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Memo's & Misc.

(2) 46
CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

Afghanistan occupies strategic real estate connecting the Middle East and South Asia on the southern border of the USSR. Afghanistan follows a policy of neutrality and non-alignment despite massive Soviet assistance to Afghan economic development and the Afghan military. U.S. policy to preserve a Western presence in Afghanistan has been successful, and the Afghans have refused to bow to Soviet and Chicom pressure on Vietnam.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan is conducting an experiment in democracy initiated in 1963. We have welcomed this venture in the hope that it will promote stability and progress in the area, and we were pleased in 1963 when the new government succeeded in restoring diplomatic and commercial relations with Pakistan. Growing pains developed suddenly last October when a new Parliament, elected by secret ballot under the 1964 Constitution, and student demonstrations forced a change of Cabinet. Mohammed Hashem Maiwandwal, Ambassador to the U.S. from 1958-63 and a good friend of our country, then became Prime Minister.


Maiwandwal is doing well as he attempts to consolidate his domestic position, to move his country forward on inter-related programs of political and economic development and to carry out Afghanistan's traditional policy of neutrality. He and the King must also deal with a new element, namely, increasing Chicom interest in Afghanistan. The Chicombs have extended a loan to Afghanistan, and the King has expressed to Ambassador Steeves growing concern over the subversive threat the Chicombs may become.

The U.S. has indicated support to the democratic experiment through Presidential messages and public statements. We have gone ahead with our aid program including new projects designed to support the democratic experiment. The King and Queen came here in 1963 as state guests. However, Soviet leaders have been in more frequent touch with the King and Premiers. Kosygin and Brezhnev visited Kabul recently, Prime Minister Yusuf went to Moscow several times, and Maiwandwal has already been to Moscow once.

We believe that an invitation to Maiwandwal would strengthen his domestic position, an important consideration for us since in the normal course he could expect to remain Prime Minister until 1969. An invitation would also indicate our continuing interest in Afghanistan's experiment with democracy, its economic development, and preservation of its neutrality and independence. It would be an effective follow-up to the successful visit of the King and Queen here in 1963. No Afghan Prime Minister has visited the U.S. since 1958.

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✓ 23 December 1965

SC No. 00702/65A

42

Copy No. 1

SPECIAL REPORT

AFGHANISTAN AND ITS EXPERIMENTS WITH REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-116-2-5

By ics NARA, Date 10-12-01

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AFGHANISTAN AND ITS EXPERIMENTS WITH REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

The latest phase in Afghanistan's experiment with representative democracy has gotten off to a boisterous start. Elections held last August and September--the first conducted under universal suffrage--returned a legislative assembly which was generally seen as conservative and docile. To the astonishment of most observers, however, the People's Council (the lower house of parliament) asserted its independence by refusing for more than a week to confirm the reappointment of Prime Minister Yusuf.

Meanwhile, virtually unprecedented rioting by politically oriented students led the alarmed government to take overly repressive counter-measures, resulting in a number of student deaths. Given a new issue, the legislators redoubled their criticism of the Yusuf regime, and the prime minister was forced to step down just four days after receiving a vote of confidence.

With the subsequent appointment of Prime Minister Maiwandwal and the recess of parliament for the winter, the situation now seems reasonably well in hand. The King and the powerful royal family appear willing to continue in the direction of political liberalization, but they are probably disturbed by the new forces that seem to have been set in motion and more determined than ever to proceed cautiously. No early change in Afghanistan's non-aligned foreign policy is likely.

Constitutional Reform

King Zahir's cautious program of political reform began in 1963 with the ouster of his strong-man cousin, Mohammed Daud, from the office of prime minister. Daud's ten-year-old regime had seen the beginning of an ambitious economic development program aided by the US and the USSR. Political power, however, had become strongly concentrated

in the hands of the prime minister and a coterie of his supporters, nearly all of whom were members of the Mohammedzai--the extended royal family. Control was authoritarian, enforced when necessary by political imprisonments. Throughout most of Daud's regime, the King, valuing the prime minister's role in speeding Afghanistan's economic modernization, remained relatively detached from policy questions.

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60132

The King

The Prime Minister



ZAHIR



MAIWANDWAL

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Daud's downfall came largely as a result of a growing concern among influential members of the royal family over the consequences of his vigorously anti-Pakistan foreign policy. Ever since Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the Afghans have insisted that the Pushtoon tribes in the hill areas adjacent to Afghanistan be given an opportunity to determine for themselves their national alignment.

Nearly half of Afghanistan's population--including the royal family--is Pushtoon, and the emergence of Afghanistan as a nation was, in fact, the result of a union of Pushtoon tribes in the mid-eighteenth century. The "Pushtoonistan" issue is thus a highly emotional one among Kabul's power elite.

Nevertheless, criticism of Daud began to mount when a series of border forays by Afghan irregulars led Pakistan to close Afghan trade missions and consulates in mid-1961. Disapproval deepened when the subsequent breach of diplomatic relations and abandonment of Afghan transit rights through Pakistan made the Afghans entirely dependent on the USSR for access routes to free world markets.

Although the Soviets were accommodating in their efforts to ease the impact of trade dislocation, Afghanistan's export earnings fell off. Government revenue, heavily dependent on customs levies, also declined sharply, forcing budgetary cuts. Finally, in March 1963, King Zahir stepped in to replace Daud with Minister of Mines and Industries Mohammed Yusuf.

The appointment of Yusuf, a commoner, signaled the beginning of a gradual move toward liberalization of Afghan political institutions with the King playing a leading role. The King was probably motivated in part by a recognition that a political awareness was beginning to evolve, and that explosive forces could develop unless the citizenry were given a greater sense of participation in the affairs of state. Authoritarian measures were relaxed, and in September 1964 a new constitution was ratified by the Loya Jirgah, a traditional assemblage of tribal elders and notables. A key provision of the new constitution prevents the King's close relatives from holding high government office. Prince Daud, to whom the measure applies, unsuccessfully attempted to prevent its inclusion.

The constitution establishes a bicameral legislature comprised of a 215-member People's Council, directly elected under universal suffrage and by secret ballot, and an 84-member Council of Elders. One third of the Council of Elders is appointed by the King, while the remainder represents the various provinces--one member elected by the citizens of each province and one appointed by provincial councils which are to be established as soon as enabling legislation can be passed. Government officials, including cabinet ministers, are banned from membership in the parliament. Legislation must be approved by the King before becoming law, and there is no provision for overriding a royal veto.

The second step toward representative government was the

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promulgation of an election law. Its provision that candidates be literate automatically limits eligibility to about ten percent of the populace. Election commissions, composed primarily of educators and jurists, are established in local areas to oversee campaigning and balloting.

On paper at least, the constitution and the election law provide the basis for a free selection of legislators, but without tampering unduly with traditional local power structures.

The Election Aftermath

The parliamentary elections concluded last September produced a legislature that was, for the most part, an unknown quantity. Most members of the lower house were new to national politics. Only about 20 percent had any significant background in national public life. Of the 99 candidates who had been members of either the previous legislative assembly (a rubber-stamp body) or of the Loya Jirgah, only 29 were elected. The absence of political parties, which are envisaged at a later stage of the liberalization program, made it all the more difficult to assess the political views of the new membership.

Parliament convened on 14 October, its first task being to consider the King's reappointment of Yusuf as prime minister. From the outset the new legislators proved unexpectedly assertive. Spurred on by leftist members from Kabul and by conservative elements who disapproved of several of the cabinet assignments,

the parliamentarians demanded that Yusuf present his proposed cabinet in person to the lower house, and that each potential minister issue a statement of personal assets. Charges of maladministration and corruption were leveled at Yusuf and his cabinet colleagues.

The prime minister, disturbed by the vocal opposition to his cabinet, reportedly twice tendered his resignation to the King, but was urged to persevere. On 21 October he entered the chamber unexpectedly to defend his position, only to be challenged by several legislators who questioned his right to attend parliamentary sessions without the permission of the members. Yusuf stormed out of the hall, but was pursued by more moderate members who urged him to proceed with his presentation.

Meanwhile, the Kabul populace--particularly students from Kabul University and a high school near the parliament building--were beginning to show great interest in the proceedings. Student interest appears to have been deliberately stimulated by both leftist and progovernment elements attempting to stir up popular enthusiasm for their respective factions. A number of students were in the galleries when Yusuf gave his 21 October speech, and their vociferous approval of his remarks suggests they may have been planted there by supporters of the Yusuf regime.

On 24 October, when Yusuf returned to present his cabinet to the assembly, throngs of the

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curious and confused citizenry crowding the Council chambers and the streets outside so obstructed the proceedings that the president of the lower house was forced to postpone the session. The spectators--mostly students--were finally dispersed with help from the army.

To forestall further confusion, the People's Council met in closed session the following day. Loudspeakers outside the parliament building, which had broadcast previous sessions to the crowds, were turned off. As a precaution against further disorders, several truckloads of troops and six armored cars were positioned outside. Students who had turned out for the session were incensed at their exclusion from the Council chamber. Scuffling with security forces quickly mushroomed into wider rioting in which government forces fired upon the crowd. Several dozen civilians and a number of policemen reportedly died in the clashes.

Under heavy pressure from King Zahir the People's Council hastily gave a vote of confidence to the Yusuf government on the afternoon of 25 October. Rioting continued into the evening, however, now centering on protests against excessive government brutality and demands that students arrested during the day be released.

These protests were echoed in parliament in the days that followed. Yusuf appeared before the lower house on 27 October, but was received coolly.

These discordant developments must have alarmed King Zahir and the Moheemdzai, whose interest in political reform is strongly tempered by a determination not to let matters get out of hand. On 29 October the King asked for and received Yusuf's resignation, appointing in his stead Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, formerly minister of press and information.

Maiwandwal is a relative newcomer to cabinet-level politics, having spent much of his official career in diplomatic posts abroad. He was first appointed to the cabinet last January, after having served as ambassador to the UK, the US, and Pakistan. Although not the most politically influential of Yusuf's cabinet colleagues, Maiwandwal may well be stronger now than Yusuf was when he assumed office in 1963. Like Yusuf, Maiwandwal has the backing of the King, and with the perquisites of high office now at his disposal, Maiwandwal is in a good position to improve his stature.

The cabinet presented to parliament by the new prime minister represented a substantial revision of the Yusuf government. In general, most of the cabinet members have had extensive experience in their fields, but they do not--at least at the outset--command much political muscle.

Maiwandwal moved quickly and effectively to reduce both parliamentary and student restiveness. He appeared unescorted at

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Kabul University on 4 November to express his condolences for the student fatalities and to listen to student grievances while Maiwandwal was heckled by the leftist fringe; most students were receptive, and as the visit ended he was carried to his car on the shoulders of several enthusiastic students.

Maiwandwal has also been favorably received by parliament. This may be due in part to heavy pressure from the King, but it also reflects satisfaction with the new prime minister's willingness to cooperate with legislative committees set up to investigate corruption in government and other matters.

Problems and Prospects

After three of the most eventful and turbulent months in recent Afghan history, affairs finally seem fairly well under control. The legislature, eager to avoid the rigors of a Kabul winter in the unheated parliament building, has recessed until next March.

Student protests continue, but they are--temporarily, at least--on such relatively nonpolitical issues as difficult examinations, the policy of eliminating students who have flunked three times running, and German professors whose lectures are too obscure. The prime minister is therefore reasonably free to concentrate on the longer range problem of consolidating his political position and setting his new government to work at the major administrative tasks

involved in Afghanistan's political and economic modernization.

Maiwandwal's longevity as prime minister will depend on his ability to retain the support of the traditional sources of power--the King, the royal family, and tribal elements--while contending successfully with the growing influence of newer elements, such as the urban educated elite, the students, and an independent-minded parliament.

At present there is every indication that the King's interest in continued political reform has not been significantly dampened. He is probably more sensitive than before, however, to the danger that liberalization will lead to unrest. Renewed and protracted disorders would alarm the royal family and strengthen sentiment favoring a return to Daud's repressive methods. Rumors circulating in Kabul have, in fact, linked Daud with the recent disturbances, but they are thus far unsubstantiated.

It is therefore imperative that the new prime minister prove his ability to maintain control, and student agitation could well develop into a major test. The Kabul University students have long nursed a number of grudges, some legitimately and some in largely unjustified reaction to administration efforts to raise standards. The students did not become politically involved until the recent parliamentary election campaign. At that time, many students, under the strong influence of Kabul's small urban

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intelligentsia, actively supported the candidacy of several leftists. A small but vocal segment of the student body now seems determined to keep this political consciousness alive. They are helped by the heady feeling of the students that they were largely responsible for the fall of the Yusuf government.

In his effort to bring these forces under control, Maiwandwal has selected as education minister Dr. Mohammed Osman Anwari, a conservative and a strict disciplinarian who was formerly rector of Kabul University. The government has considerable leverage over the students through its authority to control enrollments. Because a university degree virtually guarantees the graduate a good job, the fear of dismissal can be an effective deterrent to unauthorized behavior. Seven students were expelled on 10-12 December for their part in campus demonstrations. One campus agitator, a junior mathematics instructor, has been summarily fired and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for 'crimes against the public interest and security.'

Control of parliament may prove to be a somewhat more elusive goal. Although political parties have not yet been authorized, members of the lower house already appear to be drifting into several distinct groups. By far the largest of these is extremely conservative, loyal to the King, and resistant to any changes that would disrupt their traditional Islamic society. For the most part members of this group were elected to parliament

from outlying constituencies where their selection was strongly influenced by the local leadership structure. Although this group probably would support programs publicly endorsed by the King, it is unlikely to feel as receptive toward those identified solely with Maiwandwal.

At the opposite political pole is a small but vocal group of Marxists representing several Kabul constituencies. Their following is not large--they have no influence outside Kabul--but they are better organized and more active than the conservative deputies. They are also capable of evoking the support of some student groups.

More or less in the political center, but divided into rightward and leftward leaning factions, is a group of moderates who were senior officials in the Yusuf government or who have ties with former Yusuf cabinet ministers.

The president of the People's Council, Dr. Abdul Zaher, who was deputy prime minister in the Yusuf government, is influential among the more conservative centrists, while former deputy planning minister M. S. Farhang leads a small socialist faction. The moderates generally favor the King's gradual approach to reform, but personal rivalries are strong and many disapprove of the appointment of Maiwandwal. A number of opponents of the new prime minister presumably would have preferred the selection of Dr. Zaher.

Maiwandwal risks having his position subtly undermined if he fails to conciliate the rival

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elements in the political center, both within and outside parliament. He has already taken a first step to guard against this by appointing several former members of Yusuf's cabinet as key advisers.

Just what effect the eventual formation of political parties will have remains to be seen. Several members of parliament with varying political leanings appear eager to form and lead such parties. The passage of enabling legislation must await the reconvening of parliament next March. Even then, the political parties law proposed by the government may well be couched in language designed to minimize the initial impact of the parties, allowing them only gradually to assume a meaningful role in the political system.

Apart from the immediate problem of staying in office, the Maiwandwal government must cope with the major task of administering Afghanistan's various development programs. Cabinet reshuffling has eliminated a number of key administrators and the promotion of several deputy ministers to the cabinet has left a number of second-ranking posts vacant. The dearth of administrative talent is felt even more severely at lower levels of government. These personnel deficiencies point up the pressing requirement for greater ad-

vances in education, a need that will be felt with increasing urgency as economic development enters more advanced stages.

The Afghan economy seems reasonably well in hand for the time being, although serious problems may lie ahead if the government's fiscal affairs are not handled prudently. A foreign-exchange crisis earlier this year forced the government to turn to the International Monetary Fund for help. The IMF agreed to provide \$6.75 million in foreign exchange, but only after Kabul committed itself to raising tax and customs rates and curbing inflationary government borrowing from the central bank. As a result, the steady depreciation of the Afghani ceased in May, and its free market value has since remained relatively stable. Inflationary pressures may still prove troublesome, however, if local currency expenditures for development generate more purchasing power than can be adequately absorbed.

In foreign policy matters Maiwandwal will probably pursue the nonaligned course set by his predecessors. Many of his cabinet colleagues are US educated and seem generally well disposed toward the US. Nevertheless, the proximity of the USSR, and the major Soviet contributions of military and economic aid, argue for continued close ties with Moscow.

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Strains may again develop in Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan, but a repetition of the 1961 diplomatic rupture is unlikely. During the recent India-Pakistan hostilities, Kabul remained neutral and refrained from taking advantage of Pakistan's commitment of nearly all its regular troops to the Kashmir and Punjab war zones. There are indications, however, that Afghanistan now intends to press hard for some Pakistani conces-

sions on the Pushtoon question. The new Afghan foreign minister, Nur Ahmed Etemadi--until recently ambassador to Pakistan--has appeared in the past to be in sympathy with Prince Daud's hard line and can be expected to present Afghanistan's case forcefully. The King and the Mohammedzai, however, will probably not allow a repetition of anything like the unhappy developments that ended the Daud regime. ~~(SECRET)~~

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T. Smith
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CONFIDENTIAL

September 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

I talked with Mrs. Gonella in Mrs. Johnson's office about the possibility of her seeing Princess Aliya of Afghan while she was here in Washington (See Read/Bundy Memo of 9/3/65).

We agreed to say Mrs. Johnson would be delighted to see the Princess but regrets that this will not be possible inasmuch as Mrs. Johnson is away now, is leaving for the Grand Tetons from the 7th until the 11th, and might then go to Texas. The Princess will be here only until the 10th. *cl*

told it to the director.

RWK

R. W. Komer

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By *DCB*, NARA, Date *10-7-91*



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
September 2, 1965

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2- Ret.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Afghan Princess to Call on
Mrs. Johnson

Princess Aliya, sister of the Queen of Afghanistan and now in Washington with her husband Prince Ghazi, has indicated a desire to call briefly on Mrs. Johnson. The Princess will be in Washington through Friday, September 10. A brief biographic sketch of the Princess is enclosed.

The American Ambassador enjoys excellent personal relations with the King of Afghanistan who exercises very considerable power in Afghanistan. These relations continue to be an important asset in promoting United States objectives in that strategically located land. The Department believes that a brief call by the Princess on Mrs. Johnson would be a very helpful contribution to improving our relations with the Royal family.

If this request for a call on Mrs. Johnson is granted, we would hope that Mrs. Majid, the wife of the Afghan Ambassador; Mrs. William J. Handley, wife of the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and an interpreter could also be present.

The Princess is not expected to raise any matters of substance.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch of Princess Aliya

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SEP 11 1965
12.14.05

SEP 3 1965

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Princess Aliya of Afghanistan

Princess Aliya is a sister of Queen Homaria of Afghanistan who paid a State visit to the United States in 1963. The Princess is in Washington with her husband, Prince Sultan Mahmud Ghazi, a cousin of King Mohammed Zahir Shah and President of the Afghan Air Authority. The Prince is here as a guest of the Department of State under the Department's Leader Grant program.

The Princess is about 37 years of age. She was educated in Kabul, Switzerland and Canada. She has four children, one son and three daughters, all of whom reside in Kabul; the youngest is only 15 months old. The Princess speaks some French but no English.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By JK/SP NARA, Date 12.14.05

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

49

August 14, 1964

Mr. Benjamin H. Read

Attached is approved Presidential
message to Afghan Student Associa-
tion for dispatch.

McGeorge Bundy



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AUG 11 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message to
Afghan Students Association

The Association of Afghan Students in the United States is to hold its annual convention at Harvey Mudd College in Claremont, California on September 3, 4 and 5. Some 200 Afghan students from various colleges and universities in the United States will meet to exchange views and elect officials for the coming year. The Afghan Ambassador, various educators and South Asian scholars will also attend. We believe a Presidential message to the convention would be very helpful in impressing these future leaders with the continuing interest of the United States in Afghanistan's freedom and prosperity. A similar message was sent to last year's meeting of the students. A suggested message is enclosed.

Hawthorne Mills
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested message.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Suggested Presidential Message

It gives me great pleasure to extend my greetings to the Afghan Student Association. It is my hope that your stay in the United States has been pleasant and beneficial. Most importantly, I hope you will carry back to your own country useful skills and experiences that will enable you to participate effectively in the great task of nation building being carried forward under the wise leadership of King Mohammad Zahir.

I also feel that the United States will gain from your stay here because of the opportunity provided for direct exchange of thoughts and ideas between the young people of both our countries. This in turn will lead to greater understanding and a strengthening of our friendly relations. I especially hope that you will return to your own country with the knowledge that the United States firmly supports your Government's courageous efforts to build a prosperous and free nation.

My best wishes for your future success and happiness.

Lyndon B. Johnson

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~SECRET~~

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Info

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LIMDIS

PRELIMINARY 25x1 REPORTS RE POSSIBLE PRESENCE AFGHANISTAN
SOVIET MISSILES HAVE NOW RPT NOW RECEIVED CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONFIRM-
ATION. 25x1 VISUAL OBSERVATION LATE IN EVENING
AUGUST 12 OF LARGE MILITARY CONVOY INCLUDING CONSIDERABLE
NUMBER SINGLE-AXLE SEMI-TRAILERS OF TYPE DESIGNED TRANSPORT
SAM-2 MISSILES. 25x1 SIX SEMI-TRAILERS WITH CANVAS
CFN 83 27 12 13 5PM 25x1 12 SAM-2.

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 161 ~~SECRET~~
COVERS SHROUDING WHAT LOOKED SUSPICIOUSLY LIKE MISSILES THEM-
SELVES. IN ACCORDANCE LOCAL CUSTOM, WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY ANY
SUCH NEW AFGHAN MILITARY CAPABILITY WILL BE REVEALED FOR FIRST
TIME AT ANNUAL JESHYN MILITARY PARADE AUGUST 23.

WHILE AFGHAN DESIRE OBTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEM OF SUCH DEGREE OF
SOPHISTICATION WOULD MAKE NEITHER ECONOMIC NOR MILITARY SENSE IN
TERMS COUNTRY'S BACKWARDNESS, FACT IS RGA HAS BEEN CONCERNED
FOR SOME TIME RE ALLEGED INFRACTIONS OF AIR SPACE ALONG PAK BORDER
BY PAK MILITARY AIRCRAFT (EMBTTEL 456, JANUARY 30, 1964). AFGHANS
HAVE FELT UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE MEET THIS THREAT AS WAS
MADE CLEAR TO ME EVEN BY SUCH ANTI-COMMUNIST KEY ROYAL FAMILY
MEMBER AS ABDUL WALI. ADDITIONALLY, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, KING
PROBABLY KEENLY INTERESTED IN EMPHASIZING TO AFGHAN PEOPLE THAT
COUNTRY'S DEFENSES, PRIMARILY AGAINST PAKISTAN, ARE IN GOOD
REPAIR AT TIME WHEN DISMISSAL FROM OFFICE PRO-PUSHTUNISTAN
CONSERVATIVES AND EFFORTS GET LIBERAL CONSTITUTION THROUGH LOE
JIRGA MAKE REFORMIST REGIME VULNERABLE ATTACKS FROM PUSHTUNISTAN
CFN 23456 30 1964

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~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"Authority NLI-001R-116-002/13By fc NARA, Date 1-2-14

~~SECRET~~

-2- 83, August 13, 5 P.M., From Kabul

PATRIOTS". SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S TWO CALLS ON KING IN RECENT WEEKS MAY IN PART BE EXPLAINABLE THIS BASIS.

EVEN THOUGH MISSILES CLEARLY DEFENSIVE IN CHARACTER AND MAY BE OBSOLESCE IN GREAT POWER TERMS, AND WHILE AFGHANS CAN HARDLY BE EXPECTED OPERATE THEM EFFECTIVELY, THEIR ACQUISITION AND SUDDEN DISPLAY AT JESHYN COULD WELL PROMPT SERIOUS REACTION PAKISTAN.

25x1

I HAVE THOUGHT PROPER MENTION REPORT TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR ONLY. HE HAD HAD NO RPT NO SIMILAR INFO BUT COMPLETELY AGREED THAT MOST SENSITIVE ASPECT MATTER LIKELY BE EXTEND AND CHARACTER PAK REACTION.

QUESTION ARISES WHETHER, AND IF SO HOW, GOP SHOULD BE DISCREETLY INFORMED OF LIKELIHOOD THAT AFGHANS NOW POSSESS SOME MISSILES. DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE USG OFFICIALS SHOULD DO SO LEST THIS GET BACK TO AFGHANS EITHER THROUGH RGA OR SOVIET PENETRATION OR TECHNICAL MONITORING PAK INTELLIGENCE. PERHAPS BRITISH MIGHT CFN

PAGE FOUR RUQVWB 161 ~~SECRET~~
DISCREETLY INFORM PAKS BUT THIS OBVIOUSLY HAS SOME OF SAME DRAWBACKS AS DIRECT USG CONTACT WITH GOP.

25x1

25x1

BORNE IN MIND THAT WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN ANY SUCH MISSILES AS RGA MAY HAVE ACQUIRED WILL UNQUESTIONABLY APPEAR PUBLICLY AT JESHYN.

DEPT'S GUIDANCE RE FOREGOING AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT IMPLICATIONS WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM PRESENCE ANY SUCH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY SOUTH OF HINDU KUSH WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

GP-2. STEEVES

BT

CFN 2

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Alghemist*

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Action

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Info

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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~~SECRET~~ SEONE OF TWO 34 JULY 20, 11 AM

July 20, 1964
3:09 a.m.

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JOINT EMBASSY-AID MESSAGE

PAID COURTESY CALL ON NEW MINISTER FINANCE JULY 18. IN RESPONDING FELICITATIONS, RISHTIYA SAID, "YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED MY UNUSUAL INTEREST IN FINANCIAL MATTERS DURING PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, FOR I HAVE KNOWN FOR SIX MONTHS THAT I WAS TO BE ASSIGNED TO THIS MINISTRY."

HE RECITED IN PRECISE TERMS ACUTE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES FACING COUNTRY. REPEATED, IN GENERAL, STORY PREVIOUSLY TOLD TO GERMAN AMBASSADOR (SEE EMBTEL 26), BUT SAID HE HAD HOPES IN HOLDING CFN 34 20 11 AM 18 26

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 235/1 ~~SECRET~~

DEFICIT BELOW BILLION AFGHANI LIMIT MENTIONED EARLIER. HE SAID, "MY POLICY WILL BE STRICTLY AN AUSTERITY PROGRAM WITH FULL BACKING OF KING AND PRIMIN." ILLUSTRATING SEVERE MEASURES BEING TAKEN, HE SAID HE HAD TOLD DEFENSE MINISTRY THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE ONLY EXPENDITURES HE WOULD GUARANTEE FOR DEFENSE WAS FOR PAY AND FOOD. OTHER THAN THAT, EVEN FOR CLOTHES, THEY MIGHT HAVE TO WAIT. HE HAD ORDERED CURTAILMENT IN EVERY ASPECT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE - BUILDING, TRAVEL, ENTERTAINMENT, ETC. HE HAD EVEN TAKEN \$6,000 FOR MEMBERSHIP DUES IN COLOMBO PLAN OUT OF HIS OWN MINISTRY BUDGET TO ILLUSTRATE HOW TIGHT SURVEILLANCE OF EXPENDITURES WOULD BE.

HE REPORTED HIS FIRST CONVERSATION WITH IMF TEAM NOW HERE. SAID HE HAD NOT HELD BACK BUT HAD GIVEN THEM ACCURATE PICTURE OF DIFFICULTIES TO BE FACED. THEY ASKING IMF FOR FIRST \$5 MILLION LOAN TRANCHE PLUS \$10 MILLION STAND-BY. HE NOTED THIS HELP WOULD BE USEFUL PRIMARILY VIS-A-VIS FOREIGN EXCHANGE ASPECT OF CURRENT FINANCIAL PROBLEM.
CFN \$6,000 \$5 MILLION \$10 MILLION

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By *Q*, NARA, Date *10/5/11*

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-2- 34, July 20, 11 a.m. from Kabul (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

HE REITERATED RGA'S NEED FOR ASSISTANCE. HE RECOGNIZED UPHILL BATTLE IN INTRODUCING AND ENFORCING TAX PROGRAM, CONTROL OF SMUGGLING, RAISING OF TARIFFS AND CONTROL ON IMPORTS, BUT FELT CERTAIN THAT THESE MEASURES WOULD BRING ABOUT IMPROVED FINANCIAL SITUATION IN TIME. HE RECALLED PRIMIN'S APPROACH TO ME SOON AFTER LATTER'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW (SEE EMBTEL 708). RISHTIYA ALSO RECALLED THAT HE HAD APPROACHED THE FRG FOR ASSISTANCE. HE EXPRESSED APPREHENSION WITH RESPECT TO WHEAT SITUATION, FEARED THAT EVEN GOOD PROSPECTS THIS YEAR WOULD NOT OVERCOME EFFECTS STILL BEING FELT FROM HEAVY SHORTAGE LAST YEAR WHEN EVEN SURPLUS AREAS LIKE HERAT HAD HAD TO BE HELPED TO TUNE OF 12,000 TONS. HE RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN DOMESTIC BUYING FOR DEFENSE FOOD SUPPLIES LEST IT HAVE INFLATIONARY EFFECT ON PRICES OF WHEAT. HE WONDERED THEREFORE IF, IN CONSIDERING WHAT HELP US MIGHT BE ABLE TO OFFER, WHETHER WE WILLING TO THINK IN TERMS OF 50,000 TONS OF WHEAT AGAIN.

I TOLD FINANCE MINISTER WE NOT IN POSITION TODAY TO RESPOND WITH RESPECT TO ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE GLAD TO TALK GENERAL PRINCIPLES WITH HIM AND EXPLAIN VARIOUS PROGRAMS WHICH, IF APPLIED FOR AND APPROVED, WERE SOMETIMES USED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I TOLD HIM OF REASONS WHY WE RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER WHEAT:

1. TITLE 2 PROGRAM IN STRICTER SENSE HARDLY APPLICABLE. I ALSO REMINDED RISHTIYA THAT I HAD TOLD PRIMIN LAST YEAR THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH NOW PREVAIL WE WOULD NOT RESPOND FAVORABLY TO TITLE 2 REQUEST.

2. CONTINUOUS IMPORTATION WHEAT HAD TENDENCY TO DEPRESS AFGHAN PRODUCTION THIS VITAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT ENCOURAGING FARMERS TO TURN TO SUCH CROPS AS COTTON. IN LONG RUN THIS DETRIMENTAL NOT BENEFICIAL.

3. AS GENERATOR OF LOCAL CURRENCY, WHEAT BULKY, MADE GREAT DEMANDS ON TRANSPORTATION, RELATIVELY SPEAKING, IN COMPARISON WITH CERTAIN OTHER COMMODITIES AND WAS NOT GREAT SOURCE OF LOCAL CURRENCY.

NUCKER EXPLAINED IN BROAD TERMS VARIOUS PL 480 PROGRAMS OF VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR WHICH RGA MIGHT APPLY. RISHTIYA INDICATED GREATEST INTEREST IN TITLE 4. MENTION OF EDIBLE OILS WAS OF GREAT INTEREST TO HIM AND HE

ASKED WHETHER SUGAR ALSO AVAILABLE UNDER SUCH PROGRAM. WE POINTED OUT THAT AVAILABILITIES UNDER PL 480 WERE BASED ON U.S. SURPLUSES. WE WERE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF SUGAR BUT MENTIONED VARIOUS OTHER PRODUCTS WHICH, IF APPROVED, COULD BE INCLUDED. HE MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING WHEAT IN THIS CATEGORY. GP-2. STEEVES

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of Sta.*

44

~~SECRET~~Action
NEAControl: 15351
Rec'd: JULY 20, 1964
3:43 A.M.Info
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FROM: KABUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 34

DATE: JULY 20, 11 A.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11)

JOINT EMBASSY - AID MESSAGE

RISHTIYA EXPLAINED THAT ALL SUCH PROBLEMS NOW WERE REFERRED TO HIGH ECONOMIC COUNCIL CONSISTING OF HIMSELF, MINISTER OF PLANNING YAFTALI, MINISTER OF COMMERCE SARWAR OMAR, PRESIDENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN BANK AND MR. ZABULI. HE WOULD CONFER WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AND GIVE US THEIR VIEWS LATER.

WHILE I EMPHASIZED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT WE WERE MERELY PROVIDING INFORMATION CONCERNING OUR VARIOUS PROGRAMS AND COULD GIVE HIM NO INDICATION WHATSOEVER AS TO WHAT RECEPTION A SPECIFIC REQUEST WOULD RECEIVE IN WASHINGTON, WE LEFT HIS OFFICE WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT WE MAY INDEED BE HEARING MORE, NEXT IN TERMS OF A DEFINITE REQUEST. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN THE REPORT OF THE IMF. I URGED HIM TO COMPLY WITH WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS IMF MIGHT SUGGEST ON RESTRICTIONS WHICH THEY MIGHT IMPOSE, FOR WE HAD THE HABIT OF PAYING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO IMF'S ANALYSIS OF A COUNTRY'S FINANCIAL ILLS AND METHODS TO CORRECT THEM. HE AGREED THIS VERY IMPORTANT AND SAID THEY WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO COOPERATE WITH IMF'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

COMMENT: WHILE WE WERE CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE FINANCE MINISTER, AS STATED, NUCKER AND I ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE WE MAY RECEIVE REQUEST FOR SOME RELIEF. AS STATED IN EMBTEL 24, WE BELIEVE THE PAST AND PRESENT ACTIONS THIS GOVT WARRANTS SOME MODEST ASSISTANCE TO AFFORD RELIEF TO THIS GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT HARD-PRESSED CIRCUMSTANCES. I WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE SOME WORD FROM DEPARTMENT AS TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF RESPONDING FAVORABLY SHOULD THE REQUEST MATURE

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-2- 34, JULY 20, 11 A.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM KABUL

FOR A LOAN EITHER UNDER PL 480, TITLE 4 OR UNDER A SUPPORT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. IF DEPARTMENT FEELS THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING A REQUEST FAVORABLY, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE SOME GUIDANCE AS TO WHAT TYPE OF PROGRAM IT MIGHT CONSIDER MOST SUITABLE FOR MEETING THE PRESENT SITUATION.

GP-2.

STEEVES

SMD/22

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Afghanistan**52*34
ActionSS
Info~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Control: 121
Rec'd: JULY 1, 1964
5:41 A.M.

FROM: KABUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 2

INFO: KARACHI 1
TEHRAN 1
DOD UNNUMBERED

024

DATE: JULY 1, 1 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

LIMDIS

DEPTELS 343 AND 396

HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM HOUR AND TEN MINUTE AUDIENCE WITH HIS MAJESTY KING ZAHED. KING IN UNUSUAL ACTIVE, TALKATIVE AND COURAGEOUS MOOD. GAVE PRONOUNCED IMPRESSION OF BEING MUCH MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNTRY AND EXHIBITED DEEPER INTEREST IN ALL SUBJECTS DISCUSSED THAN HAS BEEN TRUE OF HIS MAJESTY SOMETIMES IN THE PAST. INTERVIEW OPENED WITH PLEASANT EXCHANGES RE HEALTH OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN WHO RETURNING TO KABUL ON FRIDAY, REPORTEDLY IN GOOD HEALTH. AS TOKEN OF PERSONAL ESTEEM AND FRIENDLINESS, I GAVE HIS MAJESTY A PAIR OF ELCTRIC SOCK I HAD ACQUIRED FOR HIM IN WASHINGTON "FROM ONE HUNTER TO ANOTHER."

I CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF DEPTEL 343 TO HIS MAJESTY. IN SPEAKING OF SUBJECT CONTAINED PARA 3, I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON COULD SPEAK WITH KNOWLEDGE AND FEELINGLY ON SUBJECT OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS LEGISLATION, ETC., HAVING JUST BEEN THROUGH INTENSIVE EFFORTS HIMSELF ON SUCH MATTERS AS CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION. I COMMENTED THAT AFGHANISTAN'S REFORM PROGRAM, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND PROGRESSIVE MATTERS THIS CHARACTER WERE SUBJECTS IN WHICH PRESIDENT HAD DEEP PERSONAL CONCERN AND INTEREST.

KING EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE CONTINUING INTEREST OF THE PRESIDENT AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. SAID THAT

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By *SP* NARA, Date *10/5/11*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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-2- 2, JULY 1, 1 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM KABUL

HE WAS SORRY THAT HE DID NOT MEET PRESIDENT JOHNSON DURING HIS OWN UNFORGETTABLE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. HE WISHED TO HAVE THESE PERSONAL SENTIMENTS OF GRATITUDE AND GREETING CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT TOGETHER WITH HIS ADMIRATION FOR WHAT HE HAD HEARD CONCERNING SUCH EFFORTS AS CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM. HE SAID THAT CONCERNING HIS OWN REFORM PROGRAM, "THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE ADOPTED BY THE LOY JIRGA ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER JESHYN." THIS PLACES THE ANTICIPATED DATE APPROXIMATELY MID-SEPTEMBER. I RECALLED PLEASANT OCCASION WHEN UNIVERSITY BUILDINGS DEDICATED AT WHICH WE BOTH PRESENT. I USED THIS AS ILLUSTRATION OF THE MEANING OF PARA 4 REFTTEL. HE SAID WISHED ASSURE ME AGAIN HOW GRATEFUL HE IS FOR UNITED STATES MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT AND REMARKED THAT AS AFGHANISTAN PROGRESSED ALONG ITS NEW ROAD, HE PROBABLY WOULD BE TALKING TO US ABOUT AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD BE OF CONTINUING HELP.

I THEN PASSED ON MESSAGE CONTAINED IN DEPTTEL 396. KING LAUNCHED INTO SPRIGHTLY DISCUSSION OF MEANING OF PRESIDENT AYUB'S VISIT. HE SAID PRESIDENT AYUB HAD ASKED TO PAY A BRIEF VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN ON HIS WAY WEST AND HE HAD GLADLY EXTENDED INVITATION. HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYMBOLISM OF THIS GET-TOGETHER RATHER THAN EXPECTATION ANY DEFINITE BUSINESS TO BE TRANSACTED. HE SAID THE PERSONAL CONTACT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT AYUB WAS NOT AN EMPTY PROPAGANDA GESTURE. HE WOULD DEEPLY DEPLORE ANYBODY'S SUGGESTING THAT THIS WAS FOR MERE SHOW. HE STATED IT WOULD HELP FOR HIM AND AYUB TO BECOME PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED. HE SAID, "THE POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY IS TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL OF OUR NEIGHBORS. WE HAVE NO OTHER RECOURSE OR DESIRE." HE RECOUNTED LAST WEEK'S CONVERSATION WITH A CORRESPONDENT OF LONDON DAILY MAIL WHO HAD ASKED HIM IF AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT CONTEMPLATING ENTRY INTO SOME ALLIANCE LIKE CENTO, ETC. HE SAID, "I TOLD HIM AFGHANISTAN DOES NOT NEED SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. OUR SECURITY MUST BE BASED UPON AMICABLE RELATIONS AND IF THAT DOES NOT SUFFICE, THERE IS NO OTHER POLICY WE CAN FOLLOW."

WITH RESPECT TO IRAN, KING SAID RELATIONSHIPS WERE MUCH IMPROVED. MR. EQBAHL'S VISIT HAD PRODUCED GOOD RESULTS IN PETROLEUM AGREEMENT. THE ONE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCE WITH IRAN WAS THE DIVISION OF HELMAND WATERS WHICH NOW PRESENTED NO PROBLEM AS THEY HAD PRACTICALLY COME TO AGREEMENT AND THIS MATTER WOULD BE SETTLED SOON. GP-3.

STEEVES

MV

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

34
Action

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NNNNVV QVA606 VWA942 VVWB271
RR RUEHCR
DE RUQVWB 17/2 01/0820Z
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IN COMMENTING ON PEACE CORPS D

IN COMMENTING ON PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR SHRIVER'S VISIT, HE SPOKE VERY WARMLY OF THE MEETING AND REMINDED ME THAT HE HAD PROMISED SHRIVER THAT HE WOULD BECOME BETTER ACQUAINTED PERSONALLY WITH PEACE CORPS PERSONNEL. HE SAID, "THE WEATHER FOR GETTING AROUND IS BETTER NOW. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO CALL ON SOME OF THE PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS AT WORK."

ONE OF THE MOST PERTINENT COMMENTS TO EMERGE FROM INTERVIEW AROSE IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF TRAINING FOR AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICERS. HE ADVISED ME THAT HE WOULD ACT FAVORABLY ON ALLOWING CFN 1 12:30 PM.

PAGE TWO RUQVWB 17/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THREE SENIOR OFFICERS TO ACCEPT INVITATION TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT SPRING IN CONNECTION WITH A VIP TOUR FOR WHICH DA WILL EXTEND THREE INVITATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN. HE THEN DISCUSSED HIS OWN PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING THE LOT OF HIS MILITARY OFFICERS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT ONE MORE YEAR FOR HIM TO COMPLETE THE CURRENT EFFORT TO IMPROVE PAY, RATIONS, LIVING CONDITIONS AND PHYSICAL RECREATION FACILITIES FOR OFFICERS. HE THEN SAID, "WHEN I HAVE THESE FACILITIES READY,

I WANT TO INAUGURATE A MORE ACTIVE ORIENTATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR MY OFFICERS." THE TRANSLATOR INTERPRETED HIS MAJESTY'S REMARKS BY SAYING THAT HIS MAJESTY WAS ANXIOUS THAT HIS OFFICERS NOT BE SUBJECTED TO MERELY ONE POINT OF VIEW, BUT THAT HE WANTED THEM TO BE EXPOSED TO A VARIETY OF OPINIONS AND INFLUENCES. AT THAT POINT THE KING INTERRUPTED HIM AND THE TRANSLATOR SAID, "I AM SORRY,

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-2- 2, JULY 1, 1 PM: FROM KABUL (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

HIS MAJESTY HAS CORRECTED ME AND HAS SAID HIS MEANING IS THAT HE DOES NOT WANT ANY OF THIS PROGRAM TO BE CONTRIBUTED TO FROM THE BLOC, BUT WANTS IT ALL TO COME FROM THE UNITED STATES OR POSSIBLY SOME OTHER FRIENDLY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES." THE KING THEN EXPANDED ON HIS REQUEST BY POINTING OUT THAT HE WANTED A PROGRAM OF ORIENTATION, FILMS, LITERATURE, RECREATIONAL ITEMS, AND AS MUCH OF A PROGRAM AS COULD POSSIBLY BE ARRANGED FOR WHAT,

PAGE THREE RUQVWB 17/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN OUR TERMS, WOULD BE A VIRTUAL I&E PROGRAM. I TOLD HIM I WOULD BEAR HIS REQUEST IN MIND AND SEE WHAT WE MIGHT DO.

I REPORTED TO THE KING THAT OUR NEW CHANCERY BUILDING WOULD NOW SOON BE STARTED. HE AGAIN REMINDED ME THAT AS SOON AS WE HAVE THE GROUND PLANS, HE WANTED THE PRIVILEGE OF SUPPLYING ALL OF THE TREES, PLANTS, SHRUBS, ETC. FOR THE LANDSCAPING OF THE AREA.

COMMENT: AS MENTIONED EARLIER, HIS MAJESTY AT TIMES HAS A TENDENCY DURING INTERVIEWS TO DEAL IN GENERALITIES AND PLEASANTRIES WITHOUT TOO MUCH SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. THERE HAVE, OF COURSE, BEEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS IN THE PAST, TOO, SUCH AS MY SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH HIM BEFORE DEPARTING FOR WASHINGTON IN APRIL. IT IS RATHER SIGNIFICANT THAT HE WAS WILLING TO SEE ME THIS WEEK IN THE MIDST OF A CABINET SHAKE-UP, PREPARATIONS FOR THE RECEPTION OF PRESIDENT AYUB AND MIKOYAN FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE ENRGETIC

PAGE FOUR RUQVWB 17/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAY IN WHICH HE WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS AND PROBLEMS PLUS HIS OBVIOUS LACK OF FEAR IN RECEIVING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR DURING A PERIOD SUCH AS CURRENTLY EXISTS MAY BE TAKEN AS AN INDICATION OF HIS COURAGE AND INCREASED SELF-CONFIDENCE.

COUNTRY TEAM NOW CONSIDERING KING'S REQUEST FOR HELP RE ORIENTATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM AFGHAN OFFICERS AND WILL SUBMIT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO WASHINGTON SHORTLY.

GP-3. STEEVES

BT

CFN 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

46

Origin

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USIA

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

ACTION: Amembassy KABUL 396

Info: Amembassy KARACHI 1740
Amembassy TEHRAN 975

Your 741

We assume this will be first formal meeting with King since your return and that President's message (Deptel 343) will be basis your remarks.

In addition you might wish make following observations:

1. USG pleased with progress in Afghan-Pak relations. Invitation to Ayub particularly appropriate and we hope it presages further high level contacts between two countries. We realize progress some areas will be slow but assume RGA will do everything possible maintain forward momentum. FYI We have in mind further toning down Pushtunistan propaganda which seems to have increased in recent months. END FYI

2. We also welcome growing links with Iran. As King knows US believes Afghan security and prosperity can best be assured through increased ties with Free World in general and Muslim neighbors in particular.

GP-3

END

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By SC/AG NARA, Date 12-14-05

Note: Distribution coordinated with SS-0.

RUSK

Drafted by:
NEA:SOA:RJC/rbk 6-26-64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:
GTI - Mr. Thomas (draft)
AID/NESA - Mr. Pagan (draft)
White House - Mr. Saunders

SOA - Mr. Cameron
S/S - ~~XXXXXX~~ Miss Moor

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

June 26, 1964

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Indur for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft cable to Kabul

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 10-3-91

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Mac -

April 23, 1964

Steeves is doing a good job, and things do seem to be going our way in Afghanistan. But I'd regard LBJ's seeing him as far lower priority than many other foreign policy matters on which we want to bid for Presidential time.

In fact, we're entering home leave season, with a whole crew of ambassadors back. Why not pass word to State now, and save ourselves a lot of annoyance (and paper work)?

On other hand, I'd favor a personal LBJ message for Steeves to take to King on return. This would take 30 seconds of LBJ's time to read.

RWK

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Att: Memo, Read to Bundy, Subj: Meeting with the American Ambassador to Afghanistan
4/22/64

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By 1418 NRP, Date 12/14/05

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For me
File

55

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RWK
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cc. BKS

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By icly, NARA, Date 12-14-05



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1964

Afghanistan 2/50

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with the American
Ambassador to Afghanistan

Ambassador Steeves will be in Washington for consultation for about a week (April 23-May 1) in connection with his home leave.

Afghan-United States relations are friendly and following the King's visit here in September 1963, have been marked by a new warmth. The United States has a stake in the success of the new Afghan government, particularly in its efforts to develop institutions along democratic lines and to bolster the independence of Afghanistan. A new constitution has been drafted and hopefully will be promulgated this summer. In recent meetings with Ambassador Steeves, the King has cautiously indicated his hopes for lessening Soviet influence in the Afghan military establishment.

A brief talk between the President and Ambassador Steeves would demonstrate to the Afghans continuing United States support. This would be reinforced if the President would authorize the Ambassador, on his return to Kabul, to give the King a personal message indicating his sympathetic interest in Afghan developments, including particularly the new constitution and the King's efforts to restore a better balance in Afghan's non-aligned status.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch of
Ambassador Steeves.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *4/1/9*, NARA, Date *12-14-05*

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

APR 23 1964

55-16

JOHN M. STEEVES

Prior to being nominated as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Mr. John M. Steeves was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, assuming these responsibilities on the 19th of October, 1959. He is a Foreign Service Officer and in February 1961 the President conferred upon him the rank of Career Minister.

Mr. Steeves was born in Brinsmade, North Dakota, on May 6, 1905. After receiving his BA Degree from Walla Walla College in 1927, he spent sixteen years in India in educational work, taking a year out in 1936-38 to do graduate work for which he received his Masters Degree from the University of Washington. During the war he was associated with the Office of War Information in the China-Burma-India Theatre, and in August 1945 he joined the Department of State.

In 1948 Mr. Steeves was appointed a Consul and Secretary in the Diplomatic Service and was assigned as First Secretary at New Delhi. He was detailed to the National War College in Washington in 1950. Following his graduation in 1951, Mr. Steeves was named Chief of the Political Division of the American Embassy at Tokyo and in 1953 became Charge' d'Affaires ad interim and Counselor of the American Embassy at Djakarta, Indonesia. In 1955 he became Foreign Relations Consultant to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, serving concurrently as Consul General in Naha and Counselor of Embassy in Tokyo. In July 1957, he was named Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with the personal rank of Minister. Just prior to his return to the Department of State as Deputy Assistant Secretary, he was Consul General at Hong Kong.

With more than thirty years' service in Asia, Mr. Steeves has acquired extensive acquaintance with the general as well as the specific aspects of Asian countries; their culture, their lands and their peoples. His experience has been varied, ranging from service in Japan during the occupation and, more recently, as Political Adviser to the U.S. Pacific Command to administering United States programs of cultural relations in India. During his early service in India, he acquired the knowledge of two of India's chief languages, Urdu and Hindi. During the summer of 1961, the Ambassador served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Delegation at the 14-Nation International Conference on Laos.

He was in Washington in September 1963 to be present for the State Visit of the King of Afghanistan.

Mr. Steeves is married and has one married daughter. Mrs. Steeves accompanied him to his post. Mr. Steeves arrived on post in March 1962.

APP 23 1964



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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56
4/23
APR 22 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with the American
Ambassador to Afghanistan

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/s/ Benjamin H. Read

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch of
Ambassador Steeves.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
By: jcl/g Date: 12/14/05

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GROUP 3

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Mr. Steeves was born in Brinsmade, North Dakota, on May 6, 1905. After receiving his BA degree from Walla Walla College in 1927, he spent sixteen years in India in educational work, taking a year out in 1934-38 to do graduate work for which he received his Masters Degree from the University of Washington. During the war he was associated with the Office of War Information in the China-Burma-India Theatre, and in August 1945 he joined the Department of State.

In 1948 Mr. Steeves was appointed a Consul and Secretary in the Diplomatic Service and was assigned as First Secretary at New Delhi. He was detailed to the National War College in Washington in 1950. Following his graduation in 1951, Mr. Steeves was named Chief of the Political Division of the American Embassy at Tokyo and in 1953 became Charge' d'Affaires ad interim and Counselor of the American Embassy at Djakarta, Indonesia. In 1955 he became Foreign Relations Consultant to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, serving concurrently as Consul General in Naha and Counselor of Embassy in Tokyo. In July 1957, he was named Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with the personal rank of Minister. Just prior to his return to the Department of State as Deputy Assistant Secretary, he was Consul General at Hong Kong.

With more than thirty years' service in Asia, Mr. Steeves has acquired extensive acquaintance with the general as well as the specific aspects of Asian countries; their culture, their lands and their peoples. His experience has been varied, ranging from service in Japan during the occupation and, more recently, as Political Adviser to the U.S. Pacific Command to administering United States programs of cultural relations in India. During his early service in India, he acquired the knowledge of two of India's chief languages, Urdu and Hindi. During the summer of 1961, the Ambassador served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Delegation at the 14-Nation International Conference on Laos.

He was in Washington in September 1963 to be present for the State Visit of the King of Afghanistan.

Mr. Steeves is married and has one married daughter. Mrs. Steeves accompanied him to his post. Mr. Steeves arrived on post in March 1962.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MAR 29 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message to University
Dedication Ceremony in Kabul,
Afghanistan

On April 4 a ceremony will be held to commemorate the completion of the new campus of Kabul University, the most impressive United States aid project in the capital city. The United States contributed some four million dollars to this project.

We understand the ceremony will be attended by the King and senior officials of the Afghan Government.

We believe a presidential message delivered at the occasion by the Ambassador would be very useful in highlighting our contribution and our continuing interest in Afghan progress. If approved, we propose to send the enclosed telegram to Embassy Kabul.

J. E. Read
Benjamin E. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed telegram
to Amembassy Kabul.

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by _____

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*1- Komer
2- Ret. 3/31
Back to Komer
3/31*

Checked 4/14

*Komer sent to
Fedy 4/23*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 6, 1964

753
58

IN REPLY REFER TO:

S/S 2080

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible Change of Government
in Afghanistan

Our Embassy in Kabul reports that a cabinet shake-up may be in the offing.

Prime Minister Yusuf, appointed in March 1963 as the first commoner in Afghan history to hold that position, has been in poor health for some time. He may have to relinquish office completely or take a period of leave for medical treatment abroad.

In the latter case Deputy Prime Minister Malikiyar would probably take over on an interim basis.

If Yusuf is compelled to resign, a more permanent replacement is likely. Dr. Zahir, an American trained physician and President of the Afghan National Assembly, is considered a leading candidate. There are also unsubstantiated reports that Abdul Majid, currently Ambassador to the United States now in Afghanistan on home leave, and Abdul Zabouli (Afghanistan's leading financier who until recently lived in exile in the United States) are being considered.

These developments are significant because of their bearing on the continuing internal power struggle described in our memorandum of January 24, 1964. They appear to complicate the King's problems at a time when he is under heavy pressure by both the leading political factions in Afghanistan -- the liberals now dominating the Cabinet, and the adherents of former Prime Minister Daud. Our best information is that the King still supports the reform program but has been reluctant to take any action that might bring matters to a head.

Malikiyar,

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intervals; not
automatically declassified


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Authority NET 201 R-116-2-16
By SA, NARA, Date 10/5/11

FEB 7 1964

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- 2 -

Malikiyar, next in line of succession in the Cabinet, is a known supporter of Daud. His appointment to the Prime Ministership, though initially on an interim basis, might be prolonged and thereby strengthen the Daud forces. Dr. Zahir and the others are generally thought to be more sympathetic to the reform program. An appointment from this group, though signaling the King's decision to proceed with reforms, could lead to the conflict he has been seeking to avoid.


for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~



S/S 1417

~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Danger Signals in Afghanistan

As a result of recent danger signals from Kabul, we want to raise a warning of possible difficulties in Afghanistan. Our information is still scanty but an internal power struggle appears to be taking place. The Government's political reform movement is being challenged by certain members of the Royal Family led by former Prime Minister Daud. All the proponents are not known but the points at issue are clauses in the proposed new constitution which would liberalize the political system, bar Royal Family members from direct participation in the government, and reserve certain powers for the King.

The King, who dismissed his Royal cousin, Daud, in March of 1963 from the Prime Ministership and had been the main support for the reform program, seems to be hesitating in the face of Royal Family criticism. There are also reports that the struggle is reflected in the Army, the chief instrument of power in Afghanistan. Roughly, one group appears loyal to the King, the other tending to support Daud. The King apparently is seeking to strengthen his control of the Army before deciding what action to take in the political field. Reportedly, Daud has been in close touch with the Soviet Embassy.

Outlook

Daud is a powerful figure who ruled Afghanistan as a dynamic but ruthless dictator for ten years. If he obtains support from other principal branches of the Royal Family who dislike him but share his concern over the threat to the leading position of the Family posed

by the

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intervals; not
automatically declassified

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By SP, NARA, Date 10/5/11

JAN 27 1964

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
-2-

by the reform, the King, who in the past has not always been decisive, will probably be forced to accede to some of his demands. On the other hand, the King is publicly committed to the present reform program. His own and possibly Afghan national prestige would suffer were he to back down. Also, the small but growing liberal group in the country would be alienated. Since this group has limited political power, however, the King's concern for its views is probably minimal. The locus of power remains the Royal Family, the unity of which the King considers is essential to the future of Afghanistan.

It is too early to predict the outcome of this struggle but a compromise involving some concessions to Daud's point of view seems possible. In the extreme, which is unlikely, a showdown with possible violence and even Soviet involvement could develop.

Implications for U.S. Interests if Daud Succeeds

If Daud fully succeeds, U.S. interests will suffer. Resurgence of his influence could lead to worsening relations with Pakistan and an end to the King's efforts to achieve more balance in Afghanistan's relations with the USSR and the West.



Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Afghan

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36
Action

SS
Info

Control: 14380
Rec'd: January 21, 1964
7:25 a.m.

60

FROM: Kabul

ACTION: Secstate 436

DATE: January 21, 11 a.m.

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Reference EMBTEL 435.

Minister Interior Kayeum reviewed current internal political difficulties with DCM during extended private talk late January 20. Following were Kayeum's main points:

1. Current political uncertainties due ex-Prime Minister Daud's increasingly open and unalterable opposition number key elements new Constitution, notably:

(A) Definition Royal Family which by including first cousins and brothers-in-law King would definitely exclude Daud and Naim from political life; and

(B) What Daud regards as overly powerful role for King even under new Constitution.

2. Daud has been seeing Soviet Ambassador and otherwise acting in "crazy, childish" manner in effort undermine Yusuf Cabinet.

3. Liberal activists in Cabinet (notably Kayeum) had wanted deal with threat posed by Daud themselves. However, Prime Minister Yusuf, who continues unwell, apparently has temporized and King has said he wishes deal with Daud himself. Kayeum commented his Majesty had been "pretty firm" in his support Yusuf Cabinet and that, while not a

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Authority NSA001R-116-2-18
By P, NARA, Date 10/5/11

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-2- 436, January 21, 11 a.m. from Kabul.

man given to decisive action, King was apparently having increasingly serious doubts that Daud had interests Royal Family at heart. Accordingly, King had recently sent Foreign Office Secretary-General Nur Etemadi (who Kayeum described as die-hard Daud-Naim supporter) to Daud to tell him King backing Yusuf Cabinet and does not desire change now.

4. Expressing "personal optimism" about outcome, Kayeum said he doubted current difficulties would result in real overt trouble. Said he was sure Yusuf and Cabinet liberals would win if King gave them whole-hearted support but admitted outcome uncertain if royal vacillation continues. Expressing sympathy but impatience with both King and Yusuf, Kayeum added he respected Daud more because of latter's decisiveness and clear idea what he wants. He indicated portion military as well as all influential Foreign Office officials would support Daud and implied last month's unrest Kabul University also pro-Daud. Said he felt Yusuf should combat Daud forces openly by releasing political prisoners and prosecuting reform program energetically but indicated Yusuf so far unwilling thus throw down gauntlet. Failing this, Kayeum would like see King openly support new Constitution (presumably authorizing its early publication) and make clear publicly his view Daud as Royal Family member would be excluded politics. Unless this done, Kayeum fears many Afghans will continue with-hold full support Yusuf Cabinet fearing Daud's return to power and his reprisals thereafter.

Comment: While Kayeum's bitterness against Daud must be borne in mind in assessing foregoing, we believe it fairly accurate picture current disturbed political scene here. To Kayeum and other liberals, Constitution is important largely as means checkmating Daud and King's whole-hearted support key elements text as written accordingly is required. However, King apparently on horns dilemma under which his full support to liberals might weaken power position Royal Family but if he in effect encourages greater role for Daud and his supporters,

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-3- 436, January 21, 11 a.m. from Kabul.

net effect may well be the same. In circumstances, it by no means clear how or when current difficulties may be resolved.

GP-2.

STEEVES

MBK-18

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1. Mr. Komer

2. Return to Bromley Smith

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Komer
W H *61a*

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Control: 2235
Rec'd: JANUARY 6, 1964
4:32 AM

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FROM: KABUL

ACTION: SECSTATE 412

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DATE: JANUARY 6

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2/18/64

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 212

FROM KING ZAHIR'S STANDPOINT, ONE OF MOST GRATIFYING RESULTS HIS MAJESTY'S STATE VISIT LAST SEPTEMBER WAS INFORMAL AGREEMENT REACHED WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHEREBY PRESIDENT AND HIS MAJESTY MIGHT REMAIN IN PERSONAL TOUCH. PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOLD HIS MAJESTY HE COULD REACH HIM AT ANY TIME THROUGH PRIVATE MESSAGE SENT VIA AMERICAN AMBASSADOR KABUL. THE SECRETARY IS PERSONALLY AWARE OF THIS ARRANGEMENT.

VIEW FOREGOING, I SUSPECT HIS MAJESTY MAY INTERPRET PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL LETTER CARRIED BY SHRIVER, NOTABLY PARA A. WLTNUKG*, AS MODIFYING OR RESTRICTING EARLIER UNDERSTANDING. ACCORDINGLY, I WOULD HOPE I MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED AT APPROPRIATE TIME TO ASSURE HIS MAJESTY THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS FULLY AWARE OF UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN KING AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND WILL OF COURSE BE AGREEABLE RECEIVING HIS MAJESTY'S PERSONAL AND PRIVATE VIEWS AT ANY TIME ON SAME BASIS AS AGREED UPON WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

GP-2

STEEVES

LM

*As received.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jclg* NARA, Date 12.14.05

EXDIS

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JAN 6 1964

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Authority requested in paragraph 2 of reftel granted.

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E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By jc/g, NARA, Date 12-14-05

Drafted by:

NEA:PTalbot/S/S-BHR Read: jml
1/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

afghan 63

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Control:

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Rec'd:

DECEMBER 9, 1963

4:20 PM

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FROM: KARACHI

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1112, DECEMBER 9, 6 PM

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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1112, INFO KABUL PRIORITY 115,
TEHRAN, PESHAWAR, LONDON UNNUMBERED.

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RMR

DURING OUR CALL ON FONSEC AZIZ AHMED DECEMBER 7, GRANT AND I HAD OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION BOTH GENERAL ATMOSPHERE AND CERTAIN PENDING ISSUES IN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS.

IN RESPONSE OUR QUERY HOW FONSEC VIEWED PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS AS A WHOLE, HE REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH IT SOMEWHAT TOO EARLY TO SAY, HE THOUGHT GOOD RELATIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED OVER PERIOD OF TIME. GOP SINCERELY DESIRED FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS AND WILL DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER BRING THIS ABOUT. FONSEC HOPED GRANT WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY WHILE IN KABUL FOLLOWING WEEK TO REMIND AFGHANS THAT AGREEMENT TO RESTORE RELATIONS REACHED AT TEHRAN WAS BASED ON PRECISELY THOSE PROPOSALS MADE TO PRESIDENT AYUB BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY AT NEWPORT IN SEPTEMBER 1962 AND WHICH PAKS THEN OBLIGED TO REJECT. FACT THAT GOP HAD "SURRENDERED" AND AGREED TO THESE SAME PROPOSALS IN TOTO AT TEHRAN IN MAY, 1963 WAS INDICATION GOP'S EARNEST DESIRE TO MEND RELATIONS, EVEN IF NECESSARY TO GO TO EXTREME LENGTHS. TEHRAN AGREEMENT WAS NO COMPROMISE, LITERALLY ALL CONCESSIONS HAVING COME FROM PAK SIDE. IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE OF HOPEFUL CHANGE IN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FROM DAUD TO YUSUF THAT PRESIDENT AYUB AGREED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. FONSEC HOPED THAT AFGHANS APPRECIATED EFFORTS GOP HAD MADE REGARDLESS OF "FACE" CONSIDERATIONS, AND WOULD RECIPROCATATE BY MAKING SUBSTANTIAL AFGHAN CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.

FONSEC NOTED

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Authority NGDIR-116-2-19
By JP, NARA, Date 10/5/11

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-2- 1112, DECEMBER 9, 6 PM FROM KARACHI.

FONSEC NOTED THAT IN AMBASSADOR YOUSUF'S FIRST CALL ON AFGHAN KING, THE LATTER HAD BEEN MOST COURTEOUS AND POLITE. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, YOUSUF HAD RECEIVED LONG LECTURE ON PUSHTUNISTAN FROM PM. AT ONE POINT DURING THIS LONG DISCUSSION PM HAD DROPPED HINT THAT SUGGESTED AFGHAN STATEMENTS ON PUSHTUNISTAN MIGHT BE ONLY FOR THE RECORD, BUT GOP WAS NEVERTHELESS TAKING A GENERAL "WAIT AND SEE" STANCE. GOP HAS IMPRESSION AFGHANS GENERALLY UNHAPPY WITH WAY THINGS WENT UNDER DAUD AND THAT HE FOLLOWED WRONG POLICIES. CERTAINLY THE GOP REGARDS NEW GOVERNMENT AS IMPROVEMENT.

FONSEC SAID ONE OF PROBLEMS WAS GENERAL AFGHAN PRACTICE "RUSHING INTO THINGS" WITHOUT CAREFUL DELIBERATION AND CITED AS EXAMPLE THE WAY AFGHANS WENT AHEAD IMMEDIATELY AFTER RELATIONS RE-ESTABLISHED, STATIONING CONSULS AND COMMENCING TRUCK TRANSIT EVEN BEFORE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE ACCREDITED OR OTHER USUAL FORMALITIES OBSERVED.

PRESIDENT AYUB HAD ALWAYS FELT THAT TROUBLE USUALLY STARTED WHEN AFGHANS ABLE TO GET PAK TRUCKERS BEYOND PAK BORDERS, WHERE AFGHANS THEN ABLE TO SELECT AND FAVOR VULNERABLE TRUCKERS WILLING TO ACT AS AGENTS FOR AFGHANS. WHEN AYUB ORDERED THAT TRUCKS BE STOPPED AND GOODS EXCHANGED AT BORDER AND WHEN GOP REMINDED AFGHANS THAT MINUTES OF TEHRAN MEETINGS DID NOT REPEAT NOT SUPPORT AFGHAN THESIS THAT FULL STATUS QUO ANTE ON TRUCK TRANSIT WAS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED, AMB MAIWANDWAL CAME TO FONSEC IN "TERRIBLE PANIC" ABOUT INJURY THIS COULD CAUSE TO RELATIONS. FONSEC PROMISED DISCUSSION MATTER WITH PRESIDENT AYUB WHO IN INTEREST MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS AGAIN MADE FURTHER CONCESSIONS. FONSEC SAID THIS WAS INDICATION PAK DESIRE MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND DO ALL IT COULD FURTHER IMPROVE RELATIONS.

ON SPECIFICS I TOLD FONSEC (AS AUTHORIZED DEPTTEL 762) WE REMAINED PREPARED GO AHEAD WITH OUR STATED INTEREST IN ASSISTING WITH RESPECT POSSIBLE RAIL SPURS BOTH SPIN BALDAK AND TORKHAM, BUT THAT WE FELT WE COULD NOT PROCEED FURTHER UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT ON WHAT WAS WANTED, AND ON

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-3- 1112, DECEMBER 9, 6 PM FROM KARACHI.

WAS WANTED, AND ON PROCEDURES BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS THEMSELVES. IN EFFECT WE WERE STANDING BY BUT READY TO HELP. WE WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, OF COURSE, NEED A DETAILED FEASIBILITY SURVEY ON TORKHAM BEFORE CONSIDERING MATTER FURTHER. I SAID WE NEEDED A MUCH CLEARER UNDERSTANDING THAN WE HAVE NOW AS TO WISHES OF TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON PROPOSED LANDI KOTAL TORKHAM EXTENSION.

FONSEC AGREED IN GENERAL WITH OUR OBSERVATIONS, SAYING HE THOUGHT MAIWANDWAL ALSO AGREED ON IMPORTANCE MOVING QUICKLY WITH SPIN BALDAK. AS FOR TORKHAM PWR OFFICIALS HAVE SAID CONSTRUCTION WOULD TAKE LONG TIME AND WOULD BE VERY COSTLY. IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUERY FROM GRANT WHETHER GOP IN FAVOR OF TORKHAM SPUR, FONSEC SAID HE WAS HIMSELF UNCERTAIN. WHEN I REMINDED HIM THAT PRESIDENT AYUB HAD ALSO APPEARED UNDECIDED DURING OUR OCT 21 CONVERSATION, FONSEC NODDED AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, GOP HAD GENERALLY OPEN MIND. HE FELT THAT GOOD SURVEY WAS A PREREQUISITE TO FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF MATTER.

BOTH GRANT AND I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT PROCEEDING FURTHER ON SPIN BALDAK WOULD NOT BE DEFERRED PENDING STEPS TO RENEGOTIATE 1958 TRANSIT AGREEMENT WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD TAKE SOME TIME.

WE SUGGESTED THAT IF EARLY SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON CONSTRUCTION CHAMAN-SPIN BALDAK SPUR COULD BE CONCLUDED, THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. IN RESPONSE SUGGESTION FROM GRANT THAT PERHAPS WHOLE ISSUE OF RENEGOTIATION 1958 TRANSIT AGREEMENT COULD BE DEFERRED FOR ONE YEAR BY SIMPLY EXTENDING AGREEMENT, FONSEC SAID THIS NOT POSSIBLE. PRESIDENT AYUB "ABSOLUTELY FIRM" THAT AGREEMENT MUST BE REVISED IN CERTAIN LIMITED RESPECTS.

GOP HAS NO DRASTIC CHANGES TO PROPOSE, FONSEC SAID, BUT IS ANXIOUS TO GET RID OF CERTAIN QUESTIONABLE PROCEDURES THAT HAVE CAUSED FRICTION IN THE PAST AND MIGHT DO SO AGAIN. SIMPLER PROCEDURES CERTAINLY POSSIBLE. GOP'S INTENTIONS WERE TO ACCOMPLISH RENEGOTIATION AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, REFLECTING ITS GENUINE DESIRE FACILITATE
TRADE AND SPEED

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4- 1112, DECEMBER 9, 6 PM FROM KARACHI.

TRADE AND SPEED TRANSIT ALONG LINES THAT DID NOT MAKE PROBLEMS FOR PAKISTAN. GOP WANTS NEGOTIATIONS TO START AT ONCE SO AS NOT TO RISK HIATUS WHEN PRESENT AGREEMENT EXPIRES NEXT APRIL. GOP UNDERSTANDS RGA HAS DESPATCHED "AN OFFICER" TO KARACHI FOR EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS, BUT HE HAS NOT YET CONTACTED FONOFF. HOW NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOP DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES. IF THEY GENUINELY WANT BETTER RELATIONS AND ARE DESIROUS OF SEEING TRADE AND TRANSIT MOVE RAPIDLY AND EFFICIENTLY, THEN THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY IN RENEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT. FONSEC CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF AFGHANS, HOWEVER, HAD SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND (THE IMPLICATION OBVIOUSLY RELATING TO PUSHTUNISTAN), THEN HE HAD NO IDEA HOW THINGS MIGHT DEVELOP.

GP-3.

MCCONAUGHY

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State Afghanistan

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FROM: KABUL

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 345, DECEMBER 2, 1 PM

JOINT EMBASSY-USAID MESSAGE

AIDTO 538

I INFORMED PRIMIN YUSUF DEC. 1 THAT RGA REQUEST 100,000 TONS TITLE II WHEAT GRANT HAD BEEN APPROVED SUBJECT CONDITIONS REFTEL WHICH I OUTLINED FOR HIM. PRIMIN EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND GRATIFICATION THAT SUCH PROMPT ACTION COULD BE TAKEN SO SOON AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DEATH. VOICING DEEP APPRECIATION FOR USG ACTION, YUSUF SAID HE THOUGHT CONDITIONS REFTEL WOULD BE NO RPT NO PROBLEM. WE AGREED DETAILS SHOULD NOW RPT NOW BE DISCUSSED AT TECHNICAL LEVEL BETWEEN USAID/A AND APPROPRIATE RGA OFFICIALS (PRESUMABLY DEPMINFIN ZIAI).

COMMENT: I BELIEVE THIS FORTHCOMING RESPONSE ON MATTER SUCH URGENCY TO RGA MAY DO MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE CONVINCE AFGHANS (1) OUR CONTINUED INTEREST THEIR WELFARE AND (2) FACT BASICALLY SYMPATHETIC ORIENTATION LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO AFGHAN PROBLEMS NOT RPT NOT MODIFIED BY CHANGE ADMINISTRATION. WOULD LIKE EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION ALL THOSE INVOLVED WASHINGTON FOR MAKING IT POSSIBLE REAP THESE POLITICAL DIVIDENDS.

STEEVES

JTC

Control
Rec'd
BUNDY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELM
BRUBECK
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNCAN
ECKEL
FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.

207
DECEMBER 2, 1963
5:47 AM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S
4/23/65

DATE: April 1, 1965
TIME: 11:30 A.M.
PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Appeal of Certain Non-Aligned States
on the Viet-Nam Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Abdul Majid, Ambassador, Afghanistan ✓
Berhanou Dinke, Ambassador, Ethiopia
Miguel Augustus Ribeiro, Ambassador, Ghana
Veljko Micunovic, Ambassador, Yugoslavia

COPIES TO: The Secretary
Nicholas G. Andrews, OIC, Yugoslav Affairs, EE

S/S	AF	INR/OD
G	IO	AmEmbassy BELGRADE
S/AH	S/P	AmEmbassy ACCRA
EUR	CIA	AmEmbassy KABUL
FE	White House	AmEmbassy ADDIS ABABA
NEA	DOD	AmEmbassy SAIGON

The Yugoslav Ambassador stated that, on behalf of seventeen non-aligned nations, he was presenting an appeal to the Secretary for the President concerning the Viet-Nam crisis. He said the same message would be presented to all interested parties, including the UK, the USSR, France, Mainland China, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Canada and Poland, as well as to the Secretary General of the UN and the leadership of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong).

The signatory states, he continued, were deeply concerned by the situation in Viet-Nam. They were calling on all interested parties to seek a peaceful settlement by means of negotiations without prior conditions from any side. The Yugoslav Ambassador expressed the sincere hope that this initiative would be regarded by all sides which desired a peaceful settlement as a constructive step toward that settlement. He then handed over the text of the appeal to the Secretary. (The text is the same as that contained in Embassy Belgrade's 1739 of March 25.)

Upon being asked by the Secretary whether any of the other Ambassadors wished to add anything, the Ghanaian Ambassador said he would like to emphasize one point. He said that they knew and appreciated the difficult situation of the US in Viet-Nam and

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By 12.14.05

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the reasons why the US was involved. Both the allies of the US as well as other countries were concerned that something should be done to promote a peaceful settlement because of the danger that the conflict might expand into a more general war. He said the non-aligned states would very much like to see efforts made in the direction of a peaceful settlement, since, he stressed, their interest, as is the interest of the US, is world peace. He hoped serious consideration would be given to this appeal.

The Afghan Ambassador, emphasizing the concern of the seventeen non-aligned states and of other peoples in the world, said it was necessary to find ways to create an atmosphere suitable to the peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation. The Ethiopian Ambassador noted that the message was clear and expressed the hope that the US Government would respond favorably.

The Secretary said the US would give this important communication careful study and consideration, and will reply in the near future. We realized the concern of the signatory governments and would very much like to see a peaceful settlement. We must proceed, however, from the factual basis that military personnel are being sent from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. There has been no indication, either officially or privately or through any of the existing channels of communication, that North Viet-Nam is interested in stopping this activity. Peace could be achieved quickly if North Viet-Nam stopped this activity. The Secretary said that in a recent press conference he had pointed out that in other crises private contacts had preceded official meetings which resolved dangerous situations. The ending of the Berlin blockade in 1948 was one such case. But there does not now appear to be any basis for a peaceful solution. The missing element is that there has been no indication from Hanoi that they will stop doing what they have been doing. He expressed the hope that the initiative of the non-aligned states may reveal whether there is a serious basis for a quick solution not now apparent to us. He commented that he could not help noticing that President Tito had been bitterly criticized by some quarters for his participation in this initiative. He expressed the hope that the reaction of other capitals receiving this appeal would afford clues or indications or possibilities in the direction of a peaceful solution that we are not now aware of. He said the appeal would, of course, be discussed with the President and would be given the serious study which it obviously deserved.

The Yugoslav Ambassador agreed concerning the necessity for creating a basis for peaceful settlement and stated that the appeal was intended to assist in creating such a basis. He noted, however,

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that the situation appeared to be worsening, even since the text of the appeal was accepted on March 15. He stressed the importance of doing something to create a more favorable atmosphere for negotiations. He referred to certain military activities, including the bombing of North Viet-Nam and activities in Viet-Nam as a whole, and suggested that, if they were stopped, this action would be very helpful in creating such an atmosphere. The Secretary said that if the Yugoslav Ambassador could tell him what would happen and what Hanoi would do if the US stopped bombing, he would consider such action. But could the Yugoslav Ambassador state that infiltration of military personnel into South Viet-Nam would stop? If it did not, the US would be faced with an intolerable situation.

The Yugoslav Ambassador said that he did not wish to criticize military activities. Speaking merely of practical results, the situation now appeared to be worse than in December or January although certain military activities began about eight weeks ago. He hoped that, within the framework of this worsening situation, it might be possible to stop some military actions and thus bring about ways and means toward a peaceful solution. He said the signatory states supported the principle of outlawing foreign intervention and foreign aggression. He feared that the situation was worse now after these recent military actions. He could not suggest concrete steps to improve the atmosphere, but hoped that something could be done to change the deteriorating situation.

The Secretary said the responses of other addressees of this appeal would also be considered. He hoped that these responses might reveal some window, some opening or some opportunity for finding a peaceful solution. Until then, our commitment is clear that we will not tolerate the use of force by states against their neighbors.

In reply to a question from the Ghanaian Ambassador as to what kind of signs on the part of Hanoi would be expected or desired, the Secretary replied that these signs could be verbal or de facto, either public or private. He noted that he had not established preconditions in his press conference concerning such signs, but had emphasized that the missing piece was Hanoi's willingness to stop doing what it was doing. Whether such a sign were given through private channels or in response to this appeal or de facto in Viet-Nam itself, we would be quickly aware of it and would respond to it. He noted the US's disappointment that the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference had disagreed on what action they might take to contribute to a peaceful solution. The Polish proposal that the two co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC hold a preliminary meeting looking toward a general meeting on Laos was

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supported by the US, but was rejected by the other side. We fear that in the event of an unprepared political confrontation at a conference, the hostility and disappointment which might result would leave us worse off than in the absence of such a conference. We sincerely hope to find a basis for peace. The Secretary concluded the meeting by saying that the appeal would receive the US Government's serious study and consideration and that the US would be replying in the very near future.

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