

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: National Security Council		
#1 b Memcon	Pres. & Wilson, tour d'horizon <i>OPEN 7/11/95 NLJ 93-265</i>	<i>Exempt per State 10-11-78</i> 3/2/64	<i>6-14-82</i> A
#5 e Memo	Bundy for record re LBJ-Home talk (dup. #3 in NSF Country File, United Kingdom, PM Home Visit, 2/12-13/64) <i>SANITIZED 7/11/95 NLJ 93-265</i>	<i>Exempt per State 6-14-82</i> 2/13/64	<i>NSA-82-70</i> A
#19 a Memcon	Pres. & Wilson (dup. #1 b above) <i>OPEN 7/11/95 NLJ 93-265</i>	3/2/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File
United Kingdom, Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>State 3-30-78</i> Agency: State Department		
#3 a Notes	Cleveland on Wilson and his thinking C 5 p <i>open 7/26/01 NLS 01-61</i>	1/ /64	A + C
#7 Cable	4443 to London C 1 p <i>open 8-16-79 in 8</i>	1/22/64	A
#8 Cable	2753 fm London C 1 p <i>open 4-6-94 NLS 93-267</i>	12/13/63	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 Report	Agency: CIA CSDB-3/659, 884	Exempt CIA LU 2/21/78 3/4/64	Exempt NLS 93-260 A
	Wilson C 2 p	3/ /63	A
#5 g Biog.	Wilson exempt per RAC 9/11/00		

FILE LOCATION

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United Kingdom, Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

4 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: WH/State Department		
#4 a Memo	Klein to Bundy, "Harold Wilsonisms" 3 2 p <i>Exempt from GDS 12/20/77</i> <i>OPEN 7/11/95 NY 93-265</i>	3/2/64	A
#6 Memo	Klein to Smith, Wilson's meeting w/Pres. 0 1 p <i>open 8-16-79</i>	1/23/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File
United Kingdom, Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

3504

1

File

Wilson Train

June 30, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

myth

Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between The President and Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P., dated March 2, 1964 regarding Tour d'Horizon with Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

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Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

EUR:WRTyler:mt

~~SECRET~~

(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

16

WHITE HOUSE APPROVED

6/29/64

Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-265

By ing, NARA, Date 5-15-95

The White House

5:00 p.m.

DATE: March 2, 1964

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon with Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party

PARTICIPANTS: US

The President

Mr. Tyler

UK

Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P.

Mrs. Harold Wilson

Mr. Giles Wilson (son)

Mr. David Ennals (in charge of Research
in Labor Party)

3494

COPIES TO:

S/S

S/MF

INR/OD

The White House

S/P

NEA

G/PM

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ARA

ACDA

EUR

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Amembassy London

☐ The President told Mr. Wilson he was glad to see him again and ☐
Mr. Wilson recalled that he had last been in the White House in April
1963, though he had come to Washington since then at the time of the
funeral ceremony for President Kennedy.

The President said to Mr. Wilson that things seemed to be going
a little better in Cyprus, and Mr. Wilson agreed though he commented
that it seemed that a vote at the UN on the resolution had been post-
poned until tomorrow. The President said he had prepared a message to
send to President Inonu of Turkey that very morning, but had held off
from doing so because it seemed that the Turks were coming on board.
He feared the postponement implied that there was some difficulty
coming from Makarios. The President commented that he had seen
Makarios last year, and had formed the impression that he was a very
hard man. (The President called Mr. McGeorge Bundy on the phone in
order to get the latest information on Cyprus.)

The President asked Mr. Wilson why the UK considered it worth-
while to continue to trade with Cuba, which represented only about
\$5 million, when by so doing the UK was creating so much anti-British
feeling over here. The President said that after the Prime Minister's

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press ☐

FORM DS-1254
3-61~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

-2-

press conference in Washington on the subject, there had been a great deal of criticism of the UK. Had the Prime Minister merely pointed out that the UK had reduced its trade with Cuba from \$55 million to \$5 million, the effect would have been favorable instead of unfavorable. Mr. Wilson said that the reason why the Prime Minister had spoken in the way he did was in order to get votes at home by taking the position of a staunch defender of UK policy and interests. The President set forth the reasons that lay behind US policy toward Cuba and said that Castro's policy was a great threat not only to this hemisphere but to Western security as a whole. He said it was important that this fact should be understood. Mr. Wilson replied with classic British reasoning on not using foreign trade as an instrument of coercion except in exceptional cases. He recalled that when he was President of the Board of Trade he himself had instituted a UK embargo on shipments of arms to the Soviet Union, and that he had at one point cut off all trade with Hungary when the Hungarian government had arrested a British business man. However when it came down to non-strategic commodities, it was British policy to encourage trade across the board. He pointed out that buses could not be considered to be in this category. The President said that the situation must be looked at in terms of Cuba's needs to keep her economy going. He said that buses represented 80 per cent of Cuban transportation. On the other hand, US wheat sales to the Soviet Union were a one-shot deal and represented less than one per cent of the Soviet Union's need in wheat.

Mr. Wilson said he realized that this was a difficult issue between the United States and the United Kingdom and that he would do everything he could to keep it from playing a major role in the campaign. He said he thought that the British elections would take place in May or June, because the Tories would not be able to hold out until the last moment. He said he thought there would be a certain amount of anti-American sentiment aroused, in the course of the campaign, by the Conservative party. There were still memories of Suez, and there were back-benchers in the Conservative party who would play up to nationalistic feeling for electoral purposes. He stressed to the President that the Labor party was a strong

supporter

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~~SECRET~~

-3-

supporter of NATO and the Atlantic community, and had a broad international outlook which was not the case with the rank and file Conservatives. He said the Labor party wanted to play a positive role in Europe but did not want "to be corralled in a little Europe with the Six." The Labor party was mindful of the broad interests of the Commonwealth and wanted to play a part which would be in active support of US efforts to maintain worldwide security.

Turning to defense, Mr. Wilson repeated almost verbatim the arguments he had used in his talk with Secretary Rusk. He said that a Labor government would want to get rid of the national deterrent which made no sense at all for England today. He said this would save 300 million pounds which could be used to put back the British fleet on the high seas, and would permit an increase in conventional forces so that the UK could play an active and useful role in putting out brush fires when necessary.

The President asked Mr. Wilson for his views on the MLF. Mr. Wilson replied with the standard arguments which he had already expressed at lunch. He said that the only circumstances in which the Labor government would support the MLF would be if this were the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring a national nuclear force. He said that he did not think that the German government wanted this, or that there was any support for this in German public opinion. The President asked Mr. Wilson whether he really thought that Germans had abandoned their desire to play a dominant role, and Mr. Wilson said that even if they wanted to do so, the West had the means of preventing this from happening. He felt that the MLF did have the result of putting the German finger on the nuclear trigger. He was apprehensive of a possible development whereby the United States would no longer retain the veto, and Germany might find herself in a position of casting a majority vote by "three to two." The President said that such a situation would never be permitted to arise.

Mr. Wilson said that in general the British elections would be waged and won on domestic issues, and he himself wanted to wage a campaign against poverty, as President Johnson himself

was

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-4-

was doing. The President asked Mr. Wilson how he saw the relationship between the UK Labor party and the Democratic party in the United States. Mr. Wilson said he thought that both had much in common. They were both parties of the people, with a strong social sense, and with a desire to develop and change institutions in the interest of the welfare of the majority, whereas the Conservative party was inclined to preserve the vested interests of a minority and to resist change and progress. The President mentioned the London municipal elections coming up in early April and asked Mr. Wilson how he thought they would go. Mr. Wilson said he was reasonably optimistic.

The President mentioned the A-11, the new US interceptor plane. He said it had a speed of 3.2 Mach and a ceiling above 70,000 feet. He said this was a very considerable technical advance which was of great importance to the Free World. He said he had sent a message to the Prime Minister informing him about the announcement before he had made it. Mr. Wilson said that this plane was a very great development and that it pointed up the fact that it was useless for the UK to try to play a role in the same league as the United States in the defense field. He said that the UK just wasn't "in the same line of country," and that this was a further justification of the Labor party's policy to get rid of the national deterrent.

In conclusion, Mr. Wilson thanked the President for having received him, and his family, and said he hoped very much to have the chance of seeing him and Mrs. Johnson again in London and in Washington.

~~SECRET~~

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2 March 1964

McGB

More on Harold Wilson (received from Harlan
Cleveland) which you might want to look at
before you meet with Harold Wilson at 4:30.
Look particularly at page 5.

Dylan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3a
✓ 2.11.
Wilson

NOTES ON HAROLD WILSON AND HIS THINKING

On January 23, 1964, I had lunch at the House of Commons at his invitation with Harold Wilson, the Leader of the Opposition. We covered a great deal of ground and I did not, of course, take notes. But some items are worth noting in view of the possibility he may be Britain's next Prime Minister.

1. General.

I have known Harold Wilson since he was a tutor and I was a student at University College, Oxford. At Oxford he was extremely bright but personally rather shy. Ten years later, when he was a very young Minister (as President of the Board of Trade), he seemed rather too pleased with himself, and a little pompous. Now, fifteen years after that, he is still very sure of his own brilliance, but has settled into a mood of relaxed confidence, seemingly in command of himself and of the situation in which he finds himself. He retains that joy of rapid and fancy intellectual footwork, which has long been his trademark whether in House of Commons debate or in private conversation.

2. The Campaign.

As far as Wilson is concerned, the election campaign is already on. He says he thinks Home made a serious mistake in saying publicly that every action and statement must be judged with the upcoming election in mind. This has given Wilson an opportunity to claim that defense policy should be non-partisan - while continuing to criticize the Government's defense policy. He asked what our practice was in Washington, and I told him there was a sort of unwritten understanding that the State, Defense and Treasury Departments were not a part of the campaign structure of an Administration running for re-election - though their performance, of course, was always fair game in campaign oratory. He said he thought this was a good principle and that he intended to keep reminding people about Home's unguarded comment.

Wilson said the campaign poses special requirements: Debate in the House of Commons is usually extemporaneous, but the campaign requires prepared addresses, mimeographed and released ahead of time. He literally has to write a large proportion of his own stuff, he says, though he can recruit volunteer help on specific subjects here and there among Labor supporters in the intellectual community. His own staff as Leader of the Opposition consists of two girls in a small outer office. But

Wilson

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By Sj, NARA Date 7-23-01

Wilson still says that his best successes have come through ad libbing: In a recent speech on scientific research, which was sound enough stuff, the part that made the headlines was an ad lib addressed to British scientists who had emigrated to other countries ("Come back, you British scientists, because after the election your work will be welcomed at home."). Wilson is consciously accepting speaking engagement that follow Home's campaign trail. But unlike Home, he is largely avoiding an ad hominem approach, preferring to present his assessment of the Prime Minister's performance "more in sorrow than in anger".

// Wilson went out of his way to tell me how much he appreciated Ambassador Bruce's delicacy in relation to the British political campaign. Ambassador Bruce is staying in contact with the Labor Party, and generally avoiding anything that might seem American intervention in the process by which the British are making up their minds. He said that when Labor won the election, he would return the compliment by staying out of the American campaign; that is why he wants to come to the United States in early March rather than later on.

3. Command.

Several remarks and one incident illustrated his own confidence that he is in charge of the Party's policy and machinery. He said his practice in dealing with dissidents in the Party was to ask them to come with their problems to his office in the House of Commons; not many would come and most who did went away unwilling to challenge his leadership in public. The unpleasant incident in which George Brown appeared on a television show apparently // intoxicated and certainly belligerent, has removed the one major // challenge to Wilson's position as leader.

While we were sitting at lunch, the shadow Postmaster General (Douglas Jay?) came to the table and there was a brief discussion of an issue which happened to be hot that day. Apparently the Government had recently passed a rule that enabled the Post Office, for a fee, to distribute junk mail to everybody's home in a given district, without the sponsoring company having to go through the labor of finding names and addresses and putting them on envelopes. The Conservative Party machinery was starting to use this new rule to flood political literature into the homes of voters in a number of constituencies. Wilson had given the Prime Minister a kind of ultimatum, either to change the policy or face a major debate over it in the House of Commons. I was interested that in the colloquy between his shadow Postmaster General and Wilson, that Wilson was clearly in charge of the strategy, and rather bolder in charting his political moves than his colleague was inclined to be.

4. Staffing

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- 3 -

4. Staffing the new Administration.

Wilson has very much on his mind the task of executive leadership which he is confident will face him in a few months. He asked me a number of questions about the history of the White House staff, and was extremely interested in my recitation of the early Roosevelt days, Louis Brownlow's Committee on Administrative Management, and the concept of the Presidential Assistants with a "passion for anonymity".

Wilson said that the War Cabinet Secretariat was, of course, quite a strong central executive staff during the 1940's, but had withered away since then. The Prime Minister, he said, now has only four private secretaries, and twenty stenographers and clerks. One of the four professional assistants is occupied full time with ecclesiastical patronage, the nomination of Bishops and the like, and another is a full-time note-taker. Of course, a Prime Minister doesn't need "a Congressional Relations Staff" since he and his colleagues are in and out of the House of Commons every day and, in any case, have an automatic majority when they need it. (I reminded him of my definition, at Oxford, of the British system of government: "The system in which the legislature is trampled upon by an executive of its own choosing.")

On his prospective personnel selections he was remarkably frank. Certainly franker than it was prudent to be with a visitor like myself:

. He repeated his intention to appoint Hugh Foote, "as a member of the Government", to be Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the UN in New York. The arrangement he has in mind is consciously modeled on U.S. practice whereby Cabot Lodge and Adlai Stevenson have been members of the Cabinet. Wilson questioned me closely on the arrangements for handling UN affairs in Washington, and seemed inclined to build up the "backstopping" function in this field.

. He spoke of Patrick Gordon Walker, now the shadow Foreign Minister, as "having good judgement most of the time". He said Gordon Walker had "got a little excited over Malaysia", so he (Wilson) asked Gordon Walker to see

Ambassador

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Ambassador Bruce to get the full story of what Attorney General Kennedy had been trying to do on the Malaysian question.

. In the Foreign Office, he said he regarded Harold Caccia as somewhat old-fashioned and would prefer to bring Trevelyan (now Ambassador to Moscow) in as Permanent Under Secretary. He seemed to assume that the Permanent Under Secretary, who is, of course, a career man, in the British system, was just as subject to being shifted as a Minister is, with a change of Administration.

. He likes the idea of having a Disarmament Agency, and again asked me something about the setup in Washington on disarmament. He said he was thinking of Kenneth Younger as a director of the work on disarmament; Younger, who is now head of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, is no longer in Parliament and could not, therefore, be a Minister. Wilson thinks that disarmament should be definitely within the Foreign Office, and not an independent agency.

. Wilson indicated that on the Defense side, he would have to appoint Denis Healey in the first instance at least. His comment on Healey was "He is no McNamara, he is not much on cost effectiveness."

5. International Peacekeeping.

During the week I was in London, there was much discussion about Britain's "thin red line" of troops engaged or likely to be engaged in emergency peacekeeping efforts here and there around the world. Wilson's thinking seems to be veering toward more vigorous British participation in and leadership of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Labor's policy on the Congo was of course quite consciously parallel to our own, and the Labor line on Cyprus was to call for UN Intervention. (Wilson's comments on Cyprus, some of which are overrun by events since our luncheon, had a careful and practical tone befitting a man who thinks he may soon have to take responsibility for the consequences of his opinions.) I believe, and said, that the role of Britain's "thin red line"

of conventional

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- 5 -

of conventional forces around the world should increasingly be that of participation in international peacekeeping ventures under UN sponsorship.

6. British Guiana.

In a wide-ranging tour d'horizon of current issues that might affect the relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, I commented that perhaps the most dangerous decisions would have to do with preventing British Guiana from becoming "another Cuba"; British Guiana's location in the Western Hemisphere would inevitably make any U.S. Administration feel that Britain should act in the matter only in the closest consultation with Washington. Wilson grinned and said that was just what David Bruce had been telling him. The trouble, he said, is that the U.S. in backing Burnham overtly and covertly was backing the losing horse, "just as Britain did in Zanzibar." He went on to say that Jagan had sought him (Wilson) out during the abortive constitutional discussions in London, and tried to get the Labour Party to intervene with the Government to force a coalition. Jagan has since been writing to Wilson. I had the impression that Wilson might be more willing to see British Guiana become independent under a Jagan Government than the Conservatives are today.

Harlan Cleveland

IO:HC:mtb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum shows what Wilson has been saying in other places so far.

George Ball gave a lunch for Wilson today, and at my request he has explained to Wilson exactly how we feel about any public statements he may make. Wilson has assured Ball that he does not intend to discuss Cuba in any way, shape or form, and that he will limit his comments to the press, as he did with President Kennedy, to a general statement that "we discussed common interests of the Alliance and of the defense of the West." Ball says he got the signal loud and clear, and remarked that while Home had used buses for domestic mileage, he would do nothing of the sort if only because it would seem repetitive and thin at home.

I am seeing him at 4:30 before he sees you, and I will convey the same message again. I will also give him a few words on British Guiana, which it may be better for you not to mention yourself, in the light of the fact of our private understanding with Home, which must be carefully protected.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1964

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McGB-

SUBJECT: Harold Wilsonisms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-265
By ing, NARA, Date 5-15-95

In his discussions here, Wilson has been putting forward the following lines:

1. The British Deterrent. He repeats his earlier insistence that Britain must give up the so-called independent deterrent. His arguments remain the same. The deterrent is not independent; it is bought in the United States. It cannot deter; it can only serve as a catalyst. Moreover, it is not an admission ticket to the conference table. Britain has other justifications for participating in international meetings; its so-called national deterrent does not get it there. Moreover, if Britain does away with its national deterrent, perhaps German desires can be curbed.

2. Europe and de Gaulle. De Gaulle raises Wilson's hackles. But in Wilson's view the only alternative is to live with him until nature takes its course and make sure that in the interim the rest of Europe doesn't fall within his grasp.

As for the Common Market, the Labor Party has no intention of seeking early entry. The terms must be appropriate, but with de Gaulle at the helm in France, appropriate terms are unlikely. (Wilson has other problems with the French. He considers the French Socialist Party ~~the~~ the least reliable of the Socialist parties in Western Europe and Guy Mollet a Communist-leaning Socialist.) - so do we.

3. Nuclear Disengagement. Wilson supports the Polish (Gomulka) plan, although he apparently does not know its contents. Wilson's own formula for disengagement calls for the removal of nuclear weapons from Central Europe (the precise area not defined) with no limitations on conventional forces. This, in Wilson's view, could be tied to an agreement to regularize relations between East and West Germany, and assure West Berlin of its continued survival, perhaps formal incorporation into the Federal Republic. (Wilson claims he has Brandt's support for this. I doubt it. There's little in the proposal to appeal to a German leader, particularly on the eve of elections.)

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-2-

I expect Wilson will take this general line with the President. But I see no difficulty in handling it. I am sure the President will not want to get involved in British partisan issues. In so far as the Polish plan is concerned, our stance is that we are prepared to consider it, but have only just received it (it was delivered to our Embassy in Warsaw on Saturday) and are going to study it carefully.

David Klein

~~SECRET~~

46
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1964

MRS. ROBERTS:

This short memorandum
should be added to the
President's papers for his
talk with Harold Wilson.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of State called to ask me to remind you that nothing that Alec Douglas-Home said about the timing of the British election should be repeated or reported in any way to Harold Wilson. I told him I was sure you had this point in mind, but I would pass on a short reminder.

McG. B.

5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Harold Wilson, March 2, 4:30 PM

Harold Wilson, the British Labor Party's leader, is making his third trip to the United States since taking charge of the British Labor Party last year. He met with President Kennedy last April and invited himself to Washington for the funeral in November.

This visit is timed to follow closely on the heels of your meeting with Douglas-Home. It is important for the British election campaign, and you will have to give him about an hour. (I am still about 2 hours ahead of you on my hour-a-week program).

I think you will find Wilson interesting, affable, persuasive, and seemingly sincere, (although he is widely accused of opportunistic insincerity). His detractors say that he has a photographic memory and can "spout names, dates and quotations like a champion quiz kid." He is a cold man.

His political line is friendly to the United States except for reservations appropriate for a Socialist leader and a defender of British national prestige. He insists publicly and privately that Labor will be a more reliable political partner for the United States than the Tories have been.

You probably will want to let him tell you his views of British domestic problems and major international issues. He enjoys talking.

You also will want to give him a sense of your own basic policies. (The State Department memorandum (Tab A) provides useful checklist for this purpose.) In particular, I think you may want to emphasize, as you did with Home, our views on Communist trade with Cuba, so that Wilson will take back the same impressions Home did. At Tab B is my memorandum of your conversation with Home. You might also want to stress, for Wilson's benefit, our continuing interest in the multilateral force (MLF), emphasizing that we look at the MLF as


originally conceived -- a response to Allied wishes and not a project being hoisted on our partners. The State Department brief takes a somewhat stronger line than I would. It is also important that Wilson be fully aware of your determination to pursue the search for peace at Geneva and elsewhere.

For background purposes, I am attaching CIA's biographic statement on Wilson (Tab C). In this connection you might also be interested in David Bruce's judgment -- that Wilson's "greatest danger might be a tendency to express his views with unnecessary freedom and verbosity without having sufficiently weighed the complexities of the problems covered."

McG. B.

McG. B.

5a



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

February 28, 1964

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By JB, NARS, Date 7/28/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with Harold Wilson, Leader
of the British Labor Party, March 2, 1964.

Purpose of Harold Wilson's visit to the U.S.

To become acquainted with you and your ideas, to enhance his public image in Britain, and to reassure you regarding his reliability as an ally. You met him at President Kennedy's funeral.

The Election

The present odds favor a Labor victory in the elections, which must be held within the next eight months. The Labor Party has been out of power since 1951. Many of its leaders have never held responsible government positions. A certain amount of experimentation is inevitable if Labor wins. Nevertheless, the main lines of British foreign policy are accepted by both Parties and the British public and will not be radically changed. With the increased prosperity of the British working class there is less incentive for radical solutions or economic innovations emphasizing class divisions. The Labor Party realizes that to win it must appeal to the growing floating vote which is largely middle-class in outlook.

The Man

Harold Wilson badly wants to become Prime Minister. He was identified with the left wing of the Party until he became its leader

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

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-2-

its leader last year. Not a man of strong political convictions himself, he now probably reflects the consensus of Labor Party opinion. He has succeeded in getting the warring factions of the Party to present a public image of unity in face of the common need to win the election. Wilson is an intellectual, a former Oxford don, and a skilled debater in the House of Commons. Somehow, he does not inspire a feeling of trust in many people. This is his greatest political handicap. It has led some to say that in the next election, the British are faced with a choice between "smart aleck and dumb Alec".

Items for you to raise

1. Ask him about his election prospects, the timing of the election and the main aspects of the Labor Party platform.

2. Tell him about our efforts in the pursuit of peace. Discuss with him our proposals at the Disarmament Conference. He may in turn outline Labor's ideas on improving East-West relations including a nuclear-free zone and an area of controlled disarmament in Central Europe.

3. Explain to him the basis of our Cuban policy. Tell him why we consider it essential to prevent an upturn in the Cuban economy. He will take a line on the Cuban issue similar to that of Sir Alec Douglas-Home.

4. Go over with him our preoccupation with the situation in British Guiana. Some Labor Party spokesmen favor independence for British Guiana as soon as possible.

5. Review the situation in the Far East. Tell him we shall continue to help Viet-Nam to win the war;

de Gaulle's

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-3-

de Gaulle's recognition of Communist China harms the Free World; the U.S. supports the peaceful national independence of Malaysia.

6. Inform him we believe that the kind of improved nuclear consultation Labor is seeking will only be meaningful if the major non-nuclear countries in the Atlantic Community possess a share in strategic deterrents through the MLF.

Item which Mr. Wilson may raise

Harold Wilson will say the views of the Labor Party on many major issues are actually closer to those of your Administration than those of the Conservative government. He will try to give the impression that you will have no difficulties in working with him should he be the next British Prime Minister.

Mr. Wilson will be accompanied by Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.


Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Schedule of appointments
for Harold Wilson.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Schedule of Appointments
for
Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party
February 29-March 3, 1964

February 29 - Saturday - 1:30 p.m. - Arrive at Union Station

6:30 p.m. - Press reception at home of
Denis Greenhill, British Minister

8:00 p.m. - Dinner given by Assistant
Secretary Cleveland

March 1 - Sunday - 12:00 noon - Meet with American correspondents
at home of Michael Robb,
Information Minister,
British Embassy (subject to
confirmation)

1:00 p.m. - Lunch given by Under Secretary
Harriman (stag)

7:00 p.m. - Dinner given by Senator and
Mrs. Fulbright

March 2 - Monday - 12:00 noon - Secretary McNamara

1:00 p.m. - Lunch given by Under Secretary
Ball at Blair House (stag)

3:30 p.m. - Secretary Rusk

4:30 p.m. - The President

6:00 p.m. - Background briefing for British
correspondents at the Embassy

8:00 p.m. - Dinner given by the British
Ambassador

March 3 - Tuesday - 9:00 a.m. - Press conference

11:00 a.m. - Depart from National Airport

* * *

51



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-265
By 48, NARA, Date 5-17-95

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

President's private conversation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home
Wednesday, February 12 (as described by the President at 12:45)

The President and the Prime Minister met privately from 11 o'clock
until just before 12.

They discussed the problem of Cuba. The President made clear
the depth of American concern on trade with Cuba. The Prime Minister
said that he quite understood the importance of this problem to the
United States. He said that the British had a firm national policy in
favor of peaceful trade with any country -- a policy which he could not
reverse.

1.3
(a)
(3,5)
[REDACTED]

The President reminded the Prime Minister of the understanding
between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan with respect
to British Guiana. The Prime Minister at once replied that he under-
stood this agreement and supported it.

1.3
(a)
(3,5)
[REDACTED]

The President also raised with the Prime Minister the question of a
planned raise in the British bank rate. The Prime Minister undertook
to report the President's concern to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Mr. Maudling, and said that the British government had understood
that the U. S. Federal Reserve might be planning to raise the re-
discount rate, for its own reasons.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed Southeast Asia, and
the Prime Minister agreed that in the case of Vietnam the British
government would do what it could to help, although it must help very
quietly because of its peace-keeping role under the agreements of 1954.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


- 2 -

The Prime Minister and the President also discussed the problem of Indonesia and Malaysia. In particular they reviewed the Attorney General's recent mission. The President explained the need for a decision about aid to Indonesia in the light of new provisions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, and the decision to send the Attorney General as the best emissary available to review the situation and to attempt to create an environment in which assistance to Indonesia would not have to be ended in circumstances damaging to U. S. interests. Up to this point the mission had been successful. The Prime Minister made it clear that he fully understood the purpose of the Attorney General's mission and believed that it had been genuinely helpful. Unfortunately, it had been badly reported and much criticized in the British press. (Later in the day in a larger meeting the Prime Minister made it clear that during his visit he would find an opportunity to inform the press of his favorable impression of the Attorney General's mission.)

The President and the Prime Minister spoke briefly about Zanzibar and the Prime Minister indicated that he would see what his government could do to improve the situation there.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the political situations in their own two countries. The Prime Minister informed the President that his party was gaining with each passing month. If certain London elections should go well in the spring, he would call the election at once. Otherwise he might put it off as late as October. The Prime Minister spoke particularly of his affection and respect for the Secretary of State.

The President and the Prime Minister briefly discussed East-West relations and confirmed to each other their strong desire to find new areas of peaceful settlement with the Soviet Union.



The President and the Prime Minister talked briefly about General de Gaulle. In response to a question from the President, the Prime Minister said that he really did not know what made General de Gaulle tick. He had certainly done a great deal with the internal affairs of France, but on the world scene he was a problem.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

57



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR BROMLEY SMITH

S

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson's Meeting with the President

In view of speculation that the British elections might take place as early as March, I suggested to the Department that Ormsby-Gore be told immediately of Harold Wilson's scheduled meeting with the President on March 2.

I do not think we want to be in the position of having Harold Wilson (by an oversight) here in the middle of a British election campaign. By keeping David Gore informed, the British Government at least will not be caught off guard.

David Klein



DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12-20-77; NSC 11-24-78
By inf, NARS, Date 8-16-79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54

Origin
EUR

ACTION: Ambassy LONDON 4443 PRIORITY

Jan 22 5 40 PM '64

Info:
SS
G
PR
SY
RMR

ATTENTION AMBASSADOR BRUCE

You may inform Wilson President agrees to appointment

March 2. END

GP-3

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-30-78
By ing, NARS, Date 8-16-79

Drafted by:
EUR:WCBurdett/lm 1-22-64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EUR - William C. Burdett

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Smith (subst)

BNA - Mr. Tucker (subst)

Mr. Read

S - Mr. Little

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File 7a

To: Bromley Smith S
From: Ken O'Donnell

March 2nd is available for
the President -

I assume that this is all O.K.
with State Dept. -

yes

Burdett informed

Tell S/S as well

Done
(min) 1/22

Done Khr

BKS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7b

Mr. O'Donnell

Is March 2 OK?
Amb. Bruce talked
to President Johnson
about the appointment.

R Smith

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

7c

36.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

Action

By JB, NARS, Date 7/29/77

EUR

PP RUEHCR
DE RUFTLN 486C 21/1248Z

Info

P 211238Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY/LONDON

SS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

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STATE GRNC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 3377 JANUARY TWENTYFIRST 1 PM

RMR

ATTENTION ASSISTANT SECRETARY TYLER.

ALTHOUGH FORMAL APPLICATION SHOULD NORMALLY COME VIA BRIT EMBASSY WASHINGTON, HAROLD WILSON CALLED ME ON PERSONAL BASIS THIS MORNING TO STATE HIS PROBLEM REGARDING SEEING PRESIDENT.

I HAD TOLD HIM UPON MY RETURN HERE THAT PRESIDENT COULD NOT RECEIVE HIM BEFORE MARCH.

HE HAS NOW ASKED ME TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER AN APPOINTMENT ON MARCH 2 WOULD BE FEASIBLE. IF SO, HE WOULD ARRANGE TO RECEIVE A UNIVERSITY DEGREE DURING THE COURSE OF HIS SHORT CFN 3377 1 2

PAGE 2 RUFTLN 486C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TRIP, AND ALSO PROBABLY GO TO CANADA.

THE REASON HE ASKS FOR SPEEDY CONSIDERATION AND IS HOPEFUL OF THIS DATE BEING ACCEPTABLE IS:

1. THE DOMESTIC ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IS IN FULL SWING HERE, AND HE HAS A CROWDED CALENDAR OF MAJOR SPEECHES.
2. THERE IS STILL, ACCORDING TO HIM, THE POSSIBILITY OF A MARCH ELECTION. I RECOMMEND THAT, IF CONVENIENT TO PRESIDENT, DATE OF MARCH 2 BE AGREED. HE COULD BE THERE ON MARCH 1ST, BUT THAT BEING SUNDAY I HAVE ASSUMED, ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT SO INFORMED WILSON, THIS WOULD BE UNSUITABLE.

THIS MATTER IS URGENT FROM WILSON'S VIEWPOINT. A RAPID REPLY WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO ME IN RELATION TO MY OTHER DEALINGS WITH HIM. GP-4. BRUCE

BT

CFN 1. 2. 2 1ST GP-4

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cc: Mr. Tyler

✓

7d
u.k.

December 19, 1963

(My dear Harold)

In regard to your letter of December 17 about the possibility of your visiting the United States in late February, I discussed this last night with Secretary Rusk and William Tyler (Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs). The Secretary is thoroughly agreeable to this in principle. I explained to him that you were not considering it as an official visit, and that if the proper clearance were obtained from the State Department you would then deal with it through the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Washington.

Dean Rusk has instructed Bill Tyler to take the matter up next week and ascertain when and how this could be fitted into the President's schedule. Tyler will communicate the result to this Embassy during my absence, and the Minister, Lewis Jones, will promptly get in touch with you.

I anticipate no difficulty whatever except the off chance that the President might be away at that time.

Please excuse this letter, dictated in haste, as I am leaving for Washington in a few minutes.

With my warm personal regards and every good wish for a happy Christmas, I am

Ever yours,

The Rt. Hon.

Harold Wilson, O.B.E.,
House of Commons,

(David Bruce)

S ✓



Dec. 10th I spoke to the
Secy about this. He thought it OK
in principle: there would be no official
hist. but Mr. Tyler should take it in
hand & see whether it would be convenient
to the Pres. to receive him. He
17th December, 1963.

Tyler should then notify Embassy London
as soon as possible. H.B.

My dear David,

When I met you last week
I raised with you the question of my visiting
Washington.

As you know, I hoped to visit
the U.S. early in January, partly to receive an
honorary doctorate from a New England university,
but also with the intention of visiting Washington
to bring myself up to date on recent Washington
thinking on world affairs, and, of course, to answer
any questions on Labour Party policy.

With the death of President
Kennedy I naturally reviewed my plans. I am, of
course, extremely anxious to meet the President,
but recognise the difficulty of proposing this in
advance of Sir Alec Douglas-Home's visit. At the same
time, with the possibility of an early election,
I should not wish to delay my visit too long, and
I think it is important, having regard to conditions
in this country, that both of us should have the
opportunity of meeting the President.

I should be grateful, therefore,
if you could raise with Washington the possibility
of my going to the U.S. in late February. As on
the last occasion, the visit would be related to
another engagement (in this case the honorary doctorate)
in the U.S.

As soon as I hear from you, I will
immediately get in touch with the university concerned,
and I should perhaps mention I would intend also to
visit Toronto to fulfil an oft repeated invitation
to address the Canadian Exporters Association.

Yours,

H.E. the U.S. Ambassador

Harold Wilson

P.S. Thank you for a most enjoyable & interesting lunch

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ Bundy

8

36

Action
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Info RR RUEHCR
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G R 131451Z ZEA
PR FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
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BT STATE GR110

1963 DEC 13 AM 10 49

USIA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2753 DEC 13 3PM

RMR FROM BRUCE.

HAROLD WILSON LUNCED ALONE WITH ME YESTERDAY.

HE WOULD LIKE TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE HOPE OF MEETING THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER; HE THINKS IT WOULD BE INDECOROUS TO DO SO EARLIER.

HE WILL MAKE HIS NORMAL APPLICATION THROUGH THE FOREIGN OFFICE VIA THE BRIT EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

WILL DISCUSS HERE WITH SCHAEZEL WILSON'S VIEWS ON TRIPS TO WASHINGTON BY OTHER IMPORTANT LABOUR PERSONALITIES; HE HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THEIR DESIRABILITY IN SOME INSTANCES.

GP-3. BRUCE

BT

CFN 2753 13 3PM GP-3

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-267
By *ju*, NARA, Date *3-22-94*

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McNamara/Wilson
MemCon - 3/5/64

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File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C. 20301

International Security Affairs

5 March 1964

In reply refer to:
I-3433/64

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Visit of Mr. Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party

Place: Secretary McNamara's Office, Pentagon
1210 - 1245, 2 March 1964

Participants:

United Kingdom Side

Leader of British Labor Party - Mr. Harold Wilson

United States Side

Secretary of Defense - Robert S. McNamara
Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA - Mr. William P. Bundy
Assistant, European Region, ISA - Captain J. G. Andrews, USN

1. Public Announcement

Mr. Wilson stated that he considered his call an official, informal meeting; that if asked by the press what he and Secretary McNamara talked about he would merely say "defense". In response to a query Mr. McNamara stated that he expected to leave for the Far East Thursday and be gone from Washington about a week. Mr. Wilson said that if the press asked him about Southeast Asia, he would say he would have to wait to hear what Secretary McNamara had to say when he returned. Mr. Wilson was assured that the statements attributed to Mr. Gordon Walker as a result of his meeting with Secretary McNamara did not reach the press through any action on the U.S. side.

2. Southeast Asia

Mr. Wilson said that Britain must at all costs ensure that both India and Malaysia are defended militarily and economically - the fall of either

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 7/29/77

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS, DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

would mean the end of British influence in the area. Mr. McNamara said that Vietnam was the key to all of the rest of Southeast Asia. He said that he was not sure what we should do. The situation was comparable to that which existed in 1961 when the U.S. had embarked on a massive training program. Mr. Wilson inquired of the intentions for carrying the war into North Vietnam with the attendant risk of bringing in the Chinese Communists, indicating that he considers it a parallel to the Korean situation of the early 1950's. Secretary McNamara indicated that no specific course of action had been determined.

Mr. Wilson asked whether Laos wasn't the backdoor to Vietnam and the Pathet Lao responsible for getting support to the Viet Cong into Vietnam. Secretary McNamara agreed that this was so. Mr. Wilson volunteered that he had asked Khrushchev why he didn't bring pressure to bear to enforce the neutrality agreement in Laos and that Khrushchev had replied that his influence did not extend that far. Mr. Wilson advanced the opinion that Khrushchev would hate to see South Vietnam fall as it would appear to be a vindication of the militant Chinese Communist ideology.

3. Labor Defense Policy

Mr. Wilson discussed the Defence White Paper and the defense debate in the House of Commons. He thought the Paper much too skimpy, although an improvement on last year's. He went to some length to reiterate Labor's unequivocal support of the Holy Loch arrangement, being called upon to do so because the Labor front bench had failed to respond to Mr. Thorneycroft's question on that score in the House last week. He did add that Labor might favor labeling Holy Loch a NATO installation (solely for U.S. use, of course) but that was merely a matter of nomenclature.

Mr. Wilson reiterated Labor's intention to do away with the U.K.'s nuclear force. With the considerable sums saved thereby he would improve the conventional forces' equipment (not necessarily the numbers of personnel, although more money would attract more people) and improve its mobility. He believed that if a country the size of Britain tried to have "a little of everything" it wound up with "a lot of nothing". Part of the improved conventional posture and mobility would consist of increasing the naval construction program.

Secretary McNamara reviewed the U.S. position on aircraft carriers and stated that their principal role was in non-nuclear war. He then briefly explained the concept of the SIOP and stated that because of the increases in numbers of Polaris and other strategic weapons it would not be necessary to assign SIOP commitments to aircraft carriers after 1966.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Mr. Wilson asked whether aircraft could get through Russian defenses. Mr. McNamara went into the U.S. intelligence estimates and capabilities at some length.

Mr. Wilson made a point of the clever political wording in the Defence White Papers, justifying the independent deterrent on the grounds that "a potential enemy might be tempted to attack in the mistaken belief that the United States would not act unless America herself were attacked." He went on to say that he had been told that the cost of developing weapons systems was rising at a rate ten times that of the GNP's of the Western countries and therefore Britain would be happy to have a smaller set of golf clubs and have the U.S. have in its bag the masher for getting out of that bunker:

Mr. Wilson would like, when Britain was divested of her nuclear capability, to develop highly mobile fire brigade forces to be used East of Suez and in Africa and elsewhere to keep the peace. He would like to see it develop in a Commonwealth context with, hopefully, more Commonwealth participation. Britain could go into a lot of these unstable areas because she had at one time governed many of them and there was a reservoir of good will remaining. The U.S. couldn't go into these places without having Russia want to do so too. It was gratifying that the East African countries had requested British aid. Mr. Wilson and Secretary McNamara agreed that it was impressive how much had been accomplished there with so few troops. Secretary McNamara made the point that next time it would require more. Mr. Wilson enlarged on his fire brigade concept by stating he would like to see the U.K. looked to as a regular contributor of UN peace-keeping forces much the same as Sweden is, or that the Commonwealth fire brigade operations could be carried out with some sort of UN blessing or acquiescence.

Secretary McNamara stated that the U.S. would be very glad to see the U.K. have this capability; that whereas the U.S. has the strength to field the peace-keeping forces there was a conviction in some quarters that doing so would put a disproportionate share of the cost of defense on the U.S.

Mr. Wilson mentioned the TSR-2 and said that if it looked as good as he had the impression it was, a Labor government would continue the program. In response to Mr. Wilson's question, Mr. McNamara mentioned the TFX with its very demanding specifications which necessitated adopting variable geometry in the sweepback of the wings. He also mentioned the knowledge and experience the U.S. had gained in adapting the B-52 for low altitude flight.

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Secretary McNamara explained that our offer to destroy B-47's in return for destruction of Badgers was prompted in part by a desire to avoid their coming into the hands of third parties (Indonesia, etc.). Mr. Wilson was informed, in response to his query, that the British V-Bomber force is more akin to the U.S. B-47's than the B-52's.

4. French Southeast Asia Policy

Mr. Wilson volunteered that he thought de Gaulle was merely making mischief with his suggestion for neutralizing South Vietnam. He said that Labor was unalterably opposed to the idea, that South Vietnam should not be neutralized unless North Vietnam were also, and the latter was impossible of accomplishment. He advanced the rationale for de Gaulle that French pride and prestige had suffered a stinging blow in French Indo-China and the French would derive some satisfaction if the U.S. were to suffer a comparable defeat in that area.

5. Italian Government

Mr. Wilson took credit for having gotten Nenni to go along with NATO with the argument that he need not reverse himself by coming out loudly in NATO's support, but he could support it by merely recognizing the existing situation. Mr. Wilson believes the Italian Government is "resilient" (if not strong).

6. German Socialists

Mr. Wilson volunteered that the Labor Party was in close touch at a high level with the German Social Democratic Party and had very good rapport. The contact had come about through an initial endeavor to discuss disarmament but the discussions had soon ranged over the entire spectrum of defense. In Mr. Wilson's view it is a healthy development and would be very useful if Labor wins and the Socialists should come to power.

7. Politics

Mr. Wilson pointed out that he had tabled his support of increased defense expenditures without bothering to call a Party conference. The few dissenters had been identified and dealt with summarily. This illustrated the solidarity of the Labor Party and the fact that it was no longer in the deplorable state of having to depend for support on the pacifist unilateral disarmament element.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Labor is somewhat on the defensive in its position on the nuclear deterrent; the Conservatives appeal to the national pride of the "man in the pub" for support in retaining the deterrent whereas the intelligent people and responsible press all agree with Labor. Mr. Wilson hopes to keep the issue on a high plane and to avoid anti-American or anti-German slants. Secretary McNamara hoped that the campaign could be carried off without having either become issues.

If Labor wins, Fred Milley, now Shadow Secretary of State for Air, will become the number two man in the Defence Department and be responsible for organization and management.

Mr. Dennis Healey will visit Washington later in March. Secretary McNamara said that he would be happy to see him.

Memorandum of Conversation
Prepared by: Captain J. G. Andrews

Approved by: Mr. Bundy, ASD/ISA
4 March 1964

Distribution:

SecDef (1)
DepSecDef (1)
Chairman, JCS (3)
OSD - DDF&E (2)
Comptroller (2)
Mr. William Tyler, State (6) (Suggest
distribution to Embassy London)
Mr. McGeorge Bundy (1)
Mr. Henry Owen, State (2)
ISA (6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wilson to LBJ Ltr
3/4/64

11

March 9, 1964

John W. K

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Thanks very much for your note of March 4. Our talk was a great pleasure for me, and Mrs. Johnson and I very much enjoyed meeting Mrs. Wilson and Giles.

The papers here treated your visit in the most friendly way, and I am particularly grateful for the care and restraint with which you stated your position on sensitive issues.

Sincerely,

LBJ

The Honorable Harold Wilson
House of Commons
London, S. W. 1
England

LBJ:McG. B. :ms

Cy ex SLs 3/10

House of Commons,

London, S.W.1

4th March, 1964.

Dear Mr President,

I should like to thank you again
for so kindly receiving me on Monday.

It was a great pleasure and honour
to meet you and I appreciate the time you gave to our
meeting, as I know how tight your daily schedules
must be.

I found our talk most stimulating.

I need hardly tell you how much
my wife, Mary, and Giles enjoyed their time with
Mrs. Johnson and the fact that they were able to
meet you later.

You were both most kind and made our
trip a memorable one.

With every good wish,

Yours,

Harold Wilson

P.S. I have of course made no outside reference to
the subjects of our talk. If I was reported as having made
references to Cuba in my press conference
The President this was because I answered questions
but in a British context - not in that of
the conversation in the White House.

Unofficial Transcript
Wilson 3/3/64 PressC.

✓ 14
h.k.

UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN IN WASHINGTON

ON TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1964.,

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HAROLD WILSON, P.C., M.P.

Gentlemen, if we are all gathered, I have not much in the way of a statement, but just to get it on the record you will know, I think, who I have seen while I have been on this short visit to Washington, after some weekend talks with members of the Government, with Senators and others. Yesterday of course I met Secretary MacNamara, Under-Secretary George Ball and some of his colleagues, Secretary Rusk and President Johnson. I also had talks with Mr. McGeorge Bundy. As I have made clear in answer to questions, as an opposition leader I am not here to negotiate with the Government; oppositions can't negotiate with Governments. I have come to bring myself up to date on Washington thinking on big world issues and to answer any questions that have been put to me, and there have been very many, about my own Party's policy on world affairs. Now, are there any questions?

Q. Mr. Wilson, will a Labour Government seek closer economic and political ties with continental Europe, and if so what kind of ties would you have in mind and how would you go about it?

A. We want closer economic ties with everyone, but we think that the right answer to this, to get the closer economic ties, is through the Kennedy round and the removal of impediments to trade in the Western World as a whole. So far as the Common Market in Europe is concerned, which I gather is probably what you had in mind, those talks of course were broken off. My own Party listed five very clear conditions that must be fulfilled, including the right to have an independent foreign policy; the right to plan our own economy; the rights of our E.F.T.A. partners
: / (European

(European Free Trade Association partners); the position of British agriculture, and above all freedom to go on importing from the Commonwealth, as heretofore. These conditions were laid down before the Labour Party could have supported entry. Those conditions remain. We are prepared to resume negotiations with the Common Market only on those conditions. As far as political ties are concerned, we have always rejected any conception of a supranational political organisation in Western Europe, covering, say, defense and foreign policy. We believe it is important not only for Britain but for the world for Britain to have our own foreign policy, and in any case we regard ourselves as a world power, as a country with world interests, particularly through the Commonwealth and I think we, the whole British people, would resist any idea of being corralled in Europe.

Q. Mr. Wilson, do you subscribe to the theory that the well-fed, relatively prosperous, communist is less dangerous than the lean and hungry one?

A. If you are asking me to say whether I agree with Sir Alec Douglas Home on this point, I do agree with him. This has always been the view of the Labour Party, and I remember very well when I went to the Soviet Union in 1935, I think the first Westerner to go there after Stalin's death, Sir Winston Churchill who was at that time not only Prime Minister but Acting Foreign Secretary, was very keen to hear what I found and the first question he put to me was: "What is their attitude to consumer goods?" He felt that if they were aiming to raise living standards in the Soviet Union he thought that would have very considerable international effects.

/Reuters

Q. Mr. Wilson, Reuters reported yesterday, last night, I assume, based on the background that you had given British correspondents, that you said that NATO is in a critical stage and that you have certain plans how to help. Could you tell us what these plans are?

A. I think this was based actually on something I said on the record outside the White House. We do believe that NATO is going through very great strains, partly of course because of the French attitude. We feel that our own proposals in relation to defence policies will help to make NATO more effective. We believe there should be much more concentration on the deterrent, for example, in terms of the Western Alliance rather than in terms of individual European countries. Also we feel that the pressure in Europe for a separate European deterrent excluding the United States is a dangerous proposal and would be divisive within NATO. We believe it would cause a diversion of effort from the job of making NATO more effective.

Q. Sir, I notice that in your speech at Bridgeport you said you are not convinced that the M.L.F. has any function. Sir, you also apparently opposed going ahead with the plans for a British submarine, nuclear submarine. Where do you come down then in terms of defense policy if you were Prime Minister. The M.L.F. seems to be a means of coming down the middle.

A. Oh I think that I have always said that on the M.L.F., on the mixed manned force, if we were convinced that this was the only way to stop Germany from becoming a nuclear power then reluctantly, very, very reluctantly, we would go along with it, but we are not convinced of this. And we feel that this particular proposal adds nothing at all to Western deterrent strength. The motives are purely political, and we believe that this, so far from sublimating Germany's nuclear ambitions might whet her appetite.

/We believe

We believe that the right answer here is to recognise clearly that the nuclear power in the West is in the hands of the United States and that pretences of other countries to be nuclear powers are or will become shortly unreal. And we would like to see much more work done in NATO on the basis of consultation about the circumstances in which the Western deterrent is used to see that we are all more closely involved in the targeting, the deployment and the rest. But we believe the right division of labour within the Western Alliance for Britain, for example, is to strengthen our conventional forces. We have all paid tribute, and rightly, to the very good job done by the British troops recently in East Africa and indeed in Cyprus where they have shown great restraint and done a remarkable job. But the elastic is stretched very tight so far as Britain's conventional forces are concerned, and a redeployment of our defence policy saving resources on the nuclear programme and improving the number of troops, improving their equipment, above all, improving their mobility, would we feel, be more helpful to the Western Alliance and the cause of peace. You have got to remember that Britain has a very long naval tradition, has tremendous contacts with the Commonwealth and with former Colonial powers and I believe that we have a unique contribution to make within the Alliance and whenever United Nations peace-keeping is required, on the basis of that naval tradition and that Commonwealth connection, and that's where we see Britain's defence policy being deployed.

/Q. In a defence

Q. In a defence debate last week in the House, Thorneycroft managed to confuse the Labour position on the Americans at Holy Loch. Should you come to power, would you permit the Americans to continue there?

A. Well, I do not want to carry on our little domestic political arguments over here but I have seen reports, and indeed I was asked on arrival in Canada, about Mr. Thorneycroft's question to the Labour Front Bench. His question related to the Holy Loch Base. Well, of course, Mr. Thorneycroft, perhaps his memory is not as good as I thought it was because I remember being on television with him in Britain on the 6th of June, 1962, when he thought it pertinent to put that question to me very clearly in front of ten million people and he got a very clear answer, and indeed, I think he does know the answer really about where we stand because I said it again on British television, only a month ago, that, so far as the Labour Party is concerned, we accept the Polaris Holy Loch Base, but it is our view that as soon as possible this should be turned into a NATO responsibility because a British Labour Government will, of course, fully honour any obligations laid upon us by NATO.

Q. Mr. Wilson, referring to your previous remarks, there is a report in London that you would be prepared to put the British Navy under the United Nations.

A. I understand that one or two English evening papers are running that story on the basis of something filed in Washington, this is of course a complete lie. Under any Government, Conservative or Labour, the control of the armed forces will be 100 per cent within the sovereign control of the United Kingdom. And I have explained what I think would be a valuable role for our armed forces, suitably built up, in putting out brush fires, in dealing with problems, particularly East of Suez, or should we

/say

say in Asia or in Africa, and it would be right that from time to time Britain should make an appropriate contribution to a specific United Nations peace-keeping operation. That is what is happening in Cyprus or what is now currently to-day proposed for Cyprus. We would want to strengthen our forces so that we could respond to calls, whether from the Alliance or the United Nations, to deal with situations of danger in various parts of the world. But the suggestion that we should put the British Navy under the control of the United Nations, or anywhere, except under the control of our own Government is really too fantastic to deal with.

Q. There was quite an opposition in this country and also in Western Germany against any schemes of the nuclear freeze in Central Europe and one of the arguments is that it is going to undermine the whole Atlantic Alliance and also unbalance the present power structure in Europe. What is your comment?

A. You are talking about proposals for a freeze on the build-up of nuclear systems in Central Europe. Our position is, and always has been, that we support the ultimate aim of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe and at the same time a planned and agreed reduction in conventional armaments in that danger area. As a step towards this, we welcome proposals for a freeze of nuclear weapons there. But we do make two very important conditions for these proposals. One, that it must not relate only to the two Germanies. It must extend further East than that, Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example. Secondly, we insist, as did the United Nations Resolution on this subject, or its sponsors, we insist that it should be done in such a way as not to alter the balance of force - the balance of power -

/between

between East and West. It should not be a back-door method of reducing the strength of one side or the other.

Q. Mr. Wilson, would your Government be any more cooperative than the present British Government in cutting off all trade with Cuba except for food and medicines?

A. Our position in relation to trade with Cuba is exactly the same as that of the present British Government. There is no party difference, or intra-party difference in Britain, on that question.

Q. Would you give us your views on General de Gaulle's proposals for neutralization of Southeast Asia and also the effects that the recognition of Communist China will have in that area?

A. On the first question of neutralization, for example in South Viet Nam, we think this is in present circumstances a visionary proposal. It would be right only if you could get a total and effective neutralization of North Viet Nam, and with a Communist regime there, we would regard that as improbable, if not impossible. Therefore, we cannot regard this as a helpful suggestion on the part of General de Gaulle.

With regard to the French recognition of Communist China, this was, of course, so far as recognition is concerned, - the British Government 14 years ago recognised Communist China, de facto, as the Government with effective control of China which is always the test that any British Government, Labour or Conservative, applies - this was a decision of the Labour Government, and was supported from the Opposition benches by the then Leader of the Opposition, Sir Winston Churchill, who said this was a right decision. And, of course, the position of the two parties in Britain has not changed since that time. However, if one looks underneath de Gaulle's motive at this time, at this and certain other things, well one is free to speculate on what he is really after there.

/Q. You have said

Q. You have said that if you come to power you will seek to renegotiate or denegotiate the Nassau Agreement. Could you tell us what you mean by that?

A. We believe that the Nassau Agreement involved a decision that Britain should try to maintain the pretence of being an independent nuclear power. We do not believe you can talk about an independent British deterrent if you have, in fact, to buy it from an ally. More specifically, we believe this is the wrong use of Britain's limited military resources and the wrong contribution for Britain to make to the Alliance. We believe that a British-owned Polaris would not add anything significant to Western deterrent striking strength. We cannot envisage any circumstances in which Britain would want to use it alone. We would not want to use it, for example, in another Suez operation. I hope to God we've seen the last of that kind of operation. I think they would not want to take on the Soviet Union alone for the sake, as Sir John Slessor, one of the great Air Marshals said, of exacting a certain posthumous revenge on the Soviet Union. I sincerely trust that no one would want to use it for the purpose of triggering off a nuclear war, a catalytic operation to bring America in, and we therefore feel the proposal is more connected with shall we say, prestige or some nostalgic considerations. But the serious thing, a proper defence posture for Britain, is that this does spend very considerable resources in money and materials which we believe could be better deployed. I have said I think Britain's role could be a very significant one in the world on the basis of our conventional forces. Britain is a world power and I think that we should be able to deploy our resources so that we can behave like a world power, in peace-keeping operations.

/Q. (inaudible)

Q. (Inaudible)

A. If we won the election, in due course, we would come over here for wide ranging defence discussions not just on the Nassau Agreement but on the whole question of the future of NATO with particular reference to getting agreement and consensus on the circumstances in which the Western deterrent would be used. And a greater share and greater voice in NATO nuclear policy. We think that is the way that NATO should be moving, not splitting off into ownership of separate deterrents. Moreover, passionately, we are anxious to get an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons all over the world, and we believe that separate deterrents stand in the way of that agreement. May I say finally, we believe that if individual countries insist on having their own deterrent it will be impossible in the long run or even in the short run to stop Germany becoming a nuclear power and we believe that that will be a very dangerous development.

Q. Mr. Wilson, the suggestion has been made that if the submarines are built and if the delivery of the Polaris missiles continues, and is completed, that you would place these submarines under NATO, is that true?

A. The position is of course, that the election has got to be held this year, and the submarines can't have made very much progress by that time. We believe there is a need for a very much expanded conventional naval ship-building programme in Britain and we would hope to convert them from their present design to nuclear powered tracker submarines. I don't know whether that will be technically possible, it rather depends on when the election is and how far they've got. If they had got, in a sense, past the point of no return here, we would obviously be prepared to offer them for the Western deterrent within NATO

/on whatever

on whatever basis NATO is going to be organised. Exactly as the present Government, and in our view, rightly, has handed over the V-bombers to NATO.

Q. Mr. Wilson, you have been quoted as saying or implying in some earlier remarks that you believe a Labour Government could get along better with the American Government than the Conservative Government. What do you have to document that?

A. Well, I wouldn't put it quite in that way; I wasn't answering that particular question when I said what was quoted, I think it's something I said in London last week. I think that any Government in Britain has a very close identity of interest with this country because of our ancient ties, because of our common interest in the Alliance, but I would mention one or two areas where I think our thinking is very close to that of Washington. We have in all the arguments about the United Nations, for example, the Congo operation two or three years ago, strongly supported United Nations action against somewhat different attitudes on the part of our opponents. Again, to take a very up to date question, we take exactly the same view about an arms embargo to South Africa as the United States Government, and indeed the United Nations takes the same view now. Then again on certain aspects of disarmament, I think we would find ourselves in very considerable agreement. We warmly welcome for example President Johnson's proposal for the freezing of missile systems which we regard as a very big step forward; we think there is a great deal in, and strongly support, his proposal for a bonfire of obsolescent bombers.

We believe that one of the fundamental aims of the United States administration is an anti-proliferation agreement. We share that view. Of course there are differences between us and

/Washington

Washington policy - two have been mentioned this morning.

One is trade with Communist countries; another is the question of recognition of Communist China. On these issues we are not in agreement with the United States Administration, and on both these issues, as I say, there is no argument as between the parties in the United Kingdom.

Q. Could you tell us why you don't accept the American argument that in trading with Cuba the Western allies are endangering the security of the free world, in that Cuba, because of its subversive action, is more than just a threat in the Caribbean area?

A. We are of course very well aware of the strong feelings here about Cuba and I think we are very fully aware of the arguments that have been deployed in this connection, both in Sir Alec Douglas Home's visit and in my own. But it has always been the tradition and the policy of British Governments not to use trade embargoes as a means of enforcing political differences, even the deepest political differences. We have, of course, had an embargo on strategic materials and arms - I myself introduced the one in relation to Russia, and Eastern Europe at the time of the Berlin air lift, when I was in charge of Britain's trade - and of course we all support a complete control on the shipment of strategic materials or arms to Cuba. We have always taken this view, but as to a general trade embargo, successive British Governments have been against this. We, for example, have in the Labour Movement been highly critical of Spain but it was never the policy of the British Labour Government to have an embargo against Spain. And, as far as South Africa is concerned, where we feel very very strongly indeed, we have not pressed for a trade embargo, but only for an arms embargo.

Q. Mr. Wilson, you just mentioned that you side with the Americans on the question of anti-proliferation of atomic weapons. There seems to be a contradiction with the whole attitude on the multilateral force, because the Americans maintain that this is a road-block on the road to proliferation, whereas you maintain that this is an instrument of that.

A. It is our view that the multilateral proposal was put forward to some extent in response to the situation developing under Nassau. I think it was the fundamental position of the United States Government, for example in the Ann Arbor speech of Secretary MacNamara, that there should be two nuclear powers with no further proliferation. And this has always been our position. But of course with the French and British insistence on the so-called independent deterrents, this created a new situation under which I think the American Government felt that Germany would be the next in the queue; and we share very much the feeling of the American Government that this would be a most dangerous thing and this is why they have put forward this proposal. But perhaps if we had a change of policy in Britain one could go back to first base on this whole question. May I just say this with regard to the Mixed Manned Force. We are opposed to it. We believe that from the military point of view it adds nothing at all to Western strength. From the political point of view we can see the attractions, but there are also many dangers, particularly if we are thinking of devising disarmament agreements.

/Q. Would

Q. Would you discuss the Malaysia situation and whether you think the international peace-keeping force down there might keep the peace better than the present arrangement?

A. So far as Malaysia is concerned my Party one hundred per cent stands behind the principle of supporting Malaysia against any form of aggression or infiltration, and we welcome the action taken by British troops there in a most difficult situation. And both the troops from Britain, and the Gurkhas, who are doing a remarkable job there, have made a big contribution. It may well be that if aggression is renewed - if infiltration continues - that more troops will be required. This is the sort of thing I had in mind when I said that we wanted to have more mobile and more effective troops for Commonwealth and peace-keeping purposes.

Q. Some political leaders in the United States, including former Vice-President Nixon, have suggested that Congress, or indeed the American people might take action to boycott the products of British companies who trade with Cuba. What would be the British re-action to this and what could you say about it?

A. We are totally opposed to boycotts of this kind and to blacklisting, whether it's a matter of blacklisting British firms which trade there, or whether it's a matter of blacklisting shipping companies who send their ships there. There is always the danger that this kind of practice could spread. We saw only yesterday that a lot of African countries were meeting to propose blacklisting or boycotts on transportation companies and shipping and aviation companies who have dealings with South Africa, and you very quickly get the world divided up and trade pretty well wrecked if this becomes general.

/Q.

Q. Mr. Wilson, in view of what you said about the great role of conventional forces, what are your views about conscription?

A. Both we and the British Government have rejected the idea of conscription. And may I say this very frankly, in the sort of circumstances we are in at the present time, where, as I say, the elastic is stretched very tight, conscription, so far from helping the situation, would make it more difficult because you would have to use a substantial number of your highly trained soldiers, who are needed for operational purposes, for a year or two actually doing the job of training the new recruits. So conscription is not only not necessary in these circumstances, it would be directly unhelpful.

Q. Mr. Wilson, would you delineate for us exactly why you feel it would be a dangerous situation for Germany to become a nuclear power? And would you also say whether you think General de Gaulle is aware of this danger?

A. On the first point, we would regard Germany becoming a nuclear power as passing the point of no return in the matter of proliferation. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the danger of their being used for purely nationalistic purposes (one might think, for example, of the Middle East) is very acute indeed.

Our feeling about German nuclear weapons is not in any sense an anti-German feeling or fighting old wars over again. But we believe that one of the very serious consequences here would be that any hope of understanding between East and West would become almost impossible. The Russians have an obsession - I don't think that's too strong a word - about Germany. They have always admired the Germans in a technical sense. Before the Revolution, almost anything that ran in Russia ran because it was managed either by Germans or by Scotsmen, and they've always had this

/sort

sort of not love-hate relationship, but admiration-hate relationship. And in view of their experience you can't talk to any Russian, whether at the top level in the Kremlin or any man in the street, without this coming out within a very few minutes. And I believe that if Germany became a separate nuclear power, it would put paid to any hope of real East-West understanding.

Q. Do you think the French and General de Gaulle are aware of this danger?

A. I haven't answered the second half of the question. I always find it very difficult to speculate what goes on in the mind of the President of France. I find a lot of other people have the same difficulty but a lot of journalists get paid high sums for trying and I don't get paid for trying, so I won't continue with that. I don't know whether he sees that danger. I do believe that his own attempt at an independent deterrent is not going to be as easy as he thinks. The day of the bomber is dying, as a means of delivering the bomb and he has not yet got very far with the cost and the implications of building a missile.

We, in Britain, with some of the finest technicians in the world, tried the independent missile, with Blue Streak. That failed - not through any technical failure, they did a wonderful job - but because the sheer pace of events made the designs obsolete and Britain did not have the economic reserves to be able to deploy enough on that kind of proposition. I think that France will find the same very soon. They are about five years behind where we were when we cancelled Blue Streak. And I think we may see interesting developments there in the next five years.

Q. Mr. Wilson, could you give us an assessment of your working relationship with German and Italian Socialists, and specifically to what extent has the M.L.F. project been discussed informally with them?

A. I think

A. I think one of the heartening features of the past few months has been the way in which the Labour Party in Britain and the S.P.D., the German Social Democratic Party, have improved their relations. Those relations are now closer than they have ever been in the history of our two parties. This was symbolised when at our Party Conference, for the first time, we had an overseas speaker, and it was Willy Brandt. And our own personal relations, my colleagues and myself, with the S.P.D. leaders, I think, is a very high order of understanding and personal relations. With regard to the Joint Committee we set up, we were told that the S.P.D. had not done very much work on disarmament, on arms control, and so on, and we, of course, have done a great deal of work on this, and have the advice of some of the foremost world experts - Nobel Prize Winner Philip Noel Baker, and others - and so we offered to place our information at their disposal. We then formed a Joint Committee and of course it's gone wider in its discussions, dealing with general problems of NATO defence. We have of course had informal talks about the Mixed Manned Force in this, but that's only part of a much wider front.

In relation to the Italian Socialist Parties, of course, we have had contacts with Signor Saragat and Signor Nenni and I think we can claim to have played a humble part in helping to get some reconciliation in matters of policy there, which led to Signor Nenni joining the Government.

/Q.

Q. Mr. Wilson, as you look ahead, do you see realistic prospects for more agreements with the Soviets in areas which would ease tension? And what role, if any, do you think Premier Krushchev plays in this over-all effort?

A. My colleagues and I were involved in very searching discussions with Premier Krushchev last June. We tried to reassure the Soviet Chairman and his colleagues, for example about the misunderstanding which had developed between the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of inspection. It was a genuine misunderstanding and we were able to tell him that there had been no bad faith in the matter, that the U.S. position on this was absolutely 100% honourable, but there had been a misunderstanding, and during that week of discussions, we were able to size up the situation I think fairly well, and to play some part in discussing the basis on which a test ban agreement could be reached. I believe that two of the key factors here were first the Senate Resolution on the three environments, which provided a new technical way out of the deadlock, and secondly, the degree of confidence and trust generated by President Kennedy's speech on the 10th June to the American University. And we saw, we were in Krushchev's room very shortly after that speech, and we were the first I think to hear and see his reaction to it which was I think encouraging, and indeed all of us felt that that speech was in this sense historic. Now we believe that there is a desire there to go forward. I am afraid everyone has lost impetus a bit in the last few months and it is dangerous to stand still in this matter.

/So far as

So far as disarmament is concerned, therefore, we warmly welcome, as I have said, President Johnson's initiative about the freezing of missile systems and we also welcome the proposal for a nuclear freeze. We have put forward a number of proposals ourselves, but we believe it is important to make an advance quickly on the freeze and on anti-proliferation.

Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Thank you.

Rusk/Wilson MemCon
3/2/64

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment) *File*

March 12, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read *mk*
Executive Secretary

Attached for your information and files is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between The Secretary and Mr. Wilson regarding various subjects dated March 2, 1964.

Attachment:

S/S #3532

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Approved in S
3/11/64Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By TB, NARS, Date 7/29/77DATE: March 2, 1964
Time: 3:30 p.m.
Place: The Secretary's office

SUBJECT: General Discussion

U.S.UK

PARTICIPANTS:

The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNAHarold Wilson, Leader
of the British
Labor Party

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3/11/64.

The Secretary began the conversation by saying that he thought the UK had picked up its responsibility in Cyprus very well. He hoped it could be maintained. It had the big advantage of having a legal basis.

Mr. Wilson replied that Makarios probably found it easier to deal with the British than with anyone else. He said this reminded him of something the Secretary had said to him a few years ago about Britain's role east of Suez. In his talks in Washington, Mr. Wilson said, he had been stressing Britain's world-wide role. He had not gone into the domestic British controversy over the independent nuclear deterrent. This had become highly "electoral" with the Labor Party on the defensive. The independent deterrent had an emotional appeal to the man in the pub. He hoped that Labor would be able to counter this appeal with its call for a build-up of British conventional forces, not only in manpower but also in equipment. Three hundred million pounds a year which would be saved by giving up the independent deterrent would do a lot for British conventional forces. They could be used in the brush-fire capacity in support of U.S. efforts. There were places where it was easier for the British to go than for the Americans without arousing the Russians. It might also be possible to earmark some of the British forces, for instance a part of the BAOR, for support of the UN peace-keeping program. Britain could become very active in a peace-keeping role, even more so than such countries as Sweden.

Mr. Wilson

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3-61Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
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- 2 -

Mr. Wilson termed his program of building up conventional forces as his "sea dog" policy. He said that if Labor won the elections, he would want to come over quickly to Washington to de-negotiate the Nassau Agreement.

In response to questions from the Secretary, Mr. Wilson expressed the following opinions regarding Socialist parties in Europe:

1. Germany - One of the best things which had happened recently had been the development of close relations between the SPD and the Labor Party. This had been the conscious policy of the Labor Party and it could turn out to be most important if both the SPD and the Labor Party won their respective elections.

2. France - Mr. Wilson said he would be meeting Defferre shortly. He did not think that Defferre could be completely trusted. He had to be watched as he liked to use people. In any case, he was better than Guy Mollet.

3. Italy - The conversion of Nenni seemed to be genuine. He had passed various tests. One of them had been an invitation to visit Berlin which he had accepted. In the case of Berlin, one could not sit on the wall but had to be either on one side or the other of it. A real merger of the two Socialist parties in Italy would probably not take place for a few years, possibly ^{not} until both Nenni and Saragat died. Nenni was getting to be an old man who probably had only a few more active years left. Mr. Wilson thought Nenni would like to spend these last years as a senior minister in the government. The Labor Party was trying to make Nenni's conversion easier for him. It had for instance arranged for his party to be invited to send observers to the Socialist International. Nenni would accept the invitation.

A general discussion on disarmament ensued. Mr. Wilson said that Labor liked the idea of a freeze on delivery vehicles and non-proliferation. The Secretary remarked that there was one aspect of the disarmament question which did not get enough attention. He referred to the minor league armaments races. They simply did not make sense. For the cost of one supersonic squadron, a university could be built and maintained. This was one of the reasons why the U.S. favored the B-47-Badger bonfire proposal.

Mr. Wilson

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- 3 -

Mr. Wilson described his last meeting with Khrushchev. He noted that Khrushchev had been most favorably impressed with President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10. Khrushchev thought this meant that the anti-communist crusade was over. Mr. Tyler remarked that it was interesting to note that the Chinese blast against the USSR came shortly after the speech and was in turn followed almost immediately by the cessation of Soviet jamming of the VOA. The Secretary and Mr. Wilson agreed that the members of the Politburo were very well informed on all subjects. Gromyko seemed to have no real power. He merely carried out instructions. The Secretary added that there were some indications that the Soviets were beginning to understand the American political process a little better. He would never forget the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. It was clear that after Laos had been gotten on tracks, Khrushchev was simply out to intimidate the President. The President had stood firm, and at the end of the conversation had said: "Well, Mr. Chairman, it looks as though we are in for a cold winter."

The Secretary inquired how the Labor Party was getting along with its campaign against the "brain drain". Mr. Wilson said he was not so much worried about the exodus of scientists. Salaries did not seem to be the real problem but rather the lack of adequate facilities, as far as scientists were concerned. He was worried about the migration of technicians and engineers. The trouble was that the British industry was simply not absorbing them.

Finally, after ascertaining that the U.S. was backing the UN on the question of the South African arms embargo, Mr. Wilson mentioned that the Labor Party also supported the arms embargo. He had said so publicly as long ago as last March. The Labor Party, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to a trade boycott under present circumstances. If there was a situation approaching open warfare, Labor would favor something like an oil embargo.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

March 16, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

[Handwritten signature]

Attached for your information and files
are copies of memoranda of conversation be-
tween:

File 1) The Secretary and Mr. Wilson regard-
ing various subjects dated March 2.

Bundy 2) Mr. Patolichev and Mr. Martin regard-
ing U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade dated March 3.

Bundy and 3) Mr. Patolichev and Mr. Martin regard-
ing Wheat Shipments in U.S. Vessels
dated March 6.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S
3/11/64DATE: March 2, 1964
Time: 3:30 p.m.
Place: The Secretary's office

SUBJECT: General Discussion

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

U.S.

By VB, NARS, Date 7/29/77

UK

PARTICIPANTS:

The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNAHarold Wilson, Leader
of the British
Labor Party

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" " " Rome
" " " Moscow
" " " Bonn

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Mr. Wilson

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declassified after 12 years

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- 2 -

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1. Germany - One of the best things which had happened recently had been the development of close relations between the SPD and the Labor Party. This had been the conscious policy of the Labor Party and it could turn out to be most important if both the SPD and the Labor Party won their respective elections.

2. France - Mr. Wilson said he would be meeting Defferre shortly. He did not think that Defferre could be completely trusted. He had to be watched as he liked to use people. In any case, he was better than Guy Mollet.

3. Italy - The conversion of Nenni seemed to be genuine. He had passed various tests. One of them had been an invitation to visit Berlin which he had accepted. In the case of Berlin, one could not sit on the wall but had to be either on one side or the other of it. A real merger of the two Socialist parties in Italy would probably not take place for a few years, possibly until both Nenni and Saragat died. Nenni was getting to be an old man who probably had only a few more active years left. Mr. Wilson thought Nenni would like to spend these last years as a senior minister in the government. The Labor Party was trying to make Nenni's conversion easier for him. It had for instance arranged for his party to be invited to send observers to the Socialist International. Nenni would accept the invitation.

A general discussion on disarmament ensued. Mr. Wilson said that Labor liked the idea of a freeze on delivery vehicles and non-proliferation. The Secretary remarked that there was one aspect of the disarmament question which did not get enough attention. He referred to the minor league armaments races. They simply did not make sense. For the cost of one supersonic squadron, a university could be built and maintained. This was one of the reasons why the U.S. favored the B-47--Badger bonfire proposal.

Mr. Wilson

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- 3 -

Mr. Wilson described his last meeting with Khrushchev. He noted that Khrushchev had been most favorably impressed with President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10. Khrushchev thought this meant that the anti-communist crusade was over. Mr. Tyler remarked that it was interesting to note that the Chinese blast against the USSR came shortly after the speech and was in turn followed almost immediately by the cessation of Soviet jamming of the VOA. The Secretary and Mr. Wilson agreed that the members of the Politburo were very well informed on all subjects. Gromyko seemed to have no real power. He merely carried out instructions. The Secretary added that there were some indications that the Soviets were beginning to understand the American political process a little better. He would never forget the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. It was clear that after Laos had been gotten on tracks, Khrushchev was simply out to intimidate the President. The President had stood firm, and at the end of the conversation had said: "Well, Mr. Chairman, it looks as though we are in for a cold winter."

The Secretary inquired how the Labor Party was getting along with its campaign against the "brain drain". Mr. Wilson said he was not so much worried about the exodus of scientists. Salaries did not seem to be the real problem but rather the lack of adequate facilities, as far as scientists were concerned. He was worried about the migration of technicians and engineers. The trouble was that the British industry was simply not absorbing them.

Finally, after ascertaining that the U.S. was backing the UN on the question of the South African arms embargo, Mr. Wilson mentioned that the Labor Party also supported the arms embargo. He had said so publicly as long ago as last March. The Labor Party, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to a trade boycott under present circumstances. If there was a situation approaching open warfare, Labor would favor something like an oil embargo.

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Pres/Wilson MemCon
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~~(SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1. *[Signature]*
2. Return BKS

March 4, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

2 K- [Signature]

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation
Between the President and
Harold Wilson

*Ind S/S 6/3/64
(alm m.)*

For White House approval prior
to distribution.

The President's remarks are
side-lined in blue.

[Signature]
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enc: Memorandum of Conversation

~~(SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

The White House
5:00 p.m.

DATE: March 2, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-265

By ing, NARA, Date 5-15-95

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon with Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party

PARTICIPANTS: US

The President
Mr. Tyler

UK

Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P.
Mrs. Harold Wilson
Mr. Giles Wilson (son)
Mr. David Ennals (in charge of Research
in Labor Party)

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The White House

The President told Mr. Wilson he was glad to see him again and Mr. Wilson recalled that he had last been in the White House in April 1963, though he had come to Washington since then at the time of the funeral ceremony for President Kennedy.

The President said to Mr. Wilson that things seemed to be going a little better in Cyprus, and Mr. Wilson agreed though he commented that it seemed that a vote at the UN on the resolution had been postponed until tomorrow. The President said he had prepared a message to send to President Inonu of Turkey that very morning, but had held off from doing so because it seemed that the Turks were coming on board. He feared the postponement implied that there was some difficulty coming from Makarios. The President commented that he had seen Makarios last year, and had formed the impression that he was a very hard man. (The President called Mr. McGeorge Bundy on the phone in order to get the latest information on Cyprus.)

The President asked Mr. Wilson why the UK considered it worthwhile to continue to trade with Cuba, which represented only about \$5 million, when by so doing the UK was creating so much anti-British feeling over here. The President said that after the Prime Minister's

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downgrading and
declassification

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press conference in Washington on the subject, there had been a great deal of criticism of the UK. Had the Prime Minister merely pointed out that the UK had reduced its trade with Cuba from \$55 million to \$5 million, the effect would have been favorable instead of unfavorable. Mr. Wilson said that the reason why the Prime Minister had spoken in the way he did was in order to get votes at home by taking the position of a staunch defender of UK policy and interests. The President set forth the reasons that lay behind US policy toward Cuba and said that Castro's policy was a great threat not only to this hemisphere but to Western security as a whole. He said it was important that this fact should be understood. Mr. Wilson replied with classic British reasoning on not using foreign trade as an instrument of coercion except in exceptional cases. He recalled that when he was President of the Board of Trade he himself had instituted a UK embargo on shipments of arms to the Soviet Union, and that he had at one point cut off all trade with Hungary when the Hungarian government had arrested a British business man. However when it came down to non-strategic commodities, it was British policy to encourage trade across the board. He pointed out that buses could not be considered to be in this category. The President said that the situation must be looked at in terms of Cuba's needs to keep her economy going. He said that buses represented 80 per cent of Cuban transportation. On the other hand, US wheat sales to the Soviet Union were a one-shot deal and represented less than one per cent of the Soviet Union's need in wheat.

Mr. Wilson said he realized that this was a difficult issue between the United States and the United Kingdom and that he would do everything he could to keep it from playing a major role in the campaign. He said he thought that the British elections would take place in May or June, because the Tories would not be able to hold out until the last moment. He said he thought there would be a certain amount of anti-American sentiment aroused, in the course of the campaign, by the Conservative party. There were still memories of Suez, and there were back-benchers in the Conservative party who would play up to nationalistic feeling for electoral purposes. He stressed to the President that the Labor party was a strong

supporter

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supporter of NATO and the Atlantic community, and had a broad international outlook which was not the case with the rank and file Conservatives. He said the Labor party wanted to play a positive role in Europe but did not want "to be corralled in a little Europe with the Six." The Labor party was mindful of the broad interests of the Commonwealth and wanted to play a part which would be in active support of US efforts to maintain worldwide security.

Turning to defense, Mr. Wilson repeated almost verbatim the arguments he had used in his talk with Secretary Rusk. He said that a Labor government would want to get rid of the national deterrent which made no sense at all for England today. He said this would save 300 million pounds which could be used to put back the British fleet on the high seas, and would permit an increase in conventional forces so that the UK could play an active and useful role in putting out brush fires when necessary.

The President asked Mr. Wilson for his views on the MLF. Mr. Wilson replied with the standard arguments which he had already expressed at lunch. He said that the only circumstances in which the Labor government would support the MLF would be if this were the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring a national nuclear force. He said that he did not think that the German government wanted this, or that there was any support for this in German public opinion. The President asked Mr. Wilson whether he really thought that Germans had abandoned their desire to play a dominant role, and Mr. Wilson said that even if they wanted to do so, the West had the means of preventing this from happening. He felt that the MLF did have the result of putting the German finger on the nuclear trigger. He was apprehensive of a possible development whereby the United States would no longer retain the veto, and Germany might find herself in a position of casting a majority vote by "three to two." The President said that such a situation would never be permitted to arise.

Mr. Wilson said that in general the British elections would be waged and won on domestic issues, and he himself wanted to wage a campaign against poverty, as President Johnson himself

was

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was doing. The President asked Mr. Wilson how he saw the relationship between the UK Labor party and the Democratic party in the United States. Mr. Wilson said he thought that both had much in common. They were both parties of the people, with a strong social sense, and with a desire to develop and change institutions in the interest of the welfare of the majority, whereas the Conservative party was inclined to preserve the vested interests of a minority and to resist change and progress. The President mentioned the London municipal elections coming up in early April and asked Mr. Wilson how he thought they would go. Mr. Wilson said he was reasonably optimistic.

The President mentioned the A-11, the new US interceptor plane. He said it had a speed of 3.2 Mach and a ceiling above 70,000 feet. He said this was a very considerable technical advance which was of great importance to the Free World. He said he had sent a message to the Prime Minister informing him about the announcement before he had made it. Mr. Wilson said that this plane was a very great development and that it pointed up the fact that it was useless for the UK to try to play a role in the same league as the United States in the defense field. He said that the UK just wasn't "in the same line of country," and that this was a further justification of the Labor party's policy to get rid of the national deterrent.

In conclusion, Mr. Wilson thanked the President for having received him, and his family, and said he hoped very much to have the chance of seeing him and Mrs. Johnson again in London and in Washington.

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