

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 charts	re Cyprus C 3 pp.	6/17/64	A
#3 report	Miscellaneous Document S 2 pp.	6/17/64	A
#8 report	Talking points S 2 pp.	6/20/64	A
#10 list	Background Papers Index S 1 p.	6/64	A
#12 report	Background Paper C 2 pp. [Dup. # 127, NSF, Files of Komer, "Cyprus - Inoué/Papandreou visits" Box 18]	6/19/64	A
#14 report	Background Paper C 2 pp.	6/19/64	A
#16 report	Background Paper C 2 pp.	6/19/64	A
#18 report	Background Paper C 2 pp.	6/19/64	A
#20 list	US Military Assistance Program to Greece S 1 p.	undated	A
#21 report	Military Assistance Program S 3 pp.	undated	A
#22 list	Proposed Significant Item Content S 1 p.	undated	A
#24 chart	US Economic Assistance to Greece C 1 p.	6/19/64	A
#39 list	Biographic Data Index S 1 p.	6/64	A
#41 report	Biographic Sketch S 1 p.	undated	A
#43 report	Biographic Sketch S 1 p.	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, "Greece, Papandreou Visit 6/23-24/64," Box 127

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#45 report	Biographic Sketch sanitized 7/24/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-175 C 1 p. exempt 1/10 per RAC	undated	A
#47 report	Biographic Sketch exempt 7/24/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-175 C 1 p. exempt 1/10 per RAC	undated	A
#50a cable	Deptel 3446 to USUN - New York S 13 pp. open 1/10/12 per RAC [Dup. # 92, NSF, Files of Komer, "Cyprus - Inonu/Papandreu Visits" Box 18]	6/29/64	A
#51 cable	USUN 4654 C 2 pp. open 1-1806	6/29/64	A
53 #52 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. sanitized 7-9-13	6/27/64	A
#54 cable	Deptel 6996 to Paris S 1 p. open 1-1806	6/25/64	A
#55 memo	Komer and M. Bundy to the President S 2 pp. open 9-23-04 HWO 04-36	6/25/64	A
#62 memo	Komer to the President S 2 pp. open 9-23-04 HWO 04-36	6/23/64	A
#63 report	Talking Points with Papandreu S 2 pp. open 1-18-06	6/23/64	A
#64 cable	re Greece S 1 p. Exempt 6-23-04 NLJ/RAC 04-24 sanitized 1/10/12 per RAC same sanitization 7/24/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-175	6/21/64	A
#65 memo	to Bromley Smith S 8 pp. exempt 7/24/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-175 sanitized 1/10/12 per RAC	6/21/64	A
#66 report	re Inonu and Papandreu S 7 pp. open 01/10/12 per RAC	undated	A
#67 cable	Athens 1943 S 3 pp. open 01/10/12 per RAC [Dup. # 120, NSF, Files of Komer, "Cyprus, Inonu/Papandreu Visits" Box 18]	6/19/64	A
#69a cable	Athens 1929 S 3 pp. open 01/24/12 per RAC (#50) [Dup. # 50, NSF, cf, "Cyprus, Inonu, " Box 120] [Dup. # 121, NSF, Files of Komer, "Cyprus - Inonu/Papandreu Visits" Box 18]	6/18/64	A
#70 memo	Komer to M. Bundy S 2 pp. open 01/10/12 per RAC	6/18/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#70a memo	Rusk to the President S 3 pp. <i>open 11.3.03</i>	6/18/64	A
#70b report	Talking Points S 4 pp.	6/18/64	A
#70c report	Talking Points S 4 pp.	6/18/64	A
#70d report	Legal Issues Raised in Johnson-Inonu Correspondence S 3 pp. <i>open 1.18.06</i>	6/18/64	A
#71 cable	Athens 1921 S 1 p.	6/17/64	A
#72 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>same sanitization 7/24/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-175</i>	6/17/64	A
#73 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 7/24/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-175</i>	6/17/64	A
#74 cable	Deptel 1545 to Athens C 4 pp. <i>open 1.18.06</i>	6/17/64	A
#74c draft	Work copy of document #74 C 4 pp.	6/15/64	A
#75 memo	Komer and M. Bundy to the President S 2 pp. <i>open 9.23.04 HJ04.36</i>	6/17/64	A
#75a cable	Ankara 1661 S 14 pp. <i>open 1.18.06</i>	6/13/64	A
#75b cable	Athens 1905 S 4 pp. <i>open 1/10/12 per RAC</i>	6/15/64	A
#75c	Duplicate of document #73 <i>Exempt NLJ001-422-3 11/12/01</i>		
#75d cable	USUN 4490 S 3 pp. <i>open 1/10/12 per RAC</i>	6/15/64	A
#77 cable	Deptel 1365 to Ankara S 3 pp. <i>open 1.18.06</i>	6/16/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#79 cable	Athens 1913 C 1 p.	6/16/64	A
#80 cable	Athens 1911 C 1 p. [Dup. #123, NSF, Files of Komer, "Cyprus - Inonu/Papandreou Visits" Box 18]	6/16/64	A
#81a cable	Athens 1904 C 1 p.	6/15/64	A
#82 memo	Komer to M. Bundy S 1 p.	6/15/64	A
#84 cable 83	Deptel 1516 to Athens S 1 p.	6/15/64	A
#85 cable	Athens 1898 S 3 pp.	6/14/64	A
#86 cable	Deptel 1513 to Athens S 4 pp.	6/13/64	A
#86a memo	Read to M. Bundy C 1 p.	undated	A
#86b draft	of document #86 S 1 p.	6/13/64	A
#86c draft	Work copy of #86 S 2 pp.	6/12/64	A
#87 cable	Athens 1886 C 1 p.	6/13/64	A
#88 cable	Athens 1895 S 1 p.	6/13/64	A
#53 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p. sanitized and NLS 01-127-3-3 11/13/01 same sanitization 7/24/13 per NLS/RAC 12-175 & NLS 04-37	6/27/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, "Greece, Papandreou Visit, 6/23-24/64," Box 127

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

SUGGESTED PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF
HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE PAPANDREOU, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

JUNE 23 - 25, 1964

TUESDAY, JUNE 23

5:00 p.m. EDT His Excellency George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, and his party will arrive at Langley Air Force Base near Williamsburg, Virginia, aboard a Presidential aircraft.

5:10 p.m. Departure from the airport.

5:40 p.m. Arrival at Williamsburg, Virginia.

Private evening.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24

9:05 a.m. EDT Departure from Williamsburg, Virginia, by helicopter. (55 minutes flying time)

10:00 a.m. EDT Prime Minister Papandreou and his party will arrive at the White House where he will be greeted by the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State Ball, a representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and other officials. Full military honors will be rendered.

10:15 a.m. Prime Minister Papandreou will meet with President Johnson at the White House.

Upon conclusion of the meeting, Prime Minister Papandreou, accompanied by the Chief of Protocol, will depart the White House and proceed to Blair House. (Prime Minister Papandreou will reside at the Blair House during his visit at Washington.)

WEDNESDAY (Cont'd.)

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24 (Continued)

12:30 p.m. The Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister Papandreou aboard the USS SEQUOIA.

6:00 p.m. His Excellency George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, will give a reception in honor of the President of the United States at Blair House.

THURSDAY, JUNE 25

9:30 a.m. Prime Minister Papandreou will meet with Secretary Rusk at the Department of State.

10:40 a.m. Prime Minister Papandreou will visit Arlington National Cemetery where he will place a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and a wreath on the grave of the late President John F. Kennedy.

12:30 p.m. President Johnson will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister Papandreou at the White House. (Stag)

5:00 p.m. Prime Minister Papandreou will meet with President Johnson at the White House. (A Joint Communique will be released.)

6:00 p.m. Prime Minister Papandreou will meet with members of the press at Blair House.

p.m. Private dinner.

FRIDAY, JUNE 26

9:25 p.m. Departure from Blair House.

9:30 p.m. Prime Minister Papandreou and his party will arrive at the Ellipse. Under Secretary Ball will head the Farewell Committee. There will be an exchange of remarks. (No military honors)

9:45 a.m. Departure from the Ellipse by helicopter.

9:55 a.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.

FRIDAY, JUNE 26 (Continued)

10:05 a.m. EDT Departure from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
aboard a United States Air Force special flight.
(1 hour and 15 minutes flying time.)

11:20 a.m. EDT Arrival at the Marine Air Terminal, LaGuardia
Airport, New York City.

11:30 a.m. Departure from the airport.

12:00 noon Arrival at the Plaza Hotel.

* * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~IPW/B-1
June 17, 1964VISITS OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY AND GREECE
June 22-23 and June 24-25, 1964CYPRUSSTATUS OF UNFICYP FORCE STRENGTH AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR SUPPORT OF UNFICYP AS OF JUNE 17, 1964I. Military, Police and Hospital Units (Source: UN Military Staff)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Operational</u> <u>June 17</u>	<u>Operational</u> <u>June 20</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Australia	Police	40	40	
Austria	Police	33	33	
	Hospital	55	55	
Canada	Troops	1122	1122	
Denmark	Troops	676	982	
	Police	40	40	Airlift of the Danish contingent was completed on June 12 with the arrival of 306 troops. The Danish contingent thus now stands at 982. However, the newly-arrived 306 troops will not become operational until June 20.
Finland	Troops	1000	1000	
Ireland	Troops	639	639	USUN reports that the Irish Government has rejected the Secretary-General's most recent request for 300 additional troops from that country.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/rg* NARA, Date 1-16-06

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declassified after 12 years.*Cap. Tiers**1/2*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>Country</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Operational</u> <u>June 17</u>	<u>Operational</u> <u>June 20</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Netherlands	--	--	--	The Dutch Government is understood to have rejected the Secretary-General's request for a one battalion contingent.
New Zealand	Police	20	20	
Sweden	Police	40	40	
	Troops	954	954	
United Kingdom	Troops	1792	1100	The UK contingent will be reduced to about 1100 troops when the remaining Danish troops become operational on June 20. No further reductions of the UK contingent are presently contemplated.
<u>Subtotals</u>	<u>Police</u>	173	173	
	<u>Hospital</u>	55	55	
	<u>Troops</u>	6183	5797	
<u>TOTALS</u>		<u>6411</u>	<u>6025</u>	

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II. Financial Contributions

Australia	\$111,875	Netherlands	\$ 100,000
Austria	40,000	New Zealand	42,000
Belgium	100,000	Nigeria	2,800
Cyprus	280,000	Norway	49,699
Denmark	75,000	Sweden	100,000
Greece	500,000	Switzerland	75,000
Italy	250,000	Turkey	100,000
Japan	100,000	United Kingdom	1,000,000
Liberia	3,000	United States	2,000,000
Luxembourg	5,000	West Germany	500,000
Morocco	10,000		

SYG's REQUEST\$6,000,000
TOTAL..... 5,444,374
SHORTFALL.....\$ 555,626

NOTES:

Secretary General U Thant, in his report on Cyprus to the Security Council dated June 15, now estimates the financial obligations for the operations of UNFICYP, for the three-month period ending June 27, at \$5,430,000. Sufficient funds have been pledged to cover this amount. The Secretary General estimates the operation of UNFICYP for a further three months would incur an additional \$7,300,000 in financial obligations.

Drafted by: IO:UNP:JCDorrance	Cleared by: NEA-Mr. Jernegan GTI-Mrs. Bracken
S/S-S: BCTueller, Room 7237, Ext. 4154	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
IPW/M-1
June 17, 1964

VISITS OF THE PRIME MINISTERS OF TURKEY AND GREECE
June 22-23 and June 24-25, 1964

CYPRUS

Miscellaneous Document

Prime Minister Papandreou's Letter to the President

June 9, 1964

Dear Mr. President,

The Honorable Henry Labouisse, Ambassador of the United States in Athens has imparted to Mr. S. Costopoulos, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the concern of the American Government in view of information about an imminent Turkish landing in Cyprus. He also informed Mr. Costopoulos of the action taken by the American Government with the Government of Turkey, in order to avert the landing.

The Greek Government wishes to express its warm thanks for this appropriate and wise initiative of the President of the United States, which agrees with the tradition of the American Nation as well as with the mission of the United States as leader of the Free World.

We do not know if the above step has been decisively effective. Information is reaching us that Turkey persists in the policy of landing and is preparing for it; and that, in order to justify the landing, she is staging the proclamation, by the very small Turkish minority of Cyprus, of a federative or an independent State.

The Greek Government has repeatedly declared and reasserts today that its policy is peace; but, in case of aggression, it will be defense.

The

His Excellency
The President of the United States
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED^{XVI}
Authority FRUS. Vol. 60, # 60
By 19 NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The Greek Government most assuredly regards a Turkish landing in Cyprus as an aggression; because the resolution of the Security Council of the 4th of March would thus be violated and also because such an action aims at the strangulation of the rights of the great Greek majority of the island.

This will be one of the consequences of an eventual Turkish landing: a Greek-Turkish conflict and the dissolution of the Southeastern flank of NATO. But this will not be the only consequence. Communism will become omnipotent within the island of Cyprus; and, we unfortunately fear, within Greece, where, with our policies, we have reduced it to 12%. Besides, it is inevitable and human that the Greeks of Cyprus, threatened by a Turkish invasion tolerated by the Allies, should seek help wherever they can find it. And it is known, under the present circumstance, whence this help will be offered. An objective assessment of the future, unfortunately leads to the certain forecast that, under these conditions, Cyprus will end into another Cuba and that the Greek Government will no longer be in a position to exercise any restraining influence.

We feel that a critical hour has struck and we regard it our duty to define responsibilities before the Greek nation, before the Free World to which we belong, as well as before History. And this is the meaning of the present message.

Yours Sincerely,

GEORGE A. PAPANDREOU

Prime Minister of Greece.

SECRET

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
JUNE 24-25, 1964

GENERAL INDEX

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TAB</u>
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TALKING POINTS PAPER	I
BACKGROUND PAPERS	II
PUBLIC STATEMENTS	III
BIOGRAPHIC DATA	IV

SECRET

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY JW ON 10-18-91

0. SCHEDULE

5

NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS

REVISION NO. 1
JUNE 18, 1964

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

SUGGESTED PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF
HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE PAPANDREOU, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

JUNE 23 - 25, 1964

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5:40 p.m. Arrival at Williamsburg, Virginia.

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(1 hour and 15 minutes flying time.)

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Airport, New York City.

11:30 a.m. Departure from the airport.

12:00 noon Arrival at the Plaza Hotel.

* * *

I. TALKING POINTS
PAPER

21

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IPW/G - TP-1

June 20, 1964

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTONJune 24-25, 1964TALKING POINTS

During their Washington visits, both Turks and Greeks will seek greater assurances of both military and economic support. They want to bolster their position in what both have forecast accurately is going to be pressure to talk and solve their differences. The President will concentrate on the main issue of concern--the Cyprus problem. He will refer any other bilateral economic and military issues to the agency concerned. Both the Turks and Greeks may petition Secretary Rusk for greater concessions in textile restraint and chromite barter problems still under discussion with both countries. Both delegations may also wish to pursue substantive issues in the economic and military fields with Secretary McNamara and AID Administrator Bell.

The Greeks, principally Andreas Papandreou, suspect that we might use aid, particularly military, as a lever to pressure Greek-Turkish talks on the Cyprus problem. Therefore they will try to obtain reassurances of greater aid and an increase in the level of our support of the NATO Defense Exercise (CY 1964 commitment up to \$5 million). We have in the past endeavored to reassure the Greeks that we plan to follow economic developments in Greece closely to assure ourselves that Greece's development is not hampered by lack of external resources. Our position, for the moment, on reassurances has changed. Recent indicators point to the possibility Prime Minister Papandreou will resist American endeavors to move the Cyprus problem toward a solution. Until we have indications of flexibility in the Greek position and receptiveness to our approach, we should avoid any statement of sympathetic support.

We should instead concentrate on difficulties in considering economic and military programs until there is some forward movement on a Cyprus solution. Cite the burden on defense budget of Greek support to the irregulars in Cyprus. The Greeks will try to justify this by the Turkish threat and Turkey's proportionately larger support of the Turkish Resistance Organization. This does not excuse the Greeks nor help to explain to their allies the urgency of increasing the levels of support through the NATO exercise.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 10-27-03

SECRET

- 2 -

1. United States-Greek Bilateral Problems.--It is possible, but not likely that Papandreou may allude to United States-Greek problems such as TWA routes and schedules and United States cotton textile import quotas under the Long-Term Arrangement.

Suggested Response.--Assure him of our desire to settle all outstanding problems on a fair and reasonable basis. For further details see Background Paper on United States-Greek Bilateral Problems.

2. United States Economic Assistance.--He may cite Greece's need for continued economic assistance.

Suggested Response.--We have just advised the Embassy of the approval of the Kremasta Dam loan in the amount of \$7.7 million and understand United States officials are arranging delivery of the formal letter of advice to the Public Power Corporation. We hope details can be worked out for public statement on the loan agreement before June 30. For further details see Background Paper on United States-Greek Bilateral Problems.

3. MAP Program.--He may seek assurances of continued MAP at current or increased levels.

Suggested Response.--Our position has not changed from that set forth in the Aide Memoire of August 7, 1963. However, as long as the Greek Government diverts its own military and economic resources to the paramilitary action on Cyprus, it is indeed difficult for us to treat the Greek military program with the priority the Greeks desire. For further details see Background Paper on United States-Greek Bilateral Problems.

4. NATO-related Problems.--He could complain of the slowness with which donor countries, including the United States, have implemented their 1963 and 1964 pledges of defense budgetary support for Greece.

Suggested Reply.--Assistance of this type always involves problems and delays. The United States is now processing substantial drachma releases. For further details see Background Paper on NATO-related Problems of Greece.

Drafted by: GTI - Mr. Hocter Mrs. Bracken	Cleared by: NEA - Mr. Jernegan AID - Mary Wampler DOD/ISA - Captain Johnson
S/S-S Blaine C. Tuller Room 7237, Ext. 4155	

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II. BACKGROUND PAPERS

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
JUNE 24-25, 1964

BACKGROUND PAPERS INDEX

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TAB</u>
CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION	A
ECONOMIC SUMMARY	B
US-GREEK BILATERAL PROBLEMS	C
NATO RELATED PROBLEMS OF GREECE	D
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO GREECE	E
U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GREECE	F

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13293 Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/f*, NARA, Date 1-16-06

SECRET

11

A

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

Background Paper

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Prime Minister George Papandreou won a solid victory in the February 16 elections in which his Center Union party obtained 171 seats in the 300-man Parliament. Resurgence of the center movement has eliminated the dangers of choice between extreme right and extreme left. It has also awakened anticipation of more "change" in the political arena along with rising economic expectations. His victory resulted from his dramatization of Greece's desire for a new deal--for more democracy and for a higher standard of living. In his campaign Papandreou emphasized his loyalty to NATO but indicated that his government would follow a more independent line with its allies. He attacked the Caramanlis Government for its Cyprus policy and its acceptance of the London-Zurich Agreements.

Following his election, Papandreou has been occupied mainly by the Cyprus crisis, the formation of his Government, and King Paul's death. He maintains the political initiative. Minor opposition from the left-of-center element of his party has been easily quelled by Papandreou. Fears that the Center Union (and principally Papandreou) would come into conflict with the Palace and could not work closely with the military because of the Palace's mistrust of the Center position on the question of the monarchy have been dispelled by Papandreou's efforts to promote King Constantine as a reformist monarch, and some reshuffling of senior military leaders into a combination with which he could work in confidence.

The Cyprus situation has put a strain on United States-Greek relations, especially in February and early March. Anti-American demonstrations occurred, and were not resisted by Papandreou, who

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By Cbm/s NARA, Date 1-16-06

limited himself to a caution against violence. In March, King Paul's death and the UN resolution on Cyprus tended to stabilize the situation. Papandreou commented that the Security Council resolution had restored United States-Greek relations and that "the Cyprus crisis is thus dispelled as a danger and remains as a problem".

Cyprus continues, however, to be the most important problem the Government must face. His ability to control events is limited and the future of his government will depend at least as much on external developments as on his ability to produce a new deal in Greece. A new turn has occurred in his relationship with Makarios. By means of a special emissary he has provided Makarios with a statement of his position on enosis and NATOization as the ultimate preferable solution for the Cyprus problem. Makarios' statement of June 17 in favor of enosis followed the next day. It is still too early to assess what this means in terms of Papandreou's control of Makarios.

Drafted by:
NEA/GTI:TFHector

Cleared by:
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B

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

Background Paper

ECONOMIC SUMMARY

Despite the political instability which had existed since the fall of the Caramanlis Government on June 11, the Greek economy continued to show significant growth in all sectors throughout the year. GNP grew by 7.6 per cent in constant prices. Private investment has been heavy. With the help of higher invisible and export earnings, plus foreign supplier credits, the 1963 balance of payments showed an increase in reserves.

Greece's association with the EEC (since October, 1962) has not yet resulted in any significant change in trade patterns. U.S. exports to Greece increased in 1963. The growing number of public and private investment projects planned or under way make prospects for capital equipment sales promising, especially if accompanied by attractive financing. The February 16 elections promise no major change in policies affecting American trade and investment.

GOG steps to restrict speculation on the drachmae price of the gold sovereign in early days of Cyprus crisis have apparently been effective. The sale of sovereigns has dwindled and the free market price has fallen. Prices have remained stable, as the public converted a large part of its new prosperity in a record volume of savings deposits. When the drachmae faltered a bit last winter, the stock market showed no signs of panic. In short there is a growing evidence that the Greek economy has achieved a built-in momentum.

The Papandreou Government

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The Papandreou Government relies primarily on private enterprise to foster Greece's economic development. A prime objective is to gear the economy to take full advantage of the Greek-EEC association, which to date has had no appreciable effect on Greek-EEC trade. The major long-range goal is to improve Greece's balance-of-payments structure by diversifying agricultural exports and increasing industrial exports, so as to reduce the present heavy reliance on earnings from tobacco exports and invisibles. To this end, the need for capital goods is accelerating; in addition, the economy has reached a stage where the effective demand for consumer goods is also accelerating. As a result, the outlook for further increases in U.S. trade with and investment in Greece in 1964 appears to be excellent.

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IPW/G - B-5

June 19, 1964

16

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

Background Paper

US-GREEK BILATERAL PROBLEMS

A. Cotton Textiles

The Greeks have been attempting to expand their cotton textile exports but, because they had no history of previous exports to the U.S., they have been held to minimal quotas of yarn sales in the U.S. under the Long-Term Cotton Textile arrangement. A U.S. delegation went to Athens on April 27 to discuss their desire for a sharp increase in their ceiling (from about 670 thousand pounds per annum to about 5 million pounds). Agreement was reached to raise the Greek quota for yarn to 1 million pounds, and to allow quotas of fabric (1 million square yards) and apparel (200 thousand square yards). This agreement received interagency clearance and we are now awaiting its acceptance by the GOG.

B. Civil Aviation

The GOG, acting in the interest of Olympic Airways (Onassis) is curtailing TWA's Rome-Athens traffic. We contend that this action is in violation of the US-Greek bilateral agreement. We have cautioned the GOG that its action will disrupt its tourist traffic at the height of the season. We have pressed the Greeks to cancel the order and hope that TWA and Olympic can reach a mutually beneficial solution to the problem.

C. VOA Sites

The U.S. has requested certain sites for location of new (project Gamma) broadcasting facilities in Greece. The GOG has declined the U.S. request for a site near Thessaloniki and has suggested alternative sites. We now intend to survey the alternative sites, and we are hopeful that the project can get under way next fiscal year.

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D. Pre-War Treasury Debt

The Greeks owe the U.S. about \$12,000,000 (principal) arising from a loan made in 1929 to assist them to resettle refugees from Turkey. The U.S. offered to refund the debt, with payments to be used for educational exchanges. The Greeks welcomed this suggestion, and an agreement has now been reached. Implementing legislation will be introduced in Congress in the near future.

E. U.S. Economic and Military Assistance

Economic

Greece is one of the countries expected to move from concessional rate lending by AID to Export-Import Bank credit. New development loan commitments are probably no longer necessary. Under presently foreseeable circumstances they certainly will not be needed beyond FY 1965. We plan to follow closely economic developments in Greece to assure ourselves that Greek development efforts are not hampered by lack of external resources. In this connection the OECD Greek consortium offers a useful forum for the Greek Government to explain its plans and requirements. As soon as the expected settlement of the Greek pre-war sterling debt is announced, Greece will be eligible for IBRD assistance.

Military

As stated in our aide-memoire of August 7, 1963, we will, subject to the availability of funds provided by Congress, continue a substantial program of grant military assistance. MAP deliveries to Greece are continuing satisfactorily. Congress has not completed action on the FY 1965 program. However, the threat of a Greek-Turkish clash over Cyprus causes Congressmen and the public to question the utility of the military assistance program.

(See paper on NATO Related Problems of Greece).

Drafted by:
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D

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

Background Paper

NATO RELATED PROBLEMS OF GREECE

A. NATO Defense Study of the Southeastern Region

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting of December, 1963 it was decided to study the special defense needs of Greece and Turkey. Since that time little progress has been made because of procedural tangles, including a dispute between the Greeks, who want the problems of both countries studied together, and the Turks, who want separate studies. In addition, neither Greece nor Turkey has submitted the economic data required for the study.

The Cyprus dispute may well have had a part in stalling the Southeastern study in that it has discouraged both the GOG and GOT from cooperating with each other. Since the contribution of multilateral NATO defense assistance to Greece after 1964 depends on the study, Greece has an important stake in its success. Turkey has not so far received such assistance, and hopes that the Southeastern study will enable it to do so. Both countries therefore need to work together if they are to realize anything from the exercise.

B. NATO Working Group for Greek Defense

In the NATO Ministerial Meeting of May 1962 it was decided that the more affluent NATO powers should contribute budgetary defense support for Greece in CY 1963 and 1964. As a result, about \$23.4 million was pledged at the December 1962 Ministerial Meeting, of which the U.S. pledged up to \$10 million in drachma, half each from the proceeds of Title I, PL 480 and the estimated remainder of Supporting Assistance in the pipeline.

Implementation

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Implementation of the 1963 pledges has been slow, and the GOG complained recently that it has received only \$1.5 million of the total expected. The U.S. is processing the release of \$8.9 million drachma equivalent. FYI. It appears now that there will be a shortfall of about \$1 million in the U.S. contribution, owing mainly to the effects of price decline, refunds and shipping waivers. END FYI.

Implementation of the 1964 pledges made in the December 1963 Ministerial Meeting, and which has been estimated at about \$23.5 million, has not yet begun. In accordance with our Aide-Memoire of August 7, 1963, the U.S. pledged up to \$5 million out of proceeds of the current PL 480 program. Of the other major contributors, Germany (\$9 million) has made its support contingent on the contributions of others. The UK has made its contribution dependent on Greek settlement of its pre-war debts to British bond-holders (expected soon); while France appears anxious to back out of its pledge altogether. The donor countries also have expressed their desire to see evidence of an increased GOG defense effort in line with Greece's economic growth.

The Greek experience with NATO multilateral defense support so far shows that such assistance presents a number of fiscal and procedural difficulties for both donors and receivers. At best there are unavoidable delays and shortfalls, as the commodity compositions of such assistance are agreed upon, and as their valuations change.

We believe that the U.S. record has been good. We have implemented our 1963 pledges as fully and as rapidly as we could, and will do so in carrying out the 1964 pledge. In addition, we have done so while providing a sizeable MAP program including commercial consumables (\$8 million each in FY 1963 and 1964) for which we have not so far sought credit in the NATO context.

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U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO GREECE

(Total Obligational Authority in \$ Millions)

Grant Aid

(\$ Figures as of 11 April 1964)

FY 50-63	1,225.7
FY 60	49.6
FY 61	109.4
FY 62	112.8
FY 63	85.1

30 June 1963 Undelivered Balance 187.6

FY 64	77.3
FY 65	80.5
FY 66	79.0
FY 67	81.8
FY 68	92.4
FY 69	92.4
FY 70	92.4

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Greece

Authority: Military assistance to Greece is authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and carried out under bilateral agreements. The prime objective of the program is to assist Greece to maintain forces capable of accomplishing assigned NATO defense tasks and expand participation by the armed forces in projects which contribute to economic and social development while not materially impairing performance of the primary military mission.

Military Threat: Greece guards the southern flank for NATO against Soviet or Bloc incursions into the Mediterranean and the Near East, and in consequence faces a possible limited war threat involving Bulgaria and possibly Albania, as well as the same threat of general hostilities which confront Turkey and the other NATO nations. The threat from Albania is limited to guerrilla warfare, while the threat from Bulgaria is increasing. While the Communists do not now appear to have the power to mount a successful coup, they have gradually infiltrated the labor movement to some extent and are pushing hard for Greece's withdrawal from NATO and removal of United States installations and personnel from Greece.

Military Assistance Accomplishments: Military assistance has played a vital role in the preservation of a free and independent Greece which is oriented firmly to the U.S. and to NATO. Its greatest accomplishment was thwarting the attempt to seize the Greek Government in 1949 by Communist guerrilla forces, supported by Russia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. The military forces have contributed substantially to the pool of technically trained manpower within the country and to the economic infrastructure by the accomplishment of such civic action projects as construction of road networks, schools, churches, water supply for small communities, flood control, land reclamation, reforestation and irrigation projects.

Military assistance has enabled Greece to participate and contribute to the NATO shield. Without this contribution there would be a wide gap in NATO's southern flank in which the Communist forces could ultimately reach their long sought objective of warm water port facilities and extend their influence to cover the Middle East.

Existing Capabilities: The Hellenic Armed Forces have marginal capability of defending Greece against simultaneous Albanian and Bulgarian attack. The Hellenic Army today, when compared with the Bulgarian Army is at a considerable disadvantage in mobility (particularly in tanks) and is out-numbered and out-ranged in its artillery. The continuing capability of the Hellenic Armed Forces to meet the threat posed by the anticipated further improvements in the Bulgarian forces, due to USSR support, depends almost entirely on the future level of U.S. military assistance which provides essentially all military equipment. The effectiveness of the Navy is limited due to obsolescence of its units. It has limited Surface, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Amphibious and Mine Warfare capability. The Air Force has interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles deployed in defensive roles against the immediate air threat. The offensive and reconnaissance forces can support initial strikes but lack logistic support for sustained operations. The RHAF will be able to compete qualitatively much more effectively with the MIG 19's of Bulgaria when the F-104 and F5A aircraft, currently being provided through MAP, are delivered. However, the quantitative difference will not be rectified.

Greece

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Greece

(All dollar values are in thousands)

CATEGORIES		PROGRAMS		DELIVERIES/EXPENDITURES FROM FY 1950 - 64 PROGRAMS		
		Cumulative FY 1950 - 64	FY 1964 As of 1/25/64	Cumulative thru June 1963	Estimated FY 1964	Est. July 1964 and After
(a)		(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1 TOTAL (Excludes Lines 14, 15, & 16)		\$ 1,302,984	\$ 77,324	\$ 1,038,031	\$ 93,059	\$ 171,894
2 Aircraft (incl spares)		308,119	25,987	201,525	32,624	73,970
3 Ships (incl overhauls & spares)		108,782	3,150	81,023	7,294	20,465
4 Vehicles & Weapons (incl spares)		274,142	10,790	246,581	10,284	17,277
5 Ammunition		203,289	2,565	196,992	2,454	3,843
6 Missiles (incl spares)		56,236	4,364	26,215	1,261	28,760
7 Communications Equip (incl spares)		78,285	3,036	61,638	10,270	6,377
8 Other Equipment & Supplies		142,063	14,124	114,211	11,467	16,385
9 Construction		1,005	10	927	64	14
10 Repair & Rehab of Equipment		20,388	2,652	15,986	3,530	872
11 Supply Operations		79,408	6,760	71,215	8,193	-
12 Training		20,053	2,900	16,160	2,356	1,537
13 Other Services		11,214	986	5,558	3,262	2,394
14 Excess Stocks (Value at Acq Cost)		112,866	611	111,394	361	1,111
15 Credit Assistance (Under Sect 508 FAA)		-	-	-	-	-
16 Direct Sales (Under Sect 507 FAA)		1,134	-	873	211	50

Greece

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Greece

(Quantities each unless specified)

KEY END - ITEMS	PROGRAMS		DELIVERIES/EXPENDITURES FROM FY 19 50 - 64 PROGRAMS		
	Cumulative FY 1950 - 64	FY 1964 As of 1/25/64	Cumulative thru June 1963	Estimated FY 1964	Est. July 1964 and After
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
F-84F Aircraft	120	-	120	-	-
F-84G Aircraft	233	-	233	-	-
F-104G Aircraft	39	-	-	20	19
F-5A & F-5B Aircraft	37	17	-	-	37
T-37 Aircraft	16	-	-	11	5
Cessna U-17A Aircraft	16	16	-	-	16
DD Destroyer	8	-	8	-	-
DE Destroyer Escort	4	-	4	-	-
SS Submarine	3	-	2	-	1
MSC Minesweeper Coastal	21	1	14	2	5
LST Landing Ship Tank	4	-	3	1	-
Tank Medium	410	-	275	135	-
Carrier Pers Armd	462	-	454	8	-
Vehicle Tank Recovery	28	-	28	-	-
Truck Cargo 1/4 T	3,997	750	3,247	-	750
Truck 3/4 T	2,311	139	2,090	81	140
Truck 2 1/2 T	7,414	2,084	5,074	256	2,084
Truck 5-10 T	597	-	588	9	-
Rifle 106mm W/Mt	564	-	564	-	-
Howitzer 105mm	450	-	450	-	-
Rifle Cal 30	180,387	-	180,387	-	-
Machine Gun Cal 30	2,344	-	2,344	-	-
Machine Gun Cal 50	14	-	14	-	-
Launcher Rocket Mk 51	250	-	250	-	-
SIDEWINDER Missile	1,044	8	494	88	462
NIKE Missile	184	12	172	-	12
BULL PUP Missile	302	-	-	-	302
SS 10 & 11 Missile	1,619	-	1,324	295	-
HONEST JOHN Rocket	300	12	210	78	12

Greece

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PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT ITEM CONTENT

OF GREECE FY 65 MAP

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
F-5A/B Fighter A/C	22
Observation A/C, O-I-E (L-19)	24
ASW Torpedo Tubes, MK 32	4
Tank Recovery Vehicles, Full Track, M-74	4
Truck, Cargo, 5 Ton	57
Truck, Tractor, 5 Ton	36
Truck, Wrecker, 5 Ton	18
Truck, Cargo, 3 Ton	76
Truck, Cargo, 2½ Ton	2,586
Truck, Dump, 2½ Ton	194
Truck, Cargo, 1 Ton	734
Truck, ¼ Ton, M-106	731
Trailer, Cargo, 1½ Ton	4,789
Trailers, ¼ Ton	408
Semi-Trailer, 25 Ton	36
Jet Engines, J-85	13
NIKE Improvement Kit	1
ASN Torpedo, MK-44, Warshot	5
Radio Sets, AN/GRC-46	25
Crane, Truck Mounted, 10 Ton	4
Road Grader	8
Tractor	10
Firetrucks	7
40MM Ammo Rounds	4,092
Hand Grenades	36,172
3"/50 Naval Ammo, Rounds	4,940
5"/38 Naval Ammo, Projectiles	2,668
5"38 Naval Ammo, Charges	4,828
155MM Propellant Charges	7,449
155MM Projectiles	7,086
8" Projectiles and Charges	1,924
90MM Cartridges	25,703
105MM Cartridges	33,883
4.2" Cartridges	169
Torpedoes, MK 14 and 15	7
3.5" Rockets	10,561
7.2" Rockets	184
Jet Engine Overhauls	42

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U. S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GREECE
(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

	<u>Total</u> <u>1946-1963</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>Projected 1964</u>
A.I.D.					
Loans	119.6	-	10.0	31.6	7.7
Grants	962.3	20.4	20.3	-	-
 PL 480 - Total	 193.7	 21.2	 15.5	 14.6	 18.0
of which:					
TITLE I - Loans & Grants	74.0	10.1	6.6	6.5	8.7
TITLE II - Emergency Relief & Economic Development	3.5	3.5	-	-	-
TITLE III- Voluntary Relief Agencies	116.2	7.6	8.9	8.1	9.3
 EX-IM Long-Term Loans	 21.4	 1.8	 2.1	 3.0	 -
 OTHER U.S. Economic Programs (mainly post-war relief)	 536.7	 -	 -	 -	 -
 TOTAL ECONOMIC	 1,833.7	 43.4	 47.9	 49.1	 25.7
MAP	1,225.7				
OVERALL	\$ 3,059.4				

For Military Assistance see Background Paper on U.S. Military Assistance to Greece.

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III. PUBLIC
STATEMENTS

SECRET

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
JUNE 24-25, 1964

PUBLIC STATEMENTS INDEX

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A

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June 19, 1964

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am very happy to welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister, to our country. I deeply appreciate your coming at this time. The gravity of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean indeed calls for extraordinary efforts by all who are concerned with imperatives of world peace. And your response, Mr. Prime Minister, is in keeping with your extended record of devotion to the ideals of freedom and the solution of problems through negotiation.

The enduring concepts of democracy which Greece has given the world have been the base for inspired action throughout the long history of civilized man. Your own record, Mr. Prime Minister, has been truly consistent with these ideals and so we Americans greet you with a special feeling of spiritual kinship.

I am confident that the close and cordial relations that have existed between Greece and the United States will be reaffirmed in this visit and take on new meaning as we seek through diligence and understanding to chart a course that will

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preserve the union and harmony of free nations militantly
opposed to Communist aggression.

I am looking forward to our exchange of views also as
an opportunity to become acquainted with one whose wit and
sagacity are widely known and whose devotion to peace and
justice has aroused special admiration.

Drafted by: NEA:GTI:KWBracken	Cleared by: NEA - JDJernegan
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PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
Working Visit, June 24-25, 1964

Public Statement

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR UNDER SECRETARY'S FAREWELL REMARKS

1. Deeply appreciate honor Prime Minister has paid us in coming to Washington at this time.
2. Visit to Washington, his first as Prime Minister, has necessarily been arranged in haste and has been brief. Wish he could have stayed longer.
3. Visit has presented opportunity to have full and frank exchange of views on problems of grave concern to both our nations.
4. We have gained increased understanding of Greece's viewpoint and are confident our own strong interest is also fully appreciated.
5. Confident that with patience and determination, attack on problems can be made in a manner that preserves peace in the Mediterranean world and strengthens the solidarity of our two nations united against communist aggression.

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6. Friendship of United States and Greece of long standing.
Americans have deep reverence for contributions of
democratic philosophy Greece has made to modern as well
as to ancient civilizations.
7. Ask Prime Minister to carry back to Greece warmest best
wishes of American people.

Drafted by: NEA/GTI:TFHector	Cleared by: NEA - JDJernegan NEA/GTI - KWBracken
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PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

Public Statement

TOAST FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT STAG LUNCHEON

Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen:

The American people are highly honored and I personally am very happy to welcome you to our country. The industrious and determined people of Greece have long held the admiration of Americans and we recall with pride your firm stand against heavy odds on repeated attempts by enemies of democracy to turn back the tide of history in your ancient land two decades or so ago.

In the long history of the Greek people, there have been many spokesmen for the high principles that have sparked other peoples to follow your example. In your own long life of devotion to these principles, Mr. Prime Minister, you have distinguished yourself with your courage, with your persistence, and with your eloquence. There is a special quality in venerable and vigorous statesmen which marks them as clearly superior among their fellows. I hail the Prime Minister of Greece as prominent in that select group.

These critical times yearn for leaders with dedication to democratic ideals and yet who also never flinch from the arduous tasks that demand the utmost in vigor nor surrender their adherence to justice in determined pursuit of high goals. It is our good fortune, Mr. Prime Minister, that the Greek people have chosen you for their leader at this moment in history.

May I ask my guests to join me in a toast to His Majesty, the King of the Hellenes, and for the continued prosperity of his individualistic and friendly people, who continue to follow nobly the tradition of Demosthenes.

Drafted by: GTI - Mr. Hoctor NEA/P - Mr. Fisk	Cleared by: GTI - Mrs. Bracken NEA - Mr. Jernegan U/PR - Mr. King
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PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON
June 24-25, 1964

Public Statement

FAREWELL TELEGRAM

Mr. Prime Minister:

I hope you will return to Greece with the same gratification that I feel that our talks have been of mutual benefit. I derived from your visit a new understanding of your country and its problems and I trust that you carry with you both a new understanding of the United States and a new confidence, as I now have, in the firm bonds of friendship between Greece and the United States. Please accept my best wishes for your good health and the continued progress and well-being of the Greek people.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
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NEA/P - Mr. Fisk	NEA - Mr. Jernegan
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PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON

June 24-25, 1964

Public Statement

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece and President Johnson have discussed the problem of Cyprus and its relationship to the alliance of free nations. A full exchange of views was occasioned by the Prime Minister's visit at the invitation of the President.

The views of the United States on current problems in the eastern Mediterranean area were presented by the President. He stressed the United States concern that solidarity among nations allied against Communist aggression be maintained as of paramount importance to the free world. He reaffirmed the long-standing friendship of the United States for Greece and welcomed assurances of the Prime Minister of Greece's continued concern for peace in the area. The Prime Minister set forth his country's views on the problem of Cyprus.

The discussions considered ways in which their two countries could reinforce the role of the United Nations in connection with the Cyprus problem. The urgency for arriving at (or a basis for) understanding upon a lasting solution was emphasized.

The two leaders reiterated their determination to make every effort to increase the understanding between Greece and Turkey.

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DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

During the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister of Greece conversations were held between Mr. George A. Papandreou and the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and other officials of the United States Government.

The conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordiality, have contributed to the strengthening of the close ties between Greece and the United States.

The visit provided the opportunity to the Greek Prime Minister and the President of the United States to review various aspects of the international situation and to discuss subjects of mutual interest.

The President of the United States and the Greek Prime Minister had a sincere and useful exchange of views on the Cyprus situation. Both expressed full support of the efforts undertaken by the Security Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations for ^{achieving} ~~the consolidation of~~ peace in the island and for finding a permanent solution. The Greek Prime Minister explained in detail the Greek position on the problem. He emphasized that a permanent solution should be based upon the principles of Democracy and Justice.↑

The Greek Prime Minister expressed the deep appreciation for the generous support of the United States Government and people in the hard struggle of the Greek people for their freedom and welfare.

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PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU VISIT TO WASHINGTON

June 24-25, 1964

Public Statement

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Prime Minister Papandreu of Greece and President Johnson have concluded discussions on the problem of Cyprus and its relationship to the alliance of free nations. A full exchange of views was occasioned by the Prime Minister's visit at the invitation of the President.

The views of the United States on current problems in the eastern Mediterranean area were presented by the President. He stressed the United States concern that solidarity among nations allied against Communist aggression be maintained as of paramount importance to the free world. He reaffirmed the long-standing friendship of the United States for Greece and welcomed assurances of the Prime Minister of Greece's continued concern for peace in the area. The Prime Minister set forth his country's views on the problem of Cyprus. With good will and candor, both leaders discussed means of preserving and strengthening a just peace in the Mediterranean area. There was also a frank discussion of the effect of the Cyprus problem upon other world issues.

The two leaders reiterated their determination to make every effort to increase the understanding between Greece and Turkey and they emphasized their intention to advance their common efforts on behalf of individual freedom and human dignity everywhere.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
NEA/GTI - Mr. Hocter	GTI - Mrs. Bracken
NEA/P - Mr. Fisk	NEA - Mr. Jernegan
S/S-S Blaine C. Tueller Room 7237, Ext. 4155	

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IV. BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
JUNE 24-25, 1964

BIOGRAPHIC DATA INDEX

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By Cbml/s NARA, Date 1-16-06

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Stavros KOSTOPOULOS
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Stavros Kostopoulos, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Papandreou Cabinet formed in February, comes from a wealthy family of Peloponnesian bankers.

He has been a Liberal Party deputy in Parliament since 1928, and was Minister of Interior in Papandreou's first Cabinet (November 1963).

A 1959 visitor to Communist China, he has stated [redacted] since becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, that as Minister he would never advocate the recognition of Communist China. Before entering the Cabinet, he was a member of the Greek-Rumanian Friendship League and the Friends of New China Society.



Kostopoulos was born in 1900 at Kalamata, graduated in law from Athens University in 1921, and received an LLD from the University of Paris in 1923. After a period of study at Paris and a year in a New York law office, Kostopoulos returned to Greece where he became a deputy and an attorney. He was a member of several Cabinets between 1932 and 1951. From 1951 to 1953 he served as an ineffective governor of the National Bank of Greece.

His family has extensive banking and business interests, and Kostopoulos has published books and articles on financial affairs. He is married and the father of one child. His language capability includes some English and French.

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By UW NARA, Date 07-09-2013



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Alexandros Antonios MATSAS
Ambassador to the United States

Alexandros Matsas, Greek Ambassa-
dor to the US since February 1962,



While Ambassador to Ankara (1959-62), Matsas attempted to improve Greek-Turkish relations. He was effective in assisting Archbishop Athenagoras, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, in his difficult position during and after the 1960 Turkish coup.

He is himself a man of letters, having published poems and plays--in both Greek and French.

The Ambassador was born in Athens in 1910. He speaks excellent English and French and fair German and Italian. After graduating from the University of Athens, he entered the foreign service in 1934. During World War II, he was attached to the Greek government-in-exile in London and after the war he served at Paris, The Hague, and Rome, between tours in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In 1948 Matsas married a wealthy widow, Mme. Saltafera. They have one daughter (Mme. Matsas has two children by her former husband), and have a home among the olive groves outside of Athens.

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NARA, Date 07-09-2013

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(FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED BY MESSENGER, FROM PAN AMERICAN)

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE AS WELL AS FOR THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO ME AND TO MY PARTY DURING OUR STAY IN WASHINGTON. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT OUR CONVERSATIONS WERE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT. THEY WERE ALSO TO THE BENEFIT OF PEACE AND OF THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM TO WHICH AS MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BOTH OUR COUNTRIES ARE DEDICATED.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT THE PROBLEM WE DISCUSSED WILL SOON FIND A SOLUTION; A SOLUTION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE IDEAL OF THE GREAT DEMOCRACY YOU SO ABLY LEAD.

MAY I RECIPROCATE YOUR GOOD WISHES AND EXPRESS MY FEELINGS OF GREAT ADMIRATION AND AFFECTION OF YOUR PEOPLE

GEORGE A PAPANDREOU PRIME MINISTER.

1. Bundy

2. Komer

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[Signature]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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CYPRUS

FOR STEVENSON FROM CLEVELAND

Following is ~~full~~ draft memo of Sunday afternoon's conversation with Papandreou, reported orally to Under Secy. and Talbot.

In hour's conversation with PM Papandreou in his hotel suite Sunday afternoon, Stevenson, accompanied by Cleveland, drew from Papandreou a very full restatement of his understanding on forthcoming talks with UN Mediator in Geneva. Meeting was at Papandreou's invitation, in effect as apology for having sent word to Stevenson at Skouras' party Saturday night that he could not talk with & him there. Bitsios, Matsos, Costopoulos present but silent.

In view interesting nuances in discussion, full MEMCON follows. Here is summary main points of QTE clarification UNQTE
Greek position as of June 28th.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 001E-127-3-5

By QA, NARA Date 11/6/12

Drafted by: **IO:HEleveland:mtb**

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Harlan Cleveland

Clearances:

S/S-O N. C. McManus

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1. Greek representative in Geneva talks will not initially be authorized participate in joint meetings with Turks, even under sponsorship of and in presence of UN Mediator. Joint talks only appropriate later when present gap has been narrowed; when held, they may have to be at higher level than Geneva Ambassadors.

2. Greek representative in talks will probably be ~~XXXXXX~~ their PERMREP in Geneva. (Vlachos?)

3. Greek Representative will be authorized meet with Acheson, especially if UN Mediator QTE recommends UNQTE it. But there should be no QTE parallel UNQTE series of talks with US, and no secret QTE ~~conspiratorial~~ conspiratorial UNQTE meetings outside UN framework.

4. Papandreou, reviewing Washington talks, complained about US preoccupation with mediation procedure, U.S. QTE neutrality UNQTE ^{illusory} on the substance of a Cyprus solution, and/US belief in QTE magical UNQTE quality of joint (Greek-Turk) conversations.

5. For first time in any Papandreou conversation, he discussed difficulty of keeping Government of Cyprus on reservation in event of direct Greek-Turkish talks about future of Cyprus.

Detailed MEMCONV follows:

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PM's

After opening ~~fixes~~ pleasantries, including apology for QTE misunderstanding UNQTE about conversation at Skouras party, ^{Andrea} and reminder that ~~Andreas~~ Papandreou was a Stevenson supporter at University of Minnesota, Stevenson briefly ~~ref~~ reviewed US concerns.

at

Stevenson referred to useful talk with Bitsios ~~and~~ Skouras ^{obviously} party. Cyprus situation was ~~obviously~~ very serious, and US role was attempt to be helpful. Main difficulty seemed to be conditions under which an American presence in Geneva could be helpful in UN mediation process. He thought an American could be useful, and so ~~we~~ did Tuomioja and SYG. We know that Greeks are concerned about publicity and we too appreciate value of privacy in forthcoming talks.

Papandreou said he thought there was QTE complete understanding UNQTE, but would review his understanding to make sure. He had seen U Thant and Tuomioja and had repeated Greek desire to follow a QTE UN road UNQTE.

In recent days he had often been asked why Greeks thought it would not be useful to have direct and immediate confrontation between Greeks and Turks. In theory such a confrontation would be helpful, but there were two difficulties which made the time for direct talks not ripe just now.

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One difficulty was simple fact that gap in thinking of Turks and Greeks as regards final Cyprus solution was still very wide. The Turks want either the rehabilitation of the existing treaties, or partition. The Greeks want full freedom and democratic choice safeguard by Cyprus with international guarantees to ~~safeguard~~ Turkish Cyprus minority. Direct talks today would simply produce deaf QTE two monologues UNQTE, QTE a dialogue of the ~~deaf~~ UNQTE. Thus, premature confrontation might well be ~~harmful~~ because it would encourage irresponsibles on both sides to take irresponsible action.

Second difficulty was that to start a discussion between Governments of Greece and Turkey ~~to~~ alters the essential structure of the problem, and ~~the~~ derogates from the ~~independence~~ of Cyprus. While Cyprus was still under the UK, it was possible ~~to have~~ direct talks among countries concerned with its future. But now, the Government of Cyprus is a member of the UN, and only appropriate role for Greek ~~Government~~ GOVT is one of assistance, not determination of Cyprus future. Suppose Turkey and Greece agree on a solution with which Cyprus disagreed. Then Cyprus would merely continue struggle within UN.

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Therefore, said Papandreou, Greeks were QTE surprised UNQTE at the QTE preoccupation with procedure UNQTE they found in Washington. They also found, to their distress, QTE a certain neutrality UNQTE in Washington on the substance of a permanent solution. Papandreou added that he had had some difficulty wedging into conversations on procedure any statements of Greek views about ultimate solutions. Maybe this was because US is trying to avoid ~~making~~ taking sides, and Greeks can understand this. But objective facts cannot be overlooked.

Warming to his theme, Papandreou said he had found this week some confusion as to the weight to be assigned to ~~this~~ different absolute aspects of the Cyprus problem. Some aspects are ~~absolute~~, others relative. In the absolute category he would place the most basic question - the question of war or peace, which was somewhat independent of the conflict about the Cyprus issue as such. Papandreou had been QTE amazed UNQTE to learn that Stykker had said that in event of war, NATO would remain neutral. If there is ~~agge~~ aggression by one NATO member, surely the rest of the NATO membership has a special obligation: to ~~assure~~ issue a QTE categorical demand UNQTE that there must never be war among allies. If this principle is not established, QTE NATO has left its course UNQTE for local wars would become general war. This principle applied

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equally in restraint of Greeks as well as Turks.

Turning to issues of substance, Papandreou reviewed familiar Greek position. Turks, he said, had two possible solutions: to stay with the existing treaties, or to achieve partition.

Existing treaties led to impasse, which made them impractical quite apart from their legal validity. So it cannot be seriously proposed to maintain status quo indefinitely. Partition would obviously lead to massive security trouble on Island, and

QTE 100 percent of Greek Cypriots would become communists UNQTE.

Would this, Papandreou asked, be a QTE final solution UNQTE
for Turkey

~~xxx~~ bringing QTE security ~~xxxxxx~~ UNQTE ?

So what is the answer? Papandreou asked. QTE We ~~said~~ say enosis ~~xxxxxx~~. We don't necessarily support it; there could theoretically be two Greeces in the UN, combined in a Customs Union; but that would not give adequate security for Turkey or for the free world. Only NATOfication can give protection - and that means Enosis UNQTE.

Concept of NATOfication, according to Papandreou, means that ~~xx~~ Turks could maintain a presence on Cyprus within NATO framework. Cyprus would become like Crete, a ~~Main~~ Mediterranean Island with a NATO base. This would serve the interests of nearly all concerned; only two people would be inconsolable - Khrushchev and Makarios.

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Turkey has legitimate demand: its security. Enosis, with international guarantees, does the ~~work~~ job.

We are often asked, Papandreou said, what precisely we would be willing to pay for our preferred solution. But what does Turkey give up that it should now demand a price? The Turks sold Cyprus to the UK a century ago. The solution proposed by Greece already gives Turks fulfillment of all their legitimate demands.

Please

In ~~xxx~~ serious tone Papandreou said, QTE ~~please~~ believe me: I do not act only as a Greek leader, but a responsible member of the free ~~world~~,^{world,} responsible to history for consequences of my actions. I know that even a small mistake could bring disaster. UNQTE.

Papandreou then reverted to review of his visit to Washington. US GOVT had emphasized and reemphasized that it is necessary to talk. Apparently, US officials believed that if talks were begun, happen, QTE something magical is expected to ~~come~~, UNQTE perhaps QTE bad spirits would be driven out UNQTE.

Greeks were told that in absence of Turks, Turks might make an war. But this is ~~an~~ ultimatum, an attempt by Turks to impose takes QTE unconditional surrender UNQTE, which ~~takes~~ us back to the days accepted an ultimatum. of ~~Maxim~~ Nazism. Greece has never ~~accepted~~ ~~what ultimatum~~

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The answer is peace, through UN machinery. And we (said Papandreou) will exercise all our influence on the Island. QTE I will go to Cyprus myself if necessary UNQTE. Here he handed Stevenson a message he had sent that day QTE June 28th UNQTE to Markarios. ~~XX~~

threat.

Again, he reverted to Turkish ~~trade~~. The transmission of
this Turkish ultimatum, he said, QTE almost ~~UNQTE partakes~~ ^{partakes} of
~~forebearance or tolerance of the ultimatum itself.~~ UNQTE.

President Johnson intervened personally to stop the Turks from moving - QTE That is his glory, that is why I have called him a champion of peace UNQTE. But how can the US say that after the second or third ~~xxx~~ threat Turkey is then free to move?
Geneva

Finally, Papandreou briefly discussed ~~General~~ procedures.

He had agreed in Washington with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, he said, that direct talks are not necessary, that it is ^{use} satisfactory to/UN mach nery. He had seen U Thant and Tuomioja, and fully cooperated in any initiative UN takes.

Mexicans

If UN Mediator~~s~~ wishes to call an American to Geneva to help in the process, that is all right. But Papandreou said he did not believe there can be any secrecy about it. QTE ~~xxxxxx~~ Don't even strive for secrecy UNQTE, he said. QTE It ~~x~~ gives the impression of a conspiracy UNQTE. There is nothing ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ about all this, so let us not give the impression that there is. Tuomioja

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has responsibility for mediation task, let him get on with it.

But Papandreou added he should avoid trying ~~to have~~ to have combined meetings with both Turks and Greeks present, and stick to meetings separately with Turks and Greeks.

Stevenson asked for ~~clarification~~ clarification on this last point, and Papandreou softened it to say that meetings should be separate QTE until a fruitful time UNQTE. At that time, he said, joint ~~***~~ meetings should probably be between Papandreou and Inonu.

Cleveland asked whether this meant that in Greek view, neither the time nor the level of the Geneva talks is right for joint Greek-Turkish meetings. Papandreou ~~replied~~ replied that only the time is not ripe. ~~There~~ There might be joint meetings at Ambassadorial level ~~for governments~~ if governments decide that there is a basis for them. (He made clear that Greek decision to have joint meetings would require substantial change in Turk's position.)

Cleveland asked whether this meant Greek representative in Geneva talks would have instructions not to participate in any joint meeting with Turkish representative, even under UN ~~observation~~ ^{auspices.} ~~probable~~ In reply, Papandreou said he would review ~~probably~~ steps in Geneva procedure. First, the ~~Greek~~ Greek representative would explain Greek position to UN Mediator, exactly as Papandreou has explained

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it in Washington. Turkish ~~w~~ representative would also explain existing ~~existing~~ Turkish position. Mediator would presumably communicate privately the position of each side to the other side. Then, if the Turks ~~w~~ hold to their original position, there is obviously no point in having a joint meeting.

Besides, Papandreou added, the Ambassadorial rank of the representatives obviously meant their authorities would be restricted to a QTE ~~reconnaissance~~ ^{reconnaissance} ~~UNQTE~~ by Geneva representatives of the two governments UNQTE. (Later, Papandreou, again referred to Greek delegate in ~~Geneva~~ ^{Geneva}, Matsos and Bitsios confirmed afterwards that probable representative will be Greek PERMREP something like Vlachos. in Geneva, whose name is ~~unknown~~ ^{unknown}. However, Tuomioja may ask concessions of each side, and if some accommodation is possible, then a conference is possible. But if the gap remains unbridgeable, there would be no point in having a QTE conference UNQTE.

Stevenson then asked Papandreou's view about meetings with ~~him~~ an American in Geneva.

Papandreou replied that Tuomioja would be chairman of the ~~and~~ mediation effort. He will presumably invite the help of Americans, as part of his effort to bring two positions closer together. But Papandreou said he ~~saw~~ ^{saw} no point ~~in~~ in a series of separate

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~~XXXX~~ meetings with an American. This would merely bypass the UN.
QTE What special resources would the American bring UNQTE to ~~h~~ the matter?

It would be especially difficult for Tuomioja to sponsor separate conspiratorial conversations if they were QTE ~~conspiratorial~~ UNQTE Papandreou said. Such conversations would imply that he has given up on ^{own} his ~~own~~ mediatory efforts, so he would have to resign. In summary, he said, let us add the US ~~influence~~ influence by all means, but openly, ^{QTE} without this dangerous secrecy. UNQTE

Stevenson stressed that both U Thant and ^{Tuomioja} ~~Tuomioja~~ had asked us to help, and thought ^{our} ~~our~~ influence would be useful. We are not so much stressing secrecy, but effective and practical talks with a US representative, Dean Acheson. U Thant has said Tuomioja ^{counsel.} cannot ask Acheson to be his assistant or ~~representative~~. But they are quite prepared for UN mediator to QTE encourage and recommend UNQTE to Turks and Greeks that they talk with Acheson in Geneva.

Papandreou argued this is not a UN route but a substitute for it. Stevenson further ~~we~~ clarified our concept that US effort is part of UN mediation effort, but Papandreou shook his head, describing this ^{as} ~~as~~ an original view UNQTE, which QTE distorts the UN mediation UNQTE.

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He would have no objection to Greek representative seeing Acheson, but to start a parallel series of talks would weaken UN effort, not strengthen it. Thant wants US participation in talks unknown to the public. That, in Papandreou's ~~x~~ opinion, is impossible. Greeks admire Acheson, and ~~DOG~~^{GOG} would ~~xxxx~~ certainly not prevent Greek representative from ~~xxxxinghim~~ seeing him. But there should be no QTE parallel ~~pe~~ procedure UNQTE.

Stevenson reiterated that we got into this at the request of U Thant and Tuomioja, who obviously needed help/ and said so. Papandreou finally said ~~xxxx~~ QTE If it is the recommendation of Tuomioja for our representative to see ^CAcheson, our representative will see him ~~UNQTE~~ in an isolated fashion. UNQTE. But he would not see him with the Turkish representative. Conversations with Acheson, like conversations with the UN Mediator, would have to be conducted QTE pair-wise UNQTE, in other words in groups of two - Greek with US REP and Turk with USREP.

Stevenson repeated his understanding that given a Tuomioja recommendation, Greek representative could meet with US Rep, but not in joint session with Turk. He then argued case for joint sessions to ~~accelerate~~ accelerate process of ~~xxxx~~ accommodation.

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Papandreou said when Greek Government judges that the time is right, surely we will have joint sessions. But the implication was clear that the initial instructions to Greek representative in Geneva will not include authority to meet with the Turks. A lifting of this limitation would be decided in Athens only after ~~xxx~~ review of reports of initial phase separate meetings with UN Mediator.

In final comment, Stevenson thanked Papandreou for special effort to see him shortly before his departure from US. The meeting had been helpful and had cleared away from ~~misapprehensions~~ misapprehensions. Stevenson reiterated that Tuomioja came to ~~us~~ for help, and our efforts are designed to help him. Greeks have ~~insisted~~ insisted on UN sponsorship of the mediation process, and we have accepted that point. But talks should be serious, since situation ^{understood} is so serious. Stevenson said he ~~understood~~ ^{understood} that U Thant assumes Greeks will be willing to meet jointly with Turks in presence of UN Mediator, and thought that Papandreou's clear declaration against joint meetings ^{now} ~~in the first instance~~ would be a ~~xx~~ surprise and a disappointment to SYG and his ~~Med~~ Mediator. Papandreou reiterated that the time ~~xx~~ was not yet ripe for joint sessions.

END

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1. Mr. Komer
2. Return to Bromley Smith

John
PP

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CYPRUS -TUG

FOL LETTER HANDED STEVENSON BY PAPANDREOU YESTERDAY:

QUOTE

HIS BEAUTITUDE
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
NICOSIA

FROM THE UNITED STATES WHERE I HAVE COME AT THE
INVITATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND I STRIKE FOR THE CAUSE
OF CYPRUS, I EXTEND TO YOU MY GREETINGS. I DEFEND THE POLICY WHICH
WE HAVE JOINTLY DRAWN UP DURING OUR MEETING IN ATHENS.
OUR AIM IS UNRESTRICTED INDEPENDENCE, WHICH INCLUDES THE
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, AS WELL AS FULL GUARANTEES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE TURKISH MINORITY.
MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THIS AIM ARE PEACE AND THE APPEAL TO THE
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IT IS ON THIS
POINT THAT I WISH TO INVOKE YOUR CARE.

I KNOW YOUR CONTINUOUS STRUGGLE IN FAVOUR OF PEACE. BUT
THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, VIOLATING THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, THREATENS CONTINUOUSLY TO INVADE THE ISLAND,
UNDER THE PRETEXT OF DEFENDING THE ALLEGEDLY PERSECUTED
TURKISH MINORITY. IT IS CERTAIN THAT INVASION MEANS WAR.

IT IS THEREFORE A MEASURE OF PRECAUTION ON OUR PART
AND A SUPREME PATRIOTIC DUTY TO INCREASE OUR VIGILANCE
FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE
IS IT ALLOWED TO FALL IN THE TRAP OF PREMEDITATED PROVOCATION.

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By *Chm/ly* NARA, Date 1-16-06

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JUN 29 1964

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-2- 4654, JUNE 29, 10 AM, FROM USUN

THERE MUST ALSO BE MAINTAINED ABSOLUTE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS, WHOSE MISSION IS THE RESTORATION OF NORMALITY AND PACIFICATION JOINTLY WITH THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS OUR AGREEMENT IN ATHENS AND CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING TODAY MAKE ITS APPLICATION IMPERATIVE.

I AM SURE THAT THE PRESENCE IN THE ISLAND OF GENERAL GRIVAS, WHOSE PATRIOTISM AND POLITICAL WISDOM ARE WELL KNOWN, IS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE APPLICATION OF THIS POLICY.

UNQUOTE

GP-1 STEVENSON

BT

CFN 4654

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:18 AM, 6/29/64.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

ACTION: His Excellency

NEA

George Papandreou

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Prime Minister of Greece

U.S.

c/o/Chief of ~~XXXX~~ Protocol

Plaza Hotel

New York, New York

Jun 28 12 23 PM '66

Mr. Prime Minister:

I hope you will return to Greece sharing my gratification that our talks have been of mutual benefit. I believe we have both gained new understanding of each other's problems and a new confidence in the firm bonds of friendship between Greece and the United States. I trust also that we share a new sense of urgency in resolving the problem which could bring disaster to the alliance which is the cornerstone of western security.

Please accept my best wishes for your good health and the continued progress and well-being of the Greek people.

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

Drafted by: NEA/GTI:TFHector/NEA/P:EHFisk	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan
Clearances: U/PR - Mr. King GTI - Mrs. Bracken	The White House - Mr. Bundy S/S - Miss Moor

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

COUNTRY GREECE / CYPRUS / TURKEY

DATE OF
INFO.

DISTR. 27 JUNE 1964

SUBJECT

REACTIONS OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU TO
HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 15881

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

APPRAISAL: 3

1. [REDACTED] GREEK PRIME MINISTER GEORGIOS
PAPANDREOU WAS DISAPPOINTED AND "A LITTLE ANGRY" OVER THE
OUTCOME OF HIS TALKS ON 24 AND 25 JUNE WITH PRESIDENT LYNDON
JOHNSON ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THE REASONS FOR HIS REACTION
FOLLOW:

A. PAPANDREOU WAS LEFT TO EXPOUND THE GREEK CASE AND
RECEIVED LITTLE IN THE WAY OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. THE UNITED
STATES OFFERED NO CONCRETE PLAN FOR SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM BEYOND THE TOO OFTEN REPEATED SUGGESTION THAT GREECE
AND TURKEY AS INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD MEET TO WORK OUT A

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IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (OCT): ATTN, SECRETARY AND HUGHES

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(C)

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By LUD NAKA Date 07-09-2013

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PAGE 2

SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THEMSELVES.

B. THE AMERICAN PRESSURE ON PAPANDREOU TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WAS "EVIDENTLY RATHER STIFF."

C. PAPANDREOU WAS DISTURBED OVER THE INCLUSION OF THE REFERENCE TO THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY JOHNSON AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTER INONU AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR TALKS. COMING AS IT DID ON THE EVE OF PAPANDREOU'S OWN TALKS WITH JOHNSON, THIS REFERENCE WAS IN PAPANDREOU'S VIEW "TACTLESS TO SAY THE LEAST." PAPANDREOU ATTEMPTED TO INCLUDE AN UNSPECIFIED PHRASE IN THE JOHNSON-PAPANDREOU COMMUNIQUE TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE REFERENCE TO THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS BUT FAILED TO DO SO.

D. PAPANDREOU WAS IRRITATED BY FREQUENT REFERENCES TO THE WEAKNESS OF INONU'S GOVERNMENT AND THE IMPLICATION THAT INONU'S WEAKNESS JUSTIFIED GREEK CONCESSIONS OVER CYPRUS.

2. ☐ DISSEM MINISTER ONLY, CINCPACAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

PRIORITY 6996 Jun 25 9 41 PM '64

EXDIS

REF: EMBTEL 6347

We will recommend President send de Gaulle letter tomorrow reporting on his talks with Inonu and Papandreou. Suggest you request appointment with the General prior to his appointment with Papandreou, which we understand is set for Monday. Advise GOF that purpose of timing of request is to report on Greek and Turkish talks here, and to discuss other matters contemplated in reftel.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
S/S: BHRread/vh 6/25/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Tyler (in substance)

S/S - Mr. Baldwin

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FORM
8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12292, Sec. 3.4
By *Cloudy* NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

Pap. Union
June 25, 1964 *55*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We're still nowhere with the Greeks. Labouisse is trying out on them now the attached fallback (mentioned to you this noon), which in effect puts Acheson under UN mediator's umbrella as a public relations sop. But none of us are optimistic the old man will buy.

Ball agrees /
My own sense is that a firm line--with all the private verbal pyrotechnics you desire--is still the best line. Even if we don't crack the Greeks now, we still have to do so sooner or later if we're to get a solution with which we can live. So it's better to have a short term appearance of failure, than to concede the ballgame and have to put this to the Turks.

Some say Papandreou would like to go home, having faced down the US. I don't agree. Good Greek/US relations are still very meaningful to Greece, especially since they know it is we (not the UN) who have blocked Turk invasion so far.

1. Why not try out your communique idea that we each briefly state our disagreements? I don't think Greeks could take this (in less than ten pages) so we'd end up either with no communique at all or a brief one saying only that we met and talked.

2. You might harp on our inability to comprehend why Greeks won't talk with their allies. How can they defend this? If their case is so strong, what have they to fear?

3. But if Greece wants war, it can have it--and we'll have to make clear how we tried to forestall one.

Rob Komer
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-36
By is, NARA, Date 9-17-04

McP. B

~~SECRET~~

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The Greek and U.S. Governments will ask the Mediator in furtherance of his efforts to call on Dean Acheson to assist him by carrying on private talks on an urgent basis with representatives of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers. If the Turkish PM also agrees to this procedure, the Greek PM will appoint a senior representative to meet with Mr. Acheson and the Turkish representative at Camp David immediately after July 4. The purpose of these talks is to bring about an understanding between the Greek and Turkish Governments in support of the total effort of the Mediator to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

~~SECRET~~

Communiqué

56

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

57
JUNE 25, 1964 S

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF PRIME
MINISTER PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON

During the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister of Greece conversations were held between Mr. George A. Papandreou and the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and other officials of the United States Government.

The conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordiality, have contributed to the strengthening of the close ties between Greece and the United States.

The visit provided the opportunity to the Greek Prime Minister and the President of the United States to review various aspects of the international situation and to discuss subjects of mutual interest.

The President of the United States and the Greek Prime Minister had a sincere and useful exchange of views on the Cyprus situation. Both expressed full support of the efforts undertaken by the Security Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the island and for rapidly finding a permanent solution. The Greek Prime Minister explained in detail the Greek position on the problem. He emphasized that a permanent solution should be based upon the principles of democracy and justice. The two leaders reiterated their determination to make every effort to increase the understanding among Allies.

The Greek Prime Minister expressed the deep appreciation for the generous support of the United States Government and people in the hard struggle of the Greek people for their freedom and welfare.

#

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Pap. 6-25
JUNE 25, 1964 58

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF PRIME
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#

59

Pap J. J. J.

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Greek View of Papandreou on Eve of Visit

On the eve of Premier Papandreou's visit to Washington, pro-Government Greek papers are predicting that no bilateral talks will result between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus issue. The Greek press looks to the UN for a solution.

Opposition papers charge the Papandreou Government with being a captive of its own "demagogic bragging and consequent inconsistencies." No one knows what Papandreou's stand is on Cyprus, one paper claims.

The popularity of the Papandreou Government has fluctuated since the Center Union's November 3, 1963, election victory. Immediately after Papandreou formed his government, an opinion survey in Greater Athens by a commercial organization (made available to USIA) showed widespread approval of the way he was handling government affairs. Papandreou's popularity sank somewhat in December, upon outbreak of the Cyprus conflict, but rose to a peak in March.

It was in March that the Government curbed the Voice of America's broadcasts originating from transmitters in Greece. A planned visit to Greece of the U.S. Sixth Fleet also was discouraged.

Since March, Papandreou's popularity has suffered a decline and the number of Athenians who have no opinion about his policies has been increasing steadily. His lagging popularity may be related to his handling of the Cyprus issue, but is also due in part, no doubt, to his slowness in unveiling his promised legislative program.

Results of consecutive surveys have been as follows:

	<u>Nov. '63</u>	<u>Dec. '63</u>	<u>Mar. '64</u>	<u>Apr. '64</u>	<u>May '64</u>
Approve	76%	72%	82%	70%	67%
Disapprove	7	10	7	13	12
No opinion	17	18	11	17	21

Carl T. Rowan

JUNE 24, 1964

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND
PRIME MINISTER GEORGE PAPANDREOU OF GREECE
UPON THE LATTER'S ARRIVAL ON THE SOUTH LAWN
OF THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Mr. Prime Minister, it is a proud privilege for me to welcome you to the United States this morning, and to express my deep personal appreciation for your coming to our country at this time.

This country and your country are bound together by ties that are both ancient and modern. The founders of these United States drew deeply from the wisdom and the ideals of ancient Greece in formulating the concepts of our own free and democratic society. In this 20th Century, your country and mine have stood stalwartly together to defend those enduring ideals against aggressors, and to advance their fulfillment among our people.

We are friends in freedom; we are allies in NATO for peace; we are co-workers in the common labors of progress and prosperity. These are strong and welcome bonds. We are bound together also, Mr. Prime Minister, by close and lasting ties of kinship. Americans harbor a very warm affection for those of your countrymen and their dependents who have honored us through the years by coming to live in our midst as neighbors, as friends, and as leaders in American life.

In recent months, occasions of grief have brought us close together in moments of national sorrow. Last November Queen Fredericka came to our country as a representative of your country at the time of the tragic death of President Kennedy. Only a short time later, Mrs. Johnson made a sad mission of mourning to attend the funeral of your beloved King Paul, whom we had been privileged to meet so happily on our visit to your land only two years ago.

Today I am confident that your visit and the talks that we shall have together will again affirm the close and cordial relations between Greece and the United States. With diligence and understanding, we shall seek to chart a course that will preserve the union and harmony of free nations, militantly opposed to Communist aggression.

We in America know that the people of Greece yield to no other people in the world in their devotion to freedom and independence, and in their desire to keep the peace won and maintained by such great sacrifice from free men in our times.

Mr. Prime Minister, it is to that cause of peace that our efforts are dedicated today.

MORE

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU: Mr. President, I thank you for your kind welcome. I regard it as a great privilege that upon your friendly invitation I find myself in the Capital of the mighty American democracy, the great friend and ally of Greece, and before this famous mansion which has housed so many illustrious promoters of human achievement, of liberty and justice.

I am happy that I shall be given the opportunity to become personally acquainted with the present great leader of the United States, the champion of peace, as well as with members of his Administration and of the Congress of the United States.

Your concern for the maintenance of peace and freedom is shared by the Greek nation and by myself. Greece has always tried for the promotion of peace. A people that has suffered as much as ours from the violence of war and the reverses of history can only long for peace, but no peace can be durable without justice, and no settlement of problems can be right and just if it is not based on democracy and freedom.

In the past there existed a distinction between the world of ideals and the world of politics, between a policy based on idealism and a policy based upon realism. Nowadays they have merged into one, and the policy is today the more positive the more it is in consonance with ideas. This constitutes the glory of our times, the glory of the free world whom you are called upon by history to lead.

My country does not forget that the United States, through the doctrine which bears the name of one of your great predecessors, President Truman, has been instrumental in the defense of Greece against aggression, as well as in the rehabilitation of the country, exhausted and devastated by cruel years of war. Greece also feels proud to be represented in your great democracy by a number of citizens of Greek descent who constitute a living link between the two nations, and of our national cultural ties to the world of American civilization.

Mr. President, I welcome this opportunity to bring to you and to the people of the United States the cordial salute of the people of Greece.

END

Pop Lissin *6/24* *61*
Ben Seng King
Cy Lower
 June 23, 1964
Cy Marie Johnson
S

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
 THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Subject: Participants in White House
 Meetings of the Visit of
 Prime Minister Papandreou of
 Greece**

The following persons are expected to attend
 the 10:15 a.m. meeting on June 24 at the White House:

U.S.

The President
 Under Secretary Ball
 Ambassador Labouisse

Greek

Prime Minister Papandreou
 Foreign Minister Costopoulos
 Andreas Papandreou
 Ambassador Matsas
 John Sossides (interpreter)

It is anticipated that the same persons will attend
 the 5:00 p.m. meeting on June 25. A confirming memo-
 randum will be forwarded as soon as the actual persons
 are known.

1st Marion Baldwin
for

**Benjamin H. Read
 Executive Secretary**

~~SECRET~~

Pop Wein
June 23, 1964 *62*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since Inonu has bought secret talks (with Acheson helping), we must now use every device to bring Papandreou into line. This will be no mean trick, because he reportedly expects to talk us into buying his views (see attached). State says he has a strong ego, and is the most gifted political speaker in Greece.

Worse yet, he sees that if the US will only keep turning off Turk invasion, Greece will win a cheap victory. So he's not eager for talks with Turkey. He'd rather let the UN keep matters moving his way. He may claim that he doesn't want enosis, merely an independent Cyprus, but he thinks this will inevitably lead to union with Greece.

Our only real hope of getting to him is not to rebut his case (which has much merit), but to force on him that Greece can't get Cyprus free. Our best card is to convince him somehow that Turkey may move (with disastrous consequences) unless he'll compromise, and that the US can't turn the Turks off again.

Papandreou will claim that the Greek Cypriot majority must have the right to determine its own future. This is the democratic way. Without contesting this, our counter is to say that he is ignoring several other key factors:

a. A minority does have a right to resist oppression. The violent way in which the Greek Cypriots have gone about imposing their will is the root cause of the whole crisis.

b. Won't Papandreou admit that the Turks have a case when they claim a compromise settlement sanctified in treaties only four years ago cannot just be tossed out the window? This should be our answer if he brings up the Inonu communique.

c. But we don't want to debate the pros and cons. Instead we're horrified at the way both Athens and Ankara are ignoring their own vital security interests and are on a collision course. Does a Greek Cyprus at the cost of a Greek/Turk clash or at minimum deep hostility look like a very good bargain? Not to us.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-36
By isa, NARA, Date 7-17-04

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- 2 -

d. Turkey has been put in a box from which it sees no way out except to intervene. We're convinced that Inonu may move despite our pleas, or worse yet that he'll lose power to the warhawks. He's not bluffing.

US Position. If we can only move the Greeks by scaring them, the best means of doing so is to say that if the Turks do move, we cannot stop them. We didn't tell Inonu this, but we will not go to war with an ally. You can't risk US lives to protect Makarios from the consequences of his own folly.

You might add that we will stop the Soviets from intervening, however. In effect we'll be forced to hold the ring if the Greeks and Turks go mad. It might even lend credibility to our concern if you warned against any direct attack by Greece or Turkey with US-supplied arms on each other's territory. If hostilities ensue, it is imperative they be confined to Cyprus.

The above are the useful lines of argument. But I am convinced that it will be your own personal impact which will be determining here. This man thinks he's going to snow you, which makes it all the more important you sell him. Attached are Ball's suggested talking points.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ - TUG

June 23, 1964

TALKING POINTS WITH PAPANDREOU

1. He must understand that we averted a Greco-Turkish war only by the most vigorous, last-minute intervention. Inonu is the only Turkish leader who would have responded to our request that military action be withheld and who was able to impose that decision on the military. He has paid heavily for his restraint. We don't believe he could afford to stand down again if pressures for military action mount. If his Government falls, whoever replaces him will be less responsive to U.S. influence.
2. Because of the inflexible positions taken in Athens and Nicosia, the Turks are being forced to look to the only alternative that appears available to them--military action. The Greeks and Cypriots are driving the Turks into a corner.
3. The situation is deteriorating. It looks to us that it will deteriorate further unless a settlement is promptly reached. The Turks agree to talks. If the Greeks refuse, Papandreou will bear the burden of the consequences that may follow. We and our Western Allies cannot risk either a Greek/Turkish war or a Communist Cyprus.
4. If the Turks insist upon intervening, Papandreou should not count on us to fight our allies. While we have not told this to Inonu, the most we could do would be to try arrange with the other guarantor powers that the military consequences be limited as much as possible.
5. Papandreou must realize that the longer a solution is delayed, the greater the possibility that the Turks will impose a de facto partition. Also, the longer the delay, the greater the chance of Communist influence increasing on the island.
6. Only Greece and Turkey can settle this problem. They are the only responsible governments directly involved.
7. We know all the arguments in favor of enosis on the Greek side and all the arguments in favor of double enosis on the Turk side. We know they are deeply felt on each side. The US does not intend to pass a moral judgment.

~~SECRET~~ - TUG

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/s*, NARA, Date 1-16-06

SECRET - TUG

- 2 -

8. Nor does the US intend even to propose a settlement, since any such proposal to us would be attacked as an American attempt to dictate to its Allies.

9. However, Ball outlined in Athens the conditions we feel essential to a settlement:

- a. It must be negotiated between Greece and Turkey;
- b. It must be permanent;
- c. It must leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
- d. It must involve no humiliation to either side;
- e. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side; and
- f. It must be broadly acceptable to the population involved.

10. We urgently ask Papandreou to play the statesman's role and negotiate with the Turks. We propose that talks be undertaken secretly at a neutral spot (perhaps Camp David) with a distinguished American--Dean Acheson--as a catalyst.

11. Any statesman must be prepared to negotiate when the dangers to his own country and the world are so great.

12. If things don't get better fast, they'll get worse fast. Because of our responsibility for Americans in the area, we may have to warn against tourist travel to Greece and Turkey, as we've already had to do in the case of Cyprus.

13. You may have to play this card: You do not want to have to let it be known that Inonu has agreed to negotiate and Papandreou has refused.

SECRET - TUG

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TO DIRNSA (EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BLAKE)

DIA PRODCEN (EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL)

WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM

ZEN/STATE (NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO MR THOMAS L. HUGHES)

ZEN/ARMY STAFF COMM (EXCLUSIVE FOR ACSI, GENERAL DOLEMAN; NAVY DNI,

ADMIRAL TAYLOR; AIR FORCE AFGIN, GENERAL THOMAS)

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~~SECRET~~✓ CIA sending
memo Monday
a.m. B.103

PREVIOUS VISITS TO THE U.S., [REDACTED] HAS INTERVIEWED NUMEROUS PROMINENT U.S. GOVERNMENT FIGURES. HIS REPORTS OF HIS INTERVIEWS, AS LATER PUBLISHED IN GREEK NEWSPAPERS, HAVE BEEN WORDED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DISTORT THE AIMS OF U.S. POLICY AND DAMAGE THE U.S. IMAGE IN THE EYES OF HIS GREEK READERS. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT USG OFFICIALS SHOULD AVOID ANY CONTACT WITH HIM WHICH MIGHT ENHANCE HIS STATURE OR ACCESS OR GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY HIS FAVORITE GAME OF DISRUPTING US-GREEK RELATIONS.

GP-1

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-175
By UUS NARA, Date 09-09-2013

~~SECRET~~ TUG

66

Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey will be in Washington
June 22-23 (Monday and Tuesday). Prime Minister Papandreou
of Greece will be here June 24-25 (Wednesday and Thursday).

Purpose of Visit

You have invited them to Washington in order to persuade
them to get together and settle the Cyprus problem. Our
objective should be to obtain the agreement of each to
designate negotiators to sit down secretly in the presence
of an impartial American at a neutral spot. Dean Acheson
is prepared to undertake this assignment.

Prospects for Success

Inonu is desperate. The Turks see their position
progressively eroding. [He will almost certainly agree to the
plan being proposed.] [Papandreou is a far tougher nut

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Authority NLT001R-127-3-6
By SP, NARA, Date 1/6/12

to crack. The Greeks think they are winning and if they sit tight long enough they will be able to bring about the annexation of Cyprus to Greece or in other words enosis.

It will therefore be necessary to use very hard-boiled tactics with Papandreou, just as you used very tough tactics in your letter ^{to} with Inonu when he was threatening to invade.

Talking Points for Inonu

1. Regret the need for such a stern letter but you were working against a very short fuse. A Turkish invasion of Cyprus would almost certainly have meant a war with Greece and the US cannot let this happen.
2. You appreciate Inonu's difficult political problems in the face of a highly ~~inflamed~~ Turkish public opinion. You

know he has risked political capital in coming to Washington.

3. You understand that the Turks see the solution of the problem in terms of partition - or in other words double enosis with the respective parts of Cyprus joining Greece and Turkey. The Greeks see the solution as enosis.
4. You know all the arguments on each side and you are not prepared to make a moral judgment. However, this is a matter which must be settled, and it can be settled only by some arrangement between Greece and Turkey.
5. You are not prepared to suggest the terms of such an arrangement since any plan proposed by the United States would encounter built-in resistance. George Ball has, however, outlined in Ankara the conditions we feel are essential to a settlement:
 - a. It must be negotiated between, and have approval of,

both Greece and Turkey;

- b. It must be permanent;
- c. It must leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
- d. It must involve no humiliation to either side;
- e. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side;
- f. It must be broadly acceptable to the population involved.

6. You think it imperative that Greece and Turkey begin conversations immediately and in order to assist those conversations, you are prepared to provide an American—

just as an American ~~was provided to~~ assist the Netherlands

and Indonesia in working out the West New Guinea problem.

Dean Acheson is prepared to undertake ~~this~~ ^{this} and you know

he is highly regarded in Turkey.

7. You suggest that talks be held secretly by representatives of Greece and Turkey together with Acheson at some neutral spot. This might be, for example, a Villa on Lake Como or Camp David.

TALKING POINTS WITH PAPANDREOU

1. ^{He}~~You~~ must understand that you only averted a Greco/Turkish war by the most vigorous, last-minute intervention with Inonu. From your talks with Inonu you are convinced that you ~~you~~ probably cannot do this the next time, and The United States has ^{already} paid a substantial cost in US-Turkish relations.
2. Papandreou must understand that the world cannot risk either a Greco/~~Turkish~~ war or a Communist ^{Cyprus}~~soot~~ Cyprus will continue to go Communist and will threaten the peace of the world unless this quarrel is promptly settled.
3. Only Greece and Turkey can settle this problem. They are the only responsible governments directly involved.
4. You know all the arguments in favor of enosis on the Greek side and all the arguments in favor of double enosis on the Turkish side. The United States does not intend to pass a moral judgment.

5. Nor does the United States intend even to propose a settlement since that would create its own built-in resistance. You recall the anti-American riots in Athens when there was even a suggestion that the United States might be favoring a particular solution.
6. You are urgently asking Papandreou to play the statesman's role and undertake to negotiate this matter with the Turks immediately. You propose that these negotiations be undertaken secretly at a neutral spot in the presence of a distinguished American--Dean Acheson.
7. All you are asking is Papandreou's willingness to negotiate-- which is what any statesman must be prepared to do when the dangers to the world are so great.
8. You may have to play this card: You do not want to have to let it be known that Inonu has agreed to negotiate and Papandreou has refused.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (1943) INFO ANKARA 379 LONDON 339 JUNE 19, 7 PM

E X D I S T U G

DEPTELS 1553, 1565

1. IN TALK WITH FONMIN COSTOPOULOS TODAY I COVERED MATTERS REFERRED TO IN REFTELS. I EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING AS WELL AS PORTRAYING VISIT AS ONE WHOSE PURPOSE IS FULL AND FRAND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MEANS OF REACHING SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF GRAVE MUTUAL CONCERN; THAT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT JUST CASE OF PAPANDREOU GOING TO SELL HIS VIEWS. COSTOPOULOS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CFN 1943 379 339 19 7 1553 1565 1.

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 07A ~~SECRET~~

THIS AND WOULD TRY GUIDE THINGS THAT WAY. I ALSO SPOKE TO THE KING ALONG SAME LINES LAST NIGHT, IN HOPE HE MIGHT SEEK INFLUENCE. PAPANDREOU IN MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TODAY. I WILL ALSO HAVE GO AT PAPANDREOU OR HIS SON LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW.

2. CONCERNING PROJECTED PAPANDREOU PRESS CONFERENCE (DEPTEL 1565), COSTOPOULOS SAID THAT THEY WERE PLANNING THIS EITHER FOR WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK AND HE FELT IT COULD BE HANDLED IN WAY TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT. APPARENT PURPOSE IS TO SEEK TO OVERCOME SOME OF UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY GREECE HAS HAD IN STATES. I POINTED TO PITFALLS BUT GREEKS SEEM TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY PAPANDREOU TO HANDLE SITUATION.

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CONTINUE TO TRY TO GUIDE GREEKS ALONG LINES REFTELS, THERE ARE CERTAIN HARD FACTS WHICH LIMIT AREA OF SUCCESS:

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Authority *NTJ 0012-127-3-1*

By *JP*, NARA, Date *1/6/12*

JUN 22 1964

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1943, JUNE 19, 7 PM FROM ATHENS

A) PAPANDREOU, WHO IS MAKING HIS FIRST VISIT TO THE STATES, WANTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OCCASION TO PUBLICIZE GREECE, TOURISTICALLY AND OTHERWISE (AND ALSO, PRESUMABLY, HIMSELF AS LIBERAL LEADER). IT ALSO TRUE THAT GREEKS CONSIDER THEY HAVE HAD UNDESERVEDLY BAD PRESS ON CYPRUS AND THAT THIS IS GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO REORIENT U.S. PUBLIC OPINION.

PAGE THREE RUQMAT 07A ~~SECRET~~

B) REFERRING DEPTTEL 1553, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PAPANDREOU IS CONVINCED HIS PROPOSAL IS THE SOLUTION. HE IS THEREFORE BOUND TO WANT TO RESTATE HIS CASE PERSONALLY. IF NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, IT WILL HAVE A BAD EFFECT. AFTER STATING HIS PROPOSAL TO THE PRESIDENT, HE WILL DOUBTLESS WANT TO KNOW WHETHER THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERS THIS A FEASIBLE APPROACH. IT IS THEN THAT WE CAN BRING TO BEAR SUCH ARGUMENTS AS WE HAVE AGAINST PAPANDREOU'S SOLUTION (IF WE CONSIDER IT IS ALONG WRONG LINES) OR OUR SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING WHAT MORE MUST BE ADDED (IF WE THINK IT ALONG RIGHT LINES).

AGAINST BACKGROUND OF SUSPICIONS OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS THAT U.S. HAS BEEN PLAYING CLOSE TO TURKEY AND THE LINGERING SUSPICION AMONG SOME GREEKS THAT WE STILL FAVOR PRO-TURKISH SOLUTION, MUCH ILL WILL CAN DEVELOP FROM THIS VISIT IF WE GIVE THE GREEKS THE IMPRESSION WE ARE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN THEIR VIEWS OR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE EQUITABLE AND "OBJECTIVE" SOLUTION AND ARE NOT PREPARED TO TALK TO THEM ABOUT IT.

AS WE PREPARE U.S. POSITION INFORTHCOMING TALKS WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACT THAT BECAUSE OF GENERALLY VOLATILE NATURE GREEK PUBLIC OPINION WHICH IS IRRATIONALLY SENSITIVE ON CYPRUS ISSUE,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1943, JUNE 19, 7 PM FROM ATHENS

PAGE FOUR RUQMAT07A ~~SECRET~~

GOG IS VULNERABLE NOT ONLY TO ATTACKS FROM THE RIGHT BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY FROM THE LEFT WHICH IS SKILLFULLY PLAYING STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC GAME. EXCESSIVE PRESSURE, THEREFORE, ON ASPECT SUCH AS TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS RUNS RISK OF PRESENTING AN ISSUE WELL-TAILORED TO LEFTIST EXPLOITATION AND CONSEQUENTLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO U.S. AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN GREECE ITSELF.

GP-3. LABOUISSÉ
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:20 PM 6/19/64

~~SECRET~~

Pap Tison
68

JUN 19 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CLIFTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Request for Additional Aircraft to be used for the
Visit to the United States of the Prime Minister
of Greece

His Excellency George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, will begin a visit to the United States on June 23, 1964, at the invitation of the President of the United States. The Prime Minister and his party will arrive in the United States at Langley Air Force Base, near Williamsburg, Virginia, on June 23 aboard a Special Air Mission aircraft (VC-137). On June 24 they will come to Washington, departing June 26 for New York City. The time of departure from the United States has not yet been determined.

In consultation with the Embassy of Greece, the Office of the Chief of Protocol has developed a tentative program for Prime Minister Papandreou's visit, a copy of which is attached. To implement this program, it is requested that aircraft be made available to the Department throughout the visit.

It is requested, therefore, that in addition to the VC-137 aircraft which is being provided to bring the Prime Minister to the United States, the following aircraft be provided to the Department of State on a non-reimbursable basis for travel as indicated in the attached itinerary.

1. Two helicopters from Williamsburg, Virginia, to Washington, D.C.
2. Cargo aircraft from Williamsburg, Virginia (Langley Air Force Base) to Washington, D. C.
3. Two helicopters from the Ellipse to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
4. USAF aircraft (VC-118) from Andrews Air Force Base to New York City.

Dwight J. Porter
Assistant Secretary for Administration

Enclosures:

1. Tentative program.
2. Itinerary.

ITINERARY FOR THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF
HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE PAPANDREOU, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

June 23 - 26, 1964

Transportation
Requested

June 24	9:05 a.m. EDT	<u>Depart Williamsburg, Virginia.</u> (Williamsburg Golf Course) (Langley Air Force Base)	Two helicopters Cargo aircraft
	10:00 a.m.	Arrive Washington, D. C. (Ellipse) (Andrews Air Force Base)	
June 26	9:45 a.m. EDT	<u>Depart Washington, D. C.</u> (Ellipse)	Two helicopters
	9:55 a.m.	Arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.	
June 26	10:05 a.m. EDT	<u>Depart Andrews Air Force Base,</u> <u>Maryland.</u>	USAF aircraft
June 26	11:20 a.m. EDT	Arrive New York, New York (Marine Air Terminal, LaGuardia Airport)	<u>END OF MISSION</u>

~~1. Mr. Komer~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

69

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

69a

W 14

32

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED:

Control:
Rec'd:

17368

6-18-64, 1:20PM
MV

JUNE 18, 1964
9:49 AM

FROM: ATHENS - CORRECTED PAGE 1 & 2

ACTION: SECSTATE 1929, IMMEDIATE

INFO: ANKARA 377, PRIORITY
LONDON-337, PRIORITY

DATE: JUNE 18, 2 PM

EXDIS - TUG

DEPTTEL 1531

FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED AS SUPPLEMENTAL TO MY EARLIER MESSAGES AND IN RESPONSE OF REQUEST FOR SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE TALKING POINTS DURING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH INONU AND PAPANDREOU.

KEY QUESTION WHICH ARISES IN PROBING "FLEXIBILITY" OF GREEKS IS NATURE OF CONCESSIONS GOG MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE TO ACHIEVE NATO-FICATION BY MEANS OF SELF-DETERMINATION RESULTING IN ENOSIS.

IT IS OUR ESTIMATE, AS STATED REPEATEDLY BEFORE, THAT TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF THE GREEKS OF ANY SUBSTANCE, SUCH AS SAMOS, CHIOS OR LESVOS ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION. IN THE GREEK VIEW THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE PAYMENT OF GREEK TERRITORY TO TURKS AS COMPENSATION ALLEGED TURKISH RIGHTS IN CYPRUS WHICH GREEKS MAINTAIN ARE TOTALLY DEVOID OF FOUNDATION. OPPOSITION, BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT, STAND AS ONE WITH GOVERNMENT ON THIS SCORE. EVEN THE MENTION OF KASTELORIZON WHICH WAS FLOATED A FORTNIGHT AGO RAISES GREAT GREEK HACKLES.

AS OUTLINED IN PAPANDREOU'S VARIOUS STATEMENTS AND THE AIDE MEMOIRE HE IS PREPARED TO (1) ACCEPT THAT THE RIGHTS OF

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority NLT001R-120-7(*50)
By SP, NARA, Date 11/9/02

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1929, JUNE 18, 2 PM, FROM ATHENS

TURK CYPRIOTS BE PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES (AND PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS, ETC.); (2) HELP WITH COMPENSATION FOR TURK CYPRIOTS WISHING TO LEAVE THE ISLAND. HE ALSO HOPES THAT POSSIBLE ECONOMIC AID TO TURKEY WILL ALSO SUGARCOAT THE PILL. HIS MAJOR EMPHASIS, HOWEVER, IS ON "NATO-FICATION", WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATO BASE ON THE ISLAND. THIS COULD SERVE AS AN UMBRELLA FOR TURKISH FORCES REMAINING AS PART OF NATO CONTINGENT, AND, HE ARGUES, SHOULD MEET BOTH THE TURKISH SECURITY PROBLEM AS WELL AS SAVE FACE IN THAT THE TURKISH TROOPS WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE THE ISLAND. PAPANDREOU APPEARS READY TO "SACRIFICE" MAKARIOS IF THIS WOULD HELP THE TURKISH DOMESTIC PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT REPEAT NOT SPECIFICALLY SO STATED, WE BELIEVE HE IS ALSO RECONCILED TO THE FACT THAT THE GREEK PASSPORT HOLDERS IN ISTANBUL MIGHT BE FORCED OUT AS QUID PRO QUO FOR THE ACCEPTANCE BY TURKEY OF THOSE TURK CYPRIOTS WHO WANTED TO MOVE. THERE IS ALSO POSSIBILITY GREEKS WOULD CONSIDER TRANSFER OF PATRIARCHATE OUT OF ISTANBUL.

BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY GREEK GOVERNMENT COULD COUNTENANCE GIVING UP GREEK TERRITORY FOR THE SAKE OF ACHIEVING SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE. THUS, IF TERRITORIAL INDEMNIFICATION WOULD BE ONE OF THE TURKISH STIPULATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, WE MAY BE FORCED TO RETREAT TO ANOTHER SOLUTION NOT INVOLVING SELF-DETERMINATION AND ENOSIS, BUT SIMPLY AN EFFORT TO REVISE THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS TO ATTEMPT TO MAKE THEM WORK. THIS, HOWEVER, COULD LEAD TO A STRICTLY INDEPENDENT AND PRESUMABLY NON-ALIGNED CYPRUS WITH ALL THE DANGERS TO BOTH TURKEY. NATO AND THE WEST WHICH THIS SOLUTION IMPLIES.

IN SUM, IF WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT KEEPING CYPRUS CLOSELY ALIGNED TO THE WEST BY MEANS OF GREECE AND NATO IS IMPORTANT TO THE U.S., WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE PRICE ASKED OF THE GREEKS BE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS AND THAT WE NOT COUNT ON TERRITORIAL CESSIONS BY GREECE AS ONE OF THE FACTORS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1929, JUNE 18, 2 PM, FROM ATHENS

IN ANY FORMULA.

ANKARA MAY WISH COMMENT ON VALUE TO TURKS OF AFOREMENTIONED
NON-TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS.

LABOUISSÉ

BAP

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 10:05 AM JUNE 18TH

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

*AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~