

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1084

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	273512 to Lisbon <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del> *	1 p <del>11/18/68</del> *	<del>A</del>
#3 memo	to the President from Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>secret</del> * (dup. #4, 754 Memos to the President, vol. 94)	1 p <del>09/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#3a cable	Lisbon 1976 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>secret</del> (dup. #4a, as above)	2 p <del>09/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	to the President from Rostow <del>confidential</del>	1 p <del>09/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#4a cable	Lisbon 1952 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del> (dup. #27a, as above)	1 p <del>09/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#4b cable	Lisbon 1953 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del> (dup. #27b, as above)	2 p <del>09/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 cable	Lisbon 1949 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del>	2 p <del>09/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#6 report	#0621/68 <i>sanitized 10/17/01 NLS/RAE 00-187</i> <del>confidential</del>	5 p <del>09/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#8 memo	to the President from Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del>	1 p <del>06/04/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#8a memo	to Rostow from Read <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del>	2 p <del>05/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#10 cable	Lisbon 1307 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>confidential</del>	1 p <del>04/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#11 cable	Lisbon 719 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>secret</del>	2 p <del>12/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 cable	Lisbon 483 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>secret</del>	2 p <del>10/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 cable	54185 to Lisbon <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>secret</del>	2 p <del>10/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#14 cable	38198 to Lisbon <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>secret</del>	2 p <del>10/04/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#15 cable	Lisbon 437 <i>open 4/13/01 NLS 00-128</i> <del>secret</del>	2 p <del>10/09/67</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
Portugal, vol. 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 cable	State 51535 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2-p	10/10/67	A
#17 cable	Lisbon 463 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	1-p	10/12/67	A
#18 cable	Lisbon 010 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	1-p	7/6/67	A
#20 cable	Lisbon 1498 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2-p	5/30/67	A
#22 cable	Lisbon 666 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2-p	12/8/66	A
#23 MemCon	Courtesy Call.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	3-p	11/14/66	A
#24 cable	Lisbon 419 <i>open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	2-p	10/12/66	A
#25 cable	Lisbon 799 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	1-p	6/18/65	A
#26 cable	Lisbon 765 <i>open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	4-p	6/25/66	A
#27 cable	Lisbon 666 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2-p	5/13/---	A
#28 cable	Lisbon 652 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	3-p	4/13/---	A
#29 cable	Lisbon 604 <i>open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	1-p	3/26/65	A
#30 cable	Lisbon UNN <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	3-p	12/13/65	A
#31 cable	Lisbon 495 <i>open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	1-p	1/5/65	A
#32 cable	Lisbon 435 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1-p	12/23/64	A
#33 cable	Warsaw 412 <i>transferred to National Security File, Country File, Poland</i> <i>"Lahot Wang Jialuo" Box 202</i> <del>Confidential</del>	3-p	9/16/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File,  
Portugal, Vol. 2 8/64-11/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#34 cable	Lisbon 209 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	1 p 10/22/65	A
#35 cable	Lisbon 207 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	1 p 10/22/65	A
#36 cable	Anderson to Rusk for the President <del>Secret</del> <i>utilized 9/20/02 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del> [Dup #50a, NSF, CF, Rhodesia, Vol. 2, Bx 97] <i>open 8/17/11 NLJ 10-455 (#50a)</i>	3 p 5/13/65	A
#37 cable	Lisbon 83 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p 8/26/65	A
#38 cable	Lisbon 4 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p 7/2/65	A
#39 airgram	A-128 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	20 p 9/13/63	A
#40 cable	Lisbon 9254 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p 7/16/66	A
#41 cable	Lisbon 657 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p 6/15/66	A
#41a note	Transmittal memo <i>open</i> <del>Secret</del>	1 p 6/14/66	A
#41b cable	Duplicate of #41 <i>open 4-5-00</i>		
#42 cable	Lisbon 590 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p 5/24/66	A
#42b cable	Work Copy <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p undated	A
#43 cable	Lisbon 497 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	1 p 4/14/66	A
#44 cable	Lisbon 400 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p 2/28/66	A
#45 cable	Lisbon 174 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	3 p 10/19/65	A
#46 cable	Lisbon 122 <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	3 p 9/25/65	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File,  
Portugal, Vol. 2 8/64-11/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#47 cable	Lisbon 610 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	5/4/65	<del>A</del>
#49 cable	Circular 1165 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	12/17/65	<del>A</del>
#51 cover sheet	Outgoing Message <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	11/12/65	<del>A</del>
#51a cable	Bundy to Watson <del>Confidential</del> <i>Open 7/95</i>	1 p	11/12/65	A
#51b cable	Duplicate of #51a			
#52 cable	Duplicate of #51a			
#52 <sup>b</sup> cable	Watson to Bundy <del>Confidential</del> ✓	2 p	11/12/65	A
#55 memo	Dean Rusk to the President <del>Confidential</del> <i>open 4-5-00</i>	2 p	5/14/66	<del>A</del>
#57 memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	5/31/68	<del>A</del>
#58 memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	1/13/69	<del>A</del>
#60 memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	11/8/68	<del>A</del>
#61 memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	10/22/68	<del>A</del>
#62 note	Rostow to the President <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#62a cable	Lisbon 2483 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#62b cable	Lisbon 1953 ( <i>Aug #46</i> ) <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#64b MemCon	Message to President.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p	5/16/66	<del>A</del>

Transferred to #92-98,  
NSF, Country Files,  
Poland, Vol 1,  
Box 200

## FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File,  
Portugal, Vol. 2 8/64-11/68

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#65 note	<del>Read to Rostow transmittal note</del> <del>Secret</del>	<del>1 p</del>	<del>5/17/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#65a MemCon	Message to President.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret - duplicate of #64b</del>	2 p	5/16/66	A
#66 memo	Rusk to the President <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	5/14/66	A
#68 airgram	A-420 <i>sanitized 10/17/01 NL/PAC 00-187</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p	5/9/66	A
#70 memo	Rusk to the President <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	5/14/66	A
#71 memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	5/15/66	A
#71a report	Biographic Sketch <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	undated	A
#73 memo	Klein to McGB <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	8/18/64	A
#75 note	RWK to Mac <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	1 p	6/10/65	A
#75a cable	Lisbon 671 <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	4 p	6/9/65	A
#77 MemCon	Portuguese Policy.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	3 p	5/3/66	A
#78 MemCon	Portugese Position.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	10/12/65	A
#79 MemCon	Viet-Nam <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p	10/12/65	A
#80 MemCon	Voting in.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	1 p	10/9/65	A
#81 MemCon	Portugal, Timor and... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	2 p	10/9/65	A
#82 MemCon	Portugese Relations.... <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Confidential</del>	2 p	10/12/65	A
FILE LOCATION				

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Portugal, Vol. 2 8/64-11/68

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*6 up 6*

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#83 MemCon	<del>Macau</del> <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>2 p</del> 10/9/65	<del>A</del>
#84 MemCon	<del>Southern Rhodesia</del> <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>Sanitized 1-17-96 NLS 95-231</i>	<del>3 p</del> 10/9/65	<del>A</del>
#85 MemCon	<del>Discussion of General....</del> <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>4 p</del> 6/18/65	<del>A</del>
#86 MemCon	<del>General Portuguese Views....</del> <i>open 4-5-00</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>2 p</del> 6/18/65	<del>A</del>
#87 MemCon	<del>Portuguese-U.S. Policy..</del> <i>Open 4/13/01 NS 00-128</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>12 p</del> 6/18/65	<del>A</del>

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Portugal, Vol. 2 8/64-11/68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 437

PAGE 01 STATE 273512

85  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,FILE 02,1032 R

DRAFTED BY:EUR:M TOON:AMR  
APPROVED BY:MR. KATZENBACH  
S/S:MR WALSH

046438

R 182332Z NOV 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
USMISSION NATO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 273512

EXDIS TOSEC 83

SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ACTING SECRETARY THIS AFTERNOON TO DELIVER TWO ORAL STATEMENTS COMPLAINING OF (1) FORMATION OF NATO AIR SURVEILLANCE FORCE IN MEDITERRANEAN INVOLVING PARTICIPATION US-UK-ITALY AND, ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS, TURKEY AND GREECE AS WELL, AND (2) NEW NATO ACTIONS, "DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET UNION", WHICH BOUND TO COMPLICATE US-SOVIET RELATIONS. (OBVIOUSLY A REFERENCE TO NATO COMMUNIQUE). SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO SAID HIS GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO SET DATE FOR SIMULTANEOUS DEPOSIT IN CAPITALS OF INSTRUMENTS RATIFICATION ASTRONAUT RESCUE AND RETURN AGREEMENT. KATZENBACH

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pw, NARA, Date 3-8-00

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





Department of State

ED  
**TELEGRAM**  
2

UNCLASSIFIED 703

PAGE 01 STATE 279206

88

ORIGIN EUR 20

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 25, USIA 12, /078 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR:SPP:SGGEBELT

APPROVED BY: EUR:SPP:GEORGE W LANDAU

EUR: MR RHAN

S/S: MR BRANDT

S/NL: AMBASSADOR LEONHART

----- 102008

R 280117Z NOV 68

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LISBON

UNCLAS STATE 279206

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT BY PRESIDENT THOMAZ:

QUOTE ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR ELECTION FOR THE HIGH OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, I WANT TO CONVEY TO YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND MY BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE TOGETHER WITH THE EXPRESSION OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATION.

AMERICO THOMAZ

PRESIDENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC END QUOTE

2. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

QUOTE I AM MOST GREATEFUL FOR YOUR WARM AND THOUGHTFUL CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE. PLEASE ACCEPT IN RETURN MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED WELL BEING AND THAT OF THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE.

SINCERELY, RICHARD M. NIXON END QUOTE

3. PRESIDENT-ELECT'S OFFICE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION SHOULD GOP WISH TO DO SO. ADVISE DEPARTMENT IF RELEASED. RUSK

UNCLASSIFIED



INFORMATION <sup>2</sup>  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ (30)

rec'd 7:30

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
7:05 p.m.

Mr. President: (PS)

Contrary to press reports,  
Dr. Merritt rates Salazar's chance  
for survival is virtually zero.

W. W. Rostow

Lisbon 1976

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jw, NARA, Date 3-8-00  
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ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, CCO 00, /070 W  
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O 182055Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2502

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 1976

LIMDIS

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH DR. HOUSTON MERRITT ON PROSPECTS FOR  
DR. SALAZAR

1. DR. HOUSTON MERRITT, ACCOMPANIED BY PROF ALMEIDA LIMA  
(ONE OF OUR LOCAL PHYSICIANS ATTENDING DR. SALAZAR), CAME

TO MY HOUSE EARLY THIS EVENING. DR. MERRITT HAS EXAMINED  
PRIME MINISTER TWICE TODAY IN COMPANY OF HIS PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES  
AND WITH SOME OF THEM VISITED PRES. THOMAZ AT PRESIDENTIAL  
PALACE IN BELEM THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS SALAZAR'S CONDITION  
AND PROGNOSIS OF CASE. DRS. MERRITT AND ALMEIDA LIMA REPORTED  
THOMAZ HAD MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTED UNVARNISHED TRUTH AS TO  
PM'S CONDITION. MEDICAL TEAM HAS ALSO PREPARED REPORT ON TODAY'S  
CONSULTATIONS WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE PUBLIC SHORTLY.

Mr. Pastor  
Contrary to  
press reports

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-8-00



2. DR. MERRITT, ALONG WITH PORTUGUESE DOCTORS, CONSIDERS SALAZAR'S CONDITION WITHOUT HOPE AND DOES NOT EXPECT HIM TO REGAIN CONSCIOUSNESS. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAS KNOWN CASES WHICH DESPITE ALL INDICATIONS SUDDENLY TOOK TURN FOR BETTER. IN SALAZAR CASE, EARLIER HEMATOMA CAUSED BY FALL WAS A LARGE ONE, AMOUNTING TO 100CC. SUBSEQUENT SEPT 16 ATTACK HAD NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH EARLIER PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH PROF. ALMEIDA LIMA VOLUNTEERED THAT AFTER EFFECTS OF SHOCK FROM EARLIER OPERATION UNDER LOCAL ANASTHETIC - TWO HOLES DRILLED INTO SKULL - COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ONSET OF "VASCULAR ACCIDENT". MERRITT EXPLAINED LATEST ATTACK WAS ACTUALLY BRAIN HEMORRHAGE RATHER THAN THROMBOSIS AND THUS MORE SERIOUS AS TO POSSIBILITIES OF RECOVERY.

3. DR. MERRITT ESTIMATED SALAZAR SURVIVAL PERIOD AS PERHAPS 10 DAYS. PROF. ALMEIDA LIMA EXPRESSED VIEW IT MIGHT BE AS LITTLE AS FOUR DAYS, POINTING OUT THAT VARIATIONS IN PULSE ALREADY BEGINNING TO APPEAR, ACCOMPANIED BY SOME REAPPEARANCE OF FEVER. DR. MERRITT AMENDED HIS PROGNOSIS TO NOT LONGER THAN 10 DAYS.

4. BOTH DOCTORS SAID FORTHCOMING REPORT WOULD NOT CONCEAL GRAVITY OF SITUATION BUT WOULD AT SAME TIME INCLUDE SOME HOPEFUL EXPRESSIONS WITH VIEW TO EASING IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION.

BENNETT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

INFORMATION  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4  
13  
PS

Monday, September 16, 1968  
8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

As the attached telegrams indicate, Prime Minister Salazar, an old economics professor that made good, appears to have had a dangerous relapse.

*W. Rostow*  
W. Rostow

Lisbon 1952  
Lisbon 1953

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DCH, NARA, Date 4-18-89

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38  
ACTION EUR 23

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, GPM 04, H 02,  
INR 07, L 03, NSC-10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, RSR 01, /079 W

O 162035Z SEP 63  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2483

*Rostow*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1952

SUBJECT: SALAZAR'S CONDITION

AS OF 9 PM LOCAL TIME, HAVE REPORT FROM DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUE  
BASED ON SOURCE HE CONSIDERS ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE THAT THERE IS  
NO HOPE FOR PRIME MINISTER'S SURVIVAL AND WHOLE GOVERNMENT  
AND COUNCIL OF STATE HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED. MEDICAL BULLETIN  
EXPECTED BEFORE MIDNIGHT.

BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-8-00

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HCE 814

PAGE 01 LISBON 01953 162300Z

02  
ACTION EUR 20

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INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, RSR 01, /079 W

0 162250Z SEP 68

FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2484

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1953

SUBJ: SALAZAR SUCCESSION

REF: LISBON 1952

1. OTHER SOURCES CONFIRM INFO REFTL THAT AS OF 15:30Z LOCAL TIME COUNCIL OF STATE AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS GATHERING AT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO CHOOSE SUCCESSOR TO PRIME MIN SALAZAR. DECISION EXPECTED THIS EVENING. SALAZAR'S CONDITION REPORTEDLY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

2. ALL SECURITY FORCES ON LOW LEVEL ALERT. TOO EARLY FOR PUBLIC REACTION AS YET TO NEWS OF SALAZAR'S RELAPSE, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN LOW KEY ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT YET THAT SUCCESSION UNDER CONSIDERATION.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju NARA, Date 3-8-00

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



3. PORTUGUESE PRESS SOURCE REPORTS THAT FRONT RUNNERS FOR SUCCESSION BEFORE MEETING STARTS ARE LONG-TIME HEIR APPARENT MARCELO CAETANO, FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY STRONGMAN SANTOS COSTA AND CURRENT DEFENSE MINISTER GOMES DE ARAUJO. THESE THREE NAMES REPRESENT EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT TO GUARANTEE ORDERLY TRANSITION, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY PRIMARY CONCERN GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EXCLUSIVE LISTING.

4. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM WALK THROUGH POPULAR QUARTER OF ALFAMA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF STAFF AND I HAVE DRIVEN AROUND VARIOUS QUARTERS OF TOWN. TRAFFIC AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AS USUAL, SIDEWALK CAFES WELL PATRONIZED AND EVENING STROLLERS OUT IN FORCE. ATMOSPHERE AS OF NOW IS ONE OF NORMALCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LISBON 01953 162300Z

IN STREETS.

BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

Portugal  
5  
TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 447

PAGE 01 LISBON 01949 162044Z

85  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 2,  
SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, AF 10, ACDA 16, MC 01, E 15, TRSY 11, RSR 01,  
/146 W

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R 161815Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2480  
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1949

SUBJ: DEPARTURE OF SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER FOR  
WASHINGTON

1. DEPARTURE OF SPANISH FONMIN CASTIELLA FOR WASHINGTON  
TALKS ON EXTENSION OF US BASE RIGHTS CARRIED AS MAJOR  
NEWS ITEM BY PRINCIPAL LISBON DAILIES.

2. SEPT 15 SECULO (INDEPENDENT) HEADLINED ANI (OFFICIAL  
PORTUGUESE NEWS AGENCY) DESPACH WHICH INDICATED SPAIN  
HELD SEVERAL VALUABLE TRUMPS WITH PRESENCE OF SOVIET  
SHIPS IN MEDITERRANEAN, ABDICATION OF FRANCE FROM ITS  
ROLE IN NATO AND MIDDLE EAST SITUATION; WHILE ECONOMIC  
ASPECTS STILL IMPORTANT, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUESTS  
OF POLITICAL NATURE. ACCORDING ARTICLE, "MADRID POLI-  
TICAL CIRCLES" INDICATE SPAIN DESIRES SUPPORT OF US ON  
GIBRALTAR, ON ENTRY INTO NATO AND POSSIBLY INTO EUROPEAN  
COMMON MARKET.

3. SEPT 16 SECULO HEADLINED AFP DESPACH ALSO CARRIED  
IN DIARIO DA MANHA (OFFICIAL PARTY NEWSPAPER) WHICH  
REVIEWED HISTORY OF BASE NEGOTIATIONS AND INDICATING  
SPAIN SEEKING POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ADVAN-  
TAGES AS RESULT OF PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. SEPT 16 DIARIO  
DE NOTICIAS (PRO-GOVT) GAVE FEATURE PLAY TO REUTER'S  
ITEM INDICATING SPAIN SEEKING MORE US ECONOMIC AND  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE (PLANES, MODERN SUBMARINES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-8-00





# Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LISBON 01949 162044Z

AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT). ARTICLE STATED NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED FORWARD IN CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE AND AMERICAN FUNCTIONARIES APPEAR CONVINCED THAT AGREEMENTS WILL BE RENEWED.

4. COMMENT. THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO OVERT LINKING BY PORTUGUESE OF US-SPANISH BASE RIGHTS NEGOTIATIONS WITH STATUS OF LAJES BASE IN AZORES, EITHER IN PRESS OR IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS. HOWEVER, THIS UNUSUALLY PROMINENT PRESS TREATMENT OF THIRD-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS IS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, ARE WATCHING US-SPANISH TALKS CAREFULLY AND, DEPENDING ON OUTCOME, MAY SEEK TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS PERTAINING TO CONTINUED DE FACTO US PRESENCE IN AZORES. WE WOULD NOT OVERLOOK POSSIBILITY OF SPILLOVER FROM US-SPANISH NEGOTIATIONS INTO AZORES BASE CONTEXT, ESPECIALLY IN A POST-SALAZAR GOVT.

BENNETT

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Portugal File destroyed  
25, 26, 27 - B&S dest.  
27 - Fried  
~~Confidential~~  
29 - Destroyed

61



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Succession Possibilities in Portugal*

~~Confidential~~

28

13 September 1968

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-187  
By SJ, NARA, Date 10/1/01



## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
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DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
13 September 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Succession Possibilities in Portugal

Summary

The present government will carry on until Prime Minister Salazar recovers from recent brain surgery or, if he is permanently incapacitated or dies, until a successor can be designated according to constitutional procedures. Although initial reports of Salazar's condition are optimistic, it will be several days before the outcome of the surgery will be known. In Portugal it is rumored that he will not return to his usual level of activity and that a government reorganization is impending. But the government plans to leave the decision to Salazar. If a change becomes necessary, the succession is expected to be orderly and a member of the present establishment will be chosen to succeed.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.  
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence  
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

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#### Impact of Salazar's Operation

1. The brain surgery performed on Prime Minister Antonio Salazar on 7 September following an accidental fall focuses attention on two problems: 1) ensuring the normal functioning of the government during the temporary disability of the 79-year-old dictator and 2) choosing a successor in case of his permanent incapacitation or death. Although initial reports of his condition are optimistic, it will be at least several days before the outcome of the surgery will be known.

#### Temporary Measures

2. A government spokesman has indicated that there is no plan to appoint an acting prime minister, and the ministers will be carrying on their duties as usual. Minister of State Antonio da Mota Veiga, who prior to the operation had already taken over a great part of routine administrative decision-making, will continue answering for responsibilities of the office of prime minister until a reliable prognosis can be obtained. Thus the present cabinet is likely to carry on without a formal leader until Salazar recovers or, if he is permanently incapacitated or dies, until a successor can be designated.

3. The US Embassy in Lisbon reports that already there is substantial opinion that Salazar will have to curtail his activities, and reports of impending government reorganization have already started. However, the earliest government actions indicate that any decision on changes will be held up for Salazar to make.

#### The Selection Process for a Prime Minister

4. The constitution provides that the president of the republic, whose duties as formal head of state are mostly ceremonial, shall dismiss and appoint the prime minister. Salazar has held his post since 1932. Consequently this provision has not been exercised. The provision is no threat to Salazar because in actuality he chooses the president and makes sure that the candidate elected is

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a loyal member of the establishment. For the past ten years the chief of state has been President Americo Thomaz, a rear admiral in the Portuguese Navy. Thomaz is now 73 and has four years to serve on his second term. Whether Salazar has ever indicated a preference about his own successor or how Thomaz might go about choosing a new prime minister is not known, and the lack of information suggests that no decision has been made. Logically, if it becomes necessary to replace Salazar, Thomaz would be expected to consult with the major power groups supporting Salazar: the military in particular, the business oligarchy, the bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent, the church. The illegal opposition parties are too disorganized and lacking in influence to make it necessary that their views be considered.

#### Likely Choices

5. Because Salazar has never permitted a potential successor to remain long enough in the limelight to become heir apparent, there is no front runner. Efforts to predict a likely successor are further complicated by lack of previous examples of how the consultation process might operate. Speculation in informed circles in Portugal most frequently mentions as likely choices such men as former minister of justice Joao de Matos Antunes Varela, the often-rumored successor Professor Marcelo Caetano (former minister of the presidency), the ambitious ex-minister of overseas Adriano Moreira, and businessman Antonio Carvalho Fernandes, former secretary of state for industry.

6. The armed forces are unlikely to want to make one of their own the prime minister, but if there were a strong consensus among the military against a candidate of the other groups, or if a consensus could not be reached, they might insist on a military man. Then the choice might fall on a leading military figure such as General Manuel Gomes de Araujo (defense minister), General Venancio Deslandes (chief of staff of the armed forces), or General Luis da Camara Pina (army chief of staff).

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The Future

7. Salazar's successor will most likely be a supporter of the present regime. The initial phases are expected to be orderly. The more imponderable problem is how well a successor could function without the prestige of Salazar. His success will depend not only on his ability, but also on such factors as economic progress, possible military reverses in Africa, and increasing modernization of life in Portugal. If these factors become unmanageable, the possibility of civil strife would increase.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1968

IN REPLY REFER TO:

8019

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: United States-Portugal Civil  
Aviation Consultations

The civil aviation consultations between the United States and Portugal which began in Washington May 15, and about which you were informed in my memorandum dated May 11, 1968, were concluded on May 17, without agreement being reached on the level of frequencies for US carriers in their operations between the United States and Portugal during the 1968 summer season.

These consultations were held at the request of Portugal which was concerned that any frequency increases by US carriers at this time might jeopardize the operations of the Portuguese air carrier which recently entered the US-Portugal air transport market. Our delegation presented a strong case backed by extensive statistical data which fully justified the modest frequency increases proposed by the US carriers (PAA and TWA). This data also established that the US carriers had been more than mindful of the recent entry of the Portuguese carrier into the US-Portugal market as their level of services over the past several years had not increased as much as those of other carriers in the market or commensurate with the rapid market growth.


It was apparent from the outset, however, that the Portuguese were not prepared to agree to any frequency increases for US carriers regardless of the strength of the US presentation. Consequently, the talks were quickly concluded with both sides agreeing to report back to their governments. Our delegation offered to discuss the matter again later in the year

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after both sides had had the opportunity of reviewing this year's traffic growth.

In the meantime, the summer schedules of PAA and TWA are approved by the Portuguese only through May 31, 1968. We have expressed our view to the Portuguese that failure to extend approval of the schedule beyond that date would constitute a unilateral act in violation of the Air Transport Agreement. Our Embassy in Lisbon has been requested to review the outcome of the consultations with the Foreign Ministry in a further effort to obtain extension of the Portuguese approval of the summer schedules to cover the full summer period.



Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.  
Wednesday, June 5, 6:00 p. m.

Our relations with Portugal have been cool. The Portuguese are unhappy with our policy of supporting self determination for their African territories and preventing military equipment of U. S. origin from being used in their colonial conflicts.

The Portuguese are holding their own against the guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique. They are losing ground in Portuguese Guinea.

Despite the strain caused by our differences over Africa, the Portuguese support our policy in Vietnam and remain committed to NATO. They have cooperated with us on the balance of payments issue.

You may wish to ask Ambassador Bennett for his assessment of Portugal's future in Africa and the long-term impact of the African issue on U. S. -Portuguese relations.

We continue to use our Azores facilities on a provisional basis. The Portuguese have not responded to our long standing offer to discuss a long-term agreement covering our peacetime use of these facilities. (Wartime use is tied to the duration of NATO.) As a result the Portuguese could revoke our peacetime use at any time.

You may wish to ask Ambassador Bennett whether he believes our Azores facilities could become an issue with the Portuguese.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 31, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Appointment with Ambassador  
Bennett, Wednesday, June 5 at 5:30 p.m.

I am providing below background information for possible use by the President at his meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, The Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Wednesday, June 5 at 5:30 p.m. The President last met with Ambassador Bennett a year ago on June 6.

1. U.S.-Portuguese Relations--U.S. support for self-determination for the Portuguese African territories and our policy of preventing military equipment of U.S. origin from being obtained either by the Portuguese or various nationalist forces for use in conflicts in Portuguese Africa have caused a continued coolness in our political relations. Despite this strain, the Portuguese support U.S. policy in Viet-Nam and, within the context of their limited resources, remain committed to NATO. They are apprehensive about the presence of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

2. Economic Questions--The Portuguese have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on the balance of payments program, even though they are concerned about the effects the restrictions may have on tourism and bank lending and supported us on the establishment of special drawing rights in the IMF. They took the same position as the U.S. following the devaluation of the British pound; there is continuing expansion of trade between the two countries; they went along with the Findley Amendment barring sales to North Viet-Nam and restricting sales to Cuba.

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By ylw, NARA, Date 3-9-00

3. Azores -- We continue our de facto provisional peacetime use of the various military facilities on the Azores. There has been no substantive response from the Portuguese to our longstanding offer to discuss a longterm extension of that part of the agreement which expired December, 1962. (The agreement for U.S. use of the Azores during war in which the U.S. and Portugal are allied is for the duration of NATO. That part of the agreement permitting U.S. forces to be stationed and operate in the Azores in peacetime is what we wish to renew. As a result, the Portuguese could revoke our peacetime use at anytime, even though we would be entitled to a period of six months to one year for evacuation.)

4. Portuguese Africa -- During the past year, the military situation in Angola and Mozambique has remained in balance, with the Portuguese keeping pace with some increase in insurgency pressures and remaining in control of the threat. In Portuguese Guinea, however, the insurgent threat has mounted significantly with the guerrillas making progress in their attempts to control the countryside but with the Portuguese remaining in control of population centers. (Since the President last saw Ambassador Bennett, the Ambassador made a six-week, 25,000 mile trip to Angola, Mozambique and to eight independent African countries, July 23-September 2, 1967. Portuguese President Thomaz visited Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, January 29-February 21, 1968.)

5. Salazar Celebrates 40 Years in Office -- On April 27, Prime Minister Salazar completed 40 years as the leading member of the Portuguese Government; on the following day, April 28, he celebrated his 79th birthday. Although there is continued speculation about a successor, no single serious candidate has emerged nor is there any indication that Dr. Salazar intends to retire.

6. Non-proliferation treaty -- Because of its concern over what it regards as inadequate security guarantees for non-nuclear powers, Portugal is expected to abstain when the NPT resolution is voted on in the U.N. General Assembly.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1968

IN REPLY REFER TO: 7250

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: United States-Portugal Civil  
Aviation Consultations

Civil aviation consultations with Portugal are scheduled to be held in Washington commencing May 15, 1968. These consultations are being held at the request of Portugal which has taken exception to the increased frequencies planned by US carriers (Pan American - two additional round trips weekly over last year's twelve and TWA - one additional one-way weekly over last year's ten round trips) in their summer operations between the United States and Portugal. The Portuguese maintain that these planned increases are out of proportion of the needs of the traffic.

Portuguese concern is due primarily to the fact the Portuguese air carrier (TAP) began scheduled operations to New York with its own equipment on April 1. The Portuguese Delegation can be expected to rely heavily on a United States/Portugal Memorandum of Conversation of May 26, 1966 in which the Director General of Portuguese Civil Aviation expressed the view that a developing carrier should be permitted to initiate services on a route free from excessive competition from carriers with well established services on the same route. We took cognizance of this view by agreeing to a priori consultations, within the context of the Bermuda principles, during a five-year developmental period whenever the Portuguese regard frequencies proposed by US carriers as being unreasonable.

In the present instance, we believe the Portuguese are being overly protective towards TAP as the United States-Portugal market is strong and growing, with passenger traffic averaging a 24 percent increase yearly over the past five years. Our carriers have been more than mindful

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of TAP's entry into the market and have exercised commendable restraint in proposing only a 11.4 percent increase over frequencies operated in 1967.

The US position will be directed at convincing the Portuguese the frequency increases planned by the US carriers are modest in the face of current traffic demands and will not jeopardize the operations of the Portuguese air carrier.

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Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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INFO CPR 02,GPM 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,USIA 12,RSR 01,073 W  
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R 221606Z APR 68

FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1307

SUBJ: BIRTHDAY GREETINGS FOR SALAZAR

REF: LISBON A-336 APR 10, 1968

FOR SPP

SUGGEST PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO DR. SALAZAR ON  
79TH BIRTHDAY APRIL 28. BELIEVE NO NOTE NEED BE  
TAKEN OF HIS 40TH ANNIVERSARY IN OFFICE APRIL 27.

GP-4

BENNETT

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By yw, NARA. Date 3-9-00

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PAGE 01 LISBON 00719 111852Z

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ACTION SS 25

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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /026 W

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O R 111810Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1601  
INFO USMISSION NATO 09

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 719

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO COME TO SEE HIM TODAY JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR BRUSSELS. HE HAD RETURNED FROM ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC ON WEEK-END SHOOT WITH FRANCO AND OTHER SPANISH OFFICIALS. HE RECALLED YOUR INQUIRY OF HIM DURING YOUR RECENT TALK IN WASHINGTON RE STATE OF FRANCO'S HEALTH, AND INDICATED YOUR INTEREST HAD BEEN VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND DURING OUTING.

2. FRANCO NOGUEIRA SAID THERE HAD BEEN FIVE SEPARATE SHOTS DURING THE DAY, THREE IN THE MORNING BEGINNING AT 9:30 A.M. (AN EARLY HOUR FOR PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER) AND TWO IN THE AFTERNOON. ACCORDING FRANCO NOGUEIRA'S ACCOUNT,

PAGE 2 RUDKLI 719 ~~SECRET~~  
FRANCO HAD BROUGHT DOWN 10, 12, 18, AND ABOUT 30 PARTRIDGE RESPECTIVELY ON FIRST FOUR STANDS. HE DID NOT KNOW NUMBER FOR LAST STAND BUT THOUGHT FRANCO TOTAL FOR DAY WAS CLOSE TO ONE HUNDRED. PRESIDENT THOMAZ OF PORTUGAL GOT A FEW MORE, BUT FRANCO'S TOTAL INDICATED TO FRANCO NOGUEIRA

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By ful, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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PAGE 02 LISBON 00719 111852Z

THAT FRANCO'S EYE WAS KEEN AND HIS HAND STEADY.

3. FRANCO ATE WELL AT MEALS AND THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SPECIAL DIET. HE TOOK BOTH WHITE AND RED WINES IN MODERATE QUANTITIES, WHICH FRANCO NOGUEIRA SAID WAS MORE THAN HIS OWN CONSTITUTION PERMITS HIM JUST NOW. AN ATTENDANT DID PROVIDE FRANCO WITH A COUPLE OF PILLS AT LUNCH BUT FRANCO NOGUEIRA DID NOT KNOW WHOM THESE WERE FOR. IN SHORT, HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE FOUND FRANCO IN FULL HEALTH AND VIGOR DURING THIS ENCOUNTER OVER LAST WEEK-END.

4. FRANCO NOGUEIRA WILL PROBABLY BE GIVING YOU THIS INFORMATION AT BRUSSELS BUT I THOUGHT I WOULD PASS IT ALONG IN VIEW OF HIS EVIDENT INTEREST IN FOLLOWING UP ON YOUR INQUIRY TO HIM. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS INFORMATION TO EMBASSY MADRID, SINCE I REALIZE THIS

PAGE 3 RUDKLI 719 ~~SECRET~~

PORTUGUESE ACCOUNT IS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER INFORMATION COMING TO US ABOUT FRANCO.

5. FRANCO NOGUEIRA RELATED HIS WASHINGTON CONVERSATION WITH YOU WITH HIS USUAL PRECISION AND TOOK OCCASION TO EXPRESS ONCE AGAIN HIS HIGH RESPECT FOR YOU AND HIS APPRECIATION OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. HE COMMENTED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT ALWAYS HAVE YOUR AGREEMENT, HE ALWAYS CAME AWAY FROM A MEETING WITH YOU FEELING THAT HE HAD HAD FULL CHANCE TO STATE HIS CASE AND TO BE HEARD.

GP-2, BENNETT

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PAGE 01 LISBON 00483 171148Z

47  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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R 171045Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1430  
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 75  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 95

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 483

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CONGO

REF: STATE 54185

1. CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH GOP ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGO, EMBASSY PASSED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY (THEMIDO) OCTOBER 16 (1) INFORMATION ON MINISTERIAL CHANGES CONTAINED IN KINSHASA 4710 AND (2) ORALLY APPROPRIATE PORTIONS OF KINSHASA 4740. THEMIDO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FULL FACTUAL INFORMATION, WHICH GOP HAD NOT HAD, AND FOR USG EVALUATION, WITH WHICH HE DID NOT DIFFER, INDICATING THAT GOP'S PREVIOUS IMPRESSIONS HAD BEEN BASED ON FACTS OBTAINED FROM PRESS REPORTS.

PAGE 2 RUDKLI 483 ~~SECRET~~

2. EMBASSY ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO CALL TO FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ATTENTION REPORT (NOT NOTED IN LOCAL PRESS) THAT ICRC DELEGATE GAFNER HAD LEFT SWITZERLAND OCTOBER 13 FOR CONGO TO WORK OUT WITH ALL INTERESTED PARTIES PRACTICAL WAYS OF CARRYING OUT EVACUATION OF

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By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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PAGE 02 LISBON 00483 171148Z

MERCENARIES WITHIN PERIOD OF THREE OR FOUR WEEKS.

GP-3. BENNETT

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PAGE 01 STATE 54185

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: AF/AFCM ATTIENTEN  
APPROVED BY: EUR/SPP LANDAU  
AFCM BROWN  
S/S MEEHAN  
EUR BEAUDRY

R 140012Z OCT 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON 0063  
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0148  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0220

~~SECRET~~ STATE 54185

EXDIS

REF: LISBON 470

1. RE PARA 3 REFTTEL, DEPT REPEATING KINSHASA 4710 ANNOUNCING GDRG CABINET CHANGES AND KINSHASA 4740 GIVING EMBASSY'S EVALUATION (WITH WHICH WE CONCUR) FOR YOUR USE IN RESPONDING ON THEMIDO INQUIRY.

2. DEPT BELIEVES CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH GOP ON CONGO MOST USEFUL JUST AT THIS TIME IN LIGHT REPORTS SUCH AS LUANDA'S

PAGE 2 RUEHC 54185 ~~SECRET~~  
240 INDICATING NEW MERCENARY ARRIVALS IN ANGOLA AND SUGGESTS  
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
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PAGE 02 STATE 54185

REPLY TO THEMIDO BE HANDLED ORALLY.

GP-3. RUSK

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# Department of State

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DRAFTED BY: AF/AFCM: L. DEAN BROWN  
AF: J. PALMER  
EUR/SPP: MR. FUNSETH  
EUR/FBX: MR. MOFFAT  
S/S: MR. HOUDEK

P 040113Z OCT 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0025  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0081  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0060

~~SECRET~~ STATE 48198

EXDIS

REF: KINSHASA 4634

1. DISCUSSED REFTEL WITH DAVIGNON. HE AGREED HAVE GOB TAKE LEAD IN LISBON. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE INSTRUCTED SEE FONOFF, GIVE EXPLANATION EFFORTS BEING MADE EVACUATE MERCENARIES PEACEFULLY UNDER AEGIS ICRC, AND EXPRESS STRONG HOPE NOTHING WOULD BE ALLOWED INTERFERE WITH THIS ACTION. AGREED THIS BETTER APPROACH THAN FURTHER ACCUSATIONS PORTUGUESE SUPPORTING MERCENARY ACTIVITIES.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 48198 ~~SECRET~~

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By ju NARA. Date 3-9-00

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 48198

2. DAVIGNON SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL GET GERMANS INTO ACT IN VIEW THEIR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH PORTUGUESE. HE WILL DISCUSS WITH HIS PEOPLE AND TAKE ACTION IF THOUGHT ADVISABLE.

3. SEE LITTLE POINT IN EMBASSY LISBON TAKING ANY ACTION WITH PORTUGUESE. SUGGEST, HOWEVER, IT KEEP IN TOUCH WITH BELGIAN EMBASSY.

GP-4. KATZENBACH

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~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





# Department of State

WH  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 LISBON 00437 091320Z

43  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

2

P 091235Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1400  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 90  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 71

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 437

EXDIS

REF: STATE 48198

1. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR GOFFIN APPROACHED ME AT DINNER OCTOBER 7 TO SAY HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE UP CONGO MERCENARY QUESTION AGAIN WITH GOP. HE SAID HE HAD REPLIED TO BRUSSELS, EXPRESSING STRONG OPPOSITION TO DOING SO. FOR HIM TO GO BACK TO GOP AGAIN ON MATTER WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO PRESENT DEFINITE PROOF OF PORTUGUESE INVOLVEMENT WOULD IN HIS VIEW AVAIL NOTHING BEYOND REITERATION OF PREVIOUS GOP STATEMENTS OF NON-INVOLVEMENT AND WOULD IN FACT BE HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO FONMIN, WITH ADVERSE EFFECTS ON CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH

PAGE 2 RUDKLI 437 ~~SECRET~~  
GOFFIN PRIDES HIMSELF ON HAVING WITH FRANCO NOGUEIRA.

2. IF DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS SOME ACTION STILL DESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE OF EVENTS, I WOULD SEE NO REPEAT NO PARTICULAR RISK TO OUR OTHER INTERESTS HERE IN OUR TALKING WITH PORTUGUESE EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR LISBON

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLI 00-128**

**By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01**

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 LISBON 00437 091320Z

ALONG LINES MY SUGGESTION IN LISBON 337 THAT WE CONSULT MORE OFTEN WITH GOP ON CONGO. IF, AS PRESS STORIES OF LAST FEW DAYS INDICATE, PROGRESS IS IN FACT BEING MADE ON PLANS FOR EVACUATION OF MERCENARIES THROUGH ICRC AUSPICES, WE MIGHT REVIEW FOR PORTUGUESE ACTUAL STEPS TAKEN AND ANY FORWARD MOTION ALREADY ACHIEVED TOWARDS OBJECTIVE. THIS WOULD BE DONE IN SIMPLE FORM OF PROVIDING THEM WITH INFORMATION, RATHER THAN ASKING FURTHER ASSURANCES OR COOPERATION FROM THEM. NEITHER WE NOR BELGIANS CAN EXPECT LATTER SINCE IT AGAINST GOP CONCEPTION OF ITS NATIONAL INTEREST. HOWEVER, I AGREE WITH GOFFIN THAT PORTUGUESE ARE CAUTIOUS PEOPLE AND WOULD NOT

WANT TO BE LEFT OUT ON WRONG LIMB REGARDING CONGO, NO MATTER HOW MUCH THEY DISLIKE MOBUTU. IF THEY CAN BE GIVEN IDEA THAT EVACUATION PLANS ALREADY WELL

PAGE 3 RUDKLI 437 ~~SECRET~~

IN TRAIN ANDSOROMISE EARLY CONCLUSION OF AFFAIR, THEN IN MY OPINION GOP NOT REPEAT NOT LIKELY TO TRY TO SPIKE MATTERS AT THIS STAGE.

3. ANOTHER DIPLOMATIC SOURCE WHO SCOOPS UP CONSIDERABLE LOCAL INFORMATION, A GOOD BIT OF IT NOT TOO RELIABLE, TOLD ME SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT BOB DENARD BACK IN LISBON. OUR VARIOUS MISSION RESOURCES HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THIS, IN RESPONSE MY QUERY BELGIAN AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD NO REPEAT NO INDICATION THAT DENARD CURRENTLY IN PORTUGAL. IT REMAINS POSSIBLE OF COURSE THAT DENARD MAY HAVE STOPPED HERE OR PASSED THROUGH RECENTLY.

GP-3 BENNETT

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 51535

81

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: AF/AFCM: WESCHAUFEELE  
APPROVED BY: AF: AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE  
EUR/SPP: MR FUNSETH  
AF/AFCM: MR BROWN  
EUR/FBX/ MR MOFFAT  
S/S: MR MEEHAN

P R 102100Z OCT 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0049  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0170  
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0115

~~SECRET~~ STATE 51535

EXDIS

REF: LISBON 437; KINSHASA 4777; STATE 48198

1. OBVIOUSLY THERE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING RE NATURE REPRESENTATIONS DAVIGNON AND WE AGREED GOB AMBASSADOR IN LISBON WOULD MAKE.

2. WE DO NOT EXPECT GOB MAKE FURTHER CHARGES OR OBJECTIONS ABOUT GOP INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT MERCENARY ACTIVITIES. OUR CONCEPTION BELGIAN DEMARCHE WAS SIMPLY TO INFORM GOP OF GENERAL STATUS PLANS FOR MERCENARY EVACUATION AND TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT, IN INTEREST

PAGE 2 RUEHC 51535 ~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 51535

PEACEFUL RESOLUTION THIS PROBLEM, IT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL.

3. FOR LISBON: WE HAVE NO OBJECTION AND SEE SOME ADVANTAGES IF YOU MAKE THESE POINTS AS SUGGESTED LISBON 437.

4. FOR BRUSSELS: SUGGEST YOU CHECK STATUS THIS MATTER USING YOUR INQUIRY TO RESTATE FORM FOR GOB EFFORT WHICH WE AGREED UPON WITH DAVIGNON PER STATE 48198.

GP-3. RUSK

EXD

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

17

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 LISBON 00463 121248Z

40  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

P 121145Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1415  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 73  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 93

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 463

EXDIS

REF: STATE 51535

SUBJ: CONGO

1. HAVE APPOINTMENT MORNING OCTOBER 13 WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOREIGN MINISTRY. WILL MAKE APPROACH AS SUGGESTED LISBON 437 AT THAT TIME.
2. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR HAS INFORMED ME HE MADE APPROACH (ALONG LINES INDICATED PARAGRAPH 2 REFTEL) TO SECRETARY GENERAL FOREIGN MINISTRY ON OCTOBER 11.

GP-3.

WELLMAN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

WH 18

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Action  
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Info

~~SECRET~~

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1967 JUL 6 AM 8 34

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RR RUEHC  
DE RUDKLI 010 1871149  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 061145Z JUL 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ LISBON 010

EXDIS

REF: STATE 217511 CIRCULAR

DISCUSSED HOLLYBUSH MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER IN  
TALK LAST EVENING. FRANCO NOGUEIRA EXPRESSED  
APPRECIATION FOR RUN-DOWN AND SHOWED FULL AWARENESS OF  
DELICATE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST. HE  
INDICATED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN DISCUSSION OF ARMS  
LIMITATIONS AND SHOWED SATISFACTION OVER US WARNING TO  
SOVIETS ON CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA. IT WILL  
BE RECALLED IN THAT CONNECTION THAT FRANCO NOGUEIRA IN  
HIS REMARKS AT RECENT NATO MINISTERIAL IN LUXEMBOURG  
CALLED ATTENTION TO CASTRO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN  
LATIN AMERICA, AND GOP HAS SHOWN CONCERN OVER CUBAN  
OPERATIONS IN CONGO (B) AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. GP-3.

BENNETT  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin	ACTION:	Amembassy LISBON	PRIORITY
SS		Amembassy MADRID	"
Info:		Amembassy VIENNA	"
H		Amembassy LONDON	"
EUR		Amembassy DUBLIN	"
NSC		Amembassy ROME	"
		US MISSION GENEVA	"
		Amcongen BARCELONA	"

JUN 1 6 40 PM '67

STATE 206308

Mr. Allan Shivers of Austin, former Governor of Texas, and  
Mrs. Shivers travelling Europe June 1-25. Please extend appropriate  
assistance and courtesies.

Itinerary follows:

June 2. - Arrive Barcelona 12:20 <sup>pm</sup> ~~am~~ via Pan American #154  
staying Hotel Ritz

June 6 - Depart Barcelona 10:10 am via Iberian #172  
- Arrive Geneva 11:30 am staying Hotel Interconti-  
nental Geneve

June 10 - Depart Geneva 2:20 pm via Austrian Air #502  
- Arrive Vienna 4:40 pm staying Hotel Imperial  
Vienna

Drafted by:

Text received from

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

White House

classification approved by:

S/S - Herbert B. Thompson

Clearance

WH - Mr. Smith

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~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

June 16 - Depart Vienna 11:05 am via Austrian Air #201  
- Arrive London 1:20 pm  
- Depart London 2:45 pm via Irish Air #159  
- Arrive Dublin 4:15 pm staying The Shelbourne

June 21 - Depart Dublin 8:30 am via Irish Air #150  
- Arrive London 9:55 am  
- Depart London 10:45 am via BEA #254  
- Arrive Rome 1:50 pm staying Hotel Cavalieri Hilton

June 25 - Depart Rome 11:00 am, Pan American #111  
~~Depart New York (JFK) 5:45 pm via American #25~~  
~~Arrive Dallas 8:04 pm~~

GP-EXEMPT

END.

RUSK

UNCLASSIFIED

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

VIA LDX

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

19a

TO S/S Mr. Thompson

Personal conversation

Bronley Smith

SENT

01/1726



WEDNESDAY, MAY 31

*Former Governor of Texas  
now a lawyer in  
Austin*  
*196*

Lv. Austin 4:05 p.m., Braniff # 242  
Ar. Dallas 4:48 p.m.  
Lv. Dallas 5:45 p.m., Braniff # 6 (non-stop jet - dinner)  
Ar. New York (JFK) 9:46 p.m.  
HOTEL: THE REGENCY - PL 9-4100 (212)

THURSDAY, JUNE 1

Lv. New York (JFK) 10:30 p.m., Pan American # 154 (jet - stops in Lisbon,  
but no change)-  
Ar. Barcelona 12:20 noon (next day, June 2)  
HOTEL RITZ, Barcelona, Spain

TUESDAY, JUNE 6

Lv. Barcelona 10:10 a.m., Iberian # 172 (non-stop jet)  
Ar. Geneva 11:30 a.m.  
HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL GENEVE, Petit Saconnex 7-9, Suisse  
Geneva, Switzerland

SATURDAY, JUNE 10

Lv. Geneva 2:20 p.m., Austrian Air # 502 (jet - stops in Zurich, but no  
change)  
Ar. Vienna 4:40 p.m.  
HOTEL IMPERIAL VIENNA, Karntnerring 16, Vienna 1, Austria  
TELEPHONE: 651765

FRIDAY, JUNE 16

Lv. Vienna 11:05 a.m., Austrian Air # 201 (non-stop jet)  
Ar. London 1:20 p.m.  
Lv. London 2:45 p.m., Irish Air # 159 (non-stop jet)  
Ar. Dublin 4:15 p.m.  
HOTEL: THE SHELBOURNE - TELEPHONE: 66471-7, Dublin, Ireland  
TELEGRAMS: "Shelotel, Dublin"

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21

Lv. Dublin 8:30 a.m., Irish Air # 150 (small jet - Viscount; non-stop)  
Ar. London 9:55 a.m.  
Lv. London 10:45 a.m., BEA # 254 (Trident jet - lunch - non-stop)  
Ar. Rome 1:50 p.m.  
HOTEL CAVALIERI HILTON, Rome, Italy

SUNDAY, JUNE 25

Lv. Rome 11:00 a.m., Pan American # 111 (jet)  
Ar. New York (JFK) 1:40 p.m.  
Lv. New York (JFK) 5:45 p.m., American # 25 (non-stop jet - dinner)  
Ar. Dallas 8:04 p.m.  
Lv. Dallas 8:30 p.m., Trans-Texas # 441  
Ar. Austin 9:38 p.m.  
AIR MAIL POSTAGE RATES - EUROPE - 20¢ PER HALF OUNCE

RECEIVED  
GARVIN WATSON  
JUN 26 1967

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

20

141  
Action

88  
Info

~~SECRET~~  
VZCZCDKA044  
PP RUDTCR RUEHC  
DE RUDKLI 1498 1501150  
ZNY SSSSS  
P R 01125Z MAY 67  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUDKMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ LISBON 1498

1967 MAY 30

03/256  
AM 10 58

2

SUBJ: LANDING AND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES

REF: STATE 203921

EXDIS

1. GOP RESPONSE TO CLEARANCE REQUEST WOULD LIKELY VARY IN PROMPTNESS AND DEGREE OF COOPERATION DEPENDING ON PARTICULAR CONTINGENCY (DISCUSSED BELOW) AND ON DEVELOPING INTER NATIONAL SITUATION. GOP HAS NO USE FOR NASSER (AND OTHER ARAB STATES SUCH AS ALGERIA) BECAUSE OF THEIR TROUBLE7MAKING PROCLIVITIES AND ESPECIALLY THEIR ASSISTANCE TO ANTI7PORTUGUESE INSURGENTS IN AFRICA. ALTHOUGH GOP ALSO HAS LITTLE RAPPORT WITH ISRAEL, WHICH ALLEGEDLY ALSO AIDS ANTI7PORTUGUESE AFRICANS (E.G. TANZANIA) AND

PAGE 2 RUDKLI 1498 ~~SECRET~~  
TAKES ANTI7PORTUGUESE POSITIONS AT UN, GOP WOULD TEND TO FAVOR ISRAEL ON BALANCE BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S WESTERN ORIENTATION AND BECAUSE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST STATES SUPPORTING ARAB COUNTRIES. GOP ALSO SHARES US ESTIMATE OF ISRAELI'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

2. SPECIFICALLY WITH REFERENCE TO CONTINGENCIES POSTULATED:

A) EMERGENCY EVACUATION US CITIZENS: CLEARANCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE ACCORDED WITHOUT DELAY.

B) UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION: GOP WOULD FIND CLEARANCE REQUEST DIFFICULT IN VIEW GENERALLY UNSATISFACTORY RELATIONS WITH UN. (SEE FOR MOST RECENT EXAMPLE LISBON 1471 RE U THANT'S BRIEF STOPOVER HERE.) GOP MIGHT WELL DELAY REPLY IN HOPE ALTERNATIVE FACILITIES WOULD BE EXPLORED AND PORTUGUESE WOULD NOT BE NEEDED.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *fwjg*, NARA, Date 3-29-00



~~SECRET~~

-2-Lisbon 1498, May 30

C) UNILATERAL US INTERVENTION: WE BELIEVE GOP ATTITUDE WOULD BE DETERMINED BY PLANNED EXTENT AND NATURE OF PROPOSED USE PORTUGUESE TERRITORY, GOP JUDGMENT ON SERIOUSNESS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND, ABOVE ALL, ON EXTENT TO WHICH PORTUGUESE INTERESTS AND WESTERN

PAGE 3 RUDKLI 1498 ~~SECRET~~  
PRINCIPLES WHICH PORTUGUESE ESPOUSE (E.G. FREE PASSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS) ARE CLEARLY ENGAGED. GOP ACKNOWLEDGES US LEADER FREE WORLD, YET CRITICIZES US FOR SEEKING BE WORLD'S POLICEMAN. IN VIEW IMPORTANCE PORTUGAL ATTACHES TO MARITIME ISSUES INVOLVED THIS CONFRONTATION, GOP WOULD LIKELY GO ALONG WITH US, BUT ONLY AFTER MOST CAREFUL APPRAISAL.

D) INTERVENTION WITH UK OR OTHER EUROPEAN STATE OR STATES: IF OPERATION INVOLVED PRINCIPAL WESTERN MARITIME STATES, PORTUGAL WOULD TEND BE MORE SYMPATHETIC. GOP WOULD ALSO MORE READILY COOPERATE WITH NATO SPONSORED OR SUPPORTED OPERATION. FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN PARTICULAR WOULD BE HELPFUL ON PORTUGUESE ATTITUDE. GOP CURRENTLY BEARS STRONG RESENTMENT AND SUSPICION TOWARDS UK OVER RHODESIAN ISSUE, AND IT IS DOUBTFUL ASSOCIATION OF UK ALONE WITH US IN ANY ENTERPRISE WOULD INCREASE ITS ACCEPTABILITY HERE AT THIS TIME.

3. ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH GOP BELIEVED HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN ALL CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING USE PORTUGUESE TERRITORY AND IMPERATIVE IN B, C AND D, EVEN THOUGH AZORES BASE

PAGE 4 RUDKLI 1498 ~~SECRET~~  
AGREEMENT (TECHNICALLY EXPIRED BUT STILL EFFECTIVE) MAY NOT LEGALLY LIMIT USE OF LAJES BY US MILITARY AIRCRAFT. IN PARTICULAR, "STAGING" OF US FORCES INVOLVING SUBSTANTIAL SUPPLIES AND MANPOWER, WITH CONNOTATION OF GOP CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY ACTION IN MIDDLE EAST, WOULD POSE PROBLEM FOR GOP WHICH ALREADY FIGHTING COUNTER GUERRILLA WAR IN AFRICA. WELLMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~





S/S-9550

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

2172

21

1-Port  
2-Rit

JUN 6 A.M.

Action LSE

June 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Ambassador  
to Portugal in Washington on Consultation,  
June 5-9, 1967.

For such action as the President and the White House may wish to take, the Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., United States Ambassador to Portugal, will be in Washington on official consultation, June 5-9, 1967. During that period he can be reached in Room 5226A, Department of State, extensions 5545 or 5774.

*Carroll Br*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Noted by FMB per JRE  
6/6/67

RECEIVED  
HOSKOW'S OFFICE

1967 JUN 5 PM 6 07

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W 12 22 7

~~SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 7092  
RECD: DECEMBER 8, 1966, 10:03 AM

Info FROM: LISBON  
ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 666

N O D I S

FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *gwl/mg* NARA, Date 3-29-00

1. FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCO NOGUEIRA HAS JUST SPOKEN WITH ME ABOUT RHODESIA, FIRST TIME THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN RAISED IN OUR CONVERSATIONS. FONMIN SAID HE HAD RECEIVED PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR GARIN IN WASHINGTON TO EFFECT THAT IN ABSENCE SECRETARY AND NUMBER OTHER PERTINENT OFFICIALS FROM WASHINGTON, HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE APPOINTMENT AT WHAT HE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO CARRY OUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENT PORTUGUESE POSITION ON RHODESIAN PROBLEM. FONMIN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO STATE POSITION TO ME WITH REQUEST I BRING IT TO YOUR ATTENTION. I INDICATED I WOULD DO SO WITHOUT DELAY.

2. FRANCO NOGUEIRA SAID THAT AS WE COULD IMAGINE, HE WAS FOLLOWING RHODESIAN SITUATION CLOSELY. HE EMPHASIZED GOP VIEWS MATTER WITH GREAT CONCERN, AS HE IS SURE WE DO. THUS REPORTS FROM UN INDICATE AFRICAN DELEGATIONS ARE IN HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE AND ARE ATTEMPTING BROADEN SANCTIONS RESOLUTION CONTEMPLATED BY UK WITH "AUDACIOUS" REQUESTS. AS IS TO BE EXPECTED. HE SAID, AFRICANS ARE TALKING IN VERY VIOLENT TERMS. SINCE GOP CONSIDERED US WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT IF NOT DECISIVE ROLE IN SC CONSIDERATION OF MATTER, HE WANTED TO BE SURE WE UNDERSTOOD PORTUGUESE VIEWS.

3. FONMIN RECALLED PRIME MINISTER SALAZAR'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON LAST MAY (DEPTEL 573 MAY 16). HE SAID PORTUGUESE STILL STAND ON POSITION OF GRADUALISM EXPRESSED IN THAT COMMUNICATION. IF USG COULD ACT IN DIRECTION OF PROPOSALS OUTLINED THAT LETTER, HE BELIEVED GREAT DIFFICULTIES AND VIOLENCE COULD BE AVOIDED IN SOUTH AFRICA. IT WOULD BE A WAY TO PREVENT THINGS FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND.

4. FRANCO NOGUEIRA SAID THERE WAS ONE POINT IN WHICH HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH AFRICAN DELEGATIONS, NAMELY, THAT IF

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- LISBON 666, DECEMBER 8

MANDATORY OIL SANCTIONS WERE AGREED ON BUT NOT APPLIED TO SOUTH AFRICA, THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN APPLYING THEM AT ALL. THIS WOULD SOLVE NOTHING, HE SAID, AND REPEATED WITH SOME EMPHASIS THAT NOTHING WOULD BE SOLVED. HE DID NOT GO BEYOND THAT COMMENT AND MADE NO STATEMENT AS TO PORTUGUESE REACTION IN EVENT APPLICATION OF OIL SANCTIONS TO MOZAMBIQUE, ALTHOUGH LATTER WAS OBVIOUSLY ON HIS MIND.

5. FONMIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SC WAS SCHEDULED MEET LATE THIS AFTERNOON AND THAT AFRICAN GROUP HAS SCHEDULED A MEETING BEFOREHAND. HE UNDERSTANDS AFRICANS INTEND TO REQUEST THAT SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN SC MEETING AND THAT SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE INDICATED THEY WILL NOT PARTICIPATE. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC IN RESPONSE MY INQUIRY AS TO WHETHER PORTUGAL WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE, BUT SAID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT AND RECALLED THAT PORTUGAL HAD DECLINED A SIMILAR INVITATION ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION. HE REMARKED THAT GOP POSITION SUCH MATTERS IS THAT IT IS UP TO INTERESTED DELEGATIONS TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR INTEREST IN TAKING PART IN SC CONSIDERATION OF A PROBLEM AND THEN FOR THE SC TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO DEBATE OR NOT.

GP-3. BENNETT

~~SECRET~~

(Drafting Office and Officer)

APPROVED IN M  
11/22/66

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 14, 1966

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call by the Portuguese Ambassador on Under Secretary Rostow

PARTICIPANTS: The Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. Eugene Rostow  
Dr. Vasco Vieira Garin, Portuguese Ambassador to Washington  
Mr. Robert Grey, Special Assistant to Mr. Rostow  
Mr. Robert L. Funseth, EUR:SPP

COPIES TO:

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S/P	CIA	CU		SAIGON
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INR/OD	FE-3	AID		

At his request the Portuguese Ambassador, Dr. Vasco Vieira Garin, made a courtesy call on Mr. Rostow on the occasion of his becoming Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Ambassador Garin said that in its economic relations with the United States, Portugal feels it has been cast in a Cinderella-like role. He explained that when Portugal was first offered Marshall Plan assistance, it declined, believing that other countries in Europe were more in need. Eighteen months later, however, he said Portugal did request assistance which was granted. He said Portugal was the lowest of all Marshall Plan recipients and had even received less than the city of Trieste. Most of the aid was in the form of loans which, he said, Portugal has repaid. He mentioned the total outright grant aid was approximately \$10-15 million.

The Ambassador recalled that Portugal is a poor country which has suffered various financial crises. Under Dr. Salazar, he said, great effort was made to put Portugal's economic house in order and to stabilize its currency. He said Dr. Salazar achieved a balanced budget in his first year and it has been balanced ever since. The Ambassador said as a result of Dr. Salazar's policies, the Portuguese escudo has become one of the world's most stable currencies. This was accomplished, he said, at the price of a strict policy of austerity by Portugal.

Ambassador Garin said Portugal has also made some progress in economic development but it is now confronted with problems in Africa.

FORM DS-1254  
3-61~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By *fw*, NARA, Date 3-9-00



In response to Mr. Rostow's question of whether there were many foreign companies in Portugal, including American, the Ambassador said there were not many and these were mostly British. On the American side, he said Firestone had a factory and there was some U.S. participation in the textile industry. Mr. Funseth noted that, in addition to those cited by the Ambassador, Ford and General Motors had assembly plants in Portugal, Goodyear and General Tire had separate arrangements with the Portuguese company, Mabor and that he understood there was also some American participation in the pharmaceutical industry.

The Ambassador said he had, at the outset of the conversation, mentioned that Portugal had received relatively a very small amount of U.S. assistance in order to support the Portuguese contention that the U.S. ought to be more sympathetic and forthcoming to their requests than they believe has been the case. To support this view, he cited three past actions of the U.S.: the bilateral cotton textile agreement; the PL 480 wheat agreements (past and proposed); the cancellation of AID financing of Portuguese pharmaceutical imports to South Viet Nam.

With regard to the first cited action, Ambassador Garin said as part of his country's industrialization, there had been a modernization and expansion of its textile industry. He complained that just when this industry had succeeded in entering the U.S. market, the U.S. embarked on a system of import quotas, limiting access to its market. The Portuguese quota, he said, when compared to that of Hong Kong or Japan, was very small. Moreover, he said, the bilateral agreement established various import categories which caused the Portuguese difficulty. He said the agreement expires this year and he hopes that the U.S. will grant Portugal's request for a liberalization of categories during the negotiations for an extension of the agreement.

The Ambassador said that in its PL 480 wheat agreement, the Portuguese had been given less favorable terms than had been given to Sweden and Yugoslavia. He said there has been pending for some time an application by a Portuguese agricultural cooperative to enter into a new PL 480 agreement with no indication of any decision. The Ambassador had not been aware that a Department of Agriculture official had recently been in Lisbon to discuss the proposal and to ascertain whether it met the requirements of U.S. law.

Finally, the Ambassador said there was the story of the sales of AID-financed Portuguese pharmaceuticals to Viet Nam which were suddenly cancelled earlier in the year under a "Buy America" program. He said this action had been a severe blow to their new industry whose annual sales to Viet Nam had amounted to \$4-5 million, representing an important part of its total production. He said Portugal had requested the U.S. to approach the Vietnamese Government to determine if it would be willing to purchase Portuguese pharmaceuticals from its own funds. He did not know if anything had come from this request. Mr. Rostow said the U.S. regretted having to take such restrictive measures but that the U.S. was confronted with a serious balance of payments problem and was obliged to take remedial action.



Mr. Funseth recalled that Mr. Leddy had informed the Ambassador on October 5 that we had relayed the Portuguese request to the Vietnamese authorities but we did not know what action, if any, had been taken by the Vietnamese.

Mr. Rostow said that notwithstanding the incidents mentioned by the Ambassador he had the impression that Portugal had done rather well in the development of its economy. The Ambassador agreed but said Portugal has suffered because "we are good boys." That is to say, he explained, because Portugal maintains a balanced budget and a stable currency, its requests do not receive the same favorable consideration as those from states who have not, for a variety of reasons, been willing or able to achieve such goals.

Replying to Mr. Rostow's question, Ambassador Garin said he thought there were only a few Portuguese students studying in the United States. He explained that one important reason is that only after World War II did the Portuguese become interested in pursuing studies in the English language. Even this new interest has not displaced French as the dominant second language and he was not so sure but that German wasn't second. He agreed that there should be an increase in the exchange of students between Portugal and the U.S. The Ambassador also mentioned that, in cooperation with Brazil, his country had been encouraging the expansion of Portuguese study programs at American universities.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

24

4

~~SECRET~~

Action

SS

CONTROL: 18714  
RECEIVED: OCTOBER 12, 1966, 11:39 P.M.

Info

FROM: LISBON  
ACTION: SECSTATE

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 419

OCTOBER 12

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM POLLACK AND WALKER (RPM)

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM ISIDOR I. RABI MAY BE OF BACKGROUND VALUE. AT REQUEST OF ZUCKERMAN, RABI VISITED LONDON EARLY LAST WEEK FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ZUCKERMAN AND CHALFONTE. ZUCKERMAN SAID THAT ON RECENT VISIT TO SOVIET UNION HE WAS INFORMED THAT SOVIETS HAD ESTABLISHED MATHEMATICAL THOUGH NOT EXPERIMENTAL PROOF OF ABILITY TO DISTINGUISH NUCLEAR FROM NATURAL SEISMIC EVENTS AT A LEVEL RENDERING DETECTION FEASIBLE AND INSPECTION PRESUMABLY LESS ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATION. LEVEL REPORTED TO BE FOUR.

2. ZUCKERMAN AND CHALFONTE CONCERNED THAT GEORGE BROWN INTENDED ON VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO LAY SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT BEFORE SECRETARY RUSK AND IN EFFECT PRESS FOR BASIC CHANGE IN US POSITION ON INSPECTIONS. IMPLICATION THAT BRITISH WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION RE DISARMAMENT IF US RESPONSE NOT SATISFACTORY.

3. AS CONSEQUENCE DISCUSSIONS WITH RABI, ZUCKERMAN AND CHALFONTE REINFORCED IN THEIR VIEWS THAT BROWN APPROACH NOT LIKELY PRODUCE USEFUL RESULTS. RABI'S IMPRESSION IS THAT ZUCKERMAN AND CHALFONTE ADVICE FINALLY PREVAILED AND THOUGH BROWN WILL RAISE SUBJECT, ORDERLY EXAMINATION OF SOVIET CLAIM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

4. RABI STRESSED TO BRITISH IMPORTANCE OF INFORMING US TECHNICAL PERSONAGES CONCERNED WITH THIS PROBLEM SUCH AS THOSE IN AEC, OST, ACDA OF BROWN'S DESIRE DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT SO THAT SECRETARY AND OTHERS IN US GOVT COULD BE PREPARED. WHETHER THIS HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO DEPT, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

~~SECRET~~

02

*Rostow*

~~SECRET~~

-2- Lisbon 419, October 12

THAT SOMEONE BE READY TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA WITH BROWN, SINCE, AS REPORTED TO RAB1, (1) BROWN IS EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE AND (2) UK BECOMING INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF US MOTIVES FOR INSISTING ON ON-SITE INSPECTION.

5. RAB1 CONVERSATIONS WITH ZUCKERMAN AND CHALFONTE ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL AND IT ESSENTIAL THAT ALL SOURCES BE PROTECTED.

GP-1.

BENNETT

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

44  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED: 6-19-65,  
1:12 P.M., MV

033

CONTROL: 17414

RECD: JUNE 18, 1965, 3:17 PM

FROM: LISBON - CORRECTED PAGE ONE

ACTION: SECSTATE 799

~~SECRET~~

JUNE EIGHTEENTH

REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 671.

APPRECIATE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION DEPT HAS AFFORDED MY PROPOSAL (EMBTTEL 652) AND EARNESTLY HOPE IT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO SOME BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD SOLUTION PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES PROBLEM.

MY CONSIDERED COMMENT ON SEVEN NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS REFTTEL FOLLOWS:

PARAGRAPH 1. CONCUR

PARAGRAPH 2. CONCUR GENERALLY BUT RECOMMEND WE STAY FLEXIBLE ON TRANSITION PERIOD DURATION. THOUGH AFRICAN COUNTRIES MIGHT

BE RELUCTANT SPEAK OPENLY OF ANYTHING IN EXCESS FIVE YEARS. FACT REMAINS WITH OR WITHOUT AGREEMENT THEY ARE CURRENTLY IN NO POSITION ASSURE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE STATUS QUO WITHIN THAT TIME SPAN. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE LET DICTATES THEIR DECLARATORY POSITION PREVAIL OVER REAL POWER FACTORS INVOLVED TO SUCH EXTENT AS TO JEOPARDIZE WHOLE SCHEME. IT IS IMPORTANT BEAR IN MIND TRANSITION PERIOD WILL BE POINT OF MAJOR DIFFICULTY FOR PORTUGUESE. FOR THIS REASON I WOULD PREFER TO SOUND THEM OUT INITIALLY IN BROAD OUTLINE WITHOUT MENTIONING PRECISE NUMBER OF YEARS, THOUGH WITH THOUGHT IN MIND THAT TEN-YEAR PERIOD (WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER HAVE BOTH PREVIOUSLY REJECTED AS TOO SHORT) MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE PROPOSED.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

002

CONTROL: 25552  
RECD: JUNE 25 1966 9:50AM

FROM: LISBON

ACTION: SECSTATE 765

~~SECRET~~ SEONE OF TWO JUNE 25

E X D I S

SUBJECT: DELIVERY PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO SALAZAR LETTER ON  
RHODESIA PROBLEM

REF: DEPTTEL 657

1. PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED ME IN OFFICIAL RESIDENCE 6 PM JUNE 24. HE ACCEPTED BUT DID NOT OPEN OR READ LETTER MY PRESENCE. I ORALLY CONVEYED FOUR POINTS (PARAGRAPH 2 REFTEL) EMPHASIZING THEY WERE CONTAINED PRESIDENT'S LETTER. I THEN EXPRESSED TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS (PARAGRAPH 3 REFTEL) EMPHASIZING I WAS DOING SO ON INSTRUCTIONS.
2. PRIME MINISTER THEN KEPT ME FOR TOTAL OF 45 MINUTES AS HE DISCOURSED IN RELAXED FASHION MAINLY ON DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING CONCEPTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA. CONVERSATION WAS IN PORTUGUESE, BUT I TOOK ADVANTAGE PRESENCE DR. CALDEIRA COELHO (DIRECTOR INFORMATION SERVICES FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO WAS THERE TO INTERPRET IF NEEDED) TO INSURE I COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD DR. SALAZAR'S COMMENT ON BRITISH POLICY, (PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW) AND TO BE SURE HE UNDERSTOOD OUR INTEREST IN PORTUGAL'S USING ITS INFLUENCE IN SALISBURY FOR MODERATION AND A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW).
3. RESPONDING TO STATEMENTS OF US VIEWS ON BRITISH ATTITUDE (PARAGRAPH 3 REFTEL), SALAZAR STATED HE WAS CONVINCED BRITISH WERE TRYING TO MITIGATE HARMFUL EFFECTS THEIR ACTIONS ON RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL. FACT WAS HOWEVER THAT ACTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN (HE SPOKE OF UN RESOLUTION, ATTACKS AGAINST PORTUGAL IN UN AND BEIRA BLOCKADE) WHICH PORTUGAL REGARDED AS INJURIOUS AND SERIOUS. HE RECOGNIZED UK HAD TAKEN RHODESIA TO UN BECAUSE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS IT WAS EASIER TO DEAL WITH IT THERE. I EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AS ALLIES OF BOTH PORTUGAL AND UK AND REEMPHASIZED OUR CONFIDENCE BRITISH SINCERELY REGRETFUL OF ADVERSE EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL. HE DID NOT DISAGREE.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-765, June 25, from: Lisbon (Section 1 of 2)

4. ON UK-RHODESIAN TALKS SALAZAR ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INFORMATION ON PROGRESS CONVERSATIONS, WHICH HE OBSERVED WERE SECRET AND ADVISABLY SO. HE ASKED IF WE HAD ANY CONVICTION TALKS WOULD SUCCEED, AND STRESSED DIFFICULTY OF REACHING AGREEMENT. I REPLIED WE HAD HOPES CONVERSATIONS COULD ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THIS VIEW, STRESSING HOPES RATHER THAN CONVICTIONS.

5. ON RHODESIAN ATTITUDE, HE EXPRESSED VIEW RHODESIA WANTED PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND WISHED TO REMAIN IN BRITISH FAMILY OF NATIONS AND COMMONWEALTH TO WHICH THEY BELONGED BY ORIGINS, SENTIMENTS AND DEVOTION TO BRITISH SOVEREIGN.  
WELLMAN

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

42  
Action  
SS  
Info

CONTROL: 25597  
RECEIVED: JUNE 25, 1966 10:16AM  
FROM: AMEMBASSY LISBON  
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC 765

002

~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO JUNE 25

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DELIVERY PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO SALAZAR LETTER ON RHODESIA PROBLEM

REF: DEPTTEL 657

6. SALAZAR DECLARED BRITISH WRONG IN BELIEVING ALL RHODESIAN BLACKS AGAINST SMITH. SMITH HAD BEEN WISE IN CONSULTING CHIEFS WHO ONLY REAL REPRESENTATIVES BLACK COMMUNITY, AND CHIEFS HAD RECOGNIZED BLACKS NOT READY GOVERN AND WILLING ACCEPT WHITE LEADERSHIP IN INDEPENDENT STATE.

7. SALAZAR STATED AND JUSTIFIED PORTUGAL'S POLICY OF MAINTAINING FREE ACCESS THROUGH PORTUGUESE AFRICAN PROVINCES TO ALL INTERIOR STATES WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION. HE SAID THIS POLICY WAS UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD BE ONLY ONE ACCEPTABLE TO AFRICANS INVOLVED. AT THIS POINT I EXPRESSED HOPE PORTUGAL WOULD CONTINUE TO USE ITS SPECIAL POSITION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ITS INFLUENCE WITH RHODESIA IN FAVOR OF MODERATION AND PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

8. ON AFRICAN SITUATION IN GENERAL, DR. SALAZAR REPEATED HIS VIEWS WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN AND HAVE BEEN REPORTED FROM PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS. HE STRESSED AFRICANS NOT YET READY FOR ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, NOT YET QUALIFIED TO MANAGE THEIR AFFAIRS COMPETENTLY, WORSE OFF ECONOMICALLY IN INDEPENDENCE THAN UNDER COLONIAL RULE (HE MENTIONED HUNGER IN CONGO) HAVE VERY LIMITED ELITE COMPETENT TO GOVERN AND THESE ARE BEING KILLED OFF IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS (HE MENTIONED RECENT EXECUTIONS IN CONGO). HE OBSERVED IT WAS UNREALISTIC APPLY ONE MAN, ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE TO PRESENT DAY AFRICA. IN REPLY QUESTION HOW LONG HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEFORE AFRICANS READY FOR INDEPENDENCE HIS ANSWER WAS "CENTURIES".

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 765, JUNE 25 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM LISBON

9. ON CONGO, SALAZAR EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER RECENT CHANGES IN POLICY ON PART MOBUTU AND FEAR THERE MIGHT BE DISORDER THERE ON OR AFTER JUNE 30.

10. SALAZAR REFERRED TO RECENT CONVERSATION WITH MCCONE (REF A-479 JUNE 6) WHOM HE SAID HE HAD FOUND IMPRESSIVE. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH MCCONE'S OBSERVATIONS ON RESULTS OF STUDY OF SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES OF NEGRO DISORDERS IN CALIFORNIA (WATTS), WHICH ACCORDED WITH CONCLUSIONS OF PORTUGUESE ON INDIGENOUS AFRICANS IN THEIR PROVINCES. HE SAID MCCONE HAD PROMISED TO SEND HIM COPY REPORT.

11. THIS WAS MY FIRST CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER AND FIRST OPPORTUNITY OBSERVE HIM CLOSELY. HE APPROACHED SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY WITH AID OF CANE, WAS STOPPED, SANK RATHER HEAVILY INTO CHAIR FOR OUR CONVERSATION, BUT TALKED WITH ANIMATION, FORCE AND COHERENCE. WHEN I SPOKE HE LISTENED CAREFULLY AND GAVE ME HIS COMPLETE ATTENTION. HE WOULD SINGLE OUT FROM WHAT I SAID WHAT HE COULD AGREE WITH AND REPEAT THOSE PHRASES. HE GREETED AND SAID GOODBYE CORDIALLY WITH A STRONG HANDSHAKE, AND STOOD IN HOUSE ENTRANCE UNTIL MY CAR HAD DRIVEN AWAY.

GP-1. WELLMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

27

87-82

Action CONTROL: 12282  
 SS RECEIVED: MAY 13 2:58PM  
 Info FROM: AMEMBASSY, LISBON  
 G ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 666  
 SP  
 AF

EUR  
 NSC  
 INR  
 AID  
 E  
 COM  
 FRB  
 TRSY  
 XMB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 13

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

1. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN OBSERVING SITUATION IN PORTUGAL AND HER AFRICAN PROVINCES FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS. I HAVE OFTEN THOUGHT PROBLEM IN AFRICA, ESPECIALLY MOZAMBIQUE, REQUIRED MASSIVE CATALYST IF ANY HEADWAY TOWARD REAL PROGRESS WAS GOING TO BE MADE IN GENERATION. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE SUCH A CATALYST IS CURRENTLY DEVELOPING.

RSR 2. GOP FOR NUMBER OF YEARS HAS BEEN STUDYING POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING ZAMBEZI RIVER VALLEY IN NORTHWESTERN MOZAMBIQUE. LAND IS FERTILE, MANY MINERALS ARE KNOWN TO BE THERE. BUT BIGGEST ATTRACTION HAS BEEN NATURAL DAMSITE WHICH MANY ENGINEERS HAVE CALLED FINEST IN WORLD. WELL-DEVELOPED PLANS SHOW THAT DAM COULD HAVE POWER STATION IN FIRST PHASE THAT WOULD PUT FORTH 1.2 MEGAWATTS AND PROVISION COULD BE MADE FOR SECOND STATION AT SAME SITE (WHEN NEED DEVELOPED LATER) WHICH WOULD PRODUCE ADDITIONAL 1.7 MEGAWATTS! ESTIMATED COST OF DAM AND FIRST POWER STATION IS \$250 MILLION.

3. ORDER JUSTIFY DAM FINANCIALLY GOP HAS COUNTED UPON SELLING MOST OF POWER INITIALLY TO SOUTH AFRICA. ALSO EXPECTS, SELL TO ZAMBIA, MALAWI, RHODESIA AND TANZANIA. THEN, AS AREA DEVELOPS THROUGH NEW AGRICULTURE AND MINING PROJECTS WHICH COULD BE OPENED UP ONCE DAM'S WATER AND POWER AVAILABLE, PORTUGUESE EXPECT BEGIN CHANNEL MORE AND MORE POWER TO MOZAMBIQUE AND ADD SECOND POWER STATION.

4. WHILE PROJECT HAS BEEN STUDIED FOR YEARS, IT SUDDENLY HAS REACHED "PUT UP OR SHUT UP" STAGE.

5. SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOTIFIED PORTUGAL IT CAN WAIT NO LONGER WHILE GOP SEEKS PERFECTION THROUGH ITS STUDIES. IF PORTUGAL NOT GOING BUILD DAM, SA IS GOING CONSTRUCT THERMAL STATIONS SINCE POWER SHORTAGE WILL DEVELOP THAT AREA NEXT TWO-THREE YEARS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 State Dept. Guidelines  
 By         , NARA, Date 3-9-00



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 666, May 13, From Lisbon

6. LATE LAST WEEK GOP CONTACTED GENERAL ELECTRIC AND ASKED COMPANY HEAD CONSORTIUM CONSTRUCT DAM, PROVIDE ALL EQUIPMENT, TRANSMISSION LINES, ETC. WANTED SIGNED LETTER OF INTENT, INCLUDING GUARANTEE THAT FINANCING WAS AVAILABLE, BY MAY 15. ASSUMED VOLUMES OF STUDIES ALREADY CONDUCTED BY GOP WOULD BE SUFFICIENT ENABLE GE COMPLY. GE VICE PRESIDENT FLEW TO PORTUGAL FOR CONSULTATION AND, IN SPITE SIZE OF UNDERTAKING AND MONEY REQUIRED, HAS SINCE RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTIC BACKING FROM BECHTEL, MORRISON-KNUDSON AND TOP LEVELS GE. UNDERSTAND HAS ALSO APPROACHED EXIM BANK FOR PART OF FINANCING.

7. I CANNOT SUPPORT THIS PROJECT TOO STRONGLY. IF GE WILLING HEAD THIS UNDERTAKING, I SINCERELY HOPE TEMPORARY POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH SOUTH AFRICA WILL NOT CAUSE USG TO DISCOURAGE EXIM PARTICIPATION AND DENY TO NATIVES OF ALL THE SURROUNDING AREAS THE GREAT BENEFITS THAT CAN ONLY COME TO THEM ANY TIME SOON IN THE WAKE OF SUCH A MAMMOTH UNDERTAKING. AT TIME WHEN US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS NEEDS ALL THE HELP IT CAN GET, QUARTER BILLION DOLLAR PROJECT IN WHICH MUCH OF THE MONEY FOR EQUIPMENT WILL BE SPENT IN THE US SHOULD CERTAINLY BE WELCOMED BY ADMINISTRATION AS IT ALREADY SEEMS TO BE BY US BUSINESS.

8. AT LEAST TWO YEARS AND PROBABLY THREE WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE ANY POWER CAN POSSIBLY REACH SOUTH AFRICA. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT WE SHOULD NOT DENY OURSELVES THE OPPORTUNITY TO DOMINATE THIS LARGE PACKAGE THAT CAN DO SO MUCH GOOD FOR SO MANY, REGARDLESS OF WHO RUNS MOZAMBIQUE, BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL BE CLARIFIED BY THE TIME PROJECT COMES TO FRUITION.

9. I RECOMMEND DEPT INFORM EXIM BANK PROJECT HAS ITS APPROVAL.

GP-3.  
ANDERSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

28

43

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 11204  
RECD: APRIL 13, 1:22 PM

AF

Info

FROM: LISBON

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 652

G

SP

DATE: APRIL 13, 5 PM

SAH

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EUR

~~SECRET~~

IO

NSC

REF: DEPTTEL 524

INR

CIA

WHILE I BELIEVE NYERERE PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED REFTEL WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO PORTUGUESE (EMBTTEL 604), FACT HE MADE ANY OFFER ENCOURAGING, AND OPENING IT PROVIDES SHOULD NOT BE LOST. PRESUMABLY IT INDICATED HE SEARCHING FOR SOME SOLUTION TO PORTUGUESE PROBLEM AS ALTERNATIVE TO BLOOD BATH FLOWING FROM -- AND PERHAPS TO -- TANZANIA.

NSA

DOD

AID

RMR

EMBASSY CANNOT STATE THAT GOP WOULD AT PRESENT JUNCTURE FIND FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE (OR ANY OTHER) ACCEPTABLE, BUT DOES BELIEVE IT COULD BE PROPOSED WITHOUT CAUSING AS MUCH IRRITATION AS NYERERE'S, AND PERHAPS COULD BECOME BASIS FROM WHICH CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN REASONABLE AFRICAN LEADERS AND PORTUGUESE MIGHT DEVELOP.

SPECIFICALLY EMB INVITES RECONSIDERATION SUBSTANCE ITS PROPOSAL SUBMITTED IN A-128 SEPTEMBER 1963. IN ESSENCE THIS SUGGESTED ATTEMPT WIN GOP ACCEPTANCE SELF-DETERMINATION ON BASIS DEFINITE TIMETABLE WITH AFRICAN NATIONALIST SUSPENSION ANTI-PORTUGUESE ACTIVITIES DURING THAT PERIOD PLUS CAREFULLY TAILORED POLITICAL ASSURANCES AND SPECIFIED ECONOMIC INDUCEMENTS BEING OFFERED GOP IN ORDER FORESTALL INEVITABLE ARGUMENT ANY DEADLINE BOUND BE TELECOPED DRASTICALLY.

SIGNIFICANT POINTS TO WHICH PORTUGUESE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE WOULD INCLUDE:

(A) ACCEPTANCE OF FIXED DATE, SAY TEN YEARS FROM TIME OF AGREEMENT, FOR BROADLY BASED PLEBISCITE OR REFERENDUM IN PORTUGUESE AFRICAN PROVINCES. OPTIONS WOULD INCLUDE INTER ALIA COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE, AUTONOMOUS COMMONWEALTH STATUS, OR CONTINUED INTEGRATION WITH METROPOLE AS PART OF PORTUGUESE NATION. PLEBISCITE WOULD HAVE TO BE FAIR, OPEN AND WITH INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

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By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~SECRET~~

-2- 652, April 13, 5 PM From Lisbon

(B) ACCELERATED INTERIM PORTUGUESE EFFORT TO IMPROVE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATUS OF ALL PEOPLE OF PROVINCES.

(C) POLITICAL AMNESTY AND REPATRIATION FOR ALL EXCEPT THOSE WHO HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AS DISTINGUISHED FROM POLITICAL ACTION.

PRINCIPAL POINT TO WHICH NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES WOULD HAVE TO AGREE WOULD BE REFUSAL PERMIT USE THEIR TERRITORY AS TRAINING OR OPERATING BASE ANY ANTI-PORTUGUESE FORCES DURING SAME PERIOD AS (A) ABOVE.

SIGNIFICANT POINTS TO WHICH OTHER SELECTED NATIONS, MOST ESPECIALLY US AND OTHER NATIO PARTNERS, WOULD HAVE TO AGREE:

(1) UNDERWRITE POLITICAL GUARANTEES GIVEN BY NEIGHBORING AFRICANS TO PROHIBIT SUBVERSION AND TRANS-BORDER AGGRESSION ORIGINATING THEIR TERRITORIES, INCLUDING ASSURANCE MILITARY ASSISTANCE -- IF REQUESTED -- IF GUARANTEES BROKEN.

(2) AT SAME TIME (TO REASSURE NEIGHBORING AFRICANS) GUARANTEE TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM POLITICAL PRESSURE ON GOP SO THAT RIGHTS OF ALL CONCERNED WOULD BE PROTECTED WITHIN PORTUGUESE MULTI-RACIAL COMMUNITIES WITHOUT DISTINCTION RACE, CREED OR COLOR.

(3) PROVIDE ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE WORKED OUT WITH PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES TO FACILITATE PREPARATION OF PEOPLES CONCERNED DURING AGREED INTERIM.

IDEALLY ACCEPTANCE THIS CONCEPT WOULD, BY MOVING RESOLUTION PORTUGUESE AFRICA PROBLEM FROM BATTLEFIELD TO DEVELOPMENTAL AND PLEBISCITE CHANNELS, ELIMINATE PRESENT THORNY PROBLEM OF ARMS SUPPLY. IF HOWEVER MODUS VIVENDI BROKEN BY COMMUNIST ARMED OR TRAINED EXTERNAL FORCES, GOP WOULD THEN BE ENTITLED PURCHASE IN US OR ELSEWHERE ALL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 652, April 13, 5 PM From Lisbon

I BELIEVE THAT AN UPDATED VARIANT OF THIS PACKAGE, PRESENTED BY ME IN A FRIENDLY CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER, MIGHT STIMULATE POSITIVE THINKING ON PART OF HIGHEST PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES. IF GOP COULD NOW OR LATER BE PERSUADED ADOPT IT, I SHOULD IMAGINE IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO MODERATE AFRICAN LEADERS AND TO MAJOR NATIONS WESTERN WORLD. CERTAINLY ANY AFRICANS WHO OPPOSED IT WHEN THE ALTERNATIVE IS ALMOST 100 PERCENT CERTAIN TO BE BLOODSHED AND CHAOS, WOULD HAVE DISCLOSED THEIR TRUE COLORS. AT VERY LEAST OUR WILLINGNESS, ALONG WITH OTHER NATO ALLIES, ACTIVELY GUARANTEE WORK FOR PERIOD PEACE IN PORTUGUESE AFRICAN PROVINCES SHOULD ENTRENCH PORTUGAL IN FOLD OF NATO.

GP-3.

CFN 524 604 128 1963 100 3

ANDERSON

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

29

84

~~SECRET~~

Action

AF CONTROL: 23962  
RECD: MARCH 26, 1965, 12:43 P.M.

Info

SS FROM: LISBON  
G  
SP ACTION: SECSTATE 604  
SAH DAR-ES-SALAAM 23  
EUR DATE: MARCH 26, 2 P.M..

IO ~~SECRET~~

031

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

RMR

REF DEPTTEL 515 SENT THE HAGUE 704

SEEN FROM HERE, NYERERE PROPOSAL (DAR ES SALAAM 2032 TO DEPT) SEEMS COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH PORTUGUESE REALITIES. NO BASIS VISIBLE HERE FOR BELIEVING GOP WOULD UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES EVEN CONTEMPLATE CEDING ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE TO US AS TRUST TERRITORIES.

CONSTANTLY AND PUBLICLY REPEATED GOP HOSTILITY AND SCORN FOR UN MAKES PROPOSAL SEEM OUTLANDISH, PARTICULARLY WHEN VIEWED AGAINST BACKDROP GOP DEDICATION TO CONCEPT ITS HISTORIC AND CIVILIZING MISSION. IF ANY FURTHER ELEMENT REQUIRED TO ROUND OUT PICTURE OF SCHEME INCONVEIVABLE TO GOP IT IS CERTAINLY SUPPLIED BY IDENTITIES OF SUGGESTED TRUSTEES.

PORTUGUESE ARE PROUD PEOPLE AND PROPOSAL SEEN AS PUBLIC ATTEMPT BUY THEM OFF WILL BE CONSIDERED INSULTING AND PROBABLY HARDEN THEIR DETERMINATION STAND FAST IN AFRICA. "PORTUGUESE HONOR NOT FOR SALE" WILL BE NEW RALLYING CRY DESIGNED REINSPIRE ANY PORTION POPULATION WHOSE ENTHUSIASM FOR AFRICAN CRUSADE MIGHT BE LAGGING.

NEVERTHELESS, IF NYERERE AND DUTCH HOSTS FEEL FLOATING OF TRIAL BALLOON NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE, EMBASSY WOULD NOT RECOMMEND US OPPOSE SO LONG AS US IN NO WAY ASSOCIATED WITH IT AND PREPARED IN ADVANCE TO ISSUE STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON TO EFFECT USG HAD NO HAND IN DEVELOPING PROPOSAL AND HAS NO COMMENT TO MAKE ON AFFAIR INVOLVING VITAL INTEREST OF NATO ALLY.

GP-3  
CFN 515 704 2032 -3

ANDERSON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

~~SECRET~~

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# SUMMARY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Action

SS

Info

CONTROL: 10004

075

RECD: DEC 13, 1965 11:15 AM

FROM: LISBON

ACTION: SECSTATE UNN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By gn, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECEMBER 13.

REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 267, EMBTEL 323.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

BRITISH EMBASSY REQUESTS CONSULTATION ON GOP ATTITUDE OIL EMBARGO AND BEST APPROACH GOP.

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR REQUESTED CONSULTATIONS DECEMBER 11 AS RESULT OF INSTRUCTION FROM LONDON REQUESTING COORDINATION WITH US EMBASSY ON REPLY QUESTIONS THIS SUBJECT. BRITISH EMBASSY REPLY WILL NOTE IT WAS PREPARED AFTER DISCUSSION WITH ME BUT THAT THIS EMBASSY HAD NOT RECEIVED PARALLEL INSTRUCTIONS. IT WILL BE REPEATED BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND BE AVAILABLE THERE FOR DEPARTMENT'S EXAMINATION.

2. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS RAISED IN FONOFF INSTRUCTION (DIRECTED ALSO TO GSA ATTITUDE) CONCERNED FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS ON WHICH GENERAL AGREEMENT:

A. GOP WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OIL EMBARGO OR REQUEST FOR COOPERATION. LIKELY RESPOND INITIALLY ALONG LINES NOGUEIRA PRESS CONFERENCE, NAMELY TO RESIST INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY. UNLIKELY BE MOVED BY APPEAL TO UN RESOLUTION OR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. WOULD BE GUIDED BY WHAT IT CONCEIVED TO BE PORTUGUESE INTERESTS. AT MAXIMUM COULD BE PERSUADED TO GIVE ONLY TACIT AND LIMITED COOPERATION AND WOULD SEEK TO EXACT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC "COMPENSATION".

B. BEFORE ANY APPROACH GOP SHOULD DECIDE WHAT MINIMUM GOP COOPERATION ESSENTIAL. (BRITISH INSTRUCTION CALLED GOP, AS WELL AS GSA, COOPERATION "CRUCIAL"). BRITISH AMEMBASSY FELT SHOULD ASK GOP FOR FULL COOPERATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IN VIEW

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-2-Unnumbered, December 13, from: Lisbon

PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC AND GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND POLICY KEEP TRANSPORT FACILITIES OPEN, ONLY VERY LIMITED COOPERATION REALISTICALLY TO BE EXPECTED. THAT IS, GOP NOT LIKELY AGREE CLOSE RAILWAYS OR PIPELINES TO SR, BUT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY AGREE NOT INCREASE NORMAL COMMERCIAL EXPORTS, NOT SUPPLY SR WITH OIL RECEIVED FROM NORMAL SUPPLIERS (WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SOUTH AFRICA). THEN IF OIL EMBARGO EFFECTIVE AND NORMAL SUPPLIES DRIED UP GOP COULD BE IN FACE-SAVING POSITION OF NOT BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR SR FAILURE, OBTAIN OIL.

C. NECESSARY PERSUADE GOP IN PORTUGUESE INTEREST COOPERATE. TO THIS END ESSENTIAL DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE END UDI AND EMPLOY SUCH ECONOMIC MEASURES AS REQUIRED FOR PURPOSE. TACTICALLY UNWISE IMPLY OIL EMBARGO ESSENTIAL AND CONSEQUENTLY TEMPT GOP TO SEEK THWART OBJECTIVE BY NON-COOPERATION. IMPORTANT CONVINCE GOP UDI CANNOT SUCCEED AND GOP WOULD BE BACKING LOSING CAUSE BY NON-COOPERATION.

D. GSA ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRITICAL FOR GOP AND TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD CERTAINLY CONSULT BEFORE TAKING POSITIONS.

E. UNDESIRABLE IN ANY APPROACH GOP TO WARN NON-COOPERATION COULD BRING SANCTIONS AGAINST ALL SOUTHERN AFRICA, WITH IMPLICATION UK-US WOULD EITHER SUPPORT OR PERMIT GOP WOULD NOT FIND SUCH ACTION BY ALLIES CREDIBLE. EVEN THREAT SUCH ACTION WOULD RISK DAMAGE EXISTING POLITICAL RELATIONS HOWEVER AND ACTION ITSELF WOULD RISK LOSE MILITARY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC HOLDINGS DEPENDENT THESE RELATIONS.

F. IF OIL EMBARGO DECIDED UPON, IT WOULD BE MISTAKE NOT TO APPROACH GOP AND REQUEST COOPERATION. DESIRABLE KEEP GOP INFORMED OF PROPOSED ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES AND CONSULT GOP AS ALLY AND AFRICAN POWER IN STRATEGIC POSITION TO HELP OR HINDER.

G. NECESSARY ENVISAGE GOP WOULD REQUEST QUID PRO QUO FOR ANY COOPERATION, E.G., GUARANTEE AFRICAN STATES (INCLUDING SR UNDER ANY NEW GOVT) WOULD NOT PERMIT USE TERRITORIES FOR ATTACKS PORTUGUESE PROVINCES, AND COMPENSATION FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR SERVICES NOT PROVIDED SR.

H. HIGH LEVEL CONFIDENTIAL APPROACH TO GOP WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

3. GOP ATTITUDE POSSIBLY INFLUENCED BY FEAR SUCCESS OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SR MIGHT LEAD TO INCREASED PRESSURE FOR ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST PORTUGAL TO FORCE COMPLIANCE UN RESOLUTIONS. THIS POINT NOT DISCUSSED WITH BRITISH EMBASSY.

4. UK EMB COUNSELOR STATED BRITISH HAVE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION PORTUGUESE HAVE RECENTLY MADE COMMITMENTS PROVIDE SR WITH OIL. PETROFINA AND PORTUGUESE AGENT FOR FRENCH COMPANY ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED.

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-3-Unnumbered, December 13, from: Lisbon

5. BRITISH AMBASSADOR DOUBTED RECENT PORTUGUESE PRESS REPORTS SR HAS SIX MONTHS OIL SUPPLIES ON GROUND SR HAS NOT THAT MUCH STORAGE CAPACITY. BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICER LAST ASSIGNED PRETORIA REPORTED SOUTH AFRICA HAS TWO YEARS OIL SUPPLY, HOWEVER.
6. POINTED OUT TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT UK, UN, US AND GO ALL AGREE SR PRIMARILY UK RESPONSIBILITY. CONSEQUENTLY IN ANY APPROACH GOP ON OIL EMBARGO, UK SHOULD TAKE LEAD AND US SHOULD HAVE ONLY SUPPORTING ROLE. BRITISH AMBASSADOR DID NOT DISAGREE BUT OBSERVED PROBLEM TOO BIG FOR UK ALONE.
7. INFORMED BRITISH AMBASSADOR OF PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTRY RESENTMENT AT UK UN REP'S REMARKS CONCERNING PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES IN RECENT APARTHEID DEBATE. POINTED OUT THIS HAD NOT CREATED BEST CLIMATE FOR UK APPROACH THIS TIME FOR GOP COOPERATION.
8. EGFJYZBWCEHFS\*POINT OUT USG BY JOINING UK IN ASKING FOR GOP COOPERATION WOULD RISK PUTTING GOP INTO POSITION SEEK INVOLVE US/UK IN DEFENSE THEIR AFRICAN PROVINCES, E.G., IF REQUEST ENVISAGED 2 G ABOVE ACCEPTED IN GOOD FAITH. UK AMBASSADOR SEEMED FEEL THIS PRICE MIGHT BE WORTH PAYING UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER WHETHER USG SHOULD BECOME SO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH UK IN APPROACH TO GOP AS TO ENCOURAGE GOP BELIEVE US WOULD SHARE COST -- ESPECIALLY POLITICAL GUARANTEE. USG INTERESTS MIGHT BE SERVED BETTER BY HAVING UK INFORM GOP OF COMBINED PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, WITH USG STANDING READY TO CONFIRM US PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT. UK RATHER THAN JOINT UK-US APPROACH COULD BE EXPLAINED TO UK AS RESPONSIVE TO GOP'S STATED POSITION IT CONSIDERS SR PRIMARILY UK MATTER.

GP-3  
WELLMAN  
BT

\*As received, correction to follow.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

31

~~SECRET~~

84

ion

CONTROL: 2112

EUR

RECD: JANUARY 5, 1965 3:05 PM

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FROM: LISBON

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ACTION: SECSTATE 495

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DATE: JANUARY 5, 6 PM

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~~SECRET~~

NSC

REF EMBTEL 452

INR

I FULLY CONCUR REFTEL SUBMITTED BY EMBASSY DURING MY ABSENCE.

CIA

WOULD ADD HOWEVER STRONG NOTE OF CAUTION THAT IF GOP LEARNS

NSA

USG ENDEAVORING PREVENT SALE MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY FRG TO

DDD

PORTUGAL SEVERE AND ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS MUST BE ANTICI-

IGA

PATED. CERTAINLY IF GERMAN SALE F-86S IS BLOCKED, SOME

AID

EXTERNAL SOURCE (GERMAN, FRENCH OR CANADIAN) MOST LIKELY

E

ATTRIBUTE THIS TO USG. FAT WILL REALLY BE IN FIRE WITH

MC

RESPECT US-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS. I FEEL CONSTRAINED ALERT

DEPT MY BELIEF THAT IN SUCH EVENT NOT RPT NOT ONLY WILL POSSI-

BILITY LORAN-C NEGOTIATIONS BE NEGATED BUT THERE IS CHANCE

GOP MIGHT GIVE US EVICTION NOTICE ON AZORES.

RMR

QUESTION IS WHETHER SUCH RISK REALLY IN US INTEREST  
REGARDLESS MERITS OF DENYING GOP ARMS FOR PURPOSES OF SELF-  
DEFENSE WHEN NO RPT NO CONCURRENT EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN  
PROCESS TO PREVENT COMMUNIST WEAPONS BEING SUPPLIED AFRICAN  
NATIONALISTS.

GP-3

452 F-86S GP-3

ANDERSON

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By cm, NARA Date 3-22-01

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

32

82

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Action  
SVN

Control: 17542  
Rec'd: December 23, 1964  
2:16 p.m.

Info

FROM: Lisbon

SS

ACTION: Secstate 435

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CINCEUR Unnumbered

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DATE: December 23, 5 p.m.

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CINCEUR FOR POLAD

USIA

NSC

Reference: Department Circular Telegram 1099

INR

CIA . Ambassador raised with Foreign Minister December 21 possibi-

NSA . lity GOP assistance Viet Nam along lines suggested REFTEL.

DOD . Franco Nogueira non-committal, emphasized GOP preoccupation

AID . African problem and cited delicate status Macao as inhibiting  
factor any action likely irritate CHICOMs. Ambassador said

RMR we recognized special problem posed by Macao but would nonthe-  
less appreciate any possible assistance, even symbolic if  
necessary, and helpfully broadening free world front in  
support South Viet Nam.

In closing Foreign Minister agreed "consider" matter but  
Ambassador interpreted words and manner as meaning GOP parti-  
cipation not likely.

GP-4.

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TRT/6

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Authority Group 4

By pw, NARA. Date 3-9-00

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PROCESSING NOTE:

Document #33 has been transferred to National Security File, Country File, Poland, "Cabot-Wang Talks," Box 202.

04/18/89

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY

30

~~SECRET~~

38

48  
Action

SS  
Info

CONTROL: 17957  
RECD: OCT 22, 1965, 11:46 A.M.  
FROM: LISBON  
ACTION: SECSTATE 209

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

~~SECRET~~ OCTOBER 22.

REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 174.

LIMDIS

IN MEETING YESTERDAY WITH FONMIN I CARRIED OUT PRECISELY INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTTEL. HE DISPUTED SIGNIFICANCE USG ATTACHES TO "FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY" CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT BUT PROFESSED IGNORANCE OTHER FACTORS BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION.

TO MY SUGGESTION GOP MIGHT NOW WISH REEXAMINE POSITION FONMIN RESPONDED. GOP ASSURED BY FIRST-CLASS LEGAL COUNSEL IN US THAT ITS LEGAL AND MORAL POSITION PERFECTLY CORRECT. I OBSERVED LAWYER ONLY ABLE RENDER OPINION ON BASIS OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO HIM. IN AMSWEC MY INQUIRY, FONMIN IDENTIFIED DEAN ACHESON AS US LEGAL COUNSEL INVOLVED.

FONMIN ENDEAVORED TO ARGUE ACTION ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL DIRECTED AGAINST PORTUGAL "WHICH WOULD NOT BE CASE IF COUNTRY INVOLVED WERE ITALY OR SOMEBODY ELSE." THIS I FIRMLY REFUTED.

FONMIN THEN COMMENTED SOMEWHAT EMOTIONELLY ON GOODWILL ASPECTS OF CASE, PARTICULARLY AS TO RETURN OF AIRCRAFT TO US CUSTODY AND SOUGHT INJECT EXTRANEIOUS ISSUE, E.G. ANGOLA OFFICE IN NEW YORK. I BROUGHT HIM BACK TO FACT CENTRAL ISSUE WAS CONSPIRACY VIOLATE US LAW AND OBSERVED IF ROLES REVERSED GOP COULD CERTAINLY COUNT ON PROMPT FULL COOPERATION USG IN DEALING WITH ANY COMPARABLE VIOLATION PORTUGUESE LAW. FONMIN PROMISED REEXAMINE CASE AND DISCUSS WITH MINDEF.

EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE RELY ON SIGNALS BEING CALLED FROM WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER PLAYS BUT WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN NEXT PUBLIC COURTACZION SCHEDULED OR LIKELY.

GP-1

ANDERSON

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM ~~SUMMARY~~ Department of State

35

~~SECRET~~

48  
Action

CONTROL: 18056

55

Info

RECD: OCT 22, 1965  
12:33 P.M.

FROM: LISBON

ACTION: SECSTATE 207

~~SECRET~~ OCTOBER 22.

LIMDIS

DESPITE TIGHT SECURITY TREATMENT AFFORDED B-26 AIRCRAFT CASE, I WAS SURPRISED LEARN YESTERDAY UK EMBASSY APPEARS HAVE CONSIDERABLE RELATED KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST. BRITISH CHARGE REVEALED HIS PEOPLE QUIETLY INVESTIGATING VICINITY TANCOS AFB AND HAD TAKEN PHOTOS WHICH SENT LONDON FOR EVALUATION.

AS POSSIBLY MATERIAL TO INVOLVEMENT GOP OFFICIALS IN CONSPIRACY ASPECTS OF CASE, UK EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS FROM PORTUGUESE SOURCE SECURITY POLICE (PIDE) MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HAWKE'S PASSPORT TO BE EXEMPTED FROM PORTUGUESE ENTRY AND EXIT NOTATIONS THUS BETTER TO CONCEAL HIS MOVEMENTS.

GP-1

ANDERSON

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

FROM: GEORGE W. ANDERSON, AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL  
FOR SECRETARY RUSK FOR THE PRESIDENT; REQUEST PASS TO SECRETARY  
MCNANARA AND GENERAL WHEELER AT DISCRETION OF SECRETARY.

18 MAY 1964

SUBJECT: RHODESIA

1. RESORT TO THIS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IS FOR SECURITY AND HIGHEST  
LEVEL CONSIDERATION.

2. I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED <sup>regarding</sup> IMPLICATIONS FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS RHODESIAN  
SITUATION WHICH WILL BE DISASTROUS FOR PEOPLE OF ALL PARTS SOUTHERN  
PART OF AFRICA AND UNWILLINGLY INVOLVE UNITED STATES DIRECTLY OR  
THROUGH UNITED NATIONS. AM CERTAIN THIS CONCERN SHARED BY  
PORTUGUESE AND SOUTH AFRICANS ALTHOUGH THEIR MOTIVATION IN THEIR  
OWN VITAL INTERESTS.

3. INFORMATION FROM ADMIRAL ROBOREDO, PORTUGUESE CNO (LONG TIME  
PERSONAL FRIEND) GIVEN TO ME BECAUSE OF MY FORMER NAVAL POSITION  
AUGMENTED FROM OTHER SOURCES AVAILABLE TO SERVICE ATTACHES  
PARTICULARLY SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY CONFIRMED IN  
PART BY ITEMS CONTAINED IN REPORTS FROM OUR OWN EMBASSIES AND  
CONSULATES IN SUBSTANCE AS FOLLOWS:

A. SITUATION HAS MOST SERIOUS PROTENTS.

B. NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH BETWEEN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND  
UK LEADING TO REASONABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTION CAN AVERT ESCALATING  
DANGER LEADING TO MAJOR HOSTILITIES. SERIOUS DOUBT EXPRESSED THAT  
UK REALLY WISHING ACCEPT ANY REASONABLE COMPROMISE.

C. WORLD IS GETTING MASSIVE DOSE OF BRITISH PROPAGANDA CONDUCTED  
WITH SOPHISTICATION AND DETERMINATION. US GOVERNMENT IS PRINCIPAL  
TARGET.

D. UK PREPARING FOR CONTINGENT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST  
RHODESIA UNDER UN MANDATE THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE. ROBOREDO EMPHASIZES  
BEIRA ONLY FEASIBLE PORT OF ACCESS AND OPERATIONS COULD NOT BE  
CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY FROM TANGANYIKA.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLI 10-455 (#502)  
NARA, Date 8-3-11

E. JUSTIFICATION MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD BE INTERNAL RIOTS BY AFRICANS INSIDE RHODESIA STIMULATED BY UK CLANDESTINE ACTION. FACT UK CONSIDERING SUCH COVERT ACTIVITY REPORTED BY NAIROBI'S 1067 LIM DIS 2/17/66.

F. UK MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ALREADY ACTIVE IN BEIRA AREA AND ALONG PROJECTED MILITARY ROUTE TO SALISBURY FERRETING INFORMATION FOR PLANS AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

G. UN RESOLUTION BY AFRICANS WOULD BE STIMULATED BY UK AT PROPER TIME WHICH WOULD AUTHORIZE ACTION AND CALL UPON PORTUGUESE COOPERATION, WITH THREAT OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST PORTUGAL IN EVENT NON-COMPLIANCE IMPLICIT.

H. PORTUGAL COULD NOT ACQUIESCE AND WOULD BE SUPPORTED MILITARILY BY SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA HAS OFFERED MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN PAST, AND ALTHOUGH PORTUGAL HAS CONSISTENTLY AVOIDED INVOLVEMENT BEFORE IN THIS CONTINGENCY IT WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT. PORTUGUESE ALREADY REINFORCING BEIRA AREA WITH TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT.

I. UK EVEN WITH UN SUPPORT BUT WITHOUT US PARTICIPATION COULD NOT SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT OPERATION BECAUSE IN ROBOREDO'S VIEW TENACITY OF PORTUGUESE RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION WOULD BE FIERCE AND SOUTH AFRICAN HELP ANTICIPATED.

4. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING WHICH REPRESENTS ANALYSIS OF RESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS GOP AND POSSIBLY ALSO IN GSA, AND DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS TO EXTENT TRUE, I RECOMMEND:

A. MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PRESSURE ON UK TO REACH REASONABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTION WITH FACE-SAVING FEATURES FOR ALL FROM PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

B. UTILIZE SUCH RESOURCES AS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO US EITHER IN OR OUT OF GOVERNMENT TO EMPHASIZE TO SMITH AND HIS REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

C. USE ALL MEANS TO FORESTALL ANY UN ACTION UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETED.



D. CAREFUL REEXAMINATION OF WHAT EXTENT US DOG BEING WAGGED BY UK TAIL OR HOODWINKED BY UK PROPAGANDA AND INFLUENCE SOME OF OUR OWN ZEALOTS.

E. SEND SOME INDIVIDUAL IN WHOM PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE COMPLETE PERSONAL CONFIDENCE TO ASSESS SITUATION PREVAILING IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND CONTIGUOUS STATES AND PROVINCES. HE SHOULD HAVE STATUS WHICH WOULD INSURE ACCESS TO HIGHEST AUTHORITIES AND MAKE DISPASSIONATE FIRST-HAND FACT FINDING REVIEW FOR THE PRESIDENT. EVEN IF IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED THIS COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ADEQUATE COMMITMENT OF TIME AND ENERGY. (SIMILAR RECOMMENDATION IN CONTEXT PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES MADE BY ME JUST TWO YEARS AGO TO SECRETARY BALL AND MCGEORGE BUNDY AND ROSWELL GILPATRIC MADE TWO WEEK TRIP TO ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THIS HELPED BUT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT ADEQUATE.)

F. UNTIL TRUE SITUATION AND ALL IMPLICATIONS FULLY EVALUATED US GOVT SHOULD NOT GET COMMITTED TO ANY FURTHER ACTION ON BEHALF EITHER SIDE OR IN UN EXCEPT TO EMPHASIZE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH.

5. I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE THE HATRED (WORD USED ADVISEDLY) AND DISTRUST PREVAILING AMONG PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES AND INFORMED CIVILIANS FOR UK IN LIGHT RECENT UK AND UN ACTIONS. GOP ESPECIALLY RESENTFUL UK USES NO INFLUENCE ON TANZANIA TO STOP TERRORIST ACTIONS ACROSS FRONTIERS INTO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE. US WILL SHARE THIS ONUS IN INCREASING DEGREE WITH ADDED SUPPORT FOR UK/UN ACTIONS. WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT DIPLOMATIC PERSUASION WILL CHANGE GOP ATTITUDE.

6. RECOMMEND MAXIMUM HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION TO REPLY TO SALAZAR LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT UNDERSTOOD BEING ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

GP-3

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

31

49-S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action  
EUR

CONTROL: 20005  
RECEIVED: AUGUST 26, 8:26 A.M.

Info

FROM: LISBON

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC 83

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128  
By cm, NARA Date 3-22-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 26

FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND UNDER SECRETARY BALL

FOLLOWING IS ACCURATE QUOTATION MADE BY ALEXANDER MAKINSKY, VICE PRESIDENT COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION, TO ME AUGUST 25 FOLLOWING HIS EXTENDED TRIP TO ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION HE HAD WITH FONMIN FRANCO NOGUEIRA:

QUOTE: AFTER MENTIONING THE VARIOUS 'PIN PRICKS,' RECENT AND MORE REMOTE, NOGUEIRA SAID: 'ISN'T THIS STUPID? AFTER ALL, WHILE WE ALWAYS, AS YOU KNOW, DISLIKED THE BRITISH - AND THIS DESPITE OUR ALLIANCE - WE ALWAYS LIKED THE

PAGE 2 RUFJCX 075 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AMERICANS AND WE ARE PREPARED TO RESUME OUR AFFECTION FOR THEM EVEN TODAY AND EVEN DESPITE ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS AND ALL THE PROOFS OF MISUNDERSTANDING ON THEIR PART THAT WE HAVE WITNESSED. WHENEVER ANY AMERICAN OPENS HIS MOUTH IT IS USUALLY TO CRITICIZE US OR CONDEMN US IN PRIVATE OR IN PUBLIC. WHY CAN'T THE UNITED STATES MAKE SOME SORT OF FRIENDLY GESTURE TOWARD US - ANY KIND OF GESTURE, IN THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, OR IN ANY OTHER PUBLIC STATEMENT? IF THIS WERE DONE, IT WOULD THEN BE MUCH EASIER FOR US TO SIT DOWN WITH THE AMERICANS AND DISCUSS OUR PROBLEMS IN A QUIET ATMOSPHERE FROM WHICH ALL PASSIONS WOULD BE BANISHED.' UNQUOTE.

THE "PIN PRICKS" HE MENTIONED REFER TO LIST OF COMPLAINTS FONMIN MADE DURING LAST VISIT TO US. AT THAT TIME YOU ASSURED HIM THEY WOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND REPORT TRANSMITTED TO HIM THROUGH ME. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION TOGETHER WITH A MUCH COORDINATED PROPOSAL TO BE MADE TRYING TO SOLICIT SOME FLEXIBILITY ON PART OF PORTUGUESE RELATIVE TO SUBJECT OF "SELF-DETERMINATION" FOR THE AFRICAN PROVINCES.

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-2-83, August 26, from: Lisbon

I FEEL CERTAIN THAT DURING HIS INTERVIEW WITH YOU

PAGE 3 RUFJCX 075 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FONMIN HAD HOPED FOR SOME EXPRESSION OF REGRET OR SYMPATHY ON YOUR PART RELATIVE TO HIS COMPLAINTS IN RETURN FOR WHICH HE HAD SOME FLEXIBILITY TOWARD MOVING FORWARD REGARDING AZORES BASE AGREEMENT AND FACILITIES WE WANT FOR LORAN-C. THEREFORE I HOPE WHATEVER REPLY IS MADE TO HIS COMPLAINTS WILL BE COUCHED IN SUCH LANGUAGE AS TO PROVIDE SOME OPPORTUNITY OF MOVING FORWARD. CATEGORICAL DENIALS WITHOUT SOME EXPRESSION OF REGRET AT LEAST FOR MISUNDERSTANDING WILL ONLY LEAD TO STIFFENING OF SUPER-SENSITIVE AND STUBBORN PORTUGUESE HIGHER OFFICIALS. AS TO REMARKS OF FONMIN ATTRIBUTED TO ROY WELENSKY AND PRINCE OTTO (MENTIONED IN HIS COMPLAINTS), I HAVE REASON BELIEVE FONMIN AND DR. SALAZAR ARE POSITIVELY CONVINCED INFO GIVEN THEM WAS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT. THEY WILL PROBABLY REMAIN SO CONVINCED EVEN IF WE GIVE THEM A CATEGORICAL DENIAL.

EVEN THOUGH I BELIEVE PORTUGUESE ARE NOT AT THIS TIME AND ON BASIS OF CONCEPTS THUS FAR DISCUSSED WILLING MOVE FORWARD WITH REGARD TO "SELF-DETERMINATION" I THINK THEY ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE BETTER RELATIONS WITH US, HENCE REMARKS QUOTED TO MAKINSKY HAVE SOME VALID MEANING AND MERIT CONSIDERATION.

GP-3

ANDERSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY

38

85

CONTROL 1863

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

RECD JULY 2, 1965 3:26 PM

EUR

FROM LISBON

Info

ACTION SECSTATE 4

SS

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CG

RSR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JULY 2

REF: DEPTTEL 697, JUNE 21

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *fw/mg*, NARA, Date 3-29-00

I MET WITH FONMIN JULY 1 DISCUSS HIS RECENT TRIP US. HE WAS RELAXED AND EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND FELT HE HAD FINE VISIT. HE RECOGNIZED SECRETARY'S PREOCCUPATION VIET NAM AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND EXPRESSED REGRET NOT ABLE SEE PRESIDENT, BUT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. SALAZAR AND CABINET BRIEFED ON BRAZILIAN PORTION HIS TRIP BUT NOT THEN ON VISIT TO US.

FONMIN DESCRIBED HIS THREE HOUR CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY AS FREINDLY AND SAID HE WAS OBLIGED MAKE COMPLAINTS HE DID IN ORDER BE SURE BROUGHT TO SECRETARY'S ATTENTION. GRATEFUL THAT COMPLAINTS "WILL BE INVESTIGATED". HE EXPRESSED REGRET HE LEFT IMPRESSION LORAN-C AND AZORES BASE NEGOTIATIONS ARE LINKED TO SOLUTION PORTUGUESE PROBLEM IN AFRICA. HE HAD CONSIDERED ASKING FOR ANOTHER BRIEF PERIOD WITH SECRETARY TO CLARIFY THIS IMPRESSION INDICATIONG TO ME THAT OTHER "QUID PRO QUO" PERHAPS FEASIBLE.

WITH RESPECT LORAN-C I TOLD FONMIN I DISAPPOINTED THEY HAD NOT COME TO GRIPS THIS IMPORTANT PROBLEM DURING CONVERSATIONS. FONMIN SAID HE COULD NOT SAY NOW HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED ON LORAN-C AND WOULD TALK TO ME AFTER REPORTING TO PRIME MINISTER.

I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT ANOTHER QUESTION RAISED DURING CON-VERSATION WAS NOT ANSWERED, THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST THAT PORTUGAL GIVE ITS FRIENDS "A FLAG TO RALLY AROUND". WHILE PORTUGUESE POSITION IN AFRICA RELATIVELY STRONG NOW, I SUGGESTED GOP CONSIDER BEST WAY COPE WITH SITUATION IN TERMS OF 15 OR 20 YEARS. IF PORTUGAL COULD SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY WE MIGHT BE ABLE HELP OUT. FONMIN SAID HE WOULD KEEP THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND AND TALK ABOUT SUBJECT AFTER SEEING PRIME MINISTER.

HE REPEATED OLD COMPLAINTS ABOUT UNITED NATIONS, STRESSING UNFRIENDLY MAKE-UP OF SECRETARIAT WHICH IS DOMINATED BY INDIANS AND COMMUNIST BLOC NATIONALS.

AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN I AM SOMEWHAT LESS PESSIMISTIC. POSSIBILITIES OUR DOING BUSINESS WITH GOP ON MATTERS ESSENTIAL TO US.

ANDERSON

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# AIRGRAM

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AIR PRIORITY

TO : SecState WASHINGTON

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COPY NO. 2C SERIES A

FROM : AmEmbassy LISBON

DATE:

SUBJECT The Problem of Portuguese Africa: Suggested U. S. Proposal  
for Submission to Portuguese Government as Follow-Up on  
REF Visit of Under Secretary Ball

Under Secretary of State George W. Ball in his conversations last week with Prime Minister Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira indicated that following his return to Washington and reports to the Secretary of State and the President, United States reactions and further views would be communicated to the Government of Portugal.

The Embassy considers an early follow-up desirable in the interests of further capitalizing upon the impact of Mr. Ball's visit, keeping alive the dialogue with Prime Minister Salazar, and attempting to achieve whatever constructive results may be possible prior to or early during developments at the 18th United Nations General Assembly. There is, therefore, enclosed with this airgram a draft communication setting forth a U. S. proposal which the Embassy believes might usefully be placed before the Portuguese Government. This communication is cast in the form of a letter from Under Secretary Ball to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira although, should the Under Secretary prefer, it could be sent instead to Prime Minister Salazar. The latter alternative has the advantage of keeping alive the direct contact recently established by Mr. Ball, as Special Representative of the President, with the ultimate source of authority and decision in Portugal. Should the Under Secretary address himself, however, to Franco Nogueira, this would take advantage of the rapport which

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NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:FJDevine:ECON:JFBuckle:jcs 9/13/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: WLBlue

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
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Mr. Ball obviously established with the Foreign Minister and would make certain that the latter appears early in the internal GOP consultations. Franco Nogueira may seem obdurate and unwilling to face reality, but it is the Embassy's opinion that he is among the more worldly of the advisors around Dr. Salazar and perhaps speaks somewhat differently -- at least in the first instance -- during private conversations with the Prime Minister. If so, a communication going initially to him might result in his serving somewhat as its advocate when it is reviewed by Dr. Salazar.

As will be seen from the draft letter (Enclosure 1), the basic principle involved is that of establishing for the effective exercise of self-determination a timetable which could be acceptable to non-extremist Africans and which at the same time may be so "sweetened" with political guarantees and economic inducements as to diminish beforehand the standard objections regularly voiced by the Portuguese. The Embassy harbors no illusions about the Portuguese resistance to the concept of a publicly-stated timetable. Portuguese officials up to and including Dr. Salazar have consistently ruled it out in the past. What we have in mind, however, is a new variant of this which has never, to the Embassy's knowledge, been proposed to the GOP. Under this scheme, Portuguese acquiescence in a publicly stated timetable would be conditioned upon prior receipt of assurances and guarantees -- privately obtained with US assistance -- that appropriate nations would accept and help to assure completion of the stipulated period. A combination of these political assurances coupled with specified economic inducements constitutes, in the Embassy's opinion, a new and constructive proposal far from sure of success but certainly meriting serious consideration.

Full details of the Embassy's proposal emerge only in Enclosures 2 and 3, and it is therefore suggested that these be read prior to Enclosure 1. The latter, representing the draft communication for dispatch by the Under Secretary, is necessarily somewhat more limited and general in its terminology.



William L. Blue  
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosures:

1. Draft letter from Under Secretary Ball to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira.
2. Political Aspects of U. S. Proposal.
3. Economic Aspects of U. S. Proposal.



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LISBON

Dear Mr. Minister: (or "Dr. Salazar" as case may be)

I have given considerable thought to the paper you left with me after our pleasant dinner at the Avis Restaurant on September 6, and I have discussed it with Secretary Rusk and the President. It would not be consistent with the relationship which I believe we established during my recent visit if I were less than frank now, so I must advise you of our strong opinion that the economic development and political advances which the paper mentions as being part of the Portuguese plans for the future can only be of value in stemming increasing African efforts against Portugal if they are placed within a definite framework. I regret having to add that we are convinced that such worthy efforts as your country has in mind probably would not even have the opportunity of coming into fruition--because of the violence likely to be initiated by opposing forces--if some sort of arrangement which at least the more moderate among the African leaders can consider as holding definite hope for progress in the near future is not offered to them and their agreement obtained during the unique opportunity which this next session of the UN General Assembly provides.

As I told you and Dr. Salazar in Lisbon, nothing is further from US policy than the encouragement of violence as the means of settling disputes, and we shall do all that we can--as we have been doing for some time now--to discourage and restrain the use of force and mob rule in the settlement of international disputes. Our powers of persuasion are smaller than we are generally given credit for, however, and in the case of attempting to modify the drive against the Portuguese provinces which African nationalists now place as their primary objective, they are virtually nil in the present setting. Unless we can point to some concrete gains which will be accepted as evidence that quiet discussions, plus the Portuguese Government's own plans for its people, are moving the overseas territories forward on an economic, social and political basis at least as fast as most of the new African nations are going on their own, I see no chance of lessening the pressure of African nationalism and of the community of independent African states.

On the other hand, after further contemplation of my discussions with you and Dr. Salazar I am not certain we are so far apart on the point of how some tangible evidence could be given the moderates as it sometimes seemed. It has occurred to me that there is a possible resolution of what our difference appeared to be on the question of a date or stage of growth being announced in advance as a goal following which a referendum on self-determination would be held. Would it not meet the requirements we both believe to be essential if your Government agreed to announce such a decision, but only after you had received adequate guarantees that such a period of time would be permitted to pass? In other words, drawing upon

His Excellency

Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Lisbon, Portugal.

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the well-known experience of the Congo, you (or the United States if you would prefer) would advance the thesis that the only way in which a meaningful referendum can really be held is after the great mass of the native population in your African provinces have had an essential minimum of education and preparation. And the only way in which a future associated territory--or independent state, if the voting should turn out that way--could be expected successfully to finance and govern itself would be if a sufficient cadre of trained technicians, managers, doctors, etc. has been developed. Preoccupation with and spending on defense and internal security would only prolong the period over which the development process would have to be extended. Therefore, the African states, if they truly believe in what they profess to espouse, should be willing to agree to forego all agitation against the Portuguese during a stated period and stop aiding and assisting by any means the enemies of Portugal. Portugal, in turn, would agree to and accept a certain method of measurement (time, level of education, stage of economic development) as to when a referendum would be freely held. In addition, Portugal would pledge its resources in assisting the provinces toward this goal. It would, of course, be in Portugal's own best interest to do the utmost possible within the measurement period in order to take full advantage of the trouble-free period to demonstrate to and convince the overseas provinces of the advantages of continuing, in one form or another, their association with the Metropole.

Obviously some reasonable standard would have to be set forth in order to make the above idea acceptable, e.g., ten years at the outside, or whenever the GNP of a province doubles, or some other internationally acceptable means of judging advancement. It is my own conviction, however, that the ten-year period offers the best possibility of striking an acceptable compromise between the opposing points of view. During such a period, your Government should be willing to continue to contribute at least as great a portion of your GNP to overseas development as you have been doing (which I assume is nothing more than you already plan to do) and possibly giving to an intensive drive in the field of education 50 per cent of what you would save in defense expenditures. If you would agree to take such steps, my Government would, as you know, be willing to assist you. I believe a number of other Western countries also could be persuaded to participate in a program designed to reduce one of the major dangers (because of the active fighting which the rebels might instigate with the help of other countries, including Communists) to peaceful relations among nations today. I should think a consortium might be arranged within the DAC which would enable your Government to mount an over-all plan, perhaps double the size that you would find feasible by yourself, and I can assure you of my Government's willingness to explore this possibility under the circumstances outlined.

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I should also think that additional assistance would be forthcoming as a result of such a declaration by you if accepted and supported by most other countries. One important item undoubtedly would be a significant supply of private capital to assist in the development of the private sectors of the economies both in the provinces and the Metropole. A guaranteed period of peace and tranquility and the knowledge that Portugal itself would no longer have to support a massive defense effort but instead would be free to concentrate on its own development inevitably would remove the doubts some investors must be holding regarding the future of both your country and its overseas provinces in light of the possibility that heavy fighting, with the international complications attendant thereon, could break out. I can also virtually promise you that we in the US would be able to raise a contingent, possibly including Portuguese-Americans, for a Peace Corps program which could assist you with the burden of providing teachers for the schools and training centers you would be setting up in the overseas provinces.

I am sure that you will give this suggestion your urgent and serious consideration and will let me have your Government's response as soon as it is available. Even the joint working out of the broad outlines of such a proposal, plus the briefest consultations with our NATO Allies, would take most of the time remaining before the African leaders begin to leave New York and the unique opportunity is lost to explain to them fully a reasonable proposal and, hopefully, gain their acceptance while they are in a different milieu and somewhat removed from the national problems and other pressures which normally dominate their thinking. If it would facilitate matters, I would be glad to join you and Dr. Salazar for another day or two of discussions during which we could gain the clearest picture of what would be expected of both of our countries, and when we might plan the next steps in order to assure the success of this undertaking. Once we are in broad agreement, the United States would be prepared promptly to enter into diplomatic conversations with selected other governments for the purpose of eliciting the support and prior guarantees which would allow the Government of Portugal to repose its confidence in the enforceability of the reasonable time table which is envisaged.

Looking forward to your views on this proposal, and with renewed assurances of my highest esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

George W. Ball

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## POLITICAL ASPECTS OF U. S. PROPOSAL

### Introduction

Encouragement can be drawn from Prime Minister Salazar's evident interest in seeing his conversations with Under Secretary Ball result either in a meeting of the minds or of some narrowing of the gulf between the U. S. and Portuguese positions. At the same time, there is little in the past record, in the discussions just conducted at Lisbon, or in stated Portuguese plans for the future to indicate that the Portuguese have yet become either serious or realistic about applying the principle of self-determination to the various peoples of Portuguese Africa. While making a major point of the fact that they can agree with the US definition of the concept of self-determination, the Portuguese obviously differ from us and most other international observers in their sense of timing. To our emphasis upon the dynamics of African nationalism, they respond by insisting that self-determination come about only as the end-product of indefinite but long-term evolution; to our warning that time is running out, they blandly maintain that time is on their side.

The latter Portuguese assertion is subject to certain qualification. Portuguese officials belittle the political maturity, economic viability, and sense of responsibility of the new African states; they maintain that the creation of those states was a fundamental error on the part of the West and that this fact is becoming increasingly evident to the major Western powers. As the latter lose patience with the antics of the African states, they will inevitably recognize the error of their own policies and the correctness of Portugal's stand. Individual statements by Western leaders, occasional voting positions at the UN and other such elements are adduced by the Portuguese in support of their contention that this process has already begun; the supposed inevitability of its end-result is the basis for the Portuguese claim that time is on their side. This is, however, a long-run view. Inwardly, the Portuguese are far from oblivious to the gathering forces arrayed against them and are well aware of the unpleasant developments facing them in the near future. Their sense of timing thus presents a certain dichotomy in that, while publicly proclaiming confidence that time is on their side (in the long run), they are in private gravely concerned over the fact that time (in the short run) may indeed be running out so far as the Portuguese Empire is concerned. Their tactic, then, is so to temporize and stretch out the short run as to blend it into the long.

The Portuguese psychology and sense of history inhibit spontaneous quest for new solutions. Even to the brink of disaster, the Portuguese are likely to hold fast to the principles embodied in their present policy. Only the naked spectre of defeat and the most persistent pressure from other countries will probably move them in the direction of enlightened and progressive policy changes. When so moved, they will probably yield only grudgingly and do as much as, but no more than, required by force of circumstances at each step along

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the way. Such changes as to occur, however, will, under the existing regime, come about only in response to actions and decisions on the part of Dr. Salazar. This, then, argues for continuing and expanding the dialogue with Dr. Salazar and of (1) seeking to impress upon him the unpleasant realities of the 20th Century, and (2) insuring that there are brought to his personal attention the decisions and measures required if an orderly solution to the problem of Portuguese Africa is to come about.

#### Alleviation of African Pressure

In seeking a solution for the problem of Portuguese Africa, the primary objective would seem to be a mitigation of the pressure emanating from the community of independent African states. Portuguese inflexibility has forfeited valuable time which could have been put to use in this respect and has contributed to an accumulation of pressures which may now be at or near the point of no return. The seriousness of the consequences possibly involved, however, warrants maximum effort to avert, if at all possible, the violent military solution toward which present events are tending.

The fundamental question is as to what action on the part of the Portuguese could serve to mitigate African pressures. The past record and the present temper of the Africans inspire little confidence that Portuguese "reforms" or vague pronouncements of intent will be accepted as meaningful by the African community. The latter is pressing for a clear-cut acceptance by the Portuguese of self-determination as applicable to their African territories and a meaningful and responsive discussion of ways and means of early implementation. Thus far, there is little indication that either the Portuguese or the Africans are prepared to talk in terms acceptable to the other.

Despite the manifest reluctance, if not unwillingness, of Dr. Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira to consider announcement of any timetable leading toward the exercise of self-determination in the African territories, the establishment of some terminal date may nonetheless be indispensable to any workable arrangement between the parties to the dispute. Both Dr. Salazar and the Foreign Minister have repeatedly based their opposition to any timetable upon the Belgian Congo experience; both profess to believe that public acceptance of the principle of self-determination would set in motion irresistible and irreversible forces and that the stipulation of any timetable would thereafter be completely unenforceable. To the Embassy's knowledge, however, suggestions that they consider the issuance of such an announcement and the stipulation of such a timetable have never yet included the concept of prior guarantees that these would be acceptable to, respected by, and even enforced if necessary by those states most in a position to guarantee their success. It is, therefore, suggested that a major effort be exerted to secure top-level Portuguese consideration of a public acceptance of self-determination and of a related timetable based upon the combination of political and economic inducements which are set forth in the following sections.

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### General Theory of Inducements

A major objective of Portuguese diplomacy has been U. S. political and diplomatic support in defense of the Portuguese Empire vis-a-vis the Afro-Asian forces which would dismember it. For obvious reasons, such support has not been forthcoming. However, there is ample reason to believe that it continues to be a prime Portuguese objective.

A simultaneous fact of life is the depressed economic capability and standard of living of the Portuguese people. Despite the fact that austere economic and fiscal policies have maintained Portuguese hard currency reserves at an impressive level (approximately US \$767 million), the GNP of Portugal on a per capita basis is the lowest of Western Europe. The limitation thereby imposed upon both the standard of living in the Metropole and the development possibilities in the overseas territories ipso facto suggests a possible opportunity for effective application of leverage through economic assistance. Specifically, it would appear that the unique ability of the United States to provide or to arrange from other sources the types of developmental and technical assistance required in this case should have a special attraction for the Portuguese.

The combination of these two forms of inducements - political support and economic assistance - should logically be relatively persuasive, vis-a-vis the Government of Portugal and seem to the Embassy worth employing in pursuit of a national objective of such importance as a non-violent resolution of the problem represented by the Portuguese African territories.

### Political Inducements

Following further emphasis to the Portuguese Government of our serious apprehension that only military disaster and disappearance of the Portuguese presence in Africa will result from continued failure to deal adequately with mounting African pressures, it should be suggested to the Portuguese (initially in the proposed communication and more fully in any subsequent discussion based thereon) that they make a public statement officially recognizing the applicability of self-determination to the territories of Portuguese Africa and establishing a ten-year transition period within which to prepare the peoples of those territories for the responsibilities thereby entailed. It should be emphasized again, as Mr. Ball has already done in talks with Dr. Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, to the Portuguese that the exercise of self-determination at the end of that period must neither assure nor exclude the option of independence. While requiring that independence be one of the options available, however, the terms of reference should clearly provide that continued Portuguese rule and other forms of association are equally possible.

In anticipation that they will balk at public mention of the ten-year period and of the standard Portuguese rejoinder that irresistible and irreversible forces

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thereby set in motion would render unenforceable any reasonable timetable, including the proposed ten-year period, the Portuguese should be asked what, if any, political assurances could induce them to place their reliance upon such a timetable. They should be clearly apprised of our belief that responsible nations, including other Western powers and a significant number of African moderates, are sufficiently concerned over the possibility of premature independence leading to chaos so that they would strongly favor a reasonable timetable such as that suggested, even to the point of giving it their effective support. By "effective support" is meant a prompt public endorsement, a guarantee of non-interference, and a readiness to withhold support from violent measures to the contrary by extremist forces. In the event that this would or might overcome Portuguese apprehensions, the United States should express to the Government of Portugal its readiness at the United Nations and in the respective capitals concerned to exert its best efforts to elicit prior guarantees of such support from appropriate governments. It should be made clear to the GOP, however, that this could only be done on the basis of a clear and unequivocal GOP pronouncement to be issued thereafter along the lines suggested and in anticipation of a meaningful implementation by the GOP throughout the ten-year transition period.

In making the foregoing proposal, the United States would identify to the GOP those moderate African states and leaders to be approached along the suggested lines and would invite any additional suggestions from the GOP as to others who might usefully be approached. The time factor should be emphasized to the Portuguese with particular reference to (1) initiating such action prior to or early during the 18th United Nations General Assembly, and (2) taking advantage of the concentrated presence of African Chiefs of State in New York at the outset of the 18th UNGA.

In view of the past record and the current level of African distrust with respect to Portuguese motives, intentions and good faith, it would probably be essential to provide for some form of verification procedure during the ten-year period. We should, therefore, as an integral part of the proposal to the GOP (though in subsequent discussion rather than as part of the initial approach) suggest the necessity and desirability of providing for interim verification of action being taken and progress being achieved. Since the Portuguese have been, and will presumably continue to be, allergic to compulsory interference, observation and supervision from external sources, it is highly unlikely that they would agree to inspection procedures imposed by the UN or African nations. They might, however, be amenable to some form of periodic verification having a voluntary flavor, i.e., made available to the African states by the GOP in the same way as its past invitations to visit the African territories and see for themselves. Alternatively, verification might be accomplished on an annual basis by some specialized agency or by the UN Secretary General or his designated representative, thus utilizing an instrument which has appeared more palatable and acceptable to the GOP than UN committees the

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
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competence and terms of reference of which it has challenged.

In the event that the suggested approach arouses visible interest on the part of the OGP, subsequent discussion could develop in greater detail the types of assistance which the United States might make available designed to contribute to the development of the economy of Portuguese Africa and of the readiness of the inhabitants of that area for the exercise of self-determination. (See Enclosure 3.)

The point should be emphasized to the Portuguese that the ten-year period free from outside interference and benefiting from capital injections on a significant scale should represent ample opportunity - and one unlikely to be otherwise or ever again achieved - for beneficially affecting African attitudes in a manner conducive to an eventual option favorable to Portuguese aspirations for a continuing presence in Africa.

The contemplated combination of political and economic inducements would be presented to the Portuguese Government as a carefully considered, reasonable and constructive U. S. proposal carefully designed to afford the indispensable minimum of satisfaction to moderate African states while, at the same time, safeguarding insofar as possible the legitimate interests and possible future presence of the Portuguese in Africa.



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Economic Aspects of U. S. Proposal

The GOP has studiously avoided setting an economic price tag on the renewal of the Azores base agreement and occasionally takes pride publicly in the fact that it has not asked for--indeed has even refused--offers of economic assistance. It might seem, therefore, that an offer of economic assistance as part of the package suggested in Enclosure 1 would be a waste of time and perhaps even regarded unfavorably by the Portuguese as an attempt to buy their cooperation. However, during Mr. Ball's conversations with Dr. Salazar the Prime Minister deigned to recall an earlier offer by the U.S. to help Portugal with the massive education problem it faced in its African provinces. While this is probably as close as Dr. Salazar will be able to bring himself to asking directly for U.S. economic assistance, at least under present conditions, it suggests that the GOP has reassessed the magnitude of the problem which faces it in this field and recognizes that a reasonably early solution is beyond its own capabilities.

In order to avoid Portuguese objections to any initial outside estimates of what the overseas provinces will need and what Portugal's ability is to meet these requirements, the suggested approach retains their own plans as a basis upon which to build. It then uses the figure which the GOP has stated to the DAC as the percentage of their GNP which they made available to the development of the overseas provinces in 1962 (1.71%) as the percentage which they, as a minimum, should continue to provide under the new approach. Since that percentage was the highest of any country in the world for that year, it would also seem that the more reasonable Africans could not really expect Portugal to do more. Furthermore, the period of stability which would follow a UN guarantee along the lines of the proposal would very probably attract private investment capital and production know-how in massive quantities to both the metropole and the overseas provinces. By using a percentage rather than a specific figure as the annual amount guaranteed to be provided by the GOP, the rise in the Portuguese GNP which presumably would ensue would automatically be reflected in an increased contribution to the overseas development plan.

There still remains the fact that Portugal's GNP is so low--roughly \$2.8 billion in 1962--that her "record" contribution percentage-wise amounted only to about \$48 million last year. Therefore, it is almost certain that such African leaders as will want to fight the new proposal will claim that the actual amount being pledged is too small to boost the African provinces ahead in any reasonable time period regardless of record percentages, good intentions, etc. But precisely because the actual figure is so low, we and a limited number of DAC powers should be able to say, without having to hold innumerable meetings where a precise total and an exact percentage for such consortium member would finally be agreed upon, that we wanted to make certain that this plan would succeed; so, among us, we would make available a similar amount each year--thus doubling the program. In the case of the U.S., at least, our share even at a high percentage undoubtedly would be less than we would find necessary to

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contribute to the almost inevitable UN operation which would follow a chaotic break-up of the "Portuguese Integrated Space".

In any event, the participation by other powers in the GOP's development program for the overseas territories is probably a sine qua non if the Africans are to accept the total package contemplated. There can be little doubt that the leaders of the African states would be extremely skeptical of any promises given solely by the GOP about providing massive educational and economic development in the overseas provinces as a prelude to and preparation for a referendum on self-determination. Aside from a visceral feeling that the Portuguese were merely attempting to buy time with words, the Africans understand the magnitude of the task which would confront Portugal if she earnestly undertook the job, and they are well aware of Portugal's poverty compared to the other colonial powers. It also seems reasonable to assume that the chances of African acceptance would probably be increased if a fairly large group of Western countries were participating in the developmental undertakings since the African skeptics would, or could be induced to, reason that they might keep close tabs on progress or lack thereof through the observations of at least one of the consortium members even though the Portuguese might resist formal inspections.

Given the brief time remaining in which the total package would have to be sold first to the Portuguese, then to other Western countries and finally to the Africans, it would almost inevitably doom the exercise to failure if a specific set of aid figures or even precise developmental goals were set forth in it. Some countries would argue that the figures or goals were too low, others would claim they were unrealistic, and others would want assurances that this or that special field would have priority. On the other hand, an approach on the basis of a vague concept only, with all details to be worked out later, probably would not be definitive enough for the Africans to feel secure in accepting it. Therefore the Embassy's suggestion is an approach somewhere between preciseness and obscurity in an effort to formulate a possibly salable compromise.

One further consideration—if a really accelerated social and political development is desired, an additional sum of money will be needed for an expanded educational program. The Portuguese Development Plan, to which the monies mentioned above would be directed, covers only the construction phase of education. Teachers' salaries and other operating expenses come from the budgets of the provinces. Hence those budgets would have to rise sharply if the greatly enlarged development plan were succeeding.

Here again the Embassy believes a simple solution may be possible. It would seem reasonable, in this regard, to ask the Portuguese to make available whatever amount might be necessary for an accelerated educational program from the sum by which the GOP would be able to reduce its defense expenditures

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because of the agreement reached on the basis of this package. If this approach is accepted as reasonable, there need be only a minimal time spent discussing how such reduced expenditures are to be agreed upon, for the Portuguese have already submitted to NATO a study on the percentage of their GNP devoted to defense. This shows a figure of 4.5% in 1956, 1957 and 1958; 4.8% in 1959 and 1960; with an increase to 7.3% in 1961 and 8.5% in 1962. While Portugal probably would not permit her defense establishment to revert to the '56-'58 level, even a 2% reduction in expenses would make available a significant contribution (roughly \$28 millions under the 50% formula) which could go to the educational drive. A further argument in its favor is the fact that the GOP is requiring the overseas provinces, by paying additional taxes, to shoulder most of the burden involved in maintaining the defense posture. The taxes are not excessive (the Embassy estimates about 13%). But when the defense costs can be reduced, it seems logical that the savings from that reduction should remain in the provinces, especially if the provinces continue to pay the same taxes.

Although the Embassy's proposal purposely avoids mentioning any details of the contemplated development program, it is realized that a more specific guide as to just what might be involved if the plan were adopted will be required by the Washington reviewers of this proposal. Therefore, the Embassy has drawn upon a number of official Portuguese sources and compiled the tables attached to this enclosure. They show reasonably clearly what the GOP intended to accomplish in the overseas provinces under the second six-year Development Plan; the earnest pursuit of those intentions through the planning stages and first few months of 1961; then the marked reduction in activity which followed when defense requirements assumed priority. It should be pointed out that Portuguese budgeteers suffer from the reverse of the malady which afflicts Communists in the same profession--the Portuguese inevitably publish goals which they are convinced they can exceed, rather than setting high targets and hoping they will be an inspiration in themselves. Therefore, it can be assumed that the GOP really intended to go considerably beyond the totals set for 1959-1964, and the fact that they may reach the planned levels as published, if 1964 is relatively quiet, is really a considerable shortfall from what they otherwise expected to attain, e.g., normally the 1962 "Financing Plan" (Table F) would have seen an increase over the figure in the "Financing Plan" for 1961 (Table D) rather than a reduction below even the "Expenditures" figure made in 1961 (Table E).

Attachments:

Tables A thru G (Unclassified when  
separated from Airgram)

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)  
(In millions of escudos)

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	295.0	50.0	-	3.5	3.0
Revision of general cartography	250.0	20.0	-	3.5	
Geological surveys	30.0	20.0	-	-	3.0
Soil maps	15.0	10.0	-	-	
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	800.0	413.0	63.0	84.5	37.0
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	480.0	163.0	57.0	79.0	23.0
Power and industry	320.0	250.0	6.0	5.5	14.0
<u>Colonization</u>	1,085.0	925.0	-	-	-
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	2,147.0	1,385.0	94.0	113.0	67.0
Roads	780.0	780.0	30.0	30.0	45.0
Railroads	745.0	100.0	-	-	-
River transport and works	72.0	-	45.0	-	-
Ports	370.0	355.0	-	80.0	10.0
Airports and aeronautical material	140.0	150.0	9.0	3.0	10.0
Telecommunications	40.0	-	10.0	-	2.0
<u>Health and Education</u>	156.0	370.0	15.0	9.0	13.0
Schools and equipment	156.0	160.0	15.0	2.0	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	210.0	-	7.0	13.0
<u>Local Improvements</u>	100.0	100.0	-	-	35.0
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	25.0
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	10.0
Works of local interest	100.0	100.0	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	20.0	-	8.0	-	-
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	8.0	-	-
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	20.0	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	4,603.0	3,243.0	180.0	210.0	155.0
Own financing	2,400.0	1,310.0	105.0	none	none
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	2,203.0	1,933.0	75.0	210.0	155.0

Total investment in all the overseas provinces for 1959-64 is estimated at 9,000 million escudos, of which 5,000 million will be obtained in metropolitan Portugal. Under the Portuguese Constitution, the overseas provinces are not permitted to borrow in foreign countries.



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)

(In millions of escudos)

FINANCING PROGRAM (1959 thru 1961)

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	<u>138.1</u>	<u>47.6</u>	-	<u>2.0</u>	<u>3.2</u>
Revision of general cartography	111.5	14.4	-	2.0	0.8
Geological surveys	12.9	21.0	-	-	-
Soil maps	7.3	6.0	-	-	-
Agricultural surveys	-	-	-	-	2.4
Population studies	4.9	4.7	-	-	-
Economic studies for development pl.	1.5	1.5	-	-	-
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	<u>946.5</u>	<u>344.4</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>64.1</u>	<u>25.7</u>
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	522.5	194.1	30.2	61.6	14.3
Power and industry	424.0	150.3	3.8	2.5	11.4
<u>Colonization</u>	<u>274.4</u>	<u>335.4</u>	-	-	-
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	<u>1,668.6</u>	<u>1,006.0</u>	<u>76.8</u>	<u>207.2</u>	<u>112.0</u>
Roads	430.0	482.5	18.0	102.4	54.3
Railroads	629.7	212.2	-	-	-
River transport and works	20.3	-	11.1	-	-
Ports	372.1	194.4	-	87.0	34.7
Airports and aeronautical material	168.7	116.9	31.4	17.8	17.7
Telecommunications	47.8	-	16.3	-	5.3
<u>Health and Education</u>	<u>122.6</u>	<u>138.3</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>8.5</u>
Schools and equipment	122.6	67.3	6.3	5.6	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	71.0	-	5.2	8.5
<u>Local Improvements</u>	<u>117.8</u>	<u>43.0</u>	-	-	<u>82.4</u>
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	73.1
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	9.3
Works of local interest	117.8	43.0	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	<u>12.8</u>	-	<u>16.7</u>	-	<u>3.5</u>
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	16.7	-	3.5
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	12.8	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>3,280.8</u>	<u>1,914.7</u>	<u>133.8</u>	<u>284.1</u>	<u>235.3</u>
Own financing	1,466.8	1,026.5	107.1	-	115.6
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	1,814.0	888.2	26.7	284.1	119.7

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)

(In millions of escudos)

EXPENDITURES (1959 thru 1961)

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	<u>80.9</u>	<u>32.1</u>	-	<u>0.4</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Revision of general cartography	68.3	9.7	-	0.4	-
Geological surveys	7.6	15.6	-	-	-
Soil maps	2.8	4.7	-	-	-
Agricultural surveys	-	-	-	-	2.3
Population studies	2.0	1.5	-	-	-
Economic studies for development pl.	0.2	0.6	-	-	-
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	<u>560.2</u>	<u>248.4</u>	<u>27.2</u>	<u>58.3</u>	<u>6.8</u>
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	375.0	162.9	26.6	58.2	6.6
Power and industry	185.2	85.5	0.6	0.1	0.2
<u>Colonization</u>	<u>214.8</u>	<u>321.4</u>	-	-	-
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	<u>1,027.2</u>	<u>939.2</u>	<u>39.3</u>	<u>159.1</u>	<u>53.1</u>
Roads	343.4	473.8	9.5	94.2	25.4
Railroads	454.2	212.2	-	-	-
River transport and works	8.0	-	7.3	-	-
Ports	124.6	163.2	-	49.7	15.4
Airports and aeronautical material	80.5	90.0	14.6	15.2	9.7
Telecommunications	16.5	-	7.9	-	2.6
<u>Health and Education</u>	<u>71.8</u>	<u>116.7</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Schools and equipment	71.8	64.6	6.2	4.8	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	52.1	-	4.0	4.1
<u>Local Improvements</u>	<u>95.3</u>	<u>37.1</u>	-	-	<u>35.0</u>
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	31.9
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	3.1
Works of local interest	95.3	37.1	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	<u>2.7</u>	-	<u>7.4</u>	-	<u>1.9</u>
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	7.4	-	1.9
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	2.7	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2,052.9</u>	<u>1,694.9</u>	<u>80.1</u>	<u>226.6</u>	<u>103.2</u>
Own financing	938.4	982.9	65.6	-	54.4
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	1,114.5	712.0	14.5	226.6	48.8

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)

(In millions of escudos)

FINANCING PLAN FOR 1961

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	<u>57.9</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Revision of general cartography	44.9	6.4	-	1.0	0.4
Geological surveys	5.8	7.7	-	-	-
Soil maps	4.3	2.3	-	-	-
Population studies	1.9	1.7	-	-	-
Economic studies for development pl.	1.0	1.0	-	-	-
Agricultural surveys	-	-	-	-	1.1
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	<u>389.8</u>	<u>138.3</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>16.2</u>	<u>13.7</u>
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	232.6	84.1	9.7	15.2	7.3
Power and industry	157.2	54.2	1.1	1.0	6.4
<u>Colonization</u>	<u>122.4</u>	<u>143.2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	<u>554.9</u>	<u>387.9</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>57.6</u>	<u>42.4</u>
Roads	184.5	164.0	8.8	31.1	18.8
Railroads	123.4	55.5	-	-	-
River transport & works	12.7	-	6.0	-	-
Ports	128.9	103.4	-	21.5	12.1
Airports and aeronautical material	76.0	65.0	10.1	5.0	9.2
Telecommunications	29.4	-	8.6	-	2.3
<u>Health and Education</u>	<u>57.4</u>	<u>85.1</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>4.0</u>
Schools and equipment	57.4	35.0	4.0	1.1	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	50.1	-	1.1	4.0
<u>Local Improvements</u>	<u>66.2</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>28.9</u>
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	25.4
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	3.5
Works of local interest	66.2	20.5	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	5.1	-	1.4
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	7.8	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1,256.4</u>	<u>794.1</u>	<u>53.4</u>	<u>77.0</u>	<u>91.9</u>
Own financing	407.7	401.9	30.1	-	41.2
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	848.7	392.2	23.3	77.0	50.7



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(UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
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Table E  
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)

(In millions of escudos)

EXPENDITURES IN 1961

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	<u>28.0</u>	<u>15.4</u>	-	<u>0.4</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Revision of general cartography	24.5	5.3	-	0.4	-
Geological surveys	1.3	6.9	-	-	-
Soil maps	1.0	2.0	-	-	-
Population studies	1.0	0.6	-	-	-
Economic studies for development pl.	0.2	0.6	-	-	-
Agricultural surveys	-	-	-	-	1.1
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	<u>214.3</u>	<u>88.2</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	140.3	69.9	9.3	13.4	4.1
Power and industry	74.0	18.3	0.3	-	-
<u>Colonization</u>	<u>93.0</u>	<u>137.4</u>	-	-	<u>0.04</u>
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	<u>329.4</u>	<u>346.3</u>	<u>22.1</u>	<u>48.6</u>	<u>25.2</u>
Roads	142.5	160.0	4.1	29.7	9.1
Railroads	75.0	55.5	-	-	-
River transport and works	1.3	-	2.8	-	-
Ports	47.3	81.3	-	14.2	5.3
Airports and aeronautical material	60.4	49.5	10.0	4.7	8.9
Telecommunications	2.9	-	5.2	-	1.9
<u>Health and Education</u>	<u>34.2</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Schools and equipment	34.2	33.4	4.0	1.1	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	32.2	-	1.0	1.6
<u>Local Improvements</u>	<u>47.7</u>	<u>17.6</u>	-	-	<u>19.5</u>
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	17.8
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	1.7
Works of local interest	47.7	17.6	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	<u>1.5</u>	-	<u>4.3</u>	-	<u>0.3</u>
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	4.3	-	0.3
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	1.5	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>748.1</u>	<u>670.5</u>	<u>40.0</u>	<u>64.5</u>	<u>51.8</u>
Own financing	196.3	401.6	26.0	-	25.8
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	551.8	268.9	14.0	64.5	26.0

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COVERING AIRGRAM)

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)

(In millions of escudos)

FINANCING PLAN FOR 1962

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	<u>67.0</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Revision of general cartography	55.0	4.0	-	0.2	0.2
Geological surveys	6.0	6.0	-	-	-
Soil maps	3.0	2.0	-	-	-
Agricultural surveys	-	-	-	-	1.0
Population studies	2.0	2.0	-	-	-
Economic studies for development pl.	1.0	1.5	-	-	-
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	<u>180.0</u>	<u>150.0</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	157.0	80.0	10.0	13.0	3.0
Power and industry	23.0	70.0	1.0	-	5.0
<u>Colonization</u>	<u>102.0</u>	<u>120.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	<u>312.0</u>	<u>272.5</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>11.0</u>
Roads	150.0	176.5	8.0	10.3	9.6
Railroads	62.0	6.0	-	-	-
River transport & works	4.0	-	6.0	-	-
Ports	76.0	60.0	-	17.5	1.4
Airports and aeronautical material	15.0	30.0	3.5	2.0	-
Telecommunications	5.0	-	4.0	-	-
<u>Health and Education</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>105.0</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>4.5</u>
Schools and equipment	25.0	45.0	4.0	0.5	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	60.0	-	1.5	4.5
<u>Local Improvements</u>	<u>35.0</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7.5</u>
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	5.5
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	2.0
Works of local interest	35.0	20.0	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	0.5	-	-
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	4.0	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>725.0</u>	<u>683.0</u>	<u>37.0</u>	<u>45.0</u>	<u>32.2</u>
Own financing	90.0	191.0	-	-	0.4
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	635.0	492.0	37.0	45.0	31.8

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES IN AFRICA

SECOND SIX - YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1959-64)

(In millions of escudos)

FINANCING PLAN FOR 1963

	Angola	Mozambique	Guinea	Cape Verde	S. Tomé & Príncipe
<u>General Surveys</u>	<u>71.0</u>	<u>15.9</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Revision of general cartography	55.0	4.0	-	0.2	0.2
Geological surveys	7.0	5.5	-	-	-
Soil maps	3.0	2.0	-	-	-
Population studies	3.0	2.9	-	-	-
Economic studies for development pl.	3.0	1.5	-	-	-
Agricultural surveys	-	-	-	-	1.0
<u>Improvement of Resources</u>	<u>263.5</u>	<u>145.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>12.0</u>	<u>5.9</u>
Agricultural, forestry & livestock	174.5	96.0	9.0	12.0	3.9
Power and industry	89.0	49.0	1.0	-	2.0
<u>Colonization</u>	<u>109.0</u>	<u>112.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
<u>Communications &amp; Transportation</u>	<u>240.0</u>	<u>211.1</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>9.3</u>
Roads	160.0	146.0	4.5	9.0	7.3
Railroads	35.0	0.1	-	-	-
River transport and works	4.0	-	8.0	-	-
Ports	21.0	45.0	-	18.2	2.0
Airports and aeronautical material	15.0	20.0	3.0	-	-
Telecommunications	5.0	-	2.0	1.0	-
<u>Health and Education</u>	<u>27.0</u>	<u>76.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Schools and equipment	27.0	36.0	3.0	0.1	-
Hospitals and equipment	-	40.0	-	1.5	2.3
<u>Local Improvements</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7.0</u>
Urbanization	-	-	-	-	6.0
Urban sanitation	-	-	-	-	1.0
Works of local interest	25.0	20.0	-	-	-
<u>Equipment of Public Services</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Road maintenance machinery	-	-	0.5	-	0.3
Installation and equipment of Laboratório de Engenharia Civil	4.0	-	-	-	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>739.5</u>	<u>580.0</u>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>42.0</u>	<u>26.0</u>
Own financing	2.0	153.1	-	-	1.8
Loans from metropolitan Portugal	737.5	426.9	31.0	42.0	24.2

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(UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
COVERING AIRGRAM)



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

119254

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LITON IMMEDIATE  
INFO: Amembassy KINSHASA ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY  
Amembassy BRUSSELS ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY

STATE 9254

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

02

1. FYI. Rumors received various sources indicate Tshombe/military coup plot planned for July 17 or 21 in Congo. Plan would be to stage comeback in Lubumbashi with ultimate objective of reinstating Tshombe as Prime Minister of Congo. Base of support would be certain mercenaries presently in Congo plus others still in South Africa. Rationale for coup would be disorder, supposed drift leftward of Mobutu regime and allegation Tshombe illegally deprived of office. Plot allegedly has support of certain SAC, SR and Angolan authorities and supposedly financed by private interests. Alleged Portuguese involvement said to consist of sympathetic response from Government of Angola (sic) to approach by plotters. Angola will allegedly supply arms and a base as a springboard for operations. Base thought to be Henriques de Carvalho. Coincidentally one of Mobutu's crimes in eyes of plotters is that he permitting terrorist camps to be based in Congo for action against Angola.

2. FYI. We have informed Mobutu and COB of rumored plot and restated to Mobutu US support central government. ~~END FYI.~~

ENDORS

Drafted by:

Tel. Ex

Telegraphic transmission and

AFCM:ADHerlind:mr 7/16/66

7738

classification approved by:

AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

AFCM - LDBrown

~~AFCM:ADHerlind:mr~~

EUR - WISTWASSAL, Jr. (In Sub)

s/s - Mr. Thompson

SPP-Mr. Ortiz

~~SECRET~~





# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

FILE COPY  
09685

BATOR  
BOWDIE  
BOWMAN  
BUDGET  
HAYNES  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
JORDEN  
KEENEY  
KOMER  
MOYERS  
TAYLOR  
WRIGGINS

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON IMMEDIATE

FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By W, NARA, Date 3-9-00

657 JUN 15 12 41 PM '66

1. Upon receipt of signed original of President's reply dated June 10, 1966, to Prime Minister Salazar's letter of May 11, 1966, you should request an appointment with the Prime Minister to deliver the letter personally.
2. In presenting the President's reply to the Prime Minister, you should state the President: (a) was pleased to receive the Prime Minister's thoughtful letter; (b) carefully reflected on its contents; (c) was pleased to learn that the Prime Minister had been counselling moderation in Salisbury and <sup>that Prime Minister</sup> believes the Rhodesians desire successful conversations with the British; (d) was encouraged by resumption of talks looking toward peaceful solution of Rhodesian problem.
3. You should also inform the Prime Minister that: (a) we are confident the British are seriously interested in moving toward a settlement of the Rhodesian question in their talks with the Rhodesians, and (b) we believe that the British regret the situation

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:RLFunseth:mbs 6/13/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EWK U - The Under Secretary

EUR - Mr. Stoessel

AF - Mr. McElhiney (draft) The White House  
Mr. Hamilton

IO - Mr. ~~POPPER~~ Popper (draft) S/S - Mr. Walsh

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Handled as Lmdis per S/S -

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

has evolved in such a way as to strain British relations with Portugal.  
FYI Under Secretary agreed to British Ambassador Dean's request that  
these two points be made when responding to Prime Minister. END FYI.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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2-RIT.

4/0

June 14, 1966

Date

F9

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to Lisbon

*Cleared as  
amended.*

*EJH*

*6-15-66*

DETERMINED TO BE AN ~~SECRET~~  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING CLASSIFICATION  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY 19 ON 4-17-89

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUN 14 PM 5 51



Hand

~~1. Haynes~~

2. Return to BKS

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy LISBON IMMEDIATE

FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. GuidelinesBy *JW*, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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2. In presenting the President's reply to the Prime Minister, you should state the President: (a) was pleased to receive the Prime Minister's thoughtful letter; (b) carefully reflected on its contents; (c) was pleased to learn that the Prime Minister had been counselling moderation in Salisbury and <sup>that Prime Minister</sup> believes the Rhodesians desire successful conversations with the British; (d) was encouraged by resumption of talks looking toward peaceful solution of Rhodesian problem.
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EUR:WE:ELFunseth:mhs 6/13/66

KNE U - The Under Secretary

EUR - Mr. Stoessel

AF - Mr. McElhinney (draft) The White House -

IO - Mr. ~~SENEB~~ Popper (draft) S - Mr. Walsh~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

WORK COPY

2

Ambassy LISBON

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

has evolved in such a way as to strain British relations with Portugal.

FYI Under Secretary agreed to British Ambassador Dean's request that these two points be made when responding to Prime Minister. END FYI.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~  
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

14405

MAY 24 5 45 PM '66

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 590

Info:

INFO: USUN 2739

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By: jd, NARA, Date 3-9-00

NODIS

Portuguese Ambassador called on President ~~May 16~~ <sup>May 16</sup>

~~xxxx~~ to deliver letter from Salazar on Rhodesia (text by SEPTTEL - Deptel 573).

In delivering letter, Garin said Portugal was concerned and alarmed re Rhodesian problem. Portugal had hoped follow policy of neutrality but found herself involved more than she wished. SC resolution was unfair and unjust against Portugal; draft prepared by African countries for discussion SC meeting tomorrow was extreme statement which deeply troubled Portugal.

Garin also stated that British Government was presently undertaking serious military preparations with view to carrying out military intervention in Rhodesia. He mentioned presence UK fleet units in Mozambique channel; surveillance of port of Beira, reports of British troop movements and

Drafted by:

EUR:WJStoessel, Jr.: AMR 4224

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Hamilton

S/S Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

and shipment of heavy equipment from England. If British planned to invade Rhodesia, there would be three possible approaches: through Zambia, South Africa or Mozambique. Given port and rail facilities as well as pipeline through Mozambique, latter was "ideal way for invasion of Rhodesia", and Portugal is alarmed by reports she is receiving. If invasion occurs, Portugal would resist, South Africa would become involved and US would be affected by resulting conflagration. Garin stressed Portugal's hope for successful outcome negotiations on Rhodesia between UK and Rhodesia and said that Salazar is requesting President to exercise his influence to insure this.

President said he would be very pleased read Salazar's message and it would be given careful study. He hoped that situation would not develop in manner outlined by Garin and would be resolved in peaceful manner through negotiations.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*



~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

May 16, 1966

1437

20

~~1. Bratos~~  
2. Ret.

To: Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

From: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

F  
S

For White House approval  
prior to transmission.

Attachment:

Cable to Amembassy LISBON.

5/25/66  
Cleared w/88 after  
discussion with Mr. Rostow.  
by EKH.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY hgy ON 4-17-89



RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 17 AM 9 02

426

~~SECRET~~ACTION: ~~Ambassador~~ LISBONDECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

NODIS

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EUR:WJStoessel, Jr.: AMR 4224

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

S/S

~~SECRET~~

2

Embassy LISBON

~~SECRET~~

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END

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

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426  
THE WHITE HOUSE—  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1966

FOR MR. ROSTOW -

Walt:

Our wires got somehow crossed on the attached cable for clearance. I thought that you and Francis had made a deal <sup>on it</sup> with Ben Read, but I was apparently confused.

Since you were at the meeting between the President and the Portuguese Ambassador, could you glance over this and see whether it is a faithful report? I think it is still worth sending for the Ambassador's information.



Ed Hamilton

Attachment:

Draft cable to Amemb. Lisbon.

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

07987

002

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80  
Origin  
55  
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy LISBON 497

INFO: AmEmbassy LONDON 6080

APR 14 8 00 PM '66

EXDIS

REF: EMBTEL 572 rptd London 84

Department does not consider time now appropriate explore mediation efforts described REFTEL in support possibility of UK-Rhodesian negotiations. Whether mediation becomes possibility depends largely on British attitude. We will be talking with British soon about their plans and DEPTTEL 6034 to London reports our suggestions to Australians in regard to their possible efforts.

You should continue your efforts to urge GOP to avoid breaching embargo on Rhodesia.

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

Drafted by: **Rewritten in U**  
**M:JDJohnston:sb**

Tel. Ext. **2157**  
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

**The Under Secretary**

Clearances:

**BNA - Mr. Shullaw**  
**WE - Mr. Anderson**  
**AFC - Mr. McElhiney**

**AF - Mr. Palmer**  
**WE - Mr. Funseth**  
**EUR - Mr. Stoessel**

**M - Mr. Mann**  
**S/S - Mr. Grey**  
**AFC - Mr. Hogniger**

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~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE ☐ COMACT  
☐ CABLE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44  
14973

91-82

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ACTION: Ambassador LISBON

400

FEB 28 5 49 PM '68

AGREEMENT CHANNEL

DEPTEL 362

It is now clear Bennett will not repeat not be able arrive Lisbon before end of May. Consequently we would be most grateful if you would extend until May 15. Recognize personal inconvenience this may involve, but know you will understand importance minimizing gap between your departure and Bennett's arrival.

Palmer's reply your letter February 10 follows.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-128  
By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

Drafted by

O/DG:SPalmer:gm 2/28/66

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by

O/DG - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Classification

U - Mr. Springsteen  
(cleared in substance)

EUR - Mr. Leddy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM 048 05-322



## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

84

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON

PRIORITY 174

Oct 19

6 21 PM '65

SS  
Info:

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-128

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

FOR AMBASSADOR

Upon return FonMin to Portugal, you should seek earliest opportunity to continue discussion illegal export seven B-26 with FonMin. Your presentation should be oral and no rpt no written memorandum should be given to him or other Portuguese official. Instructions follow:

1. You should inform FonMin that you have been instructed to continue conversation he had with Secretary, October 9, as well as your last conversation, September 30, prior his departure for U.N.
2. Express appreciation that GOP has conducted an investigation, and that GOP is willing cooperate in investigating illegal export. FYI You may, at your discretion, express appreciation for copy of Hamilton letter to Portuguese Embassy and copy of Luber contract. END FYI.
3. State that certain new factors have come to our attention as result of study terms PAF-Luber contract and statements of defendants indicted at Buffalo, October 8, which we would like bring to attention of FonMin:

(a) ~~State~~ Contract signed by PAF and Luber has as one of its conditions that aircraft and spare parts have "Federal Aviation Agency" air worthiness certification. Contract states that aircraft ~~skat~~ should have ~~xxxx~~ "suffered

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:RLFunseth:mhs 10/15/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances:

WE - Mr. Anderson  
G/PM - Capt. Coward, USN.  
MC - Mr. Reiger  
L/EUR - Mr. Reis

EUR - Mr. Stoessel  
AFC - Mr. Brown  
UNP - Mr. Dean

S/S - Mr. Thompson  
G - Ambassador Thompson

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

no accidents after the date of guaranty certificate issued by Federal Aviation Agency." Air worthiness certificates for each of seven aircraft delivered to PAF had certificates issued by U.S. FAA in 1965, prior flights to Portugal. This explicit condition of sale in contract would seem indicate that Portuguese officials signing contract on behalf GOP knew country of origin was U.S. These certificates only issued for aircraft from U.S. If aircraft had come from other country, no FAA certificate could have been issued. ~~XXXXX~~ (When issuing ~~certificates~~ ~~certificates~~ FAA had no way of knowing aircraft were for export) ~~XXXXXX~~.

(b) Further indication that PAF officials directly concerned were aware of possible U.S. origin is supported by pilot's statements that he flew first aircraft direct from U.S. to Portugal with refueling stops in Newfoundland and Santa Maria, arriving at Tancos, June 4. He has stated that he discussed flight with PAF officers and was given guidance (code word "Sparrow," radio/frequencies) ~~XXXXXX~~ to facilitate future flights. He has also stated that two PAF officers escorted him from Tancos to Lisbon, assisted in purchasing a one-way Lisbon-New York SwissAir ticket for him and saw him off on flight ~~for New York~~ at Lisbon airport.

Defendants

(c) ~~Defendants~~ have also been indicted for making at least two other flights to Portugal in a C-46 aircraft, in which they illegally transported B-26 spare parts and armaments from U.S. to Portugal in fulfillment of same contract.

4. In view foregoing, and in particular, fact that provisions of PAF-Luber contract required a U.S.G. air-worthiness certificate immediately prior delivery, and pilot's statement of open discussions with PAF officials on flight plans, seems evident that Portuguese officials who were most directly involved in transaction, had every

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~~SECRET~~

reason suppose aircraft were coming from U.S. For these new reasons, USG hopes that FonMin would wish determine if his government does not rpt not now wish reexamine its position in this matter. END INSTRUCTIONS.

FYI We recognize very difficult and delicate task you are undertaking and of only slim chance we can persuade GOP to reconsider its position. Intent our continuing discussions with GOP is also to make absolutely sure they have clear understanding that up to now, USG has not rpt not found their explanations satisfactory and that we view episode as grave matter. We do not rpt not wish give them any pretext for believing we intend drop matter, at same time we would not rpt not wish indicate what we may ultimately do. Further purpose our instructions is to provide GOP opportunity face-saving exit without directly involving PriMin or FonMin. We believe it is important that for time being this whole matter be discussed separately from proposal for Portuguese Africa and Azores question. END FYI.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

14197  
SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~

Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON

IMMEDIATE

122

SEP 25 4 10 PM '65

LIMDIS

040

Subject: Illegal Transfer B-26 Aircraft to Portugal

FOR AMBASSADOR

You should seek appointment at earliest possible date with Foreign Minister and make the below listed points. Your presentation should be oral and no rpt no written memorandum of any kind should be given to him or other Portuguese official. Instructions follow:

1. You should inform Fonmin that you have been instructed to discuss a grave matter with him on urgent basis.
2. You may state that Fonmin is undoubtedly aware of press reports originating from the U.S. of the arrest of persons in the U.S. charged with smuggling surplus-type military aircraft from the U.S. to foreign countries, in contravention U.S. laws and that attorney of defendants has told newsmen one of his clients flew seven B-26 bombers to Portugal and delivered them to Portuguese Air Force officers.

3. You have been instructed to inform Fonmin that U.S., as friend and ally of Portugal, wishes to bring to GOP attention following information pertaining to this case:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 00-128

a. On September 17,

By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

EUR:WE:RL:Emseth:mhs 9/24/65

classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

G/PM G. M. Amb. Thompson

EUR - Mr. Laddy

MC - Mr. Reiger (in substance)

UNP - Miss Brown

AFC - Mr. Brown

(in draft)

U.S. Customs (through MC - Mr. Reiger)

S/S - Mr. Gordon

~~SECRET~~

EUR - Mr. Stoessel

WE - Mr. McKillop

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~~SECRET~~

a. On September 17, John Hawke, a British subject, and Henri de Montmarin, a French national, were arrested in Miami, Florida, charged with illegally transferring seven B-26 (also known as A-26) ~~xxxxx~~ aircraft from the U.S. to Portugal. An American, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Gregory Board, ~~has~~ has also been charged with same offense but as of September 24, had not rpt ~~not~~ not been apprehended. A public hearing has been scheduled September 30, to determine jurisdiction of case, with court action of case to follow soon after.

b. Hawke, the pilot, has informed U.S. officials that he flew seven B-26 aircraft (he provided serial numbers of aircraft) to Tancos AFB, arriving there on June 4, June 25, July 4, July 18, August 6, August 15 and August 20. He provided serial numbers of aircraft. He stated on his arrival at Tancos, June 4, with first aircraft, he was met by ~~E~~ Colonel Rodriguez, base commander, and others. He stated on June 5, he met and discussed his flight with Lieutenant Colonel ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Mourao, Chief, Portuguese Air Force Intelligence Section and other Portuguese officials. He stated five of seven flights were made via Santa Maria. It is alleged that delivery to Portuguese Air Force was through an intermediary.

c. During impending court proceedings, which in U.S. are public trials, details of case will receive wide publicity. Defense attorney has already intimidated <sup>that</sup> <sup>are</sup> to newsmen/his clients/<sup>involves</sup> persons of "little importance" involved in case which/~~involves~~ highly placed officials. Presumably, he is referring to Portuguese officials Hawke alleges to have met in Portugal.

4. You should inform Fonmin ~~obvious that~~ there apparently existed an elaborately conceived scheme to smuggle aircraft outside of USG in contravention US laws

~~SECRET~~

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laws and that USG would greatly appreciate GOP assistance in getting to bottom of this criminal conspiracy against USG. We would appreciate Fonmin requesting that appropriate GOP officials undertake to verify whether such aircraft have in fact ~~arrived~~ arrived in Portugal. If it is found that the ~~air~~ aircraft did in fact land in Portugal, as alleged, USG would assume GOP prepared extend its cooperation in arranging for their immediate return to ~~XX~~ USG custody.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

01290

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By yw, NARA, Date 3-9-00

MAY 4 4 25 PM '65

83

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LISBON 610

EUR

Info:

INFO: AmConsul LUANDA (POUCH)  
Amconsul LOURENCO MARQUES (POUCH)

SS

G

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DOD

Re Embtel 700, Minister-Counselor Rosa called on Deputy Assistant SecState under Westerfield, ~~under~~ instructions, re UPI interview Governor Williams in which "other sources" quoted as saying Johnson administration formulating new policy for Africa which would focus on Portuguese Africa. Rosa said GOP interested in knowings: (1) Reasons USG now focusing on Portuguese Africa; (2) How would ~~USG~~ <sup>stated</sup> USG concern for Portuguese Africa be translated into action.

Westerfield replied we are in process taking over-all look at our African policies, examining what we have done and what we should do. While he did not rpt not know accuracy of news report, could say that there was no particular focus or emphasis on Portuguese Africa ~~but~~ but it obviously included in general review. He emphasized continuing USG concern over southern Africa, including Portuguese territories and said we would like very much see peoples of Angola and Mozambique and Portugal enter into a dialogue toward a mutually agreed solution.

Rosa asked if Westerfield could deny that Governor Williams was source of paragraph in article which said USG policy concern in months ahead will focus on east and southern Africa with special emphasis on Portuguese territories.

Westerfield replied he

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

~~EUR, WE, RL, Funseth:mhs~~ 5/4/65

classification approved by:

WE - Edgar J. Beigel

AF - Mr. Westerfield

AFC - Mr. High

AF/P - Mr. Kent

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Westerfield replied he not rpt not present during press interview and could not say this, but he could deny that any fixed priorities have been established and he was sure ~~was~~ neither Governor Williams nor African Bureau prepared at this time say any particular problem in Africa had top priority. He could not rpt not predict outcome of present study.

Meeting concluded with restatement GOP position in Africa by Rosa.

END

Pouchrd by OCT

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



48

Circular Cable



EHD

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY FOR INFO 165 DEC 17 20 10

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ZEN/AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH

ZEN/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA FLASH

ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH

ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE FLASH

ZEN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT FLASH

ZEN/AMEMBASSY BONN FLASH

INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

ZEN/AMCONSUL SALISBURY IMMEDIATE

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CIRCULAR 1165 DECEMBER 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECEMBER 17

INFORMATION LONDON AND SALISBURY. ALL OTHERS ACTION.

OIL EMBARGO

DEPTTEL 271 TO LISBON, PRETORIA 987, LONDON 3390; DEPTTEL 2641 TO PARIS, THE HAGUE 375, KUWAIT 75, LISBON 267, LONDON 3305, PRETORIA 969.

1. UK OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SR EXPECTED BE ANNOUNCED AFTERNOON DEC 17 WASHINGTON AND LONDON CONCURRENTLY WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OIL AIRLIFT TO ZAMBIA. US ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUPPORT THESE MEASURES ALSO EXPECTED DEC 17. UK WILL REQUEST SUPPORT ALL GOVTS WITH WHICH RELATIONS MAINTAINED.

2. FOR PRETORIA AND LISBON - SUCCESS OF OIL EMBARGO DEPENDENT TO LARGE EXTENT ON SAG AND GOP ATTITUDE. YOUR UK COLLEAGUE WILL BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEMARCHE TO SAG AND GOP ANNOUNCING EMBARGO AND STRESSING UK DETERMINATION TO END SR REBELLION. UK AMBASSADOR WILL ASK FORMALLY FOR SUPPORT THESE TWO GOVTS STRESSING TO SAG RECOGNITION BY UK OF ANNOUNCED POLICY OF NORMAL BUSINESS RELATIONS (WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE OIL) AND TO GOP DESIRABILITY OF ASSISTING IN KEEPING LINES COMMUNICATION OPEN TO ZAMBIA TO HELP IN MAINTAINING STABLE GOVT AND ECONOMY THERE.

3. FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES - YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH YOUR UK COLLEAGUE ON TIMING AND CONTENT US SUPPORTING APPROACH TO HOST GOVERNMENT AND PROCEED ACCORDINGLY.

GP-3

BT

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED  
HCA

49  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jn, NARA, Date 3-9-00

S

CAP CABLES

50