United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

Walter:

I believe this is the statement that the Senator wants. This is the Report to the ~~Congress~~ Democratic Senators last year.

I can find no specific reference to the moon. But there is a strong statement about the need to obtain control of outer space in order to control the earth. Following this there was some adverse editorial criticism about the stress on "control." This was followed on 1-14-58 by the speech to the CBS affiliates spelling out the U.N. idea.

Sour

 Speech

STATEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC LEADER LYNDON B. JOHNSON TO THE MEETING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 7, 1958.

Members of the Conference:

For this presentation this morning, I shall divide my own remarks in two parts.

I shall, briefly, summarize certain of the findings which have been made thus far by the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee. Other members of the subcommittee will, in greater detail, deal with specific areas of the investigations.

In all candor, however, I cannot begin these remarks with a simple recapitulation of the work we have done. Illuminating as such might be, I realize -- as I know all members realize -- that we have, thus far, barely begun a work that will occupy and dominate the Congresses of free men for lifetimes to come. It is, therefore, of first importance, that -- no matter how feeble our understanding -- we strive to establish perspective.

Our security may very well depend, above all else, on how well and how quickly we grasp such perspective.

Let us begin with this fact: the ground beneath us when we last met has been, largely, swept away. How much is gone, how much remains are questions no man can answer with authority.

The peril of the hour is obvious.

Less obvious, but of far greater importance, is the fact that beyond the peril lies a potential for peace that exceeds any ever before within man's reach.

Since August 30, when the first session of this Congress adjourned, the human race itself -- without regard to flags or philosophy -- has multiplied its capabilities to infinity.

The exploitation of these capabilities by men of selfish purpose holds the awful threat of a world in subjugation.

The mastery of such capabilities by men wholly dedicated to freedom presents, instead, the prospect of a world at last liberated from tyranny, liberated in fact from the fear of war.

What this Congress does will, at best, be only a small beginning on what must ultimately be done -- and will be done in decades and perhaps even centuries ahead. But, small as our effort may be in the long view of history, we can see that lack of sufficient effort on our part would be compounded throughout the ages ahead into a failure of tragic proportions.

(over)

We cannot, in the months of this session, assure the nation's superiority: the era we have entered is too young, its ultimate dimensions too far beyond our vision, for us to anticipate so fruitful a result from our labors.

We can, however, by hesitation, by dissension, by narrow partisanship do much to build an insurmountable barrier about ourselves and perpetuate our relative inferiority.

Responsible men have no choice.

We must work as though no other Congress would ever have an opportunity to meet this challenge, for, in fact, none will have an opportunity comparable.

We must, furthermore, bring to this opportunity a freshness, an originality, a diligence far exceeding our previous standards, for many of the concepts and ideas and rules which have applied to our actions in the past are no longer pertinent and applicable.

Let me expand this by dealing first with certain general facts which have been established in the short time of our hearings:

1. Our national potential exceeds our national performance.

2. Our science and technology has been, for some time, capable of many of the achievements displayed thus far by Soviet science.

3. That the Soviet achievements are tangible and visible, while ours are not, is a result of policy decisions made within the governments of the respective nations. It is not -- as yet, at least -- the result of any great relative superiority of one nation's science over the other's.

The heart of the matter then is the national policy of each of the two great world powers, for this fact stands higher than all others: we could have had what the Soviets have in the way of technical achievements if it had been the aim of our government to employ our resources and capabilities in comparable pursuit of comparable goals.

From this, we deduce these matters of importance:

First, it is obvious that the Soviet valuation on the significance of control of outer space has exceeded that of our officials.

Second, it is equally obvious that our valuation has been based on factors other than the fullest realization of our scientific capability.

In essence, the Soviet has appraised control of space as a goal of such consequence that achievement of such control has been made a first aim of national policy. We, on the other hand, have -- or so the evidence suggests -- regarded other goals and aims as having a higher imperative.

(more)

Which nation is correct?

If our policy is correct in the approach that has been taken, then the Soviet is ludicrously wrong, and some might dismiss the Sputniks as playtoys.

If the Soviet policy is correct in its approach, however, then we face the judgment that our own position may be tragic.

At root, this Congress must -- before it does much else -- decide which approach is correct. If the Soviet is wrong, then we would be wrong to undertake any sort of great acceleration solely to produce counterparts for the visible Soviet achievements. If the Soviet is correct, then we would again be wrong to limit our response to nothing more than a stride-for-stride matching of their progress.

From the evidence accumulated, we do know this: the evaluation of the importance of control of outer space made by us has not been based primarily on the judgment of men most qualified to make such an appraisal.

Our decisions, more often than not, have been made within the framework of the government's annual budget. This control has, again and again, appeared and re-appeared as the prime limitation upon our scientific advancement.

Against this view, we now have on the record the appraisal of leaders in the field of science, respected men of unquestioned competence, whose valuation of what control of outer space means renders irrelevant the bookkeeping concerns of fiscal officers.

The testimony of the scientists is this:

Control of space means control of the world, far more certainly, far more totally than any control that has ever or could ever be achieved by weapons, or by troops of occupation.

From space, the masters of infinity would have the power to control the earth's weather, to cause drouth and flood, to change the tides and raise the levels of the sea, to divert the gulf stream and change temperate climates to frigid.

The meaning is, to my limited view, quite clear.

We have, for many years, been preoccupied with weapons.

We are, even now, concerned with what some currently regard as the ultimate weapon. But, when we perfect such a weapon for ourselves we may still be far behind.

The urgent race we are now in -- or which we must enter -- is not the race to perfect long range ballistics missiles.

(over)

There is something more important than any ultimate weapon. That is the ultimate position -- the position of total control over earth that lies somewhere out in space.

This is the future, the distant future, though not so distant as we may have thought. Whoever gains that ultimate position gains control, total control, over the earth, for purposes of tyranny or for the service of freedom.

Where do we now stand?

Let me summarize briefly the work of your committee.

Our staff has spent more than 50 days in intensive preparation for hearings which now have filled nearly 3,000 pages of transcript. Thirty-four witnesses have been heard before the committee. In addition, the staff has conducted 150 to 200 interviews with individuals concerned with the missile and satellite programs. Searching questionnaires have been sent to industrial organizations, leading scientists and engineers, and leading educators.

An effective, comprehensive and important job has been done. Credit of the highest order is due each member of the subcommittee of both parties. Seldom have I seen men work with greater dedication; the debt due them is great. Likewise, the effectiveness and thoroughness of the committee's work is a direct result of the splendid direction afforded by our counsel, Mr. Edwin L. Weisl and his partner, Cyrus R. Vance. Mr. Weisl and Mr. Vance are distinguished New York lawyers, members of the firm of Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett, and we are fortunate in securing their services.

From this committee effort, the essential findings developed thus far are these:

The Sputniks now orbiting around the earth are not military weapons, but have a military potential.

Whatever their military potential may be, the present significance of these satellites is this:

First, the Soviet ability to put satellites of this size in orbit indicates a rocket ability far beyond any capacity we have developed; and, second, the satellites have gathered for the Soviet vital information about outer space which we do not have and which is decisive for any nation seeking to enter the Space Age.

Our primary effort to put a satellite into the skies ended in humiliating failure. It is my opinion the humiliation could have been avoided: it was unfair to the dedicated scientists who are trying to do a difficult job and it reflected unnecessarily upon our scientific capabilities.

(more)

The people must have the truth, good or bad, but truth begins with perspective. It is not a proper perspective to reflect the responsibility for our lack of a satellite upon the men at work now in Florida. They are neither the source nor the cause of our failure.

Beyond the satellites, our committee has learned facts in open sessions about Soviet capabilities which are far more disturbing in relation to our present security.

First, the Soviets have almost as many Army divisions as all the nations of the free world combined, and a great proportion are highly mechanized.

Second, Soviet air strength is probably close to our own.

Third, Soviet submarines now number 500, while ours total 110, and there is evidence that they have some with missile capability.

Fourth, the Soviets are building 100 submarines annually, while we are building fewer than ten.

Fifth, there is no certain evidence of a Soviet nuclear submarine, but they have launched an atomic ice-breaker, and nuclear submarines, if not now in existence, will be soon.

In the field of the intercontinental and shorter range missiles, the facts again are not comforting. The capacity to launch a one-half ton satellite is interpreted by our scientists as evidence of the capacity to launch an ICBM against our cities. Other problems than the problem of propulsion are involved, however. We cannot fully appraise Soviet capacity in this regard. The safe assumption is that they have solved or will solve such problems as remain.

In part the answers that have been given to the committee are these:

(1) strengthen our strategic air force, about which Senator Symington will tell you more;

(2) accelerate and expand our research and development programs;

(3) speed up the development and manufacture of the intermediate and intercontinental missiles now being worked on;

(4) strengthen our educational system;

(5) provide a top level non-service-connected military planning staff for the Secretary of Defense;

(over)

(6) establish a new, advanced weapons development agency outside of the Defense Department to reduce the lead time in the production of new weapons -- which, incidentally, according to evidence presented at the hearings, is over twice as long as the lead time required by the Russians;

(7) streamline the decision-making process;

(8) accelerate the nuclear submarine program;

(9) eliminate all overtime limitations;

(10) increase cooperation with our allies particularly in the exchange of information;

(11) build shelters and store food and machinery as a precaution against Russian attack;

(12) build as quickly as possible an early warning radar system capable of detecting missiles;

(13) increase our interchange of scientific information between the free nations; and

(14) that we must begin to do all of these things with a strong sense of immediacy and urgency.

The question in your minds, I am sure, is whether or not there has been progress in actions taken during the past few weeks. I believe it is fair to say that some progress has been made since the inquiry began.

The President has named Dr. Killian as his personal scientific advisor. Also, the President has designated the Pentagon's special assistant on missiles as a "missile director", although in candor it must be said that it is difficult to define his powers.

The Secretary of Defense has been active:

1. He has removed the overtime restrictions.

2. He has restored research and development funds.

3. He has speeded up development and production schedules for missiles.

4. He has ordered both Jupiter and Thor into production.

5. He has reinstated a previously canceled launching pad for the Titan intercontinental missile.

6. He has established a new agency to develop advanced weapons.

7. He has ordered the Army into the satellite project.

These actions -- as all, I am sure, will agree -- constitute only a beginning of what eventually must be done. We can hope that the rate of acceleration will be adequate to the great challenge before us.

Our problems have been listed. The suggestions about our future course have been listed. The actions taken have been listed. All of these relate to matters which are, essentially, military in character.

It is fundamental, I believe, that however urgent these military problems may be we are faced with the unchanging problem of building a strong country, not a strong military force alone.

In this perspective, we cannot ignore the problems of three to four million unemployed workers.

We cannot ignore the grave problems of our farmers.

We cannot ignore the problems of our school children.

We cannot ignore the problem of housing.

We cannot ignore the problem of credit.

We cannot ignore the soft spots in our economy which are bringing some of our most vital industries into a difficult and troublesome climate.

We cannot ignore the growing problems of small business.

We cannot ignore the issue of conserving our natural resources.

These problems -- and many more -- must occupy our attention, and it becomes all the more imperative that we seek and reach answers of lasting durability for the road ahead.

One final question, the most important of all: where do we go? What should be our goal?

If, out in space, there is the ultimate position -- from which total control of the earth may be exercised -- then our national goal and the goal of all free men must be to win and hold that position.

Obviously, attainment of that goal is no overnight thing. It may not come within our lifetime. Until it does, we must continue to have weapons -- but we must recognize both their limits and their potentially short life.

(over)

With weapons, whatever their form, our ultimate gain is likely to be stalemate -- such as we have had during the atomic age. But our position must remain flexible. We must forego a fixation on weapons as the ultimate of security. For, if we do not, we may build the Space Age's first -- and last -- Maginot Line.

Total security perhaps is possible now, for the first time in man's history. Total security -- and, with it, total peace. This potential we must not underestimate.

Within the short weeks since October 4, man has become master of horizons far beyond our imagination. We must respect this mastery, and from that respect we must, more than ever, seek to bring all men together in cooperative effort. The goals now within reach of the human race are too great to be divided as spoils, too great for the world to waste its efforts in a blind race between competitive nations. The conference table is more important now than ever it has been, and we should welcome to its chairs all men of all nations.

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And now I present the ranking majority member of the Subcommittee -- Estes Kefauver.

Senator Kefauver has been a hardworking and diligent member of our Committee. In preparation for this briefing he has made himself an expert on the intermediate range ballistics missile -- the most immediate and pressing threat to our security.

* * *

And now we will hear from our respected and beloved colleague, the Senator from Mississippi and the Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee, John Stennis.

We all know that Senator Stennis is one of the most devoted and hard-working members of the Senate. He has spent a considerable amount of time preparing for this presentation, which will cover the intercontinental ballistics missile -- a fearsome weapon.

Senator Stennis.

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The next member of the Subcommittee will tell us about the strategic air force. As a former Secretary of the Air, he is particularly qualified for this assignment.

Senator Symington has maintained his interest in the Air Force and the information which he has is drawn not only from the committee hearings, but from his long and vast experience.

Senator Symington.

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