

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

031 <sup>S</sup> 63

~~SECRET~~

88  
Action

55  
Info

VV GMA183VV ATA615  
PP RUEHCR  
DE RUQMAT 132A 1901730  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 091725Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 37  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ JULY 09

06484  
1965 JUL 9 PM 2 38

LIMDIS

INCIPIENT POLITICAL CRISIS APPEARS SUDDENLY TO HAVE CRYSTALLIZED FOLLOWING LETTER FROM KING TO PRIMIN ALLEGEDLY DELIVERED LAST NIGHT BY CHIEF ROYAL POLITICAL BUREAU, CHOIDAS, INFORMING PRIMIN THAT KING IS PREPARED TO RECEIVE HIM BUT NOT CONCUR IN THE REMOVAL OF DEFMIN GAROUFALIAS OR ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENNIMATAS (CONTENTS LETTER SEPARATELY REPORTED) APPARENTLY LETTER ASSERTS, INTER ALIA, KING HAS ALWAYS ACTED SCRUPULOUSLY WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, AND REPROACHES PAPANDREOU NOT ONLY FOR HAVING FAILED TO SUPPORT THE KING, BUT FOR HAVING PERMITTED IMPRESSION TO GROW THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 132A ~~SECRET~~  
KING IS PREPARED TO ACT EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONALLY. EXISTENCE OF LETTER HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLICLY REVEALED, BUT MAY RESULT IN RESIGNATION OF GOVERNMENT.

FESTERING POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF PALACE AND ERE ALARM AT ALLEGED EFFORTS OF PAPANDREOUS AND CERTAIN OTHER CENTER UNION ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES MAY WELL EXPLODE AS RESULT OF THIS SUDDEN ACTION BY KING. ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS KING HAS DECIDED NOT TO CONCUR IN ANY CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP ARMED FORCES AT THIS TIME, AND IS DETERMINED TO PUSH FOR SHOWDOWN WITH PRIMIN AND HIS SON ANDREAS BEFORE WHAT KING REGARDS AS THE CORRUPTION OF THE ARMED FORCES BECOMES MORE EXTENSIVE AND THE POSITION OF EDA AND EXTREME LEFT EVEN STRONGER. THERE HAVE EVEN BEEN SOME RUMORS THAT KING PREPARED TO ACCEPT GOVERNMENT UNDER A MILITARY LEADER IF SATISFACTORY GOVERNMENT, WILLING AND ABLE TO CONFRONT DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES WHICH PAPANDREOUS AND LEFT MIGHT FOMENT, CANNOT BE FORMED.

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-118

By UW NARA Date 03-23-2014

~~SECRET~~

-2- 37, July 9, From: Athens

EMBASSY POSITION HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED FROM THAT WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN EVER SINCE COLLISION BETWEEN KING AND PRIMIN FIRST BECAME REAL POSSIBILITY. AS REPORTED IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH CHOIDAS (EMBTel 1880) AND PRIMIN (EMBTel 1921), I HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO BE FOUND WHICH WOULD PERMIT

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 132A ~~SECRET~~  
PERSONS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO PRIMIN AND KING TO BE NAMED TO THE POSITIONS OF DEFMIN AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMY (SUBJECT TO QUESTIONS OF TIMING) AND THAT RAISING OF THE QUESTION OF THE REGIME WOULD BE TRAGEDY FOR GREECE FROM WHICH ULTIMATELY ONLY THE COMMUNISTS WOULD PROFIT. THIS POSITION HAS NATURALLY BEEN RECEIVED WITH A LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BY THOSE ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES WHO HOPED TO WIN THE UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT OF US.

LAST NIGHT AT DINNER AT WHICH ERE LEADERS KANELLOPOULOS, PAPALIGROUAS, TSATSOS, RALLIS AND THEOTAKIS WERE PRESENT, I REFLECTED SIMILAR VIEWS. ERE LEADERS WERE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL OVER CURRENT SITUATION BUT REVEALED VERY LITTLE EVIDENCE THEY HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ALL IMPLICATIONS OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN KING AND PRIMIN AT THIS TIME.

KING HAS BEEN ISOLATED IN CORFU PRESUMABLY DEPENDING PRINCIPALLY UPON QUEEN MOTHER, HIS POLITICAL ADVISOR CHOIDAS AND HIS LONG-TIME BEGIN UNDERLINE CONFIDANT END UNDERLINE, MAJOR ARNAOUTIS, AS ADVISORS AND INTERMEDIARIES. IN EXTENSIVE CONVERSATION WITH CHOIDAS JUNE 23 REPORTED IN EMBTEL 1880 I EXPRESSED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS AS TO WISDOM OF DIRECT COLLISION BETWEEN PAPANDREOU AND KING UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. SINCE THAT TIME I HAVE TWICE SEEN HIM SOCIALLY. ON EACH OCCASION HE ASSERTED HE WISHED TO TALK WITH ME AGAIN AND PROMISED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME, BUT CONSPICUOUSLY FAILED TO DO SO. I HAD ALSO EXPRESSED MY OWN OPINION CLEARLY TO GENERAL PAPATHANASSIADES, MARSHAL OF THE COURT, WHO ASSERTED THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED AND THAT HE HAD TRANSMITTED NOT ONLY HIS OWN BUT MY VIEWS TO THE KING.

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 132A ~~SECRET~~  
MY PRESENT FEELING IS THAT THE KING HAS ACTED WITH IMPRUDENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 37, July 9, From: Athens

HASTE AND ABRUPTNESS, THEREBY INCURRING SERIOUS RISK TO INTERNAL STABILITY WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. IF KING'S ACTION RESULTS IN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIVELY STABLE NEW GOVERNMENT (PRESUMABLY HEADED BY A CENTER UNION PERSONALITY DEPENDING PRINCIPALLY UPON ERE SUPPORT FOR ITS EXISTENCE) WITHOUT BRINGING EDA AND THE PAPANDREOUS EVEN CLOSER AND WITHOUT POSSIBLE VIOLENCE, HE WILL HAVE PROVED TO BE SHREWER JUDGE OF THE SITUATION THAN I AM PREPARED TO HOPE.

GP-3

ANSCHUETZ

BT

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY

84

~~SECRET~~

64

Action

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUQMAT 3353A 30/2009Z  
R 301929Z ZEA

Info FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

050

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1921  
STATE GRNC  
BT

27517

~~SECRET~~ JUNE 30

1965 JUN 30 PM 5 48

LIMDIS

I CALLED THIS MORNING ON PRIMIN. EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND SOSSIDES OF PRIMIN'S STAFF ALSO PRESENT.

PRIMIN COMMENCED BY STRESSING THAT HIS AIM IS TO BRING INTERNAL PEACE TO GREEK POLITICAL SCENE. HE HAD ACHIEVED THIS IN PART BY TAKING FIRM AND MODERATE STAND ON QUESTION OF REFERRAL CARAMANLIS TO THE COURTS (EMBTELS 1864, 1829) ALTHOUGH THIS HAD BEEN UNPOPULAR STEP FOR HIM WITH MANY OF HIS PARTY.

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 3353A ~~SECRET~~

NOW HE MUST FACE UP TO PROBLEM OF TAKING POLITICS OUT OF THE ARMY. THIS MEANS REMOVING THOSE WITHIN ARMY WHO ESPOUSED CAUSE OF EITHER RIGHT OR LEFT. HE HAS THEREFORE DECIDED HE MUST ASK FOR MINDEF GAROUFALIAS' RESIGNATION WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS AND ASSUME POST HIMSELF. GAROUFALIAS, IN WHOM HE HAS GREAT TRUST AND WHO WOULD BE HIGHLY COMPETENT IN ANY OTHER MINISTERIAL POST, IS UNHAPPILY LABELED AS MAN OF THE PALACE. GAROUFALIAS STRIVES TO PROTECT PALACE INTERESTS BUT IN ORDER COMPENSATE GAROUFALIAS DOES NO ACT WITH APPROPRIATE VIGOR TOWARD CENTER ELEMENTS WHO REQUIRE DISCIPLINE. HIS ACTIONS ARE CONSTANTLY MISJUDGED AND HE IS THUS NO LONGER IN POSITION TO DO JOB NECESSARY IN KEEPING ARMY FREE OF POLITICS.

GENNIMATAS, CHIEF OF STAFF, HAD ALSO BEEN LABELED AS A MAN OF THE KING AND WAS ALSO UNABLE TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE HE TOO IS UNDER FIRE FROM "THE DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS". A NEW MAN IS NEEDED AS CHIEF HGS WHO WOULD NOT BE TARRD WITH THIS BRUSH AND HE, THE PAST PRIMIN IS GOING TO ADVISE THE KING THAT A CHANGE HAS TO BE MADE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE KING WOULD AGREE TO THIS CHANGE WHEN HE HAD PRESENTED HIS REASONS FOR IT.

I SAID FRANKLY I AM CONCERNED AT IMPLICATIONS OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PALACE AND GOVT OVER QUESTION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP. US

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~~SECRET~~

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XVI, # 197  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-24-83



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1921, JUNE 30, FROM: ATHENS

INTEREST IN STABILITY OF GREECE AS WELL AS OUR CONTINUING CONTRIBUTIONS TO GREEK ARMED FORCES ARE BASIS LEGITIMATE INTEREST

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 3353A ~~SECRET~~

IN THIS QUESTION. I ENTIRELY AGREED WITH PM THAT POLITICS SHOULD BE KEPT AWAY FROM ARMED FORCES. WHILE I AGREED THAT GOVT, NOT KING IS RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICY DETERMINATION, I AM ALSO AWARE THAT MODERN GREEK HISTORY SHOWS CLEARLY THAT KING HAS OVER PERIOD OF TIME ACQUIRED A GENERALLY RECOGNIZED INTEREST IN ARMED FORCES. ANY SEVERE SHOCK TO THIS DELICATE BALANCE OF POWERS COULD BE DANGEROUS AND MIGHT EVEN RISK RAISING BASIC ISSUE OF REGIME. THIS WOULD BE TRAGIC FOR GREECE. FOR THIS REASON I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT A SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO BOTH PARTIES COULD BE FOUND. I SAID THAT I AM PLEASED PRIMIN WILL SOON HAVE OCCASION TO SEE KING IN CORFU IN CONNECTION WITH FORMALITIES FOLLOWING BIRTH OF ROYAL BABY. THIS WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR DIRECT DISCUSSION AND ELIMINATE POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS RESULTING FROM RELIANCE ON INTERMEDIARIES. I EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT DEPARTURE OF BOTH GAROUFALIAS AND GENNIMATAS MIGHT CREATE PROFOUND REACTION IN PALACE AND PERHAPS CERTAIN OPPOSITION CIRCLES.

PRIMIN BRIDLED AT INFERENCE HIS PERSONAL ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE PORTFOLIO COULD PRODUCE ANY ANXIETY. HE WAS ADAMANT THAT GENNIMATAS AS A PERSON WOULD HAVE TO GO BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ONCE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN OBTAINED TO THIS MOVE TIMING MIGHT BE MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION.

PAGE FOUR RUQMAT 3353A ~~SECRET~~

COMMENT: PAPANDREOU WAS IN A VERY SERIOUS MOOD AND SHOWED A DEGREE OF STUBBORNNESS TO MY PROBING AS TO WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY HIERARCHY MIGHT MEAN TO THE POLITICAL FABRIC OF GREECE. HE APPEARS CONFIDENT HE CAN STAND DOWN KING ON THIS ISSUE AND WILL USE THE THREAT OF RESIGNATION AND ELECTIONS IN THE EVENT THE KING DOES NOT AGREE. HE STATED FLATLY NO NEW GOVERNMENT BASED ON SUPPORT OF ERE COULD STAND BECAUSE IT WOULD BE A TRAVESTY OF WILL OF PEOPLE. HE DID NOT ONCE MENTION MITSOOKIS FACTOR OR ALLUDE TO KOKKAS ATTACKS EXCEPT INDIRECTLY, WHEN HE SAID HIS SON ANDREAS IS BEING BLAMED FOR ALL ILLS OF GREECE. HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THEY WERE TO RUN OUT OF ISSUES TO BOMB HIM FOR, ANDREAS WOULD BE BLAMED FOR SITUATION IN SATO DOMINGO.

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-3- 1921, JUNE 30, FROM: ATHENS

GAROUFALIAS CONFIDED TO ME EARLIER THIS MORNING HE DID NOT INTEND TO RESIGN, THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD THEN ASK KING TO SIGN DECREE REVOKING HIS (GAROUFALIAS') APPOINTMENT. IF KING REFUSED, GOVT CRISIS WOULD ENSUE AND PERHAPS GAROUFALIAS OR STEPHANOPOULOS WOULD BE REQUESTED TO FORM GOVERNMENT. THIS EVENING FONMIN COSTOPOULOS, A STRONG ROYALIST, EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT KING WOULD BE IN WEAK CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION IF HE REFUSED TO CONCUR IN PAPANDREOU'S ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE PORTFOLIO. ACCORDING TO PAPANDREOUS PROPOSAL GAROUFALIAS WOULD RECEIVE ANOTHER PORTFOLIO. HOUTAS, PRESENT MINISTER PUBLIC WORKS AND RELIABLE FROM PALACE POINT OF VIEW WOULD REPLACE PAPAConstantinou AS DEPUTY MIN DEF.

GP-2. ANSCHUETZ  
BT

~~SECRET~~



SUMMARY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

65

84-S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

VV QMA 61ATA931

NEA

RR RUEHCR

DE RUQMAT 3349A 30/1740Z

Info

R 301649Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1917

G

INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 652

SP

RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 556

SAH

RUFHPA/AMEMBASSY PARIS 204

L

RUFRCR/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES ITALY

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STATE GRNC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 30

USIA

PARIS FOR USRO, JAMES AND BURNS. USDOCOSOUTH FOR BURRIS.

NSC

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN KING AND PRIMIN OVER QUESTION OF  
MILITARY LEADERSHIP REMAINS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY ALTHOUGH  
PRESSURES FOR COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES ARE AT WORK. EMBASSY  
HAS RELIABLE INFORMATION (EMBTCL 1880) THAT KING IS DISPOSED  
TO MAKE STAND ON QUESTION OF RETENTION OF PRESENT ARMY CHIEF  
OF STAFF, AND HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO EITHER PREVAIL UPON  
PAPANDREOU TO ACCEPT THIS POSITION OR ELSE DEMAND PRIMIN'S  
RESIGNATION. ON OTHER HAND, BOTH PRIMIN'S PERSONAL SECRETARY

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PAGE TWO RUQMAT 3349A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AND HIS SON ANDREAS HAVE TOLD U.S. OFFICIALS IN LAST FEW DAYS  
THAT PAPA

NDREOU IS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO REMOVE GENNIMATAS  
AND IF KING REFUSES, PRIMIN WILL RESIGN.

IN EVENT CONFRONTATION DOES OCCUR, LIKELY OUTCOME  
WOULD BE RESIGNATION OF PRIMIN AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY  
OTHER MEMBER OF GOVT, POSSIBLY DEPUTY PRIMIN AND MINCOORD  
STEPHANOPOULOS. KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER STEPHANOPOULOS  
OR OTHER POLITICATJFIGURE COULD SECURE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF  
VOTES FROM OWN PARTY TO FORM GOVT. SUPPORT OF 99 ERE DEPUTIES  
IS PROBABLY, SINCER ERE MOST ANXIOUS TO BRING DOWN  
PAPANDREOU AND WOULD LIKELY BE WILLING TO SUPPORT CU GOVT  
LED BY ACCEPTABLE FIGURE SUCH AS STEPHANOPOULOS FOR LIMITED  
TIME. HOWEVER, IF NEW GOVT UNABLE TO OBTAIN MINIMUM OF  
50-60 DEPUTIES FROM CU RANKS, THEN ELECTIONS WOULD BE IN  
OFFING, DESPITE FACT THAT ALMOST NO ONE (WITH EXCEPTION OF  
PAPANDREOU) WOULD WANT THEM.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRAS, Vol. XLI, #196  
By dbm, NARA, Date 6-24-03

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1917, June 30, from Athens.

DANGEROUS ASPECT OF CURRENT SITUATION TWOFOLD: (1) IF NEW ELECTION HELD, PAPANDREOU WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE RETURNED WITH APPROXIMATELY SAME STRENGTH AS AT PRESENT, AND COULD CONCEIVABLY RECEIVE EVEN STRONGER MANDATE. THIS

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 3349A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WOULD BE HEAVY BLOW TO KING'S PRESTIGE, PARTICULARLY SINCE PAPANDREOUS, SUPPORTED BY LEFT, WOULD POSSIBLY MAKE MONARCHY AN ISSUE IN ELECTIONS. (2) IF STEPHANOPOULOS OR OTHER CU FIGURE SUCCEEDED IN FORMING NEW GOVT. PAPANDREOU MIGHT GO TO STREETS TO TRY BRING DOWN SUCH GOVT. WITH LEFTIST SUPPORT, PAPANDREOU WOULD HAVE CAPACITY TO PROVOKE SERIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. AT THIS POINT ARMY MIGHT INTERVENE, FEARING THAT STABILITY OF REGIME WERE BEING SHAKEN.

WHATEVER OUTCOME, CONFRONTATION AT THIS TIME (WHILE PAPANDREOU STILL POPULAR) AND ON ISSUE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP WOULD APPEAR TO BE UNFORTUNATE STEP BOTH FROM POINT OF VIEW U.S. AND GREEK INTERESTS. EVEN OPPONENTS OF PAPANDREOU IN BOTH GOVT AND OPPOSITION RANKS BELIEVE TIMING IS NOT RIGHT FOR CHALLENGE TO PRIMIN. THEY MAINTAIN THAT IN FALL, WHEN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REACH CRITICAL STAGE, PRIMIN'S POPULARITY WILL FALL SHARPLY, AND CHALLENGE TO HIS LEADERSHIP WILL THEN COME FROM WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY, FROM MITSOTAKIS FORCES. HOWEVER, THESE ANTI-PAPANDREOU FORCES WITHIN PARTY MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO LINE UP WITH PALACE

PAGE FOUR RUQMAT 3349A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGAINST PRIMIN NOW. DEPUTIES WOULD NOT NOW RELISH FACING ALTERNATIVES OF ELECTIONS ON ONE HAND OR PARTICIPATING IN COALITION SUPPORTED BY ERE ON OTHER.

INDICATIONS ARE THAT KING, UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER INFLUENCE OF RIGHTWING ADVISORS, BELIEVES THAT HIS LEADERSHIP OF ARMED FORCES IS BEING ERODED BY ARMY'S INVOLVEMENT IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1917, June 30, from Athens.

POLITICS AND BY ITS PENETRATION BY FORCES LOYAL TO PAPANDREOUS (SUCH AS ASPIDA) RATHER THAN TO THRONE. THEREFORE, KING APPARENTLY IS BEING PERSUADED THAT HE MUST MAKE STAND NOW, RATHER THAN AT LATER TIME, WHEN HIS POSITION MIGHT BE WEAKER.

EMBASSY REMAINS HOPEFUL THAT HEAD-ON COLLISION WILL BE AVERTED THROUGH REALIZATION BY BOTH SIDES THAT CONFRONTATION NOT IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS, AND WE ARE TAKING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT CONFRONTATION WOULD BE DAMAGING TO NATION'S INTERESTS.

GP-4. ANSCHUETZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓  
66

40  
Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

10870 002  
MARCH 12, 1965  
6:54 AM

FROM: ATHENS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1340, IMMEDIATE

INFO: ANKARA 474, IMMEDIATE  
LONDON 342, IMMEDIATE  
NICOSIA 393, IMMEDIATE  
PARIS TOPOL 134, IMMEDIATE

DATE: MARCH 12, MIDNIGHT

EXDIS

DEPTEL 1132

IN ABSENCE GAROUFALIEAS, WHO IS IN COUNTRY AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL SATURDAY, I SAW FONMIN COSTOPOULOS LAST NIGHT. HE CONFIRMED THAT SA-2S\* WERE INCLUDED IN AGREEMENT REACHED BY KYPRIANOU WITH SOVIETS IN MOSCOW. HE DID NOT KNOW NUMBER INVOLVED. COSTOPOULOS SAID THE MISSILES ARE IN THE UAR AT PRESENT TIME AND MEMBERS OF GREEK CREWS ARE THERE BEING TRAINED. AFTER I STRESSED TO HIM THE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OF THIS OPERATION AND TOLD HIM I WAS INFORMED THAT SOME OF THESE MISSILES WERE BEING LOADED IN ALEXANDRIA FOR SHIPMENT, COSTOPOULOS TELEPHONED CHIEF OF STAFF PIPILIS IN MY PRESENCE. PIPILIS ADVISED COSTOPOULOS THAT THE GREEK CREWS HAD NOT REPEAT NOT FINISHED THEIR TRAINING IN THE UAR AND THAT THE MISSILES HAD NOT AS YET BEEN SHIPPED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COSTOPOULOS SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THE DANGERS INHERENT IN IZPATON\* AND WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH NEED TO AVOID PROVOCATIONS PENDING SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON EXTENSION OF UNFICYP AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RE PLAZA REPORT. BEFORE GETTING THROUGH TO PIPILIS ON THE TELEPHONE, HE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE THE MISSILES SHIPPED (#)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-118

By UUB NARA Date 03-23-2014



SECRET

-2- 1340, MARCH 12, MIDNIGHT, FROM ATHENS

RATHER THAN TO CYPRUS IF IMAACT\* THEY WERE BEING LOADED.  
HE REPLIED HCZIE\* AFFIRMATIVE, IF COULD BE DONE SECRETLY.

I TOLD COSTOPOULOS ATHE\* TOOK A VERY SERIOUS VIEW  
OF FACT THAT LARGE QUANTITIES OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT WERE  
FINDING WAY TO THE ISLAND, SAYING THAT THIS HAS NOT ONWHF\*  
PROVOCATIVE TO THE TURKS BUT MOST DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF  
LOCAL SITUATION IN CYPRUS. I ALSO MENTIONED SOME OF THE  
POINTS SUGGESTED IN NICOSIA'S 713 AND DEPTTEL 1130. I  
EMPHASIZED TWO POINTS: A) THAT THE ARRIVAL OF THE MISSILES  
IN CYPRUS COULD WELL BE THE LAST DROP OF WATER NEEDED TO  
MAKE THE TURKISH BOWL OVERFLOW, AND B) THAT IT TOOK A VERY DIM  
VIEW OF THE GREEK MILITARY COOPERATING IN USE OF SOVIET  
EQUIPMENT.

COSTOPOULOS SAID THAT THE REASON GREEK CREWS WERE SENT  
TO BE INSTRUCTED MMJ C\* SA-GS\* WAS THAT THE GOG DID NOT TRUST  
MAKARIOS AND DID NOT WANT MISSILES IN HIS HANDS. MOREOVER,  
(#) DID NOT WANT ANY SOVIET TEN NIVZANS ON ISLAND.  
I ASKED WHETHER THE GREEKS WERE FINANCING PURCHASE OF THE  
EQUIPMENT AND HE REPLIED IN NEGATIVE, SAYING PAYMENTS WERE  
TO BE FINANCED BY CYPRIOT OUT OF OWN RESOURCES OVER PERIOD  
OF 10 YEARS. THE FIRST PAYMENT OF 300,000 POUNDS  
IS DUE AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. COSTOPOULOS OBSERVED THAT  
THE CYPRIOTS ERPAREFNLY\* TO NOT KNOW WHERE THEY ARE GOING  
TO FIND THE FUNDS BUT THE SOVIET WYUD\* AGREED TO TAKE SOVG\*  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. THIS IS A BIT OF SOPHISTRY AS GREEKS  
ARE LENDING MONEY TO CYPRUS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER  
PURPOSES.)

I BELIEVE THAT, AS A RESULT OF OUR CONVERSATION,  
COSTOPOULOS WAS SINCERELY ALARMED BY IMPLICATIONS OF IMPORTATION  
OF MISSILES IN CYPRUS AND HE ASSURED ME HE  
WOULD SPEAK TO PRCUUBT\* SUBJECT LAST NIGHT. HOWEVER, I AM  
NOT AT ALL SATISFIED THAT THIS PARTICULAR DANGER IS PASSED.  
ACCORDINGLY, I WILL FOLLOW UP WITH GAROUFALIAS ON HIS

SECRET

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-3- 1340, MARCH 12, MIDNIGHT, FROM ATHENS

RETURN TOMORROW. MEANWHILE, I HAVE ASKED ARMA TO SEE PIPILIS TODAY TO CONVERY OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS.

DURING THE CONVERSATION WITH COSTOPOULOS IT CAME OUT THAT TEN PLANES (COSTOPOULOS SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE TYPE) HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY CYPRUS FROM GERMANY. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS EXTREMELY FOOLHARDY TO HAVE THESE PLANES BROUGHT TO CYPRUS AT THIS MOMENT AND WE AGREED.

DEPENDING ON OUTCOME TALKS WITH GAROUFALIAS AND PIPILIS, IT WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR ME TO SEE PRIMIN ON THIS SUBJECT. IS\* SHOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT CAN GIVE HJ,\* PARTICULARLY RE DESIRABILITY DIVERTING TO GREECE SUCH MISSILES AS YET UNDELIVERED IF THEY CANNOT BE HELD IN UAR.

GP-3.

LABOUISSSE

BAP

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 7:01 AM MARCH 12TH  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 7:18 AM MARCH 12TH

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.  
\*AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

SECRET



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

06038

81 S

NE

1965 MAR 6 PM 5 17

Action

JXXXXE

NEA

TO O PVV QM224ATA061  
PP RUEHCR  
RUEHDT

Info

SS

DE RUQMAT 1510A 06/2030Z  
P R 062025Z ZEA

G

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

SP

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

SAH

INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA

L

RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

EUR

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

IO

RUFHPA/AMEMBASSY PARIS

P

RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK

IOP

STATE GRNC

NSC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1316 INFO ANKARA 465  
NICOSIA 384 LONDON 334

INR

PARIS 128 ROME 59 MOSCOW 15 USUN 147 FROM ATHENS MAR 6, 10:30PM

CIA

PARIS FOR USRO JAMES AND BURNS.

NSA

ROME FOR BURRIS.

DOD

NIC

DAC

I CALLED ON PRIMIN THIS MORNING AT HIS HOME IN KASTRI PURSUANT  
TO A REQUEST I HAD MADE EARLIER THIS WEEK TO HAVE ONE OF OUR  
PERIODIC DISCUSSIONS. FONMIN COSTOPOULOS WAS ALSO PRESENT.  
PRIMIN IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET  
INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW, WHICH HAD BEEN REPORTED IN PRESS  
THIS MORNING (EMBTTEL 1314). HE SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD  
CFN 1316 465 384 334 128 59 15 147 06 10:30 1314

RMR

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1510A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACCEPTED INVITATION, HE DID NOT RPT NOT HAVE ANY PRESENT  
INTENTION OF ACTUALLY CARRYING OUT VISIT. PAPANDREOU SAID USSR  
WAS IMPERIALISTIC EMPIRE, AND HE DID NOT HAVE "INCLINATION"  
TO HELP THIS EMPIRE.

PRIMIN THEN DISCOURSED BRIEFLY ON BACKGROUND OF INVITATION. HE  
SAID THAT WHEN MAKARIOS HAD FIRST BROACHED IDEA OF SENDING  
KYPRIANOU TO MOSCOW HE HAD OPPOSED IT, AND EXERTED "ALL MY  
INFLUENCE" ON MAKARIOS NOT TO SEND KYPRIANOU. HOWEVER, PRIMIN  
CONTINUED, MAKARIOS HAD STATED HE THOUGHT HE COULD GET ENOSIS  
BY VISIT. SOVIETS, OF COURSE, SIMPLY PLAYED OFF CYPRUS AGAINST  
TURKS, AND AFTER GROMYKO STATEMENT SUPPORTING FEDERATION,

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-302

By iso, NARA, Date 2-23-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1316, MARCH 6, 10:30 P.M. FROM ATHENS

MAKARIOS BLAMED PAPANDREOU BECAUSE HE DIDN'T EMULATE ERKIN'S EXAMPLE AND GO TO MOSCOW.

PAPANDREOU SAID IN RECENT MONTHS SOVIET AMB HAD REPEATEDLY ON UNOFFICIAL LEVEL BROUGHT UP IDEA OF HIS VISITING MOSCOW AND IN FACT "BEGGED ME TO GO." "NATURALLY I REFUSED," PRIMIN CONTINUED, BUT WHEN SOVIETS MADE INVITATION OFFICIAL, PAPANDREOU SAID HE FELT HE HAD TO ACCEPT IT, PARTICULARLY SINCE WESTERN LEADERS HAVE VISITED MOSCOW.

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 1510A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HOWEVER, PAPANDREOU SAID HE DID NOT LIKE IDEA OF MOSCOW BECOMING THE "UMPIRE" IN THE CYPRUS MATTER AND THAT HE REFUSED TO COURT FAVOR WITH SOVIETS BY "MAKING PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA" FOR TWO REASONS: (1) CYPRUS AND (2) "BECAUSE I AND MY GOVERNMENT BELONG TO WEST," AND THAT THEREFORE IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE.

PRIMIN SAID SOVIET AMB RAISED QUESTION OF DENUCLEARIZED ZONE FOR BALKANS AND MLF RPT MLF, AND PAPANDREOU REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN "LOCAL" DISARMAMENT PACTS SINCE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT WAS ONE FOR MAJOR PARTIES TO DECIDE. CONCERNING MLF, PAPANDREOU SAID SOVIET AMB NOTED THAT TURKS HAD "OPENLY" PULLED OUT OF MLF AND WITHDRAWN TURKISH CREW FROM RICKETTS, AMB SUGGESTED GREEKS DO LIKEWISE. PRIMIN SAID HE HAD REPLIED, "I DO NOT INTEND TO FOLLOW TURKEY."

I ASKED IF SOVIETS IMPLIED THEY WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON GREEK POSITION ON CYPRUS IF GOG AGREED TO WITHDRAW FROM MLF AND SUPPORT BALKAN DENUCLEARIZED ZONE. PRIMIN REPLIED THAT WHILE SOVIETS DID NOT DIRECTLY SAY THIS, THEY DID MAKE THIS UNDERSTOOD. PAPANDREOU SAID SOVIETS ALSO TRIED TO CLAIM

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 1510A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THEIR WARNING TO GOT AGAINST INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS PREVENTED TURKISH INVASION OF ISLAND, BUT PRIMIN SAID HE TOLD SOVIET AMB (AS WELL AS TITO WHEN IN BELGRADE) THAT WHILE SOVIET ROLE HAD BEEN BENEFICIAL AFTER TURK AIR BOMBARDMENT OF CYPRUS, REALLY DECISIVE ROLE WAS PLAYED BY US PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN PREVENTING GOT FROM CARRYING OUT LANDING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1316, MARCH 6, 10:30 P.M. FROM ATHENS

PRIMIN SAID TALK WITH SOVIET AMB HAD PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO EMPHASIZE HIS BASIC ALLEGIANCE TO WEST, AND PARTICULARLY TO U.S. HE SAID HE HAD ALSO IMPRESSED THIS POINT UPON YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT TITO AT TIME OF HIS VISIT TO BELGRADE. PAPANDREOU SAID HE TOLD BOTH SOVIET AMB AND TITO THAT WHILE GREECE SEEKS GOOD RELATIONS WITH EAST, IT IS ALLIED TO WEST.

COMMENT: PAPANDREOU'S STATEMENT THAT HE HAS NO PRESENT INTENTION OF CARRYING OUT VISIT TO USSR IS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION. IN HIS TALK WITH ME TODAY HE WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO COUNTER NEGATIVE REACTION WHICH HE KNEW THE REPORT OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET INVITATION WOULD PROVOKE WITH US. WHILE HE MAY DRAG OUT ACTUAL IMPLEMENTING OF VISIT, IN MY OPINION THERE IS BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE THAT EVENTUALLY HE WILL GO TO MOSCOW. I WOULD LIKE TO CALL ATTENTION TO MY A-710 AND EMBTELS 1216 AND 1200, WHICH PROVIDE SOME OF THE BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE WHICH MAY HAVE GONE INTO GOG DECISION TO ACCEPT SOVIET INVITATION IN PRINCIPLE.

GP-3

LABOUISSSE

BT

CFN A-710 1216 1200

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

68

38-31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action  
CPR

Info

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AEX

RMR

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR

DE RUQMAT 219 A 16/1322Z

Z 161321Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

1964 SEP 16 AM 10 11

013466

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FLASH 544 SEPT 16 3:21PM

PASS WHITE HOUSE

MISS JOHNSON AND MR HELLIS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED BY KING WITH GRAND CROSS OF ROYAL ORDER OF GEORGE FIRST. AMBASSADOR DUKE AND I BELIEVE LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS AND NATURE OF OCCASION JUSTIFY MISS JOHNSON (AS WELL AS MR. HELIS) ACCEPTING DECORATION AND WEARING SAME AT GALA BALL TONIGHT RPT TONIGHT. IF PRESIDENT HAS NO OBJECTIONS, WE SHALL SO ADVISE.

GP-3 LABOUISSSE

BT

CFN 544

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 10:22 A.M., 9/16/64.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 10:16 A.M., 9/16/64.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03



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*Greece*

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 3611 16/1611Z

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

STATE GRNC

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1964 SEP 16 16 13

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **CONFIDENTIAL** EXDIS

ACTION FLASH ATHENS 495 INFO WHITE HOUSE UNN SEPTEMBER 16,  
NOON.

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR

RE YOUR 544 WHITE HOUSE PERMISSION GRANTED FOR HELLIS TO  
RECEIVE AND WEAR GRAND CROSS DECORATION. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR  
SHOULD ADVISE MISS JOHNSON HER FATHER DOES NOT WANT HER TO  
ACCEPT THE DECORATION, BECAUSE HE FEELS IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR  
ANY MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO RECEIVE ANY SUCH AWARD. EXPLAIN  
TO GOG PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VIEWS ARE IN NO WAY RELATED TO KIND  
OFFER OF GREEK AWARD BUT TO GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RECEIVING  
SUCH AWARDS BY ANY MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY FROM ANY FOREIGN  
GOVERNMENT RUSK

BT

CFN 495 16 544

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **CONFIDENTIAL** EXDIS

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *cbm*, NARA, Date *6-26-03*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Bundy 70*

002

31

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

NNNNVV QVA365ATA785  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUQMAT 63A 04/1316Z  
R 041246Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (ATHENS)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
STATE GRNC  
BT

4211

1964 PM 12 24

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DEPT 484 INFO ANKARA 228 LONDON 189 SEPTEMBER 4, 3 PM

EXDIS

EMBTel 483

FOLLOWING IS LETTER FROM KING CONSTANTINE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON  
DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1964:

QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR REPLY OF AUGUST 28 TO MY MESSAGE  
AND I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SINCERE INTEREST AND EFFORTS IN  
FINDING A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.  
CFN 484 228 189 4 3 483 3 1964 28

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 63A ~~SECRET~~

I HAVE ACQUAINTED MY GOVERNMENT WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN  
YOUR MESSAGE.

MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT IN VIEW OF THE CONDITIONS PREVAILING  
IN CYPRUS-WHICH, AS IT IS KNOWN, ARE A RESULT OF THE RECENT  
BRUTAL AIR RAIDS AGAINST THE ISLAND-IT IS UNFORTUNATELY  
IMPOSSIBLE TO PURSUE AND IMPOSE A SOLUTION ON THE LINES OF  
MR. DEAN ACHESON'S PROPOSALS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ANY INITIATIVE  
ON MY BEHALF WOULD BE OF NO AVAIL.

I HAVE, THEREFORE, COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD BE  
PREFERABLE TO DEFER, FOR THE TIME BEING, ANY INITIATIVE IN THE  
HOPE THAT TIME WILL ALLEVIATE THE PRESENT TENSION.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-390

By 100, NARA, Date 4-23-04

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 484, SEPTEMBER 4, 3 P.M. FROM ATHENS

IN THE MEANTIME I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT ALL OUR COMMON EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS CONCENTRATING ALL ITS EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION.

SINCERELY YOURS, CONSTANTINE R UNQTE .

SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED.

LABOUISSSE

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:28 P.M.

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Bundy*  
*W/D*

*71*

31

Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

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1964 SEP 4 PM 12 34

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUQMAT 62A 04/1300Z  
P 041245Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUFDHN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 483 INFO PRIORITY LONDON 188 ANKARA 27  
SEPTEMBER 4, 3 PM

EXDIS

KING CONSTANTINE ASKED ME TO SEE HIM THURSDAY AFTERNOON. HE HANDED ME A LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, TEXT OF WHICH BEING SENT IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. WE THEN TALKED FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR ABOUT THE CYPRUS SITUATION.

THE KING EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SORROW AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT LINES SUGGESTED CFN 483 188 227 4 3

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 62A ~~SECRET~~

IN THE KING'S MESSAGE OF AUGUST 25 AS THEY HAD SEEMED TO HIM ONLY WAY OUT OF THE MESS. HE SUPPOSED, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NOTHING PRESIDENT COULD DO UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES. KING SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH MAKARIOS HAS SINCE COME OUT AGAINST ANY BASE ON CYPRUS, HE FELT HE COULD STILL HOLD HIM TO HIS WORD RE NATO BASE.

KING ASKED HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO "TRAP MAKARIOS", WHOM HE BRANDED AS AN IMPOSSIBLE SCOUNDREL. I REPLIED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME LARGELY MATTER FOR GOG TO FIND SOME MEANS OF CONTROLLING HIM, POINTING OUT THAT PART OF TROUBLE RESULTED FROM PAPANDREOU'S PUBLIC SUPPORT OF MAKARIOS TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD GRADUALLY WORKED ITSELF INTO MAKARIOS' POCKET. I SAID IT ESSENTIAL THAT CALM BE RESTORED AND HARASSMENTS STOPPED, GOING INTO SUCH POINTS AS ROTATION TURKISH CONTINGENT, BLOCKADE, FULL SUPPORT OF UN. THE KING AGREED AND SAID HE THOUGHT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DOING ALL POSSIBLE NOW ON THIS CORE. I SUGGESTED THERE WAS MUCH GOG COULD YET DO WITHOUT INCREASING GREEK FORCES

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XVI, #153  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-24-83

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 483, SEPTEMBER 4, 3 PM, FROM ATHENS

IN CYPRUS, AND WENT OVER ACHESON'S SUGGESTIONS TO SOSSIDIS AS WELL AS POINTS MADE BY BELCHER IN NICOSIA'S 304 TO ATHENS, ADDING THAT I PERSONALLY COULD GET NO SENSE THAT THERE WAS YET A

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 62A ~~SECRET~~  
LINE OF COMMAND ON GREEK SIDE. THE KING CAREFULLY LISTENED TO THESE COMMENTS AND I BELIEVE TOOK THEM TO HEART AND WILL USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH GOVERNMENT.

THE KING THEN EVERTED TO MATTER OF FINDING A SOLUTION, ASKING WHAT COULD POSSIBLY BE DONE. I SAID HERE AGAIN THAT MUCH DEPENDED ON ABILITY AND COURAGE OF GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THINGS IN HAND. HE DID NOT DISAGREE, BUT REACTED AS DO ALL GREEKS BY SAYING THERE ARE DEFINITE LIMITS TO GREECE'S ABILITY TO PERSUADE CYPRIOTS. HE WAS AFRAID THE USG DID NOT COMPREHEND THIS POINT NOR THE FACT THAT TURKEY HAD NO JUSTIFICATION FOR HAVING SEPARATE POSITION ON ISLAND PROVIDED RIGHTS OF MINORITIES PROTECTED. I AGAIN WENT OVER ARGUMENTS IN DEPTTEL 400 (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, WE HAVE BEEN USING FOR SOME TIME IN OUR CONVERSATIONS HERE BUT WHICH USUALLY FALL ON DEAF EARS), CONCLUDING THAT IF MAKARIOS CONTINUED HIS INSISTENCE ON NO COMPROMISES IT SEEMED TO ME GREECE FACED A DISMAL OUTLOOK.

THE CONVERSATION WAS FRIENDLY AND INTIMATE. AT ONE TIME THE KING ASKED SMILINGLY WHETHER I WANTED HIM TO GET RID OF PAPANDREOU. IN SAME VEIN I ASKED WHETHER HE COULD IF HE WANTED TO. HE REPLIED HE COULD NOT DO SO NOW.

PAGE VEFOKMERUQMAT 62A ~~SECRET~~

HE IS DEEPLY AND GENUINELY TROUBLED ABOUT CYPRIOT SITUATION WHICH IS ALSO HAVING ITS SERIOUS AND ALARMING REPERCUSSIONS IN THE COUNTRY, ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY. HE WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO FIND A WAY TO "TRAP MAKARIOS" BUT HE APPEARS CONVINCED THAT TURKISH THREATS AND AIR ACTION HAVE SERVED TO STRENGTHEN MAKARIOS' POSITION.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 483, SEPTEMBER 4, 3 PM, FROM ATHENS

IN MY TALK WITH THE KING, AS WITH THE PRIMIN, FONMIN, DEPUTY PRIMIN, AND WITH OTHER GREEK LEADERS, I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE LINE THAT, WHEREAS WE ARE STILL MOST INTERESTED IN HELPING TO FIND WAY OUT, THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOING SO RESTS LARGELY WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE THAT PSYCHOLOGICALLY THIS, PLUS THE GENERAL DETERIORATION MENTIONED IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, IS BEGINNING TO HAVE AN EFFECT. HOWEVER, I HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS THAT THE GREEKS WILL EVER BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE SUFFICIENTLY TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE TURKS.

LABOUISSSE

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 1:32 PM, 9/4/64.

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Greece*

36

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*72*

Action

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NNNNVV QVA447CRA677VV QVA418 QMA456ATA455

Info

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT  
DE RUQMAT 113 24/1230Z

*019621*

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R 241210Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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TO RUEHCT/SECSTATE WASHDC

SP

INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK

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STATE GRNC

1964 JUL 24 AM 10 38

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT 142 INFO USUN NINE FROM  
ATHENS JULY 24, 2-PM

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NSC

THERE WAS FLURRY OF INDIGNANT COMMENT IN ATHENS PRESS THIS  
WEEK ON JULY 21 REBROADCAST, OVER AFRS STATION AT ELLINIKON,  
OF "FACE THE NATION" INTERVIEW WITH ADLAI STEVENSON. PROGRAM  
MADE IN MID-JUNE, CONTAINED SEVERAL REFERENCES TO CYPRUS  
ISSUE WHICH GREEK PAPERS CONSTRUED AS BLATANTLY PRO-TURKISH.  
CFN 142 24 2-PM 21

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AIR

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 113 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RMR

PRO-GOVT VIMA YESTERDAY "QUOTED" AMBASSADOR STEVENSON AS  
SAYING: "THERE WILL BE A MOMENT AT WHICH PATIENCE OF TURKISH  
PEOPLE WILL BE EXHAUSTED AND THEY WILL BE OBLIGED TO MAKE  
DECISIONS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO PERMIT ANOTHER  
CUBA TO EXIST NEAR THEM."

MR. STEVENSON CONCLUDED "STRUGGLE OF TURKISH PEOPLE IS A JUST  
ONE, AND TURKS WILL HAVE TO BE SATISFIED."

TWO OTHER PAPERS, GLADFLY ESTIA (MARKEZINIS PROGRESSIVE)  
AND ATHENAIKI (PRO GOVT) CARRIED SAME QUOTE. LATTER PAPER,  
UNDER HEADLINE "ANTI-GREEK STATEMENTS BY STEVENSON," SAID:  
"THIS GOES TOO FAR. THE RELAY BY AFRS OF THE ANTI-HELLENIC  
INTERVIEW OF THE US REP TO THE UN CONSTITUTES A REAL PROVO-  
CATION AGAINST THE GREEK PEOPLE AND AROUSES THE JUST INDIG-  
NATION OF THE GREEK PEOPLE." DEMOKRATIKI ALLAGHI (PROBAEDA)  
ADDED: THESE SHAMEFUL STATEMENTS OF MR. STEVENSON WE TURN  
OVER TO THE JUDGEMENT OF THE GREEK PEOPLE."

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-2- 142, JULY 24, 2 p.m. FROM ATHENS

TWO EDITORIALS ALSO REFERRED TO STEVENSON INTERVIEW. KATHIMERINI (PRE-ERE) NOTED CU PRESS HAD PRAISED STEVENSON FOR ALLEGEDLY REFERRING TO PRIMIN AS "MOST INTELLECTUAL STATESMAN HE HAS MET," AND NOW SAME PRESS JUSTIFIABLY ATTACKED STEVENSON FOR HIS PRO-TURKISH FEELINGS.

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 113 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

KATHIMERINI ASKED: "WHY DIDN'T THE MOST INTELLECTUAL STATESMAN MANAGE TO PERSUADE MR. STEVENSON TO BE AT LEAST MORE RESTRAINED IN HIS PRO-TURKISH STAND?"

PRO-GOVT ELEFThERIA EDITORIALIZED: "IT IS KNOWN MR. STEVENSON REPRESENTS, NOT WITHOUT RECOMPENSE, TURKISH INTERESTS IN US. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN FULFILLMENT OF HIS PRIVATE COMMITMENTS HE SUPPORTED VIEW...THAT TURKS ARE RIGHT ON CYPRUS QUESTION AND MUST BE GIVEN SATISFACTION."

LABOUISSSE

BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Romer*

*W/H*

32

Action

SS  
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*73*

003

CONTROL: 20475

RECD: JUNE 22, 1964 10:06 AM

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: SECSTATE 6352 PRIORITY

INFO: ANKARA 333  
ATHENS 321  
USUN 713

DATE: JUNE 23, 1 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS - TUG.,

1. FONOFF CONFIRMS INONU DAY, JUNE 27. HE IS DINING WITH BUTLER SUNDAY EVENING, AND WILL HAVE FORMAL MEETING WITH PRIMIN AND BUTLER MONDAY MORNING. HE ENPLANING FOR PARIS MONDAY AFTERNOON.

2. FONOFF STILL ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTY SCHEDULING PAPANDREOU VISIT. IT INITIALLY PROPOSED JULY 1-2, BUT PAPANDREOU INSISTED THESE DATES INCONVENIENT FOR HIM. (FONOFF SUSPECTS HE DOES NOT WISH SEEM TO BE COMING IMMEDIATELY AFTER INONU.) INSTEAD, HE PROPOSED COMING TO LONDON ON UNSPECIFIED DATES LATER IN JULY. IN VIEW COMMONWEALTH PRIMINS' CONFERENCE AND CLOSING OF PARLIAMENT IN MID-JULY, PAPANDREOU'S SUGGESTION NOT CONVENIENT FOR BRITS. HENCE, THEY ARE STILL TRYING PERSUADE PAPANDREOU MAKE BRIEF STOP-OVER IN LONDON ENROUTE BACK FROM WASHINGTON.

GP-3.

CFN 1 27 2 1-2 GP-,

JONES

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6-22-64, 11:00 A.M.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *cbm*, NARA, Date *6-26-03*

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JUN 22 1964



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Green 74*

54

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-302

By *iso*, NARA, Date *2-23-04*

012534

NNNNVV QVA107VV QMA184ATA986

00 RUEHCR

DE RUQMAT 03A 12/2240Z

OP 122230Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHCR/ SECSTATE WASCHDC

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA

STATE GRNC

1964 JUN 12 PM 7 40

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (1885) INFO

PRIORITY ANKARA 359 FROM ATHENS JUNE 13, 1AM

FON MIN TELEPHONED ME URGENTLY AND REFERRED TO AP AND REUTERS' REPORT FROM WASHINGTON FOLLOWING BALL MEEETING WITH PRESIDENT INDICATING THAT PAPANDREOU AND INONU MIGHT VISIT WASHINGTON RE CYPRUS CRISIS. FON MIN EXPRESSED GREAT SURPRISE AND REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY TO THIS REPORT, SENSING IT WAS FORM OF PRESSURE. HE SAID PRIMIN WAS TO MAKE CLARIFYING STATEMENT THAT HE HAD NO PLAN TO GO TO WASHINGTON.

I SUGGESTED THAT HE INSTEAD SAY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF PROPOSAL TO HAVE PAPANDREOU VISIT WASHINGTON. (GREEK NATIONAL RADIO ON MIDNIGHT NEWSCAST HAS CARRIED FOLLOWING CFN: 1885 359 13 1

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 03A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRIEF STATEMENT BY PRIMIN ON THIS MATTER: "DURING BALL CONVERSATION NO QUESTION RAISED OF EITHER MEETING WITH INONU OR PRESIDENT JOHNSON").

COMMENT: SHARP OFFICIAL REACTION TO THIS PRESS PLOY UNDERLINES POINT THAT IF THERE IS THOUGHT OF INVITING PAPANDREOU TO WASHINGTON, IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT THIS BE BROACHED QUIETLY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. GREEKS WOULD BE VERY ALLERGIC TO PARTICIPATING OPENLY AT TOP-LEVEL TRIPARTITE MEETING AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT.

GP-3

LABOUISSE

CFN: GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O - 6/12/64 - 7:43 PM.  
PASSED W/H, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN - 6/12/64 - 7:55 PM.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

*[Handwritten signature]*  
2. *[Handwritten signature]*

April 21, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

9  
*[Handwritten signature]*

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Attached for your information and files  
is a copy of Airgram #1122 dated April 13,  
1964 from Amembassy Athens regarding SCIENCE -  
Government Overhauls Greek Atomic Energy Com-  
mission.

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

1721



# AIRGRAM

AE 2 GREECE

POL 15-1 GREECE  
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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AGR	COM	FRB
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
16		3
AE/CNSC	WHD	1
7	6	

A-1122

NO.

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO.

112 SERIES B

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON 1964 APR 13 AM 10 02

INFO: AmEmbassy ROME for Science Attache  
AmEmbassy VIENNA ANALYSIS for DISSEMINATION BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy ATHENS DATE: April 13, 1964

SUBJECT: SCIENCE - Government Overhauls Greek Atomic Energy Commission

REF : EMBTEL 1512, 4/8/64 (141 to Rome; 14 to Vienna)

## SUMMARY

The new Greek Government has rescinded salary increases previously approved for the scientists and the President of the Greek Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC), has initiated an investigation of the GAEC's expenditures, has dismissed the President and other members of the GAEC's Executive Committee, and has appointed as President a reputed long-time opponent of the GAEC. These moves have demoralized the GAEC's scientists and administrative personnel, many of whom are understood to be on the verge of resigning. The moves appear to have greatly lowered the political stock of the new Government among a large segment of the Greek scientific community. Resentment is particularly directed against Andreas PAPANDREOU, the Prime Minister's son and possible political heir, who was formerly viewed by the GAEC's scientists as their saviour and is now viewed as their Pontius Pilate.

## I. INTRODUCTION

In recent days the new Government has taken several actions which have adversely affected the morale--and therefore the operations--of the scientific and executive personnel of the GAEC. Because of the sizeable US stake in the GAEC, the Embassy has attempted to unravel the skein of events, issues and personalities. The purpose of this airgram is to report the findings, which may prove of interest also for the light they shed on the inner workings of the new Government.

## GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: ECON:EMCohen:hsd/mem

Contents and Classification Approved by: John Q. Boudgett, First Secty. of Embassy

Clearances: POL: OWilson, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-302  
By NS, NARA, Date 2-23-04

1721

This document consists of 10 pages  
numbered 1 through 10 copies, Series B



~~SECRET~~

An Embassy ATHENS  
A-1122, 4/13/64  
Page 2.

## II. BACKGROUND

Since the establishment of the GAEC almost ten years ago, the dominant figure in its operations has been its President, A. G. SPANIDES. A retired rear-admiral, Spanides had been one of the earliest proponents of the idea of establishing nuclear research facilities in Greece, and his activities had led the press to dub him "the Hyman Rickover of Greece." Spanides' main opposition came from various influential academicians who took the position that nuclear research is an activity best left to the wealthier countries, and that in any event it could best be conducted by existing institutions rather than by a new government agency. As the fledgling GAEC adopted an increasingly independent course, establishing its own schools and research facilities, the opposition of the academic establishment intensified. The regime of former Prime Minister Constantine CARAMANLIS became the main protector of the GAEC--a fact which has not been forgotten by Caramanlis' political opposition, which has now come to power. In 1958 Caramanlis declared the GAEC to be an autonomous agency, only nominally responsible to the Ministry of Coordination. In 1960 he placed it more directly under his wing by making it nominally responsible to the Minister to the Prime Minister.

After the elections of February 16 of this year, the new Prime Minister, George Papandreou, appointed as Minister to the Prime Minister his son, Andreas, who had previously been a professor of economics at the University of California and an American citizen for twenty years until his participation in the election campaign (for a biography see Athens A-972, 3/5/64). During the election campaign, the younger Papandreou visited the facilities of the GAEC, and impressed the staff there as being--to quote a remark made shortly afterward to an Embassy officer by the GAEC's Scientific Director, T.V. CANELLOPOULOS,—"The one man in Greece who best understands the importance of our activities, and who is determined to do things for us."

Soon after assuming his Ministership, however, Andreas Papandreou made clear to the Embassy that he intended to do things to as well as for the GAEC. He asserted that experts, particularly an associate of his from the University of California, had told him that the GAEC had been doing a bad job. He is known also to have been listening to the former Secretary General of the GAEC, T. KOUYOUMDZELIS, who had been ousted in 1960 when that part-time position was converted into the full-time position of Scientific Director, and who reportedly is no friend of Spanides. It should be noted that, while the academic establishment opposes Spanides and his group primarily on the grounds

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that they have done more than they should, the Minister's opposition has been based primarily on the grounds that they have not done all that they could.

### III. DEVELOPMENTS

A. Recission of Salary Increases: One of Andreas Papandreou's first moves was to rescind a decree which had been approved by the preceding caretaker regime authorizing salary increases for the scientific personnel and the President of the GAEC. The Minister has told the Embassy that he did this because the caretaker regime had included Admiral Spanides, who had served as Minister of Merchant Marine, so that in effect Spanides as a Minister had approved a pay raise for Spanides as President of the GAEC.

The Embassy has learned that the GAEC's request for salary increases - from a top of 10,000 drachmas (\$333) a month to 16,500 drachmas (\$550) a month - originally covered only the scientists, who work under contract and are not covered by a recent pay raise for civil servants. The request for an identical increase for the President was tacked on by the Scientific Director, Canellopoulos, after Spanides had temporarily moved over to the Ministry of Merchant Marine. Canellopoulos insists that he made this request strictly on his own, and that he did it because the President's salary of 10,000 drachmas is "an anomaly"; he points out that the President's salary is lower than that of the subordinate Scientific Director, who receives 15,000 drachmas, and that it would have been lower even than that of many of the scientists if the original request had been acted upon.

As may be expected, the scientists whose salary increases were rescinded are bitter. Apart from regret at the loss of income, they feel that they have become pawns in a game of power politics. If Andreas Papandreou wished to deny Spanides a salary increase, they ask, why did he also deny them theirs? According to Canellopoulos, many of the scientists are now on the verge of quitting, and some have even informed him that they will not wait for their contracts to end. Canellopoulos also states that he himself, though not directly affected by the salary cut-backs or any of the Government's other measures, is so demoralized that he has already written to several prospective other employers.

B. Tightening of Requirements for Bids: Another move initiated by Andreas Papandreou promptly after he assumed his Ministership was to tighten the requirements for the GAEC to obtain its supplies through public bids. Formerly, bids were required only for purchases exceeding 1 million drachmas (\$33,333) in the case of construction goods or 300,000 drachmas (\$10,000) in the case of other supplies. These ceilings have been lowered to 50,000

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drachmas (\$1,667) or 10,000 drachmas (\$333) respectively. GAEC officials contend that these ceilings are so low, and the procedure for obtaining approval of bids so bureaucratic, that their purchase operations are grinding to a halt. Moreover, they argue, scientific machinery and supplies cannot be purchased like ordinary office machinery and supplies; the scientists' specifications are often so precise that only one particular item produced by one particular supplier will fill the bill.

C. Investigation of Expenditures: The intensifying frictions between the Minister to the Prime Minister and the GAEC first came to public notice on March 22, when the press reported an announcement by the Minister that he had ordered an investigation of the GAEC's expenditures. Almost all the stories hinted that the investigation was prompted by misdoings or wrongdoings on the part of the GAEC. One typical account, for example, stated ("Elefteria"):

"According to reliable information, the Minister's decision has been prompted by data pointing to the existence of most irregular conditions in this organization, whose annual budget reaches the enormous amount of 100 million drachmas. Reports from Greek scientists as well as from a French expert refer, among other things, to burdening the organization with supernumerary personnel, who more often than not are unqualified..... Moreover,..... despite existing provisions, annual reports were not submitted to the Minister....."

According to the Minister, it was primarily the latter issue that prompted the investigation. He has told the Embassy that upon assuming office he had noted the failure of the GAEC to comply with a regulation, effected two years ago, requiring the GAEC to submit a periodic report to the Minister covering certain expenses. The Minister stated that he promptly wrote to Admiral Spanides requesting him to begin submitting reports, and that Spanides "had not even had the courtesy to send a written reply." Papandreou termed this "a simple case of insubordination." Spanides' side of the story is that the GAEC for many years has been reporting the desired information to the Ministry of Coordination, since that is the Ministry that supplies the funds in question, and that, despite the statutory requirement for a separate report to be sent to the Minister to the Prime Minister, Papandreou's predecessors in that position had agreed that they did not require the report. Upon receipt of Papandreou's letter ordering submittal of the report, Spanides has told the Embassy, he telephoned the Minister's office and arranged to meet with him to discuss the matter; but on the day of the scheduled meeting, King Paul died, and the appointment was cancelled (as was other Government business). Thereafter,

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Spanides asserted, he telephoned repeatedly for a new appointment, but the Minister's secretary maintained each time that the Minister was not available. The next word from the Minister on this subject, Spanides continued, was the announcement of the investigation, which Spanides learned about only when he read it in the newspapers.

On March 24 an Embassy officer asked Spanides for his side of the story, which Spanides gave as outlined above along with protests over the "insulting" manner in which Papandreou had taken the action, and along with assurances that the charges of "irregularities" were unjustified. The officer relayed the Admiral's sentiments to the Minister later that day. That evening Papandreou telephoned Spanides and, according to Spanides, conveyed apologies for the newspapers' embellishments upon the simple announcement of the investigation. He promised to issue a clarification, which he did the following day. As reported in the press ("Eleftheria"):

"Mr. A. Papandreou told press reporters....he was not aware of any financial irregularities in the GAEC, and his decision to set up a committee to investigate the GAEC's financial administration did not imply the existence of financial irregularities.... There was no hostile intent in his decision, the Minister asserted, but only a desire to fulfill his responsibilities...."

In addition to clarifying the situation, the Minister apparently also sought to remove the onus by obfuscating the situation; a subsequent announcement stated that not only the GAEC but also other agencies would be audited, and that the GAEC investigation is but one facet of a broad survey of Government financial practices.

Meanwhile, the investigation of the GAEC began immediately after the original announcement and has continued since. The three-man investigating committee consists of a judge, a civil engineer and an economist. GAEC officials have told the Embassy that they welcome the investigation because "it can only prove that we have nothing to hide." At worst, they stated, the audit might find that they had occasionally purchased goods before the authorization to do so was in hand; but they stressed that this is a common practice among Greek Government agencies, because "it is often impossible to wait for the bureaucrats to agree to what we know they will eventually agree to anyway."

D. Firing of the Executive Committee: The preceding events came to a climax on April 7, with an announcement of the dismissal of Admiral Spanides from the Presidency, followed on April 9 by an announcement of the dismissal of the entire five-member Executive Committee. The

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Scientific Director was not covered by this measure because technically he is not a member of the Executive Committee but rather a "voting participant" in it. Technically, too, the dismissal of the Board members other than the President was a "termination of office": their three-year terms had expired early last November, but had been extended indefinitely by the caretaker regime then in office, and it had generally been expected that some or all would be appointed to new full terms. Spanides' dismissal was an out-and-out dismissal, however, as he had another year remaining of his five-year term. All the dismissals took effect retroactively as of March 31, 1964. One year-old vacancy on the Board, which normally has six members, was left vacant (see IV below).

The old-guard GAEC officials view the dismissals as another stab in the back. Spanides has told the Embassy that after Papandreou issued his clarifying announcement concerning the investigation, Spanides telephoned him and the two arranged to meet face to face to discuss their differences. The meeting was held on April 3 in Papandreou's office. Spanides stated that Papandreou was again conciliatory, even deferential, to him. Papandreou allegedly expressed admiration for the GAEC President's good works, but said he was under "tremendous political pressure" to remove Spanides from office. Spanides said that Papandreou offered at this time to "do all I can to protect you," and to "take care of you should it become impossible to prevent your dismissal"; Spanides stated that Papandreou spoke of the possibility of having Spanides appointed as a consultant to the Government on nuclear energy matters.

A few days later, according to Spanides, a Government lawyer came to see him and, "on behalf of the Government," asked him to resign. When Spanides refused, the lawyer thrust a document before Spanides' eyes and said, "You may as well. Read this." It was the Royal Decree dismissing Spanides and the others. Spanides told the Embassy he was shocked to note the date the Decree had been signed by King Constantine: April 2 - the day before Spanides' meeting with Andreas Papandreou. Since the Minister would have had to approve the Decree before passing it along to the King for signature, Spanides maintains that when Papandreou was promising to keep Spanides in office as long as possible, Papandreou already knew that Spanides had been dismissed.

The Decree shocked the old-guard GAEC members for still another reason. It named as Spanides' successor Leonidas ZERVAS, professor of organic chemistry at the University of Athens, former caretaker Minister of Industry (in the Pipinellis Administration, June to September 1963), Second Vice President of the Royal Hellenic Research Foundation - and, the old-guarders say, one of the leading opponents of the GAEC since before its inception. Canellopoulos has commented to the Embassy that

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"it is like appointing an atheist as Archbishop." Canellopoulos also stresses that Zervas apparently will be filling his new post only on a part-time basis, unless he resigns from his various other posts, which he is not yet known to have done. Moreover, Canellopoulos asserts, he has been told by the Government official who will soon be supervising all Government research programs, an Undersecretary in the Ministry of Coordination (see F below), that "Zervas stopped growing intellectually in Berlin in 1930." (A biographic report is in preparation and will be submitted separately.) Worst of all, stated the Scientific Director and other GAEC personnel, it was Zervas alone who pushed Andreas Papandreou to fire Spanides. They state that their friends and contacts in the ranks of the new Government have reported to them that the "tremendous political pressure" to which Papandreou had referred in his talk with Spanides was being exerted only by Zervas and by Papandreou himself.

The old-guarders are convinced that the Minister's "mud-slinging" at Spanides shortly after the new Government took office was a crude attempt to force Spanides to resign, and that it was only when this failed that Papandreou resorted to direct action, and that even then he masked his actions because "he didn't have the courage to be honest."

E. Threat to GAEC's Graduate School: Canellopoulos is particularly worried over the impact of the recent moves on the GAEC's "Institute for Advanced Studies." The Institute was established in November 1961 to fulfill the need for postgraduate-level training facilities in Greece for students pursuing careers in nuclear research. Due to the opposition of the Greek academic establishment, the Institute was prohibited from awarding degrees to its graduates. The GAEC has overcome this handicap by effecting arrangements with the Chaim Weitzmann Institute of Israel and with Grenoble University of France, which accept the GAEC Institute's graduates and award them Ph.D. degrees (Weitzmann awards its after the candidate has satisfactorily completed six months of resident training in Israel; Grenoble awards its upon approval of the candidate's thesis). According to Canellopoulos, Columbia University of New York recently agreed to effect a similar arrangement. Canellopoulos fears that the Government will now try to incorporate the Institute into Greece's regular university system. For the highly flexible and informal Institute, which is constantly changing its curriculum to meet needs as they arise, this incorporation into the traditional system would be, in Canellopoulos' words, "the kiss of death."

F. Transfer to the Ministry of Coordination: There are various indications that the GAEC, along with all other research operations, will be made responsible to the Ministry of Coordination. GAEC personnel are not

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unhappy about this, especially since it would take them out from under the thumb of Andreas Papandreou. They fear, however, that the reorganization will destroy the merely nominal GAEC-Government relationship they previously enjoyed, and that the Government would exercise a very real control over the GAEC's day-to-day operations. They point out that until the GAEC was placed under the Minister to the Prime Minister in 1960, there had been three representatives from Government ministries serving as voting participants in the Executive Committee. The fear is that something like this may again be instituted. Canellopoulos maintains, too, that on the one hand Zervas is held in low esteem by the career Government officials who will be responsible for overseeing the centralized program covering all research activities, and that on the other hand Zervas is likely to feel greater loyalty to the Government than to the GAEC whenever the inevitable disputes arise.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The Embassy believes it will be necessary to wait for the dust to settle before determining what steps, if any, need be taken to prevent deterioration of the GAEC's operations. Among the key unknown factors are:

A. The validity of the criticisms against the GAEC: The Embassy has been told by several visiting American experts in recent years that the GAEC has been doing an impressive job, and that its shortcomings are the kind which characterize such operations in any country of comparable size and resources. However, to our knowledge no one in the US Government, in the IAEA or in any other position has made any intensive, detailed assessment of the GAEC in recent years. We have learned from some of the American scientists who have worked under contract there that Admiral Spanides was not running a tight ship: the main complaint has been that operations are so departmentalized and so decentralized that scientists working a few yards from one another, possibly on related projects, know nothing of each other's work. We know, too, that Queen Frederika, who has long taken an active interest in the GAEC's affairs, has been less than satisfied with some aspects (it would be interesting to know what role, <sup>if any,</sup> she has played in these recent events--and what role she will be playing henceforth). In any event, the possibility must be allowed that Andreas Papandreou's low opinion of the GAEC's record will prove to be well-founded.

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B. The new GAEC leadership: The new executives of the GAEC have not yet demonstrated their capabilities or intentions for their new jobs. A few have been engaged in nuclear research before, but none of them has had any extensive experience in programs of the kind being undertaken by the GAEC. It should be noted that the same was true of the previous members of the Executive Committee when they were first appointed to the Committee; but those men had accumulated years of experience. Prudence would have dictated that at least one or two of the previous members be retained, to provide some measure of continuity of knowledge. Andreas Papandreou probably felt that this would be provided by the retention of the Scientific Director, Canellopoulos, but as mentioned earlier, Canellopoulos now may be on the verge of resigning (he has told the Embassy that he will "give Zervas a chance" but will resign "if Zervas does what I think he will").

A few days ago Canellopoulos and another GAEC old-guarder, referring to the one vacancy remaining to be filled on the Executive Committee, asked the Embassy to try to persuade Andreas Papandreou to appoint to it George PANTAZIS, professor of biology. Pantazis was among those dismissed from the Committee as of March 31, and in fact for some years until then he had been the GAEC's Vice President, although this was only a part-time position. Canellopoulos stressed that Pantazis' work could not be opposed either on scientific or on political grounds, and that Pantazis has a fund of knowledge which the GAEC cannot afford to lose. The Embassy was sympathetic to the proposal for the additional reason that Pantazis knows more than any man alive about the important program for the elimination of the Dacus fly, to which the US Government recently contributed 1,200,000 drachmas (\$40,000).

The Embassy therefore put the suggestion to Andreas Papandreou that Pantazis be re-appointed to the Committee. Papandreou replied that he is favorably inclined to do so and will give it thought. The main obstacle is that the vacancy calls for a specialist in physics, and there is already a biologist among the new appointees (the Committee is statutorily required to consist of one expert from each of six different branches of science).. Another difficulty in the way of Pantazis' appointment, the Embassy has subsequently learned, is that T. KOUYOUMDZETIS, former Secretary General of the GAEC (mentioned in II above) and a physicist, is seeking the post.

C. The Government's policies for research: Other key unknowns are the form and substance of the new Government's program for centralizing, intensifying and expanding Greece's research activities, and of the related program for overhauling and modernizing the country's educational system. While the old-guard GAEC members view with trepidation any Governmental controls over the GAEC, the point to note is that they do so mainly because

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
they equate Government control with bureaucratic red-tape--and it is precisely bureaucracy and red-tape which the new Government is trying to eliminate.

In this connection, it is worth stressing that the Embassy knows Andreas Papandreou and his colleagues in the new Government to be men who are fully aware of the importance of research and technology for a country in Greece's stage of economic development. Despite the evident clumsiness of Andreas Papandreou in his dealings with the GAEC so far, there can be no doubt that he has been acting out of the best of motives both for the GAEC and for the country. It seems reasonable to expect that as he learns more about the art of politics he will be able to do more for the science of nuclear research.

The Embassy deems it advisable at this time to confine its efforts to a few well-chosen nudges, hints and suggestions to the Government. The Embassy has been under some pressure from the GAEC old-guard to do more. Scientific Director Canellopoulos has told us that he and his scientific and administrative staffs feel that "you are the only ones who could help us." They are probably right. But we feel that any further intervention on their behalf could well prove counterproductive. Moreover, as stated at the start of this section, we feel it is too early to tell what steps, if any, need be taken.

The Embassy will keep close tabs on the situation and will keep the Department and other interested parties informed of major developments.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

  
John Q. Blodgett  
First Secretary of Embassy

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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IN PRESENTATION NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM TO PARLIAMENT MARCH 30, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU DEVOTED SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS TO GREEK TURKISH RELATIONS. PM SAID HE WAS "SINCERELY SORRY" ABOUT RECENT "MISUNDERSTANDINGS" WITH TURKEY OVER CYPRUS QUESTION AND STRESSED THAT GREEK TURKISH FRIENDSHIP IS MATTER OF "HIGHEST INTEREST" TO BOTH COUNTRIES. NOTING THAT TURKEY HAS CHARGED THAT GOG HAS QUESTIONED LIABILITY  
CFN 1473 249 239 254 173 30

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 04A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LONDON AND ZURICH AGREEMENTS AND HAS "EVEN THREATENED" REPRISALS PAPANDREOU SAID IT WAS NOT GOG "BUT FACTS THEMSELVES" WHICH HAVE THROWN AGREEMENTS INTO QUESTION AND THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS RECOGNIZED INAPPLICABILITY OF ACCORDS "AS PROVED" BY DESPATCH PKF TO CYPRUS AND NAMING OF MEDIATOR.

PM CONTINUED THAT IT NECESSARY FOR TURKEY TO RECOGNIZE REALITY OF SITUATION, SINCE "NOTHING WOULD BE MORE UNPLEASANT FOR GREECE THAT STATE OF TENSION OR EVEN ACTUAL BREACH WHICH WOULD BECOME INEVITABLE IN EVENT OF TURKISH INVASION," SINCE IN EVENT OF TURKISH "ATTACK," DEFENSE IS DUTY OF HONOR. "NOTING THAT QUESTION OF CYPRUS IS NOW BEFORE "INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENT," PAPANDREOU SAID FINAL SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND ONLY WHEN CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE" ARE APPLIED TO ISLAND.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

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By 110 NARA, Date 2-23-04

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-2- 1473, March 31, 10 p.m. From: Athens.

IN CONCLUSION PAPANDREOU CALLED FOR "TERMINATION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION" IN CYPRUS AND SAFEGUARDING OF RIGHTS BOTH OF GREEK MAJORITY AND SMALL "TURKISH MINORITY, "IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRECEPTS OF DEMOCRACY." ONLY IN THIS WAY, HE SAID, CAN A SOLUTION BE FOUND TO PROBLEM WHICH HAS PLACED GREEK TURKISH RELATIONS AND NATO ALLIANCE "UNDER TRIAL."

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 04A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MAIN SIGNIFICANCE OF STATEMENT IS ITS RELATIVE MODERATION AND EMPHASIS UPON NEED FOR PRESERVATION GREEK TURKISH FRIENDSHIP. STATEMENT THAT FINAL SOLUTION MUST BE BASED ON "DEMOCRACY" IS APPARENTLY REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, ALTHOUGH PM AVOIDED USING THIS PHRASE. ALTHOUGH REITERATING THAT GREECE WOULD REACT IN EVENT TURKISH INTERVENTION, FORM OF STATEMENT WAS MEASURABLY SOFTER THAN EARLIER STATEMENTS THIS VEIN.  
LABOUISSSE  
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:30 p.m. 3-31-64.

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE, CIA, JCS, OSD, USUN, CINCEUR  
ALSO FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE ALSO FOR POLAD AT 6:50 PM.  
3-31-64.

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NEA-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**AIRGRAM**

DEF 15-5 GREECE-45

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COPY NO. 81-86 SERIES B

MAR. 21 1964

DATE: March 20, 1964

FROM : Amembassy ATHENS  
SUBJECT : Naval Communications Station

REF : Athens' 1963 Airgrams: A-49, A-139, A-187, A-242, A-380, A-454

The Naval Communications Station, Greece, was activated on November 30, 1963. A dangerous gap in communication with the Sixth Fleet while in the Eastern Mediterranean has thus been filled. Until the activation of the Station such communications were at best undependable and at worst ineffective.

In addition to performing its basic function of reaching the Sixth Fleet, the Station is carrying out the NATO tasks envisaged in A-242. It is also a principal carrier of communications for this Embassy and of the other United States Government agencies in Greece. Finally, the Station will provide a means by which the Royal Hellenic Navy can communicate with its ships at sea when a program of modernization of the obsolete communications equipment of its ships is completed.

The problem of the acquisition of the real estate needed for the efficient functioning of the Station seems on its way to resolution. A solution has been found for the difficulties posed by the presence of beach cottages in the southern easement area of Nea Makri (A-187). The Station's needs can be met by exchanging the easement area in which the beach cottages are located for the exclusive use of a slightly larger contiguous area to the north, which has always been included in the overall boundaries of the Station but as an easement area only. Its conversion to exclusive use occasions no difficulty since it is land of no recreational or any other particular value. This exchange, approved by

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

GROUP 3

By isrl NARA, Date 8-22-92 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: MSA/MCKenney Jr./AGVigderman:gmK

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances: NAVCOMMSTA:Commander Grantham (in draft)

*See Clayton*  
*This document consists of 3 pages  
numbered 1 of 90 copies, Series B*



the Chief of Naval Operations, was welcomed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unless the Department perceives objection, the Embassy will present the note requesting the change which, along with maps, is enclosed with this airgram.

A further proposed modification of the Kato Souli site has come about from the wish of the local farmers to retain a portion of the northwest area of the exclusive use area, which it is proposed be surrendered in exchange for land of less value to the northeast (A-139). This exchange again presents no technical difficulty. Maps and new metes and bounds descriptions are being prepared which will describe precisely the proposed exchange. This, too, will be submitted in a note. It is proposed in the same note to define the easement area of the microwave passive reflector site which is now in use by the Station (A-454). These new descriptions will be sent to the Department as soon as they are available.

The Foreign Office has told the Embassy that once all of the land area adjustments needed to suit the convenience of the station and of Greek interests have been made, it will propose that notes be exchanged recording the final version of the land made available to the United States.

For the Department's information there are enclosed in two copies sketches prepared by the Commanding Officer of the Naval Communications Station which show the succession of changes so far made in the boundaries of the two sites.

For the Ambassador:

*Alfred G. Vigderman*  
Alfred G. Vigderman  
Counselor of Embassy  
for Mutual Security Affairs

Enclosures:

- at {
1. Proposed note to Foreign Office.
  2. Two copies each of sketches showing succession of changes made in boundaries at Nea Makri and Kato Souli
  3. Y & D Drawing #948487--General Map
  4. Y & D Drawing #948485A--Map of metes and bounds
  5. Y & D Drawing #948485A--Map of metes and bounds indicating antennae
  6. Metes and Bounds Descriptions
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The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the proposed revision of the exclusive use and easement areas of the Naval Communications Station receiver site at Nea Makri. In order to avoid difficulties which may arise because of the presence of certain improvements in the southern easement area of the site at Nea Makri, it is proposed to convert certain land in the northeastern section of the Nea Makri site from easement use to exclusive use. The nature of the proposed change is depicted in the two copies of drawing Y & D 948485-A Mod. 1 which was submitted to the Ministry on February 24, 1964.

This proposed change has been the subject of discussion with the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Embassy would be most appreciative if the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs could take the measures necessary to put these changes into effect.

The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this occasion to renew to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DE RUQMAT 01A 09/1415Z

1964 MAR 9 PM 12 18

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

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006024

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 1374 MARCH 9 4PM

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS

WE CAN ANTICIPATE GREAT PRESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRESENCE HERE OF MRS. JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT TRUMAN. HOWEVER, SOLEMNITY OF OCCASION, CURRENT WAVE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM (WHICH APPEARS TO BE SUBSIDING) AND CONTINUED PRESSURE OF CYPRUS ISSUE SUGGEST POLICY OF MINIMAL DIRECT EXPOSURE TO PRESS DESPITE EXPECTED EFFORTS OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN PRESS EXTRACT COMMENTS FROM VISITORS.

SUGGEST THAT COMMENTS BY DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN VISITORS BE CFN 1374 9 4PM

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 01A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LIMITED TO SOMETHING ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

## 1. FOR MRS. JOHNSON:

"I AM SORRY THAT MY RETURN TO GREECE IS FOR SUCH A SAD OCCASION. MY HUSBAND AND I WERE PRIVILEGED TO KNOW KING PAUL, AND IT WAS A SOURCE OF PARTICULAR SADNESS TO US THAT HE PASSED AWAY.

"I WISH TO EXPRESS AGAIN MY HEARTFELT SYMPATHY TO HER MAJESTY QUEEN FREDERIKA AND ALL THE ROYAL FAMILY AND TO EXPRESS THE BEST WISHES OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MYSELF TO KING CONSTANTINE.

## 2. FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN:

"I HAVE LONG WANTED TO COME TO GREECE BUT I AM SORRY THAT THIS, MY FIRST VISIT, SHOULD HAVE TO BE FOR A PURPOSE OF SUCH SADNESS. IT IS ALWAYS SAD WHEN A NOBLE AND GOOD MAN PASSES, ESPECIALLY SUCH A MAN AS KING PAUL WHO HAS BEEN A LEADER OF MEN AND A FRIEND AS WELL.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1374, MARCH 9, 4 PM FROM ATHENS

"AS YOU KNOW, GREECE HAS FOR MANY YEARS HELD A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN MY AFFECTIONS AND I ONLY WISH MY STAY COULD BE LONGER."

AS IS EVIDENT, WE THINK PRESS STATEMENTS SHOULD BE GENERAL AND AVOID REFERENCE TO CYPRUS CRISIS, TURKEY OR ANTI-AMERICAN  
CFN 1 2

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 01A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FEELINGS NOW CURRENT IN GREECE. PRESIDENT TRUMAN WILL PROBABLY BE PARTICULARLY SUBJECTED TO EFFORTS OBTAIN STATEMENT

CYPRUS ISSUE. IF IT IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE AVOID A STATEMENT WE THINK IT SHOULD BE CONFINED TO REMARKS TO EFFECT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PASSED; WE HOPE THAT THIS WILL PROVIDE THE MEANS THROUGH WHICH PEACE WILL BE BROUGHT TO THE TROUBLED REPUBLIC.

WE MAY HAVE FURTHER GUIDANCE TO OFFER WHEN DIGNITARIES ARRIVE.

LABOUISSÉ  
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE AT MARCH 9, 2:45 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Greece

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

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DE RUQMAT 02A 09/1527Z  
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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
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005997

1964 MAR 9 AM 11 41

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IMMEDIATE 1376 MAR 9, 5 PM

FOR ZUMAS - O

RE KING PAUL'S FUNERAL

1. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT MRS. JOHNSON, PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND I WILL BE INVITED BY KING CONSTANTINE TO TATOI PALACE WITH OTHER TOP FOREIGN DELEGATES AFTER INTERMENT ON THURSDAY. SIMPLE FOOD AND REFRESHMENTS WILL BE SERVED ALTHOUGH NOT FORMAL LUNCH. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SERVICES AND PROCESSION STILL AS SET FORTH PARA E OF EMBTEL 1371.  
CFN 1376 9 5 1. 1371

PAGE TWO RUQMT 02A LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2. NATIONAL MOURNING WHICH IS VERY STRICT IN GREECE BARS FORMAL ENTERTAINING FOR BOTH GREEK AND FOREIGNERS. HOWEVER, PRIMIN PAPANDEOU IS INVITING PRESIDENT TRUMAN FOR INTIMATE STAG LUNCHEON WEDNESDAY WHICH PRIME MINISTER'S SON AND I SHALL

ALSO ATTEND. THAT SAME DAY MY WIFE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE MRS. JOHNSON AND MRS. CARPENTER FOR LUNCH. IF THIS IS APPROVED, MY WIFE WILL EXPLORE WHETHER ONE OR TWO IMPORTANT GREEK WOMEN COULD INFORMALLY ATTEND. AS PREMIER AND DEPUTY PREMIER HAVE NO WIVES, SHE WOULD TRY FOR WIFE OF FONMIN AND WIFE OF PRIMIN'S SON. PLEASE WIRE WHETHER OR NOT MRS. JOHNSON APPROVES. DEPENDING ON WHETHER ANY GREEK GUESTS PRESENT (WHICH WOULD COMPEL KEEP LUNCH VERY SMALL) RES OF DELEGATION WOULD BE INVITED FOR LUNCH EITHER AT COUNSELOR'S HOUSE OR AT RESIDENCE.

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-2- 1376, MARCH 9, 5 PM, FROM ATHENS

3. AS SAID IN EMBTEL 1373, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE WHOLE DELEGATION FOR INFORMAL SUPPERS WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. AND ALL THOSE NOT GOING TO TATOI PALACE FOR LUNCH THURSDAY.

4. I SUGGEST THAT CONTACTS WITH GREEKS (OTHER THAN AS ABOVE) FOR BOTH THE TOP AND OTHER DELEGATES SHOULD BE ARRANGED AFTER ARRIVAL IN FORM OF INDIVIDUAL CALLS.  
CFN 2. 1373 3. 4.

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 02A LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER MRS. JOHNSON, PRES TRUMAN AND OTHER DELEGATES HAVE PARTICULAR WISHES REGARDING SEPARATE OR COLLECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SIGHTSEEING OR A T OTHER ACTIVITY SUCH AS CONTACTS WITH AMERICAN SCHOOL OR ARCHEOLOGY AND OUR OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THIS AREA. THIS WOULD CONCERN WEDNESDAY SCHEDULE ONLY AS EVERYTHING INCLUDING MUSEUMS AND EVEN THE ACROPOLIS WILL BE CLOSED ON DAY OF FUNERAL.

6. DRESS FOR MEN: FOR FUNERAL, PALACE CONFIRMS MEN WILL WEAR FULL EVENING DRESS, SUBSTITUTING BLACK WAISTCOAT FOR WHITE. DARK SUITS WITH BLACK TIES WILL BE IN ORDER FOR MEN AT OTHER TIMES.

ALTHOUGH PLANS STILL UNCLEAR CONCERNING FORMALITIES OF RECEPTION BY KING, SUGGEST THAT IF POSSIBLE PRES TRUMAN ALSO HAVE WITH HIM CUTAWAY WITH DARK VEST.

LABOUISSSE

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 3/9/64, 11:45 AM.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE ALSO FOR POLAD, USUN 3/9/64, NOON.

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34-32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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JTJEVA 104 ZCZCQMA141ATA040  
00 RUEHCR  
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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
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005280

1964 MAR 7 AM 8 52

FILE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IMMEDIATE (1369) MAR 7 3PM

FUNERAL KING PAUL WILL BE THURSDAY, MARCH 12, EXACT TIME IN MORNING STILL TO BE SET.

GERMAN AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES REPORT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE COORDINATING EFFORTS TO HAVE EITHER PRESIDENT OR PRESIDENT OF SENATE REPRESENT AT CEREMONY. FRENCH REPORT IF DE GAULLE CANNOT ATTEND BECAUSE OF HIS IMMINENT DEPARTURE FOR LA, POMPIDOU WILL ATTEND. PRINCE PHILIP AND DANISH AND NORWEGIAN CROWNED HEADS ARE DEFINITELY COMING. GREEK PRESS SPECULATING EISENHOWER OR TRUMAN WILL REPRESENT U. S.

LABOUISSIE

BT

CFN 1369 MAR12

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 9 AM, 3/7/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 9:15 AM, 3/7/64.  
PASSED CIA, JCS, OSD AT 9:26 AM, 3/7/64.  
PASSED CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE ALSO  
FOR POLAD, USUN AT 9:20 AM, 3/7/64.

NOTE: MR. TRONE INFORMED 3/7/64.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm NARA, Date 6-26-03

PRESERVATION COPY



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

NNNNQVA120ZCZCQMA162ATA041

NEA

PP RUEHCR

Info

DE RUQMAT 02A 07/1330Z

P 071300Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1367 INFO PRIORITY  
ANKARA 227 LONDON 218 PARIS 156 USDOCOSOUTH UNN FROM ATHENS  
MARCH 7 3 PM.

OSD

NAVY

REF: DEPTTEL 1010

RMR

DEPT PASS JCS; PARIS FOR JAMES AND USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH FOR BURRIS

LONDON FOR CINCUSNAVEUR

SIXTH FLEET VISIT HAD BEEN PLANNED IN TWO GROUPS. VISIT FIRST GROUP PLANNED MARCH 5 TO 11. REGARDLESS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, DEPTH OF MOURNING WHICH WILL PREVAIL UNTIL FUNERAL KING PAUL SCHEDULED MARCH 12 MAKES VISIT FIRST GROUP COMPLETELY IMPRACTICAL. VISIT OF SECOND GROUP (INCLUDING COMSIXTHFLEET AND ENTERPRISE) HAD BEEN PLANNED MARCH 16 TO 24. WE BELIEVE ANTI-AMERICAN (AND THEREFORE ANTI-SIXTH FLEET) ATMOSPHERE SUBSIDING AT RATE SUCH THAT, IN ABSENCE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, VISIT OF SECOND GROUP WOULD HAVE BEEN PRACTICAL. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT DURING MOURNING PERIOD (WHICH WILL BE IN EFFECT DURING PERIOD OF VISIT) GREEKS OF ALL POLITICAL COMPLEXIONS WILL BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO INEVITABLE FRICTIONS AND INCIDENTS GROWING OUT OF SHORE LEAVE THOUSANDS OF MEMBERS OF FLEET. FACT OF MOURNING AND MEASURES TAKEN DURING THIS PERIOD MAY ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR MEN TO MAKE FULLEST USE OF LIBERTY. WE WILL, HOWEVER, BE CONSULTING GOG NEXT WEEK TO TEST OUR VIEWS ON PRACTICALITY VISIT OF SECOND GROUP AND WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

GP-3

LABOUISSSE

BT

CFN 16 24

NOTE: PASSED JCS 3/7/64, NOON.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

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By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

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005339

1964 MAR 7 AM 10 34

*See*

*82*  
*4-5-64*  
*3-4-64*



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Greece*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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NNNNQVA003ZCZCQMA317ATA101

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~~FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS~~

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY (1359) - 5 MARCH 7PM

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

VARIOUS NEWSPAPER REPORTS INDICATE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AID MESSAGE OR OTHER OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS MAY INCLUDE MENTION OF GREECE AS ONE OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES WHICH WILL NO LONGER RECEIVE AID LOANS IN FUTURE. WHILE NOT WISHING QUESTION SUBSTANCE OF SUCH A POLICY, COUNTRY TEAM AND ALL SENIOR STAFF HERE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH STATEMENT AT THIS TIME, PARTICULARLY IF IT INDICATES TURKEY WILL CONTINUE ELIGIBLE FOR AID, WILL BE CONSIDERED AS PROOF OF US PRO-TURKISH BIAS. CFN 1359 5 7

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 09A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS CREATED BY CYPRUS SITUATION, NOW BEGINING TO SUBSIDE, WILL BE FURTHER EXACERBATED. WE STRONGLY URGE AVOIDANCE MENTION OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONCERNING AID AT THIS TIME.

GP-3. LABOUISSSE

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 9:20 PM, 3/5/64.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE ALSO FOR POLAD, USUN 9:07 PM, 3/5/64.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *cbm*, NARA, Date *6-26-03*

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

1964 MAR 4 22 08

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

O 042039Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 36158

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE 1350 4 MARCH 11 PM

GREEK RADIO HAS ANNOUNCED CONDITION KING PAUL WORSENING.

WE INFORMED FROM SOURCE BELIEVED RELIABLE THAT KING HAS JUST  
DIED AND PALACE WITHHOLDING ANNOUNCEMENT. PLEASE HOLD UNTIL  
CONFIRMED.

GP-3. LABOUISSSE

BT

CFN 1350 4 11 GP-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

NNNN

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39  
Action

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FM AMEMBASSY/ATHENS  
TT RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
INFT RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
RUFRCR/USDOCOSOUTH  
STATE GR85  
BT

CONTROL: 2330  
RECD: MARCH 4, 1964  
9:23 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 1347 LONDON 212  
INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA 220 USDOCOSOUTH UNN FROM ATHENS MAR 04. R PM  
USDOCOSOUTH FOR BURRIS

LONDON'S 215 TO ATHENS, 4296 TO DEPT.

IN EMBTEL 1346 I DESCRIBED CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO TEMPORARY  
POSTPONEMENT VISIT OF SIXTH FLEET TO GREECE. SO FAR AS I AM  
AWARE THERE IS NO SIMILAR OR OTHER REASON TO POSTPONE THE  
ISTANBUL VISIT. I THEREFORE DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THAT  
VISIT TO ISTANBUL SHOULD BE CANCELLED. GREEKS MAY POSSIBLY  
DRAW USEFUL LESSON FROM CONTRAST.

GP-3  
LABOUISSIE  
BT

CFN 1347 212 220 04 4PM 215 4296 1346 GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O at 9:23 A.M. MARCH 4, 1964  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD,  
CINCSTRIKE ALSO FOR POLAD, USUN at 9:30 A.M., MARCH 4, 1964

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BELK  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
DINGEMAN  
DUNGAN  
FARRISTAL  
ISSUP  
JOHNSON  
KIN  
KOPPEL  
SALINGER  
SANDERS  
SCHLESINGER  
SMITH, WM. Y

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

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PAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
IMMEDIATE	<del>BUNDY-SMITH</del> <b>PRIORITY</b> <del>ALEXANDER</del> <del>BELK</del> <del>BRUBECK</del> <del>CHASE</del> <del>DINGEMAN</del> <del>DUNGAN</del> <del>FORRESTAL</del> <del>JESSUP</del> <del>JOHNSON</del> <del>KLEIN</del> <del>KOMER</del> <del>SALINGER</del> <del>SAUNDERS</del>

O P 041440Z ZFF1

M USCINCEUR

TO RUEPDA/JCS

F KD/CINCUSNAVEUR

1 COMSIXTHFLT

AJEC GNO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **FILE COPY**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority Group 4  
By ju, NARA, Date 10-11-91

ECJCO 05873

JCS PASS TO GENERAL LEMNITZER. SMITH, WM. Y

- REFERENCES: A. COMSIXTHFLT 032120Z (NOTAL)  
B. COMSIXTHFLT 032210Z (NOTAL)  
C. CINCUSNAVEUR 040925Z (NOTAL)

(C) REFERENCE A PASSES REQUEST OF ALUSNA ATHENS THAT NO REPEAT NO SIXTH FLEET SHIPS ENTER GREEK PORTS UNTIL ADVISED BY ALUSNA. REFERENCE B QUESTIONS WHETHER SCHEDULED VISIT TO ISTANBUL SHOULD BE MADE IN LIGHT OF REFERENCE A. REFERENCE C IN RESPONSE, ADVISES COMSIXTHFLT TO DEFER TO POLITICAL AUTHORITY BUT TO CONTINUE PLANS TO VISIT ISTANBUL, REMAINING ALERT FOR SUDDEN CANCELLATION.

2. (C) VISITS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 5-11 MARCH. IN LIGHT OF HIGHLY INDETERMINATE SITUATION IN GREECE, AND THE FACT THAT THESE EXERCISES WERE INTENDED INITIALLY TO PROVIDE CONCOMITANT PRESENCE OF SIXTH FLEET IN GREECE AND TURKEY, USCINCEUR RECOMMENDS THAT VISITS TO GREEK AND TURKISH PORTS BE CANCELLED, OR ALTERNATELY THAT SHIPS VISIT THE PORTS AS SCHEDULED, BUT THAT LIBERTY OR SHORE LEAVE NOT BE GRANTED UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS.

CP 4  
BT

ACT.....J3-7

CJCS-2 DJS-3 NMCC-2 SECDEF-8 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 GEN LEMNITZER-2  
FILE-1(28)FJC  
(STATE)

ADV CY TO CJCS, CJCS FOR GEN LEMNITZER, DJS NMCC OSD

OUT OFF CER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
WD/ADJ WD <i>A</i>	1 1	CITE NO.	DTG
		ECJCO 05873	041440Z MAR 64

FORM NO  
JCS DEC 83 58

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Crane*

87

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action  
SSPP RUEHCR  
DE RUQMAT 04A 21/1430Z  
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Info

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
BT

1964 FEB 21 PM 1 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY (1274) FEBRUARY 21, 4PM

027

FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM FEB 20, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU TOLD ME KING IS GRAVELY ILL, AND DEFINITELY HAS CANCER. HE SAID KING WAS IN CONSTANT PAIN AND I GATHERED HE HAD LITTLE HOPE FOR HIS MAJESTY'S RECOVERY. (PLEASE PROTECT NATURE ILLNESS UNTIL FACT BECOMES PUBLIC).

PAPANDREOU THEN WENT ON TO EXTOL KING'S CHARACTER; HE SAID HE WAS A FINE, GENEROUS MAN, WHO IF HE WERE NOT RPT NOT KING WOULD STILL BE A GREAT SEIGNEUR. AS FOR CROWN PRINCE, HE WAS HOPEFUL ABOUT HIS FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, AND HAD OBSERVED SOME "MATURING" AND "IMPROVEMENT" IN CROWN PRINCE. HE NOTED PRINCE WAS EXTREMELY YOUNG AND STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY HIS MOTHER, QUEEN FREDERIKA.

HE SAID QUEEN DOES NOT RP T NOT UNDERSTAND NOR BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACY; SHE ACTS AS THOUGH THE COUNTRY BELONGS TO HER AND ANYONE WHO DISAGREES WITH HER IS ACTING IN BAD FAITH. PAPANDREOU SAID HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH TO SEE REGIME QUESTION RAISED FOR IT WOULD ONLY PLAY INTO HANDS OF THE COMMUNISTS, BY INSERTING A POWERFUL ELEMENT OF DISSENSION IN NATIONALIST CAMP.

HE ADDED, MONARCHY MUST BE "EDUCATED" AS TO ITS PROPER FUNCTIONS AND HE WOULD USE HIS BEST EFFORTS TO DO SO. HE HOPED HE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL.

GP-3.  
LABOUISSSE  
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2/21/64, 1:50 PM.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 2:25 PM, 2-21-64.

Note: Handled as LIMDIS per SS-0

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5.

NLJ 03-302

By *ind*, NARA, Date *2-23-04*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Greece* 88

58 52

Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 13412  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 19, 1964  
4:07 P.M.

031

NEA

FROM: ATHENS

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1262 PRIORITY

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DATE: FEBRUARY 19, 9 P.M.

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EUR

IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS REPORTS KING PAUL IS SERIOUSLY ILL. WHILE THE PALACE HAS STEADFASTLY MAINTAINED THAT HIS HIGHNESS IS SUFFERING ONLY FROM A SEVERE CASE OF LUMBAGO, RUMORS HAVE CIRCULATED THAT THE KING HAS CANCER OF THE SPINAL CORD. ANDREAS PAPANDREOU, NEWLY APPOINTED MINISTER TO THE PRIMIN IN THE CU GOVT, TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER TODAY HE WAS "SHOCKED" BY KING'S APPEARANCE AT SWEARING-IN CEREMONY TODAY. YOUNG PAPANDREOU AND OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES BELIEVE THE REPORTS THAT THE KING HAS CANCER ARE ACCURATE.

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IF KING IS, INDEED, SERIOUSLY ILL, IT RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT RELATIONSHIP OF PALACE WITH NEW CU GOVT OF GEORGE PAPANDREOU. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE LOVE BETWEEN PAPANDREOU AND THE MONARCHY IN THE PAST, SINCE PAPANDREOU WON HIS FIRST VICTORY IN THE NOV 3, 1963 ELECTIONS RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED.

FURTHER, PAPANDREOU APPOINTMENTS TO KEY CABINET POSITIONS IN HIS NEW GOVT INDICATE A FINE REGARD FOR BOTH ABILITIES OF CROWN AND THE ARMY. (SEE EMBTEL 1261.) WHILE RELATIONS BETWEEN KING AND PAPANDREOU MIGHT NEVER BE CLOSE, THERE HAS BEEN IN PROSPECT A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO, BASED ON AN UNDERSTANDING OF REALITIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SITUATIONS.

SHOULD KING DIE IN THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE, THIS "SILENT UNDERSTANDING" BETWEEN THE CROWN AND THE LEADER OF THE CU WOULD BE PLACED IN JEOPARDY. THAT PAPANDREOU HIMSELF IS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY IS INDICATED BY THE COMMENT OF HIS.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-302

~~SECRET~~

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By *ics*, NARA, Date *2-23-04*



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1262, FEBRUARY 19, 9 P.M. FROM ATHENS

OF HIS SON ANDREAS THAT WHILE KING IS A "TRUE GENTLEMAN," AND "BEST ONE UP THERE" SON IS AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY UNDULY INFLUENCED BY HIS MOTHER.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT QUEEN FREDERIKA HAS LITTLE REGARD FOR PAPANDREOU, NOR HE FOR HER. QUEEN WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET DURING 1962-63 PERIOD OF PAPANDREOU'S "UNRELENTING STRUGGLE" WHEN HE REFUSED TO APPEAR AT VARIOUS CEREMONIES ATTENDED BY THE ROYAL FAMILY BECAUSE ERE GOVT WAS IN ATTENDANCE.

IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE QUEEN DOES HAVE A DOMINATING INFLUENCE ON HER 23-YEAR-OLD SON AND SUCCESSOR TO THE THRONE, CONSTANTINOS. SHOULD CONSTANTINOS SUCCEED HIS FATHER SOON, CERTAINLY QUEEN WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT BEHIND-THE-SCENE ROLE AND COULD TRY TO INFLUENCE CONSTANTINOS AGAINST PAPANDREOU. INDEED, SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE ALREADY DONE SO. THUS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE THRONE AND THE PROUD CU-LEADER COULD EASILY COME ABOUT.

GP-1.

LABOUISSSE

PLH/22

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Greece**89*

45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action  
NEAControl: 6721  
Rec'd: February 10, 1964  
5:05 p.m.

Info

FROM: Athens

ACTION: Secstate 1196

SS

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INFO: Paris 145

SP

Rome 128

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Thessaloniki Unnumbered

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EUR DATE: February 10, 7 p.m.

AIDA

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USIA ROME FOR BURRIS

NSC

INR PARIS FOR USRO, BURNS AND JAMES

CIA

NSA Death February 7 of CU leader Sophocles Venizelos, several

OSD times Greek Prime Minister and most recently Deputy Prime

ARMY Minister and Minister Foreign Affairs in Papandreou

NAVY Government November-December 1963, expected to have

AIR significant implications for Greek political life.

RMR While Venizelos death may not have impact on outcome  
next week's elections, it will be factor after elections  
both within CU and in relationship to CU to Crown and  
military.

With Venizelos death, former Prime Minister Papandreou becomes uncontested leader of CU. Papandreou-Venizelos rivalry has been cause of friction in CU since its creation in 1961, and as recently as last December there were rumors Venizelos might split from party and take along his followers to form coalition with ERE. This threat to CU unity is now ended, and Papandreou's hold over party enhanced.

Venizelist faction within CU as well as inactive liberal party becomes leaderless; neither former Minister of Commerce Papapolitis and Merchant Marine Polychronidis (Venizelos followers in last CU Cabinet) or Cretan Deputy Paul

Vardinoyannis

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-83~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1196, February 10, 7 p.m. from Athens

Vardinoyannis, close Venizelos associate, have strength or personal following to succeed Venizelos. Former Parliamentary President Elias Tsirimokos, who was close to Venizelos, may try emerge as successor to Venizelos and leader of anti-Papandreou forces within CU. On Crete, stronghold of Venizelism, Venizelis rival Constantinos Mitsotakis may emerge as dominant figure, although bulk of Venizelos personal following may be split among various Cretan deputies.

Venizelos death also leaves question mark about post of Minister of Foreign Affairs (as well as Deputy Prime Minister) if CU successful at polls February 16. Former Minister Coordination Mavros may succeed Venizelos as Foreign Minister, with role for Stefan Stephanopoulos, who could be made Minister Coordination, thus solving problem of where to place disgruntled deputy from Ilias.

Major factor is that Venizelos death will probably have effect of making Papandreou victory, already distasteful to Royal family and some elements of military, even more unpalatable. Venizelos was viewed by Throne as moderating force on more unpredictable and volatile Papandreou. Venizelos close ties with Palace made him likely choice by King to participate in any future coalition government between CU and ERE. Palace realizes that Papandreou, who reciprocates distaste of Palace for him, would have been deterred from taking any anti-monarchist step by presence Venizelos in top Councils CU. Now this restraining force has gone and Palace is predicatly unhappy.

Even more significant is impact on military already nervous over probable Papandreou victory and tense over Cyprus situation. Question arises as to whether this concern will reach point where military may feel justified in reacting against Papandreou victory.

GP-4

LABOUISSSE

TRT/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY GREECE

DATE OF INFO. 5 FEBRUARY 1964

DISTR.

SUBJECT

ILLNESS OF KING PAUL

2.

[REDACTED] KING PAUL HAS A SERIOUS DISEASE, BUT HIS DOCTORS ARE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER IT IS CANCER OR SOME OTHER DISEASE REQUIRING A SERIES OF OPERATIONS.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC

~~NOX~~ ~~OSAX~~ OCI ONE

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

EXO

☐ EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-54

By LUB NARA, Date 09-10-12

90



## CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~  
(When Filled In)

IN 13412

PAGE 2

3. ACCORDING TO DOCTORS AT EVANGELISMOS HOSPITAL, KING PAUL IS DYING AND HAS ONLY A MATTER OF MONTHS TO LIVE. HE HAS CANCER OF LUNG AND PELVIS AND IS NOW UNDERGOING X-RAY TREATMENT AT EVANGELISMOS. BECAUSE PALACE IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THIS INFORMATION THE [REDACTED] OUT OF PRESS, HOWEVER, DOCTORS ON DUTY AT HOSPITAL HAVE BEEN KEPT AWAY FROM KING AND ONLY KING'S PERSONAL PHYSICIAN<sup>18</sup> ALLOWED TO SEE X-RAYS.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KING PAUL IS SUFFERING FROM CANCER AND FOR THIS REASON, NOT BECAUSE OF CYPRUS, QUEEN FREDERICKA RETURNED SEVERAL DAYS EARLY FROM VISIT TO U.S. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FORM  
5-63

2096

MFG. 6-63

(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Control 91*

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 7625

Rec'd: December 11, 1963  
4:32 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Athens

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 843, PRIORITY

G

S P

INFO: PARIS 80

EUR

ROME 75

P

USIA

DATE: December 11, 1 p.m.

NSC

INR

CIA

PARIS FOR USRO, BURNS AND JAMES

NSA

OSD

ROME FOR BURRIS

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

Sudden departure of former Prime Minister Caramanlis has shocked Greek political world. While rumors of his possible resignation as head of party had circulated such an abrupt withdrawal from political life was completely unexpected. Even Caramanlis confidant such as former Minister Coordination Papaligouras learned of departure plans only after Caramanlis left, and when Papaligouras spoke to Ambassador shortly thereafter, he was still reeling from blow.

ERE Party members met last night and elected Canellopoulos as leader of ERE by unanimous vote. Protopapadakis, Averoff and Theotokis among speakers urging ERE solidarity behind Canellopoulos. Only Cassimatis spoke of need for "triumvirate" to lead party. Canellopoulos was also received by Prince Constantine yesterday morning and asked for audience with King upon his return.

Enthusiasm of pro-government forces at Caramanlis departure tempered by uncertainty about what impact this move will have on future political life of country. While pro-government press has hailed Caramanlis leaving as "just result\* for sinful past," government sources comment much more guarded. Key question is whether Caramanlis departure has made elections

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

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By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 843, December 11, 1 p.m. from Athens

more or less likely. Although pro-government press insists elections even more imperative now, political observers generally believe they less probable, since without Caramanlis at helm, many ERE deputies may feel free to bolt to CU. Should ERE deputies defect to CU in sufficient number, Papandreou would be hard put to justify new elections to either King or public. However, Papandreou reportedly more determined than ever to have early elections since his chance of decisive electoral victory increased by Caramanlis departure. EDA which is jubilant over Caramanlis departure has now changed its tune from one of opposing elections to supporting elections but on proportional system.

Embassy believes that departure of Caramanlis, who has dominated Greek political scene for 8 years, is loss for country. Not only will he be difficult to replace, but ERE party may break up with his departure.

If, as is generally believed, palace actions played key role in influencing Caramanlis decision to leave, they would appear to be operating against their long run interests, since Caramanlis was one of thrones most dedicated defenders. Papandreou may be next target of palace; if he is alienated or forced out, throne may end up with a Prime Minister who is more "flexible" but who does not have adequate support of the people.

GP-4.

LABOUISSSE

LTR/18

\*As received.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

92  
15707  
~~new, 1/2/66~~  
DEC 31 3 54 PM '65  
DEC 31 3 54 PM '65  
002

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

82  
Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS 71φ

EXDIS

Embtel 1006.

Matter under consideration urgent basis.

END

GP-1

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm NARA, Date 6-26-03

Drafted by:

NEA: GTI: JHowison: atm 12/31/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

S/S- Mr. Waldh

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11536

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

81  
Origin

55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

PRIORITY

687

DEC 22 3 06 PM '65

EXDIS

Athens' 963

Reply

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ to King Constantine's letter pouched December 21

002

(Registry No. 271041).

here

King's letter dated November 29 received ~~in Department~~ December 6. ~~and~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ As letter urged favorable US response to

Greek aid request, preparation reply delayed until decision reached announce

PL 480 reactivation ~~December 18~~

GP-3

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By ctm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

Drafted by: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA/GTI:JMH:son:hf:12/22/65 2732

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger Davies

Clearances:

s/s - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

42 S

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy Athens

PRIORITY 638

DEC 9 12 14 PM '65

NEA

Info:

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XMB

FYI only: Resumption of PL 480 program approved for FY 1966 covering 165,000 tons feedgrains, corn and/or sorghums, 10,000 tons soybean oil, 2,000 tons tallow, term and interest remain same, with removal export restriction wheat up to 350,000 tons for FY 1966. No change in usual marketings. Value of commodities and ocean transportation about \$14 million. If export limit exceeded penalties in November 1964 agreement of course apply. Negotiating instructions to follow will include conditions such as 1) 25 percent proceeds drachmas generated to be devoted to livestock development program, 2) GOG will persevere with tax measures and reduction agricultural subsidies proposed, 3) GOG will also obtain funds from EMA and/or IMF (It is difficult for us to justify special actions in support of Greek economy when Greeks have not used IMF gold tranche), 4) GOG will agree to periodic review with us on progress made to achieve announced GOG objectives. Purchases under 3 year CCC credits to be applicable to Usual marketings.

We are working on public statement including above program approval and Eximbank possibilities with psychological injection

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

Drafted by: NEACGTI:KWBrecken/jw

Tel. Ext. 3095

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Rodger P. Davies

NEA - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

Agriculture - Mr. Street  
White House - Mr. Komer  
S/S - Mr. Walsh

Treasury - Mr. Newman  
AID/NESA Mr. Farr  
AI R/MR - Mrs. Bitterman

E/TEP - Mr. Sanderson  
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~~SECRET~~

of sympathetic concern you have recommended, hopefully for release  
before end of week. end FYI

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
McGEORGE BUNDY

5277

94a

1-10/10/65  
2-dit

December 8, 1965

1965 DEC 9 AM 9 44

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

OK - Jacobsen  
gave me President's  
oral approval of  
my memo 9 Dec.  
Rux

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

Jan Jensen  
11:35 12/9

for W.G. Miller  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Athens. DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)  
BY yw ON 10-11-91

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

DEL 9 1965



95

1 2 2 3 6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-302  
By us, NARA, Date 2-23-04

83  
Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS  
" NICOSIA  
INFO: " ANKARA

459  
98  
344

OCT 22 5 50 PM '65

LIMDIS

049

CYPRUS SAMS: Athens' 621; Nicosia's 189

We adhere to position previously stated to GOC (Deptel 1276). GOC objective should be to freeze shipments and training as long as possible. In our view emplacement missiles might well be factor which could precipitate violent Turk reaction.

For Nicosia: Agree in general with Athens recommendation in 621. Understand Nicosia's concern regarding restatement our position to Makarios unless there is some possibility of influencing him, particularly in light of problems requiring sorting out as result of new immunities and privileges law (Nicosia's 194). However, now that missile discussion has surfaced, are there indications from British or Turk reps of concern on their part ~~xxx~~ or recommendations to their governments to take action?

For Athens: Should GOC press for reaction before any further steps taken in Nicosia, you authorized take line recommended your 621. First restate US position as stated first para this tel, then inform GOC it must make its own decision re Greek technicians (excluding any US missile-trained personnel) for SA-2 training in UAR in light its relations with GOC and possible GOC reaction. In any event we do not want to be party to Greek decision. CP-3.

END

Drafted by: <b>NEA/GTI:KWBracken:hf:10/22/65</b>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>The Under Secretary</b>
---	---

Clearances:  
NEA - Ambassador Hare  
DOD - Secretary McNamara  
S/S - Mr. Thompson

RUSK

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~~SECRET~~



1. *Kings*  
2. *Ref. Smith*  
04870  
96

~~SECRET~~

Origin  
INRD

260

**Info:**

013  
SEP 9 7 48 PM '65

**Your 369**

We here agree that as crisis deepens we should review urgently what influence we might bring to bear. You have skillfully avoided untimely reinvolvement of American factor, and we believe this healthy trend should be encouraged as far as possible.

XXX would appreciate a sharpened assessment on certain points to clarify nuances to which you refer. I am curious why wealthy Greeks, whether Center or Right, would not see it in their own interest to tap their own ample finances to encourage, without foreign support, a moderate evolutionary government without Papandreuos.

Our goal is to produce a renewal of sufficient healthy political activity on ~~their~~ <sup>their</sup> own to enable Greeks to work out ultimate political transition without dumping problem in American lap as in early 1950's. Question is whether action under Part One would achieve this.

END

**RUSK**

Drafted by: **NEA:PTalbot:atm** 9/9/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

INR/DDC - Albert Carter

### Clearance

GTI - Mrs. Bracken

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FORM DS-322  
8-63

SEP 17 1965

**SANITIZED**

**E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5**

NLJ 12-112

By Uud

NARA, Date 103-23-2014



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03942

97

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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43-82

Origin  
CPR

Info:

SS

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NEA

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USIA

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INR

DOD

SCI

NASA

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS PRIORITY  
Amembassy ANKARA PRIORITY  
Amembassy ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY  
Amembassy TANANARIVE PRIORITY  
Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY

254

195

192

SEP 8 5 58 PM '65

173

461

Itinerary of trip of astronauts does not have final approval,

however following is being considered:

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 16

5:15 p.m.

Departure from Andrews Air Force Base.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 17

1:15 a.m.

Arrival at Lajas AFB, Azores (Refuel)

2:45 a.m.

Departure from Lajas AFB

11:00 a.m.

Arrival at Athens, Greece.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 18

At Athens (Firm invitation received from IAF)

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 19

Rest

4:00 p.m.

Departure from Athens

6:25 p.m.

Arrival Ankara, Turkey (Daylight Time)

MONDAY

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

Lloyd N. Hand

Chief of Protocol

Clearances:

S/CPR:SLKing:ejen 9/4/65

classification approved by:

M - Thomas C. Mann

SCI - Col. Milner

S/S - Mr. Thompson

NASA - Mr. Scheer

White House - Mr. Valenti

AF - Gov. Williams  
(in substance)

NEA - Mr. Radcliffe  
(in substance)

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassies ATHENS, ANKARA, ADDIS ABABA, TANANARIVE, and LAGOS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

254  
195  
192  
461  
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20

2:30 p.m. Departure from Ankara 3  
7:00 p.m. Arrival Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21

12:00 noon Departure from Addis Ababa  
4:30 p.m. Arrival Tananarive, Malagasy

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22

At Tananarive

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23

Possible rest.

3:00 p.m. Departure from Tananarive.  
6:00 p.m. Arrival at Nairobi, Kenya (Refuel)  
7:30 p.m. Departure from Nairobi  
11:00 p.m. Arrival at Lagos, Nigeria

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24

At Nigeria

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 25

At Nigeria

(Visit to Kano to be included during  
visit to Nigeria)

SUNDAY

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SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26

5:00 p.m. Departure from Nigeria

9:15 p.m. Arrival at Lajes AFB, the Azores (Refuel)

10:45 p.m. Departure from Lajes AFB

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27

1:35 a.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.

Unless you perceive objection, in which case cable immediately,  
/ ~~request~~ <sup>request</sup> you approach host government on confidential basis  
to obtain appropriate formal invitation for astronauts' visit.  
Trip has not been announced and it important that plans not be  
disclosed. White House will announce after invitations received  
and itinerary is approved. Purpose of visit is to demonstrate the  
United States' willingness to share its knowledge about space  
technology and to allow our astronauts to demonstrate our peaceful  
intentions in the exploration of space by maximum public exposure.

Request following information:

Name of Embassy Project Officer (do not use Defense  
Attaches as project officers)

Recommendations for arrival and departure ceremonies,  
if any.

Comment re timing of arrival and length of stay.

Distance

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



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Distance and driving times airport to city and other possible moves.

Suggestions for program including public appearances, possible parade, universities, scientific forums, social functions.

NASA will have aboard aircraft:

12-minute silent color film of Gemini 5 flight. Astronauts will narrate.

Still projector and slides of flight.

25,000 color lithographs of astronauts for each stop. Printed material in local language.

One-tenth scale models of Gemini 5 spacecraft -- approximately eight for presentation at each stop.

60 lapel pins for presentation at each post.

Albums of photos taken during flight - one per country.

Space suit - exhibit.

Food packages used in flight.

Press kits for local reporters.

Party includes astronauts' wives and two Cooper teenage daughters; Department of State, NASA, USIA representatives; American press; and an aircraft crew of 15.

Report regarding invitation soonest.

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 2 3 6 3

98

058

85

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS PRIORITY

204

55

Info

LINDIS FOR CHARGE

AUG 23 8 39 PM '65

Highest authority concerned over prospect continuing disturbance of public order in Greece and possible involvement of American visitors. Request Embassy's judgment/<sup>soonest</sup>whether public expression of this concern would have constructive, sobering effect on situation. It might be coupled with advice, which we contemplate giving in any case to American tourists, to be wary of visiting Greece at this time.

GP-3

~~XXXX~~

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

Drafted by:

NEA: Mr. Talbot:leb

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Talbot

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Moore

White House - Mr. Bundy (substance)

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

08921

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33

Origin

NEA

Info:

SS

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NSC

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

FLASH 1512

JUN 13 2 08 PM '64

INFO: Amembassy ANKARA 1345  
Amembassy NICOSIA 940  
Amembassy LONDON 8261  
PARIS TOPOL 1944

073

78

Following summary FII only and NOT FORN. It is unclear and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.

Although we tried to arrange appointment for delivery of Papandreou letter June 10 because of heavy schedule President could not receive Matsas until Thursday, June 11. Matsas vigorously stressed Matsas on theme of QUOTE talk don't fight UNQUOTE. Outside powers cannot solve Cyprus crisis. Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves. Papandreou should get together with Inonu or have some representative talk with the Turks. US ~~is~~ told Turkey there could not be war but we do not know how long this ~~will~~ stick. We disappointed that COG ~~has~~ not taken initiative to talk with Turks. US sees two requirements for solution: (a) whatever is done must be permanent; (b) solution must not humiliate either side. Much more dangerous not to have a solution than to get together. War would help nobody. President stated he had told Ball urge Papandreou take initiative getting together with GOT. Makarios does not seem to care. He thinks Greeks support him. Meanwhile Soviets meddling and ~~expected~~ expected to win in the end. President stressed/American public reaction, with some Americans

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

Drafted by:

NEA/GTI:TFHocter:js 6-12-64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

John D. Jernegan

NEA - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

NEA/GTI - Mrs. Bracken (Draft) *JB*

WHITE HOUSE -

Mr. MX Komer

s/s - Mrs. Davis

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

already wondering if safe to visit eastern Mediterranean. US had helped Greece and Turkey under Truman Doctrine. American people and President himself had deep affection for Greece. Did not want US people get the idea that Makarios using the Greeks.

~~Matsas asked what GOG's chief need was cessation constant Turk threats~~

~~invade Cyprus. GOG disturbed by reported overflights Rhodes. Makarios tendency~~

~~drift to communist side caused by Turkish threats. If US could secure GOG agreement~~

Matsas tried to explain GOG's chief need was cessation constant Turk threats invade Cyprus. GOG disturbed by reported overflights Rhodes. Makarios tendency drift to communist side caused by Turkish threats. If US could secure GOG agreement not to invade, tensions would decline and there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus. Turkish agreement not to invade was key to situation. President pointed out we had already stopped Turkish invasion moves but could not stop them always. US acted vigorously when trouble was imminent but might not be able stop Turks again. Pointed out Turkish threat not the only source of danger. GOG support of Makarios, and Cyprus arms imports also dangerous. President emphasized US could not eliminate invasion threat until the Greeks agreed to talk. He appealed to Papandreou's statesmanship. Suggested Prime Minister call Inonu at once and arrange meeting. Stated Greece and Turkey would not be justified in destroying NATO over this issue. Cited GOG's apparent willingness for secret talks, of which Matsas unaware. In reply to Matsas' question President denied Ball prepared present US proposals. Emphasized US not going to make proposals this point. Such proposals would be seized upon by one side or the other and used to blame US. Greece and Turkey should start making proposals to each other. Matsas replied talks difficult under invasion threat.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

President came back that of course talks difficult now but would be even more difficult to talk after invasion. Asked GOG to work something out; if not, all NATO will become involved.

Matsas contended GOG from beginning sought contain dispute and avoid actions tending increase threat hostilities. In contrast GOT spread dispute by its treatment of Istanbul & Greeks. Expressed GOG's desire for fully independent Cyprus with guarantees minority rights, claiming this a compromise position. Asked for President's reaction this approach. President replied US unable negotiate for the Turks. All US wanted was for Greece to get together with them. Not up to US to say what agreement should be reached. Stated QUOTE We stopped an invasion the other night. Now we want a conference. Let's start discussing this thing UNQUOTE.

The President pointed out that GOT were the only ones he had gotten to do anything until now and that all he wanted was for Greek Prime Minister to sit down and talk. Added QUOTE I made a positive request of the Turks and they said that even though they did not agree they would comply. I now make a positive request to you to ~~talk~~ talk. If you comply we will then make some suggestions to the Turks. That's better than fighting. ~~UNQUOTE~~. / ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ what these suggestions would be, but President would not commit himself on promised if Papandreou would try bring & Greece and Turkey together US would help all it could to bring about agreement.

President concluded by <sup>pointing</sup> ~~saying~~ out that negotiations with Makarios impossible. Makarios not REPEAT not interested in security of West. But Greece, Turkey and US were. Matsas interjected that Greece could not negotiate without Makarios. President indicated understanding Cypriots would have to be consulted at some point but

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

important thing was Greek-Turkish agreement. Observed that Greece talked about its  
responsibilities to Greek-Cypriots, ~~and insisted that~~ <sup>Didn't</sup> Greeks understand that fate  
of 100,000 Turkish-Cypriots also a matter of honor for Inonu too?

Above summary of long conversation in which Matsas repeatedly returned to  
question of need for US guarantee against Turkish invasion and constant repetition  
familiar themes from his earlier presentations GOC positions in conversations with  
Department officials. President required repeatedly bring him back sharply to focus  
on US view of requirements of situation. Memcon follows.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

3184  
99a  
1. Komer  
2. [Signature]  
June 12, 1964

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

Just SLS 6/13 (am m.)  
13 June

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

[Signature]  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

**Enclosure:**

Telegram to Athens

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY yw ON 10-11-91

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION



~~SECRET~~FLASH  
PRIORITY

Ambassy ATHENS

INFO:

Ambassy ANKARA

Ambassy NICOSIA

Ambassy LONDON

PARIS TOPOL

Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. It is unclear and subject  
~~Following discussion on 6/12/64 in the memorandum of conversation~~  
 to amendment upon review of memcon.

Although we tried to arrange appointment for delivery of Papandreou  
 letter June 10 because of heavy schedule President could not receive ~~xxx~~  
 Matsas until Thursday, June 11. ~~xxx~~ *rigorously pressed Matsas*  
~~President took opportunity make presentation along~~  
~~following lines: Emphasis in conversation was on~~ QUOTE talk don't ~~xxxxx~~  
 fight UNQUOTE. Outside powers cannot solve Cyprus crisis. Greeks and Turks  
 must settle it themselves. Papandreou should get together with Inonu or  
 have some representative talk with the Turks. US ~~x~~ told Turkey there could  
 not be war but we do not know how long this ~~would~~ <sup>will</sup> stick. We disappointed  
 that GOG ~~had~~ <sup>has</sup> not taken initiative to talk with Turks. US sees two require-  
 ments for solution: (a) whatever is done must be permanent; (b) solution  
~~could~~ <sup>must</sup> not humiliate either side. Much more dangerous not to have a solution  
 than to get together. War would help nobody. President stated he had told  
 Ball urge Papandreou take initiative getting together with GOT. Makarios  
 does not seem to care. He thinks Greeks support him. Meanwhile Soviets  
 meddling and ~~expecting~~ <sup>worried</sup> expect ~~to~~ win in the end.

President stressed <sup>worried</sup> American public reaction, with some Americans

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 State Dept. Guidelines

NEA/GTI:TFHector:js 6-12-64

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

John D. Jernegan

NEA/GTI - Mrs. Bracken (Draft) *js*

WHITE HOUSE -

S/S -

~~SECRET~~



2

Amembassy ATHENS

~~SECRET~~

already wondering if safe to visit eastern Mediterranean. US had helped Greece and Turkey under Truman Doctrine. American people and President himself had deep affection for Greece. Did not want US people get the idea that Makarios using the Greeks.

OMIT [ Matsas asked what response his Government had given Ball. President replied GOG seems to be considering our demarche, but he urged a Greek initiative and stressed need for action. ]

Matsas tried to explain GOG's chief need was cessation constant Turk threats invade Cyprus. GOG disturbed by reported overflights Rhodes. Makarios tendency drift to communist side caused by Turkish threats. If US could secure GOT agreement not to invade, tensions would decline and there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus. Turkish agreement not to invade was key to situation. President pointed out we had already stopped Turkish invasion moves but could not stop them always. US acted vigorously when trouble was imminent but might not be able stop Turks again. Pointed out Turkish threat not the only source of danger. GOG support of Makarios, and Cyprus arms imports also dangerous. President emphasized US could not eliminate invasion threat until the Greeks agreed to talk. He appealed to Papandreou's statesmanship. Suggested Prime Minister call Inonu at once and arrange meeting. Stated Greece and Turkey would not be justified in destroying NATO over this issue. Cited ~~SEE~~ GOG's apparent willingness for secret talks, of which Matsas unaware. In reply to Matsas' question President denied Ball prepared present US proposals. Emphasized US not going to make proposals this point. Such proposals would be seized upon by one side or the other and used to blame US. Greece and Turkey should start making proposals to each other. Matsas replied talks difficult under invasion threat.



~~SECRET~~

President came back that of course talks difficult now but would be even more difficult to talk after invasion. Asked GOG to work something out; if not, all NATO will become involved.

Matsas contended GOG from beginning sought contain dispute and avoid actions tending increase threat hostilities. In contrast GOT spread dispute by its treatment of Istanbul & Greeks. Expressed GOG's desire for fully independent Cyprus with guarantees minority rights, claiming this a compromise position. Asked for President's reaction this approach. President replied US unable negotiate for the Turks. All US wanted was for Greece to get together with them. Not up to US to say what agreement should be reached. Stated QUOTE We stopped an invasion the other night. Now we want a conference. Let's start discussing this thing UNQUOTE.

The President pointed out that GOT were the only ones he had gotten to do anything until now and that all he wanted was for Greek Prime Minister to sit down and talk. Added QUOTE I made a positive request of the Turks and they said that even though they did not agree they would comply. I now make a positive request to you to ~~XXXX~~ talk. If you comply we will then make some suggestions to the Turks. That's better than fighting. ~~XXXX~~ UNQUOTE. *President would not commit himself on* (Did not state what) these suggestions would be, but promised if Papandreu would try bring & Greece and Turkey together US would help all it could to bring about agreement.

President concluded by <sup>pointing</sup> ~~pointing~~ out that negotiations with Makarios impossible. Makarios not REPEAT not interested in security of West. But Greece, Turkey and US were. Matsas interjected that Greece could not negotiate without Makarios. President indicated understanding Cypriots would have to be consulted at some point but

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4

Amembassy ATHENS

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important thing was Greek-Turkish agreement. Observed that Greece talked about its responsibilities to Greek-Cypriots, ~~and inquired~~ Didn't Greeks understand that fate of 100,000 Turkish-Cypriots also a matter of honor for Inonu too?

Above summary of long conversation in which Matsas repeatedly returned to question of need for US guarantee against Turkish invasion and constant repetition familiar themes from his earlier presentations GOG positions in conversations with Department officials. President required repeatedly bring him back sharply to focus on US view of requirements of situation. Memcon follows.

GP-3

END



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

04318

100

*Grece*

57

Origin  
NEA

ACTION:

Amembassy Athens 1466

Info: Paris for Burns for Lemnitzer 6482  
Paris TOPOL

JUN 6 7 18 PM '64

Info:

SS

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USIA

NSC

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NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Embtels 1828, 1829

Without making special point of it, please set record straight with Costopoulos that Palamas' report from Paris that Lemnitzer had gone to Ankara in capacity American general was incorrect. He went as Saceur, as he had in January, because of ~~min~~ his concern over possible development which would affect his NATO role. In answering press inquiries to us we have been careful to make this plain.

We hope that the press statement contained in Deptel 1460 has clarified to the Greeks our desire that US actions not interfere with the UN role of peacekeeping and mediation on Cyprus.

While we cannot release the text of President's message to the Greeks, you of course can see that it is explicit in not leading Turks to think we are aligning with them against Greeks and that you can find some means of conveying this to GOG. As Deptel 1306 to Ankara, 1457 to Athens, pointed out

Draft: NEA:GTI:KWBracken/kb 6-6-64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Jernegan

Clearances:

EUR- Mr. Van Hollen

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

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FORM DS-322  
5-61

By ctm NARA, Date 6-26-03



~~SECRET~~

if Turks through press leaks endeavor to parlay message into  
commitment it did not make, we will deny publicly.

END

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

00139

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Classification

39

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS  
Amconsul HONG KONG

808

793

FEB

6 10 PM '64

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON  
Amembassy PARIS  
Amembassy RABAT

4737

3896

1318

SS

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AF

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NEA

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NAVY

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TRSY

PARIS FOR USRO

Hong Kong 1376 and 1394.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-302

By *iw*, NARA, Date 2-23-04

Department believes decision as to disposition cobalt ore aboard SS MASTER GEORGE primarily one for Greek Government, but GOG deserves maximum possible cooperation from other COCOM countries in support own controls implementing CHINCOM embargo.

Embassy should express to GOG our support for Greek action. Request that GOG keep us informed of progress of case. Note that we anticipate they will hear from British on matter, but we wish to call to their attention certain difficulties which may arise. So long as ship is in Hong Kong, Chicoms have maximum opportunity to exert leverage which could strain UK cooperation. This is particularly true since Chicoms have recently offered to solve Hong Kong's serious water supply problem. Using this rationale, seek

Drafted by:

FE:ACA-LGrant/lg:2-1-64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

ACA - Lindsey Grant

Clearances:

E/MDC - Mr. Papendorp (subst.) GTI - Mr. Schott (subst.)  
AFN - Mr. McClintic (subst.)

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*Classification*

opportunity to encourage Greeks to remove ship to another jurisdiction before ordering off-loading or other disposition of cobalt ore.

GP - 3

END

ACTING

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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102

54

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS 674

JAN 8 2 21 PM '64

NEA

Info:

SS

G

PR

P

USIA

RMR

Please transmit the following message to Stratos Haratsaris,  
Mayor of Tavros:

QUOTE: I thank you for your warm and thoughtful message wishing  
me success as President of the United States. Your kind sentiments  
of friendship for my country are matched by the regard which Americans  
hold for Greece. <sup>We</sup> X recall with pleasure the memorable hospitality of  
Tavros and its people when Mrs. Johnson and I visited Greece last year.

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:GTI:TFHector:js 12-18-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Mailles

White House - Mr. Komer

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CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*Log 4 102a*  
*1. Komer*  
*2. [unclear]*  
December 31, 1963  
Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

*Just S/S OK 1/2/64*  
*OK*  
*OK*  
The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*WHL for*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Draft cable to Athens.
2. Copy of cable from Mayor Stratos Haratsaris.

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CLASSIFICATION

JAN 2 1964



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3446

Office of the  
Washington

WN3 62/61 VIA RCA

1963 DEC 14 AM 8 26

ATHINAI 1945 DEC 13 1963

THE PRESIDENT

WHITEHOUSE

MAYOR MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND PEOPLE OF THE MUNICIPALITY  
OF TAVROS ( ATHENS ) WHICH HONORABLE LADY JOHNSON  
VISITED ON SEPTEMBER 1ST 1962 EXPRESS THEIR CORDIAL  
CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF  
BELOVED AND ALLIED COUNTRY WISHING SUCCESS OF YOUR  
TASK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE WORLD

MAYOR STRATOS HARATSARIS

PRESERVATION COPY



102-c

December 14, 1963

TO: Mr. Benjamin H. Read

FROM: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

For recommendation.



*102-d*

The White House  
Washington

WN3 62/61 VIA RCA

1963 DEC 14 AM 8 26

ATHINAI 1945 DEC 13 1963

THE PRESIDENT

WHITEHOUSE

MAYOR MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND PEOPLE OF THE MUNICIPALITY  
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TASK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE WORLD

MAYOR STRATOS HARATSARIS



103

Memos & Misc



✓ Mr. Bundy

104

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY  
SCHNITTKER

More Title IV for Greeks. We realize the pain that a new Title IV agreement would cause Agriculture, on quite legitimate grounds. However, State and Phil Talbot make a very powerful political case for doing something to help the shaky Stephanopoulos regime--a case which I believe both the White House and the Secretary of State would share.

In these circumstances, we really have only two options: (a) A Title IV deal which goes your ex; or (b) A program loan which costs us dollars. From the overall point of view, wheat is clearly cheaper to the USG. So I hope that Secretary Freeman and you can once again be lenient to those irresponsible Greeks. I attach some comments from State, but I think the basic case is that I've made above.

R. W. Komer

cc: McG Bundy

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/83, Ex-101 Dept. Guidelines  
By abm, NARA, Date 6-26-03



104a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

### Why the U. S. Should Extend P. L. 480 Title IV Assistance to Greece

1. In gaining Greek "cooperation" in the phaseout of our economic assistance in the early 60's, we offered P.L. 480 as a transitional assistance instrument. We now find that other forms of maintaining the bilateral U. S. economic presence in Greece are no longer available, e.g., AID project and non-project loans, in view of the restricted AID budget and the current U. S. balance of payment difficulties. Our Aide Memoire of August 7, 1963, outlining U. S. transitional aid policy, stated that we recognize "the particular significance which such P. L. 480 commodities can have during a period of transition to self-sufficiency such as is envisioned for Greece in the immediate future."

2. We have been forced to be negative on a whole series of Greek requests: elimination of local currency support for the defense budget; a phase-down of commercial consumables, a reduction of MAP levels, an accelerated phaseout of the P. L. 480 Title III charity program, and delay on accommodation of Greek Government civil aviation requests.

*WMS*  
3. At the same time we are seeking Greek Government cooperation on various matters, such as: acquisition of important facilities, including a site at Iraklion, Crete, for housing Air Force dependents, a 2,000-acre site in Northern Greece for VOA, continuing assistance and land-acquisition to facilitate operation of the important Naval Communications Station at Marathon, application of shipping restrictions on Cuban and North Vietnamese trade, cotton textile export restrictions, favorable interpretation of airline Fifth Freedom rights in the case of TWA, and tariff cooperation.

4. Greek agricultural policies have become askew. Given the history of U. S. involvement in Greece since 1947, and an accustoming by them in the 1950's of the U. S. "pushing" them to take the bitter pills, it is important that we obtain some concessional assistance on P. L. 480 in order to stiffen the current government's efforts to redress the balance in agricultural subsidies.

### Comments on U.S.D.A. Objections to Title IV Feed Grain Program

1. The U. S. D. A.'s insistence on the substitutability of Greek soft wheat for feed grains, which has blocked a workable Title IV program, is not a statutory requirement, but only an administrative

interpretation

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *Cem*, NARA, Date *6-26-03*

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GROUP 3

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-2-

interpretation which should be relaxed when overriding foreign policy considerations so require. We believe it in the U. S. interest to approve our proposed Title IV program even though Greece has a temporary wheat surplus.

2. In response to U.S.D.A.'s objections to supplying feed grains to a wheat-surplus country, it should be pointed out that the GOG is taking steps to eliminate this temporary surplus problem through acreage reduction and cutbacks in subsidies. Furthermore, the GOG is providing 150,000 m.t. to poor rural families and will release 100,000 m.t. for feeding to animals, an agricultural practice not heretofore used extensively in Greece. It will take time, however, to change long-standing peasant habits. To eliminate the surplus, Greece will also need to export a substantial quantity of wheat in the coming months.

NEA/GTI:RO'Neil:jaw:mb1  
11/19/65

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1965

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
~~Baker~~  
J. Ritz  
~~Cy. Kowal~~

105

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Resumption of Civil Aviation Consultations  
with Greece

The enclosed memorandum concerns the civil aviation consultations with Greece which will be resumed November 16 at Athens.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

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105a

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MEMORANDUM

Resumption of Civil Aviation Consultations with Greece

We will resume at Athens on November 16 civil aviation consultations which began and were recessed last July at Washington. The issues are the Greek's desire to define their air route to the United States under the Air Transport Services Agreement, signed in 1946 between the two countries, and the United States desire that Greece's unilateral restrictions on Trans World Airways operations to and through Athens be eliminated.

In the July consultations we first offered the Greeks a route from Athens to New York via Rome and Paris, but later agreed to an unrestricted route; that is, from Athens to New York via intermediate points. The latter offer was made on the condition of Greek acceptance of a proposed Agreed Minute which would commit both Governments to screen for reasonableness new flight schedules proposed by their airlines, and which would outline procedures for bilateral capacity consultations. At the same time, however, the proposed Agreed Minute would be fully consistent with the Bermuda capacity principles embodied in the present United States-Greece Air Transport Agreement, in that it prohibits unilateral predetermination by either Government of the capacity offered by the airlines.

The Washington consultations were recessed because the Greek delegation, in addition to an unrestricted route to the United States, insisted both upon an implied commitment that rights to fly beyond New York would be granted at a later date, and upon a formula which would give them the unilateral right to prohibit any increase in Trans World Airways capacity for three years and impose limited restrictions for an additional two years.

Since those consultations, we have reaffirmed our position to the Greeks that we are not prepared to grant rights beyond New York now, nor to give an implied promise of beyond rights at some time in the future. We have also reaffirmed that we cannot accept unilateral predetermination of the capacity offered by our airlines. Subsequent to this restatement of our position, the Greeks informed us that

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- 2 -

they felt that early resumption of the consultations might prove fruitful.

The route we have offered Greece (Athens to New York via unspecified intermediate points) is one of the most desirable routes in the world. Moreover, the Greek carrier, Olympic Airways, intends to begin operations over this route with daily flights, utilizing highly competitive new jet equipment. Olympic Airways, owned by Mr. Onassis, is now a well-established airline and has the full backing of the Greek Government. Under these circumstances, we can see no justification for making major additional concessions on routes or acquiescing in restrictions on Trans World Airways capacity which would injure both Trans World Airways and our general civil aviation position with regard to other countries.

Should these consultations result in agreement between the United States and Greek Delegations, the Department will issue a brief press release stating only that agreement has been reached ad referendum and that the terms of the agreement will be made public following final approval by both Governments. The United States Delegation will request the Greek Government to follow the same procedure on a simultaneous-issuance basis.

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✓ Bundy 106

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 September 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR GREECE

1. The political scene in Greece has deteriorated considerably since NIE 29.1-64 (28 October 1964). The conservative forces which became entrenched during the Karamanlis regime have never become reconciled to the pronounced leftward shift shown by the Center Union victory in the election of February 1964. These elements, especially the top ranking army officers and the palace, have been jittery over the relaxation of strict restraints on the far left since the departure of Karamanlis. As Papandreou moved rightist officers out of key positions in the army and security forces, these elements began to see their fears realized. Papandreou, on the other hand, was determined to have the ultimate say in Greek political life. The resulting crisis has severely shaken political stability, raised the spectre of polarizations at the extremes of right and left, and perhaps has threatened Greece's postwar political structure.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs

☐ EO 13526 3.5(c)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NLI / RAC 12-54

NARA Date 09-10-12

By LCB

(106)

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2. While Papandreou's popularity with the voters has apparently remained extremely high, he has alienated many of the other major figures in the Center Union by his one-man rule without reference to party councils and by his efforts to groom his son Andreas as his successor.\* Andreas is widely regarded in the party as an upstart [redacted]

[redacted] At least in part to counter insinuations that he was an American stooge (he had been an American citizen for some years), he adopted an extremely critical attitude toward the United States and surrounded himself with a group of leftist opportunists, some of whom probably are susceptible to Soviet influence. Hence, in June when Andreas came under heavy fire from elements in the Center Union for alleged implication in organizing a leftist, but apparently non-Communist, organization (ASPIDA) within the Greek Army, the senior Papandreou was threatened with a major party revolt. It was to protect Andreas and to stem this tide of criticism that Papandreou sought to gain more control over the military establishment which was investigating the ASPIDA affair. This led to a confrontation with 25-year-old King Constantine who considered the military his own special province.

\* In the 1964 elections the Center Union won 53% of the vote; it has 171 seats of the 300 seats in parliament. The National Radical Union has 99 seats, the Communist front EDA has 22 seats, and the Progressives 8.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

3. Since July, when the King in effect dismissed Papandreou from the Prime Ministry, the latter has sought to demonstrate the impossibility of forming any government not headed by him, hoping thereby to compel the King to agree to early elections. He has managed to retain the allegiance of all but about 35 members of his party's representatives in parliament. These adherents, plus the 22 members of EDA have been able to prevent any of the king's choices for prime minister from winning a vote of confidence. In this situation, Papandreou has refused to compromise. Instead, the Papandreous have insisted on immediate elections. In conjunction with Communist elements, Andreas has organized demonstrations against the monarchy. While these demonstrations have on occasion led to rioting and disorder, the senior Papandreou has not attempted to foment rebellion or to come to power through any extra-legal means.

4. For his part, the King remains determined to prevent Papandreou from returning to power. He has used the lure of the Prime Ministry to induce a succession of Center Union leaders to desert Papandreou, but none has been able to bring along enough Center Union members to form a viable government. With each successive failure, the King's position has weakened. Yet he apparently continues to consider instability for an

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

indefinite period preferable to the return of Papandreou. He is still trying to promote a workable government under<sup>a</sup> defector from the Center Union, such as Stephanopoulos. For this to be successful, it would require the defection of seven or eight more Center Union deputies and the support of the eight Progressives. We regard the chances of success as no better than even. If this effort fails, Constantine is considering turning to some non-party figure. If this in turn fails, the King may, as a last resort, attempt to establish a military dictatorship.

5. The Communists have benefited from this political impasse. EDA has, with some success, taken advantage of the relaxation of security restrictions to increase its activity. However, following leftist gains in the July 1964 municipal elections, Papandreou began to take a firmer line against EDA. Nevertheless, EDA supported Papandreou in his struggle against the conservative elements. At least initially, EDA supported demonstrations against the King, though only the hard-core pro-Chinese wing favored violence. More recently, however, some EDA leaders appear to be having second thoughts about the wisdom of identifying their fortunes with Papandreou. They are concerned that their followers were moving into Papandreou's camp and they also wished to escape blame for disorders. Indeed, these leaders have even begun to voice sharp public criticism of Papandreou.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



Political Outlook

6. No lasting solution of the present Greek political crisis seems likely with the present parliament. Even should some government manage to gain a vote of confidence, it would probably be unstable, depending on a razor-thin majority made up of disparate groups ranging from rightist National Radical Union members to the former members of the left wing of the Center Union. We believe that such a coalition would not maintain its unity very long; it would be under strong pressure both within and outside parliament from pro-Papandreou elements. It seems likely that within six months any coalition government which excluded Papandreou would fall. But by that time, tempers may have cooled to the point where the King and the political parties would be prepared to hold elections.

7. If Papandreou should lose control over a sizable number of his presently loyal deputies, which is possible but not probable, the Center Union Party might be completely shattered. Over the short run this would enhance the prospects for survival of any coalition the King might succeed in putting together. At the same time, it could lead eventually to a return to the sharp polarization between right and extreme left which characterized the scene during the early years of the Karamanlis

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

regime. If no new moderate leftist party or grouping appeared, a large number of Greeks would have no alternative but to support the Communists, who would thus become a major influence on the Greek scene.

8. If the King is unable to establish a workable government and remains determined to avoid elections within the next six to nine months, he will probably see no alternative but to attempt to install some form of dictatorial regime based on the military. In Greece's present political climate, we believe such a course would be fraught with great danger. There appears to be no military or civilian figure with sufficient prestige and ability to establish an effective government of this kind. Thus we believe that such a move would lead to considerable demonstrations and violence of a kind which in time might turn into a civil war. This would severely strain the resources and loyalty of the military, which might itself split. In <sup>such</sup> extreme circumstances, the King would prefer to rely on the National Radical Union. We believe that this party has not yet seriously faced such a possibility and, if forced to do so, would probably break up.

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



9. If elections were held within the next six to nine months, Papandreou would stand a good chance of winning a majority in parliament. Once in power with a commanding mandate and freed from the restraint of the former Center Union defectors, Papandreou would be likely to move to limit the role and influence of the crown in Greek political life. He would also probably take steps to bring the military establishment under parliamentary rather than palace control. If their position were severely weakened, the palace and the military might feel unable to resist such moves, though Papandreou could move prematurely and precipitate a last-ditch effort by the King to establish a military regime.

10. Papandreou himself is unlikely to cooperate willingly with the Communists in domestic matters. We also doubt that he would make any significant changes in Greece's pro-Western foreign policy. He seems convinced that a close tie with the US is desirable on general grounds; he would also be hesitant to antagonize the US unduly lest it side with Turkey in regional disputes, particularly Cyprus. However, Andreas probably would urge a more leftist and anti-American line on his father. More importantly, Andreas probably would become involved in new troubles, and the senior Papandreou has demonstrated a willingness to

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

subordinate other considerations to protecting his son. An additional danger might arise if Papandreou failed to receive a parliamentary majority. In such a case, we believe he would seek defectors from other parties, but failing this, he might not refuse to accept EDA votes as a condition for his political survival. It is difficult to predict the effect of these possibilities, but we do not believe that they would lead a Papandreou government to make substantial alterations in Greece's foreign policy.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



ABBOT SMITH  
Acting Chairman

- 8 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~




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~~SECRET~~

Mac -

September 11, 1965

A much better case than the Agency  
put together.



3.3  
(b)(1)

I feel that CIA took a bit of advantage  
of my open-mindedness in saying "come up with  
a good proposal and we'll consider it on the  
merits" (your instruction to me). Nonetheless,  
there is a case, even if a borderline one.

*RWK*  
RWK

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 08-183  
By isl, NARA, Date 6-4-09

✓ 107a

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

# Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY GREECE

DATE OF INFO. 8 SEPTEMBER 1965

DISTR. 9 SEPTEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

POSSIBLE PARLIAMENTARY SOLUTION TO PRESENT GREEK  
POLITICAL CRISIS

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWDLER  
OWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KCMER  
MOODY

1. DURING THE EVENING OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1965, CENTER UNION (EK) DEPUTY ZIZIS PAPALAZAROU AND IOANNIS VELLIDES, PUBLISHER OF THE PRO-EK MAKEDONIA, CALLED ON FORMER PRIME MINISTER GEORGIOS PAPANDREOU TO URGE HIM TO SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCE IN THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT BY FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER STEFANOS STEFANOPOULOS, WITH THE PROVISIO THAT ELECTIONS BE HELD IN EIGHT TO TEN MONTHS. PAPANDREOU FLATLY REFUSED, CLAIMING THE KING WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ELECTIONS WITHIN A SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT AND THAT A STEFANOPOULOS GOVERNMENT WAS BOUND TO FALL SOON IN ANY EVENT. AS A RESULT, PAPALAZAROU AND OTHER EK DEPUTIES WHO ARE AWARE OF THIS RESPONSE BY PAPANDREOU ARE INCREASINGLY DISTRUSTFUL OF

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO  
AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC EXO

☐ EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-54

NARA. Date 09-10-12

By LK18

107a



PAPANDREOU'S PURPOSES.

2. DURING THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN STEFANOPOULOS AND THE KING IN THE PAST TWO DAYS, STEFANOPOULOS HAS ADVISED THE KING THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE GIVEN A MANDATE UNLESS ASSURED OF THE SUPPORT OF AT LEAST 154 DEPUTIES. THE KING HAS AGREED AND HAS INDICATED HE IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING OFFERING THE MANDATE TO STEFANOPOULOS IF HE CAN LINE UP THIS NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTES. THE KING AND STEFANOPOULOS HAVE ALSO AGREED WHOEVER RECEIVES THE MANDATE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING AT LEAST "SYMBOLIC" REPRESENTATION FROM NATIONAL RADICAL UNION (ERE) AND PROGRESSIVES.

3. STEFANOPOULOS BELIEVES THAT A COALITION, WITH ERE PARTICIPATION, IS PREFERABLE TO A GOVERNMENT MADE UP SOLELY OF EK DEFECTORS BECAUSE IF ERE PARTICIPATES THERE WOULD BE LESS DANGER OF A SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL OF ERE SUPPORT, STEFANOPOULOS ALSO FEELS THAT ERE PARTICIPATION IS DESIRABLE TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT A NON-PARTISAN PUBLIC IMAGE, WHICH IS NEEDED TO COPE WITH URGENT NATIONAL PROBLEMS.

4. PRO-PAPANDREOU PUBLISHER CHRISTOS LAMBRAKIS IS AWARE THAT STEFANOPOULOS MAY RECEIVE A NEW MANDATE, AND HE IS DETERMINED TO OPPOSE IT BY ALL MEANS, CLAIMING "THIS IS THE KING'S LAST CHANCE" AND IF STEFANOPOULOS' SOLUTION FAILS, THE KING "WILL HAVE HAD IT" AND EARLY ELECTIONS WILL BE INEVITABLE.

5. IF SUCCESSFUL IN FORMING A GOVERNMENT, STEFANOPOULOS WILL DO THE FOLLOWING:

- A. VIGOROUSLY CRACK DOWN ON COMMUNISTS AND COMMUNIST-FRONT ACTIVITIES.
- B. IMMEDIATELY PURGE PAPANDREOU'S PROTEGES--ESPECIALLY THOSE OF

SECRET [REDACTED]

ANDREAS--FROM MAJOR GOVERNMENT POSTS.

C. PROMPTLY SEEK U.S. ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE REGARDING ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS.

D. REQUEST LOANS FROM THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OR ELSEWHERE TO CARRY ON PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS.

E. TRY TO ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL AND TOURISM.

F. INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN EARLY CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, PROBABLY BEGINNING WITH A REVIVAL OF THE ACHESON FORMULA OF LAST YEAR.

6. COMMENT: WHILE STEFANOPOULOS' PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS CANNOT BE ACCURATELY ESTIMATED AT THIS TIME, IT IS BELIEVED THE FOREGOING AT LEAST INDICATES THAT NEITHER THE PALACE NOR THE GREEK POLITICIANS HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF A PARLIAMENTARY SOLUTION.)

7. DISSEM: NONE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 2, 1965

NO. 204

PHILLIPS TALBOT SWORN IN AS  
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO GREECE

Phillips Talbot, of New York, was sworn in today as United States Ambassador to Greece. He succeeds Henry R. Labouisse, who is now Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund.

Born at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on June 7, 1915, Mr. Talbot graduated from the University of Illinois in 1936. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1954. Mr. Talbot was a reporter for the Chicago Daily News from 1936 to 1938. He was awarded a fellowship by the Institute of Current World Affairs, New York, which enabled him to study at the School of Oriental Studies, University of London, during the 1938-1939 term and in India during the next two years.

Some months before Pearl Harbor Mr. Talbot went to Manila and joined the U.S. Navy. In November 1941 he was assigned to India as Naval Liaison Officer in Bombay and remained there until transferred to Chungking as Assistant Naval Attaché in 1943. After World War II he became a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News and served in India, Pakistan and Southeast Asia. In 1948 he was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He returned to Asia as a foreign correspondent 1949-50.

In 1951 he was selected to be the first Executive Director of the American Universities Field Staff, Incorporated, a private non-profit educational organization. Mr. Talbot served as Executive Director for ten years. On April 21, 1961 he was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Mr. Talbot is married to the former Mildred Aleen Fisher and they have three children: Susan, Nancy and Bruce Kenneth.

\* \* \*

109  
F S  
Wednesday, August 25, 1965  
9:10 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Warning to US Tourists on Disorders  
in Greece

I have taken staff readings on this problem and I find unanimous opinion in the State Department and in the Embassy that any open expression of our concern for public disorder in Greece would be taken as a kind of "intervention" which we have been doing our very best to avoid. Anschuetz, the able Charge in Athens, points out that Center and Left editorialists would be delighted to compare disorders in Greece with disorders in Los Angeles.

He also points out that there has been no injury to American tourists beyond a few whiffs of tear gas.

One of the troubles here is that ever since the Greek Civil War, every American whisper has been taken as a roar in Athens. Since in fact, we have very little real influence in the contest between the King and Papandreou, it seems to everyone I have talked to that we would do better to avoid public comment as long as we can.

The Embassy is, of course, making it clear to all the Americans it is in touch with that they should stay clear of demonstrations, rallies, and crowds. This will not stop undergraduate adventurers, but that is just as true at home as abroad.

McG. B.

cc: *clayton*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

McGB:

August 24, 1965

After mulling it over, I think we'd be on risky ground warning American tourists away from Athens unless the danger increases unexpectedly. Doing it for political reasons wouldn't accomplish much and wouldn't please either side.

No one can say that no American will get hurt. But so far tourists have been able to steer clear of the rioting. Latest reports suggest that the riot leaders fear they overplayed their hands last Friday and are running a little scared in the face of the threatened police crackdown. We'll probably see more demonstrations, but the moderates may make a better effort against losing control to the Commies as they did Friday. So I don't think the current situation would justify our arguing that tourists are in serious danger.

Warning tourists away--unless clearly for their safety--would bring charges of American meddling. The "American factor" in Greek politics has been an issue since we helped put down the Communist insurgency, so the Greeks are especially sensitive to US "meddling." In this case, the King and PM would probably resent the implication that they've lost control, and they don't want to be any more vulnerable than they are to charges of US backing. Papandreou, on the other hand, has always felt we kept Karamanlis in power, and his people have charged that we "engineered" his own downfall last month. (Today's Post editorial will confirm his views.) So I doubt anyone wants our help.

There's not much leverage in this. We thought about it during the Cyprus showdown last year because threatening a stable government in early summer with loss of a big foreign exchange earner looked like it might have some impact. Now, however, political emotions drown rational economic calculations, and the tourist season is just about over. We might sway a few fence-sitters toward backing a stable government but then only if we had a clear security problem.

I find that CIA and State intelligence people share these views. Talbot's people this morning feel the same way, though they'd want to check with the embassy again if we asked them for a formal recommendation.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: RAC-NLS 001-126-2-16  
By: lis, NARA, Date: 3-26-03

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

109 B

## King or Chaos *Wash. Post 8/24*

Friends of Greece can wish for nothing (e) than a period of stability in that emotionally inflamed country. If the five-week crisis since King Constantine dismissed Premier Papandreou has proved anything, it is that the mob is a peril to all established government. For that reason it is much to be hoped that the new Premier Tsirimokos, a breakaway member of Papandreou's Center Union Party, will succeed in obtaining a vote of confidence.

Premier Papandreou came to power 18 months ago after an astonishing victory of the Center Union. He had pledged himself to needed social reforms as well as to undoing the alleged dictatorial excesses of former conservative Premier Caramanlis. But the promise was soon tarnished by bickering, and there seems to have been substance to the charge that Papandreou's effort to fire the Defense Minister—which led to the Premier's dismissal—might have opened the door to Communist influence in the army. This is not an idle fear, for the Communists have made repeated efforts to penetrate the hitherto relatively secure armed forces.

In the circumstances one may suspect that there

are more than a few backward glances at the progress during the eight-year tenure of Caramanlis. His recall from a self-imposed exile abroad is unlikely because the Center Union still holds a plurality. At the same time, a new election held now as Papandreou demands could easily become a mockery after what has happened. Almost certainly it would be a ballot for or against monarchy rather than on the real issues.

For these reasons, the confirmation of the Tsirimokos government now would seem to offer the best chance of calming the atmosphere. Young King Constantine is certainly inexperienced, but he is the one figure in Greece who stands above the incredibly involved factional battles, and it would be a pity to put this bulwark in jeopardy.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

109c

Wednesday, 25 August, 1965  
8:30 a.m.

McGB:

Here's the reply from Anschuetz, also recommending we not warn American tourists away from Athens.

Bill Handley told me last night that Ball also vigorously opposes such a move.



HHS

Att: Athens 293

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 5.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC Memo, 1/20/25, State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, DARA, Date 6-26-03

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

109-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AUGUST 24

035

DEPTEL 204

LIMDIS

NO END IN SIGHT OF RISK OF PUBLIC DISORDER HERE. COMMUNIST AND ALLIED LEFT OF CENTER FORCES LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO CALL FOLLOWERS INTO STREETS OF ATHENS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

BELIEVE ANY OPEN EXPRESSION BY US OF ITS CONCERN ABOUT DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER IN GREECE WOULD BE TAKEN AS A KIND OF "INTERVENTION," WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SEDULOUSLY SEEKING TO AVOID. WHILE PAPANDREOU FOLLOWERS AND THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 953A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANY VIGOROUS OR SYSTEMATIC ATTACK ASSERTING US HAS INVOLVED ITSELF IN ANTI-PAPANDREOU ACTIVITY, THERE IS OPEN BELIEF IN SOME CIRCLES THAT "ALLIES" OF GREECE HAVE BEEN COLLABORATING WITH PALACE AND OTHER CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN GREECE TO FRUSTRATE PAPANDREOU'S RETURN TO POWER.

A US STATEMENT DEPLORING PUBLIC DISORDER WOULD BE SEEN AS AN EFFORT TO DISCOURAGE PRO-PAPANDREOU MANIFESTATIONS AND THEREFORE AS A DELIBERATELY CALCULATED ACT OF UNFRIENDLINESS TO PAPANDREOU FORCES. EMBASSY EFFORTS TO AVOID AN UNWHOLESOME BREACH WITH CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT SECTOR OF GREEK POLITICAL LIFE WHICH CENTER UNION FOLLOWERS

OF PAPANDREOU REPRESENT WOULD TEND TO BE UNDERMINED. EDITORIALISTS OF CENTER AND LEFT WOULD RELISH OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE DISORDERS HERE WITH THOSE IN WATTS.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-293, August 24, from: Athens

EMBASSY NOT AWARE OF INJURY TO AMERICAN TOURISTS SO FAR, BEYOND A FEW WHIFFS OF TEAR GAS. SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO ATHENS-SALONIKA AREAS. OTHER TRADITIONAL VACATION AREAS (THE ISLANDS, PLACES OF ARCHEOLOGICAL INTEREST) COMPLETELY FREE OF DANGER. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES, EMBASSY HAS BEEN TELLING AMERICAN TOURISTS HERE WE SEE NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD LEAVE GREECE, BUT EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS TO THEM THAT THEY AVOID ALL DEMONSTRATIONS, RALLIES AND CROWDS.

GP-3. ANSCHUETZ  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

✓ File  
5 110~~SECRET~~

August 11, 1965

Mac -

FYI, Greek crisis is getting much worse, not better. Papandreou is simply outmaneuvering our incautious young King. Two efforts by the Palace to split Papandreou's CU have failed. There remains some chance of a coalition behind a non-party personality, or even a split in the CU, but the options are really narrowing to (1) bringing back Papandreou; (2) new elections which he'd surely win; or (3) a military regime. Let's hope the King won't be dumb enough to try the last, which would split Greece.

Both sides have tried to drag us in, but we're still staying loose (which is only sensible policy). We'd be tarred with the responsibility for anything we touched--~~is fact~~ the recent bald forgery attempt to implicate us in the Gorgopotamos affair. The Embassy   clearly think this was the work of Andreas or at least his entourage.

RWK  
RWK~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 12AC 12-55  
By LCB NARA, Date 11-2-12





S/S 10635

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

July 8, 1965


1965 JUL 8 PM 7 03

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Consultations with Greece

At the request of the Greek Government to define its air route to the United States under the provisions of the bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement of May 22, 1947, we began consultations July 6 in Washington with representatives of the Greek Government.

In addition to the question of the Greek air route, we hope to persuade the Greeks to remove certain restrictions which they have imposed on Trans World Airlines' operations to and through Athens. Although attempts over the past several years to have these unilateral restrictions removed have not been successful, we believe that the Greeks may be more amenable to our point of view now that the national carrier of Greece, Olympic Airways S.A., has a serious interest in beginning operations to the United States.

  
Grant G. Hilliker  
Acting Executive Secretary

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CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Executive Secretariat

March 26, 1965  
Date

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

For your information and  
files.

Enclosures:

S/S 4451, cy 9

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 10-11-91

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS  
CLASSIFICATION

MAR 29 1965



*Handle as EXDIS.*

1255

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~~EXDIS~~ ~~SECRET~~  
ROYAL GREEK EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4451

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 03-302  
By is, NARA, Date 2-23-03

March 22, 1965

Highly ~~confidential~~  
and ~~secret~~

9

*Dear Mr Under Secretary of State,*

With reference to the conversations which I had the honour to have with Your Excellency and His Excellency the Secretary of Defense, respectively on March 12 and 17, 1965, I am instructed directly by the Prime Minister to bring to your knowledge the following communication of which I would like to stress the highly confidential and secret nature.

The Royal Hellenic Government have had no cognizance whatsoever of the texts of the accords signed in Moscow by the Governments of Cyprus and of the USSR; except for the agreement of which the text is herewith attached. This document has been communicated by the Government of Cyprus to the Government of Greece under the strictest pledge of secrecy. The Annex mentioned in this agreement was not communicated to my Government.

His Excellency Mr. George W. Ball,

Under Secretary of State,

Department of State, Washington.

~~EXDIS~~ ~~SECRET~~

MAR 29 1965

It was, however, concluded from this text that the agreement in question presented no element interesting the Atlantic Alliance so as to entail any obligation of Greece, as member of the Alliance, to communicate it to NATO. This is all the Greek Government know about the agreements concluded in Moscow which, in their general lines, have been reported by the Press. Thus, the only thing which my Government knew with regard to the equipment of Cyprus with soviet arms, was the delivery of torpedo boats which in due time was communicated by the Greek Government.

With regard to what was conducted in Egypt, the Royal Government knew nothing beyond the fact, publicly reported long ago, that soviet war material was being sent in the UAR for transfer to Cyprus. As Mr. P. Garufalias, the Greek Minister of Defense, has already assured the Honorable Robert McNamara, no Greek officer or enlisted man, whether on active service or retired, has ever been to Egypt in order to take charge of soviet missiles.

A supplementary proof of this lies in the very fact that the Greek Government were so unaware of the whole subject, that in their initial aide-memoire of March 14, 1965, they did not exclude the possibility, asserted to me during our conversation of March 12, 1965, that retired Greek servicemen had been to Egypt for training and taking charge of those missiles.

However, the thorough investigation which was conducted by the Greek Authorities following the above mentioned



representations of Your Excellency, has proved beyond any doubt that no Greek, either on active service or retired, has travelled to Egypt for such a purpose.

With reference to what can be done by Greece in order (a) to assert once more her loyalty to her allies and (b) to avert a conflict, I am instructed to state the following:

The Greek Minister of Defense has already declared that the Greek Government will exert all their influence, which we trust will be effective, in order to secure that no Greek, whether on active service or retired, will be used in the handling of the Russian missiles. Thus, no danger of leakage of the secret of missile NIKE could possibly arise.

The Greek Government will also deploy every possible effort in order that any transport of missile material from Egypt to Cyprus should be suspended, at least provisionally. Greece will also exert all her influence for the pacification of Cyprus and for averting any warlike action on the part of the Greek Cypriots.

The Greek Government trust that these endeavours will find appropriate response.

In conclusion, the Greek Government will do their utmost both in order to reassert their integrity and loyalty as ally; and in order to stabilize the pacification of the Island. The Greek Government hope and wish to hope that the

tension that has suddenly arisen will subside; and that the Government of the United States will respectively exert all their influence on the Government of Turkey for the consolidation of peace.

Finally, the Royal Government wish to express their surprise at the following. It has been widely known for a long time that the USSR had agreed to send war material to Cyprus. The American Services were certainly aware of this. Nevertheless, no objection was ever raised by the Government of the United States. All of a sudden, in the last few days, the responsibility of this development was ponderously laid on the Greek Government. The Greek Government feel that it gives them the right to express their surprise as well as their disappointment.

In bringing the above to the knowledge of Your Excellency, I am instructed to reiterate to the Government of the United States the assurance that Greece has always been in the past and will always be in the future a sincere and faithful ally.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Alexander Matsis*



AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS  
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE DELIVERY AND PAYMENT TERMS FOR THE SPECIAL EQUIPMENT  
TO BE SUPPLIED FROM THE SOVIET UNION

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the desire to develop and strengthen further the friendly relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Cyprus, based on the principles of complete equality, respect for the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs, desirous of strengthening the defence of the Republic of Cyprus in the light of the threats directed against its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty and in compliance with the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus

Have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall supply in the period of 1964-1965 to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus the special equipment of the type, quantity and at the prices as set out in the Annex attached to this agreement to the amount of 12.334.980 roubles.

Article 2

The delivery of the equipment indicated in article 1 shall be effected by the Soviet party on CIP terms at the port of Alexandria, provided the consent of the Government

The handing over of the equipment shall be made to the representatives of the Republic of Cyprus in Alexandria and shall begin from the day of the unloading of this equipment.

### Article 3

The deliveries of the special equipment under Annex to this agreement to the amount of 12.334.980 roubles shall be effected on favourable terms.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus shall pay to the Government of the USSR only half of the cost of the special equipment under Annex amounting to 6.167.490 roubles.

For effecting the payment of the above sum the Government of the USSR shall grant credit to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to the amount of 6.167.490 roubles (one rouble contains 0.987412 grams of fine gold) at the rate of 2% per annum. The other half of the cost of the equipment under Annex amounting to 6.167.490 roubles shall not be paid by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to repay to the Government of the USSR the credit granted in accordance with the present article to the amount of 6.167.490 roubles during the period 1966--1980 by 15 equal annual instalments, each amounting to 411.166 roubles before March 31 of each year. Notwithstanding the above the Government of the Cyprus Republic may pay any instalment at any time prior to such instalment being due and payable.

The interest of the credit given shall accrue from the date of bill of lading and shall be paid within the first quarter of the year following the year in which the interest



The repayment of the last instalment with the balance of the interest shall be effected before March 31, 1980.

#### Article 4

The repayment of the credit granted under the present agreement with the interest accrued shall be effected by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus by way of delivering to the USSR Cyprus commodities that are of interest to the USSR and/or by payment in hard currency, by mutual agreement between the State Bank of the USSR or, on its behalf, the Bank for Foreign Trade of USSR, and Central Bank of Cyprus.

Six months prior to the year of recurrent payment of the credit with the interest accrued, the parties shall agree upon the range and prices of commodities as well as the scope and dates of deliveries thereof. When effecting repayment of the credit with the interest accrued in hard currency the conversion of roubles into hard currency shall be effected on the basis of the gold parity of the rouble and the hard currency of the payment day.

#### Article 5

Should the gold content of the rouble change (at present one rouble contains 0.987412 grams of fine gold) the State Bank of the USSR or, on its behalf, the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR and the Central Bank of Cyprus shall effect the re-evaluation of the credit balance existing on the day of the above change respectively to this change.

The sum of the unused credit shall be re-evaluated in the same order.

#### Article 6

For keeping the registration of the utilisation and the repayment of credit with the interest accrued the State Bank of the USSR or, on its behalf, the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR and the Central Bank of Cyprus shall open an account in roubles and mutually shall establish the procedure of payments and keeping accounts under the credit granted in accordance with the present agreement.

#### Article 7

Besides the special equipment listed in the Annex the respective Soviet organizations shall deliver to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus during the period of 1964 and first quarter of 1965, under the terms of the Soviet-Cyprus Trade Agreement in force 145 trucks with the required quantity of spare parts.

The respective Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations shall grant the respective Cyprus Organization the right to pay the value of the said trucks by instalments in a period of up to 5 years starting from the date of delivery with interest at 2% per annum.

The detailed terms of the delivery will be stipulated in a contract which shall be concluded between the respective Soviet and Cyprus Organizations.

#### Article 8

In accordance with the agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the UAR in regard to the training of Cyprus specialists in the UAR



in the maintenance and operation of the equipment to be delivered under the present agreement, the Soviet party shall assign to the UAR at its own expense the necessary number of Soviet specialists for the purposes mentioned above. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus shall come to an agreement with the Government of the UAR about location of the Soviet specialists in UAR, transport for service purposes and medical aid at the expense of the Soviet party.

The Soviet party shall receive, at the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, in Soviet Union Cyprus specialists for training in maintenance of the equipment to be delivered under the present agreement.

The expenses connected with the training, upkeep, food and clothing allowances of the said Cyprus servicemen in Soviet military training establishments as well as the pocket money allowance at the rate of 20 roubles monthly per each serviceman, travel fare on the territory of the USSR and from the place of training back to Cyprus shall be borne by the Soviet party. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus shall pay only the travelling expenses of Cyprus servicemen from Cyprus to the USSR.

#### Article 9

The respective Soviet and Cyprus Organizations shall sign contracts stipulating for detailed terms of delivery and of other services connected with the implementation of the present agreement.

The invoices to be presented for payment ~~for the~~

for the equipment out of credit shall bear the indication "for goods under order No. (No. of the contract)". Specifications to the invoices shall be handed over to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the provisions made above.

#### Article 10

The respective Soviet Organizations shall supply free of charge to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus descriptions, instructions and manuals in respect of the special equipment to be delivered.

#### Article 11

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus shall not except with the consent of the Government of the USSR sell or hand over formally or de facto the special equipment referred to in the present agreement and the relevant documentation and information to or permit the use of the above equipment and documentation by a third party or any physical or legal persons other than the Cyprus officials and specialists in the service of the Cyprus Government.

#### Article 12

The contracting parties shall take all necessary measures to keep secret the terms of delivery and training of the Cyprus specialists and all correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present agreement.

#### Article 13

All correspondence pertaining to the implementation



of the present agreement shall be effected in the english language.

Article 14

The present agreement comes into force the day of its signature. The Annex is an integral part of the present agreement.

Done in Moscow on 30 September 1964 in two originals, each in english and in russian, both texts being equally valid.

For and on behalf  
of the Government of  
the Republic of Cyprus  
Spyros Kyprianou

For and on behalf  
of the Government of  
the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics  
Sitarovic