



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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October 30, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira
Requests Appointment with You

Acting on instructions of Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Ambassador Garin has requested an appointment for the Foreign Minister with you during the week of November 6, 1967. On his last visit to Washington in June, 1965, he was received by Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House.

The Foreign Minister will arrive in the United States November 5 and plans to remain in this country for approximately two weeks. He has accepted invitations to address the National Press Club in Washington, November 8 and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, November 16.

Upon confirmation of the appointment, we will prepare briefing material.

/s/ George E. Kelly

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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
7116
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520
1-7-68
2-11-68

July 2, 1968
54

Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

Attached is a copy of our telegram
to Embassy Lisbon requesting that
appropriate courtesies be extended to
Mr. Gerald Mann, in response to your
request of today's date.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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Amembassy LISBON

STATE

1. The Postmaster General has informed the Department that his friend Mr. Gerald Mann, is arriving at Lisbon on Monday, July 8, and will be at the Este Rio del Sol Hotel in Este Rio Lisbon.
2. Request that appropriate courtesies be extended to Mr. Mann.

END

S/S - WSShepard 7/2/68 7741
XXXX

S/S - WSShepard

EUR - Mr. Waller

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1422
55
Ruth - BKS had gone so I gave orig to WWR + kept a copy for BKS for Mon. A.M.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Portuguese Ambassador Garin

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Portuguese Ambassador Garin for 10-15 minutes to permit him to deliver a personal letter to you from Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Under instructions from Prime Minister Salazar, the Portuguese Ambassador has requested an urgent appointment to deliver to you a letter from Dr. Salazar concerning the situation in Rhodesia and southern Africa, preferably before the meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the Rhodesian question, May 17. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira, informed Ambassador Anderson in Lisbon, May 11, that the Portuguese share the U.S. concern over the potentially explosive situation in southern Africa. He said Dr. Salazar hopes that even though you are very busy, you would personally be able to receive Ambassador Garin to accept the letter.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

At the present time, continued Portuguese cooperation is important to us in achieving our objectives in Africa and in Europe. Because of the location of the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola on the east and west coasts of Africa, bordering Southern Rhodesia, we need Portuguese assistance in order to help the British achieve success in restoring constitutional rule in Rhodesia. Likewise in Europe, it is equally important that we have Portuguese support in reaching a solution to the Franco-NATO problem.

An additional consideration in support of your briefly receiving Ambassador Garin, is that this is the first such request from Prime Minister Salazar in many years and the first he has asked of you. A denial might have an unfortunate effect on his attitude towards us during this critical period. On the other hand, it could be ten or fifteen minutes well-invested from the point of our national interest.

Langdon Ball
for Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S-16943

January 9, 1969

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: President's Appointment with Ambassador
Bennett, Thursday, January 16 at 1:00 p.m.

The President has agreed to receive the United States Ambassador to Portugal, the Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Thursday, January 16 at 1:00 p.m. The President last met with Ambassador Bennett on June 5, 1968.

This will be a courtesy call and the Ambassador does not plan to raise any questions of substance. Since the President's last meeting with Ambassador Bennett, the Prime Minister of Portugal, Dr. Salazar, suffered a serious brain hemorrhage and has been replaced as Prime Minister by Professor Marcello Caetano. The transition has been uneventful and, although giving the impression of being personally somewhat more flexible, Caetano's policies do not appear to differ radically from those of his predecessor.

A brief biographic sketch of Ambassador Bennett is enclosed.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch of
Ambassador Bennett.

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1969 JAN 9 PM 3 13

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

OF

THE HONORABLE W. TAPLEY BENNETT, JR.

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. ("Tap") was born in Griffin, Georgia, April 1, 1917. He graduated from Griffin High School, received a B.A. from the University of Georgia in 1937 and an LLB from George Washington University in 1948. He also attended the University of Freiburg, the University of Georgia Law School and American University.

Mr. Bennett is married to Margaret Rutherford White, daughter of the late U.S. Ambassador John Campbell White. They have five children: W. Tapley III, age 20; John C. W., age 18; twin daughters Anne B. and Ellen P., ages 15; Victoria R., age 13.

Mr. Bennett was an instructor in political science at the University of Georgia in 1937 and was in U.S. Army Intelligence in the Panama Canal Zone and the European Theater, 1944-46, entering as a Private and leaving as a First Lieutenant.

His government service began in 1940 at the Department of Agriculture. He joined the State Department in 1946 and has held numerous positions, principally in Latin American Affairs, including Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs in 1951. Ambassador Bennett served as Political Counselor in Vienna and Rome and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Athens before his nomination as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic in 1961. He was sworn in as Ambassador to Portugal, June 7, 1966. He is a 1955 graduate of the National War College.

He is a member of the Georgia Bar Association, Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Delta Phi, as well as other professional and social clubs and associations.

Ambassador Bennett delivered the 1966 Commencement Address and received an Honorary Doctor's Degree at Indiana State University, June 5, 1966.

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S/S-8113

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 31, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Appointment with Ambassador
Bennett, Wednesday, June 5 at 5:30 p.m.

I am providing below background information for possible use by the President at his meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, The Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Wednesday, June 5 at 5:30 p.m. The President last met with Ambassador Bennett a year ago on June 6.

1. U.S.-Portuguese Relations--U.S. support for self-determination for the Portuguese African territories and our policy of preventing military equipment of U.S. origin from being obtained either by the Portuguese or various nationalist forces for use in conflicts in Portuguese Africa have caused a continued coolness in our political relations. Despite this strain, the Portuguese support U.S. policy in Viet-Nam and, within the context of their limited resources, remain committed to NATO. They are apprehensive about the presence of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

2. Economic Questions--The Portuguese have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on the balance of payments program, even though they are concerned about the effects the restrictions may have on tourism and bank lending and supported us on the establishment of special drawing rights in the IMF. They took the same position as the U.S. following the devaluation of the British pound; there is continuing expansion of trade between the two countries; they went along with the Findley Amendment barring sales to North Viet-Nam and restricting sales to Cuba.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 3-9-00

3. Azores -- We continue our de facto provisional peacetime use of the various military facilities on the Azores. There has been no substantive response from the Portuguese to our long-standing offer to discuss a longterm extension of that part of the agreement which expired December, 1962. (The agreement for U.S. use of the Azores during war in which the U.S. and Portugal are allied is for the duration of NATO. That part of the agreement permitting U.S. forces to be stationed and operate in the Azores in peacetime is what we wish to renew. As a result, the Portuguese could revoke our peacetime use at anytime, even though we would be entitled to a period of six months to one year for evacuation.)

4. Portuguese Africa -- During the past year, the military situation in Angola and Mozambique has remained in balance, with the Portuguese keeping pace with some increase in insurgency pressures and remaining in control of the threat. In Portuguese Guinea, however, the insurgent threat has mounted significantly with the guerrillas making progress in their attempts to control the countryside but with the Portuguese remaining in control of population centers. (Since the President last saw Ambassador Bennett, the Ambassador made a six-week, 25,000 mile trip to Angola, Mozambique and to eight independent African countries, July 23-September 2, 1967. Portuguese President Thomaz visited Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, January 29-February 21, 1968.)

5. Salazar Celebrates 40 Years in Office -- On April 27, Prime Minister Salazar completed 40 years as the leading member of the Portuguese Government; on the following day, April 28, he celebrated his 79th birthday. Although there is continued speculation about a successor, no single serious candidate has emerged nor is there any indication that Dr. Salazar intends to retire.

6. Non-proliferation treaty -- Because of its concern over what it regards as inadequate security guarantees for non-nuclear powers, Portugal is expected to abstain when the NPT resolution is voted on in the U.N. General Assembly.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSEDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. GuidelinesBy ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00Subject: Resumption of Negotiations with
Portugal on Air Transport Services

Our negotiations with Portugal on a new Air Transport Services Agreement will resume at Lisbon on January 13. As pointed out in my memoranda of October 22, and November 8, 1968, our first round of talks at Washington was adjourned without agreement. The principal problem was that the Portuguese delegation had been unable, within the framework of their instructions, to accept any arrangement which did not provide for unilateral control over new capacity, so as to enable them to protect their carrier, TAP, during its developmental period in transatlantic operations. Our willingness to agree to a variety of other methods for protecting TAP without compromising our Bermuda principles on capacity, therefore, was not acceptable. There was also disagreement, of lesser significance, on both routes and the number of carriers which might be designated. Both delegations agreed to report the results of the talks to their governments and request further instructions. Subsequently, the Portuguese proposed the resumption of the talks at Lisbon.

Our Embassy at Lisbon reports that the Portuguese will be entering this new round of talks ready to accept a new agreement incorporating our Bermuda principles if they can obtain a satisfactory confidential side arrangement on capacity control for a certain period. The Portuguese are developing proposals along these lines to present to us, but it is not clear yet if they will prove acceptable. If this second round of talks fails, it is possible that for tactical reasons Portugal may denounce the existing Agreement.

The White House will be kept informed of any significant developments in the negotiations.

BHR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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59

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Monday, January 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador W. Tapley
Bennett, Thursday, January 16 1:00 p.m.

Bennett has been our Ambassador to Portugal since June 1966. You last met with him in June 1968. Since then, Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar suffered a serious brain hemorrhage and was replaced by Professor Marcello Caetano. The transition has been uneventful so far. Although Caetano gives the impression of being somewhat more flexible than Salazar, his policies appear to differ little from those of his predecessor.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador Bennett is attached.

W. W. Rostow

JKN:mm

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Ambassador Bennett delivered the 1966 Commencement Address and received an Honorary Doctor's Degree at Indiana State University, June 5, 1966.

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S/S-16943

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 9, 1969

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Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch of
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1969 JAN 9 PM 3 13

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14743

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 8, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Negotiations With Portugal on Air Transport
Services

As you know from my memorandum of October 22, Delegations from the United States and Portugal met in Washington beginning on October 14 with the objective of negotiating a new Air Transport Service Agreement to replace the current Agreement. The meetings concluded on October 23 without agreement.

From the start, the Portuguese insisted that any new Agreement should provide for unilateral control of capacity. They added that it was not their intention to use this control to freeze United States capacity; they would, they said, allow United States participation in this growing market to the extent that the Portuguese carrier could not provide the capacity required.

The United States took the position that, in accord with our air transport policy, the new Agreement should incorporate, as does our current Agreement with Portugal and all our other bilateral Air Transport Service Agreement, the Bermuda principles. Under these principles, control of capacity cannot be exercised unilaterally.

The United States Delegation sought to demonstrate that the Bermuda principles could not work to the detriment of the Portuguese and, moreover, would be more beneficial to the Portuguese than the very scheme of capacity apportionment they had put forward.

The United States Delegation expressed its understanding of and sympathy for the position of the Portuguese carrier which is just now initiating its services over the Atlantic. Further, the U.S. Delegation proposed a variety of accommodations designed to stabilize the market during a so-called development period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By yw, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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The Portuguese rejected these proposals on the grounds that it would not give them the veto they desired on capacity introduction.

The delegations also differed on two other aspects of a new Agreement, routes and the number of carriers each party might designate, but these were of secondary importance to the capacity issue and probably could be negotiated if that issue were resolved.

Prior to these discussions, the Portuguese had told Embassy Lisbon that they were prepared to denounce the current Agreement if they could not obtain a new Agreement that met their demands. They did not mention denunciation during the recently concluded discussions.

The Delegations agreed to report the results of the talks to their Government for further instructions.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


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1. ~~Frank~~
2. Ret.
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October 22, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Negotiations with Portugal on
Air Transport Services

The United States and Portugal began negotiations in Washington on October 14 on a new Air Transport Service Agreement to replace the current Agreement. The Government of Portugal requested these negotiations.

Enclosed for your information is a paper describing the probable issues of the negotiations. If the delegations come to an accord on an Agreement, it will be on an ad referendum basis, and approval will be sought in accordance with current procedures.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Paper describing probable
issues of the negotiations

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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1968 OCT 22 PM 8 00

United States-Portugal Air Transport Negotiations

Portugal has requested negotiations with a view to concluding a new bilateral Air Transport Agreement to replace the current Agreement, which came into force in 1945, with amendments in 1947 and 1953. The current Agreement, as amended, includes the standard Bermuda provisions, which under the US interpretation and traditional usage prohibits a priori restrictions on airline services.

Since 1966 the Portuguese have sought to impose unilateral restrictions on capacity, an action that would be in contravention of the Bermuda principles. In May of that year, in return for approving a modest increase in summer frequencies for TWA, Portugal obtained a US understanding (Memorandum of Consultation) that a priori consultations on proposed capacity would be held on request, but if no agreement were reached in the consultations the proposed capacity could go into effect.

In April 1968, the Portuguese Airline (TAP) began operation on the Transatlantic route for the first time with its own equipment. Three days earlier, the Government of Portugal informed the United States that the 23 weekly frequencies of Pan American and TWA were excessive, requested consultation pursuant to the 1966 Memorandum of Consultation and approved the increased summer schedules only to the end of May. Consultations in May reached no solution because the United States insisted that the traffic justified that number of frequencies while Portugal insisted on protection of TAP's nascent service. In June, Portugal requested the negotiations that are about to take place and informed TWA and PAA that their summer frequencies had to be cut back on August 1.

It is our view that Portugal hopes through these negotiations to obtain either agreement on unilateral restriction of capacity or at least some US accommodation that would postpone full application of the Bermuda principles. The United States delegation has been instructed not to depart from US aviation policy, which calls for acceptance of the Bermuda principles. If necessary, the US delegation may offer an accommodation whereby, for a reasonable period of time, the United States will accept stabilization of our air service or a program of controlled increases, or a combination of both.

Should Portugal wish to denounce the Agreement despite this US accommodation, the US delegation has been instructed to inform the Portuguese that they could not expect to restrict the US carriers in a no-agreement situation without the US reciprocating against the Portuguese carrier. (Embassy Lisbon reported to us that the Portuguese have said that they would denounce the current Agreement if they were unable to obtain a new Agreement providing unilateral restriction of service; and that operations without an Agreement would be preferable to operation under the current Agreement.)

Among other issues in these negotiations, expected to be of lesser importance than capacity, are (1) the modernization of the text of the existing 1945 Agreement, (2) the number of carriers each country may designate (the Portuguese draft Agreement proposes only one) and (3) routes modifications.

The consultations are expected to have no political overtones. Indeed, the Portuguese have told Embassy Lisbon that if they were to denounce the Agreement, it would be an act of no hostile content.

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Monday, September 16, 1968
8:15 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**As the attached telegrams
indicate, Prime Minister Salazar,
an old economics professor that
made good, appears to have had
a dangerous relapse.**

W. W. Rostow

**Lisbon 1952
Lisbon 1953**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DLH, NARA, Date 4-18-89

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1968 SEP 16 20 45

ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,GPM 04,H 02,
INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,RSR 01,/079 W

O 162035Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2483

Ristor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1952

SUBJECT: SALAZAR'S CONDITION

AS OF 9 PM LOCAL TIME, HAVE REPORT FROM DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUE
BASED ON SOURCE HE CONSIDERS ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE THAT THERE IS
NO HOPE FOR PRIME MINISTER'S SURVIVAL AND WHOLE GOVERNMENT
AND COUNCIL OF STATE HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED. MEDICAL BULLETIN
EXPECTED BEFORE MIDNIGHT.

BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *MA* NARA, Date *3-9-00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jw, NARA, Date 3-9-00

PAGE 01 LISBON 01953 162300Z

92
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, RSR 01, /079 W

O 162250Z SEP 53

FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2404

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1953

SUBJ: SALAZAR SUCCESSION

REF: LISBON 1952

1. OTHER SOURCES CONFIRM INFO REFTL THAT AS OF 10:30 LOCAL TIME COUNCIL OF STATE AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS GATHERING AT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO CHOOSE SUCCESSOR TO PRIME MIN SALAZAR. DECISION EXPECTED THIS EVENING. SALAZAR'S CONDITION REPORTEDLY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.
2. ALL SECURITY FORCES ON LOW LEVEL ALERT. TOO EARLY FOR PUBLIC REACTION AS YET TO NEWS OF SALAZAR'S RELAPSE, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN LOW KEY ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT YET THAT SUCCESSION UNDER CONSIDERATION.
3. PORTUGUESE PRESS SOURCE REPORTS THAT FRONT RUNNERS FOR SUCCESSION BEFORE MEETING STARTS ARE LONG-TIME HEIR APPARENT MARCELO CAETANO, FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY STRONGMAN SANTOS COSTA AND CURRENT DEFENSE MINISTER GOMES DE ARAUJO. THESE THREE NAMES REPRESENT EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT TO GUARANTEE ORDERLY TRANSITION, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY PRIMARY CONCERN GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EXCLUSIVE LISTING.
4. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM WALK THROUGH POPULAR QUARTER OF ALFAMA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF STAFF AND I HAVE DRIVEN AROUND VARIOUS QUARTERS OF TOWN. TRAFFIC AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AS USUAL, SIDEWALK CAFES WELL PATRONIZED AND EVENING STROLLERS OUT IN FORCE. ATMOSPHERE AS OF NOW IS ONE OF NORMALCY

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PAGE 02 LISBON 01953 162300Z

IN STREETS.

BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Memo's & Misc.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT SS#8080

May 17, 1966

1450
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Rostow for
Clearance of

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

President's
Comment.

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

B/KS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of conversation
between the President and
Portuguese Ambassador Garin,
May 16, 1966

For approval prior to distribution.
The President's remark is sidelined in
blue.

OK ✓ called for s/s
5/18/66
JH

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS ENCLOSURE

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1966 MAY 18 AM 10 09

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Attachment Classification

N O D I S
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EXTREMELY SENSITIVE

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FROM:
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DATE:

COPY # _____

FOR: _____
(Please initial)

The attached document is of the highest sensitivity and no additional distribution may be made without the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of State.

This document should be returned in a sealed envelope to my office, Room 7224, by hand, within 48 hours of receipt.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

THIS COVER SHEET WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT
SHOULD BE HANDLED AS CONFIDENTIAL

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NO
DISTRIBUTION

Attachment Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8080

1450
64b**Memorandum of Conversation**

The White House

DATE: May 16, 1966
2:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Message to President from Prime Minister of Portugal concerning Rhodesia

U.S. Side

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Mr. Walter W. Rostow
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR)
Mr. Chester C. Carter (S/CPR)Portuguese Side:

Ambassador Garin

COPIES TO:

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White House
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USUN - Amb. GoldbergAmembassy LISBON-Amb. Anderson
LONDON-Amb. Bruce

Ambassador Garin said that he appreciated all of the demands on the President's time and therefore was most grateful that the President had been able to receive him. He then presented to the President an envelope which he said contained a letter from Prime Minister Salazar with regard to the Rhodesian problem, which was causing concern and alarm to Portugal.

The Ambassador said that Portugal had desired to follow a policy of neutrality in connection with Rhodesia and had been ready to accept the British contention that the matter was an internal problem for the UK to resolve. However, the Portuguese Government now found itself involved in the situation more than it had wished. The Security Council resolution against Portugal had been unfair and unjust. Now the SC would be meeting tomorrow to consider a draft resolution prepared by the African countries. This is an extreme resolution which would oblige the Portuguese to stop trade and other relations with Rhodesia and it caused Portugal much concern.

In addition, the Ambassador said, the British Government is now making serious military preparations with a view to military intervention

1966 MAY 16 PM 8 07

intervention in Rhodesia. A large part of the British fleet is in the Mozambique channel. The port of Beira is under surveillance and there are reports of British troop movements and shipment of heavy equipment from Portsmouth and Southampton. While much of this is based on rumor, the Portuguese have had many reports of this kind, which are most alarming.

If the British decide on intervention in Rhodesia, the Ambassador continued, there are three ways in which this could be carried out. The British troops could come through Zambia, but Kaunda has said that he does not wish this and will not permit his country to be a base of operations against Rhodesia. The British could attempt to come through South Africa, which would cause obvious problems. Lastly, they could come through Mozambique. With its port facilities, railways and pipeline, Mozambique is the ideal way for the invasion of Rhodesia.

The military action could come through a sudden unilateral move by the British or as a result of UN action. If the British attempt to enter Mozambique, the Portuguese would destroy the port facilities, South Africa would become involved, and "there would be a conflagration". The Ambassador thought that the U.S. inevitably would become involved.

For all these reasons, the Ambassador said, the Portuguese hope that the talks now going on between the British and the Rhodesians on Rhodesia will be successful. Prime Minister Salazar is asking the President in his letter to use his influence to this end.

In response, the President said he would be very happy to read the Prime Minister's letter, which would be given careful study. He hoped very much that the situation would not develop in the manner outlined by the Ambassador but that it would be resolved in a peaceful way through negotiations.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
CLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

65

May 17, 1966
Date

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For your information and
files.

Enclosures:

S/S 8080, CY 5

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
CLASSIFICATION

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY rg ON 4-18-89

650
F
55

Memorandum of Conversation

APPROVED BY WHITE HOUSE

5/18/66

The White House

DATE: May 16, 1966
2:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Message to President from Prime Minister of Portugal concerning Rhodesia

U.S. Side

Portuguese Side:

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mr. Walter W. Rostow
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR)
Mr. Chester C. Carter (S/CPR)

Ambassador Garin

COPIES TO: S/S
White House
EUR - Mr. Leddy
IO - Mr. Sisco
AF - Amb. Palmer
USUN - Amb. Goldberg

Amembassy LISBON-Amb. Anderson
LONDON-Amb. Bruce

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The Ambassador said that Portugal had desired to follow a policy of neutrality in connection with Rhodesia and had been ready to accept the British contention that the matter was an internal problem for the UK to resolve. However, the Portuguese Government now found itself involved in the situation more than it had wished. The Security Council resolution against Portugal had been unfair and unjust. Now the SC would be meeting tomorrow to consider a draft resolution prepared by the African countries. This is an extreme resolution which would oblige the Portuguese to stop trade and other relations with Rhodesia and it caused Portugal much concern.

In addition, the Ambassador said, the British Government is now making serious military preparations with a view to military intervention

FORM DS-1254
8-61

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

-2-

intervention in Rhodesia. A large part of the British fleet is in the Mozambique channel. The port of Beira is under surveillance and there are reports of British troop movements and shipment of heavy equipment from Portsmouth and Southampton. While much of this is based on rumor, the Portuguese have had many reports of this kind, which are most alarming.

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1422
66

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Portuguese Ambassador Garin

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Portuguese Ambassador Garin for 10-15 minutes to permit him to deliver a personal letter to you from Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Under instructions from Prime Minister Salazar, the Portuguese Ambassador has requested an urgent appointment to deliver to you a letter from Dr. Salazar concerning the situation in Rhodesia and southern Africa, preferably before the meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the Rhodesian question, May 17. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira, informed Ambassador Anderson in Lisbon, May 11, that the Portuguese share the U.S. concern over the potentially explosive situation in southern Africa. He said Dr. Salazar hopes that even though you are very busy, you would personally be able to receive Ambassador Garin to accept the letter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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
1966 MAY 14 PM 3 43

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

At the present time, continued Portuguese cooperation is important to us in achieving our objectives in Africa and in Europe. Because of the location of the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola on the east and west coasts of Africa, bordering Southern Rhodesia, we need Portuguese assistance in order to help the British achieve success in restoring constitutional rule in Rhodesia. Likewise in Europe, it is equally important that we have Portuguese support in reaching a solution to the Franco-NATO problem.

An additional consideration in support of your briefly receiving Ambassador Garin, is that this is the first such request from Prime Minister Salazar in many years and the first he has asked of you. A denial might have an unfortunate effect on his attitude towards us during this critical period. On the other hand, it could be ten or fifteen minutes well-invested from the point of our national interest.


for Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Let
WGB 67*

February 4, 1966

NOTE TO MR. BUNDY

*do
this* | Attached is the latest on the Bennett transfer. Maybe we should have raised this with the President yesterday. What do you think of having Linc Gordon see if Secretary Rusk will speak to the President. I can get Bunker to call the Secretary to urge that he do so.

WGB
WGBowdler

Go ahead ✓.

No, don't .

Attachment:

Cpy of AP 262, 2/3/66.

AP 262 Feb. 3

Ambassador Bennett
Lisbon, Portugal

Portuguese government censor allowed publication today of report indicating that William Tapley Bennett Jr. would be the next US Ambassador in Lisbon.

The permission to publish the news apparently meant Portugal had agreed to Washington's reassignment of the American Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to Lisbon.

US officials have said he is to get an unspecified new post.

"We have no objection to this news, but any confirmation must come from the US," a foreign ministry spokesman commented.

67a

AIRGRAM

POL 23-9 PORT

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	LUR	FC
ITA	FU	INT
IT	IT	IO
L	FRD	AIO
AGR	COM	FRD
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-420

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

TO : Department of State

COPY NO.

SERIES B.

FROM : Amembassy LISBON

DATE: May 9 1966

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

SUBJECT: Embassy Comment on [REDACTED] Planned Coup

REF :

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Your attention is invited to [REDACTED] information that a small number of Portuguese Army officers plan a coup to take place in late 1966 or early 1967.

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

It is not possible to determine the extent of involvement of people or units in this planned action; however it is reported to be a small force.

It is very probable that this revolt will not materialize according to plan for the following reasons:

A. The long period of time involved until action is initiated during which circumstances might change and influence the instigators to abandon the plan.

B. With the control and safeguards in effect under the present regime in Portugal against this type activity there is a good possibility that the plan would be compromised enabling the Government to prevent its initiation.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In☐ Out

Dated by:

DATT/Col WF Crowley *WFC*

Contents and Classification Approved by:

The Ambassador

Clearances:

POL/JMCIntyre; WMacLean; DCM/HRWellman *WMA*

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-187

By *Sj*, NARA, Date *11-10-01*


1966 MAY 10 PM 12 41

COPYFLO-PBR


~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

2

C. The eventual realization by the plotters that their plan is impractical due to the small military forces available to them might well influence them to cease their efforts in this enterprise.



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)



ANDERSON

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1966

Mr. Rostow:

Jim Jones in Marvin Watson's office has reserved 1:30 p.m. Monday for the Portuguese Ambassador to see the President in the event that is what you decide to do following receipt of Salazar's letter.

BKS
BKS

F BKS
69
Check with
Ben Read on
D.R.'s recommendation
and let
Jim Jones
know as
soon as
possible

also
inform
Amb. &
Port.
WJ

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Portuguese Ambassador Garin

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Portuguese Ambassador Garin for 10-15 minutes to permit him to deliver a personal letter to you from Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

At the present time, continued Portuguese cooperation is important to us in achieving our objectives in Africa and in Europe. Because of the location of the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola on the east and west coasts of Africa, bordering Southern Rhodesia, we need Portuguese assistance in order to help the British achieve success in restoring constitutional rule in Rhodesia. Likewise in Europe, it is equally important that we have Portuguese support in reaching a solution to the Franco-NATO problem.

An additional consideration in support of your briefly receiving Ambassador Garin, is that this is the first such request from Prime Minister Salazar in many years and the first he has asked of you. A denial might have an unfortunate effect on his attitude towards us during this critical period. On the other hand, it could be ten or fifteen minutes well-invested from the point of our national interest.

Langford Ball
for Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/5-8018

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1- Bator 9/16
2- lit.

71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 15 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call on the President by Portuguese
Ambassador, Dr. Vasco Vieira GARIN,
May 16.

The President has agreed to receive Dr. Vasco Vieira GARIN, the Ambassador of Portugal, May 16, for 10 to 15 minutes. Ambassador Garin requested the appointment under instructions from Prime Minister Salazar in order to deliver personally a letter to the President from Dr. Salazar concerning the situation in Rhodesia and the Security Council meeting on Rhodesia, May 17. He will be accompanied by Ambassador Symington and Acting Assistant Secretary Stoessel.

Dr. Garin presented his credentials to the President on April 8, 1964. The President last met him on May 5, 1966 when he was a guest at a luncheon given by Mr. Valenti and Ambassador Symington at the White House.

The President may wish to accept the letter from the Ambassador without commenting on it, other than to inform him that he will give it his careful attention.

The Ambassador may take the opportunity to repeat his remarks to the President of May 5 that: (a) Portugal was attempting to establish a multi-racial society in her African territories and that opposition to her efforts came from outside groups, supported by Communists from the Soviet Union, China and Cuba; and (b) Portugal hoped the President would use his influence to ensure a successful outcome of the U.K.-Rhodesian talks. He may also ask for U.S. support to block any moves to have

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By yw, NARA, Date 3-9-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the Security Council apply sanctions against Portugal in the Rhodesian crisis.

To such statements, I would suggest that the President reply to the Ambassador that in southern Africa the U.S. supports a peaceful solution based on self-determination. In Rhodesia, we believe it is in the mutual interest of the U.S. and Portugal that the British achieve success in restoring constitutional government in Rhodesia with provision for a transition to majority rule. This in turn would reduce pressures in the U.N. for broader and stronger resolutions. I believe it would be preferable to avoid any further reference to the impending Security Council meeting on Rhodesia until we have had an opportunity to study Dr. Salazar's letter. I would also suggest that the President express to the Ambassador our wish to maintain friendly and constructive relations with Portugal.

A brief biographic sketch is enclosed.

W. W. Humphreys
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch of
Ambassador Garin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
1966 MAY 18 AM 9 05

71a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Vasco Vieira GARIN
Ambassador of Portugal to the United States

Dr. Vasco Vieira GARIN (pronounced Gah-BEEN) presented his credentials as Ambassador of Portugal to the United States on April 8, 1964. Formerly, he had served as Portugal's permanent representative to the United Nations. He is personally friendly to the United States but in his exchanges with U.S. officials, he reflects his government's frustration and resentment over the U.S. policy of advocating self-determination for Portugal's African territories and U.S. restrictions against the use of military equipment of U.S. origin in Portuguese Africa.

Ambassador Garin is married to the former Phyllis Graham who is of English origin. His stepdaughter is married to an American and he thus has two American granddaughters. He speaks and understands English.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

file
72
Tuesday, May 3, 1966 - 12:55pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Senate Hearings on Tap Bennett's Appointment to
Lisbon**

**Tap Bennett had his hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee this morning and he reports that it went smoothly.**

**The Senators present were Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Symington,
Aiken and Carlson. Both Clark and Morse were away.**

**Tap said that Fulbright was non-polemical in his line of ques-
tioning on the Dominican Republic and that Symington and
Hickenlooper both said nice things about his service in the
Dominican Republic. He was asked only one question on
Portugal having to do with our Base in the Azores.**

W. W. Rostow

*up to Moyer
Kintner
Mentor*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 18, 1964

Mc GB-

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Professor Adriano Moreira

at 10:45 Aug. 19

Dr. Moreira is a young, bright, ambitious, 42-year old Portuguese politician with a large personal following, especially among the young people.

In Portuguese politics he is labelled a "liberal." But this is all relative.

Until ousted in December 1962 from his post as Minister for Overseas Affairs -- a portfolio he held just short of two years -- he was the youngest and publicly the loudest member of the Salazar government.

His break with Salazar came on the African question. Moreira never called for self-determination, but he argued privately and publicly for a more flexible policy and Salazar's reaction was fast and predictable.

Moreira is now the Director of the Overseas Institute for Advanced Social and Political Studies -- a training academy for overseas administrators. This is not political limbo. It is a prestigious position and a platform and a job that he probably could not hold without Salazar's passive consent.

Moreira has had an interesting career. He began as a Marxist; was subsequently in prison for criticizing the government; was later taken into the government and given a top position.

Even as an ousted minister Moreira has not remained silent. He continues to criticize certain governmental policies. He has maintained his political alliances. He clearly is planning to return to government and the expectations are that he will play an important role in the regime that follows Salazar's, assuming of course a relatively peaceful transition.

David Klein

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *yn*, NARA, Date *3-9-00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7912

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
May 20, 1965

2109

~~1-11-65~~
2-1-65
74

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *B. H. Read*
Executive Secretary

There is enclosed a
Diplomatic Note dated May 18,
received by the Department from
the Portuguese Embassy acknowledging
the President's birthday congratula-
tions to the President of Portugal.

Enclosure:

Diplomatic Note.

7912

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATEEMBAIXADA DE PORTUGAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

74a

Proc. 207/9241
No. 30
1965 MAY 20 PM 12 11RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

The Embassy of Portugal presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to request the Department's good offices in transmitting to His Excellency the President of the United States a message of deep appreciation from the Prime Minister of Portugal on the Note of congratulations which the President sent to the Prime Minister on his birthday.

Washington, D. C.

May 18, 1965

SECRET

June 10, 1965

Mac -

You should know that we're moving ahead on a pitch to Portugal on a sensible way out of its African dilemma. I'm all for this as a way of getting ourselves on record for gradual decolonization, though it's surely a non-starter with Salazar.

Surprising thing is that Anderson is willing to try it out. Even admirals are re-educable within limits.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

RWK
RWK

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

05171

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

84
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy, LISBON

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

JUN 9 5 26 PM '65

Greatly appreciate your 652 as means break stalemate in this long-standing and grave issue. It has evoked wide interest here and in African posts whose views have been solicited and which you have seen.

050

We are only too well aware of difficulties you would have in selling proposal to Portuguese and appreciate need for positive elements from their viewpoint if they are to give serious consideration to such proposal. At same time we are concerned about such aspects as extent of US involvement, length of transitional period, need for political activity prior to plebiscite, and role for UN and OAU. We have modified your proposal on these points and have elaborated several others and following is outline of our thinking for an approach to Portuguese.

1. We believe present juncture when Portuguese are in relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozambique presents opportunity for GOP and Africans to reach agreement for peaceful resolution their differences. Key elements of solution would have to be transition period leading to self-determination and cessation of nationalist

Drafted by: AF:AF: MJL:ooram:GBH:high
EUR/WE:EJBeigel:blh 5/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Under
The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Creel

AF -

XXXXX
XXXXX

S/S - Mr. Walsh

UNP - Mr. Buffum

S/AH -

Gov. Harriman

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By: *fw/r*, NARA, Date 3-29-00

FORM 8-63 DS-322

BUNDY-SMITH
GATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KROMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

~~SECRET~~

nationalist-inspired violence and subversion, as well as inspiration and support for such actions by African governments concerned. Full ^{maintenance} range of choice would be left to people, and would include ~~maintainance~~ of present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within commonwealth, or full independence. Aim of proposal would be peaceful transition and creation stable society no matter what political decisions are made by the people.

2. Specifically Portugal would propose eight-year transition period leading to free and open plebiscite observed by UN and OAU representatives. (FYI: We propose eight years, given comments from African posts that five may be realistic limit negotiable with Africans, but this of course is matter for negotiating parties to determine. END FYI). In return neighboring African states would pledge assurances they would not allow subversive elements to organize or operate from their territories against Portuguese territories for purposes of infiltration, subversion or attack across international frontiers, and that they will not allow arms to flow across their territories to such elements. All training camps for nationalist military or para-military training would be disbanded.

3. US and other NATO allies would encourage Africans' acceptance and urge fulfillment terms of such an agreement, would publicly come out in full support of agreement once it is adopted and would publicly condemn any violation of terms should such occur subsequently from any quarter.

We would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

We would sympathetically consider Portuguese request for support for Portuguese complaint in UN if we were satisfied deliberate and organized violations had taken place, and under same circumstances would be responsive to GOP requests for arms purchases. FYI By same token if Portugal weighed on plebiscite, we would consider sympathetically African requests for support END FYI.

4. We recognize that Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville) are not likely to accept proposal and would probably continue support of violence against Portuguese Guinea and Cabinda. If agreement were reached and in force with others, we would in this event publicly condemn such actions. We would make other African governments aware of our position on this aspect from the outset.

5. During transition period US would itself provide and would encourage other NATO allies to provide, if Portugal so requests, economic and technical support for Portuguese efforts to develop African territories. UN and its specialized agencies would be allowed to observe and report on developments and provide assistance. OAU members would also be invited to provide economic and technical assistance.

6. Increasingly free political activity would obviously have to be permitted to make for meaningful plebiscite. Full amnesty and repatriation would also be allowed for refugees and, as time for plebiscite approached, for nationalist leaders, who must be permitted to campaign openly and freely for independence if they choose to do so.

7. We would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7. We would hope that GOP, if interested in such proposal, would in time present it to African leaders and thereby initiate dialogue which might result in meaningful negotiations. Should Portugal desire, we would be quite willing to assist by sounding out such leaders and U Thant on a tentative basis and in manner designed to pave way for direct Portuguese-African discussions.

Would appreciate your comments on foregoing draft presentation and on timing of any approach. **END.**

GP-1.

Note: Handled LINDIS per SS-0.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

76

MemCom's

EUR:WE:RLFunseth:mhs
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W. H.

77 8113

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPROVED S/S:LCWilliamson

Memorandum of Conversation

1. Bates
2. Haynes

DATE: May 3, 1966

SUBJECT: Portuguese Policy Toward NATO and Rhodesia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *fw/mg*, NARA, Date 3-29-00

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Dean Acheson
Mr. Vasco Vieira Garin, Ambassador of Portugal
Mr. Robert L. Funseth, Officer in Charge, Portuguese Affairs

COPIES TO:

S/S
S/P
G
INR/OD
White House

CIA
IO
AF
EUR

Amembassies: LISBON, PARIS for USRO, USUN

At his request, the Portuguese Ambassador called on Mr. Acheson to bring to his attention the Portuguese position in NATO and to discuss briefly Portuguese views on the Rhodesian situation.

The Ambassador said Portugal recognizes that a very grave crisis exists in NATO and agrees on the necessity of safeguarding the North Atlantic Treaty. In its discussions with its NATO allies on this subject, the Ambassador said his country has made the following points: (1) because of France's geographic, political and military importance, the Allies should avoid taking any actions which would isolate France; (2) there is a practical need to redefine the political and military relationships within NATO; (3) the door should be kept open for the return of France; (4) Portugal does not minimize the concerns of those countries bordering directly on the Soviet bloc, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany.

He said that during the deliberations preceding the declaration of the 14, issued on March 18, Portugal had proposed a draft which was aimed at temporizing the positions of the United States, France and West Germany. He gave a copy to Mr. Acheson. The Ambassador said the Portuguese proposal was discussed in Paris but was not accepted. He said when the declaration was issued, Portugal made certain explanatory statements concerning its agreement to the declaration. He gave Mr. Acheson a copy of these statements. He said he would also like to bring to Mr. Acheson's attention two recent newspaper interviews of Prime Minister Salazar in which the Prime Minister had made statements about Portuguese policy toward NATO. The first was an interview with The New York Times which that newspaper has not as yet published and the second with the Chicago Tribune which has been published.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He gave Mr. Acheson English translations of the texts of both interviews. He said the Times article by Tad Szulc was a particularly bad distortion of what Dr. Salazar said and was, in fact, a story about the interview rather than a publication of the Prime Minister's replies to Mr. Szulc's questions. The Tribune story was better but even there he had found some minor distortions.

The Ambassador also gave Mr. Acheson the text of the Prime Minister's address to a delegation from Angola, delivered April 13, 1966, describing Portuguese policy in Africa.

Mr. Acheson expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for providing him with his government's views on NATO and for making available to him copies of various statements, including those of Prime Minister Salazar. He said he had already seen some of these but would reread them. Mr. Acheson also said he recalled with pleasure a most interesting discussion with Dr. Salazar, some years ago.

Turning to Rhodesia, the Ambassador said Portugal was most unhappy with British actions effecting Portugal. He said that just prior to the last Security Council meeting, the British sent Lord Walston, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lisbon, to discuss the Rhodesian question. While he was there and without any advance notice, the Ambassador said, the British tabled their draft resolution, seeking Security Council approval for the use of force in preventing oil shipments to Beira, whose destination they suspected was Rhodesia. He said his government issued a statement in Lisbon, following the talks with Walston, expressing its profound surprise at the British action in New York. Their suspicion of British bad-faith was reinforced, the Ambassador said, when they discovered that the British had actually facilitated the entry of the Greek tanker, the Joanna V, into the port of Beira. He said they had learned that when the master of the Joanna V told the British navy boarding party that he would not accede to their request not to enter Beira, the British naval officers voluntarily briefed him on how best to enter the port and how to avoid going aground on the shifting sand bar at the entrance to the port. The Ambassador said it is obvious that the last thing the British wanted was for the ship not to succeed in getting into Beira for this would have rendered more difficult their making Portugal a scapegoat in the Rhodesian affair.

The Ambassador asked rhetorically, what difference one tanker made to the outcome of the Rhodesian problem. Moreover, he said, in the middle of the whole affair, Ian Smith, in order to avoid any embarrassment to Portugal, said he would not accept any of the oil of the Joanna V.

Ambassador Garin noted that for the first time in the history of the United Nations, Chapter VII had been invoked. He said it had not been invoked when Soviet troops were slaughtering Hungarians in Budapest, nor in Tibet, Cuba or in Viet Nam. However, he said, when two tankers arrive off the port of Beira suddenly this becomes a threat to the peace.

Mr. Acheson said he was sympathetic to the Portuguese point of view.

The Ambassador said his government had addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, April 27, communicating certain Portuguese reservations on the Security Council resolution adopted April 9, concerning Rhodesia. He said his government questions the legality of the action taken when two permanent members, France and the Soviet Union, abstained. He said Portugal recognizes that the jurisprudence has been accepted that abstentions of great powers do not constitute a veto but he pointed out this procedure was not adopted for Chapter VII situations. In his government's view, he said, the spirit and letter of the Charter ought to be scrupulously respected when the Council is taking a Chapter VII action. Moreover, he argued, with an enlarged Security Council, five abstentions of the permanent members are not sufficient to block adoption of a resolution--it now takes seven abstentions--therefore, under this procedure, the Security Council could adopt a Chapter VII resolution without the approval of any of the five permanent members.

The Ambassador returned to his contention that the British wanted to make the Portuguese scapegoats in the Rhodesian problem. He said the fact of the matter is that no oil has gone to Rhodesia from Beira. Everyone knows, he said, that Rhodesia is getting its oil from South Africa, where the British have important financial interests which they do not wish to jeopardize.

Ambassador Garin said the Security Council resolution disrespects two fundamental points of international law: First, freedom of the seas which was the second of President Wilson's 14 points--a freedom to be respected in both peace and war; and, second, the principle of free access for landlocked countries. Portugal, he said, has not denied access to any landlocked countries in Africa using its ports and transit facilities. He cited the Congo where even when the Congolese were facilitating the Angolan terrorists, Portugal did not disrupt Congolese transit trade. He said his government is pursuing the same policy at the present time. He said Portugal is cooperating with Malawi and Zambia on this matter and has joined with these two countries in forming a tri-partite commission to facilitate transit of goods. At the same time, he said, Portugal respects access to Rhodesia. However, the Ambassador said, Portugal is not going around looking for oil for Rhodesia. He said Portuguese policy is that when oil arrives at their ports for Zambia, for example, it guarantees that it is going to Zambia and not to some other destination. Likewise, he said, they apply the same policy for shipments consigned to Malawi, the Congo, Mozambique or Rhodesia.

Mr. Acheson thanked the Ambassador for bringing to his attention Portugal's position on these two important international matters, NATO and Rhodesia.

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October 12, 1965

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965
1965 OCT 23 PM 5 22

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Portugese Position in UN General Assembly (Part II of VIII)

Participants:

U.S.

Portugal

Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	EUR	AmEmbassy LISBON
G	G/PM	
S/P	CIA	
INR/OD	USUN-3	
IO	DOD	
AF	White House	

The Secretary told Nogueira that he had nothing further to report on the subject they had discussed the other night, but that Ambassador Yost would get in touch with the Portugese delegation to the UN for further discussions. He asked Nogueira when he would speak to the General Assembly.

Nogueira replied that he would speak on Monday, October 11. He would not have much to say, he claimed, and would concentrate on the need for adherence to the UN Charter. He said he would also oppose the formation of a UN peacekeeping force, which Portugal feels is a very serious matter. Such a force would never act against the best interests of the great powers but only against the smaller powers.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said that his guess was that a UN force would act only in peacekeeping operations and would not fight any wars. Nogueira said that the central question here was what kind of a peace was to be kept and in what sort of conflicts a UN force would act. Would it act only in international wars? What would be the status of "wars of national liberation" or subversive movements? Portugal regards this question as a very delicate one.

In the U.S. view, the UN force would primarily act to police international settlements, the Secretary said. He cited the examples of Cyprus and Kashmir. Nogueira said that a UN force might be useful to police a border, as in the Middle East. But India has now reversed its stand on UN forces and refused to permit UN forces on Indian soil, though they pushed strongly for a UN force in the Congo not long ago.

The Secretary remarked that the world was full of unique situations. Nogueira retorted that Portugal too felt somewhat unique but was always being considered analogous.

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965

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October 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Viet-Nam (Part III of VIII)

Participants:

U.S.

Portugal

Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	FE	AmEmbassy SAIGON
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EUR	AmEmbassy LISBON	

Foreign Minister Nogueira said that the Secretary had been apprehensive over Viet-Nam last spring, but that United States fears seem not to have been realized. He wondered what had happened and how the future now looked.

The Secretary replied that the Viet-Cong had attempted conventional operations in the spring--staging three of the classic Maoist operations--and had suffered severe setbacks. Several units were almost destroyed in May, and the Viet-Cong have been able to mount only one or two attacks a week since. They have been forced to give up the idea of a major victory in a great land war and have had to revert to more traditional guerilla tactics such as bombing and sabotage.

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By ju, NARA, Date 3-9-00

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The Viet-Cong seem to have overestimated the effect of the monsoon on United States air operations, the Secretary went on. In fact the efficiency of United States air was reduced only about 10 percent by the rains. This has been a key element in our ability to redress the balance.

Now the weather is improving and in each of the last two weeks the Viet-Cong have suffered record casualties. As U.S. forces and firepower increase, it becomes increasingly unlikely that conventional ground operations can be staged by Hanoi or the Viet-Cong without Chinese troops.

Nogueira speculated that if the Chinese intervened another Korea-type war would result. The Secretary cautioned that he would not be at all sure of this. One of the reasons that the United States decided on bombing North Viet-Nam was to convince the Chinese that the range of American responses would not be as limited in a future conflict as it was in Korea. He felt the Chinese realize this and continue to be more cautious in actions than in words.

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October 12, 1965

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965

OCT 25 PM 5 22

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Voting in the Enlarged Security Council (Part IV of VIII)

Participants:

U.S.

Portugal

Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	CIA
G	USUN-3
S/P	White House
INR/OD	AmEmbassy LISBON
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Foreign Minister Nogueira said he would like to ask the Secretary for his estimate of the effect of the January 1, 1966 enlargement of the Security Council on the operations of that body. Portugal felt that the situation would be more difficult. With "6 Afro-Asians, 2 Communist countries, 4 permanent members and 3 more, 7 abstentions would be needed to assure the defeat of any resolution."

The Secretary said that the United States had analyzed the probable effect of the enlargement and that he would send Nogueira a copy of the analysis. Briefly, the United States believes the situation will not change radically as it will only be necessary to get the vote of one Afro-Asian to block a resolution. The new arrangement will certainly be more unwieldy and time-consuming, but the voting pattern would not be essentially changed.

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October 12, 1965

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965

1965 OCT 25 PM 5 22

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Portugal, Timor and Indonesia (Part V of VIII)

Participants:

U.S.

Portugal

Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	NEA	AmEmbassy LISBON
G	FE	AmEmbassy DJAKARTA
S/P	CIA	
INR/OD	USUN-3	
IO	DOD	
EUR	White House	

The Secretary asked whether Timor was fairly quiet at present. Nogueira said it was entirely quiet. Timor does not want to be under Indonesian rule as life under Portugal is far better than in Indonesia. Further, the people of Timor do not / Indonesian ethnically or culturally. consider themselves

Nogueira said that the U.S. knew, though couldn't admit, that the Goans were very unhappy under Indian rule and felt enslaved rather than liberated. Here was a case where Portugal wanted a plebiscite but India insisted that only a transfer of sovereignty was involved.

The U.S. does not yet know what will happen in Indonesia, the Secretary said, but the army has reacted sharply to the 30 September group and the PKI.

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By juw/mg, NARA, Date 3-29-00

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On the other hand the 30 September movement was very discriminatory in killing the six army leaders and seem to have decapitated a key part of the army leadership. Indonesian charges of CIA involvement are not true. The murdered generals acted as a brake on Sukarno when they were alive. Now the army has moved against Sukarno but the question is will they persist after losing several key leaders. Sukarno and Subandrio are now in Bogor for their own security.

In addition to the army reaction, the Secretary went on, the Muslims have also been stirred into action. While the U.S. attaches no importance to the burning of PKI headquarters by crowds shouting "Long Live America" and "Kill Aidit," it is a new experience.

Nogueira asked what the U.S. sees as the prospects for Indonesia, and the Secretary replied that much depends on Sukarno's personal health. There is evidence that his kidney problem is becoming more serious. However, if he is fit it is unlikely that anyone will move against him, for this would be like deposing George Washington. If he is unable to rule effectively, on the other hand, the army and the Muslims may take over. It is early to form opinions, but it appears that Sukarno has lost much personal power as a result of the recent events.

Nogueira said that Portugal was very anxious about the situation, as either an army takeover or a PKI takeover could lead to the invasion of Timor. The Secretary said that the army would probably be less likely to make such a move and Nogueira agreed that this might be the case.

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Portugese Relations with Brazil (Part VI of VIII)

Participants:

U.S.

Portugal

Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	EUR
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S/P	White House
INR/OD	AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO
CIA	AmEmbassy LISBON
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The Secretary asked Mr. Nogueira if he had any comment on the current state of Portugese relations with Brazil.

Nogueira said that he had made a long unilateral statement on this subject on his return from Brazil some time ago. This statement was not agreed upon with the Brazilian Government in advance or communicated to the Brazilians prior to its release. Two unpleasant comments were made by his old enemies in Brazil (a newspaper editor and a politician), Nogueira said, but very many others reacted favorably. Press editorials and comments by foreign politicians were positive, and Brazilian Foreign Minister da Cunha, when asked to evaluate the statement, said it was very good and

positive

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positive. Nogueira said he had spoken briefly with da Cunha at the UN in New York and was very pleased with what he said. Da Cunha confirmed that he would visit Lisbon very soon.

Improvements in Portugese-Brazilian relations are limited, Nogueira went on, by the internal situation in Brazil which is not good at all. Before the situation is consolidated, no Brazilian Government wants to make a final pronouncement on Portugal, which would certainly stir up opposition and cause the situation to deteriorate. If nothing is said, no one will be antagonized.

The Secretary said that he thinks Brazil has made important economic gains recently. The economic reforms have been a bitter medicine for some elements but were necessary. Now the rate of inflation has been slowed and things are improving. The Secretary said that he would be in Brazil in November for the Rio Conference.

Nogueira said that Portugal had been invited to participate in the Rio Conference for the first time this year, "as observers of course." While he himself will not attend, a delegation will be sent.

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October 12, 1965

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Macau (Part VII of VIII)

Participants:

U.S.

Portugal

Secretary Rusk
Robert L. Barry

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	White House
G	USUN-3
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FE	AmEmbassy TAIPEI
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The Secretary asked whether the Communist Chinese were trying to stir up any trouble for Portugal in Macau at present. Foreign Minister Nogueira replied that there were no specific difficulties now, but the Peiping Chinese were very vigilant and kept a close eye on what was going on in Macau. It is for this reason that Portugal had to close the Chinese Nationalist Consulate there. The GRC had been warned to confine its activities in Macau to normal consular affairs and to such side activities as would not be very noticeable. The GOP was willing to close its eyes to a little information gathering and a little spying, but the Nationalists persisted

in engaging

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By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

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in engaging in these activities immoderately. They continued to actually send guerrillas and plastic bombs into mainland China from Macau and prepare sabotage missions there. They were warned that Portugal could not allow this, as the price would be the loss of Macau to Communist China, an eventuality which would benefit neither Portugal nor the Republic of China. As the warnings were ignored, the consulate had to be closed.

In this connection, Nogueira said, Portugal is aware of "certain U.S. activities" in Macau. If exaggerated, these activities might also mean the loss of Macau, which would be to no one's advantage. There are many American tourists who visit the city each year and it "just happens all of them are officers."

The Secretary pointed out that we had had a similar problem with U.S. servicemen on leave in Hong Kong and had ceased sending so many of them there to take some pressure off the British. Nogueira indicated that the problem of Macau was somewhat different. He was not making a protest or a request, he pointed out, but simply suggested that we keep our activities in the city "on the quieter side," as this would be more profitable for both sides. Otherwise Portugal has no problem in Macau but there is always the awareness that China could take the city in a few hours.

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTIETH SESSION OF
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September- October 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 9, 1965

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: Southern Rhodesia (Part VIII of VIII)

Participants:

US
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Robert L. Barry

PORTUGAL
Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira

Distribution:

S/S	INR/OD	EUR	USUN-3	AmEmbassy LISBON
G	IO	CIA	White House	AmEmbassy SALISBURY
S/P	AF	DOD	AmEmbassy LONDON	AmEmbassy LUSAKA

Secretary Rusk pointed out that Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and British Prime Minister Wilson had gotten nowhere at all in their London conversations and that the talks had ended without agreement.

Nogueira said that he had not intended to mention Southern Rhodesia but since the subject had come up he had two points to make: (1) Portugal has nothing to do with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. (2) If anyone believes that Portugal has any influence with Smith, he is wrong. Portugal has no influence at all in Salisbury.

The Secretary said that he accepted that.

For the last couple of months, Nogueira said, the British have been pressuring Portugal every couple of weeks to do something or other to influence the Southern Rhodesian Government. The Government of Portugal said it is not its job, as the U.K. has ultimate responsibility for the foreign affairs of Southern Rhodesia. Smith has never asked Portugal's opinion nor taken Portugal into his confidence regarding Southern Rhodesian policy.

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By CM, NARA Date 3-22-01

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Nogueira said it was his opinion that the British were cornering Smith too much and thus leading him into a desperate situation. He said he had told Stewart this in a recent conversation.

The Secretary asked why Smith had to be in such a hurry to declare independence.

Nogueira replied that he did not know, but that information coming to him from the Portuguese mission in Salisbury indicated that Smith was under severe pressure from his own party. Thus he felt that he had to take the step of UDI now or the situation would deteriorate. Nogueira emphasized that this was his own belief and was not based on any conversations with Smith. He went on to say that his opinion was that UDI would perhaps result in trouble for the British but he did not know that it would result in general troubles as others believe. UDI will be primarily a political problem for the British in their Commonwealth relations but this is their problem.

Nogueira

The Secretary asked what /thought the effect of UDI on Zambia would be.

Nogueira said he did not think that Smith would act against Zambia if the Zambians behaved themselves properly. Even if a few people from Zambia crossed the border to start trouble he doubted if Smith would react.

There is no feeling in Washington that Zambia will take up arms against Southern Rhodesia, the Secretary said, for they have no capability to do so.

Nogueira said that if this was the case then he doubted that UDI would create any great problem in Zambia. Portuguese experience with Zambia indicated that it is a realistic country. The Zambians must know that if they take strong economic action against Southern Rhodesia then economic life in Zambia will be disrupted and stopped within six to eight months. If the U.S. is in a position to do so, Nogueira said, the Secretary should reassure the Zambians on this issue. Portugal is not in a position to make such a statement.

Nogueira went on to say that the British expect Security Council and General Assembly meetings in the event of a UDI. The Secretary replied that the question was now before the Fourth Committee. Nogueira remarked that some people expected the U.N. to pass resolutions and perhaps to impose sanctions. When he discussed the problem with Stewart recently, he asked him if the U.K. thought that the Security Council might ask for military measures against Southern Rhodesia. After some hesitation Stewart replied that he did not think such action would be wise.

In any case, Nogueira said, Portugal had a policy of non-interference, of keeping its hands off the situation, and is not connected with events there in any way. Further, Portugal does not want to be called on to involve itself.

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Nogueira drew the Secretary's attention to the recent "U.S.-U.K. demarche" on the subject of S. Rhodesian representation in Lisbon, acknowledging that the Government of Portugal was grateful that the U.S. position differed from the British. Portugal had done the minimum it could; if the Rhodesian representative had not been accepted "Rhodesia would have acted." This would have been a good excuse for them. The Government of Portugal made a compromise between the demands of Rhodesia and the U.K. While the representative was accepted, the British were told that Portugal recognizes that the U.K. has full responsibility for Southern Rhodesian external affairs. Thus Portugal avoided precipitating a crisis. If Britain did not like the situation that resulted, they could have followed normal diplomatic procedures and sent a note saying that the Southern Rhodesian representative had been appointed to the staff of the British Embassy in Lisbon. But the British were afraid to do this because they know what the reaction would be in Salisbury.

The Secretary asked what status the Southern Rhodesian representative had. Nogueira replied that he was regarded as an official representative of Southern Rhodesia without diplomatic status. This contrasted with the situation of the Southern Rhodesian representative in South Africa who does have diplomatic status. The Portuguese position is entirely correct in this matter and should have satisfied both the Rhodesians and the British. The British were mistaken to make an issue of the subject; but they have gone ahead and created a fuss.

Nogueira said that he has had some talks with African delegations on UDI. They do not like the prospect and hold the British entirely responsible. But the situation in Africa "all goes together." He referred to the Secretary's earlier comment that the voice of the moderates in Africa is getting louder. These moderates do not want trouble; for this reason the GOP feels that the consequences of UDI may not be as serious as some think. He then asked for the Secretary's views on the situation.

The Secretary said it would be very unfortunate if Smith moved to UDI as this would create disturbances and turmoil in Africa at a time when we can well do without them. It is possible that Smith will go home and say that he made no concessions in London and that he was unable to agree with Wilson and then take no further action. Nogueira said that he doubted that Smith could stay in such a position for long. Portugal is also concerned about disturbances in Africa as it has its share already. As he told Stewart, Nogueira said, Portugal does not want any more Tanzanias in Africa. But the British have very closed minds and call on the GOP to share this responsibility for what may or may not happen in Southern Rhodesia. Portugal firmly refuses to do this.

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Message Room of Conversation

PART I of III

1965 JUL 20 AM 9 00

DATE: June 18, 1965
Time: 6:00 p.m.
Place: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Discussion of General African Situation
(DEPTEL to Lisbon 697, June 19, 1965)

PARTICIPANTS: United States

Portuguese

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE
Mr. Robert L. Funseth, WE

Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister
Ambassador Vasco Vieira Garin,
Portuguese Embassy

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WE " DAR-es-SALAAM

The Secretary opened the conversation by stating his pleasure that the Foreign Minister could return to follow up their earlier conversation at the luncheon that the Secretary had given the same day for the Minister. The Minister said he was very grateful that the Secretary could see him. He thought he should come through Washington, as long as he was in the Western Hemisphere, as he had a few things of interest and importance to discuss.

Tour d'Horizon on General African Situation - The Secretary said he would appreciate the Foreign Minister's impressions on what is happening in certain key African countries. For our part, he said, we are concerned about Tanzania, Algeria and the U.A.R. The Secretary said he would add Ghana, but that country seems to be in such internal difficulty that its capability of causing external problems is minimal.

Dr. Franco Nogueira said he would agree with that list but would add Congo Brazzaville. He said it is a small country of 800,000 persons, in a precarious state, which a few tough and capable people could easily control. But, the Foreign Minister said, Tanzania is the country of most concern. He said the Portuguese have reports of a vast arms buildup from Communist sources, which is much more than would be needed just against Mozambique. They believe this scale of preparations suggests that Tanzania may be planning subversive activities against Uganda, Zambia and Malawi as well as continued support of rebels in the Congo.

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(At this point the Under Secretary joined the meeting.)

The Secretary observed that it was only fair to say that Tanzania was now the only country that had not pulled out from supporting the Congolese rebels and that we believed that arms continue to come through Tanzania. He noted that the Sudan may also resume permitting such shipments.

The Foreign Minister recalled their ^{over}earlier conversation at lunch when they had discussed Portuguese concern ~~for~~ political developments in North Africa. He would add, he said, that the Portuguese believe the Chinese are much stronger than the Soviets in West Africa. He referred again to what they regard as a dangerous situation in Brazzaville.

The Secretary said we had hoped that the French would become more interested. He said we feel they are indifferent to what we call Central Africa and we have the impression that they have concluded that Central Africa is going back to the bush any way, so why bother. We fear, however, said the Secretary, that it won't go back to the bush but to the wrong people.

The Foreign Minister said he had no information to corroborate that this was the French view. He said the situation across the river in Leopoldville was much better. Terrorism in the northeast Congo is much less and there is no doubt that Tshombe has considerable popularity, he said. The Minister added that this popular support is not only limited to the Katanga but exists in Leopoldville and in other parts of the country.

The Foreign Minister said he did not know how long the federation in Nigeria would last. He said he agreed with the Secretary's estimate of the situation in Ghana.

The Secretary said Nkrumah had been asking the West for large sums of money because he is "broke". The Foreign Minister said Nkrumah had wasted vast sums of money on subversion and propaganda.

The Foreign Minister said the situation in Morocco is not good at all. The Moroccans continue to fear Algerian military aggression because of the unsettled border situation and believe that clashes could erupt at any time. According to Portuguese information, the Minister said Ben Bella is walking a very tight rope between the army and the party. He said Ben Bella is getting financial support from the U.S. and the French, which he is passing out in order to maintain his position.

The Secretary interrupted to say that the only thing Ben Bella receives from the United States is food--no cash. The Foreign Minister backed off and said the French are giving him considerable funds.

The Foreign

The Foreign Minister said there are encouraging signs in Africa such as the greater willingness recently for the moderate Africans to stand up against the radicals and the success the Portuguese have had in assuring the security of Angola and Mozambique. But the over-all picture, given the subversive activities of the Chinese and Soviets in supplying arms, etc., remains dangerous.

The Secretary asked how the Minister saw the future in Southern Rhodesian-Zambian relations. The Foreign Minister said Zambia needs Southern Rhodesia and thought if the Zambians do not cause Southern Rhodesia any trouble, the latter would be prepared to help. He mentioned a UN conference which is studying the problems of land-locked countries such as Zambia in which Portugal is participating.

In response to the Secretary's question, there ensued a discussion on how Zambian products reach the sea. The Foreign Minister said there is talk of a new railroad in Zambia to Tanzania. He said Portugal is not worried because it would take at least ten years to construct and would cost millions of dollars. However, he added that the Portuguese feared that the railroad would be used by the Russians, Chinese and Indians if ever constructed. He said there are two million Indians in East Africa. The Secretary noted that there were very poor north-south communications between Tanzania and Mozambique. With the aid of maps, the Foreign Minister briefed the Secretary on the rail networks in Mozambique, connecting with East African countries. Ambassador Garin said that 90 per cent of the traffic on the Beira railroad comes from Zambia.

The Foreign Minister said that Kaunda is being very careful, but he had heard the Chinese Communists have 40 officials at their Embassy in Zambia and are causing Kaunda considerable difficulty.

The Secretary said he thought there is a growing awareness in Africa of what the Chinese are up to and cited Burundi, Kenya and the OCAM states, as examples. He asked the Foreign Minister if he saw any prospect of other Western European countries, such as Italy, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, taking more interest in Africa. He said there seems to be much indifference in NATO toward developments in Africa.

The Foreign Minister replied that apart from commercial interest, he did not think so except for France and the U.K. He added, perhaps Germany and Italy had to some extent an interest but wished to avoid any political involvement. Nogueira said, however, America's neighbor to the north, Canada, has demonstrated a keen interest in Tanzania. He reported that a Canadian firm, with strong Canadian Government support and with Canadian aircraft, is conducting aerial map surveys along the Tanzanian-Mozambican border. In response to Portuguese questions, the Canadians, he said, claimed it was a legitimate civilian project. The Minister said it may be legitimate in Canadian eyes,

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but it might be seen quite differently by the Tanzanians when one takes into account events beginning in the fall of 1964. Moreover, the Minister said, the Canadians are training the Tanzanian Air Force. They argue, he said, that if the Canadians were not there, the Chinese would be. From the Portuguese viewpoint, he said, if we are bombed by the Tanzanians, it will make little difference whether the Tanzanian Air Force were trained by the Canadians or by the Chinese, except the Canadian training is probably superior.

Situation in Portuguese Territories - Turning to the situation in the Portuguese territories, the Foreign Minister said their position in Angola is very good both politically and militarily. He said the situation in Mozambique is good except for armed incursions from Tanzania. However, he said, they are much better prepared to defend themselves against such attacks than they were in Angola. He said it is clear that the Portuguese could not possibly remain in their territories without the consent and support of the populations, given the size of the population and the areas of the territories. In Portuguese Guinea, he said, the Portuguese were really worried 12 to 18 months ago but not now. He said armed incursions continue from Guinea and Senegal with more coming from Guinea. The Portuguese believe the rebels are receiving training from the Guinean Army.

At this point, there took place a brief discussion of Portuguese air links with its African territories and with other African countries. The Minister noted that in ICAO, the Afro-Asians are trying to eliminate all references to Portuguese flights as if they did not exist. He said this could create serious air safety problems.

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(Drafting Chief and Officer)

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7/13/65

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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McGEORGE BONDY'S OFFICE Conversation

PART II OF III

1965 JUL 20 AM 9 00

DATE: June 18, 1965
TIME: 6:00 p.m.
PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: General Portuguese Views on NATO *
(DEPTel 697, June 19, 1965)

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary,
EUR
Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE
Mr. Robert L. Funseth, WE

Portuguese

Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira,
Foreign Minister
Ambassador Vasco Vieira Garin,
Portuguese Embassy

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S/P INR/OD AmEmbassy PARIS
G CIA PARIS for USRO
EUR White House

WE

The Secretary said General de Gaulle has been leaving the impression that the North Atlantic Treaty is to be completely re-negotiated in 1969. This, he said, is a departure from the original thinking when the Treaty was signed. Actually the Treaty states that in 1969 a member can withdraw from the organization on one year's notice. Other members presumably would remain and the organization would continue to function.

The Foreign Minister said the French have not said anything to the Portuguese about this nor have the Portuguese discussed the question with the French. He said, the Portuguese believe, however, that if the Alliance is to go on and to be useful, there should be changes. He said the Portuguese doubt the usefulness of the Alliance in its present form. Nogueira said it is not just a question of the Allies agreeing with one another or supporting one another on various questions. (The Secretary injected that the United States has had some experience with this manifestation.) The Foreign Minister continued that it is quite another thing for the NATO Allies to be hostile to one another. He asked can they be allies to the Tropic of Cancer and neutral or even hostile south of that parallel? He cited as an example recent unfriendly statements

against

* Further remarks on NATO are contained in the context of Part III regarding U.S.-Portuguese differences.

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against Portugal by the Danish Foreign Minister. He said the NATO Allies cannot go on pretending that events outside of the NATO area -- in Africa and in South America -- do not affect us. He noted there is definite disarray in the Alliance.

The Secretary said there are two principal points of disarray. The first is de Gaulle's own special view of France and its position in the Alliance. The second point is caused by the discussions and considerations within NATO of problems outside of the NATO area -- such world problems as Cuba and South Viet-Nam where there is disagreement. He said if pressures from East Europe against West Europe were resumed, he believed NATO would recover its sense of solidarity.

The Foreign Minister said he noted that the Secretary had cited Cuba and South Viet-Nam -- problems of particular concern to the United States. He said there are examples where the United States had not been supporting its Allies on questions which affect their vital national interests. He said there is no doubt that on the other side (the Communist bloc), they are united in a solid block against us.

The Under Secretary said he thought that it would be more accurate to say the Communist countries pursued parallel but competitive courses of action. The Secretary referred to the growing variations in the policies of Eastern European countries.

The Foreign Minister said this may be true with regard to their actions toward Western Europe, but in other parts of the world he believed they remain united. He said, "the winds that blow in Angola -- although they appear different -- are the same winds that blow in Cuba, South Viet-Nam and Malaysia".

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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PART III OF III

1965 JUL 20 AM 9 01

DATE: June 18, 1965
Time: 6:00 p.m.
Place: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Portuguese-U.S. Policy Differences
(DEPTel 697, June 19, 1965)

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE
Mr. Robert L. Funseth, WE

Portuguese

Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira,
Foreign Minister
Ambassador Vasco Veira Garin,
Portuguese Embassy.

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EUR CIA " LEOPOLDVILLE
WE E White House

The Foreign Minister said he would like to bring up a few points concerning the direct relationships between the U.S. and Portugal. He said he had made a few notes the night before--and while there may be explanations--when he tried to put the pieces together, U.S. policy toward Portugal did not appear very clear to him.

1. Activities of American Embassy in Brazil - He said he had learned during his visit in Brazil that American Embassy officials had "immediately sought out" Brazilian Senators and Deputies, returning from visits to Angola and Mozambique, advising them they had probably not received a very clear picture of the real conditions in those territories. He said he had been informed that our Embassy officials had told these Brazilians that it would be in Brazil's interest to persuade Portugal to change its policies in Portuguese Africa. The Foreign Minister said Portugal took a dim view of such activities. The Secretary and all of the Department participants said this was the first time they had heard of this allegation. The Secretary said he would look into the matter and send the results to the Foreign Minister.

2. Archduke Otto of Hapsburg - The Minister said Otto had first visited Angola in 1961 and had recently made a second visit there. On his return he passed through Leopoldville and had lunch with Ambassador Godley. Otto informed the Minister that Ambassador Godley had told him that he had sent a telegram to the Department of State recommending that the U.S. "resume" aid to Holden Roberto. He said he understood that Ambassador Godley had denied having had such a conversation with Otto but, Portugal still has

doubts.

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doubts. He thought a misunderstanding on Otto's part was out of the question since he speaks such excellent English.

3. Canadian F-86 Aircraft - The Minister said the next point was a "very serious problem" concerning Portuguese efforts to purchase some obsolete F-86 aircraft from Germany. He said negotiations with the Germans were almost completed and the Germans were prepared to sign the contract, when the Canadians came forward and placed a veto on the sale. He understood that under the agreement by which Germany had originally obtained the aircraft from Canada, Germany had agreed to secure Canadian approval of any future transfer of title of the aircraft. At that time, the Minister said, the American Ambassador in Lisbon informed them that the U.S. had placed no objection to the sale and Portuguese Ambassador in Bonn reported that the American Ambassador in Germany had said the same thing. Recently, the Minister said, Sir Roy Welensky of Southern Rhodesia had passed through Lisbon on his return from Canada and reported that Canadian Prime Minister Pearson had volunteered to him that Canada was having problems with Portugal. Pearson told Welensky it concerned the sale of F-86 aircraft which the U.S. had asked the Canadians to veto.

Under Secretary Ball said he did not believe that the United States had "vetoed" this sale. The Minister rejoined, "Pearson said so". He continued that Portugal had been flying F-86 aircraft in Africa for years. The Secretary asked, where had Portugal got them? Without replying directly to the question, the Foreign Minister then discussed the question of Portuguese diversion of MAP supplied F-86 aircraft to Portuguese Guinea. He said he recognized that Portugal had not had the right to move these aircraft but when Portugal was facing the most critical period in Portuguese Guinea, the U.S. put great pressure on Portugal to withdraw them. He complained there was hardly an official exchange between the two Governments during that period when this matter was not mentioned, with no U.S. appreciation of the desperate situation in which the Portuguese found themselves. Nonetheless, he said, the aircraft were returned and are now in Portugal.

The Secretary said this is part of the general problem of U.S. arms provided for NATO purposes that are subsequently diverted for other purposes.

4. Portuguese Attempts to Obtain 60 mm Mortars - The Minister said "very recently" the Portuguese attempted to purchase 60 mm mortars from an American firm. The U.S. Government asked that Portugal declare that the mortars would not be used outside of the NATO defense area. He said Portugal was not prepared to give this guarantee, and went to Italy and were just about to close the deal, when the Italians informed them they could not sell Portugal the mortars because the U.S. had vetoed the purchase. The Minister said Portugal has already bought them elsewhere, but still resented U.S. interference.

5. Purchase of Military Vehicles - The Minister said Portugal has wanted to purchase a type of military vehicle from a U.S. firm and was asked by

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the firm to provide assurances that the vehicles would not be permitted to fall into Communist hands. The Portuguese agreed, he said, but then the firm, at U.S. Government behest, asked them to provide guarantees that they would not be used outside of the NATO area. The Minister said he finds it "revolting" that Mr. Ben Bella and others of his ilk can get arms anywhere without providing guarantees but that Portugal is not permitted to buy arms for self-defense. He exclaimed, "Why can our enemies get what they need and we cannot?".

The Secretary asked if the Minister was saying that Ben Bella and Portugal's "enemies" were getting arms from the United States.

The Foreign Minister said, well, if Ben Bella and others could not get the arms from the U.S., they could get them in Communist countries.

6. F-84 Aircraft Engines.-- The Minister said they had been recently trying to buy aircraft engines for aircraft to be "utilized within the geographic area of NATO" and had so stated to the company proposing to sell the engines. He said, the U.S. did not accept this guarantee and recently delivered a note to the Portuguese requesting detailed information on the serial numbers of the aircraft and the engines far beyond normal requirements and usual practice in such transactions.

7. Addresses of Governor Williams - The Minister said he would now like to mention certain speeches of Governor Williams. He said the Governor always speaks of the pressures which the U.S. is applying on Portugal to change its African policy and always links Portugal with South Africa. He recalled a conversation of Assistant Secretary Williams with Ambassador Garin in which the Portuguese Ambassador had asked the Governor to speak of some of the positive achievements of Portugal in Africa. He said Governor Williams replied he would only agree on the condition that Portugal make a public declaration accepting self-determination. The Minister said Governor Williams is a high official of the U.S. Government and as his views have not been corrected, Portugal assumes his views represent the official position of the U.S. Government.

8. American Support of Holden Roberto - The Minister said Ambassador Godley's statement that he had recommended that the U.S. should "resume" aid to Holden Roberto and his use of the word "resume" is very significant to the Portuguese. Moreover, the Foreign Minister said articles in the Western press of Holden Roberto constantly describe him as the "American-supported" or the "American-aided" leader. The Minister said he knew very well that the journalists writing these articles do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S., but he has noted that not one of these articles has ever been denied by the U.S. and this is an "unpleasant fact" for Portugal.

The Secretary said he did not recall ever being asked a question about this in a press conference and was not aware of the press interest in this subject to the extent the Minister had indicated. He noted that Roberto's

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lack of active support from Tshombe had created serious problems for Tshombe in gaining African support. He asked the Minister of his impressions of the Angolan movements and if they were unified. The Minister replied they were not united.

The Minister asked rhetorically, if Tshombe is not supporting Roberto, who is? He said there is also the question of Roberto's Tunisian passport, of which he has the original, in which there is an American visa--the only visa in the passport.

9. Misuse of American Aid to Angolan Refugees - The Minister said there is also the question of the Angolan refugees in the Congo who are suffering for lack of food, shelter and medical attention. He said the Portuguese have built reception centers in Angola and are prepared to receive them, but Roberto is trying everything in his power to prevent them from going back. The Minister charged that foodstuffs and other items obtained from American private groups for the help of the refugees are being diverted by Roberto, who sells them to finance himself. The Minister said recently 20-25 Angolan refugees came to the Portuguese Embassy in Leopoldville seeking help to return to Angola. He said the Embassy gave them safe conduct to the Angolan border when they were arrested by Roberto's police and prevented from returning to Angola. He said this is an example of the police state that Roberto has created within the Congo.

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The Secretary asked the Minister if it/ true that Tshombe had visited Lisbon. The Minister said he did not know.

10. U.S. Efforts to Prevent African Support of Portugal - The Minister said the U.S. has, in criticising Portuguese policy, said that it causes frictions with other African states, but, he asserted, there are some Africans who support Portuguese policy in Africa. The Minister said he did not see why these African leaders should be criticized by U.S. officials for supporting Portugal. The Secretary and Under Secretary said they did not know what he was referring to. The Minister said he had learned that at a recent meeting in London, in which Africa was discussed, Mr. Fredericks (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) had declared Malawi Prime Minister Banda was a reactionary for supporting the Portuguese.

Outstanding U.S. Requests - Tracking Station, Loran-C, and Azores Bases - The Foreign Minister said opposite this partial list of complaints which he had just mentioned are three outstanding matters which the U.S. had requested of Portugal: 1) a Gemini tracking station on the Cape Verde Islands; 2) establishment of Loran-C transmitter sites; and 3) renewal of the Azores Base Agreement. He said he believed that the U.S. attaches some importance to these matters and so does Portugal.

The Minister said the points he had just recited suggests a U.S. attitude toward Portugal which is not only one of lack of support or

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endorsement but goes beyond and indicates that U.S. policy seems to want to assure that Portuguese policy in Africa will fail--a policy which the Portuguese are convinced is correct.

The Minister said the Portuguese have been intensifying their educational efforts in the territories and have now expanded it to and including the university level. Others have believed, he said, that when Portugal increased the educational facilities and the native populations became better educated, the latter would give the Portuguese more difficulty. He asserted the contrary has proved to be true. Much to the surprise of the critics, they continue to support Portugal and we will continue to expand our programs of education.

The Foreign Minister said he wished to add one more point to the list of items he had recited. It perhaps was a small matter but the Portuguese see it in the context of the other actions, he said. The Minister related that sometime ago, in response to a request of Tshombe, the Portuguese had "loaned" him two civilian transports--Skymasters he thought. Recently, a Belgian army officer in the Congo informed them that when the aircraft were in need of spare parts, the U.S. agreed to supply them until they learned of the origin of the aircraft and then refused to supply the necessary parts.

The Under Secretary said he had never heard of this incident before and he doubted very much that it is true.

The Foreign Minister asked the Secretary if he honestly believed that if Portugal withdrew from its African territories, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists would say that these areas are now liberated from colonialism and withdraw? He said we are told about self-determination. The Minister said Portugal is not against self-determination, it is only opposed to certain definitions of self-determination.

Request for Clarification of U.S. Policy - The Minister said he would like some clarification of U.S. policy toward Portugal. He said it was difficult to reconcile our requests to Portugal with the list of things he had mentioned.

The Secretary said he recalled with some pain that in the Cyprus situation there had been simultaneous demonstrations against American Embassies in Nicosia, Athens and Ankara indicating each party to the conflict thought the U.S. was favoring its opponents. He said he could provide the Foreign Minister with a long list of U.S. attempts to moderate excessive attacks on Portugal, and that these efforts had caused the U.S. a great deal of difficulty. He said no one would be happier than the U.S., if the problem of Portuguese Africa could be resolved peacefully. The Secretary cited the example of Spain and its overseas territories and how the Spaniards had made some concessions in principle and thus by improving Spain's public stance, had succeeded in blunting some of the attacks directed against them.

The Foreign Minister said there was no comparison between the two problems. He claimed that the Spaniards are far behind the Portuguese on the question of self-determination and said the big difference between the Spanish and the Portuguese territories is that those of Spain are worthless.

The Secretary said he noted that the Minister spoke of the education of the Angolans and of certain African leaders who had been privately supporting the Portuguese position. He asked if there ~~was~~^{were} any way the Portuguese could get these people to stand up and speak--to get local Angolans and Mozambican leadership to speak to other countries. Could not these people affirm how they preferred continued Portuguese presence, he asked?

The Foreign Minister objected that it was not a question of a Portuguese presence in Angola or Mozambique--they are Portugal. He said there are elected Angolan deputies in the Portuguese Parliament in Lisbon and there are elected representatives sitting in the provincial legislatures. He said the Africans refuse to admit that Portugal could be acceptable to the local populations. He mentioned the recent Security Council debate on the Senegalese complaint against Portugal where Portugal was represented by a Goan. He said the Indian delegate walked out when he spoke because they could not accept a Goan speaking for Portugal. Likewise, he recalled a conversation he had with Mr. Diallo of Guinea in the UN in which the latter said the Africans would not accept the results of a plebiscite in which the Angolans or Mozambicans or Portuguese Guineans opted for Portugal.

The Secretary said, "But we would". He asked the Foreign Minister if he were saying that the Portuguese agree to the U.S. concept of self-determination but are afraid that the Africans would not. The Foreign Minister said, "yes". The Secretary asked if the Minister thought that the Portuguese and the United States could develop a formula on this question to which both would agree. The Minister said this was not a new suggestion and that it had been discussed by the Under Secretary with Prime Minister Salazar and had been further explored in an exchange of letters.

The Under Secretary confirmed this and said the problem is the ways in which self-determination would be expressed--the mechanism or "modalities" of self-determination.

The Minister said the Africans will only accept the modalities which would permit them to railroad through a result which coincided with their pre-conceived position. He asserted that the Portuguese position is one of strength. He said things are not going too badly for Portugal in Angola and Mozambique and have improved slightly in Portuguese Guinea. He commented on the presence of Soviet ships in Angolan waters, performing various espionage and subversive activities, and asked if the U.S. thought this area would be safer if Roberto were president of Angola.

The Secretary

The Secretary said he would answer that question by stating that Angola's security would be reinforced if there were an indication that the Angolans supported their government.

The Minister said the real issue is not self-determination and suggested this is a pretext to force Western influence out of still another area of Africa. He cited the radical African criticism of Tshombe, Banda and Kuanda to reinforce his contention that in the radicals' view, Africans are not allowed to cooperate with the West. The Secretary said he believed the moderates are making a comeback.

The Minister said that a number of African leaders are telling the Portuguese not to change their policies. The Secretary asked is there anything the Portuguese can do to enable Angolans themselves to speak out.

The subject changed slightly and the Foreign Minister said that apart from ideological reasons, the Portuguese see some other motives behind U.S. policies toward Portugal. He said Portuguese public opinion does not understand the lack of U.S. support of Portugal. He said in this connection, he is asked embarrassing questions about the Azores bases at almost every press conference.

Distinction between NATO and African Questions - The Secretary said he would draw a distinction between the tracking stations and the Azores and Loran-C questions. He said that the Azores and Loran-C are part of NATO's defense, including that of Portugal. He said the U.S. has 250,000 troops in Western Europe and is spending half of its defense budget for NATO. The Azores base is Portugal's principal contribution to NATO and the common defense and he thought it should be defended to the Portuguese in that manner.

But, the Foreign Minister said, Portugal is not interested unless all of Portugal and all of its territories are defended.

The Secretary said perhaps this point should have been discussed more fully when Portugal joined NATO for the fact of the matter is that the African territories are not included in NATO.

The Minister complained that Portugal faces dangers as a Soviet target because of its membership in NATO but at the same time it is confronted with increased hostility from its Allies from within NATO. He said Portugal could not accept being placed in such a situation.

The Secretary said that if the Minister ^{were} saying that Portugal is safer outside of NATO, then Portugal ought perhaps to consider that possibility. The Foreign Minister quickly disclaimed such a possibility and that Portugal wanted to remain in NATO.

said

The Secretary

The Secretary said that since the establishment of NATO, its members had spent several trillion dollars in defense and that the United States had contributed \$800 billion of this total.

The Foreign Minister repeated that the situation for Portugal is difficult and that Portugal does not understand how the U.S. can derive any benefit from its policy of hostility toward Portugal. It seems to us, he said, that the American Government wants to see Portuguese policy fail.

The Secretary said he would return to the illustration of the demonstrations in Ankara and Athens. He said, the principal problem between our two countries is Africa. The U.S. is repeatedly criticized by the Africans for its support of Portugal and he has sustained many bruises in defense of American policy toward Portugal.

The Foreign Minister said that the U.S. and Portugal are allies and that one can not please "everybody". The Secretary replied it seems as though one cannot please "anybody".

The Under Secretary said he would like to comment on another aspect of the problem. He said that the security of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea will in the end be determined by what happens on the whole of the continent of Africa. If the Communist efforts succeed, it would be difficult for the security of these territories to be protected. But, he said, if there is a possibility of the Africans and the Portuguese working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement, the Communists could be kept out and the security of the territories would be protected. He said, if the U.S. wished to maintain its influence in Africa, it could not announce support of policies to which the Africans are passionately opposed. To do so, the U.S. would be "dead in Africa". He said he believed that the present U.S. policy of maintaining its influence in Africa supports Portuguese policy in the long run and added U.S. policy is to preserve a Portuguese presence.

The Secretary said that because of its policy of local rule, the United States in Puerto Rico has immunized itself from the kind of difficulty ^{in which} the Portuguese find themselves. The Minister said if metropolitan Portugal were like the United States, there would be no problem; but it is not.

The Secretary believed that if the Portuguese could say that their system rested on strong popular support, Portugal would get much more world support. The Foreign Minister returned to his argument that African support for self-determination in the Portuguese African territories is a pretext for wresting control of these areas from Portugal. He said in Mozambique, the Tanzanians, Malawians and Zambians all claim slices of Mozambique, and if they succeed in realizing their claims, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would move in and take the remaining slices in order to protect their interests and then the world would see what "self-determination" is for Mozambique.

U.S. Has Good Impression of Portuguese Efforts - The Under Secretary said that the U.S. has a good impression of what Portugal is doing in Angola and Mozambique. He said that an esteemed American, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, had reported to the Secretary and himself on his impressions of a recent trip there and had indicated that the Portuguese had made a great deal of progress. Thus he did not believe the Portuguese have as much to be afraid of as the Minister suggested. He thought, for instance, that the Angolan people are getting an increased stake in Angola.

Mr. Leddy believed that if Portugal were willing to give the inhabitants the choice to "opt in or opt out", Portugal would be in a much better position. And, the Under Secretary added, the U.S. is not saying when.

The Foreign Minister exclaimed, "Impossible, absolutely impossible!". He claimed that as soon as Portugal said that in 1975 something would happen, the next day things would begin to get out of control. He asserted that it is not a question of self-determination or independence with Portugal's opponents, they believe that 1) no political links should exist between a European country and an African country; and 2) ^{that} a multi-racial society with rights for both blacks and whites should not exist.

The Secretary said these last two points are not U.S. policy and asked the Foreign Minister why his country did not hoist a flag around which its friends could rally.

Differences Over Tactics - The Under Secretary said in his discussions with Prime Minister Salazar, he came to understand that our differences were largely on the question of tactics. He believed that Portugal is accomplishing considerable social progress in its territories but is not getting credit for it because of its unwillingness to revise some of its tactics.

The Foreign Minister agreed tactics are very important.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister why Portugal does not pursue talks quietly with the Africans expressing sympathy for Portugal, in an attempt to find a formula on common agreement.

The Foreign Minister replied let us assume that Portugal had followed the policy which the United States advocated in 1961. "What would have been the result?" He answered his own question - "frightful."

The Secretary said it is always difficult to speculate on what might have been but certainly since 1961, the Africans have become much more alert to the dangers of both the Soviets and the Communist Chinese. The Foreign Minister remarked that the Portuguese presence in Africa is different from the ^{former} French and the British presences. The Portuguese believe that for the real welfare of Africa, their policy has not been so bad. And only since 1961 and the Angolan rebellion have Portugal and the United States been at odds in the UN and elsewhere.

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The Foreign Minister said that in his conversations with Ambassador Garin, he has gained the impression that the United States believes present Portuguese policies in Africa are undermining American interests by permitting the Communists to make inroads.

The Under Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to assume for a moment that the United States had adopted a position of total support for the Portuguese position in Africa and then suggested he consider what would happen to the American position in Africa. The Under Secretary believed that the United States position in Africa then would be the same as Portugal's, which is not so good. Thus it is his belief that the United States can help the Portuguese best by maintaining its influence with the Africans.

The Secretary observed that the Portuguese have an advantage with the Africans in that he has heard many Africans acknowledge to him that the Portuguese are not racists.

Commenting on the Under Secretary's hypothesis, the Foreign Minister said that if the United States had supported the Portuguese, he did not think the consequences would have been as he had outlined. Moreover, he said, the time is coming when the United States will have to beat on the table in the UN and say, "No more, we must now follow the Charter". He said Portugal is not so influenced by the vote of Burundi or Ceylon in the UN, but it does care about the vote of the U.S., which is regarded as a green or red light by the other members.

The Secretary said this is not the case in all questions. The Foreign Minister replied that it is in most.

The Secretary said it concerned him that the Minister seemed to link NATO questions--the Azores and Loran-C-- with our differences in Africa. He was not sure that is in Portugal's interest. He added that if Americans concluded that the Portuguese people do not feel a part of NATO, they may ask why take bruises because of Portugal's policy in Africa. He continued there are other differences between NATO Allies than those between Portugal and the U.S. For example, France advocates peace at any price in Southeast Asia and another NATO ally, the UK, trades with Cuba. In spite of these differences, the United States continues to fulfill its NATO obligations. The Under Secretary also commented in support of this point.

The Secretary said he would like to give the Foreign Minister a thought. According to U.S. tabulations, the United States votes with the majority more than any other member state in NATO but when we are voting with the minority, it is usually because we are supporting Portugal.

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The Foreign Minister said he did not have such statistics but he believed that the UK and France have taken positions opposed to us because of previous U.S. actions in the Suez, Algerian and Indo-Chinese crises.

The Under Secretary said the UK is not trading with Cuba because of what the U.S. has done or not done--they simply wish to trade regardless of political implications.

The Foreign Minister said that before he had left Lisbon, our Embassy had asked if Portugal would support the United States in the Dominican Republic. In the absence of any agreed global policy, the Portuguese said no but had not obstructed us there.

The Foreign Minister also complained about U.S. pressure on Portugal to stop shipping tantalite from Africa to the Soviet Union. He said the Soviets were willing to pay \$10,000 a ton compared to the U.S. offer of \$5,000 and that nationals of Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium were involved in the transaction, but that the United States only complained to the Portuguese.

Returning to the central theme, the Secretary said what the United States really hoped is that politically, Portugal would help itself. He feared that if Portugal hews to the status quo, its position will steadily weaken.

The Secretary reminded the Minister that looking back to 1945, the United States has never put anything on any agenda concerning Portugal's overseas territories. But, the Secretary said, when the United States is presented with an issue, it must reflect and take a position consistent with its own beliefs, including consideration for what local populations wish.

The Foreign Minister then turned to Portugal's loss of Goa as a case history. The Secretary said that in Goa, the Portuguese did not negotiate with India nor ask the Goans themselves-- they remained fixed in their position. Then losing Goa, they blamed the United States.

The Foreign Minister asserted Portugal did not blame the U.S., but that the Indians were not interested in negotiating a solution. They were only interested in negotiating a timetable for a Portuguese withdrawal. Nor would Nehru accept a free and open plebiscite. The Secretary and the Under Secretary thought it would have been tactically sound for Portugal to have done so.

The Foreign Minister then asked what about West New Guinea. The Secretary recounted the events which transpired in that situation, stating he believed the United States was unjustly accused of forcing the Dutch out. The Foreign Minister asked if the United States thought that Sukarno would be satisfied if Portugal gave self-determination to Timor.

The Under

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The Under Secretary said that was not the point. The crucial point was that if Portugal had had a plebiscite in Goa, it would have placed Nehru in a much more difficult situation when he moved against it. The Secretary said by the same token, if Portugal has a plebiscite in Timor, it would strengthen its position tenfold against Sukarno.

The Foreign Minister asked if the Indonesians invaded Timor, would we send American troops to help Portugal? The Secretary thought it too early to discuss such an eventuality.

In further discussion of Portuguese views of alleged American hostility, the Secretary said he had the impression that the Minister's antennae were very sensitive. The Foreign Minister replied that perhaps this was the case.

Article 19 of the UN Charter - Referring to the financial problem in the UN in a change of subject, the Foreign Minister asked the Secretary if the United States had taken any final position.

The Secretary replied that while the United States position is still under consideration, we hold firmly to the following views: 1) The United States is not going to accept a double standard in the UN, if the General Assembly is not willing to enforce Article 19 with the U.S.S.R., it is not going to enforce it with the United States. 2) If the General Assembly gives up its peace-keeping function we want the General Assembly to understand very clearly what it is doing and the consequences that flow therefrom.

The Foreign Minister said that UN Secretary General U Thant had told him a few days earlier that this question had been solved through a procedure of voluntary contributions. The Secretary said he was not so sure.