

527
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file 57

Sunday, November 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You can see from these cables Cy left for
Ankara in pretty good shape from Athens.

WWR

27a

Z 270105Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3900
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 653
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 604
USUN NEW YORK 207

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2446

EXDIS

VANTO

SUBJ: VANCE MEETING WITH FONMIN PIPINELIS, NOVEMBER 26

1. VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR TALBOT AND JOHN WALSH, CALLED ON FONMIN TO RECEIVE GREEK REACTIONS TO DRAFT ACCORD AS MODIFIED IN NOVEMBER 25 MEETINGS IN ANKARA. PIPINELIS REPORTED CABINET HAD REVIEWED DRAFT IN LONG AND DIFFICULT SESSION AND HAD PREPARED REVISED DRAFT WHICH HE REQUESTED VANCE TO PRESENT TO GOT TOMORROW. ~~TEXT CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CABLE~~ **ATTACHED.**

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2446 ~~SECRET~~

2. AFTER QUICK REVIEW VANCE SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE CARRY OUT WISHES OF GOG BUT IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT THAT THEIR DRAFT COULD NOT BE SOLD TO GOT. WITH TIME RUNNING OUT, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE TEXTUAL CHANGES. WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND HE HAD PREPARED DRAFT WHICH REPRESENTS FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN DESIRES OF TWO COUNTRIES AND WHICH HAS

(VANCE)

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Authority FRMS 64-68, 16-2, 16-325
By je, NARA, Date 12-10-03

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PAGE 22 ~~ATHENS 22443 270157Z~~

REASONABLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE IN ANKARA. TEXT FOLLOWS:
QUOTE

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS, SUCH AN APPEAL TO INCLUDE, INTER ALIA;

A. AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO REAFFIRM THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

B. A REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF OF EACH OTHER AND OF CYPRUS AND AS A FIRST STEP ALONG THE LINE

OF MY PREVIOUS APPEAL TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES, IN EXCESS OF THOSE PRESENT IN 1963.

~~PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2445 SECRET~~

2. THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY FORTHWITH WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. THEREUPON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL WITHDRAW EXPEDITIOUSLY ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM CYPRUS. ACCOMPANYING THIS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR REMOVING THE CRISIS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE THREE COUNTRIES UNDERTAKE TO SEEK FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ENLARGED AND IMPROVED MANDATE FOR UNFICYP GIVING IT AN INCREASED PACIFICATION ROLE AND CALLING UPON IT TO ASSIST IN SETTING UP EXPEDITIOUSLY NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING THE SAFETY OF ALL CITIZENS) AND THE SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT. UNQUOTE

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 2446 ~~SECRET~~

3. IN EXPLAINING TEXT, VANCE EMPHASIZED THAT HIS OBJECT WAS

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~~PAGE 03 ATHENS 32446 270157Z~~

TO STOP OUTBREAK OF WAR AND NOT TO SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS OF CYPRUS. THEREFORE, TEXT COULD NOT BE AS INCLUSIVE AS EITHER PARTY MIGHT WISH. ON OTHER HAND, TEXT SEEMS FAIR TO BOTH AND COULD PROVIDE MEDIUM FOR RESOLUTION PRESENT CRISIS.

4. AFTER DISCUSSION NUMBER ELEMENTS OF VANCE DRAFT, PIPINELIS SAID IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO REASSEMBLE THE CABINET TO REVIEW PAPER BEFORE VANCE'S DEPARTURE. HE THEN PROPOSED A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." VANCE SHOULD PRESENT THE GREEK DRAFT TO GOT TOMORROW. IF IT IS REJECTED, VANCE SHOULD THEN PRESENT HIS DRAFT. IF TURK CONCURRENCE IS OBTAINED, PIPINELIS PLEDGED HIMSELF TO SUPPORT THE DRAFT IN CABINET. HE ALSO AUTHORIZED VANCE TO INFORM GOT THAT HE HAD REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT GOG WOULD APPROVE THE DRAFT.

5. IN DISCUSSING GOT PLANS FOR REDUCTION MOBILIZATION LEVELS, PIPINELIS SAID GOG PLACED HIGH PRIORITY ON REMOVAL INVASION FLEET WHICH HAD BEEN ASSEMBLED IN TURK PORTS

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 2446 ~~SECRET~~
AND WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN LETTER FROM GOT COVERING REDUCTION SCHEDULES COMPARABLE TO THEIR LETTER ON WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULES. VANCE SAID HE WOULD URGE GOT TO PROVIDE SUCH A LETTER.
TALBOT
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EXDIS

57-6

Z 270047Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3899
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 652
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 603
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 65
AMEMBASSY LONDON 390
USUN NEW YORK 206
USMISSION NATO 101
CINCEUR

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2445

EXDIS

VANTO

FONMIN PIPINELLIS PRESENTED COUNTER-DRAFT THIS EVENING TO VANCE. WHILE AGREEING TO DELIVER IT TO GOT, VANCE EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT IT WOULD BE REJECTED. TEXT FOLLOWS:

~~PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2445 SECRET~~

QUOTE 1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS ADDRESSED AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS ON NOVEMBER 24, 1967.

2. ON NOVEMBER 25, 1967 THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS REACHED A CONSENSUS, NOTING WITH SATISFACTION THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE

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E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4
State Dept Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-10-03

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~~PAGE 02 ATHENS 02445 270143Z~~

GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THAT THEY AGREE TO THE REDUCTION OF FORCES SUGGESTED THEREIN WITH A VIEW TO THE ULTIMATE COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION, AND THAT THEY SHALL DESIST FOR THE USE OF FORCE OR THE THREAT OF USE OF FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR ENDS; SHALL RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS; AND SHALL REFRAIN FROM ANY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF THAT REPUBLIC.

~~PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2445 SECRET~~

4. THEREUPON, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCEPTS TO WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM CYPRUS. TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION, IT WILL RECALL ONE BATTALION FORTHWITH.

PARALLEL TO THIS WITHDRAWAL, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL RECALL THE MEASURES OF PREPAREDNESS AGAINST GREECE AND CYPRUS.

5. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, AN ENLARGED AND IMPROVED MANDATE FOR UNFICYP WOULD BE SOUGHT, GIVING IT AN INCREASED PACIFICATION ROLE AND THE TASK OF BRINGING ABOUT NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING SAFETY FOR ALL CITIZENS). UPON COMPLETION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS, THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS WILL WITHDRAW THEIR MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF UNFICYP. UNQUOTE.

GP-3 TALBOT

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 02441 261643Z

52
ACTION SS 35

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, /035 W

Z 261530Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3895
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 650
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 601
AMEMBASSY LONDON 389
USMISSION NATO 100
USUN NEWYORK 205

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2441

EXDIS

VANTO 28

REF: VANTO 29

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH TURKISH PRESIDENT SUNAY - NOV 25

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2441A ~~SECRET~~
VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR HART AND JOHN WALSH, CALLED
ON TURKISH PRESIDENT SUNAY AT 1230 NOVEMBER 25. PRIME
MINISTER DEMIREL AND FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL ALSO PARTICIPATED.

AFTER CONVEYING KING CONSTANTINE'S GREETINGS TO SUNAY, VANCE
OUTLINED FOR THE PRESIDENT ORIGINS OF HIS MISSION. LAST SUNDAY
FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ASKED AMBASSADOR HART HOW US COULD BE
HELPFUL. THE AMBASSADOR PROMPTLY REPORTED THIS APPEAL TO HIGH
LEVELS IN USG AND BEGAN CERTAIN ACTIONS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY.
FURTHER TO THIS END THE PRESIDENT HAD DESPATCHED THE VANCE

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NLJ 04-76
By us, NARA, Date 10-5-04

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02441 261643Z

MISSION TO SEE HOW OUR OLD FRIENDS AND ALLIES COULD BE HELPED. WE HAD FIRST VISITED ANKARA WHERE TWO PRINCIPLES WERE EXPRESSED BY THE GOT, NAMELY, NEITHER GREECE NOR TURKEY SHOULD BE HUMILIATED AND NO DIPLOMATIC VICTORY OR DEFEAT WAS SOUGHT.

IN THE SPIRIT OF THOSE PRINCIPLES, VANCE HAD ACCEPTED THE GOT REQUEST THAT HE INFORM THE GOG THAT THERE WERE TWO PRE-CONDITIONS TO SETTLEMENT: (1) COMMITMENT BY THE GOG THAT ITS FORCES IN EXCESS OF LONDON/ZURICH LEVELS BE WITHDRAWN AND (2) THAT THE GOG TAKE THE FIRST STEP.

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2441A ~~SECRET~~

VANCE HAD GONE TO ATHENS WITH GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS BECAUSE OF THE MANIFEST SENSITIVITY OF ANY GOVERNMENT WHEN CONFRONTED BY PRECONDITIONS. IN LONG, DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGH GREEK OFFICIALS, HE HAD MADE THE CASE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRECONDITIONS AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE AVOIDANCE OF A TRAGIC AND DEVASTATING WAR. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE GREEK CABINET HAD DEBATED THIS ISSUE AT LENGTH AND HAD TAKEN THE COURAGEOUS DECISION TO COMPLY. VANCE HAD THEN MET WITH THE KING, PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS AND DEVELOPED TWO DOCUMENTS DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CRITICAL SITUATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE TWO PARTIES INVOLVED. THE KING HAD PLAYED A VERY HELPFUL ROLE IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

VANCE HAD LEFT THE PALACE AT 0330 AND PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TO THE AIRPORT. HIS PLANE HAD REACHED ESENBAGA AIRPORT AT 0530 AND HE MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL AT 0800. HE HAD PRESENTED THE DOCUMENTS TO THE MINISTER AND HAD CLARIFIED CERTAIN POINTS IN THEM. PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE TO A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT 0930, THE MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ABOUT THEIR SUITABILITY. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE DOCUMENTS WERE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH WITH A TURKISH WORKING

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 2441A ~~SECRET~~

GROUP WHICH HAD SUGGESTED CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES. VANCE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THESE REVISIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 02441 261643Z

PAGE 6 RUQMAT 2441A ~~SECRET~~

VANCE RESPONDED WITH CONSIDERABLE VIGOR, EMPHASIZING THAT WITHDRAWAL AND STANDDOWN WAS THE GUT ISSUE. PARA 3 HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND HE FIRMLY BELIEVED THE EXISTING LANGUAGE, PLUS THE SIDE SECRET GREEK LETTER, WAS A REASONABLE FORMULATION AND WAS AS FAR AS THE GREEKS COULD GO. IN A PRACTICAL SENSE WITHDRAWAL AND STANDDOWN OPERATIONS HAD TO BE ON A PHASED BASIS. FURTHERMORE, IF THE GREEKS BEGAN WITHDRAWING THEY HAD TO HAVE REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT PARALLEL ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE TURKS. TO SUBSTITUTE GENERALIZATIONS ON THE TURKISH SIDE SUCH AS "SAFEGUARDING PEACE" WOULD BE VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS. IN VANCE'S JUDGEMENT TO ASK THE GREEKS TO ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE WOULD BE TO ASK THEM TO BE HUMILIATED. THEREFORE, THE TURKISH DRAFTING PROPOSALS WERE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE TURKISH ASSURANCE TO HIM THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO HUMILIATE THE GREEKS. VANCE SAID HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO INSIST THAT THE GOT WITHDRAW THESE PROPOSALS.

AT THIS POINT, PRESIDENT SUNAY CONFERRED WITH DEMIREL AND THEN TOLD VANCE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD RECONVENE THE CABINET TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. HE SAID HE WISHED TO EXTEND HIS PERSONAL THANKS TO VANCE AND TO EXPRESS HIS HOPE THAT THIS MATTER WOULD

PAGE 7 RUQMAT 2441A ~~SECRET~~
BE ENDED CONSTRUCTIVELY. THERE WOULD BE NO TURK MILITARY ACTION WHILE VANCE WORKED ON THIS PROBLEM. HE THEN ASKED VANCE TO THANK KING CONSTANTINE FOR HIS GREETINGS AND TO EXPRESS HIS WARM REGARDS TO HIM.

GP-2. TALBOT

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 02441 261643Z

THE GOG BUT HE WAS PREPARED TO RETURN PROMPTLY TO ATHENS TO FIND OUT AND TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE BETWEEN OUR TWO FRIENDS.

BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, VANCE SAID HE WISHED TO ASK TWO BASIC QUESTIONS: (1) ARE WE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THE GOT WILL TAKE NO MILITARY ACTION WHILE WE ARE ENGAGED IN ATHENS; AND (2) ARE WE CORRECT IN ASSUMING WORKING GROUP SUGGESTIONS ARE THE POSITION OF THE GOT.

AT THIS POINT PRESIDENT SUNAY STATED VANCE WAS CORRECT IN HIS ASSUMPTION THAT THE GOT WOULD TAKE NO RPT NO MILITARY ACTION, BUT ADDED THAT THIS ASSURANCE WAS ONLY GOOD FOR A MATTER OF HOURS. HOWEVER, AT THE END OF THE MEETING, HE LENGTHENED THE TIME LIMITATION BY ASSURING VANCE THAT THE GOT WOULD TAKE NO MILITARY ACTION WHILE VANCE REMAINED ENGAGED IN HIS PEACE EFFORTS.

PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL, SPEAKING OFF OF DOCUMENTS IN CONTRAST

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 2441A ~~SECRET~~

TO HIS FORENSICS AT THE FIRST MEETING WITH HIM, RESPONDED TO THE SECOND QUESTION. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FULLY REALIZED THE WEIGHT OF VANCE'S BURDENS, THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES OF MAINTAINING PEACE, AND THE GOOD FAITH AND FRIENDLY FEELINGS WHICH MARKED HIS EFFORTS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT VANCE SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE GOT POSITION AND THE MAGNITUDE OF ITS EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CONCLUDE THAT THE TURKS WERE TRYING TO MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT. HE SUGGESTED THAT VANCE SHOULD EVALUATE THE DRAFTING CHANGES WHICH HE WOULD PROPOSE IN THAT SPIRIT.

HE THEN PROPOSED TWO CHANGES IN THE GUT PARAGRAPH (PARA 3) INVOLVING GREEK WITHDRAWAL AND TURKISH STAND-DOWN. THE FIRST INVOLVED THE REPLACEMENT OF "PHASED WITHDRAWAL" BY "EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL." THE SECOND INVOLVED THE DELETION OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE FORMULATION "IN PARALLEL, THE GOT WILL TAKE THE MEASURES DESIGNED TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE." WITH THESE CHANGES THE TEXT, AS REVISED BY THE TURKISH WORKING GROUP, WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOT.

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Seen by Mr. Rostow.

PAGE 01 ATHENS 02435 261017Z

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ACTION SS 35

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /035 W

Z 260958Z NOV 67 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3890
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 645
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 597
AMEMBASSY LONDON 385
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 62
USUN NEW YORK 202
US MISSION NATO 97
USCINCEUR

SECRET ATHENS 2435

EXDIS

VANTO 31

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH SYG BROSIO-NOVEMBER 26

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2435A ~~SECRET~~

VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR TALBOT AND MESSRS. WALSH AND HOWISON, HAD BREAKFAST MEETING THIS MORNING WITH NATO SYG ROSIO. VANCE DISCUSSED ACTIVITIES AND PRESENT STATUS HIS MISSION WITH FULL FRANKNESS AND GAVE TO HIM COPY OF CURRENT DRAFT ACCORD.

BROSIO EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT DRAFT PROVIDED REASONABLE BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT ALTHOUGH REFERENCES IN FIRST PARA TO 1960 NICOSIA TREATIES IS OBVIOUS STUMBLING BLOCK. HE FEELS MISSION HAS ALREADY MADE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO DEFUSING SITUATION AND INTENDS REMAIN IN SUPPORTING POSITION IN AREA UNTIL VANCE MISSION COMPLETES ITS

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-10-03

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02435 261017Z

ASSIGNMENT. IN TALKS WITH KING CONSTANTINE THIS AFTERNOON, HE INTENDS TO PRESS FOR FULL GREEK SUPPORT FOR SPEEDY SETTLEMENT. HE WILL THEN FLY TO ANKARA FOR MEETINGS WITH FONMIN AND PRESIDENT SUNAY. HE INTENDS TAKE LINE WITH TURKS THAT FRAMEWORK OF ACCORD NOW EXISTS THAT WILL REALIZE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF GETTING ILLEGAL GREEK FORCES OFF ISLAND AND RESORT TO WAR UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE COMPLETELY FOOLISH. HE IS QUITE AWARE OF THE ANTI-NATO SENTIMENT WHICH HAS BUILT UP IN TURKEY AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO SMOOTH RUFFLED TURKISH FEATHERS IN THIS RESPECT.

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2435A ~~SECRET~~

VANCE ASSURED BROSIO THAT HE FULLY WELCOMED HIS PRESENCE AND SINCERELY BELIEVED HE COULD MAKE VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION IN EASING THE DANGEROUS TENSIONS EXISTING BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. TALBOT

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 02432 260031Z

83
ACTION SS 35

INFO NSCE 00, CIAE 00, SSO 00, DODE 00, USIE 00, NSAE 00, CCO 00, /035 W

Z 252345Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3887
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 642
AMEMBA
SSY NICOSIA 594
AMEMBASSY LONDON 383
USMISSION USUN NY 200
USMISSION NATO 95
USCINGEUR

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EXDIS

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EXDIS

VANTO 30

1. VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR TALBOT AND JOHN WALSH,
MET WITH FONMIN PIPINELIS IN SHORT MIDNIGHT SESSION. VANCE

~~PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2432A SECRET~~

OUTLINED NOVEMBER 25 ANKARA DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED
SEPTELS THIS SERIES, EMPHASIZING NOTABLE SHIFT TOWARD
MODERATION AND ACCOMMODATION ON PART GOT OFFICIALS DURING
COURSE OF DAY, INCLUDING ASSURANCE FROM PRESIDENT
SUNAY IN PRESENCE PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT GOT
WOULD TAKE NO MILITARY ACTION WHILE MISSION REMAINS ACTIVE
IN AREA. VANCE ALSO CONVEYED FRIENDLY PERSONAL MESSAGE
FROM FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL AND SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
SUNAY TO KING CONSTANTINE. VANCE ALSO PRESENTED TO PIPINELIS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-10-03

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02432 260031Z

DRAFT ACCORD DEVELOPED DURING DAY IN CONSULTATIONS WITH GOT, POINTING OUT THAT MISSION HAD TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE PERSUASION TO OBTAIN TURK AGREEMENT TO WHAT MISSION CONSIDERS TO BE MORE FAVORABLE PARAGRAPH COVERING GREEK WITHDRAWALS AND TURK REDUCTION OF MOBILIZATION LEVELS.

2. PIPINELIS RESPONDED FAVORABLY, NOTING THAT ITS FAVORABLE ASPECTS WERE SUPPORTED BY PRESS STATEMENT BY TURKISH PRIME MINISTER THIS EVEING. HE ALSO REPORTED ENCOURAGING INDICATIONS FROM CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR THAT MAKARIOS WOULD BE AMENABLE TO WITHDRAWAL GREEK FORCES.

~~PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2432A S E C R E T~~

3. AFTER BRIEF READING DRAFT ACCORD, HE EXPRESSED VIEW DOCUMENT GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE ALTHOUGH CERTAIN PROBLEMS REMAIN FROM GOG VIEWPOINT SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPHS #- (A) AND 1(BL. HE PROMISED PUT HIS IMAGINATION TO WORK ON THESE PRIOR AGAIN MEETING WITH VANCE ABOUT NOON TOMORROW.

4. SURRENT TEXT DRAFT ACCORD CITED ABOVE FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS, SUCH AN APPEAL TO INCLUDE, INTER ALIA:
A. AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO REAFFIRM THE INVIOABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, WITHIN THE FRAME WORK OF THE TREATIES SIGNED ON AUGUST 16, 1960 IN NICOSIA.
B. A REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNEMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT

~~PAGE 4 QUAMT 2432A S E C R E T~~

TO THE SECURITY OF EACH OTHER AND OF CYPRUS AND

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 02432 260031Z

TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-CYPRIOI FORCES IN EXCESS OF THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATIES SIGNED IN NICOSIA ON AUGUST 16, 1960.

2. THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY FORTHWITH WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. THEREUPON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL WITHDRAW EXPEDITIOUSLY ITS MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS. ACCOMPANYING THIS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR REMOVING THE CRISIS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THERE SHOULD BE ENLARGED AND IMPROVED MANDATE FOR UNFICYP GIVING IT AN INCREASED PACIFICATION ROLE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT OF ALL FORCES CONSTITUTED AFTER DECEMBER 1963 AND NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING THE SAFETY OF ALL

~~PAGE 5 RUQMAT 0432A 3 E S R E T~~
CITIZENS).

5. TEXT SECRET LETTER GIVEN BY FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL TO VANCE, CONTAINING GOT ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD REDUCE MOBILIZATION LEVELS PARALLEL WITH GREEK FORCES WITHDRAWALS, WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPTTEL TOMORROW.

TALBOT

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM
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~~SECRET~~ 769

PAGE 01 ATHENS 02431 252119Z

81
ACTION SS 35

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,DODE 00,1035 W.

Z 252057Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3886
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 641
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 593

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2431

VANTO 29

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA

VANCE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL - NOVEMBER 25

1. SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR HART AND JOHN WALSH, MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL LATE AFTERNOON. BY END OF ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS FRANK EXCHANGES, VANCE HAD OBTAINED GOT CONCURRENCE TO REVISED DRAFT TEXT CONTAINING

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2431 ~~SECRET~~
BOTH ADVANTAGES AND SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR GOG VIEWPOINT. WHILE PROCESS FORMULATING ACCORD AGREEABLE GOT AND GOG IS PAINFULLY SLOW AND MISSION HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT CAPACITY MAKARIOS GOVERNMENT TO PLACE SPANNER IN WORKS, IT HAS IMPRESSION AFTER LONG AND HARD DAY WITH TURKS THAT THEY MAY HAVE TURNED THE CORNER IN A POLICY SENSE IN THE DIRECTION OF TRYING TO OBTAIN PEACE.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, Vol. 16, #324

By jc NARA, Date 12-10-03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02431 252119Z

2. MISSION RETURNS TO ATHENS WITH FLAT ASSURANCE OF PRESIDENT SUNAY, WITH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HEARING HIS WORDS, THAT NO MILITARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN WHILE MISSION EFFORTS CONTINUE. FURTHERMORE, IN COURSE OF DAY, GAGLAYANGIL'S MOOD AND MANNER SHIFTED DRAMATICALLY. IN MORNING SESSION HE VERGED ON RUDENESS AND UGLINESS, WITH MUCH DARK MUTTERING ABOUT POTENTIAL COLLAPSE OF TURKISH SOCIETY UNLESS WAR DECISION WERE MADE. AT PRODUCTIVE NOON SESSION WITH PRESIDENT SUNAY HE SAID NOTHING. IN LATE AFTERNOON HE WAS AGAIN COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY, SPEAKING OF DESIRE FOR PEACE, COOPERATIVELY WORKING OUT TEXTUAL CHANGES, VOICING CONFIDENCE IN GREEK INTENT CARRY OUT WITHDRAWAL PLEDGES, AND WARMLY PRAISING PEACE EFFORTS OUR MISSION. WHY THIS SHIFT OCCURRED IS NOT CLEAR BUT WE SUSPECT THAT IT REFLECTS THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION OF PRESIDENT SUNAY AND THE

PAGE 3 RUGMAT 2431 ~~SECRET~~

WEIGHT OF PERSISTENT U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO HOLD THE TURKISH HAND. IN ADDITION, THERE MAY BE GROWING BELIEF IN GOT THAT ARRANGEMENTS SHORT OF WAR CAN BE MADE FOR DEPARTURE GREEK FORCES. WHILE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT FINAL RESULTS, WE REMAIN HOPEFUL.

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ANKARA FOR MR. VANCE

1. IN OUR FINAL MEETING EARLY THIS MORNING KING CONSTANTINE PUT TO VANCE TWO STRAIGHT QUESTIONS.

(A) IF ALL PEACE EFFORTS FAIL AND TURKEY SHOULD ATTACK GREECE AS WELL AS CYPRUS, WOULD U.S. COME TO ASSISTANCE OF GREECE? VANCE REPLIED "MILITARILY, NO," BUT GREECE COULD BE SURE WE WOULD BE LEANING AGAINST TURKEY WITH ALL NONMILITARY WEIGHT. HE EXPLAINED THAT APART FROM OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IT SIMPLY

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2419 ~~SECRET~~
NOT REALISTIC TO ANTICIPATE THAT AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN ANOTHER WAR NOW.

(B) COULD KING TAKE IT FOR CERTAIN THAT U.S. AND ALLIES WOULD KEEP BULGARIA OFF GREECE'S BACK WHILE HE DEFENDING HIS COUNTRY AGAINST TURKISH ATTACK? HE EXPLAINED HE WAS THINKING NOT ONLY OF REGULAR BULGARIAN FORCES ON BORDERS OF THRACE (WHICH HE AGREED COULD HARDLY BE MOVED WITHOUT CONSENT OF MOSCOW), BUT ALSO OF SOME TENS OF THOUSANDS OF GREEK ETHNICS EVACUATED TO COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED STATES OF EASTERN

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02419 251134Z

EUROPE AFTER GREEK GUERRILLA WAR WHO ARE NOW OF MILITARY AGE AND PRESUMABLY INCLUDE TRAINED GUERRILLAS.

2. WE REPLIED THIS QUESTION MORE DIFFICULT. IN ADDITION TO OUR PUTTING IT TO WASHINGTON, WE SUGGESTED HE SHOULD DISCUSS IT WITH BROGIO ON LATTER'S ARRIVAL TODAY. GP-3

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3872
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VANTO 16
FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND MC NAMARA

IN THE COURSE OF A BUSY DAY I HAVE MET WITH KING CONSTANTINE, PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS, FOREIGN MINISTER PIPINELLIS, AND THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, ROLZ-BENNETT. I HAVE FOUND IN ATHENS NONE OF THE RAUCOUS WAR HYSTERIA WHICH PREVAILS IN ANKARA. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PANIC BY THE PEOPLE OR THE GOVERNMENT.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2410A ~~SECRET~~
IN MY OPINION, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT REMAINS COOL AND DETERMINED AS THE WAR CLOUDS THICKEN. THEY HAVE A REAL DESIRE TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. THE KING AGAIN TODAY REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PREVENTIVE MILITARY ACTIONS BY GREEK FORCES. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO ACCEPTED CERTAIN MILITARY RISKS IN LIMITING MILITARY CALL-UPS AND MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN ORDER TO AVOID PROVOCATION OF THE TURKS AND EXCITING THE POPULACE. THEY HAVE LEANED OVER BACKWARDS IN AN EFFORT TO FORMULATE A PROPOSITION FOR ME TO CONVEY TO THE TURKS TOMORROW WHICH WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH GREEK NATIONAL DIGNITY AND TURKISH DEMANDS FOR GREEK TROOP WITHDRAWALS. I COULD NOT ASK THEM TO DO MORE. SIGNED VANCE

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ADDENDUM BY TALBOT:

REVISIONS OF GREEK STATEMENT WHICH WE DECLARED NECESSARY
ENCOUNTERED CONSIDERABLE RESISTENCE IN LENGTHY "LITTLE
CABINET" MEETING WITH KING TONIGHT. WE UNDERSTAND GREEK
MILITARY COMMAND--BUT IN END NOT MILITARY MINISTER--
STRONGLY RESISTED COMPROMISES THEY DESCRIBED AS CAPITULATION.
WHEN VANCE AND TALBOT MET KING, PRIMIN, FONMIN AT 0115 LOCAL,
GOG STILL WANTED SIMULTANEITY IN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF

PAGE 3 RUCMAT 2410A ~~SECRET~~

ACCEPTANCE OF UNSYG APPEAL BY GOG AND GOT. NEARLY TWO HOURS
OF DISCUSSION ENSUED, WITH KING'S DECISIVE INTERVENTIONS
FINALLY TURNING TIE. AT LAST VANCE HEADED FOR AIRPORT
AT 0330 WITH DOCUMENTS HE COULD FAIRLY PRESENT TO TURKS.
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VANTO 15

REF: VANTO 13

TEXT CITED REFTTEL WHICH I PLAN TAKE TO ANKARA EARLY TOMORROW
MORNING IS BOTH A PECULIAR PIECE OF ART AND A STATESMAN LIKE ACT
BY PIPINELLIS AND HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES.

PAGE W RUQMAT 2403A ~~SECRET~~

I CANNOT JUDGE WHETHER TURKS STILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CONTROL
TO ACCEPT ANY PEACE PROPOSAL. I INTEND, HOWEVER,
TO MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT PERSUADE THEM IT WILL NOT ONLY PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE FORMULA FOR GETTING GREEK FORCES OFF THE ISLAND BUT
WILL ALSO PROVIDE ALL INTERESTED PARTIES A SAFE ROUTE OUT OF THE
FIRE-FOREST OF NATIONAL PRIDE WHICH CURRENTLY SURROUNDS
THEM. THREE TEXTUAL NUANCES IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE NOTED:

1. PARA 3 COVERS THE REPATRIATION OF GREEK MILITARY FORCES

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02403 250116Z

AND THE REDUCTION OF TURKISH MOBILIZATION LEVELS. ORIGINAL GREEK DRAFT SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR SIMULTANEITY IN THESE ACTIONS. I PERSUADED PIPINELLIS TO REMOVE THIS WORD AND TO AUTHORIZE ME TO INFORM GOT THAT REQUIREMENTS OF THIS PARA WOULD BE MET IF WITHIN 4 YOURS OF PUBLIC STATEMENT BY GOG THAT IT WOULD REPATRIATE ITS FORCES THAT GOT WOULD BEGIN PROCESS OF REDUCING MOBILIZATION LEVELS. PIPINELLIS HOPES SHORTLY OBTAIN CABINET AUTHORIZATION THIS FORMULATION.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2403A ~~S E C R E T~~

2. IN VIEW OF GOG FEAR THAT DANGEROUS VACUUM WOULD EXIST ON ISLAND AFTER REPATRIATION GREEK FORCES, PARA 4 SD 5 WHICH COVER CREATION OF REPLACEMENT FORCE IS BASIC TO GOG ACCEPTANCE OVERALL DOCUMENT. THE IMPLEMENTATION THIS PARA WOULD REQUIRE AUTHORIZATION MAKARIOS. GREEKS INTEND PRESS HIM FOR GREEN LIGHT. IF I AM SUCCESSFUL IN MEETING WITH TURKS, MAY FLY TO NICOSIA TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WITH HIM.

3. PARA 6 ENVISIONS THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE AUTHORIZED UNDER LONDON-ZURICH ACCORDS ON THE ISLAND. THIS IS INTERRELATED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REPLACEMENT FORCE. GOG DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE BALANCED REDUCTIONS IN VIEW DISPROPORTION OF GREEK AND TURK FORCES BUT TOTAL ELIMINATION SHOULD BE FINAL RESULT.

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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 531

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VANTO 14

REF: ATHENS 2400

DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE DIFFERENCES IN PROPOSED UNSYG STATEMENT
IN TOVAN 15 AND THAT CONTAINED IN GREEK PAPER GIVEN VANCE BY
PIPINELLIS (VANTO 13). VANCE WILL SEEK TO SELL GREEK VERSION
TO TURKS MORNING NOVEMBER 25. IF THEY ACCEPT, THAT WILL BE VERSION

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2401A ~~SECRET~~
TO BE PUSHED WITH U THANT. OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL
AFTER VANCE'S DISCUSSION WITH TURKS AND PROBABLY MAKARIOS.

IF U THANT READY TO MAKE APPEAL TODAY, COULD IT BE IN GENERAL
TERMS NOT RPT NOT PREJUDICING MORE SPECIFIC APPEAL WE HOPE PARTIES
AND HE WILL AGREE TO SURFACE TOMORROW???

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VANTO 11

SUBJECT: VANCE'S MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PIPINELLIS
NOVEMBER 24

(PART ONE OF TWO PARTS)

SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR TALBOT AND JOHN WALSH, HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PIPINELLIS THIS

~~PAGE 2 RUCMAT 2395A SECRET~~
MORNING. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION PIPINELLIS WAS COURTEOUS, CALM, THOUGHTFUL AND SOMEWHAT FATALISTIC.

IN RESPONSE TO PIPINELLIS' INQUIRY, VANCE FRANKLY OUTLINED HIS IMPRESSION OF THE MOOD AND POSITION OF THE GREEK AND THE TURKISH PEOPLE. HE SUMMARIZED SITUATION AS VERY GRAVE WITH WAR FEVER RUNNING AND GREEK FLATLY INSISTING ON IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ILLEGAL GREEK FORCES AS SINE QUA NON FOR EASING OF TENSIONS. HE POINTED

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OUT THAT HE HAD BEEN REBUFFED WHEN HE SUGGESTED THAT SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOUND IN SIMULTANEOUS GREEK WITHDRAWAL AND GOT STEPS TO LOWER MOBILIZATION LEVELS. WHILE SOME MODERATE FORCES EXIST WITHIN GOT, HE WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THEY COULD WITHSTAND MOUNTING WAR PRESSURES.

PIPINELLIS SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED BY VANCE'S ASSESSMENT. GREECE AND HER ALLIES WERE FACED BY GRAVEST DANGERS. ALL GREEK INFORMATION POINTED TO PROBABILITY OF TURK ATTACK. HE HAD TAKEN POSITION AS FOREIGN MINISTER DETERMINED TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT NOT AT THE PRICE OF NATIONAL HUMILIATION. WHAT TURKEY ASKS, HE SAID, NO SELF-RESPECTING GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT. THEY WISH

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2395 ~~SECRET~~

GREECE TO GIVE UP ALL ITS ASSETS BEFORE TALKING. IF GREEK FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM CYPRUS, HE PREDICTED COMMUNAL CLASHES WOULD OCCUR FOLLOWED BY A TURKISH LANDING. TURKEY WOULD THEN EXERCISE ITS WILL WITHOUT HINDRANCE ON CYPRUS. IF CLASH WITH TURKEY IS UNAVOIDABLE, HE PREFERRED IT TO OCCUR UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. DESPITE HIS CONVICTION THAT GREEK FORCES ARE FACTOR OF STABILITY ON ISLAND AND THEIR ELIMINATION WOULD CREATE VACUUM INVITING TURKISH INTERVENTION, HE WAS PREPARED CONSIDER PHASED WITHDRAWAL CONNECTED WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME OTHER TYPE POLICING FORCE, PROVIDING TURKS WOULD ACCEPT FORMULA WHICH WOULD NOT HUMILIATE GREECE. THIS, HE SAID, IS ALL GREECE CAN DO. IF IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO TURKEY, SITUATION IS HOPELESS.

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~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2396

EXDIS

VANTO 11

SUBJECT: VANCE'S MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PIPINELLIS -A
NOVEMBER 24

(PART TWO OF TWO PARAS)

VANCE THEN TURNED TO POSSIBILITY OF SOLUTION TO INPASSE IF
U THANT ISSUED CALL TO GREEKS TO START WITHDRAWING AND TO TURKS TO

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2396A ~~SECRET~~

TAKE ACTION REDUCE TENSION. S HE FELT THIS PLAN COULD PREVENT WAR
WITHOUT HUMILIATION AND STATED HE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM PIPINELLIS
THAT UKG SHARED THIS VIEW. GREEKS WOULD RESPOND FIRST TO SYG AND THE
N
TURKS WOULD RESPOND. UNDER THIS PLAN SYG WOULD PROVIDE
UMBRELLA
PROTECTING DIGNITY EACH COUNTRY. IN EYES OF WORLD, GREECE WOULD
BENEFIT IF IT RESPONDED FIRST TO SYG. FURTHERMORE, CHANCES OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARE SLIGHT UNLESS GREECE MOVES FIRST, SINCE

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GOT HAS PRESENTED COMPLETE STONEWALL WHEN WE RAISED POSSIBILITY
SIMULTANEITY IN DECISIONS BOTH COUNTRIES.

VANCE POINTED OUT THAT HIS PROPOSAL HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED
AS YET WITH U THANT BUT HE WOULD RAISE IT WITH HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE ROLZ-NETT, IF PIPINELLIS CONSIDERED PLAN HAD MERTI.

PIPINELLIS RESPONDED THAT IDEA APPEARED REASONABLE, BUT FELT
GOG WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST SIMULTANEITY IN NOTIFICATIONS TO SYG AND
TIMING OF COMMENCEMENT OF SPECIFIC ACTIONS. FS
THERNORE, THERE
WOULD BE NO GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM CYPRUS UNLESS TURKS WITHDRAW.
MOMENT OUTWARDS MUST BE ON STAGED BASIS AND ACCOMPANIED BY BUILD-UP O
F
UN OR OTHER REPLACEMENT FORCES. ENSUING DISCUSSION INDICATED PIPINEL
LIS

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2396A ~~SECRET~~

UNAWARE NUMBERS OF GREEK AND TURKISH ILLEGAL FORCES ON ISLAND AND
APPARENTLY ASSUME APPROXIMATE EQUALITY THESE FORCES. HE EMPHASIZED
THAT PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL MUST BE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES.
THIS SHOULD NOT BE LINKED, HOWEVER, TO LONDON-URICH ACCORDS BECAUSE
OF MAKARIOS.

PIPINELLIS SAID HE WOULD WORK OUT WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR
CONSIDERATION WITH VANCE IN AFTERNOON AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH CABINET.

HE THEN SUMMED UP HIS VIEWS BY SAYING HE WAS PREPARED TO GO FAR
IN SEARCH FOR PEACE BUT HE WOULD NOT YIELD TO TURKISH PRESSURE. IF
TURKS NOT PREPARED MAKE SLIGHTEST GESTURE OF UNDERSTANDING FEELINGS
OF A FREE PEOPLE, WAR WILL RESULT. FINALLY, ANY TJRK LANDING ON
CYPRUS WOULD SPEEDILY ESCALATE INTO FULL WAR BETWEEN GREECE AND
TURKEY.

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EXDIS

VANTO 09

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH TURKISH PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS

NOVEMBER 23

(PART THREE OF FIVE PARTS)

TURKISH PROPOSALS FOR
A SOLUTION TO CRISIS

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2389A ~~SECRET~~

IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY VANCE'S PROBING QUESTIONS, PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL DESCRIBED AT SOME LENGTH TURKISH CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE MADE FORCEFULLY WITH ULTIMATUM IMPLICATIONS, AND STRONG OVERTONES OF FINALITY AND FATALISM. THEY LEFT VERY FEW LOOP-HOLES FOR A MEDIATION EFFORT.

DEMIREL APPROACHED THIS SUBJECT FROM A BACKDROP OF A HARSH

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DENUNCIATION OF GREEK POLICIES AND ACTIONS. HE MAINTAINED THAT FOR FOUR YEARS THE GOT HAD TAKEN NO ACTION DESPITE CONTINUING GREEK TREATY VIOLATIONS AND KILLINGS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID, NO ONE COULD SHOW WHERE A TURK HAS DONE ANY KILLING. ALTHOUGH TIME IS VERY SHORT, HE SAID, THERE REMAINS ONE ROUTE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IN SIMPLE TERMS, THE GREEKS MUST GET THEIR ILLEGAL FORCES OFF THE ISLAND, THE HEAVY ARMS MUST BE COLLECTED BY UNFICYP, AND THE KILLING MUST STOP. IF THE GREEKS BEGAN WITHDRAWING, THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD BE CREATED WHICH WOULD PERMIT DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER PROBLEMS DIV I GG THE TWO COUNTRIES.

DEMIREL FLATLY REJECTED VANCE'S SUGGESTION THAT THE IMPASSE

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2389SS ~~SECRET~~

MUST BE BROKEN BY DEVELOPING A FORMULA COMBINING GREEK WITHDRAWAL WITH A REDUCTION IN TURKISH MOBILIZATION LEVELS. HE SAID THEY HAD GIVEN THE GREEKS A NOTE ON NOVEMBER 17 ESTING # ON GREEK WITHDRAWAL. HE WARNED THAT, IF THEY DON'T ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, THEY ARE BUYING TROUBLE. WHEN ASKED IF THE GOT WOULD AGREE TO TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION OF CYPRUS, DEMIREL REPLIED OBVIOUSLY THAT THE GOT WOULD AGREE TO A RETURN TO THE ARMS LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE CYPRUS CONSTITUTION.

IN RESPONSE TO VANCE'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD FLY TO ATHENS

IN HIS CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, DEMIREL ASSERTED THAT THE GOT HAD NOTHING TO DISCUSS OR BARGAIN WITH THE GOG. HE CONCLUDED WITH THE FLAT ASSERTION THAT VANCE IS ALWAYS WELCOME IN TURKEY BUT THE GOT WILL HAVE NOTHING LEFT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM UNLESS THE GREEKS WITHDRAW THEIR ILLEGAL FORCES ON THE ISLAND. D TALBOT

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VANTO 09

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH TURKISH PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS
NOV 23

(PART II OF SEVERAL PARTS)D

IN RESPONSE TO VANCE'S REQUEST FOR TURKISH VIEWS ON SITUATION
AND POSSIBLE MEANS OF SOLUTION, PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL REPLIED IN
TONES OF COLD PASSION, OUTLINING SIMPLISTIC TURK VERSION OF CYPRUS
HISTORY AND RECENT EVENTS ON ISLAND

TURKISH VERSION OF EVENTS ON CYPRUS

~~PAGE 200MAT 2377A SECRET~~
DEMIREL STATED STATE OF CYPRUS CREATED BY AGREEMENT UK TURKEY
AND GREECE, BT BY ITS OWN ACTS. MAKARIOS WAS ELECTED UNDER
CONSTITUTION WHICH HE VIOLATED IN 1963. IN SO DOING, SE LOST LEGAL
BASIS.

ACCORDING TO BASIC AGREEMENTS OF 1960, NUMBERS GREEK MILITARY
FORCE ON ISLAND AND NATURE EQUIPMENT STRICTLY LIMITED3

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SUBSEQUENTLY GREEKS IN VIOLATION THEIR SOLEMN COMMITMENTS HAVE INTRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS ADDITIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMED WITH HEAVY EQUIPMENT, POSSIBLY OF NATO ORIGIN. THE OBJECT OF THESE ILLEGAL ACTS IS TO DESTROY THE TURKISH COMMUNITIES BY SALAMI TACTICS WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF INCORPORATING ISLAND INTO GREECE. THEIR INGENIOUS PLANS BASED UPON THREATS AND KILLING OF TURKS.

DEMIREL STATED THAT TWO MONTHS AGO HE TOLD GREEK PRIME MINISTER GOT WISHED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT CYPRUS ISSUE BUT THIS REQUIRED TIME AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER ON ISLAND. HE HAD WARNED HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FURTHER KILLING IN ORDER REMOVE ANY POSSIBILITY GREEK MISUNDERSTANDING THIS SCORE/

G-3 3EQMAT 2377SSE C R E T

ACCORDING TO DEMIREL, THE GREEK RESPONSE BECAME CLEAR ON NOVEMBER 15-16 WHEN GREEK FORCES MASSACRED 29 TURKS (AT THIS POINT HE MADE DRAMATIC USE OF PROPAGANDA PAMPHLET CONTAINING GRISLY PICTURES OF MUTILATED TURK CYPRIOTS). HE SAID GOT IS CERTAIN THIS OPERATION WAS PLANNED IN ATHENS. GRIVAS, WHO WAS INSTRUMENTALITY OF GREEK POLICY, USED 6,000 MEN WITH HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN LEVELING TURK VILLAGES. SUBSEQUENTLY, CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL, AND RECALL OF GRIVAS WAS ORDERED BY ATHENS, THUS PROVING THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC GOVERNMENT FOR THE NOVEMBER 15-16 ATROCITIES.

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VANTO 9

FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MC NAMARA

REF: VANTO 6

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH TURKISH PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS
PART I OF SEVERAL PARTS

IN SESSION LATE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 23SAND STRETCHING OVER TWO

PAGE 2 RUSKAT 2371S ~~SECRET~~
HOUR PERIOD IN SEPARATE GOT OFFICES, SECY VANCE, AMB. HART AND
MISSION MEMBERS MET WITH PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL AND FOREIGN
MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL. SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SUNAY
COVERED IN ANKARA 2518.

VANCE OPENED SESSIONS WITH PREPARED STATEMENT OF HIS
OBJECTIVES IN FLYING TO ANKARA. TEXT FOLLOWS:

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~~PAGE 02 ATHENS 02371 241301Z~~

I AM GRATEFUL THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED ME ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. THE RAPIDITY OF MY FLIGHT TO ANKARA REFLECTS THE APPRECIATION OF MY GOVERNMENT OF THE SERIOUSNESS AND URGENCY OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED OUT OF THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 15 AND 16 ON CYPRUS.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO OFFER MY SERVICES IN ALL GOOD FAITH TO THE INTERESTED PARTIES IN AN EFFORT TO ASSIST THEM TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE GRAVE PROBLEMS WHICH THREATEN THE PEACE OF THE AREA.

~~PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2371ES E C R E T~~

IT IS MY INTENTION TO FAMILIARIZE MYSELF ON AN URGENT BASIS WITH THE MATTERS AT ISSUE. IN SO DOING, I HOPE TO OBTAIN ON A FIRST HAND BASIS THE VIEWS OF THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, TO SEARCH OUT AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT, AND TO FIND THE BASIS FOR A VIABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEM.

IT IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT THE SUCCESS OF MY EFFORTS WILL DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES FRANKLY WITH ME, TO HONOR THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR EXCHANGES, AND TO REFRAIN FROM WORDS AND DEEDS WHICH MIGHT INCREASE THE DANGEROUS TENSIONS WHICH ALREADY EXIST IN THE AREA.

I COME TO ANKARA UNDER THE DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS OF MY PRESIDENT AS A WARM FRIEND AND ALLY OF TURKEY. IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT I NOW WISH TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND TO THE PRESENT DANGEROUS IMPASSE. FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSIONS TODAY, I INTEND TO PROCEED TO ATHENS TO CONDUCT SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS IN THAT CAPITAL.ED

UNQUOTE.

TALBOT

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 02294 212040Z

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ACTION SS 80

INFO NSCE 00, CIAE 00, SSO 00, DODE 00, USIE 00, NSAE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

LIMDIS

Z 211945Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3794
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 567
AMEMBASSY LONDON 339
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 537
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 21
USUN NEW YORK 153
USMISSION NATO 50
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH

(S)

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2294

LIMDIS

1. KING IS CONSIDERING SUGGESTING TO PRESIDENT LATER THIS EVENING THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON INVITE CONSTANTINE AND SUNAY

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2294 ~~SECRET~~
WITH THEIR MINISTERS TO MEET WITH HIM URGENTLY IN UNITED STATES TO FIND WAY TO AVERT WAR. KING NOW CHECKING OUT IDEA WITH PRINCIPAL CABINET MEMBERS AND SAID HE MIGHT BE IN TOUCH WITH ME LATER.

2 ALTERNATIVE IDEA DEVELOPED
BY KING EARLIER TODAY WOULD BE
FOR GOG AND GOC TO REQUEST UNSYG TO CALL MEETING OF THEIR TWO GOVERNMENTS, TURKEY AND BRITAIN UNDER U THANT'S PERSONAL AUSPICES.

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 02294 212040Z

KING NOW FEELS THIS WOULD AT LEAST DEMONSTRATE GREEK DETERMINATION TO DISCUSS ISSUES, BUT FOR PRACTICAL RESULTS IS LEANING TOWARD REQUEST TO PRESIDENT.

3. FURTHER POINTS IN MY CONVERSATION WITH KING THIS EVENING FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY.

GP-3
TALBOT

LIMDIS

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

72 41

~~SECRET~~ 90-4

PAGE 01 ATHENS 02199 180118Z

85
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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P 172325Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3733
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 525
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 499
AMEMBASSY LONDON 307
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 121
USMISSION NATO 18E
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2199

REF: STATE 70961

SUBJ: CYPRUS

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2199A ~~SECRET~~
DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KING
CONSTANTINE TO MARSHAL OF COURT AMBASSADOR
PAPAGOS 2320 LOCAL, WITH COPY TO PRIME
MINISTER TEN MINUTES LATER.

GP-3.

TALBOT

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-O.

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TELEGRAM

73/47

~~SECRET~~ 076

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01896 252121Z

82

ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

R 251758Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3601

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1896

EXDIS

1. KING CONSTANTINE TOLD ME OCTOBER 23 THAT HE AND JUNTA HAVE NOW AGREED ON CERTAIN CABINET CHANGES TO TAKE PLACE PROBABLY VERY SHORTLY AFTER "OCHI" DAY OBSERVANCES OCTOBER 28. AMBASSADOR PALAMAS WILL BE RECALLED FROM WASHINGTON TO REPLACE FOREIGN MINISTER ECONOMOU-GOURAS. (KING EXPRESSED HOPE USG WOULD NOT TAKE OFFENSE AT THIS CHANGE DESPITE VERY RECENT ARRIVAL OF PALAMAS IN WASHINGTON. PURPOSE IS TO PUT STRONGER HAND AT HELM OF FOREIGN MINISTRY.) FOUR OR FIVE OTHER CIVILIAN MINISTERS WILL BE REPLACED BY PERSONS EXPECTED TO BE MORE EFFICIENT. COL. PAPADOPOULOS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE ADVANCED TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 48355 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
AT THIS TIME. MILITARY MINISTERS (SPANDIDAKIS, ZOITAKIS, PATTAKOS, MAKAREMZOS AND PAPADOPOULOS) WILL RESIGN ARMY COMMISSIONS IN ORDER TO STAY IN GOVERNMENT. ARMY OFFICERS HOLDING GOVERNMENT POSITIONS BELOW CABINET LEVEL WILL NOT RESIGN COMMISSIONS AT THIS STAGE. COMMENT: UNTIL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, THERE ALWAYS CHANCE SIGNALS WILL BE CHANGED AGAIN.

2. ACCORDING TO KING, RECENT PAZDMASH STATEMENT ON CON-
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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01896 252121Z

STUTUTIONAL TIMETABLE WAS APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS WHO HOWEVER HAD NOT INFORMED REST OF CABINET. AFTER ITS PUBLICATION, MILITARY MINISTERS HAD COMPLAINED. PRIME MINISTER HAD REPLIED STATEMENT WAS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE SINCE IT REPRESENTED DECLARED GOVERNMENT POLICY AND HE HIMSELF HAD MADE COMPARABLE STATEMENT. THOUGH VISIBLY IRRITATED AT THIS ACTION TAKEN WITHOUT THEIR PRIOR CONSENT, MINITARY MINISTERS HAD NOT MADE IT A MAJOR ISSUE. IN AGREEING TO PALAMAS AS FOREIGN MINISTER, THEY HAD ALSO SOUGHT TO PLACE KYP CHIEF AS UNDER SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VICE CHRISTOPOULOS) TO BRING

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 48355 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
ADMITTEDLY RESTIVE FOREIGN SERVICE UNDER CLOSER JUNTA CONTROL, BUT HAD BEEN TALKED OUT OF IT.

3. DURING PREVIOUS WEEK KING HAD HAD SERIES OF FRANK AND RATHER SHARP TALKS WITH COL. PAPADOPOULOS, LT. COL. BALOPOULOS, SECOND-LEVEL JUNTA MEMBER SERVING AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF TOURISM, AND LT. GEN. ANGELIS, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. EACH HAD REPORTED HEARING RUMORS THAT CERTAIN ARMY OFFICERS HAD POLLED SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO FIND WHICH ONES WOULD STAND WITH KING IN EVENT OF CLASH WITH JUNTA. THEY HAD COMPLAINED SUCH TACTICS UNACCEPTABLE, SINCE THEY SUGGESTED COMING SPLIT BETWEEN KING AND JUNTA. KING HAD TOLD THEM TO IGNORE SUCH RUMORS AND GET ON WITH JOB OF REUNIFYING ARMY UNDER PROPER DISCIPLINARY LINES. BALOPOULOS HAD SHOCKED KING BY DECLARING BIGGEST POST-WAR PROBLEM IN ARMY HAD BEEN LACK OF INTEGRITY AND COMPETENCE IN ITS GENERALS AND "WE HAVE TO GET RID OF ALL OF THEM." KING HAD LASHED BACK WITH CAUSTIC COMMENT ABOUT COLONELS WHO TALK ABOUT OTHER PEOPLE'S INTEGRITY BUT TAKE GOVERNMENT SALARIES INSTEAD OF BEING SATISFIED WITH MILITARY PAYCHECKS.

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 48355 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
HE HAD REVEALED HIS MOOD BY TELLING BALOPOULOS THAT OF COURSE
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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ATHENS 01896 252121Z

ARMY SUPPORTS KING AND COUNTRY RATHER THAN ANY PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT JUST AS KING SUPPORTS ANY GOVERNMENT SO LONG AS IT IS GOOD FOR COUNTRY BUT WILL DISMISS IT OUT OF HAND WHEN IT BEGINS TO DAMAGE NATIONAL INTERESTS. "AND IF I HAVE TO DO THIS TO YOUR GOVERNMENT SOME DAY, YOU'LL BE OUT AND I'LL STILL BE KING." SUBSEQUENTLY KING HAD SCOLDED GENERAL ANGELIS FOR FAILURE TO RESTORE PROPER ARMY DISCIPLINE. HE TOLD ANGELIS THAT WHOLE ARMY BELIEVED HIM UNDER THUMB OF LT. COL. LEKKAS, COUP MEMBER WHO MONITORS EVERY DECISION MADE BY ANGELIS. ANGELIS, WHOM KING DESCRIBED AS COMPLETELY PRO-JUNTA, HAD LEFT ANGRY BUT PERHAPS SHAKEN AS KING HAD WANTED HIM TO BE.

4. KING SAID JUNTA EXCEEDINGLY JITTERY OVER REPORTS THAT "OCHI" DAY OBSERVANCE IN THESSALONIKI MIGHT BE SEIZED AS OCCASION FOR COUNTERCOUP. REGIME DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST SUCH ATTEMPT, INCLUDING SENDING TWO COMMANDO UNITS INTO THESSALONIKI AREA. FOR HIS PART, KING WOULD NOT SPARK OR INVOLVE HIMSELF IN ANY COUNTERCOUP

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 48355 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
EFFORT ON THIS OCCASION. THERE WOULD BE NO POINT TO TRYING SINCE THEY SO OBVIOUSLY EXPECTED IT. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVES AGAINST THIS REGIME. HE WAS STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH QUESTION WHETHER HE SHOULD MAKE ANY MOVE BEFORE SOME KEY GENERALS BECOME SUBJECT TO RETIREMENT AT END OF THIS YEAR. PROBLEM IS TO FIND PROPER OCCASION TO WORK IT OUT WELL. I COMMENTED THAT IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO TAKE ANY STEP I ASSUMED KING WOULD STUDY VERY CAREFULLY WHETHER ISSUE EXISTED AROUND WHICH COUNTRY WOULD RALLY, WHETHER PLANS DEVELOPED SUFFICIENTLY TO MEET RISKY CONTINGENCIES, AND WHAT WOULD FOLLOW. KING RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD PLAN TO PUT INTO OFFICE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WITH EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. SINCE OUR TIME HAD RUN OUT I RESPONDED MERELY THAT THESE QUESTIONS WOULD CERTAINLY INVOLVE HIM IN MOST THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION OF RAMIFICATIONS.

5. COMMENT: IT IS EVIDENT THAT FOR MOMENT KING HAS
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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01896 252121Z

DECIDED TO TAKE STRONGER LINE WITH JUNTA THAN HERETOFORE.
HE SEEMS BUOYED UP BY SUCCESS OF HIS INSISTENCE THAT

PAGE 6 RUQMAT 48355/ ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
MILITARY MINISTERS RESIGN THEIR COMMISSIONS AND HIS REFUSAL
TO PROMOTE PAPADOPOULOS AT THIS TIME. IT IS HARD TO SAY
HOW LONG-LIVED THESE ACHIEVEMENTS MAY BE. JUNTA AND
GENERAL ANGELIS MUST BE SMARTING UNDER KING'S RECENT
STERNNESS AND PERHAPS RECOGNIZE HE NOW FEELS VERY
IMPORTANT ARMY ELEMENTS, NOTABLY GENERAL PERIDES OF
C CORPS, HAVE BEEN WON TO HIS SIDE. ASSUMING THIS IS
TRUE, RECENT REPORTS HAVE INDICATED, JUNTA LIKELY

TO MOVE WITH CAUTION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE VIS---VIS
KING. IF SO, AND IN VIEW KING'S ASSURANCES HE PLANS
NOTHING FOR COMING WEEKEND, THERE IS GOOD CHANCE "OCHI"
DAY OBSERVANCE WILL PASS PEACEFULLY DESPITE INDICATIONS
JUNTA IS IN FACT JITTERY, AS KING SAID. IF TROUBLE
ERUPTS, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE SPARKED BY ISOLATED
ACTS OF VIOLENCE BY UNDERGROUND ELEMENTS.
TALBOT

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74
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01716 120752Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 120700Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3523

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1716

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 1713

KING NOW RPT NOW BELIEVES JUNTA LEADERS AGREE TO DEFER CHANGE
N CABINET POSITION OF COL. PAPADOPOULOS. COL. MAKAREZOS
TOLD HIM EVENING OCTOBER 11 THAT FOR PRESENT GROUP WOULD
NOT RPT NOT PRESS PAPADOPOULOS' PROMOTION. MAKAREZOS ALSO
SAID HE, PATTAKOS AND PAPADOPOULOS PREPARED TO RESIGN ARMY
COMMISSIONS. IN DEFERENCE TO KING'S WISHES THEY WOULD ALSO
"SEEK TO PERSUADE" OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS IN GOVERNMENT
POSITIONS TO RESIGN THEIR COMMISSIONS. AT END OF INTERVIEW
KING UNDERSTOOD JUNTA NOW RPT NOW PLANNING TO WORK OUT
QUESTION OF RESIGNATIONS AND REPLACEMENT OF FIVE CIVILIAN
MINISTERS IN COURSE OF NEXT WEEK OR SO.

GP-3. TALBOT

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75
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 ATHENS 01713 132229Z

82
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

0 111707Z OCT 67 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3521

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1713

EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING IS KING'S VERSION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESHUFFLE
MANEUVERING AS OF NOON OCTOBER 11:

2. DURING PAST WEEK KING CONSULTED PRIMIN KOLLIAS AND DEPUTY
PRIMIN SPANDIDAKIS AGAIN ON COL. PAPADOPOULOS' REQUEST TO BE
PROMOTED TO DEPUTY PRIMIN. FOUND KOLLIAS DISLIKING IDEA
AND ESPECIALLY OPPOSING SHIFT AT PRESENT TIME WHEN INTER-
NATIONAL REACTION, ALREADY HOSTILE, WOULD BE STRONG. GENERAL
SPANDIDAKIS AGAIN DECLARED HE WOULD RESIGN IF PAPADOPOULOS
BECAME DEPUTY PRIMIN AS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT HIS OWN AUTHORITY
IN ARMED SERVICES. SPANDIDAKIS DARKLY INSISTED THAT PAPADO-

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1713A ~~SECRET~~
POULOS' PROPOSAL "MEANS STAGE TWO HAS COME AND MUST BE
RESISTED". HE STATED HIS READINESS TO ARREST PAPADOPOULOS,
BUT HAD NO ANSWER TO THE KING'S REJOINDER, "WITH WHAT?"

3. ON EVENING OF OCTOBER 10 BRIG GENL PATTAKOS
AND PAPADOPOULOS CALLED SEPARATELY ON KING. PATTAKOS TOLD KING "WE"
(MEANING, APPARENTLY, HIMSELF, PAPADOPOULOS AND MAKAREZOS),
PERHAPS IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL, HAD DECIDED TO MOVE NOW TO REPLACE MINISTER OF

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01713 132229Z

LABOR, INDUSTRY, EDUCATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, AND PUBLIC ORDER. PRESENTED PANEL OF TWO OR THREE NAMES FOR EACH POSITION FOR KING'S DECISION. ASKED THAT KING AND HE AGREE ON FIRST CHOICES, WHICH PATTAKIS WOULD THEN PRESENT TO PRIMIN KOLLIAS FOR FORMAL TRANSMITTAL TO KING. AMONG PROPOSALS WERE RETIRED GENERALS PANAGIOTIS VELLIOS, GEORGE BALLAS, AND GEORGE VALLIS. KING HAD RULED OUT FIRST TWO IMMEDIATELY, WITH PATTAKOS' CONCURRENCE. AS TO VALLIS, WHO WAS PROPOSED FOR PUBLIC ORDER (VICE TOTOMIS) AND WHO NOW HEAD OF ROYAL INSTITUTE, KING OBVIOUSLY ATTRACTED TO WHO SUPPORTS PALACE WOULD TAKE CHARGE OF POLICE, THOUGH HE MADE NO DECISION. HE UNFAMILIAR WITH CIVILIAN

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 1713A ~~SECRET~~

NAMES PROPOSED EXCEPT FOR FORMER RECTOR OF UNIVERSITY OF THESSALONIKI PANAGIOTIS CHRISTOU. KING SAID HE WOULD PONDER LIST FOR FEW DAYS.

4. PATTAKOS ALSO PROPOSED PAPADOPOULOS BE MADE DEPUTY PRIMIN. ASSURED KING THAT PAPADOPOULOS BETTER MAN THAN HE, PATTAKOS. KING TOLD HIM BOTH KOLLIAS AND SPANDIDAKIS DEFINITELY OPPOSED. IN DISCUSSION PATTAKOS ADMITTED HE TOO HAD URGED PAPADOPOULOS NOT TO MAKE THIS MOVE SO SOON, BUT HAD FINALLY AGREED TO LATTER'S REASONING THAT HIS PROMOTION NECESSARY TO GET REVOLUTION MOVING MORE EFFECTIVELY AND TO CONSOLIDATE CONTROL OVER ARMY. KING SHOWED HIS DISAGREEMENT.

5. WHEN PAPADOPOULOS PRESENTED HIMSELF IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING, HE OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT GOT WORD. KING FOUND HIM AFFABLE, EVEN JOVIAL, PURRING AS IF ALREADY LICKING CREAM HE EXPECTED TO BE OFFERED HIM. KING TOLD HIM HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE VARIOUS CABINET CHANGES THEY HAD DISCUSSED, INCLUDING SUGGESTIONS JUST HANDED TO HIM BY PATTAKOS. THERE WERE THREE ELEMENTS: RESIGNATIONS OF THEIR COMMISSIONS BY OFFICERS IN GOVERNMENT POSTS, REPLACEMENT OF WEAK CIVILIAN MINISTERS,

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 1713A ~~SECRET~~

AND QUESTION OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERSHIP FOR COL. PAPADOPOULOS. IN BEST INTERESTS OF COUNTRY HE ~~PROPOSED~~ **REPRODUCED**

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ATHENS 01713 132229Z

TWO ELEMENTS AS INITIAL PACKAGE AND LEAVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIRD TO SOME MORE PROPITIOUS TIME. PAPADOPOULOS' FACE BECAME HARD, HIS EYES STEELY. ALWAYS POLITELY BUT OBVIOUSLY SEETHING INSIDE, HE INSISTED ALL THREE ELEMENTS MUST BE ACHIEVED SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN THAT WAY CONTROL OVER ARMY WOULD BE ASSURED, RUMORS OF COUNTERCOUPS STOPPED, AND KING'S SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT VISIBLE TO ALL. KING ARGUED THAT ON CONTRARY REACTIONS TO SUCH A MOVE AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE ADVERSE. IN ANY CASE, SINCE PRIMIN AND DPTY PRIMIN OPPOSED TO IDEA, THERE WAS NOTHING KING COULD DO ABOUT IT EXCEPT TO GIVE THEM DIRECT ORDER TO PROMOTE PAPADOPOULOS, WHICH HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO DO. AFTER FURTHER INCONCLUSIVE CONVERSATION, KING SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRIMIN AGAIN.

6. AS TO RESIGNATIONS OF COMMISSIONS, PAPADOPOULOS TOLD KING HE, PATAKOS AND MAKAREZOS PREPARED TO BECOME CIVILIANS, BUT OTHER OFFICERS IN GOVERNMENT SHOULD KEEP THEIR COMMISSIONS.

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 1713A ~~SECRET~~
KING DISAGREED, ARGUING ALL SHOULD CHOOSE BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY SERVICE.

7 KING CALLED KOLLIAS AT NOON TODAY AND LEARNED PAPADOPOULOS HAD ALREADY MET PRIMIN AT 8 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING. KOLLIAS HAD STOOD HIS GROUND FIRMLY TELLING PAPADOPOULOS THAT HE WOULD GET NO MORE AUTHORITY AS DEPUTY PRIMIN THAN HE NOW EXERCISES AS MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER. HE FIRST URGED HIM TO DELAY HIS AMBITIONS, THEN REFUSED FLATLY TO PROPOSE HIS PROMOTION TO KING. PAPADOPOULOS HAD ANSWERED, "THEN I SHALL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSEQUENCES." KOLLIAS HAD THEN (ACCORDING TO HIS ACCOUNT TO KING, WHICH I TEND TO CREDIT) VERBALLY TORN IN TO PAPADOPOULOS, ASKING HIM WHAT HE MEANT, WAS IT THREAT TO DISLodge GOVERNMENT BY FORCE, ETC. PAPADOPOULOS HAD QUIETED DOWN AND GIVEN ASSURANCES HE WANTED TO SEE GOVERNMENT CARRY ON.

8. KOLLIAS HAD URGED KING TO STAND FIRM AGAINST PROMOTION OF PAPADOPOULOS. HE TOO HAD SUGGESTED THAT ~~PAPADOPOULOS~~

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01713 132229Z

MIGHT HAVE TO BE ARRESTED, BUT HAD GIVEN NO ANSWER TO KING'S RATHER BLEAK QUESTION "WITH WHAT?".

PAGE 6 RUQMAT 1713A ~~SECRET~~

9. THIRD MEMBER OF TRIUMVIRATE, COL. MAKAREZOS, HAS ASKED TO SEE KING THIS EVENING. KING ASSUMES HE MAY BRING MESSAGE THAT WILL THROW LIGHT ON PAPADOPOULOS' NEXT MOVE. KING ALSO ASKED ME TO SEE HIM LATER IN EVENING.

10. AS FOREGOING SUGGESTS, KING BELIEVES HIS CONFRONTATION WITH PAPADOPOULOS MAY BE RAPIDLY COMING TO HEAD. HE IS AWARE OF RUMORS IN TOWN THAT WITH HIS WIFE'S DEPARTURE TOMORROW FOR WEEK'S TRIP TO ITALY (TO BE WITH HER PARENTS WHO ARE VISITING THERE) AND HIS MOTHER'S TRAVELS A FEW DAYS LATER KING IS CLEARING DECKS FOR A SHOWDOWN WITH COUP GROUP. HE INSISTS THIS NOT HIS INTENTION; ON CONTRARY, HE'D LIKE TO SEE SITUATION MOVE SMOOTHLY TO PRESENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFT TWO MONTHS HENCE. BUT HIS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT MAY LIE JUST AHEAD IS INDICATED BY HIS COMMENT TODAY THAT HE IS KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH AS MANY ELEMENTS AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE HE DOESN'T WANT TO BE SURPRISED AGAIN (AS ON APRIL 21).

GP-3
TALBOT

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76
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01621 041806Z

46
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 041725Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3485

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1621

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 1385

1. WITH DISTASTE AND REGRET, KING CONSTANTINE TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT IN RESPONSE TO HIS SECRET QUERY (REFTEL) REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP HAD CONCLUDED IT MUST STAY IN OFFICE FOUR YEARS TO COMPLETE ITS MISSION. AT MEETING CONVENED TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER, PRIME MINISTER HAD ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST SO LONG A PERIOD BUT MILITARY MINISTERS HAD BEEN INSISTENT. ACCORDING TO KING, NEITHER HE NOR KOLLIAS AGREE WITH DECISION, AND BOTH WOULD WORK TO GET IT REVISED. KING ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BY COMMUNICATING

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1621A ~~SECRET~~
THIS DECISION TO HIM JUNTA HAD DECLARED, ALBEIT SECRETLY, ITS DETERMINATION NOT TO GIVE UP POWER SOON.

2. I ASKED WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO TWO-YEAR TIMETABLE THAT KING HAD COMMUNICATED TO CHARGE ANSCHUETZ IN JULY. THIS HAD BEEN PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION, KING EXPLAINED. KING AND I AGREED THAT FOUR YEARS OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO CAUSE GREAT DIFFICULTIES

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01621 041806Z

FOR GREECE BOTH INTERNALLY AND IN ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS.
TALBOT

EXD-S

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01618 030949Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 041615Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3482

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1618/1

CORRECTED COPY

EXDIS

1. KING CONSTANTINE CALLED ME IN TUESDAY EVENING TO DISCUSS DECISIONS HE NOW FACES VIS-A-VIS JUNTA. SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER COL. PAPADOPOULOS HAD COME TO HIM AND STATED THAT TIME HAS ARRIVED FOR CABINET RESHUFFLE. MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY, LABOR, PUBLIC WELFARE AND POSSIBLY EDUCATION AND PUBLIC ORDER SHOULD BE REPLACED. PAPADOPOULOS HIMSELF SHOULD BE ELEVATED TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, PRESUMABLY ALONGSIDE CURRENT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BRANDIDAKIS. PAPADOPOULOS HAD PREFACED THESE PROPOSALS (WHICH KING TOOK AS DEMARCHE) BY TELLING KING "IN ALL FRANKNESS" OF RUMORS THAT KING AND SOME ARMY COMMANDERS ARE PLOTTING COUNTERCOUP AND HAVE DISCUSSED MID-OCTOBER TIMING WHEN ON SOME

PAGE TWO RUGHAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~
PRETEXT KING WOULD BE IN NORTH OF GREECE. KING HAD LAUGHED THAT ONE OFF WITH QUESTION, "DO YOU REALLY THINK I WANT TO TAKE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL HEADACHES THAT ARE NOW YOURS AND FOR ALL GOVERNMENT'S MISTAKES?" NEITHER HAD FURTHER MENTIONED COUNTERCOUP RUMORS, BUT KING RECOGNIZED PAPADOPOULOS HAD NOT RAISED SUBJECT IDLY.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-281

By isl NARA, Date 1-20-11

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ATHENS 01618 000949Z

2. KING BELIEVES PAPADOPOULOS IS NOW DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION BUT WOULD AGREE TO KING'S DEMAND THAT MILITARY MINISTERS QUIT ARMY COMMISSIONS AS PRICE OF KING'S APPROVAL. TENTATIVELY, KING HAD CONCLUDED THIS WOULD BE SATISFACTORY DEAL. BY REMOVING COUP LEADERS FROM ACTIVE MILITARY, IT WOULD REDUCE ANOMALY OF MIDDLE GRADE OFFICERS CONTROLLING TOP GENERALS AND OPEN WAY TO REESTABLISH DISCIPLINE WITHIN ARMED FORCES. WITH DISCIPLINED ARMY KING'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS PAPADOPOULOS WOULD BE IMPROVED.

PAGE THREE RUGMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~

3. KING HAD TOLD NO ONE BUT TWO GENERAL OFFICERS ABOUT PAPADOPOULOS' REQUEST. GENERAL PERIDES, COMMANDER OF "C" CORPS, HAD VERBALLY EXPLODED AT IDEA OF COLONEL AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD PROPOSED THAT IF PAPADOPOULOS SHOULD PRESS THIS DEMAND, KING SHOULD CALL "COUNCIL OF GENERALS" WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY NOT AGREE. TO THIS KING, OBVIOUSLY REMEMBERING APRIL 21, HAD REPLIED, "YOU MEAN YOU WANT TO GET ALL TOP GENERALS IN ONE ROOM AROUND WHICH THEY (JUNTA) COULD SO EASILY PLACE GUARD CORDON?" PERIDES HAD BACKED AWAY FROM SPECIFIC SUGGESTION, BUT CONTINUED TO INSIST GOVERNMENTAL ROLE OF COL. PAPADOPOULOS SHOULD NOT BE STRENGTHENED. PERIDES HAD HOWEVER FELT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS IF DEAL COULD BE WORKED OUT THAT WOULD GET COUP GROUP OUT OF ARMY.

4. JUST BEFORE SEEING ME, KING HAD ALSO TOLD GENERAL SPANDIDAKIS THAT PAPADOPOULOS WANTED TO BE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. SPANDIDAKIS HAD REACTED WITH EVEN MORE AGITATION THAN PERIDES, POINTING OUT THIS WOULD UNDERCUT HIS OWN INFLUENCE OVER ARMY. (KING OBSERVED THAT SPANDIDAKIS, BASICALLY WEAK AND FOOLISH)

PAGE FOUR RUGMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~

HAD ALWAYS OVERESTIMATED HIS OWN INFLUENCE.) ON SPUR OF MOMENT, SPANDIDAKIS HAD OFFERED TO LEAD IMMEDIATE COUNTERCOUP AGAINST COLONELS ON BEHALF OF KING. KING HAD TOLD HIM TO GO OFF AND COOL DOWN AND TO COME BACK IN DAY OR SO FOR ANOTHER TALK. HE HAD ALSO WARNED HIM AGAINST SHOWING BY WORD, GESTURE OR FACIAL EXPRESSION THAT HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF PAPADOPOULOS' PROPOSAL.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01618 050949Z

FYI. SRANDIDAKIS CAME TO DINNER WITH ME NINETY MINUTES AFTER LEAVING KING. AFTER DINNER HE ARGUED WITH USUAL VIGOR THAT COUP HAD SAVED GREECE FROM COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. WHEN I HAZARDED COMMENT THAT TOWN IS FULL OF RUMORS COUP GROUP IS PLANNING SECOND STAGE HE ADMITTED KNOWLEDGE OF RUMORS BUT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE KING WOULD ALWAYS PROTECT COUNTRY'S BEST INTERESTS. AS OF TODAY HE IS AND CAN BE NOTHING BUT A KING'S MAN. END FYI.

4. KING HAD REMINDED PAPADOPOULOS THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD FOR SOME TIME FAVORED REPLACING AGED AND WEAK MINISTERS WITH STRONGER CIVILIANS. AS TO PAPADOPOULOS' PROMOTION, WOULD NOT MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE THIS A DISPLAY OF PURELY PERSONAL AMBITION?

PAGE FIVE RUMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~

PAPADOPOULOS HAD INSISTED HE WANTED VICE PRIME MINISTERSHIP ONLY TO STRENGTHEN DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH STILL SUFFERING FROM INDIVIDUALISTIC APPROACHES OF DIFFERENT MINISTRIES. KING HAD ASKED HOW ARMY WOULD REACT. PAPADOPOULOS HAD REPLIED ARMED SERVICES COULD BE MADE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE BY BETTER GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS-- INDEED, IF HE HIMSELF WERE TO BECOME MINISTER OF DEFENSE HE COULD DO MUCH TO IMPROVE ARMED FORCES. KING HAD REJOINED THAT PAPADOPOULOS SHOULD NEVER EVEN CONSIDER IDEA OF BECOMING DEFENSE MINISTER INCE THIS JUST NOT A POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT FOR ONE WHO TILL NOW HAD BEEN ARMY COLONEL. KING HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR TO PAPADOPOULOS THAT IN CONSIDERING HIS REQUEST HE WOULD ASSUME THAT OFFICERS IN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO RESIGN COMMISSIONS. ALTHOUGH PAPADOPOULOS HAD NOT ANSWERED THAT POINT, KING IS CONFIDENT HE UNDERSTANDS THIS WOULD BE NATURE OF BARGAIN.
TALBOT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01618 02 OF 02 041835Z

42

ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 041550Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3483

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ATHENS 1618

EXDIS

5. IN REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTION BY KING, I OBSERVED THAT TO PROMOTE PAPADOPOULOS AT THIS TIME COULD STRENGTHEN VIEWS HELD IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT JUNTA LEADERS DRIVING FOR PRE-EMINENCE IN GREECE. SHOULD PAPADOPOULOS PERSIST, WOULD THERE BE WAY OF LINKING HIS PROMOTION TO COMPLETION OF FIRST STAGE OF RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY AND INAUGURATION OF INTERIM PERIOD LATE THIS YEAR? INTERNATIONAL OPINION MIGHT BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO THAT LINK. KING ASKED IF I MEANT THAT GETTING COUP LEADERS OUT OF ARMY WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT QUID PRO QUO. HE HAD THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE IMPORTANT ADVICE. I AGREED IT WOULD BE USEFUL BUT

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1618/26 ~~SECRET~~
WOULD IT STEM ADVERSE EXTERNAL REACTIONS? KING SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THIS POINT FURTHER AND DISCUSS IT AGAIN WITH ME AFTER A DAY OR TWO.

6. COMMENTING FURTHER ON HIS DISCUSSION MONDAY WITH GENERAL PERIDES, KING SAID LATTER HAD ASSURED HIM ALL BUT ONE OF DIVISION COMMANDERS IN "C" CORPS AREA WECHER COMPLETELY LOYAL TO KING AND WOULD STAND FIRM IN EVENT OF CONFRONTATION WITH COLONELS. GENERAL VELIGIANNIS,

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01618 02 OF 02 041635Z

CG, 10TH DIVISION, WAS UNCERTAIN QUANTITY. PERIDES AWARE THAT REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS PLACED SOME OF ITS PEOPLE IN VARIETY OF IMPORTANT POSTS IN HIS COMMAND BUT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE TY

Y COULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY OPERATION THAT MIGHT BE ORDERED. KING HAD DISCUSSED WITH PERIDES HIS PROBLEM OSBHEALING WITH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IF, INSTEAD OF ABRUPT CONFRONTATION, IT SHOULD MOVE GRADUALLY AND CAREFULLY IN ENHANCING ITS POWER. PERIDES' RESPONSE LSS THAT ARMY WOULD STAND FIGL AGAINST ANY SERIOUS ENCROACHMENT.

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 1618/2A ~~SECRET~~

7. C

YMENT: DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED ABOVE REFLECT KING'S STEPPED UP INITIATIVES VIS-A-VIS JUNTA SINCE HIS RETURN FROM WASHINGTON AS WELL AS EVIDENT DECISIONS BY VOLUTIONARY GROUP TO XDRE N- THEIR OWN DRIVE FOR POWER. KING HAD TVQG PAPADOPOULOS WEEK BEFORE LAST THAT ARMY OFFICERS IN GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESIGN COMMISSIONS, BUT HAD DELIBERATELY PAUSED BEFORE PRESSING ISSUE. HE TOLD ME IN GREAT SECRECY THAT HE HAD ALSO CHARGED GENERAL (NOT REPEAT NOT PRIME MINISTER) KOLLIAS, CG FIRST ARMY, WHOM HE TRUSTS, WITH TASK OF WORKING OUT PLAN TO REESTABLISH KING'S CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT SHOULD COUP GROUP ATTEMPT TO SEIZE FULL POWER. IN ADDITION HE HAD SOUNDED OUT GENERAL PERIDES, WHO AS WE KNOW FROM OTHER SOURCES, [REDACTED] WAS MORE CAUTIOUS THAN GENERAL KOLLIAS IN OFFERING HIMSELF FOR ROYAL MOVE AGAINST JUNTA AND WHO HAS DOUBTED THAT GREEK ARMY IN NORTH READY TO TAKE ON THIS TASK EVEN THOUGH HE PERSONALLY HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY DISENCHANTED WITH COUP LEADERSHIP. COUP LEADERS, PRESUMABLY AWARE OF FERMENT IN TOP ARMY ECHELONS, CAN BE SUPPOSED TO BE WORKING OUT THEIR OWN PLANS TO PREVENT SUCCESSFUL MOVE AGAINST THEM BY KING AND UNFRIENDLY

3.3
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PAGE 4 RUQMAT 1618/2A ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01618 02 OF 02 041635Z

GENERALS. THUS ELEMENTS OF CONFRONTATION ARE SHAPING
UP.

GP-3. TALBOT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01618 041933Z

81

ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 041615Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3482

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1618/1

EXDIS

1. KING CONSTANTINE CALLED ME IN TUESDAY EVENING TO DISCUSS DECISIONS HE NOW FACES VIS-A-VIS JUNTA. SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER COL. PAPADOPOULOS HAD COME TO HIM AND STATED THAT TIME HAS ARRIVED FOR CABINET RESHUFFLE. MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY, LABOR, PUBLIC WELFARE AND POSSIBLY EDUCATION AND PUBLIC ORDER SHOULD BE REPLACED. PAPADOPOULOS HIMSELF SHOULD BE ELEVATED TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, PRESUMABLY ALONGSIDE CURRENT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SPANDIDAKIS. PAPADOPOULOS HAD PREFACED THESE PROPOSALS (WHICH KING TOOK AS DEMARCHE) BY TELLING KING "IN ALL FRANKNESS" OF RUMORS THAT KING AND SOME ARMY COMMANDERS ARE PLOTTING COUNTERCOUP AND HAVE DISCUSSED MID-OCTOBER TIMING WHEN ON SOME

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~
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2. KING BELIEVES PAPADOPOULOS IS NOW DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION BUT WOULD AGREE TO KING'S DEMAND THAT MILITARY

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01618 041933Z

MINISTERS QUIT ARMY COMMISSIONS AS PRICE OF KING'S APPROVAL. TENTATIVELY, KING HAD CONCLUDED THIS WOULD BE SATISFACTORY DEAL. BY REMOVING COUP LEADERS FROM ACTIVE MILITARY, IT WOULD REDUCE ANOMALY OF MIDDLE GRADE OFFICERS CONTROLLING TOP GENERALS AND OPEN WAY TO RE-ESTABLISH DISCIPLINE WITHIN ARMED FORCES. WITH DISCIPLINED ARMY KING'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS PAPADOPOULOS WOULD BE IMPROVED.

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~

3. KING HAD TOLD NO ONE BUT TWO GENERAL OFFICERS ABOUT PAPADOPOULOS' REQUEST. GENERAL PERIDES, COMMANDER OF "C" CORPS, HAD VERBALLY EXPLODED AT IDEA OF COLONEL AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD PROPOSED THAT IF PAPADOPOULOS SHOULD PRESS THIS DEMAND, KING SHOULD CALL "COUNCIL OF GENERALS" WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY NOT AGREE. TO THIS KING, OBVIOUSLY REMEMBERING APRIL 21, HAD REPLIED, "YOU MEAN YOU WANT TO GET ALL TOP GENERALS IN ONE ROOM AROUND WHICH THEY (JUNTA) COULD SO EASILY PLACE GUARD CORDON?" PERIDES HAD BACKED AWAY FROM SPECIFIC SUGGESTION, BUT CONTINUED TO INSIST GOVERNMENTAL ROLE OF COL. PAPADOPOULOS SHOULD NOT BE STRENGTHENED. PERIDES HAD HOWEVER FELT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS IF DEAL COULD BE WORKED OUT THAT WOULD GET COUP GROUP OUT OF ARMY.

4. JUST BEFORE SEEING ME, KING HAD ALSO TOLD GENERAL SPANDIDAKIS THAT PAPADOPOULOS WANTED TO BE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. SPANDIDAKIS HAD REACTED WITH EVEN MORE AGITATION THAN PERIDES, POINTING OUT THIS WOULD UNDERCUT HIS OWN INFLUENCE OVER ARMY. (KING OBSERVED THAT SPANDIDAKIS, BASICALLY WEAK AND FOLLISH,

PAGE FOUR RUQMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~

HAD ALWAYS OVERESTIMATED HIS OWN INFLUENCE.) ON SPUR OF MOMENT, SPANDIDAKIS HAD OFFERED TO LEAD IMMEDIATE COUNTERCOUP AGAINST COLONELS ON BEHALF OF KING. KING HAD TOLD HIM TO GO OFF AND COOL DOWN AND TO COME BACK IN DAY OR SO FOR ANOTHER TALK. HE HAD ALSO WARNED HIM AGAINST SHOWING BY WORD, GESTURE OR FACIAL EXPRESSION THAT HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF PAPADOPOULOS' PROPOSAL. FYI, SPANDIDAKIS CAME TO DINNER WITH ME NINETY MINUTES AFTER LEAVING KING. AFTER DINNER HE ARGUED WITH USUAL VIGOR THAT

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01618 041933Z

COUP HAD SAVED GREECE FROM COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. WHEN I HAZARDED COMMENT THAT TOWN IS FULL OF RUMORS COUP GROUP IS PLANNING SECOND STAGE" HE ADMITTED KNOWLEDGE OF RUMORS BUT EXPRESSED COINCIDENCE KING WOULD ALWAYS PROTECT COUNTRY'S BEST INTERESTS. AS OF TODAY, HE IS AND CAN BE NOTHING BUT A KING'S MAN. END FYI.

4. KING HAD REMINDED PAPADOPOULOS THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD FOR SOME TIME FAVORED REPLACING AGED AND WEAK MINISTERS WITH STRONGER CIVILIANS. AS TO PAPADOPOULOS' PROMOTION, WOULD NOT MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE THIS A DISPLAY OF PURELY PERSONAL AMBITION?

PAGE FIVE RUGMAT 1618/1 ~~SECRET~~
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RGT

(#) APPARENT OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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TELETYPE

79

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01552 301311Z

47

ACTION NEA 19

INFO EA 19, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,

CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, NSAE 00, SAH 03, SAL 01, NO 21, AID 30,

/178 W

R 301230Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3447

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1552

1. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SPANDIDAKIS ASKED ME LAST EVENING WHETHER IT WOULD BE "VERY HELPFUL" SHOULD GREECE OFFER SOME FORM OF MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO VIETNAM. GREECE'S CONTRIBUTION COULD IN ANY EVENT ONLY BE SMALL, HE SAID,

BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE SYMBOLICALLY USEFUL. I REPLIED THAT I WAS SURE THE UNITED STATES WOULD WELCOME CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ANY OF ITS ALLIES. PENDING DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE I DID NOT HOWEVER PROBE FOR DETAILS OF WHAT SORT OF CONTRIBUTION HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1552 ~~SECRET~~

2. FOR SOME TIME IT HAS SEEMED LIKELY THIS GREEK REGIME WOULD GET AROUND TO CONSIDERING WHETHER A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION TO VIETNAM WOULD HELP STRAIGHTEN OUT ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE. NOW THAT PRESSURES OF ADVERSE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACTIONS ARE MOUNTING, GREEKS MIGHT ACTIVELY PURSUE QUESTION. THEY WOULD PROBABLY CONSIDER SUCH AN OFFER, (JUST AS I SUSPECT THEY INTERPRET THEIR PROJECTED ASSISTANCE TO CONGO), AS A WAY OF HELPING US WHERE WE NEED

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01552 301311Z

HELP AND THUS EARNIG WARMER UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THIS REGIME.

3. HOW FAR, IF AT ALL, SHOULD EMBASSY ENCOURAGE FUTURE GREEK APPROACHES ON THIS QUESTION?

GP-3 TALBOT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

80

~~SECRET~~

2

PAGE 01 ATHENS 01527 281736Z

42

ACTION Ss 25

INFO /025 W

R 281625Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3435

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1527

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA AND DA ACSI/DFIR.

2. KING APPEARED DISCOURAGED AND DISGUSTED WITH ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY THOSE REGARDING ARMED FORCES. HE FEELS THAT EXTREMIST MEMBERS OF JUNTA ARE GAINING STRENGTH AND CONSOLIDATING THEIR POSITIONS. HE FEELS THAT TOO MANY OFFICERS OF ALL SERVICES HAVE BEEN RETIRED, AND HE SUSPECTS THAT IN DECEMBER WHEN SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL MEETS TO ACT ON PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS OF GENERALS THAT LTGS KOLLIAS AND TSOUMBAS - AND

PAGE 2 JKQMAT 1527A ~~SECRET~~
POSSIBLY PERIDIS-WILL BE RETIRED. KING SAID HE IS WARY OF AND DOES NOT TRUST JUNTA AND THAT THEY FEEL SAME WAY ABOUT KING.

2. [REDACTED] THAT HE MET WITH COL JAPADOPOULOS A FEW DAYS AGO AND TOLD HIM THAT LATE KING PAUL'S CHIEF CONCERN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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By isl NARA, Date 1-20-11

E.O. 13526

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01527 281736Z

WAS MAINTAINING PROPER MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND CHAIN OF COMMAND IN ARMED FORCES AND KEEPING MILITARY OUT OF POLITICS. HIS (CONSTANTINE'S)

OBJECTIVES ARE SAME, AND HIS CONFRONTATION WITH PAPANDREOU WHICH LED TO FALL OF GOVT WAS TO PREVENT MILITARY FROM COMING UNDER CONTROL OF CENTER UNION PARTY. KING ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN DANGEROUS SITUATION THEN BUT HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY SUPPORT FROM PAPADOPOULOS OR THE JUNTA THEN WHEN HE REALLY NEEDED HELP. KING EXPLAINED THAT IF HE HADN'T ACTED THEN, PAPADOPOULOS WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF ARMY A LONG TIME AGO.

3. KING TOLD PAPADOPOULOS THAT IDEA OF HAVING LTCS AND MAJORS ACTING AS WATCHDOGS IN OFFICES OF MANY OF GENERALS

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 1527A ~~SECRET~~

IS DISGRACEFUL. ALSO, THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN ARMED FORCES IF YOU HAVE COLONELS, WHO IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MINISTERS, SIT ON MILITARY COUNCIL AND DECIDE ON PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS OF GENERALS. KING TOLD PAPADOPOULOS THAT HE FEELS THAT IF OFFICERS WISH TO BE MINISTERS THEN THEY SHOULD RESIGN FROM ARMY. PAPADOPOULOS REPLIED THAT HE WILL RESIGN FROM ARMY IF KING GIVES HIM A DIRECT ORDER TO RESIGN. KING SUGGESTED THAT PAPADOPOULOS MEET WITH OTHER MILITARY MEMBERS OF HIS GROUP TO DISCUSS MATTER AND LET KING KNOW THEIR VIEWS.

4. [REDACTED] THAT IF PAPADOPOULOS RETURNS AND STATES THAT MILITARY MINISTERS WILL NOT RESIGN THEN KING WILL GIVE THEM DIRECT ORDER TO RESIGN.

5. [REDACTED] DETERMINED THAT KING HAS NO DEFINITE CONTINGENCY PLANS.

6. [REDACTED] ASKED KING IF IT IS TRUE THAT PAPADOPOULOS MAY TAKE POSITION OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER REPLACING GEN

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01527 281736Z

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 1527A ~~SECRET~~
SPANDIDAKIS. KING SAID THAT HE BELIEVES SO SINCE JUNTA
THINKS THAT UOIND YAKIS IS STUPID.

7. [REDACTED] THAT LTG GP(RET) GEORGE MORONIS WILL REPLACE
LTG PROKOS AS CHIEF OF CYPRIOT NAT'L GUARD. KING ALSO SAID
THAT GOVT WANTS TO GET RID OF GEN GRIVAS; THEY WILL NOT
DISMISS HIM BUT THEY PLAN ON MAKING CONDITIONS SO DIFFICULT
FOR HIM THAT HE WILL BE FORCED TO SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION.
KING WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CYPRUS AND ADMITTED THAT RECENT
GREEK-TURKISH DIALOGUE ON CYPRUS CRISIS WAS COMPLETE FIASCO
AND PROBLEM WILL NOT BE SETTLED FOR LONG TIME.

GP-1. TALBOT

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01385 201830Z

43
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

P 201645Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3363

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1385

EXDIS

1. IN LENGTHY MEETING TUESDAY EVENING I FOUND KING CONSTANTINE EXTREMELY PLEASED BY RECEPTION GIVEN HIM LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON. HE SPOKE WARMLY OF THE STRENGTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S LEADERSHIP IN THE FACE OF MANY PROBLEMS, AND WAS ESPECIALLY IMPRESSED THAT DESPITE OTHER BURDENS THE PRESIDENT ARRANGED A SECOND MEETING TO COMPLETE THEIR CONVERSATION. KING SAID HE GRATIFIED BY FULLNESS AND FRANKNESS OF HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RUSK. ALTHOUGH HE HAD APPROACHED MEETING WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WITH SOME UNCERTAINTY, IT TOO HAD SEEMED TO GO WELL. HE MAY HAVE

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1385A ~~SECRET~~

DISABUSED SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN PRESENT OF SOME MISCONCEPTIONS, AND HOPES HE ELICITED GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH GREECE NOW FINDS ITSELF. LEAKS PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON POST HAD BEEN AWKWARD, BUT HE BELIEVES HE HAS SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AWAY STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM, TO WHICH GOVERNMENT HERE HAD INITIALLY TAKEN EXCEPTION.

2. ON RETURN TO GREECE, KING CONTINUED, HE FOUND ATHENS

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01385 201830Z

FULL OF RUMORS THAT JUNTA'S OFTEN PREDICTED "SECOND STAGE" BEING READIED BY COL. PAPADOPOULOS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, STORIES CIRCULATING THAT VARIOUS ANTI-REGIME GROUPS ORGANIZING FOR COUNTERCOUP. ALTHOUGH HIS INFORMATION NOT YET SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, IT CLEAR SITUATION GETTING INCREASINGLY CONFUSED WITH GROWING PROSPECT SOME GROUP MIGHT TRY TO MAKE A MOVE TO GET JUMP ON OTHERS. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE TOO HAVE BEEN HEARING RUMORS THAT JUNTA PLANNING TO REPLACE CIVILIA DMINISTERS (EXCEPT PERHAPS PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS) WITH MILITARY MEN IN ORDER CONSOLIDATE ITS GRIP

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 1385A ~~SECRET~~

ON GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY. SOME OF OUR PEOPLE SKEPTICAL THAT PAPADOPOULOS AND HIS COLLEAGUES SERIOUSLY INTEND TO MOVE TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, BUT WE NOT NOW IN POSITION TO ASSESS JUNTA'S INTENTIONS WITH CONFIDENCE. AS TO GROUPS CONSIDERING HOW TO EJECT JUNTA, WE HAVE ALSO HEARD STORIES BUT MAINLY CONNECTED TO FORMER POLITICIANS AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS WHO COMMAND NO TROOPS.

3. KING REMINDED ME THAT BEFORE LEAVING FOR NORTH AMERICA HE HAD EXTRACTED FROM COL. PAPADOPOULOS COMMITMENT THAT NO "SECOND STAGE" ABOUT TO BE MOUNTED. ON HIS RETURN HE HAD ASSURED LEADERS THAT, ASSUMING CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE, AMERICANS WOULD NOT TURN THEIR BACKS ON GREECE. HE HAD TOLD THEM, HOWEVER, THAT AMERICANS STILL THINK OF GREEK REGIME AS JUNTA RATHER THAN AS GOVERNMENT. THUS IT IMPORTANT TO PERSUADE WORLD THAT GREECE IS IN FACT MOVING BACK TO CONSTITUTIONALITY. RATHER TO HIS SURPRISE, PAPADOPOULOS HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED FOR MEETING OF TOP FIVE MINISTERS (KOLLIAS, SPANDIDAKIS,

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 1385A ~~SECRET~~

PATTAKOS, MAKAREZOS AND PAPADOPOULOS) FOR SEPTEMBER 23 TO DETERMINE CONSTITUTIONAL TIMETABLE TO BE PRESENTED

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01385 201830Z

TO KING "IN ORDER TO EASE HIS MAJESTY'S MIND ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS." KING SAID THIS AN UNEXPECTED STEP AFTER JUNTA'S PERSISTENT REFUSAL TO SET DATES. KEY QUESTION IN KING'S MIND WAS WHETHER PAPADOPOULOS REALLY INTENDS TO MOVE FORWARD OR TO USE THIS APPROACH AS SCREEN TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM A NEW EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN HIS OWN POWER.

4. MANY PEOPLE ARE TELLING HIM THAT TIME IS RUNNING AGAINST HIS INTERESTS, KING SAID. SHOULD HE HAVE TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND CONSTITUTIONALITY AGAINST JUNTA'S AMBITIONS, HE BELIEVES HE COULD STILL GET SUPPORT OF BULK OF ARMY AS WELL AS GENERAL PUBLIC APPROVAL. SCATTERED AND UNCOORDINATED RESISTENCE GROUPS COULD, HOWEVER, LEAD TO CHAOS AND INEFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO JUNTEOUS AMBITIONS. HE HOPED SHORTLY TO GET MORE INFORMATION ABOUT SECRET GROUPS SEEKING TO ISOLATE OR OVERTHROW JUNTA. KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT OTHERS MIGHT DO COULD BE

PAGE 5 RUGMAT 1385A ~~SECRET~~

IMPORTANT TO HIM IN DECIDING COURSE HE SHOULD FOLLOW TO OPPOSE ANY "SECOND STAGE." HE IS THINKING ALSO OF INITIATING ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS WITH TOP GREEK GENERALS. TO EACH HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT GREECE COULD DEPEND ON ITS AMERICAN ALLY SO LONG AS IT MOVING ALONG ROAD BACK TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE. HE COULD STRESS THIS POINT IN WAYS THAT COULD IDENTIFY ISSUE AROUND WHICH HE COULD, IF NECESSARY, RALLY KEY MILITARY UNITS FOR ANY SHOWDOWN.

5. KING SAID THAT, BEARING IN MIND ASPECTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, HE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY WHAT ACTIONS HE MIGHT TAKE IN ANY EVENTUALITY. HE HOPED NEVER TO BE CAUGHT AGAIN AS ON APRIL 21 BUT EVEN IN THAT EVENT WOULD NEED PLAN CAPABLE OF RAPID EXECUTION. I OBSERVED THAT BEFORE PUTTING ANY PLAN IN MOTION HE WOULD WANT TO BE SURE HE HAD CAREFULLY THOUGHT THROUGH ALL ASPECTS.

6. KING SAID THAT ESPECIALLY AFTER WASHINGTON VISIT HE

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01385 201830Z

WOULD WANT TO KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH USG AS
SITUATION HERE EVOLVES.

GP-3. TALBOT

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01197 081132Z

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NATUS

SUBJ: CYPRUS

IF DEPARTMENT WISHES, PASS LONDON, PARIS, USUN NEW YORK

ACCORDING RELIABLE EMBASSY SOURCE (FORMER ERE ALTERNATE MINISTER
OF COORDINATION BOUTOS):

PAGE 2 RUGMAY 1197A ~~SECRET~~

1. BRIGADIER PATTAKOS, ONE OF LEADING FIGURES IN JUNTA,
TELEPHONED FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER PAPALIGOURAS YESTERDAY TO
ASK TO SEE HIM URGENTLY. WHEN PAPALIGOURAS BEGGED OFF ON
GROUNDS HE WAS LEAVING FOR ISLAND TRIP UNTIL NEXT MONDAY,
PATTAKOS EXCITEDLY REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO DISCUSS CYPRUS
QUESTION WITH HIM AND THAT NEXT MONDAY MIGHT BE TOO LATE
FOR A DISCUSSION. PAPALIGOURAS, HOWEVER, REFUSED TO MEET HIM
UNTIL NEXT WEEK. PAPALIGOURAS SURMISES THAT JUNTA WANTED TO
SEE HIM AND FEW OTHER SELECTED FORMER POLITICIANS, PERHAPS
INCLUDING PROGRESSIVE PARTY LEADER MARKEZINIS, TO SOLICIT THEIR

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01197 081112Z

VIEWS ON CYPRUS ISSUE JUST PRIOR THIS WEEK END'S KOLLIAYDADEMIREL TALKS AND TO TRY TO OBTAIN THEIR ENDORSEMENT OF CERTAIN PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT. (MARKEZINIS MENTIONED YESTERDAY TO AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAS BEEN INVITED BY COLONEL MARKEZOS MINISTER OF COORDINATION, TO PRIVATE CHAT THIS EVENING.)

2. PAPALIGOURAS HAS LEARNED FROM TWO TRUSTED FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, WHO HAVE ACCESS TO CYPRUS FILES, THAT KOLLIAS WILL OFFER DEMIREL MODIFIED ACHESON-PLAN, INCLUDING SOVEREIGN TURKISH BASE ON ISLAND. ACCORDING TO THESE FONMIN OFFICIALS, JUNTA IS

PAGE 3 RUGMAT 1197A ~~SECRET~~

PROCEEDING ON ASSUMPTION MAKARIOS WILL RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THIS KIND OF SETTLEMENT. THEORY IS ARCHBISHOP REALIZES HE HAS NOT CHOICE BECAUSE, IF HE OPPOSES, JUNTA WILL ACT THROUGH GREEK ARMY ON ISLAND TO DEPOSE HIM.

3. COMMENT: THOUGH WE ARE UNABLE TO EVALUATE INFORMATION OF TWO FONMIN OFFICIALS, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF PRESENT REGIME DID IN FACT OFFER TURKS SOME SORT OF SOVEREIGN BASE ON ISLAND. WE HEARD AS EARLY AS LAST MAY [REDACTED] THAT COLONEL PAPADOPOULOS HAD ENTRUSTED N. FARMAKIS TO DRAW UP CYPRUS PLAN BASED ON ACHESON PROPOSALS. WE BELIEVE THAT JUNTA IS ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS NOW TO ACHIEVE AN IMPORTANT VICTORY THAT WOULD BOLSTER ITS INTERNAL POSITION. ITS RECORD TO DATE HAS BEEN GENERALLY UNIMPRESSIVE, AND THOUGH THERE IS NOT YET ANY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO REGIME, IT UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZES THAT IT IS NOT GAINING IN POPULARITY WITH PEOPLE. A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT WHICH COULD BE CALLED ENOSIS BY GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PRESS AND RADIO MIGHT BE SIGNIFICANT SHOT IN ARM TO JUNTA.

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(b)(1)

4. THOUGH EMBASSY NICOSIA IS NATURALLY BETTER ABLE THAN WE TO

PAGE 4 RUGMAT 1197A ~~SECRET~~

COMMENT ON MAKARIOS POSITION, WE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE JUNTA IS WORKING ON ASSUMPTION ARCHBISHOP WILL ACCEPT ACHESON-TYPE SOLUTION IN VIEW ALL HE HAS SAID IN PAST THREE YEARS IN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01197 081112Z

OPPOSITION TO TURKISH BASE AND IN FAVOR OF "UNADULTERATED ENOSIS". THROUGH [REDACTED] AND FROM FARMAKIS HIMSELF, HOWEVER, WE HAVE HEARD THAT JUNTA WOULD ACT TO OUST MAKARIOS IF HE OPPOSED A GREEK-TURKISH AGREEMENT ON CYPRUS. WE WONDER WHETHER DEMIREL WOULD BE WILLING CONDONE SUCH ACTION NOW IN VIEW HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW.

5. RELIABLE SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT LT. COLONEL KONSTANTINOS ASLANIDIS, MEMBER OF JUNTA AND CLOSE FRIEND OF PAPADOPOULOS, WAS TO LEAVE THIS WEEK FOR CYPRUS. THOUGH HIS TRIP MAY BE FOR OTHER PURPOSES, WE CANNOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY IT IS RELATED TO GOG-GOT SUMMIT TALKS.
GR-1. TALBOT

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Department of State

83
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01155 061204Z

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-307
By Cb, NARA Date 8-4-97

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

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1. SINCE MID-JUNE WHEN I LEFT GREECE, JUNTA HAS MORE FIRMLY BUTTONED ITS CONTROL ON GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY. ITS GRIP ON MINISTRIES, PUBLIC AGENCIES AND PRESS IS VIRTUALLY COMPLETE. IT CONTROLS COMMAND STRUCTURES OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE AND OF KEY ARMY UNITS IN ATHENS AREA, THOUGH ITS RELATIONS WITH SOME OTHER ARMY COMMANDS CHARACTERIZED MORE BY MUTUAL TOLERANCE. (SEVERAL GENERAL OFFICERS WHO FAVOR

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 1155/1 ~~SECRET~~
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01155 061204Z

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2. IT IS NOW EVIDENT THAT GOVERNMENT CONSISTS OF (A) DIRECTING PERSONALITIES--MINISTER PAPADOPOULOS, PATTAKOS AND MAKAREZOS--SUPPORTED BY A FEW PARTICIPANTS SUCH AS SPANDIDAKIS AND CIVILIAN MINISTERS WHO ARE USEFUL BUT WITHOUT INDEPENDENT POWER, AND (B) ABOUT TEN AHRD-LINE EXECUTIVES OF MAJOR TO

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LT, COLONEL RANK (E.G. LADAS, LEKKAS, STAMALELOPOULOS) INSTALLED AS SECRETARIES GENERAL OF MINISTRIES AND IN SIMILAR POSTS. PAPADOPOULOS HAS ESTABLISHED HIS ASCENDANCY WITHOUT RUPTURING JUNTA UNIT. SECOND-LINE EXECUTIVES (WHO APPARENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR MANY JUNTA'S HARSHER DECISIONS, INCLUDING EXCESSIVE COURT MARSHAL SENTENCES) ALLEGEDLY RESTIVE THAT REVOLUTION NOT BEING PUSHED MORE AGGRESSIVELY. THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT, IF LEADERSHIP FAILS, THESE MORE EXTREME SUBORDINATES MIGHT STRIKE FOR CONTROL OF REVOLUTION. HOWEVER, I DO NOT REGARD SUCH REVOLT AGAINST COUP LEADERSHIP AS LIKELY IN NEAR FUTURE. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE PAPADOPOULOS HIMSELF MIGHT BE CONTRIVING THESE THREATS OF REVOL TO JUSTIFY FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF JUNTA POWER.

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01155 061204Z

PAGE FOSC RUQMAT 1155/1 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01155 061204Z

5. AS USUAL IN GREECE, NEARLY EVERYONE IS TRYING TO ESTIMATE IMPACT OF "AMERICAN FACTOR," WITH "OUTS" PASSIONATELY EAGER TO HAVE IT APPLIED IN SUPPORT OF KING AGAINST "INS". WE HEAR MANY GREEKS ARGUE THAT AMERICANS OBVIOUSLY SUPPORT JUNTA BECAUSE OTHERWISE BY FLICK OF WRIST THEY COULD DEPOSE IT. (I DON'T KNOW HOW) TO AUGMENT THIS BELIEF GREEK-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS RECENTLY CONVENING IN ATHENS

PAGE SIX RUQMAT 1155/1A ~~SECRET~~
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6. LOOKING AHEAD, WE IN ATHENS FORSEE PERIOD OF RISING TENSIONS. REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER AUTUMN ACTIVITIES MAY CREATE SHARPER SECURITY PROBLEMS, IMPELLING TOUGHER JUNTA CRACKDOWNS. JUNTA'S INADEQUACIES MAY BE MORE FULLY EXPOSED AS IMPACT OF EARLY BOLD MOVES (CHURCH REFORMS, ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATIONS, FREE EDUCATION PROMISES) IS SUCCEEDED BY RECOGNITION OF DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN DEALING WITH MORE COMPLEX LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS, ONE OF THESE IS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, TO WHICH REGIME IS PLEDGED BUT WHICH IS SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AND OPPOSITION WITHIN JUNTA.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01155 052155Z

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-307
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-97

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01155 052155Z

PAGE FOUR RUGMAT 1155/1 ~~SECRET~~
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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01155 052155Z

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PAGE SIX RUQMAT 1155/1A ~~SECRET~~
(ARCHDIOCESAN COUNCIL, PAN-EPIROTICS, PAN-ARCADIANS) AND CERTAIN CONGRESSMENT HAVE PROJECTED IMAGE OF ENTHUSIASTIC AMERICAN SUPPORT OF THIS REVOLUTION. USG OFFICIAL RESERVE ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND OTHER QUESTIONS GIVES OPPOSITE IMPRESSION TO GOG, OF COURSE. EMBASSY IS SEEKING TO CONVEY IDEA THAT US REGRETS CERTAIN TYPES OF ACTIONS REVOLUTIONARY GROUP HAS TAKEN BUT IS READY TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH GOG IN EXPECTATION GOG PLEDGES OF RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY WILL BE REDEEMED IN GOOD TIME. UNSPOKEN COROLLARY IS THAT DESCENT OF GREECE INTO HARD MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WOULD BRING FURTHER REVIEW OF US POLICY.

6. LOOKING AHEAD, WE IN ATHENS FORSEE PERIOD OF RISING TENSIONS. REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER AUTUMN ACTIVITIES MAY CREATE SHARPER SECURITY PROBLEMS, IMPELLING TOUGHER JUNTA CRACKDOWNS. JUNTA'S INADEQUACIES MAY BE MORE FULLY EXPOSED AS IMPACT OF EARLY BOLD MOVES (CHURCH REFORMS, ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATIONS, FREE EDUCATION PROMISES) IS SUCCEEDED BY RECOGNITION OF DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN DEALING WITH MORE COMPLEX LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS, ONE OF THESE IS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, TO WHICH REGIME IS PLEDGED BUT WHICH IS SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AND OPPOSITION WITHIN JUNTA.

#AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01155 052216Z

87

ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 051635Z SEPT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3251

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1155 SECTWO OF TWO

EXDIS

7. REALISTICALLY, RETURN TO OLD CONSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS HAS BECOME VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. AS IN TURKEY, MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN GREECE MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS LONG-RUN POLITICAL FACTOR. REVISED CONSTITUTION, THEREFORE, WILL NEED TO BALANCE CLAIMS OF ARMED FORCES AGAINST THOSE OF PALACE, OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL POPULATION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES INSISTENCE ON FULLY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WOULD PROBABLY MEAN THAT GREECE WOULD GET NO REPEAT NO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT PROVIDED LIMITED DEMOCRATIC POWERS, WITH SAFEGUARDS FOR ARMY AND RESTRICTIONS AGAINST RESURGENCE OF SOME OLD POLITICAL ELEMENTS, MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO JUNTA AND WOULD BE DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER PRESENT SITUATION.

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 1155/~~SECRET~~

8. MY OWN ESTIMATE IS THAT THERE IS REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONS WILL BE DRAFTED ON SCHEDULE. WHETHER THEY WILL BE REVIEWED PROMPTLY BY GOG AND PUT TO PLEBISCITE BY OR BEFORE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF COUP NEXT APRIL WILL DEPEND ON DEPTH OF DISAGREEMENTS GENERATED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND KING OVER SPECIFIC PROVISIONS. AT THIS MOMENT I AM DUBIOUS THAT JUNTA IF STILL IN POWER WOULD AGREE TO

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01155 052216Z

WITHIN SECOND YEAR AFTER COUP. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE OUR CREDIT CAN BE MOST WISELY SPENT BY PRESSING FOR ONE STEP AT A TIME, I.E., BY CONCENTRATING NOW ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND PLEBISCITE, WHILE LEAVING ELECTIONS QUESTION TILL NEXT YEAR. AS A COROLLARY, I BELIEVE THAT FOR TIME BEING USG SHOULD LEAVE MAIN BRUNT OF CRITICISM OF GREEK CIVIL RIGHTS SHORTCOMINGS TO

PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS AND NONOFFICIALS. EVEN THOSE DIFFICULT ISSUES CAN BE BETTER DEALT WITH IN FRAMEWORK OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE.

9. AT PRESENT, LEADERSHIP OF JUNTA IS PRO-WEST, PRO-NATO; THAT MEANS IT IS PRO-US IN FOREIGN POLICY. HIGHLY STRATEGIC

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 1155/2 ~~SECRET~~
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF GREECE, OUR VERY SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENTS AND FACILITIES HERE, OUR INCREASED CONCERN FOR STABILITY OF SOUTHEASTERN NATO FLANK AND OF EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND NEAR EAST IN FACE OF EXPANDING SOVIET ENCROACHMENT ALL ARGUE IN FAVOR OF KEEPING GREECE COMMITTED. WE HAVE REASON, THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE, BY VARIOUS MEANS, TO PRESS THE GOG IN THE DIRECTION OF A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. I FEAR A LACK OF PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD DEEPEN STRAINS WITHIN NATO, WHERE ANTAGONISMS TO GREEK REGIME IN SOME MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY TROUBLED ALLIANCE EXERCISES. ON OTHER HAND CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS, EVEN IF IMPERFECT, SHOULD EASE THESE TENSIONS.

10. TO DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON JUNTA, WE NEED TO FIND WAY TO GET PAST CURRENT POSTURE OF PENALIZING IT FOR HAVING SEIZED POWER. FOR THIS REASON AND BECAUSE OF CONSIDERATIONS DESCRIBED IN FOREGOING PARAGRAPH, RESTRICTIONS ON MAP AS MEANS OF SHOWING OUR DISAPPROVAL OF COUP MAKE LESS AND LESS SENSE AS MONTHS WEAR ON. WHEN GLOBAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR FY 1968 AUTHORIZED AND FUNDED, AND POSSIBLY EVEN EARLIER, TIME WILL HAVE ARRIVED FOR GREEK MAP TO BE CONSIDERED AS FULLY ON MILITARY AND STRATEGIC MERITS AS MAP TO ANY OTHER RECIPIENT.

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01155 052216Z

PAGE THREE RUGMAT 1155/2A ~~SECRET~~

11. IN EVENT KING AND JUNTA SHOULD COME TO LOGGERHEADS IN COMING MONTHS OVER CONTROL OF ARMY, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, OR OTHER ISSUE, I BELIEVE OUR MORAL SUPPORT SHOULD BE CLEARLY ON SIDE OF KING.

JUNTA SUCCESS IN SUCH CONFRONTATION COULD ONLY INCREASE LIKELIHOOD OF INDEFINITE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP, WHEREAS KING IF SUCCESSFUL COULD BE EXPECTED TO CREATE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED TOWARD EARLY RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. I DO NOT BELIEVE KING IS CURRENTLY IN POSITION TO INITIATE SUCCESSFUL CONFRONTATION; HE WOULD NEED SHARPER AND MORE VISIBLE ISSUE THAN NOW APPARENT, AS WELL AS SOME REALISTIC ADVANCE PLANNING. SHOULD JUNTA BY EXTREME ACTIONS PRESENT HIM WITH SUCH ISSUE, HOWEVER, WE ESTIMATE KING COULD GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY SUPPORT. IN THAT SITUATION AMERICAN POSITION WOULD BE IMPORTANT. I ASSUME OUR PHYSICAL INTERVENTION, OVERT OR CLANDESTINE, TO BE OUT OF QUESTION. HOWEVER, I WOULD EXPECT TO URGE PROMPT USG ENDORSEMENT OF EFFORTS TO ASSURE MAINTENANCE OF GREEK CROWNED DEMOCRACY AND

PAGE FOUR RUGMAT 1155/2A ~~SECRET~~

EARLY RETURN TO CIVILIAN-CONTROLLED CONSTITUTIONAL RULE. SUCH AN ENDORSEMENT COULD BE IMPROTANT INFLUENCE ON MILITARY COMMANDERS WAVERING BETWEEN KING AND JUNTA.

12. IT IS HARD TO EXAGGERATE EXTENT OF KING'S CURRENT ISOLATION FROM GREEKS WHO COULD GIVE HIM SOPHISTICATED, UNBIASED ADVICE. HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS GOVERNMENT'S ADVICE, IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH FORMER POLITICAL CIRCLES (WHO, DESPITE THEIR PETTINESSES AND OTHER SHORTCOMINGS, AT LEAST HAVE MORE COLDBLOODED UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL MANEUVERING THAN DOES YOUNG KING), AND EXCEPT FOR VERY SMALL CIRCLE IN ROYAL HOUSEHOLD HAS ONLY SPASMODIC CONTACT WITH OTHERS WHO COULD COUNSEL HIM. KING WILL THEREFORE UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO RAISE MANY OF THESE QUESTIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT. POINTS THAT THE PRESIDENT IN MY VIEW COULD THEREFORE USEFULLY EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF FORWARD CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT TO AVERT DOMESTIC

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01155 052216Z

RESISTANCE AND TO REVIVE STRONG GREEK RELATIONS WITH NATO PARTNERS; DESIRABILITY OF ADDING RESPECTED PUBLIC FIGURES TO GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO INCREASE ITS COMPETENCE AND PAVE WAY FOR TRANSITION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM; LIMITS OF USG ACTIONS IN VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES; HAZARDS OF ACTING IMPULSIVELY OR ON

PAGE FIVE RUQMAT 1155/2 ~~SECRET~~

BASIS OF UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION AND IN ABSENCE OF CAREFULLY-THOUGHT-OUT PLAN; AND DESIRABILITY OF CONSULTATION WITH USG BEFORE COMMITMENT TO ANY DRASTIC COURSE OF ACTION IN AN UPCOMING CRUNCH. FOR REASONS SET OUT ABOVE, I ALSO STRONGLY HOPE KING CAN BE GIVEN ASSURANCES OF MILITARY AID RESUMPTION.

TALBOT

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85

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR:

You doubtless saw the attached cable from Athens on the Greco-Turkish summit.

not in
This is simply to alert you that State will have an item on it in the Evening Reading. A judgement on how the President should react will be included in the briefing for Constantine's visit (next Monday).

In Collaboration

RM

Roger Morris

Att: Athens 1137

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-10-03*



Department of State

SUMMARY

85a

TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-238
By js, NARA, Date 6-6-03

PAGE 01 ATHENS 01137 041906Z

47

ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

R 041412Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3242
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 441
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 424
AMEMBASSY LONDON 236
AMEMBASSY PARIS 424

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1137

LIMDIS NOFORN

NATUS

1. PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS ASKED ME TODAY TO CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HIM TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. HE REQUESTED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD VERY CLOSELY UNTIL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT MADE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER 6.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1137A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

2. KOLLIAS SAID THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL ARE TO MEET SEPTEMBER 9 IN KESAN REPEAT KESAN, TURKEY, AND SEPTEMBER 10 IN ALEXANDROUPOLIS, GREECE. HE HAS PROPOSED THAT FIRST AGENDA ITEM BE POLICIES THAT GREECE AND TURKEY CAN DEVELOP IN COMMON, WITHIN NATO FRAMEWORK, TO MEET INCREASED COMMUNIST THREAT IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. KOLLIAS FORESEES NO GREAT IMPEDIMENT TO AGREEMENT ON JOINT GRECO-TURKISH MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THIS THREAT. SECOND ITEM WOULD BE CONSIDERATION



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01137 041906Z

OF OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, NOT EXCLUSIVELY (THOUGH OF COURSE NOTABLY) OVER CYPRUS. KOLLIAS SAID HE WILL APPROACH TALKS IN SPIRIT OF SINCERE DESIRE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES SO THAT NATO CAN BE STRENGTHENED AT ITS VULNERABLE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK. HE BELIEVES THAT IF DEMIREL FOLLOWS SIMILAR APPROACH, CHANCES OF AGREEMENT SHOULD BE GOOD.

3. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, KOLLIAS EXPLAINED THAT SOON AFTER TAKING OFFICE THIS GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD DETERMINED NOT ONLY TO ELIMINATE COMMUNIST THREAT FROM GREECE BUT ALSO TO TAKE

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 1137A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
POSITIVE STEPS TO DEFEND AGAINST GROWING COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THIS PART OF NATO AREA. IN EARLY APPROACH TO ANKARA, THEREFORE, GOG HAD PROPOSED THAT TWO PRIME MINISTERS MEET TO CONSIDER ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. TURKS HAD PROVED DOUBTFUL AND RELUCTANT, PREFERRING TO CONTINUE EXPLORATION OF DIFFERENCES AT LOWER MINISTERIAL LEVEL. AFTER INTENSIVE CONSIDERATION IN ANKARA IN RECENT DAYS, WITH TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO GREECE TULUY PARTICIPATING, TURKS HAD AGREED TO MEETING OF PRIME MINISTERS.

4. I EXPRESSED CERTAINTY PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD BE PLEASED TO KNOW TWO PRIME MINISTERS WOULD SOON MEET FOR FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION OF WAYS TO STRENGTHEN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. AS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN AT PRESIDENT'S SIDE IN 1964 WHEN HE HAD SOUGHT TO PERSUADE THEN PRIME MINISTERS OF GREECE AND TURKEY THAT BY FACE-TO-FACE MEETING THEY MIGHT AMELIORATE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES, I COULD STATE CONFIDENTLY USG WOULD GREET WITH GREAT SATISFACTION NEWS THAT THREE YEARS LATER MEETING NOW TO TAKE PLACE AND HOPEFULLY IN BETTER CLIMATE. WE WOULD STRONGLY

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 1137A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
HOPE MEETINGS WOULD SUCCEED.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01137 041906Z

5. AT THIS STAGE IT BECAME CLEAR THAT KOLLIAS, WHO THEN WAS SUPREME COURT PROSECUTOR, HAD BEEN UNAWARE OF CONTENT OF USG DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTERS INONU AND PAPANDREOU IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE 1964. HE IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT HAD HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HAD BEEN USG'S IDEA HE WOULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT FORTHCOMING PRIMIN MEETING BE HELD IN PRESENCE OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON. I ASSURED HIM THAT USG, THEN AND NOW, SAW BEST PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN DIRECT MEETINGS OF GREEK AND TURKISH LEADERS WITHOUT THIRD PARTY.

6. WHETHER FROM RELUCTANCE TO SPEAK OR LACK OF PLANNING, KOLLIAS GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHAT SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITIONS HE WOULD PUT TO DEMIREL. IN COURSE OF ASSERTING OUR HOPE MEETINGS WOULD SUCCEED, I THEREFORE REFERRED TO RISKS AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES INHERENT IN SUMMITRY. I SUGGESTED THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS HAVE SOMETIMES PROVED USEFUL IN RESOLVING SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS WHEN TWO SIDES HAD PREVIOUSLY

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 1137A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
EXPLORED EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS IN DETAIL AND WHEN PRINCIPALS PREPARED TO STEP BEYOND POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY SET OUT BY THEIR SUBORDINATES. KOLLIAS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS. ANTICIPATING THAT FULL AGREEMENT ON FIRST AGENDA ITEM WOULD GIVE PRIME MINISTERS SOLID ACHIEVEMENT JUSTIFYING THEIR MEETING, HE THOUGHT WORK ON SECOND ITEM COULD PROCEED IN GOOD SPIRIT AND WITH GOOD CHANCE OF BREAKTHROUGH. AGAINST CONTINGENCY OF FAILURE, HOWEVER, PRIMINS HAD ALREADY REACHED UNDERSTANDING THAT UNRESOLVED MATTERS WOULD BE REFERRED TO RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION.

7. COMMENT: KOLLIAS IS OBVIOUSLY SET UP OVER SUCCESS OF HIS FIRST FOREIGN POLICY PLOY, THAT OF GETTING TURKISH PRIME MINISTER TO SIT DOWN WITH HIM. HE CAN ALSO VISUALIZE A GREEK-TURKISH AGREEMENT ON STRENGTHENING EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AS VALIDATING PRESENT GOG'S CREDENTIALS AS LOYAL AND EFFECTIVE NATO PARTNER OF U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE. ADDITIONALLY, HE CAN ALMOST TASTE TREMENDOUS BOOST HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GAIN DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY IF



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 01137 041906Z

HE AND DEMIREL AT A STROKE COULD END GREEK-TURKISH DIFFERENCES

PAGE 6 RUGMAT 1137A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
OVER CYPRUS. ON BASIS OF EMBASSY'S PRESENT INFORMATION, THESE
DREAMS MAY PROVE OVERINFLATED. IT IS TRUE, AS DEPARTMENT
KNOWS, THAT ELEMENTS IN PRESENT GOG HAVE BEEN DRAFTING SKETCHES
OF POSSIBLE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT WITH WHICH GREECE COULD LIVE.
ONE OR MORE OF THESE COULD BE SURFACED AT PRIME MINISTERS'
MEETING. HOWEVER, AS YET WE HAVE OBTAINED NO FIRM INDICATION
THAT GOG HAS STAFFED OUT ANY CYPRUS PROPOSAL GOING SUBSTANTIALLY
BEYOND RECENT GREEK OFFERS OF LONG LEASE OR POSSIBLE
CESSION OF DHEKELIA SOVEREIGN BASE AREA. EVEN AS TO A
GREEK-TURKISH PACT ON DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
IN MEDITERRANEAN, I AM NOT CERTAIN GREEK READING OF PRESENT
GOT POLICIES IS REALISTIC. NONETHELESS, POSSIBILITY REMAINS
THAT GREEK AND TURKISH POSITIONS WILL HAVE MORE FLEXIBILITY
THAN WE YET PERCEIVE AND THAT PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING COULD
THEREFORE BE RESOUNDING SUCCESS. LET US ALL HOPE SO.
TALBOT



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 01109 311712Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

02

R 311600Z AUG 87
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3227

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1109

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 1050

REQUEST REPLY AS SOON AS FEASIBLE AS WE ARE BEING PRESSED FOR
ANSWER: TALBOT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-10-03

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87
TELEGRAM

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02

PAGE 01 ATHENS 01050 281956Z

82

ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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R 281547Z AUG 87
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3203

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1050

EXDIS

1. BEFORE DEPARTING GREECE KING CONSTANTINE ASKED USG ASSISTANCE IN SWEEPING HIS PALACE OFFICE FOR POSSIBLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES. HIS SUSPICION OR FEAR THAT OFFICE HAD BEEN BUGGED BY COUP GROUP LED HIM TO WALK ME IN GARDEN DURING OUR LAST TWO TALKS. BASED ON TECHNICAL ADVICE [REDACTED] HE WAS INFORMED THAT TYPE OF SWEEP FEASIBLE WITHOUT DETECTION BY PALACE STAFF COULD NOT BE CONCLUSIVE AND THAT ANY PROTECTION OBTAINED WOULD BE ASSURED ONLY SO LONG AS OFFICE KEPT UNDER CONTINUOUS LOYAL GUARD. DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO DOWNGRADE SECURITY ASSURANCE A CLADESTINE SWEEP COULD GIVE, HE REPEATED

3.3
(b)(1)

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1050A ~~SECRET~~
REQUEST THAT U.S. WORKING WITH HIS CONFIDANT GENERAL DOVAS, CONDUCT SUCH A SWEEP DURING KING'S ABSENCE FROM GREECE.

2. [REDACTED] REGIONAL OFFICE POSSESS CAPABILITY OF GENERAL SWEEP, WHICH WE ESTIMATE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER GENERAL DOVAS' SUPERVISION WITHOUT ALERTING OTHERS TO PROJECT. WHILE I AM RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR KING'S ELECTRONIC SECURITY ON BALANCE AND TAKING

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(b)(1)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-281

NARA, Date 1-20-11

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 01050 281956Z

INTO ACCOUNT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH KING I RECOMMEND THAT
AUTHORITY BE GIVEN.

3. PLEASE INSTRUCT TALBOT

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 00982 251201Z

42
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

O 241138Z AUG 67 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3161

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 982

EXDIS

1. AFTER FINAL HESITATION OVER RISKS ADVERSE IMPACT OF POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS IN NEW YORK (DEPTTEL 25903) KING DECIDED LEAVE ON SCHEDULE SINCE PSOTPONEMENT NOW WOULD CAUSE GREATER DIFFICULTIES. HE HOPES PROGRAM IN NEW YORK CAN PROCEED WITHOUT INCIDENT BUT IS PREPARED TO CHANGE SCHEDULES AT SHORT NOTICE IF NECESSARY.

2. IN PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS KING HAS HAD EXTREMELY CANDID TALKS WITH MINISTERS AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. HE CONFRONTED PAPADOPOULOS WITH REPORTS THAT JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE PUSHING FOR "SECOND PHASE" AND REMINDED

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 982A-~~SECRET~~
PAPADOPOULOS OF HIS PLEDGE OF UTMOST FRANKNESS CONCERNING TRUE FACTS. PAPADOPOULOS SWORE TO KING THAT HE COULD CONTROL JUNIOR OFFICERS AND IS NOT MOVING AND WILL NOT MOVE TO REPLACE PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS, ALTHOUGH ASSUMING DEPUTY PRIME MINSTERSHIP HIMSELF AT SOME TIME IN FUTURE MAY BE DIFFERENT QUESTION. KING TOLD PAPADOPOULOS TO PLAN FOR REPLACEMENT OF PRESENT AGED CIVILIAN MINISTERS BY MORE VIGOROUS YOUNGER CIVILIANS AFTER KING'S RETURN. HE EMPHASIZED WORD CIVILIANS.

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NLJ 04-76
By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 00982 251201Z

PAPADOPOULOS SWORE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WILL CREATE NO DIFFICULTIES WHILE KING ABSENT.

3. KING TOLD GENERAL (NOT PRIME MINISTER) KOLLIAS OF FIRST ARMY (LARISSA) THAT IF COUP GROUP SHOULD TRY ANYTHING WHILE KING AWAY IT WOULD BE UP TO HIM, GENERAL KOLLIAS, TO "MOVE FAST AND TO WIN." THIS ORDER BASED ON KING'S CURRENT APPRAISAL, WHICH GENERAL KOLLIAS APPARENTLY SHARES, THAT WHILE MILITARY UNITS IN ATHENS ARE UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN NORTHERN GREECE WOULD

B

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 982A ~~SECRET~~
SUPPORT KING ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY IN EVENT OF CONFRONTATION.

4. KING ALSO "PUT FEAR OF GOD" INTO GENERAL SPANDIDAKIS AND MADE CLEAR TO PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS, AS WELL AS TO PAPADOPOULOS, THAT NO CABINET CHANGES WERE TO OCCUR IN HIS ABSENCE.

5. HE ALSO TALKED WITH PATTAKOS, WHO ASSURED HIM HE KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT'S GOING ON AND THERE WOULD BE NO TROUBLE WHILE KING AWAY. KING HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS AND BY SOME (UNSPECIFIED) MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT GOG IS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONARY PROCESS AND THAT DRAFT WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN ORIGINAL SIX-MONTH PERIOD. SUBSEQUENT GOVERNMENTAL REVIEW WILL BE BRIEF, DRAFT REVISIONS WILL BE ISSUED EARLY IN 1968 AND PLEBISCITE WILL BE HELD NO LATER THAN FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF COUP. ASSUMPTION IS THAT ELECTIONS WILL FOLLOW WITHIN ONE YEAR THEREAFTER.
GP-3. TALBOT

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TELEGRAM

89

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 00967 232216Z

82
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00, /025 W

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O 231510Z AUG 67 ZFF-4 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3151

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 967

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

REF: ATHENS 963

1. KING CONSTANTINE HAS BEEN URGED BY NUMBER OF NON-OFFICIAL PERSONALITIES, INCLUDING FORMER CONSERVATIVE MINISTERS, TO REDUCE HIS TIME ABROAD IN ORDER TO REDUCE CHANCES OF ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS IN HIS ABSENCE. IF HE HEEDS THIS ADVICE, HE WILL DELAY DEPARTURE BY WEEK OR SO, ARRIVING CANADA JUST IN TIME FOR OFFICIAL VISIT. HE PROMISED TO INFORM ME AS SOON AS DECISION MADE TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 967A ~~SECRET~~

2. AS KING ANALYZED SITUATION THIS MORNING, HANDLING OF AVEROFF SENTENCE AND SUSEQUENT ROYAL GRACE HAS INCREASED TENSIONS AND DISSATISFACTION WITHIN JUNTA. YOUNGER OFFICERS FEEL KING INTERVENED TOO ACTIVELY

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 00967 232216Z

AND THAT TIME HAS COME TO INITIATE "SECOND STAGE" IN WHICH PAPADOPOULOS WOULD BECOME PRIME MINISTER AND MILITARY REGIME WOULD TAKE OVER FULL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY. GENERAL SPANDIDAKIS, ANXIOUS AND DEFENSIVE BECAUSE HE HAS VERY LITTLE POWER, HAS BECOME HARDLINER ON ALL SUBJECTS TO REASSERT HIS AUTHORITY. HAVING MISSED MEETING AT WHICH CABINET DECIDED TO ASK KING TO EXTEND ROYAL GRACE TO AVEROFF, SPANDIDAKIS HAS SUBSEQUENTLY OPPOSED SPEED WITH WHICH THAT ACTION TAKEN. PATTAKOS THINKS HE CONTROLS MANY THINGS BUT IN FACT CONTROLS NOTHING. PAPADOPOULOS HAS REPORTEDLY TOLD JUNIOR OFFICERS THAT AS PRIMARY ACTION OFFICER, HE HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERMINING ANY NEXT STAGE. KING BELIEVES THERE IS NO AGREEMENT WITHIN JUNTA ON HOW TO CONFRONT KING BUT THAT JUNIOR OFFICERS IN PARTICULAR ARE ANXIOUS THAT

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 967A ~~SECRET~~

JUNTA MOVE BEFORE KING EFFECTIVELY CONFRONTS THEM.

3. KING COGITATED ALOUD ON WHAT COURSES OF ACTION MIGHT BE OPEN TO HIM IF CONFRONTATION SHOULD BECOME INESCAPABLE. SHOULD PAPADOPOULOS BE ARRESTED? (KING SAID SOME THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ARRESTING PAPADOPOULOS DURING RECENT VISIT TO CYPRUS BUT THIS REJECTED BECAUSE NO APPARATUS ESTABLISHED FOR SUCCESSOR AUTHORITY.) IF PAPADOPOULOS ARRESTED, WHAT WOULD PATTAKOS DO WITH TANKS? HOW TO NEUTRALIZE RANGERS NOW UNDER EFFECTIVE JUNTA COMMAND? ARMY IS REPORTED TO BE INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY ABOUT JUNTA COLONELS, BUT HOW FAR CAN KING GO SAFELY IN PROBING WHETHER ARMY CHIEF ANGELIS WOULD BACK KING IF HE SHOULD DISMISS PRESENT GOVERNMENT? WHEN MOMENT TO ACT ARRIVED, SHOULD KING GO TO THESSALONIKI AND ANNOUNCE CHANGE FROM THERE OR TAKE A CHANCE ON GETTING TO ATHENS RADIO?

4. KING REITERATED THAT HE DOES NOT FORESEE THAT THESE

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 01167 232216Z

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 967A ~~SECRET~~

PROBLEMS WILL REQUIRE SOLUTION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BUT THAT SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER COULD BRING THEM TO HEAD. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO FRANKEST POSSIBLE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT.

5. I TOLD KING THAT SINCE RETURNING FROM UNITED STATES VISIT I HAD SENSED SOME HARDENING OF MOODS IN GREECE. BOTH MILITARY JUNTA AND POTENTIAL OPPOSITION FIGURES APPEAR LESS FLEXIBLE THAN EARLIER. JUNTA SEEMS ANXIOUS ABOUT SECURITY SITUATION IN AUTUMN, AFTER UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS HAVE BECOME ACTIVE FOLLOWING SUMMER LULL. TIME MIGHT SOON ARRIVE WHEN JUNTA, RECOGNIZING IT HAS MADE MISTAKES AND IS NOT SOLVING MANY MAJOR PROBLEMS, WOULD EITHER SUCCUMB TO PRESSURE TO BROADEN ITS BASE AND MOVE TOWARD RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE OR WOULD FURTHER CENTRALIZE CONTROL IN HARD-CORE MILITAR TYPES, MAINLY OF MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS OF 1940. JUNTA'S DECISION AT THAT POINT WOULD PROBABLY DETERMINE HOW AGGRESSIVELY OTHER ELEMENTS

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 967A ~~SECRET~~

IN COUNTRY WOULD OPPOSE THIS REGIME. IT WOULD ALSO HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE ON OTHER NATO COUNTRIES' ATTITUDE TOWARD GREEKS. I NOTED THAT, AS SHOWN BY DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY SUNSHINE EXPRESS EXERCISE, ISSUE OF SOME OTHER MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD GREECE COULD BECOME NEXT GREAT NATO PROBLEM FOLLOWING DEFECTION OF FRANCE. AGAIN, PERSUASIVE MOVEMENT TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL RULE WOULD BE BEST AND PERHAPS ONLY SOLVENT OF OTHERS' OPPOSITION.

COMMENT:

KING'S BROODING DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT CONFRONTATION HAS BECOME INESCAPABLE, HOWEVER, AS REPORTING

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 00967 232216Z

BY EMBASSY [REDACTED] INDICATED, ATTITUDES AND POSITIONS ARE IN FACT HARDENING. THERE IS THUS SOME REAL PROSPECT THAT KING AND MILITARY JUNTA MAY COLLIDE AT SOME POINT WITH FATAL EFFECT TO ONE OR THE OTHER. I DO NOT ANTICIPATE CRISIS LIKELY TO ERUPT WHILE KING ABSENT, BUT SHORTENING HIS TIME OF ABSENCE MIGHT BE PRUDENT.
GP-3. TALBOT

3.3
(b)(1)

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 00876 181657Z

40
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 181342Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3105

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ATHENS 876

EXDIS

1. IN EXPRESSING HIS GREAT APPRECIATION OF OPPORTUNITY TO MEET PRESIDENT JOHNSON SEPTEMBER 11 KING CONSTANTINE VOICED HOPE THAT IN ADDITION TO SMALL LUNCHEON HE MIGHT HAVE SOME TIME ALONE WITH PRESIDENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITHOUT RESERVE ABOUT DOMESTIC GREEK SITUATION AS WELL AS CYPRUS AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN. HE HAS IN MIND GIVING THE PRESIDENT HIS PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF POSSIBILITIES OF FURTHER CRISIS GREECE AND DESCRIBING COURSES OF ACTION THAT MAY BE OPEN TO HIM IF ARRANGEMENTS FOR RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALISM BREAK DOWN AT ANYPOINT. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT POSITION USG

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 876A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
MIGHT TAKE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND COMMENTED THAT PROBABLY THIS WOULD NOT INCLUDE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, EVEN WORDS COULD BE HELPFUL. I URGED HIM TO BE CANDID IN ALL RESPECTS, AND REAFFIRMED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC TO COUNT ON ANY MATERIAL INTERCESSION BY USG.

2. AS TY CYPRUS AND RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, KING NOW HOPES GREEK AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTERS CAN ARRANGE TO MEET SOMETIME BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11. IT IS CLEARLY HIS HOPE HE WILL BE ABLE TO REPORT PROGRESS WHEN HE SEES THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3, TALBOT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-10-03



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91

~~SECRET~~

(Handwritten initials)

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 00684 071421Z

44
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 071130Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3015

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-281
By isl NARA, Date 1-20-11

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 684

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 604

1. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH KING JULY 30 HE REFERRED ONCE AGAIN TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN END HE MIGHT HAVE TO COME INTO CONFRONTATION WITH PRESENT REGIME. AS DEPT AWARE KING'S VIEW OF INEVITABILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF CONFRONTATION HAS VARIED IN PAST SEVERAL MONTHS DEPENDING GENERALLY ON TEMPERATURE OF HIS COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH JUNTA (READ PAPADOPOULOS). MORE RECENTLY KING HAS INDICATED HE VIEWS IMMEDIATE PERIOD AFTER SUBMISSION OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION AS SENSITIVE ONE IN WHICH CONFRONTATION MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE IF REGIME DOES NOT KEEP FAITH WITH ITS ASSURANCES RE CONSTITUTION AND EARLY REFERENDUM. THIS SAME THREE-MONTH PERIOD IS ALSO CONSIDERED

33
(b)(1)

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 684 ~~SECRET~~

ONE OF INCIPIENT CRISIS BY A MAJORITY OF GREEKS WHO FOR PRESENT ARE WILLING TO GIVE REGIME CHANCE TO PROVE ITS INTENTIONS.

2. KING SPOKE OF CONTACTS HE HAD MADE WITH SENIOR GENERALS AND OTHERS, AND SEEMED REASONABLY EXPECTANT THAT IN EVENT OF SHOWDOWN HE COULD GET ADEQUATE SUPPORT TO OUST JUNTA. HE DID NOT WANT TO PRECIPITATE ACTION, HOWEVER, UNLESS US KNEW AND APPROVED OF HIS PURPOSES. HE DID NOT ASK, AS HE HAD DONE IN THE PAST, ABOUT PROSPECTS THAT HE COULD COUNT ON

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 00684 071421Z

AMERICAN FLEET PRESENCE OR LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE.

3. IN REPLYING, I POINTED OUT THAT AT PRESENT US HEAVILY COMMITTED IN MANY PARTS OF WORLD. I TRIED TO GET HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT US SHOULD NOT BE LOOKED TO FOR PARTICIPATION IN ANY CHANGE IN GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS SORT OF DECISION COULD BE MADE ONLY BY HIM. KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, BUT IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY TO MOVE HE WOULD ADVISE US IN ADVANCE.

4. AS EXAMPLE OF INFLUENCES NOW BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON KING, I WAS INTERESTED IN HIS ACCOUNT OF SECRET VISIT TO

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 684 ~~SECRET~~

HIM BY RETIRED GENERAL GENNIMATAS, FORMER CHIEF OF HNDGS. LATTER HAD REMINDED HIM THERE HAD LONG BEEN SUSPICIONS THAT PAPADOPOULOS AND OTHER COLONELS HAD BEEN PLOTTING AND THAT HE, GENNIMATAS, HAD DISPERSED THEM TO DISTANT COMMANDS WHEREAS SUBSEQUENTLY GEN. SPANDIDAKIS HAD PERMITTED THEM TO REASSEMBLE IN ATHENS POSTS. HE THOUGHT THIS COULD MEAN SPANDIDAKIS WAS IN ON PLOT, THOUGH HE HOPED NOT. IN ANY CASE, COLONELS ARE MORE KNOWN THAN RESPECTED BY ARMED FORCES, WHO NOW ACCEPT THEIR AUTHORITY FOR LACK OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVE. GENNIMATAS PROPOSED THAT WHEN NEW CONSTITUTION READY KING MOVE TO DISPOSE OF COLONELS. THEY COULD BE THANKED FOR THEIR ROLE IN SAVING COUNTRY FROM COMMUNISM, DECORATED, AND RETURNED TO DISPERSED UNITS OR RETIRED. FROM THEN ON, ARMED FORCES WOULD PAY NO ATTENTION TO THEM. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE FORCED TO RESIGN FROM ARMY IN ORDER TO STAY IN POLITICS. HERE, AGAIN, THEY WOULD LOSE GRIP OVER ARMED FORCES. KEY POINT, HE SAID, WAS NOT TO PERMIT IMPORTANT FURTHER CHANGES IN THE ARMY BEFORE THE NEW CONSTITUTION READIED. IT WOULD THEN BE ESSENTIAL TO MOVE BEFORE JUNTA CONSOLIDATED CONTROL OVER ARMY COMMANDS. WHATEVER COURSE KING MIGHT CHOOSE TO

PAGE FOUR RUQMAT 684 ~~SECRET~~

PURSUED IN RIDDING COUNTRY OF THESE COLONELS, GENNIMATAS WAS

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ATHENS 00684 071421Z

CONVINCED ARMED FORCES WOULD SUPPORT HIM ABSOLUTELY. KING HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST BUT WITHOUT COMMITMENTS. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER GENNIMATAS WAS ORGANIZING A MOVEMENT AMONG SENIOR MILITARY PEOPLE AGAINST THE COLONELS, BUT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD NOT INTERFERE. (DATT COMMENT: GENNIMATAS' VIEWS ARE CORRECT BUT HE IS NOT KNOWN TO BE IN ANY PARTICULAR CONTACT WITH ANY GROUP.)

3.3
(b)(1) 5. COMMENT: WE HAVE RECENTLY HAD REPORTS OF PRELIMINARY PLOTTING BY SEVERAL GROUPS OF OFFICERS (MOSTLY RECENTLY RETIRE) [REDACTED]. WE BELIEVE SOME OF THIS IS MOTIVATED BY THEIR BELIEF KING WOULD SUPPORT A COUNTERCOUP. (IT IS FAIRLY GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT HIS TRIPS TO NORTH WERE FOR PURPOSE POLLING AMOUNT OF SUPPORT HE COULD COUNT ON IN SUCH EVENT.) SOME MAY ALSO BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN ATTITUDE OF COOLNESS TOWARD A "COLONELS" REGIME IMPLIES WE WOULD SUPPORT A COUNTERCOUP BY OTHER MILITARY. HOWEVER, WE SEE NO EVIDENCE YET THAT PLOTTERS PINPOINTED SO FAR WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER CURRENT REGIME, EITHER AS SCHEDULING EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES OR ACTING WITH MORE

PAGE FIVE RUQMAT 684 ~~SECRET~~

LENIENCY IN REPRESSIVE MEASURES. THIS ESTIMATE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE REVISED IF REGIME GAVE INDICATIONS OF BETRAYING ASSURANCES BOTH TO US AND GREEK PUBLIC RE RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY LIFE. WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO WATCH CAREFULLY WHAT, IF ANY, PROGRESS VARIOUS GROUPS MAKE IN COALESCING TO POINT THEY UNDERMINE REGIME'S CONTROL OF KEY UNITS IN ATTICA AREA OR CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL OF SUFFICIENT OTHER ONES (LARRISSA AND THE NORTH) TO NEUTRALIZE REGIME'S SUPERIORITY IN ATTICA.

6. (COMMENTS CONT'D) SOME OF THE PLOTTERS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN AWAITING MY RETURN AND ANY COMMENTS I MIGHT MAKE, EITHER DIRECTLY OR AROUND TOWN, TO GET NUANCES OF LATEST WASHINGTON ATTITUDE TOWARD PRESENT REGIME. TO EXTENT THERE ARE INCIPIENT COUP AMBITIONS IN GREEK MILITARY, WE FACE TRICKY PERIOD OF ATTEMPTING TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION EITHER THAT WE FIRMLY ENDORSE PRESENT REGIME OR THAT WE WOULD ENCOURAGE SOME

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PAGE 04 ATHENS 00684 071421Z

COUNTERCOUP.

3.3
(b)(1) 7. [REDACTED] DATT CONCUR IN COMMENT.
GP-1 TALBOT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 487

PAGE 01 STATE 117560

83

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/LDBATTLE
APPROVED BY: NEA:LUCIUS D BATTLE
S/S:MR MEEHAN

R 192120Z FEB 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1078

~~SECRET~~ STATE 117560

EXDIS

REF: STATE 113580

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BATTLE

DEEPLY REGRET THAT DUE AID AND OTHER HEARINGS MUST FURTHER
POSTPONE TRIP ATHENS AND OTHER COUNTRIES. LETTER FOLLOWS.
GP-3. RUSK

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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93/46

~~SECRET~~ 992

PAGE 01 STATE 110349

83

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, /031 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/GRK:HDBREWSTER

APPROVED BY: S/S:FJMEEHAN

NEA:MR. ROCKWELL, WHITE HOUSE:MR. SAUNDERS

O 052349Z FEB 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0969

~~SECRET~~ STATE 110349

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 3439

PROPOSED CHANGE IN TEXT AGREEABLE.

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~~SECRET~~930
For Clearance1 - Saunders
2 - R.T.

AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

State

EXTDIS

Ref: Athens 3439

Proposed change in text agreeable.

QP-3

OK
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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
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By je, NARA, Date 12-11-03Old 5/5, Helen Brown
2/5/68 6:30 am

NEA/GRK:JDK:water:jsp 3095

S/S

NEA - Mr. Rockwell

White House - Mr. Saunders

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PAGE 01 STATE 108701

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO MM 01,SSO 00,NSCE 00,CCO 00,/031 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/GRK: MKMITCHELL
APPROVED BY: NEA: STUART W. ROCKWELL
S/S: MR. WALSH
WHITE HOUSE: MR. SAUNDERS

0 012330Z FEB 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0946

~~SECRET~~ STATE 108701

EXDIS

REF: STATE 101277

IF SUBJECT OF PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO PAPADOPOULOS LETTER
ARISES YOUR MEETING FEBRUARY 2, YOU WILL HAVE TO SAY THAT YOU
HAVE NO REPLY TO DATE. FYI: SUGGESTED TEXT OF LETTER AND
ADVISABILITY OF SENDING UNDER PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE UNDER
CONSIDERATION. GP-3. RUSK

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95 / 40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 532

PAGE 01 STATE 108450

81

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO MM 01,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/031 R

DRAFTED BY:NEA/GRK:MKMITCHELL
APPROVED BY:NEA- MR BATTLE
NEA/GRK:HDBREWSTER
S/S- MR WALSH
NEA- MR ROCKWELL
WHITE HOUSE- HAROLD SAUNDERS

0 012124Z JAN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 108450

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. AS YOUR FIRST CALL ON PRIME MINISTER PAPADOPOULOS SINCE RESUMPTION NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL SET TONE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GOG FOR SOME TIME TO COME, YOU WILL AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT STRIKE RIGHT NOTE FROM OUTSET. FROM WHERE WE SIT, MAIN TEHEME SHOULD IN ESSENCE BE THAT REGIME IN GREECE MUST HELP US TO HELP IT. BY WAY OF AMPLIFICATION YOU MAY WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT USG MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT STRONGLY UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD GOG HELD IN SOME CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESS QUARTERS. IN ADDITION TO THIS REALITY, WEIGHT OF OUR WORLDWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES, AND INCREASING LACK OF EHTUSIASM ON PART OF

PAGE 2 RUEHC 108450 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 02 STATE 108450

CONGRESS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN GENERAL, WILL HAVE GENERALLY LIMITING EFFECT ON OUR FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS ABROAD. NEVERTHELESS, FOR MANY REASONS ARISING OUT OF OUR COMMON TIES AND MUTUALITY OF PURPOSES, WE WOULD LIKE TO REESTABLISH CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE. WE WILL BE IN BEST POSITION TO DEAL WITH CRITICISM AT HOME IF GOG MAKES MEANINGFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS RESTORATION OF THOSE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IT HAS ALREADY PROMISED. MUCH THAT GOG HAS DONE RECENTLY HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. WITHOUT WISHING SPECIFY TIME LIMITS, WITHOUT SUGGESTING ANY RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE, FOLLOWING ARE STEPS WHICH WHEN ACCOMPLISHED, OR WHEN CLEARLY ON ROAD TO ACCOMPLISHMENT, WOULD DO MUCH IN U S AND ELSEWHERE ABROAD TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

- A) RESTORATION OF PRESS FREEDOM;
- B) RESOLUTION OF CASES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
- C) PUBLICATION OF PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTION;
- D) ANNOUNCEMENT OF SPECIFIC DATE FOR PLEBISCITE;
- E) INCREASED FREEDOM FOR TRADE UNIONS;

PAGE 3 RUEHC 108450 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
F) HOLDING OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.

2. AT SAME TIME, YOU MAY INDICATE THAT IF ALL GOES WELL, WE WILL REEXAMINE ONCE AGAIN OUR POLICY OF SUSPENDING MAP ITEMS. WE CANNOT PROMISE ANYTHING SPECIFIC AT MOMENT BUT THIS MATTER WILL BE VERY MUCH ON OUR MINDS.

3. FYI WE WISH REGAIN FLEXIBILITY ON MATTER OF SUSPENDED ITEMS. AMBASSADOR BATTLE INTENDS CONSULT WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, TO INFORM THEM HE PLANS TO GO TO GREECE SOON TO LOOK PERSONALLY INTO SITUATION (VISIT TENTATIVELY SET FOR ABOUT FEBRUARY 21), AND IF, AS WE WOULD LIKE, HE GETS REASONABLE COMMITMENT FROM REGIME IN DIRECTON TOWARDS CONSITUTIONALISM, HE WILL UPON RETURN TO WASHINGTON CONSULT AGAIN WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WITH VIEW TO LIFTING SUSPENSION NUMBER OF ITEM. IT IS ENVISAGED THAT FOLLOWING PARTIAL LIFTING OF SUSPENSIONS, JOINT MAP PLANNING CAN BE INITIATED.

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PAGE 03 STATE 108450

4. IT IS OF COURSE CLEAR THAT DETAILS YOUR CONVERSATION WITH PAPADOPOULOS WILL DEPEND UPON CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT BE

PAGE 4 RUEHC 108450 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED TO ABOVE. WE WOULD HOPE FOR EXAMPLE THAT CONVERSATION WOULD BE AMPLIFIED TO INCLUDE TOUR D'HORIZON (PARTICULARLY ON DOMESTIC PROGRAMS) WHICH WILL PROVIDE BETTER APPRECIATION THAN WE NOW HAVE OF GOG ULTIMATE INTENTIONS AND ABILITY ACCOMPLISH THEM. BUT ABOVE LINE GIVES BURDEN OF LINE BATTLE INTENDS TO TAKE WHEN HE GOES OUT AND WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT YOU AND HE BE IN HARMONY. OUR MAIN THOUGHT IS THAT YOUR FIRST VISIT WITH PAPADOPOULOS ESTABLISH SENSE OF FRANKNESS BY ALLUDING OUR DIFFICULTIES AND OUR DESIDERATA, AND A FEELING OF CONFIDENCE BY INDICATING THAT WE SEE HONORABLE WAY OUT FOR PRESENT REGIME THROUGH EVENTUAL POLITICAL LEGITIMIZATION. GP3. RUSK

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WWR:

February 1, 1968

Attached is guidance for Phil Talbot's first call on Papadopoulos (6:00 a.m. EST Friday) since our resumption of normal diplomatic contacts. We'd like to get it out this morning so Phil can have a few hours to mull it over.

I was about to clear it, but thought you might like to see it since it could come up in connection with the possible letter to Papadopoulos you sent to the President last night.

The line is fully consistent with our continued effort to use our resumed contact to press the regime back toward constitutionalism. Having taken our flak for resuming, we want to be able to say honestly we're using our relationship as productively as we can.

Hal
HHS

OK to go ✓
Call me

2/1/68
S/S - State (Peggy Bremigan)
notified; Hal Saunders
notified
rlr

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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445
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Ambassy ATHENS

IMMEDIATE

STATE

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR

1. As your first call on Prime Minister Papadopoulos since resumption normal diplomatic relations will set tone of our relationship with GOG for some time to come, you will agree it is important strike right note from outset. From where we sit, main theme should in essence be that regime in Greece must help us to help it. By way of amplification you may wish make clear that USG must take into account strongly unfavorable attitude toward GOG held in some Congressional and press quarters. In addition to this reality, ^{weight} weight of our worldwide responsibilities, and increasing lack of enthusiasm on part of Congress for foreign assistance in general, will have generally limiting effect on our financial commitments abroad. Nevertheless, for many reasons arising out of our common ties and mutuality of purposes, we would like to reestablish close relationship with Greece. We will be in best position to deal with criticism at home if GOG makes meaningful progress towards restoration of those constitutional processes it has already promised. Much that GOG has done recently has been encouraging. Much remains to be done. Without wishing specify time limits, without suggesting any return to status quo ante, following are

NEA:GRK:JHChittell:jsp:av 1/31/68 5098

NEA - Mr. Battle

NEA:GRK:JHChittell

S/S

NEA - Mr. Rockwell

White House

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By JC, NARA, Date 12/1/03

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steps which when accomplished, or when clearly on road to accomplishment, would do much in U.S. and elsewhere abroad to establish bona fides of present government:

- a) restoration of press freedom;
- b) resolution of cases of political prisoners in accordance with due process of law;
- c) publication of proposed new constitution;
- d) announcement of specific date for plebiscite;
- e) increased freedom for trade unions;
- f) holding of parliamentary elections.

2. At same time, you may indicate that if all goes well, we will reexamine once again our policy of suspending MAP items. We cannot promise anything specific at moment but this matter will be very much on our minds.

3. FYI We all wish regain flexibility on matter of suspended items. Ambassador Battle intends consult with Congressional leaders, to inform them he plans to go to Greece soon to look personally into situation (visit tentatively set for about February 21) and if, as we would like, he gets reasonable commitment from regime in direction towards constitutionalism, he will upon return to Washington consult again with Congressional leaders with view to lifting suspension number of items.

It is envisaged that following partial lifting of suspensions, ~~discussions with regard to~~ joint MAP planning can be initiated.

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4. It is of course clear that details your conversation with Papadopoulos will depend upon circumstances and not be limited to above. We would hope for example that conversation would be amplified to include tour d'horizon (particularly on domestic programs) which will provide better appreciation than we now have of GOQ ultimate intentions and ability accomplish them. But above ^{line} gives burden of ~~heavy~~ ^{take} Battle intends to ~~take~~ when he goes out and we believe it important you and he be in harmony. Our main thought is that your first visit with Papadopoulos establish sense of frankness by alluding our difficulties and our desiderata, and a feeling of confidence by indicating that we see honorable way out for present regime through eventual political legitimization.

GP-3

END

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48

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PAGE 01 STATE 101277

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/GK HDBREWSTER
APPROVED BY: NEA LUCIUS D BATTLE
U KATZENBACH(DRAFT)
S/S WALSH
WHITE HOUSE SAUNDERS

O 190123Z JAN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0840

~~SECRET~~ STATE 101277

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 3220, PARA. 5

1. IN LIGHT OF SITUATION AS YOU SEE IT AND APPARENT INTERNAL STRAINS BETWEEN PIPINELIS AND PAPADOPOULOS YOU MAY ACKNOWLEDGE TO PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF IN AN INFORMAL SESSION RECEIPT HIS JANUARY 6 MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT. YOU CAN ADD YOU DO NOT YET HAVE RESPONSE.

2. WITHOUT COMMITTING PRESIDENT TO REPLY, YOU MAY DESCRIBE PRESIDENT'S ESPECIALLY HEAVY BURDENS AT THIS TIME OF YEAR AS PROBABLE REASON NO RESPONSE AS YET.

3. FYI WE PLAN SUBMIT DRAFT REPLY TO WHITE HOUSE JANUARY 19.
RUSK

PAGE 2 RUEHC 101277 ~~SECRET~~

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By jc, NARA, Date 12/1/03

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97

PAGE 01 STATE 98446

47

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 R

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R 131846Z JAN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0814
INFO USMISSION NATO 0976
AMEMBASSY ROME 1026

~~SECRET~~ STATE 98446

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. WE HAVE DECIDED TO MOVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO A WORKING
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REGIME IN ATHENS. OUR PLAN IS FIRST TO
CONSULT DURING THE COMING WEEK IN WASHINGTON WITH NATO REPS AND
THEN TO AUTHORIZE YOU TO PAY A FORMAL CALL ON PIPINELIS.
FORMAL CONTACT WITH JUNTA MINISTERS WOULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED FOR
TIME BEING BUT IS ENVISAGED AS FOLLOWING STEP DEPENDING ON
DEVELOPMENTS.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 98446 ~~SECRET~~

2. DECISION IS BASED ON FACT REGIME IN CONTROL OF COUNTRY,

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By jc NARA. Date 12-11-03



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PAGE 02 STATE 98446

BELIEF WE HAVE EXTRACTED AS MUCH BENEFIT AS WE LIKELY OBTAIN FROM PRESENT POLICY, AND FACT WE HAVE INTERESTS IN GREECE WHICH REQUIRE ATTENTION.

3. WE DO NOT INTEND MAKE FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT, AND WILL SEEK AVOID PUBLICLY DISCUSSING QUESTION OF WHETHER WE HAVE RECOGNIZED GOG. WE PLAN SAY WE RESUMING WORKING RELATIONSHIP BASED ON DE FACTO SITUATION OF CONTROL.

4. DURING YOUR FUTURE MEETINGS WITH FONMIN YOU SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD CONSTITUTIONALISM.

5. IF YOU RELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL YOU AUTHORIZED INFORMALLY CONVEY TO FONMIN, WITHOUT AWAITING OCCASION OF FORMAL CALL, ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MESSAGE WHICH PRIMIN SENT TO PRESIDENT VIA PRIVATE CHANNEL. TEXT BEING SENT YOU SEPARATELY.

6. IN LIGHT ABOVE WE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE YOU REMAIN ATHENS

PAGE 3 RUEHC 98446 ~~SECRET~~
FOR TIME BEING.

7. AT LUNCHEON WITH PALAMAS JANUARY 15 BATTLE WILL BE GENERALLY ENCOURAGING RE US-GOG RELATIONSHIP.

GP-1
KATZENBACH

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98 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 424

PAGE 01 STATE 90906

42

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, /026 R

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0 291611Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0690

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 90906

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS TEL. 2972

OUR THINKING HERE IS THAT TO ASK KING IF HE ACCEPTS APPOINTMENT OF REGENT AS LEGITIMATE INTERIM STEP COULD PUT BOTH HIM AND US IN DIFFICULT POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD KING SAY NO AND SHOULD WE LATER DECIDE THAT OUR OWN INTERESTS BEST SERVED WITH ATTENDANCE TO DEUM, KING WOULD PROBABLY INFER THAT WE WERE MAKING MAJOR POLICY CHANGE AND ABANDONING MONARCHY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IF BECAME KNOWN THAT HE HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION AND THAT WE HAD ACQUIESCED IN IT, RELATIONS BETWEEN HIM AND REGIME, NOT TO SPEAK OF OURS,

PAGE 2 RUEHC 90906 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WOULD BE FURTHER COMPLICATED. FOR THESE REASONS, WE THINK

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PAGE 02 STATE 90906

IT BEST NOT TO SOUND KING OUT ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGEST.
GP-3. RUSK

EXD-5

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