

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

182

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#10 memo	to Secretary from Thomas L. Hughes confidential open 6-14-94 NLS 93-269	10 p 02/07/68	A
#11 memo	to Mr. McCafferty from OCI exempt per RAC 9/11/90 confidential	1 p 02/07/68	A
#11a report	re: Vietnam confidential open per RAC 2/5/02	4 p undated	A
#13 memo	to Walt Rostow from Leonard Marks confidential open 8-4-93 NLS 93-263	1 p 02/05/68	A
#13b report	British public Opinion on Issues Affecting Anglo-American relations confidential open 8-4-93 NLS 93-263	34 p 01/18/68	A
#14 memo	to Walt Rostow & Ed Fried from Harold Saunders secret open 8-28-97 NLS 93-266	1 p 02/02/68	A
#17a memo	to President from W. W. Rostow confidential open 9-17-90	2 p 01/12/68	A
#18 cable	to President from Walt Rostow confidential open 9-17-90	2 p 01/12/68	A
#18a memo	from W. W. Rostow to President confidential open 9-17-90	2 p 01/12/68	A
#18b memo	from W. W. Rostow to President confidential open 9-17-90	2 p 01/12/68	A
#19 memo	to Rostow from Ed Fried secret open 8-28-97 NLS 93-266	1 p 01/10/67	A
#19a memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read secret open 6-14-94 NLS 93-269	17 p 01/10/68	A
#19b report	draft scope paper secret open 6-10-98 NLS 93-269	21 p 02/7-9/68	A
#19b bio sketch	James Harold Wilson confidential	2 p 03/67	A
#20 cable	to President from Sec. of State secret open 6-10-98 NLS 93-269	1 p 12/29/67	A
#20a cable	to President from Sec. of State secret	1 p 12/29/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File
United Kingdom 2/7-9/68, Visit of PM Wilson

Box 216

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2082

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20b cable	to President from the Secretary <i>open 6-10-98 NLG 93-269</i> secret	1 p 12/29/67	A
#20c cable	to President from the Secretary <i>4</i> secret	1 p 12/29/67	A
#21 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow confidential <i>open 9-17-90</i>	1 p 12/15/67	A
#21a memo	to President from W. W. Rostow confidential <i>open 9-17-90</i>	1 p 12/15/67	A
#22a memo	to President from Dean Rusk <i>open 6-10-98 NLG 93-269</i> secret	1 p 11/29/67	A
#22b memo	to President from Dean Rusk secret <i>(dup. #17a, NSF, memos to the President Rostow, Vol. 52)</i> <i>open 6-10-98 NLG 93-269</i>	1 p 11/29/67	A
#24 cable	London 6156 <i>open 2-28-01</i> confidential <i>exempt 6-14-94 NLG 93-269</i>	2 p 02/02/68	A
#19f	<i>exempt per RAC 2/5/02</i>	<i>2p.</i>	

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File
United Kingdom 2/7-9/68, Visit of PM Wilson

Box 216

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

FEBRUARY 8, 1968

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND
PRIME MINISTER WILSON OF GREAT BRITAIN
STATE DINING ROOM

AT 10:27 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson, Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey, Members of the Cabinet, Distinguished Members of the Congress, Distinguished Guests:

Let me thank you first of all for coming out on a winter's night to warm this house with friendship.

It could be said that we are gathered here to welcome a Prime Minister who has come in out of the cold.

I refer, of course, to the famous English winter -- ending in July and reappearing in August.

But whatever the season, sir, there is always strength and comfort in standing beside you to field the challenges of the day. It is always a good day for any man or any nation when they can claim the British as comrades in adversity, or brothers in adventure, or as partners in advancement.

But I do not want tonight to wave either the Union Jack or the Stars and Stripes. We buried the need for that with Colonel Blimp, Yankee Doodle and other caricatures of yesteryear. When Americans talk today of what Great Britain means to us -- and means to the world in which we live -- we are moved by a more meaningful English voice from the past. It was Robert Browning who spoke the truth for our time: "My sun sets to rise again."

Yes, these are difficult times for Great Britain -- and they are very difficult times for the United States. Yes, we have our family differences still. And yes, Britain means as much to us as she ever meant.

-- Our two nations are as close as ever.

-- Our two peoples are as determined as ever to master the trials of the moment and to move on to the triumphs of the future.

That is what the Prime Minister and I have spent the day talking about. We have ranged around the world, reviewing our large responsibilities, drawing on our experiences, exchanging insights, giving and getting much of value. But we always came back to one basic and unbreakable agreement.

-- We want the same things for our people.

-- They will not come easily or they will not come overnight, but our people shall have them if patience and perseverance can win them.

MORE

They are the simplest things to describe -- but they are the hardest to achieve.

- A peace rooted in the good, firm earth of freedom.
- A world respectful of law, given to justice, hostile only to force.
- A life without the torment of hunger, ignorance, and disease.
- A higher standard of living and more opportunity for all.

It will come for us. If any man doubts it, let him look at how far the Americans and the British have come already in common purpose. Let him reflect on all that we have overcome already by sharing struggle and sacrifice.

And then let him look deeply into the well of our strength -- the traditions and the character that shape us.

He will come quickly to the truth that sustains us: The American and British peoples are not short-distance crusaders. If we must tighten our belts for a time, it does not leave us breathless for the next battle. We are veteran campaigners, not amateurs. We have learned to pace ourselves -- to accept temporary detours and steer around them.

I have enormous confidence, Mr. Prime Minister, in the character of my own people, in their ability to understand and master trial. I am very proud to place equal faith in your people, in their characteristic courage and fortitude. I say with them, and I say to them, using the slogan of the moment: The American people are backing Britain.

The greatest of nations, the size of their global role and influence -- these laurels are not earned or held by the trappings of power alone.

Ultimately, nations can only lead and leave their mark if they have the power to attract and to instruct by example. The rank and worth of nations are decided, finally, by what pushes upward and outward from their roots -- the character of citizens, the value of ideals, the quality of life, the purpose of a people.

What a magnificent opportunity for the people of Great Britain!

Character -- Ideals -- Culture -- Purpose. The world already knows them as unmistakably British qualities; as the benchmarks of civilized life; as standards of decency and development that surpass and survive the importance of any single epoch.

The new and struggling states of the world can gain much from these gifts of British example. The older nations can also learn from them, and can count on them for security and for progress. Britain itself will continue to build on them.

-- In British education, for example, where a revolution of learning and opportunity is already underway.

-- And in British technology, where the native skills of an inventive and industrious people are establishing a new "workshop of the world."

There is so much, Mr. Prime Minister, waiting for our peoples on the road ahead.

The confidence and purpose that we show to the world will always be a reflection of our own relationship. I want it always to have the importance and to have the meaning that that great President of ours, Franklin D. Roosevelt, gave it more than a quarter-century ago, when he welcomed King George VI to this house.

"I am persuaded," he said, "that the greatest single contribution our two countries have been enabled to make to civilization, and to the welfare of peoples throughout the world, is the example we have jointly set by our manner of conducting relations between our two nations."

It is a grand toast still. I renew its promise now, Mr. Prime Minister, by offering it as a tribute to you and to your people.

The thing our people want most tonight, Mr. Prime Minister, of course, is peace in the world. As you and I pursue it, I think we are entitled for a moment to have a little peace of mind -- even a little music while we work.

The songs you will hear tonight have been challenged in some sections of the press today. When I heard that on my morning radio, I thought, "Well, there they go again, always wanting me to dance to their tune."

But I am a man who really, after all, loves harmony. I was ready to believe that Mr. Merrill and Miss Tyler were actually trying to maintain the balance of payments in their choice of songs tonight by paying you a compliment on "The Road To Mandalay," and paying me a compliment -- "Oh, Bury Me Not On The Lone Brairie."

I was ready to believe it until I had some Senator say to me this morning, "Well, what have they really got to sing about anyway?" I think that should settle the matter. If it doesn't, Mr. Prime Minister, I am prepared tonight to keep peace at any price.

Let us now toast to lasting harmony between the best of friends -- the British and the American people.

Ladies and gentlemen, Her Majesty, The Queen.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Humphrey, Distinguished Cabinet Officers, Your Excellency, Distinguished Senators, Congressmen and Friends:

MORE

It is my privilege, Mr. President, to rise and toast your health. On behalf of my colleagues, may I thank you for your kind hospitality to us this evening and for enabling us to meet this distinguished gathering of American citizens.

In particular, I should like to thank you for what you have said and the way in which you have said it.

It was one of the most moving speeches I think any of us has ever listened to.

You referred to the difficult times through which the United States, Britain, and the world are moving. You set out in words which all of us would endorse your conception of the hopes and aspirations for our people -- yours and, indeed, ours.

We welcomed everything you have said to us tonight. You referred to the days of Anglo-American relationships, the days of your great master and tutor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. But I make bold acclaim that relations between our two countries today, in 1968, in the years when you and I have been meeting, are no less close and no less intimate than they were in those perilous wartime days of the Anglo-American Alliance.

I was particularly moved to hear you endorsing the slogan of backing Britain. Mr. President, the acoustics in this room are always a little dubious. Last year I dispensed with this machine and relied on my own voice. From this distance, I thought what you were saying was not backing Britain, but "Buying British." I hope the acoustics will not blame me for it.

Mr. President, our talks this morning and this afternoon, as always, have been informal, friendly, and, above all, to the point. This meeting was arranged some time ago. We couldn't know the exact developments that we should be discussing in each part of the world where our talks today have led us.

What I particularly appreciate is that at this time we have been able to have such a thorough and wide discussion of the whole world scene. Inevitably, at this time -- and I think this has been true of almost every discussion we have had together in the last three or four years -- and true also of the contacts that we are able to maintain in between meetings, a great part of our discussion has related today to the situation of Vietnam.

I make no apology for the fact that on what should be a happy occasion, I want to devote most of my time this evening to referring to that situation, because the events of the last 10 days have brought home to millions of people far from the conflict, within our own countries, the indescribable horror and agony this war is bringing to a people for whom peace has been a stranger for a generation.

But the scenes of outrage that we have seen on our television screen can beget dangerous counsel. It can beget impatient and exasperated demands to hit back, to escalate in ways which would widen and not end that war.

MORE

The responsibility of power, Mr. President, as you know, means not only loneliness. In a democracy, it means facing demands for punitive action whenever national interests are outraged. The hardest part of statesmanship is to show restraint in the face of that exasperation.

All those understandable demands for actions which are immediately satisfying could have incalculable effects, effects, indeed, on the whole world. That is why, Mr. President, your administration's attitude following the Pueblo incident is one which will earn tributes from reasoning men everywhere and, indeed, from history.

You referred just now, Mr. President, to the musical entertainment. When I read your press this morning, and I always believe everything I read in the American press, I said, "I hope they won't change the program for me. These are my favorite tunes."

"Mandalay," I don't know why anyone thought that was embarrassing. We got out of Mandalay 20 years ago.

But if we are going to go back to Rudyard Kipling -- and some of us are trying now to escape from him -- I think one of the greatest phrases he used -- which must have rung many times in your ears, Mr. President, when you talked about the hard and difficult times, and the misunderstandings of the things that statesmen have to do from time to time -- was when Kipling, in his famous poem, said -- and when things are really tough, one should either re-read that poem or read what Lincoln said when he was up against it -- "If you can meet with triumph and disaster, and treat those two imposters both the same, once we can recognize that, it makes us a little more detached about some of the things we have to do."

Mr. President, the problem of Vietnam, as you have always recognized, can never be settled on a durable and just basis by an imposed military solution. Indeed, the events of these past days have underlined yet again that there can be no purely military solution to this problem; that there can be no solution before men meet around the conference table, determined to get peace.

I have said a hundred times that this problem will never be solved by a military solution, which I see is one of the lessons of the last few days -- a determined resistance to see that a military solution is not imposed on the people of Vietnam.

MORE

I am frequently urged, as what is supposed to be the means to peace, to disassociate the British Government from American action, and, in particular, to call for the unconditional ending of all the bombing.

Mr. President, I have said this a hundred times, too, in my own country, in Western Europe, in the Kremlin, that if I felt that by doing this I could ensure that this war ended one day earlier, or that it would ensure that peace, when achieved, was one degree more durable, one degree more just, I would do what I am urged and disassociate.

I have not done so, and I am going to say why. Over the past three years, Mr. President, as you know, as the Secretary knows, I have been in the position to know a good deal about the history of negotiations and consultations, and contacts and discussions, aimed at getting away from the battleground and getting around the conference table.

I recall our talks here in Washington at the time of your Baltimore speech, now nearly three years ago.

I recall the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference over two-and-a-half years ago when 20 Commonwealth heads of Government from Asia and Africa, from the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, Australia, Europe and America, of widely different views and widely differing loyalties over Vietnam, all of them, called for a cessation of the bombing, and, in return, a cessation of infiltration by the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam.

I recall a hundred proposals to our fellow Geneva co-chairman to activate the Geneva Conference or any other forum to get the parties around the table.

I recall meetings and discussions in Washington, in London, in New York, in Moscow, and innumerable less formal consultations, with anyone and everyone who could help find the road to peace.

And all of these have failed -- failed so far to find a solution.

But it doesn't mean we were wrong, all of us here, to try, and to go on trying.

I believe, and this is true even today against the differing background of all that is now happening on the battle field, that the road to peace was fairly charted, not for the first time, but with greater and more meaningful clarity at San Antonio last September.

A fortnight ago I was in the Kremlin, and in many hours of discussion with the Soviet leaders I sought to spell out what San Antonio and what subsequent elucidations of San Antonio meant.

I believe the Soviet leaders now know, if they did not understand before, that what that formula means is that the United States would be prepared to stop the bombing given an assurance that prompt and productive discussions will start, and that this action will not be exploited to create

a new situation of military advantage which would delay a political settlement.

It was, Mr. President, as you know, our purpose in Moscow to show that once the surrounding misunderstandings have been removed, this approach could be reconciled with the conditions laid down by the DRV Foreign Minister, Mr. Trinh, on December 29th.

What I am saying now, interpreting, and I think you will agree I am interpreting correctly the San Antonio formula, really answers his latest speech this week which has been printed today.

There have been some, not only in Moscow, as I learned, who would believe that San Antonio meant that the United States were insisting, in advance, as a pre-condition, on a given outcome to the talks as a condition to stopping the bombing.

We believe that this reconciliation is possible once it is clear that all that is needed to start negotiations is assurance that the talks will begin promptly, and that they will be meaningful and directed in good faith to a peaceful settlement.

Given, therefore, good faith, we -- all of us -- America, the Soviet Union -- we, ourselves, are to ask now whether the events of these past ten days mean that there is not, that there cannot be, that good faith.

Whatever the discouragement of these past ten days, all of us, Mr. President, feel for you in this conflict. I do not take that feeling, because, as I have said, this problem cannot be settled by a purely military solution. Negotiations for a political settlement will have to come. Every day that the start of those negotiations is delayed means more suffering.

This is not the time to attempt to set out what the provisions of such a settlement should be. But statesmen from many countries, differing deeply in their attitudes to the Vietnames problem, have each in their own words stressed that the basic principle involved in that settlement is the right of the peoples of that area to determine their own future through democratic and constitutional processes -- words, Mr. President, I am quoting from yourself.

Once willingness is shown to enter into prompt and productive discussions, we in Britain in our capacities as Geneva co-chairmen, or in any other appropriate way, will play our full part in helping the parties to reach agreement. And with the political settlement will come the enormous task of repairing the damage, of embarking on the great era, the great challenge, of economic and social reconstruction in that area.

Mr. President, the noises of battle, the noises of controversy, too, in all our countries, have perhaps caused many to forget our own proposal on the theme of economic

reconstruction in Vietnam which I read in your speech at Baltimore now nearly three years ago. It may have been forgotten, but once again it will become, I hope soon, a reality.

I feel it right to add that within the resources we could make available we shall be ready to play our part.

It may be, Mr. President, that tonight in my speech of thanks and appreciation to you I have been striking -- as indeed you, yourself, said -- something of a somber note because of the circumstances in which we meet -- somber but at the same time hopeful -- hopeful because at the same time determined.

As you have said, when we have pursued a common aim, however dark the background against which we have been operating, that common aim, that hope and that determination have set an example to the world.

The problems with which so many of us here tonight are concerned, the problems we have dealt with in our wide-ranging talks earlier today, have not been confined even to the compelling and urgent problem brought about by the tragedy of Vietnam. We have discussed problems of Europe, of the Middle East, the problems of the developing world, problems of nuclear disarmament, the challenge of making a reality of the authority of the United Nations.

And all of these have proved again today, and in all of our continuing discussions and changes over these past years, to have their own urgencies and their own priorities.

But in a wider sense we are trying, together, to face challenges on a world scale, the challenge of a world increasingly dominated by the explosion of race and color.

Mr. President, whatever they say, neither you nor we have any need to apologize about our reaction to the challenge of race and difficulty; the challenge on a world scale of the population explosion; the challenge of the problems acute for advanced countries and for developing countries alike; the problem of freer movement of trade and freedom from the throes of outmoded international financial practices and international financial doctoring -- may I add, and the worship of the Golden Calf.

It is, therefore, Mr. President, in the conferences that together we, the United States and Britain, are friends and partners in the commonwealth, in Europe, in the United Nations.

The years ahead will bring for us a new and fresh spirit to the attack on these problems.

It is in that spirit and in that confidence that I have the pleasure now of toasting the health of the President of the United States of America.

END

(AT 11:00 PM EST)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E.
M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

White House Arrival and Meeting with President Johnson
February 8, 1968

At 11:25 a.m., Thursday, February 8, 1968, Prime Minister Wilson and his party will arrive at the White House, entering thru the Southwest Gate.

Suggested car seating:

Car No. 1 - Prime Minister Wilson
Ambassador Symington

Inspector G.
Fryer

State Security Car

Car No. 2 - Sir Burke Trend
Ambassador Dean
Sir Denis Greenhill

Car No. 3 - Mr. Tomkins
Mr. Halls
Mr. Murray

Car No. 4 - Mr. Palliser
Mr. Kaufman
Mr. Lloyd-Hughs

Mr. Bruce T. Howe, Protocol Officer, will arrive at the White House at 11:00 a.m. thru the Southwest Gate for the arrival arrangements.

Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson after the informal greeting at the White House.

3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

February 6, 1968

NO. 27

PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE
HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E., M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND
MRS. WILSON

February 7 - 9, 1968

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7

9:00 p.m. EST

The Right Honorable Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P., Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Mrs. Wilson, will arrive at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, aboard an RAF VC-10.

9:10 p.m.

Departure from Andrews Air Force Base, and proceed to the British Embassy, 3100 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest. Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson will reside at the British Embassy during their visit in Washington, D.C.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8

11:20 a.m.

Prime Minister Wilson will depart from the British Embassy.

11:30 a.m.

Arrival at the White House.

Prime Minister Wilson will meet with President Johnson at the White House.

1:00 p.m.

Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson will have luncheon privately at the British Embassy.

Afternoon open.

5:30 p.m.

His Excellency Sir Patrick Dean, G.C.M.G. British Ambassador, will give a reception in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the British Embassy.

8:00 p.m.

The President and Mrs. Johnson will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson at the White House.

Dress: Black tie.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9

8:30 a.m.

Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson will give a breakfast in honor of Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey at the British Embassy.

FRIDAY (Cont'd.)

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9

12:30 p.m.	His Excellency Sir Patrick Dean, G.C.M.G., British Ambassador, will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the British Embassy.
2:30 p.m.	Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart from the British Embassy.
2:35 p.m.	Arrival at the United States Naval Observatory, Massachusetts Avenue at Thirty-fourth Street, Northwest.
<u>2:40 p.m.</u> EST	Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart aboard a United States Marine Corps special helicopter.
<u>2:50 p.m.</u> EST	Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
<u>3:00 p.m.</u> EST	Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, aboard an RAC VC-10.
<u>4:00 p.m.</u> EST	Prime Minister Wilson and his party will arrive at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.
4:05 p.m.	Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart from the airport and proceed to 4 East 66th Street.
6:30 p.m.	The Council on Foreign Relations will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister Wilson at the Harold Pratt House, 58 East 68th Street.
9:15 p.m.	Departure from the Council on Foreign Relations.
9:45 p.m.	Arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport.
<u>10:00 p.m.</u> EST	Prime Minister Wilson and his party will depart from John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, aboard an RAF VC-10 for Ottawa, Canada.

* * *

5

Friday, February 9, 1968
1:00 AM

Mr. President:

Reuters filed the attached "positive" story on Wilson's speech.

I showed it to UPI, which had filed a negative lead.

To me, the significance is that Wilson endorsed the San Antonio formula.


George Christian

LEAD WILSON--BACKING

WASHINGTON, Feb. 8 (REUTERS)-BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON TONIGHT STRONGLY ENDORSED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLITICAL AND BOMBING POLICIES IN VIETNAM AND PRAISED HIM FOR HIS RESTRAINT IN HANDLING THE PUEBLO CRISIS.

AT THE SAME TIME, WILSON, SPEAKING AT A BANQUET HELD IN HIS HONOR IN THE WHITE HOUSE, URGED THE UNITED STATES TO SHOW CAUTION AND RESTRAINT IN REACTING TO THE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM.

WILSON SAID THE SENSE OF OUTRAGE GREETING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM "CAN BEGET DANGEROUS COUNSELS, IMPATIENT AND EXACERBATED DEMANDS TO HIT BACK, AND ESCALATE IN WAYS WHICH WOULD WIDEN, NOT END THAT WAR."
(MORE) DL/GRB 11:48P

*Wilson
Visit*

FIRST ADD WASHINGTON LEAD WILSON--BACKING X X X WAR."

HE REMINDED JOHNSON THAT "THE HARDEST PART OF STATESMANSHIP" WAS TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF "ALL THOSE UNDERSTANDABLE DEMANDS FOR ACTIONS WHICH, HOWEVER IMMEDIATELY SATISFYING, COULD HAVE INCALCULABLE EFFECTS."

WILSON AGAIN REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH DEMANDS FROM HIS CRITICS THAT HE DISSOCIATE BRITAIN FROM U.S. ACTION IN VIETNAM, OR CALL FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL HALT TO U.S. BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

"I HAVE SAID IT A HUNDRED TIMES IN MY OWN COUNTRY, IN WESTERN EUROPE, IN THE KREMLIN: IF I FELT THAT BY SO DOING I COULD ENSURE THAT THIS WAR ENDED ONE DAY EARLIER, OR WOULD ENSURE THAT PEACE WHEN ACHIEVED WAS ONE DEGREE MORE DURABLE, ONE DEGREE MORE JUST, I WOULD DO WHAT I AM URGED," HE DECLARED.

WILSON BACKED JOHNSON'S "SAN ANTONIO FORMULA" WHICH, HE SAID, FAIRLY CHARTED THE ROAD TO PEACE.

IN A SAN ANTONIO SPEECH SEPT. 29, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IF HANOI ENTERED PROMPTLY INTO PRODUCTIVE TALKS AND DID NOT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF A BOMBING PAUSE.

WILSON SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH HE EXPLAINED THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA TO RUSSIAN LEADERS AND TRIED TO SHOW THAT IT COULD BE RECONCILED WITH CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY NORTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY TRINH DEC. 29.

(MORE) DL/GRB 12:02A

SECOND ADD WASHINGTON LEAD WILSON--BACKING X X X DEC. 29.

WILSON CAUTIONED THAT THE VIETNAM PROBLEM COULD NOT BE SETTLED BY A PURELY MILITARY SOLUTION AND SAID EVERY DAY OF DELAY IN THE OPENING OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A LOSS. MOREZBUEAERQNGEFORLTINENESSTWASESEOWNOPDR. PROMPT, PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS, BRITAIN, IN ITS ROLE AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR IN ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WAY, WOULD PLAY ITS FULL PART IN HELPING THE OPPOSING SIDES TO REACH AGREEMENT.

WILSON, REPLYING TO A DINNER TOAST BY JOHNSON, TALKED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY OF VIETNAM, HE SAID HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT EARLIER IN THE DAY WERE INFORMAL, FRIENDLY AND TO THE POINT, RANGING OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA, EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

BUT HE GAVE NO DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

IN HIS TOAST, JOHNSON TOLD WILSON "THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BACKING BRITAIN."

AN "I'M X X X PICKING UP SECOND PARA (8:11P).

DL/GRB 12:14A

! 30QA.

WILSON 2/8 WA

URGENT

1ST NIGHT LD 267A

BY MERRIMAN SMITH

UPI WHITE HOUSE REPORTER

WASHINGTON (UPI) --BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON WARNED PRESIDENT JOHNSON THURSDAY NIGHT OF THE DANGER OF "IMPATIENT AND EXASPERATED DEMANDS" FOR ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE.

"THE HARDEST PART OF STATESMANSHIP IS TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF THAT EXASPERATION," HE TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN AN AFTER DINNER SPEECH AT THE WHITE HOUSE, "FOR ALL THOSE UNDERSTANDABLE DEMANDS FOR ACTION, HOWEVER IMMEDIATELY SATISFYING, COULD HAVE INCALCULABLE EFFECTS FOR THE WHOLE WORLD."

THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE AT HOME TO DISASSOCIATE BRITAIN FROM U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THE PROBLEM OF THAT EMBATTLED COUNTRY COULD NEVER BE SETTLED ON A JUST AND DURABLE BASIS BY AN IMPOSED MILITARY SOLUTION.

"THE EVENTS OF THESE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE UNDERLINED THAT," WILSON ADDED. "THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION BEFORE MEN MEET AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE DETERMINED TO GET PEACE."

"I HAVE SAID A HUNDRED TIMES IN MY OWN COUNTRY, IN WESTERN EUROPE, IN THE KREMLIN, THAT IF I FELT THAT BY ... (DISASSOCIATING BRITAIN FROM U.S. POLICY) I COULD ENSURE THAT THIS WAR ENDED ONE DAY EARLIER OR WOULD ENSURE A MORE DURABLE AND JUST PEACE, I WOULD DO WHAT I AM URGED. I HAVE NOT," THE BRITISH LEADER SAID IN PLEDGING HIS COUNTRY'S SUPPORT.

EARLIER, IN A GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP TOWARD BRITAIN, JOHNSON TOASTED WILSON AND SAID THAT DESPITE "FAMILY DIFFERENCES" THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN REMAINED "AS CLOSE AS EVER."

PICKUP 2ND PGH 267A: "THESE ARE

RM1214AES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6

Walt Rostow -
for your information.
Bob Fleming

CBS NEWS
2020 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

TRANSCRIPT

All copyright and right of copyright in this transcript and in the broadcast are owned by CBS. This transcript may not be copied or reproduced or used in any way (other than for purposes of reference, discussion and review) without the written permission of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

6a
NOT FOR RELEASE UNTIL
BROADCAST: 12:30 PM EST
SUNDAY, FEB. 11

FACE THE NATION

as broadcast over the

CBS Television Network

and the

CBS Radio Network

Sunday, February 11, 1968 - 12:30-1:00 PM EST

GUEST: THE RIGHT HONORABLE
HAROLD WILSON
Prime Minister of Great Britain

NEWS CORRESPONDENTS:

Martin Agronsky
CBS News

Marquis Childs
St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Marvin Kalb
CBS News

DIRECTOR: Robert Vitarelli

PRODUCERS: Prentiss Childs and Sylvia Westerman

NOTE TO EDITORS: This broadcast was pre-recorded at CBS, Washington,
Friday, February 9.

1 ANNOUNCER: The following program was recorded on Friday.

2 MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, would you say now, after
3 your talks with President Johnson, what you said after your
4 talks with Premier Kosygin in Moscow, that is, that only a very
5 narrow bridge remains to be crossed to reach peace in Vietnam?

6 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: I believe that, yes. But, of course,
7 the events of the last ten days have made it a lot harder to
8 cross that very narrow bridge.

9 ANNOUNCER: From CBS Washington, in color, FACE THE NATION, a
10 spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview with Prime Minister
11 Harold Wilson of Great Britain, who visited the United States
12 this week for talks with President Johnson. Prime Minister
13 Wilson will be questioned by CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent
14 Marvin Kalb, Marquis Childs, Washington Bureau Chief of the
15 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and CBS News Correspondent Martin
16 Agronsky.

17

18 MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, in light of the fact that
19 Premier Kosygin said very recently that he was not authorized
20 to do anything about peace in Vietnam, aren't you giving per-
21 haps a misleading impression when you indicate, as you did
22 after your Moscow meeting, as you do now, that the prospects
23 for peace have perhaps improved?

24 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Not at all a misleading impression. He
25 has not been authorized by Hanoi to negotiate, that is what he

1 has made clear on a number of occasions. Last year, in London,
2 when he was there in February, he spent a great deal of time
3 with me trying to work out exactly what the gap was to be
4 bridged and how it could be bridged. And this year he made
5 clear in the communique that the Soviet government would do
6 everything in their power, either jointly with us, as Geneva
7 co-chairmen, or separately, to try and achieve the kind of
8 political settlement that at the end of the day must be reached
9 in Vietnam.

10 MR. CHILDS: But last year, in London, Mr. Prime Minister, the
11 whole stress by both you and Premier Kosygin was on ending the
12 bombing, and you gave every indication that if the bombing
13 were ended there could be peace talks. Now you seem to have
14 changed your viewpoint on that because you do not urge an end
15 to the bombing.

16 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: No, no. Last year all the emphasis --
17 and it went on day after day and night after night -- was to
18 see what guarantees could be given by Hanoi that if the bombing
19 were to stop there would be no undue military advantage taken
20 of that position. And we made a lot of progress in trying to
21 work out a basis on which there could be an assurance to the
22 United States if the bombing stopped. At the end of the day
23 the operation failed. This year we were talking much more, in
24 Moscow, from the position laid down by the San Antonio formula,
25 which I believe and which I said again in these past few days

1 in Washington, is the road to peace, and to try to reconcile
2 that with the statement of Foreign Minister Trinh of North
3 Vietnam. And here the problem is how we can insure, if we can
4 ever insure, that Hanoi would follow the bombing by going
5 promptly to the conference table and that the talks will be
6 meaningful and not just time-wasting or, shall we say, another
7 Panmunjom.

8 MR. KALB: Mr. Prime Minister, a number of people in this
9 country say that if the Soviet Union were so interested in
10 bringing this to a peaceful settlement they could do it in one
11 way by reducing their arms supplies to North Vietnam.

12 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: This is not realistic, you know. The
13 Soviet government has their own problems within the Communist
14 world of their relations and their rivalry with China. This
15 is a big problem in Hanoi, the struggle for power within Hanoi
16 between China and Russian influence there. Of course, Russia
17 could cut off arms supplies. I don't think that would increase
18 their influence in Hanoi if they were to do it.

19 MR. CHILDS: Mr. Prime Minister, in your toast to the President
20 you put great stress on restraint and the importance of re-
21 straint. As you know, at the time of the Pueblo incident there
22 was congressional clamor for the use of tactical nuclear
23 weapons if a second front developed. Now something like that
24 same pressure is growing in relation to the massive attack on
25 Khe Sanh for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in South

1 Vietnam. What, in your opinion, would be the effect on a world
2 view of the United States if in the last resort we use such
3 weapons?

4 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: You realize, of course, I can't comment
5 on internal political controversy in the United States or say
6 anything about what is being said in Congress or the Senate.
7 But to answer the direct question I think any attempt to
8 escalate this war will be most dangerous, to escalate it either
9 qualitatively or in an extent or in an area or -- I think will
10 be extremely dangerous. As for the proposal, whoever makes it,
11 to use tactical nuclear weapons in that war, this would be
12 lunacy.

13 MR. CHILDS: You think this would be disastrous for America's
14 position?

15 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: It would not only be disastrous to
16 America's position, it would run a very, very great risk of
17 escalation for the world. It would be sheer lunacy.

18 MR. KALB: In what way, sir? What kind of scenario do you see?

19 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: I don't knock out scenarios. A lot of
20 other people can do that. But I think, in the first place, it
21 would -- when you talk about America's position, meaning
22 America's image in the world, I think it would have a disastrous
23 effect, certainly.

24 MR. KALB: What about that image right now, Mr. Prime Minister?
25 You have traveled around the world a good deal. Do you find

1 that that image has suffered in any way because of the war?

2 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Everybody has got their own mind made

3 up about this one way or the other. I have found that at

4 prime minister conferences, I get anti-Vietnam, which means

5 anti-American, demonstrations almost everywhere I go. In

6 Britain I get these things, especially in university towns.

7 The only place I have been to recently where I didn't have any

8 at all was Moscow, where they don't demonstrate about Vietnam.

9 But most people have made up their minds about this. I believe

10 that the American position, for example, in San Antonio, on the

11 stopping of the bombing hasn't been thoroughly understood. I

12 tried to help this week in this matter as indeed I have in the

13 British House of Commons. And I think the other thing is that

14 the scene on our television screens, some of the evidence of

15 atrocities and barbarism, in the last ten days fighting in

16 Saigon, may have had some effect in bringing home to our own

17 people what the issues are. Though, of course, there is

18 barbarity and there is ferocity on both sides. That ghastly

19 picture that the world saw of that execution in cold blood --

20 now this has a very bad effect, but so I think do the effects

21 of some of the Viet Cong activities.

22 MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, a recent public opinion poll

23 in your country demonstrated that 66 per cent of the people of

24 Great Britain are opposed to U.S. policy in Vietnam and,

25 therefore, are opposed to your supporting American policy in

1 Vietnam. Does that affect you in any way? Do you feel that
2 they are wrong and that you speak rightly for Britain?

3 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: I don't think a government can just
4 follow a policy based on public opinion polls. If so, every
5 country would abolish taxation and increase government ex-
6 penditure. So far as this is concerned, I think our line is
7 right. It is not an easy line to take. There is very great
8 criticism of it in the House of Commons from my own friends and
9 supporters. It is not easy. We believe this line is right,
10 but, of course, as I have said and said again in Washington
11 this week, if I thought that dissociation from the American
12 policy would shorten the war by one day or make the chance of a
13 durable peace that bit stronger, of course I would do it. It
14 is because I don't think that that I haven't done it.

15 MR. CHILDS: You have -- excuse me.

16 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: But escalation, if there were escalation
17 of the kind that you said, of course, we should make our view
18 known immediately.

19 MR. CHILDS: You have much stronger party discipline in your
20 country than we have here. A very large number of your majority
21 in the House of Commons is opposed to your policy. Do you
22 think you can hold that majority in spite of the deep,
23 apparently emotional reaction to your support of our policy in
24 Vietnam?

25 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: We had these difficulties when I had a

majority of three in the House of Commons. And I believe what is called party discipline must depend on freedom of expression of views, and I think it right that my colleagues in the parliamentary party should express their great anxiety in any way to me or to my colleagues in the government. But at the end of the day it has got to be the government's responsibility, particularly where major issues of world affairs are affected, and then our colleagues are going to decide their attitude to the action that we have taken.

MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, isn't your own influence and the impact of your whole position in Great Britain seriously endangered when you find yourself in the paradoxical position, as you now do, of finding Mr. Heath, the leader of the opposition, passing a resolution in the House, supported by the entire shadow cabinet of the Conservative Party, supporting your position on Vietnam, and you find something like 30 or 40 per cent of your party against it? You stand with the opposition and you stand against almost half of the position of your own party. How long can you continue that?

PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Oh, any identification of particular groups, whether opposition or anything else in the British House of Commons, is purely coincidental. We do what is right. I will express my views on that particular motion when I get back to Britain. I am very much in favor of all possible exports to America except political controversy, which I would

1 like to keep at home.

2 MR. KALB: Mr. Prime Minister, the implication of what you
3 have said twice in this broadcast is that if the President were
4 to decide to escalate the war in Vietnam, as a result of the
5 current Communist offensive, that you then might be forced to
6 dissociate Britain's support.

7 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: We support the action taken by the
8 United States when we think that this is the one most likely to
9 bring the political settlement which, at the end of the day, must
10 come. There will be no military imposed solution in this war.
11 And we support any measures taken to that end, as long as we
12 are satisfied, -as we are satisfied about the sincerity of the
13 proposals for peace negotiations.

14 MR. KALB: Do you think we're on the right track in Vietnam?

15 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: This is a matter, of course, the
16 American government must decide. I believe that you are on the
17 right track for ending this ghastly situation, namely by putting
18 forward proposals for peace negotiations, which I think are
19 reasonable and which all of us must try and get the other side
20 to accept.

21 MR. CHILDS: Coming back to your relations with Premier Kosygin,
22 do you have a continuing exchange with him, Mr. Prime Minister?

23 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Yes.

24 MR. CHILDS: On Vietnam?

25 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: On a number of questions, of course,

1 including Vietnam, including problems of European security. We
2 have this hot link now between Downing Street and the Kremlin
3 which we can use. And also, of course, we keep in touch
4 through ambassadors.

5 MR. CHILDS: You use that not alone for emergency situations
6 but for continuing dialogue, do you?

7 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: It has not been installed very long. It
8 has only been in three or four months, and so a regular pattern
9 hasn't been established. But we would use it exactly as I do
10 the similar link with the White House, for continuing dialogue,
11 quite apart from emergency situations.

12 MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, did you raise with Premier
13 Kosygin, with the Russians, the withdrawal of Britain from --all
14 of its forces east of Suez, from Singapore and from the Persian
15 Gulf; and did you raise with him the obvious concern throughout
16 the free world that the Soviets may step into the vacuum that
17 is created by the British withdrawal?

18 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: No, I didn't raise it. I didn't need
19 to raise it. He knew the facts exactly as every other country
20 does, so I didn't raise it with him. We took our decision. We
21 don't have to raise it with anybody. In fact, it came up in
22 discussion. I think his anxiety was -- he said he is afraid
23 now that the Americans would move into these areas we're moving
24 out of.

25 MR. KALB: Well do you yourself feel, sir, that there is the

Phone (Area 202) 626-4266

WARD & PAUL

25 K Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

1 possibility of a pax Americana?

2 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: World peace must come from the United
3 Nations. We're no longer living in a world where there can be
4 a pax imposed by any nation, however strong, however specific
5 in its intentions.

6 MR. AGRONSKY: There is a very great concern in this country --
7 I repeat, Mr. Prime Minister -- as to who will replace Britain
8 in the areas from which she has now removed herself. Did you
9 raise that with the President when you spoke to him?

10 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: A question of who replaces -- you know,
11 there was a song about the Road to Mandalay, which I very
12 much enjoyed. It was beautifully sung. We got out of Mandalay
13 twenty years ago. There has been no problem of replacement in
14 Mandalay. What we have got to do is to help our good friends
15 in Singapore and Malaysia to help themselves. We shall do all
16 we can in the way of training. We shall leave equipment behind.
17 We shall leave them in a position to become viable economically.
18 And, really, the best answer is for our friends to be more
19 capable of looking after themselves.

20 MR. AGRONSKY: Well, suppose they cannot?

21 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: We can't go on carrying on the police-
22 man's role in the world.

23 MR. AGRONSKY: Well, if that is your attitude in regard to
24 Malaysia, many Americans are concerned that the South Vietnamese,
25 for example, are not able to help themselves and that is the

1 reason that we are there. Would you expect us to help those who
2 can't help themselves in the other parts of the world because
3 you have laid down the burden?

4 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: So far as South Vietnam is concerned, I
5 understand it to be American policy that as soon as the people
6 get to the conference table and a political settlement, there
7 will be no intention to maintain United States troops in that
8 area but that the people of South Vietnam would then look after
9 themselves. This is exactly our position. It has been our
10 position in a whole generation of decolonialization, of moving
11 out and leaving the people there with such help as we could
12 give them to look after themselves. Certainly in the areas we
13 are proposing to leave, in the Far East, I have no doubt at all
14 about the vigor and virility and ability of Malaysia and
15 Singapore to look after themselves. We have, of course, and
16 shall have a general capability, based on Europe, based on
17 Britain and on the Continent of Europe, and we would always be
18 ready to consider coming to the help of our Commonwealth
19 colleagues, our Commonwealth partners, if that were necessary.

20 But there will be no prior obligation to do so, nor would there
21 be any question of keeping a special capability in the area.

22 MR. CHILDS: Mr. Prime Minister, in connection with your with-
23 drawal from, in effect, a world role, why do you need nuclear
24 power any more? Why do you need a nuclear card in this game?

25 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Why do we need it? Well, as I say, of

1 course, this was something we inherited. It had gone past the
2 point of no return. I have never exaggerated the importance of
3 British nuclear power as British nuclear power and I have
4 always, I think, dismissed the pretensions of those who talk
5 about a genuinely independent British deterrent. It isn't.
6 Nevertheless, having got the Polaris submarines and it having
7 gone so far, we believe that we are right to commit this to
8 NATO on a collective basis.

9 MR. CHILDS: You aren't going to sell the Polaris submarines,
10 as has been reported?

11 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Sell it?

12 MR. CHILDS: This has been a rumor over here.

13 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Well, I haven't heard --

14 MR. CHILDS: It came into print.

15 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: I haven't had anybody in the market for
16 Polaris submarines and shortly we will be, I hope, all of us,
17 signing the nonproliferation treaty which will preclude the
18 sale, transfer, gift, alienation of nuclear weapons. No, they
19 are committed to NATO. Meanwhile, of course, the bomber
20 deterrent is slowly over a period phasing out.

21 MR. KALB: Mr. Prime Minister, given the pending withdrawal of
22 a good deal of British power from east of Suez, do you plan to
23 use some of that power to bolster British forces on the
24 Continent and perhaps to increase the British naval presence in
25 the Mediterranean?

1 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: It will, of course, be our intention to
2 make a full contribution to NATO and to concentrate our military
3 capability mainly on Europe, including, of course, Britain,
4 which is in Europe. We don't envisage strengthening or increas-
5 ing our contribution to Germany and there is still, of course,
6 the problem of financing the foreign exchange burden, which we
7 are now discussing with the Germans. I think as to the question
8 of the Mediterranean, we had better sort all of these things out
9 when we publish our new defense policy in July.

10 MR. AGRONSKY: May we turn to the question of the Mediterranean.
11 As you know, there is throughout the world a growing concern
12 about the increase in Soviet strength in the Middle East. The
13 Soviets have been arming the Arab states and since the June
14 war with Israel they have re-armed the Arab states; did you
15 raise that concern with Kosygin in Moscow?

16 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Yes, of course. We had a very full
17 discussion about the Middle East, including a long talk about
18 the problems of opening the canal. Now, their position and
19 ours is different. Their position and that of America is
20 different. This is well known. What we tried to do is to see
21 what progress can be made within the ambit of the Security
22 Council Resolution which our own representative, Lord Caradon,
23 the British representative, introduced at the end of last year.
24 And they fully support this resolution. We are going to need
25 a lot more, I think, give and take on both sides before we can

1 turn it into a reality. But we said, and they agreed, that the
2 thing for the time being is to back up the Jarring Mission in
3 fulfillment of that Security Council Resolution and that must be
4 the next step in Middle East policy.

5 MR. AGRONSKY: Well, did you discuss with them the inconsistency
6 of their being for this resolution, at the same time going all
7 out to re-arm the Arab world?

8 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Well, of course, the only answer to
9 this -- and we took an initiative in this last June -- is arms
10 control, an arms control policy in the Middle East. That is not
11 acceptable to the Soviet government, obviously. And I am not
12 at all clear in the present situation what the attitude of
13 France is to the question of arms supply in the Middle East. I
14 don't think it will be generally acceptable, but this is the
15 only way to get any progress. You won't do any good just by
16 telling one country not to arm its friends, however much you
17 may deplore what is going on.

18 MR. CHILDS: Mr. Prime Minister, you have had some problems on
19 foreign exchange. You devalued the pound. What is your
20 opinion of the President's proposed travel tax that is intended
21 to keep Americans out of Europe, particularly since I believe
22 three per cent of your foreign exchange comes from the American
23 dollar spent by travelers?

24 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Again, I must not get involved in an
25 issue which is now on the floor of Congress. But as far as the

Phone (Area 202) 628-4266

WARD & PAUL

25 K Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

1 general proposals are concerned, they will hit us considerably.
2 They will hit other countries more. In view of the situation
3 the United States was facing, I felt, when I got the message
4 from the President informing me of what he was going to do,
5 that his general package, tough though it was, was a fair and
6 reasonable package. I mustn't comment on individual bits of it,
7 and particularly the tourist tax. What I am worried about is
8 the proposal for what will be a small export subsidy and for
9 border taxes. I think this would not be helpful. It might
10 continue what is already a rather dangerous pile of protection-
11 ism and, as we knew thirty years ago, once this begins it can
12 be devastating. But I felt he was justified in taking action,
13 even though it will hurt us a little.

14 MR. KALB: Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to get back to
15 Vietnam. You have expressed your support of the President's
16 position, but isn't that expression of support really a quali-
17 fied expression? Were you just completely in tune with what
18 the President is doing in Vietnam?

19 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Of course it is a qualified --

20 MR. KALB: Well, could you tell us what the qualifications are?

21 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: We are a sovereign country, not a
22 satellite. I don't say that whatever he may decide tomorrow or
23 the day after we shall go along with. I say we will go along
24 with it as long as we think it is right and the best way to
25 peace. That is our position.

1 MR. AGRONSKY: As of now you think it is right?

2 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: As of now -- and I have had many
3 anxieties over the last three years and I have been living with
4 this problem for three years. I have had anxieties sometimes
5 about whether there was, in the early days, three years ago, a
6 real willingness for negotiations. Since the Baltimore speech
7 onward I have had no doubts about that. And I am supporting
8 this line because I think that San Antonio interpreted, as I
9 did interpret it to the Russians, obviously in accordance with
10 the American interpretation, that this is the road to peace.
11 That is why I support it.

12 MR. CHILDS: You don't believe, then, as many critics of the
13 President here believe, that certain peace overtures over the
14 past year and a half or two years have been aborted by sudden
15 unexpected bombing attacks, that there has been a failure to
16 take advantage of peace overtures?

17 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: This has been said, and I know that it
18 is widely believed on the other side of the Iron Curtain. I
19 have been into this at great length with the Russians, for
20 example -- and with others, particularly around about the time
21 of December 1966. I think there were great misunderstandings at
22 that time and sheer breakdowns in communication. But there
23 have been long periods of no bombing. There has been this very
24 long period of restraints starting last autumn in relation to
25 Hanoi and Haiphong to which there has been no response. I think

1 there have been cases, more of misunderstanding than of any
2 wrong policy.

3 MR. KALB: There has been a response, Mr. Prime Minister. The
4 North Vietnamese have come around some ways from "could" to
5 "will." They have said just this past week that the talks will
6 start as soon as the bombing is stopped. There is some give
7 on the other side.

8 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Yes, I thought the move from "could" to
9 "will" was important and I don't think it was just an exercise
10 in semantics. It certainly wasn't a problem of translation or
11 interpretation. They are, I think, keen that the world should
12 know that they meant "will" and not "could." But, in addition
13 to that, I think they are probably taking on-board what I tried
14 to tell Kosygin, that it must be a prompt start in negotiation,
15 because you couldn't have them hanging about for six months
16 intensifying the war and then continue with the bombing pause;
17 Nor could they destroy the possibility of negotiations once
18 begun by taking unfair military advantage. In those circum-
19 stances I am afraid all bets would be off. And I think they
20 are coming to understand this.

21 MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, would you feel that the last
22 statement of the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Mr. Trinh,
23 indicates any more give? We would assume that you discussed
24 that with the President. Would you have gone further than the
25 President has gone?

1 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: I referred to it in the speech I made in
2 the White House, at the dinner, the latest statement. I would
3 like to know what he means. And sometimes it is what you can
4 get from them in private that is more important than what they
5 say in public. I think it is a further advance. I think it
6 points the road to how to get onto the bridge. But, of course,
7 I mean the sensible thing would be if somebody from North
8 Vietnam would sit around with perhaps one or both of the Geneva
9 co-chairmen and say exactly what it really means. To have these
10 long-range exchanges in Vietnamese semantics when really the
11 lives of thousands of people depends on it does suggest to me
12 the right thing is,--all right; if you have got something to
13 say, let's go without prejudice, get around the table and see
14 what these words "will," "could," and the rest mean. I believe
15 the difference is very small if the will is there.

16 MR. AGRONSKY: Well, one clear action you could have involved
17 yourself in when you were talking with Kosygin was to call for
18 a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, which you co-chair with
19 the Russians. Did you do that?

20 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: Oh, we've done that about a hundred
21 times.

22 MR. AGRONSKY: This time?

23 PRIME MINISTER WILSON: And they have not been willing -- I
24 raised it with them again -- their view is that once there is a
25 willingness by what they call the "parties" to the conflict to

1 get around the table, then the co-chairmen can give any help
2 the parties want, whether by convening this kind of conference
3 or that kind of conference and the rest. I am not absolutely
4 certain that a full-dress Geneva Conference, with all the same
5 personnel who were there last time, would necessarily be the
6 most helpful in securing peace. I think the Chinese were a
7 little difficult on the last occasion in Geneva, in 1954, and I
8 am not sure they are all that more helpful today.

9 MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Prime Minister, I regret we have run out of
10 time. Thank you very much for being here to FACE THE NATION.

11 - - -

12 ANNOUNCER: Today on FACE THE NATION, Prime Minister Harold
13 Wilson, of Great Britain, was interviewed by CBS News Diplomatic
14 Correspondent Marvin Kalb, Marquis Childs, Washington Bureau
15 Chief of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. CBS News Correspondent
16 Martin Agronsky led the questioning. Next week another
17 prominent figure in the news will FACE THE NATION. FACE THE
18 NATION was recorded at CBS Washington.

19 - - -

1

Friday, February 9, 1968, 11:25 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilson

Prime Minister Wilson would like to speak to you briefly on the phone sometime prior to his departure from the British Embassy at 2:30 P. M. this afternoon.

The most convenient times would be:

**between 11:30 and 12:15
12:30 to 12:45**

However, anytime during this period would be acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Bremley Smith

BKS:amc

February 8, 1968
2:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT

I checked out the PM Wilson speech
with Ambassador Bruce.

-- "Absolutely tip top."

And Bill White.

-- "Splendid...just great...
I have nothing to add to
such a fine speech."

Charles Maguire

CMM:dlc

cc: Walt Rostow

5
8
/

40

February 8, 1968

2:00 p.m.

ga

Walt: The heat's off on this. President thought it very good. Asked me to check with Ambassador Bruce -- who said "absolutely tip top." President also wants me to show it to Bill White this afternoon. Let me know if you have any last minute comments.


Charles Maguire

2/9
12:00

86

WALT:

I reached back to my British years and put my heart into this one. McPherson thinks it "superb". I think it needs to be said by the Boss — for sake of GB — and US — and making points for Boss. Given the length, I suspect I'll need supporting fire from you. Please say "Good Show" and leap into the breach.


Charles

February 8, 1968
12 noon

UK- W son Visit Feb

8c

MR. PRESIDENT

I don't often come as a special pleader for a speech.

But I ask you to give this one at the Wilson dinner tonight.

- McPherson does too. He thinks it is a "superb job" and perfect for the occasion.
- Ambassador Bruce gave me two hours worth of his good thinking.
- Christian has heard the news lead sections and likes them.

This speech will hold your audience and make headlines -- particularly in Britain. Christian can make special arrangements for maximum European coverage.

It is a leadership speech -- timely, statesman-like and eloquent. You rally the American and British peoples in face of trial and inspire their confidence in a common and hopeful future.

Charles Maguire

Note: Walt has been in on the thinking. A copy is on his desk.

8-d

Toast for Prime Minister Wilson
Dinner: February 8, 1968.
Words: 984 /Maguire

Let me first thank you all for coming out on a winter's
night to warm this house with friendship.

It could be said that we are gathered here to welcome a
Prime Minister who has come in out of the cold. (PAUSE)

I refer, of course, to the famous English winter -- ending
in July and reappearing in August.

Whatever the season, sir, there is always strength and
comfort in standing beside you to field the challenges of the day.
It is always a good day for any man or nation when they can claim
the British as comrades in adversity, brothers in adventure,
and partners in advancement.

But I do not want to wave either the Union Jack or the Stars
and Stripes tonight. We buried the need for that with Colonel Blimp,

Uncle Sam and other caricatures of yesteryear. When Americans talk today of what Great Britain means to us -- and to our world -- we are moved by a more meaningful English voice from the past. It is Robert Browning who speaks the truth for our time: "My sun sets to rise again."

Yes, these are difficult times for Great Britain -- and for the United States. Yes, we have our family differences still. And yes, Britain means as much to us as ever.

-- Our two nations are as close as ever.

-- Our two peoples are as determined as ever to master the trials of the moment and move on to the triumphs of the future.

That is what the Prime Minister and I have talked about today. We have ranged around the world, reviewing our large

responsibilities, drawing on our wide experience, exchanging insights, giving and getting much of value. But we always came back to one basic and unbreakable agreement.

-- We want the same things for our people.

-- They will not come easily or overnight, but our people shall have them if patience and perseverance can win them.

They are the simplest things to describe -- and the hardest to achieve.

-- A peace rooted in the good firm earth of freedom.

-- A world respectful of law, given to justice, hostile only to force.

-- A life without the torment of hunger, ignorance, disease.

-- A good job, home and education.

-- A higher standard of living and more equal opportunity.

-- A time when the faces of men see the promise of their humanity, and reach out as one family to possess its joy.

-- A new day on earth.

It will come for us. If any man doubts it, let him look at how far the Americans and the British have come already in common purpose. Let him think how long and vigorously we have sought our goals. Let him reflect on all that we have overcome by sharing struggle and sacrifice.

And then let him look deeply into the well of our strength

-- the traditions and the character that shape us.

He will come quickly to the truth that sustains us: The

American and British peoples are not short-distance crusaders.

If we must tighten our belt for a time, it does not leave us
breathless for the next battle. We are veteran campaigners, not
amateurs, and never quitters. We have learned to pace ourselves
-- to accept temporary detours and steer around them -- to be
purposeful in setting those long-range priorities that will most
safely and quickly span the difference between what we desire
and what we can deliver.

I have enormous confidence, Mr. Prime Minister, in
the character of my own people, in their ability to understand and
master trial. I am proud to place equal faith in your people, who
have turned adversity into victory so many times. I look to their
characteristic courage and fortitude now, with admiration and
expectation. I say with them, and to them, using the slogan of
the moment: I'm Backing Britain. The American people are
backing you.

Our world, I think, is badly in need of our kind of trust and faith. Nations, like men, teach and learn best by example.

The greatness of nations, the size of their role in the world, the weight of influence they exercise -- these laurels are not earned or long held if they rest only on the trappings and outposts of physical power.

Ultimately, in our uncertain world, nations can only lead and leave their mark if they have the power to attract and instruct by example. Their rank and worth will be decided by what pushes upward and outward from their roots -- the character of citizens, the value of ideals, the quality of life, the purpose of a people.

What a magnificent opportunity for the people of Great Britain!

Character -- Ideals -- Culture -- Purpose ... What people are richer by tradition in such wealth? What country possesses a

more powerful national asset? The world already knows these qualities as uniquely British gifts; as the benchmarks of civilized life; as standards of decency and development that surpass and survive the importance of any single epoch.

The new and struggling States of the world can gain much from these gifts of British example. The older nations can always learn from them, and count on them for security and progress. Britain itself will continue forward, spurred by the spirit of its people and their fresh victories.

-- In education, for example, where a revolution of learning and opportunity is underway.

-- And in technology, where the native skills of an inventive and industrious people are establishing a new "workshop of the world."

There is so much, Mr. Prime Minister, waiting for each of us on the road ahead. It is a hopeful and exciting journey for our two nations, and an example for every nation that shares our hopes. That is reason enough for us to travel on -- to give example so that others may follow us.

The face and purpose we show to the world will always be a reflection of our own relationship. I know it will continue warm and close. I want it always to have the importance and meaning that President Franklin Roosevelt gave it more than a quarter-century ago, when he welcomed King George VI to this house.

"I am persuaded that the greatest single contribution our two countries have been enabled to make to civilization, and to the welfare of peoples throughout the world, is the example we have jointly set by our manner of conducting relations between our two nations."

It is a grand toast still. I renew its promise now, Mr. Prime Minister, by offering it as a tribute to you and your people.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Her Majesty, The Queen.

#####



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D.C.

7 February 1968

HH
Rubrow
9

Dear Phil,

I think you may be interested to
... see the attached extract from a reply
given by the Prime Minister in the House
of Commons on 6 February to a supplementary
question about Vietnam.

I shall be grateful if you could
ensure that this reaches Mr. Rusk and also
the White House without delay.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Wilford
—(K.M. Wilford)

Mr. Philip Habib,
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of State,
Washington D.C.



The Prime Minister: What I shall say in Washington is exactly what I said in Moscow in regard to our position over Vietnam and in regard to the basis on which peace can be found in Vietnam following the San Antonio Speech.

Mr. Heath: Is the Prime Minister saying that what he told Mr. Kosygin is that the British Government stand by the approach of President Johnson in his San Antonio speech on the question of a settlement?

The Prime Minister: Yes, of course I do. That is exactly what I told Mr. Kosygin. The purpose of our discussions in the Soviet Union was to see how far the relatively narrow gap between public statements, the San Antonio speech and the State of the Union Message on the one hand and the statement by Mr. Trinh on the other, can be bridged. The Rt. Hon. Gentleman will recognise that the events of last week have made these things more difficult.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research
Memorandum

REU-10, February 7, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: Wilson Plagued by Domestic Political Problems
On Eve of Washington Visit

ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Washington, February 8-9, comes at a time when he is under increasing pressure and criticism at home -- from some members of his own Labor Party who are upset at the cutbacks in the planned level of domestic spending, especially in education and welfare programs; from the Tory opposition, which is unhappy about the government's plans to accelerate withdrawals of military forces from the Persian Gulf and East of Suez, and from most of the press and the public which have discovered a Wilson "credibility gap." This paper analyses the Prime Minister's current leadership problems, examines the difficulties ahead, and assesses his prospects for survival.

ABSTRACT

Harold Wilson has not had an easy time the last three years, and the next three do not promise to be any easier. Since coming to power in October 1964, the Wilson administration has been a virtual prisoner of the UK's economic malaise.

In the 1964 elections, the British voters took Labor only on inspection. Wilson persuaded the public, however, that Labor was a moderate, constructive, responsible party and was rewarded with a landslide victory in March 1966. But the worsening economic situation has forced Wilson to take measures that have cost him the confidence and support of his followers.

In July 1966, Wilson instituted the toughest austerity program experienced in Britain since World War II. It succeeded in holding the line but failed to

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-269

By *fw*, NARA, Date *5-27-94*

Downgraded
interval; 10
automatically declassified

-ii-

bring about the needed improvement in the balance of payments. Last November, despite repeated earlier assurances that HMG would not devalue, Wilson was forced to do just that. Since then his personal position and the position of the Labor Party have seriously declined. The public in general and Laborites in particular feel that Wilson has broken promise after promise. Much of the national press is currently portraying Wilson as a discredited, broken, pathetic little man. Most journalists seem to have been converted from ardent admiration of Wilson two years ago to total incredulity about anything he says today.

The three major public opinion polls differ in their most recent findings, but they all agree that the Conservatives are currently leading Labor by significant margins -- from 5 percent to 18 percent.

On top of all his economic and popularity problems, Wilson has a serious problem of maintaining discipline within the always rambunctious Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP). The problem of intra-party discipline in Commons was almost non-existent when Labor first came to power in October 1964 and had to rely on a hand-to-mouth majority of 1-4 votes. However, when the government gained an unassailably huge majority in the March 1966 general election, both the appeal and the necessity of sticking together disappeared and sizable abstentions became increasingly commonplace. This in turn angered many middle-of-the-road and right-wing loyalists who resented being called on to stifle their own occasional misgivings in order to put through measures on which their left-wing colleagues consistently bucked the party leadership.

-iii-

The most recent spate of bickering within the PLP began with bitter protests by some of the loyalist majority against the apparent impunity with which 25 mostly left-wing MPs had abstained on a vote of confidence on the government's public expenditure announcement of January 16. Wilson and other party leaders, anxious to avoid hardening the lines between right and left, asked for some disciplinary action milder than expulsion, and the PLP voted to suspend the rebels from party activities for a month.

The spreading sense throughout the PLP that it is being asked to betray much that Labor has stood for is genuine. On this issue the differences between the government and the left are slight. The hard-core left-wingers would rather have their say than their seats. For most members, however, the answer is more practical. They admit that party leaders have failed and have had to abandon some principles, but they see their first duty now as that of keeping the party in power, certain in the knowledge that a general election in the near future would probably cost them not only their government but also, in the case of many, their seats.

The opposition that the government will face in the next few months, as it carries out its program to make devaluation work, will be formidable. The best that party leaders can hope for is to contain within reasonable bounds the opposition to some of the individual items of the cuts package, to new taxation and further hire-purchase controls, and to possible new wage legislation. The real danger to the government is more long-term; it must be able to show results on the economic front within a reasonable period of time or Labor can write off the next elections.

-iv-

The party has not yet reached the point where it feels someone else would be preferable to Wilson. In the absence of a consensus that a successor is needed and in the absence of an agreed-on successor, Wilson seems safe in his position as Party Leader and Prime Minister, but time is running out. Yet, Wilson has proved himself highly skillful and resilient in the past, and he probably still has time to convince the party and the public that he and his administration are in control of events and thereby to regain their confidence.

A Tough Three Years for the PM

No head of a major Western government has been without his difficulties in recent years, but few would deny that Harold Wilson has had a particularly rough time as Prime Minister of Great Britain for the last three years and three months. And, since he is faced with the necessity of regaining enough confidence to ride out the current wave of criticism and unrest, the next three years do not promise to be any easier.

Lurking behind most, if not all, of the problems that Wilson's government has had to face since coming to power in October 1964, have been the United Kingdom's formidable economic difficulties. The Wilson administration has been a virtual prisoner of the UK's economic malaise. In most respects the Labor Government has been as baffled as were previous Tory administrations about how to deal with Britain's chronic economic problems.

In the 1964 elections, the British voters took Labor only on inspection. Despite few legislative accomplishments and even fewer positive steps to cure the country's economic ills, Wilson managed to persuade the public that Labor, long considered the home of radicals, oppositionists, and irresponsibles, was a moderate, constructive, responsible, and even respectable party. As the March 1966 general election approached, public opinion polls showed the country pretty evenly divided when asked which party would really get the British economy moving. Nevertheless, the public apparently viewed Labor's prices and incomes policy as a more positive response to the country's economic problems than the Conservatives' generalized aim of competition and action against restrictive practices. Also, according to another poll, 68 percent of those questioned thought Labor was "genuinely concerned to raise the standard of living of ordinary men," while only 48 percent felt that the Conservatives were. But, after the winning the 1966 election by a landslide, the government, faced with one economic crisis after another, was unable to live up to the voters' confidence in it. To deal with the worsening economic situation, in July 1966, Wilson instituted the toughest austerity program in Britain since World War II. This program, which featured a 6-month absolute wage-price freeze, followed by a 6-month period of "severe restraint," succeeded in holding the line but it failed to bring about the needed improvement in the balance of payments. Finally, despite repeated assurances that HMG would not devalue the pound sterling, Wilson was forced to do just that last November.

In the three months since the devaluation drama began (it was announced on November 18) Wilson's personal position and the position of the Labor Party have seriously declined. The public in general and Laborites in particular feel that Wilson has broken promise after promise made to them -- that wage restraint would be temporary; that there would be no devaluation; that devaluation, when it did come, would obviate the need for further austerity measures; that a Labor Government could be expected to make good on the party's time-honored promises to expand the social and welfare programs. To these broken promises in the economic field, some disgruntled voters would add Wilson's inability to make good on his promise to settle the Rhodesian rebellion and to honor the UK's commitments to his allies East of Suez.

- 2 -

Last October, Wilson emerged from the Labor Party Conference unchallenged as Party Leader. It seemed clear then that, although the party was unhappy with some of the government's policies, it believed that there was no one else who could lead it as well, let alone better. Today, there are many doubters.

Press Relations Turn Sour

Much of the British national press, indulging its penchant for caricature, is currently portraying Wilson as a discredited, broken, pathetic little man. Most of the press corps seems to have been converted from ardent admiration of Wilson two years ago to total incredulity about almost anything he says today. Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, complained to the House of Lords last week that the newspapers had been indulging in a "vicious vilification and denigration of the Prime Minister which has really passed all the bounds of decency." During the public and parliamentary debate on public spending cuts, announced January 16, Wilson and the government received one of the worst floggings from the press since taking office. After nearly a week of adverse comment about his leadership, the papers played up the disciplinary problems in the Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) and the public call made by Labor MP Reginald Paget, a right-wing maverick, for Wilson's resignation. This was followed by a crop of stories openly questioning the Prime Minister's survivability and speculating on the prospects for a change. The Economist remarked last week that the anti-Wilson bandwagon has rolled with a vengeance which has been almost hysterical. Yet, as David Watt, the respected political editor of the Financial Times, has pointed out, the press has been saying nothing about Wilson not being said as loudly by some of his own supporters in Westminster.

Furthermore, while most of the criticism has been leveled at the Prime Minister personally, it is also obviously aimed at the performance of his administration. The failure of the government to solve the country's problems and to project an image of success are seen by many as the fault of more than Wilson alone.

Small Comfort from the Polls

The three major public opinion polls differ in their most recent findings, but they all agree that the Conservatives are currently leading Labor by significant margins. A National Opinion Poll survey taken January 24-29 registered an 18.3 percent Tory lead and showed 55 percent dissatisfied with Wilson and 68 percent dissatisfied with his government. A total of 49 percent of those questioned thought that the government should resign and call a general election. An Opinion Research Center poll taken January 13-14 showed a 17 percent lead for the Tories and percentages roughly similar to those of the NOP regarding opinions of Wilson and the government. The most recent Gallup Poll, completed between January 6-15, gave the Conservatives a lead of only 5 1/2 percent, a large drop from the record margin of 17 1/2 percent the preceding month.

The wide difference between Gallup and the other two polls may be due to the different times at which the surveys were taken; the Gallup poll was made almost 10 days before the announcement on public spending. In any event, during the current period of indecision, public opinion poll figures from any source need to be taken with some reservation. There is plenty of evidence that the public is following the situation very closely, and apparent violent swings in opinion

- 3 -

probably reflect genuine indecision. Any favorable news is more than welcome to Wilson these days, however, and he will take what comfort he can from the Gallup figures. According to the Gallup analysis, Labor's improvement between the December and January polls can be attributed in part to the failure of the Conservative opposition to take advantage of the current situation to establish policies that are seen as different and viable alternatives. This interpretation is supported by the continued slump of Conservative Leader Heath in the Gallup ratings, where criticism of the Tory leader has increased for the third month in succession. The NOP and ORC polls also showed that Heath's personal popularity failed to benefit. The Gallup analysis of its January poll concluded that, unless Heath and the Conservatives can make their criticisms of the government more effectively than they have so far, it would seem that the government stands to gain almost in direct proportion to the toughness of the measures it imposes.

Gallup also interpreted the improvement in Labor's standing between the December and January polls as an indication 1) that Labor's supporters apparently had recovered somewhat from the shock of devaluation; and 2) that Labor apparently benefited from the readiness of the government to take definite if uncomfortable measures to deal with the economic situation. Gallup pointed out, however, that the main effect of economic action of this kind was to cause a number of those who previously "disapproved" to move over to the "don't know's" rather than to the category of those who "approved" of Wilson and the government.

Intra-Party Squabbles Complicate Situation

On top of all his economic and popularity problems, Wilson has a serious problem of maintaining discipline within the always rambunctious PLP. This is not to say, however, as some observers have suggested that his position has been so weakened as to make the PLP prefer another leader. Those who express this view are fusing and confusing two quite separate problems -- the loss of confidence in Wilson and the Labor Party's internal squabbles. Despite the rebellious mood -- for different reasons -- of some left-wingers and some moderates, the government has never been in any real danger from its backbenchers. On the most recent issue of expenditure cuts, it was able to keep all but 22 hard-core left-wingers and 3 disgruntled right-wingers in line for two reasons: 1) they were appeased by the fact that defense programs were cut as well as social and welfare programs, and 2) they were deterred by the knowledge that toppling the government would bring on a new general election that would put the Tories into office.

The problem of intra-party discipline in Commons was almost non-existent when Labor first came to power in October 1964 and remained largely so for 17 months, when it had to rely on a hand-to-mouth majority of 1-4 votes. In such a situation the government could depend on its backbenchers not to risk the government's possible overthrow in their own self-interest. Moreover, Labor's miniscule margin made for high party morale in the House.

However, when the government gained an unassailably huge majority in the March 1966 general election, both the appeal and the necessity of sticking together disappeared. Maverick MPs could afford to flaunt the disciplinary rules and the

whips' instructions, secure in the knowledge that the government's majority would be assured by the votes of those who always toed the party line. Making a virtue of necessity, therefore, party leaders liberalized the disciplinary rules so as to allow MPs greater freedom in voting their "consciences." As a result, sizable abstentions became increasingly commonplace, and the leadership failed to curb the number of "conscience" demonstrations against government policy. This in turn angered many middle-of-the-road and right-wing loyalists who resented being called on to stifle their own occasional misgivings to put through measures on which their left-wing colleagues consistently bucked the party leadership.

The most recent spate of bickering within the PLP began with bitter protests by some of the loyalist majority against the apparent impunity with which 25 MPs (mostly left-wingers) had abstained on a vote of confidence on the government's public expenditure announcement. Under intense pressure from the loyalists, Chief Whip Silkin, himself a proponent of liberal disciplinary rules, suspended the 25 rebels from party activities but still required them to continue to accept the party whip and voting and pairing arrangements. Left-wingers accused Silkin of having exceeded his authority, Loyalist MP's were angered because they feared that Silkin's action compromised the chances of forcing eventual expulsion of the leftists. The dispute became so heated that Wilson was forced to call an emergency meeting of party leaders.

At a January 25 PLP meeting Wilson made a strong appeal for party unity. He criticized both the rebels who had abstained in the Commons vote and the "counter rebels" who were demanding expulsions of the abstainers and calling for the resignation of the Chief Whip. Wilson underlined the consequences for the party of mass abstentions when each member who abstained knew he was counting on others to keep the government in power. He concluded his 20 minute speech, listened to in silence by the members, with what many interpreted as a declaration to stay at the helm. He said: "The government -- you can be clear about this -- is not going to lose its nerve or cohesion."

Apparently on Wilson's instructions, the issue of what to do about the 25 rebels was put to a vote of the PLP last week. The result was that 24 MPs were suspended from activities for a month (Sidney Silverman, who suffered a heart attack, was not included although he had abstained). Wilson and other party leaders, anxious to avoid hardening the lines between left and right, had asked for some disciplinary action milder than expulsion. In practical terms the suspension means only that the 24 will not be able to attend party meetings which have no governmental authority anyway. They will continue to be governed by the party rules and will still have their voting rights in Commons.

It seems doubtful that the government can escape further abstentions when some of the individual expenditure cuts are debated in the next few weeks. If there are abstentions on other important Commons votes, the abstainers might well face expulsion. The PLP is expected to vote this week on a new code of conduct which reportedly includes proposals for graduated penalties.

More Party Problems Ahead

The reasons behind the PLP unrest stem, of course, from the government's wage policies and plans to cut domestic spending. Although the results of what one observer called "three weeks of intensive horse trading between the different spending Ministries" robbed Labor backbenchers of their opportunity to complain that social and welfare services have been sacrificed to defense spending, they are nevertheless very unhappy over some important reductions in home-front outlays. The spreading sense throughout the PLP that it is being asked to betray much that Labor has stood for is genuine. On this issue the differences between the government and the left are slight. They all hate the cuts in domestic programs and admit that the economies represent retreats from Labor policies and principles. But the left contends that Wilson and the cabinet have changed, not it. The hard core left-wingers would rather have their say than their seats. For most members of the PLP, however, the answer is more practical. They admit that party leaders have failed and have had to abandon some principles, but they see their first duty now as that of keeping the party in power, certain in the knowledge that a general election in the near future would probably cost them not only their government but also, for many of them, their seats.

As the Prime Minister bluntly told Labor MPs last week, 1968 and 1969 will not be easy years. Wilson repeated, as he has over and over again, that the government is determined to make devaluation work. He told the PLP that the government was being criticized for not announcing a great measure of "panic deflation" -- intimating that such measures would not be taken. Nevertheless, it seems certain that the cabinet will at least have to consider the possibility of further legislative powers over wages, especially if, as is possible, the Trades Union Council's special conference of union executives decides to discontinue the TUC's own voluntary pay-vetting machinery. The cabinet discussion, when it comes, will provide the government with its most difficult test since the decision to devalue sterling. The opposition in the PLP to fresh wage legislation could easily make the revolt of the 25 MPs against the spending cuts seem like a purely local conflict.

The opposition that the government will face in the next few months will be formidable. The best that party leaders can hope for is to contain within reasonable bounds the opposition to some of the individual items of the cuts package, to new taxation and further hire-purchase controls, let alone to possible new wage legislation. Despite any agreement on new disciplinary rules, there will most likely be abstentions on some votes. However, we would expect the government will be able to contain any dissatisfaction and have its way. The real danger to the government is more long-term; it must be able to show that devaluation is accomplishing what Wilson and Jenkins say it must accomplish. The government must be able to show results within a reasonable period of time or Labor can write off the next elections.

Wilson Needs to Re-Establish Image of Authority

Much the same thing can be said regarding Wilson personally. It is the intensely personal style of Wilson's premiership that has left him open to the personal denigration that he is currently suffering. He has always relied heavily on a personal domination of the Labor Party and the House of Commons and on both fronts he is now demonstrably weaker. He has lost the personal authority he once had and probably can no longer dominate the cabinet the way he once did. Nevertheless, it is much too soon to begin the wake for yet another British Prime Minister. The party certainly has not reached the point where it feels anyone is preferable to Wilson. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the cabinet is plotting against him. None of Wilson's possible successors has yet gained sufficient confidence of the party or the public to risk trying to oust the Prime Minister. Even Jenkins, most recently touted as the de facto No. 2 man, has not yet lived up to his advanced billing. At least he has not been able to provide the spark of exuberance, of confidence-inspiring vigor, so badly needed in Britain today.

In the absence of a consensus that a successor is needed, and in the absence of an agreed-on successor, Wilson seems safe in his position as Party Leader and Prime Minister, but time is running out. Yet, Wilson has proved himself highly skillful and resilient in the past, and he probably still has time to convince the party and the public that he and his administration are in control of events and thereby to regain their confidence.

11a

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC-NLS 001-216-42
By us, NARA, Date 1-24-02

VIETNAM

1. ON THE NIGHT 29/30TH JANUARY, TAKING ADVANTAGES OF THE TET TRUCE, COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM LAUNCHED A WIDESPREAD OFFENSIVE. IN A SERIES OF ATTACKS, CLEARLY PLANNED OVER A LONG PERIOD, AND WELL CO-ORDINATED, THEY DAMAGED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OVERRAN URBAN AREAS, PENETRATING INTO SAIGON. THIRTYFIVE OUT OF FOURTY-FOUR PROVINCIAL CAPITALS WERE ATTACKED AND TEN FELL UNDER AT LEAST PARTIAL COMMUNIST CONTROL AT SOME TIME. A FURTHER THIRTY-SIX DISTRICT CAPITALS WERE ALSO ATTACKED. THE WIDESPREAD NATURE OF THE ASSAULTS AND THE TARGETS THEMSELVES CAME AS A SURPRISE. COUNTER-ACTION BY ALLIED FORCES CONTAINED OR DEFEATED MANY OF THESE ATTACKS AND THE COMMUNISTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SUFFERED VERY HEAVY CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THE COMMUNISTS STILL HAVE A FOOT HOLD IN AT LEAST SIX PROVINCIAL CAPITALS FROM HUE, 60 MILES SOUTH OF THE DMZ TO BEN TRE, 40 MILES SOUTH OF SAIGON, AND IN SOME AREAS OF SAIGON/CHOLON ITSELF.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. COUNTRYWIDE, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS GRADUALLY BEING RESTORED, BUT THE OFFENSIVE MUST HAVE HAD A POWERFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON BOTH THE RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION AND WILL PROBABLY LEAVE THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMME LARGELY IN RUINS. THERE IS AT LEAST ONE REPORT OF A PACIFIED VILLAGE DEFECTING TO THE COMMUNISTS AND MORE WILL NO DOUBT COME TO LIGHT, BUT IN THE MAIN THE POPULATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MOSTLY CONCERNED FOR ITS OWN SAFETY. NEVERTHELESS IT IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE POSITIONING OF ARMS CACHES BUILDING UP IN TOWNS AND THE INFILTRATION PRECEDING THE ATTACKS TOOK PLACE WITHOUT DEFECTION. THE APPARENT LACK OF DETAILED INTELLIGENCE OF THESE ACTIVITIES INDICATES AT LEAST A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF LOCAL ACQUIESCENCE.

3. COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE WESTERN DMZ AREA MAY NOW BE READY TO LAUNCH THE LONG-EXPECTED OFFENSIVE AGAINST KHE SANH. THIS OFFENSIVE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN PLANNED ORIGINALLY TO COINCIDE WITH THE WIDE-SPREAD ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS, BUT EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD WEATHER HAD MADE POSSIBLE A PROGRAMME OF VERY HEAVY ALLIED BOMBING WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INACTION OF THE PAST WEEK. ON THE NIGHT 4/5TH FEBRUARY TWO US MARINE CORPS OUTPOSTS ON THE HILLS SURROUNDING KHE SANH REPULSED DETERMINED COMMUNIST ATTACKS WHICH HAD FOLLOWED A 4-HOUR BOMBARDMENT. IF THIS OFFENSIVE DEVELOPS WE CONSIDER THAT ITS AIM WOULD BE TO GAIN A SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL VICTORY OVER US FORCES, IN WHICH LARGE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE TAKEN, AND TO DOMINATE THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES.

OVERALL COMMUNIST AIMS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. IN VIEW OF THE SCOPE OF THE OPERATIONS AND OF OUR ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL AND MILITARY THINKING OVER THE LAST YEAR, WE CONSIDER THAT THE AIMS OF THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE MAY HAVE BEEN:

(A) AS A MINIMUM, TO DESTROY THE CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO PROTECT THEM.

THEY MAY ALSO HAVE HOPED:

(B) TO CAUSE A COLLAPSE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ADMINISTRATION AND ARMED FORCES:

(C) TO INFLICT A MILITARY DEFEAT ON THE AMERICANS:

(D) AS A RESULT OF (C) AND DISILLUSION WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERFORMANCE TO UNDERMINE THE WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO CONTINUE THE WAR:

(E) TO GIVE GREATER CREDIBILITY TO THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONTS CLAIM TO BE THE "SOLE GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

THE RESULTS SO FAR INDICATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN (A), AND HAVE DEALT A SEVERE BLOW TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ADMINISTRATION AND ENHANCED THE STATUS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

5. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE FOR BELIEVING THAT THE OFFENSIVE REPRESENTS A LAST DESPERATE GAMBLE BEFORE AMERICAN MILITARY SUPERIORITY TOOK TOO GREAT A TOLL.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

③

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. AT PRESENT THE COMMUNISTS RETAIN THE CAPACITY FOR FURTHER ACTION AND ARE LIKELY TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO MAINTAIN THEIR MOMENTUM AND HOLD THE INITIATIVE, COMPELLING THE ALLIES TO CONTINUE TO REACT TO WIDESPREAD ATTACKS, AND PROVIDING FURTHER EVIDENCE TO THE POPULATION OF THEIR STRENGTH. ATTACKS ARE PARTICULARLY LIKELY IN THE DELTA REGION AND IN SAIGON, TO WHICH A THREAT ALREADY EXISTS FROM AN UNCOMMITTED MULTI-BATTALION FORCE IN THE JUNGLE NORTH OF BIEN HOA, ONLY 25 MILES TO THE NORTH.

7. SO FAR, THE ALLIES CLAIM TO HAVE KILLED NEARLY 17,000 COMMUNIST TROOPS, BUT THIS FIGURE HAS YET TO BE CONFIRMED. IN ANY CASE, GENERAL GIAP HAS NEVER BEEN FRIGHTENED OF HEAVY CASUALTIES AND SINCE SO FAR MOST OF THESE WILL HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY VIETCONG LOCAL RATHER THAN MAIN FORCE UNITS, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DETER FURTHER ATTACKS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMMUNIST MOVES TO NEGOTIATE AND WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE INTERESTED IN THEM EXCEPT ON THEIR OWN TERMS. ENDS.

800 800

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

FS

Wilson's Visit Costs a Song

British Prime Minister and Mrs. Harold Wilson will not hear "I Got Plenty of Nuthin" and "On the Road to Mandalay" at tonight's White House dinner.

Elizabeth Carpenter, press secretary to Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson, said Metropolitan Opera baritone Robert Merrill had chosen the numbers "without giving it a whole lot of thought."

Mrs. Carpenter said the decision on substitute numbers more in tune with the state visit of Wilson — who has devalued the British pound and announced military withdrawals from former British strongholds in the Far East — will be made at today's 3 p.m. rehearsal.

FOR RELEASE AFTER 6:30 P.M.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1968

Office of the Press Secretary
to Mrs. Johnson

THE WHITE HOUSE

A variety of operatic and semi-classical selections will be presented by Metropolitan opera stars Robert Merrill and Veronica Tyler at the White House dinner given by President and Mrs. Johnson in honor of the Right Honorable the British Prime Minister and Mrs. Harold Wilson on Thursday, February 8.

Robert Merrill this year marks his 23rd anniversary as one of the great stars of the Metropolitan Opera Company. He made his debut with Toscanini singing La Traviata in 1945, and also made his Metropolitan Opera debut with it. In October, 1967, he opened at Covent Gardens with this opera for three weeks of performances at the royal opera house in London, which received triumphant acclaim. He will present a selection from La Traviata at the White House.

Mr. Merrill's accompanist will be his wife.

Miss Tyler was one of the American prize winners at the June, 1967 Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow. Born in Baltimore, she is a graduate of the Peabody Conservatory of Music and studied at the Juilliard School of Music with Florence Page Kimball. Among her awards and prizes are a 1962 Fischer Foundation Scholarship from the Metropolitan Opera Auditions, a 1962-63 John Hay Whitney Fellowship, and first prize in the vocal division of the 1963 Munich International Competition. Her first New York appearance was in 1961 with the American Opera Society, and as soloist with the New York Philharmonic Young Peoples Concert. She has appeared with New York's leading musical organizations, as well as with organizations in other cities in this country. She lives in New York City with her husband, Barry Hawkins.

Miss Tyler will be accompanied on the piano by Miss Diane Richardson of New York City.

PROGRAM

Miss Veronica Tyler

Doretta's Aria from La Rondine - Puccini

An Die Musik - Schubert

Hello, Hello from The Telephone - Mennotti

Mr. Robert Merrill

I Got Plenty of Nothin from Porgy and Bess - Gershwin

On the Road to Mandalay - Kipling-Speaks

The Di Provenza, il mar from La Traviata - Verdi

Both

You'll Never Walk Alone - Rogers and Hammerstein



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

13

*Cy sent
ED Fried*

DIRECTOR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
The White House

In preparation of the talks with Prime Minister Wilson, I thought you might like to have the enclosed background material on British press and public opinion reaction on major issues of mutual concern.

The summaries highlight:

1. Korea. The British press generally supports U.S. positions and actions in the Pueblo affair.
2. Viet-Nam. The British press is divided, with conservative papers in general support of U.S. policy, and liberal and labor papers in opposition. Public opinion surveys show that a majority of Britons do not feel that they understand why the U.S. is fighting in Viet-Nam. Public opposition to U.S. policies in Viet-Nam appears to outweigh approval.
3. U.K. military retrenchment. The British press is expressing some concern over U.S. "resentment" about British plans of action.
4. U.S. measures to defend the dollar. The British press approves the President's balance of payments measures, but shows some apprehension about the effect of these measures on the British economy.


Leonard J. Marks

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-263
By *fw*, NARA, Date 7-2-93

13a

IOP/GM
February 1, 1968

BRITISH PRESS ATTITUDES ON U.S. -U.K. CONCERNS

In terms of U.S. -U.K. relations, the British press in recent months has been concerned with two major subjects of controversy which bring out sharp differences of opinion between the two countries and in Britain itself: 1) the war in Viet-Nam, and 2) British retrenchment, including defense cut-backs which call for withdrawal from military responsibilities east of Suez.

Regarding Viet-Nam, a substantial element of the British press is strongly opposed to U.S. military involvement, and is sharply critical of U.S. actions, particularly the bombing of North Viet-Nam. On the subject of British retrenchment, on the other hand, there is no criticism of the U.S. but much concern about how it will affect America militarily, and regret at letting down a friend and ally.

These two matters stand out, for elsewhere across the broad range of Anglo-American concerns British opinion, as reflected in the press, supports U.S. positions and policies -- with a few relatively unimportant exceptions.

Even the current crisis caused by North Korea's seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo evoked no significant adverse criticism of American policy or action. On the contrary, the press generally praised President Johnson's handling of a dangerous situation, emphasizing the calm moderation of his statements, and his "prudence" in taking the issue to the U.N.

NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF U.S. SHIP

The British press generally regarded the seizure of the Pueblo as a calculated provocation by North Korea to embarrass the U.S. and to give indirect support to North Viet-Nam.

First editorials urged the U.S. to "play this provocation cool" and to pursue diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of the Pueblo and its crew. Observers said the U.S. could not afford a second front in Asia. Among leading dailies, only the nationalistic London Daily Express contended that "the Americans must retaliate ... possibly by armed force."

As it became clear that the U.S. would seek a diplomatic settlement, commentators commended President Johnson for his "calm and measured response" and his "prudence" in taking the matter to the U.N. Right-of-center papers called on Britain to lend "fervent moral support" to the U.S. in this "moment of crisis."

The territorial waters controversy generated little discussion. Most writers either indicated acceptance of the U.S. statements on the Pueblo's position when captured, or accused North Korea of a planned provocation.

Newspapers generally agreed that the Soviet Union wanted to avoid a confrontation with Washington over the incident, but was treaty-bound to come to the defense of North Korea if it were attacked. Moreover, it was argued, Soviet influence in Pyongyang was limited and Moscow wanted to avoid pushing the North Koreans toward Peking. The liberal Manchester Guardian wrote:

The U.S. appeal to the Soviets to intercede "relies on the obsolete view that the Russians can determine events in other parts of the Communist world, whereas North Korea is increasingly enjoying the status of a free-lance revolutionary, beholden to neither Moscow nor Peking."

Nevertheless, a number of commentators thought that Premier Kosygin's statements in New Delhi over the weekend were "a move to defuse the crisis." The London Times went a step further by suggesting that "the Russians and Chinese may be at one -- behind the scenes -- in looking for a suitable settlement of the Pueblo incident."

The Times also argued that intelligence ships were useful because they provide a de facto system of mutual inspection.

"After years of international argument about the need for inspection in sensitive areas, lest either side should deceive the other, something like a de facto system of mutual inspection is now in being. Vessels like the Pueblo and the Russian 'trawlers' are risky but useful agents of a tacit coexistence."

On January 31, the focus of press attention returned abruptly to Viet-Nam, but editors continued to follow developments in Korea with the apparent hope that a diplomatic solution would be forthcoming soon.

THE WAR IN VIET-NAM

The cleavage in the British press puts the conservative papers in general support of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam and the liberal and labor papers in opposition. A few influential papers are in between, apparently unwilling to take a positive stand one way or the other.

The most consistent and articulate support for all aspects of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam comes from the conservative Daily Telegraph which endorses the bombing of North Viet-Nam and maintains that a bombing pause without reciprocation would be unwise. It also attacks critics of U.S. actions in Viet-Nam. Other publications that strongly support the U.S. are the Economist, the Daily Express, and the Daily Mail.

Uncommitted to a basic pro or con position are the Times, the Sunday Times, and the Financial Times. They discuss aspects of the war. Their treatment of U.S. policy is hedged about with qualifications, though the Sunday Times does call out strongly against the bombing of the north.

The leader of the opposition would seem to be the liberal Guardian, followed by the Daily Mirror, the pro-Labor Sun, the Observer, and the New Statesman.

The Guardian objects to the U.S. military being in Viet-Nam at all, declaring that Asia should be left to the Asians. Consequently, of course, it strongly condemns U.S. bombing. Furthermore, it repeatedly expresses doubt that the U.S. is sincerely interested in peace talks. It said on January 5 that the U.S. may be "impelled to the negotiating table, if not kicking and screaming, at least with the gravest reservations."

U.K. DEFENSE CUTBACKS

The British Government's decision to speed up its military withdrawal east of Suez and to make other major defense spending cuts provoked a sharply divided reaction in the British press.

Disagreement in British Press

Left-of-center papers, which had generally favored deep military cutbacks, applauded Mr. Wilson's "courage" and his recognition "at last" that an economically-weak Britain could no longer afford the luxury of world-power status. Some writers, including those in a few right-center papers, felt the spending cuts were inadequate because they did not, in fact, accomplish the kind of savings necessary to correct the payments deficit.

The conservative-oriented press generally deplored the military cuts, seeing them as a severe blow to Britain's interests and a "betrayal" of its friends and allies. There was little of the resigned acceptance that even critics of the social welfare cuts accorded to those measures.

The uproar over the spending cuts deepened the gloom among media commentators to the point where the London Times remarked on January 18 that "the British people lack confidence in their government and therefore in their future." Moreover, this "crisis of confidence" was compounded by an undertone of regret and frustration evident in press comment.

Much Concern Over U.S. Reaction

The realization that the military pullback was a blow, morally if not materially, to the U.S. at a time when its troops were fighting in Asia prompted considerable concern. U.S. reaction to the U.K. decision was given prominent attention. Correspondents said President Johnson had "great sympathy for Wilson's grave dilemma" but the U.S. resented the timing and extent of the withdrawal.

A major theme in press comment was that the U.K. decision might encourage isolationist tendencies in the U.S. Thus, the conservative Daily Telegraph wrote:

"Many of those who are first to criticize America assume vaguely that Pax Americana will automatically succeed Pax Britannica. But America, left unsupported, would inevitably tend -- especially in an election year -- to become more isolationist."

"Great Strain Placed on America"

The sister Sunday Telegraph called on Britons to take "a sympathetic and constructive interest" in the state of the American Union, saying "there

should be no illusions here about the tremendous strain Europe's withdrawal into isolationism is having on America, not so much materially as morally."

The paper added that Britain "last week made it clear that it no longer has the will to help maintain peace in the world at large. The least its citizens can do is to stop trying to make life difficult for the country that has."

Critics of the military pullback also feared a power vacuum in areas where Soviet influence was growing. But pro-Labor papers argued that there was no alternative to U.K. withdrawal. The Sun declared that Britain "will have to go back on promises to friends and allies ... and we should honestly admit this."

The liberal Manchester Guardian, a frequent critic of U.S. policies, contended that "in the perspective of history, our departure is likely to make better sense than America's involvement in Viet-Nam.... Asia is for the Asians, and the security of the Asian nations is primarily a matter for themselves and the U.N."

"Special Relationship Now Dead?"

In recent months a number of influential papers have carried editorials claiming that the Anglo-American "special relationship" was dead or moribund. Part of the feeling of disaffection can be attributed to passing irritation over various U.S. proposals before Congress which observers said would harm Britain. Moreover, some disclaimers of a continued special relationship were seen as tactical maneuvers to prove to President de Gaulle that the British were "good Europeans" and not subservient to Washington.

Britain Looks More Toward Europe

But editors indicated that the feeling runs deeper, and undoubtedly reflects the growing conviction that Britain's future lies in Europe, albeit a Europe closely allied with the U.S.

The recent defense cutbacks will probably heighten this tendency to look more and more toward Europe for the fulfillment of Britain's still immense political and economic potential. Some observers have argued that in any case U.S.-U.K. ties in recent years have been based more on self-interest than genuine affinity. The Times wrote on January 18:

"The basis of Wilson's foreign policy was an understanding with the U.S. that Britain supported American actions in

Viet-Nam and maintained troops in the Far East in return for a close relationship with the U.S. and American support for the pound. That world commitment has now been dropped; the one element that remains is British support for the U.S. on Viet-Nam. That support is purely diplomatic and probably hypocritical."

Johnson-Wilson Talks Awaited

Despite controversy over the defense cuts, critics and supporters of the Labor Government agreed that stringent measures had to be taken to make Britain solvent. A major trimming of defense expenditures was seen by most media as essential, even though painful to others, especially the U.S.

Nevertheless, the psychological consequences of Britain's retrenchment are still evolving and observers will look to the Johnson-Wilson talks to see what impact the U.K.'s decisive move away from world power status and closer to Europe has had on Anglo-American relations.

Reaction in Other Countries

Media in other countries generally regarded the U.K. decision to speed up its military pullback as an historic turn in British policy. Editorialists proclaimed "the end of an Empire" and "a withdrawal to Europe."

The French press expressed sympathetic understanding for London's economic plight. Several papers said the "retreat" marked the end of the Anglo-U.S. "special relationship" and the beginning of Britain's role as a "European power." They hoped the move would increase British chances of gaining entry to the Common Market.

Some writers in Europe and Asia thought the U.S. must fill the vacuum created by the U.K. pullback. However, a number of papers in Australia, India, Malaysia, and Singapore saw a regional defense system as the best long-term solution.

DEFENSE OF THE DOLLAR

The British press gave cautious approval to the President's balance of payments measures earlier this month, stressing that the action was justified to defend the dollar. Some apprehension was voiced that the measures

would slow down world economic expansion and hurt U.K. efforts to eliminate its payments deficit. But this was tempered by a feeling that others, especially France, would be harder hit. The liberal Sunday Observer remarked that Britain "should come off quite lightly from the President's cuts ..."

In Paris, Gaullist papers attacked the "discriminatory character" of the U.S. restrictions. Gaullist organ Nation contended the fact that Britain "had kept its privileges in relation to American investment" vindicated French policy toward U.K. entry into the EEC.

U.S. DECISION TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEM

British media were critical of the U.S. announcement that it would build a "thin" anti-ballistic missile system. A major theme was that the decision was based more on domestic political rather than on military considerations.

Most commentators expressed concern that the move would initiate a new arms race. Other reasons for concern that the papers gave were: 1) Pressures would build to expand it into a "thick" system to guard against attack from the Soviet Union; 2) the U.S. decision might prejudice the chances of securing an NPT; 3) the decision was bound to emphasize Western Europe's vulnerability to nuclear attack and make it more dependent on the U.S.; 4) the U.S. might have to break the limited test ban treaty, and 5) the U.S. failed to consult its allies on the decision.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Most of the British press strongly supports the proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The reasons given for seeking conclusion of such a pact closely parallel those of the U.S. and British governments.

Observers have welcomed U.S. -Soviet agreement on a draft treaty as a sign that Moscow and Washington can work together despite sharp differences over Viet-Nam.

The liberal Manchester Guardian wrote on January 20:

"A nuclear non-dissemination treaty can achieve much more than merely ban bombs. It can establish precedents in cooperation. More important still, it tends to induce countries which renounce the prospect of nuclear weapons to insist on alternative guarantees for their security."

"That the Russians and the Americans at last reached full agreement on the terms of a treaty is very good news."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13-8

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-263
By ju, NARA, Date 7-2-93

RECENT INDICATIONS OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION
ON ISSUES AFFECTING ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

January 18, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY

I. Confidence In Present Political Leadership

As the time for the February Anglo-American conference approaches President Johnson appears to enjoy a large measure of confidence with the British public as evidenced by predominant expressions of esteem and favorable judgments about his personal qualities.

The British Prime Minister, however, will apparently visit Washington at a time when dissatisfaction with his stewardship outweigh favorable views.

II. General State of Anglo-American Relations

A majority of the British public (54%) feel there is something special about Britain's relationship with America and nearly half (45%) cite the U.S. as Britain's best friend.

There is, however, evidence of some erosion of pro-American sentiment in Great Britain over the past year.

III. NATO and Britain's Role In Defense

The large majority among the British (66%) agree that NATO is still essential for European security and many (52%) attach moderate to great importance to its future political role.

Only a small minority (18%) appear to believe that the U.S. is exerting disproportionate influence in NATO and feel a better balance should be achieved.

However, both cutbacks in military expenditures and precedence of non-military over military spending are supported by the majority of the British public.

This emphasis upon military retrenchment may relate in part to a fundamental shift in British public opinion from pursuing world power status to seeking to emulate countries like Sweden and Switzerland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

And that perhaps a radical downgrading of British defense commitments is going on in the minds of the British public is suggested by a survey which turned up a 63 per cent vote for British non-involvement should a major world crisis with a threat of war arise between the U.S. and the USSR.

A majority of the British support a nuclear non-proliferation agreement but would not go so far as to give up their atom bomb to rely upon the U.S. for their defense.

The idea of a substantial reduction of American troops in Western Europe elicits plurality approval (41%) and only a small minority (16%) expressly oppose such a course.

IV. European Relations and the Common Market

When faced with a fundamental, if perhaps somewhat artificial, choice between Europe and America, the British predominately cast their lot with Europe.

But the sentiment also predominates that Western Europe should develop a close interdependent relationship with the United States.

And in the meantime, a greater proportion of the British would prefer to work more closely rather than less closely with the U.S. on questions of foreign policy and economic policy.

Whatever the British affinity for Europe they have been consistently divided on the merits of applying for membership in the Common Market and in the latest November survey disapproval appears to hold the edge.

In July as many as 69 per cent saw little or no harm to Britain in remaining outside the Common Market, and 71 per cent would approve a government decision not to enter if British terms are not met.

Beyond this, a majority of the British (56%) indicate they would disapprove of entry into the Common Market if it entailed breaking any special relationship with the U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V. Economic Issues

Only a small minority among the British public (19%) had any expectation of the devaluation of the pound and most felt such an action would be harmful.

In consequence, devaluation when it came had a widespread negative impact with 78 per cent judging its effects as bad for them personally, and by lesser margins bad for the country and damaging to British prestige.

But the British appear determined to bear up under the new burdens with 85 per cent agreement to accept any equitable sacrifices and 59 per cent support for a concrete proposal to freeze wages, prices and dividends for a time to give labor and management a chance to think of ways to increase productivity.

On the specific issue of American investments in British industry the majority of the British (54%) judge such investments as beneficial rather than harmful to Britain.

VI. Vietnamese Issues

Though the British predominantly see the Vietnamese conflict as a Communist attack (49%) rather than a civil war (27%), they do not for the most part feel they know what the war is all about and what the Americans are fighting for.

But whatever the degree of understanding of the issues at stake British opposition to U.S. policies in Viet-Nam appears to outweigh support as indicated on three different measures.

VII. Arab-Israeli Issues

Survey soundings at various times since the recent hostilities indicate that the British predominantly sympathize with the Israeli, believe they have behaved well since their victory, and recommend that they keep all or most of the territory they have occupied.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTENTS

Confidence In Present Political Leadership	1
Esteem for President Johnson	1
Satisfaction with Prime Minister Wilson	3
General State of Anglo-American Relations	4
Special Relationship	4
Best Friend	5
Community of Purpose	6
NATO and Britain's Role In Defense	7
Need for NATO	7
Political Role for NATO	8
U.S. Influence in NATO	9
Cutback In Military Expenditures	10
Military Versus Non-Military Expenditures	11
Devaluation of Britain's World Power Status	12
Extent of Neutralist Sentiment	13
Support for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement	14
Willingness to Give Up Atom Bomb	14
Reaction to U.S. Troop Reduction	15
European Relations and the Common Market	16
Europe Versus the U.S.	16
Views About the Common Market	19
U.S. Relations Versus the Common Market	21
Economic Issues	22
Anticipations About Devaluation	22
Reactions to Devaluation	23
Attitude Toward U.S. Investments in Great Britain	25
Vietnamese Issues	26
Awareness of What Viet-Nam Is About	26
Support for U.S. Policies	27
Arab-Israeli Issues	28
Sympathies and Judgments	28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I. Confidence In Present Political Leadership

Esteem for President Johnson ...

As the time for the February Anglo-American conference approaches President Johnson appears to enjoy a predominantly favorable public opinion among the British public as sampled by the British Gallup organization in December 1967.

"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about political leaders in various countries."

<u>Gallup Poll</u> President Johnson of U.S.	
<u>Dec.</u> <u>'67</u> <u>(1000)</u>	
No. of cases	
Very good opinion	13%
Good opinion	40
Neither good nor bad opinion	31
Bad opinion	7
Very bad opinion	2
No opinion	7
	<u>100%</u>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

An earlier survey by National Opinion Polls -- another well-known British survey organization -- suggests that the majority of the British public feel that President Johnson has the kind of qualities which, it may be inferred, would be likely to inspire confidence in him as a participant in any British-American conference.

"Would you say that President Johnson of the United States is or is not (card)---"

<u>National Opinion Polls</u>		
Feb.		
<u>'67</u>		
(1904)		
No. of cases	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No, No answer</u>
Very intelligent	73%	27 .. 100%
A reasonable man	69%	31
Sincere	68%	32
Really concerned about peace	61%	39
Straightforward	61%	39
In touch with ordinary people	53%	47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Satisfaction with Prime Minister Wilson ...

The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, will apparently visit Washington without the full confidence of his constituents. The latest available measurements of British satisfaction with their Prime Minister's stewardship suggest that favorable opinions are currently outweighed by negative views. The hardships associated with the recent British devaluation of the pound are not likely to improve the adverse balance of sentiment.

"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. Harold Wilson as Prime Minister?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>	<u>National Opinion Polls</u>
	Nov.	Dec.
	'67	'67
No. of cases	(1000)	() ¹
Satisfied	41%	46%
Dissatisfied	51	50
No opinion	8	4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

¹ The number of cases in the National Opinion Polls sample is not yet available.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

II. General State of Anglo-American Relations

Special Relationship ...

That there is something especially close about the relationship between Great Britain and the U.S. is a viewpoint held by the majority of the British as measured in a Gallup survey in December of 1966.

"Do you think that Britain has a 'special close relationship' with America or does America have much the same relationship with us as with other leading European countries?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
Dec.	
'66	
No. of cases	(1000)
Special relationship	54%
Same as other countries	32
No opinion	<u>14</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Best Friend ...

The indication that many of the British see something special in their relationship with the U.S. is substantiated by the large plurality who cite the U.S. as Britain's "best friend" among the nations of the world. This point of view, however, has apparently declined somewhat since earlier measured by the British Gallup organization in mid-1967.

"Which country do you regard as Britain's best friend?"

No. of cases	<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
	June	Dec.
	<u>'67</u> (1000)	<u>'67</u> (1000)
America (U.S.)	54%	45%
Australia	14	14
Canada	6	6
France	3	1
Scandinavia	3	3
Holland	1	2
Russia	1	1
West Germany	1	3
Belgium	*	1
Italy	*	*
Switzerland	*	2
India	-	*
Israel	-	*
Japan	-	*
Pakistan	-	*
Other	2	3
No opinion, None	<u>15</u>	<u>23</u> ¹
	100%	104%

¹ Total adds to more than 100 per cent as some respondents named more than one country.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Community of Purpose ...

Further evidence of high standing but also some erosion during 1967 in pro-American sentiments among the British is revealed in trend measurements conducted for USIA by the British Gallup Poll. The trend indication is that appreciably fewer in September than in February were of the view that the basic interests of Great Britain and of the United States are at least fairly well in agreement.

"In your opinion, are the basic interests of our country and each of the following countries very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?" How about the U.S.?

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>		
	Feb. '67	May '67	Sept. '67
No. of cases	(1001)	(992)	(978)
Very much in agreement	27%	22%	13%
Fairly well in agreement	46	50	50
Rather different	11	14	17
Very different	3	4	5
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>
	100%	100%	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

III. NATO and Britain's Role in Defense

Need for NATO . . .

When questioned by British Gallup in February of last year the large majority of the British public agreed that NATO was still essential for European security.

"Some people say that the Soviet Union no longer poses a serious military threat to Western Europe and therefore there is no longer much need for NATO. Others disagree and say that NATO is still essential for West European security. Which of these views is closer to your opinion?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>
	Feb. '67 <u>(1001)</u>
No. of cases	
No longer need for NATO	14%
NATO still essential	66
Never required	2
No opinion	<u>18</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Political Role for NATO ...

By nearly a two-to-one margin the British feel that NATO is likely to become important as a political organization in coming years. However, opinion divides on whether this importance is likely to be great or only moderate.

"Regardless of how you feel about the military aspect of NATO, how about NATO as a political organization? Do you feel that NATO will be of great importance, moderate importance, or little or no importance as a political organization in the coming years?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
	Feb.	
No. of cases	'67	(1001)
Great Importance	25%	
Moderate Importance	27	
Little or no Importance	27	
No opinion	<u>21</u>	
	100%	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. Influence in NATO ...

The idea that the U.S. exerts too much influence in NATO receives no great echo among the British with only 27 per cent concurring in such a viewpoint. Of these only 18 per cent indicated in further questioning that they felt a better balance should be achieved.

"Do you believe that U.S. influence in NATO is too great, too little, or about right at the present time?"

No. of cases	<u>Gallup Poll</u>
	Feb. '67 (1001)
Too great	27%
Too little	5
About right	43
No opinion	<u>25</u>
	100%

"Do you think that this is an inevitable result of America's preponderant military strength or do you think that a better balance of influence should be achieved?" (Asked of those who said "Too great" above)

Inevitable result of American strength	6%
Better balance should be achieved	18
No opinion	<u>3</u>
	27%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cutback in Military Expenditures ...

A series of questions posed in a March 1967 survey by the British Gallup poll suggest that cutbacks in military expenditures are supported by a majority of the British public. The greatest support is for cutting the cost of the British army in Germany, followed by cutting military demands east of Suez, and finally general defense reductions, including atomic weapons.

"Do you think that Britain should or should not cut back expenditures on military demands east of Suez? On the cost of the Army in Germany? On defense generally, including atomic weapons?"

		<u>Gallup Poll</u>
		Mar.
		'67
		(1000)
No. of cases		
<u>Military demands east of Suez</u>		
Should		58%
Should not		20
No opinion		<u>22</u>
		100%
<u>Cost of the Army in Germany</u>		
Should		65%
Should not		18
No opinion		<u>17</u>
		100%
<u>Defense generally, including</u> <u>atomic weapons</u>		
Should		54%
Should not		29
No opinion		<u>17</u>
		100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Military Versus Non-Military Expenditures ...

The same widespread support for reduction in military expenditures is evident in a July Gallup survey which shows that for the large majority of the British defense funds are to be cut before non-military expenditures. The majority also voice the view that cuts in defense should take precedence over any increase in taxes.

"If the Government were faced with having to cut defense or cut education, which should be cut?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>
	July '67 <u>(1000)</u>
No. of cases	
Defense	70%
Education	14
No opinion	<u>16</u>
	100%

"If the Government were faced with having to cut defense or cut health services, which should be cut?"

Defense	71%
Health services	15
No opinion	<u>14</u>
	100%

"If the Government were faced with the alternative of having further cuts in defense or to raise taxes, what should it do?"

Cuts in defense	61%
Raise taxes	18
No opinion	<u>21</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Devaluation of Britain's World Power Status ...

British emphasis upon retrenchment in military expenditures may relate in part to what appears to be a fundamental shift in British opinion as to what status Britain should strive to attain among the nations of the world. In 1964 and 1965 the predominant viewpoint was that Britain should try to be a leading world power. But a Gallup survey in August of 1967 revealed a switch in opinion with the sentiment now predominating that Britain should try to be more like Sweden and Switzerland.

"Do you think it is important for this country to try to be a leading world power, or would you like to see us be more like Sweden and Switzerland?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>			
	Jan. '64	Feb. '65	May '66	Aug. '67
No. of cases	(1000)	(1000)	(1000)	(1000)
Be world power	51%	55%	46%	34%
More like Sweden and Switzerland	32	26	40	50
No opinion	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Extent of Neutralist Sentiment ...

That perhaps a rather radical downgrading of British defense commitments is going on in the minds of the British public is suggested by the results of a July 1967 sampling by the Opinion Research Centre, an organization that conducts surveys for the British Sunday Times. The extent of British neutralism indicated by the results below provides no little food for thought:

"If there was a major world crisis and a threat of war between Russia and America, do you think Britain should help and support the United States or just make sure we do not get involved?"

	<u>Opinion Research Centre</u>
	July
	'67
	() ¹
Help and support U.S.A.	28%
Make sure we don't get	
involved	63
No opinion	<u>9</u>
	100%

It would be premature, of course, to draw conclusions on so serious a matter on the basis of this one survey indication. But if verified in further surveys it would seem to point to no small problem in British defense morale.

¹ The number of cases in the Opinion Research Centre sample is not yet available.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Support for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement ...

Since Britain is already a member of the Nuclear Club it is perhaps not surprising that a majority among the British support a non-proliferation agreement.

"As you may know, the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries are considering an agreement that would prohibit the development of nuclear weapons by countries which do not now have them. Do you think that such an agreement would be a good thing or a bad thing for Britain?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>
	May '67 (1000)
No. of cases	
A good thing	61%
A bad thing	16
No opinion	<u>23</u>
	100%

Willingness to Give Up Atom Bomb ...

However much the British wish to reduce their defense costs the large majority would not approve of giving up their atom bomb to rely on the U.S. for their defense.

"A prominent American official has said in this country that we should give up our atom bomb and rely on the U.S.A. for our defense. Would you approve or disapprove if we gave up our atom bomb?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>
	May '67 (1000)
No. of cases	
Approve	19%
Disapprove	69
No opinion	<u>12</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reaction to U.S. Troop Reduction ...

Apparently the British people are not thinking of U.S. troops in Europe as an offset to their own planned defense reductions. Asked by the Gallup poll in May about their reaction to a substantial reduction of American troops in Western Europe the plurality sentiment was in favor and as many as a quarter indicated that they didn't care much one way or the other.

"During the past year there has been talk in the United States about making a substantial reduction in the number of American troops stationed in Western Europe. Would you personally favor such a reduction, oppose it, or don't you care much one way or the other?"

No. of cases	Gallup Poll
	May '67 <u>(992)</u>
Favor	41%
Oppose	16
Don't care much	26
No opinion	<u>17</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IV. European Relations and the Common Market

Europe Versus the U.S. ...

When faced with a fundamental, if perhaps somewhat artificial, choice between Europe and America the British predominantly cast their lot with Europe.

"If Britain has to join with other countries in order that she may hold her place in the world, would you rather see her join with America or with Europe?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
	May '67	
No. of cases	(1000)	
With America	29%	
With Europe	46	
With neither		
No opinion	<u>25</u>	
	100%	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

But at the same time the preponderant sentiment is that Western Europe should develop a close interdependent relationship with the United States and thereby become a partner in a larger and stronger community of nations.

"Some people say that a close interdependent relationship between the United States and Western Europe benefits Western Europe by making it a partner in a larger and stronger community of nations.

Others say that a close interdependent relationship between the United States and Western Europe harms Western Europe because it will lead to U.S. domination of Western Europe."

Which of these two views is closest to your own?

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>
	Sept. '67
No. of cases	(978)
Benefits West Europe	48%
Harms West Europe	20
No opinion	<u>32</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

And in the meantime a greater proportion of the British would prefer to work more closely than less closely with the U. S. on questions of foreign policy and economic policy.

"Do you think that Britain should work more closely or less closely with the U.S.A. than it is at present on questions of foreign policy? On economic policy?"

No. of cases	<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
	<u>Foreign policy</u>	<u>Economic policy</u>
	May '67 <u>(1000)</u>	May '67 <u>(1000)</u>
More closely	36%	35%
As at present	21	19
Less closely	22	21
No opinion	<u>21</u>	<u>25</u>
	100%	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Views about the Common Market ...

Whatever the British affinity for Europe they evidence something less than enchantment with the European Common Market. In a series of trend surveys by the British Gallup Institute reactions to British application for membership have been close to evenly divided and in the most recent November survey disapproval appears to hold an edge.

"Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for membership of the European Common Market?"

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>				
	May '67	June '67	Sept. '67	Oct. '67	Nov. '67
No. of cases	(1000)	(1000)	(1000)	(1000)	(1000)
Approve	36%	40%	40%	46%	37%
Disapprove	41	45	41	34	44
No opinion	<u>23</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>19</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Some of the negative British reactions may, of course, be sour grapes in the face of French inhospitality. But whatever the motives at work 69 per cent of the British see little or no harm to Britain in remaining outside the Common Market, and 71 per cent indicate they would approve a decision to remain outside the Market if British terms are not met.

"How much harm will it do to Britain if we do not succeed in getting into the European Common Market -- a lot, a little, or none at all?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
<u>July</u>	
<u>'67</u>	
No. of cases	<u>(1000)</u>
Lot	16%
Little	31
None at all	38
No opinion	<u>15</u>
	100%

"If the British Government cannot get the terms they want and decide not to enter the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove of the Government's decision?"

Approve	71%
Disapprove	11
No opinion	<u>18</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. Relations Versus the Common Market ...

In the light of these less than enthusiastic evaluations of the Common Market it can now be understood that though the British show some general affinity for Europe over America (page 16), they are not necessarily willing to sacrifice their special relationship with the U.S. as a condition for entering the Common Market. In fact, the majority would disapprove of such a course.

"To get into the Common Market, Britain may have to do certain things. I would like to ask you about them, first whether you would approve or disapprove if we would have to break any special relationship we have with the USA?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
May	
<u>'67</u>	
No. of cases	(1000)
Approve	25%
Disapprove	56
No opinion	<u>19</u>
	100%

On the further query of joining the Common Market versus closer association with America, British public opinion appears to be at a standoff.

"If you had to choose between entering the Common Market, or closer association with America, which would you choose?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
July	
<u>'67</u>	
No. of cases	(1000)
Common Market	42%
America	40
No opinion	<u>18</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V. Economic Issues

Anticipations About Devaluation ...

It is too soon to look for British public opinion indications on any Anglo-American issues that might derive from the recent devaluation of the pound. But in any case it should be appreciated that the devaluation was a blow that as late as October, a Gallup Poll indicates, the British public did not expect for the most part and widely felt would be harmful if instituted.

"Some people say that sooner or later Britain will have to devalue the pound. Do you think Britain will have to devalue or can it be avoided?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
Oct.	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
Will have to devalue	19%
Can be avoided	48
No opinion	<u>33</u>
	100%

"Do you think that people like yourself would suffer if Britain devalued the pound, or wouldn't it make any difference to you?"

Would suffer	64%
No difference	17
No opinion	<u>19</u>
	100%

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reactions to Devaluation ...

Sampled by the Opinion Research Centre in November after the devaluation announcement the British by a large margin saw the devaluation as bad for them personally and by a lesser margin bad for the country and damaging for British prestige.

Do you think devaluation will be good or bad for you personally?¹

<u>Opinion Research Centre</u>	
Nov.	
*67	
No. of cases	() ¹
Good	5%
Bad	78
No opinion	<u>17</u>
	100%

"Do you think devaluation will be good or bad for Britain?"

Good	29%
Bad	46
No opinion	<u>25</u>
	100%

How much has devaluation damaged British prestige?¹

A great deal	27%
Quite a lot	30
Not much	23
None	8
No opinion	<u>12</u>
	100%

¹ The precise wording of these two questions has not yet been ascertained nor the number of cases in the Opinion Research Centre sample.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

But that the British are determined to bear up under the new burdens seems indicated by a widespread expression of willingness to make sacrifices to help to get the country back on its feet. Tested in more concrete terms a majority of 59 per cent expressed support for a freeze on wages, prices, and dividends for a time during which unions and management could get together to think of ways of increasing productivity.

"Would you personally be prepared to make sacrifices to help get the country on its feet if everybody else did so as well?"

Opinion Research Centre

	Nov.
	'67 ¹
No. of cases	() ¹
Yes	85%
No	7
No opinion	8
	<u>100%</u>

"One suggestion for getting us out of our difficulties is that there should be a freeze on wages, prices and dividends for a limited period of time, during which unions and management should get together to make productivity deals. Do you think this is a good idea or not?"

Good idea	59%
Not a good idea	22
No opinion	19
	<u>100%</u>

¹ The number of cases in the Opinion Research Centre sample is not yet available.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attitude Toward U.S. Investments In Great Britain

On a question that relates in part to the general problem of devaluation, and the measures the U.S. may take to remedy its own balance of payments difficulties, the majority of the British expressed a favorable opinion. Sampled in May, 54 per cent among the British voiced the opinion that by and large U.S. investments in British business benefits Great Britain.

"Now a question about investments by U.S. business firms in Britain. Is it your opinion that, by and large, such investment by U.S. business benefits our country or harms our country?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
May	
*67	
No. of cases	(992)
Benefits	54%
Harms	18
Little effect (Vol.)	6
No opinion	<u>22</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VI. Vietnamese Issues

Awareness of What Viet-Nam Is About ...

Surveyed in February of 1967 by the British Gallup Poll the largest proportion of the British sampled (49%) said they saw the war in Viet-Nam as primarily a Communist attack rather than a civil war (27%). However, queried in July, 52 per cent stated they had no clear idea of what the Viet-Nam war was all about and what the Americans were fighting for.

"Some people see the war in Viet-Nam primarily as a Communist attack on South Viet-Nam; others see it primarily as a civil war. How about you? Which of these two views comes closest to your opinion?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
Feb.	
'67	
No. of cases	(1001)
Communist attack	49%
Civil war	27
Both	7
Neither	3
No opinion	<u>14</u>
	100%

"Do you feel that you have a clear idea of what the Viet-Nam war is all about, that is, what the Americans are fighting for?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
July	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
Yes	35%
No, do not	52
No opinion	<u>13</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Support for U.S. Policies ...

But whatever their degree of understanding of the issues at stake in Viet-Nam, British opposition appears to outweigh support of U.S. policies in the conflict. This is shown on three different measures below, and is particularly overwhelming to any idea of sending British troops to help out the South Vietnamese in the conflict.

"Is Britain right or wrong to continue its support of American policy in Viet-Nam?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
Oct.	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
Right	34%
Wrong	45
No opinion	<u>21</u>
	100%

"Just from what you have heard or read, which one of these statements comes closest to the way you yourself feel about the U.S. war in Viet-Nam?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
June	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
U.S. should:	
Begin to withdraw its troops	45%
Carry on present level of fighting	15
Increase strength of attacks against North Viet-Nam	15
No opinion	<u>25</u>
	100%

"Would you approve or disapprove if the Government were to send troops to fight alongside the South Vietnamese in Viet-Nam?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
Nov.	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
Approve	7%
Disapprove	82
No opinion	<u>11</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VII. Arab-Israeli Issues

Sympathies and Judgments ...

Survey measurements taken by the British Gallup organization at various times since the Arab-Israeli flareup indicate that the British predominantly sympathize with the Israeli, believe that they have behaved well since their victory, and recommend that they keep all or most of the territory they have occupied.

"Who are your sympathies with in the present Middle East dispute: Israel or Egypt and other Arab countries?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
June	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
Israel	59%
Egypt	4
Neither	22
No opinion	15
	100%

"Do you think that Israel has behaved well or behaved badly since their victory?"

<u>Gallup Poll</u>	
Sept.	
'67	
No. of cases	(1000)
Well	42%
Badly	18
No opinion	40
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Do you think the Israelis should withdraw to their original frontier; return most of the Arab territory it now occupies but retain some of the territory like Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip; or keep hold of all or most of the territory they have taken over?"

Gallup Poll

No. of cases	Nov. #67 (1000)
Withdraw	13%
Return most of the Arab territory it now occupies	21
Keep hold of all or most of the territory	44
No opinion	<u>22</u>
	100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW ✓
ED FRIED

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Wilson and the Persian Gulf

I have refrained during previous Wilson visits from pressing any of my concerns because I realize that higher priority items are on the agenda for these talks. However, this time I would like to make a plea for one sentence in your Memorandum for the President on the Persian Gulf. I should imagine this would not distort the agenda you are planning since it is part of the larger subject of British retrenchment.

The point I would like to see the President make is: We hope the British will retain a substantial political position in the Persian Gulf and not dismantle its present network of political posts and treaties.

Our reasoning is that the British, even if they may have to pull their troops out, can still do a lot to encourage new political and economic relationships in the Gulf. They have the influence and the experience where we do not.

I also want to strike one note of caution. I understand that the following sentence now appears in the Secretary's Memo to the President: "The President may want to urge the Prime Minister to insure that the UK Government does everything possible to promote regional security arrangements in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf." If you haven't seen the reaction to Gene Rostow's offhand comment in a BBC interview about new security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, you ought to know that this got every major country in the region up in arms against us. The fact is that we have no intention of participating and want to make this clear. Any equation of Persian Gulf and security arrangements in Southeast Asia will do more harm than good, although we obviously want the nations of the Persian Gulf to unite ^{on their own initiative} in a variety of ways to ward off Soviet penetration.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-266
By ais, NARA Date 8-15-97


Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR

WALT ROSTOW

FROM:

MIKE MANATOS *mm*

The attached speech from Senator Javits on U.S. - British relations is forwarded for your information. I have acknowledged receipt to the Senator.

Original sent to Central Files 2/20/68

January 29, 1968

Dear Senator:

Thank you for your letter of January 25 to the President enclosing a copy of your recent Senate speech on the need for United States and the United Kingdom to act harmoniously for mutual benefit.

We are glad to have the benefit of your views and I am sure the President will be most appreciative.

Sincerely,

Mike Manatos
Administrative Assistant
to the President

Honorable Jacob K. Javits
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

fs/jf

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 25, 1968

My dear Mr. President:

As you may know I have long been concerned about the United Kingdom's economic difficulties especially as they effect the strength of the Western alliance and have made a number of speeches in the Senate and in London in the past two years suggesting some steps that both the United States and Britain could take to meet the problem. I am enclosing for your information a copy of a speech I made in the Senate yesterday.

I hope that you will give these views your every consideration in the forthcoming talks with Prime Minister Wilson.

With warm regards to you and Mrs. Johnson in which Mrs. Javits joins, believe me,

Sincerely,

Jacob K. Javits

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

From the Office of:

SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS (R-NY)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
WEDNESDAY January 24, 1968

The following are the remarks of Senator Jacob K. Javits prepared for delivery in the Senate, Wednesday, January 24, 1968.

AMERICA'S STAKE IN BRITAIN'S FUTURE

It was my good fortune to be present in the gallery of the House of Commons on Tuesday, January 16, when Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the new austerity measures which bring to an end Britain's centuries old role as a world power East of Suez. It was a sad occasion---especially as Britain has long since given up any imperial role---and an occasion for dismay. The sadness arose from a deep sympathy for a great nation and a great people now in difficult circumstances. The dismay arose even more strongly from a realization that Britain's forced retreat inevitably brings on consideration of heavy new burdens for the United States--and at a time when our people are already uneasy over the dimensions of the burden we are now carrying.

In a larger sense, however, I am not convinced that there was any inexorable inevitability about the British pull-out East of Suez. Even more important, I do not believe that the United States must or can sit by and watch the further liquidation of such a major free world strength as Britain's.

Our policy makers for some time have recognized the premium value of Britain's continued role as a power East of Suez. This realization prompted the United States time and again to encourage Britain to carry on---in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, in Southeast Asia and in the Far East. Our urgings generally were agreed to. While they were well motivated, it is clear in retrospect that we did not make enough provision for the consequences of what we were asking. Rather, as is too often the case, our policy makers were under the pressures of immediate crises most of the time. To be sure, we often extended financial credits and other assistance designed to help to carry some of the continued burden which Britain could no longer sustain. But, debts have to be repaid and economically the net effect was to blur the real implications of what was urged upon our great ally and thus to make the inevitable day of reckoning considerably more cruel and arbitrary than it should have been.

There is not much to be gained in raking over the coals of the past. The task now is to face the future and to lay definite plans for making the most of the possibilities inherent in the situation.

To put matters bluntly, if the situation is allowed to continue to deteriorate Britain could end up on the perilous rocks of grave financial stringency. Leaving sentiment aside, there is no question that the United States may pay dearly in the most practical monetary and strategic terms if such a folly and such a catastrophe is permitted to happen.

Unless some decisive measures are taken there is a real prospect of further drift and deterioration in Britain's over-all position. Stripped of its empire and excluded from the Common Market, Britain cannot carry on a major role from a position of economic isolation.

In assessing the situation which now confronts us, it is essential to bear in mind the fact that the post war arrangements

more

in Europe assume and depend upon Britain being a major power there. Should financial stringencies compel Britain to withdraw from its military and political commitments in Germany and Berlin--the most unsettling and dangerous consequences could ensue. Present arrangements, which provide at least some stability, could rapidly come undone and bring on a volatile and potentially explosive situation in central Europe.

This prospect is certainly one which should give pause to the leaders of France, and to the leaders of all western European nations. A sober realization that nothing less than the stability of Europe is involved in Britain's well being and financial situation should be the common platform from which the Atlantic community proceeds. Nor can central Europe and the USSR be unconcerned--dislocation of the status quo in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin abruptly and in response to financial stringency, could create grave problems and tension for them too.

I wish to reiterate here that we are dealing with considerations of the most direct and important self interest. It is not sentiment which compels us to be gravely concerned over Britain's plight, although sentiment is certainly there is generous measure.

The mood of Britain, as I sensed it, is depressed and confused. There is a sense of real grievance, mingled with frustration together with an understandable urge to escape into the swinging world of mini-skirts and 'little England'.

In view of the buffeting it has taken---without any real rest after the exertions and exhaustion of two world wars---it is not surprising that Britain seems almost dispirited at the present moment of travail and trial.

Britain did not have the benefit of the Marshal Plan with the modernization of plant which resulted particularly in West Germany, France and Italy. On the contrary, Britain suffered the drain of terrible losses--material and human--in World Wars I and II, and carried a heavy share of the burden of responsibility in the post war world, further seriously draining its resources. It seems to be widely accepted among the British people themselves, whether Labor or Tory that Britain must take major steps to deal with the grave danger of the erosion of British energies.

The figures, fiscal and monetary, in trade, in productivity and even in technology and innovation (in which Britain still remains ahead of most Continental European countries) are still not encouraging. By every measure Britain seems to have reached a cross-roads in its national life. British business and industry need modernization in machinery, techniques, manpower and competitive spirit. The problems of investment required for sustained economic growth, and the balancing of such growth with schemes of welfare, health and education, is a further grave problem.

Britain is still altogether too vital to the world for us to leave her willingly in this condition. It would be most desirable and helpful if Britain's own leaders told the world what they need and how they would use it. In the world's own interest this is no time for reserve or diffidence. There are important things which others---and most specifically the US---can and ought to do. It will take big measures which deal with basic factors to reverse the present downward drift.

I would like to suggest some measures for consideration and urge Britain's government to express itself frankly on this subject. Prime Minister Wilson is expected in Washington in early February. His presence here can mark a truly new beginning for us all.

more

Specifically I suggest the following for consideration:

1) Now that the application for even negotiations on Britain's entry into the European Common Market has been vetoed by France, it is only right to give full examination to a proposal for an Industrial Free Trade Area as an alternative to Britain's joining the EEC. IFTA would create a single competitive market among the US, Canada, and other industrialized countries of the West--some from the European Free Trade Association, some from the Commonwealth, and including Japan, if it so desires. IFTA would gradually lower tariffs and trade barriers on manufactured goods and raw materials over a 15 to 20 year period and would bring substantially free trade within this area.

Special arrangements could also be made to assure access to this market by developing countries with particular reference to the newly developing Latin American Common Market. Distinguished teams of economists are preparing a report on this proposal in the US, the United Kingdom and Canada. In the US the team is headed by Professor Thomas Franck, Director of the Center for International Studies of New York University; in Britain where a preliminary report has already been issued by the Atlantic Trade Study Group under the direction of Sir Michael Wright and Maxwell Stamp; and in Canada by Professor Theodore English. IFTA would free Britain of many of the obsessions of restraint incident to its present position and might also have a salutary effect on the European Common Market and enable it to reject the counsel of those who would make it an exclusive trade grouping rather than an effective part of a more liberal world trading system.

2) Britain must be refinanced on a sound and long term footing. Half measures designed to shore up Britain's balance of payments problems will accomplish little over the long run. What is needed is a modernization fund designed to modernize and rationalize Britain's industry.

Specifically, I would propose a twenty-year, ten billion dollar modernization fund to be established jointly by the United States and Western Europe including the Common Market nations. It would be a prudent investment of the great Atlantic partners in the future of a major element in what inevitably may be the joint prosperity and safety of the western world.

Many will say that neither the United States nor the nations of Western Europe are in the position or mood to undertake to finance such a major investment primarily in the United Kingdom. This is undoubtedly the prevailing mood. The United States is in a difficult budgetary situation and European nations have thus far been unwilling to override France's refusal to include Britain into Europe.

Standing alone, a modernization fund for Britain does not constitute the answer to Britain's problems or is it a new or more realistic US policy towards Europe. There is much that Britain must do herself first domestically and demonstrate that it has the will and the leadership to do at home what is necessary to achieve a brighter future and to be in a position to play a significant role in world affairs. But I feel that the Western world is in dire need of a new grand strategy involving new relationships within Europe and between Europe and the United States and what I am proposing here should be an element of this new policy.

more

The United States for its own part should begin to reassess the adequacy of its policy towards Europe in the political, economic and military fields. I would like to think that discussion and debate on our European policy could begin with our relationship to Britain---with the concept I am suggesting here---and how we can most effectively strengthen it. Interestingly, during my recent conversations in Western Europe, on a purely informal basis, I solicited reaction to a modernization fund and encountered few objections to the basic idea, either as regards desirability or feasibility.

In addition, I suggest the establishment of an Atlantic Projects Authority including the US, Britain and Canada with the addition of other appropriate nations which choose to join to develop and finance projects based on new technologies in electronics space, computers, air and water pollution, housing construction and similar matters with the necessary research and development to back them up. This could represent an excellent way to use the modernization fund and benefit all the participants. And as a corollary, I suggest the establishment of an Atlantic Technological Community to handle the research and development aspects of this project.

3) As a contribution to its economic recovery Britain should be assisted by the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development with the problems associated with the more volatile elements in the official sterling balances around the world and with the necessity to stretch out over the next 15 to 20 years some part of the short term British indebtedness. The United Kingdom's gross external liabilities in sterling are estimated about \$15 billion or roughly 6½ billion pounds. This includes indebtedness of the United Kingdom to the IMF due in 1970, as well as private sterling holdings, official holdings of non-sterling countries, holdings of international organizations and the \$1.7 billion holdings of central monetary institution of overseas sterling countries which often contribute to sterling instability. It is somewhat offset by UK ownership of stocks and bonds. It is estimated roughly that up to \$5 billion would be involved in any funding operations to ease the existing United Kingdom sterling balance burden on a selective basis. Standing alone, this would be a questionable enterprise but as part of an overall plan the basic elements of which are discussed above, it would be indispensable. Therefore, it should properly be a part of the major items for consideration which I have outlined.

It would certainly be improper for me or anyone similarly situated to deal with the internal factors, governmental and private, which have brought Britain to this pass. But, the courage, the heroism and the elevated character of the British people must in the interest of all mankind be given the opportunity to assert themselves.

Many will ask how we can afford to participate in so great a venture considering our own troubles with the international balance of payments. To those I would say we cannot afford to fail to participate for the consequences would be infinitely more costly in the prospects for peace and world stability as well as in money---and that we will find the way. Let us never forget Winston Churchill's example, when in 1940, in Britain's darkest hour he sent one of the best armored divisions to North Africa, a decision which kept open an option to be used when the US entered the struggle. The absence of that option in 1943 could

more

very well have materially extended the war and perhaps jeopardize the victory. What I am suggesting is an act of courage of much less magnitude, and only a part of what we in the world owe as an opportunity to the British people.

Call it an International Marshall Plan for Britain if you will---the British people have earned the opportunity to do something with it; Britain needs it and the rest of the free world needs a strong Britain.

####



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

360

1-7-68
2-11-68
16

IN REPLY REFER TO: 1297

January 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Toast for the President's
February 8 Dinner for Prime Minister
and Mrs. Wilson

Enclosed for White House consideration is a
proposed toast for the President's dinner in honor
of Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed Toast

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 JAN 25 PM 3 07

Proposed Toast for President's Dinner for Prime Minister
and Mrs. Wilson, February 8, 1968

Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is, as always, a great pleasure for Mrs. Johnson and for me to have you and Mrs. Wilson with us here in Washington. Thanks to the geographical advantage Washington enjoys it can offer you a warmer welcome at this time of year, Mr. Prime Minister, than you may have experienced elsewhere in your recent travels. But of course we do not rely on fickle weather alone. We reinforce our welcome with the cordiality of long years of friendship between our two peoples. This, I must admit, has not always been the case. In the early days of this Republic the cry "The British are coming" led our ancestors to reach for their muskets rather than their hospitality.

In the many talks we have had, Mr. Prime Minister, there has always been a diversity of crises confronting us. But we have had to support us the common dedication of our two peoples to liberty and the rule of law, and a

common understanding of the goals both our countries have sought since World War II. These goals, pursued with patience and unflagging hope, can be summarized in a few words. The first is peace--a lasting peace--on terms that are safe for free institutions. The second is the social and material advance of our peoples and of mankind generally. These are also the goals, we believe, of a great majority of the nations of this earth, old and new, rich or poor. The highest promises of the technological revolution still lie before us. While the realities of poverty, of hunger and of disease are all too present, mankind now has the potential and, we devoutly hope, the will to vanquish these evils, to see the dawn of a new day.

In the 20th Century, Mr. Prime Minister, Britain has added another chapter to its long history. From its former Empire has emerged a legion of independent countries to join the council of nations. The current economic difficulties which Britain is experiencing obscure but do not obliterate the responsibilities which it has to share in the efforts of the new states to achieve a better life.

Remembering the tested valor of the British people

and the character they have always displayed I am certain, Mr. Prime Minister, that, however altered its role, Britain will continue to contribute its share morally and materially to making this world a better and safer dwelling for future generations.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Wilson, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I propose a toast to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth.

January 12, 1968

Walt:

This reflects discussion in yesterday's meeting as modified by your comments in staff meeting.

Mike Glitman has approved it for Ed Fried. I have discussed it with Jim Jones who favors the recommendations in the memo.

Dick Moose

cc: Fried

S/S + Bee
adell

maquie
informed
1/12/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 12, 1968

17a

FROM: W. W. Rostow

FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFO: Jim Jones

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Oct, NARA, Date 9-17-90

Following our planning meeting in preparation for Harold Wilson's visit, Feb 8-9, we need guidance from you on some aspects of the visit. We believe the format of the visit should be fairly informal and low key, while bearing in mind Wilson's desire for visibility to his electorate. (This is entirely appropriate in view of the fact that only last June you received Wilson with full honors, remarks, black tie dinner, etc.).

As now projected, the Prime Minister's arrival would be informal -- no military honors or remarks. This would take place on Thursday, Feb 8 at about 11:30 AM, followed by an hour and a half private meeting. Is this agreeable to you?

Yes ✓ No

Should this meeting be followed by a luncheon, or would you rather give a dinner for Wilson that evening? If you opt for a luncheon -- which I recommend -- you would have a choice of formats. I suggest a small luncheon with a guest list of about 40. (Mrs. Wilson probably will not accompany the Prime Minister, in which case, invitations would be on a stag basis). Would you indicate your preference:

Luncheon as described above

Smaller working luncheon

Large luncheon (guest list of 140)

Dinner ✓

The question of a possible second meeting turns to some degree on your preference for lunch vs. dinner. If you opt for a luncheon, I would suggest scheduling a brief second meeting on Friday, Feb 9 at 11:30 AM. Without this, your participation in Wilson's "visit" would be rather brief -- back-to-back meeting and lunch -- completed within three hours the first day. While this would be the easier course for you, it probably would fall somewhat short of what Wilson needs by way of exposure.

On the other hand, if you have a dinner for Wilson, there would be less need to schedule a second meeting. In any event, we could always reserve time for a brief second meeting and wait until nearer the time of the visit before making a final decision.

Schedule a brief second meeting ~~XXXX~~

Reserve time for second meeting (but make no commitment) ✓

18
CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCEEAD72
OO WTE10
DE WTE 349

Received Washington CommCen
1:22 P.M. EST Friday 12 Jan 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
1:04 P.M. CST Friday 12 Jan 68

(F)
FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
INFO: JIM JONES
CITE: CAP80310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

FOLLOWING OUR PLANNING MEETING IN PREPARATION FOR HAROLD WILSON'S VISIT, FEB 8-9, WE NEED GUIDANCE FROM YOU ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE VISIT. WE BELIEVE THE FORMAT OF THE VISIT SHOULD BE FAIRLY INFORMAL AND LOW KEY, WHILE BEARING IN MIND WILSON'S DESIRE FOR VISIBILITY TO HIS ELECTORATE. (THIS IS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT ONLY LAST JUNE YOU RECEIVED WILSON WITH FULL HONORS, REMARKS, BLACK TIE DINNER, ETC.). IN THE LIGHT OF FORTHCOMING UNPLEASANT U.K. DECISIONS, THIS IS NOT A GOOD TIME FOR A DRAMATIC VISIT.

AS NOW PROJECTED, THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL WOULD BE INFORMAL - NO MILITARY HONORS OR REMARKS. THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THURSDAY, FEB 8 AT ABOUT 11:30 A.M., FOLLOWED BY AN HOUR AND A HALF PRIVATE MEETING. IS THIS AGREEABLE TO YOU?

YES.....

NO.....

SHOULD THIS MEETING BE FOLLOWED BY A LUNCHEON, OR WOULD YOU RATHER GIVE A DINNER FOR WILSON THAT EVENING? IF YOU OPT FOR A LUNCHEON - WHICH I RECOMMEND - YOU WOULD HAVE A CHOICE OF FORMATS. I SURGEST A SMALL LUNCHEON WITH A GUEST LIST OF ABOUT 40. (MRS. WILSON PROBABLY WILL ACCOMPANY THE PRIME MINISTER.) WOULD YOU INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988

By D40, NARA, Date 9-17-90

LUNCHEON AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.....

SMALLER WORKING LUNCHEON.....

LARGE LUNCHEON (GUEST LIST OF 140).....

DINNER.....

THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE SECOND MEETING TURNS TO SOME DEGREE ON YOUR PREFERENCE FOR LUNCH VS. DINNER. IF YOU OPT FOR A LUNCHEON, I WOULD SUGGEST SCHEDULING A BRIEF SECOND MEETING ON FRIDAY, FEB 9 AT 11:30 AM. WITHOUT THIS, YOUR PARTICIPATION IN WILSON'S "VISIT" WOULD BE RATHER BRIEF - BACK-TO-BACK MEETING AND LUNCH -- COMPLETED WITHIN THREE HOURS THE FIRST DAY. WHILE THIS WOULD BE THE EASIER COURSE FOR YOU, IT PROBABLY WOULD FALL SOMEWHAT SHORT OF WHAT WILSON NEEDS BY WAY OF EXPOSURE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU HAVE A DINNER FOR WILSON, THERE WOULD BE LESS NEED TO SCHEDULE A SECOND MEETING. IN ANY EVENT, WE COULD ALWAYS RESERVE TIME FOR A BRIEF SECOND MEETING AND WAIT UNTIL NEARER THE TIME OF THE VISIT BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION.

SCHEDULE A BRIEF SECOND MEETING.....

RESERVE TIME FOR SECOND MEETING (BUT MAKE NO COMMITMENT).....

DTG: 121802Z JAN 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House, Confidential, Feb. 24, 1983

By DCM, NARA, Date 7-17-94 January 12, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: W. W. Rostow

FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFO: Jim Jones

Following our planning meeting in preparation for Harold Wilson's visit, Feb 8-9, we need guidance from you on some aspects of the visit. We believe the format of the visit should be fairly informal and low key, while bearing in mind Wilson's desire for visibility to his electorate. (This is entirely appropriate in view of the fact that only last June you received Wilson with full honors, remarks, black tie dinner, etc.).

As now projected, the Prime Minister's arrival would be informal -- no military honors or remarks. This would take place on Thursday, Feb 8 at about 11:30 AM, followed by an hour and a half private meeting. Is this agreeable to you?

Yes ☒ No ☐

Should this meeting be followed by a luncheon, or would you rather give a dinner for Wilson that evening? If you opt for a luncheon -- which I recommend -- you would have a choice of formats. I suggest a small luncheon with a guest list of about 40. (Mrs. Wilson probably will ~~be~~ accompany the Prime Minister.) ~~in which case, invitation should be on a stag basis.~~ Would you indicate your preference:

Luncheon as described above ☐

Smaller working luncheon ☐

Large luncheon (guest list of 140) ☐

Dinner ☒

The question of a possible second meeting turns to some degree on your preference for lunch vs. dinner. If you opt for a luncheon, I would suggest scheduling a brief second meeting on Friday, Feb 9 at 11:30 AM. Without this, your participation in Wilson's "visit" would be rather brief -- back-to-back meeting and lunch -- completed within three hours the first day. While this would be the easier course for you, it probably would fall somewhat short of what Wilson needs by way of exposure.

On the other hand, if you have a dinner for Wilson, there would be less need to schedule a second meeting. In any event, we could always reserve time for a brief second meeting and wait until nearer the time of the visit before making a final decision.

In the light of forthcoming unpleasant U.K. decisions, this is not a good time for a dramatic visit

Jim Jones telephoned Mr Rostow at 4:10 PM 1/12/68 Mr Rostow notified Ben Rand + Ed Fried new

18a sent Rand CAP 80310

Schedule a brief second meeting_____

Reserve time for second meeting (but make no commitment)_____✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 12, 1968

FROM: W. W. Rostow

FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFO: Jim Jones

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 048, NARA, Date 9-17-90

18-6
sent Rostow
CAP 80310

Following our planning meeting in preparation for Harold Wilson's visit, Feb 8-9, we need guidance from you on some aspects of the visit. We believe the format of the visit should be fairly informal and low key, while bearing in mind Wilson's desire for visibility to his electorate. (This is entirely appropriate in view of the fact that only last June you received Wilson with full honors, remarks, black tie dinner, etc.).

In the light of forthcoming implement U.K. decisions, this is not a good time for a dramatic visit.
As now projected, the Prime Minister's arrival would be informal -- no military honors or remarks. This would take place on Thursday, Feb 8 at about 11:30 AM, followed by an hour and a half private meeting. Is this agreeable to you?

Yes ☒ No ☐

Should this meeting be followed by a luncheon, or would you rather give a dinner for Wilson that evening? If you opt for a luncheon -- which I recommend -- you would have a choice of formats. I suggest a small luncheon with a guest list of about 40. (Mrs. Wilson probably will ~~not~~ accompany the Prime Minister,) ~~in which case, invitations would be on a working basis.~~ Would you indicate your preference:

Luncheon as described above ☐

Smaller working luncheon ☐

Large luncheon (guest list of 140) ☐

Dinner ☒

Ben Rostow
Ed Fried
notified

The question of a possible second meeting turns to some degree on your preference for lunch vs. dinner. If you opt for a luncheon, I would suggest scheduling a brief second meeting on Friday, Feb 9 at 11:30 AM. Without this, your participation in Wilson's "visit" would be rather brief -- back-to-back meeting and lunch -- completed within three hours the first day. While this would be the easier course for you, it probably would fall somewhat short of what Wilson needs by way of exposure.

On the other hand, if you have a dinner for Wilson, there would be less need to schedule a second meeting. In any event, we could always reserve time for a brief second meeting and wait until nearer the time of the visit before making a final decision.

Schedule a brief second meeting_____

Reserve time for second meeting (but make no commitment) ✓

Mann 1/2/68

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1967

19

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Wilson Visit

Attached is the draft State scope paper and tentative schedule for the Wilson visit.

The most important issues, in addition to Vietnam, will probably be:

UK/Defense Policy -- Wilson is under economic pressure to cut the budget, appears determined to end UK military presence in the Persian Gulf by 1970-71 and to abandon UK defense commitments in East Asia by early 1971. The purchase of F-111s may be cut back. The BAOR could be reduced if the British don't get full offset from the Germans. The Brown talks today will give us a line.

Impact of our Balance of Payments Program -- and the prospects for their program since devaluation.

Internal UK Political/Economic Situation -- The UK's economy remains depressed, with resultant growing criticism of Wilson's leadership.

UK/EEC -- How do the British view their long-term campaign and their interim tactics?

Schedule -- We need to discuss the guest list for the Wilson dinner and the possibility of an informal breakfast with the Vice President or the Secretary of State before Wilson meets with the President.

Dinner - lunch

2 days or 1 day

Ed Fried
Ed Fried

ERF:MWG:mst
ERF:MWG:mst

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-266
By *us*, NARA Date 8-15-97



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 470

~~SECRET~~

130
1-7-68
2-1-68
19a
January 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Background Papers for the February 7-9 Visit
of Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom

Prime Minister Wilson will come to Washington for talks with President Johnson on February 8-9. A meeting is scheduled at the White House for Thursday, January 11, 10:30 a.m., to make preliminary plans for this visit. Deputy Assistant Secretary George Springsteen and UK Country Director J. Harold Shullaw will attend this meeting.

The Department does not yet know who will accompany the Prime Minister. Enclosed is a biographic sketch of Prime Minister Wilson. As soon as the names of the other members of the Party are received from the British Embassy, additional biographic reports will be prepared.

There are also enclosed background papers on the visit including a draft scope paper which has not yet been cleared by the Secretary, background notes on the United Kingdom, a tentative schedule and a recommendation against an exchange of gifts by the President and the Prime Minister on this visit.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Biographic Sketch
2. Draft Scope Paper
3. Background Notes on UK
4. Tentative Schedule
5. Gift Exchange Recommendation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-269
By ju, NARA, Date 5-27-97

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
OSTROY'S OFFICE

1968 JAN 10 PM 4 10

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 93-269

By us, NARA Date 4-16-98

~~SECRET~~

19-b

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
February 7-9, 1968

DRAFT SCOPE PAPER

You have agreed to see Prime Minister Wilson at 12:00 noon on Thursday, February 8 and you may also meet with him on Friday morning, February 9. You have agreed to give a dinner at the White House in his honor at 8:00 p.m. on February 8. You last met with Wilson in Melbourne on December 22. Wilson last visited Washington in June 1967. This will be his sixth visit to Washington since he became Prime Minister.

Wilson will fly to Washington from London on the evening of February 7. He will depart for Ottawa the afternoon of February 9 for talks with Canadian officials.

Wilson has just finished his most difficult year in office. Despite strenuous efforts to cope with Britain's massive economic problems, complicated as they were by the Arab-Israeli war and the closure of the Suez Canal, the British Government was unable to avoid devaluation of the British pound in November. Nor did the campaign to win Common Market membership for the UK succeed in overcoming French opposition to the opening of negotiations.

In the past six months, Wilson has watched his party suffer humiliating by-election defeats while his own popularity, as measured by the public opinion polls, has declined to a new low. The British electorate faces a long, hard winter with deflationary measures still in effect and with little prospect of immediate improvement in the economic scene. Wilson cannot claim the same authority in his party he enjoyed only a few months ago. Nevertheless he is not in immediate political danger and can resist calling a general election until his economic measures begin to take effect.

Britain is still in the process of making major decisions as to its future world role. Its growing interest in Europe

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

is accompanied by diminished interest in Britain's traditional world role. Economic necessity has been a spur to this development. The UK has decided to advance its withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia to early 1971 regardless of the protests of friends and allies in the area. Furthermore, the current British intention is to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in 1970-71. So far as the British forces in Germany are concerned, their maintenance at present levels is being linked to a full offset agreement with the Federal Republic. There may be cuts in UK contracts for U.S.-produced aircraft, particularly F-111's, which were originally seen as relevant to a more active presence East of Suez.

Wilson and his Government have held the line against the vocal critics of U.S. policies in Viet-Nam. The British still feel they may have a role to play in possible negotiations, and Wilson will reiterate that he will come under increasing pressure to exert influence on the U.S. for negotiations with Hanoi.

Wilson will probably be interested in probing (i) U.S. views on future British tactics as regards Common Market membership, (ii) our thinking on the British balance of payments problem and policies for dealing with it, and (iii) our suggestions on how the British Government can contribute to the search for peace in Viet-Nam.

~~SECRET~~

19-c

VISIT OF
UNITED KINGDOM PRIME MINISTER
HAROLD WILSON
February 1968

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

Wednesday, Feb. 7

P.M. Prime Minister Wilson and party arrives from London. To be met by Ambassador Symington. The Prime Minister leaves for the British Embassy by auto.

~~Handwritten scribble~~ Dinner at British Embassy Residence

Thursday, Feb. 8

11:30 A.M. The Prime Minister and party arrive by auto at the White House. The Prime Minister will receive military honors.

Handwritten note:
No formal
arrival
No
Pres.
no
no
no

Prime Minister Wilson meets with the President. Principal advisers to the Prime Minister and the President are to be available if needed.

> 1:00 P.M. The Prime Minister departs by auto for the British Embassy

Lunch at the British Embassy

< Prime Minister Wilson gives an open press conference at the British Embassy.

8:00 P.M. The President is host at a black tie White House dinner. (The alternative would be a working lunch.)

Friday, February 9

> 11:30 A.M. The Prime Minister meets with the President at the White House. Principal advisers to be available if needed.

Lunch. Informal luncheon at the British Embassy

P.M. The Prime Minister and party depart for Canada

19-d

List of Suggested Gifts

The President and the Prime Minister have exchanged gifts on Mr. Wilson's previous visits to the United States.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson have met frequently since Mr. Wilson took office in October 1964. The Department does not believe that an exchange of gifts is required on this visit; however, should the President wish to present a gift to the Prime Minister, we would suggest a golf bag with matching club-head covers.

Background Notes

UNITED KINGDOM



19-8

Population: 54,066,000
Capital: London

The United Kingdom of Great Britain (England, Scotland, Wales) and Northern Ireland lies off the northwest coast of the European continent, separated from it by the English Channel, the Straits of Dover, and the North Sea. At the closest point, it is only 12 miles from France. In the southeastern corner of England is London, the capital city, in about the same latitude as Winnipeg, Canada. Together with its many islands, the United Kingdom occupies a total land area of 93,024 square miles, a little smaller than Oregon.

The British Isles have a complex geology, providing a rich variety of scenery and impressive contrasts in topography. Highland Britain, formed of older rocks, contains the principal mountains (the highest ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 feet), and occupies most of the north and west of the United Kingdom, while Lowland Britain, which is a generally rolling land, lies to the southeast.

Owing to prevailing southwesterly winds, the climate of Britain is temperate and equable. Temperatures range from a mean of about 40°F. in winter to about 60°F. in summer. A low of 20°F. is occasionally reached during the winter months, and a high of over 80°F. may occur during the summer. Average annual rainfall over the United Kingdom is 35-40 inches, distributed relatively evenly throughout the year. Cloud cover is persistent, however, limiting sunshine to an average of about 6 hours in summer and about 1 to 2 hours in winter.

THE PEOPLE

In 1964, 54,066,000 persons were estimated to be resident in the United Kingdom, an increase of over 3 million since 1954 and a seven-fold increase since 1700. London itself has 8,173,000 inhabitants. The U.K.'s population density, one of the highest in the world, is 574 persons per square mile. Nearly one-quarter of the population reside in England's prosperous and fertile southeastern corner, with population declining in the more rugged areas to the north and west. Over the United Kingdom as a whole, the population is predominantly urban and suburban.

The contemporary Briton is descended mainly from the varied racial stocks which had settled there before the end of the 11th century. As an island lying close off the European continent, Britain has been subject to many invasions or migrations,

especially from Scandinavia and the continent, including Roman occupation for several centuries. The Normans, last of a long succession of invaders and colonizers, and themselves Scandinavian Vikings who had settled in northern France, conquered England in 1066. Under them, the pre-Celtic, Celtic, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, and Norse influences were blended into the Briton of today. While the Celtic languages still persist in Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland to a small degree, the predominant language has long been English, a marriage of Anglo-Saxon and Norman-French.

The Church of England (Episcopal) with 27 million baptized members is the established church but religious freedom is guaranteed to all. A number of other churches, including the Roman Catholic and the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian), have substantial numbers of adherents.


HISTORY

The Roman invasion of 57 B.C. and the subsequent incorporation of Britain into the Roman Empire stimulated the development of modern Britain and formally launched her on an active role in foreign affairs. After the Romans' departure, the country remained prey to other invasions until the Norman conquest of 1066. Norman rule effectively assured Britain's safety from further invasion and stimulated the development of institutions, both new and indigenous, which have since distinguished British life. A central administration, the separation of church and state, common law, and representative government, for example, gradually evolved after 1066. Their sturdy development has contributed to Britain's remarkable internal stability and enhanced her role abroad.

Begun initially in support of William the Conqueror's holdings in France, a policy of active involvement in European affairs was embarked upon which endured for several hundred years. By the end of the 14th century, foreign trade, originally based on wool exports to Europe, had emerged as a cornerstone of national policy. The foundations of sea power—to protect Britain's trade and open up new routes—were gradually laid. Defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 firmly established Britain as a major sea power. Thereafter, her interests outside Europe grew steadily.

Empire Period

Attracted by the spice trade, British mercantile interests spread first to the Far East. In search of



an alternate route to the Spice Islands, John Cabot reached the American continent in 1498, soon after Columbus. Sir Walter Raleigh organized the first, short-lived British colony in Virginia in 1584, and British settlement followed. During the ensuing two centuries, alternately in contest and concord with its European neighbors, Britain extended her influence abroad and consolidated her political development at home. The territorial limits of the British Empire, with the principal exceptions of parts of Africa and India, had already been reached by the time of the Boston Tea Party.

While British progress in the preceding era had been considerable, over a century of unparalleled power lay ahead. The economic miracle of its industrial revolution began to emerge with impressive force at the very time Britain's temporarily errant government lost its American colony. Good government restored, the United Kingdom triumphantly met the challenge of Napoleon of France. By the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, Britain had no peer in Europe, and her navy ruled the seas. The peace in Europe that followed allowed Britain once again to focus her interests on more remote parts of the world, at the expense of her European rivals. During this period, the British Empire reached its zenith. British colonies, skillfully managed, sustained the United Kingdom's extraordinary economic growth and contributed to the power of her voice in world affairs. Paradoxically, Britain became more imperial as she continued to strengthen and broaden her democratic institutions.

By the time of Queen Victoria's death in 1901, however, the tide had changed. Other nations, including the United States and Germany, had benefited from their own industrial development. Britain's comparative economic advantage had declined, and the ambitions of her rivals had grown. The First World War drastically depleted British resources and consequently undermined her ability to maintain the dominant role of the previous century. As Britain's independent power base weakened, she began to move toward the close ties with the United States characteristic of her current policy.

Inter-War Period

British control over the empire loosened. Ireland, with the exception of Ulster, broke away in 1921. Emergent nationalism arose in other parts of the empire, most forcefully in India and Egypt. In 1926 Britain granted Australia, Canada, and New Zealand complete autonomy within the empire. As such, they became charter members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, an informal but closely-knit association destined to succeed the empire. Throughout the inter-war period, moreover, Britain's economy continued to lose ground to its competitors.

World War II sealed the fate of the British Empire. Unable to maintain her control, Britain began the process of dismantling her empire in 1947. Most of the viable colonial units have now

been granted independence in a remarkably orderly and generous manner. The only important exception, Southern Rhodesia, unilaterally declared itself independent in November 1965, in opposition to British attempts to foster a government representing Africans as well as white settlers.

GOVERNMENT

The unwritten British Constitution is based partly on statute, partly on common law, and partly on the "traditional rights of Englishmen." Constitutional changes may come about formally through new Acts of Parliament, or informally through the acceptance of new traditions and usage, or by new judicial precedents. Although Parliament has the theoretical power to make or unmake any law—it has been said that it can do anything except make a man a woman or a woman a man—in practice the weight of 700 years of tradition restrains arbitrary actions.

Executive government rests nominally with the Crown. In actual practice it is exercised by a committee of Ministers, called the Cabinet, who traditionally are selected from among the members of the House of Commons and, to a lesser extent, the House of Lords. The Prime Minister is the leader of the majority party in the Commons, and his government is dependent on its support.

The Parliament of the United Kingdom represents the entire country and can legislate for the whole or for any constituent part or combination of parts. The life of a Parliament is fixed by law at 5 years, although the Prime Minister may dissolve it and call a general election before then if his policies are severely criticized. The locus of legislative power is the 630-man House of Commons, which has sole jurisdiction over finance. The upper House of Lords, though shorn of most of its powers, can still review, amend, or delay for a limited time any legislation except money bills. Only a fraction of the some 900 members attend at all regularly, but the House of Lords has greater leisure than does the House of Commons to debate public issues—one of its more important functions.

The judiciary is independent of the legislative and executive branches of government, but it cannot review the constitutionality of legislation.

The separate identity of each of the Kingdom's constituent parts is taken into account. Welsh affairs, for example, are administered at the national level by a Cabinet Minister (the Secretary of State for Wales), with the advice of a broadly representative Council for Wales. At the local level, the Welsh-speaking minority in Wales are permitted their own schools. Scotland continues, as before the union, to enjoy a different system of law (Roman-Dutch), judiciary, education, local government, and national church (the disestablished Presbyterian Church of Scotland). In addition, most domestic matters are handled by separate government departments grouped under the Secretary of State for Scotland, who is also a Cabinet member. Finally, Northern Ireland has its own Parliament and Prime

Minister, as well as 12 seats in the United Kingdom House of Commons. Except for defense and foreign relations, Northern Ireland controls most of its own affairs.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Labor Party is led by Prime Minister Harold Wilson and in the general election of 1965 won 364 of the 630 seats in the House of Commons.

The Labor Party is predominantly a moderate social-democratic party and, except for its small left-wing minority, is strongly anti-Communist in belief and action. This generalization also applies to British trade unions, which form the basic core of Labor's organized political strength and the bulk of its financial support.

In recent general elections, the Labor Party has sought to broaden its appeal to the voters, particularly among the middle classes and the so-called "classless" white-collar groups who live in suburbia and who work the newer technologies. Recent political trends have forced the Labor Party toward the center, and Labor leaders have generally made a conscious attempt to achieve a broadly centrist accommodation of party interests and groups by balancing the representation of right and left wings in positions of responsibility. The present Labor Government reflects this general tendency.

In foreign policy, the Labor Government supports the main collective purposes of NATO, with appropriate changes in strategic planning, the United Nations, and the old and new ties with the Commonwealth. The Labor Government, like its Tory predecessor, places the highest value on the maintenance of intimate ties with the United States and seeks to preserve and develop Anglo-American cooperation on several world fronts. At the same time, it seeks to emphasize the independent British contribution to world affairs.

The Conservative Party forms the Loyal Opposition in Parliament. Led by Edward Heath, it won 254 seats in the 1965 general election. It is supported by most farmers, about two-thirds of the middle and white-collar classes, and by almost a third of the working class.

After 13 years in power, the Conservatives were narrowly beaten in the 1964 election and suffered a heavy defeat in the 1965 contest. They have found their unaccustomed opposition role unsettling and the stresses of opposition life have been magnified by change in leadership, and by internal disagreement over a number of contentious issues, such as the question of Southern Rhodesia. The Conservatives possess great internal political strength and resilience, however, and are the only credible alternative ruling party in an essentially two-party system. They derive strength from the generally conservative nature of British society and from a successful effort to move with the times. The party's ruling councils are composed of mixed political types at various levels, but the temper and policy of the national party are set and usually maintained by progressive, reform-minded leaders.

The Liberal Party under the leadership of Jo Grimond has made a determined effort to recover some of the political power and influence which it once exercised in British politics. In the existing two-party system the Liberals have recently gained limited ground, but in the absence of some form of proportional representation the substantial increases in popular vote that they gained in the last two general elections were not reflected in the House of Commons. In the 1965 general election, the Liberals won 12 seats out of the total of 630, an increase of 3 seats over the number they won in 1964 and 6 over their total in 1959.

The Liberals have sought to attract dissident elements in both the main parties to a nonsocialist and broadly reformist set of principles. In domestic affairs, the party favors principles of co-ownership in industry and other reforms which are closer to the working aims of the Labor Party than to those of the Conservatives.

The Communist Party is numerically and politically insignificant in national politics and holds no seats in Parliament. It poses no threat to the political stability of the United Kingdom and has lost much of its strength in its few trade union strongholds.

ECONOMY

The United Kingdom is one of the world's leading industrial and trading nations. Its economic position is enhanced by the central role it plays in the Commonwealth and the sterling area, which provide a large portion of the world's trade. Structurally, the British economy is predominantly industrial with agriculture contributing only 3.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The economy relies mainly on the profit motive and on the free market for its function.

The United Kingdom must import a large part of its food and almost all of its raw materials except coal; however, promising natural gas exploration is being conducted on the British continental shelf in the North Sea. In order to pay for essential imports, a high level of exports must be maintained. In addition, considerable foreign exchange is earned through "invisible" exports such as shipping, banking, and insurance services.

Economic Development

Since World War II, the British economy has grown substantially (by 35.6 percent during the period 1956-65), although at a somewhat uneven rate. Preliminary figures indicate that the U.K. gross national product (GNP) for 1965, at market prices and in terms of constant 1965 dollars, stands at \$98,300 million, as compared with \$64,550 million in 1956. Despite this expansion and the concurrent rise in British standards of living in terms of per capita GNP, which now stands at \$1,800 as compared with \$1,245 in 1956, the British economy has not grown as rapidly as those of many

Other Western countries. Per capital GNP in the United Kingdom, for example, is now about three-fourths that of Sweden and Canada and slightly below that of Denmark, France, Norway, and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is approximately one-half that of the United States.

The National Plan, published in September 1965, sets forth an ambitious program for (U.K.) economic development over the next 5 years. The Plan establishes as a target an increase of 25 percent in national output between 1964 and 1971 as well as a better regional and social balance in the use of the country's resources, elimination of the balance of payments deficit, and achievement of a surplus to repay external borrowing(s).

Balance of Payments

The persistent weakness of its balance of payments has been a problem for the United Kingdom for a number of years and assumed major proportions with the sterling crisis beginning in late 1964. During the years 1958-63, the cumulative current account was just in balance, but in this period long-term capital exports averaged about £175 million per year. As a consequence—and taking into account the balancing item which, on the average, was positive—the cumulative deficit of current and long-term capital transactions was approximately £496 million for the period 1958-63.

1964, the deficit jumped to £769 million per annum.

A number of factors have contributed to the U.K. balance-of-payments difficulties; foremost among them are the following:

1. The unsatisfactory performance of British export industries, as reflected in the decline in the U.K. share of world trade in manufactures from 17.7 percent in 1958 to 13.7 percent in 1964;

2. The loss of British overseas investments in World War II and the burden on the balance of payments resulting from the build-up of these external investments in recent years; and

3. The cost of British overseas defense and aid commitments.

The sterling crises of the postwar era have seriously threatened the U.K.'s gold and foreign exchange reserves and, consequently, the U.K.'s position as banker to the sterling area. Internal measures to restrict demand, import controls, and devaluation (in 1949), along with financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States, and other Western countries, have helped to meet these recurring difficulties. These periodic efforts to reduce the balance-of-payments deficits have, however, had a deflationary impact, causing economic growth to slow down abruptly.

With the advent of the Labor Government in 1964—which roughly coincided with the onset of the worst sterling crisis—the British have sought to break out of the "stop-go" cycle which has been so detrimental to long-term economic growth. The current approach seeks to attain permanent improvement in the British balance of payments and to

avoid severe domestic deflation. It is recognized that, to do this, there must be significant structural changes in, and modernization of, the economy. A number of measures have been introduced or are planned to achieve this correction of the economy, including: (1) a productivity, prices, and incomes policy—coupled with efforts to eliminate restrictive industrial practices—so as to limit wage raises to a level warranted by productivity increases and to reestablish the United Kingdom's competitive position abroad; (2) efforts to shift manpower from service to manufacturing industries; and (3) controls on export of capital, extension of domestic credit, and government expenditures.

As a consequence of these actions, the U.K. balance-of-payments deficit was approximately halved in 1965 to £354 million versus £769 million in 1964. Exports were up 7 percent while imports rose by only 1 percent, and the net outflow of long-term capital was reduced from £363 million to £218 million.

In order to repay its obligations to the IMF which begin to fall due in 1967, the United Kingdom hopes to achieve balance-of-payments equilibrium by the end of 1966 or early 1967 and thereafter to be in surplus.

Industry

The U.K. economy is a mixture of public and privately owned firms with a number of joint ventures as well.

Several important British industries are under public ownership, including the railroads, coal mining, certain utilities, and a large part of civil aviation. Moreover, the Labor Government announced in April 1966 its intention to restore public ownership and control of the main part of the steel industry.

One of the outstanding traits of private British industry is the large number of comparatively small firms. There is, however, a growing trend toward increasing the size of British industrial units—a movement which the government plans to encourage through the establishment of an Industrial Reorganization Corporation, which will be able to assist financially in appropriate mergers.

In addition to encouraging industrial growth by furthering mergers, the present government is adopting a system of cash grants (in lieu of tax allowances) as investment incentives. The grants will range from 20 percent in overcrowded districts to 40 percent in development areas. Higher grants for development areas are intended to decrease the rate of industrial concentration in the already overpopulated South, East, and Midland regions and to encourage investment in such areas as Scotland, and Northern Ireland, which have an appreciably higher level of unemployment than the United Kingdom as a whole.

The government agencies primarily responsible for economic policy are the Board of Trade and the Treasury, together with the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), which deals primarily with

the long-term aspects of economic policy. The National Economic Development Council and a number of industrial economic development committees, which have been set up in the major industrial sectors, serve as a link between industry and the government in encouraging industrial expansion and exports, as well as the more efficient use of labor.

Labor

The British labor force was estimated at 24,729,000 in January 1966. Approximately 40 percent of all British workers are members of the 600 unions, and over 8 million workers are members of unions affiliated with the Trade Union Congress, a loose federation of constituent unions. Collective bargaining on wage rates and employment terms is generally conducted on a national basis by the responsible union and the employer counterpart.

During the postwar period Britain has adhered to a policy of full employment, and the level of unemployment has been consistently low. In large part because of the low level of unemployment, wage rates have risen rapidly—frequently more than productivity increases would warrant. In the 12-month period ending in October 1965, for example, wage rates were up by 7 percent.

Agriculture

Despite the density of the population in the United Kingdom, British agriculture has increased considerably its share of the foodstuffs consumed in the United Kingdom. Net output has increased one-third during the last decade, although employment in agriculture was down by approximately one-quarter. British farmers are assisted by a system of subsidy payments equivalent to the difference between market prices and guaranteed price levels for their products. This arrangement permits the United Kingdom to continue its importation of cheap foodstuffs, although there are agreements with supplier countries regarding minimum import prices and quotas for imports.

Taxation

The United Kingdom is one of the most heavily taxed countries in the Western world with taxes absorbing 36.8 percent of national income in 1964. The major taxes are as follows: (1) corporation tax (now set at 40 percent which replaced the former profits tax of 15 percent, and the standard corporate income tax of 41.25 percent); (2) (long-term) capital gains tax of 30 percent for individuals and investment trusts and 40 percent for corporations; (3) personal income taxes which discriminate against investment, as opposed to "earned," income and which can theoretically go up to 91.25 percent; (4) selective employment tax, which is designed to

encourage the movement of manpower from service into manufacturing industries; (5) purchase tax, levied at the wholesale stage and ranging from 10 to 25 percent of most products; and (6) customs duties which range up to 33 percent and more on 70 percent of imported manufactured goods.

Most foodstuffs and raw materials enter duty-free, particularly from Commonwealth countries. Protective tariffs, but not revenue duties, are to be abolished on non-agricultural European Free Trade Association imports beginning January 1, 1967.

Other taxes include death duties; revenue duties on tobacco, liquor, and petroleum products; motor vehicle duties; gambling tax; stamp duties; and municipal taxes.

The Budget

In the United Kingdom, the budget is used as a means of providing guidance for the economy. The budget for fiscal year 1966-67 (which began April 1, 1966 and runs through March 31, 1967), for example, included the introduction of the selective employment tax, announcement of the abolition of the import surcharge, and the inauguration of controls on investment in developed overseas sterling countries.

The comparative budget figures for the fiscal years 1965-66 and 1966-67 are as follows:

	1965-66	1966-67
	(£ million)	
Revenue	9,145	10,224
Expenditures	8,456	9,177
Surplus	689	1,047
Consolidated Fund Loans	1,265	1,334
Net Exchequer Borrowing and Special Transactions	576	287

TRADE

As has been stated, the United Kingdom is highly dependent on foreign trade. In 1965 imports amounted to 16.4 percent of GNP and exports to 13.9 percent of GNP. Major British exports include machinery, vehicles, metals and metal products, chemicals and drugs, and textiles. In 1965 British exports (including re-exports), on a free on board (f.o.b.) basis, totalled \$13,716 million, of which 19.1 percent went to European Economic Community countries, 14.1 percent to EFTA countries and 10.5 percent to the United States. Total British imports, on a cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) basis, were \$16,140 million, of which 17.4 percent came from EEC countries, 13.5 percent from EFTA countries, and 11.7 percent from the United States. Principal United States exports to the United Kingdom were machinery, chemicals, cereals and cereal preparations, non-ferrous base metals, and tobacco and tobacco products. Major British exports to the United

States included motor vehicles (automobiles, motorcycles and trucks), whiskey, machinery (including textile and office machinery, tractors, and machine tools), aircraft and aircraft engines, iron and steel, and chemicals.

There has been a distinct shift in the composition of both exports and imports for the United Kingdom since World War II. On the import side, food and raw materials have diminished in importance while manufactured goods have increased significantly. On the export side, engineering products, particularly motor vehicles and aircraft, constitute a greater proportion of the total, whereas textiles and coal have decreased in significance. Similarly, there has been a change in the geographic distribution of British trade, with the overseas sterling area taking a smaller share of British exports and the industrial countries of Western Europe as well as the United States and Canada becoming more important as British markets. On the import side, the Middle East has become of increasing importance to the United Kingdom because of oil.

International Economic Relations

It has been a major aim of successive U.K. governments since World War II to work for the removal of restrictions on trade and, as far as possible, to restore the convertibility of sterling and increase world liquidity. To this end the United Kingdom has taken a leading part in setting up such organizations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Monetary Agreement (EMA).

The United Kingdom is also a charter member of the European Free Trade Area, which was established as the counterpart of the European Economic Community (EEC). Beginning in the early 1960's, however, the United Kingdom sought to enter the EEC and conducted negotiations to that end until January 1963, when the talks were broken off. In recent months, however, there have been numerous indications of increasing British interest in the EEC, and various British ministers have stated that the United Kingdom would be willing to join the EEC provided acceptable terms for entry could be agreed upon.

Foreign Investment in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom perhaps more than any other European country has welcomed foreign investment, particularly from companies which promise to contribute to the expansion of British exports, to introduce new techniques, or to increase employment in areas of high unemployment. Total foreign investment in the United Kingdom is estimated at \$8.4 billion, of which U.S. investment was calculated at \$4.5 billion in 1964. Approximately 6,000 U.S. companies have agents and distributors in the United Kingdom, and 900 U.S. firms have subsidiaries there.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Commonwealth of Nations

Deprived of an empire, Britain nevertheless remains an important world power. As tribute to her latter-day enlightenment as a colonizer, almost all of the newly independent colonies have become members of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has been weakened increasingly by economic and political nationalism, and most recently by the reaction to Southern Rhodesia's act, yet it continues to provide a unique framework for British leadership. It offers Britain a voice and a role among developed and less developed countries. Moreover, it perpetuates in principle if not always in practice many British institutions, from parliamentary democracy to the sterling system. Britain has, in addition, retained authority over and maintains military forces in a number of strategic points in its former empire. These serve to facilitate a significant peacekeeping role for Britain.

The Commonwealth does not, however, compensate for the loss of an empire, and Britain has accordingly sought in recent years to achieve a closer association with Europe as well as with the United States. Her application to join the European Common Market in 1961 climaxed her new European policy. And although France in 1963 blocked her membership, Britain has continued to seek closer ties with Europe through other channels.

U. K. - U. S. Relations

The seeds of British-American cooperation—common language, ideals, and democratic practices—were planted long ago. They ultimately induced and enhanced Britain's alliance with the United States during the two World Wars and Korea. It took on renewed meaning in opposition to the threat of the forceful Soviet expansion following World War II. Churchill's Fulton speech in 1946 stimulated U.K.-U.S. cooperation in defense of the free world. Britain subsequently has played a major role in such collective security arrangements as NATO, SEATO, and CENTO. She has supported U.S. peacekeeping efforts in Berlin and Korea. In Southeast Asia, she supports U.S. policy in Viet-Nam and has bolstered Malaysia against the "confrontation" of Indonesia.

Although fully aware of the declared policies of Communist China, the United Kingdom recognized China's new government in 1949 on the grounds that it was firmly in control, and in the belief that it was desirable for the West to have a point of contact with so important a country. The United Kingdom has been forthright, however, in her criticism of Communist China's aggressive acts.

Britain has cooperated with the United States in attempts to accelerate the growth of less developed countries through national and international channels. U.K.-U.S. cooperation in military, economic, and political efforts is extensive and mutually valuable.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Queen Elizabeth II
Prime Minister—Harold Wilson
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—~~Michael~~
~~Stewart~~ **GEORGE BROWN**
Ambassador to the United States—Sir Patrick Dean

Counselor for Political Affairs—William H. Brubeck
Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs—Ronald I. Spiers
Counselor for Administration—Peter Skoufis

BIBLIOGRAPHY

There are large numbers of books of all sorts on the United Kingdom, its history, economy, and many other subjects. For an all-purpose reference work, Britain—An Official Handbook, published by the British Central Office of Information, London, is recommended.

PRINCIPAL U. S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—David K. E. Bruce
Minister—Philip M. Kaiser
Minister for Economic Affairs—~~William C. Armstrong~~
STANLEY CLEGG LAUD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8099
Released August 1966

Office of Media Services
Bureau of Public Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-269
By us, NARA Date 4-16-98

~~SECRET~~

1967 DEC 29 22 42

Christine
12/30

20

EEA736
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3232

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671243

Jeff

67 DEC 29 PM 5:48

FRIDAY

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 29, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

PAT DEAN CAME TO SEE ME THIS MORNING AND DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

THE PRIME MINISTER HOPES TO ARRIVE IN OTTAWA ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 6, SPEND THE DAY OF THE 7TH IN OTTAWA AND ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON LATE ON THE EVENING OF THE 7TH. HE WOULD THEN EXPECT TO HAVE TALKS WITH YOU ON THE 6TH WITH A FINAL MEETING IN THE MORNING OF THE 9TH.

approved
1/8

DEAN TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, WELL BEFORE A HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE ON VIET-NAM. THEY WILL NEED ANOTHER TWO DAYS TO CLEAR THINGS OUT WITH THE CANADIANS BECAUSE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH THE CANADIANS ARE HOLDING DURING THIS PERIOD.

MY SUGGESTION WOULD BE THAT WE PLAN A SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 2. A PROPOSED DRAFT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWS:

"PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL RECEIVE PRIME MINISTER WILSON IN WASHINGTON FOR TALKS ON FEBRUARY 8TH AND 9TH.

approved
1/4

THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IS ANOTHER OF THE PERIODIC EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BETWEEN THE TWO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT."

Wilson was in US (was)
June 2, 1967
June

~~SECRET~~

DTG 292213Z DEC 1967

1 - Press of informed and to make announcement
1/15 would expect -- Canadian/British problem
Question went to announce

~~SECRET~~

20a

12-30-67
J. Edgar Hoover
UWVPE
EEA736
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3202

Received Washington CommGen
4:10 P.M. Friday 29 Dec 67

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
4:41 P.M. Friday 29 Dec 67

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671243

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-269
By is, NARA Date 8-16-78

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 29, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

PAT DEAN CAME TO SEE ME THIS MORNING AND DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

THE PRIME MINISTER HOPES TO ARRIVE IN OTTAWA ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 6, SPEND THE DAY OF THE 7TH IN OTTAWA AND ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON LATE ON THE EVENING OF THE 7TH. HE WOULD THEN EXPECT TO HAVE TALKS WITH YOU ON THE 8TH WITH A FINAL MEETING ON THE MORNING OF THE 9TH.

DEAN TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, WELL BEFORE A HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE ON VIET-NAM. THEY WILL NEED ANOTHER TWO DAYS TO CLEAR THINGS OUT WITH THE CANADIANS BECAUSE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH THE CANADIANS ARE HOLDING DURING THIS PERIOD.

MY SUGGESTION WOULD BE THAT WE PLAN A SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 2. A PROPOSED DRAFT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWS:

"PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL RECEIVE PRIME MINISTER WILSON IN WASHINGTON FOR TALKS ON FEBRUARY 8TH AND 9TH.

THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IS ANOTHER OF THE PERIODIC EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BETWEEN THE TWO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT."

APPROVE ✓ DISAPPROVE _____

DTG 292210Z DEC 1967

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~

NLJ 93-269

By us, NARA Date 4-16-98

December 29, 1987

SEND TO: THE RANCH

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY.

Pat Dean came to see me this morning and discussed, among other things, the Prime Minister's visit.

The Prime Minister hopes to arrive in Ottawa on the evening of February 6, spend the day of the 7th in Ottawa and arrive in Washington late on the evening of the 7th. He would then expect to have talks with you on the 8th with a final meeting on the morning of the 9th.

Dean told me that they would like to make an early announcement of the Prime Minister's visit, well before a House of Commons debate on Viet-Nam. They will need another two days to clear things out with the Canadians because of a Constitutional Conference which the Canadians are holding during this period.

My suggestion would be that we plan a simultaneous announcement in London and Washington on Tuesday, January 2. A proposed draft of an announcement follows:

QTE President Johnson will receive Prime Minister Wilson in Washington for talks on February 8th and 9th.

The meeting between the President and Prime Minister is another of the periodic exchanges of views on the international situation between the two Heads of Government. UNQTE.

S. D. Rusk: jmr
Cleared: EUR - Mr. Leddy

The Secretary

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 93-269

By is, NARA Date 4-16-78

December 29, 1987

4921

20-c

~~SECRET~~

SEND TO: THE RANCH

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY.

Pat Dean came to see me this morning and discussed, among other things, the Prime Minister's visit.

The Prime Minister hopes to arrive in Ottawa on the evening of February 6, spend the day of the 7th in Ottawa and arrive in Washington late on the evening of the 7th. He would then expect to have talks with you on the 8th with a final meeting on the morning of the 9th.

Dean told me that they would like to make an early announcement of the Prime Minister's visit, well before a House of Commons debate on Viet-Nam. They will need another two days to clear things out with the Canadians because of a Constitutional Conference which the Canadians are holding during this period.

My suggestion would be that we plan a simultaneous announcement in London and Washington on Tuesday, January 2. A proposed draft of an announcement follows:

QTE President Johnson will receive Prime Minister Wilson in Washington for talks on February 8th and 9th.

The meeting between the President and Prime Minister is another of the periodic exchanges of views on the international situation between the two Heads of Government. UNQTE.

S:DRusk:jmr

Cleared: EUR - Mr. Leddy

The Secretary

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM (

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, December 15, 1967 -- 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Mr. Edward Tomkins, Minister of the British Embassy, called with the following message from Prime Minister Wilson.

Wilson is grateful for the message from the President. But, on reflection the Prime Minister would find it difficult to get away during the first week in January. Therefore, he suggests the dates of February 7-8 in Washington.

I told Tomkins we would have to check out those dates because it was my feeling Eshkol would be here at that time.

Here are your appointments at about that time and your free dates.

February 7-8 (Wednesday-Thursday) -- Prime Minister Eshkol.

February ¹⁴⁻¹⁵~~15-16~~ (Thursday-Friday) -- open.

February 21-22 (Wednesday-Thursday) -- Open. Washington's birthday.

I recommend that you invite Wilson for February 15-16. Ordinarily I would not recommend a visit involving a Friday, but am doing so in this instance to avoid tying up two successive Wednesdays, which might complicate scheduling of a Cabinet meeting in this period. If a second meeting with Wilson is necessary on Friday, February 16, it could be set for the morning so that you could still get away Friday afternoon should you want to travel that week end.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3 (b)

White House Guide

By out, NACA 9-17-90

Invite Wilson: 14-15
February 15-16
February 21-22
See me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

CC: E F
Put Dean informed.
ACTION
Tell State
Cy sent E. Fried 21

Walt Rostow

✓ ✓ ✓
Luther HC R

ced. st. Chris
12/16/67 6:30 pm

12/16/67
MEMORANDUM

ACTION

21a

①
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow
notified
and seen
12/18/67

Friday, December 15, 1967 -- 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Mr. Edward Tomkins, Minister of the British Embassy, called with the following message from Prime Minister Wilson.

Wilson is grateful for the message from the President. But, on reflection the Prime Minister would find it difficult to get away during the first week in January. Therefore, he suggests the dates of February 7-8 in Washington.

I told Tomkins we would have to check out those dates because it was my feeling Eshkol would be here at that time.

Here are your appointments at about that time and your free dates.

February 7-8 (Wednesday-Thursday) -- Prime Minister Eshkol.

February ¹⁴⁻¹⁵~~15-16~~ (Thursday-Friday) -- open.

February 21-22 (Wednesday-Thursday) -- Open. Washington's birthday.

I recommend that you invite Wilson for February 15-16. Ordinarily I would not recommend a visit involving a Friday, but am doing so in this instance to avoid tying up two successive Wednesdays, which might complicate scheduling of a Cabinet meeting in this period. If a second meeting with Wilson is necessary on Friday, February 16, it could be set for the morning so that you could still get away Friday afternoon should you want to travel that week end.

Walt
Invite Wilson: 14-15
February 15-16 ✓
February 21-22 ✓
See me _____
either OK or

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, 12/20/67
By DCIA NAW 9-17-90

MEMORANDUM

25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
ACTION
22

Thursday, November 30, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd 7:35 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Wilson's Visit

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memorandum containing Prime Minister Wilson's suggestion of Tuesday and Wednesday, January 16 and 17, as dates for a possible visit with you.

The Prime Minister would plan to stop at Ottawa on his way here. He may go to Moscow at the end of January.

Secretary Rusk suggests we tell the Prime Minister that January 16 and 17 would be agreeable subject to adjustment should Congress decide to convene later than usual.

Jim Jones says your schedule is free on these dates.

You agreed to see Sir Harold Macmillan sometime between January 13-17 for a courtesy call. I believe we can move this around so there will be no problem.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Approve January 16-17, subject to adjustment
should Congress convene late _____

No _____
Call see me ☒

N

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4(b)
White House, Dec. 14, 1983
DH 9-5-90

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

4522
22a

~~SECRET~~

November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Sir Patrick Dean came in to see me this afternoon with a message from his Prime Minister about the dates for a possible visit.

The Prime Minister suggests Tuesday and Wednesday, January 16th and 17th.

It would be his plan to stop off in Ottawa on the way and reach Washington on the evening of the 15th or the morning of the 16th. It seems to me that a stop in Ottawa on the way presents no problems, especially in view of DeGaulle's recent attack on Canada.

If the 16th and 17th are not convenient, Sir Patrick Dean thought that a week earlier might be agreeable. This idea arose because of the possibility that our Congress might elect to return later than usual in January. I believe the Prime Minister suggested the 16th and 17th because he thought you would have the State of the Union behind you by that date.

There is also the possibility that the Prime Minister would be going to Moscow at the very end of January. He would probably change this date if such a Moscow visit would create any problems for you. My own impression is that if there were a ten day interval no particular problem would arise.

I would suggest:

That we tell the Prime Minister that the dates of January 16 and 17 appear to be agreeable but that some adjustment would have to be made if the Congress decides to meet later than usual in January. This would mean that we should hold off making a public announcement of his visit for another ten days or two weeks.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-269
By iss, NARA Date 4-16-98

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

1967 NOV 30 AM 10 15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-269
By iso, NARA Date 4-16-98

~~SECRET~~

Checked w/ Jim Jones
Schedule of
Reminded him of
McMillan. He said
Set McM. 1/15 if
necessary.
Se advised Ed Fried. DM 11/30/07
Fried should
mention McMillan with name
22-b 4522
1 - Fried 11/30
2 - Ret
November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Sir Patrick Dean came in to see me this afternoon with a message from his Prime Minister about the dates for a possible visit.

The Prime Minister suggests Tuesday and Wednesday, January 16th and 17th.

It would be his plan to stop off in Ottawa on the way and reach Washington on the evening of the 15th or the morning of the 16th. It seems to me that a stop in Ottawa on the way presents no problems, especially in view of DeGaulle's recent attack on Canada.

If the 16th and 17th are not convenient, Sir Patrick Dean thought that a week earlier might be agreeable. This idea arose because of the possibility that our Congress might elect to return later than usual in January. I believe the Prime Minister suggested the 16th and 17th because he thought you would have the State of the Union behind you by that date.

There is also the possibility that the Prime Minister would be going to Moscow at the very end of January. He would probably change this date if such a Moscow visit would create any problems for you. My own impression is that if there were a ten day interval no particular problem would arise.

I would suggest:

That we tell the Prime Minister that the dates of January 16 and 17 appear to be agreeable but that some adjustment would have to be made if the Congress decides to meet later than usual in January. This would mean that we should hold off making a public announcement of his visit for another ten days or two weeks.

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

Sugg Mandy

State Cables



Department of State

7. 1. 02
TELEGRAM

24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 982

PAGE 01 LONDON 06156 021808Z

45
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, RSC 01, SS 20, NSC 10, CPR 02, O 02, SY 03,
P 04, USIA 12, OPR 02, RSR 01, GPM 03, MM 01, /088 W

P 021741Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1619

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 6156

FOR CHESLAW, (EUR/BMI)

SUB: BACKGROUND ON GERALD KAUFMAN

[. CONFIRMING TELECON YESTERDAY, GERALD KAUFMAN, WHO WILL BE IN WILSON ENTOURAGE NEXT WEEK, IS PARLIAMENTARY PRESS LIAISON OFFICER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE IS YOUNGISH, SELF-EFFACING BACHELOR, FORMER NEW STATESMAN AND DAILY MIRROR STAFFER, WHO HAS BEEN WILSON'S PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVISOR FOR SEVERAL YEARS. HE IS VERY MUCH AN INSIDER OF THE MARCIA WILLIAMS-GEORGE WIGG VARIETY AND IS GENERALLY AGREED TO HAVE MORE DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO THE PM THAN MANY CABINET MINISTERS. HE IS NOT OVERLY POPULAR WITH HIS FORMER

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 6156 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JOURNALIST COLLEAGUES NOR WITH MANY MINISTERS AND MP'S WHO RESENT HIS PROXIMITY TO THE FLAGPOLE. HE IS POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND IS LOOKING FOR A SEAT IN PARLIAMENT, BUT HIS CLOSE TIES WITH 10 DOWNING ST. HAVE ALWAYS PUT HIM AT SOME DISADVANTAGE IN GAINING ACCEPTANCE FROM CONSTITUENCY ORGANIZATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/mg NARA, Date 2-27-01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 06156 021808Z

2. HOW MUCH OF HIS ADVICE WILSON ACCEPTS, OR ACTS ON, IS OF COURSE A MOOT QUESTION. AS DEPT. WELL AWARE, PM IS NOT READILY INFLUENCED EVEN BY CLOSEST ADVISERS AND DESPITE KAUFMAN'S BEST EFFORTS, WILSON'S RELATIONS WITH PRESS HAVE DETERIORATED STEADILY SINCE 1966 ELECTION. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS GENERALLY AGREED HERE THAT HIS ADVICE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ON SOME OCCASIONS, THAT HE DOES NOT RESTRICT HIMSELF EXCLUSIVELY TO PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVICE AND THAT HE HAS PROVED HIMSELF A USEFUL BUFFER FOR HAOLD WILSON ON MANY OCCASIONS. IN ANY CASE, PM IS STELL VERY MUCH ACCESSIBLE TO KAUFMAN AND DEPT. MAY WISH TO GIVE HIM APPROPRIATE ATTENTION NEXT WEEK. BRUCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

moose
TELEGRAM
25
48

UNCLASSIFIED 435

PAGE 01 LONDON 06074 311753Z

51
ACTION EUR 20

INFO EA 10, IO 13, SAL 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02,
ACDA 16, SAH 03, NEA 13, E 15, COM 08, FRB 02, TRSY 08, STR 08, AID 28,
RSR 01, MM 01, /214 W

R 311641Z JAN 68
PM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1562
INFO USUN USMISSION NEW YORK 1034

UNCLAS LONDON 6074

1. BELOW IS A SUMMARY OF PRIMIN WILSON'S REPLIES TO
QUESTIONS ABOUT VIETNAM, PUEBLO, AND OTHER MATTERS DURING
HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE COMMONS ON JANUARY 30 AS REPORTED BY
TODAY'S TIMES.

2. BEGIN QUOTE - MR. WILSON - THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT TO
WASHINGTON IS TO HAVE A PERSONAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE
PRESIDENT ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE HOUSE WILL
BE GLAD TO KNOW THAT IN ADDITION TO MEETING THE PRESIDENT, I
HOPE ALSO TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS IN CANADA WITH MR. PEARSON AND
IN NEW YORK WITH UTHANT.

PAGE 2 RUDSC 6074 UNCLAS
MR. ELTON GRIFFITHS - IN VIEW OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN
KOREA AND THE GREAT BATTLE THAT IS NOW UNDER WAY IN VIETNAM,
WILL THE PRIME MINISTER ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT ANY AMERICAN
POLICY WHICH SEEKS PEACE BY NEGOTIATION AND WHICH MAINTAINS

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LONDON 06074 311753Z

FIRM RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION ON THE LAND OR HIGH SEAS WILL ALWAYS HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF THIS COUNTRY?

MR. WILSON - UNDOUBTEDLY BOTH THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM SITUATIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS FOR PEACE BY NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM AND THIS WAS THE SUBJECT OF SOME OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK. THE SITUATION IN KOREA IS BEST LEFT WHERE IT IS AT THE MOMENT, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

MR. WINNICK ASKED THE PRIMIN IF HE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS PRESIDENT TO STOP BOMBING SO THAT TALKS COULD BEGIN.

MR. WILSON - IN DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH IN MOSCOW THE PRECISE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH, FOLLOWING THE STOPPING OF BOMBING, THERE COULD BE PROMPT AND MEANINGFUL TALKS. THERE IS NOW VERY LITTLE

PAGE 3 RUDSC 6074 UNCLAS

BETWEEN TWO SIDES, SO FAR AS PUBLIC DECLARATIONS ARE CONCERNED. I THINK AMERICANS HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ASSURED THIS ACTION WILL FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ASSURED THE AMERICANS WILL STOP THE BOMBING IF THIS FOLLOWS. IT NEEDS THE FRIENDS OF BOTH SIDES TO PERSUADE THEM TO CROSS THAT VERY NARROW BRIDGE THAT REMAINS.

MR. MAUDLING - WILL THE PRIMIN DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT THE ADVISABILITY OF THEIR TAKING OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GULF OR THE FAR EAST WHEN WE WITHDRAW FROM EAST OF SUEZ?

MR. WILSON - WE HAVE NO VIEWS TO PUT TO AMERICAN PRESIDENT ON THAT QUESTION. WE SHALL BE INTERESTED TO HEAR HIS VIEWS ON THE SITUATION. THE RIGHT HON. GENTLEMAN WILL NOT BE SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT WE HAVE EXCHANGED NUMBER OF MESSAGES ON THE QUESTION.

MR. BLAKER - NOW THAT WE ARE TO GIVE UP OUR PEACE-KEEPING ROLE EAST OF SUEZ, DOES THE PRIMIN FEEL THAT BRITISH GOVT IN THE FUTURE WILL HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE IN FORMULATION OF AMERICAN POLICY AS IN THE PAST?

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 LONDON 06074 311753Z

PAGE 4 RUDSC 6074 UNCLAS

MR. WILSON - WE SHALL CONTINUE TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON FORMULATION OF AMERICAN POLICY. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE HAD OUR UPS AND DOWNS. THE BIGGEST 'DOWN' WAS 12 YEARS AGO. WE HAVE VERY MUCH MORE INFLUENCE IN THESE MATTERS NOW - THAN OPPOSITION MEMBERS HAD THEN. THEY WERE NOT EVEN IN COMMUNICATION FOR THREE MONTHS, AND HAD TO SEEK AN INTERNATIONAL LOAN FROM AMERICANS THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST.

MR. HEATH - WHAT ATTITUDE DOES THE PRIMIN PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH PRESIDENT TOWARDS THE IMPOSITION OF EXPORT INCENTIVES IN THE US WHICH WILL AFFECT OUR TRADE?

MR. WILSON - THE BIGGEST ANXIETY IS THE PROPOSAL ABOUT BORDER TAXES, COUPLED WITH EXPORT REBATES. WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE USG OF OUR STRONG FEELINGS IN THIS MATTER. IF MEASURES OF THAT KIND ARE TAKEN WHICH MIGHT HAVE BAD EFFECT ON SPIRALLING DOWNWARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, WE SHOULD HAVE TO RESERVE OUR POSITION ENTIRELY ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE EXPORT REBATE. END QUOTE. BRUCE

PAGE 5 RUDSC 6074 UNCLAS

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 282

PAGE 01 STATE 106485

92

ORIGIN EUR 20

INFO SS 20, GPM 03, CPR 02, NSC 10, P 04, USIA 12, MM 01, RSC 01, /073 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR: BMI: ICHESLAW
APPROVED BY: EUR: BMI: JHSHULLAW
S/CPR: BURTON (SUBS)

P 292248Z JAN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2976

UNCLAS STATE 106485

FOR AMBASSADOR

THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE TO PASS THE FOLLOWING INVITATION TO AMBASSADOR AND MRS. DAVID K.E. BRUCE: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. JOHNSON INVITE YOU TO A BLACK TIE DINNER HONORING THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. WILSON, THURSDAY FEBRUARY 8, 1968 AT 8:00 O'CLOCK, THE WHITE HOUSE. FORMAL INVITATION FOLLOWS. RSVP. UNQUOTE. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO REPLY DIRECTLY TO THE SOCIAL SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE. RUSK

UNCLASSIFIED