

## ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

August 31, 2011

# LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 1

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
048	memo	Portuguese-African Territories [sanitized 04/18/01 NLJ/RAC 00-186 & state letter 5/16/78]	S	11	05/03/64	A

**Collection Title** National Security File, Country File

**Folder Title** "Portugal, Volume I, 11/63-7/64"

**Box Number** 203

**Restriction Codes**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
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9/7/2011

AC  
Initials

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I  
 AGENCY: National Security Council

ITEM NOS.	DATE	IDENTIFICATION	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
<del>62</del>	<del>05/23/64</del>	<del>Memo for Valenti from McG. B.</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del> NSC <del>Stt.</del> , 12-14-75
<del>64</del>	<del>05/27/64</del>	<del>Memo for Brubeck from Chase</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del> NSC <del>Stt.</del> , 12-14-75
<del>66</del>	<del>06/02/64</del>	<del>Memo for King from Chase</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del> NSC <del>Stt.</del> , 12-14-75
<del>67</del>	<del>06/03/64</del>	<del>Memo for the President from McG. B.</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Confidential</del> NSC <del>Stt.</del> , 12-14-75

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I  
 AGENCY: Department of State

ITEM NOS.	DATE	IDENTIFICATION	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
<del>53b</del>	<del>11/27/63</del>	<del>Deptel 365 to Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 2)</del>
<del>54</del>	<del>12/06/63</del>	<del>Memo for Bundy from Belk</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del>
<del>55</del>	<del>12/10/63</del>	<del>Memo for Bundy from Belk</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del>
<del>57</del>	<del>02/15/64</del>	<del>Portuguese African Territories</del>	<del>8</del>	<del>Secret</del>
<del>58a</del>	<del>02/13/64</del>	<del>Airgram 349 from Lisbon</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del>
<del>58b</del>	<del>02/05/64</del>	<del>MemCon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Confidential</del>
<del>60</del>	<del>03/19/64</del>	<del>Memo for Bundy from Read</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Confidential</del>

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I  
 AGENCY: Department of State

ITEM NOS.	DATE	IDENTIFICATION	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
<del>26</del>	<del>02/14/64</del>	<del>Embtel 648 from Lisbon</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>State 6-19-79 agen 6-27-79 Secret (Gp 1)</del>
<del>27</del>	<del>02/29/64</del>	<del>Airgram 378 from Lisbon</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>29</del>	<del>04/18/64</del>	<del>Embtel 813 from Lisbon</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 3)</del>
<del>30</del>	<del>04/22/64</del>	<del>Embtel 820 from Lisbon</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>32</del>	<del>04/20/64</del>	<del>Deptel 654 to Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>33</del>	<del>05/06/64</del>	<del>Embtel 865 from Lisbon</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>34</del>	<del>05/09/64</del>	<del>Deptel 672 from Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>35</del>	<del>05/09/64</del>	<del>Airgram 520 from Lisbon</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 3)</del>
<del>35a</del>	<del>04/17/64</del>	<del>MemCon: Portuguese Africa</del>	<del>7</del>	<del>Confidential</del>
<del>40</del>	<del>06/18/64</del>	<del>Deptel 758 to Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 1)</del>
<del>41</del>	<del>07/03/64</del>	<del>Deptel 18 to New York</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 3)</del>
<del>42</del>	<del>07/10/64</del>	<del>Embtel 15 from Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>43</del>	<del>07/31/64</del>	<del>Embtel 74 from Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 3)</del>
<del>44</del>	<del>07/31/64</del>	<del>Embtel 78 from Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>45</del>	<del>07/31/64</del>	<del>Embtel 79 from Lisbon</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 3)</del>
<del>46</del>	<del>12/16/63</del>	<del>MemCon: US Portuguese Relations</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret</del>
48	05/03/64	Memo: Portuguese-African Territories	11	Secret (Gp 1)
49	05/12/64	Embtel 18 from The Hague	1	Conf. (Gp 1)
50	12/04/63	Memo for Bundy from Belk	1	Secret
51	12/04/63	Memo for Bundy from Belk	1	Confidential
51a	12/03/63	Embtel 2324 from New York	2	Conf. (Gp 3)
52	12/05/63	Memo for Bundy from Belk	1	Confidential
53	12/05/63	Memo for Bundy from Belk	1	Secret

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I

<u>ITEM NOS.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<del>5</del>	<del>12/03/63</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 4)</del>
<del>11</del>	<del>12/12/63</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 4)</del>
28	03/07/64	3	U
<del>31</del>	<del>05/01/64</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 4)</del>
<del>37</del>	<del>06/05/64</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 4)</del>
<del>38</del>	<del>06/05/64</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 4)</del>
<del>55a</del>	<del>12/09/63</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Conf. (Gp 4)</del>
47	03/03/64	1	U
47a	Undated	17	U
<del>50a</del>	<del>12/03/63</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 4)</del>
<del>53a</del>	<del>12/04/63</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 4)</del>
58	02/19/64	1	U
59	02/20/64	2	U
61a	05/20/64	2	U
65	05/25/64	1	U

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20	Undated	1	U
21	02/01/64	1	U
23	Undated	1	U
39	06/10/64	1	U
61	05/21/64	1	U
63	05/26/64	1	U

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I  
 AGENCY: Central Intelligence Agency

ITEM NOS.	DATE	IDENTIFICATION	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
<del>36</del>	<del>05/22/64</del>	<del>Special Report</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 1)</del> CIA Ltr 12-8-75
<del>39a</del>	<del>06/08/64</del>	<del>Memo No. 9 64</del>	<del>11</del>	<del>Secret (Gp 1)</del> CIA Ltr 12-8-75

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I  
 AGENCY: Department of the Navy

ITEM NOS.	DATE	IDENTIFICATION	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
<del>56</del>	<del>[01/23/--]</del>	<del>Memo of Information for the Secretary of the Navy from Craighill</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Secret</del> Navy ltr 12-15-75

FILE: National Security Files - Country File - Portugal, Vol. I  
AGENCY: Department of State

ITEM NOS.	DATE	IDENTIFICATION	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
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Open 2-2-01 NLJ00-112	11/26/63	Embte1 427 from Canberra	1	Secret
	12/02/63	Embte1 2300 from USUN NY	2	Conf. (Gp 3)
	11/30/63	Deptel: Action: USUN NY	1	Conf. (Gp 3)
	12/03/63	Deptel 372 to Lisbon	2	Conf. (Gp 3)
	12/04/63	Embte1 138 from Sao Paulo	1	Conf. (Gp 3)
	12/05/63	Embte1 484 from Lisbon	1	Conf. (Gp 3)
	12/06/63	Embte1 493 from Lisbon	2	Conf. (Gp 3)
	12/10/63	Deptel 1692 to Bonn	1	Confidential
	12/11/63	Deptel 1676 to New York	3	Confidential
	12/23/63	Deptel 424 to Lisbon	1	Conf. (Gp 1)
	01/17/64	Deptel 444 to Lisbon	6	Conf. (Gp 3)
	01/20/64	Embte1 574 from Lisbon	1	Secret (Gp 3)
	01/21/64	Embte1 575 from Lisbon	1	Secret (Gp 1)
	01/22/64	Embte1 374 from Abidjan	2	Secret
	01/24/64	Embte1 591 from Lisbon	4	Secret (Gp 3)
	01/27/64	Deptel 464 to Lisbon	1	Secret (Gp 1)
	01/27/64	Deptel 465 to Lisbon	1	Secret
	01/30/64	Embte1 600 from Lisbon	1	Secret (Gp 1)
Open 2-2-01 NLJ00-112	01/31/64	Embte1 603 from Lisbon	1	Secret
	02/04/64	Deptel 477 to Lisbon	1	Confidential
	02/06/64	Embte1 404 from Addijan	1	Secret
	02/06/64	Embte1 620 from Lisbon	1	Secret (Gp 3)
	02/06/64	Embte1 404 from Abidjan	1	Secret

## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

*Portugal*

43

Action

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Control: 17421

Rec'd: November 26, 1963  
10:28 p.m.

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FROM: Canberra

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 427, November 23, 11 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 00-112  
By CB, NARA Date 1-29-01

ACTION DEPARTMENT 427; INFORMATION DJAKARTA 43, LISBON 1,  
CINCPAC UNNUMBERED.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD.

Acting Secretary of External Affairs Waller informed DCM that GOA efforts to persuade Portuguese to relax colonialist grip on Timor had reached impasse.

Waller said Prime Minister has sent his personal communication to Premier Salazar pointing to dangers inherent in Timor situation unless Lisbon takes initiative to decolonize the territory, preferably with introduction of U.N. presence. Recently GOA representative in U.N. had discussions with Portuguese Foreign Minister upshot of which was Portuguese request to GOA to cease its approaches with reference to Timor. Foreign Minister charged GOA with desire terminate Portuguese control over Timor in order turn over to Indonesians. Waller said this was patently false charge but he believed impossible to reason with Portuguese on this issue. Waller said he would recommend to Barwick that GOA continue low-key attempt influence Portuguese Timor policy with little hope however that much would be accomplished.

Additional purpose for continuing contacts with Portuguese on Timor issue, according Waller, would be to provide record (for Australian public) of GOA efforts to achieve solution other than a sudden takeover by Indonesia in the event latter took place.

ba/4.

~~SECRET~~

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

BATTLE  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

2  
Copy given Bundy  
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staff summary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2300 DEC 2 2 PM

PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

WHEN QUESTION OF PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES COMES BEFORE SC, PROBABLY WEEK OF DEC. 2, WE WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY RECOVER MUCH OF OUR WEAKENED INFLUENCE WITH AFRO-ASIANS SIMPLY BY CARRYING THROUGH VIGOROUSLY ON WHAT IS ALREADY US POLICY. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, WE MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FOL FACTS:

1. WE HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING ARMS TO PORTUGAL UNDER MAP TO DEFEND WE AGAINST SOV AGGRESSION.
2. WE KNOW THAT LARGE QUANTITIES, AND AFRICANS KNOW THAT SOME, OF THESE ARMS ARE IN FACT BEING USED BY PORTUGAL AGAINST AFRICAN NATIONALISTS IN THEIR COLONIES. MORE DETAILS WILL INCREASINGLY BE AVAILABLE TO AFRICANS AND WILL EMBARRASS US. SOVS HAVE ALREADY SCORED SOME POINTS BY REFERRING TO F-86S PORTUGAL HAS DIVERTED TO AFRICA. IT ONLY QUESTION OF TIME -- PROBABLY IN FORTHCOMING SC -- THAT WE WILL HAVE TO ANSWER SPECIFIC CHARGES OF THIS SORT.
3. PORTUGAL IS DOING ALL THIS IN VIOLATION OF ITS EXISTING AGREEMENT WITH US. AFRICANS KNOW THIS BUT SUSPECT IT BEING DONE WITH OUR TACIT APPROVAL.
4. USE TO WHICH THESE ARMS BEING PUT IS THEREFORE CONTRARY TO US NATIONAL INTEREST. INSTEAD OF DETERRING SOV AGGRESSION IN EUROPE, THESE WEAPONS NOW SERVING SOV PURPOSES BY UNDERMINING OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH 32 AFRICAN STATES.
5. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD SEEM WE HAVE NO CHOICE -- IN TERMS OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By g/m, NARA, Date 3-29-00

000706  
1963 DEC 2 PM 3 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2300, DECEMBER 2, 2 PM, FROM: NEW YORK

BUT TO TAKE THESE STEPS: (A) REQUEST PORTUGAL'S IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE WITH TERMS OF OUR AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD MEAN AT LEAST RETURNING TO PORTUGAL ALL MAP EQUIPMENT SENT TO AFRICA SINCE JULY 1961 AND IMPOSING STRICT US END USE CHECKS TO PREVENT DIVERSION TO AFRICA OF FUTURE MAP EQUIPMENT. IF PORTUGAL COOPERATES WE COULD THEN INFORM SC OF DETAILS OF US POLICY AND OF WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INSURE US ARMS UNDER MAP ARE NOT BEING USED FOR OTHER THAN NATO PURPOSES. (B) IF PORTUGUESE REFUSE TO COMPLY WE SHOULD INFORM SC OF OUR FULL POLICY AND STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN WITH PORTUGAL., WE MIGHT ALSO INFORM PORTUGUESE PRIVATELY THAT WE WILL SUSPEND ALL FURTHER ARMS SHIPMENTS TO PORTUGAL UNTIL THEY COMPLY WITH PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENT, INCLUDING RETURN OF F-86S.

6. IF WE VALUE OUR INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION FOR MEANING WHAT WE SAY, IT HARD TO SEE AT THIS POINT HOW WE CAN AFFORD TO DO ANYTHING LESS.

GP-3. STEVENSON

BT

CFN 2300 2 2 2 1 2 F-86S 3 4 32 51961 F-86S 6 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
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EEMAN  
DUNGAN  
ECKEL  
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JOHNSON  
KILDUFF  
KOBIN  
KOMER  
SAUNDERS  
SCHLESINGER  
SMITH, WM. Y.

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Bundy

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33

Origin

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Info

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ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 1585

INFO: Amembassy LISBON

FILE COPY<sup>369</sup>

2277

Dec 2 2 58 PM '63

We note according URTEL/there seems to be some prospect that SC session on Portuguese territories can be concluded after short debate by Council reaffirming desirability of further direct negotiations. Request you do what you can which discreetly to encourage such outcome/would be most desirable. In fact, we do not consider any ~~KAM~~ other SC action at this time would be appropriate or ~~HEM~~ conducive to further talks, encouragement of which remains ~~our~~ an <sup>US</sup> immediate policy objective.

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 6/10/76

By Smg., NARS, Date 8/5/76

11/30/63

Drafted by

IO: UNP: EABrown; WBBuffum: aam

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

IO - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances

AF - Mr. Strong

EUR - Captain Freeman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dept 4/10/74

By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/74

36

Origin  
IO  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON  
INFO: USUN, New York

372  
1597

IMMEDIATE

~~PRIORITY~~

Dec 3 12 28 PM '63

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US ARMS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES

US continues be seriously disturbed at repeated indications that equipment US origin being used in Portuguese African territories, and especially concerned by shipment of F-86's to Guinea last AUG. We have come under attack in recent 4th CMTE debate on Portuguese territories and expect that attacks will continue in Security Council, which will probably convene DEC 5 on Portuguese territories question. We especially concerned that public knowledge (New York's 2150 being RPTD Lisbon) that F-86's now in Portuguese Africa makes it increasingly difficult defend US position.

Strong US statement in UN in 1961 on our unequivocal opposition to use of US-supplied military equipment in Portuguese Africa, reiterated in 1962, along with public announcement our 1961 requests for Portuguese assurances of non-diversion, should leave no doubt US position. Portuguese may, however, not be fully aware of importance we attach to matter. In any event,

Drafted by: TO: UNP: RHEdwards: WBBuffum/ck

Clearances: AF - Mr. Fredericks (in substance)

AF - Mr. Strong  
G/PM - Mr. Meyers  
S/S - Mr. Hilliker

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EUR - Mr. Burdett/  
~~XXXXXX~~  
~~XXXXXX~~

The Under Secretary

(in draft)

IO - Mr. Sisco

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we have been waiting for several months for GOP to clarify status MAP items in Africa. We anxious have this clarification.

We desire prevent Portuguese miscalculation re US position which could encourage future arms diversion. Moreover, we must be able demonstrate convincingly in SC that our assurances in UN re limitations on supply of arms to Portugal have been given in good faith and that we attach great importance to their being honored. Portuguese good faith also in issue since Nogueira stated in SC July 1963 "we have not used in any Portuguese territory any arms or ammunition supplied by NATO countries or which may have been supplied to us for NATO purposes."

You should therefore make immediate formal approach to GOP <sup>early</sup> requesting ~~prompt~~ return to the metropole of F-86's reported to be in Portuguese Guinea. In this connection, you should make reference to our 1961 request for assurances of non-diversion and to our repeated statements since then that MAP arms should not be deployed to Portuguese Africa. Using DEPTTEL 80 as appropriate, you should also recall repeated queries we have made re F-86's and tell FONMIN we would appreciate early clarification of status MAP items in Portuguese Africa which he promised supply several months ago.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

### Origin

Dec 3 4 38 PM '63

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GP-4

DECLASSIFIED

RUSK

By IP, NARS, Date 10-31-75

**Drafted by:**

EUR:WE:EJBeigelXX:cv

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

THE UNDER SECRETARY

~~X X P H A X Y A C T E X N O X X S I G N E R E K D C W~~

**Clearances:**

WE - Mr. Meloy

GER - Mr. Finn

AFC - Mr. Looram

EUR - Mr. Burdett

L-consulted re versionary rights. S/S - Mr. Hilliker

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FILE COPY

6

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58

Action  
IO

DECLASSIFIED

Control:

2528

Rec'd:

December 4, 1963

Authority State Ltr 6/10/74  
By Shu, NARS, Date 8/5/74

2:53 p.m.

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FROM: Sao Paulo  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 138, December 4, 5 p.m.

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KLEIN  
KOMER  
SAUNDERS  
SCHLESINGER  
SMITH, WM. Y.

IMMEDIATE

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT 138, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 96,  
LISBON 4, USUN 3.

Reference: URTEL 204 and 183.

Captain Henrique Galvao has presented valid stateless person passport bearing exit visa authorized Ministry Justice Brazil stating purpose departure is appearance before UN New York, and granting permission return Brazil. Galvao states he must appear UN latest Monday December 9. Plans departure from Rio Saturday December 7 0145 ETA New York Idlewild 1155 Argentine Airlines Flight 350.

He apparently does not expect be met by friends on arrival. Anticipates press may seek interview, though Galvao apparently not inclined to take initiative.

CONGEN suggests that, if nonimmigrant visa authorized and it is desired minimize press contacts, arrangements might be made for his attorneys or friends to meet him at airport and offer secluded accomodations on excuse enhance personal safety. Galvao apparently short of funds and might be inclined accept.

Request guidance issue visa.

GP-3.

LYON

KEA:18

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0, 12-4-63, 3:27 p.m.

Note: Passed White House 12-4-63, 3:35 p.m.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

*Portugal* 7

39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 2993

Rec'd: December 5, 1963  
7:21 a.m.

IO

Info

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FROM: Lisbon

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 484, December 5, 11 a.m.

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 484, INFORMATION PRIORITY USUN 127.

Reference: DEPTTEL 372.

Last evening I personally made strong representations to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira and left aide-memoire (text being pouched) for immediate return MAP F-86's from Africa, emphasizing US position re arms diversion. Foreign Minister appeared uncomfortable GOP position this matter and impressed by urgency, persistency and firmness US attitude. He promised discuss further with GOP Defense officials and provide reply.

He made strong point that in UN no pressure ever put on Africans stop support training and basing terrorists in their countries for operations in Portuguese territories, stating this in fact is real threat to the peace.

Will advise further developments.

GP-3.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Br. 6/10/76  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

ANDERSON

REE

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

8  
Bundy  
Portugal

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 4456

IO

Rec'd: December 6, 1963  
4:59 p.m.

Info

FROM: Lisbon

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 493, December 6, 6 p.m.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 6/10/76  
By Chiu, NARS, Date 8/5/76

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 493; INFORMATION PRIORITY USUN 133.

Reference: EMBTEL 484.

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira unexpectedly called me to Foreign Ministry noon today and lodged strongly worded protest over alleged reception Holden Roberto by US Mission. Cited information available GOP that Roberto visited USUN December 5 despite previous official USG assurances that he would not be received at Department or USUN. Foreign Minister seemed exceptionally agitated over this, and I suggested he not leap to conclusions. While stating I found it difficult believe Roberto actually received by USUN, I admitted possibility he might have sought audience there and said that I would of course report Foreign Minister's concern to Department and endeavor ascertain true facts. Meanwhile, I urged him resist hasty hypothetical judgments on basis unsubstantiated reports.

In view importance attached by GOP and in light of policy set forth first paragraph. CA-14448 of June 24, 1963, request that I be informed soonest whether Roberto did in fact visit USUN recently and if so full circumstances.

As part same conversation Foreign Minister stated Holden Roberto also called on SYG and it was rumored he might be asked appear before SC during current discussion

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-2- 493, December 6, 6 p.m., from: Lisbon

Portuguese Africa. Franco Nogueira said visit to SYG would be subject separate protest to latter by Garin. Added that if Roberto (whom Portuguese hold directly responsible for over thousand killings by terrorists early 1961) were accorded status before SC reaction here could be so strong as to lead to GOP withdrawal from UN (I again warned Foreign Minister against hasty conclusions and actions on basis incomplete or unsubstantiated reports).

Immediately after foregoing discussion I asked Franco Nogueira rather bluntly about GOP reply to my demarche (EMBTEL 484) on F-86 aircraft in Portuguese Guinea. He responded that substance official reply which would soon reach us in that:

- (A) F-86s in Portuguese Guinea being withdrawn from all operations;
- (B) Long distance precluded their return Continental Portuguese by air; and
- (C) Aircraft will be disassembled, crated and shipped here by sea.

Confirmation will be provided soon as amplifying information or official GOP response received.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

MRJ/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

04845

*Portugal*

Dec 10 7 13 PM '63

57

Origin  
EUR

ACTION: Amembassy, BONN

1692

Info:

INFO: Amembassy, LISBON

385

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

Your 2010

We prefer avoid discussing matter Portuguese T-6's already in Africa with FRG, but if Fonoff poses question cited reftel Embassy should reply that according info available Dept aircraft acquired from European sources several years ago, before present situation Portuguese territories existed. We were not informed of trans- actions at time they took place. END.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Cti. 6/10/76

By smg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

Drafted by: EUR/WE:REBarbour:cs 12/10

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

WE - E. J. Beigel

Clearances:

AFC - Mr. Loomer  
GER - Mr. Finn

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

05511

*Portugal*

Dec 11 7 11 PM '63

57

Origin

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 1676

IO

Info

Ambassy LISBON PRIORITY 387

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RMR

Portuguese Charge ~~De~~ <sup>Mr</sup> ~~Rose~~ called at his request on Deputy Assistant Secretary Sisco December 11 re US vote on SC RES concerning Portuguese Territories. Charge hoped US would abstain on this RES ~~at~~ it had in July. Said present SC RES was similar to one in July in which US abstained. ~~XXXXXX~~ Referred in particular to ~~XXXXXX~~ arms & embargo PARA which he thought had been major factor in US abstention in July. Charge noted Portuguese view that change of vote would be interpreted as change in US policy.

Sisco informed Charge of US decision to vote affirmatively. Explained in detail our reasons emphasizing our belief that RES offers opportunities for resumption of talks since definition of self-determination in RES leaves Following points open various options. ~~Following~~ are major/ of Sisco presentation:

Stressed RES  
1. ~~XXXXXX~~/first what ~~XXXXXX~~/does not contain: ~~XXXXXX~~ no sanctions; ~~XXXXXX~~ no language describing/situation as threat to peace, which would place RES under Chapter VII of UN Charter; ~~XXXXXX~~ such words/as "condemnation" ~~XXXXXX~~ to describe Portuguese ~~XXXXXX~~ policy or attitude. In historical context of RESES on this question these omissions are important.

2. RES makes reference to UN GA RES 1541, which describes self-determination in terms of three separate options, not just independence.

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:PWKriebel:cab

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

UNP-Mr. Buffum

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~INRxxxxMr. Buffum~~

Clearances:

EUR/WE - Mr. Barbour

~~UNP-Mr. Buffum~~

IO - Mr. Sisco

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Authority State ltr. 6/10/76

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

By lhur, NARS, Date 8/5/74

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This is significant departure from past practice.

3. ~~The~~ US worked extremely hard for this moderate RES. USG was particularly concerned over operative Para one which in original form placed exclusive responsibility on Portugal for breakdown in talks with Africans. This ~~is~~ Para changed as result of personal appeals from Secretary to sponsors.

4. USG ~~was~~ was able to change operative Para ~~reaffirms~~ <sup>reaffirming</sup> SC RES of July to preambular Para simply recalling this RES.

5. USG has reservations/~~over~~ <sup>about</sup> operative para three which deprecates non-compliance GOP with July SC RES. We will make clear in explanation of vote that our position on July SC RES has not changed, <sup>i.e.</sup> ~~but~~ there are portions of it with which we do not agree. (US subsequently abstained on PARA 3.)

6. Operative Para ~~is~~ four re self-determination is most important Para in RES and provides basis for resumption Portuguese-African talks. Definitely leaves <sup>various</sup> open/options of self-determination. US in explanation of vote will make explicit <sup>explaining</sup> statement in Council ~~explaining~~ our interpretation this Para. Hope Portugal will consider this Para useful.  
~~might be useful to the extent of this Para~~

7. Operative Para seven ~~requests~~ <sup>does so</sup> which requests SYG to continue his efforts sums up entire RES. Requests SYG to seek continuation talks but ~~states~~ <sup>states</sup> in such way as not to be prejudicial to Portuguese position. ~~Moreover, /GOP favors~~ <sup>Moreover, /GOP favors</sup> This consistent with GOP attitude toward SYG's ~~participation~~ contribution.

In rebuttal Charge said he would prefer US not vote affirmatively since change in vote over July will be regarded as change in policy. GOP objects to repeated resolutions in UN at its expense. He noted that Portuguese-African talks are ~~quite~~

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independent of SC RES. Reiterated view that arms embargo was major element in  
 US decision abstain on July RES. <sup>Added</sup> ~~xx XXXXX~~/that vote is important thing not ex-  
 planatory statement. US abstention would help Portuguese efforts to continue  
 talks with Africans.

Responding, Sisco stressed that present RES represents triumph of moderate  
 African States over ~~xxxx~~ extremists. ~~xxx~~ US affirmative vote is not change in  
 policy. RES reflects US position because it recognizes range of options for  
 self-determination and is consonant with our arms policy. Sisco concluded he  
 earnestly hoped Charge would report conversation/~~in full~~ Views expressed  
 had been very carefully weighed. USG convinced RES of considerable value to GOP.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal*

11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45  
Action CONTRL: 8709  
IO REC D: DECEMBER 12, 1963, 8:45 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By IP, NARS, Date 10-31-75

Info  
SS FROM: NEW YORK  
G  
SP TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

L  
H  
AF 2474 DECEMBER 12, 8 PM  
EUR

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USIA ACTION DEPARTMENT 2474, INFORMATION PARIS 138.  
INR  
O

RMR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

IN EXPLAINING TO YOST YESTERDAY HIS ABSTENTION ON SC RES CONCERNING PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES, SEYDOUX INDICATED THIS HAD BEEN PERSONAL DECISION OF GEN DE GAULLE. HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH DE GAULLE DURING LATTER'S ATTENDANCE AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S FUNERAL BOTH SOUTH AFRICAN AND PORTUGUESE QUESTIONS, WHICH WERE ABOUT TO COME BEFORE SC. THE GENERAL HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG WITH MAJORITY VIEW N SOUTH AFRICA BUT HAD TAKEN DIFFERENT VIEW ON PORTUGAL. HE SAID PORTUGUESE GOVT IS VULNERABLE INTERNALLY AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD TAKE NO STEP WHICH MIGHT WEAKEN IT. HE CONSIDERED PORTUGUESE GOVT HAD SHOWN SIGNS OF GOOD WILL VIS-A-VIS AFRICANS AND THIS WAS GOOD OCCASION FOR SHOWING AFRICANS THAT PORTUGAL'S ALLIES WOULD NOT LET THEMSELVES BE PUSHED TOO FAR ON THIS SUBJECT. SEYDOUX PRESUMED THEREFORE THAT, THOUGH HE INFORMED PARIS WELL IN ADVANCE THAT FRANCE WOULD BE ISOLATED, GENERAL INSISTED ON MAINTAINING HIS POSITION.

SEYDOUX ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ADVANCE CONSULTATION AMONG WASHINGTON, LONDON AND PARIS ON ISSUES OF THIS KIND WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN FUTURE.

GP-4.

STEVENSON

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01538 <sup>12</sup>

*Portugal*

JAN 5 2 11 PM '64

Origin  
EUR

ACTION: ~~Amembassy~~, LISBON 424

INFO: USUN 1809

Info:

SS

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IO

MC

INR

NAVY

RMR

FOR ANDERSON FROM THE ~~SECRETARY~~ Under Secretary

Dept plans inform Portuguese Naval Attache that on basis new information supplied by him on Dec 17 (two memcons pouched) and subsequently confirmed by Chief Naval Staff personally to you, we withdrawing previous objections to sale six three <sup>fifty</sup> ~~pound~~ inch/naval guns and related fire control systems.

via a vis

We desire use this to maximum effect/~~WILKINSON~~ LORAN-C. Consequently we shall defer conveying foregoing to Naval Attache in order give you opportunity use it for this purpose to greatest advantage in Lisbon.

Report promptly when conveyed GOP so we may inform Naval Attache.

END

GP-1.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 4/10/76  
By Smey, NARS, Date 8/5/76

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:REBarbour:rms 12/23/63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Under

The Secretary

Clearances:

MC - Mr. Margrave

~~AFC - Mr. Godley~~

EUR - Mr. Tyler

RPM - Mr. Conroy

EUR/RPM - Mr. Van Hollen

G - Mr. Johnson

Navy - Capt Calvert

S/S-Carol Moore

C/PM - H. Meyers

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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57

DECLASSIFIED

Origin  
EUR

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 444

Authority State Ch. 4/10/76

Jan 17 6 06 PM '64

Info:

INFO: USUN 1865

By smey NARS, Date 8/5/76

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Amembassy Leopoldville

By pouch

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Amembassy MADRID

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By pouch

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Amconsul ~~Amembassy~~ LOURENCO MARQUES

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Lisbon's 559

IOP

You should seek early appointment with Fonmin and, if you believe it advisable, Primin Salazar, to consult on following problem.

INR

RMR

Developments in early months 1964 could significantly affect future course events in Portuguese territories. In first place, it clear from growing Chicom presence and Chou En-lai visits that Red China embarking on major political offensive in Africa. This will see Chicom effort to identify themselves with African movements and to increase their influence among nationalist groups by generous offers of assistance. Recent reports of GRAE leader Roberto's intention accept these offers show that Chicom offensive cannot fail affect situation in Portuguese territories. This in Chicom view is made-to-order situation pitting non-whites against

European,

Drafted by: IO:UNP:REDwards

Telegraphic transmission and

M - Governor Harriman

EUR:WE:REBarbour:cs:

classification approved by:

~~The Secretary~~ The Under

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Tupper

Mr. Burdett

FE - Mr. Green

Secretary

~~XXXXXX~~

IO - Mr. Cleveland

AF - Governor Williams

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S Mr. Hilliker

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European, NATO power in "liberation struggle" which offers glittering opportunity deal blow to West and at same time assert superiority Chicom revolutionary ideology over that of USSR.

Second, African Fonmin meeting late February will be in effect caucus to outline strategy on Portugal and other issues. Once African line set and announced, flexibility African moderates these issues seriously curtailed. If meeting took place today result would probably be hardened African stance reflecting growing opinion among African states that Portuguese policies antagonistic to ~~legitimate~~ aspirations peoples Portuguese territories.

These two elements show that situation in overseas provinces becoming more acute, as Under Secretary Ball had predicted, and that moves along lines suggested by Under Secretary more necessary than ~~was~~ before. For this reason we desire consult GOP on problem and to solicit suggestions for dealing with it. We also have proposals to make as to immediate actions which we hope will be received as serious expressions of our concern at a trend of events we consider adverse for Portugal unless new elements injected into it.

We believe one of most hopeful elements which would in the first instance seize initiative and encourage African response would be Portuguese move encouraging resumption Portuguese-African dialogue under UNSYG auspices. Review of Fonmin's statements in Washington indicate, GOP prepared meet again with African reps on condition that there

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

be no conditions. While some Africans reportedly prepared urge resumption on this basis, majority maintain talks futile without some Portuguese acknowledgment that self-determination is valid political goal for peoples its African territories. ~~Six~~ Fonmin has acknowledged that definition self-determination contained UNGA resolution 1514 and reaffirmed in SC res S/5481 of December 11, 1963, ("All peoples have right to self-determination; by virtue that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development") <sup>has advantages for Portugal (USUN 2502).</sup> ~~is good definition compatible with Portuguese status and interests.~~ We believe Portugal disserving own interests by refusing become advocate this principle. Moreover, S/5481 also reaffirmed that self-determination offers options of sovereign independence, association or integration with independent states, thereby meeting Fonmin's insistence that independence not be posed as sole option.

You should therefore propose to Fonmin and/or Salazar that GOP make early public statement endorsing self-determination in this sense as goal Portuguese policies and programs. If Portugal were to make such a statement, US efforts to bring about resumption of talks and place difficulties in way Chicom penetration would be greatly strengthened. If Portuguese have alternate suggestions which would contribute achievement these goals, we would be pleased receive them.

In presenting above proposal you may in your discretion also draw on following:

1. Secretary recently told Nogueira in Paris that we keenly aware

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

progress made by Portugal in Africa last year and we regret GOP not making best case for itself internationally. Continued Portuguese rejection self-determination seems unnecessarily injurious its cause in light current reforms (Luanda's A-107).

2. Weeks ahead will be optimum time for Portugal make unilateral gesture unattributable external pressures.

3. As Secretary made clear at Paris, we strongly deprecate violations of Portuguese territories' borders. Our support of self-determination in no sense implies our support of interventionist or expansionist aspirations or predatory attacks in any form by one nation against territory of another. This position has been set forth publicly and privately. This position, and approaches we have made to Congolese ~~ANNEX~~ and certain Africans in same sense and to warn of Chicom subversion are responsive to Franco Nogueira's insistence that US make same efforts with others as we make with Portugal. However, our chances for success in any approaches we ~~may~~ might make to Africans would be limited without Portuguese statement on self-determination.

4. In event Portuguese do make a forthright statement accenting self-determination (as defined by UN SC RES S/5481), we would <sup>publicly</sup> ~~naturally~~ be prepared/to welcome this development ~~publicly~~ to urge ~~again~~ Africans participate in discussions with the Portuguese, and to

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reiterate our view that they should eschew force in pressing for ~~peaceful~~ change in Portuguese territories.

(FYI) For your background and such use with Portuguese as you may deem appropriate, following is assessment of Congo-Angola interaction:

More than 250,000 Africans have moved from Angolan territory to Congo. Border is vast and we assume its control is extremely difficult. As GOP knows we have repeatedly pointed out to GOC our aversion to violent actions and our hope that Angolan problems will find peaceful solution. Congolese leaders have indicated their personal hopes that such solution might be found, but at same time are faced with great internal and external pressures to favor nationalists and hasten settlement. We shall continue make these views known to GOC leaders. However, it must be realized that our capability in this ~~domain~~ domain has definite limitations; USG in any event convinced that in unlikely hypothesis Adoula and other moderate Congolese leaders were to take strong measures against Angolan nationalist, their Government would be short lived and would be replaced by less moderate regime which would probably soon turn to Communists for guidance and support. Present GOC recently indicated their concern re Chicom involvement with Angolan nationalists and stated that Chicom technicians would not be welcome in Congo. (END FYI)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~XXXX~~ Should Franco Nogueira question you re possibility Portuguese recourse to Security Council, for example, on K Cabinda incident, you should reply in accord memo being forwarded you by Cleveland. You should point out that SC might well follow pattern of 1946 UN Commission to investigate Greek border incidents. Commission given broad mandate conduct investigation in all areas concerned and elucidate causes and nature border violations. Africans likely press hard for including authority examine "underlying causes", i.e., issue self-determination in terms reference UN body created to investigate Portuguese complaint.

END

GP-3

RUSK

NOTE: Pouched by OCT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal* 14

~~SECRET~~

55  
Action

Control: 13840  
Rec'd: January 20, 1964  
2:22 p.m.

55  
Info

FROM: Lisbon

ACTION: Secstate 574

037

INFO: Madrid 23

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 6/10/76  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

DATE: January 20, 6 p.m.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

I have noted column in NEW YORK TIMES of January 17 quoting Portuguese representative in Madrid stated GOP considering recognition Communist China. Have been informed source is Foreign Minister himself to Paul Hofmann, NEW YORK TIMES correspondent Madrid. We are probing his intentions and whether this maneuver is related to reported similar action on part of France. Will advise soonest practicable.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

MRJ/4

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15

*Portugal*  
*WID*

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Action

Control: 14651  
Rec'd: January 21, 1964  
10:51 a.m.

SS  
Info

FROM: Lisbon

ACTION: Secstate 575 Priority

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003

INFO: Madrid 24  
Paris 45  
Taipei 5

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 4/10/74  
By kmw, NARS, Date 8/5/74

DATE: January 21, 2 p.m.

As Embassy convinced GOP informed by GOF of their decision recognize Peking, DCM in discussion with Fragoso January 20 presented points outlined DEPCIRTEL 1269. He also stressed depth of feeling in US about CHICOM regime growing out historical lies with China as well as losses in Korean war. Fragoso did not take exception to any this presentation but also declined admit that GOP had been informed of French decision. On one occasion, however, he referred to CHICOMS as being "slippery".

EMBOFF also broached subject January 17 article in NY TIMES (EMBTTEL 564). Fragoso stated he could say nothing about this except he had not had conversation with newspaperman on this subject in Madrid. When EMBOFF said that left Nogueira, he smiled knowingly. He did add that we would not wake up tomorrow morning to find that GOP had recognized CHICOM regime.

Comment: Although Embassy does not underestimate influence of French on Portuguese, doubtful GOP presently seriously contemplating recognition Peking regime. While more probably there is aspect of gamesmanship in Nogueira's statements to NY TIMES correspondent, it is possible GOP might be restudying this question in view FONMIN's personal interest in Far Eastern Affairs and Portugal position in Macau. Ambassador therefore plans reiterate US point of view when he next sees Foreign Minister.

GP-1.  
HMR/4

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NOTE: HANDLED AS EXDIS PER SS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*F 16  
W HB  
Action  
SS  
Info~~SECRET~~Control: 16162  
Rec'd: January 22, 1964  
5:10 p.m.

FROM: Abidjan

ACTION: SecState 374

EXDIS

DATE: January 22, 6 p.m.

002

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. GuidelinesEXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION GOVERNOR HARRIMAN By *Julia* NARA, Date 3-29-00

In consultation with Secretary early January, we discussed possible role of Houphouet in advancing solution to Portuguese territories problem. Last night in context of review of Angola problem, Houphouet voluntarily expressed his interest in receiving a Portuguese mission in the Ivory Coast. He sees purpose of visit to show Portuguese that mutually profitable relationships can be established between African state and former metropole as in Ivory Coast. In view of delicate nature of such a proposal and in view earlier GOIC initiative this regard he insisted that initial contact must come from Portugal. He suggested, however, US could plant seed of such idea and assure Portugal that Ivory Coast would welcome visit of a Portuguese mission. Once Portugal had made opening move, Houphouet would have to pave way through contacts with selected African colleagues.

As background, Houphouet explained he had made contact through third country with Portugal last year inviting a Portuguese mission to visit the Ivory Coast. Although his initiative courteously received, Portugal did not respond to the invitation. He continues believe he could be help in convincing GOP that only two alternatives are open to them: That of Algeria where drawn out war resulted in no gain for parent country and colony driven away from metropole toward socialism; and that of Ivory Coast where good relations maintained to mutual benefit metropole and former colony.

/Houphouet indicated

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-2- 374, January 22, 6 p.m., from Abidjan

Houphouet indicated his willingness to receive Holden Roberto in separate attempt to demonstrate benefits of cooperation between Africans and metropole and advantages to be gained by retaining trained cadres from metropole after independence. Houphouet thinks Roberto's overtures to Chinese Communists intended only as gesture at this time. There is precedent for visit by Roberto in several recent visits to Abidjan by Amilca Cabral of Portuguese Guinea who was received by Houphouet.

I believe Houphouet's proposal that we act as intermediary deserves serious consideration. There is, of course, danger that Portuguese will distort Ivoirien contact in such a way as to hurt Ivory Coast among other Africans and thus weaken Houphouet's consistent pro-US influence in Africa. Also possible that Houphouet will find reactions other African chiefs of state so hostile he will be forced to call off visit. Houphouet surely aware of these dangers and, I believe, sincerely considers risk worth taking. If mission to have any hope of avoiding these pitfalls and achieving gains, our contacts with Portuguese will require utmost care. Question of relative timing Portuguese and Roberto's visits important in view sensitivities both parties. Composition of Portuguese delegation crucial element mission success. Despite above problems I believe this opportunity should be explored especially in view Houphouet persuasive-ness when dealing with small group.

WINE

LM

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal* 17

33-32

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Action

Control: 18117

Rec'd: January 24, 1964

5:55 P.M.

EUR

DECLASSIFIED

Info

FROM: Lisbon

Authority State Ltr. 6/10/74

SS

ACTION: Secstate 591

By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

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SP

DATE: January 24, 8 P.M. (SECTION I OF II)

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IOP

INR

I met with Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira this morning discussing with him current Portuguese-American problems exclusive of Azores and request for Consulate in Beira, both of which I felt were untimely. Foreign Minister in calm, relaxed mood listened attentively before talking.

RMR

First subject was desirability of unilateral Portuguese move on self-determination in which I presented all items mentioned Department telegram 444 plus relation this matter to recent press statement by U Thant in which he excused himself for not visiting Portuguese Africa due to wide divergence interpretations "self-determination". Foreign Minister said he would give arguments serious consideration but reiterated his personal belief no dramatic move at this time would be helpful to Portugal. This I countered with forceful statement immediate future time for action more than any other of which I could conceive. Foreign Minister SYG public announcement and reason for not accepting Portuguese invitation came as complete surprise, although they did not expect him to accept.

Second subject, related to foregoing, was Portuguese image and necessity to project to world current progressive measures being taken in Portuguese Africa together with reforms which have been and are being made. This led to importance avoid antagonizing friendly elements by such actions as totally unjustified wave of critical editorials and anti-American attitude manifested in radio and TV. I mentioned harmful effect on Portuguese image by their actions re Protestant missionaries in Africa, pointing out that vast majority these

people engaged in

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-2- 591, January 24, 8 P.M., From Lisbon (SECTION I OF II)

people engaged in humane and evangelical work and furtherance beliefs of millions Americans anxious to serve mankind. These missionaries should not be penalized nor their supporting groups alienated because of possible irritation Portuguese authorities with indiscreet actions of a few. No comment by Foreign Minister.

This led to discussion recognition of Communist China; hoped he would understand US concern over French actions and emphasized points set forth Department telegram 455. I said I had read reports GOP considering recognition Communist China and hoped such consideration would not lead to affirmative decision on matter, which would only expose Portugal to Communist influence and subversion and would alienate large segment American people friendly to Portugal. Foreign Minister stated he did not know exact reasons French took actions they had re recognition and Communist China nor was he in any position to judge. However, he did say he fully understood American feelings. He stated Portugal had de facto arrangement on Macau but necessarily had to consider longer range problem Macau as well as long-range commercial interests. He stated matter under consideration as had been many times before. However, was not related to French decision nor was for purpose of irritating or alienating US. He stated quite frankly any decision, if made, would not be in near future. "You do not have to worry".

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33-32

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 18146

EUR

Rec'd: January 24, 1964  
6:38 p.m.

Info

FROM: Lisbon

SS

ACTION: Secstate 591

G

SP

DATE: January 24, 8 p.m. (SECTION 2 OF 2)

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INR

Portugal greatly apprehensive effects of Chou -en-Lai visit to Africa. Foreign Minister considers this master stroke of CHICOM diplomacy. Agreed with our concern Chinese ambitions. However, felt matter even more serious that we do as CHICOM approach type that appeals to Africans.

RMR In response to my question about decision on Loran-C, Foreign Minister apologized delay in response but stated both Defense Minister and he had been out of country and said he would get me reply "next week".

Foreign Minister indicated information requested by Secretary Rusk on terrorist operations across frontiers in Africa was being typed by his office and would be delivered to Secretary through me within day or so.

I expressed appreciation for prospect forthcoming action PL-480 matter and indicated there was good possibility early consummation agreement on cotton textiles. Foreign Minister grateful efforts of Department but said he was not personally familiar with details.

I mentioned hope that I might visit African territories sometime near future provided no Portuguese objection. Foreign Minister stated not only no objection but visit would be most welcome. In fact, he was sending circulars to all diplomatic representatives here urging them to say for themselves what is going on in Portuguese Africa. I thanked him for his views as necessary preliminary to consultation with Department on such visit.

I stated

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 591, January 24, 8 p.m., from Lisbon (SECTION 2 OF 2)

I stated I had been Portugal some months and felt it desirable to talk to Dr. Salazar. Foreign Minister indicated certain Dr. Salazzar would be pleased to receive me at any time. Have initiated request for interview with him for early next week at which time will present again arguments made to Foreign Minister re statement on self-determination, improvement of Portuguese image, US views on recognition Communist China, and need for early affirmative action on Loran-C.

Full memos of conversation being pouched.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

JNA

~~SECRET~~

1. ~~Mr. Brubeck~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

H

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 464

INFO: Amembassy ABIDJAN 453

~~XXXXXXXX~~ EXDIS

## Houphouet-Boigny Initiative on Portuguese African Territories

Abidjan's 374 being repeated Lisbon.

Request Embassy's comments on Houphouet's proposal at least first phase, namely visit by Portuguese mission Ivory Coast.

Should you believe appropriate, you might wish pass on to Portuguese possibility during talk with Salazar Houphouet's approach Obviously no to US re visit. ~~NO~~ mention should ~~NOT~~ be made of Houphouet's thought of inviting Holden Roberto.

GP-1

End

BALL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter JUN 19 1979

By ig, NARS, Date 6-27-79

Drafted by: AF:AFC:MJLeoram:osm 1/27/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

M - Gov. Harriman

Clearances:

EUR/WE - Mr. Appling AF - Mr. Tasca

S/S- Mr. Hilliker

U - Mr. Springsteen

AFW - Mr. Dorros

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 465

Jan 28 4 22 PM '64

~~EXDIS~~ EXDIS

(Code Room: Please repeat Amembassy ABIDJAN's telegram EXDIS 374  
dated January 22, 1964.)

002

BALL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter JUN 19 1979

By if, NARS, Date 6-27-79

Drafted by: AF:AFG:MJLooram:osm 1/26 1/27/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

M - Gov. Harriman

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Hilliker AF - Mr. Tasca

AFW - Mr. Dorros

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EXDIS

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1. ~~Mr. Brubeck~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal  
(104 Jan 30 1964)  
B. B. B. 20a*

31

~~SECRET~~

Action  
SS

Control: 22057  
Rec'd: January 30, 1964  
6:57 a.m.

Info

FROM: Lisbon

002

ACTION: Secstate 600 Priority

DATE: January 30, 11 a.m.

EXDIS

EXDIS

Reference: DEPTTEL 464.

Embassy welcomes Houphouet-Boigny's initiative as fitting neatly into our over-all effort encourage contact and reciprocal influence between port and moderate African group. Although port do not accept Houphouet's thesis of only two cited alternatives being open to them, such effort his part appears worthwhile and to be encouraged. Embassy therefore, favors acceptance and early implementation Houphouet's proposal.

I have appointment today with Salazar and as authorized by reference telegram shall raise matter with him.

GP-1.

ANDERSON

JNA

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE letter JUN 19 1979  
By ip, NARS, Date 6-27-79

EXDIS

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2/1/64

21

1. Mr. Brubeck
2. Return to BKS

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W H  
212  
Brubeck

L

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 23202  
Rec'd: January 31, 1964  
9:24 a.m.

FROM: Lisbon

ACTION: Secstate 603

INFO: Abidjan Unnumbered

DATE: January 31, Noon

ag# 3 det  
4/21

003

EXDIS

EXDIS.

Re DEPTTEL 464 and Abidjan's 374.

During conversation with Salazar last evening I mentioned offer of Houphouet-Boigny. Salazar said this first indication he had received. He spoke highly of Houphouet-Boigny as only really civilized African Chief of State but ineffective in putting across his ideas either to his own more radical associates or to other African leaders. Salazar appreciative and indicated he would speak to Foreign Minister and suggested I also do so.

ANDERSON

MBK-17

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-112  
By cb, NARA Date 1-29-01

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01222

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Portugal*

FEB 4 6 20 PM '64

53

Origin

EUR

Info:

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ACTION: Amembassy, Lisbon 477

Comments made to you on Chicom recognition by Primin, Fonmin and others give impression this matter being seriously considered by GOP, an impression strengthened by press treatment of subject, most noticeably in Diario de Noticias editorial of January 30. Fonmin's statement (your 591) that decision not imminent not comforting.

requests continued  
Department therefore ~~commends~~ efforts, such as that reported your A-331 to point out to diverse elements GOP dangers which recognition PRC would have for Portugal. You should in particular stress disadvantages in its African territories, ~~recognition~~ <sup>recognition</sup> boost ~~which~~ would give PCP, and, in particular, belief that effect of such move on Portuguese-US relations would be adverse and profound.

background  
As of possible use to you, Department pouching copies instructions this subject sent other posts.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 4/10/74  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

RUSK

Drafted by

EUR/WE/REBarbour:cs

2/4

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

WE - Hugh G. Appling

Clearances:

~~TOP SECRET~~

FE/ACA - Mr. Dean

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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23

1. ~~Mr. Brubeck~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

*Portugal*

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

232

W/d

~~SECRET~~

31

Action

SS

Info

Control: 3889  
Rec'd: February 6, 1964  
11:22 a.m.

*Bornbeck*

FROM: Abidjan

ACTION: Secstate 404

EXDIS

003

DATE: February 6, Noon

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION - GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

DEPTEL 453 and Lisbon telegram 603 to Department

Houphouet expressed pleasure at speed we moved on Portuguese matter. Seemed content to await developments.

WINE

LMS/4

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 4/10/76  
By mg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

EXDIS

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

24

B  
Action  
SS  
Info

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Control: 4119  
Rec'd: February 6, 1964  
2:49 p.m.

FROM: Lisbon

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION: Secstate 620

Authority State Ltr. 6/10/74  
By rme, NARS, Date 8/5/74

g# 2 dest  
4/24  
003

DATE: February 6, 5 p.m.

EXDIS

EXDIS

Today I asked Franco Nogueira when I might receive reply on Loran - C matter which ten days ago he had assured me would be forthcoming "next week". Foreign Minister hesitated, then said in effect that reply held in abeyance due to remarks made in Canada by Governor Williams which GOP considered most unfriendly and untimely. I countered by stating I had requested full text Governor Williams' remarks (EMBTel 616), including question/answer portion which Foreign Minister considered inappropriate. I was certain remarks had either been taken out of context or were distorted in translation. Also informed Foreign Minister Loran-C installation most important for all NATO as essential facility to enhance U.S. nuclear deterrent force. From other sources I am informed Foreign Minister received report Williams' presentation at Toronto from Portugal Embassy Ottawa from people actually present. Other members Ministry echoing Foreign Minister's remarks and understand he has also been sounding off throughout diplomatic community in Lisbon.

When text Williams' comments received here I will do my best set Foreign Minister straight. On other hand, if they actually were unnecessarily offensive, I would hope that such corrective action as feasible may be taken and repetition avoided. Cases like this, if true, vitiate months of hard work to keep ship on an even keel in rough weather while endeavoring move Portugal to more flexible position on "self-determination" and to cope with current problem of flirtation with Red China.

GP-3.

FP

~~SECRET~~

ANDERSON  
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EXDIS

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

*Portugal* ✓

*W. H.*

31

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 3889

SS

Rec'd: February 6, 1964

11:22 a.m.

Info

FROM: Abidjan

ACTION: Secstate 404

EXDIS

002

DATE: February 6, Noon

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION - GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

DEPTEL 453 and Lisbon telegram 603 to Department

Houphouet expressed pleasure at speed we moved on Portuguese matter. Seemed content to await developments.

WINE

LMS/4

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Authority State Ptr. 6/10/74  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

EXDIS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

26 WH  
Bamber

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Action  
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Info

Control: 10185  
Rec'd: February 14, 1964 003  
3:47 PM

FROM: Lisbon

ACTION: Secstate 648

DATE: February 14, 7 PM.

Cyff 2 dist  
4/24

EXDIS

EXDIS

DEPTEL 493

During meeting with Foreign Minister today I raised again possibility of Portuguese meeting with Houphouet Boigny and explained in broad terms his objective and desire to be helpful. I did not, of course, mention possibility any subsequent meeting with Roberto. Foreign Minister made complimentary comments re Houphouet Boigny but did not indicate his intentions one way or another, although he seemed to be interested.

GP-1.

ANDERSON

CC-17

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE letter JUN 19 1979  
By if, NARS, Date 6-27-79

~~SECRET~~

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17 **AIRGRAM**DEF 19-3 US-PORT  
XRDEF 15-4 PORT-US  
FOR RM USE ONLYEUR-6  
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AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON

1964 MAR 2

INFO : AmEmbassy PARIS (FOR JAMES AND BURNS)  
USRO PARIS  
CINCEUR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED

ANALYSIS &amp; DISTRIBUTION

Authority: *Handwritten* 6/10/80

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

DATE: February 29, 1964

FROM : AmEmbassy LISBON

SUBJECT : Recommended Release to Portugal of Military Assistance  
Program Arms and Equipment

REF : COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

COPY NO. 103 - 108 SERIES B

Basic Thesis

That the political and military interests of the United States warrant elimination at this time of the self-imposed policy restriction under which deliveries of MAP arms and equipment to Portugal have been suspended for tactical negotiating purposes relating to a base rights agreement in the Azores.

Background

Existing policy guidance establishes the retention of US military base rights in the Azores as the primary US objective in dealing with the Government of Portugal. During latter 1962, with the base rights agreement about to run out, maximum effort was directed toward the negotiation of a new base rights agreement, or an extension of the old agreement, on or before December 31, 1962. As one means of contributing to this end, the Ambassador and the Country Team recommended a suspension of deliveries of arms and equipment under the Military Assistance Program. This recommendation was approved and, except for certain follow-on items previously committed and training programs, MAP deliveries have since then been held in suspense.

The original raison d'etre of this policy had two distinct but interrelated facets. The first of these was an attempt to enlist the support of the Portuguese military in favor of early conclusion of a new base rights agreement. It was hoped that suspension of deliveries under MAP would come to constitute a source of steadily increasing concern to Portugal's professional military officers and would be

GROUP 3

FORM DS-323

4-62

F.J.D.

~~SECRET~~

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

FJDevine:jcs 2/26/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM - Mr. *Handwritten*

Clearances:

ECON

Backle

Counselor - Mr. Xanthaky *Handwritten*POL - Mr. MacLean (informed) *Handwritten*USARMA - Col. Jeffries *Handwritten*MAAG - R. Adm. Tibbets *Handwritten*ALUSNA - Cmdr. Enyart *Handwritten*AIRA - Col. Crowley *Handwritten*USIS - Mr. White *Handwritten*~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 4 pages. Number of 13 copies, Series B

related by them to the pending negotiation of new or extended base rights. To the extent that they might view the former as dependent upon the latter, it was further hoped that the military would come to constitute an effective pressure group upon the nation's civilian and political leaders and would help to impel the latter toward conclusion of an agreement.

The second facet of this policy related to the practical matter of payment for whatever base rights might be forthcoming. Although Portugal has long maintained that previous base rights were granted the US without payment of rental, it is a fact that the Portuguese military over approximately the decade of the 1950's received millions of dollars worth of US equipment (admittedly largely surplus) and that there was a tendency on the part of many persons - official and private - to consider these matters not unrelated. This, plus the general "defense agreement" context in which any base rights were expected to be forthcoming or renewed, generated a certain expectation that in one form or another the United States would be required to schedule continuing deliveries of arms and equipment to the Portuguese Armed Forces. Reinforcing this view was the Portuguese Government's official statement made during the course of 1962 negotiating talks (A-259, November 20, 1962) that the Government of Portugal would no longer be able to make available base rights in the Azores without the payment of a stipulated rental. While the Portuguese Government never went further than this, and specifically did not stipulate the amount or character of such rental, the US was forced to assume that economic and/or military assistance on a significant scale would be required at such time as a new base rights agreement might finally be concluded with the Government of Portugal. This being the case, MAP arms and equipment destined for Portugal but withheld under the policy described above came to be viewed increasingly in the nature of a "down payment" on whatever price tag Portugal might eventually attach to the concession of military base rights. By "down payment" was, of course, merely meant that hopefully military items or at least the dollar amount involved could in whole or in part be off-set against the rental payment exacted by Portugal and that in this way the dollar impact upon the United States could be reduced or cushioned.

#### Results of This Policy in Terms of Base Rights

As the Department is well aware, the Portuguese Government has been unwilling to conclude a new base rights agreement. The old agreement expired on December 31, 1962, and our military presence and operations in the Azores since that date have been based upon a de facto arrangement. Essentially this consists of a Portuguese authorization for such presence and operations to continue during the period in which a new base rights agreement is being negotiated. In actual fact, the Portuguese have displayed no alacrity to push ahead with such "negotiations" and have instead seemed content to continue to live with the present situation, i.e., the de facto arrangement. It is pertinent to note that under this arrangement, the United States has already obtained rent-free use of the Azores base throughout all of calendar year 1963 and seems likely to so continue into the future for a period which cannot at this point be predicted. As recently as February 4, Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira reiterated at a press conference that the status of American forces in the Azores was essentially the same as that just described.

The Embassy believes that subsequent events have confirmed the validity of its analysis as set forth in A-448, February 19, 1963. The Portuguese Government has attached primary importance to the political leverage afforded it vis-a-vis the US by keeping us in the Azores on as short-range and indefinite a basis as possible. For the sake of this primary consideration, it has been willing thus far to forego the economic and/or military quid pro quo which it might have been in a position to exact as the price for a formal, longer-range extension of base rights. As of today, there is perceived no compelling political or economic pressure which would force Lisbon into a modification of this policy.

In synthesis then, the 1962 policy of withholding MAP deliveries for the purposes cited above has not, in fact, achieved the desired purpose. Regardless of whether the policy might or might not have induced them to make the attempt, the Portuguese military have not in fact persuaded the nation's political leaders to conclude a new base rights agreement. Furthermore, in the absence of such an agreement, the practical application of the items and amounts represented by the MAP deliveries has not materialized.

#### Results of This Policy in Terms of Politico-Military Impact

The withholding of MAP deliveries has understandably had an adverse impact upon relations between US and Portuguese military bodies. MAAG Portugal has been deprived of the wherewithal to carry out much of its intended function. Through non-fulfillment of this function and inability to provide Portuguese counterparts with an explanation thereof, MAAG officers have seen a steady deterioration of the relationship between the services which they represent and the corresponding services of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Top ranking military leaders of Portugal, irritated by US arms restrictions responsive to African policy considerations, have missed the point of our MAP withholding policy and have tended to consider it a direct result of the same policy which gave rise to these other restrictions.

As reported in A-333 of February 1, 1964, the Embassy has now become aware of a separate and distinct but reinforcing element of anti-US sentiment among Portugal's professional military officers at lower levels. These field-grade officers, who presumably include the military leaders of years to come, are increasingly concerned over the lack of modern equipment and technique available for training purposes within Metropolitan Portugal and resentful of apparent US unwillingness to cover such deficiency.

Finally, the NATO-committed capability of Portugal, as well as its capability to defend its own metropolitan boundaries, has been subject to a steady process of attrition. Admittedly, this has been due in part to the priority which Portugal affords to the defense of what it defines as its vital interests in Africa as opposed to the secondary importance attached to fulfillment of its NATO-commitments. Apart from this, however, it is undeniable that out-moded equipment, normal attrition, inadequate training and the suspension of MAP deliveries have eroded Portugal's NATO and national defense capability to an undesirable degree and one which could not have been foreseen even two years ago. Every senior US military commander who has visited Lisbon during the past year will, I believe, concur in this assessment.

Conclusions

To me, the import of all the foregoing is obvious. The withholding of MAP deliveries has not produced a new base rights agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, the application of MAP items and dollar amounts toward base-rights rental has been neither required nor possible. Present prospects of a new base rights agreement are most indefinite. I therefore consider that the continued sacrifice of our subordinate but concurrent military objectives here - i.e., maintenance and strengthening of Portuguese military capability to meet and fulfill NATO and JCS goals and force objectives - is neither warranted nor wise.

Recommendation

In the light of the foregoing considerations, taking into account our present requirement for LOPAN-C sites in Portugal, and on the basis of political and military justification which seems to me compelling, I strongly recommend that MAP grant aid materiel (or other items of equivalent dollar value) in the FY:1963 program, deliveries of which have been reserved or suspended at Country Team recommendation on the basis of considerations relating exclusively to negotiation of a new Azores base agreement, be released for delivery to the Portuguese Armed Forces. In making this recommendation, I am, of course, cognizant of the political sensitivity attaching to any real or apparent diversion of US arms to the African theatre, and this Embassy is prepared to work closely with the MAAG in ruling out this possibility.

I urge that this recommendation be afforded immediate consideration and I am prepared to submit any additional justification and/or explanation which the Departments of State and Defense may desire.

  
George W. Anderson

ORIGIN/ACTION

EUR-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

SOC 10 PCPT  
Portugal  
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28

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-393

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AIR POUCH

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

20 MAR 11 1964

Jm

DISTRIBUTION

FROM : Amembassy LISBON

DATE: March 7, 1964

SUBJECT : US Assistance Program for Victims Azores Earthquakes

REF : Embtel 674; Deptel 537

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

Immediate emergency Azores earthquake area appears ended with refugees beginning return home and reconstruction now to be undertaken.

GOP official posture continues one of appreciation our offers of assistance coupled with apparently continuing admirable determination cope with emergency through own efforts and resources. In contrast this national government attitude, District Governor and other Azores officials, who are closer to crisis situation and see actual suffering, have shown selves quite willing accept emergency assistance extended by Lajes base authorities and, as reported Ponta Delgada's 14, rptd Dept. 46, have now indicated interest in more sizeable assistance linked to reconstruction and housing.

GOP has also been unwilling publicly to credit USG with even modest gestures and assistance thus far made available. GOP has, for example, thus far declined publish President Johnson's message, has permitted only minimal press mention of early deliveries foodstuffs and bedding, and has more recently censored material which local media wished carry concerning assistance received by their representatives from COMUSFORAZ while covering Azores story.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: ECON:JFBuckle:POL:FJDevine:rpc

Contents and Classification Approved by:

WLH:jup

Clearances: USIS:HWWhite POL:WMacLean MAAG:R.ADM.Tibbets ArmyAtt:Col.JCJeffries (all cleared  
AirAtt:LtCol.RBHarrison NavyAtt:Cmdr.JENyart COMUSFORAZ:Gen.Boylan in draft)

Notwithstanding GOP attitude and unlikelihood our receipt of formal request for assistance from national government, Country Team believes reconstruction needs of São Jorge Island offer useful opportunity which we should exploit in manner circumventing official censorship in order demonstrate US generosity and put across directly to people of Portugal meaningful humanitarian message.

With foregoing in mind, General Boylan, COMUSFORAZ, on March 3 reviewed for Embassy the emergency assistance which the Air Force has rendered to victims Azores earthquakes. Described personal visit with staff to São Jorge, worst hit of islands. Velas, largest village on island, almost completely destroyed and 60 per cent damage observed at second largest village. Reconstruction cost estimated at \$3,000,000.

As Department aware, Azorians extremely frugal, hardworking people who barely manage scrape subsistence from island and sea. Extremely unlikely that earthquake victims have any reserves from which to draw for almost complete reconstruction now needed. Furthermore, they traditionally have low priority with Dr. Salazar. Despite admitted talent of District Governor and stated intention GOP assume burden reconstruction, doubtful Azorians will be able extract more than minimum assistance from GOP--and this only after many surveys and much delay.


While only few thousand people involved, their immediate situation is tragic and quite apt to become desperate before it improves. Some emergency measures of medium-term length are required whatever else is done, e.g., temporary housing. But some waste might be avoided if it were correlated with larger plan in mind. Perhaps more importantly, knowledge that US would be helping in near future would give victims support of hope--a support they conspicuously lack now.

If USG/private foundations could offer provide immediate survey by experts familiar antiseismic construction with promise of follow-through in form some construction materials plus modern machinery for making structural forms from resources available, e.g., cinder blocks from lava rock, Azorians undoubtedly would be more than willing furnish all labor both to run machinery and reconstruct villages after basic operating skills acquired. US offer bound to become known, even though GOP probably would not publicize it, and large, sympathetic response among general population both Azores and metropole inevitable. While GOP undoubtedly will continue refrain from asking for help, doubt if it would refuse specific offer along these lines, especially if Azorian governor had been consulted first on "technical points" and thus aware US intentions.

Realize completely open-ended proposal not possible and definite package will require some time prepare. On other hand, order avoid scatteration funds and efforts in make-shift emergency measures, hope Department will quickly review possibilities which might be drawn upon order launch some sort of construction program and, if such review shows funds and skills could be made available, Embassy be authorized make properly restricted offer soon, e.g., provide materials and technical advice (no money) up to \$1,000,000 (or up to 50 per cent of total cost of program which GOP/US would jointly undertake).

Suggest consideration be given to making offer through People-to-People program of Defense (which GOP much less likely view with suspicion than "normal" US Aid program) or perhaps under private foundation auspices, e.g., Kennedy Foundation (large number American emigrants now naturalized US citizens residing New England states).

Appreciate prompt response since suffering already exists and some emergency measures will be necessary quickly. However, would assume if US prepared make major contribution toward construction two new earthquake proof villages on São Jorge, temporary shelters could truly be temporary whereas without US assistance odds are that many Azorians would live within emergency housing until they personally rebuilt former homes by repiling rock upon rock.

  
William L. Blue  
Counselor of Embassy

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal 29*

58  
Action  
EUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 15497  
Rec'd: April 18, 1964  
11:22 a.m.

Info

FROM: Lisbon

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Ltr. 6/10/74*  
By *rmg*, NARS, Date *8/5/74*

ACTION: Secstate 813

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RMR

DATE: April 18, 5 p.m. (SECTION I OF II)

Reference: DEPTTEL 628

I met yesterday with Salazar for one hour forty minutes. Found him mentally alert as ever but physically somewhat subdued (I had heard that he recently recovered from pneumonia). He admitted he was tired.

After thanking for courtesies shown me throughout Portuguese Africa, I made 40-minute uninterrupted presentation which covered both observations on my trip and USG position with respect problem of Portuguese territories, along same lines as my talk with Franco Nogueira (EMBTTEL 764) extended as per instructions set forth DEPTTEL 628. Salazar listened intently and then engaged me in spirited one-hour discussion, MEMCON of which will be pouched soon as possible. I can assure Department that points contained reference telegram were covered by me both forcefully and comprehensively. In strongest terms I urged Salazar produce public statement accepting reasonable concept of self-determination on basis of which extreme African pressures could be relieved, Portuguese image could be improved, our Portugal's friends could rally in support of orderly, phased, peaceful solution to problem of general concern to us all.

Regret I must report that Salazar remained adamantly opposed any public statement on self-determination. He adduced familiar case of Belgian Congo and said with entire weight of evidence against prospects any orderly transition he could not understand why USG insisted upon trying invent yet one more formula. I told him we did so precisely to

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-2- 813, April 18, 5 p.m. (SECTION I of II), FROM LISBON

avoid repeating errors of past. Salazar said that while Nationalist pressures of today are from outside Angola and Mozambique they would promptly develop internally if GOP were to make public utterance of type we sought press upon it.

To my suggestion that Angolan refugees with exception known criminals be welcomed back into that province, Salazar replied that GOP quite willing accept them and even Congo Leopoldville probably quite glad be relieved of them, but that armed forces of Holden Roberto physically prevented their return except for small groups which manage straggle across frontier and reach Portuguese reception stations.

ANDERSON

HMR/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

15499

Rec'd:

April 18, 1964

11:29 a.m.

EUR

FROM: Lisbon

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 813

G

SP

DATE: April 18, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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Salazar readily agreed with my assertion need for massive investment to develop material and human resources Portuguese Africa. Cited drain imposed on Portuguese development funds and capabilities by present military situation as basis for view political solution must precede economic. As regards specifically private investment, I mentioned need for political stability as one essential ingredient in favorable investment climate. He responded by comparing stability offered by Portuguese administration in Africa with that offered by newly-independent African states. Enlarging upon this, Salazar said he did not know about US but that private investors from European countries seemed willing invest in Portuguese Africa and were still doing so at present time. To him this suggested that they found business conditions more promising there than in independent Africa and that they did not attach too great importance to terrorism in Northern Angola.

Only point upon which Salazar readily fell in with our thinking had to do with continued Luso-African conversations. He professed see these as unproductive due to fact participants operating on entirely different wave lengths but smilingly expressed his willingness carry them on if we felt this advisable.

On balance I could perceive no real give or hint of prospective change in Salazar's position. He made clear and explicit his belief that USG efforts are misdirected and that morally and realistically we should be pressing African states to withdraw support from terrorists who impede political, economic and social evolution of Portuguese Africa rather

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-2- 813, April 18, 5 p.m. (SECTION II OF II), From Lisbon  
than pressuring Portugal to take steps which could only  
lead to instability and retrogression.

Salazar remained personally friendly throughout entire  
discussion and at its conclusion thanked me for report  
upon my African travels. Again I was amazed at the amount  
of detailed knowledge he has over an area which he has never  
visited.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

HMR/16

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal*

30

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Action

Control: 18362

Rec'd: April 22, 1964

1:43 p.m.

EUR

FROM: Lisbon

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 820

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Authority State Str. 4/10/74

SP

DATE: April 22, 6 p.m.

By rmg → NARS, Date 8/5/74

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NEA

Reference: Department Telegram 632.

SMF

Subject of course views or modifications Ambassador may wish express upon return, Embassy inclined doubt usefulness raising Azores Base problem with Franco Nogueira at next months Hague meeting.

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Single likely advantage would be further reinforce record along line suggested Department telegram 388. Since this has already been done however (Embassy telegram 524) we question whether value repetition outweighs risk of disturbing what seems at present militarily workable and cost-free modus operandi. (Foreign Minister would of course be in no position commit GOP or do more than receive our demarche for referral Lisbon).

While Secretary could relate mention of base to newly signed agreement with French, doubt that Foreign Minister would find this persuasive as he has already stated publicly US interest unaffected by new agreement (Embassy telegram 784).

Pending Ambassador's return Embassy therefore recommends against raising subject at Hague.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal*

59-M  
Action  
EUR.

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Control: 783  
Rec'd: May 1, 1964  
6:28 PM

FROM: Lisbon

ACTION: Secstate 844 Priority

INFO: Madrid 40

DATE: May 1, 10 PM

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By 1P, NARS, Date 10-31-75

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Reference: Embassy telegram 838 repeated information Madrid 39.

After uneventful day, larger than usual crowd congregated downtown Lisbon and watched student-age youths begin minor demonstration approximately 7:30 PM Rossio Square. Singing and chanting such phrases as "Liberty", "Fascist" and "Amnesty", group of few hundred marched to Restauradores Square where small street fights occurred. Demonstrators then stoned National Information Service headquarters breaking several windows. Group broke and ran when shots fired apparently by PIDE agent. When demonstrators began to regroup, uniformed security police stationed at strategic points nearby moved into square and dispersed group with rifle butts. By 9 PM situation appeared back to normal though strong contingents security police took up prominent positions throughout downtown area. Extremely difficult estimate number of demonstrators due heavy attendance by on-lookers. At no time, however, did demonstration assume proportions difficult for police to control. Although security police acted energetically to disperse crowd, they were relatively restrained in both their actual commitment of forces and tactics employed. Some persons were injured though number and seriousness of casualties not known.

Foregoing preliminary report based on observation by Embassy officers in immediate area where demonstration had been scheduled. No way of knowing yet whether disturbances occurred elsewhere in city or outside Lisbon.

GP-4  
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ANDERSON

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### Origin

MAY 3 5 38 PM '64

INFO: Amembassy, PARIS TOPOL 1689

Lisbon's A-333, A-387

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 6/10/76

By smg, NARS, Date 8/5/74

1. Dept sympathetic problems resulting from suspension FY 1963 MAP deliveries to Portugal, particularly difficulties caused Embassy with younger military officers. We also aware disadvantages from NATO standpoint. ~~consider lifting~~ However, we unable/~~XXXX~~ suspension FY 1963 MAP equipment unless following conditions are met: (a) withdrawal remaining F-86's from Guinea; (b) firm commitment that MAP equipment to be furnished would remain in North Atlantic Treaty area and (c) reasonably effective means of confirming compliance. (Agreement on LORAN-C would also help but a-b-c required.)

2. Regardless MAP aspects, Dept considers new approach on F-86's necessary. Ambassador therefore requested see FonMin at early date to reassert importance we attach to withdrawal. You should refer categorical undertakings given personally by FonMin Dec 6 (Embtel 493) and inquire when these commitments will be fulfilled. (Would appreciate Embassy's estimate number F-86's still Guinea.)

[illegible]

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

**Drafted by:**

### Telegraphic transmission and

EUR:WE:REBarbour:cs

classification approved by:

**Clearances:**

G - H. A. Johnson

DOD/ISA - Gen. Folda

EUR - Mr. Burdett

WE - Mr. Appling

G/PM - Mr. Meyers

EUR/RPM - Mr. Ackerman

S/S-Mr. Rowe

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3. Meanwhile, irrespective conditions paragraph one, and subject Embassy/MAAG views, Dept and DOD agreeable releasing some FY 63 MAP funds to offer small number LORAN-C receivers to Navy (in addition those lent for civilian use mentioned Deptel 617) to improve LORAN-C attractiveness. Offer of course conditional on favorable response LORAN-C sites.

Copies pertinent memos pouched Lisbon.

END.

GP-3.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33

*Portugal*

53-52

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Action

Control: 4149  
Rec'd: May 6, 1964  
2:01 p.m.

EUR FROM: Lisbon  
Info  
SS ACTION: Secstate 865  
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SP DATE: May 6, 5 p.m.  
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FOR THE SECRETARY

EMBTEL 847

In anticipation your meeting with Foreign Minister Nogueira at The Hague, and in accordance Department circular telegram 1962 following may be useful:

Without knowing what Foreign Minister may have on his mind, I presume he will seek support Portuguese position in Africa and may advance thesis that recent provincial elections there evidence progress on part GOP along lines consistent with reasonable concept self-determination. Foreign Minister may also refer your request at last meeting with him for documented case of transborder aggression from Congo, may note that factual dossier submitted, and may inquire as to USG action contemplated on basis thereof.

For our part, I would like to suggest possible desirability raising following two subjects:

1. Loran-C: Without entering into technical details with Foreign Minister, I believe it might be very helpful were you personally to impress upon him importance which we attach to Loran-C not merely for US but for all of NATO and necessity we feel for early action this matter.

2. Self-determination: My most recent talks with Salazar (EMBTEL 813) and Foreign Minister (EMBTEL 848) convince

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Authority State Ltr. 6/10/74  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

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-2- 865, May 6, 5 p.m., from: Lisbon

me that neither is at this time willing consider any public statement on self-determination of type we have been recommending. I am personally highly dubious as to merit or net advantage to USG of continuing to hammer away at theme at once unacceptable and unpalatable to GOP. Apart from being unproductive, such continuing effort progressively erodes our good will credit and our ability influence Portuguese on other matters of importance to us. We are already, I believe, undesirably far out in front of practically all other countries in this regard. While we continue press and irritate Portuguese on matter of Africa and self-determination, other nations through more passive role are picking up points and advantages in other areas.

I therefore suggest as means moving this problem off dead center and for purpose introducing new element flexibility that, in your conversation with Foreign Minister at The Hague, you probe GOP position in following manner. After making reference our continuing but as yet unfruitful effort elicit GOP public statement on self-determination and reasons why US believes such statement would be helpful to GOP position, inquire of Foreign Minister as to what if any action, assurances, or guarantee of support on part of USG would persuade GOP issue such statement. You could indicate our familiarity with standard GOP arguments but also make reference again to frequently expressed belief by GOP that we are in position materially influence course of events in Africa. While reiterating view that US influence significantly overrated, you could conclude that US willingness attempt find peaceful resolution of problems besetting our allies can stand, and has stood, severe tests and we quite prepared place our prestige along side Portuguese on a specific and defensible proposal if this will move issue forward. Foreign Minister would then specifically be asked whether any action or guarantee

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-3- 865, May 6, 5 p.m., from: Lisbon

of support on our part could induce GOP come forth with desired statement. His answer, or Salazar's, should then either open up new and more fruitful avenue of discussion (which I doubt) or provide clear evidence no useful purpose served by continuing present tactics until circumstances have changed sufficiently to so warrant.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

MRJ/1

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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04896

*Portugal*

57

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 672 PRIORITY

MAY 9 12 38 PM '64

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INFO: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 1743  
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Authority State Ltr. 4/10/74 116

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Your 863

By smg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

L

Return of F-86's to Portugal from Guinea should be dealt with

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on own merits, that is, <sup>as</sup> ~~XX~~ unapproved diversion MAP equipment out-

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side NATO area (see Deptel 80 July 26, 1963). Moreover, FonMin's

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personal assurances to you of last December were unequivocal.

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Therefore, desire that your demarche to FonMin on F-86's not be

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associated with resumed MAP or any possible responses to this by

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AIR

FYI. If Franco Nogueira forthcoming on LORAN-C, you  
authorized defer approach on F-86's until next meeting. END FYI.

Dept unable state categorically at this time that withdrawal  
F-86's from Guinea would automatically result in renewed MAP  
assistance to Portugal, because conditions (B) and (C) of para 1  
Deptel 654 would remain to be fulfilled. However, following  
confirmed repatriation, Dept would be prepared authorize Embassy/  
MAAG to reformulate MAP program using suspended FY 1963 funds,

Drafted by:

EUR/WE:REBarbour/pr/hm 5-9-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

G/PM - Mr. Meyers  
EUR - Mr. Burdett

OSD/ISA - Col. Smyser (subst)

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(see last FYI para). Approach to GOP on (B) and (C) and implementation to follow Washington concurrence in new program.

Dept therefore suggests that if you believe it would be useful you supplement your demarche to FonMin by similar approaches to military leaders on F-86's, during which you could let military know that presence of F-86's in Guinea impedes program of NATO-oriented/military cooperation. <sup>US-Portuguese</sup>

FYI. We do not wish give GOP impression we would "reward" it for repatriation F-86's, an action it already obligated to take. Nor would we wish present matter to GOP as new policy decision. Instead, we would want to stretch out implementation of FY 1963 program over several years on basis following criteria: (a) foster, accelerate and improve Army reorganization to meet NATO force goals; (b) encourage pro-western, pro-NATO orientation on part military, particularly mid-ranking officers; (c) emphasize training and training equipment at metropolitan/centers <sup>training</sup> including expanded training in US in such fields as civic action; (d) emphasize equipment with least susceptibility diversion to Africa.

END FYI.

END

BALI.

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# AIRGRAM

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FOR RM USE ONLY

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A-520

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AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON

1964 MAY 11

DECLASSIFIED

INFO : USUN NEW YORK

Authority State Ltr. 6/10/76

By [Signature] NARS, Date 8/5/96

FROM : AmEmbassy LISBON

DATE: May 9, 1964

SUBJECT : Transmitting Memorandum of My Conversation with Prime Minister Salazar on April 17.

REF : EMBTEL 813

pol 15:1 Port  
+ 2 pol 10 Port

I met with Dr. Salazar for one hour and forty minutes on April 17. After describing to him my recent trip to Portuguese Africa and the observations which I had made in the course thereof, I went on to make a comprehensive and forceful presentation of US views with respect to the problem of the Portuguese territories and the desirability of a Portuguese Government statement publicly accepting and identifying itself with a reasonable concept of self-determination. A summary of our conversation has already been submitted to the Department in Embassy Telegram 813. A full memorandum of that same conversation is now submitted as an enclosure to the present airgram.

The principal impression which I derived from this extended conversation with Dr. Salazar was that he remains as convinced as ever of the correctness of Portugal's present policy. I could perceive no hint of prospective change on his part and it seemed from what he said that recent developments in Africa have only strengthened his conviction that a public acceptance of self-determination would set in motion forces of a calamitous nature for the peace and stability of Angola and Mozambique and for any continued Portuguese presence in Africa. Finally, he was quite explicit in saying that US policy is in his view misdirected and would contribute more to the orderly political, economic and social evolution of Portuguese Africa were it to discourage other nations from supporting elements who now impede these and pursue a course conducive only to instability and retrogression.

George W. Anderson, Jr.

Enclosure: [Signature]

MemCon of April 17, 1964

GROUP 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

FJDevine:jes 5/7/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

The Ambassador

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 4/10/76  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Page 1 of  
Enclosure 1 to  
A-520 from LisbonMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 17, 1964

SUBJECT : Portuguese Africa

PARTICIPANTS : Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar  
American Ambassador George W. Anderson  
Dr. Jose Manuel Frago, Director General for Political Affairs,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Frank J. Devine, First Secretary, American Embassy J. J.

The Ambassador led off by thanking Dr. Salazar for the courtesies and assistance received from the Portuguese Government and its representatives during his recent visit to Portuguese Africa. He described the heavy schedule and fifteen-hour workdays which had characterized his visit. Dr. Salazar smilingly observed that the Ambassador should have planned a more extended stay so that each day's activities could have been spread over a longer period. The Ambassador responded that thanks to the miracle of modern communication and transportation he had been able to compress perhaps three months of normal observation into his much shorter stay.

Ambassador Anderson then said that despite numerous and persistent questions from the press and from his diplomatic colleagues he had refrained - and would continue to refrain - from commenting publicly on the internal military and political situation in Portuguese Africa.

The Ambassador said that he had been preparing reports for Washington on various aspects of his trip, that he had conveyed some of his impressions and observations to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, and that he would now like to comment briefly to Dr. Salazar on the military and political situation as he had observed it in Portuguese Africa.

Ambassador Anderson described the military situation he had encountered in Angola with special emphasis upon the physical features of the terrain which made it difficult if not impossible to locate and eliminate guerrilla elements. He said that as a military man he could easily understand the frustration and mounting impatience voiced to him by Portuguese military leaders over the availability to the enemy of safehaven and training bases across the border in the Congo. At the same time he expressed great doubt that air or land action against those bases could effectively or permanently put them out of business. And, he added, the adverse political implications and repercussions for Portugal itself of any such trans-border thrust would be out of all proportion to the possible gains.

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With respect to economic and social development observed in Africa, the Ambassador said he had been surprised and very favorably impressed. He recounted for Dr. Salazar some of his observations, paying special tribute to the fine schools, hospitals and other institutions visited. He said gently that some of the provincial administrators were better than others, and he suggested that some Portuguese officials, like their counterparts in the American and other bureaucracies, were prone to report what they thought their superiors wished to hear rather than what objectivity dictated.

Ambassador Anderson then said that much remained to be done in Angola and Mozambique if those territories were to be endowed with the necessary instruments and agencies essential to economic development and political maturity. Investment on a fairly massive scale was called for, and the laudable improvement programs already underway would have to be magnified many times over. Obviously this posed a problem so long as defense expenditures continued to be required on the present scale.

The Ambassador said that after leaving Portuguese Africa he had briefly visited some of the newly-independent countries. These visits had been highly useful in affording him a firsthand exposure to some (non-Portuguese) African nationalists. He had been surprised and could not help but be impressed by the energy, the fanaticism, and the determination with which nationalist leaders saw a necessity for liquidating the last vestiges of European "colonialism" from Africa. While a heterogeneous group with tremendous problems and widely diverse interests, they seemed united by the "common denominator" of animosity and opposition toward Portugal and South Africa. The Ambassador said that he had previously underestimated the force and drive of this African nationalist sentiment, and he wondered if the Portuguese Government, too, might not be underestimating it.

Ambassador Anderson then suggested that in order for Portugal to win the necessary time to develop the human and material resources and the political institutions of its African territories it seemed essential that it find a way of placating or at least abating this external pressure of African nationalism. He readily admitted that Ben Bella, Nkrumah and other extremists could never be won over. Moderate elements among the African leaders were more tractable however, and Portugal should carefully consider how best to obtain their sympathetic understanding. For this purpose, continued Luso-African dialogue was useful and desirable. Most important of all, however, were the contiguous African neighbors without whose active or passive support aggression against Portuguese Africa would be difficult if not impossible. The Ambassador suggested that Portugal should concentrate its efforts on a limited political target, i.e., making clear that Portugal posed no threat to anyone, dissuading the Congo from permitting terrorist use of bases presently within its territory for aggression against Angola and similarly dissuading other countries, such as Tanganyika and Nyassaland, from permitting the establishment of any new such bases.

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Portugal should make it easier, said the Ambassador, for its friends to assist in this process. If it were to show that it, like they, recognized the inevitability of change and if it were to take meaningful, demonstrable action to prepare for such change, then Portugal's friends would find it feasible to rally around, to go to work on the moderate African leaders, and to develop support for a defensible and morally correct position. It was for this reason that the United States attached such great importance to the recommended public declaration in any appropriate forum by Portugal associating itself with a reasonable concept of self-determination. The Ambassador emphasized that this did not mean the African concept permitting solely and exclusively of an option for independence. It did mean however a genuine basing of the form of government and the form of association with the Metropole upon the will and the consent of the governed. Additionally it would be helpful if Portugal were to make a public statement welcoming back those refugees and expatriates now living outside Portuguese Africa. If Portugal's friends and the world at large could see that the Portuguese Government recognized and provided for change, and that it did not rule out any prospect of Angola or Mozambique eventually becoming another Brazil, then a new and healthier situation would exist in which all could join hands and work together to provide the time necessary for development of the necessary instruments of government and for an orderly, peaceful, phased transition.

Dr. Salazar, after thanking the Ambassador for the report on his trip, said that the Ambassador's presentation seemed to him to contain a basic inconsistency. While implying that the force and tide of African nationalism were irresistible, the Ambassador nevertheless seemed to be suggesting ways and means of trying to resist them and to solve the economic and social problems in terms that cannot provide any solution. The Ambassador answered that change as distinguished from so-called African nationalism was indeed inevitable and irresistible, but that Portugal by its actions could determine whether it would be identified with or overcome by such change. It was for this reason that the choice and timing of its actions seemed so important. A prompt political solution with respect to the bases in contiguous territories could make available the time necessary for further development and for the preparation for greater exercise of self-government which must go forward in an atmosphere of law, order, security and peace. The proper declaration of principles by Portugal might win over the force of world opinion to Portugal's side and thus make it possible to resist the forces of such magnitude now working against it.

Dr. Salazar asked if the Ambassador, just back from Portuguese Africa, had seen evidence of or believed there to exist a strong feeling of nationalism or desire for independence within Angola or Mozambique. The Ambassador said he was prepared to admit that the stimulus and source of such nationalist sentiment appeared at the present time to be outside Portuguese Africa.

Dr. Salazar said that this was correct, that the problem at present was an external one. Were Portugal to make a public declaration accepting the concept of self-determination, however, the problem would immediately become an internal

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one where none now existed. The African people of Angola and Mozambique, once told that they were to choose, would - under the impulse of external propaganda - immediately request independence. They would no longer be content to live and work under the present system. If each dockworker, stevedore, typist, etc. saw ahead of him the prospect of becoming a Cabinet Member or Prime Minister, how much attention would he pay to his present duties and functions?

Dr. Salazar observed that the United States attached much importance to the so-called African moderates and seemed to feel that once the Portuguese Government had pronounced itself publicly on self-determination it (the USG) could work through such leaders as Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor to stabilize and control the process of transition. He asked how much influence Ambassador Anderson thought Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor had with the African population inside Angola and Mozambique. The Ambassador admitted that they probably had very little. This was indeed the case, said the Prime Minister. Were Portugal publicly to accept and associate itself with the concept of self-determination, it would create for itself a raging new internal problem where none now existed. What the United States could or could not do with the leaders of other African states would not be relevant. The Prime Minister recalled the case of the Belgian Congo where a 50-year time span envisaged for the transition to independence was progressively shortened to 30 years, 5 years and finally came about in six months with great accompanying chaos and disorder. The same thing would occur in the case of Portuguese Africa if Portugal were publicly to accept self-determination. Dr. Salazar said that with such historical precedents he could not understand why the United States insisted on Portugal's following a course which had not succeeded and could not succeed. No new formula could be invented, yet the United States persisted in trying to invent one. Ambassador Anderson said the US sought to do so precisely to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past since the American Government (and he personally) feels that the development of a chaotic situation in Angola and Mozambique would be a tragedy. Dr. Salazar observed that there was little precedent in Africa on which to base any realistic hope that this could be done.

The Prime Minister then said that United States policy and efforts seemed to him exactly inverted. The US was bending every effort to persuade Portugal to alter its African policy and way of life so as to accommodate those other states who would subordinate stability and orderly evolution to a crusade for immediate independence and accompanying instability. The great powers, the United States included, should use their influence and position of moral authority and leadership to tell those other states that their tactics of violence, subversion and trans-border terrorism are improper and should be discontinued. It was completely backwards, said the Prime Minister, to acquiesce in the illegal activities of Portugal's African neighbors and then pressure Portugal to take steps pleasing to those neighbors but which would inevitably lead to more instability and disorder.

On the subject of economic development, Dr. Salazar said that Portugal was doing what it could, notwithstanding the sizeable defense effort forced upon it. A political solution was essential to any significant increase in developmental expenditure. He suggested that foreign private investors could decide

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for themselves between the degree of stability offered by the Portuguese Government and that offered by the newly-independent African governments. The Prime Minister said that he did not know about the United States but that European investors seemed interested enough and were in fact currently making investments in Portuguese Africa. To him, this suggested a degree of satisfaction on their part with Portuguese stability as compared to that of independent Africa and also that they did not seem to take the terrorism in northern Angola too seriously.

The Ambassador made clear that in his remarks about the need for massive investment he had not been making any special plea on behalf of American capital but had been referring instead to the over-all capital requirement for developmental purposes. He noted that there seemed considerable difference of opinion as to how much time might remain available to Portugal in which to carry out its development programs. This would, of course, depend upon many and unpredictable events, some good and some bad. It would, however, be a tragedy - and one certainly not desired by the United States Government - if at the present time Portuguese control and Portuguese instruments of government were to be precipitously removed from Angola or Mozambique.

The Ambassador invited attention to another element of potential instability in the overseas territories. As educational programs are stepped up, there is a correspondingly increased need for employment opportunities. Unless those newly educated and technically trained can find appropriate employment for their knowledge and skills, they will fall prey to frustration and disillusionment with resulting social, economic and political pressures. Dr. Salazar nodded his general agreement with this.

The Ambassador then said that there are currently two struggles going on: The first is the struggle being waged by the Portuguese armed forces against terrorists; the second is the struggle being waged for the minds of men and particularly of young people in Africa. Ambassador Anderson said that he was well aware that teachers, nuns and other Portuguese representatives in Africa were doing a laudable job in this field but the forces arrayed against them were great and growing ones. In resisting and countering the influence of ideas from abroad, the Portuguese would greatly serve their own interests by the type of declaration which had been suggested and which would associate Portugal internationally with a moral and defensible position on the subject of self-determination. Dr. Salazar shook his head. He said that it would be naive to think that the forces working against Portugal would cease their activities just because of a declaration from Portugal. What then of their interests? Were they to allow time for the peaceful development of Angola and Mozambique, they would be defeating themselves. Ambassador Anderson replied that some of those forces would indeed continue their attacks but that Portugal would be in a stronger position by virtue of being able to count on the politically conscious people inside Angola and Mozambique to work jointly on the tasks ahead. The Prime Minister remarked that the politically conscious people in Portuguese Africa knew which

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was the correct road to follow. The others, those lacking in education and political maturity, were the only ones for whom foreign propaganda had any appeal. Ambassador Anderson expressed certain doubt on this score and warned that even those already educated and politically conscious might be open to subversion.

Dr. Salazar referred back to the Ambassador's suggestion that refugees and expatriates, with the exception of known criminals, be welcomed back into Angola. He assured the Ambassador that the Portuguese Government was quite willing to accept these people, and he said that even the Congo-Leopoldville Government would probably be quite glad to be relieved of their presence. In actual fact, it was Holden Roberto and the armed guards of the UPA who physically prevented the return of the refugees. The Portuguese Government had set up and manned reception stations near the frontier but only small groups of eight or ten persons at a time managed to straggle across the frontier and reach these posts.

Ambassador Anderson said that before concluding, he would like to make just one or two more points. He warmly praised the teachers and medical personnel he had seen in Portuguese Africa and called them "wonderfully dedicated people". He noted, however, that their wages and salaries were very low and said he thought it would be a great help if something could be done about this. Dr. Salazar nodded sympathetically but made no comment.

The Ambassador then spoke of the colonatos he had seen, making special reference to Limpopo. He expressed the view that in this very fine settlement project slightly too little land had been made available to each individual settler. This made for less than optimum production and a lower standard of living than was really necessary. Additionally, the Ambassador said he had the impression that some settlers had not been carefully enough selected with the result that they proved maladjusted to life and the conditions in Africa. Dr. Salazar recalled that at the time the Limpopo project had been designed, the basic idea had been to make land available to the individual settler in two separate plots: one for strictly agricultural development and another somewhat removed plot for livestock grazing. He added that he was not at the present time too familiar with how this was being handled. Dr. Salazar expressed agreement with the Ambassador's comment on maladjusted settlers and noted that the selection process was a difficult one. He added that some 5-8 percent of the settlers lose heart after arrival in Africa and then return to the metropole. Dr. Salazar commented that the colonato is an extraordinarily expensive device for settling an area.

Ambassador Anderson then emphasized again his belief that the Portuguese Government should do whatever it could to place before the world the strong points of its case with respect to Portuguese Africa. Dr. Salazar himself would be a most effective spokesman were he to prepare a TV tape which could be shown internationally. In terms of the general forum of world opinion, and particularly

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at the UN, it was important that Portugal demonstrate an attitude of flexibility. For this reason, the United States had been gratified by the talks between Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira and the African leaders. The fact that some African leaders remained interested in further talks with Portugal seemed an encouraging sign and the United States hopes that Portugal will agree to a resumption of those talks. Dr. Salazar smiled and said that the Africans seemed very much given to talking. He likened the Luso-African talks to a "conversation of deaf men" because of the fact that the participants spoke entirely different languages. For this reason, he professed to see the talks as inevitably unproductive. At the same time, he observed that they cost nothing and that if it were felt advisable to carry them forward, Portugal would have no objection to doing so.

As the conversation closed, Ambassador Anderson mentioned that he planned to travel to the United States on or about May 20, noting that this would be his first return there since arriving in Lisbon last September. Dr. Salazar said that it would no doubt be useful for the Ambassador to visit Washington and in closing the conversation he thanked the Ambassador again for the report upon his African trip.

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22 May 1964

SC No. 00620/64A

Copy No. 2

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*Patuzo*

# SPECIAL REPORT

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Authority CIA 12-8-75  
By LW, NARS, Date 1-8-76

PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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22 May 1964

## PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Portugal's economy is in much better shape than many observers were predicting when the revolt in Angola broke out three years ago. Its continued growth despite the strains imposed by increasing defense expenditures has helped prevent any real threat to Prime Minister Salazar's authoritarian regime. Serious problems are in prospect, however, when the military budget begins to drain off funds needed to sustain economic development projects and Salazar starts to lose the support of vested business interests. The delusion that time is on Portugal's side in Africa has blinded the regime to the strength of African nationalism. Lisbon may lose even minimum influence in its overseas territories after they become independent unless genuine reforms are quickly implemented.

### Economic Performance

Perhaps the most important indication of Portugal's unexpected economic strength is the regime's success in more than doubling defense expenditures since the beginning of the Angolan conflict early in 1961. This is particularly noteworthy because allocations for economic development have simultaneously increased and other government expenditures have remained close to normal levels.

Almost 44 percent of the 1963 national budget, totaling \$494.7 million, went for defense. The percentage will probably be at least as high this year although the initial 1964 budget, totaling \$517.4 million, allocated only 35 percent to military outlays. The Second Six-Year Economic Development Plan (1959-64) is to have \$70.3 million in 1964, an increase of 6.5 per-

cent over the funds allocated last year.

Government estimates, using 1962 prices, predict a 5.2-percent increase in GNP for 1963 --the same as in 1962 and only slightly below the 5.3-percent average for the period 1958-62. This rate is too low to enable Portugal, starting as it did from a low base, to catch up soon with the more industrially advanced European countries, but the ability to maintain such a steady growth has contributed to an optimistic outlook in business and official circles. The government is publicly committed to speeding up economic development, but stresses that defense requirements have priority.

The continuing strength shown in some parts of private enterprise is also an encouraging indicator. For example, deposits in Portugal's five

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major private banks in 1963 increased by an average of nearly 25 percent over 1962. The banks also extended 22 percent more credit and upped their net profits more than 14 percent. At the end of February, 1964, Portugal's gold and foreign exchange reserves stood at \$833 million, a record high.

The good performance of the Portuguese economy despite the expense of the Angolan war has been aided by the general prosperity in Angola itself--where the government has succeeded in containing the rebellion. The losses initially inflicted by guerrilla activity have been almost entirely made up. Angola has converted an unfavorable trade balance--\$6.3 million in 1959 and \$3.6 million in 1960--to a favorable one which averaged \$19.2 million for the three-year period 1961-63. A contributing factor has been the sharp, profitable rise in Angolan coffee prices which helped raise the overseas province's total foreign trade for 1963 to a record level. Moreover, the money spent in Angola by 40,000 military personnel, with higher pay than ever before, has created a boom in many of its economic sectors.

The favorable trade activity in Angola has not prevented Portugal as a whole--including all overseas territories--from registering a net balance-of-payments deficit in the last four years, ranging from \$6 million in 1960 to \$100 million in 1962 and probably about the

same for 1963. However, Angola's success has helped offset Portugal's own large trade deficit. This amounted to \$220.8 million in 1962 and \$235.5 million in 1963, due in large part to increased imports for expanding industrial production.

The government's firm military posture in Angola and its determination to carry on with economic development at home have inspired growing confidence generally in the business community. Even financial circles traditionally opposed to borrowing large sums abroad seem inclined to go along with the new economic policy.

Nevertheless, benefits accruing to the country from continued economic growth are not being felt by the population at large. Labor is becoming increasingly resentful of low pay levels, even though living costs in Portugal have also remained low when compared with those in other Western European countries. During the last two years or so, several thousand workers seeking a better living standard have emigrated clandestinely, particularly to France.

### Political Situation

The Salazar regime, after nearly 32 years in power, retains firm control. It still has the backing of big business and other vested interests, and has even strengthened its public image by its resolute handling of the Angolan revolt.

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The armed forces remain loyal, despite discontent on the part of some upper-echelon officers --led by ex-President Craveiro Lopes and former Defense Minister Botelho Moniz--who would like to see political and further economic reforms at home and a more flexible policy in Africa.

Any organized opposition to Salazar's regime is illegal. The only group which could be so described, in any case, is the small, tightly knit Communist party, whose principal activity is clandestine dissemination of antiregime propaganda. The non-Communist political opposition remains fragmented and has little popular following. There is no sign of a leader with the ability, determination, and stature to unite opposition groups and force the regime to adopt reforms.


Nevertheless, these groups --as well as Salazar's opponents in apolitical intellectual and student circles--have during the past year become more outspoken in criticizing restrictions on civil liberties. The regime's successes in the Angolan war have not dissipated opposition fears that Salazar's intransigent African policy will eventually lead to Portugal's collapse. Students in particular are opposed to the war on both ideological and practical grounds, and hundreds of them are said to have left the country legally or illegally in the past two years to evade conscription.

The morale of army conscripts sent to Angola for duty has also been affected. One report holds that 60-70 percent of the noncommissioned officers and enlisted men are disheartened by the situation there. While this figure is probably too high, there is little doubt that many soldiers are discouraged by the difficulty of waging war in Angola as well as by occasional indications that rebel capabilities are slowly improving. The increasing unfriendliness of Angola blacks and mulattoes must also affect the troops' morale.

While the regime is determined to retain control of Portugal's African territories and resist international pressure for their self-determination, the current policy is essentially a delaying action. This involves holding the line militarily and, on the political level, conceding only enough by way of reforms to give world opinion the impression that there is movement toward greater autonomy.

The Portuguese argue that they are carrying out a civilizing mission in Africa with the ultimate aim of producing an integrated multiracial state in which the overseas territories will rank equally with the metropole. Meanwhile, they insist, over-all control of territorial administration must remain in Lisbon. After a necessarily protracted period of education and apprenticeship, self-government will be practicable.

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The threat of Communist penetration in Africa and increasing unrest in some of the newly independent African countries are cited to emphasize that the Portuguese are "the only ones on whom the Africans can rely to save them from themselves."

Prime Minister Salazar and his close associates are confident other Western countries will eventually recognize the correctness of Portugal's position and change their attitude toward its overseas policy. Meanwhile, Lisbon has lessened its feeling of isolation by strengthening relations with major European powers which have at least refrained from joining the anticolonialists. In April, France got permission to set up a missile-tracking station in the Azores, and last October, an agreement between Lisbon and Bonn gave the Germans military training and logistics facilities in Portugal. In connection with both agreements the Portuguese obtained material useful for prosecuting the war in Angola. The government-controlled press gave full play to statements by visiting German

officials in 1963 that indicated a favorable attitude toward Lisbon's overseas policy.

Prospects

The outlook in Angola is for an eventual extension, rather than continued containment, of guerrilla action. In Portuguese Guinea, another territory where government forces now are hard pressed, the situation may become untenable in another year. If the African rebellion spreads next to Mozambique, the strain on Lisbon's military resources would at this point almost certainly force curtailment of expenditures for economic development, with a resultant slowdown in Portugal's economic growth.

In that event the regime would probably be confronted with rising opposition at home, not only from its traditional antagonists but also from big business. The rising dissatisfaction might then convince the military of the need to remove Salazar. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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*Bundy*  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 5103  
Rec'd: June 5, 1964  
10:45 a.m.

FROM: Lisbon

ACTION: Seestate 936

INFO: Paris 84  
Taipei 12  
Hong Kong 10

DATE: June 5, noon

Department telegrams 701, 724.

I saw Foreign Minister yesterday concerning recognition Peking.

I of course referred to Paul Hofmann article and asked Minister if he could shed any further light on subject. In response he said Hofmann article was his own responsibility but stated when queried he told Hofman about Conde's visit to Canton Consular premises. He mentioned premises supervised by caretaker from whom GOP had never gotten accounting for use funds provided him. As for recognition Chinese Communists, position GOP was same as that given Ambassador Anderson several months ago (Embassy telegrams 591, 614 and 649).

He then queried why US was disturbed over prospect Portuguese recognition Chinese Communists. I responded that he was certainly aware deep feeling on this subject in US and reiterated reaction in US to any such recognition on part GOP would be most serious. At this point Foreign Minister interjected thought he was arguing for argument's sake, and statements not to be interpreted as changing above stated position. He then said we did not seem to be disturbed when country such as Algeria recognized Chinese Communists. I replied this hardly comparable as Portugal an ally and fellow member NATO. At this point, he asserted

*Julius*

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)  
By IP, NARS, Date 10-31-75

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 936, June 5, noon, from Lisbon

responsibilities of NATO applied all members. I did not dwell this subject but went on to mention that consideration recognition Chinese Communists this point would seem particularly inappropriate considering her renewed militancy which even disturbing to USSR plus her activities in Africa which represented threat Portuguese territories. Minister did not take issue with my statement but rather turned conversation towards preoccupation GOP over developments in Zanzibar and Tanganyika. He said US was always warning Portugal about future difficulties in Mozambique but he wished to stress GOP concern about threat to peace in Zanzibar and Tanganyika which he felt should be matter of worldwide concern.

Comment: Foreign Minister relaxed and in good humor. He refused be drawn out any further on subject Chinese recognition, but made considerable effort make it appear there was nothing new this subject. Question still remains as to whether he again engaged in gamesmanship or prepared take further steps in direction recognition. Embassy inclined believe former is case at present time.

GP-4.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 5116  
Rec'd: June 5, 1964  
10:47 a.m.

AF

FROM: Lisbon

Info

ACTION: Secstate 937

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G

INFO: Algiers 6

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)  
By IP, NARS, Date 10-31-75

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DATE: June 5, 1 p.m.

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Reference Embassy telegram 936.

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FE

During conversation with Foreign Minister yesterday concerning recognition of Peking, he asked me bring to attention USG reports concerning landing of 600 Cuban soldiers in Algeria. He expressed serious concern over this development and indicated he would appreciate any comment USG might have on use these troops. I specifically asked if he thought they were for use Angola and Mozambique, Morocco or Tunis, and he answered in negative in each case. He also expressed GOP concern about reports of Khrushchev-Ben Bella agreement for establishment Soviet base Algeria on which he said GOP had very reliable information. I told him Embassy had no information on either report but would convey to USG his expression concern.

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

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It would be useful in Ambassador's future talks with Franco Nogueira if Embassy could have information from Department on Cuban troop and Soviet base reports. Paul Hofmann informed me last week Franco Nogueira quite annoyed with Castiella because latter indicated GOS had no confirmation Soviet base report.

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6/10/64

✓ 39

To: Mr. Bundy

From: D. Klein

Suggest you read summary, and paras. 8, 9, and 10.

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*Mr. Tunny*

39a<sup>B</sup>

*See for you  
Real summary  
+ pars. 8, 9, 10*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *Dele*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA 12-8-75  
By LW, NARS, Date 1-8-76

8 June 1964

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 9-64

SUBJECT: Salazar's Current Prospects

*Paulig*

SUMMARY

Portugal's fortunes have improved measurably over the last two years. The Portuguese military has reduced the Angolan war to manageable proportions against present levels of terrorist activity. The Portuguese economy has shown the capacity to sustain a rapid increase in defense expenditures without seriously slowing domestic growth. By establishing direct military ties with France and with West Germany, Salazar has demonstrated that he is not wholly dependent on the US in this field and has broken the political isolation that has long hobbled Portugal's diplomatic efforts. Consequently, US efforts to move Salazar toward a public acceptance of self-determination or a formal agreement on base facilities will prove more difficult than ever.

There are, of course, weak points in the Portuguese armor. Per capita income is still the lowest in Europe. Portuguese Guinea remains a festering sore. Opposition elements led by Humberto Delgado have formed an alliance with Communists and have established themselves in Algeria, which raises the possibility of an increased subversive threat to the regime. Nevertheless, short of a major colonial disaster, which might move the conservative elements in Portugal to remove Salazar, there is little prospect for a change in Portuguese policies. Even then, any likely successor regime, though it might follow a more progressive course at home and a more flexible policy in Africa, would be as determined as Salazar to retain Angola and Mozambique.

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downgrading and  
declassification

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1. Last month Portugal observed both the 75th birthday of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and his 36th year as his country's strongman. Although he has indicated that he would like to step aside if it were not for the African crisis, there is every reason to believe that, barring divine intervention, the good doctor will remain in office for at least one more round of celebrations.

2. Two years ago the outlook for Portugal seemed dim indeed. It was beset with many difficulties in the defense of its colonial empire -- including a deteriorating military situation in Portuguese Guinea, the genesis of a guerrilla war in Mozambique, and the possibility of an economic boycott spearheaded by increasingly aggressive African nations. The obvious displeasure of the US over Portuguese colonial policies, combined with the political isolation imposed on Portugal by most of Europe, raised further question as to the durability of the Salazar regime.

3. Since that time, however, the short-term outlook has improved measurably. The military situation in Angola has eased. A sharp rise in Angola's export earnings (especially from coffee)

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and increasing foreign investment\* in Portugal have brought Salazar's exchange reserves to record highs and have permitted him to more than double his defense expenditures since the Angolan insurrection began in 1961. At the same time, he has continued to fulfill his economic development plans without serious budgetary strain.

4. There are weak points, of course, in the Portuguese condition. The per capita income is still the lowest in Europe. Portuguese Guinea remains a festering sore, and the future of Portuguese Timor depends on the whims of Indonesian President Sukarno. But, on balance, Salazar's actions have been, at least for the moment, remarkably successful.

5. In these circumstances, the US is finding it increasingly difficult to convince Portugal that its African policies are misguided. The US has anxiously prodded Salazar to recognize publicly

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\* Loans to Portugal from foreign sources over the last two years include:

US Export-Import Bank	\$55 million
IBRD	\$12.5 million
New York Banks	\$35 million
French Private Banks	\$23 million
West German Government	\$37.5 million

In addition, Ford and General Motors each has invested about \$3.5 million in automobile assembly plants, and a Swedish firm is willing to invest up to \$28 million in a wood pulp plant.

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the principle of self-determination for its territories, arguing that, short of such a gesture, the nationalist movements will become more violent, racist, and less disposed to allow Portugal to retain its presence and influence in the Overseas Provinces. The US has urged that moderate leaders on the African scene like Senghor and Houphouet Boigny could influence other Africans if only they had a declaration of good intentions from Salazar. We have also told the Portuguese that Chinese Communist interest in Africa, the uprisings in East Africa, and general African political instability, all underscore the necessity for Portugal to move faster in satisfying nationalist desires. We have repeatedly asserted that African pressure against Portugal in the UN can be diverted only by a clear statement of its approval of self-determination.

6. In his present mood, Premier Salazar has been singularly unmoved, and it is less likely than ever that any government he heads will ever publicly agree to genuine self-determination for the overseas territories. He believes that a pledge of self-determination, or a public acceptance of the principle, would be regarded by most Africans as a virtual concession of early independence. In response to repeated US requests for a statement on self-determination, however, Salazar has agreed that Portugal does

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believe in the principle, but defines it as a right only for those who are properly civilized -- and the decision as to who is civilized rests exclusively with Lisbon. Moreover, he questions how much influence Houphouet Boigny and Senghor have with the likes of Ben Bella, Babu, and Holden Roberto. Further, he wonders how the US logically can force self-determination on Africa but deny it to Kashmir, pursue one policy for Goa, another for Cyprus. As for the UN assembly, he considers that it has only one purpose with regard to Portugal -- to eliminate Portuguese sovereignty in the overseas territories.

7. On a more positive note, Salazar believes that recent events in Africa have demonstrated his contention that at this time an African "nation" is another name for chaos. He holds that the Portuguese provinces will soon become an enclave of stability midst a black sea of communism -- and that the "correctness" of the Portuguese position will sooner or later be evident even to the US. Moreover, in contrast to the US position, Salazar is not convinced that the tide of African nationalism is irresistible. Indeed, he feels that the Portuguese concept of a multi-racial society is the only morally right and economically feasible solution of benefit both for the people of the particular areas and for the free world, and that time will prove him right.

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The Base Rights Question

8. US difficulties in coping with Salazar have long been complicated by our interest in retaining base rights in the Azores. More recently, a new factor has been introduced by the importance we now attach to the installation, not only in the Azores but on Madeira and the Portuguese mainland, of LORAN-C navigational equipment.\* Salazar believes that a trump card in dealing with the US is the value to the US of these facilities. As if to underline the nature of this "dependence," the Portuguese have thus far been unwilling to renew the 1951 base agreements which expired at the end of 1962. The US is now in the Azores on a de facto basis, subject only to a six-month notice of expulsion. The Portuguese are moving very slowly in responding to US requests for LORAN-C facilities and may use this as a point of pressure to persuade the US to ease off on the colonial issue.

9. In the last analysis, however, Salazar will probably not go beyond protests, warning, and foot-dragging on the question

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\* LORAN-C is a precise long-range navigational aid used by ships and aircraft to establish their positions. For purely geographic reasons, establishment of a Portuguese chain of three LORAN-C stations (Azores, Madeira, the mainland), especially the Azores location, is particularly important to cover areas of the Atlantic which cannot be covered by stations in other locations.

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of base facilities. Holding only one trump card, the Premier will be most reluctant to play it. In certain circumstances, however, a Portuguese decision to ask the US to withdraw is conceivable -- e.g., outright US support of African nationalist attacks against Portuguese territory, or US participation in an embargo.

#### The NATO Question

10. Certain developments in bilateral relations with other NATO members have given Salazar new opportunities to demonstrate his independence of the US. He has recently ceded to France the rights to a missile tracking station in the Azores. While the Portuguese Government has officially denied the political significance of such an agreement, the state-controlled Portuguese press has been heavy-handed in stressing that France, in contrast to the US, has supported Portugal in the UN. In recent months, the West Germans have been granted the right to establish extensive military facilities in Portugal. Portugal has made substantial purchases of military equipment from West Germany and has sought other official and commercial ties with Bonn. Unlike the US, the West Germans appear to have placed no restrictions on the use of the weapons or aircraft Portugal may receive as part of the military facilities deal.

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11. On a related front, the Portuguese seem to have gone out of their way to indicate their unhappiness with NATO. Heretofore, Portugal had clung to its NATO role, in part because this relationship gave Salazar's isolated regime a certain hallmark of respectability and acceptance in Europe. Consequently, the US was able to bring, or threaten to bring, pressure on Portugal through NATO councils. Recently, however, the Portuguese have begun to downgrade the importance of NATO. Salazar has indicated a need to consider a basic reorganization of NATO and a reorientation of its objectives. What Portugal apparently wants is an extension of NATO cooperation and support to areas outside of Europe (that is, to Africa). We believe Salazar may upon occasion follow the French lead in steps distasteful to the US. One gesture in this direction could be early Portuguese recognition of Red China. We do not believe that they will seek actively to disrupt NATO.

Policies of any Successor Regime

12. A successor regime to Salazar might follow more flexible policies in the overseas territories or be more responsive within NATO, but the current state of the opposition in Portugal does not suggest that this is likely. The Portuguese population

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remains basically apathetic and organized opposition to Salazar is fragmented, inept, and unimpressive.

13. The only significant new development within the Portuguese opposition is the effort of Humberto Delgado to form an alliance with the Portuguese Communists. These various groups have found refuge in Algeria, which the government believes will be used as a base of operations against metropolitan Portugal.

14. Delgado's move further weakens the democratic opposition to Salazar and increases the threat from the extreme left. It is possible that this could lead rightist elements to undertake a coup attempt. These men, who are or have been key figures in the regime, agree with Salazar's policy objective of maintaining the Overseas Provinces as part of Portugal, but fear his inflexibility as to means may defeat these ends. Some, like General Santos-Costa, are at least as authoritarian as Salazar. Those among them called "liberals" -- Generals Botelho Moniz and Craveiro Lopes, ex-Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira and former Rector of Lisbon University Marcelo Caetano -- are not friends of the political democracy as that term is understood in most of the West. They advocate, rather, economic, social, and administrative reforms which they hope could reconcile Africans in the Overseas Provinces to continued membership in the Portuguese nation.

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15. The dissatisfaction of these men with Salazar's inflexibility, combined with considerable personal ambition, has at times led to various combinations among them in efforts to overthrow Salazar. The effectiveness of the security apparatus, rivalry among the various contenders for power, and a general lack of political courage, have voided these efforts.

16. The one development which might embolden these men to decisive action could be a military disaster in one of the Overseas Provinces, or fear of a leftist coup in Portugal. The Botelho Moniz-Craveiro Lopes factions are believed to have some support in the military. They are seeking support from Portuguese business leaders, who are concerned about higher taxes in the metropole to finance colonial wars, and worried that Salazar's overseas policies ultimately will lead to their being forced out of Africa altogether.

#### The Future


17. The foregoing is not intended to suggest that Salazar is in process of winning his battle against the forces of change. Ineffective as Africa's "freedom fighters" may be today, the long-range prognosis for Portugal's African territories remains questionable. But the present indications are that Dr. Salazar will

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have a good deal more time to play out his hand than most observers were willing to give him a year or two ago.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Sherman Kent".

SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 758

INFO: USUN 3348

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JUN 19 5 02 PM '64

Authority State Sec. 4/20/74

By smg, NARS, Date 8/5/74

BUNDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER LIMDIS

BATOR

BELK

BRUBAKER

CHASE

FORRESTAL

JESSUP

JOHNSON

KEENY

KLEIN

KOMER

MOODY

REEDY

SAUNDERS

SAYRE

SMITH, WM. Y.

Portuguese Ambassador Garin called on Tyler

June 18 to express his distress and concern at article with UN dateline in June 14 Sunday Star by William Frye alleging that US African policies shifting to one of active support for Portuguese African nationalists.

Garin particularly exercised over following passages.

~~XXXX~~  
BEGIN SUMMARY. Unable continue straddle African problem indefinitely, US may shift policy to <sup>favor</sup> African nationalists. Selection of Harriman as President's "Africa coordinator" gives weight this theory. Already there is reportedly being considered CIA plan for providing arms and money to selected rebel leaders to lead them away from dependence on Moscow. Among other things US might do are following: actively support ~~for~~ Africans in UN; greatly increase scholarships to American schools; prepare urgently phase out Azores.

END SUMMARY. (full text pouched)

Garin said

Drafted by

Telegraphic transmission and

M - Governor Harriman

EUR:WE:REBarbour:nlf 6/18/64

classification approved by:

EUR: William R. Tyler

Clearance

AF Mr. Tasca  
IO Mr. Buffum

EUR - William R. Tyler

s/s - Mr. Davies

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JUN 13 5 02 PM '64

Garin said Frye known ~~be close~~ to members USUN, and ~~and~~ this therefore lent credence to story. Said obliged report article to Lisbon and hoped for mitigating comment.

Tyler dismissed allegations in article as being entirely speculative and without foundation. Asked Garin emphasize his comments when reporting story to Lisbon.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 18

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COMITE 24: Portuguese Territories

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Following is text of explanation of vote on Comite 24 res on

Portuguese Territories:

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Authority State Ltr. 6/10/76

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/76

My delegation has abstained on the committee's latest resolution on the subject of the Portuguese territories because, much to its regret, it sees no possibility that this resolution will hasten the fundamental improvement in these territories that all of us hope for. We believe this fundamental improvement depends in the first instance upon the patient and persistent pursuit of understanding between the African states and Portugal. We believe this understanding must be sought through the traditional methods of consultation and discussion that are prerequisite to any stable solution.

Because of its interest in a long-range solution which is equitable to all the parties concerned, my delegation has ~~repeatedly~~ voted against ~~the operative paragraphs 2, 4 and 7.~~

Drafted by:

7/3/64

UNP - William B. Buffum

IO: UNP: RHennes: Edwards: eu

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

XX - ~~Richard Goodland~~

Clearances:

AFC - Mr. Loomam

WE - Mr. Appling

AFI - Mr. Strong

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*Classification*

~~negotiations on the SEZ negotiations.~~ We do not think a solution is advanced by the unprecedented action of condemning the Government of Portugal. Customary practice in this Committee is to disagree with the policy and actions of a government, not to condemn the government itself. In addition, if we are to hope for success in the Secretary-General's efforts, referred to in his report to the Security Council, to reconvene talks between Portuguese and African leaders, it is surely inappropriate to condemn a participant in these conversations.

For similar reasons, my delegation questions the advisability of seeking now a new Security Council endeavor to deal with the situation in the Portuguese territories. The Security Council last December provided a vital referent for a Portuguese-African dialogue by defining the concept of self-determination in a way which my delegation believes should be acceptable to all parties. What the present situation calls for, therefore, is not Security Council action but rather a resumption of the Portuguese-African talks. The proposed resolution strikes an unhelpful note hardly conducive to productive discussions which we strongly believe are possible and desirable.

Finally, my delegation questions the implications in operative paragraph 7 and ~~in~~ Preambular paragraph 5 that foreign economic activities in the Portuguese territories are prejudicial to the

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to the political interests of the peoples concerned. In fact, the assumption that foreign investment impedes political progress is contrary to the experience of most member states of the UN.

Having expressed the foregoing reservations, my delegation does wish to record once more its strong support for the principle of self-determination and for the valuable and tireless efforts of the Secretary-General to bring together the Portuguese and African leaders <sup>so</sup> ~~that~~ that they may set out once more on the path of reason, which still remains open. It is the view of my delegation that this path can produce the results we all seek. . END VERBATIM TEXT.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Classification*

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

42

*Portugal*

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Control: 8498  
Rec'd: July 10, 1964  
3:51 p.m.

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FROM: Lisbon  
  
ACTION: Secstate 26  
  
DATE: July 10, 7 p.m.  
  
EMBTEL 15

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Authority State ltr. 6/10/76  
By rmg, NARS, Date 8/5/74

Following strenuous protests I have been making to all available Portuguese officials, Secretary of State for Air General Chagas advised AIRA July 9 that decision has been taken to fly F-86s from Bissau in Guinea to Sal in Cape Verde Islands. Further stated that F-86s would be restricted from flying in Guinea and all these aircraft redeployed to Sal as soon as maintenance completed to insure safe flight. Maintenance team being dispatched by Chief Staff of PAF to assist in preparation of aircraft for flight to Sal and thence at later date to Metropolitan Portugal. Emphasized that few aircraft may take longer than others to prepare for flight. General Chagas rather insistent that Air Attache and I should fly with him to Bissau or Sal to verify movement of aircraft. I am declining this but will have Air Attache accompany Chagas and verify aircraft status.

In discussion General Chagas explained that in earlier high level consideration of F-86s Dr. Salazar indicated that Loran-C, Azores base agreement and procurement of F-86s for Portugal should be considered as one problem. Minister of Defense and Secretary of State for Air advised they were individual problems and should be acted on separately. Salazar agreed to this. It appears now that there is possibility recent reversal of General Chagas and Foreign Minister's unequivocal statements that F-86s would not fly in Guinea was result Dr. Salazar's intervention and countermanding of orders through Minister of Defense without

advising

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-2- 26, July 10, 7 p.m. from Lisbon

advising other principals. General Chagas concluded by stating Dr. Salazar and Minister of Defense not happy about redeploying these jet aircraft but they understood that this move essential to improvement Portuguese position with US.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

TRT/6

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal*

43

53

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Action

Control: 25646  
Rec'd: July 31, 1964  
2:38 p.m.

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FROM: Lisbon

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ACTION: Secstate 76

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DATE: July 31, 5 p.m.

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Portugal Trade with Cuba

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After inviting Foreign Minister's attention outcome recent inter-American Ministerial meeting of consultation, overwhelming consensus in favor further isolation Castro regime, likelihood that states not voting in favor would nonetheless respect and implement resolutions adopted, and reasons for asking friends elsewhere cooperate with effort of inter-American community, I expressed earnest hope GOP would carefully consider foregoing and refrain from trade with Cuba which would be inconsistent therewith.

Foreign Minister listened attentively, assured me GOP had no intention establishing trade ties with Cuba but called to my attention that one local private shipping firm seriously distressed by funds long-blocked in Cuba. To resolve this problem and in view Portuguese need for sugar, GOP contemplating one-shot transaction which would offset these two items. Negotiations in process but culmination not yet assured. Foreign Minister told me not to be surprised however if such deal materialized but to rest assured it would be one-time only in character.

In response these statements, I reminded Foreign Minister Portugal had many good friends in US sincerely trying be of assistance GOP. Surest way alienate these friends is through "playing footsies" with Communists and particularly those in Cuba. I reminded Foreign Minister 34 percent Angolan exports bought by US first two months 64. Adverting to missile crisis October 62, I pointed out USG could easily have invaded

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-2- 76, July 31, 5 p.m. from Lisbon

have invaded Cuba and eliminated Castro problem once and for all. Out of deference to fact USSR might conceivably have inflicted counter-damage upon friendly nations in Europe USG had refrained from such action and opted instead for longer, slower, and more frustrating tactic of economic attrition to force Cuba desist subversion and aggression in western hemisphere. Latter deserved fair trial and needed support of GOP and other friendly countries which USG and I personally hoped would be forthcoming.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

TRT/12

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal*

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Action

Control: 25672  
Rec'd: July 31, 1964  
2:48 p.m.

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FROM: Lisbon

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ACTION: Secstate 78

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DATE: July 31, 6 p.m.

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Reference: Embassy telegrams 74, 26

F-86s in Portuguese Guinea

At one point in overall conversation Foreign Minister expostulated that wherever GOP turned and with whomever it talked in Washington it heard only about F-86s in Portuguese Guinea. "We are tired of hearing about F-86s". Foreign Minister admitted GOP in wrong on this issue and had failed fill commitment to USG. Said decision firmly taken fulfill this commitment for their return but that until this done GOP could not discuss other substantive matters with USG. He specifically said GOP would not talk about Loran-C, tantalite shipments, trade matters, or any other such items until they had gotten F-86s back to Europe.

Foreign Minister said in meeting with Minister Defense and Dr. Salazar it was decided bring F-84s which they had purchased from Angola to replace MAP F-86s Portuguese Guinea. This would necessitate 300 meter extension of runway at Bissau. While runway being extended F-86s would be kept at Sal in Cape Verde Islands for deterrence value. Movement to be effected soon as possible.

From Foreign Minister's general manner and presentation I gained distinct impression that decision withhold discussion other items until GOP purges self of culpability on F-86s had come from Dr. Salazar who had settled prevailing controversy between Minister Defense and Foreign Minister. There is obvious deep resentment

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-2- 78, July 31, 6 p.m. From: Lisbon

and irritation on part of these officials and others over US pressure when as Foreign Minister stated "we are victims of aggression from neighboring nations".

GP-3.

ANDERSON

HLL/12

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Portugal* 45

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Action

Control: 25694  
Rec'd: July 31, 1964  
3:05 p.m.

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DATE: July 31, 6 p.m.

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CINCLANT FOR POLAD.

Reference: Embassy telegram 74.

LORAN-C.

In spite of Foreign Minister's refusal discuss other substantive matters pending resolution F-86 problem (Embassy telegram 78), I nevertheless pressed him for answer and early action on LORAN-C facilities. I pointed out this matter hanging fire since last December and that even were affirmative decision taken today much time would be needed for survey, selection and acquisition of necessary sites, construction of facilities, training of personnel, including Portuguese, etc. I urged upon him desirability of getting this underway while F-86s still in process repatriation from Portuguese Guinea. Foreign Minister remained adamant in his refusal discuss this possibility obviously under instructions Dr. Salazar.

Comment: Last week I talked to COMSUBRON 16 at Rota on subject LORAN-C. My impression is that operation Polaris forces consider installation Portuguese complex exceedingly important (A) for missile accuracy, (B) for redundancy of navigational aids for Polaris systems submarines now and possibly for MLF later.

It seems important to me that USG determine how badly it really

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Authority *State Ltr. 4/10/76*  
By *smg*, NARS, Date *8/5/76* 096

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-2- 79, July 31, 6 p.m., from Lisbon.

wants the facilities for LORAN-C in Portuguese territory and how far it is willing to go in concessions to Portugal to obtain concurrence. This is likely to be a straight quid pro quo deal independent of Azores base problem or of political differences between US and Portugal over African territories. My belief is that, barring unforeseen developments or exacerbation US-Portuguese relations other areas, deal can be worked out provided US willing grant export licenses for spare parts for US-type aircraft and equipment which Portuguese have previously purchased and which are operating in Africa. Further that sale (possibly on some credit arrangement) of new aircraft which Portuguese want would have binding agreement prohibiting their use in Africa without prior approval of USG but which would be forthcoming if Portuguese were to be attacked by air from neighboring nations. We can probably hold line on sale of actual "weapons" for Portuguese forces in Africa and still get an agreement for LORAN-C without getting out on an insupportable position with anyone else.

In view excessive time which has elapsed and foreseeable additional delay of a month or two pending final resolution F-86 problem, I suggest that now rather than later is time for USG to face up to controversial decisions likely to be involved in accommodating predictable GOP requests.

GP-3.

ANDERSON

KGG/9

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