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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Complaints of members of the Church  
of Christ that they are being denied  
religious freedom in Greece

In my memorandum of December 23, 1964 regarding efforts of the Church of Christ to obtain a license for worship in Greece, I informed you that an appeal had been filed requesting the Greek Council of State to reverse the unfavorable decision of the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs.

The Embassy has now learned that the hearing on the appeal, which had been scheduled for March 9, 1965, has been postponed until October 5, at the request of the Ministry.

You will be informed of further significant developments in this case as they occur.

*for H. Ford*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

MAR 22 1965

~~SECRET~~



✓ 19 March 1965

SC No. 00662/65A

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# SPECIAL REPORT

PAPANDREOU'S FIRST YEAR AS PREMIER OF GREECE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC-NL3001-126-2-17  
By js, NARA, Date 5-22-03

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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~~SECRET~~

19 March 1965

#### PAPANDREOU'S FIRST YEAR AS PREMIER OF GREECE

The first year in office of the centrist government of George Papandreou has produced marked changes in Greece's political, economic, and foreign policy outlook. In the midst of the chronic abusive infighting that characterizes Greek politics, some extreme leftist elements have taken advantage of the government's tolerance of dissent and become more active. Papandreou's social welfare and wage support programs have added to inflationary pressures. The Cyprus dispute has destroyed Greece's close military ties with Turkey, and emotional reaction to any unfavorable developments there could upset present political patterns. Uncertainty also surrounds the tenure of and succession to the 77-year-old Papandreou.

#### The Center Union Government

The Center Union achieved its present mandate in February 1964 largely because of Papandreou's talent as an orator and the popular desire for a change. He was well known as the premier of a wartime government in 1944, and had participated in several coalition cabinets in the early postwar years. His fortunes were in eclipse while Constantine Karamanlis' right-of-center governments held office from 1955 to 1963, but Papandreou's gift of spellbinding oratory helped the Center Union take advantage of Karamanlis' difficulties and turn the political tables. The Center Union won a plurality of parliamentary seats in the elections of November 1963; two months later the party won 53 percent of the popular vote and 171 of 300 seats--a landslide in Greek politics.

The Center Union is a melange of formerly separate political organizations whose members represent nearly the entire Greek political spectrum from disgruntled former deputies of right-wing parties to one-time collaborators with the Communists.




George Papandreou

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~~SECRET~~

PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE GREEK PARLIAMENT  
( PERCENTAGES SHOW SHARE OF POPULAR VOTE IN FEBRUARY 1964 ELECTION )



Its ideological mainstream follows the slightly left-of-center, liberal, and frequently republican tradition in Greece. Although Papandreou has been in undisputed control of the party since the death of party co-founder Sophocles Venizelos just before last year's elections, bitter factionalism is never far below the surface.

The Center Union rode the wave of a growing popular demand for greater personal freedom and social justice and for the relaxation of repressive measures designed to restrict Communism. Papandreou treats Communism as a social problem which can be defeated by eliminating those conditions which nourish its growth. At the expense of security forces' morale, he has released several hundred "political" prisoners serving terms for crimes committed during the Communist uprising, has restricted police activity against extreme leftists, and has dropped the requirement for loyalty certificates except for members of the armed forces and public services. He has permitted left-

ist demonstrations and "peace marches" such as Karamanlis never countenanced.

The Center Union government has also sought to deal with the more basic causes of economic discontent by redistributing income to the benefit of the farmer and the urban worker. Greece's underdeveloped economy suffers from a lack of natural resources, and agricultural underemployment characterizes rural Greece. Because of the wide divergence in income and job opportunities between rural and urban populations, young people are continually moving to the cities or emigrating to Western Europe in search of work. The government has enacted large agricultural subsidies and promoted substantial wage increases for industrial workers. Papandreou has also taken steps to modernize and expand education.

#### Succession Issue

The foremost element of instability in the Center Union government is uncertainty as to how long the septuagenarian premier will remain at the head of his party and government. Papandreou appears to be in good health but, in view of his advanced age, a struggle for succession has been under way ever since his government was formed.

At first glance, the most obvious possibility is the premier's son, Andreas Papandreou. A distinguished economist and a US citizen for 20 years, Andreas returned from California

at his father's urging to run in the 1964 elections. On winning an impressive victory, he was brought into the cabinet as minister to the prime minister. He was subsequently transferred to the post of alternate minister of coordination, presumably to take advantage of his economic talents, but last November resigned in the face of opposition charges of corruption. Even outside the cabinet Andreas Papandreou remains a powerful influence on his father, who may soon bring him back into the government.

At least in foreign policy, Andreas Papandreou exerts a leftist influence. He has been highly critical of US policy regarding Cyprus, and has made no attempt to deny reports that Washington was responsible for forcing his resignation. As a former US citizen he may be overcompensating for his vulnerability to charges of being pro-American. He is rumored to be contemplating offers to take over eventual leadership of a political grouping to be created from among members of the Center Union's left wing and the Communist-front United Democratic Left.

Andreas Papandreou's major rival for Center Union leadership is the able and dynamic finance minister, Constantine Mitsotakis. Mitsotakis has demonstrated astute political acumen in his present position, performing his job competently, permitting no scandals in the ministry, and carefully avoid-

ing intrusion in the affairs of other ministries. He has demonstrated loyalty to the elder Papandreou and has thus far refused to give encouragement to those elements in the right-wing opposition who are seeking a realignment of political parties. His weaknesses appear to be his arrogance and unknown political strength beyond his home island of Crete. Mitsotakis enjoys the support of the Athens daily Eleftheria, which is one of the most influential journals in Greece.

#### The Army and the Palace

So far, Papandreou has done relatively well in managing relations with two major independent power centers in Greek politics, the army and the palace, which traditionally favor strongly anti-Communist, rightist governments.



Andreas Papandreou

Senior military leaders closely identified with the Karamanlis regime were quickly purged when Papandreou took office, but those remaining in high position are believed to be only slightly less conservative. Papandreou's defense minister comes from the Center Union's right wing, and appears to be generally acceptable to his military subordinates. Rumors of coup plotting within the army, which were widely circulated before the Center Union came to power, have disappeared in recent months.

Papandreou has also maintained at least proper, and publicly cordial, relations with the palace. Young King Constantine is said to be unhappy with some of the government's policies, but the prime minister's current popularity is sufficient to discourage the palace from any attempt to replace him.

#### Attack From the Right

Papandreou is facing an increasing barrage of assaults from the only major non-Communist opposition party, the right-of-center National Radical Union (ERE) created by Karamanlis nine years ago. The current party leader, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, is a scholarly but rather colorless figure who has held the party together, but failed to inspire his followers. Many are hoping for the early return of Karamanlis from his self-imposed exile in Paris, although this appears unlikely at present.

The passage last month of an EDA-sponsored bill to investigate alleged illegal actions of Karamanlis and two of his colleagues when they were in office has raised the tempo of the political warfare. Kanellopoulos has called for creation of a center-right coalition government. Papandreou has responded by charging that in 1959 the Karamanlis government used police measures to ensure re-election of ERE. Kanellopoulos followed by calling for Papandreou's resignation "lest there be bloody developments," and the premier publicly labeled the ERE a "fascist" organization.

The rapidly mounting tension between the two parties appears to have served Papandreou's purpose of making any coalition between ERE and dissident Center Union deputies a virtual impossibility in the near future. ERE also does not want to press issues to the extent of provoking elections, for all evidence points to the continued popularity of the Center Union.

#### Leftists and Communists

High on the ERE list of charges against the government is that it has been "soft on Communism."

The Communist Party itself is still outlawed and its leaders and many of its members are in exile in the Soviet bloc. The government has rejected demands to legalize the party and



Panagiotis Kanellopoulos

permit mass repatriation of the exiles. Nevertheless, the government's relaxation of other anti-Communist measures has led to some increased activity by the extreme left.

On the political scene Greek Communism operates through the United Democratic Left (EDA) party, which holds 22 seats in parliament on the basis of 12 percent of the popular vote. The EDA remains isolated, however. It has failed to make headway toward forming a common front with the Center Union, is being subjected to increasing verbal attack by the prime minister, and, like the two major parties, suffers from internal factionalism.

EDA, however, has made the most of the new freedom of action which it enjoys under Papandreou. New EDA cells and front organizations have been established throughout Greece. EDA

has been particularly successful in rapidly expanding the 30,000-member Lambrakis Youth Organization, named after a left-wing deputy killed under suspicious circumstances when Karamanlis was in power. In addition, the largest organization of university students in Greece came under Communist control in 1964.

While rejecting EDA bids for cooperation, Papandreou faces the continuing problem of keeping the Center Union's own left wing in harness. Shortly after last year's elections, 32 deputies refused to vote for parliamentary officers because the left wing had received short shift, and Papandreou temporarily expelled two of the factions' leaders. This past January he attempted to heal the breach by bringing into the cabinet one of these two leaders, a former Communist collaborator, as minister of interior.

Papandreou's handling of this cabinet change illustrates his approach to the leftist problem. Before making the appointment he removed all significant security functions from the Interior Ministry. When a new labor law permitted leftists to gain controlling positions in the country's largest labor federation, the minister of labor, with an assist from the courts, managed to return the organization to nationalist control. Papandreou has attempted--without much success thus far--to counter the growth of the Lambrakis Youth Organization by starting his own Center Union Youth Movement. He

has refused to outlaw the Lambrakis Youth Organization, leaving it to the courts to act if the organization violates existing laws.

#### Economic Problems

The Communists' greatest opportunity probably lies in exploiting Greece's unresolved economic problems. The EDA constantly attempts to increase discontent with the status quo by demanding extravagant reforms. Government economists warn, however, that inflationary pressures may get out of hand unless agricultural subsidies and wages are held in line. So far, Papandreou has been unwilling to risk the political consequences of doing so, while at the same time resisting the EDA's extreme demands.

His domestic economic policies are considered largely responsible for the loss of foreign assets which is causing growing concern throughout the business community. Although official figures for 1964 have not yet been issued, it is generally accepted that foreign assets fell by \$50 million last year--the first decline in six years. This was largely attributable to a failure of capital inflow and invisible earnings, notably tourism, to rise during a year when the country's foreign trade deficit jumped by more than \$100 million. Another year like 1964 would virtually exhaust Greek foreign reserves, which now stand at \$60 million.

Prospects for improvement are poor. Potential foreign investors appear increasingly skeptical over the attractiveness of Greece, partly because of administrative obstacles. With the government apparently in no mood to dampen domestic demand for goods by reversing its wage and subsidy program, imports are likely to continue growing.

#### Turkey and Cyprus

The problem of Cyprus and its ramifications remains the most intractable problem facing Papandreou. It has not yet had any significant domestic impact beyond providing another subject for attack and counterattack among political enemies, but unsettling international effects may have far-reaching consequences in Greece.

Since early in the crisis the Papandreou government has consistently demanded "unfettered independence and self-determination" for Cyprus--the latter term being equated with union with Greece. Papandreou has countered attacks on his failure to make progress toward this goal with reminders that the unpopular London-Zurich agreements of 1959 were negotiated by Karamanlis.

Privately, Greek officials have indicated a willingness to move toward any solution which can be sold to Archbishop Makarios. There is evidence that Athens has tried to restrain

the Greek Cypriots on several recent occasions. An estimated 10,000-13,000 Greek troops are on the island, not only to assist the Cypriots against possible Turkish invasion, but apparently also to ensure that Athens retains some control over military events there. Generally, however, Papandreou appears to have been unwilling to engage Makarios in a direct confrontation over the Archbishop's frequent exercises in brinkmanship. Papandreou evidently felt that the record required him recently to assert that "the capital of Hellenism is in Athens, not Nicosia."

By reviving the deep historic animosities, the dispute has virtually ended political and military cooperation between Greece and Turkey. The Turks have tried to force the departure of Greek citizens long resident in Istanbul. Even joint planning for defensive purposes in the NATO context is next to impossible.

Most ominous, however, has been the tendency in Athens, as in Ankara, to look to Moscow for diplomatic support. Prior to the adjournment of the UN General Assembly last month Papandreou's policy was based

on seeking a favorable solution through the UN, and Soviet backing there was considered essential. Athens' emotional reaction to Moscow's seeming switch to the Turkish-favored "federal" solution last December revealed the extent to which this support had come to be counted on. Despite this flirtation and dissatisfaction with US and UK policy, however, the Papandreou government has not altered Greece's basic pro-Western orientation.

#### Outlook

Given the present instability of the Center Union, a disaster on Cyprus could completely upset the existing pattern of Greek politics. Papandreou's failure to make steady progress toward a clear economic goal leaves him vulnerable to a major defeat on such an emotional issue, despite his current personal popularity. His death or serious illness before the succession question is resolved also could lead to the break-up of the Center Union and to a reversion to government by successive unstable coalitions as during the immediate postwar period, which would allow the Communists to break out of their present isolation. ~~(SECRET)~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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JAN - 8 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Leader of the chief opposition party in Greece sends an art book to the President

At the request of the author, the American Embassy at Athens has forwarded Athens, an art book by Mr. Panayotis Kanellopoulos, for transmittal to the White House. The title page of the book bears the inscription: "For the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Lyndon Johnson with my best wishes for the New Year. Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Athens, Dec. 18, 1964". The package containing the book is enclosed.

Mr. Kanellopoulos is parliamentary leader of the National Radical Union (ERE), the chief opposition party in Greece.

The Department has sent a brief letter of acknowledgment on behalf of the President and Mrs. Johnson.

/s/ J. W. Davis

for

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Book.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*5080*  
*Lowered & cleared*  
*Ret. & revised*  
*changes*  
*116*  
*To Halbur*  
*for*  
*release*  
OCT 7 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: 60th Anniversary Year - American Farm  
School in Thessaloniki, Greece:  
Suggested Presidential Message

The American Farm School in Thessaloniki, the oldest and best-known American-sponsored school in Greece, has designated the Academic Year 1964-65 as its 60th Anniversary Year, to be inaugurated by a banquet to be held in New York on December 29, 1964. Mr. Alexander W. Allport, Vice President of the school, has requested a Presidential message for inclusion in a press release some time prior to the banquet.

The President and Mrs. Johnson visited the American Farm School in September 1962, at which time the President presented a tractor and a lathe to the school. The President met the Director of the school, Mr. Bruce Lansdale, during the visit. We understand that Mrs. Johnson has agreed to serve as a member of the 60th Anniversary Sponsoring Committee.

We recommend that the President send a message. We have accordingly supplied a suggested draft for transmittal to Mr. Allport at the Office of the Trustees, The American Farm School, 36 East 61st Street, New York, New York, 10021.

*Herbert Gordon*  
*for*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Presidential message.

**SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE**

As the American Farm School begins to celebrate its 60th Anniversary, all who know and admire the school are inspired by its long record of achievement. My visit to the school in September 1962 with Mrs. Johnson was a highlight of our visit to Greece.

The education and training of rural youth to become efficient farmers, able to contribute to the progress of Greece both by their work and their example to their neighbors, continues to be a most important weapon in Greece's struggle for higher living standards. The American Farm School has played a leading part in rural education in Greece. It has helped Greece greatly, but it has also helped our own country. The school has become one of the strong bonds of friendship between the American and Greek peoples, and has demonstrated to us how much dedicated people can do when their hearts are in the task.

The American Farm School was started on a very modest basis by Dr. John Henry House, and remains even today a place where a man brought up on a farm is quickly made to feel at home. It is a place where men like Bruce Lansdale achieve great results through understanding of the farm boys they teach and through love of Greece, the country in which they work. Our country can be justly proud of such men and of their achievements.

FOR RELEASE AT 12 NOON

September 8, 1964

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE WEDDING OF  
HIS MAJESTY KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE  
AND  
PRINCESS ANNE-MARIE OF DENMARK  
ATHENS, GREECE, SEPTEMBER 18, 1964

The President has designated Mr. William G. Helis, Jr., of Louisiana, and his daughter Miss Lynda Bird Johnson to be his personal representatives at the wedding of His Majesty King Constantine of Greece and Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark. Ambassador and Mrs. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol, will accompany Mr. Helis and Miss Johnson. Miss Cassandra Helis, daughter of Mr. Helis, will also be included in the delegation. The group plans to leave New York Sunday evening, September 13 and arrive in Athens Monday afternoon, September 14, 1964.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1964

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cables from Greece

The attached cables from Athens may be of some interest. The first is an answer from King Constantine to your last letter, and the second is a longer interview between Labouisse and the King.

All this is for information only. Currently we hope to have Acheson in for the regular Tuesday lunch, unless you disapprove.

*M. B.*  
McG. B.

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S/S 11390

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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*Sent Dungan*  
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*Cy Rowel*

August 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Greek Royal Marriage -  
Suggested Attendance of  
Miss Lynda Bird Johnson

*Bundy thinks  
this is good  
idea. Lynda  
Bird mentioned  
it to him  
recently.  
Will you  
pres?  
what is  
date?*

My memorandum to you of July 17, 1964, recom-  
mending that a Presidential representative attend  
the wedding of young King Constantine and Princess  
Anne-Marie of Denmark, included a list of names  
from which a representative might be chosen.

I wish to recommend that Miss Lynda Bird  
Johnson's name be added to that list. Miss Johnson's  
attendance would create a very favorable impression  
in Greece and would redound to our advantage in our  
relations with that country.

*for*  
*Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

*June*  
S 120

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. Valenti

SUBJECT: Appointment on Thursday, June 25  
at 5:45 P.M.

1. At 5:45 P.M. you are scheduled to meet for two minutes with three of your Ambassadors -- Ambassador Blair (Philippines), Ambassador Hare (Turkey), and Ambassador Labouisse (Greece). Mike Forrestal will entertain the three visitors in the Cabinet Room until Jack Valenti can escort you in at, or a little after 5:45 P.M. The routine for you is the usual one -- a greeting and an individual picture with each Ambassador.
2. Some brief biographic data on the three Ambassadors is attached.

*H*

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/75, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03



S/S 9303

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON120a

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Appointments for American  
Ambassadors to meet the  
President

In response to arrangements made with Mr. Gordon Chase, the following American Ambassadors will be at the White House at 5:40 p.m., June 25 for a brief chat and photographs:

Ambassador Blair, Jr. (Philippines)  
Ambassador Hare (Turkey)  
Ambassador Labouisse (Greece)

The President has recently met all three of these Ambassadors in connection with the visits of Prime Minister Krag of Denmark and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey.

Short biographic summaries of the individuals listed above appear on the enclosed sheet.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "B. Read".

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic summaries.

WILLIAM McCORMICK BLAIR, JR. - Ambassador to the Philippines

Ambassador Blair, prior to his appointment as Ambassador to the Philippines, served as Ambassador to Denmark. A lawyer, he was previously closely associated with Governor Stevenson for a number of years. He is married to the former Catherine Gerlach and has a twenty-two month old son, William, III. He plans to leave for Manila the early part of July.

RAYMOND HARE - Ambassador to Turkey

Ambassador Raymond Hare, a career foreign service officer since 1927, has seen service in many important posts abroad, including Cairo, Tehran, Beirut and his current assignment in Ankara, and in the Department, where he last served as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in 1960-61. A few weeks ago he was given the Department's Distinguished Honor Award in recognition of his significant contribution to the understanding of the Middle East and to the advancement of United States policies in that complex part of the world.

HENRY R. LABOUISSSE - Ambassador to Greece

Ambassador Labouisse served as Director of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and headed the Task Force to prepare and present to Congress the new Foreign Economic Aid Program. Upon the termination of ICA and its transfer to the Agency for International Development he was appointed Ambassador to Greece. He also served as Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. He is married to the former Eve Curie.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR GWEN KING

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President - June 25 at 5:45 P.M.

1. The President is now scheduled to meet briefly, for a handshake and a picture, with William Blair (Philippines), Raymond Hare (Turkey), and Henry Labouisse (Greece) in the Cabinet Room on June 25 at 5:45 P.M.
2. I wonder if you would help us out on the following points:
  - (a) Would you reserve the Cabinet Room for the meeting and inform State?
  - (b) Since the meeting is off the record, would you tell State to have the Ambassadors enter and leave the White House via the West Basement? The Ambassadors should be in the Cabinet Room by 5:40 P.M.
  - (c) Would you ask Cecil Stoughton or Dan Lewis to be on hand in the Cabinet Room at 5:40 to take individual pictures of each Ambassador with the President.
3. Mike Forrestal will be the NSC man in the Cabinet Room.
4. Please let me know if you have any problems with this memo.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Forrestal  
Capt. Stoughton  
Mr. Reedy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5**  
**NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines**  
**By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03**

~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

21 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House

SUBJECT: Elias Dimitracopoulos

In reply to your request to Mr. Heimann, there is attached a brief resume of our knowledge of the activities of Athens newspaperman Elias Dimitracopoulos.



Attachment

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI 12AC 12-54

NARA, Date 09-10-12

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~~SECRET~~

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File  
122a

1. Elias Dimitracopoulos has been known to--and a source of embarrassment to American circles in Greece since 1950. His dossier at the Embassy  runs to several hundreds of pages. From the material therein, there emerges the picture of a man whose chief characteristics are these:

He is extremely ambitious and goes to any lengths to achieve his ends; he is a liar and a boaster.

He works alone, has no confidants and leads a life which in some important respects is a mystery, particularly the source of his funds.

He is extremely clever at name dropping, exploiting casual contacts and making the most of his acquaintances.

He has consistently over the years boasted that he has a special relationship with the American intelligence community and has used this claim as an entree into other foreign and Greek circles.

Although associating freely with Americans and professing to like America, his writings have consistently given a false impression of America, several times resulting in serious problems between the governments of the United States and Greece resulting from misunderstandings caused when his distortions of statements by American officials provoked a strong reaction by the Government of Greece.

2. One fact stands out in the long relationship between Dimitracopoulos and the Americans: although he has ferreted out

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-54

NARA, Date 09-10-12

by LKB

(122a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a number of interesting pieces of information from various Americans, he has never given any part of the United States Government any information of value in return.

Some Highlights from the Record:

3. November 1950: Decorated by Patriarch of Alexandria Christoforos for bravery during resistance operations during the German occupation of Greece in World War II, saving the lives of seven downed American airmen being specifically mentioned. A later investigation showed that he was in a German detention camp at the time the airmen were rescued.

4. December 1950: Dimitracopoulos stated to the head of a wartime resistance organization that he was employed by the American Embassy's secret service and showed his credentials, one of which was allegedly signed by the Chief of the Athens Police. On the authority of the Embassy's secret service, Dimitracopoulos ordered the head of the resistance organization to have 20 of his men at the Piraeus docks the next morning to prevent sabotage to arriving Sixth Fleet ships. When the Fleet visit materialized some days later, it was clear to the head of the resistance organization that no one wanted or needed his help.

5. August 1952: (Excerpt of letter from Ambassador John Puerifoy to the Department) "For example, during the crisis of June 1951, he told one and all that he served as a common confidential agent between Papagos and the King. Neither the King

nor Papagos has ever met Dimitracopoulos....He accused one of our senior officers of being a pervert, another of collaborating with two EDA officials to wreck American policy in Greece.... I had them investigated and the accused were unanimously cleared. Dimitracopoulos also claims to have refused a \$17,000 a year job with CIA to the deep regret of that organization's hierarchy."

6. July 1957: Dimitracopoulos proposed to an Athens newspaperman that the man give him three passport-sized pictures so that Dimitracopoulos could get an American passport for him. "After all," explained Dimitracopoulos, "you can't tell when we may need these things," whereupon he took out of his pocket an American passport made out in his name and showed it to the newspaperman. Dimitracopoulos also proposed on the same occasion that if the newspaperman would sign the necessary receipts, Dimitracopoulos could get him 20,000 drks. (\$667.00) from the "U.S. Government Secret Service."

7. November 1957: Dimitracopoulos printed a story in the Athens newspaper Kathimerini that NATO was "demanding" missile bases in Greece. In addition to being factually wrong, the story started a flood of premature public discussions on a sensitive subject. Kathimerini's publisher, Eleni Vlachou, demanded to know Dimitracopoulos' source for the story. Dimitracopoulos refused to name his source and was suspended from the paper for a month. He told the American Embassy that Vlachou was changing Kathimerini's line to the left and away from its previous pro-NATO, pro-Western

orientation on the paper. Kathimerini did not and has not changed its pro-Western orientation. Dimitracopoulos never worked for Kathimerini again. It is worth noting that the "missile bases" story was submitted by Dimitracopoulos in typescript, as are all his stories, although he cannot type. Also few members of the working press in Athens who know him believe that Dimitracopoulos is capable of writing the material he submits. On one occasion in 1957 when his colleagues on Kathimerini tricked him into sitting down and writing a news story in the paper's office, Dimitracopoulos' style was markedly different than that of the material he submits for publication.

8. October 1959: Greek intelligence and security officials consider Dimitracopoulos as the main channel used by the Yugoslavs in Athens to plant unattributable news and propaganda in the Greek press. On at least three occasions the Yugoslav Press Attache has approached Dimitracopoulos to plant unattributed stories.

9. March 1960: Dimitracopoulos published the first information about NATO-Greek negotiations for the establishment of a missile training base in Crete, claiming "Paris NATO officials" as his source. An investigation showed that Dimitracopoulos made no attempt to see any high NATO officials until several days after the story had already appeared in the Greek press.

10. June 1960: The Greek Central Intelligence Service, having definitely established that the private secretary of a

minister of the Greek Government was passing classified information to Dimitracopoulos, had this person transferred out of that position.

11. September 1960: A Dimitracopoulos exclusive reported maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean by some 15 units of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Prime Minister Karamanlis and the security chiefs at Naval Headquarters were shaken to notice how closely Dimitracopoulos' story paralleled a secret report on this subject disseminated to the Greek military community.

12. October 1960: Dimitracopoulos sent to the Paris office of the Herald Tribune a story that Greece and the United States had recently signed a special agreement providing for the storage of special weapons on Greek soil. This came several weeks after the Greek Government officially denied that any such weapons were based in Greece. The Paris Tribune did not use the story.

13. December 1960: As a result of Dimitracopoulos' publishing a NATO document of Italian origin which referred to Northern Epirus (i.e. the southern part of Albania, against which Greece has territorial claims) as belonging to Albania, Prime Minister Karmanlis became enraged at Dimitracopoulos and issued a direct order that all Greek officials should consider Dimitracopoulos Persona Non Grata.

14. February 1961: (Cable from Ambassador Briggs to the Department) "...I have prohibited anyone here from dealing with him except through our press officer. ...Record, which is

voluminous, indicates he is dangerous, unscrupulous correspondent and should be kept at arms length."

15. November 1961: The Greek Central Intelligence Service acquired proof that an officer in Greek Naval Intelligence Headquarters was passing classified information to Dimitracopoulos. The man was transferred to a non-sensitive position.

16. September 1962: On the eve of Vice President Johnson's visit to Athens, Dimitracopoulos published interviews with Edward Kennedy and Assistant Secretary of State Manning in which non-committal references to the "Macedonian Question" were made to look like official U.S. Government support for the Yugoslav point of view in the dispute. While the Vice President was in Greece, Opposition leader George Papandreou took the comments from the two interviews and escalated them into a long anti-American denunciation contained in a major speech.

17. May 1963: Dimitracopoulos published an article in the Greek newspaper Makedonia, based on an interview with General John Bowen, Director of the U.S. Military Aid Program. The article compromised Greek-U.S. nuclear cooperation and claimed that Bowen said the U.S. was not satisfied with the state of the Greek military forces. This article was so damaging to U.S.-Greek military cooperation that it was picked up and replayed by the Soviet news agency TASS.

18. October 1963: Following an August 1963 visit to the U.S., Dimitracopoulos published a series of articles in the English

~~SECRET~~

language Athens Daily Post. One article, reporting an interview with Senator Barry Goldwater, was so slanted as to appear an attempt to influence forthcoming Greek elections. Senator Goldwater had to issue a clarification of the interview in order to set the record straight. A second article in the series, reporting an interview with Admiral Arleigh Burke, made it appear that the U.S. was highly displeased with the cooperativeness of some NATO members. This article was subsequently replayed by Radio Moscow.

19. October 1963: Dimitracopoulos was responsible for publishing in the Athens daily Eliftheria a classified Aide Memoire from the U.S. Government to the Government of Greece.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

3827

*Price*

*123*

*7/17*

JUL 17 1964

*Olson*  
*Chute*

*Bundy 7/2!*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Greek Royal Marriage - Letter  
from Greek Ambassador

The Greek Ambassador, H. E. Alexander A. Matsas, has invited the President to appoint a representative to attend, with spouse, the wedding of King Constantine and Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark on September 18, 1964. The Ambassador's letter is enclosed. It will be noted that the representative will be expected to arrive in Athens on September 15, 1964.

We recommend that an affirmative response be furnished and, accordingly, a suggested letter for the President's signature is enclosed. There is also enclosed a suggested list of prominent persons from which a representative might be chosen.

*H. Storgson*

Benjamin M. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Ambassador Matsas.
2. Draft letter of response.
3. Suggested list of representatives.

ROYAL GREEK EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 9, 1964.

*Mr. President,*

By Command of His Majesty, The King of the Hellenes, my August Sovereign, I have the signal honor to invite Your Excellency to be pleased to appoint a Representative, in order to attend the Ceremonies of the Wedding of His Majesty The King to Her Royal Highness The Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark which is felicitously to take place in Athens, on September the 18th 1964.

The Representative of Your Excellency could be accompanied to the Ceremonies by his or her consort and, failing this, by a member of the retinue. The official guests will be expected kindly to arrive in Athens on Tuesday, September 15, 1964, in order to be able to attend, on the evening of the following day, Wednesday, September 16th, the First State Reception to be held at the Royal Palace of Athens.

In bringing respectfully to Your Excellency's notice this August and most cordial invitation, I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency,

Mr. President

the assurances of my highest consideration and *of my feelings of devoted deference*

*Alexander Matsas.*

His Excellency  
The President of the United States of America  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

SUGGESTED REPLY

123-8

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your letter of July 9, 1964 in which you transmit an invitation to me to appoint a representative to attend the wedding of King Constantine and Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark which will take place on September 18, 1964.

In accordance with your kind invitation, I intend to appoint a representative of the United States of America to attend the Royal Wedding, and have directed that you be furnished the name of the representative at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Alexander A. Matsas,  
Ambassador of Greece.

123-c

## SUGGESTED LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES

Suggested list of prominent persons from which a representative could be chosen to attend the wedding of King Constantine of Greece and Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark on September 18, 1964.

### GOVERNMENT

The Honorable The Chief Justice and Mrs. Warren

The Honorable The Secretary of the Treasury and Mrs. Dillon

The Honorable W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,  
and Mrs. Harriman

### CONGRESS

The Honorable J. W. Fulbright, United States Senate, and Mrs. Fulbright

The Honorable Hubert Humphrey, United States Senate, and Mrs. Humphrey

### OTHERS

Mr. William Conomos, General Manager of the Sentinel of Orlando, Florida,  
and Mrs. Conomos

Mr. Pericles Lantzounis, Supreme President of the Greek-American Progressive  
Association, and Mrs. Lantzounis; 203 East 73rd Street, New York, New York

Mr. John Plumides, President, American Hellenic Educational Progressive  
Association, and Mrs. Plumides; 114 Law Building, Charlotte, North  
Carolina

The Honorable George V. Allen, and Mrs. Allen; Former U. S. Ambassador  
to Greece (1956-1957); 4730 Quebec Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

Dr. and Mrs. Peter D. Comanduras; Prominent Greek-American Physician,  
Co-founder and Executive Secretary of "Medico" (with Dr. Tom Dooley);  
2025 Eye Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

SECRET Enclosure

6/13

June 12, 1964

① Kauer  
② RL

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House  
J. DAVIS  
FROM: Benjamin H. Read FOR  
Executive Secretary

Not used as of 7/24

Memorandum of Conversation  
between the President and  
His Excellency Alexander  
Matsas, Ambassador of Greece,  
dated June 11, 1964.

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are side-lined in blue.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation re  
President's Meeting with Greek  
Ambassador Matsas.

SECRET Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

*June*

June 11, 1964

TALKING POINTS FOR GREEK AMBASSADOR

1. You appreciate Papandreou's letter and his talk with Ball. But you'd also hoped for some constructive ideas on how crisis might be peacefully resolved.
2. We agree that situation is still critical. Turks may yet move. US leverage to turn them off about used up.
3. We also agree that consequences of Turk intervention could be grave, though frankly we see little difference between Cyprus becoming "another Cuba" as result of Turk attack and becoming one more slowly because of direction Makarios is now taking. We emphatically disagree with Papandreou statement that Greek Cypriots should get help wherever they can find it (i. e. from USSR).
4. We wish Greeks had admitted earlier that they couldn't control Makarios. He--with apparent Greek acquiescence--is humiliating the Turks, and driving them into a corner. Papandreou's letter talks of his "responsibilities before the Greek nation." Doesn't he see that the fate of 100,000 Turk Cypriots is a matter of honor for Inonu too?
5. Negotiating with Makarios is impossible. Makarios has no interest in the security of the West. But Greece does have a special responsibility here. Greece is a part of NATO.
6. So Greece must step in to work out a solution with Turkey. The alternative may be war--because the US and UN may be unable to restrain Turks any longer. US will not go to war with Turkey to defend Makarios.
7. Greece must avoid at all costs further humiliation of its ally Turkey. In depths of Cuban missile crisis, we were always careful to allow the Soviets a way out. This is even more important to an ally than an enemy!
8. We're happy to hear that Greece is ready for secret talks with Turkey. But these will fail unless Greece is prepared to go beyond anything hinted yet.
9. We won't presume to tell Greece what to suggest. But time has arrived for Greek statesmanship to match Turk restraint. The more the Greeks show they are not being used by Makarios, the better the chance for a meeting of minds.
10. You will be in touch with Papandreou further shortly, but your words today meant in deep sense of friendship. We are counting heavily on him.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 State Dept. Guidelines + NSC Memo 1/30/95  
 By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

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*Sum* *Orig* *Trans* <sup>126</sup>/<sub>5</sub>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 10 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call by Greek Ambassador Matsas, June 10

There is enclosed a Talking Points Paper for the President's meeting with Greek Ambassador Matsas this afternoon.

The Ambassador is calling on the President to present a letter from Prime Minister Papandreu dealing with the current Cyprus crisis. The letter thanks the President for his action in forestalling a Turkish intervention on Cyprus and expresses the Prime Minister's view that Turkey is primarily responsible for the crisis. An advance copy of the letter was transmitted under cover of a memorandum to you dated June 9. A suggested reply to the Prime Minister's letter will be submitted to you upon completion of George Ball's current conversations in Athens and Ankara.

*15/ J. W. Davis*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Talking Points Paper.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *cbm*, NARA, Date *6-26-03*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

126a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Call By Greek Ambassador Matsas, June 10

Talking Points Paper

1. Thank Ambassador Matsas for the Prime Minister's letter and his expression of appreciation for your action in averting Turkish intervention on Cyprus. Say you will send reply shortly.

2. Make clear our opinion that the threat was real.

3. Stress that we have used our biggest diplomatic guns in keeping the Turks from moving and that repetition of United States efforts to pull the Turks back from the brink has reduced our leverage to do so again.

4. Underscore our belief that the Turkish agreement to delay a decision on intervention does not mean they have renounced this possibility.

5. Remind the Ambassador that the United States Government has been working very actively and earnestly throughout this crisis to encourage Turkey to find an alternative to intervention. Make clear our feeling that we have often found our efforts not supported and sometimes opposed by the parties directly concerned.

6. Emphasize our conviction that the Greek Government must take more positive action to help ease the situation. Point out that Greece must avoid policies which force the Turks into a corner where they cannot escape except by force or complete surrender. Note that we avoid such tactics with the Soviets - even in the Cuban crisis, a face saving device for the Soviets was an important element in our every move.

7. Note that the Government of Turkey considers the Government of Greece as a puppet to Makarios' and acts on this assumption. Ask what the Government of Greece has done or will do to prove that it is not being forced to sacrifice its basic interests through Makarios' initiatives.

8. Note that we emphatically disagree with the Prime Minister's statement that the Greeks of Cyprus should seek help wherever they can find it.

9. Ask if the Greek Government would accept a Communist Cyprus or war with Turkey in preference to a serious and determined effort to negotiate a settlement of the problem.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By abm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1964

TALKING POINTS FOR GREEK AMBASSADOR

1. You appreciate Papandreou's letter, though you'd also hoped for some constructive ideas on how crisis might be peacefully resolved.
2. We agree that situation is still critical. Turks may yet move. US leverage to turn them off about used up.
3. We also agree that consequences of Turk intervention could be grave, though frankly we see little difference between Cyprus becoming "another Cuba" as result of Turk attack and becoming one more slowly because of direction Makarios is now taking. We emphatically disagree with Papandreou statement that Greek Cypriots should get help wherever they can find it (i. e. from USSR).
4. We wish Greeks had admitted earlier that they couldn't control Makarios. He-- with apparent Greek acquiescence--is humiliating the Turks, and driving them into a corner. Papandreou's letter talks of his "responsibilities before the Greek nation." Doesn't he see that the fate of 100,000 Turk Cypriots is a matter of honor for Inonu too?
5. Negotiating with Makarios is impossible. Makarios has no interest in the security of the West. But Greece does have a special responsibility here.
6. So Greece must step in to work out a solution with Turkey. The alternative may be war--because the US and UN may be unable to restrain Turks any longer. US will not go to war with Turkey to defend Makarios.
7. Papandreou clearly wants enosis, but Turkey might invade rather than permit this final humiliation. Thus it's up to Greece to work something out with Turkey.
8. In depths of Cuban missile crisis, we were always careful to allow the Soviets a way out. This is even more important to an ally than an enemy!
9. We're happy to hear that Greece is ready for secret talks with Turkey. But these will fail unless Greece is prepared to go beyond anything hinted yet.
10. We won't presume to tell Greece what to suggest. But time has arrived for Greek statesmanship to match Turk restraint. The more the Greeks show they are not being used by Makarios, the better the chance for a meeting of minds.
11. You will be in touch with Papandreou further shortly, but your words today meant in deep sense of friendship. We are counting heavily on him.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

~~SECRET~~

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



8551 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call by Greek Ambassador Matsas, June 10

There is enclosed a Talking Points Paper for the President's meeting with Greek Ambassador Matsas this afternoon.

The Ambassador is calling on the President to present a letter from Prime Minister Papandreou dealing with the current Cyprus crisis. The letter thanks the President for his action in forestalling a Turkish intervention on Cyprus and expresses the Prime Minister's view that Turkey is primarily responsible for the crisis. An advance copy of the letter was transmitted under cover of a memorandum to you dated June 9. A suggested reply to the Prime Minister's letter will be submitted to you upon completion of George Ball's current conversations in Athens and Ankara.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Talking Points Paper.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

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JUN 10 1964

127-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Call By Greek Ambassador Matsas, June 10

Talking Points Paper

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3. Stress that we have used our biggest diplomatic guns in keeping the Turks from moving and that repetition of United States efforts to pull the Turks back from the brink has reduced our leverage to do so again.
4. Underscore our belief that the Turkish agreement to delay a decision on intervention does not mean they have renounced this possibility.
5. Remind the Ambassador that the United States Government has been working very actively and earnestly throughout this crisis to encourage Turkey to find an alternative to intervention. Make clear our feeling that we have often found our efforts not supported and sometimes opposed by the parties directly concerned.
6. Emphasize our conviction that the Greek Government must take more positive action to help ease the situation. Point out that Greece must avoid policies which force the Turks into a corner where they cannot escape except by force or complete surrender. Note that we avoid such tactics with the Soviets - even in the Cuban crisis, a face saving device for the Soviets was an important element in our every move.
7. Note that the Government of Turkey considers the Government of Greece as a puppet to Makarios' and acts on this assumption. Ask what the Government of Greece has done or will do to prove that it is not being forced to sacrifice its basic interests through Makarios' initiatives.
8. Note that we emphatically disagree with the Prime Minister's statement that the Greeks of Cyprus should seek help wherever they can find it.
9. Ask if the Greek Government would accept a Communist Cyprus or war with Turkey in preference to a serious and determined effort to negotiate a settlement of the problem.

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5**

**State Dept. Guidelines**

**By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03**

**JUN 10 1964**



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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5/21

*George*

*1. O'Brien  
2. [unclear]*

MAY 21 1954

*Reedy  
5/22*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Presidential statement on Greece  
for the New York Journal of Commerce

The Director, International Division, New York Journal of Commerce, has requested, by letter addressed to Mr. George Reedy, a statement from the President regarding Greek-American relations. The statement would be published on May 25 next to a statement by Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece in connection with an economic review of Greece.

We believe that a Presidential statement would be helpful in stimulating United States trade and investment as regards Greece. A draft statement and letter of transmittal are therefore enclosed.

/s/ John A. McKesson

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft letter of transmittal.
2. Draft statement.

**DRAFT LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL**

128a

Dear Mr. Potesky:

The President welcomes the opportunity to express his high regard for Greece and his hopes for the future development of United States-Greek relations, especially in the economic field. He has therefore asked me to forward the enclosed statement for use in connection with the economic review of Greece to be published on May 25.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

Presidential statement.

Mr. P. Robert Potesky, Director,  
International Division,  
The New York Journal of Commerce,  
80 Varick Street,  
New York 13, New York.

128 b

DRAFT STATEMENT

Today Greece, which fifteen years ago fought and defeated communist aggression, is moving forward to a new day of promise and prosperity. From the long poverty of underdevelopment and the prostration of war, it has become a nation where the fruits of a modern economy are no longer a distant dream but a goal within sight and being rapidly approached.

The bonds of friendship between Greece and the United States are many and close. These ties have for many years been strengthened by official programs of aid and cultural exchanges. Today Greek-American friendship is expressed in increased trade, tourism, and investment. American private investment is playing a significant role in the industrial growth of Greece.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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MAR 25 1964

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Xerox by sent  
4/25*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Informal Consultations with Greek Government  
on Airline Capacity

The following memorandum is for Mr. Myer Feldman.

*orig 4/25*

During the week of March 23, a State/CAB team carried on an informal capacity consultation with the Greek Government (composition of the Delegation is enclosed). No substantive agreement was reached and the Greeks threatened to prohibit full operation by TWA of its proposed summer schedule.

Since TWA introduced a very large (approximately 85%) increase in frequencies during the summer of 1963, the Greek aviation authorities have been asking for capacity discussions with the United States. Last fall (September 20), General George Doukas, Director, Civil Aviation, during a visit arranged by the FAA, spoke briefly with Mr. Ferguson and seemed satisfied for the time being, but in February the Greek Government made an informal request for consultations.

The issue discussed in March was whether the TWA capacity, particularly between Rome and Athens, was so great as to justify a Greek Government action to force a cut back. The Greeks made a totally unconvincing case, but insisted that for the sake of the profitable operation of their own airline (Olympic Airways) they would nevertheless have to reduce TWA's operation from the proposed 14 to at most 10 flights per week. The United States Delegation insisted that the experience of the preceding year (to say nothing of expected increases in traffic in summer of 1964) amply justified the service offered between Rome and Athens. Consequently, the United States Government would be strongly opposed to any attempt by the Government of Greece to force a cut back.

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- 2 -

The discussions ended without any element of agreement but were nevertheless cordial.

Since the end of the negotiation, the Greek Government has announced that it would permit only 10 (not the 14 proposed) weekly flights carrying traffic between Rome and Athens. Similar reductions (from 7 to 5) are to be imposed on flights between Athens and Cairo and between Athens and Tel Aviv. The effective date of the restriction is April 26. The Department will continue to press the Greek Government to permit the full operation.

*1s/ Richard Moose*  
*fr*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

List of delegation members.

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ENCLOSURE

129a

Greek Delegation:

**Chairman:** Ambassador Leonidas Papagos, Foreign Office  
Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs

Major General George Doukas, Director, Civil  
Aviation

Mr. Passialis, Assistant Director, Civil Aviation

Mrs. Hadjivassiliou, Assistant to General Doukas

Mr. Matthioudakis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Hartzoutsis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Economides, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mavrokephalos, Olympic Airways (Observer)

United States Delegation:

**Chairman:** Allen R. Ferguson, Coordinator, Office of International  
Aviation, Department of State

Department of State:

Andreas Lowenfeld, Assistant Legal Adviser for  
Economic Affairs

John Q. Blodgett, American Embassy, Athens

Civil Aeronautics Board:

G. Joseph Minetti, Board Member

Joseph C. Watson, Director, Bureau of International  
Affairs

James L. Deegan, Assistant to Vice Chairman

James S. Horneman, Bureau of International Affairs

Observer:

David Brewer, TWA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*J. Read*  
*Chell*  
*4/8*

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130

APR 7 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Greek Prime Minister's Office  
Sends Photographs to the White House

At the request of the Prime Minister's son, Andreas Papandreou, Minister to the Prime Minister, the American Embassy at Athens has forwarded two photographs to the Department for transmittal to the White House. The packages are addressed to Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson and Miss Lynda Bird Johnson and are enclosed.

*J. Read*  
*fr*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Two packages.

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1964

*Bruce*  
131

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE MANATOS

It goes without saying that the only political problem to worry about on your sad mission to Athens is possible Greek press efforts to get statements which could be construed as the US taking sides on Cyprus. Because of our own overriding interest in the security of both Greece and Turkey as the southern flank of NATO, we have naturally leaned over backwards to be as neutral as possible on the merits of this painful dispute, in hopes that Greeks and Turks would finally get together. As you know, this is the President's own view.

Given the highly emotional reaction of both Greeks and Turks, however, silence has been taken in each country to mean we are in favor of the other. I suspect that the Greek press may try to get some expressions of opinion, but it seems to me that we are safe in responding that public statements would not be in keeping with this wholly non-political occasion. I might add that the very fact of our sending such a high-level delegation will be ample evidence of our great affection for Greece.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

132

*Gene*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Salinger

Here is draft  
release prepared by  
State and OIC here

B Smith

Also attached are 3  
messages being sent  
now. BKS

*Let's find in  
appropriate  
Caus. files.*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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132a  
2nd s/s ok  
3/4 (above M)

Mac -

March 4, 1964

These are good noises, especially when our Greek affairs are in some disarray. Need LBJ see?

Note draft Salinger press release enclosed.

*RWK*  
RWK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

s/s 3458

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

1223  
1326  
1. Koster OK  
2. Peter  
March 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Death of King Paul of Greece

King Paul of Greece is expected to die at any moment. It is important, particularly at this time, that the United States show sympathy and concern for Greece at this loss of their King. We have therefore proposed through Deputy Under Secretary Crockett that a Presidential delegation be sent to Greece to attend the funeral.

We have also proposed a draft White House press release and telegrams from the President to the new King, Queen Frederika and Prime Minister Papandreou. Draft press release and telegrams are enclosed for advance approval.

I also enclose a memorandum indicating other actions to be taken upon the King's death.

*Hawthorne Mills*  
Benjamin H. Read for  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- ✓1. Proposed telegram to King Constantine.
- ✓2. Proposed telegram to Queen Frederika.
- ✓3. Proposed telegram to Prime Minister Papandreou.
- ✓4. Proposed White House press release.
5. Memorandum.

Exempted from automatic decontrol  
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MAR 4 1964

132c

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Actions to be Taken Upon the  
Death of King Paul of Greece

A. Department of State

1. On the day notification is received, Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Duke, and Assistant Secretary Talbot will call on Ambassador Matsas to express the condolences of this Government.
2. On the same day telegrams of condolence will be sent by the President to the new King (Constantine), to Queen Frederika and Prime Minister Papandreou, and by the Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister (Stavros Costopoulos).
3. A statement by the President to be released to the press the same day.
4. The President names a personal representative to attend the funeral. Representation should also include Ambassador Labouisse.
5. It is not customary to fly the flag at half-mast except at the American Embassy in the host country. The Office of Protocol will so inform the military.
6. A note in reply to a Greek Embassy note regarding the King's death will be prepared.

B. Greek Embassy

Foreign Embassies in Washington usually hold services at a local church on the death of the Head of State. The Greek Embassy can be expected to do so and to invite the President, the Chief Justice, the Speaker, members of the Foreign Relations Committees of the House and Senate, the Secretary of State and other Cabinet members, and other high officials, such as the Assistant Secretary (NEA), the Chief of Protocol, and the Director of GTI. The Office of Protocol will coordinate attendance of the memorial service.

C. Congress

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5**  
**State Dept. Guidelines**  
**By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03**

MAR 1 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

C. Congress

The Senate and House may wish to pass resolutions expressing condolences. GTI should discuss with members of the Senate and House who are known philhellenes, such as Senator Keating and Congressman Brademas.

D. Cabinet

Cabinet members wishing to express condolences to the GOG should be advised to express such condolences to their opposite members in the GOG. The Office of Protocol will provide guidance to other agencies.

*js*  
NEA/GTI:IFHocto:js  
3-3-64

Clearance:

U/PR - Mr. Duke (Draft) *js*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1223  
132-d

Draft Press Release by the White House

President Johnson has requested me to issue the following Statement:

The death of King Paul of Greece is a matter of deep sorrow to me, a sorrow which I know is shared by the American people.

King Paul's reign covered a period of great trial and sacrifice for Greece. His steadfast devotion and unwavering faith in Greece and the Greek people provided leadership in times of strife, unrest, readjustment, and recovery. The example of personal integrity and unselfish dedication to duty which King Paul represented has served as an inspiration and source of strength to his people. The American people will miss a true friend.

My deepest sympathy goes out to the bereaved Queen, to the Royal Family, and to the people of Greece.

May God bless King Constantine, and may his father's memory give him courage and inspiration in facing the great responsibilities that lie before him.

~~SECRET~~

March 2, 1964

*Bruce  
Papa Cones  
133*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Papandreou's two replies to your private message on Cyprus and your more public congratulations (latter was released to Greek press and Papandreou intends to release his reply).

*mu Bundy*

The slightly argumentative private reply reinforces other evidence that Papandreou thinks strong support of the Greek Cypriots is politically essential to his new administration. So we can't count too much on Papandreou to keep his Cypriots in line. Therefore, instead of going back at him now, we suggest waiting for a better moment.

If the SC resolution goes through (and the Greek Cypriots let it be carried out), we'll hopefully have bought some time and a shot at mediation. The crisis will be far from over, however. It could heat up at any time because the peacekeeping force may prove unable to prevent fighting. There's also no certainty that the mediator's report would be acceptable to all parties.

If the SC initiative fails, we're nearing the flash-point. Both sides are going in for brinkmanship, and talking themselves into military moves.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

Attach. (1) Memo Read to Bundy dtd 2/27/64 encl. ltr frm Greek PM dtd 2/27/64; (2) Memo Read to Bundy dtd 2/29/64 subj. Papandreou's Reply to President's Congratulatory Msg

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, Same Dept. Guidelines  
By Com, NARA, Date 6-26-03

~~SECRET~~

February 28, 1964

*Staff mtg 134  
Men*

Mac:

I gather that Truman gambit is still on. According to Jernegan, Acheson was favorable but said HST was in no condition to travel around the world. Ergo, Ball, thinking that Acheson could perhaps go out for Truman and invite Inonu and Papandreou to come here with HST as middleman (peacekeeper cum mediator). This sounds queer to me; if anyone is going to invite Inonu and Papandreou here, presumably it would be LBJ. Perhaps you should call Ball or Acheson and get a clearer picture before this goes much further.

FYI, apparently some thought in State that coolness of Papandreou reply was because of changes we made in State's draft to him. I naturally pooh-poohed and invited comparison of drafts. Real answer is that Papandreou is operating on basis of his own domestic political problem, and miscalculation was that he would be more statesmanlike than he's turned out to be.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By C6m, NARA, Date 6-26-03

*RWK*  
RWK

~~SECRET~~

*Greece*  
134a

~~SECRET~~

February 28, 1964

Mac -

Here is Papandreou's reply to LBJ message. In short, we didn't make a dent. The reply is sufficiently cool and contentious, in fact, as to make me feel again that we're going to have to indulge in some much blunter private talk if we're going to move this man.

I wouldn't say this if moving him weren't essential, but unless we get the GOG to go along with us, however, reluctantly, no solution is going to work.

Predictably, moreover, it's the Turks who want a summit, not the Greeks. I've felt consistently that instead of trying to get Papandreou to go to Inonu, the reverse was a far better ploy. It is Inonu who looks good if he thus appeals to the Greeks before moving, and if he goes and says "we have to move, let's move together," he has real leverage.

Mac, this Cyprus affair can blow up into a crisis far hairier than Vietnam, with the Soviets dragged in by a spiralling chain of events despite their better judgment. We are clearly on a slippery slope, and if you felt me too alarmist yesterday read Ankara 1090 and 1091 (which say the same thing today). We're nearing the flashpoint which will trigger the Turks.

I can't play the role of undersecretary (I still find this ridiculous), but it's time at least to clue LBJ that we're close to the brink, to have him brace Home directly, and to batten down for the storm. And if I'm wrong, so much the better.

*I don't want to sound shrill but am deeply worried.*

*RWK*  
RWK  
568  
161  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Cat. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/20/65, and Dept. Exec. Order  
By rbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

~~SECRET~~

*Zimmer*  
*Mc Smith*  
January 27, 1964  
*S*  
*135*

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Queen Frederika is all primed to bend your ear on Cyprus. She harangued Gen. McHugh and others for over two hours on train coming down last night.

She says she's in constant touch with the King, who says the Greek military will intervene if the Turks do. The King can't stop them. So he (or she, because she runs him) wants us to put a naval patrol between Turkey and Cyprus to warn off the Turks. Of course, she'd allow a similar patrol between Greece and Cyprus.

The Queen says she won't abuse your hospitality by raising Cyprus unless you ask her (though she may be unable to contain herself). At any rate, such a partisan US move would utterly queer us with Turkey. The best riposte would be to urge that Greece press Makarios to be reasonable so threat of outside intervention will disappear.

Ambassador Labouisse reports that the Palace (where the Queen wears the pants in the family) had a lot to do with the fall of Karamanlis, the best Greek PM in a long time. At least she had a lot more to do with it than I did. You might impress on her the importance we attach to a stable government after the 16 February election.

You may also get a pitch for more US aid. I hate to be the guy always saying this, but Greece has done so well by us, it's on Dave Bell's list for FY '65 cut-off. We haven't said anything to Greeks yet, but they'll buck and kick. However, facts are that we'll still be giving them almost \$80 million in grant MAP, and that Greek GNP is still rising at 5-6% annually as it has since 1957. So here's one place where our investment of a cool \$3.4 billion (1.6 military and 1.8 economic) has really paid off.

Let me stick my neck out and say that the Queen interferes too much in Greek politics (which most Greek-Americans don't like). So the more you make the luncheon purely social, the more she'll get the point.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-300  
By NS, NARA, Date 4-23-04

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 26 1964

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*Draw*

*Jim Tschudi*  
*1/25*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Luncheon for Queen  
Frederika, January 27.

In accordance with Mr. Bromley Smith's request,  
there are attached 1) suggested statement and toast  
by the President, and 2) suggested talking points  
for Mrs. Johnson.

*R. Moore*  
for  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Suggested Toast.
2. Suggested Talking Points.

DRAFT TOAST FOR QUEEN OF GREECE

"When Mrs. Johnson and I visited Greece last year, we were most impressed, as are all Americans visiting Greece for the first time, by the driving sense of purpose, the optimism, and the courage with which the Greek people are so rapidly modernizing their economy and their society without losing the ancient heritage common to all of us but particularly the pride of Greece. And then we recalled that only a few short years ago Greece had been the victim of a classic case of communist aggression through subversion and insurgency. Already weakened by courageous struggles against Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany and a long and oppressive military occupation, this little country took the brunt of a foreign-inspired, foreign-supplied civil war of the most deadly kind. It struggled against the bleakest poverty and financial disorganization. Even its children were stolen away by the thousands and taken away by those who sought to destroy Greek democracy.

"But Greece was victorious, as always. And today a free, proud people govern themselves through free elections, play their full part in the collective defense of the Free World, and increase their per capita national income at a rate among the highest in the world. We helped Greece to win--and we should all be eternally grateful for the wisdom of President Truman and the many others who made our contribution possible. But we only helped. Greece did the job. The reason why was made clear to us when we met Queen Frederica and King Paul on the island...

the island of Corfu. We had heard of the inspiration which they had provided to the Greek people during the dark days. We had heard how the Queen exposed herself to the gravest dangers to keep up the spirits of her people. But when we met her, it all fell into place, and we could feel the reason why Greece was victorious because we could symbolize in our charming hostess all the qualities which have enabled Greece to defy tyranny through the ages.

"Ladies and Gentlemen--I give you Her Highness, the Queen of the Hellenes."

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MRS. JOHNSON FOR  
LUNCHEON FOR QUEEN FREDERIKA

JANUARY 27, 1964

1. Compliment the Queen on one of the new activities of the Queen's Fund--providing dowry (priksa--pree-kah) for deserving, underprivileged village girls.

2. Get her thoughts on some activities needed in Northern Greece to stem tide of Greek workers emigrating to Germany, Belgium and Italy. (Their remittances are important in balance of payments but unusually large numbers are leaving now and causing morale problem-- "flower of our youth is leaving" theme.)

3. Ask about progress of Queen's Fund program in building community centers in northern border areas. (Centers are combination creche-adult education-vocational training, staffed with professional social workers. Area is problem, depressed area.)

4. Inquire about Queen's Fund projects in urban areas. During November visit Queen was curious about our low cost housing programs for workers. She may be thinking of some financing or promotion through Queen's Fund of such projects. It would be a good thing for image of monarchy and for Greece.

Valenti

549

137

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*J*

January 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM

*For the President*

FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith *S*  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *BR*  
Executive Secretary

The Acting Secretary requested that the President be cautioned that the situation in Cyprus may change so fast that the first item in the briefing memo will be outdated by Monday. If so, we will send over an addendum.

Attachment:

Memo for the President - White House Luncheon for Queen Frederika - Briefing Memorandum.

*[Handwritten signature]*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 25, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: White House Luncheon for Queen Frederika -  
Briefing Memorandum

Although Queen Frederika is here on an unofficial visit, perhaps you might wish to use the opportunity afforded by your luncheon on January 27 to underline to the Queen several points of interest of the United States. A biographic report on the Queen is enclosed.

Several suggested topics of conversation follow:

1. Cyprus

Convey to the Queen our appreciation for the restraint and cooperation from the Greek Government thus far. The situation on Cyprus is tense. Express hope that the Queen will exert all her considerable influence to make the London talks a success. Impress on her that we look to her to persuade Makarios and his followers to reject violence as a weapon of policy and to adopt a conciliatory attitude - not only in their actions, but in their public statements. Encourage the Queen to use her prestige to mediate between Greeks and Turks. Impress upon her the dire consequences of a conflagration involving Greece and Turkey which would endanger NATO and the Greek population in Istanbul. Tell her the only ones to benefit would be the Communists.

2. Greek Political Elections of February 16

Ask the Queen about the outlook. Impress upon her our hope that elections will result in decisive majority for one of the nationalist parties and in a further decrease in the leftist vote. It is important that political stability be re-established to enable a government to carry out its program for the continued development of Greece.

3. Economic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 3

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


-2-

3. Economic

Comment on the favorable rate of economic progress Greece continues to experience. Express our hope that after the election and hopefully a settlement of the Cyprus problem, the economy will shrug off any signs of inflation. (The recent price increase of the gold sovereign by \$.33 even with heavy bank sales of sovereigns is disquieting.) Impress upon the Queen that continued economic progress, resulting from wise policies and hard work (and United States aid), is vital to Greece and the United States.

4. Family

Ask about the King's health (we understand he has been in bed with rheumatism). Congratulate the Queen on the recent birth of her granddaughter and the forthcoming marriage (January, 1965) of the Crown Prince to Princess Anna Maria of Denmark.

  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Report -  
Queen Frederika.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QUEEN FREDERIKA

Frederika, Queen of the Hellenes, wife of King Paul I of Greece, is a member of the former German royal family. Frederika has taken her position seriously and is widely respected, if not always popular, among all classes in the country. She has great charm, wit, and intelligence, and, although sometimes blunt or indiscreet, she appears to be conscious at all times of the responsibilities and prerogatives of her royal rank. Often simple and direct in manner, she is impatient with inefficiency in whatever form. She is an effective public speaker.

Frederika and King Paul were married at Athens in 1938. Their three children are Princess Sophia, 26, Crown Prince Constantine, 24, and Princess Irene, 22. Princess Sophia was married to Prince Juan Carlos of Spain in May, 1962 and the Princess recently gave birth to a daughter. Prince Constantine is engaged to Princess Anna Maria of Denmark and they will be married in January, 1965.

As Queen, Frederika is the active head of many Greek charitable societies, and she has devoted herself earnestly to the welfare projects that were developed in the wake of World War II and during the Communist-led guerrilla hostilities from 1947 to 1949. Frederika's front-line tours during the guerrilla war and her efforts to speed and assist rehabilitation did much to improve her image in the post-war period when the Greeks were still embittered toward the Germans.

Queen Frederika is generally considered a livelier, more decisive and controversial character than her husband, King Paul. The royal family is not wealthy, and this is frustrating to the Queen. Occasionally this leads to queenly indiscretions such as a demand for a large dowry for Sophia and an expensive royal airplane. These whims are not popular in Greece.

Queen Frederika has visited the United States three times - once in October 1953 when she accompanied King Paul, again in October 1958, and in November 1963. She knows a wide number of influential Americans and supports U.S.-Greek relations wholeheartedly. She believes that Greece's ties with the United States and the monarchy are Greece's best protection against Communism.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By Cbm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

December 16, 1963

138

McGB -

All Greeks are passionate about politics. These two friends of Mike Manatos are no exception.

As a Karamanlis man myself, I find the characterization of his regime as extreme Right rather inaccurate; he did get more than half the votes for many years. Moreover, it was the Palace, a lot farther Right than Karamanlis, which engineered his downfall.

As for Labouisse and co., while they have never struck me as terribly effective, they aren't quite as depressingly biased as Mr. Vournas suggests. They kept excellent ties with Papandreou and Venizelos.

Enfin, I certainly would not waste LBJ's time with this correspondence. If he's going to focus on Greece, we can produce a far shorter and better informed brief.

OK  
mjd

RWIK  
RWK

15/63

138a

To: RWK

What say ?

McG. B.

DEC 6 1963

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1963

✓ 1388

~~DK~~  
RWK: what say?

MEMORANDUM FOR

McGeorge Bundy

The attached material is self-explanatory.

I know George Vournas very well and reiterate  
my statement to Ken O'Donnell attached.

*M.M.*  
Mike Manatos

Attachments

6 1030

*Greece*

138c

December 12, 1963

Dear Mr. Phillies:

The tragic events of the past few weeks have prevented my acknowledging your letter of November 20th in which you gave me the benefit of your views with respect to the new Government of Greece.

I recall very well the efforts you spearheaded in 1945 on The Justice for Greece Committee.

In accordance with your suggestion, I am passing on your letter to those individuals on the President's staff who have this area of concern.

I hope to be able to apprise the President of your views.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Mike Manatos  
Administrative Assistant  
to the President

Mr. George E. Phillies  
Chairman  
The Public Relations Committee  
The Justice for Greece Committee  
1064 Ellicott Square  
Buffalo 3, New York

MM/ac

DEC 16 1963

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

138-d

Mr. Manatos:

This was with material on Mr. O'D's desk and far as I know, he didn't get a chance to show it to the President.

Perhaps it should be passed along to someone else.

H. Colle

DEC 16 1952

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
MEMORANDUM

138-2

November 9, 1963

TO: Ken O'Donnell  
FROM: Mike Manatos *M.M.*

It occurs to me that the attached letter from Mr. George Vournas, who is not only a close friend of mine, but a successful lawyer; a former President of Ahepa and a real student of Greek Government and History, might be of interest to the President.

Vournas is really a very astute observer.

MM/ac

Attachment

DEC 16 1963

CABLE ADDRESS  
"GEVOUR"

PHONES  
NATIONAL { 8-5581  
8-5582

LAW OFFICES OF  
GEORGE C. VOURNAS  
INVESTMENT BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 5, D. C.

138-f

November 7th, 1963

Mr. Mike N. Manatos  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: Politics, Government and Elections  
in Greece.

Dear Mike:

I returned late last night, having spent about fifteen days in Greece. The political developments flowing from the elections of November 3rd did not come as a surprise to me. In fact, I wired Pearson on Tuesday, October 29th, predicting that the Center -- Papandreou-Venizelos -- would receive 42% of the vote. (Actually, they received 42.6%, and perhaps it will be increased to reach 43%.)

It is sad to report, however, that our diplomatic and other representatives in Greece have become, during the past few years, almost an official arm of the Greek Rightists and Birchites, whose number, under the most generous estimates, does not exceed 25% of the Greek population. True, they are the element with the best houses, yachts, country estates, automobiles, etc. They and the dynasty are Greece's cream of the crop, and roughly speaking, like the Syngman Rhee of Korea, the Diems of Viet Nam, the Chiang Kai Sheks of Formosa, etc., consider themselves God-annointed to rule. Caramanlis -- otherwise a good man -- has been more or less their prisoner. They are against any dialogue between Right and Left. Their interests are best served by perpetuation of Right and Left polarization, since their undisputed Rightist position brings benefits in the form of American aid, both open and concealed. Whatever they lacked in popular support, they tried to make up through oppression, rigged elections and terror at the countryside. The Center, which won the election, will, without the slightest doubt, increase its percentage if another election is held, because a beginning has been made in having honest elections and in removing the open and covered police oppression of the people -- particularly at the countryside where police power reigns supreme.

Speaking of police powers, you would be interested to know that the Security Police of Greece is not only numerous, it is the one and only institution in Greece which has had uninterrupted prosperity since the days of its establishment by the Metaxas dictatorship in the middle 30s. This organization, patterned after the Gestapo, served the Metaxas dictatorship, then the Germans and Italians during the occupation, and post-war Rightist governments to this day. It is the Security Police which issues certificates of good conduct (certificates pertaining to social views), an indispensable requirement for securing employment either with the Government or any private institution. This practice,

DEC 16 1963

November 7th, 1963


in turn, has opened wide avenues for abuses. Young boys and girls born after the German occupation, graduating from high school and seeking employment, must produce such a certificate! The fact that they were infants during the revolutionary upheaval of the middle 40s is of no avail. The Security Police determine the issue on the basis of the views of the grandfather, the father, brothers and cousins at the time. Of course, a favorable certificate can be invariably procured for a consideration!

It is no secret that U. S. representatives -- diplomatic, A.I.D., Army and the flatfooted detectives otherwise known as the C.I.A. operatives, who invariably leak their assignments in order to acquire status -- do not maintain even social contacts with the leadership of the Center that won the election, much less with the leadership of the "left" known as EDA. In this connection I have heard many disheartening reports regarding the doings of our own Ambassador, Mr. Labouisse, and particularly of Mr. Herbert C. Brewster. They have treated the leadership of the Center as potential enemies of the United States -- an obvious lunacy! Venizelos, who in my opinion will be the Vice President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Government, is -- by tradition, training and heritage as the son of the great Eleftherios Venizelos -- a Democrat with capital letters. The same may be said of Mr. Papandreou, who is and has been a progressive Democrat for more than 45 years of political life. Greek education owes a lot to Mr. Papandreou, and it was his government which defended Greek democracy upon the withdrawal of the German forces of occupation.

While on the subject, a word may be said also about the EDA -- the Hellenic democratic front -- which is being accused of being under the thumb of Moscow. While it may be true that some members of the leadership follow the Communist line -- since Communism, as such, has been outlawed and it is a criminal offense to even mention the word in Greece -- there are others who are no more Communist than our Senator Morse or the late Fiorello LaGuardia or Harold Ickes. We must never lose sight of the fact that it serves Greek Birchites to paint in bold bright red strokes anyone not agreeing with them, because polarization has been their bread and butter.

The time has come that not only the musicians (our representatives there), but also the tune must be changed in Greece and changed quickly. Unless this is done, we are running the risk of alienating ourselves from the broad masses of the Greek people. Let's stop equating Caramanlis and the discredited extreme Right with Greece. The great masses of the Greek people are Democrats by inclination, history and tradition. Dictatorships do not long endure in the Greek climate. Our long-term national interest demands that we embrace the broad masses of the Greek people with affection and understanding, and aid them to solve their domestic problems in harmony with their tradition. Any other policy is bound to fail and fail miserably.

As ever, yours,

  
George C. Veurnas

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Congressman, Mass., House Majority Leader  
HON. CHESTER E. MERROW,  
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Bishop, Western New York  
MRS. LESLIE SWAIN,  
Former President, Northern Baptist Convention  
DR. SAMUEL VAN VALKENBURG,  
Geographer

(Continued on Reverse Side)



The Justice  
for Greece Committee

OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN OF  
PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
GEORGE E. PHILLIES  
1064 ELLICOTT SQUARE  
BUFFALO 3, N. Y.

1389

November 20, 1963

Mr. Mike N. Manatos  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: Current Government in Greece.

Dear Mr. Manatos:

I am using the stationery of "THE JUSTICE FOR GREECE COMMITTEE" permissibly, I believe, to remind you of 1945 when you, as Administrative Assistant to Senator O'Mahoney, and I, as Past Supreme President of the Ahepa, were inviting U.S. Senators to membership in this great Committee. Its objective was to save battling Greece from being dragged behind the Iron Curtain. This was achieved with the initial help of the Senate.

The argument was then, as now and ever will be, that the security of the U.S.A. requires a strong and democratic Greece as a bulwark in the Eastern Mediterranean, the most sensitive and geographically strategic sector in the world--a bridgehead for air, water and land activities between three continents. The voices of the 36 U.S. Senators and others, whose names are inscribed on this stationery, and particularly of Senators Vandenberg and Connolly, echoed through the State Department and thence to the White House where the genius and vision of President Truman created his historic Doctrine.

Resultantly, Greece is now free, strong and our loyal Ally.

To continue that controlling status, Greece is presently in need: First, of a strong and popular government, and Second, of a clear understanding of her political situation by the White House, the State Department, the Congress and the populace. This American understanding and consequent policy must be predicated on cogent appraisal and unerring judgment of Greek politics, politicians and people. We must not fail Greece now as we almost failed her previous to the Truman Doctrine due to the erroneous views and policy of the State Department and of our misguided press of that time. I know that to be a fact. Representing "THE JUSTICE FOR GREECE COMMITTEE", I had repeated debates at the State Department on that subject.

DEC 1 6 1963

**UNITED STATES SENATORS**

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 HON. DENNIS CHAVEZ, N. M.  
 HON. JOSEPH F. GUFFEY, Pa.  
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 Pres. American Chamber of Commerce  
 REV. CLAYTON E. WILLIAMS,  
 American Church of Paris

Greek-born and American-cultivated, I am now, as in 1945, interested in the foregoing matters. Obviously, Greece is again at the cross-roads of transition and in a state of suspense. The masses have again spoken at the polls quite definitely regarding the situation.

Whether the government of Papandreou, which they preferred, will survive Greek "politics" and become viable will be determined, in a great measure, by the position that the U.S. takes. In my humble judgment, failure to support heartily and tangibly Papandreou and Venizelos would be an error comparable to the pre-Truman errors of our Government. It would be bound to create an interminably chaotic situation.

My voice is not heard far and my influence as an individual is limited but, I believe, my judgment is sound and of potent value. It is based not on hearsay or on casual information or on probes through diplomatic channels. (Often I found the conclusions of these channels about Greece woefully erroneous. The probes lack Greek mentality and even full opportunity to feel the pulse of the common people.) My judgment is based on my own Greek-American mentality and legal training and on actual knowledge of Greek politics, politicians and common people, their pride, ambitions, caprices and preoccupations; it is distilled through my own experiences and study of their thinking and history.

To be specific: Aside from my one-half century of intense activities in America on behalf of Hellenism, during the period of 1939 to 1959 (excepting 1940-1945), I lived for months at a time in Greece where, owing to my investment in the Ptolemais lignite industry, I dealt personally with Gen. Metaxas and former Prime Ministers Tsaldaris, Gen. Papagos, Papandreou, Venizelos and Karamanlis and their Cabinets. I studied their idiosyncracies, characteristics and propensities and I assessed their individual abilities. Among them, Papandreou is outstanding in probity and ability and the staunchest friend of the U.S.A.

I have nothing but praise for intelligent, stubborn, dominant, resolute and efficient Karamanlis. He has played his role well and he is still young. No politician, however, or even statesman, is flawless or immune to wear and tear. Furthermore, prolonged power-wielding and monophony in politics engenders partiality, stagnation and even satrapism.

The masses appreciate that Karamanlis contributed tremendously to the progress, particularly of public works and tourism. But they know that the privileged upper class benefited directly from his fiscal policies. The income tax of the rich is practically nil. They also know that the farmers, the civil servants and working people have been sidetracked by his economic and social program.

Mr. Mike N. Manatos

-3-

November 20, 1963

The democratic people of Greece are entitled to a change--new political blood, new ideas, new efforts, new horizons. Papandreou and his program will be overwhelmingly supported by them if he is fortunate enough to receive duly and unqualifiedly the blessing of Washington and true encouragement at this critical time. He is detached from the upper privileged crust and ready to show his worth to his people and to the West.

Comparing Papandreou with those that I have mentioned above, I find him more understanding of the people's needs, more capable to produce economic, social and educational progress than the opposition Party. He is brilliant, unsurpassable as an orator, resourceful, farsighted, fearless, experienced and a true democrat and eager to work.

My dear friend, you are now in a key position, as you were in 1945; your motives then, and mine, were and, I am sure, still are identical per se concerning our country and our ancestral land. Pre-1945, the official judgment in Washington was erratic; mine was correct. Please give consideration to my judgment on current Greek politics and, in the name of everything which we have in common, please make my considered views known to the President and wherever their intent and purpose may best be understood and served. Papandreou and venizelos should have unlimited support at this time.

Thanking you for your courtesies and with my kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,



GEORGE E. PHILLIES

gep/erf



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Greene*

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December 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

*12/12*

Subject: Recommendation that the President and  
Mrs. Johnson host a luncheon in honor  
of Queen Frederika of Greece.

Her Majesty Queen Frederika of the Hellenes plans to arrive in Washington, D. C. with her daughter, Princess Irene, on January 26, 1964. The Queen is making a private visit to the United States where she will be the guest of Barnard College. An honorary degree will be awarded the Queen by Barnard on January 22.

According to the Greek Ambassador, Queen Frederika wishes to spend about five days in Washington, D. C., residing at the Embassy. The Ambassador understands fully that this is a private and unofficial visit.

It is recommended that the President and Mrs. Johnson give a luncheon for Her Majesty during her stay, preferably either on January 27 or 28. It will be recalled that Queen Frederika attended the funeral of the late President, and that the President and Mrs. Johnson were entertained by Their Majesties on Corfu when they visited Greece in 1962.

/s/ John A. McKesson  
for

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

*File*

*140*

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December 11, 1963

McGB -

I've been sitting on attached because of its low priority.

My instinct had been to reject Duke's suggestion that JFK invite Queen Frederika down. No real reason why President has to see minor league royalty, especially on distaff side, every time they come. Moreover, Greek Royal Family has been meddling in Greek politics again (see Athens 840 on Caramanlis' disgust with King).

Now that LBJ saw Queen at funeral, why should he put himself out in election year? As for Duke's point about massaging Greek-American leaders, for every Greek-American who's a royalist, I suspect there's at least one republican. So if you approve, I'll tell Duke we'll finesse this one. At maximum, Mrs. Johnson might have Queen down for lunch.

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*I was*  
*understand and*  
*P. has agreed*  
*to lunch via*  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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December 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Recommendation that the President and  
Mrs. Johnson host a luncheon in honor  
of Queen Frederika of Greece.

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Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

DEC 19 1963



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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November 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID KLEIN  
The White House

*Robert Komer*

Subject: Visit of the Queen of Greece in  
January

Ambassador Matsas of Greece has advised me that Her Majesty Frederika, Queen of the Hellenes, is expected to arrive with her daughter Princess Irene and the Mistress of the Court in New York on January 21.

She is to be the guest of Barnard College the afternoon of January 22 and that evening there will be a banquet at the Waldorf which probably will be attended by the Secretary of State. On Friday, January 24, the Hellenic Foundation will also give a dinner, after which the Queen would be free to come to Washington. The Ambassador asked me to advise the White House of this and inquired as to what plans the President and Mrs. Kennedy might have in connection with this unofficial, informal visit.

Subsequently, I had an opportunity to talk the matter over with Mrs. Kennedy who appeared to be open minded on the subject of a possible luncheon on Sunday, January 26, at Atoka in Virginia. Alternatively, I would propose that the President and Mrs. Kennedy give a luncheon on Monday, January 27, as I feel there are many Greek-American leaders around the United States who would not otherwise have an opportunity to come to

the White

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the White House. The guest list would be handled in a manner similar to the Irish, German and Italian visits, although presumably much smaller. A Read to Bundy memorandum will be coming over on this subject at an appropriate time.



Angier Biddle Duke  
Chief of Protocol

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(Drafting Office and Officer)  
12/10/65

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Part 1 of 2

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Approved in S  
12/21/65

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**Memorandum of Conversation**

1965 DEC 27 AM 11 31 DATE: December 8, 1965  
12:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT:** Greek Request for Economic Assistance  
Part I of II

**PARTICIPANTS:** The Secretary.  
Elias Tsirimokos, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Greece.  
Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece.  
Marcos Economides, Executive Secretary, Greek Foreign Ministry.  
Constantine Panayotacos, Counselor, Embassy of Greece.  
William B. Buffum, Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO.  
Katherine W. Bracken, Director, GTI  
Richard W. Barham, OIC, Greek Affairs.  
A. Tumayan, Interpreter. **ORIGINAL/ [ ] TO RM/R FOR RECORDING & DISTRIBUTION**

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The Secretary, after an exchange of greetings, asked Deputy Prime Minister Tsirimokos about his plans for the immediate future and if he would attend the NATO meeting. Tsirimokos replied that he hoped to be in time for the NATO meeting; however, he could not leave without his Turkish colleague. They would go together to NATO as friends leaving here the question that divides them.

The Deputy Prime Minister then brought up the Greek economic situation which he said was of major concern to the GOG. Before Parliament recesses for Christmas, the GOG plans to introduce stringent economic measures. It is most important, Tsirimokos declared, that the GOG be able to announce some form of U. S. aid in conjunction with the new measures. The Secretary replied that he was working on it personally, and, as had been explained to Ambassador Matsas, the problem was not one of will but rather it was how to find the resources needed. He told Tsirimokos that the P. L. 480 issue was very close to a solution and assured him that we were aware of the importance of the time factor.

Tsirimokos expressed great pleasure that the Secretary was dealing with the matter personally. He recalled his meeting of the day before at the Departments of Agriculture and Treasury where he had heard excellent presentations of the technical aspects affecting U. S. trade and finance. He commented that political considerations sometimes go beyond the economic considerations, which he hoped would be the case in this instance.

Tsirimokos

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By ctm, NARA, Date 6-26-03

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Tsirimokos said he was embarrassed at having to request us to do something extremely difficult falling as it did outside the scope and philosophy of our aid program, but he was impelled to do so by the clear emergency that had arisen. The Secretary explained that the political considerations involved were not so much external ones but considerations arising out of our commitments to our own Congress, whose members at the moment were scattered all over the world. He said he understood the political importance of this problem for Greece.

Tsirimokos queried whether the GOG could have something concrete from the U. S. at this time coupled with public assurances of the continuing interest of the U. S. in Greece's problems. The Secretary asserted our desire to be concrete on at least one or two things. He added that, though repetition in politics is dull, he would have thought that many people in Greece, after twenty years of cooperation with the U. S., would have no doubt about our commitment to their country, and in this case we would do our very best. Ambassador Matsas declared that if the Greek people could have heard what the Secretary had told him on their previous meeting they would have felt greatly reassured. Tsirimokos reiterated GOG plans for introducing "unpleasant" measures soon, noting that it would be very helpful if something could be announced by the U. S. this week.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

*3*  
*143*

Approved in S  
12/9/65

DATE: November 29, 1965  
Time: 5:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Greek Request for Economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary.  
Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece.  
Costa P. Caranicas, Economic Minister, Embassy of Greece.  
Alexander A. Coundouriotis, First Secretary, Embassy of Greece.  
Katherine W. Bracken, Director, NEA/GTI.  
Richard W. Barham, OIG, Greek Affairs.

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Ambassador Matsas called on the Secretary on November 29 on instructions, regarding the status of the Greek request for economic assistance. Matsas described the economic situation in Greece as extremely serious, noting in this connection the shrinking reserves, the large balance of payments gap, and other "disheartening statistics". He expressed fear that the "impending economic crisis" could lead to chaos which, as events of the past summer have shown, could bring forth subversive forces. He noted that US help in the past had provided the basis for economic recovery in Greece and urged another boost for Greece, a sort of rescue operation. The Ambassador stressed that the GOG intends to take severe corrective measures but needs US help to make this possible. He added that the GOG would not like to be forced into drastic economic measures such as a cut in military expenditures.

Secretary Rusk asserted the strong interest of the US in the security, political health, and economic prosperity of Greece, which, he added, is vital to us and to the free world in general. The Secretary said that the essence of our problem is as follows: There are no more free dollars. We have certain "bank accounts", some of which are heavily overdrawn. We would hope, together with the Greeks, to look at these various bank accounts to see what might be done, for example, through P.L. 480 and the Ex-Im Bank. We understand, however, that the GOG does not want to call on the EMA, whose

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By *cfm*, NARA, Date *6-26-03*

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original capital was U.S. funds. Ambassador Matsas replied that an EMA drawing would have an adverse psychological effect and that a show of U.S. interest would be necessary to boost Greek morale. Matsas harked back to previous assurances by the U.S. [1963 Aide Mémoire] that the phase-out of aid to Greece would be reconsidered if necessary. He also quoted Mr. Bell as having made a statement in November to the effect that external help can provide the crucial margin for developing countries. The Ambassador added that now is the time as far as Greece is concerned and that assistance for Greece should be viewed here as an emergency rescue operation. The Ambassador asked what he might report to the GOG on the status of the aid request.

The Secretary assured him that we are ready to sit down with the Greeks to see how we, within our means, might be helpful. We would hope that the GOG would be flexible with regard to means so that we could be of maximum help. It is a matter, he said, of trying to put together our resources to help Greece meet its problem. He cautioned, however, that on the psychological side, we might need help from the GOG on how to move. If, for example, there is a feeling in Greece that whatever happens the US is always there then some re-education may be required. Ambassador Matsas gave hasty assurances that no pressure was intended but that the GOG merely wanted to make its problems known to the USG. In response to the Secretary's inquiry, Matsas stated that the lack of drachmas is one of the principal problems in Greece. Mr. Caranicas suggested that the drachma problem might best be solved by reinstating a P. L. 480, Title I program in Greece. The Secretary pointed out that the existence of surpluses in Greece of products similar to those we have in surplus would make it difficult for us to justify such a program to Congress.

Ambassador Matsas then raised the question of a program loan. The Secretary explained that this would be very difficult. He added, however, that "there are many ways to skin a cat", and we are looking for ways of meeting the Greek problem in light of our own problems. In this respect, he expressed hope that people in Athens will not get their minds fixed on particular kinds of help to the extent that a psychological problem is created with regard to means. He assured the Ambassador that the USG is sensitive to the fact that the GOG is on thin margins politically. Ambassador Matsas asked whether the Secretary's words could be made public to the extent of indicating that the US has a continuing interest in Greece, and so forth, without, of course, creating false impressions. The Secretary replied that we are willing to consider some kind of statement. Again there might be a problem if people in Athens have locked themselves into a particular way of thinking as to methods. The Ambassador said he would discuss the question of a statement with the Foreign Minister.

Secretary

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-3-

Secretary Rusk brought up the question of Greek use of EMA funds. One of our problems, he noted, is that we have funds in this institution, funds that are marking time and should get to work. He said he understood Greek reluctance to go to IMF where the gold tranche constitutes part of the GOG reserves; but what about EMA? Both Ambassador Matsas and Mr. Caranicas maintained that the short-term credits available from the EMA would not help Greece, which must have long-term credits to restore confidence. In this regard, the Secretary noted that over \$100 billion of our credit burden is short term.

The Secretary referred to the reputation of the Greeks for good business sense and said he sees this perhaps hindering the short term solution. There are two problems: The immediate situation and the need for long term development credits. We should not confuse the two solutions. He suggested that the Greeks might temporarily go counter to their good business sense and do what is necessary in this emergency situation.

In conclusion, Ambassador Matsas asked what he might report to his government on the aid request, suggesting that he might say that the US is studying ways to meet the situation but can provide no program loan. The Secretary reiterated that a program loan would be extremely difficult, but that we are looking at a variety of resources that might be brought to bear to meet the situation. This matter, he said, will be looked after principally in Athens through Ambassador Talbot, who understands thoroughly the problems from the Washington side and can be trusted to take care of Greek interests. Ambassador Matsas returned to the question of a "statement of encouragement" and Mr. Caranicas again referred to the 1963 Aide Memoire as having the necessary statements regarding US reconsideration of Greek needs. The Ambassador added that the moment of need is here. The Secretary said we would approach it with that in view and, together with the Greeks, with whom we have shared many foxholes in the past, would seek to find a way out of this one."

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Approved in S  
5/11/65

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 5, 1965  
4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Cyprus: Greek-Turk Talks at London

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Mr. Richard W. Barham, Officer in Charge, Greek Affairs, NEA.  
  
His Excellency Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece.  
Mr. George D. Vranopoulos, First Secretary, Embassy of Greece.

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Ambassador Matsas expressed the appreciation of Foreign Minister Costopoulos for the Secretary's continuing interest in a settlement of Greek-Turkish differences. He asked if the Secretary had any thoughts on the subject that could be passed on to the Foreign Minister, especially in view of the planned London talks.

The Secretary replied that his views are well known. We would like to see relations between Greece and Turkey improved; the dispute has burdened our own relations with the two countries. For the London talks to succeed, both sides will have to display good will and patience. The two foreign ministers will need to approach the meeting in a good frame of mind, and they should not be disappointed over any initial difficulties that are likely to crop up. One thing on which they should refresh their minds is that Greece and Turkey have many common interests; they are neighbors and allies, both are interested in peace, neither wants to see unfriendly outsiders gain influence in the area, and there are many other elements in common. They should have in mind that perhaps more than one meeting will be called for at London to establish the proper contact for wrestling with the problems. (The Secretary observed that he and Gromyko talked about the Berlin problem for one and a half years.)

Secretary Rusk said that before going to London he would consult our Ambassadors in the countries concerned with the Cyprus issue so that he would have a better basis for talking with Costopoulos and Isik.

Ambassador Matsas commented that Foreign Minister Costopoulos hopes the Turks will not do anything to disturb the situation so that a peaceful climate

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can be maintained before and after the London meeting. Matsas voiced the personal hope that the GOT would not look upon the Greek initiative as resulting from Turkish pressures.

In response to a question from the Secretary about Makarios' knowledge of the proposed London meeting, Matsas said the Archbishop probably does not know about it.

Secretary Rusk assured the Ambassador that the USG will do everything possible to see that the atmosphere for the meeting is favorable. In his view what is said at the NATO table could have an important bearing on the talks; it is probably better, therefore, for the two foreign ministers not to debate their differences in the Council. Matsas replied that Costopoulos is very much aware of this and has asked Isik to agree not to engage in provocative debates.

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White House:RKomer/hmh

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Memorandum of Conversation

*June*

APPROVED BY WH  
6/25/64

DATE: June 11, 1964

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Greek Ambassador Matsas

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
His Excellency Alexander Matsas, Ambassador of Greece  
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and  
South Asian Affairs  
Robert W. Komer, The White House

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After the President greeted Ambassador Matsas cordially, the Ambassador said he understood that the President had already taken action on the letter now being formally delivered. However, Matsas had had no report as yet on the Ball conversation in Athens. The President then carefully read Prime Minister Papandreou's letter.

The President made clear our position on the Cyprus crisis. Outside powers could not solve it. The Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves. He believed the Prime Minister of Greece should get together with Prime Minister Inonu, or have some representative talk with the Turks. We had told Turkey that there could not be war but we didn't know how long this would stick. Moreover, we were "disappointed" that the Greek Government had not taken the initiative to meet and talk with the Turks. It was much more dangerous not to get together than to get together. As we saw it, there were two requirements for a solution: (a) whatever was done must be permanent; (b) the solution could not be humiliating to either side. It was

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Authority: FRUS, Vol. XVII, #62  
By: ctm, NARA, Date: 6-24-03

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much more dangerous not to have a solution. War could help nobody. Therefore, the President continued, he had told Ball to urge Papandreu to take the initiative in getting together somehow with the Turks. The US people were becoming quite worried over the Cyprus problem; they couldn't understand why "two of our close allies were growling at each other." As for Makarios, he didn't seem to care. He thought he had the Greeks supporting him. Meanwhile, the Soviets were meddling and fully expected to win in the end. So we thought the Greeks must show some statesmanship and get moving toward agreement.

The President returned to the theme of American public attitudes. Some Americans were already wondering if they should go to Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean now. There was no reason why Turkey and Greece couldn't agree to talk about their problem. It would be dangerous if they did not. To repeat, this solution should be permanent and not humiliating to either side. We had gone to the aid of Greece and Turkey in the Truman Doctrine. We had helped through the years, and wanted to help now. But Greece and Turkey must grasp the problem. We had stopped the Turks from moving, but we couldn't drop the matter there. We wanted to see them at the conference table. Greece should take the initiative.

what

The Ambassador asked/response his government had given to Ball. The President replied that they seemed to be considering our demarche. But he urged a Greek initiative. Action was what was needed.

Matsas explained that the chief need as his government saw it was to stop the constant threats of invasion. The President interrupted him, saying we had stopped it already but couldn't stop it always. We had acted vigorously when trouble was imminent, but we might not be able to stop the Turks again.

Ambassador Matsas agreed there were still dangers ahead. His government had had disturbing reports in the last day or so, including reported overflights of Rhodes. The President replied, "If I can't get you to talk, I can't keep the Turks from moving."

Matsas again sought to explain the Greek position. He reported that the whole trouble lay in the continuing Turkish threat to invade Cyprus. The President interjected: "Or in your support of what Makarios is doing, or in arms imports." The Ambassador replied that otherwise Makarios would have felt isolated. There were two dangers: The Greek-Turkish tensions and the risk of Makarios drifting to "the other side." Both are the consequence of the Turkish threats. If only the US could secure Turkish

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agreement not to invade, then tensions would be reduced and there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus, etc. etc. The President emphasized that we could not get the threat called off until the Greeks had agreed to talk. This called for statesmanship. Papandreou was a statesman. Matsas should tell his Prime Minister to call Inonu today and arrange a meeting. We had done everything we could. Our troubles around the world these days were not our own; our troubles turned out to be mostly disputes between our allies. Certainly Greece and Turkey would not be justified in destroying NATO over this issue.

Matsas asked if the President thought it impossible to get the Turks not to invade. The President said: "Nothing is impossible if people will act." But Papandreou must act in this case if we were to have peace and not war. Matsas tried to point out again that Turkish agreement not to invade was the key to the situation. The President said bluntly that we could not get the Turks to turn off until there was some basis on which to argue with them. He noted that the Greek Government was apparently willing to have secret talks (this surprised Matsas who was obviously unaware of this. So Mr. Komer confirmed that the Foreign Minister had said secret talks were possible). Matsas then asked whether any US proposals had been mentioned by Ball. The President said that we were not going to make proposals ourselves at this point. Any US proposals would be seized upon by one side or the other and used to blame us. We want the Greeks and Turks to start making proposals to each other. This should be a matter between the two of them. Matsas added: "And the Cypriots." Matsas said that "talks are difficult under the threat of invasion." The President immediately came back: "Of course they're difficult. But it's more difficult to talk after an invasion. Get together and work something out. If not, all NATO will become involved."

The Ambassador contended that the Greeks from the beginning had sought to keep the dispute damped down and avoid actions which increased the threat of hostilities. He gave examples of proposals advanced to the British, cooperating with the UN, etc. In contrast, he said, the Turks have done everything to spread the dispute, as by their treatment of the Greeks in Istanbul. The President said he thought Papandreou should appoint someone and talk with Inonu immediately. Talk was far better than the way of the jungle. Matsas attempted to return to the theme of calling the Turks off. The President interrupted him again, saying: "I have only a temporary hold-off. What we want is for your Prime Minister to sit down with the Turkish Prime Minister and work out an agreement. Our people are getting terribly worried." Matsas said that temporary cessation of the invasion threat won't solve the problem: it won't keep Makarios from building up arms supplies. The President responded that nothing would. The President said: "The Turks are the only ones I have gotten to do anything till now. All I want is for the Greek Prime Minister to sit down and talk. This is not so difficult." He pointed out that by just this means he had gotten

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the railroad strike settled in ten days. But Greece always wants Turkey to do something to ease tensions and Turkey always wants Greece to do something. What was the Greek program for settling the crisis?

Matsas described the desire for a fully independent state with self-determination and guarantees of minority rights. He noted this was a "compromise" position (i. e. not enosis). He asked what the President thought of this approach. The President said that we couldn't negotiate for the Turks. All we wanted was for Greece to get together with them. It wasn't up to us to say what agreement should be reached. "We stopped an invasion the other night. Now we want a conference. Let's start discussing this thing." He again mentioned the problem of American tourists going to the threatened area. It was easier to talk than to fight. The President told the Ambassador: "You will only be admired for saying 'let's talk'." It was a matter of the Biblical injunction, "Come let us reason together." Matsas said he would so report to his government.

The President then changed tactics and pointed out the strong American affection for Greece. The President himself would like to travel there again soon with his family. But there could not be a war. We had turned off the Turks. Now we want talks. As Speaker Rayburn had said, "It's always better to talk than fight." Matsas tried once more to press the theme that the US or the UN Security Council should get the Turks to call off their invasion threats. The President said, "Let's see what you can do for us and we will see what we can do for you." Matsas sought to inquire whether this meant the President would get Turkey to agree permanently not to invade. The President carefully avoided any such commitment. He said: "I made a positive request of the Turks and they said that even though they didn't agree they would comply. I now make a positive request to you to talk. If you comply, we will then make some suggestions to the Turks. That's better than fighting." The President did not tell him what these suggestions would be, but promised that if Papandreou would try to bring Greece and Turkey together, we would help all we could to move things along to an agreement. Otherwise we'd have a disaster.

The President asked Matsas to tell his Prime Minister of the President's deep sense of friendship for him and for Greece. The President was counting heavily on Papandreou. We did not want the US people to get the idea that Makarios was "using" the Greeks. "Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its ally Turkey. Even in the Cuban missile crisis, we always left the enemy a way out. With an ally it was even more important to leave a way out."

The President observed that negotiating with Makarios was impossible. Makarios wasn't interested in the security of the West. But Greece, Turkey,

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and the US were. Matsas interjected that Greece could not negotiate without Makarios. The President indicating understanding that the Cypriots would have to be consulted at some point but the important thing was Greek-Turkish agreement. Greece talked about its responsibilities to the Greek Cypriots. Didn't the Greeks see that the fate of 100,000 Turkish Cypriots was a matter of honor for Inonu too?

Ambassador Matsas assured the President that he would promptly inform his Government.

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Rusk to Caramanlis  
ltr - 4/27/64



S/S 8094

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to letter of former Greek  
Prime Minister Caramanlis  
to the President.  
Mr. Bundy's Memorandum of May 14.

The Department has recommended that the  
Secretary reply to the letter of former Greek Prime  
Minister Constantine Caramanlis dated April 20, 1964  
and addressed to President Johnson from New York.  
The Secretary has signed the suggested letter, a copy  
of which is enclosed.

*W J. W. Davis*  
*for*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of letter from the  
Secretary to Mr. Caramanlis.

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May 27, 1964

Dear Mr. Caramanlis:

The President has asked me to reply to your kind letter from New York and to thank you for your sympathetic interest. Both the President and Mrs. Johnson remember with pleasure their visit to Greece in 1962 and your part in making that visit a success.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

His Excellency  
Constantine Caramanlis,  
6 Boulevard Maillot,  
Paris 16, France.

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CABLE ADDRESS  
"SHERRY-NETHER" NEW YORK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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RECEIVED

New York, April 20th, 1964

Dear Mr. President,

On the occasion of my passage through the United States I wish to address to you, my warmest greetings.

I always remember the useful talks we had during your last visit to Greece and the keen interest you showed in her problems.

I am following, with much interest, your successful endeavours for the solution of the internal and foreign policy matters with which your great country is faced and wish you success at the forthcoming elections for the benefit of the United States and of the Free World.

Please convey my respects to Mrs. Johnson.

Yours sincerely,

C. Karamanlis

May 14, 1964

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**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**Mr. Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State**

**May I have a draft reply for the attached  
letter, if one is recommended?**

**McG. Bundy**

**Letter to the President from C. Karamanlis -  
Sherry Netherland 781 Fifth Avenue, New York 22 NY  
dtd 4/20 - letter of greeting while passing through US.**

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LBJ/Queen Frederika  
Memcon 11/25/63

