

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

185

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to Rostow from John W. Foster secret <del>open</del> 4/8/03 FRUS, 64-68, Vol. 21, #200	1 p 07/22/68	A
#2 memo	to Walt Rostow from John Foster secret <del>open</del> RAC 001-138-3-1; 11/13/01	1 p 07/17/68	A
#4a memo	to Secretary from Lucius D. Battle Secret <del>open</del> 1-2-04 NLJ 03:175	3 p 09/21/67	A
#5 memcon	Robert Anderson and Lucius D. Battle conversation secret <del>open</del> 4/8/03	1 p 10/16/67	A
#6 memcon	Adan M. Pachachi and Lucius D. Battle conversation secret <del>open</del> 4/8/03	3 p 09/26/67	A
#7a memo	to Sec. Rusk from Lucius Battle <del>secret</del> <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-402</i> (dup. #68A, NSF, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 43)	2 p 09/21/67	A
#8a memo [dup. #7a]	to Sec. Rusk from Lucius Battle <del>secret</del> <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-402</i>	2 p 09/21/67	A
#9 cable	intelligence information cable secret <del>sanitized</del> <i>sanitized RAC 001-138-3-1; 11/13/01</i> Same sanitization 10/9/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-90	2 p 08/23/67	A
#10a memo	to President from Eugene Rostow confidential <del>open</del> 4-13-00	3 p 06/01/67	A
#11 memo [dup. #10a]	to President from Eugene Rostow confidential <i>open 3-10-06</i>	3 p 06/01/67	A
#12 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow secret <del>open</del> 4-13-00	2 p 05/31/67	A
#12a memo	to President from Dean Rusk confidential <del>open</del> 4/8/03 of Dept Guidelines + FRUS	1 p 05/31/67	A
#13 cable	intelligence information cable <del>secret</del> <i>exam 1-2-04</i> <del>secret</del> <i>Exam 9/1/01 per NLJ/RAC 02-249 NLJ 03:174</i> <del>secret</del> <i>Exam per RAC 3-12-04</i> sanitized 10/9/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-90	3 p 08/24/67	A
#14 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow confidential <del>open</del> 4-13-00	2 p 01/27/67	A
#14a memo	to President from Dean Rusk <del>confidential</del> <i>open 4/8/03</i>	2 p 01/20/67	A
#15 cable	to Walt Rostow from Arthur McCafferty top secret - <del>sanitized</del> <i>exam 1-2-04</i> <del>open</del> 4-13-00	2 p 01/08/68	A

FILE LOCATION Same sanitization 1/13/10 per NLJ 15-84  
NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
Iraq, vol. 1 12/63-7/68  
Box 138

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#16 memo</del>	to President from W. W. Rostow <del>secret</del> <i>open 4-13-00</i>	<del>1 p</del> 04/05/67	<del>A</del>
<del>#17 airgram</del>	A 571 from Baghdad <del>confidential</del> <i>open 1-2-04 NLJ/RAC 03-143</i>	<del>2 p</del> 02/24/67	<del>A</del>
<del>#18 cable</del>	Baghdad 1262 <del>confidential</del> <i>open 9-5-91 NLJ 91-211</i>	<del>2 p</del> 01/16/67	<del>A</del>
#19 cable	Baghdad 669 secret	2 p 10/12/66	A
<del>#20 cable</del>	Baghdad 567 <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>1 p</del> 09/28/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#21 cable</del>	Deptel 125694 to Baghdad <del>confidential</del> <i>open 9-5-91 NLJ 91-211</i>	<del>1 p</del> 01/25/67	<del>A</del>
<del>#22 cable</del>	Deptel 108441 to Baghdad <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>3 p</del> 12/23/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#23 cable</del>	Deptel 91650 to Baghdad <del>confidential</del> <i>open 3-10-00</i>	<del>1 p</del> 11/23/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#24 cable</del>	Deptel 88138 to Baghdad <del>confidential</del>	<del>1 p</del> 11/18/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#24a memo</del>	to BKS from HHS <del>confidential</del> <i>open 4/8/03</i>	<del>1 p</del> 11/19/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#25 cable</del>	Deptel 50322 to Baghdad <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12 NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>1 p</del> 09/19/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#26 cable</del>	Baghdad 477 <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>2 p</del> <del>4 p</del> 09/17/66	<del>A</del>
<del>26a cable</del>	<i>near dup #26 open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>		
<del>#27 cable</del>	Deptel 48527 to Baghdad <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>1 p</del> 09/16/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#28 cable</del>	Baghdad 397 <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>2 p</del> 09/08/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#30 cable</del>	Baghdad 694 <del>secret</del> <i>open 9-21-12, NLJ/RAC 11-53</i>	<del>2 p</del> 05/19/66	<del>A</del>
<del>#31a cable</del>	Deptel 538 to Baghdad <del>confidential</del> <i>open 3-10-00</i>	<del>1 p</del> 05/12/66	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32 airgram	A-822 from Baghdad secret <i>open 3-10-06</i>	1 p 04/05/66	A
#33a airgram	A-711 from Baghdad confidential <i>open 9-21-12, NLT/RAC 11-53</i>	2 p 02/09/66	A
#35 cable	Baghdad 357 confidential <i>open 3-10-06</i>	2 p 12/12/65	A
#38 cable	intelligence information cable secret, <del>sanitized RAC 001-138-3-7; 11/15/01</del> <i>some sanitization 10/9/15 per NLT/RAC 15-90</i>	2 p 07/07/65	A
#39 cable	Baghdad 1078 confidential <i>open 9-21-12, NLT/RAC 11-53</i>	2 p 06/02/65	A
#40 cable	Baghdad 796 secret <i>open 9-21-12, NLT/RAC 11-53</i>	1 p 03/23/65	A
#41 cable	Baghdad 792 secret	1 p 03/23/65	A
#43 cable	Baghdad 957 confidential	1 p 05/05/65	A
#44 cable	Baghdad 408 confidential <i>open 3-10-06</i>	2 p 11/14/64	A
#45 cable	Baghdad 365 confidential	1 p 10/26/64	A
#47 cable	Airgram A-226 confidential	1 p 09/10/64	A
#48 cable	Baghdad 87 confidential <i>open 9-21-12, NLT/RAC 11-53</i>	2 p 07/25/64	A
#49 cable	Baghdad 49 confidential	4 p 07/15/64	A
#50 cable	Baghdad 1033 confidential <i>open 3-10-06</i>	1 p 06/08/64	A
#51 cable	Baghdad 994 confidential <i>open 9-21-12, NLT/RAC 11-53</i>	2 p 06/01/64	A
#52a cable	Deptel 03934 to Baghdad confidential	1 p 05/07/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#53a cable	Baghdad 897 confidential <i>open 9-21-72, NW/RAC 11-53</i>	4 p 05/04/64	A
#54 cable	Damascus 598 <del>secret</del>	2 p 03/09/64	A
#55 cable	Baghdad CS-27-64 secret <i>sanitized 1-2-04 NW/RAC 03144</i> <i>same sanitization 4/10/17 per NLJ 15-85</i>	1 p 02/10/64	A
#56 cable	intelligence information cable <i>exempt 1204</i> secret <i>Exempt RAC DDF 138-3, 11/13/01 NW 03144</i> <i>exempt 10/9/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-96</i>	2 p 01/02/64	A
#57 cable	Baghdad 666 secret <i>sanitized 5/14/19 per NLJ/RAC 15-96</i> <i>Exempt RAC DDF 138-3, 11/13/01</i>	3 p 12/27/63	A
#58a cable	Baghdad 1455 confidential <i>open 3-10-06</i>	1 p 02/12/67	A
#59b bio sketch	Nuri Jamil confidential	1 p undated	A
#60a memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read confidential <i>open 4/8/03</i>	1 p 01/24/67	A
#60b bio sketch	Maj. Gen. Hassan Sabri Muhammad Ali confidential <i>open 8/17/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-97</i>	2 p 01/67	A
#61 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow confidential <i>open 4/8/03 per FCUS 64-68, Vol. 21 &amp; 18B</i>	2 p 01/21/67	A
#61a memo	to President from Dean Rusk confidential <i>open 4/8/03</i>	2 p 01/20/67	A
#62 memo	from Walt Rostow to the President confidential <i>open 4/8/03</i>	1 p undated	A
#62a message	to Pres. Aref from Pres. Johnson confidential <i>open 4/8/03 per FCUS 64-68, Vol. 21 &amp; 18B</i>	1 p undated	A
#62b cable	to President from Walt Rostow confidential <i>open 4/8/03</i>	1 p 11/25/66	A
#63 memcon	between The Secretary, Simmons, Pachachi, & H. E. Nasir Hani [part 3 of 5 sessions] secret <i>open 4/8/03</i>	2 p 10/05/66	A
#64 memcon	between The Secretary, Simmons, Pachachi, & H. E. Nasir Hani [part 1 of 5 sessions] Secret <i>open 4/8/03</i>	2 p 10/05/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#65 memo</del>	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read <del>open 4/8/03</del> <del>secret</del>	<del>1 p 07/13/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#65a cable</del>	Baghdad 38 <del>secret</del> <i>open 3-10-06</i>	<del>1 p 07/11/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#67 memo	to President from WH Situation Room possible classified info <del>sanitized 1-2-04 NW/RAC 08/05</del> <i>same sanitization 01/25/12 per RAC</i>	1 p 06/30/66	A
<del>#68 memo</del>	to President from WWR <del>open 4/8/03</del> <i>NS 87-100</i> <del>secret</del>	<del>1 p 06/01/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#69a memo</del>	to President from WWR <del>open 4/8/03</del> <i>NS 87-100</i> <del>secret</del>	<del>1 p 06/01/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#70 memo</del>	to Mr. Califano from WWR <del>open 4/8/03</del> <del>secret</del>	<del>1 p 06/15/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#72 memcon</del>	between the Secretary, Newberry, Bazzaz and Nasir Hony <del>[part III of III]</del> <del>secret</del> <i>open 1-2-04 NW03175</i>	<del>2 p 10/08/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#73a memcon</del>	between Robbins, and Jernegan <del>confidential</del> <i>open 1-2-04 NW03175</i>	<del>1 p 01/21/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#74a memcon</del>	between the Secretary, Mr. Walsh, Naji Talib, and Khalaf <del>confidential</del> <i>open 4/8/03 per FRUS 64-68, vol 21 #169</i>	<del>2 p 12/11/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77 memo</del>	to McG. Bundy from Ben Read <del>open 4/8/03</del> <del>confidential</del>	<del>1 p 04/01/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#79b bio sketch</del>	Dr. Nasser Al-Hani <del>confidential</del> <i>open 3-10-06</i>	<del>1 p undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#80 memo	to Director of Central Intelligence from Deputy Director for Plans <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized RAC 00-138-2-13; 11/13/01</i>	3 p 01/03/64	A

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A Clearer Picture of the Iraqi Coup

While you were gone, the situation in Iraq became much clearer. The new government could still be a little harder for us to deal with than the old -- if we ever have a chance to deal with it -- but if we had to have a Baathist government there, this is probably the best we could expect.

The Baathists are from the right-wing of the party -- the opponents of those in control in Syria -- and non-Baathists are playing a major role in the new government. The Syrians had nothing to do with the coup; in fact, one of the most interesting questions raised by the coup is whether the Iraqi example will encourage the moderate Syrian Baathists now in exile to take a crack at the Syrian regime.

The inability of the Aref government to deal with Iraq's domestic problems was the reason -- or excuse -- for the coup, and the new government is talking mainly about economic reforms, eliminating corruption and solving the Kurdish problem. They have made the usual statements about Zionism, Imperialism and Arab unity, but so far there have been no indications that Iraq's foreign policy will become more radical. It's too early to know whether there will be progress on a Kurdish settlement or more trouble -- a key determinant of how free Iraqi troops will be to menace Israel.

Until we see these people in action, we won't know for sure what problems we might face, but there seems to be less cause for concern over anything radically different now than there was last Wednesday.

*JWF*  
John W. Foster

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 21, #200  
By jc NARA, Date 3-26-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

July 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Iraqi Coup

Until things sort themselves out, and until we get better information--we have no representation in Baghdad--it's impossible to tell what the effect of last night's coup will be. We can't even be sure that the coup leaders' claim of military support is true. A counter-coup tomorrow is conceivable.

The intelligence community's initial reading is that the new group--apparently Baathists--will be more difficult than their predecessors, but at this point no one knows how radical they will be. So far, their communiqués have taken a fairly moderate line by Iraqi standards, promising economic reforms, honest government, a "wise" solution of the Kurdish problem, and Arab unity against the Zionist and Imperialist threats. On the other hand, if these people are Baathists, their tendencies will be towards moving Iraq even closer to Fatah, the Syrians and the Soviets. From our point of view, the most important question is whether they will continue Iraq's support for King Hussein. Iraq has about 25,000 troops in Jordan and could easily make life difficult for the King.

This is just to give you the best reading we have before you leave.

  
John Foster

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC-NLJ001-138-3-1  
By is NARA, Date 10-19-01

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1968

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MEMO FOR MR. GOLDSTEIN

We've long had a problem dealing with representatives from Barzani. We've tried to treat the Kurdish rebellion as an internal Iraqi affair. After the Kurds and the Iraqi government reached a tentative agreement in mid-1966, we sponsored a food program for the Kurdish areas, but that ended with the break in relations last summer. So for the moment, our hands are tied unless we want to begin clandestine aid to the Kurds, and we haven't so far seen much to be gained from that. In the past, we've let the more junior officers in State handle these representations because any official response from the President would have naturally upset the Iraqi government. Now when we have no relations the problem isn't so ticklish, but we probably want to stick to our general approach until there seems good reason to change it.

Hal Saunders

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3aLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 12, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Shafiq Qazzaz

Mr. Ernest Goldstein, at the request of Justice Douglas, yesterday received Mr. Qazzaz, who gave Mr. Goldstein a letter to the President from Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani. Mr. Goldstein then asked Mr. Saunders to speak with Mr. Qazzaz, an Iraqi Kurd who has lived here for seven years and who visited Barzani in February.

Mr. Qazzaz reviewed the situation in Iraq along the general lines of his paper (attached), but emphasized the paper's final point--the Kurds are the only unified force which can save Iraq. Unless something is done to solve the Kurdish problem along the lines of the 1966 agreement, and unless the Kurds are given a chance to become a stabilizing factor in Iraq, Iraq is going to continue downward. He was not at all clear about how the Kurds are going to play their role in Iraq or about what, if anything, the US government should be doing about this. Mr. Saunders deliberately avoided asking what he wanted the USG to do.

The action he wants from the US government is on a different problem. He would like the American Red Cross to do something in the Kurdish controlled areas where years of war have left the population in great need of food and medical supplies. Aid through the Iraqi Red Crescent has usually gone to the few Kurds who are friendly to the government, but aid could be channeled through Iran as the ICRC has recently done.

Qazzaz feels that the Red Cross is aware of the situation, but that it is being held up by a lack of approval from the US Government. He asked that we inform the Red Cross that such a program would be all right. He said he understood that the USG could not officially aid the Kurds under present circumstances.

Mr. Saunders replied that we want to preserve the independence of the Red Cross and that therefore we don't want to become involved in suggesting programs to them. Any initiative should come from the Red Cross, and they should be the ones to seek government opinion as necessary. He suggested that Mr. Qazzaz approach the Red Cross directly.

John W. Foster

cc: Mr. Goldstein  
Mr. Rostow  
Mr. Battle

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## The Kurdish Question in Iraq

The Kurdish movement began at first as a small resistance group fighting the government of Abdul Karim Kassim in September 1961. The government fought the Kurds unsuccessfully until it was overthrown in February 1963 and replaced by a new regime under Abdul Salam Arif. It was at the same time that a cease-fire agreement was concluded with the Kurds as a step towards negotiations to grant the Kurds their rights within the framework of "autonomy within Iraq." These negotiations did not fare well and the war was resumed by the government in June of the same year. The fighting this time was characterized by an unusual degree of brutality by which the Baathist government hoped to crush the Kurdish revolt completely (some Western newsmen even described it as a war of extermination). The Baathist regime came to an end in November 1963 when Abdul Salam Arif took complete control of the Iraqi government and a military-dominated cabinet was formed under the premiership of General Tahir Yahya, who is also serving as premier in the present Iraqi Government. It was not until February 1964 that a cease-fire agreement was reached and talks began to settle the problem. Chances for a settlement looked dim especially after the government had issued the new May 4 Constitution, which did not include the granting of national rights of the Kurds as it had been previously promised.

It was also at this time that signs of a split among the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party became evident. This finally led to a complete split between a group led by Ibrahim Ahmed (then General Secretary of the KDP) and Jalal Talabani and the rest of the Kurdish movement led by General Mustafa Barzani.

Having reached no agreement with the Iraqi Government, the Kurds set up a de facto autonomy in November 1964, which consisted of a Command Council and an Executive Bureau under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani himself. On April 15, 1965 Abdul Salam Arif's government attacked the Kurds once again. In September an attempted coup by the then Premier Aref Abdul Razzak was put down and for the first time since 1958 a civilian, Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz became the new premier. Bazzaz's efforts to solve the Kurdish problem through waging a diplomatic offensive against the Kurdish movement rather than negotiating with them directly, did not succeed and the Iraqi army began a winter offensive in December. On April 15 Abdul Salam Arif died in a plane crash and Bazzaz assumed presidential powers and at the same time became one of the prospects to succeed Arif; but the Council of Ministers and the Defense Council elected General Abdul Rahman Arif (Abdul Salam Arif's brother) to the presidency, and Bazzaz remained as premier. The new president promised autonomy to the Kurds, but later Iraqi

officials denied such a promise by Arif and in May a new government offensive was launched against the Kurds. The new military offensive failed and towards the end of June 1966 Premier Bazzaz announced which has since then been known as the June 29 plan for the settlement of the Kurdish question. Shortly thereafter Bazzaz resigned and was replaced by General Najib Talib as premier. Both the new government and the present one of General Tahir Yahya promised to implement the June 29 plan, but nothing so far as been done and the Kurds seem to have lost all hope in arriving at a peaceful settlement through the implementation of this plan. Relations between the government and the Kurdish Revolution have constantly deteriorated, especially in the last two months when the Kurds began withdrawing their representatives and are gradually cutting their contacts with the Iraqi Government.

#### Personal Observations

These observations are based upon a trip made recently to Iraqi-Kurdistan, during which I had the opportunity to see the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and also to travel throughout the Kurdish-controlled territory.

\*I was struck by the extent of poverty and disease, which in addition to the hardships of the last six years, have left definite scars upon the health and well-being of the Kurdish community. Though these conditions seem to have had little effect upon the faith of the people in their cause, they are deeply disappointed that the United States has thus far not extended to them any humanitarian aid. This sense of disappointment is compounded by the fact that several other and less able countries have come forth with such aid.

\*The strength of the Kurdish movement lies basically in the quality of the Peshmerge (the Kurdish army) and in the personality of its leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The people seem to have reached the conclusion that at the present time Barzani is the only person who can lead the movement. It is also important to realize that Mustafa Barzani is probably the only political figure in the Middle East who can claim and be certain of the loyalty of several thousand armed men.

\*The split which occurred in 1964 between some members of the Kurdish Democratic Party and Mustafa Barzani has had definite weakening effects upon the organization and the administration of the Kurdish movement, but there is reason to believe that the movement has survived and is on its way to recovery. The important point here is that the survival of the movement under the leadership

of Barzani is as much due to the miscalculations of the Talabani group as it is a result of Barzani's effective leadership and the work of the men around him. As far as the Kurdish community is concerned, the Talabani group could not have committed a worse political mistake than cooperating with the Iraqi Government.

\*The Kurdish army (Peshmerge) seems to have been little affected by the split; its organization, training and equipment remain very much the same as before; and the rank and file of the army seems confident and capable of continuing the armed struggle if the fighting resumed once again.

\*While the Kurds are disappointed in the United States' attitude towards their question, they feel certain that once the U.S. realizes their potentials and intentions, it will be more willing to cooperate not only to extend help to them but also to pursue the kind of relationship which will serve her own interests.

\*The Kurds' attitude towards Communism stems from a basic distrust of the Communist bloc countries and misgivings about the activities and intentions of the Iraqi Communist Party. The danger of possible Communist influence upon the Kurdish movement and upon Iraq as a whole comes from the fact that the present unstable atmosphere in Iraq is most conducive to the increase of Communist activities. The Kurdish movement seems determined to check Communist activities provided that it is helped and strengthened in the face of the growing activities of the Iraqi Communist Party.

\*The Kurdish movement, by having under its command a substantial number of armed men, constitutes the only organized political force in Iraq which has the means to bring about effective change in the country as a whole. The sense of responsibility and moderation which characterizes the leadership of the Kurdish movement causes one to believe that this movement should be aided not only to solve Iraq's most urgent problem, but that it could serve effectively as a means towards establishing a better and more stable Iraq.

Shafiq Qazzaz  
February 1968

Shafiq Qazzaz  
1420 Hampshire West Court  
Apartment 10  
Silver Spring, Md. 20903

Home 437-7034  
Work 526-3031

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

3639

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

September 22, 1967

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow ←  
The White House  
FROM: *John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Attached herewith is a copy of a memorandum concerning Pachachi's conversation with Robert Anderson.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

*Send copy to Anderson*

*by mail  
Anderson 11/4*

*Handwritten notes at top of page*

~~SECRET~~ ~~APPENDIX~~

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 SEP 22 PM 4 51

correspondence  
reference, a conversation with  
copy of a memorandum concerning  
attached herewith is a

FROM: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
WILLIAM H. REED

*Handwritten signature*

FOR: THE WHITE HOUSE  
MR. MALCOLM A. ROSSOM ←

September 22, 1967

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~ ~~APPENDIX~~

*Handwritten number 3734*

~~SECRET~~

42

MEMORANDUM

September 21, 1967

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: NEA - Lucius D. Battle

SUBJECT: Ambassador Pachachi's Conversation with  
Mr. Robert Anderson

Mr. Robert Anderson called me to report that Ambassador Pachachi of Iraq had called on him today for a full review of the Middle Eastern situation. During the special session of the General Assembly, Mr. Pachachi was the spokesman for a group of moderate Arabs with Mr. Anderson and others.

Mr. Pachachi, basing his comments on a meeting of his group (although UAR and others are not yet in New York), said that there was general concern because the Arabs did not believe they knew the position of the United States. The United States has not been explicit, they felt, in describing that position. There is some concern that this stems from U.S. support of the Israeli desire that nothing happen for a time since the Israelis are convinced that time is on their side. The moderate Arabs hope that our position is not also one of inaction as they consider that there must be an early settlement to the difficulties. If there is not an early settlement, U.S.-Arab relations will suffer considerably.

The moderate Arabs do not consider that their dialogue with the U.S. is adequate. They believe that there should be more contact with Ambassador Goldberg (which I urged during the last Assembly and urged today). Representatives of the group would like to meet with me, and I have agreed to get together with them the early part of next week in New York.

~~SECRET~~  
GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NIJ 03-175  
By me NARA, Date 12-15-03

Ambassador Pachachi was asked how far the Arabs were prepared to go at this time. He replied that they were willing to accept "almost complete rights of passage" in the waterways. There is no problem on Aqaba, and the Suez Canal could be opened to all but Israeli flagships. When Mr. Anderson expressed doubt that the Israelis would accept such an arrangement, Mr. Pachachi replied that, while he could not speak for Nasser, it was even possible that the Canal could be opened to Israeli flagships if necessary to obtain a settlement.

The Arabs are willing to guarantee all borders, but they must have retreat from occupied territories.

Withdrawal from Sinai could be coupled with a demilitarization arrangement.

They would accept demilitarization of the Syrian Heights under United Nations direction.

They will accept a unified Jerusalem provided there is some kind of administration by the Arabs (presumably the Jordanians) over the old Arab quarter.

Mr. Pachachi remarked that the Russians will "go as far as the Arabs want them to go provided the United States will join." The Eastern Bloc is, according to Pachachi, largely pro-Israel in attitude and the Russians cannot ignore this feeling on the part of satellite countries.

The Arabs are willing to accept a declaration of the end of a state of belligerency in some form.

They cannot accept direct negotiations alone with the Israelis. They will accept, if necessary, negotiations with a third party in the room. They would prefer to have the Arabs in one room, the Israelis in a second room, and a representative of the third country in a room between the two. They admit, however, that there is some precedent for them to sit at the same table provided a third party is present.

COMMENT: The foregoing is the most forthcoming offer yet reported. As I told Mr. Anderson, it is possible that Pachachi will be more open with him than he would be with a Government official. I would suspect that Pachachi's position

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3

with Mr. Anderson will not be fully reflected in an official talk, but I will try to find out during the next few days. If the Arabs are willing to make a deal along the foregoing lines, this is very encouraging.

Copies to:

U - Mr. Katzenbach  
M - Mr. Rostow  
G - Mr. Kohler  
IO - Mr. Sisco  
USUN NEW YORK

NEA:LDBattle:lab  
9/21/67

~~SECRET~~

White House - 3977  
Mr. Rostow

10/16/67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
TELEPHONE  
Memorandum of Conversation

\*7879

DATE: October 16, 1967

SUBJECT: Sulfa Project in Iraq

1. Rostow  
2. Anderson  
3. net BKS 6PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Robert Anderson, ex-Secretary of the Treasury  
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for NEACOPIES TO: White House - Mr. Rostow - 1  
U - Mr. Katzenbach - 1  
M - Mr. Rostow - 1  
NEA - Mr. Davies - 1  
S/S - 1

Mr. Robert Anderson called me today to report that he has been in touch with several of the Iraqis with respect to the sulfa project in Iraq in which he has long been interested. The group which Mr. Anderson represents is called the Pan American Sulfa Company (or something like that). A French group is also interested, and recently the Russians have indicated a desire to get into the act. President Arif wants Mr. Anderson to come out to Iraq in the near future, and Mr. Anderson has agreed to do so.

Foreign Minister Riad of the UAR called Mr. Anderson on Saturday to convey the information that the "Government wants Mr. Anderson to come out any time after October 15". Mr. Anderson has made no decision as to the wisdom of a trip to Cairo at this time and is open to any suggestions that we can make. He will, however, plan to go to Iraq in about two weeks.

I told Mr. Anderson that the question of his trip to Cairo must relate to what happens in Israel and that I could not give him any specific advice at this stage. I would, however, talk with my colleagues, and we would be back in touch with him in the near future. He agreed that no decision should be made at the moment pending further developments.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. GuidelinesBy jc, NARA, Date 3-26-03

FORM 3-61 DS-1254(T)

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GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified.

GPO 908991

3709  
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~~SECRET~~

16614 <sup>6</sup>

*Saunders*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 26, 1967

SUBJECT: Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Adan M. Pachachi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq  
Lucius D. Battle, Asst. Secretary of State for NEA

DISTRIBUTION: S/S  
WHITE HOUSE (Mr. Rostow)  
IO - Mr. Sisco  
USUN - Ambassador Goldberg  
M - Mr. Rostow  
NEA - Mr. Davies

I received Mr. Pachachi on September 25 in my room at the Waldorf. He remained for approximately one hour and twenty minutes. The meeting grew out of Mr. Pachachi's conversations with former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson.

After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Pachachi launched vigorously into a discussion of the Middle East. He said that the current session of the United Nations must not let an opportunity go by to solve the Middle East problem. Action through either the General Assembly or the Security Council during this session was imperative. The Arabs had accepted a moderate course at the Khartoum meeting and this must be built upon and as soon as possible or moderate leadership would give way to more radical influences. The United States had been very general in its pronouncements and it is imperative that we define carefully and precisely what we mean by the principles we have enunciated. The Israelis, in Mr. Pachachi's opinion, want no action at the present session and he feared the United States was supporting them in this course. Moreover, he detected in Ambassador Goldberg's statements an erosion of the US position which he found alarming.

I replied that the Middle East presented problems for the world and that a dangerous situation continued to exist there. Clearly we hoped for as early a solution as possible and we felt that the United Nations General Assembly offered one opportunity to come to grips with difficult problems. However, many levels of conversation and discussion were necessary and every forum

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LDBattle:vm 9-26-67

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-26-03

MICROFILMED  
BY S/S: GMS

should be utilized to the fullest extent. While speed of solution was important, it was equally imperative that we have a just and lasting solution as the world could not afford to risk a war every ten years or so.

I said that the United States position had been stated in the President's speech of June 19 and that there had been no change in our position. We still sought a lasting and just peace and to us an obvious starting point was for both sides to agree that the war was over and the state of belligerency ended.

We had refrained from defining what we would find acceptable in terms of a solution. What was acceptable to us was a solution the parties themselves could agree upon. We had no magic formula and had offered no overall plan. The general principles we had stated remained our position and we were reluctant to attempt to define a solution the parties themselves might reject. In this connection I pointed out that contrary to some opinion we had neither the right nor the power to dictate a solution.

Mr. Pachachi then spoke at great length on the need for the United States to define its views either privately or publicly. Private discussions should come first and reflect what the parties would agree to which could then be stated publicly.

I asked Mr. Pachachi whether a UN Representative could usefully, by exploring the issues in detail with the parties, give a sense of direction which might lead to peace. Mr. Pachachi said that a mediator was impossible unless the outlines of peace had already been agreed to in a UN context. To send a mediator first put the Arabs in a position of negotiating with Israeli troops on their soil. This was an impossible situation and the Arabs could not be expected to negotiate while occupied by foreign troops.

We returned to the possibility of finding a formula to end the state of belligerency. I told Mr. Pachachi that it was difficult indeed for us to encourage the Israelis or anyone else to believe the Arabs wanted a political settlement when statements continued to emanate from Arab countries indicating the war would go on.

I tried to draw Mr. Pachachi out on specific issues such as the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and refugees without much success. He returned each time to the need for the United States to say what it wished to see happen after which there could be discussion leading to General Assembly or Security Council action. He reaffirmed Arab unwillingness to negotiate directly or to recognize Israel.

Mr. Pachachi urged that the United States keep in touch with the Arabs and do all possible to prevent increasingly hostile attitudes from developing

in the Arab world toward the United States. I told him that we were willing always to talk. Ambassador Goldberg with whom he had had a friendly relationship for some time was always willing to see him, Ambassador Meyer would be here for several weeks, and I was available in Washington and occasionally in New York if conversations with me would be helpful. Mr. Pachachi said he would try to see Ambassador Goldberg and also keep in touch with Ambassador Meyer.

COMMENT:

I found very little latitude in Mr. Pachachi's discourse. None of the moderation evident in his talks with Mr. Anderson was repeated to me. He adamantly insisted that it was up to the United States to do something but gave little evidence of desire on the part of the Arabs to do anything except continue a dialogue. The conversation was friendly although fairly firm on both sides.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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REGISTRY'S OFFICE

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1967 SEP 29 AM 10 31

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

24

Saturday, Sept. 23, 1967  
3:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report of a conversation between Bob Anderson and Ambassador Pachachi -- to which I referred the other day -- gives you the flavor of a number of Arab approaches which we will be exploring in New York in the days ahead. They are moving, but whether they are moving far enough to make a serious deal remains to be seen.

W.A.R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

23

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NUJ 94-402

By ig, NARA, Date 3-27-95

7a

~~SECRET~~

Copy of memorandum to Secretary Rusk from Lucius Battle (Sept. 21, 1967)

SUBJECT: Ambassador Pachachi's Conversation with Mr. Robert Anderson

Mr. Robert Anderson called me to report that Ambassador Pachachi of Iraq had called on him today for a full review of the Middle Eastern situation. During the special session of the General Assembly, Mr. Pachachi was the spokesman for a group of moderate Arabs with Mr. Anderson and others.

Mr. Pachachi, basing his comments on a meeting of his group (although UAR and others are not yet in New York) said that there was general concern because the Arabs did not believe they knew the position of the United States. The United States has not been explicit, they felt, in describing that position. There is some concern that this stems from U. S. support of the Israeli desire that nothing happen for a time since the Israelis are convinced that time is on their side. The moderate Arabs hope that our position is not also one of inaction as they consider that there must be an early settlement to the difficulties. If there is not an early settlement, U. S. -Arab relations will suffer considerably.

The moderate Arabs do not consider that their dialogue with the U. S. is adequate. They believe that there should be more contact with Ambassador Goldberg (which I urged during the last Assembly and urged today). Representatives of the group would like to meet with me, and I have agreed to get together with them the early part of next week in New York. Ambassador Pachachi was asked how far the Arabs were prepared to go at this time. He replied that they were willing to accept "almost complete rights of passage" in the waterways. There is no problem on Aqaba, and the Suez Canal could be opened to all but Israeli flagships. When Mr. Anderson expressed doubt that the Israelis would accept such an arrangement, Mr. Pachachi replied that, while he could not speak for Nasser, it was even possible that the Canal could be opened to Israeli flagships if necessary to obtain a settlement.

The Arabs are willing to guarantee all borders, but they must have retreat from occupied territories.

Withdrawal from Sinai could be coupled with a demilitarization arrangement.

They would accept demilitarization of the Syrian Heights under United Nations direction.

They will accept a unified Jerusalem provided there is some kind of administration by the Arabs (presumably the Jordanians) over the old Arab quarter.

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-2-

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The Arabs are willing to accept a declaration of the end of a state of belligerency in some form.

They cannot accept direct negotiations alone with the Israelis. They will accept, if necessary, negotiations with a third party in the room. They would prefer to have the Arabs in one room, the Israelis in a second room, and a representative of the third country in a room between the two. They admit, however, that there is some precedent for them to sit at the same table provided a third party is present.

COMMENT: The foregoing is the most forthcoming offer yet reported. As I told Mr. Anderson, it is possible that Pachachi will be more open with him than he would be with a Government official. I would suspect that Pachachi's position with Mr. Anderson will not be fully reflected in an official talk, but I will try to find out during the next few days. If the Arabs are willing to make a deal along the foregoing lines, this is very encouraging.

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~~SECRET~~

*Cragg*

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3:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

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~~*Mr. Goldstein*~~

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Battle memo to Rusk 9/21/67 Amb. Pachachi's Conversation with Mr. Robert Anderson)

*Dec 1967*

1983  
*6-2-89*

~~SECRET~~

8a

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

By            NARA, Date 3-27-95

~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID  
USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

EAO DDIE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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
COUNTRY: IRAQ/USSR

DOI: MID TO LATE JULY 1967

SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFER TO UNDERWRITE IRAQI LOSS OF OIL REVENUES IF  
IRAQ SHUTS OFF ALL OIL PRODUCTION TO THE WEST FOR THREE  
MONTHS

ACQ:

SOURCE:



3.3(b)

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec 1.5

NLI/RAC 15-96

NARA, Date 09-08-2015

ULS. 001.138.003/2

By ULS

• ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM  
(classification) (dissem controls)

25X1X

[REDACTED]

1. SOMETIME IN MID TO LATE JULY 1967, THE SOVIET UNION INFORMED IRAQ THAT IT WOULD UNDERWRITE IRAQ'S FINANCIAL LOSSES IF IT WOULD CUT OFF ALL OIL SHIPMENTS TO THE WEST FOR A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS. 25X1X

25X1A

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE HOW THIS MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE SOVIET OFFER, BUT ALL [REDACTED] TOLD HIM VIRTUALLY THE SAME THING, AS ABOVE.) 25X1X

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (ALSO SENT: [REDACTED]) 25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X1A

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

25X1A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967  
4:20 p. m.

*Swamp*

Mr. President:

Herewith, on behalf of  
Sec. Rusk, a preliminary talking  
paper for your meeting with  
Pachachi.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House, Washington, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Deid, NAD:ly Hrc 6-2-87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10a  
June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi,  
June 1, 6:45 P.M.

You have agreed to receive Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Foreign Minister of Iraq on June 1, at 6:45 p.m. Dr. Pachachi has come to the U.S. to explain the Arab point of view in the current Arab-Israeli political crisis.

Dr. Pachachi has been Foreign Minister of Iraq since April, 1966. He had previously been permanent representative of Iraq to the United Nations where he often served as the principal spokesman and negotiator of the Arab bloc in dealing with the United States on Arab-Israeli affairs. Dr. Pachachi received his higher education in the United States, respects American institutions, and has developed good working relationships with U.S. officials. He speaks excellent English. In diplomatic debates he is highly articulate, stubborn but reasonable.

Dr. Pachachi has just been in Cairo and can be expected to give Cairo's views on the current crisis but with more detachment. Iraq maintains close ties with the UAR and attempts to maintain unity of policy with the latter except when this might contradict vital Iraqi national interests. It is possible that Pachachi might attempt to act as the UAR's broker in the present crisis. He will undoubtedly adopt the UAR legal position on the status of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Following are points which you and others may wish to make in your discussions with Dr. Pachachi:

- I. The United States is seeking to avoid hostilities and to

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By JW, NARA, Date 4-10-00

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achieve a resolution of the crisis through the United Nations if possible. We fully back the Secretary General's efforts to find ways to re-establish peace in the Middle East. We agree with his assessment that the current crisis is more serious than at any time since 1956.

2. We value our relations with the Arab world and realize the mutual danger we could suffer if a peaceful solution by the international community could not be attained.

3. We have urged all members of the Security Council to support the Secretary-General in his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. We believe that a breathing spell not impairing free passage through the Strait of Tiran is needed for diplomatic activities to take place, and for the Council's more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues. We are in favor of a resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal to all parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence, and to avoid all other actions which could increase tensions.

4. In the pursuance of this effort we have dissuaded the Israelis, for the time being, from taking military actions. We now need a conciliatory approach on the part of the Arabs.

5. Our legal position on the Gulf of Aqaba is based on international law and on Article 16, para. 4, of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1958 and was clearly stated by you on May 23. It is important that all concerned understand the depth and firmness of our commitment to free passage through the Strait of Tiran for the ships of all nations.

6. This principle has nothing to do with Israel and the UAR. The second principle on which our position rests is equally important: We support the territorial integrity and political independence of all the countries of the Middle East. This principle has been affirmed by four American Presidents. It

has been invoked to protect Egypt against Israel, in 1956, in the Lebanon crisis of 1958, and in behalf of other Arab governments as well.

We wish all the friendly Arab governments thoroughly to understand this fact, and recall the occasions when the principle was invoked in their behalf.

7. We believe that effective steps must be taken to reaffirm the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement and revitalize the Armistice machinery (we note that the UAR also called for this in the May 29 Security Council meeting).

We will be sending over later accounts of Pachachi's discussions today with Ambassador Goldberg (8:00 a.m.), myself (3:30 p.m.) and Secretary Rusk (5:00 p.m.). We will make certain that Dr. Pachachi agrees to the same conditions of approach and secrecy regarding his conversation with you as in the case of Foreign Minister Eban.

Eugene V. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 1, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister  
Adnan Pachachi, June 1, 6:30 P.M.  
15

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GROUP 3  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sj/rg*, NARA, Date *3/1/06*

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to act as the UAR's broker in the present crisis. He will undoubtedly adopt the UAR legal position on the status of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Following are points which you and others may wish to make in your discussions with Dr. Pachachi:

1. The United States is seeking to avoid hostilities and to achieve a resolution of the crisis through the United Nations if possible. We fully back the Secretary General's efforts to find ways to re-establish peace in the Middle East. We agree with his assessment that the current crisis is more serious than at any time since 1956.

2. We value our relations with the Arab world and realize the mutual danger we could suffer if a peaceful solution by the international community could not be attained.

3. We have urged all members of the Security Council to support the Secretary-General in his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. We believe that a breathing spell not impairing free passage through the Strait of Tiran is needed for diplomatic activities to take place, and for the Council's more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues. We are in favor of a resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal to all parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence, and to avoid all other actions which could increase tensions.

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Eugene V. Rostow

Mr. Head / Walsh

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RUSTON'S OFFICE

1967 JUN 1 PM 4 03

MEMORANDUM

21)

12

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 4-10-00

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 31, 1967 -- 8:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment With Iraqi Foreign Minister

Attached is Sec. Rusk's recommendation that you see Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi. Since he has just been in Cairo and is a responsible man, he could turn out to be one of our better channels to the Arabs.

We shall aim to tie him to the same kind of commitment to secrecy we got from Eban.

Sec. Rusk would see him before you, but Pachachi would probably have to be told before he'd come down from New York that he had an appointment with you.

I believe you should give serious consideration to seeing him. In Arab eyes, we are completely committed to Israel. It would be healthy, if we are to salvage any of our Arab interests from this crisis, if a responsible Arab could carry away an impression of both your resolution and your good will for Arabs who are trying to restore peace.

My recommendation is that he carry away a firm sense of how deeply meant were all aspects of your May 23 speech.

I'll see him \_\_\_\_\_  
See me \_\_\_\_\_

Walt Rostow

*only if you get  
some promise of secrecy  
we are not from Eban  
I need some conditions*

~~SECRET~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Chicago, Illinois, May 15, 1946

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Dear Mr. [Name]:

I am pleased to hear that you are interested in the [Project Name] project.

The project is currently in the planning stage and we are looking for qualified individuals to join the team.

I believe you should give serious consideration to this opportunity. We are currently accepting applications and would like to see your resume and references.

Very respectfully,  
[Name]

[Signature]

[Text]

28

3097

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Dr. Adnan Pachachi,  
Foreign Minister of Iraq

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Foreign Minister of Iraq, who arrived in New York on May 29 and plans to remain until June 1. Dr. Pachachi has come to the United States for several days in the hope of seeing you in connection with the Arab-Israel crisis.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Background:

Dr. Pachachi is an extremely able and experienced diplomat who, in several past UN General Assembly sessions, has been designated by the Arab states as their principal spokesman and negotiator in dealing with our delegation on Arab-Israel issues. He has the full confidence of the Iraqi Government, and his mission has cabinet approval. He is moderate and reasonable. He has just been in Cairo and wishes to submit the Arab point of view to you, as well as to make whatever other contribution he can toward reducing the current tension. Your reception of an Arab statesman of this caliber would help balance any Arab reaction to the visit of Foreign Minister Eban of Israel.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

*Others of us will have a full round with him before you see him.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *pc*, NARA, Date 3-26-03  
(S FRUS 64-68, vol. 21, \* 192, n. 2)

RECEIVED  
RDS 67'S OFFICE

1967 MAY 31 PM 5 05

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 37504

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	AID
									USIA	ONE	ORR	DCS	CGS

DDI EXD

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE [ ]

DIST 24 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY: IRAQ

DOI: [ ]

3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE COUP PLOTTING IN IRAQ

ACQ:

SOURCE:

[ ] 3.3(b)(1)

1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER AHMAD HASAN BAKR IS ACTIVELY PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE IRAQI REGIME. HIS MAIN SUPPORT COMES FROM FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE ABD AL-AZIZ AL-UQAYLI AND SEVERAL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY OFFICERS FROM MOSUL. THE GROUP IS NOT YET STRONG

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NLI IRAC 15-96

By LLLD NARA Date 09-08-2015

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~  
(classification) (dissem controls)

ENOUGH TO CHALLENGE THE REGIME, BUT PLANS TO DO SO IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BY WHICH TIME THEY HOPE TO HAVE RECRUITED 700 OFFICERS INTO THEIR ORGANIZATION.

2. THE MOTIVATING FACTOR BEHIND THIS GROUP IS THAT IT BELIEVES THAT IRAQ HAS GONE TOO FAR TO THE LEFT, AND THAT IRAQ MUST STOP ITS FLIRTATION WITH MOSCOW AND RETURN TO A MORE NEUTRALIST COURSE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. UNDER THIS GROUP, IF IT SUCCEEDS, IRAQ WOULD BE IRAQI FIRST AND ARAB SECOND, BUT NON-ALIGNED WITH ANY BLOC, INTERNATIONAL OR ARAB. ALTHOUGH THE GROUP IS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY COMPOSED OF MILITARY OFFICERS, IT INTENDS TO INSTALL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IF IT SUCCEEDS. A GOVERNMENT UNDER THIS GROUP WOULD NOT BE PRO NASIR NOR WOULD IT BE IN THE CAMP OF CONSERVATIVE REGIMES IN THE AREA. IT IS ESSENTIALLY AN "IRAQI FIRSTER" KIND OF GROUP, BUT DEFINITELY ANTI-SOCIALIST AND ANTI-COMMUNIST.

3. IRAQ IS RIPE TODAY FOR SOME KIND OF MILITARY MOVEMENT. MORE THAN TWO THIRDS OF THE ARMY OPPOSES THE REGIME, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE A HALT IN THE SWING TO THE LEFT WHICH IRAQ HAS MADE IN RECENT MONTHS. THE OFFICERS WHO ARE FED UP WITH THE REGIME ARE ABOUT EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN THOSE WHO SIMPLY WANT TO GET

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~  
 (classification) (dissem controls)

OUT, EITHER RETIRE OR GO ABROAD AS MILITARY ATTACHES, AND THOSE WHO WANT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT CHANGING THE REGIME. THESE LATTER ARE PROBABLY WORKING ON SOMETHING.

4.  COMMENT: THE RECENT ARAB/ISRAELI WAR HAS SERVED 3.3(b)(1) AWAKEN THE IRAQIS INTO SEEING THAT THEY ARE ON THE WRONG COURSE. MANY IRAQIS TODAY BELIEVE THAT THEY MUST STOP THE SOCIALIST DRIFT OR THE COUNTRY WILL BE RUINED, AND IT SEEMS TRUE THAT THE COUNTRY IS RIPE FOR SOME STABILIZING MOVEMENT. THE RECENT WAR ALSO UNMASKED IAR PRESIDENT NASIR, WHOSE PRESTIGE IN IRAQ TODAY IS AT AN ALL TIME LOW, AS IS THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. PART OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME ALSO SPRINGS FROM A WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION TO IRAQ'S CURRENT OIL POLICY, PARTICULARLY THE EMBARGO ON OIL SHIPMENTS TO WEST GERMANY WHICH HAS LONG ENJOYED AND STILL ENJOYS AN EXCELLENT REPUTATION IN IRAQ. IF IRAQ CARRIES THROUGH ITS PROPOSAL TO STOP ALL OIL FLOW FOR THREE MONTHS, THIS COULD BE THE TIPOFF TO THE GROUP DESCRIBED ABOVE TO ACT.

5.  DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL) 3.3(b)(1) CINCMEAFSA CINCUSNAVEUR (ALSO SENT:  3.3(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 21, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gift and Message from Iraq's President

Attached is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts.

This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message.

I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way--nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an opportunity we shouldn't miss.

Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates--headed by Aref--can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own--and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble.

We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 4-10-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation.

*Walt* W. Rostow

I'll see General Sabri \_\_\_\_\_

I'll see all five together  
if Secretary Rusk would like ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

229

14a

January 20, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presentation of Gift from Iraqi President

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you receive Major General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, on January 23, 24, or 25 long enough for him to present a gift sent to you by the President of Iraq, and that you present him with a gift in exchange.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DISCUSSION:

Major General Hassan Sabri, accompanied by four other senior Iraqi Army officers, is arriving in Washington on January 22 for a Military Aid Program orientation tour in the United States. The delegation, whose members have considerable political power in Iraq, will be carrying both an oral message and a gift for you from President Aref of Iraq. The gift is understood to be a carpet. Our Ambassador in Iraq strongly recommends that you receive the delegation plus the Iraqi Ambassador here for a few minutes in order to exchange gifts.

Ambassador Strong's recommendation is undoubtedly prompted by the fact that Iraq is entering a critical

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By je, NARA, Date 3-26-03

decision period. President Aref has been trying to build up an "Iraq-firster" regime which would put Iraq's national interests ahead of the strained attempts to maintain unity of policy with the radical Arab nationalist states such as the UAR and Syria. The Syrian shutting off of the main oil pipeline of the part American owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is contributing to the importance of the decision President Aref will have to make on the composition of his government. The present cabinet has shown itself too weak to make the sort of decisions required of it by the expected drastic decrease of the IPC revenues on which the Iraqi Government depends. A more radical cabinet might attempt to nationalize IPC, a course which would be self-defeating and precipitate a greater economic crisis. In the current juggling in Iraq, Aref heads the forces of moderation which are trying to find a non-disruptive solution to the oil crisis. In the long term, if these moderates can maintain power in Iraq they will make an important contribution to stability in the area.

We therefore believe that in the forthcoming critical period, we should continue to stiffen President Aref's morale, and that any such personal recognition by you of his special emissary would serve this purpose by strengthening the cordial ties already established by past messages exchanged between you and President Aref through diplomatic channels.

General Sabri will be available in the Washington area January 23, 24, and 25. If you can receive him and the Iraqi Ambassador for a few minutes during that period, the Department of State could provide a silver cigarette box bearing the Presidential seal for you to make an exchange present for President Aref.



Dean Rusk

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 JAN 21 AM 9 26

~~TOP SECRET~~


Received: Washington CommCen  
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FROM ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY  
TO WALT ROSTOW  
CITE CAP80181

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.3(b)(3)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 15-84  
By CH NARA, Date 12-6-15

3.3(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG: 081206Z JAN 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

16

FS

~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Iraqi President Aref

Ambassador Strong will be calling on President Aref tomorrow morning before returning here on consultation and home leave. Since Aref's term as President has just been extended, he would like to deliver personal congratulations from you in the form of the following message:

"I was pleased to learn that the Cabinet and Defense Council have extended your term of office. My sincere congratulations both to you and to the people of Iraq."

I recommend you approve. This would be another in the series of relatively short messages of this kind which you have used to establish a personal relationship with this man who appears to be leading Iraq gradually into a more moderate course. He deeply appreciated your receiving his top generals last December, and this seems an appropriate time for another short message.

We will have to get this out tonight if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve   V  

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Sold s/s - Jan 1967  
Kang on 4/10/67*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By   JW  , NARA, Date   4-10-00  

~~SECRET~~

# AIRGRAM

17

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22

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-571

~~CONFIDENTIAL - EXDIS~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 2 8 32 AM 1967

02

COPY NO. SERIES B

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: February 24, 1967

SUBJECT: Local Interest in an Invitation to President Aref to Visit the US

REF : Enclosure to DATT's IR 2 847 0042 67

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-143  
By us, NARA, Date 12-15-03

EXDIS

The reference recounts how the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi General Staff, Major General Hasan Sabri, during his recent three-week tour of US military installations ran across a former US Army Attache' in Baghdad; how Colonel Artman artlessly planted in Sabri's mind the idea that President Aref should visit the United States; how Sabri broached the matter to President Aref; how Aref responded (according to Sabri); and how Sabri approached DATT.

I do not think Aref himself will push the matter in the near future. Whether he cleared Sabri's approach to DATT is a moot point. How far Sabri pushes it remains to be seen. In absence of any response from the USG, the matter is likely to die.

In my opinion it is premature for several reasons to propose a visit by Aref: (1) he holds office legally only a few months more, but an invitation should not be considered until after he has been continued in office for a further period by some kind of legal action; (2) given the state of affairs in the Arab world, with its impact on Iraq, the benefits from such a visit would be minimal; (3) while Aref may gain in strength, leadership, skill, and experience, he still is an unproven quality; and (4) if Aref visits the US before the IPC agreements are ratified, it may become even more difficult for him to push ratification after his return (assuming at some point he may decide that ratification makes sense) because by doing so he would open himself to the charge of having sold out to the US.

4. If Aref continues in office for a longer period, and if he seems to grow in stature and capability, then some way might be found to get

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Gp-1; Excluded from automatic downgrading.

~~CONFIDENTIAL - EXDIS~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In  Out

Drafted by: Ambassador Robert C. Strong/mvm 2/21/67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Ambassador

Clearances:

Baghdad A-571

~~CONFIDENTIAL: EXDIS~~

across to him the idea that we should like to have him visit the US but that we do not want to jeopardize the possible ratification of the IPC draft agreements, ratification being the sine qua non for a satisfactory pace of economic and social development.

To pass such remarks to Aref, a private emissary from President Johnson would be preferable. There are several reasons I should not do it. I have in mind former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson who has come to Iraq twice in the past year on private business, whose presence here would cause no unusual stir, who can gain access to Aref readily and who has the stature and the personal qualities which will enable him to put across these ideas without repercussions.

Before such a gambit is put in motion, request I be consulted. British should also be consulted in advance.

*Rees*  
STRONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL: EXDIS~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

*9/1/67*

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RUQTAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
ZEN/AMCONSUL BASRA  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
ZEN/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
STATE GRNC  
BT

012354  
1967 JAN 16 PM 5 01

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-211  
By [signature], NARA, Date 9-5-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1262

GIFT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRESIDENT AREF.

PAGE 2 RUQTBG 1262 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. WE LEARNED JANUARY 15 THAT DUPUTY CHIEF OF IRAQI GENERAL STAFF WHO ARRIVING WASHINGTON JANUARY 22 AT HEAD OF HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DELEGATION WILL BE CARRYING AN ORAL MESSAGE AND A GIFT FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRESIDENT AREF (GIFT UNDERSTOOD TO BE A CARPET). EXTRA IRAQI MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING DELEGATION AT IRAQI EXPENSE TO ACT AS GIFT BEARERS.
2. DECISION APPARENTLY MADE AT LAST MINUTE BY AREF AND IS A COMPLICATION WHICH COULD NOT GRACEFULLY BE ELIMINATED BY ACTION HERE. FAVORABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND IMPORTANCE THEREOF ARE RECOGNIZABLE. AREF'S ACTION POSSIBLY STIMULATED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE.
3. FROM PERSPECTIVE OF BAGHDAD CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON RECEIVE DELEGATION AND IRAQI AMBASSADOR IF ONLY FOR FEW MINUTES. ALSO RECOMMEND PRESIDENT PRESENT DELEGATION A GIFT FOR AREF.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- BAGHDAD 1262 JANUARY 16, 1967

4. SUGGEST ANY PUBLICITY BE LOW KEY, BRIEF AND FACTUAL.
5. REQUEST I BE GIVEN TELEGRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF WHITE HOUSE MEETING, DESCRIPTION OF GIFTS EXCHANGED, SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION

PAGE 3 RUQTBG 1262 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AND INDICATION OF PRESS TREATMENT.

6. IF PRESIDENT UNABLE RECEIVE DELEGATION, PLEASE GIVE ME AN EXPLANATION FOR DELIVERY TO AREF ALONG WITH ANY ORAL MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO HIS.

7. ADDENDUM: YASUB RAFIQ, MASTER OF CEREMONIES AT PRESIDENCY, TOLD EMBOFF JANUARY 14 THAT AREF IS GOING TO ANKARA PROBABLY IN FEBRUARY, TO TEHRAN IN MARCH AND IS NOT EPT NOT GOING CAIRO.

GP-3. STRONG  
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE 1/16/67 8 41 PM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Copy sent Washington*

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action  
SS  
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~~SECRET~~

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DE RUQTBG 567 2711030  
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
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~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 567

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1966 SEP 28 11 7

SEP 28

EXDIS

FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES

STATE 47193 AND 48527

1. MADE POINTS TO PRIME MINISTER TALIB AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABD AL-MAJID BOTH OF WHOM I SAW SEPARATELY ON SEPTEMBER 27. ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH HANI HAD PROPOSED SOME KIND OF PUBLIC STATEMENT, USG THOUGHT SUCH WOULD BE MORE HARMFUL THAN HELPFUL AND THUS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DONE. ALSO GAVE BOTH OF THEM A TRANSCRIPT OF RECENT CLANDESTINE BROADCAST FROM QTE VOICE OF IRAQI PEOPLE ENDQTE ACCUSING USG OF CAUSING DEFECTION AND MURDERING FOUR IRAQI PILOTS, AND ATTACKING GOI FOR HUSHING UP FACTS.

PAGE 2 RUQTBG 567 ~~SECRET~~

I POINTED TO DELIBERATE COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN LONG UNDER WAY TO USE EVERY DEVICE TO DISCREDIT USG AND ALIENATE IT FROM ITS FRIENDS.

2. BOTH EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR STRAIGHT-FORWARD STATEMENTS. NEITHER INDICATED THAT A REPORT HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM HANI. BOTH SAID THEY AND ALL OTHER RESPONSIBLE IRAQIS AWARE THAT COMMIES RUNNING SCURRILOUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST USG. TALIB SPOKE BITTERLY OF BROADCASTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AGAINST EVERY IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

3. APPROACHES IN WASHINGTON AND HERE SHOULD PROVE HELPFUL. HOWEVER, DOUBT ISSUE PERMANENTLY OVERCOME.

GP-1. STRONG

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 11-53  
By UCLB NARA, Date 07-12-12

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

125694

21

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy BAGHDAD PRIORITY

NEA

Info:

SS  
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USIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
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CPR

STATE 125694  
REF: BAGHDAD'S 1262

JAN 26 12 55 PM '67

1. The President received all five Iraqi military officers plus Iraqi Ambassador Hani twenty-fifth in informal but warm and friendly meeting. General Sabri read off non-substantive message from President Aref expressing friendship and presented the President with rug and goblets. In reply the President expressed his appreciation, presented Sabri with watch and cigarette case for President Aref, and extended best wishes to Government and people of Iraq.

2. Dept has requested text of President Aref's message from Iraqi Embassy and will pouch to Embassy Baghdad when received.

GP 3

KATZENBACH

END

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-211

By 47, NARA, Date 9-5-91

Drafted by: <b>NEA/ARN/LLK insolving: jh 1/25/67</b>	Tel. Ext. <b>3235</b>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>NEA/ARN - Robert B. Houghton</b> <del>NEA - Robert B. Houghton</del>
---	--------------------------	--

Clearances:

~~NEA/ARN - Robert B. Houghton~~

S/S  
Mr. Thompson

White House  
Mr. Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Confiden. at~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1-Whiggins  
2-Ret.

Called Jan 25  
12:15 1/26  
vls

January 25, 1967

Date

OK  
HHS  
[Signature]

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

BY [Signature] ON 1-2-67

Enclosure:

Tel to Baghdad re Baghdad's 1262.

~~Confidential~~  
CLASSIFICATION

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 JAN 26 AM 9 03

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

108441

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

42  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy BAGHDAD,  
AmEmbassy CAIRO  
AmEmbassy JIDDA  
AmEmbassy KUWAIT  
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV  
AmEmbassy TRIPOLI  
INFO: AmEmbassy ~~AmEmbassy~~ Damascus  
AmEmbassy Beirut  
INFO: AmEmbassy London  
~~SECRET~~ GINGSTRIKE  
INFO: AmEmbassy Amman

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Dec 24 2 30 PM '66

EXDIS  
STATE

108441

1. We have now concluded negotiations with King Hussein on delivery of certain items of military equipment to Jordan. A substantial portion this equipment will be airlifted to Jordan within the next 30 to 60 days. Included in our grant are APC's, 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, 105 and 155 mm. howitzers, 106 mm recoilless rifles, trucks, jeeps, communications equipment and ammunition. Cost of these items totals approximately \$7.5 million which is considerably smaller than the amount requested by King Hussein. We feel however that its delivery by airlift will have substantial psychological impact in view of current situation in Jordan.

2. In return, King Hussein has agreed that he will do all he can to prevent the stationing of foreign Arab troops in Jordan, will limit actual force levels of JAA to 53,000 men (present force level

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLI/IRAC 11-53  
By LUB NARA, Date 07-12-12

Drafted by: NEA/ARN/MWwiley: jh 12/23/66

Tel. Ext. 3236

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA- Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - A.L. Atherton  
S/S

S/S-O: G. Ferri

DOD/ISA - Mr. Barringer (subs)  
AID/NESA - Mr. Macomber (info)

~~SECRET~~

AFN

E - Mr. Looman (subs)

~~SECRET~~

approximately 50,000) and will continue his strenuous efforts to

prevent exfiltration into Israel by terrorist groups.

3. USG also agreed deploy to Jordan in January six F-104 aircraft of US Air Force, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~

but with Jordanian markings, on temporary basis pending delivery commencing in July ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~

of other F-104s which GOJ purchasing from USG under early 1966 agreement. Purpose ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~

is provide evidence continued U.S. support while avoiding appearance of show of ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~

force. This action not yet announced and public line now being worked out.

4. Hussein understands that USG is not prepared to alter terms  
1965 1966

of sales agreements of ~~1964~~ and ~~1965~~ for military ground equipment

and F-104 aircraft. These agreements require cash payment in advance

of delivery of equipment. In case UAC funding arrangement break

down, we have agreed to approach SAC and GOK to support King's

request to these governments for funds to replace UAC contribution.

King also may request us approach Libyan Government.

5. We have acquiesced in pay raise for enlisted men in Jordan Arab

Army of magnitude of 25% and have agreed to reduce our cut in

supporting assistance for Jordan in JFY-67 from \$5 million to

\$3 million.

6. Although our response is considerably less than Jordanians had

requested, we believe it adequate to bolster the regime in diffi-

cult times ahead and, at same time, sufficiently small to avoid

triggering another round in Near East Arms race at expense of

development programs in Jordan. King is planning to visit Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait in Early February in search of funds and in March

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

will go to Libya for same purpose. Instructions for our supporting role in Jidda and Kuwait and possibly Libya will follow.

7. Above information FYI only and should be closely held.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

91650

23

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2-S

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy BAGHDAD

Nov 25 11 21 PM '66

NEA

Info:

STATE 91650

SS

REF BAGHDAD'S 964

GPM

SP

SC

SAH

P

NSC

You authorized convey oral message from the President to Aref as contained  
para 1 reftel.

GP 3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA/ARN:LIKinsolving:jh 11/23/66

Tel. Ext.

3235

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA: William J. Handley

Clearances:

NEA/ARN- A.L. Atherton  
s/s - Mr. Shaver  
White House Mr. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By gfy, NARA, Date 3-1-06

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

88138

24

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

87

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy Baghdad

Nov 19 7 19 PM '66

SS

Info:

STATE

88138

LMDLS

REF : BAGHDAD'S 909

1. Before referring your recommendation to White House, suggest in view of your more intimate knowledge of Aref's situation and susceptibilities you amplify last para ref tel and submit rough draft of proposed message.
2. Iraqi Ambassador Hani called on the President in hospital here seventeenth to leave card. The President invited him in personally for twenty-minute visit, along with Lebanese Ambassador.

GP 3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN/LLKinsolving:jh 11/18/66	Tel. Ext. 3235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA: Rodger P. Davies
---	-------------------	--

Clearances:  
NEA/ARN: A.L. Atherton  
S/S - Mr. Shostal  
White House - Mr. Bromley Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-1-06

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

24a  
File  
S/S informed

November 19, 1966

BICG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BKS:

Ambassador Strong will shortly call on President Aref in his new capacity as dean of the diplomatic corps in Baghdad. He's recommended he be authorized to convey a general message from the President. The attached simply asks for suggestions and reports Ambassador Hani's call on the President at the hospital.

Recommend we clear.

Hal  
HHS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-26-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

4082

24/5

November 18, 1966

Date

1 Muggins  
2 [unclear]

OK HHS

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

BY DCA ON 6-2-79

Enclosure:

Tel to Baghdad re Baghdad's 909

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

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1966 NOV 18 PM 6 21

50322

25

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET - XEROX~~

42  
Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

00

SEP 20 1 34 PM '66

STATE 50322  
EXDIS  
BAGHDAD 477

Prohme fully briefed to fill you in on points raised reftel.

GP-3

BALL

Drafted by: NEA/ARNEALatherton, Jr. :acs 9/19/66	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
---	-------------------	---

Clearances:  
S/S - Mr. Thompson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 11-53

NARA, Date 07-12-12

~~SECRET - XEROX~~

FORM 8-65 DS-322

By LCB

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

42  
Action

~~SECRET~~

02

VV QVA773IVV QIA707V BGA949

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Info

RH RUEHC  
DE RUQTBG 477 2600945  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 170940Z  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

015560

1955 SEP 17 AM 7 35

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 477

EXDIS

SEPTEMBER 17

REF: STATE 47193

EXDIS FOR DEPUTY ASST SECRETARY DAVIES.

1. APPRECIATE YOUR RESPONSE TO BAGHDAD 397. MEASURES BEING TAKEN SHOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR PRESENT. WE SHALL TRY KEEP FINGER ON PULSE HERE AND IF NECESSARY RECOMMEND FURTHER STEPS. PROBLEM IS THAT IN MATTER OF THIS NATURE GOI UNLIKELY ENGAGE IN OPEN OR PROLONGED ARGUMENTATION WITH USG BUT MORE INCLINED TAKE UNILATERAL AC HHL DGKMJZIXD BUNGA.\*

2. POINTS TO BE MAPIUTUAIJIANHSRELATE\* TO PAST AND PRESENT ONLY. IRAQIS CERTAIN TO NOTE THIS AND WILL CONTINUE BE UNEASY ABOUT FUTURE. WHILE I DISLIKE HARPING ON SUBJECT, I AM IGNORANT OF USG INTENTIONS AND THEREFORE MUST WORRY. THERE ARE TWO KEY POINTS IN MY MIND:

PAGE 2 RUQTBG 477 ~~SECRET~~

(A) IRAQ IS NOT REPT NOT AN ENEMY COUNTRY AND WOULD HAVE STRONG LEGAL AND MORAL CASE IF USG WERE TO TAKE POSSESSION AIRCRAFT; AND

(B) IRAQI MILIARY WILL LONG CONTINUE TO BE SOLE SOURCE OF POWER IN IRAQ; MILIARY DIGNITY DAMAGED BY DEFECTION; WHEREAS UNABLE ACT AGAINST ISRAEL, IRAQI MILIARY WILL OF NECESSITY HAVE TO RESET STRONGLY IF USG ULTIMATELY EXPOSES ITSELF; ADVERSE EFFECTS THUS LIKELY BE ENDURING WITH POWER ELEMENT HERE.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~

NLI/KAC 11-53  
NARA, Date 07-12-12

y LUB

~~SECRET~~

-2- BAGHDAD 477, SEPTEMBER 17

3. MY PREVIOUS MESSAGES MAY BE MISLEADING IN ONE RESPECT. THREAT AGAINST AIR ATTACHE WAS IN FACT POSSIBLE DECISION BY GOI TO REQUIRE PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL OF ENTIRE AIR ATTACHE ESTABLISHMENT. GROUNDS WOULD BE THAT SINCE GOI LACKS AIR ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, INAPPROPRIATE FOR USG MAINTAIN SUCH OFFICE HERE. GP-3 STRONG  
BT

\* - As received; correction to follow.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*26a*

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTIONS ISSUED:  
9/19/66 3:12 A.M. MEC

*42*  
Action

*SS*

Info

VV QVA773TVV QTA707V BGA949  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUQTBG 477 2600945  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 170940Z  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD - CORRECTED COPY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 477

015560

1966 SEP 17 AM 7 35

EXDIS

*02 FS*

SEPTEMBER 17

REF: STATE 47193

EXDIS FOR DEPUTY ASST SECRETARY DAVIES.

1. APPRECIATE YOUR RESPONSE TO BAGHDAD 397. MEASURES BEING TAKEN SHOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR PRESENT. WE SHALL TRY KEEP FINGER ON PULSE HERE AND IF NECESSARY RECOMMEND FURTHER STEPS. PROBLEM IS THAT IN MATTER OF THIS NATURE GOI UNLIKELY ENGAGE IN OPEN OR PROLONGED ARGUMENTATION WITH USG BUT MORE INCLINED TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION WITHOUT WARNING.

2. POINTS TO BE MADE TO HANI RELATE TO PAST AND PRESENT ONLY. IRAQIS CERTAIN TO NOTE THIS AND WILL CONTINUE BE UNEASY ABOUT FUTURE. WHILE I DISLIKE HARPING ON SUBJECT, I AM IGNORANT OF USG INTENTIONS AND THEREFORE MUST WORRY. THERE ARE TWO KEY POINTS IN MY MIND:

PAGE 2 RUQTBG 477 ~~SECRET~~

(A) IRAQ IS NOT REPT NOT AN ENEMY COUNTRY AND WOULD HAVE STRONG LEGAL AND MORAL CASE IF USG WERE TO TAKE POSSESSION AIRCRAFT; AND

(B) IRAQI MILITARY WILL LONG CONTINUE TO BE SOLE SOURCE OF POWER IN IRAQ; MILITARY DIGNITY DAMAGED BY DEFECTION; WHEREAS UNABLE ACT AGAINST ISRAEL, IRAQI MILITARY WILL OF NECESSITY HAVE TO RESET STRONGLY IF USG ULTIMATELY EXPOSES ITSELF; ADVERSE EFFECTS THUS LIKELY BE ENDURING WITH POWER ELEMENT HERE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI 12AC 11-53

NARA, Date 07-12-12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- BAGHDAD 477, SEPTEMBER 17

3. MY PREVIOUS MESSAGES MAY BE MISLEADING IN ONE RESPECT. THREAT AGAINST AIR ATTACHE WAS IN FACT POSSIBLE DECISION BY GOI TO REQUIRE PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL OF ENTIRE AIR ATTACHE ESTABLISHMENT. GROUNDS WOULD BE THAT SINCE GOI LACKS AIR ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, INAPPROPRIATE FOR USG MAINTAIN SUCH OFFICE HERE. GP-3 STRONG  
BT

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

48527

27

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

002

81  
Origin

ACTION: ~~Ambassy BAGHDAD~~ PRIORITY

SEP 16 4 14 PM '66

55  
Info

STATE

48527

EXDIS

REF: State's 47193

1. Points reftel made to Ambassador Hani sixteenth.
2. Ambassador said allegations USG connected defection MIG pilot had been made by some East Bloc contacts here. As result, he had advised Baghdad that there likelihood inspired press campaign and that such conclusion unwarranted in absence concrete evidence to contrary. He disturbed now that Baghdad papers replaying Beirut stories tying in MIG defector with death by shooting of Iraqi Air Force student pilot in US. Agreed that public denial would dignify rumors but thought it would be useful if we or Iraqis could let it be known through Beirut press that Iraqi Ambassador Washington was assured rumors had no basis in fact.
3. Davies said unless situation changed, seemed better let issue die away. Important thing was for GOI to know USG not involved.
4. Ambassador said he would inform Foreign Minister Pachachi these points next Monday in New York.
5. You may now proceed to make same points to GOI.

GP 3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.5

NLI/RAC 11-53  
NARA, Date 07-12-12  
By LKJ

Drafted by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies :md 9/16/662107

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - A.L. Atherton  
Mr. Thompson

NEA/IAI - H.M. Symmes

INR/DDC - J. Gardiner

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*(Handwritten initials)*

*28*

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VV QVA956VV QIA163VV BGA657  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUQTBG 397 2511315  
ZNY SSSSS  
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 397

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SEP 08.

E X D I S

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARE

1. BAGHDAD 396 REPORTS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS HERE ARISING FROM DEFECTION OF IRAQI PILOT WITH MIG-21. MANY FRIENDS TELL US THAT ARTICLES IN BEIRUT PRESS REPLAYED HERE HAVE HAD SERIOUS IMPACT.

2. DESPITE PLEA BY FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY JAMIL FOR PUBLIC DENIAL BY USG OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MIG DEFECTION (A-166) I DO NOT BELIEVE USG WOULD ISSUE SUCH STATEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE OTHER STEPS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL, SUCH AS:

- A. CALLING IN AMBASSADOR HANI.
- B. ASSURING WITHIN USG THAT NEITHER PILOT DEFECTOR

PAGE 2 RUQTBG 397 ~~SECRET~~

NOR HIS FAMILY ADMITTED TO US FOR NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.

C. MAINTENANCE OF SILENCE ON INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION OF MIG-21 WITHIN ISRAEL.

INSTRUCTING ME TO DELIVER NOTE TO PRIMIN CATEGORICALLY DENYING US RESPONSIBILITY, STATING THAT US NOT RPT NOT SEEKING OR PLANNING TAKE POSSESSION OF MIG AND THAT DEFECTOR AND FAMILY HAVE NOT SOUGHT ENTRY INTO US AND WILL NOT BE ADMITTED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH GOI SHOULD THEY LATER APPLY, AND HOPING (WITHOUT IMPLYING THREAT) THAT GOI WILL ESCHEW ACTIONS ADVERSELY AFFECTING US-IRAQI RELATIONS SINCE SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE BASED NOT ON PROOF, OF WHICH THERE IS NONE, BUT SOLELY ON CLEVER PROPAGANDA OF ELEMENTS WHO HAVE BEEN

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 11-53

By LUC NARA, Date 07-12-12

~~SECRET~~

-2-, BAGHDAD 397, SEP 8

AND CONTINUE BENDING EVERY EFFORT TO DISCREDIT USG AND DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN US AND OTHER FREE COUNTRIES.

E. INCLUSION OF THIS ITEM IN AGENDA FOR SECRETARY'S TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PACHACHI IN NEW YORK SOMETIME BETWEEN PACHACHI'S ARRIVAL SEPTEMBER 19 AND SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE SEPTEMBER 24.

3. DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS STILL LIMITED, BUT AS

PAGE 3 RUQTBG 397 ~~SECRET~~

STATED IN MESSAGE SENT THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS AUGUST 17, POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE IS GREAT IF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS POINT FINGER AT US, PARTICULARLY ASSUMPTION BY USG OF POSSESSION OF MIG-21. FOR PRESENT, IRAQIS AVOIDING OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, BUT IF AIR ATTACHE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA, UNLIKELY THIS CAN BE KEPT QUIET AND LIKELY LEAD TO INCREASED PRESSURE FOR FURTHER ADVERSE ACTIONS AGAINST OUR OPERATIONS. IN MY OPINION CANCELLATION OF AIR TRAINING PROGRAM MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN OUSTING OF AIR ATTACHE. MODERATE ELEMENTS WORKING TO LIMIT INIMICAL IRAQI ACTIONS CAN BE BOLSTERED BY ACTIONS OF NATURE DESCRIBED ABOVE. I HAVE ALREADY CATEGORICALLY DENIED TO FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY AND TO MINISTER OF CULTURE AND GUIDANCE US ROLE IN DEFECTION, BUT SUCH UNINSTRUCTED EFFORTS ARE INSUFFICIENT.

4. REQUEST EARLY INSTRUCTIONS AND INDICATIONS AS TO COURSE USG TO FOLLOW.

GP-1. STRONG

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

29

*(Handwritten mark)*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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1966 MAY 23 AM 10 23

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 706  
RUEKDA/DOD  
STATE GRNC  
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MAY 23RD

SUBJECT: IRAQI MILITARY PROCUREMENT

RSR

1. FONMIN PACHACHI TELLS ME THAT SOME MONTHS AGO PENTAGON ISSUED LETTER OF OFFER TO IRAQI MILITARY ATTACHE FOR CERTAIN ITEMS MILITARY EQUIPMENT. LETTER EXPIRED MARCH 7. ATTACHE REQUESTED PENTAGON EXTEND VALIDITY OF LETTER FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BECAUSE HE UNABLE OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD BEFORE DEADLINE. PENTAGON REFUSED EXTENSION. IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE NOW CONSIDERS PROCUREMENT URGENTLY NECESSARY.

2. PACHACHI STRESSED POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FACILITATING IRAQI EFFORTS DIVERSIFY SOURCES OF ARMS AND ALSO OF SUPPORTING MODERATE IRAQI REGIME. HE WAS VAGUE ABOUT ITEMS INCLUDED IN LETTER OF OFFER SAYING HE THOUGH MINE DETECTORS, MORTAR AMMUNITION AND 75 MM AMMUNITION INVOLVED.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT GOI HAD HAD SEVERAL MONTHS TO MAKE A DECISION AND THAT PENTAGON COULD HARDLY TURN SUCH THINGS ON AND OFF LIKE WATER FAUCET. HOWEVER, I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS REQUEST.

4. COMMENT: ARMA SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM IRAQI ARMY. HIS RECORDS SHOW THAT COLONEL OLIVER OF MILITARY SALES DIVISION WROTE IRAQI MILATT APRIL 18 (FILE REF AMC MU-S/3) THAT ENGINEERING CHANGES BEING MADE ON TRUCK-MOUNTED MINE DETECTOR PRECLUDED EXTENSION OF LETTER OF OFFER WHICH EXPIRED MARCH 7. ARMA HAS NO RECORD OF ANY OTHER SIMILAR PROBLEMS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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-2- 706 May 23 from BAGHDAD

5. IRAQI ARMY HAD HAD INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY EXPERIENCE WITH ROAD MINES LAID BY KURDS AND UNDERSTANDABLY IS ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN EQUIPMENT. AT SAME TIME FAILURE TO RESPOND WITHIN TIME LIMIT OF OFFER SEEMS INCOMPREHENSIBLE. WE DO NOT FEAR

ANY PARTICULAR POLITICAL DETERIORATION IF PACHACHI'S REQUEST CANNOT BE MET, BUT WE DO ADVOCATE AS SYMPATHETIC AN APPROACH AS POSSIBLE.

6. ACTION REQUESTED. NEED INSTRUCTIONS FOR REPLY TO PACHACHI. IF THERE IS ANY OTHER AVAILABLE MINE DETECTING EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT MEET IRAQI NEEDS, SUGGEST IT BE MENTIONED IN INSTRUCTIONS.

NOT TO BE AUTOMATICALLY DECONTROLLED. STRONG  
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

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RR RUEHC  
DE RUQTBR 132 1391147  
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 694  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ MAY 19TH

17184

1966 MAY 19 AM 8 52

S

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS TO ISRAEL

REFS: DEPCIRTELS 2079 AND 220

1. INFORMED FONMIN PACHACHI MAY 19 USING PART OF MATERIAL IN REFTELS IN PRESENTATION AND WORKING IN REMAINDER DURING ENSUING DISCUSSION.
2. HIS FIRST AND STRONGEST COMPLAINTS WERE THAT THE TIMING WAS VERY BAD AND THAT US UNDERMINED THOSE IN ARAB WORLD WHO BELIEVE IN AND WORKING FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH US. HE SAID AREA VERY TROUBLED JUST NOW AND ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HEIGHTEN CLAMOR. TIMING WOULD LEAD MANY TO BELIEVE SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL IS RESPONSE TO KOSYGIN VISIT TO CAIRO (HE ADDED HE KNOWS IT IS NOT). US SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WILL REINFORCE WIDESPREAD VIEW THAT PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION FAVORS ISRAEL OVER ARABS AND WILL GIVE MORE AMMUNITION TO ARAB EXTREMISTS. SYRIA UAR, AHMAD SHUKHAIRY (HEAD OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION) AND USSR WILL BE HAPPY BECAUSE THEY CAN EXPLOIT US ACTITN FOR OWN PURPOSES.
3. PACHACHI TRIED TO CREATE CASE THAT US MISLED BY ISRAEL AS TO ARAB STRENGTH AND USED THREAT OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 11-53

By LKB NARA, Date 07-12-12

~~SECRET~~

-2- 694, MAY 19, 1966 FROM BAGHDAD

TO BLACKMAIL US INTO SUPPLYING WEAPONS. HE THOUGHT MANY ARABS WOULD REFUSE BELIEVE USG HAD COME TO QUOTE END OF CYCLE END QUOTE AND THERE WOULD BE GREAT PRESSURE FOR PURCHASE OF MORE ARMS FROM USSR. IF ARABS HAD STRENGTH AND OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK ISRAEL THEY WOULD NOT TALK ABOUT DOING IT. ARAB MILITARY POSTURE IS ENTIRELY DEFENSIVE. ISRAEL IS STRONGER THAN ARABS COMBINED AND HAS AMBITIONS TO EXPAND. HE ADMITTED ISRAEL ABLE EXPLOIT CONSTANT ARAB VERBAL THREATS, WHICH HE SAID STEMMED FROM WEAKNESS. HE URGED USG PERSUADE ISRAEL ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OF DIMONA REACTOR; OTHERWISE ARABS WILL CONSTANTLY SUSPECT ISRAEL OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. I REFERRED TO DREW PEARSON COLUMN MAY 18 (WHICH FONOFF LIKELY TO RECEIVE IN FEW DAYS) AND TOLD PACHACHI STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR WERE TOTALLY INACCURATE. REMINDED HIM OF OUR TALK MAY 7 (A-932).

5. COMMENT: PACACHI SEEMED UNSURPRISED. HE MAY HAVE HAD PRIOR INFORMATION OF SALE. HIS MANNER WAS RELAXED AND HIS WORDS RESTRAINED. HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHAT ACTION GOI WOULD TAKE, IF ANY. WE CAN EXPECT RATHER STRONG PROPAGANDA LINE FOR A WHILE AND PERHAPS SOME DELAY IN THINGS INVOLVING OVERT COOPERATION WITH USG SUCH AS SIGNATURE OF INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGREEMENT. DOUBT ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EMBASSY BUT OF COURSE CANNOT RULE OUT SMALL-SCALE PRIVATE ACTIONS OF HOSTILE NATURE. GP-3 STRONG  
BT

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

was  
talked  
w/ OSS  
5/14

5/14/66

31

BKS:

Recommend we clear today  
since Strong's appointment will be  
Monday or Tuesday. Note  
added sentence which I've  
checked back with NE  
(Atherton).

This sets about the right  
tone. We don't want to be  
overly friendly because we  
don't know how firmly Aref  
is seated. On the other hand,  
no reason not to be friendly.

Hal Saunders

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

08852

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31a

87-S

MAY 14 4 51 PM '66

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

538

PRIORITY

NEA

Info:

REF: Your 662

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US IA  
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1. Department welcomes news that President will receive Ambassador.
  2. We believe time not yet appropriate for presidential letter to Aref or letter from Secretary to Bazzaz. However you may reiterate President's congratulations on Aref's assumption of office.
  3. Initial call on President should be primarily courtesy call although specific subjects at issue between USG and GOI may be discussed if you feel it appropriate. Possibilities include contractors claims, investment guarantee agreement and oil agreement.
  4. If you receive additional feelers for invitation Bazzaz to Washington, you may reply that formal visit during 1966 is out of question because of President's full schedule. ~~but~~ If Bazzaz comes to New York again in fall, he would be welcomed informally again in Washington (option C, Embassy's A-826), although call at White House unlikely.
- GP-3.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-1-06

Drafted by: <b>NEA:NE:MWiley:es:5/12/66</b>	Tel. Ext. <b>3235</b>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>NEA - Rodger P. Davies</b>
Clearances:		

NE - Mr. Symmes

S/S - Mr. Humphreys

- White House - Mr. Rosten

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# AIRGRAM

DEF 12-5 Jordan 32

FOR RM USE ONLY

M/R	REP	AF
RA	EUR	FL
IEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
GR	COM	FRR
NT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
RMY	CIA	NAVY
ISD	USIA	NSA

A-822

~~SECRET~~: EXDIS

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SECSTATE, WASHINGTON

INFO : JIDDA, KUWAIT, KHARTOUM,  
AMMAN, TEL AVIV

COPY NO.

SERIES B

002

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: April 5, 1966

SUBJECT : US Sale of Combat Aircraft to Jordan

REF : DEPCIRTEL 1925. m

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF  
 1 PAGES COPY... OF...  
 AMEMBASSY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

EXDIS.

When I called on Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Pachachi on April 4 to discuss other matters (reported separately) he remarked that the Jordanian Government had informed the Iraqi Government that the USG had agreed to sell some combat aircraft to Jordan. He asked what I knew about it.

I replied I had recently been informed that the GOJ would announce briefly on April 2 the purchase of some aircraft from the US but I had not yet read such announcement (Pachachi said it had been issued). I knew the question had been under consideration for a very long time and that the decision to sell had finally been taken in the belief that the aircraft were necessary for Jordan's defense and that their acquisition by Jordan would not upset the military balance in the area. Apparently the sale involved spaced deliveries, but beyond this I was unable to go.

Pachachi remarked that this US action was the sort that brought benefit to the US in the Arab world, provided it was not used to justify and followed by what could be presented as a balancing sale of similar equipment to Israel. He hoped the US would not turn around and undo the benefits from the deal with Jordan.

I remarked that from my own experience in Washington and from later observation from Baghdad, every significant decision on arms sales by the USG was taken on its own merits and only after the most extensive and careful consideration. Lacking knowledge whether any more cases were pending, I could not possibly comment on his remarks.

*Robert C. Strong*  
 Robert C. Strong

~~SECRET~~: EXDIS

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In  Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

1966 APR 12 PM 12 11

COPYFLO-PBR

Prepared by: Ambassador Strong/mvm 4/5/66

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
 State Dept. Guidelines  
 By *sjr*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

v  
22

Met. B

Do something  
for your country.

RWK

1. State called  
to your attention  
because of Bundy  
recommendation (last  
para.)

IL sent  
2. n Art ~~has~~ a copy,  
but he's off today,  
so maybe you  
want to send 'is  
to McGB.

NEA-10

# AIRGRAM

EDU 9-3 IRAQ ✓

XR AID (FORD FOUNDATION)  
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
		AID
S/S	S/P	G
27	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-711

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

26 FEB 11 1966

33a

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: February 9, 1966

SUBJECT : Assistance to Baghdad University, Ford Foundation Representations.

REF : Department's A-7276 and A-91; Baghdad's A-634. EDU 9-3 IRAQ  
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARE

1. In a recent encounter with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Pachachi, I inquired whether Prime Minister Bazzaz had given further thought as to how assistance could be rendered to Baghdad University short of a large construction loan. Pachachi said Bazzaz had referred the matter to the University with the request for specific proposals. The University had not yet responded. I then explained the Department's efforts with the Ford Foundation and the lack of USG funds for anything sizable and asked if it would be useful if I were to summarize in a letter to Bazzaz. Pachachi said such a letter would be helpful (it is in preparation).

2. Ford Foundation Angle. Nothing has been heard yet from Hugh Walker, the Foundation's regional representative in Beirut, as a followup to the Department's contact with Foundation headquarters. I have not seen Walker for two years, and in fact have seen him only once in my 31 months here, at my request. His principal assistant also called once, at my request. Walker's method of operation in Baghdad is to appear without advance notice, walk into offices requesting immediate interviews, then disappear and undertake no followup. His rapport with Iraqi officials is practically non-existent.

The following is a quote from a memorandum of a recent conversation with Dr. Henry Stippler, an agricultural expert assigned by the Foundation to work with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for two years. Stippler sought the appointment with me and his remarks were voluntary, not elicited by me.

"Stippler sharply criticized Hugh Walker, Ford Foundation Middle East representative, for haphazard conduct of relations with Iraq, for poor administration and for inadequate guidance. He said he had been inadequately briefed before he came and inadequately supported since then. In all his

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~: GROUP THREE

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In  Out

Drafted by: Ambassador Robert C. Strong/mvm 2/9/66

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Ambassador

Clearances: In draft with DCM, Mr. Duncan, ECON, Mr. Prohme.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.5

By LKB NLJ/RAC 11-53  
NARA, Date 07-12-12

26 FEB 14 PM 3 58

CC: YFLC-PBR

his experience he had never worked under a poorer administrator than Walker and if he felt as he did now in another year he would not take another assignment with Ford. He criticized the Foundation itself for inadequate guidance and lack of flexibility in programming and use of funds."

Walker has made it a point to avoid contact with the Embassy. He has not even tried to coordinate with the UN people here, with resultant misunderstandings. This is in contrast to the modus operandi of the Foundation representative in the UAR who has worked closely with all concerned.

3. Comment. The Embassy understands and fully accepts the complete independence of the Foundation. This is not at issue as far as we are concerned. However, we think the Foundation's usefulness and effectiveness in Iraq is minimal principally because of Walker. We are quite prepared to work with Walker quietly and without prejudicing with the GOI the Foundation's independent position. However, we believe Walker to be incapable of working effectively in Iraq. We are therefore concerned that he apparently is the one who will be responsible for the principal response of the US to Bazzaz's approach to Secretary Rusk.

4. Recommendation. That the Department suggest to McGeorge Bundy that after he assumes the presidency of the Foundation he look into the suitability of Walker for his present position.

  
Robert C. Strong

# SUMMARY

34

## INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

44

UNCLASSIFIED

009326

Action  
NEA

VV EUA424LDA395  
PP RUEHC RUEHDT  
DE RUQTBG VRO 3461145

1965 DEC 12 AM 9 39

Info  
SS

ZNR UUUUU

P 121145Z

G

FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

SP

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 356

H

RUEHDT/USUN NEWYMAK PRIORITY NINE

EUR

RUFKVV/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 21

IO

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 151

P

RUQTAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 64

USIA

RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 32

NSC

ZEN/AMEMBASSY AMMANZNN

INR

AOT/AMEMBASSY JIDDA UNN

CIA

ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS UNN

NSA

ZEN/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV UNN

DOD

ZEN/AMEMBASSY ANKARA UNN

SSC

ZEN/AMCONSUL BASRA UNN

AID

BT

UNCLAS DEC 12

1. DECREE ANNOUNCED EVENING DECEMBER 11 APPOINTING FIVE NEW  
MINISTERS AS FOLLOWS:

RSR

(A) MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NEW POST) -  
ADNAN AL PACHACHI, CURRENTLY IRAQI PERMANENT REP UN

(B) AGRARIAN REKDORM - MAHMUD HASAN JUM'A, FORMERLY UNDER-  
SECRETARY PLANNING.

(C) MINISTER OF STATE - MUSLIH AL NAQSHBANDI, EX-MINISTER JUSTICE.

(D) MUNICIPALITIES AND RURAL AFFAIRS AND ACTING MINISTER  
AGRICULTURE - HASAN SHAMER, MEMBER ECONOMIC PLANNING BOARD  
AND PRESIDENT IRAQI ECONOMISTS SOCIETY.

(E) COMMUNICATIONS AND ACTING MINISTER WORKS AND HOUSING 7  
AHMAD ADNAN HAFIZ, MEMBER ECONOMIC PLANNING BOARD.

2. DECREE ANNOUNCED SAME TIME ACCEPTING RESIGNATION OUTGOING  
MINISTER AGRICULTURE ALSHAM AL JAF. ACCEPTANCE RESIGNATIONS  
MUSLIH (COMMUNICATIONS) AND MUSTAFA (MUNICIPALITIES)  
ANNOUNCED SEVERAL DAYS AGO.

3. OTHER POSITIONS UNCHANGED.  
SIRONG

UNCLASSIFIED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 357, DECEMBER 12, FROM: BAGHDAD

THAT TIME CABINET ADDITIONS INTENDED WITHIN FEW DAYS.  
ANNOUNCEMENT OF APPOINTMENTS AT 10 PM LOCAL TIME FOLLOWED  
APPROXIMATELY TWO HOUR SESSION BETWEEN BAZZAZ AND PRESIDENT  
ARIF. BAZZAZ THEN ANNOUNCED PLANS TOUR NORTH TODAY  
DECEMBER 12.

5. NEW APPOINTMENTS AS SUCH APPEAR HAVE NO PARTICULAR  
POLICY SIGNIFICANCE AND PRESUMABLY WILL HELP RESTORE OPERATIONAL  
CAPABILITIES DISTURBED BY RECENT RESIGNATIONS.

DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT AFFECT CONCLUSIONS OF UPDATED EMBASSY  
ASSESSMENT POUCHED DECEMBER 11.

STRONG

MRJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

0 2 6 6 1

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

36

84

Origin  
NEA

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

97

SEP 4 3 50 PM '65

Info:

Your A-222, August 26

SS  
NSC  
SCI

Recommend you return President's letter to Department and offer  
photographs to College of Science, University Baghdad.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:LFDinsmore:es:9/1/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

S/S- Mr.  
Rattray

White House - Mr. Komer

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03022

36a

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

86

Origin  
NEA

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

PRIORITY

99

SEP 7 3 58 PM '65

Info:

SS  
NSC  
SCI

Deptel 97

Hold action pending further instructions.

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/NE:LFDinsmore

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances: NEA/NE - Rodger P. Davies

S/S - Mr. Thompson

White House - Mr. Komer

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CLASSIFICATION

3847

368

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1 - Kof... 9/7  
2 - Let.

RECEIVED  
MCGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

September 6, 1965

1965 SEP 7 AM 11:04 Date

Called Jan  
9/7/65 3:20 pm  
JH

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*a Ratt...*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft Cable to BAGHDAD.

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CLASSIFICATION

SEP 7 1965

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

TP 8 IRAQ(BA)  
R POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON

E-12

RM/R	REP	AF
1	1	
ARA	EUR	FE
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AGR	COM	FRB
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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		6

Original to be Filed in \_\_\_\_\_ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

A-21. UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amembassy BAGHDAD

37

AUG 10 1 51 PM '65

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT : Presidential Message for Baghdad Fair

REF :

The Presidential Message for presentation at the United States National Exhibition in Baghdad, November 1-30, 1965 is as follows:

"I extend to you a warm welcome to the first United States Exhibition in Iraq.

"This exhibition deals mainly with petrochemicals - chemicals derived from that great natural resource, oil, which Iraq has in such abundance - and with the products which the scientific use of these chemicals in industry has made possible.

"The petrochemical industry has created vast employment opportunities and new dimensions for a more abundant life for all men.

"Exhibitions such as this provide a vital forum for the exchange of goods and ideas. We hope that this exchange will lead to increased trade and strengthen the ties of friendship between the peoples of Iraq and the United States.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

RUSK

2

UNCLASSIFIED

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In  Out

FORM 4-63 DS-323

Drafted by:	Drafting Date:	Contents and Classification Approved by:
CH E:OT:STA:LHPomeroy:nto	8-2-65	E/STA - JMChand CA
Clearances:	<del>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</del>	
Commerce/OITP- Mr. Craig Mr. Clarke Mr. Fox	USIA/IAN-Mr. Curran Mrs. Vardaman	P-MS-Mr. Reynolds USIA/ICS-Mr. Hickok NEA-Mr. Bensky NEA-Mr. Lensmore
White House - Mr. Komer R.K.S/S - Mr. Walsh		



S/S 12281

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

August 5, 1965

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 AUG 5 PM 5 02

3395

272  
1-Kor...  
2-R...  
OK  
as written  
RWK

Jan...  
1635-1/9

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message for the United States  
National Exhibition in Baghdad, 1965.

Enclosed is a proposed Presidential Message for the  
first United States Exhibition in Baghdad, Iraq, to be  
held November 1-30, 1965.

The exhibition will have a petrochemical theme.  
Broadly stated, its purpose is to enhance the image of  
the United States in the Near East and to promote trade  
and cultural relations between the United States and Iraq.  
More narrowly stated, our objective is to present an  
image of United States competence and expertise in every-  
thing having to do with oil, Iraq's great natural resource.  
At the same time, we seek to leave the impression of a  
free enterprise system which has exploited the vast poten-  
tial of oil to the benefit of everyone.

If the suggested message is approved, the Department  
will transmit it to our Embassy in Baghdad for appropriate  
use at the exhibition.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Presidential Message  
in the form of an Airgram.

AUG 5 1965

# AIRGRAM

378

Original to be Filed in \_\_\_\_\_ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amembassy BAGHDAD

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT : Presidential Message for Baghdad Fair

REF :

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"The petrochemical industry has created vast employment opportunities and new dimensions for a more abundant life for all men.

"Exhibitions such as this provide a vital forum for the exchange of goods and ideas. We hope that this exchange will lead to increased trade and strengthen the ties of friendship between the peoples of Iraq and the United States.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

FORM 4-63 D5-323

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In  Out

Drafted by: <i>CH</i>	Drafting Date: 8-2-65	Contents and Classification Approved by: E/STA - JMCHand <i>(initials)</i>
E:OT:STA:LHPomeroy:nto		
Clearances: Commerce/OITP - Mr. Craig <i>(initials)</i> Mr. Clarke <i>(initials)</i> Mr. Fox <i>(initials)</i>	USIA/IAN - Mr. Curran <i>(initials)</i> Mrs. Vardaman <i>(initials)</i>	P-MS - Mr. Reynolds <i>(initials)</i> USIA/ICS - Mr. Hickok <i>(initials)</i> NEA - Mr. Bensky <i>(initials)</i> NEA - Mr. Densmore <i>(initials)</i>

38

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

# Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY IRAQ/JORDAN

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

DATE OF INFO. 5 JULY 1965

DISTR: 7 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

REPORTS OF POSSIBLE COUP IN IRAQ

3.3(b)(1)

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

[Redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

1. [Redacted] COMMENT: [Redacted] INFORMATION. 3.3(b)(1)

WAS REPORTED ON THE RESIGNATION OF PRO-NASIRIST IRAQI MINISTERS AND EFFORTS OF PRIME MINISTER TAHIR YAHYA AL-TIKRITI TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT THAT REMAINS WEAKENED. 3.3(b)(1)

2. JORDAN ARAB ARMY DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR GENERAL

SHARIF NASIR STATED THAT HE IS IN CONTACT WITH A VARIETY OF ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS IN IRAQ. ONE GROUP IS PRO-JORDAN. ALL OTHERS ANTI-COMMUNIST, ANTI-BA'TH, AND ANTI-NASIR. THEY HAVE DEFINITE PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE ARIF REGIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. A DEFINITE DATE HAS NOT BEEN SET FOR THE COUP BUT ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE IT SHOULD SUCCEED. THE PLOTTERS ARE CONVINCED THAT WITH EACH PASSING WEEK ARIF IS BECOMING FURTHER ISOLATED AND WEAKENED. ALTHOUGH ARIF IS ASSUMED TO BE GENERALLY AWARE OF THE GROUPS INVOLVED AND THEIR INTENTIONS, HE IS AT PRESENT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO  
CIA/NMCC AD/CI 2

EXO

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 15-96

By UCD NARA, Date 09-08-2015

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

IN -05502  
3.3(b)(1)

PAGE Two

RELATIVELY HELPLESS TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST THEM. THE PRO-JORDAN GROUP HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUP ITSELF AND WILL SHOW ITS HAND ONLY AFTER THE COUP IS SUCCESSFUL. [REDACTED] COMMENT: KING HUSAYN HAS PREVIOUSLY DENIED THAT JORDAN WAS PLOTTING AGAINST IRAQ. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] HAS REPORTED THAT ON 6 JULY 1965 JASIM MUHAMMAD AL-GHANIM, A KUWAITI BUSINESSMAN IN BEIRUT WHO HAD JUST

RETURNED FROM A TOUR OF THE ARAB STATES, SAID THAT A COUP IN BAGHDAD IS IMMINENT, AND THAT IT WILL TAKE PLACE BY 14 JULY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCEAFSA. (ALSO SENT TO [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

034

42  
Action

88  
Info

001644

VV EUB022HEC063  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUQVWG 2030 02/0814Z  
R 020813Z ZEA  
FM ANEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1078  
INFO RUFHBN/ANEMBASSY LONDON 122  
STATE GRNC

1965 JUN 2 AM 9 56

BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 2

LINDIS

IPC NEGOTIATIONS.

MOSES REPORTED JUNE 1 THAT NEGOTIATIONS AT POINT WHERE SMALL REMAINING DIFFERENCES COULD BE SETTLED IN ONE SESSION, BUT IRAQI NEGOTIATORS STILL SPEAKING OF SETTLEMENT BEING ACHIEVED IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS. MOSES SPECULATES THIS IS TACTIC TO FOCUS ATTENTION OF CRITICS ELSEWHERE, PERMITTING GOI TAKE SURPRISE ACTION EARLIER. WE HAVE NO WAY OF TELLING WHETHER THERE ARE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF WHETHER MBEES IDEA CORRECT. SOURCE CLOSE TO WATTARI TOLD ME MAY 30 THAT GOI VERY MUCH CONCERNED

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 2030 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LINDIS  
ABOUT ATTITUDE OF SOVIETS AND LOCAL COMMIES, AND MOSES INFORMED BY WATTARI THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON UQAILI OFSPNOC RECENTLY SEEKING DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT.

FOLLOWING ARE POINTS STILL UNSETTLED:

1. GOI WANTS GUARANTEED COMPANIES WILL MAKE USE OF IRAQI TANKERS WHEN AVAILABLE TO HAUL JOINT VENTURE OIL. COMPANIES HAVE PROVIDED DRAFT LETTER MERELY PROMISING CONSIDER AT THE TIME.
2. GOI WANTS GUARANTEE OF MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT IF COMPANIES GIVE BETTER TERMS ELSEWHERE. COMPANIES FLATLY REFUSE.
3. INSERTION OF NEW STEP OF 140 FILS IN CARGO DUES STILL OPPOSED BY COMPANIES. MOSES DOUBTS THIS WILL LONG

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 11-53

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By LCB NARA, Date 07-12-12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1078, JUNE 2 FROM BAGHDAD

SERVE AS BARRIER TO SETTLEMENT.

4. WATTARI STILL DEMANDING 800,000 TONS OIL AT COST AND COMPANIES STANDING ON 500,000.

5. BUYBACK NOT FULLY SETTLED, BUT MOSES BELIEVES IRAQIS WILL ACCEPT REVISED COMPANIES OFFER. WHEN BUYBACK PROPOSAL FIRST TABLED WITH SEVERAL LIMITATIONS IN IT, IRAQIS RAISED REAL CLAMOR, CLAIMING COMPANIES ENGAGING LAST MINUTE

PAGE 3 RUQVWG ~~2030 CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMDIS  
SABOTAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. NEW COMPANIES DRAFT ELIMINATES ALL BUT TWO OF LIMITATIONS.

ISSUES SETTLED IN PAST FEW DAYS WERE (A) ARBITRATION BETWEEN INOC AND COMPANIES, WHICH TO BE SAME AS BETWEEN IPC AND GOI; (B) "PRESENTATION" OF INOC JOINT VENTURE; AND (C) BANK OF ENGLAND HAS GUARANTEED CONVERTIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURE PAYMENTS TO INCO.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM MOSES, I EXPRESSED VIEW COMPANIES SHOULD APPEAR WILLING BUT NOT EAGER TO CONCLUDE SETTLEMENT. IF TALK OF TWO MONTHS' DELAY HAS POLITICAL OR TACTICAL MOTIVATION, BEST POSTURE FOR COMPANIES IS PATIENT WAITING. GOI OBVIOUSLY WANTS SETTLEMENT, WHILE DELAY COSTS COMPANIES NOTHING, EVERY DAY LOST COSTS IRAQ IN TERMS OF DELAY IN COMMENCEMENT OF JOINT VENTURE AND IN COMMENCEMENT OF REVENUES TWO OR THREE YEARS HENCE.

MUTUAL FRIEND OF WATTARI AND MYSELF CAME TO SEE ME MAY 30. IN THE THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT PASS WORD BACK TO WATTARI I TOLD HIM GOI HAD GOTTEN ALL IT COULD FROM COMPANIES, EVERY DAY OF DELAY WAS A LOSS FOR IRAQ BUT NOT FOR COMPANIES, AND COMPANIES NEGOTIATORS WERE QUITE WILLING WAIT PATIENTLY IF GOI WANTED DELAY. FRIEND UNABLE EXPLAIN TALK OF DELAY TWO MONTHS.

GP-3.  
STRONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

F5 40

40 RR RUEHCR  
Action DE RUQVWG 1543 23/1254Z

1965 MAR 23 AM 9 21

SS R 231252Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

20273

002

Info TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS (796) MAR 23, 4 PM

EXDIS

DEPTEL 550

ASSUME THAT GOI MADE BRITISH DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE TO UARG AND THAT CURRENT CONCERN SHOWN BY UARG AND GOI OVER ALLEGED GIANT IMPERIALIST CONSPIRACY DERIVES AT LEAST IN PART FROM THEM. WHETHER EGYPTIANS AND IRAQIS LACK SUFFICIENT SOPHISTICATED TO COMPREHEND CONTINGENCY NATURE OF DOCUMENTS OR WHETHER, SAY, UARG DOES COMPREHEND BUT FINDS THEM USEFUL TO FURTHER ITS ENDS IN AREA CANNOT CONFIDENTLY BE JUDGED HERE. HOWEVER GIVEN CONSPIRATORIAL CFN 796 23 4 550 GOI UARG UARG GOI UARG

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 1543 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS  
NATURE OF UAR AND IRAQI LEADERS (IN FACT OF MOST PEOPLE IN AREA) THEY NATURALLY INCLINED TO SUSPECT THE WORST. A FEW DAYS AGO UAR AMBASSADOR IMPLIED TO ME THAT USG BEHIND THE GREAT CONSPIRACY. IF ON OTHER HAND UARG RECOGNIZES DOCUMENTS FOR WHAT THEY ARE, IT STILL MAY WISH TO EXPLOIT THEM AT APPROPRIATE TIME TO FURTHER DISCREDIT AND WEAKEN "IMPERIALISM" AND TO GAIN SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER NON-ALIGNED STATES AS WELL AS TO STRENGTHEN NASSER'S POSITION IN ARAB WORLD AND WEAKEN THOSE ELEMENTS WELL DISPOSED TOWARD WEST.

IN MY OPINION GOI UNLIKELY TO BE THE ONE TO REVEAL DOCUMENTS SINCE GOI HAS LITTLE STANDING OR CAPACITY OF ITS OWN TO EXPLOIT THEM. ALSO BELIEVE GOI HAS ENOUGH WORRIES AT PRESENT WITHOUT GRATUITOUSLY ADDING ANOTHER. HOWEVER, WHATEVER UAR DOES IS UNLIKELY BE BASED ON GOI DESIRES DESPITE IRAQI ROLE IN OBTAINING DOCUMENTS, AND GOI WILL SUPPORT UAR WILLY-NILLY. AGREE US AND UK SHOULD COORDINATE LINES TO BE TAKEN BUT RECOMMEND IDENTICAL STATEMENTS.

THERE ARE SEVERAL POTENTIALS FOR UNHAPPY DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA, INCLUDING FOLLOW-ONS TO RECENT SYRIAN CASE AGAINST US. WOULD SEEM TO BE THE TIME TO WALK SOFTLY, INCLUDING FURTHER DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING DEPCIRTEL 1750, WHILE SEEKING WAYS TO REVERSE TREND. KEY STILL LIES IN US RELATIONS WITH UAR. GP-3 STRONG

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By NLJ/RAC 11-53  
LCLD NARA, Date 07-12-12

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

41

~~SECRET~~

4  
Action

1965 MAR 23 AM 4 11 19918

55

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9 002

Info

Q W  
CTIHTMVV QVA266VV VWA089VV WGA988  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUQVWG 1535 23/0835Z  
R 230834Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ 792 MARCH 23-11:30 AM

EXDIS

DEPCIRTELS 1750 AND 1752.

AM UNAWARE OF REASON FOR DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTION TO POSTPONE APPROACH OUTLINED DEPCIRTEL 1750 BUT AM RELIEVED AT DELAY. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HOLD OFF UNTIL WELL AFTER WEST-GERMAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS ESTABLISHED AND ARABS HAVE HAD TIME TO SIMMER DOWN. HOWEVER, WOULD LIKE AUTHORIZATION SPEAK WITH FOM IN ABOUT HARRIMAN MISSION.

FOREGOING WAS DRAFTED BEFORE RECEIPT OF AMMAN'S 558 TO DEPT. WISH TO SECOND BARNES SUGGESTION THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTRUCTION AWAITS CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE.

GP-3.

STRONG

BT

CFN 792 EXDIS 1750 1752 1750 558 3

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sj/rg, NARA, Date 3-1-06

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

42

45

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

013536

Action

NEA

RR RUEHCR

DE RUQVWG 1988 14/1120Z

1965 MAY 14 AM 8 09

R 141058Z ZEA

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 998

G

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 21

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RUFHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON 119

AF

RUGMVL/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV NINE

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ZEN/AMEMBASSY AMMAN

IO

ZEN/AMEMBASSY ANKARA

P

ZEN/AMCONSUL BASRA

CU

ZEN/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USIA

ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

NSC

ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAMASCUS

INR

ZEN/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

CIA

ZEN/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

NSA

ZEN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

DOD

ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEHARN

AID

ZEN/AMEMBASSY TUNIS

RMR

ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS

STATE

BT

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EMBTEL 989

IRAQI-WEST GERMAN BREACH

GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID MAY 14 THAT GOI HAS NOT YET MADE DECISIONS AS TO HOW MANY GERMAN DIPLOMATS MAY REMAIN HERE UNDER FRENCH FLAG, WHAT TO BE DONE UNDER GOI-FRG CULTURAL AGREEMENT, AND WHAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE. THERE IS NO PRESSURE ON THE AMBASSADOR TO LEAVE (HE IS THINKING OF LEAVING IN ABOUT 10 OR 12 DAYS), HE THINKS SEVERAL OF HIS STAFF WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAY, AND ALL

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 1988

INDICATIONS ARE THAT GOI WANTS ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO CONTINUE. THERE IS SOME TALK ABOUT SEVERING FRG FROM TECHNICAL SCHOOL AND THEREFORE MORE QUESTION OF WHAT CULTURAL RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE. AMBASSADOR HAS URGED

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-2- 998, MAY 14, FROM BAGHDAD

HIS GOVERNMENT BE PATIENT, AVOID ANY RETALIATION AGAINST  
MINOR IRAQI MOVES, AND KEEP AS MUCH INTACT AS POSSIBLE.  
IN MY OPINION THIS WOULD BE WISE.

THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN WHATSOEVER OF DEMONSTRATIONS

AGAINST WEST GERMANS AND COMPLETE ABSENCE  
OF HOSTILITY TOWARD GERMANS. SEEMS LIKELY GO  
WATCHING ACTIONS OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY UAR,  
BEFORE MAKING FURTHER DECISIONS.  
STRONG  
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OO RUEHCR  
DE RUQVWG 1847 05/1130Z  
O 051130Z ZEA  
FM (EMBASSY BAGHDAD)  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 957  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MAY 5

03899  
1965 MAY 5 AM 8:21

FOR JERNEGAN.

ENBTEL 952. PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS

IN FORMAL LETTER DELIVERED PAA MANAGER LATER THIS MORNING, DGCA STATED AS RESULT CIVIL AIR BOARD MEETING APRIL 10 GOI AWARDED PAA UNRESTRICTED FIFTH FREEDOM RIGHTS FROM BAGHDAD EAST TO SAN FRANCISCO, BUT GRANTED ONLY TEMPORARY STOPOVER RIGHTS FOR WESTBOUND FLIGHTS FROM BAGHDAD TO BEIRUT AND ISTANBUL UNTIL OCTOBER 31, 1965.

ON BASIS MORNING'S CONVERSATION WITH DGCA, PAA MANAGER INTERPRETING LETTER TO MEAN PAA HAS FIFTH FREEDOM RIGHTS CFN 057 952 10 31 1965

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 1847 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TO WEST BEYOND BEIRUT AND ISTANBUL UNTIL OCTOBER 31, ALTHOUGH LETTER DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY SO. PAA MANAGER WORRIED, HOWEVER, ABOUT SIX MONTHS RESTRICTION.

YOU MAY WISH TAKE THIS LIMITATION, ISSUE UP WITH HANI.

GP-4.  
STRONG  
BT  
CFN 31 4

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 8:35 a.m. 5/5/65  
Passed to White House at 8:55 a.m. 5/5/65

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sjrg, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OO RUEHCR RUFHDN  
DE RUQVWG 0810 14/0530Z  
O 140517Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUQVWA/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
STATE GRNC

1 1 7 5 0

1964 NOV 14 PM 2 43

BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT 408 INFO  
PRIORITY CAIRO 25 DAMASCUS 18 LONDON 56 TEHRAN 39 AMMAN  
BASRA BEIRUT JIDDA KUWAIT TAIZ TELAV IV UNN NOVEMBER 14-8:15PM

FROM ADAMS

1500Z , NOVEMBER 14, BAGHDAD RADIO CARRIED ANNOUNCEMENT  
PRIMIN TAHIR YAHYA, "PROMPTED BY ECONOMIC TROUBLES AND  
POLITICAL DISSENSION IN COUNTRY", SUBMITTED RESIGNATION.  
PRESIDENT AREF IMMEDIATELY ASKED HIM FORM NEW GOVERNMENT  
BASED ON FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:  
CFN 408 26 13 55 39 1500Z 14

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 0810 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1) RETURN CONSTITUTIONAL LIFE WITHIN YEAR
  - 2) REBUILDING AND SOLVING PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRAQ
  - 3) FORMING "CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL" WITHIN MONTH
  - 4) STRENGTHENING ARMY WHICH WILL BE KEPT OUT OF POLITICS
  - 5) IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OCTOBER UNIO\* AGREEMENT WITH UAR.
- (#) \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNIFICANT CABINET CHANGES FOLLOWED:

- NAJI TALIB - FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- SUBHI ABD AL-HAMID - INTERIOR
- MUHSIN HUSSAIN HABIB - DEFENSE
- SHUKRI SALIH ZAKI - EDUCATION
- ADIB JADIR - INDUSTRY
- FUAD RIKABI - MUNICIPALITIES

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By *g/lrg*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 408, NOVEMBER 14, 8 PM, FROM BAGHDAD

YAHYA HAS EVIDENTLY JUMPED OFF FENCE TO SIDE OF ARAB NATIONALISTS FOR WHOM CABINET CHANGE CLEAR VICTORY. ALL NEW MEN ARE CONSPICUOUS NASSERITES. STRONGEST "IRAQ FIRSTER" IN OLD CABINET, INTERIOR MINISTER RASHID MUSLIH, HAS NO NEW APPOINTMENT BUT APPEARED IN GOOD SPIRITS AT AIRPORT CEREMONIES FOR DEPARTING MALI PRESIDENT, KEITA, THIS MORNING. FORMER AGRICULTURE MINISTER, ABD AL-GHANI AL-RAWI APPOINTED "AMBASSADOR IN DIWAN".  
CFN 1 2 3 4 5

PAGE THREE RUQVWG 0810 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT AREF, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING KEITA'S DEPARTURE, LEFT FOR SCHEDULED TRIP TO BASRA. ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY MILITARY OFFICER - NOT USUAL CABINET ENTOURAGE.

BAGHDAD CALM AND NO UNUSUAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS NOTED.

GP-3.  
STRONG  
BT  
CFN 3

\* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 2:47 PM, 11/14/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:03 PM, 11/14/64.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

S 45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

025

44  
Action

SS  
Info

RR RUEHCR RUFHDN  
DE RUQVWG 0707 26/0945Z  
R 050942Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
STATE GRNC  
BT

021425  
1964 OCT 26 AM 5 57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMDIS

ACTION (DEPT 365) INFO LONDON 54 FROM BAGHDAD OCTOBER 26 1PM

IPC NEGOTIATIONS:

IPC CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE STEWART TOLD ME OCTOBER 24 THAT GOI RELYING HEAVILY ON NEW LABOR GOVERNMENT TO ENCOURAGE IPC BE MORE LIBERAL IN TERMS OF SETTLEMENT WITH IRAQ. IN STEWART'S OPINION, THIS WAS MAJOR FACTOR IN IRAQI REQUEST FOR NEGOTIATIONS RECESS.

GP-3.

STRONG

BT

CFN 365 54 26 1PM 24 GP-3

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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# AIRGRAM

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50 10 25  
40  
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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OSD	USIA	NSA

*Handwritten in table:*  
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NASA  
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A-85

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : American Embassy, BAGHDAD

FROM : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE:

SUBJECT : Ranger Moon Shot Photos

SEP 17 7 52 PM '64

REF : Your A-226, September 10, 1964

Please return the letter and booklet to the Department.

RUSK

1964 SEP 17 PM 10 47  
COPYFLO-PER

①

FORM 4-62 DS-323

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In  Out

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:LFDinsmore:he:9/17/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

NEA - Mr. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies *RMD*

ORIGIN ACTION

S/S 56

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

*frag*

SP 10 US

4945

47

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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OSD	USIA	NSA

A-226

~~Confidential~~ - Limdis

Air Pouch

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 10 35

This document consists of 1 page  
number 1 of 1 copies. Serial

COPY NO. 54

*Jim*  
SERIES B

RIWAN  
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION  
BRANCH

FROM : American Embassy BAGHDAD

DATE: September 10, 1964

SUBJECT : Ranger Moon Shot Photos

REF : DEPCIRTEL 339, August 21. *S/S*

Upon receipt of President's letter to President Aref enclosing a booklet of moon photos, we sent a note on August 19 to the Foreign Office stating that either I would present the letter and booklet to Aref personally or the Embassy would deliver it to the Foreign Office for transmission to Aref, whichever he preferred.

Now Aref has gone off to the UAR without the courtesy of a reply, likewise failing to reply to informal inquiry whether he would want to see me before I return to the US for consultations.

Believe Aref's discourtesy stems from his deepseated feeling about US support of Israel.

Request instructions whether (1) to forward letter and photos to Foreign Office for delivery to Aref, or whether (2) to return them to the Department.

Recommendation: Recommend (2). In meantime, should the Foreign Office request they be forwarded, we shall do so.

*Robert C. Strong*

Robert C. Strong

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *SJL/g* NARA, Date 3-1-06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~: LIMDIS

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In  Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Amb:RCStrong:mvm 9/9/64

Contents and Classification Approved by: Amb Strong

Clearances:

*8*

1964 SEP 15 PM 12 30

COPYFLO-PDR

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

*Iraq*

*48*

50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action NEA Control: 20593  
 Rec'd: July 25, 1964  
 10:14 a.m.

Info FROM: Baghdad

SS	ACTION: Secstate	87
G		
SP	INFO: Ankara	1
L	Cairo	9
EUR	London	19
IO	Tehran	13
E	Aleppo	Unnumbered
IGA	Amman	Unnumbered
AID	Basra	Unnumbered
P	Beirut	Unnumbered
USIA	Damascus	Unnumbered
NSC	Dhahran	Unnumbered
INR	Jidda	Unnumbered
CIA	Kuwait	Unnumbered
NSA	Moscow	Unnumbered
OSD	Tabriz	Unnumbered

ARMY  
 NAVY  
 AIR  
 NIC  
 DATE: July 25, 2 p.m.

RMR According KDP supporter of Mulla Mustafa, Kurds now have incontrovertible proof that GOI 1) intends make no concessions to Kurds and 2) will attack Kurds as soon as ammunition ordered from US, UK and USSR arrives. According to source, President also assured high-ranking officers that GOI will allow Kurds use Kurdish in schools but nothing more, army in north has started digging in and Aref told officers they will soon be called on to crush rebels.

Newly elected political bureau therefore has over-ridden Mulla Mustafa's veto and adopted same position as deposed political bureau, i.e., promises of GOI are worthless and Kurds must resume fighting to win their rights. Early this week political bureau drafted ultimatum to GOI demanding GOI announce its acceptance principle of autonomy and open negotiations with

*/Kurds*  
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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By LCH NLI / RAC 11-53  
 NARA. Date 07-12-12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 87, July 25, 2 p.m. from Baghdad

Kurds on its definition immediately, otherwise Kurds will set up own regional government.

Mulla urged that no action be taken before September but was again overruled by political bureau. Ultimatum to be delivered "within next few days".

With Kurdish policy now following main lines advocated by Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad, road to reconciliation between Mulla Mustafa and most old political bureau members now open. Latter reportedly have been invited return to Iraqi Kurdistan on conditions 1) they apologize to Mulla for accusation he "sold out" to GOI and 2) turn over caches arms and ammunition held by their followers. One member, Muhammad Haj Tahir, has apologized and is back in Rania. Four places on new political bureau being held open to old members provided they accept terms. According to source, any old member, with exception Ibrahim Ahmad would be acceptable to Mulla.

Comment: We lack confirmation of Aref's reported remarks but cannot discount them. Defensive measures by army natural in light of recent fighting among Kurds. Doubt these two things explain remainder of source's report. With Shia problem in south and discipline of Shia ex-listed men uncertain (#) action against Kurds. Would seem make sense for Kurds reunite and put heat on. Outside influences may also be at work causing tribal leaders modify position.

GP-3.

STRONG

MBK-17

(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*J. [unclear]*

49

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 11834  
Rec'd: July 15, 1964  
11:23 a.m.

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RMR

FROM: Baghdad

ACTION: Secstate 49

INFO: London 12  
Cairo 3

DATE: July 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

After months of official assurances that rumors of impending nationalization were lies spread by imperialist agents (Prime Minister Yahya morning July 13 stated there would be no nationalization) and emphasizing place of private capital in Iraq, at 7 a.m. July 14 soldiers sealed premises of private banks and number other firms. Nationalization decree issued at 9 a.m. by Prime Minister Yahya. President Aref at noon July 14 read charter of new Arab Socialist Union which emphasized that salvation of Arabs lay in union and that socialism is step toward union.

We do not yet know when nationalization decision was taken but it obviously reflects influence of pro-UAR and pro-union elements in government. GOI must now be considered far closer to UAR and more susceptible to its influence than a week ago. Pro-Nasser group may have felt itself endangered by growing Shia unrest (which it believed exploited by Iranians and British, by dissatisfaction business community including propertied Sunnis, by unrest in the army and by continuing lack of a solution to Kurdish problem. Turn to Nasser and Nasser methods for support is one of two recourss for ruling Sunnis. Other is Soviets.

Business community had not taken the government's earlier assurances of good-will toward capitalists seriously but extent and rapidity of move came as surprise. Most popular explanation advanced by businessmen is that Foreign Minister Abd Al-Hamid in July 5 trip to Cairo was told that Iraqi economy

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 11-53

NARA, Date 07-12-12

By UUB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 49 July 15, 3 p.m. from Baghdad (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

economy must be placed on same basis as Egypt's before unity could be considered and that forces in GOI, wanting union, complied. May be some basis this story but there are other explanations for move -- all of which must have been considered before decree issued. GOI's earlier assurances to business community (which may have been made in good faith at time) had resulted in little increase in business activity and private investment. GOI may have concluded there no point in propitiating capitalists and nationalization only way get business moving. Substantial portion of private business and finance in Iraq controlled by Shia; nationalization their assets deprives wealthy Shia of their potential for stirring up the Shia southerners through contribution to Shia religious leaders and other troublemakers. Sunni businessmen have also been affected but they too have not been outstanding supporters of the government. (Corollary, which government may not have considered, is that the Shia religious leaders will now be more dependent on contributions from Iran and therefore more susceptible to pressures from Shah.) Nationalization also opens up new prospects for placement of military officers in executive positions in nationalized firms, thereby tying them to regime and reducing chance of officer-lead revolt.

Shia have not been well organized and their opposition to the government has heretofore been limited to speeches and poems. But new measures could be exploited by Shia leaders and there will undoubtedly be strong pressures on Shia Imams from Shia business community to issue fatwa against socialism. Koran says "Decorations of life are sons and property" and local proverb says of Shia "You can take his life but not his purse". If present action does not arouse Shia to action, their leaders, both religious and civilian, along with landlords and tribal leaders, can be written off as political force in Iraq. GOI no doubt counting on this as desirable by-product of nationalization.

GP-3.

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AJT/6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 11902  
Rec'd: July 15, 1964  
12:16 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Baghdad

Info

ACTION: Secstate 49

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INFO: London 12

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Cairo 3

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DATE: July 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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Reaction of business community and some other conservative elements to above was, as expected, horror at governmental duplicity. They predict widespread unemployment, economic chaos and disaster for country but are exaggerating ill-effects. Nationalized private sector not of vital importance to economy (total assets estimated not exceed ID 25 million)--banks and factories will continue function, albeit with some loss efficiency, and employment probably will not be greatly decreased. In fact it may be increased as nationalized enterprises hire staff which private owners found unnecessary.

ARMY

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Reaction other elements in country generally favorable. Kurds probably neutral to move but Baath favors it (although move does not increase Baathi support of regime) and Communists presumably in favor. Intellectuals and large numbers of government officials--particularly those who hope gain more important jobs--favorably disposed. Masses have distrust and hatred of propertied classes and, no doubt, also strongly support move.

Recognizing Shia potential for stirring up trouble, government ingratiated self with enlisted men, (who largely Shia) by raising their pay by from 2 to 4 dinars per month. Likewise ordinary policemen. All teachers who eligible were promoted.

RMR

Relatively little US capital involved (see separate message) in nationalization. British interests much more effected and British annoyance with government increased--although difficult see what action they could take other than stiff note we understand they submitting. Reaction of Iran will be of importance to US since

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-2- 49, July 15, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Baghdad

GOI likely regard Iranian courses of action as reflecting US views.

Shia may attempt some move against government but if enlisted men have been bought off by pay-raises, their capabilities are limited.

There will undoubtedly be surge of rumors of plots but we unable predict what will happen. Combination of internal and external pressures on Sunni Arab ruling groups appears to be forcing them collaborate in moving toward UAR. UAR appears to be exploiting this necessity by encouraging domestic measures which increase compatibility of the two regimes. If pressures eased, normal devisive forces presumably would work to create change for "better", but we see little prospect for reduction in pressures. Intensification would seem more likely. How far "Iraqi-first" elements in GOI and Army will go along with pro-Unionists remains to be seen, but being Sunni Arabs they will have to think many times before splitting openly with pro-Unionists elements while under non-Arab, non-Sunni pressures. A question is how far GOI will go with Soviets in search of additional support.

US interests. For US, principal issue is compensation for nationalized American capital, which we checking on. See nothing to be gained by taking issue with GOI over its actions. GOI is going proceed with its development program and imports must be maintained, thus dollar-producing business will continue available. Private sector has in fact contributed to Iraqi development but a fraction of what it could have. While we believe GOI action wrong on several counts, we cannot bring about reversal. Iraqi credit is still excellent, based on oil revenues, and we believe GOI will not nationalize IPC so long as IPC continues produce large quantities of oil.

Recommendation: That in answering questions about Iraqi nationalization measures Department spokesman confine his comments to our concern to assure prompt and adequate compensation for US firms affected.

GP-3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Info* *SD*

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*SS*  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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0070118

1964 JUN 8 AM 9 21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1033 JUNE 8-3PM

LIMDIS

EMBTEL 1020.

FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL BITS OF INFORMATION BEARING ON QUESTION OF DAM:

1. AREF'S STATEMENT TO FRENCH CORRESPONDENT (EMBTEL 1027) THAT AN IRAQI ECONOMIC DELEGATION GOING TO MOSCOW AFTER RETURN OF IRAQI MILITARY DELEGATION PRESENTLY THERE. (WHATEVER WAS DISCUSSED BETWEEN AREF AND KHRUSCHECHEV IN EGYPT THUS WILL START COMING TO HEAD IN PERHAPS TWO WEEKS OR SO.)  
CFN 1033 1020 1 1027

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 2362 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. EMBASSY OFFICER HAS LEARNED AUTHORITATIVELY THAT PLANNING BOARD RETURNED TO COMMITTEE FOR RESTUDY THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION THAT YUGOSLAV BIDDER BE GIVEN CONSULTANT JOB ON ESKI MOSUL DAM COMMITTEE REVIEWED MATTER AND AGAIN RECOMMENDED YUGOSLAVS. PLANNING BOARD SENT BACK WORD TO COMMITTEE THAT IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WANT YUGOSLAVS AS CONSULTANTS ON ESKI MOSUL. (SIGNIFICANCE NOT REPEAT NOT KNOWN TO EMBASSY, BUT POSSIBLE EXPLANATION WOULD BE LIKELIHOOD SOVIETS WOULD OBJECT TO YUGOSLAVS.)

3. ITALIAN INTEREST IN FINANCING PROJECTS IN IRAQ, WITHOUT SIMILAR IRAQI ENTHUSIASM REPORTED EMBTEL 1026. (ITALY THUS SHOWING WILLINGNESS FINANCE HERE ON SCALE BEYOND THAT REQUIRED FOR DAM.)  
GP-3. STRONG  
BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sj/rj*, NARA, Date *3-1-06*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Bundy*  
5 51

33  
Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 265  
Rec'd: June 1, 1964  
9:10 a.m.

*Jag*

SS  
Info

FROM: Baghdad

ACTION: Secstate 994 Priority

035

INFO: Ankara 100  
London 312  
Moscow 14  
Tehran 145

DATE: June 1, 2 p.m.

LIMDIS

(Request this be closely held for present).

Faiq Samarrai told me May 30 Khrushchev and Aref agreed in Egypt on Soviet assistance in construction of Eski Mosul and Euphrates dams and on purchase by Iraq of additional Soviet military equipment. Some form of Soviet grant aid worth 200,000 dinars also involved. Samarrai said he learned this from representative of Aref who proposed his appointment as Iraqi Ambassador to Soviet Union (Samarrai said he refused and objected to policy of putting Iraq back into bed with Soviets).

Without revealing foregoing information in any way, I questioned Minister of Communications Dujaili about economic discussions in Egypt and remarks to press by Soviet Ambassador in Baghdad to effect that results of Khrushchev-Aref talks would be seen in few days. Djuaili was evasive initially but eventually volunteered that SOVS had in mind a new triumph in form of high dam in Iraq such as Eski Mosul or Euphrates. Soviet Ambassador expected instructions shortly to start talks. Dujaili expressed view that Iraq is quite different from Egypt and that large scale Soviet presence and high prestige in Iraq for 7 or 8 years was undesirable but he placed blame on west for inactivity, particularly British.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLJ/RAC 11-53

NARA, Date 07-12-12

By LCB

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-2- 994, June 1, 2 p.m., from Baghdad

Comment: Very much doubt foregoing is ploy to get western offers to build dams. Assuming Soviets will in fall offer build either Eski Mosul or Euphrates dam on reasonable terms, believe that in absence western offer would be difficult for those opposed to major Soviet role in Iraq to marshal effective opposition, particularly in light of Iraqi dependence on Soviets for military equipment. Apart from other considerations, undesirable for Soviets have large project at Eski Mosul in or near Kurdish area with large component of Kurdish labor.

Recommendations:

1. That whenever matter becomes public knowledge Department spokesman say USG reaction confined to Diplomatic channels.
2. That Department seek early decision in principle whether USG wishes to offset Soviet move by telling GOI that we will take initiative to create a western consortium for financing and construction of Eski Mosul (leaving Soviets to work more isolated Euphrates area). Of course we would have no objections here to western consortia to build both dams.

Western offer might well create deadlock over dam projects for length of time needed for determination of outcome of internal Iraqi contest over unity movement and over Iraqi policy toward Soviets (discussed in separate message).

Frankly, we do not relish prospects in Iraq if Soviets have their way unhindered.

GP-3.

STRONG

MEJ

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. ~~Mr. Komer~~

52

2. Return to Bromley Smith

*Jan*

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03934

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51

*W Id Kowal 52a*

Origin ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD 512  
SS  
Info: INFO: Amembassy LONDON 7302

MAY 7 9 45 PM '64

EXDIS

003

EMBTEL 897

IPC Negotiations

*Cy 2 destroyed*

Substance reftel conveyed May 6 Anderson, Jersey Vice President.

Only point on which he appeared have difficulty was your recommendation two. Anderson commented it would be very difficult for IPC shareholders agree on single IPC negotiator.

GP-3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12AC 11-53

By UCLD NARA, Date 07-12-12

Drafted by:

NEA:NE/E:SCBlackiston,Jr:acs 5/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Phillips Talbot

NEA - ~~John D. Jennings~~

Clearances:

NEA:NE:RPDavies

s/s - <sup>0</sup> Robert B. Williams

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM DS-322  
5-61

MAY 8 1964

1. ~~Mr. Komer~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

53

*July*

*1953*

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

*Romer*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53a

H  
Action

Control: 1505  
Rec'd: MAY 4, 1964  
7:12 AM

SS  
Info

FROM: BAGHDAD  
ACTION: SECSTATE 897  
INFO: LONDON 301  
DATE: MAY 4, NOON

003

*Cy# 2 dist*

EXDIS

FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JERNEGAN FROM STRONG

IPC NEGOTIATIONS.

PERSONAL FRIEND OF TEN YEARS STANDING WHO IS CONFIDENT OF WATTARI HAD DINNER WITH WATTARI MAY 1. FROM EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS I HAVE CONFIDENCE MY FRIEND IS ACCURATE OBSERVER AND ANALYST AS WELL AS BEING UNUSUALLY HONORABLE. HE HAS TOLD ME FOLLOWING BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER HIS DINNER, INDICATING WATTARI'S POSITION HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED IN LAST SEVERAL WEEKS:

1) WATTARI WANTS SETTLEMENT WITH IPC VERY MUCH BOTH TO BENEFIT IRAQ AND TO RAISE HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE FOR FUTURE JOB OPPORTUNITIES. IF HE CAN GET SETTLEMENT HE WILL BE ABLE MODIFY HIS HARD LINE IN OPEC. IF HE CANNOT OBTAIN AGREEMENT PRIOR TO JULY 6 HE WILL HAVE TO DO ALL HE CAN TO PREVENT A SETTLEMENT OF OPEC ISSUE WITH COMPANIES IN ORDER PROTECT IRAQ. HE WILL HAVE TO SEEK TO FORCE UNILATERAL LEGISLATION BY OPEC COUNTRIES REQUIRING EXTENSION OF ROYALTIES. (THIS NOT RPT NOT PUT AS THREAT.)

2) WATTARI IS GOOD MAN AND REASONABLE. HE IS VERY WELL DISPOSED TOWARD AMERICANS AND FRENCH, BUT LIMITS OF HIS POSITION MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. HE UNABLE SEEK REPEAL OR CHANGE LAW 80. IN NEGOTIATIONS EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON IPC APPROACH. IF IPC ONLY DEMANDS WHAT IT NEEDS, BASIS

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 11-53

By UUB NARA, Date 07-12-12

MAY 4 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 897, MAY 4, NOON, FROM BAGHDAD

FOR AGREEMENT WILL BE LACKING. WATTARI CANNOT MAKE A PROPOSAL. HE CAN ONLY ACCEPT FOR STUDY A PROPOSAL BY IPC INCLUDING THINGS WATTARI NEEDS. IF PROPOSAL IS REASONABLE ON MAIN ISSUES, DETAILS CAN BE NEGOTIATED INTO AGREEMENT. QUESTION EXISTS IN WATTARI'S MIND WHETHER IPC WANTS AGREEMENT.

3) IPC CAN HAVE 1/2 PERCENT RESERVED UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF LAW 80 SUBJECT ONLY TO CERTAIN REQUIRED PRODUCTION LEVELS AND CERTAIN OTHER NEGOTIABLE CONDITIONS. WATTARI KNOWS IT ALSO NECESSARY TO FIND A WAY AROUND LAW 80 TO GIVE MORE AREA TO IPC.

4) FROM IPC WATTARI NEEDS FOLLOWING: A) INCREASED AND RISING REVENUES; B) A WRITTEN APPLICATION FOR THE 1/2 PERCENT AREA, WHICH APPLICATION NEED NOT MENTION LAW 80 SPECIFICALLY BECAUSE APPLICATION IN ITSELF WILL CONSTITUTE IPC ACCEPTANCE OF LAW 80, IF TACTIC, WHICH ESSENTIAL; C) AN IPC AGREEMENT WORK WITH INOC, OR SUCH AGREEMENT BY IPC SHAREHOLDER OR SHAREHOLDERS, PREFERABLY AMERICAN OR FRENCH, THROUGH WHICH MORE THAN 1/2 PERCENT OF IPC CONCESSION CAN BE ALLOCATED; AND D) IPC AGREEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE COOPERATION OF OTHER FIRMS WITH INOC ON REMAINDER OF FORMER IPC CONCESSION.

5) WATTARI IS UPSET THAT IPC REFUSED PERMIT ONE IPC MAN UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL EXPLORATION WITH WATTARI ALONE. SENDING OF IPC TEAM FORCES WATTARI INCLUDE SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF THUS FORMALIZING AND HANDICAPPING PROCEEDINGS UNFORTUNATELY. IPC SHOULD AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE PROPOSE REDUCING NEGOTIATORS TO ONE ON EACH SIDE. AFTER SINGLE NEGOTIATORS HAVE ENGAGED IN EXPLORATION IPC SHOULD PUT IN WRITTEN PROPOSAL. THERE WILL BE TOUGH BARGAINING OVER DETAILS, BUT IF WATTARI'S PRINCIPAL NEEDS MET BY IPC, AGREEMENT ATTAINABLE. WATTARI BELIEVES IPC ABLE MEET HIS NEEDS ON BASIC POINTS. IT WILL FALL ON IPC TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY BY MAKING PROPOSALS FOR GETTING AROUND STICKING POINTS. WATTARI CANNOT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 897, MAY 4, NOON, FROM BAGHDAD

RELATIONSHIP OF MY FRIEND TO WATTARI IS ONE OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP OVER MANY YEARS. I KNOW THEY ARE VERY CLOSE. I HAVE DISCUSSED FRANKLY WITH MY FRIEND QUESTION WHETHER WATTARI SIMPLY MAKING SWEET TALK TO HIM ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT BECAUSE HE KNOWS MY FRIEND HAS AMERICAN CONTACTS. AM FULLY REASSURED THIS IS NOT CASE. IF WATTARI HAS BIAS AGAINST BRITISH IT DERIVES FROM HIS BELIEF BRITISH WERE INSTIGATORS OF EFFORT BY ADIB AL-JADER FEW WEEKS AGO TO REPLACE HIM AS MINISTER OF OIL.

COMMENT: BRITISH INDEED APPEAR DISTRUST WATTARI AND DOUBT HIS ABILITY REACH SETTLEMENT. I ADHERE TO VIEW THAT IF IPC ABLE OFFER GOI ENOUGH OF WHAT IT WANTS IN REVENUE AND PRESTIGE FOR INOC, SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. THAT BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF FOREGOING BE DISCUSSED BY DEPT WITH IPC SHAREHOLDERS.
2. THAT IPC TRY TO SHIFT AT EARLY DATE FROM TEAM TALKS TO INDIVIDUAL EXPLORATION BETWEEN DUROC-DANNER AND WATTARI.
3. THAT IPC INCLUDE TO EXTENT POSSIBLE IN INITIAL WRITTEN PROPOSAL, AFTER EXPLORATION, THOSE THINGS NEEDED BY IRAQ.
4. THAT IPC SEARCH FOR AND PRESENT FORMULAS FOR GETTING AROUND STICKING POINTS.
5. THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE IN LONDON TO ASSURE THAT I AM KEPT INFORMED OF COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT BEING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 897, MAY 4, NOON, FROM BAGHDAD

OBLIGATED CONSTANTLY TAKE INITIATIVE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.  
IMMATERIAL HOW OR WHERE BRIEFINGS ARRANGED.

GP-1.

STRONG

BAP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Long*

54

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Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

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TX FTQVA 007ZCZCQMA002ZCZCQMA181DMA028  
RR RUTLNL RUEHCR RUQVBD  
DE RUQMDM 15 09/1515Z  
R 091445Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQVBD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
RUTDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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0 0 6 3 3.8

1964 MAR 9 PM 7 49

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DEPT (598) INFO BAGHDAD 213 BEIRUT 243 LONDON 21 FROM DAMASCUS NINTH

LIMDIS

BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS SHOWN US HIS COMMUNICATIONS TO LONDON AND BAGHDAD RELATING TO RECENT VISITS TO BRITISH EMBASSY OF ABD-AL-JABIR JAMALI, IRAQI, REPRESENTING A SHIA GROUP PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF IRAQ. JAMALI CLAIMS HE NEPHEW OF FADHIL JAMALI WHO HE SAYS IS PRESENTLY IN BEIRUT, AND ALSO REPRESENTS ANOTHER UNCLE, ABD-AL-RASUL

PAGE 2 RUQMDM 15 ~~SECRET~~

JAMALI. ABD-AL-RASUL, IN WRITTEN LETTER AND PROGRAM ADDRESSED TO BRITISH EMBASSY DAMASCUS, DESCRIBES SELF VARIOUSLY AS "PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZING COMMITTEE FOR THE NATIONAL OPERATION" AND "PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL OPERATIONS COMMITTEE" IN BAGHDAD.

GROUP ASKED BRITISH OFFICIALLY ONLY FOR GUARANTEES OF SYMPATHY AND FRIENDSHIP AFTER IT SEIZES POWER IN IRAQ. BRITISH DCM, WHO HANDLED ALL CONTACTS FOR EMBASSY, REPLIED ONLY THAT HE WOULD INFORM HIS AMBASSADOR ABOUT JAMALI'S STATEMENTS AND ASSERTED CLEARLY THAT BRITISH WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAQ.

ACCORDING TO ABD-AL-JABIR AND WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS FROM ABD-AL-RASUL, GROUP IS LIMITED TO SHIA AND IS USING THE "GREAT MOSQUES" FOR TEMPORARY HEADQUARTERS "IN THE SOUTH".

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 11-53

NARA, Date 5/11/17

By CTS

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 598, MARCH 9, FROM: DAMASCUS

CLAIMS TO HAVE SUPPORT OF 170 ARMY OFFICERS, WITH GREAT IMPETUS LENT BY COLLABORATION OF HARDAN TIKRITI. OTHERS MENTIONED INCLUDED GEN MUHAMMAD ABD-AL-QADR HUSSAYN, FORMER DEPUTY COS; BRIGGEN SA'IS AL-AZZIH (PHONETIC), DIRGEN OF RAILWAYS IN BAGHDAD; COL KIFAN AL-SALAH; AND ONE SHAYKH AL-HAKIM.

AIMS OF GROUP APPEAR VAGUE, BUT MENTION MADE OF RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WITH SOME AUTONOMY FOR SHIA.

PAGE 3 RUQMDM 15 ~~SECRET~~

LETTER FROM ABD-AL-RASUL STATED THAT GROUP HAD "QUASI-OFFICIAL" SUPPORT OF SYRIANS WHO PROMISED SUPPLY ARMS AND FUNDS, AS WELL AS SUPPORT OF SHIA IN SYRIA, LEBANON AND IRAN. SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED SUPPORT OF KAMAL MARUWA, LEBANESE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER WHO, WE BELIEVE, HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR HIS IRAQI SHIA CONNECTIONS.)

TIMING OF OPERATION ALSO APPEARS VAGUE. LETTER MENTIONS VARIOUS "PREPARATORY" ACTIVITIES AND SAID THAT THE ARMY OFFICERS INVOLVED WERE BEING "HELD BACK" UNTIL WEEK OF THE HAJ, APRIL 21. ABD-AL-JABIR ORALLY MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF ACTION "IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS" IN LAST CONTACT WITH BRITISH DCM MARCH 5.

ABD-AL-JABIR SAID THAT HIS WIFE IS SISTER OF DIRECTOR OF SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, AND THROUGH THIS CONNECTION HE IS ABLE TRAVEL FREELY BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA.

BRITISH EMBASSY INFORMING FOREIGN OFFICE AND BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD THAT THEY HAVE SHARED THIS INFO WITH US.

BRITISH AMBASSADOR DISCREETLY MENTIONED ONE ADDITIONAL ITEM TO AMBASSADOR WHICH NOT REPORTED BY BRITISH EMBASSY IN COMMUNICATIONS SHOWN/US: ABD-AL-JABIR JAMALI STATED MATTER OF FACT TO HIS BRITISH CONTACT THAT HIS GROUP, "OF COURSE" WAS AWARE THAT AN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER NAMED JOHNSON IN DAMASCUS EMBASSY WAS IN CONTACT WITH ALI SALIH AL-SA'DI. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO EXPLANATION OF THIS STRANGE STATEMENT, UNLESS JAMALI CONFUSED OUR JAMES JOHNSON WITH AN ANDREW JOHNSTONE IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE BRITISH JOHNSTONE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SA'DI EITHER.

KNIGHT  
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

224 50

58  
Action  
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EO  
13526  
3.3(h)(1)  
EO  
13526  
3.3(h)(2)

Info EUS019  
PP RUEHCR  
SS DE RUEPCR 101 10/1820Z  
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SP FM DIA/CIIC  
L INFO RUEHCR/STATE  
EUR RUEPIA/CIA  
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AIDA FM USARMA BAGHDAD IRAQ  
P TO RUEPDA/DA  
CU RUEAHQ/CSAF  
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NSC RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAG  
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RUFPAW/USAFE LAS GER  
RUFPAW/CINCUSAREUR  
RUQAVD/COMIDEASTFOR RUCKSM/CO FICEUR PORT LYAUTEY  
RUQVGP/USARMA DAMASCUS SYRIA  
RUEKDL/CINCSTRIKE  
RUTPC/CO SIXTH FLEET

3.3(h)(1)  
3.3(h)(2)

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN DISSEM [redacted] FOR ACSI, AFNIN AND DNI  
IRAQI STUDENT STATES THAT ALL BAAHIST STUDENTS HAVE BEEN  
WARNED TO EXPECT BAAHIST COUP ON 8 OR 15 FEB. SOURCE NOT BAAH  
MEMBER AND CLAIMS TO HAVE GOTTEN INFORMATION FROM CLOSE FRIEND WHO  
IS PARTY MEMBER.

COMMENT: 8 FEB IS ANNIVERSARY OF BAAHIST REVOLUTION AND ALSO  
DATE OF OPENING OF BAGHDAD FAIR WHICH IS TO BE PATRONIZED BY  
PRESIDENT ARIF. 15 FEBRUARY IS DAY AFTER FEAST MARKING END  
OF RAMADHAN. INCLINED TO DISCOUNT REPORT AS RUMOR; REGIME  
ALMOST SURE TO TAKE EXTRAORDINARY PRECAUTIONS ON 8 FEB AS  
MATTER OF COURSE. HAVE NO CONFIRMING INFORMATION THAT  
BAAHISTS READY TO MAKE MOVE.

[redacted]

3.3(h)(1)  
3.3(h)(2)

BT

~~SECRET~~

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Authority 15-85  
By CTS, NARA, Date 4/17/17

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

57

~~SECRET~~

34-32

Action

NEA

Control:

17844

Rec'd:

December 27, 1963

7:24 a.m.

Info

SS

FROM: Baghdad

ACTION: Secstate 666

SP

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NAVY

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AID

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INFO: Cairo 154  
London 247

DATE: December 27, 1 p.m.

NOFORN

Reference: 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)&gt;25Yrs

Agree with reported view of UK Ambassador that we cannot rule out possibility UAR troops will be stationed in Iraq. By Anglo-Saxon logic it would seem improbable because apparent disadvantages outweigh apparent advantages. But we cannot accurately assess relative weights assigned by Arabic and Egyptian logic. If UAR forces are brought here attempt at federation might follow, but we think plebiscite would be difficult for GOI.

Advantages as Aref might see them.

1. Aref and his friends might feel more secure.
2. Purge of Baath could be speeded up.
3. Intervention in Iraq by a Baathi Syria would be rendered almost impossible.
4. Greater pressure would be placed on Baath in Syria.
5. Greater pressure might be placed on Kurds.
6. Nassers prestige would be available for mediation Kurdish

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Authenticity NLJ/KAC 15-96  
By CTS, NARA, Date 4/30/18

~~SECRET~~

-2- 666, December 27, 1 p.m., from Baghdad

question.

7. Step toward cherished and more meaningful Arab unity would have been taken.

8. GOI might be able buy wide-range military supplies from UAR.

We are unqualified make detailed assessment of advantages as Nasser might see them but would assume he would be happy to help put finishing touches on Baath in Iraq and Syria; bring pressure to bear on Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from another direction; put a new feather in cap after having lost a good many of late; and shake up Turks, Iranians and British.

Disadvantages as Aref might see them.

1. Many officers of Iraqi Army might be antagonized (presence of Syrians was different because Syria smaller than Iraq and Syrian forces were under Iraqi command).

2. Shias, Kurds, Turkomans, Christians and great many influential Sunnis likely be frightened and hostile.

3. Turks and Iranians would strongly oppose. Latter in particular likely to react with unfriendly moves, involving both Shia and Kurds.

4. British would strongly oppose.

5. Soviets would be put on spot and likely oppose strongly.

6. If UAR troops used as part of Baghdad Garrison, would cause strong reaction (reaction likely be somewhat less if used in North to replace Syrians.

7. Clandestine, reorganizing Baath might gain accretions of strength.

8. Expense to Iraq would be considerable.

9. Most Iraqis would oppose outside intervention in Kurdish problem.

~~SECRET~~

-3- 666, December 27, 1 p.m., from Baghdad

Again we cannot not detail disadvantages as Nasser would see them but believe he would have to ponder expense, exposed position of troops and supply problems, possibility of another disaster arising from a premature move and mercurial Iraqi temperament, reactions of Soviets at time he has problems with US, and further anti-UAR reaction in US.

There has been no preparation of public here and presumably no consultation with other interested parties. Mood in GOI and leading public figures has been one of wanting friendly relations with UAR but cautious approach to unity. Most Iraqis seem want period of stability and building. GOI has been doing utmost create confidence among business men. Ministerial program fails foreshadow such startling move.

All in all, we obliged express view that British report inaccurate but, again, stranger things have happened. If report proves correct, we believe USG should make no hasty or hostile moves, should advise Turks and Iranians adopt similar position, and let natural processes in Iraq work themselves out. We still fail see Iraq agreeing to rule from Cairo or allowing its territory be used for military move against neighbor.

3.3(b)(1)

Latest  information, received following Ambassadors drafting of above and his departure for Iran, indicates there is no substance to the British report.

GP-2.

ADAMS

SYT

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd  
2/21/67  
12:30p

①

(2)

58

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Iraqi Generals take back the good word.

President Aref of Iraq has cabled his thanks for the message and gifts you sent to him through his Generals (you will recall you saw them on January 25 -- and they brought you a carpet).

He also expresses appreciation for the treatment the delegation received elsewhere in the government.

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC WASHDC 595  
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BT

*W. Higgins*

*9*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1455

SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT AREF TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

1. DURING MY CALL FEBRUARY 20 PRIME MINISTER TALIB SAID THAT JUST BEFORE PRESIDENT AREF LEFT FOR TURKEY HE ASKED TALIB PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ME FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON: HE APPRECIATES VERY MUCH THE MESSAGE AND GIFTS FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON BROUGHT TO HIM BY THE IRAQI MILITARY DELEGATION AND HE ALSO APPRECIATES THE COURTESIES SHOWN TO THE DELEGATION WHO HAVE PRAISED IN THE HIGHEST TERMS THE TREATMENT THEY RECEIVED.

2. TALIB SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD DESIRED TO GIVE ME THIS MESSAGE PERSONALLY BUT SINCE HE WILL BE ABSENT SIX DAYS AND DOES NOT WANT TO DELAY FURTHER THE TRANSMISSION OF THE MESSAGE, HE CHOSE THIS WAY TO DELIVER IT.

GP-4. STRONG  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sjrg*, NARA, Date 3-1-06

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

February 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Iraq that the appointment of Mr. Nuri Jamil as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Iraq would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Protocol  
CF w/cy of Incoming  
Country File w/Incoming

WWR:BKS:amc

*Dispatched 2/4/67 - Outside Dept*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

377

592

February 3, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy in Baghdad which states that the Government of Iraq has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Nuri Jamil as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Iraq to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Jamil is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Jamil as Ambassador of Iraq at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Iraq of your approval.

Faithfully yours,



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 FEB 4 AM 10 29

598

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NURI JAMIL

IRAQ

Nuri Jamil, Iraqi Ambassador-designate to the United States, is a retired brigadier with almost a decade of ambassadorial experience. He has served as Under Secretary of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry for the past year and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1966. He is a friendly, cooperative and intelligent individual who is favorably disposed toward the west and has worked well with U. S. representatives in Baghdad.

Ambassador-designate Jamil was born in Baghdad about 1914. He graduated from the Staff College in Baghdad in 1940. He had military training assignments in England, India and Egypt. He achieved his last rank in the army, that of staff brigadier, in 1954. Before his first assignment in the Foreign Ministry in 1958, Jamil taught at the Staff College, commanded the Staff College, and according to one source, was aide-de-camp for a short time to King Faysal, who was murdered in 1958. Jamil was not involved in the coup that toppled the monarchy. In July 1958, however, he did not oppose the dictator 'Abd al-Karim Qasim.

Jamil was appointed Iraqi Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1958, to India in 1960 and to Italy in 1962. He remained in Italy until 1966 when he returned to the Foreign Ministry in Baghdad as Under Secretary. He is not expected to arrive in Washington until about June 1967.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-1-06

60

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 25, 1967

BKS:

The attached arrived too late for use.

However, after talking with the Country Director last night I put essentially the same in Walt's memo to the President.

So all taken care of. The meeting was warm and friendly and accomplished its purpose.

  
HHS

UNCLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 5.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DLG, WGA, Date 6-2-89

CONFIDENTIAL



1347

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1967

227 H  
1-Walsh  
2-Rit. JD  
Cy Moore  
60a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Call on the President by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the  
Iraqi Army

As outlined in the Secretary's memorandum of January 22 to the President, General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, is bearing not only a gift but also a personal message from President Aref of Iraq for the President. A biographic brief of General Sabri is attached.

We do not know the contents of the oral message but we assume that it consists basically of a renewed expression of friendship and good will.

We recommend that the President reply that he wishes to reassure President Aref of the friendship and good will of the American Government and people for the Iraqi Government and people, and that he wishes Iraq well in its continued economic development and its progress towards political stability.

*John G. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic Brief of General Sabri

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-26-03

✓

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 JAN 25 AM 10 19



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

608

## BIOGRAPHIC DATA

IRAQ  
Major General Hassan SABRI Muhammad Ali  
January 1967

(U) NAME: Major General Hassan SABRI Muhammad Ali, Army.

(U) POSITION: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations since May 1966.

(C) SIGNIFICANCE: One of more competent Iraqi senior officers. Considered to have excellent potential for advancement.

(C) POLITICS:

(C) International: Friendly toward U.S. Scheduled for U.S. orientation tour, Jan 1967.

(U) Internal: Not considered politically ambitious.



(U)

(1957)

(U) PERSONAL DATA:

(U) BIRTH: 16 Jun 1920, Baghdad, Iraq.

(U) Family: Wife, Fatme Nevin Abdul, speaks English. Two sons (1957 information): Felah, born 1950; Faisal, 1954.

(U) Description: Height 5'9", weight 163 pounds; dark hair and eyes. Somewhat reticent but personable and approachable.

(U) Languages: Native Arabic, Fluent English and Turkish, some German.

(U) Religion: Islam.

(U) CAREER:

1938	- Royal Military College, Iraq.
1941	- School of Engineers.
1942	- Small Arms School.
1943	- School of Minor Tactics.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/EPIC 15-97

By 448 NARA, Date 07-22-2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP-3  
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Encl 11 (S-2158/100 SA)

IRAQ  
Major General Hassan SABRI Muhammad Ali  
January 1967

- 1947 - Iraqi Staff College.
- 1948 - Military History Instructor, Royal Military College.
- 1950 - Staff Officer, Directorate of Operations.
- 1951 - CO Engineer Training Depot.
- 1952 - Staff Captain, Inf Bde Hq.
- 1953 - Bde Major, Mechanized Force.
- 1954 - Staff Officer for Training, Royal Military College.
- 1956 - U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Regular Course.
- 1959 - First General Staff Officer, 4th Div.
- 1962 - Director of Military Training.
- 1963 - Accountant General assigned to Field Force Hq.
- 1966 - Dep Comdr, Field Force Hq.
- 1966-Present - Dep Chief of Staff for Operations, May. U.S. orientation tour, Jan 1967.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Handwritten:*  
S  
61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gift and Message from Iraq's President

Attached is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts.

This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message.

I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way--nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an opportunity we shouldn't miss.

Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates--headed by Aref--can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own--and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble.

We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 21, #188

*jc* NARA Date 3-26-03

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation.

*Walt* Rostow

I'll see General Sabri \_\_\_\_\_

I'll see all five together  
if Secretary Rusk would like \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

229  
bla

January 20, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presentation of Gift from Iraqi President

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you receive Major General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, on January 23, 24, or 25 long enough for him to present a gift sent to you by the President of Iraq, and that you present him with a gift in exchange.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DISCUSSION:

Major General Hassan Sabri, accompanied by four other senior Iraqi Army officers, is arriving in Washington on January 22 for a Military Aid Program orientation tour in the United States. The delegation, whose members have considerable political power in Iraq, will be carrying both an oral message and a gift for you from President Aref of Iraq. The gift is understood to be a carpet. Our Ambassador in Iraq strongly recommends that you receive the delegation plus the Iraqi Ambassador here for a few minutes in order to exchange gifts.

Ambassador Strong's recommendation is undoubtedly prompted by the fact that Iraq is entering a critical

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3


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not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-26-03

decision period. President Aref has been trying to build up an "Iraq-firster" regime which would put Iraq's national interests ahead of the strained attempts to maintain unity of policy with the radical Arab nationalist states such as the UAR and Syria. The Syrian shutting off of the main oil pipeline of the part American owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is contributing to the importance of the decision President Aref will have to make on the composition of his government. The present cabinet has shown itself too weak to make the sort of decisions required of it by the expected drastic decrease of the IPC revenues on which the Iraqi Government depends. A more radical cabinet might attempt to nationalize IPC, a course which would be self-defeating and precipitate a greater economic crisis. In the current juggling in Iraq, Aref heads the forces of moderation which are trying to find a non-disruptive solution to the oil crisis. In the long term, if these moderates can maintain power in Iraq they will make an important contribution to stability in the area.

We therefore believe that in the forthcoming critical period, we should continue to stiffen President Aref's morale, and that any such personal recognition by you of his special emissary would serve this purpose by strengthening the cordial ties already established by past messages exchanged between you and President Aref through diplomatic channels.

General Sabri will be available in the Washington area January 23, 24, and 25. If you can receive him and the Iraqi Ambassador for a few minutes during that period, the Department of State could provide a silver cigarette box bearing the Presidential seal for you to make an exchange present for President Aref.



Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW

TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Aref of Iraq

OIC to Aref  
BKS  
02

Affairs in Iraq have been unsteady for some time. President Aref is a moderate who is being opposed by Communists broadcasting from Eastern Europe, left-leaning elements in the administration and also by pro-Cairo nationalist zealots who tried a coup d'etat last summer.

Despite these challenges, Aref has shown a steady hand and real courage in (a) seeking peace with the Kurds and in (b) persisting in efforts to broaden his base of support among Iraq's diverse populace.

Ambassador Strong recommends, and State and I concur, that the following message of encouragement from you be given orally to President Aref by our Ambassador.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jcl/g NARA, Date 4-7-03

62a

~~SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT AREF~~

*Quote*

I was delighted to have the opportunity to talk to Ambassador Hani November 17 and when I learned of Ambassador Strong's call on you I wanted to use the opportunity to send you my personal greetings. I have been impressed with your efforts to create stability in an atmosphere of moderation and to strengthen national unity by conciliating all elements. Your achievement of peace in the north is a monument to your leadership. I have noted with pleasure the development of Iraqi-United States relations on a sound basis and look to even more mutually beneficial relations in the future. I offer you my best personal wishes for your continued success and the well-being of your country. *subquote*

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 21, #186  
By jc NARA, Date 3-26-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1966 NOV 25 23 24

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP661056

66 NOV 25 PM 6:32

FRIDAY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AREF OF IRAQ

AFFAIRS IN IRAQ HAVE BEEN UNSTEADY FOR SOME TIME. PRESIDENT AREF IS A MODERATE WHO IS BEING OPPOSED BY COMMUNISTS BROADCASTING FROM EASTERN EUROPE, LEFT-LEANING ELEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND ALSO BY PRO-CAIRO NATIONALIST ZEALOTS WHO TRIED A COUP D'ETAT LAST SUMMER.

DESPITE THESE CHALLENGES, AREF HAS SHOWN A STEADY HAND AND REAL COURAGE IN (A) SEEKING PEACE WITH THE KURDS AND IN (B) PERSISTING IN EFFORTS TO BROADEN HIS BASE OF SUPPORT AMONG IRAQ'S DIVERSE POPULACE.

AMBASSADOR STRONG RECOMMENDS, AND STATE AND I CONCUR, THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM YOU BE GIVEN ORALLY TO PRESIDENT AREF BY OUR AMBASSADOR.

QUOTE

I WAS DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO AMBASSADOR HANI NOVEMBER 17 AND WHEN I LEARNED OF AMBASSADOR STRONG'S CALL ON YOU I WANTED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEND YOU MY PERSONAL GREETINGS. I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH YOUR EFFORTS TO CREATE STABILITY IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MODERATION AND TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL UNITY BY CONCILIATING ALL ELEMENTS. YOUR ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE IN THE NORTH IS A MONUMENT TO YOUR LEADERSHIP. I HAVE NOTED WITH PLEASURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQI-UNITED STATES RELATIONS ON A SOUND BASIS AND LOOK TO EVEN MORE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. I OFFER YOU MY BEST PERSONAL WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS AND THE WELL-BEING OF YOUR COUNTRY.

END QUOTE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc/rj, NARA, Date 4-7-03

DTG: 252243Z NOV 66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Approved in S 10/10/66

~~(SECRET)~~ <sup>63</sup>  
 SecDel/MC/39  
 October 6, 1966

MICROFILMED  
 BY S/S: CL

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION  
 TO THE  
 TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE  
 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
 New York, September-October 1966

*1- W. Higgins*  
*2- Davis*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 5, 1966

Time: 3:45 - 5:10 p.m.

Place: USUN

PART III OF V SECTIONS

Subject: South Arabia

Participants:

U.S.  
 The Secretary  
 Wm. L. Simmons (NEA)

IRAQ  
 H.E. Adnan M. Pachachi,  
 Minister for Foreign Affairs  
 H.E. Nasir Hani, Ambassador  
 to the United States

Distribution:

S/S	EUR	AmEmb.	ADEN
S/P	NEA	"	BAGHDAD
G	IO	"	CAIRO
INR/OD	USUN	"	TAIZ
CIA	White House	"	LONDON

Complete Dist. made in CMS  
 10/13/66

The Secretary asked whether UK withdrawal from South Arabia would make a Yemen solution more difficult. The Minister said that he thought a South Arabia settlement is possible before 1968, although he deplored the British reservation to the UN resolution on this problem that the UK was not prepared to make any constitutional changes without prior SAFC agreement. He recently had spoken to Lord Caradon and had the impression that the UK is re-examining its position. He said that he had talked to the Secretary General and an agreement had been reached on a three-nation UN mission conditional on the UK clarifying its position regarding constitutional changes and assuring the Secretary

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 State Dept. Guidelines  
 By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-26-03*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

General that the UN Mission will have complete freedom of action. He emphasized that the UN Mission would not attempt to seek a solution but will rather have the task of getting an agreement by all parties on the modalities looking toward a settlement.

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1966 OCT 17 PM 3 35

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Approved in S 10/10/66

(SECRET)  
SecDel/MC/39  
October 6, 1966

64

*W. Rogers  
S. Spindler  
J. T. Jones*

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION  
TO THE  
TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, September-October 1966

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 5, 1966

Time: 3:45 - 5:10 p.m.

Place: USUN

PART I OF V SECTIONS

Subject: US-Iraq Relations and Economic Problems

Participants:

U.S.  
The Secretary  
Wm. L. Simmons (NEA)

IRAQ  
H.E. Adnan M. Pachachi,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Nasir Hani, Ambassador  
to the United States

Distribution:

S/S	CIA	USUN
S/P	EUR	Amemb. BAGHDAD
G	NEA	Amemb. TEHRAN
INR/OD	E	Amemb. LONDON
White House ✓	AID	

Complete Dist. made in CMS 10/13/66

The Foreign Minister stated that relations with the US were good and he would like to see expanded and "easier" cooperation between our two countries.

On the internal side, he said that Iraq had been able to solve one of its most difficult internal problems, the Kurdish question. He recalled that he had many talks with Ambassador Strong on this. Iraq had thought that since the US was a friend of both countries and an ally of Iran, the US would be in a position to do something about Iranian assistance to the Kurds. The Minister said that he will be meeting in New York with

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-26-03*

Iranian Foreign Minister Aram and current plans were for the two to meet in Baghdad in November for talks with a set agenda.

The Minister said that his government had appropriated five million dinars for reconstruction in the northern area of Iraq. However, Iraq was passing through a financial crisis. "It would be a gesture of great help if the US could aid in the reconstruction in northern Iraq."

The Minister and Ambassador Hani stated that negotiations on PL-480 wheat were progressing satisfactorily.

The Minister said that his government hoped to ratify an agreement soon regarding private investment in Iraq. The Secretary said that there have been difficulties in the past in this field and the USG hopes that these can be resolved. The Secretary inquired about prospects for exploitation of the recently discovered sulphur deposits. The Minister said he had seen Secretary Anderson in Baghdad and will probably see him in New York to discuss this matter.

Regarding petroleum, the Minister said that he hoped the USG will work with HMG and the US companies involved to press them to seek agreement with the Iraqi government. He appreciated the fact that the American companies were private entities.

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1966 OCT 17 PM 3 35



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 13, 1966

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1-Wiggins  
2-Rit.  
Informed S/S  
Kearney  
7/15/66 JPS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT. W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Reply to July 4 Congratulatory Message  
to President Johnson from Kurdish Rebel  
Leader General Barzani

① Tell S/S  
② File

The President received a July 4 congratulatory message from Kurdish leader General Barzani. Our Embassy at Baghdad recommends that the White House issue no reply to this message, as benefits would be negligible and adverse reactions on the part of the Iraqi Government quite possible. We concur in this opinion and hence are taking no further action. A copy of Ambassador Strong's recommendation against any reply is enclosed.

*TR Shaver*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Telegram from the American Embassy at Baghdad, No. 38, dated July 11, 1966
2. Message from General Barzani dated July 5, 1966

~~SECRET~~  
Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-26-03

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

55

Info

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1966 JUL 11 AM 7 04

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 38

JULY 11

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 4617

CONSIDER UNDESIRABLE ACKNOWLEDGE BARZANI MESSAGE. DOUBT FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE WILL HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT ON BARZANI WHO HAS RECEIVED NO RESPONSE TO NUMBER OF MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS. BARZANI IS PRIVATE IRAQI CITIZEN AND GOI, WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO HEAR OF ORAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT HOWEVER MADE, WOULD RESENT AND SUSPECT WORST.

GP-3 STRONG  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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658  
The White House  
Washington

1966 JUL 5 AM 9 52

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CD PARIS VIA WUI 4 1710

LT HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

WASHDC

ON THE OCCASION OF THE HUNDRED NINETIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
UNITED STATES DAY I CONGRATULATE YOU AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE  
IN THE NAME OF KURDISH PEOPLE AND MYSELF WISHING THAT IT WILL  
RETURN EVERY YEAR AND UNITED STATES HAS MADE MORE PROGRESS  
FOR THE SAKE OF SERVING HUMANITY AND PEACE IN THE WORLD FAITHFULLY  
YOURS

---

GENERAL BARZANI COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE KURDISH REVOLUTION.

PERSONAL AND  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 28, 1966

120  
66  
1. ~~Mr Smith~~ S  
2. ~~H Wiggins~~  
3. File - Ed Roberts

Mr. Marlin E. Sandlin  
1700 Southwest Tower  
Houston, Texas 77002

Dear Marlin:

We have looked into the suggestion made by you and Bob Anderson of a possible visit to Washington by Iraq's Prime Minister Bazzaz.

For a variety of reasons, it appears best to the State Department and to us to wait until the United Nations General Assembly meets in the Fall, at which time State may be able to lay on an informal visit to Washington.

I would be delighted to talk to you about this the next time you will be in town.

Sincerely,

15/

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President

12/ ✓  
Copy to: Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DLA, NARA, Date 6-2-81

Thursday, June 30, 1966  
9:05 AM

67

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Coup in Iraq

25X1

CIA has received a report [redacted] that a coup may be underway in Iraq.

According to the report, aircraft are attacking the palace; tanks and anti-aircraft guns around the palace are returning the fire.

White House Situation Room

*Arthur McAfferty*  
Briefing Officer

UNCLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By sp NLJ 001-138-3-12  
NARA, Date 1/12/12

*file*

*68*

~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Visit of Prime Minister Bazzaz to the United States as suggested by Robert Anderson and Marlin Sandlin

Discreet discussion with the State Department elicits the following:

1. The Department is reviewing Ambassador Strong's recommendation that Prime Minister Bazzaz be invited. They agree that a visit will strengthen his westward leanings in the economic sphere.

2. P. M. Bazzaz saw the Vice President last year in Washington, but it was a last-minute, helter skelter visit at the time of the UN General Assembly. State would therefore like to make a more formal visit this time, if he comes. But they are reluctant to press for an official visit because there are so many others from the Near East who want to come and your time should be protected. There are also complex reasons of inter-Arab politics which justify our holding back.

3. We have indicated to them that there are some "business reasons" which would make it useful for him to come on some kind of a visit, although we do not want to add this to the President's schedule. They are therefore reviewing their priorities and will be in touch with us.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 87100

~~SECRET~~

By plip NARA. Date 3-26-03

(30)

Mr <sup>69</sup>

S

Thru Joe Calijano

file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6/1/66

~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Visit of Prime Minister Bazzaz to the United States as suggested by Robert Anderson and Marlin Sandlin

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Walt R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 87-100

By plap, NARA, Date 3-26-03

~~SECRET~~

<sup>20</sup>  
Sent 6/18/66

~~SECRET~~

June 15, 1966

file

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALIFANO

SUBJECT: Possible Visit to Washington of Iraq's  
Prime Minister Bazzaz -- Further to Bob  
Anderson's Suggestion

There is much evidence suggesting Bazzaz's domestic position is not too secure. Various coups are in the making; and the visitors' program seems pretty full.

Therefore, State recommends that P. M. Bazzaz not be invited for a special visit. When the UNGA meets this Fall, State can lay on an inconspicuous business visit.

W.W.R.  
W.W.R.

JC/WWR/HW/llw

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-26-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3:40 pm. Friday  
May 13, 1966

LN - please copy to:  
HW  
Please follow  
with extreme  
discretion

FOR Walt Rostow

FROM Joe Califano



Would you please pick up the suggestion in the second paragraph of the attached memorandum with State. As Sandlin explained it to me, the Prime Minister of Iraq could come here without involving the President because he is not the head of state. Please let me know how this progresses so I can keep Sandlin informed.

The information about sulphur in Iraq is extremely sensitive and Sandlin and Anderson asked that we handle it on a strict need-to-know basis. I assured them we would.

Attachs.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7/a

8:15 pm. Thursday  
May 12, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano *JC* *2*

Marlin Sandlin dropped by this afternoon to personally deliver the attached letter which reports a major sulphur discovery in Iraq. Sandlin and Bob Anderson wanted you to know about it. Sandlin said that the Russians have also tried to exploit this discovery but that the Prime Minister of Iraq wants to stay neutral with a "Western" tinge, especially with respect to hard currency and technical know-how.

Sandlin also said the Prime Minister would like to visit the U.S. in the near future. I will ask Rostow to explore this with the State Department.

Kosygin has invited the Prime Minister of Iraq to visit him in Moscow and he will probably go.

Attach.

712  
ROBERT B. ANDERSON  
ONE ROCKEFELLER PLAZA  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

May 10, 1966

My dear Mr. President,

Marlin Sandlin and I are writing this memorandum jointly.

We have through the Ambassador, informed the State Department in general about our project but we thought you should know about it because of the size and significance of the proposed development.

I have recently been in Iraq and have had with me the Chief Engineer of the Pan American Sulphur Company. We have now determined that the sulphur resources of Iraq are larger than the combined reserves of sulphur in both the United States and Mexico. They are certainly larger than anything ever discovered before. We have made definite proposals to the government of Iraq to develop these sulphur reserves together with phosphate reserves on a joint basis between Pan American Sulphur Company, a 50% ownership by the Government of Iraq and Robert B. Anderson.

We both believe that in view of the fact that both sulphur and phosphate are indispensable ingredients to fertilizers that it is exceedingly important nationally that these reserves be under the management of and participated in by American companies.

You know better than we the food problem of the future and what fertilizers are going to mean in supplying the food supplies of a world in which the population is expanding so rapidly.

We are keeping our Ambassador, Mr. Stone, fully informed and we will keep the Department of State informed as well. We simply wanted you to know of this major discovery and its importance.


We should like for you to also know that this sulphur deposit is so large that the people who control it are probably going to have a major voice in the world price for sulphur and, of course, unless it is handled properly it could be so utilized as to prove a serious impediment.

I should like to conclude by saying that I have recently had talks with the Prime Minister of Iraq and he expresses the belief that his country should be politically neutral but economically associated with the West. He made it very clear to me that he hoped that at some time he may be invited to visit the United States. I have passed this information on to the Department of State through Tom Mann.

We are, with great respect,

Sincerely yours,

  
Robert B. Anderson

  
Marlin Sandlin

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Approved in S  
10/13/65

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE CUNY'S OFFICE

NEA-Mr. Daniel Newberry

1965 OCT 21 PM 4 59

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4600  
1-Kofee  
2-Rit.  
72

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION  
TO THE  
TWENTIETH SESSION OF  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, September-October 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 8, 1965

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place: Waldorf Towers  
Suite (30C)

Subject: Kurdish Affairs (Part III of III)

Participants:

U.S.  
The Secretary  
Mr. Daniel Newberry, NEA

Iraq  
H.E. Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz  
Prime Minister  
H.E. Nasir Hony, Ambassador  
to the United States

Distribution:

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INR/OD	White House	
CIA	AmEmbassy BAGHDAD	

The Prime Minister early in the conversation asked the Secretary to consider the serious implications of affairs among the Kurds as they now stood. The Minister characterized the problem as basically an internal one for the Government of Iraq but remarked that there were also external aspects to the problem. He asserted that the Government of Iraq does not pretend that the Kurds are Arabs but rather the Government was willing to look at the Kurdish peoples as a nation. Even so, the Prime Minister predicted, there would never be a unified Kurdish state embracing the Kurdish peoples of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister estimated that if the Kurds of Iraq were accorded the kind of autonomy that some of their

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLI 03-175

OCT 21 1965

By ms, NARA, Date 12-15-03

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- 2 -

leaders were demanding, the only kind of political entity which would evolve would be a communist puppet regime.

The Prime Minister expressed the conviction that Iraq's neighbors should cooperate with Baghdad in the search for tranquillity in the Kurdish area. He called particular attention to the need for Iran to understand that the Iranians were creating future trouble for themselves by continuing clandestine assistance to the Iraqi-Kurdish insurgents. The Prime Minister suggested that if the United States and the United Kingdom could advise the Shah of the inadvisability of his policy, maybe progress could be made. The Prime Minister stressed that he was not asking the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Iran but only to advise the Shah, particularly that the Shah not use arms supplied to him by the United States for smuggling into Iraqi Kurdistan. The Prime Minister cited the United States' close association with CENTO as giving us a legitimate right to make such a request of Iran.

The Secretary reiterated that the United States supports the territorial integrity of Iraq. He asked the Prime Minister to appreciate that the capability of the United States to exert influence in such matters was sometimes overestimated. The Secretary cited our experience in the India-Pakistan quarrel as an example of how little the parties were disposed to listen to our counsel.

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NEA:JDJernegan:bw 1/65  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation (TELEPHONE)

DATE: January 21, 1965

SUBJECT: J. A. Jones Company Request for AID Loan to Iraq

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-175  
By is NARA, Date 12-15-03

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Haywood Robbins, General Counsel, J. A. Jones Construction Company  
Mr. John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

JDJ

COPIES TO:

S/S - 3	AID/NESA - 2	M - 2
G - 1	INR - 8	
NEA - 2	H - Miss Folger	
NE - 2	Dept. of Commerce	
NE/E - 2	Amembassy Baghdad	
U/IB - 2	<del>White House</del> - Mr. Komer	
A/AID - Mr. Gaud		

32

AID (US) 9 IRAG

I called Mr. Robbins with reference to the visit he and Mr. Harold Kohler had made to me on December 22 at which they had renewed their expression of hope that an AID loan could be made to Iraq in order to enable the J. A. Jones Company to get a contract for the proposed large irrigation project in the Kirkuk region and, by arrangement with the Iraqi Government, receive payment of some \$11 million in Iraqi dinars in settlement of pending claims connected with the construction of the Derbendi-Khan Dam.

I told Mr. Robbins that I had checked the appropriate authorities in the Department and in AID and had found no change in their previously stated opposition to any concessional lending to the Government of Iraq. My inquiries at the White House had elicited no information as to any Presidential views on this subject. (I pointed out, however, that this might be due to the pre-occupation of the White House staff with the inaugural preparations.)

Mr. Robbins thanked me for calling. He said that he, himself, had the impression the White House had been pre-occupied with the inauguration and he had decided not to pursue the matter for another week or two. He had heard, furthermore, from Mr. Clint Murchison (whose firm TECON is associated with J. A. Jones in the Iraqi operation) that the President had said he did not intend to do anything or even think about the company's proposal until after the inauguration. Mr. Robbins said he would be back in Washington in about two weeks and would get in touch with me then.

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JAN 28 1965

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

1/25  
Kopel

January 25, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

2 Feb  
1965

Attached for the information and files of the White House is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. John D. Jernegan and Mr. Haywood Robbins dated January 21 regarding J.A. Jones Company Request for AID Loan to Iraq.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

JAN 26 1965

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

*lag* 6280  
*74*  
*[Signature]*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Executive Secretariat

12/21/64

Date

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *WAH for*  
Executive Secretary

For your information and  
files. SecDel /MC/29 Part 1 and 2  
SecDel /MC/28 Part 1 of 3

Enclosures:

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

DEC 22 1964

Approved in S  
12/17/64

Konrad

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SecDel/MC/28  
December 11, 1964

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION  
TO THE  
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, November 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1964

Time: 4:30 p.m.

Place: USUN

PART I of III

Subject: The Kurdish Problem

Participants:

U.S.  
The Secretary  
NEA - Mr. Walsh

Iraq  
Foreign Minister Naji Talib  
Under Secretary for Foreign  
Affairs Kadhim Khalaf

Distribution:

S/S	INR/OD	Amembassy KUWAIT	SecDel-2
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G	Amembassy BAGHDAD	Amembassy LONDON	G/PM
NEA-3	Amembassy TEHERAN	USUN-3	

The Minister said that he had one problem which he wished to bring to the attention of the Secretary, namely, the Kurdish situation.

The Minister said that the Kurdish problem fundamentally dominated the Iraqi scene. The Iraqi Government is preoccupied with this issue and has little time or energy to turn to other pressing economic and social issues. He was not sure that they were any closer to a solution now than they were before the fighting started several years ago.

The Minister went on to say that he could not understand certain elements of the Kurdish problem. Manifestly there are unidentified forces supporting the Kurds. The Kurds are poor people and their land has been damaged by war. Where are they getting money from to buy staple foods, arms, and equipment? Who are these mysterious forces? What do they want?

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Authority FRus. 64-68, vol. 21, #169  
By je NARA Date 3-26-03

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- 2 -

The Minister stated that his Government might be able to deal with Mullah Mostafa Barzani but the Communists and the Democratic Party were much more difficult. In his opinion, the Kurds were controlled by the Communists. If a Kurdish state were established, it would be a Communist enclave which would split the Arab world, pierce the protective CENTO belt, and shatter the stability of Turkey and Iran. He had seen Kurdish maps indicating a Kurdish state stretching from Iskendrun in Turkey to Basra in Iraq.

He said that the Turks had sealed their Kurdish frontier. On the other hand, some support was drifting into Kurdish hands across the long Iranian frontier. This did not appear to be the result of deliberate Iranian Government intent but rather reflects the inability of a weak government to patrol its frontiers.

He asserted that he did not wish to suggest that the U.S. was supporting the Kurds but he did wish to emphasize that his Government is sore-perplexed by the machinations of some mysterious force which is supporting the Kurds.

In reply, the Secretary categorically assured the Minister that the United States was not directly or indirectly supporting the Kurdish movement. The U.S. supported the independence, integrity, and prosperity of Iraq. It had no other interest in Iraq affairs. Furthermore, he shared the Minister's concern about the dangers of Communist penetration of the Near East by means of a Kurdish independence movement.

The Minister said that he was very pleased to have had this exchange of views and to receive this reassurance in respect to what he had known was American policy. He said that the U.S. could help Iraq by determining who is the financing and supplying source for the Kurds and what the motivation of this source is.

JFWalsh:nrs:12-11-64

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 23, 1964

75

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Appointment with President --  
American Ambassadors

1. We have three more American Ambassadors who need the usual two-minute, off-the-record treatment in the Cabinet Room -- i. e. a handshake and a picture. The Ambassadors are Baras (Jordan), Hart (Saudi Arabia), and Strong (Iraq).
2. Can you spare two minutes this afternoon or Thursday?

Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Dec. 24, 1983  
By RLW, NARA, Date 6-2-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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*J. H. ...*

*Chase - Strong*

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SEP 1 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Consultation of Ambassador Robert C. Strong

Our Ambassador to Iraq, Robert C. Strong, is scheduled to be in Washington on consultation September 17-18 and September 21-25. He will be available for appointments during the periods indicated. The Ambassador has not previously met with the President.

GRANT G. HILLIKER

*gr*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biography.

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Robert C. Strong

Born Chicago 1915.

Raised in Beloit, Wisconsin; attended Beloit public schools. Graduated from Beloit College 1938, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa. Left University of Wisconsin graduate work after one semester to enter Foreign Service in 1939.

Married Betty Jane Burton of Wheaton, Illinois, in London in August 1939. Two daughters in college, one son in high school.

Served as vice consul at Frankfurt-on-main, Prague and Durban and as Second Secretary at Sofia.

In 1946-1947 attended the Naval War College as the first student from The Department of State.

Served as consul at Tsingtao and as first secretary at Canton, Chungking and Taipei, acting as Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy to China for the last four months of the Chinese Nationalist Government on the mainland and the first eight months of that government's existence on Taiwan.

In the Department 1950-1954 served in the Office of Chinese Affairs, in the Office of Personnel, on the Policy Planning Staff, and in the Office of the Under Secretary.

From 1954 to 1958 was deputy chief of mission in Damascus, acting as Charge the last six months of 1957.

Assigned to the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., as Department of State Faculty Advisor 1958-61.

1961-63, Director of Office of Near Eastern Affairs, with family maintaining residence at Carlisle.

Presented credentials as Ambassador to Republic of Iraq July 2, 1963, and has been in Baghdad since then.

Distinguished Service Award granted by the Department in 1959 and Distinguished Service Citation granted by Beloit College in 1959.

*Jug* *John* *4/2*

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 1 1964

*7*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by  
His Excellency Nasir al-Hani,  
Ambassador of Iraq

Dr. Nasir al-Hani, newly appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Washington, has assumed his duties and is awaiting the pleasure of the President to receive him.

I am enclosing a copy of the remarks which the Appointed Ambassador will hand to the President, a copy of the suggested reply, a biographic sketch of the Ambassador, and a briefing memorandum.

Dr. al-Hani will be one of five Chiefs of Foreign Mission to present credentials on Wednesday, April 8, 1964, at 12:00 Noon. The Chief of Protocol, Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, will accompany the Ambassador on his call. Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, will be at the White House twenty minutes before the appointment time. No interpreter is required.

GRANT G. HILLIKER

*for*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Ambassador's remarks.
2. Proposed reply.
3. Biographic sketch.
4. Briefing memorandum.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

CONFIDENTIAL

By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-26-03



January 6, 1964

*Handwritten initials*

*na*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Iraq that the appointment of Nasser Al-Hani would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

*151*

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Office of the Chief of Protocol

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

79a

January 6, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy in Baghdad which states that the Government of Iraq has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Nasser Al-Hani as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Iraq to the United States. A biographic sketch of Nasser Al-Hani is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Nasser Al-Hani as Ambassador of Iraq at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Iraq of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

79-6

Dr. Nasser Al-Hani  
Newly Designated Ambassador of Iraq  
to the United States

Dr. Al-Hani was born in 1917 of an Iraqi Muslim family. He was awarded a License in Literature from the Higher Teachers College in Baghdad in 1943. In 1947, he was awarded a B. A. Degree in Literature (with distinction) from the Arts College, University of Cairo. He won a Ph. D. from the University of London in 1950.

Between 1950 and 1954 Dr. Al-Hani was a Professor at the University of Baghdad, with the exception of a short period spent in the Ministry of Education. From 1954 to 1959, he was the Cultural Attache at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington. He went to the University of London in the latter year and served as a Professor there until 1960. In 1960, he became Director of Public Relations at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, Baghdad. In 1961, he was named Iraqi Ambassador to Lebanon where he served one year. In 1962, he was named Ambassador to Syria and served there until October 1963. From that time until the present, he has been Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Baghdad.

Dr. Al-Hani, who speaks Arabic and English fluently, has been Iraqi Delegate to several International Conferences. Most recently he was Head of the Iraqi Delegation to the 35th Session of the Council of the Arab League, Cairo, in 1960, and President of the Council of the Arab League for its 1963 Session. He and his European wife are parents of one daughter and one son.

Dr. Al-Hani is well and favorably known to the American Embassy in Baghdad as well as to various officers in the Department of State who have known him. The Iraqi Foreign Minister explained to our Ambassador in Baghdad that Dr. Al-Hani was selected as the man best qualified to pursue improvement in U.S. - Iraqi relations desired by the Iraqi Government.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-1-06

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
~~SECRET~~  
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*Jaag*  
*1- Kof*  
*2- Return*

3 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Indication That Exiled Leaders of Both Factions  
of the Ba'th Party of Iraq are Plotting Against  
President Arif

25X1X

25X1X

25X1X1. [REDACTED]

25X1X

[REDACTED] we have received reports indicating that the exiled  
leaders of both factions are independently plotting with their  
adherents inside Iraq for counter-coups against the Arif regime and  
a seizure of power. It is believed that despite their limited capa-  
bilities for effectively seizing and holding the machinery of  
government, both factions of the Ba'th have the capability for  
eliminating Arif at almost any time and are disposed to do so.

25X1A


2. [REDACTED] it was  
reported that extremist remnants of the national guard (previously  
controlled by the Ali Salih faction) were plotting to assassinate  
Arif and other government leaders as part of a plan to seize the  
government.

25X1A

3. [REDACTED] it was  
reported that Ali Salih and fellow-exiled leaders of his faction  
were planning clandestine re-entry into Iraq with a view to regain-  
ing control of the party apparatus as quickly as possible in order  
to overthrow the Arif regime. Ali Salih himself and his principal  
lieutenant, Hamadi Abd-al-Majid who have been in Belgrade since about  
20 December were expected to proceed to Syria via Beirut about  
3 January, thence to follow other leaders of their group into Iraq  
over established rat-lines.

*what are these New Kows?*

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SANITIZED  
Authority RAC-NLJ 001-138-3-13  
By *MS* NARA, Date 10-17-01

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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25X1X

25X1X

[REDACTED] a report has been received indicating that President Arif's presidential guard includes two individuals loyal to their faction. The Jawad faction has also noted that Arif's upcoming trip to the Cairo Conference of Arab Chiefs of State will increase his vulnerability to assassination and will create what they consider to be a favorable situation for re-seizure of power. They are reported to have considered the possibility of sabotaging the plane which will carry Arif to Cairo. Expected inclusion of a number of Ba'thists in the delegation will reduce the likelihood of their following through on this.

5. President Arif is clearly aware of the opposition of both factions of the Ba'th and he is known to have ordered the Director General of Security to keep several potential rivals for power under surveillance. He appears to be remaining holed up within the presidential palace in order to minimize exposure to potential assassins. Lacking a political organization upon which he can depend, Arif relies heavily upon his brother, Chief of Staff Brigadier Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Arif; upon a relative by marriage, Director General of Security Anwar Thamir al-Ani; upon Minister of Foreign Affairs Subhi Abd-al-Hamid, and upon Minister of State for Union Affairs, Shamil al-Samarrai. Arif has not yet been able, however, to build up a network of relatives and friends within the Iraqi power structure to provide him with adequate protection against a counter-coup.

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[REDACTED]  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

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Orig & 1 - The Director of Central Intelligence

cc Special Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
U. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

- 3 -

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