

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	Deptel 86428 to Kampala confidential <i>open 12.13.05</i>	<del>2 p 12/19/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#2 cable	Kampala 1117 confidential <i>open 310/11 NLJ/RAC 10-340</i>	<del>2 p 12/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#3 cable	Deptel 163160 to Kampala confidential	<del>1 p 03/16/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#3b cable	duplicate work copy of #3		
#4 cable	Kampala 1389 secret	<del>1 p 03/20/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 cable	Kampala 2389 secret	<del>1 p 03/20/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#6 cable	Kampala 1292 secret <i>open 310/11 NLJ/RAC 10-340</i>	<del>1 p 03/04/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#7 cable	Deptel 149746 to Kampala secret <i>open 310/11 NLJ/RAC 10-340</i>	<del>1 p 03/06/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#8 cable	Kampala 1161 secret <i>open 12.13.05</i>	<del>1 p 02/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#9 cable	Kampala 1143 secret	<del>2 p 02/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#10 cable	Deptel 39113 to Kampala confidential	<del>1 p 09/01/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#10b cable	work copy of #10		
#11 cable	Kampala 1468 confidential	<del>1 p 05/06/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 cable	Deptel 03145 to Kampala confidential	<del>1 p 05/05/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 cable	Kampala 1408 secret <i>sanitized 12/10/12 per NLJ/RAC 10-340</i>	<del>2 p 04/21/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#14 cable	Deptel 13850 to Kampala secret <i>open 9/22/11 per RAC</i>	<del>1 p 04/25/66</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
uganda, vol. 1

Box 101

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.  
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#15 cable	Kampala 1179 <del>secret</del> sanitized 9/22/11 per RAC open 12/10/12 per NLJ/RAC 10-340	1 p 03/05/66	A
#16 cable	situation report <del>secret</del> open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10-340	1 p undated	A
#16b cable	Kampala 1065 <del>confidential</del> open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10-340	2 p 02/22/66	A
#17 cable	Kampala 1088 <del>secret</del> open 9/23/11 per RAC	2 p 02/24/66	A
#18a cable	deptel to Kampala ref Kampala 861 <del>confidential</del> open 12.13.05	1 p 01/18/66	A
#20 cable	Kampala 620 <del>confidential</del> open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10-340	2 p 11/13/65	A
#21 cable	Kampala 1496 <del>confidential</del>	2 p 02/25/65	A
#25 cable	Kampala 1473 <del>confidential</del>	1 p 02/24/65	A
#27 cable	Kampala 1449 <del>confidential</del>	2 p 02/23/65	A
#28 cable	Kampala 1437 <del>secret</del>	3 p 02/21/65	A
#29 cable	Kampala 1436 <del>confidential</del>	2 p 02/20/65	A
#31 cable	Kampala 1431 <del>confidential</del> open 12.13.05	1 p 02/21/65	A
#33 cable	Kampala 1429 <del>secret</del> sanitized 8/10/11 NW/RAC 10-340	1 p 02/20/65	A
#34 cable	Kampala 1385 <del>confidential</del> open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10-340	5 p 02/16/65	A
#38 cable	Bujumbura 605 <del>confidential</del>	1 p 01/19/65	A
#39 cable	Bujumbura 593 <del>confidential</del>	1 p 01/15/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
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3784

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#40 cable	Kampala 1111 <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 3.10.11 NW/RACIO-340</i>	<del>4 p</del> 01/09/65	<del>A</del>
#41 cable	Kampala 1078 <del>secret</del>	<del>2 p</del> 01/05/65	<del>A</del>
#42 cable	London 463 <del>secret</del>	<del>3 p</del> 07/28/64	<del>A</del>
#43 cable	Kampala 71 <del>secret</del>	<del>4 p</del> 07/23/64	<del>A</del>
#44 cable	Kampala 51 <del>secret</del>	<del>4 p</del> 07/16/64	<del>A</del>
#45 cable	Kampala 1166 <del>secret</del>	<del>4 p</del> 06/09/64	<del>A</del>
#46 cable	Deptel 32031 to WH attn: Mr. Bundy <del>confidential</del>	<del>3 p</del> 01/24/64	<del>A</del>
#47 cable	Kampala 729 <del>confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 12/10/65	<del>A</del>
#48 cable	Kampala 797 <del>confidential</del>	<del>2 p</del> 12/22/65	<del>A</del>
#49 cable	Kampala 602 <del>confidential</del>	<del>4 p</del> 01/24/64	<del>A</del>
#50 cable	Kampala 594 <del>confidential</del>	<del>2 p</del> 01/24/64	<del>A</del>
#51 cable	Dar es Salaam 914 <del>confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 01/23/64	<del>A</del>
#53 cable	Kampala 590 <del>confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 01/23/64	<del>A</del>
#54 cable	London 3464 <del>confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 01/23/64	<del>A</del>
#55 cable	Kampala 577 <del>secret</del> <i>Sanitized 3.10.11 NW/RAC 10-340</i>	1 p 01/21/64	A
#56 cable	Deptel 207 to Kampala <del>confidential</del> <i>Open 12.13.05</i>	<del>3 p</del> 08/13/65	<del>A</del>

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Uganda, vol. 1

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

4734

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#57 cable	Deptel 158 to Kampala confidential <i>open 12-13-05</i>	<del>1 p</del> 08/03/65	<del>A</del>
#58 cable	Deptel 1546 to Kampala confidential <i>open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10340</i>	<del>1 p</del> 02/24/65	<del>A</del>
#59 cable	Deptel 1509 to Kampala confidential <i>open 12-13-05</i>	<del>3 p</del> 02/20/65	<del>A</del>
#61 cable	Deptel 1424 to Kampala secret	<del>1 p</del> 02/13/65	<del>A</del>
#63 cable	Deptel 416 to Kampala confidential <i>open 12-13-05</i>	<del>1 p</del> 11/24/63	<del>A</del>
#64b bio sketch	Erifasi Otema Allimadi Confidential <i>open 6/16/11 NLJ/RAC 10-340</i>	<del>1 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
#66 memo	to Secretary from George C. Denney, Jr. secret <i>open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10340</i>	<del>3 p</del> 02/23/66	<del>A</del>
#69a memcon	re: US Uganda relations confidential	<del>3 p</del> 02/20/65	<del>A</del>
#70 memcon	re: Uganda's foreign relations confidential	<del>2 p</del> 06/23/65	<del>A</del>
#71 memo	to McG. Bundy from Ben Read confidential <i>open 12-13-05</i>	<del>1 p</del> 02/17/65	<del>A</del>
#71a memo	briefing memo for President confidential <i>open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10340</i>	<del>2 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
#76 memo	to President from McG. B. confidential <i>open 12-19-90</i>	<del>1 p</del> 09/04/64	<del>A</del>
#77 memo	to Gwen King from Gordon Chase confidential <i>open 12-19-90</i>	<del>1 p</del> 09/03/64	<del>A</del>
#78 memo	to Mr. Valenti from Gordon Chase confidential <i>open 12-19-90</i>	<del>1 p</del> 09/02/64	<del>A</del>
#82 memo	to Secretary from George C. Denney, Jr. confidential <i>open 3/10/11 NW/RAC 10340</i>	<del>2 p</del> 01/23/64	<del>A</del>
#83 report	situation report secret <i>open 12-13-05</i>	<del>1 p</del> 01/23/64	<del>A</del>

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 344

PAGE 01 STATE 86428

83

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: AFCH JAMCKESSON  
APPROVED BY: AFCH JAMCKESSON  
AF PALMER (DRAFT)  
DOD/ISA COL KENNEDY (SUBS)  
AFE MEAGHER (SUBS)  
S/S GLKELLY

-----  
O P 190207Z DEC 67 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0262  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0248  
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0582  
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0244  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0820  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0456  
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0147  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1735  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1843  
AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 0138  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1357  
CINCSTRIKE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 86428

EXDIS

PAGE 2 RUEHC 86428 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

By *hly* NARA, Date 12-12-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 86428

1. DEMARCHE TO MOBUTU SHOULD BE MADE SOONEST BY STEBBINS OR BY BURNS IF TIME PRECLUDES SEEING MOBUTU IN KAMPALA. FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE.

(A) U.S. GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER POSSIBILITY CONGOLESE MAY TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST RWANDA AS INTIMATED BY BOMBOKO TO AMBASSADOR CYR.

(B) US HOPES PROBLEM OF MERCENARIES CAN BE SOLVED TO SATISFACTION OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT MILITARY SOLUTION, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN SERVE INTEREST OF CONGO. ISSUE WOULD INEVITABLY GO TO SECURITY COUNCIL AND CAUSE GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR CONGO AND ITS FRIENDS.

(C) IN ANY CASE T-28 AIRCRAFT PRECLUDED FROM USE OUTSIDE CONGO BY TERMS OF MAP AGREEMENT (UNDER TERMS OF US-CONGO MAP AGREEMENT T28'S CAN ONLY BE USED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY OR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE. USE FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE WOULD REQUIRE USG APPROVAL WHICH COULD NOT BE GIVEN IN THIS CASE.)

PAGE 3 RUEHC 86428 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(D) US NOT INVOLVED IN MERCENARY PROBLEM AND BELIEVES GDRC SHOULD CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT RESOLVE DIRECTLY WITH PARTIES CONCERNED.

2. IF ASKED WHETHER US HAS APPROACHED BELGIANS OR OTHERS IN MATTER, AMBASSADOR SHOULD REPLY THAT WE HAVE NOT FOR REASONS STATED IN (D) ABOVE.

GP-3 RUSK

~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
~~EO. 13526, Sec. 3.4~~  
By           , NARA, Date           

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





Department of State

2  
TELEGRAM

43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 282

PAGE 01 KAMPAL 01117 190151Z

82  
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /026 W

-----  
Q 182230Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2234  
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 256  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 138  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 105  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 34  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 107

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KAMPALA 1117

EXDIS

REF: STATE 85979

1. WHILE WE HAVE NO HARD INFO AS YET ON DECISIONS  
REACHED AT KAMPALA RE MERCS FOLLOWING INFO PICKED UP BY  
DCM IN CONVERSATION WITH JACK SHIDELER, AFRICAN CORRESPONDENT  
FOR CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, LATE THIS AFTERNOON MAY BE

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 1117U ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OF INTEREST.

2. SHIDELER SAID CORRESPONDENTS COVERING CONFERENCE SPECULATE  
THAT KAYIBANDA MAY HAVE DEPARTED KAMPALA IN SOMEWHAT OF A  
HUFF. THEIR SPECULATION BASED ON FACT KAYIBANDA WAS NOT  
SEEN OFF BY OBOTE AND WAS NOT ACCORDED FAREWELL HONORS EITHER  
AT APOLO HOTEL OR AIRPORT. DCM, WHO WAS AT APOLO TO PARTICIPATE  
IN FAREWELL HONORS FOR KENYATTA SAW KAYIBANDA DEPART AND  
CAN CONFIRM THAT NEITHER OBOTE NOR USUAL CONTINGENT UGANDA

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

By isd





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 KAMPAL 01117 190151Z

OFFICIALS WERE PRESENT. HIS SUDDEN DEPARTURE SATURDAY AFTERNOON WAS UNEXPECTED AS DIPLOMATIC CORPS HAD BEEN INFORMED AT ENTEBBE FOLLOWING DEPARTURE HIM ONLY TO PROCEED TO APOLO HOTEL KAMPALA TO SEE KENYATTA OFF. KENYATTA AND OBOTE APPEARED IN HOTEL LOBBY SHORTLY AFTER KAYIBANDA DEPARTED AND PROCEEDED TO CLEARED PARKING AREA WHERE FAREWELL HONOR GUARD CEREMONY FOR KENYATTA TOOK PLACE. OBOTE AND KENYATTA THEN WENT TO PARLIAMENT BUILDING WHERE REMAINING HEADS STATE WERE GATHERED AND JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS FINALLY ISSUED ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER.

3. SHIDLER ALSO SAID ONE COPY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 1117U ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MADE AT LUSAKA WAS INADVERTENTLY GIVEN TO A CORRESPONDENT SATURDAY AFTERNOON BY MEMBER KENYA DELEGATION, BUT WAS HANDED BACK WHEN CORRESPONDENT TOLD BY CONFERENCE OFFICIAL DOCUMENT WAS NOT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PRESS. SHIDLER STILL HERE AND WE WILL CONTACT HIM AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING SEE IF HE HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE RE CONTENTS.

4. SUBSEQUENT DESPATCH KAMPALA 1110 WE LEARNED MOBUTU NOW SCHEDULED DEPART KAMPALA TOMORROW MORNING FOR DAR WHERE IT IS REPORTED HE WILL MEET WITH KAYIBANDA ON WEDNESDAY. SHIDLER STATES REUTERS CORRESPONDENT WHO HAS BEEN COVERING CONFERENCE TOLD HIM HE HAD APPOINTMENT WITH KAYIBANDA IN DAR ON WEDNESDAY.

5. FINALLY WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF WHAT BOMBOKO TOLD AMB CYR ABOUT DECISION TAKEN AT LUSAKA RE RETURNING MERCS TO CONGO IS TRUE, THEN PARA THREE OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE BECOMES VERY IMPORTANT AS BEING FULL OF HIDDEN MEANINGS. STEBBINS

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

163160

CATE: ☐ COLLECT  
FARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84

Origin  
AF

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA  
Amembassy OTTAWA

Info:

STATE: 163160

SS

GPM

SP

SC

SAH

EUR

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

CPR

REF: State 144840, 150938

FOR AMBASSADOR

Obote Visit

1. Before we can authorize you extend invitation to Obote visit Washington, Dept. needs know your estimate whether Mrs. Obote planning accompany President to Expo. If she coming, we will be faced with difficult problems. FYI ONLY. Mrs. Johnson will not rpt not be in Washington during time proposed visit. END FYI.

FOR OTTAWA: Would appreciate your attempts ascertain from Canadians if they aware any plans Mrs. Obote without revealing reasons for asking.

2. Tentative rpt tentative timing for visit June 22./ Would include White House plane to meet President in CONUS, presumably New York. Meeting with President Johnson and lunch, night at Blair House.

3. Advise soonest.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4

By 146 NARA, Date 12-12-05

RUSK

Drafted by:

AF: AFE: BEN: clt

3/16/67

Tel. Ext:

3442

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AFE - Mr. Strong

Clearances:

S/CPR - Mr. Symington

AF - Amb. Trimble

The White House

G - Mr. Low

S/S - Mr. Thompson

Mr. Hamilton EUR/CAN - Mr. Straus (in draft)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

889

1- Hamilton  
2- Ritz.  
Cy Moore

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

March 16, 1967  
Date

3a

BY Dust ON 12-19-90

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

*[Signature]*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

BY Dust ON 12-19-90

Enclosure:

Telegram to Kampala

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

*called S/S Ricardo Smith  
3/17/67 7:00pm. SB  
9K for clearance.  
Eth  
3-17-67*



RECEIVED  
TOWNSHIP'S OFFICE

1967 MAR 17 AM 9 21



36~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassy KAMPALA  
Ambassy OTTAWA

STATE: \_\_\_\_\_

REF: State 144840, 150938

FOR AMBASSADOR

Obote Visit

1. Before we can authorize you extend invitation to Obote visit Washington, Dept. needs know your estimate whether Mrs. Obote planning accompany President to Expo. If she coming, we will be faced with difficult problems. FYI ONLY. Mrs. Johnson will not rpt not be in Washington during time proposed visit. END FYI.

FOR OTTAWA: Would appreciate your attempts ascertain from Canadians if they aware any plans Mrs. Obote without revealing reasons for asking.

2. Tentative rpt tentative timing for visit June 22. / <sup>With trip to Canada just planned June 25-27.</sup> Would include White House plane to meet President in CONUS, presumably New York. Meeting with President Johnson and lunch, night at Blair House.

3. Advise soonest.

End

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4  
By jcl/h, NARA, Date 12-12-85

AF:AFE:RENalle:clt 3/16/67

3442

AFE - Mr. Strong

S/CPR - Mr. Symington  
AF - Amb. Trimble  
The White House -

G - Mr. Low  
S/S - Mr. Thompson  
EUR/CAN-12 Strong (in draft)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

<sup>4</sup>  
*Hamilton*

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1967 MAR 20 12 52

EHB178  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC 19299 0791300  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 201234Z MAR 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO WHITE HOUSE  
O R 201125Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1161  
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 236  
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 153  
RUQSOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 48  
RUQSNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 315  
RUDTCR/AMCONSUL SALISBURY 5  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ KAMPALA 1389

EXDIS

REF: STATE 158168

1. PROPOSED GENERAL TOUR PARTICULARLY IF ACCOMPANIED BY FREDERICKS WOULD BE MOST WELCOME AND USEFUL.
2. OWING GOU DEEP FEELINGS REGARDING SOUTHERN RHODESIA WE FEEL THAT BENEFIT OF TOUR WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF CONGRESSMEN INCLUDED SOUTHERN RHODESIA. HOWEVER WE DO NOT FEEL THAT CONGRESSMEN WOULD BE UNWELCOME ON THAT ACCOUNT. STEBBINS  
BT

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4  
By *jclg*, NARA, Date *12-12-05*



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

5

Action

019299

Info

1967 MAR 20 AM 7 34

AQVZCZCLDN459  
OO RUEHC RUQSOH RUQSNI  
DE RUDTCR 2389U 0791130  
ZNY SSSSS  
O R 201125Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUQSOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
RUQSNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
RUDTCR/AMCONSUL SALISBURY  
STATE GRNC  
BT

2

~~SECRET~~ KAMPALA 2389

EXDIS

REF: STATE 158168

2. PROPOSED GENERAL TOUR PARTICULARLY IF ACCOMPANIED  
BY FREDERICKS WOULD BE MOST WELCOME AND USEFUL.

2. OWING GOU DEEP FEELINGS REGARDING SOUTHERN RHODESIA  
WE FEEL THAT BENEFIT OF TOUR WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF  
CONGRESSMEN INCLUDED SOUTHERN RHODESIA. HOWEVER WE DO  
NOT FEEL THAT CONGRESSMEN WOULD BE UNWELCOME ON THAT ACCOUNT. STEBBINS  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8:04 a.m., 3/20/67.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4  
By jclg, NARA, Date 12-12-05

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

42  
ActionSS  
Info~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC  
DE RUDTCR 1292U 0631400  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 041355Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
STATE GRNC  
BT

004459

1967 MAR 4 AM 10 16

~~SECRET~~ KAMPALA 1292

E X D I S

REF: KAMPALA 1291, 1288

1. TELEPHONE CALL EARLY THIS MORNING FROM PRESIDENTIAL LODGE (REFTEL 1291) WAS MADE BY ROBERT GABOR OF PEACE THROUGH FREEDOM WHO HAD SPENT EVENING WITH PRESIDENT. SUGGESTION FOR BREAKFAST APPOINTMENT CAME FROM GABOR AND WAS IMMEDIATELY AGREED TO BY OBOTE. GABOR PRESENT AT BREAKFAST SESSION BUT NO OTHERS.

2. DURING CONVERSATION THIS MORNING GABOR ASKED THE PRESIDENT IF HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT VISITING UNITED STATES. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT SUCH A VISIT BUT WOULD DISCUSS IT PRIVATELY WITH ME AT SOME LATER DATE. (FROM THIS I CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS BETTER FOR ME NOT REPEAT NOT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF HIS REPORTED PLANS TO GO TO MONTREAL AND THE SUGGESTION MADE IN DEPT 144840).

3. GABOR REPORTED TO ME THIS MORNING THAT LAST NIGHT OBOTE HAD TOLD HIM THERE HAD BEEN A MILITARY PLOT AGAINST HIM INVOLVING ARMY PERSONNEL IN THE EAST OF UGANDA BUT THAT HE HAD BROKEN IT UP BY MAKING CERTAIN TROOP MOVEMENTS. HE ALSO TOLD GABOR THAT LOWER LEVEL MEMBERS OF THE UPC WERE INVOLVED IN THIS PLOT BUT HE DID NOT SPECIFY NAMES NOR DID HE INCLUDE ANY CABINET MEMBERS.

4. GABOR ALSO TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT OBOTE HAD TOLD HIM LAST NIGHT THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD DICTATED STORY PUBLISHED TODAY'S ISSUE THE PEOPLE REPORTED IN REFTEL 1288. WHILE I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT BRITISH KNOW THIS, I FEEL STRONGLY THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE PASSED TO THEM THROUGH COVERT CHANNELS IN ORDER AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY FUTURE EMBARRASSMENT TO ME HERE I THEREFORE PLAN TAKE NO ACTION ON THIS VIS-A-VIS ACTING BRIT HICOM KAMPALA. ADVISE.  
GP-1 STEBBINS

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE 10:42 A.M., 3-4-67.

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5By *isl* NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

80  
Origin

55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA PRIORITY

2

Uganda  
1 4 9 7 4 6  
MAR 6 7 27 PM '67

STATE: 149746

REF: Kampala 1292

EXDIS

Re para 4 reftel, prefer that info in this para not repeat not be passed to British through any channels. Believe info provided by you to Foster (para 4 Kampala 1293) sufficient.

GP-1

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By id NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

Drafted by: AF/AF: Cstrong: rca: 3/6/67

Tel. No. 4929

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

AF - JWFedericks gus

Clearances:

INR/DDC - Mr. Eker 1/02  
S/S - Mr. Morris 1/02

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

8

~~SECRET~~

2

42  
Action

Info

ZCZCLDD95 4  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUDTCR 1161U 0461330  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 151320Z FEB 67  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ KAMPALA 1161

013637  
1967 FEB 15 AM 10 48

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 137163

HIGHEST RANKING MEMBER FOROFF I COULD SEE TODAY  
WAS JOINT PERM SEC KIINGI AS EVERYONE ELSE WAS  
AT AIRPORT MEETING PRESIDENT ON HIS RETURN FROM KINSHASA.  
HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE HOPEFULLY TONIGHT OR EARLY TOMORROW MORNING.  
WHEN I REMARKED THAT DEPT PLANS PRESS RELEASE  
THURSDAY AFTERNOON KIINGI REPLIED THAT HE WOULD DO  
EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO OBTAIN PRESIDENT'S CONCURRENCE  
IN TIME TO INCLUDE UGANDA IN PRESS RELEASE BUT THAT SHOULD  
THIS NOT BE POSSIBLE HE HOPED DEPT MIGHT USE SOME  
SUCH WORDING AS FOLLOWS: "THE UNDER SECRETARY HOPES ALSO  
TO INCLUDE UGANDA IN HIS ITINERARY." STEBBINS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4  
By 1018 NARA, Date 12-12-85

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Uganda*9~~SECRET~~87  
ActionSS  
Info

NNNNZCZCLDD785  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUDTCR 1143U 0441330  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 131325Z FEB 7  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ KAMPALA 1143

REF: STATE 135564

EXDIS

1. ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSE PROPOSED VISIT.
2. AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE OBOTE WILL BE IN ENTEBBE/KAMPALA BUT WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN WITHOUT DISCLOSING POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO GOU. IT IS NOT IMPROBABLE THAT OBOTE WILL INVITE KATZENBACHS AND FREDRICKS BE HIS GUESTS AT STATE HOUSE ENTEBBE. IN THAT EVENT SCHEDULE OUTLINED BELOW WOULD HAVE TO BE READJUSTED TO MEET ANY PERSONAL WISHES PRESIDENT OBOTE MAY HAVE AS HOW 24 HOUR STAY CAN BEST BE UTILIZED SEE HIS COUNTRY AND GET ACQUAINTED HER PROBLEMS AND HER PEOPLE.

3. SUGGESTED SCHEDULE IS AS FOLLOWS:

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8 WEDNESDAY ARRIVE ENTEBBE LATE AFTERNOON.

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 1143U ~~SECRET~~

CALL ON PRESIDENT OBOTE AT STATE HOUSE ENTEBBE (MRS. KATZENBACH CALL ON MRS. OBOTE AT SAME TIME). VISIT AID AGRICULTURAL INFO CENTER. DRIVE FROM ENTEBBE TO KAMPALA. PRESIDENT OBOTE WILL PROBABLY WISH TO GIVE A DINNER IN HONOR OF UNDER-SECRETARY AND MRS. KATZENBACH EITHER AT ENTEBBE OR KAMPALA THAT EVENING. REMAIN OVERNIGHT KAMPALA AS GUESTS AMB AND MRS. STEBBINS.

THURSDAY MARCH 9 - EARLY MORNING(8:30 A.M.) QUICK TOUR OF MAKERERE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE FOLLOWED BY COFFEE WITH PRINCIPAL LULE AND SELECTED FACULTY MEMBERS. AT 9:30 DEPART MAKERERE FOR JINJA IN COMPANY FOREIGN MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN UGANDA ELECTRICITY BOARD TO VIEW OWEN FALLS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jcl/4*, NARA, Date *12-12-05*

~~SECRET~~

-2- KAMPALA 1143, FEBRUARY 13, 1967

DAM. PAY VISIT PCV AT SCHOOL ENROUTE JINJA. DEPART JINJA 11:30 A.M. ARRIVE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE 12:30 FOR STAG BUFFET LUNCH WITH SELECTED AFRICAN PERSONALITIES. AFTER LUNCH FOLLOWING BRIEF TOUR OF KAMPALA DEPART FOR ENTEBBE FOR FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT OBOTE WITH PAANNED DEPARTURE FROM ENTEBBE AIRPORT FOR ADDIS AROUND 4:30 OR 5:00 P.M.

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 2143U SECRET

4. A SEPARATE SCHEDULE WOULD BE ARRANGED FOR MORNING MARCH 9 FOR MRS. KATZENBACH IN ACCORDANCE HER WISHES OUTLINED REFTEL TO BE FOLLOWED BY LADIES LUNCHEON HOSTED BY MRS. STEBBINS IF THIS AGREEABLE. HER AFTERNOON SCHEDULE WOULD BE SAME AS UNDER-SECRETARY. STEBBINS  
BT

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

39113

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10

44  
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA - IMMEDIATE

AF  
Info:

STATE 39113

SEP 1 10 39 AM '66

SS

Ref: Kampala 342

G

SP

IO

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

CPR

If Obote raises possibility visiting US during UNGA and likelihood seeing President you should be guided by CA-525. In case you have not received, main points this instruction are that time available to President for meetings with foreign leaders during UNGA is extremely limited, that White House has found it necessary curtail its already crowded schedule of official visits and that Chiefs of State attending GA should not expect invitation to pay official visit to this country or to meet informally with President. As Embassy aware, President Johnson ~~KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS~~ has during this period an extremely crowded and already was crowded schedule for this period. ~~Therefore we can give no assurance at this time that President would be able to see Obote if he should visit US during UNGA.~~

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jcl* NARA, Date 12-12-05

Drafted by:

AFE:CCStrong;el 8/13/66

Tel. No.

4929

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AFE - Curtis C. Strong

Clearance:

C - Mr. Low (substance)  
White House - Mr. Hamilton  
S/S - Mr. Thompson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

3139  
100  
1 - Hamilton  
2 - Ret.

August 31, 1966

Date

FS

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

✓  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

BY DR ON 12-19-60

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to KAMPALA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

Cleared with  
45 (Thompson)  
Sth  
9-1-66



RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1956 AUG 31 PM 6 06

106~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassy KAMPALA - IMMEDIATE

Ref: Kampala 342

If Obote raises possibility visiting US during UNGA and likelihood seeing President you should be guided by CA-525. In case you have not received, main points this instruction are that time available to President for meetings with foreign leaders during UNGA is extremely limited, that White House has found it necessary curtail its already crowded schedule of official visits and that Chiefs of State attending GA should not expect invitation to pay official visit to this country or to meet informally with President. As Embassy aware, President Johnson ~~IMMEDIATELY~~ has during this period up to early November and already was crowded schedule for this period. ~~remainder of instruction~~ Therefore we can give no assurance at this time that President would be able to see Obote if he should visit US during UNGA.

END

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.4  
By gclg 11/24/05 Date 12-12-05

AFK:CCStrong;cl 8/13/66 4929

AFK - Curtis C. Strong

G - Mr. Low (substance)  
White House -  
S/S -~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

47-42

Action

O

Info

SS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCLDN255  
00 RUEHC RUSBHT  
DE RUDSVK 046U 1261340  
ZNY CCCCC  
O R 061330Z

FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1468  
INFO RUSBHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU ONE  
STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 06

AGREEMENT CHANNEL

REF: DEPTTEL 1788

HAVE APPOINTMENT WITH MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS ODAKA MAY 7  
9:30 A.M. FORSEE NO DELAY IN GOU PROMPT AGREEMENT TO PROPOSED  
APPOINTMENT. WILL ADVISE DEPT IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH  
ODAKA. SUGGEST IF POSSIBLE THAT TEXT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT  
BE CABLED EMBASSY AND RELEASE TIME COORDINATED WITH WASHINGTON  
AND KAMPALA.

DEMING  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jcl* NARA, Date *12.12.05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03145

12

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84-80

Origin  
0

Index

SS

ACTION: Ambassador KAMPALA  
INFO: Ambassador KATHMANDU

IMMEDIATE 1788  
IMMEDIATE 226

MAY 5 7 56 PM '66

S

AGREEMENT CHANNEL

President desires appoint Henry E. Stebbins (CM)  
Ambassador to Uganda. Please request written agreement and  
inform Department soonest when agreement received. Request  
GOV officials keep proposed appointment in confidence  
pending White House announcement nomination. Bio data in  
Biographic Register.

President ~~will~~ wishes announce intention to nominate ~~you~~  
Stebbins within next three days. Advise soonest whether you  
can meet this schedule.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4  
By jclg NARA, Date 12-12-05

Drafted by: DG/PAS: RNZ Zimmermann yw 5/3/66	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: O/DG - James E. Hoofnagle
Clearances: U - Mr. Springsteen <del>Mr. Palmer</del> NEA - Mr. Handley	White House - Mr. Falcon (in substance) AF - Mr. Palmer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46-42

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL:

17663

INRD

RECD:

APRIL 21, 1966, 10:33 AM

Info

FROM:

KAMPALA

RSR

ACTION:

SECSTATE 1408

15

~~SECRET~~ APRIL 21

ROGER CHANNEL

1. GERMAN AMBASSADOR PASSED ON TO ME IN CONFIDENTIAL FOLLOWING INFORMATION. EARLY THIS WEEK HE WAS INFORMED BY SECOND-HAND SOURCE IN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE THAT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE HAD BEEN FOUND IN KAMPALA RESIDENCE FORMER UGANDA VICE PRESIDENT NADIOPE OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN "PLOT" BY FIVE ARRESTED MINISTERS AND VICE PRESIDENT TO OVERTHROW OBOTE GOVERNMENT. ONE DOCUMENT WAS SAID TO LIST MEMBERS OF A NEW GOVT HEADED BY GRACE IBINGIRA AS PRIME MINISTER. GERMAN AMBASSADOR'S INFORMANT, WHO I GATHERED WAS LOW LEVEL, SAID THERE RUMORS IN MIN. JUSTICE THAT AMERICAN EMBASSY AND/OR AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WOULD SHORTLY BE ACCUSED BY OBOTE OF AIDING THIS PLOT AND THAT AMBASSADOR WOULD PROBABLY BE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA.

2. COMMENT:

A. RUMORS OF THIS KIND INVOLVING BRITISH, AMERICANS, ISRAELIS AND OTHERS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN CIRCULATED DURING PERIOD INSTABILITY IN UGANDA SINCE FEB 4. GERMAN EMBASSY ITSELF WAS THIS WEEK CHARGED IN FORMAL NOTE FROM FOREIGN OFFICE OF COMPLICITY IN PROVIDING A GERMAN AGENT TO TRAIN KABAKA'S SECURITY POLICE. GERMAN EMBASSY IS DENYING THIS CHARGE IN STRONG TERMS AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT.

B. I [REDACTED] KNOW OF NO BASIS WHATSOEVER FOR RUMORED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE INDICATING ANY EMBASSY OR US GOVT SUPPORT TO VICE PRESIDENT OR FIVE MINISTERS. IT CONCEIVABLE BUT MOST UNLIKELY THAT NADIOPE MIGHT HAVE MADE SOME WRITTEN RECORD OF HIS CONCERN AND ORAL APPEALS TO EMBASSY FOR ASSISTANCE DURING TIME OF JOHN KAKONGE'S SCHEME TO UNSEAT OBOTE AS PRESIDENT OF UPC IN SPRING OF 1964. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FORGED DOCUMENTS

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NLI / RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 10-31-12

By ULS

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1408, APRIL 21, 1966 FROM KAMPALA

MAY HAVE BEEN PLANTED WITH OR WITHOUT OBOTE'S KNOWLEDGE AS OBOTE'S INTELLIGENCE AGENT ODOKO KNOWN BE PRONE THIS DEVICE AND SOVIET OR CHICOM ASSISTANCE NO DOUBT AVAILABLE.

C. OBOTE IS PARANOID AND HAS SUSPECTED MANY PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE OR UNSEAT HIM. ON ONE OCCASION THERE WAS RUMOR OF "AMERICAN PLOT HATCHED IN MANHATTAN" TO ASSASSINATE HIM AT ENTebbe AIRPORT ON HIS RETURN FROM RUSSIA AND ASIAN TOUR IN AUGUST 1965. IT WAS SUCH WILD RUMORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO UPC EXECUTIVE'S DEMANDS LAST YEAR THAT OBOTE EITHER REVEAL SOURCES OF THESE RUMORS OR DISMISS THEM SINCE THEY WERE DISRUPTING PARTY UNITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE. HE DID NEITHER.

D. OBOTE IN SPEECH APRIL 15 ANNOUNCING NEW CONSTITUTION MADE MUCH OF ALLEGED PLOT BY KABAKA OVERTHROW HIM WITH ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE FORCES. HE WAS CAREFUL NOT NAME ANY FOREIGN EMBASSY OR POWER BUT INFERENCE POINTED TO UK HIGH COMMISSION. IT MAY BE HE HAS DECIDED MAKE CHARGES AGAINST ONE OR MORE FOREIGN MISSIONS, INCLUDING THIS EMBASSY, IN CONNECTION WITH TRIAL OF FIVE MINISTERS NOW PROCEEDING IN CAMERA AT GULU. HOWEVER IT HARD TO SEE WHAT HE WOULD GAIN FROM SUCH ACTION NOW THAT HE HAS SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED HIS CONTROL OF GOVT UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION.

E. [REDACTED] REVEALS NO EVIDENCE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY PLOT, INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL, TO OVERTHROW OBOTE BY FORCE, THOUGH KABAKA AND OTHERS HAVE HOPED FOR HIS DOWNFALL. IT GENERAL CONSENSUS, HOWEVER THAT OBOTE BELIEVES PLOT TO HAVE EXISTED.

F. SHOULD OBOTE MAKE CHARGES, PUBLICLY OR THROUGH PRIVATE OFFICIAL CHANNELS, OF USG COMPLICITY IN PLOT AGAINST HIM, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE REACT POSITIVELY AND PROMPTLY BY RECALLING AMBASSADOR FOR CONSULTATION. BY SO DOING WE MAY BE ABLE INHIBIT GROWING ABUSE BY AFRICAN LEADERS OF "THE PNG PRIVILEGE" WHICH, AMONG OTHER AFRICAN STATES AT LEAST, IS TAKEN AS PROOF OF GUILT. IN THIS REGARD I AM MINDFUL OF THE RECENT CASE IN BURUNDI.

G. UGANDA CAN ONLY FURTHER HURT HER WORLD IMAGE AND JEOPARDIZE PROGRAMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ASSISTANCE TO HER IF PLOT CHARGES ARE MADE AGAINST AMERICAN, BRITISH OR OTHER MISSIONS HERE. I DOUBT THAT OBOTE WILL DO SO AGAINST US BUT WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR EVENTUALITY.

GP-1

DEMING  
BT

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

85-80

Origin  
INRD

Info.

ACTION: *Ambassy, KAMPALA 1714*

REF: *RefTel 1408*

*ROUTER CHANNEL*

*13850*  
*why*  
*13*  
*APR 25 6 10 PM '66*

*Hayner*

1. RefTel reinforces concern expressed deptel 1700 and makes more urgent need to re-normalize US - Uganda relations.
2. If charges against Ambassador are made, decision re action to be taken *inter alia* will be made in light circumstances, ~~and~~ whether charges public or private.

GP-1

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NLTCCR-101-4-5*  
By *J*, NARA, Date *7/22/11*

*AF:AFK:BBHalle:djw 4/25/66*

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

INR/DDC - H. L. T. Koren

Clearances:

*AFK:TWK:Elhiney*

INR/DDC - Mr. Ekern AF - Mr. Fredericks

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15/ ✓ HC

48-42

CONTROL:  
RECEIVED:

4796

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 5, 1966, 5:12 A.M.

Action

INRD

FROM:

KAMPALA

Info

ACTION:

SECSTATE 1179

015

RSR

INFO:

DAR ES SALAAM 233

NAIROBI 289

S E C R E T MARCH 05

ROGER CHANNEL

REF: DEPTTEL 1370

1. SHOULD OBOTE OR ANY MEMBER GOV RAISE PLOT CHARGES AGAINST US I SHALL BE GUIDED BY INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTTEL. OBOTE IN HIS SPEECH TO NATION ON MARCH 3, WHICH WAS REPORTED BY EMBASSY SEPARATELY, MADE REFERENCE TO INFORMATION GOVT HAD OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO "CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS". HE ADDED, "WHERE NECESSARY, SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE DISCLOSED IN PROPER PLACE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF OUR COUNTRY AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE".

2. I BELIEVE ABOVE INDICATES HE WILL BE VERY CIRCUMSPECT IN LEVELING CHARGES AT US OR ANY OTHER GOVT. IN THIS CONNECTION; IN SPITE OF HOT DISCUSSION OBOTE HAD WITH HICOM HUNT IN WHICH HE ACCUSED BOTH HUNT AND MILITARY ADVISOR SENIOR WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, HE HAS MADE NO PUBLIC CHARGES AGAINST HMG OR HIGH COMMISSION AND SO FAR AS WE KNOW HAS NOT REQUESTED SENIOR'S DEPARTURE. BELIEVE OBOTE FULLY AWARE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT ENSUE IN RELATIONS WITH US, HMG, OR OTHER GOVTS THAT HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY AND HELPFUL TO HIS GOVT. I THEREFORE INCLINED BELIEVE THAT IF HE DOES MAKE CHARGES AGAINST FOREIGN EMBASSIES OR INDIVIDUALS, THEY WILL BE MADE IN PRIVATE AND OFFICIALLY AND HE WILL WISH AVOID PUBLICITY.

AM INFORMED THAT WILLIAM RUXTON, WHO IS MI-5 OFFICER AT HICOM, WILL QUIETLY DEPART UGANDA ON MARCH 18. HE HAS BEEN WITH HICOM SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1962. ACUTALLY HIS LEAVE AND TRANSFER HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR SOME MONTHS AND TIMING IS COINCIDENTAL.

GP-1.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 10-30-12

By CLK

~~SECRET~~

DEMING



#26

~~SECRET~~

S 16

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CIA/OCI

CONSENT ON EMBASSY KAMPALA 1065 DTC 221511Z  
PRIME MINISTER OBOTE'S ARREST OF SIX MINISTERS

UGANDAN PRIME MINISTER OBOTE'S ACTION IS A MOVE TO COUNTER POLITICAL  
ATTACKS ON HIM BY A BLOC REPRESENTING THE SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE  
COUNTRY. THE SOUTHERNERS ARE "MODERATES," WHEREAS OBOTE AND HIS  
NORTHERN FRIENDS ARE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE "RADICAL" AFRICAN  
POSITION. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN SIMMERING FOR SOME TIME, AND  
ARMY IS SPLIT AS WELL. COMMANDER OPOLOTO IS SOUTHERN-MINDED, WHILE  
CHIEF OF STAFF, AMIN, IS LEADING NORTHERN LIGHT AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE  
OF OBOTE. IN THIS SITUATION, WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY THAT THERE IS A  
GOOD CHANCE OF CLASH BETWEEN MILITARY FACTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 10-340  
By id NARA, Date 3-3-11

PRESERVATION COPY

162

VV  
AP78

U R G E N T

(KAMPALA, UGANDA)--THE PRIME MINISTER OF UGANDA, MILTON OBOTE (OH-BOH'-TAY), HAS HAD FIVE CABINET MEMBERS ARRESTED IN WHAT HE CALLS THE INTEREST OF PUBLIC SECURITY. HE SAYS HE HAS TAKEN OVER ALL THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT AND WILL ANNOUNCE SOON MEMBERS OF AN ADVISORY COUNCIL. OBOTE SAYS HE ACTED INDEPENDENTLY BECAUSE OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HE TERMED THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE FOR PEACE, ORDER AND PROSPERITY.

RP1156AES 22

EHX854

U\*\*\*ZZ RUEHEX

DE RUEHC 17818 05311

ZNY CCCCC

Z 221658Z

FM SECSTAT WASHDC

INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEHJS/DOD

RUEHLG/CIA

Z O 221511Z FEB 66

FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH (1065)

INFO RUCJHK/CINCSRIKE IMMEDIATE UNN

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 59

RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM IMMEDIATE 189

RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 188

RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDISABABA IMMEDIATE 62

RUQSKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 67

RUQSNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 236

RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE IMMEDIATE 108

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FEBRUARY 22

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED REPORT THAT FOLLOWING SIX MINISTERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY POLICE SPECIAL FORCES ON ORDERS OF PRIME MINISTER OBOTE: MINISTER AGRICULTURE NGOBI, MINISTER STATE IBINGRIA, MINISTER LABOR AND HOUSING MAGEZI, MINISTER HEALTH LUMU, MINISTER INTERNAL AFFAIRS BATARINGAYA AND MINISTER WATER AND MINERAL RESOURCES KIRYA. ALL ARE MODERATES AND GOOD MEN WHO STOOD BEHIND OR ACTIVELY SUPPORTED DAUDI OCHENG'S MOTION IN PARLIAMENT ON JAN 4 FOR SUSPENSION OF CHIEF OF STAFF IDI AMIN. FIRST REPORT CAME TO ME FROM GERMAN AMB

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By isl NLJ/IRAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

RECEIVED

16-20  
1966 FEB 22 17 21



~~PAGE 2 RUDTCR 2030 U C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

WHO HAD IT FROM GERMAN PRIVATE CITIZEN EMPLOYED WITH OBOTE FOUNDATION. REPORT CONFIRMED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY CAS. ARRESTS WERE MADE DURING OR RIGHT AFTER CABINET MEETING IN ENTEBBE, WHICH CONVENED THIS MORNING AT 10 AM AS IS CUSTOMARY ON TUESDAY. ACCORDING OUR INTELLIGENCE ALL SIX MEN HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED UNDER GUARD TO THE NORTH PRESUMABLY TO THE VICINITY OF GULU OR LIRA, HOME TERRITORY OF OBOTE, NEKYON AND OTHER NORTHERN RADICALS. KAMPALA SO FAR QUIET WITH NO EVIDENCE POLICE OR TROOP MOVEMENTS. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO GOVT OR OTHER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF ARRESTS. WE ARE QUIETLY INFORMING AMERICANS THROUGH ESTABLISHED E&E CHANNELS TO STAY HOME AND TAKE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS. I AM STOPPING SEE UK HICOM HUNT AT HOME SHORTLY. IT IS NOW 1730 HOURS LOCAL.

2. COMMENT: IRONIC THIS ACTION SHOULD OCCUR ON WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY. THOSE WHO BELIEVED OBOTE WOULD USE FORCE OR ANY OTHER MEANS NECESSARY AT LAST MOMENT TO PREVENT DISCLOSURES INCRIMINATING HIM SEEM TO HAVE BEEN PROVED CORRECT. OBOTE HAS CROSSED RUBICON AND SEEMS UNLIKELY HE CAN MAKE HIS ACTION STICK WITHOUT VIOLENCE WHICH MOST LIKELY COME FROM ELEMENTS OF ARMY WHO ARE ANTI-NORTHERN, SPEARHEADED BY YOUNG

~~PAGE 3 RUDTCR 2030 U C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

OFFICERS OF WHOM GRACE IBINGIRA'S BROTHER, MAJOR KATABARWA, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM SANDHURST IS POSSIBLE LEADER. HOWEVER MUCH DEPENDS ON WHETHER ARMY COMMANDER OPOLOTO STAYS LOYAL TO OBOTE AND THOSE GOVT LEADERS WHO HAVE IN EFFECT SEIZED POWER. WILL REPORT DEVELOPMENTS. DEMING  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

49  
Action

INRD  
Info

RSR

~~SECRET~~

013

CONTROL: 1 9 3 1 6

RECD: FEBRUARY 24, 1966  
8:16 A.M.

FROM: KAMPALA

ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 1088

~~SECRET~~ FEB 24

ROGER CHANNEL

1. I SAW BRITISH HOCOM HUNT THIS MORNING AT MY REQUEST SINCE I HAD LEARNED HE HAD APPOINTMENT SEE OBOTE AT LATTER'S REQUEST YESTERDAY.
2. HUNT TOLD ME HE HAD NOT SEEN OBOTE AND THEN GAVE ME FOLLOWING INFORMATION (PROTECT SOURCE AS HUNT SAID HE WAS INFORMING NO OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSION). OBOTE HAD TELEPHONED HIM YESTERDAY, WEDNESDAY FEB 23 AND SAID ABRUPTLY "YOU ARE INTERFERING IN MY INTERNAL AFFAIRS. YOUR COLONEL SENIOR HAS BEEN SEEING ONE OF MY ARMY OFFICERS. SENIOR MUST GO". THEN OBOTE ADDED "WE HAVE BEEN WATCHING YOUR OWN MOVEMENTS AND THEY ARE NOT SATISFACTORY". HUNT TOLD OBOTE THAT THERE MUST BE SERIOUS MISTAKE OR MISUNDERSTANDING AND HE ASKED TO COME TO ENTEBBE SEE OBOTE AT ONCE. IN REPLY OBOTE HESITATED THEN SAID "WELL, WE'LL SEE" AND HUNG UP. LATER BIGIRWENKYA, ACTING PERMSEC IN OBOTE'S OFFICE, CALLED REQUESTING HUNT TO SEE HIM. HUNT DID NOT DISCLOSE TO ME WHAT HE DISCUSSED WITH BIGIRWENKYA, WHO IS CIVIL SERVANT, BUT SAID IT WAS ON SAME SUBJECT BUT LOW KEY AND CORRECT.
3. JUST BEFORE I LEFT HUNT HAD PHONE CALL REQUESTING HIM MEET WITH PM AT 1100 HOURS LOCAL. I SHALL SEE HUNT LATER TODAY.
4. IN SEPARATE BUT RELATED DEVELOPMENT ISRAELI AMBASSADOR LUBRANI ASKED SEE ME AND I STOPPED AT HIS HOUSE LAST NIGHT. HE SAID HE HAD INFORMATION FROM USUALLY RELIABLE UGANDAN SOURCE THAT OBOTE WOULD ACCUSE EMBASSY OR USG OF INTERFERING IN UGANDA INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND HAVING HAD IMPROPER CONTACT WITH MINISTERS WHO NOW IN DETENTION. I SAID WE HAD HAD FAIRLY FIRM REPORT

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLT 201R-101-4-9  
By *SA*, NARA, Date 9/23/11

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1088, FEBRUARY 24, FROM KAMPALA

OF THIS NATURE PREVIOUSLY, THAT IT QUITE POSSIBLE OBOTE WOULD MAKE SUCH CHARGES, PRIVATE OR PUBLIC, AGAINST US OR OTHER GOVTS IN ORDER PLACE BLAME FOR HIS ILLEGAL ASSUMPTION POWER ON "NEFARIOUS ACTIONS" OF FOREIGN GOVTS AND OUTSIDERS. I SAID OBOTE WAS IN WEAKEST POSSIBLE POSITION AT MOMENT TO GET AN CREDIBILITY OR SUPPORT FOR SUCH CHARGES AMONG HIS PEOPLE OR GOVT OR AMONG FOREIGN GOVTS AS IN HIS SITUATION IN TRANSPARENT HE LOOKING FOR SCAPEGOAT.

5. COMMENT: IN LIGHT ABOVE I AGAIN ALERT DEPT TO POSSIBILITY IF NOT LIKLIHOOD OBOTE WILL MAKE SUCH CHARGES TO ME PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY. IN EVENT HE DOES I SHALL FOLLOW PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTIFY DEPT AT ONCE.

(COL. SENIER REFERRED TO ABOVE IS HICOM MILITARY ADVISOR.)

DEMING

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICA ON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

January 25, 1966

1966 JAN 26 AM 9 11 Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Cable to Amembassy KAMPALA

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12336,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY DCA ON 12-19-90

CLASSIFICATION

JAN 26 1966

*218*  
*x Hayes - OK*  
*1 - Komer*  
*2 - Pitt*  
*18*

*This was withdrawn by S/S. - R. Hayes 1/31/66*

*Obote is not being invited. - R.*

18a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA HIGHITY

INFO: Amembassy DAR-ES-SALAAM (Pouch)  
Amembassy NAIROBI (Pouch)DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By jc/ly, NARA, Date 12/12/05

Ref Kampala's 861, rptd Dar, Nairobi Umm.

March 27

1. FYI We inclined favor possible visit Obote on PanAm/VIP inaugural flight. However, due outstanding invitations to three African leaders make official or state visit during 1966, you should make no commitment concerning a call on President. ~~XX ADVISED THAT~~ Secretary ~~XXXX~~ now plans be in Washington during time of visit and would probably be able meet with Prime Minister. End FYI

2. You should advise Reece in noncommittal manner that we see no objection issuance invitation to Prime Minister. Make it clear to PanAm that this would be entirely private visit; parallel might be drawn to 1963 visit to get honorary degree Long Island Univ. Assume trip would be along same lines as Mrs. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ <sup>Kenyatta's trip,</sup> with PanAm taking full responsibility for all travel, housing, entertainment except that which Uganda Emb Washington, UNDel NYC might wish do. (FYI Possibly due pressure from Kenyan delegation, PanAm showed tendency present last minute requests for changes in schedule which were difficult comply with. End FYI)

3. Do you see any problems arising from such modest visit with respect Obote or other elements UPC? Assume possible early call of Parliamentary elections not factor.

GP-3

End

AF:AFE:BN:Wallesey:1/18/66

3442

AFE - Curtis C. Strong

S/CPR - Mr. King (draft)

S - Mr. Strestor

AF - Governor Williams (draft)

G - Mr. Low (draft)

AN - Mr. Styles (draft)

AF - Amb. Trimble (draft)

White House -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other  
flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division



1965

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

20

5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

0110468

AF ZCZCLDN131

1965 NOV 13 AM 1 26

Info PP RUEHCR RUFHDN RUQSDA RUQSN  
DE RUFHDN 975U 3160850  
SS ZNY CCCCC  
G P R 120829Z  
SP FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
SAH TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 620  
L INFO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 103  
H RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 91  
EUR RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 12  
IO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY BLANTYRE 05  
P RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 128  
USIA RUFHDN/AMCONGEN SALISBURY 02  
NSC RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 28  
BT STATE GRNC

INR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOVEMBER 12

CIA  
NSA 1. GOU REACTED CALMLY BUT STRONGLY TO RHODESIAN UDI.  
DOD 2. IN STATEMENT RELEASED THURSDAY EVENING OBOTE SAID SMITH'S  
AID ANNOUNCEMENT DOES NOT LATER GOU POSITION AND VIEWS THAT RHODESIA  
E STILL BRITISH COLONY. SAID GOU HAD SENT MESSAGE TO WILSON  
RSR CONTAINING FOLLOWING POINT: WELCOMED ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNOR  
GIBBS IN DISMISSING REBELLIOUS RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT; URGED HMG  
AND UK PARLIAMENT TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES INSURE SUCCESS OF  
GOVERNOR'S ACTION; UGANDA STILL REGARDS RHODESIA AS BRITISH  
COLONY AND THEREFORE SUPPORTS STERN MEASURES QUELL REBELLION;  
UGANDA ALSO EXPECTS HMG HAVE PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN RHODESIA TO

PAGE 2 RUFHDN 975U ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BACK UP GOVERNOR'S ACTION IN HIS DIRECT ADMINISTRATION AND ALSO  
PROTECT LIVES LOYAL RHODESIANS.

PM SAID HE HAD PROPOSED MEETING OF EA LEADERS PLUS ZAMBIA  
TO REVIEW SITUATION. ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR EARLY MEETING.

AFTER ISSUANCE STATEMENT PM CALLED IN UK HICOM HUNT FOR  
MEETING WHICH INCLUDED MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ODAKA. HUNT  
TOLD CHARGE THAT PM HAD EMPHASIZED POINT CONTAINED HIS PUBLIC  
STATEMENT BUT HAD BROUGHT UP NOTHING NEW. THERE WAS GENERAL,  
RESTRAINED DISCUSSION OF SANCTIONS WHICH UK AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS  
COULD BRING BEAR ON RHODESIA.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By id NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 620, NOVEMBER 12 FROM KAMPALA .

4. ARGUS EDITORIAL NOVEMBER 12 SAID SMITH'S "ACT OF DESPERATION" WAS ACT OF REBELLION WHICH MUST MEAN "SORROW, HATRED AND BLOODSHED." ALTHOUGH FACT THAT REVELS " PREPARED FOR SIEGE" SHOWED THEY NOT BLIND TO DANGERS OF UDI, IT ALSO CLEAR THEY DID NOT FULLY REALIZE RISKS INVOLVED; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE PUSHED CRISIS TO POINT THAT "PRECIPITATED THEIR COUNTRY INTO UNKNOWN"

5. COMMENT:

ALTHOUGH OBOTE'S STATEMENT DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION USE OF FORCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF UK "PHYSICAL PRESENCE" TO SUPPORT GOVERNOR'S DIRECT ADMINISTRATION AND PROTECT LOYAL RHODESIANS WOULD SEEM REQUIRE UK ARMED FORCES.

GP-3 FLINN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

21

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action CONTROL: 22211  
AF REC'D: February 25, 1965  
Info 9:23 p.m.

FROM: Kampala

SS ACTION: Secstate 1496 Priority  
G

SP INFO: Addis Ababa 120 Priority  
EUR Dar-es-Salaam 255 Priority  
IO Lagos 1496 Priority  
P Nairobi 359 Priority  
USIA USUN 53 Priority  
NSC  
INR  
NSA  
OC

DATE: February 25, 7 p.m.

RMR

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 1502

REGRET DELAY REPLY REFTEL DUE SERIOUS DECODING BACKLOG. FULLY SUPPORT DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS FOR INITIATIVES TO DEAL WITH ESCALATION CONGO-UGANDA BORDER DISPUTE. EMBASSY EXPLORING REACTION TO OAU OBSERVER TEAM CONCEPT WITH GOU CONTACTS AND UK HICOM DOING LIKEWISE. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC COMMENTS DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSALS:

1. APPROACH TO UN SYG APPEARS MOST DESIRABLE AND LOGICAL MOVE AS EFFORT CALCULATED TO BRING REASON TO BEAR WITH REPS GOU AND GDRC IN LIGHT PRESENT EMOTIONAL AND "NON-THINK" ATMOSPHERE. APOLLO KIRONDE HAS RETURNED UGANDA AND PRESUME ALIMADI IN CHARGE.

2. INITIATIVE BY MODERATE AFRICANS DIRECTLY TO GOU HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN LIGHT PRESENT INDICATIONS SOME TOP MEMBERS GOU IN DETENTE MOOD. MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE RESIDENT KAMPALA PROBABLY NIGERIAN ACTING HICOM CHUKWARA, SINCE ETHIOPIA NOT REPRESENTED HERE, IN SPITE OF FACT GOU COOL TO NIGERIA OVER LATTER'S SUPPORT LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CONGO. ACTUALLY NIGERIAN HICOM MARTINS, ACCREDITED TO UGANDA BUT RESIDENT DAR-ES-SALAAM, WOULD BE BEST CHOICE IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED COME KAMPALA FOR THAT PURPOSE.

3. PROPOSED COMPOSITION MULTI-NATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM SHOULD BE ABLE DISCHARGE RESPONSIBILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

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By *isl*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1496, February 25, 7 p.m., from Kampala

ONAMA APPARENTLY RECEPTIVE IDEA SUCH PATROLS BOTH SIDES OF BORDER (EMBTel 1484). HOWEVER, APPEARS UNLIKELY TO EMBASSY THAT GOU PREPARED INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GDRC BUT MIGHT BE WILLING USE FRIENDLY INTERMEDIARY.

4. IF MODERATES CAN TAKE LEADERSHIP AT OAU FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING NAIROBI THIS MOST EFFECTIVE FORUM FOR GETTING ACCEPTANCE BORDER CONTROL SCHEME. BELIEVE SUCH INITIATIVE BY ETHIOPIAN REP PROBABLY CARRY MORE WEIGHT WITH UGANDA THAN OTHERS SUGGESTED REFTel. MEANTIME, OR IF OAU EFFORT FAILS, WE SHOULD ENDEAVOR FOLLOW THROUGH WITH PROPOSAL IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

GP-4.

DEMING

DLW

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 10:05 P.M., FEBRUARY 25.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, DOD, CINCStrIKE 1:40 A.M., FEBRUARY 26.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

22

6

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Action

Control: 22324

AF

Rec'd: February 26, 1965  
2:45 a.m.

Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1478, Immediate

G

SP

INFO: Addis Ababa 115, Priority

L

Dar-es-Salaam 250

H

London 231

EUR

Brussels 125

IO

Leopoldville 327

P

Nairobi 353

USIA

Kigali Unnumbered

NSC

Bujumbura Unnumbered

INR

NSA

DATE: February 24, 6 p.m.

AID

PC

DEPARTMENT PASS CIA, DOD, WHITE HOUSE, CINCSTRIKE

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

RMR

EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1468

OBOTE PRESS CONFERENCE ON CONGO WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON DOMINATED BY REPETITION CHARGES US RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONGO SITUATION AND BORDER ATTACKS ON UGANDA. FOLLOWED FAMILIAR LINE FOR MOST PART, BUT FOLLOWING WERE NEW TWISTS:

1. FOR FIRST TIME DID NOT DENY THAT GOU ASSISTING REBELS; SAID WEST NILE "NOT GREATEST OR MAIN SUPPLY LINE" TO REBELS.

2. GOU HAD CLOSED RWANDA BORDER BECAUSE "WE DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENS ON OTHER SIDE BETWEEN RWANDA AND CONGO."

3. "BOMBING" ATTACKS HAD NOT BEEN "MISTAKES." THERE HAD BEEN FURTHER CONGO INCURSIONS AGAINST UGANDA INCLUDING A RECENT EXTREMELY SERIOUS ONE IN INTERIOR OF COUNTRY. REFUSED EXPAND ON THIS DESPITE REPORTERS FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONING.

DEMING

Note: Advance copy to S/SO at 3:10 a.m. February 26  
Passed White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSTRIKE 4:15 a.m. February 26

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

23

84

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Action

AF NNNNDSA603SVA908VKA027  
PP RUEHC RUQSUC RUQSDA RUFJER  
Info DE RUDSVK 257 24/1444Z

SS P 241330Z

G ZNR

SP FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

EUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
IO INFO RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE

P RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USIA RUFJER/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

NSC RUDSVC/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

INR RUDSVD/AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM

NSA RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

AID STATE GRNC

PC BT

RMR UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1467 INFO LEOPOLDVILLE 322 ADDIS

ABABA 113 BRUSSELS 123 NAIROBI 350 DARESSALAAM 248

LONDON 228 CINCSTRIKE DOD WHITE HOUSE UNN FROM KAMPALA

TWENTY-FOURTH

20891  
1965 FEB 24 PM 4 46

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

REPLYING TO OPPOSITION QUESTIONS AS TO WHY UGANDA HAD BEEN BOMBED AND WHAT STEPS GOU TAKING DEFEND ITSELF PM OBOTE TOLD PARLIAMENT FEB. 23 THAT UGANDA ATTACKED BECAUSE IT REFUSES RECOGNIZE CONGO NATIONALISTS AS REBELS. REGRETTED HE COULD NOT DISCLOSE STEPS BEING TAKEN DEFEND UGANDAS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BUT STRESSED GOU POLICY THAT ONLY SOLUTION TO CONGO PROBLEM WAS POLITICAL ONE, WHEREBY POLITICAL LEADERS SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND WORK OUT FUTURE THEIR COUNTRY.

CFN 1467 322 113 123 350 248 228 23

PAGE TWO RUDSVK 257 UNCLAS

SAID UGANDA COULD NOT REJECT ANY CONGO POLITICAL LEADER.

"ONCE WE BEGIN TO BE SELECTIVE WE DEFEAT PURPOSE OF OUR POLICY, THAT IS WHY WE HAVE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH VARIOUS CONGO POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING MR. GBENYE. GBENYE HAS BEEN IN MOST GOVERNMENTS IN THE CONGO. HE WAS INTERIOR MINISTER IN THE FIRST CONGO GOVERNMENT, HE WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO MR. ADOULA, AND UNTIL RECENTLY, HE WAS STILL A MINISTER IN CONGO GOVERNMENT."

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-2- 1467, February 24, From Kampala

"PEOPLE TEND TO ASK QUESTIONS, PEOPLE TEND TO THINK THE GOVERNMENT MUST SHOW A SIDE. BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US HERE TO TAKE SIDES. THEREFORE, WE ARE BEING ATTACKED BECAUSE WE HAVE REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE GBENYE, BOMBOKO, AND OTHER POLITICIANS OPPOSED TO TSHOMBE AS REBELS. AND I BELIEVE THAT IMMEDIATELY WE RECOGNISED THESE PEOPLE AS REBELS WE SHALL NOT BE ATTACKED."

"BUT IF WE RECOGNISE THOSE PEOPLE AS REBELS WE SHALL DEFEAT PURPOSE OF POLICY OF RECONCILIATION. WE SHALL HAVE TO SUPPORT POLICY OF MILITARY SUPPRESSION OF WHAT IS CALLED REBELLION, AND OUR READING OF THE SCENE IS THAT MILITARY SUPPRESSION OF WHAT IS CALLED REBELLION IN CONGO WILL NOT BRING STABILITY INSIDE CONGO. IT CAN ONLY BRING A TEMPORARY PEACE AND OTHER REBELLIONS WILL START. THAT I BELIEVE IS BASIS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE."

PAGE THREE RUDSVK 257 UNCLAS

REFERRING TO GOU DEFENSE MEASURES, SAID THAT FREEDOM IN UGANDA IS BEING MISUSED BY OUR ENEMIES TO FEED INFORMATION TO OUTSIDE WORLD REGARDING OUR STRENGTH.

COMMENT FOLLOWS. DEMING  
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2/24/65, 5:54 P.M.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, DOD, CINCSTRIKE, 2/24/65, 7:20 P.M.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

24

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5  
Action Control: 21040  
Rec'd: February 24, 1965  
10:00 p.m.

AF FROM: Kampala

Info

SS ACTION: Secstate 1477 Priority

G

SP INFO: Dar-es-Salaam 249

EUR London 230

IO Nairobi 352

P Addis Ababa 114

USIA Brussels 124

NSC Leopoldville 366

INR CIA Unnumbered

NSA DOD Unnumbered

AID White House Unnumbered

PC CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered

RMR

DATE: February 24, 7 p.m.

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

Embassy telegram 1467

Substance Obote's argument in imprecise Congo statement yesterday in Parliament was: Since military action cannot solve Congo problem, GOU not taking sides between opposing Congo forces. Instead it wishes all concerned to sit down at conference table and negotiate political reconciliation. Uganda under military attack because it does not consider Gbenye and other anti-Tshombe forces as rebels but rather nationalists.

Obote made no mention of GOU assistance to rebels, stating only that GOU "maintained contact" with various leaders including Gbenye. Remarks suggest there is no legitimate government of Congo and therefore all factions must meet form such government. This is retrogression from previously-reiterated GOU recognition legitimacy GDRC and approaches policy non-recognition of fellow OAU state.

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-2- 1477, February 24, 7 p.m., from Kampala

OAU state. Statement that GOU "not taking sides" is of course outright falsehood.

Probably not overly significant that US not attacked or even mentioned. We have learned that PM personally ordered TV panel program attacking US foreign policy February 21. In wake continued aircraft attacks Uganda territory, believe anti-US pressure will continue.

DEMING

HC

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 1:15 a.m., February 25, 1965

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

87

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Action

Control: 21020  
Rec'd: February 24, 1965  
9:07 p.m.

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1473, Priority

G

SP

INFO: London 229, Priority  
Leopoldville 324, Priority  
USUN 52, Priority

EUR

IO

P

DATE: February 24, 6 p.m.

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

PC

RMR

UK HICOM Hunt informed me today he had instruction requesting him consider ways he might intercede with GOU to improve "American Image" in Uganda on Congo issue. He proposed take opportunity raise matter at meeting he has scheduled tomorrow with Onama, acting Foreign Minister, to discuss Tshombe's overture re Congo Border Patrol Commission. We agreed that he should impress on Onama palpable folly of GOU charges USG responsibility for attacks on Uganda territory, grave error they making in pressing such charges publicly and serious consequences that might arise if strained relations with US, which demonstrably good friend of Uganda, were further to deteriorate. I told Hunt such initiative with Onama might prove very helpful and his efforts greatly appreciated. Hunt said he has definite impression Obote feels politically and militarily over-extended on Congo and is trying crawl back on limb. In my view this remains to be proved but we should lose no opportunity encourage it.

GP-4.

DEMING

FP/12

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By isl NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

26

49

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Action

Control:

20883

Rec'd:

February 24, 1965

4:38 p.m.

AF  
Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1466, Priority

G

SP

INFO: London 227

L

Dar-es-Salaam 247

EUR

Nairobi 349

IO

Brussels 122

P

Bukavu 134

USIA

Geneva 22

NSC

Kigali 137

INR

Leopoldville 321

NSA

CIA Unnumbered

AID

DOD Unnumbered

PC

White House Unnumbered

SCA

CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered

ORM

RMR

DATE: February 24, 5 p.m.

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

Latest GOU response Congo attacks has been to round up and intern Congolese refugees in Kampala area.

Roundup in residential area began night of February 22 and continued February 23. Refugees taken to Mengo Social Center and confined under guard. Police source told Embassy officer that order was "spur of moment" decision by director refugees Mubanda and that police had no explicit guidance as to who should be picked up. Said he understood screening being done by Mubanda's staff but personally doubted whether it could be effective. Another source informs that all Congolese who entered Uganda since GDCRC independence are affected, that all will be repatriated to Congo at unspecified time in future.

/Argus had

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-2- 1466, February 24, 5 p.m. from Kampala

ARGUS had short, vague story 24th featuring detention Congo musicians employed at local night clubs.

Comment: Legality doubtful in cases those Congolese who entered Uganda in non-refugee status between mid 1960 and last August.

Extremely difficult distinguish between Congolese and large local colony Rwandese. Some of these undoubtedly caught in net which will exacerbate GOU-GOR tension produced by closing of border.

DEMING

TRT/19

Advance Copy to S/S-O 2/24/65, 7 p.m.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

27

81-S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

19579

Rec'd:

February 23, 1965

2:19 p.m.

AF

Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: SecState 1449, PRIORITY

G

Brussels 117

SP

Bujumbura 93

EUR

Leopoldville 232

NSC

CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered

INR

NSA

INFO: Kigali 134

RMR

DATE: February 23, 8 p.m.

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

Kigali's 366 and 367 to Department.

Uganda Closing of Rwanda Border

Recent events make unfortunately clear that closing of Rwanda border resulted from GOU anti-GDRC policy, and was specifically designed cut off flow of gasoline and other POL to ANC.

Doubt action resulted from any GOU desire punish Rwanda for use Kamembe in support GDRC or as retaliation other assistance extended ANC. On contrary, through out Congo crisis GOU has maintained extremely close relations Rwanda (especially in security field) and is net gainer from extensive entrepot and illegal trade. Moreover GOU cannot afford prolonged break with GOR because of need maintain close cooperation at border regarding Tutsi refugees in Uganda. Tangled skein political lines involved in refugees but GOU shares GOR's concern that refugees not go on rampage or attack GOR.

Closing of Rwanda border has long been aim of Minister Planning and Community Development Nekyoh. Department

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

By *iol*

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/WILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1449, February 23, 8 p.m., from Kampala.

will recall that he told Embassy Office on December 9 that Congo and Rwanda borders closed (Embassy telegram 923). Altho he unable implement decision then, he and Army Chief of Staff Amin have gradually extended military control of Congo/Rwanda border points, starting in West Nile and gradually extending southward to Kisoro and finally Merama Hill.

Separate message (Brussels, Department and Kigali only) gives Belgian Ambassador Rittweger's report to his Foreign Office on border closing; he states when GOR Ambassador made oral protest to Foreign Office here stressing obligation permit transit to land locked area, latter embarrassed but made no commitment. Rittweger believes GOU beginning appreciate magnitude error in cutting off Rwanda and will rescind action.

On February 14 police special force units replaced Uganda military at both West Nile border points (Vurra and Goli) and at Rwanda posts (Kisoro and Merama Hill). American missionary who travelled Arua-Kampala February 23 told Embassy that commander special forces unit posted Goli had told him last week that special forces had replaced military because latter undisciplined and would not follow orders. Police special force have specific instructions that personnel and goods are not to pass in either direction at these points.

Embassy informed today that Rwandese Ambassador in company Belgian Ambassador Rittweger (stationed Dar-es-Salaam accredited here) proceeded Kigali via charter plane today discuss border closing. GOU reportedly interested in entering into conversations GOR with view early opening of border. Allegedly GOU making no conditions except safety its border.

GP-4

DEMING

RE/14

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, 2/23/65, 6:00 P.M.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, DOD, 2/23/65, 6:00 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

28

43-S

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 18507  
Rec'd: February 21, 1965  
9:16 a.m.

AF

Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1437, IMMEDIATE

G

SP

INFO: Dar-es-Salaam 241, PRIORITY

EUR

London 222, PRIORITY

P

Nairobi 341, PRIORITY

NSC

Brussels 113, PRIORITY

INR

Leopoldville 314, PRIORITY

CIA Unnumbered, PRIORITY

DOD Unnumbered, PRIORITY

White House Unnumbered, PRIORITY

CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered, PRIORITY

RMR

DATE: February 22, 3 p.m.

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD.

Reference: Department Circular telegram 1539 and Leopoldville's 3020 to Department.

Leopoldville's 3020 to Department permits conclusion that no bombing, rocketing or machine-gunning occurred at Goli. Fact that planes over Mahagi roughly seven air miles from Goli in our view leaves question open as to whether diversion made. Department Circular telegram states Department satisfied no basis for allegation GDRC air operations involved attack on Uganda territory and indicates information available suggests incident manufactured. Embassy wishes comment on this trend of thought and recommend some cautions.

Embassy has determined from high EXPAT official Ministry Internal Affairs that final and detailed report of incident occurring February 13 not yet received that level and further that Ministry Foreign Affairs pushing that Ministry for report. Slowness preparation report probably more inefficiency than anything else. Embassy officer discussed with this official possibility staging of affair and he of opinion this highly

/ unlikely.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By 102 NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1437, February 22, 3 p.m. from Kampala.

unlikely.

We understand that entire press corps Nairobi has made request to GOU for permission visit West Nile and specifically Goli and Paidha. We are also informed that GOU has intentions granting of such request and decision expected February 22. Above Ministry Internal Affairs official stated opinion that permission might well be granted.

Missionary source resident in area has reported his personal observations to effect that when travelling Arua-Goli February 14 bridge over stream marking boundary at Goli had been heavily attacked and damaged. Bridge is roughly 200 yards from Customs Post previously reported as attacked. Missionary source added that attack by planes in vicinity Customs Post February 13 had caused number of children from Mission in vicinity flee toward Arua. Source could not state bridge damaged February 13 nor did he report damage to Customs Post in letter from which we gleaned above.

In all reporting from this Embassy we have gone only so far as to state that something happened at Goli on February 13 with indications that it was not "staged". Charge has had request for appointment pending Minister State Foreign Affairs Odaka since morning February 17 with one of objectives demand for full report on Goli incident, but no response or explanation for delay has been forthcoming.

We believe Department may be treading on thin ice charging or assuming that affair was staged prior to having pressed GOU to produce detailed report and examination of area by neutral observers. This in effect is calling GOU liar without demanding proof of incident and we in good position demand proof because we charged as main culprit. Furthermore taking this stand may well stiffen GOU attitude towards more sober approach this incident and border violations between GDRG and Uganda (Embassy telegrams 1433 and 1436). In current highly charged atmosphere any direct questioning of GOU's integrity can only cause reaction making it more difficult return to reason. This particularly true with Obote personally since he in nervous, taut mood following demonstration fiasco of February 16.

/ We believe

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1437, February 22, 3 p.m. from Kampala.

We believe line should be that since we do not have all facts from GOU, that we are without knowledge whether the incident occurred as reported by GOU and that we awaiting full and detailed report with hope that it will be supported by opportunity for neutral outsiders examine area and damage. Until such event occurs, facts and GOU's motivation remain unknown. This might be coupled to or lead to establishment of neutral border observer team (possibly under OAU auspices) which would seem desirable move better US-GDRC and GOU relations.

GP-2.

FLINN

MBK-12

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 9:45 a.m. 2/21/65

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

29

83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action Control: 18378  
Rec'd: February 20, 1965  
6:15 p.m.

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1436, Immediate

G

SP

INFO: London 221, Immediate

EUR

Brussels 112, Immediate

FE

Leopoldville 313, Immediate

P

Nairobi 340, Immediate

USIA

CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered, Immediate

NSC

INR

DATE: February 20, Noon

NSA

NIC

AID

CINCSTRIKE FOR POSAL

PC

RMR

Reference: Embassy telegram 1433

1. First GOU statement tonight reported reference telegram is encouraging sign GOU backing away from further inflation border incidents. Tone is consistently moderate even though story of ANC ambush and kidnapping of six Uganda's soldiers on Uganda territory is pretty hard to swallow. Reference to unfounded allegations "at times like these" presumably pointed at GDRC but could also apply to GOU. Most important is earnest effort made in last sentence to absolve GDRC and Leopoldville authorities of blame by shifting it to mercenaries. This would seem give opening for pursuance GDRC border inspection proposal.

2. While moderates here have been working on Obote, believe he would not have backed down had Tshombe taken hard line in press remarks. Urge Department and Leopoldville give maximum play to GOU statement, pointing out it is significant step toward cooling off.

3. Refutation of Newsweek article (second statement) is typical Odaka emotional reaction and also had his hallmark of sloppy

/drafting.  
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

By *id* NARA, Date 3-3-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1436, February 20, noon, from Kampala

drafting. (Believe Ibingira drafted first statement.) Article particularly embarrassing after hard on heels of Obote's reported agreement to visit CPR (Embassy telegram 1422). Statement's emphasis is defense of Chinese, not continuation of previous Congo statement: ARUA is thrown into mix, but is not central point.

FLINN

FP/9

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2/20/65, 6:33 p.m.

NOTE: Passed White House, DOD, and CIA, 2/20/65, 6:50 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

30

83

UNCLASSIFIED

18366

1965 FEB 20 PM 3 55

Action DSA856SVA609VKA032  
AF 00 RUEHC RUQSUC  
DE RUDSVK 214 20/1920Z  
ZNR  
Info O P 201918Z  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
SS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
G RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE  
SP INFO RUDSVK/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
EUR RUDSVD/AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM  
FE RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
P RUFJER/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
NSC STATE GRNC  
BT  
INR UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1433 LEOPOLDVILLE 312 INFO PRIORITY  
NSA NAIROBI 339 DARESSALAAM 240 LONDON 220 BRUSSELS 111  
NIC CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD UNN FROM KAMPALA TWENTIETH  
AID PASS USIA AND WHITE HOUSE  
PC  
RMR PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE RELEASED FOLLOWING TWO STATEMENTS  
1700Z SATURDAY. COMMENT FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.

I. REPORTS FROM ALL UNITS OF UGANDA ARMY CONFIRM THAT NO ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FOR OUR TROOPS TO CROSS INTO CONGO AT ANY TIME. IT IS, HOWEVER, REPORTED FROM UNITS STATIONED IN W. NILE THAT SIX SOLDIERS WHO MEMBERS OF CONTINGENT PATROLLING OUR BORDER WERE AMBUSHED AND KIDNAPPED BY CONGOLESE TROOPS WHILE CARRYING OUT THEIR DUTIES INSIDE UGANDA. OTHER MEMBERS OF CONTINGENT GAVE PURSUIT AND ARRESTED NUMBER OF CONGOLESE SOLDIERS BUT WERE UNABLE REACH SIX KIDNAPPED SOLDIERS.  
CFN 1433 312 339 240 220 111 1700Z I

PAGE TWO RUDSVK 214 UNCLAS  
THERE HAVE BEEN IN RECENT DAYS REPORTS OF CROSSINGS BY CONGOLESE TROOPS IN ISHASHA AND IN BWAMBA COUNTY IN TORO AND ALSO YESTERDAY AT PANGERE IN THE PADYERE COUNTY OF W.NILE DISTRICT. WE HAVE NO TROOPS OCCUPYING ANY TOWN OR TERRITORY IN CONGO AND WE HAVE NO REASON FOR DOING SO. NEWS REPORTS HAS NOW BEEN RECEIVED BY GOVT. THAT THE CONGOLESE TROOPS ARE HOLDING SOME UGANDA SOLDIERS. THIS CAN ONLY BE THOSE WHO WERE AMBUSHED AND KIDNAPPED INSIDE UGANDA IN WEST NILE DISTRICT. AN APPROACH IN BEING MADE TO CONGO GOVT. TO RETURN THESE SOLDIERS, AND WE HOPE, AS IN CASE OF CONGOLESE SOLDIERS IN OUR CUSTODY, THAT OUR SOLDIERS REPORTED TO BE IN CONGO

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-2- 1433, FEBRUARY 20, FROM KAMPALA

WILL NOT BE MOLESTED AND THAT THEY WILL BE RETURNED SAFELY TO UGANDA. IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT AT TIMES LIKE THIS, VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS ARE MADE WHICH HAVE NO FOUNDATION. WE HAVE NO CAMPS IN UGANDA FOR ANTI-CONGOLESE GOVT. FORCES. WE, HOWEVER, CONSIDER THAT MUCH OF THE ACTIVITY AGAINST UGANDA BY CONGOLESE TROOPS CURRENTLY GOING ON IS BEING DONE EVEN WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE IN AUTHORITY IN LEOPOLDVILLE. THIS IS BECAUSE CONGOLESE TROOPS ARE BEING COMMANDED AND BASICALLY LED BY MERCENARIES WHO CARE NOTHING ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN ONE AFRICAN STATE AND ANOTHER.

PAGE THREE RUDSVK 214 UNCLAS

II. AMERICAN MAGAZINE "NEWSWEEK" HAS REPORTED IN ITS CURRENT ISSUE THAT ARUA IS MAIN SUPPLY POINT FOR ARMS GOING TO CONGOLESE FORCES OPPOSED TO GOVT. OF CONGO.

ARTICLE IN QUESTION DISCUSSES WHAT IS, IN OPINION OF "NEWSWEEK" EDITORS, CHINESE DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN AFRICA AND ALLEGES THAT ARMS ARE BEING AIRLIFTED FROM DARESSALAAM TO THE CONGO.

SPOKESMAN FOR PRIME MINISTER DENIED THIS ALLEGATION AND STATED THAT ARUA AIRFIELD IS SO OPEN THAT NO SUCH AIRLIFT COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ITS BEING KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC. HE ALSO DENIED ALLEGATION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE THAT ARMS FROM ALGERIA AND U.A.R. BEING DELIVERED AT ARUA. GEOGRAPHY AND CONDITION OF AIRFIELD IN ARUA, HE STATED, WOULD CONVINCE ANYBODY WHO NOT MALICIOUS THAT ARUA CANNOT BE SUCH CENTRE. ARTICLE MUST THEREFORE BE TREATED AS WRITTEN WITH INTENTION TO CAUSE TROUBLE IN UGANDA AND TO DAMAGE THE IMAGE OF THE COUNTRY OVERSEAS. THE ARTICLE, IN SO FAR AS IT REFERS TO UGANDA TOTALLY UNTRUE, NOT ONLY IN THE CASE OF ARUA BEING DISTRIBUTION CENTRE WHERE ANTI-CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT FORCES COULD GET THEIR ARMS, BUT ALSO IN CASE OF DIRECT REFERENCE TO AN ALLEGED QUARREL BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER OF UGANDA AND CHINESE AMBASSADOR

PAGE FOUR RUDSVK 214 UNCLAS

IN KAMPALA. ARTICLE ALLEGES THAT ABOUT THE TIME PRIME MINISTER OF BURUNDI WAS ASSASSINATED, UGANDA PRIME MINISTER ANGRILY

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-3- 1433, FEBRUARY 20, FROM KAMPALA

TOLD CHINESE AMBASSADOR IN KAMPALA THAT HE DID NOT WANT CHINESE TO GIVE FUNDS TO AN OPPOSITION PARTY. SPOKESMAN STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT SEEN CHINESE AMBASSADOR FOR LAST SIX MONTHS AND REPORTED CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CHINESE AMBASSADOR MUST THEREFORE ONLY BE TREATED AS DANGEROUS PLOT AND ATTEMPT MAKE PEOPLE BELIEVE WHATEVER ACTION OTHERS MAY BE PLANNING TO EXECUTE AS BEING DONE BY THE CHINESE. THE SPOKESMAN STRESSED THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR PEOPLE OF UGANDA HOLD CHINESE AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR WHATEVER MAY HAPPEN IN NEAR FUTURE. FLINN  
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:55 P.M., 2/20/65

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 4:20 P.M., 2/20/65

PASSED USIA AT 4:20 P.M., 2/20/65

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED  
WHICA

31

EMX971  
PP RUEHCP  
DE RUEHCP 18381 21/2830Z  
P 210815Z ZEA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY  
RUEKDA/DCD  
RUEPIA:CIA  
RUCJHK/CINCSOUTH  
STATE GRNC  
BT

35 FEB 21 08 59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7827

S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION SECSTATE 1431 PRIORITY  
INFO LEOPOLDVILLE 311 FEBRUARY 22, 3 PM FROM KAMPALA  
SIGNED FLINN

REFERENCE: DEPARTMENT'S TELEGRAM 1498; EMBASSY'S TELEGRAM 1404.

IN PRESENT ABSENCE CLEAR INDICATION DANGER TO THEM, MISSIONARIES  
WOULD BE RELUCTANT LEAVE MISSIONS IN BORDER AREAS ESPECIALLY  
IN VIEW ONAMA STATEMENT (REFERENCE EMBTEL) GUARANTEEING GOV  
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. SO FAR, EMBASSY UNAWARE FIGHTING  
IN UGANDA AND THERE NO INDICATION BREAKDOWN LAW AND ORDER.  
CFN 1431 311 28 3 PM 1498 1424

PAGE 2 RUEHCP 18381  
EMBASSY OFFICE TELEPHONED CENTRAL CATHOLIC MISSION IN TORO  
TODAY AND THEY REPORT ALL QUIET AT THEIR STATIONS NEAR MPODWE/  
KASINDI. EMBASSY OFFICE WILL DISCUSS WEST NILE SITUATION WITH  
AIR DIRECTOR AMSTUTZ THIS AFTERNOON.

UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, MAXIMUM CAR TRAVEL TIME FOR ANY  
MISSION STATION TO DISTRICT CAPITAL IS 2 HOURS.

EMBASSY KEEPING CLOSE WATCH ON SITUATION AND READY IMPLEMENT  
PLAN ANY TIME.

RUSK  
BT  
CFN 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jclg*, NARA, Date 12-11-05

NNNN



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

32

83681

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Action

Control: 18377

Rec'd: February 20, 1965  
5:51 p.m.

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1430, Priority

G

L

INFO: London 219

H

Nairobi 338

EUR

P

DATE: February 20, 3 p.m.

USIA

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PC

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FBO

OPR

OC

RMR

Embassy informed by ARGUS reporter February 19 that Uganda Development Corporation Chairman Semei Nyanzi called ARGUS 1:00 AM this morning stating that UDC intended evict Embassy from office premises within 24 hours. Nyanzi reportedly said proposed action in hands of UDC lawyers, that FONOFF neither consulted nor concerned, and that action stemmed from complaints of other tenants in building after demonstrations against Embassy. Also mentioned that lease not yet culminated and thus could be broken. ARGUS rechecked this morning got same story from Nyanzi.

We have received no direct word from UDC or GOU on this matter it correct that lease not registered since local registrar will not accept Ambassadorial real as common real. British High Commission is only local mission to register leases and this done by means of a trusteeship.

Local law firm Hunter and Greig advises that, although lease has not been registered and is therefore, not "culminated", it is binding.

Request standing authority engage Hunter and Greig should need arise. For information required by 2FAM 283.3 refer our OM November 25, 1964 (to FBO) regarding lease S-656-FBO-25 and A-404, June 25, 1964. Firm unable provide estimate fee on short notice and without knowledge scope of work.

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-2- 1430, February 20, 3 p.m., from Kampala

Comment:

Embassy has no reason believe Uganda court would be subject political pressure to point it would not follow rule of law outlined by Hunter and Greig above.

FLINN

FP/9

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2/20/65, 9:45 p.m.

Note: Passed White House, CIA, DOD, CINCSTRIKE, 2/20/65, 11:30 p.m.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33

~~SECRET~~

83  
Action

Control: 18376  
Rec'd: February 20, 1965  
5:48 p.m.

AF

Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1429, Priority

G

CP

DATE: February 20, 3 p.m.

NSC

INR

NSA

AID

PC

RMR

Within past 24 hours [REDACTED] had opportunity confer with number of high level reliable GOU contacts. During these discussions it determined there is considerable unrest with course of events and uncertainty as to where Uganda headed. There has been meeting of all Kingdom heads including Kabaka of Buganda and Kaybazinga of Busoga in which situation discussed and fear expressed that Uganda being led in direction not its interest.

33  
(b)  
(1)(6)

It also has been determined that no detailed report of alleged bombing incident has been made available to Cabinet and there are those in Cabinet who beginning to believe they led down garden path, i.e. incident staged. Some members of Cabinet also concerned possibility that commitments were made to Gbenye at Mbale meeting on use Ugandan troops. It interesting note this regard that Commander Ugandan Army Opolot completely uninformed on events occurring western border Uganda and not in confidence Obote.

It would appear that if border incidents receiving central direction, which still not certain, only Obote, Onama and Chief of Staff Amin au Courant. It even possible that Onama not fully informed. [REDACTED]

3.3  
(b)  
(1)(6)

FLINN

FP/9

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2/20/65, 10:15 p.m.

NOTE: Passed White House, CIA, DOD, CINCSTRIKE, 2/20/65, 10:45 p.m.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

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By *id*



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

34  
✓

85

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Action

Control: 14011  
Rec'd: February 16, 1965  
2:14 p.m.

AF  
Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1385, Immediate

G

INFO: London 207, Priority

SP

Nairobi 322, Priority

L

Dar-es-Salaam 230, Priority

H

Addis Ababa 104, Priority

EUR

Brussels 102, Priority

IO

Bukavu 128, Priority

P

Kigali 125, Priority

CU

Leopoldville 295, Priority

USIA

CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered, Priority

NSC

USUN 50, Priority

INR

NSA

DATE: February 16, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

NIC

AID

PC

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

O

SY

Anti-US Congo protest demonstration held on schedule at 2:15 p.m.

SCA

No damage to Embassy personnel or premises other than one window broken. Lower floors Embassy building, however, had door panels and other windows broken.

SCS

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PER

FBO

OPR

OC

Initial protection of regular unarmed police insufficient to withstand rock and bottle throwing vanguard of crowd which numbered less than 500 out of a total demonstration of somewhat less than 5,000. Crowd carried crude placards in limited number reading: Johnson a leader of darkness, a murderer; US ashamed in Cuba, you will have it in Uganda; the (#) than Tshombe". Special force unit brought in at 230 and were forced use tear gas after initial baton and shield charges failed move crowd back from Embassy entrance. Police officer subsequently informed us that he had been reprimanded by inspector general of police on Prime Minister's orders for authorizing dispatch of special force unit. Unit withdrawn at 3:00 p.m.

RMR

/During interval

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

By *ial* NARA, Date *3-3-11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1385, February 16, 8 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Kampala

During interval when police were occupied repelling mob and prior arrival special force troops, some of demonstrators gained access to building's fire escape, proceeded to roof and hauled down Embassy Flag. Flag, somewhat torn, caught on ledge and Embassy officer retrieved it. Meanwhile in street group of red-shirted youth wingers burned another American Flag. No serious casualties to police or demonstrators although demonstrators bruised by police batons and 4 police injured by rocks.

Two delegations admitted separately to deliver protest to Charge. First, headed by Minister State and UPC Secretary General Ibingira, included Ministers Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries Babiha; Attorney General Binaiisa; and Abu Mayanja, Kabaka Yekka MP. Group stated that Latim, DP Leader and Parliamentarian, had been scheduled to appear with others but had been unable to get through crowd. Presented three page, unsigned, mimeographed protest entitled "Protest by the People of Uganda". Principal points: US support of Tshombe in disregard of OAU resolution constitutes violation of UN Charter and has resulted in naked aggression against Uganda. Ugandans will not tolerate another Vietnam in Africa nor allow Uganda to become extension of Congo dispute and battlefield for US ideology. US desires exploit Africa's wealth for financial adventurers and speculators of Wall Street.

Uganda wants Congo problem solved at round table conference but this wishful thinking so long as US military aid pouring into Congo and US supports Cuban rebels and Tshombe. If attacks continue against Uganda they will be regarded as declaration of war by US, Belgium and Congo (L). Uganda people demand US halt all military aid to Tshombe, withdraw Cuban rebels from Congo, use influence on Tshombe to withdraw all other mercenaries, guarantee that territorial integrity of Uganda not violated with aid of American arms, and allow OAU find African solution.

Charge noted American regret over violation of Uganda territory and promised that US would support protest to GDRC if facts as alleged proven true. Said he wanted make special point /that Uganda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1385, February 16, 8 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Kampala that Uganda Government had sponsored demonstration which supposed to be peaceful. On contrary, it had evidenced violence, very thing which was being protested. Amid explosion of tear gas grenades Ibingira quickly replied that delegation regretted violence and that protest had only peaceful intent.

FLINN

FP/12

(#) Omission, correction to follow.

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2/16/65, 2:45 p.m.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 2/16/65, 5 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 14025  
Rec'd: February 16, 1965  
2:35 PM

Action

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1385 Immediate

G

SP

INFO: London 207 Priority

L

Nairobi 322 Priority

H

Dar-es-Salaam 230 Priority

EUR

Addis Ababa 104 Priority

IO

Brussels 102 Priority

P

Bukavu 128 Priority

USIA

Kigali 125 Priority

CU

Leopoldville 295 Priority

NSC

USUN 50 Priority

INR

CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered Priority

NSA

NIC

DATE: February 16, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

AID

PC

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

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SY

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PER

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OPR

OC

Charge held closely to contents Department press comment in responding charges and added that protest contained many inaccuracies and conclusions unacceptable to US Government. It also stressed that US too wished African solution to Congo problem but could not help but note lack of forthcomingness of African countries in response Congo plea for assistance maintain law and order. Visitation broken up by lone appearance Minister Health Lumu who urged colleagues early departure before demonstration got further out of hand.

RMR

When Ibingira emerged from Embassy after presenting protest, he was set upon by Youth Wingers and had to be rescued by police. Binaisa, in typical show of party loyalty, disappeared into crowd pointing to his UPC shirt.

Other delegation which admitted subsequently had three representatives from Makerere University headed by J. K. Shija, President Makerere Students Guild. Their open protest letter

/supported

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-2- 1385, February 16, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), From: Kampala

supported OAU in efforts find African solution and made four points: US responsible for Tshombe's utilization of planes and bombs; use of US-made planes and Cuban rebels constitutes American involvement in bombing of Uganda; US and other foreign powers should respect non-alignment and keep Cold War out of Africa; US policy has failed in Africa and Tshombe should learn to respect African opinion and honor pledges to OAU.

Interesting note that student representatives brought to door of Embassy by Minister State Foreign Affairs Odaka who waited while protest presented. This delegation and its protest more sober and sophisticated than UPC effort.

Embassy will send strong note protesting lack of police protection during GOU-sponsored demonstration and delay in despatch and early withdrawal special force unit, directly resulting in damage to Embassy and desecration American flag.

Comment: Demonstration not well organized or directed and turn out certainly not impressive in light of GOU support and obvious desire create crisis atmosphere. (Magei had publicly urged employers release workers to participate, and some GOU offices closed.)

Protest delegation was clearly unhappy with role. Babiha in particular looked as though he preferred be anywhere else.

Ibingira may well have had foreboding that Youth Wingers waiting for him.

Text two protests being pouched.

GP-4.

FLINN

CC-1

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 3:10 PM, 2/16/65.

Passed White House, DOD, CIA 4:45 PM, 2/16/65.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

35

86

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

Control: 12123

Rec'd: February 13, 1965

4:01 p.m.

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1360 IMMEDIATE  
Leopoldville 283 IMMEDIATE

G

SP

INFO: Dar-es-Salaam 226 Priority  
Nairobi 314 Priority  
London 202 Priority  
Addis Ababa 102 Priority

L

EUR

IO

P

USIA

Brussels 98 Priority

NSC

Bujumbura 82 Priority

INR

Bukavu 122 Priority

CIA

Khartoum 76 Priority

NSA

Kigali 121 Priority

DOD

USUN 48 Priority

AID

DATE: February 13, 9 p.m.

OPR

RMR

EMBTEL 1359 (NOTAL) and DEPTTEL 1391

Odaka urgently called in Cromwell late afternoon thirteenth (Charge up country, returning Sunday). Said he had gravest matter discuss. Handed note which made following points:

1. At 10 a.m. February 13 plane believed be American bombed Goli and Paidha (Uganda West Nile border villages opposite Mahagi).

2. Recalled Prime Minister's concern expressed to Charge February 1 that arms being given Tshombe and his mercenaries without control as to use; danger that Congo's neighbors faced; since these planes piloted either by American citizens or Cuban or other mercenaries that GOU would regard it as most unfriendly act by US if any arms or equipment supplied by US were used against Uganda.

3. Full report damage to villages not yet available but

/present

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-2- 1360, February 13, 9 p.m., From Kampala

present information indicated at least one Uganda soldier seriously injured.

4. Embassy requested draw USG attention to "act blatant aggression perpetrated by enemies Uganda without any provocation, using arms supplied by USA".

5. GOU requests "urgent categoric assurance from USG there will be no repetition such unwarranted attacks".

After reading note Embassy officer expressed profound regret at reported violation Uganda territory and stated would bring to Department's attention immediately. Asked Odaka whether he had sent similar protest to GDRC. Odaka replied that Belgian Ambassador being called in and that GOU had cabled protest to Leopoldville.

Odaka then launched thirty minute emotional diatribe. Following were main points:

(A) Congo had started war against Uganda; (B) GOU small country which had no arms to protect itself; (C) Uganda had been "falsely accused" of assisting rebels; (D) inconceivable that US could not control use of military equipment provided Tshombe (here mentioned Ankole panching scheme and US protest over use of aid-supplied information vans by UPC as examples our concern over end use assistance material); (E) Tshombe was American puppet and if US continued present policy it was starting war against all Africa; (F) there close parallel between Congo and Viet-Nam; US should get out of both countries; (G) if US could not prevent aggression by its aircraft, Uganda would have no alternative but give up US assistance and remove American presence Uganda; (H) if Uganda territory again attacked GOU request meeting of Security Council; (I) GOU had been seriously considering acceding to GDRC request establish Embassy Kampala but under present circumstances this impossible; (J) proposed trip to West Nile by Embassy officer no longer possible.

Embassy officer pointed out that while aircraft may have yeaknsdjent\* US supplied, they not flown by American citizens and were under control of GDRC, not us. Noted that villages were only few hundred yards from Congo border, that Mahagi had

//been

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-3- 1360, February 13, 9 p.m., From Kampala

been scene intense fighting, and that he was sure that if GOU's reports were correct, violation had been inadvertent. Said there definite limited action USG could take with sovereign government but was sure report would be brought to urgent attention GDRC. Noted that anything GOU could do to demonstrate it not assisting rebels would better its relations with GDRC and decrease chance possible future incidents on border. Said reported incident seemed to underline need for Uganda push action by OAU and contrary to Odaka statement, GDRC Embassy here would seem more than ever desirable. Odaka replied only US had the power to curtail the mercenaries and prevent attacks on Uganda.

Odaka said Prime Minister making public report to country this evening and wished see Charge upon his return tomorrow.

FLINN

AAL/1

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2/13/65, 4:10 p.m.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 2/13/65, 5:10 p.m.

\*As received.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda* <sup>36</sup>

46-41

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Action

Control: 12075  
Rec'd: February 13, 1965  
1:24 p.m.

AF  
Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1359 Flash

G

SP

INFO: Leopoldville 282 Immediate

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IO

DATE: February 13, 9 a.m.

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OC

Minister State Odaka called in Embassy officer this afternoon and handed stiff note protesting bombing two Uganda West Nile border towns by American aircraft this morning. One Uganda soldier reported injured.

Odaka highly emotional, threatened take matter Security Council if repetition such "acts of blatant aggression". Note request "urgent categoric assurances from US no repetition such unwarranted attacks." Details follow.

FLINN

RMR

MEJ

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O 2/13/65 2:05 P.M.

Passed White House 2/13/65 1:57 p.m.

Passed CIA & DOD at 2/13/65 2:05 p.m. per S/S-O.

Passed USUN 2/13/65 2:15 P.M. per S/S-O.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

37

86	<u>LIMITED OFFICIAL USE</u>		Control: 12984
Action			Rec'd: January 18, 1965
			2:17 p.m.
AF	FROM:	Kampala	
Info			
	ACTION:	Secstate 1183	
SS			
G	INFO:	Dar-es-Salaam 180	
SP		London 169	
EUR		Nairobi 259	
IO		Addis Ababa 86	
P		Brussels 81	
USIA		Kigali 107	
NSC		Leopoldville 252	
INR		CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered	
CIA			
NSA	DATE:	January 18, 6 p.m.	
DOD			
SCA			
ORM			
		CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD	

RMR At termination January 16 Kampala meeting, 6 EA Ministers of Foreign and Internal Security Affairs plus Zambian Foreign Minister issued following communique:

"Ministers responsible for External Affairs and Internal Affairs and Security of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, joined by Minister for Foreign Affairs from Zambia, discussed matter of common interest affecting security of their countries. and agreed upon need for closer cooperation and consultation in these matters.

Particular attention was paid to question of persons declared prohibited immigrants in any one of the countries, and it was agreed to recommend to their governments that any persons so declared should be treated similarly by all other governments.

Among many other things discussed was situation in Congo and Mozambique. Ministers expressed necessity frame common policy toward refugees from these and other troubled areas.

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-2- 1183, January 18, 6 p.m. From Kampala

Ministers recognized that certain refugees and freedom fighters constituted a security risk in the host countries.

They however recommended that OAU be requested give greater authority to coordinating committee of liberation of training and movements of true freedom fighters."

Comment: Most distrubing feature of communique is recommendation that OAU give greater authority to ALC for "training and movements of true freedom fighters". Although drafting is unclear, sense of passage which linked specifically to Congo and Mozambique, appears pressage Kenyatta sub-committee recommendation bring ALC active presence into West Nile.

With GOU effectively barring outsiders from West Nile (Embassy informed January 16 that EMBOFF would not be issued permit visit Americans in West Nile) practical conditions now obtain for area be used as staging as well as rebel supply and re-equipment depot.

From logistic standpoint West Nile has only two access roads from rest of Uganda (Pakwach and Laropi) both of which require ferries across Nile. It certainly questionabe whether GDRC assurances to respect neighboring country borders would be honored if in fact rebel troops and ALC "volunteers" are based in and can retreat to West Nile.

FLINN

HED/14

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

38

6  
Action  
SS  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 13624  
Rec'd: January 19, 1965  
6:59 a.m.

FROM: Bujumbura

ACTION: Secstate 605 Flash

030

DATE: January 19, 2 p.m.

LIMDIS

My telegram 603.

King phoned me 1200 noon local January 18 that Embassy employee, Gonzalve Muyenzi, a Rwandan refugee, had just confessed to shooting Prime Minister and re-enacted crime at hospital. He reportedly said he had accomplices but has not yet identified them.

Contrary to expectations of King, 12:45 p.m. (local) newscast did not announce confession and identity of assassin. Stated simply that thus far 20 arrested. Will keep Department informed.

GP-3.

DUMONT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 7:11 a.m., January 19, 1965.  
Passed White House at 7:16 a.m., January 19, 1965.  
Passed DOD, CIA at 7:30 a.m., January 19, 1965.

vmt

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By isl NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 11528  
Rec'd: January 15, 1965  
7:21 p.m.

AF FROM: Bujumbura

Info

ACTION: Secstate 593 FLASH  
Dar-es-Salaam 47 FLASH  
Leopoldville 395 FLASH  
Bukavu 136 FLASH  
Kigali 173 FLASH

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INFO: Brussels 265 IMMEDIATE  
USUN 118 IMMEDIATE  
Paris 40 IMMEDIATE  
London 22 IMMEDIATE

DATE: January 16, 1 a.m.

My Telegrams 592 and 591.

King telephoned me 2030 hours Zulu January 15 to ask if I would "do necessary" to see that frontiers alerted. He's by no means sure that tonight's assassin of Prime Minister Ngendandumwe is Rwandan refugee; fears he may be Mulelists. At this moment his majesty is worried possibility of coup against both monarchy and new government, instigated by Congolese rebels and/or refugees.

RMR

Have informed Belgian Ambassador Henniquiau of details of assassination (REFTEL 592) as I learned them from ex-Prime Minister Murhirwa at hospital.

Henniquiau fears violent Hutu reaction in the hills tomorrow or day after.

As of 2230 Zulu city quiet.

DUMONT

CAT/17

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:29 p.m., 1/15/65

NOTE: Passed WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 7:45 p.m., 1/15/65

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NLJ/RAC 10-340

By id NARA, Date 3-3-11

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

40

86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 5813

Rec'd: January 9, 1965  
9:51 a.m.

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info  
SS

ACTION: Secstate 1111

G

SP

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INFO: Leopoldville 233

P

USIA

DATE: January 9, 4 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

NSC

INR

CIA

Reference: Department telegram 1084; Embassy telegram 1078

NSA

DOD

IGA

AID

RMR

Minister State Foreign Affairs Odaka handed me last evening at Peace Corps reception at residence the following Aide-Memoire:

Verbatim text

"The Government of Uganda is in receipt of the personal note from the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister, which we are acknowledging through our Ambassador in Washington and also your Aide-Memoire dated 4th January, concerning the supply of material and personnel to Congo Rebels and has the honor to answer as follows:

"1. The Government of Uganda would be grateful if an indication of assistance extended by the United States to the Congo and in particular its duration was given. As you know, African Governments, including the Uganda Government, have called on the withdrawal of foreign interference in the Congo. The Government of Uganda would, therefore, appreciate the extent to which the United States Government is militarily committed to helping the Congolese Government.

"2. Although it is noted that, 'Tshombe called on African States to supply troops to suppress the rebellion, requested the United States and Belgium to continue their military aid, and also recruited mercenaries,' the Uganda Government would like to recall that in the same summer at Addis Ababa by a

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NLJ/RA 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

By *ind*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1111, January 9, 4 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Kampala

resolution passed with the approval of Tshombe, most of the African Governments called upon Tshombe to realize this was a civil war whose solution was essentially political, to stop fighting and also to withdraw mercenaries as pre-requisites for a political solution under the Ad Hoc Committee of the organization of African unity.

"3. It is noted with regret that with the aid of United States Government, Tshombe instead has insisted on the impression of the rebellion. This has been aggravated considerably by the activities of the 24th November, 1964, and by the continued use of mercenaries who it is regretted are supplied with United States military equipment. The question of United States favoring the utilization of African rather than mercenary troops is also noted but it is the Government of Uganda's view that no African troops could replace the mercenaries as their objective and functions are essentially wrong, because as soldiers of fortune they are hired not to keep law and order but to shoot and kill. This was first pronounced by President Tsiranana of Malagasy Republic and subsequently confirmed by all African member states at the Addis Ababa conference in September.

"It is emphasized that the Government of Uganda would not be opposed to the United States Government giving military aid by the supply of United States troops whose aim would be to keep law and order but the Government of Uganda is opposed to the supply of United States military weapons, which are given to the mercenaries. The Prime Minister has already written to the Ambassador on this point.

"4. It is not for us to answer allegations against other governments either by Congo or the Government of the United States. It is, however, on record that both Ghana and the Sudan have denied such allegations.

DEMING

FP/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

86.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 5856

Rec'd: January 9, 1965  
10:39 a.m.

AF

FROM: Kampala

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1111

G

SP

INFO: Leopoldville 233

EUR

P

DATE: January 9, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

USIA

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AID

RMR

"The Government of Uganda has already made its position clear on the question of what the solution of the Congolese problem should be. It is, therefore, hoped that United States will reconsider their method of helping the legitimate Government of the Congo, namely, by prevailing upon that government to stop using mercenaries and direct such aid not for the annihilation of the Congolese people but for restoring law and order.

"Finally, the Government of Uganda would reiterate its appeal for the cessation of all foreign intervention in the Congo from whatever source this intervention comes from and in particular from such intervention as would lead to the spread of the cold war in Africa."

End verbatim text.

Odaka said Aide-Memoire represented thing of Prime Minister Obote, but that a separate acknowledgment of Secretary's personal message to him is being directed through Ugandan Ambassador Asea in Washington. Odaka further indicated that message to Secretary is along similar lines to above Aide-Memoire and contained no startling departures.

Comment:

Note: Odaka's reference to our Aide-Memoire of January 4 relates to instructions contained Department circular telegram 1096 which reported Embassy telegram 1090.

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/I scanned  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1111, January 9, 4 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Kampala

I scanned Aide-Memoire in presence Odaka who was in most friendly and serious mood. I noted that repeated reference to US "interference" in Congo was not accurate in face indisputable fact assistance given at request legally constituted central government. Odaka did not make issue of this. I also filled him in on USG military and internal security assistance to Congo contained talking paper number 2 CA-5477, which at least partially responsive to paragraph number 1 Aide-Memoire.

Second paragraph of numbered paragraph 3 of Aide-Memoire surprisingly and emphatically indicates GOU would not be opposed to use US troops and equipment in Congo to maintain "law and order" so long as weapons not provided to mercenaries. This most unusual thought coming from African Government and represents deep feeling re mercenaries as well as confidence in USG sincere efforts stabilize Congo. Missing from GOU thinking set forth in Aide-Memoire is any proposal for African assistance to GDRC to end that mercenaries could be dispensed with.

Seems clear Obote wants work with us to open up new initiatives on Congo and we should of course take every step keep dialogue going. Presume that his message to Secretary will give further opportunity to do this.

GP-3.

DEMING

FP/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Uganda**41*

86

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control:

2074

Rec'd:

January 5, 1965

2:18 p.m.

AF

Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1078, PRIORITY

G

SP

INFO: Leopoldville 228

L

IO

DATE: January 5, 5 p.m.

P

IOP

NSC

FOR THE SECRETARY.

INR

CIA

Reference: Department telegram 1084.

NSA

DOD

IGA

AID

RMR

I gave your message transmitted reference telegram to Prime Minister Obote through Minister of State for External Affairs Odaka at 1100 today. Latter came out of Cabinet meeting to receive it and promised deliver it to Prime Minister immediately he was free. In discussion with Odaka I reminded him of his conversations with you at UN and with officers in Department on various aspects of Congo problem and drew from substance your message to Prime Minister to stress our concern for integrity of Uganda-Congo border and our readiness assist in any way possible should there be any threat of attack. Odaka was in receptive and thoughtful mood and said GOU's chief concern as neighbor of Congo was to prevent that country becoming center of cold war or other East-West confrontation. In this connection I asked him what GOU attitude would be to hypothetical suspension U.S. military aid to Congo and he responded at once "no, we know this is not possible or desirable at present". He declined to be drawn out or give assurance re use of Uganda territory as base for depredations into Congo in support rebels. I had raised point with him day before at separate meeting with same negative results. This confirms Embassy's view previously reported that GOU still following policy "tacit" support to rebels in permitting transit supplies from neighboring countries while hoping avoid deeper involvement which might result reprisals.

/ I stressed

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

By *id* NARA, Date *3-3-11*~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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34

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1078, January 5, 5 p.m. from Kampala.

I stressed to Odaka that USG continues receptive to any COU proposals for peaceful solution Congo problem where we could be helpful either through OAU or otherwise and that SC resolution opens up chances for new initiatives. Told him I would be in Washington next week prior attending second session UNGA and would be happy convey any message formal or informal which Prime Minister might wish send Secretary in reply latter's message. Odaka appreciated this and I got impression he would make such recommendation to Obote.

I think timing of your message good and may open up some constructive dialogue.

GP-3.

DEMING

MBK-12

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda* 42

30

Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

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1964 JUL 28 PM 3 27

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DE RUDTLN 666C 28/1820Z  
R 281709Z ZFA  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
RUCQKKB/CINCSTRIKE  
RUEKDA/DEPT OF DEFENSE  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DEPT (463) INFO DAR-ES-SALAAM 11 KAMPALA TWO NAIROBI  
FIVE TEL AVIV TWO CINCSTRIKE FOUR DEPT OF DEFENSE 29  
FROM LONDON JULY 28 6PM

LIMIDS-NOFORN

DEPTEL 601

EMBOFF TODAY DISCUSSED WITH CRO (ASPIN, HEAD EAST AFRICA  
DEPT AND CHITTY, EAST AFRICAN DEFENSE MATTERS) ISRAELI  
ROLE IN PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UGANDA.  
CFN 463 11 29 28 6PM 601

PAGE TWO RUDTLN 666C ~~SECRET~~

USING VERY RESTRAINED LANGUAGE ASPIN EXPLAINED THAT IF  
FORCED OUT OF MILITARY FIELD IN UGANDA UK WOULD NATURALLY  
WANT TO BE SUCCEEDED BY PRO-WESTERN ELEMENT. ALSO,  
HAS NO BASIC OBJECTION TO PRESENCE OF ISRAELIS. HOWEVER,  
CONSIDERING GENERAL DEPORTMENT OF ISRAELIS IN CONNECTION  
WITH ENTRY INTO UGANDA AND TOTAL LACK ANY CONSULTATION  
WITH UK, CRO DOUBTS THAT MOVE COMPLETELY FAVORABLE TO  
WEST. INSOFAR AS UGANDANS CONCERNED, CRO HAS REASON  
BELIEVE MOVE ENGINEERED BY ONOMA WITHOUT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE  
OF OBOTE.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/JRAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

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-2- 463, JULY 28, 6 PM FROM LONDON

AS INDICATED KAMPALA'S 71 TO DEPT, LIST MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRESENTED TO UK BY UGANDANS CONSIST PRIMARILY OF ROAD TRANSPORT WITH SOME AIRCRAFT AND RADIO EQUIPMENT. EQUIPMENT SAID TO BE FOR USE OF ARMY, POLICE AND PRISONS. UGANDANS ASKED THAT (1) THEY BE PERMITTED FINANCE PURCHASE THROUGH COMMONWEALTH LOAN FUND OR FAILING THAT (2) EQUIPMENT BE SUPPLIED ON GRANT BASIS. TOTAL COST ROUGHLY ESTIMATED AT TWO AND ONE-HALF MILLION POUNDS. IN OPINION CRO, UGANDANS HAVE NO NEED FOR ALL OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT REQUESTED. ALSO, CRO ASSUMES SHOPPING LIST PREPARED CFN 71 (1) (2)

PAGE THREE RUDTLN 666C ~~SECRET~~

BY ISRAELIS AS IT SEEMS TO COVER ITEMS GOI NOT IN POSITION TO SUPPLY AND THAT ISRAELIS WILL SUPPLY SMALL ARMS. QUESTION OF WHETHER UK WILL AGREE TO UTILIZATION COMMONWEALTH LOAN FUND (PRIMARILY INTENDED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) OR GRANT STILL AWAITS MINISTERIAL DECISION. CRO NOT OVERLY ANXIOUS FOLLOW EITHER PROCEDURE, TO AVOID ESTABLISHING DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.

UGANDANS WERE RECENTLY TOLD THAT UK COULD NOT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS WORK IN DOUBLE HARNESS WITH ISRAELIS AND ASKED TO EXPRESS VIEWS RE FUTURE ROLE OF UK MILITARY PERSONNEL. UK AT SAME TIME INDICATED WOULD BE READY WITHDRAW PERSONNEL IF SO DESIRED. UGANDANS REPLIED THEY WANTED PERSONNEL WITHDRAWN AND DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO WITHDRAW ALL UK MILITARY PERSONNEL BY AUGUST 24.

UK ALSO DECIDED TODAY TO INSTRUCT BRITAMB IN TEL AVIV TO LODGE COMPLAINT WITH GOI RE ISRAELI INTRUSION WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. BRITAMB WILL APPARENTLY ALSO EXPLAIN WHY IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR BRIT PERSONNEL WORK JOINTLY WITH ISRAELIS IN UGANDA.

THERE ARE NO SIGNS AS YET, ACCORDING TO ASPIN THAT  
CFN 24

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 463, JULY 28, 6 PM FROM LONDON

PAGE FOUR RUDTLN 666C ~~SECRET~~  
ISRAELIS READY TO "MUSCLE IN" ON KENYA. SIMILARLY NOT  
WORRIED RE TANGANYIKA.

ASPIN REMAINED RESERVED WHEN ASKED WHAT SHOULD BE  
US RESPONSE IN EVENT KENYA AND/OR UGANDA APPROACH  
U.S. FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. RE UGANDA, HE INDICATED  
UK AWARE APPROACH HAS BEEN MADE TO U.S. FOR AIR FORCE  
ASSISTANCE AND SAID UK WOULD NOT OBJECT TO SUCH COOPERATION.  
RE KENYA HE SIMPLY COMMENTED NO REASON EXPECT KENYA  
APPROACH U.S. AT LEAST FOR SOME TIME TO COME IN VIEW  
VERY SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT BEING RECEIVED IN MILITARY  
AND OTHER FIELDS FROM UK.

COMMENT: ISRAELI INTRUSION INTO UGANDA HAS OBVIOUSLY  
GREATLY ANNOYED BRITS. AS EMBOFF WAS LEAVING, ASPIN  
COMMENTED THERE "CERTAIN VILE RUMORS" THAT ONAMA RECEIVED  
ISRAELI PAYMENT, GENERALLY PUT AT TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND  
POUNDS, FOR ENGINEERING BRIT EXPULSION. HE COMMENTED  
AT SAME TIME THAT ISRAELI EFFORTS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
FIELD IN UGANDA LESS IN INTERESTS OF WEST THAN OF  
ISRAELIS. EMB HAS ALSO LEARNED THAT BRIT MILITARY  
PARTICULARLY RESENTFUL RECENT COURSE OF EVENTS IN UGANDA.

GP-1, BRUCE  
BT  
CFN GP-1

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda*

50

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 18806  
Rec'd: July 23, 1964  
2:42 p.m.

43

FROM: Kampala

ACTION: Secstate 71 Priority

054

INFO: Dar-es-Salaam 15 Priority  
Nairobi 18 Priority  
London 17 Priority  
CINCSTRIKE 1 Priority  
Tel Aviv 2 Priority

DATE: July 23, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Embassy telegram 1243 and 51.

Embassy Officer has discussed with Acting British HICOM Aston and Defense Advisor developments at London talks on British military aid to GOU. Prime Minister Obote and Minister Internal Affairs discussed following matters with Sandys, CRO:

1. British officers would no longer be seconded to Uganda army but would be attached as advisors. GOU is to supply list of advisor requirements at early date for British review and consideration (not yet supplied).
2. Shopping list military supplies and equipment including military hardware prepared by Uganda army staff for Onama prior to departure for London was not presented in that form to British. Obote presented much reduced list containing only vehicles all types; 2 helicopters, 4 caribous and 5 beavers for police air wing; and some communications equipment. Numbers of vehicles increased from original list but list item-wise small. There was no request for military hardware to modernize army nor was subject of Uganda "Air Force" raised possible that GOU has abandoned idea and substituted "police air wing" mentioned above.

British

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~

NLI/RAC 10-340

By *id* NARA, Date 3-3-11



~~SECRET~~

-2- 71, July 23, 7 p.m., from Kampala (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

British took equipment request under advisement and no firm decision yet made whether GOU will be allowed to finance from Commonwealth loan fund or required pay cash. Grant for items discussed considered unlikely.

Aston informed Embassy Officer that British HICOM had received instructions July 17 withdraw all seconded officers from Uganda army. Acting HICOM stressed he not informed and unable to predict whether this action final or will be followed by assignment new group attached officers serve in advisory capacity. He described situation as still under review and largely dependent on actions and nature of requests of GOU.

Contrary to information reported Embassy telegram 51, Aston stated that British Commander and British seconded officers Uganda army headquarters were replaced June 29, not July 1, by Ugandan officers without prior notice or consultation of any kind. British HICOM called immediately on Obote for explanation and determination of status. According Acting British HICOM Obote explanation flimsy and lacking in candidness, giving impression that he only learned of event after the fact. Onama's announcement of changeover was made in routine manner on July 1 in accordance British desires since they wished no unsettling public controversy to arise during period London discussions.

It also noted during conversation with Acting HICOM that Israeli mortars arrived Entebbe June 29. In meanwhile British have learned that 9 Israeli officers are expected to be working with Uganda army soon as training advisors with both battalions.

Comment: From tenor of conversations with British colleagues it quite apparent they extremely critical and resentful at manner in which Onama proceeded in changeover of command.

DEMING

PLH/18

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

50  
Action

55  
Info

Control: 18818  
Rec'd: July 23, 1964  
2:55 p.m.

FROM: Kampala

ACTION: Secstate 71 Priority

INFO: Dar-es-Salaam 15 Priority  
Nairobi 18 Priority  
London 17 Priority  
CINCSTRIKE 1 Priority  
Tel Aviv 2 Priority

054

DATE: July 23, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

This coupled with assignment of more Israeli officers as advisors could well result complete withdrawal British military advisors. Acting HICOM commented it looked as though GOU wanted Britain meet equipment requirements while Israelis filled advisory role. British Defense Advisor later in an aside indicated this arrangement hardly acceptable and they do not intend play "second fiddle" to Israelis. In Embassy view British are prepared pull out of both military supply and advisory fields leaving them open to Israelis. It is believed that Onama already committed to this course. However, Obote himself must now decide what course Uganda is to follow and we assume this is matter he will give urgent attention to on return from OAU Conference.

I reviewed above developments with Aston yesterday and reiterated our hope GOU would continue look to UK for internal defense and security equipment and advisors for both army and "air force". We agreed that if GOU for own reasons turned to Israel for such assistance there was nothing intrinsically bad in this from point of view our national interests but HICOM concurred that Israeli Embassy here being secretive on whole matter and though he had given lead to Israeli Ambassador Michael in recent conversation

to

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-2- 71, July 23, 7 p.m., from Kampala (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

to discuss matter Michael had clammed up.

I expect see Obote within week for general discussion and subject military assistance may well come up. Would therefore appreciate Department's views on Israeli competence assume major military assistance role in Uganda and whether there anything inimical our interests in their so doing.

GP-1.

DEMING

PLH/18

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Uganda* 44

46

~~SECRET~~

076

Action CONTROL: 13017  
AF RECD: JULY 16, 1964, 12:33 P.M.  
Info FROM: KAMPALA  
ACTION: SECSTATE 51  
SS INFO: DAR-ES-SALAAM 13  
G LONDON 14  
SP NAIROBI 14  
EUR TEL AVIV 1  
NEA CINCSTRIKE UNNUMBERED  
NSC  
INR DATE: JULY 16, 3 P.M. (SECTION I OF II)  
CIA  
NSA CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD  
OSD

RMR

EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1243

EMBASSY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH EXPAT OFFICIALS, SECONDED BRITISH OFFICERS AND UK HICOM HAVE REVEALED THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES MAY BE DEVELOPING IN UGANDA ARMED FORCES AND DEFENSE POLICY. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS:

1. ARMED FORCES ACT 1964 WAS INTRODUCED INTO PARLIAMENT BY MINISTER INTERNAL AFFAIRS ONAMA ON JUNE 19, 1964, BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN AND MAY NOT BE DEBATED THIS SESSION DUE ABSENCE ONAMA ATTEND LONDON COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AND CAIRO OAU CONFERENCE. THIS BILL PROVIDES FOR FORMAL CREATION OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND RESERVE; VOLUNTEER FORCE AND RESERVE. PRESIDENT BECOMES COMMANDER IN CHIEF. BILL PROVIDES FOR APPOINTMENT CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND CHIEF AIR STAFF, ALL OF WHOM RESPONSIBLE TO DEFENSE COUNCIL. REMAINDER OF BILL DEALS PRIMARILY WITH PERSONS SUBJECT TO CODE OF SERVICE, DISCIPLINE, SERVICE OFFENSES AND TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF SERVICE OFFENSES.

COMMENT: BILL DRAFTED BY V.C. CRABBE, GHANA IAN WHO SERVING AS FIRST PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AND FOLLOWS CLOSELY CANADIAN AND GHANA IAN ARMED FORCES BILL. BILL GIVES REASONABLE FRAMEWORK TO ESTABLISHMENT UGANDAN ARMED FORCES BUT PROVIDES FOR STRUCTURE VERY DIFFICULT TO STAFF UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES (ARMY HAS 120 OFFICER SPACES OF WHICH 60 ARE FILLED). PERHAPS OF GREATER CONCERN ARE ELABORATE PROVISIONS FOR WRITTEN RECORD IN ALL ACTIONS TAKEN BY OFFICERS AGAINST SUBORDINATES WITH RECORDS PASSED UP THROUGH CHANNELS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

By *iol* NARA, Date 3-3-11~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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-2- 51, JULY 16, 3 PM (SECTION I OF II) FROM KAMPALA

FOR FORMAL REVIEW. ACCORDING TO SECONDED BRITISH OFFICERS, THESE DEMANDS ON OFFICERS AT COMPANY LEVEL PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FULFILL DUE PRESSURE OTHER DUTIES, LACK OF STAFF AND NEAR ILLITERACY IN MANY INSTANCES. ADVERSE EFFECT ON DISCIPLINE LIKELY BE DRASTIC.

2. MINISTER INTERNAL AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED JULY 1 THAT COMMAND OF UGANDA ARMY HANDED OVER FROM COLONEL GROOME, BRITISH SECONDED OFFICER, TO COLONEL O.L. OPOLOT AND THAT FIVE OTHER SECONDED BRITISH OFFICERS IN ARMY HEADQUARTERS SIMILARLY HANDED OVER RESPONSIBILITY TO UGANDAN OFFICERS BUT WILL CONTINUE PERFORM ADVISORY DUTIES. EXACT DUTIES WILL BE DETERMINED DURING CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN LONDON (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 3).

COMMENT: AS MATTER OF FACT COLONEL OPOLOT AND OTHER UGANDAN OFFICERS ASSUMED COMMAND JULY 6 AND COLONEL GROOME, FORMER COMMANDER, IMMEDIATELY WENT ON LEAVE PENDING RETURN TO BRITAIN. OPOLOT ONE OF TWO UGANDA ARMY COLONELS ELIGIBLE TO ASSUME COMMAND, ACCORDING EXPAT SOURCE. OPOLOT IS FAVORITE OF MINISTER INTERNAL AFFAIRS ONAMA. HE IS FROM TESO AND WAS ORIGINALLY PROTEGE MINISTER JUSTICE OBWANGOR, TESO POLITICAL BOSS. HE HAS APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS EXPERIENCE AS OFFICER AND ACCORDING EMBASSY SOURCES IS ILL PREPARED FOR PRESENT POST, NOT OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE AND CAN BE EXPECTED BLINDLY CARRY OUT ONAMA'S ORDERS.

OPOLOT REPLACED AS COMMANDER SECOND BATTALION BY MAJOR HUSSEIN SULEIMAN, WHO REPORTEDLY OF GOOD BACKGROUND AND CAPABILITIES. FIRST BATTALION REMAINS UNDER COLONEL AMIN, A COMPETENT OFFICER WHO ORIGINALLY ONAMA PROTEGE BUT WHO HAS REPORTEDLY BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH ONAMA'S INTERFERENCE IN COMMAND. HE PRESENTLY ON STUDY COURSE IN BRITAIN. UGANDA OFFICERS REPLACING BRITISH SECONDED OFFICERS IN HEADQUARTERS STAFF ALL FROM SOUTH, I.E., BUGANDA AND ANKOLE, WHICH MOVE IS BELIEVED DIRECT EFFORT ONAMA REMOVE SOUTHERNERS FROM CHANNEL OF COMMAND WHILE COMMAND POSITIONS REMAIN IN HANDS NORTHERNERS WITH WHOM HE HAS INGRATIATED HIMSELF. AT SAME TIME ABOVE ACTION ALL BRITISH OFFICERS WITH TROOPS REPLACED BY UGANDANS BUT NO ANNOUNCEMENT SO MADE. SENIOR BRITISH OFFICER HAS INSTRUCTED THAT NO SECONDED BRITISH OFFICER SHOULD ACT IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY AT ANY LEVEL UGANDA ARMY PENDING DETERMINATION OF STATUS AT LONDON TALKS.

FLINN

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46

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076

Action CONTROL: 13047

AF RECD: JULY 16, 1964, 12:54 P.M.

Info FROM: KAMPALA

SS ACTION: SECSTATE 51

G

SP INFO: DAR-ES-SALAAM 13  
EUR LONDON 14  
NEA NAIROBI 14  
NSC TEL AVIV 1  
INR CINCSTRIKE UNNUMBERED

CIA DATE: JULY 16, 3 P.M. (SECTION II OF II)

NSA

OSD CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

RMR 3. GLOBEMASTER CARRYING SIX ISRAELI-PRODUCED 120MM MORTARS AND LIMITED AMOUNT AMMUNITION ARRIVED ENTEBBE FROM ISRAEL ON JULY 6. IT WILL BE RECALLED ONAMA RETURNED FROM RED CARPET TRIP TO ISRAEL RECENTLY. ISRAELIS HAVE HAD SPECIAL TRAINING TEAM OF SIX UNDER COMMAND OF MAJOR WITH UGANDAN ARMY FOR MOST OF PAST YEAR. SPECIAL FORCE TRAINING TEAM OF THREE WITH UGANDA POLICE FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. DURING 1963 ISRAEL TRAINED 15 UGANDANS AS ARMY OFFICERS, EIGHT OF WHOM ACCEPTED AND COMMISSIONED ON RETURN. ONE OF THESE CASHIERED LATER FOR CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND REMAINING SEVEN MARGINAL. FOUR PILOTS ALSO TRAINED IN ISRAEL BUT TRAINING INADEQUATE FOR COMMISSIONING ON RETURN. THESE LATTER POSTED KENYA FOR FURTHER TRAINING WITH BRITISH BUT RECENTLY WITHDRAWN BY ONAMA AND SENT AGAIN TO ISRAEL ON JULY 9 FOR FURTHER TRAINING. WITHIN PAST WEEK PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY UGANDA TO RECEIVE FOUR ISRAELI OFFICERS AT HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION, JINJA, AND THREE ISRAELI OFFICERS, HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION, MOROTO, WHO PRESUMABLY WILL SERVE AS ADVISERS AND MAY BE INTENDED REPLACE BRITISH SECONDED OFFICERS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED THESE UNITS.

COMMENT: BRITISH SECONDED OFFICERS CONSIDER ISRAELI MORTARS INAPPROPRIATE FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE WHERE HIGHLY MOBILE FORCE REQUIRED MOVE ACROSS DIFFICULT TERRAIN. RANGE CONSIDERED TOO LONG FOR CLOSE OPERATIONS IN PRIMARILY TRIBAL DISORDERS WHILE SIZE AND WEIGHT OF WEAPON AND AMMUNITION QUITE APART FROM EXPENSE MAKES WEAPON PRACTICALLY ROADBOUND.

GENERAL CONSENSUS BRITISH SECONDED OFFICERS TRAINING IN ISRAEL INADEQUATE AND INTENDED PLEASE UGANDANS RATHER THAN

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-2- 51, JULY 16, 3 PM (SECTION II OF II) FROM KAMPALA

PRODUCE COMPETENT FINISHED PRODUCT. SELECTION FOR TRAINING BY UGANDANS OFTEN DONE ON POLITICAL BASIS OR STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY NEPOTISM. ISRAELI TRAINING TEAMS HERE HAVE NOT BEEN AS EFFECTIVE AND WELL SELECTED AS COULD BE EXPECTED BUT HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL IN TRAINING EFFORTS. AGAIN CONSENSUS BRITISH OFFICERS IS THAT SPECIAL FORCE AND RANGER TYPE TRAINING GIVEN BY THEM TOO AGGRESSIVE FOR APPLICATION IN DEALING WITH DOMESTIC POLICING PROBLEMS. IT IS ALSO BELIEVED BY SECONDED BRITISH OFFICERS THAT ISRAELIS HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH ENCOURAGING UGANDANS REMOVE BRITISH FROM COMMAND POSITIONS AT THIS TIME SINCE THEY DID NOT WISH EQUIPMENT MENTIONED ABOVE ARRIVE DURING TENURE BRITISH.

GENERAL COMMENT: IN EMBASSY VIEW ISRAELIS MAKING STRONG BID FOR ACTIVE IF NOT PREDOMINANT ROLE UGANDA MILITARY, WHICH IF SUCCESSFUL WOULD ADD TO ISRAELI POLITICAL PRESTIGE AND LEVERAGE SOUTH OF SAHARA. IF ISRAELIS SUCCESSFUL UGANDA ARMY LIKELY TAKE ON ANTI-ARAB COLORATION THEREBY INTENSIFYING RACIAL ISSUE IN STATE BORDERING SUDAN. ONAMA PROCEEDED TO LONDON WITH LONG SHOPPING LIST NEEDED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1243) AND WHOLE QUESTION STATUS BRITISH OFFICERS TO BE RESOLVED THERE. ONAMA CAN BE EXPECTED MAKE BID FOR BRITISH GRANT OR LOAN COVER ALL ARMY REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, ITEMS REQUIRED TO MODERNIZE TWO BATTALIONS INCLUDING SIX FERRETS, ARE BUDGETED FOR CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. HENCE BRITISH UGANDA AGREEMENT COULD TAKE FORM PARTIAL GRANT AND PURCHASE. ON OTHER HAND IF BRITISH NOT FORTHCOMING IT LIKELY THAT ONAMA WHO APPARENTLY DEEPLY IMPRESSED ON RECENT TRIP TO ISRAEL WILL TURN TO ISRAEL FOR ADVISERS AND EQUIPMENT. IF THIS TRANSPIRES UGANDA ARMY WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE WHAT IT WANTS WITH PRESTIGE BEING IN FOREFRONT OF MOTIVATION RATHER THAN A SOUND AND SOBER MODERNIZATION OF ARMY WHICH UGANDA NEEDS. ON OTHER HAND GOU OVERTURES TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF ASSISTANCE FROM ISRAEL MAY BE PART OF STRATEGY DESIGNED TO GET BRITISH TO SUPPLY ARMY EQUIPMENT PROMPTLY AND ON FAVORABLE TERMS OR UNDERWRITE AIR FORCE (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1243). DIRECTION OF UGANDA POLICY WILL NO DOUBT DEPEND MUCH ON OUTCOME LONDON TALKS, DETAILS OF WHICH NOT YET KNOWN HERE. BRITISH HICOM SOURCE HOWEVER ADVISES THAT CONCESSIONS WILL PROBABLY BE MADE TO UGANDANS PERMITTING PURCHASE CIVILIAN TYPE SUPPLIES (TRUCKS, UNIFORMS, ET CETERA) FROM COMMON-WEALTH LOAN FUND, BUT NOT MILITARY HARDWARE. SAME SOURCE INDICATES BRITISH LIKELY BE NEGATIVE TO SUPPLY UGANDA ARMY WITH MODERN WEAPONS OR CREATION OF AIR FORCE EITHER BY GRANT OR LOAN.

GP-1.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Uganda**45*

54

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~Control: 8448  
Rec'd: June 9, 1964  
1:31 p.m.

FROM: Kampala

ACTION: Secstate 1166 Priority

DATE: June 9, 1 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

045

LIMDIS

Minister Internal Affairs Onama called me to his office in Parliament Building yesterday afternoon.

Onama said it had been decided Uganda must have a small tactical "air force" for internal security and defense purposes. What they had in mind was squadron of 12 fighter jets of "Hunter" class. They wished planes and training to be supplied by US. They aware that this was an expensive matter and would require 3 or 4 million pounds outlay from Uganda's resources. Decision to establish small air force had been pending for some time but had been brought to head by recently announced British agreement train a Kenya air force, and deteriorating situation in two of Uganda's neighboring countries, namely, Sudan and the Congo. Onama said GOU expected situation be very bad in eastern Congo by August and that Uganda would face additional refugee problem.

Onama said that decision request USG for assistance in establishing proposed air force was known only to himself, the Prime Minister and Mr. Davies, his Permanent Secretary. The decision would be reported to Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, June 9.

I thanked the Minister for confidence he had indicated in US in making this request. I then reviewed with him our general policy of looking to British or other former metropolitan power to supply arms needed for internal security and defense in newly independent African countries, our wish of course to avoid giving any impetus to an "arms race" in East Africa which would put disproportionate load on the economies, or any action that would set up rivalries between countries, etc. I also reviewed my understanding of GOU's agreement

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NARA, Date 3-3-11



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-2- 1166, June 9, 1 p.m., from Kampala (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

agreement with UK following recent withdrawal of UK troops; that UK would continue and expand its training of army officers, would continue for time being to command Uganda rifles, would maintain officers in advisory capacity at battalion and company level, would provide flight training in Kenya for Ugandans, and would sell to Uganda necessary arms and military equipment for army. Onama said my understanding of this agreement correct but as regards air force Uganda had never had one and had no agreement and had made no request to any other country to supply and train one. They had decided against going to British for such facility and were now asking whether US would do so.

I again expressed appreciation GOU's confidence and told Onama that I would report his request immediately to my government and it would be taken under most active consideration. I could go no further at moment but I assured him I agreed that Uganda had need for such a force which obviously was of size and nature to be used only for internal defense, to prevent possible military or insurgent incursions from neighboring countries, and to give authority to Uganda's determination to live in peace with its neighbors.

Onama then remarked, perhaps casually and perhaps with intent, that he was leaving June 11 for Israel with a few of his police and military advisors to accept long-standing invitation from government of Israel to inspect their internal defense setup. The inference might be drawn that if USG could not respond positively Uganda would look next to Israel. However, professionals in Uganda army and police have not been happy with training so far provided by Israel and I believe they reluctant go to them for "air force."

I told Onama that conceivably I would have some indication of my government's reaction before he departed on Thursday but if not, I would see him at once on his return from Israel June 18. He was agreeable to this.

DEMING

PLH/19

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 8416  
Rec'd: June 9, 1964  
1:18 p.m.

57  
Action

55  
Info

FROM: Kampala

ACTION: Secstate 1166 Priority

DATE: June 9, 1 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

LIMDIS

Comment:

1. While there is certainly some element of "keeping up with the neighbors" in Onama's request, I believe an "air force" for Uganda of type requested is eminently justified in view of very unsettled and even threatening situation in her two largest neighbors who are relatively powerfully armed. No one could suspect that Uganda in her size and position has any aggressive intent. Onama assured me his mention of influx of refugees had nothing to do with need or use of air squadron. What Uganda feared is possible incursion into Uganda of foreign forces following the refugees and he cited situation in Burundi and Rwanda where "Jeunesse" forces had reportedly intruded recently.

2. In my own view Onama's request to us comes under idea conditions to elicit favorable response. Request is uninspired by us and there is no advance commitment on our side. British have no undertaking in this field and should not object to our entering it. When I reminded Onama that there might be some political "fall out" for Uganda with other African countries, if and when US aid for such project became public, he dismissed this as inconsequential and something Uganda was quite prepared to live with.

3. Onama said he envisages a 4 or 5 year period of training, first in US and then in Uganda before proposed squadron could be fully manned and maintained by Ugandan personnel.

4. He said Entebbe airport would not be base for squadron but new air base must be established, probably at Jinja, adjacent

to

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-2- 1166, June 9, 1 p.m., from Kampala (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

to barracks of Uganda Rifles and to Owen Falls hydroelectric dam.

5. From budget figure Onama mentioned it clear that GOU plans sizable financial input, hoping I suspect that training would be supplied at expense of US Government, and aircraft at less than list price.

6. I recommend that I be authorized on urgent basis tell Onama that my government is giving favorable consideration to GOU request. I should like to so inform him before his departure for Israel June 11, but no harm would be done if this not possible. However, we must respond by 18th.

GP-1.

DEMING

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**FLASH**

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NLJ/RAC 10-340  
By *isl* NARA, Date 3-3-11

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DE RUEHCR 18296 24/2343Z

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO THE WHITE HOUSE/ATTN MR BUNDY

STATE GRNC

BT

32031

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*uganda*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOLLOWING TEL RPTD YOU:

ACTION FLASH DEPT 515 INFO IMMEDIATE LONDON 98 NAIROBI.  
129 DARESSALAAM 110, JANUARY 23, 9 PM, FROM KAMPALA,  
SIGNED DEMING.

QUOTE:

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ANUARY TWO THREE AT REQUEST TROOPS UGANDA RIFLES  
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IMIN URGED ALL

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NOT PRECLUDE POSSIBLE EXPULSION RXXXXX BRITISH EX  
PCT OFFICERS SECONDED UGANDA RIFLES PGH SCP DSH FO

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

47

82

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Action

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Info

DE RUFHDN 176U 3441430

ZNY CCCCC

R 101420Z

1965 DEC 10 PM 4 55

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FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 729

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INFO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 116

EUR

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 124

IO

RUQSN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 152

P

RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 41

USIA

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 27

NSC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DEC 10

INR

RHODESIA

CIA

NSA

REF: LONDON'S 2591 TO DEPT

DOD

AID

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E

THERE ARE INDICATIONS GOU SEEKING WAY TO AVOID BREAK WITH UK OVER RHODESIA.

RSR

ACCORDING HICOM HUNT, DURING BOTTOMLEY VISIT LAST WEEK-  
END OBOTE TOLD THEM THAT GOU REP ONAMA AT OAU CONFERENCE ADDIS  
HAD SAID UGANDA MIGHT LEAVE COMMONWEALTH ON DECEMBER 19, NOT  
WOULD AS REPORTED IN PRESS.

HUNT CALLED ON OBOTE DEC. 8 UNDER INSTRUCTIONS AND  
OUTLINED TO HIM SOME OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND  
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES AND UNKNOWNNS THAT MIGHT FOLLOW  
DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH UK. OBOTE WAS SERIOUS, LISTENED  
ATTENTIVELY, BUT HAD VERY LITTLE TO SAY. HOWEVER AT END OF TALK  
HE OBSERVED THAT OAU RESOLUTION WAS AD REFERENDUM AND UGANDA  
WOULD DECIDE ACTION IT WILL TAKE NEXT WEEK, PRESUMABLY BEFORE  
SCHEDULED OPENING SESSION OF PARLIAMENT DEC. 15.  
IT ALSO MAY BE NOTEWORTHY THAT OBOTE NOW ON 'UPCOUNTRY  
SPEAKING TOUR HAS NOT ALLUDED TO POSSIBLE BREAK WITH UK.

HICOM HERE PLAYING THREAT OF BREAK IN RELATIONS IN LOW KEY.  
ALL BRITISH HICOM PERSONNEL INSTRUCTED STRESS "BUSINESS  
AS USUAL" LINE. HE FEELS THAT ANY FURTHER APPROACHES TO GOU  
BY HIM OR US ON BRITISH BEHALF LIKELY BE COUNTER-  
PRODUCTIVE. IN HUNT'S VIEW BEST CHANCE FOR MORATORIUM ON  
OAU RESOLUTION WOULD BE AGREEMENT CONVEENE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE  
ON RHODESIA ISSUE WHICH HMG NOW EXPLORING. SEVERAL MODERATE  
GOU MINISTERS HAVE RECENTLY INDICATED TO US THAT THEY  
FAVOR SUCH A COURSE (PARA 7, EMBTEL 712).

DEMING

BT

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

By *id* NARA, Date 3-3-11

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY

48

45

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Info

ZCZCLDN831  
RR RUEHCR RUQSDA RUQSNI  
DE RUFHDN 276U 3561346  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 221320Z

1965 DEC 22 AM 11 43

SS

FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 797

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INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 16

SAH

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM 132

L

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 139

EUR

RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDISABABA 47

NSC

RUQSLK/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA WET

INR

RUQSNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 168

CIA

STATE GRNC

NSA

BT

DOD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECEMBER 22

O

REF: EMBTEL 778

SCA

REPRESENTATION UK INTRESTS

SCS

1. HICOM HUNT CALLED ON ME TODAY TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING UGANDA-UK RELATIONS, POSSIBLE NEED FOR EMB REPRESENT UK IN CASE OF BREAK IN RELATIONS, ETC.

RSR

2. HE IS CONSIDERABLY HEARTENED BY RESULTS NAIROBI MEETING AND ODAKA'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY. BELIEVES STAND TAKEN BY THREE LEADERS HAS SLOWED IF NOT STOPPED MOMENTUM IMPELLING AFRICA COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES TOWARDS BREAK WITH UK.

PAGE 2 RUFHDN 276U ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. HE INFORMED (PROTECT SOURCE) THAT AT NAIROBI MEETING OBOTE ESPECIALLY OUTSPOKEN AGAINST IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION TAKEN BY AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AT ADDIS OAU MEETING. OBOTE SAID IF UGANDA WERE TO BREAK WITH UK HE WOULD FEEL IT NECESSARY GO WHOLE WAY INCLUDING SUSPENSION ECONOMIC AID, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM COMMONWEALTH. HOWEVER HE NOT PREPARED TO DO THIS. KENYATTA TOOK SAME VIEW.

4. HUNT CONSIDERS NKRUMAH REAL MALEFACTOR IN SITUATION AND THAT HE WILL USE INFLUENCE OVER DIALLO TELLI TO FRUSTRATE CALLING OF MEETING REQUESTED BY SELASSIE, KENYATTA AND OBOTE.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLJ/RAL 10-340

By *isl* NARA, Date 3.3.11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-797, December 22, from: Kampala

5. THESE EVENTS IN HUNT'S VIEW INDICATE THAT NO BREAK WILL OCCUR WITH UGANDA UNTIL AFTER LAGOS MEETING JAN 10 IF THEN.

6. HE PROVIDED EMB WITH COMPLETE BREAKDOWN HICOM STAFF NOW HANDLING ADMINISTRATIVE, CONSULAR AND OVERSEAS AID PROGRAMS UGANDA. IF BREAK COMES HE WILL REQUEST GOU PERMIT ALL SUCH PERSONNEL REMAIN AND HE BELIEVES OBOTE WOULD AGREE. THIS MEANS THAT AT MOST EMB WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE ONLY GOOD OFFICES AND FORMAL CONTACT WITH FOREIGN OFFICE.

7. RECOMMEND DEPT CONTINUE MAKE STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS AS REQUESTED REFTEL BUT PROSPECTS LOOK BRIGHTER THAT WE WILL

PAGE 3 RUFHDN 276U ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NOT HAVE TO ASSUME THESE RESPONSIBILITIES. DEMING  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda*

49

57  
Action  
AF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 17906  
Rec'd: January 24, 1964  
2:43 p.m.

Info FROM: Kampala

SS ACTION: Secstate 602 immediate

G INFO: London 104 priority

SP Dar-es-Salaam 116 priority

EUR Nairobi 135 priority

IO

AIDA DATE: January 24, 9 p.m. (Section 1 OF 2)

P

USIA

NSC I called on UK HICOM Hunt 9 o'clock this morning. He gave

INR me following chronological outline events yesterday.

NSA

SCA 1. At 10:30 a.m. he called on Obote in Entebbe by previous

RMR appointment discuss developments Zanzibar, Tanganyika and East Africa generally. Obote expressed deep concern that fine leader like Nyerere brought under pressure military. He and Hunt agreed it would be intolerable development if duly appointed heads of government and elected representatives of people were to be at mercy of insurgent sargeants and corporals as had happened in Congo and now apparently East Africa. Hunt said he and Obote developed this theme at some length and had meeting minds.

2. At 3:55 that afternoon he had unexpected call from Obote. PM recalled their conversation that morning, said unrest and dangerous situation developing at Jinja barracks first battalion Uganda Rifles and said he wanted troops sent in from Kenya. Hunt asked if he meant African troops. Obote said no, British. HICOM said this serious request and would Obote put it in writing. When he said he would, Hunt agreed find out at once if his government willing.

3. To make long story short, Hunt said HMG agreed and he went at once Entebbe carrying formal request for British troops which Obote signed.

4. Obote told

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By *isl* NLJ/RAL ID-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 602, January 24, 9 p.m. From: Kampala (Section 1 of 2)

4. Obote told him entire cabinet had approved his proposal and Hunt said Nekyon surprisingly appeared to be PM's staunches supporter throughout. Colonel Tillet, Commander Uganda Rifles, felt move not necessary but was brought around.
5. Hunt said he had to admire Obote's courage on this occasion to take difficult decision and stick to it. Observed this put Obote political future in Uganda and with PAN-Africanists in jeopardy but perhaps time would vindicate him for keeping peace.
6. Minister Internal Affairs Onama had gone Jinja in early afternoon at PM's direction meet with first battalion to discuss their grievances and found them in mutinous mood. Disaffection centered in headquarters company and their complaint was entirely on pay issue, not British officer or extraneous matters. Spokesman company noted Onama's earlier announcement had provided pay increases for non-coms but none for privates and they demanded immediate raise. Atmosphere got nasty and though Onama allowed to leave, many Askaris remained outside barracks and refused obey officers.
7. Hunt said he amazed at speed with which British forces were able respond Uganda's appeal and he was at airport Entebbe with Minister Information Nekyon to meet them. Commented troops did not know what to expect and debarked from planes in full battle dress and deployed for action. Nekyon impressed.
8. During night one company secured airport, one company remained in reserve Entebbe, and one company proceeded Kampala and moved into police barracks at 4:00 a.m. Friday. Hunt said an additional full battalion was in reserve in Kenya ready to fly to Uganda.
9. HICOM said situation now in hand but might still be /trouble at

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 602, January 24, 9 p.m. From: Kampala (Section 1 of 2)

trouble at Jinja barracks. If so, British troops would disarm remaining members first battalion there, remove arms from arsenal and evacuate British officers and families from Jinja.

10. Uganda police under Inspector Macoun had performed essential task during night, manning roadblock at Mukono, 15 miles from Kampala on Jinja road and closing road to all traffic across

DEMING

NOTE: Advanced copy to S/S-O 1-24-64 3:45 p.m.

Passed White House 4:45 p.m. 1-24-64.

Passed JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR,  
CINSTRIKE ALSO FOR POLAD 1-24-64.

DDD/18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

57

Action  
AF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 17933  
Rec'd: January 24, 1964  
3:10 p.m.

Info

FROM: Kampala

SS

ACTION: Secstate 602, IMMEDIATE

G

SP

INFO: London 104, PRIORITY  
Dar-es-Salaam 116 PRIORITY  
Nairobi 135 PRIORITY

EUR

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AIDA

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DATE: January 24, 9 p.m. (Section 2 of 2).

USIA

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RMR

Owen Falls Dam at Jinja. Said crested Crane Hotel at other side dam had best nights business ever.

11. Hunt said new pay scales announced for Uganda Rifles which will also result raise for Uganda police, will cost GOU dearly, an estimated 2 million pounds per year.

In discussion situation Hunt and I agreed Obote had moved boldly, taken risks, but kept peace and order and, not incidentally, retained his position as Prime Minister Uganda and leader government by requesting British intervention. We also agreed Obote carries some heavy responsibility for letting situation and his leadership deteriorate over past months, first by never taking strong stand against increasingly militant UPC youth wing command second, by himself contributing to fears and divisions in country by recent imprudent speeches denouncing and threatening all political opposition in Uganda.

My own observation is that British have played well the role of responsible friend in Ugandas time of need despite the unfriendliest treatment recently of some of their citizens in Uganda.

GP-4.

DEMING

NOTE: Advanced copy to S/S-O 1-24-64 3:45 p.m.

NOTE: Passed White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, CYNSTRIKE ALSO FOR POLAD, 1-24-64 515 p.m.  
JJF/19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Aljander*

50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Action

FROM: KAMPALA

CONTROL: 17375

AF

RECD: JANUARY 24, 1964  
5:07 A.M.

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 594 FLASH

SS

INFO: LONDON 100 IMMEDIATE  
DAR-ES-SALAAM 112 IMMEDIATE  
NAIROBI 131 IMMEDIATE

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DATE: JANUARY 24, 11 A.M.

8 A.M. ROUNDUP.

1. UK HICOM SIR DAVID HUNT PHONED EMBASSY SHORTLY AFTER RETURN FROM ENTEBBE WHERE HAD MET BRITISH TROOPS ON ARRIVAL. TOLD US OBOTE HAD REQUESTED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM BRITISH GOVT "IN WRITING." PM HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT NYERERE OF HIS INTENDED ACTION IN ADVANCE. OBOTE TOLD HUNT HE "FED UP"

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 17375 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WITH NYERERE FOR SITUATION HE ALLOWED HIMSELF GET INTO.

2. HUNT TOLD US TROOPS CONSISTED OF ABOUT 450 MEN OF STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT AND SCOTS GUARDS FLOWN FROM NAIROBI. THEY CONTROLLED AIRPORT, GIVEN POINTS ENTEBBE AND WERE ON WAY TO KAMPALA.

3. HUNT SAID WITH WRY HUMOR THAT GOU REPRESENTATIVE AT AIRPORT TO MEET BRITISH TROOPS WAS MIN INFO ODOKO NEKYON.

4. TECHNICALLY THERE WAS NO MUTINY BUT CONSIDERABLE NUMBER ASKARIS AND MEMBERS HEADQUARTERS COMPANY OF FIRST BATTALION JINJA HAD BECOME INSUBORDINATE REFUSING OBEY ORDERS BRITISH OR AFRICAN OFFICERS. PROBABLE THAT ACTUAL MUTINY WAS ONLY MATTER HOURS.

5. SITUATION DETERIORATED RAPIDLY AFTER 3 PM LOCAL TIME THURSDAY WHEN OFFICE CHIEF OF POLICE TOLD EMBASSY EVERYTHING COMPLETELY QUIET.

6. BRITISH OFFICERS AND NCO'S AND THEIR FAMILIES UNHARMED AND REMAIN JINJA.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

By *isl*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 594, JANUARY 24, 11 A.M., FROM KAMPALA

7. KAMPALA QUIET THIS MORNING, TRAFFIC NORMAL, AND GOVT BUSINESS AND SCHOOLS OPEN AS USUAL. NO CONSPICUOUS EVIDENCE BRITISH TROOPS IN CITY.

8. SEEING UK HICOM THIS MORNING FOR FURTHER FILL-IN.

GP-4

DEMING

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 5:20 AM, JANUARY 24, 1964  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, OSD, JCS, CIA, CINCSTRIKE POLAD,  
5:30 A.M., JANUARY 24, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda* 51

50-53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 17107  
Rec'd: January 23, 1964  
5:00 p.m.

AF

FROM: Dar-es-Salaam

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 914 FLASH

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SP

INFO: London 211, FLASH

H

Nairobi 235 FLASH

SAL

Kampala 108 FLASH

EUR

AYD

DATE: January 24, 1 a.m.

P

USIA

1. UK HICOM informs us that in response to written request Obote UK sending troops to Uganda. Mission to secure Entebbe Airport and assist quell army mutiny. Forces are seven aircraft and 450 troops from Kenya.

NSC

INR

NSA

SY

SCA

2. HICOM has advised Nyerere of movement. His reaction described as thoughtful but he gave no indication he considering request to UK to bring in RHYL, OWEN, and CENTAUR landing parties he knows are offshore.

SCS

RMR

3. FYI and NOFORN: We understanding Brigadier Douglas ousted CO Tanganyika rifles, has recommended to Nyerere intervention British forces Tanganyika as last chance retrieve army situation. END FYI

GP-1

LEONHART

AAL/16

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 1/23/64, 5:05 p.m.

NOTE: Passed White House, OSD, JCS, CIA, CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD, 1/23/64, 5:15 p.m.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

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By *id*

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda*

*52*

57

UNCLASSIFIED

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ZCZCSCAT073

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FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUDSES/AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM

RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

STATE GRNC

BT

017147  
1964 JAN 23 PM 6 38

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT FLASH (593) DARESSALAAM FLASH 111 LONDON  
IMMEDIATE 99 NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 230 FROM KAMPALA TWENTYTHIRD

REFERENCE: 572

AT 11:00 PM LOCAL TIME RADIO UGANDA BROADCAST SECOND STATEMENT  
FROM PRIM. MIN. OBOTE SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

PRIM MIN. REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT UGANDA RIFLES WERE IN THEIR  
BARRACKS AT JINJA AND SOLDIERS PERFORMING THEIR ASSIGNED DUTIES  
AND ARE LOYAL TO GOVERNMENT. MIN. INTERNAL AFFAIRS ONAMA WAS ON  
WAY TO ENTEBBE TO REPORT TO HIM. THERE HAD BEEN NO MUTINY. THE  
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE ARE BEING REVIEWED, NCOS HAVE ALREADY  
CFN 593 111 99 130 572

PAGE TWO RUDSCX 1174 UNCLAS

RECEIVED INCREASE IN PAY AND OTHER RANKS WILL RECEIVE INCREASE  
LATER. PRIM. MIN. SENDING MESSAGES TO ALL UNITS UGANDA RIFLES  
IN UGANDA ADVISING THEM OF HIS DIRECTIVES.

BECAUSE OF CONFUSED SITUATION UGANDA CABINET REQUESTED UK  
GOVERNMENT TO SEND TROOPS TO INSURE LAW AND ORDER. REQUEST  
READILY GRANTED AND TROOPS ARE NOW IN UGANDA. IN VIEW OF  
CONDITIONS OBTAINING THEIR PRESENCE SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED  
FOR LONG. THERE IS NO REASON FOR PANIC. ALL GOVERNMENT OFFICES  
WILL BE OPEN TOMORROW AND BUSINESSES SHOULD DO  
THE SAME. DEMING

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6:49 PM, 1/23/64.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 7:40 PM, 1/23/64.

PASSED JCS, OSD, POLAD CINCSTRIKE 7:45 PM, 1/23/64.

PASSED CIA 7:45 PM, 1/23/64.

PASSED USUN 6:49 PM, 1/23/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNR  
P 231403Z  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUDSCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

016909

1964 JAN 23 PM 2 18

ACTION SECSTATE (590) INFO LONDON 96 ZANZIBAR UNN JAN 23, 6 PM  
DAR-ES-SALAAM 108, NAIROBI 127 FROM KAMPALA

UN HICOM HUNT TOLD ME DURING CONVERSATION YESTERDAY THAT UK INTELLIGENCE HAS POSITIVE INFO TANGANYIKA SUPPLIED QUANTITY RIFLES IN SUPPORT SUCCESSFUL ZANZIBAR COUP, SUFFICIENT FOR OKELLO TO TAKE OVER TOWN WITHOUT BREAKING INTO ZANZIBAR ARSENAL WITH PANGAS AND CLUBS AS ALLEGED. SOME OF RIFLES OBSERVED ON THEIR SUBSEQUENT SHIPMENT BACK TO DAR WERE IDENTIFIED, ACCORDING HIS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, AS BELONGING TANGANYIKA POLICE FORCE. ALSO ACCORDING TO HICOM'S SOURCES BRITISH "EXPAT" IN TANGANYIKA DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS DIVULGED THAT KAMBONA ALERTED TANGANYIKA RIFLES FOR POSSIBLE EMERGENCY DUTY SATURDAY NIGHT PRECEDING ZANZIBAR COUP.

HICOM SAID HE HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING ALL DAY SECURE APPOINTMENT WITH PM OBOTE TO APPRISE HIM OF THIS EVIDENCE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN ZANZIBAR COUP WHICH OBOTE ALREADY SUSPECTED. PROTECT SOURCE.

GP-3.  
UNQTE

DEMING

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:19 PM, 1/23/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4:55 PM, 1/23/64.  
PASSED JCS, OSD, POLAD CINCSTRIKE 5:00 PM, 1/23/64.  
PASSED CIA 5:00 PM, 1/23/64.  
PASSED USUN 5:15 PM, 1/23/64.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NLI/RAC 10-340

By *iel* NARA, Date 3-3-11

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda*

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54

Action  
AF

FROM: LONDON

CONTROL: 16951

REC'D: JANUARY 23, 1964  
3:05 P.M.

Info  
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ACTION FLASH SECSTATE (3464) INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI 101,  
DARESSALAAM 61. KAMPALA 33, JANUARY 23, 7 PM, FROM AMEMBASSY  
LONDON

UGANDA

FOLLOWING FROM WALSH-ATKINS OF CRO:

MMG RECEIVED REQUEST FROM OBOTE AT 1500 GMT TODAY TO SEND UK  
TROOPS TO UGANDA AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE IN VIEW OF DISTURBANCE  
AT JINJA. UK MINISTERS HAVE AGREED THERETO AND SMALL BODY UK  
TROOPS NOW IN AIR ENROUTE FROM KENYA. BESIDES SERVING PRECAUTIONARY  
PURPOSE TROOPS WILL ALSO SECURE ENTEBBE AIRFIELD FOR USE SHOULD  
FURTHER UK FORCE BE REQUIRED. OBOTE HAS CONFIRMED REQUEST FOR  
TROOPS IN WRITING AND WILL INFORM NATION THEREOF BY BROAD-  
CAST AT 2000 GMT TONIGHT.

KAMPALA REPORTED TO BE QUIET!

GPI

BRUCE

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 1-23-64, 3:20 P.M.

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, POLAD CINCSTRIKE,  
USUN 1-23-64, 3:35 P.M.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By *id* NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 3-3-11

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Uganda* 55

58

Action  
AF

~~SECRET~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

15122  
January 21, 1964  
7:02 p.m.

Info

FROM: Kampala

034

SS

ACTION: Secstate 577 FLASH

G

SP

INFO: Nairobi 122 IMMEDIATE

L

London 91 IMMEDIATE

H

Dar-es-Salaam 104

SAL

EUR

DATE: January 22, 5 a.m.

IO

SCI

Reference: Nairobi's 1062 to Department repeated Kampala 110.

AID

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RMR

Immediately on receipt referenced telegram telephoned U. K. HICOM Hunt at midnight, who had received identical information re visit Babu and Hanga Kampala. This further confirmed by Uganda chief police Macoun. Hunt judged Babu and Hanga already Entebbe conferring with Obote.

[REDACTED]  
local fill in that Prime Minister had reluctantly agreed receive Babu on basis visit secret and no publicity. Double guards on Obotes lodge in Entebbe, Uganda Rifles alerted and strong guard placed Tiejr arsenal in Jinja, 50 miles from Kampala.

COMMENT: Our conjecture with which U. K. HICOM concurs is that Babu and followers have lost control Zanzibar to Okello and Tanganyika in same situation with collaboration Kambona. Babu visits Kenya and Uganda to rally political, military support against Okello forces. Risk here is that Uganda Rifles may decide take over command from British officers. Fact GOU alerted is advantage here however. All quiet at present.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 10-340  
By *id* NARA, Date *3-3-11*

3.3  
(b)(1)(6)

JJF/19

DEMING

NOTE: Advance copy delivered to S/S-O January 21, 730 p.m.

NOTE: Passed White House 735 p.m.

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~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

89-82

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA

207

Uganda  
07641  
56  
Aug 13 10 12 PM '65

Info

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INFO: Amembassy KARACHI (POUCH)

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4  
By *jcl/h* NARA, Date 12-12-05

SAH

Amconsul HONG KONG

"

L

ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN AF (POUCH)

H

AF

Karachi's 198, sent Kampala 1. (NOTAL)

BUR

1. Reftel quotes Obote as stating during press conference Karachi

NEA

IO

August 8 that views Uganda and Communist China on Vietnam dispute identical.

P

USIA

As Department had been led believe otherwise from, for example, communique

NSC

issued following Obote's visit India, we feel it may be useful review ChiCom

INR

position with Obote at appropriate time. You may wish draw on following points:

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

AID

PC

2. CHICOM Position: Peking contends that there is no genuine will in

South Vietnam to resist armed Communist attempt take it over. Under this

definition Peking portrays US action in support GVN as obstacle to attainment

by Vietnamese people of their legitimate aspirations. This makes Vietnamese

Government, according ChiCom viewpoint, fair game for ChiCom-style war of

national liberation. Within context ChiCom world view Vietnam has become

test tube case for its theory that properly conducted "wars of liberation" can

succeed, despite US opposition, and without risk of major international war.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Any proposal for settlement Vietnam conflict that does

Drafted by:

8-13-65

Telegraphic transmission and

FR/ACA:WJGunninghamiced

classification approved by:

FE - Leonard Unger

Clearance

FE/VN - Mr. Miller

AF - Mr. Nalle

RA - Mr. Taylor

AFT - Mr. ~~Wagner~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that does not rpt not fully satisfy North Vietnam and NLFSV demands unacceptable to ChiComs. Moreover, Peking has rejected every attempt achieve negotiated settlement Vietnam question, usually terming them US-inspired "swindles" designed "achieve at conference table what cannot be realized on battlefield." ChiComs are unlikely soften this position unless there is a major change in military situation in Vietnam or unless Hanoi chooses to break ranks with Peking.

3. Recent ChiCom statements have elaborated upon Peking's views as follows:

a. PENG Chen, Mayor of Peking and leading ChiCom party functionary, told mass rally July 15 (day before Obote left Communist China) that "In the past few months the United States, its satellites, and its followers have played the trick of peaceful negotiations on a large scale. Although they sing in different voices, the real tune is the same--through negotiation they want to preserve what U.S. Imperialism will soon lose completely on the battlefield..... Whether one resolutely supports the Vietnamese people in defeating U.S. aggressors completely may serve as a touchstone to see whether one is a true or a fake revolutionary and whether one is truly or untruly opposed to imperialism."

b. August 3 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial declared "The United States will never lay down its butcher knife, nor will it ever mend its evil ways and be benevolent. In face of such a nefarious aggressor, any begging or any wish for something good to turn up will only feed its ferocity. The only correct way is to do the United States what it does to us: to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against it. Only by smashing the Johnson administration's adventurous plan for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

expanding the war in the course of its escalation can peace in Vietnam and Indochina be restored."

c. ChiCom Government statement issued August 7 stated:

"Johnson said (July 28) that the United States was ready to discuss any proposals of any government including those already set forth by Hanoi. This can deceive nobody....All countries and people who love peace and uphold justice must unite, thoroughly expose the 'peace talks' swindle of the United States, and resolutely support the Vietnamese people in their just struggle to defeat the U.S. aggressors...."

4. In addition foregoing you may wish, as appropriate, draw upon Depcirtel 204 describing nature Viet Cong, Depcirtel 2648, June 9, particularly para 10, supplemented by USIS Africa Wireless File AF-140, July 29, describing negotiating initiatives so far undertaken in Vietnam and ChiComs' response thereto and CA-12277, May 18, which includes useful ChiCom quotes on liberation movements, negotiation, and Vietnam.

5. Main statements US position contained in President's April 7 speech, US reply to 17 non-aligned nations' appeal (State Dept Bulletin No. 1348), Secretary's June 23 address (State Dept Bulletin 1359) and President's July 28 Press Conference statement.

6. African Info addressees may draw upon contents this message, as appropriate, in discussing ChiCom viewpoint on Vietnam with host country officials.

GP-3.

END

RUSS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: Pouched by OCT.

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Uganda  
00651

57

45

AUG 3 9 53 AM '65

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA 158

Info

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 310  
Amconsul HONG KONG 116

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Re Hong Kong's 58, rptd Kampala 1.

In view Obote's statement that he had "learned a lot" about Viet-Nam during his talks with ChiCom leaders, suggest you seize suitable occasion after his return to Kampala to find out what he may have "learned" in Peiping and then administer any necessary antidote drawing on circular and wireless file material already sent to embassy.

FYI: We are inclined to agree with Hong Kong's comment that Obote seems have resisted ChiCom blandishments on Viet-Nam quite well. END FYI.

GP-3

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By jclg, NARA, Date 12-12-05

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE/VN: GBRoberts/mig 7/30/65

FE/VN: Robert H. Miller

AF/AFE-Mr. Nalle

FE/ACA-Mr. Dean

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~







# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11986

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59

83-81

Origin ACTION: ~~Embassy~~, KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 1509  
AF LEOPOLDVILLE " 2085

FEB 20 5 22 PM '65

Info:  
SS INFO: " NAIROBI 3400  
G DAR-ES-SALAAM 2405  
SP BRUSSELS 1777  
EUR LONDON 5263  
IO USUN 2064  
P CINCSTRIKE  
DOD

11:00 a.m., EST,

Secretary met Ambassador Asea ~~on Saturday, Feb 20.~~ Following

based on unclassified memocon: FYL-NOFORN-Subject revision upon review memocon.

After amenities, Ambassador Asea said he was not rpt not coming deliver protest which had already been done Kampala. He wanted let USG know GOU feelings on Congo and wished guidance on US-GDRC relations. Before going that subject, wished point out GOU angry about demonstrations in front Embassy; he had heard that hired individuals were responsible and noted that tear gas was used disperse crowd. Concluded this ~~part~~ <sup>by</sup> QUOTE ~~was hoping/~~ there not be pall on friendly relations/~~XXXX~~ UNQUOTE.

Amb. then made long delivery on Congo situation. Points are: GOU has been on record as concerned over possibility outbreaks, no Uganda troops in Congo, GOU holds USG as responsible for raid because in alliance with GDRC. If there was raid, he said, USG must have known about it. Also, noted that planes were piloted by mercenaries or Cuban refugees, recruited and trained <sup>be</sup> ~~was~~ by US. He felt that use by GDRC of US supplied equipment could ~~be~~ controlled to include only internal security matters. Asea then remarked

Drafted by AF: AFE:BBN/bbn 2/20

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by Henry J. Tasca  
AF: AFE: JMK/Knight

Clearances:

~~EUR~~ - Mr. Siscoe (info) S/S - Mr. Rattray  
IO - Mr. Roberts (info)  
AFE-JMK/Knight (draft)

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FORM DS-322  
6-63

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

By *iel* NARA, Date 3-3-11



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that  
~~there~~ there is ~~very~~ moral obligation on the world-wide sale of weapons; Secretary  
 interposed, by USSR? and Asea replied, ~~of course~~ <sup>QUOTE</sup> ~~of course~~ <sup>UNQUOTE.</sup> Asea speculated on what  
 would happen if ~~the~~ OAU group went into Congo and Secretary again question/with or  
 without  
~~without~~ GIRC permission to which Asea replied with permission.

Secretary then took up conversation. Said that USG policy has been, is now  
 and will always be to support and favor security, prosperity and independence  
 of Uganda. Paused slightly and added identical attitude holds toward GIRC. Ref-  
 erred to his message to Obote some weeks ago and said that if the facts bear out  
 the allegations we will support protest to GIRC. However, he said, it becoming  
 increasingly clear that reports of 'bombing' not true. No observers are permitted  
 into area inspect damage, determine cause. Then he asked Ambassador if Uganda  
 had arms and aircraft. Asea did not reply. Secretary went on say he believed  
 Uganda army had UK-furnished equipment. He asked does the UK control the use of  
 arms supplied to Uganda? Secretary urged GOU make public its intention to leave  
 Congo alone, to be sure that nothing goes either way across border. Said with  
 great seriousness Uganda cannot be a safe haven or sanctuary. This highly  
 dangerous. Said he had seen reports re Uganda personnel in Kasindi, Mahagi, that  
 the rebels receiving assistance and staging rights and that arms for rebels were  
 being allowed transit Uganda. This was very serious and gravely increases danger  
 of situation.

The Secretary reiterated history of US assistance to Congo, noting that  
 there was nothing we would prefer more than to limit our help to GIRC to purely  
 economic aid. He referred to the furnishing <sup>of illegal arms</sup> by the USSR and others through

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~from~~ certain African states ~~committing themselves~~ to the rebel group, and urged GOU refuse get involved in these activities.

Amb. Asea noted GOU support for legal government Congo but when overflight occurred, Secretary's mood had changed. Avoided answering/Secretary's comments on safe haven, restraint and that arms transits. Stated Uganda had always acted with ~~restraint~~ if reports that occupation Kasindi and Mahagi were true, was retaliatory action. He then made reference to ~~the~~ correctness/ ~~the~~ GOU attitude on refugees from Congo, Sudan. QUOTE UNQUOTE Secretary made last, strong suggestion both governments pull apart from border.

During twenty minute meeting, Secretary ~~was~~ grave, serious. Believe Amb. Asea caught his mood. On departure, Amb. met two members press, had no comment did except say he ~~not~~ rpt not present protest and that he came at own request discuss situation. END

GP-3

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1 0 9 2 3

60

43-41

Origin

AF

Info

NSC

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA PRIORITY 1400  
Amembassy NAIROBI " 2075  
Amembassy LEOPOLDVILLE " 2058  
Amconsul BUKAVU " 200

FEB 19 11 14 AM '65

INFO: WHITE HOUSE

Deptel 1475 to Kampala, repeated all posts

All further messages re Congo border conflict should be repeated for

info to White House, as well as to info addressees refal.

BERK

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

AF/CWG:ADB:rlind:dh 2/19/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF/CWG - Curtis C. Strong

Clearances:

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07789

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

82

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA PRIORITY 1424

FEB 13 4 12 PM '65

AF

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LEOPOLDVILLE PRIORITY 2005

SS

USUN 2010

G

SP

Re Embtel 1359. You should reply in accordance Deptel 1391

L

H

adding that USG shares GOU concern over border violation of any

EUR

IO

nature as Secstate pointed out in special message to Obote

P

(Deptel 1084). If you think it useful you should read

USIA

NSC

Secstate message to Odako.

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

You should suggest that if GOU wishes to protest to

GDRC it desirable have details, particularly time and place.

USG would volunteer communication facilities to transmit

message to GDRC and if facts warrant would support their protest.

BALL

Drafted by:

AF: CWG: RMcIlvaine: ml 2/13/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

M - W. Averell Harriman

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Hoffacker

AF - Mr. Frederickk (draft)

AFE - Mr. Mulcahy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

By *isl*





UNCLASSIFIED

QUOTE His Excellency Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa II

President of Uganda

Kampala, Uganda

On the occasion of the completion of Uganda's second full year of Independence I would like to convey to you and to the people of Uganda my best wishes for success and prosperity. With the arrival in Washington of the first Ambassador of Uganda and with an increasing exchange of students, government officials and others, I believe that relations between our two countries, already close and friendly will continue to grow and broaden.

The progress you and your countrymen have made in the past two years has been dramatic and inspiring; I am certain that Uganda will continue to develop and provide an example to all newly independent countries of the value of the democratic way of life.

The people of the United States join me in extending best wishes to you and to all Ugandans for the success of the past and bright prospects for the future.

Signed

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

The Department plans no release, but has no objection to release by recipient.

RISK

UNCLASSIFIED



4930  
told 5/5  
(Jan)  
9/28  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

4930  
for WB  
1. Brubaker  
2. Lit.  
September 25, 1964

Date  
62a

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

for Grant G. Hillier  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft cable to Kampala.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION



TELEGRAPH BRANCH

WORK COPY

2

Ambassy KAMPALA

UNCLASSIFIED

*Uganda*

*628*

QUOTE His Excellency Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa II

President of Uganda

Kampala, Uganda

On the occasion of the completion of Uganda's second full year of Independence I would like to convey to you and to the people of Uganda my best wishes for success and prosperity. With the arrival in Washington of the first Ambassador of Uganda and with an increasing exchange of students, government officials and others, I believe that relations between our two countries, already close and friendly will continue to grow and broaden.

The progress you and your countrymen have made in the past two years has been dramatic and inspiring; I am certain that Uganda will continue to develop and provide an example to all newly independent countries of the value of the democratic way of life.

The people of the United States join me in extending best wishes to you and to all Ugandans for the success of the past and bright prospects for the future.

Signed

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

The Department plans no release, but has no objection to release by recipient.

UNCLASSIFIED

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

62-c

UNCLASSIFIED

Ambassy KAMPALA

Following messages for transmittal on anniversary of Uganda  
Independence:

QUOTE The Honorable Sam Odaka

Minister of State for External Affairs

Entebbe, Uganda

On the occasion of the second anniversary of Uganda's  
independence, I would like to extend to you my sincere best  
wishes and congratulations. I have had the pleasure of meeting  
with the first Ambassador of Uganda to the United States, Dr. Asen  
and know that relations, already friendly and close between our  
countries will increase with the presence in Washington of the  
new Embassy of Uganda.

I believe that the statesmanship demonstrated by the  
Government of Uganda in the past will be continued in the  
future and I wish to extend to you my wishes for the years to  
come.

Signed

Dean Rusk UNQUOTE

AF/AFB:BNHalle:df 9/24/64

AF - J. Wayne Fredericks

P - Mrs. Deane

AF - Mr. MacKnight

WHITE HOUSE -

S/S.C.

O/CFR -

Mr. Carter

UNCLASSIFIED

12006

*Uganda* 63

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43

Original  
AF  
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy KAMPALA

416

Nov 26 7 50 PM '63

SS  
G  
SP  
L  
H  
INR  
RMR

In view text Obote message, if there is appropriate occasion for informal and personal discussion with Obote, and you believe it would be productive to do so, you may wish review with him developments which have taken place and underline President Johnson's close association with the foreign and domestic policies of President Kennedy.

End.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4  
By *felby* NARA Date *12-12-05*

Drafted by: AF/AFB: JMacKnight 11/24/63	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	U - Mr. Ball AF - G. Mennen Williams
---	--	---

Clearence:

S/S - Mr. McKesson

White House - Mr. Brubeck

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 26, 1963

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

BHR  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Tel to Kampala, and ~~one to Lagos~~.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12336,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY DCB ON 12-19-90

CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

64

August 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Uganda that the appointment of Mr. Erifasi Otema Allimadi as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

*W W Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

Copy to:

Office of the Chief of Protocol

2694  
64a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy in Kampala which states that the Government of Uganda has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Erifasi Otema Allimadi as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Uganda to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Allimadi is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Allimadi as Ambassador of Uganda at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Uganda of your approval.

Faithfully yours,



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE



RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 AUG 4 AM 10 38

648

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

ERIFASI OTEMA ALLIMADI OF UGANDA

Erifasi Otema Allimadi was born in the Acholi district of Uganda on February 11, 1929. He completed secondary school at Gulu and began, but did not complete, a correspondence course leading to a London General Certificate of Education.

From 1947 to 1956 Allimadi served as a minor medical functionary, first with the British African army and, thereafter, with the Uganda Medical Service. After a year in business he turned to politics and until 1960 held positions concurrently with the Acholi District Council and the Uganda National Congress (party). In 1960 he joined with Milton Obote in forming the Uganda People's Congress, eventually rising to the post of National Vice Chairman. After failing to be elected as an independent Member of Parliament in 1962, Allimadi successively served on Uganda's UN delegation in 1963, as Chairman of the Government's Press Censorship Board during its brief existence in 1964, and as Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in 1964-65.

The selection of Allimadi for the post of Ambassador to Washington represents a victory for the northern radical clique which currently guides Uganda's affairs. He can be expected to be loyal to President Obote on the basis of their long and close relationship.

Allimadi was once regarded as a radical left wing member of the UPC and is well known for having been the sponsor of many students to various countries in the Communist world during Uganda's pre-independence days. He has traveled to Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Communist China, as well as to Greece and Switzerland. Since independence, however, he appears to have tempered his views and it is probable that his previous radical tendencies were largely opportunistic. According to USUN, during the year Allimadi served as Deputy Permanent Representative he was helpful and friendly to Americans and partial to the US point of view.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By isl NLJ/RAC 10-340  
NARA, Date 6-1-11

65  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Uganda that the appointment of Mr. George Kamba as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

*W W Rostow*

W. W. Rostow

Copy to:

Office of the Chief of Protocol



2521  
65a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1966

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MEMORANDUM ATTACHED

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy in Kampala which states that the Government of Uganda has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. George Kamba as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Uganda to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Kamba is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Kamba as Ambassador of Uganda at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Uganda of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MEMORANDUM ATTACHED

658

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

GEORGE KAMBA

UGANDA

George Kamba was born in the Bukedi District of Uganda in 1927. He received his Primary, Secondary, and High School education at the Nabumali School in his home district. He entered the Kampala, Uganda, Engineering School in 1948 and in 1953 received a degree as a Civil Engineer. For the next eight years he combined a career in working for the Government as a regional engineer with a rising interest and activity in politics. In 1958, he was elected Secretary General of the Bukedi District Administration, which office he held until he was appointed first Uganda High Commissioner to India in 1964. He is said to be a very active sportsman.

During his period in India, Mr. Kamba made friends with a number of members of the staff of the United States Embassy. Such information as we have concerning him is favorable in nature.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
CONTROLLED DISSEM

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Intelligence  
Note* -115

February 23, 1966

66

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S

From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.l*

Subject: Success of Obote's Power Grab Still in Doubt

Take-Over May Unleash Conflict. Prime Minister Apolo Milton Obote seized supreme power on February 22 and arrested five leading ministers of his former government. Obote probably acted in political desperation, and there is a strong possibility of violent opposition to his "coup by decree." We still do not know precisely who is lined up with and against him in the present situation. Of particular importance, the loyalties of the police and army are still in doubt. Uganda's regional, ethnic and religious divisions are deep and sometimes bitter; they permeate all elements of the political and governmental system, including the security forces. It is unlikely that Obote has so effectively orchestrated his take-over as to preclude the possibility of violent counter-action from one or another of the elements opposed to him.

Obote Seeks to Pre-Empt Conservatives. Obote and his radical, mainly northern, supporters have been on the defensive since the Uganda Parliament, earlier this month, condemned Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Idi Amin, for diverting into his pockets and those of others (including Obote's) substantial quantities of gold "liberated" from the Congo early in 1965.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
CONTROLLED DISSEM

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 10-340

By *isl* NARA, Date *3-3-11*

automatic  
and  
declassification



~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
CONTROLLED DISSEM

- 2 -

Threats of an Amin-led military coup ten days ago failed to materialize, and Obote's position seemed weaker than ever. Thereafter, Obote's opponents -- mainly southern moderates -- pressed their attack, demanding Amin's arrest and suggesting that Obote himself resign. His hold on the Premiership threatened, Obote moved to seize power.

Role of the Army and Police will Prove Critical. The arrest of five southern ministers (including the leading moderate, Minister of State Grace Ibingira) by the police suggests that the latter are giving substantial support to the Prime Minister. The police are probably Uganda's strongest single security force. While the army could offer opposition, it is more likely to split into antagonistic factions than to act in any unified way. To Obote's advantage, however, is the fact that three of the four battalion commanders are northerners, as are most of the enlisted ranks. On the other hand, the Army Commander, Brigadier Opoloto, is usually identified with the southern moderates, as are a number of junior officers at army headquarters. Opoloto does not clearly command substantial personal loyalty within the army, however, and even if he has not already been deposed, he cannot be depended upon to resist Obote's move.

Obote Not Yet Firmly in the Saddle. With the balance of armed power in doubt, it is still an open question whether Obote can carry off his coup. He will probably encounter strong -- perhaps violent -- opposition in the capital, for Kampala is the heart of the conservative southern kingdom of

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
CONTROLLED DISSEM

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
CONTROLLED DISSEM

- 3 -

Buganda. The appeal of traditionalism is even stronger in outlying southern areas. How effectively this can be translated into action against Obote depends in the last analysis on the determination of southern leadership to resist and on Obote's willingness -- and ability -- to resort to harsh and perhaps widespread repression to maintain himself in power.

International Aspects. If he can hold power, Obote will probably in time steer Uganda away from close ties with the West, toward warmer relations with communist countries and closer alignment with Africa's radical states. The southerners are closely identified with the West, especially by Ugandan radicals. Ibingira specifically has close ties with the US, and Obote might single out the US as the malefactor that forced him to take steps against the southern ministers.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
CONTROLLED DISSEM



IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
February 11, 1966

1966 FEB 12 AM 8 59

326  
67  
1. Hayes  
2. K...  
3. Ret.  
OK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to the President to  
Attend Ugandan Mission Ground  
Breaking Ceremony in New York

Ambassador Apollo K. Kironde, Permanent  
Representative of Uganda to the United Nations,  
invited the President to attend ground breaking  
ceremonies for Uganda House on February 16 at  
11:30 a.m. in New York.

m. Dr.  
Original of  
note from Uganda  
Perm rep. to Protocol  
and invitation to  
the Pres. were attached  
to memo to the Pres.  
requesting his  
approval for Amb.  
Goldberg's reply.  
- U. H.  
2/15/66

The Department does not believe this event  
warrants the President's attendance. Ambassador  
Goldberg has regretted because of conflicting  
engagements, and the U.S. Mission will be repre-  
sented at the ceremonies by lesser ranking officers.

We therefore recommend that you authorize  
Ambassador Goldberg to convey to Ambassador Kironde  
the President's regrets. A copy of the suggested reply  
to the Permanent Representative of Uganda is enclosed.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested Airgram to USUN enclosing  
suggested reply.
2. Invitation to the President.

FEB 12 1966

Trans 1071766



# AIRGRAM

67a

Original to be Filed In \_\_\_\_\_ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

OR	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
ISR	COM	FRS
NT	LAB	TAR
YR	XMB	AIR
RMV	CIA	NAVY
DSO	USIA	NSA

UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : USUN NEW YORK

INFO : Amembassy KAMPALA

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT : Invitation to the President

REF :

Ambassador Apollo K. Kironde, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations, has forwarded an invitation to the President to attend ground-breaking ceremonies for Uganda House February 16 in New York. The invitation was transmitted under cover of a note addressed to the Chief of Protocol.

Enclosed herewith is a draft note of regret for transmission by Ambassador Goldberg to Ambassador Kironde. It would be appreciated if USUN would forward to the Department a copy of the actual reply when it is sent.

## Enclosures:

1. Copy of Ugandan note.
2. Draft reply.

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☐ In ☐ Out

FORM DS-323

Initiated by: IO:JPP Phillips:ahw 2/9/66

Drafting Date:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearance: AF Mr. Nalle

IO - Mr. Sisco White House -

FEB 14 1966

DRAFT NOTE

678

The Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Uganda and has the honor to refer to his note of January 31, 1966, to the Chief of Protocol transmitting an invitation to the President of the United States to attend ground-breaking ceremonies for Uganda House on February 16, 1966.

The President regrets that he is unable to accept Ambassador Kironde's kind invitation. He nonetheless wishes to convey his warm congratulations and best wishes to the Uganda Mission on this auspicious occasion.

IO:JPPhillips:ahw  
2/9/66

Clearances: AF - Mr. Nalle  
IO - Mr. Sisco

1965



878  
69  
1. Kohn  
2. Read BLS.  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

March 2, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Attached for your information and the files of the White House is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Ambassador Asea of Uganda dated 2/20/65 regarding US-Uganda Relations.

Attachment:

S/S-2730

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

MAR 3 1965

1950  
F. T. BARTON  
C. D. C. C. C.

1950 MAR 25 6:14 P. M.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2730

69a

## Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S 3/1/65

DATE: February 20, 1965  
11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: US-Uganda Relations

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Solomon B. Asea, Ambassador of Uganda

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State  
Beauveau B. Nalle, Officer-in-Charge, Uganda Affairs

COPIES TO:	S/S	USUN	Amembassy Kampala	Amembassy Leopoldvill
	G	CIA	" Nairobi	" Stanleyville
	S/P	IO	" Brussels	" Bujumbura
	AF	DOD/OSD	" Kigali	" Dar-es-Salaam
	EUR	White House	" Addis Ababa	
	INR/OD	CINCSTRIKE	AmConsulate Bukavu	

Ambassador Asea said that he was not coming to deliver a protest over the border violations. He said that this had been done already in Kampala. He did want, however, to talk with the Secretary about his Government's feelings with respect to the Congo and to ask the Secretary for his comments on our Congolese policy. Before going into the Congo problem, the Ambassador said that his Government was angry about the demonstration which had recently taken place in front of our Embassy in Kampala. It was the Ambassador's opinion that hired thugs were responsible for the damage. He wished to point out that the police had used tear gas to disperse the unruly crowd. Ambassador Asea hoped very much that this demonstration would not color our friendly relations.

The Ambassador then launched into a discussion of his Government's views on the Congo situation. He noted his Government's concern over the possibility of outbreaks of violence and stated specifically that there were no Uganda troops in the Congo. The Government of Uganda contends that because of our alliance with the Congo we must be held partly responsible for these border violations. The GOU believes that the USG must have known of the bombing attack at Goli. He also pointed out that the planes were of US manufacture and were piloted either by mercenaries or Cuban refugees who had been recruited and trained by the United States. His Government believes that

## GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.FORM DS-1254  
2-61~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

MAR 3 1965

By isl

NARA, Date 3-3-11



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

US-supplied arms should be used only for internal security matters. The Ambassador said that there are moral obligations involved in the world-wide sale of weapons. At this point the Secretary interposed, "By the USSR?", and the Ambassador replied, "Of course." Ambassador Asea, as if thinking out loud, wondered what would happen if an OAU mission went into the Congo. The Secretary asked, "With or without the permission of the GDRC?", to which Ambassador Asea replied, "With that permission."

The Secretary said that U.S. policy is to support the security, prosperity and independence of Uganda, and he pointed out that we have an identical attitude with respect to the GDRC. He referred to his January 1 message to Prime Minister Obote and said that if the facts bear out the allegations we would support a protest to the Tshombe Government. He said, however, that it was becoming increasingly clear that the reports of the bombing were not correct and noted that no observers had been permitted into the area to inspect the damage and to determine its cause. The Secretary then asked the Ambassador if Uganda had arms and aircraft. When the Ambassador did not reply to this, the Secretary went on to say that he believed Great Britain had furnished military equipment to Uganda and then asked if the UK controls the use of these arms. Again, Ambassador Asea did not reply.

The Secretary urged that the GOU make public its intention to leave the Congo alone and to be sure that nothing goes either way across the border.

He noted that Uganda cannot be a safe haven or sanctuary. This, he said, was highly dangerous. He had seen reports that Uganda personnel were in Kasindi and Mahagi, that the rebels were receiving assistance and staging rights in Uganda, and that arms for the rebels were being allowed to transit Uganda. This, he said, was a very serious matter.

The Secretary reviewed for Ambassador Asea the history of United States assistance to the Congo, noting that we would prefer to give only economic aid.

He said that foreign policy could not be based on personalities and that we had not expected Tshombe to become Prime Minister. The Secretary made reference to the fact that the Soviets and others were furnishing arms to the rebels in violation of the most elementary principles of the United Nations and that certain African states were permitting this. He urged the GOU to refuse to become involved in these illegal activities and stated that such a refusal would obtain widespread support.

Ambassador Asea replied that his Government had always respected the legal GDRC and had safeguarded their interests. He said, however, when the bombing took place the mood in his country had changed. He replied rather ambiguously to the Secretary's remarks on safe haven and training for the rebel soldiers. He contended that Uganda had always acted with restraint and that if the reports of the occupancy of Mahagi and Kasindi were true

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- 3 -

it was a retaliatory action. The Secretary said that he would be very interested in hearing if the United States could assist in any way to maintain the integrity of the border. The Ambassador said he felt the first step was up to the OAU. Ambassador Asea made a final reference to the GOU attitude on refugees which he said demonstrates the correctness of the Uganda attitude towards its neighbors. In concluding, the Secretary suggested that both governments should draw back from the border.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S 7/7/65 **Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: June 23, 1965 3p.m.

PART II of II

SUBJECT: Problems in Uganda's Foreign Relations

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Sir William Nadiope,  
Edward W. Mulcahy, Vice President of Uganda  
Acting Director, AFE Prince Stephen Karamagi, Charge d'Affaires,  
Embassy of Uganda  
Vasco da Gama Iwigale, Secretary  
to the Vice President

COPIES TO: S/S Amembassies Kampala  
G Nairobi  
S/P Dar es Salaam  
AF Leopoldville  
INR/OD Kigali  
CIA White House

Major Political Considerations

The Secretary asked the Vice President what he considered to be Uganda's greatest current problem. Without hesitation Sir William stated that it was Communism. The Communists, he said, are already on Uganda's borders (meaning in Tanzania). The Red Chinese and Soviet Embassies in Kampala were becoming extremely active and devoting their attention to the unemployed and more radical youth elements. There was considerable evidence of their success.

Sir William at this point digressed to deplore the deterioration of relations with Tanzania and to confess his perplexity over the course Julius Nyerere seems to have chosen. With respect to Kenya, Sir William stated that relations were currently excellent now that the disagreement last month over the shipment of Chinese arms from Tanzania through Kenya had been settled to everyone's satisfaction. He emphasized the importance to Uganda of maintaining good relations with Kenya. This led to a discussion of the difficulties faced by landlocked states of which Africa has quite a number. Mr. Mulcahy stated that we had been particularly unhappy to see landlocked Uganda place restrictions upon traffic to and from landlocked Rwanda and hoped that this situation would shortly be cleared up. Sir William said that he thought that much of this friction had already been removed. The Secretary indicated his agreement with Sir William's hope that the Africans would find a formula which would prevent landlocked states from becoming victimized by others.

Congo-Uganda

FORM 8-61 DS-1254

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Group 3

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

JUL 15 1965

By isl



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- 2 -

Congo-Uganda Relations

The Secretary led the discussion from this point into Congo-Uganda relations. He said that we had been particularly concerned by the deterioration of relations between the two countries a few months ago but were happy that the differences now seemed to be resolving themselves. He felt that it was not in Uganda's interest to allow outsiders to use the Congolese border for activities against the Central Government there. Sir William expressed his wholehearted agreement, adding his conviction that his own government had never sanctioned anti-Congolese activities across the border. It had become clear in recent weeks that some dishonest individuals had been largely to blame for the troubles along that border. He firmly expressed Uganda's hope for only the best relations with the Congo. He mentioned the importance of the cross-border trade to both countries and said he hoped it would soon be flowing freely once again. The Secretary said that he wanted to reiterate what he had already told Prime Minister Obote that the United States was equally concerned with the integrity of Uganda's borders as it was with those of the Congo.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1965

*Uganda**M. Komer**Chase**71*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Presidential Meeting with U.S.  
Ambassadors to East Africa

We have asked President Johnson to receive for a brief call Ambassadors Leonhart (Tanzania), Attwood (Kenya), and Deming (Uganda) who are in Washington on consultation. The request for this meeting was made through the office of the Chief of Protocol and brief biographic sketches were previously forwarded to the White House. I enclose, for possible use by the President, a briefing memorandum on the present situation in the three countries.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Briefing memorandum.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
Not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *yc/h* NARA, Date 12.12.05



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71a

Briefing Memorandum for the President

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassadors Leonhart, Attwood and Deming

Tanzania

Ambassador William Leonhart is scheduled to arrive in Dar-es-Salaam at the end of February. As you know, Tanzania has publicly stated they are recalling their Ambassador, Othman Shariff. This is a result of our having requested the withdrawal of their Counselor in Washington in the aftermath of the expulsion of our Counselor Robert Gordon and Consul General Frank Carlucci. Ambassador Leonhart will be bringing with him your reply to President Nyerere's letter to you of January 28.

While the recall of Ambassador Shariff by Tanzania does not mean a break in diplomatic relations between our two countries, it is apparent that President Nyerere is upset. He believes it unjust for us to ask for the recall of their Counselor, an innocent man, because he has expelled two of our officers whom he believes were engaged in subversive activities. He has refused, however, to provide evidence which would substantiate his allegation, or to participate with us in a joint inquiry into all the facts of the matter.

Kenya

Kenya, the most economically developed of the East African countries, became independent December 12, 1963. Politically, tribal differences and particularly the drive for power of pro-communist politicians led by Vice President Odinga and amply financed by the Chicoms and/or the USSR were of concern to the US. Suspicions of US intentions were fed by events in the Congo. Ambassador Attwood recently had his first talk with President Kenyatta since Stanleyville. He believes we should try to get Kenyatta and his moderate Ministers concentrating on internal problems and away from the emotional Congo issue. The invitation to President Kenyatta for a State Visit to the US pleased him greatly as did the announcement by Ambassador Attwood of our willingness to supply corn to alleviate the food shortage and US plans for assistance to the Kenya Police Airwing. Ambassador Attwood believes the atmosphere both with the President and, in general, has improved in recent weeks.

Uganda

Our relations with Uganda which were very close and friendly prior to the Stanleyville rescue operations, have recently taken a turn for the worse. In early January, Prime Minister Obote held a press conference in which he attacked US policy in the Congo in very strong terms. Although it appeared from a meeting he had with our Charge on February 2 that he

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3-3-11

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- 2 -

was moderating his stand somewhat, recent allegations that Uganda border towns were bombed by Congolese planes supplied by the US and piloted by mercenaries have resulted in a sharp protest to us by the Government of Uganda.

In spite of disagreements over the Congo, we feel that Uganda still has an underlying feeling of friendship for US. We have an effective AID program there and senior officials both privately and publicly have expressed their appreciation for our assistance.

On Tuesday, we were advised of a demonstration in front of our Embassy. Damage was minor - one window broken. The flag was cut down by a demonstrator but was saved from further damage by an alert Embassy officer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS 83

KAMALA UGANDA DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1700Z 22 FEB 65 K/X

(TEXT) BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADJOURNED (THIS EVENING) THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, FELIX ONAMA INFORMED THE HOUSE OF THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN THE WEST NILE. HE SAID THAT CONGOLESE AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY TSHOMBE MERCENARIES AGAIN VIOLATED UGANDA AIRSPACE BY BOMBING THE OWANJE PRIMARY SCHOLL NEAR (YAPEA), IN THE DISTRICT OF WEST NILE AT THREE O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON. NO REPORT OF CASUALITIES HAVE SO FAR REACHED KAMPALA.

22 FEB 1832Z HWM/RLM



*Uganda* 366  
13  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED  
February 11, 1965  
RECORDED & INDEXED

1966 FEB 11 PM 7 08  
TO: Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House *[Signature]*

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

For your information.

Enclosure:

Correspondence between  
Mr. Watson and Dr. Warren  
Harrison.



1992  
IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNNEY'S OFFICE  
February 11, 1966

1966 FEB 11 PM 7 08

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. MARVIN WATSON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Your Memorandum of February 7  
Pertaining to Dr. D. Warren  
Harrison

Dr. Harrison has called at the Department of State a number of times, the last occasion being approximately one year ago. At that time he stated that he was employed by the Ministry of Health of Buganda, a tribal Kingdom in Uganda. He was interested in obtaining secondhand medical equipment; at the same time, he mentioned the High Protein Food factory he writes of in his memorandum to you. Subsequently, Dr. Harrison returned to Uganda and became further involved in the food factory and other projects. He approached our AID Mission in Kampala on two separate occasions to discuss his food program.

Our feeling is that while there is some merit in the plans he outlines, there has not been enough study given to these projects; nor have the proposals been, to our knowledge, in any way co-ordinated with on-going programs sponsored by the Government of Uganda. They also have not been integrated with the various Uganda development plans which we feel are sound and well thought out.

In addition to these basic objections, we are concerned that there does not seem to be any serious attempt to set up real organizations to back these plans. There are indications of contributions from various United States companies and foundations, but little evidence of substantial


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-2-

financial backing. Furthermore, Dr. Harrison's connection with a local government (Buganda Ministry of Health) gives us some concern as there might arise questions of conflict of interest.

The Public Health Division of the AID African Bureau is however, continuing to explore ways of assisting Dr. Harrison.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of Dr. Harrison's  
letter of February 2.

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736

African Desk, State Department:

Dr. Harrison has been in touch with you rather extensively according to his correspondence to me. Could you tell me, via memo and very briefly, what the situation is?

Thanks.

W. Marvin Watson

D. Warren Harrison, M.D.  
2705 13th Street N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20018

Feb. 2, 1966

73c

W. Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Watson:

I wish to thank you for your kindness in your consideration of my recent letters to you, and also for arranging the conference with Mr. Ulric Haynes.

From my brief contacts with you I feel strongly that you can and will help me in the problem I have brought to your attention. I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to have a brief conference with you.

The only reason I am bringing this problem to your attention is because I have exhausted every routine channel. (almost everyone concerned with these programs in the state department or AID knows me-smile). I am almost certain there is no other country at present, certainly not in Africa, that has the four major AID programs I have listed on the inclosed paper, organized and in operation or ready to start. These four AID programs are without question the most important, most basic, and most far reaching of our gigantic efforts to build democracy around the world.

The African government for which I am working is asking for and is in dire need of all four of these programs NOW. I must not, we cannot let our "neighbors" down unless all avenues are completely exhausted (to let them down is to let ourselves and our boys in Viet Nam down). Only God in heaven knows where the leftest movements in East Africa will lead to, when the powder keg in Southern Rhodesia will explode and how far its ashes will scorch the earth, or how long the period of relative peace will last in the Congo, Nigeria, Dahomey, etc. I need not remind us of the financial burden we carried so recently in the Congo, or of the present Viet Nam costs in money and lives.

I've come to a "dead end" street in two of the major programs listed on the paper. I am confident you can help at this stage once you see the problem. Within a matter of months portions of this program can be extended to the Congo, Zambia, etc.--in any direction that the state department would indicate. Each of these projects is 100% controlled by some of Americas most dedicated and most knowledgable citizens, and the projects are 100% designed and operating to uplift the masses of the people. With a minimum of our financial appropriations a maximum good will come to the given countries, and without doubt prevent the heart rending cost in lives and distruction that must come where social injustice continues to exist.

Forgive me for repeating what you already know and what our President is saying and has said far more effectively than I can. Let me rest this matter in your competent hands at this point. I trust I may have the privilege of meeting you.

Very sincerely yours,

*D. Warren Harrison*  
D. Warren Harrison, M.D.

73d

FOUR      OR PLANS ADOPTED FROM "THE GRE      SOCIETY"  
THAT HAVE BEEN INITIATED IN EAST AFRICA

As stated again and again by our President, the following five basic human needs must be the ground substance for any hope for world peace and political stability: FOOD, CLOTHING, ADEQUATE SHELTER, EDUCATION, AND A JOB. The following plans will do much to secure these specific needs.

1. A HI-PROTEIN FOOD FACTORY IN EAST AFRICA with an AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM TO PRODUCE MORE PROTEIN FOODS:
  - (a) Specific emphasis is being placed on pre-school malnutrition.
  - (b) The protein crop is being grown by thousands of peasant farmers-- thus providing them with the MONEY, indispensable to raising their standards of living, and at the same time solving their most pressing problem--MALNUTRITION.  
(this project is in operation now)
2. A FIVE MILLION DOLLAR (\$5,000,000) CO-OP HOUSING PROJECT.
  - (a) This is an AID guaranty program started over one year ago.
  - (b) It is the ONLY 100% PRIVATE OWNERSHIP HOUSING PROJECT of this size started in Africa.
  - (c) This is the only US foreign AID housing scheme, so I understand, organized and financed so as to establish a continuing HOME BUILDING AND HOME OWNERSHIP program for those most in need of better housing.
3. SMALL INDUSTRIAL (mainly RURAL--"grass-roots") ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
  - (a) This plan is being engineered by experienced specialists from two top American Universities, and the University in the African country with the cooperation of the local African Government Economic Planning Ministry.
4. A PUBLIC HEALTH SCHOOL--to train SUB-PROFESSIONAL RURAL PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICERS.
  - (a) Only one US MEDICAL UNIVERSITY has pioneered such a school in an under-developed country.
  - (b) This US Medical School started their first foreign Public Health School in a Church Mission Hospital in Tanzania five (5) years ago.
  - (c) This educational program has successfully met the needs for rural or village Public Health progress and Community Development to achieve a higher standard of living.
  - (d) With the supervision of this Medical School and one other US Medical School a similiar Public Health School is being opened by my department for the country where I work.
  - (e) This will be the first Public Health School of this type (a "grass-roots" educational program) operated by the government of any developing country.



January 14, 1966

73e

copy

Dear Dr. Harrison:

Further to our interesting meeting on January 19, I have now reviewed your four-part aid proposal for Uganda.

I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your proposal to Dr. A.C. Curtis at AID who is already familiar with your interest in helping Uganda. Dr. Curtis can be reached on Dudley 3-7130 and will be happy to explore this matter further with you. Do phone him for an appointment.

Rest assured that your interest in the world-wide application of the Presidents Great Society program is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Ulric Haynes, Jr.

Dr. D. Warren Harrison  
2705 - 13th Street, N.E.  
Washington, D. C. 20018

(I should perhaps mention this correction - the enclosed OUTLINE is not a proposal - it is an outline of what is being done.)  
(I have followed thru on this appointment, but AID assistance would be two years or more in the future.)  
A.W.H.

Pls. send this over to Marvin  
Watson's office to be attached  
to their "Harrison file".

739

D. Warren Harrison, M.D.  
2705 - 13th Street N.E.  
Washington, D. C. 20018

January 31, 1966

Mr. Ulric Haynes, Jr.  
National Security Council  
Washington, D. C. 20506

It was very kind of you to give me the opportunity to discuss the request and need for continued development in the country where I am now employed, Uganda.

I have had one meeting with Dr. A.C. Curtis and will have another soon. Thank you very much for arranging this for me. I am sure something productive will come from our meeting.

Thank you again for your kind consideration of our problems.

Very sincerely yours,

*D.W. Harrison, M.D.*  
D.W. Harrison, M.D.



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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presentation of Credentials:  
Dr. Solomon Bayo Asea,  
Ambassador of Uganda.

Ambassador Asea has assumed his duties in Washington and has asked to be received by the President to present his credentials. Ambassador Duke will accompany Ambassador Asea. Assistant Secretary Williams, who will be at the White House twenty minutes before the appointment time, will also be present.

Enclosed are a briefing memorandum, a copy of the remarks which the Ambassador will hand the President, a suggested reply and a biographic sketch of the Ambassador.

/s/ J. W. Davis

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Memorandum
2. Ambassador's Remarks
3. Suggested Reply
4. Biographic Sketch

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(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosures.)

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75a

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

Subject: Your meeting with Ambassador  
Asea of Uganda

1. We do not believe that Ambassador Asea will bring up anything of great substance during his call on you. He might, however, mention:

a. A visit to the United States of President Sir Edward Mutesa. The President was planning a private visit to the United States last July, primarily to see the World's Fair. He had hoped to come to Washington informally to meet you. We understand that he still is thinking about a short trip to the United States along the same lines.

b. United States assistance. Ambassador Asea might thank you for United States assistance to Uganda which has been primarily in the fields of education and agriculture.

2. You may wish to bring up:

a. Nonalignment. We respect the desires of a country to remain, within its capabilities, out of the East-West struggle. We believe, however, that true nonalignment involves responsibility and integrity.

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75-25

THE REMARKS OF  
THE NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR OF UGANDA  
DR. SOLOMON BAYO ASEA  
UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS  
LETTER OF CREDENCE

Mr. President:

I have the honour to present to you the Letter of  
Credence by which Sir Edward Mutesa, the President of the  
Sovereign State of Uganda accredits me as the first  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United  
States of America. I am conscious of the heavy responsibility  
which is involved, but I feel confident that with the  
cooperation of the United States Government I will strengthen  
and promote the friendly relations which exist between our two  
Governments and peoples.

The United States of America and Uganda have many similar  
possessions like great lakes, and long rivers. Sir, if you  
would allow me to mention a personal observation which I have  
made during my short stay in Washington, I would like to say

that I

that I have seen some people here who very much resemble Ugandans! The other striking similarity between our two countries which I might mention is that both the United States of America and Uganda are led by Presidents as Heads of State. In this connection I would like to take the liberty to pay tribute to the late President John F. Kennedy who the world has come to recognize as a great Leader. He will forever be remembered as the Champion of Peace, Justice, and Equality.

In bidding me farewell my President, Sir Edward Mutesa asked me to convey to you his personal greetings and to say how sorry he was that he could not visit the United States of America as was arranged because of illness. However, he hoped it would be possible for him to make a visit in not a too distant future.

May I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to express to you the sincere gratitude of the Uganda Government and people for the various assistances which you have given to Uganda since her Independence. The American aid has helped

Uganda to

Uganda to push ahead with some of her vigorous projects such as Secondary Schools Expansion, Group Farming, and others. The Uganda Government is also appreciative of the fact that the United States of America is the biggest buyer of Uganda coffee. Long may this continue. Uganda would in turn like to offer to American people her world renown tourist attractions. As more and more Americans visit Uganda so will the ties and bonds of friendship between Americans and Ugandans grow stronger and stronger; for there is nothing to equal personal contact in promoting friendly human relations.

I would wish in conclusion, Mr. President, to express my most sincere wishes for your own well-being and for the happiness and prosperity of the American people. Now Mr. President, I have great pleasure in presenting to you my Letter of Credence as the first Ambassador of Uganda to the United States of America.



THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY  
TO THE REMARKS OF THE  
NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR OF UGANDA  
DR. SOLOMON BAYO ASEA  
UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS  
LETTER OF CREDENCE

Mr. Ambassador:

It is a pleasure for me to accept the letters of credence from President Mutesa which designate you the first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from Uganda to the United States. I hope that during your stay in our country you will be able to travel about our land and see our farms and cities, our rivers and mountains and above all, our people, many of whom may well trace their origin back to your own beautiful country.

I should like to thank you for your reference to the late President and my own close friend, John F. Kennedy. All Americans hold dear his memory and all of us are moving along toward the fulfillment of the dream he and I shared. Furthermore, I fully believe that we will surpass his highest hopes

as we

as we strive to bring to every citizen freedom and prosperity.

We appreciate your kind words about American help to Uganda. The people of America understand the problems of newly independent countries; we are not so old that we have forgotten those days after we became free. We offer the hand of friendship in sincerity, with the hope that all who believe, as do your countrymen, in the freedom and dignity of man, will clasp it and walk with us toward a world of peace and happiness.

I, too, fully believe in the value of personal contacts; when we meet and talk together, our differences more often than not will fade into common understanding and mutual respect.

In conclusion, I should like to extend my best wishes to Sir Edward Mutesa, the first President of Uganda, and to all the people of your country. I am pleased to accept you as the first Ambassador of Uganda to the United States.

**Dr. Solomon Bayo Asea**  
**Newly Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and**  
**Plenipotentiary of Uganda to the United States**

Dr. Asea was born in the West Nile district of Uganda in 1924. He was educated at King's College, Uganda, often described as the Eton of East Africa, and Makerere College, Uganda. At Makerere he studied medicine and was the first African to gain the degree of the East African medical society. He subsequently studied in the United Kingdom where he attained high honors in the fields of public health and tropical medicine. He has served as director of a number of government hospitals in his native country and has worked in the Ministry of Health as well. Our Embassy in Kampala advised that Dr. Asea was especially selected by Prime Minister Milton Obote for this position.

The Ambassador entered the Ministry of External Affairs in January of 1964 and attended the Commonwealth meeting in London this past June. Following the Commonwealth meeting, he attended the meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo.

Ambassador Asea is married and has seven children, all of whom are with him in Washington. One of his daughters is going to the National Cathedral School; the other children attend public schools near their Embassy. He speaks excellent English. His recreations are music and photography.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Uganda*  
76

September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Jack Valenti

SUBJECT: Appointment on Friday at 6:00 P. M.

1. At 6:00 P. M. you are scheduled to meet for two minutes with three of your Ambassadors, Cecil Lyon (Ceylon), Olcott Deming (Uganda), and William Snow (Paraguay). Bill Brubeck will entertain the three visitors in the Cabinet Room until Jack Valenti can escort you in at, or a little after 6:00 P. M. The routine for you is the same -- a greeting and an individual picture with each Ambassador.
2. Some brief biographic data on the three Ambassadors is attached.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DCT, NARA, Date 12-19-80



S/S 12543

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointments for American Ambassadors  
to meet the President

In accordance with arrangements made with  
Mr. Gordon Chase, the following American Ambassadors  
will be at the White House at 5:55 p.m., September 4  
for a brief chat and photographs:

Ambassador Olcott H. Deming (Uganda)  
Ambassador-designate Cecil B. Lyon (Ceylon)  
Ambassador William P. Snow (Paraguay)

Ambassador Deming has not met the President.  
Ambassador Lyon met President Johnson in Paris while  
serving there as Minister. Ambassador Snow was at  
the White House in March of this year with a group of  
other American Ambassadors to Latin American countries  
who met with the President.

Short biographic summaries of the individuals  
listed above appear on the enclosed sheet.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic summaries.

76-b

OLCOTT H. DEMING - Ambassador to Uganda

Ambassador Deming, age 55, was born in New York City. He received his BA degree from Rollins College in Florida and did graduate work at the University of Tennessee. Prior to being commissioned a Foreign Service Officer in 1948 he had taught school and was a research assistant at the TVA. Ambassador Deming is the first American Ambassador to Uganda. He was at Post when the country received her independence in 1962 and has represented the United States there since that time. He is married.

CECIL B. LYON - Ambassador-Designate to Ceylon

Ambassador Lyon, age 61, was born in New York and is a graduate of Harvard University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1930. He attended the National War College, has served as our Ambassador to Chile and has been Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission in France since 1958. Ambassador Lyon is married and has two children.

WILLIAM P. SNOW - Ambassador to Paraguay

Ambassador Snow, age 57, was born in Maine and was educated at Bowdoin College and Tufts University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1934 and has served at numerous posts abroad, principally in Europe and Latin America. He has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and as our Ambassador to Burma from 1959 to 1961. Ambassador Snow is married and has five children.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

76-c

S/S 12512

September 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointments for American  
Ambassadors to meet the  
President

In accordance with arrangements made with Mr. Gordon Chase, the following American Ambassadors will be at the White House at 5:55 p.m., September 4 for a brief chat and photographs:

Ambassador Olcott H. Deming (Uganda)  
Ambassador William P. Snow (Paraguay)  
Ambassador James W. Wine (Ivory Coast)

Ambassador Deming has not met the President. Ambassador Snow was at the White House in March of this year with a group of other American Ambassadors to other Latin American countries who met with the President. Ambassador Wine has met the President on two previous occasions.

Short biographic summaries of the individuals listed above appear on the enclosed sheet.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic summaries.



OLCOTT H. DEMING - Ambassador to Uganda

76-d

Ambassador Deming, age 55, was born in New York City. He received his BA degree from Rollins College in Florida and did graduate work at the University of Tennessee. Prior to being commissioned a Foreign Service Officer in 1948 he had taught school and was a research assistant at the TVA. Ambassador Deming is the first American Ambassador to Uganda. He was at Post when the country received her independence in 1962 and has represented the United States there since that time. He is married.

WILLIAM P. SNOW - Ambassador to Paraguay

Ambassador Snow, age 57, was born in Maine and was educated at Bowdoin College and Tufts University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1934 and has served at numerous posts abroad, principally in Europe and Latin America. He has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and as our Ambassador to Burma from 1959 to 1961. Ambassador Snow is married and has five children.

JAMES W. WINE - Ambassador to the Ivory Coast

Ambassador Wine, age 45, was born in West Virginia. He received A.B. and LL.B degrees from the University of Kentucky and studied international affairs at Oxford University. In 1959 he was appointed as Associate General Secretary of the National Council of Churches. In the campaign of 1960 he headed the Community Relations Division of the Democratic National Committee. Ambassador Wine has also served as an Ambassador to Luxembourg from 1961 to 1962. He is married and has four children, including twin boys.

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September 3, 1964

*Uganda*  
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MEMORANDUM FOR GWEN KING

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President on September 4  
at 6:00 P.M.

1. The President is now scheduled to meet briefly with Ambassadors James W. Wine (Ivory Coast), Olcott H. Deming (Uganda), and William P. Snow (Paraguay) on September 6 at 6:00 P.M. I wonder if you would help us out on the following points:

- (a) Will you reserve the Cabinet Room for the meeting and inform State?
- (b) Since the meeting is off-the-record, will you tell State to have the Ambassadors enter and leave the White House via the West Basement. The Ambassadors should be in the Cabinet Room by 5:55 P.M.
- (c) Will you ask Capt. Stoughton to insure that a photographer is on hand in the Cabinet Room at 5:55 P.M. to take individual pictures of each Ambassador with the President.

2. Bill Brubeck will be the NSC man in the Cabinet Room.

3. Please let me know if you have any problems with this memo.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Reedy  
Mr. Brubeck  
Capt. Stoughton

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DW, NARA, Date 12-19-90

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September 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Appointment with President --  
American Ambassadors

1. We have three more American Ambassadors who need the usual two minute, off-the-record treatment in the Cabinet Room - i.e. a handshake and a picture. The Ambassadors are Wine (Ivory Coast), Snow (Paraguay), and Dening (Uganda).
2. Can you spare two minutes on Thursday or Friday.

Gordon Chase

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Dkt, NARA, Date 12-18-90

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Uganda*  
May 2, 1964

*Done 5/5 5/2  
(Obama/Booker)*  
79

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY:

RE: APPOINTMENTS WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. Henry L. T. Koren, Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo. *Brubaker*  
Monday, May 4 at 1:00.
- 12:30* 2. The Ambassador of Panama -- Wednesday, May 6 at 11:30. *Chase ✓*  
*Obama* " " " 11:45 " ✓
3. ~~The Ambassador of Ireland -- Wednesday, May 6 at 12:00.~~ *Klein ✓*
- 11:30* ④ 4. The Ambassador of Rwanda -- Wednesday, May 6 at ~~12:30.~~ *Brubaker*
5. ~~Georges Heisberg, Ambassador from Luxembourg -- farewell~~ *Klein*  
~~appointment -- Friday, May 8 at 12:15.~~ *Left Jan 4/28*
6. Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa, President of Uganda -- Monday, *Brubaker*  
May 25 at 11:30.

These appointments have been approved by the President.

- 12:00* ② Ambassador of Mauretania *wed.*
- 12:30* ③ Ambassador of Panama Jack Valenti



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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment for President Mutesa of  
Uganda with President Johnson

President Johnson has agreed in principle to visit with Heads of State who come to the United States to visit the World's Fair. We are advised that President Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa of Uganda is coming to the United States for Africa Day May 21 and then wants to come to Washington to meet President Johnson.

We believe that the morning of May 25, would be most satisfactory in light of President Johnson's known schedule. We request therefore that if convenient, a specific time for the meeting be established on May 25.

GRANT G. HILLIKER

*fr*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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July 6, 1964

*Uganda*

*81*  
*✓*

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Uganda that the appointment of Dr. Solomon Baye Asea as Ambassador would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

*(S)*

**McGeorge Bundy**

**cc: Office of the Chief of Protocol**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy in Kampala which states that the Government of Uganda has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Dr. Solomon Bayo Asea as the first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Uganda to the United States. A biographic sketch of Dr. Solomon Bayo Asea is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Dr. Solomon Bayo Asea as Ambassador of Uganda at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Uganda of your approval.

Faithfully yours,



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

Dr. Solomon Bayo Asea  
Newly Designated Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary of Uganda to the United States

Dr. Solomon B. Asea was born in Uganda in 1920. After primary school, he attended Kings College, Budo, and Makerere University College, Kampala, from which he graduated with honors. He attended graduate schools in Liverpool and London and has several advanced degrees in various fields of medicine, particularly public health. Prior to his entry into the field of Diplomacy in 1964, he was Medical Superintendent of the Government hospital at Gulu, an important provincial center in Uganda and also served as Senior Medical Officer in the Ministry of Health in Kampala. In the Ministry of External Affairs, he served as Under Secretary before being designated Ambassador to the United States.

Dr. Asea is married and has two daughters and five sons. He speaks good English.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

JAN 23 1964

TO : The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.f*

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: Deteriorating Security Situation in East Africa:  
Uganda, the New Flash Point

British Troops Respond to Uganda Appeal. British military assistance probably will stabilize internal security and shore up the government of Prime Minister Milton Obote for the time being. Obote, however, has been under serious pressure in recent weeks from radical groups within his own party as well as from the opposition. Obote's reliance on British troops will probably in the longer run further undermine his strength, adding to other complaints the accusation that he has brought back the former colonial master.

Likely Impact in Kenya. We believe that Prime Minister Kenyatta, who probably concurred in this deployment of British troops from their Kenyan bases, did so because he himself is fearful that the virus of army dissidence will spread to Kenya. The British action is likely to give pause to potential trouble-makers in the Kenyan army. (Some 4,000 UK troops are presently stationed in the country.) However, as in the case of Uganda, the more volatile elements both within and outside the government coalition will accuse Kenyatta of complicity with British neo-colonial machinations, and could over time threaten the Prime Minister's position.

Likely Impact in Tanganyika. Dar-es-Salaam remains unsettled following the recent mutiny. The British move in Uganda will undoubtedly

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 10-340

NARA, Date 3.3.11

By *isl*

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GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified

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- 2 -

have an impact on the Tanganyikan mutineers. We are unable to estimate at this time, however, whether the swift British response to Obote's appeal will cow the Tanganyikan army or provoke it to further disorders leading to a possible coup d'etat.

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Uganda  
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83  
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Situation Report - January 23, 1964 - 1300 -

- 1350 In response to request from CINCSTRIKE, regarding disposition of the USS MANLEY, State felt that the ship should remain off Dar for a period of from two days to a week in view of situation which is still troubled.
- 1417 London Reuters item repeated over FBIS #75) reported that mutinous Uganda soldiers kidnapped Interior Minister Onama when he went to talk with them about their demands for ouster of British officers and higher pay.
- 1421 FBIS 79 reported British troops are being flown from Kenya to Uganda at request of Uganda premier. The Commonwealth Relations office reported that seven planes carrying troops are on the way to "help the maintenance of law and order."
- 1420 FBIS 78 reported that Lima AFP reported that according to unconfirmed rumors Field Marshall Okello was shot to death in Zanzibar.
- 1520 London's 3464 reported that Commonwealth Relations office had received request from Obote today to send UK troops to Uganda as a precautionary measure in view of disturbance at Jinja. UK Ministers have agreed and small body of UK troops are now enroute from Kenya. Troops will also secure Entebbe Airfield should further UK force be required. Obote has confirmed request for troops in writing and he will inform his nation by broadcast tonight. Kampala is reported to be quiet.
- 1620 FBIS item #93 reported from Uganda Domestic Service that the Prime Minister issued a statement saying that the situation at the Army Barracks at Jinja is completely normal. The statements said that the Minister of Internal Affairs was on his way from Entebbe to report to the PM. The main point made by the troops was pay increases but they are all loyal to the government. Because of the confused situation at Jinja during the afternoon the cabinet had requested British Government to send troops to help insure maintenance of law. In view of normal situation it will not be necessary to stay long. All business and government offices should open tomorrow.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By JCM NARA, Date 12-12-05