

PLAINFIELD

A INSERT
ADD A
ADD ON P. 71

*Source
Interview with
Attorney General
and Commissioner
Vluisaker*

At approximately 6:00 p.m. ~~on~~ Saturday night the Mayor and Police Chief of Plainfield telephoned ~~Governor~~ *Gov. Gaerem* ~~in the Newark Armory~~ to request assistance in dealing with ~~the disturbed~~ *a disturbance* situation. As a result, ~~state~~ *state* police officers were sent into the city that night.

At about dawn on Sunday, the state's Commissioner of Community Affairs received a ~~xx~~ phone call from a member of the Governor's ~~xxxx~~ staff requesting him or a member of his staff to travel to Plainfield immediately in order to provide the same type of services which they had ~~provided~~ provided in Newark -- i.e., contact with the Negro community. The Commissioner immediately made arrangements for three members of his ~~xxxxxxx~~ staff to go to Plainfield to ~~evaluate~~ evaluate the situation.

~~On Monday afternoon~~ *1:00* Between 4:00 ~~am~~ and 6:00 p.m., the ~~Attorney~~ *Attorney* General of the State, the Commissioner of Community Affairs, and the ~~State~~ Superintendent of the ~~State~~ State Police arrived in ~~Plainfield~~ Plainfield. A meeting was arranged at city hall for ~~xxxx~~ 7:30 p.m. between the state and city officials ~~and~~ and members of the Negro community.

The prime topic of discussion of the city hall meeting over which the Community Affairs Commissioner presided was a tightening of the perimeter around the Negro ghetto so that no outside vehicles or police cars would be permitted to enter. During the course of the meeting several Negro leaders said that it was the understanding of the Negro groups that the state ~~and~~ and city officials were to return the visit ~~xxxxx~~

of the Negro leaders by themselves coming ~~ix~~ into the ~~h~~ ghetto to speak to the people. The meeting therefore adjourned so that the officials could go into the ghetto ~~whitxxxx~~ while it was still light.

After proceeding through the checkpoint and into the cordoned off area, the Commissioner addressed the crowd with a bullhorn from a ~~xxx~~ truck. In the meantime, the Attorney General accompanied by the State Police ~~Superintendent~~ Superintendent left ^{his} ~~their~~ car and advanced to the truck from which the ~~address~~ address was being made. In his talk to the crowd, the Commissioner spoke for about 10-15 minutes summarizing the city hall conference and declaring that while the state officials were unable to make any specific promises ~~that~~ they would ~~not~~ certainly ~~listen~~ listen to the grievances of the Negro community and attempt to solve some of the problems. He then announced the ~~agreement~~ agreement which had been reached as to the perimeter and patrol cars in the cordoned off area, and gave the bullhorn to the Mayor of Plainfield. However the Mayor was greeted with cat calls from the crowd and so the Commissioner took back the bullhorn and told the crowd that the Attorney General ~~was~~ General who was there would try to facilitate bail procedures for those arrested in connection with the ~~ix~~ disturbances.

During the time in which the Commissioner had been ~~speaking~~ speaking, the Attorney General ~~had~~ General had moved over to the porch of a house in the area from which he was unable to hear the

proceedings on the truck. However when he observed that the speakers had ~~em~~ completed, he got back into his car and started moving away. At this point a crowd surged around his car completely ~~xxxx~~ blocking it. The Attorney General then got out of the car ~~and~~ to speak to the crowd. He told them that the perimeter would be ~~xxxx~~ strictly enforced and that ~~xxxxxxx~~ he had just arrived in the city and was unaware of the charges against those arrested. However he also stated that he would call the Public Defender of the state ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in order ~~wouldxxxxxxx~~ to facilitate the release of some of the prisoners on bail. At this point, ~~the attention of~~ the crowd, ~~xxxx~~ which was both rude and unruly, was diverted and the Attorney General got back into his car which inched its way out of the ~~the~~ ghetto.

Upon arrival at City Hall, the state and city officials attempted to devise a ~~xxx~~ statement ~~a spec~~ for the press. At this point one of the leaders of the Plainfield Negro community came into the room ~~xxxx~~ in which they were meeting and indicated the importance of getting people out on bail. Through a series of phone calls to various state executive and ~~judicial~~ judicial officials, a plan was devised whereby 12 persons charged with disorderly conduct, which is regarded as an offense and not a crime, were released on bail.

During the next day a "selective search" for the ~~xx~~ 46

~~causes~~ carbines wa~~d~~ conducted in ~~a~~ Plainfield. According to ~~some~~ *an official*
~~observers~~ the entire community, both Negro and white,
~~was~~ ~~an~~ "edgy" because of the weapons which were
still floating ~~in~~ through the community. ~~According to one~~ *This* official *said*
~~that~~, "Following the ~~the~~ search, it was as
if a bottle of champagne had been opened, popped and then
gone flat. The tensions were removed and the ~~people~~ people
of the community felt that law and order had been restored."

MEMORANDUM

To: Victor Palmieri
Stephen Kurzman
Robert Conot

From: Charles Nelson

Subject: Review of Conot's History, Profiles & Analysis

Attached are annotated copies
of all parts of the Conot draft except
Atlanta
Tampa
Plainfield
Riot Profile

We will send the others very soon.

Code: In general comments are
written in margins or attached
notes. The following symbols will
used:

X = No basis for supporting
the statement one way or the other

? = Doubt validity of content


Editorial Change = Disagree with content


~~S~~ (On Detroit an X with
red underlining means Bernie D
could not confirm source)

Statistics: We have ~~the~~ double-checked ~~the~~ numbers only where they seemed wrong on first reading.


Superlatives: We like the paper, but I feel it does use ~~too~~ an excess of superlatives that will make it vulnerable to charges of exaggeration. (city was "awash"; people "scream"; streets are "flooded" etc.)

Format: ~~The~~ The style intersperses chronology with Background. Suggest two different margins and 2 type styles to set these apart. For example

Chronology 

Background 


} in Italian

~~Chronology~~ 

TAMPA --

R.C. dates

Card Jim Hillis
NAACP (Luther P. Ford)
Shipyard Band



Cincinnati --

Prof. Matthews (?)

Atlanta --

Maya Allen

Newark -

Mr. Gen. Conwell -
Catholic Priest

Col. David Kelly -
Addazio (?)
Boone -
Spin -
Melhorn -
Cuwi
Loftin -
Treat -
Morris -

1. Vocals & icon deprivation
2. Political non-responses
3. Rot & Proclivity
- politic
4. Opt. as
5. Remorse & Curious
6. - midday
7. Corrupt & org.
- motions of notes

1. Categories

2 - Dim. Obsc.

- corrupt.

- optation

3 - Pol. as

4 - Central factor

5 - Nat. Gen.

6 - Vocals & Pol. + C. B.

Youth - pol.

Delect issues

Quatern - migrant

moderate v. consensus. etc.

7 - Participants

- behavior patterns

- as N. J. ?

- Over types (Dread Rep. etc)

- Writings & Grand Rep. etc - Key

time data

- fed emp. by etc

Middle class

- poverty hypothesis -
Middle class

- migrations

- family & tentat

- youth

- Conf

Analysis =

1. - What have we learned

2. - What we really don't know

limited to

1. Shittose + dysfunction

2. Violence of prop. except by police

3. All cases involved resentment against police led to incidents

4. Young people + older + richer get in later

5. alienated participants

6. stereotypes -



entry to
the country

program
implications

Discontents (LAO Detent)

- police
- police
- Racial attitudes
 - anti-white
 - black consciousness
 - materialism & conspiracy

Rioters needs of 1966 -

Post-riot conditions -

Psychol. Conseq. for Negroes

Post-riot in selected cities

1) What are the underlying conditions.

POLICE

2) Group Reaction



3) - Riots

1. Central problem of polit. systems is anticip.,
a response to disruption of the system.
Rel. between what's going on as a whole -
What's going on as a whole - what's structural
features imped. integration (transformation
of 1.) - conditions of Nigeria so that
difficulties become inconsequential)

2. Systemic capabilities to manage phenomenal
which produce violence

A. Amer politics historically has been
characterized by social hierarchy (historical view)

B. Questions

1 - Cultural looks to social hierarchy

2 - Structural con. features ^{obstacles} to integration

3 - Admin capab. of govt. const. to implement
integ & equalization policies

4 - Extent to which public policies have been
largely symbolic

5 - Values Niger as a political system

a - what is analytically to be expected
of leadership of a group in Niger
position

C. Form of civil conflict

1 - natural geography

2 - compatibility with interstate politics

II Politics & management of actual violence

1. Studies on organizational culture (policy
guards)

2. other org. pertinent to control of civil violence

3. Capabilities of existing force units

4. actual functioning of systems under crisis

a - what happened i.e. natural history

b - org. decision-making under crisis
(commun. - entree)

Stan Vander

1. The conditions deplorable in contrast to other areas of American Society
2. Fed. agencies are harmful to Am. Negroes
3. Waste for info's attitude - confusion between cause & cure!
4. Welfare system undermining family stability
5. If everything quiet, its all OK - but establishment misdeeds of success. Lack of absorption is sign of total lack of energy rather than activity of govt
6. Youth a tremendous vulnerability to criminal lures -
7. Guaranteed annual income the only answer to family stability - the handout would degrade the morals of middle class, not Negroes.

R. Clark -
 You'd never know
 when the black man
 wants to live with
 the law the right to
 to live appears

Father Dupp:

1. Will be studying the wrong people - Black community problem is effect of the white man's problems. (black class citizen chat.)
2. Police - attitude of hate and contempt toward blacks.
3. Intolerable living conditions the cause -
4. ^{help} Children from Milwaukee con. schools being segregated in schools to which they are being leased.
5. Anger is good! it must be

Black Power is
 redemptive force
 in white community
 by creating respect -
 this power

Chaos exists all
 the time! on the
 ghetto!

channeled to constructive social action.

5. Urban dev. depriving 1000 Black families with no place to go!

6. Stop fed funds to cities and companies promoting b.g. migration

With Fed. money!

Ernie Chambers

1. Amer. history celebrates revolution
but Negro revolution is damned

2. Dodd - Powell case

3. Rate bill & Nat Guard appropriations

4. Little Black Garbo to white way
of putting Negro down

Marx Twain - Nigger Jim

O'Neill - Empress Jones & black niggers

- Old Black Joe

5. Bastardy in Omaha behind - difference
in physical facilities!

6. Discrimination on housing -

7. No services in ghetto -

Homer Elyard
Tyrone Power
Human Race

Peter Thomas

1. We don't ^{reasonably} want to live with the
white man - we just want to
live like him

2.

All categorized By Cities

1. Processed Interviews
Only those Conot has underlined

2. General Interviews (2 drawers)
Team interviews... either duplications of processed interviews or Conot has not underlined

3. Newspaper Clippings

4. Investigations
Conot's + his staff's investigations
file by subject or, if multiple subjects, by interviewer

Depositions
{ Cities' }
5. { Back ground (2 drawers)
OEO's, Statistics, ~~Any~~ Reports
on city, Comm. trips

6. Commission
Reports

7. Transcripts
of Commission



W 382-6335

FRANKS



pg 4 ① confrontation

pg 8 15 add ... they before assumed

pg 13 4 redundant: none.... all-white

pg 18 22 insert i after City Council

pg 21 7 change job to mob

pg 26 12 delete yet....

pg 28 5 change councilmen to aldermen

6 change councilmen to aldermen

pg 38 Smith has several violations also

pg 34 Spina there? **Yes**

pg 40 carloads of police officers?

pg 41 23 change ow to car

pg 58 6 delete a at end of line

pg 59 2 gangline should be gangling

~~pg~~ 23 picturings should be pilgrimage

pg 60 10 won's should be won't

23a

pg 70 14 deaptes should be deeper
15 glups should be groups

pg 71 15 prepart should be prepare

pg 73 12 Blainfield police ? was such
14 cavid should be David
18 rensions should be tensions

pg 78 21 givorously should be vigorously

80 1 add while before... He Black Power
20-21 Sunday morning ? (it's still Sat nite)

pg 100 6 rapisly should be rapidly
8 younder should be younger
10 unemp-oyment should be unemployment

pg 102 23 white should be while

pg 106 9 meaningful what?

pg 107 22 tage should be stage

pg 108 24 delete ==

pg 131 8 went along to people should be ... with people

visa age to 25

Police aids -

(white hats)

Jangl

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ~~Victor Palmieri~~

DATE: November 16, 1967

FROM : *T* Howard Margolis *AM*

SUBJECT:

I have been in touch with the OEO people. They have indeed sponsored a study looking for correlations between city statistics and incidents of riots. They expect the report in from their contractor within the next two weeks.

They are properly cautious about drawing any firm conclusions from this work because of weaknesses in data. So I don't expect us to gain anything terribly important from it. I do think we should keep an eye on it, and I will do so.

*Don't very interested
in this & hope
you will help it.
? H*



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

X

NEW BRUNSWICK

All during the weekend that violence sputtered, flared, subsided, then flared again in Plainfield, in New Brunswick, less than 10 miles away, there were numerous rumors that "New Brunswick was really going to blow."

(In addition to the lack of recreational facilities)

the lack of recreational facilities

Dissatisfaction in the Negro community revolved around issues: The closing of a local teenage coffee house by the police department, and the release of a white couple on \$100 bond after they had been arrested for allegedly shooting at three Negro teenagers.

Again there was a feeling the law was not being applied equally to whites and Negroes. By Monday tension was reported, "so thick that you could eat it with a fork." In the late afternoon the city's woman mayor, Patricia Sheehan, who had *been elected on a reform platform and had been* only been in office two months, took steps to assume direct control of the police department.

A Negro lieutenant, John Brokaw, was appointed as *community relations liaison* ~~her right hand man~~ and authorized to bypass normal police department channels. *(8 men)* The department's entire Negro complement was put in plainclothes and, together with community workers, went out into the streets to expose rumors and act as counter-rioters. The radio station *decided on its own* ~~agreed~~ to play down *initial* rumors of any disturbances.

Nevertheless, by late Monday evening, small groups of *Negro* teenagers *aged from 11-15* began breaking windows. As larger crowds

mostly

X
~~(Horton does not recall source)~~

gathered, wild rumors swept the city: reports of armed Negro and white gangs; shootings, fires, beatings and death. In fact, except for some minor looting, the atmosphere, according to Mayor Sheehan, "had been like Halloween-- a gigantic night of mischief."

Tuesday morning the mayor imposed a curfew, further consolidated her direct control over the police department, and made a tape recording, played periodically over the city's radio station, appealing for order. All of the persons who had been picked up the previous night were released on their own recognizance or on low bail.

In the late afternoon the mayor and city commissioners met with 35 angry and initially hostile teenagers who "poured out their souls to the mayor." As a result, the mayor, the city commissioners and the Negro youths drew up a statement attacking segregation, discrimination, inferior educational and employment opportunities, police harrassment, and poor housing. Four of the young people began broadcasting over the radio station, urging their "soul brothers and sisters" to "cool it, because you will only get hurt and the mayor has talked with us and is going to do something for us." Other youths circulated through the streets with the same message.

Despite these measures, confrontation ~~between~~ the ^{photography} police and a crowd that gathered in the ghetto was narrowly averted that evening. The police wanted to break ^{up a crowd} ~~up the~~

that had gathered near a public housing project

crowd. The crowd was angry at the massive show of force by the police. Asked to return to their homes, people replied: "We will go home when you get the police out of the area."

by three Commissioners, one of whom was Negro

Requested by the commissioners to pull the police back, the Chief refused. He was then given a direct order to pull back by the mayor.

When the police chief still hesitated a county judge, leader among the

According to the Chief, he had "been a police officer for 24 years and had never felt so bad."

police officer ordered the men to withdraw. The police officers complied.

An hour later, elements of the same crowd, which was an older one than the night before and contained persons in their 30's and 40's, gathered in front of the police

lots seen 20's or early 30's

station. Again, the police wanted to disperse the people by force. Again the mayor prevailed. She went out into the street, talked to the people and asked that she be given a chance to correct conditions. Over the objections of the Chief, she agreed to let representatives of the people inspect the jail cells to satisfy themselves that everyone arrested on the previous night had been released. The New Brunswick riot had failed to materialize.

believing

THE BLACK POWER CONFERENCE

~~III~~
IV
③

Even as various communities in northern New Jersey were still being agitated by the corona of the Newark riot, 900 or more delegates from all over the United States gathered on July 20 in Newark for the first national Black Power conference.

The diverse delegates and the organizations they represented were unified by only one element: race. The most militant and extreme whites were barred. Two Negro officers of the New York Police Department were admitted.

The organizer of the conference, Dr. Nathan Wright Jr., himself was emblematic of the metamorphosis in Negro philosophy and psychology that had taken place in the United States during the course of a few years. An Episcopal minister with six college degrees, including a doctorate from Harvard University, a generation ago he would have been identified-- whether he liked it or not-- with the "Black Bourgeoisie." In Newark he was able to cast his lot, ideologically, with the late Malcolm X and Rap Brown.

Among the delegates there was as much disagreement as there was agreement. A resolution, referring to the Newark riot, put the delegates on record as givorously affirming "the right to exercise our unchallengeable right to self-defense."

Whose
Took my senses
on + his

?

An extremist faction believed that the best self-defense was to attack. Many speakers, however, warned that Negroes were not yet ready to confront the "white power structure." Even Rap Brown warned that it would be "self-genocide" to challenge white America to physical conflict at this time.

It soon became apparent that someone, in Detroit, was not listening.

Although inadequate or injudicious police response is involved in ~~many~~ almost every instance, a major police action, such as the shooting of the youth in Tampa, is the precipitating incident in a minority of riots.

X The volatility of idle masses of young people is not a racial phenomenon. White middle class teenagers and college youths gathering in vacation resorts have created trouble for the police from Oregon to Florida, and from Maine to California. In the ghettos, where approximately 50 per cent of the population is under 25, the ~~troubles~~ troubles have become multiplied. It does not appear accidental that the time of the most serious disturbances has coincided with the dismissal of school, and the appearance on the streets of tens of thousands of inadequately trained and educated youths.

3

It does not appear accidental that the time of the most serious disturbances coincides with the dismissal of school, and the appearance on the streets of tens of thousands of teenagers, who, unable to obtain jobs, lack adequate

~~and numbers. Approximately 50 percent of the ghetto population is made up of persons 25 years of age or younger.~~

Inadequately educated, without salable skills in a complex technological society, the unemployment rate of this group in some areas ^{is} ~~was~~ as high as 35 percent. Incongruous situations exist~~d~~ in which, as thousands of people look~~d~~ for work, hundreds of job openings ~~were~~ ^{are} available which applicants lack~~d~~ the skills to fill.

recreational facilities. ^{such} The volatility of/masses of young people ~~congregated in our area~~ ^{is} not, essentially, a Negro phenomenon. White middle class teenagers and college youths gathering in vacation resorts have created troubles for the police from Oregon to Florida and from Maine to California. ~~Nor are the police necessarily the precipitating element, although injudicious or inadequate police action frequently~~ ~~becomes a factor.~~

In some years SNCC, the Student Nonviolent
Cooperating, has been meeting to the extent that both in City



In the disbursement of funds, the leadership of the
Student Nonviolent

Some do the fact that one shot might be repeated half a
dozen times by half a dozen different persons as it cannot
prevent a mile or more from the city.

cc: Nathan

Howard
Approp the
in make-run
data processing
center at
Indiana I had you
about
Charles

You are cordially invited to attend
Graduation Ceremonies of the
Data Processing Class
to be held at the Indiana Reformatory
Pendleton, Indiana, Sunday Evening
December 10, 1967
6:00 to 9:00 P.M.

Cordially yours,

DAN A. OREWILER
CLASS SPONSOR

ROBERT F. DINGER
SUPERVISOR
DATA PROCESSING CENTER

FROM:
CHARLES LERNER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANTS
BETHESDA, MD

cc: Nathan 11/28 (age)

Howard Margolis/October 30, 1967

TOPIC SENTENCES

1. The Interim Report deals with the immediate context of the riots, and consequently, its discussion and recommendations are concerned ^{especially} ~~primarily~~ with matters affecting the police (and supporting organizations such as the National Guard.) This is necessarily the case since it is explosive police-ghetto relations that is ^{a principal} ~~the main~~ fuel of the riots; an incident involving the police that usually initiates the riots; and police handling (or mishandling) of incipient disorder that has the main influence on whether order is promptly restored or whether it escalates to a Detroit or Newark catastrophe.

2. The Commission cannot state to what extent the programs it recommends will lessen the violence next summer. But both common sense and experience in such cities as New York and St. Louis strongly suggest that programs to lessen police-ghetto tensions, to improve tactics, to make clear the importance of cool judgment by officials in charge will certainly help the situation.

INSERT A

3. In addition to the key areas centering on the police, recommendations we believe urgent are made in such areas as providing effective channels for presentation and resolution of community grievances, and for job programs with concentrated impact on young people -- that is on the element in the community which does most of the rioting. Again, experience in such cities as New York and St. Louis suggests that these steps are both feasible and important. But the experience of Detroit suggests that these efforts by themselves, without efforts to deal with police problems, can still leave an explosive situation.

4. Nevertheless, important as we feel the recommendations of this Interim Report to be, we must state emphatically ^{the need} ~~that it is important~~ to recognize the riots as symptoms of much deeper, much less easily resolved problems. Whether there was an inevitability that these underlying problems should erupt in such a dangerous form as the urban violence of recent summers, we cannot say. Still less can we say, or do we wish to predict, that the programs of this Interim Report -- which essentially are limited to dealing with these symptoms -- will be inadequate to substantially end the current epidemic of rioting. But if they do succeed -- especially if they do -- the country should not simply return to business as usual and once more ignore the grave

problems of discrimination, urban decay and poverty which combine to create the desperate situation out of which the riots have risen. The riots must be stopped. But to stop the riots without dealing with their roots is the surest formula to lay the grounds for even graver challenges to a stable society than we have yet seen.

5. Discrimination, urban decay, and poverty -- all related, each aggravating the problems posed by the others -- are the ingredients of the problem. The Commission, in this Interim Report, offers only a tentative and partial appraisal of the impact of these factors, ^{Not only here} ~~simply because~~ its efforts to date have been necessarily focussed mainly on the immediate problems of the riots, ^{but it recognizes} ~~in part because~~ of the greater inherent difficulty in reaching judgments in this area. We set forth what we now feel we can say, including drawing attention to the major uncertainties and differences of judgment on these issues.

6/ Discrimination is decidedly less of a problem today than it ever has been in the past. But to say that it still exists is an understatement. It is an important force in denying equal job opportunities to

the ghetto dweller. And it is a major factor in the creation of the ghetto, with the grave implications the existence of extensive ghettos have both for providing a breeding ground for desperation and disorder, for the decay of our great cities, and for the eventual creation of an urban vs. suburban tensions (compounded by race) on a scale unknown today.

7. Poverty, which is not the peculiar possession of the Negro community, but which falls with exceptional force upon it, makes the ghetto more than a minority enclave. ^{a minority enclave that it represented,} If ~~that~~ were all, it is hardly likely that we would have the riots we have experienced today. But poverty -- especially the immersion in poverty of the city slums -- creates problems of its own, exemplified by the Moynihan thesis. The combination of the resulting "pathology of the ghetto" together with the unifying effect (and able leadership) created by the facts of racial discrimination, creates a classic formula for organized social discontent.

8. The decay of the cities is largely a consequence of the exodus of the better-off members of the community to the suburbs, leaving the cities with more and more problems (as the ghettos increase in size)

and less and less resources to deal with them. Much of this problem would probably have developed even if there had been no color problem at all in this country. But discrimination has been a powerful aggravating force, accelerating both the outflow of affluent whites to the suburbs, and enforcing the concentration of low income Negroes in the central ghettos. (There are more poor whites in this country than poor Negroes, even if we leave out the rural poor. But the poor whites are not nearly so concentrated in ghettos of the central cities, and they do not face the same problems in moving to the suburbs to take a job outside the city.) There is no basis today for supposing that the position of the cities will not grow continuously worse in the years ahead in the absence of major efforts to reverse the situation. And the situation will then be aggravated even further as the differences in racial composition between the suburbs and the central cities becomes even more pronounced than it already is today.

9. To an extremely grave extent, all of these problems come to a focus in the area of jobs. The fact is that in today's booming "full-employment" economy, the ghetto dweller of our large cities is living under the unemployment conditions of the bottom of the worst years of

the depression. But unlike the depression, the ghettos suffer this handicap alone, surrounded by prosperity for the rest of the community. What has happened is this: "full-employment" means, in fact, an unemployment rate of about 4 percent. If this 4 percent were spread throughout the nation, the social costs would go substantially (even if unwarrantedly) unnoticed, and at least partially offset by the economic stability (freedom from inflation) that comes with a situation just short of true full-employment. But it is not spread throughout the nation. Rather it is intensely concentrated on a single group -- the Negro American, while this group itself is concentrated in the crowded ghetto. Unemployment rates in the ghettos of any American city rarely drop below 10 percent, and frequently are 15 percent or more. Further, "underemployment" (counting not only those who are looking for work at the moment, but those who have less than full-time work, or full-time work but at wages so low as to require welfare support of some kind if they have a family) runs to upwards of 30 percent. Thus a single group -- a group which could not escape self-identification if it wished -- and physically concentrated in the central cities, bears an extraordinary burden which we usually think of as spread throughout society. This is perhaps the most important

single factor of the whole problem and whether it is necessary or prudent to allow it to continue, (and what might be done to correct it) seems the single most critical factor in designing programs to get below the symptom of the riots and to the roots of the problem.

Section 2 -- CINCINNATI

On Monday, June 12, while Tampa was still smoldering, trouble erupted in Cincinnati, 940 miles to the north.

Beginning in October, 1965, assaults on middle-aged white women, ^{whom} in which several of ~~the victims~~ were murdered, had generated an atmosphere of fear in the city. When it became known that the tentative identification of the "Cincinnati Strangler" indicated him to be a Negro, a new element of tension was injected into relations between the races.

In December, 1966, a jazz musician named Postel Laskey was arrested and charged with one of the murders. In May of 1967 he was convicted and sentenced to death. Although two of the principal witnesses against Laskey were Negroes, many persons in the Negro community felt that, because of the charged atmosphere, he had not received a fair trial. They were further incensed when, at about the same time, a white man, convicted of manslaughter in the death of his ^{girlfriend,} ~~mistress,~~ received a suspended sentence.

Despite the fact that the cases were dissimilar, there was talk in the Negro community that the difference in the severity of sentences was indicative of a double standard of justice for white and black.

Following Laskey's conviction, a drive began in the community to raise funds for an appeal. Laskey's cousin, Peter Frakes, began walking the streets, carrying a sandwich board advertising the "Laskey Freedom Fund," and *and* *declaring: "Cincinnati Guilty - Laskey Innocent."* After warning him several times about his activities, police arrested Frakes on a charge of blocking pedestrian traffic.

A substantial portion of the Negro community looked upon the arrest as a harassing action by the police, similar to the apparently selective enforcement of the city's anti-loitering ordinance. Between January and June, ~~1966,~~ of some 240 persons arrested under it, 170 had been Negro.

Frakes was arrested at 12:35 A.M. on Sunday morning, June 11. That evening, concurrently with the commencement of a Negro Baptist Convention, it was announced in one of the churches that a meeting to protest the Frakes arrest and the anti-loitering ordinance would be held the following night at a junior high school in the Avondale District.

Without the city's realizing what was occurring, over the years protest through political and non-violent channels had been becoming more and more difficult for Negroes. It seemed more and more futile to the young, militant element in the Negro community to abide by accepted procedure.

Although the city's Negro population had been rising swiftly -- in 1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes -- there was only one Negro sitting on the City Council. In the 1950's, with a far smaller Negro population, there had been two. Negroes attributed this to the fact that the city had abolished its proportional representation system of electing the nine councilmen, thereby diluting the Negro vote. When a Negro received the largest total vote of any of the councilmen -- traditionally the criterion for choosing the mayor -- tradition was cast aside and a white man was picked for mayor instead.

Although, by 1967, 40 percent of the school children were Negro, there was only one Negro on the Board of Education. Of 81 members of various city commissions, only one was a Negro.

Under the leadership of the NAACP, picketing took place at the construction site of a new city convention hall, to protest lack of Negro membership in building trades unions. It produced no results. When the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, who had led the Negroes in the Birmingham march of 1963, staged a protest against alleged discriminatory practices at the County Hospital, he and his

followers were arrested for trespassing. After being sentenced to jail, Reverend Shuttlesworth's sentence was suspended. Placed on probation, he was kept under the court's jurisdiction and prevented from leading further non-violent protests.

Traditional Negro leaders drawn from the middle class lost more and more of their influence as promises made by the city degenerated into petty results. In the spring of 1967, a group of 14 white and 14 Negro business and community leaders, called the Committee of 28, talked about 2,000 job openings for young Negroes. Only 65 materialized. Almost one out of every eight Cincinnati Negroes was unemployed. Two out of every five Negro families were living on or below the border line of poverty.

A study of the West End Section of the city indicated that one out of every four Negro men living there was out of work. In one public housing area two-thirds of the fathers were missing from the home. Of private housing occupied by Negroes, one-fourth was overcrowded and half was dilapidated.

In the 90 degree temperature of Monday, June 12th, Negro youngsters roamed the streets. The two swimming

pools available to them could accommodate only a handful.

In the Avondale Section -- which had, up to a few years before, been a prosperous middle class community, but now contained more than half the city's Negro population --

Negro youths watched white workers going to their jobs in white-owned stores and businesses. One youth began to count the number of delivery trucks being driven by Negroes.

During the course of the afternoon, of the 52 trucks he counted, only one had a Negro driver. His count was remarkably accurate. According to a study conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, less than 2 per cent of truck drivers in the Cincinnati area are Negro.

Late in the afternoon the youths began to interfere with deliveries being made by white drivers. Dr. Bruce Green, president of the local NAACP chapter was notified.

Dr. Green asked his colleague, Dr. Robert Reid, the director of the Opportunities Industrialization Center, to go and try to calm the youngsters. Dr. Reid found several whom he knew, and convinced them to go with him to the Avondale Special Services Office to talk things over.

They were in the process of drawing up plans for a meeting with merchants of the Avondale area, when there was an indication of ^{an altercation} ~~some excitement~~ at a nearby drugstore. Several of the youths left the meeting and rushed over to the store. Dr. Reid followed them. The owner of the store was complaining to the police that the youths earlier had been interfering with his business; ^{he declared that} ~~and~~ he wasn't going to stand for it.

Dr. Reid was attempting to act as a mediator when a police sergeant arrived and asked the officers what was going on? One allegedly replied that they had been called in because: "Young nigger punks were disrupting deliveries to the stores."

A dispute arose between Dr. Reid and the sergeant as to whether the officer had said "nigger." After further discussion the sergeant told the kids to "break it up!" Dr. Reid, together with some of the youngsters, returned

to the Special Services Office. After talking to the youngsters again, Dr. Reid left to attend a meeting elsewhere.

Shortly thereafter some of the youngsters began to make their way toward the junior high school, where the meeting protesting the Frakes arrest and the anti-loitering ordinance was scheduled to take place.

The police department, alerted to the possibility of a disturbance, mobilized its forces. However, because of complaints from Negro militants that the police themselves were an inciting factor -- some months earlier, when Ku Klux Klansmen had been attracted to the scene of a speech by Stokely Carmichael, a Negro crowd, reacting to the heavy police following a speech by Stokely Carmichael, a crowd ~~had~~ patrolling, had

gathered about the car of a plainclothesman and attempted

to overturn it -- the department decided to withhold its men from the immediate area of the meeting.

It appeared as if this policy might be rewarded until, toward the close of the rally, a Negro real estate broker arose to defend ~~the~~ the police and the anti-loitering ordinance. The youngsters who had had the encounter with the police officers only a short time earlier were incensed. When the meeting broke up a missile was hurled through the window of a nearby church. A small fire was set in the street. ~~The window of the drug store, at which the afternoon dispute had taken place, was broken.~~

A Molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of a drug store.

The police were able to react quickly. There was only one major confrontation between them and the mob. Little resistance was offered.

Although windows were broken in some two dozen stores, there was virtually no looting. There were 14 arrests, some of them not connected with the disturbance. Among those arrested was a community worker, now studying for a doctorate at Brandeis University. When he went to the area to help get people off the streets, he was arrested and charged with loitering.

The next morning a judge of the Municipal Court, before whom most of the persons charged were to be brought, stated that he intended to mete out the maximum sentence to anyone found guilty of a riot-connected offense. Although the judge later told the Commission that ^{he knew} this statement was a "violation of judicial ethics," he said that he made it because the "city was in a state of siege," and he intended it to act as a deterrent against ~~XXXX~~ further violence.

Maximum sentences were, in fact, pronounced by the judge on all those who were ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ convicted in his court, regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, or the background of the persons arrested. As police were charging white persons arrested ~~XXXXXX~~ principally with ~~XX~~ disorderly conduct -- for which the maximum sentence ~~was~~ 30 days in jail -- but many Negroes ^{is} ~~was~~ ^{and a \$100 fine} were charged with violation of the Riot Act -- for which the maximum sentence is one year in jail plus a \$500 fine -- the impression among a major portion of the Negro community continued to be that the courts were dispensing discriminatory justice.

Tuesday morning a list of 11 demands and grievances stemming from the Monday night meeting was presented ^{by Negro leaders} to the municipal government. Included were demands for repeal of the anti-loitering law, release of all prisoners arrested during the disturbance, full employment for Negroes, and equal justice in the courts.

Municipal officials agreed that the city council would consider the demands. However, they rejected ^{a suggestion} ~~that~~ that they attend an open-air meeting of residents in the Avondale section, ~~that evening~~. City leaders did not want to

give stature to the militants by acknowledging them as the de facto representatives of the community. Yet, by all indications, the militants were the only persons with influence on the people on the streets.

Mayor Walton H. Bachrach declared that he was "quite surprised" by the disturbance because the council had "worked like hell" to help Negroes. As in ~~many~~ other cities, municipal officials, whose contacts were, generally, with the small percentage of middle-class Negroes, appeared not to realize the danger presented by the pent-up frustrations of a ghetto population mired in poverty.

*Tension
at night*

~~When no city official appeared at the meeting that evening, the throng that had assembled began to mill about. Shortly before 7:00 P.M. rock throwing started. At 7:15, according to the chief of police, "All hell broke loose."~~

~~Looting commenced, fires were set. firemen were~~

Early in the evening a crowd, consisting mostly of teenagers and young adults, began to gather in the Avondale District. After a short period of time, when no one appeared to give direction to the assembly, they began to mill about. A few minutes before 7 p.m. cars were stoned and windows were broken. Police moved in to disperse the gathering. E

Fires were set. When firemen reached ~~KK~~ the scene they were subjected to a barrage of rocks and bottles. A full scale confrontation between police riot squads and the Negro crowd ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ took place. As police swept the streets, people scattered. According to the chief of police, at approximately 7:15 p.m. "All hell broke loose."

~~stoned~~. Like fragments of an exploding bombshell, the riot spread to other sections of the city. Although most of these fragments were small and the damage they caused was minor -- of 40-odd fires that were to be reported before dawn only 11 resulted in a loss of more than \$1,000, and

9

on the Fire Department log only four are listed as having caused major damage -- the confusion and rapidity with which the disorder spread made it difficult if not impossible to determine its scope.

Many reports of fires set by Molotov cocktails, cars ~~that had been~~ ^{being} stoned, and windows ^{being} broken were received by the police from several parts of the city. A white motorist -- who died three weeks later -- and a Negro sitting on his ~~own~~ porch suffered gunshot wounds. Ominous rumors of gangs of Negroes raiding white neighborhoods, ^{of} shootings, and ^{of} organization of the riot -- nearly all of which were discovered later to be unfounded -- circulated.

~~INSERT~~

At 9:40 p.m., following a request for aid to surrounding communities, Mayor Bachrach placed a call to the Governor asking for mobilization of the National Guard.

At 2:30 a.m., Wednesday the first units of the National Guard appeared on the streets. They followed a policy of restraint in the use of weapons. Few shots were fired.

Two hours after the appearance of the Guard, the streets were quiet.

Wednesday afternoon an open session of the city council was held. The chamber was jammed with Negro residents, many of whom gave vociferous support to their spokesmen, who criticized the city administration. When the audience became unruly, a detail of National Guardsmen was stationed outside the council chamber. Their presence resulted in a misunderstanding, ^{causing} many of the Negroes ^{to} walk out, and the meeting ~~broke up~~ ^{to come to an end.}

Wednesday night there were ~~few~~ virtually no reports of riotous activity until 9 p.m., when scattered incidents of violence ^{again} began to take place. One person was injured by a gunshot.

Despite fears of a clash between Negroes and SAMS -- white Southern Appalachian migrants whose economic conditions paralleled those of the Negroes -- ^{such} a clash ~~never~~ ^{was averted.}

H. "Rap" Brown, arriving in the city ~~at the tail~~ ^{on Thursday,}
~~end of the disturbance,~~ attempted to capitalize upon the
discontent. The list of 20 "demands" he presented were
of such a scattershot, dictatorial and impractical nature
that few persons could have taken them seriously. Their
principal effect would have been total removal of all
white persons, whatever their capacity, from the ghetto
area. Demand No. 18 stated that "at any meeting to
settle grievances . . . any white proposal or white
representative objected to by black representatives must
be rejected automatically." No. 20 demanded a veto
power over police officers patrolling the community.

His appearance had no galvanizing effect. Although
scattered incidents occurred for three days after the
arrival of the National Guard, the disorder never again
threatened to get out of control.

W.D. Of 63 reported injuries, ~~only~~ 12 were serious enough
(56 of the persons injured were white. Most of the injuries were incurred as the result of thrown objects or of glass shards.) to require hospitalization; Of the 107 persons arrested
Tuesday night, when the main disturbance took place, 75
were 21 years of age or younger. Of the total of 404
128 were juveniles, and persons arrested during the riot, 338 were 26 years of age
or younger. *of the adults arrested, 29 percent were unemployed.*

Section 1 -- TAMPA

On Sunday, June 11, Tampa, Florida, sweltered in the 94 degree heat. A humid wind ruffled the bay, where thousands of persons had watched the hydroplane races. Since early morning the Police Department's Selective Enforcement Unit, designed as a riot control squad, had been employed to keep order at the races.

At 5:30 P.M., a block from the waterfront, a photo supply warehouse was broken into. Forty-five minutes later two police officers spotted three Negro youths as they walked near the State Building. When the youths caught sight of the officers, they ducked into an alley. The officers gave chase. As they ran, the suspects left a trail of photographic equipment scattered from the yellow paper bags they were carrying.

The officers transmitted a general broadcast over the police radio. As other officers arrived on the scene, a chase began through and around the streets, houses, and alleys of the neighborhood. When Negro residents of the area adjacent to the Central Park Village Housing Project became aware of the chase, they began to participate. Some attempted to help the officers in locating the suspects.

R. C. Oates, one of the 17 Negroes on the 500-man Tampa police force, spotted 19-year old Martin Chambers, bare to the waist, wriggling away beneath one of the houses. Oates called for Chambers to surrender. Ignoring him, Chambers emerged running from ~~the opposite side of~~ ^{beneath} the house. A white officer, J. L. Calvert, took up the pursuit.

Pursuing Calvert, in turn, were three young Negroes, all spectators. Behind one of the houses a high cyclone fence created a two-foot wide alley twenty-five feet in length.

As Chambers darted along the fence, Officer Calvert rounded the corner of the house. Calvert yelled to him to halt. Chambers ignored him. Calvert, ~~raised his~~ ^{who had flunked his last marksmanship test, pointed} his ^{his} .38 revolver and fired. Chambers, the slug entering his back and passing completely through his body, raised his hands over his head and clutched at the cyclone fence.

When the three youths running behind Officer Calvert came upon the scene, they assumed Chambers had been shot standing in the position in which they saw him. Rumor quickly spread through the neighborhood that a white police officer had shot a Negro youth who had had his hands over his head and was trying to surrender.

The ambulance that had been summoned became lost on the way. As minute follow^{ed} ~~ing~~ minute, ~~stretching into a~~
~~quarter past seven~~, the gathering crowd viewing the bloody, critically injured youth became increasingly belligerent.

Finally, the Reverend M. L. Newman told police they'd better get the boy out of there. Officer Oates loaded Chambers into his car and drove him to the hospital. The youth died shortly thereafter.

As officers were leaving the scene, a thunder storm broke. Beneath the pelting rain, the spectators scattered. When an officer went back to check the area he found no one on the streets.

A few minutes after 7:00 P.M., the Selective Enforcement Unit, tired and sun-parched, reported in from the races. A half hour later a report was received that 500 persons were gathering. A police car was sent into the area to check the report. The officers could find no one. The men of the Selective Enforcement Unit were told to go home.

The men in the scout car had not, however, penetrated into the Central Village Housing complex where, as the rain ended, hundreds of persons poured from the apartments. At

least half of them were teenagers and young adults. As they began to mill about, old grievances, both real and imagined, were resurrected: discriminatory practices of local stores, advantages taken by white men of Negro girls, the kicking in the face of a Negro by a white man as the Negro lay handcuffed on the ground, the chronic lack of

recreation facilities, ~~and~~ the blackballing of two Negro

high schools by the Athletic Conference, ~~and~~ police-community relations had

and the fact that there was an excess of bias allowed by whites, in the neighborhood, less than a month before,
been severely strained by the actions of a pair of white officers who were subsequently transferred to another beat.
Officer Oates returned to the area it ~~was~~ seething.

sharply after
Attempting to convince the crowd to disperse of its own accord, he announced that a complete investigation would be made into the shooting. He seemed to be making headway when a girl, ~~appeared~~ crying hysterically that the police had killed her brother, ~~she~~ *came running down the street.* Her appearance galvanized the crowd. Rock-throwing began. Police cars driving into the area were stoned. The police, relying on a previous experience when, after withdrawal of their units, the crowd had dispersed, decided to send no more patrol cars into the vicinity.

This time the maneuver did not work. From nearby bars and tawdry night spots patrons joined the throng. A window was smashed. Haphazard looting began. As fluid

bands of rioters moved down the Central Avenue business district, those stores whose proprietors were particularly disliked were singled out. A grocery store, a liquor store, a restaurant were hit. The first fire was set.

Because of the dismissal of the Selective Enforcement Unit and the lack of accurate intelligence information, the police department was slow to react. Although Sheriff Malcolm Beard of Hillsborough County was in contact with the Department throughout the evening, it was not until approximately 11:00 P.M. that a request for deputies was made to him.

At 11:30 P.M. a recall order, issued earlier by the police department, began to bring officers back into the area. Lighted by the flames of burning buildings, the ~~area~~^{streets} housing project ~~was~~^{was,} by this time, engulfed in a full-fledged riot.

Falling power lines whipped sparks about the skirmish line of officers as it moved down the street. The popping noise of what sounded to the officers like gunshots came from the direction of the housing project. The officers did not return the fire.

It was announced over a public address system that anyone

caught armed would be shot. The firing ceased. Then, and throughout the succeeding two days, law enforcement officers refrained from the use of firearms. No officer, nor any civilian, suffered a gunshot wound during the riot.

Driving along the expressway, a young white couple, Mr. and Mrs. C. D. , were startled by the fires. Deciding to investigate, they took the off-ramp into the midst of the riot. The car was swarmed over. Its windows were shattered. C. D. was dragged into the street.

As he emerged from a bar in which he had spent the evening, 19-year old J. C., a Negro fruit-picker from Arkansas, was as surprised by the riot as Mr. and Mrs. C. D. Rushing toward the stationwagon in which the young woman was trapped, he interposed himself between her and the mob.

^{Although} ~~With~~ rocks and beer cans ^{ed} ~~smashing at~~ the windows, she was able to drive off. J. C. pushed through to where the white man lay. With the hoots and jeers of rioting youths ringing in his ears, J. C. helped him, also, to escape.

By one A.M., police officers and sheriff's deputies had surrounded ~~and blocked off~~ an area several blocks square. Firemen began to extinguish the flames which, by this time, had spread to several other establishments from the three stores in which they had, originally, been set.

No resistance was met. Control was soon re-established.

Gov. Claude Kirk flew to Tampa. Since the Chief of Police was absent, and since, in Florida, sheriffs are direct arms of the governor, Sheriff Beard was placed
~~Because of the absence of the Chief of Police, Governor Claude Kirk placed Sheriff Beard~~ in charge of the combined forces of the police and sheriff's departments.

For the next twelve hours the situation remained quiet but tense. Rumors abounded. By the afternoon of Monday, June 12, the sheriff's and police forces both had been fully committed. The men were tired. There were none in reserve.

As a precautionary measure the Sheriff decided to request that a contingent of the National Guard be made available to the city.

Late in the afternoon ~~Mayor~~ and Governor ~~Claude~~ Kirk met with the residents at a school in the Central Park Village area. It was a tense meeting, charged with hostility, in which every speaker, white and Negro, was booed and hissed. ^{Although} Officials prided themselves on supposedly good race relations and the lack of massive resistance by whites to the integration of schools and facilities in the city, ~~the~~ Negroes, who make up almost 20 percent of the population, had had no one ^{of their own race} to represent them in positions of policy or power, ~~and~~ nor ~~could~~ ^{to} ~~they~~ appeal for redress of grievances. Frustrations had built up to the boiling point.

There was no Negro on the City Council; none on the School Board; none on the Fire Department; none of high rank on the Police Force. ^{Six} ~~one~~ out of every ten Negroes lived in dilapidated housing, many of them in shacks with broken window panes, leaking gas, and holes in the walls through which rats scampered. Rents were fifty to sixty dollars a month. Recreational facilities were few. Those that did exist lacked equipment and supervisors. Young toughs preempted and intimidated the children who tried to use them.

In the schools, the majority of Negroes never reached the eighth grade. In the high schools, only 3 to 4 per cent of Negro seniors attained the minimum passing score on the State's college entrance examination, one tenth of the percentage of white students.

A difference of at least three-and-a-half years in educational attainment separated the average Negro and white. ~~women~~ Fifty-five percent of the Negro ^{men} in Tampa were working in unskilled jobs. More than half of the families had incomes of less than \$3,000 a year. The result was that 40 percent of the children lived in broken homes, and the city's crime rate was among the top 25 percent in the nation.

Although the meeting between the residents and the officials broke up without concrete results, the Governor believed it had ~~enabled~~ ^{served a purpose in enabling} the residents to let off steam.

That evening, as National Guard troops supplanted local forces in maintaining a perimeter and establishing roving patrols, anti-poverty workers went from door to door, urging citizens to stay off the streets.

A reported attempt by Black Muslims to incite people to further violence failed. Although there were scattered reports of trouble from several areas of the city, and a few fires were set -- a substantial proportion of them in vacant buildings -- there were no major incidents. Three youths were arrested when discovered with a cache of molotov cocktails. They were white. ~~They were the only firebugs caught during the riot.~~

All during the next day false reports poured into Police Headquarters. Normal, everyday scenes took on menacing tones. Twenty Negro men, bared to the waist and carrying clubs, were reported to be gathering. They turned out to be construction workers.

Mayor Nuccio continued, with uncertain success, to meet with residents. At their suggestion that the man

most likely to carry weight with the youngsters was Coach Jim Williams, he placed a call to Tallahassee, where Williams was attending a coaching clinic.

An impressive-looking man with graying hair, Williams had been the football coach at ~~the~~^a high school serving the central city. A year earlier he had become an assistant coach at Louisiana's Southern University.

It was almost 48 hours after the shooting of Martin Chambers that Williams arrived in Tampa. Together with another coach he went to the Greek Stand, a hangout for kids. There he discovered that plans were being formulated for the throwing of rocks and molotov cocktails that evening. Coach Williams began to talk to them; began to attempt to convince them that protest could take responsible forms.

In another part of the city a physician and an attorney, both Negroes, began similarly to attempt to turn the youths into constructive behavior. The idea of a Youth Patrol, which would take over responsibility from police for patrolling the trouble area, was formulated. White armbands -- and later white hats -- were chosen for the purpose of identification. Sheriff Beard decided to take a chance on the White Hat Patrol.

It was almost 48 hours after the shooting of Martin
Chambers that Williams arrived in Tampa. Together with another
coach he went to an eatery called ~~X~~ The Greek Stand, behind which
he found a number of youngsters fashioning an arsenal of bottles,
bricks, and Molotov cocktails. As in the crowds that were ^{once more} ~~begin-~~
~~ning to gather, ^{again,} ~~the principle complaint/was~~~~
about
~~the presence of the National Guard, who, the residents~~
asserted, gave them a feeling of ~~being~~ being hemmed in. Williams
decided
~~to attempt to negotiate the removal of the National Guard~~
if the people would agree to ~~keep the peace and to~~
disperse.

Emotions were starting to run high again all over the city.
Negro
Two/community leaders, Dr. James O. Brookins and attorney Delano
S. Stewart, were apprized by acquaintances that, unless the
intensive patrolling of ~~the~~ Negro neighborhood, ceased, people
were planning to set fires in industrial ~~and~~ districts that evening.
Like Coach Williams, ^{Dr. Brookins and Stewart} ~~they~~ contacted Sheriff Beard.

Sheriff Beard had been in ~~consultation~~ consultation with
Robert Gilder of the NAACP. Gilder was in ~~close~~ touch with leaders
of the Negro youth. Some were college students who had been unable
to get summer jobs. One was a Viet Nam war veteran who had been
turned down for a position as ~~a~~ a swimming pool life
guard. ^{Youth} They believed that ~~the~~ ~~dis-~~
had
~~crimination~~ played a ~~part~~ part in their lack of
success in finding jobs.

the National Guard be pulled out of the Negro
The suggestion was made to Sheriff Beard that these young ^{areas,}
men, as well as others, be given ~~the~~ the opportunity ^{and}
that
to keep order. The
idea made sense to the sheriff. He decided to take a chance on
~~the~~ the Youth Patrol. Participants were identified first by

~~1952~~ Xphosphorescent armbands, and later by white hats.

During the next twenty-four hours 126 youths, some of whom had participated in the riot, were recruited into the patrol. ~~Of the leaders, four-fifths~~ ^{Many} were high school dropouts.

On Wednesday, the inquiry into the death of Martin Chambers was concluded. When the verdict ^{was} issued that the officer had fired the shot justifiably and in the line of duty, apprehension rose that trouble would erupt again.

The leaders of the Youth Patrol were called in. The sheriff explained the law to them, and pointed out that the verdict handed down was in accordance with the law.

~~Nevertheless,~~ Despite the fact that the verdict was not

to their liking, the White Hats continued to keep order.

trouble
~~trouble~~ On Monday, June 12th, while Tampa was still smoldering, ~~trouble~~ erupted in Cincinnati, 940 miles to the north.

PROFILE -- NEWARK -- FINAL

Section 4

On that same Tuesday night, June 20, Newark, New Jersey, hovered on the brink of violence. At a tumultuous meeting of the Planning Board that lasted until four o'clock in the morning, speaker after speaker from the Negro ghetto arose to denounce the city's intent to turn over 146 acres in the heart of the Central Ward as a site for the State's new medical and dental college.

The growing opposition to the city administration by vocal black residents had paralyzed both the Planning Board and the Board of Education. Tension had been rising so steadily throughout the northern New Jersey area that, in the first week of June, Colonel David Kelly, head of the State Police, had met with the chiefs of police of most of the municipalities to draw up plans for state police support of city police wherever a riot developed. Nowhere was the tension greater than in Newark.

Founded in 1666, the city, part of the Greater New York City port complex, rises from the salt marshes of the Passaic River. Although in 1967 Newark's population of 400,000 still ranked it 30th among American municipalities, for the past 20 years the white middle class had been deserting the city for the suburbs.

In the late 1950's the desertions had become a rout. Between 1960 and 1967, the city lost a net total of more than 70,000 white residents. Replacing them in vast areas of dilapidated housing where living conditions, according to a prominent member of the County Bar Association, were so bad that "people would be kinder to their pets," were Negro migrants, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. In six years the city switched from 65 percent white to 52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban.

The white population, nevertheless, retained political control of the city. On both the City Council and the Board of Education seven of nine members were white. On other key boards the disparity was equal or greater. In the Central Ward, where the medical college controversy raged, the Negro constituents and their white Councilman found themselves on opposite sides of almost every crucial issue.

The municipal administration lacked the ability to respond quickly enough to navigate the swiftly changing currents. Even had it had great astuteness, it would have lacked the financial resources to affect significantly the course of events.

In 1962, seven-term Congressman Hugh Addonizio had forged an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow long-time Irish control of the City Hall. A liberal in Congress, Addonizio, when he became mayor, had opened his door to

all people. Negroes who had been excluded from the previous administration began to be brought into the government. The police department was integrated.

Nevertheless, progress was slow. As the Negro population increased, more and more of the politically oriented found the progress inadequate.

The Negro-Italian coalition began to develop strains over the issue of the police. The police were largely Italian, the persons they arrested largely Negro. Community leaders agreed that, as in many police forces, there was a small minority of officers who abused their responsibility. This gave an aura of credibility to the cries of "Brutality!" voiced periodically by ghetto Negroes.

In 1965 Mayor Addonizio, acknowledging that there was "a small group of misguided individuals" in the department, declared that "it is vital to establish once and for all, in the minds of the public, that charges of alleged police brutality will be thoroughly investigated and the appropriate legal or punitive action be taken if the charges are found to be substantiated."

Pulled one way by the Negro citizens who wanted a Police Review Board, and the other by the police, who adamantly opposed it, the Mayor decided to buck all complaints against the police to the FBI for investigation. Since the FBI was not conceived as an agency to investigate municipal police departments, and could act only if there had been a

violation of a person's civil rights, no complaint was ever heard of again.

Nor was there much redress for other complaints. The city had no money with which to redress them.

The City had already reached its legal bonding limit, yet expenditures continued to outstrip income. Health and welfare costs, per capita, were 20 times as great as for some of the surrounding communities. Cramped by its small land area of 23.6 square miles -- one-third of which was taken up by Newark Airport and unusable marshland -- and surrounded by independent jurisdictions, the city had nowhere to expand.

Taxable property was contracting as land was cleared for urban renewal and then lay fallow year after year. Property taxes had been increased beyond the point of profitable return. By the fall of 1967 they were to reach \$661.70 on a \$10,000 house* -- double that of suburban communities. As a result, people were refusing either to own or to renovate property in the city. Seventy-four percent of whites and 87 percent of Negroes lived in rental housing. Whoever was able to move to the suburbs, moved. Many of these persons, as downtown areas were cleared and new office buildings were constructed, continued to work in

* The legal tax rate is \$7.76 per \$100 of market value. However, because of inflation, a guideline of 85.27 percent of market value is used in assessing, reducing the true tax rate to \$6.617 per \$100.

the city. Among them were a large proportion of the people from whom a city normally draws its civic leaders, but who, after moving out, tended to cease involving themselves in the community's problems.

Since, during the daytime Newark more than doubled its population, the city was forced to provide services for a large number of people who contributed nothing in property taxes. The city's per capita outlay for police, fire protection and other municipal services continued to increase. By 1967 it was twice that of the surrounding area.

Consequently, there was less money to spend on education. Newark's per capita outlay on schools was considerably less than that of surrounding communities. Yet within the city's school system were 78,000 children, 14,000 more than ten years earlier.

Twenty thousand pupils were on double sessions. The dropout rate was estimated to be as high as 33 percent. Of 13,600 Negroes between the ages of 16 and 19, more than 6,000 were not in school. Over half of the adult Negro population had less than an 8th grade education.

The typical ghetto cycle of high unemployment, family breakup, and crime was present in all its elements. Approximately 12 percent of Negroes were without jobs. An estimated 40 percent of Negro children lived in broken homes. Although Newark maintained proportionately the largest police force of any major city, its crime rate was among the highest

in the nation. In narcotics violations it ranked fifth nationally. Almost 80 percent of the crimes were committed within two miles of the core of the city, where the Central Ward is located. A majority of the perpetrators were Negro. Most of the victims, likewise, were Negro. The Mafia was reputed to control much of the organized crime.

Under such conditions a major segment of the Negro population became more and more militant. Largely excluded from positions of traditional political power, Negroes, tutored by a handful of leftists who had moved into the city in the early 1960's, made use of the anti-poverty program, in which poor people were guaranteed representation, as a political springboard. This led to friction between the United Community Corporation, the agency that administered the anti-poverty program, and the city administration.

When it became known that the Secretary of the Board of Education intended to retire June 27, 1967, the militants proposed the city's budget director, a Negro with a master's degree in accounting, for the position. The mayor, however, had already nominated a white man. Since the white man had only a high school education, and at least 70 percent of the children in the school system were Negro, the issue of who was to obtain the secretaryship, an important and powerful position, quickly became a focal issue.

Joined with the issue of the 146-acre medical school site, the area of which had been expanded to triple the

original request -- an expansion regarded by the militants as a ploy to dilute black political power by moving out Negro residents -- the Board of Education battle resulted in a confrontation between the mayor and the militants. Both sides refused to alter their positions. The impasse was complete and explosive.

Into this impasse stepped a Washington Negro named Albert Roy Osborne. A flamboyant, 42-year old former wig salesman who called himself Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed and wore a black beret, he presided over a mythical "Blackman's Volunteer Army of Liberation." Articulate and magnetic, the self-commissioned "Colonel" proved to be a one-man show. He brought Negro residents flocking to Board of Education and Planning Board meetings. The Colonel was not afraid to speak in violent terms, nor to back his words with violent action. At one meeting he tore the tape from the stenographic recorder being used to keep the official record. After he was ejected from the room, one of his captains threw a mapboard across the stage and smashed a tape recorder against the wall.

It became more and more evident to the militants that, though they might not be able to prevail, they could prevent the normal transaction of business. Filibustering began. A Negro former State Assemblyman held the floor for more than four hours. One meeting of the Board of Education began at 5 P.M. and did not adjourn until 3:23 A.M. the next morning. Throughout the months of May and June speaker after speaker

warned that if the mayor continued to persist in naming a white man as Secretary to the Board of Education, and in moving ahead with plans for the medical school site, violence would ensue. The city administration played down the threats.

On June 27th, when a new Secretary to the Board of Education was to be named, the state police set up a command post in the Newark armory.

The militants, led by the local CORE* chapter, disrupted and took over the Board of Education meeting. The result was a stalemate. The incumbent secretary decided to stay on another year. No one was satisfied.

At the beginning of July there were 24,000 unemployed Negroes within the confines of the city. Their ranks were swelled by an estimated 20,000 teenagers, many of whom, with school out and the summer recreation program curtailed due to a lack of funds, had no place to go.

On July 8, Newark and East Orange Police attempted to disperse a group of Black Muslims gathered in front of a house occupied by one of them. In the melee that followed, several police officers and Muslims suffered injuries necessitating medical treatment. The resulting charges and countercharges heightened the tension between police and Negroes.

Early on the evening of July 12th a cab driver, by the name of John Smith, according to police reports began

* Congress of Racial Equality

tailgating a Newark police car. Smith was an unlikely candidate to set a riot in motion. Forty years old, a Georgian by birth, he had attended college for a year before entering the United States Army in 1950. In 1953 he had been honorably discharged with the rank of Corporal. A chess-playing trumpet player, he had worked as a musician and a factory hand before, in 1963, becoming a cab driver.

As a cab driver, he appeared to be a hazard. Within a relatively short period of time he had eight or nine accidents. His license was revoked. When, with a woman passenger in his cab, he was stopped by the police, he was in violation of that revocation.

From the high-rise towers of the Reverend William P. Hayes Housing Project, the residents can look down upon the orange-red brick facade of the Fourth Precinct Police Station and observe every movement. Shortly after 9:30 P.M., people saw Smith, who either refused or was unable to walk, being dragged out of a police car and into the front door of the station. Within a few minutes at least two civil rights leaders received calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was being beaten by the police. When one of the persons at the station notified the cab company of Smith's arrest, cab drivers all over the city began learning of it over their cab radios.

A crowd formed on the grounds of the housing project

across the narrow street from the station. As more and more people arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered to Smith became more and more exaggerated. The descriptions were fueled and sustained by other complaints of police malpractice that over the years had been submitted for investigation but had never been heard of again, so that they remained like sores festering in the minds of the people.

Several Negro community leaders, called by a civil rights worker and informed of the deteriorating situation, rushed to the scene. By 10:15 P.M. the atmosphere had become so potentially explosive that Kenneth Melchior, the senior inspector on the night watch, was summoned. He arrived at approximately 10:30 P.M.

Met by a delegation of civil rights leaders and militants who demanded the right to see and interview Smith, Inspector Melchior acceded to their request.

When the delegation was taken to Smith, the Inspector agreed with their observations that, as a result of injuries Smith had suffered, he needed to be examined by a doctor. Arrangements were made to have a police car transport him to the hospital.

Both within and outside of the police station the atmosphere was electric with hostility. Carloads of police officers, arriving for the change of shifts, were subjected

to a gauntlet of catcalls, taunts and curses. Some of them replied in kind.

Joined by Oliver Lofton, administrative director of the Newark Local Service Department,

insert 11
been injured, the crowd outside became more and more unruly. Two of the ~~XXXXXX~~ Negro ^{spokesmen} ~~leaders~~ inside the station decided to go outside to attempt to pacify the people.

There ^{spokesmen's} ~~was~~ little reaction to the appeal that the ~~XXXXXX~~ people go home. The second of the two had just finished speaking from atop ~~of~~ a car when several Molotov cocktails smashed against the wall of the police station.

Inspector Melchior had a squad of men form a line across the front of the station. Volleys of profanity between the police officers and the Negroes on the other side of the street exacerbated the hostility.

Three of the Negro leaders requested they be given another opportunity to disperse the crowd. Inspector Melchior agreed to let them try, and provided a bullhorn for them.

As the three were addressing the several hundred persons who had gathered in the street and on the grounds of the housing project, it ^{continued to be} ~~was~~ apparent that the people were not going to disperse. A new strategy was devised. It was decided to attempt to channel the energies of the people into a non-violent protest. While Lofton promised the crowd

that a full investigation would be made of the Smith incident, the other Negro leaders began urging those on the scene to form a line of march toward the city hall.

Some persons joined the line of march. Others milled about. From the dark grounds of the housing project a barrage of rocks commenced. Some of them fell among the crowd. Others hit persons in the line of march. Many smashed the windows of the police station. The rock throwing, it was believed, was the work of youngsters -- approximately 2,500 children lived in the housing project.

Almost at the same time another Molotov cocktail flared against the wall of the police station. An old car was set afire in a parking lot. The line of march began to disintegrate. The police, their heads protected by World War I type helmets, sallied forth to disperse the crowd. A fire engine, arriving on the scene, was pelted with rocks. As police drove people away from the station, they scattered in all directions.

A few minutes later, a short distance away, the first liquor store was broken into. Some persons, seeing a small caravan of cabs appear at city hall to protest Smith's arrest, interpreted this as evidence that the disturbance had been organized and generated rumors to that effect.

However, only a few stores were looted. By about 2:30 A.M., the disorder appeared to have run its course.

The next afternoon the Mayor described it as an isolated incident. At a meeting with Negro leaders, at which measures to defuse the situation were discussed, he agreed to a demand for the naming of a Negro to the rank of Captain in the Police Department, and announced that he would set up a panel of citizens to investigate the Smith arrest. To one civil rights leader this sounded like "the playback of a record," and he walked out. Other observers reported that the Mayor seemed unaware of the seriousness of the tensions.

The police were not. Unbeknown to the mayor, Dominick Spina, the director of police, had extended shifts from 8 hours to 12, and was in the process of mobilizing half the strength of the department for that evening. Spina had arrived at the Fourth Precinct Police Station at approximately midnight, and had witnessed the latter half of the disturbance. Earlier in the evening he had held the regular weekly "open house" in his office. This was intended to give any person who wanted to talk to him an opportunity to do so. Not a single person had shown up.

As director of police, Spina had initiated many new programs: police-precinct councils, composed of the police precinct captain and business and civic leaders, who would meet once a month to discuss mutual problems; Junior Crime-fighters; a Boy Scout Explorer program for each precinct; mandatory human relations training for every officer; a

Citizens' Observer Program, which permitted citizens to ride in police cars and observe activities in the stations; a Police Cadet program; and others.

Many of the programs initially had been received enthusiastically, but -- as was the case with the "open house," to which hardly anyone came anymore -- interest in them had fallen off. In general, the programs failed to reach the hard core unemployed, the disaffected, the school dropouts -- of which Spina estimates there are 10,000 in Essex County -- that constitute a major portion of the police problem.

As reports and rumors, including one that Smith had died, circulated through the Negro community, tension continued to rise. Nowhere was the tension greater than at the Spirit House, the gathering place for Black Nationalists, Black Power advocates, and militants of every hue. Black Muslims, Orthodox Muslims, and members of the United Afro-American Association, a new and growing organization that follows, in general, the teachings of the late Malcolm X, came to mingle and exchange views. Anti-white playwright LeRoi Jones held workshops. The two police-Negro clashes, coming one on top of the other, coupled with the unresolved political issues, had created a state of crisis.

Inflammatory leaflets were being printed, and circulated in the neighborhoods comprising the Fourth Precinct.

A "Police Brutality Protest Rally" was announced for late in the afternoon in front of the Fourth Precinct Station. Several television stations and newspapers sent news teams to interview people. Cameras were set up. A crowd gathered.

A picket line was formed to march in front of the police station. Between 6:30 and 7:00 P.M. James Threatt, Executive Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission, arrived to announce to the people the decision of the Mayor to form a citizens group to investigate the Smith incident, and to elevate a Negro to the rank of Captain.

The response from the loosely milling mass of people was derisive. One youngster shouted "Black Power!" Rocks were thrown at Threatt. The barrage of missiles that followed placed the police station under siege.

As the rock throwing momentarily ceased, the police issued forth to deal with the crowd. According to witnesses, there was little restraint of language or action by either side. A number of police officers and Negroes were injured.

As on the night before, once the people had been dispersed, reports of looting began to come in. Soon the glow of the first fire was seen.

Without enough men to establish control, the police set up a perimeter around a two-mile stretch of Springfield Avenue, one of the principal business districts, where bands of youths roamed up and down smashing windows. Grocery and

liquor stores, clothing and furniture stores, drug stores and cleaners, appliance stores and pawnshops were the principal targets. Periodically police officers would appear and fire their weapons over the heads of looters and rioters. Laden with stolen goods, people began returning to the housing projects.

Near midnight activity appeared to taper off. The Mayor told reporters the city had turned the corner.

As news of the disturbance had spread, however, people had flocked into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with impunity, many spectators bowed to temptation and joined the looting.

Without the necessary personnel to make mass arrests, police were shooting into the air to clear stores. A Negro boy was wounded by a .22 caliber bullet said to have been fired by a white man riding in a car. Guns were reported stolen from a Sears Roebuck store. Looting, fires, and gunshots were reported from a widening area. Between 2:00 and 2:30 A.M. on Friday, July 14, the mayor decided to request Governor Richard J. Hughes to dispatch State Police and National Guard troops. The State Police arrived with a sizeable contingent before dawn.

During the course of the morning the Governor and the Mayor, together with police and National Guard officers, made a reconnaissance of the area. The police escort guarding the officials arrested looters as they went. By noon the

National Guard had set up 137 roadblocks, and state police and riot teams were beginning to achieve control. Command of anti-riot operations was taken over by the governor, who decreed a "hard line" in putting down the riot.

The three-way command structure -- City Police, State Police and National Guard -- worked poorly. The City and State Police did not operate on the same radio wave-lengths. Each did many things the other did not find out about until later.

At 3:30 P.M. that afternoon, the family of Mrs. D. J. was standing near the upstairs windows of their apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furniture store on Springfield Avenue. Three carloads of police officers rounded the corner. As the police yelled at the looters, they began running.

The police officers opened fire. A bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apartment. A moment later she heard a cry from the bedroom. Her three-year old daughter, Debbie, came running into the room. Blood was streaming down the left side of her face, where the bullet had entered her eye. The child spent the next two months in the hospital, losing the sight of her left eye and the hearing in her left ear.

Simultaneously, on the street below, Horace W. Morris, an associate director of the Washington Urban League who had had been visiting relatives in Newark, was about to enter a

car for the drive to Newark Airport. With him were his two brothers and his 73-year old step-father, Isaac Harrison. About 60 persons had been on the street watching the looting. As the police arrived, three of the looters cut directly in front of the group of spectators. The police fired at the looters. Bullets plowed into the spectators. Everyone began running. As Harrison, followed by the family, headed toward the apartment building in which he lived, a bullet kicked his legs out from under him. Horace Morris lifted him to his feet. Again he fell. Mr. Morris' brother, Virgil, attempted to pick the old man up. As he was doing so, he was hit in the left leg and right forearm. Mr. Morris and his other brother managed to drag the two wounded men into the vestibule of the building, which was jammed with 60 to 70 frightened and angry Negroes.

Bullets continued to spatter against the walls of the buildings. Finally, as the firing died down, Morris -- whose stepfather died that evening -- yelled to a sergeant that innocent people were being shot.

"Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," the sergeant, according to Morris, replied.

"They don't have guns; no one is shooting at you," Morris said.

"You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant yelled.

Heavy sniper fire was, in fact, being reported from all

over the city.

At approximately 5:00 P.M., a police detective was felled and killed by a shot whose origins could not be determined. Later a fireman met the same fate. Snipers were blamed for the deaths of both.

At 5:30 P.M., on Beacon Street, W. F. told J. S., whose 1959 Pontiac he had taken to the station for inspection, that his front brake needed fixing. J. S., who had just returned from work, said, "Okay," went to the car which was parked in the street, jacked up the front end, took the wheel off, and got under the car.

The street was quiet. More than a dozen persons were sitting on porches, walking about, and shopping. None heard any shots. Suddenly several state troopers appeared at the corner of Springfield and Beacon. J. S. was startled by a shot clanging into the side of the garbage can next to his car. As he looked up he saw a state trooper with his rifle pointed at him. The next shot struck J. S. in the right side.

At almost the same instant, K. G., standing on a porch, was struck in the right eye by a bullet. Both he and J. S. were critically injured.

At 8:00 P.M., Mrs. L. M. bundled her husband, her husband's brother, and her four sons into the family car to drive to a restaurant for dinner. On the return trip her

husband, who was driving, panicked as he approached a National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, then quickly swerved around. A shot rang out. When the family reached home, everyone began piling out of the car. Ten-year-old Eddie failed to move. Shot through the head, he was dead.

Although, by nightfall, most of the looting and burning had ended, and there were no longer any mobs on the street, reports of sniper fire increased. The fire was, according to New Jersey National Guard reports, "deliberately or otherwise inaccurate." Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey Department of Defense, testified before an Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that "there was too much firing initially against snipers" because of "confusion when we were finally called on for help and our thinking of it as a military action."

"As a matter of fact," Director of Police Spina told the Commission, "down in the Springfield Avenue area it was so bad that, in my opinion, guardsmen were firing upon police and police were firing back at them . . . I really don't believe there was as much sniping as we thought . . . We have since compiled statistics indicating that there were 79 specified instances of sniping."

Several problems contributed to the misconceptions regarding snipers: the lack of communications -- the state

police had placed men on rooftops, but other law enforcement personnel remained unaware of this; the fact that one shot might be reported half a dozen times by half a dozen different persons as it caromed and reverberated a mile or more through the city; the fact that the National Guard troops lacked riot training. They were, according to Spina, "young and very scared," and had had little contact with Negroes.

Within the Guard itself contact with Negroes had certainly been limited. Although, in 1949, out of a force of 12,529 men there had been 1,183 Negroes, following the integration of the Guard in the 1950's the number had declined until, by July of 1967, 303 Negroes were left in a force of 17,529 men.

On Saturday, July 15, Spina received a report of snipers in a housing project. When he arrived he saw approximately 100 National Guardsmen and police officers crouching behind vehicles, hiding in corners and lying on the ground around the edge of the courtyard. Since everything appeared quiet and it was broad daylight, Spina walked directly down the middle of the street. Nothing happened. As he came to the last building of the complex, he heard a shot. All around him the troopers jumped, believing themselves to be under sniper fire. A moment later a young Guardsman ran from behind a building. The Director of

Police went over to where the soldier had crouched down, and asked him if he had fired the shot. The soldier said yes, he had fired to scare a man away from a window; that his orders were that no one had a right to be standing at a window.

Spina said he told the soldier: "Do you know what you just did? You have now created a state of hysteria. Every Guardsman up and down this street and every State Policeman and every city policeman that is present thinks that somebody just fired a shot and that it is probably a sniper."

A short time later more "gunshots" were heard. Investigating, Spina came upon a Puerto Rican sitting on a wall. In reply to a question as to whether he knew "where the firing is coming from?" the man said:

"That's no firing. That's fireworks. If you look up to the fourth floor, you will see the people who are throwing down these cherry bombs."

By this time four truckloads of National Guardsmen had arrived and troopers and policemen were again crouched everywhere looking for a sniper. The Director of Police remained at the scene for three hours, and there was no shot fired except the one by the Guardsman.

Nevertheless, at six o'clock that evening two columns of National Guardsmen and state troopers were directing mass

fire at the Hayes Housing Project in response to what they believed were snipers.

On the 10th floor, Eloise Spellman, the mother of several children, fell, a bullet through her neck.

Across the street a number of persons, standing in an apartment window, were watching the firing directed at the housing project. Suddenly several troopers whirled and began firing in the general direction of the spectators. Mrs. Hattie Gainer, a grandmother, sank to the floor.

A block away Rebecca Brown's two-year old daughter was standing at the window. Mrs. Brown rushed to drag her to safety. As Mrs. Brown was, momentarily, framed in the window, a bullet spun into her back.

All three of the women died.

A number of eye witnesses, at varying times and places, reported seeing bottles thrown from upper story windows. As these would land at the feet of an officer he would turn and fire. Thereupon, other officers and Guardsmen up and down the street would join in.

In order to protect his property, B. W. W., the owner of a Chinese laundry, had placed a sign saying "Soul Brother" in his window. Between 1:00 and 1:30 A.M., on Sunday, July 16, he, together with his mother, wife and brother, was watching television in the back room. Up to that point of the night the neighborhood had been quiet. Suddenly B. W. W.

heard the sound of jeeps, then shots.

Going to an upstairs window he was able to look out into the street. There he observed several jeeps, from which soldiers and state troopers were firing into stores that had "Soul Brother" signs in the windows. During the course of three nights, according to dozens of eye witness reports, law enforcement officers shot into and smashed windows of businesses that contained signs indicating they were Negro-owned.

At 11:00 P.M., on Sunday, July 16th, Mrs. Lucille Pugh looked out of the window to see if the streets were clear. She then asked her 11-year-old son, Michael, to take the garbage out. As he reached the street and was illuminated by a street light, a shot rang out. He died.

No snipers were arrested. Of the 250 fire alarms, many were false, and only 13 were considered by the city to have been "serious." Four-fifths of the \$10,251,000 worth of damage was incurred due to stock loss. Damage to buildings and fixtures was less than \$2 million.

Of the twenty-one civilians who died as a result of gunshot wounds, all were Negro. One was 73-year old Isaac Harrison. Six were women. Two were children.

On the evening of Monday, July 17, a Catholic priest saw two Negro men walking down the street. They were carrying a case of soda and two bags of groceries. An unmarked car

with five police officers pulled up beside them. Two white officers got out of the car. Accusing the Negro men of looting, the officers made them put the groceries on the sidewalk, then kicked the bags open, scattering their contents all over the street.

Telling the men, "Get out of here," the officers drove off. The Catholic priest went across the street to help gather up the groceries. One of the men turned to him: "I've just been back from Vietnam two days," he said, "and this is what I get. I feel like going home and getting a rifle and shooting the cops."

December 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: Victor Palmieri
Stephen Kurzman
Robert Conot ✓

FROM: Charles Nelson

RE: Further comments on Conot Draft

Attached are annotated copies of the sections on

Atlanta
Tampa
Plainfield.
Riot Profile & Analysis

Lacking anyone who was on the original Plainfield Team, we were not able to comment very adequately at all on it. We did, however, add some material obtained on a recent return visit.

Basic Comment on "Profile": The "Embryonic" stage assumes some sort of peaceful gathering. Detroit need not be an exception, it seems to me. Some situations can go as easily from a police arrest to large violence without any peaceful congregation to "isolate and contain." Also Cincinnati is an example in which the police did not show force during the embryonic stage, but the tactic failed. (See p.105)

MEMORANDUM

To: Victor Palmieri
Stephen Kurzman
Robert Conot

From: Charles Nelson

Subject: Review of Conot's History, Profile & Analysis

Attached are annotated copies
of all parts of The Conot draft except
Atlanta
Tampa
Plainfield
Riot Profile

We will send the others very soon.

Code: In general comments are
written in margins or attached
notes. The following symbols were
used:

X = No basis for supporting
the statement one way or the other
? = Doubt validity of content
Editorial Change = Disagree with content.

STC

Statistics: We have ~~the~~ double-checked ~~the~~ numbers only where they seemed wrong on first reading.

Superlatives: We like the paper, but I feel it does use ~~too~~ an excess of superlatives that will make it vulnerable to charges of exaggeration. (city was "awash"; people "scream"; streets are "flooded" etc.)

Format: ~~is~~ The style intersperses chronology with background. Suggest two different margins and 2 type styles to set these apart. For example

Chronology

Background

In Italics

~~Chronology~~
Chronology

On page 106 -- clarify line 9 . . . make meaningful, etc.

Page 110 -- Because the Algiers Motel case is pending, and because this is a clear reference to it, I feel the reference should be eliminated or at least toned down by deleting ~~that~~ "in their determination to interrogate suspects." Even if this is some other case, not the Algiers motel, it sure comes through ~~them~~ to the casual reader as such.

page 115 -- . . . "virtually no Negroes ink key appointive positions." But you said earlier this was being done in Newark. Instead of "virtually no" should it be "hardly any" or "few" or the like.

Also, bottom paragraph is unclear; should it say ghetto residents had no one of their own kind on whom they could apply particular pressure; or no direct representatives on whom they could do so. Presumably, they have the same rights as any other citizen to apply political pressure on the President, Governor, mayor, congressman etc.

p. 116 -- We've used the word investigators several times, but perhaps we shouldn't do so here. We have insisted in press contacts that our field team people weren't Investigators but staff survey and staff study teams. Which is closer to the truth, too.

p. 117 -- Instead of "Everywhere the persons who suffered the greatest loss of ~~prestige~~ prestige were the Negroes who had counseled moderation."---- Many Negro leaders ~~with~~ counseled ~~up~~ moderation. But moderation often had been responded to with platitudes; militancy with results.

p. 125 ~~pa~~ -- bottom. Would it help, or is it necessary, to attribute source (i.e. from our wire services, etc.) of Detroit News story from Englewood?

same re Phila. Inquirer on p. 126.

The point being that you're right, the papers printed it, but that it wasn't their own reporters that said it, if that is indeed the fact.

p. 128 -- I would take out the empirical tests tending to indicate unlikelihood of a conspiracy. Suffice it to say that we're still investigating and so far have found none. And ~~am~~ do we want to say no evidence of a NATIONAL conspiracy?

P. 129 Z- Reference to Rap Brown -- again, whether one agrees with it or not, his case is still pending in Cambridge. Should there be this implied acquittal of him on conspiracy to incite riot charge (if that, rather than incitement, was the charge.)

p. 129 -- can we state so flatly that "there were no 'outside agitators' in any of the cities. Maybe not identifiable as immediate causes of the riots -- but certainly before and during. What about Brown in Cambridge; maybe he wasn't a conspirator but he certainly was an agitator, and got wounded when the riot broke out.

Notes on Conant's Riot Profile (71)

p. 101 - 2nd pp - Atlanta events initiated by private guard's detention of a Negro and subsequent arrest by police. (The private security guards have no arrest powers.)

→ p. 102. Don't know whether the apartments are overcrowded or not; we do know that maintenance services by the landlord and public services to the area were very inadequate.

p. 102 - First word of last paragraph beginning on page should be "while", not "white."

→ p. 105 - 3rd pp - "Isolate and contain" too simple a formula. In particular such containment about other action and with containing force in view but not arresting may serve to encourage and embolden the crowd.

⇒ p. 107 - Above comment applies to paragraph on Tampa; police were in view before they came in in assault force. Likewise, lines

were reported to have begun
after live apparatus came
 into view [1st interview with
 Hammond, Gilder interview, After-
 Action Report of Police & Sheriff's
 Depts.]

p. 111 - 2nd p - while the material
 in this paragraph perhaps
 adequately describes young
 militant Negroes, I think
 the point is overplayed if
 the implication is that most
 rioters are such young
 militants. Rather perhaps
 a little discussion of the
 vast army of young, jobless,
 alienated Negroes who have
 no regard for the society,
 law and order, etc. should
 be inserted. This should be
 coupled with an uncompromising
 statement re why they
 are as they are.

p. 115-118 Political Perspective - Excellent,
 but why no analysis of live &
 paragraph on p. 118.

P. 130. First paragraph on this page contradicts, in my mind, analysis of Stokely's & Rap's intentions on p. 6. I think the analysis on this page is correct.

I. Hunt

→ Black Power Conference Paper - This is too sketchy, general, and brief to be commented upon; it could've been written after reading only one newspaper account or hearing one newscast of the conference.

D. Phillips: Some of the long, rough sentences need to be shortened & thereby sharpened.

Riot profile F. S. Sharp

→ Pg 100 & 101 - I think police involvement in precipitating incident is played down too much. The ultimate point -- that the police are not the root cause of the situation of the black community; ~~that the police merely~~ bear the brunt of the frustrations caused by poverty and inequality is certainly true. However, it is the police who directly strip many Negro Ghetto dwellers of any semblance of dignity or manhood that they may have. Extensive police reform in maintaining the peace in the Ghetto is drastically needed.

→ Pg 104 & 5 - It is necessary to give the grievances an ~~legitimate~~ aura of legitimacy. Though often exaggerated the complaints are legitimate and have no outlet through normal political procedure.

General or Profile

→ More could be said of the small cities and small riots. A number of these probably could not be interpreted just as situations that never yet beyond the 1st or 2nd stage of the outlined stages.

Comments on The Riot Profile, ~~the~~ Const

→ p. 100 In the second paragraph the phrasing unfortunately indicates that the school-agers were intentionally turned out on the streets at a volatile time. Also, if the lack of recreation is to be stressed in this context, it should be highlighted elsewhere.

→ p. 101 I am not certain what Const includes in the ~~same~~ ^{phrase} "major police action" or what he means by "infrequently". In addition to Tampa, Dayton III was precipitated by a policeman slaying a Negro. In Newark people were certainly inflamed when the cab driver was removed from the precinct house to the hospital. ~~These~~ These are major police actions in my view, and three of 23 cities studied does not seem to me infrequent.

General Comment

My overall impression of this section of the paper is that it utterly fails to convey any sense of urgency about solving the underlying problems. To the contrary, it conveys a false sense of security by pointing out in some detail the erroneous reporting of riots with the plain implication that things aren't as bad as the reporting implies. Based on my work in the field, I am of the opinion that it is imperative that anything published by the Commission convey a strong sense of urgency.

(1)

~~QUESTION NO.~~ 1: What is the relative impact of the depressed conditions in the ghetto -- joblessness, family instability, poor ~~xxx~~-education, lack of motivation, poor health care -- in stimulating people to riot?

A growing body of evidence indicates there is a direct correlation between areas of economic deprivation, ~~maxxxxxxxx~~ low social status, and family instability ^{and} the locale in which a riot is likely to commence. Housing projects, deteriorating mixed residential-business districts, areas with a high incidence of crime -- these are ~~fertile~~ spawning grounds for ~~dissatisfied~~ dissatisfaction and a readiness to resort to force. These are the areas that have benefitted least from the revolutionary technological and ~~re~~economic changes that have altered America's ~~social~~ social structure in the past ~~50~~ fifty years. These are the areas in which the housing is the poorest and the most overcrowded.

In ^{the} Grand Rapids, for example, ~~where the riot area was limited to~~ ~~approximately 36 blocks,~~ most of the houses within ~~it~~ had been inadequately maintained for over ten years. Structures designed as one-family residences were being occupied by from two to four (mostly large) families. →

* ~~Median rent in the area was \$75 a month.~~

No 99 In the 12th Street ~~area~~ ^{section} of Detroit, almost half the housing was dilapidated. These are the areas in which the broken family becomes an accepted way of life. ^{to} Some housing projects ~~in the areas in which~~ ~~the~~ the father was present in less than half of the homes.

These are the areas in which the schools are failing ^{at} ~~at~~ ² at a time when 55 percent of America's high school graduates are going on to college, in many ghetto schools 50 percent or more of the pupils are dropping out. The average Negro youngster in the 12th grade is performing ~~only~~ at only a 9th grade level. Traditionally ^{American} ~~the~~ schools have been the means ~~by~~ ^{through which} through which the children of immigrants moved into the middle class. Yet the urban schools of the latter half of the 20th Century, more and more tailored to middle class children, ^{are} ~~are~~ not geared to deal with a massive influx of lower class children of dissimilar cultural background. Hence, the ~~Negro~~ ~~disadvantage~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~schools~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~disparity~~ in the quality of education received by the white and Negro child -- long a fact of life in the South where, until 1954, the schools attended by Negroes were forced to operate at a fraction of the budget of those attended by whites -- ^{has} ~~continued~~ continued in the North.

The cycle of poverty, despair and degradation from which education offers ~~the~~ the best means of escape ^{to} ~~is~~ not being interdicted. ~~Some~~ deprived of the opportunity to join ^{some} ~~any~~ labor unions ^{and} and to acquire apprenticeship training ^{from the times} as a result of animosity engendered ^{has} when management ~~had~~ used Negroes as strike-breakers ⁱⁿ the effort to inhibit ~~unionization~~ ~~unionization~~ unionization, the Negro ^{has been} ~~was~~ forced to take low-paying, unskilled jobs; jobs that were the first to disappear at a time of economic recession; ^{frequently} jobs that ~~did~~ not carry with them ~~even~~ social security and unemployment

(3)

and ~~unemploy~~ unemployment benefits; jobs unaffected by the unionized working man's gains. ^{EVEN} ~~Just~~ as there is a direct correlation between low education and low employment-low income, so is there a direct correlation between low income and family breakup and illegitimacy, irrespective of race or nationality. 92 percent of Negro families and 96 percent of white families whose income is \$7,000 or more are intact. However, in 42 percent of Negro families and 23 percent of white families ^{where} ~~with~~ income ^{is} under \$3,000 ^{have} the man ~~is~~ missing from the household.*

Similarly, there is direct correlation between broken families and school dropouts. Various studies have indicated that anywhere from 27 percent to 45 percent ^{of dropouts} come from broken homes. ** Thus, ~~the~~ cycle ^{is} ~~has been~~ completed: From inferior education to low employment, to family breakup, to dropouts ^{and back to inferior education.}

More and more young Negroes, as ~~they become~~ awareness of this catastrophic ~~cycle~~ cycle is etched sharper and sharper upon their ^{in minds,} ~~are~~ are rebelling against it.

QUESTION NO. 2: Why does one man break the law, while another, living in the same circumstances, does not?

* Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States, Oct. 1967.

** School Dropouts, Research Division-National Education Association.

The recourse to violence, whether by the action of an individual, the institutionalized process of the nation's engagement in war, or the haphazard eruption into riot by a mob, traditionally tends to come as a last resort when other options have been exhausted.

For example: For the poverty-stricken individual in a rural area, the option remains to move to the city. For the resident of a small city, the option remains to move to a larger city. ~~For~~ ~~the~~ ~~people~~ ~~living~~ in an area that overtly practices discrimination, the option remains to move to an area which, purportedly, does not. For the ill-housed, ill-clothed, poorly educated man, the option remains to better his education and increase his income. Only when a person believes his non-violent options have been exhausted, whether because the goal ~~appear~~ ~~so~~ ~~far~~ removed from him as to be an impossible one, or because the barriers erected against him ~~appear~~ seem indestructable, does he tend to resort to violence. If this is an act of an individual it translates ^{itself} into crime. If it is the act of a group, it translates ^{itself} into a riot.

Expectations raised among lower class Negroes by the passage of civil rights legislation have remained largely unfulfilled. The practical effect of the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision has been to turn all-white schools into all-black schools. The hope, however unrealistic ^{it} ~~they~~ ~~may~~ have been, that a Voting Rights Bill ^{would} ~~might~~ result in material improvement for an illiterate, poverty-stricken laborer, has wasted away. Much of the civil rights legislation has, in fact, been irrelevant as the population shifted from the South to the North, where the principal barrier against the Negro has been not legal, but economic. Much of the civil rights drive ~~is~~ has seemed to the Negro poverty classes as an alliance between liberal whites and middle class

5

Negroes, its achievements benefitting the middle class.

The very gains that the middle class Negro has made during the past 15 years have served to alienate him from the black masses. As the gap widened, not only did it ~~appear~~ appear to become insurmountable, but a reaction against Negro leadership drawn from the middle class began to set in.

~~The more disillusionment grows, the more and the more available options become exhausted, the more likely, it may be postulated, will there be a recourse to violence.~~

It ~~has not been~~ ^{is not} the new arrival, ^{still has hopes, who has} who ~~rioted~~ rioted in the cities. ~~a~~ ^{ad} study made in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riot shows that 75 percent of the more serious offenders had resided in the city for more than five years. In a study of ~~516~~ juveniles arrested, the place of birth appeared to make little difference. (250 were born in California; 257 elsewhere, mostly in the South.) ^{The key factor was how long} Yet, of these 257, 80 percent had ~~lived in California more than five years.~~ ^{who rioted} The youths had lived in the city. 88% ~~of them~~ ^{of them} in the city

for years or more.

While ^{more extensive} ~~fewer~~ studies are needed, the indication is ^{strong} ~~strong~~ that the individual prone to riot is ^{who is} one of ~~disillusionment~~ ^{disillusionment} and ~~despair~~ ^{despair} feels rejected by society, and has lost hope that he can gain admittance to that society by ~~non-violent~~ non-violent methods.

(S)

* Walter Rios Amster, ~~former~~ Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Dept. of Justice, State of Calif.

4

~~QUESTION NO~~ 3: Why do riots occur in some cities and not in others?

We hereby begin the answer. Traditionally cities have been able to absorb an influx of under-skilled and under-educated people because the cities themselves were still expanding and because the nation was in an earlier stage of industrial development in which an amplitude of low-skill jobs were available. A generation ago an upwardly mobile family, when it moved, tended to move from one section of the city to another. Today the move is most often from the city to the suburbs. The most vigorous revenue-producing portion of the population is, therefore, lost.

Of the 26 cities which experienced civil disorders in 1967 ~~there~~ have been studied with particular care by the Commission. Of these 26 cities, only six have kept up with the nation's urban growth since 1930. Six are actually smaller than they were in 1930; four ~~of them~~ grew slowly until 1950 and then declined. In all cities but two, the Negro population doubled during the period 1930-1960, regardless of whether the city was growing or declining.

As Negroes moved into the cities to begin occupying the deteriorated and dilapidated housing that other groups reaching affluente were moving out of, the cycle/in which families of migrants were entrapped, began to transfer itself to~~s~~ the cities. The migrants, with their low level of education and skills, had difficulty finding employment. The employment they did find consisted of low-paying jobs, often ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ season^{al} ~~or~~ ^{otherwise} fluctuating occupations in which income was low and uncertain.

7

As the economic condition of numbers of its people declined, the economic health of the city began to be affected. Simultaneously, because lower income groups tend to commit more crimes, the incidence of crime began to rise. As the incidence of crime increased, so did the need for a larger police force. It is no coincidence that, in such cities as Detroit and Newark, a ^{high} crime rate and a large police force go hand in hand. As the number of children in the schools increased, large families, also tending to be a characteristic of ^a lower income ~~families~~ ^{population}, the cost of running them ^{Schools} increased. As the number of broken families rose, so did the cost of welfare services.

In Los Angeles, the cost of one program alone, that of aid for families with dependent children, has risen from approximately \$2 million in 1945 to more than \$150 million in 1967. As residential areas deteriorated, the need for fire protection in them g became greater. Conversely, the larger the areas of deterioration, the smaller the base ~~is~~ from which property taxes ^{could be} ~~were~~ collected, became. Since, despite the decrease in revenue the cost of municipal services ~~in~~ inexorably rose, ^{only} an increase in the tax rate -- and then another increase in the tax rate, and then another increase in the tax rate -- could provide the necessary funds. As taxes in the city increased, the disparity between the ~~rate~~ in the city and ^{that in} the suburbs ^{became} ~~also~~ increased ^{very pronounced} and ~~the~~ flight of the middle class accelerated.

As the middle class departed it left ~~the~~ a vacuum to be filled with more migrants. By the very nature of perpetually renewing itself, the cycle tends ^{to} accelerate. Once a city has been caught in it, ~~it soon~~ ~~tends to lose its~~ ^{lose} viability. Schools and services deteriorate. Such

programs as urban renewal -- which have failed to take into account that, although slums may be razed, one cannot raze the people that inhabit them -- have frequently created more problems than they solved.

As the complaints of citizens, more and more of whom ^{are} were black, increase^{to} proportionately ~~with~~ the city's inability to meet such complaints constructively, anger and frustration ^{mount} ~~mount~~ on both sides. Since municipal officials and the purveyors of municipal services are mostly white, and the complainants ~~are~~ mostly black, the agony of the city begins to take on the antagonisms of race.

The disenfranchisement, whether by design, such as changing from a district to an at-large system of elections, or by accident, of a large portion of this growing black population has aggravated these antagonisms. A check of 17 Eastern, Southern and Midwestern cities, that were involved in disturbances during the ~~the~~ summer of 1967, and which have Negro populations ranging from 9 percent to 52 percent, reveal them to have a total of 16 Negro councilmen (the total number of councilmen in each city ^{ing} ranged from 5 to 30), 16 members of the Boards of Education (in school systems that were as much as 76 percent Negro), and, with the notable exception of Detroit, ^{scarcely any} ~~virtually no~~ Negroes in key appointive positions.

The normal evolutionary process of ~~the~~ minorities gradually being fused into government and learning the disciplines and responsibilities thereof, has, as ~~result~~ a result, been frustrated. The ability to bring about ~~can~~ change ^{through} from political pressure has similarly been ^{abated} ~~frustrated~~. Spokesmen committed to the lower class Negroes' cause have been non-existent. Municipal ^{officials} have lacked awareness of the volatile fermentation

19
that, as a result, has been occurring in the ghettos.

In one relatively small city, for example, the mayor, who ~~had~~ had been in office more than a decade, averred himself to be "shocked by conditions" when he visited the Negro ghetto.

The inability of the Newark government to visualize or adjust to the changing realities was a ~~major~~ major contributing factor to the tensions in that city. The problem is aggravated by the fact that not only are the most restless and the most militant Negroes primarily young, so that they have had little opportunity to participate in the political process, but many of them have no conception of how that process works.

A youth in Plainfield, ~~in the belief that~~ complained that: "The Negroes had only recently learned that the Council had not even forwarded the list of grievances to the Federal Government in Washington." He believed that such forwarding was standard procedure.

By ~~the~~ ^{their} reaction to violence, municipal authorities have, in fact, ~~reinforced the impression that the militants are right~~ undercut the position of the moderate~~s~~ and reinforced the impression that the militants are right: That petitions may be ignored, but that the use of ~~the~~ power cannot.

In Los Angeles, following the riot, it was discovered that ^{with} the expenditure of some effort, more than 10,000 jobs could be made available to ghetto residents.

In Atlanta, grievances that had gone unanswered for months, suddenly were responded to with alacrity. In Detroit, militants were for the first time ~~included~~ included in the city's planning.

The more a municipality's viability has deteriorated and the larger

(1) 8
its Negro population has become, the more likely -- it may be postulated -- it is to experience a riot. At some point, as the black core within a city grows and the municipal capability becomes increasingly vitiated, the mass becomes critical.

In Detroit, counting the number of whites who left the city and the number of Negroes who replaced them, there was more than a 30 percent shift in population between 1960 and 1967. In Newark a cataclysmic shift in population from ~~more than~~ 65 percent white to 62 percent Negro and Puerto Rican, took place between 1960 and 1967.

The most enlightened of administrations could not have coped with ~~the~~ ^a situation in which demands have far outstripped resources. It is in those cities in which ~~the availability~~ ^{a host} of non-violent options ~~has~~ ^{have} been ~~most nearly exhausted~~ ^{tried but have failed} that the situation ~~has~~ ^{is} the most ~~volatile~~ ^{volatile}. For the inhabitants of ~~the~~ ^a city whose government is unresponsive the final non-violent option is to elect a government that will be more responsive. ~~if-then~~ If then, this new government proves unwilling or unable to materially improve the conditions of the people, the availability of non-violent options has been exhausted.

Los Angeles,
In the three cities with major riots: /Newark and Detroit, Negroes had voted overwhelmingly for a "liberal administration" which they expected to produce change. When this expectation proved unfulfilled -- in Los Angeles and Newark five years after the election; in Detroit six -- portions of the populace exploded into riot.

p. 18

Over the years, the lack of response by the City to the ~~non-violent~~ protests through political & ~~jud.~~ legal channels, & by non-violent means, made further protests of this type more & more difficult.

P. 20 - INSERT (A)

protesting

in connection with
~~meeting~~
Franchise
arrest

20

The police department ^{had} mobilized its forces for a possible disturbance. Because of complaints from Negro militants ^{about "over policing" in an earlier incident} ~~that the police themselves~~ ~~were an inciting factor~~, the Acting Police Chief decided to ~~withhold~~ ~~most of the~~ most of the men in reserve, away from the immediate area of the scheduled ~~protest~~ meeting. (In April, following ^{minor disorder after} a speech by Stokely Carmichael, there were charges that the large numbers of policemen in riot-gear had been the real cause of the trouble.)

P. 20 - INSERT (B)

It appeared as if this policy might be rewarded as the protest meeting proceeded ~~peacefully~~ without disturbance, ~~the meeting considered the protest~~.

One issue considered was the ~~anti~~ anti-biting ordinance and its alleged ^{overly} strict enforcement.

[INSERT lines 3 through 7 of p. 18

A Toward the close of the meeting, however,

a wealthy Negro read

[GO ON TO P. 21]

SUGGESTED ADDITION:

page 21, re: Mr. Chenault

One of those arrested was Mr. Chenault, a Negro in his sixties. ^{N eyes eye - white 2 sea} ~~Observers at the scene~~ said that police were rushing down the street six abreast when Mr. Chenault, who was trying to get around them on his way home from work, was struck on his head, knocked to the ground, and sprayed with ^aMACE. ~~Mzzz@ham~~ Although observers reported that he was actively trying to get out of the way of the on-rushing policemen, that he made no effort to strike the officers, and the very idea ^{that} an old man would assault two armed policemen ^{seemed highly unlikely.} ~~was in itself preposterous.~~ Mr. Chenault was charged and later convicted of assaulting an officer. ~~Mxxixprexxentix~~ At his first trial Tuesday morning, Mr. Chenault ^(A) was not represented by counsel. ^{presented to the City on Tuesday} The first of the Eleven Points ~~xx~~ for Discussion ^{was} his case. He was granted a new trial, with counsel, but was again convicted. He is presently serving a one-year term in the Cincinnati Workhouse.

POSSIBLE ADDITION

re: City Council Meeting and the National Guard, p. 23

An open meeting of City Council was held Wednesday afternoon at 3 p.m., at which any citizen present was invited to speak to the Council. ~~xThexmx~~ Council Chambers were crowded and hot, as speaker ~~an~~ after speaker took the microphone to criticize the inaction of city officials to alleviate the plight of the Negro in Cincinnati. In the midst of the meeting, a squad of National Guardsmen marched through the Chambers, with their guns fixed. Tensions in the room had been high from the beginning, and ~~but~~ the presence of the Guard caused a complete breakdown of communication. Although the Safety Director said that their presence in the Chambers was an accident, most of those present were too angry to listen to his explanation. At best, it seemed another tragic mistake.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Charles Nelson

DATE: December 5, 1967

FROM : Melvin Goldstein

SUBJECT: Conot Paper

I would like to convey to you my general impressions of the Conot Riot Profile and Analysis. Although one may disagree with minor aspects of Conot's treatment of the role of the police, I feel that both the Profile and Analysis are very good products which effectively and concisely analyze the social situation out of which the disorders developed. I also feel that it effectively captures the "mood" of the communities in which disorders occurred.

cc: Lee Satterfield



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Comments on A Short Narrative History, Court

p. 1 - The school case is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al.

p. 2 - The Supreme Court did not rule in the Montgomery case that ~~all~~ segregation in all public facilities was unconstitutional. Had it done so, there would have been little need for the anguish over a public accommodations act

IRA:

p. 6

I feel that the tenor of this page is to place the "blame" for what happened in 1967 on Ray Brown & Stokely. We have found in almost every city that this ~~is~~ just is not true."

MEL:

p. 6

re: "Only if Carmichael... in the making" -
"How does this contribute to their words being heeded by Negro masses?"

re: final. ff - "What trap?"

Notes on Conroy's Introduction (I)

- p. 1 - Topke v Brown should be
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka
- p. 3 - I don't think SNCC
was formed "under the aegis of Dr. King."
- p. 4 - The turning point from peaceful
attempts at integration, etc. was not
the church bombing, but rather
the frustration that COFO
summer workers felt at the
Demo convention in Atlantic
City over the MFDP
controversy. At least this was
true of Stokely & SNCC.
- p. 6 - I think Stokely & Rap were
trying to convince Black America
that integration was impossible
& irrelevant, and that organization
within the black community and
self-help were more important
rather than that "white America
would respond to... grievances
with a policy of suppression
and violence."

Comments on Detroit Portion of Court draft

? 1. It may be incorrect to refer to the T194 as an anti-riot squad. There is a more elite group referred to as Commandoes which is probably more correctly the anti-riot squad.

? 2. The statement comports with what the team heard in Detroit but I question the characterization of Conot's source as "expert" without some further identification.

? 3. We were told by Norvel Harrington that the first sweep by commandoes occurred near midday.

? 4. I have the impression from our interviews that East Detroit where the Kercheval incident occurred is a poorer area than the 12th Street area on the west side.

? 5. We were told by two interviewees who ~~reported~~ stated that they witnessed the bayonetting. Perhaps this should be elevated above mere rumor.

General Comments

(A) I would suggest that more attention be given to the fact that the extent of black militancy in Detroit probably contributed to riot fever in Detroit.

B. Some attention should be given to the breakdown of the judicial system during the disorder. Some more detailed description of detention facilities should be added.

WALDO

Everett Waldo

NOTES on Conot Narratives

Section I; Short Narrative History

1. This brief narrative sets the issue in good perspective.

My general impression is that some most obvious points of history have been omitted, and the reader will wonder why; what ax is being ground to which these items were not germane? They follow - -

2. The March on Washington was in summer 1963, with the Birmingham bombing; it was a landmark of somekind, if a requiem for the non-violent movement. It should be mentioned with evaluative comments to identify its place in the history.

3. White Americans will wonder at the omission of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In spite of its weaknesses, it is some kind of national act in fulfillment of our constitutional base. It, too should have a place - rather has a place - - in this narrative, and its omission will raise too many questions. Again, an evaluative inclusion.

4. Page 4, first full ¶: what purpose does this ¶ serve? It can be omitted without ever missing it!

5. Page 5, last two lines....WHY?? - the exit from the Civil Rights Movement of hundreds of devoted young whites is also a significant landmark, and must be treated with more than a statement. The statement must be followed by a reason, an answer to the inevitable cry of WHY?

6. In the history from 1954 to 1964, the American protestant churches played a role they never played before. What significance, for these conservative institutions to follow the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr.? Many are still playing the role with millions of dollars each year.

7. The concluding paragraph of the short narrative gives Carmichael and Brown a larger role than necessary; it perhaps even implies that they played a significant role in all the happenings summer '67/. Is this valid? Some of the riots happened without their sponsorship or nourishment. The division between black and white America is real and will produce violent conflict even without the leadership of these two. This ^{more} ¶ has/to do, perhaps, with the hopes of Carmichael and Brown, rather than with the history and present shape of the revolution to date. The "trap" in the last paragraph identifies a Carmichael-Brown political posture, rather than one of the present shape.... Unless of course I totally miss the universal significance that C&B hold in the ~~1/11/67~~ latest chapter of the revolution.....

Section V: Black Power Conference

This short paper sets out what happened at the Conference; that's fine.. What does that last sentence mean? As it stands it raises problems it does not answer, it answers no questions raised earlier; delete it.

Section VI, pages 24-30, Atlanta

- E. Wold & I. Hunt³

1. Atlanta schools are integrated only de jure - only by law and token^y, essentially, Atlanta schools are segregated, and likely to remain so under present leadership. (Letson.)

2 Page 24, third paragraph, "maintaining constant pressure" is a white man's view of the threat of black neighbors. The phrase as stated implies a self-conscious effort to create and maintain the pressure. This is not the case, albeit, the demographic pressures are there.

3. Page 24, 3d ¶, blockbusting...by whom, for whom, for what. Is this phrase here self explanatory? I seriously doubt it.

4. Page 25, 3d full ¶, 1st sentence: What does this sentence mean? As STET it says nothing.

5. Page 26, 2d full ¶,, Negro attended only four and a half hours refers to those schools on double sessions; while the only schools on double sessions were Negro, not all nine/high schools had double session.

6. Page 27, reference "private Negro guards". (a) there were 2 of them and they were Negro; (b) the term "security guards" connotes their nature and function better than "private guards"; (c) they had authority to detain for arrest, but not to arrest; they carry handcuffs (used in this case) and side arms; and (d), it is routine to call police officers to make arrests in cases like this.

7. the 200-300 people were not suddenly drawn from a vacuum to the scene of action; see third line, next paragraph (re. ¶ 2d full and 3d full page 27.)

8. Bottom of page 27, ff on page 28: "there was much bitterness" indicates that at this point the people became bitter; their bitterness was once more aroused by this action. Page 28, 2d ¶, first part of last sentence puts it better.

9. Page 28, 2d ¶, last sentence. A meeting was held Sunday night. A police brutality committee was formed, a cleanup committee was formed, and the woman arrested Saturday night "displayed her bruises." (Crawford report and study.)

10/. "a drunk" implies to this white writer, one who is habitually reeling along the curbing of run-down streets. Therefore to my biased view, this is an evaluative and derogatory reference. "a man who had been drinking" (as I do occasionally) might be safer.

11. Page 28, 3d full ¶: the bell was ringing, maybe even on its own, as it ~~was wont to do~~ ^{sometimes did;}; the young man (who had been drinking!) was trying to still it, by his own contention, *as he had seen police officers*

12. Page 28, 3d full ¶: who began hitting whom first? Evidence we have is not clear, so it is unsafe to attribute initiative in this place.

*do. this
in the
past.*

13. Page 28, last ¶: there were two meetings Monday night. One, at St. Lukes had about 30 non-conflict leaders. (Crawford, Gates & Wesley). The 250 were at St. Joseph's, where Carmichael followed two non-conflict speakers. (Crawford et al).

14. Page 29, 3d full ¶: FBI reports a total of 200, which means 160 others; 180 also reported in reserve standby.

15. ADD to info in 5th full ¶, that during the recruitment fo the youth patrol, a SNCC representative harangued the young men coming to the meeting and / embarrassed them so that many did not join the patrol. SNCC sound truck in area Monday and Tuesday shouting "Black Power" (Crawford et al.).

16. This is stated incorrectly: let me quote from Atlanta Chronology: ^{Tuesday} ~~Monday~~, June 20, 1967: 5:00 p.m.: Rock throwing occurred. Extra police arrived in large numbers. A cap (cherry bomb) was popped in the shopping plaza. Several police weapons were fired. (Crawford). 7:30 p.m. A very large crowd (more than 1,000) was gathered in the area by this time. (Parker). One report times the event around 7:30 (Gates and Wesley); another times it between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. (Parker); and the FBI sets the time at 9:15 or later (FBI Report). The sequence is about the same in each report: Some sporadic shooting had occurred before the event. A molotov cocktail exploded near some policemen. A gun was firedetc. as top of your page 30.

We are checking on whether a meeting was in fact held on Tuesday evening. Will know by 1:00-1:30

DETROIT

X1 On Saturday evening, July 22, the Black Power Conference was still in session, the Detroit Police Department raided five blind pigs. The blind pigs had had their origin in the days before World War II, when they had served as private social clubs for affluent Negroes who, because of discrimination, had been unable to gain entrance to public night spots. Gradually, as public facilities opened their doors to Negroes, the character of the blind pigs had changed, and they had become illegal drinking and gambling spots.

X2 The fifth blind pig on the list, the United Community and Civic League at the corner of 12th Street and Clairmount, had been raided twice before. Once ten persons had been
 X3 picked up; another time, 28. A Detroit Vice Squad officer had first tried but been unable to gain entrance to the blind pig shortly after ten o'clock Saturday night. When, on his second attempt, he was successful, it was 3:45 A.M. Sunday morning.

?1 The Tactical Mobile Unit, ^{which} the Police Department ~~is~~ ^{uses} an anti-riot squad, had been dismissed at 3:00 A.M. Since Sunday morning is, traditionally, the least troublesome time for police departments all over the United States, there were only 193 officers patrolling the streets. Of these, 44 were in the 10th Precinct where the blind pig was located.

Instead of the expected two dozen patrons, the blind pig contained 82. Before additional patrol wagons could be called to transport all the persons from the scene, an hour had elapsed. The weather was warm -- during that day the temperature was to rise to 86 degrees -- and humid. Despite the hour, numerous persons were still on the streets. Within a short period a crowd of approximately 200 persons had gathered.

X 4 { In November of 1965 the Honorable George Edwards, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Commissioner of the Detroit Police Department from 1961 to 1963, had written in the Michigan Law Review: "It is clear that in 1965 no one will make excuses for any city's inability to foresee the possibility of racial trouble . . . Although local police forces generally regard themselves as public servants with the responsibility of maintaining law and order, they tend to minimize this attitude when they are patrolling areas that are heavily populated with Negro citizens. There they tend to view each person on the streets as a potential criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is reciprocated. Indeed, hostility between the Negro communities in our large cities and the police departments, is the major problem in law enforcement in this decade. It has been a major cause of all recent race riots."

At one time, Judge Edwards told Commission ~~investi~~ ^{interviewers} ~~gators~~, there was "open warfare between the Detroit Negroes

1943

and the Detroit Police Department." As late as "1961 he thought that Detroit was the leading candidate in the United States for a race riot."

There was a long history of conflict between the police department and the citizens. Detroit's 1943 race riot, in which 34 persons died, was the bloodiest in the United States in the span of four decades. During the labor wars of the 1930's union members had come to view the Detroit Police Department as a strike-breaking force.

Judge Edwards and his successor, Commissioner Ray Girardin, attempted to restructure the image of the department. A Citizens Complaint Bureau was set up to facilitate the filing of complaints by citizens against officers; but there are indications that in practice it worked little better than less enlightened and more cumbersome procedures in other cities.

Expert testimony has been given the Commission that the very nature of the trial board procedure tends to favor the accused officer. Officers are reluctant to testify against fellow-members of the department and some who have done so in the past have found themselves ostracized.

Lately, following the advice of attorneys with regard to the rules against self-incrimination, officers have refused even to make statements to Department investigators. In certain precincts investigators for the Citizens Complaint Bureau have been made to feel so unwelcome that they are reluctant even to go to the stationhouses.

On 12th Street, with its high incidence of vice and crime, the issues of police brutality was a recurrent theme. A month earlier the killing of a prostitute had been determined by police investigators to be the work of a pimp. According to rumors in the community the crime had been committed by a Vice Squad officer.

Approximately at the same time the killing of a 27-year old Negro Army veteran, Danny Thomas, by a gang of white youths inflamed the community. Coverage by the city's major newspapers, which played down the story in the hope that the murder would not become a cause for increased tensions, backfired. A banner story in the Michigan Chronicle, the city's Negro newspaper, began: "As James Meredith marched again Sunday to prove a Negro could walk in Mississippi without fear, a young woman who saw her husband killed by a white gang, shouting: 'Niggers keep out of Rouge Park,' lost her baby." ✓

"Relatives were upset that the full story of the murder was not being told, apparently in an effort to prevent the incident from sparking a riot."

Some Negroes believed that the treatment of the story by the major newspapers was further evidence of the double standard: Playing up crimes by Negroes, playing down crimes committed against Negroes.

Although police arrested and charged one suspect with murder, Negroes questioned why the entire gang was not held. What, they asked, would have been the result if a white man had been killed by a gang of Negroes?

Interestingly enough

Better Transition? The Thomas family had lived only three blocks from the scene of the blind pig raid. *4* A few minutes after 5:00 A.M. a police cruiser had its rear window smashed by an empty bottle. Shortly thereafter a litter basket was thrown through the window of a store. A youth police nicknamed, "Mr. Greensleeves," because of the green shirt he was wearing, was shouting: "We're going to have a riot," and exhorting the crowd to vandalism. ①

At 5:20 A.M. Commissioner Ray Girardin was notified. He immediately called Mayor Jerome Cavanagh. Seventeen officers from other areas were ordered into the 10th Precinct. By 6:00 A.M. police department strength had grown to 369 men. Of these, however, only 43 were committed to the immediate riot area. By that time the number of persons on 12th Street was in the process of growing into the thousands, and widespread window-smashing and looting had begun.

x 6 Although a block to either side of 12th ~~Street~~ were fine middle class districts, along 12th Street itself, overcrowded apartment houses created a density of more than 21,000 persons per square mile, almost double the city average. Only 18 percent of the residents were homeowners. Twenty-five percent of the housing was considered so substandard as to require clearance, and another 19 percent had major deficiencies. The crime rate was almost double that of the city, which, in itself, has one of the highest in the nation.

x 7 The proportion of broken families was more than twice that in the rest of the city. The movement of people when the

slums of "Black Bottom" had been cleared for urban renewal had changed 12th Street from an integrated community into an almost totally black one, in which only numbers of the businessmen remained white.

?3 By 7:50 A.M., ^{STET} when a 17-man ~~commando~~ ^{unit} attempted ^{STET} to make the first sweep, there were an estimated 3,000 persons on 12th Street. They offered no resistance to the police. As the squad moved down the street they gave way to one side, and then flowed back behind it.

At 8:25 A.M. the first fire blossomed in a shoe store. Firemen who responded were not, however, harrassed, and the flames were extinguished. By mid-morning 1122 men, approximately a fourth of the strength of the ^{police} department, had reported for duty. Of these, 540 were in the riot area, which had still not expanded beyond six blocks. 108 officers were being used in an attempt to establish a cordon. There was, however, no interference with looters, and police were refraining from the use of force.

Police in Fire? presumably police

According to witnesses, police at some roadblocks made little effort to stop people from going in and out of the area, and a good deal of bantering took place between police officers and the populace.

Commissioner Girardin believed: "If we had started shooting in there . . . not one of our policemen would have come out alive. I am convinced it would have turned into a race riot in the conventional sense."

Many of the police officers were being used to guard key installations in other sections of the city in the fear that the disturbance on 12th Street might be a diversionary tactic. Belle Isle, the recreation area in the Detroit River that had been the scene of the 1943 riot, was sealed off.

In an effort not to attract people to the scene, media of mass communication were cooperating in reporting no news of the riot. As a result, numerous police officers had to be detailed to protect the 50,000 spectators that were expected at that afternoon's New York Yankees-Detroit Tigers baseball game.

Early in the morning a task force of community workers had gone into the area to dispel rumors and act as counter-rioters. Such a task force had been singularly successful at the time of the Kercheval incident in the summer of 1966, when scores of people had gathered at the site of an arrest. [Ker-
 ?4 cheval, however, ~~was a higher-income area, with few stores,~~
~~that also~~ happened to have the city's most effective police-community relations program. By the time the members of the task force were able to inject themselves into the situation on 12th Street, it had already gotten out of hand.

The movement from a serious to a critical stage appar-
 ?5 ently began when a ~~rumor~~ ^{rumor} threaded its way through the crowd that a man had been bayoneted by the police during an attempt by them to sweep the streets. Missiles began to be thrown at the officers. By 1:00 P.M. the first of the serious fires had been set. An hour later smoke was billowing upward from at

least four different locations. Firemen were being harrassed and pelted with rocks.

The Michigan State Police, who had been alerted earlier, were requested to come to the city's assistance. Shortly after 3:00 P.M., even as State Police were arriving, the riot spread from 12th Street into other business districts.

There was no lack of the disaffected to help spread it. Although not yet deteriorated to the point of Newark, like Newark Detroit was losing population. Its prosperous middle class whites were moving to the suburbs and being replaced by unskilled Negro migrants.

X 8 { Between 1960 and 1967 the Negro population rose from just under 30 percent to an estimated 40 percent of the total. Those who moved out were the most vigorous, revenue-producing portion of the population, leaving behind an ever greater number of the old and young, who were less productive, yet cost the city more in terms of services.

In a decade the school system had gained 50,000 to 60,000 children. Fifty-one percent of the elementary school classes were overcrowded. Simply to achieve the statewide average, the system needed 1,650 more teachers, which would mean the building of an additional 1,000 classrooms. The combined cost would be \$63 million. Of 300,000 school children, 171,000 or 57 percent, were Negro. According to the Detroit Superintendent of Schools, 25 different school

districts surrounding the city spent \$100 to \$500 more per pupil per year than Detroit. In the inner city schools more than half the pupils who entered high school became dropouts.

The strong union structure had created ideal conditions for the working man, but had left others, such as Civil Service and Government workers, comparatively disadvantaged and dissatisfied. In June the "Blue Flu" had struck the city as police officers, forbidden to strike, had staged a sick-out. In September, the teachers were to go on strike. [The starting wages for a plumber's helper were almost equal to the salary of a police officer or teacher.]

Some unions, traditionally closed to Negroes, zealously guarded training opportunities. In January of 1967 the school system notified six apprenticeship trades it would not open any new apprenticeship classes unless a larger number of Negroes were included. By the Fall of 1967 some of the programs were still closed.

High school diplomas from inner city schools were regarded by personnel directors as less than valid. In July of 1967 unemployment was higher than it had been for five years. In the 12th Street area it was estimated to be between 12 and 15 percent for Negro men; 30 percent or higher for those under 25.

The more education a Negro had the greater his inequality in income vis-a-vis the white tended to be. Whereas the

income of whites and Negroes with a 7th grade education was about equal, the median income of whites with a high school diploma was \$1,600 more per year than that of Negroes, and white college graduates made \$2,600 more per year than their Negro counterparts. In fact, as far as his income was concerned, it made very little difference to a Negro whether he had attended school for 8 years or for 12.

Although Mayor Cavanagh had appointed many Negroes to key positions in his administration, in elective offices the population was still grossly underrepresented. Of nine councilmen, only one was a Negro. Of seven members of the school board, only two were Negroes.

Resistance to urban renewal was widespread among residents. Results from urban renewal were doubtful. In the middle of the downtown urban renewal area, one of the city's two largest department stores had closed its doors. Because of the financial straits it found itself in, the city was unable to produce on promises to correct conditions engendering complaints.

By 4:00 P.M. the rioting, looting and burning was spreading over an ever-wider area. There was no longer any hope of the restoration of order without a massive response. The National Guard was called for.

At 6:57 P.M. the first troops appeared on the streets. At 9:07 P.M. the first sniper fire was reported. At 12:45 A.M., Monday, July 24th, the first person died. He was a 45-year old

white man, shot by the owner of the store he was looting.

As the entire social order began to show signs of disintegrating into chaos, individual responses sometimes were unexpected.

Twenty-four year old E. G., a Negro born in Savannah, Georgia, had arrived in Detroit in 1965 in order to attend Wayne State University. Rebellion had been building in him for a long time because "You just had to bow down to the white man." For example: "When the insurance man would come by he would always call out to my mother by her first name and we were expected to smile and greet him happily. . . Man, I know he would never have thought of me or my father going to his house and calling his wife by her first name. Then I once saw a white man slapping a young pregnant Negro woman on the street with such force that she just spun around and fell. I'll never forget that." The memory of violence committed against Negroes in the south, for which no one had ever been punished, still rankled in him.

When a friend called to tell him about the riot at 12th Street, E. G. went there expecting "a true revolt," but was "disappointed as soon as I saw the looting begin. I wanted to see the people really rise up in revolt. When I saw the first person coming out of the store with things in his arms, I really got sick to my stomach and wanted to go home. Rebellion against the white suppressors is one thing, but one measly pair of shoes or some food completely ruins the whole concept."

E. G. was standing in a crowd, watching firemen work when Fire Chief Alvin Wall called out, asking for help from among the spectators. E. G. responded, his reasoning was that "No matter what color someone is, whether they are green or pink or blue, I'd help them if they were in trouble. That's all there is to it."

He worked with the firemen for four days, the only Negro in an all-white crew. (Of 1700 men in the fire department there were only 40 Negroes) Elsewhere, at scattered locations, a half dozen other Negro youths pitched in to help the firemen.

Police protection for firemen was sporadic. As a result, the order was issued that whenever firemen were subjected to attack, whether by rocks and bottles or sniper fire, they were to abandon whatever fire they were working on and withdraw from the area. As desperate residents -- employing garden hoses in the attempt to keep the flames from spreading to their homes from adjacent business establishments -- witnessed the withdrawal of the firemen, [they were led to believe that the withdrawal was intended as an act of retribution. Antagonism against the firemen increased.]

Since a moderate breeze was blowing, there were many instances of a fire spreading from its original location. This led to erroneous reports that entire blocks were being fire-bombed and destroyed. At one point, out of a total of 157 pieces of fire apparatus with which Detroit was equipped, 153

were engaged in fighting the fires.

One area of the ghetto remained insulated from the riot fever. On the northeast side a district of some fifty square blocks inhabited by 21,000 persons had been, in 1966, guided into ~~re~~organizing itself by the Institute of Urban Dynamics. Banding together in the Positive Neighborhood Action Committee the residents had begun, with professional advice but with community control, to organize block clubs and to make plans for the improvement of the neighborhood. In order to meet the need for recreational facilities, which the city was not providing, they managed to raise \$3,000 to purchase a number of empty lots for playgrounds. Although opposed to urban renewal they agreed to co-sponsor ~~e~~ with the Archdiocese of Detroit a housing project in which the block clubs would have equal control.

When the riot broke out, the residents, through the block clubs were able to organize quickly to seal off the area. Youngsters, agreeing to stay in the neighborhood, participated in detouring traffic. Even though many persons identified with the rioters as far as a rebellion against the system was concerned, only two small fires -- one of them in an empty building -- were set. There was no violence.

Many of the National Guardsmen when they arrived in the city were tired, having traveled 200 miles on trucks from their summer encampment. For some, the city was unfamiliar territory occupied by an unfamiliar people. Without training in their role as auxiliary law enforcement personnel, the Guardsmen were unable to cope with the situation with which they were faced.

A Detroit newspaper reporter who spent two days riding in the command jeep of one column, told a Commission ~~investigator~~ ^{interviewer} of machine guns being accidentally fired, street lights being shot out by rifle fire, and buildings being placed under siege on the most haphazard and sketchy reports of a sniper hiding there. One incident related by the reporter was the following:

X13 { A report was received on the radio that an Army bus was pinned down by sniper fire at the intersection. National Guardsmen and police, arriving from varying directions, jumped out and began asking each other: "Where's the sniper fire coming from?" One person said: "I think it's coming from over there." As he pointed to a building, everyone rushed about, taking cover. A soldier, alighting from a jeep, accidentally pulled the trigger on his rifle. As the shot reverberated through the darkness an officer yelled: "What's going on?" "I don't know," came the answer. "Sniper, I guess."

Without any clear authorization or direction someone opened fire upon the suspected building. A tank rolled up and sprayed the building with .50 caliber tracer bullets. Law enforcement officers rushed into the surrounded building and discovered it empty. "They must be firing one shot and running," was the verdict.

As this was occurring, the reporter went to the bus and interviewed the men who had gotten off and were crouched all around it. When he asked them about the sniping incident he

was told that someone had heard a shot. He asked: "Did the bullet hit the bus?" The answer was: "Well, we don't know."

In another instance a column of National Guardsmen reportedly opened fire upon a police command unit that had been placed upon a high building in order to deal with snipers.

Lt. General John L. Throckmorton, the regular Army officer placed in command of the combined forces, requested that the city relight the darkened streets. Mayor Cavanagh replied that he would be happy to do so if the troops would stop shooting out the lights.

X 14 { As troops were busy shooting out lights at one such location, a radio newscaster reported over the air that he was pinned down by sniper fire.

With persons of every description arming themselves, and guns being fired accidentally or on the vaguest pretext all over the city, it became more and more impossible to tell who was shooting at whom. Firemen, contrary to law, were arming themselves. One shot a fellow fireman; another shot himself. A National Guardsman and a fireman were felled by high caliber bullets whose origin it was impossible to determine.

X 15 { The Chief of Police in Highland Park, a separate political entity surrounded by the city of Detroit, recalled that one sniper proved to be an old white drunk, shooting from the top of an apartment building.

X 16 [Unverified reports received by Commission ~~investi~~^{interviewers} gators tell of street gangs roaming the city, firing a shot here and a shot there, then disappearing before the arrival of police.] National Guard gunfire killed one woman when she stood silhouetted in the window of her motel.

A four-year old girl was shot to death when troopers opened up with machine guns in response to the flash of a cigarette being lighted.

Of the 43 persons who were killed during the riot, the ^{Wayne County} ~~Detroit~~ Prosecutor's office was able to issue warrants in only six of the cases. In 8 no action was taken or recommended, because no suspect was found or the homicide was accidental. In 29 deaths, the ruling was either one of justifiable homicide, or there was insufficient evidence upon which to base any charge.

Approximately one and a half to two years before the riot, R. R., a 27-year ^{White} old coin dealer, had bought a three-story house on "L" Street, an integrated middle class neighborhood. In May of 1966, R. R., together with his wife and child, had moved to New York and had rented the house to three young men. After several months neighbors began to report to R. R. that the house was being used for wild parties.

In March of 1967, R. R. instituted ~~eviction~~ proceedings against the tenants. These were still pending when the riot broke out. On Wednesday, July 26th, R. R., concerned about what might happen to the house, decided to fly to Detroit. When he arrived, he went to his mother's house to

pick up his 17-year old brother, and another teenager. Together the three went to the house on "L" Street, where they discovered the tenants were not at home. R. R. called his attorney, who advised him to take physical possession of the house.

Taking an old .22 caliber rifle with them for protection, the three men entered the house. R. R.'s 17-year old brother took the gun into the cellar and fired it several times into a pillow in order to test it.

At 7:45 P.M. R. R. called Mrs. R. in New York and advised her that he was changing the locks on the house. At 8:45 P.M. he called her again and told her that the tenants had returned and he had refused to let them in. He also asked Mrs. R. to send the family's watchdog for protection.

At approximately the same time the National Guard received a call that: "Three unidentified white men had broken into the house, forced the occupants thereof out at gunpoint, and hauled in boxes of guns and ammunition with which they were going to start sniping, sometime after dark."

At 9:05 P.M. a National Guard column with two tanks pulled up in front of the house. A National Guard captain said that he saw a flash in an upstairs window, and shouted a warning to the occupants. Neighbors report they heard no such warning.

The three men were on the second floor of the house when a barrage of fire was unleashed against it. As hundreds

X
from
New
York?

~~Reportedly
from
New
York
Tammany~~

That is, the owner, his brother, and another friend

of bullets crashed through the windows and ricocheted off the walls, they dashed to the third floor. Protected by a large chimney, they huddled in a closet until, during a lull in the firing, they were able to hang a pink bathrobe out of the window as a sign of surrender. They were arrested as snipers.

The firing from rifles and .50 caliber machine guns had been so intense that in a period of a few minutes the house suffered more than \$10,000 worth of damage. One of a pair of stone columns was shot nearly in half.

Chaos reigned in the 10th Precinct Station to which the three men were taken. The commander of the precinct had transferred his headquarters to the riot command post at a nearby hospital. In his absence the command structure apparently broke down.

As hundreds of arrestees were brought in, officers were running this way and that, taking it upon themselves to carry on investigations and to attempt to extract confessions.

Because, they said, the metal made them a target for snipers, officers throughout the police department had taken off their badges. They had also taped over the license plates and the numbers of the cars, so that identification of individual officers became virtually impossible.

Sometime Wednesday night R. R. and his two companions were taken from their cell to an "Alley Court," the police slang for attempting to beat confessions out of prisoners. Officer W. administered such a severe beating to R. R. that the bruises were still visible two weeks later.

R. R.'s 17-year old brother had his skull cracked open, and was thrown back into the cell. He was taken to a hospital only when other arrestees complained that he was bleeding to death.

The charges against all three of the young men were dismissed at the preliminary hearing. The police officer who had signed the original complaint refused even to take the stand when he was called.

Dozens of cases of police brutality emanated from the 10th Precinct station. One of these involved the same officer W. A young woman was brought into the station and told to strip. After she had done so, as another officer took pictures, Officer W. came up to her and began fondling her. One of the pictures subsequently made its way to the Mayor's office.

On Monday, July 24th, General Throckmorton, following an inspection tour of the area, in which he had seen in indication of imminent danger, had ordered all weapons unloaded. The order was largely ignored by the National Guardsmen. By late Tuesday, looting and firebombing had virtually ceased. Yet between 7:00 and 11:00 P.M. Tuesday night there were 444 incidents reported. Most were reports of sniper fire.

During the daylight hours of July 26th there were 534 such reports. That evening between 8:30 and 11:00 P.M. there were 255. Most were unconfirmed, and many turned out to be completely unsubstantiated. Yet with the proliferation

of such reports, the pressure on law enforcement officers to discover some snipers became tremendous. Homes were broken into, and searches made on the flimsiest of tips.

X 17 { Before the arrest of a secretary in the City Assessor's office called attention to the situation on Friday, July 28th, any person with any kind of a gun in his home was liable to be picked up as a suspect.

X 18 { Of the 27 persons who were charged with sniping, 22 had charges against them dismissed at the preliminary hearings. One pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered gun and was given a suspended sentence. Trials of the remaining four -- one on a reduced charge -- are pending.

XI
②

II THE RIOT PROFILE

By the summer of 1967 the Negro ghettos of the United States had become vast reservoirs of explosive humanity. As a result of migration from rural areas and a Negro birth rate 50 percent higher than that of the white population, the ghettos, whose density was already much higher than that of surrounding areas, continued to increase rapidly in size and numbers. Approximately 50 percent of the ghetto population was made up of persons 25 years of age or younger. Inadequately educated, without salable skills in a complex technological society, the unemployment rate of this group in some areas was as high as 35 percent. Incongruous situations existed in which, as thousands of people looked for work, hundreds of job openings were available which applicants lacked the skills to fill.

See notes:
Tex

It does not appear accidental that the time of the most serious disturbances coincides with the dismissal of school, and the appearance on the streets of tens of thousands of teenagers who, unable to obtain jobs, lack adequate recreational facilities. The volatility of masses of young people congregated in one area is not essentially a Negro phenomenon. White middle class teenagers and college youths gathering in vacation resorts have created troubles for the police from Oregon to Florida and from Maine to California.

Nor are the police necessarily the precipitating element, although injudicious or inadequate police action frequently becomes a factor.

Too soft?
See notes:
Sharp

For example:

In Cincinnati the chain of events was initiated by complaints about the purported double standard of justice, and the actual spark was struck by anger at a middle class Negro's defense of the system; ~~his defense included the police, or one reason the meeting was called was to protest the arrest of Frakes -~~

In Atlanta the chain of events was initiated by a Negro private ^{security} guard's ^{detention} ~~arrest~~ of a Negro; ~~until police came to arrest him~~

In Plainfield the chain of events was initiated by the refusal of an off-duty police officer to treat a Negro-upon-Negro assault as serious. ~~him included 1 Negro & 6 whites~~ ^{S. Glasco reports that group which assaulted} ~~See Brer Intern~~

(one youth) A major police action, such as the shooting of the youth in Tampa has, in fact, been involved only infrequently. Most riots have built up in stages from a minor police arrest. Notably, mostly in smaller cities, both the residents and the police became so convinced that a riot was about to take place that this very expectation, like the buildup of opposing armies along a hostile border, tended to lead to a clash. ~~This includes over-reaction by police (ex: Englewood, Jersey City)~~

Rayon III
Newark?
Watts
See notes:
Tex
Sharpe

The riots that have taken place in the United States over the course of the past several summers, may be traced through six identifiable stages. These are:

- (1) Embryonic
- (2) Out of Control
- (3) Community Involvement
- (4) Massive Response
- (5) Breakdown of the Social Order
- (6) Control

The vast majority of the riot situations never reached the third stage. In only three cities, Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit, did a riot pass through all six stages.

1. Embryonic The focal point for the commencement of every riot has been a high density area. In the majority of cases this has been at or in the vicinity of a housing project. Where a housing project has not been involved the location has been some other centralized one where a large number of people could gather quickly.

In Atlanta it was a shopping center surrounded by over-crowded apartment buildings. ~~Do we know that they're over-crowded? There're also small homes in Dixie Hills.~~ See notes! Hunt

In Detroit -- as in Grand Rapids -- it was a main business thoroughfare, noted for the prevalence of vice, from which overcrowded apartment houses and residences were set back on both sides; and which, even under normal circumstances, is filled with numerous people.

The focal area, therefore, has always been a natural gathering place. And whereas the specific incident involving the police has often been of a secondary nature in precipitating the riot, the presence and actions of the police have contributed significantly to attracting the large number of people from which a pool of rioters could develop.

While people are, naturally, drawn to any scene of excitement, the ennui and dreariness of the ghetto tend to multiply the drawing power of an event interrupting the routine. One of the great problems of fire departments in ghetto areas

is the numerous small grass and garbage fires set, and false alarms turned in, by kids for no other purpose than to see fire engines roll down the street.

In almost every case it may be found that, as a result of the weather, more people than usual were in the streets. In 17 cities examined, the average temperature on the day the precipitating incident took place was 87 degrees, 6 degrees above normal for that date.

Weather is significant only because it brings larger numbers of people out of their homes into the streets.

The longer the police remained in the area and the more flamboyantly they, or the fire department did so -- with sirens turned on and flashing red lights -- the more they served as a magnet for people.

In Los Angeles, since the Watts riot, it has become standard procedure for the police and firemen to move in and out quickly and silently, without the use of sirens, when a potential riot condition exists.

Once numbers of residents have gathered, the assembly takes on the air of a neighborhood meeting. As descriptions of the police action on the scene are passed from mouth to mouth they become magnified and distorted. Other actions of the police in the past which, as result of the inadequacy in police procedure for handling grievances, have never been resolved and have thus been left festering in the minds of the people, are brought up. Soon the current incident is inextricably interwoven with those of the past.

Information is exchanged regarding the practices of merchants and landlords, and the injustices and indignities,

both real and fancied, suffered by the people. At this juncture the gathering may be regarded as a massive gripe session, lacking an outlet for the expression of the gripes.

If a significant official, such as the mayor, to whom the gripes may be directed, arrives on the scene, violence may usually, for the moment, be averted. If no such figure arrives, but some kind of indigenous leadership emerges from the assembly, a meeting with municipal authorities is usually sought.

The most significant exception to this process occurred in Detroit, where the action of rioters leapfrogged, almost completely, the initial stage.

The reaction of the police at this point is crucial. The reflex reaction is to disperse a crowd, especially if it is an obviously hostile crowd, from the fringes of which occasional rocks are thrown. The standard concept of law enforcement is to break up an illegal demonstration or march. There has been a failure to recognize that such tactics are not applicable to ghetto gatherings.

In the traditional demonstration or march, diverse people from diverse areas unite to protest against one specific object or one specific policy. When such a march is broken up, the physical unity of the group tends to be dissolved. As people are scattered they return to the diverse areas and pursuits which are their norm.

In Newark, no vandalism till police chased people - & they directed their anger at things other than the police.

The dynamics of the ghetto gathering are entirely different. Since such gatherings tend to be political

~~base~~
meetings of the most primeval, grass-roots nature, to disperse them is to disperse frustrations that have not had an opportunity for release. Since the people are native to the area in which they are gathering, to disperse them is the opposite of useful. When police in one city shouted to demonstrators: "Go home!" the retort was: "We are home, you go home."

If is necessary to give the
of grievances in a sense of legitimacy -
5- Though often exaggerated the
10- complaints are legitimate & have no
bottled through no other political procedure -

The folly of police action in breaking up such incipient political meetings, was most dramatically demonstrated in Plainfield and Newark, where police directly inhibited the political process, and immediately thereafter witnessed the commencement of widespread violence.

In fact, every effort should be made to contain the protest within the bounds of political expression. Although at loggerheads with her police department, the Mayor of New Brunswick, New Jersey, was vindicated in her use of political means to solve the crisis.

The key words in the ~~police~~ lexicon of riot prevention during the embryonic stage are: "Isolate and contain."

Too simple
contingent upon working
See notes:
Hunt

Police must be able to act swiftly enough and in large enough force to seal off the area in which the crowd has gathered and to prevent it, as much as possible, from scattering into business streets where longstanding grievances against commercial practices are likely to be transformed into the physical acts of window-smashing, looting and firebombing.

Simultaneously, since aggressive action by the police will almost surely aggravate the anger and resentment of the

How?
where?
is the
steam
blown off?

Negro crowds, the police should make every effort to avoid playing the role of agents provocateur. How?

In Los Angeles in 1965, for example, the actions of two Highway Patrol officers in dragging a young girl whom they believed, erroneously, had spit on them, out into the middle of the street, transformed a potentially dangerous situation into a critically explosive one.

2. Out of Control: If a crowd is frustrated by:

(1) ~~the~~ failure of municipal government to make meaningful _____?
or (2) the actions of the police; they will almost surely move into the second stage, consisting of intensified rock-throwing and window-smashing, followed by looting and burning. This is the commencement of the riot proper.

As far as has been determined, the initial participants in this activity consist almost totally of male teenagers and young adults, few of whom are over the age of 25. There is some evidence that initial attacks tend to be discriminate and made against those stores and businesses whose proprietors have incurred the most resentment of the residents.

It is at this juncture that the police have the last opportunity to control the situation. If they are unable, because of a lack of sufficient ⁷manpower, either to make arrests or to cordon off the area, riot activity will, most likely, spread to other areas of the Negro ghetto.

There is evidence, although at this moment not conclusive, that in some cities criminal elements have begun to

take advantage of the situation to systematically rob stores. The most devastating reaction occurs when police remain visible, but, because of the fewness of their number amidst a vast mass of rioters, appear to have been rendered impotent.

(In Cincinnati, although the disturbance spread, in no case were law enforcement officers outnumbered to the extent that they were not able to react and, as a result, although there were isolated actions in various portions of the city, they were easily controllable.)

In Tampa, where police were caught unprepared, they remained out of the area entirely until they were able to move in sufficient force to control the situation. Whereas this resulted in considerable destruction at one locale -- and in terms of scope of the area and numbers of the people cannot be equated with such cities as Detroit and Los Angeles -- it did effectively prevent the creation of the psychological image of a police force that has been overwhelmed.

3. Community Involvement Once it becomes apparent that arrests are not being made, spectators and bystanders, young and old, begin to join in the looting. As people see neighbors with goods in their hands walking about freely under the eyes of the police, and some of the stores from which these goods have come going up in flames, there is a rationalization that what is going to burn anyway might as well be made use of. The stigma of theft is removed and the "carnival atmosphere" that numerous witnesses have spoken of, sets in. At this stage of a riot hopes of containment must be abandoned,

Disagree!
If that was the case, why were police from that state + surrounding communities + then the Nat'l Guard called?

See notes: Hunt

But inaction by police left non-conflict leaders with a strong negative image of isolation.

and all force possible marshaled to restore law and order. *Restraint must still be exercised in the use of firearms. It doesn't help to shoot down innocent people whether or not it is intentional.*

It was the swift movement of the riot from Stage 1 to 3 and the failure of the authorities to recognize the fact that contributed to making the Detroit riot the most destructive. As rioters and looters were roaming unmolested up and down 12th Street and spreading out to other sections of the city, counter-riot teams of community workers were still moving through the neighborhoods, trying to dampen rumors and asking people to cool it. *Does this mean that authorities or community workers failed to realize it? And why shouldn't C.W. continue to try to limit involvement, anyway?*

This was activity appropriate and effective for the first stage of a riot, not the third. Simultaneously municipal authorities were continuing to proceed with a plan of operations that had been effective in the Kercheval incident the year before, when only a small number of persons within a limited area had been involved.

The fact that the Detroit riot reached, within a time of two to three hours, the stage that it had taken the Los Angeles riot, two years before, 36 hours to arrive at, points *how?* up the necessity for municipal authorities to increase the speed and effectiveness of their response. *Also response needs to be carefully discriminating so that tactics are appropriate to circumstances. (See Shellow on this)*

As massive numbers of extra-urban law enforcement personnel -- state police, National Guard and, in Detroit, Federal Troops -- are injected into the chaos of a riot, they have, in the past, -- themselves tended to exacerbate the confusion. Young National Guardsmen, many of them unfamiliar with cities or their Negro inhabitants, were plied with rumors

of snipers and guerilla warfare and a population in rebellion. As they were injected into darkened areas, the most innocuous actions of the populace began to take on sinister meanings for them. Reflections in a window were interpreted as sniper fire. A man lighting a cigarette was thought to be a fire bomber. The behavior of a drunk driver was interpreted as a kamikaze assault.

As police began using gunfire in their attempt to capture looters, and National Guard troops used their weapons for such diverse purposes as shooting out streetlights and firing at cars that failed to halt at roadblocks, reports of sniper fire spiralled upward in number. Even as looters were cleared from the streets and fires were being controlled, the intensity of the major riots incongruously heightened. In every case the death toll rose ^{perceptively} ~~precipitately~~. In every case the impression was implanted that numbers of the deaths were due to sniper fire; although law enforcement officers, who, logically, would be the target of such snipers, escaped virtually unscathed.

Which are the major riots (not defined till later)

5. Breakdown of the Social Order As the atmosphere of fear and chaos continued, some of the safeguards that society has constructed to insure the maintenance of order, and to make every person accountable for his actions, began to show signs of cracking. Arrests were made if a person was seen carrying a bag of groceries or had a suitcase of clothes in his car. People swept up en masse in the streets disappeared for days into detention facilities.

In Newark some police officers, adopting the behavior of rioters whom they had been arresting, engaged in the destruction of property. In Detroit, a police officer with an excellent record committed at least two criminal acts. In a motel, several officers, in their determination to interrogate suspects, began playing "a game," and before the game was ended, three persons had been shot to death.

Law enforcement officers began to act upon wild tips -- as in the case of the Muslim Mosque shooting in Los Angeles or the sniping reported from the house on "L" Street in Detroit -- as if they came from the most reliable of sources.

Media of mass communications reported rumors and on-the-spot items without checking on them, and by the very nature of their being broadcast, they tended to assume the authority of fact. *+ a character of sensationalism*

6. Control As the successful implementation of curfews by large numbers of law enforcement personnel successfully cleared the streets of affected cities, and fire discipline was restored to troops and police, the number of incidents reported rapidly diminished. In no case did the withdrawal of troops lead to a resumption of riotous activity.

III. ANALYSIS

For an America that had become accustomed to the Negro's acceptance, by and large, of the inferior status assigned to him, to his passive non-violent response to active acts of violence perpetrated against him, and to his never-ending reliance on legal redress to force compliance with national laws that in some sections were being ignored or evaded, the revelation that Negroes would advocate responding to force with force was a startling one.

See notes: Hunt

The demagoguery and braggadocio of Rap Brown's declarations: "We built this country up, and we can burn it down," created among whites a mood of fear and anger and a readiness to believe that organized rebellion was throbbing in the heart of every city. Many young militant Negroes, conversely, had become disenchanted with an evolutionary process that appeared to hold little promise for them in their lifetimes. Believing they had nothing to lose, they accepted the philosophy that riot was a legitimate means of protest, and that the looting of white businesses and destruction of white property in the black ghettos was, in fact, not a criminal act, but just retribution for "exploitation."

As the summer of 1967 approached, therefore, a climate had been created in which much of white America expected riots, and in which many young Negroes were willing to oblige on the slightest pretext.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

perhaps
 Actually, ~~most~~
 Negroes ~~suffered~~
 more as a
 result of
 the techno-
 logical
 revolution,
 given their
 current
 level of
 skills.

Located as they have been, at the bottom of the ladder, Negroes have been the last to benefit from the revolutionary technological and economic changes that have altered America's social structure in the past 50 years. At a time when 75 percent of America's high school graduates are going on to college, in many ghetto schools 50 percent or more of the pupils are dropping out. Until 1954 the southern schools the Negro had attended had been forced to operate on a fraction of the budget of the white schools. Teachers with inferior educations, working in inferior facilities, had produced inferior-educated pupils. As these pupils flocked and continue to flock to urban areas in one of the great migrations of history, they have been unable to compete. As their sons and daughters ~~enter~~ ^{entered} big city schools these schools, geared largely to the education of middle class children, began to have difficulty coping with the new arrivals.

The American educational system, a major factor in the growth of American affluence, began to show signs of cracking under the stress. The average Negro youngster in the 12th grade is performing at a 9th grade level.

Also, blacks
 would mean
 more
 competition
 for the
 available
 jobs -

The animosity of many American labor unions towards the Negro, an outgrowth of battles between unions and management in which Negroes were frequently used as strike-breakers, aggravated the Black man's problems in job training and employment.

Statistical studies have shown a direct relation between low employment-low income and family breakups and illegitimacy irrespective of race or nationality. In 42 percent of Negro families and 23 percent of white families with incomes under \$3,000 the man is missing from the household. Ninety-two percent of Negro families and 96 percent of white families whose income is \$7,000 or more are intact.*

Similarly, there is a direct correlation between broken families and school dropouts. Various studies have indicated that anywhere from 27 percent to 45 percent of dropouts come from broken homes. **

Thus, a repeating cycle sets in:

Inferior Education → Low Income → Family Break-up →
 Low Employment Illegitimacy

Dropouts → Inferior Education

The effect on major cities has been catastrophic.

* Social + Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States, October, 1967.

** School Dropouts. Research Division -- National Education Association.

Traditionally cities have been able to absorb an influx of underskilled and undereducated people, because the cities themselves were still expanding, and because the nation was in an earlier stage of industrial development, in which an amplitude of low-skilled jobs were available.

A generation ago an upwardly mobile family, when it moved, tended to move from one section of the city to another. Today the move is most often from the city to the suburbs. The most vigorous, revenue-producing portion of the population is, therefore, lost.

As Negroes moved into the cities to begin occupying the deteriorated and dilapidated housing that other groups reaching affluence were moving out of, the cycle in which families of migrants were entrapped began to transfer itself to the cities.

Migrants → Low Employment —→ Low Revenue
 Low Income High Crime

Greater Demand for Municipal Services —→ Increase in Tax Rates →
 Deterioration of Tax Base

Acceleration of Middle Class Flight → Replacement by Migrants

In this process, such cities as Newark and Detroit have lost their viability. Schools and services deteriorated. Such programs as urban renewal -- which have failed to take into account that, although slums may be razed, one cannot raze the people that inhabit them -- have frequently created more problems than they solved.

As the complaints of citizens, more and more of whom

were black, increased proportionately with the city's inability to meet such complaints constructively, anger and frustration mounted on both sides. Since municipal officials and the purveyors of municipal services are mostly white, and the complainants mostly black, the agony of the city began to take on the antagonisms of race.

THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

As cities are, literally, contracting upon themselves, the black core within them is expanding rapidly. Whether by design (such as a changing from a district to an at-large system of elections) or by accident, this growing concentration of black people has been largely disenfranchised. A check of 17 Eastern, Southern and Midwestern cities that were involved in disturbances during the summer of 1967, and which have Negro populations ranging from 9 percent to 52 percent, revealed them to have a total of 16 Negro councilmen (the total number of councilmen in each city ranged from 5 to 30), 16 members of the boards of education (in school systems that were as much as 76 percent Negro), and, with the notable exception of Detroit, virtually no Negroes in key appointive positions.

If this is relying on Cn'ty, that's not exactly what happened -

Even with a district system, the typical single Negro councilman is powerless within the council.

A re-writing of this sentence would clarify the meaning of this -

Not only, therefore, was the normal evolutionary process of minorities gradually being fused into government, and learning the disciplines and responsibilities thereof, being frustrated; but the ghetto populations had no one on whom they

could apply political pressure -- threatening his defeat in the next election if he failed to be responsive.

That, in present circumstances, municipal officials have been largely unresponsive, has been amply documented by Commission investigators. In one relatively small city, for example, the mayor, who had been in office more than a decade, averred himself to be "shocked by conditions" when he visited the Negro ghetto. The inability of the Newark government to visualize or adjust to the changing realities was a major contributing factor to the tensions in that city. The problem is aggravated by the fact that not only are the most restless and most militant Negroes primarily young, so that they have had little opportunity to participate in the political process, but many of them have no conception of how that process works.

clarify
A youth in Plainfield, in the belief that this was standard procedure, complained that: "The Negroes had only recently learned that the Council had not even forwarded the list of grievances to the Federal Government in Washington."

Under such circumstances the question, "Where are the Negro leaders?" asked oftentimes during the riots, takes on almost comic connotation. In fact, the middle class Negro whom whites have tended to identify as the Negro leader is, to the Negro masses, no more acceptable as a spokesman than the president of General Motors would be to the United Auto Workers.

By their reaction to violence municipal authorities have, in fact, reinforced the impression that the militants are right: that petitions may be ignored, but the use of power cannot. In Los Angeles following the riot it was discovered that with the expenditure of some effort more than 10,000 jobs could be made available to ghetto residents. In

Atlanta, grievances that had gone unanswered for months, while city officials claimed the supposed response had been planned for that date far in advance, suddenly were responded to with alacrity. In Detroit mili-

In whose eyes did these men lose it? In some places officials finally showed a willingness to talk to them, preferring them to the militants.

thus damping the activity was a response to the disorder.

tants were, for the first time, included in the city's planning. Everywhere the persons who suffered the greatest loss of prestige were the Negroes who had counseled moderation. Moderation had been responded to with platitudes; militancy with results.

Do we have the information to back up this generalization?

The very gains that the middle-class Negro has made during the past fifteen years has served to alienate the black masses from him. For these masses the civil rights drive appeared to be largely an alliance between liberal whites and the middle class Negro, its achievements benefiting the middle class.

For a man wondering whether he had enough money to buy the next meal for his family, the question of whether or not he could eat in an expensive white restaurant was academic. Traveling for a few hours on a segregated bus might be tolerable, but living under a white thumb in a decrepit shack was intolerable.

The very achievement of integration has tended to have the opposite of the desired effect. In Los Angeles, after the fire department was integrated, the percentage of Negro firemen declined to a third of what it had previously been. In Cincinnati, the number of Negroes on the police force slipped to little more than half that prior to integration. Following integration of the New Jersey National Guard, Negroes began to vanish from the ranks.

Questionable generalization: Do the examples really support it? Or are there explanations of the examples which don't support it?

Of the force or of assignments? What were the reasons? I don't think integration was the reason for the decline.

As the middle class Negro gained ground and the nation congratulated itself on his advances, to the lower class Negro the gap appeared to grow wider and wider, and he felt less and less identification.

RIOT PROCLIVITY

The more a municipality's viability has deteriorated and the larger its Negro population has become, the more likely -- it may be postulated -- it is to experience a riot. Newark underwent a cataclysmic shift in population, from more than 65 percent white to 62 percent Negro and Puerto Rican, between 1960 and 1967. The most enlightened of administrations could not have coped with a situation in which demands had far outstripped resources.

In Detroit, counting the number of whites who left the city and the number of Negroes who replaced them, there

was more than a 30 percent shift in population between 1960 and 1967.

Under such circumstances the police, as the most visible and authoritarian sign of white power, become a crucial factor. No matter with what good intentions, few, if any, of the major cities appear to have solved the problem.

Although, beginning in 1961, major efforts were made in Detroit to establish better police-community relations, Commission investigators were told that the process never reached the grass roots level; that practical difficulties prevented the patrolman in the squad car from sitting down across the table from the youth who was likely to throw rocks.

In one city where officers were compelled to attend a community relations course, it was referred to by them as "Nigger loving school." In another city that had, presumably, instituted a comprehensive community relations program, the Director of Police told Commission investigators that he did not see "much basis whatsoever to the various complaints of Negro groups as to their social and economic conditions." A captain called the program "a crock." Another captain declared that there was no doubt in his mind that "many of my men say 'you black fuck'." However, he added that he did not consider that this constituted abusive language because, in the vernacular of the community, the word "mother-fucker" is regarded as "hello."

This needs to be said even louder for white men to hear —

What problem?

What city? A reader might think that the Director was right —

In another city the Chief of Police told Commission investigators that "the majority of officers approach the Negro family with the same courtesy as a white family." The Deputy Chief, directly contradicted him, declaring that you have to use a "double standard" in dealing with Negroes. He explained that: "When you go into their homes, for example, you have to adjust to the situation," that "you cannot use the polite language that you would use in a white middle class home. You have to make a show of force, otherwise you would not be understood," because "politeness is construed as weakness."

These are the words of a man in fear -

This may be an oversimplification: Do they support in the Negro community that they do in the white. Because of the high Negro crime rate the law enforcement officer tends to view every black person as a suspect. Yet the overwhelming majority of victims of Negro crimes are Negroes --- in one Detroit precinct, where 78 percent of identified assault offenders were Negroes, 76 percent of the victims were Negroes and the complaints of the victims is that the police fail to respond expeditiously; and when they do arrive, are apt to regard the crime not as seriously as a similar offense committed in a white area. As a result the police tend to be looked upon more as a force of occupation than a keeper of law and order.

Consequently, the police have neither the image nor the support in the Negro community that they do in the white. Because of the high Negro crime rate the law enforcement officer tends to view every black person as a suspect. Yet the overwhelming majority of victims of Negro crimes are Negroes --- in one Detroit precinct, where 78 percent of identified assault offenders were Negroes, 76 percent of the victims were Negroes and the complaints of the victims is that the police fail to respond expeditiously; and when they do arrive, are apt to regard the crime not as seriously as a similar offense committed in a white area. As a result the police tend to be looked upon more as a force of occupation than a keeper of law and order.

As greater and greater areas of a city become inhabited by Negroes, precinct stations become bastions, the primary allegiance of whose defenders is not to the citizens, but to each other. Problems of police recruiting become critical.

Whites are reluctant to enter a profession in which the expectation is one of daily stress and antagonism.

Negroes are reluctant to enter a profession, the community view of which is negative, and in which Negro officers traditionally have been isolated:

It is the police, therefore, who, as a constant irritant, are most likely to inflame the Negro community.

AVAILABILITY OF OPTIONS

The recourse to violence, whether by the action of an individual, the institutionalized process of a nation's engagement in war, or the haphazard eruption into riot by a mob, traditionally tends to come as a last resort, when other options have been exhausted.

For example: For the poverty-stricken individual in a rural area the option remains to move to the city. For the resident of a small city the option remains to move to a larger city. For the people living in an area that overtly practices discrimination, the option remains to move to an area which, purportedly, does not. For the inhabitants of a city whose government is unresponsive, the option remains to elect a government that will be more responsive.

If, then, this new government proves unwilling or unable to materially improve the conditions of the people, the availability of nonviolent options has been exhausted.

In the three cities with major riots: Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit, Negroes had voted overwhelmingly for a "liberal administration" which they expected to produce

This may be
disproven
when it is
a rural southern
area erupts.

change. When this expectation proved unfulfilled, the probability of a riot became great.

In Los Angeles and Newark the explosion came five years after the election; in Detroit, six.

RUMORS AND SNIPERS

As a result of the riot climate that had been created, much of the nation's press was ready to seize upon any disturbance and describe it as a "riot." Acts of violence and destruction committed by rioters, amplified in some cities by the massive and inappropriate response of National Guardsmen and law enforcement officers, ~~were~~^{were} then further exaggerated by reporters and headline writers, until the population of the United States could believe itself, reasonably, to be faced with a state of civil insurrection in which organized guerilla bands were roaming city streets.

Rumors proliferated and sometimes had their origins in the most unexpected places. In Grand Rapids, two carloads of vacationing families were reported to be guerilla reinforcements rushing to the city. In Tampa, a Trailways bus loaded with Negroes was viewed in the same light. In Los Angeles, postal employees, arriving for a convention, were reported to be "hordes of Black Muslims." In Detroit a person with a bow and arrow was reported as a "sniper."

The sheriff of one community in New Jersey related to Commission investigators "A trick," which, he felt, "helped calm things down some." The Sheriff said that he had gotten

hold of one of his people in New York City and asked him to call one of the militant Negroes in _____. He said he asked this caller to say that that night there was going to be a showdown between people from New York City and the _____ police department, that he was bringing a lot of Negroes with guns over from Harlem, and that they were going to shoot it out with the _____ police department and it didn't make any difference who or how many people got killed. The Sheriff said that the man who had been called went immediately to the _____ police department and that he also spread the word that people should keep off the streets that night because there was going to be serious trouble from outsiders. The Sheriff believes that this "trick" had resulted in the quietest night of the whole week.

Although the devastating effect of rumors during wartime has been amply documented, there has been a failure to recognize that the spread of rumors could be even more injurious during a period of potential civil disturbance. Reporters unfamiliar with and inexperienced in the coverage of riots often accepted as fact second and third-hand accounts and expressions of opinion. Any person injured by gunfire from an unknown source, was shot by a "sniper." Officials played statistical games which turned bad situations into seemingly catastrophic ones. Impressive figures on riot injuries were compiled by such devices as listing poison ivy as a "riot-connected" injury.

One city's fire department listed 82 injuries, including such as "Fell on hand, injuring right little finger,"

"Pain in back, fell over and couldn't straighten up," and, "Fell off apparatus which moved." Only two of the men were injured by missiles and none by sniper fire, yet the overriding impression created was that many of them had been hurt as a result of direct acts against them by the populace.

A representative sample of the repertorial distortions:

TAMPA, Fla., June 13 (AP) -- Rampaging Negroes burned and looted Tampa's sprawling slums Monday for the second night, battling with about 1,000 heavily-armed police and National Guardsmen."

"Police repeatedly were pinned down by snipers throughout the night and early morning hours. A cruiser reported at 2:00 A.M. it was receiving sniper fire from two sides."

The fact: In Tampa on the second night there was only scattered, light action.

"CINCINNATI, Ohio, June 14 (AP) -- National Guardsmen -- bayonets and machine guns ready -- reinforced police today after "huge bands of marauders" had scattered racial violence, fire, looting and vandalism in Cincinnati."

The fact: The trouble was confined to individual carloads of youths riding about here and there in various sections of the city.

"ATLANTA, June 20 (UPI) -- One man was killed and three persons were wounded tonight in gun battles between Negroes and police as violence broke out for the second night."

The fact: There was no gunfire by Negroes.

The Detroit News on Saturday, July 15, reported from Ne :

"Negro rioters in hit-and-run guerilla-type attacks, spread racial violence to"

from ambush positions fought several gun battles with National Guardsmen and police." . . . "Negro youths in the riot sector told newsmen that Black Muslims took part in the violence and they mix lye with molasses -- and 'when they throw it at the cops, it sticks.'"

The Fact: There were no such hit-and-run guerilla-type attacks; there were no gun battles from ambush; and there was no molasses thrown at the police.

On July 26th the Detroit News reported:

"Three unidentified Negro youths were killed in a gun-fight behind the Algiers Motel, Woodward and Virginia Park.

"The bodies were found on the ground floor of the Algiers Manor, a three-story annex to the motel.

"Police and Guardsmen were called to the scene about midnight when sniping began from the Manor.

"Homicide Detective Edward Hayes said shots were coming from the roof and windows on all floors.

"Police and Guardsmen were pinned down for several minutes before the firing stopped."

The fact: There is no evidence that anyone fired out of the motel. Two of the youths were shotgunned down by police, and the death of the third is still being investigated. Murder charges have been filed against one officer.

On July 24th The Detroit News reported from Englewood, New Jersey:

"Police and Negro snipers exchanged heavy gunfire last night and early today as racial violence hit this New York

City suburb for the fourth straight night.

"Snipers set up a three-way crossfire at William and Jay Streets in the heart of the Fourth Ward Negro ghetto, and pinned down 100 policemen, four reporters and a photographer for more than an hour."

The fact: Kids set off a number of firecrackers.

The lead story in the July 27th edition of the Philadelphia Inquirer read as follows:

"DETROIT, July 27 (Thursday) -- Two National Guard tanks ripped a sniper's haven with machine guns Wednesday night and flushed out three shaggy-haired white youths. Snipers attacked a guard command post and Detroit's racial riot set a modern record for bloodshed: The death toll soared to 36, topping the Watts bloodbaths of 1965 in which 35 died and making Detroit's insurrection the most deadly racial riot in modern U. S. history."

"In the attack on the sniper's nest, the Guardsmen poured hundreds of rounds of .50 caliber machine gun fire into the home, which authorities said housed arms and ammunition used by West Side sniper squads.

"Guardsmen recovered guns and ammunition. A reporter with the troopers, said the house, a neat brick home in a neighborhood of \$20,000 to \$50,000 homes, was torn apart by the machine gun and rifle fire.

"Sniper fire crackled from the home as the Guard unit approached. It was one of the first verified reports of sniping by whites."

"A pile of loot taken from riot-ruined stores was recovered from the sniper's haven, located ten blocks from the heart of the 200-square block riot zone.

"Guardsmen said the house had been identified as a storehouse of arms and ammunition for snipers. Its arsenal was regarded as an indication that the sniping -- or at least some of it -- was organized."

The fact: Except for the National Guard's attack upon the house, the entire story is a fiction. There was no crackling sniper fire, no pile of loot, and, except for one old .22 caliber rifle, no storehouse of arms and ammunition. The circumstances surrounding the attack upon the house have been described elsewhere.

The overall effect of day after day of such reports beneath glaring banner headlines: "GUARD RIDDLES SNIPER'S HAVEN IN DETROIT," "TANKS MOVE INTO DETROIT'S 'ALL-OUT WAR' AFTER LETHAL SNIPERS ROUT GUARD, POLICE," "MORE RACIAL TERROR," and, "GUERILLA WAR RIPS 12th," was devastating.

Although, in three cities in which a total of 100 deaths occurred there has yet to be one verified sniper,* apparitions of snipers were everywhere. A Detroit newspaper reporter wrote that: "A rifleman gave me a short course in sniper warfare in city streets.

* Three persons are awaiting trial on sniping charges in Detroit.

"'Watch for houses with one screen off a window on the second floor,' he said matter-of-factly. 'And keep your eye peeled for second floors where one window has the shade down and the other is open a crack.'

"'Can you spot them by muzzle blasts when they fire?'" I asked.

"'No, not any more,' he said. 'They've gotten smart. They open the window a little, move way back in the room and then fire.'

"'They can snipe away for hours and you can't see them. We were even taking fire from burning buildings last night.'"

European newspapers began calling American cities Riotville, U.S.A. The Communist Press reveled in the violence, and exploited it to the hilt.

Is the Communist Press the name of a periodical? Why is it underlined? And have the riots really been exploited in communist newspapers?

CONSPIRACY AND ORGANIZATION

The Commission is conducting a continuing and extensive investigation into the question of organization in the riots. To date no evidence of a conspiracy has been found. Empirical tests tend to indicate the unlikelihood of such a conspiracy.

That it did exist? or that it may exist in the future?

Riots did not take place concurrently in major cities so as to create the greatest possible strain on law enforcement agencies. In most communities the issues were local, and in many of them militant Negroes attempted to bring about a solution of the problems by political means.

Conspirators, if they existed, were utterly inept.

In Cambridge, Maryland, ~~they scheduled~~ Rap Brown's visit was ~~scheduled~~ for the same night that the local unit of the National Guard held its weekly drill. Nowhere were industrial installations attacked, even though in Los Angeles manufacturing plants -- including one producing napalm -- worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were left unguarded. In Newark the Telephone Exchange controlling an entire section of the Eastern Seaboard was left untouched.

*Stolen
cartridges
in New Jersey?*

From Los Angeles to Plainfield fire chiefs reported that if Molotov cocktails had not been made in the most amateurish fashion their effect would have been far greater.

On a number of occasions black militants complained, both to newspaper reporters and Commission investigators, that they had been caught unprepared by the riots and therefore had not been able to exploit them.

The evidence is overwhelming that there were no "outside agitators" in any of the cities. In one community an official described a young Negro militant as "an outside agitator," only to discover that he had lived in the city all of his life.

*Brown in
Cambridge?*

In fact, rioters have concentrated almost exclusively on vandalizing and destroying businesses dealing in consumer goods that were useful, negotiable and could be transported easily. Highly flammable installations, such as gasoline stations, which would be a logical target if massive destruction were the principal intent, have escaped virtually un-

~~scathed~~

Before the summer of 1967 H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael set the trap. Their intent was to convince Negroes that only by uniting and separating themselves from the white community could they escape the genocide being planned for them. It was their contention that America would never willingly grant equality to Negroes, but that the response would be one of violence.

Didn't white society set the trap? Carmichael & Brown certainly didn't do it single-handedly.

vs: p. 6
re: their intentions
See notes:
Hunt

Hence, the greater the violence that was reported, the more grist was manufactured for their mill. They interpreted the reports of scores of snipers as evidence that the black man was uniting and had reached the stage of guerilla warfare. The reaction of authorities with massive force was, for them, proof that the campaign of genocide had gone into effect.

Overstatement

Everywhere that Commission investigators went they were told by white and black, high and low, that the riots had polarized the community. Everywhere middle class Negroes began identifying with the rioters. Everywhere the feeling was becoming prevalent among Negroes that all other options had been used up, and that now militancy was the only possible recourse.

A Negro businessman in Detroit expressed himself in sympathy with the rioters, even though two of his stores had been sacked.

A Negro police officer in Atlanta said he believed riots were a good thing because they appeared to be the only way to shake whites out of their apathy and call attention to the problem.

Questioned about his reactions, an arrestee in Detroit who, after being swept up on the streets, spent days in a fetid, improvised jail subjected to the verbal and physical abuse of officers said: "(Before the riot) I was really a passive person -- hard-working -- trying to reach this goal, trying to get that degree. That's what I wanted. And I wasn't messing with nobody. I didn't break no laws or nothing -- (went along to people) I got too much resentment inside me, or bitterness now to let it (his treatment during the riot) happen again -- to let somebody say to me, 'You have to do this.'"

"If there was another riot, you know what I think I'd do? I think I'd blow up police stations. I'd go killing this time. Oh, I'd go killing I'd kill. That's what I'd do. Man, I ain't against all white folks, man, but they don't stand by and let that happen. Yeah, that's what I'd do first -- I'd set more bombs and booby traps in the world. Kill them, just like that. I'd do it. Personally I hope there's not another riot. Because this time it's gonna go farther than it was -- it's going to spread. It's going to cause a lot of destruction -- everywhere."

As disillusion has spread among the Negroes, the philosophy of the extremists has gained more credence. Partially as a result of the Black Power Conference in Newark,

there is growing communication between Black Power adherents all over the nation. There appears, concomitantly, to be a growing unity. It would be unwise to believe that this unity may not be translated into action if the events of the summer of 1967 are repeated.

A former railroad engineer who has become a leader of the militants in Newark, and, following the riot, visited Czechoslovakia, told Commission investigators recently:

"I will make any kind of a commitment even with the devil himself if it means bringing about meaningful change for Black people. For Black people to enter the mainstream of American life, be it Communist, Socialist or whatever. The supposedly democratic process and the American way of life has not proven to me and to other Black people that it can deal effectively with the changes necessary to bring about conditions favorable to Black people."

Newark

Pg 31 #1 (H1) I assume that this ties in with a previous paragraph that makes "its" clear, and that connects "Wednesday night" to some previous event so as not to confuse it with Wed. July 12 of the riot.

Only dates we have for Blight hearings were May 27 and sometime in June.

One significant thing about the blight hearings was that the Negro community expected to change the Medical School site by attending and the city government held them only as a requisite to receive federal funds for the land clearance and relocation.

Pg 33 TPB #2

The first "strains"

came almost immediately after the election when George Richardson who had been the mayor's campaign manager left the mayor's camp over what he considered a personal affront. The mayor did not give Richardson his private unlisted number. (see Malafonte + Richardson Interview) This was aggravated further when Harry Wheeler left the mayor ~~camp~~ due to some highly publicized discrepancies in a milk money fund in the school where Wheeler taught.

The mayor lost some more Negro support in the Barringer High School construction controversy in 1963. The construction site was picketed because there were no Negroes working for the construction Co. The mayor did push an ordinance requiring all ~~city~~

~~Contracting to city~~ construction
companies contracting with the
city to hire Negroes. ~~the~~ He
~~city~~ let the Union's subvert
that victory though by using
flying squads of Negroes to
give the appearance of ~~Integration~~
integration on construction jobs.
(See Mulafonte + Curvin).

The police review board
issue came up in 1965 for the
first time. I + came to a
head with the Martinez case
(see Curvin, Hooper, Walker, Williams,
Schiff) Martinez shot and killed
a Negro youth under questionable
circumstances. Martinez was
cleared, but not to the satisfaction
of many Negroes. (He continues
to be an irritant -- he was involved
in the East-Orange border incident
on June 8 and was allegedly
(unconfirmed by police reports) on duty

in the South precinct the night
of John Smith's arrest.

pg 32 #3 (#3) - After losing on
the Police review board, the
Medical School, & the Parker
Calaghan school board issue, plus
a number of brutality cases,
Negroes felt they could not
win any victories as long
as the mayor was in office.

pg. 36 #1 (#4) the term Militant makes
no differentiation between a Henry Jones,
or Willy Wright and a George Richard-
son or ~~Timothy~~ Timothy Still.

The mayor and especially Don
Malafronte when he speaks for the
mayor tend to label any one
with a black face who disagrees
with the city administration
a "Militant" Malafronte also

consider

any disagreement with the mayor as a political threat, he left me with the very distinct impression that ~~the~~ he and the mayor considered any Negro who wanted to better the situation of the Black community was a political hack who was only trying to ~~make~~ ^{improve} his own political position. Since the mayor "had always been a strong civil rights advocate", if he did not suggest or control something then the Black community did not need it.

pg 416

(#5)

No specific mention is made here of the death of Dr. Martin Luther King. According to FBI reports, he was shot in a "gun battle" around 5:00 PM Fri. and died according to newspapers and ~~Spina~~ ^{Spina} interview about 6:30 PM. His death precipitated more violent action by the police. ~~For~~ Captain

Kinney during their interview with Spina said that Toto's death was announced over the police radio and stirred the men up. The majority of the deaths (I can not confirm times) occurred after Toto died.

Also Moran's death Saturday could be mentioned.

By 51 PP 2#6 According to NLSP report the state troopers were the principal culprits in destroying stores with soul Brother signs. NLSP reports 41 of 84 ^{of the} eyewitness accounts of separate incidents were done by State Police.

Review

~~By the summer of 1967 the Negro ghettos of the United States had become vast reservoirs of explosive humanity. As a result of migration from rural areas and a Negro birth rate 50 percent higher than that of the white population, the ghettos, whose density was already much higher than that of surrounding areas, continued to increase rapidly in size~~

high has been further by discriminatory housing practices, have become vast reservoirs of explosive youth

I²

Robert Conot

A SHORT NARRATIVE HISTORY, PROFILE,
AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF THE
SUMMER OF 1967

I. A SHORT NARRATIVE HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1967 a former second-string football player and choir singer named Hubert Geroid Brown threatened America with destruction.

"We built America up and we can burn it down," he shouted in city after city.

How was it that a nation which, during the course of the past two decades, had concerned itself more with the equality of its minorities than ever before, could have simultaneously engendered a "Rap" Brown?

In 1954 the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, et al of ~~Topeka vs Brown~~, had ruled that separate but equal facilities are inherently unequal, and that schools would have to be desegregated with all deliberate speed.

On December 1, 1955 a Negro seamstress named Rosa Parks was arrested when she refused to give up her seat to a white man on a Montgomery, Alabama bus. When the news spread through the community, a young Negro minister named Martin Luther King, Jr. organized a boycott of the bus line. It was the first implementation of the doctrine of non-violence in the civil rights struggle. It demonstrated to Negroes that, as a people, they had power that they lacked as individuals. As the case slowly wended its way through the courts, they stood firm despite intimidation, threats of violence, and use of violence by whites. Houses in the Negro section were shot at and bombed. Only the will of Dr. King prevented Negroes from ~~reacting~~ ^{reacting} to violence with violence.

The 1964 Civil Rights Act included public facilities - which would've been totally unnecessary if the Supr. Court ruled in 1956 -

See Tex's note

[By the time the Supreme Court of the United States, ~~ruled segregation in public facilities un-~~ *found to reverse lower court order ruling segregation on public transportation un-* constitutional, a significant change was in the process of

taking place in relations between the races.] As ruling after ruling of the Supreme Court placed Federal Law and the Negro side by side, the civil rights drive gained legality and stature. As the Negro saw that by unity he could obtain power, he acquired both self-respect and militancy.

A Negro janitor in Montgomery told a reporter: "We got our head up now, and we won't ever bow down again -- no, sir -- except before God!"

"Rap" Brown was a ten-year old in Baton Rouge, Louisiana when the Supreme Court delivered its ruling on integration of the schools. Yet, during the next ten years, the schools he attended were totally segregated. The son of an oil refinery laborer and a dietician, Brown, like his older brother and sister, attended the high school affiliated with Southern University in Baton Rouge. Like his older brother and sister, he went on to the university.

In 1960 he was a high school senior, considered by his teachers to be introspective and quiet, yet very much oriented toward the struggle for equality. When students at Southern University organized a sit-in at lunch counters in an attempt to integrate them, Brown's brother was one of the leaders. In order to end the demonstration, Louisiana State authorities

threatened to cut off funds for the university unless the demonstrations were curbed.

The president of the university, a Negro, capitulated. Several students were expelled. In protest, scores of others, including Rap Brown's brother, transferred elsewhere. Rap Brown, himself, however, attended Southern University until 1963 when he became a coordinator in Alabama for the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

3/22/68
4/11/2/68

SNCC had been formed in Atlanta in 1960 ~~under the aegis~~ ^{civil rights} of Dr. King in order to coordinate the activities of various ~~groups in the South.~~ ^{civil rights organizations.} It had at its inception been firmly committed to the ~~doctrine~~ ^{practice} of non-violence, and the goal of integration. Many of its workers were white. Yet the winds of change that had been expected to blow across the nation were not blowing. In the South there were hardly more Negro children in white schools than ten years previously. Elsewhere the principal effect of integration was to turn all-white schools into all-black schools.

As the drive for Negro equality continued in the South, busses were burned, demonstrators were beaten and maimed, and civil rights workers were abducted and murdered. Members of civil rights organizations, attempting to operate within the framework of the nation's laws, were jailed and prosecuted with impunity by those who opposed the laws.

As more and more of the workers suffered serious injuries and death, and little was changed as a result, more

and more began to believe that in a confrontation between moral persuasion and violence, violence would be the victor. The turning point was reached in the summer of 1963.

The most massive demonstrations the South had seen began in Birmingham, Alabama. The white response was a series of bombings that inflamed Negroes. Retaliation against whites in the form of rock-throwing and burning of white-owned property began. A series of bloody battles ~~were~~^{was} fought with the police. The culmination came in the quiet of one Sunday morning. As a group of Negro children sat in Sunday school, a bomb exploded beneath the church. Four young girls were killed. No one was ever tried for the murders. The sacrifice had achieved virtually nothing. Birmingham remained as white supremacist as ever.

see notes of Ike + EV

Yet all over the nation, Birmingham had forged a bond among Negroes. Psychologically they had marched with the marchers, suffered with the injured, and become more and more embittered at the authorities.

In the November, 1965 issue of the Michigan Law Review the Honorable George Edwards, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and former Police Commissioner of Detroit, wrote: "Episodes like those experienced in Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, in Oxford and Neshoba County, Mississippi, add to the police problems in every section of the country."

In the April, 1965 issue of the "Liberator," the organ of the militants, the disaffection had grown to the extent that

a writer declared: "Either black people will be destroyed or the white American Government will be destroyed. It is a life or death struggle. This further illustrates that we have only one alternative: Unite for self-defense warfare now, or perish!"

Four months later, in August, a combination of haphazard circumstances plunged Los Angeles into the bloodiest American domestic turmoil in two decades. Within a period of two days, with virtually no organization, and relatively little effort, Negroes overwhelmed the police and infused the fibers of the nation's third largest city with fear. Negroes everywhere seized upon the riot as a demonstration that ~~Black~~ Power was both viable and practical.

The April 22, 1966 issue of the Black Muslim newspaper, "Muhammed Speaks," headlined "Coming: Bloody Conflicts in the Cities?" The thesis of the article was that, as major American cities attained a black majority, "The white power structure will not 'willingly' yield to the democratic concept of 'majority rule.'"

By the spring of 1967, Stokely Carmichael and "Rap" Brown were saying that "You can't turn your back on violence, because you can't live in America if you're black and be non-violent." [Proclaiming ever-more stridently that America was conducting "genocide" against the black man, they were themselves in the process of killing SNCC. Its white supporters had either been expelled or had deserted. Its supply of funds

See
at the
note of
Diane
(REV?)

was rapidly drying up.] [Only if Carmichael and Brown could, simultaneously, convince white America that a revolution was in the making, and Black America that white America would respond to black grievances with a policy of suppression and violence, could they hope that their words would be heeded by the masses; that they themselves could attain the stature of leaders.]

The trap had been baited and set. The question remained, would it be sprung?

See
at the
notes of
Dane,
Ira,
Ike,
Ev,
Mel

Intro:

pp 5-6

Is SNCC dead?

They may have been killing white support of SNCC and, always low on funds, this probably hurt.

But, is SNCC dead?

p. 6 1st sentence

That's rough.

And if they haven't attained the status of leaders, what black man in this nation has - today?

TAMPA

VII

On Sunday, June 11, Tampa, Florida lay somnolent in the 94⁰ heat. A humid wind ruffled the bay, where thousands of persons had watched the hydroplane races. Since early morning the Police Department's Selective Enforcement Unit, designed as a riot control squad, had been employed to keep order. *at the races.*

At 5:30 p.m., a block from the waterfront, a photo supply warehouse was broken into. Forty-five minutes later, as gathering clouds were shadowing the sun, two police officers spotted three Negro youths as they walked near the State Building. As the youths caught sight of the officers they ducked into an alley. The officers gave chase. As they ran, the suspects left a trail of photographic equipment scattered from the yellow paper bags they were carrying.

The officers transmitted a general broadcast over the police radio. As other officers arrived on the scene, a dangerous game of hide and seek began through and around the streets, houses, and alleys of the neighborhood. When Negro residents of the area adjacent to the Central ^{Park} Village Housing Project became aware of the chase, they began to participate. Some attempted to help the officers in locating the suspects.

R.C. Oates, one of the 17 Negroes on the 500-man Tampa police force, spotted 19-year old Martin Chambers, bare to the waist, wriggling away from him beneath one of the houses. Oates called for Chambers to come out and surrender. Ignoring

him, Chambers emerged in a running crouch from the opposite side of the house. A white officer, J. L. Calvert, took up the pursuit.

Pursuing Calvert, in turn, were three young Negroes, all spectators. Behind one of the houses a high cyclone fence created a two-foot wide alley twenty-five feet in length.

As Chambers darted along the fence, Officer Calvert rounded the corner of the house. Calvert yelled to him to halt. Chambers ignored him. Calvert, who had flunked his last marksmanship test, raised his .38 revolver and fired.

Chambers, the slug entering his back and passing completely through his body, raised his hands over his head, clutched at the cyclone fence, and requested to be taken to a hospital.

^{they} When the three youths running behind Officer Calvert came upon the scene, ^{they} assumed Chambers had been shot standing in the position in which they saw him. Rumor quickly spread through the neighborhood that a white police officer had shot a Negro youth who had had his hands over his head and was trying to surrender.

The ambulance that was summoned became lost on the way. As minute following minute stretched into a quarter hour and then beyond, the ever-gathering crowd viewing the bloody, critically injured youth became ever-more belligerent.

Finally, the Reverend M. L. Newman told police they'd better get the boy out of there. Officer Oates loaded Chambers

Good narrative, based on official conclusions; But are these conclusions firm?

?

Det

X

X

X

into his car and drove him to the hospital. He died shortly thereafter.

As officers were leaving the scene, the storm broke. Beneath the pelting rain the spectators scattered. When an officer went back to check the area he found no one on the streets.

A few minutes after 7:00 P.M., the Selective Enforcement Unit, tired and sun-parched, reported in from the races. A half hour later a report was received that 500 persons were gathering. A police car was sent into the area to check the report. The officers could find no one. The men of the Selected Enforcement Unit were told to go home.

? How many

The men in the scout car, had not, however, penetrated into the Central Village Housing complex where, as the rain ended, hundreds of persons poured from the apartments. At least half of them were teenagers and youths. As they began to mill about, old grievances, both real and imagined, were resurrected: discriminatory practices of local stores, advantages taken by white men of Negro girls, the kicking in the face of a Negro by a white man, the lack of recreation facilities, the blackballing of two Negro high schools by the Athletic Conference, the shooting of two handcuffed Negro youths by a police officer.

? How many

When Officer Oates returned to the area it was seething with teenagers and young adults. Attempting to convince them to disperse of their own accord, he assured them a complete

~~This happened after the riot (Address in Terway)~~

Gray interview
Hammond Jones interview
Cufflinks and in police was the man while
↑ ready up

while the 4th
the man
handcuffed
of like
custody, but police had only arrested the one trigger later

~~custody, but police had only arrested the one trigger later~~ [Hammond interview]

Missing here: Name and title of Officer Coates with the initial groups; Presence and role of non-conflict leader.

It was not her brother who had been killed, but Chambers had a nickname similar to her brother's. [Coates' interview]

investigation would be made into the shooting. He believed himself to be making headway when a hysterical girl appeared crying that the police had killed her brother. Her appearance galvanized the crowd. Rocks were thrown. Police cars driving into the area were stoned. The police, relying on a previous experience when, after withdrawal of their units, the crowd had dispersed, decided to send no more patrol cars into the vicinity.

This time the maneuver did not work. From nearby bars and tawdry night spots patrons joined the throng. A window was smashed. Haphazard looting began. As fluid bands moved down the Central Avenue business district, those stores whose proprietors were particularly disliked were singled out. A grocery store, a liquor store, a restaurant were hit. The first fire was set.

according to the other lines,

Fire Dept entered area but was forced to retreat because of sniper fire

Because of the dismissal of the Selected Enforcement Unit, and the lack of accurate intelligence information, the police department was slow to react. Although Sheriff Malcolm Beard of Hillsborough County was in contact with the Department throughout the evening, it was not until approximately 11:00 P.M. that a request for deputies was made to him.

fire (after Action Report)

At approximately the same time the recall, issued earlier by the police department, began to show results. At 11:30 P.M., officers moved back into the area. Lighted by the flames of burning buildings, it was, by this time, engulfed in a full-fledged riot.

Falling power lines whipped sparks about the skirmish line of officers as it moved down the street. The popping noise of, presumably, gunshots came from the direction of the housing project. The officers did not return the fire.

It was announced over a public address system that anyone caught armed would be shot. The firing ceased. Then, and throughout the succeeding two days, law enforcement officers refrained from the use of firearms. No officer, nor any civilian, suffered a gunshot wound during the riot.

Driving along the expressway, a young white couple, Mr. and Mrs. C. D., were startled by the fire. Deciding to investigate, they took the off-ramp right into the midst of the riot. The car was swarmed over. Its windows were shattered. C. D. was dragged into the street.

As he emerged from a bar in which he had spent the evening, 19-year old J. C., a Negro fruit-picker from Arkansas, was as surprised by the riot as Mr. and Mrs. C. D. Rusing toward the Mercury stationwagon in which the young woman was trapped he interposed himself between her and the mob. As, with rocks and beer cans smashing at the windows, she was able to drive off, he pushed through to where the white man lay. With the hoots and jeers of rioting youths ringing in his ears, J. C. helped him, also, to escape.

By one A.M., police officers and sheriff's deputies had surrounded and blocked off an area several blocks square.

and because a county sheriff is the highest law enforcement officer in a county, responsible directly to the Governor, [Beard interview]

Firemen began to extinguish the flames which, by this time, had spread to several other establishments from the three businesses in which they had, originally, been set. No resistance was met. Control was soon re-established.

Because of the absence of the Chief of Police, Governor Claude Kirk placed Sheriff Beard in charge of the combined forces of the police and sheriff's departments. [This was at a meeting in the Sheriff's Office 3:00 a.m. Monday. Beard interview]

For the next twelve hours the situation remained quiet but tense. Rumors became as abundant as flies in a stable. By the afternoon of Monday, June 12, the sheriff's and police forces had both been fully committed. The men were tired. There were none in reserve.

As a precautionary measure the Sheriff decided to request that a contingent of the National Guard be made available to the city.

Late in the afternoon Mayor Nick Nuccio and Governor Claude Kirk met with the residents ^{at a school in} of the Central Park Village area ^{at the MacArthur School in the area. [After Action Report]}

X which every speaker, both white and Negro, was booed and hissed. Although there had been no massive resistance to the integration of schools and facilities in the city and officials prided themselves on the supposedly good race relations, the fact that Negroes, who make up almost 20 percent of the population, have had no one to represent them in positions of policy or power, and therefore felt that

they had no one to whom to appeal for a redress of grievances, had built up frustrations to the boiling point.

There was no Negro on the City Council; none of the School Board; none on the all-white Fire Department; none of high rank on the Police Force. Four out of every ten Negroes lived in shacks with broken window panes, leaking gas, and holes in the walls through which rats scampered. Rents were fifty to sixty dollars a month. Recreational facilities were few. Those that did exist lacked equipment and supervisors. Young toughs preempted and intimidated the children who tried to use them.

Education provided by the schools was so limited that the majority of Negroes never reached the eighth grade. Of every 1,000 Negro students who graduated from high school, only 28 could attain the minimum passing score on the State's college entrance examination.

A difference of at least three-and-a-half years in educational attainment separated the average Negro and white youth. Fifty-five per cent of the Negroes in Tampa were working in unskilled jobs. More than one half of the families had incomes of less than \$3,000 a year. The result was that 40 percent of the children lived in broken homes, and the city's crime rate was among the top 25 percent in the nation.

Although the meeting between the residents and the officials broke up without concrete results, the Governor

2
 to
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 school
 things

2
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 to
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 school
 things
 3-5
 G.I.
 Stewart
 interview

believed it had enabled the residents to let off steam.

That evening, as National Guard troops supplanted local forces in maintaining a perimeter and establishing roving patrols, anti-poverty workers went from door to door, urging citizens to stay off the streets.

X
 A reported attempt by Black Muslims to incite people failed. Although there were scattered reports of trouble from several areas of the city, and a few fires were set -- a goodly proportion of them in vacant buildings -- there were no major incidents.

(Three youths were arrested when discovered with a cache of molotov cocktails. They were white. They were the only firebugs caught during the riot.)


All during the next day false reports poured into Police Headquarters. Normal, everyday scenes took on menacing tones. Twenty Negro men, bared to the waist, and carrying clubs, were reported to be gathering. They turned out to be construction workers.

Mayor Nuccio continued, with uncertain success, to meet with residents. At their suggestion that the man most likely to carry weight with the youngsters was Coach Jim Williams, he placed a call to Tallahassee, where Williams was attending a Coaching Clinic.

An impressive-looking man with graying hair, Williams had been the football coach at the high school serving the central city. A year earlier he had become an assistant

Learning?

There were 9 in the
 version of
 (press
 of Beard?)



coach at Louisiana's Southern University, the same school Rap Brown had attended.

It was almost 48 hours after the shooting of Martin Chambers that Williams arrived in Tampa. Together with another coach he went to the Greek Stand, a hangout for kids, where, he discovered, plans were being formulated for the throwing of rocks and molotov cocktails that evening.

~~One of his football players at Southern University, J. L. C. was a resident of Tampa. Coach Williams enlisted his aid.~~

~~was~~

~~was~~

In another part of the city a physician and an attorney, both Negroes, began similarly to attempt to turn the youths into constructive behavior. The idea of a Youth Patrol,

They enlisted aid of J.L.C. a football player of Southern U. [Brookings interview] IC (4)

which would take over responsibility from police for patrolling the trouble area, was formulated. White armbands -- and later white hats -- were chosen for the purpose of identification. Sheriff Beard decided to take a chance on the

White Hat Patrol. (Brookings Interview) This same

came to conference at attorney's office in N. Tampa and

During the next twenty-four hours 126 youths, some of whom had participated in the riot, were recruited into the patrol. Of the leaders, four-fifths were high school dropouts.

Physician also organized youths in the Jackson Heights area for the same purpose. [Brookings interview; Brookings interview]

On Wednesday, the inquiry into the death of Martin Chambers was held. Upon the verdict that the officer had fired the shot justifiably and in the line of duty, apprehension rose that trouble would erupt again. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the verdict was not to their liking, the White Hats continued to keep order.

X. Concluded, and findings published by the state's attorney. (FBI report)

? this is not secure info.

On Monday, June 12th, while Tampa was ~~still~~ smoldering,
discontent erupted in Cincinnati, 940 miles to the north.
The issue there, too, was a killing.

CINCINNATI

VIII

During This Time the deaths of seven middle-aged white women were attributed to the "Cincinnati Strangler"

In October, 1965 a series of assaults on and murders of white women began, which during the following year had generated an atmosphere of fear in the city. increasing Although the newspapers were generally restrained in their treatment of the case, when it became known that the tentative identification of the strangler indicated him to be a Negro, a new element of tension was injected into relations between the races.

(?)

In December, ^{1966,} a jazz player named Postel Laskey, was arrested and charged with one of the murders. In May, of 1967, he was convicted and sentenced to death. Although two of the principal witnesses against Laskey were Negroes, many persons in the Negro community felt that because of the charged atmosphere he had not received a fair trial. They were even further incensed when a white man, convicted of ~~the~~ manslaughter

the death of (a friend) killing his mistress,

Despite the fact that the cases were ^{dissimilar,} not at all alike, there was talk in the Negro community that the difference in the severity of sentences was indicative of the double standard of justice for white and black.

Following Laskey's conviction a drive began in the community to raise funds for an appeal. Laskey's cousin, Peter Frakes, began walking the streets, carrying a sandwich board soliciting support for Laskey's appeal. advertising the "Laskey Freedom Fund" After warning him several times about his activities, police

X? Is this true?

Not: Our who was that he was collecting money sub role but that quantity he was only collecting signatures

against obstructing pedestrian traffic

arrested Frakes on Saturday, June 10, on a charge of violating the city's ~~anti loitering~~ ordinance.

[See POLICE REPORT p. 13]

(A major portion of the Negro community looked upon the ordinance as an anti-Negro one. Between January and June, 1966, of some 240 persons arrested under it, 170 had been Negro.)

Move TO INSERT on p. 20

Frakes was arrested at 12:35 A.M. on Sunday morning, June 11. That evening, concurrent with the commencement of a Baptist Convention, Dr. Martin Luther King spoke ~~in one~~ ^{at two} ~~of the~~ ^{second} churches. Following the speech, it was announced that a meeting to protest the Frakes arrest and the ~~anti-loitering ordinance~~ ^{on the grounds of} would be held the following night at a junior high school in the Avondale ~~District~~ area.

NOT SURE ANNOUNCEMENT INCLUDED REFERENCE TO "ANTI-L" ORD

Without realizing the implication, Cincinnati over the years had been making protests through political and non-violent channels more and more difficult. It seemed more and more futile to the young, militant element in the Negro community to abide by accepted procedure.

See attached

Although the city's Negro population had been rising swiftly, and in 1967 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes, there was only one Negro sitting on the City Council. In the 1950's, with a far smaller Negro population, there had been two.

This was ^{attributed} due to the fact that the city had changed from ~~District~~ ^{an at-large proportional} to ~~at-large~~ ^{an} election system in which a person's votes for nine candidates have equal weight.

reduction in Negro representation

[SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE PHRASING: ~~that~~ that the City had ~~changed~~ abolished its ~~proportional~~ representation system of election.]

Although 40 percent of the school children were Negro, there was only one Negro on the Board of Education. Of 81 members of various city commissions, only one was a Negro.

Picketing at the construction of a new ^{federal building, a new} city convention hall, ^{and a new school,} to protest lack of Negro ^{membership} representation in building trades unions, produced no results. When Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, who had led the Negroes in the Birmingham march of 1963, staged a protest against alleged discriminatory practices at the County Hospital, he and his followers were arrested for trespassing. The Rev. Shuttlesworth, sentenced to jail, had his sentence suspended and was placed on probation. By this device the court kept him under its jurisdiction, and prevented him from leading further non-violent protests.

~~we don't have info on this in our files -~~
but
Diane Phillips
can check from her personal recollection

Traditional Negro leaders drawn from an affluent and conservative middle class became more and more discredited as grandiose promises ^{at} generated ~~into~~ petty results. Of 2,000 jobs ^{openings} talked about for young Negroes in the spring of 1967, only 65 materialized. Almost one out of every 8 Cincinnati Negroes was unemployed. Two out of every five Negro families were living on the border of poverty or below.

~~bi-racial~~

A study of the West End ^{section} ~~District~~ of the city indicated that one out of every four Negro men living there was out of work. In one public housing area two-thirds of the fathers were missing from the home. Of private housing

occupied by Negroes, one-fourth was overcrowded and half was dilapidated.

In the 90 degree temperature of Monday, June 12th, hundreds of Negro kids roamed the streets. The two swimming pools available to them could accommodate only a handful. In the Avondale ~~Section~~ ^{area}, which had, ~~up to~~ ^{until} a few years before, been a prosperous middle class community, Negro youths watched white workers going to their jobs in white-owned stores and businesses. One youth began to count the number of delivery trucks being driven by Negroes. During the course of the afternoon, of the 52 trucks he counted, only one had a Negro driver.

Late in the afternoon The youths set up an impromptu ~~picket line~~ ^{road block}. Trucks were prevented from making deliveries. The police were called. Although, for the moment, trouble was avoided, dissatisfaction hung like a Damocles sword in the air.

The police department mobilized its forces for a possible disturbance. However, because of complaints from Negro militants that the police themselves were an inciting factor -- some months earlier, following a speech by Stokely Carmichael, a crowd had gathered and burned the car of a plainclothesman -- it was decided to withhold the police from the immediate area of the scheduled protest meeting, that evening.

~~It appeared as if this policy might be rewarded until, toward the close of the rally, a wealthy Negro real~~

[INSERT @ ATTACHED]

x?
(School was NOT closed. In fact, Police Chief, Director of Public Safety & Police - Comm. Relations Officer were all out of town finishing vacations & conference before school was out in anticipation of possible trouble later, graduation at some schools was called off during the riot)

and now has more than one-half of Cincinnati's Negro population

I don't know whether this is true

See attached IN SECRET (A)

The first meeting planned

estate broker arose to defend both the police and the anti-loitering ordinance. The largely youthful, militant audience was incensed. When the meeting broke up a missile was hurled through the window of a nearby church. A small fire was set in the street.

The police were able to react quickly. There was only one major confrontation between them and the mob. Little resistance was offered.

Although windows were broken in some two dozen stores, there was virtually no looting. There were 14 arrests, some of them not connected with the disturbance. Among those arrested was a former community worker, studying for a doctorate at Brandeis University. Called to the area to help get people off the streets, he was charged with loitering.

The next morning it was stated by the judge of the Municipal Court, before whom most of the persons charged were to be brought, that he intended to mete out maximum sentences to anyone found guilty of a riot-connected offense. Although the judge intended the statement to act as a deterrent against further violence, to many persons in the Negro community it appeared further evidence of discriminatory justice.

Tuesday morning, a list of eleven grievances, 11 demands stemming from the Monday night meeting was presented to the municipal government. Included were demands for repeal of the loitering law, release of all prisoners arrested during the disturbance, full employment for Negroes, and equal justice in the courts.

Spr.

Don't UNDERSTAND 'in the street'

SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL STORY ABOUT ARREST ON MON NIGHT OF MR. CHENNAUL, A 60 YEAR OLD MAN WHO WAS REPORTEDLY ASSAULTED BY THE POLICE (ARRESTED) FOUR STRIKING A POLICE MAN. HIS CASE WAS ONE OF THE ELEVEN GRIEVANCES PRESENTED TO THE CITY GOVT. THE NEXT DAY. HE IS NOW SERVING A ONE YEAR SENTENCE IN HIS WORKHOUSE

Spr

Municipal officials agreed that the city council would consider the ^{POINTS} demands. Officials, however, rejected the call that they attend an open-air meeting of residents in ~~the~~ Avondale ~~Section~~ that evening. City leaders did not want to give stature to the militants by acknowledging them as the de facto representatives of the community. Yet, by all indications, the militants were the only persons with influence on the people on the streets.

Mayor Walter ^{H.} Bachrach declared that he was "quite surprised" by the disturbance because the council had "worked like hell" to help Negroes.

When no city official appeared at the meeting that evening, the throng that had assembled quickly began to mill about. Shortly before 7:00 P.M. rocks began to be thrown. At 7:15, according to the chief of police, "All hell broke loose."

Looting commenced, fires were set, firemen were stoned. Like fragments of an exploding bombshell, the riot spread to other sections of the city. Vehicles were stoned and burned. A paper company was set afire and damaged extensively. Although the police force was at maximum strength, the confusion and rapidity with which the disorder spread made it apparent that city police would not, alone, be able to cope with it.

Shortly before 10:00 P.M., after a request for aid to surrounding communities, a call was put in to the Governor asking for mobilization of the National Guard.

NOTE -
Paper
which
was
submitted
was
entitled
"POINTS
FOR
DISCUSSION"

See
Comments
on
PAGE
107

At 2:30 A.M. Wednesday the first units of the National Guard appeared on the streets. There was a policy of restraint in the use of weapons. Few shots were fired. Despite fears of a clash between Negroes and ^{SAMs} ~~Gans~~ -- white Southern Appalachian Migrants whose economic conditions paralleled those of the Negroes -- such a clash never developed.

Even though scattered incidents occurred for three days after the arrival of the National Guard, the riot never again threatened to get out of hand.

Of 63 reported injuries, only 12 were serious enough to require hospitalization. Of the 107 persons arrested Tuesday night, when the main disturbance took place, 75 were 21 years of age or younger. Of the total of 404 persons arrested during the riot, 338 were 26 years of age or younger.

A press conference by Ray Brown on Wednesday evening, at which he presented a list of 20 demands, apparently had no little or no effect

?
What also this ending. Some thing else. He said at-out afterwards

[On Wednesday ~~noon~~ afternoon a City Council

Each ? has either a numbered note in circle ①
or a marginal note on same page

ATLANTA

VI

As Rap Brown arrived in Cincinnati on Thursday, June 15, to attempt to exploit the riot situation there, SNCC's home base of Atlanta, Georgia, was beginning to ferment. Rapid industrialization following World War II, coupled with annexations that quadrupled the area of the city, had made Atlanta a vigorous and booming community. Pragmatic business and political leaders gave to the city the reputation of the "Moderate ~~stronghold~~ stronghold of the Deep South."

misconceptions
re pre-riot
general things and
Negro people

Nevertheless, although integration of schools and facilities has been accepted, the fact that the city is the headquarters for both civil rights organizations and segregationist elements, makes the modus vivendi between the races a tenuous one.

The rapidly growing Negro population, which, by the summer of 1967, had reached an estimated 44 percent and was scattered in several ghettos throughout the city, was maintaining constant pressure on surrounding white residential areas. Blockbusting tactics were frequently and successfully utilized. On one occasion the city barricaded a road to prevent movement between white and Negro areas. The city police were constantly under pressure to keep marches and countermarches of civil rights and white supremacist organizations from flaring into violence.

Following the fatal shooting of a Negro by a police officer in September of 1966, only the dramatic ghetto

appearance of Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., without police protection, had averted a riot. X

Boasting that Atlanta had the largest KKK membership in the country the Klan, on June 4, 1967, marched through one of the poorer Negro sections. Only ^a massive police escort prevented a racial clash. X

According to Mayor Allen, 55 percent of municipal employees hired in 1967 were Negroes, and Negroes now make up approximately 28 percent of the city work force. Of 908 police department employees, 85 are Negro, one of the higher percentages among major city police departments in the nation. X

Yet the progress made has served more to reduce the level of inequality than to create equal conditions among blacks and whites. Different pay scales for black and white municipal employees performing the same jobs had only recently been eliminated. X 2, 4

Indications are, in fact, that the economic and educational gap between the black and white populations is increasing. The average white Atlantan is a high school graduate; the average Negro Atlantan has not even graduated from grammar school. X

The median income of a Negro family is less than half of white's \$6,350 a year, and 48 percent of Negroes earn less than \$3,000 a year. Fifty percent of the men work in unskilled jobs, and many more Negro women than men, 7.9 percent

as against 4.9 percent of the respective work forces, hold well-paying, white collar jobs.

Living on marginal incomes in cramped and deteriorating quarters -- one-third of the housing was overcrowded and more than half deteriorated -- families were breaking up at an increasing rate. In approximately four out of every ten Negro homes the father was missing. In the case of families living in public housing projects, more than 60 percent of the fathers are missing.

The Mayor estimated there were 25,000 jobs in the city waiting to be filled because people don't have the education or skills to fill them. Yet overcrowding in Negro schools has forced the scheduling of extended and double sessions. Although Negroes comprised 60 percent of the school population there are 14 white high schools compared to 9 Negro. Whereas the white high school student attended classes six and a half hours a day, the Negro attended only four and a half hours. In one case, elementary school children were forced to attend classes in a church.

One of the daily papers in Atlanta still advertises jobs by race, and in some industrial plants there are still Negro jobs and white jobs, with little chance for advancement by Negroes. A major industrial plant, with a work force of 26,400, has 1,910 Negro employees.

It was shortly after 8:00 P.M. on Saturday, June 17 that a young Negro, E. W., carrying a can of beer, attempted

References: FBI Report
Crawford Report + Study
Gates & Wesley Interview
27

to enter the Flamingo Grill in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center. When a ~~██████████~~ Negro ^{security on duty there} guard told the youth he could not enter, a ~~scuffle~~ ^{scuffle} ensued ~~██████████~~ ^{Police} officers ~~came to~~ ^{were called to} the guard's aid. E. W. received support in the person of his 19-year old sister, who flailed away at the ^{officers} [officers] with her purse. Another 19-year old Negro youth entered the affray. All three were arrested by the police. ⁶ ⁷

Although some 200 to 300 persons had been drawn to the scene of the incident, when police asked them to disperse they complied.

Because the area is isolated from the city in terms of transportation, and there are few recreational facilities, the shopping center is a natural gathering place.

The next night, Sunday, an even bigger crowd was hanging around.

[Crawford's study Sunday crowd 200]

During the course of the evening Stokely Carmichael, wearing plaid shorts, a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, sun glasses and sandals, appeared, together with several followers. Approaching a police captain, Carmichael asked why there were so many police cars in the area. Informed that they were there to make sure there was no disturbance, Carmichael

started dancing up and down, clapping his hands and singing words to the effect that ~~there might have to be a riot if the police cars were not removed~~. When Carmichael refused to move on as requested, he was arrested.

Although there were no further disturbances, There ⁸
note: a window was broken Sunday evening or night.
(Crawford, Gates + Wesley)

Unsubstantiated efforts by the guards to detain him for arrest.
FBI - but in conflict with Crawford notes.

was much bitterness among residents about their inability to get the city government to correct conditions and make improvements. Petitions would be acknowledged, but never acted upon. Because elections were on an at-large basis, only one of 16 councilmen was a Negro, and many black wards were represented by white councilmen.] 8

Demands for a swimming pool, for an access road to a nearby city park, for rodent and pest control, for better lighting and better garbage collection, had been to no avail. As the residents mingled and discussed their grievances, it was decided to organize ^{several committees, and to hold} a protest meeting ~~the~~ the following night.] 9

Upon his release from jail Monday morning, Carmichael declared that the black people were preparing to resist "armed aggression" by the police by whatever means necessary.] X

Shortly thereafter in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center, which had been closed down for the day, a drunk, using a broom handle, began to pound on the bell of a burglar alarm. When officers responded and requested him to stop hitting the bell, the drunk complied, and began hitting the officers. In the ensuing scuffle several bystanders intervened. One of the officers drew his service revolver and fired, superficially wounding the drunk.] 10

2 Tension rose. Approximately 250 persons were present at that evening's meeting. When a number of Negro leaders urged the submission of a petition of grievances through legal channels, the reception was tepid. When Carmichael took to] 11

the podium, urging Negroes "to take to the streets and force the police department to work until they fall in their tracks," the response was tumultuous.

The press quoted him as continuing: "It's not a question of law and order. We are not concerned with peace. We are concerned with the liberation of black people. We have to build a revolution."

As the people present at the meeting poured into the street they were joined by others. The crowd soon numbered an estimated 1,000. Fifty of these began throwing rocks and bottles at the 40 police officers on the scene.

Reinforced ^{approximately} by 200 other officers, police, firing over the heads of the crowd, quickly regained control. Of the ten persons arrested, six were 21 years of age or younger, and only one was in his thirties.

The next morning city equipment appeared in the area to begin work on the long-delayed projects demanded by the citizens. It was announced a Negro Youth Corps ~~was~~ would be established along the lines of the Tampa White Hats.

SNCC responded that volunteers would be selling their "Black brothers out," and would be viewed as "Black Traitors," to be dealt with in the "manner we see fit." add (15) ?

Nevertheless, during the course of the summer the 200 youths participating in the corps played an important role in preventing a major outbreak.

Another meeting of area residents was called for ~~the~~ evening. ^[FBI, Rev. Mrs. Crawford] At its conclusion 200 protesters were met by 300

where does this come from? never heard of it!
 Tues day

7
 ster

see note (16)

mole the cocktail

a ~~fire bomb~~ [FBI report] 30

(2)

police officers. As two police officers chased several
boys down the street, *of Molotov cocktail*
of Molotov cocktail
of Molotov cocktail

X

In response, several shots emanated from police ranks,

X

which, in that vicinity, consisted mostly of Negro officers.

The discharge from one shotgun struck in the midst of several persons sitting on the front porch of a house. A 46-year old man was killed. A 9-year old boy was critically injured.

No. Due to the ~~appearance of Mayor Brown~~ and the efforts of neighborhood workers who circulated through the area, urging the restoration of order, no further violence ensued.

Q

When H. Rap Brown, who had returned to the city that afternoon, went to other Negro areas in an attempt to initiate a demonstration against the shooting of the Negroes on the porch, he met with no response. Atlanta, *Police controlled* had weathered *Atlanta's first* its *disorderly* *1967*

crisis.

II

NEWARK

Don't have preceding page to check out about

Newark was just approaching its. At a tumultuous meeting of the Planning Board that lasted until four o'clock in the morning of that same Wednesday night, speaker after speaker from the Negro ghetto arose to denounce the city's intent to turn over 150 acres in the heart of the Central Ward as a site for the State's new medical and dental college.

See Note #1

Such was the growing opposition to Mayor Hugh Addonizio's administration by the black residents of the city that both the Planning Board and the Board of Education had been paralyzed. Tension had been rising so steadily throughout the northern New Jersey area that, in the first week of June, Col. David Kelly, head of the State Police, had met with chiefs of police of most of the municipalities to draw up plans for state police support of city police in riot situations. Nowhere was the tension greater than in Newark. Nowhere did the city administration seem less aware of it.

? ~~Totally~~ partially?

~~Over from the Superlatives~~

Founded in 1666, the city rises from the salt marshes of New Jersey where the Passaic River opens into Newark Bay, a part of the Greater New York City port complex. Although its population of 400,000 still ranks it 30th among American municipalities, for the past 20 years the city has been collapsing upon itself like a balloon from which the air is

seeping. By the 1950's it had built up vaster areas of dilapidated housing than any other city of its size in the nation. Steadily its population moved to the suburbs.

In the late 1950's the movement became a rout. Between 1960 and 1966, 80,000 white residents fled the city.

Replacing them in areas where living conditions were so bad that, according to a prominent member of the County Bar Association,

"People would be kinder to their pets," were Negro migrants,

Cubans and Puerto Ricans. In six years the city switched from 65 percent white to 52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban. Its government, however, remained almost totally white.

On both the City Council and the Board of Education, seven of nine members were white. On other key boards the ratio was the same or worse. In the Central Ward, which the medical college controversy raged, the Negro constituents and their white Councilman found themselves on opposite sides of almost every crucial issue.

The municipal administration lacked the ability to respond quickly enough to navigate the swiftly changing currents. Even had it exercised the utmost astuteness, it lacked the financial wherewithal to significantly affect the course of events.

In 1962 seven-term Congressman, Hugh Addonizio, had forged an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow long-time

Irish control of the City Hall. A chunky athlete who had been a third-string quarterback during Fordham's football heydays, he had compiled a distinguished war record. A liberal in Congress, Addonizio, when he became mayor, opened his door to all people. Negroes who had been excluded from the previous administration began to be brought into the government.

Nevertheless, progress was slow. As the Negro population bounded upward, more and more of the politically oriented found the progress inadequate.

The Negro-Italian coalition began to develop strains over the issue of the police. The police were largely Italian; the persons they arrested largely Negro. Community leaders agreed that, as in most police forces, there was a small minority of officers who abused their responsibility. This

conversely, gave an aura of credibility to malefactors who screamed "Brutality!" every time they were caught.

some very legitimate cases that never received any redress.

In 1965 Mayor Addonizio, acknowledging that there was "a small group of misguided individuals" in the department, declared that "it is vital to establish once and for all, in the minds of the public, that charges of alleged police brutality will be thoroughly investigated and the appropriate legal or punitive action be taken if the charges are found to be substantiated."

Pulled one way by the Negro citizens who wanted a Police Review Board and the other by the police, who adamantly

*see 42
No 42*

*who was his
public
my?*

*There were also
see Comm
Lifton*

opposed it, the Mayor decided to buck all complaints against the police to the FBI for investigation. Since the FBI was not conceived as an agency to investigate municipal police departments, and could act only if there had been a violation of a person's civil rights, it quickly became clear

that a complaint, after being filed, would not be heard of again.

This action was subsequently considered a double-cross by many white spokesmen. It not only did not answer complaints, they felt they had been tricked.

Nor was there much redress for other complaints. The city had no money with which to redress them.

The City had already reached its legal bonding limit, yet expenditures continued to outstrip income. \$200 million was needed for new school construction. Health and welfare costs were 20 times as great as for some of the surrounding communities. Cramped by its small land area of 23 square miles, one-third of which was taken up by Newark Airport and unusable marshland, the city had nowhere to expand.

Taxable property was, in fact, contracting as land was cleared for urban renewal and then lay fallow year after year. Property taxes had been increased beyond the point of profitable return. By the fall of 1967 they were to reach \$776 on a \$10,000 house -- more than double that of suburban communities. As a result, people were refusing to either own or renovate property in the city. Seventy four percent of whites and 87 per cent of Negroes rented the places in which they lived. Whoever was able to move to

~~Assessed or market value?~~

the suburbs, moved, yet continued to work in the city.

During the daytime Newark more than doubled its popula- ✓

tion. *Some new business did move in. i.e. Mutual Life Benefit built 6 new office buildings; Prudential 1 tower office. These provided little for Ghetto, and heightened contrast between prosperous business section and*

As a result it was forced to provide services for *deteriorating central ward in* people contributing nothing financially to the city. Yet *sight of* the city's per capita outlay for police, fire protection and *business area.* other municipal services continued to increase. By 1967

it was twice that of the surrounding area.

Consequently, there was less money to spend on education. Newark's per capita outlay on schools was considerably less than that of surrounding communities. Yet within the city's school system are 78,000 children, 28,000 more than in the 1950's. X

Most school buildings are over 50 years old. Twenty thousand pupils are on double sessions. The dropout rate is estimated to be as high as 33 percent. Over half of the adult Negro population has less than an 8th grade education.

The resulting cycle of high unemployment, family break-up and crime, was present in all its elements. An estimated 20 percent of young Negroes were without jobs. Forty percent of Negro children lived in broken homes. Despite the fact that Newark maintained the largest police force of any major

city, it also had the highest crime rate. *Also 4th highest absolute No. of dope addicts. Highest Maternal mortality rate and highest rate of new TB cases*

Under such conditions a major segment of the Negro population became more and more militant. Since they were *militant or alienated?* largely excluded from positions of traditional political

power, they made use of the antipoverty program, in which poor people were guaranteed greater representation, as a political springboard.

When it became known that the Secretary of the Board of Education intended to retire June 27, the militants proposed the city's budget director, a Negro with a master's degree in accounting, for the position. The mayor, however, had already decided upon a white man. Since the white man had only a high school education, and almost 80 percent of the school children in the system were Negro, the issue of who was to obtain the secretaryship, a lucrative and powerful position, quickly became a cause celebre.

*Isn't there a better term? Militant makes no difference in action between a Leroy Jones and a Tim George Richardson
see note*

Joined with the issue of the 146-acre medical school site, the area of which was triple the original request, an expansion regarded by the militants as a ploy to dilute black political power by moving our Negro residents -- the Board of Education battle brought on a dire confrontation between the mayor and the militants. Both sides refused to alter their positions. The impasse was complete and explosive.

Into this impasse stepped a Washington Negro named Albert Roy Osborne. A 42-year old flamboyant former wig salesman who called himself Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed, he presided over a mythical "Black Liberation Army." Articulate

Hassan helped dramatize the situation, but his importance is over played here. 37

and magnetic, Colonel Hassan proved to be a one-man show. He brought Negro residents flocking to Board of Education and Planning Board meetings. The Colonel was not afraid to speak in violent terms, nor to back his words with violent action. In one instance he tore the tape from a tape recorder, so that there would be no record of the meeting. For good measure, one of his lieutenants smashed the recorder against the wall X

As it became more and more evident to the militants that, though they might not be able to prevail, they could prevent the normal transaction of business, they began to taste victory. Throughout the months of May and June speaker after speaker warned that if the mayor continued to persist in naming a white man as Secretary to the Board of Education, and in moving ahead with plans for the medical school site, violence would ensue. The Administration played down the threats.

The state police set up a command post in the Newark armory.

On June 27th, when a new Secretary was to be named, the militants, led by CORE, disrupted and took over the meeting. The result was a stalemate. The incumbent secretary decided to stay on another year. No one was satisfied.

At the beginning of July, 44,000 unemployed were X roaming the streets of the city. Their ranks were swelled

by an estimated 20,000 teenagers who, with school out and the curtailment of the summer recreation program because of a cutback in Federal funds, had no place to go.

On July 8th an encounter between Black Muslims and police took place on the East Orange-Newark border. ^T ~~Early~~ ^{Early} on the evening of July 12th a cab driver by the name of John Smith, began (according to police reports) tailgating a Newark police car.

Smith was an unlikely candidate to set a riot in motion. Forty years old, a Georgian by birth, he had attended college for a year before entering the United States Army in 1950. In 1953 he had been honorably discharged with the rank of Corporal. A chess-playing trumpet player, he had worked as a musician and a factory hand before, in 1963, becoming a cab driver.

As a cab driver, he appeared to be a distinct hazard. Within a relatively short period of time he had eight or nine accidents. His license was revoked. When, with a woman passenger in his cab, he was stopped by the police, he was in violation of that revocation.

From the twin high-rise towers of the Reverend William P. Hayes Housing Project, the residents can look down upon the 4th Precinct Police Station and observe every movement. With its orange-red brick facade, the three-story structure looks more like a schoolhouse than a police station.

~~Smith received a broken rib and head injuries. (Medlead Report)
In a sworn statement he claims that he did not resist arrest
or use profanity to the officer and that they beat him 39
in the car and in the station. (Statement taken by Harris David of
N/LSA, July 29) The fact that Smith's arrest (justified or not)
was not gentle should come out here.~~

Shortly after 9:30 p.m., people looking out of their windows saw Smith, who either refused, or was unable to walk, being dragged out of a police car and into the front door of the station. Within a few minutes at least two civil rights leaders had received calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was being beaten by the police. Simultaneously, since Smith had, from the cab, radioed his dispatch office that he was being picked up, cab drivers all over the city were learning of the arrest.

Within minutes a crowd was forming on the grounds of the housing project across the narrow street from the station. As more and more people arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered to Smith became more and more exaggerated. These descriptions were fueled and sustained by other tales of police malpractice that, going back over the years, had been submitted for investigation but never been heard of again, so that they remained like sores festering in the minds of the people.

By 10:15 p.m. the situation had become so potentially explosive that both the Senior Inspector on the night watch and the Director of Police, Dominick Spina, were summoned to the 4th Precinct. Spina, 56 years old, a graduate of Newark (now Rutgers) University Law School, is known as a cop's cop; hard and tough, but supposedly just and fair also. Since taking over in 1962 his principal goal had been to get

9
B. J. Curvin
later called
the Cab Co. to try
to raise bail for
Smith
(Curvin Interview)

✓
Spina arrived
about 12:30
(Spina Interview
& police report)

the police out of politics, to make them professionals and get rid of the incompetents and the slough-offs.

By offering to meet with all-comers one night a week and by initiating a Citizens Observer Program in which interested citizens could ride in patrol cars, he had attempted to initiate a dialogue between the police and the population. Although the concept of the program was sound, in practice it failed to work. Few of the younger element of the population -- those that were likely to cause the most trouble -- would willingly ride in the patrol car.

When Inspector Melchior and Director Spina arrived ^{Spina not at station yet.} at the police station ^{Melchior only} they were met by a delegation of civil rights leaders and militants who demanded the right to see Melchior and interview Smith. Inspector Melchior acceded to their ^(ALL 5 P minutes Spina interview) request. When Smith appeared before the delegation it was apparent that, whatever the cause of his injuries, he needed to be examined by a doctor. Again, bowing to demands, the police agreed to transport him to a hospital. ^{The police were the cause -- whether they were justified is another question. Police were less than cooperative (Lofton)}

Both within and outside the police station the atmosphere was growing ever tenser. Carloads of police officers, ^{Police reinforcements were arriving as the crowd grew.} summoned as reinforcements, were arriving. Subjected to a gauntlet of catcalls, taunts and curses, some of them replied in kind. Three of the civil rights leaders inside the station decided to attempt to disperse the crowd -- ^{Lofton and still were poverty program workers, not necessarily civil rights workers. Curvin the only civil rights workers} numbering some 200 to 300 persons, almost all of them

young -- by telling them a protest march to City Hall would be organized on the following day. The people at this time were still gathered on the grounds of the housing project on the opposite side of the street from the station, and there had been no physical confrontation between them and the police.

As the men were talking to the crowd, one or more Molotov cocktails, arced against the brick wall of the police station and splattered harmlessly to the ground.

A few minutes later a formation of police officers, exiting from the back door, waded into the assembled group in order to drive it away from the station. Lofton and Curvin pleaded with the police for more time to disperse the group peacefully. It was agreed that they could have 15 minutes more. They decided that, in order to move the crowd out, they would organize a march on City Hall immediately instead of waiting until the following day.

The protesters had now been augmented by an estimated 25 cab drivers who, upon hearing of Smith's arrest, had decided to stage a rally of their own. They began taking on passengers for the short trip to the City Hall. As Curvin climbed to the top of an automobile, rocks started flying. Someone yelled: "Man, get off that damn cow!" Automobiles were set on fire. It was approximately midnight when a fire engine, arriving on the scene, was pelted with bricks.

Lofton and Curvin still claim that police charged again before and broke up picket line, then rocks started to fly and

Curvin told to get off car, Many Negroes claimed they were given less than 15 minutes - (Curvin, Hooper)

*Police charge before
rocks according to L. P. Mc
+ still Lottom says they
came out without orders from
Inspector (NLS) minutes of July 24)*

and bottles. The police, their heads protected by World War I
? tin helmets, sallied forth in full force. The marchers, who
were still in the process of forming, were scattered. A
few minutes later down the street the first liquor store was
broken into. Spina ~~arrived~~ *arrived about this time (NLS minutes)*

However, by about 2:30 A.M., the disturbance appeared
to have run its course. *Spina says only about 10 stores
that night were looted. (Spina interview)* ✓

The next afternoon the Mayor described it as an isolated
incident. Invited to appear before and talk to the people
at a protest rally being organized at the housing project,
he is reported to have declined the invitation. He did agree
to the demand to the naming of a Negro to the rank of Captain
in the Police Department and announced that he would set up
a panel of citizens to investigate the Smith arrest. To one
civil rights leader this sounded like "The same old song" and
he walked out. Other observers reported that the Mayor seemed
unaware of the seriousness of the tensions. The police were,
not Unbeknown to the Mayor they were mobilizing almost half
of the strength of the department for that evening. Within
the Negro community there were reports that police had begun
arresting teenagers for investigative purposes. Tension
continued to mount.

Nowhere was the tension greater than at the Spirit House,
the gathering place for Black Nationalists, Black Power

]+?

What are militants?

advocates, and militants of every hue Black Muslims, Orthodox Moslems, and members of the United Afro-American Association, a new and growing organization who follow in general the teachings of the late Malcolm X, came to mingle and exchange views.

??

The two police-Negro clashes, coming one on top of the other, coupled with the unresolved political issues, had created a mood of rebellion.

In the Hayes Housing Project across the street from the 4th Precinct Police Station, leaflets were being passed out announcing a "Police Brutality Protest Rally." Television cameramen were on hand to film the demonstration. Kids were performing for the cameras.

A picket line was formed to march in front of the police station. At 6:30 P.M. James Treatt, Executive Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission, arrived to announce to the people in front of the station the decision of the Mayor to form a citizens group to investigate the Smith incident, and to elevate a Negro to the rank of Captain.

The response from the loosely-milling mass of people was derisive. One kid shouted "Black Power" several times.

A rumor spread that Smith -- who had been released in the custody of his attorney -- had died. Rocks were thrown at Treatt. Missiles began hurtling against the walls of the police station. Within the station the anger of the police

Threat asked that the picket line be suspended against the protests of the organizers so he could make his announcement (Hush)

X

officers was intense. After a short period of time they were given an order to break up the demonstration. There was, reportedly, little restraint on either side. The language employed was that of the ghetto. Anyone who failed to move was moved by force.

Following this, while some members of the crowd turned to throw rocks at the police station, others scattered in all directions. Soon reports of looting began to come in. Without enough men to establish control, the police set up a perimeter around a two-mile stretch of Springfield Avenue, one of the principal business districts, where bands of youths roamed up and down smashing windows. Grocery and liquor stores, clothing and furniture stores, drug stores and cleaners, appliance stores and pawnshops were the principal targets. Periodically police officers would appear and fire their weapons over the heads of looters and rioters.

By midnight activity appeared to begin to taper off. The Mayor told reporters the city had turned the corner.

As news of the disturbance had spread, however, people had flocked into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with impunity, many spectators bowed to the temptation and began helping themselves.

Without the necessary personnel to make mass arrests, police were shooting into the air to clear stores. A Negro boy was wounded by a .22 caliber bullet fired by a white man riding in a car. X Guns were reported stolen from a Sears

Roebuck store. Looting, fires, and gunshots were reported from an ever-wider area. Between 2:00 and 2:30 A.M. on Friday, July 14, the mayor decided to request Governor Hughes to dispatch State Police and National Guard troops. The State Police arrived with a sizeable contingent before dawn.

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During the course of the morning the Governor and the Mayor, together with police and National Guard officers, made a reconnaissance of the area. The police escort guarding the officials arrested looters as they went. By noon the National Guard had set up 137 roadblocks, and state police and riot teams were beginning to achieve control. X The three-way command structure: City Police, State Police, and National Guard, however, worked poorly. The City and State Police did not operate on the same radio wave-lengths. Each did many things the other did not find out about until later.

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At 3:30 P.M. that afternoon, the family of Mrs. D. J. were standing near the upstairs windows of their apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furniture store on Springfield Avenue. Three carloads of police officers rounded the corner. As the police yelled at the people in the furniture store, they began running.

X

The police officers opened fire. A bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apartment. A moment later she heard a whine from the bedroom. Her three-year old daughter,

Debbie, came running into the room. Blood was streaming down the left side of her face, where the bullet had entered her eye. She spent the next two months in the hospital. She lost the sight of her left eye and the hearing in her left ear. (See N. 5)

On the street Horace W. Morris, associate director of the Washington Urban League who had been visiting relatives in Newark, was about to enter his car for the drive to Newark Airport. With him were his two brothers and his 73-year old stepfather, Isaac Harrison. About 60 persons had been on the street watching the looting. As the police arrived, three of the looters cut across the street directly in front of the group of spectators. As the police began firing at the looters, bullets plowed into the spectators. Everyone began running. As Harrison, followed by his family, headed toward the apartment building in which he lived, a bullet kicked his legs out from under him. Horace Morris lifted him to his feet. Again he fell. Mr. Morris's brother, Virgil, attempted to pick the old man up. As he did so, he was hit in the left leg and right forearm. Mr. Morris and his other brother managed to drag the two wounded men into the vestibule of the building, which was jammed with 60 to 70 frightened and angry Negroes.

Bullets continued to spatter against the walls of the buildings. Finally, as the firing died down, Morris -- whose

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stepfather succumbed to his wounds that evening -- yelled to a sergeant that innocent people were being shot.

"Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," was the reply.

"They don't have guns; no one is shooting at you," Morris said.

"You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant yelled.

Heavy sniper fire was, in fact, being reported from all over the city. *Two hours later from when? No time given for Morris's report.*

Two hours later three blocks away on Beacon Street, X *5:30 p.m.*
W. F. told J. S., whose 1959 Pontiac he had taken to the station for inspection, that his front brake needed fixing. J. S., who had just returned from work, said, "Okay," went to the car which was parked in the street, jacked up the front end, took the wheel off, and got under the car. X

The street was quiet. More than a dozen persons were sitting on porches, walking about, and shopping. None heard any shots. Suddenly several state troopers appeared at the corner of Springfield and Beacon. J. S. was startled by a shot clanging into the side of the garbage can next to his car. As he looked up he saw a state trooper with his rifle pointed at him. The next shot struck J. S. in the right side.

At almost the same instant, K. G., standing on a porch, was struck in the right eye by a bullet. Both he and J. S. X

were critically injured.

By nightfall most of the looting and burning had been ended, and there were no longer any mobs on the street.

At 8:00 P.M. Mrs. L. M. bundled her husband, her husband's brother and her four sons into the family car to drive to the White Castle Restaurant for dinner. On the return trip her husband, who was driving, panicked as he approached a National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, then quickly swerved around. When the family reached home, everyone began piling out of the car. Ten-year-old Eddie failed to move. Shot through the head, he was dead.

Reports of sniper fire continued to increase. ~~It~~ ^{The fire} was, according to National Guard reports, "Deliberately or otherwise inaccurate." Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey Department of Defense, testified before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that "There was too much firing initially against snipers" because of "confusion when we were finally called on for help and our thinking of it as a military action."

A high-ranking Newark police official said that "There probably had not been as much sniping as everyone thought."

Some of the misconceptions were due to the lack of communications. The state police had placed men on rooftops but other law enforcement personnel remained unaware of this. Other misconceptions could be traced to the fact that the

8:00 P.M.'s
~~night-~~
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~~It~~ ^{The fire} was, ~~according to~~ ^{what was} ~~Deliberately or otherwise inaccurate.~~ ^{deliberately} ~~Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey Department of Defense, testified~~ ^{inaccurate?} ~~before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that~~ ^{five or reports}

In discussion of sniping it should be made that one shot could often be reported numerous times, i.e. by nearly every witness or Guardsman who heard the shot. Also an M-1 slug carries 4900 ft. When it lands it could cause a report. (Spina interview)

National Guard troops lacked riot training. They were, according to the same Newark police official, "young and very scared," and had had little contact with Negroes.

Within the Guard, itself, contact had certainly been limited. Although, in 1949, out of a force of 12,529 men there had been 1,183 Negroes, following the integration of the Guard in the 1950's the number had declined until, by July of 1967, only 303 Negroes were left in a force of 17,529 men.

On Saturday, July 15, Dominick Spina, the Director of the Newark Police, received a report of snipers in the Hayes Housing Project. When he arrived he saw approximately 100 city and state police officers and National Guardsmen hiding in corners and lying on the ground all around the edge of the courtyard. Since everything appeared quiet and it was broad daylight, Spina walked out directly into the middle of the courtyard. Nothing happened. A few minutes later, as he stood there, he heard a shot. All around him the troopers jumped, believing themselves to be under sniper fire. A moment later a young Guardsman came running from behind a building and plopped down into another hiding place. The Director of Police went over to where the soldier had crouched down, and asked him if he had fired the shot. The soldier said "yes," he had fired to scare a man away from a window; that his orders were that no one had a right to be standing at a window.

The Director of Police remained at the housing project for three hours, and there was no shot fired except the one by the Guardsman.

By six o'clock that evening two columns of National Guardsmen and state troopers were directing mass fire at the Hayes Housing Project in response to what they believed were snipers.

On the 10th floor, Eloise Spellman, the mother of several children, fell, a bullet through her neck.

Across the street a number of persons, standing in an apartment window, were watching the firing directed at the housing project. Suddenly several troopers whirled and began firing at the spectators. Mrs. Hattie Gainer, a grandmother, sank to the floor. X

A block away Rebecca Brown's two-year old daughter was standing at the window. As Mrs. Brown rushed to drag her to safety, she was framed in the window. A bullet spun into her back. All three of the women died. X

A number of eye witnesses, at varying times and places, reported seeing bottles thrown from upper story windows. As these would land at the feet of an officer he would turn and fire. Thereupon, other officers and Guardsmen up and down the street would join in.

In order to protect his property, B. W. W., the owner of a Chinese laundry, had placed a sign saying "Soul Brother"

in his window. Between 1:00 and 1:30 A.M. on Sunday, July 16, he, together with his mother, wife and brother, was watching television in the back room. Up to that point of the night the neighborhood had been quiet. Suddenly B. W. W. heard the sound of jeeps, then shots.

Going to an upstairs window he was able to look out into the street. There he observed several jeeps, from which soldiers and state troopers were firing into stores that had "Soul Brother" signs in the windows. During the course of three nights, according to dozens of eye witness reports, law enforcement officers shot into and smashed windows of businesses that contained signs indicating they were Negro-owned.

At 11:00 P.M. on Sunday, July 16th, ^{Note No 6} Mrs. Lucille Pugh looked out of the window to see if the streets were clear. She then asked her 11-year old son, Michael, to take the garbage out. As he reached the street and was illuminated by a street light, a shot rang out. He died.

This fact could be more important possibly in a 1963 report

No snipers were arrested. Of the 250 fire alarms, many were false, and only 13 were considered by the city to have been "serious." Four-fifths of the \$10,251,000 worth of damage was incurred due to stock loss. Damage to buildings and fixtures was under \$2 million.

Of twenty-one civilians who died as a result of gunshot wounds, all were Negro. One was 73-year old Isaac Harrison.

~~our figures have 23 deaths due to gunshot (later report)~~

Six were women. Two were children.

On the evening of Monday, July 17, a Catholic priest saw two Negro men walking down the street. They were carrying a case of soda and two bags of groceries. An unmarked car with five police officers pulled up beside them. Two white officers got out of the car. Accusing the Negro men of looting, the officers made them put the groceries on the sidewalk, then kicked the bags open, scattering their contents all over the street.

Telling the men, "Get out of here," the officers drove off. The Catholic priest went across the street to help gather up the groceries. One of the men turned to him: "I've just been back from Vietnam two days," he said, "and this is what I get. I feel like going home and getting a rifle and shooting the cops."

That Thursday the Black Power Conference began in Newark.

~~Should there be a little more about what happened after riot? ie, Police dog hearings, Winman's beating, Spina's suit (in the neighborhood of \$1,000,000) against John Smith who is now on city welfare. (telephone conversation with Anna Mae Sheppard.)~~

~~In general Newark is probably more tense now than last summer. Halloween night a curfew was imposed and trouble expected. — "Polarization" of whites and Negroes.~~

III

NORTHERN NEW JERSEY

As reports of looting, snipers, fire and death fanned outward towards other Negro enclaves in northern New Jersey, a web of tension began forming. Whenever one strand of that web was agitated, the whole web rippled. Everywhere Negro ghettos existed -- Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Plainfield, New Brunswick -- people had friends and relatives living in Newark. Everywhere the telephone provided a direct link to the scenes of violence. The telephonic messages, expressing the minority point of view, frequently were at total variance with reports being transmitted by the mass media.

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As hoary stories from Newark grew in number, fear and anger interwove themselves within the Negro ghettos. Conversely, rumors amplified by radio, television and the newspapers -- especially with regard to guerilla bands roaming the streets -- created within the white communities a sense of danger and terror. To Mayor Patricia Q. Sheehan of New Brunswick, it seemed as if, "~~Almost~~ There was almost a fever in the air." She went on to say: "Rumors were coming in from all sides on July 17th. Negroes were calling to warn of possible disturbances; whites were calling; shop owners were calling. Most of the people were concerned about a possible bloodbath." It was her opinion that: "We are talking ourselves into it."

*(Except New
negroes ~~Became white when
was negro)~~)*

Everywhere there was the same inequality with regard to education, job opportunities, income, and housing. Everywhere there was the same lack of representation of Negroes on the local government. In six New Jersey communities with sizeable Negro populations, there were only a total of five Negro Councilmen. In a half dozen school systems in which Negro children composed as much as half of the school population, there were only a total of six members of the Board of Education. ~~In none~~ ^{virtually} of the municipal governments did a Negro hold a key position. In each of the ghettos the Negro felt himself surrounded by an intransigent wall of whites.

?

See Note

In four cities: Bloomfield, Harrison, Irvington, and Maplewood, forming an arc about Newark, out of a total population of more than 150,000, only 1,000 were Negroes. In the six cities surrounding Plainfield, out of a population of more than 75,000, only 1,500 were Negro.

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Two northern New Jersey communities, Jersey City and Elizabeth, had had ~~minor~~ disturbances in 1964. The view from Jersey City is that of the New York skyline. Except for a few imposing buildings, such as those of the high-rise New Jersey Medical Center, much of Jersey City is a collection of nondescript and deteriorating houses, fleshed out with factories and cut up by ribbons of super-highways and railroads.

As one of the principal freight terminals for New York City, Jersey City's decline has paralleled that of the railroads.

As railroad lands deteriorated in value and urban renewal lands were taken off the tax rolls, the city suffered a catastrophic decline in assessed valuation, from \$465 million in 1964 to \$367 million in 1967. The tax rate, according to Mayor Thomas J. Whelan, has "reached the point of diminishing returns."

Urban renewal projects intended to clear slums and replace them with low-cost housing have resulted, actually, in a reduction of 2,000 housing units. "Planners make plans and then simply tell people what they are going to do." Negroes complained in their growing opposition to such projects.

Wooden sewers serve residents of some sections of the city. Outworn brick sewers in other sections, collapse frequently, backing up the sewage. ^{The Henderson St. Renewal area has been declared blighted for SIX years. Much of it is inhabited, but no repairs have been made for SIX years.} The population clamors for better education for its children; but the school system has reached its bonding capacity. By 1975 it is estimated that there will be a net deficit of 10 elementary and one ~~high school.~~

Recently the mayor proposed to the Ford Foundation that it take over the operation of the entire educational system. The offer was declined.

A large percentage of the white population send their children to parochial schools. As a result, because they

According to a Negro leader who formerly worked in Jersey City, and now lives in New York, anyone who "rocks the boat" immediately finds himself harassed by the police, cut off from welfare and perhaps out of a job. It is noted a number of potential Negro leaders have left the city in recent months.

have not had to utilize the public school system, white residents have been slower to move out than in other cities.

The Negro population remains relatively small; only 15 per cent of the total, it is confined within one limited area. There is little Negro political leadership. What does exist is fragmented and indecisive. Although the amount of schooling whites and Negroes have had is almost equal, the median family income of whites is \$1,500 more than Negroes.

Living only a Christian and common who have virtually no ties to the ghetto pov. Source!

See Note #2

~~See~~
~~Source~~
interest attached

The police department, like Newark's, one of the largest in the nation for a city of its size, still retains some of the flavor described by a successful white executive: "We were accustomed to the Special Service Division of the Police Department. If we were caught hanging around we were picked up by the police and taken to the city hospital and beaten with a rubber hose."

A city official, questioned about Negro representation on the police force, replied that it was 34 times greater than 20 years ago. Twenty years ago it had consisted of one man.

A hard-nosed, but realistic police captain who commands and lives within the precinct with the highest Negro concentration, insists that his men adapt to the mores of the population and be able to get along with the people. If they can't, they are transferred from the precinct. It is

the captain's opinion that the greatest degree of tension arises when policemen from outside the precinct come in in order to make arrests or quell disturbances. Such police officers do not understand the problems and the social habits of the people and are therefore apt to react with undue force.

During the four days of the Newark riot, when the city became awash with tales of all descriptions, Mayor Whelan announced that if there were any disturbances he would "meet force with force." The ghetto area was flooded with police officers.

On Monday and Tuesday, July 17 and 18, when crowds gathered and a few rocks were thrown, mass arrests were made. Only one store was broken into and the pilferage there was limited to items such as candy and chewing gum.

One man died. He was a Negro cab driver whose cab a Negro boy threw a Molotov cocktail.

A chicken and an Orthodox Moslem combined to keep Elizabeth cool. As in Jersey City, police had beefed up their patrols, and the very presence of so many officers contributed to the rising tensions. Residents of the 12-block by 3-block ghetto, jammed between the New Jersey Turnpike and the waterfront, went around muttering: "We are being punished but we haven't done anything."

"The community," another said later, "felt it was

See Note #3

See Note #3

OR

had thrown

The mayor announced a police

showing no mercy to the lawless

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(source: Newark Post)

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in a concentration camp."

Kids from the two high-density housing projects concentrated in the area were walking around saying: "We're next, we might as well go."

About 11:30 p.m. Monday, July 17th a window was broken. Commented a businessman: "Down here in the port it's a business as usual when one store window is broken each week. What is normal becomes abnormal at a time like this."

Soon other windows were being broken. As police arrived in force, groups scattered and began breaking windows further down the street. A Molotov cocktail was thrown at a tavern. Fire engines arrived. They were pelted with rocks. Community workers began circulating through the area, desperately attempting to get kids off the street. Many of them had relatives and friends in Newark. Based on what had happened in Newark, they feared that if the violence were not curbed it would turn into a bloodbath.

One worker discovered kids, siphoning gasoline into soda bottles from a truck in an alley. He managed to talk them out of the Molotov cocktails.

The confrontation between the police and the mob of teenagers and youths was progressing toward a climax when a chicken fluttered out of the shattered window of a poultry market. One youth attempted to throw gasoline on it and set it afire. As the gasoline sloshed onto the

pavement, the chicken leaped. The flames merely singed its feathers. A gangline six-foot youth attempted to leap upon the chicken. The bird was too quick for him. As it darted out of his way, he slipped and tumbled against a tree.

The stark unwitting comedy broke the tension. People laughed. Soon they began to drift home.

The following day tensions in the area mounted again as police patrolled the 36 square blocks with 220 men, some of them stationed on rooftops. ^{late in the afternoon} ~~Early in the evening~~

the mayor agreed to meet with a delegation of 13 community leaders. ^{when} ~~After~~ they had entered his office ^{the city's Director and} ~~he called in~~ the chief of police ^{were already present.} ~~and read~~ an executive order to:

^{any sniper} ^{later} "Shoot to kill." ^{He indicated that} ~~Force~~ would be met with superior force, ^{the Mayor after calling the meeting to order} ~~he said.~~ Any deviation from this order by an officer would be cause for dismissal.

The delegation from the community did not react favorably. They proposed the setting up of a "peacekeeper task force." The mayor agreed to let them try. One-hundred armbands with the words "peacekeeper" were printed. One of those who agreed to be a peacekeeper was Hesham Jaaber. Jaaber, who officiated at Malcolm X's funeral and has made two pilgrimages to Mecca, is a leader of a small sect of Orthodox Moslems. A teacher of Arabic and the Koran at

the Spirit House in Newark, he is a responsible militant ^{? / 5,} whose existence the Mayor said he had not been aware of, but with whom he thought he could work in the future. Although Jaaber believed that certain people were sucking the life blood out of the community-- "Count the number of taverns and bars in the Elizabeth port area and compare them with the number of recreation facilities" -- he had witnessed the carnage in Newark and believed it could serve no purpose to have a riot. Two dozen of his followers, wearing their red fezzes, took to the streets to urge order. He himself traveled about in a car with a bullhorn.

As the peacekeepers began to make their influence felt, the police withdrew from the area. There was no further trouble.

On the night that Dr. Nathan Wright was holding his Black Power Conference in Newark, his niece was attending an integrated party in Englewood. X

In the community of 28,000, one-fourth of whom are Negro, the police had been expecting a riot since two weeks before Newark. As part of this expectation they had tested tear gas guns on the police firing range situated in the middle of the Negro residential area. The wind blew the tear gas into surrounding houses. The occupants were enraged.

The day following the outbreaks in Elizabeth and Jersey City, police began warning the businessmen in Englewood to prepare for a riot.

On Friday, July 21, on the report that crowds were gathering, police issued a general alarm. Three-hundred police officers from ^{31 + County Police} surrounding communities were brought into the city. As rumors of an impending riot swept the city numbers of curious citizens began gathering at street corners.

220 Source interviews with Mayor + Sheriff.

At 9:00 o'clock that evening a fire truck responded to an alarm. ^{the fire which Mayor says ~~this~~ was started by a fire bomb.} It was pelted with rocks. As policemen arrived to provide protection some members of the bands of unemployed Negro youths who regularly hung out at street corners began breaking store windows. The windows

damaged were apparently selected at random. A paint store window was broken but a jewelry store window was left untouched. There was no looting. ^{Some looting in two grocery stores} Police, sealing off the area, quickly contained the disturbance.

See Note #4

This was true on the first night in the business section. Note #4

Abetted by the authorities, the press magnified the nature of the disturbance manifold. Among the distortions was a report that police were pinned down by crossfire from snipers. When an investigation was made later, it was determined that the crossfire had consisted of kids setting off firecrackers in a park.

Auxiliary Forces were on duty for 6 nights. Heaviest action was on the first night and after that it was contained in an 8 block area in Negro section. There were a number of abortive attempts to hold meetings. (Source Mayor County Association)

F. Sharp

Page 54 # 1 (A) In New Brunswick and Jersey City Negroes do hold key positions, ie Commissioner in a commission form of Government in New Brunswick and Director of Health and Welfare, Jersey City. In J.C. especially Julian Robinson Health and Welfare Director has considerable political power due to his connections with Fred Martin an old-line Negro politician who ~~was~~ is part of the Kenny machine.

In Neither city do these men represent the Negroes in the ghetto to any great extent, so if the statement is qualified to this effect it is incontrovertible.

Pg 56 #1 (#2)

Model Cities

Application estimates 1966 Negro population at 23%, and Puerto Rican population at about 5% giving Jersey City a Non-white population of 28%.

1960 census give Puerto Ricans population at about 7,000. Estimates by priest working with the Puerto Ricans ~~say~~ claim there are now 18,000 to 20,000 Puerto Ricans in Jersey City (See Interview with Father Call)

The Negro and Puerto Rican area forms sort of a belt along the Eastern and Southern part of the city, with the exception of one low-income housing project which is 90-95% Negro in the western part of the city. The Negro area is rapidly spreading south and west, but few Negroes live outside ~~of~~ the fringes of this area.

Pg 57 Note #3

No discussion

of Jersey City is complete without mention of the political system. It is important to put Mayor Whelan's statements and hard line policy in this context. The Hudson County Democratic Machine is possibly the most powerful political machine in the country. It is run now by 76 year old John V. Kenny who spends most of his time in Miami. Kenny took over in the early '50's from Frank Hague, who ruled from the early 30's and died just after world war II. Whelan ~~may~~ claims to be somewhat of a renegade, but he still would have to make very significant compromises with the machine.

There are several reasons why Mayor Whelan's hard-line

stand worked in Jersey City last summer. ① In the past year and a half ^{two Negro} boys have been shot ^{and wounded} inside one of the high schools, by police called in to keep order.

The policeman, a Negro, who did the shooting is still on duty and reportedly shot and killed a man in a dispute over a parking spot.

② In the 1964 disorder several people were seriously injured by police gunfire.

③ The National Guard armory on the edge of the Ghetto area was a staging area for the Guard going into Newark. Armed guardsmen, tanks, and ^{Personnel} carriers were visible during the time of the Newark riots.

Page 61 #3 (#4) 3 businesses (2 grocery stores and a lunchroom owned by the man who owned one of the stores) were looted and fire bombed a number of times. The stores allegedly practiced unfair credit procedures. These were in the heart of the riot area on the corner of Jay and Humphrey Streets. (Source Mayor + Police Chief)

Any mentions to be made of Patterson or Bridgeton? Patterson appeared to be well handled; Bridgeton was not very significant except for KKK activities preceding riot.

PLAINFIELD

IX

It was the city that produced the 1956 Decathlon champion, Milt Campbell, that experienced New Jersey's worst violence outside of Newark.

A pleasant, tree-shaded city of some 45,000, Plainfield has a growing Negro population which, by 1967, was estimated to be nearly 30 percent of the total. As in Englewood, there was a sharp division between the Negro middle class, which lived in the "gilded ghetto," and the unskilled, unemployed and underemployed poor.

The political and social structure of the community, geared towards meeting the needs of the suburban middle class, was unprepared to cope with the problems of a growing underskilled and undereducated population. Accustomed to viewing politics as a gentleman's pastime, they were startled and upset by the heat and intensity with which demands issued from the ghetto. Usually such demands were met obliquely, rather than head-on.

For example, in the summer of 1966, trouble was narrowly averted over the issue of a swimming pool for Negro youngsters. In the summer of 1967, instead of having built the pool, the city began bussing the children to the county pool a half-hour's ride distant. The service was not free. The fare, 50 cents per person for a round trip, would be prohibitive on a frequent basis for poor families with numbers of children.

Pressure increased upon the school system to adapt itself to the changing social and ethnic background of its pupils. There were strikes and boycotts. It was estimated that two-thirds of the school dropouts were Negro.

In February of 1967 the NAACP, out of a growing sense of frustration with the municipal government, tacked a list of 19 demands and complaints to the door of the city hall. Most dealt with discrimination in housing, employment, and in the public schools. By the summer of 1967 the city's common council had not responded. Although two of the 11 council members were Negro, both represented the "gilded ghetto." The poverty area was represented by two white women, one of whom had been appointed by the council after the elected representative, a Negro, had been transferred by his company and had moved out of the city.

The week prior to the Newark outbreak, trouble had arisen in Plainfield during the course of a routine arrest in one of the housing projects. A woman, after she had been handcuffed, had fallen down a flight of stairs. The officer said she had slipped. Negro residents claimed he had pushed her. When a delegation went to city hall to file a complaint, they were told by the city clerk that he was not empowered to accept it. Believing they were being given the run-around, the delegation, angry and frustrated,

departed.

On Friday evening, July 14, the same police officer involved in the arrest was moonlighting as a private guard at a diner frequented by Negro kids. He was, reportedly, number two on the community's "ten most-wanted" list of disliked police officers. The list itself was colorblind. Although out of 82 officers on the force only 5 were Negro, two of the ten on the "most-wanted" list were Negro.

The two officers most generally respected in the Negro community were white.

Although most of the kids at the diner were of high school age, there was one husky youth in his mid-twenties who had a reputation as a bully. Sometime before 10:00 p.m., as a result of an argument, he hit a 16-year old boy and split his face open. As the boy lay bleeding on the asphalt, his friends rushed to the police officer and demanded that he call an ambulance and arrest the offender. Instead, the officer walked over to the boy, looked at him, and reportedly said: "Why don't you just go home and wash up?" He refused to arrest anyone.

Although a police car ultimately arrived to take the boy to the hospital, the youngsters at the diner were in-

censed. They believed the episode portrayed the double standard of law enforcement among white and black. They believed that, had the two participants in the incident been white, the older youth would have been arrested, the younger taken to the hospital immediately.

In order to go from the diner to the housing project in which most of them lived, the youths had to traverse four blocks of the city's business district. As they walked, they smashed 3 or 4 windows. It was a challenge to the police: "If they won't do anything about that, then let's see them do something about his." Two weeks earlier a white man had broken a whole streetful of windows.

On one of the quiet, suburban streets, two young Negroes, D.H. and L.C. had been neighbors. D.H. had graduated from high school, attended Farley-Dickenson College, and, after receiving a degree in psychology, had obtained a job as a reporter on the Plainfield Courier-News.

L.C. had dropped out of high school, become a worker in a chemical plant, and, although still in his 20's, had fathered seven children. A man with a strong sense of family, he liked sports and played in the local basketball league. Active in civil, he had, like the civil rights organizations, over the years, become more militant. For a period of time he had been a Muslim.

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Shortly after midnight, in an attempt to cap the eruption, D.H. and the two Negro councilmen met with the youths in the housing project. Although the focal point of the youths' bitterness was the attitude of the police-- until 1966 police had used the word "nigger" over the police radio and one officer had worn a Confederate belt buckle and had flown a Confederate pennant on his car-- their complaints ranged far and wide over local and national issues. The issues were diverse. There was an overriding cynicism and disbelief that government would, of its own accord, make meaningful changes to improve the lot of the lower class Negro. An overriding belief that there were two sets of policies by the people in power, whether they were law enforcement officers, newspaper editors, or government officials: One for white Americans, and one for black.

There was little confidence that the two councilmen whom the youths regarded as "Uncle Toms," and who, of course, did not represent the poor section, could exercise any influence. However, on the promise that meetings would be arranged that same day, Saturday, with the editor of the newspaper and with the mayor, the youths agreed to disperse.

At the first of these meetings the youths were, apparently, satisfied by the explanation that the news-

paper's coverage was not deliberately discriminatory. The second meeting with the mayor, however, which began at 7:00 o'clock that evening, proceeded badly. The Negroes present felt that the mayor was complacent and apathetic, and that they were simply being given the usual lip service, from which nothing would develop.

The mayor, on the other hand, told Commission investigators that he recognized that "Citizens are frustrated by the political organization of the city," because he, himself, has no power and "each of the councilmen says that he is just one of eleven and therefore can't do anything."

After approximately two hours, a dozen of the youths walked out, indicating an impasse and signalling the break-up of the meeting. Shortly thereafter window smashing began. A tree was set afire by a Molotov cocktail. One fire engine, in which a white and Negro fireman were sitting side by side, had a Molotov cocktail thrown at it; the white fireman was burned.

There was apparent discrimination as to which store windows were smashed, at least in the beginning. Liquor stores and taverns, especially, were singled out. Some of the youths believed that there was an excess concentration of bars in the Negro section, and that these were an unhealthy influence on the community.

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Because the police department had mobilized its full force, the situation, although serious, never appeared to reach the point of getting out of hand. Officers made numerous arrests.

At three o'clock Sunday morning a heavy rain began to fall, scattering whatever persons remained on the streets. The chief of the fire department told Commission investigators that it was his conclusion that "individuals making firebombs did not know what they were doing, or they could have burned the city."

In the morning police made no effort to cordon off the area. As white sightseers and churchgoers drove by the housing project there were sporadic incidents of rock-throwing and violence. During the early afternoon these accelerated.

L.C., together with two officials of the city's Human Relations Commission, decided to call another meeting to draw up a formal petition of grievances. As the youths gathered it became apparent that some of them had been drinking. A few kept drifting away from the parking lot where the meeting was being held to throw rocks at cars passing. It was decided to move the meeting en masse to Greenbrook Park, a county park several blocks away.

Between 150 and 200 persons, including almost all of

the rockthrowers, piled into a caravan of cars and headed for the park. At approximately 3:30 p.m. the Chief of the Union County Park Police arrived to discover the group being addressed by David Sullivan, Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission. He "informed Mr. Sullivan he was in violation of our park ordinance and to disperse the group." Sullivan and L.C. attempted to explain that they were in the process of drawing up a list of grievances, but the Chief remained adamant. They could not meet in the park without a permit, and they did not have a permit.

After permitting the group 10 to 15 minutes grace, the Chief decided to disperse them. "Their mood was very excitable," he reported, and "in my estimation no one could appease them so we moved them out without too much trouble. They left in a caravan of about 40 cars, horns blowing and they yelling, headed south on West End Avenue to Plainfield."

Within the hour looting became widespread. Cars were overturned, a white man was snatched off a motorcycle, and the fire department stopped responding to alarms because the police were unable to provide protection. After having been on alert until midday, the Plainfield Police Department was caught unprepared. At 6:00 p.m. only 18 men were on duty. Checkpoints were established at crucial

at approximately 7:15 p.m., the County Prosecutor arrived in Plainfield with approximately 12 men from his detective division and approximately 12 sheriff's officers. Upon their arrival, they heard shots fired around police headquarters. The Prosecutor therefore directed the sheriff's officers to take positions

at intersections in an effort to isolate the area as much as possible.

around the building to prevent it. He directed his detectives to assist the Plainfield police department in patrolling the streets.

At one of the intersections, three blocks from the housing project, Officer John Gleason, together with two reserve officers, had been posted. Gleason was a veteran officer, the son of a former lieutenant on the police department. Shortly after 8:00 p.m. two white youths, being chased by a 22-year old Negro, Bobby Williams, came running towards the post.

As he came in sight of the police officers, Williams stopped.

Source: Kaplan's interview

When D.H., the newspaper reporter, saw Officer Gleason he was two blocks from his post. Striding after Williams, ever deeper into the ghetto area, he had already passed one housing project. People in small groups were milling about everywhere. In D.H.'s words: "There was a kind of shock and amazement," to see the officer walking by himself so deep in the ghetto.

Suddenly there was a confrontation between Williams and Gleason. Some witnesses reported Williams had a hammer in his hand. Others say he did not. When D.H., whose attention had been momentarily distracted, next saw Gleason he had drawn his gun and was firing at Williams. As Williams fell to the ground, critically injured, Gleason turned and began running back toward his post.

Does this adequately spell out the ⁷¹ different versions of this event?

Negro youths chased him. Gleason stumbled, regained his balance, then had his feet knocked out from under him. A score of youths began to beat him and kick him. Some of the residents in the apartment house attempted to intervene, but they were brushed aside. D.H. believes that, under the circumstances and in the atmosphere that prevailed at that moment, any police officer, black or white, would have been killed.

Didn't Gleason die later?

After they had beaten Gleason to death, the youths took D.H.'s camera from him and smashed it. Fear swept over the ghetto. Many residents were convinced, on the basis of what had occurred in Newark, that law enforcement officers would come into the ghetto shooting, bent on vengeance. There was no lack of weapons. People began actively to prepare to defend themselves. One man sent his family out of the city and barricaded himself behind his door with a shotgun.

From a nearby arms manufacturing plant 46 carbines were stolen. They were passed out in the street by a former newspaper boy. Law enforcement officers, backed up by National Guardsmen, threw a cordon about the area, but made no attempt to enter it except, occasionally, to rescue someone. Reports of sniper firing, wild shooting, and general chaos continued until the early morning hours.

to Add INSERT A (Separate sheet)

By daylight Monday New Jersey state officials had

begun to arrive in the city. At a meeting in the early afternoon it was agreed that to inject police into the ghetto would be to risk bloodshed. That, instead, law enforcement personnel should continue to retain their cordon, while residents patrolled the area themselves.

All during the day various meetings took place between Government officials and Negro representatives. Police were anxious to recover the stolen weapons. Negroes wanted assurances against retaliation.

At 8 p.m. the mayor, accompanied by two State officials, went to the housing project and spoke to several hundred Negroes. The crowd was hostile. There were demands that ~~city~~^{the} officials give concrete evidence that they were prepared to deal with Negro grievances. Again, the meeting was inconclusive. The officials returned to City Hall.

At 9:15 p.m. L.C. rushed in averring that, as a result of the failure to resolve any of the outstanding problems, violence was about to explode anew. The key demand of the militant faction was that those who had been arrested during the riot should be released. State officials decided to arrange for the release on bail of 12 arrestees charged with minor violations. Reciprocally, L.C. agreed to try to arrange for the return of the stolen carbines by noon on Wednesday.

At 4 o'clock Tuesday morning a dozen prisoners were released from jail. Plainfield police officers considered this a sellout.

When, by noon on Wednesday, the stolen carbines had not been returned, the Governor decided to authorize a mass search of the area. At 2 p.m. a convoy of State Police and National Guard troops prepared to enter the area. In order to direct the search as to likely locations, a handful of Plainfield police officers were spotted throughout the 28 vehicles of the convoy. As the convoy prepared to depart, the State Community Relations Director insisted that the Plainfield Police was such that to permit them to enter the area would be to run a serious risk of violence.

Colonel David Kelly of the New Jersey State Police considered this estimate of the situation ridiculous. However, the views of the State Community Relations Director prevailed. As the search for carbines in the community progressed, tensions increased rapidly. According to witnesses and newspaper reports, some men in the search column began to destroy property, leaving apartments they had gone through a shambles.

An hour and a half after it was begun, the search, which had proven to be an exercise in futility, was called off.

Their removal from the convoy had, Plainfield Police

officers felt, been their crowning humiliation. A half hour after the conclusion of the search, in a meeting charged with emotion, the entire Department threatened to resign unless the State Community Relations Director left the city. He bowed to the demand. On Friday, exactly a week after the first outbreak, the city began returning to normal.

Under such circumstances the police, as the most visible and authoritarian sign of white power, become a crucial factor. No matter with what good intentions, few, if any, of the major cities appear to have solved the problem. (5)

Although, beginning in 1961, major efforts were made in Detroit to establish better police-community relations, Commission investigators were told that the process never reached the grass roots level; that practical difficulties prevented the patrolman in the squad car from sitting down across the table from the youth who was likely to throw rocks.

In one city where officers were compelled to attend a community relations course, it was referred to by them as "Nigger loving school." In another city that had, presumably, instituted a comprehensive community relations program, the Director of Police told Commission investigators that he did not see "much basis whatsoever to the various complaints of Negro groups as to their social and economic conditions." A captain called the program "a crock." Another captain declared that there was no doubt in his mind that "many of my men say 'you black fuck'." However, he added that he did not consider that this constituted abusive language because, in the vernacular of the community, the word "mother-fucker" is regarded as "hello."

In another city the Chief of Police told Commission investigators that "the majority of officers approach the Negro family with the same courtesy as a white family." The Deputy Chief, directly contradicted him, declaring that you have to use a "double standard" in dealing with Negroes. He explained that: "When you go into their homes, for example, you have to adjust to the situation," that "you cannot use the polite language that you would use in a white middle class home. You have to make a show of force, otherwise you would not be understood," because "politeness is construed as weakness."

Consequently, the police have neither the image nor the support in the Negro community that they do in the white. Because of the high Negro crime rate the law enforcement officer tends to view every black person as a suspect. Yet the overwhelming majority of victims of Negro crimes are Negroes -- in one Detroit precinct, where 78 percent of identified assault offenders were Negroes, 76 percent of the victims were Negroes, ~~and~~ the complaints of the victims is that the police fail to respond expeditiously; ~~and~~ ^{that,} when they do arrive, ^{they} are apt to regard the crime not as seriously as a similar offense committed in a white area. As a result the police tend to be looked upon more as a force of occupation than a keeper of law and order *in the ghetto,*

~~As greater and greater areas of a city become inhabited by Negroes, precinct stations become bastions, the primary allegiance of whose defenders is not to the citizens, but to each other. Problems of police recruiting become critical.~~