

PROCESSING NOTE

3/5/92

Wilson

Documents 46-1, 47-1, 48-1, and 49-1 were found in the file, unnumbered and misfiled. I refiled and numbered them with the number of the document they go immediately in front of, and a -1.

46-1

Tyler/Nogueira Mem-
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US/MC /9

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
THIRTY-SECOND MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Paris, France, December 16-18, 1963

D. B. Schick
*2 L1*MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 16, 1963

Time: Lunch and dinner

Participants:United States

William R. Tyler

Portugal

Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister

Subject: US-Portuese Relations

<u>Copies to:</u>	U	IO	Amembassies:	Lisbon
	M	UNP		Leopoldville
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	G/PM	INR/OD		
	AF	White House		
	AFC	DOD		

At lunch today, and again at dinner, Foreign Minister Nogueira expressed himself with great bitterness with regard to the role and attitude of the United States Government in the recent Security Council session in New York. He said that the resolution was worse than the previous one of July 31. He rejected all attempts to persuade him that on the contrary it had represented progress in the direction of moderation, and by keeping open the possibility of renewing talks with the Africans. He complained specifically that Ambassador Yost had been much more forthcoming in his remarks addressed to the African representatives than when he mentioned the Portuguese Foreign Minister. He also complained that Ambassador Yost had volunteered the statement that the United States had not sold any arms to Portugal and would not do so in the future, but had omitted to ask that no one should sell arms to the terrorists who were training on the soil of the Congo. He railed against the United States for insisting on the return of the F-86's from Portuguese Guinea.

I have never known Nogueira to speak more bitterly than he did to me on these two occasions. Several times he made allusions to (a) a review which the

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Authority *State let* 6/10/76
By *rmg*, NARS, Date *11/2/77*

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-2-

Portuguese government was undertaking of its relations with the United States and its own position in relation to the Alliance, and (b) to the Portuguese government having come to the end of its patience with regard to the Congo. He hinted that his government was considering taking measures to put an end to the present situation which permitted terrorists to operate with impunity from the soil of the Congo. While he was not specific, I inferred that the Portuguese government is considering armed action.

At the end of the evening, Ambassador de Staercke, in conversation with the Secretary, discussed Foreign Minister Nogueira's state of mind, and said that he also had never known him as violent or bitter. He said Nogueira had also told him that the Portuguese government had come to the end of its patience and was contemplating some form of military action in the Congo. de Staercke said he had warned Nogueira emphatically of the consequences to Portugal of any such course of action. de Staercke said that Nogueira had asked him if he would come to Portugal and see the Prime Minister (whom de Staercke knows very well) some time soon, but de Staercke was not certain whether it would be desirable for him to go in view of the Portuguese government's state of mind.

USDEL:WRTyler:mt
12/17/63

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47-1

Salazar to Ball ltr 3/3

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 3, 1964

To: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White HouseFrom: ^{ghm} Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary1. Brubeck
2. *[signature]*

The attached letter from Prime Minister Salazar to Under Secretary Ball is in response to Mr. Ball's letter to Salazar of October 21.

Portugal

Unofficial translation

Jan

Dear Mr. Under-Secretary

I thank you for your letter dated the 21st. of October, 1963. I am replying to it only now, as in the meantime the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had occasion, in New York and in Washington, to discuss with you and with the Secretary of State some of the points contained in your letter. My reply thus comes in the sequence of the conversations then held and is given with all the frankness called for by our common interests.

2. It does not seem to me necessary to analyse your interpretation of the new order which is said to be under way in a large part of the world. For the American leaders of today, there is one ineluctable fact, seemingly a beneficial one, namely the nationalist movement of the peoples of the African continent, tending to independence. A movement of such magnitude has to deny the pre-existing right, while attempting to create a new right; accordingly, the United States considers itself naturally released from the obligation to defend the former and ready to recognize the latter. Viewed in this light, the matter would lead us to give up further discussions, seeing that, on your side, it is sought to interpret, if not to legitimize, a fact and, on ours, to defend a right: our mutual arguments would never meet along any line of

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thought. But the actual facts are not these, because they are not wholly spontaneous nor do they evolve by themselves; indeed it is wished that they should evolve within a framework of law.

Those who were responsible for the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations found, besides nations subjugated as a result of war, the following fact: depending on States, both on the winning and on the vanquished side, there were some territories in which the geographical situation, the social organization, the cultural and economic development, the race and the language of most of the inhabitants placed them far behind those very States which held sovereignty there. These territories, with greater or lesser capacity for development and with greater or lesser prospects of becoming independent States, were so to say extraneous, lying outside the national unity and treated more or less as politically inferior a line of conduct had to be laid down in regard to them. But, as it was not possible from the very outset to define the goal of their evolution and, consequently, their political statute, the Charter of the United Nations, prudently foreseeing the possibility of various solutions ranging from integration to independence, decided to leave the definition of the destiny of those territories to be worked out, through the sovereignty responsible for them, by means of self-determination of the peoples concerned, naturally at a stage when the latter were able to answer for such a transcendental act of political will. The worst of the matter, however, is that self-determination began thereafter to be treated as though, in the Charter of the United Nations, it were independent of every-

thing else.

Now, in regard to this point, we have three serious complaints which are not being heard nor taken into account:

1. The Portuguese overseas territories are not and were not dependencies but territories politically integrated in a State which was admitted without dissent, with this constitutional structure, into the United Nations;
2. in the resolutions adopted with reference to Portugal, self-determination has not been treated as a choice of various alternatives, as provided by the Charter, but as the imposition of one option only - independence;
3. as regards Portuguese territories (at least with reference to them) the immediate independence which has been demanded negates the natural evolution of the peoples and the existence of an enlightened political formation.

This means: we complain about the objective, the manner and the timing in the application to Portuguese territories of that instrument of political evolution in the world. And we could also complain that the so-called self-determination is being sought by means of all sorts of external pressure, as if the will of other peoples could be substituted for the will, which alone is valid, of the populations concerned.

3. We have no desire to doubt the sincerity of the American Government's adherence to the principle of self-determination nor that its policy is not inspired by its own interests and that its objective is to preserve the values of our civilization. But, as

the American policy has not been consistent in its adherence to the exact sense and to the true *raison d'être* of the principle of self-determination, it happens that we have unfortunately seen the concept vary on the different occasions on which the Government of the United States has been called upon to express itself on the matter. We have seen the United States defending self-determination as an imperative process of choice to be adopted in respect of small human communities; but we also saw that elsewhere the American Government not only accepted the principle as an imposition without an alternative, so that a territory and a people could be absorbed by another, but even used in this behalf the weight of its great influence. We have seen the United States vigorously defending concrete measures to apply the principle so as to bring about a fragmentation of a territory, while, on another occasion and in the name of the same principle, we also saw the United States contributing in order that political unity could be imposed on a certain territory by force of arms. Again, although it is now the avowed policy of the United States to attribute to the United Nations the responsibility to decree the principle and to regulate its implementation, we have found that the cases are neither few nor unimportant in which the American Government acquiesced in that the United Nations should drop discussion of some unsolved questions of self-determination and even totally ignore others.

4. This has led us to think that the United States, while weighing the tremendous responsibilities which devolve on it, has

found itself obliged to regard self-determination not as a right of universal application, but as a political principle open to various modalities, whether in its enunciation or in its application. The concept thus seems to be a part of a political pragmatism, which, realistically, we have to accept as something natural. This enables us to expect a better understanding of the Portuguese case, if indeed it is not left alone, as it should, for juridical reasons.

5. Within the framework of the abovementioned political pragmatism, the American position, as may be inferred from your letter, is as follows:

- a) the American Government affirms its desire that Portuguese "presence, influence and interests" be maintained in the African territories of Portugal, it being understood, however, that this objective can be attained only if the Portuguese Government takes a position, publicly, in regard to the application to the Portuguese overseas territories of the principle of self-determination with a reference, vague or concrete, to a target date. You think that, in that case, the United States, along with Portugal and with moderate African Leaders, would be able to support that new Portuguese policy and resist the pressures which might be exerted in the direction of immediate concession of independence to the Portuguese territories;
- b) in another context, the American Government thinks that, should Portugal fail to carry out a programme of "decolonization", new and "prodigious" opportunities will thereby be given to international communism, whose progress in

Africa, according to you, has been successfully checked by the West.

Always with the reservation of the principles which I have set forth above, I take the liberty to assess these positions:

6. As regards the first point, when we last met in Lisbon, you expressed to me your conviction that, in order to ensure the desirable Portuguese presence in Africa, it was neither essential nor indispensable to maintain political ties between the European and the overseas parts of Portugal. The same idea is contained in your letter under reply, when you state that, in the cases in which the new States were set up with the consent and help of the metropolitan power, it has been possible to maintain intimate and mutually profitable relations. Thus it seems that we have to infer that, when you recommend the application of the principle of self-determination to the Portuguese overseas territories, you have in mind that the inevitable result or at least the desirable one and the one that will best suit the ends in view, will be the total political independence of each of the territories in question. This kind of self-determination is, in fact, the only one consented to by the United Nations Organization, whenever it is a question of taking away territories from the influence of Europe and no conquering power appears on the scene or there is no immediate Afro-Asian heir in sight. In view of what I have said above, I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by commenting on the various aspects — moral and material — of the question. But, since in your

letter and on other occasions the American Government has expressed its concern for the maintainance of Portuguese "presence, influence and interests" in Africa, it seems appropriate to examine the conditions in which it is thought that result could be secured in the absence of any political ties as well as the consequences which we think would befall the interests of the populations of the territories concerned, of Portugal and of the West, which we consider, in this order, the three legitimate parties involved.

7. Both in our conversation and in the letter under reply you have confronted the disastrous results witnessed, when independence was attained against the will of the sovereign power, with the success obtained when it came about with the help of the latter. Now, in a great majority of the new States, experience has shown that, when one or another leader of the political élites existing at the time of independence — I refer to black África — commands at the same time tribal allegiance, the political organs enjoy a certain stability, thanks to the discipline of the respective aggregates; but, when that is not the case, the political life of the new State is precarious and, in order not to be so, it requires the aid, not only economic but also military, of the former metropolitan power. Thus we see that the political stability of the new States either rests on a tribal basis or depends on external aid. In the first case, we witness a retrogression marked by a revival of the primitive organization of the territories; in the second case, we are

in the presence of what may be called a pseudo-independence or a mask of sovereignty of the territories in question. In order to attain a certain degree of desirable collaboration, it has been found essential, more than the manner of access to independence, that large funds be made available to the new States by the former metropolitan powers and that, in exchange, the latter be able to keep effective control of the economic and financial life of the new States and thereby of their political life. However, one begins to hear with increasing intensity, in African circles and in others unfriendly to the West, the latter type of relation being denounced as a form of "neo-colonialism", as much hated as the former dispensation. And the populations run the risk of losing all the advantages which they would derive from a close collaboration with the colonizing powers.

8. In the absence of political ties, we do not think that the panorama of the Portuguese overseas provinces would be different. Let us leave aside those of smaller size and weaker in material resources; in relation to these, self-determination would certainly work out in two stages, the first of which could bring them independence, but the second would undoubtedly correspond to their annexation by the neighbouring States. (In Goa, not even the first stage was observed; it would be the same in Macau and Timor.) In Angola and in Mozambique, as you admit, there is no authentic nationalism outside the Portuguese national unity. On the other hand, and even if an insurrection or a revolution fomented from outside could

create that nationalism, as you aver on the basis of analogy — though unfounded — with the Algerian case, such nationalism would not but rest on negative foundations and it would not be possible to build on such a base the stability and the progress of new State. Now, Portugal, as at present constituted, has sufficient capacity to grant funds or to guarantee internal or external loans, as it has been doing, to ensure the normal development of its overseas territories; but it could not and surely it would not be inclined to feed, for the benefit of outsiders and for an unlimited period of time, the stream of subsidies which are at present keeping alive the newly independent African States. In such circumstances, there would be no other alternative but that of some third power taking Portugal's place — is this not the end in view ? — as experience shows that the existing international bodies have neither the vocation nor the financial means to take the place of State organizations. In this context — which cannot be accused of pessimism, because it rests on realities demonstrated by experience — we remain unable to envisage the benefits which would accrue, as a result of self-determination, to the populations of those territories except the passing euphoria of some, indeed very few, in the face of an independence which they regard in terms of laurels but not of responsibilities. This is the crux of the matter, since the good of the people must outweigh all other political considerations or disadvantages.

9. Thus we see that, given the abovementioned factual circumstances

tances, full independence for the Portuguese overseas provinces would not, ultimately, ensure the progress of the populations nor would it guarantee Portuguese "presence, influence and interests" in Africa. According to the American Government, however, an interim period of preparation would be useful and possible: useful, because it would enable the preparation, by a process of accelerated training, of local elements to staff all the administrative structures of the territories; possible, because, once the intention of the Portuguese Government to grant independence — it seems no longer worth even talking about self-determination — was announced, the United States together with moderate African leaders could effectively oppose the forces which would arise, especially outside the territories, clamouring for immediate independence, as has been voted by the United Nations.

We have listened and conceded a certain amount of good faith to the statements made by such African leaders favouring a programme of evolution towards independence to be applied to the Portuguese overseas territories. We see that the same moderate opinions have been placed before the Government of the United States, which thinks it can mobilize them in the desired direction. It is not the good intentions that we doubt; we do, however, doubt if there is freedom to express such ideas publicly and to act accordingly, not only in view of the violent character of the revolutionary movements which have already taken root in Africa and of the limitations which they impose but also of the impact of the multi-

ple interests which are even alien to the African continent itself. The way in which the talks between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and the group of African representatives took place, under the aegis of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the manner in which an end was put to them, leave no doubt that our scepticism is legitimate. Likewise recent statements made by Secretary General U Thant do not encourage the hope that one will see shortly the advent of realism in African politics at an international level. As a matter of fact, the United Nations have already voted that no preparation is necessary for independence.

But, supposing the African States, which are still moderate and which are possibly on the eve of not being so, were inclined to act in a certain manner, in combination with the United States, can they think of mustering sufficient strength to prevent others, both in the internal and in the external spheres, from drawing, with increased speed and in advance of all time limits, the consequences implicit in the principle to be enunciated by the Portuguese Government ? Recent experiments, very badly conducted ones, do not encourage us to make such an admission. We have seen that it is the violent that dictate terms and we have not seen that the big powers dare oppose them. They dare not and they will not want to do so, since the target to be attained is the same for both and can be distinguished only by accessory or accidental details of action. If nothing essential differentiates them, it is because all are in agreement. Once international law is set aside and all are involved

in the fret and fever of empirical and opportunist solutions and in the network of fallacious expedients, nothing will be achieved either for the good of peoples or, in the present case, in favour of Portuguese "presence, influence and interests" in Africa, which the United States says it desires to maintain. It is in this context that we consider as non-viable in the practical sphere — let alone the juridical sphere — to consort with any other States a plan of action designed to secure our presence in the territories where Portuguese sovereignty is exercised in Africa.

10. For the reasons set forth and for the others which have contributed down the years to form our position in the matter, we believe that no benefit would accrue, either to the populations of the Portuguese territories or to the Portuguese nation, from a decision involving a rupture of political ties which unite the whole. Nor do we think that the West will derive any advantage therefrom. In fact, the political map of Africa, excepting Southern Africa, shows today an exclusively neutralist colour, if not indeed, in some cases, of alignment against the West, which means that the new African States either refuse to take a position in the ideological conflict between the West and the communist world or take it in favour of the latter. It seems to us that it is a great mistake to interpret the evident lack of adaptation of the communist structure to the present characteristics of African society as signifying Africa's hostility to international communism; this, because communism will not proceed in Africa as it did in Europe and in Ame

rica and has already given up doing in most places. Thus, we think that communism, after taking a false step in African politics, can desist from setting up African political parties identified as communist parties; it can likewise give up trying ostensibly to establish popular republics — though it may avail itself of and support those which desire of themselves to be such. Communist objectives in Africa, as we see them, will be satisfied with leading Africa to nationalize wealth — half the way gone through to cut off the continent from economic progress — and then neutralize it ideologically and strategically. In this manner, communism will prevent the West or at least Europe from availing itself, in case of need, of the geographical and human values which, for example, enabled the victory of the allied forces in the second world war. For this reason, to the extent to which we encourage African neutralism by means of independence granted to unprepared new countries, we believe that we will be building up positions which essentially serve the interests of the enemy. It will be said that Western policy and in some measure Soviet policy also seem to be heading for an exclusion of a generalised conflict. This is neither here nor there, because little by little the position and the interests will likewise be lost. Ultimately, it can well happen that the sum-total of those losses will coincide, as far as the West is concerned, with the result which would follow a war, generalized and lost.

11. That is why we cannot accept the opinion that the West is winning the fight for Africa and recent events, some of them subse-

quent to our conversation, confirm our position. On the other hand it seems to us that there is nothing to support your opinion that communist penetration is rendered easier in territories which are not yet "decolonized" and that communist influence in the future depends not on communizing activity in independent countries but in the manner in which the West deals with the problem of political evolution in the southern one third of Africa. I take a very serious view of these statements, inasmuch as the judgment expressed there is tantamount to throwing the responsibility for the communization of the territories on the policy of the powers still holding sovereignty there, solely because these do not abandon those territories materially and culturally, to all foreign influences, including those of communism. In the domain of principles, it is not seen that there is any connection between decolonization and independence: the former not only does not depend on the latter but we can easily find colonial situations in independent states. In the domain of facts and in so far as we are concerned, apart from the communist support to the terrorist movement in Angola, we can guarantee that Soviet proselytism has not made itself felt either in Angola or in Mozambique. But the same cannot be said of "decolonized" Africa, where opposition to the West is being progressively reiterated by trade unions and extremist parties. We shall all pay dearly — starting from the African populations — for the idea of transplanting to Africa, without previous work of assimilation, the complex of political institutions and social organs to which the Western nations

tions are adapted and with which they somehow or other govern themselves.

12. I noted with satisfaction that, in your letter, you recognize the efforts of the Portuguese Government in the implementation of the plans for the economic, social, political and educational development of the overseas provinces. We too agree that it would be excellent if, freed from the enormous expenditure incurred at present with the security of the territories, we could increase the tempo of development. Since the maintenance of peace and order there depends on the behaviours of outsiders, we welcome with great interest the desire expressed by the State Department to be acquainted with the data showing complicities foreign to Angola in the events which have been taking place since 1961. These complicities are notorious and have been publicised everywhere with the pride of great actions, but we have given very close attention to the request and, some days back, the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed over to Ambassador Anderson a complete dossier on the subject. We do not have the slightest doubt that, if the external aid given to the terrorists were to cease, it would not be long before the latter also gave up their evil and useless activity. That would be the stage for revising the tempo and the scope of the reforms which are under way and of others which have been planned; and nobody would do it more eagerly than the Portuguese Government. We do not forget that the Government of the United States generously expressed its readiness to assist Portugal in the effort to develop the overseas

territories, particularly in the field of social welfare, education and communications. I think you reiterated the offer in the course of our conversations. It will, however, be understood that the Portuguese have found it repugnant to accept aid which, in the genuine manner of thinking of the offeror, is indissolubly linked with the dismantling of the Nation, as it has come to be across the centuries.

13. You will excuse me for the length of this letter and also if I have not been absolutely clear in regard to all the points I have touched upon: what I have sought, however, is to make a contribution so that no doubts may remain as to the Portuguese position regarding the overseas provinces. On our side, we believe that we have understood well the manner in which the United States regards these problems and the ends it has in view. Indeed, the doctrine of the American administration has been expounded often enough with the greatest publicity and clearness: all must have understood it well, particularly those who have adopted it in recent years. In regard to its general application, we note political shortcomings and sociological gaps, both of a serious nature; in so far as it is sought to apply it to Portuguese territories, we note, over and above, juridical and moral aspects which may not be despised. We are far from being in a position to assess, in historical perspective, the results of the precipitate independence of African States. The facts which we are able to observe are, in our opinion, only the beginning of a crisis of utmost gra-

vity which will take a long time to solve, but those facts are already sufficiently expressive of the retrogression and chaos surging there before our very eyes. Modestly, we think that this is the time to revise ideas and positions. The defence, which we have put up strenuously in all fields in order to ensure respect for our rights and for our historical reality, places upon us a burden of very heavy sacrifices, but at the same time it creates an opportunity and we cannot believe that it will fail to be used to the advantage of the West.

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4/29/64 Action Memo
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Portugal - Inc

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48

This document consists of _____ pages.

Number 3 of 8 copies, Series A

~~SECRET~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

Jim Bundy 5/4

May 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Attorney General
Secretary of Defense
Director, Central Intelligence Agency ✓
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson *UH*

SUBJECT: Portuguese-African Territories

T. Brubaker
by hand
2 Return BIC
SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-186 + State Ltr 5/16/78
By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

Attached is a paper prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs at the request of Secretary Rusk as a basis for the discussion on the foregoing subject at the meeting, 4:30 p.m., May 4.

In addition to the considerations with respect to Africa, as set forth in the attached paper, Secretary Rusk suggests that consideration will also need to be given to the effects on our NATO relationships with and our military interests in Portuguese territory, as well as the place of Portugal in the NATO alliance.

Attachment as stated.

~~SECRET~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

AF

APR 29 1964

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: G - Mr. Johnson
FROM : AF - G. Mennen Williams
SUBJECT: Portuguese African Territories: Action Memorandum

Summary

The issue of the Portuguese African territories remains stalemated--the present courses of action followed by the Portuguese Government and the nationalists respectively have led to a blind alley. The threat of the rebel movements, our own efforts with Salazar and the attitudes of some of the NATO members have thus far resulted in only limited movement by the Portuguese. At the same time, rebel activity has not met with notable success. Guerrilla actions continue, but they have been contained to a large degree by the Portuguese military at considerable financial cost.

Eventually Portugal will have to reach an accommodation with the nationalist movements. In the meantime, however, the nationalists are becoming increasingly radical; they have just admitted extremist and pro-Communist elements into the organizations. The most immediate problem in the overall issue is, therefore, to try to prevent the nationalists from mortgaging their future to the Communists and from reaching a stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement when Portugal finally comes around to offering one.

United States long-term interests require that a new approach be made to the issue in order to unblock the present stalemate and thus prevent the future situation of the Portuguese African territories--and with them the future of central Africa--from being gravely jeopardized. We should accordingly propose that the nationalists alter their tactics and develop a political action program with the objective of significantly expanding their political organizations and activities within and outside the territories. Broad-based support and participation would be sought among the populations concerned for campaigns in favor of self-determination. The United States would be prepared to provide clandestine assistance for this purpose.

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Discussion

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Discussion

Current Trends in the Nationalist Movements

The rebel leaderships of both Angola and Mozambique are now passing through a critical phase. Frustrated by Portuguese military containment and Salazar's refusal to concede any steps toward self-determination, they have also become embittered by the lack of UN, Western and even African support. The various War Games played at the Department and JCS have shown that as the Angolan conflict was prolonged, the more racist, violent and extremist the rebel movement became and the more the chances for an evolutionary settlement were compromised. Thus we are witnessing today the development of internal dissension within the Angolan nationalist leadership, the emergence of strongly anti-Western tendencies, and overtures for Communist help. Adoula recently told Governor Harriman he was very much concerned about the possibility that Holden Roberto might soon be ousted by extremists. It is now reported that Viriato da Cruz, a pro-Chicom leader of a rival nationalist group, has just been admitted into Roberto's organization.

This is now a critical juncture. If present trends continue unchecked, I fear that the nationalist movements will become more extremist and anti-white, with a possibility of strong Communist influence. Should this occur, there would be little chance for peace and a Portuguese-African compromise solution until and unless Portugal wearies and decides to cut its losses. Under these circumstances the future of Angola and Mozambique would be seriously jeopardized, and with them, the future of central Africa.

At the same time, it is probably unlikely that these nationalist movements would become so blatantly dominated by Communist elements as to alienate African support. Despite the reservations of moderate leaders, their fears of another Congo-like situation developing in Angola, and their often-expressed hope (albeit privately) for a peaceful and gradualistic solution, the nationalist cause has such wide African appeal that the African leaders really have no choice but to back the Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements if they are to survive politically themselves. Thus, almost irrespective of the political coloration and actions of the nationalists, their struggle is likely to remain a burning issue in Africa and a touchstone in our relations with the Africans until the issue is finally resolved.

Portuguese

~~SECRET~~ - SPECIAL HANDLING

Portuguese Government Attitudes

The Portuguese leaders give every sign of being convinced that they can ride out the storm and that if the rebellion can be eliminated within the next few years, they will be safe home. There are reports of returning soldiers being fed up with the struggle and feeling it is hopeless. Moreover, military expenditures are taking up a large portion of the budget at the sacrifice of public investments in the domestic economy. I suspect, however, that Salazar is being told mostly what he wants to hear, and Admiral Anderson reports that there is no indication of any give in Salazar's position.

As in the case of French attitudes toward the Algerian struggle, Portugal will in all probability come around eventually to seeing the hopelessness of trying to maintain the status quo and will make an accommodation with the nationalists. There are those who contend that it is futile to try and move Salazar, at least at present, and that we should wait until the moment is ripe for us to exert pressures. The flaw in this theory is that if we stand by and do nothing until rebel violence finally forces the Portuguese to face realities, by that time the nationalists will probably have reached a point of no return and no longer be disposed to working out with Portugal a compromise settlement.

U.S. Objectives

Our objective is to bring about an evolutionary settlement of the issue, which will ultimately provide stability for the territories and for the adjacent areas. This requires meeting the nationalist aspirations and at the same time permitting the maintenance of Portuguese presence in some form. Thus the settlement requires African-Portuguese cooperation. In order to make such an objective realizable, some progress has to be made in the meantime, namely before the African and Portuguese positions become wholly unreconcilable and before the orientation of the nationalists becomes such as to preclude a moderate and transitional settlement.

A New Approach - Political Action Program

In order to avoid a further deterioration and bring about some progress toward settlement, we believe that the nationalists should alter their present tactics and concentrate their energies, ^{ex} with our clandestine assistance, in setting up an extensive political organization within and outside the territories. This

organization

organization should be based on non-racial principles and obtain the adherence of as many elements as possible of the populations concerned--the various tribes, as well as the white and mulatto segments of the population. Once set up, the organization should endeavor to set in motion forces favorable to the cause of self-determination and capable of bringing pressures to bear on Portugal to change its policies. Inside the territories, this would consist of political campaigns designed to bring about a political consciousness and manifestations of public support for self-determination. If the nationalists could thus succeed in showing that they did in fact reflect the will of the majority, their cause would evoke significant international sympathy and impress on world public opinion the urgent need for a solution. Under such circumstances, the American public would be prepared to back the nationalists, and our NATO allies might be more disposed than they are now to help cope with the issue. Even the Portuguese might feel obliged to face up to realities, and the nationalists' emphasis on non-violence might make it more palatable for the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the rebel leadership.

Admittedly there is no guarantee that the nationalists, particularly the Angolans, would accept the concept of non-violence when their whole strategy is based on guerrilla warfare. Even if they were to accept it, they might not be able to carry it out. The Angolans and Mozambicans do not have a tradition of passive resistance or, more importantly, a British colonial police to contend with. The nationalists would have to be extremely adept in building up an effective and extensive underground organization that could successfully elude the ubiquitous Portuguese secret police (P.I.D.E.). Similarly, great courage and enormous sacrifices would be required of the indigenous peoples in carrying out passive resistance in the face of ruthless counter-measures by the police. (In the past P.I.D.E. has dealt brutally with any Africans suspected of being involved in strikes, not to mention the treatment meted out to the ring-leaders.)

It should also be kept in mind that if the nationalists were to engage in political campaigns, it would probably be unrealistic to expect that all violence and guerrilla operations could be stopped. Roberto has a trained force in being of five to seven thousand men, and for him to try to keep them "on ice" for an extended period of time or attempt to adapt all of them to non-violence tactics could easily lead to his overthrow. Extremist

elements

-5-

elements in the organization are unlikely to accept a complete change to non-violent tactics. Similarly Algerian-trained guerrillas of Mondlane's FRELIMO have just returned to Dar, thus adding to the pressures for immediate military action. By the same token events have probably gone too far to persuade the nationalists to turn down all offers of Communist support. (Were they to do so might indicate the existence of our own support.) We would, nevertheless, with our assistance, be in a position to limit the extent of nationalist involvement with the Communists, at least for a certain period of time.

Despite these obstacles, the present guerrilla operations have not met with notable success, and an effort should be made to persuade the nationalists to undertake new tactics. Essential of course would be our commitment to provide them with assistance for this purpose. We should, moreover, try to get the support and direct involvement of those African leaders who have an influence over the nationalists.

Program

Approaches to Selected African Leaders and Nationalists

We should in the first instance explore the concept of a political action program in support of self-determination on a highly confidential basis with Adoula, insofar as Angola is concerned, and with Nyerere, insofar as Mozambique is concerned, and endeavor to persuade them of the merits of these tactics. [REDACTED] although it may be necessary for Ambassadors Godley and Leonhart to pave the way. The argumentation to be used is outlined in the following section below. Ideally, if these two leaders could be convinced of the merits of expanding the nationalists' political organization and of using it to maximum effectiveness in peaceful political campaigns, they should be urged to try to sell the idea to the nationalists themselves. The Congolese and Tanganyikan leaders should also be sounded out on the feasibility of their advancing the concept in due course among other selected African leaders and possibly Nehru. To be successful, these new tactics should avoid carrying a U.S. label, but rather should seem to originate and be politically and possibly materially backed by the leading African states. Only if Adoula and Nyerere thought it best, should we propose the idea directly to the nationalists ourselves. [REDACTED]

Argumentation

Argumentation

The following points would be made [REDACTED] to Adoula and Nyerere, and possibly afterwards to the nationalists:

The great prize for the nationalists is the winning of open and irrevocable world support--not only that of the governments but also of the publics. To an extent, this even applies to the Portuguese public. This the nationalists have yet to succeed in doing, at least insofar as the American public is concerned. The reason for this is that the nationalists have failed to demonstrate that they and their aims of early independence have the whole-hearted and active backing of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. The Angolan nationalist movement consists principally of the Bakongo tribe. Although other tribal elements are represented in the GRAE and the military force and there are probably secret nationalist cells in many parts of Angola, the majority of the Ovimbundu and the Chokwe inside Angola (to a lesser extent even the Kimbundo) have yet to come out in full support of the nationalists and their goals. Mondlane's organization reportedly has an underground network in parts of Mozambique, but it has also failed to show extensive and representative support. We appreciate that rebellions are undertaken by a handful of dedicated and purposeful individuals and we can understand that in Africa today most of the indigenous populations are probably fed up with colonial regimes and want to determine their own destinies. Nevertheless, unless and until the nationalists can clearly show that they genuinely reflect the will of the majority of the peoples concerned, their insistence on self-determination on their own terms is not convincing to world opinion. Governments, such as ours, do not operate in a vacuum; our foreign policies and actions must have public acceptance and support.

Guerrilla activities may have their place, but the fact is that in Angola they have not yet met with notable success and thus have not persuaded the Portuguese Government of the need to change its policies. Since the outbreak of 1961, the Portuguese military have been greatly reinforced. As a result they have succeeded in containing the Angolan rebellion and in preventing, at least as yet, serious activity on the part of the Mozambican nationalists. Portuguese military and financial resources do not appear to be unduly strained, and there is thus every reason to assume that the Portuguese military effort in the territories can continue, if not increase, for the foreseeable future. Already many Angolan lives have been lost, great suffering endured, and the continuation of violence on the part of the nationalists will only mean far greater casualties. The issue can never be won militarily in the field.

International

International pressures on Portugal, to the extent that there have been pressures, have not succeeded in bringing about a change in policies. We have had--and continue to have--frequent high level discussions with the Portuguese Government, urging acceptance and early implementation of the principle of self-determination. While we are not unduly pessimistic about the prospects of the Portuguese coming around to accepting self-determination, it will take time and there are limits to the extent that a foreign power, even the U.S., can feasibly bring about relatively rapid changes in a government's basic policies on issues of vital national interest. The Portuguese have been buoyed by military successes and at the same time inhibited by fear that the Lisbon regime would be gravely endangered by loss of the territories. Moreover, they are concerned by the possible expulsion of all Portuguese settlers and the loss of their economic interests if political ties are not maintained. They point to the fact that they do not have the resources which France and the UK have available to use in order to maintain their presence in the former colonies.

Thus the issue is stalemated, and there is little chance for progress toward a settlement in the foreseeable future, if the nationalists and the Portuguese persist in following their respective courses of action.

We have concluded that under the circumstances, a new approach must be made by the nationalists and that the most effective formula for bringing about progress would be to expand greatly their political organizations both inside and outside the territories with a view to mobilizing forces in favor of self-determination. Inside the territories it would entail establishing an extensive underground political apparatus in order to organize broad-based support for and participation in peaceful campaigns. This would entail strikes and other manifestations of public support for the nationalist cause. Outside the territories, the nationalists should organize much more effective campaigns than they have done heretofore in setting forth their goals and in enlisting world-wide support.

The difficulties involved inside the territories are not underestimated: how to reorient the whole strategy and tactics of an organization which until now has been patterned on the Algerian rebellion and has concentrated primarily on violence; how to overcome the insistence of extremist and pro-Communist elements to step up terrorism; how to organize an effective,

resourceful

resourceful, secret and extensive underground network; how to undertake strikes and other public demonstrations in the face of the ubiquitous and ruthless Portuguese secret police; how to obtain widespread public support in the face of fear of retaliation against the civilian population, etc.

Nevertheless, violence has not paid off. Moreover, in almost every country of the world that has obtained independence since World War II, the means employed have been political and non-violent, combined with the support of world opinion. India and its tactics of non-violence were a notable example. The will of the peoples was so explicit and had such widespread American public support that the U.S. Government opposed its ally's policies and came out in open support for Indian independence. There have been exceptions, such as Indonesia, North Vietnam and Algeria, but by and large the newly emerging nations, particularly in Africa, have won their independence through broadly-based political and non-violence movements that won indigenous and then world-wide backing. Especially in the face of strong military force, non-violent action is far more powerful and convincing for world opinion than sporadic guerrilla tactics. If through such actions, the nationalists could obtain broad-based Western (including U.S.) support for their cause, this would certainly be more effective than relying on a narrow base of extremists backed by the Communists. If there were ruthless retaliation by the local Portuguese authorities, this would become known and especially serve the nationalist cause by providing arguments for the validity of the movement and the urgent need of a solution.

It would also be far more palatable for the Portuguese Government to agree to work out with a political and non-violent organization an evolutionary settlement for the territories than with a guerrilla outfit. Holden Roberto's name is anathema to the Portuguese Government and to the Portuguese settlers as a result of the 1961 massacres, with which Roberto is associated. If he and Mondlane could become the popularly supported leaders of nationalist political movements, the Portuguese might find it easier to deal with them. In this connection and related also to the need for world public support, is the need for the nationalists to show that they are non-racist. To this end it would be most effective were the nationalists to succeed in obtaining the backing, or at least the understanding and tacit acceptance, of local white and mulatto elements. This is not possible through the use of terrorism.

Wa

We are not interested primarily in the nationalist movements per se, but rather in the future welfare of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. And it is our belief that their well-being depends eventually on a moderate evolutionary solution, entailing a transitional period with Portuguese cooperation leading to independence, possibly within a Lusitanian Commonwealth or any other solution that seems best, but providing for the maintenance of Portuguese presence in a form acceptable to the indigenous population. This is the only way to avoid a chaotic political and economic situation that will hardly benefit the peoples concerned and only invite outside exploitation. An abrupt Portuguese abandonment would not be in anybody's interest. Thus the doors must be kept open to negotiations with the Portuguese when the latter finally come around to face realities.

Finally, if the nationalists were successful in such political campaigns, they could expect political and practical support from the American people. The possibilities of private fund raising alone in the U.S. are almost limitless, if the nationalists can convince the American public of the validity and genuineness of their cause.

What Political Action Program Would Involve

It is envisaged that the program would entail the following:

Administrative support for significantly expanding the nationalists' organization both within and outside the territories; a greatly expanded public relations program for outside consumption; clandestine radio stations, including an extensive communications network set up within and outside the territories; printing presses and widespread circulation of leaflets, newspapers, etc.; nationalist cells set up in every village, industry and large farm; penetration of the police and other Portuguese services, as well as possibly the ex-Katanga gendarmes; winning the support and cooperation of the tribal leaders; direct or indirect contacts with the white and mulatto elements in the territories, giving assurances for their continued presence and seeking their support; organization of peaceful demonstrations and of strikes, ideally leading up to a general strike, even if only of brief duration; in sum, effective operations of an extensive underground political movement. On the outside, nationalist representatives should undertake campaigns to publicize their cause and enlist support and material backing.

Assistance

~~SECRET~~ - SPECIAL HANDLING

-10-

Assistance Required

It is difficult to estimate the amount of U.S. clandestine assistance required. Much would depend on the nationalists' performance and how effectively they got the campaigns under way. Initial amounts of \$200,000 for the Angolans and \$100,000 for the Mozambicans should be programmed, but considerably larger amounts would be needed as the organization began to be set up and started to function. The funds should be channeled partly through Adoula and Nyerere, partly through American private institutions, [REDACTED] Funds would be made available in such a way as to take into account any changes in nationalist leadership that might occur. Moreover, the nationalists should be urged to raise funds themselves in the U.S. for their political activities.

Approaches to the Portuguese

We should continue private conversations with Salazar and Nogueira urging that they accept and implement the principle of self-determination for the African territories. At a later date, depending on the degree of success of the nationalists' non-violence campaigns, we should undertake high-level discussions with the Portuguese in a more serious effort than made heretofore to bring them around to proposing a realistic settlement. At that time we would also approach various NATO powers and Brazil, urging their support.

Recommendation

It is recommended that this program be submitted to the Special Group for favorable consideration and early implementation.

Approved _____
Disapproved _____

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4/28/64

~~SECRET~~ - SPECIAL HANDLING

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Secy/Nogueira
MemCon 5/12/64

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

49

43-H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

CONTROL: 8392
RECEIVED: MAY 12, 1964, 1:55 A.M.

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Info

FROM: THE HAGUE

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE SECTO 18

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INFO: LISBON 5
PARIS 227

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DATE: MAY 12, 2 A.M.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 6/10/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 11/2/77

NSC

INR

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO.

RMR

FOLLOWING IS BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON, SUBJECT TO REVIEW,
AND NOFORN.

IN COURSE SECRETARY'S CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER NOGUEIRA TODAY, FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS DISCUSSED ON INITIATIVE SECRETARY: CUBAN OVERFLIGHTS AND NEED THEREFOR, AND ASSESSMENT OF BRAZILIAN SITUATION. NOGUEIRA SPOKE OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS AND INDICATED ANNOYANCE WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS FOR EXPRESSION CONCERN ABOUT KATANGA GENDARMERIE IN ANGOLA AND ALLEGED THREAT TO CONGO WITHOUT CORRESPONDING CONCERN AT CONGO-MOUNTED AGGRESSION AGAINST ANGOLA. HE DESCRIBED PORTUGAL AS INCREASINGLY "IMPATIENT" AND ADDED THAT GETTING IMPATIENT HAD BECOME A VALID ARGUMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CITING CONDUCT OF SUKARNO AND NEHRU IN CASE OF GOA AS EXAMPLES.

NEITHER F-86'S, LORAN-C NOR QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES RAISED IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION.

FULL MEMCON FOLLOWS.

GP-1.

RUSK

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:32 A.M. MAY 12, 1964
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:37 A.M. MAY 12, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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50
Portuguese

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Galvao Problem

As you will note from the attached cable from Lisbon, there may be some hope that the Portuguese will decide not to make a major issue of the extradition problem.

As for Galvao himself, he must now go to the U.S. Consulate in San Paulo with the correct papers -- which he now has-- and apply for a visa. At that juncture there is little we can do other than delay its issuance, and we cannot do this for too long lest we leave ourselves open to strong criticism by many UN members -- especially the Afro-Asians -- who would accuse the U.S. of impeding the work of the UN.

✓

SRB

Sam Belk

Atchmt

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 7/18/79
By MIE Date 9/5/79

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

502

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~~SECRET~~Action
L

Control: 1710

Rec'd: December 3, 1963
5:00 P.M.Info
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FROM: Lisbon

DECLASSIFIED

TO: Secretary of State

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

NO: 481, December 3, 7 P.M.

By IP, NARS, Date 10-31-75

021

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 481, INFORMATION PRIORITY USUN 125.

FOR BALL

Embassy Telegram 475.

I called on Foreign Minister Nogueira this evening to solicit reply to your letter re Galvao. He stated that until receipt subject letter he considered only proper course was to present extradition request directly to State Department. However, he had requested Portuguese Embassy Washington to obtain advice their US legal counsel as to most correct procedure. Their reply not yet received and formal response to your letter would be forthcoming as soon as possible. Foreign Minister reiterated no desire GOP to permit what in their minds should be purely legal, moral and psychological issue to develop into major political problem.

I reiterated suggestion your letter was intended to be most helpful all concerned, particularly to GOP. Will advise further developments.

GP-4.

ANDERSON

TMC/17

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Portugal

CONFIDENTIAL

December 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Security Council Consideration of the Portuguese Territories

It now appears that this item will be taken up by the Security Council on Friday. I am attaching a cable which reveals the mood of some Africans on the matter. This is most encouraging. Our delegation is working hard behind the scenes to make the meeting as brief and quiet as possible. With luck we may get simply a consensus in the Council with no resolution at all.

If we are fortunate enough to get the Portuguese item out of the way without intemperate manifestations by the Africans, the latter will have demonstrated most laudatory conduct indeed on two such emotion-packed subjects. I think the reasons behind this are probably three: (1) the death of the President which, according to a member of our mission, hit the Africans harder than any other group; (2) the emergence of a new President and the realization by the Africans of the enormity of the problems facing him; and (3) as a result of very hard work on the part of several delegations, but especially the U.S. and the U.K., aimed at injecting more temperance into the African approach to these two problems.

SRB

Sam Belk

Atchmt

✓

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 7/18/79
By MDE Date 9/5/79

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

519

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 1813
Rec'd: December 3, 1963

10:11 P.M.

DUNGAN

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FORRESTAL

JOHNSON

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SAUNDERS

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WIT, WM, Y.

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Info

FROM: New York

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 2324, December 3, 8 P.M.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 2324, INFORMATION LISBON 131.

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Portuguese Territories.

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RMR

Yost asked Karefa-Smart (Sierra Leone) this morning whether Africans desire proceed with SC meeting on Portuguese territories as soon as current South African item is concluded.

Karefa-Smart replied African Foreign Ministers are still debating this question but he hopes to be able inform us shortly. Grimes (Liberia), Sylla (Madagascar) and himself desire brief single meeting at which SYG's report would be noted with appreciation and he would be requested continue his good offices. There would be no round of speeches but only this simple substantive action. However, Slim (Tunisia) does not agree and is still urging fuller treatment. Karefa-Smart said that if agreement can not be reached, his group, in view of fact GA almost over and everyone desires get home, may simply take position there be no SC meeting on Portuguese territories at this time.

Yost said it has been our strong impression that, despite claims to contrary, round of talks between African Foreign Ministers and Portuguese had been useful and had induced Portuguese to move somewhat. Therefore, resumption talks would be desirable. Karefa-Smart said that this also represents his view and he hopes talks can be resumed.

Comment: We believe African view on SC meeting will be decided no later than tomorrow and very much hope African-Portuguese talks can be resumed after first of year. In order to make this possible / it would

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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By yw, NARA, Date 38.00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2324, December 3, 8 P.M., From New York

it would almost certainly be necessary that Nogueira drop his apparent reservation (Lisbon's 469) that dialogue could be resumed "only on basis pre-argued conditions." Any attempt by Portuguese to put forward conditions would almost certainly cause Africans on their side to put forward unacceptable conditions and hence would in fact prevent resumption of talks. Failure to resume, moreover, would no doubt lead to renewal African demand for SC meeting at which punitive resolution would be sought. If, therefore, procedure proposed by Karefa-Smart is followed by Africans, we will have to exert our influence to utmost with Portuguese to ensure, first, that they resume talks without preconditions, and second, that they demonstrate sufficient flexibility on crucial point of self-determination so that talks may be fruitful and not promptly lead to another impasse.

GP-3.

STEVENSON

TMC/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

J. M. Smith

52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 5, 1963

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(SECRET when with atchmts)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Galvao Problem

Galvao

As you will note from the attached cable from Lisbon, the Portuguese apparently are willing to go along with the suggestions in George Ball's letter to Nogueira.

Since Galvao has now applied for a visa at our Consulate in San Paulo, it was decided at a meeting in the Department this morning to proceed along the following lines. We will issue Galvao a visa on Saturday which will not be valid until Monday, and will remain valid only for the period he will be appearing before the Committee. The Consulate in San Paulo will inform Galvao of these limitations so that he will know exactly what to expect.

The only plane Galvao can get after the visa is issued will get him to New York at noon on Monday. He will be met by an American agent for security purposes and to see that Galvao conforms to the stipulations of his visa.

Meanwhile Charlie Yost, who was here for the meeting this morning, is certain that he can arrange for Galvao to testify before the 4th Committee on Monday afternoon, with the understanding that it would be desirable to finish up that day, but that Galvao could remain an extra day if the Committee felt it necessary. Yost doubts that the Committee will wish to extend the hearings. Conceivably, Galvao could start his return to Brazil Monday night, but we will take no action against him until Tuesday night. If he is not on the Tuesday night plane, we will begin proceedings with the courts to extradite him. Certainly the UN cannot expect us to do better than this.

On the Portuguese side of the picture, we expect that they will deliver a note to the Department on Monday demanding extradition. It is very easy to delay real action for forty-eight hours, by which time Galvao will have departed, and the curtain will come down on the whole affair.

There remains, of course, the possibility that Galvao might not wish to play his part as we think he will. If he wishes to "martyr himself, he can so do it by missing the Tuesday night plane.

Ref: To Lisbon 365
Fr Lisbon 483

Sam Belk

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Messrs Schlesinger and Baughman

Authority NSC 7/18/79
By WDE NARS, Date 9/5/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

✓ Portugal ⁵³
December 5, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Galvao Problem

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-8-00

As you will note from the attached cable from Lisbon, the Portuguese apparently are willing to go along with the suggestions in George Ball's letter to Nogueira.

Since Galvao has now applied for a visa at our Consulate in San Paulo, it was decided at a meeting in the Department this morning to proceed along the following lines. We will issue Galvao a visa on Saturday which will not be valid until Monday, and will remain valid only for the period he will be appearing before the Committee. The Consulate in San Paulo will inform Galvao of these limitations so that he will know exactly what to expect.

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SB
Sam Belk

2 Atchmnts

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 2570

Rec'd: December 4, 1963

3:30 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By IP, NARS, Date 10-31-75~~BUNDY SMITH~~~~ALEXANDER~~~~BELK~~~~CHASE~~~~DINGEMAN~~~~DUNGAN~~~~ECKEL~~~~FORRESTAL~~~~JOHNSON~~~~KILDUFF~~~~KLEIN~~~~KOMER~~~~SAUNDERS~~~~SCHLESINGER~~~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

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FROM: Lisbon

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 483, December 4, 6 PM.

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 483, INFORMATION PRIORITY USUN 126

FOR BALL

Reference: Embassy Telegram 481

Fragoso, acting under instructions from Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, informed Embassy officer today that GOP would accede to suggestion made in Under-Secretary Ball's letter re Galvao. If, therefore, Galvao should enter US, Portuguese Embassy would immediately request his extradition through State Department. He added that GOP felt it had airtight case against Galvao under article 2 paragraph 7 sub-paragraph C of US-Portuguese extradition treaty of May 7, 1908.

Speaking off the record Fragoso said that explanation contained in last two sentences penultimate paragraph Ball letter had been duly noted. (TEXT OF LETTER ATTACHED.)

Fragoso said his statement should be taken as reply to Mr. Ball's letter.

GP-4.

ANDERSON

CC-16.

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FILE COPY

BUNDY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK
BRUBECK
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FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.

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13878

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

58

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ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 365
INFO: USUN NEW YORK 1568
Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO 742
Amconsul SAO PAULO 203

PRIORITY

Nov 30 3 59 PM '63

Ambassador requested deliver to Nogueira soonest following letter from
Under Secretary Ball re Galvao case.

BEGIN TEXT:

Dear Mr. Minister:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State H-6/10/76
By MDE, NARS, Date 7/11/79

Naturally we have been following very closely the developments in connection with the decision of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly to invite Henrique Galvao to appear before it. We understand that Galvao ~~is coming~~ intends to come to New York, even though he knows that he is then subject to extradition proceedings under the US-Portuguese Treaty.
as you know,

We had thought that it would be in the best interests of all of us who are concerned with achieving an acceptable solution to the problem of the Portuguese territories if the extradition issue could be handled in such a way that Galvao could make his appearance at the United Nations and ^{quietly} depart. With this thought in mind Ambassador Anderson was instructed to discuss the situation with you, but I gather from his report that you have concluded that you must exercise your rights under the treaty to request extradition, despite the disadvantages which you recognize.

/I am writing

Drafted by: <u>L: LMeeker 11-27-63</u>		Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <u>The Under Secretary</u>
IO: UNP: EABrown/WB Buffum: rem		
Cleances:	AF - Mr. Strong (draft)	AF - Mr. Tasca (subs)
	XXXX L - Mr. Meeker (draft)	IO - Mr. Cleveland
	EUR - Mr. Burdett (subs.)	UNP - Mr. Buffum
	WE - Mr. Barbour	S/S - Mr. Christensen

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I am writing you, however, to ask whether you would not give further consideration to your position in view of the special circumstances surrounding Mr. Galvao's presence in the United States. I can understand the desire of the Government of Portugal to satisfy certain moral and legal obligations in connection with the treaty. Should this be your primary concern, the Government of Portugal could proceed by directing a request to the Department of State for extradition, rather than by going directly to a competent United States court to ask for a warrant of arrest with a view to extradition. In the latter event, the public political problems would of course be maximized. However, a request for extradition directed to the Department of State in diplomatic channels could be handled without publicity. If this procedure were to be followed, Galvao's stay in the United States could be limited to the minimum time necessary to appear before Committee IV, and he could depart quietly from the United States before completion of all the legal steps necessary to effect his arrest for extradition. Under such a procedure, your Government would be acting to exercise its treaty rights, but it would be doing so in a manner to offset and avoid the political disadvantages of an actual arrest for extradition, which you have recognized.

I should appreciate having your reaction on an urgent basis so that, if there is any prospect of working out the extradition problem in a satisfactory way, we can proceed at once. GEORGE W. BALL. END TEXT

END

GP-2

SECRETARY
DEPT. OF STATE
RUSK
TOLSON
ROSEN
WHEELER
CIVIL
BUREAU
RECORDS
MAIL

~~SECRET~~

✓ Portugal

CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: UN Matters

The Security Council is meeting this afternoon on the Portuguese territories. However, contrary to our earlier hope of having only a one-day session, Charlie Yost has told me that the Africans probably will keep the matter before the Council until the middle of next week. We are still trying to avoid a resolution if possible, but it is too early at this point to see how the matter will turn out.

As for the Galvao problem, I will be watching it over the weekend and if the scenario starts falling apart I will let you know.

In the event Arthur did not tell you, the telephone conversation between the President and Stevenson on Wednesday was very general in nature, touching on outer space and apartheid. Arthur got this from Adlai himself.

The more I think of the President's appearance before the General Assembly, the more I like it. If nothing else, it will give the delegates an opportunity to see the President and to talk to him. The delegates will be leaving for home shortly after the President's appearance, and this will give them something to report in their own capitals. This is badly needed for, let us face it, very few of these people know very much about the new President.



Sam Belk

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Authority NSC 7/18/79
By MIE NARS, Date 9/5/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

55
Portugal

CONFIDENTIAL

December 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Security Council Consideration of the Portuguese
Territories

As you will note from the attached cable, it is quite possible that there will be a vote this afternoon and it may well be a unanimous one in support of a resolution personally negotiated by Stevenson with the Africans. Except for language making the resolution current and a definition of self-determination, we are in the same position we were last August -- no better, no worse. We expect the Africans to continue their good behavior this afternoon.

✓

SJB

Sam Belk

Atchmnt

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Authority NSC 7/18/79
MFE, Date 9/5/79

42

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Action

Control: 5999

~~BUNDY-SMITH~~

IO

Rec'd: December 9, 1965

~~ALEXANDER~~

10:41 p.m.

~~BELK~~

Info

FROM: New York

DECLASSIFIED

~~BRUBECK~~

SS

TO: Secretary of State

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

~~CHASE~~

G

By: IP

NARS, Date 10-31-75

~~DINGEMAN~~

SP

NO: 2414, December 9 9 p.m.

~~DUNGAN~~

L

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PRIORITY

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AF

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ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 2414, INFORMATION LISBON 139

~~KILDUFF~~

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Portuguese Territories - Verbatim Text

~~KOMER~~

NEA

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P

~~SCHLESINGER~~

USIA

~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

INR

O

RMR

Following is new draft resolution on Portuguese territories with modifications we obtained as result negotiations with Africans based on Department telegram 1651. Negotiating session included Sierra Leone, Liberia, Madagascar, Ghana, Tunisia, US, Norway and UK. We have subsequently given revised text to France. Understood by all that text was agreed ad referendum.

We strongly recommend US support this text. Dean (UK) making similar recommendation to London. Vote probable Tuesday afternoon.

Department will note we obtained reference resolution 1541 in preamble; moved operative paragraph on resolution of 31 July to preamble and got word "affirms" changed to "recalling"; narrowed paragraph calling for compliance for that resolution to one calling for compliance with paragraph six ("aims control provision which we endorsed"); softened first operative paragraph to replace word "refusal" with words "failure so far" and "did not achieve" to "have not achieved"; obtained deletions parts B, C and D paragraph five; changed word "affirms" to "notes" in paragraph six; and obtained US wording for paragraph seven. Furthermore, during discussions Africans indicated they expected SYG to bring about further contacts between them and Portuguese in accordance paragraph eight. While they recognized this they said it would be difficult for them themselves to sponsor such language in resolution last operative paragraph consequently unchanged.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2414, December 9 9 p.m., from New York

In our speech we could include two points which would make US position clear: (A) That we consider self-determination to include all options included resolution 1514 and (B) that we believe resumption of talks would be useful. May also wish to say re Portugal's compliance with S/5380 (new operative paragraph three) that we refer to its general tenor along lines statement we made after its adoption.

After meeting, Chakravarty (India) asked Yost if reference to resolution A/1807 might be included in new operative paragraph five which already cites resolution 1542 (XV). Yost reserved opinion on matter. FYI resolution 1542 labels GOA a non-self governing territory within meaning of Article 11 of Charter.

The SC,

Having considered the SYG's report as contained in document S/5448,

Recalling GA resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

Recalling further its resolution contained in document S/5380 of 31 July 1963,

Noting appreciation the efforts of the SYG in establishing contact between representatives of Portugal and representatives of African states,

1. Regrets that this contact has not achieved the desired results, on account of Portugal's failure so far to accept the UN interpretation of self-determination;
2. Calls upon all states to comply with the provisions of paragraph six of the resolution of 31 July 1963;
3. Deprecates the non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with SC resolution S/5380,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 2414, December 9, 9 p.m., from New York

4. Reaffirms the interpretation of self-determination as laid down in GA resolution 1514 (XV), as follows: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

5. Notes GA resolution 1542 (XV) which enumerates inter alia territories under Portuguese administration as falling under the category of non-self-governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter;

6. Believes that action by the GOP to grant an amnesty to all persons imprisoned or exiled for advocating self-determination in these territories would be in evidence of good faith;

7. Requests the SYG to continue with his efforts and report to the council not later than 1 June 1964.

GP-4.

STEVENSON

DJS/3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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Authority NAVY 12-18-75
By LW, NARS, Date 1-8-76

Mr. Klein
or how are
we on this?

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-616C/jm
Ser 002505P61

21 1964

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Portugal (U)

1. Background. On 11 December 1963 the Security Council again called on Portugal to recognize the principle of self-determination, urged all UN members to refrain from the sale of military equipment to Portugal for use in Africa, and encouraged continued efforts for the resumption of Portuguese-African roundtable discussions. On 20 December 1963 Ambassador Anderson left an Aide-Memoire with Portugal's Foreign Minister, Nogueira, requesting authority to establish on Portuguese territory three Loran-C transmitter sites and two monitoring stations. Simultaneously, Ambassador Anderson let it be known that the U.S. would like to secure a permanent extension of our Azores base rights and that he was ready to discuss this matter at any time.

2. Recent Developments. In an effort to gain a more favorable response to the Loran-C request the Department of State at the request of Ambassador Anderson reconsidered and approved the sale of six 3 inch 50 caliber AA guns for use on Portuguese frigates. Nogueira has promised an early reply regarding Loran-C, but as in the past has not brought up the subject of the Azores. The State Department plans to make another low key approach later this month on the Azores, but believes the Portuguese will attempt to retain the present de facto arrangement, which as of 1 January 1964, calls for the beginning of the evacuation period (6-12 months) whenever GOP considers "conversations and negotiations" terminated.

The Department of State has asked Ambassador Anderson to seek an early appointment with either the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister to appraise him of Red China's major political offensive in Africa and the acute danger if Portugal does not make an early public statement endorsing self-determination and also seize the initiative by encouraging the resumption of Portuguese-African dialogue.

3. Op-61 Comment - The African Foreign Ministers meeting in late February will probably outline future strategy on Portugal's colonies. Failure by the Portuguese to advocate the principle

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
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Op-616/jm
Ser 002505P61

of self-determination prior to that time would probably result in a hardened African stance and give the CHICOM's a golden opportunity to encourage a non-white "liberation struggle" against a European NATO ally of the U.S.



Richard S. Gralshill
Director, Political-Military Policy Division

Copy to:
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Op-94
Op-92 (4)
Op-01
Op-03
Op-333E
Op-04
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Op-05
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Op-60
Op-63
Op-07

① Case ^{on} Patyure + Pursue ^{on} them

② ~~Review Current Program~~
- talk closely with leaders

③ ~~Cooperate w/ Africans~~

④ ~~AID Program larger?~~

⑤

BRS-
have we a
memory of decisions
on this / ml B.

Revised 2/15/64

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Portuguese African Territories

22

Assessment of Present Situation

The issue of the Portuguese African territories remains stalemated--there is no evidence of progress being made toward a compromise or toward a military solution. The positions of both antagonists, the Portuguese and the nationalists have hardened. The latter are now convinced they must rely on force. As things are going, one can only expect an ineluctable deterioration of the situation eventually leading to a very grave crisis in the area. By then it may be too late to avert chaos in Angola, much less to preserve Western interests.

With sizeable reinforcements, the Portuguese military in Angola have succeeded in stabilizing the situation for the present and in confining rebel activities to relatively small pockets in the northern part of the territory. Rebel capability appears also to have improved and sporadic guerrilla operations continue. It would, nevertheless, appear that the security situation in Angola has been considerably restored, certainly in comparison with the situation in 1961. The Angolan economy is thriving, owing partly to the international coffee boom and partly to the new money being injected into the economy by military expenditures and investments. Finally, a Katanga gendarme force is reportedly being built up, probably with a view to forcing Adoula to put the wraps on Roberto's guerrillas and possibly even to try to bring about Adoula's eventual replacement by Tshombe.

Ambassador Anderson's recent demarches to Salazar and the Portuguese Foreign Minister indicate that Portugal is not contemplating public acceptance of the principle of self-determination or basic revision of policy toward the overseas territories. On the contrary, everything points to a tendency on the part of the Portuguese to believe they are "over the hump": their tactics in the U.N., by accepting talks with the Africans, succeeded in avoiding a difficult debate; military and economic reports from Angola are encouraging, and the Portuguese are hopeful that having learned a bitter lesson from the recent East African events, the U.S. and others will come around to see the advantages of stability. The Portuguese anticipate that in the meantime their reform program may succeed in countering international pressures and in winning adherence of the Angolan Africans. Progress has been made in this connection by a significant expansion of native schools, although some of the effect will be offset by the closing down of missionary schools. In the political and administrative fields, the Portuguese are also making a new approach--there is likely to be an increase in the African electorate and there are rumors that an African may be appointed to a high administrative post. Elections for legislative organs will be held next month.

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Authority State ltr 6/10/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 11/2/77

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Thus far, however, it does not appear that the reform program is having a significant political impact on the Africans.

In the meantime the rebellion continues under Holden Roberto. Frustrated by what he considers to be lack of any progress in the UN (he feels that his African colleagues were outwitted by the Portuguese in the talks) and believing that the West, notably the U.S., will not undertake meaningful pressures on Portugal, Roberto has come to the conclusion he must rely principally on force for the present. However, the African states have failed to come through with promised military and financial assistance, and serious dissension has arisen within Roberto's movement as a result of impatience on the part of his military elements and dissatisfaction with Roberto's authoritative direction. There have been grave shortages of food at the Thysville Camp and reported instances of mutiny. Thus desperately short of funds and his leadership threatened, Roberto announced acceptance of Chicom, Soviet and Cuban assistance. Undoubtedly there were other reasons, including the hope for a U.S. reaction that might be to his benefit. While this move by Roberto was not unexpected (the scenarios of the three war games held on Angola during the past year included this development), it is of great concern. Not only does it enhance the current Chicom political offensive in Africa, but it threatens the future political orientation of the Angolan nationalist movement.

In any event the nationalist movement and its guerrilla activities will continue. No amount of reforms by Portugal, short of a basic change in Angola's political structure looking toward independence, will satisfy the nationalists. The latter have from five to ten thousand troops; recruiting is no problem; elementary training is continuing; and some substance of a military establishment is being developed. Their operations will intensify sooner or later. It is no longer a question of whether or not Angola will become independent, the only question is when and how, as was the case of Algeria. By the same token, it is certain that the longer the struggle goes on, the more violent, racist, and Communist infiltrated it may become, the more serious will be the final crisis confronting the U.S. and the more chaotic, radical and anti-Western an emerging independent Angola will be.

As to Mozambique, while there have been some disturbances, strikes and sporadic emigration of Africans to neighboring countries, the situation remains relatively quiescent. At the same time nationalist leader Eduardo Mondlane has also indicated a desperate need for funds and the strong pressures on him to accept communist aid. In Portuguese Guinea, guerrilla operations continue, although some progress appears to have been made by the Portuguese in containing rebel activity. The fate of

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these territories hinges to a large degree on developments in Angola.

Actions the U.S. Has Taken and Results

1. Demarches to the Portuguese

These include Under Secretary Ball's talks with Salazar and Nogueira last summer and recent approaches by Ambassador Anderson. The Portuguese have since shown tactical flexibility but no substantive change of position. Salazar remains obdurate in refusing to move toward the minimum U.S. objective of accepting publicly the principle of self-determination. While the Portuguese reforms, if fully implemented, may improve the internal situation in Angola, decisions are made in Lisbon and it is not believed that even at best the reforms could have a sufficient enough impact to win over the loyalty of the African population to Portugal. That time has passed.

2. Encouragement of Portuguese-African Talks

Partly owing to our efforts, these talks were held last fall. No progress was made in reconciling the Portuguese and African points of view. By the end of the talks, most of the Africans came to believe that they represented nothing more than skillful delaying tactics on the part of the Portuguese. The talks postponed coming to grips with the issue and accordingly a difficult confrontation for us.

3. U.S. Position in UN

While we have sought to promote moderate resolutions, we have come out unequivocally for self-determination. This has irritated the Portuguese and given some satisfaction to the Africans. The latter have been deeply disappointed, however, with our refusal to go farther and to support sanctions.

4. U.S. Arms Policy

We have tightened our screening procedures in an effort to prevent Portuguese purchases in the U.S. and MAP assistance from including military equipment for use in the territories. Nevertheless, the presence of MAP equipment and equipment of U.S. origin in the territories remains an embarrassing issue.

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5. Education Program

There is now underway a series of steps directed toward expanding educational facilities for Angolan and Mozambique refugee students. We are hopeful they will contribute significantly toward countering communist scholarship offers and toward preparing and orienting an eventual elite for future responsibilities.

6. Assistance to Refugees

We continue to provide PL 480 food relief through UN and charitable agencies to Angolan refugees in the Congo.

Possible Courses of Action to be Considered Now

1. Undertake No New Significant Action

There is some merit to this. The Portuguese may well persist in refusing to accept and implement self-determination until the internal security situation of Angola and Mozambique deteriorates and Portuguese military and financial resources are stretched thin, or until there are political changes in the Metropole. The objections are, however, that in the meantime the struggle becomes embittered, chances for a peaceful compromise solution diminish, the nationalists become more radical with the danger of communist infiltration, and the aftermath in Angola may bring chaos. African views toward the West will similarly harden in a sense adverse to U.S. interests.

2. Increased Pressures on Portugal

Obviously the degree of pressures must be weighed by the importance of maintaining U.S.-Portuguese military cooperation, as well as a climate conducive to influencing Portuguese leadership. Moreover, in their present mood, the Portuguese would seem less susceptible than ever to persuasion. However, it would seem important to disabuse Salazar of the notion that U.S. views and policies toward the issue are changing as a result of East African events and Chicom activities, together with the change in U.S. Administration, and to resuscitate Salazar's fears of diplomatic isolation. In any event Ambassador Anderson should persist in his efforts to educate the Portuguese to reality. Possibly another exchange of views between the Under Secretary and Salazar should be considered. Talks with the Portuguese might be keyed to the need for action before the next Security Council meeting on the issue.

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3. US Role in the UN

According to the last UNSC resolution, the Secretary General is to report back to the Security Council at the beginning of June on the issue. At present it does not appear that any new US initiative in the UN would be practicable or fruitful. Our position should be directed principally toward supporting bi-lateral approaches to the Portuguese and the Africans (paragraphs 2 and 5) with a view to getting Portuguese acceptance of self-determination (admittedly this may no longer be sufficient to satisfy African demands) and resumption of Portuguese-African talks. We should also indicate as appropriate our expanded education program for Portuguese African refugee students and state our arms control procedures, as may be needed, depending on the outcome of paragraph 6 below.

4. Concerted Pressures by NATO Powers and Brazil

20
This approach would not appear very promising, at least at present. The only NATO powers, apart from ourselves, that could have an influence on Portugal are France and the UK. France will not touch the issue with a ten-foot pole and the recent talks confirmed that the UK is not very enthusiastic about making strong representations on this issue. Possibly this may change if a Labor Government comes to power but even this is dubious. Brazil in its present situation similarly seems reluctant to take on the Portuguese.

5. Encourage Resumption of Portuguese-African Talks

For the lack of anything better, we have already done this, but without notable success. Given their experience last fall, the Africans are reluctant to resume talks unless there is some indication that the Portuguese accept the principle of self-determination and that there would accordingly be a basis for meaningful

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-6-

discussions, if not negotiations. African diffidence is further strengthened by Holden Roberto's opposition. He is not overly confident that his interests will be safeguarded by his African colleagues and insists that any talks with the Portuguese should include him. As to the Portuguese, they would probably have reservations regarding renewed discussions with the Africans at this time and are in any event likely to be unwilling to concede substantively on self-determination in order to facilitate holding of talks. They categorically refuse to meet with Roberto. Despite the foregoing, a Portuguese-African dialogue has merit and would appear to be worth pushing further. In this connection, we have authorized Ambassador Anderson to pass on to the Portuguese Houphouet Boigny's hope that the Portuguese might send a mission to the Ivory Coast in order to hold discussions with him. Salazar's initial reaction was not unfavorable.

✓ 6. Urge Return of F-86's to Portugal

In reply to our repeated urgings, Portuguese Foreign Minister finally promised Ambassador Anderson last December that the MAP F-86's would be returned to Metropolitan Portugal. Nevertheless, they are still operating in Portuguese Guinea. Another strong demarche would seem in order.

7. Put Significant Pressures on Portugal to Change Her Policies

Given Portuguese unwillingness to heed our urgings, what are the types of meaningful pressures that might induce her to change her policies?

- a. | Suspension of all military assistance and prohibition of Portuguese purchases of equipment in the US conceivably having military use.
- b. | Threat to push for far more substantive UN actions than heretofore.
- c. | Promote continual discussions in the NATO Council on the issue. (France, the UK and probably the Fed. Republic would not back us and France might even take a strong stand against us, but the Scandinavians and Benelux might be helpful.)
- d. | Suspend on technical grounds Export-Import Bank payments on the loan for a bridge over the Tagus River.


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-7-

- e. Try to reduce the U.S. importations of Angolan coffee.
- f. Cancel PL 480 Title III program.

It is far from certain any of these would succeed in bringing about a Portuguese move toward a peaceful solution, but there is no doubt that they would seriously aggravate U.S.-Portuguese relations, jeopardize any political influence we might have and possibly undermine our tenancy of the Azores facilities, not to mention the affect on our current attempts to obtain LORAN C sites. It is accordingly questionable that it would be in the U.S. interests to undertake such steps. As to the "carrot" approach, namely offering substantial financial assistance to Portugal in order to assist her in adjusting to a changed relationship with the African territories, the time is probably not yet ripe. In his speech last summer, Salazar reacted very adversely to a proposal of this nature. Small scale technical assistance to Portugal would be unlikely to have any effect on basic Portuguese policies.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONFIDENTIAL (Attachment)
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1. Bruback
2. Rtn

February 19, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attached for your information is
airgram, A-349, from Amembassy Lisbon
to The Secretary dated February 13, 1964
enclosing a memorandum of conversation
between Theodore A. Xanthaky, Counselor
of Embassy, and Dr. Jose Manuel Fragoso,
Director General for Political Affairs of
the Foreign Ministry, dated February 5,
1964.

Attachment:

As stated.

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OF IN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

5821019

AIRGRAM

POL 1 A. H. 9-Port

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A-349

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AIR POUCH

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9

FROM : AmEmbassy LISBON

DATE: February 13, 1964

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between Theodore A. Xanthaky, Counselor of Embassy, and Dr. José Manuel Fragoso, Director General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, on February 5, 1964.

REF : General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, on February 5, 1964.

Enclosed for the Department's information is a memorandum of conversation between Theodore A. Xanthaky, Counselor of Embassy, and Dr. José Manuel Fragoso, Director General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, on February 5, 1964 on the subject of an address made by Assistant Secretary Mennen Williams before the African Students Foundation at Toronto, Canada on January 31, 1964.

George W. Anderson
George W. Anderson

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 6/10/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 11/2/77

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Counselor: TAXanthaky:fj T.A.X.

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances: DCM - Mr. Blue

POL:FJDevine JJD

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EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure 1
Page 1
A-349 from Lisbon

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. José Manuel Fragoso, Director General for Political
Affairs, Foreign Ministry

Theodore A. Xanthaky, Counselor of Embassy

DATE: February 5, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 6/10/76

By lmj, NARS, Date 11/2/77

Dr. Fragoso telephoned me this afternoon to register "a complaint" against statements which he alleged have been made by Mr. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, before the African Students Foundation at Toronto, Canada on January 31. It was obvious that Dr. Fragoso was reading from a report received from the Portuguese Embassy in Ottawa. According to that report, Mr. Williams, in the question-and-answer period, said the US deplored Portuguese policy in Africa and considered that the rigidity of GOP policy was the cause of violence in Angola, etc. Mr. Williams allegedly spoke of Portugal in a patronizing and ironical manner, making such remarks as "the Portuguese seem to think that the winds of change will stop at their frontiers". Also he reportedly said that the "nationalist" chiefs Holden Roberto and Eduardo Mondlane are serious and responsible leaders. (NOTE; The Portuguese consider Roberto to be a terrorist and responsible for the butchery of hundreds of their citizens.) Mr. Williams is said to have recalled that some years ago Holden Roberto made advances to the GOP but that the latter was intransigent, thus giving his audience the general impression that the GOP is the villain of the piece and to blame for the troubles in Angola, etc. Mr. Williams is also said to have expressed the opinion that even though Roberto and Mondlane might seek aid from Communist China and Russia, that does not mean that they are Communists. In Mr. Williams' address before this group, the Portuguese report has him making the following assertions:

1. The present nationalist movements in Africa are the first step towards complete independence.
2. Recent disturbances in East Africa are purely economic in origin.
3. The Zanzibar problem is exclusively a question of Negroes against Arabs.

- - - -

I told Dr. Fragoso that the Foreign Minister had already brought Mr. Williams' Toronto address to the attention of Ambassador Anderson and that

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Enclosure 1
Page 2
A-349 from Lisbon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the Ambassador had requested full texts from Washington since we had no information on the subject. I also said I could hardly believe certain of the allegations which were attributed to Mr. Williams and that surely phrases had been lifted out of context. He insisted that Mr. Williams had, in a country other than his own, given what amounted to an "indoctrinating course" to a group hostile to the Portuguese and said he could not conceive of Mr. Williams doing this without the full approval of the US Government. Fragoso said he wished to make clear that such performances on the part of Mr. Williams set back Luso-American relations by several steps. I insisted that various of the statements which he was attributing to Mr. Williams and which I could hardly believe certainly would not have had the approval of the Secretary of State. By this time, Dr. Fragoso was getting quite emotional and making such extravagant noises as: "I do not think that the opening of consulates by Communist China at Lourenco Marques and Luanda could be more harmful than what Mr. Williams repeatedly does to us publicly." I contested the obvious exaggeration and validity of his comparison and told him he knew better and should not make such a wild statement, even though he had prefaced it by saying that it was "off-the-record" and a "purely personal view".

Fragoso told me that he would soon be leaving the Foreign Office since his ulcers were far from cured, and he hoped to be appointed Ambassador to the OECD in Paris.

Counselor:TAXanthaky:fj

TAX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS



S/S-2873

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

59 #044
3/21
Carter G Klein

February 20, 1964

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Azores Earthquake and US Assistance

According to most recent reports, seismic tremors have ceased on the island of Sao Jorge in the Azores group, and the sulphur fumes which were feared to portend a volcanic eruption have disappeared. The situation has thus stabilized, at least momentarily, and evacuation has been suspended by the Portuguese authorities pending a study by a group of Portuguese seismologists.

The picture, however, is not a clear one, for a heavy storm with 80-mile winds has prevented inshore boat operations or aerial reconnaissance for the past two days. We do not know exactly how many persons have been evacuated. There are no reports of deaths or injuries.

In coordination with the American Consulate at Ponta Delgada (on Sao Miguel Island), the Commander of the Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island, approximately 20 miles from Sao Jorge, has offered all possible assistance to local Portuguese authorities. This offer included air evacuation, medical assistance, lodging for 1,000 refugees, food supplies, air drops, and reconnaissance. However, only the reconnaissance, some food and a supply of cots have been accepted. US Army LCM's have lightered refugees from evacuation ships offshore to Terceira Island.

In Lisbon

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-2-

In Lisbon Ambassador Anderson has expressed his concern at the Azores situation to the Foreign Ministry and to the Minister of Marine and has asked if there were any way in which the United States could be of assistance. The Embassy does not believe we shall be called on to any significant extent.

The American Red Cross has gotten in touch with the Portuguese Charge d'Affaires in Washington to offer help, and we have contacted the Charge on behalf of Home International, which offers emergency housing at minimum cost.

The Charge told us he had been informed by Lisbon that press accounts of the earthquake appeared to be exaggerated, that adequate means to care for the refugees were available in the Azores and that more help would be sent from the metropole. Thus, our Embassy's doubt that US large-scale US aid will be solicited appear justified.



Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by
Dr. Vasco Vieira GARIN, Newly
Appointed Ambassador of Portugal

Dr. Vasco Vieira Garin, newly appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Portugal in Washington, has assumed his duties and is awaiting the pleasure of the President to receive him.

I am enclosing a copy of the remarks which the Appointed Ambassador will hand to the President, a copy of the suggested reply, a biographic sketch of the Ambassador, and a briefing memorandum.

The Chief of Protocol, Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, will accompany the Ambassador on his call. Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, will be at the White House twenty minutes before the appointment time. No interpreter is required.

If you will be good enough to advise me of the date and hour when it will be agreeable for the President to receive the Ambassador, I shall be pleased to inform him.

Marion A. Balclutha
for

Benjamin H. Reed
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Ambassador's remarks.
2. Proposed reply.
3. Biographic sketch.
4. Briefing memorandum.

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Authority State let 6/10/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 11/2/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 21, 1964

TO: Mr. Klein

FROM: Gordon Chase

Could you give us your view
on this one?



S/S 7537

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

6/a 2705

[Handwritten signature]

May 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

5/21
6-11
5/21

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President for
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.,
Ambassador to Portugal.

Ambassador Anderson will be in the Department on consultation from June 1 through 5 and in Washington on personal business from May 21 - 31. He has requested an opportunity to call on the President some time during this period. It is accordingly recommended, subject to the convenience of the President, that an appointment be made for any afternoon during the period indicated.

Ambassador Anderson assumed the Embassy at Lisbon on September 25, 1963. This is the first visit to Washington since that time.

A biographic sketch is enclosed.

/s/ John A. McKesson

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH
ADMIRAL GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR.

George Whelan Anderson, Jr. is 56 years old and was born in Brooklyn, New York. He entered the U. S. Naval Academy in 1923.

Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1927 and sea duty, he was designated Naval Aviator after training at Pensacola, Florida. He then served in various flight and patrol squadrons until 1940 when he was assigned to the Navy Department.

From April until November 1943, he was aboard the USS Yorktown in her early Pacific action. He next served on the staff of the Pacific Fleet Aircraft Commander. In 1944 he became Assistant to the Deputy Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

In June 1945 he was assigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and in 1946 was ordered to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

After further sea duty in 1949 and service at the National War College, he served as Fleet Operations Officer for the Sixth Fleet and later as senior U. S. Officer in Plans and Operations at SHAPE. In July 1952 he assumed command of the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt.

He later served as assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanding officer of the Formosa Patrol Force, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Pacific Command, and Commander of the Sixth Fleet. In June 1961 President Kennedy appointed Admiral Anderson Chief of Naval Operations. He served in this capacity until August 1963, when the President appointed him U. S. Ambassador to Portugal.

Among the many American and foreign decorations he has earned, Admiral Anderson holds the Grand Cross of Military Merit and the Order of Prince Henry the Navigator from the Portuguese Government.

Admiral Anderson is married to the former Mary Lee Lamar Sample of Pensacola, Florida, and has two sons, Lieutenant George W. Anderson III, USN (Class of '57), and Thomas Patrick; a daughter, Mary Annette; and a step-daughter, Carolyn Sample.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. VALENTI

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 12-16-75
By LW, NARS, Date 1-13-76

SUBJECT: Appointment with President --
Ambassador George Anderson

1. Attached is a memorandum from State recommending that the President see Admiral George Anderson, our Ambassador to Portugal.
2. As you know, we think it important that all our Ambassadors have their pictures taken once with the President, and I think that Anderson ought to get at least this minimum treatment. In addition, the President might want to spend a few extra minutes with Anderson, who is a former Chief of Naval Operations; but this is not essential.
3. Can you try to give us a time for this one -- in the afternoon, sometime between now and June 5.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 26, 1964

Patridge

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MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KLEIN

**SUBJECT: Appointment with the President -
Ambassador Anderson**

Ambassador Anderson will meet with the President on June 4 at 12:30 P.M. State has been informed and will prepare a briefing paper.

Gordon Chase

**cc: Mr. Bundy
Gwen King**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRUBECK

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President - U.S.
Ambassadors

1. At 12:30 P.M. on June 4 the President will shake hands and take individual pictures with Ambassadors Anderson (Portugal), Sprouse (Cambodia), Torbert (Somali Republic), and Morris (Republic of Chad). The scenario calls for you to hold the group at bay in the Cabinet Room until the President pops in to do the necessary. None of the Ambassadors are now expected to stay on after the greeting and picture-taking festivities, which should take no more than five minutes. In order to avoid the public appearance of a mass production process, however, the public record will indicate that each Ambassador met individually with the President at consecutive 15 minute intervals.
2. S/S (McKesson) has been informed of the scenario. The Ambassadors will be in the Cabinet Room at 12:25 on June 4; the briefing memoranda on the four Ambassadors will be sent to the White House in one package.
3. In addition to being in the Cabinet Room in time to receive the four Ambassadors, would you please ensure that Torbert and Morris know the scenario?

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Valenti
Mr. Forrestal (Would you please ensure that Sprouse knows the scenario?)
Mr. Klein (Would you please ensure that Anderson knows the scenario?)
Gwen King

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 12-16-75
By LW, NARS, Date 1-13-76

MAY 28 1964

*Patridge
Dir. G.C.*MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

5

Subject: Appointments for American Ambassadors
to Meet the President

It is my understanding that arrangements have been made for the President to receive two small groups of American Ambassadors (and one Minister) for a brief chat and photographs on June 1 and June 4, at 12:30 p.m. both days. The President has not previously received any members of this group. They will be divided as follows:

June 1, 12:30 p.m.

Ambassador Edward M. Korry (Ethiopia)
Ambassador Brewster H. Morris (Chad)
Minister William A. Crawford (Rumania)

June 4, 12:30 p.m.

Ambassador George W. Anderson (Portugal)
Ambassador Philip D. Sprouse (Cambodia)
Ambassador Horace G. Torbert, Jr. (Somalia)
(Ambassador Walworth Barbour - Israel - may be present if his picture has not been made with the President during the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol).

Short biographic summaries of the individuals listed above appear on the two enclosed sheets.

/s/ John A. McKesson

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Biographic summaries for June 1 appointments.
2. Biographic summaries for June 4 appointments.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fitzgerald

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 12-16-75
By LW, NARS, Date 1-13-76

June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR GWEN KING

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President - June 4 at 12:30

1. The President is now scheduled to meet briefly with Horace Torbert (Somali), Walworth Barbour (Israel), and George Anderson (Portugal) on June 4 at 12:30.
2. I wonder if you would help us out on the following points:
 - (a) Would you reserve the Cabinet Room for the meeting and inform State?
 - (b) Since the meeting is off the record, would you tell State to have the Ambassadors enter and leave the White House via the West Basement? The Ambassadors should be in the Cabinet Room by 12:25.
 - (c) Would you ask Cecil Stoughton to be on hand in the Cabinet Room at 12:25 to take individual pictures of each Ambassador with the President?
3. Bob Komer will be the NSC man in the Cabinet Room. Please let him or me know if you have any problems with this memo.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Komer
Mr. Cecil Stoughton
Mr. Kilduff - (Note 2(b). As we did on Monday, I will give you a paragraph for the afternoon briefing on June 4.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1964



MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 12-16-75
By LW, NARS, Date 1-13-76

SUBJECT: Appointment on Thursday, June 4 at 12:30

1. On Thursday, at 12:30 you are scheduled to meet briefly in the Cabinet Room with three of your Ambassadors -- Horace Torbert, Ambassador to Somalia; Walworth Barbour, Ambassador to Israel; and George Anderson, Ambassador to Portugal and former Chief of Naval Operations. The scenario calls for Bob Komer to entertain the three visitors in the Cabinet Room until Jack Valenti can escort you in, at or a little after 12:30.

2. You need only say a few words to the group, have your picture taken with each Ambassador individually, and depart after three or four minutes. The Ambassadors know the scenario, and the somewhat abrupt departure should be expected and entirely painless.

3. Some brief biographic data on the three Ambassadors is attached.

McG. B.

CONFIDENTIAL

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To Be Received by the President
June 4, 12:30 P.M.

George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations, was appointed Ambassador to Portugal in August, 1963. He is here for consultation concerning our problems with Portugal, its African territories, and our military installations in the Azores.

Walworth Barbour entered the Foreign Service in 1938, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and from 1955 to 1961 was Minister Counselor in London. Since becoming Ambassador to Israel in May, 1961, he has been deeply involved in U.S. initiatives to solve the Arab refugee problem and to allay Israeli security concerns.

Horace G. Torbert, Jr., a graduate of Yale and Harvard, he entered the Foreign Service in 1947. Prior to his present assignment he served in Vienna, Madrid, Rome, and Budapest. He has been Ambassador to Somalia since January, 1963.