

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

June 18, 1964

Here are the key papers probably up for discussion at Ball's meeting 11:30 Friday.

Their aim is admirable. What we're after is clearly stated. The logic is impeccable. All that's missing is how to convince our two reluctant dragons to play.

If LBJ's gambit is to work, he's got to have more ammunition. This should be our main project Friday.

A. For the Turks:

1. Security arguments. We cannot permit larger security interests of Turkey or Greece be compromised over Cyprus. This crisis made to order for USSR. US didn't arm Greece and Turkey so they could fight each other. Mutterings of Greek and Turkish military are irresponsible.

2. Turks must face facts of life. 110,000 Turks cannot dictate form of government for 480,000 Greeks any more than Turks would let minorities in Turkey have separate states within a state.

3. As practical matter, chief Turk-Greek-US/UK common interest is to keep Cyprus from going neutralist and then Communist. Once we all agree on this we can reach a solution. Zurich Agreements were flawed in arriving at independence as a compromise.

4. We annoyed that Turks question fidelity of US to Turk alliance because US won't come down on Turk side against Greece. We can't simply dictate solutions as between two friends. Foolish to expect this.

5. We can prevent Turkey from being humiliated but we cannot force a pro-Turk solution on Greek majority. UN won't let us, and we will just force Greek Cypriots into Communist arms.

6. If Turkey intervenes in Cyprus it will force US to re-examine our policy toward Turkey.

7. In fact we resent increasing anti-US sentiment in Turkey. Even if irrational, it's against Turkey's own interests.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 2018-127-3-8
By: 91, NARA, Date: 1/6/12

70

*Ball has redone.
did get new drafts.*

B. For Papandreou. He'll be the hardest not to crack, as Athens 1923 shows. But the only persuader State proposes is the mention of double enosis. We might also consider following:

1. Our disappointment that Turk restraint not matched by Greek realization that Makarios dragging Greece into terrible danger, and jeopardizing Greek security.

2. Merits of Greek Cypriot vs. Turk Cypriot case not the only issue at stake. The security of Greece is too. Will Makarios help defend Thrace against Bulgars to extent Turks will?

3. US has had to shoulder whole burden of restraining Turks. It has had no help whatsoever from Greeks.

4. US cannot undertake to restrain Turks further unless Greeks will talk.

5. If a military regime or even VP came to power in Turkey, Turk-Greek alliance will be dead.

6. Is GOG willing to sacrifice Makarios? If so, why doesn't it tell Turks?

- - - - -

C. There are a number of subsidiary issues that also need to be raised tomorrow.

1. Assuming we get talks, how do we keep them secret?

2. How do we keep Makarios from going his merry way while talks in progress?

3. How do we short-circuit Papandreou and Inonu from making long set speeches (To Athens 1553 is not enough)?

4. How do we keep in phase with UN? Will SYG play ball?

RWK
RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 10.27.03

70a

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~ - TUG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cyprus--Your Discussions with the Prime Ministers
of Turkey and Greece, June 22-25

Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey will be in Washington June 22 and 23.
Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece will be here June 24 and 25.
Both are coming at your invitation.

This Cyprus Book is for your use in carrying forward our plan to facilitate a Cyprus settlement. The two separate "bilateral" books are designed for the conversations at the White House luncheon and for the Secretary's and Under Secretary's talks in the Department and on the Sequoia.

I. Reasons for Visits

A. Both visits are essential steps in our plan to move the Cyprus problem toward solution. The elements of the plan have not been definitely and specifically agreed to by the British who state, however, that they are happy for us to proceed with it and will come in with their support at appropriate moments.

B. The visits give you the opportunity to seize the initiative at the outset to shake both leaders off their fixed positions and move them toward negotiations.

C. The visits fit in with our plan by providing opportunities for Inonu and Papandreou to ascribe their hoped-for future greater flexibility to United States' urging and advice.

D. Both visitors:

1. Are proud and sensitive elder statesmen;
2. Place tremendous store on these visits;

3. Want

JUN 18 1964

~~SECRET~~

3. Want desperately to take home a victory or concrete evidence of progress;

4. Want us to force a settlement on them that they can live with politically.

II. Our objectives

A. To obtain agreement that Greece and Turkey must negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The alternatives are unacceptable:

1. A Greco-Turkish war; or
2. A Communist Cyprus.

B. To obtain agreement, a solution must meet the following basic specifications:

1. It must come about with the full approval of both Greece and Turkey;
2. It must be permanent;
3. It must leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
4. It must involve no humiliation to either side;
5. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side;
6. It must be broadly acceptable to the population involved.

C. To obtain agreement that their Washington visits will be followed up by highly secret meetings between representatives of both governments at a neutral spot under the aegis of an American. These sessions would serve the purpose of narrowing the range of solutions

acceptable

acceptable to either side and would pressure accommodation by forcing each side to test its preference (enosis for Greece or double enosis for Turkey) in the crucible of the above six specifications.

III. Talking Points

Separate talking points for each visitor are enclosed.

Dea Pub.

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points--for Turkish Prime Minister
2. Talking Points--for Greek Prime Minister

NEA:GTI:GDKing/KWBracken:jaw
6/17/64

~~SECRET~~

708

TALKING POINTS

Subject: Visit of Turkish Prime Minister: Ismet Inonu

A. The Prime Minister

1. He is the Grand Old Man of ... proud, courageous, calm, stubborn, a tough negotiator, the hero of the ... in 1923 which gave back to the Turks some concessions the Greeks thought they had won.

2. He leads a minority government which stays in power among other reasons, there is a general reluctance to change ... in the mid-stream of the Cyprus crisis and he has the confidence of senior military leaders.

3. He is a moderate on the Cyprus issue when compared to other government and political leaders and to the military and public.

B. His State of Mind

1. He is deeply perplexed and worried over our attitude toward Turkey's intervention threat and what he considers our failure generally to give the Turkish position forthright support in the Cyprus issue.

2. He is under increasingly serious pressure from Kamikaze-minded military types who would invade Cyprus regardless of the consequences.

3. He is concerned that your letter of June 5 raised questions about Turkey's motives in wanting to take direct military action in Cyprus.

4. He feels deeply that he must return to Ankara with adequate proof that Turkey's aims on Cyprus have been advanced by his trip.

5. He is

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chen/ly*, NARA, Date 1-16-06.

JUN 18 1964

5. He is beset by public opinion problems. The press and opposition parties are having a field day in irresponsible criticism of his motives and willingness to negotiate a solution of the Cyprus problem.

6. He is somewhat disheartened by an increasing awareness among many urban sectors that sustained economic growth is fifteen rather than seven or ten years ahead for Turkey.

C. The Prime Minister will

1. Try to discover how far the United States will go in pushing the Greeks toward double enosis.

2. Defend Turkey's right of military intervention on Cyprus under present circumstances.

3. Argue strongly that Turkish military intervention is necessary to neutralize Makarios and clear the way for meaningful negotiations toward a settlement;

4. Imply that his ability to continue to defend Turkey's close alliance with the United States depends on the reaction of the Turkish public to our attitude and what we can produce on the Cyprus problem;

5. Try to obtain results from the visit which will improve Turkey's bargaining posture vis-à-vis Greece by furthering the idea that a special understanding exists between Turkey and the United States (which, by implication, does not exist between the United States and Greece);

6. Underscore Turkey's determination not to be humiliated in any Cyprus settlement;

7. Emphasize that all levels of the Turkish Government, military and nation are united on the Cyprus issue.

D. You

D. You should

1. Assure the Prime Minister of our intention to play an active role in bringing about a solution;

2. Emphasize our refusal to define that solution;

3. Persuade him a solution cannot be imposed by force against the will of a determined majority of the population.

4. Bear down on the urgency of reaching a solution at an early date to eliminate continuing danger of Greek-Turkish war or continuing growth of Greek-Cypriot ties with Russia. Stress that time is not working on our side.

5. Make plain that we do not consider the problem can be solved on purely legalistic basis. Turkey itself now admits that there can be no return to the form of government set up under the London-Zurich agreements and instead calls for double enosis or federation. London-Zurich agreements themselves were the product of long, hard negotiations based on political and security interests of the parties. The present crisis can only be solved by similar hard and realistic bargaining between the principal parties: Greece and Turkey.

6. Urge his acceptance of our basic specifications for a solution:

a. It must be negotiated between, and have approval of, both Greece and Turkey;

b. It must be permanent;

c. It must leave Cyprus in responsible hands;

d. It must involve no humiliation to either side;

e. It cannot

- e. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side;
 - f. It must be broadly acceptable to the population involved.
7. Urge his agreement to highly secret meetings between representatives of Greece and Turkey at a neutral spot, under the aegis of an American.

NEA:GTI:GDKing/KWBracken:jaw
6/17/64

Discussion with Prime Minister Papandreou

Talking Points

I. The Prime Minister

A. Is an excellent political tactician, quick-witted, intelligent, and Greece's finest orator today. He has a good sense of humor.

B. Leads a majority government of the center which he has brought into power against heavy odds--highly favorable economic progress under Karamanlis and fractionalism among groups he united in the Center Union.

C. He contributed to long-range Greek political development, because resurgence of the center movement has reduced the dangers of polarization--no choice except extreme right or extreme left--that threatened Greek political life from 1958-1961 and that became more of a problem as Karamanlis extended the period of his one-man rule beyond 1962.

II. His State of Mind

A. He is grateful for your intercession with Turkey at the June 5 intervention threat.

B. However, he is increasingly worried over:

1. The real prospects of a Greek-Turkish war;
2. The extension of Communist influence in Cyprus;
3. His inability to control Makarios.

C. He is caught in the maelstrom of feeling on the one hand that time is on the side of the Greeks and, on the other, that a solution is urgent to prevent Makarios' slippage into Soviet arms.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Cherry* NARA, Date 1-16-06

JUN 18 1964

D. He is reluctant therefore to engage in meaningful negotiations and continues to hope that Makarios will win without any real cost to Greece.

E. Nevertheless, he recognizes the very real need for a settlement and probably hopes that we will push him toward one that he can live with politically by pointing to outside pressures (a traditional Greek ploy in such circumstances).

III. The Prime Minister will.

A. Restate Greek support for self-determination in Cyprus.

B. State that Greece sees self-determination for Cyprus as leading directly to enosis.

C. Insist that enosis is the best possible solution for all concerned, including the United States.

D. Argue that the crisis and tension concerning Cyprus spring only from Turkey's threats to intervene.

E. Emphasize that Greece will go to war with Turkey if Turkey intervenes militarily on Cyprus, in a situation where the Greek contingent would, for honor's sake, have to become involved.

F. Claim that Makarios' willingness to accept communist support stems from the Turkish threat of military intervention.

G. Attack recent Turkish actions against Greece.

H. Maintain that Greece could never consider any settlement of the Cyprus dispute which involved a cession of Greek territory.

IV. You

IV. You should seize the initiative and point out early in the discussion that you have been well and fully briefed on his views through Mr. Ball, Ambassador Labouisse and Ambassador Matsas, and then

A. Emphasize that the Turks meant their intervention moves of June 6 and that it took our biggest diplomatic guns to stop them. We do not think we can do it again.

B. Stress that a Greek-Turkish war or a communist-dominated Cyprus are unthinkable and unacceptable.

C. Insist that Greece and Turkey have no alternative but to negotiate the Cyprus problem. Neither side has all the right on its side.

D. Tell the Prime Minister that no solution is possible unless certain basic specifications are accepted:

1. The solution must have the approval of both Greece and Turkey;
2. It must be permanent;
3. It must leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
4. It must involve no humiliation to either side;
5. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side;
6. It must be broadly acceptable to the population involved.

E. Concur in his view that a unitary state on Cyprus does not protect Greek, Turkish or Western interests and that a solution based on federation is obviously unacceptable to Makarios.

F. Note

F. Note that this leaves Greece's solution of enosis and Turkey's choice of double enosis as the only feasible alternatives we can see.

G. Stress that Greece and Turkey must agree to bargain realistically by considering the feasibility and desirability of both solutions. Greece must listen to the Turkish expressions of the validity and viability of double enosis and test them according to the basic specifications for a permanent solution, along with the statement of the Greek case of the advantages of enosis. Only in this way can we create a malleable situation from one that is now dangerously brittle.

H. Emphasize that we expect the Greek Government to engage its prestige in bringing about a solution based on either enosis or double enosis, including the exercise of all necessary leverage on Makarios.

I. Point out that Greece cannot expect to win its preferred solution without paying for it something of value.

J. Urge the Prime Minister's agreement to highly secret Ambassador-level meetings at a neutral spot under the aegis of an American.

K. Report on your impressions of Inonu's willingness to undertake the same plan.

Ed King
NEA:GTI:KWBracken:jaw
6/17/64

~~SECRET~~ - TUG

70-d

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN JOHNSON-INONU CORRESPONDENCE

(For contingency use should the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister Erkin attempt to sidetrack the conversation into a legalistic rebuttal of your June 5 letter)

The exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister reflected differences of viewpoints on a number of specific issues related to Turkey's use of its right of military intervention at this time. The invitation to Inonu was contained in the letter as a means of full and frank consultations regarding the apparent divergences of views. Since the invitation, however, the United States has undertaken a more active role in promoting a solution of the Cyprus problem. It would appear more desirable at this time, therefore, that both sides having made their points we should let these matters rest and concentrate on current moves. In the event the Turks return to these issues, however, the following comments may be made. (The Foreign Minister is more likely to belabor the points than the Prime Minister.)

I. Treaty of Guarantee

The President's letter resulted from information that Turkey was "contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus." We recognized that Turkey considered it had a special legal position vis-à-vis Cyprus under the Treaty but nevertheless considered two problems to be involved:

A. Timing

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chen/ly* NARA, Date 1-16-06

JUN 18 1964

A. Timing

While the United States recognized in December that the pressure of events might lead one or more of the guarantor powers to intervene in Cyprus, by June the actions of the guarantor powers through the UN and otherwise raised a serious question whether "common or concerted action" had yet proven impossible so as to justify unilateral action.

B. Purpose

Information that the Turkish Cypriots intended to extend control over an additional area and declare a Turk-Cypriot state which Turkey would then occupy did not appear to be an action which could be justified under Article IV of the Treaty.

Without questioning the validity of the treaty, we were concerned that Turkey would act prematurely without full regard for the consequences which might be visited on its NATO allies, or in such a way that Turkey would be charged with aggression in spite of the treaty.

C. Consultation

The President's letter was transmitted after he was informed that Turkey had "postponed its decision for a few hours" to obtain his views. He accordingly noted that he did not consider this consistent with the Turkish commitment to consult fully as discussed by Mr. Ball and Ambassador Hare. We recognize that useful consultation has taken place since the beginning of the crises; our point is that neither these talks nor "information" received only a few hours in advance about such an intervention constitute "full consultation" about a move which would have plunged NATO and the United States into a crisis of the first magnitude.

II. United

II. United Nations Reaction

The President's letter did not question Turkey's commitment to the UN and its adherence to the Charter. Rather he expressed his appraisal of how a new action by Turkey, namely, unilateral intervention, would be construed by the UN. As Mr. Ball had previously made clear, our ability to assist in the UN has always been circumscribed by any Turkish action which would produce an adverse UN atmosphere.

III. NATO

There appears to be no purpose in attempting to refine in the present context the nature of the commitment of member states under Article 5 of NATO: to come to the assistance of a member suffering armed attack. The President's letter simply reiterated Mr. Ball's earlier cautions. In his February visit, ksubsequently reaffirmed by Ambassador Hare, he pointed out that actions by either Greece or Turkey which led them into hostilities with each other would greatly impair the ability of NATO to respond to any Soviet attack. The June 5 letter defined this further by cautioning that Turkey's "NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Papandreou
visit*

33

~~SECRET~~

71

Action

NEA

Info

SS
G
H
IO
PR
AIDA
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
O
SY
A
OPR
RMR

NNNNEIC579RA345AT855ATA458
*****ZZ RUEHCR R
DE RUQMAT 04A 17/1522Z
Z 171520Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~

085

016389
1964 JUN 17 PM 12 07

ACTION FLASH DEPT 1921 INFO FLASH ANKARA 374 JUNE 17 5 PM

REF: DEPTTEL 1540; ANKARA'S 1634

I HAVE JUST SEEN PAPANDEOU AND HE ACCEPTS WITH GREAT APPRECIATION OFFER OF PRESIDENTIAL PLANE. HE ALSO CONCURS TENTATIVE SCHEDULE TO EXTENT SET FORTH IN DEPTTEL 1540.

PAPANDEOU PLANNING BRING HIS SON ANDREAS AND ALSO FORIEGN MINISTER, TOGETHER WITH OTHERS. ANDREAS AND OTHERS WILL WANT HAVE SOME INFORMAL TALKS AID AND IBRD. WE SHALL ADVISE NAMES OF PARTY AS SOON AS KNOWN.

MEANWHILE WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE HOW MANY PASSENGERS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED ON PLANE AND ALSO ETD ATHENS ON TUESDAY, JUNE 23. ALSO FULL SCHEDULE AS SOON AS KNOWN.

LABOUJISSE

BT
CFN 1921 374 17 5 1540 1634 1540 23

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/17/64, 12:08 PM.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN 6/17/64, 12:18 PM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Ch...* NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

25X1A

COUNTRY CYPRUS/GREECE

~~BUNDY SMITH~~

~~ALEXANDER~~

~~BATOR~~

~~SUBBELK~~

~~BRUCECK~~

~~CHASE~~

~~FORRESTAL~~

~~JESSUP~~

~~JOHNSON~~

~~KEENY~~

~~KLEIN~~

~~KOMER~~

~~MOODY~~

DISTR. 17 JUNE 1964

25X1A

DATE OF INFO.

[REDACTED]

REACTION OF MAKARIOS TO PAPANDEOU'S AIDE MEMOIRE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

25X1A

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

[REDACTED]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

[REDACTED]

25X1X

25X1A

IN 08523

REF

1. AMBASSADOR ANDREAS PAPAS, SPECIAL EMISSARY TO ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS FROM GREEK PREMIER GEORGE PAPANDEOU, SHOWED MAKARIOS THE TEXT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE PAPANDEOU HAD SENT U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN ADVANCE OF PAPANDEOU'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON SCHEDULED FOR 24 JUNE 1964. THE AIDE MEMOIRE REPORTEDLY STATES THAT THE CHOICE IN CYPRUS IS NATO-IFICATION OR A MEDITERRANEAN CUBA. PAPANDEOU CLAIMS ENOSIS IS THUS THE INDICATED SOLUTION, WITHOUT TERRITORIAL EXCHANGES FROM GREECE. IF THIS NOT REALIZABLE, THEN CYPRUS SHOULD BE GIVEN TRUE INDEPENDENCE PLUS MINORITY SAFEGUARDS AND SHOULD

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO
 DD/1 AD/CI 2 CINCMEAFSA

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (OCT) (ATTN: SECRETARY AND HUGHES)

JUN 18 1964

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-175; NLJ-001-127-3-6-4

By LLD

NARA, Date 07-09-2013

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IN 08523

PAGE 2

AGREE TO FOLLOW A PRO-WESTERN POLICY.

2. MAKARIOS EMPHASIZED TO PAPAS THAT ENOSIS WAS NOT REALIZABLE FOR THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIONS BUT THAT IF TRUE INDEPENDENCE WERE REALIZED, AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WAS NOT RULED OUT, THEN ENOSIS WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. MAKARIOS THEN WARNED PAPAS THAT IN SO CLEARLY SPELLING OUT HIS VIEWS FOR JOHNSON PAPANDREOU WAS NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT JOHNSON, DESPITE THE GOOD WILL HE MIGHT HAVE, MIGHT WELL NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THEM. IN THAT CASE PAPANDREOU WAS EXPOSING THE GREEK SIDE TO THE PRESSURE OF CONCESSIONS AWAY FROM HIS STATED POSITION. THESE CONCESSIONS, MAKARIOS SAID, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AT LEAST WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT. ACCORDINGLY, MAKARIOS CONCLUDED, WHILE PAPANDREOU'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WAS NOT ITSELF BAD IT WAS DANGEROUS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WHAT MIGHT RESULT FROM THE PRESSURE PUT ON HIM BY THE AMERICANS FOR AGREEMENT.

25X1A 3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, CINCPACSA.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 2096
5-63

MFG. 6-63

(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SMITH~~
~~ALEXANDER~~
~~ATOR~~

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

~~BRUNCK~~
~~CHASE~~

FILE COPY

COUNTRY GREECE / CYPRUS / TURKEY

Handwritten notes and initials

~~FOR~~

~~JESS~~

~~JOHNSON~~

~~KEENE~~

~~KLEIN~~

~~KOMER~~

~~PAPANDREOU'S~~

~~REEDY~~

~~SAUNDERS~~

~~SAVBE~~

~~SMITH~~ REF W.M. Y.

17 JUNE 1964

SUBJECT

PAPANDREOU'S AND SOSSIDIS' COMMENTS ON PAPANDREOU'S AND INONU'S VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

1. COMMENTING [Redacted] ON HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND THE VISIT OF TURKISH PRIME MINISTER ISMET INONU, GREEK PRIME MINISTER GEORGIOS PAPANDREOU MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER IS A "GOOD MAN" WHO, DESPITE GREAT DOMESTIC PRESSURES, HELD HIS GROUND AND REFUSED TO AUTHORIZE TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS 5 AND 6 JUNE 1964. THUS, INONU ON HIS WASHINGTON TRIP WILL BE SEEKING COMPENSATION FOR HAVING NOT INTERVENED; HE WILL BE IN A STRONG POSITION.

B. CONCERNING HIS OWN VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HOWEVER, PAPANDREOU INDICATED THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD NO WORRIES OVER THE OUTCOME.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO DD/1 AD/CI 2

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (OCT) (ATTN: SECRETARY AND HUGHES)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-175
By LCB NARA, Date 07-09-2013

~~SECRET~~
(d In)~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

IN

PAGE 2

PAPANDREOU HAS GREAT FAITH IN THE POWER OF WORDS, AS WELL AS IN HIS ABILITY TO USE THEM. FURTHER, PAPANDREOU FEELS THE GREEK CASE ON CYPRUS IS A STRONG ONE. THESE FACTORS TAKEN TOGETHER HAVE LED PAPANDREOU TO THE CONCLUSION THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO CONVINCED PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON THAT THE GREEK POSITION IS JUST AND CORRECT.

2. IN CONTRAST TO PAPANDREOU'S OPTIMISM ARE THE VIEWS OF HIS CONFIDANT AND DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, IOANNIS SOSSIDIS. ALTHOUGH NOT OPPOSING THE VISIT, SOSSIDIS IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME. SOSSIDIS BELIEVES THAT PAPANDREOU'S POSITION AS OUTLINED ABOVE DISREGARDS MANY POWER FACTORS AT WORK WHICH HAVE NO RELATION TO THE CORRECTNESS OR JUSTNESS OF THE GREEK POSITION.

3. PAPANDREOU WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY BE ACCOMPANIED BY GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER STAVROS KOSTOPOULOS WHEN HE TRAVELS TO WASHINGTON. THE REST OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY HAS NOT BEEN SELECTED; HOWEVER, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT PAPANDREOU'S SON, DEPUTY MINISTER OF COORDINATION ANDREAS PAPANDREOU, WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUP.

(END OF MESSAGE)

~~SECRET~~CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~FORM
5-63

2096

MFG. 6-63

(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

10882

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pap. visit

74

30

Origin ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS Immediate 1545

NEA
Info:

JUN 17 3 54 PM '64

SS
G
PR
P
USIA
NSC
INR
SY
A
OPR

Following is suggested program for Papandreou visit. Washington portion without reference to plane or arrival via Williamsburg discussed by Ambassador Duke with Ambassa-Matsas today. However, it should not be discussed further with Greeks until Ankara reports Inonu's acceptance of plane arrangements suggested previous telegram.

Tuesday June 23 5 p.m. EDT Papandreou and party arrive Langley AFB

5:40 p.m. arrival Williamsburg

p.m. Private evening

June 24 9:05 a.m. EDT Departure from Williamsburg by helicopter (55 minutes flying time)

10:00 a.m. EDT Papandreou and party arrive at White House where greeted by President, Secretary of State, Under Secretary, representative from JCS, Dean of diplomatic corps and other officials. Full military honors will be rendered.

10:15 a.m. Prime Minister will meet with President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4
By *Chr/ty* NARA, Date *1-16-00*

Drafted by: NEA:GTI:KJBracken/lb 6-15-64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

U/PR - Mr. King (*Suts*)
S/S - Mr. McKesson

XXXXX White House - Mr. Komer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "OFFICIAL USE ONLY" OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Johnson at White House. Upon conclusion meeting Chief Protocol will accompany Prime Minister to Blair House where party will reside during visit.

12:30 p.m. Under Secretary Ball will give luncheon ~~minut~~ aboard USS SEQUOIA.

~~Evening~~ Evening to be scheduled by Greek Embassy. Ambassador has indicated he proposes reception in honor of President at Blair House.

Thursday June 25 9:30 a.m. Prime Minister will meet with Secretary of State at Department of State.

10:40 a.m. Prime Minister will place wreath at tomb of Unknown Soldier and wreath on grave of late President John F. Kennedy.

12:30 p.m. President Johnson will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister at White House.

3:00 p.m. Prime Minister will return to Blair House.

5:00 p.m. Prime Minister will meet with President Johnson at White House (joint communique will be released).

6:30 p.m. Prime Minister and party will arrive at Ellipse. Under Secretary will head Farewell Committee. There will be exchange of remarks (no military honors).

6:40 p.m. departure from Ellipse by helicopter for Andrews AFB. 7:00 p.m. EDT Departure from Andrews aboard USAF special flight, destination to be determined.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. Presidential luncheon second days necessitated by presence PM Menzies in Washington and luncheon planned well before invitation to Papandreu. Point has been discussed with Ambassador Matsas who indicated he understood situation.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

When we get ^{74a}
final OK on
Greek schedule,
(Bunch-Read memo),
this can go out
automatically.

PWT

|

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3234

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT


1. Kama
2. M. 746

June 16, 1964

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

copy of cable to Amembassy
ATHENS

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 10-18-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74c

Amembassy ATHENS Immediate

Following is suggested program for Papandreou visit. Washington portion without reference to plane or arrival via Williamsburg discussed by Ambassador Duke with Ambassador Matsas today. However, it should not be discussed further with Greeks until Ankara reports Inonu's acceptance of plans arrangements suggested previous telegram.

Tuesday June 23 5 p.m. EDT Papandreou and party arrive Langley AFB

5:40 p.m. arrival Williamsburg

p.m. Private evening

June 24 9:05 a.m. EDT Departure from Williamsburg by helicopter (55 minutes flying time)

10:00 a.m. EDT Papandreou and party arrive at White House where greeted by President, Secretary of State, Under Secretary, representative from JCS, Dean of diplomatic corps and other officials. Full military honors will be rendered.

10:15 a.m. Prime Minister will meet with President

NEA:GTI:KWBracken/lb 6-15-64

NEA - John D. Jernegan

U/PR - Mr. King (Suts)

S/S White House

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA 11/16/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

2

Athens

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Johnson at White House. Upon conclusion meeting Chief Protocol will accompany Prime Minister to Blair House where party will reside during visit.

12:30 p.m. Under Secretary Ball will give/luncheon ~~board~~ aboard USS SEQUOIA.

~~Evening~~ Evening to be scheduled by Greek Embassy. Ambassador has indicated he proposes reception in honor of President at Blair House.

Thursday June 25 9:30 a.m. Prime Minister will meet with Secretary of State at Department of State.

10:40 a.m. Prime Minister will place wreath at tomb of Unknown Soldier and wreath on grave of late President John F. Kennedy.

1:30 p.m. President Johnson will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister at White House.

3:00 p.m. Prime Minister will return to Blair House.

4:30 p.m. Prime Minister will meet with President Johnson at White House (joint communique will be released).

6:30 p.m. Prime Minister and party will arrive at Ellipse. Under Secretary will head Farewell Committee. There will be exchange of remarks (no military honors).

6:40 p.m. departure from Ellipse by helicopter for Andrews AFB. 7:00 p.m. EDT Departure from Andrews aboard USAF special flight, destination to be determined.

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

WORK COPY

4

Athens

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. Presidential luncheon second days necessitated by presence PM Menzies in Washington and luncheon planned well before invitation to Papandreu. Point has been discussed with Ambassador Matsas who indicated he understood situation.

GP-3.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

~~SECRET~~

2
June 17, 1964

15
75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since you will be away this weekend, we want to begin now to give you fuller Cyprus coverage in anticipation of Monday-Thursday talks with Inonu and Papandreou.

A. The Turk Mood. The Turks are very unhappy with the harsh way we turned them off on 5 June. Inonu has countered with a long letter (Tab A) arguing that he's kept confidence with us every step of the way and that we've let down one of our most faithful allies. His military are extremely unhappy at having their fourth invasion opportunity turned off. So our biggest job will be to heal some raw wounds, while trying to convince him that Turkey must face the facts of life. Meanwhile, there's some chance Inonu will resign if he loses a critical confidence vote Thursday or Friday. In fact the cagey Inonu may resign even if the vote is close, as a means of scaring the opposition and showing us how desperate Turkey's position is. In this case, of course, the trip will be off.

B. The Greek Mood. Papandreou gladly accepted your invite, because he'd look bad if Inonu came and he didn't. Unlike George Ball, however, we see few signs that the Greeks are yet scared enough to compromise. Papandreou's memo to you (Tab B) is a wordy plea for enosis, but he still hasn't focused on how to make this palatable to the Turks. Meanwhile, neither State nor our Ambassador has yet followed up on your pitch to Matsas that Greece must talk with Turkey.

One danger we face is that the Greeks may be playing a double game. While Papandreou talks about calming the Greek Cypriots, the Greeks have sent over 200 army officers and NCO's to organize a Cypriot army, together with substantial military equipment. Now former EOKA leader Grivas has slipped back onto the island, perhaps with Papandreou's knowledge. So we're not sure whether we can in fact get the Greeks to parley with Turkey instead of sticking with Makarios.

C. Proposed Scenario. Both Inonu and Papandreou will probably want to spend a lot of time explaining their positions (see Tab C for fascinating report on how Papandreou thinks he can "convince" you). This sort of thing seems such an unproductive waste of time that we suggest passing word in advance that you're fully familiar with both Greek and Turk stands, and hope meetings can be devoted to key problem of where we go, not how we got into this mess.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-36
By is, NARA, Date 9-17-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2.

State sees our primary aim in the talks as being to secure secret Greek-Turk negotiations, with Dean Acheson as unofficial mediator. Our hunch is that both will agree fairly readily to this, after an initial show of reluctance. However, much will depend on whether talks can really be kept secret. Papandreou cannot afford to be caught negotiating behind Makarios' back. And if the talks leak, we'll be accused of mediating behind the UN's back. So we'll have to put a real clamp on talkative State, British, and Turks. The press is already citing direct negotiations as our chief objective.

In any case, the important question is less whether secret talks can be laid on, but whether you can soften up the Greeks and Turks enough to give these a real chance of success. Otherwise Acheson will have too much of an uphill climb. So it seems imperative that you press Inonu and Papandreou, not just to talk, but to agree to work out some basis for compromise.

But how? Persuasion alone won't work, because each is convinced of the rightness of his case. So other pressures will have to be brought into play. It was really our threats that turned Inonu off last time, and similar threats are the only thing that will budge the Greeks. We may have to mutter about refusing to supply military and economic aid to Greece or Turkey if they siphon it off to arm their Cypriots (one trouble here is that we don't want to jeopardize our many key installations in Greece or Turkey). With Greece, the best persuader may be our judgment that the Turks will probably move if Greece won't talk.

What solution? The UN mediator's own views make sense (Tab D). Like the UK, he sees enosis with compensation for the Turks as the only solution. We've been toying with "double enosis" as much more acceptable to the Turks, but (a) the Greek Cypriots won't buy it; (b) it would require painful rejudding on the island; (c) we probably couldn't get the UN to support it. So its greatest merit is probably as a ploy to get the Greeks to offer adequate compensation.

The above merely brings you up to date. We'd like to meet with you briefly tomorrow if feasible--a sense of your own views would permit us to get all our ducks in a row for next week's meetings while you are away.

have a short phone talk
R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

McG. B.

McG. Bundy

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*original returned
to Bromley Smith
6/15/64*

75a



~~SECRET~~

H
Action
SS
Info

Control: 13204
Rec'd: JUNE 13, 1964
1:36 PM



FROM: ANKARA
ACTION: SECSTATE 1661 IMMEDIATE
INFO: ATHENS 550 IMMEDIATE
NICOSIA 504
PARIS TOPOL 127
LONDON 627
USUN 374
WHITE HOUSE UNNUMBERED
OSD UNNUMBERED
JCS UNNUMBERED
CIA UNNUMBERED

Cyprus
Turkey
Cables

DATE: JUNE 13, 5:30 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

EXDIS

FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT PRIMMIN INONU'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S JUNE 5 LETTER:

QUOTE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF JUNE 5, 1964 THROUGH AMBASSADOR HARE. WE HAVE, UPON YOUR REQUEST, POSTPONED OUR DECISION TO EXERCISE OUR RIGHT OF UNILATERAL ACTION IN CYPRUS CONFERRED TO US BY THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE. WITH DUE REGARD TO THE SPIRIT OF CANDOUR AND FRIENDSHIP IN WHICH YOUR MESSAGE IS MEANT TO BE WRITTEN, I WILL, IN MY REPLY, TRY ALSO TO EXPLAIN TO YOU IN FULL FRANKNESS MY VIEWS ABOUT THE SITUATION.

MR. PRESIDENT,

YOUR MESSAGE, BOTH IN WORDING AND CONTENT, HAS BEEN DISAPP-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

15 1964 By *chaly* NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1661, JUNE 13, 5:30 PM (SECTION 1 OF 4) FROM ANKARA

POINTING FOR AN ALLY LIKE TURKEY WHO HAS ALWAYS BEEN GIVING THE MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO ITS RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND HAS BROUGHT TO THE FORE SUBSTANTIAL DIVERGENCES OF OPINION IN VARIOUS FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS PERTAINING TO THESE RELATIONS.

IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT BOTH THESE DIVERGENCES AND THE GENERAL TONE OF YOUR MESSAGE ARE DUE TO THE HASTE IN WHICH A REPRESENTATION MADE IN GOOD-WILL WAS, UNDER PRESSURE OF TIME, BASED ON DATA HURRIEDLY COLLECTED.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS BEING EMPHASIZED IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT WE HAVE FAILED TO CONSULT WITH THE UNITED STATES WHEN A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS WAS DEEMED INDISPENSABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE. THE NECESSITY OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS HAS BEEN FELT FOUR TIMES SINCE THE CLOSING DAYS OF 1963. FROM THE OUTSET WE HAVE TAKEN A SPECIAL CARE TO CONSULT THE UNITED STATES ON THIS MATTER. SOON AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE CRISIS, ON DECEMBER 25, 1963 WE HAVE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THE UNITED STATES OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER GUARANTEEING POWERS ONLY TO BE ANSWERED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT A PARTY TO THIS ISSUE. WE THEN NEGOTIATED WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GREECE FOR INTERVENTION AND, AS YOU KNOW, A TRI-PARTITE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION UNDER BRITISH COMMAND WAS SET-UP ON DECEMBER 26, 1963. UPON THE FAILURE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND OF THE JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS, DUE TO THE ATTITUDE OF MAKARIOS AND IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING ASSAULTS IN THE ISLAND AGAINST RE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, WE LIVED THROUGH VERY CRITICAL DAYS IN FEBRUARY AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE VISIT OF MR. GEORGE BALL TO ANKARA, WE INFORMED AGAIN THE UNITED STATES OF THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. WE TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THAT THE NECESSITY OF INTERVENTION TO RESTORE ORDER IN THE ISLAND MIGHT ARISE IN VIEW OF THE VACUUM CAUSED BY THE REJECTION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND WE INFORMED YOU THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO INTERVENE AT ANY TIME. WE EVEN REQUESTED GUARANTEES FROM YOU ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND YOUR ANSWERS WERE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HOWEVER, YOU ASKED US NOT TO INTERVENE AND ASSURED US THAT MAKARIOS WOULD GET AT THE UNITED NATIONS A SEVERE LESSON WHILE ALL THE TURKISH RIGHTS AND INTERESTS WOULD BE PRESERVED.

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1661, JUNE 13, 5:30 PM (SECTION 1 OF 4) FROM ANKARA

WE COMPLIED WITH YOUR REQUEST WITHOUT ANY SATISFACTORY RESULT BEING SECURED AT THE UNITED NATIONS. MOREOVER THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE, DECIDED UPON BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BECAME A PROBLEM. THE NECESSITY FOR INTERVENTION WAS FELT FOR THE THIRD TIME TO PROTECT THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AGAINST THE ASSAULTS OF THE TERRORISTS IN CYPRUS WHO WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES WOULD BE SET UP IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF MARCH 4, 1964. BUT ASSURING US THAT THE FORCE WOULD BE SET UP VERY SHORTLY, YOU INSISTED AGAIN THAT WE REFRAIN FROM INTERVENING. THEREUPON WE POSTPONED OUR INTERVENTION ONCE AGAIN, AWAITING THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES TO ASSUME THEIR DUTY.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THE ERA OF TERROR IN CYPRUS HAS A PARTICULAR CHARACTER WHICH RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ALL MEASURES TAKEN SO FAR. FROM THE VERY OUTSET, THE NEGOTIATIONS HELD TO RESTORE SECURITY AND THE TEMPORARY SET-UPS HAVE ALL HELPED ONLY TO INCREASE THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND THE DESTRUCTIVENESS OF THE MAKARIOS ADMIN. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE LATELY STARTED TO ARM THEMSELVES OVERTLY AND CONSIDERED THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENT TO BACK UP THEIR RUTHLESS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL RULE. IT HAS BECOME QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE NEITHER THE AUTHORITY NOR THE INTENT TO INTERVENE FOR THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND TO PUT AN END TO AGGRESSION. YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF THE INSTIGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. DURING THE TALKS HELD IN YOUR OFFICE, IN THE UNITED STATES, WE INFORMED YOU THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE COMPELLED TO INTERVENE IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO THE ATROCITIES IN CYPRUS. WE ALSO ASKED YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE HAGUE WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT US IN SUCH A EVENTUALITY AND WE RECEIVED NO ANSWER. I THINK, I HAVE THUS REMINDED YOU HOW MANY TIMES AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WE INFORMED YOU OF THE NECESSITY FOR INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS. I DO REMEMBER HAVING EMPHASIZED TO YOUR HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS OUR DUE APPRECIATION OF THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1661, JUNE 13, 5:30 PM (SECTION 1 OF 4) FROM ANKARA

INCUMBENT UPON THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND OF THE NECESSITY TO BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL AND HELPFUL TO ENABLE HER TO MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AS YOU SEE, WE NEVER HAD THE INTENTION TO CONFRONT YOU WITH A UNILATERAL DECISION ON OUR PART. OUR GRIEVANCE STEMS FROM OUR INABILITY TO EXPLAIN TO YOU A PROBLEM WHICH CAUSED US FOR MONTHS UTMOST DISTRESS AND FROM YOUR REFUSAL TO TAKE A FRANK AND FIRM STAND ON THE ISSUE AS TO WHICH PARTY IS ON THE RIGHT SIDE IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO ALLIES, NAMELY TURKEY AND GREECE.

HARE

HMR



~~SECRET~~

COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHCR
DE RUQMGU 266 13/1530Z
O 13/1430Z ZFA

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUFQWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEPIA:CIA
STATE
BT

0 1 3 2 3 1

1964 JUN 13 PM 2 25

~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE 1661 INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS 550
NICOSIA 504 PARIS TOPOL 127 LONDON 627 USUN 374 WHITE HOUSE
UNN OSD UNN JCS UNN CIA UNN FROM ANKARA JUNE 13 5:30 PM

THIS IS SETWO OFFOR

EXDIS

MR. PRESIDENT,

IN YOUR MESSAGE YOU FURTHER EMPHASIZE THE OBLIGATION OF TURKEY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER TWO GUARANTEEING POWERS, BEFORE TAKING ANY UNILATERAL ACTION. TURKEY IS FULLY AWARE OF THIS OBLIGATION. FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS WE HAVE INDEED COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS OBLIGATION. BUT GREECE HAS, NOT ONLY THWARTED ALL THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY TURKEY TO SEEK JOINTLY THE WAYS AND MEANS TO STOP GREEK CYPRIOTS FROM REPUDIATING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, BUT CFN 1661 550 504 127 627 374

PAGE TWO RUQMGU 266 ~~SECRET~~
HAS ALSO SUPPORTED THEIR UNLAWFUL AND INHUMAN ACTS AND HAS EVEN ENCOURAGED THEM.

THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAS NOT HESITATED TO DECLARE PUBLICLY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS SIGNED WITH US WERE NO LONGER IN FORCE. VARIOUS EXAMPLES TO THAT EFFECT WERE, IN DUE COURSE, COMMUNICATED IN DETAIL, ORALLY AND IN WRITING, TO YOUR STATE DEPARTMENT.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM (SECTION II OF IV) FROM ANKARA

WE HAVE LIKEWISE FULFILLED OUR OBLIGATION OF CONSTANT CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE OTHER GUARANTEEING POWER.

IN SEVERAL INSTANCES WE HAVE, JOINTLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WITH A VIEW TO RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER. BUT UNFORTUNATELY, THESE REPRESENTATIONS WERE OF NO AVAIL DUE TO THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES.

AS YOU SEE, TURKEY HAS EARNESTLY EXPLORED EVERY AVENUE OF CONSULTING CONTINUOUSLY AND ACTING JOINTLY WITH THE OTHER TWO GUARANTEEING POWERS. THIS BEING THE FACT, IT CAN NOT BE ASSERTED THAT TURKEY HAS FAILED TO ABIDE BY HER OBLIGATION OF CONSULTING WITH THE OTHER TWO GUARANTEEING POWERS BEFORE TAKING UNILATERAL ACTION.

P PGE THREE RUQMGU 266 ~~SECRET~~

I PUT IT TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS FELT THE NEED TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF TURKEY TO HER OBLIGATION OF CONSULTATION, YET EARNESTLY AND FAITHFULLY FULFILLED BY THE LATTER, SHOULD NOT HAVE REMINDED GREECE, WHO REPUDIATES TREATIES SIGNED BY HERSELF, OF THE NECESSITY TO ABIDE BY THE PRECEPT "PACTASUNT SERVANDA" WHICH IS THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THIS PRECEPT WHICH, ONLY A FORTNIGHT AGO, WAS MOST ELOQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED AS "THE BASIS OF SURVIVAL" BY YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE HIMSELF IN HIS SPEECH AT THE "AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE", IS NOW BEING COMPLETELY AND CONTEMPTUOUSLY IGNORED BY GREECE, OUR NATO ALLY AND BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

AS IMPLIED IN YOUR MESSAGE, BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, THE THREE GUARANTEEING POWERS HAVE, IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH OF THE PROVISIONS OF THAT TREATY, THE RIGHT TO TAKE CONCERTED ACTION AND, IF THAT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE, UNILATERAL ACTION WITH THE SOLE AIM OF RE-ESTABLISHING THE STATE OF AFFAIRS CREATED BY THE SAID TREATY. THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE WAS SIGNED WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING BEING SHARED BY ALL PARTIES THERETO. THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT", SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 19, 1959 BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF TURKEY AND GREECE, IS AN EVIDENCE OF THAT COMMON UNDERSTANDING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM (SECTION II OF IV) FROM ANKARA

ON OTHER HAND, AT THE TIME OF THE ADMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS, THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION WERE FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH ALL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CIP REPUBLIC AND NO OBJECTIONS WERE RAISED IN THIS RESPECT.

FURTHERMORE, IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON CYPRUS LEADING TO THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON MARCH 4, 1964 BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATE, AMONG OTHER, EXPLICITLY DECLARED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD NO POWER TO ANNUL OR AMEND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES.

THE UNDERSTANDING EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT THE INTERVENTION BY TURKEY IN CYPRUS WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE PARTITION OF THE ISLAND HAS CAUSED ME GREAT SURPRISE AND PROFOUND SORROW. MY SURPRISE STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT THE DATA FURNISHED TO YOU ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF TURKEY COULD BE SO REMOTE FROM THE REALITIES REPEATEDLY PROCLAIMED BY US. THE REASON OF MY SORROW IS THAT OUR ALLY, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, COULD THINK THAT TURKEY MIGHT LAY ASIDE THE PRINCIPLE CONSTITUTING THE FOUNDATION OF HER FOREIGN POLICY, I. E. ABSOLUTE LOYALTY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS, AS FACTUALLY EVIDENCED IN MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WELL KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU MOST CATEGORICALLY AND MOST SINCERELY THAT IF EVER TURKEY FINDS HERSELF FORCED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN CYPRUS THIS WILL BE DONE IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS AND AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, ALLOW ME TO STRESS, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF OUR DECISION DOES NATURALLY, IN NO WAY AFFECT THE RIGHTS CONFERRED TO TURKEY BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE.

MR. PRESIDENT,

REFERRING TO NATO OBLIGATIONS, YOU STATE IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT THE VERY ESSENCE OF NATO REQUIRES THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT WAGE WAR ON EACH OTHER AND THAT A TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS WOULD LEAD TO A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN TURKISH AND GREEK FORCES.

I AM IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE FIRST PART OF YOUR STATEMENT, BUT THE OBLIGATION FOR THE NATO ALLIES TO RESPECT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED AMONG THEMSELVES AS WELL AS THEIR MUTUAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM (SECTION II OF IV) FROM ANKARA
TREATY RIGHTS AND COMMITMENTS IS AN EQUALLY VITAL REQUISITE
OF THE ALLIANCE. AN ALLIANCE AMONG STATES WHICH IGNORE
CFN 4

PAGE SIX RUQMGU 266 ~~SECRET~~
THEIR MUTUAL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS IS UNTHINKABLE.

AS TO THE CONCERN YOU EXPRESSED OVER THE OUTBREAK OF A TURCO-
GREEK WAR IN CASE OF TURKEY'S INTERVENTION IS CYPRUS IN CON-
FORMITY WITH HER RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS STIPULATED IN INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT TURKEY WOULD
UNDERTAKE A "MILITARY OPERATION" IN CYPRUS EXCLUSIVELY UNDER
THE CONDITIONS AND FOR THE PURPOSE SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENTS.
THEREFORE, A TURCO-GREEK WAR SO PROPERLY DESCRIBED AS "LIT-
ERALLY UNTHINKABLE" BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK COULD ONLY
OCCUR IN CASE OF GREECE'S AGGRESSION AGAINST TURKEY. OUR VIEW,
IN CASE OF SUCH AN INTERVENTION IS TO INVITE TO AN EFFECTIVE
COLLABORATION, WITH THE AIM OF RESTORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER IN CYPRUS, BOTH GREECE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THEIR
CAPACITY AS GUARANTEEING POWERS. IF DESPITE THIS INFITATION
AND ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS GREECE WERE TO ATTACK TURKEY,
WE COULD IN NO WAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF SUCH AN ACTIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY
SERIOUSLY DRAWN, THE
GREEK GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION ON THESE MATTERS.

HARE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O - 6/13/64 - 2:35 PM.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

H
classification
SS
info

~~SECRET~~

NNNNVV QVA269QMA373
OO RUEHCR RUFQWP RUEHDT RUEPWW RUEPDA RUEKDA RUEPIA
DE RUQMGU 266 13/1600Z
O 13/1430Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUGMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUFQWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEPIA/CIA
STATE
BT

1964 JUN 13 PM 2 47 24.6

SECRET OFFOR ~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 1661 INFO
IMMEDIATE 550 NICOSIA 504 PARIS TOPOL 127 LONDON 627 USUN 374
WHITE HOUSE UNN OSD UNN JCS UNN CIA UNN FROM ANKARA JUNE 13, 5:30 PM

EXDIS
THE PART OF YOUR MESSAGE EXPRESSING DOUBTS AS TO THE OBLIGATION OF THE NATO ALLIES TO PROTECT TURKEY IN CASE SHE BECOMES DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH THE USSR AS A RESULT OF AN ACTION INITIATED IN CYPRUS, GIVES ME THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE ARE AS BETWEEN US WIDE DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS AS TO THE NATURE AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IF MUST CONFESS THAT THIS HAS BEEN TO US THE SOURCE OF GREAT SORROW AND GRAVE CONCERN. ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST A MEMBER OF NATO WILL NATURALLY CALL FROM THE AGGRESSOR AN EFFORT OF JUSTIFICATION. IF NATO'S STRUCTURE IS SO WEAK AS TO GIVE CREDIT TO THE AGGRESSOR'S ALLEGATIONS THEN IT MEANS THAT THIS DEFECT OF NATO NEEDS REALLY TO BE REMEDIED. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IMPOSES UPON ALL MEMBER STATES THE OBLIGATION TO COME FORTHWITH TO THE ASSISTANCE OF ANY MEMBER VICTIM OF AN AGGRESSION. THE ONLY POINT LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE MEMBER STATES IS THE NATURE AND THE SCALE OF THIS ASSISTANCE. IF NATO MEMBERS SHOULD START DISCUSSING THE RIGHT AND WRONG OF THE SITUATION OF THEIR FELLOW-MEMBER VICTIM OF A SOVIET AGGRESSION, WHETHER THIS AGGRESSION WAS PROVOKED OR NOT AND IF THE DECISION ON WHETHER THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THESE MEMBER SHOULD BE MADE TO DEPEND ON THE ISSUE OF SUCH A DISCUSSION, THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE SHAKEN AND IT WOULD LOSE ITS MEANING. AN OBLIGATION OF ASSISTANCE, IF IT IS TO CARRY ANY WEIGHT, SHOULD COME INTO BEING IMMEDIATELY UPON THE OBSERVANCE OF AGGRESSION. THAT IS WHY, ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY CONSIDERS

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM FROM ANKARA (SECTION III OF IV)

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE OF THE MEMBER STATES AS AN ATTACK AGAINST THEM ALL AND MAKES IT IMPERATIVE FOR THEM TO ASSIST THE PARTY SO ATTACKED BY TAKING FORTHWITH SUCH ACTION AS THEY DEEM NECESSARY.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO FURTHER POINT OUT THAT THE AGREEMENTS ON CYPRUS HAVE MET WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, AS EARLY AS THE STAGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE ON THE PROBLEM, I. E., EVEN PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, HENCE LONG BEFORE THE OCCURANCE OF THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER, 1963.

AS YOU WILL RECALL, AT THE MEETING OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL HELD THREE WEEKS AGO AT THE HAGUE, IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TREATIES CONTINUED TO BE THE BASIS FOR LEGALITY AS REGARDS THE SITUATION IN THE ISLAND AND THE STATUS OF CYPRUS. THE FACT THAT THESE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE FLAGRANTLY UNLAWFUL ACTS OF ONE OF THE PARTIES ON THE ISLAND SHOULD IN NO WAY MEAN THAT THE SAID AGREEMENTS ARE NO LONGER IN FORCE AND THAT THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF TURKEY BY VIRTUE OF THESE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE IGNORED. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WOULD MEAN THAT AS LONG AS NO DIFFICULTIES ARISE, THE AGREEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED AS VALID AND THAT ARE NO LONGER IN FORCE WHEN DIFFICULTIES OCCUR. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING OF LAW CANNOT BE ACCEPTED, I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THERE COULD BE NO SHADOW OF DOUBT ABOUT THE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT TURKEY WITHIN THE NATO ALLIANCE IN A SITUATION THAT CAN, BY NO MEANS,

BE ATTRIBUTED TO AN ARBITRARY ACT OF TURKEY. AN OPPOSITE WAY OF THINKING WOULD LEAD TO THE REPUDIATION AND DENIAL OF THE CONCEPT OF LAW AND OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

IN YOUR MESSAGE, CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE COMMITMENTS OF TURKEY AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. I AM SURE, MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME IF I SAY THAT SUCH A CONCERN, WHICH I DO NOT SHARE, IS GROUNDLESS ESPECIALLY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: TURKEY HAS DISTINGUISHED HERSELF AS ONE OF THE MOST LOYAL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EVER SINCE ITS FOUNDATION. THE TURKISH PEOPLE HAS SPARED NO EFFORT TO SAFEGUARD THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, AND HAS EVEN SACRIFICED HER SOME FOR THIS CAUSE. TURKEY HAS NEVER FAILED IN SUPPORTING THIS ORGANIZATION AND, IN ORDER TO SECURE ITS PROPER FUNCTIONING, HAS BORNE GREAT MORAL AND MATERIAL SACRIFICES EVEN WHEN SHE HAD MOST PRESSING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. DESPITE THE EXPLICIT RIGHTS CONFERRED TO TURKEY BY THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, MY GOVERNMENT'S RESPECT FOR AND ADHERENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM FROM ANKARA (SECTION III OF IV)
HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DEMONSTRATED ONCE MORE BY ITS ACCEPTANCE
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF MARCH 4, 1964 AS WELL
AS BY THE PRIORITY IT HAS GIVEN TO THE SAID RESOLUTION.

SHOULD THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BEEN PROGRESSIVELY SUCCESSFUL
IN CARRYING OUT THEIR TASK AS POINTED OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE,
A SITUATION WHICH IS OF SUCH GRAVE CONCERN FOR BOTH YOU AND I,
WOULD NEVER HAVE ARISEN. IT IS A FACT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS IN THE ISLAND HAVE PROVED UNABLE TO PUT AN END TO THE
OPPRESSION.

THE RELATIVE CALM WHICH HAS APPARENTLY PREVAILED IN THE ISLAND
FOR THE PAST FEW WEEKS MARKS THE BEGINNING OF PREPARATIONS OF
THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR FURTHER TYRANNY. VILLAGES ARE STILL
UNDER SIEGE. THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES, ASSUAGING TURKISH
CYPRIOTS, ENABLE THE GREEKS TO GATHER THEIR CROPS; BUT THEY DO NOT
TRY TO STOP THE GREEKS WHEN THE CROPS OF TURKS ARE AT STAKE
AND THEY ACT AS MERE SPECTATORS TO GREEK ASSAULTS. THESE
VITALLY IMPORTANT DETAILS MAY NOT WELL REACH YOU, WHEREAS WE
LIVE IN THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY THE DAILY REPORTS OF SUCH TRAGIC
EVENTS.

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE
UNITED NATIONS ON JUNE 15, 1964. I AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED
THAT WE MAY FACE YET ANOTHER DEFEAT SIMILAR TO THE ONE WE ALL
SUGGERED ON MARCH 4, 1964. THE SESSION OF MARCH 4TH HAD FURTHER
CONVINCED MAKARIOS THAT THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE DID NOT EXIST
FOR HIM AND WHEREUPON HE TOOK THE LIBERTY OF ACTUALLY PLACING
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES UNDER HIS CONTROL AND DIRECTION.
FROM THEN ON THE ASSASSINATION OF HOSTAGES AND THE BESIEGING
OF VILLAGES HAVE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED.

HARE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 - 6/13/64 - 3:24 PM.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

H

~~SECRET~~

013254

action

VV QVA270MA379GUA861

SS

OO RUEHCR RUFGWP RUDTLN RUEHDT RUEPWW RUZRDS RUEKDA

DE RUQMGU 266 13/1640Z

1964 JUN 13 PM 2 58

O 13/1430Z

info

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEPIA/CIA
STATE
BT

SEFOR OFFOR ~~US SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 1661 INFO
ATHENS IMMEDIATE 550 NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 504 PARIS TOPOI IMMEDIATE
127 LONDON IMMEDIATE 527 USUN IMMEDIATE 374 WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
UNN OSD IMMEDIATE UNN JCS IMMEDIATE UNN CIA IMMEDIATE UNN FROM
ANKARA JUNE 13, 5:30 PM

EXDIS
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

OUR ALLIES WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO ARBITER IN THE CYPRUS
ISSUE AND TO ORIENT IT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION HAVE SO FAR BEEN
UNABLE TO DISENTANGLE THE PROBLEM FROM A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR.
THE CYPRUS TRAGEDY HAS BEEN ENGENDERED BY THE DELIBERATE
POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AIMED AT ANNULING THE TREATIES
AND ABROGATING THE CONSTITUTION. SECURITY CAN BE ESTABLISHED
IN THE ISLAND ONLY THROUGH THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF AN AUTHORITY
ABOVE THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS. YET ONLY THE MEASURES ACCEPTABLE
TO THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT ARE BEING SOUGHT TO RESTORE SECURITY
IN CYPRUS. THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION SET UP FOLLOWING
THE DECEMBER EVENTS, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS, AND FINALLY
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND HAVE ALL BEEN FOUNDED ON THIS UNSOUND
BASIS AND CONSEQUENTLY EVERY MEASURE ACCEPTABLE TO MAKARIOS
HAS PROVED FUTILE AND HAS, IN GENERAL, ENCOURAGED OPPRESSION
AND AGGRESSION.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

YOU PUT FORWARD IN YOUR MESSAGE THE RESENTMENT CAUSED IN
GREECE BY THE POLICY PURSUED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT. WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF THE CYPRUS ISSUES, THE NATURE OF THE GREEK

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM (SECTION IV OF IV) FROM ANKARA
POLICY AND THE COURSE OF ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY GREECE INDICATE
THAT SHE IS APT TO RESORT TO EVERY MEANS WITHIN HER POWER
TO SECURE THE COMPLETE ANNULMENT OF THE EXISTING TREATIES.
WE ARE AT PAINS TO MAKE OUR ALLIES UNDERSTAND THE SUFFERINGS
WE BEAR IN OUR RIGHTFUL CAUSE AND THE IRRETRIEVABLE PLIGHT
IN WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE LIVING. ON THE OTHER HAND,
IT IS NOT THE CHARACTER OF OUR NATION TO EXPLOIT DEMONSTRATIONS
OF RESENTMENT. IS ASSURE YOU THAT OUR DISTRESS IS DEEPLY
ROOTED SINCE WE CAN NOT MAKE YOU UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTFUL POSITION
AND CONVINCE YOU OF THE NECESSITY OF SPENDING EVERY EFFORT
AND MAKING USE OF ALL YOUR AUTHORITY TO AVERT THE PERILS INHERENT
IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BY ATTACHING TO IT THE IMPORTANCE IT WELL
DESERVES.

PAGE THREE RUQNGU 255 ~~SECRET~~
THAT FRANCE AND GERMANY HAVE BURIED THEIR ANIMOSITY IS INDEED
A GOOD EXAMPLE. HOWEVER, OUR NATION HAD ALREADY GIVEN SUCH AN
EXAMPLE FORTY YEARS AGO BY ESTABLISHING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH
GREECE, RIGHT AFTER THE RUTHLESS DEVASTATION OF THE WHOLE
ANATOLIA BY THE ARMIES OF THAT COUNTRY.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

AS A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE OUR NATION IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF
HER DUTIES AND RIGHTS. WE DO NOT PURSUE ANY AIM OTHER THAN
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE EXISTING TREATIES. SUCH A SETTLEMENT IS LIKELY
TO BE REACHED IF YOU LEND YOUR SUPPORT AND GIVE EFFECT WITH
YOUR SUPREME AUTHORITY TO THE SENSE OF JUSTICE INHERENT IN
THE CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN NATION.

MR PRESIDENT,

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR STATEMENT EMPHASIZING THE VALUE ATTACHED
BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE WITH TURKEY
AND FOR YOUR KIND WORDS ABOUT THE TURKISH NATION. I SHALL BE
HAPPY TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES TO TALK THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
WITH YOU. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET ON
JUNE THE 17TH. IN THE MEANTIME, MR. DIRK STIKKER, SECRETARY
GENERAL OF NATO, WILL HAVE PAID A VISIT TO TURKEY. FURTHERMORE,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1661, JUNE 13, 5 PM (SECTION IV OF IV) FROM ANKARA

THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR MR. TUOMIOJA WILL HAVE SUBMITTED HIS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SITUATION. IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO GO ABROAD TO JOIN YOU, AT A DATE CONVENIENT FOR YOU, IMMEDIATELY AFTER JUNE 20 TH.

IT WILL BE MOST HELPFUL FOR ME IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW OF ANY DEFINED VIEWS AND DESIGNS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION SO THAT I MAY BE ABLE TO STUDY THEM THOROUGHLY BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION FOR THE FRANK, FRUITFUL AND PROMISING TALKS WE HAD WITH MR. G. BALL IN ANKARA JUST BEFORE FORWARDING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU.

SINCERELY,

ISMET INONU

UNQUOTE

HARE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 - 6/13/64 - 3:40 PM.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

756

48

~~SECRET~~

010

Action
SS
Info

THTAECTI .

5

014525

1964 JUN 15 PM 9 42

3"

30

;;; 1;-564QMA 749

Copy

OO RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUQMAT 02A 15/2135Z
O P 152120Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1905 INFO PRIORITY ANKARA 368 NICOSIA
345 LONDON 330 USUN 130 JUNE 15, 12 MIDNIGHT

E X D I S

FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT GOG AIDE MEMOIRE DELIVERED TONIGHT
AS FOLLOW-UP MY CONVERSATION WITH PM JUNE 14

QUOTE

ON THE OCCASION OF THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO HIM BY PRESIDENT
JOHNSON, THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE MR. GEORGE PAPANDREOU,
DEEMS IT USEFUL TO SUMMARIZE IN THE ATTACHED AIDE-MEMOIRE THE
GREEK VIEWS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AS THEY WERE RECENTLY FORMULATED
BY HIM IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL TALKS. -

I

AS EVENTS DEVELOPED, THE CYPRUS PROBLEM CEASED TO BE A GREEK-
TURKISH QUESTION. IT HAS BECOME A PROBLEM BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS.

THE DILEMMA IS:

"NATIFICATION" OR CUBA.

"NATIFICATION" CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH UNION WITH GREECE.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NGJ 001R-127-3-9
By SP, NARA, Date 1/6/12

N 17 1964

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1905, JUNE 15, MIDNIGHT, FROM ATHENS .

AS A RESULT OF UNION THE ENTIRE ISLAND, BEING PART OF GREECE, COULD BECOME A NATO BASE, LIKE CRETE. INTERNAL COMMUNISM WILL CONSIDERABLY DIMINISH AS IN GREECE WHERE IT WAS REDUCED TO 12 PERCENT.

THUS, THE SECURITY OF TURKEY AND OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST WILL BE FULLY SAFEGUARDED.

IF NATIFICATION OF CYPRUS DOES NOT OCCUR, THE ISLAND WILL INEVITABLY BE TRANSFORMED INTO ANOTHER CUBA BECAUSE INTERNAL COMMUNISM WILL BECOME ALL-POWERFUL AND ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE UNAVOIDABLE.

II

LET US EXAMINE OTHER PROPOSED SOLUTIONS:

1. PARTITION OF THE ISLAND OR ITS EQUIVALENT, FEDERATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES.

ANY ATTEMPT AT PARTITION WILL BE FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE REVOLT OF THE GREEKS OF CYPRUS WITH ACTIVE SOVIET SUPPORT.

IN SUCH AN EVENT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD NEITHER BE IN A POSITION NOR HAVE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE AS PARTITION OF THE ISLAND WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A MONSTROUS SOLUTION.

2. CONQUEST OF THE ISLAND OR OF PART OF IT BY TURKISH INVASION.

IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD LEAD TO IMMEDIATE WAR AND CERTAINLY NOT A LOCALIZED ONE.

3. LIMITED OR TIED INDEPENDENCE. IT IS THE REGIME WHICH LED TO THE PRESENT DEADLOCK.

4. FULL INDEPENDENCE. IT IS THE ONLY REAL SOLUTION WHICH OF COURSE LEADS TO UNION WITH GREECE OR "ENOSIS".

IF FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THE FREE WORLD "ENOSIS" IS ADOPTED, THE QUESTION THAT ARISES IS WHEN AND HOW THE UNION OF CYPRUS WITH GREECE SHOULD TAKE PLACE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1905, JUNE 15, MIDNIGHT, FROM ATHENS

A. - TIMING.

IN MY OPINION, THIS IS RELATED TO THE PRESENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE ISLAND. THEREFORE, THE TERM OF THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE SHOULD BE EXTENDED SO THAT THE FINAL SOLUTION SHOULD BE FOUND DURING THAT PERIOD.

B. -- METHOD.

THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY OF ACHIEVING THE FINAL SOLUTION IS BY A PLEBISCITE TO BE HELD UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE.

III

FINALLY, HOW TURKEY COULD BE PERSUADED?

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MOST PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS:

1) SECURITY.

IT IS NOT PARTITION BUT NATIFICATION THAT GUARANTEES SECURITY TO TURKEY.

ON THE CONTRARY BY PARTITION TURKEY WOULD BE ENCIRCLED BY COMMUNISM.

2) DEMOCRACY.

BY SUPPORTING A PLEBISCITE IN CYPRUS THE MORAL STATURE OF THE UNITED STATES, LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD WILL BE ENHANCED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LEADERS OF TURKEY WILL NOT APPEAR AS SUCCUMBING TO PRESSURE OR ACCEPTING A SOLUTION FAVOURING ONLY GREECE. THEY WILL APPEAR AS FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY EMBODIED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH IN THIS CASE COINCIDE WITH THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF TURKEY.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1905, JUNE 15, MIDNIGHT, FROM ATHENS

3) INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

IT IS ACCEPTED THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

HOWEVER, THE BEST GUARANTEE LIES IN THE FACT THAT TURKS LIVING IN GREECE HAVE NEVER BEEN ILL-TREATED AND ENJOY FULL PROTECTION. THEY LIVE UNDER CONDITIONS OF COMPLETE EQUALITY WITH THE OTHER GREEK CITIZENS.

4) COMPENSATION OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS WISHING TO LEAVE THE ISLAND.

5) POSSIBLE ECONOMIC AID TO TURKEY.

*From the US; naturally
RWT*

ATHENS, 15TH JUNE, 1964.

UNQUOTE. LABOUJISSE
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/15/64-1028PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA 6/15/64-1025PM

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

75-d

54
Action
SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BECK~~
- ~~BRUBACK~~
- ~~CHAMBERLAIN~~
- ~~FORESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KROMER~~
- ~~MOODY~~
- ~~REEDY~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SAYRE~~
- ~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

ETD156VVVZCZCETD159
 PP RUEHCR RUDTLN RUQVHN RUQMAT RUQMGU RUF GWP
 DE RUEHDT 156 15/2315Z
 P 152230Z ZEA
 FM USUN NEWYORK
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 RUF GWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
 STATE GRNC
 BT

014465

1964 JUN 15 PM 8 00

Cyprus

SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~ PRIORITY ACTION (DEPT 4490) INFO LONDON 1095 NICOSIA
 343 ATHENS 296 ANKARA 312 PARIS 355 FROM USUN JUNE 15, 7 PM

PARIS FOR USRO

SUBJECT: CYPRUS

LIMDIS

TUOMIOJA ACCOMPANIED BY VIRALIE AND MILLER CALLED ON STEVENSON
 JUNE 15 AND STATED FOL:

1. NO PROGRESS ON SOLUTION. NEITHER SIDE BUDGING. GREEK CYPRIOTS
 FEEL THINGS GOING THEIR WAY. CARE NOTHING FOR CONSTITUTION OR
 LEGALITIES. PLANNING EVENTUALLY TO HAVE OWN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,
 WRITE THEIR OWN CONSTITUTION. TURKS BITTER. INTERVENTION THEIR
 ONLY RECOURSE, BUT IN VIEW MISTRUST GREEK CYPRIOTS THEY NOT
 REALLY ANXIOUS REESTABLISH OLD CONSTITUTION -- WHICH ONLY PRETEXT
 INTERVENTION.

2. ENOSIS BEST SOLUTION. OFFERS BETTER GUARANTEES FOR TURKS, WHO
 RIGHTLY MISTRUST GREEK CYPRIOTS AS "MURDERERS AND KILLERS," WHO
 UNFIT RUN A STATE OR HANDLE A MINORITY. GOG COULD SUPPLY SAFE-
 GUARDS, AGREE TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AS WELL. THIS WOULD
 ALSO BLOCK COMMUNIST DANGER WHICH IMMINENT ONE, NOT IN INTERNAL
 SENSE, BUT IN SENSE GROWING DEPENDENCE GOC ON SOVBLOC. PAPANDREOU
 REALIZES THIS. TURKS MUST "CHOOSE BETWEEN CUBA OR NATO".

3. PROBLEM IS COMPENSATION TO TURKEY: 1) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR
 OPTIONAL RESETTLEMENT, WHICH MOST TURK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT DESIRE
 IF GOG HAS SITUATION IN HAND; 2) CESSION OF GREEK TERRITORY
 "PERHAPS AN ISLAND;" 3) SATISFACTION GOT STRATEGIC NEEDS --
 PERHAPS TURK-MANNED NATO BASE ON ONE OF UK BASE AREAS.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
 PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority NETD01R-1273-9
 By *SA*, NARA, Date 11/6/12

JUN 16 1964



~~SECRET~~

-2-, 4490, JUNE 15, 7 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

4. "WE" (MEDIATOR) CANNOT ADVOCATE SUCH SOLUTION AND IF WE DID, GOT WOULD REJECT. WE CANNOT PROPOSE ABOLITION MEMBER STATE BUT WE COULD PROPOSE NORMAL CYPRIOT STATE RULED BY MAJORITY. TURKS WILL NOT EVEN DISCUSS THIS, BUT PERHAPS CAN BE PERSUADED TO DISCUSS ENOSIS, BUT "NOT BY US."

5. THIS MEANS ROLE BY SOMEONE ELSE, LOGICALLY "BIGGEST ALLIES" OF GREECE AND TURKEY. IN THIS REGARD, HAPPY TO HEAR US MORE WILLING GET ENGAGED. SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT HOWEVER BITTER PILL ENOSIS MIGHT BE FOR GOT. ALTERNATIVE IS "SOMETHING WORSE."

6. IN ANSWER STEVENSON QUESTION ON TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS, TUOMIOJA INDICATED HE HAD IN MIND ONLY SOME SMALL, VIRTUALLY UNINHABITED ISLAND--SOMETHING "TO SUGAR THE PILL."

7. RE QUESTION ON DOUBLE ENOSIS, TUOMIOJA SAID IMPOSSIBLE FOR GREEK SIDE ACCEPT AND WOULD REQUIRE FORCIBLY MOVING MANY GREEK CYPRIOTS AS NO PREDOMINANTLY TURKISH ETHNIC AREA EXISTS ON CYPRUS.

8. TUOMIOJA CONFIRMED SYG'S REPORT WOULD NOT DISCUSS MEDIATOR'S MISSION EXCEPT TO SAY IT PROCEEDING.

9. RE STEVENSON REMARK THAT US RELUCTANT INTERFERE WITH MEDIATOR'S MISSION, TUOMIOJA REPLIED "AM PLEADING WITH YOU. PLEASE DO SOMETHING".

10. TUOMIOJA AGREED STAY IN TOUCH. SAID HE PLANNED BE IN NY UNTIL JUNE 23, COULD EXTEND IF USEFUL.

11. TUOMIOJA OBSERVED THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS FAVOR ENOSIS AND EVEN CYPRIOT COMMUNISTS HAD TOLD HIM THEY FAVOR IT IN SPITE CONSEQUENCES TO THEM. "GREEK REGIME MAY CHANGE.... GREECE ETERNAL" WAS THEIR LINE. SOVS, WHO "DREAMING SWEET DREAMS. PERHAPS OF BOSPORUS," INSISTING ON INDEPENDENT CYPRUS AND WOULD SEND MILITARY AID ONLY ON CONDITION ENOSIS IDEA BE DROPPED. TUOMIOJA SAID, GOC COMMERCE MINISTER HAD LEFT OR WOULD LEAVE SHORTLY FOR MOSCOW THIS PURPOSE.

12. STEVENSON SAID ENOSIS COINCIDES UK VIEW (TO WHICH TUOMIOJA AGREED), AND SAID TUOMIOJA ASSESSMENT CLOSE TO THAT OF US. ASKED IF TUOMIOJA HAD SOUNDED GOG OUT ON TERRITORY CONCESSIONS. TUOMIOJA REPLIED HE HAD HINTED AT IT. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT TOKEN ISLAND WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR TURKS, TUOMIOJA SAID HE DID NOT KNOW TURK PRICE. SO FAR, HAD REFUSED TO SET ONE. REMARKED THAT "WHEN I

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-3-, 4490, JUNE 15, 7 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

SUGGESTED NECESSITY FOR FIGURING OUT PRICE OF ENOSIS, RATHER THAN GETTING SOMETHING WORSE, THIS MADE THEM VERY UNHAPPY" (SIC).

13. RE MARKARIOS FATE, UNDER ENOSIS, TUOMIOJA SAID PAPANDREOU HAD INDICATED HE WOULD BE REMOVED, REMAINING PERHAPS ONLY IN HIS CLERICAL ROLE.

14. RE TURK INTERVENTION, TUOMIOJA SURE EOKA WOULD BEGIN RECKLESS KILLING MOMENT TURKS LANDED AND "ONE TURK BN WOULD BE NEEDED PROTECT EACH VILLAGE."

15. TUOMIOJA URGED THAT THERE WAS "NEED TO MOVE BEFORE SITUATION GOT WORSE FOR TURKS."

COMMENT: OF INTEREST RE TUOMIOJA (AND BUNCHE) WAS BUNCHE REMARK TO YOST JUNE 15 HE "DISAPPOINTED" IN TUOMIOJA, IN SPIE OF FACT HE RECOMMENDED HIM. SAID HE PREJUDICED AGAINST GREEKS AT BEGINNING AND HAD NOT CHANGED. SPOKE TOO OPENLY, WAS TOO IMPATIENT AND NOT ALL IMPATIENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS WIFE. TUOMIOJA HAD NOT GOTTEN ON WELL WITH GYANI, WHEREAS GALO-PLAZA, WHO IN CONTRAST TO TUOMIOJA LIKED CYPRUS, HAD. BUNCHE SAID TUOMIOJA HAD AGREED CONTINUE MEDIATE BUT WITH HQ IN GENEVA.


TUOMIOJA'S FINNISH ENGLISH IMPRESSIVE BUT DISTURBING IN CURRENT DELICATE SITUATION. BUNCHE'S DISAPPOINTMENT APPEARS EXTEND DISAPPOINTINGLY TO SUBSTANCE TUOMIOJA'S THINKING AS WELL AS HIS TECHNIQUE. COMBINATION TUOMIOJA'S OUTSPOKENNESS (SOME OF WHICH COULD-LEAK OUT) AND BUNCHE STATEMENT TO YOST THAT SYG REPORT WOULD CRITICIZE HOSTAGE-TAKING, ARMS, IMPORTATION, CONSCRIPTION, INTERVENTION THREATS, AND REFUSAL GOT CONTINGENT RETURN TO BARRACKS, PROMISES ROUGH WEEK AHEAD.

GP-3
STEVENSON

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 6-15-64, 8:24 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA, 6-15-64, 9:36 PM

~~SECRET~~

THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

Handwritten signature of George A. Papandreou in blue ink, with the name "Papandreou" written below it in a smaller, similar script.

Athens, 16th June, 1964

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter handed to me on June 14th, by Ambassador Labouisse and for your kind invitation to visit Washington for an exchange of views on the Cyprus problem.


I have great pleasure in accepting your invitation and I shall be glad to be in Washington on June 24 and 25.

The keen interest shown by you, Mr. President, in the Cyprus problem and your efforts for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations are inspired by the great traditions of the United States, leader of the free world.

I do not have any doubts that our conversations will serve our common ideals of Peace, Democracy and Justice.

Looking forward with great pleasure, Mr. President, to meeting you soon, I am,

Sincerely yours

Handwritten signature of George A. Papandreou in blue ink, written in a cursive style.

(George A. Papandreou)

The President,
The White House.-

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

10506

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

By Tied 77

54

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ANKARA 1365

FLASH

NEA

ATHENS 1540

IMMEDIATE

Info

Jun 16 7 58 PM '64

SS

Embtel 1677

G

SP

As you pointed out to Erkin, revised schedule suggested by Inonu would

L

cause overlap with Papandreou visit. Since Papandreou accepted only after

H

assurances by us that he would not be in Washington at same time as Inonu

EUR

IO

and face possibly embarrassing situation in explaining reasons for not

PR

P

meeting, it would seem impossible for Inonu to remain on in Washington

USIA

NSC

even in category of QUOTE resting UNQUOTE at Embassy. If compressed

INR

CIA

schedule were accepted we would have to get him back to New York very early

NSA

O

morning of June 24 (FYI Papandreou's arrival at White House is being

SY

suggested at 10:00 a.m. END FYI).

A

To facilitate matters

OPR

/ President offers to make available one of his planes to bring Inonu

and his party from Ankara. Plane has comfortable sleeping facilities

which will permit Inonu to rest undisturbed during trip. Advise flash

repeating to Athens whether such an arrangement would permit Inonu to come

direct and to adhere to earlier schedule with only slight variations. If

this is accepted plane would depart Ankara for arrival Williamsburg about

5 pm Sunday June 21. Overnight stop at Williamsburg (which is quiet and

where there would be no REPEAT no ceremonies or formalities) provides

additional opportunity for rest and is practice followed in many state

visits

Drafted by:

NEA:GTI:KWBracken:jaw
6/16/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Jernegan

Clearances:

U/PR - Mr. King (draft)
White House -

Mr. Komer

S/S - Mr. Christensen

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "OFFICIAL USE
ONLY" OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

visits. Helicopter would bring party to Washington, depart in Williamsburg am. for 55 minute copter trip from Langley AFB, for arrival at White House lawn at 10:30 a.m. Following ceremony and first business meeting with President, Inonu would be accompanied to Blair House by Ambassador Duke and return to White House for luncheon at 1:30 p.m. Balance of schedule (including departure arrangements) as given in Deptel 1359 still stands, except that 3:30 p.m. meeting at White House June 23 has been cancelled. Second meeting with President would begin at 4:30 and joint communique would be issued.

For Athens:

In light of offer to Inonu, President offers to send Presidential jet to bring Papandreou party to Washington and return them to New York or their point of departure from US. Proposed program for Papandreou still not firm but if Presidential plane is used we ~~tentatively plan on~~ arrival Williamsburg 5 p.m. Tuesday June 23, and arrival by helicopter from Langley AFB at 10:00 June 24 for welcoming ceremony on White House lawn to be followed by first meeting with President. ~~Will confirm and provide remainder of suggested schedule.~~ When confirmation of acceptance of plane flashed to you from Ankara you may propose same arrangement to Papandreou. Inform him that it is our understanding that Inonu intends to spend several days in New York. We are presently considering taking Papandreou back to New York by USAF flight arriving New York June 25 at 8:15 p.m. If he does not wish to be in New York at same time as Inonu he might visit some other city before New York or consider departing immediately for Athens. There are

facilities

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

facilities for overnighting at International Hotel at Airport. Portion of visit following arrival New York City is for account of Greeks.

GS-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3250

CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*1. Kerner
2. R...*

77a

June 16, 1964
Date

*Just S/S 6/16
(Sully)*

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

BGR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of cable to Ankara and
Athens

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY Jan ON 10-18-91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

78

6/16

TO: Mr. BUNDY

FROM: Mr. Valenti

Pop *turn*

Out of date now.
PWK

~~ALL~~

B

✓

78a

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

This is a tentative schedule of your meeting with the Turk and the Greek as discussed with Ambassador Duke this morning.

Monday, June 22, 1964

12:15 Prime Minister of Turkey arrives on White House lawn and greeted by President.

12:30 Meeting with Prime Minister

1:30 Lunch with Prime Minister

Sometime between 6:30 and 8 PM a 20 minute drop in at the Turkish reception.

Tuesday, June 23, 1964

Communique meeting begins at 3:30. President will enter meeting at 4:30 and leave at approximately 5 PM.

Wednesday, June 24, 1964

9:30 Prime Minister of Greece arrives on White House lawn and greeted by President.

9:45 Meeting with Prime Minister

Sometime between 6:30 and 8 PM a 20 minute drop in at the Greek reception.

Thursday, June 25, 1964

1:30 Lunch with Prime Minister

4:30 Communique meeting with Prime Minister

NOTE: On June 24th the President will also meet at 12 Noon with
the Prime Minister of Australia

At 1:00 PM on June 24th the President will lunch with the
Prime Minister of Australia.

J. Valenti

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Papandreou Visit 79

35

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

NEA

Info

SS

G

SP

PR

P

USTA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

O

SY

A

OPR

RMR

O P 161640Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
STATE GRNC
BT

1 5 2 8 1

1964 JUN 16 PM 2 06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1913 INFO PRIORITY ANKARA 371 JUNE 16, 7 PM
RE ANKARA'S 558 TO DEPT

WE NOTE ERKIN'S SUGGESTION INONU SPEND JUNE 24 AND 25 AT TURK
EMBASSY WASHINGTON. IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED WE CONSIDER
PAPANDREOU VISIT MUST BE RESCHEDULED SINCE ONLY CONDITION WHICH
PAPANDREOU POSED, AND WHICH US ACCEPTED, WAS THAT HIS VISIT MUST
NOT OVERLAP THAT OF INONU.

GP-3. LABOUISSSE
BT

CFN 1913 371 16 7558 24 25

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:10 PM, JUNE 16.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 2:20 PM, JUNE 16.

NOTE: REF IS ANKARA 1677 TO DEPT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chmly*, NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Papandreou
Visit

80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57

Action

NEA

Info

SS

G

SP

EUR

IO

PR

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

O

SY

A

OPR

RMR

NNNNVV QVA792ATA300
PP RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUQMAT 05A 16/1500Z
P R 161459Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WAFOMC
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
STATE GRNC
BT

0154711

1964 JUN 16 PM 3 43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1911 INFO ANKARA 269 NICOSIA 346 LONDON 332
USUN 131 JUNE 16, 5 PM

FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON
JUST DELIVERED TO EMBASSY. TEXT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER HANDED
TO ME ON JUNE 14TH, BY AMBASSADOR LABOUISSSE AND FOR YOUR KIND
INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE
CYPRUS PROBLEM.

I HAVE GREAT PLEASURE IN ACCEPTING YOUR INVITATION AND I
SHALL BE GLAD TO BE IN WASHINGTON ON JUNE 24 AND 25.

THE KEEN INTEREST SHOWN BY YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, IN THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM AND YOUR EFFORTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF GREEK-TURKISH
RELATIONS ARE INSPIRED BY THE GREAT TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD.

I DO NOT HAVE ANY DOUBTS THAT OUR CONVERSATIONS WILL SERVE
OUR COMMON IDEALS OF PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE.

LOOKING FORWARD WITH GREAT PLEASURE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MEETING
YOU SOON, I AM, SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE A. PAPANDREOU.

UNQUOTE.

IN COVERING LETTER TO AMBASSADOR PAPANDREOU REQUESTED THAT HIS
AIDE-MEMOIRE EMBTEL 1905 SUMMARIZING THE GREEK VIEWS ON THE CYPRUS
QUESTION BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.

LABOUISSSE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly NARA, Date 1-16-06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

81

June 15, 1964

Mr. Bundy:

My own instinct would be to hold this until morning just to keep a gap for form's sake between the Turkish and Greek announcements. But, if the Greeks are likely to announce it at 6:00 this evening (our time) anyway, this probably won't be feasible.

RWK

✓

8/a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57-22
Action
NEA
Info
SS
G
SP
PR
P
NSC
INR
O
SY
A
OPR
RMR

*****ZZ RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUMAT 01A 15/1756Z
Z P 151755Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
STATE GRNC
BT

Pap Visit

FILE COPY 014169
1534 JUN 15 PM 3 08

- ___ BUNDY-SMITH
- ___ ALEXANDER
- ___ BATOR
- ___ BEEK
- ___ BRUBECK
- ___ CHASE
- ___ FORRESTAL
- ___ JESSUP
- ___ JOHNSON
- ___ KENNY
- ___ KLEIN
- ___ ~~HOMER~~
- ___ MOODY
- ___ REEDY
- ___ ~~SEANDERS~~
- ___ SAYRE
- ___ SMITH, WM. ?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION FLASH DEPT 1904 INFO PRIORITY ANKARA 367 LONDON 329
NICOSIA 343 USUN 129 JUNE 15, 8 PM

DEPTEL 1516

LOCAL PRESS ACTIVELY SPECULATING THAT INVITATION HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO PAPANDEOU BY PRESIDENT.

ALTHOUGH PROMISED LETTER FROM PAPANDEOU HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED, RECOMMEND WHITE HOUSE MAKE FOLLOWING RELEASE 6 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME, MIDNIGHT ATHENS TIME TODAY JUNE 15: QUOTE I AM PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU OF GREECE HAS ACCEPTED MY INVITATION AND IS COMING TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION. END QUOTE.
CFN 1904 367 329 343 129 15 8 1516 6 15

PAGE TWO RUMAT 01A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREGOING TEXT MODELED ON WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT INONU VISIT AND FOREIGN OFFICE CONCURRENCE TEXT AND TIMING HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED.

ANDREAS PAPANDEOU JUST CONFIRMED JUNE 24 AND 25 ARE SATISFACTORY PROVIDED IT IS DEFINITE INONU HAS LEFT BY TIME PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL. REASONS PAPANDEOU'S INSISTENCE SET FORTH PARAS ONE AND TWO EMBTEL 1898.

GP-3. LABOUISSIE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 3:09 PM, 6/15/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA AT 3:15 PM, 6/15/64.
PASSED USIA, 6/15/64, 4:00 PM (PER SS)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Proc. 3.4
By clm/ly, NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

Pap

82

Mac -

June 15, 1964

I'm discouraged by Papandreou's acceptance of visit. Now we have two coming with nothing to say to either.

Papandreou's talk with Labouisse (Athens 1898) also shows no signs of give. Regrettably there's no sign that Labouisse did as he was told, and pressed for secret Greek-Turk talks. Nor is there any sign that LBJ pitch to Matsas sank in. Am urging we send Labouisse right back in to do as he was told, and say LBJ wants an answer on secret talks right now. He might hint that Papandreou visit would be useless otherwise (I hope Greeks aren't cannily holding out this plum for visit, but fear they are).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-36
By is, NARA, Date 9-17-04

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

09163
83

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

M

Origin

ACTION: AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 1516

002
Jun 15 12 47 PM '64

SS

Info:

INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8280
USUN 3291
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1349
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 943

Cy 3 destroyed

EXDIS

Embtel 1898

Dates June 24 and 25 satisfactory. We will arrange Inonu visit so he departs before Papandreou arrives.

As requested by Papandreou we will hold up public announcement pending receipt formal letter of acceptance, but we anxious release news soonest.

END

GP-3

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ly* NARA, Date 1-16-06

Drafted by: **NEA: JDJernegan/U: GSSpringsteen:lr**

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

classification approved by: **George W. Ball**

Clearances:

GTI - Mrs. Bracken

S/S - Mr. Read

UPR - Mr. King

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

S/S 8797

June 15, 1964

Kathryn
cc Banfillton
cc R. Chase

84

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

*Mac - letter OK
to me, and
just as good
as Volenti edis.
PWS*

These tentative schedules for
the Inonu and Papandreau visits avoid
any known major conflicts of schedul-
ing for the President.

Would you please let us know as
soon as possible whether the schedules
as outlined are agreeable to the White
House.

Papandreau

Ben Read

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
Washington, D.C.

84a

NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS

JUNE 15, 1964

SUGGESTED PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C., OF HIS
EXCELLENCY GEORGE PAPANDEAU, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

June 23 - 25, 1964

TUESDAY, JUNE 23

p.m. His Excellency George Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece,
and his party will arrive at the John F. Kennedy International
Airport aboard _____, New York City.

(Prime Minister Papandreu will remain overnight at New York -
possibly at the International Hotel at the John F. Kennedy
International Airport.)

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24

- 7:55 a.m. EDT Prime Minister Papandreu will depart the John F. Kennedy
International Airport, New York City, aboard a United States Air
Force special flight. (1 hour and 15 minutes flying time.)
- 9:10 a.m. EDT Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
- 9:20 a.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base by helicopter.
- 9:30 a.m. Prime Minister Papandreu and his party will arrive at the
White House where he will be greeted by the President of the
United States, the Secretary of State, a representative from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and
other officials. Military honors will be rendered.
- 10:00 a.m. The Prime Minister will meet with President Johnson at the
White House.
- 11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Papandreu, accompanied by the Chief of Protocol,
will depart the White House and proceed to Blair House. (Prime
Minister Papandreu will reside at the Blair House during his visit
to Washington.)
- 12:30 p.m. The Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, will give
a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister Papandreu aboard the
USS SEQUOIA.

WEDNESDAY (Contd.)

NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS

- 2 -

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24

- p.m. Open
- p.m. To be scheduled by the Embassy of Greece.

THURSDAY, JUNE 25

- a.m. Possible visit to Arlington National Cemetery where Prime Minister Papandreu will place wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and at the grave of the late President John F. Kennedy.
- 11:00 a.m. The Prime Minister of Greece will meet with the Secretary of State at the Department of State.
- 1:30 p.m. President Johnson will give a luncheon in honor of Prime Minister Papandreu at the White House. (Stag)
- 3:00 p.m. The Prime Minister will return to Blair Hours.
- 4:30 p.m. Prime Minister Papandreu will meet with President Johnson at the White House. (A Joint Communique will be released)
- 6:30 p.m. Prime Minister Papandreu and his party will arrive at the Ellipse. Secretary Rusk will head the Farewell Committee. There will be an exchange of remarks. (No military honors)
- 6:40 p.m. Departure from the Ellipse by helicopter.
- 6:50 p.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.
- 7:00 p.m. EDT Departure from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, aboard United States Air Force special flight. (1 hour and 15 minutes flying time.)
- 8:15 p.m. EDT Arrival at New York City at _____ Airport.

* * * * *

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Burdy 85

H

~~SECRET~~

Action
SS

Info

QVA
RVZTV QMA363QMA528
OO RUEHCR PP RUEHDT
DE RUQMAT 03A 14/2030Z
O P 142025Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUQVMN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1898 INFO PRIORITY
LONDON 326 USUN 128 ANKARA 365 NICOSIA 341 FROM ATHENS
JUNE 14, 11PM

EXDIS

I SAW PAPANDEOU THIS MORNING ACCOMPANIED BY BREWSTER. AFTER PRELIMINARIES, I HANDED OVER PRESIDENTS LETTER. PAPANDEOU READ IT CAREFULLY AND SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO ACCEPT, AND THAT JUNE 24 AND 25 WOULD BE SATISFACTORY PROVIDED INONU HAD THEN LEFT. HE STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST EMBARRASSING IF THEY WERE BOTH THERE AT SAME TIME AND MADE THIS POINT A FLAT CONDITION. HE FEELS IT WOULD BE MOST AWKWARD IF BOTH WERE THERE AT SAME TIME AND THEY DID NOT SEE ONE ANOTHER, AND HE DOES NOT CONSIDER IT POLITICALLY FEAZIBLE TO HAVE A MEETING WITH INONU AT THIS TIME.

I BELIEVE THAT PAPANDEOU IS SINCERE IN HIS BELIEF THAT AN OVER-LAPPING WITH INONU WOULD CAUSE REAL DIFFICULTIES, AND I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT SET THE DATE FOR PAPANDEOU'S ARRIVAL AND MEETING WITH HIM SO AS TO AVOID POSSIBLE OVER-LAPPING.

PAPANDEOU THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT, AS PRACTICAL POLITICIANS, PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND HE WOULD NOT WANT TO HAVE A MEETING WHICH FAILED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED TO MAKE THE GREEK POSITION CLEAR TO ME IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS AND TO MR. BALL LAST WEEK. HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT

J.P. [unclear]
013451
1964 JUN 14 PM 5 49
Cy 12 destroyed

013

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority MEJ 0012-127-11
By SP, NARA, Date 1/5/12

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1898, JUNE 14, 11 P.M., FROM ATHENS

THE GREEK POSITION HAD BEEN FORMULATED "OBJECTIVELY" AND ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT MY UNDERSTANDING THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD IN MIND REACHING A DEFINITE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM DURING THE PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS. HE WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO SHORT-CIRCUIT THE UN. THE PURPOSE OF THE TALKS WAS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD A SOLUTION. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT REPEAT NOT POSING THIS AS A CONDITION TO A MEETING BUT HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO KNOW HIS VIEWS. HE SAID HE WOULD PUT THESE IN A LETTER WHICH HE WOULD DELIVER TO ME THIS EVENING.

THE PRIMIN THEN PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE HIS POSITION, VERY MUCH IN THE SAME WAY HE HAS DONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS AND WITH MR. BALL. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN HIS PRESENTATION, EXCEPT FOR HIS EMPHASIS ON FACT THAT ENTRY OF SOVIETS IN PICTURE HAD MADE CYPRUS ISSUE A GREAT DEAL MORE FAR-REACHING THAN SIMPLY A GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEM. FROM THE "SECURITY" POINT OF VIEW, THE ONLY HOPE WAS "NATOFICATION," INCLUDING A NATO BASE WHICH COULD HAVE TURKISH NATO PERSONNEL. FROM "MORAL" VIEWPOINT THERE SHOULD BE SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PRESENT LIMITED INDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE LIFTED AND SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISED IN THE FORM OF A PLEBISCITE (RESULTING IN UNION WITH GREECE) TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE UN FORCES LEAVE THE ISLAND; I. E. , WITHIN THREE MONTHS. HE STRESSED THAT AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS WOULD MEAN A CUBA AND A PARTITIONED CYPRUS WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY TO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 400,000 GREEKS AND THE 100,000 TURKS WHICH WOULD ONLY CONTINUE THE CRISIS SITUATION.

HE ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT ABOUT THIS. REVERTING TO HIS SECURITY ARGUMENT, I SUGGESTED THAT TURKS MIGHT WELL THINK DOUBLE ENOSIS WOULD BEST SERVE PURPOSE. HE REPLIED THAT EVEN IF HE SHOULD ORDER PARTITION THE POPULATION OF THE ISLAND WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT AND CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS WOULD ENSUE. IN BOTH CASES THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE THE WINNERS. ONLY BY A CLOSE LINK WITH THE WEST COULD THIS BE AVERTED.

I OBSERVED THAT EVEN THOUGH HIS ARGUMENTS MIGHT SOUND "OBJECTIVE" TO MANY, THERE WAS STILL AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR AND POLITICAL REALITIES WHICH INONU HAD TO FACE. I SUGGESTED THAT IF MENDERES HAD BEEN ALBE TO NEGOTIATE A DEAL WHICH DISALLOWED ENOSIS, IT WOULD BE EXPECTING A LOT FOR INONU TO ACCEPT IT. I REPEATED THE QUESTION I HAD OFTEN POSED TO HIM -- WHAT COULD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1898, JUNE 14, 11 P.M., FROM ATHENS

BE DONE TO MEET INONU HALF WAY? HE CAME BACK TO HIS "SECURITY" ARGUMENT, REPEATING THAT THE NEW FACTOR SINCE 1959 WAS THAT SOV UNION WAS ON SCENE AND WOULD BE MUDDYING WATERS. HE FELT THAT THE US SHOULD STRESS HEAVILY TO INONU THAT NATO-FICATION WOULD ACHIEVE THE SECURITY OF THE ISLAND WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK AND TURKEY WOULD NOT HAVE A CUBA OFF ITS SOUTHERN SHORE. THIS SOLUTION COULD ALSO GET MAKARIOS OUT OF THE WAY WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE TURKISH GOVT WITH ITS PROBLEM OF FACE. ALSO, COMPENSATION COULD BE PROVIDED FOR THE TURK CYPRIOTS WHO WANTED TO MOVE TO THE MAINLAND, AND FURTHER ECONOMIC AID FROM THE WEST MIGHT BE PROMISED. HE UNDERLINED (MORE FOR US BENEFIT, I THINK, THAN FOR THE TURKS) THAT THIS SOLUTION WOULD BE A LASTING ONE AND ARRIVED AT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES.

I PRESSED HIM ON SCORE AS TO WHETHER COMPENSATION HE WAS OFFERING WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE TURKISH POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM FACING INONU. HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO ABOVE. WHEN I TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON QUESTION OF POSSIBLE TERRITORIAL EXCHANGES BASED ON NEWS REPORTS HE TOOK STANDARD GREEK LINE THAT GIVING UP ISLANDS SUCH AS CHIOS, MYTILINI OR SAMOS WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE. IT WOULD LEAD TO REVOLUTION IN GREECE.

OUR TALK, WHICH WAS HIGHLY INFORMAL (NO OTHER GREEKS PRESENT) AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT, DID NOT TOUCH ON DISPLACEMENT OF ISTANBUL POPULATION AND PATRIARCHATE.

AS TO PUBLICITY CONCERNING THE VISIT, HE STATED THAT UNTIL HE HAD SENT A FORMAL REPLY OF ACCEPTANCE AND HAD RECEIVED FURTHER WORD FROM US, HE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY STATEMENT. HE WOULD PARRY QUESTIONS WITH FORMULA "I HAVE RECEIVED NO FORMAL INVITATION." PUBLICITY FROM U. S. SIDE SHOULD BE HELD UP ALSO, PENDING CONSIDERATION OF CONTENT OF FORMAL LETTER, WHICH WILL BE CABLED AS SOON AS RECEIVED. MEANWHILE, I SHALL APPRECIATE COMMENTS RE DATE OF MEETING IN LIGHT PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE.

GP-1
LABOUIS
BT
CFN 1 2 GP-1

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/14/64-603PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA 6/14/64-645PM

~~SECRET~~

08922

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

86
F
4

M

Origin
SS
Info

ACTION:	Amembassy ATHENS	FLASH	1513
INFO:	Amembassy ANKARA		1346
	LONDON		8262
	NICOSIA		941
USUN			3280

Jun 13 2 16 PM '64

Pop & Cyprus 003

EXDIS

In light of your 1886, you authorized to sound out Papandreou on visit here, saying President would be happy to have him come if he so desired. In this connection, you should make crystal clear that invitation to Inonu given last week was an essential part of President's successful effort to turn off Turk intervention. We had to offer Inonu an outlet for his frustration. FYI. Since this invitation was emphatically in Greek interest, we see no occasion for Papandreou to feel offended. END FYI.

Drawing on themes President used with Ambassador Matsas, ~~xxm~~ (see ~~SEPTEL~~) you should also press home that President sees most acute need as opening of Greek-Turk talks to get Cyprus started on road to peaceful solution. We have no intent or desire to short circuit the UN, but Greece as well as Turkey ~~an~~ has a separate and equally important requirement for preventing further critical

6/13/64

Drafted by: NEA: JDJernegan: GTI: KBracken
White House: McG. Bundy

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S: Mr. Read

IO - Mr. Cleveland (substance)
U - Mr. Springsteen

U/PR - Amb. Duke

Mr. King
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly* NARA, Date 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

deterioration in Greek-Turk relations, with all its implications for the ultimate security of both nations.

If Papandreou does express desire to come to US now, you should present following letter of invitation from President:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am glad that you and Under Secretary Ball had a useful exchange of views during his stop in Athens last week. It seems to me that this talk, together with Mr. Ball's discussions the next day in Ankara, have opened up certain perspectives which it would be most helpful if you and I could pursue together. I should be most ~~great~~ grateful if you would find it possible to come to Washington as soon as convenient for you after June 24. Prime Minister Inonu has agreed to come on June 22, and I think this makes it even more important that you and I have an opportunity to exchange views personally on ways to get ahead on the Cyprus problem.

As I told your Ambassador, I think it imperative that we find ways to stop the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations and bring the ~~Cyprus~~ Cyprus difficulties to a quick ~~conclusion~~ conclusion. From the reports of Mr. Ball and Ambassador Labouisse, I have concluded that

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

you share this view and agree that continuation of the present state of affairs would only provide a fertile field for Communist penetration not only on the Island but in other parts of the eastern Mediterranean. You and I have a profound common interest in preventing such instability in the area as might lead to a renewal of the Communist aggression our two countries fought in the early days of the Truman Doctrine.

I hope you agree that time is of the essence and can give me an early response. We should be able to launch a course of action which will lead Greece, Turkey and all concerned back to the happier state of affairs which was so sadly interrupted last December.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

UNQUOTE

You should, of course, emphasize to Prime Minister that this invitation represents first step in the increased activity by US Government in regard to Cyprus which Papandreou urged upon Mr. Ball during his visit to Athens. It should in no way be regarded as a summons but rather as evidence of great ^{friendship} ~~friendship~~ and most earnest desire to be helpful in solving tragic problem. If necessary, you may explain that present constitutional position in United States makes it

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

impossible for President to leave country. Therefore, failure to offer to come to Athens should in no way be taken as a slight. The President's schedule is taken from June 26 through July 2 because of state visits or absence from Washington. If Papandreou accepts in principle and suggests date, we suggest you push for June 24-25.

END

ANDREW
RUSK

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Message to Prime Minister Papandreu
Conveying Invitation to Visit Washington

The President has agreed to invite Prime Minister Papandreu of Greece to Washington for a working visit after June 24. This invitation is closely related to that to Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey, which we anticipate will be accepted for release Saturday, June 13, assuming Prime Minister Inonu accepts. Tactically it is desirable that the invitation to Prime Minister Papandreu be known to him before the announcement of Prime Minister Inonu's acceptance. The Department would therefore appreciate it if the enclosed suggested message of invitation could be approved as soon as possible.

B. H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Message

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec 3.4
By *chm/j* NARA, Date *1-16-06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

June 13, 1964/11:30 am

866

AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH

Info: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USUN

EXDIS

*Sent to S/S Red
July 6/13 - 12:10 pm
Called S/S to check.*

In light of your 1886, you authorized to sound out Papandreou on visit here, saying President would be happy to have him come if he so desired. In this connection, you should make crystal clear that invite to Inonu given last week was an essential part of President's successful effort to turn off Turk intervention. We had to offer Inonu an outlet for his frustration. FYI. Since this invitation was emphatically in Greek interest, we see no occasion for Papandreou to feel offended, ~~and if this proves to be the case, you should frankly tell him so.~~ END FYI.

(see sept)

Drawing on themes President used with Ambassador Matsas, you should also press home that President sees most acute need as opening of Greek-Turk talks to get Cyprus started on road to peaceful solution. We have no intent or desire to short-circuit the UN, but Greece as well as Turkey has a separate and equally important requirement for preventing further critical deterioration in Greek-Turk relations, with all its implications for the ultimate security of both nations.

If Papandreou does express desire to come to US now, you ~~may~~ present following letter of invitation from President:

Shurel

Then add attached cable

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4
By *com/ly*, NARA, Date 1-16-06

3174
860

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

add to preceding draft

Amembassy ATHENS FLASH

INFO: Amembassy ANKARA
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy NICOSIA
USUN

EXDIS

Please deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister:

VERBATIM TEXT:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am ^{glad} [delighted] that you and Under Secretary Ball had [such] a useful exchange of views during his stop in Athens last week. It seems to me that this talk, together with Mr. Ball's discussions the next day in Ankara, have opened up certain ^{perspectives} ~~prospects~~ which it would be most helpful if you and I could pursue together. I should be most grateful if you would find it possible to come to Washington as soon as convenient for you after June 24. Prime Minister Inonu has agreed to come on June 22, and I think this makes it even more important that you and I have an opportunity to exchange views personally on ways to get ahead on the Cyprus problem.

As ^{I told you Ambassador} [Mr. Ball told you] I think it imperative that we find ways to stop the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations and bring the Cyprus difficulties to a quick conclusion. From the reports of Mr. Ball and Ambassador Labouisse, I have concluded that you share this view and agree that continuation of the

NEA:JDJernegan:GTI:KBracken:eac
6/12/64

IO - Mr. Cleveland (substance)
~~By~~ U-Mr. Springsteen

White House -

s/s
~~Under Secretary of State~~
U/PR-Ambassador Duke
Mr. King

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

RECORDED
E.O. 12812-2.4
By *cm/fj* DATE *6/16/66*

2

Embassy ATHENS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

present state of affairs would only provide a fertile field for Communist penetration not only on the Island but in other parts of the eastern Mediterranean. You and I have a profound common interest in preventing ^{such} any recurrence of instability in the area ^{AS} that might lead to a renewal of the Communist aggression our two countries fought in the early days of the Truman Doctrine.

I hope you agree that time is of the essence and can give me an early response. We ~~should be able to launch a course of action which will lead~~ Greece, Turkey and all concerned back to the happier state of affairs which was so sadly interrupted last December.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson" END VERBATIM TEXT.

OK You should, of course, emphasize to Prime Minister that this invitation represents first step in the increased activity by U.S. Government in regard to Cyprus which Papandreou urged upon Mr. Ball during his visit to Athens. It should in no way be regarded as a summons but rather as evidence of great friendship and most earnest desire to be helpful in solving tragic problem. If necessary, you may explain that present constitutional position in United States makes it impossible for President to leave country. Therefore, failure to offer to come to Athens should in no way be taken as a slight. The President's schedule is taken from June 26 through July 2 because of state visits or absence from Washington. If Papandreou ~~can~~ accepts in principle and suggests date, we suggest you push for June 24-25.

GP-3

END

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W/H 87

M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

OO RUEHCRR
DE RUQMAT 02A 13/1039Z
O R 13/1034Z ZEA

SS

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

1 2 9 9 6

Info

INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 JUN 13 AM 8:22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy taken 002

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1886 INFO ANKARA 360 JUNE 13, 1 PM

E X D I S

RE DEPTTEL 1509

1. IN MY OPINION AN INVITATION AT THIS TIME TO PAPANDEOU FOR WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAS LESS THAN FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. THE ONE REASON WHY I DO NOT CONSIDER REFUSAL AS SURE BET IS THAT PAPANDEOU MAY NOT WANT TO FEEL LEFT OUT OF THINGS AND HE MAY BELIEVE THAT A VISIT WILL GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY TO USE LARGER STAGE TO PROMOTE HIS VIEWS. I BELIEVE THAT STRONGER FORCES WOULD LEAD HIM TO REFUSE VISIT AT THIS TIME. SUCH A VISIT, FOLLOWING MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND INOYOU, WOULD BE TAKEN BY MOST GREEKS AS EFFORT ON OUR PART TO ASSUME ROLE OF ARBITER AND TO SHOVE UN ASIDE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED HERE.

CFN 1886 360 13 1 1509 1.

PAGE TWO RUQMAT 02A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. IF PRESIDENT DECIDES TO ISSUE INVITATION, SUGGEST THAT I FIRST BE AUTHORIZED TO SOUND OUT PAPANDEOU IN ORDER TO AVOID UNNECESSARY UNPLEASANTNESS IF HE IS FIRMLY OPPOSED.

3. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, I BELIEVE THAT SOLUTION CYPRUS QUESTION WILL REPEAT WILL REQUIRE SOME USG PRESSURE. HOWEVER, TIMING AND MANNER ARE MOST IMPORTANT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD FORM OUTLINE OF SOLUTION WE THINK IN OUR BEST INTERESTS AND WHICH HAS SOME CHANCE OF ACHIEVEMENT. THEN WE SHOULD WORK QUIETLY ON PARTIES TO ACHIEVE IT, MEANWHILE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO REVERSE TENDENCIES ON BOTH SIDES TOWARD ESCALATION. THIS MAY TAKE BIT MORE TIME BUT I SINCERELY BELIEVE IT WILL BE MORE PRODUCTIVE.

GP-3. LABOUISSÉ

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:00 AM 6/13/64

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN AT 9:45 AM 6/13/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Dec 31

By *cbm/y* NARA, Date 1-16-06

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH 88

~~SECRET~~

Pop

F
S

52
Action
SS

013305

Info

VV QVA293VV QMA418EATA071
OO RUEHCR
DE RUQMAT 10A 13/2200Z
OO 132150Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC

1964 JUN 13 PM 6 40

003

BT
~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE (1895) JUNE 13, 11:45 PM

EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KAY BRACKEN, I SOUNDED OUT PAPANDEOU. HE IS RECEPTIVE AND I PLAN TO DELIVER PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF INVITATION TOMORROW (SUNDAY) MORNING AT 11:30.

2. BECAUSE OF DELICACY POLITICAL SITUATION HERE, I HOPE NO ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THIS WILL BE MADE FROM WASHINGTON PENDING FURTHER WORD FROM ME. IT IS OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT GREEKS MAY LEAK IN MEANTIME, BUT I DOUBT IT. IF THEY DO, IT WILL PROBABLY BE FOR PURPOSE PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION.

GP-3

LABOUISSSE

BT

CFN: 1895 13 11:45 1 11:30 2 GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 6-13-64, 6:43 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN 6-13-64, 6:59 PM

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526
By *Cham/ly* NARA, 2008 1-16-06

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

INCOMING TELE AM Department of State

Cyprus
Pap. Anax
 89

UNCLASSIFIED

53

Action VV QVA100163ATA972

012472

RR RUEHC RUDSC
 NEA DE RUQMAT 808 12/1910Z

1964 JUN 12 PM 5:33

Info ZNR
 R 121900Z ZNH

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 SS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
 G INFO RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 SP RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 EUR RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
 IO STATE GRNC

P UNCLAS ACTION DEPT (1882) INFO LONDON 321 ANKARA 356 NICOSIA 335
 USIA THESSALONIKI UNN FROM ATHENS TWELFTH

NSC PM PAPANDEOU MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT JUNE 10 ON HIS TALKS
 INR WITH UNDER SECRETARY BALL:
 CIA

NSA QUOTE: LAST FRIDAY NIGHT (JUNE 5) I SENT PERSONAL MESSAGE TO
 OSD MR. JOHNSON IN VIEW OF TURKISH THREATS CONCERNING INVASION. AFTER
 ARM THAT MR. JOHNSON ADVISED MR. BALL TO COME TO ATHENS TO COMMUNICATE
 NAV WITH ME AND TO GIVE ME PERSONALLY PRESIDENT'S ANSWER. THIS WAS
 AIR EXPLANATION MR. BALL GAVE ME FOR HIS VISIT. ON THIS OPPORTUNITY I
 SET FORTH TO MR. BALL GREEK VIEWS ON QUESTION AND I AM HAPPY THAT
 I WAS GIVEN THIS POSSIBILITY FOR DIRECT TALKS. END QUOTE

RMR REPLYING TO QUESTION AS TO MANNER IN WHICH US HAD PREVENTED
 INVASION, PM SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW "EXTENT" TO WHICH INVASION
 HAD BEEN ACTUALLY PREPARED AND WHETHER IT HAD BEEN FINALLY DECIDED
 UPON, BUT SAID THAT "CONFIRMATION THAT IT WAS AVERTED WAS ENOUGH FOR
 ME". IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION PAPANDEOU SAID THAT WITH AVERTING
 OF INVASION TENSION HAD EASED ALTHOUGH HE ADDED "WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN
 FUTURE I CANNOT PREDICT". ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD OCCURRED NEW EVENT
 WHICH PROMPTED BALL VISIT, PM REPLIED "THERE WAS NO RPT NO NEW EVENT".
 PM ALSO DENIED THAT BALL HAD DELIVERED INVITATION FOR HIM TO MEET
 WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER BALL WAS PLAYING ROLE
 OF MEDIATOR, PM SAID UNDER SECRETARY WAS MEETING WITH GOVERNMENTS
 OF GREECE AND TURKEY "BUT THAT DOES NOT RPT NOT MEAN MEDIATION
 (OPP. KATHIMERINI ALONE OF ATHENS PAPERS QUOTED PM AS SAYING HE WAS
 "NEITHER OPTIMISTIC NOR PESSIMISTIC" FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH BALL.
 PAPER CLAIMED PM'S OFFICE LATER ASKED THIS STATEMENT BE DELETED.)

ON JUNE 12 "GOVT SOURCE" ISSUED CORRECTION OF PM'S STATEMENT
 THAT HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS SENT JUNE 5 AND SAID MESSAGE
 WAS ACTUALLY SENT JUNE 8 AFTER PM'S RETURN FROM CRETE. SOURCE ADDED
 THAT MESSAGE CONTAINED NO APPEAL TO PRESIDENT TO AVERT TURKISH INVASION
 BUT THANKED PRESIDENT FOR STOPPING TURKISH MILITARY ACTION.
 LABOUISSE

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
 PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"