



Department of State

99 NSC
TELEGRAM

47

~~SECRET~~ 714

PAGE 01 STATE 89222

85
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/SWROCKWELL
APPROVED BY: NEA:WJHANDLEY
S/S. MR. O'DONOHUE

P 231937Z DEC 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0670

~~SECRET~~ STATE 89222

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 2918

1. WE CONCUR THAT IF THERE ARE CONVINCING INDICATIONS KING ABOUT TO RETURN IT WOULD BE WISE TO HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH PAPADOPOULOS BEFOREHAND. WE CONSIDER HIS DECEMBER 23 STATEMENT CONSTRUCTIVE.

2. IF YOU SEE PAPADOPOULOS IT SHOULD BE ON VERY INFORMAL BASIS. YOU COULD TELL HIM WE FOUND HIS STATEMENT CONSTRUCTIVE, AND IN FRIENDLY MANNER SEEK ASCERTAIN HIS PLANS RE SUCH MATTERS AS ELECTIONS, RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS, ETC. MAKE CLEAR IMPORTANCE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 89222 ~~SECRET~~
OF LIVING UP TO TIMETABLE.

3. AS PRESUMABLY YOU WOULD BE SEEING PAPADOPOULOS IN CONTEXT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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IMMINENT RETURN OF KING, QUESTION OF RECOGNITION SHOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE.

4. IF NO INDICATIONS RECEIVED THAT KING IS ABOUT TO RETURN, WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD SEEK APPROPRIATE INFORMAL OPPORTUNITY CONVEY SUBSTANCE PARA 2 TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF REGIME. SINCE STATUS CHIEF OF STATE WOULD REMAIN UNCLARIFIED IN THIS SITUATION, DISCUSSION OF RECOGNITION SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

GP-1. RUSK.

EXD

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~~SECRET~~ 761

PAGE 01 STATE 86871

80
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/HDBREWSTER:SWROCKWELL
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
NEA- MR. BATTLE
U- MR. KATZENBACH
S/S: MR. MEEHAN

P 192339Z DEC 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0641

~~SECRET~~ STATE 86871

EXDIS

1. KING CONSTANTINE TELEPHONED TO SECRETARY AT 9 AM EST DECEMBER 19 TO REPORT THAT MESSENGER CH. POTAMIANOS RETURNING TO ATHENS. KING'S VIEWS WERE THAT THERE SHOULD BE FIRM DATE FOR PLEBISCITE ON CONSTITUTION AND DATE FOR ELECTIONS SET BY THE JUNTA. CONSTITUTION WAS NOT AN ISSUE BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS IN IT. HE HAD TO INSIST ON PRECISE DATES.

2. KING EXPRESSED HOPE US WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE GOG UNLESS HE RETURNS AS SAFEGUARD THAT THINGS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. HE HOPED UK AND OTHERS WOULD ALSO PUT PRESSURE ON GOG USING MEANS AT THEIR COMMAND.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 86871 ~~SECRET~~

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Authority FR4564-68, 116, #350

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3. HE SAID HE WAS CONSIDERING POSSIBLY GOING BACK WITHOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATION. (COMMENT: THIS BRAINSTORM MAY HAVE GROWN OUT OF HIS TALK WITH CARAMANLIS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE ADVISED HIM TO GO BACK BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE.)

4. SECRETARY DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS IDEA. HE ALSO DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF CONCERNING KING'S REQUEST TO LINK US RECOGNITION WITH KING'S RETURN TO GREECE, SAYING THAT QUESTION WOULD REQUIRE STUDY.

5. KING CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY STATING HE WOULD NOT BE MAKING PRESS STATEMENT TODAY.

6. WE HAVE REVIEWED CAREFULLY QUESTION OF US-GREEK RELATIONS AND DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO THE MIDDLE IN NEGOTIATING QUESTION OF KING'S POSSIBLE RETURN. OBVIOUSLY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT AND NOT READY TO PAY MUCH OF A PRICE, IF ANY, FOR KING'S RETURN. AT SAME TIME WE WANT TO STRIKE A BLOW WITH GREEK REGIME FOR PRINCIPLES OF EARLY PLEBISCITE ON

PAGE 3 RUEHC 86871 ~~SECRET~~

CONSTITUTION AND A FIRM COMMITMENT CONCERNING ELECTIONS. WE WANT TO USE LEVERAGE OF US RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO MAXIMUM DEGREE AS AN ADDITIONAL TOOL IN ACHIEVING OUR BASIC GOAL OF BRINGING GREECE BACK TO DEMOCRATIC LIFE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT KING MAY DECIDE TO DO.

7. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO GET IN TOUCH INFORMALLY AND QUIETLY WITH PAPADOPOULOS OR PATTAKOS, (RATHER THAN PIPINELIS AS SUGGESTED ATHENS 4175). SAY THAT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE COMPLICATED FOR US OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE, BUT THAT THIS WAS ALREADY DIFFICULT FOR BASIC REASONS WHICH REMAIN A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THE KIND OF RELATIONS WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE WITH A NATO PARTNER AND TRADITIONAL FRIEND. WE SEE LITTLE CHANCE FOR A SATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIP UNTIL PROGRESS IS MADE ON REMOVING THESE PROBLEMS, WHICH CAN BE DESCRIBED IN GENERAL AS THE CONTINUING LACK OF CONVINCING MOVEMENT TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION. INVOLVED ARE SUCH ISSUES AS

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FIRM AND EARLY DATES FOR A PLEBISCITE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS, RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESS, AND THE RESOLUTION

PAGE 4 RUEHC 86871 ~~SECRET~~
OF POLITICAL PRISONER CASES IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW. ADD THAT THE STRENGTH OF OPINION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES ON THESE ISSUES PREVENTS THE USG FROM HAVING A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE, AND THAT ACCORDINGLY WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE GREECE MAKE DECISIVE PROGRESS TOWARD CONSTITUTIONALITY.

8. IF YOU ARE ASKED WHETHER THE US INTENDS TO RECOGNIZE THE GOG, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN PENDING CLAIRIFICATION STATUS OF KING: YOU SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT BASIC PROBLEM FOR US CONTINUES TO BE UNDEMOCRATIC NATURE OF REGIME ITSELF. FYI: WE PREFER LEAVE SITUATION IMPRECISE FOR AWHILE, ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE CONTACT WITH PAPADOPOULOS OR PATTAKOS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED A STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION: WE HOPE IT CAN BE DONE IN A MANNER TO MINIMIZE SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. END FYI: GP-3 RUSK

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~~SECRET~~ 966

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/GRK HD: BREWSTER
APPROVED BY: NEA: STUART W. ROCKWELL
S/S: MRS. DAVIS

Q R 161941Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0627
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME 0731

~~SECRET~~ STATE 85829

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 2826 AND ROME 3181

INASMUCH AS KING NOW HAS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH ATHENS, BELIEVE
IT PREFERABLE NOT REPEAT NOT TO PROVIDE HIM WITH YOUR ESTIMATE.
GP-3 RUSK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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43

~~SECRET~~ 337

W K

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83

ORIGIN INRD 10

INFO ES 06, RSC 01, MM 01, 7018 R

DRAFTED BY NEA SWROCKWELL
APPROVED BY INR MR HUGHES
NEA MR BATTLE

.....
O 142348Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0609

~~SECRET~~ STATE 84840

ROGER CHANNEL

REFERENCE ATHENS 2799

WE HAVE SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO EMBASSY ROME TO OBTAIN FRO KING
INFORMATION SUBJECT REFTEL AND AMBASSADOR REINHARDT IS CALLING
ON KING AT LATTER'S REQUEST THIS AFTERNOON. WE WOULD PREFERE
AWAITING OUTCOME THIS CONVERSATION TO SEE WHETHER TRIP BY
LEPCZYK REQUIRED. WE SEE DISADVANTAGES TO CONTACT WITH
KING AT THIS TIME BY US OFFICIAL STATIONED IN GREECE. GP-3.
KATZENBACH

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By ius, NARA, Date 10-5-04

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

103 21

SECRET 905

PAGE 01 STATE 84497

40

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:SWROCKWELL

APPROVED BY: NEA-LUCIUS D. BATTLE

U-MR. KATZENBACH (SUBSTANCE), S/S-MR. WALSH, L/NEA-MR. WEHMEYER

O 141747Z DEC 67 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0601

~~SECRET~~ STATE 84497

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

UNTIL OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GOG CLARIFIED WE BELIEVE THAT YOU PERSONALLY SHOULD NOT HAVE CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS GOG UNLESS MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE URGENCY AND IMPORTANCE INVOLVED. HOWEVER WE DO NOT DURING THIS PERIOD WISH TO BE CUT OFF FROM INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS AND SUGGEST YOU AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATE CONTACTS BY SENIOR MEMBERS YOUR STAFF.

GP-3. KATZENBACH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

104 43

~~SECRET~~ 28

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16

PAGE 01 STATE 83933

81
ORIGIN INRD 10

INFO ES 06, RSC 01, MM 01, 7018 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA: SWROCKWELL
APPROVED BY: INR: MR. HUGHES
U: MR. KATZENBACH (SUBS)
S/S: MR. WALSH

Z 132150Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0588

~~SECRET~~ STATE 83933

ROGER CHANNEL

FOR AMBASSADOR

YOU MAY BE SURE NO MAJOR DECISION WILL BE MADE HERE REGARDING
CURRENT GREEK DEVELOPMENTS WITHOUT CONSULTING YOU. MEANWHILE
HOWEVER ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE CREATING PROBLEMS HERE.
WE HOPE YOU CAN TAKE STEPS TO FREE UP THE FLOW.

GP-3. KATZENBACH

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By js, NARA, Date 10-5-04

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~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 STATE 78736

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

EYES ONLY

82

ORIGIN SS 35

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WHCA

INFO CCO 00,MM 01,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/036 R

1967 DEC 4 00 32

DRAFTED BY:AS RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE (MR. BROMLEY SMITH
AND MR. ROSTOW) FOR TRANSMISSION 12/3/67
APPROVED BY: S/S-C:MR. LEDBETTER
NEA:AMB BATTLE (SUBSTANCE)
U:MR. KATZENBACH (SUBSTANCE)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT EXCEPT
WHITE HOUSE

O 032359Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0491

~~SECRET~~ STATE 78736

EXDIS

EYES ONLY FOR MR. VANCE

1. THE PRESIDENT IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR REPORT
OF YOUR MISSION AND HE HAS SUGGESTED THAT YOU PLAN TO SEE HIM
AT 12:30 P.M., TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, AFTER WHICH YOU WOULD
REMAIN FOR THE REGULAR TUESDAY LUNCH WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS
WITH SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S MONDAY SCHEDULE IS SO TIGHT THAT THERE IS
INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE KIND OF DISCUSSIONS HE WOULD LIKE
TO HAVE.

~~SECRET~~

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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PAGE 02 STATE 78736

PAGE 2 RUEHC 78736 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

3. IN ORDER TO FOCUS PRESS ATTENTION ON YOUR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON TUESDAY, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT YOUR ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON BE NO EARLIER THAN 11:00 P.M. EST (2300) MONDAY, DECEMBER 4.

4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT IS AGREEABLE TO YOU.

5. WE ARE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH MRS. VANCE ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO YOUR SCHEDULE AND WILL OF COURSE BE HAPPY TO PASS ON ANYTHING YOU DESIRE.

GP-2.
RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS IMMEDIATE

Info: ~~INFO: Amembassy ANKARA~~
~~Amembassy Nicosia~~

STATE 78736

EXDIS

FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION OF MR. VANCE

1. The President is looking forward to hearing your report of your mission and he has suggested that you plan to see him at 12:30 P.M., Tuesday, December 5, after which you would remain for the regular Tuesday lunch which the President has with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

2. The President's Monday schedule is so tight that there is insufficient time for the kind of discussion he would like to have.

3. In order to focus press attention on your report to the President on Tuesday, it is suggested that your arrival in Washington be no earlier than 11:00 P.M. EST (2300, Monday, December 4).

4. We would appreciate your confirmation that this arrangement is agreeable to you.

Dated by: NEA/CTF:MDraper:ml:12/3/67 Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Amb. Battle (subs.)

White House - Mr. Rostow

IO - Mr. Sisco (subs.)

White House - Mr. Bromley Smith

SECRET/XXX S/S -

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy ATHENS

~~SECRET~~
Classification

5. We are keeping in touch with Mrs. Vance on all matters relating to your schedule and will of course be happy to pass on anything you desire.

GP-2.

END

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

HCE800

PAGE 01 STATE 78724

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

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45

ORIGIN SS 83

INFO NSCE 00, CIAE 00, SSO 00, DODE 00, USIE 00, NSAE 00, CCO 00, MM 01,
/081 R

DRAFTED BY: CTF:MDRAPER
APPROVED BY: CTF:MDRAPER



Z 031546Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0489
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0678

~~SECRET~~ STATE 78724

LIMDIS

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY RUSK IS BEING DELIVERED
TO KYPRIANOU:

QUOTE

PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY CYRUS VANCE HAS REPORTED THE RESULTS
OF YOUR MEETING THIS MORNING. I DEEPLY REGRET YOUR RESPONSE
TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE AGREEMENT.

QUOTE I WANT TO THANK YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR RECEIVING

~~PAGE 2 RUEHC 78724 SECRET~~

HIM SO CORDIALLY AND GIVING HIM EVERY CONSIDERATION. I HOPE
THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS WILL COOPERATE FULLY IN THE PEACE-

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 STATE 78724~~

MAKING AND PEACEKEEPING PROCESS WHICH IS AHEAD OF US.
SINCERELY, DEAN RUSK END QUOTE. RUSK

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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45
ORIGIN SS 80

1967 DEC 3 15 28

INFO NSCE 00, CIAE 00, SSO 00, DODE 00, USIE 00, NSAE 00, CCO 00, MM 01,
/081 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CTF:MDRAPER
APPROVED BY: IO - MR. SISCO
NEA - AMB. BATTLE

g. Daugherty

Z R 031507Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0487
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0676
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0242
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1476
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0396
USCINCEUR
USMISSION NATO 0628
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1067

~~SECRET~~ STATE 78722

LIMDIS

TOVAN 63

REF: PARAGRAPH 4 OF PRECEDING INSTRUCTION REGARDING U.S.
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SYG APPEAL

~~PAGE 2 RUEHC 78722 SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 STATE 78722~~

WITHHOLD INFORMING GOVERNMENT OF CONTENTS OF U.S. STATEMENT
IN SUPPORT SYG APPEAL. THIS WILL DEPEND IN PART ON WHETHER
SYG WOULD PREFER THAT U.S. MAKE OR NOT MAKE SUPPORTING STATE-
MENT.

~~GP 3.~~ RUSK

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-1-03*

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PAGE 01 STATE 77383

1967 NOV 30 23 45

81
ORIGIN SS 35

INFO MM 01,CCO 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,/036 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/SWROCKWELL: CYPRUS TASK FORCE: TEXT REVISED IN
WH
APPROVED BY: NEA: MR. BATTLE
NEA-AMBASSADOR BATTLE
S/S:MR. READ
IO-JJSISCO
THE WHITE HOUSE: MR. SMITH

Z R 302257Z NOV.67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0460
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0655
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0221
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1389
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0366
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0997
USMISSION NATO 0587

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 77383

EXDIS

NATUS

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. VANCE FROM PRESIDENT
JOHNSON: QTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-11-03*

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PAGE 02 STATE 77383

PAGE 2 RUEHC 77383 C ~~O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

DEAR CY: AT A CRITICAL TIME FOR PEACE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN YOU ACCEPTED FROM ME AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE A DIFFICULT AND HIGHLY IMPORTANT MISSION. I ASKED NOTHING LESS OF YOU THAN TO HELP THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE, TURKEY, AND CYPRUS AVOID A MAJOR WAR AND A TERRIBLE HUMAN TRAGEDY. WITH COURAGE, PERCEPTIVENESS, SKILL, AND TOTAL DEDICATION YOU PURSUED THIS FORMIDABLE TASK, AND YOU SUCCEEDED.

YOU HAVE MY PROFOUND GRATITUDE AND ADMIRATION, AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I AM SURE THESE SENTIMENTS ARE SHARED BY THE PEOPLES OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN PARTICULAR, AND BY ALL MEN OF GOOD WILL EVERYWHERE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU TOMORROW. SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. END QUOTE. RUSK

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1967 NOV 30 22 27

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PAGE 01 STATE 77197

81
ORIGIN SS 35

INFO CCO 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, /035 R

DRAFTED BY: S/S: BHREAD
APPROVED BY: S/S-MR. READ
WHITE HOUSE-MR. SMITH/MR. JONES

O R 302121Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0458
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0220
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0654
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0994

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 77197

EXDIS

FOR VANCE

TOVAN 44

WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD ARRANGE YOUR DEPARTURE
FROM ATHENS BY 12:30 P.M. EST IN ORDER TO PERMIT 1330 TENTATIVE
APPOINTMENT FOR YOU WITH THE PRESIDENT. RUSK

Rusk

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-1-03*

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~~SECRET~~ 599

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44

ORIGIN SS 80

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /081 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:JJSISCO
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
U: THE UNDERSECRETARY
S/S: MR. READ
NEA: MR. BATTLE

Z 301612Z NOV 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0454
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 0651
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1378
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0217
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0363
USCINCEUR
USMISSION NATO 0582
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0986

~~SECRET~~ STATE 77024

LIMDIS

TOVAN 41

1. THE FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPEAL
TO THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH AMB GOLDBERG WILL TRY TO GET SECRETARY

PAGE 2 RUEHC 77024 ~~SECRET~~
GENERAL TO ISSUE TODAY, AFTER CONCERTING WITH HIM AND THREE

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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PARTIES CONCERNED.

QUOTE. ON NOVEMBER 24 I EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE UN THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE ORGANS TO DO ALL IT CAN TO REVERSE THE TREND TOWARD WAR RESULTING FROM THE CYPRUS QUESTION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET AND ON NOV25 CALLED UPON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED "TO SHOW THE UTMOST MODERATION AND RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS AND CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE PEACE." THE SECURITY COUNCIL FURTHER REQUESTED ALL CONCERNED "URGENTLY TO ASSIST AND COOPERATE IN KEEPING THE PEACE AND ARRIVING AT A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 4 MARCH 1964."

IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS AND THE CONTINUING TENSION IN THE AREA, AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, I NOW URGE THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EACH OTHER AND OF CYPRUS, AND AS A FIRST STEP ALONG THE LINES OF MY PREVIOUS

PAGE 3 RUEHC 77024 ~~SECRET~~

APPEAL TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE FORCES IN EXCESS OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK CONTINENTS.

"IN ADDITION UNFICYP UNDER ITS EXISTING MANDATE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO UNDERTAKE AN ENHANCED AND BROADER PACIFICATION ROLE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT OF ALL FORCES CONSTITUTED AFTER 1963 AND NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNAL SECURITY INCLUDING THE SAFETY OF ALL CITIZENS." UNQUOTE. RUSK

SECRET



Department of State

NSC
TELEGRAM

111 30

~~SECRET~~ 460

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85

ORIGIN SS 35

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /035 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:LDBATTLE:CTF:DAWEHMEYER
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE: MR. ROSTOW (TEXT BELOW)
S/S:MR. READ

Z 282029Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0433
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0631

~~SECRET~~ STATE 75628

EXDIS

TOVAN 35

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT SUNAY
IS FOR DELIVERY IF AND ONLY IF GOVERNMENT OF GREECE REJECTS
NEW FOUR-POINT TURKISH POSITION, AND THEN UNDER THE FOLLOWING
CONDITIONS:

(1) VANCE MAY USE IN HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE RETURNS TO ANKARA,
OR

PAGE 2 RUEHC 75628 ~~SECRET~~

(2) AMBASSADOR HART MAY DELIVER IF HE DETERMINES THAT GOT
MAY RESORT TO FORCE BEFORE VANCE RETURNS TO ANKARA. VANCE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-237
By ns NARA, Date 6-5-03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 75628

MAY MAKE CHANGES IN TEXT TO FIT THE SITUATION PREVAILING
UPON HIS RETURN TO TURKEY.

TEXT OF MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: HIS EXCELLENCY
CEVDET SUNAY
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I KNOW THESE ARE TRYING HOURS FOR YOU.

I RECALL OUR WORDS WHEN YOU WERE LAST IN WASHINGTON. AT THAT
TIME I ENDEAVORED TO MAKE CLEAR TO YOU MY PERSONAL REGARD FOR
YOU AND FOR THE TURKISH PEOPLE. THAT HIGH REGARD WAS A FACTOR
IN MY SENDING MR. VANCE TO YOU AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE HOPES THAT HE COULD ASSIST YOU AT THIS TIME.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 75628 ~~SECRET~~

WE HAVE URGED AND BROUGHT ABOUT CONSIDERABLE CONCESSIONS ON THE
PART OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME I MUST SAY
IN ALL FRANKNESS THE TURKISH POSITION APPEARS TO HAVE HARDENED. EVEN
SO,
WE ARE TRYING.

MY REPORTS FROM MR. VANCE INDICATE THAT HE STILL HAS HOPES
OF RECONCILING THE POSITIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES AND I
CALL UPON YOU AS A FRIEND AND VALUED ALLY TO ALLOW HIM ADEQUATE
TIME TO ESTABLISH WHETHER SUCH A RECONCILIATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.
IN THE SAME SPIRIT, I ASK YOU TO LEND YOUR WISDOM TO THESE
EFFORTS. IN MY OPINION, WE ARE CLOSE TO FINDING A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION, AND HISTORY WOULD NOT FORGIVE ANY OF US IF WE FAIL
TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A SOLUTION WHEN THE ALTERNATIVE IS WAR
WITH ALL OF ITS CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES.

WITH SINCERE BEST WISHES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. UNQUOTE. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

112/43

~~SECRET~~ 959

PAGE 01 STATE 75139

81
ORIGIN SS 35

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /035 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA: STEWART ROCKWELL
APPROVED BY: NEA: MR. ROCKWELL
S/S: MR. MEEHAN
CTF: MR. MORRIS DRAPER

O 272144Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0417
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0613
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0188
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1267
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0314
CINCEUR
USMISSION NATO 0506
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0916

~~SECRET~~ STATE 75139

EXDIS

TOVAN 31

1. WHAT IS UNDERSTANDING YOU AND AMBASSADOR TALBOT OF PRESENT
ATTITUDE GOG TOWARD NECESSITY GOC AGREEMENT TO CURRENT FORMULA TO

PAGE 2 RUEHC 75139 ~~SECRET~~
END CRISIS? IF AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN GOG AND GOT, WOULD
GOG BE PREPARED IMPLEMENT (A) IF MAKARIOS APPROVED; (B) IF HE
ACQUIESCED WITHOUT FORMALLY AGREEING OR OPPOSING? RUSK

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26

~~SECRET~~ 697

2

PAGE 01 STATE 74834

47
ORIGIN SS 35

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /035 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA: SW ROCKWELL; L/EUR: EBERLACK; EUR/RPM: JIGETZ
APPROVED BY: NEA: STUART W. ROCKWELL
EUR: MR. STOESSEL
S/S: MR. MEEHAN

O 251938Z NOV 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0397
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0593
USMISSION NATO 0477

~~SECRET~~ STATE 74834

EXDIS

NATUS
TOVAN 20

SUBJECT: CYPRUS

REF: ATHENS 2419

1. YOUR ANSWER TO FIRST QUESTION WAS ACCURATE REFLECTION OF
US UNWILLINGNESS TO USE ARMED FORCE IN CIRCUMSTANCES POSED BY

PAGE 2 RUEHC 74834 ~~SECRET~~
KING. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE IN LEGAL DIALOGUE
WITH GREEKS INVOLVING ARTICLE 5 OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

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PAGE 02 STATE 74834

2. WITH REGARD TO QUESTION (B) , WE ALSO COMMEND YOUR REPLY AND PREFER NOTHING MORE BE SAID UNLESS KING RAISES MATTER AGAIN.

3. IF HE DOES, YOU COULD SAY THAT PRELIMINARY INFORMAL ESTIMATE HERE IS THAT BULGARIA WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO MOVE FOR SEVERAL REASONS, SUCH AS UNWILLINGNESS USSR GET MILITARILY INVOLVED AND GREECE'S NATO MEMBERSHIP. SAME PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE IS THAT NO IMPORTANT NUMBER OF GREEK ETHNICS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD BE PERSUADED TO MOVE AGAINST MOTHERLAND WHILE IT BEING SUBJECTED TO TURKISH ATTACK. (FYI WE ARE MUCH MORE CONCERNED WITH POSSIBILITY ACCIDENTAL VIOLATIONS OF BULGARIAN TERRITORY RESULTING FROM GREEK-TURKISH HOSTILITIES. END FYI
RUSK

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PAGE 01 STATE 74187

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43
ORIGIN SS 35

057 NOV 21 17 40

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /035 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:MDRAPER
APPROVED BY: S/S:MR. READ
NEA: MR. BATTLE

ag Daumh

Z 241723Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0377
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0577
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0161

~~SECRET~~ STATE 74187

EXDIS

TOVAN 15

1. WE ARE URGENTLY SEEKING TO HAVE U THANT MAKE APPEAL TO GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS NOT TO INITIATE MILITARY ACTION BUT TO HAVE FULL RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR PRESERVATION OF PEACE. U THANT WOULD STATE THAT IF GOG, GOT AND GOC IMMEDIATELY AGREE TO WITHDRAW OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM CYPRUS ABOVE LEVELS STIPULATED IN LONDON-ZURICH ACCORDS, PEACE WILL BE SAVED. WITHDRAWAL

PAGE 2 RUEHC 74187 ~~SECRET~~
WOULD HAVE TO COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY.

2. WE WOULD SEEK TO HAVE APPEAL ENDORSED BY ALL POSSIBLE

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PAGE 02 STATE 74187

GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ALL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, NATO, UNFICYP CONTRIBUTORS.

DETAILS IN SEPTELS. RUSK

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115
TELEGRAM

Ed Roberts

48

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154

PAGE 01 STATE 73698

85

ORIGIN SS 80

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, /080 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA TASK FORCE: MDRAPER

APPROVED BY: NEA TF: MDRAPER

S/S: READ

P: MCCLOSKEY

Z O 230030Z NOV 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0345
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0528
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0140
AMEMBASSY ROME 0483
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 0404
USDOCOAIRSOUTH
CINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0825
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0056
AMCONSUL IZMIR 0037
AMCONSUL ADANA 0032
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0021
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0260
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1149
SIXTHATAF
USDOCOSOUTH
CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMFA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0368

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 73698

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: VANCE MISSION

1. BECAUSE TURKEY AND GREECE HAVE ACCEPTED PROPOSAL TO SEND PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY, FOLLOWING WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE WILL BE MADE ON OR AFTER 1915 E.S.T.:

IN FURTHERANCE OF EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS TO DISCOVER A PEACEFUL WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION OF TENSION AND TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF WAR FROM THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS TODAY SENDING MR. CYRUS VANCE TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE. A SIMILAR CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS MAY BE ARRANGED.

A PROMINENT NEW YORK ATTORNEY AT PRESENT, MR. VANCE WAS UNTIL

PAGE 3 RUEHC 73698 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
JULY 1, 1967 THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

MR. VANCE DEPARTED NEW YORK BY A SPECIAL AIR MISSION AIRCRAFT AT 7:15 P.M., E.S.T., FOR ANKARA. HE IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE THERE THURSDAY MORNING. FROM ANKARA, MR. VANCE WILL FLY TO ATHENS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE. RUSK

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PER S/S-O.

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Department of State

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SUMMARY

116
48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 153

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ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO EUR 20, IO 15, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03,
SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, H 02, L 03, P 04, CIA 04, INR 07, NSAE 00, AID 30,
ACDA 16, DOD 01, 154 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/GRK: MKMITCHELL
APPROVED BY: NEA/GRK: MR. BREWSTER
NEA/MR. ROCKWELL

Z O 222348Z NOV 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 0343
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0526
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0138
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0824
USMISSION NATO 0401
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0259
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1148

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 73688

1. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION GREEK REPLY
TO TURKISH NOTE OF NOV 17. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS GREEK REPLY
DELIVERED TURK FONMIN ANKARA MORNING NOV 22 LOCAL. QUOTE

2. "THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF THE NOTE VERBALE
OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1967 WHICH IT HAS
STUDIED WITH THE GREATEST ATTENTION."

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NLJ 04-76

By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 73688

PAGE 2 RUEHC 73688 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS OF THE OPINION THAT BEFORE ARRIVING AT ANY CONCLUSION NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED ON ANY SIDE WITH THE VIEW TO PROCEEDING WITH ATTENTION AND WISDOM TO A DETAILED AND OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLICATED QUESTIONS WHICH ARE POSED.

4. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SHARES THE VIEWPOINT OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVES THAT THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 15 AND 16 ON CYPRUS HAVE DEMONSTRATED ONCE MORE HOW PRECARIOUS PEACE IS ON THIS ISLAND. IT IS THEREFORE OF THE OPINION THAT FOR THIS REASON PRECISELY IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO EXCLUDE ACTIONS THAT MIGHT AUSE A MORE GENERAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS.

5. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN THESE DIFFICULT MOMENTS IS TO FACE THE EVENTS WITH COOLNESS AND TO SEEK UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALL THE INTERES ED PARTIES FOR THE PEACEFUL SET LEMENT OF THE DIFFERENCES WHICH ARISE.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 73688 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN ITS NOTE GIVES AN INEXACT AND IN ANY EVENT INCOMPLETE PICTURE OF EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE RECENTLY. NOTABLY, IT DOES NOT MENTION THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT THAT THESE EVENTS HAD THEIR CHRONOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE IN THE ATTEMPT OF MR. DENKTASH TO DISEMBARK CLANDESTINELY ON THE ISLAND AND IN THE NATURAL REACTION WHICH THIS EVENT CAUSED AMONG GREEK CYPRIOTS. IT IS NOT CORRECT THAT THE CYPRIOT FORCES UNDERTOOK AN ATTACK AGAINST THE TURKISH SECTOR. WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT PATROLS, WHOSE LEGITIMACY UNFICYP HAS NOT CONTESTED, WERE CARRIED OUT. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION MOREOVER OF PATROLLING THE TURKISH SECTOR BUT RATHER THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPURS OVER WHICH THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT HAS THE RIGHT AND THE OBLIGATION TO EXERCISE ITS LEGITIMATE SOVEREIGNTY INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF POLICE CONTROL AND OF CONDUCT OF PATROLS. IT IS ON THE OTHER HAND UNDENIABLE (HAVING BEEN CONFIRMED BY UNFICYP) THAT THE CYPRIOT PATROL WAS ATTACKED BY

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PAGE 03 STATE 73688

TURKISH CYPRIOTS LYING IN AMBUSH AND THAT THE CYPRIOT PATROL HAD TO RESORT TO ITS RIGHT OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE.

7. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT CANNOT SHARE THE VIEWPOINT

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OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE SUI GENERIS CONDITIONS OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE. ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS ARE ON THE CONTRARY PROVEN BY THE FACT, RECOGNIZED EVEN IN THE TURKISH NOTE, THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS DUE TO ITS IMMEDIATE AND ENERGETIC INTERVENTION ALL AROUND. IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW THIS INTERVENTION OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT CAN BE INTERPRETED IN A WAY TO IMPUTE TO IT RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVENTS. IN ANY EVENT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PAINED AND SADDENED BY THESE BLODDY EVENTS WHICH IT DISAPPROVES OF IN THE CONVICTION THAT DIFFERENCES BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

8. MANY TIMES THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED WHILE FURNISHING CONCRETE PROOF THAT IT WISHES AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES AND THAT IT TRIES PARTICULARLY TO STRENGTHEN AND DEVELOP EVEN MORE ITS RELATIONS WITH ALLIED COUNTRIES INCLUDING TURKEY. INSPIRED ALWAYS BY THESE PRINCIPLES THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WISHES AND IS READY TO SEEK SETTLEMENT OF THE CURRENT CYPRUS CRISIS BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND BY UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 73688 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS OF THE OPINION THAT EFFICACIOUS MEASURES MUST BE SOUGHT FOR THE PROTECTION AND THE SECURITY OF THE TWO ELEMENTS COEXISTING IN CYPRUS AND TOWARDS THIS END IT IS READY TO EXAMINE IN CONCERT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND CYPRUS THIS PRIME QUESTION. THE FIRST INDISPENSABLE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE THE CESSATION OF PROVOCATIONS, SUSPENSION OF MILITARY MEASURES, MODERATION OF PRESS COMMENT AND EVENTUALLY OTHER PACIFICATION MEASURES IN CYPRUS. FURTHER

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THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE SHOULD FOLLOW IN RAPID SUCCESSION DISCUSSION AND SOLUTION OF THE THORNY QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE CYPRUS CRISIS AND WHICH POISONED GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE QUESTION TO ASSURE THE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF THE TWO ELEMENTS IN THE ISLAND. IN THE OPINION OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THESE MEASURES SHOULD IN ANY EVENT CONFORM TO THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

10. THE RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS WOULD THEN PERMIT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ACT IN ACCORD WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

PAGE 6 RUEHC 73688 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO WORK OUT A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRIOT QUESTION SERVING AS BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL AND FRUITFUL COEXISTENCE OF THE TWO ELEMENTS ON THE ISLAND.

11. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WHATEVER ITS ASPIRATIONS THE GREEK GOVERNMENT COULD NOT HOWEVER ENGAGE IN SUCH NEGOTIATION UNDER PRESSURE.

12. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT CANNOT ENVISAGE AN EVENTUALITY IN WHICH A GOVERNMENT SINCERELY DEDICATED TO PEACE AND DESIRING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PRESENT DIFFERENCES COULD REJECT THIS PROCEDURE WITHOUT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DANGEROUS AGGREGATION OF THE SITUATION. UNQUOTE. RUSK

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TELEGRAM
45

~~SECRET~~ 474

PAGE 01 STATE 73078

88
ORIGIN SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, /070 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/SWROCKWELL
APPROVED BY: NEA-AMB, BATTLE
S/S- MR KELLY
WHITE HOUSE- MR. ROSTOW

O 220216Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0323

~~SECRET~~ STATE 73078

LIMDIS

ATHENS 2294.

WHILE OBVIOUSLY WE DO NOT WISH PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION TO CONSTANTINE AND SUNAY, WE DO NOT AT THIS POINT WISH ENCOURAGE SUCH APPROACH. AT PRESENT STAGE WE DO NOT WISH INVOLVE OURSELVES SO DEEPLY AS THIS, AND WE ALSO UNCERTAIN WHETHER SUNAY WOULD ACCEPT SUCH INVITATION. IF MATTER RAISED AGAIN BY KING ON SIMILAR TENTATIVE BASIS SUGGEST YOU ENDEAVOR DISCOURAGE BY BRINGING UP OTHER POSSIBLE CONCEPTS SUCH AS USE OF BROGIO, UN REP, DIRECT GREEK-TURKISH MEETING, ETC.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 73078 ~~SECRET~~
WE DO NOT WANT TO PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION AT THIS POINT BUT NEITHER DO WE WISH TO SEE IDEA SNOWBALL TO STAGE WHERE FORMAL SUGGESTION MADE AND WHERE WE MIGHT BE FACED WITH REQUIREMENT OF TUNRING THIS DOWN. GP-3. RUSK

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By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-11-03

Jim/
Break down on potential
Evacuees from Cyprus, Turkey &
Greece.

CYPRUS-

NICOSIA- 1,335

North Coast - 165

Evacuees from Nicosia would either
fly out by charter flight or else go
overland to RAF Station for flight out.
The 165 on coast would go by sea.

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PAGE 01 STATE 71799

92

ORIGIN NEA 15

1967 NOV 18 23 40

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RSC 01,L 03,H 02,P 04,CIA 04,INR 07,NSAE 00,AID 30,NIC 01,SCA 02,
SCS 04,0 02,SY 03,PER 02,FBO 01,OPR 02,OC 06,CCO 00,DOD 01,/146 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP:RFOLSOM

APPROVED BY: NEA:RFOLSOM

NEA-MR. BATTLE, JCS(INFORMED), OSD:ISA(INFORMED), WLG-OKAYED

O 182308Z NOV 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0268
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0444
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0011
AMCONSUL IZMIR 0023
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0043
AMCONSUL ADANA 0017
INFO CINCEUR
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0305
AMEMBASSY ROME 0442

~~SECRET~~ STATE 71799

UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE OBJECTION, RECOMMENDED INITIATE WARNING
PHASE ONE E AND E PLAN. SUBMIT TELEGRAPHICALLY ESTIMATE NUMBER
POTENTIAL EVACUEES.

GP-2. RUSK

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TURKEY

5,000 in Ankara
3,000 in Adana
4,000 in Istanbul
• 300 in Izmir.

12,300

The evacuees from Turkey would fly out, however, evacuees from Izmir & Adana would have problems if hostilities broke out. Both cities have Turkish air force bases which would be used for an attack against Greece. Also the fields would also be under Greek attack.

GREECE

6,500 in Athens
1,000 in Salonika
600 in Crete.

8,100

In addition there are 12,000 Greek-Americans who would probably remain in Greece.



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 52666

47

ORIGIN EA 19

INFO NEA 19, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04
CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, NSAE 00, SAH 03, SAL 01, IO 21, AID 30,
EUR 25, /203 R

DRAFTED BY: DOD/ISA: CAPT. HOLLYFIELD
APPROVED BY: NEA/GRK: H. DANIEL BREWSTER
EA: PHCHADBOURN, JR.
NEA: LUCIUS D. BATTLE
S/S: MR. MEEHAN
DOD/ISA: MR. SCHWARTZ, MR. STEADMAN
WHITE HOUSE: MR. ROSTOW

EA: MR. HABIB

R 120048Z OCT 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0105
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON 1027
USCINCEUR
CHJUSMAGG ATHENS GREECE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 52666

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: ATHENS 1552

1. QUESTION OF POSSIBLE GREEK MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO VIETNAM BY THIS GREEK REGIME POSES AWKWARD PROBLEM FOR US IF IT IS SUPPOSED TO BE LINKED TO A US QUID PRO QUO. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE LONG THOUGHT GREEKS COULD AND SHOULD MAKE LARGER EFFORT IN VIETNAM, BUT WE ARE NOT INTERESTED NOW BECAUSE WE COULD NOT LET ANY CONTRIBUTION AFFECT OUR POSTURE TOWARD PRESENT

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NLJ/RAC 04-71

By no, NARA, Date 10-7-04

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PAGE 02 STATE 52666

PAGE 2 RUEHC 52666 ~~SECRET~~

GOVERNMENT. WE ASSUME FROM YOUR REPORT THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WAS ESSENTIALLY PROBING AS TO WHETHER SUCH AN OFFER WOULD SPECIFICALLY ENSURE REINSTATEMENT OF MILITARY AID AS WELL AS HELP EARN THEM WARMER US SUPPORT. WE BELIEVE THEREFOR THAT YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE INITIATIVE IN PROBING THIS QUESTION WITH GOG BUT AWAIT FURTHER GREEK APPROACHES.

2. IF GOG RAISES SUBJECT AGAIN YOU MIGHT SUGGEST A MEDICAL TEAM SUCH AS IRANIANS AND SPANIARDS NOW HAVE IN VIETNAM OR ANY OTHER KIND OF CIVILIAN ENDEAVOR IN WHICH GREEKS MAY HAVE A PARTICULAR TALENT GP-3 RUSK

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 37758

3

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP: JEHORNER
APPROVED BY: NEA: STUART W. ROCKWELL
NEA/TURK- MR. HOWISON
NEA/GRK- MR. BREWSTER
S/S- MR. HOUDEK

R 150019Z SEP 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0378
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0642
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0278
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1272
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1140

~~SECRET~~ STATE 37758

EXDIS

NATUS

REF: ATHENS 1266: ANKARA'S 1220.

1. WHILE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT EXPECTED WEEKEND TALKS BETWEEN GREEK AND TURK PRIME MINISTERS WOULD LEAD TO IMMEDIATE OR DRAMATIC RESULTS, WE ARE DISAPPOINTED LEARN THAT TWO PARTIES

PAGE 2 RUEHC 37758 ~~SECRET~~

WERE SO FAR APART. WE HAD FELT EARLIER TOUMBAS-CAGLAYANGIL

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Authority FRV.S. 64-68, 16#302

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By jc NARA, Date 12-1-03



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 37758

CONVERSATIONS WERE LEADING IN DIRECTION "COMPENSATED ENOSIS" AND HAD BELIEVED GOG WILLINGNESS OFFER GOT SOVEREIGN BASE AREA ON CYPRUS WOULD BE MAIN INGREDIENT IN TURKISH ACCEPTANCE ENOSIS. ON OTHER HAND, GREEK DELEGATION PROBABLY WENT KESAN/ALEXANDROPOLIS MEETING WITH SOMEWHAT EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS. ONE CAN SPECULATE THAT BECOMING AWARE OF GREEK JUNTA'S DESIRE ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT FOR POLITICAL REASONS. GOT HAS SOMEWHAT RAISED ITS PRICE FOR AGREEMENT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE VIEW EMBASSIES ATHENS AND ANKARA THIS POINT.

2. WE ARE CONCERNED LEST THIS SETBACK COULD LEAD TO LOSS MOMENTUM AND DISSIPATION OF FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAS EXISTED. BOTH SIDES SEEM BE WEARY OF PROLONGED STALEMATE SINCE DECEMBER 1963. IN TALKING WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GOG AND GOT, WE HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT PRIME MINISTERIAL MEETING, ALTHOUGH LACKING IN CONCRETE RESULTS, REPRESENTS ACT OF STATESMANSHIP AND SINCERE ENDEAVOR TO FRANKLY COME TO GRIPS WITH CYPRUS PROBLEM. WE HOPE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WILL AVOID TAKING RIGID OR

PAGE 3 RUEHC 37758 ~~SECRET~~

INTRANSIGENT POSITIONS, AND WILL NOT RAKE OVER PAST GRIEVANCES. IMPORTANT THING NOW IS THAT TALKS CONTINUE, AND THAT REAL EFFORT BE MADE COMPROMISE ON DIFFERENCES WHICH, IF SUBSTANTIAL DO NOT SEEM BE IRRECONCILABLE. GP-3 RUSK

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PAGE 01 STATE 37293

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ORIGIN SS 70

INFO /070 R

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By iss, NARA, Date 10-5-04

DRAFTED BY: NEA:SWROCKWELL
APPROVED BY: NEA: SWROCKWELL
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS
NEA-MR. BATTLE
S/S - MR. MR. MEEHAN

.....
P 141501Z SEP 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0377

~~SECRET~~ STATE 37293

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ROCKWELL

1. AT HIS REQUEST GREEK CHARGE SAW ME PRIVATELY THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS HIS CONCERN OVER CHALMERS ROBERTS STORY IN WASHINGTON "POST" SEPTEMBER 12 DERIVED FROM SENATE SOURCE AND QUOTING KING AS HAVING SAID DURING MEETING WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT CURRENT GOG WAS NOT HIS GOVERNMENT. CHARGE EXPRESSED VIEW, WHICH WE GATHER IS THAT OF KING, THAT THIS STORY MAKES HIM APPEAR TO DISAVOW THE GOVERNMENT AND WILL MAKE SERIOUS TROUBLE FOR HIM WITH COUP GROUP. CHARGE ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT THERE WAS ANYTHING USG COULD DO SUCH AS YOUR POINTING OUT IN

PAGE 2 RUEHC 37293 ~~SECRET~~
ATHENS THAT ROBERTS MISINTERPRETED THE KING'S REMARK WHICH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 37293

WAS LIMITED TO MEANING THAT GOVERNMENT WAS NOT HIS IN SENSE THAT HE HAD NOT APPOINTED IT.

2. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD COMPLICATE MATTERS FOR AN AMERICAN SPOKESMAN TO MAKE THIS POINT AND THAT KING WAS BEST INTERPRETER OF HIS OWN WORDS. I SHOWED CHARGE SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF REGRET THAT OFF-THE-RECORD CHARACTER OF MEETING HAD BEEN VIOLATED WHICH PAPADOPOULOS HAD NOT SEEN AND BELIEVED WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ATHENS. I REITERATED VIEW WHICH WAS CONVEYED TO PAPAGOS YESTERDAY THAT PUBLIC EFFORT TO CLARIFY KING'S REMARKS IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD ONLY MAKE MATTERS WORSE.

3. THERE IS NO DOUBT KING IS EMBARRASSED BY THIS INCIDENT. HE HAS INDIRECTLY SUGGESTED TO US THAT USG SHOULD PUT OUT OFFICIAL INFORMATION TO EFFECT THAT HE REQUESTED RESUMPTION MILITARY AID AND SOME ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN ORDER COUNTERACT IMPRESSION HE DISAVOWED GOG DURING SENATE MEETING. SINCE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW ANY SUCH STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE OUR CONSTANT POSITION THAT LIFTING OF SUSPENSION MAP ITEMS

PAGE 3 RUEHC 37293 ~~SECRET~~

LINKED WITH CONCRETE EVIDENCE FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALISM, OCCURS TO US THAT BEST WAY TO HELP KING IN THIS PREDICAMENT MIGHT BE FOR YOU CASUALLY TO LET APPROPRIATE GREEK AUTHORITIES KNOW THAT KING FAR FROM DISAVOWING GOG HAD ON ITS BEHALF REQUESTED LIFTING SUSPENSION MAP ITEMS AND SOME ECONOMIC AID WHILE IN WASHINGTON. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS.

GP-3.

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2- *Ret.*
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INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

September 13, 1967

BY *W* ON 10-16-91

Date

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

OK -
note one minor editorial
change in para. 1
HHS

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Robert C. Fendler
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Amembassy ATHENS

Chd w/ Jan Jensen
10:30 9/14 RB

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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ROCKWELL
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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By isa, NARA, Date 10-5-04

1. At his request Greek Charge saw me privately this morning to discuss his concern over Chalmers Roberts story in Washington "Post" September 12 derived from Senate source and quoting King as having said during meeting with Senate Foreign Relations Committee that current GOG was not his government. Charge expressed view, which we gather is that of King, that this story makes him appear to disavow the government and will make serious trouble for him with coup group. Charge asked whether I thought there was anything USG could do such as your pointing out in Athens that Roberts misinterpreted the King's remarks which was limited to meaning that government was not his in sense that he had not appointed it.

2. I said that I thought it would complicate matters for an American spokesman to make this point and that King was best

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NEA - SWRockwell

~~XXXX~~ WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Saunders (Substance)

~~XXXXXX~~ NEA - Mr. Battle S/S -

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interpreter of his own words. I showed Charge Senator Fulbright's public expression of regret that off-the-record character of meeting had been violated which Papadopoulos had not seen and believed would be helpful in Athens. I reiterated view which was conveyed to Papagos yesterday that public effort to clarify King's remarks in this country would only make matters worse.

3. There is no doubt King is embarrassed by this incident. He has indirectly suggested to us that USG should put out official information to effect that he requested resumption military aid and some economic assistance in order counteract impression he disavowed GOG during Senate meeting. Since from our point of view any such statement would have to include our constant position that lifting of suspension MAP items linked with concrete evidence further progress toward return to constitutionalism, ~~otherwise~~ occurs to us that best way to help King in this predicament might be for you casually to let appropriate Greek authorities know that King far from disavowing GOG had on its behalf requested lifting suspension MAP items and some economic aid while in Washington. Would appreciate your views.

GP-3

END



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85

ORIGIN NEA 19

INFO SS 35, NSC 10, GPM 03, SP 02, SC 01, H 02, P 04, USIA 12, CIA 04, RSC 01,
NSAE 00, INR 07, DOD 01, AID 30, /131 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/GRK: HDBREWSTER
APPROVED BY: NEA/GRK: BREWSTER
NEA: ROCKWELL
WHITE HOUSE: SAUNDERS
S/S: MEEHAN

R 132356Z SEP 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0374

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 36985

1. KING CONSTANTINE'S PRIVATE VISIT WENT OFF IN GOOD ORDER AND WAS PLAYED IN LOW KEY. HE HAD HALF-HOUR PRIVATELY WITH PRESIDENT FOLLOWED BY LUNCH AT WHICH SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS WERE NOT DISCUSSED. AFTER SANDWICHING IN VISIT TO LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND SMITHSONIAN, KING ATTENDED COFFEE HOSTED BY SENATE FOREIGN REALTIONS COMMITTEE. THERE KING MADE BRIEF STATEMENT CONCERNING SITUATION IN GREECE AND MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. HE STRESSED FORWARD MOTION BEING MADE BY GOVERNMENT AND ASKED FOR SENATORS' "PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING" IN FACING GREEK PROBLEMS AND IN WORKING TOWARDS GOALS WHICH WERE IN BEST INTERESTS OF GREEK PEOPLE.
2. THERE WAS NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO AID OTHER THAN WHEN KING

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By jc, NARA, Date 12/1/03

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PAGE 02 STATE 36985

PAGE 2 RUEHC 36985 C ~~ON F I D E N T I A L~~

NOTED NEED TO KEEP UP DEFENSES OF GREECE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF NATO. IN RESPONSE TO ONE QUESTION AS TO WHOM US ARMS WOULD BE USED AGAINST, HE SAID "ENEMIES OF US." GENERAL TENOR OF QUESTIONING WAS NOT HOSTILE AND HE ACQUITTED HIMSELF WELL, FIELDING QUESTIONS IN VERY DIRECT AND ALERT FASHION.

3. REFERRING TO CYPRUS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION RAISED BY SENATOR AIKEN, KING REPLIED THAT GREEK SIDE VERY MUCH HOPED FOR PROGRESS ON THIS SUBJECT AND HE HAD PRESSED FOR MEETING AT PRIME MINISTER LEVEL. GREEK EXPECTATIONS HAD BEEN HIGH FOR SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF SEPTEMBER 9-10 MEETINGS BECAUSE GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO OFFER MORE THAN ANY PREVIOUS GREEK GOVERNMENT IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN ENOSIS WITH COMPENSATIONS. HE WAS SORRY TO HEAR THAT MEETING HAD NOT PRODUCED RESULTS.

4. THIS MORNING PAPAGOS CALLED FROM NEWPORT TO EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS AT CHALMERS ROBERTS STORY BASED ON SENATE SOURCE HEADLINED "GREEK KING SETS HIMSELF APART FROM MILITARY JUNTA AT ATHENS." BUT AFTER CHAT ON GENERAL PRESS ASPECTS OF VISIT AND FACT THAT ATTEMPTING TO DENY STORY WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 36985 C ~~ON F I D E N T I A L~~
MATTER WAS DROPPED.

GP-3. RUSK

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SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 10-16-91

September 12, 1967

Date

OK with
deletion
HHS noted.

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Robert C. Fendick
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Clareda/Barbara Young
1600 9/13 RB

Tel to Athens re King Constantin's
Visit.

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Amembassy ATHENS

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03
^{122b}

STATE

1. King Constantine's private visit went off in good order and was played in low key. He had half-hour privately with President followed by lunch at which substantive matters were not discussed. After sandwiching in visit to Lincoln Memorial and Smithsonian, King attended coffee hosted by Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There King made brief statement concerning situation in Greece and made it clear he was fully committed to constitutional reform. He stressed forward motion being made by government and asked for Senators' "patience and understanding" in facing Greek problems and in working towards goals which were in best interests of Greek people.
2. There was no direct reference to aid other than when King noted need to keep up defenses of Greece within framework of NATO. In response to one question as to whom US arms would be used against, he said "enemies of US." General tenor of questioning was not hostile and he acquitted himself well, fielding questions in very direct and alert fashion.
3. Referring to Cyprus in response to question raised by Senator Aiken, King replied that Greek side very much hoped for progress on this subject and he had pressed for meeting at Prime Minister level. Greek expectations

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9/12/67

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NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster

NEA - Mr. Rockwell

S/S - Mr. Houdek

WH -

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had been high for successful outcome of September 9-10 meetings because Greek Government was prepared to offer more than any previous Greek Government in effort to obtain enosis with compensations. He was sorry to hear that meeting had not produced results.

~~4. There was further private meeting with President before he took off by helicopter to Andrews and returned to Newport. (Separate message to follow.)~~

4. This morning Papagos called from Newport to express unhappiness at Chalmers based on Senate source and Roberts story/headlined "Greek King Sets Himself Apart from Military Junta at Athens," but after chat on general press aspects of visit and fact that attempting to deny story would be counterproductive, matter was dropped.

GP-3

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: IO/SY: KEBROWN
APPROVED BY: NEA/GRK: LMILNER DUNN
NEA/GRK: MISS MITCHELL
S/S: MR GRIBBLE
NEA: MR ROCKWELL

R 010049Z SEP 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0284

~~SECRET~~ STATE 30796

EXDIS

ATHENS 1050

1. MATTER DISCUSSED [REDACTED] AND AUTHORITY IS GRANTED FOR
GENERAL SWEEP AS REQUESTED. HOWEVER, USE OF SOPHISTICATED
OR CLASSIFIED COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT NOT APPROVED. MASON
RECEIVER KIT SHOULD BE ADEQUATE.

3.3 (b)(1)

2. FYI UNDERSTAND [REDACTED] FURNISHED GOG WITH TECHNICAL GEAR.
[REDACTED] SHOULD BE KNOWLEDGEABLE. END FYI

"

3. PARA 2 INDICATES [REDACTED] AND SY REGIONAL OFFICES POSSESS

"

PAGE 2 RUEHC 30796 ~~SECRET~~
CAPABILITY. SY HAS NO OBJECTION TO POST REQUESTING SERVICES

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NLJ 09-281

By isl NARA, Date 1-20-11

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PAGE 02 STATE 30796

OF A TECHNICAL SECURITY OFFICER, IN VIEW OF SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL
BEIRUT, ASSISTANCE, IF DESIRED, SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM RTC
FRANKFURT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 29800

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY NEAGRK:MKMITCHELL
APPROVED BY NEAGRK:LMDUNN
NEA:ROCKWELL
SY:LYNCH
S/S:GRIBBLE

P 302256Z AUG 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0273

~~SECRET~~ STATE 29800

EXDIS

REF: ATHENS 1047

1. SY OFFICER WHO INTERVIEWED FORMER GREEK POLICE OFFICER, NOW HOT-DOG PEDDLER, LONG ISLAND, HAS REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:

2. SUBJECT INTERVIEWED SAID THAT HE WROTE COUSIN WHO IS GREEK SECURITY OFFICER CONCERNING AGITATION IN NEW YORK CITY AGAINST KING. SUBJECT REFERRED TO GREEK-AUSTRALIAN RADIO SPEAKER ON NEW YORK GREEK-LANGUAGE STATION AND INFLAMMATORY REMARKS CARRIED IN NEW YORK GREEK QTE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 29800 ~~SECRET~~
LEFTIST UNQTE PAPER CAMPANA. SUBJECT HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMA-

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NLJ 04-76

By 122, NARA, Date 10-5-04



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PAGE 02 STATE 29800

TION ABOUT PLOTS AGAINST KING AND CLAIMED HE HAD NOT WRITTEN
OF ANY THREATS AGAINST KING'S LIFE.

GP-3. RUSK

EXD-15

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By isa, NARA, Date 10-5-04

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:GRK:MKMITCHELL
APPROVED BY: NEA/GRK: L.M. DUNN
NEA: MR. ROCKWELL
S/S: MGRIBBLE
SY: MR. GRINON (SUBS)

P 290026Z AUG 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0256

~~SECRET~~ STATE 28361

EXDIS

ATHENS 1047

1. DISCUSSED CONTENTS REFTEL WITH SY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING OFFICERS DETAILED KING NEW YORK. THEY ARE TAKING STEPS INTERVIEW FORMER GREEK POLICE OFFICER LONG ISLAND. IN GENERAL THEY COMMITTED TO RCMP CANADA TO ASSIST LATTER WHEREVER INDICATED.

2. EMBASSY MAY WISH REASSURE GOG AUTHORITIES THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS WERE TAKEN TO PROTECT KING NEW YORK, AND THEY SUCCESSFUL ALSO IN WARDING OFF OR AVOIDING PICKETS AND DEMONSTRATORS. SAME STRINGENT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN

PAGE 2 RUEHC 28361 ~~SECRET~~
NEWPORT AND WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, IF GOG STILL WISHES SEND ADDITIONAL SECURITY OFFICER, DECISION UP TO THEM.

GP-3. RUSK

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82
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:GRK: H D BREWSTER
APPROVED BY: NEA: MR ROCKWELL
S/S: MR BROWN

R 082314Z AUG 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0085

~~SECRET~~ STATE 17826

EXDIS

ATHENS 684

WE ENDORSE LINE YOU HAVE TAKEN WITH KING REGARDING POSSIBLE
CONFRONTATION. WE HOPE YOU CAN CONTINUE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS ALONG
LINES PARA 3 REFTEL AS PLANS FOR INFORMAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON
TAKE SHAPE.

GP-3. RUSK

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NLJ 04-76
By iss, NARA, Date 10-5-04

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REF: ATHENS 3237

1. WHILE I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT OUR ONLY PUBLIC COMMENT SHOULD BE THAT WE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF KING'S MOVE AND WE NOT REPEAT NOT INVOLVED IN COUNTERCOUP, THIS LINE MAY NOT HOLD IF LIVELY SPECULATION BEGINS TO BUILD UP ABOUT SIGNIFICANCE OF MY TWO MEETINGS WITH KING IN HIS LAST TWELVE HOURS IN ATHENS. IN THAT EVENT DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO TRY TO HEAD OFF STORIES BY DEEP BACKGROUNDING KEY INTERESTED CORRESPONDENTS. PERTINENT POINTS COULD BE: (A) KORIZI (LADY-IN-WAITING) DINNER INVITATION FOR DECEMBER 12 HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ME ABOUT TWO WEEKS EARLIER, BUT ONLY ON AFTERNOON OF 12TH DID I LEARN KING AND QUEEN WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT THAT EVENING; (B) AT DINNER PARTY KING AND I HAD NO REPEAT NO CONVERSATION IN ANY WAY SHEDDING LIGHT ON HIS FUTURE PLANS, BUT AT END OF EVENING KING ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM AT TATOI PALACE SHORTLY BEFORE 9:30 FOLLOWING MORNING; (C) ON MY ARRIVAL AT PALACE ON MORNING OF 13TH, KING TOLD ME HE HAD LAUNCHED MOVE TO TAKE OVER GOVERNMENT AND WOULD HIMSELF BE LEAVING PALACE WITHIN MINUTES. (N.B. CONVERSATION LASTED ABOUT 10 MINUTES AND HE GAVE ME NO OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON OPERATION WHICH THEN ALREADY IN PROGRESS); (D) BY TIME I HAD DRIVEN BACK TO CITY AND REACHED EMBASSY, HE WAS PRESUMABLY ALREADY ON HIS WAY.

2. IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY UNFORTUNATE IF ANY OF ABOVE DETAILS CAME OUT, ESPECIALLY WITHOUT PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH KING AND PAPADOPOULOS (WHO ALREADY KNOWS THEM). OBJECT OF BACKGROUNDING WOULD BE TO TURN OFF PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT MY MOVEMENTS ON DECEMBER 12 AND 13 AT THIS SENSITIVE POINT IN PROCESS OF RESUMING OFFICIAL CONTACTS. IF NEW YORK TIMES OR OTHER PRESS COMMENTS STIR NO MORE EXAGGERATED SPECULATION THAN DID DREW

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 3245A ~~SECRET~~
PEARSON PIECE LAST MONTH, I RECOMMEND WE HOLD TO PUBLIC LINE WITHOUT BACKGROUNDING.
GP-3. TALBOT

~~SECRET~~



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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4187
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NODIS

REF: STATE 86367

1. EMBOFF CALLED ON AVEROFF DECEMBER 20 AT RESIDENCE OF BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF REFERENCE TELEGRAM. AVEROFF REVEALED THAT PATTAKOS YESTERDAY (DEC. 19) AND CHIEF OF ATHENS SECURITY TODAY HAD PERSONALLY TOLD HIM BY PHONE THAT HE WAS FREE TO RETURN HOME AND THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO ARREST. THOUGH AVEROFF WAS STILL FEARFUL THAT JUNTA AND PARTICULARLY COLONEL LADAS MIGHT LATER CHANGE ATTITUDE AND SEIZE HIM, HE WAS PLANNING TO RETURN THIS AFTERNOON TO HIS KIFISSIA RESIDENCE.

2. AVEROFF EXPRESSED REGRET THAT USG WAS UNABLE TO REPLY

PAGE 2 RUOMAT 2890A ~~SECRET~~
AFFIRMATIVELY TO HIS REQUEST TO TAKE HIM OUT OF GREECE. HE NOTED THAT AS DEPUTY AND AS FOREIGN MINISTER, HE HAD LONG BEEN STRONG SUPPORTER OF WEST AND U.S. AND THAT, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE HAD TAKEN SIDE OF U.S. ON ISSUES WHICH WERE NOT POPULAR DOMESTICALLY, E.G. NEA MAKRI AND KATO SOULI. HE THOUGHT IT UNFORTUNATE USG WAS NOT IN POSITION TO HELP ITS TRUE AND LOYAL FRIENDS IN HOUR OF NEED. THOUGH NOT MAKING REFERENCE TO FUTURE, EMBOFF NOTED THAT U.S. RESPONSE WAS IN REFERENCE TO "CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES." SEE SEPTTEL RE REMAINDER OF PATTAKOS CONVERSATIONS WHICH OF WIDER INTEREST IN WASH.

3. SUBSTANCE FIRST SENTENCE STATE 86367 ALSO CONVEYED TO MPS. RALLIS.

GP-3. TALBOT
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By iw NARA, Date 10-5-04

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~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2831

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1. NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT TOLD EMBOFF TODAY HE KNEW AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON KING WEDNESDAY MORNING SHORTLY BEFORE LATTER'S FLIGHT FROM ATHENS. ASSUME GOG MUST NOW BE LEAKING THIS INFO, WHICH MAKES TASK OF AVOIDING SUSPICION OF US INVOLVEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. I STILL STRONGLY DESIRE TO AVOID PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF MY VISIT AND WILL TRY TO CONTINUE BEING VAGUE ABOUT WHEN I LAST SAW KING. IF QUESTION PRESSED TO POINT WHERE CONTINUED EVASION MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS TACIT ADMISSION OF INVOLVEMENT,

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2831A ~~SECRET~~
HOWEVER, MIGHT BE ADVISEABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT TI WAS SUMMONED BY KING AND REACHED TATOI PALACE SHORTLY BEFORE 0930 LOCAL, BY WHICH TIME AS I THEN LEARNED OPERATION ALREADY IN PROGRESS. COULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT USG HAD NO PREVIOUS INTIMATION OF KING'S PLANS AND THAT BY TIME I RETURNED TO EMBASSY (35-40 MINUTE DRIVE) KING HIMSELF WAS LEAVING OR ABOUT TO LEAVE TATOI.

2. REQUEST IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS WHETHER TO CONTINUE STONE WALLING OR SHIFT TO MORE CANDID LINE OUTLINED ABOVE.

TALBOT
BT

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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AVEROFF, WHO HAS TAKEN REFUGE IN BELGIAN EMBASSY SINCE DECEMBER 15, HAS SENT WORD TO ME TODAY THAT HE WOULD LIKE USG OT GET HIM OUT OF COUNTRY ~~WHICH HE HAS TAKEN~~. HE FEARS FOR HIS LIFE WHEN REGIME DISCOVERS MEMOS HE HAD WRITTEN TO KING IN RECENT MONTHS AND DEVELOPS SUSPICIONS ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES DURING RECENT PERIODS OF RESIDENCE IN LARISSA.

3.3
(b)(1)

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2829A ~~SECRET~~

2. AVEROFF ONLY ONE OF NUMEROUS PERSONS LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED AS ENEMIES OF REGIME IF AUTHORITIES HAVE FOUND PALACE PAPERS INTACT. REGIME MAY DEAL ROUGHLY WITH SOME OF THEM. NEW WAVE OF ARRESTS OF PROMINENT PERSONLITIES HAS INCREASED FEARS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER PHYSICAL HARM WILL COME TO ANY OF THESE PEOPLE, BUT WE DO KNOW THERE ARE SOME IN JUNTA WITH SPECIAL HUNGER FOR VENGEANCE AGAINST AVEROFF. THIS WAS EXPLANATION OF ABSURD FIVE-YEAR COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE WHICH KING AND PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS IMMEDIATELY REVERSED.

3. AVEROFF CAN PROBABLY STAY IN BELGIAN EMBASSY FOR SOME TIME LONGER, THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED GREEK AUTHORITIES OF HIS PRESENCE. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR DESCRIBES HIM AS A PERSONAL GUEST, BUT IF GREEK POLICE COME TO RESIDENCE DEMANDING HE BE TURNED OVER TO THEM HE IS PREPARED TO SAY AVEROFF HAS REQUESTED POLITICAL ASYLUM.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-281

By *id* NARA, Date 1-20-11

4. AT BEST ACCEDING TO AVEROFF' REQUEST WOULD BE A

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2829A ~~SECRET~~

HOWEVER, AVEROFF IS PROVEN FRIEND OF
WEST AND PARTICULARLY US AND HE AMY INDEED BE IN PHYSICAL
DANGER ONCE OUTSIDE BELGIAN EMBASSY PREMISES. WHAT REPLY
SHALL I MAKE?

TALBOT

3.3
(b)(1)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W 10

5

~~SECRET~~

133

Action

Info

00 RUEHC
DE RUQMAT 2732A 3481020
ZNY SSSSS
O 141018Z DEC 67 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 195
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4123
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2782

3 3 6 10
1967 DEC 14 AM 6 30

NODIS

REF: ATHENS 2719

FOR FUTURE HANDLING OF OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL RELATIONS
WITH PIPINELIS, I SHOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER
KING'S MESSAGE (REFTEL) WAS PASSED TO HIM WEDNESDAY.
TALBOT
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 12/1/03

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WTT

134

6

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

***** ZZ RUEHC.
DE RUOMAT 2755A 3471524
ZNY SSSSS
Z 131520Z DEC 67 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4098
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2755.

3150Q

1967 DEC 13 PM 1255

NODIS

REF: STATE 83722, ATHENS 2754

FYI. PRESS GUIDANCE IS ENTIRELY ACCURATE STATEMENT.
WHEN KING CALLED ME THIS MORNING HE HAD ALREADY
REPEAT ALREADY LAUNCHED HIS UNDERTAKING, BOTH IN
FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS MOVEMENT AND IN
ORGANIZATION OF HIS RECEPTION IN NORTH. SEE LAST
PARAGRAPH ATHENS 2749. END FYI.
TALBOT

DECLASSIFIED NLS 04-76
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By C/12, NARA, Date 12-11-03
10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W B 135 4

~~SECRET~~

Action OO RUEHCR
DE RUQMAT 2749A 3471640
ZNY SSSSS
Info O 131628Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/US MISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 177
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4093
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2749

3163Q

1967 DEC 13 PM 2 15

Restow

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. FOLLOWING AMPLIFIED ATHENS 2719. AT SMALL DINNER PARTY LAST EVENING KING CONSTANTINE TENSE AND PREOCCUPIED, ASKED ME TO SEE HIM AT 0915 LOCAL TODAY. HE RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING AT TATOI PALACE IN FIELD UNIFORM. LAST NIGHT'S HESTIATIONS WERE GONE. SPEAKING CRISPLY AND RAPIDLY HE TOLD ME HE HAD DECIDED TO MOVE TODAY AGAINST JUNTA/ PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS WAS TO CALL ON HIM WITHIN THE HOUR, WHERE-UPON KING WOULD "KIDNAP" KOLLIAS AND TAKE HIM ABOARD ROYAL

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2749A ~~SECRET~~
AIRCRAFT AT TATOI AIRFIELD ALONG WITH GENERAL ANTONAKOS, CHIEF OF GREEK AIR FORCE, QUEEN, THEIR TWO CHILDREN, QUEEN MOTHER FREDERIKA AND PRINCESS IRENE. AIR COVER FOR KING'S FLIGHT HAD BEEN ARRANGED. ANTONAKOS WOULD BE DROPPED AT LARISSA TO TAKE COMMAND OF AIR OPERATION. KING AND REMAINDER OF PARTY WOULD PROCEED TO KAVALLA, WHERE HE ASSURED ARMY COMMANDERS READY TO RECEIVE HIM. HE HAD ALREADY TAPED MESSAGE TO NATION AND HAD HAND WRITTEN ORDERS DISMISSING GENERAL ANGELIS FROM POST AS CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF. HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GENERALS MANETAS, PERIDIS AND HERSCHELMAN. THEY WERE SURE NORTHERN ARMY WOULD RALLY TO KING.

2. IF KING SUCCESSFULLY REACHED NORTH, HE PLANNED TO BROADCAST HIS STATEMENT TO NATION, TAKE PERSONAL COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CALL FOR RESIGNATION OF GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT HIM TO GIVE COUNTRY A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE HOPED JUNTA WOULD ACCEPT HIS COMMAND. HE ALSO HOPED US COULD TAKE ANY APPROPRIATE ACTION TO HELP PERSUADE JUNTA NOT TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By *iss*, NARA, Date *10-5-04*

~~SECRET~~

-2- ATHENS 2749, DECEMBER 13

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2749A ~~SECRET~~

OPPOSE KING AND THUS BRING COUNTRY INTO CIVIL WAR. HE ACKNOWLEDGED ACTION HE TAKING TODAY A "GREAT GAMBLE" BUT SAID HE HAD NO CHOICE. FROM OUR MANY TALKS, HE WAS SURE I WOULD UNDERSTAND HIS REASONS.

3. KING STATED HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY INDICATION BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND USG IN SUPPORT OF HIS EFFORT TO RETURN COUNTRY TO CONSTITUTIONALITY.

4. HE ALSO ASKED THAT I PASS WORD THROUGH OUR CHANNELS TO MINISTERS PIPINELIS AND SPANDIDAKIS AT THE NATO MEETING INFORMING THEM OF HIS ACTION AND ASKING THEM TO SUPPORT ACTION WITH NATO ALLIES AND THEN RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO THESSALONIKI TO JOIN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD HOPE WE COULD BROADCAST HIS STATEMENT ON AFRS ATHENS, AND GAVE ME TAPE. I MADE NO PROMISES ON THIS, BUT AGREED TO FORWARD HIS REQUEST TO SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS AND TO DEPARTMENT. I ALSO AGREED TO HIS REQUEST THAT I ASK OUR AMBASSADORS IN COPENHAGEN AND MADRID TO PASS WORD TO DANISH QUEEN AND KING AND PRINCESS SOPHIA THAT HE INTENDS TO TAKE FAMILY TO

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 2749A ~~SECRET~~
MACEDONIA #

5. KING SAID THAT IF SUCCESSFUL HE WOULD CREATE NEW GOVERNMENT CONSISTING OF CIVILIANS EXCEPT POSSIBLY FOR ONE OR TWO GENERALS. HE WOULD DRAW MINISTERS FROM GROUP OF YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES IN NATIONALIST PARTIES WHO ARE BRIGHT, PATRIOTIC AND HAVE ALREADY BEEN MEETING TO DISCUSS WHAT CAN BE DONE TO SAVE COUNTRY.

6. I WISHED KING WELL, ON GROUNDS THAT ONCE THIS ENTERPRISE LAUNCHED ITS FAILURE WOULD BE DISASTROUS. WITH SHOW OF CONFIDENCE HE SAID HE HOPED TO SEE ME AGAIN SOON.

FYI. I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT MY MEETING WITH KING THIS MORNING BE KEPT ABSOLUTELY NODIS. EVEN THOUGH USG IN NO WAY INVOLVED IN KING'S EFFORT, FACT I CALLED TO TATOI THIS MORNING, IF IT BECOMES KNOWN, WOULD BE TAKEN HERE AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE WE ARE IMPLICATED. IT IS BECAUSE JUNTA IS LIKELY TO LEARN OF VISIT THAT WHEN PAPADOPOULOS ASKED ME IF WE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE (ATHENS 2719) I CHOSE WORDS CAREFULLY IN RESPONDING THAT THERE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- ATHENS 2749, DECEMBER 13

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 2749A ~~SECRET~~

CERTAINLY NOTHING I COULD TELL HIM ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

THIS MINI-FIGLEAF, I ADMIT, BUT IT'S BEST I COULD DO.

END FYI.

TALBOT

BT

NOTE: PASSED NATO BY OC/T 12/13/67

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**W 14 6*~~SECRET~~*13b*

Action

Info

***** ZZ RUEHC RUEHCR

DE RUQMAT 2722A 3470959

ZNY SSSSS

Z 130955Z DEC 67

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MADRID FLASH 089

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4076

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 27223 0 2 6Q
DEC 13 1967
5:46 A.M.

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR DUKE FROM AMBASSADOR TALBOT

AT REQUEST OF KING CONSTANTINE, PLEASE TELL PRINCESS SOPHIA PRIVATELY AND IMMEDIATELY THAT KING, HAVING DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST JUNTA TODAY, HAS FLOWN WITH QUEEN, CHILDREN, QUEEN MOTHER AND PRINCESS IRENE TO MACEDONIA. KING EXPECTS TO TAKE PERSONAL COMMAND OF ARMED FORCES AND DISMISS JUNTA WITH OBJECT OF FORMING NEW GOVERNMENT THAT WILL TAKE COUNTRY BACK TO CONSTITUTIONALITY.

TALBOT

BT

NOTE: PASSED MADRID PER S/S-O, MR. WISE, 12/13/67.

DECLASSIFIED *NLS 04-76*
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *[signature]* NARA, Date *12-11-03*
10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

W 1d 6 137

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

~~KL 105~~

***** ZZ RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUQMAT 2721A 3470957
ZNY SSSSS
Z 130955Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN FLASH 049
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4075
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2721

Q 3025
REC 5:43 a.m.

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR WHITE FROM AMBASSADOR TALBOT

AT REQUEST OF KING CONSTANTINE, PLEASE INFORM KING
AND QUEEN PRIVATELY AND IMMEDIATELY THAT KING, HAVING
DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST JUNTA TODAY, HAS FLOWN WITH
QUEEN,, CHILDREN, QUEEN MOTHER AND PRINCESS IRENE TO
MACEDONIA. KING EXPECTS TO TAKE PERSONAL COMMAND OF
ARMED FORCES AND DISMISS JUNTA WITH OBJECT OF FORMING
NEW GOVERNMENT THAT WILL TAKE COUNTRY BACK TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
TALBOT
BT

DECLASSIFIED NLS 04-76
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *[signature]* NARA, Date *12-1-03*
10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

138

W 10

6

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

***** ZZ RUEHC RUEHCR
DE P QMAT 2719A 3470917
ZNY SSSSS
Z 130915Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/MISSION NATO 164 FLASH
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4074
STATE GRNC
BT

3023Q

Recd Dec 8 5:08 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2719

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. KING CONSTANTINE SUMMONED ME TO TATOI PALACE AT 0915 LOCAL AND STATED HE HAS DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST JUNTA TODAY. HE PLANNED TO LEAVE TATOI AIRPORT THIS MORNING IN HIS AIRCRAFT WITH ENTIRE ROYAL FAMILY, PRIME MINISTER KOLLIAS AND GENERAL ANTONAKAS AND FLY TO KAVALLA WHERE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN NORTH PREPARED TO RECEIVE HIM. HE WILL ASSUME COMMAND OF GREEK ARMED FORCES, AND CALL FOR RESIGNATION OF GOVERNMENT SO HE CAN

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2917A ~~SECRET~~
REFORM IT TO CARRY FORWARD "GREEK RENAISSANCE."

2. KING ASKED THAT WE PASS HIS INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH OUR CHANNELS TO MINISTERS PIPINELIS AND SPANDIDAKIS ORDERING THEM TO SUPPORT HIS MOVE WITH NATO ALLIES AND THEN PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO THESSALONIKI TO JOIN GOVERNMENT.

3. KING SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF PRESIDENT AND USG COULD ENDORSE HIS MOVE AS STEP TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By ins, NARA, Date 10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- ATHENS 2719 NODIS FLASH

HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE USE ALL AVAILABLE PERSUASION TO CONVINCE COLONELS IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR THEM TO SEEK TO OPPOSE HIS ACTION AND THUS THRUST GREECE INTO CIVIL WAR. HE ASKED THAT USG DO WHAT IT CAN TO KEEP GREECE'S NEIGHBORS FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION. HE ASKED IF AMERICAN STATIONS IN GREECE COULD BROADCAST STATEMENT HE HAS TAPED STATING HE HAS GONE TO MACEDONIA IN ORDER TO EXERCISE FREELY HIS INITIATIVE FOR REFORMING OF GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC NORMALITY. HE HOPED WE COULD DO THIS IF FORCES LOYAL TO HIM FAIL IN EFJQRT PROJECTED FOR THIS HOUR TO SEIZE

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2719A ~~SECRET~~

ATHENS RADIO FACILITIES. FINALLY, HE ALSO ASKED ME TO REQUEST OUR AMBASSADORS TO ADVISE KING AND QUEEN OF DENMARK AND PRINCESS SOPHIA IN MADRID.

4. COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT KING IS PREPARED, DIE IS CAST. I WILL SEND FURTHER FLASH WHEN WE HEAR WHETHER HE HAS SAFELY GOTTEN AWAY FROM TATOI AIRPORT. I DO NOT PLAN TO HAVE KING'S STATEMENT BROADCAST ON AMERICAN FACILITIES AT LEAST UNTIL IT CLEAR HIS MANEUVER HAS REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PLEASE INFORM PIPINELIS AND SPANDIDAKIS.
TALBOT
BT

NNNNSYQ

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W 1d

139
#7

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 1480

RECD: DECEMBER 1, 1967
11:52 A.M.

Info

***** ZZ RUEHC RUEHDT
DE RUQMAT 2561A 3351625
ZNY SSSSS
Z 011620Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3976
RUEHDT/USUN 246
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2561

Roston

NODIS

VANTO 69

3.3(b)(1)

WE HAVE SEEN [REDACTED] HERE INDICATING SOVIETS
ARE MEDDLING IN NICOSIA AND HAVE INFORMED GOC THAT TURKS ARE
BLUFFING IN RESPECT TO INVASION THREAT. THEY HAVE TOLD GOC
THEY SHOULD NOT ACCEPT PARA 4.

IF DISCUSSION WITH MAKARIOS REQUERES, INTEND TELL MAKARIOS
THIS EVENING THAT WE ARE AWARE A CERTAIN POWER HAS GIVEN
HIS GOVERNMENT ABOVE ADVICE AND THAT IT WAS THIS SAME POWER
WHICH PRECIPITATED THE ISRAELI/ARAB WAR BY GIVING SYRIAN GOVERNMENT
COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS ADVICE.

TALBOT
BT

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-281
By *isl* NARA, Date 1-20-11

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH 140

2

~~SECRET~~

Action

181Q
December 1, 1967
1:55 p.m.

Info

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMAT 2556A 3351550
ZNY SSSSS
P 011530Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3973
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2556

F 3

NODIS

REF: STATE 77526

1. BELIEVE THAT PAPANDREOU LETTER ARRIVING VIA UNIDENTIFIED CHANNELS TO ERLANGER WAS POSSIBLY TRANSMITTED BY DANISH JOURNALISTS HERE IN ATHENS WHO HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH BOTH PAPANDREOUS SINCE 21 APRIL, ALTHOUGH NOT EXCLUDED THAT RECENTLY EXPELLED DANISH FIRST SECRETARY MAY HAVE CARRIED IT HOME WITH HIM.
2. SINCE HIS RELEASE FROM HOUSE ARREST, ELDER PAPANDREOU HAS MADE IT REPEATEDLY CLEAR TO CONFIDANTS THAT HE IS

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2556A ~~SECRET~~
PREPARED TO SUPPORT KING IN ANY MOVE TO OUST PRESENT MILITARY REGIME [REDACTED] WHICH GIVE GOOD IDEA OF PAPANDREOU AIM TO PUSH KING INTO OUSTING JUNTA, HIS PLANS TO GAIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR SUCH ACTION, AND HIS ORGANIZATIONAL MOVES TO REACTIVATE HIS INFLUENCE.)

3.3
(b)(1)

3. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION AT ALL WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT THE KING HAS RESPONDED TO, OR IS INTERESTED IN PAPANDREOU'S EFFORTS TO RE-INSERT HIMSELF INTO THE POLITICAL SCENE.

4. THEREFORE CONCUR WITH DEPT THAT NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED.

GP-4
TALBOT
BT

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-281

By *isl* NARA, Date 1-20-11

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2 W 18 141

~~SECRET~~

Action

Cyprus Poulos

Info

Rostow

NNNNVV CRA570
*****ZZ RUEHC
DE RUQMAT 2444A 3310040
ZNY SSSSS
Z 270034Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH [REDACTED]
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2444

1967 NOV 26 PM 07080

NODIS

VANTO

FONMIN PIPINELLIS PRESENTED LETTER TO VANCE THIS EVENING CONTAINING PLANNED WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE. HE REQUESTED IT BE PASSED TOMORROW TO GOT. TEXT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT THE TIMETABLE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK FORCES FROM CYPRUS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE THE FOLLOWING:

1. WITHDRAWAL OF ONE BATTALION FORTHWITH;
2. WITHIN ONE MONTH WITHDRAWAL OF ONE THIRD OF THE GREEK

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2444 ~~SECRET~~
TACTICAL FORCE;

3. WITHIN TWO MONTHS WITHDRAWAL OF A FURTHER THIRD OF THAT FORCE;

4. WITHIN THREE MONTHS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES. UNQUOTE

GP-3

TALBOT
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3-4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-1-03*

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WID 142
4

~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUOMAT 2074A 3170830
ZNY SSSSS

Info

R 130810Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3672
STATE GRNC
BT

3219Q

1967 NOV 13 AM 4:57

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2074

NODIS

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY

1. AS KING CONSTANTINE HAS NOW ASKED ME THRICE WHETHER I HAD NEWS OF RESULTS OF "HOMEWORK" HE SAYS PRESIDENT ASKED YOU TO UNDERTAKE ON KING'S SPECIAL REQUESTS TO PRESIDENT. I USED YOUR NAME SUNDAY IN GIVING KING RESPONSES ALONG LINES OF BATTLE LETTER TO ME OF OCTOBER 27 AND PRIOR BREWSTER LETTER.

33
(b)(1)

[REDACTED] NOR CAN WE LET HIM ASSUME THAT IN EVENT OF CRUNCH SIXTH FLEET WOULD PROMPTLY COME SAILING OVER HORIZON.

11 [REDACTED] BUT THAT FOR NUMEROUS OBVIOUS REASONS MOVEMENTS OF SIXTH FLEET COULD NOT BE PLEDGED AHEAD OF TIME AND WOULD BE DICTATED BY OVERALL CIRCUMSTANCES OF MOMENT. ALSO, AS HE HAD UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON, THERE IS NO POINT IN THINKING IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE US PHYSICAL INTERVENTION IN GREECE.

2. KING RECALLED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED TO PRESIDENT NEED TO WORK OUT PLAN FOR ACTION (AND COOPERATION?) AHEAD OF TIME, AND ASKED IF YOU HAD SUGGESTED ANY PLAN FOR HIS CONSIDERATION. I REPLIED THAT YOU HAD NOT, AND ADDED PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT WOULD REALLY NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR US TO DO SO.

3. KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. IF HE SHOULD DECIDE HE HAD TO MOVE HE WOULD EXPLAIN SITUATION TO ME IN DETAIL

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-281404-71

By *isl* NARA, Date 1-20-11

~~SECRET~~

-2- ATHENS 2074, NOVEMBER 13

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2074 ~~SECRET~~

AHEAD OF TIME SO THAT WE WOULD NOT BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE. HE WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED THAT IN EVENT OF CRUNCH IN GREECE HE WOULD BE CONFIDENT WE WOULD ADOPT POSTURE THAT WOULD RESTRAIN BULGARIANS OR TURKS FROM ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INTO THIS COUNTRY, SO THAT HE COULD CONCENTRATE ON HIS DOMESTIC SITUATION WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT POSSIBLE INCURSIONS ACROSS HIS BORDERS. I RESPONDED THAT WE ALSO WOULD INDEED BE CONCERNED AT ANY INDICATION THAT EITHER WARSAW PACT SLAVS OR TURKISH ALLY WAS CONSIDERING INCURSION INTO GREECE.

4. RUMINATING ABOUT SITUATION IN GREECE, KING COMMENTED THAT HIS POLICY IS TO COOPERATE WITH PRESENT GOVERNMENT SO LONG AS HE THINKS IT NOT "BAD" FOR GREECE, AT WHICH TIME HE WOULD SEEK TO REMOVE IT. BREAK MIGHT COME SHOULD GOVERNMENT TRY SOME MAJOR MOVE IN DIRECTION OF DICTATORSHIP OR SHOULD HE BE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT ITS SALAMI TACTICS WERE REDUCING TO DANGER POINT HIS ABILITY TO PROTECT NATION AND ARMED FORCES. HE AGREED WITH MY COMMENT THAT QUESTION WOULD BE NOT ONLY WHAT END RESULT HE WANTED BUT ALSO WHAT KIND OF ISSUE WOULD MAKE

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 2074 ~~SECRET~~

SENSE TO GREEK PUBLIC OPINION AND HOW HE WOULD ORGANIZE RESOURCES TO MOVE EFFECTIVELY AND PEACEFULLY. HE INSISTED HE DOES NOT WANT SPANDIDAKIS OR SOMEONE ELSE TO SET OFF HALF-BAKED MOVE THAT COULD LEAD TO BLOODSHED.

5. COMMENT: I HAVE BEEN OVER MOST OF SAME GROUND WITH HIM BEFORE BUT THIS TIME FELT I HAD TO USE YOUR NAME FOR REASONS CITED ABOVE. AS HE DID NOT AGAIN RAISE QUESTION OF USG ASSISTANCE IN POSSIBLE EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF HIS FAMILY, I DID NOT MENTION THAT MATTER. SHOULD YOU WISH TO MODIFY, AMEND OR ADD TO STATEMENT GIVEN IN YOUR NAME, I SHOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

6. AS OTHER REPORTING WILL INDICATE, I DID NOT GET IMPRESSION KING FEELS HIS HOUR OF CONFRONTATION WITH JUNTA IS AT HAND. HOWEVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH IMPONDERABLES BETWEEN NOW AND END OF YEAR (E.G., POSSIBLE ATTEMPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION TO CUT ROYAL POWERS, A STEP KING WOULD SURELY OPPOSE) SO THAT ALL EMBASSY COMPONENTS ARE ON ALERT FOR SIGNS OF NEW TAKEOVER EFFORTS BY OR AGAINST PRESENT JUNTA.

TALBOT
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Action

Cy pent Prudes

Info

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMAT 1715A 2841737
ZNY SSSSS
O 111731Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

2384Q
1967 OCT 11 PM 4 16

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1715

NODIS

KING CONSTANTINE ASKED TODAY WHETHER ANY INFORMATION YET
ARRIVED FROM WASHINGTON ON SPECIAL MATTERS HE DISCUSSED WITH
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. I REPLIED NOT YET.

GP-1.

TALBOT
BT

DECLASSIFIED NLS 04-74 ..

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc/ie*, NARA, Date *12-11-03*
10-5-04~~SECRET~~

086367

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Origin ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS PRIORITY

19 DEC 67 00 25 z

Info: STATE 86367

NODIS

Athens' 2829 and 2838

We have investigated possibilities undertaking Averoff has in mind and have concluded that in current circumstances it impracticable and likely be very risky for him. You should tell him this and ask whether he has considered seeking safe conduct out of Greece via Belgian Embassy. Substance first sentence above should also be conveyed Mrs. Rallis if Ambassador believes ~~XXXX~~ response necessary.

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

Drafted by:

NEA:SWRockwell:av 12/18/67

Tel. Ext.

8825

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

U - Mr. Katzenbach

~~NEA xx Luolus xx Battle~~

Clearances:

S/S -Mr. Walsh NEA - Mr. Battle

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

085852

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy ATHENS IMMEDIATE

Info: STATE 85852

16 DEC 67 23 40z

NODIS

Reference: Athens 2831

You should stick with "no comment" but, if possible, couple
with denial any prior knowledge of operation before it began.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA:LDBattle:sb:12/16/67

5381

classification approved by: S/S - Jeanne W. Davis

Clearances:

U - Mr. Eg Eagleburger (informed)

~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED NLS 04-76
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/is NARA, Date 2-1-03
10-5-04

084837

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

IMMEDIATE

14 DEC 67 23 10z

Info:

INFO: USMission NATO

TOSEC

IMMEDIATE

Amembassy ROME

IMMEDIATE

STATE 84837

NODIS

TOSEC 41

1. In state of deep emotion over failure of King's counter coup, Mazarakis, Counselor of Greek Embassy, called on Rockwell December 14 on instructions of Ambassador to say that King had just called Ambassador from Rome prior to holding press conference in an hour's time to inquire what USG's attitude was toward present GOG. Did USG contemplate recognizing?
2. Rockwell said King could be informed USG would take no decision for several days pending clarification of situation. One important element missing from picture was King's attitude and plans for future. We would be very interested receiving King's views.
3. Rockwell informed Mazarakis of GOG attempt convene Ambassadors in Athens and USG instructions to Ambassador Talbot to not attend meeting.
4. Mazarakis then said that Ambassador Palamas had in mind advising King not to burn all his bridges with present regime and to take moderate attitude in forthcoming press conference. King had also requested USG advice in this regard. Rockwell, emphasizing he speaking personally, said he thought most important thing at moment was to avoid civil war in Greece and that for this purpose moderate public remarks by King would be preferable to

Drafted by:

NEA:SWRockwell:av 12/14/67

Tel. Ext.

8825

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Battle

S/S - JPWalsh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-76

By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy ATHENS IMMEDIATE~~SECRET~~

statements of nature which could be interpreted by King's followers in Greece as a call to arms against the regime. Accordingly Rockwell thought Ambassador's proposed advice was sound.

5. Mazarakis then expressed deep distress over ^{after} ~~xxx~~ King had launched his enterprise. He said that for months USG had been urging King to move against regime and when he did USG did not exercise its leading role as a great power in defense of legality in Greece. ~~xxx~~ At moment of crisis, he continued, Greeks had not expected US to sit on hands while awaiting information as to balance of power between opposing forces in Greece. Rather US should have acted on principle. American and Western Ambassadors during crucial day of December 13, should have moved north to join King.

6. Rockwell said that perhaps Mazarakis did not know that, contrary to urging King to move against junta, USG both in Washington and in Athens had consistently advised King against confronting junta, and certainly against doing so without proper preparation to be sure of maximum support. USG had been concerned over possibility of civil war in Greece resulting from confrontation, and had urged King to try to push junta toward constitutionalism by peaceful political pressures. Mazarakis said he had not known this but later, after a telephone conversation with Palamas, reported Ambassador's view as being that even if USG had advised King not to confront junta, nonetheless USG had moral obligation to help King now since he had been trying to achieve goal USG wanted.

7. With regard to Mazarakis remarks re inaction USG, Rockwell pointed out USG quite unaware of King's plans to undertake his enterprise at this given moment and that once counter coup began Embassy Athens totally out of contact with King and uncertain as to

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy ATHENS IMMEDIATE~~SECRET~~

his whereabouts. Communications were cut and USG did not have sufficient information on which to base a decision as to appropriate action. USG could not take important step of type Mazarakis apparently had in mind in a vacuum.

8. Mazarakis then inquired whether USG would take decisive action to help King now. Rockwell stated that in prior conversations it had been made entirely clear to King that there could be no question of ^{US} military intervention if he moved to confront junta. This would apply all the more now that King had moved, apparently without adequate advance preparation and had failed.

9. Mazarakis said he had no doubt there would be civil war in Greece sooner or later. Present crowd would turn Nasserite and would probably be succeeded by extreme leftists. Right and center would not accept this and conflict would result.

10. During conversation Palamas telephoned. Mazarakis gave him information he had obtained from Rockwell for onward transmission to King in Rome.

~~11.~~ At conclusion of conversation Mazarakis apologized for his "undiplomatic frankness".

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~ / NODIS

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Origin

ACTION:
INFO:Amembassy ATHENS
Amembassy ANKARA
" NICOSIA
LONDON
OTTAWA
USUN, NEW YORK
US MISSION NATOFLASH
IMMEDIATE

23 Nov 67 02 53z

Info:

STATE 74019

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR TALBOT

1. If Turkish Government announces that it is moving forces on to Cyprus in order to equalize number of troops in being on island and states this is action limited to this/^{purpose}~~purpose~~ and that GOT has no intention of widening hostilities unless landing interfered with, you should urgently inform GOG that we find this Turkish action deplorable and have been exerting every effort to prevent it. USG is supporting urgent call for meeting of UN Security Council. It is intention of USG to present in unequivocal terms its opposition to this Turkish action and to insist on and work for the withdrawal of such Turkish forces as may be landed in Cyprus.

Drafted by:

L/NEA-DWehmeyer:SWRockwell:jfb

11/22/67

Tel. Ext. 8825

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

The Under Secretary (Draft)

S/S - Mr. Kelly

~~SECRET~~ / NODIS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-11-03

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy ATHENS~~SECRET/NODIS~~

2. It is our view that if the Turkish military action on Cyprus is limited as announced by the GOT this will be less catastrophic than an outbreak of general hostilities between Greece and Turkey and the widening of the conflict which would certainly result if Greek forces were to attempt to prevent the landings. Taking everything into account, and fully realizing how painful is the situation for Greece, it is our view that action to repel a move on to Cyprus, or to attack the Turkish mainland, should not be undertaken by Greece.

GP-3

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

068667

148

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

14 Nov 67 02 14

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS

Info:

STATE 68667

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

YOUR 2074

I have nothing which would modify, amend or add to the statements which, in your usual skilful manner, you gave to the King in my name on November 12. I feel it important that you should continue your efforts to give King a realistic understanding of limitations of US role in event of crisis between himself and junta.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:SWRockwell:av 11/13/67

Tel. Ext.

8825

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Battle
S/S - Mr. Shepard

FORM 8-65 DS-322

~~SECRET~~
Classification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By PC NARA, Date 12-11-03

149

CIA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN 33099

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DD/I EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

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182057Z

CITE

DIST 18 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY : GREECE
DOI :
SUBJECT : POSSIBLE RESIGNATION OF PIPINELIS

ACQ :
SOURCE :

1.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER PANAGIOTIS PIPINELIS "IS PREPARING TO RESIGN HIS POSITION."
SINCE 13 DECEMBER 1967 PIPINELIS HAD CONSIDERED HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT AS BEING LINKED WITH THE EVENTUAL RETURN OF KING CONSTANTINE TO GREECE.
PRIME MINISTER GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS WELL AND WHOSE~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09.282
By il, NARA, Date 4-14-10

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(dissem controls)

[REDACTED] TOLD PIPINELIS THAT THE KING CANNOT RETURN TO GREECE, AT LEAST NOT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. PIPINELIS NOW CONSIDERS HIS MISSION A FAILURE AND WANTS TO RESIGN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PIPINELIS VISITED REGENT LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGIOS ZOITAKIS AND PAPADOPOULOS [REDACTED] AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER STYLIANOS PATTAKOS [REDACTED] TO INFORM THEM OF HIS INTENTIONS.

[REDACTED] PATTAKOS ATTEMPTED TO TALK PIPINELIS OUT OF RESIGNING.

2. [REDACTED] POTENTIAL REPLACEMENTS FOR PIPINELIS ARE: (A) VASILEIOS PAPADAKIS, A FORMER AMBASSADOR, 70 YEARS OLD, A VERY ACTIVE AND VERY SHREWD INDIVIDUAL, RECENTLY APPOINTED THE HEAD OF ZOITAKIS' POLITICAL OFFICE, A FORMER CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF DECEASED DICTATOR IOANNIS METAXAS, A FORMER HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL OF METAXAS' RIGHTIST YOUTH MOVEMENT; AND (B) NIKOLAOS FARMAKIS, FORMER NATIONAL RADICAL UNION (ERE) DEPUTY, WHO WAS PICKED BY PAPADOPOULOS ON 21 APRIL 1957 TO BE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT WHO WAS REJECTED AS A CANDIDATE BY THE KING.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

3. DISSEM STATE (ALSO SENT

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

151

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~~Intelligence Information Cable~~

• PRIORITY

IN 32971

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SOO	ONE	CRS
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
CITE

DIST 18 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY : GREECE
 DOI : 17 TO 18 JANUARY 1968
 SUBJECT : MILITARY MOVEMENTS INDICATING POSSIBLE ALERT

ACQ :

SOURCE :



1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 17 JANUARY 1968 AND THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 18 JANUARY, VARIOUS MOVEMENTS OF ARMORED CARS AND TANKS TOOK PLACE IN ATHENS (AMBELOKIPOI) AREA AND ITS SUBURBS, AND ISOLATED TANKS WERE MOVING ON THE ATHENS-ELEFSIS ROAD. ALSO AT APPROXIMATELY 0100 HOURS ON 18 JANUARY, THE THESSALONIKI RADIO STATION AND TELEGRAPH OFFICE WERE PUT UNDER

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NIJ 09-282
 By il NARA, Date 4/4/10

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

MILITARY GUARD (COMMANDOS). [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ACCORDING TO UNDERMINISTRY OF PRESS OFFICIALS, A MINOR STATE OF ALERT WAS BEING CALLED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. AT APPROXIMATELY 1100 HOURS ON 18 JANUARY, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR STYLIANOS PATTAKOS GAVE A STATEMENT TO SELECT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT "GREECE IS STRONG, IS NOT WORRIED BECAUSE OF THE RUMORS CIRCULATING CONCERNING THE COUNTRY, AND THAT, IF NECESSARY, GREECE IS ABLE TO MEET IN BATTLE HER ENEMIES AND SOME FOES WHO WANT GREECE TO BECOME ANOTHER VIETNAM."

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] ABOVE ACTIVITY WAS INITIALLY INTERPRETED AS BEING A RESULT OF A CLASH BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS AND COLONEL IOANNIS LADAS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC ORDER. HOWEVER, IT WAS LATER BELIEVED TO INDICATE NERVOUSNESS ON THE PART OF THE REGIME OVER SOME OTHER, UNKNOWN, THREAT. IN CONNECTION

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(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH A POSSIBLE CLASH BETWEEN LADAS AND PAPADOPOULOS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A NUMBER OF REASONS HAVE BEEN CITED FOR THE REGIME'S NERVOUSNESS, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT BY KING KONSTANTINOS OR FORMER CENTER UNION (ED) DEPUTY ANDREAS PAPANDREOU. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, THE TROOP MOVEMENTS INDICATE THAT THE REGIME IS WORRIED OVER INTERNAL MATTERS RATHER THAN INTERNATIONAL ONES.)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCSOUTH (PERSON) CINCUSNAVEUR CINCEAFSA USAREUR USAFE (ALSO SENT [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] GP-1

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE 152

IN 13310

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	AID
		DDI	EXO						USIA	ONE	ORR	DCS	CGS

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[Redacted]

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151822Z

CITE

DIST 15 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY GREECE

DOI 13 TO 14 DECEMBER 1967

SUBJECT REGIME ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN POWERS

ACQ

SOURCE

[Large Redacted Area]

1.

[Redacted]

DIRECTOR [Redacted]

AND HIS ASSISTANT,
VOICED SUSPICIONS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

[Redacted]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-282
By int, NARA, Date 4-14-10

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)

THAT KING KONSTANTINOS' COUNTER-COUP ATTEMPT HAD THE "STRONG SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH AND THE QUIET ACQUIESCENCE OF THE AMERICANS." BOTH STATED THAT NOW THAT THE REGIME IS IN FIRM CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND THE KING HAS DEPARTED, GREECE SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO DEPEND ON HER ALLIES AS IN THE PAST; IN FACT, GREECE SHOULD FOLLOW AN "INDEPENDENT" POLICY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE BAD TREATMENT OF THE JUNTA BY THE ALLIES SINCE 21 APRIL.

[] DESCRIBED THIS INDEPENDENT POLICY AS ONE WHICH WOULD TAKE GREECE OUT OF NATO BY 1969, WHICH WOULD DEVELOP IN MANY WAYS LIKE DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY (ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE ALIGNED WITH IT) AND WOULD INCLUDE AN INCREASE IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, WITH WHICH GREECE HAS TRADED ON FAVORABLE TERMS IN THE PAST. IN SUMMATION, [] STATED THAT SINCE 21 APRIL THE JUNTA SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT GREECE HAS BEEN ABLE TO LIVE WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES; CONSEQUENTLY GREECE DOES NOT NEED THE ALLIES. "IF THE ALLIES NEED US FINE; IF NOT, THEY WILL GO THEIR WAY AND WE WILL GO OURS."

2. DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE KING'S COUNTER-COUP

[] THE PRIME MINISTER COLONEL GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

COMMENTED ON SEVERAL OCCASSIONS THAT THE AMERICANS PROBABLY WERE SUPPORTING THE COUNTER-COUP. THESE STATEMENTS WERE MADE BEFORE PAPADOPOULOS MET WITH UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS TALBOT ABOUT NOON ON 13 DECEMBER.) AT APPROXIMATELY 1330 HOURS ON 13 DECEMBER PAPADOPOULOS STATED THAT THE KING'S COUNTER-COUP "WAS SET UP BY THE CIA IN ATHENS".

THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE AFTER THE MEETING BETWEEN APADOPOULOS AND THE AMBASSADOR.) DURING THE PERIOD OF 13 TO 14 DECEMBER, PAPADOPOULOS GRADUALLY BECAME CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE COUNTER-COUP; HOWEVER, PAPADOPOULOS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AT LEAST FOREWARNED AND HAD QUIETLY "APPROVED IT". DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 14 DECEMBER, WHEN IT HAD BECOME ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE KING COULD NOT MUSTER ANY SUPPORT FOR HIS MOVEMENT IN THE MILITARY, PAPADOPOULOS EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO THE FUTURE RECOGNITION OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT BY FOREIGN POWERS. SPECIFICALLY, PAPADOPOULOS EXPRESSED FEAR THAT THE ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, MIGHT NOT RECOGNIZE THE JUNTA AS THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF GREECE. AS THE DAY OF 14 DECEMBER PROGRESSED, VARIOUS JUNTA OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)

THE EXTREMISTS, BEGAN ADVISING PAPADOPOULOS THAT HE MUST NOT "SURRENDER TO THE ALLIES IN ORDER TO GAIN RECOGNITION", POINTING OUT TO PAPADOPOULOS THAT THE ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, NEED GREECE NOW IF NATO IS TO BE MAINTAINED AND IF GREEK NEUTRALISM IS TO BE PREVENTED. ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE IS DESIRABLE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE REGIME'S INTERNAL SURVIVAL. FURTHERMORE, GREECE COULD FIND "COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD ACCEPT HER". PAPADOPOULOS HAS RESISTED EFFORTS BY THE EXTREMISTS TO TAKE A HARD STAND TOWARD THE KING AND THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE GREEK PRESS. PAPADOPOULOS STATED THAT ONE OF THE EXCESSES OF THE 21 APRIL REGIME WAS ITS OVER-REACTION TO MANY PROBLEMS, AND HE DID NOT WANT THE JUNTA TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE NOW. PAPADOPOULOS EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE JUNTA AS THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF GREECE SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WAS REALISTIC TO DO SO. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO ABANDON ITS HEAVY INVESTMENT IN GREECE AND TO ENDANGER THE NATO ALLIANCE FURTHER.

 DESPITE THIS EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE, PAPADOPOULOS IS DEFINITELY WORRIED ABOUT FOREIGN, AND ESPECIALLY UNITED STATES, RECOGNITION.)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)

(dissem controls)

3. [] DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCSOUTH

(PERSONAL) CINCUSNAVEUR CINCMEAFSA USAREUR USAFE []

A) GP-1

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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154

COUNTRY	GREECE/CYPRUS/TURKEY	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	ON MAKARIOS AND THE CYPRUS SITUATION	DATE DISTR.	8 DECEMBER 1967
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO. 3 TO 4 DECEMBER 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [REDACTED]

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

1.

[REDACTED] THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT IS VERY DISSATISFIED WITH THE GREEK REGIME SINCE IT BLAMES THE JUNTA FOR THE "TREACHEROUS SOLUTION" OF THE CRISIS AND FOR THE PRESSURE EXERTED ON ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ACCEPT IT.

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
BY in 09-282
NARA, Date 4-14-10
E.O. 12958
2.3(c)(1)

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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STATE	#	DIA	#	ARMY	#	NAVY	#	AIR	#	NSA	AID	OCR	
(NOTE: FIELD DISTRIBUTION INDICATED BY "#.")													

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- 2 -

MAKARIOS WAS "COMPLETELY LEFT OUT" OF THE INITIAL PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND INFORMED OF THE SOLUTION "AFTER THE FACT" BY PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY CYRUS VANCE.

MAKARIOS CONSIDERS THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ACTIVITIES AS A US EFFORT TO FORCE A PRO-TURKISH SOLUTION "DOWN THE THROATS OF THE INTERNATIONALLY DESPISED GREEK JUNTA."

2. MAKARIOS WILL TAKE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS /UN/ IN ORDER TO GET A "DEMOCRATIC UN DECISION ON A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM."

MAKARIOS WILL DEMAND THE REMOVAL OF THE 650 TURKISH AND THE 950 GREEK LEGAL TROOPS STATIONED ON THE ISLAND AS PART OF THE SOLUTION. WITH THE REMOVAL OF THESE LEGAL FORCES, CYPRUS WILL THEN HAVE LEGAL GROUNDS TO CONSIDER THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS AND TURKEY'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN CYPRUS AS NO LONGER VALID.

THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD WILL NOT BE DISARMED, AND SPECULATED THAT EVEN IF MAKARIOS WANTED TO DISARM IT, THE GUARD ITSELF WOULD REFUSE. ALSO, THE CYPRUS POLICE FORCES WILL REMAIN AT THEIR PRESENT LEVELS AND ARMED.

MAKARIOS CONSIDERS THE RIGHT TO ARM AND DISARM GREEK CYPRIOTS AS A DECISION THAT CAN BE TAKEN ONLY BY A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT AND ONE NOT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS BY OTHER PARTIES, INCLUDING THE UN.

3.

THE
USSR'S POSITION DURING THE CRISIS WAS ANTI-GREEK JUNTA AND PRO-TURKISH, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SUPPORTING THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS. THUS, THE USSR HAD A FLEXIBLE POLICY AND ONE ELASTIC ENOUGH TO APPEAL TO THE TURKS

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- 3 -

AND TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. THE US POLICY WAS CLEARLY ANTI-GREEK
JUNTA, ANTI-GREEK CYPRIOT AND PRO-TURKEY. THE US POLICY WAS
TOTALLY INFLEXIBLE. [REDACTED] THE USSR WOULD
SUPPORT ANY GREEK CYPRIOT APPEAL TO THE UN SIMPLY BECAUSE
MAKARIOS "WOULD SHREWDLY TIE IN CYPRIOT INDEPENDENCE WITH
A DECREASE IN THE UN PEACEKEEPING ROLE."

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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1967 NOV 25 14 05

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STATE (RCI)
CIA-OCI
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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN DISSEM CITE [REDACTED] (ADVANCE)

COUNTRY GREECE
DOI SEE BELOW
SUBJECT SITREP AS OF 1200 LOCAL TIME
ACQ
SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY CYRUS VANCE AND THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE JOSE R OLZ-BENNETT AND NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANLIO BROGIO TO THE SCENE HAVE IMBUED THE GREEK POPULACE WITH A SMALL MEASURE OF OPTIMISM. THE GREEK PRESS, WHICH MAINTAINED A NOTE OF RESTRAINT THROU GHOUT THE CRISIS, WAS EVEN BLANDER ON THE MORNING OF 25 NOVEMBER. THE ATHENS CITY TRAFFIC WAS NORMAL, THERE WAS STILL NO SCARE BU YING IN THE SHOPS, AND THE GAS STATIONS AND FUEL OI L SUPPLIERS WERE OPERATING AS USUAL. NO VIOLENCE AGAINST TURKISH DIPLOMATIC OR COMMERCIAL INSTALLATIONS OR AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN GREECE HAS BEEN REPORTED. ABOVE STANDS IN CONTRAST TO THE MOB SCENES AND PRESS HYSTERIA WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED FROM TURKEY.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-282
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-14-10

XEROX FROM QUOTE COPY

E.O. 12958 3.3(1)(1)

1. A SMALL BOMB EXPLODED AT NOON ON 24 NOVEMBER INSIDE THE GREEK MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY BUT CAUSED NO CASUALTIES AND ONLY MINOR DAMAGE. AT THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS THE MINISTRY EMPLOYEES WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE AFTER SHOWING THEIR IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE BOMB INCIDENT HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH THE CYPRUS CRISIS.

3. EVIDENCE OF THE FACT THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF DOING BUSINESS AS USUAL IS THE 24 NOVEMBER REPLACEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF LABOR. ATHENS ATTORNEY DIMITRIOS POULEAS UNEXPECTEDLY RECEIVED A CALL TO MEET WITH MILITARY JUNTA LEADER COLONEL GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS AND PRIME MINISTER KONSTANTINOS KOLLIAS. UPON ARRIVING AT THEIR OFFICES ON THE MORNING OF 24 NOVEMBER HE WAS ASKED TO ACCEPT THE LABOR PORTFOLIO. HE FINALLY ACCEPTED BUT COMMENTED TO FRIENDS LATER THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THAT HIS COUNTRY'S LEADERS HAD TIME AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE TO ARGUE A NOMINEE INTO TAKING THIS RELATIVELY MINOR CABINET POSITION.

4. ~~DISSEM:~~ STATE ARMY NAVY AIR (ALSO SENT ~~DISSEM~~)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NNNN

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

COUNTRY --- GREECE CYPRUS
DCI -- 24 NOVEMBER 1967
SUBJECT -- PAPANDREOU'S COMMENTS ON CYPRUS CRISIS

ACQ --

SOURCE --

1. CENTER UNION /EK/ LEADER GEORGIOS PAPANDREOU DECIDED ON 24 NOVEMBER NOT TO ISSUE ANY STATEMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME ON THE CYPRUS CRISIS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF A WAR OCCURS HE WILL ISSUE A STATEMENT SAYING THAT "THE ENTIRE GREEK NATION IS UNITED WITH KING KONSTANTINOS AGAINST TURKEY." BEFORE THIS DECISION, HOWEVER, PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING ISSUING A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE CRITICIZED THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND ITS HANDLING OF THE CYPRUS CRISIS AND WOULD HAVE CALLED ON THE KING, IN THE FACE OF THE TURKISH THREAT, TO ATTEMPT TO BROADEN THE GOVERNMENT BY INCLUDING, IN ADDITION TO THE TRIUMIRATE, NATIONAL RADICAL UNION /ERE/ LEADER PANAGIOTIS KANELLOPOULOS, PROGRESSIVE PARTY PPADAHSPYROS MARKEZINIS, AND HIMSELF PAPANDREOU. HE SAID THAT HE CHANGED HIS MIND BECAUSE THE KING HAD HAD AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS AND HAD FAILED. /SOURCE COMMENT -- THE MAIN REASON WHY PAPANDREOU DECIDED NOT TO MAKE A STATEMENT RIGHT NOW REGARDING CYPRUS IS PROBABLY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT THE JUNTA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRISIS, AND THUS ALL POLITICIANS SHOULD DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM ANY ACTIVITY WHICH MIGHT ALSO MAKE THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JUNTA'S MISTAKES./

2. PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A WAR BECAUSE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT IT CANNOT DEFEAT TURKEY AND THUS WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO SURRENDER TO WHATEVER DEMANDS TURKEY MIGHT MAKE. PAPANDREOU ADDED THAT THE PRESENT REGIME MUST NOW ENGAGE "IN THE DIRTY WORK" TO PACIFY BOTH THE TURKS AND GREEK PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S MISTAKES ON CYPRUS.

3. DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR /ALSO SENT

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ 09-282
By is NARA, Date 4-14-10

1572

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to omitted or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

COUNTRY Greece

REPORT NO. []

SUBJECT Latest Plans of Georgios Papandreu

DATE OF REPORT 8 November 1967

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 25 October through 5 November 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ []

SOURCE []

1. On the basis of numerous discussions and contacts since his release from house arrest, Center Union (EK) leader Georgios Papandreu now believes that the "critical period" for the coup regime and for the political parties is the period between the deposition of the draft constitution by the constitutional committee, and the actual plebiscite on the draft constitution. Papandreu has information (no further details available) indicating that the constitution as drafted by the committee will be a "decent" one; however, the regime will attempt to amend it into a "monstrous" one. The political parties will then be faced with the dilemma of whether to accept this "monstrous" constitution, thus forcing themselves to abide by it indefinitely, or rejecting it, thus taking the chance that the people might approve it, permitting the regime to assert that the people are pro-junta and against political parties. To prevent alteration of the committee's draft constitution and to prevent public acceptance or refusal of a "monstrous" amendment by the political parties, Papandreu has instituted parallel, but separate, negotiations with other political parties and with King

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 09-282

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Konstantinos through (unidentified) intermediaries, in an effort to persuade the King and the Americans to oppose the junta's attempts to alter the draft constitution.¹ Papandreou has now decided not to make any public declaration against the regime at any time,² nor sign any joint declaration with other political parties.³ Papandreou plans the following actions as soon as the draft constitution is completed:

- a. Through (unidentified) intermediaries to propose to the King that a transitional dictatorial government be formed under the King's control, as opposed to the junta's. Papandreou will provide assurances to the King that after parliamentary democracy is restored in the country, the King will be defended for his role in the transitional dictatorial regime;
 - b. Papandreou will publicly praise the King for his personal efforts to restore parliamentary rule by supporting a transitional dictatorial regime in order to allay the King's fears for the future of the throne (i.e. that the fall of the junta means the fall of the throne). The King must refuse to accept alteration of the draft constitution by the junta and must persuade the junta to accept a transitional dictatorship under the control of the King;
 - c. Through various contacts Papandreou will attempt simultaneously to gain the support of the Americans for the above solution, since the King's fortitude in rejecting any "monstrous" alteration of the draft constitution by the junta will depend "90 percent on the moral support given the King by the Americans." Similarly, only American pressure can force the junta to accept a dictatorship under the King.
 - d. Papandreou will stimulate other political parties, particularly the National Radical Union (ERE) and the one-time "apostates" (EK dissidents) to conduct parallel but separate activities with the King and with their American contacts, to support the above.
 - e. As a quid pro quo for the regime, and in order to ensure junta acceptance of the above, Papandreou and the others will tell the King to "thank the junta publicly for the service it rendered to Greece by ridding it of Communism and bureaucracy."⁴
2. Papandreou has organized two EK committees:⁵ one to assist financially needy former EK deputies and another to contact and supply the foreign press with information. The former comprises the former ministers in the Papandreou cabinet, Andreas Kokkevis and Nikolaos Zorbas, and former EK Deputy Georgios Grigorion; the latter comprises former EK Deputies Georgios Mylonas, Georgios Navros and Athanasios Kanellopoulos. Of all the committeemen mentioned above, Papandreou has the most confidence in Kokkevis and he has made it clear to the others that Kokkevis will serve as the liaison between the two committees and Papandreou. The committee formed to handle the foreign press and relations abroad in general, has tentatively nominated two journalists to make contact with the foreign press in Athens on behalf of the EK. They are Georgios Kavounidis, former Director for Press in the Government of Papandreou, and Ethnos staffer Georgios Drossos.

1. Comment:
Papandreou is already in touch with the King. According to a Greek Center politician who has provided generally accurate information in the past, Papandreou and National Radical Union (ERE) leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos are also in contact.
2. Comment: Papandreou was reported as saying right after his release on 8 October 1967 that he would not make any anti-regime declaration at that time.
3. Comment: Papandreou believes that any anti-regime statement would be pointless for three reasons: (a) if all parties unite now in a joint declaration against the junta, the Greek public will be disgusted with the parties for not having united prior to 21 April and thus prevented events leading to the military coup; (b) no single individual can sign such a joint declaration on behalf of ERE "because that party has been split into five separate groups"; (c) Papandreou does not want to sign anything jointly with the "apostates".
4. Comment: The political parties are not likely to make any public statement regarding the activities of the junta. This abstinence would permit the parties, and particularly Papandreou, once parliamentary rule has been established, to rid the Greek military of the junta types through normal military promotions, retirements or possibly purges.
5.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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CITE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

DIST 25 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY: GREECE

DOI:

SUBJECT: CURRENT VIEWS OF PAPADOPOULOS

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER COLONEL GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS STATED THAT THE GREEK MILITARY REGIME MUST REMAIN IN POWER FOR AS LONG AS FOUR YEARS IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE NECESSARY PURGES, REFORMS AND GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATIONS. AFTER THE FOUR YEARS, PAPADOPOULOS FORESEES A FURTHER STAGE OF "CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY" OF UNSPECIFIED DEFINITION AND DURATION, AT THE END OF WHICH PERIOD GREEK CONDITIONS AND THE OUTLOOK OF THE GREEK PEOPLE WILL HAVE CHANGED TO THE POINT WHERE AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION WILL HAVE BEEN CREATED. COMMENT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-282
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[REDACTED] POSSIBLY A CLAUSE WILL BE
INSERTED IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION OR IN THE ENSUING PLEBICITE,
SANCTIONING THE CONTINUATION OF THE REGIME IN POWER FOR A SPECIFIED
PERIOD, PRIOR TO THE HOLDING OF THE ELECTION THAT WOULD PRESUMABLY
USHER IN THE PERIOD OF "CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY.")

2. PAPADOPOULOS MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING AS THE AREAS WHICH
MUST BE REFORMED: (A) THERE MUST BE A PURGING OF THE GOVERNMENT
APPARATUS, WHICH REQUIRES A SLOW, CAREFUL PACE SINCE THE REGIME MUST
CAREFULLY SIFT THE EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST A PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE TO ENSURE THAT SERIOUS INJUSTICES ARE NOT COMMITTED WHILE
DISLOYAL PERSONS ARE BEING REMOVED. (B) ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT
THE GOVERNMENT HAS UNCOVERED AN UNBELIEVABLE EXTENT OF GRAFT WITHIN
THE STATE ADMINISTRATION, THE CAUSES OF WHICH MUST ALSO BE REMOVED.
(C) THE GREEK LABOR MOVEMENT IS BADLY IN NEED OF REORGANIZATION.
THE REGIME FEELS THAT THE OLD GUARD SYNDICALIST LEADERS, WHO ARE
ALMOST UNIVERSALLY DISCREDITED WITH THE WORKERS, MUST BE ELIMINATED,
THAT FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE CONSOLIDATED AND THAT A NEW
SYNDICALIST LEADERSHIP IN TUNE WITH MODERN SOCIAL NEEDS MUST BE
ENCOURAGED. THE REGIME, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZES THAT SUCH A NEW LEADERSHIP
CANNOT BE CREATED OVERNIGHT AND THAT CHANGES AND REFORMS MUST BE

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ACCOMPLISHED BY WORKING THROUGH SYNDICALIST CHANNELS RATHER THAN BY DIRECT GOVERNMENT IMPOSITION. THE REGIME IS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE EFFORTS OF LABOR MINISTER ALEXANDROS LEKKAS AND BY THE FAILURE OF MINISTER OF EDUCATION KONSTANTINOS KALAMBOKIAS TO CARRY OUT A REORGANIZATION IN THE GREEK EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.

(D) THE REGIME IS ABOUT TO RESHUFFLE THE CABINET TO REPLACE SOME OF THE LESS PRODUCTIVE MINISTERS BUT IT IS ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTIES IN FINDING QUALIFIED YOUNGER CANDIDATES (43 TO 45 YEARS OF AGE) FOR APPOINTMENT TO HIGH GOVERNMENT POSTS WITHIN THE MINISTRIES AND THE QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BANKS. THIS SEARCH ALSO REQUIRES TIME AND THE NEW APPOINTEES MUST BE ASSURED SUFFICIENT TIME IN OFFICE TO PERFORM EFFECTIVELY.

3. PAPADOPOULOS DISCOUNTED ANY DANGER THAT THE REGIME WILL BE BROUGHT DOWN FROM WITHIN BY THE YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS, SO LONG AS PAPADOPOULOS REMAINS IN THE LEADERSHIP. PAPADOPOULOS ADMITTED THAT THE REGIME HAD COMMITTED SOME INJUSTICES IN ITS EARLIER PURGES OF THE MILITARY BUT HE STATED THAT THE REGIME PLANS TO REAPPOINT MANY OFFICERS WHOM IT HAD EARLIER RETIRED AND THAT, IN FUTURE PURGES, THE REGIME WILL BE MORE CAREFUL IN ITS SCREENING PROCESS.

4. ON RELATIONS WITH KING KONSTANTINOS, PAPADOPOULOS COMMENTED

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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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THAT THE KING VACILLATES BETWEEN WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME AND HESITANCY AND RELUCTANCE IN THIS REGARD. PAPADOPOULOS SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE SEES THE KING FREQUENTLY AND HE FEELS THAT HE IS IN A POSITION TO GUIDE THE KING AND OBTAIN SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT WITH HIM ON THE MAIN ISSUES.

5. ☐ DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

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CITE

DIST 9 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY : GREECE

DOI : AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT : GREEK MILITARY REGIME CONFRONTATION WITH KING
CONSTANTINE

S

ACQ :

SOURCE :

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-282
By 128, NARA, Date 4-14-10

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(classification)

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(dissem controls)

1. SUMMARY: [] AUGUST 1967 KEY GREEK GOVERNMENT FIGURES MET WITH KING CONSTANTINE AT HIS ATHENS PALACE IN WHAT AMOUNTED TO A SHOWDOWN OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RÉGIME AND THE THRONE. THE MILITARY RÉGIME, DISTURBED OVER GROWING INDICATIONS THAT THE KING IS WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH THE RÉGIME, PRESENTED A BILL OF PARTICULARS ON ALLEGED ACTIONS OF THE KING, DEMANDED CLARIFICATION, AND RECEIVED A PLEDGE FROM THE KING THAT HE WAS NOT IMPOSING ANY OBSTACLES TO THE PROSECUTION OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN FULFILLMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 21 APRIL COUP.

2. [] AUGUST 1967 MINISTER []

[] AND MINISTER []

[] EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS SEVERE PRESSURE FROM KING CONSTANTINE, PRIME MINISTER KONSTANTINOS KOLLIAS, AND AMERICAN AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS TALBOT UPON THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. []

[] THESE PRESSURES WERE FOR THE IMMEDIATE RESTORATION OF A FREE PRESS, CHANGING OF RÉGIME IDEAS ON THE SHAPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, AND SPEEDING UP THE PROCESS;

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AND [REDACTED] THESE PRESSURES WERE BEING EXERTED WITHOUT PROPER APPRECIATION OF THE FACT THAT A RETURN TO A CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM MUST BE PRECEDED BY A PERIOD OF UNPREDICTABLE DURATION IN WHICH THE MILITARY RÉGIME MUST CARRY OUT THE REFORMS NECESSITATED BY THE SITUATION WHICH PROVOKED THE 21 APRIL COUP. MOREOVER, THERE MUST BE TIME TO PREPARE FOR AN ORDERLY POLITICAL SUCCESSION, BY THE RÉGIME OR ITS CHOSEN POLITICAL HEIRS AS DESIGNATED IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH PREREQUISITIES, THE RÉGIME CANNOT CONSIDER YIELDING TO PRESSURE AND IN FACT IS WELL AWARE THAT IF IT DID, IT WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE OVERTHROWN BY ITS OWN SUPPORTERS AMONG THE MORE JUNIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE EVEN THREATENED TO KILL PAPADOPOULOS IF HE "BETRAYS THE REVOLUTION." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE RÉGIME DID NOT TAKE ALL THE RISKS OF THE 21 APRIL COUP FOR THE PURPOSE OF QUICKLY RESTORING THE GREEK SITUATION TO THE SAME VENAL AND LEFTIST-INFLUENCED PARTIES FROM WHOM IT WAS TEMPORARILY SAVED. MOREOVER, UNTIL THE NECESSARY REFORMS CAN BE EFFECTED, THE MILITARY RÉGIME AND ITS SUPPORTERS HAVE NO GUARANTEE THAT THEIR OWN NECKS WILL NOT BE ON THE BLOCK WITH A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT.

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(classification)

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3. [] AUGUST THE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP HELD A LONG
DISCUSSION WITH KING CONSTANTINE IN HIS ATHENS PALACE, []

[]

A MILD

SECURITY ALERT WAS MEANWHILE CALLED THROUGHOUT THE GREEK ARMED
FORCES. AT THIS MEETING THE GOVERNMENT LEADERS LAID BEFORE THE
KING A FULL LISTING OF THE KING'S ALLEGED ANTI-RÉGIME
STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES, AND DEMANDED THAT THE KING
CLARIFY HIS POSTURE TOWARDS THE RÉGIME, INCLUDING HIS VIEWS
ON PRESS CENSORSHIP, AN IMPENDING GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE,
AND OTHER MEASURES ON WHICH THEY FEEL THEY MUST HAVE A FREE HAND.

4. THE KING REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT TO BLAME FOR VARIOUS
STORIES BEING CIRCULATED BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER PANAGIOTIS
KANELLOPOULOS, MANUFACTURER GEORGIOS DRAKOS, AND OTHERS,

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(dissem controls)

TO THE EFFECT THAT THE KING WAS THE FOCUS OF POPULAR SENTIMENT AGAINST THE RÉGIME. THE KING THEN GAVE HIS WORD OF HONOR THAT HE THOROUGHLY ENDORSED THE RÉGIME AND WOULD NOT IMPOSE ANY OBSTACLES TO ITS PROSECUTION OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN FULFILLMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COUP. THE RÉGIME LEADERS THEN TOLD THE KING THAT THEY MUST STAY IN POWER AS LONG AS WAS NEEDED TO CARRY OUT THEIR OBJECTIVES, WHETHER IT BE TWO, THREE, OR EVEN FIVE YEARS. THE KING INTERPOSED NO OBJECTION. THE MEETING THEN BROKE UP AND THE SECURITY ALERT WAS LIFTED. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] AUGUST IT WAS [REDACTED] STATED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THE RÉGIME HAD HELD TWO LONG CONFERENCES, AT ONE OF WHICH TEMPER BECAME SO HEATED THAT MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DREW THEIR PISTOLS. THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE CONFERENCES WERE BELIEVED TO BE (A) PRESS FREEDOM, WHICH MOST OF THE COUNCIL OPPOSE, (B) A GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE TO REMOVE ALL INCOMPETENTS, INCLUDING

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LABOR MINISTER ALEXANDROS LEKKAS, FINANCE MINISTER ADAMANDIOS ANDROUTSOPOULOS, WELFARE MINISTER EVANGELOS POULANDZAS, COMMERCE MINISTER GEORGIOS PAPADIMITRAKOPOULOS, AND PUBLIC ORDER MINISTER PAVLOS TOTOMIS, AND (C) PAPADOPOULOS' PLAN TO REPLACE THE MINISTRY TO THE PRIME MINISTER WITH AN OMNIPOTENT MINISTRY OF DIRECTION AND POLICY (OR GOVERNMENT ORIENTATION AND POLICY) HEADED BY PAPADOPOULOS AND INCLUDING THREE DIVISIONS-COORDINATION UNDER COLONEL KONSTANTINOS KARYDAS, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION UNDER BRIGADIER GENERAL ILIAS PAPAPOULOS, AND POLICY UNDER (FNU) OIKONOMOPOULOS. [] COMMENT: THE LATTER IS PROBABLY NOT THE ELDERLY JURIST, INDUSTRY MINISTER NIKOLAOS OIKONOMOPOULOS, BUT A MILITARY OFFICER CLOSE TO PAPADOPOULOS.)

6. [] DISSEM: STATE ARMY EUCOM CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL)
CINCUSNAVEUR CINCPACAFSA USAREUR USAF []

[]
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

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161

Defense

163

Memos & Misc.

164
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wait:

Mike Manatos asked how he should reply to George Vournas' proposal that the President receive Andreas Papandreou.

I showed Vournas' letter privately to Luke. He'll be sending a Read-Rostow memo on the general problem of handling Andreas here, but he has also agreed to my line in the attached reply to Mike.

I also had a go-round on the general subject of Andreas' visit with Jim Critchfield. His memo is also attached.

Hal

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-77
By ins, NARA, Date 10-7-04

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE MANATOS

SUBJECT: Your Reply to George Vournas on Andreas Papandreou

I suggest you reply orally to Vournas' proposal (attached) that the President see Andreas saying we can't fit Andreas into the President's schedule, but other officials will be glad to see him and want to hear what he has to say. You might leave it vague whether someone in the White House will see him. I would be the logical one, I guess, but I think we ought to offer this only if he and his friends press. State's tentative plan is for Luke Battle to receive him and for Nick Katzenbach to see him socially if need be.

This whole business is tricky because we want to give Andreas enough attention to satisfy his friends without letting them use us. On the one hand, most friends of Andreas feel that State and CIA are so committed against him that only the White House will give him a fair shake. So he almost has to see someone here if we're going to give the impression that he's had a fair hearing. On the other, his friends will use any White House meeting the way Evans and Novak used the meeting you set up here for George Plytas. (Quite frankly, the enmity of US diplomats and CIA for Andreas does not stem--as George Vournas says--from his failure to back NATO, but from a feeling that he can't be trusted, and his most recent blow-off in Paris doesn't make people feel any less that way.)

The trouble with Vournas' proposal is that it seems terribly naive. The notion that, if the President sees Andreas, "the political climate in Greece will change overnight" just doesn't square with our estimate of the junta's control. It sounds like about as bad a judgment as the King's on December 13. We don't think Andreas has the power--even if we did back him--to do much about the situation in Greece. All backing him would achieve would be to get us thrown out for good.

Most of Andreas' friends--or Greek exiles like Plytas--that we've heard from seem reluctantly to admit that we won't help anybody by slamming our door on the junta. They feel we should hear Andreas out, but even an Andreas supporter like Carl Kaysen thinks it would be a bad idea if he even saw Secretary Rusk.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-230

By 4418 NAR. Date 05-26-2016

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- 2 -

Even if Vournas' idea would work, it would be serious business for the USG to take an active role in the traditional Greek political struggle between monarchy and democracy by raising our flag over Andreas. This is serious business, which we have decided to stay out of. A year ago when faced with proposals to involve ourselves in the then impending election, we decided to stand clear. I still think this is the right posture.

I'm fully aware of the pressures that our pro-Andreas friends can loose on us under the banner of returning democracy to Greece. However, we do have to operate within the framework of what is possible. On the one hand, the junta controls Greece and is capable of taking Greece into a more independent stance à la de Gaulle. On the other, the King by his own ineffectiveness has thrown away any serious chance of influencing the Greek scene, and he cannot now return to Greece on his own say-so or under Andreas' wing. Should we do what we can with the men in charge or join the exiles by throwing in our lot with them? Andreas' friends are influential and make a lot of noise, but I gather that AHEPA has pretty much come to terms with the junta's rule.

Therefore, we'll try to keep any contacts with Andreas Papandreou within appropriate bounds. We want to see him and hear what he has to say, but we don't want to stake our future in Greece on him. We also have to be careful about walking into meetings with him that he can later use to his advantage and our embarrassment.

I'm attaching a CIA memo on the subject of Andreas' visit and will send you State's memo when it arrives.


W. W. Rostow

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

164-B

February 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

FROM: Mike Manatos ~~M.M.~~

The attached letter from George Vournas is self-explanatory.

Whether or not this is the time to move will have to be decided by experts other than me. I want to say, however, that William G. Helis is one of the most successful oil men in the country and does have access to the Royal Family. Vournas, on the other hand, has connections with the Papandreou group. Whether he would be skilled enough to act as a sounding board or to negotiate, I do not know. He is an unusually intelligent individual.

*Original letter attached returned to
Mike Manatos with W W Rostow
memo of 2/21/68.*

LAW OFFICES OF
GEORGE C. VOURNAS
INVESTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

164-c

February 12th, 1968

Mr. Mike N. Manatos
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mike:

The Evans-Novak column of today in The Washington Post, to which your attention had been invited, shows the general thinking of people in regard to the situation in Greece.

It seems to me that there are two avenues open to the United States: (a) through the King, and essentially the forces of the right; and (b) through the great mass of the Greek people, whose symbol is Andreas Papandreou.

It is my view that the return of the King to Greece, while having some short-term advantages, may react against U. S. interest in the long run, thereby endangering our very presence in the Aegean. Whatever is decided, it must be done and done in a hurry -- the command for this type of operation to be vested in The White House rather than the State Department, C.I.A. or the Pentagon.

Whether the problem is approached under "a" or "b", the services of William G. Helis, Jr. could be valuable. He has the advantage of private wealth, and contacts with both the Royal Family and the democratic left (through the writer).

As ever, yours,

George C. Vournas

GCV/mwe

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

164-d

February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

FROM: Mike Manatos *M. M.*

I am probably getting more deeply involved in Greek politics than I have right to be. How do you suggest that I respond to George Vournas?

Original letter attached returned to Mike Manatos with W W Rostow memo of 2/21/68.

LAW OFFICES OF
GEORGE C. VOURNAS
INVESTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

164-e

February 14th, 1968

Mr. Mike N. Manatos
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Re: Greek situation

Dear Mike:

Pardon me for returning to the problem. I was informed that Mr. Andreas Papandreou is a scheduled speaker at the A.D.A. dinner to be held at the Sheraton-Park Hotel on Saturday, March 9th.

I became somewhat perturbed by this development -- especially after the endorsement of Senator McCarthy by the A.D.A. hierarchy -- but I found that the invitation and acceptance occurred three weeks ago. To cancel would create more problems than it would solve, so I think it is best that the engagement be honored. I am sure that Papandreou will find some way to dissociate himself from all domestic U. S. politics.

In view of these developments, I wish to emphasize:

1. Since U. S. policies in Greece have been based on an erroneous premise from the beginning -- alleged communist expansion as contrasted with the now-demonstrated reality that Churchill's insistence on the return of the dynasty inspired fears that Greece would be delivered to rightist reaction -- a reappraisal by the summit is absolutely necessary. The present plight of Greece is more than 50% American-made. The high-school dropout King brought about power seizure through acts of his intended to discredit representative government. He was too stupid to realize that his throne, too, would go if representative government was eliminated.

2. The erroneously-premised U. S. policies were the beneficiaries of the compounding talents of Messrs. Acheson and Dulles, so that with the passage of time, became almost sanctified. With each passing year more myths were added to "cover up" previous ones, with the result that while public opinion abroad is quite conversant with the facts, the American public is just beginning to glance at them as at long last the curtain is being lifted. (I take it that you read the article in the Sunday Post by a cold war warrior, Professor D. George Kousoulas, entitled, "What Shattered Stalin's Monolith?")

3. It is incontrovertible that U. S. presence in Greece can only pay dividends if based on its free acceptance by the Greek people. The enmity of U.S. diplomats and the C.I.A. in Greece against Andreas Papandreou flows from the fact

February 14th, 1968

that he did not oblige by coming out for NATO even though the ones offering the advice knew that compliance would have meant political suicide. That being the case, all effort must be directed toward changing the feelings of the Greek people on the score, instead of penalizing the leaders. The Greek people do not object to the American presence in Greece per se; they welcome it. What they do object to is the alliance of the United States with the status quo and the dynasty. After nearly twenty years of policies premised on error, the crossroads at long last have been reached. Either U. S. policy will be for the Greek people -- when U. S. presence there will be unassailable -- or it will be with the Palace and the rightist gang, when dictatorship in some form is unavoidable.

4. Policy and execution must be brought in harmony with reality. The opportunity is provided by the Papandreu visit, and the most spectacular and dramatic way to herald the change would be for the President to receive Papandreu with all the fanfare that is usually attendant to a White House visit. It will serve as notice to the dynasty and the rightists that American chips are on the side of democracy (and that means the Greek people), and not to any rightist faction or the dynasty. When that happens, the teeth of the serpent of the extreme left will also be removed, and there will be only one way for them to go -- and that is the democratic way. Communist containments have been tried and have failed everywhere. The antidote to communism is not containment -- which creates martyrs and glorifications -- but democracy.

Once Mr. Papandreu is received, the entire political climate in Greece will change overnight. It is possible that the junta -- a lower-echelon officer group whose chief collective characteristic, according to a U. S. journalist who met them, is colossal ignorance -- may, in order to save their very heads, decide to go leftward by releasing prisoners and fading away. (There is something in the air on this latter point, because I was approached by persons claiming to express the inner thoughts of the junta and was sounded out whether the American committees for democracy would support the junta were the junta to restore civil liberties in Greece. Obviously similar soundings were made to the Honorable Francis Biddle, because he spoke to me on the telephone prior to his departure for warmer climates, that it might be wise for us to reach some accommodation with the junta, thereby saving Greece from a civil war and the United States from further complications in that part of the world. Be that as it may, I indicated, speaking for myself, that I would do all in my power to urge amnesty for one and all involved in the movement were the junta to restore civil rights and representative government in Greece.)

5. It is customary for any distinguished visitor visiting the United States who is received by the President, to be presented by the Ambassador of his country. Since the Greek Ambassador of today is a junta man and, as such, mandatorily excluded from any of these contacts, I hope it will be possible for the President to extend me the honor of bringing Mr. Papandreu to The White House. I acted similarly for a Foreign Minister of Greece with the Speaker (the late Sam Rayburn) when he had visited the United States on the occasion of the organizational meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco.

February 14th, 1968

6. In this connection The White House may very well use the services of William G. Helis, Jr. to apply balm and analgesic to Royal feelings -- and Frederika in particular. I know of no other person who can do that better than Bill.

7. If and when the above recommendations are adopted, there will be a new ballgame not only in Greece, but the world over in a lesser sense. A change of U. S. policies in Greece will receive worldwide approbation, particularly in university and college circles, where the most vociferous opponents of the administration are to be found.

With kindest personal regards,

As ever, yours,

George C. Vournas

GCV/mwe

~~SECRET~~

AIDE MEMOIRE

164-f

SUBJECT: Andreas PAPANDREOU's Visit to U.S.

1. On 9 March 1968, Andreas PAPANDREOU is expected to be a principal speaker at a dinner sponsored by the Americans for Democratic Action in Washington. Based on PAPANDREOU's various statements to the press since his release from prison in December 1967, this event is likely to serve as a major propaganda forum for PAPANDREOU and his supporters who are opposed to the present regime in Greece.

2. Although PAPANDREOU says he expects to spend the greater part of his projected month-long visit to the United States on a "fact-finding" mission in Washington, it is probable that he will take every opportunity to press his case against U.S. policy toward Greece via press conferences, contacts with U.S. Senators and Representatives, and public appearances under the aegis of various committees formed to oppose the present Greek government.

3. The main thrust of PAPANDREOU's argumentation is expected to be directed against the policy pursued by the United States, i.e., the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Athens, and the C.I.A., toward Greece--and specifically toward him--since 1961. He will probably contend that the U.S. Embassy--especially Ambassador Talbot--and the C.I.A. have consistently opposed him and misrepresented his statements and policies, particularly in their reporting that he is anti-West, anti-NATO, and anti-U.S. He will deny the existence of any significant communist problem in Greece prior to the 21 April 1967 coup and will undoubtedly imply that the U.S. supported the coup and possibly the King's attempted counter-coup in December 1967 as well. And he will continue to deny his private statement to Ambassador Talbot that the U.S. has no alternative but to maintain correct relations with the Greek Junta. He will also deny that he gave his assurances to Minister of Interior PATTAKOS (prior to his leaving Greece) that he would refrain from any political activity abroad. Additionally, PAPANDREOU will no doubt deny his admission to PATTAKOS that he had collaborated with the communists in his pre-21 April bid for electoral power.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-229

By 448 NARA, Date 12-13-12

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4. While PAPANDREOU can claim the support of an assortment of recently established ad hoc committees, it is doubtful that he could rely on any effective organizational support from any but the A.D.A. and the U.S. Committee for Democracy in Greece (Melina Mercouri, Francis Biddle, Victor Reuther). On the other hand, the largest Greek American organization in the United States--the American Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association (AHEPA)--has not expressed opposition to the present regime in Greece; has acknowledged the need for the 21 April coup; and has reconciled itself with the fact that Greece will have to undergo a period of military rule before democracy could be safely re-established. In Western Europe, external resistance organizations formed by Greek exiles have not yet coalesced into a cohesive group. Although these resistance groups in Europe include members of PAPANDREOU's Center Union Party, by and large the leadership is in the hands of the better organized United Democratic Front (Greek Communist front party).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 12, 1968

165

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

SUBJECT: Evans-Novak Column This Morning

Evans and Novak are off on Greece again. I suspect they are being fed by a wild Greek journalist who is now here (Demetricopolos) and maybe some other of Andreas Papandreou's friends here. Since they do ^{mention} important secret meetings in the White House, you ought to have the following facts as background.

The Greek visitor in question approached Mike Manatos and Mike referred him to Walt. Walt agreed to see him but was too busy that morning on Korea and passed him on to me. My memcon is attached.

If this subject comes up, I should think you could take the following general line on a background basis:

1. Plytas did talk to several people while he was in Washington. He met with a member of Walt Rostow's staff, but the Evans-Novak description ("extended meeting with Plytas well beyond its allotted time") is overdrawn. Members of the staff talk to all kinds of people in order to understand all viewpoints.

2. We have received no request to see Andreas Papandreou. If he came to Washington, U.S. officials would obviously want to talk with him. (State has no request either.)

3. We don't know specifically what the Greek exiles may be planning.



Harold H. Saunders

- Att: 1. Evans-Novak column, Washington Post, 2/12/68, "Greek Left and Right Exiles United to Woo U.S. From Support of Junta"
2. Cy, Memcon by Harold H. Saunders, 1/29/68, with George Plytas, ex-Mayor of Athens.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By fe, NARA, Date 12-11-03

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165a
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Greek Left and Right Exiles Unite To Woo U.S. From Support of Junta

THE NEW DETERMINATION by exiled Greek politicians to forget past differences and forge an alliance against the military dictatorship in Athens is clearly seen in an extraordinary request privately submitted to top Johnson Administration officials.

In a series of secret meetings over the last three weeks, these officials were asked by an exile emissary to receive Andreas Papandreou — the left-of-center Greek leader now exiled in Paris who never has been a favorite of the State Department—when he comes to the United States.

What made this request so remarkable was the identity of the exile emissary: George Plytas, the highly conservative former Mayor of Athens whose ties to King Constantine (exiled in Rome) are intimate. Inasmuch as palace-oriented politicians such as Plytas considered Papandreou a Red-tinged enemy of the monarchy before the coup of the colonels last April, this means the extreme edges of the old Greek political spectrum are coalescing against the military junta.

This was an eye-opener for key policymakers here. The Plytas mission showed that the Democratic Greek Right as well as the Left fears that continued military rule in Athens in time will lead to a Communist-led armed resistance and a renewal of the Greek civil war—a terrible prospect pooh-poohed by the State Department until now.

PLYTAS, WHO FLED Greece after the unsuccessful



Novak

Evans

But Plytas is well aware that whatever exile alliances are forged in Europe will mean nothing if they are opposed by Washington. Furthermore, there is some fear that the mercurial Papandreou might get enveloped in a popular front including Communists if he is rebuffed and the junta is embraced by the U.S. Government.

Accordingly, in his meetings at the State Department and the White House, Plytas sharply criticized the resumption of U.S. diplomatic relations with the Athens junta and pleaded with the United States not to resume full military aid. Backing up these arguments, he gave policy makers information quite different from the pro-junta dispatches coming from the U.S. Embassy in Athens.

The prospect of a Popular Front armed resistance inside Greece—under covert control of the Communists—is nearing, Plytas informed U.S. officials. He has fully substantiated evidence that a warchest has been raised (perhaps with Communist Party help) in Western Europe and an attempt made to purchase a large

quantity of arms in Milan.

That attempt failed, but a willing arms merchant will be found sooner or later. In Greek guerrilla fighting, there is some question how much popular support would be given the military government and how effective would be the army minus so many senior officers purged for suspected disloyalty to the ruling colonels.

THE IMPACT of the Plytas mission was considerable. At the height of the Pueblo crisis, one key White House adviser extended his meeting with Plytas well beyond the allotted time. As for that request, he was assured that Papandreou would be received by top policymakers if he visited Washington (despite opposition from Daniel Brewster, the notoriously pro-junta Greek desk officer in the State Department).

But the Brewsters in the State Department are not alone. They are backed by influential congressmen and American businessmen led by the politically potent Litton Industries, which signed a development contract with the Greek government shortly after the April coup. Just how strong they are will soon be determined by Washington's official attitude toward the new coalition of Greek exile politicians attempting to avert catastrophe in their homeland.

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This poignant "Fa

ful royal counter-coup of last December, has now returned to Europe to try to build the broad anti-junta coalition. His first step will be to see Papandreu and convince him of the necessity to cooperate with his arch-enemy, the former conservative Premier Constantine Caramanlis (also exiled), under the general leadership of the King.

Conservative exiles believe Papandreu, whose demagogic oratory against the King helped precipitate the April coup, has modified his anti-royalist stance. What may take considerable negotiation is getting Papandreu to accept even King Constantine's nominal leadership.

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165-16

CONFIDENTIAL

January 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. George Plytas, ex-Mayor of Athens
Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Plytas had come to see Mr. Rostow. Mr. Rostow met him briefly but had to excuse himself to handle other urgent business so I spent an hour and a quarter with him discussing the situation in Greece.

He began by describing his own experience with the military regime. After the April coup at the request of the regime, he had retained his dual position as Mayor of Athens and President of the association of all Greek municipalities. His main disagreement with the regime developed over the regime's efforts to dismiss a large number of municipal councils and to replace them with friendly nonentities. Mr. Plytas was in Strasbourg at a meeting of a sub-committee of the Council of Europe when King Constantine launched his counter-coup on December 13. He went to Rome to see the King, was asked twice by the military regime to resume his duties in Athens and was replaced when he refused.

He said his purpose in coming to the US was to describe the situation in Greece and support the return of the King. He believes the military regime intends to stay in power for some time. He does not think the Constitution will be a genuine effort to return to full civil liberties and representative government. He does not believe the conservatives, of which he is one, will be able to overthrow this regime. The Communists, he believes, do have the potential to overthrow it. Whether they have the opportunity will depend on how soon the military regime returns the country to Constitutional government.

When we discussed the role of the King, he said--based on his own conversations with the King--that the King should remain outside the country until his conditions for return are met. He personally felt that the King had not set stiff enough conditions, but he bowed to the King's views on this subject. Plytas has a substantial insurance business in Greece which he has left behind; he says he will not return until the King can.

In discussing the US role, he showed mild displeasure over our having resumed normal diplomatic contacts, but at the same time, he did not feel we should cut ourselves off completely from the government at Athens. In response to my question on what role we should play in

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- 2 -

the future, he said he did not think that we should resume military aid and he hoped we would discourage private investment.

On the latter point, he cited the fact that the junta had made much of our "excepting" Greece from our controls on private investment in our new balance of payments program. Even though I explained that our criteria had been purely economic and were unrelated to the present political situation in Greece, he said that the regime had taken political advantage of our "exception." He suggested that we privately discourage American money from going into Greece until constitutional processes had been restored. He suggested that this could be done through the financial community without the USG's getting openly involved. When I asked whether he felt we should encourage damage to the long-range economic development of Greece for the sake of making a temporary political point, he hedged and said we should subtly discourage capital from going to Greece for the time being.

Comment: Mr. Plytas seemed moderate and not emotionally critical of our posture, though there is an undercurrent of feeling that somehow we ought to have less to do with the military regime. He clearly did not act as if he had any specific message from the King to deliver (despite that was the impression he gave Mr. Manatos when arranging the appointment). He said he was here to talk to anybody interested in the situation in Greece and to do what he can to explain the dangerous forces at work there. When I described our dilemma and the tightrope we felt we must walk between blessing the regime and slamming the door on it, he agreed that our options are limited, although he did seem to feel that the options of the regime are similarly limited and that we should not fear their walking out of NATO.

I think he left with the feeling that he had met his responsibilities here; he did not ask to see the President or anyone else and seemed to have nothing more to say. He doesn't seem likely to attack the Administration openly, but his reservations about our posture may well feed those who want to.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mike Manatos
John Walsh
Dan Brewster
WWRostow

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

The Greek Junta: Its Problems and Prospects

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-127-1-27

By is NARA, Date 10-18-01

~~Secret~~

29

19 January 1968
No. 0578/68

Background Use Only

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 January 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Greek Junta: Its Problems and Prospects

Summary

With nearly nine months of rule under their belt, the leaders of the "21 April revolution" in Greece appear to have settled in for an extended stay. The junta's defeat of King Constantine's ill-fated counter coup attempt in December removed the only apparent mechanism for focusing resistance to its rule, at least from outside its ranks.

Many of the problems the junta has at home were inherited from the chaotic situation existing before it seized control. It has set as its basic goal the total reform of the country's economic, political, and social institutions--an objective it will almost certainly be unable to realize. Steps taken thus far toward this end have enabled the junta to forestall any immediate threat from domestic opposition and it can probably overcome the discontent of those extremists in its own ranks who think the cause is being betrayed.

Nevertheless, the regime is impatient and nervous about some of the problems it faces. It is baffled by its failure to win friends abroad and has indicated that it will not wait indefinitely for acceptance by its NATO allies, and

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particularly by the US. Prime Minister Papadopoulos, irritated by the lack of US recognition, is reported to have said that if some sign of recognition were not forthcoming by 20 January, he would show the Americans that "we mean business." He did not specify what action he had in mind.

Although the junta's long-term tenure remains questionable, most Greeks reportedly accept its control and will probably be moved to significant protest only if the regime clearly fails to show movement toward the objectives it has set.

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The Regime's Frustration in Its Foreign Relations

1. Since the junta took power last April, its principal problem has been with its allies. The open disapproval of the military regime by some NATO governments and the grudging acceptance by others have produced an increasing sense of frustration. Possibly in response to this adverse reaction from its friends, the government has moved to draft a new constitution, which at least in its initial form retains the basic institutions of a constitutional monarchy. Further, the regime has declared it will hold a national referendum as soon as practical before 15 September. Soon after the King's abortive attempt to oust the junta, the regime released its most prominent detainee, Andreas Papandreou, presumably to satisfy some of its foreign critics.

2. The regime obviously believes these steps toward "democracy" should convince its friends of its good intentions. Prime Minister Papadopoulos so far has fended off some of his hard-line colleagues who are less sensitive to the need for outside support.

3. Nevertheless, the regime has let it be known that it will not wait indefinitely for signs of acceptance from its NATO allies, and specifically from the US. Prime Minister Papadopoulos reportedly is unwilling to wait beyond 20 January for a favorable sign of US recognition. If some sign is not forthcoming, Papadopoulos reportedly said he will then show the Americans that "we mean business." Other reports have suggested that the action might take the form of a statement that Greece had been "ejected" from NATO. The regime, however, has just circulated to the NATO representatives assurances that it remains loyal to NATO. The US rather than NATO thus seems likely to be the target, and press reports hinting at this began to surface in Athens on 17 January.

4. Papadopoulos' range of options, however, does not seem wide. His regime can make life difficult for US installations in Greece, and he could

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attempt to embarrass the US with public censure of Washington in retaliation for the criticism to which he believes Greece is being subjected. There have even been suggestions that the regime might espouse Gaullism--a semiofficial emissary from Paris is reported to have brought a message from De Gaulle. The regime's vocal and vehement anti-Communism would stand in the way of a move toward "Nasirism," however, as some other observers have suggested.

The Regime's Domestic Problems and Its Attacks on Them

5. The junta faces serious problems, many of them inherited from the chaotic situation existing before the take-over last April. These will demand considerable time, energy, and administrative talent to resolve. Moreover, the fact that the regime has established the "total" reform of Greek society as its basic goal complicates its position. By professing an intention to overhaul completely all aspects of the country's economic, political, and social institutions, the regime has almost certainly bitten off more than it can chew.

6. The specific economic and social problems are generally those which confronted previous regimes. The gross national product has risen impressively in recent years, but the economy has basic vulnerabilities--a dearth of natural resources, a low level of industrial production, a highly unfavorable balance of trade, and overdependence on foreign investment. The regime has gained at least a temporary psychological advantage regarding economic problems with its simplification and lowering of income taxes. The Greek regime reasserted the primacy of private enterprise, actively encouraged foreign capital, and introduced highly important measures designed to reduce the gap between rural and urban incomes.

7. Socially, the regime has focused on two sectors--the church and the schools. Both of these institutions are conservative, even stubborn in their outlook. The junta early moved to bring new, enlightened leadership to the church with its installation of a highly respected archbishop whose views are

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more progressive. Although little movement has come in the educational field, reforms in university administration were instituted in early December which resumed some of the force of the program of the Papan-dreuou government. On balance, the junta's objectives in these areas now seem more tangible and clearly enunciated than before, when its goals were expressed in generalities and seemed the result of varied ideological considerations.

8. A political cleanup continues to be the prime objective of the junta leadership. From the outset, the regime has tried to purge the country's political institutions of what it regards as the effects of the "corrupt" personalities and inadequate policies of previous regimes. Generally disdainful of politicians of all persuasions, the junta banned political activity; Communists, left-wing sympathizers, and even heretofore "respectable" conservative political figures were jailed or placed under house arrest, and violators were subject to punishment by military tribunals. Criticism of the regime was stifled by press censorship, and the regime intends to reform the venal precoup press.

9. The past cooperation of the Palace with political elements also made the monarchy suspect, and the King quickly found some of his previous influence in the army overshadowed by the junta's power. The King periodically was confronted with military retirement lists which, in the circumstances of his straitened position, he found expedient to sign in spite of the inclusion of officers whom he believed should be retained. In these and other ways, the King's position was severely undermined by the 21 April coup, and his abortive countercoup attempt in December has left him virtually isolated in exile in Rome. The junta has not completely barred the door to his return, nor has the King burned his bridges with the top junta leaders. If he does come back, he is likely at best to reign rather than rule.

10. Virtually every section of government at both the national and local levels has felt the effects of the coup. Officials in district and local

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government have been replaced by projunta nonarchs (governors) and mayors, many of whom were ex-military officers. Control elements, again usually military officers, were established in the various ministries and agencies to maintain surveillance over hundreds if not thousands of "politically tainted" career professionals, many of whom were removed or transferred to lesser positions.

11. Even the military establishment itself has been included in the "political cleanup." The officer corps and security forces have been subjected to periodic forced early retirement and transfer of men not believed to be in sympathy with the regime. Where opposition, chiefly from the King, prevented any such move, projunta monitors were placed in key positions within command elements to observe any antiregime activity. This paid off, at least in the short term, in blocking the King's move of 13 December. Most of the officers who opposed the junta have now been removed.

12. While it has been enforcing these and other measures and apparently consolidating its control, the regime at the same time has insisted that its rule is temporary. Upon completion of the reforms, regime spokesmen reiterate, the government will return the country to "democratic" institutions. That promise is the regime's major political hurdle.

13. In the early weeks of its rule, the junta appointed a commission to draft a new constitution for submission to the government by mid-December 1967. The government received the draft a few days after the King's countercoup attempt, and announced that a referendum would be held on or before 15 September 1968. Presumably the regime will set the date for new elections upon promulgation of the constitution, but it has been deliberately hazy on this point. A recently obtained copy of the draft constitution shows relatively little basic change from the constitution of 1952. The King's powers are reduced to some degree, a constitutional court is instituted, and the freedom and "obligations" of the press are more strictly defined, as are other individual rights such as those of assembly and association. The executive was not strengthened to the degree anticipated.

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Reaction to the Junta's Works

14. The junta's performance to date has met with varying reactions. The regime apparently has won the respect, if not the admiration, of the apathetic Greek populace by its "clean sweep" tactics, combined with its public commitment to return to constitutionality. The repeated assurances on the latter score, however, along with the present draft of the new constitution appear to have contributed to a split between the "moderates," controlled by Premier Papadopoulos, and a group of extremists. This group apparently under the leadership of Colonel Ladas, the secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order, is critical of Papadopoulos' conciliatory attitude toward the King and was probably chiefly responsible for the exclusion from the pre-Christmas amnesty of suspect Communists, who remain in detention. The Ladas group reportedly further believes that only an extended period of military rule can bring about real reform. Papadopoulos believes he can curb this group and has indicated he will put it down if it continues to interfere, but he clearly must take account of the sentiment for "root and branch" change which the group represents.

Prospects

15. In an immediate sense the regime's domestic prospects appear to be good. At present no political element seems capable of effective protest. The only observable alternative in the short run seems to be an uprising of another group of officers which is even less inclined than the present group to move toward parliamentary government.

16. Economically, the junta appears to have gained at least temporary advantage from the stimulus generated by its programs which have been initially well received by the man in the street and, which, if carried through, will probably generate additional popular support.

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17. Socially, the junta still must demonstrate a capability for carrying out broad reform of an antiquated educational system, particularly at the elementary and secondary levels. It also faces a formidable task in attempting to give new life to the church, an extremely conservative establishment populated by a corrupt and poorly educated clergy. These areas presumably require the assistance of trained professionals, a group that the regime has shown little inclination to recruit as yet.

18. In its foreign relations, the junta's course clearly will depend in large part on the attitudes of Greece's allies. As a practical matter, a sharp realignment of Greek foreign policy would involve difficult adjustments, especially in the military establishment on which the junta basically depends. It is nonetheless clear that the junta is determined to press its "revolution" as far as it can, regardless of foreign criticism, and that it feels forced to move toward a more independent policy.

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