

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 cable	Kabul 660 S 2 pp. <i>Open 12-14-84 FRVS, Vol. 25</i>	5/6/65	A
#5 cable	Kabul 658 C 3 pp. <i>Open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	5/5/65	A
#6 cable	Kabul 522 S 3 pp. <i>Open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	3/18/65	A
#7 cable	Kabul 480 S 4 pp. <i>Open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	3/3/65	A
#8 cable	Kabul 430 C 3 pp. <i>Open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	2/11/65	A
#9 cable	Kabul 270 C 2 pp. <i>Open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	12/7/65	A
#10 cable	Kabul 196 C 1 p.	10/12/64	A
#11 cable	Kabul 85 C 1 p.	9/7/65	A
#12 cable	Kabul 84 C 1 p.	9/7/65	A
#13 cable	from Sec. State to M. Bundy C 1 p.	9/7/65	A
#14 cable	Kabul 46 C 1 p. <i>Open per RAC 10/23/13</i>	8/9/65	A
#17 cable	Deptel 326 to Kabul S 1 p.	5/11/65	A
#18 cable	Deptel 283 to Kabul C 1 p.	5/20/66	A
#20 cable	Deptel 71 to Kabul C 2 pp.	9/15/64	A
#21 draft	memo to the President PCI 1 p. <i>Open 12-14-84 FRVS</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, "Afghanistan, Volume I, 12/63 - 4/68," Box 116

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#21a memo	Rostow to the President S 2 pp. <i>open 12.20.05</i>	4/22/68	A
#21c memo	Rostow to the President S 1 p. <i>open 3-7-97 NLT 96-234 (Dup of #33, MTP, Vol 69)</i>	3/29/68	A
#21d memo	Zwick to the President S 3 pp. <i>open 3-7-97 NLT 96-234 (Dup of #33, MTP, Vol 69)</i>	3/27/68	A
#21e memo	Gaud and Freeman to the President C 3 pp. <i>open 7-9-99 NLT 96-275 (Dup of #33b, see above)</i>	3/6/68	A
#21f report	re PL480 agreement with Afghanistan S 2 pp. <i>open 7-9-99 NLT 96-275 (Dup of #33d, MTP, Vol 69)</i>	undated	A
#21g	duplicate of #21c <i>open 7-9-99 NLT 96-269</i>		
#21h	duplicate of #21d <i>open 7-9-99 NLT 96-269</i>		
#21i	duplicate of #21e <i>open 7-9-99 NLT 96-275</i>		
#21j	duplicate of #21f <i>open 7-9-99 NLT 96-275</i>		
#21k memo	Bromley Smith to Benjamin Read and John Hummon S 1 p. <i>open 1/11/06</i>	4/2/68	A
#22b draft	work copy cable to Kabul C 1 p. <i>open 11/5/13</i>	undated	A
#22e cable	Kabul 215 C 1 p. <i>open 11/5/13</i>	7/14/66	A
#23 memo	Wriggins to Rostow C 1 p. <i>open 11/5/13</i>	8/4/66	A
#24 memo	Read to M. Bundy C 1 p. <i>open 11/5/13</i>	9/2/65	A
#24a report	Biographical sketch C 1 p. <i>open 12.20.05</i>	undated	A
#25 memo	Wriggins to Rostow PCI 1 p. <i>Dup. #6, NSF, Files of Wriggins, "Afghanistan" box 1</i>	4/19/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26 memo	Read to Rostow S 3 pp. <i>open 1/13/14</i>	3/11/67	A
#26a memo	Wriggins to Rostow S 1 p. <i>open 1/13/14</i>	3/10/67	A
#27a memo	Rostow to the President S 1 p. <i>open 12-14-84 FRVS vol. 25</i>	4/22/68	A
#27c memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 12-14-84</i> S 1 p. <i>NLS 96-269</i>	3/29/68	A
#27d	duplicate of #21d <i>open 12-14-84 FRVS</i>		
#27f	duplicate of #21e <i>open 12-14-84 NLS 96-275</i>		
#27h	duplicate of #21f <i>open 12-14-84 NLS 96-275</i>		
#27j cable	Deptel 148514 to Kabul <i>open 12-20-05</i> S 1 p.	4/17/68	A
#27L cable	Kabul 3775 C 3 pp. <i>open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	3/30/68	A
#27n cable	Kabul 4072 S 1 p. <i>open 12-20-05</i>	4/18/68	A
#28 cable	Deptel 74856 to Kabul TS 3 pp. <i>open 10/5/11 per RAC</i>	11/25/67	A
#29a memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 12-14-84 FRVS</i> S 1 p. <i>Dup #7, NSI, Files of Wriggins, "Afghanistan" Box 1</i>	4/17/67	A
#29b memo	Zwick to the President C 2 pp. <i>open 12-20-05</i>	4/15/67	A
#29c memo	Gaud and Freeman to the President C 2 pp. <i>Dup #7a, Wriggins, as above</i>	4/7/67	A
#29e cable	Kabul 4366 <i>open 12-14-84 FRVS vol. 25</i> S 1 p.	4/28/67	A
#30 cable	unnumbered deptel to Kabul C 1 p. <i>open 12-20-05</i>	11/11/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32 memcon	with the President, Maiwandwal, et. al. open 12-14-04 FRUS C 2 pp. Dwp. # 3c, NSF, Files of Wriggins, 'Afghanistan' Box 1	vol. 25 3/28/67	A
#32c	duplicate of #32 open 12-14-04 FRUS vol. 25		
#35 memcon	with Maiwandwal and James W. Spain " S 2 pp. Dwp. # 9, Wriggins, 53 same	3/29/67	A
#36 cable	Kabul 3704 S 1 p. open 1/13/14	3/16/67	A
#37 cable	Deptel 153499 to Kabul S 2 pp. open 1/13/14	3/11/67	A
#38 cable	Deptel 66990 to Kabul C 1 p. open 12-20-05	10/16/66	A
#39a report	Biographical sketch C 2 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	undated	A
#40a draft	work copy cable to Kabul C 2 pp. open 12-20-05	3/6/67	A
#41 report	Special Report Weekly Review open 11/23/01 S 10 pp.	2/10/67	A
#43 cable	Intelligence Information Cables sanitized per RAC 11/23/01 S 4 pp.	2/16/66	A
#44	duplicate of #41 open 11/23/01		
#46 report	Biographical sketch C 1 p. open 12-20-05	undated	A
#47 report	Special Report open 11/23/01 S 11 pp.	12/23/65	A
#48a	duplicate of #24		
#48b	duplicate of #24a		
#50 cable	Kabul 83 S 2 pp. sanitized 1/13/14	8/15/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#51 cable	Kabul 34 S 4 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	7/20/64	A
#52 cable	Kabul 2 C 4 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	7/1/64	A
#53 cable	Deptel 396 to Kabul C 1 p.	6/26/64	A
#54	duplicate of #55		
#55 memo	Komer to M. Bundy C 1 p.	4/23/64	A
#55a memo	Read to M. Bundy C 1 p.	4/22/64	A
#56	duplicate of #55a		
#58 memo	Read to M. Bundy S 2 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	2/6/64	A
#59 memo	Read to Bundy S 2 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	1/24/64	A
#60 cable	Kabul 436 S 3 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	1/21/64	A
#61a cable	Kabul 412 S 1 p.	1/6/64	A
#62 cable	Deptel 214 to Kabul S 1 p.	1/6/64	A
#63 cable	Karachi 1112 C 4 pp. open 10/5/11 per RAC	12/9/63	A
#66 memcon	re Vietnam C 4 pp. open 12-20-05	4/1/65	A

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 388

PAGE 01 STATE 004097

11
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /068 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAF:WGRAMSAY
APPROVED BY: NEA/PAF:JAMES W. SPAIN
NEA-MR. HANDLEY
WHITE HOUSE-MR. SAUNDERS
S/S-MR. BROWN
666666

056761

R 100017Z JAN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KABUL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 004097

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING
MOHAMMAD ZAHED SHAH: QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY: I WAS DEEPLY
SADDENED TO LEARN OF THE CRASH OF THE ARIANA 727 NEAR LONDON.
ALL AMERICANS JOIN ME IN EXPRESSING THE MOST HARTFELT SYMPATHY
TO YOU, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO WERE
SO SUDDENLY AND TRAGICALLY LOST IN THIS ACCIDENT. SINCERELY,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON END QUOTE.

2. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE OF THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS
NO OBJECTION IF RGA WISHES TO DO SO.
DECONTROL ON RECEIPT RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2

40

~~SECRET~~

Action

SS

Info

NNNNVV QVA243V
RR RUEHCR
DE RUQVWB 108 06/1215Z
R 061200Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 660
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ MAY 6

5 1 9 5
MAY 6, 1965
9:42 AM

002

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 532

By jc NARA, Date 12-1-04

REF EMBTEL 659

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

REFTEL REPORTS WATERSHED SESSION I HAD WITH PRIMIN
MAY 5. WHILE I MOST RELUCTANT ADD EXTRAORDINARILY HEAVY
BURDENS YOU ARE CARRYING FEEL I WOULD BE DERELICT MY DUTY
WERE I NOT TO CALL TO YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION IMPLICATIONS
PRIMIN'S POSITION FOR FUTURE US-AFGHAN RELATIONS.
CFN 660 659 5

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 108 ~~SECRET~~

IF WE ARE TO BE PREVENTED BY OUR OWN REGULATIONS OR OTHER
FACTORS FROM STEPPING UP ASSISTANCE ON HELMAND VALLEY PROJECT,
WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED FOR FIFTEEN
YEARS, AFGHANS QUITE LIKELY REQUEST US TERMINATE THIS MAJOR
US ACTIVITY HERE. SINCE MANY KEY AFGHAN OFFICIALS, SUCH AS
MINFIN AND MININT, HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY IDENTIFIED WITH
HELMAND VALLEY IN PAST AND IT IS IN A VERY REAL SENSE
SEEN HERE AS HEAR OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM, AFGHANS ARE
LIKELY REGARD ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT AS "ABANDONMENT" BY
USG. THIS WOULD SET IN TRAIN HERE DEVELOPMENTS GRADUALLY
CURTAILING OUR POSITION AND INFLUENCE.

WE PRESENTLY UNDERTAKING JOINT US-AFGHAN TECHNICAL
DISCUSSIONS SEE WHETHER GOALS ENVISIONED BY PRIMIN
FEASIBLE BUT I AM NOT SANGUINE OUTCOME UNLESS WE ABLE TO
DO MORE OURSELVES THAN SO FAR AUTHORIZED. ACCORDINGLY,
BEFORE CURTAILMENT ALONG LINES ABOVE SUGGESTED TAKES PLACE,
BELIEVE POLICY DETERMINATION REQUIRED AS TO WHETHER MAIN-
TENANCE OUR EXISTING SATISFACTORY POSITION HERE OF SUFFICIENT
IMPORTANCE USG, AND TO ITS CENTO ALLIES IRAN AND PAKISTAN,

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 660, MAY 6 FROM KABUL

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 188 ~~S E C R E T~~
TO WARRANT US MAKING SPECIAL EFFORT PROVIDE FORTHCOMING
RESPONSE TO PRIMIN AND THUS MAINTAINING MAJOR AND PRODUCT-
IVE US PRESENCE IN HELMAND VALLEY DEVELOPMENT TO WHICH
AFGHANS NOW GIVING HIGHEST PRIORITY.
GP-2
STEEVES

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3

85

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Action

NEA

MWOSVV QVA967VV VWA316VV VWB945

01336

Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUQVWB 39 03/1048Z

1963 MAY 3 AM 7 25

G

R 031045Z ZEA

SP

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

EUR

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 647

P

INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE ONE

USIA

STATE GRNC

NSC

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INR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MAY 3

CIA

KSA

DOD

NIC

RMR

KABUL RADIO MAY 2 CONFIRMED REPORTS EMB HAD EARLIER HEARD THAT MINPRESS MAIWANDWAL (FORMER RGA AMB KARACHI AND WASHINGTON) TO DEPART KABUL MAY 10 FOR PRAGUE ON INVITATION CZECH GOVT. MAIWANDWAL KNOWN TO HAVE HAD RELAPSE FOLLOWING DISCHARGE FROM CZECH-OPERATED HOSPITAL HERE AFTER SERIOUS OPERATION AND HAS NOW ACCEPTED INVITATION FOR CONVALESCENT TREATMENT CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

STEEVES

BT

CFN 647 3 2 10

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4

2

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Action

NEA

Info

SS RR RUEHC
G DE RUQVWB 31 03/0510Z
SP ZNR
SAH R 030500Z ZNH
L FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
H TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 646
SAL ZEN RUEHC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW UNN
EUR STATE GRNC
BT
IO UNCLAS MAY 3
P

01101

1965 MAY 3 AM 1 25

USIA RGA-CONTROLLED KABUL TIMES MAY 2 CARRIED FULL
NSC TEXT AFGHAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING PRIME MINISTER
INR YUSUF'S RETURN APRIL 30 FROM OFFICIAL VISIT USSR. FOLLOWING
CIA USUAL PRELIMINARIES, COMMUNIQUE NOTED BOTH PARTIES
NSA "REAFFIRMED PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN JOINT DOCUMENTS AND
DOD COMMUNIQUE SIGNED EARLIER BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET
NIC UNION AND WHICH ARE TO THE INTERESTS OF PEACE
AID AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION." RE BILATERAL RELATIONS,
RMR "BOTH PARTIES BELIEVE THAT COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP
CFN: 646 3 2 30

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 31 UNCLAS
CATION OF PRINCIPLES OF PEACE FULL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN
COUNTRIES OF DIFFERENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SYSTEMS." STATEMENT REVIEWED MUTUAL SATISFACTION RE JOINT
EFFORTS ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS COMPLETED HERE TO DATE,
ADDING KUSHK-TORHOUNDI-HERAT-KANDAHAR HIGHWAY TO BE COM-
PLETED "IN A FEW MONTHS" WITH "SATISFACTORY PROGRESS OF
WORK ON EXPLOITATION OF GAS RESOURCES AND HOUSING AND
TOWN CONSTRUCTION." BOTH SIDES "EXPRESSED DELIGHT OVER
AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST YEAR" FOR SURVEY AND MAPPING AMU
AND PANJ RIVERS "FOR LAUNCHING MULTI-PURPOSE PROJECTS
UNDER WHICH USEFUL ESTABLISHMENTS WILL BE BUILT ALONG
THE COMMON BORDER." "GOVT OF USSR AGREED TO SEND ITS
EXPERTS TO HELP AFGHANISTAN IN DRAWING UP ITS THIRD FIVE-YEAR
DEVELOPMENT PLAN."

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-2- 646, MAY 3, FROM KABUL

IN INTERNATIONAL AREA, COMMUNIQUE STATES USSR SUPPORTS RGA IN ITS EFFORTS AMONG ASIAN, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES "AGAINST COLONIALISM, OLD AND NEW." BOTH POWERS EXPRESSED HOPE UN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES "WILL BE YET MORE FULLY REALIZED" BEFORE NEXT CONVENING CONFERENCE. COMMUNIQUE NOTES "AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET UNION

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 31 UNCLAS
MADE THEIR VIEWS ON VIETNAM AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SITUATION KNOWN TO EACH OTHER." BOTH NOTED UN "SHOULD REPRESENT THE ACTUAL SITUATION WHICH HAS ARISEN FROM THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT AFRICAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES." COMMUNIQUE CLOSED WITH SOVIET APPRECIATION OF AFGHAN NEUTRALITY AND "NON-ADHERENCE TO ALIGNMENT." PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN INVITED BY YUSUF VISIT AFGHANISTAN AT TIME TO BE "AGREED UPON LATER." STEEVES
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action RR RUEHCR
INR DE RUQVUB 87-05/1100Z
R 051045Z ZEA

03897

1965 MAY 5 AM 8 13

Info FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC (658)
STATE GRNC
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MAY 5

NEA
CU
USIA
NSC
CIA
NSA
DOD
AID
PC
SIL
AGR
COM
HEW
LAB
TRSY

JINT WEEKA NO. 18 FROM SAA (KABUL)

POLITICAL

1. FOMIN OFFICIAL REVIEWS PRIMIN'S MOSCOW TRIP

(CONFIDENTIAL) SENIOR FOMIN OFFICIAL REVIEWED
PRIMIN'S MOSCOW TRIP WITH POL COUNSELOR MAY 3, NOTING
SOV-AF ACCORD FIVE MAIN POINTS RE CURRENT RGA ECON
PROBLEMS: 1) "DEFERRAL" OF REPAYMENT FOR 30-YEAR TERM
OF UP TO 15 MIL RUBLE CREDIT COVERING PORTIONS AFGHANI AND
FOREIGN CURRENCY COSTS NANGRAHAR PROJECT INCLUDING COLLE-
TIVE FARMS DEVELOPMET. 2) SOV GRANT "SOFT" LONG-TERM
CFN: 658 5 1 3 1 30 15 2

RMR

PAGE TWO RUQVUB 87-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
15-MIL RUBLE CREDIT FOR SLAANG MAINTENANCE, GRAIN SILO
ANNEX AND 3 BRIDGES; 3) SOVS TO MEET ALL COSTS SOV NATIONALS
AT POLYTECHNIC; 4) SOV-AF TRADE HENCEFORTH AT WORLD PRICE
LEVELS; AND 5) AGREEMENT ON AF EXPORT NATURAL GAS RESOURCE
FROM SHIBERGAN TO USSR AT "PREVAILING WORLD PRICES". AFTER
INITIAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS DISCHARGED AGAINST SOV IMPORTS
GAS, USSR TO APPLY 15 MIL RUBLES PER ANNUM IMPORTS OF GAS
AGAINST RGA INDEBTEDNESS.

SOV EXPRESSED "REGRET" TO PRIMIN YUSUF RE LACK IMPROVEMENT
USSR-US RELATIONS AS WELL AS OVER TIMING BELGRADE APPEAL.
EMBASSY OFFICER NOTED SPECIFIC PHRASES RGA-USSR COMMUNIQUE
PATENTLY ALONG COMMIE PROPAGANDA LINE, BUT RGA OFF PLED IN-
ABILITY SECURE MORE MODERATE TONES FROM SOVS.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: FOMIN OFF SAID BRIEFING
PROVIDED ON INSTRUCTIONS AND MADE VALIAN EFFORT PUT FORTH
BOTH ECON AND POL ASPECTS OF PRIMIN'S TRIP BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT
BUT SPIRIT OF CONVICTION FALTERED RE MORE BLANTANT LINES
COMMUNIQUE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NCTDOR-116-2-1
By *SP*, NARA, Date 10/5/11

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 658, MAY 5, FROM KABUL

2. IMF TEAM CONSULTATIONS CONTINUE

(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) IMF TEAM HAS PRESENTED RGA WITH SERIES OF CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IMF
CFN: 15 3 3 452

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 87 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PREPARED TO EXTEND STANDBY FACILITIES. CONDITIONS STIPULATED ARE: 1) EXCHANGE RATE REFORM; 2) LIMITATION ON BORROWING FROM CENTRAL BANK; 3) ADOPTION OF NEW TAX AND TARIFF MEASURES DESIGNED EFFECT SIGNIFICANT INCREASES GOVT REVENUES; AND 4) ACCEPTANCE ASSIGNMENT THREE IMF ADVISORS TO CENTRAL BANK.

(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) COMMENTS: AFTER FIRST FULL DAY'S DISCUSSION IMF PROPOSALS, RELIABLE RGA SOURCES ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTY ACCEPTANCE IMF RECOMMENDATIONS WITH EXCEPTION OF RESTRUCTURING EXCHANGE RATES. ALL RGA SOURCES ARGUE IMF PROPOSAL RAISE "OFFICIAL RATE" FROM PRESENT LEVEL 45 AFGHANIS TO DOLLAR TO 60 AFGHANIS TO DOLLAR WOULD POSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR RGA. FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE GOVERNMENT LARGEST IMPORTER, PROPOSAL RAISING OFFICIAL RATE WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON EXPENDITURE SIDE RGA BUDGET THIS YEAR. RGA NOW PLANNING PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE STEPS FOR CONSIDERATION IMF TEAM. CONSULTATIONS EXPECTED CONTINUE THROUGH THIS WEEK AND PERHAPS INTO NEXT.

3. RGA OFFICIAL COMMENTS RE ALGIERS CONFERENCE

(CONFIDENTIAL) ON INSTRUCTIONS, EMB OFF BRIEFED
CFN: 1 2 3 4 45 60 3

PAGE FOUR RUQVWB 87 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SENIOR FORMIN OFFICIAL MAY 3 RE ALGIERS CONF, NOTING CHINIOUS CHARACTER COMMUNIST-RADICAL NATIONALIST ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR SAME. RGA OFF ADMITTED ANTI-US, ANTI-WEST POSSIBILITIES, AS WELL AS NOTING USSR CONCERN RE LACK OF INVITATION TO CONF MADE CLEAR IN COURSE PRIMIN-S TRIP (SEE ITEM NO. 1).

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: RGA OFFICIAL GAVE NO INDICATION RGA PREPARING CONCERT WITH LIKE-MINDED POWERS IN ADVANCE OF CONF, BUT THAT RGA MIGHT FOLLOW SOME MODERATE INITIATIVE IF SUCH COURSE APPEARED HAVE CHANCE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE BY MAJORITY CONF PARTICIPANTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 658, MAY 5, FROM KABUL.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

NEGATIVE

ARMY

1. RAA OFFICERS TO US ON ORIENTATION TOUR

(UNCLASSIFIED) THREE RAA OFFICERS LED BY LTGEN MOHAMMED ISA, CG CENTRAL ARMY CORPS AND 3RD RANKING GENERAL MND, DEPARTING KABUL MAY 7 FOR ORIENTATION TOUR US. GENERAL ISA HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN OBSERVATION US SPECIALLY FORCES AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

(UNCLASSIFIED) COMMENT: MND EXPRESSED ENTHUSIASM RE THIS INITIAL ORIENTATION TOUR UNDER AFGHANISTAN MAP. TRIP EXPECTED
CFN: 3 1 1 3RD 7

PAGE FIVE RUQVWB ~~ST-0-0-CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTRIBUTE GREATER APPRECIATION BY KEY RAA OFFICERS OF
US ARMED FORCES.

AIR

NEGATIVE

GP-3 STEEVES

BT

CFN:3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

~~SECRET~~

37

42 RR RUEHCR
Action DE RUQVWB 206 18/1158Z
R 181156Z ZEA
88 FM AMEMBASSY/KABUL
Info TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ 522 MARCH 18-5PM

1 6 1 8 3
MARCH 18, 1965
8:38 AM

LIMDIS NOFORN

JOINT EMBASSY-USAID MESSAGE

THIS MESSAGE WILL ALERT DEPARTMENT TO SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH CAUSING US DEEP CONCERN. IF CURRENT FINANCIAL SITUATION AS SERIOUS AS SOME INDICATORS WOULD SUGGEST, ECONOMIC AND RELATED POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS MAY ESCALATE IN MANNER NOT ONLY HIGHLY INIMICAL TO AFGHAN INTERNAL SITUATION, BUT MIGHT FORCE CLOSER IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SOVIETS THAN ALREADY EXISTS.
CFN 522 18 5

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 206 ~~SECRET~~

NOW SEEMS CERTAIN THAT BUDGETARY DEFICIT THIS FISCAL YEAR, ENDING MARCH 21, WILL REACH BILLION AFGHANI MARK, WHICH IS TWICE THE SIZE WHICH IMF CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE TOLERABLE MAXIMUM. IMF HAD EARLIER COUNSELED THAT DEFICIT SHOULD BE REDUCED OVER TWO YEAR PERIOD TO AT LEAST 200 MILLION IN ORDER TO AVOID BANEFUL EFFECTS INFLATION AND INSTABILITY. AT SAME TIME, AFGHAN CONVERTIBLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION IS CRITICAL. EVEN AFTER \$11 MILLION INJECTION BY IMF IN 1964 AND TAKING ACCOUNT MOST RECENT KARAKUL SALES CURRENT CONVERTIBLE EXCHANGE RESOURCES ARE BETWEEN \$8-9 MILLION, AN ALL-TIME LOW FOR THIS NORMALLY HIGH TIME OF YEAR. DEPARTMENT WELL AWARE FROM OUR PREVIOUS REPORTS OF CHIEF CAUSES THIS DETERIORATING SITUATION - HEAVY CAPITAL INVESTMENT, INABILITY SPEED FINANCIAL REFORMS, REVENUE COLLECTION, ETC. INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVITY AND REVENUE COLLECTION HAS NOT KEPT PACE WITH UNPRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT. THERE NO HIDING FACT THAT GREATEST SINGLE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR THIS DEPLORABLE
CFN 21 200 111964 58-9

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 206 ~~SECRET~~

SITUATION IS IRRESPONSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF HEAVY RUSSIAN CAPITAL PROJECTS. WHILE US AND GERMANY HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM LOCAL CURRENCY SUPPORT, THERE NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY EXERCISED. AVAILABLE FUNDS NOW SO LOW

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By JD NARA, Date 10/5/11

~~SECRET~~

-2- 522, MARCH 18, 5 PM FROM KABUL

FOR NORMAL OPERATING EXPENSES THAT FUNDS FOR MOST MEAGER YET NECESSARY OPERATING EXPENSES UNAVAILABLE. EVEN SALARIES IN MANY AGENCIES HAVE BEEN HELD UP FOR FEW MONTHS PENDING BEGINNING NEW FISCAL YEAR.

THIS SITUATION FACES EMBASSY WITH REAL DILEMMA. IF WE PROCEED AS NOW PLANNED WITH PROCESSING LOANS ALREADY IN ADVANCED STAGE AND PRESS FORWARD WITH OTHERS SOON TO BE FINALIZED, WE MIGHT WELL CONTRIBUTE TO EXACERVATION OF CURRENT FINANCIAL PLIGHT EVEN THOUGH WE CONTINUE POLICY OF GENERATING LARGER PORTION OF AFGHANI COUNTER PART. WE GIVING SOME CONSIDERATION TO SUGGESTING IN EXPLORATORY WAY WHETHER RGA WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO DELAY OR STRETCH OUT OF SUCH PROJECTS AS AIT, HERAT-ISLAM QALA ROAD AND POSSIBLY EVEN DELAY IN KAJAKAI PLANNING TO ALLOW FOR SOME BUDGTARY RECOVERY. SUCH ACTION WOULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE, IF

PAGE FOUR RUQVWB 206 ~~SECRET~~

SOME MORE RAPID AND DIRECT ASSISTANCE CAN AT SAME TIME BE INJECTED INTO THE BUDGET. WE BELIEVE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUE FOR ACCOMPLISHING THIS IS TO USE FUNDS WHICH MIGHT BE DIVERTED FROM CAPITAL PROJECTS TO COMMODITY LOAN PROGRAM WHICH (WITH CONTINUING PL 480 WHEAT PROGRAM WHICH WE FEEL ALSO WILL BE NECESSARY) COULD BRING A RELATIVELY RAPID RELIEF IF THE NECESSARY DISCIPLINES ARE APPLIED INSTEAD OF THUS BEING ENCOURGAED TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER RECKLESS ADVENTURES.

IF THE DEPARTMENT PERCIEVES NO OBJECTION WE ARE THEREFORE CONTEMPLATING CAREFUL EXPLORATION WITHOUT COMMITMENT WITH MORE RESPONSIBLE ELEMENT, SUCH AS PALACE AND CONSERVATIVE BANKING CIRCLES, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER SOME SUCH PROGRAM WOULD BE APPRECIATED AND CONSIDERED HELPFUL TO RELIEVE DESPERATE FINANCIAL SITUATION AND STAVE OFF ACCELERATING TREND TO BECOME MORE COMPLETELY ENMESHED IN SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM. TIME IS IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS CONSIDERATION, FOR PRIMIN YUSUF SOON TO VISIT SOVIET UNION AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY STRAONG COULSEL FROM THE KING (WHO HIMSELF WILL BE LEAVING FOR EUROPE MID-MAY), HE MIGHT WELL INVOLVE COUNTRY IN FURTHER RECKLESS OBLIGATIONS. AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE, HE FOREMOST ADVOCATE OF FEARLESSLY RELYING ON SOVIET SUPPORT WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

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-3- 522, MARCH 18, 5 PM FROM KABUL

PAGE FIVE RUQVWB 206 ~~SECRET~~

IF WE WERE TO SUGGEST DEFERMENT IN US CAPITAL PROJECTS WITHOUT COROLLARY SWITCH TO SOME FORM BUDGETARY SUPPORT, WE IN DANGER OF THIS ACT BEING INTERPRETED AS FINAL INDICATION OF US EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ECONOMIC AID AFGHANISTAN FOR BY COMPARISON WE ALREADY SUFFERING CONSIDERABLY IN PRESENT EUPHORIC ATMOSPHERE BROUGHT ON BY LAVISH SOVIET ATTENTION. THERE EXISTS REAL POSSIBILITY THAT BY MAKING SERIOUS APPROACH TO CAREFULLY CHOSEN RESPONSIBLE ELEMENT AND PALACE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK SENSE AND ADMINISTER SUFFICIENT SHOCK ESPECIALLY IF WE HAD SOME REMEDY TO OFFER TO CURRENT FINANCIAL AILMENT.

IF THE PROBLEM WERE PURELY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL ONE, IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE. HOWEVER, WE CONVINCE THAT ANY PRECIPITOUS OR IMPRUDENT GESTURE COULD EASILY HAVE EXTREMELY DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON US INFLUENCE AND POSTURE WHICH IN OUR VIEW IS WORTH CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT TO MAINTAIN, GIVEN THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS WHICH COULD FOLLOW A PROGRAM OF ABANDONMENT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNSEL AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT OUR EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS HERE MAY BE AS MEANINGFUL AS POSSIBLE.

GP-2. STEEVES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ACTION DEPT 430 INFO MOSCOW 34 FROM KABUL MARCH 3-5PM

AMONG THE NUMBER OF VISITORS I HAVE PRESENTED TO KING, I HAVE NEVER KNOWN HIM TO BE MORE RELAXED, RESPONSIVE OR DEMONSTRATE MORE SINCERE INTEREST IN CONVERSATION THAN HIS MAJESTY DEMONSTRATED DURING ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR AT-LARGE HARRIMAN ON MARCH 2.

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN CONVEYED PRESIDENTIAL GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES, COMMENTED ON PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN POLITICAL CFN 480 34 3 5 2

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 52 ~~SECRET~~

REFORMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. POINTED OUT US MOST INTERESTED IN CALM AND WIDE MANNER IN WHICH AFGHANISTAN CONDUCTING ITS AFFAIRS INCLUDING DIFFICULT PROBLEM WITH NORTHERN NEIGHBOR. WE GLAD TO HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO ASSIST THEM IN THIS DEVELOPMENT.

KING RESPONDED WITH GENUINE WARMTH. HE EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR NUMBER OF MESSAGES HE HAD RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT AND TOLD HARRIMAN HE WARMLY RECIPROCATED THESE GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES. KING REGRETTED HE HAD NOT MET PRESIDENT DURING HIS US VISIT SEPTEMBER 1963 DUE TO PRESIDENT'S ABSENCE ON OFFICIAL VISIT IN SCANDINAVIA. HE SPOKE WITH OBVIOUS DEEP SINCERITY OF HIS AND QUEEN'S FOND MEMORIES OF LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY. WHEN AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN COMMENTED THAT EVEN COMMON PEOPLE IN REMOTE PARTS OF WORLD HAD SHARED OUR SENSE OF LOSS, KING BROKE IN TO SAY ALSO TRUE IN AFGHANISTAN.

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-2- 480, MARCH 3, 5 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM KABUL

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT VISITING AFGHANISTAN HAVING HOPED COME HERE EVER SINCE HIS CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE WITH AFGHAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW DURING WAR. HE RECALLED HIS THEN BEING INSTRUMENTAL IN HELPING AFGHANS APPROACH SOVIET OF-
CFN 1963

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 52 ~~SECRET~~

FICIALS BECAUSE OF SOVIET SNIPING AFGHAN FARMERS ON ISLANDS IN OKUS. KING REMEMBERED INCIDENT WELL AND COMMENTED THAT PROBLEM NOT CONFINED ONE OR TWO ISLANDS BUT INVOLVED SIMILAR INSTANCES UP AND DOWN ENTIRE 2,000 KILOMETER STRETCH OF RIVER. HE MADE HASTE TO ADD HE WAS GRATEFUL RELATIONS WITH RUSSIANS NOW VERY AMICABLE AND, SO FAR AS HE ABLE JUDGE, CHARACTERIZED BY FRIENDLINESS, MAGNANIMITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE.

IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION RUSSIAN AFFAIRS AND PERSONALITIES, KING OBVIOUSLY VERY INTERESTED IN BENEFITING BY HARRIMAN'S LONG EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH RUSSIANS. HE AGREED WITH GOVERNOR'S DESCRIPTION OF KHRUSHCHEV'S JOVIAL, SOMEWHAT IMPETIOUS AND MERCURIAL NATURE, AND CONCURRED KHRUSHCHEV UNDOUBTEDLY A VERY POPULAR FIGURE WITH RUSSIAN PUBLIC. HARRIMAN, CONTRASTING RUSSIAN ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES, SAID SOVIETS DOING REASONABLY WELL IN TECHNICAL AREA, BUT AGRICULTURE DEMONSTRATED VIVIDLY GREAT WEAKNESS OF SOVIET SYSTEM. COMMUNISTS DO NOT KNOW HOW TO PRODUCE FOOD OR TO FARM, AN OPERATION IN WHICH INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP INCENTIVE IS CLEARLY ESSENTIAL. KING AGREED WHOLE-HEARTEDLY, OPINING THIS WAS ONE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S GREATEST WORRIES ABOUT WHICH KHRUSHCHEV HAD SPOKEN TO HIM DURING HIS CRIMEAN
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PAGE FOUR RUQVWB 52 ~~SECRET~~

VISIT TWO YEARS AGO. KING WAS INTERESTED IN HARRIMAN'S OBSERVATIONS THAT SOME COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, LIKE YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND, NOW RETURNING TO POLICY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LAND AND THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE A DEVELOPING POLICY IN RUSSIA. UNDER KOSYGIN HE THOUGHT FACTOR OF INCENTIVE MIGHT RETURN TO GREATER DEGREE.

HARRIMAN COMMENTED ON HIS PERSONAL APPRAISAL OF KOSYGIN EXTREMELY PRAGMATIC MAN, SERIOUS, PROBABLY MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN COUNTRY THAN FOREIGN ADVENTURES, CONCLUDING THAT IN HIS 25 YEARS OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH

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-3- 480, MARCH 3, 5 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM KABUL

KOSYGIN, "HE DID NOT SEEM TO BE OF THE STUFF FROM WHICH DICTATORS ARE MADE." KING SMILINGLY BROKE IN TO AGREE. SAID HE HAD MET KOSYGIN OFF AND ON DURING HIS VISITS TO RUSSIA AND DURING KOSYGIN VISIT HERE LAST SEPTEMBER. HE FELT PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP MIGHT DESIRE CONCENTRATE MORE ON DEVELOPING OWN COUNTRY THAN INTERFERING ABROAD. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A TURN RECENTLY BY SOVIET LEADERS TO BELLIGERENT-SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE TACTICS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS SOUTH AMERICA AND AFRICA, AND EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT THEY THUS SEEKING PROVE TO COMMUNIST WORLD THAT THEY STILL AS ORTHODOX AS PEKING, IN ORDER TO RETAIN LEADERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT. KING SAID HE IN NO POSITION TO JUDGE BUT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBILITY.

HARRIMAN ASKED KING IF HE HAD NOTED TENSION OR UNEASINESS VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS DURING HIS VISIT TO CHINA LAST FALL. KING ANSWERED, "YES" WITHOUT ANY HESITATION. HARRIMAN HAD COMMENTED THAT PEKING SEEMS TO HAVE AS A GOAL BRINGING BACK UNDER HER CONTROL ALL TERRITORIES IN ASIA OVER WHICH CHINA HAS EVER HAD SUZERAINTY, SOME OF WHICH NOW RUSSIAN. KING AGREED AND SAID THAT BORDER PROBLEMS MUST LOOK LARGE IN CONTINUING CONFLICT BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HAPPILY SMALL AFGHAN BORDER PROBLEM WITH THE CHINESE HAD BEEN SETTLED AND BORDER MARKED. HE JOKINGLY COMMENTED THAT THIS DEMARCATION WAS GOOD EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN'S ABILITY TO OPERATE IN NEUTRAL ATMOSPHERE, NOTING THEIR BORDER COMMISSION WAS ONLY MADE POSSIBLE BY AMERICAN SUPPLIES, SOME RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT AND CHINESE LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

IN COMMENTING ON CHINA AND RUSSIA, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN SAID RUSSIA SEEMED GRADUALLY BEGINNING TO GIVE MORE ATTENTION TO DOMESTIC WELFARE AND PROGRESS AND LESS TO INTERFERENCE IN OTHER PEOPLE'S AFFAIRS, BUT THAT CHINA, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOWED NO SIGN OF ANY ABATEMENT IN HER BELLIGERENT, AGGRESSIVE STANCE. KING ASKED THE GOVERNOR IF HE COULD REMEMBER WHETHER RUSSIANS WERE SOMEWHAT
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ACTION DEPT 480 INFO MOSCOW 34 FROM KABUL MARCH 3-5PM

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1965 MAR 4 AM 1 36

LIKE THIS MANY YEARS AGO AND WHETHER CHINA, TOO, MIGHT NOT BECOME MORE AMICABLE AS TIME WENT ON. KING OBSERVED THAT CHINA SUFFERED FROM CONTRAST BETWEEN CONDITIONS IN SOVIET SIBERIA AND ADJACENT AREAS IN CHINA. THERE ARE AT LEAST 20 YEARS DIFFERENCE IN DEVELOPMENT.

HARRIMAN COMMENTED ON HIS OWN VISIT DURING WORLD CFN 480 34 3 5 20

PAGE TWO RUQVUB 53 ~~SECRET~~

WAR 2 TO RUSSIAN TRIBAL AREAS, LIKE TAJEKISTAN, NOTING HE WAS IMPRESSED BY RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENT OF THESE PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY IN EDUCATION. KING AGREED, SAID HE HAD BEEN THERE AND THESE PEOPLE, WHO KINSMEN TO AFGHANISTAN'S NORTHERN TRIBES, IN FACT DOING QUITE WELL.

IN DISCUSSING US-AFGHAN RELATIONS, AID PROGRAMS, ETC., KING EMPHASIZED AGAIN GREAT APPRECIATION FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE, STRESSING CONTINUING PRIORITY BEING GIVEN EDUCATION. SUCH OPERATIONS AS HELMAND VALLEY ALSO DISCUSSED CONCERNING WHICH HE EXPRESSED SUPPORT AND ENTHUSIASM.

VERY CORDIAL INTERVIEW BROUGHT TO CLOSE BY HIS MAJESTY PRESENTING A PORTRAIT OF HIMSELF TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, DULY AUTOGRAPHED AND IN SILVER FRAME.

GP-2 STEEVES

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JOINT WEEKA NO. 6 FROM SAA (KABUL) FEBRUARY 11, 1965

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1. VIETNAM

SIL

(CONFIDENTIAL) PER DEPCIRTEL, AMB CALLED ON PRIMIN FEB 8 TO PRESENT USG POSITION RE AIRSTRIKE NORTH VIETNAM. PRIMIN SAID HE MOST DISTURBED. HOPED PEACEFUL SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND VIETNAM WITHOUT FURTHER RESORT TO FORCE. AMB RESPONDED WE DID NOT WISH OBTAIN PEACE BY LETTING AGGRESSORS OVERRUN AND BURY US, QUESTION ESCALATION CONFLICT IN HANDS DRVN, AGRESSORS SHOULD RECOGNISE US HAD GREAT INTEREST IN OBSERVING SOLEMN TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND ASSURING PEACE THAT PART ASIA (SEE PSYCHOLOGICAL).
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PAGE TWO RUQVWB 151 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. RGA RE INDONESIA AND CHICOMS

(CONFIDENTIAL) FONOFF (FARHADI) STATED FEB 8 RGA HAD TOLD INDONESIAN CHARGE INDONESIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM UN (WEEK 2) REGRETTABLE AND URGED INDOS RECONSIDER DECISION. RGA ALSO TOLD CHICOM AMB IT DISPLEASED BY PEIPING'S EXPRESSIONS JOY OVER INDO WALKOUT, THAT UN INCREASINGLY USEFUL VEHICLE IN KEEPING WORLD PEACE AND HOPES INDONESIA WILL REJOIN UN. ACCORDING PRESS YUGOSLAV AMB AND UAR CHARGE CALLED JOINTLY ON PRIMIN FEB 9 TO EXPRESS ANXIETY RE INDO DECISION AND OBTAIN COOPERATION CAIRO CONFERENCE COUNTRIES THIS ISSUE. PRIMIN RESPONDED RGA SIMILARLY CONCERNED.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: RGA APPARENTLY WILLING SUPPORT NEUTRAL EFFORT DISSUADE INDONESIA FROM GOING THROUGH WITH WITHDRAWAL.

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By [Signature], NARA, Date 10/5/11

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-2- 430, FEBRUARY 11, 11 AM FROM KABUL

3. PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

(CONFIDENTIAL) PRESS REPORTED FEB 6 THAT GOP HAD ACCEPTED NUR AHMED ETEMADI, SEC GEN FONOFF, AS NEW AFGHAN AMB KARACHI (WEEK 3). ETEMADI SAYS HE INTENDS REMAIN KABUL UNTIL AFTER MARCH 1 VIEW END FEBRUARY TRANSIT AGREEMENT NEGOTS WITH PAKS IN KABUL (WEEK 4).

4. GENERAL AREF TO BE AMBASSADOR MOSCOW

(CONFIDENTIAL) MARSHAL SHAH WALI, KING'S UNCLE, CONFIRMED TO AMBASSADOR FEBRUARY 10 GENERAL AREF, CURRENTLY HERE ON CONSULTATION FROM BELGRADE POST, BEING NAMED AMBASSADOR MOSCOW.
CFN 2 8 2 9 3 6 3 1 4 4 10

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 151 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SHAH WALI INDICATED QUESTION FONMIN PORTFOLIO STILL UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION AND INDICATED HE URGING KING NAME DEPRIMIN DR. ZAHER IN DUE COURSE.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: INDICATIONS ARE PRIMIN YUSUF MAY BE RESISTING EFFORTS RELIEVE HIM OF FONMIN PORTFOLIO.

5. HEALTH MAIWANDWAL

(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) CONDITION MIN PRESS AND INF MAIWANDWAL (WEEK 5) CONTINUES IMPROVE SLOWLY BUT STILL DANGEROUSLY ILL AND UNLIKELY RETURN WORK FOR ANOTHER MONTH. INCAPACITY MAIWANDWAL UNFORTUNATE VIEW CURRENT CAMPAIGN AMEND DRAFT PRESS LAW (WEEK 5 AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BELOW).

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. VIETNAM

(UNCLASSIFIED) EDITORIALS EXPRESSED ANXIETY OVER VIETNAM CRISIS, MICAWBER-LIKE HOPE PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND AND TEND SEE U.S. ACTION AS INTERFERENCE WHICH MIGHT EXPAND WAR (SEE POLITICAL NO. 1).

2. PRESS LAW

(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) VERNACULAR PRESS CONDUCTING WHAT APPEARS BE ORGANISED CAMPAIGN AGAINST RESTRICTIONS DRAFT PRESS LAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 430, FEBRUARY 11, 11 AM FROM KABUL

(WEEKA 5). CARTOONS AND LETTERS EDITOR LABEL SEVERAL PROVISIONS
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL".

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TEXT ARTICLE FOR DEC TEN LIFE MAGAZINE ARTICLE BY

CIA

ROY ROWAN, ENTITLED, "A NEUTRAL NATION'S SUDDEN PRO-

NSA

US TURN, ETC., ETC."

DOD

RSR

ROY ROWAN STOPPED BRIEFLY IN KABUL ENROUTE SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM TASHKENT. HE AND MRS ROWAN ACCEPTED INVITATION TO JOIN US AT RESIDENCE FOR THANKSGIVING DINNER AND, IN ADDITION TO WHAT HE MAY HAVE GATHERED FROM FELLOW GUESTS, I GRANTED HIM ON REQUEST BACKGROUNDER ON CURRENT SITUATION. HE STAYED IN KABUL ABOUT TWO DAYS, SAW A NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND, WHILE SOURCE FOR MUCH OF MATERIAL IN ARTICLE UNKNOWN, SOME OF IT TRACEABLE TO HIS PRIVILEGED CONVERSATION WITH ME. ROWAN SAID HE CHIEFLY INTERESTED IN ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS LIFE OPERATIONS BUT NATURALLY INTERESTED IN AFFAIRS OF COUNTRIES VISITED. IN ACQUAINTING HIM WITH HAPPENINGS AFGHANISTAN LAST FEW WEEKS, I EMPHASIZED AGAIN AND AGAIN FACT THAT ANY STORY EMPHASIZING PARTICULAR LINE HE HAS TAKEN IN THIS ARTICLE COULD HAVE VERY DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE DOING ANY WRITING HIMSELF AS HIS INTEREST LAY ELSEWHERE. IN VIEW OF CHARACTER OF INTERVIEW AND HIS ACCEPTANCE OF CONDITIONS, I FIND HIS ALLEGED QUOTATIONS FROM ME AS GROSS BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. LAST PARAGRAPH QUOTES ARE APPROXIMATELY ACCURATE BUT TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.

ARTICLE MAY BE EMBARRASSING HERE. TRUE, LIFE NOT WIDELY CIRCULATED AFGHANISTAN BUT ARTICLE OF THIS PROMINENCE INVOLVING AFGHAN, USSR, CHICOM AND US RELATIONS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION. AFGHANS MAY PARTICULARLY RESENT STORY THAT "THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOOK GREAT DELIGHT THAT HE (CHEN YI) WAS DROWNED OUT BY US PLANES WARMING UP THEIR ENGINES ON THE FIELD." THERE WAS NO AFGHAN FOREIGN

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Authority NIJ 001R-116-2-5
By JP, NARA, Date 10/5/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 270, DECEMBER 7, FROM KABUL

MINISTER PRESENT AT THAT DEPARTURE. AFGHANS NEVER EXPRESSED ANY DELIGHT. CHEN YI WAS NOT MAKING ANY ORATION. THE SOMEWHAT AMUSING CONFUSION WHICH COMPLICATED CHEN YI'S PLANESIDE FAREWELLS WAS FACT THAT AMERICAN EVACUATION C-130'S WERE COMING IN ALONG SAME STRIP TO PICK UP 500 EVACUEES FROM PAKISTAN.

IF AFGHANS PROTEST OR CALL ME ON CARPET FOR ARTICLE, I WILL TRY ASSUAGE THEIR ANNOYANCE AND DAMP DOWN EFFECTS OF THIS ILL-CONSIDERED ARTICLE AS BEST I CAN. WILL KEEP DEPARTMENT INFORMED. GP-3. STEEVES
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KING'S FIRST COUSIN RECENTLY INFORMED EMBOFF HIS MAJESTY GENUINELY DELIGHTED WITH PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. BOTH CORDIAL TONE AND TOPICAL SUBSTANCE REPORTEDLY MOST GRATIFYING TO HIS MAJESTY WHO HAS BEEN SHOWING TEXT TO NUMBER CABINET CALLERS DURING WEEK, EXPRESSING PLEASURE AT PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INTEREST AFGHAN MODERNIZATION EFFORTS.

COMMENT: NO RPT NO CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES OTHER HEADS STATE YET PUBLICIZED. PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS FROM BOTH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ON OCCASION ADOPTION NEW CONSTITUTION HAVE THUS MADE PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE IMPACT. BREWER.

BT

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RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI FLASH 40
RUQTAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN FLASH 31
RUSBKP/AOCONSUL LAHORE FLASH SEVEN
RUSBKP/AMOFFICE RAWALPINDI FLASH THREE
RUSBKP/AMCONSUL PESHAWARFLA 12
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI FLASH 20
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEPTEMBER 7

RGA GRANTS OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING CLEARANCE US MILITARY
AIRCRAFT PERMIT EVACUATION LAHORE, PROVIDED FLIGHTS OCCUR DAY-
TIME AND OVER CIVIL AIR CORRIDORS.

STEEVES

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN: MR BUNDY WHCA
RUEKDA/DOD

RUEPIA/CIA
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
P 071255Z

1965 SEP 7 21 22

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 84
INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI PRIORITY 39
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 19
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEPTEMBER 7

RGA CONCERN OVER CONSEQUENCES INDO-PAK CRISIS

1. ACCORDING KABUL RADIO, KING LAST NIGHT CONSULTED
PM YUSUF CONCERNING INDO-PAK CRISIS.

2. DURING LUNCH TODAY CABINET MEMBERS REVEALED
TO AMBASSADOR AND EMBOFFS CABINET MET IN EMERGENCY
SESSION THIS MORNING CONSIDER REPERNSSIONS INDO-PAK
SITUATION ON AFGHANISTAN. PLANNING MIN YAFTALI AND AGRIC
MIN KISHAWARZ STATED CABINET DISCUSSED PROBLEM
INTERRUPTION TRANSIT TRADE AND FLOW FOREIGN AID

PAGETWO RUQTKB 68 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SHIPMENTS. FINANCE MIN RISHTIYA SAID CABINET PARTICULARLY
WORRIED OVER DISRUPTION MARKETING AFGHAN FRESH
FRUIT CROP, JUST RIPENING, BULK OF WHICH NORMALLY
TRANSITS PAKISTAN TO INDIA. RISHTIYA ALSO DIVULGED
RGA DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER POSSIBILITY OF INDIANS
CARRYING WARFARE "NEAR OUR BORDERS" (IMPLYING INTO
"PUSHTUNISTAN") ABOUT WHICH AFGHANS "COULDSZOT
REMAIN INDIFFERENT".

3. OTHER RESPONSIBLE AFGHAN OFFICIALS PRIVATELY
EXPRESS OPINION OR BELIEF PUSHTUN TRIBES OF
PAK-AFGHAN BORDER AREA LIKELY RESPOND TO CALL OF
JEHAD IN KASHMIR, IF NOT ALREADY DOING SO.
RISHTIYA ALSO REFLECTED THIS VIEW, ADDING THAT IN DOING
SO TRIBESMEN MIGHT NEITHER BE SERVING OWN INTERESTS
OR THAT OF AFGHANISTAN.

COMMENT: OTHER ASPECTS OF ESCALATING INDO-PAK
CRISIS COULD WELL GIVE AFGHANS CAUSE FOR CONCERN:
DENIAL EMERGENCY SOURCE OF POL (EMBTTEL 164),
UNCONTROLLABLE TRIBAL SITUATION ALONG EASTERN BORDER,
COMPETING INDIAN AND PAK DEMANDS FOR AFGHAN
SUPPORT. UNDERSTAND RGA ALREADY APPROACHED IRAN
FOR HELP WITH POL. OF ALL ASPECTS, HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY
OF AFGHAN TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN WAR MOST
FRAUGHT WITH DANGER.

KARACHI PASS CONSTITUENT POSTS AS DESIRED.

GP-3 STEEVES

BT

CY KONEP
12

S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *12/14* NARA, Date *12-15-05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1965 SEP 7 15 43

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITEHOUSE (ATTN MR BUNDY)
TSTATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEPT 7
FOLLOWING KABUL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 83
INFO KARACHI IMMEDIATE 38 SIGNED STESES

JUST SEEN KARACHI'S 388 DEPARTMENT 26 TO KABUL.
AFGHAN FONOFF PLUS SELECTED CABINET MEMBERS PROMISE
CORDIAL, GENEROUS ASSISTANCE OF ANY KIND SHOULD WE NEED
ASSISTANCE IN STAGING OUT OR SAFEHAVEN PURPOSES FOR OUR
PEOPLE. THEREFORE ESTIMATE OF THOSE WE COULD ACCOMMODATE
INFINITELY HIGHER THAN SUGGESTED MY TEL 81 TO DEPT,
37 TO KARACHI, THIS MORNING. SHELTER AND SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY
IF TEMPORARY, NO PROBLEM. EVEN KANDAHAR FACILITIES
COULD ACCOMMODATE LARGE COMMUNITY TEMPORARILY. BECAUSE OF
PROXIMITY TO LAHORE AS COMPARED TEHRAN,
AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

OUR PROBLEM FOR SHUTTLING AIRCRAFT WOULD BE FUEL.
SUPPLY IS LIMITED HERE. GP-3 STESES.
BTC

OBAEDVZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jclg NARA, Date 12-15-05

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

14

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

L

TO RUEHCR/ ECSTATE WASHDC 46

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INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FIVE

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BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 9

FE

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

RSR

PRIMIN YUSUF MET ME FUNERAL FOR NAJIBULLAH. AFGHAN FUNERAL GATHERING ALMOST AS SOCIAL AFFAIR AS COCKTAIL PARTY PRIOR FORMAL PRAYERS AND EULOGIES. PRIMIN INVITED ME TO STAY WITH HIM AND CHAT. I WAS THE ONLY FOREIGNER THERE.

PRIMIN RAISED MATTER OF KOHLER'S WALK-OUT AT KREMLIN RECEPTION FOR KING ZAHED. I GAVE HIM FACTUAL ACCOUNT AS PER KOHLER TELEGRAM FOR WHICH INFO I WAS GRATEFUL. YUSUF DISTURBED AND FEARED SOME REPERCUSSIONS AS INTERPRETATION IN PUBLIC PRESS MIGHT SUGGEST DISCOURTESY TO AFGHAN KING. I EXPLAINED SERIOUS ASPECT OF SUCH DISCOURTEOUS AND RUDE CONDUCT BY SOVIETS AND RECALLED SIMILAR REMARKS BY KOSYGIN HERE OVER YEAR AGO WHEN I CAME CLOSE TO WALKING OUT IF I HAD NOT BEEN GUEST OF HIS MAJESTY.

I TOLD HIM FRANKLY THAT INAPPROPRIATE, UNDIPLOMATIC AND BELLIGERENT REMARKS BY HIS RUSSIAN FRIENDS AND MAKING THESE OFFENSIVE ATTACKS AT INAPPROPRIATE PLACES SIMPLY COULD NOT BE CONDONED BY US AND HE MUST UNDERSTAND IT. MY OPINION WAS THAT KOHLER HAD ACTED QUITE CORRECTLY AND KOSYGIN WAS THE ONE THAT WOULD HAVE THE REPUTATION FOR NOT MINDING HIS MANNERS.

CONVERSATION BROUGHT UP WHOLE VIET-NAM SUBJECT AGAIN. PRIMIN SEEMS TO BE MOST CONCERNED AND BAFFLED BY OPPOSITION TO OUR POLICY BY US MINORITY. THESE ARE ALWAYS THE ARGUMENTS HE USES IN BAIENBNG ME. VOCAL OPPOSITION IS DIFFICULT FOR PEOPLE LIKE YUSUF TO SEE IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE IS INCLINED TO BE APOLOGIST FOR THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE ANYWAY.

GP-3 STEEVES

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Authority U.S. ODI 12-116-2-5
By UIC, NARA, Date 10-23-13

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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5

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Action

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QTA333 TKB518

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1965 SEP 9 AM 2 48

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

SAH

TO RUQVCR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI IMMEDIATE 44

L

INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 90

H

RUSABF/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 13

EUR

STATE GRNC

NEA

BT

IO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEPTEMBER 9

P

IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION BY ROAD FROM PAKISTAN

NSC

WE ARE SETTING UP COMPLETE RECEPTION OPERATION. TEAM WITH

INR

SUPPLIES, INCLUDING GASOLINE, SHOULD BE IN POSITION

NSA

PAK/AFGHAN BORDER AT TORKHAM BY 2200 HOURS LOCAL SEPT 9

AID

SINCE RGA HAS PROMISED ARRANGE BLANKET CLEARANCE PERSONNEL

PC

AND VEHICLES AT BORDER ANTICIPATE NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON

O

DOCUMENTATION OR ENTRY. HAVE SECURED PERMISSION USE SHORTER

SY

GORGE ROUTE. EVACUEE VEHICLES WILL BE GUIDED TO EMBASSY WHICH

SCA

WILL BE RECEPTION CENTER WHERE BILLETING ASSIGNMENTS MADE.

SCS

ANTICIPATE ALL EVACUEES CAN BE BILLETED AND MESSED

PER

IN AMERICAN HOMES.

OC

SHOULD EVACUEES COME THROUGH KABUL WILL AWAIT

CCRO

INSTRUCTIONS RE ONWARD TRAVEL TO SAFEHAVEN.

STEEVES

RSR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2:52 A.M., SEPTEMBER 9, 1965,
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 3:23 A.M., SEPTEMBER 9, 1965,
DOD, CIA 3:40 A.M. SEPTEMBER 9, 1965, USIA 3:44 A.M.,
SEPTEMBER 9, 1965.

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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16

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85

Origin

NEA

Info

SS

G

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

ACTION:

Amembassy KABUL

STATE 1648
Deptel 200, Embassy's A-249

JUL 5 7 07 PM '66

In discussing with Primin timing of his visit here toward end year, please point out we unable handle visitor before November 7 due elections and November 13-19 already being ~~xxxx~~ considered for visit by chief of state.

Not automatically decontrolled.

END

BALL

Drafted by:

NEA/SGA: FESchmelzer:mw

6/30/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

G- Mr. Low

S/CPR - Mr. King

SQA - Mr. Schneider

White House - Mr. Wriggins

S/S - Mr. Thompson

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CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

2168

1. *Whiggin*
2. *Ret.*

160

July 1, 1966

Date

O.K. to

go
AK

Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

mr

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Informed Jaws/s 7/5/66 5-20pm

Enclosure:

Jfs

Telegram to KABUL

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☐ CHARGE TO

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17

80
Origin
SS

ACTION: Amembassy KABUL 326

REF : EMBTELS 659 and 660

MAY 11 8 35 PM '65

EXDIS

FOR BREWER FROM TALBOT

We

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ /acknowledge Ambassador's cable

002

660, commenting on his discussions with PM Yusuf on Helmand question. Ambassador can be sure we will take his warning signal seriously. We do not intend to let US - Afghan relations deteriorate but neither can we ignore our own aid standards and political requirements. We will seek to resolve our problems with Afghanistan in order to enable us to do what is required to maintain an effective U.S. presence there.

GP-2.

END.

) RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

By *felby* NARA, Date 12-15-05

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:FESchmelzer:ag 5/11/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Phillips Talbot - NEA

Clearances:

XX

SOA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

NEA - Mr. Pagan (draft)

S/S-Mr. Rattray

~~SECRET~~

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86

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Embassy KABUL

283

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By JCL/NARA, Date 12-15-05

MAY 21 4 56 PM '66

LIMDIS

1. White House has approved QUOTE Informal Working Visit UNQUOTE for Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Accordingly, please inform King and Prime Minister that the President hopes very much that the Prime Minister can meet with him in Washington at mutually convenient date sometime near the end of this calendar year.
2. FYI While visit tentatively scheduled for November, we would prefer leave exact timing open at present. END FYI It important that basic protocol elements of QUOTE Informal Working Visit UNQUOTE and distinction from QUOTE Official Visit UNQUOTE be clear with Afghans at outset. Under present procedures QUOTE Informal Visit UNQUOTE would ~~include~~ include Prime Minister's being met at airport by Vice President with military honors, meeting with President, stag luncheon by Secretary and other meetings as required. Prime Minister would be offered use of Blair House during his Washington stay of one or two days duration. However he would not be official guest of USG and would arrange and pay for his own travel to and within US as well as own expenses outside of Blair House.

GP 3

Drafted by:
NEA:SOA:LBLaingen:cff 5/20/66

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

Clearance:

G - Mr. Low
S/CPR - Mr. King
White House - Mr. H. Wriggins

S/S - Mr. Gordon
SOA - Mr. Schneider

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~~CLASSIFICATION~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1504
18a

1. Wiggins
red.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

May 20, 1966

Date

BY ju ON 103-91

approved
May 21

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for white House
clearance prior to transmission.

BHR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Amembassy KABUL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 MAY 21 AM 9 22

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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19

49

Origin ACTION: Amembassy KABUL 165

NEA
Info:

JAN 13 4 07 PM '65

SS

G

NEA

P

NSIA

NSO

CPR

Following received from Prime Minister.

QUOTE His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson President of the United States of America Washington D.C. On the occasion of the New Year I have great pleasure to extend to your Excellency my warmest greetings and best wishes for Your Excellency's personal well being and for the greater prosperity of the American people. Dr. Mohammad Yusuf Prime Minister UNQUOTE

Pass following to Prime Minister from President.

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Thank you very much for your personal message of New Year's greetings. I wish you and the people of Afghanistan happiness and prosperity during 1965. UNQUOTE

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
NEA:SQA:RJCarle:jp 1-11-65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

Clearances:

SQA - Miss Laise
O/CPR - Mr. Kuhlman

s/s - Mr. Hoffacker
The White House - Mr. Bromley Smith
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☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KABUL

71

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SEP 25 10 24 AM '64

NEA
Info

By jcl/ NARA, Date 12-14-05

INDEX

SS

At appropriate time convey following message from President to King:

G

QUOTE Your Majesty:

SP

P

The people of the United States join me in extending heartfelt

U.S.T.A.

NSC

congratulations to you and the entire Afghan nation on the adoption of
Afghanistan's new constitution.

We

have been impressed by _____ toward _____ in America

/ ~~xxxxxx~~ Afghanistan's ~~xxxxxx~~ /march /of social, economic and political

Its progress. /~~Adoption~~^{Adoption} of a new constitution is in one sense a culmination of this progress, and in another the beginning of a new period of ~~your~~ accomplishment.

constitutional

The ~~XXXX~~ example of Afghanistan's orderly and constructive /
development / ~~progressive process~~ will be an inspiration to the many countries and peoples

of the world who share our ideals of building a better future for mankind.

We in the United States take satisfaction in working together with

Afghanistan and other free nations for the achievement of these ideals. We

The people and Government of the United States applaud Afghanistan's wish for it advances and extend best wishes for its continued success in providing for

the happiness and prosperity of the Afghan people. Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

XXXX

WEEK

Dept

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:RJCarle/bk 9-15-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: **NEA - Phillips Talbot**

Clearance:

SOA - Mr. Cameron
NEA/P - Mr. Fisk
p - Mr. Cramer

WPAACK

White House - Mr. Komer

s/s - Mr. Hilliker

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy KABUL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department does not plan to release but has no objection if RGA desires do so. We would appreciate notification of RGA intention to release.

GP-3

END

RIJSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 200 FRUS 64-68 vol. 25-548

By jc NARA, Date 12-2-04

C4/22/60

21

DRAFT

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have had a failure in communicating your decision on the attached PL 480 package for Afghanistan. As the note indicates, Miss Nivens telephoned, as is usual, your decision to Roger Morris, who was acting in Ed Hamilton's absence for that area. He heard her decision as "approved" rather than "disapproved."

He communicated, as is usual, to State.

We discovered this after a cable had been sent to our man in Kabul and after he had (1) delivered the lecture on military spending, and (2) delivered the news that we were ready to go ahead with the PL 480 deal. Thus, due to our error, I am afraid there will be some broken crockery if we back out now.

We have two choices:

-- The President can cancel this agreement on grounds that the Symington amendment is not being complied with;

-- Or we can accept the consequences of our error and let the PL 480 package go through.

To assure that this will not happen again, I have made arrangements that all decisions will be communicated twice: to the relevant member of my staff; and to the Secretariat at the Department of State.

As you can see from the attached cable, to our Ambassador ^a believes that his lecture on military spending has begun/serious rethinking of the Afghan military budget.

SECRET

Monday, April 22, 1968 -- 1 PM

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a Freeman-Gaud-Zwick package proposing a small (\$8.2 million) PL 480 package for Afghanistan. It is a routine proposal except for the matter of applying the Symington Amendment which directs us eventually to terminate aid to poor countries which spend too much for military purposes. Everybody agrees that Afghanistan is over-armed to meet any conceivable threat from her neighbors.

You may recall reviewing this package two weeks ago. The first word we received was that you had approved the proposal and the recommended treatment of the Symington problem: a strong lecture in Kabul to the effect that further U.S. aid will be heavily contingent on defense budget reductions.

However, when the package physically returned, it was marked "disapproved." We discovered this after a cable had been sent to our man in Kabul and after he had (1) delivered the lecture on military spending, and (2) delivered the news that we were ready to go ahead with the PL 480 deal. Thus, due to our error, I am afraid there will be some broken crockery if we back out now.

More important, our refusal to go through with this deal will probably not inspire the Afghans with a new will to slash their defense budget. Our Ambassador is persuaded that his lecture has begun a process of serious re-thinking of the military budget. If that's true, a heavy hand now is likely to hurt by strengthening the forces in Afghanistan who don't want to see spending cuts and who argue that our position is an invasion of Afghan sovereignty.

If you do decide against this agreement on Symington grounds, it raises serious questions for the rest of our \$8.2 million AID program to Afghanistan (technical assistance, most in agriculture and education). The Symington language directs the President to "terminate" aid when he finds that military spending "materially interferes" with development. If we cut off food aid, we have little legal basis for continuing other kinds.

I continue to agree with Gaud and Katzenbach that we should interpret the Symington provision to require a process of pressure rather than an abrupt termination which simply loses us our seat in the game. I vote you reconsider and approve the package.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jcl/g NARA, Date 12-14-05

SECRET

- 2 -

If you wish to reaffirm your disapproval, we will come back to you on the question of extending this principle to other aid to Afghanistan.

W. W. Rostow

Approve package _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

21b



Afghanistan
2/c

Friday, March 29, 1968 -- 10:30 AM

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud, and Zwick recommend a \$8.2 million PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan (90⁰⁰ tons of wheat; 6,000 tons of vegetable oil.)

This is routine except for the serious problem posed by the Symington amendment and the fact that the Russians have armed the Afghans to the teeth. It is fair to say that if we don't find Afghan arms spending worrisome, we will be open to the charge that we have welched on our assurance that we would take the Symington amendment seriously.

Still, nothing is gained by immediate termination of technical assistance and food aid -- particularly when we want to move wheat. Symington has agreed that enforcement of his amendment should be a process of pressure, not a single rash act.

Our solution -- agreed to by Gaud and Battle -- is to send our Ambassador in with a strong speech on arms at the same time he delivers approval of the wheat deal. This is not a final answer, but it should make the Afghans think and it will give us a defensible line on the Hill.

You will want to read through Zwick's memorandum which is a concise summary of the problem and the proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve PL 480 package, with strong instruction to
our Ambassador

Disapprove ✓

Call me

EKH/vmr

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-269
By , NARA Date 2-19-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21-d

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-269

By mg, NARA Date 2-19-97

MAR 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate an \$8.2 million P. L. 480 agreement with Afghanistan (Tab A). The agreement would provide 90,000 tons of wheat and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil on 40-year dollar credit terms, with a 10-year grace period. To help the U.S. balance of payments, it would require that the first \$750,000 be paid over 10 months beginning on June 30.

The amount of wheat proposed for this agreement is quite generous in view of Afghanistan's recent good crop. However, I feel that it is warranted by our desire to move wheat and by the additional self-help leverage which we can get from a larger P. L. 480 program. This agreement would bring to \$12.5 million the amount of food aid provided in FY 1968. Our dollar aid is limited to technical assistance and is estimated at \$7.5 million this fiscal year.

Self-help. Afghanistan has taken a number of important steps to increase agricultural production, with a view to self-sufficiency in wheat and edible oil by the early 1970's. The last P. L. 480 agreement, signed in July, contained general self-help conditions designed to reinforce the Government's commitment to that goal. This agreement would require additional specific and sound measures, in particular (a) the establishment of a wheat price high enough to provide incentives to farmers, and (b) improvement of fertilizer distribution by turning it over to the private sector.

Military Expenditures. Afghanistan's military supply situation presents a particularly thorny problem. Although about half of its military hardware was provided under contracts concluded prior to 1961, the country's defense establishment is out of all proportion to its economic situation or any realistic appraisal of the current threat. Almost all of Afghanistan's military equipment has been supplied by the Soviets. The current inventory includes an estimated 335 tanks, 55 or more surface-to-air missiles, 250 anti-tank missiles, and 96 MIG fighters. (A background paper on military expenditures is attached at Tab B.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

In spite of this situation Gaud feels, and I agree, that a close reading of the Symington amendment does not require you to make a finding that Afghan resources are being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with economic development. The rationale for this approach is essentially two-fold:

- Since three-fourths of the equipment is provided on a grant basis, actual expenditures amount to only about 20% of the budget and are not out of line with neighboring India and Pakistan.
- These expenditures in themselves probably do not unduly interfere with development. Lack of technical skills and workable institutions constitute a more serious bottleneck to Afghan development.

There are also two strong practical reasons for not invoking the Symington amendment now:

- Our aid program in Afghanistan helps to counterbalance a much larger Soviet presence. In 1963, King Zahir embarked upon an experiment in parliamentary democracy which probably would not have been possible without our influence and support.
- In Afghanistan as elsewhere, the Symington and Conte/Long amendments can be quite useful for purposes of persuasion, but they lose their utility once they are applied. Our relatively small aid program may not enable us to convince the Afghans to reduce their future defense expenditures in any event, but to precipitately cut off all U.S. assistance clearly would not achieve this objective.

On the other hand, I do not think we can simply conduct business as usual in the face of this problem. There is a reasonable chance that the U.S., by building on the dialogue which Ambassador Neumann has begun, can induce some restraint in the Afghan military budget. Moreover, if we ignore the spirit of the Symington amendment in Afghanistan, we lay ourselves open to charges on the Hill that we are not serious about its application and will not put any teeth into our policy anywhere in the world.

On balance, I recommend that we go ahead with this proposed P. L. 480 agreement, but that in negotiating it the State Department be instructed to make a vigorous effort, both here and through Ambassador

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Neumann in Afghanistan, to get across to the Afghans the following points, agreed to by Bill Gaud and Luke Battle:

- (1) While we recognize that it is difficult for one country to pass judgment on the national security problems and military structure of another, it is our best judgment that Afghanistan's present military structure and expenditures need serious reexamination in the light of the present military threat and what we all know to be the country's economic needs.
- (2) U.S. law now requires that we take future developments on this front fully into account in thinking about any further P. L. 480 assistance or dollar loans or continuation of our technical assistance program.
- (3) We strongly urge Afghanistan to seek ways to reduce the burden of military expenditures upon its economy. The Afghan Government should know that, under present circumstances, increases in the defense budget or new contracts for additional military equipment will make it extremely difficult for us to provide assistance in the future.

Charles J. Fawcett
Charles J. Fawcett
Director

Attachments

Approve P. L. 480 sale _____; instruct
Ambassador and State Department to take
strong line with RGA _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 6 1968

21-2

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 90,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$3.2 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 2 percent interest during the 10 year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. However, in order to help defray U. S. Embassy expenditures in Afghanistan, we would provide for a currency use payment of \$750,000 to be converted into local currencies. Payment of the \$750,000 would be in 10 equal monthly installments (\$75,000) beginning June 30, 1968. The Department of State and the Treasury Department concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Title I, PL 480 Agreement signed with Afghanistan on July 19, 1967 provided for 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oils. These quantities were for the purpose of helping to meet Afghanistan's requirements during the first half of FY 1968 following a year of drought. Afghanistan continues to need imports to cover second half FY 1968 and part of FY 1969 requirements. The PL 480 wheat and vegetable oil imports will be used mainly to fill the needs of the urban areas.

Self-help

The Government of Afghanistan is undertaking to improve its production, storage and distribution of agricultural commodities in accordance with the self-help conditions outlined in the July 19, 1967 Agreement. In addition to these, the new agreement we propose would provide for the Royal Government of Afghanistan taking strong steps to:

1. Establish an incentive pricing policy for wheat at levels sufficient to enable farmers to purchase fertilizer, improved seed and other inputs, and adopt improved production practices.
2. Bring fertilizer imports and distribution, now handled by the government, into the private sector.
3. Improve administrative arrangements and personnel management for agricultural development, giving serious consideration to the recommendations made by the United States Agricultural Review Team.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-275

By CB, NARA Date 6-30-99

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2


Symington Amendment

Our findings pursuant to the requirements of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, are included in an attachment to this memorandum.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

January 26 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTACHMENT

Military Expenditure Review

State/A.I.D. has concluded that neither U.S. development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, nor PL 480 sales are being diverted to military expenditures and that Afghanistan resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Afghan development.

21f

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ATTACHMENT

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P. L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN PER SECTION 620(s) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED.

Afghan defense expenditures have remained stable in recent years. According to the best available statistics, which in Afghanistan must be regarded as less than averagely reliable, the percentages of actual expenditures for defense in the Government budget were 19.2 and 20.5 in Afghan fiscal years 1965/66 and 1966/67 respectively. This is a slightly smaller percentage than other countries in the region. Published budget figures for Afghan FY 1967/68 indicate that 19.1 percent has been allocated for military purposes. In constant dollar prices, (base year 1965), expenditures are estimated at \$11.8 million in 1966; \$11.0 million in 1967; and \$10.7 million in 1968. No reliable GNP data is available in Afghanistan; the budget for 1969 should be published within a month but is not yet available.

Afghanistan's military equipment and advisors are almost all supplied by the Soviet Union. The equipment supplied since 1956 by the USSR is estimated to be worth some \$226 million. \$167 million of this has been on a grant basis. Payments for Soviet military assistance (the non-grant part) are financed through barter trade arrangements and not through the use of free foreign exchange. The Afghan Government budgeted roughly \$7.3 million for these barter payments in 1965/66 and again in 1966/67. \$7.3 million is arrived at by using an exchange rate of 55 Afs to the dollar because of arrangements with the USSR (in comparison with 75 Afs in other budget calculations). This reduces the \$7.3 million to roughly \$5.3 million in terms of the budget. Moreover an unknown portion of this amount is being held in reserve and not spent. The amount actually spent is included in the overall defense expenditures described above. The major barter items have been raw cotton, wool, oilseeds and dried fruits and nuts. Many of these goods have little market for convertible foreign exchange either because of low quality or high transportation costs.

Government development investment has declined over the last three years primarily as a result of a decline in foreign economic assistance and restrictive fiscal policies, suggested by the IMF and supported by A.I.D., aimed at reducing deficit financing. Domestic revenue collection during this period has remained relatively stable. The quality of Afghan development efforts has improved and the Government now is devoting resources to activities which have a faster return in contrast to the former practice of emphasizing heavy infrastructure projects. The real deterrents to more rapid economic growth are lack of technical skills and institutional shortcomings. As far as the use of skilled manpower is concerned, the military establishment uses little skilled manpower and this would not be affected in a major way

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-275

By CB, NARA Date 6-30-99

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2

by reduction of military expenditures.

The U. S. has urged the Afghan Government to make reductions in defense outlays and in a recent conversation on this subject a high official with the foreign office said that the Defense budget for next year would not be increased. On February 13 Ambassador Neumann discussed defense spending with the Prime Minister and reported that the Prime Minister had been fully briefed on our concern in this regard. The Ambassador noted that the top officials of the RGA are now apprised of the legislation and its intent and are aware of the implications of their Government's future military expenditures and arms purchases in the light of concern about defense expenditures.

From the Afghan point of view, military expenditures can be considered to be within reasonable bounds for a society that is at once poor but feels insecure in face of an internal threat, i.e., the divisive tendencies of a largely tribal society and what it considers to be a possible external threat, notably from a stronger Pakistan.

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21-9

Friday, March 29, 1968 -- 10:30 AM

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Mr. President:

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud, and Zwick recommend a \$8.2 million PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan (90,000 tons of wheat; 6,000 tons of vegetable oil.)

This is routine except for the serious problem posed by the Symington amendment and the fact that the Russians have armed the Afghans to the teeth. It is fair to say that if we don't find Afghan arms spending worrisome, we will be open to the charge that we have welched on our assurance that we would take the Symington amendment seriously.

Still, nothing is gained by immediate termination of technical assistance and food aid -- particularly when we want to move wheat. Symington has agreed that enforcement of his amendment should be a process of pressure, not a single rash act.

Our solution -- agreed to by Gaud and Battle -- is to send our Ambassador in with a strong speech on arms at the same time he delivers approval of the wheat deal. This is not a final answer, but it should make the Afghans think and it will give us a defensible line on the Hill.

You will want to read through Zwick's memorandum which is a concise summary of the problem and the proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve PL 480 package, with strong instruction to
our Ambassador _____

Disapprove ☒ _____

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-269
By cb, NARA Date 6-30-99

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAR 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate an \$8.2 million P. L. 480 agreement with Afghanistan (Tab A). The agreement would provide 90,000 tons of wheat and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil on 40-year dollar credit terms, with a 10-year grace period. To help the U.S. balance of payments, it would require that the first \$750,000 be paid over 10 months beginning on June 30.

The amount of wheat proposed for this agreement is quite generous in view of Afghanistan's recent good crop. However, I feel that it is warranted by our desire to move wheat and by the additional self-help leverage which we can get from a larger P. L. 480 program. This agreement would bring to \$12.5 million the amount of food aid provided in FY 1968. Our dollar aid is limited to technical assistance and is estimated at \$7.5 million this fiscal year.

Self-help. Afghanistan has taken a number of important steps to increase agricultural production, with a view to self-sufficiency in wheat and edible oil by the early 1970's. The last P. L. 480 agreement, signed in July, contained general self-help conditions designed to reinforce the Government's commitment to that goal. This agreement would require additional specific and sound measures, in particular (a) the establishment of a wheat price high enough to provide incentives to farmers, and (b) improvement of fertilizer distribution by turning it over to the private sector.

Military Expenditures. Afghanistan's military supply situation presents a particularly thorny problem. Although about half of its military hardware was provided under contracts concluded prior to 1961, the country's defense establishment is out of all proportion to its economic situation or any realistic appraisal of the current threat. Almost all of Afghanistan's military equipment has been supplied by the Soviets. The current inventory includes an estimated 335 tanks, 55 or more surface-to-air missiles, 250 anti-tank missiles, and 96 MIG fighters. (A background paper on military expenditures is attached at Tab B.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-269

By ct, NARA Date 6-30-99

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2

In spite of this situation Gaud feels, and I agree, that a close reading of the Symington amendment does not require you to make a finding that Afghan resources are being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with economic development. The rationale for this approach is essentially two-fold:

- Since three-fourths of the equipment is provided on a grant basis, actual expenditures amount to only about 20% of the budget and are not out of line with neighboring India and Pakistan.
- These expenditures in themselves probably do not unduly interfere with development. Lack of technical skills and workable institutions constitute a more serious bottleneck to Afghan development.

There are also two strong practical reasons for not invoking the Symington amendment now:

- Our aid program in Afghanistan helps to counterbalance a much larger Soviet presence. In 1963, King Zahir embarked upon an experiment in parliamentary democracy which probably would not have been possible without our influence and support.
- In Afghanistan as elsewhere, the Symington and Conte/Long amendments can be quite useful for purposes of persuasion, but they lose their utility once they are applied. Our relatively small aid program may not enable us to convince the Afghans to reduce their future defense expenditures in any event, but to precipitately cut off all U.S. assistance clearly would not achieve this objective.

On the other hand, I do not think we can simply conduct business as usual in the face of this problem. There is a reasonable chance that the U.S., by building on the dialogue which Ambassador Neumann has begun, can induce some restraint in the Afghan military budget. Moreover, if we ignore the spirit of the Symington amendment in Afghanistan, we lay ourselves open to charges on the Hill that we are not serious about its application and will not put any teeth into our policy anywhere in the world.

On balance, I recommend that we go ahead with this proposed P. L. 480 agreement, but that in negotiating it the State Department be instructed to make a vigorous effort, both here and through Ambassador

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Neumann in Afghanistan, to get across to the Afghans the following points, agreed to by Bill Gaud and Luke Battle:

- While we recognize that it is difficult for one country to pass judgment on the national security problems and military structure of another, it is our best judgment that Afghanistan's present military structure and expenditures need serious reexamination in the light of the present military threat and what we all know to be the country's economic needs.
- U.S. law now requires that we take future developments on this front fully into account in thinking about any further P. L. 480 assistance or dollar loans or continuation of our technical assistance program.
- We strongly urge Afghanistan to seek ways to reduce the burden of military expenditures upon its economy. The Afghan Government should know that, under present circumstances, increases in the defense budget or new contracts for additional military equipment will make it extremely difficult for us to provide assistance in the future.

Charles J. Zwirk
Charles J. Zwirk
Director

Attachments

Approve P. L. 480 sale _____; instruct
Ambassador and State Department to take
strong line with RGA _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 8 1968

21-1

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 90,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$8.2 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 2 percent interest during the 10 year grace period and $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent thereafter. However, in order to help defray U. S. Embassy expenditures in Afghanistan, we would provide for a currency use payment of \$750,000 to be converted into local currencies. Payment of the \$750,000 would be in 10 equal monthly installments (\$75,000) beginning June 30, 1968. The Department of State and the Treasury Department concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Title I, PL 480 Agreement signed with Afghanistan on July 19, 1967 provided for 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oils. These quantities were for the purpose of helping to meet Afghanistan's requirements during the first half of FY 1968 following a year of drought. Afghanistan continues to need imports to cover second half FY 1968 and part of FY 1969 requirements. The PL 480 wheat and vegetable oil imports will be used mainly to fill the needs of the urban areas.

Self-help

The Government of Afghanistan is undertaking to improve its production, storage and distribution of agricultural commodities in accordance with the self-help conditions outlined in the July 19, 1967 Agreement. In addition to these, the new agreement we propose would provide for the Royal Government of Afghanistan taking strong steps to:

1. Establish an incentive pricing policy for wheat at levels sufficient to enable farmers to purchase fertilizer, improved seed and other inputs, and adopt improved production practices.
2. Bring fertilizer imports and distribution, now handled by the government, into the private sector.
3. Improve administrative arrangements and personnel management for agricultural development, giving serious consideration to the recommendations made by the United States Agricultural Review Team.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-275
By CB, NARA Date 6-30-99

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2

Symington Amendment

Our findings pursuant to the requirements of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, are included in an attachment to this memorandum.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

January 26 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

215

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ATTACHMENT

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P. L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN PER SECTION 620(s) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED.

Afghan defense expenditures have remained stable in recent years. According to the best available statistics, which in Afghanistan must be regarded as less than averagely reliable, the percentages of actual expenditures for defense in the Government budget were 19.2 and 20.5 in Afghan fiscal years 1965/66 and 1966/67 respectively. This is a slightly smaller percentage than other countries in the region. Published budget figures for Afghan FY 1967/68 indicate that 19.1 percent has been allocated for military purposes. In constant dollar prices, (base year 1965), expenditures are estimated at \$11.8 million in 1966; \$11.0 million in 1967; and \$10.7 million in 1968. No reliable GNP data is available in Afghanistan; the budget for 1969 should be published within a month but is not yet available.

Afghanistan's military equipment and advisors are almost all supplied by the Soviet Union. The equipment supplied since 1956 by the USSR is estimated to be worth some \$226 million. \$167 million of this has been on a grant basis. Payments for Soviet military assistance (the non-grant part) are financed through barter trade arrangements and not through the use of free foreign exchange. The Afghan Government budgeted roughly \$7.3 million for these barter payments in 1965/66 and again in 1966/67. \$7.3 million is arrived at by using an exchange rate of 55 Afs to the dollar because of arrangements with the USSR (in comparison with 75 Afs in other budget calculations). This reduces the \$7.3 million to roughly \$5.3 million in terms of the budget. Moreover an unknown portion of this amount is being held in reserve and not spent. The amount actually spent is included in the overall defense expenditures described above. The major barter items have been raw cotton, wool, oilseeds and dried fruits and nuts. Many of these goods have little market for convertible foreign exchange either because of low quality or high transportation costs.

Government development investment has declined over the last three years primarily as a result of a decline in foreign economic assistance and restrictive fiscal policies, suggested by the IMF and supported by A.I.D., aimed at reducing deficit financing. Domestic revenue collection during this period has remained relatively stable. The quality of Afghan development efforts has improved and the Government now is devoting resources to activities which have a faster return in contrast to the former practice of emphasizing heavy infrastructure projects. The real deterrents to more rapid economic growth are lack of technical skills and institutional shortcomings. As far as the use of skilled manpower is concerned, the military establishment uses little skilled manpower and this would not be affected in a major way

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-275
By CB, NARA Date 6-30-99

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2

by reduction of military expenditures.

The U. S. has urged the Afghan Government to make reductions in defense outlays and in a recent conversation on this subject a high official with the foreign office said that the Defense budget for next year would not be increased. On February 13 Ambassador Neumann discussed defense spending with the Prime Minister and reported that the Prime Minister had been fully briefed on our concern in this regard. The Ambassador noted that the top officials of the RGA are now apprised of the legislation and its intent and are aware of the implications of their Government's future military expenditures and arms purchases in the light of concern about defense expenditures.

From the Afghan point of view, military expenditures can be considered to be within reasonable bounds for a society that is at once poor but feels insecure in face of an internal threat, i.e., the divisive tendencies of a largely tribal society and what it considers to be a possible external threat, notably from a stronger Pakistan.

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21K

ATTACHMENT

Military Expenditure Review

State/A.I.D. has concluded that neither U.S. development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, nor PL 480 sales are being diverted to military expenditures and that Afghanistan resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Afghan development.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-275

By cb, NARA Date 6-30-99

21-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Mr. John P. Hummon
Executive Secretary
AID - Room 5942
Department of State

SUBJECT: PL 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

In authorizing the PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan, the President instructed that Ambassador Neumann present the package in Kabul with a strong lecture on Afghan arms spending and the Symington Amendment.

The specific points Ambassador Neumann should get across (agreed to by Messrs. Gaud and Battle and approved by the President) are as follows:

1. While we recognize that it is difficult for one country to pass judgment on the national security problems and military structure of another, it is our best judgment that Afghanistan's present military structure and expenditures need serious reexamination in the light of the present military threat and what we all know to be the country's economic needs.
2. U.S. law now requires that we take future developments on this front fully into account in thinking about any further P.L. 480 assistance or dollar loans or continuation of our technical assistance program.
3. We strongly urge Afghanistan to seek ways to reduce the burden of military expenditures upon its economy. The Afghan Government should know that, under present circumstances, increases in the defense budget or new contracts for additional military equipment will make it extremely difficult for us to provide assistance in the future.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By JK/8, NARA, Date 12-14-05

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

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Dispatched 4/2/68

Repts nos. 99-100

MEMORANDUM

46

22

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Informal Working Visit of Prime Minister
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

You will recall that several months ago you agreed to an informal working visit for the Prime Minister of Afghanistan sometime in November of this year.

A few weeks ago the Prime Minister proposed a meeting in Washington for late October to fit with a visit he is making to Western Europe. We indicated that the election would make this date impossible.

We now propose a one or two-day visit during the period November 21-23. If you approve, we can firm up the arrangements here and the Prime Minister can fix his own plans. Thanksgiving is November 24.

Walt R.

Approve _____

What about Chile?
in Nov

See me _____

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Authority NLS 87-200

By per isp, NARA, Date 10-4-91

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

July 22, 1966

Date

BY ju ON 10-3-91

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Haw
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Kabul.

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 JUL 23 AM 9 38

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION: Amembassy KABUL

STATE

LIMDIS

REF: Embtel 215

Assume reftel means we should propose date Primin visit. We would like
propose he come Washington for one or two days during period November
21 - 23.

END

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.4
By *jc/g*, NARA, Date 12-14-05

NEA/PAF:FESchmeiser

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NEA - William J. Handley

G - Mr. Low

S/S -

S/CPR - Mr. King

White House -

NEA/PAF - Mr. Spain

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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JULY 14

REF: STATE 5410

LIMDIS

I ADVISED PRIMIN HIS VISIT WASHINGTON IMPOSSIBLE
BEFORE NOV 7. HE UNDERSTOOD FULLY AND SAID HE WOULD
AWAIT SETTING UP OF DATE LATER IN NOVEMBR, GP-3, 7 STEEVES
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By *gdy* NARA Date *12-14-05*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

23~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1966

TO: W. W. R.

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Informal working visit of Prime Minister
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan, Request #2.

Further to my memorandum to the President of July 25th (copy attached) regarding dates for this visit, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, has proposed a Washington visit of November 21-23. Prior to that he hopes to visit Germany of November 13-19.

The November 21-23 dates are the ones we proposed to the President in our July 25th memorandum.

Could we not now tell the State Department that, while we cannot yet confirm the November 21-23 dates, we can inform Kabul that these are the tentative dates we are presently setting aside for Maiwandwal's visit.

I am sure that if we could make a firm commitment promptly, it would be appreciated at Kabul and in Germany.

Att: cy of memo to Pres., July 25, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By jc/ny NARA, Date 12-14-05

CONFIDENTIAL

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Informal Working Visit of Prime Minister
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

You will recall that several months ago you agreed to an informal working visit for the Prime Minister of Afghanistan sometime in November of this year.

A few weeks ago the Prime Minister proposed a meeting in Washington for late October to fit with a visit he is making to Western Europe. We indicated that the election would make this date impossible.

We now propose a one or two-day visit during the period November 21-23. If you approve, we can firm up the arrangements here and the Prime Minister can fix his own plans.

W. W. R.

Approve _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 87-200

By per iap NARA, Date 10-4-91



13996

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
September 2, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: Request for Afghan Princess to Call on
Mrs. Johnson

Princess Aliya, sister of the Queen of Afghanistan and now in Washington with her husband Prince Ghazi, has indicated a desire to call briefly on Mrs. Johnson. The Princess will be in Washington through Friday, September 10. A brief biographic sketch of the Princess is enclosed.

The American Ambassador enjoys excellent personal relations with the King of Afghanistan who exercises very considerable power in Afghanistan. These relations continue to be an important asset in promoting United States objectives in that strategically located land. The Department believes that a brief call by the Princess on Mrs. Johnson would be a very helpful contribution to improving our relations with the Royal family.

If this request for a call on Mrs. Johnson is granted, we would hope that Mrs. Majid, the wife of the Afghan Ambassador; Mrs. William J. Handley, wife of the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and an interpreter could also be present.

The Princess is not expected to raise any matters of substance.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch of Princess Aliya

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *gls*, NARA, Date 12-14-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Princess Aliya of Afghanistan

Princess Aliya is a sister of Queen Homaria of Afghanistan who paid a State visit to the United States in 1963. The Princess is in Washington with her husband, Prince Sultan Mahmud Ghazi, a cousin of King Mohammed Zahir Shah and President of the Afghan Air Authority. The Prince is here as a guest of the Department of State under the Department's Leader Grant program.

The Princess is about 37 years of age. She was educated in Kabul, Switzerland and Canada. She has four children, one son and three daughters, all of whom reside in Kabul; the youngest is only 15 months old. The Princess speaks some French but no English.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jcl/g NARA, Date 12-14-05

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25

April 19, 1967


WALT -

I gather the President wants to chat about Afghanistan PL 480 wheat and oil.

Ambassador Neumann has come in several times since his return. The price situation in Kabul continues to worsen and Neumann urges immediate action if at all possible. He argues that a prompt decision by us will help roll back flour prices, which have reached record highs in Kabul. Some holders of stocks can't be persuaded to release their holdings until a firm U.S. commitment is made public as a source of eventual replenishment of the national supply.

BoB reviewed Agriculture's self-help measures with care before approving the AID/Agriculture memorandum.

I think it puts the President in a bad light if he appears to hold up food because a Prime Minister from a little country up against the Soviet Union answers Press Club queries in a way to annoy us.


Howard Wriggins

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jclg, NARA, Date 12-14-05



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

S/S-4311

March 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Hotaki Case

Abdul Latif Hotaki is an Afghan living in California who has made charges which could embarrass us and the Afghan Government during the visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal.

Hotaki worked for USIA in Afghanistan before coming to the United States in 1957 under AID's training program. He did not complete his study program, but became Vice President of the Afghan Student Association (ASA). He married an American citizen and has two children. Since he had lost his status as a student, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings in 1965. Hotaki's father-in-law appealed to Congressman Reinecke of California for assistance in obtaining a hardship waiver that would in effect stay the deportation. However, it appeared shortly thereafter that Hotaki had separated from his wife and children, and neither the Department of State nor the Afghan Embassy supported this or a subsequent waiver request. Hotaki consequently faced deportation on February 21, 1967.

In what appears to have been a desperate effort to stave off deportation, Hotaki taped a TV interview on February 20 with station KTTV in Los Angeles. The tape was subsequently screened on the Lomax show from KTTV on February 26. It included charges that:

- (1) the regime of Prime Minister Daud was overthrown in 1963 by the CIA;
- (2) that Prime Minister Maiwandwal is a CIA puppet;

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Authority *NIA-001R 488.002/6*
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-2-14*

- (3) that Hotaki's deportation from the U.S. was being pressed because the CIA wanted to use Hotaki as an agent in Afghanistan;
- (4) that the Department of State, bowing to Afghan Embassy pressure, had turned down a request that a waiver be issued that would permit Hotaki to stay on in the U.S. with his wife and children; and
- (5) that a Foreign Service Reserve Officer now in Tehran and a former Afghan student here, now an official of the Afghan Ministry of Finance, are CIA agents (Hotaki gave the names of both persons) and that the ASA is a CIA front supported by the Asia Foundation and the American Friends of the Middle East.

Hotaki's lawyer obtained a writ on February 21 which stopped the deportation until the case could be reviewed by a Federal Court, and Congressman Reinecke again requested a waiver. Elements of the Department of State who were unaware of Hotaki's TV charges acceded to the Congressman's request and Hotaki's lawyer was told a waiver would be forthcoming, whereupon he withdrew his request for judicial review. Since it had by then become apparent that Hotaki had reunited with his wife and children and to withdraw the waiver would have appeared punitive, the deportation proceedings have been dropped and Hotaki is now a resident alien on his way to becoming a citizen.

The Hotaki story has spread fairly widely through the Afghan community in the United States, but has not been picked up yet by the press or by TV outside California. We understand, however, that Ramparts magazine has interviewed Mr. Ishaq Sharyar, President of the ASA, and that a story may be published in its next issue due out about March 28, the day that the Prime Minister arrives in Washington. The Afghan Embassy and the Prime Minister have prior

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3.

knowledge of Mr. Hotaki as a troublesome student. The Embassy has been consulting with us in an attempt to keep the Hotaki case within tolerable limits in advance of the Prime Minister's visit and has informed the Foreign Ministry in Kabul of the case. We have suggested to Ambassador Neumann that he have a low key discussion of the case with the Prime Minister to make sure that he is aware of the problem and to avoid recrimination should the story break out in one way or another while the Prime Minister is here.


Benjamin H. Reed
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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1967 MAR 13 AM 11 45

Afghanistan ^{26a}
(Hataki)

SECRET

March 10, 1967

Walt -

There is a potentially messy situation arising in California regarding an Afghan student who has allegedly spilled some beans to Ramparts and a local TV station about contacts CIA had with him. He is alleging Prime Minister Maiwandwal was put in power by the US.

I doubt if this will blow this weekend. I will have a detailed report for you on Monday. If you need details sooner, Jim Spain in State knows all about it.

Howard Wiggins

cc: Bromley Smith

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLJ 001 R 116.002/7
By jc, NARA, Date 1-2-14

~~Miss. Booth 27
to notify BOB
that memo is
now approved~~

Called Miss Fredley
1345 4/23/68 RB

Cy Yurich's memo sent to
BOB on 4/29/68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 #548By jcNARA, Date 12-1-04

ACTION

27a

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, April 22, 1968

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MR. PRESIDENT:

We have had a serious failure in communicating your decision on the attached PL 480 package for Afghanistan. As the note indicates, Miss Nivens telephoned, as is usual, your decision to the staff member working the area, Roger Morris, who was acting in Ed Hamilton's absence. He heard her relay of your decision as "approved" rather than "disapproved."

He communicated the decision, as is usual, to State which notified our man in Kabul.

We discovered the mistake a few days later and flashed Kabul (Tab C) but it was too late to catch our Ambassador before he had (1) delivered the lecture on military spending (reporting cable at Tab D), and (2) delivered the news that we were ready to go ahead with the PL 480 deal (Tab E).

Thus, due to our error, I am afraid there will be some broken crockery if we back out now.

We have two choices:

- The President can withdraw our offer to make this agreement on the grounds that the Symington Amendment is not being complied with;
- or we can accept the consequences of our error and let the PL 480 package go through.

As you can see from the cable at Tab D, our Ambassador believes that his lecture on military spending has begun a serious rethinking of the Afghan military budget. He would certainly argue that cutting off the food aid now would be self-defeating. It would also cast doubt on our \$8.2 million AID program in Afghanistan, since the Symington Amendment leaves the President no leeway once he decides that aid should be terminated because a country is spending too much on defense.

To assure that this will not happen again, I have made arrangements that all decisions will be communicated twice: to the relevant member of my staff; and to the Secretariat at the Department of State

Proceed to withdraw offer on _____ Let PL 480 deal proceed _____ Call me _____
Symington Amendment grounds _____

REFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

27-2



MEMORANDUM

ACTION

27-c

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, March 29, 1968 -- 10:30 AM

3/29/68
Regor memo
notified
re

Rec'd
12:07 p

SECRET

Mr. President:

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud, and Zwick recommend a \$8.2 million PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan (90,000 tons of wheat; 6,000 tons of vegetable oil.)

This is routine except for the serious problem posed by the Symington amendment and the fact that the Russians have armed the Afghans to the teeth. It is fair to say that if we don't find Afghan arms spending worrisome, we will be open to the charge that we have welched on our assurance that we would take the Symington amendment seriously.

Still, nothing is gained by immediate termination of technical assistance and food aid -- particularly when we want to move wheat. Symington has agreed that enforcement of his amendment should be a process of pressure, not a single rash act.

Our solution -- agreed to by Gaud and Battle -- is to send our Ambassador in with a strong speech on arms at the same time he delivers approval of the wheat deal. This is not a final answer, but it should make the Afghans think and it will give us a defensible line on the Hill.

You will want to read through Zwick's memorandum which is a concise summary of the problem and the proposal.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 96-269 (#21c)

By gchap NARA. Date 12-2-04

W. Rostow

Approve PL 480 package, with strong instruction to our Ambassador _____

Disapprove ☒ _____

Call me _____

See note on 3rd page of Budget memo - re reverse decision.

Cy to Ora Simmons 4/17
(3/27 Budget memo only)

Cy, showing added note re P's decision, sent to Ora Simmons on 4/29/68

SECRET

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1109-A

27-d

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAR 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate an \$8.2 million P. L. 480 agreement with Afghanistan (Tab A). The agreement would provide 90,000 tons of wheat and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil on 40-year dollar credit terms, with a 10-year grace period. To help the U.S. balance of payments, it would require that the first \$750,000 be paid over 10 months beginning on June 30.

The amount of wheat proposed for this agreement is quite generous in view of Afghanistan's recent good crop. However, I feel that it is warranted by our desire to move wheat and by the additional self-help leverage which we can get from a larger P. L. 480 program. This agreement would bring to \$12.5 million the amount of food aid provided in FY 1968. Our dollar aid is limited to technical assistance and is estimated at \$7.5 million this fiscal year.

Self-help. Afghanistan has taken a number of important steps to increase agricultural production, with a view to self-sufficiency in wheat and edible oil by the early 1970's. The last P. L. 480 agreement, signed in July, contained general self-help conditions designed to reinforce the Government's commitment to that goal. This agreement would require additional specific and sound measures, in particular (a) the establishment of a wheat price high enough to provide incentives to farmers, and (b) improvement of fertilizer distribution by turning it over to the private sector.

Military Expenditures. Afghanistan's military supply situation presents a particularly thorny problem. Although about half of its military hardware was provided under contracts concluded prior to 1961, the country's defense establishment is out of all proportion to its economic situation or any realistic appraisal of the current threat. Almost all of Afghanistan's military equipment has been supplied by the Soviets. The current inventory includes an estimated 335 tanks, 55 or more surface-to-air missiles, 250 anti-tank missiles, and 96 MIG fighters. (A background paper on military expenditures is attached at Tab B.)

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Authority ERUS 64-68, 10/25, 547
By *jc* NARA, Date 12-1-04

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In spite of this situation Gaud feels, and I agree, that a close reading of the Symington amendment does not require you to make a finding that Afghan resources are being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with economic development. The rationale for this approach is essentially two-fold:

- Since three-fourths of the equipment is provided on a grant basis, actual expenditures amount to only about 20% of the budget and are not out of line with neighboring India and Pakistan.
- These expenditures in themselves probably do not unduly interfere with development. Lack of technical skills and workable institutions constitute a more serious bottleneck to Afghan development.

There are also two strong practical reasons for not invoking the Symington amendment now:

- Our aid program in Afghanistan helps to counterbalance a much larger Soviet presence. In 1963, King Zahir embarked upon an experiment in parliamentary democracy which probably would not have been possible without our influence and support.
- In Afghanistan as elsewhere, the Symington and Conte/Long amendments can be quite useful for purposes of persuasion, but they lose their utility once they are applied. Our relatively small aid program may not enable us to convince the Afghans to reduce their future defense expenditures in any event, but to precipitately cut off all U.S. assistance clearly would not achieve this objective.

On the other hand, I do not think we can simply conduct business as usual in the face of this problem. There is a reasonable chance that the U.S., by building on the dialogue which Ambassador Neumann has begun, can induce some restraint in the Afghan military budget. Moreover, if we ignore the spirit of the Symington amendment in Afghanistan, we lay ourselves open to charges on the Hill that we are not serious about its application and will not put any teeth into our policy anywhere in the world.

On balance, I recommend that we go ahead with this proposed P. L. 480 agreement, but that in negotiating it the State Department be instructed to make a vigorous effort, both here and through Ambassador

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Neumann in Afghanistan, to get across to the Afghans the following points, agreed to by Bill Gaud and Luke Battle:

- While we recognize that it is difficult for one country to pass judgment on the national security problems and military structure of another, it is our best judgment that Afghanistan's present military structure and expenditures need serious reexamination in the light of the present military threat and what we all know to be the country's economic needs.
- U.S. law now requires that we take future developments on this front fully into account in thinking about any further P. L. 480 assistance or dollar loans or continuation of our technical assistance program.
- We strongly urge Afghanistan to seek ways to reduce the burden of military expenditures upon its economy. The Afghan Government should know that, under present circumstances, increases in the defense budget or new contracts for additional military equipment will make it extremely difficult for us to provide assistance in the future.

Charles J. Zwisch
Charles J. Zwisch
Director ✓

Attachments

Approve P. L. 480 sale _____; instruct
Ambassador and State Department to take
strong line with RGA _____

Disapprove ✓ _____

N.B.: The Disapprove decision was made on
March 29, 1968. On April 23, 1968
the President reversed his decision
and agreed.

~~SECRET~~

27-2



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27-f

MAR 6 1968

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 90,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$8.2 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 2 percent interest during the 10 year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. However, in order to help defray U. S. Embassy expenditures in Afghanistan, we would provide for a currency use payment of \$750,000 to be converted into local currencies. Payment of the \$750,000 would be in 10 equal monthly installments (\$75,000) beginning June 30, 1968. The Department of State and the Treasury Department concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Title I, PL 480 Agreement signed with Afghanistan on July 19, 1967 provided for 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oils. These quantities were for the purpose of helping to meet Afghanistan's requirements during the first half of FY 1968 following a year of drought. Afghanistan continues to need imports to cover second half FY 1968 and part of FY 1969 requirements. The PL 480 wheat and vegetable oil imports will be used mainly to fill the needs of the urban areas.

Self-help

The Government of Afghanistan is undertaking to improve its production, storage and distribution of agricultural commodities in accordance with the self-help conditions outlined in the July 19, 1967 Agreement. In addition to these, the new agreement we propose would provide for the Royal Government of Afghanistan taking strong steps to:

1. Establish an incentive pricing policy for wheat at levels sufficient to enable farmers to purchase fertilizer, improved seed and other inputs, and adopt improved production practices.
2. Bring fertilizer imports and distribution, now handled by the government, into the private sector.
3. Improve administrative arrangements and personnel management for agricultural development, giving serious consideration to the recommendations made by the United States Agricultural Review Team.

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Authority NLJ 96-275 (s21e)

By JLCB NARA, Date 12-2-04

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
Symington Amendment

Our findings pursuant to the requirements of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, are included in an attachment to this memorandum.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

January 26 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Attachment


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ATTACHMENT

Military Expenditure Review

State/A.I.D. has concluded that neither U.S. development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, nor PL 480 sales are being diverted to military expenditures and that Afghanistan resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Afghan development.

279



27-2

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Authority NLJ 96-275 (#21f)

ATTACHMENT

By JCS NARA, Date 12-2-04

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P. L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN PER SECTION 620(s) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED.

Afghan defense expenditures have remained stable in recent years. According to the best available statistics, which in Afghanistan must be regarded as less than averagely reliable, the percentages of actual expenditures for defense in the Government budget were 19.2 and 20.5 in Afghan fiscal years 1965/66 and 1966/67 respectively. This is a slightly smaller percentage than other countries in the region. Published budget figures for Afghan FY 1967/68 indicate that 19.1 percent has been allocated for military purposes. In constant dollar prices, (base year 1965), expenditures are estimated at \$11.8 million in 1966; \$11.0 million in 1967; and \$10.7 million in 1968. No reliable GNP data is available in Afghanistan; the budget for 1969 should be published within a month but is not yet available.

Afghanistan's military equipment and advisors are almost all supplied by the Soviet Union. The equipment supplied since 1956 by the USSR is estimated to be worth some \$226 million. \$167 million of this has been on a grant basis. Payments for Soviet military assistance (the non-grant part) are financed through barter trade arrangements and not through the use of free foreign exchange. The Afghan Government budgeted roughly \$7.3 million for these barter payments in 1965/66 and again in 1966/67. \$7.3 million is arrived at by using an exchange rate of 55 Afs to the dollar because of arrangements with the USSR (in comparison with 75 Afs in other budget calculations). This reduces the \$7.3 million to roughly \$5.3 million in terms of the budget. Moreover an unknown portion of this amount is being held in reserve and not spent. The amount actually spent is included in the overall defense expenditures described above. The major barter items have been raw cotton, wool, oilseeds and dried fruits and nuts. Many of these goods have little market for convertible foreign exchange either because of low quality or high transportation costs.

Government development investment has declined over the last three years primarily as a result of a decline in foreign economic assistance and restrictive fiscal policies, suggested by the IMF and supported by A.I.D., aimed at reducing deficit financing. Domestic revenue collection during this period has remained relatively stable. The quality of Afghan development efforts has improved and the Government now is devoting resources to activities which have a faster return in contrast to the former practice of emphasizing heavy infrastructure projects. The real deterrents to more rapid economic growth are lack of technical skills and institutional shortcomings. As far as the use of skilled manpower is concerned, the military establishment uses little skilled manpower and this would not be affected in a major way

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by reduction of military expenditures.

The U. S. has urged the Afghan Government to make reductions in defense outlays and in a recent conversation on this subject a high official with the foreign office said that the Defense budget for next year would not be increased. On February 13 Ambassador Neumann discussed defense spending with the Prime Minister and reported that the Prime Minister had been fully briefed on our concern in this regard. The Ambassador noted that the top officials of the RGA are now apprised of the legislation and its intent and are aware of the implications of their Government's future military expenditures and arms purchases in the light of concern about defense expenditures.

From the Afghan point of view, military expenditures can be considered to be within reasonable bounds for a society that is at once poor but feels insecure in face of an internal threat, i.e., the divisive tendencies of a largely tribal society and what it considers to be a possible external threat, notably from a stronger Pakistan.

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27-2





Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 148514

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DRAFTED BY: NEA: PAF: FCPRESCOTT: JHSPAIN
APPROVED BY: NEA/PAF: JAMES W SPAIN
WHITE HOUSE: ROGER MORRIS (SUBSTANCE)
AID/NESA: ERIC GRIFFEL (SUBS)

Z 172243Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KABUL FLASH

SECRET STATE 148514

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 142540

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

ESSENTIAL THAT YOU HOLD OFF ALL PUBLICITY AND ANY APPROACH TO
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ON PL 480 AGREEMENT AUTHORIZED REFTEL UNTIL
FURTHER NOTICE. NEW INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW ASAP. GP-3. RUSK

Afghanistan
PL 480 memo
hold OFF

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E.O. 13526, 13527
By jcl/12.14.05

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27-K





Department of State

SAVE for EKH
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27-4 7
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PAGE 01 KABUL 03775 300942Z

14

ACTION AID 30

INFO NEA 13,SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,CIAE 00,E 15,NSC 10,RSC 01,
SC 01,SP 02,SS 20,STR 08,L 03,H 02,GPM 03,COM 08,FRB 02,INR 07,
NSAE 00,TRSY 08,XMB 06,AGR 20,P 04,IGA 02,RSR 01,MC 01,GDP 01,
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O 300845Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5182

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KABUL 3775

DELIVER OPENING BUSINESS SATURDAY, MARCH 30

SUBJECT: CONTE-LONG AND SYMINGTON AMENDMENTS

1. DURING COURSE OF LONG CONVERSATION MARCH 26 WITH PRIMIN ETEMADI, DIRECTOR GENERAL POL AFFAIRS FARHADI, AMBASSADOR AND SPAIN, LATTER EXPLAINED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL BACKGROUND OF, AND CURRENT WASHINGTON ACTIONS ON, CONTE-LONG AND SYMINGTON AMENDMENTS. SPAIN STRONGLY EMPHASIZED VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF US AND RGA WORKING TOGETHER TO MEET OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS OF AMENDMENTS IF AID TO AFGHANISTAN WERE TO CONTINUE. BOTH PRIMIN AND FARHADI LISTEND WITH GREAT CARE AND APPEARED FULLY UNDERSTAND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS VIEWING REQUIREMENTS OF AMENDMENTS.

2. ON COMPLETION PRESENTATION ETEMADI QUERIED ABOUT STATUS OF CURRENT PL480 LOAN, EMPHASIZING THAT WHEAT WAS STILL NECESSARY.

PAGE 2 RUQTKB 3775 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EVEN THOUGH GOOD CROP WAS EXPECTED. IN REPLY SPAIN SAID THAT EARLIER PROBLEMS OF TERMS, TIMING, AND THE NEED FOR WHEAT HAD BEEN RESOLVED BUT SYMINGTON AMENDMENT WAS STILL ROADBLOCK AT TIME HE HAD LEFT WASHINGTON. HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS SOME HOPE

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Authority NIJ 001R-116-28
By OP, NARA, Date 10/5/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 KABUL 03775 300942Z

PRESENT PL480 LOAN WOULD RECEIVE FINAL APPROVAL, BUT IN VIEW OF AMENDMENTS, AND VERY REAL CONCERN IN US INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF CONGRESS OVER EXCESSIVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, HE DOUBTED THAT ANOTHER PL480 LOAN COULD BE JUSTIFIED AND WAS VERY CONCERNED OVER CONTINUANCE OF AID PROGRAM ITSELF. SPAIN REITERATED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL ESTABLISH DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS OF MEETING INTENT AND REQUIREMENTS OF AMENDMENTS IF US WERE TO MAINTAIN MEANINGFUL PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

3. CONVERSATION THROUGHOUT WAS CORDIAL BUT IN VERY SERIOUS VEIN. ONLY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE BY PRIMIN, WHO GENERALLY TENDS BY NATURE TO KEEP HIS OWN COUNSEL, WAS THAT PROBLEMS CREATED BY AMENDMENTS

WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT EXPLAIN TO AFGHAN PARLIAMENT AND HE WAS CONCERNED HOW BEST TO HANDLE THIS AS WELL AS OTHER ISSUES.

4. NEXT DAY, MARCH 27, FARHADI TOLD SPAIN HE HAD SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WHOLE PROBLEM WITH PRIMIN WHO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD

PAGE3 RUQTKB ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FULLY PROBLEMS OF AMENDMENTS AND WISHED HE COULD HAVE BEEN MORE RESPONSIVE IN MEETING BUT DID NOT FEEL HE COULD DO SO AT THAT TIME. THEN, UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER PRIMIN'S INSTRUCTIONS, FARHADI PROCEEDED TO SAY THAT PRIMIN HAD STATED NO NEW PURCHASES OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WERE PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED. WHEN SPAIN ASKED FARHADI WHETHER PRIMIN HAD SAID THAT SPECIFICALLY, FARHADI REPLIED, "YES, HE DID. YOU MAY RELY ON IT." FARHADI WENT ON TO SAY HE WOULD WORK WITH EMBASSY TO CLARIFY FURTHER JOINT US-AFGHAN OBJECTIVES OF MINIMIZING BURDEN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ON DEVELOPMENT, GATHERING NECESSARY INFORMATION, AND SEEKING MODUS OPERANDI FOR HANDLING PROBLEM IN MONTHS AHEAD.

5. AMENDMENTS, OBJECTIVES, AND REQUIREMENTS ALSO EXPLAINED BY SPAIN IN SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH OTHER INFLUENTIAL AFGHANS SUCH AS PLANNING MINISTER HAMED. WE BELIEVE SOME KEY MEMBERS OF CABINET APPRECIATE NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ARE SLOWLY AND GINGERLY WORKING TOWARD THAT END. ALSO, IN RECENT MONTHS NUMBER OF OTHER INFLUENTIAL AFGHANS ADVISED TO US THEY HAVE BEEN THINKING ALONG SAME LINES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 KABUL 03775 300942Z

6° EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PRESENTATIONS WERE HIGHLY USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO OUR EARLIER EFFORTS IMPRESS UPON PRIMIN SERIOUSNESS

PAGE 4 RUQTKB 3775 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OF THESE AMENDMENTS. AFGHAN PRIDE AND PERSONAL STYLE OF ETEMADI, PLUS FEAR OF TAKING FIRM STAND ON MATTER WHICH WOULD AFFECT MILITARY WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL OF KING, PREVENTED PRIMIN FROM SPAKING OUT. HOWEVER, SURSEQUENT COMMENTS BY FARHADI INDICATE RGA DESIRES WORK WITH US ON THESE PROBLEMS. WE HAVE NO REASON QUESTION ACCURACY OF STATEMENT THAT NO ACQUISITION ADDITIONAL SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS CONTEMPLATED AND BELIEVE THAT REQUIREMENTS OF CONTE-LONG AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN MET FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR AND PROBABLY WELL INTO NEXT.

7° WE BELIEVE GOOD BASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON WHICH WE CAN WORK IN MONTHS AHEAD AND SEE SCENARIO FOR FUTURE SOMEWHAT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A° FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH IMPORTANT CABINET OFFICIALS SUCH AS DEPPRIMINS POPAL AND YAFTALI, KEY OFFICIALS AT SUB-MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AND POSSIBLY, IN INFORMAL WAY, WITH NUMBER INFLUENTIAL DEPUTIES AND PRIVATE CITIZENS.

B° COORDINATE WITH FARHADI AND OTHERS TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC RGA FUTURE PLANS WITH RESPECT TO ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

C° SPECIAL EFFORT BY OUR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TO ENSURE

PAGE 5 RUQTKB 3775 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION WE GOT IS CORRECT.

D° POSSIBLE APPROACH TO KING AND ONE OR TWO KEY MEMBERS OF ROYAL FAMILY AS SITUATION REQUIRES.
NEUMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27-M





File
Department of State

4/18/68

27-N

TELEGRAM

H

~~SECRET~~ 402

PAGE 01 KABUL 04072 180644Z

22

ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

P 180615Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5351

~~SECRET~~ KABUL 4072

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PENDING PL 480 TITLE ONE AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 148514

1. BEFORE RECEIPT REFTEL CCLURE HAD INFORMED MINISTERS OF PLANNING AND FINANCE THAT WE WERE NOW PREPARED PROCEED WITH PL 480 AGREEMENT AND COPIES OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT WERE TRANSMITTED BY EMBASSY WITH COVERING LETTER TO RGA MINISTRIES FINANCE, PLANNING AND ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES DEPARTMENT. WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT PLANNED ANY PUBLICITY PRIOR SIGNING OF AGREEMENT AND RGA HIGHLY UNLIKELY PUBLICIZE MERE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. WE WILL HOLD LINE ON FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH RGA ON AGREEMENT PENDING RECEIPT NEW INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE PROVIDED SOONEST.

GP-3

NEUMANN

Afghanistan

PL 480

Too Late!

BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINGERICH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENE
LEONHART
ROCHE
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jclg*, NARA, Date *12-14-05*

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APPROVED BY: S/S-O MR. GENQREAU

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0259

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TOGOV 33

FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

SPECIAL SUMMARY NUMBER FIVE

1. DEPLOYMENT OF THAI TROOPS - EMBASSY BANGKOK REPORTS THE THAI ARMY HAS AGREED TO DEPLOY 59 PERCENT OF ITS ADDITIONAL TROOP COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM IN JULY 1968 AND THE BALANCE IN JANUARY 1969. THESE DATES DEPEND UPON TIMELY RECEIPT OF EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR TRAINING. DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST

PAGE 2 RUEHC 74856 ~~TOP SECRET~~
INCREMENT WILL COINCIDE WITH THE START OF ROTATION OF THAI FORCES ALREADY IN VIETNAM.

2. THIEU'S LETTER TO HO (EXDIS SOURCE) - JAPANESE AMBASS-

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 74856

ADOR NAKAYAMA TOLD EMBASSY SAIGON AS HE LEFT FOR TOKYO THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO FINAL DECISION TO TRANSMIT PRESIDENT THIEU'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT HO. NAKAYAMA HAD TOLD THIEU HE SHOULD FEEL FREE TO USE OTHER CHANNELS, SUCH AS THE POPE. THE EMBASSY SAYS NAKAYAMA GAVE THE IMPRESSION HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT PLAY POSTMAN ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE SUCH A POSSIBILITY IF JAPAN'S SOUNDINGS INDICATE GREATER RECEPTIVENESS BY HANOI.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ001R-116-2-9
By SP NARA, Date 10/5/11

3. AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS - THE RESULTS OF SENATE ELECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA APPEAR TO SHOW A SURPRISINGLY STRONG TREND AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. EMBASSY CANBERRA NEVERTHELESS BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE UNDER NO SERIOUS PRESSURE TO CHANGE ITS BASIC DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE ANOTHER MATTER.

~~PAGE 3 RUEHC 74856 TOP SECRET~~

4. IRAN AND CENTO - AMBASSADOR MEYER SUGGESTS WE CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS IN THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE TO MAKE IT COMPATIBLE WITH TODAY'S REALITIES. HE BELIEVES THE IRANIANS WOULD MAINTAIN PRESENT LEVELS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AS LONG-RANGE INSURANCE BUT LACK INTEREST IN USING CENTO MACHINERY FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING. THE REGIONAL MEMBERS, NOT THE US, SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE FOR CHANGES.

5. SOVIET AID TO YEMEN - WE ARE CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF RENEWED SOVIET ARMS AID TO THE YEMENI REPUBLICANS. IT APPEARS THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE OVER A DOZEN FREIGHT FLIGHTS TO SANAA IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT ASSEMBLING OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AT SANAA AIRFIELD IS NOW GOING FORWARD.

6. GERMAN FORCE LEVELS - OUR NATO MISSION REPORTS GERMANY WILL NOT REDUCE FORCE LEVELS IN 1968 AND HAS PROMISED TO CONSULT WITH ITS ALLIES ABOUT FUTURE PLANS. THE MISSION BELIEVES THIS DECISION HELPS STABILIZE PRESENT DEFENSE EFFORTS AND REFLECTS THE IMPORTANCE THE GERMANS ATTACH TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ABOUT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 74856

~~PAGE 4 RUEHC 74856 TOP SECRET~~

THE INTERACTIONS OF GERMAN DECISIONS ON OUR OWN.

7. THE ATMOSPHERE IN ATHENS AND ANKARA - SPECIAL EMISSARY VANCE REPORTS THAT ATHENS REMAINS COOL AND DETERMINED AS WAR CLOUDS THICKEN, IN CONTRAST TO THE RAUCOUS WAR Hysteria WHICH PREVAILS IN ANKARA.

8. VANCE-CONSTANTINE MEETING - IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SPECIAL EMISSARY VANCE TOLD KING CONSTANTINE THAT THE US WOULD NOT HELP GREECE MILITARILY WERE SHE ATTACKED BY TURKEY BUT THAT WE WOULD LEAN AGAINST TURKEY WITH ALL OUR NONMILITARY WEIGHT. THE KING ALSO ASKED IF WE WOULD KEEP BULGARIA OFF GREECE'S BACK. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH A POTENTIAL GUERRILLA THREAT FROM GREEK ETHNICS IN BULGARIA. VANCE SAID THIS WAS MORE DIFFICULT AND WOULD ASK WASHINGTON.

9. VANCE'S EFFORTS TO CONTINUE - AFTER AN UNSATISFACTORY EARLIER MEETING ON NOVEMBER 25 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL, SPECIAL EMISSARY VANCE BLUNTLY TOLD CAGLAYANGIL,

~~PAGE 3 RUENH 74856 TOP SECRET~~

PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL AND PRESIDENT SUNAY THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, PROVIDED HE WAS ASSURED BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IT WOULD TAKE NO MILITARY ACTION WHILE HIS ACTIVITIES CONTINUED. SUNAY PROMPTLY PROVIDED THIS ASSURANCE.

10. TURKISH WAR PLANS - IF PEACE EFFORTS FAIL, AMBASSADOR HART BELIEVES THE TURKS WILL ATTEMPT A RAPID, "LIMITED" INVASION OF CYPRUS. THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF DESTROYING CYPRIOT INDEPENDENCE BUT, RATHER, OF RESTORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION. SHOULD THE TURKS SUCCEED RAPIDLY, GREEK INTERFERENCE MAY BE QUITE INADEQUATE AND HART THEREFORE SUGGESTS IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF HOW WE MIGHT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES LIMIT THE CONFLICT TO CYPRUS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 04 STATE 74856

11. COMMUNIST PARTIES TO MEET - EMBASSY PARIS REPORTS THAT THE NEWSPAPER HUMANITE ANNOUNCED ON NOVEMBER 25 THAT 18 COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO HOLD A CONSULTATIVE MEETING IN BUDAPEST IN FEBRUARY 1968. THE 18 INCLUDE ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL FROM LATIN AMERICA, MONGOLIA, SYRIA AND INDIA

~~PAGE 6 RUENH 74856 TOP SECRET~~

FROM THE NEAR EAST AND ASIS, BUT NONE FROM AFRICA.

12. CONGRESSMEN'S PROPOSED HANOI VISIT - EMBASSY BANGKOK HAS ASKED THE BRITISH TO TRANSMIT THE REQUEST OF CONGRESSMEN SCHWENGEL AND COWGER TO VISIT HANOI, EMPHASIZING THE CONGRESSMEN ARE ACTING IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY. THE CONGRESSMEN INTERPRET THE PHAM VAN DONG-TODD INTERVIEW AS A CHALLENGE TO GO TO HANOI. THEY BELIEVE FAILURE TO RESPOND WOULD IMPLY CONCERN FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY WITH AN IMPLICATION THEY ARE JOINING WITH HANOI IN DISPUTING OUR CLAIM THAT BOMBING IS LIMITED TO MILITARY TARGETS.

GP-1. RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

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26
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

29a

~~SECRET~~

April 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghan PL 480 Agreement

Secretary Freeman is ready to go ahead with the \$4.4 million wheat and oil agreement you mentioned to Prime Minister Maiwandwal. Sharply rising food prices have triggered demonstrations in Afghanistan over the past two weeks, and Ambassador Neumann recommends we go ahead as soon as possible. Maiwandwal has just returned and can make good political use of a go-ahead to dampen fears of shortages.

His one comment under pressure at the Press Club remains an isolated incident. His public statements on the rest of his tour were quite moderate. Now that a couple of weeks have elapsed, we should probably go ahead now unless you are strongly opposed.

Charlie Schultze's economic analysis is attached.

Approve _____

See me _____

✓ judgment v.
Call. Rich

Walt Rostow

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 #541By jc NARA, Date 12-1-04~~SECRET~~

Called Ora Simmons 4/45 5/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1256-A

29-6

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 15 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

In the attached memo, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a Title I P. L. 480 sales agreement with Afghanistan to provide 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oil valued at \$4.4 million. This brings the total for the year to \$8.1 million compared to an average of \$24 million per year for the past three years. Almost all of the previous P. L. 480 programs have been on a grant basis (Title II). This agreement's 40 year terms are now essentially the same as the terms on our AID loans to Afghanistan.

A serious drought reduced last summer's harvest about 220,000 tons, roughly 10 per cent, below normal levels. Wheat prices have risen 30 per cent since November; in some urban areas, 100 per cent, resulting in great political pressures on the government. The drought also resulted in animal deaths which sharply reduced the supply of edible fats.

Our strategy in the agricultural sector is to help Afghanistan achieve its goal of wheat self-sufficiency by 1972. To this end we anticipate reducing concessional P. L. 480 wheat by about 20,000 tons per year as we press increasingly hard on self-help.

Self-help

With a strong push from Secretary Freeman last summer, Afghanistan has undertaken some encouraging self-help steps:

- . The third five year plan allocates 30 per cent of the government budget to agriculture vs. 17 per cent in the second plan.
- . The FY 1967 agricultural development budget was increased 69 per cent over the 1966 budget.
- . Fertilizer imports were raised from a 1960-65 average of 4,000 tons to 10,000 in FY 1967 with 15,000 expected in FY 1968.
- . 825 tons of improved seeds under the AID program are being planted this year to improve wheat yields.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jc/hg NARA, Date 12.14.05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

While an encouraging start has been made, other steps will be needed. The U. S. agricultural assistance team which was discussed by the Prime Minister and Secretary Freeman is now being assembled and will leave in early summer. Their recommendations will further clarify what needs to be done.

In view of the pressing need for wheat and oil in Afghanistan and considering the concrete first steps taken toward raising agricultural production, I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the proposed agreement.

Charles F. Schmitt

Charles F. Schmitt
Director

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1256-A

29-c

APR 7 1967

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oil, of which the current market value is \$4.4 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 1 percent interest during the 10-year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation, as does the Treasury Department.

Afghanistan's Food Situation

Afghanistan is experiencing seriously reduced food supplies, especially in the urban sector, as a result of drought last summer. Precipitation in the mountains during the winter was late and inadequate, and the outlook for grain production this year is uncertain. The wheat crop harvested last summer was approximately 10 percent below the normal 2.2 million ton level. In the urban sector market supplies of wheat decreased to about 10,000 tons per month beginning last October, as compared with the normal average level of 11,000 tons monthly. Wheat prices country-wide have risen 30 percent since November, and in some urban areas these prices have doubled since last year.

Domestic production of animal and vegetable oils does not meet present market demand. The supply of edible animal fats has decreased because of the loss of animals resulting from drought conditions during the past two years. Consumer demand is also shifting to edible vegetable oils as a result of experience with U.S. oils imported under the 1965 sales agreement.

Self-Help

In 1965 the Afghan Government initiated an accelerated agricultural production program designed to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat by 1972. In supporting this program the Government has taken some important steps in the past year. It increased the Agriculture Ministry's FY 1967 development budget by 69 percent and tentatively approved a 25-30 percent shift of development resources during the Third Plan from agricultural capital projects to production programs. Additional budget funds were provided to support 43 agricultural students abroad during the next five years and to train in Afghanistan 250 additional extension workers.

Following last August's discussions with Secretary Freeman on the need for increasing production, an intensified wheat growing program was

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
By 17 NARA, Date 12/14/05

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2


launched with the object of rapidly boosting production in FY's 1967 and 1968. In carrying out this program the Ministry of Agriculture has imported 620 tons of improved seeds from Pakistan and Mexico and has obtained authority to import an additional 225 tons under an existing U.S. loan. 6,660 acres were planted with improved varieties last fall for seed harvest this summer. Fertilizer is a vital part of this program and last fall over 800 wheat/fertilizer demonstrations were made on farmers' lands. The Government has imported 10,500 tons of fertilizer for use during the 1966-67 planting season and is ordering 10,000 tons for use during next fall's planting. This contrasts with average annual fertilizer imports of only 4,000 tons from 1960 through 1965.

In this agreement we will require that the Government of Afghanistan:


- (1) Give highest priority to the development of agriculture during the Third Five Year Plan;
- (2) Continue the accelerated wheat production program which is designed to achieve self-sufficiency by 1972;
- (3) Give special attention to the findings of the proposed U.S. Agricultural Survey Team;
- (4) Press ahead in expanding adaptive research in the application of fertilizers and in the use of improved seeds;
- (5) Give special attention to the forthcoming recommendations of the TVA fertilizer survey team concerning use and distribution of fertilizer and consider ways of rapidly expanding domestic fertilizer consumption as preparation for the full exploitation of planned fertilizer production facilities;
- (6) Take steps to significantly increase the number and quality of students in agriculture at Kabul University;
- (7) Continue its present program to become self-sufficient in edible oil production by 1970.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Walt -

This is the
cable Jim Spain
mentioned on
Afghan food.

Hal

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

29-2

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9

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KAJAKAI AND WHEAT ANNOUNCEMENTS

1. IN MY 4209 IND PREVIOUS MESSAGES I URGED IMMEDIATE US ANNOUNCEMENT NEXT PL-480 WHEAT TRANCHE. *State would have Neumann tell Maiwandwal + let him judge when + how to announce.*
2. IN ENSUING DAYS FUROR CAUSED BY ALLEGATIONS OF AFGHAN STUDENT AGAINST CIA (HOTAKI CASE) HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY IN INTENSITY AS RESULT SPATE OF STRIDENT COMMENT IN LOCAL PRESS (KABUL 4365). PRIMIN'S BELATED CONFRONTATION WITH PARLIAMENT LIKELY OCCUR TUESDAY MAY 2. AT WHICH TIME PRIMIN WILL BE HARD PUT TO DEFEND HIS RECENT TRIP TO US AND INDEED VALUE US-AFGHAN TIES IN LIGHT SUSPICION CAST ON US MOTIVES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN BECAUSE OF HOTAKI CASE (KABUL 4322).
3. WE ARE WHISTLING IN THE DARK IF WE DO NOT FACE UP TO FACT THAT HOTAKI CASE HAS NOT ONLY SERIOUSLY JEAPORDIZED MAIWANDWAL GOVT BUT ALSO HAS CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL DETERIORATION IN US POSITION HERE. IN ONE WEEK MUCH OF PROFIT OF MAIWANDWAL VISIT HAS BEEN ERASED.

This is not ready yet. We are still within the 30 days we promised.

3. WE HAVE ONE ACTION WITHIN OUR POWER WHICH HOLDS SOME PROMISE OF HELPING RETRIEVE SITUATION. WE CAN AND SHOULD ANNOUNCE NEW PL-480 WHEAT SALE AND INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH KAJAKAI BEFORE PRIMIN'S APPEARANCE AT PARLIAMENT EXPECTED MAY 2. PRIMIN, THROUGH FARHADI, INFORMED DCM TODAY

THAT TIMELY ANNOUNCEMENTS WOULD BE IMMENSELY HELPFUL.

4. I STRONGLY URGE IMMEDIATE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THESE TWO EVIDENCES US COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN NOT BECAUSE WE WISH DEFEND MAIWANDWAL (HE MAY ALREADY BE PAST SAVING) BUT BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIAL WE OFFER PROOF OF DISINTERESTED US HELP AT MOMENT WHEN US UNDER HEAVY ATTACK AND SUSPICION FOR CARRYING OUT COVERT OPERATIONS OF "IMPERIALISTIC AND NEO-COLONIALIST" NATURE. NEUMANN

HANDLED 4/21/67 T-1

~~SECRET~~

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 #542

By *jc* NARA. Date 12-1-04

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS

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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KABUL IMMEDIATE
Amembassy RAWALPINDI IMMEDIATE

Info

STATE

NODIS

~~FOR KXXXXXX~~

FOR KABUL.

- 1./ New developments require Governor Harriman project earlier departure from Kabul November 26 in order meet pressing engagements in Europe. Therefore regretfully request you cancel plans for HIQ road dedication. ~~Governor~~ Governor is exploring possibility earlier departure from Pakistan November 25 in order spend as much time in Afghanistan as possible. In meantime, proceed with arrangements for Kabul program afternoon and evening November 25 set forth in previous messages.
2. FOR RAWALPINDI. Please retain maximum flexibility tentative program morning November 25 so as to allow for mid-morning departure to Kabul.

RUSK

Drafted by:

S/AH: DNewberry:hbs 11/11/67

Tel. Ext.

3304

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/AH - Daniel O. Newberry

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. O'Donohue

CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS

Classification

Friday, October 13, 1967

syf

FOR MRS. ROBERTS

Jaunita:

Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan is entering
Andrews Air Force Base Hospital tonight
for surgery. I recommend that the
President send the Prime Minister some
flowers or whatever is appropriate in these
cases. State agrees.

W. W. Rostow

RM/vmr

Approved in S
Approved by WH-Saunders
without change 6/19/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WH
S/S-5515

32

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: March 28, 1967
PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: The President's Conversation with
Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The President

Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Howard Wiggins, Executive Office of the President

Ambassador Symington, Chief of Protocol

Acting Assistant Secretary William J. Handley, NEA ~~AS~~

Ambassador Robert G. Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Country Director James W. Spain, Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs

Afghanistan

His Excellency Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, Prime Minister

His Excellency Abdullah Malikyar, Ambassador of Afghanistan

His Excellency Nur Ali, Minister of Commerce

Secretary Farhadi, Council of Ministers

Complete dist. made
in CMS 6/20/67

After the President and the Prime Minister joined the other members of the party, the Prime Minister thanked the President for the opportunity which his visit to the United States provided to renew old friendships.

Secretary Rusk noted that the Secretary General of the United Nations had just made public his proposal on Vietnam and that the USG had commented favorably on it. He added that he understood Hanoi's reaction was negative.

The President said he had discussed the announcement with the Prime Minister and told him of our disappointment at Hanoi's negative reaction. He said we had earlier consulted with our allies on the proposal and responded affirmatively. We had done this a dozen or so times in the past on other proposals. However, Hanoi's reaction to the Secretary General was that this was none of his business.

War is everybody's business, the President said, and the U.S. is prepared to consider anybody's suggestion for ending it. He said he had asked Mr. Rostow to check the time and manner of our consultations on U-Thant's latest proposal and that he wanted to show this data to the Prime Minister.

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Authority FRVS 64-68, vol. 25 #539

By JC NARA, Date 12-1-04

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-2-

The President added that he felt more strongly than ever that the people of Vietnam should be allowed to have free elections and that after that, if they wanted us out, we would be happy to leave. The money we are spending for bullets we would be happy to spend instead for bread. We would even be willing to help Ho Chi Minh.

He stressed, however, that we were not going to surrender or pull out of Vietnam, saying that if agreements were no good there, they were no good anywhere. He said we are still ready to go toward peace. Our answer is Yes. Hanoi's is still No.

The Prime Minister observed that the Secretary General is going abroad again and suggested that perhaps he would be having further consultations on Vietnam during his trip.

Secretary Rusk noted that U Thant had seen two North Vietnamese diplomats in Rangoon and thought it possible that those discussions had been taken into account in the Secretary General's present proposal. The Secretary told the Prime Minister that we knew of his interest in the cause of peace in Vietnam. He added he did not know whether or not the Prime Minister had any way to explore privately further moves; he remarked that he thought public approaches were not likely to get very far at the present time.

The Prime Minister agreed that public approaches were not apt to be effective and said that the rigid public stands which both sides have taken makes this difficult. He noted that Afghanistan has always stood by the April, 1964 recommendations of the seventeen non-aligned countries. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk as to how much attention the Vietnam problem attracted in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said that it attracted a good deal of attention and now that there is democracy in the country it was sometimes used by the politicians for their own purposes. He expressed his concern over the problem describing it as an explosive situation which he feared might escalate into a bigger danger.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT 31a

#5515

May 11, 1967

TO: Mr. Richard Moose
The White House

FROM: Jeanne Davis
Director
Secretariat Staff

The enclosed memcon of the President's conversation with Prime Minister Maiwandwal was prepared on March 28. Through an administrative mix-up it was not, however, sent to the White House for clearance.

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

#5515

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Executive Secretariat

May 11, 1967

TO: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Memorandum of Conversation between
the President and Afghan Prime Minister
Maiwandwal, March 28, 1967

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are sidelined
in blue.

This memorandum was drafted by
NEA/PAF - Mr. Spain and cleared by
the Secretary and NEA - Acting Assistant
Secretary Handley.

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: March 28, 1967
PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: The President's Conversation with
Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The President

Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Howard Wriggins, Executive Office of the President

Ambassador Symington, Chief of Protocol

Acting Assistant Secretary William J. Handley, NEA ~~AA~~

Ambassador Robert G. Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Country Director James W. Spain, Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs

Afghanistan

His Excellency Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, Prime Minister

His Excellency Abdullah Malikyar, Ambassador of Afghanistan

His Excellency Nur Ali, Minister of Commerce

Secretary Farhadi, Council of Ministers

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Authority ERUS 64-68 vol. 294539

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By J NARA, Date 12-1-04

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-2-

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 6, 1967

WALT -

We held up this farewell message to Maiwandwal (he leaves Sunday) until we could report a milder statement on Vietnam.

We told State not to badger him any further. But his statements yesterday in Chicago -- his first since leaving Washington -- were more restrained. We're using the attached to help balance the books with the President, since we'll still have to send up the PL 480 and other aid proposals.



Howard Wriggins

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment with;
Ambassador McConaughy who is returning to Taiwan
Ambassador Neumann, who is leaving for Kabul

The State recommends and I Concur that you ~~will~~ see
Ambassadors McConaughy and Neumann at the same time.

The interview need not take long--just time for a
handshake and photographs.

W.W. Rostow

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Will see McConaughy only

☐ Will see neumann only

☐ Speak to me

File 114 67
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Not Aint
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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F. Huggins
2 Ret.

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January 13, 1967

935 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request that Ambassador Neumann
Meet the President

Ambassador Neumann will be leaving to take up his duties in Afghanistan on the evening of Thursday, January 19. We recommend that the Ambassador have a brief meeting with the President before he leaves for Kabul.

A meeting with the President would be very helpful in view of the visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, announced for March 28-29. The Ambassador would like to be able to tell both the King and Prime Minister that the President had personally expressed pleasure to the Ambassador over the prospect of seeing the Prime Minister here in Washington. The meeting would also be appropriate since Ambassador Neumann comes into the Foreign Service as a public figure well known in California, particularly in academic and political circles.

Biographic material on Ambassador and Mrs. Neumann is enclosed.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Biographic material on
Ambassador and Mrs. Neumann

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1967 JAN 14 AM 10 04

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

34-6

NOVEMBER 14, 1966

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 268

ROBERT G. NEUMANN SWORN IN AS UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN

Robert Gerhard Neumann, of California, was sworn in today as United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Afghanistan. He succeeds Ambassador John M. Steeves, who is now Director General of the Foreign Service.

Born at Vienna, Austria on January 2, 1916, Mr. Neumann was educated at the University of Rennes (Diplome Superieur, 1936); Geneva School of International Studies (Diploma Consular Academy, 1937); University of Vienna (student, 1938); Amherst College (Master of Arts, 1940); and the University of Minnesota (Shevlin Fellow, 1939-1940; Doctor of Philosophy, 1946).

An instructor at State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wisconsin in 1941-43, Mr. Neumann served in the United States Army 1942-46. In the period 1946-47, he was a lecturer at the University of Wisconsin; during the years 1947-58, he held professorial posts at the University of California at Los Angeles. From 1959 until the time of his present nomination, Mr. Neumann served as Director, Institute of International and Foreign Studies at UCLA.

His other positions have included: Director, American Seminar Political, Economic and Social Sciences, Nice, France (1957); Chairman, International Relations Section, Town Hall (1956-62). He has been a Haynes Foundation Fellow (1950-51); Social Science Research Council Fellow (1950-51) and Fulbright Fellow, France (1954-55). In 1962, Mr. Neumann was Adviser to the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, American Delegation, NATO Ministerial Conference, Paris.

Mr. Neumann is the author of European and Comparative Government (Third Edition, 1960) and a contributor of articles in several journals. He was an editorial writer for the Los Angeles Times in 1952-59. In 1955, he was awarded an honorary medal by the University of Brussels; and was decorated with the Legion of Honor, France in 1957, and the officers cross, Order of Merit, (Federal Republic of Germany) in 1963.

Ambassador Neumann is married to the former Marlen Eldredge, and they have two sons: Ronald E. and Gregory W.

* * *

CURRICULUM VITAE - MARLEN E. NEUMANN (MRS. ROBERT G.)

Born, December 20, 1915, Miraj, India; American parents.

Education: B.A. Rollins College, Florida, 1936; M.A. in International Relations, Yale University, 1941; also Diploma from Geneva School of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, summers of 1936 and 1937; attended University of Grenoble, France, 1936-37.

Professional Experience: Private Secretary to Ruth Woodsmall, then General Secretary of World YWCA, on official trip to Orient and India 1938-39. Assistant Warden (Director) of YWCA Summer Conference Center, Ootacemund, India, summer 1938. Professional lecturer on India and International Problems, 1941-43; took over husband's courses in economics and political science at State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wis., 1942-43. Information and Liaison Officer, Department of State 1943-45, in Division called CI/L, later INI, handling international information program. Extension teacher, correspondence courses in American diplomatic history, Univ. of Wisconsin (1946-47) and U.C.L.A. (1949-50).

Volunteer Civic Activities: Helped to found League of Women Voters of Oshkosh, Wis. in 1942, President thereof 1942-43; Member of State Board, League of Women Voters of California, 1947-50 (director of State Fiscal Policy Study); Member of Board LWV of Los Angeles 1949-50. 52-54, 56-57, 61-62, (holding various assignments in program and administration, such as national items on UN, Foreign Economic Policy, or program coordinator, asst. to President, etc.); President, LWV of Los Angeles 1957-59; Consultant on Community Affairs, LWVLA 1959-60; State Board, LWV of California, Director of National UN Study 1962-64; Vice President 1964. LWV Delegate to Los Angeles Area Council of Non-Governmental Organizations Accredited to the United Nations, from 1952-54; Chairman of same 1956 and 1957. Los Angeles City Civil Service Commissioner, March 1958 to July 1961. Chairman, World Affairs Committee, Women's Division, L.A. Chamber of Commerce, 1958-62. Board of Directors, United Nations Assn. of Los Angeles, 1959--. Board of Directors Metropolitan Hearing Center, Los Angeles 1963-64. Women's Planning Committee, Japan International Christian University Foundation, 1963--. Member Chi Omega Sorority, St. Alban's Episcopal Church, UCLA Faculty Women's Club. President, United Nations Assn. of L.A. 1965-67. Member, Governor's Commission to investigate the Los Angeles Riots (McCone Commission) 1965

Languages: French, German, a touch of Spanish.

Listed in Who's Who of American Women; Who's Who in the West.

Author of various articles on Indian, American diplomatic history, and Religion, in Survey Graphic, YEAR, and Los Angeles Times.

Married: Husband is Professor of Political Science and Chairman, Atlantic and West European Program at UCLA. Two sons.

AFGHANISTAN

34d

American Ambassador: Robert G. Neumann

Capital: Kabul

Population: 14 million

King: His Majesty Mohammad Zaher Shah

Prime Minister: H.E. Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal

Country Ambassador: Dr. Abdul Majid

Economy: Primarily agricultural

AID: Since 1950 - PL 480 - \$350 million for
agricultural aid (\$111 m.); Loans (\$72 m.);
direct grants (\$166 m.); Asia Foundation
assistance; Peace Corps (now over 200 in
country)

ROBERT G. NEUMANN

AFGHANISTAN

34e

Born: Vienna, Austria - January 2, 1916
(naturalized citizen)

Education: Universities abroad; M.A. from
Amherst College 1940; University of
Minnesota (Shevlin Fellow, 1939-40), Doctor
of Philosophy, 1946.

Marital Status: Wife - 2 children.

Career: Field of education; Government service-
Adviser to Sec. DOD, International Security
Affairs; American Delegation, NATO Ministerial
Conference, Paris; Consultant, State
Department, S/P and EUR.

Author

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 29, 1967

SUBJECT: Afghan Prime Minister's Comment on His Talk
with the PresidentPARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal,
Prime Minister of Afghanistan
Mr. James W. Spain, Country Director, NEA/PAFCOPIES TO: Mr. Rostow (cc) - The White House
Mr. Wriggins (cc) - The White House
Mr. Handley (cc) - NEA
Mr. Maurice Williams (cc) - AID/NESA
Amenbassy, Kabul (cc)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRS 44-68.121.25 # 540
By jc NARA, Date 12-1-01

Before Prime Minister Maiwandwal's departure from Blair House today for his luncheon with the Secretary of State, I had the opportunity to ask him for his understanding of his discussion with the President yesterday. My query was prompted by some remarks the Prime Minister made to me last evening which I thought suggested a possible misunderstanding. This turned out not to be the case.

The Prime Minister said that his discussion with the President had been thoroughly enjoyable and constructive. He felt that he and the President had come to grips with some major problems and understood each other very well indeed. He said that the point he had been trying to make in response to the President on Vietnam was that a number of other countries in the world, specifically including Afghanistan, did not see the Vietnam situation in exactly the same way we did. He said that he had tried to point out to the President that the United States had a tendency to be unduly concerned at different times with different problems; some years ago it had been organizing the northern tier into CENTO to defeat Communist aggression; earlier it had been the Marshal Plan and the Korean war; now it was Vietnam. The interests of Afghanistan and of other non-aligned Asian countries did not change as did those of the United States. This was the reason why they were not able to come as far as we would like them to at any given time on Vietnam, CENTO, the Korean war, etc.

On more specific subjects, the Prime Minister indicated that he had discussed the Ariana Airline request for a loan from the Export

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Import Bank and understood the situation as it had been explained to him by Ambassador Neumann in New York and by the President. He was content and he would wait.

On Afghanistan's present food needs, he said that the President had told him that the U.S. would do what it could to help on as generous terms as possible, specifically that cost would be repayable in 40 years.

On the Kajakai project, he said that the President was sympathetic and had said that the papers were being prepared. He understood that the President had not made a commitment and that the President expected that he (Maidanwal) would not discuss the matter publicly at this time.

He said that the President had also mentioned the upcoming loan for land improvement equipment in the Helmand Valley and that they both understood that action on this was virtually completed.

I asked the Prime Minister for his views as to timing of any future steps on the Kajakai project. He said that he would very much like to be able to announce it together with the next food agreement shortly after his return to Kabul, April 15. He said that if the food agreement were to be ready sooner, he would like to withhold announcement until after his return. He added that the Kajakai loan was particularly important to him personally and that he deduced from his conversation with the President that an announcement shortly after his return home would probably be possible.

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REF: STATE 153499

ROGER CHANNEL

1. PURSUANT RECOMMENDATION REFTEL I BRIEFED PRIME MINISTER MARCH 14 ON HOTAKI CHARGES.

2. IN SETTING FORTH FACTS OF CASE I TOOK PAINS PUT THEM IN PERSPECTIVE BY POINTING OUT (A) LOMAX TV SHOW WAS LOCAL PROGRAM, WELL KNOWN TO ME PERSONALLY AS OFTEN CATERING TO SENSATIONAL AND ODD PERSONS AND STATEMENTS, (B) HOTAKI WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING CAPITALIZE ON CURRENT FUROR OVER DISCLOSURE OF CIA SUPPORT TO STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS, AND (C) ALLEGATIONS THAT MAIWANDWAL WAS CIA PUPPET AND THAT CIA HAD OVERTHROWN DAUD REGIME WERE SO PATENTLY ABSURD THAT THEY UNLIKELY BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. I SAID KBG WAS CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED OVER POSSIBILITY UNPLEASANT PUBLICITY DURING HIS VISIT TO U.S.

3. ALTHOUGH MAIWANDWAL HAD AT OUTSET OF CONVERSATION TOLD ME HE KNEW ABOUT HOTAKI CASE, HE APPEARED GENUINELY SHAKEN BY MY BRIEFING. TOWARD THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION WHICH TOUCHED ON OTHER MATTERS PERTAINING HIS VISIT, PRIME MINISTER RETURNED TO HOTAKI CASE, SAY MATTER CONSTITUTED GREAT DANGER TO U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND HE NOW FORCED VIEW FORTHCOMING VISIT WITH MIXED FEELINGS.

4. COMMENT: I BELIEVE MAIWANDWAL CONSIDERS HIMSELF HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO CHARGES OF BEING IN POCKET U.S. HIS LONG RESIDENCE IN U.S., PUBLICITY SUCH AS LIFE ARTICLE OF DECEMBER 1965 AND, OF COURSE, NATURAL AFGHAN CONCERN OVER SOVIET ATTITUDES, ALL CONSPIRE TO MAKE HIM SENSITIVE THIS SCORE. WHILE I DO NOT THINK HOTAKI CHARGES WILL UPSET MAIWANDWAL TO POINT HE WOULD CONSIDER POSTPONING VISIT, I PREDICT HIS CONCERN AND IRRITATION OVER POSSIBLE EMBARRASSING PUBLICITY WILL MAKE HIM TOUGHER TO DEAL WITH IN WASHINGTON, AS ALREADY INDICATED MY LATEST CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

GP-1. NEUMANN.

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Authority NLS 0012.116 002/10
By jc, NARA, Date 1-2-14

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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy KABUL Priority

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Info:

State 153499

ROGER CHANNEL

MAR 11 3 50 PM '67

REF: State 150583

For Ambassador

1. Representative Ramparts magazine March 9 interviewed present President Afghan Students Association SHARYAR at Santa Barbara. Presented Hotaki charges and asked for confirmation, and indicated Ramparts was going publish next issue, and suggested SHARYAR better climb aboard band wagon to save himself because other deportations of people who might embarrass US were pending. (This untrue; we know no deportation cases Afghan students now active). SHARYAR said all Hotaki charges false and inspired by ~~personal~~ ^{personal} grudge against Prime Minister, pleaded with Ramparts representative not publish story which would damage whole student exchange program and US relations his country.

2. Above information from RAFIK who learned from student friend whom SHARYAR asked be present meeting and from Dr. Goodspeed who close friend SHARYAR. Goodspeed naturally disturbed by prospects inherent in Hotaki story but generally taking calm view and does not now expect any press or other unpleasantness Santa Barbara during Prime Ministers visit there, though uncertain what Los Angeles press and TV may do.

Drafted by:

PAF:JWSpain, *YM*

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

INR/DDC: W. McAfee

Clearances:

Clearance: NEA - Mr. Handley *YM*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 125.001R.116-202/11

By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-2-14

~~MM SECRET~~

(KTTV Lomax show request to Department and Afghan Embassy for Prime Minister's appearance has been turned down in routine way).

3. In view Rampart's interest, magazine's demonstrated desire explode journalistic "bombs" (e.g., full page New York Times ad in advance publication National Students Association case), and fact that next issue Ramparts scheduled appear March 28 (day PM arrives Washington), believe it all the more necessary you have discussion with Prime Minister recommended Para. 3 Reftel and inform us of results ASAP.

End.

RUSK

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ACTION: Amembassy KABUL FLASH

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AGREEMENT CHANNEL

S/S

STATE 66990

Oct 16 2 55 PM '66

President plans announce intention nominate NEUMANN as Ambassador
to Afghanistan Sunday afternoon or evening October 16 Washington time.

END

RUSK

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *scly* NARA, Date 12.14.05

Drafted by:

O/PAS:RWZimmermann 10/16/66

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

O/PAS - RWZimmermann

Clearances:

Cleared in substance: Mr. Steeves

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

201

39

January 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the Royal Afghan Embassy in Washington asking if this Government agrees to the appointment of Abdullah Malikyar as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Afghanistan to the United States. A biographic sketch of Ambassador Malikyar is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Ambassador Abdullah Malikyar as Ambassador of Afghanistan at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Afghanistan of your approval.

Faithfully yours,



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

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POSTW'S OFFICE

1967 JAN 19 AM 10 13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABDULLAH MALIKYAR

AFGHANISTAN

Ambassador Abdullah Malikyar was born in 1908 in Kabul to a wealthy land-holding family. He has had many senior and influential positions within the Afghan Government and has served in capacities of significance to the United States in the past. He directed the U.S.-assisted Helmand Valley Authority, one of the largest economic aid projects under way in Afghanistan (1962-63). He has visited the United States several times, recently with His Majesty King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1963. As First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, he was the chief contact for both the U.S. and the USSR aid missions in Kabul (1963-64). He has been Ambassador to the United Kingdom since 1964.

Ambassador Malikyar was one of the few members of the Afghan cabinet who enjoyed influence as a result of his own financial and ethnic relations. He is married to a niece of the King and is related through marriage to Prime Minister Maiwandwal who will be coming here on an informal visit to meet the President, March 28-29.

The Ambassador appears phlegmatic and shy, his hearing and vision are poor and his speech is slow and soft. However, this appearance belies his strength of personality as demonstrated both under the Prime Ministership of Prince Mohammad Daud and subsequently under the reform program introduced in 1963 by Prime Minister Maiwandwal. During the latter period he was the focus of the conservative group in the new cabinet and there was considerable criticism of his conduct as the Minister of Finance. A story then current in Kabul, drawing on Ambassador Malikyar's physical appearance, depicted him like God; although he was nearly blind, deaf, and immobile he seemed able to see everything, hear everything and to be everywhere at once.

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Authority NLT 0012-116-2-12
By P, NARA, Date 10/5/11

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Ambassador Malikyar speaks Persian, Pushtu, fluent French and good German. His English was limited before he went to London in 1964, but may have improved since.

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~~CLASSIFICATION~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 10, 1967

Date

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

BY ju ON 10-3-91

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Cable to Amembassy KABUL
re Prime Minister's visit

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Ambassy KABUL PRIORITY

STATE _____

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM HANDLEY

Prime Minister's Visit

1. Newly established requirement for visits involving President's participation is Press Guidance Paper, which is submitted to President same time as briefing papers. This requirement result our desire avoid repetition of unfortunate leaks to press of economic assistance figures and other data which occurred in connection with certain recent visits. Purpose of paper, therefore, is to obtain visitor's agreement to specific guidelines for any statements which might be made to press by PrMin or President following their conversations. This is related to but separate from Joint Statement or Communique, draft of which being sent septel.

2. Above is FYI but you free draw on it as you deem appropriate in seeking agreement from ROA; either Farhadi or PM himself, to following text which has been cleared by White House:

QUOTE: It is agreed that any statements to the press by the President or Prime Minister Maiwandwal concerning their

HEA/PAP:PESchmelzer:net:3/6/67 3370

HEA - William J. Handley

HEA/PAP - Mr. Spain
HEA/P - Mr. BrownP P-Mr. Reap
S/S -

White House -

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jcl/h, NARA, Date 12-14-81

2

KABUL

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conversations will be in accordance following guidelines:

a. The Prime Minister's visit provided opportunity for very useful exchange of views between Afghanistan and the United States on wide range of issues and is a reflection of the good relations existing between the two countries;

b. In referring to discussions of US support for ^{Afghanistan's} development efforts, ~~five year plan or any general or specific assistance to Afghanistan,~~ no mention will be made to the press of ~~any specific sum or money involved or any specific projects currently under~~ consideration between two governments;

c. This understanding does not, of course, preclude amendment of these guidelines during PriMin's call on President.
END QUOTE.

3. Above reflects view here that with Prime Minister's known judicious approach and absence of controversial problems between US and RGA, there should be little reason expect difficulties in way visit is handled publicly. Possible exception is Pushtunistan issue but we prefer you handle this informally with PM as you feel necessary pursuant guidance sent septel rather than seek cover it under guidelines above.

4. Need ^{agreement} ~~affirmative reply~~ by March 20.

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END

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Parliamentary Experiment in Afghanistan

Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC-NLS 001-116-2-3

By JCS NARA, Date 10-12-01

~~Secret~~

NO 3

10 February 1967
SC No. 00756/67A

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PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

The parliamentary system in Afghanistan remains in the testing stage a year and a half after it was instituted in this backward nation by its authoritarian but reform-minded King. The lower house deputies--representing, for the most part, the conservative and tradition-bound elements in the society--are still inexperienced in parliamentary procedure and have been slow in tackling the mass of reform legislation. The upper house is even more conservative than the lower house but has thus far exercised a less active political role. The lower house deputies have been generally antagonistic toward the cabinet, which reflects the views of the more educated and cosmopolitan segments of the society and, predictably, has been unsympathetic toward the dilatory tactics of the deputies. The present prime minister is an ineffective leader unable to control the country's conflicting forces of tradition and reform within the democratic framework. The poor showing thus far could lead the King to suspend his present experiment in parliamentary democracy.

Political Reform

In 1963 King Mohammad Zahir Shah decided to initiate a program of political modernization in Afghanistan. Although he had accomplished important economic and social reforms in the preceding decade, political power remained in the hands of the royal family. As resentment increased among the many educated Afghans who desired a voice in the government, the King gradually realized that if Afghanistan were to avoid the revolution and republicanism that had toppled other autocratic regimes since World War II, he would have to initiate some political reforms as well.



King Zahir

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The prime minister at the time was Mohammad Daud, first cousin of the King. Although there had been a slight broadening of the government's base of power during his ten years as prime minister, Daud firmly opposed any further extension of that base. The reform-oriented King, taking advantage of growing dissatisfaction among the ruling oligarchy with Daud's intemperate anti-Pakistani foreign policy which had resulted in the damaging closure of important trade routes, replaced Daud in March 1963 with Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, a liberal-minded commoner. The cabinet appointed by Yusuf was the first in Afghanistan's history without any members of the royal family.

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Zahir next named a committee to draft a new liberalized constitution. The draft was amended and approved by the traditional Afghan institution the Loya-jirgeh--a group of tribal leaders, royalty, and other notables gathered by the King to approve government actions of great importance. The constitution became effective on 1 October 1964.

The constitution provides for a bicameral legislature comprised of a 216-member lower house (Wolesi Jirgeh) and an 84-member upper house (Meshrano Jirgeh). The lower house is elected directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot. One third of the upper house is appointed by the King, another third is elected directly by the people in each of the 28 provinces, and the final third is chosen by popularly elected Provincial Councils. The King appoints the prime minister, who then chooses the rest of the cabinet. At all times the cabinet is responsible to the lower house for its policies. Although the legislative branch is granted a great deal of authority, the King retains extensive residual powers.

The Afghans held their first genuinely free elections in August and September 1965, and the new Parliament convened the following month. It has now completed three sessions.

The Upper House

The upper house has not yet assumed a position of importance. Its present president, Abdul Dawi, regards it as primarily an advisory body to the executive branch and the King, and its potential usefulness as a buffer against the cantankerous lower house--whose legislation the upper body can bottleneck--has not been tried.

In any case the full potential of the upper house cannot yet be determined because the one third of its members to be elected by the Provincial Councils have not yet been chosen because the councils themselves have not yet been established. Moreover, no plans have been made to bring them into existence in the near future.

The present 56 members of the upper house are--for the most part--more conservative than the lower house deputies. Those elected directly by the residents of the provinces are usually prestigious local religious leaders, tribal chiefs, and landowners. Included in the appointees of the King are former government officials and military officers.

The Lower House


The lower house is far more powerful than the upper house

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and the scene of most parliamentary activity to date. This body can vote a no-confidence motion against the cabinet at any time, and has the final legislative decision on the budget. The development of a stable, effective parliamentary system, however, has been hindered by the inexperience of the deputies and the prohibition of political parties.

The absence of political parties--they have been proscribed heretofore and cannot be formed until enabling legislation is passed--prevents the government from organizing sustained support for its programs. The fate of most legislation is in the hands of a "swing group" of deputies, numbering more than half the house, which gives or withholds its support largely



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on the strength of the oratorical and manipulative skill of various deputies on specific questions.

Most of the deputies represent the traditional and conservative elements in Afghanistan. Though well versed in village and tribal affairs, they arrive in Kabul with little understanding of formal parliamentary procedures or of the responsibilities and obligations of representative government. Half of them are barely literate and unable to understand complicated legal and constitutional questions. For this reason they tend to vote for the proposition using the simplest language. The count is taken by a show of hands and even on close votes, is only approximated. Moreover, there is well-founded suspicion that deputies sometimes vote twice. Parliamentary business is further hindered by chronic deputy absenteeism.

The sessions have been marked by heckling, name-calling, pushing, shoving, and fisticuffs despite new rules of procedure written by the deputies themselves and the house speaker's best efforts to keep order. Last November pro-Communist deputy Babrak made a speech offensive to both the monarchy and Islam which so enraged some conservative members that they ripped wooden slabs from their benches and attacked him. The ruckus that ensued resulted in the hospitalization of three left-wing deputies.

Relations with the Cabinet

The relations between the cabinet and the lower house are unstable and fluctuate from bare tolerance through mutual suspicion to open hostility. The two groups have--for the most part--had very different experiences and thus have considerably different outlooks. The ministers are a well-educated and widely traveled group. Most of the deputies, on the other hand, have spent the greater portion of their lives in the rural part of the country, and their outlook is conservative and traditional.

The deputies are jealous of their rights and privileges and have resented any attempts by the cabinet to infringe upon or ignore them. Cabinet members, however, to keep the government machinery running, have had few qualms about ignoring the real or fancied prerogatives of what they consider an often intractable legislature.

Antagonism between the deputies and the cabinet developed immediately after the parliament convened in October 1965. One of the first tasks of the deputies was to consider the king's reappointment of Mohammad Yusuf as prime minister. Leftist deputies Babrak and Mrs. Anahita, encouraged by Yusuf's personal enemies in the lower house started a movement to oppose the appointment which subsequently led as well to day-long students demonstrations put down by army troops at a

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Prime Minister
MAIWANDWAL

65641

Afghanistan's Parliament Building



cost of three dead and scores injured. In the aftermath Yusuf resigned, and the King named Mohammad Maiwandwal instead as prime minister. Both he and his cabinet were subsequently confirmed by the lower house.

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In December 1965 Maiwandwal named four new ministers without seeking parliamentary approval. This, the lower house contended, violated the spirit of the constitution--which the delegates interpreted as giving them the right to consider each cabinet minister when appointed. Maiwandwal contended that the house had the power to vote its confidence in the whole government but not in individual ministers. In the close vote that followed Maiwandwal won his point, but he also acquired a tremendous residue of ill feeling against his cabinet.

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Legislation

The legislative record of the Afghan Parliament has been poor. During the winter 1965 session, the lower house bogged down over writing its own rules of procedure and then had to

tackle the reform legislation of the Yusuf government, which, according to the constitution, it was required to approve. Moreover, a number of international agreements that had been negotiated since the implementation of the constitution had to be ratified.

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When the winter 1966 session of Parliament convened, the budget for fiscal year 1966 (21 March 1966 to 20 March 1967) had not yet been passed by the lower house. Almost the entire session was devoted to its consideration and passage to the exclusion of other important legislation.

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The Present Situation

Despite the occasional disorders in Parliament and that body's poor legislative record, the deputies have gained some experience in parliamentary procedures in the past year and a half and have demonstrated a slowly growing ability to deal with complicated legal and economic questions. Although relations between the lower house and the cabinet have been unstable and frequently hostile, the situation probably would improve measurably with the enactment of the political parties bill. A strong government party could bring about some consensus and organization in the Parliament and prevent much of the bickering and fancied slights. Prime Minister Maiwandwal has made some preliminary attempts to form such a party, but until the bill is passed he can make no formal arrangements.

Although the King remains aloof from the day-to-day affairs of government, he is still the paramount power in the country. While he has been displeased with some of the carryings-on in the parliament, he is still very much committed to the parliamentary experiment and would probably be reluctant to terminate it unless he felt the national interest required such a decision.

Certain members of the royal family and educated Afghans--including some who strongly encouraged the development of the parliamentary system--are, however, now expressing doubts about the imperfect political organism they helped to create. They find that they have little in common with the majority of the deputies and they deplore the ineffectiveness and disorganization of Parliament. Moreover, they feel that Maiwandwal is too weak a leader and they fear that his reform programs may be taking on too socialistic a tone.

Some of their uneasiness may be alleviated if Maiwandwal is replaced, and there have been many reports that this will be done in the near future. Until recently he had the support of the King, but there have been reports to indicate that the King is now dissatisfied with Maiwandwal for several reasons. In addition, the prime minister has undergone two serious operations in the past two years, and he may become physically incapable of the rigorous demands of his post. However, because Maiwandwal is scheduled to make an official visit to the US at the end of March, it is unlikely that any change would take place until after that time--if at all.

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The immediate task is to try to control the conflicting forces within the democratic framework and simultaneously accomplish the economic, social, and political reforms necessary to make Afghanistan a modern state. It appears that the only person who could solve this immediate problem is a strong capa-

ble prime minister who could win the support of the King and the armed forces and the confidence of Parliament. Such a leader, however, would need to tread cautiously where royal prerogatives are involved or risk open conflict with the palace.

If, over a period of time, King Zahir is unable to find such a leader and the conflicts continue within the lower house and between the legislative and executive branches, it is possible the King will decide to suspend the experiment in parliamentary democracy and revert to a more authoritarian form of government. Another blow to the continuation of the liberal experiment would be the death of the King. The crown prince is regarded as incompetent by most observers and his elevation to the throne could set off a disastrous struggle for power.

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January 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Afghanistan that the appointment of Mr. Abdullah Malikyar as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Afghanistan would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Protocol
CF w/cy of Incoming
✓Country File w/Incoming

WWR:BKS:amc

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

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COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN/USSR

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DATE OF
INFO.

DISTR. 16 FEBRUARY 1966

SUBJECT

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED DURING THE 1-10 FEBRUARY 1966
OFFICIAL VISIT OF THE AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER TO MOSCOW

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

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THE FOLLOWING REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BY AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER MUHAMMAD HASHIM MAIWANDWAL WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS DURING HIS 1-10 FEBRUARY 1966 OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW.

1. AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER MUHAMMAD HASHIM MAIWANDWAL MADE A SHORT BUT STRONG SPEECH DURING THE FIRST MEETING WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE USSR THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (RGA) HAD NOT, AND WOULD NOT CHANGE. MAIWANDWAL SAID THAT FOREIGN PROPAGANDA WHICH SUGGESTED THAT HIS REPLACEMENT OF MUHAMMAD YUSUF AS PRIME MINISTER IMPLIED A COMMITMENT TO THE WEST WAS AS MALIGIOUS AS IT WAS INCORRECT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS REFERRED TO THE 10 DECEMBER LIFE MAGAZINE ARTICLE WHICH ALLEGED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD TURNED

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

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Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-001-116-2-4-9

SANITIZED
Authority RAC-NLJ 001-116-2-4
By WJS, NARA, Date 10-12-01

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PAGE 2

AWAY FROM THE USSR AND TOWARD THE U.S.). HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD LOST A FRIEND WHEN YUSUF FELL, BUT THAT FRIEND HAD BEEN REPLACED BY ANOTHER FRIEND. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE RETIRED FROM OFFICE THAT HE WOULD BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER FRIEND OF THE SOVIET UNION. [REDACTED] COMMENT: MAIWANDWAL SPOKE WITH APPARENT SINCERITY AND HIS COMMENTS SEEMED TO BE WARMLY RECEIVED BY THE SOVIETS.)

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2. SOVIET PREMIER ALEKSEY KOSYGIN REPLIED WITH THE EXPECTED PROCLAMATION OF SOVIET FRIENDSHIP FOR ALL PEOPLES AND DESIRE FOR PEACE. HIS ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE MATTER OF VIETNAM WAS RELATIVELY MILD. HE REVIEWED IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES BORDERING THE SOVIET UNION, BUT MADE A BLUNT EXCEPTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH CHINA BUT THAT PROSPECTS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING BECAUSE THE CHINESE SHOWED NO INCLINATION TO RECIPROCATE.

3. FOLLOWING THE OPENING SPEECHES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS DISCUSSED. MAIWANDWAL REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE FOR COMPLETION OF PROJECTS UNDER THE SECOND RGA FIVE-YEAR PLAN, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE NAGHLU DAM AND NANGRAHAR IRRIGATION PROJECTS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE NAGHLU DAM ORIGINALLY CAME UNDER THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED. THE NANGRAHAR IRRIGATION PROJECT IS COMPLETED EXCEPT FOR THE FARMS.) THE SOVIETS READILY AGREED. MAIWANDWAL THEN ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN WHICH IS BEING PREPARED BY THE RGA; THE SOVIETS READILY AGREED TO THIS REQUEST.

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4. THE AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED FOR A COMMODITY CREDIT FOR CONSUMER GOODS TO GENERATE AFGHANIS IN ORDER TO STABILIZE THE AFGHAN ECONOMY. THE SOVIET DELEGATION REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THE REQUEST. AT THE SECOND MEETING

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THE AMOUNT OF THIS CREDIT WAS DISCUSSED; MAIWANDWAL SUGGESTED 10,000,000 RUBLES A YEAR FOR FIVE YEARS. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO HELP, BUT NOTED THAT THE RGA HAD SPENT ONLY 12,000,000 RUBLES OF A PREVIOUSLY GRANTED 20,000,000 RUBLE LOAN AND SUGGESTED THAT THE RGA DRAW ON THE 8,000,000 RUBLE CREDIT REMAINING FOR THE COMING YEAR, THAT IS UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1967. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN EXTENDING COMMODITY CREDITS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS FOR FROM \$10-12,000,000. THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING A 20,000,000 RUBLE COMMODITY CREDIT.) THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BE HELD IN KABUL ON THIS SUBJECT WHEN THE PRESENT CREDIT IS EXHAUSTED; THE RGA AGREED.

5. MAIWANDWAL REQUESTED AMMUNITION FOR SOVIET EQUIPMENT WHICH AFGHANISTAN POSSESSES. HE SAID THAT RGA STOCKS WERE LOW AND THAT AMMUNITION WAS NEEDED FOR MILITARY EXERCISES. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO FURNISH THIS AMMUNITION WITH PAYMENT FROM THE EXISTING LOAN FOR RGA MILITARY ACTIVITIES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ALL DISCUSSIONS ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WERE BASED ON EXISTING OR FUTURE LOANS. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF GRANTS.)

6. THE THIRD MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY MAIWANDWAL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NUR AHMAD ETEMADI AND DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ABDUL GHAFUR RAWAN FARHADI OF THE AFGHAN DELEGATION. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE TOPICS DISCUSSED ARE NOT KNOWN, THE THREE AFGHAN DELEGATES WHO DID ATTEND THE MEETING MAINTAINED THAT NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE WAS COVERED AND THAT THE SOVIETS AT NO TIME ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN RGA SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET POSITION ON VIETNAM.) THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS DISCUSSED AT THIS MEETING. [REDACTED] COMMENT. FARHADI DRAFTED THE COMMUNIQUE IN KABUL BEFORE DEPARTURE. THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS TEXT WITH MINOR MODIFICATION

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7. WHILE MATWANDWAL, ETEMADI AND FARHADI WERE INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE MEETING, MINISTER OF PLANNING ABDUL HAKIM ZUA'I AND OTHERS HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND CPSU CC PRESIDUM MEMBER KIRILL T. MAZUROV ELSEWHERE. THE AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN EXTENDING THE RUNWAY OF THE KABUL AIRPORT TO ACCOMMODATE INTERNATIONAL JET AIRCRAFT. THE AFGHANS ALSO REQUESTED ONE JET AIRCRAFT, POSSIBLY A TU-104 OR AN IL-18, FOR THE ROYAL AFGHAN AIR FORCE WHICH WOULD BE USED FOR THE TRANSPORT OF PROMINENT AFGHANS ON FOREIGN TRIPS. THEY ALSO ASKED THAT THE SOVIETS REPURCHASE HEAVY ROADBUILDING EQUIPMENT WHICH HAD BEEN USED TO BUILD THE TORGUNDI-HERAT-KANDAHAR ROAD; THE AFGHAN NOTED THEY HAD NO USE FOR THIS EQUIPMENT AND COULD NOT AFFORD TO MAINTAIN IT. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO ASSESS THE EQUIPMENT, DEDUCTING DAMAGE AND DEPRECIATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT SOVIET EXPERTS WOULD ARRIVE IN KABUL IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH FOR THIS PURPOSE.

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8. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE REMAINDER OF THE VISIT WAS DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO TOURISM, FRIENDSHIP MEETINGS AND THE LIKE. THE SOVIETS WERE EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE THE AFGHAN DELEGATION, COLLECTIVELY OR INDIVIDUALLY ON ANY MATTER. NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO SPARE EXPENSE IN INSURING COMFORT AND CONVIVIALITY.

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9. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

IN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SOVIETS DID NOT PRESS THE RGA FOR COMMITMENTS ON VIETNAM.

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10. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE.

END OF MESSAGE

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Parliamentary Experiment in Afghanistan

Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-116-2-3

By ics NARA, Date 10-12-01

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No 1

10 February 1967
SC No. 00756/67A

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PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

The parliamentary system in Afghanistan remains in the testing stage a year and a half after it was instituted in this backward nation by its authoritarian but reform-minded King. The lower house deputies--representing, for the most part, the conservative and tradition-bound elements in the society--are still inexperienced in parliamentary procedure and have been slow in tackling the mass of reform legislation. The upper house is even more conservative than the lower house but has thus far exercised a less active political role. The lower house deputies have been generally antagonistic toward the cabinet, which reflects the views of the more educated and cosmopolitan segments of the society and, predictably, has been unsympathetic toward the dilatory tactics of the deputies. The present prime minister is an ineffective leader unable to control the country's conflicting forces of tradition and reform within the democratic framework. The poor showing thus far could lead the King to suspend his present experiment in parliamentary democracy.

Political Reform

In 1963 King Mohammad Zahir Shah decided to initiate a program of political modernization in Afghanistan. Although he had accomplished important economic and social reforms in the preceding decade, political power remained in the hands of the royal family. As resentment increased among the many educated Afghans who desired a voice in the government, the King gradually realized that if Afghanistan were to avoid the revolution and republicanism that had toppled other autocratic regimes since World War II, he would have to initiate some political reforms as well.



King Zahir

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The prime minister at the time was Mohammad Daud, first cousin of the King. Although there had been a slight broadening of the government's base of power during his ten years as prime minister, Daud firmly opposed any further extension of that base. The reform-oriented King, taking advantage of growing dissatisfaction among the ruling oligarchy with Daud's intemperate anti-Pakistani foreign policy which had resulted in the damaging closure of important trade routes, replaced Daud in March 1963 with Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, a liberal-minded commoner. The cabinet appointed by Yusuf was the first in Afghanistan's history without any members of the royal family.

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Zahir next named a committee to draft a new liberalized constitution. The draft was amended and approved by the traditional Afghan institution the Loya-jirgeh--a group of tribal leaders, royalty, and other notables gathered by the King to approve government actions of great importance. The constitution became effective on 1 October 1964.

The constitution provides for a bicameral legislature comprised of a 216-member lower house (Wolesi Jirgeh) and an 84-member upper house (Meshrano Jirgeh). The lower house is elected directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot. One third of the upper house is appointed by the King, another third is elected directly by the people in each of the 28 provinces, and the final third is chosen by popularly elected Provincial Councils. The King appoints the prime minister, who then chooses the rest of the cabinet. At all times the cabinet is responsible to the lower house for its policies. Although the legislative branch is granted a great deal of authority, the King retains extensive residual powers.

The Afghans held their first genuinely free elections in August and September 1965, and the new Parliament convened the following month. It has now completed three sessions.

The Upper House

The upper house has not yet assumed a position of importance. Its present president, Abdul Dawi, regards it as primarily an advisory body to the executive branch and the King, and its potential usefulness as a buffer against the cantankerous lower house--whose legislation the upper body can bottleneck--has not been tried.

In any case the full potential of the upper house cannot yet be determined because the one third of its members to be elected by the Provincial Councils have not yet been chosen because the councils themselves have not yet been established. Moreover, no plans have been made to bring them into existence in the near future.

The present 56 members of the upper house are--for the most part--more conservative than the lower house deputies. Those elected directly by the residents of the provinces are usually prestigious local religious leaders, tribal chiefs, and landowners. Included in the appointees of the King are former government officials and military officers.

The Lower House

The lower house is far more powerful than the upper house

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and the scene of most parliamentary activity to date. This body can vote a no-confidence motion against the cabinet at any time, and has the final legislative decision on the budget. The development of a stable, effective parliamentary system, however, has been hindered by the inexperience of the deputies and the prohibition of political parties.

The absence of political parties--they have been proscribed heretofore and cannot be formed until enabling legislation is passed--prevents the government from organizing sustained support for its programs. The fate of most legislation is in the hands of a "swing group" of deputies, numbering more than half the house, which gives or withholds its support largely



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on the strength of the oratorical and manipulative skill of various deputies on specific questions.

Most of the deputies represent the traditional and conservative elements in Afghanistan. Though well versed in village and tribal affairs, they arrive in Kabul with little understanding of formal parliamentary procedures or of the responsibilities and obligations of representative government. Half of them are barely literate and unable to understand complicated legal and constitutional questions. For this reason they tend to vote for the proposition using the simplest language. The count is taken by a show of hands and even on close votes, is only approximated. Moreover, there is well-founded suspicion that deputies sometimes vote twice. Parliamentary business is further hindered by chronic deputy absenteeism.

The sessions have been marked by heckling, name-calling, pushing, shoving, and fisticuffs despite new rules of procedure written by the deputies themselves and the house speaker's best efforts to keep order. Last November pro-Communist deputy Babrak made a speech offensive to both the monarchy and Islam which so enraged some conservative members that they ripped wooden slabs from their benches and attacked him. The ruckus that ensued resulted in the hospitalization of three left-wing deputies.

Relations with the Cabinet

The relations between the cabinet and the lower house are unstable and fluctuate from bare tolerance through mutual suspicion to open hostility. The two groups have--for the most part--had very different experiences and thus have considerably different outlooks. The ministers are a well-educated and widely traveled group. Most of the deputies, on the other hand, have spent the greater portion of their lives in the rural part of the country, and their outlook is conservative and traditional.

The deputies are jealous of their rights and privileges and have resented any attempts by the cabinet to infringe upon or ignore them. Cabinet members, however, to keep the government machinery running, have had few qualms about ignoring the real or fancied prerogatives of what they consider an often intractable legislature.

Antagonism between the deputies and the cabinet developed immediately after the parliament convened in October 1965. One of the first tasks of the deputies was to consider the king's reappointment of Mohammad Yusuf as prime minister. Leftist deputies Babrak and Mrs. Anahita, encouraged by Yusuf's personal enemies in the lower house started a movement to oppose the appointment which subsequently led as well to day-long students demonstrations put down by army troops at a

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Prime Minister
MAIWANDWAL

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Afghanistan's Parliament Building



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At the time, it was assumed that Maiwandwal was picked primarily because he was acceptable to all influential groups. Despite considerable diplomatic and administrative experience--he was ambassador to the US from 1958 to 1963 and held the post of minister of press and information in Yusuf's cabinet--Maiwandwal has proved to be a relatively weak leader. With few exceptions, his cabinet can also be characterized as indecisive and politically inept, and its relations with the lower house have been badly strained over several issues.

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Some of their uneasiness may be alleviated if Maiwandwal is replaced, and there have been many reports that this will be done in the near future. Until recently he had the support of the King, but there have been reports to indicate that the King is now dissatisfied with Maiwandwal for several reasons. In addition, the prime minister has undergone two serious operations in the past two years, and he may become physically incapable of the rigorous demands of his post. However, because Maiwandwal is scheduled to make an official visit to the US at the end of March, it is unlikely that any change would take place until after that time--if at all.

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The immediate task is to try to control the conflicting forces within the democratic framework and simultaneously accomplish the economic, social, and political reforms necessary to make Afghanistan a modern state. It appears that the only person who could solve this immediate problem is a strong capa-

ble prime minister who could win the support of the King and the armed forces and the confidence of Parliament. Such a leader, however, would need to tread cautiously where royal prerogatives are involved or risk open conflict with the palace.

If, over a period of time. King Zahir is unable to find such a leader and the conflicts continue within the lower house and between the legislative and executive branches, it is possible the King will decide to suspend the experiment in parliamentary democracy and revert to a more authoritarian form of government. Another blow to the continuation of the liberal experiment would be the death of the King. The crown prince is regarded as incompetent by most observers and his elevation to the throne could set off a disastrous struggle for power.

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