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Talking Points

Our goals in your luncheon meeting with the King are to

- (1) indicate our strong desire for continued good relations with Greece,
- (2) assure the King of our appreciation of the importance of the monarchy to Greece and of the constructive role he has played since the Greek coup,
- (3) express the concern of the American Government and people at the suspension of democratic processes in Greece and our strongest hope that they will be restored, and
- (4) impress upon the King the need to avoid chaos or civil war in Greece.

In this connection, you may wish to point out the following:

1. Bilateral U.S. - Greek Relations

- a. We continue to consider Greece as an important NATO ally, and are thankful for the cooperation accorded to us by the Greek Government during the mid-East crisis;

- b. We fully appreciate the difficult role played by the King since the April 21 coup in encouraging the Greek Government to moderate its policies and to take steps leading towards a return to constitutionalism, without at the same time undermining his own relationship with the government leaders or provoking them to a final confrontation.

- c. The American Government and people were deeply troubled by the overthrow of the constitutional government of Greece and the arrest of large numbers of political prisoners. It was in this context that we suspended shipment of major military items to Greece

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and placed our entire MAP to Greece under review. We believe that by moving steadily to restore constitutional processes and by early release of all or most of the political prisoners, the Greek Government could more fully develop its traditionally close relations with the United States and the American people.

2. Foreign Affairs

a. Cyprus - The King will expect some acknowledgment of his efforts to improve Greek-Turkish relations by pushing for high-level Greek-Turkish government negotiations on Cyprus; you may wish to praise the King's efforts in this respect and particularly his success in achieving a meeting of Greek-Turkish Prime Ministers September 9-10. You may also wish to reaffirm our support for constructive efforts aimed at solving this disruptive issue, an issue which by disrupting Greek-Turkish cooperation weakens free world defenses in the Mid-East at a time of intensified Soviet activity in the area.

b. Vietnam - You may wish to discuss briefly the current situation in Vietnam.

c. NATO - While expressing our regret that the question of the Greek political changes has become a subject of dissension within the NATO alliance, you may wish to point out that it was inevitable that the coup would provoke an unfavorable reaction among some members of the alliance. However, we believe this reaction could be largely overcome by concrete evidence of a return to democratic processes in Greece.

d. Yugoslavia - We consider it unfortunate that the traditionally good relations between Greece and Yugoslavia have been adversely affected by the change of government in Greece, due in part to the extreme sensitivity on the part of the Yugoslavs to recent world events. It might be helpful if the Greeks might take some steps to reassure exaggerated Yugoslav fears of

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Greek intentions toward it, particularly since such fears strengthen the position of those conservative Communist elements opposed to liberal trends in Yugoslav development.

3. Economic

Express our satisfaction that the Greek Government has taken steps to encourage foreign investment by removing bureaucratic and other obstacles to such investment and our hope that Greece will move forward on the economic front.

Points King Constantine May Raise

1. Resumption of Full United States Military Assistance to Greece

a. The King will probably ask for full resumption of military assistance to Greece.

b. You might respond that while it is our desire to release some of the items now under suspension, the continuing adverse public and Congressional opinion in the United States over political developments in Greece has made it difficult to do so. However, we are exploring the possibility of releasing a limited number of items at this time. You might add that as soon as the Greek Government gives further concrete evidence that it is moving towards constitutionalism and the release of the political prisoners, the U.S. Government would be disposed to consider resumption of delivery of the suspended items.

2. Assistance for the King in the Event of a Confrontation with the Junta

a. It is likely that the King will ask for assurance of United States support in any confrontation he might have with the coup government, including possible evacuation of himself and his family if their lives were

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endangered.

b. You might respond that it is our profound hope that a confrontation between the King and the junta be avoided, since such a confrontation might plunge the country into chaos. While we firmly believe that the King should continue to press the junta towards a return of constitutionalism, he should not push matters to the point of a confrontation. If, despite the King's best efforts, a confrontation resulted over a refusal by the junta to move towards a restoration of democratic processes on a key issue and where the King's acquiescence would seriously undermine his position and influence, we would reflect in our public posture our support of a return to constitutionalism. However, there could be no United States military intervention. Possible movements of units of the Sixth Fleet to Greek waters, for political purposes only, would have to be decided at the time in light of existing circumstances.

Should the King's life and that of his family be endangered in such a confrontation, we would exert our influence on behalf of the safety of the King and his family. However, because of the risks involved to the individuals concerned, we would not attempt to evacuate the Royal family against the wishes of the junta.

You might wish to reiterate the point that we support the efforts of the King in furtherance of the peaceful return of Greece to democratic processes. At the same time, we are convinced that achievement of this objective would be undermined by a confrontation.

3. Cyprus

a. The King may ask for United States participation in the Greek-Turkish dialogue to bring about a solution to the Cyprus question, noting that the two sides are close together and need only a push from outside to reach a final agreement.

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b. You might respond that we continue to believe that the Cyprus problem can be solved only by agreement among the parties concerned. Therefore, we do not believe that our participation at the present time would be helpful. However, we do not preclude such participation at a future date if we were convinced that we could play a constructive role, and if both parties desired it.

4. Request for Economic Assistance

a. It is possible that the King may request you to support a program loan of \$70 million for Greece to assist with the reconstruction of earthquake damaged areas.

b. You might respond that while the United States Government could not provide a program loan, the Export-Import Bank would be prepared to consider applications for financing soundly conceived and economically desirable projects as well as to continue its supplier credit guarantee facility for purchases of U.S. capital equipment on appropriate credit terms.

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September 7, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

SCOPE PAPER

I. The Setting

King Constantine's visit to Washington comes at a troubled time for both Greece and the Greek monarchy. The military coup of April 21, 1967, which put an end to two years of crisis and tension in Greek political life, has raised serious national and international problems for Greece.

II. The King's Aim

The King's role in his visit to Washington is a difficult one, since his aims are somewhat contradictory. While on the one hand he must serve as a pleader for the cause of the junta, on the other he seeks assurances of support should the junta move against him. This is due to the fact that the future relationship of the King and the Greek junta remains uncertain; while for the moment the coup leaders need the King for the prestige and legitimacy he accords them, at least some of the officers supporting the junta consider the monarchy a needless luxury which should eventually be dispensed with. For his part, the King is suspicious of the junta's ultimate intentions both as regards himself and an eventual return to constitutionalism. This suspicion is reinforced by his realization that too close an identification with the coup leaders might jeopardize the future of the monarchy in Greece when the present government leaves or falls from power. Thus the King must walk a narrow line between openly opposing the regime and embracing it.

In his talk with the President the King is likely to make a strong case for full resumption of military assistance to Greece as a means of influencing the regime favorably towards the United States and making it more willing to accept suggestions aimed

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at restoring democratic processes. However, at some point, probably when speaking to the President alone, he will ask for assurances that the United States will provide him with some kind of assistance--material or psychological--in the event of a confrontation with the junta.

III. Our Aims in Greece

For a number of reasons we consider it advantageous to maintain close relations with Greece. Greece has been a valued member of NATO since 1951, and occupies a strategic location on NATO's southeastern flank. We have important installations and facilities in Greece which contribute to our national security. Moreover, the recent crisis in the Middle East, during which the Greek Government extended full cooperation to us, dramatized once more the importance to the United States of maintaining good relations with the government controlling this vital land, sea and air space. This is particularly pertinent in view of stepped-up Soviet activities in this area.

However, to a degree the coup in Greece has been injurious to our interests. It has marred the image of NATO as an organization of democratic states and has come perilously close to provoking a serious crisis within NATO. This disruptive potential for NATO remains. Further, the imposition of a dictatorship in a traditionally democratic country closely allied to the United States has deeply disturbed American public opinion and has had an unfavorable impact on Congressional attitudes towards aid to Greece and, to some degree, towards foreign military aid in general.

In view of these considerations, our current aims in Greece are (1) to preserve our traditionally close ties with that country while (2) exerting our leverage on the government to move in the direction of constitutionalism and the restoration of democratic processes.

In working towards this aim, we should continue to support the King as the most effective means of exerting leverage on the

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government to move towards constitutionalism. The King is the constitutional head of state, he is pro-U.S. and anti-Communist in philosophy, and represents the best hope of unifying the Greeks behind some future representative government. However, in working through the King we should avoid placing too much pressure on him, inasmuch as we consider it vitally important that a confrontation between the King and junta be avoided, since such a clash might produce a chaotic situation which would lend itself to exploitation by the extreme left. We, like the King, must walk a narrow line in pushing the government in the direction we wish it to go, without provoking it into a strongly antagonistic position.

IV. Strategy

The current meeting with the King offers an opportunity to further United States aims vis-a-vis Greece. Within the framework described above, we should reiterate to the King the importance we place on the maintenance of close U. S. - Greek relations and our recognition of Greece's significance to NATO. We should encourage him in his course of pressing the coup leaders in the direction of a return to constitutionalism without bringing matters to the point of a final confrontation. To counter any feeling of insecurity he may have regarding our attitude toward him, we should also make clear to him our appreciation of the monarchy as a unifying force and stabilizing institution in Greek political life. The very fact that the President is meeting the King will strengthen the King's prestige with the coup leaders.

At the same time, we should describe to him frankly the prevailing unfavorable public and Congressional attitude towards the authoritarian regime in Greece, deriving both from the traditional American devotion to the principles of freedom as well as U. S. disappointment that the birthplace of democracy should fall under authoritarian rule. In particular, the concern of our government and people at the arrest and detention without formal charges of more than two thousand persons for political reasons should be emphasized.

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It should then be pointed out to the King that, in view of this attitude on the part of the Congress and people, it would be exceedingly difficult to resume full shipments of military assistance at this time. However, we will explore the possibility of releasing a few items at this time (such as the minesweeper, F-104 trainer, etc.). Finally, the King could be assured that at such time as the coup government takes concrete steps in the direction of constitutionalism, the American Government would be in a position to favorably consider broad resumption of military aid.

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

SCHEDULE

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11

10:30 a.m. His Majesty King Constantine of the Hellenes, accompanied by His Excellency Leonidas Papagos, Marshal of the Court, will depart from Quonset Point Naval Air Station, Rhode Island, aboard a United States Air Force special flight. (Flying time: 1 hr. 30 min)

12:00 noon Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

12:10 p.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base by helicopter.

12:20 p.m. Arrival at President's Park (Ellipse), Washington, D.C.

12:30 p.m. His Majesty will arrive at the White House where he will meet with President Johnson.

1:00 p.m. Luncheon at the White House with President Johnson.

3:30 p.m. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with Chairman J.W. Fulbright as host, will give a coffee in honor of His Majesty in Room S-116 at the Capitol.

4:45 p.m. Departure from the Capitol.

5:30 p.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

5:45 p.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base aboard a United States Air Force special flight. (Flying time: 1 hour 30 minutes)

Arrival at Quonset Point Naval Air Station, Rhode Island.

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BACKGROUND
II. PAPERS

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KCG/B-5

September 6, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

POSSIBLE KING-JUNTA CONFRONTATION

Background of King-Junta Relationship

The coup of April 21, 1967 took King Constantine completely by surprise. Although he made an initial effort to contact his key military commanders to resist the coup, when it became apparent that the coup leaders had won over or effectively neutralized all major military commands, and that resistance on his part might plunge the nation into a civil war, the King reluctantly accepted the coup as a fait accompli. However, although he agreed to preside over the first Cabinet meeting of the new government, he refused to sign the royal decree suspending certain articles of the Constitution which therefore went into effect without his signature.

The King's relationship to the coup leaders remains tenuous. While constantly exerting pressure on the junta to move towards constitutionalism, he has been reluctant to push too hard lest he provoke an actual confrontation. Consequently, he has given in on a number of disagreements with the junta where he felt basic principles were not at stake. However, he has encouraged Army generals not identified with the coup to reassert their authority within the armed forces, and he has attempted to gauge the loyalty of the key military commanders whose support would be crucial in any confrontation with the coup leaders.

For their part, the coup leaders at the present time consider the King a necessity both because of the legitimacy he accords the new regime as well as because of his strength among the senior

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officers. In addition, the King is widely believed to have the support of the U. S. Government, and the coup leaders believe that any move against the King would antagonize the U. S. However, there are indications that at least some of the junta members consider the monarchy a needless luxury which should eventually be eliminated.

Possible Causes of a King-Junta Confrontation

Although there are several possible developments which could provoke a King-Junta confrontation, the most likely would ensue following some action by the coup leaders making clear that they do not intend to return to democratic processes. Examples of such action would be their rejection of the revised constitution now being prepared by a committee of jurists, or by their taking steps to oust the civilian Prime Minister and establishing a true military dictatorship under Colonel Papadopoulos or another junta figure. In either case the King would probably challenge the coup leaders, either by demanding their resignations or even arresting them. In such an event the coup leaders would probably attempt to depose the King.

Requests for U. S. Assistance

Immediately after the April 21 coup, the King raised through Ambassador Talbot the question of U. S. assistance to evacuate him and his family in the event his position became untenable. After consideration at a high level in the State Department, it was decided that if it became impossible for the King to remain in Greece, the U. S. Government would assist in evacuating the Royal Family, although not secretly (as requested by the King) but following notification to the Greek authorities. At the same time, we reiterated our conviction to the King that if at all possible he should endeavor to remain in Greece where he could continue to exert leverage for an eventual return to constitutionalism.

Within a few days, the danger passed, and the King did not formally request evacuation assistance. However, in the months since the coup the King has on a number of occasions raised with Ambassador Talbot the question of possible U. S. assistance in the

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event a King-Junta confrontation took place. Among the suggestions made by the King have been the following: (1) a landing by U. S. marines near Athens, not for combat reasons but as a "show of force" along the lines of the Lebanon landing in 1958; (2) the positioning of units of the Sixth Fleet in Greek waters prior to or during a confrontation, as a gesture of support for the King; (3) a sympathetic U. S. public posture towards the King in the event of a confrontation, including a U. S. statement reaffirming U. S. support for the King's efforts to return the country to constitutionalism, and (4) evacuation of the King and his family in the event their lives were in danger.

In his conversations with the King, Ambassador Talbot has consistently discouraged His Majesty from counting on active U. S. intervention in the event of a confrontation with the junta, particularly in the form of troop landings, although the Ambassador has not precluded the possibility of some kind of U. S. psychological support for the King. However, Ambassador Talbot has repeatedly expressed to the King the U. S. view that while he should continue to encourage the government to move towards constitutionalism, he should not provoke the coup leadership into a confrontation which could possibly lead to armed conflict and chaos.

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KCG/6

September 6, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE

September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR A PROGRAM LOAN TO GREECE

King Constantine, during his meeting with President Johnson on September 11, may ask the President to arrange a \$70 million program loan to Greece to assist with the reconstruction of earthquake damaged areas.

The past several Greek governments have suggested to United States officials that Greece should be given a long-term program loan of \$70 million to finance the importation of U. S. commodities which would be sold in Greece for drachma to finance the local currency cost of Greek development projects.

The Greek Minister of Coordination on August 24 again raised with Ambassador Talbot the need for a \$70 million program loan to be related to earthquake reconstruction. He stated that King Constantine will make a personal appeal to President Johnson for such a loan.

Our Embassy in Athens in all its discussions with the Greek authorities has explained that the U. S. Government, which terminated its grant economic aid program to Greece in 1962, would have difficulty both in providing and in justifying a program loan. At the same time, the Embassy has emphasized that the Export-Import Bank is prepared to consider loans for worthwhile projects, but the Greek Government has been slow in submitting such applications.

Our Embassy has concluded that there is a real need for earthquake relief in the stricken areas and that reconstruction could be met basically from Greek resources. The Embassy believes that some

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tangible offer of assistance would strengthen the King's position considerably in Greece.

Congressman Roman Pucinski, in a meeting in Athens with Minister of Interior Patakos on August 26 and following visits to the damaged areas, said he would lead a Congressional effort to provide \$15 million in earthquake relief for Greece.

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September 6, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

Objectives

United States grant military assistance has been provided to Greece since the Truman Doctrine of 1947 to enhance U. S. security by maintaining Greece's commitment to the Free World; to assist Greece in developing and maintaining military forces capable of resisting aggression and adequately supporting NATO and free world commitments; and to assure continued availability to the United States and its allies of overflight, staging, and base privileges as well as communication facilities.

Authority

Military assistance is provided under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the required enabling agreements. A Presidential Aide Memoire exchanged with Greece in 1963 proposed the continuation of military assistance subject to the availability of funds.

Current Military Threat

Greece faces a threat of limited war and the common threat of a general war from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Greece blocks direct Communist access to the Aegean Sea through Hellenic Thrace. Bulgaria, whose army and air force are well equipped and effective, is the primary military threat to Greece, while Albania and Yugoslavia are considered to be only minor threats.

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NARA, Date 03-20-2013

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Greek Capabilities and Contributions

Greek forces are essential to NATO's deterrent capability. The Greek Army is less mobile and has fewer medium tanks and artillery than the Bulgarian Army. Naval effectiveness is limited by some obsolescence, but the Greek Navy can provide limited anti-submarine, mine warfare, and amphibious support. The Greek Air Force is reasonably effective but has the disadvantage of having 50 per cent less jet combat aircraft than Bulgaria. Greece's capability to meet the military threat depends almost entirely on U. S. assistance which provides almost all the capital type military equipment. Greece has made a concerted effort to procure or to produce locally some items previously provided by MAP. The major Greek contribution has been in commercial consumable support (MAP supply terminated in 1966), in-country ammunition production, rehabilitation of vehicles, increased industrial capability, chemicals, electronics, construction materials, and ship construction and overhaul.

MAP Accomplishments

The program, by providing modern aircraft, weapons, ships, and training, has been responsible for the effective and reasonably modern Greek forces that now exist. The reconstitution of an effective Greek armed force has deterred further Communist expansion toward the Mediterranean and has permitted Greece to make a major contribution in providing forces in support of NATO's southern flank.

MAP Levels

During Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton's visit to Greece in 1966, the United States suggested a MAP grant planning figure of \$325 million at the rate of \$65 million annually for the five-year planning period from July 1966 through June 1971. While this was not a commitment, the Greek authorities have indicated that they regard it as a minimum U. S. figure that does not fully meet their needs. The grant MAP level for FY 1968 was \$65 million in the budget submission to Congress.

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Developments since the Coup

Shortly after the April 21 coup, we suspended the delivery of such major MAP items as aircraft, tanks, and missiles. The suspension was intended to demonstrate our general concern and to exert pressure for a return to constitutionalism and the release of the political prisoners.

At the recent IRG/NEA and SIG meetings it was agreed that our policy of pressure on the Greek Government had paid some dividends, including the formation of the constitutional committee and the release of more than half the political prisoners as well as the relaxation of some of the harsher aspects of the coup. Therefore, in order to retain our flexibility, it was agreed that as soon as it appeared appropriate to advise Congressional leaders we would release the following items under suspension:

- (a) a coastal minesweeper (\$2.9 million),
- (b) one F-104G trainer (\$1.5 million),
- (c) sidewinder missiles and related equipment which
are excess to the needs of the Netherlands (no charge),
- (d) 175 mm cannons (8 - \$1.05 million).

Most of the major items, such as tanks and aircraft, would continue in suspension until such time as we could see additional evidence that the coup government is moving toward constitutionalism.

Following his return to Greece, Ambassador Talbot has recently reported that we have only limited leverage to prod the coup leaders toward a return to constitutionalism. However, Ambassador Talbot believes our chances for success would be markedly improved by a return to flexibility in handling deliveries of restricted MAP items as the coup leaders have been increasingly frustrated and irritated over our continuing policy of suspension.

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
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GREECE

US Military Grants (Obligations)

Million US Dollars/US Fiscal Years



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September 6, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

EVALUATION OF LIKELY U.S. DOMESTIC AND CONGRESSIONAL
REACTION TO KING-JUNTA CONFRONTATION

Background

Although the American press and public generally deplored the overthrow of representative government in Greece by the April 21 coup, there was some initial hesitation to condemn the new Greek regime before all the facts were available. Some of the early, positive moves of the government such as the formation of a committee to revise the constitution, the reform of the corrupt Greek Orthodox Church leadership, and the business-like attitude towards foreign investment, served to neutralize to some degree the naturally unfavorable impression caused by the basically authoritarian character of the new regime. Congressional opinion generally coincided with public sentiment during this initial period; while dismayed, Congress too tended to wait to let the government "prove" itself.

Present Attitudes towards Government

In recent weeks, however, the image of the Greek junta in the United States has worsened. The continued imprisonment of large numbers of persons without trials (including Andreas Papandreu), the delay in reestablishing the promised degree of press freedom, and the additional arrests for political reasons, have all combined to impress on public opinion the dictatorial nature of the current Greek government. In particular, certain inept moves by the junta, such as divesting the popular Greek actress Melina Mercouri of her citizenship and the arrest and harsh sentence of a distinguished former Greek Foreign Minister, have held the government up to general public ridicule and scorn. As a result, public sentiment against the

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junta has intensified. Members of the academic community, whose personal sympathies and ideological convictions coincide in the case of Andreas Papandreu, have been particularly outspoken. They are followed by a large body of public sentiment, including a segment of the Greek-American community, although the bulk of the Greek-Americans seem still to be apathetic or maintaining a tentative attitude towards the present political situation in Greece. Finally, some of the most vociferous anti-coup opinion in the United States has emanated from Congressional representatives, especially Senators Clark and Pell and Rep. Donald Fraser.

Attitude Towards King

Attitudes toward the King do not appear to follow along the same lines as those toward the Greek Government. Even among the harshest critics of the government there is a tendency to regard the King as a constructive force and as one of the best hopes for steering the regime into a more constitutional course. It follows that public and Congressional attitudes towards the King will depend in large part on how the King conducts himself towards the regime.

Opinion in Event of Confrontation

It further follows that a confrontation between King and regime would in all probability elicit sympathy for the King. That would clearly be the case if the King and coup leaders should clash over the intransigence of the coup leaders on an issue in which the restoration of democracy were involved. But sentiment would probably still favor the King even on a question of less clear principle, as for example, control of the Army.

Assuming that the King should break with the junta on an issue which cast him in the role of the defender of democracy, there would undoubtedly be considerable popular and Congressional acquiescence and even demand for providing him with psychological and political support, such as an official U. S. Government pronouncement in his favor. There would probably also be general approval, again public and Congressional, of a humanitarian effort to evacuate him and his family in extremis. On the other hand, there would be little support from the public and probably none from the Congress for any U. S. military intervention in a Greek crisis.

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Reaction to Ouster of King

Should the junta make a successful move against the King, there would undoubtedly be irresistible pressure--notably from Congress--to cut off all aid, military and otherwise, to Greece. There probably would be strong pressure from Congress and the public for an official public condemnation of the junta. But even though the ouster of the King would confront the U. S. with the question of recognition of the regime, it is doubtful whether Congressional leaders would demand a break in relations with Greece. It is likely that some NATO countries would try to have Greece read out of their organization and that some Congressional leaders would view such an effort with equanimity. But it is unlikely that Congress would go beyond the demand for a cut-off of all aid to Greece.

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September 6, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Of the original 6,100 persons arrested at the time of the coup, about 4,000 have been released, leaving slightly more than 2,000 persons still under detention, many of them on the island of Yiaros. All but approximately 30 of those under arrest are known Communists or members of the extreme left EDA party. As of the present, no formal charges have been placed against the detainees, who are being held in accordance with the special decrees implemented by the government immediately after the coup.

Through our Embassy in Athens we have made repeated representations to the Greek authorities concerning the fate and treatment of the political detainees, and have been assured that they will not be mistreated. From information available to us, it would appear that the living conditions of the prisoners are reasonably good. We have also expressed our hope that all or most of the political detainees will be released as early as possible. However, while the Greek Government may make additional releases, it is probable that a substantial number of persons will remain under detention for political reasons.

Andreas Papandreou

Andreas Papandreou, a one-time U. S. citizen and son of former Prime Minister George Papandreou, is in prison awaiting trial on charges of conspiracy to commit treason for his membership in the illegal military organization Aspida. The indictment against Andreas Papandreou was prepared by the non-political government of John Paraskevopoulos, which fell from power several weeks

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before the coup. If convicted, the younger Papandreou faces a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment. However, there have been some indications that the regime might deport him to the United States after the trial, which is expected to take place this fall.

There has been considerable public interest in the United States in the welfare of the Greek political prisoners and particularly of Andreas Papandreou, who as an economics professor at the University of California (Berkeley) and at the University of Minnesota (Minneapolis) was well known in U. S. academic circles. Several prominent American universities have made job offers to Papandreou, including one from the University of Minnesota delivered to Papandreou by former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, who recently visited Athens to discuss the Papandreou case. The intense U. S. and other foreign interest in the fate of Andreas Papandreou appears to have irritated the Greek Government leaders, who consider the younger Papandreou the person primarily responsible for the polarization in Greek political life which brought about the coup.

In the light of the Supreme Court decision in the Afroyim case, there is a possibility that Andreas Papandreou may still retain his American citizenship. Previously, Papandreou was held to have lost his citizenship in 1964 for accepting an "office, post, or employment under a foreign government," i. e. Minister to the Prime Minister in his father's government. However, should it be determined that this expatriative provision of the law is no longer valid in view of the Afroyim decision, he would probably retain his U. S. citizenship. We are awaiting an opinion of the Attorney General on the effect of the Afroyim decision on this and other expatriative provisions of the law:

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NEA - Mr. Rockwell
L/SCA - Mr. Smith
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CG/B-3

September 6, 1967 71

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

GREECE'S FOREIGN POLICY POSTURE

The result of the April 21 coup has been to weaken Greece's traditionally friendly ties with the countries of Western Europe and to create friction in relations with the Communist nations of Eastern Europe which had been steadily improving in recent years. The overthrow of constitutional government in Greece and its replacement by an authoritarian government has also placed a strain on the keystone of Greek foreign policy, close relations with the United States. Only with Turkey and the Arab countries have relations been maintained or improved over their pre-coup level.

Greek-U. S. Relations

Immediately after the April 21 coup, the new government leaders declared their intention of preserving Greece's close ties with the United States. Even after the U. S. adoption of a "cool but correct" policy towards the Greek Government, including the suspension of delivery to Greece of major military items, the Government reaffirmed its intention of maintaining Greece's traditionally close relations with the United States. In conversations with U. S. diplomats, Greek officials emphasized that agreements with previous Greek governments providing the U. S. with various facilities in the country would be strictly honored.

During the June mid-East crisis, the Greek Government demonstrated a desire to cooperate constructively with the United States and, among other things, it granted the U. S. unrestricted overflight privileges, permitted the staging of evacuation aircraft at Greek airfields, provided blanket permission for Sixth Fleet visits to Crete, and offered safehaven to the thousands of Americans who were evacuated from other Middle East countries. The cooperation of the Greek Government during this crucial period dramatized the

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E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.5

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strategic importance of Greek land and sea space in the Mediterranean, and the need for cooperation with the government controlling that space. This is particularly pertinent in view of stepped up Soviet penetration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In recent weeks, the Greek Government leaders have evinced some impatience and irritation at what they regard as U. S. inability to comprehend the purpose and goals of their "revolution". For our part, we have considered that continued pressure on the Greek Government to move towards the restoration of democratic processes, while at the same time avoiding pushing it into an openly antagonistic position, best serves U. S. aims in Greece.

Greek-NATO Relations

Since Greece's entry into NATO in 1951, every Greek Government has supported membership in NATO as an important element of Greek foreign policy. The Greeks are deeply aware of their exposed position on the frontiers of the Balkan Communist nations. Therefore, upon coming to power, the new Greek Government promptly declared its intention of honoring Greece's commitment to the NATO Alliance.

The Greek coup came as a shock to NATO member states, and the governments and public opinion in several NATO countries were highly critical of the overthrow of the constitutional government. This was particularly true in the Scandinavian countries and in Italy, and the Danish government went so far as to propose placing discussion of the Greek coup on the NATO Council agenda.

In the months since the coup, criticism of measures adopted by the new Greek government has intensified throughout much of Europe, and those countries with significant Socialist parties have often deemed it necessary to criticize Greece publicly before various European forums. For some weeks the projected NATO military exercise "Sunshine Express" was jeopardized by the reluctance of the Italians,

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joined by the Belgians and British, to permit military units from their country to participate in military exercises with the Greeks; it took considerable behind the scenes effort by our NATO Delegation to resolve the crisis and enable the exercise to proceed.

Unless the Greek Government takes definite steps towards a return to constitutionalism in the near future, it may be expected that criticism of the Greek regime by various NATO countries will intensify, and the Greek question will remain a potentially disruptive issue within the NATO Alliance.

Greek Relations with the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe

In recent years, Greek relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe had improved appreciably. The government of former Prime Minister George Papandreou, as well as those of his successors, had sought to "normalize" the relations with Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, which had been cool since the Greek guerrilla war of 1947-49. Progress was particularly marked in the case of Bulgaria, with which an agreement on a peace treaty ending World War II was finally reached in 1964.

Since the Greek coup, relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Communist countries have worsened. The Soviets cancelled their participation in the Athens Cultural Festival as an indication of their dislike of the new Greek regime, and also decided not to take part in the annual Thessaloniki Fair. In Budapest, the Hungarian Government took the unusual step of refusing to recognize the Greek Ambassador as dean of the diplomatic corps, despite his seniority, because of the change of government in Greece. However, despite their public posture of disapproval of the new Greek regime, neither the Soviet Union nor the other Communist European nations have taken any steps to disavow their commercial and economic agreements with Greece. These trade agreements are of great importance to Greece in disposing of surplus tobacco and citrus fruits.

The deterioration in relations with the Eastern European Communist countries was most marked in the case of Yugoslavia. During the 50's, the Belgrade Government was the only one of the

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Eastern European Communist countries with which Athens had amicable relations; however, shortly after the coup the new Greek Government abrogated the 1959 Greek-Yugoslav border agreement and took other steps reflecting a less friendly attitude towards the Tito regime. These steps, plus public anti-Communist pronouncements by the new Greek leaders, strengthened Yugoslav fears of the existence of a U. S. - led "reactionary offensive" directed against Yugoslavia and other progressive" countries, and Yugoslav officials have openly expressed concern about the change of government in Greece and the ultimate intentions of the junta towards Yugoslavia. Yugoslav officials have also voiced fears of a Greek move against Albania and of a Greek-Turkish sponsored plot against President Makarios.

Greek-Turkish Relations

Greek-Turkish relations, which had been under considerable strain since late 1963 as a result of the Cyprus question (see Cyprus paper) have not been adversely affected by the Greek coup. Prior to April 21, Turkish leaders had been apprehensive over a possible victory for the forces of George Papandreu in the elections scheduled for May 28, 1967, recalling that in 1964 Papandreu had attempted to consolidate his popularity with the Greek public by adopting an uncompromising stand on the Cyprus issue. The Turkish leaders welcomed (albeit with some skepticism) the private declarations of the new Greek Government that it wished to reach a solution to the Cyprus question as a way of restoring Greek-Turkish cooperation. The Turks were aware that since the new Greek Government does not have to be responsive to public opinion, it might be in a better position to negotiate the concessions to Turkey which would be an essential part of any solution to the Cyprus problem. The King's association with a proposed settlement would enhance Turkey's acceptance of the future legitimacy of such a settlement.

The Turkish Government has agreed to Greek proposals for meetings at the Prime Ministerial level on September 9 and 10, to be held on the Greek-Turkish frontier. Although the GOT remains skeptical that the Greeks are really prepared to offer the meaningful concessions which would make a solution to the Cyprus problem possible, it is hopeful that King Constantine may play constructive role and in general Turkey is pleased at evidence of good-will displayed by the new GOG.

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Greek-Arab Relations

Traditionally Greece has sought good relations with the Arab world, considering itself a kind of "bridge" between the Arab nations and the West. Furthermore, because of the existence of Greek minorities in some Arab countries and important shipping and trade relations in the area, successive Greek Governments have given emphasis to good relations with the Arab countries in foreign policy planning. Therefore, despite considerable sympathy in Greece for the Israeli cause, the Greeks were careful during the Mid-East crisis to avoid offending the Arab governments in their public pronouncements and in U. N. debates and voting. And while offering full cooperation to the U. S. during the crisis, the Greek Government assured the Arab countries that Greece would not be used as a base for staging operations against those countries.

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September 6, 1967 ⁷³

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

CYPRUS: CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS

Background

The communal fighting in Cyprus which broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in December 1963 not only poisoned relations between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, but in 1964 brought the two nations to the verge of war. While the entry of U. N. forces on the island in March 1964 inhibited the two communities from full-scale conflict, over the past three years violence has frequently erupted, and Cyprus remains divided into two armed camps, deeply distrustful of each other. At the present time, the situation on the island is relatively calm. Following a recent rash of incidents between Greek and Turkish Cypriots which resulted in a number of deaths, a partial pacification program was announced September 2.

The key to a settlement of the Cyprus question remains agreement between Athens and Ankara. U. S. efforts in the summer of 1964 to persuade Greece and Turkey to accept a compromise solution to the Cyprus question failed when then Greek Prime Minister Papandreu refused to accept the so-called "Acheson Plan" (which would have provided union—"enosis"—of Greece and Cyprus in return for a long-term Turkish lease on the Karpas peninsula on the island) because it was vigorously opposed by Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios. Hopes for a settlement of the Cyprus problem now center on the Greek-Turkish "dialogue", which after functioning intermittently during the last two years, appears to be on the point of serious resumption.

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By ins NARA, Date 10-15-04

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Athens-Nicosia Relations

The Greek coup of April 21, 1967, dramatically changed the relationship between Athens and Nicosia. Prior to the coup, Archbishop Makarios had the potential for blocking any Greek-Turkish settlement considered inimical to his interests by appealing over the heads of the Athens Government to the Greek public, utilizing the sensationalist Greek press. Now Makarios must deal with a Greek government largely impervious to public opinion and with a government-controlled press. The Archbishop is aware that if he openly opposes the Greek Government, he risks provoking the Greek junta into action against him, using the 8,000-odd Greek mainland troops on the island under the command of long-time Makarios foe General George Grivas.

A bitter exchange between the Greek and Cypriot press during the early summer of 1967 prompted charges from Moscow and other Communist capitals that the Athens government was contemplating a coup d'etat against the Nicosia government. However, following a surprise visit to Nicosia by the "strongman" of the Greek junta, Colonel Papadopoulos, in mid-August, relations between the two governments improved appreciably. Therefore, while it is possible that under certain circumstances (including prior agreement with Turkey) the Athens government might conceivably consider a coup against Makarios, such action does not now appear likely. It seems clear that if at all possible, the junta would prefer to work towards a solution which has the endorsement of Makarios.

The Greek-Turkish Dialogue

The Greek-Turkish dialogue over Cyprus, which began under the government of Prime Minister Stephanopoulos in 1965, was interrupted by the fall of Stephanopoulos in December 1966, at the point when Greek Foreign Minister Tountas had presented a Greek proposal to Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil for settlement of the Cyprus issue. Under pressure from King Constantine the Greek government of Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos attempted to revive the dialogue in early 1967, but the Turkish government was reluctant to continue the talks with a service government and preferred to await the outcome of the elections scheduled for May 1967.

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Following the April 21 coup, the new Greek government again proposed resumption of the dialogue and, in June of this year, Greek Foreign Minister Economou-Gouras explored the possibility with Caglayangil of a settlement along the following lines: (1) union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece, (2) a long-term Turkish lease on the British base at Dhekelia, and (3) strong minority guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks were cool to the proposals, particularly the offer of a lease, since they have in the past insisted on full sovereignty over any territory on Cyprus accorded to them.

Prospects for a Settlement

Some weeks ago, the Greek Government proposed a meeting of Prime Ministers of the two countries, and on August 30 the Turkish Government informed our Ankara Embassy that it had agreed to a meeting September 9-10 on the Greek-Turkish border. Although the Turks are inclined to be skeptical about the Greek willingness to offer the kind of concessions that Ankara considers necessary in return for enosis, the Turkish Government was apparently impressed by the arguments that (1) since the new Greek Government does not have to pay significant attention to Greek public opinion, it might be in a better position than a representative government to make concessions to Turkey, and that (2) King Constantine is deeply determined to settle the Cyprus issue and remove this disruptive element from Greek-Turkish relations. Thus, the Turkish agreement to hold a Prime Ministerial meeting may be viewed as a victory for King Constantine in his efforts to get serious discussions of the Cyprus problem under way between the two governments.

While we are not optimistic that the Prime Ministerial meeting will lead to a settlement of the Cyprus problem, the mere fact that the leaders of the two countries are meeting is a distinct sign of forward progress and may well lend impetus to subsequent negotiations.

United States Position

United States policy towards the Cyprus question remains one of favoring any solution which is acceptable to the parties concerned. We view the current Greek effort to reach a settlement as constructive. Meanwhile, we support continuation of UNFICYP on the island as long as necessary.

~~SECRET~~

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September 6, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

GREECE'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SITUATION

Political

The Greek Government which came to power through a military coup April 21, 1967, appears to be firmly in control and to date there has been no overt resistance by the Greek public. Although it has modified or relaxed some of the more obnoxious restrictions imposed at the outset of the coup, the new regime is definitely of an authoritarian character. Key articles of the constitution remain suspended, political activity is prohibited, censorship of domestic publications continues (despite a recent Government pledge to abolish censorship), and meetings of more than five persons are banned. Violators of government laws and regulations are tried by military courts established throughout the country and punishment is swift and severe. Purges of officers considered unreliable were carried out in the Navy and Air Forces and there has been a wide-scale removal of heads of various governmental and semi-governmental agencies.

Late in May, under pressure from the United States as well as King Constantine, the government appointed a 20-member committee composed of eminent jurists and professors to revise the Constitution and submit it to the government within six months for approval prior to the holding of a plebiscite. The coup leaders have avoided publicly announcing a timetable stating precisely when the country would return to parliamentary democracy, although King Constantine has informed us privately that the Cabinet had promised him to restore democratic processes within two years at the most.

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It is probable that the coup leaders themselves are uncertain as to when they intend to return the country to constitutionalism. They probably also have not agreed among themselves on precisely what form that constitutionalism would take. The King, supported by Prime Minister Kollias, has taken the lead in urging the government to bring about a return as promptly as possible. The three coup leaders--General Pattakos, Colonel Papadopoulos, and Colonel Makarezos--have, in varying degrees, opposed an early return to democracy lest the goals of their "revolution" be undermined by a premature return to normal political life.

In their public statements, the coup leaders have repeatedly called for a "purification" of Greek society, but have been vague in defining precisely what this purification entails. What does seem clear is that the coup leaders lack political sophistication, as demonstrated by their ineptness in stripping a prominent Greek actress of her citizenship and sentencing a highly distinguished former Foreign Minister to five years in prison for holding a social gathering of more than five persons. In recent weeks Colonel Papadopoulos has been emerging as the "strong man" of the junta, although even he appears to be subject to pressure from certain extremist junior officers strongly opposed to a return to constitutionalism. The coup leaders share a deep disdain for almost all Greek politicians, whom they consider venal and corrupt.

As the time approaches for a completion of the constitutional revision, the true intentions of the government with regard to the restoration of democracy should become clearer. Should the coup leaders repudiate their promise to hold a plebiscite or refuse to take other steps in the direction of constitutionalism, a confrontation with the King would be likely, perhaps as early as this autumn. Also possible is a split within the coup group itself over this key question.

Although to date there has been no organized opposition to the coup government, with the passage of time such resistance must be anticipated. There is evidence that the initial acceptance of the coup by a Greek citizenry exhausted by years of political demagoguery

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and irresponsibility has begun to wane as the government has failed to meet the expectations--often unrealistic--of various segments of the population. Dissatisfaction with the government will undoubtedly increase if, as expected, there is a worsening of the economic situation. One danger in such a development is the possibility that the leadership of any resistance movement might fall into the hands of the Communists, who are better organized than any other group to wage underground resistance.

Economic

The Greek economy has been growing in recent years by an impressive 8 per cent annually and per capita GNP now exceeds \$700. This growth reflects both Greece's own efforts and \$1.9 billion in U. S. economic assistance since 1946. It should be noted to Greece's credit that the U. S. grant economic aid program to Greece officially terminated in 1962.

While there are now signs that the rate of economic growth has begun to slow down, the growth rate nevertheless is expected to amount to between 5 and 6 per cent during 1967. The slow-down in growth reflects an anticipated readjustment to the serious structural problems resulting from the rapid but uneven expansion of the past several years. In addition, the uncertainties arising from the coup and the Middle East crisis have contributed to a worsening balance of payments situation as indicated by a decline during 1967 of \$43.8 million in Greece's official gold and hard currency holdings to a total of \$258.9 million on July 31, 1967. However, the decline in official assets has been partially offset by transferring \$30.1 million from the special fund of gold sovereigns. The pressure on foreign exchange reserves has come from a growing trade deficit that has been only partially offset by invisible earnings which have been less than anticipated during 1967 as the result of a decline in receipts from tourism and workers remittances.

In view of the political and economic uncertainty prevailing before and immediately following the coup, the present government initially followed stabilizing policies designed to reduce prices and encourage savings. Expansionary steps are now being taken to liberalize reserve requirements and the discount rate and to encourage

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certain types of construction.

The government believes it can both stimulate the private sector to be the driving force behind Greek economic development and eliminate the glaring inequalities between classes. While the government has yet to implement these policies, it has begun to eliminate bureaucratic red tape and to speed up arrangements for foreign investment. It has approved and encouraged several investments by American firms, including an \$825 million capital investment program over 12 years with Litton Industries to develop Crete and the Western Peloponnesus, as well as manufacturing proposals by Union Carbide and Goodyear Rubber.

While it is believed that the negative factors affecting the Greek economy may be of short duration, the present government has yet to prove its ability to carry out its stated economic policies and to create the necessary climate of stability and confidence to attract both domestic and foreign investment.

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
75a

GREECE

Gross National Product


COMPOSITION

1966 (Estimated)




GROWTH

(1962=100)



PER CAPITA COMPARISONS


(1965 US Dollars)




GREECE

Production Indexes

AGRICULTURE
(1957-59 = 100)



INDUSTRY
(1958 = 100)




75C

GREECE

Government Expenditures

(Million US Dollars)



75d


GREECE

Balance of Payments

(Million US Dollars)


GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

*Includes IMF Gold Tranche




SELECTED INVISIBLE RECEIPTS

- Tourism
- Emigrant Remittances
- Workers Remittances
- Shipping



FOREIGN TRADE



75C

GREECE


1966 Foreign Trade (Million US Dollars)

IMPORTS (c.i.f.)


\$1130

Excludes ships transferred
to Greek flag
(93 million dollars in 1966)

COMPOSITION




DIRECTION



EXPORTS (f.o.b.)

\$406

COMPOSITION



DIRECTION




75f

GREECE

Domestic Prices and Money Supply

(Index 1958 = 100)



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PUBLIC
III. STATEMENTS

77

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE

September 11, 1967

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL TOAST -- WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON

Your Majesty, Gentlemen:

It is indeed a pleasure to receive among us the leader of a people with whom we have had a long history of close friendship and alliance.

Greece holds a special place in the hearts of all Americans. As the birthplace of democracy, ancient Greece fostered the concept of political liberty which has provided an example to free peoples down through the ages. Our own forefathers were steeped in the history and philosophy of ancient Greece, and it was upon this unequalled richness of thought that they drew in creating the historic documents which form the foundation of our political system today.

In more recent years, Greece and the United States have joined together in a partnership for freedom. It is fitting, I think, that Your Majesty is visiting us

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just one generation since that historic day in 1947 when President Harry Truman appeared before the American Congress to set forth the historic doctrine which bears his name.

It is because of these ties and connections that the American people are so interested in what goes on in Greece. They wish fervently for the well-being of the Greek people, in the full enjoyment of the benefits of the democratic system which since his school-days every American associates with the name of Greece.

Your Majesty, I had the great pleasure of visiting your country in 1962. I met many of your people. I was deeply impressed by their tremendous spirit, by their vitality, and by their industriousness. We are proud to have such people as our allies, and I salute you as their representative and leader.

Your devotion to the cause of liberty serves as a symbol to your people. We in the United States are confident that you will continue to lead your people in the great tradition of Greece.

- 3 -

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me in a toast to the distinguished leader of a great people, His Majesty King Constantine of Greece.

Drafted by: NEA - Mr. Owens
NEA - Mr. Rockwell
Cleared by: NEA - Mr. Rockwell
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September 8, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECESeptember 11, 1967PRESS GUIDANCE/CONTINGENCY

The President was happy to meet with King Constantine at the White House. The two leaders had a useful discussion on a wide range of topics of mutual interest.

President Johnson emphasized the importance for the United States of its ties to Greece. He referred to the long tradition of friendly relations between our two peoples and expressed confidence that these close ties would continue unimpaired in the future.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of the NATO alliance as a key element in the maintenance of peace. They stressed the support of their two governments for the goals of the alliance.

King Constantine described the current political situation in Greece, with particular reference to the program for a return to democratic processes. He discussed the progress of the committee of eminent jurists which was appointed to revise the constitution for submission to the Greek public in a plebiscite.

The President stressed the keen interest of the American people and government in an early return to democratic processes in Greece and expressed his hope for the vigorous implementation of the program to achieve this goal which he had been pleased to hear His Majesty discuss.

The two leaders agreed on the importance of the Free World effort in Vietnam and on the need to achieve a just and lasting peace in that war-torn country.

On departing, King Constantine thanked President Johnson for the friendly reception he had received at the White House, which he noted was in the tradition of the spirit of cooperation and friendship which have always characterized the relations between the two countries.

UNCLASSIFIED

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	EUR/RPM - Mr. Getz
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September 8, 1967

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VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE

September 11, 1967

Suggested Farewell Telegram

Your Majesty:

It has been an honor and privilege to know you. Our meeting reaffirmed the existing close relations between our two peoples. I know that, whatever difficulties may temporarily intervene, these historic ties of friendship will remain solid to sustain us.

I believe that our conversation, although brief, was very valuable. It has made clearer to us the problems facing Greece. It has also been extremely reassuring to have heard you express the wish and intention that Greece return as quickly as possible to the path of democracy, a path that our two peoples have historically traveled. You may be sure that the people and government of the United States fully support this objective of a return to constitutionalism and representative government, which are the mainstays of democratic society.

It was a great pleasure to know you personally. It is reassuring to know that the leadership of the great Hellenic people is in such dedicated hands.

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The best wishes of Mrs. Johnson and myself go out
to you and to Queen Anne-Marie on your journey home.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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BIOGRAPHIC
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GREECE
CONSTANTINE II, KING.
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1964
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GREECE

KING CONSTANTINE

Twenty-seven year old King Constantine, who has occupied his throne a scant three and a half years, is a young man of considerable intelligence, deeply devoted to the cause of Greece and the Monarchy. He sees the two as intertwined, and even allowing for self-interest, he is sincere in his view of the Monarchy as necessary to the well-being and stability of the country. This conviction accounts in large part for the King's "activist" philosophy

How many of the King's subjects today approve his concept of the Monarchy and his way of fulfilling it, is difficult to say. The ouster in 1965 of Prime Minister Papandreou cost the young King some of his tremendous initial prestige and popularity which followed upon his accession in 1964 and his marriage the same year to the young daughter of the democratically-minded Danish royal family. Also there are those who maintain that the King could have established himself irrevocably as personality and Monarch (albeit at some considerable personal risk) if he had unequivocally opposed the junta and its coup of April 21. As it is, he is reluctant to put his seal on the coup government (he did not sign the coup decree suspending certain key articles of the Constitution) and unwilling to risk the chaos which an open break between him and the junta might well entail. The King carries with him the hopes of those liberals, on the one hand, who see him as the best hope of moderating the course of the coup leaders, and of those conservatives, on the other, who see him as one of the most effective checks against the left and anarchy. Whatever the ultimate future of the Monarchy, Constantine is today the balance wheel of Greek political life, and one of the chief guarantees on the domestic scene for a gradual return to constitutional government, to which he has committed himself.

How Constantine carries out his commitment is another matter. Although brought up from childhood to occupy the

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throne, he seemed as a young man to lack serious purpose. He leaned to athletics, fast cars and an easygoing innocuous social life. He was catapulted onto the throne at the age of 24 before he had a chance to find himself and a firm footing in Greek political life.

The tough problems the King has wrestled with almost from the beginning of his reign, and his marriage and the birth of two children have changed his image, hardened his purpose and brought into better focus his strong will. He no longer lacks application even though he suffers from that perennial deficiency of the Greek monarchy, a lack of good advisors.

Politically, Constantine is attuned to the United States. He is staunchly pro-West and firmly anti-Communist. But above all, he is convinced that the future of Greece lies with the Free World under U.S. leadership. He looks to the U.S. for support and guidance in Greece's dealings with the outside world, and no less in times of domestic crisis. The U.S. is his spiritual uncle.

In external affairs, the King takes a pragmatic, constructive approach. He views Turkey, for example, as a natural ally of Greece and has encouraged Greek politicians to take meaningful steps to eliminate the Cyprus problem as a cause of serious conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Vital Statistics

Constantine was born in Athens on June 2, 1940. A year later his parents and his uncle (King George II) were forced to flee Greece, under attack by the Germans. He was taken by his parents to Crete, then to Egypt and finally to South Africa. Following a plebiscite, the royal family returned to Athens in September 1946 and Constantine's father, Paul, ascended the throne upon the death of his brother, George. As a child Constantine

attended a small private school near Athens to which a number of boys from all walks of life were admitted. Later Constantine was given military training at the Cadet Officers' school. In 1956 he began a special military course to prepare him for the commissions which he holds in the three branches of the Greek armed forces. In January 1963 Constantine was engaged to the pretty, 16 year old daughter of King Frederik and Queen Ingrid of Denmark. The couple was married in September 1964. They have two children, a daughter, Alexia, born on July 10, 1965 and a son, Crown Prince Paul, born on May 20, 1967. Like his wife, Queen Anne-Marie, Constantine is a descendant of the Danish royal house of Glucksburg. The royal family of Greece has never been of Greek ethnic origin.

Hobbies

The King has always enjoyed sports. He likes swimming and tennis and has received some instruction in judo. But his favorite sport is sailing. In 1960 as Crown Prince, Constantine endeared himself to the Greek people by winning the Dragon class yachting event at the 17th Olympiad in Rome. With that victory the Prince brought home to Greece its first Gold Medal in 50 years. Sailing has also been a feature of Constantine's current trip to the United States and Canada. This past week he participated in the sailing races held in Toronto as part of EXPO celebrations. In Newport he will watch the first America Cup race on September 12 as the guest of Wiley Buchanan, former State Department Chief of Protocol.

Visits to the United States

From January to March 1959 Constantine visited the U.S. as a guest of the Secretary of Defense. He visited several military installations, and apparently surprised officials with his knowledge of aerodynamics and aeronautical engineering. He took a brief course in paramilitary training and guerrilla warfare at the time.

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GREECE


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PAPAGOS, LEONIDAS A. DELEGATE TO
UNITED NATIONS.

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Marshal of the Court, Papagos (Pronounced Papágos)

GREECE

Leonidas Papagos was appointed Marshal of the Court in May 1967. A career foreign service officer, who rose to the rank of Ambassador, Papagos is probably best known as the son of the late General (Field Marshal) Alexandros Papagos, who in addition to his military achievements, served as Prime Minister of Greece from 1952 to 1955. Undoubtedly one of Ambassador Papagos' chief qualifications for his present job grew out of his heritage, which encompasses not only his father's charisma but also his family's loyalty to the Establishment and particularly to the Crown. Although Papagos' appointment as Court Marshal was effected just after the coup, it had been arranged some time before. Almost certainly it had no direct connection with the junta or the events of the coup, but was an instance of the King's effort to surround himself with those loyal to him. Ambassador Papagos is pleasant, agreeable and civilized. He is not noted for drive or perspicacity.

Papagos' career in the Foreign Ministry has covered a wide range of duties and geographical areas. He has served a number of tours at home base in Athens, as head of the European Union Section (1952), as head of the North Atlantic Pact Section (1955) and as director of the U. S. and UN Division (1960-65). He has been posted to London, Paris and most recently as Ambassador to Cairo (1966-67). He has led several Greek delegations to the UN General Assembly. In 1960 he was a member of the party accompanying Prime Minister Karamanlis on his state visit to Washington.

Papagos was born in 1912 in Athens. He received a law degree from the University of Athens. In 1953 he married the former Anna Goulondris, daughter of one of the Greek shipping magnates. She brought a good deal of wealth to the marriage. The Papagos' have two children.

President Johnson met Papagos in Greece in 1962. Papagos was the official Greek escort for President Johnson when he (then Vice President) visited Greece on his way back from the Far East.

Papagos speaks fluent French and English in addition to Greek.

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GREECE

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PAPADOPOULOS,

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ALCIBIADES PAPADOPOULOS (Pronounced Papadopoulos)

GREECE

Until Ambassador-designate Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas presents his credentials in mid-September, Papadopoulos is serving as Charge d'Affaires of the Greek Embassy. He was assigned to Washington on April 13, 1967 just prior to the military coup in Greece. He has already received news of his new assignment to the Greek NATO Delegation in Brussels and will leave shortly to take up his new duties. The shortness of his Washington assignment is not from all accounts due to any difficulty with the present junta in Greece but rather to the effort of Ambassador-designate Palamas to surround himself with a high-powered team of his own choice. Papadopoulos has been correct but not particularly enlightening regarding his attitude towards the present Greek regime.

A member of the Foreign Office since 1949, Mr. Papadopoulos has had assignments ranging from Ethiopia (1952-54), Lebanon (1955-57), to Moscow (1964-67). He has served several times in the United States--in the Greek Consulate General in Chicago from 1957-59, in Boston from 1959 to 1961, and most recently in Washington.

Mr. Papadopoulos is married with two children, a son, Constantine, aged 12, and a daughter, Alexandra, aged 8.

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