

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
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03i	cable	Tel Aviv 1796 Sanitized 1998	S	6	12/12/67	A
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open 11/19/14

duplicate, #34f, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol, 54, Box 26

05a	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	S	21	7/26/66	A
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Exempt RAC 001-104-1 (10/01) sanitized 4/28/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-40

06	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ	S	1	3/30/68	A
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open 12-22-03 NW03171

06a	memo	Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow	S	2	3/29/68	A
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open 12-22-03 NW03171

12	note	Walt Rostow to LBJ	S	1	3/7/68	A
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(sanitized per RAC 4/28/15) more info released 4/28/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-40

12a	memo	Intelligence Memo	S	6	3/6/68	A
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Exempt RAC 001-104-1 (10/01) exempt 4/28/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-40

exempt 12-22-03 NW03172

13	report	Intelligence Report	S	24	3/1/68	A
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Sanitized RAC 001-104-1-5 (10/23/01) more info released 4/28/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-40

17	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ	S	1	2/19/68	A
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open 12-22-03 NW03171

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Middle East, Vol. 1

Box Number 104

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
47a	cable	Beirut 6711- open 9/27/11 per RAC	<del>S</del>	<del>7</del>	<del>2/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
18	memo	Special Memorandum <del>Sanitized 10/23/01 - RAC 001-1041-6</del> same sanitization 4/28/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-40	<del>S</del>	<del>14</del>	<del>2/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
20	cable	CAP 80143 open 10/23/01 - RAC 001-1041-6 duplicate #87, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol, 56, Box 27	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>1/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
20a	cable	CAP 80164 exempt per RAC NLJ 001-1041-6 1-18-04 exempt 4/28/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-40	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>1/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
21	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ (CAP 671244) open 1-18-04	<del>S</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>12/29/67</del>	<del>A</del>
27	note	Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow [dup. #31, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Middle East 11/1/67-12/31/67" Box 25] open 1/24/12 per RAC	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>11/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
27a	report	re Hussein [dup. #31a, as above] open 1/24/12 per RAC	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>11/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
27b	report	re Husein [dup. #31b, as above]	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>11/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
30a	memo	for LBJ re Military Supply Freeze <i>exempt per RAC NW 001-104-1-10 1-18-06</i>	S	11	10/13/67	A
<del>34b</del>	<del>draft</del>	<del>report re Near East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa</del> <i>open 1-30-01 NW/RAC 03-140</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>8</del>	<del>9/20/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>35</del>	<del>memo</del>	<del>Intelligence Memorandum</del> <i>open 10/23/01 - RAC 001-104-1-12</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>12</del>	<del>7/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>39a</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>"An Approach to Political Settlement in the Near East"</del> <i>open 9/27/11 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>15</del>	<del>6/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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February 22, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Arab Boycott - Conflicting  
Policy Considerations

The enclosed memorandum sets forth certain considerations relating to the effect of the Arab boycott on U.S. commercial interests in the Middle East. It notes that we are attempting to implement policies in the area which are at times conflicting. One policy was enunciated in legislation; the others relate to our Viet Nam and Cuba policies and more generally, to our overall commercial position in the Arab world.

The memorandum notes that a case has arisen involving RCA and ITT which requires a decision in the near future as to which policy shall be deemed paramount. It indicates that our broader national interests in the area dictate a pragmatic resolution of policy conflicts when they are unavoidable; we cannot justify or accept the possibly permanent economic damage which would be sustained were we to force withdrawal of U.S. commercial interests from the area.

Benjamin M. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:  
Memorandum

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GROUP 3

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By *ngl/sk* NARA, Date 1-7-00



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### The Arab Boycott - Conflicting Policy Considerations

In November of last year, the Arab boycott of Israel conference recommended that the boycott be extended to RCA, Ford, and Coca Cola. MCA has now approached us in connection with a concrete problem which exemplified the practical issues we face with respect to our commercial interests in the Near East.

Briefly stated the issue is as follows: The USG, recognizing that it cannot force the Arab states to give up the boycott, has found that its most effective course is to deal flexibly and pragmatically with the Arab governments in efforts to minimize the impact of the boycott on US firms. Opposed to this approach are a number of domestic US groups and Congressmen who feel that neither the USG nor US firms should take any action tending to "recognize" and thereby, in their view, strengthen the boycott.

In 1965 these opposing viewpoints clashed over passage of an "anti-boycott" amendment to the Export Control Act. Certain Congressmen wished to pass legislation prohibiting US concerns from responding to letters from Arab boycott offices. The Administration opposed this amendment on two grounds. First, it would heighten the confrontation with the Arab states over the boycott and harm US commercial interests in the Near East. Second, it would be detrimental to our own vigorous efforts to persuade foreign nations to cooperate in supplying information necessary for the enforcement of our programs of embargo of shipments of certain types to Cuba and North Viet Nam.

The Administration was successful in heading off an outright prohibition, but Congress did pass the following amendment:

"The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States (A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States and (B) to encourage and request domestic concerns engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information to refuse to take any action, including the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign country against another country friendly to the United States."

Some firms interpret part (B) to mean that they should not respond in any fashion to challenges from boycott offices. Sears Roebuck, for example, has chosen not to respond and as a result of its silence has been boycotted over a misunderstanding that could easily have been cleared up had Sears been willing to communicate with the Arab boycott offices.

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By *C. J. NANA*, Date *1-7-00*



Because Sears has made it a matter of principle not to do so, the Arab states have equally made it a matter of principle to apply the boycott against Sears.

The dangers to overall US commercial interests inherent in the approach embodied in part (B) of the amendment is most sharply demonstrated by RCA's current problem in Kuwait. The dilemma for US policy is also most sharply drawn in this case because of the US Government's licensing function.

A subsidiary of RCA, RCA Communications, contracted with the Government of Kuwait to establish a direct telecommunications link between Kuwait and the US. The contract is a profitable one from RCA's standpoint. While a direct telecommunications link is desirable from Kuwait's standpoint, it is far from essential -- Kuwait can get along without it.

RCA and all its subsidiaries were recommended for boycotting because one subsidiary, RCA Victor, entered into a contract with a firm in Israel under which the firm would manufacture and sell records under the Victor label. The boycott becomes applicable to firms inter alia, "D. If they give the right of using their names of manufacturing licenses to Israeli companies."

International Telephone and Telegraph had been a competitor with RCA for the Kuwait contract in question. Upon notification of the boycott, RCA approached the Department and the FCC with a view to ensuring that, if it is ultimately unsuccessful in maintaining its contract with Kuwait, ITT will not be permitted to benefit, i.e., that the FCC will withhold a license to establish the link. More specifically, RCA indicated that it would, if necessary, argue that issuance of a license to ITT or any other US telecommunications firm would be contrary to the 1965 amendment to the Export Control Act.

Thus, if the US Government is to accede indefinitely to RCA's wishes it will be in effect sacrificing overall US commercial and telecommunications interests in Kuwait and possibly other Arab states for the sake of giving support to one concern which has been boycotted.

Although telecommunications are a somewhat special category because of the FCC licensing procedure, the pattern of the RCA case may be extended to other sectors of the US-Arab commerce. There is already considerable pressure on US automotive manufacturers and soft drink concerns to make it impossible for them to move in on the Arab markets lost by Ford and Coca-Cola. This pressure emanates from both domestic pro-Israel interest groups and from the boycotted firms themselves. Some of these firms have indicated that they will attempt to stifle efforts of their US competitors to take over the Arab markets, possibly by posing the question in Congress



of the legitimacy of such take-overs under the 1965 amendments to the Export Control Act. The US Government also faces a further dilemma on the question of the legitimacy of its efforts to encourage other US firms to fill the vacuum left by a boycotted concern. Yet to fail to do so invites non-US competition into these valuable markets. Our experience with the trade policies of foreign competitive nations indicates we have little or no hope of persuading other states to join us in opposing the Arab boycott.

It is important to be clear about the Arab position on the boycott. Neither the Arab League Central Boycott Office nor the Arab states individually wish to expand actions against individual US firms into a larger confrontation with US commerce. On the other hand, there is no sign that they are prepared to abandon or significantly modify the boycott. They regard the boycott as legitimate economic warfare against a state with which they consider themselves to be still technically in a state of war. Despite the probability of continued friction between the Arab states themselves, and despite examples of backsliding on individual boycott cases where national self-interest is involved, the Arab states have demonstrated a reasonably solid front on this issue.

While the RCA case clearly delineates the dilemma we face in dealing with this problem within the intent of Congress as expressed in the 1965 amendments, should current Congressional sentiment to introduce "mandatory" legislation in place of the present "voluntary" provision be successful, it will destroy any flexibility the Government has in avoiding a confrontation on this issue. Such mandatory legislation also would, in effect, give all the initiative to the capricious Arab boycott officials and make it impossible for US firms to defend themselves without violating US law.

We believe that as a practical matter we cannot abandon our commercial interests in the Middle East simply because potential purchasers present requirements which are distasteful to us or inconsistent with our own policy with regard to the boycott. Accordingly, at such time as it may become apparent in particular cases that our efforts to oppose the boycott will be ineffective and immediately detrimental to US commercial interests, we intend to follow whatever pragmatic approach may be feasible to maintain our overall commercial interests.

Specifically with respect to RCA, we propose to support the company's efforts to maintain its contract with Kuwait. After a reasonable period of time, during which the Department will continue to support RCA's position with the Government of Kuwait, the case would be reviewed. Should it become apparent that Kuwait will not proceed with the RCA contract and our only option is to grant a license to ITT or accept loss of the venture, we should be prepared to recommend that a license be granted by the FCC.



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Senator Javits has now proposed (February 1 Congressional Record) that the Senate Banking and Currency Committee conduct a study of the effectiveness of existing legislation in protecting US firms from the Arab boycott. This may set off a new campaign on the part of pro-Israeli domestic groups and Congressmen for even stronger anti-boycott legislation. We would consider such legislation seriously detrimental to US interests. It is highly relevant, and adds to the complexity of the problem to note that Israel's supporters here are convinced she has been hurt by the Boycott, and are moved by that conviction. However, Israel has not been hurt by the boycott and, in fact, has been helped by it.

One of the purposes of this memorandum is to call attention to the possibility that the Arab boycott issue may again arise requiring a serious Administration effort to head off damaging legislation. The Department intends to conduct a quiet educative campaign on the Hill for the Administration's position and suggests that the White House itself may wish to stress our views on this issue both with Congressmen and domestic groups who support "tougher" anti-boycott legislation. The Senior Vice President of the Coca Cola Company has intimated to the Department that his firm may also inject into Congressional consideration of the problem the question of the propriety of giving assistance or concessional financing to boycotting nations. He mentioned Lebanon and Jordan specifically in this connection.

At stake ultimately are our commercial sales to the Arab world which in 1965 amounted to \$800,000,000. Since purchases in the area are approximately \$300,000,000, we enjoy a favorable balance of trade of approximately half a billion dollars annually, exclusive of petroleum revenues. Moreover, a confrontation over the boycott could spill over into other areas of US-Arab relations, damaging important US interests and adding another force to those already tending to polarize US influence in the Near East around the Arab-Israel dispute.

L/NEA:DAWehmeyer;NEA/IAI:MSterner;E/CBA:RBallen:ef:2/21/67

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

F  
S 4/5 informed  
That Saunders  
notified 12/14/67

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Wednesday, December 13, 1967 2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli and Jordanian Arms Requests

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation for handling our pending decision on Jordan and Israeli arms requests. You will probably want more time to consider the substance of his proposals and may want to discuss them before deciding.

However, you should know that Luke Battle has been summoned to appear before Senator Symington's Mid-East subcommittee tomorrow and probably will be unable to avoid saying something about this problem. Luke would propose to take the following line, which Nick Katzenbach wants to be sure you approve:

*Stop here*  
~~No decisions have been made.~~ However, we may have to move on both Jordanian and Israeli requests while the Senate is in recess.

We are fully aware of Israel's needs and will help provide for its basic security. We have not yet, however, determined precisely what are Israel's essential equipment needs. We believe there is no immediate threat to Israel--a belief which the Israelis also share. The problem is one of lead time, particularly in light of the uncertainty that other sources, e.g. France, will deliver aircraft already contracted for. We are now actively and sympathetically examining these questions with the Israelis.

On Jordan, the question of whether we move on supplying a small amount of equipment depends on whether we want to keep the Jordanians from accepting Soviet offers for a major arms supply program. A Soviet arms presence in Jordan would not make a Middle East settlement easier. If we do decide to give some arms to Jordan, we will do only enough to keep the Jordanians from turning to the East--not enough to give them an offensive capability, and certainly much less than they would get from the Soviets.

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By *gls* NARA, D 1/7/00



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- 2 -

Luke is fully aware of the importance of not creating substantial Jewish reaction on the Hill and will do his best to keep his answers within the above positive framework unless you would rather see him take some other line.

Related subject. I might report that I delivered your message to Congressman Farberstein and other Jewish Congressmen this afternoon and assured them that we're on top of the Mid-East arms situation. They got the point and asked me, in return, to let you know of their concern over the Arab-Israeli military balance and their thanks for all you've done for Israel this summer. \*

W. Rostow

Luke's line is OK

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*Just say no decision on asset  
Conf and provisions etc -*

\* Farberstein's last word: he wants a positive decision on Israeli aircraft by Friday !!

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face--Jordan and Israel.

We don't believe we can string King Hussein along much longer. A Soviet economic delegation with a few military members is in Jordan now. The King feels he has to give his army some assurance that US equipment will be available or consider Soviet offers.

Nick thinks we should do something before Christmas. He recommends a small package from pre-war programs (roughly \$6.5 in spares, automotive and commo gear, some anti-tank guns and ammo). He knows the Israelis won't like this, but says it won't affect the arms balance. He proposes letting the key members of Congress know what we plan to do and then informing King Hussein.

That would leave us with the problem of how to handle Israeli aircraft requests. As you know, they've asked for (a) 27 additional A-4 Skyhawks to be delivered in 1969 on top of the 48 that will be delivered in 1968 and (b) 50 F-4 Phantoms for delivery in 1969-70.

The questions with Israel are not so much "whether" but "when" and "how many."

In principle, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe we should go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks to replace Israel's war losses and provide a margin of safety. They do not believe we have to decide on the 50 Phantoms until later in 1968 since the Arab-Israeli military balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as it was on June 5.

Nick would prefer not to give the Israelis a definite answer now because he does not want to do anything to jeopardize Ambassador Jarring's peacemaking mission or trigger a new round of Arab demands on Moscow. He would like to hold off at least until Eshkol's visit in early February. To meet predictable Israeli pressures, he'd assure them that we can't decide for another month or two but we will take steps to be sure that this delay will not delay eventual delivery of the aircraft if we go ahead. He would also say that, if the military balance tips sharply against Israel, we would be prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts to meet Israel's needs quickly.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By ca/jsh,NARA, 7-7-00



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- 2 -

The alternative is to go ahead with 27 Skyhawks now to balance our move with Jordan. With the substantial Soviet resupply to the Arabs over the summer, no one could argue seriously that 27 aircraft to Israel would upset chances for peace. The Israeli pressure is beginning to build up here.

Therefore, the following decisions are before you:

1. Can we go ahead with a limited program for Jordan in the next week or two, after appropriate Congressional consultation?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Hold for discussion \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

2. If so, which is the better way to handle the Israelis?

--Delay decision but assure Israelis our delay won't delay delivery? \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

--Or tell the Israelis now we'll go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks and talk about the rest later? \_\_\_\_\_

This situation is complex enough that you may want to talk it over with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick Katzenbach before you decide. However, this will give you a chance to consider the problem beforehand.

Hold for discussion \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

Walt Rostow

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memorandum (concurrent in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed.

It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it-- particularly in light of the potential domestic problems.

\* \* \*

Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70.

The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.

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NLJ-S 52001  
By rg/jsb, NARA, Date 1-7-00



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King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army.

Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association--in Arab eyes--with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers.

If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement.

I therefore conclude that:

1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front.

2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We could:

- assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale);
- indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial


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numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs.)

3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Acting

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The IRG for the Near East and South Asia, chaired by Luke Battle, and the SIG under my chairmanship have just completed a review of our arms supply policy for the Near East, with particular attention to pending arms requests from Jordan and Israel.

We have concluded that we should resume limited arms shipments to Jordan in the very near future, and that some increment of aircraft should be provided to Israel. We are recommending for Israel a good deal less at this time than it has asked for, but enough to assure its continued air superiority and to provide an extra margin of safety.

Discussion

The following have been key factors in our review:

- Israel's military superiority over the Arabs is assured at least through the end of next year. How long it will retain its superiority will be affected by the rate and nature of Soviet resupply and training of the Arabs and by Israel's ability to maintain adequately modern weapons in its own inventory.
- We continue to have a major interest not only in Israel's continued ability to defend itself, but also in maintaining influence in the Arab world. We need to retain friendly ties with the moderate Arab states, which have looked to us or other Western sources for their minimum requirements of weapons.

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Authority NW 98-302  
By 7 NARA, Date 9-2-89



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- 2 -

--The Soviets have made important inroads among the Arabs in recent years, and we are faced with the threat of further Soviet penetration via arms aid in the Near East.

For the short term at least, our hopes for progress towards some political accommodation between the Arabs and Israel--and, flowing from that, for some effective arms limitation in the area--ride on the success of Swedish Ambassador Jarring as U Thant's Special Representative under the Security Council's resolution of November 22. The Soviets voted for the Security Council resolution and even tabled their own draft resolution with a clause on arms control reminiscent of your proposal of June 19. They are continuing to ship arms to the Arab radicals, but they are probably not making decisions on shipments over the long term pending further developments.

#### Jordan

We led King Hussein to believe last August that we were sympathetic to his need to get some arms from the U. S., but we excluded Jordan from the partial lifting of our arms freeze in October. We put King Hussein off when he raised the issue in his visit here in November. Hussein stuck his neck out, played a helpful role in the Arab acceptance of the Security Council resolution, and has been working actively towards a settlement. He has staked his fate on working with the West and, particularly, the U. S.

Our principal conclusions are:

- Unless we indicate in the very near future that we will make some supplies available, we run a serious risk--acceptance by Jordan of Soviet arms or erosion of the King's support by the Jordanian military, with a consequent threat to his very survival. We should tell the King of our decision before the end of the year.
- U. S. supply commitments should, for the present, be kept to the minimum necessary to preserve stability in Jordan. We should work on the basis of the minimum list of roughly \$6.5 million (including \$1.5 million in the MAP pipeline) recommended by Embassy Amman--spare parts, automotive and communication gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. The Israelis won't like it, but the supply of these items will not have a noticeable effect on the arms balance in the area.

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- Except for drawing on acceptable items in the existing MAP pipeline (funded prior to this fiscal year), supplies should be provided on a cash sales basis.
- We should continue to encourage Jordan to find the major part of its needs in Western Europe.

#### Israel

The Israelis have given us a request for 27 A-4H Skyhawk aircraft (additional to the 48 to be delivered between now and the end of 1968) and 50 F-4 Phantom jets. The Israelis were able to prevail despite a 3 to 1 ratio against them in aircraft in June--they would have done so even without their preemptive strike--and they consider continued control of the air to be crucial for their future security. Israel lost about 40 out of an inventory of slightly under 200 tactical aircraft during the June war. It wants not only to make up its losses, but to modernize and expand its air force during the next few years.

Soviet supply to the Arab radicals is a major element in the equation. Arab aircraft inventories are edging back toward prewar levels. Soviet deliveries of jet fighters have brought the figure up to 60-80% of the prewar level in the UAR and about 90% in Syria. Arab bomber inventories are still only about half of prewar. Deliveries since June have been largely under contracts negotiated prior to the war and have consisted, by and large, of less advanced types of aircraft similar to those previously supplied. (The attached table shows the trend of Soviet deliveries since the war.) Our intelligence indicates that recent Arab pleas for large amounts of additional military equipment are still the subject of haggling and negotiation with the Soviets. We have no firm basis for predicting the volume and nature of Soviet deliveries over the months and years ahead.

French actions will also be of key importance. It now looks very uncertain whether France, which is the source of Israel's total current tactical air inventory, will actually deliver 50 Mirage V jets ordered in 1966 and scheduled for delivery in 1968.

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Our principal conclusions are:

- We should continue very carefully to study Israel's needs and assure its access to a supply of aircraft essential to preserve its security.
- We should take action in the near future to assure at least an option to supply 27 additional A-4s in 1969. These planes would provide an extra margin of safety in the light of present uncertainties in the equation. They could play a role in deterring future military action by the Arabs.
- We should not accede at this time to Israel's request for 50 F-4s. These planes are not justified by the threat Israel faces, and would tend to add unnecessarily to the arms race, not only in numbers but in sophistication of arms in the area.
- We should handle any action on the additional A-4s in such a way as to minimize possible damage to Jarring's peacemaking mission and the possibility of provoking an arms escalation by the Soviets.

We are now examining various alternatives for handling the request for additional A-4s. These include:

- (a) Deferring a commitment to the Israelis, perhaps for several months while the Jarring mission is under way, but taking measures on our own side for the procurement of components with a long lead time so as to protect the option to supply the aircraft in 1969. This would entail some obligation against our own funds.
- (b) Roughly the same as (a) above but getting the Israelis to stand the financial obligation of procurement of the long-lead items.

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- 5 -

- (c) Finding a formula to enter into an agreement to supply the planes under terms explicitly reserving our option to deliver them in the event we find they are not needed after all.
- (d) Agreeing to supply the additional planes and entering into an early agreement to that effect. The political visibility of our action would be reduced if we could simply amend the existing 1966 contract calling for 48 A-4s.
- (e) On any of the above, although we might find the funds to provide credit despite the current stringency, a straight cash sale is justified by Israel's current financial situation.

If the French actually renege on supplying the 50 Mirage Vs to Israel in 1968, we shall have to reconsider the impact on Israel's security and the implications for our arms supply policy. In that event we may have to come back to you with additional recommendations.

In any event, France's apparent decision to supply a substantial military package to Iraq--possibly including Mirage planes--and to lift its arms embargo for certain other Arab states will increase Israel's concern. It heightens the urgency of some action by us on Israel's pending request.

Scenario: We all agree that we should not take any action until we have consulted with the key people on the Hill. In view of the urgency on Jordan we should like to do so just as soon as Congressional action is completed on the foreign aid appropriation. We believe it will be desirable to inform the key people that we are considering sympathetically some additional commitment to Israel, at the same time as we inform them of our conclusion that it is essential to resume limited shipments to Jordan.

What we need now is authority from you to go ahead with consultations on the above basis. Subject to the satisfactory conclusion of those consultations, we would envisage informing King Hussein of our decision to supply him some arms. We would come back to you for a go-ahead on talking to the Israelis about additional A-4s, as soon as we have worked out more specific terms of a feasible approach to them.

~~SECRET~~



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- 6 -

Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara agree with this memorandum.

Go ahead with consultations \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me before you do anything \_\_\_\_\_

*Richard D. Hall*  
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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ESTIMATES OF SOVIET RESUPPLY OF FIGHTER AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT

(Inventories before, immediately following, and six months  
after the Arab-Israeli war)

	<u>UAR</u>			<u>Syria</u>			<u>Iraq</u>			<u>Algeria</u>		
	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>
Fighter aircraft	365	119	304	85	30	81	95	76	106	122	120	129
Bombers	69	13	43	4	2	2	22	21	29	33	33	21*

\*Some bombers transferred to UAR during the war.

SECRET

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

To Jim Jones

Here is basic memo  
and two additional  
memos for 6:30  
meeting

The President has  
seen all of them  
Brom

MEMORANDUM

8  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3a

PS  
~~SECRET~~

Saturday, December 16, 1967 -- 3:40 p.m.

Rec'd in 5-1/2

Mr. President:

I would add two points to the attached package on the Jordanian and Israeli arms problem:

-- Evron took me aside last night and indicated that the Israelis would be helpful to us if we felt we had to go ahead with the Jordan package. He didn't say so explicitly, but he was, of course, assuming we would go ahead simultaneously with the 27 Skyhawks.

-- The difference between Nick's view and Gene's is very narrow. Nick would let the Israelis know that a delay in commitment need not be a delay in delivery, because we are prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts on the Skyhawk production line if Israel needs help quickly.

Only you can make an assessment as to the importance of taking continuing pressure from the Jewish community from now until Eshkol's visit. Is it worth the bargaining advantage that 27 aircraft might give us in discussions with Eshkol?

My personal judgment is that it is not good practice to have specific aid or arms deals emerge directly from heads of government meetings. But I can quite understand and sympathize with Nick's argument for delay.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6  
MLJ-S 88001  
By rg/jsh NARA, Date 1-7-00



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3-16

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Israel and Jordan

You have asked to discuss these decisions: (1) Shall we resume now a limited (\$6.5 million) program for Jordan to keep the USSR out? (2) When should we answer Israel's aircraft requests?

I. Time is running out on our stringing Hussein along without resuming military shipments. We would go ahead in a minute except for one problem--reaction from Israel, our Jewish community and Congress. But we still feel Israel is better off with a controlled number of US arms in Jordan than with unrestrained Soviet shipments. This is a painful decision, but the Secretaries feel we must go ahead.

II. We must provide Israel with some aircraft (Tab C), but we're divided on two issues--how many? and when? The Arab-Israeli balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as on June 5. The question is how quickly we must act to keep pace with Soviet resupply. The 48 Skyhawks we are already delivering will replace Israel's war losses by the end of 1968 and bring Israel's air strength qualitatively somewhat above its June 5 level. General Weizman asked for 27 more Skyhawks and 50 F-4 Phantoms to increase that level (from 200 to 250) and permit modernization. Everyone agrees that we should go ahead with the 27 added Skyhawks soon and hold on the Phantoms until the need is clearer (e.g. French decision on 50 Mirages). But a debate on timing ranges between these choices:

--Nick Katzenbach (Tab A) would hold our decision until the Eshkol visit. He believes that we should not jeopardize Jarring's mission and that we can keep the Israelis quiet about Jordan by assuring them we'll avoid lead time delays and will divert aircraft from other contracts if Israel needs help quickly.

--Gene Rostow (Tab B) believes we must go ahead now, mainly to disabuse the Arabs of any false hopes that rapid supply of Soviet equipment has given them.

I doubt we can hold domestic pressures comfortably until Eshkol comes. I'd be inclined to go ahead now with the 27 Skyhawks, both to balance our Jordan move (if you approve) and to show we mean it about wanting Israel to be militarily self-sufficient.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
DATE 10/18/01  
By: Rg/jsh Date 1-7-00

~~SECRET~~

W. Rostow

30/

A

COPIES TO:  
S/S:RF  
NEA  
NEA/RA  
NEA/IAI  
NEA/ARN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memorandum (concurrent in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed.

It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it-- particularly in light of the potential domestic problems.

\* \* \*

Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70.

The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.

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E.O. 12858 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By gls NARA, Date 1-7-00



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-2-

King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army.

Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association--in Arab eyes--with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers.

If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement.

I therefore conclude that:

1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front.

2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We could:

- assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale);
- indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial


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-3-

numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs.)

3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Acting

~~SECRET~~

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B



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1. Scindus  
2. Ret  
3-f

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1967

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

Walt:

Attached is a memo to me from Gene on the Israel-Jordan arms question. You will note that it differs, to some extent, from the two memos I recently sent to the President. As you know, the basic memo (as distinct from my personal note) was based on our discussion in the SIG. You will recall that the general view was that our main problem was Jordan, and that we should try to keep the options open in dealing with Israeli requests. My personal note reflected my concern for the President's political problem, and therefore moved more in the direction of a forthcoming stance on the Israeli request even though the present security situation might not justify such a move.

This, obviously, is a fast-moving situation with a number of alternative ways to proceed. I have no great problem with going ahead on the 27 A-4s the Israelis want by '69. If we do move now the decision should, I think, be based on a political estimate rather than a military one. It would also raise the question of what we give Eshkol when he comes here in February. If we go ahead with the planes now, we will probably have to come up with something more when he arrives.

You should know that we have asked DOD to give us precise information on lead times, as well as an estimate of just how much elbow room we have on F-4 diversions.

*Walt*  
Acting Secretary

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-3 95001  
By *cg/jsh* NARA, Date *1-7-00*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

27

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

December 13, 1967

TO : U - The Acting Secretary  
FROM : *EM* - Eugene V. Rostow  
SUBJECT: Planes for Israel.

As I told you last night, I cannot agree with one recommendation of the attached paper. I am sorry I had to miss the discussion of the subject at the SIG meeting, which took place while I was abroad.

I agree with the action proposed with regard to Jordan.

But I cannot agree to delay a decision on additional planes for Israel.

I concur in the reasoning of Ambassador Barbour's telegrams on the subject, which I attach for ready reference.

Our basic interest in the question is to deter any Arab or Soviet temptation to strike at Israel, and to be certain that if such an act should occur, Israel would be in a safe position to deal with it alone. In terms of air power, I am not convinced that "the military balance is in Israel's favor" at this time, for the reasons Ambassador Barbour gives. And I believe that firm assurance of support for the Israeli air force now should encourage Arab cooperation with the Jarring Mission, discourage hot-heads on both sides, and constitute the right signal for the Soviets. The decision should not be made public, in my view, so as not to affront moderate Arab opinion in a period of rising Arab concern about the Soviet military presence in the area, and particularly in the Yemen. But the fact of the decision will nevertheless be known, and will improve the atmosphere.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By *gjs*/sh NARA, Date *1-7-00*

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- 2 -

I disagree also with the reasoning of paragraph 3. I can see no way to make the Israelis accept our decision with regard to Jordan without assurance as to their own supply of aircraft.

I therefore recommend that the Israelis be told now that we will sell them 27 A-4s, in addition to the number already announced, for delivery as planned; that we are keeping the problem under close and continuing review; and that we should be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; deliveries of substantial number of Mirages to Arab countries, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs).

Attachments

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*m-m Key*  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

22

~~SECRET~~ 752

*3-h*

*2.1*

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01638 271838Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

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O 271730Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2789

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1638

EXDIS

REF: STATE 74858

1. AS EXPECTED, IN MEETING WITH ME TODAY, PM ESHKOL BEGAN BY REFERRING TO NASSER SPEECH OF NOV 23. HE LIKENED HUSSEIN-NASSER RELATIONSHIP TO SEE-SAW, WITH HUSSEIN MAKING ENCOURAGING NOISES IN WORLD CAPITOLS ONLY TO HAVE HIS EFFORTS FRUSTRATED BY WARLIKE PRONOUNCEMENTS BY NASSER. HE DESCRIBED SPEECH OF NOV 23 AS DAGGER IN BACK OF CAUSE OF PEACE. ESHKOL SAID HE HAD HOPED WITH SOME CONFIDENCE THAT SIX DAY WAR WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY REAL PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST AND HE STILL HOPES SO BUT WITH CONSIDERABLY LESS CONFIDENCE. THE "SUPERLATIVES" OF NASSER'S EXPRESSION DID NOT

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 1638 ~~SECRET~~

AUGUR WELL. IN ANY EVENT, ISRAEL MUST BE CAREFUL AND REMAIN ON GUARD.

2. ISRAELI MILITARY CAPABILITY IS ADEQUATE ON GROUND. "CENTER OF GRAVITY" IS THE AIR FORCE AND THERE ISRAEL IS VERY VULNERABLE. WITHOUT REPEATING DETAILS, WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN BY GEN WEIZMAN, ESHKOL MENTIONED ONLY THAT EFFECTIVE FIGHTER STRENGTH NOW IS SOME 90 PLANES, AND THEY ARE NO "SPRING CHICKENS."

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By *rg/jsk* NARA, Date *1-7-00*

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 01638 271838Z

EM ESHKOL SAID HE IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT GETTING THE 50 FRENCH MIRAGES. IN ANY CASE, EVEN IF HE GETS THOSE, HIS ESTIMATE IS THAT ISRAEL WILL BE IN A RATIO OF ONE TO THREE IN LIGHT OF SOVIET REPLACEMENTS TO EGYPT, WORSE IF

ALGERIAN REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING, AND THIS ONLY AFTER ARRIVAL OF LAST OF 48 A4S WHICH NOT SCHEDULED UNTIL 1969. HE THINKS THIS RATIO IS TOO DANGEROUS FOR ISRAEL TO CONTEMPLATE WITH EQUANIMITY.

4. PM NOTED HE AWARE US DESIRE NOT BECOME SOLE ISRAELI SUPPLIER AND GOI ALSO WOULD PREFER HAVE MORE THAN ONE SOURCE. BUT, WITH FRENCH OUT OF PICTURE, US IS ONLY ONE TO WHICH ISRAEL CAN TURN.

PAGE 3 RUQMV L 1638 ~~SECRET~~

HE HAS THOUGHT OF ALTERNATIVE OF BUILDING PLANES HERE BUT EXPENSE AND TIME INVOLVED SUCH A PROJECT MAKE IT MOST UNATTRACTIVE.

5. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, ESHKOL WISHES MAKE MOST EARNEST PLEA FOR TWO STEPS BY US: A) AGREE TO PROVIDE 27 MORE A4A AND 50 PHANTOMS AND B) EXPEDITE DELIVERY 48 A4S ALREADY AGREED. HE URGED WE MAKE THIS DECISION WITH MINIMUM DELAY, ALTHOUGH HE APPRECIATED PROCESSING THROUGH GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY OF US MAGNITUDE TIME CONSUMING. HE NOTED GEN WEIZMAN'S REPORT THAT HIS REPRESENTATIONS HAD RECEIVED MOST CORDIAL AND SYMPATHETIC HEARING, FOR WHICH GOI GRATEFUL. BUT, HE BEGGED IN MOST ELOQUENT TERMS HE COULD MUSTER THAT GOI ALSO GET THE HARDWARE.

6. I GAVE ESHKOL FULL SUBSTANCE STATE'S MOST HELPFUL REFTEL (OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT FYI SECTION). HE MADE NO PARTICULAR COMMENT, EXCEPT TO REITERATE HIS GROWING DOUBTS AS TO NASSER'S INTENTIONS. I ALSO URGED THAT, DESPITE HIS PRESENT UNEASINESS ABOUT THE ATTAINMENT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, HE SHOULD NOT ABANDON HOPE OF SUCCESS AT THE END OF WHAT WOULD BE A HARD ROAD. HE

PAGE 4 RUQMV L 1638 ~~SECRET~~

AGREED. FURTHER, I REMARKED THAT AS THE EVENTS OF MAY AND JUNE

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 01638 271838Z

RECEDED IN PEOPLES' MEMORY, ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO GIVE INCREAS-  
ING ATTENTION TO HER IMAGE IN THE WORLD. HER POSITION AS THE  
VICTIM OF AN ATTEMPT BY HER NEIGHBORS TO ANNIHILATE HER BECOMES  
LESS CREDIBLE THE LONGER SHE SITS IN HER PRESENT POSTURE AS AN  
OCCUPYING POWER IN LARGE AREAS. SHE MUST EXERCISE THE "MAGNAN-  
IMITY OF THE VICTOR" IN HER OWN INTEREST. ESHKOL CONCURRED,  
REMINING ME THAT I HAD ONCE COMMENTED THAT ISRAEL IS NOW THE  
POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAS ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN  
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. HE CONCLUDED THAT ALL THIS IS DEPENDENT  
ON ISRAEL HAVING REAL SECURITY, TO WHICH HIS PRESENT REQUESTS  
ARE DIRECTED.

FYI. VARIOUS READERS OF THIS MESSAGE WILL RECALL THAT THIS AIR  
FORCE IMBALANCE HAS GIVEN ME CONCERN SINCE THE SOVIET REPLAC-  
MENT PROGRAM TO EGYPT BEGAN, AND I HAD HAD SEVERAL OCCASIONS  
TO MENTION IT WHEN IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY. I DO NOT TAKE ISSUE  
WITH OUR MILITARY EXPERTS' CONCLUSION THAT FOR SOME TIME TO  
COME, ISRAEL WILL BE SUPERIOR OVERALL IN MILITARY CAPABILITY  
TO ANY LIKELY COMBINATION OF POWERS WHICH MAY BE RANGED AGAINST

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 1638 ~~SECRET~~

HER, AND THIS PROBABLY WHETHER WE MAKE THE ADDITIONAL 77 PLANES  
REQUESTED AVAILABLE OR NOT. BUTWZ I SUBMIT THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS  
THEMSELVES DO NOT THINK SO, THEIR INCREASED NERVOUSNESS WILL BE  
LIKELY TO MAKE THEM AT WORST TEND TOWARD MORE ADVENTUROUS  
COURSES TO AVOID POSSIBLY IMAGINARY ARAB EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT SUCH  
IMBALANCE, AND AT BEST MORE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE TO TAKE  
STEPS INVOLVING INCREASES TO THEIR SECURITY RISKS, WHICH MAY  
BE NECESSARY IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE TOWARD FINAL PEACE.  
ALSO, DESPITE EXPERT ASSESSMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE FROM A  
STRICT CONSIDERATION OF US INTEREST IN STABILITY IN THE REGION,  
THAT ADDITIONAL MARGIN OF SAFETY TO BE PROVIDED BY THESE AIR-  
PLANES IN THE HANDS OF RESPONSIBLE (ALSO COULD READ, NON-SOVIET)  
ISRAELIS. ACCORDINGLY, AS HERETOFORE, I CONTINUE TO ENDORSE  
THESE REQUESTS AND URGE US AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BARBOUR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

3.2

~~SECRET~~

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40

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

R 121606Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2877

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 1796

EXDIS

1. AT OUTSET MEETING THIS MORNING ARRANGED BY MUTUAL REQUEST  
I HAD ANOTHER MATTER, REPORTED SEPARATELY, TO RAISE WITH  
HIM ON INSTRUCTIONS. FONMIN EBAN GAVE ME FOLLOWING AIDE  
MEMOIRE WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS SUMMARIZING THE VIEWS HE  
WISHED TO PRESENT:

BEGIN QUOTE

AIDE MEMOIRE

DECEMBER 12, 1967

THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS BECOMING  
PROGRESSIVELY MORE BLATANT AND INTENSE.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 1796/1 ~~SECRET~~

A. REARMAMENT OF THE U.A.R.

SINCE JUNE THE USSR HAS REPLENISHED OVER 80 PERCENT OF ARAB  
LOSSES IN EQUIPMENT AND STORES. AT THE PRESENT RATE THE  
RESUPPLYING OF EGYPTIAN FORCES TO PRE-JUNE STRENGTH WILL BE  
COMPLETED IN APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS. SOME OF THE EQUIP-

MENT WILL BE QUANTITATIVELY SUPERIOR TO THAT BEING REPLACED.  
SU 7 AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN GREATER PROPORTION. ~~NOT TO BE REPRODUCED~~  
TANKS ARE BEING REPLACED BY T 54 TANKS. HOWITZERS BY NEW FIELD  
GUNS. GROUND TO GROUND MISSILES ARE BEING INTRODUCED IN  
NUMBERS AND QUALITY YET TO BE DETERMINED. ~~WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION~~  
~~OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12812, 12814, 12818  
By: 10, NARA, Date: 11-11-14

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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## B. NAVAL PRESENCE

SINCE JUNE THE SOVIETS HAVE ESTABLISHED A NAVAL FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SECOND ONLY TO THE SIXTH FLEET. THE PRESENT RATIO BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES IS ESTIMATED AT UPWARDS OF 5:3. THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THIS FORCE AND THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UAR MARKS AN ESCALATION OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE REGION.

## C. AERIAL DEMONSTRATION

FOLLOWING AFTER THESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS THE SOVIETS YET

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 1796/1 ~~SECRET~~

DESPATCHED A SQUADRON OF TU-16 BOMBERS TO EGYPT FOR A VISIT OF UNSPECIFIED DURATION. IT IS REPORTED THAT OTHER SUCH VISITS WILL FOLLOW. THE MOTIVES MAY BE TO STRENGTHEN THE NASSER REGIME ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND OF AMBASSADOR JARRING'S VISIT. THE EGYPTIAN INTERPRETATION IS EXUBERANT. CAIRO IS BECOMING LESS CONVINCED THAN EVER OF THE NECESSITY TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT.

## D. SOUTH ARABIA

THE SOVIETS HAVE JUST TAKEN THE UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF INTERVENING ACTIVELY IN THE YEMEN WAR BY EMPLOYING SOVIET-MANNED AIRCRAFT AGAINST ROYALIST FORCES. IN ARAB EYES THIS GIVES FURTHER CREDIBILITY TO THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET DIRECT INTERVENTION ELSEWHERE.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THIS ESCALATION IN THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT SHOULD REMAIN UNCHALLENGED. IF IT DOES ARAB POLICY WILL BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF EVENTUAL SOVIET SUPREMACY. IT IS EARNESTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BE APPRISED OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN AND SERIOUS RESERVATIONS OVER THESE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 1796/1 ~~SECRET~~

FAR-REACHING MANEUVERS. THE ABSENCE OF ANY UNITED STATES REACTION WILL ENCOURAGE FURTHER SOVIET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PASSIVITY WILL BE GRAVE BOTH IN THE

~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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SOVIET AND ARAB CONTEXT. AT THE PRESENT STAGE THE POLITICAL EFFECTS ARE STRONGER THAN THE STRICTLY MILITARY EFFECTS. THE TENDENCY NOTICED IN NOVEMBER FOR ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO ATTACH DECISIVE WEIGHT TO UNITED STATES INFLUENCE WILL BE DISSIPATED.

FURTHERMORE WE STRONGLY URGE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO COME TO AN EARLY AND POSITIVE DECISION ON ISRAEL'S PENDING REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY AIRCRAFT. SUCH A DECISION WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING POSITIVE EFFECTS:

1. IT WILL HELP REDRESS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY GAINS ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIETS THROUGH THEIR RECENT ACTIONS.
2. IT WILL HAVE A SOBERING EFFECT ON EGYPTIAN PLANNERS AND POLICY-MAKERS. THEY KNOW THAT BEGIN UNDERLINE HUNDREDS OF AIRCRAFT HAVE REACHED THE UAR WHILE NOT ONE SINGLE AIRCRAFT HAS REACHED ISRAEL. END UNDERLINE IT WOULD BE EXTRAORDINARY IN SUCH

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 1796/1 ~~SECRET~~

A CONTEXT IF THE UAR WERE TO SHOW A CONCILIATORY FRONT.

3. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DEMONSTRATE THE U.S. DETERMINATION TO ENSURE A VIABLE BALANCE OF ARMAMENT IN THE AREA. THE FRENCH DEFECTION HAS HELPED TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL CAN SOON BE INTIMIDATED. IT IS ASTONISHING TO RECORD SUCH A POSITION SO SOON AFTER THE JUNE FIGHTING. THE CHANCES OF PROGRESS IN THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION EFFORT ARE CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THEY WERE A FEW WEEKS AGO, AS A RESULT OF THESE CUMULATIVE DISTURBANCES IN THE EXISTING AND PROSPECTIVE BALANCE OF POWER. TO ALLOW THIS DERANGEMENT TO PROCEED WITHOUT COUNTERBALANCING ACTION WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE AN ERROR OF GREAT SCOPE.

EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT DECISIONS OF WAR OR PEACE IN THIS REGION ARE DETERMINED NOT SO MUCH BY THE REALITY ~~NOT TO BE REPRODUCED~~ IMPRESSION AND APPEARANCE OF IT. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD NOT BE GREATLY AFFECTED BY AN OBJECTIVELY POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN POWER ~~OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY~~ DANGER LIES IN THE IMPRESSION THAT AMERICAN AND ISRAELI STRENGTH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 6 RUQMVL 1796/1 ~~SECRET~~

HAVE FOR SOME MONTHS BEEN STATIC, WHILE SOVIET AND ARAB CAPACITIES HAVE BEEN GROWING IN SWIFT MOMENTUM. END OF QUOTE

2. IN THE ENSUING CONVERSATION EBAN ELABORATED ON THIS PRESENTATION WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS HE SEES RESULTING FROM THE INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. REITERATING THE ISRAELI ASSESSMENT REPORTED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS THAT NASSER AND THE EGYPTIANS APPEAR EMBARKED ON A TWO-PRONGED POLICY (A) AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION ON THEIR TERMS IF POSSIBLE AND (B) AT THE SAME TIME REBUILDING THEIR MILITARY POTENTIAL TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT IF A POLITICAL SOLUTION FAILS OR THEY ULTIMATELY DECIDE THAT THEY PREFER A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES THEY WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DEFEAT ISRAEL AT THE NEXT ATTEMPT, EBAN SAID THAT HE FELT IN NOVEMBER NASSER WAS DEFINITELY EMPHASIZING THE DESIRABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE (A), A POLITICAL SOLUTION, BUT THAT THERE ARE NOW SERIOUS INDICATIONS THAT HE IS LESS DEDICATED TO THAT COURSE. THIS CHANGE EBAN

GP-3. BARBOUR

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~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

24

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01796 02 OF 02 121801Z

40

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

R 121606Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE, WASHDC 2878

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 1796

EXDIS

EBAN ATTRIBUTES TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RECENT MOVES IN THE AREA. EBAN IS APPREHENSIVE THAT IF THIS IS THE CASE THE EGYPTI-  
ANS WILL BE LESS ANXIOUS TO REACH AGREEMENT POLITICALLY THAN  
THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN HERETOFORE. HIS PARTICULAR CONCERN IS NOT A  
REAL IMBALANCE IN US-SOVIET FORCE IN THE AREA IN THE FAVOR OF  
SOVIETS BUT RATHER THE APPEARANCE OF ADDITIONAL SOVIET ACTIVITY  
WHICH MIGHT HAVE SUCH AN EFFECT ON ARABIC THINKING AS TO INFLU-  
ENCE THEM IN DIRECTION OF UNREALISTIC FURTHER ADVENTURES OR,  
OBVIOUSLY A LESSER BUT STILL SERIOUS COURSE, MIGHT PERSUADE  
THEM TOWARD ADAMANCY IN POLITICAL NEGOTIATION. TURNING TO A  
QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND PARTICULARLY US

PAGE 2 RUQMV 1796/2 ~~SECRET~~

ARMS FOR ISRAEL, EBAN AGAIN STRESSED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPOR-  
TANCE OF A FAVORABLE DECISION ON THE WEIZMAN REQUESTS AS A  
DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. DETERMINATION TO COUNTER EFFECTIVELY  
SOVIET MOVES. HE ASSUMED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT RPT NOT GET  
FRENCH MIRAGES. BUT HE STRESSED THAT EVEN IF THEY DID EVENTUALLY  
IT WOULD NOT EFFECT THE VALIDITY OF ISRAEL'S PRESENT REQUEST TO  
THE U.S. AS FOR NUMBERS, EVEN BEFORE THE JUNE HOSTILITIES ISRAEL  
ASSESSED ITS REQUIREMENTS UNTIL 1970 AS 75 A-4'S AND 100 RPT 100  
MIRAGES. THE FIRST 50 OF THE LATTER TO BE ACQUIRED

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~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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BE FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL 50 IN '69. WITH THE REARMING BY THE SOVIETS OF EGYPT AND OTHERS THIS ISRAELI REQUIREMENT STILL REMAINS VALID. THUS THE 27 A-4'S AND 50 PHANTOMS REQUESTED BY WEIZMAN ARE NECESSARY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE 50 MIRAGES COME FROM FRANCE OR NOT. EBAN CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING VIEW THAT HE HOPED FIRMLY, BASED ON THE WEIZMAN CONVERSATIONS AND HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT ONES IN WASHINGTON, THAT U.S. WOULD NOT ARGUE ABOUT NUMBERS PERHAPS ON A THEORY WHICH WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO HIM THAT A FEW MORE OR LESS WOULD HAVE SOME USEFUL EFFECT IN LIGHTENING THE IMPACT OF

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 1796/2 ~~SECRET~~  
U.S. SUPPLY. ON CONTRARY, IF WE SHOULD DO SO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNTER TO THE USSR WOULD BE DIMINISHED AND ISRAEL WOULD IN EFFECT BE LEFT IN DANGEROUSLY SHORT POSITION ON THESE ESSENTIAL DEFENSE ITEMS.

3. I SAID THAT WHILE I DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING IN ADDITION TO WHAT HE HAS BEEN TELLING IN WASHINGTON AS TO THE PRESENT STATE OF U.S. CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROBLEM IS BEING ACTIVELY PURSUED. I ADDED THAT I FELT ISRAELI CONCERNS HAVE BEEN CLEARLY ENUNCIATED AND BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON BUT THAT I WOULD OF COURSE REPORT THE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS HE HAD SET FORTH TODAY.

GP-3. BARBOUR

~~SECRET~~

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The IRG for the Near East and South Asia, chaired by Luke Battle, and the SIG under my chairmanship have just completed a review of our arms supply policy for the Near East, with particular attention to pending arms requests from Jordan and Israel.

We have concluded that we should resume limited arms shipments to Jordan in the very near future, and that some increment of aircraft should be provided to Israel. We are recommending for Israel a good deal less at this time than it has asked for, but enough to assure its continued air superiority and to provide an extra margin of safety.

Discussion

The following have been key factors in our review:

- Israel's military superiority over the Arabs is assured at least through the end of next year. How long it will retain its superiority will be affected by the rate and nature of Soviet resupply and training of the Arabs and by Israel's ability to maintain adequately modern weapons in its own inventory.
- We continue to have a major interest not only in Israel's continued ability to defend itself, but also in maintaining influence in the Arab world. We need to retain friendly ties with the moderate Arab states, which have looked to us or other Western sources for their minimum requirements of weapons.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12858 Sec. 3.5  
NLI-S 98001  
By ajsh, NARA, Date 1-7-00

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

--The Soviets have made important inroads among the Arabs in recent years, and we are faced with the threat of further Soviet penetration via arms aid in the Near East.

For the short term at least, our hopes for progress towards some political accommodation between the Arabs and Israel--and, flowing from that, for some effective arms limitation in the area--ride on the success of Swedish Ambassador Jarring as U Thant's Special Representative under the Security Council's resolution of November 22. The Soviets voted for the Security Council resolution and even tabled their own draft resolution with a clause on arms control reminiscent of your proposal of June 19. They are continuing to ship arms to the Arab radicals, but they are probably not making decisions on shipments over the long term pending further developments.

#### Jordan

We led King Hussein to believe last August that we were sympathetic to his need to get some arms from the U. S., but we excluded Jordan from the partial lifting of our arms freeze in October. We put King Hussein off when he raised the issue in his visit here in November. Hussein stuck his neck out, played a helpful role in the Arab acceptance of the Security Council resolution, and has been working actively towards a settlement. He has staked his fate on working with the West and, particularly, the U. S.

Our principal conclusions are:

- Unless we indicate in the very near future that we will make some supplies available, we run a serious risk--acceptance by Jordan of Soviet arms or erosion of the King's support by the Jordanian military, with a consequent threat to his very survival. We should tell the King of our decision before the end of the year.
- U. S. supply commitments should, for the present, be kept to the minimum necessary to preserve stability in Jordan. We should work on the basis of the minimum list of roughly \$6.5 million (including \$1.5 million in the MAP pipeline) recommended by Embassy Amman--spare parts, automotive and communication gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. The Israelis won't like it, but the supply of these items will not have a noticeable effect on the arms balance in the area.

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- 3 -

--Except for drawing on acceptable items in the existing MAP pipeline (funded prior to this fiscal year), supplies should be provided on a cash sales basis.

--We should continue to encourage Jordan to find the major part of its needs in Western Europe.

#### Israel

The Israelis have given us a request for 27 A-4H Skyhawk aircraft (additional to the 48 to be delivered between now and the end of 1968) and 50 F-4 Phantom jets. The Israelis were able to prevail despite a 3 to 1 ratio against them in aircraft in June--they would have done so even without their preemptive strike--and they consider continued control of the air to be crucial for their future security. Israel lost about 40 out of an inventory of slightly under 200 tactical aircraft during the June war. It wants not only to make up its losses, but to modernize and expand its air force during the next few years.

Soviet supply to the Arab radicals is a major element in the equation. Arab aircraft inventories are edging back toward prewar levels. Soviet deliveries of jet fighters have brought the figure up to 60-80% of the prewar level in the UAR and about 90% in Syria. Arab bomber inventories are still only about half of prewar. Deliveries since June have been largely under contracts negotiated prior to the war and have consisted, by and large, of less advanced types of aircraft similar to those previously supplied. (The attached table shows the trend of Soviet deliveries since the war.) Our intelligence indicates that recent Arab pleas for large amounts of additional military equipment are still the subject of haggling and negotiation with the Soviets. We have no firm basis for predicting the volume and nature of Soviet deliveries over the months and years ahead.

French actions will also be of key importance. It now looks very uncertain whether France, which is the source of Israel's total current tactical air inventory, will actually deliver 50 Mirage V jets ordered in 1966 and scheduled for delivery in 1968.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

Our principal conclusions are:

- We should continue very carefully to study Israel's needs and assure its access to a supply of aircraft essential to preserve its security.
- We should take action in the near future to assure at least an option to supply 27 additional A-4s in 1969. These planes would provide an extra margin of safety in the light of present uncertainties in the equation. They could play a role in deterring future military action by the Arabs.
- We should not accede at this time to Israel's request for 50 F-4s. These planes are not justified by the threat Israel faces, and would tend to add unnecessarily to the arms race, not only in numbers but in sophistication of arms in the area.
- We should handle any action on the additional A-4s in such a way as to minimize possible damage to Jarring's peacemaking mission and the possibility of provoking an arms escalation by the Soviets.

We are now examining various alternatives for handling the request for additional A-4s. These include:

- (a) Deferring a commitment to the Israelis, perhaps for several months while the Jarring mission is under way, but taking measures on our own side for the procurement of components with a long lead time so as to protect the option to supply the aircraft in 1969. This would entail some obligation against our own funds.
- (b) Roughly the same as (a) above but getting the Israelis to stand the financial obligation of procurement of the long-lead items.

~~SECRET~~

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- 5 -

- (c) Finding a formula to enter into an agreement to supply the planes under terms explicitly reserving our option to deliver them in the event we find they are not needed after all.
- (d) Agreeing to supply the additional planes and entering into an early agreement to that effect. The political visibility of our action would be reduced if we could simply amend the existing 1966 contract calling for 48 A-4s.
- (e) On any of the above, although we might find the funds to provide credit despite the current stringency, a straight cash sale is justified by Israel's current financial situation.

If the French actually renege on supplying the 50 Mirage Vs to Israel in 1968, we shall have to reconsider the impact on Israel's security and the implications for our arms supply policy. In that event we may have to come back to you with additional recommendations.

In any event, France's apparent decision to supply a substantial military package to Iraq--possibly including Mirage planes--and to lift its arms embargo for certain other Arab states will increase Israel's concern. It heightens the urgency of some action by us on Israel's pending request.

Scenario: We all agree that we should not take any action until we have consulted with the key people on the Hill. In view of the urgency on Jordan we should like to do so just as soon as Congressional action is completed on the foreign aid appropriation. We believe it will be desirable to inform the key people that we are considering sympathetically some additional commitment to Israel, at the same time as we inform them of our conclusion that it is essential to resume limited shipments to Jordan.

What we need now is authority from you to go ahead with consultations on the above basis. Subject to the satisfactory conclusion of those consultations, we would envisage informing King Hussein of our decision to supply him some arms. We would come back to you for a go-ahead on talking to the Israelis about additional A-4s, as soon as we have worked out more specific terms of a feasible approach to them.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara agree with this memorandum.

Go ahead with consultations \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me before you do anything \_\_\_\_\_

*Walter D. Hight*  
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ESTIMATES OF SOVIET RESUPPLY OF FIGHTER AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT

(Inventories before, immediately following, and six months  
after the Arab-Israeli war)

	<u>UAR</u>			<u>Syria</u>			<u>Iraq</u>			<u>Algeria</u>		
	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>
Fighter aircraft	365	119	304	85	30	81	95	76	106	122	120	129
Bombers	69	13	43	4	2	2	22	21	29	33	33	21*

\*Some bombers transferred to UAR during the war.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified.

4  
Lois,

Will you ask Mr. Rostow if these  
have been taken care of by phone  
conversations.

mjdr  
Jan 18

*[Handwritten signature]*

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, January 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

85 SUBJECT: Press Guidance on Israeli Aircraft and Jordanian Arms

We would like to deal in two ways this morning with press reports that you promised Eshkol a few more Skyhawks but that no commitment was made on Phantoms. The stories I've seen so far haven't been bad, but they haven't given us enough credit for restraint or for making an honest effort to achieve some sort of arms limitation. Therefore, we would like to give the following guidance to Bob McCloskey for use at noon and to our Ambassadors in Arab capitals to put your decision in the right perspective:

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit makes clear our continuing interest in Israel's security. In this spirit we are continuing the delivery of planes under our 1966 agreement and, in light of deliveries to other states in the area since the June war, have agreed to an extension of the 1966 agreement in order to provide a limited number of additional planes of the same type to Israel. For the immediate future, however, we are convinced that Israel's military situation gives us time to consider further a decision on F-4 Phantoms, which Israel also wants. We want to use that time to explore further the opportunities for arms limitation in the area and to work for the success of the Jarring Mission. Peace was the first order of business in our talks with Prime Minister Eshkol, and the search for peace has top priority in our present efforts. What we do about Israel's request for more aircraft will depend on developments in the area in the coming months, including the arms supply policies of others and the progress made toward a peaceful settlement.

If asked whether lead times require a decision soon, we would say that we have examined this question and concluded that lead time is a problem that can be handled. Beyond that, we would refuse to discuss details.

Some stories have also said we have informed Jordan we would relax our ban on arms sales. This has attracted less attention, so our spokesmen will not have to deal with it today. We would plan soon, however, after informing key Congressional leaders, to say in response to questions that we decided at the beginning of January to include Jordan among those countries for whom we would make limited exceptions to our arms freeze and that we are studying requests.

Approve guidance on Israeli story \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Approve your proposed course on Jordan \_\_\_\_\_

W. Rostow

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12858 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
BY: [signature] NARA, Date: 1-7-00

NEAR/ <sup>EAST</sup> ~~MIDDLE EAST~~

5





3.5(c)

5a

26 July 1966

CIA/CR M-66-19

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EO 13526

3.3(b)(1)&gt;25Y1

EO 13526

3.3(b)(6)&gt;25Y1

EO 13526

3.5(c)

EO 13526

6.2(d)

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SELECTED DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES  
TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THE  
NEAR/MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3.5(c)

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 15-40

By ch NARA, Date 3-10-15



One page sanitized in its entirety

CIA/CR M-66-19

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
26 July 1966

## SPECIAL BIOGRAPHIC MEMORANDUM\*

SUBJECT: Selected Diplomatic Representatives to the  
United States from the Near/Middle Eastern  
Countries

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\*Prepared by the Office of Central Reference



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3.3(b)(1)  
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## The Ambassador from Afghanistan

Abdul MAJID

Abdul Majid, an American-trained bacteriologist and long-time ambassador to Japan (1956-1963), has been ambassador to the US since 1963. He is also serving concurrently as ambassador to Mexico and minister to Brazil and Argentina.



3.3(b)(1)

Majid was born in 1915 and was sent to the US by the Afghan Government for his higher education. He obtained a BS from Cornell University and a PhD in bacteriology from the University of California at Berkeley. While at Berkeley he taught at Mills College in Oakland. Returning to Kabul in 1940, he was employed concurrently at the Bacteriological Institute and as a teacher of bacteriology and biology at Kabul University. In 1947 he became rector of the university. Leaving the academic world, he was minister of Public Health from 1948 to 1949, and minister of Education from 1950 to 1956.

Majid has written articles for educational periodicals, for the Public Health Journal, and for the Afghan Encyclopedia, and is also the author of several biology textbooks. He is very short (five feet), speaks excellent English as well as Farsi, and has some knowledge of French, German, and Latin. He is married and has four daughters.

26 July 1966

## The Ambassador from Ceylon

Oliver WEERASINGHE

Oliver Weerasinghe was appointed ambassador to the United States in June 1965. Since June 1956 he served on the UN staff and previous to that was Ceylon's chief town planner. Although Weerasinghe has a number of close relatives in Colombo, he has been in Ceylon only occasionally for brief periods on vacation.



3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

Weerasinghe, a Buddhist, was born in Colombo in September 1907. He studied architecture and civil design at the University of Liverpool (1932) and was a fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects. He is an Officer of the British Empire. In 1938 he was a town planner in the Local Government Department in Ceylon, becoming chief town planner in 1947. He held this position until 1956 when he became a social affairs officer in the UN's Bureau of Social Affairs. From 1958 to 1965 he was the chief of the Planning and Urbanization Section of the UN Housing, Building and Planning Branch of the Department of Economics and Social Affairs and the deputy to the head of the branch.

The Weerasinghes have two children: Menaka and Rohan. Menaka is now at Cambridge University studying for a PhD. She previously earned a degree in social anthropology from Bryn Mawr College. Rohan, who is 15, is at Choate School.

6.2(d)

26 July 1966

### The Ambassador from Cyprus

Zenon ROSSIDES

Zenon Rossides has been ambassador in Washington and permanent representative at the UN since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. He also serves concurrently as ambassador to Canada, as well as to a number of Latin American countries.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

A lawyer by background, Rossides spends almost all of his time in New York,

3.3(b)(1)

He believes that Cyprus should serve as a bridge between the West and the neutralists of the Afro-Asian bloc, and he follows an uncommitted line on some East-West issues.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Rossides was born in 1895. After graduating from the Middle Temple, London, in 1923, he became a practicing barrister in Cyprus and in 1929 was a member of a Cypriot delegation to London that discussed the status of Cyprus. Long a supporter of the union of Cyprus with Greece, Rossides was a member of several Cypriot delegations to London following World War II, and attended sessions of the UN General Assembly as an unofficial representative of the Greek Cypriots in 1951 and 1954. In 1955 he attended the UN General Assembly as a member of the Greek delegation.

He is married and is the author of The Island of Cyprus and Union with Greece (1951) and The Problem of Cyprus (1958).

26 July 1966



## The Ambassador from Egypt

Mustafa KAMIL

Mustafa Kamil, ambassador to the US since July 1958, previously served as ambassador to India. A professor of constitutional law, he taught for 20 years before entering diplomatic service. As ambassador to the US, Dr. Kamil has worked tirelessly in furthering his country's interests



his themes have included the necessity for quiet diplomacy, frank discussion, and working together in fields of mutual interest.

Ambassador Kamil was born in 1908, was graduated from the Cairo University Faculty of Law and became an instructor there in 1935. He lectured at the Baghdad Law College in 1941-42, and again from 1944 to 47. Kamil returned to Egypt in the early 1950s and in 1955 joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the rank of minister. In September 1955 he was appointed ambassador to India,

Although known as a bachelor in Washington diplomatic circles, Kamil married and divorced an Iraqi woman. He enjoys the fine arts and finds pleasure in reading. The ambassador speaks fluent English and French.

26 July 1966

3.5(c)

The Ambassador from Greece

Alexandros Antonios MATSAS

Alexandros Matsas, Greek ambassador to the US since 1962



3.3(b)(1)

While ambassador to Ankara (1959-62), Matsas attempted to improve Greek-Turkish relations.

3.3(b)(1)

He is himself a man of letters, having published poems and plays in both Greek and French.

He was born in 1910. After graduating from the University of Athens, he entered the foreign service in 1934. During World War II, he was attached to the Greek government-in-exile in London and afterwards served at Paris, The Hague, and Rome, between tours in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In 1948 Matsas married a wealthy widow, Mme. Saltafera. They have one daughter (Mme. Matsas has two children by her former husband). He speaks excellent English and French, and fair German and Italian.

26 July 1966

3.5(c)

The Ambassador from India

B. K. Nehru

Braj Kumar NEHRU



3.3(b)(1)

A veteran career official, he became India's top fund-raiser as commissioner general of economic affairs (1958-61) in Washington. Nehru also served in Washington from 1949 to 1954 as minister at the embassy and as an IBRD executive director.

Nehru was born in 1909 in Allahabad and is a second cousin of former prime minister Nehru. He attended Allahabad University, the London School of Economics, Balliol College at Oxford, and the Inner Temple. Entering the Indian Civil Service in 1934 he began his career in the Punjab. Nehru first joined the Finance Department in 1940, eventually becoming secretary of the ministry in 1957.

3.3(b)(1)

He is six feet tall and broad shouldered. He is fond of playing bridge and reading. Ambassador Nehru is married and has three sons. He belongs to the Metropolitan Club of Washington.

26 July 1966



## The Ambassador From Iran

Khosro KHOSROVANI

Khosro Khosrovani, designated ambassador to the US in March 1965, had previously served as ambassador to Turkey.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Khosrovani was born in Iran in 1914. After completing his studies in Iran, he went to England and earned a PhD in geology from the University of Birmingham and a graduate diploma in commerce. In 1940 he returned to Iran, served briefly as a geologist in the Department of Mines, and then joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He attended the UN General Assembly from 1947 to 1951 and in 1951 was the Iranian representative to the UNESCO Economic Committee. During this time he was attached first to the embassy in Washington and later to the UN Mission in New York. From 1955 to 1959 he was consul general at Hamburg, Germany. In early 1960 he was assigned as minister in Washington. Returning to Iran in early 1962, Khosrovani was appointed head of the High Board of Inspectors of the National Iranian Oil Company and a member of the Foreign Ministry's High Political Council.

The ambassador is a short, stocky, [redacted] man

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

26 July 1966

The Ambassador from Iraq

Nasir al-HANI

Dr. Nasir al-Hani, one-time cultural attaché in Washington, returned to the US as ambassador in March 1964. A liberal nationalist, Dr. Hani has served as his country's ambassador to Lebanon, Greece, and Syria, and as undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry. [REDACTED]



3.3(b)(1)

He was born in 1920, and earned his PhD in 1950 at the School of Eastern Languages of London University. Hani was at one time a tutor for King Faysal II, and later was an assistant professor on the Faculty of Arts at Baghdad. He has also taught at London and Cambridge universities. He was appointed ambassador to Lebanon in 1961, and served concurrently as Iraq's envoy to Greece.

Ambassador Hani's wife, Eileen, is [REDACTED] Irish woman who has been a great asset to her husband. The Hanis have two children, Aida, age 13, and Umar, age 7.

6.2(d)

26 July 1966

## The Ambassador from Jordan

Farhan al-SHUBAYLAT

A long time ambassador to Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, Farhan Shubaylat arrived in Washington in October 1965. The openly pro-American Shubaylat is a career diplomat and government official with an impressive record that includes allegiance to the royal family, work as an Arab nationalist, and friendly relations with Great Britain and the US.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Shubaylat was born in 1911 and was educated at the American University of Beirut, graduating with an AB in history and education in 1935. In 1946 he entered the Jordanian Foreign Service and was appointed first secretary in Beirut. He was mayor of Amman from 1952 to 1955, when he was appointed minister of defense. The following year he was named minister to West Germany, and in 1957 as ambassador to Iraq.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

He enjoys riding and shooting. The ambassador speaks English in addition to Arabic. He is married and has six children, ages 18 to 28.

6.2(d)

26 July 1966




The Ambassador from Kuwait

Tal'at Yaqub GHUSAYN

Tal'at Ghusayn, ambassador to the US and Canada (June 1965) was not born in Kuwait but in Palestine in 1925. He has represented Kuwait in this country since March 1962.



he was vociferous in his annoyance at US intervention in the Jordanian crisis of the 1950s.



3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

He graduated from the American University of Cairo in 1944 and served as a member of Yemeni delegations to the UN General Assembly in 1950-1952; during the latter part of this period he was Yemeni undersecretary for foreign affairs. He resigned this position in June 1953 and went to Kuwait where he became secretary of the Development Board. In 1961 he joined the newly organized Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was sent to New York where he initiated the campaign for Kuwaiti admission to the UN.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Ghusayn is a hi-fi enthusiast and collector of classical records. He is an avid bridge and poker player

3.3(b)(1)

Ghusayn married his first cousin, Basima Haydar, in 1953; the Ghusayns have three children.

3.3(b)(6)

26 July 1966



The Ambassador from  
Lebanon

Ibrahim Husayn al-AHDAB

Ibrahim Husayn al-Ahdab has been ambassador to the US since 1962. Prior to his appointment to Washington he served for two years as director of political affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

Ahdab was born in 1904 and was educated in Beirut and Paris, receiving an engineering degree in 1924. He worked for a time in the Ministry of Public Works, but left to become director of a private engineering firm. He entered the diplomatic service in 1947 as minister to Turkey. Since then he has served as minister to Switzerland (1954), on a special mission to Ankara (1955), and as ambassador to the UK (1955-60). He was a delegate to the Arab League in 1961, and to the UN General Assembly in 1961-63.

Ahdab is a Sunni Muslim

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

and plays chess, and is a swimmer, skier, and good tennis player. His favorite topics of conversation are national economy and contemporary history. He speaks fluent Arabic, French, and Turkish, and a little English.

26 July 1966

The Ambassador from the  
Maldives Islands

Ahamed Hilmy DIDI

Ahamed Hilmy Didi was appointed a minister of state and named permanent representative to the UN in September 1965. In October, he was appointed to serve concurrently as ambassador to the US.



3.3(b)(1)

Didi was born on the Maldivian island of Male in 1917. He was educated in Ceylon and in 1943 returned to Male where he joined the government service as a wireless operator at the Royal Air Force station.

In 1945 he was elected to Parliament for a six-year term. Subsequently, he has twice been the Maldivian representative in Ceylon. During 1951 he was the minister of health and communications, and he served again from 1956 until his appointment to the UN.

Didi traveled to London in November 1964 as the Maldivian representative to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Meeting.

Didi is married and speaks excellent English.


26 July 1966



The Ambassador from Nepal

Padma Bahadur KHATRI

General Padma Bahadur Khatri was appointed ambassador to the US and permanent representative to the UN in 1964, and is concurrently ambassador to Chile, Argentina, and Canada.



3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Khatri was born in 1915. He was educated at the Hindu School in Calcutta, has a BSc from Patna University, and attended the Indian Staff College at Quetta in 1946. Khatri joined the army in 1935 and served in India and Burma during World War II. He has been a military attaché in London and a liaison officer to the British Brigade of Gurkhas in Malaya. From 1961 to 1964 he was secretary of the Ministry of Defense and honorary aide-de-camp to King Mahendra in addition to serving concurrently as foreign secretary.

Khatri is a moderately orthodox Hindu and abstains only from eating beef.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Khatri speaks excellent English

Khatri is married and has four children. One son is attending American University in Washington, D. C.

26 July 1966

## The Ambassador from Pakistan

Ghulam Ahmad

Ghulam Ahmad succeeded his brother, Aziz Ahmad, as ambassador to the US in July 1963. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ghulam Ahmad was perhaps the most influential civil servant in the administration of the late prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan. [REDACTED]



3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED] Before assuming his current position, he publicly criticized the US for extending military aid to India without first insisting that India solve its differences with Pakistan.

A member of a well-known family, Ahmad was born on 12 August 1901 in Khanna, Punjab, and received an MA from Panjab University in 1923. Since the establishment of Pakistan, he has served as director of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau, and as secretary of the interior, information and broadcasting, and states and frontier regions ministries. After serving as permanent representative to the UN (1957), he became chairman of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. 3.3(b)(1)

He is a man of fair complexion and small build, [REDACTED] Well-read in politics and history, as well as classic English poetry, [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

26 July 1966

The Ambassador From  
Saudi Arabia

Ibrahim Abd Allah al-SUWAYYIL

Ibrahim Abd Allah al-Suwayyil has been ambassador to the US since 1964 and is also permanent representative to the UN. A career diplomat until a 1962-64 tour as minister of agriculture, Suwayyil is the only man not of royal blood ever to have held the post of minister of foreign affairs (1960-1962).



3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Suwayyil was born in 1916 and was graduated from the Saudi Institute in Mecca in 1936. He earned a degree from Cairo University in 1940, and studied for a doctorate in modern Islamic history. He was appointed to the Ministry of Education in 1943, but later transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In March 1962, Suwayyil was named head of the political branch of the Royal Diwan and special adviser to King Saud.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

he was appointed minister of agriculture by Faysal in October 1962 and remained in that post until coming to the US in 1964.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

Ambassador Suwayyil is

a student of Arabic literature and is especially fond of poetry--he has written several poems himself. He is the second commoner ever to serve as a cabinet member. He speaks fair English,

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)  
6.2(d)

they have two sons and three daughters. One boy is at MIT, another is entering in the fall, and one daughter is at school in France. Suwayyil does not drink.

26 July 1966



[Redacted]

3.5(c)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

26 July 1966

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

The Ambassador from Turkey

Turgut MENEMENCIOGLU

Turgut Menemencioglu, ambassador since 1962, is a veteran diplomat from a distinguished family.

[redacted] well informed on UN affairs, he is also deeply interested in Ottoman history and in the diplomatic history of Turkey.

3.3(b)(1)  
3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1)

He was born in Istanbul in 1914 and received a law degree from the University of Geneva. He entered the foreign service in 1939 and subsequently served as first secretary in Bucharest, as section chief in the Department of Commerce and Economic Affairs, and as permanent delegate to the Geneva office of the UN. After serving briefly in 1952 as counselor of the Embassy at Washington, he returned to Ankara. Menemencioglu was assigned to the UN as deputy permanent representative in 1954. In early 1960 he was named ambassador to Canada; but following the May 1960 coup in Turkey he was made permanent representative to the UN.

The ambassador speaks English and French in addition to his native Turkish. He is married to Nermin Moran; they have two teen-age sons, Namik and Ekber. [redacted]

6.2(d)

26 July 1966

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

The Ambassador from the  
Yemen Arab Republic

Muhsin Ahmad al-AYNI

Muhsin Ahmad al-Ayni returned to Washington in the fall of 1965 to serve as ambassador to the US and permanent representative to the UN. Ayni had initially served in these posts for several years beginning in 1962, but had returned to Yemen in April 1965 to serve briefly as minister of foreign affairs.



3.3(b)(1)

Ayni was born in 1932 and received an LLB from the Sorbonne. He was appointed minister of foreign affairs in September 1962, following the coup that deposed the Yemeni Imamate. He held this post only until his first US appointment in November of that year. In March 1965 Ayni was removed from his UN post, and the following month he returned to Yemen to work for a full withdrawal of UAR forces. Ayni's second term as foreign minister (April to July 1965) came to an end for all practical purposes in June, when UAR President Nasir demanded the removal of six so-called Baathists from the Yemen Cabinet. During a July trip to Cairo to protest Nasir's demands, Ayni had his passport withdrawn by Egyptian authorities and was forced to remain in the UAR, virtually under house arrest. He returned to the US almost immediately upon his release.

3.3(b)(1)

He is married and [redacted] wife is a member of one of the most important tribal families. They have two young children. He speaks excellent English, and his wife is also relatively fluent.

6.2(d)

26 July 1966

3.5(c)



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~Saturday, March 30, 1968 9:45 a.m.  
*Rec'd 10:06 a*

Mr. President:

You may wish to read Hal Saunders' attached reflective memorandum on where we are in the Middle East.

The heart of the problem is this choice:

-- **let terrorism versus retaliation play itself out**, with all its dangers, until the Israelis soften up enough to come off their rigid position;

-- **send someone like Mac Bundy out to tell them they must communicate to Hussein a viable Jerusalem position** so that he can take the personal and political risks of going for a settlement.

The Third possibility is a long shot: Nasser may fall; but I don't believe a U.S. policy can be based on that hope.

Hal's memo is worth reading, in my judgment.

*W. Rostow* Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-171  
By *us*, NARA, Date *12-11-03*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Next Step with Israel-Jordan

The problem in a nutshell is this:

-- We agree that terrorism is a threat Israel has to do something about.

-- We think Israel's effort to end terrorism by military attacks won't work. If they keep going down this track, we see only a rising spiral of attack and counter-attack ending in all Arabs at the summit rejecting a political solution and committing themselves to a guerrilla war against Israel. There's evidence now that the Israelis are beginning to think this way too, although they feel they must respond to terrorism somehow and don't yet see an alternative.

-- The only persons who can stop terrorism from Jordanian territory are the Jordanian government. The problem, therefore, is to convince Hussein to stop it or--if he's already convinced but unable--to create conditions which strengthen his hand enough to crack down. We disagree with the Israelis that their military attacks strengthen his hand.

-- The alternative we see is to get Jarring's peace talks on the road. If Hussein can show he's getting somewhere his way, maybe it's not too late for him to call the terrorists off, or stop them by force.

-- One of the main obstacles to getting Jarring's negotiations started is Israeli inflexibility. One of the main reasons for Israeli inflexibility is the fact that the Cabinet has not taken a formal position on the terms for a peace settlement; Eshkol fears breaking up his coalition but we have assurance that they'll make up their minds the moment there's a glimmer of Arab willingness to talk.

-- The difficulty with this is that the Arabs aren't likely to talk until somebody assures them there's a workable deal possible at the end of the track. This is what all the haggling over whether Israel accepts the UN resolution is about.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-171

By isa, NARA, Date 12-11-03~~SECRET~~



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- 2 -

What all this adds up to is the conclusion of some of us that we should now urge Eshkol to bite the bullet and make the limited move necessary to give the Arabs the assurance they're looking for. Eshkol would give away nothing of substance; he would risk a Cabinet crisis, possibly for limited gains. But the risk of doing nothing looks a lot worse to us.

The alternative is to let force play itself out. The argument for is that only the Israelis will decide to bite the bullet when the pressure of terrorism builds up. The argument against is that we're in a worse position every time Israel strikes back and there's a real danger of the UN Security Council voting sanctions against Israel--with us having to decide whether to vote for, abstain or veto. More important, Israel is in a worse position if we don't stop the guerrilla spiral before the Arabs commit themselves to it.

The debate was brought to a head today in State when Luke Battle tried to clear a response from the President to Eshkol's last message. Arthur Goldberg felt it was too tough for the President. Luke, while fully understanding the President's concerns, feels that any message we send ought to lay out what we see as the serious consequences of Israel's current course.

My own feeling is that if we decide to do nothing to deter the Israelis from further retaliation it ought to be because we've decided consciously to let force play itself out a while longer. We shouldn't do nothing just because State can't work out line of action it feels the President can approve.

I don't believe there's any point in just sending another Presidential message for Eshkol to disregard. If we approach the Israelis this time, it ought to be with the purpose of working out with them a way to get Jarring on the tracks. I think the only way to do this would be to send someone like Mac Bundy with the most serious words from the President for three or four days of talk in Jerusalem. This need not look like pressure at all. The main focus wouldn't be to restrain them. It's just the only way I can see at this time to decide where we and they are going, and the only place to do that is where Eshkol and his Cabinet are.

State is considering this idea this afternoon.



Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Middle East

GP

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

March 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: NEA - Mr. Battle  
IO - Mr. Sisco

FROM : M - Eugene V. Rostow

SUBJECT : Middle East

5

Our first review of the post March 21 situation yesterday was alarming. On reflection over night, I concluded that we should examine these approaches on an urgent basis.

(1) Suggest that Israel bring a Security Council proceeding against Syria (and perhaps UAR as well). Such a proceeding could document the case against the training and organization of terrorists in Syria, and apparently in the UAR as well, and the situation in Jordan. The Israelis won't like the idea. But politically it is sound, I think - surely preferable to another heavy raid.

(2) Prepare a possible letter from the President to Kosygin, expressing concern over the terrorist situation, and asking for effective action to stop it in Syria and Egypt.

(3) Possible public statement by President, expressing alarm over scale and purpose of terrorist activity (recalling his statement of May 23 on the subject) and its consequences - a rising scale of violence and counter violence -; urging effective political action through UN to prevent inevitable escalation, deploring delays in Jarring Mission, etc. This time he could be even-handed.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 63001  
By g/jsh HARA, Date 1-7-00



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

- 2 -

(4) Prepare circular telegram of guidance for all posts, with special instructions for Middle Eastern and North African posts.

(5) Consult with British, Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, Tunisians, Moroccans, Saudis, and perhaps others, on an urgent basis.

(6) Use our new NATO machinery hard to brief and urge separate diplomatic approaches in Syria, Egypt, Israel, and elsewhere, to get Israel to get into the S.C., and to put maximum pressure on Syria.

In Short, conduct a public and private offensive against the terrorist development, and try by every possible means to breathe life back into the Jarring Mission.

cc: S - The Secretary                      W.H. - Mr. Walt Rostow  
U - Mr. Katzenbach  
S/AH - Gov. Harriman  
S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

4894

March 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Security Council Debate on Middle  
East Situation

The Security Council reconvenes at noon today. The likely result will be the adoption in a day or two of a resolution condemning Israel for its countermilitary actions against Jordan. The Israelis expect this result since reports coming out of Israel say that the Security Council is expected "to adopt a toothless condemnatory resolution". Ambassador Goldberg has kept in close touch with the Israelis who know that we are doing our best to try to achieve a reasonably balanced resolution, but that this is not entirely in our control.

The Arabs, with the support of the USSR, India and Pakistan, have developed a resolution which condemns Israel for the large-scale military action. Its principal omission is that there is no explicit reference to the terrorist actions which provoked the Israeli action, though there is a preambular paragraph which makes oblique reference to such acts condemning "any and all violations of the ceasefire". Both Ambassador Goldberg and the Department are agreed that the best strategy is to see whether we can get the Arabs to make minimal changes designed to give the resolution more balance. Our leverage is limited because we estimate this resolution already has the required majority; the Arabs will therefore be most reluctant to make changes.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By rg/sh NARA, Date 1-7-00

*Mid East* 1061  
*1 Davis*  
*3-167*  
*no action required.*  
*W Davis*  
*3/26/68*  
*Files*


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- 2 -

The Soviet strategy is to isolate the United States in the Security Council and to exploit this in the Arab world by portraying the United States policy as one of total support for Israel. Both Ambassador Goldberg and the Department believe that from the point of view of our interests in the area the best result would be a resolution which we could support along with the rest of the Security Council. This would have to be weighed against possible adverse domestic reaction if the United States supports a resolution condemning Israel which did not give sufficient prominence to the Arab provocative terrorist raids. Since the Israelis are already discounting in their own public opinion the significance of a condemnatory Security Council resolution, this leads us to believe, for the present at least, that there would be no substantial adverse domestic flak if we were to join the majority.

We will make recommendations to the President on how we should vote when a final text is put before Security Council and we have received Ambassador Goldberg's recommendations.

Attached is a copy of the resolution presently being discussed.

  
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary



66

~~SECRET~~

The Security Council

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israeli military action across the East Bank of Jordan on 21 March 1968,

Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO as contained in Documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add. 65, and also the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Jordan in Documents S/8478 and S/8483,

Observing that this military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

Recalling Resolutions 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the ceasefire,

Recalling further Resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place;

1. Condemns Israel for this large-scale military action in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the ceasefire (resolutions);
2. Warns Israel that actions of military reprisals cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps and measures as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;
3. Calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in controvention of Resolution 237 (1967);
4. Requests the Secretary General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 89001  
By cg/jsh, NARA, Date 1-7-00

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 MAR 22 PM 7 01

Mid East

ACTION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 21, 1968 -- 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the statement which State Department proposes to issue this morning, if you approve.

It is responsive to some suggestions made by Mac Bundy, among others.

I have bracketed the two words I believe are questionable: we can make a judgment that the attacks are damaging to hopes for peace; but whether they are "unjustified" or not involves a calculus that only a higher authority, even, than the U.S. ought to make. We do not believe it realistic just to remain wholly silent, since this would be read in the Arab world as U.S. support for the Israeli exercise.

W. W. Rostow

Statement approved as is \_\_\_\_\_

Approved without "unjustified" \_\_\_\_\_

No statement \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By cg/jsh, NARA, Date 1-7-00



Cleared to State

10:45 a.m.

H.H.S

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 21, 1968

Neither kind  
of action is in  
the true interests  
of the peoples  
of the area.

Further violence cannot bring a durable and stable peace to the Middle East.

The Israeli military actions today against the territory of Jordan <sup>in response to terrorist attacks, are</sup> ~~are~~ unjustified and damaging to hopes for a settlement of the real issues involved. Furthermore, all of the parties know that peaceful channels are available.

Also disruptive  
effects of  
terrorist  
action

We also recognize

We recognize the problems created by terrorism, <sup>but</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>we also</sup> our main objective is to achieve a lasting peace. Israel and the Arab States should be adhering scrupulously to the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council and working with the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in accord <sup>once</sup> with the Security Council's resolution of last November. Any action that delays his work is most regrettable.

We have made our position known repeatedly and as recently as one day ago: Arab-Israeli differences should be settled through the efforts of the U.N. Representative and not through the use of force.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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Mid East  
10

CHRONOLOGY OF JARRING MISSION, MARCH 1968

March 2: Jarring left New York for the Middle East via Sweden.

March 7: Jarring met in Cairo with Riad.

Jarring presented the UAR with the draft of an invitation to the parties, hoping to obtain prior UAR approval before formally issuing it. Although we were not given the text, we received reports on this meeting (Cairo 1830, 1854, 1877, A-49; USUN 4102) which indicated that the invitation contained the following points (from Cairo A-49):

- a. UAR and Israel accepted Nov 22 SC resolution.
- b. Both were ready to cooperate with UN SYG's Representative.
- c. Both accepted an invitation to send representatives to Nicosia.

Riad asked about Israeli acceptance of the resolution, but Jarring had nothing new to report. Riad did not respond directly to the draft invitation, but stated that, since the aim of Israel is a peace treaty, as a result of negotiation, and this is a fact which the UAR cannot accept, there is no purpose in sending anyone to Cyprus. He indicated that the UAR might return to the SC, perhaps to obtain a "protocol of implementation" of the Nov 22 resolution acceptable to all.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By g/fsh NARA, Date 1-7-00

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-2-

March 10: Jarring met in Jerusalem with Eban.

Jarring informally showed Eban the draft invitation he had planned to issue to both parties had he obtained their prior agreement to it. Israeli sources at that time (USUN 4094; State 128497) reported the invitation essentially as follows:

- a. Israel and the UAR have accepted the SC resolution as a basis for solving differences;
- b. the two governments are therefore invited to send representatives to Cyprus for conferences with Jarring.

According to the Israelis, Eban told Jarring that if this draft had been formally presented, he was authorized to reply affirmatively. The Israelis said that Jarring stated that the UAR now wanted Israel to say it was ready to implement the SC resolution by action (meaning withdrawal first). Jarring reportedly said Riad had explained the hardening of his position as a response to GOI unilateral actions affecting the status of the occupied territories. After further discussion with Jarring about the UAR position, the GOI became convinced that the UAR had always meant to interpret "accept"

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-3-

as "implement by withdrawal."

Subsequently Tekoah (USUN 4389) gave Goldberg (in response to the latter's request), the following text of the Jarring formula as taken down by the Israelis at the time of Jarring's March 10 conversation with Eban:

The Governments of Israel and the UAR (or Jordan) have both indicated to me that they accept SC Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Mideast question, and [intend to devise arrangements under my auspices for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.] The two governments have expressed their willingness to cooperate with me in my capacity as a special representative in the discharge of my task of promoting agreement in achieving such a settlement. In view of the urgency of the situation, with a view to expediting efforts to reach a settlement, I have invited the two governments to meet with me for conferences within the framework of the SC resolution in (place). I have the pleasure to inform you that the two governments have responded favorably to this invitation.

March 14: Jarring met in Amman with Talhouni and Rifai.

According to the Jordanians (Amman 3839), Jarring stated that his mission was now stalled over the Israeli insistence upon negotiations and the UAR's insistence upon implementation of the resolution. The Jordanians said they did not see how "acceptance" could be detached from

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Formula  
Jarring  
gave  
Israel  
March 10

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-4-

"implementation." Although he denied reports of his negative statements about the UAR, Jarring did say the UAR wanted withdrawal to start before everything else. The Jordanians could not see how the situation could move until Israel had declared its readiness to proceed to implementation. Accordingly, they suggested that Jarring expand the first element of his draft invitation (which he had also shown Talhouni informally) to read:

"The UAR and Israel have indicated their acceptance of the resolution and their readiness to implement it."

Variation  
desired  
by Jordanians  
if possible

If Israel would accept this, Jordanian officials would go to Cairo to try to persuade the UAR to accept it as well.

March 18: Jarring met in Jerusalem with Eban.

According to Tekoah and Evron (USUN 4192; State 132392) Jarring presented the Jordanian revision to Eban. Eban replied, "Following UAR clarification, implementation means to the Egyptians withdrawal without peace, without negotiations, without agreement, and without free navigation." Jarring is reported by the Israelis to have agreed. Eban then saw two alternatives: (a) Jarring could ask both

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-5-

sides to respond to his original formula, which Eban considered well-balanced (and which he now said Israel accepted); or (b) Jarring could revise formula as follows:

"To seek agreement on its implementation and accordingly to come to a conference."

If the Arabs were to accept this revised formulation, Eban said the GOI would be ready to consider the matter again.

March 20: Jarring met in Amman with Rifai.

Rifai told Symmes (Amman 3913) that Jarring reported that Israel had rejected the Jordanian formulation, saying the Israelis wished to stick with the original proposal without change. Jarring did not mention an Israeli counter-proposal. The Jordanians pressed Jarring on the question of whether Israel was ready to implement the resolution; they reminded Jarring that Jordan had not reacted negatively to the idea of holding a conference provided it was for the sake of implementing the resolution, but Jarring had been unable to obtain Israeli clarification on that point.

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-6-

March 21: Jarring met in Jerusalem with Eban.

Israelis in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv 3010) said Jarring reported that the Jordanian position remained about the same, with a strong desire to remain coordinated with the UAR. Jarring told Eban that Hussein and Rifai had said they were planning to go to Cairo shortly to try to convince the UAR of the need for some changes in its attitude.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE MANATOS

THROUGH WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Javits' Speech on the Middle East

Last week, Senator Javits delivered a speech (attached) on the Middle East in which he charged that the Administration is so preoccupied with Vietnam that it has neglected the Middle East. He says this neglect is contributing to our losing the Middle East to Soviet domination. His prepared text, which the press picked up, even claimed that this neglect contributed to the outbreak of the war last spring, though that paragraph somehow was dropped in delivery. Senators Scott and Jackson joined in briefly.

I don't think the Administration particularly wants to pick a fight with Javits on this, but what bothers me is that we are making no effort to develop any answer to this line with articulate exponents in the Senate or elsewhere in the political arena. We have our own line to use in hearings but nothing to use in political debate.

Insofar as the Middle East will be an issue in the Presidential campaign--and I realize it won't be a major one--outside the Jewish community--the Republican line is likely to be that we are "losing the area to the Russians." The other dimension is that NATO has to help us save it. I think we ought to begin giving an answer a few trial runs.

But this has broader ramifications. Javits says we're losing the Mid-East because we're preoccupied with Vietnam, and that issue needs to be dealt with. There are two answers: (a) We have not neglected the Middle East. But (b) if the Administration's hands have been tied in any way there, it has been because of the mood in Congress which insists that we should be less active abroad and should not get ourselves involved in local disputes--or even in programs to promote economic progress.

Then there's the Jewish vote. We all recognize that it's cheap politics for a Senator with a large Jewish constituency to say that the US neglected the Middle East last summer. That's a pretty weak line, and Javits must know it. He praises the November 22 UN resolution but gives us no credit for it. I don't see why we shouldn't have someone right in there claiming credit for it.

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Having discussed this with State's Mid-East Congressional expert (Kay Folger), I understand there's a real problem in finding the right Senator to begin building the case against Javits' line. Not being a Congressional expert myself, or knowing how the Democratic National Committee handles this, I don't have a clear notion of how best to organize a response. However, I've roughed out a draft response to Javits just to see what it might look like (attached). This may not be the thing to do now, but I think the problem is worth some passing thought.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. Battle  
Miss Folger  
Mr. Roche  
Mr. McPherson  
Mr. Panzer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS AND LIMITATIONS

## Administration

The Act would be administered by the Secretary of Labor. Community Employment and Training Programs would be operated by local public agencies and private non-profit organizations with the full participation and cooperation of local public officials, area residents and private organizations.

## Eligible areas

Program participants in both the community and private employment programs would be recruited from rural and urban areas containing high concentrations or proportions of low-income families and individuals and having severe problems of unemployment and underemployment, or, with respect to rural areas, having out-migration problems.

## Eligible participants

Eligibility is restricted to persons who are either unemployed or low-income and who reside in eligible areas.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time. I assured the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] that when I concluded my remarks I would suggest the absence of a quorum. If that is agreeable to the acting majority leader, I do so at this time.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his suggestion for a moment?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, at the request of the Senator from North Carolina, I withdraw the request for a quorum call.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it will be noted that this year, unlike last year, I did not actually join today as a sponsor of the bill introduced by the Senator from Pennsylvania. However, I do not wish this to be taken as any design on my part not to join in the introduction of a last-resort public employment bill, having important aspects concerning private employment as well. I believe it would be more conducive to the development of a bill which would emphasize and enlist the private sector effectively if I sought to develop such a bill with the assistance of Senators on this side of the aisle.

I have every confidence that that having been done, our ideas will be merged and that we may then report an effective bipartisan bill, as we did last year. Although that bill did not pass, it certainly represented a strong effort on our part. I am hopeful that by adopting the technique I now suggest, the maximum amount of support for an agreed-upon measure may be marshaled on both sides of the aisle.

## INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2516) to prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes.

### AMENDMENTS NOS. 540-566

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to submit at this time certain proposed amendments, numbering seven in all, to amendment No. 554 to H.R. 2516. I further ask unanimous consent that the reading of these amendments be waived, and that they be deemed and taken to

have been read for all purposes required by rule XXII and any other rules of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that the amendments be printed and lie at the desk and be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received and printed, and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendments are as follows:

### AMENDMENT NO. 560

On page 20, line 8, after the word "investigation" and before the period insert the following: "Provided, however, the Secretary first complies with the provision of the Fourth Amendment relating to unreasonable searches and seizures."

### AMENDMENT NO. 561

On page 19, line 21, strike the period and add the following: "Provided, however, the court shall not take any action which will impair in any respect any title to or interest in the property involved acquired by any purchaser of encumbrance under the registration or recording statutes of the State in which such property is located."

### AMENDMENT NO. 562

On page 2, line 17, after the word "force" and before the word "willfully" insert the following: ", sufficient to constitute an assault."

### AMENDMENT NO. 563

On page 23, strike out lines 11 and 12.

### AMENDMENT NO. 564

On page 23, line 11, strike out the word "plaintiff" and insert the word "party".

### AMENDMENT NO. 565

On page 3, line 14, between the semicolon and the word "or," insert the following: "(F) pursuing his employment by any department or agency of the United States or by any private employer engaged in interstate commerce or any activity affecting interstate commerce, or traveling to or from the place of his employment or any other place for such purpose;"

### AMENDMENT NO. 566

On page 5, after line 24, insert the following:

"(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to acts or omissions on the part of law enforcement officers, members of the National Guard, as defined in section 101 (9) of title 10, United States Code, members of the organized militia of any State or the District of Columbia, not covered by such section 101 (9), or members of the Armed Forces of the United States, who are engaged in suppressing a riot or civil disturbance or restoring law and order during a riot or civil disturbance."

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to enter a quorum call notwithstanding the order under which the senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] would be immediately recognized following the statement of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask recognition under the unanimous-consent agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York may proceed.

## CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I address myself this afternoon to the situation in the Middle East, a subject too little discussed in these days of preoccupation with Vietnam.

In an overall sense, vital U.S. interests in the Middle East are in greater jeopardy than they have been at any time since World War II. The dangers of the situation there, as well as our incapacity to act effectively, were briefly thrust upon the world's attention last May and June. Fortunately, Israel's smashing victory in the 6-day war gained us a respite in time but, if anything, there has been a further deterioration of the underlying situation from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests. At the same time, the political influence and military power of the Soviet Union in the Middle East continue to grow.

The lessons of the collapse of our policy—first, to prevent Soviet intrusion into the area, and then to continue to act as though the Russians were not present in a big way—do not seem to have been learned. Indeed, there is a tendency to think that the reality of the present Soviet challenge is somehow diminished by citing historical evidence that even the czars had ambitions there.

In my judgment, unless we begin to act now in a more effective and realistic way, the Soviet Union will gain a major strategic and geopolitical advantage in the Middle East, which could have repercussions throughout the world. The Soviet position in the Middle East is based on a new Soviet military capability, as well as upon its political leverage over certain Arab governments.

A growing Soviet naval force has already made its way into the eastern Mediterranean where it maneuvers "eyeball to eyeball" with our nuclear-armed 6th Fleet. One stark consequence of this development has been to create a dangerous and direct confrontation of United States and Soviet power, in perhaps the most politically volatile area of the world. Also, the Soviet power presence has created a new threat to Israel which—its valor notwithstanding—Israel obviously cannot handle alone.

Apparently, Kremlin policymakers have calculated that the nuclear "balance of terror" has provided a cloak of impunity for the pursuit of its expansionist aims in the Middle East by the conventional devices of power politics. The U.S.S.R. continues to support, both diplomatically and with a supply—or resupply—of sophisticated weapons, the

most radical, belligerent, and trigger-happy Arab regimes.

Given the dangers of nuclear confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and U.S.S.R.'s continued support of radical Arab ambitions, in my judgment it is essential that the United States commit its full support to the achievement of a real and durable peace among the participants in the 6-day war. We can no longer afford to acquiesce in another "armistice" as in 1948, or a "paper promise" withdrawal agreement as in 1956.

It will be remembered that at that time both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in return for the withdrawal of its forces from the Sinai Peninsula, assured Israel the freedom of navigation in international waters. President Nasser's actions of last May—his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, ordering the UNEF forces out of the Sinai, and positioning massive Egyptian forces in the demilitarized areas on Israel's border—showed that "paper promises" are not valid when challenged by Arab militancy and intransigence.

I visited the area only a few weeks ago. I found in Israel a resolute determination that this time there must be a meaningful settlement. They intend that the peace shall be "hard" this time, but they do not look toward the imposition of "hard" terms on the Arab States. In my judgment, Israel does not seek a vindictive or punitive peace. It does insist that there be a peace secured by viable borders and demilitarized areas; a settlement which its Arab neighbors participate in negotiating and are thereby committed to and bound by.

There is a true paralleling of interest on this point between the United States and Israel. We can no longer afford to extend "assurances" in support of indirect and gerry-built "agreements," which—like our 1956-57 assurances on the Sinai, and transit of the Straits of Tiran and Suez—proved to be impossible to fulfill. We must reconcile ourselves to the prospect that if a "hard" peace cannot be attained, Israel will be staying where it is for some time.

I ask unanimous consent that the United Nations resolution on the Middle East of November 22 be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the resolution will be printed. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair), may I point out the key elements of that resolution? The resolution emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. So far so good. It seeks also, however, "the establishment of a just and lasting peace." Then it implements those two objectives—inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and establishment of a just and lasting peace—by the following principles. It calls for the withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the June conflict. But it says that that withdrawal must also be matched by the principle that there shall be a termination of all claims or states of belligerency. That was Egypt's excuse for prohibiting the transit of Israel's

shipping through Suez, and later through the Straits of Tiran, and for other acts which Egypt justified on the ground that she remained at war with Israel. So, belligerency must be terminated explicitly.

Second, the resolution requires respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area. Clearly, the terrorist raids by El Fatah bands, armed and supported by neighboring Arab governments, must cease.

Finally, the right of every state in the Middle East to live in peace within "secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force." There are no secure and recognized boundaries around Israel.

The United Nations resolution of November 30, 1947, which partitioned the country established certain boundaries. No sooner did that take effect than they were swept down by the incursion of all the Arab armies. That situation lasted until early 1949. At that point there was an armistice. New lines emerged from that armistice. At no time Israel had any "secure and recognized boundaries." This is the time to attain secure and recognized boundaries.

Mr. President, the one thought I wish to make in speaking today, as we may be on the eve of negotiations perhaps through the intermediation of Ambassador Jarring, is to make clear that this time we in the United States will sweat it out, too—as Israel must sweat it out—on the proposition that there is to be a firm and final hard peace which will secure the boundaries.

There is a true paralleling of interest on this point between the United States and Israel. We can no longer afford to extend "assurances" in support of indirect and gerry-built "agreements," which—like our 1956-57 assurances on the Sinai and transit of the Straits of Tiran and Suez—proved to be impossible to fulfill. We must reconcile ourselves to the prospect that if a "hard" peace cannot be attained, Israel will be staying where it is for some time.

Parenthetically, I might interject at this point that I have read with great interest Ambassador Yost's recent article in Foreign Affairs, entitled "How the Arab-Israeli War Began." In his generally balanced account, Ambassador Yost cites as one of the factors which triggered the war, Israeli actions which were mistakenly interpreted by Damascus, Cairo, and Moscow as threats to the continued existence of the Syrian regime.

However, one needs only to look at the other side of the coin to discover the real cause of war and instability. Israel's Arab neighbors did not unintentionally act in a way which was mistakenly interpreted as a possible threat to the continuance of the Eschol government. They openly vowed to destroy Israel as a nation and to annihilate its population. Syrian propagandists continue to blare forth this line, with an occasional supporting chorus from Cairo.

In his interview with Life magazine, Mr. Kosygin attempted to assume on the Middle East a high moral position—despite the U.S.S.R.'s culpability in the bloodshed of last June. He entered a

strong plea for the United States to pressure Israel into an unconditional withdrawal from the territories it occupied in the war. This tactic is clearly part of the Soviet strategy to keep the Middle East pot boiling and return it to the twilight zone of a continuing—even if often inactive—state of "belligerency" such as prevailed in the earlier periods when the U.S.S.R. first bought entry into the Arab world as the backer of Arab radicalism and bellicosity.

We must make it clear to the Soviet Union that we will not stand aside and let it have its way in the Middle East. It is this lead, this signal of resoluteness, which our friends among the Arab moderates, and Israel, seek most fervently.

Israel itself recognizes that Soviet power in the Middle East is a new factor beyond its own capacity to handle. It is taking a new look at its Arab neighbors, and is prepared to make distinctions among Arab nations, although—as shown in the 6-day war—the Arabs showed no distinctions among themselves toward Israel. Tangible evidence of this dimension of Israeli thinking is the recent public endorsement by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan of the U.S. resumption of arms supply to Jordan.

The new Soviet power positions in the Middle East, and its alliance with Arab radicalism, poses a threat to all the moderate and friendly governments of the region, Arab and non-Arab alike. It is this fact which constitutes the challenge and the opportunity to our diplomacy.

In addition to its continuing efforts and achievements in the field of strategic nuclear weapons, missiles, and anti-missiles, the U.S.S.R. has been engaged in most significant expansion of its military capabilities in another direction. This is the creation of a mobile deep-sea naval striking force—a wholly new category of military capability for the Soviets. The first big contingent of this new force has been deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The coincidence in time frame of the British withdrawal "East of Suez"—particularly from the Persian Gulf—and the development of the new Soviet naval capability, strongly suggest the future thrust of Soviet power. With the unraveling of the local Pax Britannica, the oil-rich Persian Gulf sheikdoms will provide an inviting target for Soviet penetration.

Using Egypt as its base, the Soviets can be expected to attempt to penetrate down the Red Sea, with Yemen and Aden as intermediate targets, and then up into the vacuum in the Persian Gulf. The establishment of a Soviet position of dominance in the Persian Gulf could have far-reaching impact on the balance of power in the world. It would give the Soviets new leverage over Western Europe's vital sources of oil. Iran and Turkey would be exposed to new Soviet pressures from the south to complement those which the U.S.S.R. has mounted directly from the north. In addition, dominance in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf would give the Soviets a capability to establish dominance in the Indian Ocean and strengthen its position in the India-Pakistan subcontinent.



I do not think the Soviet Union will achieve all of these objectives. There are many barriers of local resistance in addition to whatever counter actions we initiate. Moreover, I do not think that the Soviets are without a measure of prudence and restraint in their actions. But these are capabilities we must consider.

Ironically, it is possible that pressures for the reopening and orderly functioning of the Suez Canal may come eventually from the Soviet Union. If one project present trends into the future, one can see the day—perhaps not far off—when the U.S.S.R. will have the greatest dependence of any of the major countries of the world on access through Suez, to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and points East.

Nonetheless, I am greatly concerned by the dangers inherent in the situation. It is an area where the United States and U.S.S.R. now find themselves in direct confrontation with no cushion or buffers—a situation which does not exist even in Southeast Asia. The Middle East is an area which is as volatile and unstable politically as any in the world. And it is an area where growing Soviet capabilities are greatly abetted by the existence of a power vacuum created by British withdrawal.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the conclusion of my remarks an article entitled "Influence of Russia Is Penetrating Into the Life of Egypt," published in the Washington Post on February 25, 1968.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.  
(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. JAVITS. I am satisfied that there is no lack of expertise on these matters in our State Department. The dangers and complexities of the situation are recognized by the career officials who deal with them in the first instance. However, the problems of the Middle East, like the problems of Europe and Latin America, have been relegated to the second and third echelons of responsibility in the administration—while our highest officials preoccupy themselves with Vietnam and Asia. Being handled as they are, by career officials down the line who are precluded from suggesting courses of action which require the investment of significant resources or conflict with established priorities, the problems of the Middle East are not positioned within the administration in a way that they can be dealt with creatively at the highest policy levels.

The British withdrawal from "East of Suez," by dramatizing the loneliness of our position outside of Europe, emphasizes the need for us to find new modes of assistance with the burdens of peacekeeping. The final withdrawal of Britain, and the earlier withdrawal of other European powers from colonial-based positions, demonstrates that none of our close Allies has the capacity or the willingness to play a world power role as an individual nation-state.

Perhaps a new collective role is possible. Despite a strong reluctance to extend the area of commitment, the NATO powers have finally given evidence of their awareness of the need to respond collectively to the new Soviet challenge in the Mediterranean.

Given the direct and immediate stakes which Western Europe has in the Mediterranean and in the oil of the Middle East there is every inducement for NATO to concert the actions and policies of its members in the Middle East.

I urge that we press diligently within NATO councils for discussions which can lead to just such a policy of Middle East "concert." If commercial rivalries are permitted to supersede the bonds of common interest, if individual energies counteract and dissipate one another, if the potential strength of collective action is lost, each member of NATO will be the poorer in an overall sense.

I wish, finally, to close with a brief word about the refugee problem. In one important aspect there is now a new situation with respect to the Arab refugees as a result of the 6-day war. For the first time in 20 years, usually all of the refugees are now in territories controlled by just two countries—Jordan and Israel. It is essential, in my view, that this new circumstance be explored fully and creatively to see if there is now a new opportunity to effect, on an international basis, some resolution—perhaps "dissolution" is a more apposite word—for the individual who is a subject of this great human and political problem.

#### EXHIBIT 1

##### TEXT OF RESOLUTION

##### The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(1) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(2) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

#### EXHIBIT 2

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 25, 1968]

##### INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA IS PENETRATING INTO THE LIFE OF EGYPT

(By Joe Alex Morris, Jr.)

CAIRO. To foreigners, Egypt today is largely a compound of economic problems and growing Soviet influence.

Russian military advisers are present in greater numbers than ever before. Zamalek, once a plush residential preserve of Westerners and upper-class Egyptians, is now populated with Russians in blue berets, huge overcoats, and leather sandals. The same is true of Nasr City, a new suburb where much of the government, including the military command, is located.

Even the Muzak system at the plush and half-empty Nile Hilton Hotel now includes a few numbers by the Red Army chorus in its repertoire.

The Russians are active partners in Egypt's military establishment. How many new military advisers have come to Egypt since June is anyone's guess, and some of the guesses run into the thousands.

##### "COURTESY VISITS"

The Soviet navy has established a semi-permanent presence at Port Said, the northern entrance to the blocked Suez Canal. These "courtesy visits" would not be nearly so frequent nor so constant if Israel were not occupying virtually the entire Sinai Peninsula.

This naval presence, plus another one at Alexandria, represents the most significant escalation of the Soviet commitment to Egypt since the June war. In effect President Gamal Abdel Nasser is getting all the benefits of a foreign base on his soil with none of the political disadvantages: The Soviet presence discourages Israeli military adventures, and it also discourages adventurism by Egyptian line officers like the naval commander whose guided missile boat sunk the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* last fall.

That action occurred during an infrequent interval when there happened to be no Soviet warships at Port Said.

##### ECONOMIC PICTURE

The Egyptians are trying to improve both diplomatic and economic ties with the West to restore some balance in their international relations. Diplomatic relations have been resumed with Britain, and a greater portion of the cotton crop is being sold to convertible currency areas this year. Communist countries have been asked to take smaller allotments because of the hard currency crisis.

The June war closed the Suez Canal, whose revenues would have hit \$240 million this year. Loss of the Sinai oil fields was another \$35-40 million. It reduced tourism to a trickle, cutting off nearly \$100 million.

Cotton is expected to bring in \$60 million, and emergency aid from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait another \$240 million. This will barely keep the Egyptian economy turning over, and do nothing to alleviate the country's pressing burden of debts.

As of last June 30, Egypt's foreign indebtedness totaled almost \$2.2 billion, excluding short-term loans and military credits. Even before the June war the latter were estimated at another \$1 billion. Since then, Egypt has received a massive dose of Soviet military aid to replace equipment lost in the war.

##### OWES IMF

Cairo has managed to reschedule debt repayments to most of her major creditors, including France, Britain, Germany, Spain and Italy. But she has owed the International Monetary Fund \$45 million since 1965, and this is blocking a requested increase in IMF drawing rights. The U.S. is owed \$179 million in dollar repayments, \$95 million of which was due last year and not paid.



The Egyptians simply tell their creditors they haven't got the money, and they haven't. The Soviet bloc countries, which deal with Egypt mainly on a barter basis with provisions for payments in hard currencies by either side when the swing balance goes beyond a certain level, have given up trying to collect. The Czechs tried last year without success.

The country's industrial plant (800 new factories since the revolution) is in bad shape, and reportedly working at around half its capacity. The difficulties stem from bad planning and the critical hard-currency shortage which forbids imports of some vital parts not produced in Egypt.

#### QUESTIONING REVOLT

To Egyptians, the current questioning of the methods of their 1952 revolution is more important than immediate economic problems and growing Soviet influence.

Admirably, the revolution professes its determination to give all Egyptians a better life. In this it has been markedly successful, particularly in the fields of health and education. But the quest for economic viability at a new and higher level of public consumption has so far failed, partly because the key sector of industrialization has not paid off except in terms of creating new jobs of doubtful economic validity.

The Egyptian government and its planners are not blind to the problem. But they are caught between the dogma of the revolution and their limited resources, particularly since Western sources of industrial credit have virtually dried up in recent years.

The government faces similar problems with other fruits of the revolution. Better health has only increased the birth rate and contributed to Egypt's major problem overpopulation. Belated efforts at some sort of birth control program are only now getting under way.

#### EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS

Even education has created new problems. The government's program for mass education has spread literacy throughout the country.

But quantity rather than quality has been the rule, even in higher education. The country's universities turn out some 30,000 college graduates a year, and there are precious few jobs for them.

Once again, the Egyptian government is aware of the problem. It recently decided that all university graduates will have to do army service, a move which in effect puts off for two years any further job pressures as a result of the annual graduating classes. But this is plainly a stopgap measure.

Mr. SCOTT. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] for a very careful and thoughtful analysis, as well as a timely warning, of the dangers which confront the world in this area, and the fertile crescent of land surrounding it, which we have thought of as the birthplace of the human race, although sadly enough it has also been the breeding ground of many conflicts and many wars.

Surely, if we do not utilize the agencies which are available to us, such as NATO, it would seem to me that we may, through simple neglect or failure to realize the increasing danger of this unbuffered confrontation between the United States and Soviet Governments, let ourselves in for serious consequences. I hope that we will use the facilities of NATO in this regard.

Because we are engaged in a bitter and difficult war in the Far East, still does not justify a lack of concern and awareness on our part of the necessity to avert another war in the Middle East. NATO can be most useful there.

I congratulate the Senator, also, on what he has said with regard to the refugees. The abrasive soreness of the refugee problem exacerbates all other relationships, since the refugees are now gathered, as the Senator has pointed out, in only two states; namely, Israel and Jordan. I think it is incumbent upon those states, and upon all other nations whose influence could be helpful, to press for a fair and early solution of this very serious problem, contributing as it can be to so much possibility of future danger.

Again I want to thank the Senator from New York. He has always been alert to these problems in the world generally, and has contributed a great deal to the discussion about the Middle East. I regret that it often appears our Government is so involved—and necessarily involved—in Asia that it does not appear to be, at some echelons, so alert in the attempt to settle the Middle East question as it might be; but I hope that what the Senator has said here today will be noted at all the proper levels of government and that an improvement in the situation will be affected so that we may yet achieve not only the opening of the Suez Canal but also the establishment of—let us hope—a just and lasting peace.

Mr. JAVITS. I am grateful to my colleague from Pennsylvania who, in his whole career, has shown a sensitivity and an understanding of this area equal to that of anyone in Congress. I am grateful for his helpful intercession here.

Mr. President, I now yield to the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON].

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed briefly without prejudice to the rights of the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] to proceed under the previous unanimous-consent agreement granted to him, and that I may speak for 5 minutes on this subject.

Mr. JAVITS. On the same subject? Fine. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished senior Senator from New York for initiating this discussion in the Senate on the Middle East situation.

Our best intelligence indicates that the broad Soviet objective for the Middle East is the reduction and eventual displacement of Western influence in the Arab world and an increased Soviet presence and capability throughout the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins. The Soviets doubtless see, in this objective, an important general weakening of Western ability to withstand Communist pressure. The relevance to Israel and NATO is clear.

Of particular significance is the extension of Soviet naval power into the Mediterranean. Today, for the first time in history, Russia maintains a regular Mediterranean fleet of 35 or 40 ships.

Our Sixth Fleet, principal NATO guardian of the maritime corridor, consists of approximately 50 ships although their striking capacity remains considerably more than Russia's. Our problem, of course, is complicated by the fact that we can no longer count on the help of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean area. It is also complicated by Britain's abandonment of its huge Aden

base on the South Arabian peninsula and its decision to quit; plans for a new base in the southwest Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union is already using Syrian Latakia as a base for naval support, as well as Egypt's Alexandria and Port Said. In accordance with the Algerian independence agreements, France has a right to retain the Mers-el-Kebir base in Algeria until 1975. However, Paris has decided to evacuate the base within a very short period. Moscow's substantial military aid to Algeria and the recent increase in Soviet instructors and advisers there, put Soviet leaders in an excellent position to obtain special favors.

I personally believe that Europe is the primary objective of the Soviet move into the Mediterranean. A strong Soviet power position there, supported by a string of client states and base arrangements along the southern Mediterranean shore, would give the Russians control of key resources, including oil, essential to the European economy. Oil from Arab countries accounts for about 70 percent of the oil supply of Western Europe. Moscow would also hold positions from which to menace the flow of shipping on which the survival of Europe's economy depends.

As I see it, extension of Soviet power into the Mediterranean is a deliberate effort to separate Western Europe from Africa, and when the Suez Canal is opened up again, Western Europe from Asia. The final success of this policy would be marked by the removal of the U.S. 6th Fleet from its present positions. Leonid Brezhnev, key Soviet leader, recently told a gathering of Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia:

There is no justification whatever for the constant presence of the U.S. fleet in waters washing the shores of southern Europe. . . . The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.

As the Senator from New York points out, the U.S.S.R. is carrying out a bold and risky policy in the Mediterranean area. It is one which deserves much more attention by this Government and by the other members of NATO than it has received to date.

I commend the senior Senator from New York for the effective way in which he has presented this problem to the Senate this afternoon.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am very grateful to the Senator from Washington, who is known in the Senate as one of our prime experts on defense policy. I am very pleased he is in essential agreement with my own analysis of the situation. Neither he nor I, is given to dreaming up tough situations. I think it is critically important, especially when the administration—and we can understand it—seems to be overwhelmingly involved with Vietnam at the cost of even the mental powers and time and energy one can give, that we call attention to the confrontation between the Soviet Union and ourselves in the Mediterranean.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia: Mr. President, under the special order, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Ervin).

Under the previous order, the Senator from North Carolina is recognized.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Ohio for not to exceed 10 minutes, with the understanding that by so doing I do not lose my right to proceed thereafter under the previous order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the Senator from Ohio is recognized.

#### THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, supposedly acquainted with problems confronting the United States throughout the world, I have concluded that Russia's main objective at present is to obtain control of the Mediterranean. If it obtains control of the Mediterranean, it will, in effect, be able to strangle the lifeline of movement of the United States from the Atlantic to Far Asia.

Throughout the whole life of Russia, it has felt impeded about its ability to dominate the Mediterranean and the several seas that are connected with it. Since the war of last June, in which Israel was involved with the Arabs, and the defeat of the Arabs was conspicuously achieved by the Israelites, Russia has been extending every effort to help the Arabs, with the objective of dominating the Mediterranean.

We cannot allow that to happen. History has demonstrated time and again that the short way to the Far East from the Atlantic is through the Mediterranean.

Russia's supply of military equipment to the Arabs has been of a quantity so great that the Arabs are probably now in a better position than they were last June.

The query is, Can the United States allow Russia, with its Communist objectives, to obtain domination of the Mediterranean? My answer to that question is, unequivocally, "No."

There is a further aspect of this problem that I think is worthy of discussion. I do not agree with the Senator from New York that our future life should be completely disconnected from what happens in Vietnam. To me the Vietnam problem is grave, not less grave than the Mediterranean problem. The argument that we should sort of surrender in Vietnam and develop our forces in the Mediterranean does not meet with approval. The Vietnam problem is serious. The Mediterranean problem is grave. My own judgment is that there has to be a complete reappraisal of how far the United States can go in the world as a policeman in subduing disorders, without endangering its own security.

I am convinced that we cannot be the policemen of all the world. I am convinced that we are overextended. We can not engage in another land war in Asia.

The query that we have to make is: How far can we go, with our limited population of 200 million, in maintaining peace throughout the world?

I have not reached a definite conclusion, but I incline to the belief that a sup-

ply line 10,000 miles in length is beyond our ability to sustain. It becomes especially dangerous when we know that, being 10,000 miles away from our source in the responsibility of supplying military men and equipment, we are encountering grave trouble.

The Mediterranean, I suppose, must be about 5,000 or 6,000 miles away. A review must be made of the whole problem. How far can the United States go in maintaining law and order, and peace, around the world without endangering its own security?

We are in South Vietnam. Neither Johnson nor McNamara nor Rusk is responsible for that. If we are wrongfully there, the responsibility began in 1943. But we are there. And, Mr. President, we cannot lift the white flag. We cannot surrender. To surrender, in my judgment, would result in greater danger to the security of the United States than to stay there.

We should pursue every avenue of effort to achieve peace. We should try to do so with persevering insistence through the United Nations. We should make every effort possible to arrive at the negotiating table. But we cannot pull out.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. LAUSCHE. Let me summarize.

Israel is our greatest friend in the Middle East.

The Mediterranean is essential for the proper defense of the United States.

We should not permit Russia to obtain domination of the Mediterranean. I frankly state that events now appear to show that Russia is moving into the Mediterranean with a force that may soon be greater than the force we have there.

In conclusion, I say keep the Mediterranean open. Keep it at least in a state of balance, where the Russians will not have superiority over the United States. But while we are doing that, I respectfully say to the Senator from New York that we cannot, at this hour, lift a white flag in South Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kennedy of New York in the chair). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I ask for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. ERVIN. I yield the Senator from Ohio 3 additional minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator, I think quite unwittingly, has misunderstood one thing I said. I certainly did not suggest that we lift the white flag in Vietnam. I did not at all couple the need for turning attention to the Middle East with a laying down of our action and responsibility in Vietnam, what I did point out, and lament, was the exhausting preoccupation of the President and other top officials with Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

I agree with the Senator from Ohio, whatever may be my views on the matter—and incidentally, they are not too far from those of the Senator—that in prosecuting the effort to find peace, we must act in the Middle East consistently

with the responsibility we are carrying in Asia now.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. But I wish to emphasize these points, as they are pertinent to the Senator's remarks, based on his expertise as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I have suggested three courses of action, all germane to the Senator's view, and I believe they support his argument:

First, that we should not do what we did in 1956 and 1957, try to persuade or force Israel to move away from its position that this is the time to get a settlement in the Middle East. That is, it is not for us to presume Israel into a withdrawal which is not part of a really durable, meaningful peace settlement, to which the Arabs are really committed.

Mr. LAUSCHE. If the Senator will yield at that point, I have made a statement to the effect that our Government should not interfere, and that the disposition of the Middle East affair should be left to those nations involved in the quarrel.

Mr. JAVITS. I agree. This must be a "firm" peace. Second, certainly we should serve notice on the Soviet Union that we are not abandoning the Middle East, that they face a confrontation with us there, and that the Mediterranean must be kept open as a lifeline between the Atlantic and Asia. We cannot relinquish supremacy in the Mediterranean to the U.S.S.R. It is too vital to our security, and to the security of all NATO members.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I concur completely with that.

Mr. JAVITS. Third, I believe we must demonstrate that we mean business by taking up within the councils of the Alliance the need for a concerted response to the Soviet challenge in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Ultimately, it should be a NATO responsibility to assure the security of the Mediterranean—not just a U.S. responsibility.

Mr. LAUSCHE. On the third score, I cannot conceive of our Government idly standing by while Russia is building up her strength in the Mediterranean, without trying to build up a corresponding strength on the part of the free world.

Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Senator.

I thank the Senator from North Carolina for his indulgence.

#### INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2516) to prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the political disease known as Potomac fever has reached epidemic proportions in the Senate. When Senators—and I might add, Representatives fall victim to it, they come to the conclusion that the people who sent them here do not have sense enough to manage their own affairs, and that the management of their affairs should be transferred from those people to a centralized Federal Government in Washington.



11-8

March 8, 1968

STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

There is much to applaud in the speech made by Senator Javits on this floor about the Middle East. It was a thoughtful speech, much of which deserves our serious attention. However, in the spirit of serious debate, I should like to question whether what seems to be the Senator's basic premise can lead us to an imaginative policy.

The Senator seemed to start from the premise that the Administration's neglect of the Middle East is contributing to successful Soviet intrusion into the area. He spoke as if firm US reaction were all that is necessary to halt the Soviet advance. His main concrete proposal--in addition to continuing our work for peace--was for a greater NATO role in the Middle East.

In the first place, I must contest the idea that the Administration is neglecting the Middle East. The very framework for peace which the Senator endorses was laid out by the Administration--by the President himself--and was embodied in the UN resolution on November 22 only with the greatest expenditure of US ingenuity, firmness and energy.

But I wish to debate a more fundamental assumption. The Senator appears to assume that the United States--and other outside powers like the USSR and NATO--call the shots in the Middle East. Of course, the



United States is an important outside influence there. But the events of the past year have brought home to us all the strength of local forces-- the forces that will move the Middle East in the years ahead. A policy that ignores the progress or the destruction they can wreak if we fail to recognize and guide their momentum threatens real disaster.

First, it should be clear to even the casual observer that the Near East war last June was an explosion of local forces. We were not responsible for the war. We made every effort to keep it from starting. It grew initially out of an increased commitment by Arab governments and organizations to terrorism as a way of destroying Israel. No amount of US attention could have stopped those terrorist acts or the Israeli raids mounted in response. The war broke out while the US and other governments were still seeking a peaceful solution and even while the US Government was awaiting the arrival of the Vice President of the United Arab Republic to discuss how the peace might be honorably preserved. Far from standing idly by, our government was deeply engaged in an effort to save the peace. The war broke out because local forces had gained an unrelenting momentum of their own.

Second, it is even more important to understand that the future control of the Middle East will be settled by local forces. The Senator himself acknowledges that real peace can only grow out of locally

negotiated agreements. True as that is, it is even more true that national and regional pride--and national and regional decisions--will determine the future of this part of the world.

This is not to say that we must not be more active or not stand resolutely by our friends and principles. We must. It is not to say that we must not seek greater European interest and activity in the Middle East, as the Senator suggests. We must. It is not to say that we must not seek broader participation of the world community in peace-keeping. We must.

It is to say, however, that anyone who relies on outside forces, as the Senator suggests, to prevent Soviet domination of the Mid-East is building on a rapidly fading past and not on the realities of the future. The issue is not whether NATO is welcome or unwelcome in the Middle East. The point is that a policy that relies alone on powers outside the Middle East to insure its future ignores the irresistible forces in the area itself that are destined to shape its future. Such a policy ignorex these forces at the risk of sealing its own sterility.

There is a policy before us that does not ignore these forces. There is a policy before us that recognizes that, for better or worse, those forces represent the hopes and the ambitions of more than 100,000,000 people. There is a policy before us that points out a way for those people to loose themselves from a futile confrontation.

That policy was boldly outlined by the President last June 19th.

That policy is to look to the strength and the resources of the region itself to build its own future. As the President said then: "The Middle East is rich in history, rich in its people and in its resources. It has no need to live in permanent civil war. It has the power to build its own life, as one of the prosperous regions of the world in which we live."

The President also made clear that he intends to play an active role:

"If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward the works of peace, they can count with confidence upon the friendship, and the help, of all the people of the United States of America.

"In a climate of peace, we here will do our full share to help with a solution for the refugees. We here will do our full share in support of regional cooperation. We here will do our share, and do more, to see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is applied to the critical problem of desalting water and helping to make the deserts bloom."

We must also play an active role, to be sure, in limiting the influence of the Soviet Union and preventing its domination while this growth is getting underway. But military standoff between the US or NATO and the USSR is not enough. We must be involved in the development of resources of the area and in encouraging and helping our friends to turn them effectively to their peoples' use.



This brings us to a crucial point which the Senator does not mention. The limits on the Administration's attention to the Mid-East have not been imposed by its preoccupation elsewhere. The Administration last year handled the Middle East crisis with its fullest attention and with considerable credit. The Senator has charged Administration neglect, though he has not documented his case at all. But if there has been neglect, I would venture to say it has been of a different sort.

The limits on the Administration have been imposed by those right here in the Congress and elsewhere who have persistently tried to tie the Administration's hands and to keep it from taking new initiatives abroad. They have decried our commitments to friends around the world. They have limited the number of countries where our AID program can operate. They have tried to strip from our nation's hand the ability to cooperate with friends in providing for their adequate defense.

The Senator calls us to be more active. It is questionable that we will have the resources for this sort of activity or that we will have the will, if the mood of many in this body were to prevail. The President has pledged our energetic participation both to make the peace and then to make it flourish. We have no illusions. He has pledged us to an uphill fight. That fight is worth it--for the people of the area and for our own interests. But it will not be easy, and we cannot fight with our hands tied behind our backs.

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INJ ☐ TION  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Thursday, March 7, 1968  
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms files with  
you the ☐ assessment of  
dangers in the Middle East.

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It has not yet been evaluated by  
our people.

Key passages marked.

*W. Rostow*

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By *ch* NARA, Date 3-10-15

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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# Intelligence Report

*Security and Subversion in the Persian Gulf*

**Secret**

25

1 March 1968  
No. 0582/68

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
1 March 1968

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Security and Subversion in the Persian Gulf

Summary

The Persian Gulf is one of the least known corners of the globe, parts of it virtually unchanged since the 15th century. Only two or three of the states in the area deserve to be called countries--Iran, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait. Most of the rest are shabby sheikdoms with a few square miles of territory and a few thousand inhabitants. But the entire area lies above some 67 percent of the world's known oil reserves, much of it exploited by US companies and vital to Europe's economy and to Western defense.

British troops have been stationed in the gulf area for over a century. Air, naval, and ground contingents in Bahrain and Sharjah were, until last November, backed up by even greater troop strength in Aden. Now, Aden has become the radical independent "People's Republic of Southern Yemen," and the UK has announced its intention to pull its remaining troops--some 9,000 at present--out of the gulf area before the end of 1971. In an attempt to plan for the future, the nine protectorates in the area--Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial sheikdoms--have agreed to federate this March, although few details have been worked out. The British apparently also plan to sever their semipaternalistic ties with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Whether British political advisers and seconded officers will continue to work with the governments and security forces in the region is still an open question.

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Clandestine Services.

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Except for Iraq, with its minuscule border on the Persian Gulf, all of the states in the area are conservative--some medievally so--and are vulnerable to agitation for change. Iran can certainly take care of itself, however, and Saudi Arabia may prove able to do so despite a growing threat in its Eastern Province. So far, subversive activity in the Trucial States is minimal. But open revolt has already broken out in Muscat and Oman, and Southern Yemen is making revolutionary noises on its border; Bahrain and Kuwait are sitting on top of highly developed networks of subversion; and the ruling regime in Qatar seems to have thoroughly alienated the population. Whether the indigenous security forces are capable of coping with such problems--with or without British assistance--is far from certain. What is certain is that they can expect no help from radical regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, whose agents have been working for years to spread the "Arab revolution" to the gulf.

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Kuwait: Seeds of Trouble

Kuwaitis are actually a minority in their own country. Their oil wealth has attracted migrants from all over the Arab world--particularly dispossessed Palestinians--and from Iran as well, so that now some 53 percent of Kuwait's total population is expatriate. Even more significantly, 76 percent of the working population is non-Kuwaiti, deprived by the country's stringent nationality laws of citizenship, civil rights, or the right to own land. The result is a Kuwait that is really two nations: a power elite of citizens anxious to preserve their privileges without working, and an expatriate majority who have no real stake in the country but nonetheless make up the labor force and provide nearly all the technical, professional, and managerial skills.

Some mitigation of this potential danger is provided by the availability of most of Kuwait's impressive welfare benefits to its resident non-citizens. Moreover, younger Kuwaitis, who are exposed to the liberalizing influence of increased educational opportunities, are playing a more active role in both the public and the private sector. So long as it remains almost impossible, however, for an Arab foreigner, let alone a non-Arab, to acquire Kuwaiti nationality, the dichotomy will remain a threat to future stability.

Further problems stem from the fact that the government is at present something of a benevolent dictatorship--a feudal monarchy decked out in the trappings of a welfare state. Kuwait's constitution limits the powers of the Amir, and even allows the popularly elected National Assembly to override the Amir's vote. The general elections in 1967, however, were clumsily rigged by the regime to ensure that nationalist candidates would be soundly beaten. As a result, there are now no opposition members in the assembly. Despite its faulty implementation, the 1962 constitution does provide a liberal framework within which a more genuine democratic system might evolve.

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Subversive Groups in Kuwait

By far the most powerful subversive group in the country is the Kuwait Arab Nationalist Movement (KANM), with some 6,000 members and perhaps an additional 8,000 sympathizers. The organization is illegal, but is highly organized on a cell basis. Surprisingly, more than 90 percent of its members are native Kuwaitis. Despite this fact, the KANM has no members in the National Assembly; three were elected in January 1968 but resigned, along with four liberals, to protest the government's rigging of the elections. This has deprived the KANM of a legal parliamentary base and of a forum for its articulate propaganda.

The KANM has two wings; one is moderate Nasirist, and the other, probably stronger, wing is Marxist. Despite its Marxist tinge, much of the KANM's effectiveness--and funds--comes from the support of a handful of more liberal merchants, who simply wish to deprive the ruling Sabah family of their monopoly of power. The KANM operates through a variety of legal "fronts"--professional organizations, discussion clubs, and student, labor, and teacher unions. It has control of the entire labor movement, in fact, and can even blatantly ignore government regulations. It seems to be the headquarters for the network of other ANM groups throughout the gulf area--a network that includes the National Liberation Front, which has come to power in Southern Yemen--and pumps Kuwaiti funds into the coffers of less affluent ANM organizations. The extent of support, if any, furnished to the KANM through the Egyptian and Soviet embassies in Kuwait is unknown.

The Baath Party in Kuwait, in contrast, is known to be controlled through the Syrian Embassy, although it is financially independent. It has less than a thousand members, circulates clandestine pamphlets and Syrian newspapers, and concentrates primarily on labor unions and on Palestinian refugees. Its extremist wing considers the KANM "too bourgeois," and is trying to woo KANM-backed student and labor groups--so far with little success. In general, however, the Baath is forced to cooperate with the dominant KANM; the same is true of the Kuwait Communist Party, which has only a handful of native Kuwaiti members.

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A small number of less significant groups also operate in Kuwait. One of these is the pro-Nasirist Arab Socialist Union, directed from Cairo, which has technically merged with the KANM. Whatever independent role it may still play is steadily weakening, and it has been virtually inactive since the June war. Because of the high proportion of Palestinians living in Kuwait, the country is a major source of funds for the Palestine Liberation Organization and for the Fatah and Asifah guerrilla groups aimed at Israel, but these activities presumably do not directly threaten the present regime. The KANM consistently favors the liberation of Palestine and supports efforts to raise funds for the cause.

#### Kuwait's Security Forces

Kuwait's entire Directorate of Public Security consists of 36 people and a British adviser. Fourteen of them have been trained in basic security and intelligence duties, with particular emphasis on investigation, surveillance, travel control, and the recruitment and control of agents and informants. Present plans call for further expansion and an eventual telephone surveillance capability. The rank and file of the army (some 6,100 troops) and the police force (1,500 men) are recruited from Bedouin tribes that the ruling family considers loyal. The KANM is known to be trying to burrow into all of these groups, but the extent of its success is unknown.

Since Kuwait's independence in 1961, Britain's military presence in Kuwait has been maintained through the Kuwait Liaison Team, which averages perhaps 50 men. Its functions include training the army, maintaining tanks, operating and maintaining a radar system, and training the Kuwait Air Force in the operation and maintenance of Hawker Hunters.

The effectiveness of Kuwait's security forces is difficult to evaluate. Riots that broke out last June during the Arab-Israeli war were at first ignored by the regime, but after martial law was declared no further trouble occurred. Throughout 1966, the regime periodically deported batches of non-Kuwaiti Arabs and Iranians, allegedly for political connections with leftist movements, and efforts have been made to control the influx of

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Palestinians. While Kuwait's security forces may prove sufficient to prevent the regime from being overthrown, they do not inhibit the use of Kuwait as a source of organization and funds for subversion throughout the entire gulf area.

#### The Other Arab States

Kuwait alone among the Arab states on the gulf has any pretensions to democracy or a "progressive" social policy. The other Arab states are governed by traditional methods that have persisted in the Arabian Peninsula since the dawn of history. These methods are not entirely unresponsive to popular pressure. The ruler--king, amir, or shéik--is selected by all of the members of the royal family as the one best qualified to rule, and does not succeed merely because he is the oldest son. Once on the throne, he is expected to heed his advisers and not give vent to his every whim. Nonetheless, he is answerable to no one for his actions, and is free to lop off heads and hands in accordance with Islamic law.

Most of his subjects expect to be ruled in no other way. But as wealth from oil transforms the traditional way of life in these states, as money and education open up alternatives, and as technicians from other Arab states come in, the pressure for reform will mount. If the ruler remains inflexible, there will be an explosion.

Adding to the long-term threat to stability in the gulf is the presence of a sizable religious minority, the Shiah, who are treated as second-class citizens and in some cases are denied the right to practice their religion. The Shiah form some 50 percent of the population in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and 60 percent in Bahrain, where they are nevertheless subordinate to the dominant Sunni sect. Migrant Iranians--who form a substantial body in Kuwait, Qatar, and the Trucial States--are Shiah. Long years of persecution have prompted the formation of what amounts to an underground apparatus, with secret chains of command and secret meeting places. The Shiah distrust all non-Shiah, but tend to look favorably on the USSR, which has traditionally sympathized with their

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plight in its propaganda. Because the Shiah holy cities are in Iraq, there is considerable travel back and forth, and hence ample opportunity for contact with "progressive" Arab ideas.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, has a history of clashes between the Shiah community and the Saudi Government, which has at times attempted to force the Shiah to follow its own brand of Islam. The killings and bitterness that resulted induced the government to allow Shiah to practice their religion privately, although they are still considered virtual "unbelievers," and there is no such thing as a "legal" Shiah mosque in the kingdom.

#### The Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's oil deposits are in the Eastern Province, bordering on the Persian Gulf. The labor force that has gathered in this area is consequently somewhat more sophisticated than the majority of Saudis, and hence more open to subversive influences. Because even labor unions are illegal in Saudi Arabia, activities that would be conducted openly in most countries have been forced underground. In some cases, little is known about them.

The Saudi Arab Nationalist Movement (SANM), which aims at the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and the institution of a system based on Arab socialism, is the strongest subversive organization in the country. The SANM is believed to be linked with the KANM and with the AMN in Bahrain. Fragmentary evidence also suggests that the SANM maintains some kind of link--possibly through individual members--with an organization known as the Union of Democratic Forces of the Arabian Peninsula (UDFAP), established to coordinate the activities of peninsula Communist parties. SANM members have occasionally served as go-betweens for the delivery of arms, ammunition, and funds to the Bahrain ANM in support of terrorist activity and demonstrations.

Far less is known of the Saudi National Liberation Front (SNLF), which is, in effect, the Saudi Communist Party. It appears to be confined to the Eastern Province, and to consist primarily of Bahrainis, Omanis, and Yemenis working in Saudi oil installations; its leader is now living in Damascus.

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The SNLF is tied to the National Liberation Front operating in Bahrain, and both are elements of UDFAP.

The Baath Party also operates in Saudi Arabia, apparently under the direction of the Syrian Embassy. It is reported to be relatively strong, but its actual membership--as in the case of other Saudi organizations--is unknown. Egyptian intelligence is presumed to be at work within the kingdom, and there are certainly fairly large numbers of pro-Nasirists, probably more than ever since the Arab-Israeli war and the Saudi-Egyptian detente at Khartoum in August. During the June war, Cairo Radio was relied on almost exclusively as a source of news, and large crowds in the Eastern Province responded to calls by Cairo and Damascus for mob action against US installations.

#### Saudi Security

The riots and demonstrations of last June graphically demonstrated the inability of the Saudi security structure to cope with significant civil disturbances. The Saudi police and the airfield garrison at Dhahran were utterly ineffective, and may have actively encouraged some violence. Only when tribal national guard units were summoned to the area was a measure of order established. Local Saudi authorities evidently lacked good intelligence on ring-leaders and underground organizations, and resorted to large-scale arrests and far-from-gentle interrogations. Although about 100 people were detained for several months, most are apparently now back at work.

Some of the regime's ineffectiveness in the face of the riots may be traced to the death last March of Amir Saud bin Jiluwi, a singularly active governor, who was universally feared in the Eastern Province. His successor and brother, Abd al-Muhsin,

[redacted] A new deputy director of public security for the Eastern Province was appointed last August to carry out various reforms, and he is reputed to be diligent and hardworking, as well as somewhat sadistic.

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Saudi Arabia has two separate armies: a regular army about 24,000 strong, and a 28,000 man.

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national guard. The regular army was trained and equipped by a US advisory group and has adopted US organization and methods, although not very successfully. Vehicle and equipment maintenance is poor, military administration lacks planning, and training standards are low. The national guard, made up of levies from tribes traditionally loyal to the King, is primarily an internal security force. It is the

[REDACTED] Part of the guard functions as a mobile element that can be deployed anywhere in the country; the remainder, consisting mainly of older men, is stationed at population centers.

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The Saudi Navy consists of one lightly armed patrol craft based at Dammam in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely to affect the security situation. In addition, the Saudis have 11 F86Fs, which are stationed at Dhahran Airfield, and a few British Lightning supersonic jets, which are concentrated at the other side of the country near the Yemen border.

#### Subversion in Bahrain

Despite the presence of Britain's chief base in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain has a rather highly developed network of subversive organizations. Probably the strongest and most sophisticated of these is the National Liberation Front of Bahrain (NLF), which is thought to have a nominal membership of about 500, half of whom are active. It has access to duplicating machinery, and periodically circulates pamphlets. Organized on a cell basis, it has a disciplinary arm called "Committee 17," which the members apparently dread. The NLF appears to be dominated by Communists, although Baathists in the organization have recently become more active. The NLF was active in disturbances in Bahrain in the spring of 1965 and the worst acts of violence are thought to have been NLF-inspired. The NLF also claimed responsibility for attacks on Special Branch officers a year later, attacks that demonstrated considerable knowledge of explosive devices. A number of NLF members are known to have received training near Cairo in terrorist techniques.

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The NLF has been relatively inactive over the past year, but its knowledge of terrorist techniques remains a potential danger. It could probably organize civil disturbances if it decided to do so, although it lost some ground during the Arab-Israeli war because of its half-hearted efforts to support the cause.

Baathism in Bahrain did not pose a significant threat to security prior to last year, when Baathist activities began to intensify. The Baathists soon became the most active political group on the island. Meetings were held in northern coastal villages formerly regarded as NLF strongholds, and much correspondence was exchanged between Damascus and Bahrain. There are indications that Syrian Baathists are interested in Bahrain as a jumping-off place for spreading Baathism around the gulf.

The Bahrain Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) was formerly a significant factor, but its efforts were extensively disrupted by the Special Branch in 1965 and it has never recovered its cohesion or rebuilt its organizational structure. In December 1966, however, an ANM activist group emerged calling itself the "Front of Nationalist Forces" (FNF), and another group called the "Commando" is reported to have been given the task of planning attacks on Europeans in Bahrain. Some of the old leadership has been released from detention or has returned from self-imposed exile. The demonstrations that broke out in Bahrain during the June war were led by the ANM-FNF, but there is as yet no indication whether or not the movement can transform itself into an organized political machine along the lines of the NLF. Some ANM members have received training in agitation, sabotage, and terrorism in Cairo or in Basra, Iraq, but the latest known training session dates back to 1966.

#### Bahrain's Security Forces

Bahrain was more successful than neighboring gulf states in handling the potentially explosive

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situation during the Arab-Israeli war. Sheik Isa, the ruler, decided he could allow the people to blow off steam without them getting out of hand, and kept the island's police out of sight but alert. Demonstrations, which always stopped for lunch, were permitted for four days and ended without incident as soon as they were banned. Bahrain's organized nationalist groups were apparently caught off balance, and there seems to have been little organized leadership of the demonstrations. A few Palestinian, Syrian, and Egyptian school teachers acted on their own initiative. One of the police's four emergency squads of 25 men broke up a sizable clash between Iranian and Bahraini workers--the product of a backlog of ill feelings between the two groups magnified by prevailing tensions.

Some of Bahrain's stability is undoubtedly due to the presence of 1,679 British ground troops and 2,322 Royal Air Force personnel. Intelligence gathered by the Bahrain Special Branch in June 1967 revealed that the ANM had instructed its followers not to initiate violence as they could not stand up to the British forces. London's announced intention to withdraw these forces may reduce their effectiveness even before they leave, however, by casting doubts on British willingness to commit troops in case of trouble. Although "another Aden" is unlikely to develop, Bahrain's nationalist groups are capable of considerable troublemaking, and they could well receive help from Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, or Syria.

Bahrain's 800-man police force has one Jordanian and 15 British officers, and operates efficiently under normal circumstances. Bahrain came within a hair's breadth of calling in British troops in the spring of 1965, however, and might prove unable to cope with a determined nationalist onslaught. The loyalty of some of the recruits came into question during the demonstrations last June, when a delegation of demonstrators entering police headquarters was greeted by a squad of recruits who broke ranks and rushed over to embrace them. There are reports

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that Sheik Isa is planning to form his own Bedouin army with Jordanian assistance, drawing on recruits from the ruling family's ancestral home in Qatar.

Bahrain's small Special Branch--commanded by a British officer--operates effectively, as shown by its success in disrupting Bahrain's Arab Nationalist Movement. In the spring of 1966, the Special Branch was decimated by a terrorist attack and poor health, and there was serious concern whether it could be rebuilt in time to meet an expected summer of terrorism. The terror campaign failed to materialize, however, and the branch has since been restored to its previous efficiency.

#### Rumblings in Qatar

According to some assessments, the political situation in Qatar is more delicate than anywhere else in the gulf. The ruling family derives

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Of an estimated 1967 oil income of \$79 million, some \$24 million is thought to have gone directly into the royal family's coffers. The deputy

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So far, there has been little organized subversive activity in Qatar. An ANM cell was reported to have been formed last fall. A small degree of NLF activity takes place, but it is inspired from Bahrain and is conducted by persons deported from Bahrain. Little Baathist activity has come to notice, although a number of Syrians are employed in fairly senior positions in the Qatar Government. Such activity as does take place is largely confined to the circulation of propaganda material. A prominent Bahraini Baathist recently found employment in a senior position with Shell of Qatar, however, and is trying to organize a local movement as part of

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the campaign to spread Baathism in the gulf states. There is one known Communist in Qatar.

Some 300 Egyptians are employed in the Education Department, and a number of others are in influential managerial positions in local enterprises--even though official policy is to keep Egyptians out. The police maintain virtually no watch over the Egyptian teachers. Although at least five persons with suspected Egyptian Intelligence Service connections have visited Qatar in the past year, the police provided no coverage of their activities. The Palestine Liberation Organization is strongly represented in Qatar, and a large number of Palestinians are employed at Shell of Qatar.

An organization called the "Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf" (FLAG)--reported to have been created by the Egyptians in mid-1967--appears to be centered in Qatar, although it also has branches in Bahrain and Dubai. Intended as a combined front for all nationalist groups in the gulf, it is anti-British, anti-Iranian, and avowedly plans to employ terrorism and sabotage against "imperialism" and "corrupt reactionism." It has expressed the desire to coordinate action with revolutionary fronts in South Arabia and Dhufar.

Qatar has a 1,600-man police force with 15 British and 24 Arab officers, and it also has a 1,000-man army, both under the same commander, an Irishman--turned Muslim--named Muhammad Mahdi Cochrane.

[redacted] Both police and army are primarily mercenary forces, and during the June war the South Arabian element--about half the total force--came near the point of mutiny. The situation was restored only when the deputy ruler threatened to intervene with the Bedouin army, a tribal force with a tradition of loyalty to the royal family, paid from the ruler's private purse. Since June, the enlistment of Adenis, Yemenis, and Dhufaris has been halted and a number of previous recruits have been deported; their places are being filled by tribesmen from Saudi Arabia and Oman.

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The Qatar police have no special branch,

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There is a Criminal Investigation Department, however, which carries out postal interception, immigration control, and some surveillance. Both the ruler and the deputy ruler,

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These groups are also attuned to subversive stirrings among the people, however. Such activity as is unearthed is met with imprisonment, deportation, or banishment.

#### The Trucial States

By and large, the Trucial States remain sunk in medieval somnolence. Abu Dhabi recently rid itself--with considerable British assistance--of its colorful but unpopular ruler. His successor, Sheik Zayid, is said to be a progressive--by gulf standards. He apparently intends to make Abu Dhabi a second Kuwait once the oil revenues, which will eventually give Abu Dhabi's 18,000 inhabitants the world's highest per capita income, begin to mount. No concrete steps have been taken thus far, however. Oil has so far been discovered in only two of the seven states, and in neither of these have workers in oil installations reached a level of sophistication that seriously threatens the regime, although this presumably will come in time.

Meanwhile, some signs of restiveness have already begun to appear. A Baathist group is reported to exist and to maintain contact with Damascus; its activity seems to be confined to Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah, the three most advanced sheikdoms. The "National Organization of the Trucial States" (NOTS) was founded some years ago and now appears to be directed from Cairo. Some members reportedly have received sabotage and guerrilla training in Egypt, but nothing seems to have come of it as yet. NOTS may or may not be tied up with Qatar-based FLAG, the Cairo-sponsored group which reportedly has an embryonic branch in Dubai. There is no sign of Communist activity in the area.

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The few disturbances that broke out in the Trucial States during the June war were apparently small in scale and easily brought under control. So far, the most significant security force in the area has been the 1,500-man Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS), with its 37 British officers and 30 British NCOs. Its fate when the British depart has not been settled, but it seems unlikely that the TOS could effectively serve seven different masters who will almost certainly be squabbling perpetually among themselves.

Many of the sheikdoms have begun to beef up their own security forces in anticipation of future trouble. The Abu Dhabi Defense Force (ADDF) now has about 600 men, but is to be expanded to 1,000; the men are illiterate but rated as excellent by their British commander. The ADDF, which now has 18 British officers, is acquiring aircraft--to be flown by British mercenaries--and high-speed patrol boats, and the airport in Abu Dhabi is to be expanded. For routine police matters, Abu Dhabi has a small police force with two British advisers, but it is rated as "practically worthless" by the commander of the ADDF. A small Special Branch was recently established, and is reported to have attracted capable personnel.

The Dubai police force numbers about 400, and is also to be expanded to 1,000. Its British superintendent is energetic and experienced, and it is considered the best trained and most efficient force on the Trucial Coast. A Special Branch is only beginning to function, and is having trouble attracting educated Dubai personnel, who feel that economic and social prospects are better with private firms.

Sharjah's 30-man police force, although under a British commander, is in a low state of training and effectiveness and has only a rudimentary Special Branch. Sharjah also contains one of the two British bases in the area, however, and British forces currently include 2,500 ground troops, 769 Royal Air Force personnel, and 69 aircraft of various types.

Ras al-Khaimah's police force, also under a British commander, numbers about 120, is relatively

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ineffective, and is scattered in small posts throughout the sheikdom.

On 27 February, the seven Trucial States, Bahrain, and Qatar announced that they had agreed to federate, with the union assuming responsibility for defense and internal security. Although presumably no planning has yet been done for the federated security forces, this development may eventually strengthen them.

Open Revolt in Oman

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman would like to see his country move cautiously [redacted] tury. Despite mounting oil revenues, the Sultan has so far actively resisted any kind of modernization or reform. A small-scale development program is presumably to be undertaken sometime in the future, but it is to be concerned with such items as construction of schools, hospitals, municipal buildings, water pipelines, and a power plant--not welfare programs. Although the Sultan's son and heir was educated in Britain, his social and political ideas are reported to jibe with his father's. Partially because of his conservatism, the Sultan is facing revolt on three sides--and has met the

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The Omani rebel movement has religious and political roots stretching well back into the last century; even its most recent phase dates back some 14 years. The present Imam of Oman and his followers rose in revolt in 1955 and 1957, only to be put down by British air and ground forces. Sporadic guerrilla activity still continues. Although the Imam is, if anything, more conservative than the Sultan, his cause has been adopted by the "progressive" Arab countries, which have on occasion provided financial, military, and propaganda support. These countries have found themselves in an unlikely alliance with Saudi Arabia, which is embroiled in a boundary dispute with the Sultan and allows the rebels safe haven and limited transit

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rights. For the time being, however, the Imam's cause is all but dead. Its leaders are divided, outside support is drying up, and the impetus of revolt has passed to the radical nationalists.

These radicals have formed the Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF), which now appears to have joined forces with the NLF in South Yemen and is thus linked with the ANM movements throughout the gulf. British estimates put the strength of the rebels at about 100, but they could form a major threat if enough outside support were forthcoming--and Southern Yemen is right next door. An upsurge of guerrilla activity in January probably reflects the receipt of supplies from Southern Yemen. The Sultan is now building a fort on his side of the border, astride the overland supply route from Southern Yemen, and an armed dhow is patrolling the Dhufar coast.

The Sultan's regime is also threatened by his own brother, Tariq, who is openly trying to seize the throne, although he has refrained from military action. Tariq advocates a constitutional monarchy and a Kuwait-type approach to Muscat's problems. He is living in Abu Dhabi and is reported to have the support of the Abu Dhabi Government. Tariq's chances of inspiring a successful movement seem slight, but, if it did come off, it could only increase Muscat's chances for future stability.

The 2,800-man Sultan Armed Forces (SAF), with 67 British officers out of an officer corps of 100, has thus far been able to contain dissidence both in Dhufar and in Oman. The recent increase of rebel pressure in Dhufar however, prompted the British to dispatch a platoon of British infantry to Salalah to protect the Royal Air Force stationed there. There are 1,500 SAF troops in Dhufar, grouped into three units, one of which is on patrol at all times in the Southern Yemen border region.

The Sultan's own air force, consisting of four jet trainers and five light planes flown by British

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pilots on contract, constantly patrols the Dhufar area. In addition, there is a gendarmerie--with a British commander--responsible for security in the towns of Muscat and Matrah, and in the oil camps. An oil pipeline is guarded by the tribes whose territory it passes through on the basis of a stipend from the oil company. The Sultanate possesses two patrol craft, one of which is operating off Dhufar.

#### Iran: Stability and Strength

In contrast with the feudal atmosphere and stirrings of subversive activity that prevail on the Arab side of the gulf, Iran is a relatively modern country with successful economic and social development programs and, at present, no serious subversive threat. It is the only country on the gulf with a respectable defense capability, at least on paper, and the Shah is planning an expensive development program.

The Shah is nevertheless nervous that the sizable Arab minority on the Iranian side of the gulf may be infected by their more radical Arab neighbors. He has long distrusted the ambitions of Egyptian President Nasir, and fears that the eventual withdrawal of British troops from the area will leave the Egyptians a clear field for stirring up trouble, especially in the oil-rich province of Khuzistan. The majority of Iran's 800,000 Arabs are peasants, however, and appear to be politically apathetic. But the Shah's fears are fueled by the existence of the Khuzistan Liberation Front (KLF), formed by a group of exiled Iranian Arabs--based in Iraq and Kuwait--who agitate for the liberation of Khuzistan from Iranian rule.

The Shah and the Iranian security forces have argued for several years that the KLF was receiving support from Egypt and Iraq. Last summer, a group of armed Iranian Arabs was arrested, and subsequently claimed that they had been instructed by the Egyptian consul in Basra to blow up Iranian oil installations in Khuzistan. An arms cache was also uncovered in

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Khuzistan. There is no evidence, however, that the KLF has any substantial following.

The government has taken a number of non-military steps to ensure stability in the southern area, including ambitious economic development programs, a revival of the extremely nationalist Pan-Iran Party as an anti-Nasir organization, and intelligence penetration of the KLF. In addition, the Shah has undertaken a military build-up, aimed primarily at the radical Arab threat to the Persian Gulf area. He plans to spend \$600 to \$800 million in the next five years to modernize and equip Iran's navy and air force, and has formed the new "Third Army Command," with responsibility for the whole of southern Iran. The announcement of the UK's military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf lends impetus to the Shah's program, but is not expected to alter it in any fundamental way.

The Iranian Armed Forces (151,000 troops), security forces and gendarmerie (38,000 men) are considered capable of countering aggression by neighboring countries and of suppressing internal dissident activity, although relatively limited sabotage operations could do a great deal of damage to Iran's highly concentrated oil installations. The 16-ship navy--the only naval force in the area--is able to patrol the Persian Gulf and to serve as a warning mechanism, and the air defense capability has increased significantly. The security forces (SAVAK) apparently have been effective in neutralizing subversive activities in Khuzistan and elsewhere.

#### The British Pullout

Despite the Shah's fears, it seems unlikely that the withdrawal of British troops from the gulf area will seriously impair Iran's security in any immediate way--particularly if Tehran carries out its planned military build-up. The situation on the Arab side, however, is a bit more shaky and the likely effects of the pullout are uncertain.

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A great deal will depend on decisions that the British have not yet made. London envisions political independence for its former gulf protectorates, but appears reluctant to take on any defense commitments. The British "commitment" to Kuwait is an informal exchange of notes that does not commit the UK to automatic action, but leaves it free to act if requested. Now, however, Britain has notified Kuwait that even this guarantee will lapse after 1971. It seems unlikely that the British will be any more forthcoming in the case of the other states.


There are other questions involved. What will happen to the Trucial Oman Scouts, to the hundred or so British military and political advisers in the area, and to the seconded British officers on whom all of the police forces and armies in the region depend? There is no essential reason why such assistance need cease--the states in the region can well afford to pay for it--and presumably at least some of the British personnel will remain. If developments force them out, however, the result could be chaos.

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# PERSIAN GULF STATES: Population



## PERSIAN GULF SECURITY FORCES

### KUWAIT

Directorate of Public Security	37
Army	6,100
Police	1,500
Kuwait Liaison Team (British)	50
Air Force	50 personnel, 12 jet fighters 5 transports, 2 helicopters

### SAUDI ARABIA

Regular Army	24,000
National Guard	28,000
Aircraft	11 F86F, 6 Lightning 5 Hawker Hunter; 5 transports 350 personnel
Navy	1 patrol craft; 160 personnel

### BAHRAIN

Police	816 men
British troops	2,322 RAF personnel; 1,679 troops; 7 ships

### QATAR

Police	1,639
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### TRUCIAL STATES

Trucial Oman Scouts	1,567
Abu Dhabi Defense Force	618
Dubai Police Force	400
Sharjah Police Force	30
British Base in Sharjah	2,500 ground forces 769 RAF personnel 69 aircraft
Ras al-Khaimah Police Force	120

### MUSCAT & OMAN

Sultan's Armed Forces	2,967
Sultan's Own Air Force	4 jet trainers, 5 light planes
Navy	2 patrol craft

### IRAN

Troops	151,000
Gendarmes	38,300
Air Force	72 jet fighters, 36 transport aircraft 12,400 men
Navy	1 destroyer, 3 patrol boats, 6 minesweepers, 4 submarine chasers, 1 landing craft, 6,300 personnel

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE/LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thursday, February 29, 1968  
4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Greetings to Arabian Peninsula Leaders

State proposes that you send the following messages to the chiefs of state of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and South Yemen on the occasion of the major Moslem religious holiday, which occurs about March 9 this year. Last December you sent these three rulers messages for the second most important holiday instead of New Year's greetings, but it has been our custom to mark this holiday each year:

For Saudi Arabia: On behalf of my government and the American people, I extend to Your Majesty and to the people of Saudi Arabia my warm personal greetings and very best wishes on the blessed occasion of Id al-Adha. May God continue to grant health, happiness and prosperity to Your Majesty and to the people of your country under your wise leadership. May both our personal friendship and the friendship of our two nations continue to grow.

For South Yemen: I extend to Your Excellency congratulations on the blessed occasion of Id al-Adha. On this first Id al-Adha since the independence of your country, I also extend my own best wishes and those of the American people for the progress and prosperity of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen.

For Kuwait: I extend personally and on behalf of the American people my sincere congratulations to Your Highness and to the people of Kuwait on the blessed occasion of Id al-Adha. I also send my warmest good wishes for the health, happiness and prosperity of Your Highness and of the people of your country.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

W. Rostow

sent letter to S/S  
2/29 6:00 am  
notified Saunders  
off.

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PRESERVATION COPY

March 2 1968

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February 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Rusk  
Under Secretary Katzenbach

The President wished you to have a copy  
of Eugene Black's memorandum, attached.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FEB 14 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Eugene R. Black

SUBJECT: RECONNAISSANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I have met with the Heads of State in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. I saw all Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers. I met with leaders in public and private sectors plus officials of the USG and other US nationals residing in these countries.

I emphasized that I was on a "private trip" through the area. However, I told the leaders that I would be seeing you upon my return to Washington and therefore would appreciate their candid expressions concerning:

1. The current stand of this government on the Arab-Israeli question.
2. The posture of the individual and/or his government towards the USG.

My soundings may be summarized as follows:

- A. The prevailing mood in the Arab states is one of bitter frustration. It is at the moment a negative and destructive mood and therefore a dangerous one.
- B. I am personally deeply discouraged by the reactions I received on the trip and feel violence lurks just beneath the surface.
  1. All the principals in the Arab states referred to the USG policy in the Middle East as the "No Policy." (non-existent policy.) From the socio-economic-political points of view this region is in turmoil and the USG position is at a nadir.
  2. Israel on the other hand is strong, resilient and enjoying the fruits of victory. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts - especially the personal motivation quotient which has made this small state a remarkable example of "self help."
- C. The Arab world is far from monolithic. A degree of political solidarity was achieved at Khartoum, however this was short-lived and the old divisions and some new ones are evident. This disarray is leading directly into the hands of the USSR.\* (\* See J.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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- D. The Arabs hold the USG as the scapegoat. Note: No one of importance any longer believes the USG intervened directly in the war but everyone - including the most pro-western (Feisal-Hussein) believes the USG does and can control Israel and Israeli policy.
- E. Nasser, Feisal, Hussein, Emir of Kuwait and Crown Prince Jaber of Kuwait (Jaber is real power in Kuwait) feel that there is a widespread revulsion among all classes against what seems to them a complete identification of the USG with Israel. Each have specific grievances. The grip of each of the above remains strong with their rule appearing to be highly personal.
- F. The "Refugee Problem" in Jordan is appalling. There is nothing that I have seen in any country on this globe which is as tragic as the destitute condition these hundreds of thousands of persons are living in and under. I visited a number of camps in the Valley and was shocked at the bitterness expressed by old and particularly young refugees against the USG. (See Recommendation Number 2.)
- G. Old Jerusalem is an "open sore" with all Arabs in all Arab states. GOI's posture on this is inflammatory. Mayor Kolleck seems an able administrator. However, there are numerous complaints from the Arabs re the Israeli occupation - both in Jerusalem as well as on the West Bank. The shut down of the commercial banks has caused hardship and is a festering problem. Border incidents are up markedly and the action by the GOI is directed at and into the refugee camps. GOI Chief of Staff Bar Lev admits this is ugly but a necessary measure in order to stop provocative acts by Arabs.
- H. The attitude throughout area towards the "Jarring Mission" is one of doom. Little hope is given for a meaningful solution that will provide the so-called "lasting peace." Note: I met with Jarring in Cairo and he gave me impression he, too, was most discouraged. I fervently pray that this Mission will be successful because if it fails the reaction would/could be disastrous.
- I. Israel - I met with all the leaders. I will not report on this section as I feel you must be fully cognizant of the positions and posture of the GOI after the visit by Eshkol in January. In short, their attitudes represent the "other side of the coin."

J. Military - see "C"

1. USSR has substantially rebuilt her position in Arab world by rearming Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
2. The USSR naval buildup in eastern Mediterranean is new factor and a dangerous one.
3. The strategic aim of USSR is to thrust south through the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The USSR is actively working at establishing and maintaining a "presence" in Yemen and South Arabia (Aden). The closing of the Canal is a major deterrent to this scheme.
4. The USSR buildup is patently political. It is designed to capitalize on the continued USG association with Israel in the eyes of the Arabs and the weakness of the UK.
5. All Arabs spoke of their concern about the increasing Russian "presence". The flow of "technicians" and "advisors" into region is alarming even to Nasser. This is, of course, anathema to Kuwait, Feisal and Hussein.

K. Suez Canal - Estimates vary from man to man.

1. M. Younes who is Minister in charge stated Canal could be open in 50-60 days to free the 15 ships. However, to be fully open for business it would require 4-6 months. General Dayan disagrees with this and believes Canal could be open much sooner.
2. Plans are being studied by Egypt to deepen/widen Canal to handle 200,000 ton tankers. Also authorities studying feasibility of constructing 42 inch pipeline from Suez to Port Said.
3. Shooting incident on January 30 was ugly and bad omen for early opening of Canal. I visited Ismailia and saw UAR boat which had been fired on. Also saw damage to city which is extensive.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Conclusions:

- A. The Arab world is desperately in need of high level attention by the President and the USG. Time is of the essence in making some positive forward gesture.
- B. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts.
- C. The UK withdrawal from the Gulf is alarming. The vacuum must be filled before the USSR gains the advantage.

Recommendations:

- 1. You appoint a high level, experienced and internationally prominent US citizen to act as a "Personal Representative of the President of the USA" or a "Special Ambassador" to the Arab States.
  - A. This person would not undercut the existing USG Ambassadors but would compliment the USG team.
  - B. The Representative should make periodic "hand holding" missions to the area and review with each Head of State their individual problems. This would be a manifest example of good faith and intentions of USG.
- 2. Dispatch at an early opportunity, if available, Ambassador Graham Martin (Secretary Rusk's Special Assistant for Refugee Affairs) to the area. Time is short on the "human bomb" with these hundreds of thousands of homeless, helpless people. Action is needed immediately on this problem - perhaps (hopefully) the action would be independent of UNRWA which is now a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy. If Martin not available then someone of his caliber.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BRIEF SKETCH

1. Economies:

- A. Kuwait      Booming - in spite of heavy losses due to devaluation.
- B. Saudi Arabia      Continues to develop but a critical shortage of trained manpower has slowed the implementation of the development programs. These programs also being slowed due to large financial assistance being given to Egypt and Jordan.
- C. Egypt      Taking a nose-dive. USSR seems ready to provide assistance. However, situation appears hopeless. UAR is highly dependent on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya for financial assistance.
- D. Jordan      In a state of flux due to occupation of West Bank. USG's decision to give GOJ military assistance was very wise and timely.
- E. Israel      In relatively A-1 condition although naturally GOI suffered financially from war.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file*  
*[Signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arguments on the Mid-East for Jewish Audiences

I listened with sadness during the informal part of our NSC session this morning when you said the Administration's position isn't very good in the Reformed Jewish community--even on the Mid-East. Our position last summer was so close to Israel's--and the Israeli government knows it--that it makes me feel it is almost impossible to satisfy.

I'm sure you know the arguments better than I do, but leaving all the professional refinements aside, it seems to me these crude points could be made, at least in informal groups:

1. Look at the difference between 1957 and 1967! Last summer we staved off Soviet efforts in the UN to brand Israel the aggressor and make it give up occupied territories. We fought and bled for a sensible UN resolution. In 1957 we helped get Israel to pull out of the Sinai without a final Near East settlement. Under 1967 policy, any Israeli withdrawal will be voluntary and will be part of a broader settlement.
2. We're already more than making up Israel's war losses of aircraft. As everybody knows, we began in December to deliver 48 Skyhawks under a 1966 agreement. This is more than Israel lost. It will be a good bit more than 48 before we're done. (FYI, the President agreed with Eshkol to sell another 40 Skyhawks, and the agreement was signed January 31.)
3. The joint statement which President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol issued means what it says: "The President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic review." This is no phony diplomatic phrase, and we're right on top of this.
4. The Israeli government and the Israeli people are satisfied with our policy and what we're doing. Why aren't you? I was interested in a chat I had at the Congressional reception with Josh Eilberg, a Jewish Congressman from Philadelphia. He's just back from a visit

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By *g/jsh* NARA, Date *1-7-00*

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- 2 -

to Israel. He said he'd heard so much griping from the Jewish community here that he was totally unprepared to find everybody in Israel grateful for all we've done and full of praise for President Johnson and his policy.

5. If there's any doubt about the Israeli view of US-Israeli relations, Prime Minister Eshkol joined President Johnson in this statement after his recent visit: They "reviewed with satisfaction developments in the relations between the US and Israel since their last meeting in 1964." If that's too "diplomatic," try this from Eshkol's speech opening the Knesset (parliament) on October 30, 1967: "Outstanding among the speeches uttered by the world's statesmen, at or outside the [UN General] Assembly, was the important address given by President Lyndon Johnson of the United States on 19 June, in which he enunciated the policy of the United States in the area after hostilities."

6. On our Jordan arms decision, read General Dayan. Dayan has said publicly (see p. 6 of attached) that Israel needs US influence in Jordan--even if it means sending American arms. Abba Eban spoke eloquently about the noose closing around Israel's neck last spring. That was an Arab noose. Unless we keep our hands in places like Jordan, it will be a Soviet noose next time! Some Arabs are already talking about a "Soviet ring around Israel." And Israelis like Dayan know that's a serious threat. It's better to have a limited number of US arms in Jordan than unlimited quantities of Soviet arms pouring in.

7. Why do we even try to deal with the Arabs or care whether they reach a settlement with Israel? Because that's Israel's only hope of survival in the long run. A settlement the Arabs can live with is the only kind of settlement worth having. Note again General Dayan saying that the Egyptians will never get used to Israel sitting on the Suez Canal (Page 1, attached); if Israel stays, there will probably be another war. The only way Israel can withdraw is with the kind of settlement we're trying to help arrange.

Forgive me for telling you the obvious. You know the arguments better than I do. I just thought some of this material might not have crossed your desk and might be of some use to you. Obviously some of these arguments are too crude to be used in on-the-record forums, but they're all fit for informal exchanges.

*Walt* Rostow

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# AIRGRAM

POL AFAB-150  
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NAVY	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	ELR	FE
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S/AM	S/AM	INR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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A-513 UNCLASSIFIED

TO : DEPARTMENT

INFO : ALGIERS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KUWAIT, PARIS, LONDON, MOSCOW, RABAT, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, USUN

FROM : TEL AVIV

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 20 1 57 PM 1968  
ANALYSIS BRANCH  
16a

DATE: January 24, 1968

SUBJECT : DAYAN's THINKING ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

REF : A-499, January 19, 1968; A-445, December 26, 1967

POL 15-15R  
POL Arab 15R

Enclosed with this airgram is an informal translation of an extensive interview with Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe DAYAN, the text of which appeared in the influential Haaretz on January 19, 1968. The interview was conducted by a correspondent of that newspaper.

The interview merits reading in its entirety since it presumably reflects Dayan's present thinking of some of the key aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict and his appraisal of the prospects for peace or war in the Near East.

## Summary

These are some of the points covered by Dayan in the interview.

The Arabs, and particularly the Egyptians, will not countenance prolonged Israeli retention of the territories occupied since the June War. The Soviet Union is committed to try to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. If attempts at a political solution fail, there is likelihood of a coordinated Arab military struggle with Israel. But, there will only be another round if the Russians so decide. In the event there is a fourth war, Israel will win but in doing so it may sustain more losses than it did last June.

Enclosure: "Interview with Moshe Dayan", Haaretz, January 19, 1968

FORM 4-62 D5-323

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Drafted by:

POL:JPFreres/do 1/23/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
POL:JDLeonard

Clearances:

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The only significant front for Israel is that with Egypt. A peace arrangement with Hussein whereby Israel would retreat from the West Bank areas it now holds, might hinder rather than facilitate a peace settlement with Egypt. For reasons of security, Israel should not withdraw to its pre-June borders with Egypt. The Straits of Tiran are vital to Israel and cannot be turned over to Egyptian or United Nations forces. A settlement with Egypt should also include Israeli passage through the Suez Canal.

The United States position in the Near East must be consolidated. Israel has to reach an understanding with the United States so that the area will not fall exclusively within the Soviet sphere of influence. It is in Israel's interest that American, rather than Soviet, influence prevails in Jordan. Israel should maintain the security of the West Bank without getting involved unnecessarily with the local Arab population. The latter are permitted to have contacts with the outside Arab world. An isolated Arab ghetto within the State of Israel would be dangerous. An eventual peace settlement must deal with the settlement of the refugees and the right of worship and access for Arabs and Jews to the Holy Places.

Finally, Dayan expressed his hope that the various pressures acting on President Nasser will force the latter to seek a settlement with Israel.

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INTERVIEW - DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN

HAARETZ

1/19/68

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Q: What, in your opinion, are the possible developments in our relations with the Arab countries: Must we expect a fourth war, and when? Is peace possible, and how? Or shall we continue to live in a situation which is neither war nor peace?

A: Two developments (evaluations) are possible: a short-range one and a long-range one. For the short-range one the possibility of a fourth war, or at least a serious clash, must be taken into account. In the long-run permanent peace settlements can perhaps be discerned. Those who ignore the short-range problems can draw (for themselves) an ideal picture. But reality will destroy it. On the one hand, if we do not determine an aim for a longer range, there will be no correct direction for our handling of the immediate concrete questions.

My first assumption is that the Arab countries, and first of all Egypt, will not be willing to acquiesce in the present cease-fire line as a border line. For a long period of time they will not get used to it and will not put up with it and forget it (pass on to the next item on the agenda). The advantages which we see in our sitting along the Suez Canal, which give us strategic depth etc., do not exactly appeal to Egypt. We must assume that Egypt will take action so that we get out of (our positions) there. First she will certainly prefer political means; however, if these do not prove successful, she will look for other means. On no account will Egypt get used to the IDF sitting at the canal, with its guns facing their refineries. This applies to a certain extent also to other States. But Egypt first and foremost. Why Egypt? Because she is pressed more than others, and without her they cannot resume the war.

The second country which cannot put up with the status quo is the Soviet Union. From her point of view, if we do not retreat - that means for her a resounding political defeat. She will not easily put up with the fact that, after having told the Arabs what she did, and after having promised what she did, Israel is not moving. The USSR is linked to Egypt more than to any other Arab country, and we must reckon that it will be their joint policy to try and oust the IDF and cause it to retreat.

I suspect that we cannot assume that power of endurance on our part, and passing time, will bring about a settlement of the matter. On the contrary. We must assume that our continued sitting at the Suez Canal means struggle, and perhaps another round of war, although neither of them is exactly

keen on another military show-down, neither the USSR nor Egypt. If a political struggle were sufficient - they would prefer it. However, if they do not achieve our withdrawal by a political struggle - Egypt is likely to take military steps. From a military point of view, I estimate that Egypt is today not ready for military action, not even a local one. However, when Nasser completes the rehabilitation of his army, his air force and his armor, the situation is likely to change.

If another round comes to pass, we must assume that the Arab countries will coordinate their action. Not in a half-hearted manner (that leads to failure) but real coordination. They will wage a joint war: There will be two fronts, with a common aim for a north-eastern front (Iraq, Jordan and Syria) and an aim for a southern front (Egypt).

The Syrians and the Egyptians are replacing the equipment they lost during the last war, and to a certain extent they are even improving their strength in the air and armored corps as compared with what it was in May 1967. However, it will not be in a certain improvement, quantitative or qualitative, that the main difference will express itself between the possibly coming war and that of June 1967. There are two main differences:

(1) Coordinated Attack.

In June 1967, when we found ourselves in a total war with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, they attacked with artillery and, to a certain extent, from the air (Iraq bombed Nathaniya). But there was no serious attempt by Iraq, Jordan or Syria to occupy Israel; except for sending a Commando Battalion, which got exactly nowhere, and some local Syrian attacks. In the next round (war) they are likely to do what they failed to do in 1967. Those four countries on two fronts, with a coordinated plan, are likely to open with an attack on us. Because now we are sitting inside their very bones - along the Suez Canal, about 120 kms from Cairo; in the West Bank; and on the Heights of Golan - some 60 kms from Damascus. That is a good and serious reason for the Syrians to coordinate their operations with Egypt. When Egypt informed them in June 1967 that we are attacking in Sinai, they (the Syrians) were not in any hurry. This time they have a very good reason to be in a hurry.

The same goes for Jordan. If there is going to be another war, it is not because the King wants to get on the band wagon of victory. This time he regards himself as obliged to "liberate" the West Bank.



Q: Why?

Dayan: Because the lines on which we are now - in Egypt, Syria and Jordan - are a reason for the Arab countries to want to go to war. This time it is not only because they want to annihilate Israel, but because they regard it as a vital necessity for their continued existence.

(2) The New Role of the Russians.

This is the second main difference. I want to say immediately and in a most decisive manner: There will be another round only if the Russians decide that there is going to be another round. It will not be like in May last year, when the Russians told the Egyptians that there are Israeli Divisions on the Syrian border, and afterwards the Egyptians claimed that on the basis of that information from the Russians they went to war. The situation is different now. If the Russians do not decide in an absolutely clear manner and say so to the Arabs to go to war, the Arabs will not go to war. At least not within the next year. After their latest defeat they will not take such a responsibility on themselves. However, if the Russians decide that there has to be another war - the Arabs will fight!

Q: How is the Russian partnership likely to express itself in a war?

A: I estimate that the Russians are already on an operative level. They are already engaged in directing instruments (of warfare), both as regards anti-aircraft defenses as well as artillery (battle) dispositions are concerned. I estimate that they are already participating in the operative planning, how to act, on what axes, etc. From time to time the press publishes news reports that the Russian presence is likely to be as intensive as was the intervention of American advisers in the South Vietnamese Army. A Vietnamese Battalion Commander would not move without the counsel of his American adviser. I do not believe that it will be like that, but it is possible that the Russians will participate in the preparation of the plans for the opening moves of the war. It will certainly be a Russian decision - whether or not to open the war.

Q: Will the Russian targets be limited?

A: These are hypothetical questions. The limited (war) aim on the Heights of Golan is a return to the Jordan line, a distance of 20 kms. And our removal from the Suez Canal or from Sharm-es-Sheikh. There



may be limited (war) aims also in the naval and air spheres. However, all these are theoretical possibilities only.

Q: In case of another round, against a united Arab enemy who acts on the inspiration and with the assistance of the Russians, shall we be defeated or shall we win?

A: I believe that we could also win in the next round - if there is going to be one. If fighting is resumed - we shall have the upper hand.

Q: Shall we also be able to defend the civilian rear (hinterland)?

A: I cannot say there won't be any hits in the civilian hinterland. I cannot predict a kind of "de luxe war" as it was for the hinterland in June 1967 - I cannot say that it will be exactly like that.

Q: Won't even limited (war) aims be achieved?

A: What I say is, that we shall win in such a war. I cannot say where we shall gain 50 kms and where we may lose 50 kms, where we shall advance and where we shall retreat.

Q: Shall we conduct a defensive or an offensive war?

A: One does not speak about operational plans. But I would say that if there is going to be another round, we shall win. There will be battles of one sort or another - but we shall win.

Q: Wouldn't it be worthwhile to seek a settlement with Hussein, in order to facilitate our stand in the south?

A: Let us assume that we make peace with Hussein today; what will change? In my opinion, the only front today is the Egyptian front, on the Suez Canal. That is the crisis, that is the dispute. It is there that the front lies, nowhere else. If another war breaks out it could also include other countries. But Jordan will not start making war.

On the Egyptian front, along the Suez Canal, the most important fact is that the Egyptians will not, as I have said before, "get used to it." If we make peace with Hussein tomorrow, and give him what he wants, not only would

that not relax the tension on the Egyptian front, on the contrary. If we make concessions to Hussein on his front, the Russians will say: This is an Israeli concession to the U.S. To the Americans you have made concessions - but to us you won't! The Egyptians will say: This is an Israeli-Jordanian conspiracy!

Q: There are those who say that if one Arab State made peace with us, the ice would be broken, and the other Arab countries would also be prepared to make peace. Don't you believe that?

A: I have heard that theory, according to which no Arab country wants to be the first (to make peace); but I say that if we make concessions to Hussein, if we retreat from the Jordan (river) - Nasser's ambition to bring about our retreat from the Suez Canal will greatly increase. Here we say that we are not budging an inch without direct negotiations, without peace and secure borders; but if we retreat from one front, without having achieved secure borders, the pressure on the other fronts would increase. If we retreat from the Jordanian front and make peace with Hussein, Nasser will certainly not be the second (ruler) to make peace with us! He would say: "You have retreated there, why don't you retreat from Sinai?" The pressure would only be stronger. And on the other hand, if we remain firm (stubborn) on all fronts, both opposite Hussein as well as Abdul Nasser, admittedly pressure will not be reduced - I did say there is no avoiding a struggle - but it will be easier to hold our present positions, in any case from the Arab psychological viewpoint. It may be possible that Nasser will be prepared, without any connection with Hussein, to come to a settlement with us, on condition that we retreat to the old border. For that we would have to go back to the lines as they existed on June 4; then Nasser would be prepared to proclaim an end to belligerency, to free navigation through the Straits of Tiran to Eilat; perhaps he might even promise something in regard to the Suez Canal. If we were prepared to return to the previous line - we would to a large extent solve the Egyptian matter.

Q: And you are not in favor of that?

A: I am definitely against it!

Q: But why? You have said that Abdul Nasser, with the support of the Russians, will not want to put up with our sitting along the Suez Canal, and that this non-acquiescence will necessarily lead to another struggle, apparently a military one. If it is possible to reach a settlement with Abdul Nasser - "to solve the Egyptian matter" - as you

have said, by retreat, why not retreat?

A: The old border, to which Nasser wants us to retreat, is, from our point of view, not a secure border. This has been proved by two wars in which we were forced to fight against the Egyptians since 1956; the Straits of Tiran are essential (vital) for us, and we cannot abandon them and leave them in the hands of the Egyptians, or rely on the U.N. Forces to guard them.

I want a settlement with Nasser, a settlement with a secure border, that will guarantee our freedom of shipping to Eilat; a settlement regarding Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, because we got there and now we can say: "You want us to retreat - (O.K.) let us have passage for our ships!"

Q: If the Egyptians do not agree (to that) now, you prefer that we remain (sitting) on the spot where we are?

A: Yes, without such an arrangement (settlement as mentioned above) we must not make any concessions.

Q: Aren't you considering that it might be more desirable for the U.S. that the Suez Canal should remain blocked rather than that it should be a Russian waterway?

A: Perhaps. I don't know. Anyhow, the political moves that have to be made now have no direct connection with that question. From our point of view, I think that we must try to come to an agreement with the Americans as far as possible. I am in favor of it, that we should regard as a policy desirable for us the consolidation of the U.S. stand in the Middle East. We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan. Instead of American aircraft and military missions there will be (in Jordan) Soviet aircraft and military missions. For us that is very important: Whether there are Americans or Russians in Jordan. I believe that there is cause for apprehension there.

I think that to the extent that there is a connection with foreign powers there, we shall try as far as possible, and we shall be interested in it, that it should not be the Soviet Union that will inherit all the

influence in the Middle East, but that, if possible, it should be the U.S.

Q: And suppose that Hussein, who is subject to Western influence, should want to reach a settlement with us, aren't you in favor of it?

A: Definitely yes; however, we are obliged to do two things: The first thing that we have to do now is to reach, as far as possible, an understanding with the U.S., to strengthen their hand and make them stay in the Middle East.

Q: Does that depend on us?

A: It does not depend on us, but it is desirable for us. Another thing which we intend to do - to do some serious thinking about the entire complex of our relations with the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan. That is a very complicated matter. First of all, I don't see that we have been offered a final settlement now. I think that any presentation of the question - not the question you have asked - but a question as a guide to our final policy, is unrealistic. No one proposes peace to us. Therefore we have to decide now on an interim policy, not on a final policy.

Q: What ought the interim policy to be?

A: It is two-fold. (1) Not to get involved unnecessarily with the population in the occupied territories. (2) To hold on to a security line.

I am not in favor of the IDF being in Nablus, but of the IDF being on the ridges outside Nablus. We don't have to get engaged (involved) with the Arabs of Nablus, the town of Nablus, but to sit in the hills to prevent the passing of tanks from Iraq or Jordan to the West Bank. That's what must be done there. Not to govern the Arab population, but to govern the topography, to guard Israel. And that goes both for the short range as well as for the long range.

Q: Is it possible to be present, from a military viewpoint, without "getting involved", without governing the population?

A: Is that a mirage? I believe what I see. I see that it works. In the Armistice Agreements of 1948, when we fixed the lines, we wanted



to erect a barrier between Israel and Jordan, so that one could not cross from one side to the other. This time I said to myself that we are going to do the opposite: not shut off lines, but lines that would make possible contact between the three territories: the West Bank, Israel and Jordan. To the extent that the matter does not harm our security, we shall try to treat Jordan like a neighboring country in peace time. What is the result? The West Bank serves us, to a certain extent, as a medium for our contacts with the Arab world, and occasionally a very important medium. The inhabitants of the West Bank are important as a factor to prevent Fatah from waging war. They are trying to persuade Hussein to seek ways and means for peace, not war, with Israel. They do not sing our praise; they say that we are despotic rulers and that they would rejoice if the earth would swallow us. But the conclusion from that is that if the Arab armies came to liberate them, not a soul would remain alive in their settlements. "They would destroy Nablus. The Jews would destroy everything! Thank you very much, but please don't come to rescue us! You don't know those Jews. What they really want is that another war should start so that they could chase us out."

The residents of the West Bank are sending missions to Hussein. They tell him that, in fact, the Jews are encouraging El Fatah. Fatah has killed in the course of time a small number of Jews, but the Israelis are meanwhile destroying houses and are causing the Arabs to flee. "The Israelis are destroying our huts in the Jordan Valley and you give them the pretext to do so." This is an example - perhaps not very pleasant in its motivation, but important in its conclusions. An example for contact between Jordan and the West Bank, and how it influences Hussein to prevent Fatah activities. Now they want to go to the Arab summit conference in Rabat and talk to the Arab politicians to find ways and means to make peace, not war, with Israel.

Another example, which outlines the task of the West Bank at present, is in the economic sphere. Jordan announces that whoever introduces Israeli goods into Jordan will be punished, but she does permit West Bank goods to be brought over. Altogether - and not to a small extent thanks to the contact between the West Bank and Jordan - peaceful living conditions prevail on the West Bank.

I hate to think what would happen, to us and to them, if we had to wage war against a movement of liberation. A certain victim would be the complex of our relations between us and the West Bank. I am most appreciative of the correct development of these relations. I do not believe that we can turn a large Arab public into an Israeli one. Their main argument against us is: "You want to cut us off from the Arab world." That will not work. That is not the way we ought to go, if we want to live in the Middle East. They will not agree to that. We could, by force, if we wanted to rule a large Arab public, but I agree with the formula which says: The establishment of an Arab ghetto in the State of Israel - would mean placing a time bomb in Israel's lap. I doubt whether we would act wisely if we tried to cut off from the Arab world one million Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, the main question is: Can we create a structure and political and organizational solution, in which that million Arabs would not be cut off from the Arab world, no matter whether they are Israelis, or Palestinians, or Jordanian Arabs - who would not be cut off by us from the rest of the Arab world.

I am trying to find ways and means to prevent such severance, to enable as far as possible, under present conditions, ties between them and the Arab world. (I am trying).. to tell the Arabs of Nablus: "What we want from you is not to harm our security; we do not want to govern and rule your way of life." We must tell the Arabs: "You can live - whatever the final settlement may be - without our cutting you off from the Arab world." We must try and emphasize already now, that this is possible between States who live in peace with one another. The (river) Jordan, which I regard as Israel's security border, does not have to cut off the Arabs of the West Bank from the Arab world and does not have to enclose them in a Jewish ghetto. It is a fact that we have never prevented the Arabs of Israel from listening to the radio broadcasts from Arab countries. I think they ought to be allowed to publish newspapers of their own, even to give them subsidies for these papers. Let them be free to publish a newspaper, subject to military censorship. The Arab public could conduct its personal and community affairs as it wishes. We must let them live they want to.

Q: Under what conditions is a final settlement possible?

A: First of all, on Israel's Eastern border has to rest Israel's

security. Secondly, we must have relations of peace with the partner, whoever he may be, whether Hussein or the Arabs of Palestine.

Moreover, the peace treaty must contain two elements:

(1) The settlement of refugees. This is a massive part of the peace. (2) The right of religious worship and access of the two peoples to the places which have for them an historical meaning. As is customary today, for instance, in Hebron - even without the establishment of a Yeshivah in Hebron Jews can visit the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Connection means the right to visit, not necessarily a "Kushan" (certificate of land ownership). In the peace treaty it will be stipulated that the Jews and the Arabs will be able to express their historical affiliation to the holy places (places holy in their eyes). To visit, to pray - yes - but not ownership. We don't have to buy again the Tomb of the Patriarchs, and the Western Wall which Harod built. I don't accept the Waqf's claim of ownership over it.

Q: Ought we to encourage the Arabs to get organized over and beyond (the level of) municipalities?

A: Not today. Today I am speaking only about a temporary matter.

Q: A temporary matter which might last a long time?

A: Possibly; anyhow, we must be prepared that this situation might last for a long time. Years. In the meantime they travel to Jordan and they come back and they work where they like. They have Jordanian passports, they send their students to Beirut, they are part of the Arab world. Today the majority of them regard King Hussein as their King.

Q: If so, was it necessary to expel Anton Atallah?

A: We did not expel him. We told him that we shall not let him return. This is an important point. There is a difference between a situation as it exists today and one in which we would recognize that the West Bank is a Jordanian province. That - no! I would not agree to it, that in a fluid interim situation our behavior should be interpreted to the effect that the West Bank is a Palestinian State or that it is part of Jordan. Therefore I am not in favor of institutions on a higher than municipal level.

If an Arab, who is a resident of Jerusalem, goes to Jordan, goes to

the Senate, and get sworn in as a Senator there, he cannot be a Jerusalem citizen. If that Arab had come and talked to me first about it, I would have told him: "Don't do that!" To others I say: "Look here, matters have not yet been solved." Don't put us in a position which has an extreme political implication. We have annexed Jerusalem, and you go and swear allegiance to Hussein! As if you were representing Jerusalem in the Jordanian Senate." A situation must not be created in which we quasi recognize Hussein's right to the West Bank; however, they ought to be allowed to live their own lives, as Arabs - not necessarily as Jordanians; as individuals. As an Arab public, towns, villages, religious courts, an Arab educational network (within the framework of our educational Ministry) etc. But not to try to cut them off from the Arab world. I have learned during the last twenty years that this is the key problem. (Most important point.) Even if we let them pray the way they want to, and if they are given work - even then, what will oppress them will be "What are you doing to a part of the Arab people? We are part of the Arab world."

Q: In the picture you have just painted (surveyed) are there at all any unknown factors?

A: Most of the things are unknown. For instance, one of the things I don't know - though I am optimistic about it - the extent of difficulties and pressure to which Nasser is exposed. It is quite possible that he is in a position which is much more grave than we think. I hope that he is very much in need of a settlement, because this situation is too difficult for him. I hope that his situation is very difficult, economically, internally, and from a military point of view. That immunity and patronage, that the Russians will administer his affairs for him - it is rather doubtful whether he is enjoying that state of affairs. He is in a bad way. Perhaps he might say: Let's come to a settlement with Israel, if only we could get out of the situation in which we find ourselves.

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## MEMORANDUM

mid East  
INFORMATIONTHE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

17

~~SECRET~~not sent  
Monday, February 19, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: More Reporting on US Position in Near East

You have heard Gene Black's report that our position in the Near East is at a low point, and we have scheduled a discussion of this problem at Wednesday's NSC. Just to provide added breadth, I thought you might wish to be aware of the attached cable from Ambassador Porter in Beirut. You need not read it all unless you wish; the main points are:

1. Unless there is substantial progress toward peace soon, cease-fire line incidents will continue and lead to a major Israeli retaliatory raid. Such a raid would destroy all hope of a settlement.

2. Israeli intransigence is the main obstacle to progress. The Arabs have had a "remarkable change of attitude," and are now willing to grant freedom of navigation, recognize the existence of Israel, engage in what almost amounts to direct negotiations, and even give up a little territory. On the other hand, there has been no give at all in the Israeli position. If anything, it has hardened.

3. The Arabs greatly overestimate our influence on the Israelis, so they blame us for Israeli toughness. They are getting increasingly desperate. Thus, further deterioration in Arab-Israeli relations endangers our interests in Arab countries.

4. We have to convince Israel that its interests will be served by a less rigid stand. Without American intervention, the Near East is going to keep moving towards another Arab-Israeli war.

I should point out that, in the past few weeks, we've been increasingly active in trying to persuade the Israelis to cooperate more fully in getting the Jarring mission moving. We're still in the early stages, and one purpose of Wednesday's NSC meeting is to give you some picture of things you might be asked to do in the near future. For the moment, I just want you to be aware that most of your ambassadors in the field would agree with Gene Black's report.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-171  
By iw, NARA, Date 12-11-03

W. W. Rostow

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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R 161540Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4492  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2249  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 800  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1204  
AMEMBASSY RABAT 350  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 990  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 404  
USMISSION USUN 452

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~~SAUNDERS~~  
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LIMDIS

SUBJECT: ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

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1) SUMMARY: FROM BEIRUT VANTAGE POINT, WE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT DRIFT OF EVENTS IN ME. WE REALIZE USG IS EQUALLY CONCERNED, AND IS ASKING ISRAEL TO ADOPT POSTURE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE JARRING MISSION, AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SHORT PERIOD WHICH MAY BE LEFT TO US TO BRING OFF PEACEFUL SOLUTION WITH AGREED BOUNDARIES. REAL QUESTION REMAINS, HOWEVER, WHETHER EVENTS ARE NOT GETTING OUT OF CONTROL, WITH LIKELIHOOD OF GREAT DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN ME. (END SUMMARY)

2) CURRENT BORDER TROUBLES BETWEEN JORDAN, EGYPT AND ISRAEL APPEAR TO BE REACHING DANGEROUS POINT WHERE ESCALATION IS ALMOST INEVITABLE. THIS WOULD DESTROY ALL HOPES OF ACHIEVING ARAB-ISRAEL

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By SP, NARA, Date 9/27/11





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SETTLEMENT IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. REGARDLESS OF WHERE FAULT MAY LIE, IT DOES NOT SEEM POSSIBLE THAT BORDER INCIDENTS AND ARAB ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM WILL CEASE SO LONG AS ISRAEL CONTINUES OCCUPY ARAB LANDS. IN OUR OPINION, ARABS WILL CONTINUE VIEW GUERILLA ACTIVITY AS NATURAL AND PATRIOTIC, AND THE GOV WILL BE POWERLESS TO STAMP IT OUT. ISRAELIS WILL CONTINUE REACT WITH ANGER AND DESIRE TO AVENGE, AND THEY WILL NOT LONG BE RESTRAINED BY THOUGHT THAT HUSSEIN MUST BE PRESERVED.

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3) BORDER INCIDENTS (AND PREDICTABLE ISRAELI REACTION) UNDERLINE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF ACHIEVING AN ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. IF OUR INFORMATION IS CORRECT, PRIMARY REASON FOR LACK OF PERCEPTIBLE PROGRESS OF JARRING MISSION IS ISRAEL'S UNWILLINGNESS THUS FAR TO EXPRESS CLEARLY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS OF UK RESOLUTION. NATURAL CONCLUSION OF ARABS IS THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT A SETTLEMENT NOW, AT LEAST ONE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO RELINQUISH TERRITORIES IT CONQUERED IN JUNE WAR.

4) ARAB LEADERS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THEY DO NOT EXPECT ISRAEL GIVE UP EVERY INCH OF CONQUERED TERRITORY. THEY DO EXPECT SOME INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL WILLING DISCUSS AT LEAST WHAT TERRITORY SHE WILLING TO RETURN. ARAB LEADERS HAVE ALSO COME TO CLEAR REALIZATION THAT THEY MUST RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, THAT ISRAEL MUST HAVE RIGHT OF PASSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, AND THAT CLEARLY DEFINED AND AGREED BORDERS MUST BE ESTABLISHED. MANY WORLD LEADERS, INCLUDING SUCH FRIENDS OF ARABS AS TITO, DE GAULLE AND KOSYGIN, HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT WORLD IN GENERAL WILL NOT CONDONE CONTINUED ARAB HOSTILITY TOWARD EXISTENCE

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ISRAEL, AND THEY HAVE RECENTLY TAILORED THEIR STATEMENTS AND THINKING ACCORDINGLY. THIS IS A REMARKABLE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE FROM THAT OF ONE, TEN OR FIFTEEN YEARS AGO AND INDICATES A VAST AND BASIC CHANGE IN GENERAL ARAB ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE. IT ALSO MEANS THAT RESPONSIBLE ARABS ARE GENUINELY

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SICK OF WAR, REGARDLESS OF PROPAGANDA POURED OUT BY RADICAL PRESS.

5) IT WOULD BE A GREAT TRAGEDY TO LOSE THIS OPPORTUNITY ACHIEVE CONDITIONS OF PEACE, WHICH FOR FIRST TIME IN TWENTY YEARS APPEARS POSSIBLE. QUESTION IS WHAT NOW IS REQUIRED START BALL ROLLING TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. WHEN WE LOOK AT POSSIBILITIES, ABOUT THE ONLY OBSTACLE POSED BY ARABS AT THIS MOMENT IS THEIR STATED UNWILLINGNESS MEET WITH ISRAELIS AT NEGOTIATING TABLE. THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO US TO BE INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE GROWING WILLINGNESS ON PART OF ARABS TO ENGAGE IN "RHODES TYPE" OR "SEPARATE TABLES" TYPE NEGOTIATIONS. ON ALL OTHER BASIC ISSUES IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL, ARABS HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF UK RESOLUTION.

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6) ISRAEL, ON OTHER HAND, APPEARS MAINTAIN EXACTLY SAME ATTITUDE IT HELD DURING UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE LAST YEAR AND IN ARAB MINDS HAS SIMPLY HARDENED ITS POSITION AND BECOME MORE ARROGANT. ARABS CONVINCED ISRAEL WANTS HUMILIATE THEM, AND, UNFORTUNATELY, ARABS TEND MORE AND MORE TO BLAME USG FOR THIS ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. THEY POINT OUT THAT WITH ALL THE FINANCIAL, MORAL ARMS AND OTHER SUPPORT WHICH US GIVES OPENLY TO ISRAEL, US CERTAINLY HAS SOME INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELI GOVT AND ITS DECISIONS. THEY SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE US WHEN WE TELL THEM WE DO NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELIS TO PUSH THEM INTO MAKING SOME CONCESSIONS IN ORDER GIVE JARRING MISSION OPPORTUNITY GET OFF THE GROUND. IN ARAB MINDS, US SUPPLY OF FUNDS, ARMS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF SUPPORT, ARE MORE THAN ADEQUATE SOURCES OF LEVERAGE WHICH COULD BE USED TO INFLUENCE ISRAELI POLICY IF USG THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO DO SO. THEY INTERPRET OUR CONTINUED FAILURE TO USE THIS LEVERAGE AS INCOMPREHENSIBLE, YET ALMOST CONCLUSIVE, EVIDENCE THAT FOR SOME STRANGE REASON US IS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. THIS LEADS TO INFINITE AND DAMAGING SPECULATION ABOUT US ACTIONS AND MOTIVES.

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7) IT BECOMING APPARENT TO US THAT ARABS ARE GETTING DESPERATE ABOUT WHOLE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO DANGEROUS DETERIORATION JORDAN-ISRAEL BORDER AREAS AND IN ISRAELI OCCUPIED AREA. THEY GENUINELY FEAR THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARING ANOTHER

CRUSHING SAMU-TYPE RAID, WHICH THEY BELIEVE COULD SEAL FATE OF JARRING MISSION AND END POSSIBILITY ANY ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WHETHER ISRAELI RETALIATION RAID OCCURS OR NOT, CURRENT DETERIORATION IN SITUATION MAKES IT APPEAR LIKELY TO US THAT ARABS WILL AGAIN TAKE ENTIRE MATTER TO SC. IN FACT, THEY NOW ENGAGED PRIMARILY IN BUILDING A CASE WHICH WILL MAKE THEM LOOK GOOD, AND REVEAL ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. IN OUR VIEW, UN POWER BALANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF LAST SC SESSION IN WHICH ISRAEL HAD OTHERS THAN US SUPPORTING ITS VIEWS, PARTICULARLY WHEN JERUSALEM BECOMES A MAJOR ISSUE. THIS TIME, US MIGHT VERY WELL FIND ITSELF ALONE IN SUPPORTING ISRAEL AND ISRAEL'S MISTAKES, A POSITION WHICH IN ITSELF WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS EROSION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE MANY ARAB COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS.  
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2250  
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AMEMBASSY RABAT 351  
RUQMPFHXAMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 991  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 405  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 294  
USMISSION USUN 453

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SUBJECT: ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

8) WE BELIEVE THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE QUICKLY TO HALT THE

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DETERIORATION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION. WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY THE USG HAS SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE WITH THE ISRAELIS TO URGE THEM TO ACCEPT UK RESOLUTION PUBLICLY AND START GENUINE COOPERATION WITH JARRING MISSION FOR ACHIEVING A PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN OUR VIEW, US HAS PERFECT RIGHT TO USE ITS LEVERAGE WITH ISRAEL, SINCE OUR OWN FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE AND SINCE PEACE IN THE AREA IS BASIC ISSUE. WHATEVER HAPPENS TO

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ISRAEL WILL BE SHARED BY US WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT. IF BY HER ACTIONS, OR FAILURE TO ACT, ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAEL WAR SHOULD OCCUR, US CANNOT ESCAPE BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE. THE EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON OUR ALREADY POOR RELATIONS WITH ARABS (LET ALONE ON OUR WORLD IMAGE) WOULD BE UNPLEASANT TO CONTEMPLATE. IF, ON OTHER HAND, WE CAN MAKE ISRAELIS REALIZE THAT BY TAKING CERTAIN STEPS TO BREATHE LIFE INTO JARRING MISSION, THEIR DREAMED-OF GOAL OVER PAST TWENTY YEARS OF END OF BELLIGERENCY IS WITHIN THEIR GRASP, WE WILL IN OUR OPINION HAVE DONE AN INCALCULABLE SERVICE TO ISRAEL, THE ARABS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

9) WE REALIZE SOVIET POSITION MAY NOT COINCIDE WITH OUR DESIRE FOR LONG-TERM PEACE IN ME. WE ALSO REALIZE THAT SOVIET

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MILITARY PRESENCE IN AREA IS VIEWED WITH ALARM BY ISRAEL AND IS PERHAPS COMPLICATING FACTOR IN GETTING ISRAEL TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH JARRING MISSION. IT DOES SEEM A FALLACY, HOWEVER, TO ASSUME THAT ISRAEL STANDS AS A BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN ME, OR THAT ISRAEL'S STRONG MILITARY STANCE REDUCES POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET-US MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THIS AREA. ON THE CONTRARY, THE CONTINUED INSTABILITY OF THE ME, TOGETHER WITH INCREASING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE, ONLY SERVES IN OUR OPINION TO ENHANCE ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH CONFRONTATION. SO LONG AS THE PEACE IS PRESERVED BY A FRAGILE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WE CAN EXPECT AN INEVITABLE INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EGYPT AND SYRIA, WHICH COULD SOME TIME INVOLVE USSR FORCES DIRECTLY IN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL.

10) WE URGENTLY SUGGEST THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE US TO ACT TO CONVINCE ISRAEL THAT HER INTERESTS WILL BEST BE SERVED BY TAKING A LESS RIGID STAND IN DEALINGS WITH JARRING AND THE ARABS. IF WE DO NOT DO THIS, IT IS HARD TO VISUALIZE THAT THE GOI CAN BY ITSELF MAKE THE HARD POLICY DECISIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO PEACE. THE ARABS ARE INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT THE ME IS

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STARTING ON ANOTHER COLLISION COURSE, AND THEY TOO ARE INCAPABLE OF MAKING RATIONAL DECISIONS WHICH WOULD RELIEVE ISRAELI FEARS. THIS THEN APPEARS TO BE A POINT IN TIME WHERE OUR INTERVENTION IS ESSENTIAL TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK AND REVERSE THE UGY TREND OF EVENTS. IF THE ARABS DO NOT RESPOND, THERE WILL AT LEAST BE THE ADVANTAGE THAT WE AND THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT BE ISOLATED IN WORLD OPINION.  
PORTER

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