

167
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Greece

The question of recognition seems to be coming to a head.

This afternoon's manifestation of the problem is that Phil Talbot has simply asked permission to acknowledge directly to the Prime Minister the letter that came from him to the President via Tom Pappas. Nick Katzenbach may be calling you about this and I think this is the bare minimum we can do. Tomorrow we will be getting the draft reply to Papadopoulos that the President asked for. Since this whole recognition question has been moving fast, Luke Battle did not want to send over the draft which is ready until he could make a clear recommendation on whether and how to transmit it.

That's tomorrow's business. For the moment I just want to alert you to this problem and prepare you for Nick's call.

Hal
Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-11-03*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS ATTACHMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

186
[Signature]
168
January 12, 1968

Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

Attached herewith is a
Secret/EXDIS copy of the January 11
teleconference with Embassy, Athens.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

186

168a

TELECONFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND

AMERICAN EMBASSY ATHENS

ON January 11, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-307
By Cb, NARA Date 8-4-97

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

SECSTATE ITEM 1

120230Z JAN 68

PARTICIPANTS: MR. BREWSTER
MR SCOTES

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PAPADOPOULOS

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

END ITEM 1

42
RRRRRRR ZUJ

ATHENS ITEM 1 ~~SECRET~~

A. DATE AND TIME (GMT) OF CONFERENCE:
12/0230Z.

B. NAMES OF PARTICIPANTS: AMBASSADOR TALBOT
AND MR. PETERSON.

C. SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PAPADOPOULOS.

D. CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

I HAVE DAST COME FROM TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR
SESSION WITH PAPADOPOULOS AFTER PATTAKOS
HAD ERRUPTED TO EMBOFF EARLIER TONIGHT IN
COMPLAINTS AGAINST USG POLICY TOWARD PRE-
SENT GOG AND MY OWN PLANS TO VISIT CRETE
THIS WEEKEND. PATTAKOS TELEPHONED EMBOFF
(COUNSUL PETERSON) DURING EVENING AND COM-
PLAINED THAT MY TRIP TO CRETE WHICH DUE TO
START IN MORNING SHOWED ANTI-REGIME BIAS
AS INDICATED BY FACT MY WIFE AND I WOULD
BE ACCOMPANIED BY SISTER OF ANTI-REGIME POLITICIAN
JOHN TSOUDEROS. (FACT: IN QUIESCENT
PERIOD I HAVE SCHEDULED FOUR-DAY VISIT WITH
UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPRESENTATIVE FOR
GREECE TO SOCIAL WELFARE CENTERS AND
ARCHEOLOGICAL SITES IN CRETE. ONE CHILD
CARE CENTER IS SPONSORED MY MRS. VIRGINIA
PAPADATIS, SISTER OF TSOUDEROS, WHO IN-
SISTED ON BEING PRESENT WHEN WE VISIT
CENTER AND THERFORE WAS INVITED BY ME TO
ACCOMPANY US ON FIRST LEG OF TRIP, IN
CONNECTION WITH WHICH THERE ARE NO RPT
NO POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.)

PATTAKOS ALSO SAID GOVT HAD DECIDED ISSUE
STATEMENT "EXPLAINING TO GREEK PEOPLE FACTS
ABOUT CIA AND TALBOT COMPLICITY IN EVENTS
OF DEC 13" AND ALSO TO INDICATE THAT
ALL GOM 'S NOT RECOGNIZING REGIME SHOUD
INVITE THEIR AMBASSADORS TO RETURN HOME.
WENT SO FAR
AS TO SUGGEST GOG CONSIDERING PNG. HE
ALSO SAID DEGAULLE HAD SENT EMMISSARY WITH
OVERTURES & GOG HARD PUT TO RESIST EVEN THOUGH
WOULD NOT WISH DO,SO.

PATTAKOS WENT ON TO ASSERT GOG DETERMINED
AND ABLE TO GET ALONG WITHOUT US IF NEED BE.
CONTRASTED MR "UNFRIENDLINESS" WITH GERMAN &
ISRAELI ENVOYS
WHO HAVE MADE FORMAL CALLS.

PATTAKOS STATED FLATELY IF I MADE VISIT TO CRETE
PEOOPLE THERE WOULD CREATE
EMBARRASSMENT FOR ME WHICH GOG WOULD NOT BE
ABLE TO PREVENT. URGED I NOT GO OR STATE-
MENT WOULD BE ISSUED SATURDAY. EMBOFF BOTH
OFFICIALLY AND PERSONALLY SUGGESTED GOG NOT MAKE
DIFFICULTIES SINCE THAT WOULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE.
URGED GOG NOT MAKE STATEMENT, BUT WAIT
FEW MORE DAYS, WHOLE PROBLEM ONE OF BEING PATIENT.

PATTAKOS SAID GOG HAD BEEN PATIENT ALL
THESE MONTHS AND COULD BE NO LONGER.
CONPLAINED THAT US AND OTHER NATO COUNTRY
ATTITUDES CREATING UNCERTAINTY MINDS OF PEOPLE
SINCE THEY FEAR ATTITUDE INDICATES PLANS
FOR RENEWED EFFORT TO TOPPLE REGIME. RE-
PEATED DETERMINATION AND ABILITY REGIME
TO GOVERN
COUNTRY
TFAND SAID WOULD BE SAD FOR BOTH GREECE AND US IF
SAME TURNING AWAY
OF CUNTRY FROM US TIES WERE TO OCCUR AS IN CASE
OF EGYPT AND CUBA
FOR LACK OF REALISTIC AND SINCERE POLICY.

END ITEM 1

ATHENS ITEM 2 ~~SECRET~~ 12/0300Z

EVERY EFFORT MADE BY EMBOFF TO ASSURE PATTAKOS THAT AMB PERSONALLY AND OFFICIALLY NOT OPPOSED TO REGIME BUT SINCERELY MOTIVATED BY FEELINGS OF GREINDSHIP. PATTAKOS SAID THAT HE REGRETTED HAVING TO CONCLUDE THAT HIS BELIEF THAT AMB AND HE HAD REACHED SINCERE AND FRIENDLY RAPPORT WAS MISTAKEN. EMBOFF ASSURED HIM AMB BELIEVES SUCH RAPPORT EXISTS.

PATTAKOS READ SEVERAL LETTERS OF SUPPORT RECEIVED BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE COUNTRY. THEN, READ ME LETTER FROM UNNAMED GENERAL, WRITTEN BEFORE DEC. 13, IN WHICH PATTAKOS WAS WARNED THAT KING, CERTAIN UNNAMED OFFICERS, POLITICIANS AND TALBOT PLANING OVERTHROW REGIME. SAID IF STATEMENT HAD TO BE MADE BY GOG, THREE SUCH LETTERS WOULD BE PUBLISHED.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF UNFRIENDLINESS OF US GOVT AND CONCERN ONLY FOR RETURN OF KING WHICH EQUATED WITH DESTRUCTION OF REVOLUTION AND RETURN OF PAST, WAS PATTAKOS STATEMENT THAT TOM PAPPAS LAST FRIDAY WAS GIVEN WRITTEN MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FROM GOG, RETURNED TO GREECE TWO DAYS AGO, SAID HAD IMPORTANT NEWS WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE NOT ANSWER FROM PRES. BUT STRONG PAPPAS PLEA THAT KING SHOULD BE PERMITTED RETURN NOW, OR IF NOT KING AT LEAST PRINCESS IRENE. PATTAKOS ASKED EMBOFF NOT REPORT PAPPAS ACTIVITY.

EMBOFF URGED SEVERAL TIMES RECONSIDERATION OF WHAT PATTAKOS SAID WAS FRM GOG DECISION PATTAKOS TELEPHONED MAKAREZOS, TOLD HIM EMBOFF WAS THERE DISCUSSING PROBLEM, AND PASSED EMBOFF REQUEST TO POSTPONE ACTION. MAKAREZOS SAID THIS COULD NOT BE DONE IF I TOOK TRIP TO CRETE. WHEN PATTAKOS ASKED, MAKAREZOS APPARENTLY AGREED THAT "GEORGE" (PAPADOPOULOS) NEED NOT BE CALLED AT THAT HOUR.

END ITEM 2

TX ZE
ATHENS ITEM 3 ~~SECRET~~ 0325Z

AS FINAL SHOT, PATTAKOS ASKED EMBOFF TO TELL ME THAT I SHOULD CANCEL TRIP AND ARRANGE TO SEE PAPADOPOULOS, EVEN SECRETELY, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

UPON HEARING ABOVE I HAD EMBOFF CALL PAPADOPOULOS WHO RECEIVED US AT HIS RESIDENCE AT 0130 A.M. LOCAL.

I EXPLAINED AT OUTSET THAT CRETE TRIP WAS STRICTLY UNPOLITICAL AND TRIED TO READ ITINERARY. PAPADOPOULOS CUT IN AFTER A TIME AND SAID HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH TRIP. HE EXPLAINED THAT RUMORS HAD REACHED HIM THAT ON JANUARY 15 NEW EFFORT TO TOPPLE REGIME WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. HE HAD ASKED PATTAKOS TO INFORM ME AND SUGGEST THAT I CONSIDER WHETHER IT FEASIBLE MAKE TRIP AND THUS POSSIBLY INVOLVE MYSELF IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE IN SUCH POSSIBLE COUP. AT END OF OUR 2 1/2 HOUR CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, HE BADE ME A GOOD TRIP AND A PLEASANT TIME, ASSURING ME I WOULD ENCOUNTER NO PROBLEMS.

14
DURING REST OF 2 1/2 HOURS WE SPOKE FRANKLY ABOUT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS REAL PROBLEM - OUR RELATIONS, OF COURSE. I EXPLAINED PRESIDENT'S PROBLEM WITH LARGE, INFLUENTIAL, VOCIFEROUS SEGMENT OF US PRESS, ACADEMIC AND CONGRESS WHICH HAVING APPARENTLY BEEN FRUSTRATED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO FORCE A CHANGE ON VIET-NAM POLICY WERE TAKING OUT THEIR FRUSTRATIONS IN PRESSURING THE PRESIDENT ON THE GREEK QUESTION. THIS CAUSED BY WHAT HE MUST RECOGNIZE AS REPUGNANCE OF AMERICANS TO MILITARY TAKEOVER OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE IN 1960'S.

IN S ITE OF FACT THAT THE PRESS AND CONGRESSMEN ATTACK THE PRESENT REGIME BECAUSE IT IS A "MILITARY DICTATORSHIP". I EMPHASIZED THAT SINCE APRIL 21 NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR THE DEPARTMENT HAD DONE OTHER THAN URGE ON THE REGIME THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY. FOR AS LONG AS THE KING WAS HERE TO PROVIDE A LEGAL UMBRELLA FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE PROBLEMS OF RECOGNITION WAS EASIER TO DEAL WITH. HOWEVER, WHEN THE REGENT WAS APPOINTED AND THE KING DEPARTED, THE QUESTION OF A HEAD IN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SITUATION AROSE AND MADE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. THE PRESIDENT'S PROBLEM OF DEEAING WITH THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES, AND THE US PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING THE UNITY OF NATO IN SPITE OF SOME NATO COUNTRIES OPPOSITION TO THE GOG.

END ITEM 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17
RRRRRR

ATHENS ITEM, 4 ~~SECRET~~ 12/0330Z

I SUGGESTED TO PAPADOPOULOS THAT JUST AS HE HAS PRESSURES ON HIM SO DOES THE PRESIDENT. I EXPLAINED MY PERSONAL BELIEF THAT, WITH TIME, THE PRESIDENT WOULD SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS WHICH CAUSE ME TO BE WITHOUT INSTRUCT ETEE

REPEATING LAST LINE

TO BE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS TO DEAL FORNALLY WITH GOG.

PAPADOPOULOS SAID HE BELIEVES NO VALID REASON EXISTS TO CONTINUE TO REFUSE FOROAL RELATIONS. THE GREEK PEOPLE INTERPRET OUR REFUSAL TO MEAN THAT WE ARE PREPARING ANOTHER EFFORT TO BRING DOWN THE REGIME AND INSTALL THE KING. AS TO NATO'S PROBLEM WITH GREECE, HE HEATEDLY OFFERED TO SOLVE IT FOR NATO. HE SAID THAT BY A WEEK FROM SATURDAY HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT WITH RECOGNITION OF HIS GOVT SHOULD BE GIVEN BY GREECE'S ALLIES OR HE WOULD CONSIDER THAT NATO HAD EJECTED GREECE. IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE FOR HIM NOT TO DISCHARGE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE GREEK PEOPLE AND EXPLAIN TO THEM THEIR TRUE SITUATION. HE CANNOT LEAVE THEM DANGLING IN DOUBT ON THE ONE HAND THINKING THEIR GOVT IS STRONG WHILE ON THE OTHER BY WHISPERS AND RUMORS THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHER ANTI-REGIME GROUPS ARE POINTING OUT THAT GREECE'S PROFESSED FRIENDS ARE PLUCKING A RETURN OF THE KING AND OF THE PAST, AS WITNESS THEIR REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE GREECE'S GOVT.


18 I REVIEWED SITUATION AGAIN AS WE SEE IT, AND CONSULTATIONS

PAPADOPOULOS MADE A BIG POINT OF OUR ALLEGED SUPPORT OF THE KING. I TOLD HIM THE RETURN OF THE KING WOULD MAKE THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONALITY EASIER FOR US TO SOLVE, BUT THAT WE ARE NOT INSISTING ON THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF CONSTANTINE. I ASKED IF THE GOG HAD ANY IDEAS OF ABOUT WHEN HE WOULD RETURN.

PAPADOPOULOS SAID EMPHATICALLY THE KING WOULD RETURN WHEN HE (PAPADOPOULOS) DECIDED, BUT IN NO CASE WOULD IT BE BEFORE THE PLEBISCITE. THE PLEBISCITE, HE ASSURED ME, WOULD BE HELD AS SOON AFTER APRIL 21 AS POSSIBLE, AND NOT LATER THAN SEPT 15 AS HE HAD ANNOUNCED. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS NOW CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF SETTING A DATE FOR PARLIMENTARY ELECTIONS, WHICH WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

HE INSISTED THAT HE HAS LIVED UP TO THE COMMITMENTS IN THE DEC 23 STATEMENT AND DID NOT AGREE THAT THERE WAS SLIPPAGE ON THE AMNESTY QUESTION. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE YARROS ISLAND PRISONERS WERE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY BECUASE THEY HAD NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME AFTER APRIL 21 AND AMNESTY WAS ONLY FOR THOSE SO CONVICTED. HOWEVER, SCREENING PROCEDURES ARE UNDER WAY AND IN A SHORT PRIOD WOULD RESULT OF A RELEASE OF 400-600 OF THE YARROS PRISONERS.

END ITEM 4



ATHENS ITEM 5 ~~SECRET~~ 12/0400Z

ON RELAXATION OF PRESS RESTRICTIONS HE STATED THAT A COMMITTEE HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO DRAFT A PRESS LAW BY FEB 15. HE HELD OUT SOME PROMISE THAT EVEN IF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK IS NOT COMPLETED ON TIME, BY THE END OF FEB HE WILL LIFT PRESS CENSORSHIP.

HE HAS BEEN SINCERE, HE SAID, AND HAS DONE EVERYTHING HE SAID HE WOULD DO AND MORE. FROM ITS BEGINNING THIS REGIME HAS BEEN TAKING ALL STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING THE COUNTRY TO A HEALTHY DEMOCRACY. YET, ITS FRIENDS CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE THE GOG AND KEEP IT ISOLATED. THUS, HE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT ASSURANCES THAT ALL WILL BE WELL ARE INSINCERE.

I EXPRESSED MY BELIEF AGAIN THAT WITH PATIENCE THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS WOULD BE SORTED OUT. I STATE THAT I HAD BEEN REPORTING FULLY AND PERHAPS WE ARE APPROACHING A STAGE AT WHICH I MIGHT BE CALLED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION IN CONNECTION WITH A FINAL DECISION. I TOLD HIM THAT IF HE WISHED, OF COURSE, HE COULD HURRY ME HOME BY MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT WOULD INCREASE COMPLICATIONS OF OUR BILATERAL REALTIONSHIP. I ALSO SAID I WAS SURE HE WOULD NOT REACT FAVORABLY IF THE US SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SET A DEADLINE OF NEXT SATURDAY BY WHICH TIME IT WOULD INSIST THAT HE BRING THE KING BACK TO GREECE. SI ILARLY, HE COULD NOT EXPECT THAT OUR PRESIDENT WOULD REACT FAVORABLY IF HE SOULD ATTEMPT TO SET A DEADLINE BY WHICH TIME THE US WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS TO MEET GREECE'S NEEDS. WHAT IS NEEDED IS P

TIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH INVOLVE THE BASIC INTEREST OF GREECE, US AND THE ALLIANCE. EACH COUNTRY SHOULD FACE THESE QUESTIONS SERIOUSLY AND WITHOUT HASTE. HE AGREED, SAYING EACH MUST DO AS EACH CONSIDERS BEST AND PROPER.

IN CLOSING, I GAVE HIM ASSURANCE THAT US DESIRES FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND THESE CAN BE RESTORED AS CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS OCCURS. HE SAID HE HOPED I WAS CORRECT BUT DELAYS IN RESPONSES OF ALLIES HAD FORCED HIM TO HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO OUR PURPOSES.

COMMENT:- SORRY THIS HAS RUN SO LONG, BUT I FELT YOU SHOULD GET FULL FLAVOR.

AS TO TRIP TO CRETE, SINCE IT HAS BECOME AN ISSUE WHICH PAPADOPOULOS RESOLVED IN MY FAVOR, I FEEL I MUST PROCEED AS SCHEDULED AND I PLAN TO LEAVE ATHENS 3 HOURS FROM NOW. HOWEVER, EMBASSY CAN REACH ME AT ANY TIME.

AS TO SUBSTANCE, GOVT LEADERS HAVE OBVIOUSLY REACHED POINT OF EXPLODING OVER REFUSAL OF ALLIES TO DO BUSINESS WITH THEM. REASONS MAY BE THOSE SUGGESTED IN MY TELEGRAM OF SOME HOURS AGO TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE. EVEN IF WE TAKE TONIGHTS OUTPOURINGS MERELY AS HIGH DRAMA (FOR WHICH I DO NOT BELIEVE ADEQUATELY EXPLAINS THEM), WE ARE NOW WALKING ON TRICKY GROUND OVER LAND MINES WITH SHORT FUSES.

IF THERE IS ANYTHING I CAN TELL REGIME ABOUT REASONS FOR DELAYING IN US DETERMINATION TO DO BUSINESS WITH IT, THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL HERE. AS I SUGGESTED TO BATTLE, ONE WAY TO BUY TIME IN FACE OF LOCAL IRRITATIONS WOULD BE FOR ME TO BE CALLED HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ALL THIS?

END ITEM 5

AND END OF TELECON

REPLY NOW

SECSTATE -ITEM 2

HAVE CHECKED WITH LUKE AND STUART. YOU MAY GO ON TRIP AND WE WILL HAVE WORD FOR YOU BY TIME YOU RETURN AS TO QUESTION OF POSSIBLE CONSULTATION AND OTHER MATTERS RAISED. PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING ARE CERTAINLY THE WATCHWORDS. GOOD NIGHT AND BON VOYAGE

DEPT REQUESTS THAT THIS CONFERENCE BE CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

END ITEM 2

MEMORANDUM :

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, January 10, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Private Letter from Greek Prime Minister

The attached from Papadopoulos comes to you via Tom Pappas and Hal Pachios. Although it doesn't say so specifically, it looks like a plea for recognition. It makes two points:

1. His coup last April was necessary. He exaggerates both the Communist threat and the deterioration in Greece at that time, but there are elements of truth to both and he sounds sincere.

2. He's doing his best to restore democracy. He must build safeguards for democracy first, so he doesn't know when he can hold elections. He will present the new constitution "no later than 1968" and assures you he will not perpetuate an undemocratic regime.

He concludes by asking for a "due response" to Greece's "sincere devotion to its allies and to the principles of the Free World." Presumably, this means recognition.

There's nothing in this letter that Papadopoulos hasn't said to Phil Talbot. The interesting point in his making this direct approach to you is that it shows some discomfort over our keeping our distance and the value he apparently still places in a relationship with us.

Our embassy is doing business with the regime, but Phil Talbot is avoiding formal contact. State feels we must show our domestic critics that we haven't written off the King. They also want to keep pressing the government back to constitutionalism and to help re-establish the King. Soon we will regularize relations, but only after we get everything we can out of the present situation.

State proposes you not answer now, but they will find a useful time to acknowledge the letter and maybe pass a word back. But they don't want to waste that opening.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-74
By us, NARA, Date 10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

WJ *WJ* Rostow

169

snip
1/11/68 sent to J. Roberts

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 DEC 28 18 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE248

PAGE 01 ATHENS 02972 231711Z

45
ACTION NEA 15

INFO SS 20,GPM 03,SP 02,L 03,CPR 02,O 02,NSC 10,CIA 04,RSC 01,INR 07,
NSAE 00,P 04,USIE 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,CCO 00,MM 01,RSR 01,/075 W

O 231528Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4228

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ATHENS 2972

1. GREEK PRESS REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR'S TE DEUM WILL BE HELD IN ATHENS CATHEDRAL JANUARY 1 AND WILL BE ATTENDED BY THE REGENT, PRIMIN, DEPUTY PRIMIN, OTHER MINISTERS, THE HOLY SYNOD, LEADERS OF ARMED FORCES, AND DIPLOMATIC CORPS. PATTAKOS HAS ANNOUNCED CEREMONIES WILL BE ARRANGED AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THIS MEANS CHIEFS OF MISSION, MILITARY ATTACHES AND CHIEF, JUSMAGG WILL BE EXPECTED AT TE DEUM AND THAT AMBASSADOR AND CHIEF, JUSMAGG WILL RECEIVE INVITATIONS TO IMMEDIATELY-FOLLOWING CEREMONIES AT PALACE WHERE AMBASSADORS AND HIGH OFFICIALS NORMALLY PRESENTED INDIVIDUALLY TO SOVEREIGN. WE ANTICIPATE RECEIVING OFFICIAL INVITATIONS MOMENTARILY AND ASSUME THAT UNLESS KING RETURNS AT LAST MOMENT REGENT WILL REPRESENT HIM BOTH AT TE DEUM

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2972A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AND AT PALACE. IN THESSALONIKI MINISTER OF NORTHERN GREECE NORMALLY REPRESENTS KING AT TE DEUM TO WHICH CONSULS INVITED.

2. AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, NEW YEAR'S DAY PROGRAM TRADITIONALLY REGARDED AS ONE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF OFFICIAL GREEK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12/1/03*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ATHENS 02972 281711Z

CALENDER. PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF FOREIGN AMBASSADORS WILL THEREFORE BE VIEWED AS MAJOR DEMONSTRATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT OR REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS LEGITIMACY. IN PARTICULAR, POSTURE OF US ON JANUARY 1 COULD SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE CLIMATE IN WHICH WE DEAL WITH GREECE IN 1968 ON BROAD SCOPE OF BILATERAL ISSUES AND CYPRUS AND NATO QUESTIONS. FOR THIS REASON, I REQUEST IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON CONSIDERATION FULL RANGE OF USG INTERESTS IN GREECE.

3. SHOULD KING RETURN BEFORE NEW YEAR'S DAY, I ASSUME ALL OR MOST AMBASSADORS, BEING ACCREDITED TO CONSTANTINE, WOULD ATTEND CEREMONIES AS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THEIR GOVERNMENTS RESUMING REGULAR BUSINESS WITH GREECE. SAME WOULD APPLY TO THESSALONIKI CONSULAR CORPS. PROBLEM IS WHAT USG SHOULD DO IF KING DOES NOT APPEAR. IN CONSIDERING

PAGE 3 RUQMAT 2972A C O N F I D E N T I A L
OUR POSTURE, IT WOULD HELP CLARIFY LEGAL ASPECT OF US RELATIONSHIP TO PRESENT GOG IF KING CONSTANTINE'S CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARD REGENT WERE KNOWN. ZOITAKIS HAS NOW ISSUED ROYAL DECREE REGARDING AMNESTY IN NAME OF "CONSTANTINE II, KING OF THE HELLENES." IF KING HAS DECIDED NOT TO RETURN FOR TIME BEING, DOES HE ACCEPT APPOINTMENT OF REGENT AS LEGITIMATE INTERIM STEP? DEPARTMENT MAY CONSIDER UTILITY OF ASKING EMBASSY ROME TO EXPLORE THIS POINT, PROVIDED THAT CAN BE DONE URGENTLY.
4. PRESUMABLY USG AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN NEW YEAR'S CEREMONIES MAINLY IN CONTEXT OF RECOGNITION OF REGIME. GREEK VIEW, HOWEVER, IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. (EVEN ON RECOGNITION QUESTION, GENERAL GREEK MOOD SEEMS TO BE THAT KING HAS LOST AND THAT THEREFORE IT MAY AS WELL BE ADMITTED THAT PAPADOPOULOS AND ASSOCIATES NOW CONTROL COUNTRY). TE DEUM IS PUBLIC RELIGIOUS CEREMONY EVOKING PRAYERS FOR ROYAL FAMILY AND ENTIRE GREEK PEOPLE DURING COMING YEAR. IT CONSTITUTES REAFFIRMATION OF MONARCHY. GOVERNMENT OF DAY PLAYS NO ROLE EXCEPT THAT PRIMIN ESCORTS KING (THIS YEAR

CONFIDENTIAL

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

PAGE 03 ATHENS 02972 231711Z

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 2972A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
PRESUMABLY REGENT) TO SEAT OF HONOR. ABSENCE OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE INTERPRETED LOCALLY, THEREFORE, AS DISAFFECTION WITH GREECE ITSELF RATHER THAN WITH GOVERNMENT OF DAY; OR, AS SOME CYNICS SUGGEST, AS "SOUR GRAPES" THAT KING'S CAUSE FAILED--WITH OVERTONES THAT WE HAD SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS EFFORTS. PALACE CEREMONY, IN CONTRAST, IS PRIVATE OCCASION TO ENABLE ENVOYS AND HIGH GREEK OFFICIALS TO EXTEND NEW YEAR GREETINGS TO SOVEREIGN. ABSENCE FROM PALACE COULD PERHAPS BE DEFENDED SLIGHTLY MORE EASILY THAN ABSENCE FROM CATHEDRAL ON BASIS USG POSTURE NOT YET FIRMED UP. PLAIN FACT, HOWEVER, IS THAT EITHER PRESENCE OR ABSENCE AT EITHER CATHEDRAL OR PALACE WILL BE TAKEN TO HAVE SYMBOLIC MEANING.

5. FUNDAMENTALLY, NEW YEAR'S CEREMONIES THAT NORMALLY INVOLVE EMBASSY AND JUSMAGG REPRESENTATIVES CARRY SUCH HIGH SIGNIFICANCE THAT OUR POSTURE NEXT MONDAY, WHATEVER IT MAY BE, IS LIKELY TO HAVE CONSEQUENCES EXTENDING FAR INTO MONTHS AHEAD. FOR THAT REASON AND WITHOUT DISCUSSING MORAL QUALITIES OF PAPADOPOULOS GOVERNMENT

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 2972A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
(WHOSE FULL DIMENSIONS AND INTENTIONS WE HAVE NOT YET PINNED DOWN), I BELIEVE CERTAIN FACTS NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN FRAMING FUTURE USG POLICY. THESE INCLUDE:

- (1) GOVERNMENT CONTROLS COUNTRY, IS MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER AND HAS ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS OF PREVIOUS GREEK GOVERNMENT INCLUDING FIDELITY TO NATO.
- (2) EARLY OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT UNLIKELY, PARTICULARLY AS VISIBLE FOCAL POINTS OF RESISTANCE HAVE NOW BEEN ELIMINATED. INDEED, GOVERNMENT APPEARS ENJOY SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF POPULAR ACCEPTANCE.
- (3) IN PROCESS ON WHICH WE HAVE INSISTED OF RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL RULE, GOVERNMENT HAS COMPLETED STEP ONE (DRAFT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONS) AND ANNOUNCED STEP TWO (EDITING OF DRAFT BY GOVERNMENT AND RANGE OF EARLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ATHENS 02972 231711Z

DATES WITHIN WHICH PLEBISCITE WILL BE HELD). IT DID NOT ANNOUNCE SECOND STEP UNTIL COMPLETION OF STEP ONE AND MAY NOT ANNOUNCE STEP THREE (ELECTIONS) BEFORE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFT HAS BEEN VOTED.

(4) DRAFT CONSTITUTION, WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN,

PAGE 6 RUQMAT 2972A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
REPORTEDLY FOLLOWS REASONABLY JUDICIOUS LINE EVEN THOUGH IT PROBABLY INCORPORATES SOME RESTRICTIVE MEASURES SIMILAR TO THOSE FOUND IN FRENCH, GERMAN AND PAKISTAN CONSTITUTIONS AND IS LIKELY TO BE AMENDED FURTHER. WHILE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT CONSTITUTION WILL BE ON FASCIST MODEL.

(5) REGIME LEADERS HAVE CIVILIANIZED THEMSELVES. FOR BETTER OR WORSE THEY SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD POLITICAL RULE.

(6) ALTHOUGH SCOPE IS CONFUSED, AMNESTY OF POLITICAL DETAINEES HAS GONE FURTHER THAN WE ANTICIPATED AT THIS TIME IN INCLUDING ANDREAS PAPANDREOU AND NEARLY ALL OTHER FORMER MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, PUBLISHERS AND NON-LEFT-WING PUBLIC FIGURES.

(7) ALTHOUGH POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIME LEADERSHIP AND HARD-CORE SUBORDINATES EVIDENTLY NOT YET RESOLVED, WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT REGIME IS AT LAST SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING LOOSENING OF PRESS RESTRICTIONS IN REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE.

(8) KING'S ROLE, WHICH WAS ONE OF WEAK RESTRAINT, WILL NOW BE NEGLIGIBLE WHETHER HE RETURNS OR STAYS AWAY.

(9) USG AND NATO HAVE MAJOR INTERESTS IN GREECE, WHICH PRESENT

PAGE 7 RUQMAT 2972A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
GOVERNMENT HAS SO FAR ACTIVELY SUPPORTED, GIVING US ONLY BAREST HINTS (AS IN NARROWING OF SECURITY LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS) THAT OTHER OPTIONS LIE OPEN TO IT.

(10) ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES AFFECTING US INTERESTS WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN LONGER WE OUT OF CONTACT WITH GOG, IN WHOSE COUNCILS EXTREMISTS COULD SIMULTANEOUSLY GAIN STRENGTH.

(11) IF YOU SHOULD INSTRUCT ME TO ABSENT MYSELF AND OTHER EMBASSY

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 05 ATHENS 02972 281711Z

OFFICERS FROM CATHEDRAL AND PALACE CEREMONIES PRESUMABLY REASON WOULD BE THAT USG REQUIRED FURTHER SPECIFIC ACTIONS BY GOG BEFORE AGREEING TO RESUME OFFICIAL BUSINESS WITH IT. IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO BE ABLE TO INFORM REGIME LEADERSHIP WHAT THESE MEASURES WERE.

6. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADORS HERE MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS, NOTABLY NATO ALLIES, HOPE FOR PROMPT SIGNAL OF US INTENTIONS.
GP-3. TALBOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

✓ 171
December 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Recognition of Greek Junta--New Year's Deadline

You ought to be aware that we may have to decide one way or the other on recognizing the Greek junta government before 1 January. The problem is that Phil Talbot expects the usual invitations to the annual New Year's Te Deum at which the King would normally be the central figure and to a reception at the palace afterwards. He could probably go to the cathedral without committing us, but if he goes to the palace and toasts the regent, that will be recognition. Conversely, if he stays away, that will be read as refusal to recognize and not only as active US support for Constantine but maybe even as hostility towards the Greek people as well.

In Rome, Constantine is in a quandary regarding the ceremony. He feels that if the foreign ambassadors attend, he will also have to be there or suffer a blow to his prestige. If foreign ambassadors don't show up, the King thinks he can stay away and the junta's position will be hurt. It would ease our problem if Constantine would return, but he doesn't know yet whether he can or not. His Minister of Court (Papagos, who was here with him) is negotiating in Athens tonight.

State has not yet decided what to do about the ceremony. They have sent a cable to Athens asking what the other NATO ambassadors are going to do, and the effect of low level US diplomatic representation. They might just let Phil go off for a weekend at Delphi and have the chargé go. But all this will be worked out with Secretary Rusk tomorrow.

John Foster
John Foster

Hal Saunders
Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-11-03*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Handwritten: Hae for Rostow
172

~~SECRET~~

December 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: [REDACTED]

*3.3
(b)(5)(6)*

At my request, Paul Nitze has sent you the attached summary of the events involved in the [REDACTED] It is an important case history that I think you will want to look at carefully.

"

I suppose the [REDACTED] when he heard small arms fire in the vicinity of the airfield; however, I am puzzled as to how serious the circumstances would have had to have been to have persuaded USCINCEUR to order such an action.

"

I am particularly troubled by the fact that the decision to [REDACTED] This hardly seems to meet General Lemnitzer's requirement (para. 5) that a request should be made by a [REDACTED] There appears to have been no political consultation on this problem at any level.

"

My concern on this issue is clearly shared by people in State and Defense. However, there seems to be a somewhat fatalistic attitude in some quarters that nothing can be done about it.

I have suggested to Warnke that he encourage Nitze to pursue this problem in connection with his current review of [REDACTED] I have also discussed the problem with Phil Farley who may examine the problem for SIG.

"

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att.: Memo dtd 12/18

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-285
By *isl*, NARA, Date *1-6-10*

~~SECRET~~



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

4763

1-Keeny
2-Ret

172a

18 DEC 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] ^{6.2(a)} Greece

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny of your staff has asked us to forward a summary of the incident involving [REDACTED] ^{6.2(a)} during the recent attempted coup in Greece. Such a summary is attached.

Paul H. Nitze

Attachment

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-286 (#2a)
By sl, NARA, Date 4-30-10

~~SECRET~~

7905

~~SECRET~~

172-b
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-286 (#2-b, 2c)
By ad, NARA, Date 4-30-10

FACT SHEET

6.2(u)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND:

1. The [REDACTED] is charged by USCINCEUR and/or component commanders to be alert for local situations which may require increased readiness. In the absence of guidance from higher headquarters, the commander will assume a state of readiness commensurate with his evaluation of the tactical/political situation. The commander is responsible to take all the necessary precautions to [REDACTED]. This includes making the decision, when circumstances dictate, to [REDACTED] to unauthorized forces.


6.2
(u)
~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED	GROUP 3
RECOMMENDATION	Declassify on 18-12-79AC
	Declassify on 5200.10
	Declassify on 5200.10

Handle as ~~SECRET~~ under Section 1405, Atomic Energy Act, 1

SECRET

6.2(a)



SECRET

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 13-14 DECEMBER 1967

131030Z - 131130Z -

131300Z - 131315Z -

131320Z -

131330Z -

131400Z -

131345Z - 131445Z -

131445Z - 131515Z -

131500Z -

131530Z -

~~SECRET~~

6.2
(a)

~~SECRET~~

6.2(a)

131630Z

131755Z


140900Z

141330Z - 141400Z

141415Z - 141430Z

141501Z

141600Z - 141730Z



Above times are approximate.

~~SECRET~~

173

DEC. 29

Fulbright on Acheson

In a mellow and kindly spirit that we expect of our distinguished elder statesmen, Mr. Dean Acheson urges you, in his letter of Dec. 20, to take a more tolerant editorial view of the Greek military dictators. I note with interest Mr. Acheson's friendly feelings for the Greek dictators because they contrast so sharply with the viewpoint he expressed in 1947 in support of the Greek-Turkish aid program and, incidentally, suggests that, by the criteria spelled out by Mr. Acheson twenty years ago, that aid program has been a dismal failure.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1947, Mr. Acheson, who was then Acting Secretary of State, strongly urged adoption of the Greek-Turkish aid program on the ground, among others, that, if we failed to provide such aid, "The rule of an armed minority would fasten itself upon the people of Greece." Our aid, he said, would "pave the way for peaceful and democratic developments."

Further on in his statement of March 24, 1947, Mr. Acheson said: "It is our object to help to maintain the present constitutional system of Greece so long as the majority of Greeks desire it, and to help Greece create conditions in which its free institutions can develop in a more normal fashion."

Making the same point even more explicitly, Mr. Acheson said: "Since our primary purpose is to help people who are

struggling to maintain their independence and their right to democratic development, we would not, of course, want to continue this aid if we should find that our efforts were being frustrated by anti-democratic practices."

Mr. Acheson is, of course, quite right in pointing to the difficulties of constitutional and democratic government. It puzzles me, however, that his tolerance of authoritarian rule in Greece does not seem to be matched by a similar tolerance for other totalitarian regimes such as that of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam. It may be, however, that the former Secretary is inhibited by the fear of being thought "soft on communism." For my own part, I shall be prepared to take the Senate floor any time, as indeed I did some years ago, to defend him against such a calumny.

To illustrate the danger of constitutional government going awry, Mr. Acheson points to forthcoming hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which he fears the casting of leading figures in our government in roles that he deems inappropriate. In order to alleviate this danger and help set things straight, I would be delighted to have Mr. Acheson appear as a witness before the Committee casting himself as Metternich, Rasputin, or in any other role that he finds congenial.

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate,
Washington.

DEC. 27

Morse on Acheson

Dean Acheson's letter of Dec. 20 will sadden many of us who provided the votes in Congress to carry out the Greek-Turkish aid program and the North Atlantic Treaty which followed, for it is sad to find Mr. Acheson unable to accept the changes in the world that have reduced his brain-children to relics.

France was the geographic and political center of NATO; without France, it is moribund. Greece and Turkey were its eastern anchor; today they are at each other's throats, and Greece probably would have to be occupied by the United States ala Vietnam if she were to be useful to NATO in a war with the Soviet Union. Yet Mr. Acheson is foremost among those trying to keep NATO embalmed and made up in hopes no one will notice that it is dead.

Twenty years ago, the Greek-Turkish aid program that I supported in the Senate called for an outlay of \$400 million for one year to shore up Greece and Turkey against internal communism. Somehow the objective keeps changing, but the aid never ends. Turkey has received more than \$5 billion; Greece more than \$3½ billion, and right now the military junta is howling for \$100 million more worth of arms. Fear of communism has receded to the point where conflict among themselves in Greece and Turkey has precedence over everything else.

It is understandable that Mr. Acheson cannot let go of NATO, nor of Greece. His current mission to save Greece from the Papandreou is an understandable extension of his one-time mission to save it from communism. It will make no sense to the American people, however, to keep subsidizing Greece for the sake of the past.

DEC. 20 Acheson on Greece

5

As for his views of Congress and its constitutional role, Mr. Acheson was always afraid of the people's representatives, preferring to operate behind the guarded doors of government bureaucracy and secret diplomacy. In his day, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was nought but the political front for the State Depart-

ment, and it is no surprise that he is uncomfortable with any other arrangement. He does not like constitutionalism practiced in this country; why should he advocate it for Greece?

The amoral principles of foreign policy which Mr. Acheson espoused some time ago at Amherst are amply fulfilled in his choice of strong-armed colonels as appropriate rulers for Greece. No one could produce a better endorsement of the Maoist dogma that all power comes from the barrel of a gun. But the people of the world know that morality does not stop at the water's edge, no matter how much the career diplomats and colonels would like it to. We will pay a growing price in blood, money, and futility if we allow Mr. Acheson's theories to dominate current policy.

WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senator.
Washington.

Professing as I do from your excellent editorial page may I without offense urge a little more discrimination in your acceptance of the cliché ridden advice, so constantly given to the Greek colonels, that they return Greece to "constitutional government." A good many of us think well of our own constitutional system and that of Britain, less well of some European ones and still less of a type embraced by more people than any other—that of the Soviet Union and China. There seems to be no doubt that the colonels are hard at work on a constitution for Greece; but the problem is, what kind of a constitution? It is not an easy problem. Put yourself in their place.

Constitutional government and democracy are not the same thing. Britain has had the longest constitutional history

of any state, although Venice may be a strong contestant. But Britain had been a democracy for less than a century. Then, too, democracy is a slippery word. Athenian democracy was an oligarchy bottomed on slavery. Our own Constitution, as you recall, once protected that institution and a large part of our economy for sometime rested upon it. The far flung Peoples Democratic Republics are based upon a system which our rhetoric likens to slavery. So the phrase "constitutional-democracy" is not a much better guide for the puzzled Greek colonels.

Finally may I urge caution in warning them against "authoritarian rule." Two reasons support this note of caution.

First, Greeks both ancient and modern have had grave trouble when they experimented with nonauthoritarian rule. (Probably modern Greeks have as little to do with ancient Greeks, as modern Brooklynites with their pre-Columbian predecessors.) Both had trouble from instability and poor judgment. Athens' greatest statesman, Pericles, led his city into a war in which it lost independence, constitution and democracy. In modern times Greece made sounder progress toward stable statehood under a half century of strong rule by King George I than at any time since. Certainly no friend of Greece would wish to see her return to the "constitution government" of the two Panderous, the old fool and the young rascal, under which she was headed for Kerenski-like chaos, and possibly war with Turkey.

My second reason concerns ourselves rather than Greece. If I properly forecast the pre-Lenten Mardi Gras which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations intends to put on based on the proper constitutional roles of President and Congress, the President will be depicted as Nero or King Charles I, while Senator Fulbright will appear either as an incendiary shouting "Burn, Baby, Burn!" or as Oliver Cromwell, and Senator McCarthy as Nero's fiddle or John Lilburne, the pamphleteer of the Levellers.

In view of this coming spectacle those contemplating advice to the colonels against authoritarian rule would do well to remember that dwellers in glass houses should pull down the blinds and maintain a becoming silence.

DEAN ACHESON.

Washington.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 15, 1967
10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith King Constantine's present
frame of mind:

-- all bridges to Athens not yet
burned;

-- bad organization and timing
with the army wrecked his plan.

W. W. Rostow

Rome 3182

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALJ 96-295(450)

By jc/isp NARA. Date 12-11-03



Department of State

Type for the President

TELEGRAM

49

174a

~~SECRET~~ 513

PAGE 01 ROME 03182 01 OF 02 150227Z

80
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01,SSO 00,NSCE 00,CCO 00,/026 W

O 150135Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5483

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-307
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 3182

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS ATHENS AND BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY

1. KING CONSTANTINE OPENED MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BY INQUIRING WHETHER SECRETARY HAD RECEIVED HIS MESSAGE AND WHETHER THERE A REPLY. AMBASSADOR SAID MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT AND ACKNOWLEDGED.

2. KING EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD DECIDED CALL OFF PRESS CONFERENCE FOR TWO REASONS, FIRST, ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT LIKED IDEA. THIS NOT A MAJOR CONSIDERATION. SECOND, AND MORE IMPORTANT, THE ARCHBISHOP WAS ARRIVING

PAGE 2 RUFHRO 3182/1 ~~SECRET~~

TOMORROW AT THE REQUEST OF THE JUNTA. KING SAID HE HAD DECIDED NOT BURN ALL HIS BRIDGES IN PRESS CONFERENCE, AT LEAST NOT UNTIL HE HEARD WHAT ARCHBISHOP HAD TO SAY. KING COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN CLOSE TO ARCHBISHOP AS HIS AND FATHER'S CHAPLAIN. HE HAD APPOINTED HIM LAST YEAR, AND SO HE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO SEE HOW HE FACED UP TO KING AFTER ADMINISTERING OATH OF OFFICE TO QUOTE THOSE GANGSTERS UNQUOTE YESTERDAY. KING ASKED HOW MAN OF GOD COULD DO SUCH A THING. BUT HE WOULD HEAR WHAT HE HAD TO SAY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

6

~~SECRET~~ 596

PAGE 01 ROME 03182 02 OF 02 150246Z

83

ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /026 W

0 150135Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5484

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ROME 3182

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS ATHENS AND BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY

ADVICE, THAT HE SHOULD LEAVE. TAKE OFF FROM KAVALLA'S
SHORT RUNWAY EXTREMELY TRICKY AND WEATHER THERE AND FURING
FLIGHT VERY BAD. BAGGAGE FOLLOWED IN C-47. KING
THOUGHT DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY WAS COMPLETELY GONE AND WOULD
HAVE TO BE RESTORED. YOUNG OFFICERS VERY RADICAL
AND UNREALISTIC. HOWEVER, THEY TASTING
POWER AND ENJOYING IT. THEY HAD TOLD HIM THAT EVEN THOUGH
THEY SUPPORTED HIM, THEY DID NOT WANT CONSTITUTION OR ELECTION OR IF
ELECTIONS THERE MUST BE, THEY DID NOT WANT ANY QUOTE OLD

PAGE 2NRUFHRO 3182/2 ~~SECRET~~
POLITICIANS UNQUOTE TO COME BACK.

9. HE MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE IDEALISTIC
BUT MISGUIDED OFFICERS AND THOSE OF JUNTA. LATTER COM-
PLETLY UNSCRUPULOUS GANGSTERS. THIEVES. THEY HAD
ACTED DESPICABLY IN CYPRUS SITUATION AND HAD VERY NEARLY
GOTTEN COUNTRY INTO WAR WITH TURKEY. HE WOULD HAVE COME
OUT AGAINST THEM ON APRIL 21, HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE TO
DO SO WITHOUT BLOODSHED. HE DID NOT THINK THEY COULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ROME 03182 02 OF 02 150246Z

CONTROL THE COUNTRY WITHOUT HIM, AND HE THOUGHT THEY KNEW IT. HE TOOK ARCHBISHOP'S ARRIVAL TOMORROW AS EVIDENCE OF THIS. THEY WERE AWARE, HE SAID, THAT THERE WOULD BE QUOTE MANY DIFFICULTIES UNQUOTE IF THEY REFUSED PROMISE PEOPLE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS.

10. KING SAID PIPINELIS HAD TELEPHONED TODAY FROM BRUSSELS AND WOULD ARRIVE ROME TO SEE HIM TOMORROW. BUT NOT SECRETLY, AS FONMIN WANTED. HE HAD TOLD PIPINELIS HE EITHER HIM MINISTER, OR HE WITH JUNTA, COULD NOT BE BOTH. PIPINELIS A QUOTE GOOD FELLOW UNQUOTE BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, QUOTE HE LIKES THIS SORT OF THING UNQUOTE. KING THOUGHT HE WOULD

PAGE 3 RUFHRO 3182/2 ~~SECRET~~
THEREFORE WANT TO CONTINUE IN PRESENT GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH, IF KING HAD MADE HIS MOVE ON APRIL 21, PIPINELIS WOULD HAVE BEEN WITH HIM.

11. KING SPOKE FREQUENTLY AND FAVORABLY OF AMBASSADOR TALBOT. REPEATEDLY UNDERLINED HIS POINTS BY SAYING QUOTE AS TALBOT CAN TELL YOU UNQUOTE.

12. KING WAS RELAXED BUT TIRED. HE RECEIVED AMBASSADOR IN UPSTAIRS SITTING ROOM OF VILLA BELONGING TO HIS COUSIN, THE PRINCE OF HESSE. COFFEE TABLE BEFORE HIM WAS SPREAD WITH ROME NEWSPAPERS WHICH IN TWO-INCH HEADLINES REPORTED FAILURE HIS COUNTER-COUP AND HIS ARRIVAL HERE. HE IS RETURNING TO GREEK EMBASSY BUT FAMILY HAS MOVED TO THIS VILLA.

13. AT HIS REQUEST WE ESTABLISHED CHANNEL FOR FURTHER CONTACT.

14. STATE'S 84540 RECEIVED AFTER MEETING.
GP-1 REINHARDT

NOTE: NOT PASSED ATHENS AND BRUSSELS BY OC/T.
PAGE 4 RUFHRO 3182/2 ~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ROME 03182 01 OF 02 150227Z

6. KING CONSTANTINE SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT EVENTS OF PAST 48 HOURS. HE SAID AIR FORCE AND NAVY HAD ACTED EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY. BOTH HAD BEEN COMPLETELY WITH HIM. WEAKNESS HAD BEEN IN ARMY, SPECIFICALLY 3RD ARMORED CORPS HAD FAILED MOVE FAST ENOUGH. TIMING HAD BEEN VITAL ELEMENT. HIS DEPARTURE FROM ATHENS HAD GONE WELL. AIR FORCE HAD PICKED UP HIS PLANE AND SMOOTHLY IMPLEMENTED ITS PART OF PLANS. HOWEVER, WHEN HE ARRIVED AT KAVALLA AND SAW THAT TROOPS NOT YET IN MOTION, HE KNEW SLIPPAGE HAD DEVELOPED. HE TOLD CORPS COMMANDER GET UNITS UNDERWAY. KING CITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF PROBLEMS THAT HAD DEVELOPED SITUATION INVOLVING ARMORED DIVISION ON WEST COAST. DIVISION COMMANDER QUOTE A RUSSIAN UNQUOTE HAD ACTED PROMPTLY AND ARRESTED SUBORDINATE REVOLUTIONARY OFFICERS. HOWEVER, WHEN THEY AGREED TO TAKE OATH TO KING, COMMANDER RELEASED THEM AND SOMEWHAT LATER THEY ARRESTED HIM. KING SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AND PLEASED BY ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION GIVEN HIM BY PEOPLE OF KAVALLA WHO, PREVIOUSLY, HAD NOT

PAGE 5 RUFHRO 3182/1 ~~SECRET~~
BEEN PARTICULARLY FRIENDLY TOWARDS HIM.

7. HE SAID THAT HAD HE BEEN ABLE TO REACH SALONIKA LAST NIGHT, SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. HOWEVER, THERE ONLY ONE ARMY REGIMENT IN SALONIKA. AFTER TELLING LOCAL AIR FORCE COMMANDER HE WOULD BE LOYAL TO KING, REGIMENTAL CO SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED AIR FORCE COMMANDER. LATER HE TOLD ATHENS HE ACTION ON KING'S ORDERS BUT AT SAME TIME PUT HIS TROOPS IN BLOCKING POSITION BETWEEN KING AND SALONIKAM THUS MAKING IMPOSSIBLE A NON-VIOLENT ADVANCE ON TOWN. KING COMMENTED IN PASSING THAT RADIO WAS ALSO TOO WEAK.

8. KING SAID HE INTERPRETED APPOINTMENT OF SO-CALLED QUOTE REGENCY UNQUOTE AS A THREAT TO HIS SON. HEARING FROM YOUNGER OFFICERS THAT JUNTA FORCES MOVING ON KAVALLA TO CAPTURE HIM AND SEPARATE HIM FROM SON, HE AGREED WITH THESE OFFICERS

GP-1. REINHARDT

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence
Note - 1000 175

December 15, 1967

To : The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject : The Outlook for the Junta

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-307
By cb, NARA Date 8-4-97

90

The junta has won a striking victory in establishing its power over Greece. There will be much admiration for Constantine's poignantly quixotic stand against the forces of darkness and bemoaning of the sad state of democracy in the country where the word and concept were created. Democracy, however, has never taken firm root in Greece, and the conservative forces which traditionally have backed the monarchy differed from the junta only in degree, not in kind. The evidence of earlier Palace practices and the logic of the situation suggest that a royal victory probably would not have restored a free play of political forces. But however romantic sentiment would have had the denouement of the royal drama, the junta is now indisputably the government of Greece, potentially in a stronger position than before the King's abortive counter-coup. And the "American factor" in Greek politics--a compound of myth, memory, and money--is likely to be correspondingly less potent as the junta tests its strength in coming months.

If Constantine had Won. Had the junta crumbled before Constantine without a civil war, the King would have returned to Athens as the man on horseback who had saved democracy. Yet the King's commitment to democratic institutions was questionable at best, for he was not content to reign and not rule. This commitment was even more doubtful among those who would have advised him and--since he was not a strong personality--would have probably controlled his actions. If Constantine ruled today in Athens instead of Papadopoulos, the way would probably have been open not to the development of meaningful constitutional government but to rule by Palace crony. The facade of stability and legitimacy would have been preserved,

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/LIMDIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

- 2 -

but Greece would have been no farther along the path toward resolving its basic political problems and chronic economic and social imbalances than it was one, five, or even fifteen years ago.

The Need for Modernization. Greece is beset by many problems of long standing. Most basic perhaps is the need for political modernization against a backdrop of highly personalized politics and a lack of willingness to subordinate political ambitions to the orderly process of effective government. The anachronism of a partially puissant monarchy reflected even graver problems in Greek political life: the failure to find a mode of governance—either efficient authoritarianism or a democratic system—capable of providing for the implementation of fundamental socio-economic reforms. The strong-man rule of Metaxas or Papagos could not sustain itself; the experiment with parliamentary government under George Papandreu was frustrated in still shorter order. In each case, the position of the monarchy was a vital and divisive political element. Dissidents from right and center could invoke the name of the King to press their programs; the King was willing to be invoked since this interest was customarily the frustration of any strong government except one in which Palace influence would be preserved or even enlarged. At the same time, the King lacked both the talent and the power base for effective political manipulation. The monarchy provided a spurious legitimacy, even though its role is enshrined in the constitution. In fact, the institution of the monarchy provided an important fig leaf for political forces that were unwilling to recognize the concept that legitimacy in the twentieth century is usually a function of popular identification.

Whether or not parliamentary institutions are the essential political structure for the cradle of democracy, deep fissures in the Greek polity may prevent the development of a system in which the 49 percent would accept the decision of the 51.

- 3 -

On the other hand, a democratic system is what most Greeks demand. So in the present circumstances the first question is not whether Greece can flourish with democracy. In the eyes of the Greeks, the fundamental issue is to find the political expression which meets their aspirations. There are forces in Greek political life that are at least willing to try. Is the junta one of these forces, or will it provide a setting in which these forces will have a better chance than they did under the monarchy?

Alternatives Under Junta Rule: On the face of it, the military junta now has a clear opportunity to bring effective government to Greece--to undertake basic reforms that could generate a substantial measure of popular support. If royalty with pretensions to rule is inconvenient as well as anachronistic, it can dispose of the monarchical albatross without further ado. Still more important in terms of popular attitudes, it could remove the ultra-conservative die-hard monarchist elements completely from roles of influence and authority. This element represents entrenched special interests that look inward and backward. If it wants to, the junta can wipe off much of the slate of previous bad experience. First, however, it must see itself for what it is--the center of power without serious challenger--and develop the assurance that fits the position.

We do not yet know what effect the abortive counter-coup will have on the junta itself; whether some members wavered, whether mistrust was sown, or whether the events of December 13 will have a galvanizing effect. The junta must also decide whether it wishes to reinstitute a form of monarchy (and it appears at the moment to have kept the option open); whether it still must introduce a constitution with a liberal patina; whether it will utilize its success to install itself in open and undisguised authority; and whether it will permit any competition to or criticism of its rule. No one of these decisions is in itself crucial to the basic task of political modernization. What is vital is whether the junta comes to grips with the fundamental problems facing Greece as it goes about its work.

A government that could impose efficient rule on Greece, produce a program that gave promise of curing the country's economic ills, and provide psychological satisfaction for most of the population, would cause many of the Greeks who want democracy to come to think that a step forward in Greek politics have been taken even if it were brought about at the expense of constitutional institutions. Junta members are "new men" on the political scene, potentially free from the stifling effects of tradition and the constant threat of palace cliques. However, if the junta were to pull itself together and pursue such a course, it would no doubt present its friends and allies with many problems. It could very well introduce forms of social and economic control that would be increasingly oppressive. It might even reassess Greek foreign policy and seek the kind of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union that Turkey has undertaken. Such a rejuvenated government would not need the Communist threat --internal or external--to justify itself.

On the basis of its past performance, even though its time in office has been short and the magnitude of its tasks great, the junta is not rapidly learning. Granting that it may somehow learn better to cope with its problems as time passes and that it may acquire more confidence in its ability, the junta has not shown the capability of moving in a purposive, coherent fashion. It is likely to pursue its previous course, justifying itself in terms of anti-Communism, pursuing a mixed bag of goals based more on traditionalism

than on a comprehensive program of change, and generally harassing its opponents without attempting to win their support or subduing them.

The junta leadership just does not seem to have the imagination or skill to effect the basic transformation of Greece to which its propaganda refers. It does, however, have the power to impose its rule in Greece and will probably have this power for the coming months and perhaps years. The junta thus may become the worst of governments--an inefficient tyranny. The possibility seems remote that the junta itself, recognizing its lack of progress and the growing popular resistance to its rule, may ultimately be willing to give way to some form of "transitional" government as an alternative to chaos or even more stringent military dictatorship. Much would depend on the junta's assessment of its prospects, the extent of popular resistance and the positions and attitudes of Greece's allies.

The Crucible of Opposition Politics. If the junta fails to make itself an effective vehicle of change, it will find itself confronting the overwhelming mass of Greek opinion, once the initial shock of Constantine's failure has worn off. The character of Greek politics in recent years, in an era of tenuous balance and political fragmentation, has given the King disproportionate power and influence. The way is now open for a more straight-forward polarization in Greek political life between the junta and the heterogeneous opposition to it. The junta will rally what support it can, but it will be opposed by the center and left of the political spectrum and by the die-hard monarchists. This "opposition" is now a motley of political elements with no common aspiration except the ouster of the junta. The performance of the junta is the most important element of Greek politics

in the near term, but the ability of the opposition to find a basis of concerted action will be only slightly less important. If the junta fails to give satisfying leadership, the development of the opposition will be the crucial factor.

The die-hard monarchist element of the opposition will probably carry the least weight; for other conservatives are likely somehow to accommodate themselves to the regime. However, as a symbol of opposition to the junta, the King will continue to be important to the moderate rightists and others who believe that the monarchy still serves a useful purpose in Greece. Constantine's departure thus serves the monarchy better than his presence. The catalysts of the opposition, however, are likely to be found in the left or among the growing band of political exiles. The Greek Communists will work hard to achieve hegemony over the left, and their principal rivals will be Andreas Papandreu and the non-communist left. The emergence of a confrontation in which the junta can with no little justice portray itself as a bastion of anti-Communism will pose severe dilemmas for non-Communists. The junta is aware of this potential and will play it for all it is worth, taking particular care to lump Andreas, the left-of-center forces, and even the rightists it suspects of having backed the King, under the general rubric of "communist."

There is a real chance that the Communists could take over the opposition to the junta; their training is aimed toward exploiting this sort of situation. This is by no means a foregone conclusion, however, and the sooner that a coalescence of the opposition takes place, the less the chance that the Communists will be able to control it. Repression by the junta will fall hardest on the non-Communist left, if only because they are less prepared to evade it, and the longer the repression lasts, the greater will be the appeal of counter-extremism.

The polarization between a leftist-dominated opposition, on the one hand, and the junta and its conservative backers, on the other, would be dangerous, because in the Greek context it would tend to strengthen the extreme left. However, this is not necessarily worse than the

situation that would have obtained had Constantine won out. Royal rule would probably have led sooner or later to bipolarization, since residual loyalty to the monarchical symbol would have kept many right-of-center elements out of the opposition. Also, the junta lacks the "legitimacy" of the monarchy, despite its newly appointed regent, and in that sense will be a more vulnerable target. (Indeed, a victorious Constantine could have provided an almost invulnerable cover behind which political life would have continued to deteriorate.) The absence of a "legitimate" government that can play for domestic and foreign support perhaps presents the Greeks at large with the best chance that they have had in some years for modernizing their politics and meeting the junta's challenge, providing that the left-of-center organizes in short order and is able to keep the leadership of the opposition out of Communist hands. The situation will be bad, but at least it has the elements of presenting a real choice to the Greek people--not one that is disguised by confusion over the proper role of the monarchy. The outcome is not certain and perhaps the Greek polity is incapable of responding to the challenge. The end result may be the establishment of a dictatorship of the right or the left--but the chance for a genuine restructuring of Greek politics is at least clear and present.

Difficult Times Coming. Greece is facing a time of real troubles. The junta will probably utilize its success to tighten its grip on Greek affairs; any constitution presented will be a farce, less convincing than the one already designed for presentation. Although opposition will continue and perhaps lead to increased sporadic violence, the junta will enjoy full de facto power and seek to force acceptance from its own subjects and the international community. It will point to a Communist menace in justification, and its claims will have increasing substance as time passes.

For Greece's friends and allies, difficult choices lie ahead. Last spring it was possible to continue relations more or less as usual because "legitimacy" had not been impaired.

Many possibilities of compromise were then available, but the removal of Constantine has narrowed the focus considerably. The junta will seek to carry on business as usual, even though a major new round has been started in Greek politics. The junta's capabilities are probably sufficient to wage an effective war of nerves on the international scene. But unless it is able to devise a radical new approach to Greece's position, it has very few international options. Greece is too much involved internationally to disregard foreign pressures. The junta will be able to survive only if it is able to convince outsiders to accept it

as Constantine's heir (despite the bar sinister) and as the only hope for a non-Communist Greece.

These claims cannot be disregarded, but will have to be subjected to the closest scrutiny. It will be some time before we are able to make confident predictions about the development of Greek politics. We must first determine whether the junta is able to provide not only de facto rule but also effective government along desirable lines. If it cannot, we must then determine whether it presents a lesser evil to our interests than would a successor government drawn from opposition elements. At the same time, we will have to determine what effect the "American factor" in Greece can have in bringing about a desired result. This will be a continuing and agonizing process of review, unless we are prepared to accept without question the junta's legitimacy as we did the King's in the past. What is almost certain, however, is that Greece cannot bear an inefficient tyranny indefinitely. Sooner or later, both we and they have to face the problem of political modernization and other far-reaching changes in Greece, and what roles we both have to play in these processes.

~~SECRET~~

176
December 14, 1967
Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Our Position on Greece This Morning

We are waiting now to find out what position King Constantine takes. We will probably be in touch with him privately in Rome today. A lot depends on whether he sets himself up in exile or abdicates. We are still holding off on any substantive public statement.

Our next problem will be what to do with Phil Talbot. State instructed him this morning not to attend a meeting called by the junta, and Phil can probably live in this never-never land for three or four days. The debate in State ranges over these options: (1) deal de facto with the junta and ignore the recognition issue; (2) recognize the junta; (3) go on recognizing the King and recall Phil. In any case, we could call Phil back for consultation, although his return then would constitute more of an act of recognition than if he just stayed there and eased into a working relationship. Whether we could get away with the de facto arrangement would depend on whether the junta pressed us for formal recognition.

I am afraid we are going to take a beating for not having endorsed efforts to return to constitutional government yesterday. In hindsight, it would have been easier to say something yesterday than it is today. But that is water over the dam, and we can only look forward to severe restrictions on our relations with Greece imposed by American liberals who believe we should have nothing to do with a military regime, especially in the cradle of democracy.

The most remarkable fact to emerge from yesterday's events is that everyone, including the King and the junta, greatly overestimated the King's influence with the military. Although information is still fragmentary, it looks as if he got the backing of the officers he was counting on, but those officers could not control their subordinates. Whereas the junta has been operating under the restraint of the King's presence and presumed influence, they may now feel less pressure to move ahead toward turning the Government back to civilian leadership.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-74
By iss, NARA, Date 10-5-04


Harold H. Saunders

cc: Dick Moose

~~SECRET~~

12:30

NKQ

Bob

Helm

Capt
Saunders
Moose

4689

ES	✓
S	✓
U	✓
M	✓
G	✓

D
R
A
F
T

We are informed

U. S. STATEMENT

GL

177
*not used -
no statement
made*

King Constantine of Greece has departed Athens and arrived at Larissa in northern Greece. He has issued an appeal to the people of Greece asking for their support for the restoration of democracy.

Since the change of government in Athens on April 21 the United States Government has urged that steps be taken in Greece to bring about a return to constitutionalism. The United States Government has believed, and continues to believe, that it is essential that this be accomplished by peaceful means. We urge the people of Greece to work together for the reestablishment of democracy, avoiding bloodshed and civil strife.

NEA:SWRockwell:av
12/13/67



21202

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Greek Crisis

I am attaching a copy of a telecon with Athens concerning which Under Secretary Katzenbach called you a little while ago. Secretary Rusk called Luke Battle at about six o'clock. He wanted any information available on conditions in northern Greece and any evidence of support for the King's position. Battle explained that he had limited hard information but would attempt to get all he had and pass it to the Secretary.

The Secretary said there was considerable interest in the North Atlantic Council in backing the King provided there was clearly something to back. If we wish him to do anything in NATO it is essential that he have our recommendations within the next few hours. We have informed Athens, as you will see in the telecon, and Talbot will forward recommendations to the Secretary.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Athens Telecon, December 13, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-307

By cls, NARA Date 9-4-97~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified

4697

178a

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

TELECONFERENCE
BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND

Air EMBASSY ATHENS

ON

DECEMBER 13, 1967
(1720 EST)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-281
By isl NARA, Date 1-20-11

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

SECSTATE ITEM 1

132219Z

PARTICIPANTS: AMB. BATTLE
MR. ROCKWELL
MR. BREWSTER

SUBJECT: GREEK CRISIS

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET EXDIS~~

END ITEM

YES GA PLS KK
THAND YOU AMBASSADOR D TALBOT STANDING BY KK

~~SECRET~~

(SECRET EXDIS)

A

AT
ATHENS ITEM ONE,
WE FACE NEW SITUATION TONIGHT WITH
PAPADOPOULOS HAVING IN EFFECT DECLARED
KING DIPOSED AND NEW NEW GOVERNMENT
OF WHICH HE PRIME MINISTER. ETC.
MY INCLINATION CONTINUES TO BE TRY TO SEE
HIM AND AGREE ISSUE OUT ON BASIS ATHENS.
2751 (TO WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE)
HOWEVER, ATHENIANS MAY TAKE A CALL BY ME
AS DEFACTO RECOGNITION OF THIS REGIME
WHICH I ASSUME WE MUST CONSIDER TO BE
A REBEL REGIME. WE ARE ATTEMPTING
TO GET SOME EMBASSY OFFICER TO
KAVALA TOMORROW TO ESTABLISH CONTACT
WITH KING, WHOSE MOVEMENTS AND PLANS
CONTINUE TO BE UNKNOWN TO US. QUESTION
ARISES, HOWEVER, WHETHER USG SHOULD NOW
MAKE ITS CHOICE AND CAST DYE IN FAVOR OF KING.
THIS MIGHT INVOLVE USG DECLARATION OF SUPPORT
OF KING AND INSTRUCTIONS TO ME TO JOIN
KING AND HIS CABINET WHENEVER THEY MAY BE AT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. YOU WILL UNDER
STAND GRAVITY OF THIS DECISION, INVOLVING
AS IT DOES OUR TOTAL PRESENCE AND ALL
FACILITIES IN ALL OF GREECE. MY

3.4(4)(1)

OWN VIEW AT THIS MOMENT IS THAT IN
BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES USG WILL FIND IT
EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH

PAPADOPOULOS CONTROLLED GOVT OF SOUTHERN
GREECE. I CANNOT SAY FOR CERTAIN

HOW BEST CIVIL WAR CAN BE AVERTED.

MY SENSE, HOWEVER, IS THAT RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING
STRADDLE ISSUE WE MIGHT MIGHT DO BEST
BY OPTING STRONGLY ON SIDE OF KING
AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANY INFORMATION
THAT HE HAS IN FACT WON LOYALTY
AND SUPPORT OF PROPORIONANCE OF GREEK
ARMED FORCES. AS OF THIS MOMENT, WE HAVE
NO ASSETS TO LEARN TRUE SITUATION IN NORTH
OF GREECE,
NOR HAS KING YET ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH GREEK PEOPLE
OR WITH US. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS.

END ITEM ONE.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

SECSTATE ITEM 2

FOLLOWING STATEMENT DRAFTED FOR ISSUANCE THIS MORNING AND DELAYED IN VIEW SKETCHY INFO THEN EXISTING. PLEASE COMMENT ON WISDOM ISSUING THIS OR SIMILAR STATEMENT:

"U.S. STATEMENT

KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE HAS DEPARTED ATHENS AND ARRIVED AT LARISSA IN NORTHERN GREECE. HE HAS ISSUED AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF GREECE ASKING FOR THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY.

SINCE THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS ON APRIL 21 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS URGED THAT STEPS BE TAKEN IN GREECE TO BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALISM. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BELIEVED, AND CONTINUES TO BELIEVE, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. WE URGE THE PEOPLE OF GREECE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY, AVOIDING BLOODSHED AND CIVIL STRIFE.

END ITEM

ITEM TWO.

ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM 2.

YOUR STATEMENT IS EXCELLENT AND I RECOMMEND IT BE PUT OUT IMMEDIATELY. YOU WILL SEE THAT KING HAS BEEN REPORTED BY VOA SOURCE WAS SEEN IN KAVALA THIS EVENING. RATHER THAN "ARRIVED AT LARRISA" I WOULD SUGGEST "ARRIVED AT MACEDONIA."

MY OWN INCLINATION IS TO MAKE LAST APPEAL TO PAPADOPOULS, ALONG LINES OF ATHENS 2751 IF YOU AGREE, AND LAYING ON LINE OUR PROBABLE POSITION IF THEY PRESIST IN PARTITION. WE COULD OTP FOR KING EARLY TOMORROW WHEN WE KNOW BETTER WHAT HIS SITUATION IS.

END ITEM TWO.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

VV ATA793

ATHENS ITEM 3

WHILE I WAS DICTATING PREVIOUS ITEM
BRIGADIER PATTAKOS TELEPHONED EMBASSY
AND ASKED TO SPEAK TO ME. IF YOU AGREE,
I WILL PHONE BACK IN FEW MINUTES AND ARRANGE TO SEE
HIM SHORTLY TO MAKE PITCH SUGGESTED
IN PREVIOUS ITEM.
END ITEM 3

SECSTATE ITEM 3

WE UNDERSTAND THAT KING'S STATEMENT HAS
BEEN REPEATED FOUR (4) TIMES TODAY.
IS THIS CORRECT?

END ITEM

QSL ITEMST USECSTATE ITEMS -2 AND 3 KK

ITEM 4 ATHENS

ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM THREE.
WE UNDERSTAND KINGS MESSAGE WAS
BROADCAST 4 OR 5 TIMES ON
LARISSIA RADIO BETWEEN 1430 AND 1800 HRS
TODAY, AND ALSO ON THESSALONIKA RADIO.
WE HAVE NOT YET HEARD ANY BROADCAST
FROM KAVALA OR ANYOTHER MESSAGE
FROM KING OR FOCES PRESUMABLY
SUPPORTING KING.
END OF ITEM 4

~~SECRET~~ EXDMS

ITEM 5 ATHENS
STATE 84028 ANSWERING ATHENS 2751, HAS
JUST ARRIVED. I WILL PROCEED ON
BASIS THIS INSTRUCTION WITH ANY
MODIFICATIONS CONVEYED IN PRESENT TELE-
CON IN RESPONSE TO FOREGOING ITEMS.
END ITEM FIVE

SECSTATE ITEM 4

WE AGREE YOU SHOULD MAKE PITCH IN FIRST
TWO PARAS YOUR MESSAGE AND HAD ALREADY
SO AUTHORIZED. AGREE YOU SHOULD SO SPEAK
TO PATTAKOS. SUGGEST YOU NOT USE LAST
SENTENCE PARA 2 IN VIEW DANGER THAT KING
WOULD CONSIDER U.S. HAD UNEDERCUT HIM BY
EMPHASIZING NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE MAY
NOT CONSIDER ACCEPTABLE.

END ITEM

ITEM 6 ATHENS
WE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
INCREASE FLOW. OF INFORMATION
ALL ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTING ALL
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO
EMBASSY STREPS.
END ITEM 6 KK

~~SECRET~~ EXHIBIT

SECSTATE ITEM 5

WE AGREE WE CANNOT STRADDLE ISSUE VERY LONG,
AND MUST SUPPORT GENERAL GOALS OF KING.

HOWEVER, WE PREFER TO FINESSE FOR TIME BEING
QUESTION OF STATES OF REGIME IN ATHENS
AND GROUP WITH KING. WE ARE INCLINED
PREFER STANDING ON POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN
SINCE APRIL 21 WHICH IMPLIES SUPPORT OF
KING BUT WITHOUT MAKING ENTIRELY CLEAR
DIFFICULT LEGAL SITUATION.

THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN YOUR REMAINING IN
NEVER-NEVER LAND FOR DAY OR SO PARTICULARLY
IF IT APPEARS LIKELY CONTACT WITH NEW
NEW GOVT CAN PRODUCE USEFUL RESULT.

WE AGREE SUBJECT APPROVAL SECRETARY AND
PRESIDENT TO ADHERENCE PURPOSES OF KING
BUT WITHOUT GOING ALL WAY WITH YOUR WITH-
DRAWAL TO HIS AT PRESENT UNKNOWN
DESTINATION.

DECISION YOUR MOVE TO NORTH WOULD LIKELY
DEPEND ON ABILITY OF KING TO CONTROL
ARMY AND GENERATE PUBLIC SUPPORT.

END ITEM

SECSTATE ITEM 6

ASSUME YOUR CALL ON PATAXOS OBVIATES YOUR
CALL PAPADOPOULOUS FOR MOMENT. IN GENERAL,
HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD AVOID PAYING CALLS ON HIGH
LEVEL OFFICIALS IF POSSIBLE UNLESS YOU
HAVE SOME IMPORTANT REASON TO DO SO. IF IT
IS POSSIBLE TO HOLD NECESSARY CONTACTS AT LOW
LEVEL THIS IS DESIRABLE.
END ITEM 6

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

ATHENS ITM 7
ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM 6
THANKS, BUT IF WE ARE TO ATTEMPT TO
INFLUENCE PAPADOUPOLOS, PATTAKOS, AND
MAKAREZOS TONIGHT I FEAR NO EMBASSY
OFFICER BUT WE CAN ESTABLISH CONTACT.
I WILL TRY TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
IN ONE CALL, PRESUMABLY ON PATTAKOSM
END ITEM 7

SECSTATE ITEM 8
WE UNDERSTAND AND CONCUR
END ITEM

SECSTATE ITEM 7
IS IT YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT STATEMENT
OUR ITEM TWO (2) A BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY
OR DO YOU WISH AWAIT FURTHER INFO STRENGTH
OF KING WITH ARMY AND PUBLIC.
END ITEM

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIA~~

ATHENS ITEM 9
SUGGEST YOU ISSUE STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY.
ENDITEM 9

ATHENS ITEM 8
I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH PATTAKOS
WHO ASKED ME TO COME TO GREEK PENTAGON
TO MEET WITH "US". I ASSUME
HE MEANS PAPADOPOULOS, MAKARAZOS, GENERAL
ENGHELIS AND HE ARE THERE TOGETHER.
EMBOFF AND I WILLGO THERE AS SOON
AS THIS TELECON COMPLETED.
END ITEM 8

SECSTATE ITEM 9

~~SECRET~~

FROM AMB. BATTLE

I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH SECRETARY WHO
INTERESTED HAVING ALL INFORMATION AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT
SITUATION IN NORTH. HE SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY
EMBASSY SEND SOMEONE TO NORTH TO ASCERTAIN
FACTS. NATO COUNCIL ADJOURNS IN 12 HOURS.
THERE IS STRONG SENTIMENT THERE FOR WHAT
KING IS TRYING TO DO PROVIDED HE HAS
ANY BASE OF SUPPORT AND THERE IS ANYTHING
TO BACK UP. IF WE WANT SECRETARY TO
TAKE ANY ACTION HE MUST HAVE GUIDANCE
WITHIN 8 HOURS.

SECRETARY'S INCLINATION AT MOMENT IS THAT
STATEMENT SHOULD AWAIT CLARIFICATION OF
SITUATION IN NORTH.

END ITEM

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

ATHENS ITEM 10.

ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM 9

WE ARE TRYING TO OFFICER FROM CG
THELLOLANIKA OVER TO KAVALA. [REDACTED] ATTEMPTING
TO GET OFFICER FROM ISTANBUL INTO
KAVALA AREA PROBLEM IS TO PROVIDE HIM
WITH EFFECTIVE COMMO. AT FIRST LIGHT WE
WILL SEE WHETHER THERE ANY CHANCE ATTACHE
PLANE CAN TAKE OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT
FOR NORTH. US MILITARY UNITE IN NORTH
HAVE BEEN QUARTEENED ON BASES, AND WE
HAVE NO OTHER ACTIVE ASSETS IN EASTERN
MACEDONIA OR THRACE.

[REDACTED]
END ITEM 10

ATHENS ITEM 11.

FURTHER TO SECSTATE ITEM 9

I WILL FLAZH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECRETARY AT
NATO AFTER RETURNING FROM FORTHCOMING MEETING
WITH JUNTA COLONELS.

END ITEM 11

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

SECSTATE ITEM 10

RE ATHENS ITEM 4.

LARISSA ARMED FORCES RADIO ANNOUNCED
2001 GMT ON BEHALF PREMIER THAT BY
DECISIONS KING, MINISTERS PAPADOPOULOS,
ZOITAKIS, PATTAKOS ETC DISMISSED. ALL
ARMED FORCES IN THRACE, MACEDONIA EPIRUS,
THESSALY - 90 PERCENT OF ARMY AND ALL
AIR AND NAVAL FORCES OBEYING KINGS COMMAND.

END ITEM

SECSTATE ITEM 11

FROM AMB. BATTLE

IN YOUR MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY YOU SHOULD
ALSO INCLUDE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS RE PUBLIC
STATEMENT BY USG. SECRETARY STILL BEARISH
AT PRESENT TIME.

END ITEM

ATHENS ITEM 12

SECSTATE ITEM 11 UNDERSTOOD AND WILL DO
DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER?
END ITEM 12

SECSTATE ITEM 12

WE HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. THANKS

END ITEM

FBIS 81 (OUT OF SEQUENCE)

B U L L E T I N

NEW GREEK CABINET

ATHENS CENTRAL ARMED FORCES RADIO IN GREEK 2101 GMT 13 DEC 67 M

(TEXT) AT 2100 TONIGHT THE ARCHBISHOP OF ATHENS AND
ALL GREECE SWORE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AT THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF
HEADQUARTERS. THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWS:0

PREMIER, NATIONAL DEFENSE MINISTER, AND
MINISTER TO THE PREMIER

YEORYIOS PAPADHOPOULOS

DEPUTY PREMIER AND INTERIOR MINISTER

PATTAKOS

COORDINATION MINISTER

MAKAGEZOS

MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION

PAPAKOSTANDINO

COMMERCE MINISTER

PAPADHIMITRAKOPOULOS

AGRICULTURE MINISTER

MATTHAI

LABOR MINISTER

POULEAS

PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER

PAPADHIMITRIOU

MINISTER OF INDUSTRY

KIPRAIOS

MINISTER OF MERCHANT MARINE

ATHANASIOU

MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE

POULANTZAS

THE FOLLOWING WERE SWORN IN AS UNDER SECRETARIES:

FOR COORDINATION

RODHINOS-ORLANDHOS

FOR COMMERCE

YEORGAKELOS

SOCIAL WELFARE AND HEALTH

LAMBIRIS

FINANCE

LIZARDHOS

LT GEN YEORUIOS ZOITAKIS HAS BEEN SWORN IN AS VICEROY.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SIX-MINUTE RECORDING OF
THE SWEARING IN CEREMONY. ATHENS DOMESTIC SERVICE 132112 REPEATED
THE ITEM AND THE RECORDING. NO FOREIGN MINISTER IS MENTIONED.)

13 DEC 2146Z GKE/RG

I

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

180

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Walt:

I asked John, while you and I were up on the Hill, to put down some thoughts from the intelligence community on what we might expect in Greece if King Constantine's coup succeeds.

That's a big "if" tonight, and we wouldn't want you to read the attached as our prediction that the King is sure to win. But since we want him to win, I thought it might be worthwhile giving you a concrete picture of what his success might mean.



Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-72
By us, NARA, Date 11-26-04

~~SECRET~~

180a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

December 13, 1967

SUBJECT: Preliminary Thoughts on the Effect of the Greek Coup

It's still not clear how King Constantine's counter-coup is going. In Athens, the junta is claiming complete victory, but this may not mean much. Constantine is in Northern Greece, where the ranking army officers apparently had agreed to support him. The air force commander was in the plot from the beginning. There are some things which don't fit into the picture of Constantine's being in control, however. For example, the junta still controls the army radio station in the area where Constantine is supposed to be finding his greatest military support.

If the King actually has the support of the army in Northern Greece-- which outnumbers the Athens units by better than 10 to 1--he should be able to oust the junta. One big question, of course, is whether he can do it without bloodshed. But assuming for the moment that Constantine pulls off the coup without much fighting, this is the way things might go.

There shouldn't be any great change in foreign policy. The King is as loyal to NATO, the West and other Greek commitments as the junta. The main difference would be that Greece's relations with its allies would probably be somewhat easier because the King would set Greece more quickly and openly on the course back to constitutional government.

Initially, Constantine will be ruling through a junta, but this time of his own choosing. The generals will be much easier to ease out of the picture than the colonels who took over in April, and according to one report, the King has already appointed a civilian, Peter Garoufalias, as prime minister. In 1965, Prime Minister Papandreou's attempt to fire Garoufalias, then defense minister, started this long political crisis.

The King is likely to continue with the junta's efforts to change the Constitution, but probably will speed up the process. One interim measure might be to turn over the government to a politician who can rule in his own right. The two leading candidates would be Constantine's old enemy George Papandreou and rightist leader, Constantine Karamanlis. If the King can talk Karamanlis into coming back from Paris, and if Papandreou will support a royalist coalition--before the counter-coup Papandreou said he would--this might be the best solution.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI 12-212

By 448 NARL Date 05-11-2016

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

There doesn't seem much point in the King's merely returning the country to where it was last April. He was thinking of staging his own coup then to end the political maneuvering and to keep Papandreou and the leftists from returning to power. Eventually, however, the politicians are going to be back in business and trying to vote each other out of office.


John W. Foster

~~SECRET~~

Walt - This is just a
rough picture FYI.
H.

~~SECRET~~

December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Military Balance in Greece

Assuming for the sake of illustration that Constantine can count on the loyalty of all units in Northern Greece and that the junta can count on army units in Athens, the military balance breaks down roughly this way:

Constantine has 8 infantry divisions and 1 armed division. He has already been at the headquarters of the 1st Army which controls almost all army combat units and is now in Thessalonika at the headquarters of the corps controlling Greece's best divisions.


The junta has 1 or 2 raiding force battalions, 1 amphibious regiment, 1 battalion which landed from Cyprus yesterday and miscellaneous training and headquarters units.


About half the Navy is in Athens. The Navy will probably stay out of the coup. They stayed out of the last one, and are the least political of the services.

The Air Force is likely to be split, and although some units may initially become involved on one side or the other, it is unlikely that it will jump until the winner is pretty clear.

The above, of course, assumes that units in the North are loyal to the King, and in Athens to the junta. There is probably disagreement in both places, but it is likely that the King is stronger in Athens than the junta is in the North.

If things go right, the junta will probably avoid an open fight. With the present balance of forces, they wouldn't stand a chance being outnumbered better than 10 to 1.


John Foster


Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED ANSWER TO QUERIES ON GREEK COUP



182

We're watching carefully the reports coming out of Greece. ~~The~~ situation still isn't clear. We hope, as we've said many times in the past, for return to constitutional government and hope that the present confrontation can be resolved peacefully.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

183

~~SECRET~~Wednesday, December 13, 1967
8:45 pm.

Rec'd 10:25p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Greek Coup--Issues

From early evening conversations Nick Katzenbach and Luke Battle have had with Phil Talbot in Athens and Secretary Rusk in Brussels, the following issues have emerged which we will have to face tomorrow:

1. Phil posed the question of whether we should now make our choice and cast our lot with the King. This decision could even take the form of Phil pulling out of Athens and going north with the King. He suggested that we might do best by opting strongly for the King as soon as we think he has won the support of most of the Greek armed forces.

2. Nick and Luke advised Phil for the time being just to express our hope to junta leaders in Athens that the crisis be resolved without bloodshed. They realize that we may not be able to straddle this issue for long but prefer to keep Phil in Athens with our options open until the situation clarifies. But, subject to your approval and Secretary Rusk's, they agreed that we should generally back the King's goals without committing ourselves yet.

Phil also urged that we at least issue a statement saying we continue to support efforts in Greece to return to constitutional government by peaceful means. But Secretary Rusk still thinks we ought to wait till morning. (The issue is twofold: (a) this would be read as a pro-King statement; (b) US friends of Greek democracy will criticize us for failing to back the King's effort to return to constitutional government.

Secretary Rusk reports keen interest among NATO Council members in backing the King provided he has some base of support and there is something to back. Phil is talking to the junta leaders right now and trying to get someone up north to find out exactly how much support the King has. He will report directly to the Secretary.

I'll keep you posted.

Walt
Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcl/w NARA, Date 12/1/03~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

TELECONFERENCE
BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND

Am Embassy ATHENS

ON

DECEMBER 13, 1967

(1720 EST)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-73
By us NARA, Date 10-8-04

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

SECSTATE ITEM 1

132219Z

PARTICIPANTS: AMB. BATTLE
MR. ROCKWELL
MR. BREWSTER

SUBJECT: GREEK CRISIS

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET EXDIS~~

END ITEM

YES GA PLS KK
THANK YOU AMBASSADOR D TALBOT STANDING BY KK

[2]

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

A

AT
ATHENS ITEM ONE,
WE FACE NEW SITUATION TONIGHT WITH
PAPADOPOULOS HAVING IN EFFECT DECLARED
KING DIPOSED AND NEW NEW GOVERNMENT
OF WHICH HE PRIME MINISTER. ETC.
MY INCLINATION CONTINUES TO BE TRY TO SEE
HIM AND AGREE ISSUE OUT ON BASIS ATHENS.
2751 (TO WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE)
HOWEVER, ATHENIANS MAY TAKE A CALL BY ME
AS DEFACTO RECOGNITION OF THIS REGIME
WHICH I ASSUME WE MUST CONSIDER TO BE
A REBEL REGIME. WE ARE ATTEMPTING
TO GET SOME EMBASSY OFFICER TO
KAVALA TOMORROW TO ESTABLISH CONTACT
WITH KING, WHOSE MOVEMENTS AND PLANS
CONTINUE TO BE UNKNOWN TO US. QUESTION
ARISES, HOWEVER, WHETHER USG SHOULD NOW
MAKE ITS CHOICE AND CAST DYE IN FAVOR OF KING.
THIS MIGHT INVOLVE USG DECLARATION OF SUPPORT
OF KING AND INSTRUCTORS TO ME TO JOIN
KING AND HIS CABINET WHENEVER THEY MAY BE AT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. YOU WILL UNDER
STAND GRAVITY OF THIS DECISION, INVOLVING
AS IT DOES OUR TOTAL PRESENCE AND ALL
FACILITIES IN ALL OF GREECE. MY

3.3 (b) (1)

OWN VIEW AT THIS MOMENT IS THAT IN
BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES USG WILL FIND IT
EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH

PAPADOPOULOS UNROLLED GOVT OF SOUTHERN
GREECE. I CANNOT SAY FOR CERTAIN

HOW BEST CIVIL WAR CAN BE AVERTED.

MY SENSE, HOWEVER, IS THAT RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING
STRADDLE ISSUE WE MIGHT DO BEST
BY OPTING STRONGLY ON SIDE OF KING
AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANY INFORMATIO
THAT HE HAS IN FACT WON LOYALTY
AND SUPPORT OF PROPONDORANCE OF GREEK
ARMED FORCES. AS OF THIS MOMENT, WE HAVE
NO ASSETS TO LEARN TRUE SITUATION IN NORTH
OF GREECE,
NOR HAS KING YET ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH GREEK PEOPLE
OR WITH US. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS.

END ITEM ONE.

[3]

~~SECRET EXHIBIT~~

SECSTATE ITEM 2

FOLLOWING STATEMENT DRAFTED FOR ISSUANCE THIS MORNING AND DELAYED IN VIEW SKETCHY INFO THEN EXISTING. PLEASE COMMENT ON WISDOM ISSUING THIS OR SIMILAR STATEMENT:

"U.S. STATEMENT

KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE HAS DEPARTED ATHENS AND ARRIVED AT LARISSA IN NORTHERN GREECE. HE HAS ISSUED AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF GREECE ASKING FOR THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY.

SINCE THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS ON APRIL 21 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS URGED THAT STEPS BE TAKEN IN GREECE TO BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALISM. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BELIEVED, AND CONTINUES TO BELIEVE, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. WE URGE THE PEOPLE OF GREECE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY, AVOIDING BLOODSHED AND CIVIL STRIFE.

END ITEM

ITEM TWO.

ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM 2.

YOUR STATEMENT IS EXCELLENT AND I RECOMMEND IT BE PUT OUT IMMEDIATELY. YOU WILL SEE THAT KING HAS BEEN REPORTED BY VOA SOURCE WAS SEEN IN KAVALA THIS EVENING. RATHER THAN "ARRIVED AT LARRISA" I WOULD SUGGEST "ARRIVED AT MACEDONIA."

MY OWN INCLINATION IS TO MAKE LAST APPEAL TO PAPADOPOULS, ALONG LINES OF ATHENS 2751 IF YOU AGREE, AND LAYING ON LINE OUR PROBABLE POSITION IF THEY PERSIST IN PARTITION. WE COULD OTP FOR KING EARLY TOMORROW WHEN WE KNOW BETTER WHAT HIS SITUATION IS.

END ITEM TWO.

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

VV ATA793
ATHENS ITEM 3
WHILE I WAS DICTATING PREVIOUS ITEM
BRIGADIER PATTAKOS TELEPHONED EMBASSY
AND ASKED TO SPEAK TO ME. IF YOU AGREE,
I WILL PHONE BACK IN FEW MINUTES AND ARRANGE TO SEE
HIM SHORTLY TO MAKE PITCH SUGGESTED
IN PREVIOUS ITEM.
END ITEM 3

SECSTATE ITEM 3

WE UNDERSTAND THAT KING'S STATEMENT HAS
BEEN REPEATED FOUR (4) TIMES TODAY.
IS THIS CORRECT?

END ITEM

QSL ITEMST USECSTATE ITEMS -2 AND 3 KK

ITEM 4 ATHENS
ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM THREE.
WE UNDERSTAND KING'S MESSAGE WAS
BROADCAST 4 OR 5 TIMES ON
LARISSIA RADIO BETWEEN 1430 AND 1800 HRS
TODAY, AND ALSO ON THESSALONIKA RADIO.
WE HAVE NOT YET HEARD ANY BROADCAST
FROM KAVALA OR ANYOTHER MESSAGE
FROM KING OR FOCES PRESUMABLY
SUPPORTING KING.
END OF ITEM 4

[5]

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

ITEM 5 ATHENS
STATE 84028 ANSWERING ATHENS 2751, HAS
JUST ARRIVED. I WILL PROCEED ON
BASIS THIS INSTRUCTION WITH ANY
MODIFICATIONS CONVEYED IN PRESENT TELE-
CON IN RESPONSE TO FOREGOING ITEMS.
END ITEM FIVE

SECSTATE ITEM 4

WE AGREE YOU SHOULD MAKE PITCH IN FIRST
TWO PARAS YOUR MESSAGE AND HAD ALREADY
SO AUTHORIZED. AGREE YOU SHOULD SO SPEAK
TO PATTAKOS. SUGGEST YOU NOT USE LAST
SENTENCE PARA 2 IN VIEW DANGER THAT KING
WOULD CONSIDER U.S. HAD UNEDERCUT HIM BY
EMPHASIZING NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE MAY
NOT CONSIDER ACCEPTABLE.

END ITEM

ITEM 6 ATHENS
WE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
INCREASE FLOW. OF INFORMATION
ALL ELEMENTS CONTRIUTING ALL
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO
EMBASSY STREPS.
END ITEM 6.KK

~~SECRET EXD19~~

SECSTATE ITEM 5

WE AGREE WE CANNOT STRADDLE ISSUE VERY LONG,
AND MUST SUPPORT GENERAL GOALS OF KING.

HOWEVER, WE PREFER TO FINESSE FOR TIME BEING
QUESTION OF STATES OF REGIME IN ATHENS
AND GROUP WITH KING. WE ARE INCLINED
PREFER STANDING ON POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN
SINCE APRIL 21 WHICH IMPLIES SUPPORT OF
KING BUT WITHOUT MAKING ENTIRELY CLEAR
DIFFICULT LEGAL SITUATION.

THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN YOUR REMAINING IN
NEVER-NEVER LAND FOR DAY OR SO PARTICULARLY
IF IT APPEARS LIKELY CONTACT WITH NEW
NEW GOVT CAN PRODUCE USEFUL RESULT.

WE AGREE SUBJECT APPROVAL SECRETARY AND
PRESIDENT TO ADHERENCE PURPOSES OF KING
BUT WITHOUT GOING ALL WAY WITH YOUR WITH-
DRAWAL TO HIS AT PRESENT UNKNOWN
DESTINATION.

DECISION YOUR MOVE TO NORTH WOULD LIKELY
DEPEND ON ABILITY OF KING TO CONTROL
ARMY AND GENERATE PUBLIC SUPPORT.

END ITEM

SECSTATE ITEM 6

ASSUME YOUR CALL ON PATAKOS OBVIATES YOUR
CALL PAPADPOULOUS FOR MOMENT. IN GENERAL,
HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD AVOID PAYING CALLS ON HIGH
LEVEL OFFICIALS IF POSSIBLE UNLESS YOU
HAVE SOME IMPORTANT REASON TO DO SO. IF IT
IS POSSIBLE TO HOLD NECESSARY CONTACTS AT LOW
LEVEL THIS IS DESIRABLE.
END ITEM 6

[7]

~~SECRET EYES~~

ATHENS ITEM 7

ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM 6

THANKS, BUT IF WE ARE TO ATTEMPT TO
INFLUENCE PAPADOPOLOS, PATTAKOS, AND
MAKAREZOS TONIGHT I FEAR NO EMBASSY
OFFICER BUT WE CAN ESTABLISH CONTACT.
I WILL TRY TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
IN ONE CALL, PRESUMABLY ON PATTAKOS.
END ITEM 7

SECSTATE ITEM 8

WE UNDERSTAND AND CONCUR

END ITEM

SECSTATE ITEM 7

IS IT YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT STATEMENT
(OUR ITEM TWO (2)) BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY
OR DO YOU WISH AWAIT FURTHER INFO STRENGTH
OF KING WITH ARMY AND PUBLIC.

END ITEM

[8]

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIA~~

ATHENS ITEM 9
SUGGEST YOU ISSUE STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY.
END ITEM 9

ATHENS ITEM 8
I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH PATTAKOS
WHO ASKED ME TO COME TO GREEK PENTAGON
TO MEET WITH "US". I ASSUME
HE MEANS PAPADOPOULOS, MAKARAZOS, GENERAL
ENCHELIS AND HE ARE THERE TOGETHER.
EMBOFF AND I WILL GO THERE AS SOON
AS THIS TELECON COMPLETED.
END ITEM 8

SECSTATE ITEM 9

FROM AMB. BATTLE

I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH SECRETARY WHO
INTERESTED HAVING ALL INFORMATION AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT
SITUATION IN NORTH. HE SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY
EMBASSY SEND SOMEONE TO NORTH TO ASCERTAIN
FACTS. NATO COUNCIL ADJOURNS IN 12 HOURS.
THERE IS STRONG SENTIMENT THERE FOR WHAT
KING IS TRYING TO DO PROVIDED HE HAS
ANY BASE OF SUPPORT AND THERE IS ANYTHING
TO BACK UP. IF WE WANT SECRETARY TO
TAKE ANY ACTION HE MUST HAVE GUIDANCE
WITHIN 8 HOURS.

SECRETARY'S INCLINATION AT MOMENT IS THAT
STATEMENT SHOULD AWAIT CLARIFICATION OF
SITUATION IN NORTH.

END ITEM

[9]

~~SECRET~~

ATHENS ITEM 10.

ANSWERING SECSTATE ITEM 9

WE ARE TRYING TO OFFICER FROM CG

THELLOLANIKA OVER TO KAVALA. [REDACTED] ATTEMPTING

TO GET OFFICER FROM ISTANBUL INTO

KAVALA AREA PROBLEM IS TO PROVIDE HIM

WITH EFFECTIVE COMMO. AT FIRST LIGHT WE

WILL SEE WHETHER THERE ANY CHANCE ATTACHE

PLANE CAN TAKE OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT

FOR NORTH. US MILITARY UNITE IN NORTH

HAVE BEEN QUARTEENED ON BASES, AND WE

HAVE NO OTHER ACTIVE ASSETS IN EASTERN

MACEDONIA OR THRACE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

END ITEM 10

3.3 (b)(1)

3.3 (b)(1)

ATHENS ITEM 11.

FURTHER TO SECSTATE ITEM 9

I WILL FLAZH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECRETARY AT

NATO AFTER RETURNING FROM FORTHCOMING MEETING

WITH JUNTA COLONELS.

END ITEM 11

[10]

~~SECRET EX-113~~

SECSTATE ITEM 10

RE ATHENS ITEM 4.

LARISSA ARMED FORCES RADIO ANNOUNCED
2001 GMT ON BEHALF PREMIER THAT BY
DECISIONS KING, MINISTERS PAPADOPOULOS,
ZOITAKIS, PATTAKOS ETC DISMISSED. ALL
ARMED FORCES IN THRACE, MACEDONIA EPIRUS,
THESSALY - 90 PERCENT OF ARMY AND ALL
AIR AND NAVAL FORCES OBEYING KING'S COMMAND.

END ITEM

SECSTATE ITEM 11

FROM AMS. BATTLE

IN YOUR MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY YOU SHOULD
ALSO INCLUDE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS RE PUBLIC
STATEMENT BY USG. SECRETARY STILL BEARISH
AT PRESENT TIME.

END ITEM

ATHENS ITEM 12

SECSTATE ITEM 11 UNDERSTOOD AND WILL DO
DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER?
END ITEM 12

SECSTATE ITEM 12

WE HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. THANKS

END ITEM

[11]

~~SECRET~~

December 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Message from George Papandreou

State has asked me to bring to your attention a letter which former Greek Prime Minister Papandreou gave to both the Swedes and Danes to pass on to President Johnson and leaders of Western European countries. I don't think there is any need to bother the President with it, but it at least belongs in his files. You may recall that Luke Battle got a similar message through the same channel the day before King Constantine saw the President.

Essentially what Papandreou is asking for is US backing for a royal counter-coup against the junta. He proposes a "two-stage return to parliamentary government" under the King's leadership--a non-political government to be followed by a transitional political government in which both major parties would collaborate. Papandreou "as the leader of the majority of the Greek people" guarantees peace "during this time."

We don't know whether the King is aware of this plan (though the Scandinavians may already have told him) and have no direct evidence that anyone is doing anything to carry it out. We do know that the junta has been worried in the wake of the Vance agreement that some sort of counter-coup involving Constantine is being planned. Also, former right-wing premier Karamanlis recently came out against the junta from his Paris exile. The Swedish copy of the letter was accompanied by a warning that the coup might take place during the last two days of November, but obviously that's overtaken.

The State Department plans to take no action beyond thanking the Swedes and Danes and repeating the letter to Phil Talbot in Athens. With all our troubles over Cyprus, this is the worst possible time to get involved in Greek internal politics. The surfacing of the approach--let alone a US reply--would probably hurt us in Athens. One could argue that there might be some value in an informal approach to the King on the subject of coups, but the President decided in talking to Constantine that we would stand clear of this jockeying between King and junta.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-74
By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

Hal
Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

185a

TO : White House - Mr. Saunders

FROM : State - NEA/GRK - H. Daniel ^{WDB} Brewster

SUBJECT:

DATE: November 27, 1967

Deputy Assistant Secretary Rockwell received the Danish Charge on November 25. The Charge delivered the attached message to be passed on to the White House. After discussing the matter further with Mr. Rockwell, he thinks that no action on this is required by the President. If you agree, I propose to pass a copy to Phil Talbot in Athens for his information.

After further consideration we are hesitant to get into the middle with this proposal. Presumably one of the Scandinavians in Athens has been able to convey this message (which dates back to October 24, 1967) to the King or Palace circles.

Attachment:
Message from George Papandreou

^{WDB}
HDB:jsp

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By us, NARA, Date 10-5-04

~~SECRET~~



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

185-16

Text of message from the former Greek Prime Minister Georg Papandreou to the Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag.

---oo0oo---

"As you well know Greece is in an intolerable situation which must be resolved before we enter a period of greater repression and possible bloodshed.

I am using this method of secret diplomacy because all normal political channels are not available to me, nor to my party. I am addressing particularly the Prime Ministers of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway because of the valiant stand of these countries on the side of democracy, a noble service for which as you understand, we are presently unable to express openly our deep gratitude.

I would like to formally re-assert my dedication to the principles of democracy, my commitment to the NATO alliance, which I consider essential to our survival as a Western power, and to the form of the regime of crowned democracy in Greece. It is my belief that a solution lies in a two-stage return to parliamentary government. The initiative must be the King's for he is the only force today which can move the country on the correct path. If he takes the initiative, he will have my backing 100 per cent, and I speak for the entire party, as well as the majority of the Greek people which we represent.

He will need, however, the full backing of the United States and Western European powers.

In the first stage, he will form a government of non-political people of his choice, all firmly committed to a return of parliamentary government, and which will ready the country for a transition period of political collaboration between the party of ERE and the Center Union in preparation for elections.

Under these circumstances we will not raise the question of the legality of the acts of the military government.

All of this will require the utmost in wisdom, patience and understanding. Political prisoners must be released and liberalization measures taken in a graded fashion. As the leader of the majority of the greek people, I can guarantee the peace during this time.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

OVER

- 2 -

Hoping that this proposal can be transmitted as early as possible through you to President Johnson and leaders of Western European countries, and that prompt consideration be given to it, since it is my belief that this path must be taken within the next month to avoid the danger of a "new constitution" and to avoid possible conflict and bloodshed, I remain"

Washington, D.C.
November 24, 1967

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 7464Q

RECEIVED: NOV 28, 1967
10:23 a.m.

Info

ZZ RUEHC
DE RUDKLM 126A 3321515
ZNY SSSSS
Z 281500Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1627
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ STOCKHOLM 538

PRIVACY CHANNEL

NODIS

PRIME MINISTER ERLANDER SENT FOR ME 3:00 P.M. NOV 28 TO GIVE ME COPY LETTER FROM GEORGE PAPENDREOU (DATED OCT 1967) TO PM IN WHICH FORMER ASKED LETTER BE SENT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. ERLANDER SAID LETTER HAD BEEN HAND-DELIVERED BUT HE DID NOT SAY BY WHOM OR WHETHER DIRECTLY TO HIM. HOWEVER, ERLANDER GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT MESSENGER HAD GIVEN IMPRESSION GREEK COUP BY PAPENDREOU WITH KING'S BACKING POSSIBLE WITHIN 24-48 HOURS. TEXT LETTER AND SUMMARY MY CONVERSATION FOLLOW.

GP-1 HEATH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-76

By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W/D Jambus

185-d

~~SECRET~~

Action 00 R
DE RUDKLM 127A 3321545D 7481Q
ZNY SSSSS 1967 NOV 28 AM 11 11
O 281515Z NOV 67

Info FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1629
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ STOCKHOLM 540

NODIS

PRIVACY CHANNEL

REF: STOCKHOLM 538

FOLLOWING IS LETTER HANDED ME BY ERLANDER; STATIONERY IS HEADED QTE GEORGE PAPANDREOU, LEADER OF THE CENTER UNION UNQTE. TEXT FOLLOWS:

QTE
ATHENS, GREECE
OCTOBER 1967
PRIME MINISTER TAGE ERLANDER
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

AS YOU WELL KNOW, GREECE IS IN AN INTOLERABLE YITUATION WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE WE ENTER A PERIOD OF GREATER REPRESSION AND POSSIBLE BLOODSHED.

I AM USING THIS METHOD OF SECRET DIPLOMACY BECAUSE ALL NORMAL POLITICAL CHANNELS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO ME, NOR TO MY PARTY. I AM ADDRESSING PARTICULARLY THE PRIME MINSTERS OF SWEDEN, DENMARK AND NORWAY BECAUSE OF THE VALIANT STAND BF THESE COUNTRIES ON THE SIDE OF DEMOCRACY, A NOBLE SERVICE FOR WHICH, AS YOU UNDERSTAND, WE ARE PRESENTLY UNABLE TO EXPRESS OURSELVES OPENLY, TO TELL YOU OUR DEEP GRATITUDE.

I WOULD LIKE TO FORMALLY RE-ASSERT MY DEDICATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRARY., MY COMMITMENT TO THE NATO ALLIANCE, WHICH I CONSIDER ESSENTIAL TO OUR SURVIVAL AS A WESTERN POWER, AND TO THE FORM OF THE REGIME OF CROWNED DEMOCRACY IN GREECE.

IT IS MY BELIEF THAT A SOLUTION LIES IN A TWO-STAGE RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. THE INITIATIVE MUST BE THE KING'S, FOR HE IS THE ONLY FORCE TODAY WHICH CAN MOVE THE COUNTRY BACK ON THE CORRECT PATH. IF HE TAKES THE INITIATIVE, HE WILL HAVE MY BACKING

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By *is*, NARA, Date *10-5-04*

~~SECRET~~

-2- STOCKHOLM 540, NOVEMBER 28

100 PERCENT, AND I SPEAK FOR THE ENTIRE PARTY, AS WELL AS THE MAJORITY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE WHICH WE REPRESENT.

HE WILL NEED, HOWEVER, THE FULL BACKING OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN POWERS.

IN THE FIRST STAGE, HE WILL FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NON-POLITICAL PEOPLE OF HIS CHOICE, ALL FIRMLY COMMITTED TO A RETURN OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, AND WHICH WILL READY THE COUNTRY FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD OF POLITICAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE PARTY OF ERE AND THE CENTER UNION IN PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WILL NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE LEGALITY OF THE ACZS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

ALL OF THIS WILL REQUIRE THE UTMOST IN WISDOM, PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING. POLITICAL PRISONERS MUST BE RELEASED AND LIBERALIZATION MEASURES TAKEN IN A GRADED FASHION. AS THE LEADER OF THE MAJORITY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE, I CAN GUARANTEE THE PEACE DURING THIS TIME.

HOPING THIS PROPOSAL CAN BE TRANSMITTED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THROUGH YOU TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND LEADERS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND THAT PROMPT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO IT, SINCE IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THIS PATH MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH TO AVOID THE DANGER OF "NEW CONSTITUTION" AND TO AVOID POSSIBLE CONFLICT AND BLOODSHED, I REMAIN,
RESPECTFULLY YOURS, G/ PAPANDREOU
END OF TEXT

GP-1 HEATH

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

#2
Jamulus
185-2
CONTROL: 7486Q
RECEIVED: NOV 28, 1967
11:40 a.m.

Info

OO RUEHC
DE RUDKLM 128A 3321604
ZNY SSSSS
O 281538Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1630
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ STOCKHOLM 541

PRIVACY CHANNEL

NODIS

REF: STOCKHOLM 538 AND 540.

1. ERLANDER OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING LETTER HAD BEEN DELIVERED BY HAND ONLY TEN MINUTES BEFORE HE HAD CALLED ME IN. I DID NOT PRESS HIM AS TO HOW IS WAS DELIVERED BUT DID QUERY URGENCY IN VIEW OCTOBER 1967 DATE. PM SAID IT TOOK TIME TO GET LETTER OUT OF GREECE THESE DAYS. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT LANGUAGE LETTER "THIS PATH MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH."

2. THEN, HE WENT ON, MESSENGER HAD STRESSED THAT SPEED WAS OF ESSENCE AND THAT THERE COULD BE A COUP WITHIN 24-48 HOURS "OR EVEN TONIGHT." MESSENGER SAID THAT PAPENDREOU HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE KING TO FORM A GOVERNMENT AND CARRY OUT PROGRAM IN LETTER. AGAIN, PM DID NOT SAY WHO MESSENGER WAS OR WHETHER YE HAD TALKED TO HIM DIRECTLY.

3. ERLANDER'S INTERPRETATION WAS THAT PAPENDREOU COUP WITH KING'S BACKING HAD BEEN PLANNED SINCE OCTOBER AND THAT THIS LETTER WAS PAPENDREOU'S WAY OF INSURING THAT HIS PROMISES OF FIDELITY TO NATO, RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, ETC, WOULD FORESTALL US COUNTER-INTERVENTION. I COULD OFFER NO COMMENT ON THIS, OF COURSE.

4. CYPRUS WAS NOT MENTIONED IN CONVERSATION AND PRESUMABLY HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED BY MESSENGER.

5. PM SAID HE THOUGHT SIMILAR LETTER DELEVERED Krag. IN INTERVAL BETWEEN HIS CALL TO ME AND MY ARRIVAL HE HAD TRIED REACH Krag BUT Krag WAS IN PARLIAMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By *is*, NARA, Date 10-5-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- STOCKHOLM 541 Nov 28

6. ERLANDER AT FIRST SEEMED TO WANT ME TO DELIVER MESSAGE FROM MEMORY BUT I PERSUADED HIM GIVE ME COPY, WHICH, PM STRESSED, WOULD BE ONLY COPY.

7. I PROMISED PM TO GET LETTER TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY. HE URGED SPEED AND SECRECY. I AM NOT SURE THAT PM MAY NOT ALSO HAVE INFORMED UK BECAUSE HE DID MENTION NEED OF SUPPORT OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH HE ADDED US WAS MOST IMPORTANT.

GP-1 HEATH

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Saunders

077506



Department of State
TELEGRAM

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Classification

30 Nov 67 00 17Z

185-f

Origin

ACTION: AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

Info:

INFO: AMEMBASSY ATHENS

State 77506

~~EMBTLS~~ 7 NODIS

Embtels 540 and 541

1. You may thank Prime Minister on appropriate occasion for message conveyed reftel 540 which was passed promptly to White House and appropriate senior US officials.
2. For your information text of same message was delivered by Danish Charge to Assistant Secretary Rockwell on November 25. On that occasion there was no link-in made with possible Greek coup. Although ~~may~~ there have been various reports that coup by King and senior military might take place, we have had no word that Papandreou and King were conniving on such a project.
3. We propose take no further action here.
4. For Athens: Reftels being repeated.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
 NLJ 04-76
 By is, NARA, Date 10-5-04

2013

Drafted by:

NEA/GRK:HDBrewer:jsp

Tel. Ext.

3095

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Rockwell Battle

Clearances:

S/S-Mr. Read

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM B-65 D5-322
WM