

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to Katzenbach and Rostow S 1 p. exempt 1/10 per RAC	7/14/67	A
#2a memo	to Lucius D. Battle S 2 pp. <del>exempt per RAC 5.1.03</del> <del>exempt per RAC 6.5.09 NW 08.223</del>	7/13/67	A
#3	duplicate of #1		
#4 memo	Director to the President S 2 pp. <del>exempt per RAC 5.1.03</del> <del>exempt per RAC 6.5.09 NW 08.223</del>	6/13/67	A
#5a memo	to Katzenbach and Rostow S 1 p. exempt 7.25.05	7/5/67	A
#6 memo	to Katzenbach and Rostow S 1 p. <del>exempt per RAC 5.1.03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NW 08.223</del>	7/3/67	A
#7 memo	to Rostow TS 1 p.	undated	A
#7a memo	to Rostow and Katzenbach TS 2 pp.	undated	A
#7b	duplicate of #7a <del>exempt 7.25.05</del>		
#7c memo	to Rostow and Katzenbach TS 2 pp. <del>exempt per RAC 5.1.03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NW 08.223</del>	6/25/67	A
#7d memo	to Rostow TS 1 p. exempt 7.25.05	undated	A
#7e cable	WH Situation Room to the President S 2 pp. exempt 7.25.05	6/25/67	A
#7f memo	to Rostow and Katzenbach TS 1 p. <del>exempt per RAC 5.1.03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NW 08.223</del>	undated	A
#7g	duplicate of #7c <del>exempt per RAC 5.1.03</del>		
#7h memo	to Rostow - TS 1 p. sanitized 7-1508	6/25/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Salah Nasr 6/67-7/67," Box 113

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7i memo	to Katzenbach, Hughes, Battle and Rostow S 2 pp. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/26/67	A
#7j report	chronology S 1 p. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/26/67	A
#7k report	Italian version of #7j S 1 p. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/26/67	A
#8 memo	to Katzenbach and Rostow S 1 p. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	7/3/67	A
#9 memo	to Katzenbach and Rostow S 2 pp. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/30/67	A
#10 memo	to Rusk, Katzenbach, and Rostow S 1 p. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/29/67	A
#11 report	sanitized 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223 from Cairo S 2 pp. <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/27/67	A
#11a report	re Salah Nasr S 1 p. <del>exempt 7.25.05</del>	6/27/67	A
#11b report	re Salah Nasr <del>exempt per RA 5-1-03</del> S 4 pp. <del>exempt 6.5.09 NLJ 08.223</del>	6/27/67	A

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2

Mr. Rosten

This is the latest  
in the nasr series.

BKS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Rostow

The attached July 5  
memo is the latest  
in this series.

BICS



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

25 June 1967

*il* *7h*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow

SUBJECT : The Game in Cairo

25X1

2. We have no other hard information to confirm this allegation, and since such a development would be a complete switch from the long standing policy of both the Soviets and the Arabs against foreign bases, the plausibility of the report is in question.

3. The Soviets certainly feel compelled to re-equip the Egyptian army. This gesture of support for Egypt may also include a much larger Soviet military training mission, and there seems little doubt that this is one of the topics currently under discussion in Cairo. The same may be said of Syria. Cairo's recent order to terminate all military training in the USSR and pull its personnel back to Egypt may also be an indication that all further training will be conducted in Egypt. The present Soviet military mission in Egypt would be insufficient to carry out greatly expanded training.

4. While Soviet bases in the area would give them a greatly increased influence, the resultant political disadvantages both to the Arab Nationalists and the Soviets would seem to preclude their establishment at this time. A greatly expanded training mission might better serve both Arab and Soviet interests without the serious political risks.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : NLJ-141-011-5-1-0

**SANITIZED**

Authority NLJ.141.011.005/1

By JC NARA, Date 7-10-08

~~SECRET~~

29 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State  
Mr. Walt Rostow, White House

*Rostow*

3.3 (b)(1)

The following message was received from Rome [REDACTED]

"Please pass following message to Secretary of State from Ambassador

Reinhardt:

"Fanfani returned from London last night and I reached him this morning. Before I could deliver referenced message Fanfani said he was on point of sending for me since he had become increasingly convinced that given reports of situation in Egypt, [REDACTED] we should be extremely careful. I said I agreed with him but thought he would find text of message I was about to give him had been carefully drafted with this in mind. He read it and acknowledged this was so and undertook to despatch message forthwith."

3.3  
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 08-223  
By *nl* NARA, Date 3-18-09