

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Robert Conot

DATE: January 18, 1968

FROM : Roger Waldman

SUBJECT: Newark Profile

The sworn testimony taken in Newark varies from the profile as follows:

p. 37 - Carry-over paragraph. Hassan tore the tape from a stenographic machine, not a tape recorder. His lieutenant, Captain Rafik, did smash a tape recorder against the wall, but this was a separate machine. Rafik also threw the Housing Authority map across the room. Curvin 10 & 11

p. 40 - Last paragraph. The carloads of police officers were not reinforcements; they were officers reporting in for a new shift. Melchior 8

p. 41 - First full paragraph. The molotov cocktails were thrown just as Still had finished talking and was stepping down; not as he was talking. More important, while it appears that the firebombs did no structural damage, it is somewhat misleading to say they splattered harmlessly. They may have started a fire in the station house, Melchior 12, certainly caused a large flareup, Still 11, and were the cause of the police charging outside. Lofton 10, Melchior 12

formed p. 41 - Second paragraph. The police did not exit from the back door, did not wade into the assembled group, and did not have the purpose of driving the group away. Rather they exited from the front door and found a skirmish line in front of the station house. Melchior 13, Curvin 29, Still 11-12

p. 41 - Last paragraph. No one saw cabs in the area but Curvin, and he places the hour of their arrival as after the police had cleared the crowd. Curvin 34 This late hour makes sense, as the cabs, according to the police, did not get to City Hall until 1:30.

Rocks did not fly while Curvin was speaking. Curvin finished, and he and Still began organizing the crowd for a march, Still at the head, Curvin at the rear. Part of the crowd was already moving, and the



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

vanguard had reached Belmont Avenue when others still in front of the station house set fire to a car and started throwing rocks. Curvin 31-34, Still 13-17, Hush 10-13, Malchior 17, Contra Lofton 17-20

p. 42 Second paragraph. According to Curvin, it sounded like "a record playback" rather than "the same old song." Curvin 37

p. 43 - Third paragraph. Six-thirty appears to be too early. Several policemen put the rock throwing at after 7:30, virtually none at before 7:00. Spéna, Exhibit Y

p. 48 - Fourth paragraph. The quote is "I don't believe there was as much sniping as we thought at the time the insurrection was on" Spéna 84

p. 49 - Carry-over paragraph. The quote is "inexperienced untrained National Guardsmen who had never been in combat, who had never experienced bullets." Spéna 84

p. 45 - Second paragraph. Spéna denies that there was anything the state police or National Guard did that he did not find out about until later, Spéna 81-83. But given the communication set-up, Spéna 79-80, and the overload problem, Spéna 83, I find this hard to believe.



### Section 3

#### PROFILE -- ATLANTA -- FINAL

¶ On Saturday, June 17, as

~~Because~~ (the National Guard was being withdrawn from  
*an accumulation of grievances were welling up in*  
Cincinnati, Atlanta, ~~was beginning to ferment.~~

¶ Rapid industrialization following World War II, coupled with annexations that quadrupled the area of the city, ~~made~~ made Atlanta a vigorous and booming community. Pragmatic business and political leaders *(worked to give it a)* ~~gave the city the~~ reputation of *as* the Moderate Stronghold of the Deep South.\*

Nevertheless, *despite acceptance, in principle, of* ~~although~~ integration of schools and facilities ~~has been accepted in principle,~~ the fact that the city is the headquarters for both civil rights organizations and segregationist elements created a strong and ever-present potential for conflict.

The rapidly growing Negro population, which, by the summer of 1967 had reached an estimated 44 percent, and was scattered in several ghettos throughout the city, was maintaining constant pressure on surrounding white residential areas. ~~"Blockbusting" tactics by~~ *engaged in "blockbusting tactics"* some real estate agents to stimulate panic sales by white homeowners, ~~were frequently and successfully utilized.~~ The city police were continually on the alert to keep marches and counter-marches of civil rights and white supremacist organizations

\* A block is considered to have been "busted" when one Negro family has been sold a home in a previously all-white area.

from flaring into violence.

In September, ~~the~~ 1966, following a fatal shooting by a police officer of a Negro auto thief who was resisting arrest, only the dramatic ghetto appearance of Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr. had averted a riot.

Boasting that Atlanta had the largest KKK membership in the country, the Klan, on June 4, 1967, marched through one of the poorer Negro sections. A massive police escort prevented a racial clash.

According to Mayor Allen, 55 percent of municipal employees hired in 1967 were Negroes, <sup>bringing</sup> ~~and Negroes now make~~ <sup>to 28 percent.</sup> ~~up approximately 28 percent~~ of the city work force. Of 908 police department employees, 85 are Negro. ~~This is~~ a higher proportion of Negroes than in most ~~of the other~~ major city police departments in the nation.

<sup>91 To the Negro community, however, it appeared that</sup>  
The progress made, ~~however, has~~ served only to reduce the level of inequality. Equal conditions for blacks and whites remain <sup>ed</sup> ~~will~~ a hope for the future. Different pay scales for black and white municipal employees performing the same jobs <sup>had been</sup> ~~were~~ only recently eliminated.

The economic and educational gap between the black and white populations may, in fact, <sup>have been</sup> ~~be~~ increasing. The average white Atlantan <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ a high school graduate; the average Negro Atlantan had not ~~graduated~~ from grammar school.

In 1960 the median income of a Negro family was less

than half of the white's \$6,350 a year, and 48 percent of Negroes earned less than \$3,000 a year. Fifty percent of the men worked in unskilled jobs, and many more Negro women than men, 7.9 percent as against 4.9 percent of the respective work forces, held well-paying, white collar jobs.

Living on marginal incomes in cramped and deteriorating quarters -- one-third of the housing <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ overcrowded and more than half deteriorated -- families <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ breaking up at an increasing rate. In approximately four out of every ten Negro homes the father <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ missing. In the case of families living in public housing projects, more than 60 percent are headed by females.

<sup>Allen</sup> The Mayor <sup>A</sup> estimated there were 25,000 jobs in the city waiting to be filled because people don't have the education or skills to fill them. Yet overcrowding in many Negro schools forced the scheduling of extended and double sessions. Although Negroes comprised <sup>4</sup>/<sub>60</sub> percent of the school population, there <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ 14 "white" high schools compared to 9 Negro. <sup>9</sup> The city has integrated its schools, but de facto segregation as a result of housing patterns has had the effect of continuing separate schooling of nearly all white and Negro pupils.

Whereas ~~White~~ high school students attended classes <sup>6 1/2</sup> ~~six and a-half~~ hours a day; Negroes in high schools with double sessions attended <sup>4 1/2</sup> ~~only four and a-half hours~~.

One ~~of the daily papers in Atlanta~~ <sup>newspaper continued to</sup> ~~still~~ advertise <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ jobs by race, and in some industrial plants there ~~are~~ Negro

jobs and white jobs, with little chance for advancement by Negroes.

Shortly after 8:00 P.M. on Saturday, June 17, a young Negro, E. W., carrying a can of beer, attempted to enter the Flamingo Grill in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center. When a Negro security guard told the youth he could not enter, a scuffle ensued. Police officers were called to the guard's aid. E. W. received help from his 19-year old sister, who flailed away at the officers with her purse. Another 19-year old Negro youth entered the fray. All three were arrested.

Although some 200 to 300 persons had been drawn to the scene of the incident, when police asked them to disperse, they complied.

Because the area is isolated from the city in terms of transportation, and there are few recreational facilities, the shopping center is a natural gathering place. The next night, Sunday, an even bigger crowd was on hand.

~~As they mingled, residents discussed their grievances. They~~  
~~residents~~ were bitter about their inability to get

the city government to correct conditions and make improvements. Garbage sometimes was not picked up for two weeks in succession. Overflowing garbage cans, littered streets, and empty lots cluttered ~~with junk~~ <sup>breeding</sup> ~~residents~~ ~~standing~~ grounds for rats. Inadequate storm drains led to flooded streets. Although residents had obtained title to several ~~empty~~ lots <sup>for use as</sup> ~~that could be converted to~~ playgrounds, the city failed to provide the equipment and men necessary to convert them.

The area lacked a swimming pool. A nearby park was inaccessible because of the lack of a road. Petitions submitted to the mayor's office for the correcting of these and other conditions <sup>were</sup> ~~would be~~ acknowledged, but the ~~response~~ ~~was almost always one of words, not deeds.~~ <sup>not acted upon.</sup>

Since only one of the 16 aldermen was a Negro, and a number of black wards were represented by white aldermen, many Negroes felt they were not being properly represented on the city government. The small number of elected Negro officials appeared to be due to a system in which aldermen are elected at large, but represent specific wards, and

must reside in the wards from which they are elected. Because of the quilted pattern of black-white housing, white candidates <sup>were</sup> ~~have been~~ able to meet the residency requirements for running from predominantly Negro wards. Since, however, candidates are dependent upon the city-wide vote for election, and the city has a white majority, few Negroes <sup>had</sup> ~~have~~ been able to attain office.

~~As the residents of the area mingled in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center, they discussed their grievances.~~  
<sup>by the Dixie Hills residents</sup>  
A decision was made to organize ~~several~~ committees and to hold a protest meeting <sup>next</sup> ~~on~~ the following night.

~~Since~~ The headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) is located in <sup>Atlanta, its</sup> ~~the city, it was~~  
~~a simple matter for agitators from that extremely militant organization to arrive at the scene. The organization's~~  
former president, Stokely Carmichael, wearing a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, appeared, together with several companions. Approaching a police captain, Carmichael asked why there were so many police cars in the area. Informed

~~that they were there to make sure there was no disturbance, Carmichael, clapping his hands, declared in a sing-song tone of voice that there might have to be a riot if the police cars were not removed. When Carmichael refused to move on as requested, he was arrested.~~

~~On~~ <sup>the next</sup> ~~Upon his release from jail Monday~~ morning, Carmichael declared that the black people were preparing to resist "armed aggression" by the police by whatever means necessary.

Shortly thereafter in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center, which had been closed down for the day, a Negro youth, using a broom handle, began to pound on the <sup>outside</sup> bell of a burglar alarm that had been set off, apparently, by a short/circuit. When police officers responded <sup>to the alarm</sup> and ordered him to stop hitting the bell, the youth began hitting the officers. In the ensuing scuffle several bystanders intervened. One of the officers drew his service revolver and fired, superficially wounding the young man.

Tension rose. Approximately 250 persons were present at the evening's meeting. When a number of Negro leaders urged the submission of a petition of grievances through

legal channels, the response was lukewarm. When Carmichael took to the podium, urging Negroes "to take to the streets and force the police department to work until they fall in their tracks," the response was tumultuous.

The press quoted him as <sup>Saying:</sup> ~~continuing~~: "It's not a question of law and order. We are not concerned with peace. We are concerned with the liberation of black people. We have to build a revolution."

As the people present at the meeting poured into the street, they were joined by others. The crowd soon numbered an estimated 1,000. From alleys and rooftops rocks and bottles were thrown at the nine police officers on the scene. Windows of police cars were broken. Firecrackers exploded in the darkness. Police believe they may have been fired on ~~by small caliber weapons.~~

Reinforced by approximately 60 to 70 officers, the police, firing over the heads of the crowd, quickly regained control. Of the ten persons arrested, six were 21 years of age or younger; ~~and~~ only one was in his thirties.

The next day city equipment appeared in the area to begin work on the long-delayed <sup>(playgrounds and other)</sup> projects demanded by the citizens. It was announced that a Negro Youth Patrol would be established along the lines of the Tampa White Hats.

SNCC responded that volunteers <sup>for the Patrol</sup> would be selling their "Black brothers out," and would be viewed as "Black .....

Traitors," to be dealt with in the "manner we see fit." Nevertheless, during the course of the summer the 200 youths participating in the corps played an important role in preventing a serious outbreak. The police believe that establishment of the youth corps <sup>became</sup> ~~has been~~ a major factor in improving police-community relations.

Another meeting of area residents was called for Tuesday evening. At its conclusion 200 protesters were met by 300 police officers. As two police officers chased several boys down the street, a cherry bomb or incendiary device exploded at the officers' feet. In response, several shots were fired from <sup>a group of</sup> ~~police ranks~~ ~~which, in that vicinity,~~ consisted <sup>ing</sup> mostly of Negro officers. ↗

↗ The discharge from <sup>a</sup> ~~one~~ shotgun struck in the midst of several persons sitting on the front porch of a house. A 46-year old man was killed; a 9-year old boy was critically injured.

Because of the efforts of neighborhood and anti-poverty workers who circulated through the area, and the later appearance of Mayor Allen, no further violence ensued.

When H. "Rap" Brown, who had returned to the city that afternoon, went to other Negro areas in an attempt to initiate a demonstration against the shooting of the Negroes on the porch, he met with no response.

Within the next few days a petition <sup>was</sup> ~~drawn~~ up by State Senator Leroy Johnson and other moderate <sup>Negro</sup> ~~leaders~~ demanding



that Stokely Carmichael get out of the community and  
allow the people to handle their own affairs. <sup>It</sup> was signed  
by more than 1,000 persons in the Dixie Hills area.

## Section 5. NORTHERN NEW JERSEY

As reports of looting, snipers, fire and death fanned outward towards other Negro enclaves in northern New Jersey, a web of tension formed. Wherever Negro ghettos existed -- Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Plainfield, New Brunswick -- people had friends and relatives living in Newark. Everywhere the telephone provided a direct link to the scenes of violence. The telephonic messages frequently were at variance with reports being transmitted by the mass media.

As gory stories from Newark grew in number, fear and anger interwove themselves within the Negro ghettos. Conversely, rumors amplified by radio, television and the newspapers -- especially with regard to guerilla bands roaming the streets -- created within the white communities a sense of danger and terror. To Mayor Patricia Q. Sheehan of New Brunswick, it seemed "Almost as if there was a fever in the air." She went on to say: "Rumors were coming in from all sides on July 17th. Negroes were calling to warn of possible disturbances; whites were calling; shop owners were calling. Most of the people were concerned

Insert 2

Three northern New Jersey ~~XX~~ communities, Jersey City, Paterson, and Elizabeth, had had disorders in previous years. the first two in 1964, the latter in both 1964 and 1965. In these general, ~~XXXX~~ seem to have developed from resentment against the police~~X~~. The most serious outbreak had occurred in Jersey City~~X~~ after ~~XXXX~~ police had arrested a woman, and a rumor had been ~~XXXXXX~~ ~~X~~ sparked that the woman had been beaten.

~~M~~ As early as May, 1967, the authorities in Jersey City and Elizabeth had started receiving warnings of trouble in the ~~XXXXX~~ summer ahead. Following the Newark outbreak, rumors and reports, as in New Brunswick, became rampant. The police, relying on past experiences, were in no mood to take chances. In both Jersey City and Elizabeth patrols were augmented, and the departments were placed in a state of ~~XXXX~~ alert.

*The view from*

about a possible bloodbath." Her opinion was: "We are talking ourselves into it."

Everywhere there was the same inequality with regard to education, job opportunities, income, and housing.

Everywhere there was the same lack of representation of Negroes on the local government. In six New Jersey communities\* with sizeable Negro populations, of a total of 50 councilmen, ~~only~~ six were Negro. In a half dozen school systems in which Negro children comprised as much as half of the school population, of a total of 42 members of the Board of Education, ~~only~~ seven were Negro.

In each of the ghettos the Negro felt himself surrounded by an intransigent wall of whites. In four suburban cities -- Bloomfield, Harrison, Irvington, and Maplewood -- forming an arc about Newark, out of a total population of more than 150,000, only 1,000 were Negroes. In the six cities surrounding Plainfield, out of a population of more than 75,000, only 1,500 were Negro.

*Insect* ~~Two northern New Jersey communities, Jersey City and Elizabeth, had had disturbances in 1964. The view from~~

---

\* Jersey City, Elizabeth, Englewood, Plainfield, Paterson, New Brunswick

Jersey City is that of the New York skyline. Except for a few imposing buildings, such as those of the high-rise New Jersey Medical Center, much of Jersey City is a collection of nondescript and deteriorating houses, fleshed out with factories and cut up by ribbons of super-highways and railroads.

As one of the principal freight terminals for New York City, Jersey City's decline has paralleled that of the railroads. As railroad lands deteriorated in value and urban renewal lands were taken off the tax rolls, the city suffered a catastrophic decline in assessed valuation, from \$464 million in 1964 to \$367 million in 1967. The tax rate, according to Mayor Thomas J. Whelan, has "reached the point of diminishing returns."

Urban renewal projects intended to clear slums and replace them with low-cost housing have resulted, actually, in a reduction of 2,000 housing units. <sup>on</sup> One area, designated for urban renewal six years before, ~~no work had been done, and it~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~remained~~ <sup>still</sup> blighted in 1967 as it had been in 1961. ~~and untouched~~ As ramshackle houses continued to deteriorate, no repairs were made on them, yet people continued

to inhabit them. "Planners make plans and then simply tell people what they are going to do," Negroes complained in their growing opposition to such projects.

Wooden sewers serve residents of some sections of the city. Collapsing brick sewers in other sections back up the sewage. The population clamors for better education for its children; but the school system has reached its bonding capacity. By 1975 it is estimated that there will be a net deficit of 10 elementary schools and one high school.

Recently the mayor proposed to the Ford Foundation that it take over the operation of the entire educational system. The offer was declined.

A large percentage of the white population send their children to parochial schools. <sup>Possibly,</sup> As a result, ~~because they have not had to utilize the public school system,~~ white residents ~~in the past,~~ <sup>to the suburbs</sup> have been slower to move ~~out~~ than in other cities.

The exodus, however, is accelerating. Within the past seven years the Negro population has almost doubled,



and now comprises an estimated 23 percent of the total. There is little Negro political leadership. What does exist is fragmented and indecisive. The county in which Jersey City is located is run by an old-line political machine that <sup>has</sup> given Negroes little opportunity for participation.

Although the amount of schooling whites and Negroes have had is almost equal, the median family income of whites is \$1,500 more than that of Negroes.

The police department, like Newark's, one of the largest in the nation for a city of its size, has a reputation for toughness. A successful white executive recalled that in his childhood: "We were accustomed to the Special Service Division of the Police Department. If we were caught hanging around we were picked up by the police, and taken <sup>near</sup> the city hospital, and beaten with a rubber hose."

A city official, questioned about Negro representation on the 825-man police force, replied that it was 34 times greater than 20 years ago. Twenty years ago it had consisted of one man.

A hard-bitten but realistic police captain, who commands and lives within the precinct with the highest Negro concentration, insists that his men be able to get along with the people. If they can't, they are transferred from the precinct. It is the captain's opinion that the greatest degree of tension arises when policemen from outside the precinct come into make arrests or quell disturbances. Such police officers do not understand the problems and the social habits of the people and are therefore apt to react with undue force.

During the four days of the Newark riot, when the city became awash with tales of all descriptions, Mayor Whelan announced that if there were any disturbances he would "meet force with force." The ghetto area was flooded with police officers.

On Monday and Tuesday, July 17 and 18, when crowds gathered and a few rocks were thrown, mass arrests were made. Only one store was broken into and the pilferage there was limited to items such as candy and chewing gum.

One man died. He was a Negro passenger in a cab into which a Negro boy threw a Molotov cocktail.



A chicken and an Orthodox Moslem combined to keep Elizabeth cool. As in Jersey City, police had beefed up their patrols, and the very presence of so many officers contributed to the rising tensions. Residents of the 12-block by 3-block ghetto, jammed between the New Jersey Turnpike and the waterfront, <sup>expressed the opinion</sup> ~~felt~~ that: "We are being punished but we haven't done anything."

"The community," another said later, "felt it was in a concentration camp."

Youths from the two high-density housing projects concentrated in the area were walking around saying: "We're next, we might as well go."

<sup>Between 10:00 and</sup> ~~About~~ 11:30 p.m. Monday, July 17th a window was <sup>in a drugstore across the street from a housing project.</sup> broken. Commented a businessman: "Down here in the port it's business as usual when one store window is broken each week. What is normal becomes abnormal at a time like this."

~~Soon other windows were being broken. As police arrived in force, groups scattered and began breaking windows further down the street. A Molotov cocktail was thrown at a tavern. Fire engines arrived. They were~~

When the window was broken, police responded in force. Off-duty officers were recalled. Although most of the ~~XXXX~~ force remained on the periphery of the area, their presence was clearly manifested.

Since there are virtually no recreational facilities, on any summer night scores of youths may be found congregating on the streets near the housing projects. With the arrival of more and more ~~XXXX~~ police, there was a growing feeling that something was going to happen.

Crowds assembled on both the street and in the courtyard of the housing project. Rocks and bottles were thrown at police cars cruising by. More ~~XXXX~~ store windows were broken. Fires were set in trash cans and in the middle of the street.

~~pelted with rocks.~~ Workers from the anti-poverty ~~prog-~~  
~~agency and the Human Relations Commission~~  
~~group~~ began circulating through the area, ~~desperately~~  
attempting to get kids off the street. Many of the resi-  
dents had relatives and friends in Newark. Based on what  
had happened there, they feared that, if the ~~violence~~ <sup>disturbance</sup>  
were not curbed, it would turn into a bloodbath.

~~One community worker discovered several youngsters~~  
~~siphoning gasoline into soda bottles from a truck in an~~  
~~alley. He managed to talk them out of the Molotov cock-~~  
~~tails.~~

The confrontation between the police and the mob of  
teenagers was continuing ~~toward a climax~~, when a chicken  
fluttered out of the shattered window of a poultry market.  
One youth attempted to throw gasoline on it and set it  
afire. As the gasoline sloshed onto the pavement, the  
chicken leaped. The flames merely singed its feathers.

A gangling six-foot youth attempted to ~~jump upon~~ <sup>stamp</sup> the  
chicken. The bird ~~was too quick for him.~~ <sup>which had appeared dead, reacted violently. As it fluttered</sup>  
<sup>and darted</sup> ~~As it darted~~  
<sup>the youth screamed,</sup> out of his way, ~~he~~ slipped, and tumbled against a tree.



The stark comedy broke the tension. People laughed.

Soon some began to drift ho me.

A short time later a Molotov cocktail was thrown against the front of a tavern. Fire engines met with no opposition as they extinguished the flames before they could do much damage.

~~area~~  
The chief of Xpolice ordered the ~~XXXXXX~~ cleared. ~~XXXXXX~~

As the ~~XX~~ officers moved in, the persons who remained on the street scattered. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Within fifteen minutes the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ neighborhood was deserted.

On both the part of municipal authorities and Negro leaders there were fears that, if the disorder followed the pattern of past disturbances in Elizabeth and elsewhere, the following day would see an intensification of action on the part of the youths.

Police patrolled W the 36 square blocks with more than 100 men, some of them stationed on rooftops. Tension mounted as officers, residents viewed the helmeted ~~MMX~~ armed with shotguns and rifles, as a threat to them.

8a

The stark unwitting comedy broke the tension. People laughed. Soon <sup>some</sup> ~~they~~ began to drift home.

The following day tensions in the area mounted again as police patrolled the 36 square blocks with 220 men, some of them stationed on rooftops.

Early in the evening the mayor agreed to meet with a delegation of 13 community leaders. When they entered his office, the chief of police was already present. The mayor read ~~that, if he were faced with sniping or flagrant looting, his men were~~ him an ~~executive~~ order to: "Shoot to kill . . . Force will be met with superior force." An officer's deviation from this order, the mayor said, would be cause for dismissal.

~~Some of the members of~~ <sup>believed that the mayor had staged the reading of the order for them</sup> the delegation ~~from the community~~ <sup>and were not pleased by his action. They</sup> proposed the setting up of a "peacekeeper task force." The mayor agreed to let them try. One-hundred <sup>stickers</sup> ~~armbands~~ with the words "peacekeeper" were printed. One of those who agreed to be a <sup>peacekeeper</sup> was Hesham Jaaber. Jaaber, who officiated at Malcolm X's funeral and has made two pilgrimages to Mecca, is a leader of a small sect of Orthodox Moslems. A teacher of Arabic



and the Koran at the Spirit House in Newark, he is a militant who <sup>imposed</sup> ~~insistence~~ the mayor <sup>with his sense of responsibility,</sup> ~~said he had not been aware of, but with whom he thought he could work in the future.~~ Although Jaaber believed that certain people were sucking the life blood out of the community -- "Count the number of taverns and bars in the Elizabeth port area and compare them with the number of recreation facilities" -- he had witnessed the carnage in Newark and believed it could serve no purpose to have a riot. Two dozen of his followers, wearing their red fezzes, took to the streets to urge order. He himself traveled about in a car with a bullhorn.

(insert 10)

Nevertheless, many white citizens reacted unfavorably to the fact that police had permitted Negro community leaders to aid in the dispersal of the crowd on the first night. The police were called "yellow," and accused of <sup>allowing</sup> ~~permitting~~ the looting and damaging of stores.

and the Koran at the Spirit House in Newark, he is a militant whose ~~existence~~ <sup>impressed</sup> the mayor <sup>with his sense of responsibility</sup> ~~said he had not been aware of, but with whom he thought he could work in the future.~~ Although Jaaber believed that certain people were sucking the life blood out of the community -- "Count the number of taverns and bars in the Elizabeth <sup>port</sup> area and compare them with the number of recreation facilities" -- he had witnessed the carnage in Newark and believed it could serve no purpose to have a riot. Two dozen of his followers, wearing their red fezzes, took to the streets to urge order. He himself traveled about in a car with a bullhorn.

As the peacekeepers began to make their influence felt, the police withdrew from the area. There was no further trouble.

*Insert* In Englewood, a bedroom community of 28,000 astride the Palisades opposite New York, the police had been expecting a riot by some of the city's 7,000 Negro residents since two weeks before Newark. As part of this expectation they had tested tear gas guns on the police firing range,

situated in the middle of the Negro residential area. The wind had blown the tear gas into surrounding houses. The occupants had been enraged.

The day following the outbreaks in Elizabeth and Jersey City, police began warning the businessmen in Englewood to prepare for a riot.

On Friday, July 21, on the report that crowds were gathering, police issued a general alarm. Approximately two hundred police officers from surrounding communities were brought into the city. As rumors of an impending riot swept the city numbers of curious citizens began gathering at street corners.

At 9:00 o'clock that evening a fire truck responded to an alarm. It was pelted with rocks. As policemen arrived to provide protection, some members of the bands of unemployed Negro youths who regularly hung out at street corners began breaking store windows. The windows damaged apparently were selected at random. A paint store window was broken but a jewelry store window was left untouched. There was no looting. Police, sealing off the area, quickly contained the disturbance.



Although a continuing flow of rumors and anonymous tips to police ~~XXXXXX~~ that a riot was in preparation had mentioned two specific dates, July 19 and July 28, it was on Friday, July 21, that the chief of police became sufficiently concerned to alert the mayor, order mobilization of the police department, and request ~~XXXXXX THE POLICE TOXKESX OFX BERGENX COUNTYX ANDX MACKAYX COMMUNITIXX~~  
~~XXXXXX BYX TOXOX ANDX MACKAYX TOXOX~~ assistance from the police forces of Bergen County and nearby communities. The 160 officers who responded brought the total force in Englewood that evening to 220 men.

At approximately 9 p.m. a rock was thrown through a market in the ~~XXXXXX~~ lower class Negro area, resulting in the setting off of a burglar alarm at police headquarters. Two police cars responded. They were hit ~~XXXX~~ by rocks.

The  
A tactical force of officers that had been assembled was rushed to the scene. A small number of ~~X~~persons, estimated in the official police report to be no more than 15 or ~~X~~ 20, were standing in the street. When police formed a skirmish line, ~~XXXXXX~~  
~~XXXXXX~~ the ~~XX~~ loiterers, mostly youths, retreated into nearby Mackay Park, a large and tree-studded~~X~~ expanse. The police met no opposition. ~~After a short time, they left the scene.~~

~~XXXXXX~~ When a small fire was set ~~XX~~ the side of a market, ~~they returned to guard the firemen.~~ Attracted by the presence the  
of ~~XXXXXX~~ police officers, people began drifting out of Mackay Park. Angry verbal exchanges took place between the residents and the police. The Negroes demanded to see the mayor.

X The mayor arrived. The residents complained about the presence of so many police officers. Other grievances, many of them minor, began to be aired. According to the mayor, he became involved in a "shouting match" and ~~then left the scene~~ *departed. Shortly thereafter*  
*the police, too, left the scene.*



They returned to guard firemen who responded to <sup>an</sup> alarm when ~~shortly thereafter~~ small fires were set on the outside of two markets. ~~The fire department responded.~~

~~When~~ <sup>the</sup> police ordered the people on the street to disperse and return to their homes, a scuffle broke out ~~between~~ <sup>the officers and</sup> a number of persons, ~~and the police~~. After a rock knocked out a streetlight, darkness blanketed the area. From behind hedges and ~~other~~ other places of concealment a variety of missiles were thrown at the police. The officer in charge cut ~~when~~ was/severely/~~by~~ a ~~bottle~~ bottle broke the windshield of a car.

A ~~fire~~ fire department lighting unit was brought to the scene to illuminate the area. After that, except for some desultory rock throwing, ~~the~~

~~The~~ neighborhood was quiet for the rest of the night. A small ~~band~~ band of youths made a foray into the city's principal business district two blocks away. Although a few windows were broken, there was no looting. Police quickly sealed off the area. There was no further damage to any of the establishments.

The same pattern of disorders continued for the next three nights. <sup>A relatively large number of,</sup> Police, responding to the breaking of windows or the setting of a fire, would come upon a small number of persons in the street. Fires repeatedly were set at or near the same two stores and a tavern. On one occasion two Negro youths threw Molotov cocktails at police officers, and the officers responded with gunfire.

Although sounds resembling gunshots were heard sporadically throughout the area, police never came under sniper fire, no gunflashes were ~~seen~~ seen, and no bullets or expended shells were found. Lt. William Clark, who, as/Bergen County Police Department's civil disorders expert, was on the scene, reported that teenagers, as a harassing tactic, had exploded cherry bombs and firecrackers over a widely scattered area. Another view is that there may have been shots, but that they were fired into the air.



Nevertheless, these ~~press~~ ~~reports~~ ~~that~~ that.

"Snipers set up a three-way crossfire at William and Jay Streets in the heart of the Fourth Ward Negro ghetto, and pinned down 100 policemen, four reporters and a photographer for more than an hour."

~~XXXXXX~~

These reports were "very definitely exaggerated and overplayed," according to Deputy Chief William F. Harrington of the Englewood ~~Police~~ Police Department. What police termed a "disturbance" appeared in ~~the~~ press reports as a "riot," and "was way out of proportion in terms of the severity of the situation." ~~I~~ "I feel ~~very~~ strongly," the ~~Chief~~ Chief said, "that the news media . . . actually inflamed the situation day by day."



PROFILE -- PLAINFIELD -- FINAL

Section 6

New Jersey's worst violence outside of Newark was experienced by Plainfield, a pleasant, tree-shaded city of 45,000. A "bedroom community," more than ~~one~~<sup>a</sup> third of whose residents work outside the city, Plainfield had had few Negroes until the 1950's. By 1967 the Negro population had risen to an estimated 30 percent of the total. As in Englewood, there was a division between the Negro middle class, which lived in the Eastside "gilded ghetto," and the unskilled, unemployed and underemployed poor on the West side.

Geared ~~toward meeting~~<sup>to</sup> the needs of a suburban middle class, the part-time and fragmented city government had failed to realize the change in character which the city had undergone, and was unprepared to cope with the problems of a growing ~~under-skilled and under-educated~~<sup>disadvantaged</sup> population.

There was no full-time administrator or city manager.

O Boards <sup>were</sup> appointed by the mayor, <sup>part-time</sup> ~~whose~~<sup>own</sup> position was largely honorary ~~and part-time~~ -- <sup>independent</sup> with jurisdiction over such areas <sup>and</sup> as education, welfare, health, ~~etc., operated independently.~~

Accustomed to viewing politics as a gentleman's pastime, city officials were startled and upset by the ~~heat and~~ intensity with which demands issued from the ghetto. Usually such demands were met obliquely, rather than head-on.

In the summer of 1966, trouble was narrowly averted over the issue of a swimming pool for Negro youngsters. In the summer of 1967, instead of having built the pool, the city began busing the children to the county pool a half-hour's ride distant. The fare was 25 cents per person, and the children had to provide their own lunch, a considerable strain on a frequent basis for <sup>a</sup> poor families with ~~several~~ <sup>several</sup> ~~numbers of~~ children.

The bus operated only on three days in mid-week. ~~On~~ <sup>On</sup> week-ends the county pool was too crowded to accommodate children from the Plainfield ghetto.

Pressure increased upon the school system to adapt itself to the changing social and ethnic backgrounds of its pupils. There were strikes and boycotts. The track system created de facto segregation within a supposedly integrated school system. Most of the youngsters from white middle class districts were in the higher track, most from the Negro poverty areas in the lower. ~~Strained~~ <sup>were strained</sup> Relations between ~~and~~ Negro pupils, and some white teachers ~~resulted in a charged~~ <sup>were</sup> ~~racial atmosphere.~~ Two-thirds of school dropouts ~~it was~~ <sup>to be</sup> estimated ~~were~~ Negro.

*literally?* | In February ~~of~~ 1967 the NAACP, out of a growing sense of frustration with the municipal government, tacked a list of 19 demands and complaints to the door of the city hall. Most dealt with discrimination in housing, employment and in the public schools. By ~~the~~ summer, ~~of 1967~~ the city's

Common Council had not responded. Although two of the 11 Council members were Negro, both represented the Eastside ghetto. The poverty area was represented by two white women, one of whom had been appointed by the Council after the elected representative, a Negro, had ~~been transferred by his company and had~~ moved <sup>away.</sup> ~~out of the~~ city.

Relations between the police and the Negro community, tenuous at best, had been <sup>further troubled</sup> ~~strained~~ the week prior to the Newark outbreak. <sup>(After being handcuffed)</sup> ~~During the course of~~ a routine arrest in <sup>a</sup> ~~one of the~~ housing projects, a woman ~~after being hand-cuffed~~, had fallen down a flight of stairs. The officer said she had slipped. Negro residents claimed he had pushed her. When a delegation went to city hall to file a complaint, they were told by the city clerk that he was not empowered to accept it. Believing that they were being given the run-around, the delegation, angry and frustrated, departed.

On Friday evening, July 14, the same police officer was moonlighting as a private guard at a diner frequented by Negro youths. He was, reportedly, number two on the Negro community's "ten most-wanted" list of unpopular police officers. (The list ~~itself~~ was colorblind. Although out of 82 officers on the force only 5 were Negro, 2 of the 10 on the "most wanted" list were Negro. The two officers most ~~generally~~ respected in the Negro community were white).

Although most of the youths at the diner were of high school age, one, in his mid-twenties, had a reputation as a bully. Sometime before 10:00 P.M., as a result of an argument, he hit a 16-year old boy and split open his face. As the boy lay bleeding on the asphalt, his friends rushed to the police officer and demanded that he call an ambulance and arrest the offender. Instead, the officer walked over to the boy, looked at him, and reportedly said: "Why don't you just go home and wash up?" He refused to <sup>make an</sup> arrest ~~anyone~~.

The youngsters ~~at the diner~~ were incensed. They believed that, had the two participants in the incident ~~been~~ been white, the older youth would have been arrested, the younger taken to the hospital immediately.

O <sup>on the way</sup>  
~~In order to go from the diner~~ to the housing project <sup>where</sup> ~~in which~~ most of them lived, the youths had to traverse four blocks of the city's business district. As they walked, they smashed three or four windows. An observer interpreted their behavior as a reaction to the incident at the diner, in effect challenging the police officer: "If you won't do anything about that, then let's see you do something about this!"

On one of the quiet city streets two young Negroes, D.H. and L.C., had been neighbors. D.H. had graduated from high school, attended Fairleigh Dickinson University and, after receiving a degree in psychology, had obtained a job

as a reporter on the Plainfield Courier-News.

L.C. had dropped out of high school, become a worker in a chemical plant, and, although still in his twenties, had married and fathered seven children. A man with a strong sense of family, he liked sports and played in the local baseball league. Active in civil rights, he had, like the civil rights organizations, over the years, become more militant. For a period of time he had been a Muslim.

? → Shortly after midnight, in an attempt to <sup>ease hostility,</sup> ~~cap the~~ ~~eruption~~, D.H. and the two Negro councilmen met with the youths in the housing project. ~~Although~~ The focal point of the youths' bitterness was the attitude of the police -- until 1966 police had used the word "nigger" over the police radio and one officer had worn a Confederate belt buckle and had flown a Confederate pennant on his car. — Their complaints, <sup>however</sup> ~~far and wide~~ ranged over local and national issues. There was an overriding cynicism and disbelief that government would, of its own accord, make meaningful changes to improve the lot of the lower class Negro. There was an overriding belief that there were two sets of policies by the people in power, whether law enforcement officers, newspaper editors, or government officials: one for white, and one for black.

There was little confidence that the two councilmen



could exercise any influence. One youth said: "You came down here last year. We were throwing stones at some passing cars and you said to us that this was not the way to do it. You got us to talk with the man. We talked to him. We talked with him, and we talked all year long. We ain't got nothing yet!"

However, on the promise that meetings would be arranged <sup>later</sup> that same day, Saturday, with the editor of the newspaper and with the mayor, the youths agreed to disperse.

At the first of these meetings the youths were, apparently, satisfied by the explanation that ~~the~~ newspaper coverage was not deliberately discriminatory. The ~~second~~ meeting with the mayor, however, ~~which began at 7:00 o'clock that evening~~ proceeded badly. The Negroes present felt that the mayor was complacent and apathetic, and that they were simply being given the usual lip service, from which nothing would develop.

The mayor, on the other hand, told Commission investigators that he recognized that, "Citizens are frustrated by the political organization of the city," because he, himself, has no real power and "each of the councilmen says that he is just one of the eleven and therefore can't do anything."

After approximately two hours, a dozen of the youths walked out, indicating an impasse and signalling the breakup of the meeting. Shortly thereafter window smashing began.

A Molotov cocktail was set afire in ~~the middle of~~ a tree. One fire engine, in which a white and Negro fireman were sitting side by side, had a Molotov cocktail thrown at it. The white fireman was burned.

As window smashing continued, liquor stores and taverns/ especially / were/ hard hit. Some of the youths believed that there was an excess concentration of bars in the Negro section/ and that these were an unhealthy influence in the community.

Because the police department had mobilized its full force, the situation, although serious, never appeared to get out of hand. Officers made <sup>in many</sup> ~~numerous~~ arrests. The chief of the fire department told Commission investigators that it was his conclusion that "individuals making fire-bombs did not know what they were doing, or they could have burned the city."

At 3:00 o'clock Sunday morning a heavy rain ~~began to~~ ~~fall~~, scattering whatever groups remained on the streets.

In the morning police made no effort to cordon off the area. As white sightseers and churchgoers drove by the housing project there <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ sporadic ~~incidents~~ of rock throwing ~~and violence~~. During the early afternoon ~~these~~ <sup>such incidents</sup> increased.

At the housing project, a meeting was convened by L.C. to draw up a formal petition of grievances. As the youths gathered it became apparent that some of them had

been drinking. A few kept drifting away from the parking lot where the meeting was being held to throw rocks at passing cars. It was decided to move ~~everyone~~ ~~at~~ the meeting to ~~Greenbrook Park~~, a county park several blocks away.

Between 150 and 200 persons, including almost all of the rockthrowers, piled into a caravan of cars and headed for the park. At approximately 3:30 P.M. the Chief of the Union County Park Police arrived to find the group being addressed by David Sullivan, Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission. He "informed Mr. Sullivan he was in violation of our park ordinance and to disperse the group." Sullivan and L.C. attempted to explain that they were in the process of drawing up a list of grievances, but the Chief remained adamant. They could not meet in the park without a permit, and they did not have a permit.

After permitting the group 10 to 15 minutes grace, the Chief decided to disperse them. "Their mood was very excitable," he reported, and "in my estimation no one could appease them so we moved them out without too much trouble. They left in a caravan of about 40 cars, horns blowing and yelling, and headed south on West End Avenue to Plainfield."

Within the hour looting became widespread. Cars were overturned, a white man was snatched off a motorcycle, and the fire department stopped responding to alarms because the police were unable to provide protection. After having

been on alert until midday, the Plainfield Police Department was caught unprepared. At 6:00 P.M. only 18 men were on duty. Checkpoints were established at crucial intersections in an effort to isolate the area.

At one of the intersections, three blocks from the housing project, Officer John Gleason, together with two reserve officers, had been posted. Gleason was a veteran officer, the son of a former lieutenant on the police department. Shortly after 8:00 P.M. two white youths, chased by a 22-year old Negro, Bobby Williams, came running from the direction of the ghetto toward Gleason's post.

As he came in sight of the police officers, Williams stopped. Accounts <sup>what</sup> of what <sup>happened</sup> occurred next, or why Officer Gleason took the action he did, ~~was~~ What is known is that when D.H., the newspaper reporter caught sight of him a minute or two later, Officer Gleason was two blocks from his post. Striding after Williams directly into the ghetto area, Gleason already had passed one housing project. ~~People in~~ Small groups were milling about. In D.H.'s words: "There was a kind of shock and amazement," to see the officer walking by himself so deep in the ghetto.

Suddenly there was a confrontation between Williams and Gleason. Some witnesses report Williams had a hammer in his hand. Others say he did not. When D.H., whose attention momentarily had been distracted, next saw Gleason he had drawn his gun and was firing at Williams. As

Williams fell to the ground, critically injured, Gleason turned and ~~began running~~ <sup>ran</sup> back toward his post. O

Negro youths chased him. Gleason stumbled, regained his balance, then had his feet knocked out from under him. A score of youths began to beat him and kick him. Some ~~of~~ ~~the~~ residents <sup>at</sup> ~~in~~ the apartment house attempted to intervene, but they were brushed aside. D.H. believes that, under the circumstances and in the atmosphere that prevailed at that moment, any police officer, black or white, would have been killed.

After they had beaten Gleason to death, the youths took D.H.'s camera from him and smashed it.

Fear swept over the ghetto. Many residents -- both lawless and law-abiding -- were convinced, on the basis of what had occurred in Newark, that law enforcement officers, would come into the ghetto shooting. bent on vengeance, O

There was no lack of weapons. People began actively to prepare to defend themselves. Forty-six carbines were stolen from a nearby arms manufacturing plant and passed out in the street by a young Negro, a former newspaper boy. Most of the weapons fell into the hands of youths, who began firing them wildly. A fire station <sup>was</sup> ~~began to be~~ peppered with shots.

Law enforcement officers continued their cordon about the area, but made no attempt to enter it except <sup>for an</sup> occasional ~~time~~ rescue. ~~someone~~. National Guardsmen arrived shortly

8ter

O

after midnight. Their armored personnel carriers were used to carry troops to the fire station which had been besieged for five hours. During this period only one fire was reported in the city.

Reports of sniper firing, wild shooting, and general chaos continued until the early morning hours.

By daylight Monday, New Jersey state officials had begun to arrive, ~~in the city~~. At a meeting in the early afternoon it was agreed that to inject police into the ghetto would be to risk bloodshed; that, instead, law enforcement personnel should continue to retain their cordon.

All during the day various meetings took place between government officials and Negro representatives. Police were anxious to recover the carbines that had been stolen from the arms plant. Negroes wanted assurances against retaliation. In the afternoon, L.C., an official of the Human Relations Commission, and others drove through the area urging people to be calm and to refrain from violence.

At 8:00 P.M. the New Jersey Attorney General, Human Relations Director, and Commander of the State Police, accompanied by the mayor, went to the housing project and spoke to several hundred Negroes. Some members of the crowd were hostile. Others were anxious to establish a dialogue. There were demands that officials give concrete

evidence that they were prepared to deal with Negro grievances. Again, the meeting was inconclusive. The officials returned to city hall.

At 9:15 P.M., L.C. rushed in claiming that ~~as~~<sup>^</sup> a result of the failure to resolve any of the outstanding problems, and reports that people who had been arrested by the police were being beaten ~~^~~<sup>^</sup> violence was about to explode anew. The key demand of the militant faction was that those who had been arrested during the riot should be released. State officials decided to arrange for the release on bail of 12 arrestees charged with minor violations. ~~Reciprocally~~, L.C. <sup>(in turn)</sup> agreed to try to induce return of the stolen carbines by ~~noon on Wednesday~~ <sup>noon</sup>.

As state officials were scanning the list of arrestees to determine which of them should be released, a message was brought to Colonel Kelly of the State Police that general firing had broken out around the perimeter. <sup>9) The report testified to the tension:</sup>  
An investigation disclosed that one shot of unexplained origin had been heard. In response, security forces had shot out street lights, thus initiating the "general firing." ~~Tension was so great and hostility between many law enforcement officers and Negro residents so overt that there was fear that a small spark might set off a racial clash.~~

At 4:00 o'clock Tuesday morning, a dozen prisoners were released from jail. Plainfield police officers

considered this a "sellout."

X When, by noon on Wednesday, the stolen carbines had not been returned, the Governor decided to authorize a mass search of the area. At 2:00 P.M. a convoy of State Police and National Guard troops prepared to enter the area. In order to direct the search as to likely locations, a handful of Plainfield police officers were spotted throughout the 28 vehicles of the convoy. As the convoy prepared to depart, the State Community Relations Director, believing himself to be carrying out the decision of the Governor not to permit Plainfield officers to participate in the search, ordered their removal from the vehicles. <sup>The basis</sup> ~~on~~ <sup>in his order was</sup> ~~the basis~~ that their participation might <sup>ignite</sup> ~~lead to~~ a clash between them and the Negro citizens.

As the search for carbines in the community progressed, tensions increased rapidly. According to witnesses and newspaper reports, some men in the search force left apartments ~~they went through~~ in shambles.

An hour and a half after it was begun, the search was called off. No stolen weapons were discovered, ~~in the apartments.~~ For the Plainfield police, the removal of the officers from the convoy had been a humiliating experience. A half hour after the conclusion of the search, in a meeting charged with emotion, the entire ~~Department~~ threatened to resign unless the State Community Relations Director left the city. He bowed to the demand.



On Friday, <sup>seven days</sup> ~~exactly a week~~ after the first outbreak,  
the city <sup>began</sup> ~~started~~ returning to normal.

To Be Done  
on Pica — Done

Do Not ✓ Number  
Pages — but keep in  
order —

VIII: ~~Section 8~~  
~~DETROIT~~  
ts

check with  
Tex Wilson  
& John  
Worsh to  
see if this  
confirms  
with their  
1/24 memo,  
attached

sp?

On Saturday evening, July 22, the Detroit Police Department raided five "blind pigs." The blind pigs had ~~had~~ their origin in <sup>Prohibition</sup> the days <sup>and survived as</sup> before World War II, when ~~they had served as~~ private social clubs ~~for affluent~~ Negroes who, ~~because of discrimination, had been unable to gain entrance to public night spots.~~ Gradually, as public facilities opened their doors to Negroes, the character of the blind pigs had changed, and they had ~~often, they were after hours~~ become illegal drinking and gambling spots. (X)

The fifth blind pig on the <sup>July 22 raid</sup> list, the United Community and Civic League at the corner of 12th Street and Clairmount, had been raided twice before. Once (10) persons had been picked up; another time, 28. A Detroit Vice Squad officer had <sup>failed to get in</sup> tried but ~~had been unable to gain entrance to~~ the blind pig <sup>10.</sup> shortly after ten o'clock Saturday night. ~~He succeeded~~ <sup>at</sup> when, on his second attempt, ~~he was successful, it was~~ 3:45 A.M. Sunday morning.

The Tactical Mobile Unit, the Police Department's Crowd/Control Squad, had been dismissed at 3:00 A.M. Since Sunday morning is traditionally the least troublesome time for police departments <sup>in Detroit -- and</sup> all over the <sup>country --</sup> ~~United States,~~ <sup>were</sup> there were only 193 officers patrolling the streets. Of these, 44 were in the 10th Precinct where the blind pig was located.

Police expected to find two dozen patrons in the blind pig. That night, however, it was the scene of a party for several servicemen, two of whom were back from Vietnam. ~~Rather than~~ <sup>Instead of</sup> two dozen patrons, police found 82 ~~some of whom~~ <sup>all 82 could be</sup> voiced resentment at the police intrusion.

An hour went by before ~~the arrival of sufficient patrol wagons to~~ <sup>ad from the scene.</sup> transport ~~all the~~ <sup>and despite</sup> ~~During that time,~~ the late hour, many people were still on the street. In short order, a crowd of about 200 ~~had~~ gathered.

The weather was humid and warm--the temperature that day was to rise to 86° ~~The figurative climate was at least as uncomfortable.~~

[In November of 1965...]

~~If police expected to find~~  
~~Instead of the expected two dozen patrons, the~~ But that night  
~~the blind pig~~ <sup>was the scene of</sup> in which a party for several servicemen,  
two of whom had been stationed in Vietnam, was being  
held. <sup>A total of 82 persons were there.</sup> ~~contained 82.~~ Some expressed resentment at  
~~the police intrusion.~~ <sup>An hour went by</sup> Before additional patrol wagons  
could be called to transport all the persons from the  
scene, ~~an hour had elapsed.~~ The weather was warm --  
during that day the temperature was to rise to 86 degrees  
-- and humid. Despite the hour, numerous persons were  
still on the streets. Within a short period a crowd of  
~~approximately 200 persons had gathered.~~

In November of 1965, George Edwards, Judge of the  
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and  
Commissioner of the Detroit Police Department from 1961  
to 1963, had written in the Michigan Law Review:

"It is clear that in 1965 no one will make  
excuses for any city's inability to  
foresee the possibility of racial trouble  
. . . . Although local police forces gen-  
erally regard themselves as public servants  
with the responsibility of maintaining law  
and order, they tend to minimize this  
attitude when they are patrolling areas that  
are heavily populated with Negro citizens.  
There they tend to view each person on the  
streets as a potential criminal or enemy, and  
all too often that attitude is reciprocated.  
Indeed, hostility between the Negro communities  
in our large cities and the police departments,  
is the major problem in law enforcement in this  
decade. It has been a major cause of all recent  
race riots."

<sup>Detroit's</sup> <sup>race</sup>  
At the time of ~~the~~ 1943 riot, Judge Edwards told  
Commission investigators, there was "open warfare between



the Detroit Negroes and the Detroit Police Department."

As late as 1961, he thought that "Detroit was the leading candidate in the United States for a race riot."

There was a long history of conflict between the police department and citizens. <sup>The</sup> ~~Detroit's~~ 1943 race riot, in which 34 persons died, was the bloodiest in the United States in a span of <sup>two</sup> ~~four~~ decades. During the labor <sup>battles</sup> ~~years~~ of the 1930's, union members had come to view the Detroit Police Department as a strike-breaking force.

Judge Edwards and his successor, Commissioner Ray Girardin, attempted to restructure the image of the department. A Citizens Complaint Bureau was set up to facilitate the filing of complaints by citizens against officers. ~~Indications are, however, that~~ <sup>however,</sup> In practice, ~~the~~ <sup>this Bureau appeared to work</sup> ~~worked~~ little better than less enlightened and more cumbersome procedures in other cities.

On 12th Street, with its high incidence of vice and crime, the issue of police brutality was a recurrent theme. A month earlier the killing of a prostitute had been determined by police investigators to be the work of a pimp. According to rumors in the community the crime had been committed by a Vice Squad officer.

Approximately <sup>about</sup> ~~at~~ the same time the killing of <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ 27-year old Negro Army veteran, Danny Thomas by a gang of white youths, had inflamed the community. ~~Coverage by~~ <sup>The</sup> city's major newspapers, ~~which~~ played down the story in hope that the murder would not become a cause for increased

(The hope )  
tensions. backfired. A sensationalized banner story in the Michigan Chronicle, the city's Negro newspaper, began: "As James Meredith marched again Sunday to prove a Negro could walk in Mississippi without fear, a young woman who saw her husband killed by a white gang, shouting: 'Niggers keep out of Rouge Park,' lost her baby.

"Relatives were upset that the full story of the murder was not being told, apparently in an effort to prevent the incident from sparking a riot."

Some Negroes believed that the <sup>daily newspapers'</sup> treatment of the story ~~by the major newspapers~~ was further evidence of the double standard: playing up crimes by Negroes, playing down crimes committed against Negroes.

Although police arrested ~~and charged~~ <sup>for</sup> one suspect with murder, Negroes questioned why the entire gang was not held. What, they asked, would have been the result if a white man had been killed by a gang of Negroes? What if Negroes had made the kind of advances toward a white woman that the white men were rumored to have made toward Mrs. Thomas?

The Thomas family ~~had~~ lived only four or five blocks from the <sup>raided</sup> ~~scene of the~~ blind pig raid. A few minutes after 5:00 A.M., <sup>just</sup> ~~shortly~~ after the last of those arrested had been hauled away, <sup>an empty bottle smashed into the</sup> ~~a police cruiser had its rear window of a police car, smashed by an empty bottle.~~ Shortly thereafter a litter basket was thrown through the window of a store. Rumors <sup>circulate</sup> of excess force used by the police during the raid, ~~were~~ <sup>circulated.</sup> A youth, whom police nicknamed "Mr. Greensleeves"

(X) <sup>Yip, of the color of his</sup>  
because ~~of his green shirt~~ ~~was shouting~~, was shouting:  
"We're going to have a riot!" and exhorting the crowd to  
vandalism.

At 5:20 A.M. Commissioner ~~Ray~~ Girardin was notified.  
He immediately called Mayor Jerome Cavanagh. Seventeen  
officers from other areas were ordered into the 10th Pre-  
cinct. By 6:00 A.M. police department strength had grown  
to 369 men. Of these, however, only 43 were committed to  
the immediate riot area. By that time the number of  
persons on 12th Street was growing into the thousands/ and  
widespread window-smashing and looting had begun.

<sup>on</sup>  
~~Although a block to~~ either side of 12th Street were ~~near~~  
~~fine~~ middle-class districts, <sup>Along</sup> 12th Street itself, ~~however,~~  
~~overcrowded~~ apartment houses created a density of more than  
21,000 persons per square mile, almost double the city  
average. <sup>Only</sup> 18 percent of the residents were homeowners.  
Twenty-five percent of the housing was considered so sub-  
standard as to require clearance, and <sup>Another</sup> 19 percent  
had major deficiencies. <sup>The</sup> crime rate was almost double  
that of the city as a whole. A Detroit police officer told  
Commission investigators that prostitution was so wide-  
spread that officers <sup>made</sup> ~~arrested~~ <sup>3</sup> ~~prostitutes~~ only when their  
soliciting became blatant.

The proportion of broken families was more than twice  
that in the rest of the city. <sup>The</sup> movement of people when  
the slums of "Black Bottom" had been cleared for urban  
renewal had changed 12th Street from an integrated community  
into an almost totally black one, in which only a number of  
merchants remained white.



~~into an almost totally black one, in which only a number of the merchants remained white.~~

By 7:50 A.M., when a 17-man police commando unit attempted to make the first sweep, ~~there were~~ <sup>were</sup> an estimated 3,000 persons on 12th Street. They offered no resistance. As the <sup>sweep</sup> ~~squad~~ moved down the street, they gave way to one side, and then flowed back behind it. <sup>(said he)</sup> ~~The manager of a shoe store~~ <sup>manager waited vainly for police for</sup> had watched for two hours as the store was being looted, ~~vainly awaiting, according to him, the arrival of the police.~~ At 8:25 A.M. someone in the crowd yelled "The cops are coming!" <sup>The first</sup> ~~and~~ flames of the riot <sup>riote</sup> ~~blossomed~~ <sup>billowed</sup> from the interior of the store. ~~It was the first fire of the riot.~~ Firemen who responded were not harrassed. The flames were extinguished.

By mid-morning, 1,122 men, approximately a fourth of ~~the strength of the police department~~ <sup>had</sup> reported for duty. Of these, 540 <sup>men on new six-block</sup> ~~were in the riot area, which still had~~ <sup>not expanded beyond six blocks.</sup> One hundred and eight officers were ~~being used in an attempt~~ <sup>ing</sup> to establish a cordon. There was, however, no interference with looters, and police were refraining from the use of force.

○ —————→ INSERT FROM 8-7 ←————

According to witnesses, police at some roadblocks made little effort to stop people from going in and out of the area. A good deal of bantering took place between police officers and the populace, some ~~of whom were~~ still dressed in their pajamas. <sup>There seemed</sup> To some observers, at this

See  
Wilson -  
Urdu  
memo  
point 2

point to be an atmosphere of apathy. The police did not appear to care what was happening, and <sup>A number of</sup> ~~many of the~~ older, and more stable residents, who had seen the street deteriorate from a prosperous commercial thoroughfare to one ridden by vice, remained aloof.

INSERT  
ON P.  
8-6

Commissioner Girardin <sup>said:</sup> ~~believed:~~ "If we had started shooting in there . . . not one of our policemen would have come out alive. I am convinced it would have turned into a race riot in the conventional sense."

(K) Many ~~of the police~~ officers were ~~being used to~~ <sup>officials feared</sup> guarding key installations in other sections of the city; ~~on the~~ <sup>basis</sup> that the disturbance ~~at~~ 12th Street might be a diversionary ~~move~~. Belle Isle, the recreation area in the Detroit River that had ~~been~~ the scene of the 1943 riot, was sealed off.

In an effort to avoid attracting people to the scene, some broadcasters cooperated by not reporting ~~on~~ the riot, and an effort was made to downplay the extent of the disorder. The façade of "business as usual" necessitated the detailing of numerous police officers to protect the 50,000 spectators that were expected at that afternoon's New York Yankees-Detroit Tigers baseball game.

Early in the morning a task force of community workers ~~had gone~~ <sup>went</sup> into the area to dispel rumors and act as counter-rioters. Such a task force had been singularly successful

at the time of the incident in the Kercheval district in the summer of 1966, when scores of people had gathered at the site of an arrest. Kercheval, however, had a more stable population, fewer stores, less population density, and the city's most effective police-community relations program.

The 12th Street area, <sup>on the other hand,</sup> ~~to the contrary,~~ had been determined, in a 1966 survey conducted by Dr. Ernest Harburg of the Psychology Department of the University of Michigan, to be a community of high stress and tension. An over-<sup>begin</sup>whelming majority of the residents indicated dissatisfaction with their environment.

Of those interviewed, 93 percent said they wanted to move out of the neighborhood; 73 percent felt that the streets were not safe; 91 percent believed that a person was likely to be robbed or beaten at night; 58 percent knew of a fight within the last 12 months in which a weapon had been employed; 32 percent stated that they themselves owned a weapon; 57 percent were worried about fires.

A significant proportion believed municipal services to be inferior; 36 percent were dissatisfied with the schools; 43 percent with the city's contribution to the neighborhood; 77 percent with the recreational facilities; 78 percent believed police did not respond promptly when they were summoned for help.

U. S. Representative John Conyers, Jr., a Negro, was notified about the disturbance at his home, a few blocks

from 12th Street, at 8:30 A.M. Together with other community leaders, including Hubert G. Locke, a Negro and Assistant <sup>to the</sup> Commissioner of Police, he began to drive around the area. In the side streets he asked people to stay in their homes. On 12th Street, he ~~requested~~ <sup>a little</sup> them to disperse. It was, by his own account, a futile task.

¶ Numerous eyewitnesses interviewed by Commission investigators tell of the carefree mood with which people ran in and out of stores, looting and laughing, and joking with the police officers. Stores with "Soul Brother" signs appeared no more immune than others. Looters paid no attention to residents who shouted at them and called their actions senseless. An epidemic of excitement had swept over the persons on the street. ¶ <sup>Congressman</sup> Representative Conyers noticed a woman with a baby in her arms; she was raging, cursing "whitey" for no apparent reason, ~~except that in this atmosphere her anger of many years was able to find release.~~

¶ <sup>Congressman</sup> Representative Conyers climbed <sup>atop</sup> to the top of a car in the middle of 12th Street to address the people. As he began to speak he was confronted by a man in his fifties whom he had once, as a lawyer, represented in court. The man had been active in civil rights. He believed himself to have been persecuted as a result, and it was Conyers' opinion that he may have been wrongfully jailed. Extremely bitter, the man was inciting the crowd

and challenging Conyers: "Why are you defending the cops and the establishment? You're just as bad as they are!"

A police officer <sup>in the riot area</sup> ~~who was at the scene~~ told Commission investigators that neither he nor his fellow officers ~~received any instructions~~ <sup>were instructed</sup> as to what they were supposed to be doing. Witnesses tell of officers standing behind saw-horses as an area was being looted, and still standing there <sup>much</sup> ~~a considerable period~~ later, when the mob had moved elsewhere. A squad from the commando unit, wearing helmets <sup>with</sup> ~~to which~~ face-covering visors ~~were attached~~, and carrying <sup>bayonet-tipped</sup> ~~carbines, tipped with bayonets~~, blockaded a street several blocks from the scene of the riot. Their appearance drew residents into the street. Some began to harangue them and to question why they were in an area where there was no trouble. Representative Conyers convinced the police department to remove the commandos.

By that time a rumor was threading ~~its way~~ through the crowd that a man had been bayoneted by the police. Influenced by such stories, the ~~need of the~~ crowd became belligerent. At approximately 1:00 P.M. stonings ~~of police officers~~ accelerated. Numerous officers reported injuries from rocks, bottles, and other objects thrown at them. Smoke billowed upward from four fires, the first since the one at the shoe store early in the morning. When firemen



answered the alarms, they became the target for rocks and bottles.

At 2:00 P.M. Mayor Cavanagh met with community and political leaders at police headquarters. Until ~~that~~ <sup>then</sup> ~~time~~ there had been hope that, as the people blew off steam, the riot would begin to dissipate ~~itself~~. Now the opinion was nearly unanimous that additional forces would be needed.

A request was made for State Police aid. By 3:00 P.M. 360 officers were assembling at the armory. At that ~~very~~ moment looting was spreading from the 12th Street area to other main thoroughfares.

There was no lack of the disaffected to help spread it. Although not yet as hard-pressed as Newark, Detroit <sup>was</sup>, like Newark, ~~was~~ losing population. Its prosperous middle-class whites were moving to the suburbs and being replaced by unskilled Negro migrants.

Between 1960 and 1967 the Negro population rose from just under 30 percent to an estimated 40 percent of the total. ~~Those who moved out were the more vigorous, revenue-producing portion of the population, leaving behind numbers of the old and young, who were less productive, yet cost the city more in terms of services.~~

In a decade the school system had gained 50,000 to 60,000 children. Fifty-one percent of the elementary school classes were overcrowded. Simply to achieve the statewide

average, the system needed 1,650 more teachers, <sup>and</sup> ~~which~~  
~~would mean the building of an~~ additional 1,000 class-  
rooms. The combined cost would be \$63 million. Of  
300,000 school children, 171,000, or 57 percent, were  
Negro. According to the Detroit Superintendent of  
Schools, 25 different school districts surrounding the  
city spent <sup>hundreds of dollars</sup> ~~up to \$500~~ more per pupil per year than  
Detroit. In the inner city schools, more than half the  
pupils who entered high school became dropouts.

The strong union structure had created excellent  
conditions for most working men, but had left others,  
such as Civil Service and Government workers, comparatively  
disadvantaged and dissatisfied. In June the "Blue Flu" had  
struck the city as police officers, forbidden to strike,  
had staged a sick-out. In September, the teachers were to  
go on strike. The starting wages for a plumber's helper  
were almost equal to the salary of a police officer or  
teacher.

Some unions, traditionally closed to Negroes, zealously  
guarded training opportunities. In January of 1967 the  
school system notified six apprenticeship trades it would  
not open any new apprenticeship classes unless a larger  
number of Negroes were included. By ~~the~~ Fall of 1967 some  
of the programs were still closed.

High school diplomas from inner city schools were  
regarded by personnel directors as less than valid. In

July, ~~of 1967~~ unemployment was ~~higher than it had been~~ <sup>at a five-year peak.</sup>  
~~for five years.~~ In the 12th Street area it was estimated  
to be between 12 and 15 percent for Negro men <sup>(and)</sup> 30 percent  
or higher for those under 25.

(X)ster The more education a Negro had, the greater ~~was~~ the  
disparity between his income and that of a white with the  
same level of education. ~~Whereas~~ <sup>seventh</sup> The income of whites and  
Negroes with a ~~7th~~ grade education was about equal. The  
median income of whites with a high school diploma was  
\$1,600 more per year, ~~than that of Negroes.~~ White  
college graduates made \$2,600 more, ~~per year, than their~~  
~~Negro counterparts.~~ In fact, so far as ~~his~~ income was  
concerned, it made very little difference to a Negro whether  
he had attended school for 8 years or for 12. In the fall  
of 1967, a study conducted at one inner city high school,  
Northwestern, showed that, although 50 percent of the  
dropouts had found work, 90 percent of the 1967 graduating  
class was unemployed.

~~Although~~ Mayor Cavanagh had appointed many Negroes to  
key positions in his administration, <sup>but</sup> in elective offices  
the Negro population was still under-represented. Of nine  
councilmen, one was a Negro. Of seven ~~members of the~~  
~~school board~~ <sup>members,</sup> two were Negroes.

Although federal programs had brought nearly \$360  
million to the city between 1962 and 1967, the money  
appeared to have had little impact at the grass roots ~~level.~~

Urban renewal ~~program~~ for which \$38 million had been allocated, <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ opposed by many residents of the poverty area.

Because of <sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ financial straits, ~~in which it found itself~~, the city was unable to produce on promises to correct <sup>such</sup> ~~conditions~~ ~~such~~ as poor garbage collection <sup>and</sup> ~~or~~ bad street lighting ~~==~~ which brought constant complaints from Negro residents.

On 12th Street Carl Perry, the Negro proprietor of a drug store and photography studio, was <sup>dispensing</sup> ~~passing out~~ ice cream, sodas, and candy to the youngsters streaming in and out of his store. For safekeeping he had brought the photography equipment from his studio, in the next block, to the ~~drugstore~~. The youths milling about repeatedly reassured him that, although the market next door had been ransacked, his place of business was in no danger.

In mid-afternoon the market was set afire. <sup>Soon after,</sup> ~~Shortly~~ thereafter the drugstore went up in flames.

State Representative James Del Rio, a Negro, was standing in front of a building <sup>he</sup> ~~owned~~ ~~by him~~ when two small boys, neither more than 10 years old, approached. ~~As~~ <sup>One</sup> ~~of the boys~~ prepared to throw a brick through a window, Del Rio stopped him: "That building belongs to me," he said.

"I'm glad you told me, Baby, because I was just about to bust you in!" the youngster replied.

Some evidence that criminal elements spontaneously were organizing ~~to~~ to take advantage of the riot began to manifest itself. A number of cars were noted to be re-turning again and again, their occupants methodically looting stores. Months later, goods stolen during the riot were still being ~~expended~~ peddled.

A spirit of carefree nihilism was taking hold. To riot and to destroy appeared more and more to become ends in themselves. Late Sunday afternoon it appeared to one observer that the young people were "dancing amidst the flames."

A Negro plainclothes officer was standing at an intersection when a man threw a Molotov cocktail into a business establishment at the corner. In the heat of the afternoon, fanned by ~~the~~ 20 to 25 m.p.h. winds ~~that~~ <sup>at</sup> blew both on Sunday and Monday, the fire ~~was, within minutes, licking~~ reached the home ~~at the residential structure next door.~~ <sup>(within minutes.)</sup> As residents ~~made~~ <sup>uselessly sprayed</sup>  ~~futile attempts to contain~~ the flames with garden hoses, the fire jumped from roof to roof of ~~the~~ <sup>adjacent</sup> two and three-story buildings. Within the hour the entire block was ~~in~~ flames. The ninth house in the ~~row was that of the arsonist~~ <sup>(burning) belonged to the arsonist</sup> who had thrown the Molotov cocktail.

In some areas residents organized rifle squads to protect firefighters. Elsewhere the firemen were subjected to curses, <sup>and</sup> rock-throwing, ~~and, as the fire spread to residential streets, to growing hostility.~~



as The wind-whipped flames <sup>began to overwhelm</sup> ~~blossomed and leap-~~  
~~frogged everywhere,~~ the Detroit Fire Department, ~~began~~  
~~to be overwhelmed.~~ Because of a lack of funds, on a  
per capita basis the department is one of the smallest  
in the nation. In ~~comparison to~~ <sup>comparison to</sup> Newark, ~~where~~ approxi-  
mately 1,000 firemen patrol an area of 16 square miles  
with a population of 400,000, Detroit's 1,700 firemen must  
~~are forced to~~ cover a city of 140 square miles with a  
population of 1.6 million. Because the department had  
no mutual aid agreement with surrounding communities, it  
could not quickly call in reinforcements from outlying  
areas, and it was almost 9:00 P.M. ~~that evening~~ before the  
first ~~began to~~ arrived. <sup>2:4 percent of Detroit's firemen and Negro.</sup>

As the afternoon progressed the Fire Department's  
radio <sup>came repeated</sup> ~~pulsated with~~ messages of apprehension and orders of  
~~Caution:~~ <sup>to take no chances.</sup> "There is no police protection here  
at all; there isn't a policeman in the area. . . . If you  
have any trouble at all, pull out! . . . We're being  
stoned at the scene. It's going good. We need help! . . .  
Protect yourselves! Proceed away from the scene. . . .  
Engine 42 over at Linwood and Gladstone. They are throwing  
bottles at us so we are getting out of the area. . . . All  
companies without police protection -- all companies without  
police protection -- orders are to withdraw, do not try to  
put out the fires. I repeat -- all companies without police



protection orders are to withdraw, do not try to put out the fires!"

It was 4:30 P.M. when the firemen, some of them exhausted by the heat, abandoned an area of approximately 100 square blocks on either side of 12th Street to await protection from police and National Guardsmen. During the course of the riot firemen were to withdraw 283 times, ~~and~~ Fire Chief Charles J. Quinlan estimated that at least two-thirds of the buildings <sup>were</sup> destroyed <sup>by</sup> ~~were due to~~ spreading fires rather than <sup>fires</sup> ~~ones~~ set at the scene. Of the 683 structures involved, approximately one-third were residential, and in few, if any, of these was <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ fire <sup>set</sup> ~~originally~~ ~~by~~ ~~them~~.

Governor George Romney flew over the area between 8:30 and <sup>7:00 P.M.</sup> ~~9:00~~ ~~o'clock~~ that evening. "It looked like the city had been bombed on the west side and there was an area two-and-a-half miles by three-and-a-half miles with major fires, with entire blocks in flames," he told the Commission.

<sup>There were</sup> ~~some~~ <sup>some unexpected</sup> In the midst of chaos, individual responses, ~~sometimes~~ ~~were unexpected.~~

Twenty-four-year-old E. G., a Negro born in Savannah, Georgia, had <sup>come to</sup> ~~arrived in~~ Detroit in 1965 ~~in order~~ to attend Wayne State University. Rebellion had been building in him for a long time because, "You just had to bow down to the white man. . . . When the insurance man would come by he would always call out to my mother by her first name and we

were expected to smile and greet him happily. |.|.|. | Man,  
I know he would never have thought of me or my father  
going to his house and calling his wife by her first name.  
Then I once saw a white man slapping a young pregnant Negro  
woman on the street with such force that she just spun  
around and fell. I'll never forget that."

When a friend called to tell him about the riot at  
12th Street, E. G. went there expecting "a true revolt,"  
but was disappointed as soon as he saw the looting begin:  
"I wanted to see the people really rise up in revolt.  
When I saw the first person coming out of the store with  
things in his arms, I really got sick to my stomach and  
wanted to go home. Rebellion against the white suppressors  
is one thing, but one measly pair of shoes or some food  
completely ruins the whole concept."

E. G. was standing in a crowd, watching firemen work,  
when Fire Chief Alvin Wall called out asking for help from  
~~among~~ the spectators. E. G. responded. His reasoning was:

"No matter what color someone is, whether they are green or  
pink or blue, I'd help them if they were in trouble. That's  
all there is to it."

He worked with the firemen for four days, the only  
Negro in an all-white crew. ~~(Only 2.1 percent of the city's  
firemen are Negro.)~~ Elsewhere, at scattered locations, a  
half dozen other Negro youths pitched in to help the firemen.

At 4:20 P.M. Mayor Cavanagh requested that the National Guard be brought into Detroit. Although a major portion of the Guard was in its summer encampment 200 miles away, several hundred <sup>troops</sup> were conducting their regular week-end drill in the city, <sup>That circumstance</sup> ~~and the fact that the Guard was already on duty~~ obviated many problems ~~that would have otherwise arisen.~~ By 7:40 P.M. The first ~~of~~ ~~the~~ troops were on the streets. At 7:45 P.M. the mayor issued a proclamation instituting a 9:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. curfew. At 9:07 P.M. the first sniper fire was reported. Following his aerial survey of the city, Governor Romney, at or shortly before midnight, proclaimed that "a state of public emergency exists" in the cities of Detroit, Highland Park, and Hamtramck.

At 4:45 P.M. a 68-year-old white shoe repairman, George Messerlian, had seen looters carrying clothes from a cleaning establishment next to his shop. Armed with a saber, he had rushed into the street, flailing away at the looters. One Negro youth was nicked on the shoulder. Another, who had not been on the scene, inquired as to what had happened. After he had been told, he allegedly replied: "I'll get the old man for you!"

Going up to Messerlian, who had fallen or been knocked to the ground, ~~the youth~~ <sup>the youth</sup> began to beat him with a club. Two other Negro youths dragged the attacker away from the old man. It was too late. Messerlian died four days later in the

hospital.

At 9:15 P.M. a 16-year-old Negro boy, superficially wounded while looting, became the first reported gunshot victim.

At midnight Sharon George, a 23-year-old white woman, together with her two brothers, was a passenger in a car being driven by her husband. After having dropped off two Negro friends, they were returning home on one of Detroit's main avenues when they were slowed by a milling throng in the street. A shot fired from close range struck the car. The bullet splintered in Mrs. George's body. She died less than two hours later.

An hour before midnight a 45-year-old white man, Walter Grzanka, together with three white companions, went into the street. Shortly thereafter a market was broken into. Inside the show window a Negro man began filling bags with groceries and handing them to confederates outside the store. Grzanka twice went over to the store, accepted bags, and placed them down beside his companions across the street. On the third occasion he entered the market. When he emerged, the market's owner, ~~who was~~ driving by in his car, shot and killed him.

In Grzanka's pockets police found <sup>seven</sup> cigars, <sup>four</sup> packages of pipe tobacco, and <sup>nine</sup> pairs of shoelaces.

Before dawn four other looters were shot, one of them accidentally while struggling with a police officer: A

Negro youth and a National Guardsman were injured by gunshots of undetermined origin. A private guard shot ~~himself~~ himself while pulling his revolver from his pocket. In the basement of the 13th Precinct Police Station a cue ball, thrown by an unknown assailant, cracked against the head of a sergeant.

At about midnight three white youths, armed with a shotgun, had gone to the roof of their apartment building, located in an all-white block, in order, they said, to protect the building from fire. At 2:45 A.M. a patrol car, carrying police officers and National Guardsmen, received a report of "snipers on the roof." As the patrol car arrived, the manager of the building went to the roof to tell the youths they had better come down.

The law enforcement personnel surrounded the building, some going to the front, others to the rear. As the manager, together with the three youths, descended the fire escape in the rear, a National Guardsman, believing he heard shots from the front, fired ~~at them once~~ <sup>He</sup> shot killed 23-year-old Clifton Pryor.

Early in the morning a young white fireman and a 49-year-old Negro homeowner were killed by fallen power lines.

By ~~2:00 A.M.~~ <sup>2:00 A.M.</sup> Monday, ~~morning~~ Detroit police had been augmented by 800 State Police officers and 1200 National Guardsmen. An additional 8,000 Guardsmen were on the way.

Nevertheless, Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanagh had decided to ask for federal assistance. At 2:15 A.M. the mayor called Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and was referred to Attorney General Ramsey Clark. A short time thereafter telephone contact was established between Governor Romney and the Attorney General.\*

There is some difference of opinion about what occurred next. According to the Attorney General's office the Governor was advised of the seriousness of the request and told that the applicable federal statute required that, before Federal troops could be brought into the city, he would have to state that the situation had deteriorated to the point that local and state forces could no longer maintain law and order. According to the governor, he was under the impression that he was being asked to declare that a "state of insurrection" existed in the city.

The governor was unwilling to make such a declaration, contending that, if he did, insurance policies would not cover the loss incurred as a result of the riot. He and the mayor decided to re-evaluate the need for federal troops.

Contact between Detroit and Washington was maintained throughout the early morning hours. At <sup>7:00</sup>~~9:00~~ A.M. the disorder still showed no sign of abating. At one point, out

②  
①  
A little over two hours earlier, at 11:55 P.M. Mayor Cavanagh had informed the U. S. Attorney General that a "dangerous situation existed in the city." Details are set forth in the Final Report of Cyrus R. Vance, covering the Detroit Riots, released on September 12, 1967.



of a total of 157 pieces of fire-fighting equipment, the department had only four to guard ~~that portion~~ <sup>in the rest</sup> of the city, ~~outside of the riot area~~. The governor and the mayor decided to make a renewed request for federal troops.

¶ Shortly before noon the President of the United States authorized the sending of a task force of paratroopers to Selfridge Air Force Base, near the city. A few minutes past ~~2:00~~ <sup>3:00</sup> P.M., Lt. General John L. Throckmorton, commander of Task Force Detroit, met Cyrus Vance, ~~Special Assistant~~ <sup>former Deputy</sup> to the Secretary of Defense, at the air base. Approximately an hour later the first ~~troops~~ <sup>federal</sup> ~~began~~ <sup>ed.</sup> arriving.

After meeting with state and municipal officials, Mr. Vance, ~~and~~ General Throckmorton, ~~together with~~ Governor Romney, and Mayor Cavanagh, made a tour of the city, which lasted until 7:15 P.M. During this tour Mr. Vance and

General Throckmorton came to the conclusion independently that -- ~~inasmuch as~~ <sup>since</sup> substantial ~~numbers of~~ the National Guard ~~had~~ <sup>men</sup> not yet been committed, ~~as they had seen no looting or sniping, and~~ <sup>since</sup> as the fires ~~that were burning~~ <sup>since</sup> appeared to be coming under control -- injection of federal troops ~~into the city~~ would be premature.

As the riot alternately waxed and waned, one area of the ghetto remained insulated. On the northeast side the residents of some ~~first~~ <sup>50</sup> square blocks inhabited by 21,000 persons had, in 1966, banded together in the Positive Neighborhood Action Committee (PNAC). With professional

help from the Institute of Urban Dynamics, they had organized block clubs and made plans for the improvement of the neighborhood. In order to meet the need for recreational facilities, which the city was not providing, they had raised \$3,000 to purchase empty lots for playgrounds. Although opposed to urban renewal, they had agreed to co-sponsor with the Archdiocese of Detroit a housing project to be controlled jointly by the archdiocese and PNAC.

When the riot broke out, the residents, through the block clubs, were able to organize quickly. Youngsters, agreeing to stay in the neighborhood, participated in detouring traffic. <sup>While</sup> ~~Even though~~ many persons reportedly sympathized with the idea of ~~identified with the rioters as far as~~ a rebellion against the "system", ~~was concerned~~, only two small fires -- one of them in an empty building, -- were set.

During the daylight hours Monday, nine more persons were killed by gunshots elsewhere in the city, and many others were seriously or critically injured. Twenty-three year-old Nathaniel Edmonds, a Negro, was sitting in his back yard when a young white man stopped his car, got out, and began an argument with him. A few minutes later, declaring that he was "going to paint his picture on him with a shotgun," the white man allegedly shotgunned Edmonds to death.

~~Mrs. Nannie Paak and Mrs. Mattie Thomas were sitting~~

*¶ Mrs. Harriet Pack and Mrs. Mattie Thomas were sitting*  
on the porch of Mrs. Pack's house when police began  
chasing looters from a nearby market. During the ~~course~~  
~~the~~ chase officers fired three shots from their shotguns.  
~~guns.~~ The discharge from one of these accidentally struck  
the two women. Both were still in the hospital weeks  
later.

Included among those critically injured when they  
were accidentally trapped in the line of fire were an  
8-year-old Negro girl and a 14-year-old white boy.

As darkness settled Monday, ~~evening~~ the number of  
incidents reported to police began to rise again. Although  
many turned out to be false, several ~~of them~~ involved in-  
juries to police officers, national guardsmen, and civilians  
by gunshots of undetermined origin. ¶ Watching the upward  
trend of reported incidents, Mr. Vance and General  
Throckmorton became convinced federal troops should be used,  
~~committed to the streets of the city,~~ and President Johnson  
was so advised. At 11:20 P.M. he signed a proclamation  
federalizing the Michigan National Guard and authorizing  
the use of the paratroopers.

At this time there were nearly 5,000 Guardsmen in the  
city, but fatigue, lack of training, and the haste with  
which they had had to be deployed reduced their effective-  
ness. Some of the Guardsmen traveled 200 miles and then were  
on duty for 30 hours straight. Some had never received riot

training and were given on-the-spot instructions on mob control -- only to discover that there were no mobs, and ~~that~~ the situation ~~which~~ they faced on the darkened streets was one for which they were unprepared. ~~¶~~ Commanders committed men as they became available, often in small groups, ~~and~~, <sup>ing</sup> In the resultant confusion, some units were lost in the city. Two Guardsmen assigned to an intersection on Monday were discovered ~~to~~ still there ~~without having been called~~ on Friday. ~~¶~~ Lessons learned by the California National Guard two years earlier in Watts regarding the danger of over-reaction and the <sup>necessity of</sup> great restraint ~~necessary~~ <sup>using</sup> in the employment of weapons ~~in a city~~ (had not, apparently, been passed on to the Michigan National Guard. The young troopers could not be expected to know what a danger they were creating, not only to the civilian population but to themselves, by the lack of fire discipline.

<sup>c</sup> A Detroit newspaper reporter who spent <sup>a</sup> one night riding in <sup>a</sup> the command jeep ~~of a column~~ told a Commission investigator of machine guns being fired accidentally, street lights being shot out by rifle fire, and buildings being placed under siege on the <sup>sketchiest</sup> ~~most haphazard and sketchy~~ reports of sniping. Troopers ~~in the column he was accom-~~ ~~panying~~ would fire/ and immediately from the distance there would be answering fire, sometimes consisting of tracer bullets. ~~¶~~ In one instance, he related, a report was received

Jeep peeled  
off frequently)  
see Friedman  
dep.



on the jeep's radio that an Army bus was pinned down by sniper fire at an intersection. National Guardsmen and police, arriving from various directions, jumped out and began asking each other: "Where's the sniper fire coming from?" As one Guardsman pointed to a building, everyone rushed about, taking cover. A soldier, alighting from a jeep, accidentally pulled the trigger on his rifle. As the shot reverberated through the darkness an officer yelled: "What's going on?" "I don't know," came the answer. "Sniper, I guess."

Without any clear authorization or direction someone opened fire upon the suspected building. A tank rolled up and sprayed the building with .50 caliber tracer bullets. Law enforcement officers rushed into the surrounded building and discovered it empty. "They must be firing one shot and running," was the verdict.

*Why might his capacity to observe be altered?* → ~~As this was occurring,~~ The reporter ~~went to the bus~~ *the bus* interviewed the men who had gotten off and were crouched around it. When he asked them about the sniping incident he was told that someone had heard a shot. He asked: "Did the bullet hit the bus?" The answer was: "Well, we don't know."

Bracketing the hour of midnight Monday, heavy firing, injuring many persons and killing several, occurred in the southeastern sector, which was to be taken over by

the paratroopers at <sup>4:00</sup> 4:00 A.M. Tuesday, and which was, at this time, considered to be the most active riot area in the city.

Employed as a private guard, 55-year-old Julius L. Dorsey, a Negro, was standing in front of a market when accosted by two Negro men and a woman. They demanded he permit them to loot the market. He ignored their demands. They began to berate him. He asked a neighbor to call the police. As the argument grew more heated, Dorsey fired three shots from his pistol into the air.

The police radio reported: "Looters, they have rifles." A patrol car driven by a police officer and <sup>e</sup> carrying three National Guardsmen arrived. As the looters fled, the law enforcement personnel opened fire. When the firing ceased, one person lay dead.

He was Julius L. Dorsey.

In two separate areas -- one consisting of a triangle formed by Mack, Gratiot, and E. Grand Boulevard, the other surrounding Southeastern High School -- firing began shortly after <sup>10:00</sup> 10:00 P.M. and continued for several hours, ~~thereafter~~.

In the first of the areas, a 22-year-old Negro complained that he had been shot at by snipers. Later, a half dozen civilians and one National Guardsman were wounded by shots of undetermined origin.

Henry Denson, a passenger in a car, was shot and killed



when the vehicle's driver, either by accident or intent, failed to heed a warning to halt at a National Guard roadblock.

Similar incidents occurred in the vicinity of Southeastern High School, one of the National Guard staging areas. As early as 10:20 P.M. the area was reported to be under sniper fire. Around midnight there were two incidents, the sequence of which remains in doubt.

f [ Shortly before midnight Ronald Powell, who lived three blocks east of the high school and whose wife was, momentarily, expecting a baby, asked the four friends with whom he had been spending the evening to take him home. He, together with Edward Blackshear, Charles Glover, and John Leroy climbed into Charles Dunson's station wagon for the short drive. Some of the five may have been drinking, but none was intoxicated.

To the north of the high school they were halted at a National Guard roadblock, and told they would have to detour around the school and a fire station at Mack and St. Jean Streets because of the firing that had been occurring. Following orders, they took a circuitous route and approached Powell's home from the south.

On Lycaste Street, between Charlevoix and Goethe, they saw a jeep sitting at the curb. Believing it to be another roadblock, they slowed down. Simultaneously a shot rang out. A National Guardsman fell, hit in the ankle.

7 Other National Guardsmen at the scene thought the shot had come from the station wagon. Shot after shot was directed against the vehicle, at least 17 of them finding their mark. All five occupants were injured, John Leroy fatally.

At approximately the same time firemen, police, and National Guardsmen at the corner of Mack and St. Jean Streets, two and one-half blocks away, again came under fire from what they believed were rooftop snipers to the southeast, the direction of Charlevoix and Lycaste. The police and Guardsmen responded with a hail of fire.

When the shooting ceased, Carl Smith, a young firefighter, lay dead. An autopsy determined that the shot had been fired at street level, and, according to police, had probably come from the <sup>street</sup> ~~southeast~~ <sup>FROM THE</sup> ~~direction of the law~~ ~~enforcement officers.~~

(7) X At 4:22 A.M. when paratroopers, under the command of Col. A. R. Bolling, arrived at the high school, the area was so dark and still that the colonel thought, at first, that he had come to the wrong place. Investigating, he discovered National Guard troops crouched behind the walls of the darkened building, claiming they were pinned down by sniper fire.

h The colonel immediately ordered all of the lights in the building turned on/ and his troops to show themselves as conspicuously as possible. In the apartment house across

the street nearly every window had been shot out, and the walls were pockmarked with bullet holes. The colonel went into the building and began talking to the residents, many of whom had spent the night huddled on the floor. He reassured them no more shots would be fired.

According to Lt. Gen. Throckmorton and Colonel Bolling, the city, at this time, was saturated with fear. The National Guardsmen were afraid, the residents were afraid, and the police were afraid. Numerous persons, the majority of them Negroes, were being injured by gunshots of undetermined origin. The general and his staff felt that the major task of the troops was to reduce the fear and restore an air of normalcy.

In order to accomplish this, every effort was made to establish contact and rapport between the troops and the residents. Troopers -- ~~slightly over~~ 20 percent of whom were Negro -- began helping to clean up the streets, collect garbage, and trace persons who had disappeared in the confusion. Residents in the neighborhoods responded with soup and sandwiches for the troops. In ~~these~~ areas where the National Guard <sup>tried</sup> ~~attempted~~ to establish rapport with the citizens, there was a similar response.

Within hours after the arrival of the paratroops the area occupied by them was the quietest in the city, bearing out General Throckmorton's view that the key to quelling a disorder is to saturate an area with "calm, determined, and

hardened professional soldiers." Loaded weapons, he believes, are unnecessary. Troopers had strict orders not to fire unless they could see the specific person at whom they were aiming. Mass fire was forbidden.

During five days in the city, 2,700 Army troops expended only 201 rounds of ammunition, almost all during the first few hours, after which even stricter fire discipline was enforced. ~~Although~~ <sup>most of them</sup> Hundreds of reports of sniper fire -- ~~a majority~~ false -- continued to pour into police headquarters; the Army logged only ~~10~~ <sup>ten</sup> such incidents. No paratrooper was injured by a gunshot. Only one person was ~~injured~~ <sup>hit</sup> by ~~Army personnel~~ <sup>can shot</sup>. He was a young Negro who was killed when he ran into the line of fire as a trooper, aiding police in a raid on an apartment, aimed at a person he believed to be a sniper.

General Throckmorton ordered the weapons of all military personnel unloaded, but the order either failed to reach or else was disobeyed <sup>it</sup> many National Guardsmen.

Even as the general was requesting the city to relight the streets, Guardsmen continued shooting out the lights, and there are reports of dozens of shots being fired to dispatch one light. At one such location, as Guardsmen were shooting out the streetlights, a radio newscaster reported himself to be pinned down by "sniper fire." On the same day that the general was attempting to restore normalcy by ordering street barricades taken down, Guardsmen on one

street were not only, in broad daylight, ordering people off the street, but off their porches and away from the windows. Two persons who failed to respond to the order quickly enough were shot, one of them fatally.

The general himself reported an incident of a Guardsman "firing across the bow" of an automobile that was approaching a roadblock. As in Los Angeles two years earlier, roadblocks that were ill-lighted and ill-defined -- often consisting of no more than a trash barrel or similar object with Guardsmen standing near by -- proved a continuous hazard to motorists. At one such roadblock, National Guard Sergeant Larry Post, standing in the street, was caught in a sudden cross-fire <sup>as</sup> ~~from~~ his fellow guardsmen ~~as they~~ opened up on a vehicle. He was the only soldier killed in the riot.

With persons of every description arming themselves, and guns being fired accidentally or on the vaguest pretext all over the city, it became more and more impossible to tell who was shooting at whom. Some firemen began carrying guns. One accidentally shot and wounded a fellow fireman. Another injured himself.

The chaos of a riot, and the difficulties faced by police officers, are demonstrated by an incident that occurred at <sup>2:00</sup> ~~2~~ A.M. Tuesday.

A unit of <sup>12</sup> ~~twelve~~ officers received a call to guard

firemen from snipers. When they arrived at the corner of Vicksburg and Linwood in the 12th Street area, the intersection was well-lighted by the flames completely enveloping one building. Sniper fire was directed at the officers from an alley to the north, and gun flashes were observed in two buildings.

40 As the officers advanced on the two buildings, Patrolman Johnie [sic] Hamilton fired several rounds from his machinegun. Thereupon, the officers were suddenly subjected to fire from a new direction, the east. Hamilton, struck by four bullets, fell, critically injured, in the intersection. As two officers ran to his aid, they too were hit.

By this time other units of the Detroit Police Department, State Police, and National Guard had arrived on the scene, and the area was <sup>covered with a hail</sup> ~~turned into an inferno~~ of gunfire.

<sup>In</sup> ~~Amidst~~ the confusion the snipers who had initiated the shooting escaped.

At 9:15 P.M. Tuesday, July 25, 38-year-old Jack Sydnor, a Negro, came home drunk. Taking out his pistol, he fired one shot into an alley. A few minutes later the police arrived. As his common-law wife took refuge in a closet, Sydnor waited, gun in hand, while the police forced open the door. Patrolman Roger Poike, the first to enter, was shot by Sydnor. <sup>Although</sup> ~~Despite being~~ critically injured, the officer managed to get off six shots in return. Police within the building and on the street then poured a hail of fire into the apartment. When the shooting ceased, Sydnor's



body, riddled by the gunfire, was found lying on the ground outside a window.

41 5 Nearby, a State Police officer and a Negro youth were struck and seriously injured by stray bullets. As in other cases where the origin of the shots was not immediately determinable, police reported them as "shot by sniper."

Reports of "heavy sniper fire" poured into police headquarters from the two blocks surrounding the apartment house where the battle with Jack Sydnor had taken place. National Guard troops with two tanks were dispatched to help flush out the snipers. Shots continued to be heard throughout the neighborhood. At approximately midnight <sup>there are discrepancies as to</sup> ~~the precise time is difficult to pinpoint because of some discrepancies in the various reports~~ -- a machine gunner on a tank, startled by several shots, asked the assistant gunner where the shots were coming from. ~~Seeing~~ a flash in the window of an apartment house from which there had been earlier reports of sniping. The assistant gunner pointed toward it.

The machine gunner opened fire. As the slugs ripped through the window and walls of the apartment, <sup>they nearly severed the arm of</sup> 21-year-old X Valerie Hood ~~had her arm nearly severed~~ at the shoulder. Her 4-year-old niece, Tonya Blanding, toppled dead, as a .50 caliber bullet <sup>hole in</sup> ~~plowed through~~ her chest.

42 5 A few seconds earlier, 19-year-old Bill Hood, standing

broke out. Concerned about ~~what might happen to~~ the house, R. R. decided to fly to Detroit. On Wednesday, July 26, ~~July 26,~~ When he arrived at the house, <sup>^</sup>he discovered the tenants were not at home.

<sup>He</sup> ~~R. R.~~ then called his attorney, who advised him to take physical possession of the house <sup>^</sup>and, for legal protection, to take witnesses along.

Together with his 17-year-old brother and another white youth, R. R. went to the house, entered, and began changing the locks on the doors. For protection they <sup>brought</sup> ~~carried along~~ a .22 caliber rifle <sup>which</sup> R. R.'s brother took ~~the gun~~ into the cellar and fired ~~it~~ into a pillow ~~in order~~ to test it.

46 Shortly after <sup>8:00</sup> P.M., R. R. called his attorney to advise him that the tenants had returned, and he had refused to admit them. Thereupon, R. R. alleged, the tenants had threatened to obtain the help of the National Guard. The attorney relates that he was not particularly concerned, ~~and~~ <sup>told</sup> that ~~he advised~~ R. R. that if the National Guard did appear he should have the officer in charge call him (the attorney).

At approximately the same time the National Guard claims it received information to the effect that several men had evicted the legal occupants of the house, taken in weapons and ammunition, barricaded the house, and intended to start sniping ~~sometime~~ after dark.

A National Guard column was dispatched to the scene. Shortly after <sup>9</sup> P.M., in the half-light of dusk, the column

of approximately 30 men surrounded the house. A tank took position on a lawn across the street. The captain commanding the column placed in front of the house an explosive device similar to a firecracker. After setting this off in order to draw the attention of the occupants to the presence of the column, he called for them to come out of the house. No attempt was made to verify the truth or falsehood of the allegations regarding snipers.

When the captain received no reply from the house, he began counting to <sup>ten</sup> 10. As he was counting, he said, he heard a shot, the origin of which he could not determine. A few seconds later he heard another shot and saw a "fire streak" coming from an upstairs window. He thereupon gave the order to fire.

42 According to the three young men, they were on the second floor of the house and completely bewildered by the barrage of fire that was unleashed against it. As hundreds of bullets crashed through the first and second-story windows and ricocheted off the walls, they dashed to the third floor. Protected by a large chimney, they huddled in a closet until, during a lull in the firing, they were able to wave an item of clothing out of the window as a sign of surrender. They were arrested as snipers.

The firing from rifles and machine guns had been so intense that in a period of a few minutes <sup>it inflicted</sup> ~~the house~~ suffered more than \$10,000 <sup>in</sup> ~~worth of~~ damage. One of a pair of stone

columns was shot nearly in half.

Jailed at the 10th Precinct Station/ sometime Wednesday night R. R. and his two companions were taken from their cell to an "Alley Court," police slang for an unlawful attempt to make prisoners confess. A police officer, indicted for the offense, allegedly administered such a severe beating to R. R. that the bruises still were visible two weeks later.

48 ✓ R. R.'s 17-year-old brother had his skull cracked open, and was thrown back into the cell. He was taken to a hospital only when other arrestees complained that he was bleeding to death.

12  
At the preliminary hearing ~~twelve~~ days later the prosecution presented only one witness, the National Guard captain who had given the order to fire. The police officer who had signed the original complaint was not asked to take the stand. The charges against all three of the young men were dismissed.

original  
Nevertheless, the morning after the incident, occurred a major metropolitan newspaper in another section of the country had composed the following banner story from wire service reports:

2nd incident and single APAC  
"DETROIT, July 27 (Thursday) -- Two National Guard tanks ripped a sniper's haven with machine guns Wednesday night and flushed out three shaggy-haired white youths."

in the window, had lighted a cigarette.

Down the street, a bystander was critically injured by a stray bullet. Simultaneously, the John C. Lodge Freeway, two blocks away, was reported to be coming under sniper fire. Tanks and National Guard troops were sent to investigate. At the Harlan House Motel, ten blocks from where Tonya Blanding had died a short time earlier, Mrs. Helen Hall, a 51-year-old white businesswoman, opened the drapes of the fourth floor hall window. Calling out to other guests, she exclaimed: "Look at the tanks!"

She died seconds later as bullets began to slam into the building. As the firing ceased, a 19-year-old Marine P.F.C., carrying a Springfield rifle, burst into the building. When, accidentally, he pushed the rifle barrel through a window, the firing commenced anew. The Marine, who had just decided "to help out" the law enforcement personnel, was exonerated in Mrs. Hall's death.

45 R. R., a white 27-year-old coin dealer, had bought a three-story house on "L" Street, an integrated middle-class neighborhood. In May of 1966, <sup>he and</sup> ~~R. R.~~ with his wife and child had moved to New York and had rented the house to two young men. After several months he began to have problems with his tenants. On one occasion he reported to his attorney that he had been threatened by them.

In March of 1967, R. R. instituted eviction proceedings, ~~against the tenants.~~ These were still pending when the riot



Snipers attacked a guard command post and Detroit's racial riot set a modern record for bloodshed. The death toll soared to 36, topping the Watts bloodbath of 1966 in which 35 died and making Detroit's insurrection the most deadly racial riot in modern U. S. history . . . .

"In the attack on the sniper's nest, the Guardsmen poured hundreds of rounds of .50 caliber machine gun fire into the home, which authorities said housed arms and ammunition used by West Side sniper squads.

"Guardsmen recovered guns and ammunition. A reporter with the troopers said the house, a neat brick home in a neighborhood of \$20,000 to \$50,000 homes, was torn apart by the machine gun and rifle fire.

"Sniper fire crackled from the home as the Guard unit approached. It was one of the first verified reports of sniping by whites . . . .

"A pile of loot taken from riot-ruined stores was recovered from the sniper's haven, located ten blocks from the heart of the 200-square block riot zone.

"Guardsmen said the house had been identified as a storehouse of arms and ammunition for snipers. Its arsenal was regarded as an indication that the sniping -- or at least some of it -- was organized."

As hundreds of arrestees were brought into the Tenth Precinct Station, officers were taking it upon themselves to carry on investigations and to attempt to extract



confessions. Dozens of charges of police brutality emanated from the station as prisoners were brought in uninjured, but later had to be taken to the hospital.

50 ¶ In the absence of the precinct commander, who had transferred his headquarters to the riot command post at a nearby hospital, discipline vanished. Prisoners who requested that they be permitted to notify someone of their arrest were almost invariably told that: "The telephones are out of order." Congressman Conyers and State Representative Del Rio, who went to the station hoping to coordinate with the police the establishing of a community patrol, were so upset by what they saw that they changed their minds and gave up on the project.

A young woman, brought into the station, was told to strip. After she had done so, and while an officer took pictures with a Polaroid camera, another officer came up to her and began fondling her. The negative of one of the pictures, fished out of a wastebasket, subsequently was turned over to the mayor's office.

Citing the <sup>sniper</sup> danger, ~~from snipers~~, officers throughout the department had taken off their <sup>bright</sup> metal badges. They also had taped over the license plates and the numbers of the police cars, ~~so that~~ identification of individual officers became virtually impossible.

On a number of occasions officers fired at ~~the~~ fleeing looters, then made little attempt to determine whether their shots had hit anyone. Later some of the *targets* ~~persons would be~~ <sup>were</sup> discovered dead or injured in the street.

51 In one such case police and National Guardsmen were interrogating a youth suspected of arson when, according to officers, he attempted to escape. As he vaulted over the hood of an automobile, an officer fired his shotgun. The youth disappeared on the other side of the car. Without making an investigation, the officers and Guardsmen returned to their car and drove off.

When nearby residents called police, another squad car arrived to pick up the body. Despite the fact that an autopsy disclosed the youth had been killed by five shotgun pellets, only a cursory investigation was made, and the death was attributed to "sniper fire." No police officer at the scene during the shooting filed a report.

Not until a Detroit newspaper editor presented to the police the statements of several witnesses claiming that the youth had been shot by police after he had been told to run did the department launch an investigation. Not until three weeks after the shooting did an officer come forward to identify himself as the one who had fired the fatal shot.

Citing conflicts in the testimony of the score of witnesses, the Detroit Prosecutor's office declined to press

charges.

52] Prosecution is proceeding in the case of three youths in whose shotgun deaths law enforcement personnel were implicated following a report that snipers were firing from the Aigiers Motel. In fact, there is little evidence that anyone fired from inside the building. Two witnesses say that they had seen a man, standing outside of the motel, fire two shots from a rifle. The interrogation of other persons revealed that law enforcement personnel then shot out one or more streetlights. Police patrols responded to the shots. An attack was launched on the motel.

The picture is further complicated by the fact that this incident occurred at roughly the same time that the National Guard was directing fire at the apartment house in which Tonya Blanding was killed. The apartment house was only six blocks distant from and in a direct line with the motel.

The killings occurred when officers began on-the-spot questioning of the occupants of the motel in an effort to discover weapons used in the "sniping." Several of those questioned reportedly were beaten. One was a Negro ex-paratrooper who had only recently been honorably discharged, and had gone to Detroit to look for a job.

53] Although by late Tuesday/ looting and fire-bombing had virtually ceased, between 7:00 and 11:00 P.M. that

<sup>reports of</sup>  
night there were 444 incidents <sup>reported</sup>. Most were reports of sniper fire.

During the daylight hours of July 26th, there were 534 such reports. ~~That evening~~ Between 8:30 and 11:00 P.M. there were 255. As they proliferated, the pressure on law enforcement officers to uncover the snipers became intense. Homes were broken into. Searches were made on the flimsiest of tips. A Detroit newspaper headline aptly proclaimed: "Everyone's Suspect in No Man's Land."

Before the arrest of a young woman IBM operator in the City Assessor's office <sup>brought</sup> ~~called~~ attention to the situation, on Friday, July 28th, any person with a gun in his home was liable to be picked up as a suspect.

Of the 27 persons ~~who were~~ charged with sniping, 22 had charges against them dismissed at preliminary hearings, and the charges against two others were dismissed later. One pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered gun and was given a suspended sentence. Trials of two -- one on a reduced charge -- are pending.

In all, more than 7,200 persons were arrested. Almost 3,000 of these were picked up on the second day of the riot, and by midnight Monday 4,000 were incarcerated in makeshift jails. Some were kept as <sup>long</sup> ~~many~~ as 30 hours on buses. Others spent days in an underground garage without toilet facilities. An uncounted number were people who had <sup>enough to be</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>wrong</sup> on the street at the wrong time.

time, ~~in the wrong place~~. Included were members of the press whose attempts to show their credentials ~~when they were picked up~~ <sup>had been</sup> were ignored. Released later, they were chided for not having exhibited their identification at the time of their arrests.

The booking system proved incapable of adequately handling the large number of arrestees. People became lost for days in the maze of different detention facilities. Until the later stages, bail was deliberately ~~set at~~ <sup>not at</sup> high, ~~levels~~, often ~~at~~ \$10,000 or more. ~~Even when~~ <sup>It</sup> became apparent that this policy was unrealistic and unworkable, and the Prosecutor's office began releasing on low bail or their own recognizance hundreds of those who had been picked up. <sup>(Nevertheless,</sup> the fact was not publicized for fear of antagonizing those ~~persons~~ who had demanded a high-bail policy.

53 Of the 43 persons who were killed during the riot, 33 were Negro and 10 were white. Seventeen were looters, of whom two were white. Fifteen citizens (of whom four were white), one white National Guardsman, one white fireman, and one Negro private guard died as the result of gunshot wounds. Most of these deaths appear to have been accidental, but criminal homicide is suspected in some.

Two persons, including one fireman, died as a result of fallen power lines. Two were burned to death. One was a drunken gunman, one an arson suspect. One was a white

man killed by a rioter. One was a police officer felled by a shotgun blast when <sup>his</sup> the gun, in the hands of another officer, accidentally discharged during a scuffle with a looter.

Action by police officers accounted for 20 and, very likely, 21 of the deaths. Action by the National Guard for <sup>several</sup> ~~7~~ and, very likely, <sup>14</sup> ~~9~~. Action by the Army for ~~1~~ <sup>one</sup>. Two deaths were the result of action by store owners. Four persons died accidentally. Rioters were responsible for two, and perhaps three of the deaths, ~~1~~ private guard for one. A white man is suspected of murdering a Negro youth. The perpetrator of one of the killings in the Algiers Motel remains unknown.

56 Damage estimates, originally set as high as \$500 million, <sup>were</sup> quickly ~~began to be~~ scaled down. The city assessor's office placed the loss -- excluding business stock, private furnishings, and the buildings of churches and charitable institutions -- at approximately \$22 million. Insurance payments, according to the State Insurance Bureau, will come to about \$32 million, representing an estimated 65 to 75 percent of the total loss.

~~For all practical purposes, the riot had ended by~~  
~~(most riot activity had ended.)~~  
Thursday, July 27, The paratroopers were removed from the city on Saturday. On Tuesday, August 1, the curfew was lifted and the National Guard moved out.



SECTION 1

PROFILE -- TAMPA -- FINAL

1967,

On Sunday, June 11, <sup>1967,</sup> Tampa, Florida, sweltered in the 94-degree heat. A humid wind ruffled the bay, where thousands of persons had watched the hydroplane races. Since early morning the Police Department's Selective Enforcement Unit, designed as a riot control squad, had been employed to keep order at the races.

At 5:30 P.M., a block from the waterfront, a photo supply warehouse was broken into. Forty-five minutes later two police officers spotted three Negro youths as they walked near the State Building. When the youths caught sight of the officers, they ducked into an alley. The officers gave chase. As they ran, the suspects left a trail of photographic equipment, ~~scattered from the yellow paper bags they were carrying.~~ *they were carrying*

The officers transmitted a general broadcast over the police radio. As other officers arrived on the scene, a chase began through and around the streets, houses, and alleys of the neighborhood. When Negro residents of the area adjacent to the Central Park Village Housing Project became aware of the chase, they began to participate. Some attempted to help the officers in locating the suspects.

R. C. Oates, one of the 17 Negroes on the 500-man

Tampa police force, spotted 19-year old Martin Chambers, <sup>step</sup> bare to the waist, wriggling ~~away~~ beneath one of the houses. Oates called for Chambers to surrender. Ignoring him, Chambers emerged running from beneath the house. A white officer, J. L. Calvert, took up the pursuit.

Pursuing Calvert, in turn, were three young Negroes, all spectators. Behind one of the houses a high cyclone fence created a two-foot wide alley twenty-five feet in length.

As Chambers darted along the fence, Officer Calvert rounded the corner of the house. Calvert yelled to him to halt. Chambers ignored him. Calvert, who had flunked his last marksmanship test, pointed his .38 revolver and fired. <sup>ed the of Chambers</sup> Chambers, the slug entering ~~his~~ back and passing ~~the~~ completely through his body, <sup>Chambers Raising</sup> raised his hands over his head, <sup>he</sup> and clutched at the cyclone fence.

When the three youths running behind Officer Calvert came upon the scene, they assumed Chambers had been shot standing in the position in which they saw him. Rumor quickly spread through the neighborhood that a white police officer had shot a Negro youth who had had his hands over his head and was trying to surrender.

The ambulance that had been summoned became lost on the way. As minute followed minute, The gathering crowd viewing the bloody, critically injured youth <sup>grew</sup> became increasingly belligerent.

see  
Oates' X  
dep. 16

Finally, the Reverend M. L. Newman told police they'd "better get the boy out of there." Officer Oates loaded Chambers into his car and drove him to the hospital. The youth died shortly thereafter.

As officers were leaving the scene, a thunderstorm broke. Beneath the pelting rain, the spectators scattered. When an officer went back to check the area he found no one on the streets.

X

A few minutes after 7:00 P.M., the Selective Enforcement Unit, tired and sun-parched, reported in from the races. A half hour later a report was received that 500 persons were gathering. A police car was sent into the area to check the report. The officers could find no one. The men of the Selective Enforcement Unit were told to go home.

X

The men in the scout car had not, however, penetrated into the Central Village Housing complex where, as the rain ended, hundreds of persons poured from the apartments. At least half of ~~them~~ were teenagers and young adults. As they began to mill about, old grievances, both real and imagined, were resurrected. <sup>(INSERT FROM P. 1-7.8)</sup> discriminatory practices of local stores, advantages taken by white men of Negro girls, ~~the kicking in the face of a Negro~~ <sup>the kicking in the face of a Negro</sup> by a white man as the Negro lay handcuffed on the ground, ~~the chronic lack of recreation facilities,~~ ~~the~~ blackballing of two Negro high

ster

ster

X

Max 1-7+8

schools by the athletic conference, ~~and the fact that there was an excess of bars, all owned by whites, in the neighborhood.~~ Less than a month before, police-community relations had been severely strained by the actions of a pair of white officers who were subsequently transferred to another beat.

Shortly after Officer Oates returned to the area, ~~he~~ began seething. (Attempting to convince the crowd to disperse, ~~of its own accord~~) he announced that a complete investigation would be made into the shooting. He seemed to be making headway when a ~~girl, crying hysterically~~ <sup>young woman came running down the street screaming</sup> that the police had killed her brother, ~~came running down the street.~~ <sup>Chambers, it turned out, was not her brother, but her mistaken hysteria,</sup> Her appearance galvanized the crowd. Rock-throwing began. Police cars driving into the area were stoned. The police, relying on a previous experience when, after withdrawal of their units, the crowd had dispersed, decided to send no more patrol cars into the vicinity.

This time the maneuver did not work. From nearby bars and tawdry night spots patrons joined the throng. A window was smashed. Haphazard looting began. As fluid bands of rioters moved down the Central Avenue business district, ~~these~~ stores whose proprietors were particularly disliked were singled out. A grocery store, a liquor store, a restaurant were hit. The first fire was set.

Because of the dismissal of the Selective Enforcement

Unit and the lack of accurate intelligence information, the police department was slow to react. Although Sheriff Malcolm Beard of Hillsborough County was in contact with the Department throughout the evening, it was not until <sup>after</sup> ~~approximately~~ 11:00 P.M. that a request for deputies was made to him.

At 11:30 P.M. a recall order, issued earlier by the police department, began to bring officers back into the area. Lighted by the flames of burning buildings, <sup>by this time,</sup> the streets in the vicinity of the housing project were <sup>by</sup> ~~this time, engulfed in a full fledged riot.~~

Falling power lines whipped sparks about the skirmish line of officers as it moved down the street. The popping noise of what sounded to the officers like gunshots came from the direction of the housing project.

The officers did not return the fire. <sup>Police</sup> ~~It was~~ announced <sup>from a sound car</sup> ~~over a public address system~~ that anyone caught armed would be shot. The firing ceased. Then, and throughout the succeeding two days, law enforcement officers refrained from the use of firearms. No officer <sup>or</sup> ~~nor any civilian~~ suffered a gunshot wound during the riot.


Driving along the expressway, a young white couple, Mr. and Mrs. C. D., were startled by the fires. Deciding to investigate, they took the off-ramp into the midst of the riot. The car was swarmed over. Its windows were shattered. C. D. was dragged into the street.



As he emerged from a bar in which he had spent the evening, 19-year old J. C., a Negro fruit-picker from Arkansas, was as surprised by the riot as Mr. and Mrs. C. D. Rushing toward the station wagon in which the young woman was trapped, he interposed himself between her and the mob. Although rocks and beer cans smashed the windows, she was able to drive off. J. C. pushed through to where the white man lay. With the hoots and jeers of rioting youths ringing in his ears, J. C. helped him, also, to escape.

<sup>1</sup>  
By ~~one~~ A.M., police officers and sheriff's deputies had surrounded an area several blocks square. Firemen began to extinguish the flames which, by this time, had spread to several other establishments from the three stores in which they had, originally, been set. No resistance was met. Control was soon re-established.

Governor Claude Kirk flew to Tampa. Since the Chief of Police was absent, and since, in Florida, sheriffs are direct arms of the governor, Sheriff Beard was placed in charge of the combined forces of the police and sheriff's departments.

 For the next twelve hours the situation remained quiet but tense. ~~By the afternoon of Monday, June 12, the sheriff's and police forces both had been fully committed. The men were tired. There were none in reserve.~~

As a precautionary ~~measure~~ the Sheriff decided to



request<sup>ed</sup> that a contingent ~~of the~~ National Guard be made available ~~to the city~~.

Late in the afternoon Governor Kirk met with the residents at a school in the Central Park Village area.

It was a tense meeting, ~~charged with hostility, in which~~  
<sup>Most</sup> ~~Every~~ speakers, <sup>whether</sup> white <sup>or</sup> Negro, <sup>were</sup> was booed and hissed.

Although officials prided themselves on supposedly good race relations and <sup>relative acceptance</sup> ~~the lack of massive resistance~~ by whites <sup>of</sup> ~~to the~~ integration of schools and facilities, ~~in the~~ city, Negroes, <sup>comprising</sup> ~~who make up~~ almost 20 percent of the population, had had no one of their own race to represent them in positions of policy or power, nor to appeal to for redress of grievances. ~~Frustrations had built up to the boiling point.~~

There was no Negro on the City Council; none on the School Board; none on the Fire Department; none of high rank on the Police Force. Six ~~out~~ of every ten Negroes lived in dilapidated housing, many of them in shacks with broken window panes, <sup>gas leaks</sup> ~~leaking gas~~, and <sup>rat</sup> ~~holes~~ in the walls, <sup>\$50</sup> ~~through which rats scampered~~. Rents were <sup>\$60</sup> ~~fifty~~ to ~~sixty~~ dollars a month. <sup>Such</sup> ~~Recreational facilities were few. Those~~ that did exist lacked equipment and supervisors. Young toughs ~~preempted and~~ intimidated the children who tried to use them.

~~In the schools,~~ <sup>children</sup> The majority of Negroes never reached the eighth grade. In the high schools, only 3 to 4 percent

MOVE  
TO P.  
1-3

of Negro seniors attained the minimum passing score on the State's college entrance examination, one-tenth ~~of~~ the percentage of white students.

A difference of at least three-and-a-half years in educational attainment separated the average Negro and white. Fifty-five percent of the Negro men in Tampa were working in unskilled jobs. More than half of the families had incomes of less than \$3,000 a year. The result was that 40 percent of the <sup>Negro</sup> children lived in broken homes, and the city's crime rate <sup>ranked in</sup> ~~was among~~ the top 25 percent in the nation. ~~It has a high percentage of Negroes as well.~~ (PICKUP P. 1-3) X on

~~no 1~~ ~~Although the meeting between the residents and the~~ <sup>Nevertheless,</sup> ~~officials~~ broke up without concrete results, <sup>ed</sup> the Governor believed it had ~~served a purpose in enabling~~ the residents to let off steam. 0

That evening, as National Guard troops supplanted local forces in maintaining a perimeter and establishing roving patrols, anti-poverty workers went from door to door, urging citizens to stay off the streets.

A reported attempt by Black Muslims to incite ~~people~~ <sup>to</sup> further violence failed. Although there were scattered reports of trouble from several areas of the city, and a few fires were set -- <sup>largely</sup> ~~a substantial proportion of them~~ in vacant buildings -- there were no major incidents. <sup>Several</sup> ~~three~~ youths ~~were arrested when discovered~~ with a cache of 11

<sup>were arrested.</sup>  
Molotov cocktails. They were white.

SKP All ~~during~~ the next day false reports poured into Police Headquarters. ~~Normal~~, Everyday scenes took on menacing tones. Twenty Negro men, bared to the waist and carrying clubs, were reported to be gathering. They turned out to be construction workers.

see Beard dep. Mayor Nuccio <sup>met</sup> ~~continued, with uncertain success, to~~ meet with residents. At their suggestion that the man most likely to carry weight with the youngsters was Coach Jim Williams, he placed a call to Tallahassee, where Williams was attending a coaching clinic.

An impressive-looking man with graying hair, ~~Williams~~ had been the football coach at a high school serving the central city <sup>until</sup> ~~year earlier~~ <sup>when</sup> ~~he had become an assistant coach at Louisiana's Southern University.~~ Xoul

It was almost 48 hours after the shooting of Martin Chambers. Williams arrived in Tampa Together with another coach he went to an eatery called The Greek Stand, behind which he found a number of youngsters fashioning an arsenal of bottles, bricks, and Molotov cocktails. As in the crowds that were once more beginning to gather, the principal complaint was ~~about~~ the presence of the National Guard, <sup>which</sup> ~~who~~, the residents asserted, gave them a feeling of being hemmed in. Williams decided to attempt to negotiate the removal of the National Guard if the people would agree to keep the peace and to disperse.

But see Beard dep. p32 ff

Emotions were starting to run high again all over the city. Two Negro community leaders, Dr. James O. Brookins and attorney Delano S. Stewart, were <sup>advised</sup> ~~apprised~~ by acquaintances that, unless the intensive patrolling of Negro neighborhoods ceased, people were planning to set fires in industrial districts that evening. Like Coach Williams, Dr. Brookins and Stewart contacted Sheriff Beard.

Sheriff Beard had been in consultation with Robert Gilder of the NAACP. Gilder was in touch with leaders of the Negro youth. Some were college students who ~~had~~ <sup>stet</sup> been unable to get summer jobs. One was a Vietnam ~~war~~ veteran who had been turned down for a position as a swimming pool life guard. The youths believed that discrimination had played a part in their <sup>failure to find</sup> ~~lack of success in finding~~ jobs.

The suggestion was made to Sheriff Beard that the National Guard be pulled out of the Negro areas, and that these young men, as well as others, be given the opportunity to keep order. The idea made sense to the sheriff. He decided to take a chance on the Youth Patrol. Participants were identified first by phosphorescent armbands, and later by white hats.

During the next twenty-four hours 126 youths, some of whom had participated in the riot, were recruited into the patrol. Many were high school dropouts.

On Wednesday, the inquiry into the death of Martin Chambers was concluded. <sup>With</sup> ~~When~~ the verdict ~~was issued~~ that ~~the~~ <sup>Calvert</sup> Officer ~~had~~ fired the shot justifiably and in the line of duty, apprehension rose that trouble would erupt again. The leaders of the Youth Patrol were called in. The sheriff explained the law to them, and pointed out that the verdict ~~handed down~~ was in conformance with the law. ~~Despite the fact that the verdict was not to their liking,~~ The White Hats continued to keep order. order

*Officer Gates, the Negro policeman at the scene of the shooting, described how affected Officer Calvert was.*

Section 2

PROFILE -- CINCINNATI -- FINAL

On Monday, June 12, <sup>before order had been restored in</sup> ~~while~~ Tampa ~~was still smoldering,~~  
<sup>940 miles away</sup> trouble erupted ~~in Cincinnati, 940 miles to the north.~~

Beginning in October, 1965, assaults on middle-aged white women, several of whom were murdered, had generated an atmosphere of fear, ~~in the city.~~ When ~~it became known~~ that the ~~tentative identification of~~ (the "Cincinnati Strangler" <sup>was tentatively identified as</sup> ~~indicated him to be~~ a Negro, a new element of tension was injected into relations between the races.

In December, 1966, a <sup>Negro</sup> jazz musician named Posteal Laskey was arrested and charged with one of the murders.

In May of 1967 he was convicted and sentenced to death.

~~Although~~ Two of the principal witnesses against Laskey were Negroes, <sup>Nevertheless,</sup> ~~many persons in the Negro's community~~ felt that,

because of the charged atmosphere, he had not received a fair trial. <sup>aroused</sup> They were further ~~incensed~~ when, at about the same time, a white man, convicted of manslaughter in the death of his girlfriend, received a suspended sentence.)

~~Despite the fact that~~ <sup>Although</sup> the cases were dissimilar, there was talk in the Negro community that the difference in ~~the severity of sentences~~ <sup>demonstrated</sup> ~~was indicative of~~ a double standard of justice for white and black.

~~Following Laskey's conviction,~~ A drive began in the Negro community to raise funds for an appeal. Laskey's cousin,



*on behalf of this appeal*  
Peter Frakes, began walking the streets <sup>then</sup> carrying a sandwich board ~~advertising the "Laskey Freedom Fund," and~~ declaring: "Cincinnati Guilty -- Laskey Innocent." After warning him several times, ~~about his activities,~~ police arrested Frakes on a charge of blocking pedestrian traffic. *Many Negroes saw his*  
~~A substantial portion of the Negro community looked upon the arrest as a harassing action by the police, similar to the apparently selective enforcement of the city's anti-loitering ordinance. Between January and June, of some 240 persons arrested under it, 149 had been a Negro.~~  
*170 of some*  
*check that this was 1967*

Frakes was arrested at 12:35 A.M. on Sunday ~~morning,~~ June 11. That evening, concurrently with the commencement of a Negro Baptist Convention, it was announced in one of the churches that a meeting to protest the Frakes arrest and the anti-loitering ordinance would be held the following night at a junior high school in the Avondale District. *part of the significance of such a protest meeting lay in the context of past events.*  
Without the city's realizing what was occurring, over the years protest through political and non-violent channels had ~~been becoming more and more~~ *become increasingly* difficult for Negroes. ~~It seemed more and more futile~~ *Negroes,* To the young, militant element ~~especially, such protest~~ *appeared to them* ~~in the Negro community to abide by accepted procedure,~~ *had become almost futile.*

Although the city's Negro population had been rising swiftly -- in 1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes -- there was only one Negro ~~sitting~~ on the City Council. In the 1950's, with a far smaller Negro population, there had been two. Negroes attributed

*dilution of the Negro vote through abolition of the*  
this to ~~the fact that the city had abolished its~~ pro-  
portional representation system of electing the nine  
councilmen, ~~thereby diluting the Negro vote.~~ When a  
Negro received the largest total vote of any of the  
councilmen -- traditionally the criterion for choosing  
the mayor -- tradition was cast aside and a white man was  
picked for mayor, ~~instead.~~

Although, by 1967, 40 percent of the school children  
were Negro, there was only one Negro on the Board of Edu-  
cation. Of 81 members of various city commissions, only  
one was a Negro.

*When*  
Under the leadership of the NAACP, picketing took  
place at the construction site of a new city convention hall  
to protest lack of Negro membership in building trades unions.  
It produced no results. When the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth,  
who had ~~led the Negroes in~~ *been one of the leaders of* the Birmingham ~~march~~ *demonstrations* of 1963,  
staged a protest against alleged discriminatory practices at  
the County Hospital, he and his followers were ~~arrested for~~ *and convicted of*  
*When* trespassing. After being sentenced to jail, Reverend  
Shuttlesworth's sentence was suspended. Placed on probation,  
he was kept under the court's jurisdiction ~~and prevented~~ *to deter him*  
from leading further non-violent protests.

Traditional Negro leaders drawn from the middle class  
lost ~~more and more of their~~ influence as promises made by  
the city ~~degenerated into~~ *produced* petty results. In the spring of

1967, a group of 14 white and 14 Negro business and community leaders, called the Committee of 28, talked about 2,000 job openings for young Negroes. Only 65 materialized. Almost one out of every eight Cincinnati Negroes was unemployed. Two ~~out~~ of every five Negro families were living on or below the border line of poverty.

A study of the West End Section of the city indicated that one out of every four Negro men living there was out of work. In one public housing area two-thirds of the fathers were missing, ~~from the home~~. Of private housing occupied by Negroes, one-fourth was overcrowded and half was dilapidated.

In the 90-degree temperature of Monday, June 12th <sup>(as throughout the summer,</sup> Negro youngsters roamed the streets. The two swimming pools available to them could accommodate only a handful. In the Avondale Section -- ~~which had, up to a few years~~ <sup>once</sup> ~~before, been~~ a prosperous middle class community, but now <sup>the home of</sup> ~~contained~~ more than half the city's Negro population -- Negro youths watched white workers going to <sup>work at</sup> ~~their jobs~~ in white-owned stores and businesses. One youth began to count the number of delivery trucks being driven by Negroes. During the course of the afternoon, of the 52 trucks he counted, only one had a Negro driver. His <sup>sampling</sup> ~~count~~ was remarkably accurate. According to a study conducted by the

Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, less than 2 percent of truck drivers in the Cincinnati area are Negro.

Late in the afternoon the youths began to interfere with deliveries being made by white drivers. Dr. Bruce Green, president of the local NAACP chapter was notified. Dr. Green asked his colleague, Dr. Robert Reid, the director of the Opportunities Industrialization Center, to go and try to calm the youngsters. Dr. Reid found several whom he knew, and convinced them to go with him to the Avondale Special Services Office to talk things over.

They were ~~in the process of~~ drawing up plans for a meeting with merchants of the Avondale area / when <sup>word came</sup> ~~there was~~ ~~an indication~~ of an altercation at a nearby drugstore. Several of the youths left the meeting and rushed over to the store. Dr. Reid followed them. The owner of the store was complaining to the police that the youths earlier had been interfering with his business; he declared that he wasn't going to stand for it.

Dr. Reid was attempting to ~~act as a~~ <sup>e</sup>mediator when a police sergeant arrived and asked the officers what was going on. One allegedly replied that they had been called in because, "Young nigger punks were disrupting deliveries to the stores."

A dispute arose between Dr. Reid and the sergeant as to whether the officer had said "nigger." After further

discussion the sergeant told the kids to "break it up!" Dr. Reid, together with some of the youngsters, returned to the Special Services Office. After talking to the youngsters again, Dr. Reid left to attend a meeting elsewhere.

*(11 Soon)*  
~~Shortly thereafter~~, some of the youngsters ~~began to~~ *headed for* make their way toward the junior high school, where the meeting protesting the Frakes arrest and the anti-loitering ordinance was scheduled to take place.

The police department <sup>was</sup> alerted to the possibility of a disturbance <sup>and</sup> mobilized ~~its forces~~. However, <sup>the police were wary</sup> ~~because of~~ <sup>of becoming, as some Negro militants had complained,</sup> ~~complaints from Negro militants that the police themselves~~ were an inciting factor. <sup>Some months earlier, when Ku Klux Klansmen had been attracted to the scene of a speech by Stokely Carmichael, a Negro crowd, reacting to the heavy police patrolling, had gathered about the car of a plain-clothesman and attempted to overturn it,</sup> *(on Monday, June 12,)* the department ~~thus~~ decided to withhold its men from the immediate area of the meeting.

It appeared <sup>*(for a time)*</sup> as if this policy might be rewarded ~~until,~~ <sup>*Near the end*</sup> ~~toward the close~~ of the rally, <sup>*however,*</sup> a Negro real estate broker arose to defend the police and the anti-loitering ordinance. The youngsters who had had the encounter with the police officers only a short time earlier were incensed. When the meeting broke up a missile was hurled through the window of a nearby church. A small fire was set in the street. A

Molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of a drug store.

The police were able to react quickly. There was only one major confrontation between them and the mob. Little resistance was offered.

Although windows were broken in some two dozen stores, there was virtually no looting. There were 14 arrests, some ~~of them not~~ <sup>(un)</sup> connected with the disturbance. Among those arrested was a community worker, now studying for a doctorate at Brandeis University. When he went to the area to help get people off the streets, he was arrested and charged with loitering.

The next morning a judge of the Municipal Court, before whom most of the persons charged were to be brought, <sup>said</sup> ~~stated~~ ~~that~~ he intended to mete out the maximum sentence to anyone found guilty of a riot-connected offense. Although the judge later told the Commission that he knew his statement was a "violation of judicial ethics," he said that he made it because the "city was in a state of siege," and he intended it to act as a deterrent against further violence.

Maximum sentences were, in fact, pronounced by the judge on all ~~those who were~~ convicted in his court, regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, or the background of the persons arrested. ~~The~~ <sup>most</sup> police were charging white persons arrested ~~principally~~ with disorderly conduct -- for which the maximum sentence is 30 days in jail and a \$100 fine. <sup>however,</sup> ~~but~~ Many Negroes were charged with violation of the



Riot Act -- for which the maximum sentence is one year in jail plus a \$500 fine. <sup>consequent</sup> The impression among a major portion of the Negro community <sup>was that</sup> ~~continued to be that the courts were dispensing~~ discriminatory justice. (X)

Tuesday morning <sup>Negro leaders presented</sup> a list of 11 demands and grievances stemming from the Monday night meeting ~~was presented by Negro leaders~~ to the municipal government. Included were demands for repeal of the anti-loitering law, release of all prisoners arrested during the disturbance, full employment for Negroes, and equal justice in the courts.

Municipal officials agreed that the city council would consider the demands. However, they rejected a suggestion that they attend an open-air meeting of residents in the Avondale section. City leaders did not want to give stature to the militants by <sup>recognizing</sup> ~~acknowledging~~ them as the de facto representatives of the community. Yet, by all indications, the militants were the only persons with influence on the people on the streets.

Mayor Walton H. Bachrach declared that he was "quite surprised" by the disturbance because the council had "worked like hell" to help Negroes. As in other cities, Municipal officials, whose contacts were generally with <sup>a few</sup> ~~the small percentage of~~ middle-class Negroes, appeared not to realize ~~the danger presented by the~~ <sup>volatility of the</sup> pent-up frustrations ~~of a ghetto population mired in poverty.~~ (X) <sup>Negroes in the</sup>

Early in the evening a crowd, consisting mostly of teenagers and young adults, began to gather in the Avondale District. <sup>When,</sup> After a short ~~period of~~ time, ~~when~~ no one appeared to give direction <sup>to the assembly</sup> ~~to the assembly~~ <sup>they</sup>, people began to mill about. A few minutes before 7 P.M. cars were stoned and windows were broken. Police moved in to disperse the gathering.

Fires were set. When firemen reached the scene they were ~~subjected to a barrage~~ <sup>with</sup> rocks and bottles. A full-scale confrontation <sup>took place</sup> between police riot squads and the Negro crowd. ~~took place~~. As police swept the streets, people scattered. According to the chief of police, at approximately 7:15 ~~PM~~, "All hell broke loose."

<sup>Soon</sup> ~~Like fragments of an exploding bombshell,~~ the riot disorder <sup>leaped</sup> spread to other sections of the city. <sup>Although</sup> Most of

~~these fragments were small and~~ the damage they caused was minor. ~~Of~~ 40-odd fires ~~that were to be~~ reported before dawn, only 11 resulted in a loss of more than \$1,000, and <sup>listed</sup> on The Fire Department log, only four ~~are listed~~ as having caused major damage.

<sup>the</sup> confusion and rapidity with which ~~it~~ the disorder spread made it <sup>almost</sup> ~~difficult if not~~ impossible to determine its scope.

Many reports of fires set by Molotov cocktails, cars being stoned, and windows being broken were received by the police from several parts of the city. A white motorist -- who died three weeks later -- and a Negro sitting on his

porch suffered gunshot wounds. ~~Ominous Rumors~~ <sup>spread</sup> of ~~gangs~~ <sup>gangs</sup> of Negroes raiding white neighborhoods, of shootings, and of organization of the riot. ~~W~~ <sup>These rumors</sup> nearly all of which were ~~discovered~~ <sup>determined</sup> later to be unfounded, ~~circulated~~ <sup>spread</sup>. (X)

At 9:40 P.M., following a request for aid to surrounding communities, Mayor Bachrach placed a call to the Governor asking for mobilization of the National Guard.

At 2:30 A.M., Wednesday the first <sup>Guard</sup> units ~~of the National Guard~~ appeared on the streets. They followed a policy of restraint in the use of weapons. Few shots were fired. <sup>Later,</sup> Two hours ~~after the appearance of the Guard~~, the streets were quiet.

9) [INSERT FROM PAGE 2-9]  
That ~~Wednesday~~ afternoon (an open session) of the city council ~~was~~ held. The chamber was jammed with Negro residents, many of whom gave vociferous support <sup>as</sup> their spokesmen, ~~the~~ <sup>criticized</sup> the city administration. When the audience became unruly, a detail of National Guardsmen was stationed outside the council chamber. Their presence resulted in a misunderstanding, causing many of the Negroes to walk out, and the meeting to ~~come to an~~ end. (SK)

Wednesday night there were virtually no reports of riotous activity until 9 P.M., when scattered incidents of violence again began to take place. One person was injured by a gunshot.

Despite fears of a clash between Negroes and SAMS -- white Southern Appalachian migrants whose economic conditions

paralleled those of the Negroes -- such a clash was averted.

H. "Rap" Brown, arriving in the city on Thursday, attempted to capitalize ~~on~~ <sup>by present</sup> the discontent / ~~the~~ <sup>by present</sup> list of 20 "demands," ~~he presented were of such a scatter-shot, dictatorial and impractical nature that few persons could have taken them seriously.~~ Their principal effect would have been total removal of all white persons, whatever their capacity, from the ghetto area. Demand No. 18 stated that "at any meeting to settle grievances . . . any white proposal or white representative objected to by black representatives must be rejected automatically." No. 20 demanded a veto power over police officers patrolling the community.

(X) His appearance had no galvanizing effect. ~~Although~~ scattered incidents occurred for three days after the arrival of the National Guard, ~~the disorder never again threatened to get out of control.~~ <sup>violence never again</sup> <sup>but law enforcement</sup> <sup>kept them under control</sup>

Of 63 reported injuries, 12 were serious enough to require hospitalization; 56 of the persons injured were white. Most of the injuries ~~were incurred as the result of~~ <sup>from</sup> thrown objects or ~~of~~ glass shards. Of the 107 persons arrested Tuesday night, when the main disturbance took place, 75 were 21 ~~years of age~~ or younger. Of the total of 404 persons arrested, ~~during the riot,~~ 128 were juveniles / and 338 were 26 ~~years of age~~ or younger. Of the adults

arrested, 29 percent were unemployed.

VHD  
PROFILE -- NEWARK -- FINAL

Section 4

¶ The last outburst in Atlanta occurred on Tuesday night, June 20. That same night, in

~~On that same Tuesday night, June 20, Newark, New Jersey, convened the Board of the City of Newark.~~ <sup>took place.</sup>

a tumultuous meeting of the Planning Board, ~~that lasted~~ <sup>4 A.M.,</sup> until ~~four o'clock in the morning~~, speaker after speaker from the Negro ghetto arose to denounce the city's intent to turn over 146 acres in the heart of the Central Ward as a site for the ~~state's~~ new medical and dental college.

The growing opposition to the city administration by vocal black residents had paralyzed both the Planning Board and the Board of Education. Tension had been rising so steadily throughout the northern New Jersey area that, in the first week of June, Colonel David Kelly, head of the State Police, had met with <sup>municipal police</sup> ~~the chiefs of police of most of the municipalities~~ to draw up plans for state police support of city police wherever a riot developed. Nowhere was the tension greater than in Newark.

Founded in 1666, the city, part of the Greater New York City port complex, rises from the salt marshes of the Passaic River. Although in 1967 Newark's population of 400,000 still ranked it <sup>thirtieth</sup> ~~30th~~ among American municipalities, for the past 20 years the white middle class had been deserting the city for the suburbs.



In the late 1950's the desertions had become a rout. Between 1960 and 1967, the city lost ~~a not total~~ of more than 70,000 white residents. Replacing them in vast areas of dilapidated housing where living conditions, according to a prominent member of the County Bar Association, were so bad that "people would be kinder to their pets," were Negro migrants, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. In six years the city switched from 65 percent white to 52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban.

The white population, nevertheless, retained political control of the city. On both the City Council and the Board of Education seven of nine members were white. On other key boards the disparity was equal or greater. In the Central Ward, where the medical college controversy raged, the Negro constituents and their white Councilman found themselves on opposite sides of almost every crucial issue.

The municipal administration lacked the ability to respond quickly enough to navigate the swiftly changing currents. Even had it had great astuteness, it would have lacked the financial resources to affect significantly the course of events.

In 1962, seven-term Congressman Hugh Addonizio had forged an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow long-time Irish control of the City Hall. A liberal in Congress, Addonizio, ~~when he became mayor,~~ had opened his door to

all people. Negroes, who had been excluded from the previous administration, <sup>were</sup> ~~began to be~~ brought into the government. The police department was integrated.

Nevertheless, progress was slow. As the Negro population increased, more and more of the politically oriented found the progress inadequate.

The Negro-Italian coalition began to develop strains over the issue of the police. The police were largely Italian, the persons they arrested largely Negro. Community leaders agreed that, as in many police forces, there was a small minority of officers who abused their responsibility. This gave an aura of credibility to the cries of "Brutality!" voiced periodically by ghetto Negroes.

In 1965 Mayor Addonizio, acknowledging that there was "a small group of misguided individuals" in the department, declared that "it is vital to establish once and for all, in the minds of the public, that charges of alleged police brutality will be thoroughly investigated and the appropriate legal or punitive action be taken if the charges are found to be substantiated."

Pulled one way by the Negro citizens who wanted a Police Review Board, and the other by the police, who adamantly opposed it, the Mayor decided to buck all complaints against the police to the FBI for investigation. Since the FBI ~~[was not conceived as an agency to investigate municipal police departments, and]~~ could act only if there had been a

(7)

violation of a person's <sup>federal</sup> civil rights, no complaint was ever heard of again.

Nor was there much redress for other complaints. The city had no money with which to redress them.

The City had already reached its legal bonding limit, yet expenditures continued to outstrip income. Health and welfare costs, per capita, were 20 times as great as for some of the surrounding communities. Cramped by its small land area of 23.6 square miles -- one-third of which was taken up by Newark Airport and unusable marshland -- and surrounded by independent jurisdictions, the city had nowhere to expand.

Taxable property was contracting as land ~~was~~ cleared for urban renewal, ~~and then~~ lay fallow year after year. Property taxes had been increased <sup>perhaps, to</sup> ~~beyond~~ the point of *diminishing* ~~profitable~~ return. By the fall of 1967 they were to reach \$661.70 on a \$10,000 house -- double that of suburban communities.\* As a result, people were refusing either to own or to renovate property in the city. Seventy-four percent of whites and 87 percent of Negroes lived in rental housing. Whoever was able to move to the suburbs / moved. Many of these persons, as downtown areas were cleared and new office buildings were constructed, continued to work in

\* The legal tax rate is \$7.76 per \$100 of market value. However, because of inflation, a guideline of 85.27 percent of market value is used in assessing, reducing the true tax rate to \$6.617 per \$100.

the city. Among them were a large proportion of the people from whom a city normally draws its civic leaders, but who, after moving out, tended to cease involving themselves in the community's problems.

~~Since~~, During the daytime Newark more than doubled its population ~~-- and was, therefore, the city was~~ forced to provide services for a large number of people who contributed nothing in property taxes. The city's per capita outlay for police, fire protection and other municipal services continued to increase. By 1967 it was twice that of the surrounding area.

Consequently, there was less money to spend on education. Newark's per capita outlay on schools was considerably less than that of surrounding communities. Yet within the city's school system were 78,000 children, 14,000 more than ten years earlier.

Twenty thousand pupils were on double sessions. The dropout rate was estimated to be as high as 33 percent. Of 13,600 Negroes between the ages of 16 and 19, more than 6,000 were not in school. Over half of the adult Negro population had less than an (8th) grade education.

The typical ghetto cycle of high unemployment, family breakup, and crime was present in all its elements. Approximately 12 percent of Negroes were without jobs. An estimated 40 percent of Negro children lived in broken homes. Although Newark maintained proportionately the largest police force of any major city, its crime rate was among the highest

in the nation. In narcotics violations it ranked fifth nationally. Almost 80 percent of the crimes were committed within two miles of the core of the city, where the Central Ward is located. A majority of the <sup>crimes</sup> ~~perpetrators~~ were Negro. Most of the victims, likewise, were Negro. The Mafia was reputed to control much of the organized crime.

2 Under such conditions a major segment of the Negro population became <sup>increasingly</sup> ~~more and more~~ militant. Largely excluded from ~~positions of~~ traditional political power, Negroes, tutored by a handful of <sup>MILITANT SOCIAL ACTIVISTS</sup> ~~leaders~~ who had moved into the city in the early 1960's, made use of the anti-poverty program, in which poor people were guaranteed representation, as a political springboard. This led to friction between the United Community Corporation, the agency that administered the anti-poverty program, and the city administration.

When it became known that the Secretary of the Board of Education intended to retire June 27, 1967, the militants proposed the city's budget director, a Negro with a master's degree in accounting, for the position. The mayor, however, had already nominated a white man. Since the white man had only a high school education, and at least 70 percent of the children in the school system were Negro, the issue of who was to obtain the secretaryship, an important and powerful position, quickly became a focal issue.

~~Joined with the issue of the 146-acre medical school site, the area of which had been expanded to triple the~~

original request -- an expansion regarded by the militants as an ~~effort~~ to dilute black political power by moving out Negro residents -- the Board of Education battle resulted in a confrontation between the mayor and the militants. Both sides refused to alter their positions. ~~The impasse was complete and explosive.~~

Into this impasse stepped a Washington Negro named Albert Roy Osborne. A flamboyant, 42-year old former wig salesman who called himself Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed and wore a black beret, he presided over a mythical "Blackman's Volunteer Army of Liberation." Articulate and magnetic, the self-commissioned "Colonel" proved to be a one-man show. He brought Negro residents flocking to Board of Education and Planning Board meetings. ~~The Colonel was not afraid to speak in violent terms, nor to back~~ <sup>spoke</sup> <sup>and backed</sup> his words with violent action. At one meeting he tore the tape from the <sup>official</sup> stenographic recorder, ~~being used to keep the official record.~~ After he was ejected, ~~from the room,~~ one of his captains threw a mapboard across the stage and smashed a tape recorder against the wall.

It became more and more evident to the militants that, though they might not be able to prevail, they could prevent the normal transaction of business. Filibustering began. A Negro former State Assemblyman held the floor for more than four hours. One meeting of the Board of Education began at 5 P.M. and did not adjourn until 3:23 A.M. ~~the next morning.~~ Throughout the months of May and June speaker after speaker



warned that if the mayor <sup>persisted</sup> ~~continued~~ to persist in naming a white man as Secretary to the Board of Education, and in moving ahead with plans for the medical school site, violence would ensue. The city administration played down the threats.

On June 27th, when a new Secretary to the Board of Education was to be named, the state police set up a command post in the Newark armory.

The militants, led by the local CORE <sup>(Congress of Racial Equality)</sup> chapter, disrupted and took over the Board of Education meeting. The <sup>outcome</sup> ~~result~~ was a stalemate. The incumbent secretary decided to stay on another year. No one was satisfied.

At the beginning of July there were 24,000 unemployed Negroes within the ~~confines~~ <sup>limits</sup> of the city. Their ranks were swelled by an estimated 20,000 teenagers, many of whom, with school out and the summer recreation program curtailed due to a lack of funds, had no place to go.

On July 8, Newark and East Orange Police attempted to disperse a group of Black Muslims, ~~gathered in front of a house occupied by one of them~~. In the melee that followed, several police officers and Muslims suffered injuries necessitating medical treatment. The resulting charges and countercharges heightened the tension between police and Negroes.

Early on the evening of July 12th a cab driver, ~~by the name of~~ John Smith, (according to police reports) began

~~\* Congress of Racial Equality~~

tailgating a Newark police car. Smith was an unlikely candidate to set a riot in motion. Forty years old, a Georgian by birth, he had attended college for a year before entering the ~~United States~~ Army in 1950. In 1953 he had been honorably discharged with the rank of Corporal. A chess-playing trumpet player, he had worked as a musician and a factory hand before, in 1963, becoming a cab driver.

As a cab driver, he appeared to be a hazard. Within a relatively short period of time he had eight or nine accidents. His license was revoked. When, with a woman passenger in his cab, he was stopped by the police, he was in violation of that revocation.

From the high-rise towers of the Reverend William P. Hayes Housing Project, ~~the residents~~ can look down upon the orange-red brick facade of the Fourth Precinct Police Station and observe every movement. Shortly after 9:30 P.M., people saw Smith, who either refused or was unable to walk, being dragged out of a police car and into the front door of the station. ¶ Within a few minutes at least two civil rights leaders received calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was being beaten by the police. When one of the persons at the station notified the cab company of Smith's arrest, cab drivers all over the city began learning of it over their cab radios.

A crowd formed on the grounds of the housing project

across the narrow street from the station. As more and more people arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered to Smith became more and more exaggerated. The descriptions were ~~fuelled and sustained~~ <sup>supported</sup> by other complaints of police malpractice that, over the years, had been submitted for investigation, but had never been heard of again, ~~so that they remained like sores festering in the minds of the people.~~

Several Negro community leaders, ~~called~~ <sup>telephoned</sup> by a civil rights worker and informed of the deteriorating situation, rushed to the scene. By 10:15 P.M. the atmosphere had become so potentially explosive that Kenneth Melchior, the senior <sup>police</sup> inspector on the night watch, was ~~summoned~~ <sup>called</sup>. He arrived at approximately 10:30 P.M.

Met by a delegation of civil rights leaders and militants who ~~demanded~~ <sup>requested</sup> the right to see and interview Smith, ~~Inspector Melchior acceded to their request.~~

When the delegation was taken to Smith, ~~the Inspector~~ <sup>Melchior</sup> agreed with their observations that, as a result of injuries Smith had suffered, he needed to be examined by a doctor. Arrangements were made to have a police car transport him to the hospital.

~~Both within and outside of the police station the atmosphere was electric with hostility.~~ <sup>10:45 P.M.</sup> ~~Carloads of police officers/~~ arriving for the <sup>change of shifts/</sup> were subjected to a gauntlet of catcalls, taunts and curses. Some ~~of them~~ replied in kind.

Joined by Oliver Lofton, administrative director of the Newark Legal Services Project, the Negro community leaders inside the station requested an interview with Inspector Melchior. As they were talking to the Inspector <sup>about</sup> ~~regarding the~~ initiating ~~an~~ investigation ~~to determine~~ how Smith had been injured, the crowd outside became more and more unruly. Two of the Negro spokesmen <sup>went</sup> ~~decided to go~~ outside to attempt to pacify the people.

There was little reaction to the spokesmen's appeal that the people go home. The second of the two had just finished speaking from atop a car when several Molotov cocktails smashed against the wall of the police station.

<sup>With</sup> ~~the~~ the call of "Fire!", ~~went up~~, most of those inside the station, police officers and civilians alike, rushed out ~~of~~ the front door. The Molotov cocktails had splattered to the ground; the fire was quickly extinguished.

Inspector Melchior had a squad of men form a line across the front of the station. ~~Volleys of profanity between~~ The police officers and the Negroes on the other side of the street ~~exacerbated the hostility~~ *exchanged volleys of profanity.*

Three of the Negro leaders requested they be given another opportunity to disperse the crowd. Inspector Melchior agreed ~~to let them try~~, and provided a bullhorn ~~for them~~.

X As the three were <sup>talking, it was apparent that</sup> ~~addressing~~ the several hundred persons who had gathered in the street and on the grounds of the housing project, ~~it continued to be apparent that the people~~ were not going to disperse. A new strategy was devised. It was

decided to attempt to channel the energies of the people into a non-violent protest. While Lofton promised the crowd that a full investigation would be made of the Smith incident, the other Negro leaders began urging those on the scene to form a line of march toward the city hall.

Some persons joined the line of march. Others milled <sup>in the narrow street.</sup> about. From the dark grounds of the housing project, <sup>came</sup> a barrage of rocks, ~~commenced~~. Some of them fell among the crowd. Others hit persons in the line of march. Many smashed the windows of the police station. The rock throwing, it was believed, was the work of youngsters; ~~and~~ approximately 2,500 children lived in the housing project.

Almost at the same time another Molotov cocktail flared against the wall of the police station. An old car was set afire in a parking lot. The line of march began to disintegrate. The police, ~~their heads,~~ ~~protected by~~ World War I-type helmets, sallied forth to disperse the crowd. A fire engine, arriving on the scene, was pelted with rocks. As police drove people away from the station, they scattered in all directions.

A few minutes later, ~~a short distance away, the first~~ <sup>a nearby liquor store,</sup> ~~liquor store~~ was broken into. Some persons, seeing a small caravan of cabs appear at city hall to protest Smith's arrest, interpreted this as evidence that the disturbance had been organized, and generated rumors to that effect.

However, only a few stores were looted. By about 2:30 A.M., the disorder appeared to have run its course.

Thursday, July 13,

The next afternoon, the Mayor described ~~it~~ as an isolated incident. At a meeting with Negro leaders, ~~it~~ <sup>to discuss</sup> which measures to defuse the situation, ~~were discussed~~, he agreed to ~~a demand for the naming of a Negro to the rank of Captain in the Police Department~~ <sup>appoint the first captain,</sup> and announced that he would set up a panel of citizens to investigate the Smith arrest. To one civil rights leader this sounded like "the playback of a record," and he walked out. Other observers reported that the Mayor seemed unaware of the seriousness of the tensions.

The police were not. Unknown to the mayor, Dominick Spina, the director of police, had extended shifts from 8 hours to 12, and was in the process of mobilizing half the strength of the department for that evening. <sup>The night before</sup> Spina had arrived at the Fourth Precinct Police Station at approximately midnight, and had witnessed the latter half of the disturbance. ~~Earlier in the evening~~ he had held the regular weekly "open house" in his office. This was intended to give any person who wanted to talk to him an opportunity to do so. Not a single person had shown up.

As director of police, Spina had initiated many new programs: police-precinct councils, composed of the police precinct captain and business and civic leaders, who would meet once a month to discuss mutual problems; Junior Crime-fighters; a Boy Scout Explorer program for each precinct; mandatory human relations training for every officer; a



Citizens' Observer Program, which permitted citizens to ride in police cars and observe activities in the stations; a Police Cadet program; and others.

Many of the programs initially had been received enthusiastically, but -- as was the case with the "open house/" ~~to which hardly anyone came anymore~~ -- interest in ~~them~~ had fallen off. In general, the programs failed to reach the hard-core unemployed, the disaffected, the school dropouts -- of <sup>whom</sup> ~~which~~ Spina estimates there are 10,000 in Essex County -- that constitute a major portion of the police problem.

~~As~~ Reports and rumors, including one that Smith had died, circulated through the Negro community. Tension continued to rise. Nowhere was the tension greater than at the Spirit House, the gathering place for Black Nationalists, Black Power advocates, and militants of every hue. Black Muslims, Orthodox Muslims, and members of the United Afro-American Association, a new and growing organization that follows, in general, the teachings of the late Malcolm X, <sup>regularly</sup> came <sup>A</sup> to mingle and exchange views. Anti-white playwright LeRoi Jones held workshops. The two police-Negro clashes, coming one on top of the other, coupled with the unresolved political issues, had created a state of crisis.

<sup>9/ On Thursday,</sup>  
Inflammatory leaflets were ~~being printed, and~~ circulated in the neighborhoods <sup>of</sup> ~~comprising~~ the Fourth Precinct.

A "Police Brutality Protest Rally" was announced for late ~~in the~~ afternoon in front of the Fourth Precinct Station. Several television stations and newspapers sent news teams to interview people. Cameras were set up. A crowd gathered.

A picket line was formed to march in front of the police station. Between 6:30 and 7:00 P.M. James Threatt, Executive Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission, arrived to announce to the people the decision of the Mayor to form a citizens group to investigate the Smith incident, and to elevate a Negro to the rank of Captain.

2-46  
to make clear  
Threatt Negro.  
The response from the loosely milking mass of people was derisive. One youngster shouted "Black Power!" Rocks were thrown at Threatt, <sup>a Negro.</sup> The barrage of missiles that followed placed the police station under siege.

As the rock-throwing momentarily ceased, the police ~~issued forth~~ <sup>CAME OUT</sup> to ~~deal with~~ <sup>disperse</sup> the crowd. According to witnesses, there was little restraint of language or action by either side. A number of police officers and Negroes were injured.

As on the night before, once the people had been dispersed, reports of looting began to come in. Soon the glow of the first fire was seen.

Without enough men to establish control, the police set up a perimeter around a two-mile stretch of Springfield Avenue, one of the principal business districts, where bands of youths roamed up and down smashing windows. Grocery and

liquor stores, clothing and furniture stores, drug stores and cleaners, appliance stores and pawnshops were the principal targets. Periodically police officers would appear and fire their weapons over the heads of looters and rioters. Laden with stolen goods, people began returning to the housing projects.

Near midnight, activity appeared to taper off. The Mayor told reporters the city had turned the corner.

As news of the disturbance had spread, however, people ~~had~~ flocked into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with impunity, many spectators bowed to temptation and joined the looting.

Without the necessary personnel to make mass arrests, police were shooting into the air to clear stores. A Negro boy was wounded by a .22 caliber bullet said to have been fired by a white man riding in a car. Guns were reported stolen from a Sears Roebuck store. Looting, fires, and gunshots were reported from a widening area. Between 2:00 and 2:30 A.M. on Friday, July 14, the mayor decided to request Governor Richard J. Hughes to dispatch State Police and National Guard troops. The State Police arrived with a sizeable contingent before dawn.

During the ~~course of the~~ morning the Governor and the Mayor, together with police and National Guard officers, made a reconnaissance of the area. The police escort guarding the officials arrested looters as they went. By noon the

National Guard had set up 137 roadblocks, and state police and riot teams were beginning to achieve control. Command of anti-riot operations was taken over by the governor, who decreed a "hard line" in putting down the riot.

The three-way command structure -- City Police, State Police and National Guard -- worked poorly. <sup>As a result of technical difficulties, such as the fact that</sup> The City and State Police, did not operate on the same radio wave-lengths, ~~Each did many things the other did not find out about until later.~~

At 3:30 P.M. that afternoon, the family of Mrs. D. J. was standing near the upstairs windows of their apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furniture store on Springfield Avenue. Three carloads of police officers rounded the corner. As the police yelled at the looters, they began running.

The police officers opened fire. A bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apartment. A moment later she heard a cry from the bedroom. Her <sup>3</sup>~~three~~-year old daughter, Debbie, came running into the room. Blood was streaming down the left side of her face; ~~where~~ the bullet had entered her eye. The child spent the next two months in the hospital. <sup>She lost</sup> ~~losing~~ the sight of her left eye and the hearing in her left ear.

Simultaneously, on the street below, Horace W. Morris, an associate director of the Washington Urban League who had had been visiting relatives in Newark, was about to ~~enter a~~

~~car for the~~ drive to Newark Airport. With him were his two brothers and his 73-year old step-father, Isaac Harrison. About 60 persons had been on the street watching the looting. As the police arrived, three of the looters cut directly in front of the group of spectators. The police fired at the looters. Bullets plowed into the spectators. Everyone began running. As Harrison, followed by the family, headed toward the apartment building in which he lived, a bullet kicked his legs out from under him. Horace Morris lifted him to his feet. Again he fell. Mr. Morris' brother, Virgil, attempted to pick the old man up, ~~As he was doing so,~~ he was hit in the left leg and right forearm. Mr. Morris and his other brother managed to drag the two wounded men into the vestibule of the building, ~~which was~~ jammed with 60 to 70 frightened, ~~and~~ angry Negroes.

Bullets continued to spatter against the walls of the buildings. Finally, as the firing died down, Morris -- whose stepfather died that evening -- yelled to a sergeant that innocent people were being shot.

"Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," the sergeant/ according to Morris, replied,

"They don't have guns; no one is shooting at you," Morris said.

"You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant yelled.

Heavy sniper fire was, in fact, being reported from all

over the city.

At approximately 5:00 P.M., a police detective was ~~felled and~~ killed by a shot whose origins could not be determined. Later a fireman met the same fate. Snipers were blamed for the deaths of both.

At 5:30 P.M., on Beacon Street, W. F. told J. S., whose 1959 Pontiac he had taken to the station for inspection, that his front brake needed fixing. J. S., who had just returned from work, ~~said, "Okay,"~~ went to the car which was parked in the street, jacked up the front end, took the wheel off, and got under the car.

The street was quiet. More than a dozen persons were sitting on porches, walking about, <sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ shopping. None heard any shots. Suddenly several state troopers appeared at the corner of Springfield and Beacon. J. S. was startled by a shot clanging into the side of the garbage can next to his car. As he looked up he saw a state trooper with his rifle pointed at him. The next shot struck <sup>him</sup> ~~J. S.~~ in the right side.

At almost the same instant, K. G., standing on a porch, was struck in the right eye by a bullet. Both he and J. S. were critically injured.

At 8:00 P.M., Mrs. L. M. bundled her husband, her husband's brother, and her four sons into the family car to drive to a restaurant for dinner. On the return trip her



husband, who was driving, panicked as he approached a National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, then quickly swerved around. A shot rang out. When the family reached home, everyone began piling out of the car. Ten-year-old Eddie failed to move. Shot through the head, He was dead.

Although, by nightfall, most of the looting and burning had ended, and there were no longer any mobs on the street, reports of sniper fire increased. The fire was, according to New Jersey National Guard reports, "deliberately or otherwise inaccurate." Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey Department of Defense, testified before an Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that "there was too much firing initially against snipers" because of "confusion when we were finally called on for help and our thinking of it as a military action."

"As a matter of fact," Director of Police Spina told the Commission, "down in the Springfield Avenue area it was so bad that, in my opinion, guardsmen were firing upon police and police were firing back at them . . . I really don't believe there was as much sniping as we thought . . . We have since compiled statistics indicating that there were 79 specified instances of sniping."

Several problems contributed to the misconceptions regarding snipers: the lack of communications; ~~the state~~

~~police had placed men on rooftops, but other law enforcement personnel remained unaware of this;~~ the fact that one shot might be reported half a dozen times by half a dozen different persons as it caromed and reverberated a mile or more through the city; the fact that the National Guard troops lacked riot training. They were, <sup>said a police official,</sup> ~~according to Spina,~~ "young and very scared," and had had little contact with Negroes.

Within the Guard itself contact with Negroes had certainly been limited. Although, in 1949, out of a force of 12,529 men there had been 1,183 Negroes, following the integration of the Guard in the 1950's the number had declined until, by July of 1967, <sup>there were</sup> 303 Negroes ~~were left~~ in a force of 17,529 men.

On Saturday, July 15, Spina received a report of snipers in a housing project. When he arrived he saw approximately 100 National Guardsmen and police officers crouching behind vehicles, hiding in corners and lying on the ground around the edge of the courtyard. ¶ Since everything appeared quiet and it was broad daylight, Spina walked directly down the middle of the street. Nothing happened. As he came to the last building of the complex, he heard a shot. All around him the troopers jumped, believing themselves to be under sniper fire. A moment later a young Guardsman ran from behind a building. ¶ The Director of

Police went over ~~to where the soldier had crouched down,~~  
and asked him if he had fired the shot. The soldier said  
yes, he had fired to scare a man away from a window; that  
his orders were ~~that no one had a right to be standing at~~  
~~a window.~~ *to keep everyone away from windows.*

Spina said he told the soldier: "Do you know what  
you just did? You have now created a state of hysteria.  
Every Guardsman up and down this street and every State  
Policeman and every city policeman that is present thinks  
that somebody just fired a shot and that it is probably a  
sniper."

A short time later more "gunshots" were heard. In-  
vestigating, Spina came upon a Puerto Rican sitting on a  
wall. In reply to a question as to whether he knew "where  
the firing is coming from?" the man said:

"That's no firing. That's fireworks. If you look up  
to the fourth floor, you will see the people who are throw-  
ing down these cherry bombs."

By this time four truckloads of National Guardsmen had  
arrived and troopers and policemen were again crouched every-  
where looking for a sniper. The Director of Police remained  
at the scene for three hours, and there ~~was no~~ <sup>only</sup> shot fired ~~was~~  
~~except~~ the one by the Guardsman.

Nevertheless, at six o'clock that evening two columns  
of National Guardsmen and state troopers were directing mass

fire at the Hayes Housing Project in response to what they believed were snipers.

On the ~~10th~~<sup>11th</sup> floor, Eloise Spellman, the mother of several children, fell, a bullet through her neck.

Across the street a number of persons, standing in an apartment window, were watching the firing directed at the housing project. Suddenly several troopers ~~whirled~~ and began firing in the general direction of the spectators. Mrs. Hattie Gainer, a grandmother, sank to the floor.

A block away Rebecca Brown's ~~two~~<sup>3</sup>-year old daughter was standing at the window. Mrs. Brown rushed to drag her to safety. As Mrs. Brown was, momentarily, framed in the window, a bullet spun into her back.

All three ~~of the~~ women died.

A number of eye witnesses, at varying times and places, reported seeing bottles thrown from upper story windows. As these would land at the feet of an officer he would turn and fire. Thereupon, other officers and Guardsmen up and down the street would join in.

In order to protect his property, B. W. W., the owner of a Chinese laundry, had placed a sign saying "Soul Brother" in his window. Between 1:00 and 1:30 A.M., on Sunday, July 16, he ~~together with~~<sup>with</sup> his mother, wife, and brother, ~~was~~<sup>were</sup> watching television in the back room. ~~Up to that point of the night~~ The neighborhood had been quiet. Suddenly B. W. W.

heard the sound of jeeps, then shots.

Going to an upstairs window he was able to look out into the street. There he observed several jeeps, from which soldiers and state troopers were firing into stores that had "Soul Brother" signs in the windows. During the course of three nights, according to dozens of eye witness reports, law enforcement officers shot into and smashed windows of businesses that contained signs indicating they were Negrofowned.

At 11:00 P.M., on Sunday, July 16th, Mrs. Lucille Pugh looked out of the window to see if the streets were clear. She then asked her 11-year-old son, Michael, to take the garbage out. As he reached the street and was illuminated by a street light, a shot rang out. He died.

No snipers were arrested. Of the 250 fire alarms, many were false; and only 13 were considered by the city to have been "serious." Four-fifths of the \$10,251,000 <sup>in</sup> worth of damage was incurred due to stock loss. Damage to buildings and fixtures was less than \$2 million.

Of the twenty-one civilians who died as a result of gunshot wounds, all were Negro. One was 73-year old Isaac Harrison. Six were women. Two were children.

On the evening of Monday, July 17, a Catholic priest saw two Negro men walking down the street. They were carrying a case of soda and two bags of groceries. An unmarked car

FRR  
But 2-130  
says up to  
\$45m  
loss

Monday July 17,  
By ~~Monday~~ afternoon, state police and National guard

forces were withdrawn, but ~~that~~ some incidents

~~were still occurring.~~

~~On~~ <sup>City</sup> ~~at~~ evening, a Catholic priest saw two Negro men walking down the street. They were carrying a case of soda and two bags of groceries. An ~~unmarked~~ unmarked car



with five police officers pulled up beside them. Two white officers got out of the car. Accusing the Negro men of looting, the officers made them put the groceries on the sidewalk, then kicked the bags open, scattering their contents all over the street.

Telling the men, "Get out of here," the officers drove off. The Catholic priest went across the street to help gather up the groceries. One of the men turned to him: "I've just been back from Vietnam two days," he said, "and this is what I get. I feel like going home and getting a rifle and shooting the cops."

Of the 250 fire alarms, many had been false, and 13 were considered by the city to have been "serious."

Of the \$10,251,000 damage total, four-fifths was due to stock loss. Damage to buildings and fixtures was less than \$2 million.

No snipers were arrested. Twenty-three persons were killed -- a white detective, a white fireman, and 21 Negroes. One was 73-year-old Isaac Harrison. Six were women. Two were children.