

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

Thursday, November 30, 1967, 5:00 P.M.

Reid 458

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Cyrus Vance

S/S informed
OK as revised

Secretary Rusk recommends that you send at once the following congratulatory message to Cy Vance:

"Dear Cy:

"At a critical time for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean you accepted from me at a moment's notice a difficult and highly important mission. I asked nothing less of you than to help the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus avoid a major war and a terrible human tragedy. With courage, perceptiveness, skill, and total dedication you pursued this formidable task, and you succeeded. ~~Because of your~~

~~efforts, and those of the Secretary-General of NATO and the Secretary General of the United Nations through his Special Representative, the Governments concerned have been helped to save peace. It is not~~

~~often possible to say of a man 'he helped prevent a war,' but I say this~~

~~now to you.~~ You have my profound gratitude and admiration, and that

of the American people. I am sure these sentiments are shared by

the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean region in particular, and by

all men of good will everywhere.

"I look forward to seeing you tomorrow. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

✓ OK to send

Call Me

For W. W. Rostow *Bronley Smith*

186a

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, November 30, 1967, 5:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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"Dear Cy:

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"I look forward to seeing you tomorrow. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

BKS for
W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EXDIS

186-8

AmEmbassy ATHENS FLASH

INFO: AmEmbassy ANKARA
AmEmbassy NICOSIA
AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy OTTAWA
USUN NEW YORK
US MISSION NATO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

STATE

EXDIS

NATUS

Please deliver following message to Mr. Vance from President Johnson: QUOTE

Dear Cy: At a critical time for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean you accepted from me at a moment's notice a difficult and highly important mission. I asked nothing less of you than to help the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus avoid a major war and a terrible human tragedy. With courage, perceptiveness, skill, and total dedication you pursued this formidable task, and you succeeded. Because of your efforts, and those of the Secretary General of NATO and the Secretary General of the United Nations through his Special Representative, the Governments concerned have been helped to save peace. It is not often possible to say of a man INNER QUOTE He helped prevent a war END INNER QUOTE, but I say this now to you. You have my profound gratitude and admiration, and that of the American people. I am sure these sentiments are shared by the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean region in particular, and by all men of good will everywhere.

I look forward to seeing you tomorrow. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
END QUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL-EXDIS

4410
FOR INFO:
1 - *Boydell*
2 - *RET*

187

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-76
By *is*, NARA, Date *10-5-04*

Amembassy ATHENS

In concert with your British and Canadian colleagues and subject to confirmation from Ankara that GOT regards five points as valid basis for discussions, contact urgently Government of Greece and make presentation along following lines:

1. The Governments of Canada, UK, US have been in continuous consultation with respect to the dangerous situation in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean. These Governments consider it imperative that the Governments of Turkey and Greece reject use of force in this delicate situation and seek on an urgent basis a peaceful course which will remove immediate tensions and improve prospects for longer term solutions.
2. The Governments of US, UK and Canada, in view of their deep concern over the dangerous situation in which they share a common interest, are willing to do all possible to assist the parties concerned in bringing about resolution of the current and long-term difficulties. The three governments are in touch with the Government of Turkey which had advanced certain proposals as hereinafter set forth: (here include five points contained para 2 Deptel to Ankara) The Government of Turkey has indicated its willingness to accept the foregoing as the basis for a solution to the difficult problems facing the countries concerned.
3. In addition to the suggestions made by the Government of Turkey which might well form a basis for discussion, the Canadian Ambassador wishes to make available a highly informal working paper which has been in preparation for some time before the current crisis.

It is the opinion of these three governments that an early meeting between representatives of Greece and Turkey, possibly in a third

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

country, might be a constructive step toward a solution to the current crisis. If it appears useful, and the working paper commends itself, arrangements could be made for this paper to be put forward more formally prior to such a meeting.

S
188
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, November 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You can see from these cables Cy left for
Ankara in pretty good shape from Athens.

WWR

Z 270105Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3900
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 653
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 604
USUN NEW YORK 207

188a

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2446

EXDIS

VANTO

SUBJ: VANCE MEETING WITH FONMIN PIPINELIS, NOVEMBER 26

1. VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR TALBOT AND JOHN WALSH, CALLED ON FONMIN TO RECEIVE GREEK REACTIONS TO DRAFT ACCORD AS MODIFIED IN NOVEMBER 25 MEETINGS IN ANKARA. PIPINELIS REPORTED CABINET HAD REVIEWED DRAFT IN LONG AND DIFFICULT SESSION AND HAD PREPARED REVISED DRAFT WHICH HE REQUESTED VANCE TO PRESENT TO GOT TOMORROW. ~~TEXT CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CABLE~~ **ATTACHED.**

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2446 ~~SECRET~~

2. AFTER QUICK REVIEW VANCE SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE CARRY OUT WISHES OF GOG BUT IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT THAT THEIR DRAFT COULD NOT BE SOLD TO GOT. WITH TIME RUNNING OUT, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE TEXTUAL CHANGES. WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND HE HAD PREPARED DRAFT WHICH REPRESENTS FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN DESIRES OF TWO COUNTRIES AND WHICH HAS

(VANCE)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRS 04-68, vol 16, #325
By jc NARA. Date 12-10-03

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 32 ATHENS 22446 270157Z~~

REASONABLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE IN ANKARA. TEXT FOLLOWS:
QUOTE

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS, SUCH AN APPEAL TO INCLUDE, INTER ALIA;

A. AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO REAFFIRM THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

B. A REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EACH OTHER AND OF CYPRUS AND AS A FIRST STEP ALONG THE LINE

OF MY PREVIOUS APPEAL TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES, IN EXCESS OF THOSE PRESENT IN 1963.

~~PAGE 3 RUQMAT 24466 SECRET~~

2. THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY FORTHWITH WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. THEREUPON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL WITHDRAW EXPEDITIOUSLY ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM CYPRUS. ACCOMPANYING THIS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR REMOVING THE CRISIS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE THREE COUNTRIES UNDERTAKE TO SEEK FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ENLARGED AND IMPROVED MANDATE FOR UNFICYP GIVING IT AN INCREASED PACIFICATION ROLE AND CALLING UPON IT TO ASSIST IN SETTING UP EXPEDITIOUSLY NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING THE SAFETY OF ALL CITIZENS) AND THE SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT. UNQUOTE

PAGE 4 RUQMAT 24466 ~~SECRET~~

3. IN EXPLAINING TEXT, VANCE EMPHASIZED THAT HIS OBJECT WAS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 03 ATHENS 92446 270157Z~~

TO STOP OUTBREAK OF WAR AND NOT TO SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS OF CYPRUS. THEREFORE, TEXT COULD NOT BE AS INCLUSIVE AS EITHER PARTY MIGHT WISH. ON OTHER HAND, TEXT SEEMS FAIR TO BOTH AND COULD PROVIDE MEDIUM FOR RESOLUTION PRESENT CRISIS.

4. AFTER DISCUSSION NUMBER ELEMENTS OF VANCE DRAFT, PIPINELIS SAID IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO REASSEMBLE THE CABINET TO REVIEW PAPER BEFORE VANCE'S DEPARTURE. HE THEN PROPOSED A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." VANCE SHOULD PRESENT THE GREEK DRAFT TO GOT TOMORROW. IF IT IS REJECTED, VANCE SHOULD THEN PRESENT HIS DRAFT. IF TURK CONCURRENCE IS OBTAINED, PIPINELIS PLEDGED HIMSELF TO SUPPORT THE DRAFT IN CABINET. HE ALSO AUTHORIZED VANCE TO INFORM GOT THAT HE HAD REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT GOG WOULD APPROVE THE DRAFT.

5. IN DISCUSSING GOT PLANS FOR REDUCTION MOBILIZATION LEVELS, PIPINELIS SAID GOG PLACED HIGH PRIORITY ON REMOVAL INVASION FLEET WHICH HAD BEEN ASSEMBLED IN TURK PORTS.

PAGE 5 RUQMAT 2446 ~~SECRET~~
AND WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN LETTER FROM GOT COVERING REDUCTION SCHEDULES COMPARABLE TO THEIR LETTER ON WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULES. VANCE SAID HE WOULD URGE GOT TO PROVIDE SUCH A LETTER.
TALBOT
BT

NNN

#AS RECEIVED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

Z 270047Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3899
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 652
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 603
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 65
AMEMBASSY LONDON 390
USUN NEW YORK 206
USMISSION NATO 101
CINCEUR

188b

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2445

EXDIS

VANTO

FONMIN PIPINELLIS PRESENTED COUNTER-DRAFT THIS EVENING TO VANCE. WHILE AGREEING TO DELIVER IT TO GOT, VANCE EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT IT WOULD BE REJECTED. TEXT FOLLOWS:

~~PAGE 2 RUOMAT 0415 SECRET~~

QUOTE 1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS ADDRESSED AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS ON NOVEMBER 24, 1967.

2. ON NOVEMBER 25, 1967 THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS REACHED A CONSENSUS, NOTING WITH SATISFACTION THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03
12-11-03

GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THAT THEY AGREE TO THE REDUCTION OF FORCES SUGGESTED THEREIN WITH A VIEW TO THE ULTIMATE COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION, AND THAT THEY SHALL DESIST FROM THE USE OF FORCE OR THE THREAT OF USE OF FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR ENDS; SHALL RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS; AND SHALL REFRAIN FROM ANY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF THAT REPUBLIC.

~~PAGE 3~~ ~~RUQMAT 2445~~ ~~SECRET~~

4. THEREUPON, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCEPTS TO WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM CYPRUS. TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION, IT WILL RECALL ONE BATTALION FORTHWITH.

PARALLEL TO THIS WITHDRAWAL, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL RECALL THE MEASURES OF PREPAREDNESS AGAINST GREECE AND CYPRUS.

5. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, AN ENLARGED AND IMPROVED MANDATE FOR UNFICYP WOULD BE SOUGHT, GIVING IT AN INCREASED PACIFICATION ROLE AND THE TASK OF BRINGING ABOUT NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING SAFETY FOR ALL CITIZENS). UPON COMPLETION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS, THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS WILL WITHDRAW THEIR MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF UNFICYP. UNQUOTE.

GP-3 TALBOT

~~SECRET~~

November 26, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFORMATION GEORGE CHRISTIAN

189
sent Rostow
via wire
CAP 67/021

Greek response to Ankara's counterproposals last night was initially favorable, although Cy is staying in Athens most of today to work out some troublesome language (and, hopefully, to get some sleep). There is still room for a breakdown in this effort, but Cy tentatively felt last night that the Turks had turned the corner yesterday and decided they had a chance of gaining their objectives without war.

In addition to holding the Turks, Cy seems to have surmounted the first negotiating hurdles -- who backs down first and general agreement that illegal Greek forces on Cyprus must withdraw. The Turks can bill this as a victory, although in a secret annex to the agreement Cy has worked out, they agree to announce some steps toward demobilization within four hours after Greece announces its plans for withdrawal.

Now two new problems are coming into focus:

First is Makarios. He's decided that he's safe now and is going to use the crisis to eliminate formal Turk presence on Cyprus once and for all. He is going to insist on withdrawal even of those small military contingents from Greece and Turkey allowed by the 1960 agreements. Once Cy has agreement in Athens and Ankara, his next job will be to bring Makarios into line.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 98-278 (464)
By jc/is NARA Date 12-11-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Next is U Thant. He has already called for the "total demilitarization" of Cyprus and may side with Makarios on pulling out even the legal Greek and Turk contingents. More important, Arthur Goldberg has pointed out the difficulty of expanding^A the role of the UN force on the island. The agreement Cy has worked out envisages the UN force assuming much greater responsibility for order and for security of the Turk minority. Arthur says the USSR and France will make it hard for U Thant to take on that responsibility unless he can interpret his present mandate broadly enough to include it -- and he's notably wary of interpreting his mandates broadly. Arthur also points out that we will have to be ready to pick up much of the initial bill.

Many things could still go wrong. However, it seems as if Cy achieved his first objective yesterday -- giving the Turks some confidence that they could get what they want without going to war. Unless the Turks were putting on a good show of toughness at the lower levels and flexibility at the top, it looks from here as if President Sunay was largely responsible for yesterday's Turkish decision to give him a chance. We will never know for sure, but it looks as if your extremely warm talks with him last spring may have paid off yesterday. Now we have an obligation to support whatever arrangement Cy can work out.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

189a

Sent 12:57

90

1967 NOV 26 PM 1:04

SUNDAY

EEA589
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 2569

1967 NOV 26 17 52

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP671021

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 26, 1967

GREEK RESPONSE TO ANKARA'S COUNTERPROPOSALS LAST NIGHT WAS INITIALLY FAVORABLE, ALTHOUGH CY IS STAYING IN ATHENS MOST OF TODAY TO WORK OUT SOME TROUBLESOME LANGUAGE (AND, HOPEFULLY, TO GET SOME SLEEP). THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR A BREAKDOWN IN THIS EFFORT, BUT CY TENTATIVELY FELT LAST NIGHT THAT THE TURKS HAD TURNED THE CORNER YESTERDAY AND DECIDED THEY HAD A CHANCE OF GAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES WITHOUT WAR.

IN ADDITION TO HOLDING THE TURKS, CY SEEMS TO HAVE SURMOUNTED THE FIRST NEGOTIATING HURDLES -- WHO BACKS DOWN FIRST AND GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ILLEGAL GREEK FORCES ON CYPRUS MUST WITHDRAW. THE TURKS CAN BILL THIS AS A VICTORY, ALTHOUGH IN A SECRET ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT CY HAS WORKED OUT, THEY AGREE TO ANNOUNCE SOME STEPS TOWARD DEMOBILIZATION WITHIN FOUR HOURS AFTER GREECE ANNOUNCES ITS PLANS FOR WITHDRAWAL.

NOW TWO NEW PROBLEMS ARE COMING INTO FOCUS:

FIRST IS MAKARIOS. HE'S DECIDED THAT HE'S SAFE NOW AND IS GOING TO USE THE CRISIS TO ELIMINATE FORMAL TURK PRESENCE ON CYPRUS ONCE AND FOR ALL. HE IS GOING TO INSIST ON WITHDRAWAL EVEN OF THOSE SMALL MILITARY CONTINGENTS FROM GREECE AND TURKEY ALLOWED BY THE 1960 AGREEMENTS. ONCE CY HAS AGREEMENT IN ATHENS AND ANKARA, HIS NEXT JOB WILL BE TO BRING MAKARIOS INTO LINE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 98-278 (164)

By klis NARA, Date 12/10/03

NEXT IS U THANT. HE HAS ALREADY CALLED FOR THE "TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION" OF CYPRUS AND MAY SIDE WITH MAKARIOS ON PULLING OUT EVEN THE LEGAL GREEK AND TURK CONTINGENTS. MORE IMPORTANT, ARTHUR GOLDBERG HAS POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTY OF EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE UN FORCE ON THE ISLAND. THE AGREEMENT CY HAS WORKED OUT ENVISAGES THE UN FORCE ASSUMING MUCH GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ORDER AND FOR SECURITY OF THE TURK MINORITY. ARTHUR SAYS THE USSR AND FRANCE WILL MAKE IT HARD FOR U THANT TO TAKE ON THAT RESPONSIBILITY UNLESS HE CAN INTERPRET HIS PRESENT MANDATE BROADLY ENOUGH TO INCLUDE IT -- AND HE'S NOTABLY WARY OF INTERPRETING HIS MANDATES BROADLY. ARTHUR ALSO POINTS OUT THAT WE WILL HAVE TO BE READY TO PICK UP MUCH OF THE INITIAL BILL.

MANY THINGS COULD STILL GO WRONG. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS AS IF CY ACHIEVED HIS FIRST OBJECTIVE YESTERDAY -- GIVING THE TURKS SOME CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD GET WHAT THEY WANT WITHOUT GOING TO WAR. UNLESS THE TURKS WERE PUTTING ON A GOOD SHOW OF TOUGHNESS AT THE LOWER LEVELS AND FLEXIBILITY AT THE TOP, IT LOOKS FROM HERE AS IF PRESIDENT SUNAY WAS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR YESTERDAY'S TURKISH DECISION TO GIVE HIM A CHANCE. WE WILL NEVER KNOW FOR SURE, BUT IT LOOKS AS IF YOUR EXTREMELY WARM TALKS WITH HIM LAST SPRING MAY HAVE PAID OFF YESTERDAY. NOW WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT CY CAN WORK OUT.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 261657Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

November 24, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

190
sent Rostow
via wire
CAP 671004

It now looks as if Vance may have something to take back to Ankara that could stay the Turks hands. The big question is whether the Turks at this point are so wound up that they don't really want a way out. Vance sees the Turk Foreign Minister at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow (1:00 a.m. EST).

The Greek Foreign Minister has agreed to a document which incorporates most of the Turks' five points. The agreement calls for U Thant to appeal to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey to take certain steps, most importantly immediate arrangements for withdrawing some Greek troops and for de-escalating Turk war preparations. The key element is that the Greeks would be giving in to U Thant and not to Ankara. The notion of simultaneous and matching responses to U Thant also helps get around the big issue of who moves first.

We have no word yet that the Greek junta has bought the Foreign Minister's plan. It's also possible that the Turks won't consider it enough. But at least Cy can return to Ankara before the Saturday evening deadline with a proposal in hand.

The UN Security Council meets tonight probably, but our strategy will be -- at Vance's request -- to say nothing ourselves and try to minimize what others say and have the meeting adjourned without a resolution.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 98-33 (#9)
P. pc/ies, NARA, Date 12-11-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The task is complicated by a Greek government leak to the London Times and the New York Times on the proposed package. We fear it will complicate Cy's task tomorrow. Nick Katzenbach talked with the New York Times which agreed to kill the story if the London Times didn't actually run it.

Full text of proposal follows:

S/D

RECEIVED
TUSA

EXDIS

190a

~~SECRET~~

1967 NOV 22 20 47

~~SECRET~~

HCE587

PAGE 01 ATHENS 02400 242038Z

44
ACTION SS 35

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCC 00, /035 W

Z 241953Z NOV 67 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3864
USMISSION USUN 188
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 620
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 580

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 2400

EXDIS

VANTO 13

REF: ATHENS 2396 AND STATE 74187

FOLLOWING DISCUSSION REPORTED OUR REFTTEL, PIPINELLIS DRAFTED
AND CLEARED WITH CABINET WORKING PAPER FOR DISCUSSION WITH VANCE
MISSION AND ULTIMATE SUBMISSION TO GOT. IN REVIEWING PAPER THIS
EVENING, CERTAIN CHANGES WERE SUGGESTED BY VANCE AND ACCEPTED BY

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 2400A ~~SECRET~~
PIPINELLIS FOR IMMEDIATE SUBMISSION TO CABINET FOR FINAL APPROVAL
THIS EVENING.

VANCE SCHEDULED ARRIVE ANKARA 0500 AND PRESENT DOCUMENT AS
FINALLY CLEARED BY CABINET TO CAGLAYANGIL AT 0600 MEETING.

CURRENT TEXT FOLLOWS:

-QUOTE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 98.33 (#9)
By jc/ia NARA. Date 12-11-83

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 ATHENS 22455 242058Z~~

Start
1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS; SUCH AN APPEAL TO INCLUDE, INTER ALIA:

A) AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO REAFFIRM THE INVIOABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS;

B) A REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EACH

~~PAGE 3 RUHQAT 2433A S E C R E T~~

OTHER AND OF CYPRUS AND TO BRING ABOUT A REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES IN CYPRUS.

2. THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY FORTHWITH WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. THEREUPON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS FOR THE REPATRIATION OF...X... NUMBER OF GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS; ON ITS SIDE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REDUCE THEIR MILISRY PREPAREDNESS TO THE LEVELS IN EFFECT PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 14, 1967.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT SHOULD DECLARE THAT THEY ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH A UN MISSION WHICH WOULD STUDY ON THE SPOT AND PROPOSE NTW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING SAFETY OF MINORITIES) AND THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF CYPRUS.

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD THEREUPON SEND A MISSION OF

~~PAGE 4 RUHQAT 2433A S E C R E T~~

MILITARY AND POLICE EXPERTS TO CYPRUS FOR THE ABOVE PURPOSE.

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 03 ATHENS 22455 242058Z~~

6. A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS WOULD TAKE PLACE, SUCH WITHDRAWAL TO COINCIDE WITH AND CORRESPOND TO THE PHASED BUILD-UP OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED UNDER 4 ABOVE. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO TURKISH MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CYPRUS.

UNQUOTE

END

~~COMMENTS ON TEXT WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPTTEL.~~
~~TALEST~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Green

191

November 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

Having checked with State, I see no reason why Mr. Dameris should not carry on the discussions with Greek officials that are described in the attached memo.

More and more, we are depending on this sort of low visibility contact to preserve our relationship. The Greek junta is doing a good job in reforming certain basic Greek economic and bureaucratic structures.

If Mr. Dameris can contribute, so much the better.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:mlc

191a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR
THROUGH EDWARD FRIED *END*
AND BROMLEY SMITH *S*

Having checked with State, I see no reason why Mr. Dameris should not carry on the discussions with Greek officials that are described in the attached memo. *P* More and more, we are depending on this sort of low visibility contact to preserve our relationship. The Greek junta is doing a good job in reforming certain basic Greek economic and bureaucratic structures. *P* If Mr. Dameris can contribute, so much the better.



Harold H. Saunders

1918

To Ed Fried

Do you have a
review for Walt?

Brown

11/14/67

191c

November 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR
THROUGH EDWARD FRIED
AND BROMLEY SMITH

Having checked with State, I see no reason why Mr. Dameris should not carry on the discussions with Greek officials that are described in the attached memo. More and more, we are depending on this sort of low visibility contact to preserve our relationship. The Greek junta is doing a good job in reforming certain basic Greek economic and bureaucratic structures. If Mr. Dameris can contribute, so much the better.

Harold H. Saunders

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

191-d

To Ed Fried

Do you have a
review for Walt?

Brown

11/14/67

To: Walt Rostow
From: Marvin Watson
November 13, 1967

191-e

For your recommendation, please.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1967

191-f

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

FROM: Mike Manatos *M.M.*

Thano Dameris was in to see me the other day and I suggested he send me a memorandum (attached) regarding the informal discussions on the possible re-structuring banking industry of Greece which certain officials would like to carry on with Thano.

You will note from the memorandum that Thano has the judgment which would not embarrass any Government official.

Is there any reason why he should refuse to cooperate with these officials? The fact that he does speak Greek is an important consideration.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
WASHINGTON

191-8

November 8, 1967

Memorandum to -
THE HONORABLE MIKE N. MANATOS
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
The White House Office

Pursuant to our verbal conversation on Monday, November 6, below please find, in essence, our discussion:

On Thursday, November 2, I was advised, in writing, by the Minister of Coordination, Greece, that they are interested in possible future discussions leading to a profitable re-structuring of the banking industry in that country.

On previous occasions, informal off-the-record discussions have been held by me and various personnel of the Greek government, whereby factual statistic and historical data have been verbally transmitted showing the banking system, FDIC coverage, and regulations as presently operational in the United States.

At all times during our past informal discussions, I have reiterated the fact that it is not proper for me, as Assistant to the Director of the FDIC, to speak as an official representative, and that either the Chairman or Director would have to act in that capacity. Since the Director's Office is presently vacant, the sole responsibility to act as an authoritative spokesman lies with the Chairman, or the government's designee.

They have indicated their aim is not necessarily to have official representation but a discussion of an informal nature, and I was contacted primarily because of my Greek-American background as well as training and education in both banking and law.

In the event that I receive a positive request for the purpose of further discussing the success of our banking system, permission to participate in such discussions is hereby requested.

On my own, I desire to limit my participation to factual and historical data pertaining to our banking structure. I assure you that at no time will I make any attempt, directly or indirectly, by innuendo or otherwise, that my presence be sanctioned as a spokesman for the U.S. government or for the FDIC, unless otherwise directed.

November 8, 1967

I do feel that, being of Greek-American descent, I am able to communicate on an informal productive basis and that, as discussions pursue, relations between the two countries could enhance, and economic conditions improved in Greece, by they structuring a more free competitive banking system.

Please advise.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Thanos Dameris', with a large, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Thanos Dameris
Assistant to the Director

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

192

September 30, 1967

Return to N

FOR WALT ROSTOW

From Joe Califano

For your information.

CC: HS

✓

Greece
192a

LITTON INDUSTRIES, INC., 9370 SANTA MONICA BOULEVARD • BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90213

CHARLES B. THORNTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

September 8, 1967


Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Joe:

You probably have heard of Litton Industries' program for "nation building," particularly our present one in Greece. I have attached to this letter a brief write-up of our Greece venture for your information and any others in the White House that you might think would be interested in having some knowledge of it.

Look forward to seeing you again soon.

Sincerely yours,


Charles B. Thornton

STATUS REPORT: THE LITTON INDUSTRIES' PROJECT IN GREECE

Background

In May 1967, Litton Industries signed a contract with the Greek Government to manage a major economic development program for Crete and the Western Peloponnesus. The contract, subject to periodic reviews, runs for 12 years. Apart from its ambitious goals, the program is highly significant for another reason: it brings the experience and proven capabilities of private enterprise into the challenging arena of nation building on a long-term and large-scale basis.

At the heart of this pioneering development program will be Litton's use of systems management, a technique that has been developed and refined in the United States -- primarily in defense and space programs -- since World War II. In essence, the systems management technique will approach the Greek development project in an overall "master plan" way, rather than on a piecemeal basis. Thus, Litton's management resources will work to define the problems and opportunities, set the goals, weigh the various alternative approaches, establish a coordinated program for accomplishing the goals and, with the concurrence and assistance of the Greek Government, implement these goals.

Comment

The application of private enterprise and systems management to the challenge of nation building has aroused tremendous interest among intellectuals around the world. Moreover, it has begun to bridge the traditional gaps between government, industry and educational institutions in a way that had never before been anticipated.

Current Political Implications

As the contract explicitly states, the project is in no way political. Litton, proceeding solely as a private enterprise, had been working since 1965 with two predecessor Governments of Greece -- the Papandreou and Stephanopolis Governments. Each of the three successive Greek Governments, including the present one, has favored the economic development project; and each has favored the appointment of Litton Industries to work with the Greek Government in directing and implementing the program. Concurrently, Litton has maintained close contact with the U.S. Department of State and the Agency for International Development, receiving excellent cooperation from both agencies.

Objectives

Basic objectives of the Greek Government-Litton Industries partnership are to improve living standards and per capita income in Crete and the Western Peloponnesus. This will be done by attracting industry and foreign capital, and by developing improved transportation, agriculture and tourism. While neither Litton nor the Greek Government profess to have a "magic formula" for successful economic development, both are highly optimistic about the project and use of the systems management approach. In short, each party has pledged a "best effort" commitment.

Specifically, the plan for Crete includes significantly increasing tourist capacity, irrigating many thousands of acres of the Messara Plain, and developing mines and industry so as to substantially increase employment. In Western Peloponnesus, Litton proposes that Greece greatly increase hotel accommodations, and build new airports, industrial centers and harbors. A series of plans has already been formulated for the overall project, which will advance it from the "feasibility study" stage into the "capital creation" stage.

It is Litton's expectation, as well as the Greek Government's that as many Greek personnel as possible will be involved in the development program. As the program continues, moreover, Litton will propose procedures for training Government personnel, and for the eventual assignment of operational responsibilities to the Government.

Interim Results

In the less than four months that have passed since the contract was signed, a number of important steps have been taken:

... Litton International Development Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary, has been created. LIDC will direct the Greek project, and will initiate and direct other multinational projects as well. Robert M. Allan Jr., who reports directly to Litton Chairman Charles B. Thornton and President Roy L. Ash, is LIDC's president. Mr. Allan had previously been president of Cyprus Mines Corp., a diversified, worldwide firm engaged in shipping and the development of natural resources.

... Gordon Pehrson, formerly a corporate vice president of International Minerals & Chemical Co. (and previously a top civilian systems management expert on U. S. Government programs) has been named project director in Athens. In addition, the first highly qualified team of experts, ranging from doctors of medicine and engineers to seismologists and agronomists; has been hired to implement the program and is presently on the job in Greece.

... Nearly 400 corporations have already indicated interest in the project. And many have been meeting actively with Litton's staff to review the possibility of investment. The minimum investment goals, in this connection, are \$240 million by 1970 and \$840 million by 1978.

September 8, 1967

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WV QMA705VV ATA713

193

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DE RUQMAT 06 2711243

ZNY XXXXX

Z 281235Z

BT

XXXXX

WASHINGTON 61

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-284
By isl, NARA, Date 11-25-09

1

~~SECRET~~ 281235Z CITE ATHENS 732

FLASH WASHINGTON

3.3(b)(1)

11 xx 50942

ZRAMAZE

REF WASHINGTON 73633

FROM: USDAO AMEMB ATHENS

TO: DIA WASHINGTON

CITE USDAO 1187

Postow

1. SEN SYMINGTON ARRIVED ATHENS FR TEL AVIV MORNING
24 SEPT, MET BY AMB TALBOT, MR GEORGE WARREN, MSA OFFICER
EMBASSY [REDACTED] DATT MET AT AMB TALBOT'S RESIDENCE
NOON TEA; SENIOR EMB OFFS PRESENT AND CHIEF JUSMAG--NO GREEKS.
SEN SYMINGTON HAD DINNER WITH KING CONSTANTINE AND AMB
EVENING 24TH; WORKING BREAKFAST 25TH AT RESIDENCE WITH AMB,
POL COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY, AND COL. GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS,
MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER AND ACKNOWLEDGED COUP LEADER.
SEN HAD NO RPT NO OTHER CONTACTS WITH GREEKS. HE DEAPRTED
ATHENS MORNING 25 SEPT.

3.3
(b)(1)

2. DURING COURSE OF CONTACTS, AMB TALBOT ABLE TO
CONVEY EMB POSITION AND THINKING ON GREEK SITUATION. SEN

1074

1

SYMINGTON, IN TURN, REFLECTED PREOCCUPATION VIET NAM PROBLEM. TOLD DATT AT NOON TEA THAT US SIMPLY HAD TO GET OUT OF VIET NAM--SAID COST OF WAR (\$70 MILLION) PER DAY WAS BANKRUPTING US. SAID HE BELIEVED A RATIONAL CASE COULD BE MADE FOR US BEING IN VIET NAM, BUT IF RPT IF MADE, THEN SAME RATIONAL APPLICABLE ALL WESTERN ALLIES, AND IT OBVIOUS THEY NOT RPT NOT GOING TO RESPOND. IN ABSENCE OF SUCH RESPONSE, US HAD NO RPT NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GET OUT ON ANY TERMS. DEPLORED LACK OF PHILLIPINE SUPPORT AND SAID SOUTH KOREAN SUPPORT MISLEADING BECAUSE US HAD MORE TROOPS IN KOREA THAN KOREANS HAD IN VIET NAM AND US FOOTING BOTH BILLS. SAID ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN US HAD GROWN SO MUCH IN PAST FEW MONTHS THAT US ON VERGE OF REAL NATIONAL CRISIS. COMMENT: CAPT CASSELL, USN, ACCOMPANYING SEN AS ESCORT, TOLD DATT THIS HAD BEEN CONSTANT COMMENT OF SEN THROUGH TRIP--SAID SEN KEPT ASKING HIM WHAT HE WAS GOING TO LIVE ON AFTER HE RETIRED, INASMUCH AS US WOULD BE TOO BANKRUPT TO PAY RETIRED OFFICERS.

3. [REDACTED] SAME PREOCCUPATION SEN IN TALKS AT NOON TEA AND SUBSEQUENT LUNCHEON. TOLD [REDACTED] SAME

3.3
(b)(1)

2074

PAGE 3 ~~ATHENNS 772 SECRET~~

3.3
(b)(1)

ADDING VIET NAM WAS LONGEST IN US HISTORY SINCE REVOLUTION.
WHEN ASKED QTE HOW DO WE GET OUT? UNQTE, ANSWER
WAS QTE HOW DO WE GET OUT OF THIS BUILDING IF IT STARTS
FALLING DOWN? UNQTE.

4. ON FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL, SEN SYMINGTON REMARKED
TO DATT THAT US HAD BUILT ITS HOUSE ON A FEW PILLARS OF SAND,
AMONG THEM SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH SOMETIMES NOT RPT NOT
REALISTIC AND IMPOSSIBLE TO POLICE BY US.

5. ON GREEK SCENE, AMB TALBOT (WHO ALSO HAD HIS
SHARE SENATOR'S VIET NAM VIEWS) SAYS MEETING WITH KING AT
SUPPOER PRODUCED GOOD AND CLEAR UNDERSTANDING BY SENATOR
OF KING'S DESCRIPTION HIS PURPOSES AND INTENTIONS. SAYS
SENATOR'S IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS KING ON EXACTLY RIGHT
TRACK AND US SHOULD SUPPORT HIM. BREAKFAST WITH
GREEK STRONG MAN PAPADOPOULOS PRODUCED REALISTIC, OPEN
DISCUSSION BETWEEN TWO, HAND AMBASSADOR SAYS SENATOR GAVE
CONVINCING SUPPORT TO EMBASSY CONCEPT FUNDAMENTAL
IMPORTANCE OF GREECE RETURNING TO CONSTITUTIONALITY.
AMB ARGUED FOR FLEXIBILITY WITHIN OVERALL POLICY GUIDELINES
IN ORDER GIVE US MORE LEVERAGE ACHIEVE NCU RESUMED

30/4

PAGE 4 ~~ATHENS 772 SECRET~~

3.3
(b)(1)

CONSTITUTIONALITY. HE BELIEVES SENATOR LEFT WITH CONVICTION
NEED FOR LIMITED RESUMPTION MILITARY AID POLICY OF ASSISTANCE;
I.E., WITHOUT ITEMS SUCH AS TANKS AND COMBAT AIRCRAFT
FOR PRESENT.

6. APPARENTLY DISCUSSIONS WITH KING, AMB AND
PAPADOPOULOS GAINED GREEK FAVOR, IN SOME MEASURE AT LEAST,
ON PART OF SENATOR. HIS FIRST REACTION TO DATT REMARKS ON
GREEK SITUATION BROUGHT RATHER BRISTLING COMMENT THAT
IF SITUATION IN GREECE HAD BEEN SO BAD FROM COMMUNIST THREAT
STANDPOINT, WHY HADN'T KING AND ARMY DONE WHAT COUP GROUP
HAD DONE? SENATOR, INITIALLY, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ SAID QTE WHY DO WE HAVE TO HELP THE GREEKS?
THERE IS NO REAL USSR OR BULGARIAN THREAT HERE ANYMORE. UN.PTE.

3.3
(b)(1)

7. SENATOR'S DETAILED SURVEY ISRAELI/ARAB WAR SCENE,
AND CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS, HAD OBVIOUSLY LEFT
PROFOUND IMPRESSION OF RESPECT FOR ISRAELI MILITARY
CAPABILITIES. GP-1

~~SECRET~~

BT

NNNN

4074

Mr. Moose

✓
194

MEMO FOR WWR

September 28, 1967

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by New Ambassadors

We may be missing an opportunity for making the most of the meetings with the President at which new Ambassadors present their credentials. As it now stands, the whole affair is handled through Protocol channels. We never see the President's written remarks, and no one gives the President any talking paper to use in his brief substantive talk with the new Ambassador.

What really awakened me to the pitfalls in this process was the attached news story, which followed the new Greek Ambassador's ceremony Monday. State automatically releases the exchange of formal remarks, so no leaks are responsible for this story. It just means that a public statement by the President is going on the record with--as far as I know--no White House clearance. This one doesn't happen to do any harm, but it does show that the door is open for something to go awry in the future.

Fortunately, in this case, the President had just thoroughly briefed himself for his talks with King Constantine, so he had something quite relevant to say to Ambassador Palamas. However, I don't think we should leave to chance giving the President an opportunity to use one of these short meetings to make important points. We ought at least to have a chance to give him a short talking paper.

If you agree, this requires two procedural changes: (1) Require State to clear the President's formal remarks with the White House. (2) Give members of the staff at least a few hours' notice of the scheduled presentation. As it is, we usually find out after the presentation is over since we don't get copies of the President's schedule.

I might add that I find these occasions excellent opportunities to get off on the right foot with the new Ambassador. I understand that members of the staff are welcome at these ceremonies and think we ought to use them to maximum advantage. Our presence at White House functions where the Ambassadors are involved gives them a point of contact that can often take the burden off your shoulders yet still give them a sense that the President's staff cares.

Hal Saunders

Att: News clipping on "LBJ Nudges Greece on Democracy"

194a

LBJ Nudges Greece on Democracy

Associated Press

President Johnson told Greece's new ambassador to the United States yesterday that Greece can count on continued American military aid only if it returns to constitutional democracy.

The President's warning was couched in polite terms of the traditional exchange of remarks when a new foreign envoy presents his credentials.

Replying to the remarks of Ambassador Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, the President

hailed Greece as "a faithful member" of the Atlantic Alliance.

Recalling the recent visit here of King Constantine, Mr. Johnson said U.S. efforts "to assist in keeping Greece a strong partner in NATO would be greatly facilitated by an early return to constitutionalism in Greece."

"You can find that the people of this country, like the Executive and Congress, hope to see this happen," the President declared.

The Ambassador made only an indirect reference to the

military coup in his country last spring. Greece, he said, "remains strongly devoted to the Western world. She is determined to thwart any attempt to shake the very foundations of her traditions and civilization."

In Athens yesterday, Greek Interior Minister Brig. Stylianos Pattakos said a national referendum on a new constitution will be conducted in 1968. It was the first time the military junta has indicated when it planned to move toward a return to constitutional rule.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C. HS
Mr. Sanders
informed
rel 195

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, September 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further Backgrounding on King Constantine

Two sources now--Senator Pell who saw Constantine in Newport and Minister Papagos who was with the King here--have suggested that we let out on background that the King raised the question of our resuming military aid.

The purpose of such backgrounding would be to counter the unfortunate Washington Post headline yesterday which quoted the King as saying the military government "is not my government." He'd like credit for at least raising the subject closest to the junta's heart so it would not look as if he came down here on a purely social fling.

State would do this with the weekly news magazines if at all. But since the King's main talks were with you, State wouldn't think of backgrounding this way without your permission. Is this much OK with you, or would you prefer continued silence on the subject?

W. Rostow

OK _____

No _____

*IF TRUE
IT IS OK.*

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-360 (#26)

By *jc/ig* NARA. Date 12-1-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JORDEN

SUBJECT: Greek handling of the political Left after the insurgency

An essential fact in understanding the Greek handling of the situation is that in August 1949 the Communists explicitly abandoned the armed struggle. In other words, there was not a gradual diminishing of the conflict but a complete cessation at a given moment of time.

At the time of the stand-down, most of the leaders and a substantial portion of the ranks of the Communist movement fled Greece. Of those who remained, many thousands (exact figure unavailable right now) were arrested and put in island indoctrination camps. These included not only known perpetrators of criminal acts, but leaders and activists of all kinds. A screening process took place and loyalty oaths were required for release. The detention process, however, was a long one, and in 1961 there were still some 3,000 people being held in the indoctrination centers. After Papandreu became prime minister in 1964, all except a few hundred known murderers were released.

On the election front, the Left was permitted to contest all elections from the time of the stand-down. The Left Democratic Front contested the 1950 election and won 18 out of 250 seats. The high point for the Left was in 1958, at which point they won 24% of the vote and 74 out of 300 parliamentary seats. Since that election, the Left, now called the EDA, has been getting about 12-14% of the popular vote. The adoption of a marginal rather than a proportional representation system has resulted in the virtual exclusion of the Left from the Parliament.

There is a fellow named Lagoudakis, who is a genuine expert on this period of Greek history. He has, in fact, devoted considerable study to the similarities between the Greek and Vietnamese situations and has in preparation a paper on the subject. He is out of town today but will be back on Tuesday. We can at that time dig into this subject in greater detail.

Marshall Wright


197
S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1967

BKS -

I assume you will be getting from State suggested answers to the attached telegrams reporting that Andreas Pappandreou is in critical condition and is asking us to provide medical aid.

However, in case you get any phone calls from Walter Heller or his friends in the meantime, I am attaching two cables from Phil Talbot in response to State's urgent query. Both report no basis for the rumors which have apparently stimulated these telegrams.


Hal Saunders

Attached: Athens 853
" 809

August 16

197a

Mr. Saunders,

FYI: we have sent a copy of attached to
S/S for their draft reply.

Alice Caubet

The White House
Washington

197-8 ↑

1967 AUG 16 AM 10 32

WA049 PD

WUX CHICAGO ILL 16 1247A CDT

THE PRESIDENT, ATTN W W ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

LATE, VERIFIABLE INFORMATION FROM GREECE INDICATES ANDREAS

PAPPANDREOU TO BE IN CRITICAL CONDITION. MEDICAL AID IS

NEEDED IMMEDIATELY

ARISTOTLE SOTER.

3

2

August 16, 1967

197-c

Mr. Saunders:

The attached has been sent to State for a draft
reply.

Judy Holter

The White House
Washington

1967 AUG 16 PM 3 10

WA075 PD

EVANSTON ILL 16 1155A CDT

THE PRESIDENT, ATTN W W ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

URGENTLY REQUEST INTERCESSION TO SAVE LIFE OF ANDREAS

PAPANDREOU IMPRISONED IN GREECE AND REPORTED SERIOUSLY ILL

3 GEORGE I BLANKSTEN CHAIRMAN POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPT

2 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

HCE177

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

Saunders

197-2

PAGE 01 ATHENS 00853 172333Z

92-85

ACTION NEA 19

INFO SS 35, GPM 03, H 02, P 04, USIE 00, NSC 10, CIA 04, RSC 01, NSA 02,

INR 07, DOD 01, L 03, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, RSR 01, /092 W

O 171905Z AUG 67 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3091

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 853

1. PATTAKOS, WITH WHO I HAVE JUST TALKED, INSISTS THAT ANDREAS PAPANDREOU HAS SUFFERED NO "GALLOPING TUBERCULOSIS" OR OTHER SERIOUS HEALTH DIFFICULTY SINCE BEING IMPRISONED. PATTAKOS SAID HE LAST INTERVIEWED ANDREAS AT PRISON AUGUST 14. AT THAT TIME ANDREAS COMPLAINED OF SOME DEFICIENCY OF WHITE CORPUSCLES WHICH CAUSED HIM TO FEEL WEAK. DOCTOR OF JAIL HOSPITAL, WHO WAS PRESENT AT INTERVIEW, SAID THIS NOT A SERIOUS MATTER AND DID NOT INVOLVE EITHER TUBERCULOSIS OR LEUKEMIA. PATTAKOS ASSERTS THAT WHEN TALKING WITH PRESSMEN LATER HE REFERRED TO "GALLOPING TUBERCULOSIS" AS DISEASE ANDREAS HAD SUFFERED IN PAST YEARS BUT HAD ASSURED PRESS THAT NO SUCH TROUBLE NOW.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 853A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. AS ALREADY REPORTED (ATHENS 809) MRS. PAPANDREOU TOLD EMBOFF AUGUST 15 THAT HER HUSBAND IN GOOD HEALTH.
CP-3. TALBOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12/1/03



Department of State

TELEGRAM

197-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 ATHENS 00809 161024Z

9

ACTION NEA 19

INFO SS 25, GPM 03, L 03, H 02, P 04, USIA 12, NSC 10, CIA 04, RSC 01, NSA 0

INR 07, DOD 01, RSR 01, /104 W

P 161003Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3068

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 809

REF: STATE 21200

1. EMBASSY FINDS STRANGE REPORT THAT ANDREAS PAPANDREOU HAD "GALLOPING CONSUMPTION" ONLY "A FEW WEEKS AGO", PARTICULARLY SINCE HELLER FOUND HIM IN GOOD HEALTH IN LATE JULY. ALSO MARGARET PAPANDREOU MADE NO MENTION OF ANY RECENT ILLNESS OF ANDREAS DURING CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF YESTERDAY EVENING. ON CONTRARY, SHE CLAIMED

ANDREAS IS IN EXCELLENT HEALTH.

2. WE HAVE NO NEW INFORMATION ON WHEN INDICTMENT WILL BE SERVED OR WHEN TRIAL WILL BE HELD. THAT PATTAKOS ADMITTED TO JOURNALISTS THAT ANDREAS HAD REQUESTED HE BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE MAY INDICATE THAT JUNTA PLANS TO ACT IN

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 809A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HIS CASE IN NEAR FUTURE, INCIDENTALLY, MARGARET PAPANDREOU ALSO TOLD EMBOFF THAT SHE AND ANDREAS WERE AGREED THAT HE SHOULD DEFINITELY LEAVE GREECE IF EVER GIVEN OPPORTUNITY, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER A TRIAL, DESPITE ADVICE THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM SOME PARTIES THAT HE SHOULD REMAIN IN JAIL AND DEVELOP CASE OF MARTYRDOM, WHICH HE MIGHT CAPITALIZE POLITICALLY IN LATTER YEARS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-238

By ins NARA, Date 6-6-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 ATHENS 00809 161024Z

GP-3. TALBOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

October 10, 1967

MEMO FOR WALT ROSTOW

THROUGH: BILL JORDEN — *Looks OK. WJ*

SUBJECT: Cable for Clearance--Greek Flag in Vietnam

Phil Talbot has had an informal feeler from the Greek regime which suggests they're thinking of trying to trade off an offer of help in Vietnam for a more lenient position on US military aid.

From the viewpoint of US-Greek relations, I can't see this kind of trade working at all. The same people, by and large, who most vehemently oppose military aid to Greece also oppose what we're doing in Vietnam.

I think State's attached response is about right. But since this is clearly a Vietnam matter, you and Bill should be clearing this too.

The one alternative to the language as drafted if you think we ought to steer clear would be to add this clause to the final sentence: ". . . but you should leave no impression that this will in any way serve as a quid pro quo for resuming military aid."

Not needed.

Hal

Hal Saunders

Att: Athens 1552, 9/30/67

*Cleared at lunch only
10/11/67*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-216
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-28-04

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 ATHENS 01552 301311Z

47
ACTION NEA 19

INFO EA 19, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,
CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, NSAE 00, SAH 03, SAL 01, DOD 01, AID 30,
/178 W

R 301230Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3447

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1552

BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENEY
LEONHART
ROCHE
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

1. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SPANDIDAKIS ASKED ME LAST EVENING WHETHER IT WOULD BE "VERY HELPFUL" SHOULD GREECE OFFER SOME FORM OF MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO VIETNAM. GREECE'S CONTRIBUTION COULD IN ANY EVENT ONLY BE SMALL, HE SAID, BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE SYMBOLICALLY USEFUL. I REPLIED THAT I WAS SURE THE UNITED STATES WOULD WELCOME CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ANY OF ITS ALLIES. PENDING DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE I DID NOT HOWEVER PROBE FOR DETAILS OF WHAT SORT OF CONTRIBUTION HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND.

PAGE 2 RUQMAT 1552 ~~SECRET~~

2. FOR SOME TIME IT HAS SEEMED LIKELY THIS GREEK REGIME WOULD GET AROUND TO CONSIDERING WHETHER A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION TO VIETNAM WOULD HELP STRAIGHTEN OUT ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE. NOW THAT PRESSURES OF ADVERSE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACTIONS ARE MOUNTING, GREEKS MIGHT ACTIVELY PURSUE QUESTION. THEY WOULD PROBABLY CONSIDER SUCH AN OFFER, (JUST AS I SUSPECT THEY INTERPRET THEIR PROJECTED ASSISTANCE TO CONGO), AS A WAY OF HELPING US WHERE WE NEED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By pcjc NARA Date 5/15/09

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ATHENS 01552 301311Z

HELP AND THUS EARNIG WARMER UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THIS REGIME.

3. HOW FAR, IF AT ALL, SHOULD EMBASSY ENCOURAGE FUTURE GREEK APPROACHES ON THIS QUESTION?

GP-3 TALBOT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

still to be dealt with
August 11, 1967 *199*

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR *file*

SUBJECT: Greece at Your "See Me" Session

The Battle-Hoopers consensus is that you'd probably better not even raise the attached Greek memo this afternoon.

You know what Secretary McNamara has said: "If you can guarantee that going forward won't damage the MAP bill, okay. Or if State wants to move ahead and can give me that guarantee, okay." He has talked with Katzenbach.

No one is prepared to give that kind of guarantee. Moreover, Battle feels honor-bound to tell a few key Senators and Congressmen before we do anything different from what we've been doing. And the next few days are obviously not the time for that.

Reluctantly they feel there's no practical alternative to lying low, probably until after the aid bill gets through conference.

So I guess this will still be in your folder when you get back.

Hal
Hal Saunders

Att: Memo for Pres.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-11-03*

July 22, 1967 -- 3:25 p.m.

Mr. Rostow,

Vote In Senate

1990

Mary Slater telephoned to say the President's response to your memo "Normilization of Military Aid to Greece" was "see me after McNamara testimony."

Let it go a week

LN



199-b

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Beginning to Normalize Military Aid to Greece

Immediately after the Greek coup, we suspended shipment of all major military aid items, partly to signal our genuine displeasure and partly to put us in a better position with our domestic liberals. Now Secretary Rusk believes we should resume limited shipments in response to the coup government's limited steps back toward constitutional government.

His main concern is to avoid damaging our basic relationship with Greece. First, Greece is a NATO ally, and mounting dissatisfaction with us has already encouraged some officers to talk about following De Gaulle's example. But more immediately important, Greece is one of the few nations we can still count on in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Arab-Israeli war, Greece alone provided staging areas for our evacuation aircraft and port facilities for the Sixth Fleet. [REDACTED] 25X1A [REDACTED] USIA facilities operated without restriction. Ambassador Talbot and the Secretary feel that continuing the complete suspension of major items any longer will provide the makings of a confrontation between us and this government and jeopardize our free use of these facilities without improving our ability to influence its return to constitutional processes.

He does not recommend taking the wraps off altogether. We still want to hold onto whatever leverage we can to press the regime down the course it has set for itself for revising the constitution, holding elections and putting the colonels back in the field. Therefore, he recommends that Phil Talbot be authorized when he returns to Athens next week to tell the government we are beginning to relax our restrictions and are ready to release certain items (listed in the attached, page 2, para. 4). He would also say, however, that further relaxation will depend on their staying on course.

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SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-127-1-33
By ms NARA, Date 3-26-03

~~SECRET~~

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If it were not for the Congressional debate on military aid, no one would hesitate to make this recommendation to you. However, in the aftermath of the coup, Luke Battle did promise to let a few of the most interested members know when we resumed shipments. While we have the authority to resume any time, we are morally committed to tell them what we're doing, and this obviously isn't the best time.

I believe we can make a convincing case that the foreign policy considerations should override our understandable distaste for doing business with a military regime in a country like Greece. Actually, this is a small step, and we will maintain tight control. We can't treat our NATO relationship lightly, and we don't want to push Greece in France's direction. And many of the more liberal members will be impressed by the importance of our position in Greece to Israel.

If you approve the Secretary's recommendation, Talbot would carry the message back to Athens, and State would quietly inform interested members on the Hill after Secretary McNamara's testimony Wednesday. Your alternative, of course, is to wait until you have the results of Congressional soundings before giving approval. You are the better judge; my own thought is that there might be some advantage where we have a good case in showing that we're not going to let Congress cow us.

Incidentally, you will be pleased to know that this recommendation comes to you not only from the Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Near East (which has functioned well since you set up the system last year) but also from the Senior Interdepartmental Group which met for the first time in quite a while to discuss this question.

W. A. R. Rostow

Approve _____

Wait till we have Congressional soundings _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2813

1996

July 21, 1967

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Normalization of US-Greek Relations

We have had a number of interdepartmental discussions recently on the subject of normalizing our relations with the Greek Government. Both in the Regional Group under Assistant Secretary Battle and in the Senior Group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach, with Ambassador Talbot present on both occasions, certain steps in this direction have been agreed upon. I am in accord with the conclusions reached.

From the point of view of our relations with Greece, I consider the steps outlined below important to our interests. Ambassador Talbot is returning to Greece at the end of next week and should be able to tell the Greek Government something positive on this score shortly after he arrives.

Recommendation: That you approve the actions described below:

Foreign Policy Aspects

1. Since the April military coup we have withheld delivery on certain major arms to Greece and been quite cool in our relations with the Government with the idea not only of exhibiting disapproval of the methods by which the junta seized control but also, hopefully, of encouraging some return, however gradual, to more constitutional processes.

2. We now believe these tactics are no longer useful and that, if continued longer, may be counterproductive. The King has come to the same conclusion. Ambassador Talbot considers it quite possible the Greeks, although highly desirous of close relations with us, may adopt the same tactics by causing certain difficulties with some of our facilities there.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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NODIS

By *isf* NLI 09-278 and NLI 03-304 (#93)
NARA, Date 4-22-11

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3.3
(b)(1)

3. We have in Greece facilities important to the Air Force, the Navy, and USIA; they have increased in value since the Arab-Israeli war. That war underlined the importance of Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) to U. S. interests.

4. We propose that Ambassador Talbot be authorized to inform the Greek Government of certain relaxations as set forth below, making clear that future actions in this regard will be related to progress in the restoration of constitutional processes: (a) a coastal minesweeper (\$2.9 million); (b) one F-104G trainer (\$1.5 million); (c) sidewinder missiles and related equipment which are excess to the needs of the Netherlands (no charge); and (d) 175mm cannons (8-\$1.05 million). These items were chosen (a) as having a clear NATO context and (b) as obviously not lending themselves to the suppression of civil disturbances.

5. We believe we should not release just yet either tanks, helicopters, or other heavy equipment. (With respect to FRG shipment of military assistance to Greece, particularly including tanks, we believe we should give the Germans the go-ahead signal in the near future but not just at this time.)

Congressional Problems

1. Although the timing of this action is not particularly favorable given this concern in Congressional quarters with respect to arms programs, both sale and grant, nevertheless, we believe we must proceed and that the over-all interest of foreign policy requires that we do so as soon as possible. We judge that although there will be some adverse reaction in Congress and elsewhere, it will not be great and can be reasonably contained by stressing the following:

a. This is a minimum step.

b. Greece, like Turkey and Iran, emerges as particularly important to the U. S. given the uncertainties in the Middle East and the Soviet thrust in that area.

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c. It is essential that we maintain Greece as an active and functioning member of NATO under whose umbrella the arms programs are developed.

d. We must avoid pressing Greece in the direction of the French with their lukewarm and unhelpful posture in a NATO context.

2. If you approve the above course of action, we will undertake a certain amount of educational work on the Hill. How much can perhaps better be determined after the appearance on July 26 of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on military assistance programs.



Dean Rusk

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-03

Mr. W. A. Rostow
GO
201

CONFIDENTIAL

January 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. George Plytas, ex-Mayor of Athens
Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Plytas had come to see Mr. Rostow. Mr. Rostow met him briefly but had to excuse himself to handle other urgent business so I spent an hour and a quarter with him discussing the situation in Greece.

He began by describing his own experience with the military regime. After the April coup at the request of the regime, he had retained his dual position as Mayor of Athens and President of the association of all Greek municipalities. His main disagreement with the regime developed over the regime's efforts to dismiss a large number of municipal councils and to replace them with friendly nonentities. Mr. Plytas was in Strasbourg at a meeting of a sub-committee of the Council of Europe when King Constantine launched his counter-coup on December 13. He went to Rome to see the King, was asked twice by the military regime to resume his duties in Athens and was replaced when he refused.

He said his purpose in coming to the US was to describe the situation in Greece and support the return of the King. He believes the military regime intends to stay in power for some time. He does not think the Constitution will be a genuine effort to return to full civil liberties and representative government. He does not believe the conservatives, of which he is one, will be able to overthrow this regime. The Communists, he believes, do have the potential to overthrow it. Whether they have the opportunity will depend on how soon the military regime returns the country to Constitutional government.

When we discussed the role of the King, he said--based on his own conversations with the King--that the King should remain outside the country until his conditions for return are met. He personally felt that the King had not set stiff enough conditions, but he bowed to the King's views on this subject. Plytas has a substantial insurance business in Greece which he has left behind; he says he will not return until the King can.

In discussing the US role, he showed mild displeasure over our having resumed normal diplomatic contacts, but at the same time, he did not feel we should cut ourselves off completely from the government at Athens. In response to my question on what role we should play in

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
- 2 -

the future, he said he did not think that we should resume military aid and he hoped we would discourage private investment.

On the latter point, he cited the fact that the junta had made much of our "excepting" Greece from our controls on private investment in our new balance of payments program. Even though I explained that our criteria had been purely economic and were unrelated to the present political situation in Greece, he said that the regime had taken political advantage of our "exception." He suggested that we privately discourage American money from going into Greece until constitutional processes had been restored. He suggested that this could be done through the financial community without the USG's getting openly involved. When I asked whether he felt we should encourage damage to the long-range economic development of Greece for the sake of making a temporary political point, he hedged and said we should subtly discourage capital from going to Greece for the time being.

Comment: Mr. Plytas seemed moderate and not emotionally critical of our posture, though there is an undercurrent of feeling that somehow we ought to have less to do with the military regime. He clearly did not act as if he had any specific message from the King to deliver (despite that was the impression he gave Mr. Manatos when arranging the appointment). He said he was here to talk to anybody interested in the situation in Greece and to do what he can to explain the dangerous forces at work there. When I described our dilemma and the tightrope we felt we must walk between blessing the regime and slamming the door on it, he agreed that our options are limited, although he did seem to feel that the options of the regime are similarly limited and that we should not fear their walking out of NATO.

I think he left with the feeling that he had met his responsibilities here; he did not ask to see the President or anyone else and seemed to have nothing more to say. He doesn't seem likely to attack the Administration openly, but his reservations about our posture may well feed those who want to.


Harold H. Saunders

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

FOR THE RECORD

202

Approved in White House 9/28/67

DATE: September 25, 1967

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by New Greek Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ambassador Christos Palamas
NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO: S/S
White House
American Embassy, Athens
NEA/GRK

During his conversation with Greek Ambassador Palamas following the latter's presentation of credentials on September 25, the President said that he had very much enjoyed his meetings with King Constantine. The President expressed regret at the publicity which had surrounded a reported remark by the King during his meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and which had been interpreted that the King had disowned the present Greek Government. He did not mean that at all, the President continued. It was the same as if some foreign visitor, in conversation with the President, had referred to "your Congress". The President in reply might have said that it was not his Congress. This did not mean that he was unaware of the existence of the Congress or did not like it. It would merely mean that the President had not created the Congress.

The Ambassador said he knew that King Constantine was deeply appreciative of the warmth of his reception here in Washington and of the time and attention which the President had devoted to his visit. Mr. Rockwell added that this was confirmed in telegrams from Ambassador Talbot in Athens.

The President wished the Ambassador all success in his mission here and added that he would be available to the Ambassador for discussion of any problem which could not be solved at other levels of the United States Government.

RECEIVED
EO 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, NSC 5412, Dept. Guidelines
By abm/rq 10/10/67 8-26-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3693

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 16482

202a

September 27, 1967

TO: Mr. Walt. W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

1- President
2- Ret

OK
HHS

Enclosed for White House approval prior to distribution is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Ambassador Christos Palamas of Greece.

The President's remarks are sidelined in blue.

Chadwick
11:30
9/26/67
RB

Enclosure:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 SEP 28 AM 9 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16482

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

FOR THE RECORD

DATE: September 25, 1967

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by New Greek Ambassador

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NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO: S/S
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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cm/rg, NARA, Date 8-26-02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~