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1 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>State etc. 5/23/68</i> Agency: State Department		
#5 Memo	more info released 8-29-95 NLS 93-267 Ball to Pres. re Wilson visit S 10 p <i>Open NLT 98-43 10-9-98</i>	12/5/64	A
#22 Memo	Ball to Pres. (dup. #5 above) <i>Open 1-24-01</i>	12/5/64	A
#28 Memo	re position of France	12/2/64	A
#30 Memo	re European unity moves	12/3/64	A
#32 Memo	re changes in USSR	12/4/64	A
#34 Memo	re German problem	12/2/64	A
#36 Memo	re disarmament <i>open 4-6-94 NLS 93-267</i> <i>Sanitized</i>	12/4/64	A
#38 Memo	re non-dissemination <i>open 4-6-94 NLS 93-267</i> <i>Sanitized</i>	12/4/64	A
#40 Memo	re relations w/Bloc countries	12/4/64	A
#42 Memo	re China problem	12/4/64	A
#44 Memo	re Vietnam	12/3/64	A
#46 Memo	re Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation	12/2/64	A
#48 Memo	re Cuban problem	12/3/64	A
#50 Memo	re British Guiana <i>Sanitized more released 4-6-94 NLS 93-267</i> <i>Sanitized</i>	12/3/64	A

FILE LOCATION

open 11-18-04 NLS 04-204
NSF Country File
United Kingdom, PM Wilson Visit Briefing Book, 12/64

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: State cont'd.		
#60 Memo	Africa regional background paper S 4 p	12/3/64	A
#64 Memo	FE Regional paper C 4 p	12/2/64	A
#66 Memo	NEA regional paper <i>Sanitized</i> S 3 p <i>Sanitized 4-6-94 NLS 93-207 same sanitization as RAL-NLS 2/15/02</i>	12/2/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Agency: CIA		
#9 Biog.	Wilson <i>Sanitized</i> 4-12-94 NLS 93-260 same sanitization per RAC-NLS 12/15/02	C 1 p	nd A
OPEN 12-6-10 NLS/RAC 10269			
#11 Biog.	Walker <i>Sanitized</i> 4-12-94 NLS 93-260 same sanitization per RAC-NLS 12/15/02	C 1 p	nd A
#13 Biog.	Healey <i>Sanitized</i> 4-12-94 NLS 93-260 same sanitization per RAC 3/28/02	C 1 p	nd A
#76 Biog.	Wilson (dup. #9 above)	C 1 p	nd A
OPEN 12-6-10 NLS/RAC 10269			
#78 Biog.	Walker (dup. #11 above)	C 1 p	nd A
#80 Biog.	Healey (dup. #13 above)	C 1 p	nd A
#82 Biog.	Mountbatten	C 1 p	nd A
#84 Biog.	Trend <i>Sanitized</i> 4-12-94 NLS 93-260 same sanitization per RAC-NLS 2/15/02	S 1 p	nd A
#86 Biog.	Caccia	S 1 p	nd A
#88 Biog.	Zuckerman	C 1 p	nd A
#90 Biog.	Hardman	C 1 p	nd A

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

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- III. BIOGRAPHIES

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SCHEDULE

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

- 11:15 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson and his party will arrive at the White House where he will be greeted by the President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and other officials. Military honors will be rendered.
- 11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House.
- 5:00 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House.
- 8:00 p.m. The President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the White House.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

- 11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House.
- 4:00 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House. A joint communique will be issued.

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PRESIDENT'S
BRIEFING MEMO

December 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Wilson Visit

I. What the U. S. Wishes to Achieve

Whatever is worked out with the British must fall within the framework of the objectives that prompted the MLF proposal. These are principally:

A. To tie Germany irrevocably to the Western world by giving the Germans the feeling that they are respected, first-class members of the Atlantic Alliance and are not being excluded from responsible participation in the management of their own nuclear defense.

B. To set a pattern for the management of atomic weapons by collective action rather than by the proliferation of individual national deterrent systems. This applies particularly to Germany where participation in a collective effort is the safest counter to the pressures for a national system that will otherwise inevitably develop over the years.

To achieve these purposes we need not stick rigidly to all of the details of the original MLF plan but certain fundamental conditions must be met:

1. The European powers participating - particularly Germany and Italy - must be given a sense that

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By isa, NARA Date 10-9-98

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they are in on an equal basis with the United Kingdom-- and that the United Kingdom has no special position.

2. We must avoid any impression that the Anglo-Saxons are doing a deal that the continental European nations will be pressed to accept. The Germans, Italians and Dutch are all watching with great interest, much anxiety and some suspicion the outcome of the Wilson visit.

We must take care to make clear at all times that this is a multilateral proposal which can be negotiated only on a multilateral basis. We are merely exchanging views with the British regarding the scope of possible solutions. No commitments will be made until there has been a multilateral discussion among the other members.

In dealing with the British we must impress upon them that the final scheme must be so arranged that their participation is on a parity with the Germans and other Europeans rather than with the United States. And whatever views we may hold as to the necessity for British participation we must present a solid front to the British that the principle of a mixed-man surface force is a first objective of American foreign policy which we intend to pursue.

Finally, we must view this discussion not merely as a technical exercise but as part of a major effort to meet the very large objectives spelled out above. For that reason we cannot succeed merely by making a deal with the British that the Germans reluctantly accept if over the long run the result does not achieve the kind of equality of treatment that would fulfill the political and psychological needs of the Germans.

And if--because of British stickiness--the present effort should break down we want to make clear--not merely in the eyes of our own people but of the Europeans--that the blame falls squarely on the British and not on the United States.

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II. What Wilson Wants on the Atlantic Nuclear Issue

We think the Prime Minister hopes to obtain the following:

A. Agreement in principle from us on the outlines of his proposal for modifying MLF, as follows:

1. A change in name of the force from "MLF" to something like "Atlantic Nuclear Force", (what we have been calling AMF).

2. A top control board as in our present MLF proposal.

3. A permanent U.S. veto on the understanding that this could be changed only if all members agreed (including the U.K.). In addition, he may seek a British veto if this means a veto for every member.

4. A British contribution of roughly half the V-bombers with their nuclear weapons. The other half would be outside the force (with conventional capability for use or threat in Asia).

5. A British contribution of three or four POLARIS submarines to be matched by an equal number of American POLARIS subs (or, as a second best, by an equivalent American contribution of MINUTEMEN).

6. A multilaterally-owned and financed mixed-manned MINUTEMAN force in the U.S. or Canada, as a total substitution for surface-ships.

7. All these forces, national and multilateral, would be under common command and control, including PAL, and irrevocably committed for the life of the force. Wilson would probably accept the other evidences of multilateralization--common ownership, common uniforms and

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common flag. These are clearly important not only to the Germans but to the other Europeans. At the same time, Wilson will probably insist that we accept the same arrangements with respect to our POLARIS or MINUTEMAN contribution.

8. He wants British costs for this whole force not to exceed those presently programmed for 5 POLARIS submarines plus V-bombers. Really, he'd rather pay less.

9. AMF should exist side-by-side with SAC and consult with it, separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR.

B. Wilson wants agreement that non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings be part of the AMF treaty.

C. He wants public support from us for British divestiture of their "independent" nuclear deterrent. We will be asked to play up their action as a contribution toward non-proliferation, thus countering Tory opposition.

D. He also will want slogans for improved inter-allied "consultation" about "crisis management" on a global scale, beyond the NATO area. Wilson's intentions are not clear, but he wants something.

III. What we Cannot Do for Him.

Several aspects of these proposals seem unacceptable to us. They are as follows:

A. We should stand firm against the British effort to substitute mixed-manned MINUTEMEN for mixed-manned surface ships. We have been working on the mixed-manned surface ship proposal for two years and the British are johnny-come-latelies. Mixed-manned MINUTEMEN are just not on. They would undoubtedly run into heavy weather in Congress. They are likely to have little appeal to the Germans, Italians or Dutch. They would certainly be subject

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to the Caullist argument that Europe cannot rely on being defended by weapons on U.S. soil and on the opposite side of the Atlantic and hence more visibly under U.S. control.

B. Wilson has been told by Ball and Neustadt that agreement in principle on British participation in surface ships is a sine qua non for the successful outcome of these talks and for a success in negotiations with the Germans. This should remain our American position.

C. We cannot promise to support a status for this new force outside SACEUR's jurisdiction. At the present time, the Germans strongly want the force under SACEUR.

D. Even though national contributions to AMF would let us reduce the number of surface ships, we cannot accept so small a number that Germans or Italians think the surface force is meaningless.

E. We cannot now agree to including PERSHINGs or tactical aircraft in AMF. The Germans deeply suspect this is an entering wedge to giving London a veto over all tactical nuclear weapons, and furthermore we do not want to prejudice progress toward conventional use of tactical air.

IV. What Might Make a Deal?

We see the following as possible elements of agreement in principle:

A. Enough British participation in a mixed-manned surface force to satisfy the Germans that this whole arrangement is non-discriminatory. This means a significant number of British sailors on some number of ships. There can be fewer ships than 25 because a lot of weapons would be provided by national contributions, but there cannot be just a token number of ships. The British will argue that the Germans really don't set as much store by the surface

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force as we think and would be satisfied with a seat in the control board at the top. We don't buy this and don't think the Germans would either. Wilson may also argue manpower difficulties in manning both surface ships and submarines. Bob McNamara can dispose of this very quickly. (Reduction of subs from 5 to 3 would release 500 men.)

B. We could match the British POLARIS contribution with an equal number of our own submarines. But we probably could not internationalize the ownership without great difficulty although we might be able to meet the flag and uniform standards. Wilson would be likely to respond that the British can do no more than we. If so we should tell them to put in submarines while we would put in MINUTEMEN, where the need for symmetry with British submarines would be less apparent--or where we might be able to work out multilateral ownership and uniforms so long as the missiles were U.S. manned.

C. We could agree to non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings as part of a treaty.

D. We could say that we'd hail the British decision to commit their forces irrevocably as an important step back from nuclear proliferation.

E. We could leave in abeyance for later multilateral negotiations the relationship of AMF to SACEUR.

F. We could tell Wilson that we have no intention of changing our veto during the life of the force. Moreover, we could draft the treaty so that any change in voting arrangements would be subject to the concurrence of all--which would effectively give the British a veto on any relinquishment of our veto. However, we must avoid falling into the Gaullist trap of appearing to oppose European unification. Thus we should indicate that if Europe some day achieves political unity under an elected chief executive--which is clearly a long way off--that will create

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a new situation which will require all parties to reexamine all the provisions of the treaty.

G. We can agree to make clear publicly that if AMF comes into being, we will reduce our own programmed strategic forces proportionately. This is important since one of the great problems Wilson faces at home is strong revulsion against creating additional nuclear weapons above the number McNamara says are needed to cover Soviet targets.

H. We can show interest in better consultation between our governments--and other governments, too--on matters outside the NATO area. We can suggest that staff work be done to sort out just what, if any, new mechanisms are needed.

But we might also suggest that consultation is meaningful only when there are joint ventures, joint risks, and joint responsibilities. This could lead delicately into a discussion of "jointness" in Southeast Asia (see below).

I. We can graciously accept and support the British contribution of part of their V-bomber force.

J. We can work out financial arrangements which will assure Wilson that participation in the surface fleet is on a no-extra-cost basis to him. Bob McNamara can spell this out to their heart's content. (The U.K. submarines could be their capital contribution to the force.)

K. We can certainly acquiesce in abolishing the initials "MLF", but we should leave final choice of a new name to multilateral negotiation.

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V. Intangibles for Wilson

If Wilson were to accept this deal in principle, he would be taking a very considerable political risk at home since he and his party have long opposed British participation in surface ships and the Tories now also oppose it, while no segment of public opinion supports it. On the other hand, you can encourage him to the view that by taking this risk, he opens the way to enormous opportunities. Great politicians take big risks for great causes. Those opportunities include:

1. A major contribution to the prevention of atomic proliferation and specifically to forestalling German pressures over the years for an independent or Franco-German nuclear system. A real prospect of German agreement and progress in the Atlantic nuclear field.

2. The beginnings of a new relationship between Britain and Europe, particularly Germany, with all that may mean for Britain, financially and otherwise.

3. Clearing the decks for new endeavors to negotiate seriously with the Russians.

4. A positive act of solidarity with the U.S. and with Germany, bringing into being a joint venture which will deepen good relations, and give Britain a leading voice in Europe.

5. A great British initiative breaking log jams in the Alliance for which the British would receive great credit and would deserve it in your eyes.

If a deal of this sort seems to be coming off, we will recommend to you a schedule for talks by the British and ourselves with the other allies involved--at least the Germans, Italians and Dutch. It will be essential to have full agreement with Wilson on who says what to whom and when.

VI. If Wilson

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VI. If Wilson Doesn't Deal

We don't know whether Wilson can give the assurance which we seek regarding his participation on surface ships. He has said he'll negotiate seriously. But he has also said that he wants to come back here in January and he is in so delicate a situation with his Cabinet that he may not feel he can afford to give that assurance now, even to you. Or he may feel that we aren't willing to do enough in return. If so, he'll want to talk to the Germans about his proposals as they stand. And he'll want us to encourage Bonn to listen seriously. But we must not let Bonn think that we are trying to help force them off surface ships.

The question of who then says what to whom becomes very difficult. We would need a very explicit understanding on that score with Wilson before he left town.

VII. Wilson's Interests East of Suez

Britishers, particularly Defense Secretary Healy, say that agreements in principle for support of joint ventures east of Suez will be an important element in your talks. We do not know how far Wilson means to press this with you, although Healy says he means to expose it to McNamara later. If Wilson opens this with you, you could raise with him the prospect of "joint venture" in Vietnam and Malaysia. Regarding Vietnam he might be asked to make a substantial contribution. In return we would participate more actively with the UK in Malaysia.

VIII. Wilson's Interest in Financial Stability

We understand that he may well propose to you joint staff work on measures for long-term support of the pound while his government tries the hard, slow task of modernizing the economy

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and righting the balance of trade. Wilson is enormously appreciative of what you've done already to bail him out for the short-run. He probably won't ask you now to go beyond agreement for more staff work.

If this is all he asks we think you should be forthcoming. He desperately needs the technical and economic advice available to our government. It would be as much to our benefit as theirs to provide this assistance.

This indication of your interest in working toward a long-term solution for their problem might enhance the prospects of agreement on the nuclear force.

George W. Ball

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BIOGRAPHIES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MLJ/RAC 10-267
By , NARA, Date 10-21-10

James Harold WILSON
Prime Minister and First Lord
of the Treasury

Harold Wilson at 48 became the youngest British Prime Minister in this century when the Labor Party won a narrow victory in the October 1964 election. Party leader only since February 1963, he successfully united Labor's diverse elements within a few months, bringing it back into power after 13 years in opposition. He has shown the same managerial skill in his government appointments, placing "moderates" in key cabinet posts, assigning safe spots to "leftists." The juxtaposition, which gives him room for maneuvering, should enable him to retain effective control of the government.



A former economics don and statistician, Wilson has a brilliant mind, organizational ability, debating skill and wit, and unusual political acumen. Since he entered Parliament in 1945, he has held a series of important posts: President of the Board of Trade in the Attlee government (1947-51); Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer (1955-61); and Shadow Foreign Secretary (1961-63). He has never been personally popular with the Labor MP's but is respected for his talents. The center and right wing in particular accused him of overweening ambition, opportunism, deviousness, and shifting political loyalties. He was elected party leader apparently because he was the only Labor MP with the necessary qualities for a potential prime minister. Although he has "flirted" with the left, Wilson is not a doctrinaire socialist. He is above all a pragmatist, well aware of the realities of power. His commitment to close Anglo-US relations is not based solely on sentiment.

Called variously a "loner," "a cold fish," and "a cat who walks by himself," Wilson has no close political friends, and shuns ordinary social life. It is said he trusts no one completely, and vice versa. Before going to Downing Street, he and his wife and two sons lived quietly in a modest house in Hampstead. He has few interests, apart from politics, reading, and golf. A short, stocky man, he smokes a pipe constantly, enjoys simple food (canned salmon, cold roast beef), and drinks moderately (lager, bourbon whiskey). The Wilsons will celebrate their silver wedding anniversary on New Year's Day 1965.

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Patrick GORDON WALKER
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

A respected leader among the Labor Party's right-wing intellectuals, Patrick Gordon Walker, 57, was named Foreign Secretary in Britain's new Labor government, although he lost his parliamentary seat (which he had held since 1945) in the recent general election. Racial issues arising from an influx of nonwhite immigrants were the deciding factor in his loss of his constituency of Smethwick; the Conservative winner based his campaign almost exclusively on Labor's earlier opposition to a restrictive immigration policy. Gordon Walker now is slated to contest a "safe" Labor seat in a December by-election to enable him to return to the House of Commons.



Gordon Walker served as Commonwealth Relations Secretary in the 1950-51 Attlee government. While his party was in opposition, he was its spokesman in Parliament on Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, the Home Office, Defense and Foreign Affairs. A loyal, devoted supporter and close personal friend of Hugh Gaitskell, he is an influential member of the group of "Gaitskellites" determined to see that the party pursues the moderate policies laid down by their late leader. Always identified with the right or moderate wing of his party, he is strongly anti-Communist and a sincere protagonist of Anglo-American friendship. He has given consistent support to the aims and interests of the Western alliance, and to NATO and SEATO, but has opposed a European multilateral nuclear force.

A former history don at Oxford, the pipe-smoking, ruminative Gordon Walker is moderate and open to reason, and has the personality and demeanor of a trusted family lawyer. In small groups or with friends, he is amiable, warm, relaxed, and persuasive, [REDACTED] Widely travelled, he has visited the US several times, most recently in late October 1964 when he came to Washington for talks with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk. He accompanied Harold Wilson on his 1963 and 1964 trips to Moscow. Married to the former Audrey Muriel Rudolf, he has three daughters and twin sons.

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By icw, NARA, Date 1-29-02

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
Denis HEALEY
Secretary of State for Defense

Denis Healey, 47, Labor Member of Parliament for Leeds, East, who had been the chief opposition spokesman on defense in Parliament, is Secretary of State for Defense in Harold Wilson's Labor government. A member of the Shadow Cabinet since 1959, he had the responsibility for leading his party on foreign affairs during 1959-61, and then on the Commonwealth and Colonies until February 1963, when he became Shadow Minister of Defense. An intellectual and an expert on international problems, particularly in Europe, he was the late Hugh Gaitskell's principal "idea" man on disarmament, disengagement, and defense policies. It now is thought that his views on international solutions are close to Wilson's. Probably opposed to MLF, Healey believes the Communist threat no longer centers on Western Europe and that British commitments there should be reduced in favor of a larger role in the Middle East and eastern commonwealth.



A person of great self-esteem and confidence, Healey believes he has the intelligence, background, and ability to give forceful expression to his party's views on foreign policy, and reportedly was disturbed at not being reassigned to the Shadow foreign affairs post in 1961 and 1963. His colleagues agree that he is unusually knowledgeable and expert on analyzing and evaluating political trends, but several question his powers of judgment and administrative ability. Healey's general attitude toward the US is not uncritical, but he is cooperative and well informed. He has visited this country several times since 1949 and is personally most friendly toward Americans. An excellent speaker, he has warmth and charm.

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Denis Healey had a brilliant academic career at Balliol College, Oxford. While an undergraduate he joined the Communist Party in 1937, but resigned after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 (an experience which left him strongly anti-Communist). He likes to reminisce about his World War II service with the Royal Engineers in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. He is a former member of the executive of the Fabian Society, speaks several European languages, is widely travelled in Europe, and has visited the Middle and Far East and Moscow. He has a lively interest in music and the theater. Married in 1945, Healey has a son and two daughters.

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By NIS, NARA, Date 1-29-82

SECRET Enclosure

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

December 5, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *Ben Read Sr.*
Executive Secretary

Enclosed are the briefing
books for the visit of Prime
Minister Harold Wilson.

Enclosures:

Six Briefing Books

SECRET Enclosure

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

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I. GENERAL

I. GENERAL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECEMBER 4, 1964

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 513
(Revised)

PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E., M.P.,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

December 6 - 9, 1964

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 6

6:30 p.m. EST The Right Honorable Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and his
party will arrive at Andrews Air Force Base,
Maryland, aboard a Special BOAC Flight from
London. Prime Minister Wilson will be greeted
by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.

6:45 p.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base.

7:20 p.m. Arrival at the British Embassy, 3100 Massachusetts
Avenue, Northwest.

p.m. Private evening.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

11:05 a.m. Departure from the British Embassy.

11:15 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson and his party will arrive
at the White House where he will be greeted by
the President of the United States and
Mrs. Johnson, the Secretary of State, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, and other officials. Military
honors will be rendered.

11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President
Johnson at the White House.

1:00 p.m. Departure from the White House and return to
the British Embassy.

1:30 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will have luncheon at the
British Embassy.

4:50 p.m. Departure from the British Embassy.

5:00 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President
Johnson at the White House.

6:30 p.m. Departure from the White House and return to
the British Embassy.

MONDAY (Cont'd.)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7 (Continued)

8:00 p.m. The President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the White House.

Dress: Black tie.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

10:35 a.m. Departure from the British Embassy.

10:45 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson will visit Arlington National Cemetery where he will place a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and a wreath at the grave of the late President John F. Kennedy.

11:20 a.m. Departure from Arlington National Cemetery.

11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House.

1:00 p.m. Departure from the White House and return to the British Embassy.

1:30 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will have luncheon privately at the British Embassy.

3:50 p.m. Departure from the British Embassy.

4:00 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House. A joint communique will be issued.

5:00 p.m. Departure from the White House and return to the British Embassy.

6:45 p.m. Prime Minister Wilson will receive the Chiefs of Mission of the Commonwealth Countries at the British Embassy.

8:00 p.m. The Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the Benjamin Franklin Room, Department of State.

Dress: Black tie.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9

9:00 a.m. Prime Minister Wilson will have a press conference at the British Embassy, 3100 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest.

9:35 a.m. Departure from the British Embassy.

WEDNESDAY (Cont'd.)

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9 (Continued)

10:05 a.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

10:15 a.m. EST Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart from Washington aboard the Special BOAC flight.

11:30 a.m. EST Arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.

11:40 a.m. Departure from the airport.

12:15 p.m. Arrival at the United Nations Headquarters.

1:00 p.m. U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the United Nations Headquarters.

2:30 p.m. Departure from the United Nations.

3:05 p.m. Arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport.

3:15 p.m. EST Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart from New York aboard the Special BOAC flight for Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

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December 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Wilson Visit

I. What the U. S. Wishes to Achieve

Whatever is worked out with the British must fall within the framework of the objectives that prompted the MLF proposal. These are principally:

A. To tie Germany irrevocably to the Western world by giving the Germans the feeling that they are respected, first-class members of the Atlantic Alliance and are not being excluded from responsible participation in the management of their own nuclear defense.

B. To set a pattern for the management of atomic weapons by collective action rather than by the proliferation of individual national deterrent systems. This applies particularly to Germany where participation in a collective effort is the safest counter to the pressures for a national system that will otherwise inevitably develop over the years.

To achieve these purposes we need not stick rigidly to all of the details of the original MLF plan but certain fundamental conditions must be met:

1. The European powers participating - particularly Germany and Italy - must be given a sense that

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Authority PLJ 98-43
By jc/ip, NARA, Date 1-4-01

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they are in on an equal basis with the United Kingdom-- and that the United Kingdom has no special position.

2. We must avoid any impression that the Anglo-Saxons are doing a deal that the continental European nations will be pressed to accept. The Germans, Italians and Dutch are all watching with great interest, much anxiety and some suspicion the outcome of the Wilson visit.

We must take care to make clear at all times that this is a multilateral proposal which can be negotiated only on a multilateral basis. We are merely exchanging views with the British regarding the scope of possible solutions. No commitments will be made until there has been a multilateral discussion among the other members.

In dealing with the British we must impress upon them that the final scheme must be so arranged that their participation is on a parity with the Germans and other Europeans rather than with the United States. And whatever views we may hold as to the necessity for British participation we must present a solid front to the British that the principle of a mixed-man surface force is a first objective of American foreign policy which we intend to pursue.

Finally, we must view this discussion not merely as a technical exercise but as part of a major effort to meet the very large objectives spelled out above. For that reason we cannot succeed merely by making a deal with the British that the Germans reluctantly accept if over the long run the result does not achieve the kind of equality of treatment that would fulfill the political and psychological needs of the Germans.

And if--because of British stickiness--the present effort should break down we want to make clear--not merely in the eyes of our own people but of the Europeans--that the blame falls squarely on the British and not on the United States.

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II. What Wilson Wants on the Atlantic Nuclear Issue

We think the Prime Minister hopes to obtain the following:

A. Agreement in principle from us on the outlines of his proposal for modifying MLF, as follows:

1. A change in name of the force from "MLF" to something like "Atlantic Nuclear Force", (what we have been calling AMF).

2. A top control board as in our present MLF proposal.

3. A permanent U.S. veto on the understanding that this could be changed only if all members agreed (including the U.K.). In addition, he may seek a British veto if this means a veto for every member.

4. A British contribution of roughly half the V-bombers with their nuclear weapons. The other half would be outside the force (with conventional capability for use or threat in Asia).

5. A British contribution of three or four POLARIS submarines to be matched by an equal number of American POLARIS subs (or, as a second best, by an equivalent American contribution of MINUTEMEN).

6. A multilaterally-owned and financed mixed-manned MINUTEMAN force in the U.S. or Canada, as a total substitution for surface-ships.

7. All these forces, national and multilateral, would be under common command and control, including PAL, and irrevocably committed for the life of the force. Wilson would probably accept the other evidences of multilateralization--common ownership, common uniforms and

common flag. These are clearly important not only to the Germans but to the other Europeans. At the same time, Wilson will probably insist that we accept the same arrangements with respect to our POLARIS or MINUTEMAN contribution.

8. He wants British costs for this whole force not to exceed those presently programmed for 5 POLARIS submarines plus V-bombers. Really, he'd rather pay less.

9. AMF should exist side-by-side with SAC and consult with it, separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR.

B. Wilson wants agreement that non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings be part of the AMF treaty.

C. He wants public support from us for British divestiture of their "independent" nuclear deterrent. We will be asked to play up their action as a contribution toward non-proliferation, thus countering Tory opposition.

D. He also will want slogans for improved inter-allied "consultation" about "crisis management" on a global scale, beyond the NATO area. Wilson's intentions are not clear, but he wants something.

III. What we Cannot Do for Him.

Several aspects of these proposals seem unacceptable to us. They are as follows:

A. We should stand firm against the British effort to substitute mixed-manned MINUTEMEN for mixed-manned surface ships. We have been working on the mixed-manned surface ship proposal for two years and the British are johnny-come-latelies. Mixed-manned MINUTEMEN are just not on. They would undoubtedly run into heavy weather in Congress. They are likely to have little appeal to the Germans, Italians or Dutch. They would certainly be subject

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to the Gaullist argument that Europe cannot rely on being defended by weapons on U.S. soil and on the opposite side of the Atlantic and hence more visibly under U.S. control.

B. Wilson has been told by Ball and Neustadt that agreement in principle on British participation in surface ships is a sine qua non for the successful outcome of these talks and for a success in negotiations with the Germans. This should remain our American position.

C. We cannot promise to support a status for this new force outside SACEUR's jurisdiction. At the present time, the Germans strongly want the force under SACEUR.

D. Even though national contributions to AMF would let us reduce the number of surface ships, we cannot accept so small a number that Germans or Italians think the surface force is meaningless.

E. We cannot now agree to including PERSHINGs or tactical aircraft in AMF. The Germans deeply suspect this is an entering wedge to giving London a veto over all tactical nuclear weapons, and furthermore we do not want to prejudice progress toward conventional use of tactical air.

IV. What Might Make a Deal?

We see the following as possible elements of agreement in principle:

A. Enough British participation in a mixed-manned surface force to satisfy the Germans that this whole arrangement is non-discriminatory. This means a significant number of British sailors on some number of ships. There can be fewer ships than 25 because a lot of weapons would be provided by national contributions, but there cannot be just a token number of ships. The British will argue that the Germans really don't set as much store by the surface

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force as we think and would be satisfied with a seat in the control board at the top. We don't buy this and don't think the Germans would either. Wilson may also argue manpower difficulties in manning both surface ships and submarines. Bob McNamara can dispose of this very quickly. (Reduction of subs from 5 to 3 would release 500 men.)

B. We could match the British POLARIS contribution with an equal number of our own submarines. But we probably could not internationalize the ownership without great difficulty although we might be able to meet the flag and uniform standards. Wilson would be likely to respond that the British can do no more than we. If so we should tell them to put in submarines while we would put in MINUTEMEN, where the need for symmetry with British submarines would be less apparent--or where we might be able to work out multilateral ownership and uniforms so long as the missiles were U.S. manned.

C. We could agree to non-acquisition and non-dissemination undertakings as part of a treaty.

D. We could say that we'd hail the British decision to commit their forces irrevocably as an important step back from nuclear proliferation.

E. We could leave in abeyance for later multilateral negotiations the relationship of AMF to SACEUR.

F. We could tell Wilson that we have no intention of changing our veto during the life of the force. Moreover, we could draft the treaty so that any change in voting arrangements would be subject to the concurrence of all--which would effectively give the British a veto on any relinquishment of our veto. However, we must avoid falling into the Gaullist trap of appearing to oppose European unification. Thus we should indicate that if Europe some day achieves political unity under an elected chief executive--which is clearly a long way off--that will create

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a new situation which will require all parties to reexamine all the provisions of the treaty.

G. We can agree to make clear publicly that if AMF comes into being, we will reduce our own programmed strategic forces proportionately. This is important since one of the great problems Wilson faces at home is strong revulsion against creating additional nuclear weapons above the number McNamara says are needed to cover Soviet targets.

H. We can show interest in better consultation between our governments--and other governments, too--on matters outside the NATO area. We can suggest that staff work be done to sort out just what, if any, new mechanisms are needed.

But we might also suggest that consultation is meaningful only when there are joint ventures, joint risks, and joint responsibilities. This could lead delicately into a discussion of "jointness" in Southeast Asia (see below).

I. We can graciously accept and support the British contribution of part of their V-bomber force.

J. We can work out financial arrangements which will assure Wilson that participation in the surface fleet is on a no-extra-cost basis to him. Bob McNamara can spell this out to their heart's content. (The U.K. submarines could be their capital contribution to the force.)

K. We can certainly acquiesce in abolishing the initials "MLF", but we should leave final choice of a new name to multilateral negotiation.

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V. Intangibles for Wilson

If Wilson were to accept this deal in principle, he would be taking a very considerable political risk at home since he and his party have long opposed British participation in surface ships and the Tories now also oppose it, while no segment of public opinion supports it. On the other hand, you can encourage him to the view that by taking this risk, he opens the way to enormous opportunities. Great politicians take big risks for great causes. Those opportunities include:

1. A major contribution to the prevention of atomic proliferation and specifically to forestalling German pressures over the years for an independent or Franco-German nuclear system. A real prospect of German agreement and progress in the Atlantic nuclear field.

2. The beginnings of a new relationship between Britain and Europe, particularly Germany, with all that may mean for Britain, financially and otherwise.

3. Clearing the decks for new endeavors to negotiate seriously with the Russians.

4. A positive act of solidarity with the U.S. and with Germany, bringing into being a joint venture which will deepen good relations, and give Britain a leading voice in Europe.

5. A great British initiative breaking log jams in the Alliance for which the British would receive great credit and would deserve it in your eyes.

If a deal of this sort seems to be coming off, we will recommend to you a schedule for talks by the British and ourselves with the other allies involved--at least the Germans, Italians and Dutch. It will be essential to have full agreement with Wilson on who says what to whom and when.

VI. If Wilson

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VI. If Wilson Doesn't Deal

We don't know whether Wilson can give the assurance which we seek regarding his participation on surface ships. He has said he'll negotiate seriously. But he has also said that he wants to come back here in January and he is in so delicate a situation with his Cabinet that he may not feel he can afford to give that assurance now, even to you. Or he may feel that we aren't willing to do enough in return. If so, he'll want to talk to the Germans about his proposals as they stand. And he'll want us to encourage Bonn to listen seriously. But we must not let Bonn think that we are trying to help force them off surface ships.

The question of who then says what to whom becomes very difficult. We would need a very explicit understanding on that score with Wilson before he left town.

VII. Wilson's Interests East of Suez

Britishers, particularly Defense Secretary Healy, say that agreements in principle for support of joint ventures east of Suez will be an important element in your talks. We do not know how far Wilson means to press this with you, although Healy says he means to expose it to McNamara later. If Wilson opens this with you, you could raise with him the prospect of "joint venture" in Vietnam and Malaysia. Regarding Vietnam he might be asked to make a substantial contribution. In return we would participate more actively with the UK in Malaysia.

VIII. Wilson's Interest in Financial Stability

We understand that he may well propose to you joint staff work on measures for long-term support of the pound while his government tries the hard, slow task of modernizing the economy

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and righting the balance of trade. Wilson is enormously appreciative of what you've done already to bail him out for the short-run. He probably won't ask you now to go beyond agreement for more staff work.

If this is all he asks we think you should be forthcoming. He desperately needs the technical and economic advice available to our government. It would be as much to our benefit as theirs to provide this assistance.

This indication of your interest in working toward a long-term solution for their problem might enhance the prospects of agreement on the nuclear force.

George W. Ball

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I. BRIEFING
PAPERS

II. BRIEFING PAPERS

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PMW/B-2

December 3, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

Preparations for NATO Ministerial Meeting

DISCUSSION:

The December Ministerial Meeting will take place in an atmosphere of doubt regarding the solidity of the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, none of the important problems which require discussion are at a stage where an early or definitive solution is likely to be found. Our Allies will be looking to us to give them a lead which they can follow in this uneasy period. Thus, for the health of the Alliance it will be essential that the problems be recognized and commented upon in a spirit which is frank and tolerant and which sustains the basic principle that the need for the Alliance itself in today's uncertain world is undiminished.

UK Position:

While the new Cabinet is feeling its way, Wilson has publicly defined his general objectives in relation to NATO as follows: to strengthen an interdependent Alliance; to try to check the tendency to separatism therein; in the military area, to reject a separate European deterrent; and to provide for more effective safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

US Position:

We will seek to convey the impression that we intend to proceed steadily and calmly to maintain and increase NATO cohesion, neither provoking internal conflicts with the French nor giving up ground gained in promoting the evolution of the Alliance along lines we prefer. This will be reflected in the following positions:

/1. Political

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 8/2/77

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1. Political Consultation - We are interested in proposals to improve NATO political consultation along the lines of bi-monthly meetings at very high level, in our case the Under Secretary. To the same end, we will encourage the US PermRep to visit Washington more frequently to ensure that Alliance considerations are prominently represented in policy formulation.

2. Discussion of the state of the Alliance - We are still uncertain whether this should better be covered in the normal Review of the International Situation or whether there should be a special restricted discussion as at The Hague last spring. We are willing to participate in the latter if the others would like such a session. We do not want a sharp confrontation with the French and do not think this should occur if we limit ourselves to a dispassionate exchange of views. In such a context we would refer to the MLF, also in a non-controversial way. ci

3. Military Questions - The interim report of the Defense Planning Committee on the NATO Force Planning Exercise will be considered by the Ministers. When they note this interim report, we hope they will endorse both the continuation of the Exercise and the strengthening of the NATO International Staff machinery which has been set up to carry it forward.

<u>Drafted by:</u>	<u>Cleared by:</u>
EUR:RPM:GSVest	EUR - Mr. Creel RPM - Mr. Popper
S/S-S-Mr. Bartley Room 7237 Ext. 3737	

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PMW/B-3
December 2, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sta. 5/23/78

By lhw, NARS, Date 7/29/78

The Position of France

In the months ahead General de Gaulle can be expected to pursue his primary goal of a "European" Europe led by France and freed from its "mortgage" to the United States. In his view, the American nuclear umbrella should remain, American influence should go.

De Gaulle's Europe would be based on intimate German cooperation with France. Around this would gather the other states of Western Europe. All of these, including Germany, would depend on French nuclear force for their security and would thereby be susceptible to French influence in the same way that American atomic power has in his view resulted in an American post-war "hegemony" of Europe.

France under de Gaulle has played a strong role on economic questions within the EEC. Having accepted economic integration under the Rome Treaty (from which France has benefitted by a 172% increase in exports to EEC countries from 1958 to 1962), de Gaulle has also insisted on progress toward resolution of agricultural questions. He has warned that France would "cease to participate" in the EEC if agreement on a CAP were not reached within the stipulated time period, beginning with a grain price settlement by December 15, 1964.

Insinuations that France might "leave" NATO, "abandon" the EEC, "turn to" the Russians or adopt an "independent" foreign policy are similar to past warnings by which de Gaulle largely had his way among his European allies. While in many ways such over-simplified and exaggerated courses are not true paths that can be followed, de Gaulle might nonetheless act in these fields to harm the political and economic interests of the United States and those associated with us, if he thought France's concept of Europe, and her place in it, were being once and for all rejected.

What would be the developments most indicative of real danger for his Europe? Among the most important in his eyes would be for the Germans to "forsake their European vocation" in favor of further commitments to the United States, commitments he would see as in effect irrevocable and in

principle

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principle a willful abandonment of Europe. Another would be renunciation by the nation states of Europe of their security responsibilities and the substitution of a continued military dependency on the United States. Such things as the MLF and closer US-FRG military cooperation are thus the very antitheses of his desires. When we say that the MLF is a bridge between the United States and Europe or that NATO links us ever more closely, the General's reply is likely to be that that is exactly what he does not want. Our whole concept of Atlantic integration is anathema to him. Growing American financial power in European enterprises is another thread in this web, as is our desire to open Europe's door wider to American exports via the Kennedy Round.

The combative recourses open to de Gaulle are legion. Within the realm of practicality he can stymie progress in the EEC, prevent European integration, block the Kennedy Round, harass NATO and find innumerable ways to manifest his anger toward the Federal Republic, the United States or others. Probably the most serious type of retaliation would be to deny the use of French territory for NATO facilities and installations, thus placing the Alliance in deep practical trouble. But he cannot do all these things without detriment to his own political and economic interests in Europe. For example, he cannot continue to tell French farmers that the only solution to their problems lies in agricultural progress in the Common Market and, in the next breath, threaten to withdraw from it.

De Gaulle's Strasbourg speech on November 22 has been interpreted as a call for a new EDC, as a last warning to Germany to return to her "European vocation" and as a summons to the other states to fulfill their obligations. Yet, with regard to the last, it is highly questionable whether one year hence he himself will be willing for France to give up its Common Market veto and subject its European economic policies to the direction of an EEC majority.

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Drafted by:

EUR/WE - Mr. Barbour

Cleared by:

EUR/WE - Mr. McKillop

EUR/RPE - Mr. Percival

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S/S-S - Mr. Bartley, Room 7239, Ext. 3737

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December 3, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

European Unity Moves

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Authority State Ct. 5/23/78
By lhul, NARS, Date 7/28/78

DISCUSSION:

1. Spaak Proposal

Proposals by three EEC members -- Belgium, Germany, and Italy -- for relaunching talks on European political union have been floated since September. The Dutch may add a fourth later this year. Of the three, Spaak's effort -- essentially the creation of a supra-national three-member "wise man" body to draft a treaty within three years -- was greeted coolly in Paris and indifferently elsewhere.

2. Erhard Plan

In early November Erhard offered a less contentious and more inclusive blueprint. Couched in essentially "confederal" terms with a six-nation consultative committee to pave the way for future closer links, the Erhard Plan also noted that the form of an eventual union should be such that the UK can join. The remainder of the German proposal is a far-reaching scheme for strengthening the European Communities. It is unlikely that the section on political union will be discussed by the Six before next year.

3. Italian Declaration

The latest entry is a bland Italian contribution which calls for a) an "experimental period of political union" with annual meetings of chiefs of state or government and quarterly sessions of foreign, education, cultural and scientific ministers; b) periodic meetings of a "political commission" which would have a permanent secretariat; and c) a treaty by 1968. The British are to be kept informed via the WEU.

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U.K. Position

The British have displayed little enthusiasm for these initiatives. In general, the Labor Government wants to participate in talks leading to political union, but without any obligation beyond that. It believes, however, that the door should be left open for eventual accession by all European countries including the USSR and Eastern Europe. Wilson may also solicit our help, as the Conservatives did, in persuading the Six to include them in any talks from the start.

U.S. Position

1. On British Participation

Although we have long supported Britain in Europe, the current discussion is a European affair, and we do not intend to press the Six to include the UK.

2. On the Various Proposals

The Spaak proposal no longer matters. As we have stated publicly, we favor the Erhard Plan as a constructive initiative across a broad front. The Italian effort is also a welcome contribution to the debate, but is even more limited than the Erhard Plan to procedure rather than substance.

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Drafted by: EUR/RPE:GRKaplan	Cleared by: BNA - Mr. Shullaw GER - Mr. Finn RPM - Mr. Vest WE - Mr. McKillop PRE - Mr. Percival EUR - Mr. Creel
S/S-S - Mr. Bartley, Room 7239, Ext. 3737	

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PMW-B/5

December 4, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

Appraisal of Changes in the USSR

Available evidence indicates that Khrushchev's ouster was based upon general dissatisfaction with his impulsive and arbitrary methods of operation and consequent domestic and foreign policy mismanagement, rather than upon any concerted policy opposition. The new leadership appears to have come to power with a program for introducing efficiency in organization and management, but not with a platform of new policies for the solution of the many difficult problems confronting the USSR. In fact, they probably lack a consensus on how to solve their problems. Furthermore, domestic reorganizations already initiated, the need to consolidate authority and establish stature, and the divided nature of that authority, all militate against early major policy changes, particularly in foreign relations.

The Soviets are not, however, immobilized. Since Khrushchev's dismissal they have hosted high-level delegations from communist and non-communist countries, invited Scandinavian prime ministers to Moscow, concluded trade and aid agreements with France and Kenya respectively, established diplomatic relations with Chile and Chad, agreed with the US to meteorological and desalination exchanges, and approved a direct communications line for the US Embassy at Moscow. Most of these steps, however, were based on pre-existing policy lines.

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Authority State UH 5/23/78

By shu, NARS, Date 7/26/78

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Although Soviet propaganda may assume a more militant, anti-Western position on such issues as colonialism, wars of national liberation, South Vietnam, etc., we think that because of the problems confronting them the new leaders will wish to avoid major confrontations or crises, particularly with the West. Therefore, we believe the USSR will be inclined to maintain the status quo with respect to Germany and Berlin but will continue to attack the MLF concept, using fear of the FRG as a whipping boy. We anticipate that the Soviets will continue to call for settlements in Central Europe but will not be prepared to accept terms satisfactory to the West. While we do not expect early agreement on major disarmament measures the new leaders may be willing to enter into limited agreements in this and other fields to demonstrate the validity of peaceful coexistence.

Khrushchev's ouster eliminated an important factor in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but did not remove the basic causes of the conflict. Therefore, while it resulted in a lull in polemics and provided an opportunity for each to explore the intentions of the other, we do not expect a basic rapprochement because their objectives and national interests are too different. Some adjustments and accommodations, however, cannot yet be ruled out. As Soviet hopes for improved relations with the Chinese decline, and if the dispute heats up, the new leaders may feel less inhibited from improving their relations with the West when it is otherwise in their interests.

Drafted by: EUR:SOV:VIToumanoff SPolansky	Cleared by: GER - Mr. Ford ACA - Mr. Watts EUR - Mr. Davis SOV - Mr. Henry BNA - Mr. Shullaw
S/S- S - Mr. Bartley, Room 7239, Ext. 6952	

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

German Problem

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Authority State ltr. 5/23/78
By lhw, AUCS, Date 7/28/78

DISCUSSION:

With German elections in the Fall of 1965, we expect that the Germans will mount increasing pressure on the Western Allies to agree to an initiative on the German problem. On December 14 the French, British, German and US Foreign Ministers will have a dinner meeting in Paris to discuss the German problem. We have had some indications that the Germans will urge at this meeting that the Allies agree in principle that an initiative is desirable and such initiative could be of an essentially procedural nature.

U.K. Position:

1. Allies should be prepared to examine any German proposals regarding an initiative on the German problem.
2. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets have changed their policy on Germany.
3. Nevertheless, the Allies should be watchful for any signs which would indicate that the time is propitious for the introduction of any proposals on the German question.

U.S. Position:

1. We agree with UK position, as stated above.
2. We continue to believe that, for a broad initiative on unification to be useful, it must be sufficiently attractive to the Soviets in terms of substance on European security to warrant their considering it. It is primarily for the Germans to come forth with the elements of a substantive proposal which could be made. Essentially procedural proposals can be considered, but we should avoid putting forth any proposal which is likely to cause the Soviets to take counter-action, such as seeking a separate peace treaty, which would be against our interest.

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<u>Drafted by:</u>	EUR - Mr. Davis
BTF: SHMcIntyre/bgj	EUR - Mr. Creel
12/1/64	SOV - Mr. Polansky
	GER - Mr. Finn
<u>Cleared by:</u>	BTF - Mr. Taylor
	BNA - Mr. Shullaw
S/AL - Amb. Thompson	

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-267
By ju, NARA, Date 3-22-94

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PMW/B-7
December 4, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

DISARMAMENT

Discussion

Traditionally interested in plans for thinning out forces in Central Europe, the Labor Party has displayed keen interest in the Gomulka proposal for a "freeze" on nuclear warheads in both parts of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Labor is also interested in an early resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban.

UK Position

1. Arms Control in Central Europe

Mr. Wilson may indicate his government plans to formulate proposals for East-West troop reductions in Germany (with economy as an added incentive) coupled with a geographically-expanded version of the Gomulka freeze, both measures to be monitored by observation posts. As advantages of the Gomulka plan, he may say that it would freeze our tactical nuclear superiority in Europe and establish the true detente necessary for progress toward a German settlement.

2. Test Ban

He may ask whether we will be prepared soon to renew negotiations on a comprehensive test ban with at most two or three inspections, the maximum offered and later withdrawn by Khrushchev.

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US Position

1. Central European Arms Control

It would be useful to review possible arms control measures for Central Europe as part of the process of elaborating adequate European security provisions to accompany a future initiative towards a German settlement. But, with the possible exception of observation posts as a separate measure, on which we have only limited German acquiescence, the public airing of such proposals in the absence of a changed Soviet attitude on a German settlement would profoundly disturb the Germans, particularly in their pre-election situation, and could drive them closer to the French who strongly oppose disengagement schemes. Such plans should be the subject of Four Power consultation when the time seems propitious.

2. Gomulka Proposal

In keeping with our desire to build bridges to Eastern Europe, we want to leave the matter open for discussion with the Poles. But we continue to find the Gomulka plan as presently proposed unacceptable: (a) it freezes only our weapons and leaves untouched Soviet weapons held in nearby Russia; and (b) the Poles have offered no meaningful verification procedure and we have not as yet found an adequate verification scheme for nuclear warheads, especially the more numerous smaller ones. It may be noted that the Gomulka plan, unlike the earlier Rapacki plan, makes no mention of the control of delivery vehicles.

3. Reductions by Mutual Example

We have made substantial cut-backs from our 1961 peak troop strength in Germany. We do not now plan further substantial cuts. Of course if the Soviets should withdraw significant forces, we would want to reassess the situation with our allies.

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4. Comprehensive Test Ban

Our costly research efforts hold promise of substantially improving our detection and identification capability. If our expectations are confirmed in coming months, we will want to consult with a view to an early renewal of negotiations with the Soviets. We cannot now predict how soon enough data will be available nor how many inspections might be required. We would welcome Soviet cooperation in seismic research and have lately received tentative indications of possible new Soviet interest in this area.

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PMW/B-8
December 4, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

NON-DISSEMINATION

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-267
By ju, NARA, Date 3-22-94

Discussion

Although efforts to work out a non-proliferation agreement have reached an impasse because of Soviet allegations regarding the MLF, the Chinese Communist test has spurred interest in such an agreement under which nuclear powers would refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons or technology and non-nuclear powers would agree not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons.

India, which has publicly renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons but feels the greatest pressure, wants some international action to strengthen its position. It is actively soliciting support for a UNGA resolution which would go beyond the so-called Irish Resolution of 1961 and could create difficulties not only for an MLF but also for existing NATO nuclear arrangements.

The Non-Aligned Conference Declaration of October 11, 1964, stated that the participating governments are prepared to enter into an international agreement along the lines of the Irish Resolution, but also called for prohibitions that would deny transit rights for ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

UK Position

The UK is eager to find a formula on veto arrangements for the MLF (see separate paper) which would establish a better basis for a non-proliferation agreement with the Soviets. Pending the resolution of this problem, the UK may favor GA action leading to

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a non-acquisition undertaking among non-nuclear states and might favor calling an international conference for this purpose.

US Position

1. Possible Action in the UN

We strongly favor an international non-dissemination/non-acquisition agreement as called for in the Irish Resolution. We must assume, however, that Soviet agreement cannot be secured at least until the MLF situation is resolved.

The alternative of enabling non-nuclear states to reach agreement among themselves not to produce or acquire control of nuclear weapons seems attractive, but we doubt its feasibility. The very states whose adherence would be desirable (e.g. India, Sweden, UAR, Japan, Israel, Germany) are likely to balk unless the agreement is comprehensive and encompasses a non-dissemination undertaking by the nuclear powers. Moreover, a conference of non-nuclear powers would be dominated by those desirous of imposing transit restrictions on the US and UK and having no interest in safeguarding existing NATO arrangements, let alone MLF.

We favor an affirmative course of action in the UNGA which would record the readiness of non-nuclear states to sign a non-proliferation agreement and, if possible, enable them to pledge not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons in the meantime. The nuclear powers would state their readiness to respect such undertakings. Such a GA resolution could call on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to draft an international agreement as a matter of urgency. We hope to interest a non-NATO country, preferably Ireland, in sponsoring such a proposal. There will have to be close consultation with our allies and India.

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2. Safeguards on Peaceful Uses

We are anxious to make more rapid progress in getting agreement from non-nuclear countries to place all peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA or similar international safeguards and to persuade all suppliers to insist on such safeguards. We have placed our Yankee reactor under IAEA safeguards as an example which we hope others (including UK) will follow.

3. India

We are trying to strengthen the confidence of the Indian Government in the soundness of its decision not to follow the nuclear weapons route.

4. Gilpatric Committee

The group will conduct a through review of US policy and programs to prevent nuclear spread with a view to suggesting means for improving them if necessary.

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December 4, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES

There has been general accord between the US and the UK in their views of the developing situation in Eastern Europe and in their approaches to relations with the East European countries.

1. Significant Trends

During the recent period of growing diversity and change in Eastern Europe, significant trends have appeared in most of the countries of that area toward (1) internal moderation and conciliation, (2) pragmatic policies more responsive to national needs and interests, (3) a larger measure of national independence from Soviet control, and (4) increased interest in reassociation with the West. There is the prospect that the forces of evolutionary change will carry the East European states further along the road towards national independence, representative institutions, and freedom of association with the Western, and, particularly, the European communities. While it is unlikely that the operation of these forces will assure uninterrupted progress toward the achievement of Western objectives in Eastern Europe, the prospect for meaningful advances in this regard over the long term appears encouraging. This hopeful outlook in Eastern Europe emerges more clearly now than at any time since the Communist takeover there after World War II.

2. A Basic Task and New Opportunities

In the interest of European peace and security, as well as justice for the East European peoples, we consider it a basic and continuing task of the West to encourage the processes of constructive change in Eastern Europe by all peaceful means consistent with the security of the Free World. The developing situation in Eastern Europe offers new opportunities for bringing Western influences to bear more effectively in that area.

3. Consultation and Coordination of Policy

The US and other Western Governments should seek through cooperation and consultation to develop a common approach,

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By llw, NARS, Date 7/28/78

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concerted policies, and coordinated courses of action aimed at lowering barriers, building bridges, and reviving and extending traditional ties with Eastern Europe. We attach particular importance to such cooperation and consultation within NATO, with the UK, and--mindful of the relationship of the East European situation to the problem of German reunification--with the German Federal Republic. In view of varied historical ties and relationships, differing interests and resources in various fields, and other variable factors, each Western government may well find it of advantage, while coordinating and harmonizing its policies in all fundamental aspects with those of other Western governments, to apply those policies with its own choice of emphasis, timing and priorities in its bilateral relations with each East European country.

4. Policy of Differentiation and Flexibility of Means

We believe that US and Western policies toward the individual East European countries can have maximum effectiveness only if (1) we differentiate in our application of those policies among the various East European countries according to the particular conditions and developments in each and (2) we establish means and instruments which can be employed with corresponding flexibility.

5. US-East European Relations

At this time, when the climate of the cold war and the isolation of the Iron Curtain are giving way throughout most of Eastern Europe to an atmosphere of greater reason and comity, the US plans to focus and articulate its policy in keeping with the developing East European situation. We will seek, in consultation and cooperation with our Western allies, to build bridges to facilitate the process and influence the direction of change in Eastern Europe wherever we can find or establish solid footings. These bridges--both of ideas and actions--will extend into the areas of political, economic, social, and cultural bilateral relations as well as of multilateral association wherever the latter is feasible.

6. Scope for Western Initiatives

Western policies for achieving West European unity, East European evolution, and general European stability, security and peace must move forward together. We believe that, within a broad framework of NATO and bilateral consultation and coordination, the US, UK, and other Western governments should

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be able to formulate special policies and undertake initiatives in particular fields of activity or toward particular East European countries in which they may have special competence, opportunities, or relationships. In the period of relations with Eastern Europe that we are now entering, we regard the intensification of cultural exchanges and the expansion of trade as the most promising areas on which attention might advantageously be concentrated.

Beyond initiatives in these broad fields, we believe that there are many other avenues along which positive steps can be taken with selected East European countries, including the extension and improvement of official relations by the discussion and settlement of outstanding bilateral problems, the improvement of communication and transportation links, especially in civil aviation, the facilitation of tourist travel, and humanitarian assistance. In short, the prospect of expanded relations and of a revived and constructive role within the European and international communities should be held out to those East European countries where the direction and extent of change warrant and genuine interest is manifested.

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December 4, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

China Problem

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Authority State Otr. 5/23/78
By lhaw, NARS, Date 7/28/78

DISCUSSION:

1. Communist China will be around indefinitely. Economic recovery continues though massive problems of investment remain ahead. Respect for Communist China, particularly in Africa and Asia, has been much increased by the 1962 victory over India, by the nuclear test and by Khrushchev's fall.
2. The vote this year in the UNGA on whether to admit China will be very close, one way or the other. This is unlikely to result in Chinese Communist entry, since (a) some nations which oppose us on substance will vote with us that it is an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority; (b) the Chinese Communists will not come into the UN unless the UN recognizes their claim to Taiwan.
3. The United Kingdom has promised to vote with us on the "important question", though she will be against us as usual on substance. However, the UK has long been unwilling to accommodate the Chinese Communists by offering to support them regarding Taiwan.
4. The Chinese Communists have announced that "nobody has the right to intervene" in their atomic testing. They have explicitly condemned all disarmament ideas except for their own propagandistic call for a world-wide conference on nuclear weapons. (They have also called upon all nations to declare that they will not make first use of nuclear weapons.) This Chinese Communist attitude has reduced pressures for bringing the Chinese Communists into disarmament discussions.

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U.S. Position:

1. The Chinese Communists are riding the crest, psychologically. This is a dangerous period. In 1958, when they challenged us in the Taiwan Strait, they were in a somewhat comparable mood. Gestures made toward them now are more likely to confirm their estimate that they are on the right course than to encourage them to settle down to live with other ideologies.
2. We appreciate the UK's support of the position that the Chirep issue in the UNGA is an "important question." We recognize and appreciate also the UK's unwillingness to appease Communist China by accepting its right to take over Taiwan.
3. We hope to be in further touch on the implications of the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion and the question of Communist China and disarmament. Their own statements show that the Chinese Communists have no present interest in participating in disarmament negotiations.

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December 3, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

VIET-NAM

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Authority State ltr. 5/23/78

By elw, NARS, Date 7/28/78

DISCUSSION:

One year after the overthrow of President Diem, the Vietnamese armed forces have transferred power to a new civilian government, chosen by a relatively democratic process. The new Chief of State and Prime Minister in Saigon are respected figures, and despite opposition to the new government--manifested in the streets as well as by political and religious figures--it is obvious that hopes for stability in Viet-Nam rest very heavily on the new cabinet. The military situation is serious, and is complicated by the disastrous floods that have hit Central Viet-Nam, further increasing the misery of the people in the countryside there. As President Johnson has just reaffirmed after conferring with Ambassador Taylor, the United States is determined to provide all possible and useful assistance to the Vietnamese people and Government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported insurgency and aggression being conducted against them.

Despite serious obstacles the new civilian government of South Viet-Nam installed in 1964 shows promise. It is obviously too early to judge how effective it will be, but Prime Minister Tran Van Huong has displayed commendable firmness in the face of criticism from elements of the press, students, politicians, religious leaders and even members of the High National Council that confirmed his cabinet. The strong public opposition of the Buddhist leadership to the Prime Minister, and particularly to his cabinet, has been especially troublesome. The serious disturbances which broke out in the latter half of November were in general firmly controlled by police and military units, who showed commendable constraint

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in the face of provocation by the demonstrating groups. On November 26 Huong requested and obtained from the High National Council and the Chief of State a declaration of national law for the Saigon area, which has enabled the Government to bring demonstrations under control and damp down irresponsible press criticism. The Prime Minister has also taken the unpopular but justified step of beginning to draft agitators among the students into the armed forces.

Huong has close working relations with Chief of State Phan Khac Suu and with First Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu Vien, a capable individual to whom he delegates considerable responsibility. The cabinet is largely composed of well-qualified technicians or civil servants. With the aid of the United States and other countries, the Government has moved quickly to institute flood relief measures in the stricken coastal provinces in Central Viet-Nam which suffered serious damage to crops and livestock, in addition to loss of life.

On the military side, Government forces are still in the position to deal effectively with the Viet Cong on the battlefield. The past two weeks have been marked by several Government military victories and rising Viet Cong casualties as a result of a greater number of Government operations. The security situation in the northern provinces has deteriorated to some extent in recent months, and progress in other areas has been uneven. Nevertheless with the new Government now established and joint United States-Vietnamese machinery for pacification planning, there exists the opportunity to move ahead again in pacification although rapid and dramatic results cannot be expected and Government stability in the coming months is essential.

The Cambodian-Vietnamese border continues to be a serious problem. We believe that bilateral efforts to mark the border and resolve specific issues, as recommended by the United Nations Security Council Special Mission and agreed to by the Vietnamese Government, is the best hope for easing the situation.

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The root cause of the border problem is, of course, the presence on and use of the border by the armed Viet Cong. We anticipate that the frontier problem may arise in some fashion in the talks between the United States and Cambodia, which are to begin in New Delhi on December 7, but we are not particularly optimistic concerning their outcome.

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December 2, 1964

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON

December 7-8, 1964

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By shw, NARS, Date 7/28/78

MALAYSIA-INDONESIA CONFRONTATION

DISCUSSION:

Indonesia remains committed to its anti-Malaysia policies and its objective of eliminating British influence in the area. The Indonesians persist with sporadic military incursions into Malaysia, although they appear to have switched, at least temporarily, to the infiltration of smaller, less easily detected groups. Malaysia and Britain are willing to discuss the dispute with Indonesia but there is little prospect for such talks unless there is a distinct lull in Indonesian attacks against Malaysia. Britain may retaliate against Indonesian bases should there be further large scale attacks on the Malaysian mainland although further recourse to the Security Council is likely before direct action is undertaken.

There is growing friction within Indonesia between the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) and its adherents on one hand, and various anti-PKI elements, who enjoy the tacit support of the Army, on the other. The development of open opposition to the PKI is an encouraging sign but is unlikely to change Indonesia's confrontation policy in the near future. The contending forces in Indonesia are likely to try to use confrontation against Malaysia and opposition to the U.S. to advance their causes in the current internal struggle.

U. K. Position:

Indonesia shows no signs of abandoning its efforts to destroy Malaysia by armed attacks and subversion. The present British Government will fully honor Britain's commitments to Malaysia. It is essential to disabuse Indonesia of the idea that it can attack Malaysia with impunity and any further attack in strength against mainland Malaysia must be followed by appropriate counter measures including possible retaliatory strikes against Indonesian bases. Malaysia and Britain stand

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prepared to talk with Indonesia about the dispute should Indonesia cease its attacks and indicate a willingness to seek a way out of the present impasse.

U.S. Position:

Britain together with Australia and New Zealand bear the primary burden for the defense of Malaysia and external assistance to the federation. It is essential that Britain and its allies retain sufficient military power in the area to deter and if necessary to deal with possible escalation of the conflict resulting from Indonesian initiatives. The chances that Indonesia is looking for a mutually acceptable resolution of confrontation are slim, but for tactical reasons at least we hope Britain and Malaysia will continue to be willing to explore Indonesian requests for talks. We would welcome any British suggestions on policies we could follow to exploit the current struggle within Indonesia between the extremists, including the Communists, and the moderates.

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON December 3, 1964

December 7 - 8, 1964

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Authority State etc. 5/23/78
By shw, NARS, Date 7/28/78

The Cuban Problem

The British recognize our problems with Castro but believe we should follow a live-and-let-live policy toward Cuba. They do not understand the seriousness of our Hemispheric commitments and the fact that our position on Castro is deeply rooted in the Hemispheric system rather than a simple matter of United States policy. It would be well to remind Prime Minister Wilson that Castro's unslackened ties of dependency with the Soviet Bloc and his continuing subversive efforts against neighboring states continue to pose a threat to the peace and security not only of the Western Hemisphere, but, indeed, of the world and that these two issues are not negotiable. We have not forgotten that Castro's policies led to a world crisis in October of 1962, and could do so again. We are, for example, concerned over the possibility that the Cubans will take some rash action against our surveillance flights, which we consider essential and which were made necessary by Castro's refusal to co-operate with the UN in admitting on-site inspection. We remain willing to explore the development of an effective system to assure the Hemisphere against the reintroduction of offensive weapons.

We continue to believe that the best means short of force which gives promise of influencing the Castro regime and inhibiting its dangerous and adventurist subversive activities is a systematic program of economic denial and isolation within the hemisphere. As the recent OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers demonstrated, almost all the American Republics share this approach to the problem. The denial program, together with the Cuban regime's own incompetence, has resulted in increasingly serious economic problems for Castro. The recent suspension of old-line communist Joaquin Ordoqui from his posts on the Party National Directorate and as Vice Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces is indicative of the growing tensions, rivalries and distrust between factions in the government-party hierarchy. We intend to continue supporting OAS efforts to isolate Cuba both economically and politically.

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