

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

220335

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

80

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS  
Amembassy, ANKARA  
Amembassy, NICOSIA  
INFO: Amembassy, LONDON  
USUN, NEW YORK

JUN 30 7 52 PM '67

STATE 220335

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-236  
By ins, NARA, Date 7-15-03

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Possible Greek Move Against Makarios.  
Ref.A: NICOSIA's 1935; Ref.B: EKN-1467; Ref.C: LONDON's 10717.

1. Department believes there are number signs in recent days indicative of possible GOG move against MAKARIOS in near future to impose enosis-type Cyprus settlement, presumably on basis prior GOG-GOT agreement described Ref A. These signs include:

(a) Osorio-Tafall report that/~~through~~ Toumbas GOG and GOT have reached agreement in principle on Cyprus solution. Since agreement presumably involves Turkish base on Cyprus, it would be patently unacceptable to Makarios and hence would have to be imposed by GOG on Nicosia.

(b) Recent acrimonious exchanges between Greek and Greek Cypriot press suggest Greek Government is preparing Greek public opinion for eventual Athens-Nicosia clash, justifying it on basis that Hellenic goal of enosis being undermined by "apostates and saboteurs" in Nicosia.

Drafted by: NEA/CYP:CWMcCaskill:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA/GRK:JPowens:he:6/30/67

4975

classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster  
NEA/TUR - Mr. Draper  
S/S - Mr. Thompson

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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(c) British here inform us Secretary General Turkish Ministry Foreign Affairs did not seem at all disturbed by stories of possible coup on Cyprus when question raised by British Ambassador Ankara. Lack of reaction could conceivably reflect that Turks are in fact being consulted and informed.

(d) British Ambassador Athens raised question with Economou-Gouras in conformity para 4 Ref C. Economou-Gouras reportedly replied that he could give Ambassador QUOTE categoric assurances UNQUOTE that GOG would do nothing without consulting GOT. This ~~would seem~~ <sup>might</sup> indicate GOG has been in consultation with Turks on possible move against Makarios.

(e) Visit of General Denisis to Nicosia and rumors that Alexandrakis may be replaced by QUOTE military personality UNQUOTE.

(f) Fact that maneuvers scheduled to take place shortly would enable Greek Army move men and equipment and would offer excellent cover for move against Makarios.

(g) Bitter exchange of correspondence between Kollias and Makarios described Ref B. This could be effort by GOG to provoke Makarios. Even if GOG not deliberately provoking Makarios, it unlikely tolerate Archbishop's rebuff. Similarly, Archbishop's refusal publicly disavow Clerides' statement not likely please Athens.

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XX  
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~~Information here is classified as secret~~

~~XX~~2. All Action addressees requested comment soonest. FOR NICOSIA:  
Embassy should be particularly sensitive to any suspicious movements  
of men and equipment.

~~XX~~3. It imperative for obvious reasons that we give no repeat no  
indication we suspect Greek intentions.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

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198203

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

82

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS

SS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy, ANKARA  
Amembassy, NICOSIA

MAY 19 6 16 PM '67

STATE 198203

EXDIS

1. Nicosia's 1695 raises very pertinent question as to what, if any, status Farmakis formula may have. Before entering into further dialogue with him, it would seem prudent try to obtain report on discussions of Cyprus problem expected to take place between King and GOG (para 3 Embtel 5306).

GP-3.

END

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-204  
By iso, NARA, Date 4-16-04

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/GRK:HDBrewster:he:5/19/67	Tel. Ext. 3095	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Mr. Rockwell
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Clearances:  
NEA/TUR - Mr. Draper  
NEA/CYP - Mr. McCaskill  
S/S - Mr. Thompson

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

195832

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60

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

80  
Origin

55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS  
Amembassy ANKARA  
Amembassy NICOSIA

MAY 16 8 50 PM '67

STATE

195832

EXDIS

Ref: Athens 5298

1. We are considering replying to Farmakis along following lines: QUOTE We appreciate being informed of GOC thinking on Cyprus problem and are gratified to learn that GOC may be considering concrete proposals for review with Turks. However, we continue to believe that this is matter which can be discussed only by parties concerned and we prefer make no substantive comments on proposals. We suggest that these be submitted to the Government of Turkey UNQUOTE.
2. Would appreciate addressees' comments on Farmakis' solution and on Department's proposed reply before making final decision.

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-384  
By ins, NARA, Date 4-16-04

Drafted by:  
NEA:CYP:CWMcCaskill:sn:5/16/67

Tel. Ext.  
2040

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

NEA:TUR - Mr. Howison

NEA:GRK -

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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194210

NSC

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48

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

MAY 15 1 48 PM '67

STATE

194210

EXDIS

Your 5262A  
FOR AMBASSADOR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-304  
By us, NARA, Date 4-16-04

1. In conversation with Schwartz May 15 we conveyed appropriate parts of information contained reftel. Schwartz appreciative but ~~was~~ clearly interested going Athens at least for exploratory purposes. Expressed reservation about Embassy's and Department's view that participation of Brown would be complicating factor.
2. When Schwartz inquired whether Department thought his presence would be useful during trial, Department officer replied it difficult give precise answer at this time in view number of unknown factors cited by Embassy. In response to further question, Department officer said he saw no reason why Schwartz should not respond to Mrs. Papandreou's request he come to Athens, in order form his own judgment as to circumstances and likelihood helpfulness his participation in trial.
3. Schwartz promised notify Department if he decides to go.

GP-3

END

Drafted by:

NEA:SWRockwell:av 5/15/67

Tel. Ext.

8825

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - SWRockwell

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Morris

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

193530

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82  
Origin  
SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

MAY 12 6 17 PM '67

STATE 193530

E X D I S

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BATTLE

1. James Schwartz, U.S. lawyer Margaret Papandreou, has had veiled telephone conversation with her in which she appeared indicate desire for him come Athens soonest. He is willing proceed and also willing serve as counsel Andreas if possible and helpful. I have cautioned him re public announcement or any leak such offer until your views on likely utility such offer obtained.

2. Will you please inform Margaret Papandreou his willingness come and give me your advice as to feasibility his offer serve as counsel and likelihood such offer being helpful. Also advise date trial if known.

3. FYI. Former Governor Brown of California possibly will join Schwartz as counsel. END FYI.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-304

By is, NARA, Date 4-16-04

END

RUSK

GP-3

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA:LDBattle:lab 5/12/67

4263

classification approved by:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Thompson

NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



180838

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-304

By is, NARA, Date 4-16-04

APR 24 1 04 PM '67

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

FLASH

Info:

INFO: Amembassy BONN

IMMEDIATE

STATE

~~SECRET~~ KIDIS~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TOSEC

1. We have considered carefully--at high level--question of evacuation of Royal Family from Greece, including possibility of providing U. S. helicopter for secret evacuation of family and/or King, and have concluded that if at all possible, King as well as his family should remain in Greece. (Perhaps Queen might go to Corfu.) By remaining King can continue to exert leverage in manner which we will suggest in separate telegram. Also, in event it did become necessary to evacuate, we would be in somewhat stronger position to overrule GOG objection if Queen, in late stage of pregnancy, were to accompany King.

2. With regard to employment of U. S. helicopter for secret evacuation, we feel risks involved are too great. If helicopter shot down and King or his family killed, U. S. would share blame for ~~his~~ their death. Therefore, we have concluded that best approach in event extreme emergency arose would be to notify GOG that we are planning to

Drafted by: NEA/GRK:JP Owens:mb1  
4/24/67

Tel: 3898

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA/GRK NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Thompson

EX-DIS

~~SECRET~~ KIDISNEA - Lucius D. Battle  
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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



~~SECRET~~

at his request  
evacuate head of state and family/for humanitarian reasons (i.e. danger to  
his and family's life) at a specific time from fixed point. We do not  
rpt not believe GOG could interpose objections to such action; if necessary,  
we would be prepared to inform GOG that we intend to evacuate King and  
warn it against obstructing this humanitarian move. In our view, GOG would  
not risk attack on U. S. aircraft in such action, whereas if operation  
carried out covertly, GOG officials could claim they did not know King  
was aboard aircraft if it were shot down.

3. Please comment.

END

Acting

KATZ

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

180761

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

65

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Origin  
SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS FLASH

APR 24 1 22 AM '67

STATE ~~XXXXXX~~ 180761

EXDIS

2

FOR AMBASSADOR

Use of helicopter as requested in your 4860 is very serious matter. Would appreciate your commenting on how you would visualize handling evacuation which might be considered hostile act. Would there be any possibility of obtaining overflight clearance? Could any authority guarantee safety of such a flight?

End

KATZENBACH

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-304  
By us, NARA, Date 4-16-04

Drafted by: <b>NEA/GRK: LMDunn</b>	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>S/S-O: IGCheslaw</b>
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Clearances:  
**NEA - LDBattle**

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

180642

66

41  
Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS FLASH

APR 22 1 20 PM '67

STATE 180642

REF.: Athens 4820

2

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. If in your judgment situation develops to point there is clear evidence of imminent danger to Major Arnaoutis' life, you authorized extend him official protection.
2. Same would apply to Bitsios and family.

END

GP-3

Handled EXDIS per SSO.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-304  
By ics, NARA, Date 4-16-04

Drafted by: NEA:SWRockwell:lab 4/22/67	Tel. Ext. 8825	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Lucius D. Battle
Clearances:		

L - Mr. Meeker

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180319

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

91

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS IMMEDIATE

APR 21 7 36 PM '67

STATE 180319

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-304

By 110, NARA, Date 4-16-04

Reference Athens 4787

We concur fully in the line you have proposed taking with new Prime Minister. In any future conversations with King you may wish to advise Kollias him of the stand you took with Prime Minister ~~Kollias~~ while at the same time impressing upon him the need for him repeat him to continue to control situation.

We are actively looking into whereabouts of helicopter that might be able to evacuate his family. Present reading is that it would take about 36 hours to make one available with present fleet dispositions. As to question of possible landing of US marines to help him and generals re-assert their control over the armed forces, we would hope that that was more a rhetorical question than a real one. If the King should return to this question, ~~as matters stand at present~~ you should disabuse him of any hope on this score. FYI We are frankly alarmed at tenor of King's report to you in reftel. Admittedly he is not calling all the shots but riding herd on this fraction of the Greek army and political spectrum would not seem to hold nearly the same dangers as he would have faced

Drafted by:

NEA: GRK: DBrewster: awf 4/21/67

Tel. Ext.

3095

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Rockwell  
S/S - Mr. WalshWhite House - Mr. Saunders  
(in draft)~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

had an ASPIDA-type military team moved in.

We are looking forward to your continuing analysis of this very fluid situation.

END

RUSK

KOJUTER

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Department of State

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68



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to this is general concern that younger Papandreou would move Greece away from Western alliance.

3. Proposed scenario would be that you call on George Papandreou at earliest opportunity, and inform him on instructions that USG deeply concerned at present rift in Greek body politic and increasing polarization due to extreme positions being taken by both sides. You would emphasize that we have great stake in future of Greece as result of major US investment in men, money, and materiel dating from 1947. We consider prosperous Greece is essential to Western Alliance. USG is fully aware of Papandreou's devotion to democracy, his long history of anti-Communism, and his dedication to welfare of his country.

4. You could add that as we view situation, cooling off of highly charged political atmosphere could result from an agreement on both sides to moderate language in public statements and speeches. (This would seem to be particularly important at present juncture, since elder Papandreou is about to make one of his two major speeches this Sunday in Thessaloniki. Extremist remarks on that occasion would set unfortunate tone for entire campaign and might increase tensions, already dangerously high, to breaking point.)

5. To meet problem outlined para 2 we would propose compromise based on iron-clad assurances from both sides. Our formula would envision assurance from King to G.Papandreou that Andreas Papandreou would not be arrested, in return for following two concessions from Papandreou, on assumption he wins May 28 elections: (1) that he appoint only persons of "mutual confidence" to sensitive positions of Foreign Affairs and Defense and (2) that he not carry out widespread shakeup in armed forces leadership. FYI, these two assurances from Papandreou would appear to be

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minimum concessions acceptable to King to stay his hand from imposing dictatorship in event CU wins majority in elections. END FYI

6. You should attempt to induce George Papandreou to put such a compromise formula forward to Palace on his own. If he will not see King but asks you to help, you could serve as "honest broker" and convey compromise proposal to King.

7. None of elements in proposed formula is sacrosanct and we leave it to you to modify them according to prevailing conditions there. If you perceive major objection to recommended action, we would welcome countersuggestions from you. However we feel time is of essence in view of fast-moving developments in Greece, including Papandreou's opening speech this weekend and indications that government may be moving to arrest Andreas Papandreou. If latter happens, it may be too late to play constructive role in this deteriorating situation.

8. Would appreciate your comments ~~ASAP~~ urgently as to wisdom foregoing ~~GP-3~~ proposal. Please include your thoughts re dangers, charges US ~~XXXX~~ meddling in internal situation. Also comment on possibility approach being made through CAS or unofficial channel.

9. Take no action in absence further instructions.

END

GP-3

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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1, 426

2

*Greece*

69

40

Origin

55

Info

ACTION:

USDEL PONTA DEL ESTE TOSSEC

PRIORITY

APR 12 3 06 PM '67

STATE

173426

EXDIS

PASS ROSTOW

Greek Political Crisis

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-304

By *iss*, NARA, Date 4-16-04

1. Greece was plunged into major political crisis on March 30 following disagreement in Parliament between two major parties (the conservative National Radical Union-ERE and the liberal Center Union-CU) over CU's proposal to grant immunity from arrest to candidates in elections scheduled for May 28. Proposal was obviously aimed at protecting Andreas Papandreu (son of CU leader George Papandreu) who had been accused of treason for his participation in illegal army organization "Aspida". CU refused to withdraw proposal and government of John Paraskavopoulos resigned.
2. Crisis was eased somewhat April 3 when King Constantine gave mandate to form a government to leader of conservative ERE, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos. Kanellopoulos has announced that he will go before Parliament on April 14 to try and obtain a vote of confidence and that even if he does not obtain a vote of confidence, he plans in accordance with his mandate to

Drafted by: NEA/GRK:LM:unn:mb1

4/12/67

5898

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

EUR/RPM - Mr. Getz

INR/DDC - Mr. Gardner

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S/S - Mr. Walker

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dissolve Parliament and hold elections about May 28. Kanellopoulos, who has until April 13 to seek vote of confidence, has now postponed until April 14 his original plan (to start debate on April 12) in an effort to gain time in seeking support from smaller parties.

3. It is uncertain whether Kanellopoulos will be able to obtain a vote of confidence as his party has certain control over only one-third of seats. CU and extreme leftist EDA party as well as other party leaders have attacked idea of ERE party leading country to elections. Papandreou and others have called instead for formation of an impartial service government to conduct elections. It is not yet clear how far opposition parties will go in challenging giving of mandate to Kanellopoulos. It is probable that CU will limit itself to public protests and participate fully in elections. However, reactions might take a far more radical turn if, following dissolving of Parliament, Andreas Papandreou, who has attacked Monarchy and Greece's ties to NATO and US and who is greatly feared by right and by King, were to be arrested and tried for complicity in Aspida group of army officers who were recently convicted for having plotted to overthrow the Government.

4. Ambassador Talbot believes Andreas' arrest might raise issue as to whether elections would have to be postponed and Greece ruled for a period by a government without Parliamentary sanction.

5. King has indicated to Ambassador Talbot that he believes his throne and Greece's attachment to West are at stake in this crisis and that only a near miracle can save him from final choice of yielding his country to the Papandreous or establishing a

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dictatorship either before or just after scheduled elections. While King has sought a statement of U. S. support for imposition of dictatorship, our Ambassador has made clear to the King that we cannot give such advance approval and he has seriously warned the King of dangers of extra-constitutional action.

6. Although situation is a changing one, Ambassador Talbot presently believes most likely course is continuation of Kanellopoulos Government and active political campaigning until mid-May. **END**

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

151215

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Origin  
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS PRIORITY  
INFO: Amembassy, ANKARA PRIORITY  
Amembassy, LONDON PRIORITY  
Amembassy, NICOSIA PRIORITY  
USUN, NEW YORK PRIORITY

MAR 8 6 14 PM '67

STATE 151215

EXDIS

CYPRUS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-304  
By us, NARA, Date 4-16-04

REF: (A) ANKARA 4291; (B) ATHENS 4089; (C) ATHENS 4046; (D) STATE 149205.

1. Department concurs with Ambassador Hart's views ref (A).
2. We support sound reasons you have already put forward to discourage Gouras visit at this time.
3. In addition we suggest you seek opportunity see Gouras again and make ~~approach~~ approach along following lines:
  - a. use as much of ref (A) as seems appropriate.
  - b. in view importance early resumption dialogue would it not be wise postpone visit until after Sunay visit and until after resumption dialogue which we understand GOT is on point of agreeing to resume?

~~XX~~

Drafted by: NEA/CYP:CBWood:he:3/8/67	Tel. Ext. 2040	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Mr. Rockwell
Clearances: NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens NEA/TUR - Mr. Howison		S/S - Mr. Walsh

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Manner in which you may decide again to approach Gouras or GOG should of course be considered in light of any contacts you may have had since receiving ref (B).

GP-3.

END

ИЗДАНИЕ: (А) ВИКЛУЧНО УСАДЪ: (В) ВЪНШЕН ДОГОВОР: (С) ВЪНШЕН ДОГОВОР ЗАВИСИМО ОТ УСЛОВИЯТА НА ПАЗАРА

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2

162497

71

20  
Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

MAR 24 7 21 PM '67

STATE 162497

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM LEDDY

1. Deeply appreciate your interest in European Chiefs of Mission Meeting. Regret that we have been forced to limit attendance in order to keep meeting within manageable limits. Will of course make sure that complete report on meeting is sent you soonest.

Best wishes.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

EUR:RLYost:mae

Tel. Ext.

6915

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EUR - John M. Leddy

Clearances:

NEA/GRK-Mr. Brewster (informed) S/S- Mr. Thompson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

156276

INDICATE ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO:

~~SECRET~~

72

42  
Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: AMCONGEN FRANKFURT FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

MAR 16 1 56 PM '67

STATE

156276

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3-5  
Treasury State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 8-9-03

EXDIS

*Rogers*  
2

SUBJECT: Bundesbank Financial Arrangements

Request you immediately deliver following message to  
Blessing and Tungeler from Deming and Martin:

~~XX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

BEGIN MESSAGE. We have considered the proposed revision of  
the letter in your Telex Tungeler to Deming of March 16  
with great concern. We have discussed it fully in the  
Government, including the White House. We recognize the  
point raised by the Council that a commitment ad infinitum  
not repeat not to convert dollars into gold raises an issue  
of principle for the Bundesbank. On the other hand, you  
must understand that the continuance of the Bundesbank's

Drafted by: M:EV Rostow:mk	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: M:EV Rostow
Clearances: White House: Mr. Bator		
Defense: Mr. McNaughton		
EUR: Mr. Leddy		
TREAS: Mr. Deming		
Mr. Albright		
	FRB: Mr. Martin	
	SCM: Mr. McCloy	
	S/S - Mr. Walker	

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present policy in this respect is absolutely central to the complex shift in policy being undertaken by our government. We therefore propose a revision of the text submitted in order to state what we understand to be your intention to continue this policy while avoiding the possible implications of the word quote will unquote. Therefore we suggest that the last sentence of draft letter read quote you may be assured that also in the future the Bundesbank intends to continue this policy and to play its full part in contributing to international monetary cooperation end quote. END MESSAGE

For Bonn: Tungeler-Deming telex being repeated to you for info.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

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Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS PRIORITY  
Amembassy, ANKARA PRIORITY  
Amembassy, NICOSIA PRIORITY  
Amembassy, LONDON PRIORITY  
Amembassy, PARIS PRIORITY  
USCINCEUR PRIORITY  
USDOCO SOUTH NAPLES PRIORITY

MAR 3 8 27 PM '67

INFO: Amembassy, ROME  
USUN, NEW YORK

STATE 148939

NATUS

EXDIS

NOFORN

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE CABLE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 16, #258

By jc, NARA, Date 8-9-03

SUBJECT: Considerations of NATO Presence on Cyprus

REF: STATE 97095

1. Prior to suspension in December Greek-Turkish dialogue on Cyprus included consideration of base on Cyprus as compensation to Turkey for enosis. REFTEL explored possibility of a "NATO base" on Cyprus in very general terms as part of a Cyprus solution. Responses at that time indicated that:

a. While a NATO peacekeeping force on Cyprus was not considered advisable, a NATO presence such as a headquarters, command, airfield, port or support base (possibly for AMF) might provide a Turkish and/or multinational military presence on the

Drafted by: J5:Capt.Smith:he:3/3/67	Tel. Ext. 4975	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Mr. Rockwell
Clearances: NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens NEA/TUR - Mr. Howison EUR/RPM - Mr. Boggs	OSD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes OC/JCS - Col. McAuliffe L/NEA - Mr. Wehmeyer	S/S - Mr. Brown NEA/CYP - Mr. McCaskill

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN



~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

Island that could satisfy the Turks in the interests of reaching a solution to the problem.

b. The major problems to overcome are the possible opposition of Makarios, the Turkish stand against enosis and the requirement for guarantee of the rights of Turkish Cypriots.

c. The Turks (according to Ambassador Hart) might be willing to accept enosis provided the right formula could be found. This formula must include Turkish troops on the Island under a Turkish-dominated joint or NATO base at Dhekelia and guarantee of Turkish Cypriot rights by the UN.

d. Other NATO nations might go along with such an idea if it becomes a critical factor in a solution.

Subsequently, the situation has been altered: (1) Recently the Greek Crown Council (including Makarios) agreed to accept NATO base concept after enosis, and (2) the problems of troop rotations, fortifications, and Czech arms have increased tensions. In order to provide some ideas for further consideration, a closer look at the possibility of utilizing NATO in a Cyprus solution appears necessary, even though we have no assurance this will satisfy the Turks who were "offered more" during 1964 Acheson effort.

2. General concepts in para 3 below might be developed in an attempt to accommodate Turkish-Greek requirements. Their consideration along with response to questions in para 4 is requested. These ideas are

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entirely exploratory, are aimed at providing plausible NATO role for continued presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus, and represent an expansion of the ideas contained REFTEL. The US would not initiate or advocate them but would propose them discreetly to the Greeks and/or Turks for their use or sponsorship if NATO base idea proves feasible. They do not represent a US position. These concepts presuppose enosis, adequate guarantees of the rights of Turkish Cypriots, demilitarization of the Island less the SBA bases and the retention of a UN presence on Cyprus as observers. Additionally, all parties involved must accept and have valid assurance of fulfillment of all conditions in advance of execution.

3. The following are listed as possible concepts for utilizing NATO forces on Cyprus at the <sup>Dhekelia</sup> ~~Dhekelia~~ Base:

a. A Greek-Turkish joint command with the possible addition of UK forces as an extension of LANDSOUTHEAST with a mission of planning and training ground forces. The forces assigned would be from those now on Cyprus.

b. A headquarters and/or exercise base for units of the AMF or other ~~comparable~~ NATO force. The same Greek, Turkish and UK forces as in 3a, above, would be based at Dhekelia as a permanent nucleus force with the addition of limited numbers or representatives of nations providing forces to the AMF as a part of the staff.

4. The questions listed ~~xx~~ are issues that should be considered and

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answered in connection with the above concepts:

- a. What is the probable reaction of host nations to these ideas at this time?
  - b. Should sovereignty of Dhekelia be retained by UK?
  - c. Who should the commander and vice commander of such a force be and should these positions be rotated among the nations involved?
  - d. Should there be an honorary base commanding officer (Turkish) in addition to the force commander to enlarge the number of prestige positions?
  - e. Should the size of the Greek, Turkish and UK forces be limited in size to possibly a battalion each?
  - f. Should the Greeks and Turks contribute to the cost of such a concept particularly in view each spends over \$10 million annually on Cyprus?
  - g. Should other NATO nations contribute towards financing, and to what degree?
  - h. Would participation by the Turks, by having a military force on Cyprus and a degree of command, satisfy their requirements?
6. Your comments on these ideas and questions are requested by March 10. This material should be closely held. NATO base concept should not repeat not ~~at this time~~ at this time  
~~/XXXXXXXXXX~~ be discussed ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ with SYG Brosio. However we realize necessity discuss base concept with Brosio at appropriate stage GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

137146

74

81  
Origin  
55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS  
INFO: Amembassy, ANKARA  
Amembassy, NICOSIA  
Amembassy, LONDON  
Amembassy, PARIS  
USUN, NEW YORK  
USDOCOSOUTH

FEB 14 8 13 PM '67

STATE 137146  
EXDIS

NATUS INFO

Athens 3802 and 3804.

1. You should inform King and if you wish Toumbas, Stephanopoulos and Paraskevopoulos at early convenience that Dept fully endorses your remarks to them to effect US has made no undertaking to intervene and that it would be very dangerous to make any assumption regarding possible future US position in this regard. US will gladly continue support efforts its friends to work out their own solution. US therefore warmly approves Greek decision resume dialogue.

2. We urge its resumption not be delayed pending new elections or formation new government. Dialogue appears have two roles, both equally important: to work toward ultimate solution which may take long time and to maintain quick, top-level communications

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-304  
By us, NARA, Date 4-16-04

Drafted by: NEA/CYP:CBWood:he:2/13/67	Tel. Ext. 2040	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Mr. Davies
Clearances: NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster NEA/TUR - Mr. Howison IO/UNP - TNR/DDC - Mr. McAfee	EUR/RPM (info) DOD/ISA (info) S/S - Mr. Thompson	

~~SECRET~~



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between GOG and GOT which can be used avert or dampen any unfortunate developments. Loss of latter has recently been serious.

3. The diplomatic problems involved are great, but recent tensions have offered glimpse of far more dangerous alternatives.

4. You may at discretion add:

5. Our only suggestion is to devote primary effort to narrowing differences between Athens and Ankara in basic context improved Greek-Turkish relations. This would appear outweigh any other consideration or reaction.

6. FYI. We agree with you that trip by Economou-Gouras to US at this juncture is undesirable. In this connection Amb. Matsas has been called to Athens on consultation urgently and will be leaving this weekend. END FYI.

GP-3.

END

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Origin  
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS  
" NICOSIA  
" LONDON

OCT 26 6 34 PM '66

INFO: Amembassy, ANKARA

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By us, NARA Date 8-26-97

02

STATE 73508

EXDIS

Ref: ANKARA 2061.

1. Despite info contained para 1 Nicosia's 482, Dept would appreciate assessments addressee posts on practicality coordinated US-British-Greek approach to Makarios to make concessions to Turkish Cypriots.
2. Approach could be made on basis improving climate for dialogue. Makarios has supported dialogue publicly and in this regard could be captive his own statements. Alternatively, approach could be made on basis fact situation on island has been relatively quiet for some time and dramatic gesture by Makarios could have favorable impact on world opinion. FYI Dept has long felt that real improvement in conditions could put pressure on Turkish Cypriots come out of enclaves. END FYI.
3. Possibility lack of cooperation between GOC and Grivas could be avoided by coordination with Athens. General is responsive to

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/CYP:CWMcCaskill:he:10/26/66 4975		classification approved by: NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell
Clearances:	S/S - Mr. Thompson	
NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster		
NEA/TUR - Mr. Howison		
EUR/BMI - Mr. Judd		

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Athens and would be likely follow instructions to avoid provocative incidents or harassment.

4. Nicosia and Athens requested comment on advisability similar approach by Secretary to Kyprianou if latter passes through Washington on return from Latin America.

GP.3.

END

KATZENBACH

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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OCT 17 6 41 PM '66

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS  
ANKARA  
NICOSIA

STATE

67543

EXDIS

Ref: ATHENS' 1821; NICOSIA's 505; ANKARA's 1944

"Procedural Agreement"

1. Posts' views welcome.
2. Department agrees there no immediate urgency on procedural agreement, particularly view lack of signs dialogue in real trouble.
3. If trouble subsequently develops such agreement might be useful step for US to suggest, depending on circumstances at the time.

GP-3

END

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-306  
By is, NARA Date 6-24-97

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:SWRockwell:av 10/17/66

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster  
NEA/TUR - Mr. Howison

S/S - Mr. Thompson

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NEA

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ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

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STATE

Athens 1246

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BATOR  
BOWDLER  
BUDGET  
DAVIS  
GINSBURG  
HAMILTON  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
JORDEN  
KEENEY  
KOMER  
MOYERS  
TAYLOR  
WRIGGINS

1. Agree with your reasoning para 3 reftel and expect to propose scheduling of a visit for last half of 1967 when submissions go to spring White House next/week and after situation in Greek elections cleared. In meantime it is too early to make even/any formal commitment as to what President would do if King should come to US privately. FYI, in case King were to accept this invitation, we would of course hope with adequate advance notice to be able to arrange appropriate reception in Washington.

GP-3

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By iss, NARA Date 8-26-97

BALL

Drafted by: NEA:GRK:HDBrewster:jaw

9/21/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

G - Mr. Low

White House Mr. Saunders

S/S - Mr. Thompson

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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2-Ret.  
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DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

September 21, 1966  
Date

BY W ON 10-11-91


O.K. 78

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

4/5  
Ret'd 9/22 12/10

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

Called Jan 9/22  
12:13 - RB

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Cable to Amembasssy Athens  
and referenced message.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~



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Amembassy ATHENS

STATE

Athens 1246

1. Agree with your reasoning para 3 refel and expect to propose scheduling of a visit for last half of 1967 when submissions go to White House next <sup>spring</sup> ~~month~~ and after situation in Greek elections clearer. <sup>informal</sup> In meantime it is too early to make even ~~any formal~~ commitment as to what President would do if King should come to US privately. FYI, in case King were to accept this invitation, we would of course hope with adequate advance notice to be able to arrange appropriate reception in Washington.

GP-3

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By ius, NARA Date 8-26-97

NEA:GRK:HDBrewster:jaw  
9/21/66

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

G - Mr. Low

S/S -

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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By iss, NARA Date 8-26-97

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RSR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 1246

SEPTEMBER 11

1. CHRISTOPHER JANUS, PRESIDENT OF GREEK HERITAGE FOUNDATION AND ORGANIZER OF ANNUAL GREEK-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON GREEK CULTURE (TO BE HELD THIS YEAR IN ATHENS SEPTEMBER 26), ADVISED THAT MAYOR OF CHICAGO HAS ENTRUSTED HIM WITH INVITATION TO KING AND QUEEN TO VISIT CHICAGO IN AUGUST 1967 TO WITNESS OR PARTICIPATE IN SAILING EVENTS OF LAKEFRONT FESTIVAL. HE ALSO ADVISES THAT MRS. FRANCES HOWARD, A PARTICIPANT IN SYMPOSIUM, MAY BE BRINGING GREETINGS FROM VICE PRESIDENT. JANUS IS NOT INFORMED WHETHER INVITATION HAS BEEN CHECKED WITH DEPT.

2. I RECOMMEND THAT WE NOT REPEAT NOT INTERPOSE OBJECTION TO DELIVERY OF MAYOR'S LETTER BY JANUS DURING HIS AUDIENCE WITH KING (AS MODERATOR OF SYMPOSIUM) SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 29. GIVEN CURRENT UNCERTAINTY REGARDING DENOUEMENT OF POLITICAL SITUATION IN SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1967 KING WILL PROBABLY EITHER REGRET IMMEDIATELY OR DELAY REPLY FOR SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL MID-1967 POLITICAL PICTURE CAN BE MORE CLEARLY PROJECTED. IF HE SHOULD INQUIRE REGARDING HIS RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON, I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE INFORM HIM THAT SHOULD HE TRANSIT WASHINGTON, THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE HAPPY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH HIM AND ENTERTAIN HIM AT WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON OR DINNER. I BELIEVE AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE A GREAT BENEFICIAL EDUCATIVE EFFECT ON THE KING WHO HAS MATURED CONSIDERABLY IN PAST YEAR AND SURPRISED SOME OF WORST CRITICS BY HIS HANDLING OF DELICATE SITUATIONS.

3. WITH FORTHCOMING VISIT OF PRESIDENT SUNAY THERE WILL OBVIOUSLY BE USUAL GREEK CLAMOR FOR EVENHANDED TREATMENT. I

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- ATHENS 1246, SEPTEMBER 11

HAVE NOT RECOMMENDED ANY GREEK VISIT BECAUSE OF UNCLEAR  
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS HERE. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON MANNER IN  
WHICH SITUATION EVOLVES, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FAVORABLE  
CONSIDERATION OF A STATE VISIT NOT PRECLUDED.

4. PLEASE INSTRUCT PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF JANUS GROUP SEPTEMBER 25.

TALBOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

02

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Origin  
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

PRIORITY

INFO: " ANKARA  
" NICOSIA

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SEP 16 5 59 PM '66

EXDIS

STATE 48821

Athens' 1343

1. We are of course hopeful Toubas will be forthcoming on Sept 17 as to status and prospects Greek-Turkish dialogue.
2. While it would be mistake to make too much from these indicators, we note distinct falling-off in stridency Turkish expressions opposition to general idea of enosis. It will be recalled Caglayangil said Sept 13 (State 46636) it would be "difficult" for Turks to accept enosis and that Kumeralp publicly reiterated that fundamental principles Turkish Cyprus policy include "no unilateral enosis." (Ankara's 1394)
3. If we are correct in estimate Turks may not yet have ruled out consideration in dialogue of some form of enosis, important all concerned, and particularly GOG, avoid either public or private comment. Such comment could readily embarrass or frighten GOT into more cautious posture.

GP-1.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By uis, NARA Date 8-26-97

End

RUSK

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA:TUR:JMHowison:hf:9/16/66	2732	classification approved by: NEA - Raymond A. Hare
Clearances:		
NEA/CYP - Mr. Wood		
NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster		
S/S - Mr. Thompson		

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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38150

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Origin  
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Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy ATHENS

INFO: AmEmbassy LUSAKA

STATE 38150

EXDIS

FROM PALMER FOR AMBASSADOR GOOD

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By ics, NARA Date 8-26-97

AUG 30 10 34 PM '66

02 65

Please deliver following message to U. S. Ambassador Good presently visiting your area from his post in Lusaka, Zambia: In considering U. S. representation Bechuanaland after independence September 30, Dept would appreciate your views on possibility your receiving additional accreditation as Ambassador, ~~Bechuanaland~~ Botswana. Similar cable being sent Jones, Blantyre re possibility his additional accreditation Basutoland after independence October 4. Procedure would accord with arrangement for the Gambia where U. S. Ambassador to Senegal additionally accredited. If idea feasible would propose maintain upper-middle grade FSO Charge resident Gaberones in addition young FSO and secretary.

Presence of competent and experienced Charge should preclude necessity your devoting inordinate amount of time to or in Botswana.

EMD

RUSK

Drafted by: <u>WJL</u>	8/30	Tel. Ext.:	Telegraphic transmission and	AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd
F:AFS:RWStephan:GEClark:sgb		7703	Classification approved by:	
Clearances:				
AFS - Mr. Clark	AFE - Mr. Strong	AFSE - Mr. McElhiney		
O/DG - Ambassador Steeves	S/S-Mr. Bruce	AF/EX - Mr. Dobyns		

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS PRIORITY  
" ANKARA PRIORITY  
INFO: " NICOSIA PRIORITY

AUG 24 8 59 PM '66

STATE 34666

LIMDIS

Re septel on Athens UPI news story stating Makarios will discuss Cyprus with President Johnson at end of September you may at your discretion inform government to which you are accredited that there is no truth in this story. Department feels that this story could make more difficult the dialogue between Greece and Turkey and would hope that GOG and GOT could be promptly reassured that ~~there is no meeting contemplated between President Johnson and Archbishop Makarios and US is not planning any serious~~ ~~talks with him.~~

GP-3.

RUSK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By iss, NARA Date 8-26-97

Drafted by: NEA/CYP:CBwood:he

Tel. Ext. 2040

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances: NEA/GRK - Mr. Barham  
NEA/TUR - Mr. Polstein  
S/S - Mr. McCall  
S - Mr. Low

White House - Mr. Saunders

USIA - Mr. Cleveland

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy, ATHENS  
" ANKARA  
" NICOSIA

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JOINT STATE-USIA Message

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GPR

1. Department has received UPI 117 datelined Athens "President Makarios of Cyprus will go to the U.S. at the end of September to discuss a Cyprus solution with President Johnson, Athens newspapers said today.

2. "A Greek Government spokesman said Makarios was expected here (Athens) next month, but added he had no information about the reported U.S. visit."

3. Unless any of addressee posts perceive objections, Dept will seek elicit query at noon press briefing August 25 on above item and will answer along following lines:

contemplated

4. There is no meeting/scheduled between President Johnson and Archbishop Makarios in Washington.

GP-3.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By iss, NARA Date 8-26-97

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/CYP:CBWood:he:8/24/66 2040		classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Clearances:		S/S - Mr. McCall
NEA/P - Mr. Ellison		G - Mr. Low
NEA/GRK - Mr. Barham		White House -
NEA/TUR - Mr. Polstein		P - Mr. McCloskey Mr. Saunders
		USIA - Mr. Cleveland

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

23269

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Aug 6 11 38 AM '66

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Origin  
SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

INFO: Amembassy ANKARA  
NICOSIA

2

EXDIS

STATE 23269

Ref. Athens 578

For Ambassador Talbot from Secretary

Secretary's

1. Please convey orally to Foreign Minister ~~my~~ appreciation for his careful briefing concerning Greek-Turkish dialogue. He may be assured that his confidence will be fully respected.

2. While ~~we~~ do not wish to comment on substantive aspects of dialogue Foreign Minister can be reassured of our continuing support of Greek Government's efforts to make dialogue a success.

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By his, NARA Date 8-26-97

Drafted by: NEA:GRK:HDBrewster:jaw	Tel. Ext. 3095	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Raymond A. Hare
8/5/66		

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Williamson

S - Mr. Borg

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Origin  
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ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS Immediate

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Info: Amembassy MOSCOW

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JAN 2 4 14 PM '66

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-304  
By us, NARA, Date 4-16-04 S

Embtel 1010.

1. Suggestion para 4 Deptel 712 that "GOG could tell Sovreps we had responded to their official query" re Maslokovetz not intended as rigid formulation. If Greeks prefer statement Maslokov etz sought and obtained asylum in US hands and is no longer in Greece be given another acceptable preface, we would concur.

2. We continue believe confrontation impracticable. FYI- Maslokovetz suffering severe depression and would in any case be completely unpredictable in confrontation situation. End FYI.

3. Maslokovetz physical return to Greece would at this juncture present some security and publicity hazard, and would increase GOG responsibility vis-a-vis Sovs.

4. In considering how to handle domestic problem, GOG should also be cognizant fact Maslokovetz did not seek asylum with Greeks, but with Americans. His prompt removal from Greece effected out of respect for Greek desire non-involvement. While we prefer avoid elaborate structure of pretense, neither Sovreps nor Greek public know whether Maslokovetz in American

Drafted by:

NEA:GTT:JMH:son:hos

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Ambassador Johnson

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Davies

INR - Mr. Moyer

CAS - Mr. Ekstrom

S/S

John P. Walsh

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~~SECRET - EMDIS~~

in American custody when he departed Greece. This point highly relevant problem discussed in para 1 above.

5. Regret cannot in view confidential relationships be specific, but can inform GOG categorically that handling of case similar to that in many cases in countries large and small since World War II. GOG well aware our traditional proclivity grant political asylum in bona fide cases not confided to Sov citizens.

6. Line adumbrated Deptel 712 for use in event GOG does not come around to view their present innocent posture remains their safest course. While we recognize this course not easy in Greek context, our considerable experience suggests that lack of firmness in resisting Soviet pressures of this kind leads to even greater complications. If, after review of problem Tsirimokos seems at all susceptible to this reasoning, you might emphasize our willingness assume responsibility vis-a-vis Soviets, including our refusal to acknowledge to Sovreps that Maslokovetz entered our custody in Greece.

END

GP-1.

RUSK

~~SECRET - EMDIS~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS Priority 7/2

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW 1602

JAN 1 4 33 PM '66

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1. [REDACTED] Maslokovetz mental condition make a possibility surfacing him either in Greece or elsewhere impracticable.

2. Standard US practice in Soviet defector cases, with which Sovs familiar, is to permit confrontation with Sov reps when defector willing. Maslokovetz unwilling and in view his psychological state we would not encourage him change mind.

3. We note Tsirimokos considers GOG QTE cannot live UNQTE with possibility defector's simply not being discovered for longish time. If this position firm, we propose following scenario.

4. GOG could tell Sovreps that we had responded to their official query with statement Maslokovetz had sought and obtained asylum in US hands and is no longer in Greece. No breach international practice involved.

5. We would respond to Sov representations in accordance usual practice. **RUSK**

END

GP-1

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-278 and NLJ D3-304

By edl NARA, Date 4-22-11

Drafted by: NEA/GTI: JHowison:wdw	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Clearances: INR - Amb. Koren GTI - JHowison CAS - Mr. Ekstrom	SOV - Mr. Toon S/S - Mr. Rattray	G - U. A. Johnson

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CIA Cables



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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM      22 APRIL 1967    OCI NO. 0808/67

MILITARY TAKEOVER IN GREECE  
(SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 5--11:30 AM EST)

1. THE SITUATION IN ATHENS HAS REMAINED OUTWARDLY CALM. DURING THE NIGHT, TANKS AND TROOPS WERE REMOVED FROM THE CENTER OF THE CITY, AND TRAFFIC MOVED NORMALLY DURING THE DAY. THE US EMBASSY REPORTS THAT PEOPLE HAVE SEEMED TO BE GOING ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS AS USUAL ALTHOUGH THE AVERAGE PERSON APPEARED "STUNNED AND PUZZLED" BY YESTERDAY'S COUP.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, INDICATIONS THAT ALL MAY NOT BE WELL WITHIN THE NEW REGIME EVIDENTLY HAVE REACHED THE FOREIGN PRESS. A SOMEWHAT GUARDED REUTERS PIECE FROM ATHENS THIS MORNING POINTED AN ARMY BRIGADIER AND TWO YOUNG COLONELS AS THE LEADERS OF THE COUP, AND NOTED THAT THERE WAS "NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION" AND SOME UNCERTAINTY THAT THE KING BACKED THE COUP. IF RUMORS OF THIS KIND PERSIST, THE COUP LEADERS MAY WELL PRESS THE KING TO GIVE MORE SIGNS OF ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH THEM.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-308

By cb, NARA Date 9-21-99

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3. THE NEW GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS REMOVING ITS EMERGENCY RESTRICTIONS ON ECONOMY ACTIVITY, AND THAT THE STOCK AND MONETARY MARKETS WOULD OPERATE AS THEY DID BEFORE THE COUP. TRADITIONALLY, POLITICAL CRISES LEAD GREEKS TO CONVERT THEIR MONEY INTO GOLD AND TO BEGIN HOARDING HOUSEHOLD GOODS. IF SUCH ACTIVITIES BEGAN, THE GOVERNMENT PRESUMABLY WOULD REINSTATE EMERGENCY MEASURES.

4. THE COUP MAY CUT BACK THE VALUABLE GREEK TOURIST TRADE, AND MAY INHIBIT RECENTLY PLANNED FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GREECE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS EMPHASIZED THAT ITS POLICY WILL BE ONE OF FINANCIAL PRUDENCE AND MONETARY STABILITY, HOWEVER, AND IF THE SITUATION REMAINS STABLE THESE ECONOMIC REACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE ONLY TEMPORARY.

5. ON CYPRUS, THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS IS SHOWING CONSIDERABLE CAUTION IN ITS TREATMENT OF THE GREEK SITUATION, REFLECTING THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT'S ADVICE THAT CYPRIOTS AVOID INVOLVEMENT. THE PRESS TAKES PARTICULAR NOTICE OF THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT'S 8,53,559 07473 5 3 & 9-1 9! 3,98 9! :6047 285 & 433:3. THE CYPRIOT COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER WARNS THAT THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE MUST BE VIGILANT TO PREVENT EXTENSION OF THE "AMERICAN IMPERIALIST" COUP TO CYPRUS.

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OCI No. 0807/67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
22 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Military Takeover in Greece

(Situation Report Number 4--6:00 AM EST)

1. Athens remains calm. There have been only a few incidents. Security restrictions against telephone communications, commercial air service, and travel within Greece have been rescinded. Most of the politicians detained during the coup were to be released last night, but their release has not been reported.

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2. [REDACTED] suspected Communist agents will be arrested; 361 of 800 known dangerous Communists have been rounded up, and all material at some leftist organizations' offices is being confiscated.

3. In his address to the Greek people yesterday, Prime Minister Koliass justified the coup by claiming that the elections--no matter who won--would have led to "bloodshed and chaos" and that the army "intervened to check the march toward destruction one step before the brink was reached." Koliass urged national unity and castigated the "bad demons, demagogues, unconscientious opportunists, and professional anarchists who sought to divide us."

4. Although Koliass promised the country would return to "parliamentarism on a wholesome basis after the consolidation of normality," his remarks reflect a disgust with professional politicians which will make

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it difficult for the coup leaders to return Greece to its former rulers. The announced objectives of the new government--a just distribution of national income, strengthening the church, achievement of social justice and hastening of economic development--indicate that at least some of the members of the new government regard the coup as more than a temporary expedient to prevent a Communist takeover.

5. On Cyprus, Interior Minister Polykarpos Georkatzis is apprehensive about a leftwing demonstration planned for Nicosia on 22 April by AKEL (the Communist Party). Any such demonstrations or incidents instigated by AKEL presumably would be in protest against the rightwing military takeover in Greece. Georkatzis has interceded with AKEL leaders in an attempt to dissuade them from any such action, and states that if they persist in their plans he will use police and military to put down disturbances.

6. There are no indications that either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots are attempting to exploit the situation in Greece.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

21 APRIL 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

MILITARY TAKEOVER IN GREECE

(ADDENDUM TO SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 3--1700 EST)

1. KING CONSTANTINE HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR TALBOT THAT HE WAS FORCED INTO COOPERATION WITH THE MILITARY JUNTA NOW IN POWER IN ATHENS. HE STATED THAT HE ONLY ACCEPTED THE NEW GOVERNMENT AFTER A STORMY FIVE-HOUR SESSION WITH COUP LEADERS, AND CHARACTERIZED THEM AS "STUPID, ULTRA RIGHT-WING BASTARDS, WHO, HAVING GAINED CONTRL OF TANKS, HAVE BROUGHT DISASTER TO GREECE." HE CLAIMS THAT HE CONSIDERED ORDERING LOYAL TROOPS TO FIRE ON THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AT THE PALACE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY, BUT ABANDONED THE IDEA, REALIZING THAT HIS PALACE WAS SURROUNDED BY TANKS AND OTHER ARMOR MANNED BY TROOPS LOYAL TO THE JUNTA.

2. THE KING HAS ASKED TALBOT WHETHER THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY US MARINES COULD BE LANDED TO HELP HIM AND "HIS GENERALS" RE-ESTABLISH CONTROL; HE ASSERTS THAT GREEK TROOPS WOULD NOT FIRE ON US PERSONNEL.

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3. CONSTANTINE BELIEVES THAT GHQ CHIEF SPANDIDAKIS KNEW "IN GENERAL" ABOUT THE PLANNED CUP, BUT WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE WHEN IT WAS IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT HIS GO-AHEAD. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, HOWEVER, SPANDIDAKIS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE JUNTA IN ASSUMING THE FIGUREHEAD POST OF DEPUTY PREMIER. THE KING IS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT AND QUERIED AMBASSADOR TALOT ABOUT PROVIDING HELICOPTERS TO EVACUATE THE ROYAL FAMILY FROM HIS PALACE AT TATOI, NORTHWEST OF ATHENS.

4. THE KING HAS ALSO ASKED TALBOT TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO "INSIST" THAT IT LIMIT ITSELF TO MAINTAINING ORDER AND FOLLOW ORDERS OF THE KING. TALBOT HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE NEW PRIME MINISTER AND INTENDS TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE NORMAL LIFE.

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Greek Junta's Plans for Andreas Papandreou

1. CIA has no intelligence that the Greek junta is planning secretly to dispose of Andreas Papandreou. Following the protests from American interests during the first days after the 21 April coup, US Embassy reporting reflected assurances from members of the new government that political prisoners, including Andreas, would not be harmed.

[redacted] Prime Minister Kollias and Minister to the Prime Minister Papadopoulos have said that none of the four principal ASPIDA defendants would be executed. On 10 May Defense Minister Spandidakis pledged that Andreas would not be executed even if he were sentenced to death. On 31 May Interior Minister Pattakos was quoted as saying the regime had no idea of executing anyone.

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2. There is information to the effect that regardless of the outcome of Andreas' impending trial, the regime may attempt to deport him, perhaps to the US. A request of the US Embassy by Interior Minister Pattakos on 28 June as to the status of his US citizenship tends to confirm this interest.

3. That the junta desires to eliminate Andreas from the Greek political scene is unquestioned. Despite its obviously disastrous public relations efforts to date, capped most recently by the revocation of Greek actress Melina Mercouri's citizenship, we believe that there is some understanding in the junta as to the consequences, especially vis-a-vis its relations with the US, of summary action against Andreas. It should be noted, however, that if US-Greek relations sour during trial proceedings, the junta will probably be less responsive to American interests.

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# Foreign Report

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## Constantine's Tussle with the Junta

What are the chances of a return to parliamentary democracy in Greece? It may still be too soon to judge the performance of the military junta, but certain trends are now detectable. The three months that have elapsed since the April coup have given critics of the regime time to recover their balance and to discuss, furtively and speculatively, the moves that might be taken to rid the country of the dictatorship.

Meanwhile the junta is in complete control and men genuinely loyal to it – plus a considerable phalanx of 'usable' opportunists – have seized, or been given, all key posts, from cabinet portfolios down to the humblest village councillorship. The key figure is **Colonel George Papadopoulos**, the now invisible minister in charge of the prime minister's office. There is little doubt that Papadopoulos – who not so long ago was one of many colonels in the Greek army contingent in Cyprus – has immense personal ambitions, and the success of the coup – which he more than anyone else master-minded – has given him added confidence.

The possibility of some kind of split within the junta cannot be ruled out – they may be latter-day Cromwells, but they are also Greeks. **Brigadier Pattakos**, the minister of the interior, is the most vocal of the group; the seeds exist of potential rivalry between him and Papadopoulos. But for the moment the leading members of the junta are fully aware that any dissension within their ranks might only lead to their joint overthrow.

As things stand at present, **King Constantine** has given a pledge to the nation that the constitutional revision committee, headed by **Mr Charilaos Mitrelias**, who enjoys an unblemished political reputation, will have a new draft constitution ready



before the end of the year. But the junta leaders firmly refuse to say when they will relinquish power. When they receive the draft they will work on it, they say, and then present it to the people in a plebiscite. After that elections will be held – 'if conditions are appropriate'.

The junta wishes the new constitution to embody certain basic reforms. These include:

(i) The total abolition of communism – under any guise – as a political force. To ensure this, the colonels want to set up a constitutional court with the power to ban from political activity any politician or any party suspected of being communist, or in sympathy with the communists;

(ii) a separation of the executive from the legislature – i.e., a measure prohibiting members of parliament from becoming ministers. In many ways this might be healthy for Greece. But it might lead to a situation where a party, or group of parties, claiming to 'represent the spirit of the revolution' would win the next election – and proclaim someone like Colonel Papadopoulos as prime minister.

Some junta members have also revealed that one of the suggestions now being discussed is a proposal that would, in effect, terminate the careers of many of the older politicians. Parliamentary candidates would require to have their mental and physical health testified by hospitals – and their good reputation by local police stations.

What do opponents of the regime think, in brass tacks, they can achieve? Three possible lines of action are emerging:

(i) to 'humour' the colonels into accelerating the return to some form of parliamentary democracy;

(ii) to let the junta stew in its own juice of inefficiency, in the belief that it will increasingly have to seek the advice of outside experts, and in the process be gradually eased out of power;

(iii) to subvert it, by some form of counter-revolution.

The first of these policies was tried by King Constantine in the first weeks of the new regime, and for a while it looked as if the military rulers might fall for this tactic. But lately they have consolidated their position and fended off any encroachments on their power.

Constantine's main achievement was to secure the inclusion of a large number of civilians in the cabinet (most of them elderly judges). But the colonels have short-circuited this move by appointing dynamic junta men as secretaries-general in the key ministries. (The actual executive power is wielded by a revolutionary committee composed of about a dozen officers who meet daily to determine policy on major issues.)

Following the tactics outlined above, the king has made a point of emphasising, in his rare public statements since the coup, that a rapid return to parliamentary democracy is absolutely essential. But each time his statements have been either watered down, or virtually countermanded, by the colonels who make it clear that they do not propose to relinquish power until the aims of the revolution are achieved.

Behind the scenes the Americans have tried hard to put pressure on the new government by partially suspending military aid, which is worth about \$70 million a year. But this move has backfired. The colonels have been enraged by Washington's attitude – they obviously expected the Americans to support them, because of their militant anti-communist outlook. Recently, they have cut off contacts with the Americans in Athens and boycotted American parties. Faced with this impasse the Americans have come round to the view that, if they are to exert any influence at all, they must keep the lines of communication open at all costs. Thus, in principle, it has been decided in Washing-



ton to more American aid at almost the same level as previously – though before deliveries are resumed there will be Congressional hearings in Washington.

The belief that the junta will ultimately fall from its own incompetence is held by a number of prominent diplomats and politicians in Athens. Inefficiency and political inexperience, the argument runs, will inevitably force the colonels to come to terms with 'untarnished' politicians and administrators, and in the process democratic practices will gradually come back.

Those who hold this theory argue that already the junta has lost much of its initial momentum and dissipated its energies on secondary problems – such as the removal of influence and patronage, price-fixing, and so on. It has not yet got to grips with Greece's basic problems – the structural defects in the economy, the need for social reform, the Cyprus question, and so forth. There is also a patent dearth of expertise at the top; experienced technocrats and administrators have been dismissed without thought of who will take their place.

Some observers – the more optimistic ones – believe that economic pressures alone will compel the junta to 'ease up' by the end of the year. This would probably be the best solution for Greece. But which politicians would the junta be willing to deal with first? One person has already become a subject of international speculation – **Mr Constantine Karamanlis**, who was prime minister from 1955 to 1963. Now 'in retirement' in Paris, he is shrewdly watching in the wings. In many ways he was one of the ablest prime ministers Greece has ever had; he might yet put the country back on to an even keel. Another possible candidate would be **Mr Spyros Markezinis**, the Progressive leader.

But all this supposes that the present military leaders will gradually tire of the heady taste of power. This is possible; but there is precious little sign of it at the moment. Their difficulties may increase, but that does not necessarily mean they will wish to bow themselves out. Hence the growing underground rumours and rumblings about 'counter-revolutionary' organisations. Those who feel that open resistance to the regime (i.e. subversion) is now the only way out of Greece's dilemma include not merely former Centre Union politicians but many others who are already beginning to despair of the junta's ever really fulfilling the pledge to restore democracy.

To many of these people the king appears now as a potential ally in a possible counter-coup. Many senior officers who faithfully helped to carry through the April coup did so because they believed the king was fully behind it; their loyalty is to Constantine, not Colonel Papadopoulos. When the king recently toured garrisons in both northern and southern Greece many officers went out of their way to assure him that they would always obey his orders – any orders.

Officers of right-wing views have been shocked by the way the junta has put some right-wing politicians in the same doghouse as the politicians of the centre and the left. There is also some inevitable disgruntlement over the spoils of the April coup. Some officers who were privy to the plot are now in field posts, protecting the new regime; other more fortunate ones are enjoying the cocktail-party circuit in Athens in their new incarnations as chiefs of the tourist organisation or radio station executives and so on.

The junta is aware of all this: indeed, it has already shown its nervousness by dismissing a considerable number of right-wing officers whose loyalty was in doubt. Last week the supreme military council held lengthy meetings in Athens; it is widely believed that a further large-scale purge of doubtful officers is imminent.

Whether the king will acquiesce in all this remains to be seen; it may mean his signing decrees dismissing men who have long been his loyal friends. On the other hand it may



be difficult for him to establish any effective contact with these officers right now; the man who might have done it for him a month or two ago, **Major Michael Arnaoutis**, has been posted to London as assistant military attaché.

Whether any really effective underground movement is now being organised is hard to tell. One line of speculation is that the generals who were ousted by the colonels three months ago might stage a counter-coup, but this sounds faintly unreal. As one observer has put it, 'There is no one more retired than a retired general'. If one believes *The Times*, **Mr Mikis Theodorakis**, the composer, is emerging as yet another latter-day Dighenis; but serious students of Greek affairs do not give him much chance.

What is certain is that there is an immense amount of activity among expatriate Greeks in western Europe. Much of the inspiration comes from communists who are determined to exploit the present situation to the maximum. For example, in west Germany, which has a large number of Greek workers and students, an organisation called AMEE (which stands for Greek Expatriate Fighters' Front) has recently been set up and is mounting an assiduous propaganda campaign.

Last week it was reported to have planned the assassination of Brigadier Pattakos. The would-be killer was said to have made his way to Greece by road, and to have been arrested inside the Greek border. He was armed with a pistol – and is reported to have confessed.

Whatever the exact truth about this episode, the junta's leaders are determined to nip in the bud any resistance movement. Many youths have been arrested for distributing anti-regime leaflets; and it is also significant that a higher-than-usual number of youngsters, of both sexes, have been reported by their families as having mysteriously disappeared. The danger is that the communists, who are skilled in organising resistance movements, will exploit to the utmost the democratic fervour of the youth; they are likely to gain effective control of any national resistance movement that may emerge.

Against this background, it may well be that the efforts to unseat the junta will take a long time to mature. Much will depend on the relationship between the king and the colonels in the next few months. Some observers believe that a showdown is unavoidable; certainly the differences between them are mounting. The question of the suspended royalist officers is but one conspicuous issue – and the king will lose in popularity if he does not back up these men, as effectively as he can.

Another issue is the question of the timetable for the formulation of the new constitution. The king is using his influence to speed up the work of the commission; according to usually reliable reports, he wants the job completed by mid-September. This would enable him to put pressure on the junta to set a dead-line for the next phase: the final 'elaboration' of the text by the government and its presentation to the people in a plebiscite. The king's basic concern is that he must be seen to be trying to implement the pledge to the nation that democracy will be restored.

A third, and fundamental, issue between the king and the junta concerns the role of the judges who were brought into the cabinet, albeit rather as a piece of political window-dressing. In its desire to tighten its grip on the executive, the junta wants these elderly and ineffectual figures ousted; it pleads the need for efficiency. The king wants them to stay. How far will he oppose Papadopoulos and Pattakos? His handling of this issue may provide a clue to the political fate of the country. It could lead to a head-on clash which might even precipitate the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a Nasserite regime. On the other hand, if he induces the junta to retain the judges, it may be the first very faint glimmer of a return to normality in Greece.



# American Disquiet about Bonn Defence Cuts

The last few weeks have seen strange twists and turns in the curious relationship between Washington, Bonn and Paris. Much of this is due to the behaviour of General de Gaulle, with his *politique de ressentiment*. Despite the outward success of his recent visit to west Germany, Bonn officials are privately wondering whether he has not by now ruled himself out as the sheet anchor of German foreign policy. But at the same time Washington's relations with the Kiesinger government are unpleasantly strained, mainly because of differences on the issues of defence and European security.

**Mr McNamara**, the American Secretary for Defence, angrily cancelled his planned visit (17 July) to the west German capital mainly because of the Germans' complaints that they had not been fully consulted about the American proposal to reduce the number of F4 Phantom aircraft stationed in Germany. Defence Department officials in Washington say that the move was fully ventilated at the previous trilateral talks between the United States, Britain and Germany; their government, they say, had made amply clear that the withdrawal and rotation of the Phantoms would in no way weaken the American commitment to the defence of Europe, while it would ease **General Westmoreland's** burden in Vietnam (where Phantoms are needed).

Mr McNamara also shrugged off his planned visit with the argument that the recent German budget leakage (with its implication that the Germany army might be cut by 40,000 men or more) was not accompanied by any new defence proposals which could have been discussed in Bonn as an alternative to the various arrangements and expenditures which, the Americans say, had been virtually settled in the earlier tripartite talks.

Washington now awaits some new ideas from the Kiesinger government on European defence, and Germany's contribution to it. It is hoped, and almost presumed, that **Herr Schröder**, the German defence minister, will have some ideas up his sleeve when he arrives in the United States next month to attend the launching of the American-built missile destroyer which Germany has bought. But that occasion will be slightly clouded if, as reported, Bonn has not decided to purchase another vessel from the Americans.

The whole question will be discussed in greater detail when Kiesinger himself goes to Washington in mid-August, almost on Schröder's heels. On the American side the gnawing doubt is that the price for persuading the Germans to retain the Bundeswehr forces at their existing level may be an American agreement to install more Pershing rockets in Germany, instead of the Germans buying Starfighter replacements 'off the American shelf'.

The situation is complicated, too, by the usual Congressional pressures. For example, **Senator Mansfield**, the majority leader in the Senate, seems to believe that Bonn's decision to cut back on defence spending is due to appalling under-rating of the threat the Germans still face from the east. He has said with irritation that if the west Germans are blind to their responsibilities, the Americans should refuse to take them up on Bonn's behalf.

More realistic American officials strongly suspect that the cosy Johnson-Kosygin discussions, with their hint of Russo-American bilateral decisions on world affairs, including Europe, have also contributed to Bonn's mood of recalcitrance; though undoubtedly it was the decision (not even mentioned by Senator Mansfield) to withdraw the fighter-bombers that was mainly responsible for the German reaction.



Some officials in Washington argue that the policy suggested by Senator Mansfield – which in effect amounts to further cuts in the American army in Germany in order to bring the Germans to their senses – would have the opposite effect from what is intended. They contend that the German government might then, for perhaps the first time, seriously contemplate a reversal or partial reversal of its whole position on European security (such as Mansfield imagines has already occurred).

Some of Herr Kiesinger's recent statements have certainly been double-edged; they might be interpreted as containing a veiled threat of a policy switch 'if the United States won't play'. It can also be argued that Herr Brandt's talk about an east-west link in Europe can be interpreted in the same way.

American politicians who are critical of the Germans point out that it is hardly two months since the Bonn government joined Britain and the United States in declaring that there was no justification for a significant reduction in Nato's strength. More sophisticated observers feel that the Germans may be trying to do a bit of political blackmailing – but that there may just be some justification for it. This implies some criticism of Mr McNamara, on the ground that he failed to take the Germans fully into his confidence, and that he disregarded the Germans' desire to be fully in the picture whenever major decisions are pending on European security issues.

Meanwhile Washington experts who believe they know what Bonn is up to forecast that Herr Kiesinger will come out in support of the 'long-range defence programme based on undiminished strength' which was aired by **General de Maiziere**, the west German armed forces inspector-general, in a speech at Stuttgart on 6 July to the German Atlantic Society. But the clear implication of this is that the Americans must not withdraw air force squadrons.

Whatever the vicissitudes in the relations between Washington, Bonn and Paris, the Kiesinger government wants to rely for its ultimate defence on American nuclear weapons in American hands, in west Germany, for a considerable time to come.

## Saving Hussein from the Iraqis

President Nasser's speech last Sunday has pleased at least one man: **King Hussein** of Jordan.

The king is considerably more hopeful today than he was immediately after his visit to Cairo. His fear then was that the Arab world was about to polarise between the radical left-wing states and the traditionalists, which would have placed Jordan, as he saw it, in an impossible position. Now he feels that the Syrian and Algerian extremists have lost influence, and he interprets Nasser's speech as a moderate one.

King Hussein confirms, too, the western belief in the moderating influence of the Russians. He reckons that the Russians hope to prevent further armed skirmishes along the cease-fire lines; in the long term, he sees no vast difference between their policy and that of the United States. Both, he feels, are aiming at a moderate settlement that would involve Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in return for *de facto* recognition of Israel's right to exist.

Both are now taking public positions well short of this: the Americans seeking to gloss over the key issue of Arab Jerusalem on the ground that it has not been annexed anyway, and the Russians rejecting the idea that there can be a connection between Israeli withdrawal and Arab recognition.



But Hussein believes their private aims are different, and therefore hopes that Jordan may never need to make the choice between the extremists and the traditionalists (a somewhat curious way of expressing the alternatives: a simpler one would be to say that the king hopes to escape the choice between fighting to regain the lost half of his kingdom and losing it permanently.)

Internally, Hussein's position is not as weak as it has been made out. He is now making a series of 'meet the people' tours both to shore up his own position and to educate Jordanians in some of the facts of life after defeat. Some army units are bitter over their defeat, but there is no focus of revolt.

The most immediate cause for concern is not the Jordanian army but the Iraqi one. Amman is still full of Iraqi soldiers off duty who, to some Jordanians, give the impression more of occupiers than defenders. But the king has asked the Iraqis to begin moving home, and Iraqi units have been moving northward from Amman.

Yet the whole future still depends on the Israelis: or so the Jordanians feel. The key is the return home of the refugees who fled from the Israeli invasion of the West Bank. At present their physical conditions, except notably in the Wadi Dleel camp, are not too bad, and their mood is comparatively moderate. But if they are denied the prospect of early return it may turn to one of fury. Add that to the inevitable economic losses from the destruction of the tourist trade and the sudden cutting off the West Bank's agricultural income, and the kingdom might face collapse.

One thing, however, works for Hussein. Though the Israelis are (in Jordanian eyes) being bloody-minded in insisting that the refugees register for return on forms headed with the words 'Government of Israel', it cannot be in Israel's interest for the present Jordanian regime, wildly moderate by Arab standards, to be overthrown for something much nastier.

One of the most remarkable theories to emerge from the Middle East recently has been the report that the Israeli general staff has prepared an emergency plan to rescue Hussein personally, and save his regime, if he is in serious danger of being toppled. The essence of the plan is that the Israelis would make sure the Iraqis were well and truly expelled, and that Hussein's position was 'secured'. At first sight this looks very odd. Needless to say, it is a story which Hussein himself would regard with horror. But in the present topsy-turvydom of the Middle East stranger things have happened.

**UN FOOTNOTE :** Desperate Russian efforts to prevent the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Middle East from ending in a fiasco only accentuated the division of the Arab world into left-wing extremists and right-wing moderates, in the view of many U.N. observers. Their appraisal differs sharply from that held by King Hussein and outlined in the article above. Possibly the sense of 'polarisation' of the Arab world is more pronounced in New York than it is in the Middle East itself.

The Algerians are now well in the van of the extremist group at the UN. Moderate Arabs say, however, that Boumedienne got a 'cool' reception from the Russians when he visited Moscow.

But Algerian sources are saying that the time is over when Nasser can speak for all the Arabs. The Russians must understand that individual Arab states have their own policy.

On the other side, the moderate Arabs - Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon - and possibly Kuwait - are beginning to concur on one point, which has been expressed by a Tunisian source in these terms: 'We do not want another 20 years of inconclusive struggle - no peace, no war. What we want is either war or peace now'.



Since 'war' now looks pretty obviously out, some observers argue, this attitude implies the emergence of an anti-Cairo, anti-Algiers attitude which might be realistic about negotiations with Israel. But at this stage this is no more than intelligent, forward-looking speculation.

One certainty about the Middle East debate has been the visible discomfiture of the Russians. There is speculation in New York that Fedorenko may be Moscow's 'fall guy' in the whole process. Observers noted that it was Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dobrynin who did most of the talking with Mr. Goldberg and other American diplomats.

As for the United States reaction, some American officials rather give the impression of people sitting back and slightly enjoying Russia's self-induced discomfiture. But with their eye on other considerations, the Americans do not want to twist the knife.

Meanwhile, American officials are watching closely to see whether Hussein will carry out his planned visit to Moscow. How far will the Russians go to help Jordan?

For the future still depends on the Israeli or so the Jordanians feel. The key is the return home of the refugees who fled from the Israeli invasion of the West Bank. At present their physical conditions, except notably in the Wadi Bled camp, are not comparatively moderate, but if they are denied the prospect of a return to one of their own, that is the inevitable economic losses from the destruction of the tourist trade and the sudden cutting off the West Bank's agricultural income, and the kingdom might face collapse.

One thing, however, works for Hussein. Though the Israelis are in Jordanian eyes being bloody-minded in insisting that the refugees require for return on terms headed with the words 'Government of Israel', it cannot be in Israel's interest for the present Jordanian regime, wildly moderate by Arab standards, to be overthrown for something much nastier.

One of the most remarkable incentives to emerge from the Middle East recently has been the report that the Israeli general staff has prepared an emergency plan to rescue Hussein personally, and save his regime, if he is in serious danger of being toppled. The essence of the plan is that the Israelis would make sure the Kurds were well and truly expelled, and that Hussein's position was secured. At first sight this looks very odd. Needless to say, it is a story which Hussein himself would regard with horror. But in the present topsy-turvydom of the Middle East stranger things have happened.

**UNFOOTNOTED:** Despite Russian efforts to prevent the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Middle East from ending in a Russo-Gab, accentuated the division of the Arab world into left-wing extremists and right-wing moderates, in the view of many U.N. observers. Their appraisal differs sharply from that held by King Hussein and outlined in the article above. Possibly the reason of 'polarisation' of the Arab world is more pronounced in New York than it is in the Middle East itself, especially in the case of the extreme group at the U.N. Moderate Arabians are now well in the van of the extremist group at the U.N. Moderate Arabians, however, that Houmeidienne got a cool reception from the Russians when he visited Moscow last week, and he is not alone in this respect.

But Algerian sources are saying that the time is over when Nasser can speak for all the Arabs. The Russians must understand that individual Arab states have their own policy. On the other side, the moderate Arabs - Tunisian, Moroccan, Saudi, Libyan, Jordan, Lebanon - are beginning to concern on one point, which has been expressed by a Tunisian source in these terms: 'We do not want another 20 years of French influence'.

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93

Saturday, July 22, 1967

*[Handwritten signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Beginning to Normalize Military Aid to Greece

Immediately after the Greek coup, we suspended shipment of all major military aid items, partly to signal our genuine displeasure and partly to put us in a better position with our domestic liberals. Now Secretary Rusk believes we should resume limited shipments in response to the coup government's limited steps back toward constitutional government.

His main concern is to avoid damaging our basic relationship with Greece. First, Greece is a NATO ally, and mounting dissatisfaction with us has already encouraged some officers to talk about following De Gaulle's example. But more immediately important, Greece is one of the few nations we can still count on in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Arab-Israeli war, Greece alone provided staging areas for our evacuation aircraft and port facilities for the Sixth Fleet. [REDACTED] 3.3  
(b)(1)  
[REDACTED] USIA facilities operated without restriction. Ambassador Talbot and the Secretary feel that continuing the complete suspension of major items any longer will provide the makings of a confrontation between us and this government and jeopardize our free use of these facilities without improving our ability to influence its return to constitutional processes.

He does not recommend taking the wraps off altogether. We still want to hold onto whatever leverage we can to press the regime down the course it has set for itself for revising the constitution, holding elections and putting the colonels back in the field. Therefore, he recommends that Phil Talbot be authorized when he returns to Athens next week to tell the government we are beginning to relax our restrictions and are ready to release certain items (listed in the attached, page 2, para. 4). He would also say, however, that further relaxation will depend on their staying on course.

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 09-280  
By *id*, NARA, Date 1-15-10



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If it were not for the Congressional debate on military aid, no one would hesitate to make this recommendation to you. However, in the aftermath of the coup, Luke Battle did promise to let a few of the most interested members know when we resumed shipments. While we have the authority to resume any time, we are morally committed to tell them what we're doing, and this obviously isn't the best time.

I believe we can make a convincing case that the foreign policy considerations should override our understandable distaste for doing business with a military regime in a country like Greece. Actually, this is a small step, and we will maintain tight control. We can't treat our NATO relationship lightly, and we don't want to push Greece in France's direction. And many of the more liberal members will be impressed by the importance of our position in Greece to Israel.

If you approve the Secretary's recommendation, Talbot would carry the message back to Athens, and State would quietly inform interested members on the Hill after Secretary McNamara's testimony Wednesday. Your alternative, of course, is to wait until you have the results of Congressional soundings before giving approval. You are the better judge; my own thought is that there might be some advantage where we have a good case in showing that we're not going to let Congress cow us.

Incidentally, you will be pleased to know that this recommendation comes to you not only from the Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Near East (which has functioned well since you set up the system last year) but also from the Senior Interdepartmental Group which met for the first time in quite a while to discuss this question.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Wait till we have Congressional soundings \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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July 21, 1967

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~~NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Normalization of US-Greek Relations

We have had a number of interdepartmental discussions recently on the subject of normalizing our relations with the Greek Government. Both in the Regional Group under Assistant Secretary Battle and in the Senior Group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach, with Ambassador Talbot present on both occasions, certain steps in this direction have been agreed upon. I am in accord with the conclusions reached.

From the point of view of our relations with Greece, I consider the steps outlined below important to our interests. Ambassador Talbot is returning to Greece at the end of next week and should be able to tell the Greek Government something positive on this score shortly after he arrives.

Recommendation: That you approve the actions described below:

Foreign Policy Aspects

1. Since the April military coup we have withheld delivery on certain major arms to Greece and been quite cool in our relations with the Government with the idea not only of exhibiting disapproval of the methods by which the junta seized control but also, hopefully, of encouraging some return, however gradual, to more constitutional processes.

2. We now believe these tactics are no longer useful and that, if continued longer, may be counterproductive. The King has come to the same conclusion. Ambassador Talbot considers it quite possible the Greeks, although highly desirous of close relations with us, may adopt the same tactics by causing certain difficulties with some of our facilities there.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 09-278 and NLJ 03-304  
By 128 NARA, Date 4-22-11  
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-2-

3.3  
(b)(1)

3. We have in Greece facilities important to the Air Force, the Navy, [REDACTED] and USIA; they have increased in value since the Arab-Israeli war. That war underlined the importance of Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) to U. S. interests.

4. We propose that Ambassador Talbot be authorized to inform the Greek Government of certain relaxations as set forth below, making clear that future actions in this regard will be related to progress in the restoration of constitutional processes: (a) a coastal minesweeper (\$2.9 million); (b) one F-104G trainer (\$1.5 million); (c) sidewinder missiles and related equipment which are excess to the needs of the Netherlands (no charge); and (d) 175mm cannons (8-\$1.05 million). These items were chosen (a) as having a clear NATO context and (b) as obviously not lending themselves to the suppression of civil disturbances.

5. We believe we should not release just yet either tanks, helicopters, or other heavy equipment. (With respect to FRG shipment of military assistance to Greece, particularly including tanks, we believe we should give the Germans the go-ahead signal in the near future but not just at this time.)

#### Congressional Problems

1. Although the timing of this action is not particularly favorable given this concern in Congressional quarters with respect to arms programs, both sale and grant, nevertheless, we believe we must proceed and that the over-all interest of foreign policy requires that we do so as soon as possible. We judge that although there will be some adverse reaction in Congress and elsewhere, it will not be great and can be reasonably contained by stressing the following:

a. This is a minimum step.

b. Greece, like Turkey and Iran, emerges as particularly important to the U. S. given the uncertainties in the Middle East and the Soviet thrust in that area.

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c. It is essential that we maintain Greece as an active and functioning member of NATO under whose umbrella the arms programs are developed.

d. We must avoid pressing Greece in the direction of the French with their lukewarm and unhelpful posture in a NATO context.

2. If you approve the above course of action, we will undertake a certain amount of educational work on the Hill. How much can perhaps better be determined after the appearance on July 26 of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on military assistance programs.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

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July 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Greece that the appointment of Ambassador Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Greece would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Protocol  
CF w/cy of Incoming  
✓ Country File w/Incoming



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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
July 18, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the Greek Embassy in Washington asking if this Government agrees to the appointment of Ambassador Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Greece to the United States. A biographic sketch of Ambassador Palamas is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Ambassador Palamas as the Ambassador of Greece at Washington would be satisfactory. If you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Greek Government of your approval.

Faithfully yours,



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.



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1967 JUL 18 PM 1 45

WASHINGTON  
STATE TO SECRETARY OF STATE



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## BIOGRAPHY

## CHRISTIAN XANTHOPOULOS-PALAMAS

## GREECE

Ambassador Palamas was born in Messolongi, Greece on November 21, 1902. He graduated from the University of Athens with a degree in Law. He entered the Greek Diplomatic Service in 1929 and served in Romania, Istanbul, Rome and Belgrade prior to World War II. During World War II, he was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being transferred to Paris in 1945 as Chargé until 1949. Following an assignment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Palamas was named Permanent Greek Representative to the United Nations from 1954 to 1960. Upon his return to Athens, he was Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1963. At that time he was appointed to his latest position as Greek Permanent Representative to NATO in Paris. He now holds the permanent rank of Ambassador in the Greek Foreign Service.

Ambassador Palamas has been decorated on numerous occasions by the Greek Government and also holds the Grand Cross of the Yugoslav Order of the Flag and the Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold of Belgium.

Ambassador and Mrs. Palamas have no children. He speaks fluent English, French and Italian.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

→ ... Walt W. Rostow

95

TO :Members of the SIG

DATE: 17 July 1967

FROM :Frank M. Chapin

Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence for SIG

SUBJECT: Situation in Greece

Attached is a copy of the Intelligence Memorandum on the Situation in Greece prepared by CIA on July 6. It may be of particular interest to you in light of the upcoming SIG meeting of July 19.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-308  
By cl, NARA Date 9-21-99

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

THE SITUATION IN GREECE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-308

By CB, NARA Date 9-21-99

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17

6 July 1967  
No. 1255/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
6 July 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Greece

1. The eleven-week-old military regime in Athens remains firmly in command. Close on the heels of the bloodless take-over, the junta--under the leadership of Col. Georgios Papadopoulos--moved to establish complete control of all aspects of the government. In carrying out its professed aims of completely purging all Greek institutions of any semblance of the former archaic, corrupt, and "inefficient forces of the status quo," the junta installed supporters in the military high command and all key governmental and bureaucratic posts. This process is continuing. The civilian premier and foreign minister are mere figureheads.

2. Political life has been sharply proscribed. Persons making antiregime statements are subject to severe punishment by the military courts. Many of the former political leaders originally arrested have now been released, but are either under house arrest or are being closely watched. Andreas Papandreou, who the junta feared would turn an expected electoral victory into a decided swing to the political left and an eventual break in the country's long-standing ties with the West, remains in an Athens prison awaiting trial on charges of treason. Of the more than 6,000 suspect Communists originally arrested, over 2,500 are still at an island detention center. Strict control of the domestic press is maintained, and all newspapers reflect the same proregime line.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA for the use of the CIA representative on the Inter-departmental Regional Group, Middle East. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services.

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3. Some progress has been made toward one of the junta's major aims, that of revising the constitution. A constitutional review commission has been meeting since 20 June and has been instructed to finish its draft for approval by the junta by mid-December. No timetable has yet been set for the announced referendum by the people. Although the commission was directed not to alter the basic institutions of the state (i.e., the crowned democracy) the junta has suggested that the commission consider, inter alia, a provision requiring a popularly elected prime minister. This strongly suggests the junta desires a considerable limitation of the palace's previous political authority which, as a matter of fact, has been a contentious issue several times in Greece's modern history.

4. In short, the regime shows no evidence of deviating from its professed aims of "cleansing" the country's institutions until the "revolution has completed its tasks." The junta's vision of a purified political and social atmosphere may be unrealistic and its capability to realize it may be doubtful, but its resolve to see it through is firm and so far unquestioned.

5. Most of the elements best able to resist the take-over were almost immediately immobilized. The general public reaction to the events of 21 April, allowing for the initial period of shock at the speed with which they took place, appeared to be acceptance of the junta's explanation of the necessity for the coup--the removal of the "corrupt" politicians, who for so long had impeded the growth of progressive government in Greece. Popular tolerance and even satisfaction in the new government exist, even if more a matter of relief at being rid of the old than an expression of outright good will toward the new. Only sporadic instances of resistance have emerged and any effective organized opposition seems doubtful in the near future.

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6. The junta appears to face no immediate danger of a countercoup within the military. Most of the former high command and general officers, whom the junta regards as sharing--with the politicians and the palace--the responsibility for the precoup situation, have been replaced by coup activists or by officers who were in sympathy with the coup makers' objectives. The fact that promotions and retirements continue generally in line with established procedures rather than on the basis of favoritism has probably discouraged any real movement for a countercoup. In addition, awareness among the officers that a countercoup would result in bloodshed on both sides, and possibly civil war, has had a quieting effect.

7. The junta's relations with the palace continue to be strained. The King, in his isolation from the power center, has attempted to use the palace's past prestigious position vis-a-vis the military as leverage for pressing the junta into restoring military discipline and taking concrete action toward returning to constitutional government. Following a good reception by both the populace and the military during two recent visits to military establishments, the King appears confident that he could prevail if a serious confrontation with the junta should arise.

8. Actually, the King's confidence may be unwarranted. Although the colonels have capitalized on the popular acclaim for the monarch and his public cooperation with the junta in order to legitimize the regime--and will probably continue to do so in the short run--they remain suspicious of the King's motives. So far most of the points of potential conflict between the junta and the palace have involved changes in the military to which the King has had little objection. Constantine's opposition to additional purges or governmental changes, however, may at any time result in a major confrontation. The colonels have let it be known that in such an event the King will be forced to accept their plans or be asked to leave the country. In short, the King's leverage with the

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junta is slight and is likely to deteriorate as the coup leaders' control is extended.

9. Complicating the myriad problems the regime faces at home is the difficulty in gaining international acceptance. Obviously pained but apparently unswayed by the negative reaction in the West, which resulted in considerable anti-Greek dialogue in NATO and in the European Economic Community, the coup makers have repeatedly proclaimed their firm opposition to Communism, their devotion to the aims of NATO, and their hopes for continued close association with the US.

10. Their efforts aimed at the US are particularly pointed. They are eager to initiate contacts with US officials and have indicated they would accept professional outside help in dealing with the many problems they face. They reportedly believe that the US has so far failed to respond appropriately and that the US misunderstands the necessity for their take-over. The coup leaders have shown resentment over the continuing close US contact with the King. They apparently fear that the US is using the King to undermine their regime.

11. The junta members have not taken kindly to what they regard as unwarranted American interest in the welfare of their "enfant terrible," Andreas Papandreou. He has so far been treated humanely and probably will not be executed regardless of the outcome of his trial, which has not yet been scheduled.

12. The one aspect of what they regard as the "cool" US response to the regime which is most perplexing to the group is the temporary suspension of certain items of US military aid. They regard this action as a direct slap at them. They have indicated that should this policy continue, the consequent resentment would lead to anti-American reprisals and efforts to seek aid elsewhere. There is surely some element of bluster in this approach, but the threat of reprisals is unquestionably present. King Constantine, initially approving of the suspension

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of US military aid as a means whereby both he and the US might obtain needed leverage with the junta, reportedly now believes that if some overt indication that this policy is being relaxed is not soon forthcoming, a serious confrontation could arise, not only jeopardizing the already shaky position of the King, but also plaguing the development of closer US-Greek cooperation.

13. The colonels regard Greece as a bastion of strength for the West in the eastern Mediterranean, especially following the recent events in the Middle East. As a result, in addition to expecting more overt US support, the government will probably push hard for more substantial material aid from NATO, pointing to the danger of continued Soviet support for the Arabs and the increased presence of the Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. The colonels' observation of the depletion of US assets in the Middle East as a result of the Arab-Israeli war may lead them to expect new US or NATO requests for additional real estate in Greece. The government's willingness to maintain an active role in the Western defense system probably depends to a large extent on the degree to which the legitimacy of the regime is accepted by the NATO powers.

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RECEIVED  
BOSTON'S OFFICE





Thursday, July 13, 1967, 7:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Greek Ambassador Matsas' farewell call, noon  
Friday, July 14, 1967

Ambassador Matsas of Greece is retiring after five years in Washington, partially for health reasons, but more accurately because, as he told Secretary Rusk, "he can't be sufficiently enthusiastic about the new regime," which came to power in a military coup last April.

Ambassador Matsas has done much to further US-Greek relations. He is close to the Greek Royal Family.

Although the visit is largely a courtesy call, you may wish to:

1. express regret that he is leaving;
2. thank him for his efforts on behalf of Greek-American relations;
3. ask him about his health (you sent him flowers when he had a gall bladder operation this spring);
4. ask him to convey your personal greetings and good wishes to the King, along with an expression of our hope that the Greek government will return as quickly as possible to constitutional rule.

A biographic sketch of the Ambassador is attached. He will be accompanied to the White House by Chester Carter, Deputy Chief of Protocol.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: Biographic Sketch  
WWR:BKS:amc

full p 2  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ~~Talking points for~~ <sup>Greek</sup> Ambassador Matsas' farewell call, noon Friday, July 14, 1967

in Washington

Ambassador Matsas of Greece is going home after five years, partially for health reasons, but more particularly, as he told Secretary Rusk, "because he can't be sufficiently enthusiastic about the new regime." He <sup>has</sup> been a good friend of the U.S. and is close to the Greek Royal Family.

The visit is largely a courtesy call. You may want to:

- (1) express regret that he is leaving;
- (2) ask him about his health (you sent him flowers when he had a gall bladder operation this Spring;)
- (3) ask for his views on developments in Greece;
- (4) thank him for his efforts on behalf of Greek-American relations;
- (5) send personal greetings and good wishes to the King.

W. W. Rostow





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 12256

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with Greek Ambassador  
Alexander Matsas on June 14, 12:00 noon.

Ambassador Matsas, who has been Greek Ambassador to the United States since February 1962, has an appointment to pay a farewell call on the President June 14. The Ambassador is retiring from the Greek Foreign Service as well as resigning his post and will be departing from the United States on July 18 for Europe, where he will spend six weeks at Gstaad, Switzerland before returning to Greece. During his five years in Washington, Ambassador Matsas has done an excellent job in furthering U.S.-Greek friendship. Although the official reason for the Ambassador's retirement is his ill-health, the real reason has been his lack of rapport with the Greek Government which came to power in a military coup April 21.

Suggested Talking Points:

- 1) Expression of hope that the new Greek Government will return as quickly as possible to constitutional rule.
- 2) Appreciation for Matsas' outstanding efforts in behalf of Greek-American friendship during his five years in Washington.

Mr. Chester C. Carter, Deputy Chief of Protocol, will also attend.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador Matsas is enclosed.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:  
Biographic Sketch

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-34**  
**By is, NARA Date 8-26-97**

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 JUL 13 PM 6 17





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

2577  
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July 5, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request of Greek Ambassador Matsas to Pay  
a Farewell Call on You

Recommendation:

That you receive Greek Ambassador Alexander Matsas for a brief farewell call at some point during the period July 6 to 18.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Ambassador Alexander Matsas, who has been Greek Ambassador in Washington since February 1962, has asked to pay a farewell call on you prior to his departure from Washington July 18. Matsas, who has been a member of the Greek Foreign Service for more than 30 years, is retiring from the diplomatic service as well as resigning from his post.

The Greek Embassy has announced that Matsas is retiring for reasons of health. However, in his talks with Department officials, the Ambassador has indicated that a major factor leading to his resignation and retirement has been his "objective" attitude towards the government of Greece which came to power in the April 21 coup. Although apparently out of favor with the new government, Ambassador Matsas has close ties to the Greek Royal Family. No substantive discussion would be expected since the Ambassador is not returning directly to Greece but will spend approximately two months in Europe.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-34

By is, NARA Date 8-26-97

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

98

To Hal Squelch

need Rostow see?

→ Brown

I don't think

so.

H. H. A.



ΑΚΡΟΠΟΛΙΣ - 15 Μαΐου 1967

## Παλαιά ή συνεργασία 'Ανδρέα- 'Αριστερών

### 'Η δήλωσις μετανοίας του

Όπως αποδεικνύεται, από την δημοσιευμένην παραπλευρώς αποκλειστικήν, εκ Λανδίνου, ανταπόκρισιν του Διευθυντού της «Ακρόπολεως» κ. ΝΑΣΟΥ ΜΠΟΤΣΗ, ο κ. 'Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου, ευρίσκεται εις στενωπάτην έπαφην και συνεργασίαν με την 'Αριστεράν. 'Αλλά, τούτο δεν αποτελεί νέαν «γραμμήν», ή ιδιοτροπίαν εκ περιστάσεως. 'Ο υίος του κ. Γ. Παπανδρέου υπήρξεν ανέκαθεν θαυμαστής, θιασώτης και συνεργάτης της 'Αριστεράς. Τούτο δε αποδεικνύεται και από την κατωτέρω δήλωσιν μετανοίας,

την οποίαν είχεν ούτος υποχρεωθεί να υπογράψη, μαζί με άλλους συντρόφους του, το 1939, δια να καλύψη τας τότε σχέσεις του με τούς έρυθρούς. 'Υποθέτομεν, θασίμως, ότι, έν τώ μεταξύ, θα προέβη εις δήλωσιν μετανοίας και προς αυτούς και του εύχόμεθα, μόνον να μη μετανόησιν, μιαν ημέραν και πάλιν, τήσων πανηγυρικώς, όσον το 1939, δια την νυν στάσιν του. Δημοσιεύομεν την σχετικήν ειδήσιν, όπως είχε δημοσιευθή, τότε, εις την «Ακρόπολιν» και το «Βήμα» της έποχής:

### Δηλώσεις μετανοίας προς το 'Υφυπουργείον 'Ασφαλείας

«Παρά των όργάνων της Ειδικής 'Ασφαλείας του Κράτους, κατόπιν μακράς παρακολούθησως, συνελήφθησαν οι κάτωθι σπουδασταί, οίτινες, ως άπεκαλύφθη εκ των έπακολουθησάσων ανακρίσεων, είχαν σχηματίσει όργάνωσι των Τεταρτοδιεθνιστών, ήτοι έπαδών του εκ Ρωσίας έξορίστου Τρότσκι, καθοδηγούμενων υπό του κομμουνιστού Μεγαριώτη Μεν. φοιτητού της Χημείας, φερομένου ως γραμματέως της κεντρικής έπιτροπής της όργανώσεως ταύτης.

Είς την οίκίαν του εκ των μελών της όργανώσεως Α. Παπανδρέου κατεσχέθησαν:

Είς πολύγραφος και μία γραφομηχανή, δι' ών εξετυπούντο τά λαθρόδια κομμουνιστικά έντυπα «Προλετάριος», διάφορα έτερα κομμουνιστικά δελτία και προκηρύξεις. Οί συλληφθέντες προέβησαν εις πλήρεις όμολογίας της δράσεώς των, εκτός του εκ τούτων Μεγαριώτη Μεν., υποβαλόντες άκολούθως δηλώσεις μετανοίας και άποκηρύξεως της κομμουνιστικής ιδεολογίας, κατόπιν των οποίων το ύφυπουργείον Δημοσίας 'Ασφαλείας, εξ επεικειας, προς το νεαρόν της ηλικίας των και έκτιμών την έπιδειχθείσαν ει-

λικρίνειάν των, άφηκε τούτους έλευθέρους.

1) Βαλκάς Γεώργιος του Γεωργ., άεργος. 2) Παπανδρέου 'Ανδρέας του Γεωργ., φοιτητής Νομικής. 3) Γαστεράτος Στέφ. του Κων., φοιτητής 'Ανωτάτης 'Εμπορικής. 4) Καστοριάδης Κορνήλιος του Καίσαρος, φοιτητής Νομικής. 5) Κύρκος Κύρκος του Μιχαήλ, φοιτητής Νομικής. 6) 'Ιερόπαις 'Ελευθ. του Χαραλ. φοιτητής Νομικής. 7) Καραμπέλος Χρ. του Παναγ., φοιτητής Νομικής. 8) Κολοβός 'Ηλίας του Χρήστου, φοιτητής Νομικής. 9) Βαλκάς Χρ. του 'Ιωάννου, μαθητής ΣΤ' τάξεως γυμνασίου. 10) Κονδυλίδης Νικ. του Φωτίου, ηλεκτροτεχνίτης και μαθητής. 11) Κοντογιάννης 'Ιωάν. του Παν., φοιτητής Νομικής.

('Εφημερίς «Ακρόπολις» (αριθ. φύλλου 3780) της Τετάρτης 9ης Αύγούστου 1939, σελίς 4η, στήλη 4η) 'Επίσης, ή ως άνω ειδήσις έδημοσιεύθη πανομοιότυπως εις την έφημερίδα «'Ελεύθερον Βήμα» (7043) της Τετάρτης 9ης Αύγούστου 1939, σελίς 5η στήλη 7η, και υπό τον τίτλον: «'Ανεκαλύφθη νέα όργάνωσις έπαδών του Τρότσκι. Δηλώσεις άποκηρύξεως και μετανοίας κομμουνιστών»).

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

101

June 13, 1967

TO: Mr. Jim Jones

FROM: Bromley Smith

May we have a date and  
time.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10/a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassador Talbot

Phil Talbot will be here from Athens on consultations on 13 - 15 June.

Although the Middle East crisis has almost blotted the Greek coup from our minds, it is still one of those problems which arouses substantial domestic interest. When attention shifts back from the Arab-Israeli borders, it will be apparent that the coup government is not moving as quickly as a lot of liberals would like to restore constitutional government, though the new government has made some promises.

It might be worth your hearing from Phil first hand what the situation there is and what we can expect over the next months.

W. Rostow

I'll see him ☒

No ☐

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-4

By fw/imp NARA, Date 10-4-96

appointment, 15 June  
1:00 pm.

5/5 notified  
6/13. 8/14  
Saunders  
6/14 notified



9907

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 8, 1967

2219

10/6

1 - Phillips  
2 - Rostow~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Request of U. S. Ambassador to Greece, Phillips Talbot,  
for a Meeting with President Johnson

The Honorable Phillips Talbot, U. S. Ambassador to Greece, will be in Washington June 13 to 15 for consultations. Ambassador Talbot, who was formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), has been in Athens since September, 1965. The current visit to the United States will be the Ambassador's first since the Greek Government of Prime Minister Kanellopoulos was overthrown by a military coup on April 21.

Following the overthrow of the constitutional Greek government, our relationship with the new regime has been cool but correct. As part of our effort to encourage the new government to move towards a return to constitutional processes and to release all or most of the more than 5,000 political prisoners, we have suspended delivery of certain major military shipments to Greece. King Constantine has also been exerting pressure on the new government to restore parliamentary institutions.

Greece remains a member of NATO, and the current crisis in the Middle East has pointed up the strategic value of Greece to NATO and the United States.

It is recommended that the President receive Ambassador Talbot for a brief visit prior to the Ambassador's departure from Washington on June 16.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-34

By jis, NARA Date 8-26-97  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year

intervals; not

automatically declassified



RECEIVED  
RUSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 JUN 9 AM 11 13

*M. Smith*  
*S*  
*102*

~~Secret~~  
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

# 3 - *WWR destroyed*  
# 4 - *Parachutes*  
# 5 - *Pit. Run.*  
# 6 - *Dist 5/76*



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

THE GREEK JUNTA

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 09-279  
By *id*, NARA, Date *2-17-10*

E.O. 12958  
3.3 (b)(1)(6)

~~Secret~~

*2*  
24 May 1967  
No. 1113/67



## **WARNING**

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
24 May 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Greek Junta

Summary

A month after their coup, the three principal military leaders of the new Greek Government appear to be developing a largely apolitical program for Greece. Although they have been working well together, the leaders general uniformity of outlook will be put to the test, should they stay in power long, by the need to establish policy on the more obviously political questions that are certain to face them. Moreover, despite their administrative abilities, they are without political experience and this could spell trouble in the months ahead.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and with the Clandestine Services.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~  
~~SECRET~~



1. One month after the establishment of the military-backed government in Athens, the situation is outwardly calm, and there is no sign of any effective internal resistance to the regime. For the moment, although the public has not so far demonstrated support for the new regime, it appears relieved that the coup went off relatively painlessly and that there is in prospect at least a temporary respite from the political turbulence that has plagued Greece since the downfall of the Karamanlis government in 1963.

2. Three officers, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos and Colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos, have emerged as the most powerful figures of the new government. For the time being, at least, they are the key persons in any determination of the trend of events in Greece. Their backgrounds are similar but their personalities are not, and their ability to check any differences which arise among themselves will be critical.

Brigadier General Pattakos

3. Pattakos, 55, was born on the island of Crete. He had held his present rank for only three months at the time of the coup. As commander of the tank and infantry units stationed at the Armor Center just outside Athens, Pattakos played a crucial role during the seizure of power. Before the coup, he was considered pro National Radical Union (ERE) Party, pro-NATO, and pro-US. He has close relatives in the United States and two nephews serving as officers in the US Army. one of them in Vietnam. [REDACTED]

4. As interior minister, Pattakos presides over the program of investigation now being carried out regarding the several thousand political prisoners still in government jails and over the continuing campaign for the suppression of "leftists and anarchists." Pattakos has relinquished command of the armored troops in the Athens region and now seems to be devoting his entire time to his governmental duties.

Colonel Papadopoulos

5. Papadopoulos, touted frequently as the most powerful member of the triumvirate, was born in northern Greece. At 48, he has had a distinguished military career, graduating first in his cadet class in 1940, serving with General Grivas' resistance forces in World War II. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In dealing with the press and others who have quizzed him on the future course of events in Greece, he has fielded questions well and has given forthright and reasonable answers, but has occasionally demonstrated a touch of asperity.

6. Papadopoulos' present post is that of minister to the prime minister, which allows him to exercise the authority of the prime minister's office while permitting a civilian--Kollias--to hold the title.

Colonel Makarezos

7. Makarezos, also 48, was born near Athens. Recently promoted to full colonel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and has an academic background in economics, political science, and industrial management. Makarezos speaks limited English but fluent German, possibly acquired during his tour as Greek military attache in Bonn in 1963 and 1964. Although at ease in public appearances, he has kept more in the background than have the other two members of the trio. He, too, appears to be entirely pro-NATO and pro-US.

8. As minister of coordination, Makarezos is chiefly concerned with matters of economic development and--apparently--with the "cleansing" and reorganization of the government bureaucracy.



9. A number of other field grade army officers who were instrumental in carrying out the coup (the deputy prime minister, General Spandidakis, joined after it had succeeded) have remained shadowy figures whose significant functions in the government, if any, are still not clear. One of them, however, Lt. Col. Dimetrios Stametalopolos, was appointed director general of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation.

10. There have been reports stemming chiefly from speculation and gossip of nascent conflict within the junta, especially between Papadopoulos and Pattakos. This has been denied by both men [redacted]

[redacted] Nevertheless, the rumors persist, and even if they are untrue, constant reference to a conflict between Papadopoulos and Pattakos might in time serve to evoke it. At present, however, the triumvirate seems to be working well together.

11. There are a few tentative indications of rivalry between Pattakos and Papadopoulos, however.

[redacted] Papadopoulos expressed unhappiness that US officials deal with the King and Pattakos rather than with him. For his part, Pattakos made a strong pitch to come to the US for the Greek-American celebrations scheduled for 21 May. Doubtless, either man would like to be considered the one with the "American connection," and if one is singled out the other could be alienated. The King, for his part, prefers to deal with Pattakos rather than with the austere and rather humorless Papadopoulos, and hopes to exert a moderating influence on the junta through him.

#### The Leaders Speak

12. None of the military leaders of the new government has shown a great inclination toward speechmaking or public harangues, but all have been fairly explicit in statements to the press and in private conversations. Some indication of their thinking emerges from a sampling of their reported statements.

Pattakos:

On the future form of government:

"We believe the parliament will be the Greek people".

"We will have the Greek people vote if they like the new constitution or the amendments we may make."

Papadopoulos:

On his attitude toward representative government:

"The meaning of freedom and democracy is diametrically opposed to that of anarchy."

On the precoup situation in Greece and measures needed to remedy it:

"We are before a sick man whom we have on the operating table, and if the surgeon does not fasten him to the table during the operation there is the possibility that he could lead him to death. The restrictions imposed by the government are only the bindings fastening the patient to the operating table."

On returning Greece to a representative government:

"Our intention is to bring back as soon as possible parliamentary government to this country, but don't ask me to become a prophet."

On the handling of political prisoners:

"They will soon be called by security councils which operate according to law and in which judges participate! If they are described as persons not dangerous they will be freed."



On the effect of the coup on public opinion abroad:

"Saving the nation is more important than the effect on international opinion."

Makarezos:

On the security situation in Greece as of mid-May:

"We are certain that the Communist threat is over."

On the need for continued suppression of the leftists:

"We will never permit Greece to become a second Vietnam."

On the date when parliamentary rule can be restored:

"When social and political conditions in Greece are healthy and sound."

The Junta's Program

13. Immediately after the coup, it seemed evident that the new leaders lacked a well-thought-out program for running the country once they had control of it. In fact, they may have been somewhat surprised at the ease of their take-over. The consolidation phase, which they had probably envisaged as a lengthy one, was completed quickly, and the process of purging undesirable elements from the military forces and from the government bureaus had to be started. When questioned about their future plans for Greece, the new leaders had few specific positive aims they could incorporate in a general program for presentation to the public. Instead, while they dismantled the old structure, they found themselves obliged to react piecemeal to individual situations. For example, they issued a decree increasing benefits to farmers, and another--later rescinded--against beatniks.

14. This conveyed an impression of a lack of planning and coordination. Nevertheless, although they did not begin their take-over armed with a ready-made five-year plan for Greece, the coup leaders have achieved impressive results in some of the things they have set out to do. They have restored public order and near-normalcy to Greek economic life and have sought to conciliate rural opinion by taking steps to increase farm income. They have won at least the reluctant cooperation of the King, and have achieved a limited degree of success in winning the confidence of Western governments.

15. As the new government moves into its second month, apparently convinced that its chances for survival at home and acceptance abroad are reasonably good, the outlines of its program for Greece are beginning to take shape. A full system of priorities may not yet have been worked out, but the following are quite likely among its aims:

- Restaffing the government bureaucracy with nonpartisan functionaries who combine occupational skill with integrity. This will be a difficult and frustrating task, which will either force the new government into compromises or delay its turning matters over to an elected government.
- Revamping the legislative and executive branches of the government to give increased power to the prime minister.
- Redrafting the constitution to provide checks on the direct action of political parties.
- Reversing the leftist-neutralist drift in Greek foreign policy which characterized the post-Karamanlis period, to include strengthening ties with the West and perhaps adopting a more forthcoming attitude toward Turkey.
- Emphasizing development projects in poor and backward regions, coupling this with a program of aid to villages. The importance of this objective was underlined by the recent surprise announcement of an \$840-million agreement with



a California-based firm (Litton Industries) for the construction of roads, bridges, and other projects on Crete and the Dodecanese Islands. This basic agreement had been worked out by the Stephanopoulos government, but its implementation had been stymied by leftist parliamentary opposition.

--Modernizing and improving the image of the Orthodox Church by appointing clerical dignitaries sympathetic to the new government and by setting an official example of moralistic behavior in public life.

16. The domestic aspects of this program are essentially apolitical: they call mainly for effective, "decent" administration willing to ignore the complaints of special interests or the demands of the relatives of would-be contractors. If the junta stays in power for a prolonged period, however, it is likely to become involved in what will be more obviously political questions, at which point its present general uniformity of outlook will be tested by the need to provide specific policy answers. The junta members seem intelligent, able, and strong minded. They lack experience in political matters, however, and despite their administrative capabilities there could be trouble ahead. (Photos)



Minister to the Prime Minister  
Colonel George Papadopoulos



Minister of the Interior  
Brig. Gen. Stylianos Pattakos



Minister of Coordination  
Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66672 5-67 CIA



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

F 4  
103

Mr. President:

Walt Rostow called on the UPI story about Galbreath intervening with the White House for Papandrea. Rostow said that unless Galbreath talked directly to the President, he knows of no other intervention with the White House.

WU 500

The fact is that after the coup, the State Department on its own asked that all political prisoners be spared execution. No special consideration was asked for Papandrea.

REC

20

Jim J.

11:50 am  
May 8

5-8-67  
TOLD ROSTOW  
JMS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES

SUBJECT: Andreas Papandreou

Following a series of calls from economists outside the government (Kaysen, Arrow, Heller, etc.)--all friends of Andreas Papandreou--I decided to ring Dick Helms, to acquaint him with the fact that Papandreou has a great many friends in the U.S. academic community, especially among economists, who feel strongly that we should do everything possible to get him sprung.

I made it clear to Dick that:

- this was not within my area of responsibility (Greece is "Middle East"), and I had no detailed knowledge of the situation;
- however, he should know that a lot of influential American academics are personally interested;
- there is a consular rationale for giving special attention to Papandreou: an American wife and American children (American citizens).

[REDACTED]

I told Dick [REDACTED] (without wanting to engage myself as in any way representing the White House); that I thought the consular rationale would apply even if, in terms of political role, Papandreou was not helpful from a U.S. point of view; last, that we have to be careful, since it is widely held, on the outside, that we sometimes act as if we couldn't tell the difference between Ken Galbraith and Mikoyan except in height.

Francis M. Bator

File: Papandreou  
Personal Records  
Personal Chron.  
Chron.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SENSITIVE

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 09-280  
By isl, NARA, Date 1-15-10

3.3  
(b)(1)

105

*H. Helms*  
*Mr. Helms*  
*Returns to files* *E. Helms*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Domestic Concerns in the Greek Situation

Greece is outwardly calm. Rumors of counter-coups are beginning, but so far the current group seems in control. The King originally stayed aloof from the coup group but is gradually moving into a working relationship in hopes of guiding it. We're doing business with the new government, but Phil Talbot has made clear that our cooperation will depend on quick restoration of civil liberties and return to constitutional government as soon as possible. We will want to make a public statement soon.

Our main operational problem is the active campaign here by friends of Andreas Papandreou to get him out of jail. Coupled with this is the feeling of many Greek-Americans that the King and the army are out to stifle Greek democracy. If something happens to Andreas, they're quite likely to blame us for his death and the "rape of Greek democracy."

If anyone approaches you, you can say in good conscience that we've given top priority to Andreas' safety. Talbot has told coup leaders that no harm must come to political prisoners, and they have assured him repeatedly that none would. The fact remains that Andreas is public enemy #1 in the eyes of this government. It saw him rushing Greece into the hands of the Communists and--at the very least--it's fair to say that his blunt political tactics were one of the main factors in precipitating the coup.

We're trying to persuade coup leaders now to let Andreas leave Greece. Everyone agrees that before Greece can return to normal, he must leave the scene. Talbot gives this only an outside chance.

We're doing everything we can to calm people down and get Andreas out. But it may come to a point where we'd have to consider whether to use our military aid as further leverage (we've already suspended major shipments).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-415

By Julian NARA. Date 10-4-96

*W. Rostow* Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

107  
April 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Andreas Papandreou

I outlined how we're trying to get Andreas out of jail in the suggested memo for the President I sent you earlier. We'll pursue that course, but if we decide to apply greater leverage we'll have to make some judgments of our own on how far the US interest goes in getting him out of jail.

Attached are two quick papers on Andreas which I have not had time to digest. However, I want to get them in your hands quickly. I'll provide analysis later this afternoon. In the meantime, these papers lay out the facts. The broader political lines are these:

Our liberals side with Andreas. They feel the King was out to head off Papandreou-type democracy and reform at all costs. Whether or not he triggered this coup, he condoned coup planning. They think the King and military are McCarthy types who see Communism in every honest reform movement.

Our government judges that Andreas bears a large part of the responsibility for provoking this coup and also for disrupting sound post-war progress. No one says he's a Communist, but the evidence shows that he was willing to work dangerously closely with the Communists. On top of that, he openly threatened the monarchy. At the very least, it's fair to say that he proposed going farther and faster to the left than the prevailing powers could tolerate. Even George Papandreou told our Country Director a month ago that he would have read Andreas out of the party if he weren't his son.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-36  
By js, NARA Date 10-16-97

*Hal Saunders*

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1070

TO : Mr. Harold Saunders  
The White House

DATE: April 27, 1967

FROM : John P. Owens, NEA/GRK

JPO

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-34**  
**By us, NARA Date 8-26-97**

SUBJECT: Andreas Papandreou

Enclosed are three reports on Andreas (and George) Papandreou that I drafted while at the Embassy in Athens. They may be of some value to you for background purposes, and I would appreciate your returning them when you have finished with them.

It seems clear that the leadership of the coup considers Andreas Papandreou the chief promoter of the chaos in Greek political life which caused them

to move illegally to topple the Kanellopoulos Government and seize control of the country. Their specific charges against him will probably relate to his role as alleged leader of "Aspida," the secret army organization whose military members were sentenced to various prison terms in March. Andreas has long been suspected as the leader of this organization, whose purpose was never clearly defined, although it appeared to be anti-monarchist and presumably would promote a neutralist foreign policy.

However, there are more fundamental reasons for the charge that Andreas Papandreou, more than any single person, is responsible for the conditions which prompted the dictatorship. This view is based on the charge that Andreas Papandreou broke down the "consensus" that had existed in Greek political life since the end of the Bandit War of 1947-49. By attacking and even threatening the monarchy, by trying to set class against class, by constantly pounding on the theme of U.S. and NATO "interference" in Greek life, Andreas Papandreou drove Greek political tensions to a pitch unequalled since the 1947-49 period. Thus, before Andreas' entry into Greek political life, it was possible for one party to turn over power to another without any question of this transfer meaning fundamental changes in the fabric of Greek life. In 1963, CU leader George Papandreou (Andreas was not yet in politics) won against the ERE regime of Caramanlis which had ruled Greece for 8 years. There was hardly a ripple on the Greek political surface as a result of this transfer. However, by 1967, through Andreas' repeated attacks aimed at undermining Greek institutions, the conservative element in Greek society concluded that Greece's political fabric could not withstand the implications of an Andreas Papandreou victory at the polls.

~~SECRET~~



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Andreas' attacks upon the United States, NATO, the monarchy, the so-called Greek "oligarchy" and the Army leadership are fully documented. Although these attacks undoubtedly won him a degree of political support, they did so at the cost of convincing the King, the Army, <sup>and</sup> the conservative-moderate elements in Greek life that Andreas' coming into power must be prevented at all costs. Thus, although these groups were not the ones who actually carried out the coup, nevertheless Andreas' behavior created conditions under which they would acquiesce--albeit reluctantly--in it, to stave off what they consider the worse consequences of an Andreas victory.

Concerning allegations that Andreas was a Communist, the Embassy in Athens has had no evidence to support such an allegation, although many ~~conservatives~~ in Greece did believe that he was. However, there was no doubt that he frequently joined forces with them, and his slogans were frequently similar--and in some cases more extreme--to those of the crypto-Communist EDAParty. Finally, what is clear is that in his political posture he was a demagogue whose irresponsibility was repeatedly demonstrated in his extremist attacks on his chosen targets.

P. S. I am also forwarding a paper prepared by the Embassy on November 2, 1966, which I think is excellent. I would appreciate the return of all these papers this afternoon if at all possible.

NEA:GRK:JPowens:jaw



~~SECRET~~

SITUATION REPORT NO. 6 ON YEMENI SITUATION AS OF  
6:00 a.m., MAY 1, 1967

107-C



1. The evacuation plane left Taiz at 7:45z with 15 persons. Local authorities refused to permit to fly to Sana to pick-up personnel there, there fore it is returning to Asmara. Officials at the Taiz airport were very unfriendly and all baggage was minutely searched. Despite earlier approval, authorities would not allow 11 pouches, containing Diplomatic Mail and unclassified Visa and Social Security records to be put on the plane. They also would not allow the pouches to be returned to the Embassy, and, over the repeated strong protestations of Embassy officials, They were impounded on the supposed order of the Minister of the Interior, and will not be released without an order from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. In Sana there was a large orderly demonstration led by an Armored Car. Extra Yemeni and Egyptian guards have been posted at the Embassy. The Foreign Office has promised to facilitate evacuation when the plane arrives.
3. No further communication on AID employees Liapis and Hartman. Assume ~~that~~ their situation remains the same.

Yemen Task Force  
Mike Steiner- NEA/IAI  
Jim Russo 1-NEA/ARP

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-34  
By us, NARA Date 8-24-97

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No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

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108



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House

SUBJECT : Orientation of the New Greek  
Government

1. The attached memorandum is a preliminary assessment of the motivations, aims, and policies of the new rulers of Greece.

2. You may find it useful as the new government consolidates its position.

*Rich*

Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment: a/s  
No. 1100/67

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

ORIENTATION OF THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
25 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Orientation of the New Greek Government

1. Preliminary analysis of the new Greek Government indicates that the nation's new rulers have a strong moralistic motivation and are probably considerably to the right of the standard brand of Greek conservative.

2. From their public and private statements it is evident that the coup leaders aim at more than merely preventing a Communist take-over. Their emphasis on social justice, social welfare, a national mission, order, and unity may be merely rhetoric and designed for broad appeal, but their equation of order and internal security with justice and their stress on the obligation of the press to respond to the national mission appear to go beyond what was necessary for this purpose. In their demands on King Constantine to go along with their "revolution" or leave Greece, and in their disdain for civilian politicians of all stripes, they show their distrust for even the old, established conservative forces.

3. There are hints that the coup leaders envision a more nationalistic foreign policy, especially in their insistence that Greece, while supporting NATO, intends to demand its rights as an equal member of the alliance. Although they have solicited support and understanding from the US, they have revealed an underlying suspicion that US support will

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generally favor the monarchy rather than their new regime. The new government's Cyprus policy appears to be what any Greek government must have, an expressed aim of enosis.

4. The new government's stated economic policies stress a just distribution of national income, a hastening of economic development, and an extension of social welfare programs. Here, too, there is some animus against the traditional conservatives--the "economic oligarchy."

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5. The initial policy statements, in their various parts, seem to be the work of different drafters trying to meet different needs, but there is an underlying flavor of idealistic, ideological dedication. That this is the case is supported by [REDACTED] the outlook of key members of the military conspiracy, the origin of which goes back to late 1962 or early 1963. The colonels formed a group of their own at that time because the senior rightist officers who made up the old, ultraright IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers) seemed to them to be "self-seekers." Even the King was too bland for the colonels. Although he had been made aware of their plans earlier, by mid-1966 the King was not being informed because the colonels felt he was getting bad advice from his immediate entourage. The new government's policy statements indicate that the colonels--many of whom come from families who are not part of the Greek "establishment"--believe their day has come. They have not made a coup merely to turn the government over to the King's "bankers," and if politicians eventually are permitted to participate, these will be of a new, re-educated breed.

6. How much of this kind of forthright authoritarian reform will be possible, given Greek political traditions, remains to be seen. The coup leaders themselves may already be concerned by the problems of implementation, since one of them at least has indicated that US assistance would be welcome.