE, disrupted and took over the meeting, ~~and prevented the transaction of any business whatsoever;~~ the result was a stalemate, the incumbent secretary decided to stay on another year, no one was satisfied.

At the beginning of July, 44,000 unemployed were roaming the streets of the city ~~swelled~~ <sup>(their ranks were swelled)</sup> by an estimated 20,000 teenagers, who, with school out and the ~~severe~~ curtailment of the summer recreation program because of a cutback in Federal funds, had no place to go.

On July 8th an encounter between Black Muslims and police took place on the East Orange-Newark border. Early on the evening of July 12th a cab driver ~~named John Smith~~ by the name of John Smith, began, (according to police reports) tailgating a Newark police car. | Smith was an unlikely candidate to set a riot in motion, (40) years old, a Georgian by birth, he had attended college for a year before entering the United States Army in 1950. In 1953 he ~~was~~ <sup>had been</sup> honorably discharged with the rank of Corporal. A chess-playing trumpet player, he had worked as a musician and a factory hand before, in 1963, becoming a cab driver. | As a cab driver, ~~however~~ he appeared to be a distinct hazard. Within a relatively short period of time he had ~~had~~ 8 or 9 accidents, his license ~~had been~~ <sup>was</sup> revoked. When <sup>with a woman passenger in his car</sup> he was stopped by the police, he was in violation of that revocation. R

From the twin high-rise towers of the Reverend William P. Hayes Housing Project, the residents can look down upon the 4th Precinct Police Station and observe every movement. With its orange-red brick facade, the three-story structure looks more like a schoolhouse than a police station.

~~(Note: Smith was carrying a woman passenger at the time of his arrest)~~

22222222  
Shortly after 9:30 p.m. people looking out of their windows/ <sup>saw Smith,</sup> who either refused, or was unable to walk, being dragged out of a police car and into the front door of the station. Within a ~~x~~ few minutes at least two civil rights leaders had received calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was being beaten by the police. Simultaneously, since Smith had, from the cab, radioed his dispatch office that he was being ~~arrested~~ picked up, cab drivers all over the city were learning of the arrest. Within minutes a crowd was forming on the grounds of the housing project across the ~~street~~ narrow street from the station. As more and more people arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered to Smith ~~became~~ <sup>These descriptions reports</sup> more and more exaggerated. ~~They~~ were fueled and sustained by other tales of police malpractice that, going back over the years, had been submitted for investigation but never <sup>been</sup> heard of again, so that they remained like sores festering in the minds of the people.



By 10:15 p.m. the situation had become so potentially explosive that both the Senior Inspector on the ~~night~~ night watch and the Director of Police, Dominick Spina, were summoned to the 4th Precinct. Spina, 56 years old, a graduate of Newark (now Rutgers) University Law School, is known as a cop's cop; hard and tough, but supposedly just and fair also. Since taking over in 1962 his principal goal had been to get the police out of political<sup>s</sup>, to make them professionals and get rid of the incompetents and the slough-offs.

By offering to meet with all-comers one night a week and by initiating a Citizens Observer Program in which interested citizens could ride in patrol cars, he had attempted to initiate a dialogue between the police and the population. Although the concept of the program was sound, in practice it failed to work; ~~few~~ few of the younger element of the population -- those that were likely to cause the most trouble -- would willingly ride in the patrol car.

When Inspector Melchior and Director Spina arrived at the police station they were met by a delegation of civil rights leaders and militants who demanded the right to see and interview Smith. Inspector Melchior acceded to their request. When Smith ~~was brought~~ <sup>appeared</sup> before ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~delegation~~ <sup>delegation</sup>, it was ~~immediately~~ apparent that, whatever the cause of his injuries, he needed to be examined by a doctor. Again, bowing to demands, the police agreed to transport him to a hospital.

~~Smith's injuries consisted of cracked ribs.~~ Both within and outside the police station the atmosphere was growing ever tense<sup>er.</sup> Carloads of police officers, summoned as reinforcements, were arriving. Subjected to a gauntlet of catcalls, taunts and curses, some of them replied in kind. Three of the civil rights leaders inside the station decided to attempt ~~to disperse~~ <sup>attempt to disperse</sup> the crowd, ~~now~~

— now numbering some 200 to 300 persons, almost all of them young, by telling them a protest march to City Hall would be organized on the following day. The people at this time were still gathered on <sup>[the grounds of the housing project]</sup> the opposite side of the street from the station, and there had been no physical confrontation between them and the police. ~~xxx~~

As the men were talking to the crowd, one or more Molotov cocktails, possibly thrown from an upper story window in the housing project, arced against the brick wall <sup>ham</sup> of the police station and splattered ~~harmlessly~~ to the ground. A few minutes later a formation of police officers, exiting from the back door, waded into the assembled group in order to drive it ~~farther~~ away from the station. Lofton and Curvin pleaded with the police for more time to disperse the group peacefully. It was agreed that they could have 15 minutes more. They decided that, in order to move the crowd out, they would organize a march on City Hall immediately instead of waiting <sup>until</sup> the following day.

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[As Curvin climbed to the top of an automobile, rocks started flying. Someone yelled: "Man, get off that damn car!" Automobiles were set on fire. (not)]

The protesters had now been augmented by an estimated 25 cab ~~and~~ drivers who, upon hearing of Smith's arrest, had decided to stage a rally of their own. They began taking on passengers for the short trip to the City Hall. It was approximately midnight when a fire engine, ~~arrived~~ <sup>arriving</sup> a few minutes earlier when the Molotov cocktail had been thrown, ~~arrived~~ on the scene, and was immediately pelted with bricks and bottles. The police, their heads protected by World War I tin helmets, sallied forth in full force. The marchers, who were still in the process of forming, were scattered a few minutes later ~~on~~ the street the first liquor store was broken into. [However, by about 2:30 a.m., the disturbance appeared to have run its course.

The next afternoon the Mayor decried it as an isolated incident. ~~Mayor~~ Invited to appear before and talk to the people at a protest rally being organized at the housing project, ~~he~~ he is reported to have declined the invitation ~~he~~ he did agree to the demand to the naming of a Negro to the rank of Captain in the Police Dept. and announced that he would set up a panel of citizens to investigate the Smith arrest. To one civil rights leader ~~this~~ <sup>this</sup> sounded like "The same old song" and he walked out. Other observers reported that the Mayor seemed unaware of the seriousness of the tensions ~~the~~ the police were not.

Unbeknown to the Mayor they were mobilizing almost half of the strength of the department for that evening. Within the Negro community there were reports that ~~they~~ <sup>Police</sup> had begun arresting teenagers for investigative purposes. Tension continued to mount. M



Nowhere was the tension greater than at the ~~Spirit~~ <sup>Spirit</sup> ~~House~~ <sup>House</sup>, the gathering place for Black Nationalists, Black Power advocates, and militants of every hue. Black Muslims, Orthodox ~~Muslims~~ <sup>Muslims</sup>, and members of the United Afro-American Association, a new and growing organization who follow in general the teachings of the late Malcolm X, came to mingle and exchange views. ~~Playground in the Park~~

The two police-Negro clashes, coming one on top of the other, coupled with the unresolved political issues, had created a mood of rebellion.

In the Hayes Housing Project across the street from the 4th Precinct Police Station, leaflets were being passed out announcing a "Police Brutality Protest Rally."

Television camera men were on hand to film the demonstration, kids were performing for the cameras.

(Note: ~~Forgot to put in Leroy Jones' connection with the Spirit House~~)

~~At 6:30 p.m. James Threatt, Executive Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission~~

A picket line was formed to march in front of the police station. At 6:30 p.m. James Threatt, Executive Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission, arrived to announce to the people in front of the station the decision of the Mayor to form a Citizens Group to investigate the Smith incident, and to elevate a Negro to the rank of Captain.

(Note: ~~Forgot in the first night of the riot the 2nd time that Curvin and others tried to talk to the crowd they were getting on top of automobiles in front of the station. Someone said, "Man, get off that damn car" and rocks started flying and automobile fires were set~~)

The response <sup>from</sup> the loosely-milling mass of people ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> derisive. One kid shouted "Black Power!" several times. ~~A rumor spread that Smith -- who had been released in the custody of his attorney -- had died.~~ ~~rocks~~ <sup>missiles</sup> were thrown at ~~Threatt~~ <sup>missiles</sup> began hurtling against the walls of the police station. Within the station the anger of the police officers was intense. After a short period of time they were given an order to break up the demonstration. There was, reportedly, little restraint on either side ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> language employed was that of the ghetto. Anyone who failed to move was moved by force.

(Note: Regarding the rumor that went around that Smith had died -- in actuality he had been released in the custody of his attorney at 7:00 p.m.)

Following this, while some ~~members~~ members of the crowd turned to throw rocks at the police station, others scattered in all directions. Soon reports of looting began to come in. Without enough men to establish control, the police set up a perimeter ~~fence~~ around a two-mile stretch of Springfield Avenue, one of the principal business districts, where bands of youths roamed up and down, smashing windows. Grocery and liquor stores, clothing and furniture stores, drug stores and cleaners, appliance stores and pawnshops were the principal targets. Periodically police officers would appear <sup>and</sup> fire their weapons over the heads of looters and rioters.

~~However,~~ <sup>appeared to begin</sup> by midnight activity ~~began~~ to taper off. The Mayor told reporters the city had turned the corner. <sup>As</sup> news of the disturbance had spread, however, people had flocked into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with impunity, many spectators bowed to the temptation and began helping themselves.



Without~~h~~ the necessary personnel to make mass arrests, police ~~reportedly~~ were shooting into the ~~air~~ air to clear stores. A Negro boy was wounded by a .22 caliber bullet fired by a white man riding in a car~~x~~ guns were reported stolen from a SEars, Roebuck store~~x~~ looting, fires, and gunshots were reported from <sup>an</sup> ever-wider ~~an~~ area. Between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 14, the ~~Mayor~~ decided to request Governor Hughes to dispatch State Police and National Guard troops. The State Police, ~~who~~ had set up a command post in the Armory on June 27th, when ~~as~~ violence had been expected as a result of the Board of Education meeting, arrived with a sizeable contingent before dawn.

During the course of the morning, the Governor and the Mayor, together with police and National Guard officers, made a reconnaissance of the area. The police escort guarding the officials, arrested looters as they went. By noon the National Guard had set up 137 roadblocks, and state police and riot teams were beginning to achieve control. The three-way command structure: City Police, State Police, and National Guard, however, worked poorly. The City and State Police did not operate on the same radio wave-lengths~~x~~ each did many things the other did not find out about until later.

At 3:30 p.m. ~~that~~ that afternoon, the family<sup>y</sup> of Mrs. D. J. were standing <sup>near</sup> ~~in~~ the upstairs ~~of~~ windows of their apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furniture store on Springfield Avenue. Three carloads of police officers rounded the corner. As the police yelled at ~~them~~ the people in the furniture store, <sup>they</sup> began ~~running~~ running. The

police ~~xxx~~ officers opened fire ~~x~~ a bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apartment. A moment later she heard a whine ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>from</sup> the bedroom ~~x~~ her three-year old daughter, Debbie, came running into the room ~~x~~ ~~holding the left side of her face, down which~~ blood was <sup>down the left side of her face, where</sup> streaming ~~x~~ the bullet had entered her ~~left~~ eye. She spent the next two months in the hospital. She lost the sight of ~~the~~ <sup>her left</sup> eye and the hearing in ~~the~~ <sup>her</sup> left ear.

On the street, Horace W. Morris, ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> Associate Director of the Washington Urban League, who had been visiting relatives in Newark, was about to enter his car for the drive to ~~the~~ Newark Airport. With him were his two brothers and his 73-year old stepfather, Isaac Harrison. About 60 persons had been on the street watching the looting. ~~which was taking place two e~~ As the police arrived, three of the looters cut across the street directly in front of the group of spectators. As the police began firing at the looters, bullets plowed into the ~~group~~ <sup>spectators.</sup> ~~every-~~ one began running. As Harrison, ~~headed~~, followed by his family, headed toward the apartment building in which he lived, a bullet kicked his legs out from under him. Horace Morris lifted him to his feet ~~x~~ ~~and~~ <sup>again</sup> he fell. ~~Mr.~~ Morris's brother, Virgil, attempted to pick the old man up ~~x~~ As he did so, he was hit in the ~~a~~ left leg and right forearm ~~x~~ Mr. Morris and his other brother managed to drag the two wounded men into the vestibule of the building, which was jammed with 60 ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> 70 frightened and angry Negroes.



Bullets continued to spatter against the walls of the buildings. Finally, as the police firing died down, Morris--  
 whose stepfather succumbed to his wounds that evening --  
 yelled to ~~the~~ sergeant that innocent people were being shot.  
 "Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," was the reply. "They don't have guns; no one is shooting at you," Morris said. "You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant yelled.

Heavy sniper fire was, in fact, being ~~xxx~~ reported from all over the city. ~~Isaac Harrison died that evening.~~

Two hours later three blocks away on Beacon Street, W. F. told J.S., whose 1959 Pontiac he had taken to the station for inspection, that his front brake needed fixing. J.S., who had just returned from work, said, "Okay," and went to the car which was parked in the street, jacked up the front end, took the wheel off, and got under the car. A short-time-thereafter, several state troopers appeared at the corner of Sp. The street was quiet, more than a dozen persons were sitting on porches, walking about, <sup>and shopping.</sup> ~~or in the shops and~~ none of them heard any shots. Suddenly several state troopers appeared at the corner of Springfield and ~~the~~ Beacon. J.S. was startled by a shot clanging into the side of the garbage can next to <sup>his</sup> ~~the~~ car. As he looked up he saw a state trooper with his rifle pointed at him. The next shot struck J.S. in the right side. ~~xxxx~~

At almost the same instance, <sup>t, K.G.</sup> ~~the~~, standing on <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ porch, was struck in the right eye by a bullet, <sup>he and J.S.</sup> both were critically injured. By nightfall most of the looting and burning had been ended, and there were no longer any mobs on the street.

At 8:00 p.m. Mrs. L.M. bundled her ~~husband's brother~~ husband, her husband's brother and her four sons ~~into~~ into the family car to drive to the White Castle Restaurant for

dinner. On the return trip her husband, who was driving, panicked as he approached <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, <sup>then</sup> ~~and~~ quickly swerved around. When the <sup>family</sup> ~~they~~ reached home, ~~and~~ everyone began piling out of the car. 10-year-old Eddie failed to move, ~~he had been~~ shot through the head, <sup>he</sup> ~~and~~ was dead.

Reports of sniper fire continued <sup>to increase.</sup> ~~although~~ it was, according to ~~the~~ National Guard reports, "Deliberately or otherwise inaccurate." Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey Department of Defense, testified before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that "There was too much firing initially against snipers" because of "confusion when we were finally called on for help and our thinking of it as a military action."

A high-ranking Newark police official said that "There probably had not been as much sniping as everyone thought." Some of the misconceptions were due to the lack of communications. The state police had placed men on rooftops but other law enforcement personnel remained unaware of this. Other <sup>misconceptions</sup> ~~could~~ be traced to the fact that the <sup>troops</sup> National Guard/lacked riot training <sup>They</sup> ~~were~~, according to the same Newark police official, "young and very scared" and had had little contact with Negroes. Within the Guard itself, contact had certainly been limited. Although, in 1949, out of a force of 12,529 men there had been 1,183 Negroes, ~~in the Guard, following the integration of the Guard in the 1950's~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ number had ~~steadily~~ declined until, by July of 1967, only 303 <sup>Negroes</sup> ~~were~~ left in a force of 17,529 men.

Mon-Saturday, July-14



On Saturday, July 15, Dominick Spina, the Director of the Newark Police, received a report of snipers in the Hayes Housing Project. When he arrived ~~there~~ he saw approximately 100 city and state police officers and National Guardsmen hiding in corners and lying on the ground all around the edge of the courtyard. Since everything appeared quiet and it was broad daylight, Spina walked out directly in to the middle of the courtyard ~~nothing~~ happened. A few minutes later, as he stood there, he heard a shot ~~all~~ around him the troopers jumped, believing themselves to be under sniper fire. A moment later a young Guardsman came running from behind ~~the~~ a building and plopped down into another hiding place ~~the~~ Director of Police went over to where the soldier had crouched down, and asked him if he had fired the shot ~~the~~ soldier said "yes," he had fired to scare a man away from a window; that his orders were that no one had a right to be standing at ~~the~~ a window.

The Director of Police remained at the ~~Housing Project~~ for three hours, and there was no shot fired except the one by the Guardsman. ~~But~~

By six ~~Between 6:00 and 7:00~~ o'clock that evening two columns of National Guardsmen and state troopers were directing mass fire at the Hayes Housing Project in response to what they believed were snipers. On the 10th floor, Eloise the mother of several children Spellman fell, a bullet through her neck.

Across the street ~~several~~ a number of persons, ~~were~~ standing in an apartment window well watching the firing ~~being~~ directed at the ~~Hayes~~ housing project. Suddenly several troopers whirled and began firing at them spectators. ~~On the floor below, Mrs. Hattie~~ ~~Spina~~ ~~fell~~ a block away-Rebecca

Bairner, a grandmother, sank to the floor.



A block away Rebecca Brown's two-year old daughter was standing at the window <sup>As Mrs. Brown</sup> ~~she~~ rushed to drag her to safety, <sup>was framed in</sup> ~~she~~ shepherded her daughter the child away ~~from~~ the window <sup>her</sup> a bullet spun into Mrs. Brown's back ~~all~~ three of the women died.

A number of eye witnesses, at varying times and places, reported seeing bottles thrown from upper story windows. As ~~these~~ <sup>these</sup> would land at the feet of an officer he would turn and fire. Thereupon, other officers and Guardsmen up and down the street would join in.

~~During the day, Saturday, B.W.W., the owner of a Chinese~~

In order to protect his property, B.W.W., the owner of a Chinese laundry, had placed a sign saying "Soul Brother" in his window. Between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. on Sunday, July 16, he, together with his mother, wife and brother, was watching television in the back room. Up to that point of the night the neighborhood had been quiet. Suddenly <sup>B.W.W.</sup> ~~he~~ heard the sound of jeeps, then shots. Going

Insert p. 19

#### ~~ADDENDA TO NEWARK~~

No snipers were arrested. Of the 250 fire alarms <sup>many were false,</sup> and only 13 were considered <sup>(by the city to have been)</sup> ~~serious~~ "serious." Four-fifths of

<sup>the \$10,251,000 worth of damage was incurred due to stock</sup>  
<sup>Damage to buildings and fixtures was under \$2 million.</sup>  
<sup>rather than to fixtures. Stock loss totaled</sup>  
~~100%~~

she then asked he 11-year old son, Michael, to take the garbage out. As he reached the street ~~it~~ <sup>and</sup> was illuminated by a street light, a shot rang out ~~he~~ he died.

Insert Of Twenty-one civilians who died as a result of gunshot wounds, all were Negro ~~one~~ <sup>2</sup> was 73-year old Isaac Harrison.

Six were women, ~~two~~ <sup>two</sup> were children.

On the evening of Monday, July 17, a Catholic Priest saw two Negro men walking down the street. They were carrying a case of soda and two bags of groceries. An unmarked car with five police officers pulled up beside them, <sup>Accusing</sup> two white officers got out of the car. ~~The officers~~ <sup>The officers</sup> accused the Negro men of looting, <sup>the officers</sup> made them put the groceries on the sidewalk, then kicked the bags open, scattering their contents all over the street. <sup>Telling</sup> ~~The officers then told~~ the men, "Get out of here," <sup>the officers</sup> ~~and~~ drove off. The Catholic Priest went across the street to help ~~them~~ gather up the groceries. One of the <sup>men</sup> turned to <sup>him</sup> ~~the priest~~ "I've just been back from Vietnam two days," he said, "and this is what I get. I feel like going home and getting a rifle and shooting the cops."

~~That Thursday day later~~ the Black Power Conference began in Newark.

43  
As reports of looting, shippers, fire and death fanned outward towards other Negro enclaves in Northern New Jersey, a web of tension began forming. Whenever one strand of that web was agitated, the whole web rippled.

~~Since~~ <sup>Everywhere</sup> everywhere Negro ghettos existed, Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Plainfield, New Brunswick, ~~people~~ People had friends and relatives living in Newark. <sup>Everywhere</sup> the telephone provided a direct link to the scenes of violence. ~~These~~

The telephonic messages, expressing the minority point of view, frequently were at total ~~variance~~ variance with reports ~~being~~ being transmitted by the mass media. ~~In fact, both views were distorted.~~

As hoary stories from Newark grew in number, fear and anger interwove themselves within the Negro ghetto. <sup>Conversely,</sup> Rumors amplified by radio, ~~and~~ television and the newspapers, especially with regard to guerilla bands ~~reportedly~~ roaming the streets, created within the white communities a sense of danger and terror. <sup>TO</sup> Mayor Patricia Q. Sheehan of New Brunswick, it seemed as if, "Almost there was a fever in the air." She went on to say: "Rumors were coming in from all sides on July 17th. Negroes were calling to warn of possible disturbances; whites were calling; shop owners were calling.



Most of the people were concerned about a possible blood-bath." It was her opinion <sup>that?</sup> ~~that we~~ <sup>think</sup> we are talking ourselves into it."

Everywhere there was the same ~~inequality~~ <sup>and</sup> inequality with regard to education, job opportunities, income, <sup>and</sup> housing.

Everywhere there was the same lack of representation of Negroes on the local ~~government~~. In six New Jersey communities with sizeable Negro <sup>star</sup> ~~representation~~ <sup>populations</sup> ~~in which~~ <sup>a total of</sup> ~~trouble began this summer~~, there were only <sup>a total of</sup> five Negro Councilmen. In a half dozen school systems in which Negro children composed as much as half of the school population, there were only <sup>a total of</sup> six members of the Board of Education. In none of the municipal governments did a Negro hold a key position. In each of the ghettos the Negro felt himself surrounded by an intransigent wall of whites.

In four cities: Bloomfield, Harrison, Irvington, and Maplewood, forming an arc about Newark, out of a total population of more than 150,000, only 1,000 were Negroes. In the six cities surrounding Plainfield, out of a population of more than 75,000, only 1500 were Negro.

Two <sup>north New Jersey</sup> ~~of the~~ communities, Jersey City and Elizabeth, had had minor <sup>disturbances</sup> ~~riots~~ in 1964. The view from Jersey City is

that of the New York skyline. Except for a few imposing buildings, such as those of the high-rise New Jersey Medical Center, much of Jersey City ~~itself~~ is a collection of non-descript and deteriorating ~~buildings~~ houses, fleshed out with factories and cut up by ribbons of super-highways and railroads.

As one of the principal freight terminals for New York City, ~~Jersey~~ Jersey City's decline has paralleled that of the railroads. As railroad lands ~~have~~ deteriorated in value and urban renewal lands <sup>were</sup> ~~have been~~ taken off the tax rolls, the city suffered a catastrophic decline in assessed valuation, <sup>\$</sup>from \$465 million in 1964 to <sup>\$</sup>367 million in 1967. The tax ~~xxx~~ rate, according to Mayor Thomas J. Whelan, has "reached the point of diminishing returns." ~~Urban~~

Urban renewal projects intended to clear slums and replace them with low-cost housing have actually resulted in a reduction of 2,000 <sup>housing</sup> units. "Planners make plans and then simply tell people what they are going to do," ~~is the~~ <sup>complaint</sup> ~~complaint made by~~ Negroes in their growing opposition to such projects.

Wooden sewers ~~must be~~ <sup>sewer</sup> ~~for~~ residents of some sections of the city <sup>outworn</sup> brick sewers, <sup>in other sections,</sup> collapse frequently, backing up the sewage. ~~While the~~ <sup>the</sup> population clamors for better education for ~~their~~ <sup>its</sup> children, <sup>but</sup> the school system has reached its bonding capacity. By 1975 it is estimated that there will be a net deficit of 10 elementary and one high school.

Recently the ~~Mayor~~ <sup>Mayor</sup> proposed to the Ford Foundation that it take over the operation of the entire educational system ~~but~~ <sup>the offer</sup> was declined.

*Note! Mention Cap Brown's Jersey City speech!*

A large percentage of the white population send their children to parochial schools. As a result, because they have not had to utilize the public school system, white residents have been slower to move out ~~of the city~~ <sup>than in other cities.</sup>

The Negro population remains relatively small; only 15 percent of the total, it is confined ~~with~~ within one

limited area. There ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> little Negro political leadership, ~~and~~ <sup>does</sup> what ~~did~~ <sup>is</sup> exist ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> fragmented and indecisive.

*amount of schooling whites and Negroes have had is almost equal, the median family income*

*Not done*  
The police department, like Newark's, one of the largest in the nation for a city of its size, ~~1950~~ still retains some of the flavor described by ~~SHERRER~~ a successful <sup>white</sup> executive: "We were accustomed to the Special Service Division of the Police Dept. If we were caught hanging around we were picked up by the police and taken to the city hospital and beaten with a rubber hose." ~~That's a~~ white-executive.

A city official, questioned about Negro representation on the police force, replied that it was 34 times greater than 20 years ago ~~(20)~~ years ago <sup>had</sup> it consisted of one man.

A hard-nosed, but realistic police captain who commands and lives within the precinct with the highest Negro concentration, insists that his men adapt to the mores of the population and be able to get along with the people. If they can't, they are transferred from the precinct. ~~It is~~ <sup>the</sup> the captain's opinion that the greatest degree of tension arises when policemen from outside the precinct come in in order to make arrests or quell disturbances. Such police officers do not understand the



problems and the social habits of the people and are therefore apt to react with undue force.

During the four days of the Newark riot, when the city became awash with tales of all descriptions, Mayor Whelan announced that if there were any disturbances he would "meet force with force." The ghetto area was flooded with police officers.

~~On Monday and Tuesday, mass arrests were made~~

On Monday and Tuesday, July 17 and 18, when crowds gathered and a few rocks were thrown, mass arrests were made. Only one store was broken into and the pilferage there was limited to ~~candy and~~ items <sup>Such as</sup> ~~like~~ candy and chewing gum. One man died. He was a Negro cab driver into whose cab a Negro boy threw a Molotov cocktail.

(Note:) Somewhere in that account stick in the comparison between white and Negro income and education and also about the outmoded school building that the people wanted to use as a training and social center which was being utilized as a warehouse.

A chicken and an Orthodox Moslem combined to keep Elizabeth cool. As in Jersey City, police had beefed up their patrols, and ~~the very~~ the very presence of so many officers contributed to the rising tensions. Residents of the 12-block by 3-block ghetto, jammed between the New Jersey Turnpike and the waterfront, went around muttering: "We are being punished but we haven't done anything."

"The community," another said ~~later~~ later, "felt it was ~~in~~ a concentration camp." <sup>from</sup> Kids ~~in~~ the two high-density housing projects concentrated in the area were walking around

saying: "We're next, we might as well go."

About 11:30 p.m. Monday, July 17th a window was broken. Commented a businessman: "Down here in the port it's business as usual when one store window is broken each week. What is normal becomes abnormal at a time like this."

Soon other windows were being broken. As police arrived in force, groups ~~scattered~~ scattered and began breaking windows further down the street. ~~a~~ a Molotov cocktail was thrown at a tavern. ~~As~~ As fire engines arrived, ~~they~~ they were pelted with rocks. Community workers began circulating through the area, desperately attempting to get kids off the street. ~~many~~ many of them had relatives and friends in Newark. ~~And~~ Based on what had happened in Newark, they feared that if the violence were not curbed it would turn into a bloodbath. ~~one worker discovered kids in an alley~~

One worker discovered kids ~~in an alley~~ in an alley, siphoning gasoline into soda bottles from a truck. He managed to talk them out of the Molotov cocktails. [The confrontation between the police and ~~the~~ the mob of teenagers and youths ~~in their early twenties~~ was progressing toward a climax when a chicken fluttered out of the shattered window of a poultry market. One youth attempted to throw gasoline on it and set it afire. As the gasoline sloshed onto the pavement, the chicken leaped. The flames merely singed its feathers. A gangling six-foot youth attempted to leap upon the chicken. The bird was too quick for him. As it

darted out of ~~ix~~ his way, he slipped and tumbled against a tree. ~~The~~ <sup>The</sup> stark, unwitting comedy broke the tension, people laughed, ~~soon~~ they began to drift home.

The following day tensions in the area ~~began to~~ mounted again as police patrolled the 36<sup>th</sup> square block ~~area~~ with 220 men, some of them stationed on rooftops. Early in the evening the Mayor agreed to meet with a delegation of 13 community leaders. After they had entered his office he called in the Chief of Police and read him an executive order to: "Shoot to kill." "Force would be met with superior force," <sup>he said. Any</sup> ~~and~~ deviation from <sup>this order by an</sup> ~~any~~ officer would be cause for dismissal.

The delegation from the community did not react favorably. They proposed the setting up of a "peacekeeper, 'task force.'" The Mayor agreed to let them try, ~~and~~ (100) armbands with the words "peacekeeper" were printed. One of those who agreed to be a peacekeeper was ~~Hanan~~ Heshan <sup>please check spelling in old card file</sup> Jaaber. Jaaber, ~~a young Orthodox Moslem~~ who officiated at Malcolm X's funeral, is a leader of a small sect of Orthodox Moslems. A teacher of Arabic and the Koran at the Spirit House in Newark, he is a responsible militant whose existence the Mayor ~~said~~ said he had not been aware of, but with whom he thought he could work in the future. Although <sup>Jaaber</sup> ~~he~~ believed that certain people were sucking the life blood out of the community, "Count the number of taverns and bars in the Elizabeth port area and compare them with the number of recreation facilities." He had

and he made two pilgrimages to Mecca



witnessed the carnage in Newark and believed it could serve no purpose to have a riot. Two dozen of his followers, wearing their red ~~fezzes~~<sup>fezzes</sup>, took to the streets to urge order. ~~he~~<sup>he</sup> himself traveled about in a car with a bullhorn.

~~After~~ As the peacekeepers began to make their influence felt, the police withdrew ~~their personnel~~ from the area. ~~there~~<sup>there</sup> was no further trouble.

Focusing on the educational issue, a Negro minister said that out of 584 members in his ~~church~~ church, only 3 are college graduates. In a <sup>Negro</sup> population of approximately 15,000 there are no more than 100 professionals.

On the night that Dr. Nathan Wright was holding his Black Power Conference in Newark, his niece was attending an integrated party in Englewood. In the community of 28,000, one-fourth of whom are Negro, the police had been expecting a riot since two weeks before Newark. As part of this expectation they had tested tear gas guns ~~from~~<sup>situated</sup> on the police firing range in the middle of the <sup>Negro</sup> residential area. The wind blew the tear gas into surrounding houses. ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> occupants were enraged.

The day following the outbreaks in Elizabeth ~~and~~ and Jersey City, police began warning the businessmen in Englewood to prepare for a riot. On Friday, July 21, on the report that crowds were gathering, police issued a general alarm. (300) police officers from surrounding communities were brought into the city. As rumors of an impending riot swept the ~~community~~<sup>city</sup> numbers of ~~curious~~ curious citizens began gathering at street corners. At 9:00 o'clock that evening a fire truck responded to an alarm. ~~it~~<sup>it</sup> was pelted with rocks. As policemen arrived to

to provide protection some members of the bands of unemployed Negro youths who ~~regularly~~ <sup>regularly</sup> hung out ~~around the~~ <sup>at</sup> street corners, began breaking store windows. The windows damaged were apparently ~~picked~~ <sup>selected</sup> at random. A paint store window was broken but a jewelry store window was left untouched. There was no looting. Police, ~~quickly~~ <sup>sealing</sup> off the area, ~~and~~ <sup>quickly</sup> contained the disturbance.

Abetted by the authorities, the press magnified the nature of the disturbance manyfold. Among the ~~the~~ distortions was a report that police were pinned down by crossfire from snipers. When ~~later~~ an investigation ~~could be made~~ <sup>was later</sup> it was determined that the crossfire had consisted of kids setting off firecrackers in a park. ~~XXXXXX~~

### PLAINFIELD

It was the city that produced the 1956 Decathlon champion, Milt Campbell, that experienced New Jersey's worst violence outside of Newark. (7)

A pleasant, tree-shaded city of some 45,000, Plainfield has a growing Negro population which, by 1967, ~~it~~ <sup>to be</sup> was estimated ~~was nearing~~ <sup>nearly</sup> 30 percent of the total. As in Englewood, there was a sharp division between the Negro middle class, which lived in the "Gilded Ghetto," and the unskilled, unemployed and underemployed poor. The political and social structure of the community, geared towards meeting the needs of the suburban middleclass, was unprepared to cope with the problems of both ~~faced by and engendered by~~ a growing underskilled and undereducated ~~poor~~ population <sup>usually</sup> accustomed to viewing politics as a gentleman's pastime. They were startled and upset. ~~They were startled~~ by the heat and intensity with which demands issued from the ghetto. Such demands were ~~often~~ met



obliquely, rather than head-on.

For example, in the summer of 1966, trouble was narrowly averted over the issue of a swimming pool for Negro youngsters. In the summer of 1967, instead of having built the pool, the city began bussing the children to the county pool a half-hour's ride distant.. The service was not free <sup>fare, 50 cents per person for a round trip,</sup> ~~the fare, although negligible by middle class standards,~~ would be prohibitive on a frequent basis for poor families with ~~many~~ numbers of children. Pressure <sup>increased</sup> ~~grew~~ upon the school system to adapt itself to the changing social and ethnic background of its pupils ~~there~~ were strikes and boycotts. It was estimated that two-thirds of the school dropouts were Negro.

In February of 1967 the NAACP, out of a growing sense of frustration with the municipal government, tacked a list of 19 demands and complaints to the door of the ~~City~~ Hall. Most dealt with discrimination in housing, employment, and in the public schools. By the summer of 1967 the ~~City's~~ Common Council had not responded. Although two of the 11 council members were Negro, both represented the "Gilded Ghetto." The poverty area <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ represented by two white women, one of whom had been appointed ~~by~~ by the Council after the elected representative, a Negro, had been transferred by his company and <sup>had</sup> ~~was~~ moved out of the ~~area~~ city.

The week prior to the Newark outbreak, trouble had arisen in Plainfield during the course of a routine arrest in one of the housing projects. A woman, after she had been handcuffed, had fallen down a flight of stairs. The officer ~~she~~ said she had slipped ~~Negro~~ residents claimed he had pushed her. When a delegation went to ~~City~~ Hall to file



a complaint, they were told by the City Clerk that he was not ~~empowered~~ <sup>empowered</sup> to accept it. Believing they were being given the run-around, the delegation, ~~was~~ <sup>became</sup> angry and frustrated, <sup>departed</sup>.

On Friday evening, July 14, the same police officer involved in the arrest ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> moonlighting as a private guard at a diner frequented by Negro kids. He was, reportedly, number two on the community's "ten most-wanted" list of disliked police officers. The list itself was colorblind. Although out of 82 officers on the force, only 5 were Negro, two ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> the ten ~~most-wanted~~ <sup>on the</sup> list were Negro ~~officers~~. The two officers most generally respected in the Negro community were white.

~~xxx~~ Although most of the kids at the diner were of high school age, there was one husky ~~in~~ youth in his mid-twenties who had a reputation ~~as a~~ <sup>as a</sup> bullying ~~the younger kids~~. Sometime before 10:00 p.m., as a result of an argument, he hit a 16-year old boy and split his face open. As the boy lay bleeding on the asphalt, his friends rushed to the police officer and demanded that he call an ambulance and arrest the offender. Instead, the officer walked over to the boy, looked at him, and reportedly said: "Why don't you just go home and wash up?" ~~He~~ <sup>to take</sup> He refused to arrest anyone.

Although a police car ultimately arrived ~~and took~~ <sup>to take</sup> the boy to the hospital, the youngsters at the diner were incensed ~~they~~ <sup>they</sup> believed the episode portrayed the ~~double~~ <sup>double</sup> standard of law enforcement among white and black ~~they~~ <sup>they</sup>

believed that, had the two participants in the incident been white, ~~or merely the younger boy been white,~~ the older youth would have been arrested, the younger taken to the hospital immediately.

~~When the quarrel was between black and blacks, however, the police would not interfere.~~

In order to go from the diner to the housing project in which most of them lived, the youths had to traverse four blocks of the city's business district. As they ~~walked~~ <sup>smashed</sup> ~~along~~ they ~~began smashing~~ <sup>13 or 4, broken</sup> windows. It was a challenge to the police: "If they won't do anything about that, then, let's see them do something about this." Two weeks earlier a white

man had broken a whole street full of windows.

On one of the quiet, suburban streets, two young Negroes, <sup>D.H.</sup> David Hardy and <sup>L.C.</sup> Lennie Cathcart, had been neighbors. <sup>D.H.</sup> Hardy had graduated from high school, attended Farley-Dickinson College, and, after receiving a degree in psychology, had obtained a job as a reporter on the Plainfield Courier News.

<sup>L.C.</sup> Cathcart had dropped out of high school, become a worker in a ~~chemical~~ chemical plant, and, although <sup>still</sup> in his 20's, had fathered seven children. A man with a strong ~~sense~~ <sup>local basketball</sup> of family, he liked sports and played in the ~~summer baseball~~ league. Active in civil rights, he had, like the civil rights organizations, over the years, become more militant.

~~At one time he had been~~  
For a period of time he had been a Muslim.

~~(a former Muslim)~~

Shortly after midnight, in an attempt to cap the eruption, <sup>D.H.</sup>~~David Hardy~~ and the two Negro councilmen met with the youths in the housing project. Although the focal point of the youths' bitterness was the attitude of the police, until 1966 police had used the word "nigger" over the police radio ~~frequency~~ and one officer had worn a Confederate belt buckle and had flown a Confederate pennant on his car. Their complaints ranged far and wide over local and national issues.

~~Although~~ the issues were diverse, <sup>and deep belief</sup> there was an overriding cynicism <sup>that</sup> government would, of its own accord, make meaningful changes to improve the lot of the lower class Negro. <sup>an</sup> overriding belief that there were two sets of policies by the people in power, whether they were law enforcement officers, newspaper editors, or government officials: One for white Americans, and one for black.

There was little confidence that the two councilmen ~~and~~ whom the youths regarded as "Uncle Toms," and who, of course, did not represent the poor section, could exercise any influence. However, on the promise that meetings would be arranged that same day, Saturday, with the editor of the newspaper and with the Mayor, the youths agreed to disperse.

At the first of these meetings the youths were apparently satisfied by the explanation that the newspaper's coverage was not deliberately discriminatory. The second meeting with the Mayor, however, which began at 7:00 o'clock that evening, proceeded badly. The



Negroes present felt that the Mayor was complacent and apathetic, and that they were simply being given the usual lip service, from which nothing would develop.

The Mayor, on the other hand, told Commission investigators that he recognized that "Citizens are frustrated by the political organization of the city," because he, himself, has no power and "each of the Councilmen says that he is just one of eleven and therefore can't do anything."

After approximately two hours, a dozen of the youths walked out, indicating an impasse and signalling the break-up of the meeting. Shortly thereafter window smashing began, and a tree was set afire by a Molotov cocktail. One fire engine, in which a white and Negro fireman were sitting side by side, had a Molotov cocktail thrown at it; the white fireman was burned.

There was <sup>apparent</sup> ~~considerable~~ discrimination as to which store windows were smashed, at least in the beginning. Liquor stores and taverns, especially, were singled out <sup>by</sup> ~~by~~ some of the youths, <sup>believed</sup> ~~who pointed~~ that there was an excess concentration of bars in the Negro section, and that <sup>these</sup> ~~they~~ were an unhealthy influence on the community.

<sup>Because</sup> ~~As a result of the fact that~~ the police department had mobilized its full force, the situation, although serious, never appeared to reach the point of getting out of hand. Officers made numerous arrests.

At three o'clock Sunday morning a heavy rain began to fall, scattering whatever persons remained on the streets. The Chief of the Fire Dept. told Commission investigators that it was his conclusion that "individuals making firebombs did not know what they were doing, or they could have burned the city."

In the morning police made no effort to cordon off the area. As white sightseers and churchgoers drove by the housing project ~~xxx~~ there were sporadic incidents of rock-throwing and violence. During the early afternoon these accelerated.

<sup>L.C.</sup>  
~~Cathcart~~, together with two officials of the city's Human Relations Commission, decided to call another meeting to draw up a formal petition of grievances. As the youths gathered it became apparent that some of them had been drinking. A few kept drifting away from the parking lot <sup>where the meeting was being held</sup> to throw rocks at cars passing by on the street. It was decided to move the meeting en masse to Greenbrook Park, a county park several blocks away.

Between <sup>150</sup>~~200~~ and <sup>200</sup>~~300~~ persons, including almost all of the rock-throwers, piled into a caravan of cars and headed for the park. At approximately 3:30 p.m. the Chief of the Union County Park Police arrived to discover the group being addressed by David Sullivan, Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission. He "informed Mr. Sullivan he was in violation of our park ordinance and to disperse the group." Sullivan and <sup>L.C.</sup>~~Cathcart~~ attempted to explain that they were in the process of drawing up a list of grievances, but the Chief

remained adamant ~~that~~ they could not meet in the park without a permit, and they did not have a permit.

After permitting the group 10 to 15 minutes grace, ~~and even though people were still arriving,~~ the Chief decided to disperse them. "Their mood was very excitable," he reported, and "in my estimation no one could appease them so we moved them out without too much trouble. They left in a caravan of about 40 cars, horns blowing and they yelling, headed south on West End Avenue to Plainfield."

Within the hour looting became widespread ~~cars~~ were overturned, a white man was snatched off a motorcycle, and the fire department stopped responding to alarms because the police were unable to provide ~~that~~ protection. After having been on alert until midday, The Plainfield Police Dept. was caught unprepared. At 6:00 p.m. only 18 men were on duty ~~checkpoints~~ were established at crucial intersections in an effort to isolate the area as much as possible.

At one of the intersections, three blocks from the housing project, Officer John Gleason ~~had been posted~~ had been posted. together with two reserve officers, ~~A~~ Gleason was a veteran officer, the son of a former ~~police~~ police department. lieutenant on the ~~Plainfield Police Dept.~~ Shortly after 8:00 p.m. two white youths, ~~begin~~ being chased by a 22-year old Negro, Bobby ~~Robert~~ Williams, came running towards ~~the~~ the post. As he came in sight of the police



officers, Williams stopped.

When <sup>D.H.)</sup> ~~David Hardy~~, the newspaper reporter, saw Officer Gleason he was two blocks from his post, striding after Williams, ever deeper into the ghetto area, he had already passed one housing project, and people in small groups were milling about everywhere.

<sup>D.H.)</sup> In ~~Hardy's~~ words: "There was a kind of shock and amazement," to see the officer walking by himself so deep in the ghetto. [Suddenly there was a confrontation between Williams and Gleason. Some witnesses reported Williams had a hammer in his hand, others say he did not. When <sup>D.H.)</sup> ~~Hardy~~, whose attention had been momentarily distracted, next saw Gleason he had drawn his gun and was firing at Williams. As Williams fell to the ground, critically injured, Gleason turned and began running back toward his post. [Negro youths <sup>chased</sup> ~~began chasing~~ him. ~~He~~ Gleason ~~ran~~ he stumbled, regained his balance, then had his feet knocked out from under him. A score of youths began to beat him and kick him. Some of the residents in the apartment house attempted to intervene, but they were brushed aside. <sup>D.H.)</sup> ~~Maxx Hardy~~ believes that, under the circumstances and in the atmosphere that prevailed at that moment, ~~that~~ any police officer, black or white, would have been killed.

After they had beaten Gleason to death, the youths took <sup>D.H.'s</sup> ~~Harley's~~ camera from him and smashed it. Fear swept over the ghetto. Many residents were convinced, on the basis of what had occurred in Newark, that law enforcement officers would come into the shooting, bent on vengeance. There was no lack of weapons ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> people began actively to prepare to defend themselves. One man sent his family out of the city and barricaded himself behind his door with a shotgun.

From a nearby arms manufacturing plant, 46 carbines were stolen <sup>and</sup> they were passed out in the street by a former newspaper boy. Law enforcement officers, backed up by National Guardsmen, threw a cordon about the area, but made no attempt to enter it <sup>occasionally, to rescue someone.</sup> ~~except,~~ ~~that night.~~ Reports of sniper firing, wild shooting, and general chaos continued until the early morning hours.

(NOTE:) ~~Explain that the police did occasionally go into the area Sunday night to rescue someone, but otherwise stayed out.~~

By daylight Monday, New Jersey State officials had begun to arrive in the city. At a meeting in the early afternoon it was agreed that to inject police into the ~~area~~ <sup>ghetto</sup> ~~is~~ would be to risk bloodshed. That, instead, law enforcement personnel should continue to retain their cordon, while residents ~~in~~ <sup>the area</sup> patrolled themselves.

All during the day various meetings took place between Government officials and Negro representatives. Police were anxious to recover the stolen weapons. Negroes wanted assurances against retaliation.

At 8 <sup>p.m.</sup> ~~00~~ the Mayor, accompanied by two State officials, went to the housing project and spoke to several hundred Negroes. ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> crowd was hostile. There were demands that city officials give concrete evidence that they were prepared to deal with Negro grievances. Again, the meeting was inconclusive. The officials returned to City Hall.

At 9:15 p.m. <sup>L.E.</sup> ~~Cathcart~~ rushed in <sup>evening</sup> ~~that~~ as a result of the failure to resolve any of the outstanding problems, violence was about to explode ~~in~~ anew. The key demand ~~of~~ of the ~~most~~ militant faction was that those who had been arrested during the riot should be released. State officials decided to arrange for the release on bail of 12 arrestees charged with minor violations. ~~On the other hand,~~ <sup>Reciprocally, L.E.</sup> ~~Cathcart~~ agreed to try to arrange for the return of the stolen carbines by noon on Wednesday.

At 4 ~~00~~ o'clock Tuesday morning a dozen prisoners were released from jail. Plainfield police officers considered this a sellout. When, by noon on Wednesday, the stolen carbines had not been returned, the Governor

decided to <sup>authorize</sup> ~~organize~~ a mass search of the area. At 2 ~~100~~ p.m. a convoy of State Police and National Guard troops prepared to enter the area. In order to direct the search <sup>as</sup> ~~to~~ to likely locations a handful of Plainfield police officers were spotted throughout the 28 vehicles of the convoy. As the convoy prepared to depart, <sup>the State Community Relations Director</sup> ~~Dr. Paul Ylvisaker~~ insisted that the Plainfield police be replaced by the arm-banded auxiliaries who had been patrolling the ghetto ~~for two days~~. He believed that the mood of the Plainfield Police was such that to permit them to enter the area would <sup>be to</sup> ~~run~~ a serious risk of violence.

Colonel David Kelly of the New Jersey State Police considered this estimate of the situation ridiculous. <sup>However,</sup> ~~but~~ <sup>State</sup> the views of the ~~the~~ Community Relations Director prevailed. As <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ search for carbines in the community progressed, tensions increased rapidly. According to witnesses and newspaper reports, some men in the search column began to destroy property, leaving apartments they had gone through a shambles.

An hour and a half after it was begun, the search, which had proven to be an exercise in futility, was called off. The removal from the convoy had, Plainfield Police officers ~~felt~~ <sup>felt</sup> ~~been~~ their crowning humiliation. A half hour after the conclusion of the search, in a meeting charged with emotion, the entire Department threatened to resign unless the State Director ~~and~~ Community Relations left the city. He bowed to the demand.



On Friday, exactly a week after the first ~~outbreak~~ outbreak, the NEW BRUNSWICK city began returning to normal. All during the week-end that violence sputtered, flared, subsided, then flared again in Plainfield, in New Brunswick, less than 10 miles away, there were numerous rumors that "New Brunswick was really going to blow." Dissatisfaction in the Negro community revolved around two issues: The closing of a local teenage coffee house by the police department, and the release of a white couple on \$100 bond after they had been arrested for allegedly shooting at three Negro teenagers.

Again there was a feeling the law was not being applied equally to whites and Negroes. By Monday tension was reported "so thick that you could eat it with a fork." In the late afternoon the city's woman mayor, Patricia Sheehan, who had only been in office two months, took steps to assume direct control of the police department.

A Negro lieutenant, John Brokaw, was appointed <sup>as</sup> her righthand man and authorized to bypass normal police department channels. The department's entire Negro complement was put in plainclothes and, together with community workers, went out into the streets to expose rumors and act as counter-rioters. The radio station agreed to play down rumors of any disturbances, nevertheless, by late Monday evening, small groups of teenagers began breaking windows. As larger crowds ~~began to~~ gather <sup>ed</sup>, wild rumors swept the city; reports of armed Negro and white gangs; shootings, fires, beatings and death. In fact, except for some minor looting, the atmosphere, according to Mayor Sheehan, <sup>had been</sup> ~~was~~ "like Halloween -- a gigantic night of mischief."

Tuesday morning the mayor imposed a curfew, further consolidated her direct control over the police department, and made



a tape recording, played periodically over the city's radio station, appealing for order. All of the persons who had been picked up the previous night were released on their own recognizance or on low bail.

In the late afternoon the mayor and city commissioners met with 35 angry and initially hostile teenagers who "poured out their souls to the mayor." As a result, the mayor, the city commissioners and the Negro youths drew up a statement attacking segregation, discrimination, ~~and~~ inferior educational and employment opportunities, police harrassment, and poor housing. Four of the young people began broadcasting over the radio station, urging their "soul brothers and sisters" to "cool it, because you will only get hurt and the mayor has talked with us and is going to do something for us."

<sup>youths</sup> Others ~~circulated~~ circulated through the streets with the same message. Despite these measures, ~~immediate~~ confrontation between the police and <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ crowd that ~~had~~ gathered in the ghetto was narrowly averted that evening. The police wanted to break up the crowd, ~~and~~ the crowd was angry at the massive show of force by the police. Asked to return to their homes, people replied: "We will go home when you get the police out of the area." ~~Requested~~ Requested by the ~~police~~ ~~commissioners~~ commissioners to pull the police back, the Chief refused. He was then given a direct order <sup>to ~~pull~~ pull back</sup> by the mayor. \*

According to the Chief, he had "been a police officer for 24 years and had never felt so bad." An hour later, elements of the same crowd, which was an older one than the night before, and contained persons in their 30's and 40's, gathered in front of the police station, ~~he~~ Again, the police wanted to disperse <sup>people</sup> them by force, ~~again~~ again the mayor prevailed. She went out into the street, talked to the people and asked that she be given a chance

to  
A correct conditions. Over the objections of the Chief, she  
agreed to let representatives of the people inspect the jail  
cells to satisfy themselves that everyone arrested on the pre-  
vious night had been released. <sup>The</sup> New Brunswick <sup>(riot had failed to materialize.)</sup> ~~had weathered~~  
~~its crisis.~~

(end N.J. string)

# The Black Power Conference

66

Even as various communities in northern New Jersey were ~~still~~ still being agitated by the corona of the Newark riot, 900 or more delegates from all over the United States gathered on July 20/for the first national Black Power conference.

<sup>diverse</sup>  
The ~~diverse~~ delegates and the organizations they represented were unified by only one element: race. The most militant ~~of~~ extreme whites <sup>well</sup> were barred. Two Negro officers of the New York Police Department were admitted.

The organizer of the conference, Dr. Nathan Wright Jr., himself was emblematic of the metamorphosis in Negro philosophy and psychology that has taken place in the United States during the course of a few years. An Episcopal minister with six college degrees, including a doctorate from Harvard University, a generation ago he would have been identified -- <sup>whether he liked or not</sup> ~~voluntarily or not~~ -- with the "Black Bourgeoisie." In Newark he <sup>was able to</sup> ~~at least~~ his lot, ~~in~~ ideologically, with the late Malcolm X and Rap Brown.

~~There was~~  
Among the delegates there was as much disagreement as there was agreement. A resolution, referring to the Newark riot, ~~was adopted~~ <sup>was adopted</sup> put the delegates on record as vigorously affirming "the right to exercise our unchallengeable right to self-defense."

An extremist ~~x~~ faction believed that the best self-defense was to attack. Many speakers, however, warned that Negroes were not yet ready to confront the "white power structure." Even Rap Brown warned that it would be "self-genocide" to challenge white America to physical conflict at this time.

It soon became apparent that someone, in Detroit, was not listening.

DETROIT

On ~~the~~ <sup>evening</sup> the Black Power Conference ~~concluded in~~ <sup>was still in session,</sup>  
~~Nearby~~ <sup>Saturday July 22, 1965</sup> the Detroit Police Dept. raided five blind pigs. The  
blind pigs had <sup>had</sup> their originain the days before World War II,  
when they had served as private social clubs for affluent  
Negroes who, because of discrimination, had been unable to gain  
entrance to ~~Detroit~~ <sup>public</sup> night spots. ~~Gradually~~ <sup>Gradually</sup>, as public  
~~accommodations~~ <sup>facilities</sup> ~~had~~ <sup>their doors</sup> opened/to Negroes, the character of the  
blind pigs had changed, and they had become <sup>illegal</sup> ~~afterhours~~ drinking  
and gambling spots.

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The fifth blind pig on the list, the United Community and  
Civic League, at the corner of 12th Street and Clairmount, had  
been raided twice before. Once ten persons had been picked up;  
another <sup>time,</sup> 28. A Detroit Vice Squad officer had first tried b ut  
~~had~~ been unable to gain entrance to the blind pig shortly after  
ten o'clock ~~Sunday~~ <sup>Saturday</sup> night. When, on his second attempt, he was  
successful, it was 3:45 a.m. Sunday morning.

The Tactical Mobile Unit, the Police Department's anti-  
riot squad, had been dismissed at 3:00 a.m. Since Sunday mor-  
ning, is, traditionally, the least troublesome time for police  
departments all over the United States, there were only 193  
officers patrolling the streets. Of these, 44 were in the 10th  
Precinct where the blind pig was located.

<sup>Instead of the</sup> ~~As~~ expected, ~~at the most~~ <sup>the blind pig contained 82.</sup> two dozen patrons, ~~but~~. ~~and~~  
Before additional patrol wagons could ~~transport all~~ be called  
~~to~~ <sup>and</sup> transport all the persons from the scene, an hour had  
elapsed. The weather was warm -- during that day the temperature  
was to rise to 86 degrees -- and humid. Despite the hour,  
numerous persons were still on the streets. Within a short period  
a crowd of approximately 200 persons had gathered. ~~in~~

In November of 1965 the Honorable George Edwards, Judge of  
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and  
Commissioner of the Detroit Police Dept. from 1961 to 1963, had  
~~xxx~~ written in the Michigan Law Review: " It is clear that in  
1965 no one will make excuses for any <sup>city's</sup> ~~given~~ <sup>in,</sup> ability to foresee



the possibility of racial trouble . . . Although local police forces generally regard themselves as public servants with the responsibility of maintaining law and order, they tend to minimize this attitude when they are patrolling areas that are heavily populated with Negro citizens. There they tend to view each person on the streets as a potential criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is reciprocated. Indeed, hostility between the Negro communities in our large cities and the police departments, is <sup>the</sup> a major problem in law enforcement in this decade. It has been a major cause of all recent <sup>RACE</sup> riots."

At one time, Judge Edwards told Commission investigators, there was "open warfare between the Detroit Negroes and the Detroit Police Dept." ~~As~~ <sup>as</sup> late as "1961 he thought that Detroit was the leading candidate in the United States for a race riot."

*There was a long history of conflict between the police department and the citizens.*  
 [Detroit's 1943 race riot, in which 34 persons died, was the bloodiest in the United States in the span of four decades. During the labor wars of the 1930's union members had come to view the Detroit Police Dept. as a strike-breaking force.]

Judge Edwards and his successor, Commissioner Ray Girardin, attempted to restructure the image of the department. A Citizens Complaint Bureau was set up to facilitate the filing of complaints by citizens against officers; but there are indications that in practice it worked little better than less enlightened and more cumbersome procedures in other cities.

Expert testimony has been given the Commission that the very nature of the trial ~~board~~ board procedure tends to favor the accused officer. Officers are reluctant to testify against



fellow-members of the Dept. and some who have done so in the past have found themselves ~~x~~ ostracized. ~~xxx~~

Lately, following the advice of attorneys with regard to the rules against self-incrimination, officers have refused even to make statements to Department investigators. In certain precincts investigators for the Citizens Complaint Bureau have been made to feel so unwelcome that they are reluctant even to go to the stationhouses.

On 12th Street, with its high incidence of vice and crime, the issue of police brutality was a recurrent theme. A month earlier the killing of a prostitute had been ~~xxxxxx~~ determined by police investigators to be the work of a pimp. According to rumors ~~x~~ in the community the crime had been committed by a Vice Squad officer.

Approximately at the same time the killing of a 27-year old Negro Army veteran, Danny Thomas, by a gang of white youths, inflamed the community. Coverage by the city's major newspapers, which played down the story, in the hope that the murder would not become a cuase for increased tensions, backfired. ~~in~~ A banner story, <sup>in</sup> the Michigan Chronicle, the city's Negro newspaper, began: "As James Meredith marched again Sunday to prove a Negro could walk in Mississippi without fear, a young woman who saw her husband killed by a ~~white~~ white gang, shouting: 'Niggers keep out of Rouge Park,' lost her baby.

"Relatives were upset that the full story of the murder was not being told, apparently in an effort to prevent the incident from sparking a riot."

Some Negroes believed that the treatment of the story by the ~~major news~~

major newspapers was further evidence of the double standard: Playing up crimes by Negroes, playing down crimes committed against Negroes.

Although police arrested and charged one suspect with murder, Negroes questioned why the entire gang was not held. What, they asked, would have been the result if a white man had been killed by a gang of Negroes? ~~The-Thomas-family-had-lived only-three-blocks-from-the-scene-of-the-blind-pig-raid~~

The Thomas family had lived only three blocks from the scene of the blind pig raid. A few minutes after 5:00 a.m. a police cruiser had its rear window smashed by an empty bottle. Shortly thereafter a litter basket was thrown through the window of a store. A youth police nicknamed, "Mr. Greensleeves," because of the green shirt he was wearing, was shouting, "We're going to have a riot," and exhorting the crowd to vandalism.

At 5:20 a.m. Commissioner Ray Girardin was notified, and he immediately called Mayor <sup>Jerome</sup> Cavanagh. Seventeen officers from other areas were ordered into the 10th Precinct. By 6:00 a.m. police dept. strength had grown to 369 men. Of these, however, only 43 were committed to the immediate riot area. By that time the number of persons on 12th Street was in the process of growing into the thousands, and widespread window-smashing and looting <sup>had</sup> ~~beginning~~ begun.

Although a block to either side of 12th Street ~~was fine~~ were fine middle class districts, <sup>along 12th Street itself</sup> overcrowded apartment houses created a density of more than 21,000 persons per square mile, almost double the city average. Only 18 percent of the residents were homeowners, (25) percent of the housing was considered so substandard

as to require clearance, and another 19 percent had major deficiencies. The crime rate was almost double that of the city, which, in itself, ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> one of the highest in the nation.

The proportion of broken families was more than twice that in the rest of the city. The movement of people ~~within~~ <sup>when</sup> the slums of "Black Bottom" had been cleared for urban renewal, had changed 12th Street from an integrated community into an almost totally black one, in which only numbers of the businessmen remained white.

By 7:50 a.m., when a 17-man command ~~unit~~ <sup>unit</sup> attempted to make the first sweep, there were an estimated 3,000 persons on 12th Street. They offered no resistance to the police, they gave way to one side ~~to one side~~ as the squad moved down the street, and then flowed back behind it.

At 8:25 a.m. the first fire blossomed in ~~a~~ <sup>a shoe</sup> store. Firemen who responded were not, however, harrassed, and the flames were extinguished. By mid-morning 1122 men, approximately a fourth of the strength of the department, had reported for duty. Of these, 540 were in the riot area, which had still not expanded beyond six blocks. 108 officers were being used in an attempt to establish a cordon. There was, however, no interference ~~with~~ looters, and police were refraining from the use of force.

According to witnesses, police ~~at~~ some roadblocks made little effort to stop people from going in and out of the area, and ~~There was~~ <sup>took place</sup> a good deal of bantering between police officers and the populace. [ Commissioner Girardin believed: "If we had

started shooting in there . . . not one of our policemen would have come out alive. I am convinced it would have turned into a race riot in the conventional sense."

Many of the police officers were being used to guard key installations in other sections of the city in the fear that the disturbance on 12th Street might be a diversionary tactic.

Belle Isle, the recreation area in the Detroit River that had been the scene of the 1943 riot, was ~~not~~ sealed off. In an effort not to attract people to the scene, media of mass communication were cooperating in reporting no news of the riot. As a result, numerous police officers had to be detailed to protect the 50,000 spectators that were expected at that afternoon's New York Yankees-Detroit Tigers baseball game.

Early in the morning a task force of community workers had gone into the area to dispel rumors and act as counter-rioters. Such a task force had been singularly successful at the time of the Kercheval incident in the summer of 1966, when scores of people had gathered at the site of an arrest. Kercheval, however, was a ~~not~~ higher-income area, with few stores, that also happened to have the city's most effective police-community relations program.

By the time the members of the task force were able to inject themselves into the situation on 12th Street, it had already gotten out of hand. The movement from a serious to a critical stage, apparently began when a rumor threaded its way

through the crowd that a man had been bayoneted by the police  
*during an* ~~as they~~ attempt <sup>by them</sup> to sweep the streets. ~~Missiles~~ Missiles  
began to be thrown at the officers. By 1:00 p.m. the first of  
the serious fires had been set, an hour later smoke was ~~sm~~  
billowing <sup>upward from</sup> ~~from at four different~~ at least four different  
locations, ~~and~~ firemen were being harrassed and pelted with  
~~missiles, rocks.~~

The Michigna State Police, who had been alerted ~~earlier~~,  
were requested to come to the city's assistance. Shortly after  
3:00 p.m., even <sup>as</sup> ~~the~~ State Police were arriving, the riot spread  
from 12th Street into other business districts.



There was no lack of the disaffected to help spread it. <sup>yet</sup> Although not ~~deteriorated~~ to the point of Newark, like Newark, Detroit was losing population. Its prosperous middle class <sup>were</sup> whites ~~moving~~ to the suburbs and being replaced by unskilled Negro migrants.

Between 1960 and 1967 the Negro population rose from ~~just~~ under 30 percent to an estimated 40 percent of the total. Those who moved out were the most vigorous, revenue-producing portion ~~of age groups~~ <sup>of</sup> the population, leaving behind ~~them~~ <sup>an</sup> ever greater number of the old and young, who were less productive, yet cost the city more in terms of services. ~~XXXXXX~~

In a decade the school system had gained 50,000 to 60,000 children, ~~and~~ <sup>51</sup> percent of the elementary school classes were overcrowded. Simply to achieve the state-wide average, the system needed 1,650 more teachers, which would mean the building of an additional 1,000 classrooms. The combined cost would be \$63 million. Of 300,000 school children, 171,000, or 57 percent, were Negro. According to <sup>the</sup> Detroit Superintendent of Schools, 25 different school districts surrounding the city spent \$100 to \$500 more per pupil per year than Detroit. In the inner city schools more than half the pupils who entered high school became dropouts.

The strong union structure had created ideal conditions for the working ~~men~~ <sup>a</sup>, but had left others, such as Civil Service and Government workers, comparatively disadvantaged and dissatisfied. <sup>In June</sup> ~~Earlier in the summer~~ the "Blue Flu" <sup>had</sup> struck the city. ~~As~~ police officers, forbidden to strike, had staged a sick-out. In September, the teachers were to go on strike. <sup>Some unions, traditionally</sup> ~~closed to Negroes, zealously guarded~~ <sup>training</sup> ~~the~~ opportunities.

In January of 1967 the school system notified six apprenticeship trades it would not open any new apprenticeship classes unless

<sup>starting</sup> ~~The~~ <sup>plumber's helper</sup> ~~starting~~ <sup>were</sup> ~~almost equal~~ <sup>to the salary of a police officer or teacher.</sup>

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Whereas~~was~~ the income of whites and Negroes with ~~xxx~~ a 7th grade  
median  
education was about equal, the/income of whites with a

In fact, as far as his income was concerned, it made very little difference to a Negro whether he had attended school for 8 years or <sup>for</sup> 12.

a larger number of Negroes were included. By the Fall of 1967 some of the programs were still closed, ~~as a result~~.

High school diplomas from inner city schools ~~were~~ <sup>were</sup> regarded by personnel directors as less than valid. In July of 1967 unemployment was higher than it had been for five years. In the 12th Street area it was estimated to be between 12 and 15 percent for Negro men; ~~30~~ 30 percent or higher for those under 25.

*Insert*

Although Mayor Cavanagh had appointed many Negroes to ~~key~~ key positions in his administration, in elective offices the population was still grossly underrepresented. Of nine councilmen, only one was a Negro. Of seven members of the school board, only two were Negroes. [Because of the financial straits it found itself in, the city was unable to produce on promises to correct conditions engendering complaints. **Resistance**

Resistance to urban renewal was widespread among residents. Results from urban renewal were doubtful. In the middle of the downtown urban renewal area, one of the city's two largest department stores had closed its doors. **By 4**

By 4:00 p.m. the rioting, looting and burning <sup>was</sup> spread <sup>ing</sup> over an ever ~~wider~~ wider area. There was no longer any hope of the restoration of order without a massive response ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> the National Guard was called for.

At 6:57 p.m. the first ~~xxxxxxx~~ troops appeared on the streets. At 9:07 p.m. the first sniper fire was reported. At 12:25 a.m., Monday, July 24th, the first person died. He was a 45-year old white man, shot ~~down~~ by the owner of the store he was looting. [As the entire social order began to show signs of disintegrating ~~and~~



into chaos, individual responses sometimes were unexpected.

Twenty-four year old <sup>E.</sup>A.G., a Negro born in Savannah, Georgia, had arrived in Detroit in 1965 in order to attend Wayne State University. Rebellion had been building ~~up~~ in him for a long time because "You just had to bow down to the white man." For example: "When the insurance man would come by he would always call out to my mother by her first name and we were expected to smile and greet him happily. . . Man, I know he would never have thought of me or my father going to his house and calling his wife by her first name. Then I once saw a white man slapping a young pregnant Negro woman on the street with such force that she just spun around and fell. I'll never forget that." The memory of violence committed against Negroes in the south, for which no one had ever been punished, still rankled in him.

When a friend called to tell him about the riot at 12th Street, <sup>E.G.</sup> went there expecting "a true revolt," but was "disappointed as soon as I saw the looting begin. I wanted to see the people really rise up in revolt. When I saw the first person coming out of the store with things in his arms, I really got sick to my stomach and wanted to go home. Rebellion against the white suppressors is one thing, but one measly pair of shoes or some food, completely ruins the whole concept."

<sup>E.G.</sup> was standing in a crowd, watching firemen work when Fire Chief Alvin Wall called out, asking for help from among the spectators. (His reasoning was that) E.G. responded: "No matter what color someone is, whether they are green or pink or blue, I'd help them if they were in trouble. That's all there is to it."

He worked with the firemen for four days, the only Negro in an all-white crew. (Of 1700 men in the fire department there were only 40 Negroes) Elsewhere, at scattered locations, a half dozen other Negro youths pitched in to help the firemen.

~~XX~~

~~As firemen, for whom police protection was seldom available,~~  
 police protection for firemen was sporadic. As a result, the order was issued that whenever firemen were subjected to attack, whether by rocks and bottles or sniper fire, they were to abandon whatever fire they were working on and withdraw from the area. As desperate residents ~~often~~ employing garden hoses <sup>in the</sup> attempt to keep the flames from spreading to their homes from adjacent business establishments, witnessed the withdrawal of the firemen, they were ~~sometimes~~ led to believe that the withdrawal was intended as an act of retribution <sup>antagonism</sup> against the firemen increased.

Since a moderate breeze was blowing, there were many instances of a ~~xxxxxx~~ fire spreading from its original location. This led to erroneous reports that entire blocks were being fire-bombed and destroyed. At one point, out of a total of ~~157~~ <sup>of</sup> pieces of fire apparatus with which Detroit was equipped, 153 were engaged in fighting <sup>the</sup> fires. ~~When~~



One area of the ghetto remained insulated from the riot fever. On the northeast side a district of some fifty square blocks inhabited by <sup>(21,000 persons)</sup> ~~12,000 people~~ had been, in 1966, guided into organizing itself ~~the year previous~~ by the Institute of Urban Dynamics. Banding together in the Positive Neighborhood Action Committee the <sup>residents</sup> ~~they~~ had begun, with professional advice but with community control <sup>to organize block clubs and</sup> to make plans for the improvement of the neighborhood. In order to meet the need for recreational facilities, which the city was not providing, the ~~residents~~ <sup>residents</sup> managed to raise \$3000 to purchase a number of <sup>empty</sup> ~~lots~~ for playgrounds. Although opposed to Urban Renewal they agreed to co-sponsor with the Archdiocese of Detroit a housing project in which the block clubs would have equal control.

(NOTE: ~~15~~ <sup>15</sup> BLOCK CLUBS AND IN A POPULATION OF 21,000, 19,000 WERE UNDER THE AGE OF 20.)

When the riot broke out the residents, through the block clubs, were able to organize quickly to seal off the area. Youngsters, agreeing to stay in the ~~neighborhood~~, neighborhood, participated in detouring traffic. Even though many persons identified with the rioters as far as a rebellion against the system was concerned, only two small fires -- one of them in an empty building -- were set, ~~and~~ <sup>there</sup> was no violence.

~~When~~ Many of the National Guardsmen/<sup>who when they</sup> arrived in the city were ~~already~~ tired, having traveled 200 miles on trucks from their summer encampment. For some, the city was unfamiliar territory occupied by an unfamiliar people. Without training in their role as auxiliary law enforcement personnel, the guardsmen were unable to cope with the situation with which they were faced.

5

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A Detroit newspaper reporter who spent two days riding in the command jeep of one column, told a Commission investigator of machine guns being accidentally fired, street lights being shot out by rifle fire, and buildings/<sup>being</sup> placed under ~~seige~~ ~~under~~ on the most haphazard and sketchy reports of a sniper hiding there. <sup>One</sup> incident related by the reporter was the following:

A report was received on the radio that an Army bus was pinned down by sniper fire at an intersection. National Guardsmen and police, arriving from varying directions, ~~would~~ jump<sup>ed</sup> but and ~~begin~~ began asking each other: "Where's the sniper fire coming from?" One person <sup>said:</sup> ~~would say:~~ "I think it's coming from over there." <sup>As he</sup> ~~would~~ point<sup>ed</sup> to a building, and everyone ~~would~~ rushed about, taking cover. A soldier, alighting from a jeep, accidentally pulled the trigger on his rifle. As the shot reverberated through the darkness an officer yelled: "What's going on?" "I don't know," came the answer. "Shiper, I guess."

Without any clear authorization or direction someone opened fire upon the suspected building. A tank rolled up and sprayed the building with .50 caliber tracer bullets. Law enforcement officers rushed into the surrounded building and discovered it empty. "They must be firing one shot and running," was the verdict.

As this was occurring, the reporter went to the bus and interviewed the men who had gotten off and we<sup>y</sup> ~~were~~ crouched all around it. When he asked them about the sniping incident he was told that someone had heard a shot. He asked: "Did the bullet hit the bus?" The answer was: "Well, we don't know."

In <sup>another</sup> ~~an~~ instance, a column of National Guardsmen reportedly opened fire upon a police command~~o~~ unit that had been <sup>placed</sup> ~~spotted~~ upon a high building in order to deal with snipers. Lt. General John L. Throckmorton, the regular Army officer placed in command of the

combined forces, requested that the city relight the darkened streets. Mayor Cavanagh replied that he would be ~~happy~~ happy to do so if the troops would stop shooting out the ~~six~~ lights.

As troops were busy shooting out lights at one such location, a radio newscaster reported over the air that he was pinned down by sniper fire. With persons of every description arming themselves, and guns being fired accidentally ~~or~~ on the vaguest pretext, all over the city, it became more and more impossible to ~~know~~ tell who was shooting at whom. Firemen, contrary to law, were arming themselves. One shot a fellow fireman; another shot himself. A National Guardsman<sup>3</sup> and a fireman were felled by high caliber bullets whose origin it was impossible to determine.

The Chief of Police in Highland Park, a separate political entity, surrounded by the city of Detroit, recalled that one sniper proved to be an old white drunk, shooting from the top of an apartment building. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

~~Unverified~~ Unverified reports received by Commission investigators, tell of street gangs roaming the city, firing a shot here and a shot there, then disappearing before the arrival of police. National Guard gunfire killed one woman when she stood silhouetted in the window of her motel.

A four-year old girl was shot to death when troopers opened up with machine guns in response to the flash of a cigarette being lighted.

Of the 43 persons who were killed during the riot, the Detroit Prosecutor's office was able to issue warrants in only six of the cases. In 8 no action was taken or recommended, because no



suspect was found or the homicide was accidental. In 29 deaths, *the ruling was either one of justifiable homicide, or* there was insufficient evidence upon which to base any charge.

~~It was impossible to determine where the shot had come from or who might have fired it.~~

Approximately one and a half to two years before the riot, R.R., a 27-year old coin dealer, had bought a three-story house on 'L' Street, an integrated middle class neighborhood. In May of 1966, R.R., together with his wife and child, had moved to New York and had rented the house to three young men. After several months neighbors began to report to R.R. that the house was being used for wild parties.

In March of 1967, R.R. instituted eviction proceedings against the tenants. They were still pending when the riot broke out. On Wednesday, July 26th, R.R., concerned about what might happen to the house, decided to fly to Detroit. When he arrived, he ~~first~~ went to his mother's house to pick up his 17-year old brother, and another teenager. Together the three ~~of them~~ went to the house on 'L' Street, where they discovered the tenants were not at home. R.R. called his attorney, who advised him to take physical possession of the house.

Taking an old .22 caliber rifle with them for protection, the three men entered the house. R.R.'s 17-year old brother took the gun into the cellar and fired it several times into a pillow in order to test it.

At 7:45 p.m. R.R. called Mrs. R. in New York and advised her that he was changing the locks on the house. At 8:45 p.m. he called her again and told her that the tenants had returned and he had refused to let them in. He also asked <sup>Mrs. R.</sup> ~~her~~ to send the family's watchdog for protection.

At approximately ~~the~~ the same time the National Guard received a call that: "Three unidentified white men had broken into the ~~house~~ house, forced the occupants thereof out ~~at~~ at gunpoint, and hauled in boxes of guns and ammunition with which they were going to start sniping, sometime after dark."

At 9:05 p.m. a National Guard column with ~~at least one~~ <sup>two</sup> tank, ~~which rolled up onto the lawn of a neighbor's house,~~ pulled up in front of the ~~house~~ <sup>house</sup>. A National Guard captain said that he ~~saw~~ saw a flash in an upstairs window, and shouted a warning to the occupants. Neighbors report they heard no such warning.

The three men were on the second floor of the house when a barrage of fire was unleashed against it. As ~~hundreds~~ of bullets ~~xxx~~ crashed through the windows and ricocheted off the walls, they dashed to the third floor, <sup>Protected by a large chimney,</sup> ~~where there were only two small~~ <sup>they huddled in a closet until,</sup> ~~windows.~~ During a lull in the firing, ~~from .50 caliber machine guns and rifles,~~ they were able to hang a pink bathrobe out of the window as a sign of surrender. They were arrested as snipers.

The firing <sup>from rifles and .50 caliber machine guns</sup> had been so intense that in a period of a few minutes ~~the~~ the house suffered more than \$10,000 worth of damage. One of a pair of stone columns ~~in front~~ was shot nearly in half. Chaos reigned in the 10th Precinct Station to which <sup>three men</sup> they were taken. The commander of the precinct had transferred his headquarters to <sup>the riot</sup> ~~a~~ command post <sup>at a nearby hospital.</sup> ~~and~~ in his absence the command structure ~~was~~ apparently broken down.

As hundreds of arrestees were brought in, officers were running this way and that, taking it upon themselves to carry on



investigations and <sup>to</sup> attempt ~~ing~~ to extract confessions. Because, they said, the metal made them a target for snipers, officers ~~had been taken~~ throughout the ~~Police~~ Police Dept. had ~~not only~~ taken off their badges <sup>with their identifying numbers</sup> ~~and~~ also taped over the license plates <sup>and</sup> the numbers of the cars, so that identification of individual officers <sup>became</sup> ~~was~~ virtually impossible.

Sometime <sup>Wednesday</sup> ~~during~~ night ~~that~~ R.R. and his two companions <sup>an</sup> ~~had been brought in they~~ were taken from their cell to "Alley Court," the police slang for attempting to beat confessions out of prisoners. Officer ~~W.~~ W. administered such a severe beating to R.R. that the bruises were still visible two weeks later.

R.R.'s 17-year old brother had ~~a~~ his skull cracked open, and was thrown back into the cell, <sup>he</sup> ~~and~~ was taken to a hospital only when other arrestees complained that he was bleeding to death.

Dozens of ~~xxx~~ cases of police brutality emanated from the 10th Precinct <sup>one</sup> station. ~~one~~ <sup>of these involved</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>the same</sup> Officer W. <sup>a</sup> young woman was brought into the station and told to strip. After she had done so, Officer W came up to her and began fondling her, <sup>another officer took pictures</sup> ~~as pictures were taken~~ with a polaroid camera. One of the pictures <sup>Subsequently</sup> made its way to the Mayor's office.

On Monday, July ~~24~~ 24th, General Throckmorton, following <sup>in which he had seen no indications of imminent danger</sup> an inspection tour of the area, had ordered all weapons unloaded.

~~xxx~~ The order was largely ignored by the National Guardsmen.

~~By late Tuesday~~ <sup>By late Tuesday</sup> ~~looting and firebombing had~~ <sup>looting and firebombing had</sup> virtually ceased <sup>between 7 and 11:00 p.m.</sup> ~~on July 25th~~ <sup>Tuesday night</sup> there were 444 incidents <sup>mostly of sniper fire</sup> ~~reported~~ <sup>Most were reports of sniper fire.</sup>

The charges against all three of the young men were dismissed at the preliminary hearing. The police officer who had signed the original complaint refused even to take the stand when he was called.

9th Precinct Officer who signed original complaint refused to take stand when he was called. Another officer took pictures as pictures were taken with a polaroid camera. Subsequently made its way to the Mayor's office.

During the daylight hours of July 26th there were 534 *such reports*. That evening between 8:30 and 11:00 p.m. there were 255. Most were unconfirmed, and many turned out to be completely unsubstantiated, yet with the proliferation of such reports, the pressure on law enforcement officers to discover some snipers became tremendous. Homes were broken into, and searches made on the flimsiest <sup>of</sup> tips.

Before the arrest of a secretary in the City Assessor's office called attention to the situation on Friday, July 28th, any person with any kind of a gun in his home was liable to be picked up as a suspect.

Of the 27 persons who were ~~xx~~ charged with sniping, 22 had the charges against them dismissed at the preliminary hearings. One pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered gun and was given a suspended sentence. ~~xxxx~~ Trials of the remaining four --

*one on a reduced charge --  
one pending.*



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THE RIOT PROFILE

By the summer of 1967 the Negro ghettos of the United States had become vast reservoirs of explosive humanity, <sup>What of the cities in which they were located,</sup> ~~With a population density several times the ghettos continued~~ ~~to increase rapidly in size and numbers.~~ As a result of migration from rural areas and <sup>a Negro</sup> ~~the~~ birth rate 50 percent higher <sup>the ghettos, whose density was already much higher than that of surrounding areas, continued to increase rapidly</sup> than that of the ~~high~~ white population, <sup>Approximately 50</sup> percent of the ghetto population was made up of persons <sup>years</sup> 25 of age or younger, <sup>in size and numbers.</sup> ~~inadequately educated~~, without ~~skilled~~ salable skills in a complex technological society, ~~the~~ unemployment rate of this group in some areas was as high as 35 percent. Incongruous situations existed in which, as thousands of people looked for work, hundreds of job openings were available, which applicants lacked the skills to fill.

It does not appear <sup>accidental</sup> ~~accidental~~ that the time of the most serious disturbances coincides with the dismissal of school, and the appearance on the streets of tens of thousands of teenagers who, unable to obtain jobs, lack adequate recreational facilities. The volatility of masses of young people congregated in one area is not essentially a Negro phenomenon. White middle-class teenagers and college youths gathering in vacation resorts ~~for holidays~~, have created troubles for the police from Oregon to Florida and <sup>from</sup> Maine to California. Nor are the police necessarily the precipitating element, although injudicious or inadequate police action frequently becomes a factor.

For example: In Cincinnati the chain of events was initiated by complaints about the ~~inequality~~ purported double-standard of justice, and the actual spark was struck by anger at a middle class Negro's defense of the system;

<sup>the chain of events was initiated</sup>  
In Atlanta by Negro private guard's arrest of a Negro;

<sup>the chain of events was initiated</sup>  
In Plainfield by the refusal of an off-duty police officer to treat a Negro upon a Negro assault as serious.

A major police action, such as the shooting of the youths

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

in Tampa has, in fact, been involved only infrequently. Most riots have built up in stages from a minor police arrest. Notably, mostly in smaller cities, both the residents and the police became so convinced that a riot was about to take place that this very expectation, like the buildup of opposing armies along a hostile border, tended to lead to a clash.

The riots that have taken place in the United States over the course of the past several summers, may be traced through six identifiable stages. These are:

- (1) Embryonic
- (2) Out of control
- (3) Community involvement
- (4) Massive response
- (5) Breakdown of the social order
- (6) Control

The vast majority of the riot situations never reached the third stage. In only three cities, Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit, did a riot pass through all six stages.

<sup>1.</sup>  
~~1.~~ Embryonic The focal point for the commencement of every riot has been a high density area. In the majority of cases this has been at or in the vicinity of a housing project. Where a housing project has not been involved, the location has been some other centralized one where a large number of people could gather quickly.

In Atlanta it was a shopping center surrounded by overcrowded apartment buildings.

In Detroit -- as in Grand Rapids -- it was a main business thoroughfare, noted for the prevalence of vice, from which overcrowded apartment houses and residences were set back on both



and sides; which, even under normal circumstances, is filled with ~~numerous~~ people. [The focal area, therefore, has always been a natural gathering place, and whereas the specific incident involving the police has often been of a secondary nature in precipitating the riot, the presence and actions of the police have contributed significantly to attracting the large number of people from which a pool of rioters could develop.

While people are, ~~ex~~ naturally, drawn to any scene of excitement, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ennui and dreariness of the ghetto tend to multiply the drawing power of any event interrupting the routine. One of the great problems of fire departments in ghetto areas is the numerous small grass and garbage fires set, and false alarms turned in by kids for ~~the sole purpose of summoning the~~ <sup>no other purpose than to see</sup> fire engines ~~and creating excitement.~~ <sup>roll down the street.</sup>

In almost every case it may be found that, as a result of the weather, more people than usual were ~~already~~ in the streets. ~~In these cities examined it was found~~ <sup>In 17 cities examined,</sup> The average temperature on the day the precipitating incident took place ~~in these cities examined,~~ was 87 degrees, 6 degrees above normal for that date.

The longer the police remain <sup>as</sup> in the area and the more ~~flamboyantly~~ flamboyantly they, or the fire department, <sup>did</sup> ~~so~~ with sirens turned on and flashing red lights, the more they served as a magnet for people.

In Los Angeles, since the Watts riot, it has become standard procedure for the police and firemen to move in and out quickly and silently, without the use of sirens, when a potential riot condition exists. [Once numbers of residents have gathered, the assembly takes on the air of a neighborhood meeting. ~~not~~



As descriptions of the police action on the scene are passed from mouth to ~~mouth~~<sup>mouth</sup> they become magnified and distorted.

Other actions of the police in the past which, as ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> result of inadequacy in ~~the~~ police procedure for handling grievances, have never been resolved and have thus been left festering in the minds of the people, are brought up soon the current incident is inextricably interwoven with those of the past.

Information is exchanged regarding the practices of merchants and landlords, and ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> injustices and indignities, both real and fancied, suffered by the people. At this juncture the gathering may be regarded as a massive gripe session, lacking an outlet for the expression of the gripes.

If ~~at this juncture~~<sup>at this juncture</sup> a significant official, such as the mayor, to whom the gripes may be directed, ~~arise~~<sup>arrives</sup> on the scene, violence ~~is~~<sup>may</sup> usually, for the moment, ~~be~~<sup>be</sup> averted. If no such figure arrives, ~~and any~~<sup>but some</sup> kind of ~~indigenous~~<sup>indigenous</sup> leadership emerges from the assembly, a meeting ~~is~~<sup>with municipal authorities</sup> usually sought.

*new P* The most significant exception to this process occurred where the action of rioters leapfrogged, almost completely, the initial stage. in Detroit, The reaction of the police at this ~~point~~<sup>point</sup> is crucial. The reflex reaction is to disperse a crowd, especially if it is an obviously hostile crowd from the fringes of which occasional rocks ~~may be~~<sup>are</sup> thrown. The standard concept of law enforcement is to break up an illegal demonstration or march. There has been a failure to recognize that such tactics are not applicable to ghetto gatherings.

In the traditional demonstration or march, diverse people from diverse areas unite to protest against one specific object or one specific policy. ~~When~~ When such a march is broken up, the physical unity of the group tends to be dissolved ~~and~~<sup>as</sup> as people are scattered they return to the diverse areas and pursuits

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which are their norm.

The dynamics of the <sup>ghetto</sup> gathering are entirely different. Since such gatherings tend to be political meetings of the most primeval, grass-roots nature, to disperse them is to disperse frustrations that have not had an opportunity for release. Since the people are native to the area in which they are gathering, to disperse them is the opposite of useful.

When police in one city shouted to demonstrators: "Go home!"

the retort was: "we are home, you go home."

The folly of ~~such~~ police action <sup>(in breaking up such incipient political meetings)</sup> was most ~~dramatic~~ dramatically demonstrated in Plainfield and Newark, where police directly inhibited the political process, and immediately thereafter ~~witnessed~~ the commencement of widespread violence. In fact, every effort should be made to contain the protest within the bounds of political expression. Although at loggerheads with <sup>her</sup> ~~the~~ police department, the Mayor of New Brunswick, New Jersey, was vindicated, ~~at least for the moment,~~ in her use of political means to solve the crisis. ~~In fact,~~ the key words in the lexicon of riot prevention during the embryonic stage are: "Isolate and contain."

Police must be able to act swiftly enough and in large enough force to seal off the area in which the crowd has gathered and to prevent it, as much as possible, from scattering into business streets where longstanding grievances against commercial practices are likely to be transformed into the physical acts of window-smashing, looting and firebombing.

Simultaneously, since aggressive action by the police ~~is~~ will almost surely aggravate the anger and resentment of ~~the~~ Negro crowds, the police should make every effort to avoid playing the role of <sup>agents</sup> ~~agents~~ provocateur.

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In Los Angeles in 1965, <sup>for example,</sup> the actions of two Highway Patrol officers in <sup>dragging</sup> ~~driving~~ a young girl whom they believed, erroneously, had spit on them, out into the middle of the street, transformed a potentially dangerous situation into a critically explosive one.

~~1.1.1.1~~ <sup>2.</sup> ~~1.1.1.1~~ Out of control: If a crowd is frustrated by: <sup>n</sup> ~~the failure~~ of municipal government to make meaningful response, or <sup>2)</sup> ~~the~~ the actions of the police, ~~we~~ they will almost surely move into the second stage, consisting of ~~a~~ intensified rock-throwing and window-smashing, followed by looting and burning. <sup>This</sup> ~~which~~ is the commencement of the riot proper.

As far as ~~it~~ has been determined, the initial participants in this activity consist almost totally of male teenagers and young adults, <sup>of whom are</sup> few <sup>over</sup> the age of 25. There is some evidence that initial ~~the~~ attacks tend ~~to~~ to be discriminate and made against those stores and businesses whose proprietors <sup>have</sup> ~~are~~ incurred the most resentment of the residents.

~~In Los Angeles, in fact, the first window was broken accidentally and looting began almost by chance. [It is at this juncture that the police~~ <sup>have</sup> ~~had~~ the last opportunity to control the situation. If they are unable, because of a lack of sufficient manpower, either to make ~~a~~ arrests or to cordon off the area, riot activity will, most likely, spread to other <sup>areas</sup> ~~sections~~ of the Negro ghetto. # There is evidence, although at this moment not conclusive, that <sup>in some cities</sup> criminal elements <sup>have begun</sup> ~~begin~~ to take advantage of



the situation to systematically rob stores. The most devastating reaction occurs when police remain visible, but, because of the fewness of their number, amidst a vast mass of rioters, appear to have been rendered impotent.

In Cincinnati, although the disturbance spread, in no case were law enforcement officers outnumbered to the extent that they were not able to react and, as a result, although there were isolated actions in various portions of the city, they were easily controllable.

In Tampa, where police were caught unprepared, they remained out of the area entirely until they were able to move in sufficient force to control the situation. Whereas this resulted in considerable destruction at one locale, and in terms of scope of the area and numbers of the people, cannot be equated with such cities as Detroit and Los Angeles, it did effectively prevent the creation of the psychological image of a police department-force ment that has been overwhelmed.

3.  
~~12~~ Community Involvement Once it becomes apparent that arrests are not being made, ~~more~~ spectators, and bystanders, young and old, begin to join in the looting. As people see neighbors with goods in their hands, walking about freely under the eyes of the police, and some of the stores from which these goods ~~have come~~ going up in flames, there is a rationalization that what is going to burn anyway might as well be made use of. The stigma of theft is removed and the "carnival atmosphere" that numerous witnesses have spoken of, sets in. At this stage of a

riot any hopes of containment must be abandoned, and all force possible marshaled to <sup>S</sup> restore law and order.

It was the swift movement of the riot from Stages 1 to 3 and the failure of the authorities to recognize the fact that contributed to making the Detroit riot the most destructive. As rioters and looters were roaming unmolested up and down 12th Street and spreading out to other sections of the city, counter-riot teams of community workers were still moving through the neighborhood, trying to dampen rumors and asking people to cool it. <sup>This was</sup> Activity appropriate and effective for the first stage of a riot, <sup>not the third. Simultaneously,</sup> and municipal authorities were continuing to proceed with a plan of operations that had been effective in the Kercheval incident the year before, when only a small number of persons within a limited area had been involved.

The fact that the Detroit riot reached, within a time of <sup>two</sup> ~~four~~ to <sup>three</sup> ~~five~~ hours, the stage that it had taken the Los Angeles riot, two years before, 36 hours to arrive at, points up the necessity for municipal authorities to increase the speed and effectiveness <sup>of their</sup> ~~initial~~ ~~for massive~~ response. ~~XXXXXXXX~~

As massive numbers of extra-urban law enforcement personnel -- state police, National Guard and, in Detroit, Federal Troops -- are injected into the chaos of a riot, they have, in the past, themselves, tended to exacerbate the confusion. Young National Guardsmen, many of them unfamiliar with cities or their Negro inhabitants, were plied with rumors of snipers and guerilla warfare and a population in rebellion. <sup>As they were</sup> Injected into darkened, <sup>the most</sup> ~~unfamiliar~~ areas, and ~~lacking adequate communications equipment,~~ <sup>n</sup> inconspicuous actions of the populace began to take on sinister



meanings<sup>for them.</sup> Reflections in a window were interpreted <sup>as</sup> ~~to~~ sniper fire. A man lighting a cigarette was thought to be a fire bomber. The behavior of a drunk driver was interpreted <sup>a</sup> as kamikaze assault.

As police began using gunfire in ~~the~~ <sup>their</sup> attempt to capture looters, and National Guard troops used their weapons for such diverse purposes <sup>as</sup> ~~of~~ shooting out streetlights and ~~summoning-~~ firing at cars that failed to halt at roadblocks, reports of sniper fire spiralled upward in number. Even as looters were cleared from the streets and fires were being controlled, the intensity of the major ~~the~~ riots incongruously heightened. In every case the death toll rose precipitately. In every case the impression was implanted that ~~many~~ numbers of the deaths were due to sniper fire. Although law enforcement officers, who, logically, would be the target of such snipers, escaped virtually unscathed.

45). Breakdown of the Social Order As the atmosphere of fear and chaos continued, some of the safeguards that society has constructed to insure the maintenance of order, and <sup>to</sup> make every person accountable for his actions, began to show signs of cracking. Arrests were made if a person was seen carrying a bag of groceries or had a suitcase of clothes in his car. People ~~were~~ swept up en masse in the streets disappeared for days into detention facilities.

In Newark some police officers, adopting the behavior of rioters whom they had been arresting, engaged in the destruction of property. In Detroit, a police officer without <sup>an excellent</sup> ~~a blot on his~~ record, committed <sup>at least</sup> two criminal acts. In a motel, several officers,

in their determination to interrogate suspects, began playing "a game" and before the game was ended, three persons had been shot to death.

Law enforcement officers <sup>began to</sup> ~~occasionally~~ <sup>Mague</sup> act upon wild tips/ as in the case of the Muslim/shooting in Los Angeles or the sniping reported from the house on ~~East~~ <sup>44</sup> Street in Detroit as if they came from the most reliable of <sup>Sources,</sup> ~~informants~~.

Media of mass communications reported rumors and on-the-spot items without checking on them, and by the very nature of their being broadcast, they tended to assume the authority of fact.

16]. Control As the successful implementation of curfews by large numbers of law enforcement personnel successfully cleared the streets of affected cities, and ~~fix~~ fire discipline was restored to troops and police, the number of incidents reported rapidly diminished. In no case did the withdrawal of troops lead to a resumption of riotous activity.

ANALYSIS

For an America that had become accustomed to the Negro's acceptance, by and large, of the inferior status assigned to him, to his passive non-violent response to active acts of violence perpetrated against him, and to his never-ending reliance on legal redress to force compliance with ~~the~~ national laws that in some sections were being ignored or evaded, the revelation that Negroes would advocate responding to force with force ~~and to the use of power to achieve equality~~ was a startling one.

The demagoguery and braggadocio of Rap Brown's declarations: "We built this country up, and we can burn it down," created among whites a mood of fear and anger and a readiness to believe that organized rebellion was throbbing in the heart of every city. Many young militant Negroes, conversely, had become disenchanted with an evolutionary process that appeared to hold little promise for them in their lifetimes, believing they had nothing to lose, they accepted the philosophy that riot was a legitimate means of protest, and that the looting of white businesses and destruction of white property in the black ghettos was, in fact, not a criminal act, but just retribution for "exploitation."

As the summer of 1967 approached, therefore, a climate had been created in which <sup>much of</sup> white America expected riots, and in which many young Negroes were willing to oblige on the slightest pretext.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Located as they have been, at the bottom of the ladder, Negroes have been the last to benefit from the revolutionary technological and economic changes that have ~~taken place in~~ altered America's social structure in the ~~past~~ 50 years. At a time when 75 percent of America's high school graduates are going on to college, in many ghetto schools 50 percent or more of the pupils are dropping out. Until 1954 the Southern schools the Negro had ~~attended~~ had been forced to operate on a fraction of the budget of the white schools. Teachers with inferior educations, working in inferior facilities, had produced inferior educated pupils. As these pupils ~~have~~ flocked and continue to flock to urban areas in one of the great migrations of history, they have been unable to compete. As their sons and daughters enter big city schools these schools, geared largely to the education of middle class children, began to have difficulty coping with the new arrivals. ~~THEXA~~

The American educational system, a major factor in the growth of American affluence, began to show signs of cracking under the stress. *The average Negro youngster in the 12th grade is performing at a 9th grade level.*

The animosity of many American labor unions towards the Negro, an outgrowth of battles between unions and management in which Negroes were frequently used as strike-breakers, aggravated the ~~black~~ man's problems in job training and employment.



Statistical studies have shown a direct relation between

low employment-low income and family breakups and illegitimacy

irrespective of race or nationality.


In 42

~~Eighty~~ <sup>thirty</sup> percent of Negro families and 23 percent of white families with incomes under \$3,000 ~~and~~ <sup>the man is missing from the household.</sup> Ninety-two percent of Negro families and 96% of white families whose income is \$7,000 or more are intact. \*

Similarly, there is a direct correlation between broken

families and school dropouts. Various studies have indicated that anywhere from 27% to 45% of dropouts come from broken homes. \*\*

Thus, a repeating cycle sets in:



Low Income  
Low Employment

Low Employment  
Family breakup  
Illegitimacy

\* Social + Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States, Oct. 1962.  
~~Research Division~~  
 \*\* School Dropouts. Research Division - National Education Assoc.

Inferior Education




The effect on major cities has been catastrophic.

#### MUNICIPAL VIABILITY

As Negroes moved into the cities to begin occupying the deteriorated and dilapidated housing that other groups, reaching affluence were moving out of. Traditionally cities have been able to absorb ~~such~~ an influx of underskilled and undereducated people, because ~~they~~ <sup>the cities themselves</sup> were still expanding, and because the nation was in an earlier stage of industrial development, in which an amplitude of low-skilled jobs ~~were~~ <sup>were</sup> available.

A generation ago an upwardly mobile family, when it moved, tended to move from one section of the city to another. Today, the move is most often from the city to the suburbs. The most vigorous, revenue-producing portion of the population is, therefore, lost. The ~~vicious~~ cycle in which families of migrants ~~have become~~ <sup>were</sup> entrapped, ~~has thereupon transferred~~ <sup>began to</sup> itself to the cities.



Greater demand for municipal services  
Deterioration of tax base

~~Increase in tax rates~~



~~Acceleration of middle class flight~~



~~Replacement by migrants~~

In this process, such cities as Newark and Detroit have lost their viability. Schools and services deteriorated, Such programs as urban renewal / which have failed to take into account, that, although slums <sup>may</sup> be razed, one <sup>cannot</sup> ~~could not~~ raze the people that inhabit ~~ed~~ them / have frequently created more problems than they solved.

As the complaints of citizens, more and more of whom were black, <sup>increased</sup> ~~mounted~~ proportionately with the city's inability to meet <sup>such complaints</sup> / constructively, anger and frustration mounted on both sides. Since municipal officials <sup>and the</sup> ~~are~~ purveyors of municipal services are mostly white, and the complainants mostly black, the agony of the city <sup>began to</sup> ~~has~~ taken on the antagonisms of race.

THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

As cities are, literally, contracting upon themselves, the black core within them is expanding rapidly. Whether by design, such as a changing from a district to an at-large system of elections, or by accident, this growing concentration of black people has been largely disenfranchised. A check of <sup>that were</sup> 17 Eastern, Southern and Midwestern cities/involvement in disturbances during the summer of 1967, and which have Negro populations ranging from \_\_\_\_\_ percent to 52 percent, revealed them to have a total of 16 Negro councilmen, (the ~~number~~ total number of councilmen in each city ranged from 5 to 30), 16 members of the boards of education, (in school systems that were as much as 76 percent Negro), and, with the notable exception of Detroit, virtually no Negroes in key appointive positions.

Not only, therefore, was the normal evolutionary process of minorities ~~gradually infused into~~ being fused into government, and learning the disciplines and responsibilities thereof, being frustrated, but the ghetto populations had no one on whom they could apply ~~the~~ political pressure, threatening his ~~own~~ defeat in the next election if he failed to be responsive; That in present circumstances municipal officials have been largely unresponsive, has been amply documented by Commission investigators.

In one relatively small city, for example, the mayor, who had been in office more than a decade, averred himself to be "shocked by conditions" when he visited the Negro ghetto. The inability of the Newark government to visualize or adjust to the changing realities was a major contributing factor to the

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By their reaction to violence municipal authorities have in fact, reenforced the impression that the militants are right; that petitions may be ignored, but the use of power cannot. In Los Angeles following the riot it was discovered that with the expenditure of some effort more than 10,000 jobs could be made available to ghetto residents. In Atlanta, grievances that had gone unanswered for months suddenly were responded to with alacrity. In Detroit militants were, for the first time, included in the city's planning. Everywhere the persons who suffered the greatest loss of prestige were the Negroes who had been counseled moderation. Moderation had been responded to with platitudes; militancy with results.



tensions in that city. The problem is aggravated by the fact that not only are the most restless~~x~~ and most militant Negroes primarily young, so that they have had little opportunity to participate in the political process, but many of them have no conception of ~~w~~ how that process works.

(in the belief that this was standard procedure)  
A youth in Plainfield complained that: "The Negroes had only recently learned that the Council had not even forwarded the list of grievances to the Federal Government in WASHINGTON."

Under such circumstances the question, "Where are the Negro leaders?" asked oftentimes during the riots, takes on almost comic connotation. In fact, the middle class Negro whom whites have tended to identify as the Negro leader is, to the Negro masses, no more acceptable <sup>as</sup> a spokesman than the president of General Motors <sup>w</sup>ould be to the United Auto Workers, ~~as their~~

~~representative.~~ [The very gains that the middle-class Negro has made during the past fifteen years has served to alienate the black masses from him.]

(For these masses the civil rights drive appeared to be largely an alliance between liberal whites and the middle class Negro, its achievements benefitting the middle class.

For a man, wondering whether he had enough money to buy the next meal for his family, the question of whether or no he could eat in an expensive white restaurant was academic. Traveling for a few hours on a segregated bus might be tolerable, but living under a white thumb in a decrepit shack was intolerable.

The very achievement of integration has tended to have the opposite of the desired effect. In Los Angeles, <sup>after</sup> ~~the~~ the fire department was integrated, the percentage of Negro firemen declined to a third of what it had previously been. In the Cincinnati ~~Police Department~~ <sup>Police</sup> the number of Negroes on the force slipped to little more than half that prior to integration. Following integration of the New Jersey National Guard, Negroes began to vanish from the ranks



As the middle class Negro gained ground and the nation congratulated itself on his advances, to the lower class Negro the gap appeared to grow wider and wider, and he felt less and less identification.

#### RIOT PROCLIVITY

The more a municipality's viability <sup>has</sup> deteriorated and the larger its Negro population has become, the more likely it may be postulated, it is to experience a riot. Newark ~~experienced a~~ <sup>underwent a</sup> ~~cataclysmic shifting in~~ population, <sup>from</sup> ~~more than 65~~ percent white to 62 percent Negro and Puerto Rican, between 1960 and 1967. ~~And even~~ the most enlightened of administrations could not have coped with <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ situation in which demands had ~~far~~ far outstripped resources.

In Detroit, ~~examining~~ counting the number of whites who left the city and the number of Negroes who replaced them, there was more than a 30 percent shift in population <sup>between 1960 and 1967.</sup> ~~in those seven~~ <sup>under such circumstances police, as the</sup> ~~years.~~ <sup>most visible and authoritarian sign</sup> ~~In such a situation the role of the police becomes~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~EXHIBIT~~ of white power, becomes <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ crucial <sup>factor.</sup> No matter with what good intentions, few, if any, of the major cities appeared to have solved the problem.

Although, beginning in 1961, major efforts were made in Detroit to establish better police-community relations, Commission investigators were told that the process never reached the grass roots level; that practical difficulties prevented the patrolman in the squad car from sitting down across the table <sup>from</sup> ~~with~~ the youth who was likely to throw rocks <sup>for an exchange of</sup> ~~views.~~

In one city where officers were compelled to attend a community relations course, it was referred to by them as "Nigger loving school." In ~~one~~ <sup>another</sup> city that had, presumably, instituted a comprehensive community relations program, the Director of Police told Commission investigators that he did not see "much basis whatsoever to the various complaints of Negro groups as to their social and economic conditions."

~~And~~ a captain called the program "a crock." Another captain declared that there was no doubt in his mind that "many of my men say 'you black fuck'." However, he added that he did not consider that this constituted abusive language because, in the vernacular of the community, the word "mother-fucker" is regarded as "hello."

In another city the Chief of Police ~~stated~~ <sup>told Commission investigators</sup> that "the majority of officers approach the Negro family with the same courtesy as a white family." The Deputy Chief, ~~declared~~ <sup>directly contradicted him, declaring</sup> that you have to use a "double standard" in dealing with Negroes. He explained that: "When you go into their homes, for example, you have to adjust to the situation," that "you cannot use the polite language that you would use in a white middle class home. You have to make a show of force, otherwise you would not be understood," because "politeness is construed as weakness."

Consequently, the police have neither the image nor the support in the Negro community that they do in the white. Because of the high Negro crime rate the law enforcement officer tends to view every black person as a suspect, yet the overwhelming ~~majority~~ <sup>majority</sup> of ~~whom~~ victims of Negro crimes are Negroes -- in one Detroit

precinct, where 78 percent of identified assault offenders were Negroes, 76 percent of the victims were Negroes -- and the complaints of the victims is that the police fail to respond expeditiously, and when they do arrive, are apt to regard the crime not as seriously as a ~~xxx~~ similar offense committed in a white area. As a result the police tend to be looked upon more as a force of occupation than a ~~xxx~~ keeper of law and order.

As greater and greater areas of a city become inhabited by Negroes, precinct stations become bastions, the primary allegiance of whose defenders is not to the citizens, but to each other. Problems of police recruiting become critical, ~~white~~ are reluctant to enter a profession in which the expectation is one of daily stress and antagonism. Negroes are reluctant to enter a profession, the community view of which is negative, and in which Negro officers traditionally have been isolated.

It is the police, therefore, who, as a constant irritant, are most likely to inflame the Negro community.

#### AVAILABILITY OF OPTIONS

The recourse to violence, whether by the action of an individual, the institutionalized process of a nation's engagement in war, or the haphazard eruption into ~~xxx~~ riot by a mob, traditionally tends to come as a last resort, when other options have been ~~xxxxxx~~ exhausted. [For example: For the poverty-stricken individual in a rural area the option remains to move to the city. For the resident of a small city ~~xxxx~~ the option

remains to move to a larger city. For the people living in an area that overtly practices discrimination, the option remains to move to an area which, purportedly, does not. For the inhabitants of a city whose government is unresponsive, the option remains to elect a government that will be more responsive. If, then, ~~if~~ this new government proves unwilling or unable to materially improve the conditions of the people, the availability of nonviolent options has been exhausted.

In the three cities with major riots; Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit, Negroes had voted overwhelmingly for a "liberal administration" which they expected to produce change. When this expectation proved unfulfilled, the probability of a riot became ~~strong~~ great.

In Los Angeles and Newark the explosion came five years after the election; in Detroit, six.

#### RUMORS AND SNIPERS

As a result of the riot climate that had been created, much of the nation's press was ready to seize upon any disturbance and describe it as a "riot." Acts of violence and destruction committed by rioters, ~~amplified~~ amplified in some cities by the massive and inappropriate response of National Guardsmen and law enforcement officers <sup>was</sup> then further exaggerated by reporters and headline writers, until the population of the United States could believe itself, reasonably, to be faced with a state of civil insurrection in which organized guerilla bands were roaming city streets.



Rumors proliferated and sometimes had their origins in the most unexpected places. In Grand Rapids, two carloads of vacationing families were reported to be guerilla reinforcements rushing to the city. In Tampa, a Trailways bus loaded with Negroes was viewed in the same light. In Los Angeles, postal employees, arriving for a convention, were reported to be "hoards of Black Muslims." In Detroit a person with a bow and arrow was reported as a "sniper."

The sheriff of one community in New Jersey related to Commission investigators ~~that he felt that this was a trick~~ "A trick," which, he felt, "helped calm things down some." The Sheriff said that he had gotten hold of one of his people in New York City and asked him to call one of the militant Negroes in \_\_\_\_\_. He said he asked this caller to say that that night there was going to be a showdown between people from New York City and the \_\_\_\_\_ police department, that he was bringing a lot of Negroes with guns over from Harlem, and that they were going to shoot it out with the \_\_\_\_\_ police dept. and it didn't make any difference who or how many people got killed. The Sheriff said that the man who had been called went immediately to the \_\_\_\_\_ police ~~dept~~ department and that he also spread the word that people should keep off the streets that night because there was going to be serious trouble from outsiders. The Sheriff believes that this "trick" had resulted in the quietest night of the whole week. Although the devastating effect of rumors during wartime has been amply documented, there <sup>has been</sup> ~~was~~ a failure to recognize that the spread of rumors could/even more injurious during a period of potential



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civil disturbance. Reporters unfamiliar with and inexperienced in ~~the~~ the coverage of riots often accepted as fact, second and third-hand accounts and expressions of opinion. Any person ~~was~~ injured by gunfire from an unknown source, was "shot by a sniper." Officials played statistical games which ~~turned~~ turned bad situations into seemingly catastrophic ones. Impressive figures on riot injuries were compiled by such devices as listing poison ivy as a "riot-connected" injury.

On city's fire department listed 82 injuries, including such as "fell on hand, injuring right little finger," "Pain in back, fell over and couldn't straighten up," And, "fell off apparatus which moved." Only two of the men were injured by missiles and none by sniper fire, yet the overriding impression created was that many of them had been hurt as a result of direct acts against them by the populace.

A representative sample of ~~the~~ the repertorial distortions:

Tampa, Fla., June 13 (AP) -- Rampaging Negroes burned and looted Tampa's sprawling slums Monday for the second night, battling with about 1,000 heavily-armed police and National Guardsmen."

"Police repeatedly were pinned down by snipers throughout the night and early morning hours. A cruiser reported at 2:00 a.m. it was receiving sniper fire from two sides."

The fact: <sup>in</sup> Tampa on the second night there was only scattered, light action.

Cincinnati, Ohio, June 14 (AP) -- National Guardsmen -- bayonets and machine guns ready -- reinforced police today after, "huge bands of marauders" had scattered racial violence, fire, looting and vandalism in Cincinnati."

The fact: The trouble was confined to <sup>individual</sup> carloads of youths riding about here and there in various sections of the city.

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"Atlanta, June 20 (UPI) -- One man was killed and three persons were wounded tonight in gun battles between Negroes and police ~~as~~ violence broke out for the ~~second~~ night."

The fact: There was no gunfire by Negroes.

The Detroit News on Saturday, July 15, reported from Newark:

"Negro rioters ~~in~~ hit-and-run guerilla-type attacks, spread racial violence to four nearby towns today while snipers shooting ~~from~~ ambush positions fought several gun battles with National Guardsmen and police." ~~There~~ . . . "Negro youths in the riot sector told newsmen that Black Muslims took part in the violence and they mix ~~ed~~ lye with molasses -- and 'when they throw it at ~~the~~ cops, it sticks.'"

The Fact: There were no such hit-and-run guerilla-type attacks; there were no gun battles from ambush; and there was no molasses thrown at the police.

On July 26th the Detroit News reported: "Three unidentified Negro youths were killed in a gunfight behind the Algiers Motel, Woodward and Virginia Park.

"The ~~three~~ bodies were found on the ground floor of the Algiers Manor, a three-story annex to the motel.

"Police and Guardsmen were called to the scene about midnight when sniping began from the Manor.

"Homicide Detective Edward <sup>Hayes</sup> ~~Mc~~ said shots were coming from the ~~roof~~ <sup>roof</sup> and ~~roof~~ windows on all floors.

"Police and Guardsmen were pinned down for several minutes before the firing stopped."

The Fact: There is no evidence that anyone fired out of the motel. Two of the youths were shotgunned down by police, and the death of the third is still being investigated. Murder charges have been filed against one officer.

On July 24th ~~the Detroit newspaper~~, The Detroit News, reported from Englewood, New Jersey:

"Police and Negro shipers exchanged heavy gunfire last night and early today as racial violence hit this New York City suburb for the fourth straight night.

"Snipers set up a three-way crossfire at William and Jay Streets in the heart of the Fourth Ward Negro ghetto, and pinned down 100 policemen, four reporters and a photographer for more than an hour."

The Fact: Kids set off a number of firecrackers. 2

The lead story <sup>in</sup> on the July 27th ~~edition~~ <sup>edition</sup> of the Philadelphia Inquirer read as follows:

4. Detroit, July 27 (Thursday) -- Two National Guard tanks ripped a ~~sniper~~ ~~sniper~~ <sup>(s)</sup> haven with machine guns Wednesday night and flushed out three shaggy-haired white youths. Snipers attacked a guard command post <sup>and</sup> ~~in~~ Detroit's racial riot set ~~the~~ a modern record for bloodshed. The death toll soared to 36, topping the Watts bloodbaths of 1965 in which 35 died and making Detroit's insurrection the most deadly racial riot in modern U. S. history." . . .

"In the attack on the sniper's nest, the Guardsmen <sup>goured</sup> ~~laught~~ hundreds of rounds of .50 caliber machine gun fire <sup>into</sup> ~~in~~ the home, which authorities said housed arms and ammunition used by West Side sniper squads.

"Guardsmen recovered guns and ammunition. A reporter with ~~the~~



the troopers, said the house, ~~a~~ a neat brick home in a neighborhood of \$20,000 to \$50,000 homes, was 'torn apart' by the machine gun and rifle fire.

"Sniper fire crack~~ed~~ed from the home as the Guard unit approached. It was one of the first verified reports of sniping by whites" . . .

"A pile of loot taken from riot-ruined stores was recovered from the sniper(s) haven, located ten blocks from the heart of the 200-square block riot zone.

"Guardsmen said the house had been identified as a storehouse of arms and ammunition for ~~snipers~~ snipers. Its arsenal was regarded as an indication that the ~~sniping~~ sniping -- or at least some of it -- was organized."

~~XX~~ The Fact: Except for the National Guard's attack upon the house, the entire story is a fiction. There was no crackling sniper fire, no pile of loot, and, except for one old .22 caliber rifle, no storehouse of arms and ammunition. ~~The~~ The circumstances surrounding the attack upon the house have been described elsewhere.

The overall effect of day after day of such reports beneath glaring ~~headlines~~ banner headlines: "Guard riddle sniper(s) haven in Detroit," ~~Tanks~~ "Tanks move into Detroit's 'all-out war' after lethal snipers rout Guard, police," "More racial terror," And, "Guerilla War Rips 12th," was devastating.

Apparitions of snipers were everywhere. A Detroit Mnewspaper reporter wrote that: "A rifleman gave ~~me~~ a short course in sniper

[Although, in these cities in which a total of 100 deaths occurred there ~~was~~ to be one verified sniper,\*

\* Three persons are awaiting a trial on sniping charges in Detroit.

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warfare in city streets.

"Watch for houses with one screen off a window on the second floor," he said matter-of-factly. "And keep your eye peeled for second floors where one window has the shade down and the other is open a crack."

"Can you spot them by muzzle blasts when they fire?" I asked. "No, not any more," he said. "They've gotten smart. They open the window a little, move way back in the room and then fire."

"They can snipe away for hours and you can't see them. We were even taking fire from burning buildings last night."

European newspapers began calling American cities "Riot-ville, U.S.A." The Communist Press reveled in <sup>the</sup> violence, and exploited it to the hilt.

#### CONSPIRACY AND ORGANIZATION

The Commission is conducting a continuing and extensive investigation into the question of organization in the riots. To date no evidence of a conspiracy has been found. Empirical tests tend to indicate the unlikelihood of such a conspiracy. Riots did not take place concurrently in major cities so as to create the greatest possible strain on law enforcement agencies. In most communities the issues were local, and in many of them militant Negroes attempted to bring about a solution of the problems by political means.



Conspirators, if they existed, were utterly inept. In Cambridge, Maryland, they scheduled Rap Brown's visit for the same night that the local unit of the National Guard held its ~~regular~~ weekly drill. Nowhere were industrial installations attacked, even though in Los Angeles manufacturing plants -- including one producing Napalm -- worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were left unguarded. In Newark ~~was~~ the Telephone Exchange controlling an entire section of the Eastern Seaboard ~~was~~ left untouched.

From Los Angeles to Plainfield fire chiefs reported that if Molotov cocktails had not been made in the most amateurish fashion ~~where~~ their effect would have been far greater. ~~But~~

On a ~~number~~ number of occasions black militants complained, both to newspaper reporters and Commission investigators, that they had been caught unprepared by the riots and therefore had not been able to exploit them. [The evidence is overwhelming that there were no "outside agitators" in any of the cities.]

In one community an official described a young Negro militant as "an outside agitator," only to discover that he had lived ~~there~~ <sup>in the city</sup> all of his life.

In fact, rioters have concentrated almost exclusively on vandalizing and destroying businesses dealing in consumer goods that were useful, negotiable and could be transported easily. Highly flammable installations, such as gasoline stations, which would be a logical target ~~if~~ <sup>if</sup> massive destruction were the principal intent, have escaped virtually unscathed.

Before the summer of 1967 H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael set the trap. Their intent was to convince Negroes that only by uniting and separating themselves from the white community could they escape the genocide being planned for them. It was their contention that America would never willingly grant equality to

Negroes, but that the response would be one of violence.

Hence, the greater the violence that was reported, the more grist was manufactured for their mill. They interpreted the reports of scores of ~~snipers~~ snipers as evidence that the black man was uniting and had reached the stage of guerilla warfare. The reaction of authorities with massive force, *was, for them,* proof that the campaign of genocide had gone into effect.

Everywhere that Commission investigators went they were told by white and black, high and low, that the riots had polarized the community. Everywhere middle class Negroes began identifying with the rioters, *everywhere the feeling ~~became~~ was becoming* prevalent among Negroes that all other options had been used up, and that now militancy was the only possible recourse.

A Negro businessman in Detroit expressed himself in sympathy with the rioters, even though two of his stores had been sacked.

A Negro police officer in Atlanta said he believed riots were a good thing because they appeared to be the only way to shake whites out of their apathy and call attention to the problem.

## Tape 4 ANALYSES AND ADDENDA

Questioned about his reactions, an arrestee in Detroit who, after being swept up on the streets, spent days in a fetid, improvised jail ~~being~~ subjected to the verbal and physical abuse of officers said: "(Before the riot) I was really a passive person -hard working -trying to reach this goal, trying to get that degree. That's what I wanted. And I wasn't messing with nobody. I didn't break no laws or nothing-- went along ~~with~~ to people. I got too much resentment inside me, or bitterness now to let it ~~happen again~~. (His treatment during the riot) happen again- to let somebody say to me, 'You have to do this.'

" If there was another riot, you know what I think I'd do? I think I'd blow up police stations. I'd go killing this ~~time~~ time. Oh, I'd go killing.... I'd kill. That's what I'd do. Man, I ain't against all white folks, man, but they don't stand by and let that happen. Yeah, that's what I'd do first-- I'd set more bombs and booby traps in the world. Kill them, just like that. I'd do it. Personally I hope there's not another riot. Because this time it's gonna go farther than it was--its going to spread. Its going to cause a lot of destruction--everywhere." [As disillusion has spread among the Negroes, the philosophy of the extremists has gained more credence <sup>partially</sup> as a result of the Black Power Conference in Newark, there is growing communication between Black Power adherence all over the nation. There appears, <sup>concomitantly</sup>, to be a growing unity, <sup>would be</sup> and it <sup>is</sup> ~~appears~~ <sup>may</sup> ~~might~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~were to be~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~repeated~~. A former rail-

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road engineer who has become a leader of the militants in Newark, and, following the riot, visited Czechoslovakia, told commission investigators recently:

" I will make any kind of a commitment even with the devil himself if it means bringing about meaningful change for Black people. For Black people to enter the mainstream of American life, be it Communist, Socialist or whatever, the supposedly democratic process and the American way of life has not proven to me. I add to other Black people that it can deal effectively with the changes necessary to bring about conditions favorable to Black people." [REDACTED] [REDACTED]



## Section 7. NEW BRUNSWICK

Although New Brunswick is approximately equal in population to Plainfield, in ~~many~~ <sup>some</sup> ways the cities are different. A county seat ~~New Brunswick is a~~ <sup>and</sup> center of commerce ~~with a large day time population of commuters. There is a full time mayor and professional city administrator.~~ <sup>New Brunswick has an influx of people during the day</sup> No clearly defined Negro ghetto exists. Puerto Ricans and foreign-born make up, along with Negroes, substantial portions of the population.

All during the weekend, while violence sputtered, flared, subsided, then flared again in Plainfield, less than 10 miles away, there were ~~numerous~~ rumors that "New Brunswick was really going to blow." Dissatisfaction in the Negro community revolved around ~~three~~ <sup>several</sup> issues: The closing of a local teenage coffee house by the police department, the lack of <sup>a swimming pool and other</sup> recreation facilities, and the release of a white couple on \$100 bond after they had been arrested for allegedly shooting at three Negro teenagers.

Again there was a feeling that the law was not being applied equally to whites and Negroes. <sup>By Monday, according to Mayor Patricia Sheehan, the town was "haunted by what had happened in Newark and Plainfield."</sup> ~~entire town was caught in the apprehension of violence.~~ <sup>James B. Amos, the associate director of the anti-poverty program in Middlesex County,</sup> ~~In the late afternoon the city's mayor, Patricia Sheehan,~~ <sup>lamented as a "tense atmosphere in the air" that "got thicker and thicker."</sup> ~~said there was~~



of  
Staff members ~~XXXX~~ the anti-poverty agency met with  
the mayor and city commissioners to discuss what steps might  
be taken to reduce the tension. The mayor, who had been elected  
on a reform platform two months previously, appointed a Negro  
police officer,  
~~XXXXXX~~ Lieutenant John Brokaw, as X community liaison officerX,

~~XX~~  
He was authorized to report directly to the mayor. The department's

entire Negro complement of eight men was put in plain-  
clothes and ~~together with~~ community workers, went into

the streets to fight rumors and act as counter-rioters.

*Unarmed police officers were counseled to act with restraint in order to avoid the possibility of a police action  
setting off violence.*

The radio station decided on its own initiative to play

down rumors *and news of any disturbance.*  
~~for any disturbances.~~

The anti-poverty agency set up a taskXforce of workers  
to go into all of the communities, ~~XX~~ white, Puerto Rican, and  
Negro, to report ~~XXXX~~ information and to try to cool the situa-  
tion.

The Chief of Police met with X the chiefs of surrounding  
communities to discuss cooperation in case ~~of a disturbance~~  
*a disorder broke out.*

The streets remained quiet until past ~~XXXXXX~~ 9:00 p.m.  
Then scattered reports of windows being broken began to be  
received by police. ~~NXXX~~ At 10:30 p.m. Amos noticed a hundred  
youngsters, marching in a column of twos down the street, ~~approach~~  
~~that~~ A tall Negro minister stepped from the office of the anti-  
poverty agency and placed himself in the street in order to head  
~~off the marchers~~ *them off.*

"Brothers!X Stop! Let me talk to you!# he called out.

The marchers brushed past him. A small boy, about 13 years  
old, looked up at the minister:

"Black power, baby!" he ~~XX~~ said.



The New Brunswick police were ~~XXXXXX~~ reinforced by 100 officers from surrounding ~~XXXX~~ communities. Roadblocks were set up on all principal throughfares into the city.

~~XX~~ Wild rumors swept the city: reports of armed Negro and white gangs; shootings, fires, beatings, and deaths.

In fact, what was occurring was more in the nature of random vandalism. The damage, caused mostly by teenagers, was ~~XX~~ relatively minor. According to Mayor Sheehan, it was "like ~~XX~~ Halloween -- a gigantic night of mischief."

Tuesday morning the mayor imposed a curfew, ~~further consolidated her direct control over the police depart-~~

~~ment~~, and made a tape recording, played periodically over the city's radio station, appealing for order. ~~Host~~ of the persons who had been picked up the previous night were released on their own recognizance or on low bail.

The anti-poverty agency, whose summer program had ~~XXXX~~ not been funded until a few days previously, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ began hiring youngsters as recreational aides. So many teenagers applied for the jobs that it was decided to cut the stipend ~~XX~~ to each in half and hire twice as many as planned.

When the youngsters indicated a desire to see the mayor, she and ~~XXX~~ the city commissioners agreed to meet with them. Although initially hostile, the 35 teenagers who made up the group ~~XXXXXX~~

*occurred*  
project in the ghetto was only narrowly averted that evening. ~~The police wanted to break up the crowd.~~ The

crowd was angry at the massive show of force by the police. *"If you don't get the eggs out of here," one man warned, "we are all going to get our guns."* Asked to return to their homes, people replied:

"We will go home when you get the police out of the area."

Requested by several city commissioners to pull *back* the police, ~~back~~, the Chief *at first* refused. He was then given a direct order to pull back by the mayor.

According to the Chief, he had "been a police officer for 24 years and had never felt so bad."

*A short time*  
~~later~~ later, elements of the same crowd, which *and rougher* was an older one than the night before and contained persons ranging from the late teens to the ~~early~~ thirties, *appeared* ~~gathered~~ in front of the police station. *They wanted to see* ~~Again, police~~ *the mayor.* ~~wanted to disperse the people by force.~~

*Mayor Shukan went out onto the steps of the station, using a* ~~Again the mayor prevailed. She went out into the~~ *bullhorn, she* ~~street,~~ talked to the people and asked that she be given ~~a chance to correct conditions. Over the objections of~~ ~~the Chief, she agreed to let representatives of the people~~ ~~inspect the jail cells to satisfy themselves that everyone~~



an opportunity to ~~KKK~~ correct conditions. The crowd ~~was~~ was boisterous. Some persons challenged the mayor. But, finally, the opinion, "She's new! Give her a chance!" ~~prevailed~~ prevailed.

A demand was issued by people in the crowd that all ~~KKK~~ persons arrested ~~KKK~~ the previous night be released. <sup>Told that this already had been done,</sup> The people were suspicious. They asked to be allowed to inspect the jail cells.

Over the objections of the chief, the mayor <sup>permitted</sup> ~~agreed to let~~ representatives of the people look in the cells to satisfy themselves that everyone had been released.

The crowd dispersed. The New Brunswick X riot had failed to materialize.

~~In the late afternoon the mayor and city commissioners~~  
~~met with 35 angry and initially hostile teenagers who~~  
"poured out their souls to the mayor." As a result, the  
mayor, the city commissioners and the Negro youths drew up  
a statement attacking segregation, discrimination, inferior  
educational and employment opportunities, police harassment,  
and poor housing. Four of the young people began broad-  
casting over the radio station, urging their "soul brothers  
and sisters" to "cool it, because you will only get hurt  
and the mayor has talked with us and is going to do some-  
thing for us." Other youths circulated through the streets  
with the same message.

Despite these measures, <sup>a</sup>confrontation between the  
police and a crowd that gathered near a public housing



## Section 6 -- Plainfield

New Jersey's worst violence outside of Newark was experienced by Plainfield, a pleasant, tree-shaded city of 45,000. A "bedroom community," more than one-third of whose residents work outside the city, Plainfield had had few Negroes until the 1950's. By 1967 the Negro population had risen to an estimated 30 percent of the total. As in Englewood, there was a ~~sharp~~ division between the Negro middle class, which lived in the Eastside "gilded ghetto," and the unskilled, unemployed and underemployed poor on the Westside.

The mayor and city council operate on a part-time basis. There is no full-time administration or city manager. Boards appointed by the mayor are charged with responsibility for specific areas such as education, welfare, and health.

The part-time and fragmented city government has failed to realize the change in character which the city has undergone.

Geared toward meeting the needs of the suburban middle class, it was unprepared to cope with the problems

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Geared toward meeting the needs of a suburban middle class, the part-time and fragmented city government had failed to realize the change in character which the city had undergone, and was unprepared to cope with the problems of a growing under-skilled and under-educated population. There was no full-time administrator or city manager. Boards appointed by the mayor -- whose position was largely honorary, and ~~part-time~~ part-time -- with jurisdiction over such areas as education, welfare, health, ~~XX~~ etc., operated independently.



~~of a growing under-skilled and under-educated population~~  
~~it hardly knew existed.~~ Accustomed to viewing politics  
as a gentleman's pastime, <sup>city officials were</sup> ~~it was~~ startled and upset by  
the heat and intensity with which demands issued.

(Inser A) - P. 2

no 9  
□ The bus operated only on three days in mid-week -- on  
weekends the county pool was too crowded to accommodate children  
from the Plainfield ghetto.

Pressure increased upon the school system to adapt itself  
to the changing social and ethnic backgrounds of its pupils.  
There were strikes and boycotts. The track system/<sup>created</sup> de facto  
segregation within a supposedly integrated school system: most  
of the youngsters from white middle class districts were in the  
higher track, most ~~XXXX~~ from the Negro poverty areas in the  
lower. Strained relations between Negro pupils and some white  
teachers resulted in a charged racial atmosphere. Two-thirds  
of school dropouts, it was estimated, were Negro.

or frustration with the municipal government, tacked a  
list of 19 demands and complaints to the door of the city  
hall. Most dealt with discrimination in housing, employ-  
ment and in the public schools. By the summer of 1967  
the city's Common Council had not responded. Although two

of the 11 Council members were Negro, both represented the Eastside ghetto. The poverty area was represented by two white women, one of whom had been appointed by the Council after the elected representative, a Negro, had been transferred by his company and had moved out of the city.

*(Relations between the police and the Negro community, known at least, had been strained)*  
The week prior to the Newark outbreak, ~~trouble had~~

~~broken out~~ in Plainfield during the course of a routine arrest *(a woman)* in one of the housing projects. After ~~she had been~~ handcuffed, ~~the woman had~~ *had* fallen down a

flight of stairs. The officer said she had slipped.

Negro residents claimed he had pushed her. When a delegation went to city hall to file a complaint, they were told by the city clerk that he was not empowered to accept it. Believing that they were being given the run-around, the delegation, angry and frustrated, departed.

On Friday evening, July 14, the same police officer ~~involved in the arrest~~ was moonlighting as a private guard at a diner frequented by Negro youths. He was, reportedly, number two on the Negro community's "ten most-wanted" list of ~~the most~~ unpopular police officers. The list itself was colorblind. Although out of 82 officers on the force only 5 were Negro, 2 of the 10 on the "most wanted" list *were* Negro. The two officers most generally



respected in the Negro community were white.

Although most of the youths at the diner were of high school age, ~~there was a~~ <sup>one</sup> in his mid-twenties ~~who~~ had a reputation as a bully. Sometime before 10:00 p.m., as a result of an argument, he hit a 16-year old boy and split open his face. As the boy lay bleeding on the asphalt, his friends rushed to the police officer and demanded that he call an ambulance and arrest the offender. Instead, the officer walked over to the boy, looked at him, and reportedly said: "Why don't you just go home and wash up?" He refused to arrest anyone.

~~Although a police car ultimately arrived to take the boy to the hospital,~~ The youngsters at the diner were incensed. They believed that, had the two participants in the incident been white, the older youth would have been arrested, the younger taken to the hospital immediately.

In order to go from the diner to the housing project in which most of them lived, the youths had to traverse four blocks of the city's business district. As they

walked, they smashed 3 or 4 windows <sup>An observer interpreted this as a</sup> ~~while yelling~~ <sup>then behavior as a reaction to the incident at the diner, in effect</sup> a challenge to the police: "If ~~you~~ <sup>Officers</sup> won't do anything about that, then let's see ~~you~~ <sup>you</sup> do something about this!"



On one of the quiet <sup>city</sup>~~suburban~~ streets, two young Negroes, D.H. and L.C. had been neighbors. D.H. had graduated from high school, attended Fairleigh Dickinson University and, after receiving a degree in psychology, had obtained a job as a reporter on the Plainfield Courier-News.

L.C. had dropped out of high school, become a worker in a chemical plant, and, although still in his 20's, had married and fathered seven children. A man with a strong sense of family, he liked sports and played in the local baseball league. Active in civil rights, he had, like the civil rights organizations, over the years, become more militant. For a period of time he had been a Muslim.

Shortly after midnight, in an attempt to cap the eruption, D.H. and the two Negro councilmen met with the youths in the housing project. Although the focal point of the youths' bitterness was the attitude of the police--until 1966 police had used the word "nigger" over the police radio and one officer had worn a Confederate belt buckle and had flown a Confederate pennant on his car -- their complaints ranged far and wide over local and national issues. There was an overriding cynicism and disbelief that government would, of its own accord, make meaningful

*Insert 6*

There was little confidence that the two councilmen could exercise any influence. One youth said: "You came down here last year. We were throwing stones at some passing card and you said to us that this was not the way to do it. You got us to talk with the man. We talked with him. We talked with him, and we talked all year long. We ain't got nothing yet!"

~~influence.~~ However, on the promise that meetings would be arranged that same day, Saturday, with the editor of the newspaper and with the mayor, the youths agreed to disperse.

At the first of these meetings the youths were, apparently, satisfied by the explanation that the newspaper's coverage was not deliberately discriminatory. The second meeting with the mayor, however, which began at 7:00 o'clock that evening, proceeded badly. The Negroes present felt that the mayor was complacent and apathetic, and that they were simply being given the usual lip service, from which nothing would develop.

The mayor, on the other hand, told Commission investigators that he recognized that "Citizens are frustrated by the political organization of the city," because he,

himself, has no real power and "each of the councilmen says that he is just one of the eleven and therefore can't do anything."

After approximately two hours, a dozen of the youths walked out, indicating an impasse and signalling the breakup of the meeting. Shortly thereafter window smashing began. *A Molotov cocktail was set afire in the crotch of a tree.* ~~A tree was set afire by a Molotov cocktail.~~ One fire engine, in which a white and Negro fireman were sitting side by side, had a Molotov cocktail thrown at it, the white fireman was burned.

*As window smashing continued,* ~~selectivity was apparent as to which store windows were smashed, at least in the beginning.~~ Liquor stores and taverns, especially, were ~~singled out.~~ *hand hit.* Some of the youths believed that there was an excess concentration of bars in the Negro section, and that these were an unhealthy influence in the community.

Because the police department had mobilized its full force, the situation, although serious, never appeared to get out of hand. Officers made numerous arrests. The chief of the fire department told Commission investigators that it was his conclusion that "individuals making fire-bombs did not know what they were doing, or they could have burned the city."

At 3:00 o'clock Sunday morning a heavy rain began to fall, scattering whatever groups remained on the streets.

In the morning police made no effort to cordon off the area. As white sightseers and churchgoers drove by the housing project there were sporadic incidents of rock-throwing and violence. During the early afternoon these increased.

~~B.D. together with two officials of the city's~~  
*At the housing project, a meeting was convened by L.C.*  
~~Human Relations Commission, decided to call another meeting~~

~~and then~~ to draw up a formal petition of grievances. As the youths gathered it became apparent that some of them had been drinking. A few kept drifting away from the parking lot where the meeting was being held to throw rocks at passing cars. It was decided to move everyone at the meeting to Greenbrook Park, a county park several blocks away.

Between 150 and 200 persons, including almost all of the rockthrowers, piled into a caravan of cars and headed for the park. At approximately 3:30 p.m. the Chief of the Union County Park Police arrived to find the group being addressed by David Sullivan, Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission. He "informed Mr. Sullivan he was in violation of our park ordinance and to disperse the group." Sullivan and L.C. attempted to explain that



they were in the process of drawing up a list of grievances, but the Chief remained adamant. They could not meet in the park without a permit, and they did not have a permit.

After permitting the group 10 to 15 minutes grace, the Chief decided to disperse them. "Their mood was very excitable," he reported, and "in my estimation no one could appease them so we moved them out without too much trouble. They left in a caravan of about 40 cars, horns blowing and yelling, and headed south on West End Avenue to Plainfield."

Within the hour looting became widespread. Cars were overturned, a white man was snatched off a motorcycle, and the fire department stopped responding to alarms because the police were unable to provide protection. After having been on alert until midday, the Plainfield Police Department was caught unprepared. At 6:00 p.m. only 18 men were on duty. Checkpoints were established at crucial intersections in an effort to isolate the area.

At one of the intersections, three blocks from the housing project, Officer John Gleason, together with two reserve officers, had been posted. Gleason was a veteran



officer, the son of a former lieutenant on the police department. Shortly after 8:00 p.m. two white youths, ~~who were being~~ chased by a 22-year old Negro, Bobby Williams, came running from the direction of the ghetto toward Gleason's post.

As he came in sight of the police officers, Williams stopped. Accounts of what occurred next, or why Officer Gleason took the action he did, vary. What is known is that when D.H., the newspaper reporter caught sight of him a minute or two later, Officer Gleason was two blocks from his post. Striding after Williams directly into the ghetto area, Gleason already had passed one housing project. People in small groups were milling about. In D.H.'s words: "There was a kind of shock and amazement," to see the officer walking by himself so deep in the ghetto.

Suddenly there was a confrontation between Williams and Gleason. Some witnesses report Williams had a hammer in his hand. Others say he did not. When D.H., whose attention momentarily had been distracted, next saw Gleason he had drawn his gun and was firing at Williams. As Williams fell to the ground, critically injured, Gleason turned and began running back toward his post.

Negro youths chased him. Gleason stumbled, regained his balance, then had his feet knocked out from under him. A score of youths began to beat him and kick him. Some of the residents in the apartment house attempted to intervene, but they were brushed aside. D.H. believes that, under the circumstances and in the atmosphere that prevailed at that moment, any police officer, black or white, would have been killed.

After they had beaten Gleason to death, the youths took D.H.'s camera from him and smashed it.

Fear swept over the ghetto. Many residents -- both lawless and law-abiding -- were convinced, on the basis of what had occurred in Newark, that law enforcement officers would come into the ghetto shooting, bent on vengeance. *People began actively to prepare to defend themselves.* There was no lack of weapons. *Forty-six carbines that had been stolen from a nearby arms manufacturing and plant were passed out in the street by a young Negro, a former newspaper boy. Most of the weapons fell into the hands of youths, who began firing them wildly. A fire station began to be peppered with shots. One man sent his family out of the city and barricaded himself behind his door with a shotgun.*

Law enforcement officers continued their cordon about the area, but made no attempt to enter it except, occasionally to rescue someone. National Guardsmen arrived shortly

after midnight. Their armored personnel carriers were used to carry troops to <sup>the</sup> fire station <sup>which had been besieged for</sup> at ~~which potshots~~ *five hours. During this period only one fire was reported in the city.* ~~were being taken.~~ Reports of sniper firing, wild shooting, and general chaos continued until the early morning hours.

By daylight Monday, New Jersey state officials had begun to arrive in the city. At a meeting in the early afternoon it was agreed that to inject police into the ghetto would be to risk bloodshed; that, instead, law enforcement personnel should continue to retain their cordon, ~~while residents patrolled the area themselves.~~

All during the day various meetings took place between government officials and Negro representatives. Police were anxious to recover the carbines that had been stolen from the arms plant. Negroes wanted assurances against retaliation. *In the afternoon, L.C., an official of the Human Relations Commission, ~~and~~ and others drove through the area urging people to be calm and to refrain from violence.*

*the New Jersey Attorney General, Human Relations Director, and Commander of the State Police, accompanied by* At 8:00 ~~o'clock~~ p.m. ~~the mayor, accompanied by two~~ ~~several~~ State officials, *the mayor,* went to the housing project and spoke to several hundred Negroes. Some members of the crowd were hostile. Others were anxious to establish a dialogue. There were demands that officials give concrete evidence that they were prepared to deal with Negro grievances. Again, the meeting was inconclusive. The officials returned to city hall.



At 9:15 p.m., L.C. rushed in claiming that, as a result of the failure to resolve any of the outstanding *and reports that people who had been arrested by the police were being beaten,* problems, violence was about to explode anew. The key

demand of the militant faction was that those who had been arrested during the riot should be released. State officials decided to arrange for the release on bail of 12 arrestees charged with minor violations. Reciprocally, L.C. agreed to try to induce return of the stolen carbines by noon on Wednesday.

As state officials were scanning the list of arrestees to determine which of them should be released, a message was brought to Colonel Kelly of the State Police that general firing had broken out around the perimeter.

An investigation disclosed that one shot of unexplained origin had been heard. In response, security forces had shot out street lights, thus initiating the "general firing." *Tension was so great and hostility between many law enforcement officers and Negro residents so overt that there was fear that a small spark might set off a racial clash.*

At 4:00 o'clock Tuesday morning, a dozen prisoners were released from jail. Plainfield police officers considered this a "sellout."

When, by noon on Wednesday, the stolen carbines had not been returned, the Governor decided to authorize a

mass search of the area. At 2:00 ~~4:00~~ p.m. a convoy of State Police and National Guard troops prepared to enter the area. In order to direct the search as to likely locations, a handful to Plainfield police officers were spotted throughout the 28 vehicles of the convoy.

As the convoy prepared to depart, the State Community Relations Director ~~ordered the removal of the police~~

~~officers~~, <sup>believing himself to be</sup> on the basis ~~that~~ <sup>he</sup> was carrying out the decision of the Governor not to permit Plainfield officers to participate in the search, <sup>(ordered their removal from the vehicles on the basis Community Relations Director</sup> ~~their participation~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~might~~ lead to a clash between them and the Negro citizens.

As the search for carbines in the community progressed, tensions increased rapidly. According to witnesses and newspaper reports, some men in the search force left apartments <sup>they went through</sup> in shambles ~~and destroyed the occupants' property.~~

An hour and a half after it was begun, the search was called off. <sup>No stolen weapons were discovered in the apartments.</sup> ~~No weapons had been discovered.~~

<sup>For the Plainfield police, the removal of the officers from the convoy</sup> ~~Plainfield police officers felt humiliated by the~~ <sup>had been a humiliating experience.</sup> ~~removal from the convoy.~~

A half hour after the conclusion of the search, in a meeting charged with emotion, the entire Department threatened to resign unless the State Community Relations Director left the city. <sup>He bowed to their demands.</sup>

On Friday, exactly a week after the first outbreak, the city started returning to normal.