

## **ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE**

**You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.**

**The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.**

**July 21, 2003**

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 1

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
072	Cable	78033 to Tel Aviv [Exempt 1/2/03 NLJ 001-140-1]	S	2	11/03/66	A
Sanitized 10-7-03 NW/RA200-300						
098b	Memo	Saunders to Rostow [Sanitized 6/25/01 NLJ 00-228] [dup. # 27, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Israel, 1/1/67-5/31/67" Box 16] more info released 6/15/12 per NLJ 11-108	S	2	04/20/67	A
099a	Memo	Rostow to the President [Partially open per FRUS NLJ/RAC 00-243]	S	1	04/18/67	A
099c	Memo	Katzenbach to the President [Exempt 1/7/02 NLJ/RAC 001-140-1] [dup. # 125, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Israel Economic, 4/1/66-12/31/67" Box 19] [dup. # 29, NSF, CF, "Israeli Aid" Box 145]	S	3	04/17/67	A
Sanitized 10-7-03 NW/RA200-300						
126	Memo	Wriggins to Rostow (2 Wriggins to Rostow memos of same date attached) [Sanitized 7/4/01 NLJ/RAC 00-303] same sanitization 4/12/12 per NLJ 11-108		4	11/24/66	c
130a	Summary	Wriggins & Saunders to the President [Sanitized 4/10/01 NLJ/RAC 00-244] same sanitization 4/12/12 per NLJ 11-108	<del>S</del> S	<del>2</del> 2	<del>11/17/66</del> 11/17/66	<del>A</del> A
148	Report	No. 1944/66 [Exempt 1/3/02 NLJ/RAC 001-140-1] [dup. # 111, NSF, CF, "VAR, Vol. 5," Box 160] same sanitization 11-20-08 NLJ 06-63 (4/11) same sanitization 2/29/12 per NLJ 11-109 same sanitization 11/17/14 per NLJ 14-105	S	40	09/01/66	A
Sanitized 10-7-03 NW/RA200-300						

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title "Israel, Vol. 6"

Box Number 140

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06/17/2003

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#90 memo</del>	Rostow to PRES. <i>Open 6/6/00 NLS 91-470</i>	<del>5/18/67</del>	<del>ax c</del>
memo #126	Howard Wriggins to Walt <del>Ann 7-301</del> (2 Wriggins to Walt memos of same date attached) <i>Serial 7/9/01 NLS/RAL 00-303</i>	11/24/66	c

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File, Israel vol. VI ~~Memos~~

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>77-1049</i>		
#92d Memo	<i>Ad exempt per OSD 12-15-77 + State 9-13-78</i> <del>DOD S</del> <del>Hoopes to Rostow</del> <i>open 7/17/02 NJ/PAL</i> <del>3 p</del> <i>CO-299</i>	<del>5/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#92e Memo	<del>DOD S</del> <del>McNamara to Pres.</del> <i>open per FRUS 7/17/02</i> <del>2 p</del>	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#99b Memo	<del>DOD S</del> <del>McNamara to Pres.</del> <i>open 6/6/00</i> <del>2 p</del>	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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Israel Vol. VI ~~Cables & Memos~~ 12/66-7/67

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 Cable	<p>State <del>TS Gp 4</del>  6065 from Tokyo <del>9/19/77</del> <del>1 p</del>  (misfile moved to NSF, CF, Japan, Vol. 5) on 9/19/77)</p>	2/27/67	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 Cable	<i>Decisions per State 3-19-81</i> State S Gp 3 <i>open 4-16-81 ip</i> 178 from Tel Aviv 1 p	7/17/67	A
#3 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip, open 8/4/98</i></del> <del>3640 from Tel Aviv <i>Duplicated #45, NSCH, 1 p</i></del> <del><i>Middle East Crisis, Vol 13, Appendix S, Box 22</i></del>	<del>5/18/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#4 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i> 3536 from Tel Aviv <del><i>open 11/13/00 NLS 00-229</i></del> 1 p	5/9/67	A
#5 Cable	<del>State C Gp 4</del> 3511 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 9/19/77</i> 1 p	5/8/67	A
#6 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i> 3259 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 1 p	4/13/67	A
#7 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i> 3099 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 1 p	3/30/67	A
#8 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i> 3084 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 1 p	3/29/67	A
#9 Cable	State S Gp 2 <i>Exempt</i> <i>Open 4/18/02 NLS 00-226</i> 726 from Jerusalem 1 p	3/28/67	A
#10 Cable	State S Gp 2 <i>Exempt</i> <i>Open 4/18/02 NLS 00-226</i> 726 from Jerusalem 1 p	3/30/67	A
#11 Cable	State S Gp 1 <i>Exempt</i> 3020 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	3/23/67	A
#12 Cable	State S Gp 1 <i>Exempt</i> 2958 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	3/17/67	A
#13 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i> 2860 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 2 p	3/8/67	A
#14 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i> 2860 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 2 p	3/8/67	A

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Israel Vol. VI **Cables & Memos** 12/66-7/67

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 3-19-81</i>		
#15 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2785 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	2/28/67	A
#17 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 2659 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	2/14/67	A
#18 Airgram	State <del>S Gp 2</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> A-493 from Tel Aviv 3 p	<i>open 10-19-99</i> 2/10/67	<i>NSJ98-436</i> A
#19 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>agen 4-16-81 ip</i> 2610 from Tel Aviv 1 p	2/7/67	A
#20 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 2555 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 3 p	2/1/67	A
#21 Cable	State <del>C Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2454 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/23/67	A
#22 Cable	State <del>C Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2454 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/23/67	A
#23 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>agen 4-16-81 ip</i> 2390 from Tel Aviv 2 p	1/17/67	A
#24 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2371 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/16/67	A
#25 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2345 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/12/67	A
#26 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NSJ 00-229</i> A-414 from Tel Aviv 7 p	1/16/67	A
#27 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2249 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/3/67	A
#28 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2007 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NSJ 00-229</i> 3 p	12/10/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>Decisions per State 3-19-81</i>			
#29 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 2102 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 2 p	12/19/66	A
#30 Airgram	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> A-336 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 5/22/03 NS/RAL 00-298</i> 3 p	12/13/66	A
#31 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 1991 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	12/10/66	A
#32 Cable	State <del>S Gp 2</del> <i>agen 4-16-81 ip</i> 1990 from Tel Aviv 1 p	12/8/66	A
#33 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1 Exempt</del> 1942 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 3 p	12/5/66	A
#34 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 1845 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	11/29/66	A
#35 Cable	State <del>C Gp 3</del> <i>agen 4-16-81 ip</i> 1796 from Tel Aviv 1 p	11/24/66	A
#36 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>Exempt</i> 1780 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	11/23/66	A
#37 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> <i>Open 5-22-03 NS/RAL 00-298</i> 1742 from Tel Aviv 3 p	11/21/66	A
#38 Cable	State <del>C Gp 3 Exempt</del> 1698 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	11/17/66	A
#39 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 1660 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	11/14/66	A
#40 Airgram	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> A-263 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 6 p	11/5/66	A
#41 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>agen 4-16-81 ip</i> 1563 from Tel Aviv 1 p	11/4/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42 Cable	<i>Decisions per State 3-19-81</i> State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 1540 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	11/3/66	A
#43 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 899 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NIS 00-229</i> 2 p	3/14/66	A
#44 Cable	State <del>C Gp 3</del> <i>open 4-16-81 ip</i> 212751 to Tel Aviv 2 p	6/19/67	A
#45 Cable	State <del>C</del> <i>open 4-16-81 ip</i> 189225 to Tel Aviv 1 p	5/5/67	A
#46 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 187589 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	5/3/67	A
#47 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1 Exempt</del> 175751 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 1 p	4/14/67	A
#48 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1 Exempt</del> 172115 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	4/10/67	A
#49 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1 Exempt</del> 171360 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 2 p	4/7/67	A
#50 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 148938 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NIS 00-229</i> 2 p	3/3/67	A
#51 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1 Exempt</del> 142711 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	2/23/67	A
#51a Memo	State <del>S</del> Read to Rostow <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	2/23/67	A
#51b Cable	work copy of #51 above <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p		A
#52 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>open 4-16-81 ip</i> 138639 to Tel Aviv 1 p	2/16/67	A
#53 Cable	<i>Open 11/13/00 NIS 00-229</i> State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 134413 to Tel Aviv 2 p	2/9/67	A

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#55 Cable	<i>Decisions per State 3-17-81</i> State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>open 4-16-81 ip</i> <del>132614 to Tel Aviv</del> 1 p	2/7/67	A
#56 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> <del>126458 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	1/27/67	A
#57 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>123171 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 2 p	1/20/67	A
#58 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>116225 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/11/67	A
#59 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>120440 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 4 p	1/17/67	A
#60 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>111019 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	12/30/66	A
#60a Memo	State <del>S</del> <del>Read to Rostow</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	12/23/66	A
#60b Cable	<del>work copy of #60 above</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p		A
#61 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>106062 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 2 p	12/20/66	A
#62 Cable	State <del>S Gp 1</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>104756 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 1 p	12/18/66	A
#63 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>99531 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 5 p	12/8/66	A
#64 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>98895 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 2 p	12/8/66	A
#65 Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Exempt</i> <del>98894 to Tel Aviv</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 3 p	12/8/66	A

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#66 Cable	<i>Decisions per State 3-19-81</i> <del>State S Gp 3 <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i></del> <del>96223 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i></del> 3 p	12/3/66	A
#67 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i></del> <del>91636 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 11-8-02 NLG/RAC 00-299</i></del> 3 p	11/25/66	A
#68 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i></del> <del>91607 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i></del> 2 p	11/25/66	A
#69 Cable	<del>State S Gp 1 <i>Exempt</i></del> ; <i>Exempt per NLJ 85-106</i> <del>88940 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i></del> 4 p	11/22/66	A
#69b Memo	<del>State S</del> <i>ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING</i> Read to Rostow 1 p	11/21/66	A
#69c Cable	work copy of #69 above <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 4 p		A
#70 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i></del> <del>84604 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i></del> 1 p	11/15/66	A
#71 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i></del> <del>83785 to Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i></del> 3 p	11/13/66	A
#72 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>Exempt</i></del> <del>78033 to Tel Aviv <i>Exempt 1-2-03 NL 00-1401</i></del> 2 p	11/3/66	A
#73 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 <i>Open 4-16-81 ip</i></del> <del>68096 to Tel Aviv</del> 2 p	10/18/66	A
#82a Memo	<del>State C</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> <del>Read to Rostow</del> 1 p	10/20/66	A
#82b Cable	<del>State C Gp 3 <i>Open 4-16-81 ip</i></del> <del>work copy of cable to Tel Aviv</del> 1 p	10/20/66	A
#82c Cable	<del>State C <i>Open 4-16-81 ip</i></del> <del>2126 from Canberra</del> 1 p	10/20/66	A

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Israel Vol. VI **Cables & Memos** 12/66-7/67

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#84 Memo	<i>Decisions per State 3-19-81</i> State <del>C Gp 3 Exempt</del> Read to Rostow <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	7/14/67	A
#93a Cable	State <del>C Gp 3 Exempt</del> 9202 from London <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	5/5/67	A
#94b Memo	State <del>C Exempt</del> Katzenbach to Pres. <i>Open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-446</i> 2 p	5/2/67	A
#99c Memo	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> Katzenbach to Pres. <i>Exempt 1-7-02 RAC-NLJ 001-140-1</i> 3 p	4/17/67	A
#106a Memo	State <del>S Exempt</del> Katzenbach to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	12/12/66	A
#113b Paper	State <del>C</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> duplicate of NSF Files of Robert Komer (1966-67), Box 2, #47C <i>Open 1-15-92 NLJ 91-266</i> What Have We Done for Israel? 2 p	2/8/67	A
#117a Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> work copy of cable to Tel Aviv 1 p	12/23/66	A
#120a Cable	State <del>S Gp 3 Exempt</del> 1540 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	11/3/66	A
#120b Cable	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>sanitized 4-16-81 ip</i> 1845 from Tel Aviv <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	11/29/66	A
#126a Cable	State <del>S Exempt</del> <i>Exempt per NLJ 82-106</i> 1231 from Amman <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 8 p	11/23/66	A
#141c Paper	State <del>S Gp 3</del> <i>Open 4-16-81 ip</i> The Flourishing Israeli... 3 p	undated	A
#143a Airgram	State <del>C Exempt</del> A-95 from Nairobi <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-229</i> 2 p	9/21/66	A
#144a Cable	State <del>C Gp 3</del> <i>Open 4-16-81 ip</i> 984 from Tel Aviv 2 p	9/20/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#125a Cable	CIA <del>S Gp 1</del> <i>CIA ltr. 12/13/77</i> <del>48599</del> <i>1 p</i>	<del>11/26/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#148 Report	CIA <del>S Gp 1</del> <i>Exempt CIA ltr 12/13/77</i> No. 1944/66 <i>40 p</i> <i>Exempt 1-3-02 RAC-NL &amp; DDI-140-1</i>	9/1/66	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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12 of 16

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#69a Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ig</i> HHS to BKS 1 p	11/22/66	A
#79 Cable	NSC <i>Open 6/6/00</i> <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> CAP 661223 Rostow to Pres. 1 p	12/8/66	A
#80 Cable	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ig</i> CAP 666983 Rostow to Pres. 1 p	11/13/66	A
#80a Draft	work copy of #80 above " 1 p		A
#81a Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ig</i> Rostow to Pres. on Bunker's Report 2 p	11/2/66	A
#81b Memo	NSC <del>C</del> " Saunders to Rostow to Pres. 1 p	11/1/66	A
#81d Memo	NSC <del>C</del> " Rostow to Pres. on Press Release 1 p (4 copies)	11/3/66	A
#81f Memo w/ att.	NSC <del>C</del> " Rostow to Pres. 3 p	11/2/66	A
#81h Memo	duplicates #81f above " 3 p		A
#82 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ig</i> HHS to BKS 1 p	10/21/66	A
#87 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> Conversation: Evron & Saunders 1 p	5/21/67	A
#89 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>open 6-16-81 ig</i> Saunders to Rostow 1 p	5/18/67	A
#91 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> " Rostow to Pres. 1 p	5/17/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File  
Israel Vol. VI **Cables & Memos** 12/66-7/67

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#92 Memo	NSC <i>Open 11/13/00 NIS 00-228</i> <del>C Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <del>Rostow to Pres. Sanitized 1-20-93 NLS 91-442</del> 1 p	<del>5/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#92b Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Saunders to Rostow <i>Open 7/17/02 NLS 12A 00-301</i> 1 p	5/12/67	A
#93 Memo	NSC <del>C Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <i>Open 11/13/00 NIS 00-228</i> Saunders to Rostow & McPherson 1 p	5/6/67	A
#94a Memo	NSC <del>C Sanitized 9-16-81</del> <del>Rostow to Pres. Open 6/6/00</del> 1 p	<del>5/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#96a Memo	NSC <del>C Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 4-13-00 NLS 99-69</i> 1 p	4/29/67	A
#97 Memo	NSC <del>C Open 9-16-81</del> Rostow to SecState and SecDef 1 p	4/20/67	A
#98 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	4/20/67	A
#98a Memo	NSC <del>S Sanitized 9-16-81</del> <i>Open 1-29-01</i> Rostow to Pres. 2 p	4/20/67	A
#98b Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Saunders to Rostow <i>Sanitized 6/25/01 NIS 00-228</i> 2 p	4/20/67	A
#99 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 7/17/02 NLS 12A 00-301</i> 1 p	4/18/67	A
#99a Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Rostow to Pres. <i>Partially open per FRUS NLS 12A 00-243 7/17/02</i> 4 p	4/18/67	A
#101 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Saunders to Rostow <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	4/7/67	A
#102 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Saunders to Rostow <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	4/7/67	A

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NSF Country File

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#103 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <del>Saunders to Rostow</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	3/21/67	A
#103a Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <del>Saunders to Rostow</del> <i>Open 12/19/02 per NJT/RAC 00-302</i> 2 p	3/21/67	A
#104 Memo	NSC <del>C Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <del>Rostow for the Record</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	3/17/67	A
#106 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <del>Wriggins to Rostow</del> <i>Open 11-8-82 NLJ/RAC 00-301</i> 2 p	3/8/67	A
#106b Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <del>Saunders to Rostow &amp; Wriggins</del> <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 3 p	2/17/67	A
#107 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Open 9-16-81</i> Smith to Rostow 1 p	2/28/67	A
#109 Memo	duplicates #106b above <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 3 p		A
#110 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> <i>Open 7/17/02 NLJ/RAC 00-301</i> Saunders to Macomber, Hoopes & Davies 1 p	2/15/67	A
#112 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Open 9-16-81</i> Saunders to Rostow 1 p	2/13/67	A
#113a Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 9-16-81</i> <i>Open 1-10-94 NLJ 91-323</i> <i>Aug 12 195</i> <i>Memo to Pres. Rostow, vol. 21</i> Rostow to Pres. 3 p	2/13/67	A
#114 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 9-16-81</i> <i>Open 7/17/02 NLJ/RAC 00-301</i> Saunders to Rostow 3 p	1/20/67	A
#115 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	1/16/67	A
#116 Memo	NSC <del>S Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</del> Wriggins & Saunders to Rostow 1 p <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-228</i>	1/16/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#117 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 9-16-81 ip</i> HHS to BKS <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	12/30/66	A
#119 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ip</i> Rostow to Pres. 1 p	12/13/66	A
#120 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> <i>Open 11/13/00 NS 00-228</i> Wriggins & Saunders to Rostow 1 p	12/12/66	A
#123 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Komer to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	12/9/66	A
#124 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	12/2/66	A
#127 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ip</i> Saunders to Rostow 1 p	11/23/66	A
#127a Memo	NSC <del>C</del> Gp 3 " Reid's Interest in Arab-Israel... 1 p	11/18/66	A
#129 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Saunders to Rostow <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	11/17/66	A
#130a Summary	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 4/10/01 NS/PAAC 00-244</i> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Wriggins & Saunders to Pres. 2 p <i>Cat. # 15, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Israel, 4/1/66-12/31/66", Box 16]</i>	11/17/66	A
#131 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Komer to Pres. <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 1 p	11/16/66	A
#132 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 4-13-00</i> 3 p	11/15/66	A
#133 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81 ip</i> Rostow to Pres. 1 p	11/10/66	A
#133a Memo	NSC <del>C</del> " Saunders to Rostow 1 p	11/10/66	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#134 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 9-16-81</i> <i>open 3-29-93 NLJ 91-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <del>1 p</del>	<del>11/14/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#135 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <del>1 p</del>	<del>11/2/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#136a Memo	NSC <del>C</del> " Rostow to Pres. <del>1 p</del>	<del>10/7/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#137 Memo	<del>1 p</del> duplicates #136a above		<del>A</del>
#138a Memo	<del>1 p</del> duplicates #136a above		<del>A</del>
#138b Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <i>open 4-13-00</i> <del>6 p</del>	<del>11/20/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#141a Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 9-16-81</i> Saunders to Rostow <i>Open 6/6/00</i> <del>1 p</del>	<del>9/28/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#143 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> <i>open 9-16-81</i> Saunders to Rostow <del>1 p</del>	<del>9/27/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#144 Memo	NSC <del>C</del> " Saunders to Rostow <del>1 p</del>	<del>9/21/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#146 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> <del>2 p</del>	<del>9/13/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#147 Memo	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Sanitized 9-16-81</i> Rostow to Pres. <i>Open 6/6/00</i> <del>2 p</del>	<del>9/2/66</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#150</del> Memo #150	NSC <del>S</del> <i>Exempt per NSC 8-18-81</i> Conversation: Harman & Rostow <del>2 p</del> <i>open 11/13/00 NIS 00-228</i>	<del>12/9/66</del>	<del>A</del>

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Israel Vol. VI ~~Cables & Memos~~ 12/66-7/67

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

53

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

NEA

Info

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RSC

NNVZCZCQMA382Y  
CJO RUEHC RUFNCR  
DE RUQMVL 4004 1701050  
ZNY CCCC  
O P 191025Z JUN 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

015231

1967 JUN 19 AM 6 58

*Roslow*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 4204

NIXON TRIP

1. GOI, PLANNING ON BASIS ARRIVAL 1625 JUNE 22 (DEPCIRTEL 23578) HAS ARRANGED FOLLOWING TENTATIVE SCHEDULE:  
K 7:30 PM JUNE 22 MINDEF DAYAN-TEL AVIV  
10:00 AM JUNE 23 PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL-JERUSALEM. VISIT NORTH BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT. RETURN TO TEL AVIV IN AFTERNOON. (FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN OF COURSE IS IN NEW YORK.)

2. ATHEN'S 5887 INDICATES ARRIVAL TEL AVIV NOW SET FOR 2140

JUNE 21. THIS GIVES EXTRA DAY. APPRECIATE MR. NIXON'S SUGGESTIONS RE ADDITIONAL APPOINTMENTS AND ACTIVITIES. OCCURS TO US HE MAY WISH VISIT HOSPITAL WITH WAR WOUNDED, APAB AND ISRAELI. WE BELIEVE WE CAN ARRANGE. IF IT POSSIBLE FIND FREE IN THESE BUSY TIMES SUITABLE ISRAELI POLITICAL FIGURES AMBASSADOR WOULD BE PLEASED HOST WORKING LUNCHEON THURSDAY.

3. PLEASE REPLY BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM. BARBOUR

PASSED S/S-O, WHITEHOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC,  
CINCSTRIKE, USUN 6/19/67; 7:13 AM.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*2*  
*WHT*

*3*

Action

*SS*

Info

~~SECRET~~

ZRVZ CZ CQM A303 014005

1967 JUL 17 AM 5 47

PP RUEHC  
DE RUGMVL 178 1980930  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 170905Z JUL 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 178

*S* *(Signature)*

*2*

*S*

EXDIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

STATE 7609

RETURNING WASHINGTON EARLIEST POSSIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY  
AIRPLANE SERVICE HERE ON MONDAY AT MINIMUM AND BEST I  
CAN DO IS ARRIVE DULLES TWA FROM LONDON 1645 HOURS  
TUESDAY 18TH.

GP-3. BARBOUR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By *inf*, NARS, Date 4-16-81

~~SECRET~~

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3  
wld 3

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 18702

Info

RECD : MAY 18, 1967 10:52 AM

RR RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 3640 1381410  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 181355Z MAY 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3640

*Rostow*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 7-27-98

NODIS

REF: STATE 196541

1. MESSAGE DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN 1100 HOURS TODAY. IN VIEW CLASSIFICATION REFTEL I DECIDED USE OPPORTUNITY OF VISIT ARRANGED AT EBAN'S REQUEST WHICH REPORTED SEPARATELY. VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME SEE PRIME MINISTER WITHOUT AROUSING SPECULATION AS TO PURPOSE OF VISIT AT LEAST AMONG FAIRLY WIDE CIRCLE OFFICIALS.

2. EBAN COMMENTED THAT CRUX OF MESSAGE OBVIOUSLY REFERENCES TO CONSULTATIONS. HE SAID EUGENE ROSTOW HAD ALLUDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION THAT RESPECT IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HARMAN YESTERDAY. EBAN ADDED CONSULTATIONS WERE OF COURSE ALREADY GOING ON BUT THAT AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT PRESIDENT WAS SAYING THAT IT ESSENTIAL ISRAELIS

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 3640 ~~SECRET~~

NOT REACT MILITARILY TO ANY FURTHER SYRIAN AGGRESSIONS WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING US IN ADVANCE. HE CONCLUDED THAT WE COULD BE ASSURED ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT RPT NOT INTEND ANY MILITARY ACTION AND THAT GOI FULLY IN CONTROL ITS MILITARY. AS HE PUT IT, THERE NO RPT NO QUOTE AUTOMATIC SWITCHES OPEN UNQUOTE.

GP-3. BARBOUR

~~SECRET~~

4

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

2

43

Action

VZCZCQMA16IVLA385

008317

55

DD RUEHC

1967 MAY 9 AM 11 04

Info

DE RUQMVL 3536 1291355

ZNY SSSSS

R 091350Z MAY 67

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AV IV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUQMK/AMEMBASSY AMMAN

STATE CRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AV IV 3536

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3311 AND DEPT 187589.

SUBSTANCE OF FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS OF 1ST REFTEL WAS PASSED TO SASSON (ARMISTICE AFFAIRS) AND ARGOV (AMERICAN DEPT) ON MAY 9 BY DCM. THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN ALL INFO RECEIVED AND SASSON TERMED EXCHANGE USEFUL. HE WILL ATTEMPT OBTAIN MORE INFO RE IDENTITY HUSSEIN EL ASSAYAT JAMALEIN AND ANY POSSIBLE VARIATIONS ON THAT NAME. HE WILL ALSO TRY INCLUDE OTHER LEADS, HOPEFULLY OF MORE SIGNIFICANCE, ON TERRORIST PERSONNEL OPERATING IN JORDAN FOR TRANSMISSION AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REFTEL.

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 00-229**  
**By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00**

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5

40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SS

Info

NNNNVV QMA949  
R0 RUEHC  
DE RUQVL 3511 1281200  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 081155Z MAY 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AV IV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE CRNC  
BT

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AV IV 3511

006776

1967 MAY 8 AM 8 37

EXD IS

STATE 189025

FROM AMBASSADOR

WELCOME MCPHERSON VISIT JUNE 5-8. AS TO ACCOMMODATIONS,  
HOPE HE AGREEABLE STAY MY RESIDENCE.

Go-4. BARBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By MIE, NARS, Date 9/19/77

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6  
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

40  
Action

012662

SS  
Info

1967 APR 13 AM 10 44

KEMA346VLA956  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUQML 3259 1031325  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 131315Z APR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AV IV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3259

2  
FS

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 171360 AND 172115

1. ITINERARIES SUGGESTED REFTEL AGREEABLE TO GOI. AS HERETOFORE GOI WILL MEET ON ARRIVAL AND ACCOMPANY TO HOTEL. FRIDAY APRIL 21 WILL BE LEFT FREE FOR REST AS REQUESTED ALTHOUGH GOI PREPARED ARRANGE SIGHTSEEING IF TEAM SO INCLINED. FRIDAY EVENING WILL PROCEED BEERSHEVA. VISIT SCHEDULED BEGIN 0700 HOURS 22ND BUT IF TEAM WISHES, PREPARED ADVANCE HOUR UPON REQUEST. VISIT CAN BE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 22ND AND AS LATE INTO EVENING AS TEAM WANTS. HOWEVER, GOI UNABLE EXTEND VISIT FOLLOWING DAY.

2. PRESS GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT'S 804, USED LAST YEAR, SATISFACTORY. IN EVENT FORSEEN PARA 1. B. DEPTEL 804 AND ISRAELI

PAGE 2 RUQML 3259 ~~SECRET~~  
GOVERNMENT QUERIED GOI PROBABLY WILL SUGGEST VISIT HAS TO DO WITH DESALTING.

Gp-3. BARBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pw, NARA, Date 4-10-00

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

7

~~SECRET~~

40

Action

SS

Info

028971

1967 MAR 30 AM 5 35

VZCZCQMA326QMA310VV VLA464

PP RUEHC

DE RUQMVL 3099 0890910

ZNY SSSSS

P 300900Z MAR 67

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3099

02

LIMDIS - EYES ONLY FOR FOWLER

REF: TEL AVIV 3084

PASS TREASURY FOR SECRETARY FOWLER

1. ARTSTEIN, BANK OF ISRAEL (BOI), HAS RECEIVED FED. RES. N. Y. CONFIRMAL ON REQUESTED IN MESSAGE QUOTED REFTEL AND IS MAKING DEPOSIT ESF ACCOUNT.

2. BOI CABLED INSTRUCTIONS WITHDRAW FUNDS FROM ESF ACCOUNT TOMORROW AND MONDAY TO MAKE 13 MONTH DEPOSITS IN VARIOUS BANKS IN U. S.

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

*Note: Handled as EXDIS per S/O*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 4-10-00

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

8

2

~~SECRET~~

Action

SS

NNNNVZ CZCMA153VLA417

PP RUEHC

DE RUGMVL 3084 0880830

Info

ZNY SSSSS

P 290820Z MAR 67

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 3084

2

027657

1967 MAR 29 AM 3 44

LIMDIS - EYES ONLY FOR FOWLER

REF: JERUSALEM 726

PASS TREASURY FOR SECRETARY FOWLER

1. PER REFTEL ARRANGEMENTS ARTSTEIN, BANK OF ISRAEL, SENDING FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, N.Y. TODAY.

2. QUOTE PURSUANT TO DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. KNOWLTON ASSISTANT SEC. U.S. TREASURY, PLEASE CHARGE OUR ACCOUNT AND DEPOSIT U.S. DOLLARS 15 MILLION WITH U.S. TREASURY BY CREDITING THEIR ACCOUNT ESF. MARCH 30. FOR THIS PURPOSE PLEASE SELL OUT OF OUR PORTFOLIO REQUIRED AMOUNT OF TREASURY BILLS. THIS TRANSACTION IS SUBJECT TO YOUR CONFIRMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS TEMPORARY DEPOSIT WILL BEAR INTEREST ON A DAILY BASIS AT A RATE OF 4 1/8 PERCENT AND WILL BE

PAGE 2 RUGMVL 3084 ~~SECRET~~  
FREE AT ANY TIME FOR REINVESTMENT BY US IN ANY ASSETS OR DEPOSITS SERVING U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OBJECTIVES. CABLE CONFIRM IMMEDIATELY. END QUOTE.

Gp-3. BARBOUR

BT

*Notes Handled Extra per AS-U*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 4-10-00

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

9

~~SECRET~~

80  
Action

SS

Info

026841

VZCZCMA062VV JRA182

1967 MAR 28 AM 10 04

PP RUEHC

DE RUGMJR 726A 0871420

ZNY SSSSS

P 081410Z MAR 67

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUGMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 726

PASS TREASURY DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY FOWLER

EYES ONLY FOR FOWLER FROM KNOWLTON

1. KNOWLTON MET WITH GOVERNOR HOROWITZ BANK OF ISRAEL (BOI) WHO EXPLAINED BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND CASH MOVEMENT OBSTACLES TO LARGE OR RAPID INVESTMENT FUNDS REQUESTED BEFORE END OF MARCH. FINALLY AGREED TO \$15 MILLION TRANSFER IN MANNER HELPFUL THIS QUARTER AND GREATER AMOUNT IF AT ALL FEASIBLE. COMMITMENT TO DO MINIMUM \$30 MILLION FOR YEAR AND DISCUSS AT LEAST ANOTHER \$20 MILLION QTR. BOI SENT CABLE THIS MORNING TO CHEMICAL, MANUFACTURERS AND BANKERS TRUST INQUIRING ON 13 MONTH CD RATE. IF FAVORABLE REPLY TV WHUWIGOMBUY THESE TOMORROW. IF UNFAVORABLE BOI WILL ADVISE N.Y. FED DEPOSIT FUNDS IN ESF TREASQAZ EQQFRDL \* THAT MARCH 30 FOR QUOTE HOLDING FOR REINVESTMENT PURSUANT

PAGE TWO RUGMJR 726A ~~SECRET~~

KNOWLTON DISCUSSIOND END QUOTE. INTEREST RATE WOULD BE 4 AND ONE EIGHTH PER ANNUM PENDING REINVESTMENT IN NON-LIQUID FORM. PLEASE ADVISE PAGE NELSON MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGMENTS.

2. KNOWLTON AND HIRSCHTRITT PROCEEDING TO KUWAIT, BREITHUT, ECON CONSELOR, WILL FOLLOW UP THIS END IN MORNING.

GP-2 WILSON

BT

\*AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

*HANDLED AS EXDIS PER S/S*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-226  
By *Sj* NARA, Date *326-02*



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED  
MARCH 30, 1967  
2:55 A.M. RKB

2  
Action

55

026841

2

Info

VZCZCMA062VV JRA182  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMJR 726A 0871420  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 081410Z MAR 67  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM (CORRECTED COPY)  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUQMVLA/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1967 MAR 23 AM 10 04

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 726

PASS TREASURY DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY FOWLER

EYES ONLY FOR FOWLER FROM KNOWLTON

1. KNOWLTON MET WITH GOVERNOR HOROWITZ BANK OF ISRAEL (BOI) WHO EXPLAINED BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND CASH MOVEMENT OBSTACLES TO LARGE OR RAPID INVESTMENT FUNDS REQUESTED BEFORE END OF MARCH. FINALLY AGREED TO \$15 MILLION TRANSFER IN MANNER HELPFUL THIS QUARTER AND GREATER AMOUNT IF AT ALL FEASIBLE. COMMITMENT TO DO MINIMUM \$30 MILLION FOR YEAR AND DISCUSS AT LEAST ANOTHER \$20 MILLION CATER. BOI SENT CABLE THIS MORNING TO CHEMICAL, MANUFACTURERS AND BANKERS TRUST INQUIRING ON 13 MONTH CD RATE. IF FAVORABLE REPLY THEY WILL BUY THESE TOMORROW. IF UNFAVORABLE BOI WILL ADVISE N.Y. FED DEPOSIT FUNDS IN ESF TREASURY NO LATER THAN MARCH 30 FOR QUOTE HOLDING FOR REINVESTMENT PURSUANT

PAGE TWO RUQMJR 726A ~~SECRET~~

KNOWLTON DISCUSSION END QUOTE. INTEREST RATE WOULD BE 4 AND ONE EIGHTH PER ANNUM PENDING REINVESTMENT IN NON-LIQUID FORM. PLEASE ADVISE PAGE NELSON MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGMENTS.

2. KNOWLTON AND HIRSCHTRITT PROCEEDING TO KUWAIT, BREITHUT, ECON CONSELOR, WILL FOLLOW UP THIS END IN MORNING.

GP-2 WILSON  
BT

*HANDLED AS EXDIS PER S/S*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-226  
By *Sj* NARA, Date *3-26-02*



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

11

~~SECRET~~2  
Action

022823

SS

Info

NWZCZIQMA527VV VLA247

RR RUEHC

DE RUQMV L 3020 0821115

ZNY SSSSS

R 231100Z MAR 67

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 3020

1967 MAR 23 AM 6 19

2

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BARBOUR

SUBJECT: DIMONA VISIT

REF. STATE 142711; TEL AVIV'S 2785 AND 2958

1. BITAN (FONOFF) ADVISES PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL HAS AUTHORIZED HIM EXTEND INVITATION US TEAM VISIT DIMONA SATURDAY APRIL 22ND.
2. ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT SHOULD BE SAME AS LAST YEAR. THAT IS, (A) COMPOSITION TEAM AND ITS ITINERARY SHOULD BE NOTIFIED TO GOI THROUGH THIS EMBASSY AND (B) NO RPT NO INFO SHOULD BE GIVEN TO OR CONTACT HAD WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON. SPECIFICALLY TEAM SHOULD NOT RPT NOT APPLY FOR ISRAELI VISAS.
3. BITAN ASKED THAT IN REPORTING THIS INVITATION I REITERATE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES PRIME MINISTER HAS HAD TO SURMOUNT BEFORE APPROVING VISIT AND THAT DELAY HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN OCCASIONED

PAGE 2 RUQMV L 3020 SECRET  
BY MERE TACTICS OF PROCRASTINATION. HE REPEATED THAT TIMING DETERMINED BY COMMITMENTS PRIMIN FORCED MAKE IN FACE CRITICISM WHICH RESULTED FROM LEAK LAST YEAR'S VISIT.

Go-1. BARBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-00

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

12

42  
Action

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~~SECRET~~  
NNNVZCZCMA75TVV VLA076  
RR RUEHC  
DESBUGTWP245  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 171230Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2958

017249  
1967 MAR 17 AM 8 23

EXDIS

2

SUBJECT: DIMONA VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 2785

BITAN (FONOFF) CALLED THIS MORNING IN OBVIOUS STATE OF EMBARRASSMENT AT INABILITY SUGGEST DATE FOR VISIT WITHIN DEADLINE TO WHICH HE HAD AGREED AS REPORTED REFTEL. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS IN POSITION NAVIGATOR WHO HAS PRACTICALLY BROUGHT HIS VESSEL TO PORT AFTER ROUGH PASSAGE WHEN COMPASS JAMS. HE WAS REFERRING TO FACT CONSULTATIONS OF PRIME MINISTER VIRTUALLY COMPLETED BUT OPPOSITION'S TAILING NO CONFIDENCE MOTION WHICH WILL BE DEBATED IN KNESSET MONDAY HAS PREVENTED FINAL CONSULTATIONS THIS WEEK. HE SAID HE FIRMLY DETERMINED OBTAIN NEXT WEEK AT LATEST PRIME MINISTER'S AUTHORIZATION TO PROPOSE DATE FOR VISIT.

GP-1. BARBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By W, NARA, Date 5-31-60

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

13

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CORRECTION ISSUED  
3-8-67 1 PM MGG

007418

1967 MAR 8 AM 5 03

EQTJTOM/ZCZCQMA547VLA782  
RR RUEHC RUEHDT  
DE RUQMVL 2860 0670915  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 080845Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TELAVIV - CORRECTED COPY  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 2860

EXDIS

REF: STATE 148938

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 4-10-00

1. IN ABSENCE SASSON WHO HOSPITALIZED AS RESULT AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT, POINTS REFTTEL DISCUSSED BY DCM WITH ARGOV, AMERICAN DEPT FONOFF. HE STRESSED (NOT FOR FIRST TIME) THAT GOI SHOULD MAKE EARLY AND FORTHCOMING REPLY TO UN-SYG'S NOV. 29 PROPOSALS

AND THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION MAKE PROGRESS ON THEIR OWN SUGGESTIONS ONCE THIS STEP ACCOMPLISHED. HE ALSO REITERATED OUR BELIEF THAT TIME INOPPORTUNE FOR TYPE OF TALKS WITH JORDANIANS SASSON ENVISAGES, INDICATING ADVANTAGES USE MAC CHAIRMAN, WHO HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED SKILL AND DETERMINATION.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 2860 ~~SECRET~~  
IN HANDLING OF EXTRAORDINARY ISMAC MEETING, TO PROMOTE SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENTS. IN ADDITION HE TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO DISABUSE ARGOV OF WISFUL THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT BE SUGGESTING REPLY TO UNSYG'S PROPOSALS AS "UMBRELLA" FOR COMMUNICATING ISRAELI IDEAS DIRECTLY TO JORDANIANS. RATHER THAN TO UNSYG OR POSSIBLY MAC.

2. ARGOV'S IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS TO REPEAT SASSON'S POINT (REPORTED 2ND PARA TEL AVIV'S 2750) THAT JORDANIANS HAVE ONLY INTIMATED ORALLY THROUGH US CHANNELS THEIR AGREEMENT WITH UNSYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND THAT SUCH INFORMAL ACTION COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY GOI AS OFFICIAL JORDANIAN RESPONSE. HE STATED ISRAELIS DO NOT THINK ADOPTION OF THESE

~~SECRET~~

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-2- TEL AVIV 2860, MARCH 8

PROPOSALS WOULD BY ITSELF SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE BORDER SECURITY AND HENCE DO NOT WISH TO SEE THEM AS "CENTERPIECE" OF PLAN IMPROVE SITUATION ALONG THAT BORDER. HOWEVER, IF KING HUSSEIN WOULD CONSIDER GENERALLY FORTHCOMING REPLY TO UNSYG AS FIRST STEP TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT MODUS VIVENDI, INCLUDING RESULTS OF JOINT CONSIDERATION OF GOI'S SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS, IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT MATTER. DCM REMARKED THAT FAVORABLE GOI ACTION ON UNSYG PROPOSALS WOULD

PAGE 3 RUCMVL 2860 ~~SECRET~~  
CREATE ATMOSPHERE MORE LIKELY LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS IRRESPECTIVE ADVANCE ASSURANCES BY KING HUSSEIN WHICH UNLIKELY BE OBTAINABLE.

3. IN RESPONSE DCM SUGGESTION GOI MIGHT TRY SOUND OUT JORDANIANS THROUGH DAUD, USING THEIR NEW DSIS WHO SAID TO

BE OLD ACQUAINTANCE DAUD'S. ARGOV REPLIED NO GROUND-WORK DONE AND CHANCES OF SUCCESS EFFORT OBTAIN KING'S FURTHER THINKING, EXCEPT THROUGH AMERICANS, MINIMAL. HE THEN REQUESTED US TO TRANSMIT QUERY TO KING HUSSEIN AS TO WHETHER HE COULD AFFIRM THAT REASONABLY POSITIVE GOI REPLY TO NOV. 29 PROPOSALS WOULD INDEED BE TREATED BY JORDANIANS AS FIRST STEP IN PROCESS OF WORKING OUT MODUS VIVENDI FOR BORDER SECURITY. DCM REPLIED HE WOULD PASS ON MESSAGE BUT HE COULD GIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT THAT WE WOULD BE MORE WILLING TRANSMIT THIS ONE TO JORDANIANS THAN PREVIOUS ONE AND REPEATED HOPE GOI WILL RESPOND QUICKLY AND POSITIVELY TO UNSYG PROPOSALS WHATEVER IT MAY CONSIDER TO BE STATUS OF JORDANIAN RESPONSE.

4. COMMENT: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW HOW FAR G.O.I HAS GONE IN MAKING OFFICIAL REPLY TO UNSYG'S NOV. 29 PROPOSALS.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

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14

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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007418

1967 MAR 8 AM 5 02

EQJT ONVZCZCMA547VLA782  
RR RUEHC RUEHDT  
DE RUQML 2860 0670915  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 080845Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TELAVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQMG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 2860

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By JW, NARA, Date 4-10-00

EXDIS

REF: STATE 148938

1. IN ABSENCE SASSON WHO HOSPITALIZED AS RESULT AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT, POINTS REFTTEL DISCUSSED BY DCM WITH ARGOV, AMERICAN DEPT FONOFF. HE STATED (NOT FOR FIRST TIME) THAT CWPS\* SHOULD MAKE EARLY AND FORTHCOMING REPLY TO UN-SYG'S NOV. 29 PROPOSALS AND THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION MAKE PROGRESS ON THEIR OWN SUGGESTIONS ONCE THIS STEP ACCOMPLISHED. HE ALSO REITERATED OUR BELIEF THAT TIME INOPPORTUNE FOR TYPE OF TALKS WITH JORDANIANS SASSON ENVISAGES, INDICATING ADVANTAGES USE MAC CHAIRMAN, WHO HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED SKILL AND DETERMINATION

PAGE 2 RUQML 2860 ~~SECRET~~  
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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- TEL AVIV 2860, MARCH 8

PROPOSALS WOULD BY ITSELF SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE BORDER SECURITY AND HENCE DO NOT WISH TO SEE THEM AS "CENTERPIECE" OF PLAN IMPROVE SITUATION ALONG THAT BORDER. HOWEVER, IF KING HUSSEIN WOULD CONSIDER GENERALLY FORTHCOMING REPLY TO UNSYG AS FIRST STEP TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT MODUS VIVENDI, INCLUDING RESULTS OF JOINT CONSIDERATION OF GOI'S SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS, IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT MATTER. DCM REMARKED THAT FAVORABLE GOI ACTION ON UNSYG PROPOSALS WOULD

PAGE 3 RUCMVL 2860 ~~SECRET~~  
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3. IN RESPONSE DCM SUGGESTION GOI MIGHT TRY SOUND OUT JORDANIANS THROUGH DAUD, USING THEIR (#) WHO SAID TO

BE OLD ACQUAINTANCE DAUD'S. ARGOV REPLIED NO GROUNDWORK DONE AND CHANCES OF SUCCESS EFFORT OBTAIN KING'S FURTHER THINKING, EXCEPT THROUGH AMERICANS, MINIMAL. HE THEN REQUESTED US TO TRANSMIT QUERY TO KING HUSSEIN AS TO WHETHER HE COULD AFFIRM THAT REASONABLY POSITIVE GOI REPLY TO NOV. 29 PROPOSALS WOULD INDEED BE TREATED BY JORDANIANS AS FIRST STEP IN PROCESS OF WORKING OUT MODUS VIVENDI FOR BORDER SECURITY. DCM REPLIED HE WOULD PASS ON MESSAGE BUT HE COULD GIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT THAT WE WOULD BE MORE WILLING TRANSMIT THIS ONE TO JORDANIANS THAN PREVIOUS ONE AND REPEATED HOPE GOI WILL RESPOND QUICKLY AND POSITIVELY TO UNSYG PROPOSALS WHATEVER IT MAY CONSIDER TO BE STATUS OF JORDANIAN RESPONSE.

4. COMMENT: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW HOW FAR GOI HAS GONE IN MAKING OFFICIAL REPLY TO UNSYG'S NOV. 29 PROPOSALS.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

\*AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.  
(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15

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Action

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Info

VZCZCQMA535TUVLA567

RR RUEHC

DE RUQMVL 2785 0591232

ZNY SSSSS

R 281100Z FEB 67

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

S ~~SECRET~~ T TEL AVIV 2785

02536847  
1967 FEB 28 AM 8:47

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 142711

CURRENT STATUS OUR REQUEST FOR VISIT TO DIMONA IS THAT PRIME MINISTER'S CONSULTATIONS WITH COALITION COLLEAGUES AND OTHER POLITICIANS HE DEEMS ESSENTIAL AS PRELIMINARY TO APPROVAL BY APPROPRIATE CABINET COMMITTEE ARE NOW RPT NOW IN PROGRESS AS MATTER URGENCY. I AM PROMISED THAT DATE FOR VISIT WILL BE PROPOSED HOPEFULLY WITHIN NEXT 10 DAYS TO TWO WEEKS. I HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT HIGHEST LEVELS US GOVERNMENT DISTURBED AT LACK OF GOI RESPONSE THIS MATTER AND I AM CONVINCED PM COMPREHENDS UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION DELAY CAUSING.

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-00

~~SECRET~~

BROUGHT FORWARD

(9/19/77)

NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 6

2/27/67  
Previously Filed Date

NAME Dtate Cable 6065 from Tokyo 1 p

ORGANIZATION \_\_\_\_\_

NSF, CF, Japan, Vol. 5

2/27/67  
New File Symbol Date

FINAL ACTION \_\_\_\_\_



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

17

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Action  
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Info

NNNNVZCZCQMA643VV VLA115  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 2659 0441115  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 131055Z FEB 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TELAVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 2659

011895

1967 FEB 14 AM 3 23

002

EXDIS

1. JERUSALEM POST CARRIED AP RADIO PHOTOGRAPH ON FEBRUARY 12 SHOWING PLANE WITH MILITARY VEHICLE BEING UNLOADED AND BESIDE IT A TANK. CAPTION ALLEGES THAT MILITARY VEHICLE BEING UNLOADED ON FEBRUARY 9 IS TANK FROM AN AMERICAN PLANE AT AMMAN AIRPORT. SUBSEQUENTLY ARGOV, AMERICAN DEPARTMENT FOREIGN MINISTRY, PHONED STATING THAT "MAN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF OUR GOVERNMENT" HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT PICTURE AND ITS CAPTION AS CAUSE OF POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT TO GOVERNMENT. FOREIGN MINISTRY WISHED US TO FIND OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WHAT TANKS WERE BEING UNLOADED BY AIR SINCE GOI UNDERSTOOD NO TANKS WERE INCLUDED IN ADDITIONAL AID PACKAGE FOR JORDAN. SECONDLY, FOREIGN MINISTRY WISHES TO KNOW WHY WE FIND IT NECESSARY TO PERMIT SO MUCH PUBLICITY

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 2659 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS  
REGARDING US EMERGENCY AID TO JORDAN.

2. WE HAVE DISCUSSED PHOTOGRAPH WITH OUR ATTACHES AND IT APPEARS TO US THAT ALTHOUGH VEHICLE STANDING BESIDE PLANE IS UNDENIABLY TANK, VEHICLE BEING UNLOADED IS PROBABLY NOT (IT MAY BE SELF-PROPELLED ANTI-AIRCRAFT 40 MM GUN WITHOUT TURRET). I TOLD ARGOV THAT OUR TENTATIVE OPINION WAS THAT CAPTION INCORRECT AND VEHICLE BEING UNLOADED NOT TANK BUT THAT WE WOULD WIRE URGENTLY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING AP PHOTOGRAPH. PHOTO IS BEING TRANSMITTED TODAY. AS TO PUBLICITY, I REPEATED THAT WE STILL ARE IN QUANDRY DUE OBVIOUS NECESSITY GIVE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PUBLICITY TO EXERCISE WHICH, AFTER ALL, BEING CONDUCTED FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PURPOSES.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 5-31-00



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## AIRGRAM

AE 11-2 ISR

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REF	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-493  
NO.~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

18

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 14 2 13 PM 1967

COPY COPY NO. 02 SERIES B

RS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: February 10, 1967

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

SUBJECT : Dimona Nuclear Research Center

Def 12 New E

REF : Tel Aviv's A-478, February 7, 1967; A-263, November 5, 1966

AE 11-2 ISR

S/S

Two items appearing in the February 3 and February 5 issues of the English language daily, THE JERUSALEM POST (see Enclosures No. 1 and No. 2), suggest that the Israeli Government is moving toward a more open attitude towards the Dimona nuclear complex vis-a-vis the public.

The February 3 item refers to a visit to the Dimona plant on February 1 by Prime Minister Levi ESHKOL. The interesting point about this item is that, to the Embassy's knowledge, this is the first time that the Dimona plant has been referred to in the press as "the nuclear research centre near Dimona." Thus, references to these facilities have undergone a drastic change from the initial reference in 1960 to a "textile plant" or "metal-lurgical research organization" to "Dimona reactor" in 1963 to "Dimona atomic (nuclear) reactor plant" in 1966 to "nuclear research center" in 1967.

References to Dimona's research activities have, however, appeared in print in the past, specifically in the Bulletin of the Israel Journal of Chemistry. For example, on pages 231 and 240 of Volume 11 A, Number 3, October 1962 of this Bulletin (then known as the Bulletin of the Research Council of Israel) there

Enclosures:

As stated.

Group 2 - Exempted from automatic  
downgrading by MgKelakos~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ OutFORM  
4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

DCM:WNDale/SCI:MGKelakos/ac 2/9/67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:WNDale

Clearances:

EXDIS

1967 FEB 14 PM 3 29

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3

NLJ 98-436

By is, NARA Date 10-6-99



are abstracts of two papers presented during the XXXI meeting of the Israel Chemical Society (Tel Aviv, October 16-17, 1962) by scientists from "Israel Atomic Energy Commission Laboratories." The fact that other papers presented at this meeting by Israeli scientists employed at Soreq are listed in the same proceedings as "Israel AEC, Soreq Research Establishment" and considering the titles of the two papers mentioned earlier, namely "Extraction of uranium from calcined phosphate rock with aqueous aluminum chloride" and "Metals separation by focusing ion exchange" would lead one to suspect that the term "Israel Atomic Energy Commission Laboratories" is but another way of referring to the Dimona nuclear reactor plant. It is worthy of note that the reference "Dimona Research Establishment" appeared for the first time in the report of meetings of the Israel Chemical Society in the proceedings of the XXXIII meeting held in 1963.

The item appearing in the February 5 issue of THE JERUSALEM POST is an INA release from New York regarding the organization of a project by Israeli physicists working in the U.S. to provide housing and other facilities in the relatively new town of ARAD where scientists, both Israeli and non-Israeli, can reside while doing pure and applied research at the Dimona facilities nearby.

As the Department is aware, there is some history behind the proposal for scientists of other countries to work at Dimona. Foreign Minister EBAN himself broached the idea originally to me in general terms. I reverted to his suggestion again in my discussion with Mr. Eban on November 2, 1966 on the subject of IAEA controls (see Tel Aviv A-263 of November 5, 1966). Consequently, I asked Moshe BITAN on February 6 whether THE JERUSALEM POST report of February 5 had any significance along these lines. He replied that it did and that the Foreign Minister had discussed the idea of eventually opening up Dimona to foreign scientists for research with the Prime Minister. However, there was no decision as yet whether to do this and, if so, what the most advantageous timing would be. THE JERUSALEM POST item apparently reflects the Foreign Minister's feeling-out process, now under way.

COMMENT: A decision by the Israeli Government to open the Dimona nuclear facilities to foreign scientists for pure and applied research should be welcomed as an effective means to diminish speculation as

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Tel Aviv A-493

3

to activities being undertaken with this reactor. Such a decision, also, has the advantage for the Government of Israel that it would not involve the considerations unpalatable to Israel inherent in her agreement to formal international inspections.

  
BARBOUR

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~



UNCLASSIFIED

18a  
Page 1 of 1

Encl. 1

Tel Aviv A-493

THE JERUSALEM POST, February 3, 1967

PREMIER VISITS DIMONA REACTOR

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol yesterday visited the nuclear research centre near Dimona. He was shown around by Prof. Y. Dostrowsky, the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission, of which Mr. Eshkol himself is Chairman.

In the course of his tour, the Premier expressed his satisfaction at the close cooperation existing between all the research institutions in the country and particularly the assistance rendered by the centre in Dimona to factories in the vicinity in solving some of their technological problems. He stressed that it would be only natural that the Negev university of the future would be based to a large extent on the research facilities available at the nuclear reactor.

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Page 1 of 2

Encl. 2

Tel Aviv A-493

THE JERUSALEM POST, February 5, 1967

ISRAELI PHYSICISTS IN U.S. ISSUE 'HOME-TO-DIMONA' CALL

New York (INA) - Israeli physicists working in the U.S. have organized a project to provide housing facilities near the Dimona nuclear facilities for scientists from abroad, an Israeli official disclosed here.

Mr. Abraham Ben-Zvi, of the Bureau for Israeli Professionals, in New York, said that the idea had been endorsed by Premier Levi Eshkol. The plan grew out of an effort by his office to arrange a meeting of Israeli scientists now stationed in the United States to seek to persuade them to return to Israel.

Invitations to the meeting were sent out to 50 Israelis scheduled to attend the conference of the American Physical Society, now meeting in New York. Mr. Ben-Zvi said that a group of Israelis, headed by Prof. Gideon Carmi, of Yeshiva University, and Prof. Aharon Evitar, of Bell Laboratories, approached him with the proposal for the scientific community to be built at Arad.

The 40 scientists who attended the meeting which had been called to discuss suggestions that they consider returning to Israel, turned it into a session on the Arad proposal.

After discussion, 44 Israeli scientists signed a statement of readiness to back the project, which was transmitted to Israel.

The project will seek to create a community in Arad which will provide appropriate housing and other facilities where scientists, both Israeli and non-Israeli, can reside while doing pure and applied research with facilities at Dimona. The project also will seek to induce such scientists to spend sabbatical research leaves in Israel, living in Arad and working in Dimona.

One hope of the sponsors is that Israeli scientists now resident in other countries may be drawn to return to Israel by the improved housing and working facilities.

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Page 2 of 2

Encl. 2

Tel Aviv A-493

(A letter explaining the difficulties involved in the move was received last week by the Chairman of the Arad Local Council, Mr. Ze'ev Haimuny, from Prof. Carmi. In the letter Prof. Carmi notes that the plan is a long-range one and that "it won't be easy to make the jump from New York to Arad.")

(Mr. Haimuny told THE JERUSALEM POST that the citizens of Arad would do everything humanly possible to cooperate in the project and to make the scientists "feel at home.")

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 2610

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006295  
1967 FEB 7 PM 1 22

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1878

1. DIR ARMISTICE AFFAIRS SASSON AND ARGOV REPEATED RECENTLY THEIR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AS TO JORDANIAN REACTIONS TO ISRAELI IDEAS ON IMPROVING IJMAC. DCM SAID HE LACKING INSTRUCTIONS BUT ON PERSONAL BASIS BELIEVED HE COULD SAY THAT SOUNDINGS HAD NOW BEEN TAKEN IN AMMAN AND RESPONSE WAS GENERALLY NOT FAVORABLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN ISRAELI INTENTIONS HAD INCREASED WITH SAMU ATTACK AND THAT JORDANIANS DID NOT BELIEVE TIME HAD YET COME WHEN JOINT DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. DCM ADDED THAT FACT GOI HAD

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 2610 ~~SECRET~~  
NOT ACCEPTED SYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING UNTSO WHILE JORDAN HAD ALREADY DONE SO ADDED TO PROBLEM. IF GOI DID ACCEPT SYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS AT LEAST FIRST STEP ALONG ROAD TO RE-ESTABLISH TRUST WOULD BE TAKEN AND PERHAPS ATMOSPHERE IMPROVED SOMEWHAT. ARGOV REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT GOI POSITION WOULD BE AT THIS JUNCTURE.

2. AS INDIATED ABOVE WE HAVE PASSED ON ONLY GENERAL SENSE OF REFTEL AND NOT SPECIFIC POINTS MENTIONED IN PARA 4. DOES DEPARTMENT WISH US TO TRANSMIT INFO CONTAINED THAT PARAGRAPH?

GP-3. BARBOUR  
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STATE letter MAR 19 1981  
Authority \_\_\_\_\_  
By if, NARS, Date 4-16-81

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 FEB 1 AM 10 55

EXDIS

REF: STATE 121337

MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL

1. DEPUTY MINISTER DEFENSE DINSTEIN HAS RAISED WITH ME MATTER ISRAELI REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR HARMAN TO UNDER SECRETARY ON JANUARY 18. BITAN OF FONOFF ALSO PRESENT.

2. DINSTEIN ARGUED ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS ESSENTIALLY ALONG SAME LINE AS SET FORTH IN NOTE PRESENTED BY ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO DEPARTMENT ON JANUARY 23, COPY OF WHICH HE HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO ME. DINSTEIN PREDICATED REQUEST ON TWO GROUNDS, NOT ONLY THE NECESSITY TO BALANCE RECENT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS (JORDAN) BUT ALSO ON BASIS THAT APC'S ARE REQUIRED TO STEP UP ISRAELI DEFENSIVE BORDER SURVEILLANCE AGAINST INFILTRATING SABOTEURS IN LINE WITH CURRENT EMPHASIS

PAGE TWO RUQML 2555 S ~~SECRET~~

GOI HAS DETERMINED TO GIVE INTERDICTION SUCH INFILTRATION. DINSTEIN SAID PRINCIPAL PURPOSE HIS MEETING WITH ME WAS TO URGE THAT USGOVT TREAT THIS REQUEST AS MATTER OF EXTRA-ORDINARY IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY AND NOT RPT NOT AS ROUTINE.

3. IN COURSE DISCUSSION IT DEVELOPED THAT AMBASSADOR HARMAN'S NOTE UNDER REFERENCE CONTAINS SOME AMBIGUITIES WHICH GOI WILL CLARIFY. FIRST TWO ITEMS MENTIONED REFTTEL, THAT IS, THE APC'S AND \$2 MILLION TANK SPARES ARE REQUESTED ON GRANT BASIS. GOI APPRECIATES THIS IS FIRST RPT FIRST TIME SUCH GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL. HOWEVER IT ARGUES AS JUSTIFICATION BOTH FACT THAT RECENT ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN OF APPROXIMATELY COMPARABLE MAGNITUDE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 5-31-00

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-2- TEL AVIV 2555, FEBRUARY 1

WAS ON GRANT BASIS AND ADDITIONALLY ISRAEL'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. AS TO THE THIRD ITEM DESCRIBED IN REFTEL AS \$14 MILLION CREDIT ON HAWK TERMS FOR FOLLOW ON SPAREES, DINSTEIN STATED THAT \$10 MILLION OF THIS SUM WAS ALREADY AGREED TO UNDER US-ISRAELI TANK AGREEMENT AND THAT IN ESSENCE PRESENT REQUEST IS ONLY FOR THE ADDITIONAL \$4 MILLION FOR HAWK SPARES WHICH WAS BROACHED TO USG IN 1966. DINSTEIN ADMITS, HOWEVER, THAT NO RPT NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AS

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 2555 ~~SECRET~~  
TO INTEREST RATE ON ABOVE \$10 MILLION AND ACCORDINGLY REQUEST FOR 10-YEAR 3-1/2 PERCENT TERMS IS NEW.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO THIS REQUEST EXCEPT KNOWLEDGE THAT IT HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT UNDER SECRETARY HAD UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK INTO MATTER. CONSEQUENTLY I WAS NOT IN POSITION TO COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY ON USGOVT ATTITUDE. ON PERSONAL BASIS I NOTED EARLIER CONVERSATIONS, NOTABLY WITH FONMIN EBAN IN WHICH I HAD ENDEAVORED TO POINT OUT THAT MAGNITUDE OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR JORDAN WAS SO SMALL AS NOT TO UPSET BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN TO ANY APPRECIABLE EXTENT. DINSTEIN COUNTERERRED TO EFFECT THAT ANY ADDITIONS TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS OBVIOUSLY HAD SOME EFFECT ON MILITARY BALANCE BUT THAT PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT WAS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT IN ISRAEL OF SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN NOT RPT NOT BALANCED BY SIMILAR ACQUISITIONS HERE. HE ALSO ADDUCED POINT THAT THE APC'S DESIRED COULD PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE INCREASE IN ISRAEL'S BORDER PATROL OFFENSIVE POENTIAL. WHILE HE REITERATED ISRAEL'S INTEREST IN DISCUSSIONS NOW GOING ON BETWEEN US WITH RELATION TO SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONICS AND OTHER BORDER DEFENSE DEVICES, HE

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 2555 ~~SECRET~~  
EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT OBVIOUS SUCH DEVICES LIKELY TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME AT BEST BEFORE THEY COULD BE EFFECTIVE AND IN ANY CASE WILL NOT RPT NOT REPLACE NEED FOR INCREASED ISRAELI PATROL ACTIVITY. I ALSO NOTED ATMOSPHERE IN CONGRESS IN RELATION TO MILITARY AID IN GENERAL AND PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO MIDDLE EAST (REPORT OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THIS REGARD WAS PUBLISHED HERE MORNING AFTER MY CONVERSATION WITH DINSTEIN). I SAID THAT IN MY VIEW THE

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-3- TEL AVIV 2555, FEBRUARY 1

GRANT ASPECTS THIS PRESENT REQUEST MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT IN THIS CONNECTION SINCE IT CONSTITUTES DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS CONSISTENT SALES POLICY. DINSTEIN REITERATED ISRAELI ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND FACT OF GRANT TO JORDAN.

5. REGARDLESS OF MERITS OF THIS ISRAELI REQUEST AS BALANCE TO PACKAGE WE MADE AVAILABLE TO JORDAN, WHICH OF COURSE CAN BE ARGUED TO BE IN LINE WITH OUR LONG STANDING POLICY OF MAINTAINING EQUILIBRIUM ON GOI DEFENSIVE POSTURE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ISRAELI DESIRE TO INCREASE BORDER SURVELIANCE BY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CARRIERS HAS MERIT ON ITS OWN OF SERVING THE OBJECTIVE OF INCREASING GOI ABILITY TO PREVENT INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL AND DIMINISH HER RELIANCE ON

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 2555 ~~SECRET~~

RELALIATORY TACTICS SHE HAS ADOPTED IN PAST. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT WE CAN GIVE EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION THIS REQUEST.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CORRECTION ISSUED:  
1-23-67 7:57 a.m.; MCA

VV VLA447  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 2454 0230630  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 230600Z JAN 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV- CORRECTED COPY  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQMG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 2454

18155  
JANUARY 23, 1967  
2:54 A.M.

E X D I S

002

REF: TEL AVIV 2405

AS ANTICIPATED DIR. ARMISTICE AFFAIRS SASSON ASKED DCM ON JAN 20 ABOUT PROGRESS IN MAKING SOUNDINGS WITH JORDANIANS RE ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF IJMAC DESCRIBED TEL AVIV'S 2316 HE ARGUED FACT THAT SYRIANS HAVE AGREED TO DEAL WITH ISRAELIS ON CULTIVATION PROBLEMS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR

JORDANIANS TO GO AHEAD WITH DISCUSSIONS. IN SASSON'S OPINION TIME NOW IDEAL FOR THIS EXERCISE. HE EXPRESSED WISH THAT WE CONVEY HIS THOUGHTS TO DEPARTMENT IN HOPES THAT EARLY APPROVAL WILL BE GIVEN FOR EMBASSY AMMAN TO MAKE INITIAL SOUNDINGS. SASSON STATED THAT ONCE THESE INITIAL SOUNDINGS TAKEN SO THAT GOI WILL KNOW WHETHER IT CAN PROCEED DIRECTLY TO DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDANIANS, IT DOES NOT WISH US TO ACT AS GO-BETWEEN.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ND, NARA, Date 5-31-00

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
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18155  
JANUARY 23, 1967  
2:54 A.M.

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E X D I S

002

REF: TEL AVIV 2405

AS ANTICIPATED DIR. ARMISTICE AFFAIRS SASSON ASKED DCM ON JAN 20 ABOUT PROGRESS IN MAKING SOUNDINGS WITH JORDANIANS RE ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF IJMAC DESCRIBED TEL AVIV'S 26. HE ARGUED FACT THAT SYRIANS HAVE AGREED TO DEAL WITH ISRAELIS ON CULTIVATING PROBLEMS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR

JORDANIANS TO GO AHEAD WITH DISCUSSIONS. IN SASSON'S OPINION TIME IS IDEAL FOR THIS EXERCISE. HE EXPRESSED WISH THAT WE CONVEY HIS THOUGHTS TO DEPARTMENT IN HOPES THAT EARLY APPROVAL WILL BE GIVEN FOR EMBASSY AMMAN TO MAKE INITIAL SOUNDINGS. SASSON STATED THAT ONCE THESE INITIAL SOUNDINGS TAKEN SO THAT GOI WILL KNOW WHETHER IT CAN PROCEED DIRECTLY TO DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDANIANS, IT DOES NOT WISH US TO ACT AS GO-BETWEEN.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
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\*As received.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By           , NARA, Date 5-31-00

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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*8*  
*Anton*

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. I AM INFORMED THAT PRIMIN ESHKOL HAS INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR HARMAN TO DELIVER TO THE PRESIDENT AN ORAL MESSAGE CONCERNING THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION AND PARTICULARLY THE MOST RECENT INCIDENTS OF MININGS BY SYRIAN INFILTRATORS. INSTRUCTION WAS DRAFTED AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 15TH FOLLOWING PARTICULARLY VICIOUS MINING INCIDENT AT FOOTBALL FIELD IN WHICH ONE YOUTH KILLED. ESHKOL IS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPRESSED HIMSELF AT THE TIME AS AT A LOSS AS TO WHAT COURSE HE SHOULD TAKE. MESSAGE DESCRIBED AS "CRY FROM THE HEART" REPORTEDLY SETS FORTH ISRAELI SECURITY DILEMA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ABOVE INCIDENT BUT FJES NOT RPT NOT ASK FOR ANY US ACTION. ONE CONSIDERATION IN SENDING IT IS PM'S RECOLLECTION THAT AT

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 2390 ~~SECRET~~

TIME LAST CRISIS (SAMUA RAID) THERE WAS CRITICISM IN US THAT GOI HAD NOT TAKEN ANY STEPS TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US.

SUBSEQUENTLY EBEN HELD PRESS CONFERENCE FOR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS YESTERDAY IN WHICH HE OUTLINED AT LENGTH ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS IN PRESENT SITUATION. ESHKOL IS SCHEDULED TO SPEAK ON SAME SUBJECT THIS AFTERNOON IN KNESSET.

3. SITUATION IS OBVIOUSLY TENSE AND CONTINUED INCIDENTS, ESPECIALLY WITH FURTHER LOSS CIVILIAN LIVES, COULD WELL PROVOKE PRIMIN INTO DIRECT MILITARY RESPONSE ON PATTERN PREVIOUS REPRISALS. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS CPJAR THAT FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST ESHKOL HAS DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO ACT MILITARILY BEYOND REPLYING IN KIND TO SYRIAN FIRING ACROSS BORDER. GOI ENGAGING IN DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO INFORM ITS

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STATE letter MAR 19 1981

Authority

By *ip*, NARS, Date *4-16-81*



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-2- TEL AVIV 2390 JANUARY 17.

FRIENDS OF SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION IN EFFORT MAKE CLEAR ITS POSITION AS INJURED PARTY. ALTHOUGH SO FAR GOVERNMENT NOT RPT NOT PREPARED HAVE RECOURSE TO SECURITY COUNCIL, IT ADOPTING SOMEWHAT MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBILITY DISCUSSING DIRECT WITH SYRIANS THROUGH MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION MACHINERY. SUCH DISCUSSIONS OF COURSE

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 2390 ~~SECRET~~

RELATE TO ONLY LIMITED ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, THAT IS, CULTIVATION AND EXCHANGES OF FIRE ACROSS ARMISTICE LINES AND NOT THE MORE SERIOUS SABOTAGE INCIDENTS INSIDE ISRAEL, BUT IT WOULD BE HOPED THAT AT LEAST WHILE DISCUSSIONS GOING ON BOTH TYPES OF ACTIVITY MIGHT BE SUSPENDED.

4. I HAVE HAD SEVERAL OCCASIONS ON WHICH TO REITERATE US POLICY OF OPPOSITION TO ANY ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES AND PARTICULARLY TO RETALIATORY ADVENTURES. AT SAME TIME I HAVE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE IN THIS MOST RECENT VICIOUS MINING INCIDENT AND HAVE ASSURED THE GOI (ESHKOL AND EBAN) THAT IF THEY HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE COULD BE HELPFUL IN QUIETING TENSIONS I WOULD BE HAPPY TO TRANSMIT THEM FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF MY GOVERNMENT.

5. I AM CONVINCED THAT A WORD OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO HARMAN'S PRESENTATION OF ESHKOL'S MESSAGE WILL BE VERY HELPFUL IN CALMING PRIMIN ESHKOL'S EMOTIONAGXSTATE. MY FEELING IS THAT ESHKOL REALLY FINDS HIMSELF IN A SERIOUS DILEMA AND WOULD APPRECIATE AS MUCH HAND HOLDING AS IS POSSIBLE IN A POSITION WHERE HE IS TRYING TO FIND PEACEFUL WAY OUT IN FACE OF CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES FOR DIRECT ACTION.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JAN 16 AM 3 54

011609

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

TEL AVIV 2345, STATE 116225

1. PRIMIN ESHKOL REGRETS IT NOT RPT NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM  
ISSUE INVITATION FOR DIMONA VISIT JANUARY 21ST OR 28TH. HE  
REITERATES ASSURANCE THAT INVITATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING  
AND ADDS THAT "WITHIN A FEW WEEKS" HE WILL SUGGEST ALTERNATE  
DATE.

2. ESHKOL SAYS THAT AS RESULT DIFFICULTIES AT TIME OF LEAKS  
CONCERNING LAST VISIT HE GAVE ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD  
CONSULT HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES AND KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
AND SECURITY COMMITTEE BEFORE ISSUING INVITATIONS FURTHER  
VISITS AND THAT BECAUSE OF PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION HE  
NOT RPT NOT PREPARED INITIATE SUCH DISCUSSIONS THIS MOMENT.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 2371 ~~SECRET~~

3. P.M. SAYS FOREGOING POSITION REACHED AFTER MOST CAREFUL  
CONSIDERATION YOUR MESSAGE AND WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING  
IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO PROBLEM. HOWEVER HE REQUESTS THAT  
IN CONSIDERING OUR POSITION IN RELATION DISCUSSIONS WITH US  
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, WE "ALSO COMPREHEND DIFFICULTIES  
HIS POSITION WITH KNESSET".

GP-3. BARBOUR

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-60

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1967 JAN 12 AM 5 00

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E X D I S

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BARBOUR

REF: STATE 116225

1. I PASSED MESSAGE RE DIMONA VISIT ACCORDANCE REFTEL TO EBAN THIS MORNING.
2. BY DOING SO WE SMOKED OUT HITHERTO UNREVEALED FACT THAT PM ESHKOL HAS MADE AGREEMENT WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES THAT HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO FUTURE VISITS ON MORE FREQUENT BASIS THAN HERETOFORE. APPARENTLY, ALTHOUGH NOT SO STATED, THIS AGREEMENT RESULTED FROM DIFFICULTIES ESHKOL EXPERIENCED WITH COLLEAGUES WHEN LAST VISIT WAS LEAKED BY NEW YORK TIMES FINNEY.
3. HOWEVER I URGED IMPORTANCE FOR ISRAEL THAT IN CONTEMPLATED DISCUSSIONS WITH JOINT COMMITTEE DEPT HAVE UP TO DATE INFO ON DIMONA AND ALSO NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH WE PRESSING ORIGINAL

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 2345 ~~SECRET~~  
UNDERSTANDING FOR SIX MONTHS INTERVALS, IN FACT PRESENTLY REQUESTED DATES NOT FAR SHORT OF PREVIOUS TIME TABLE.

4. EARLY RESPONSE PROMISED.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By W, NARA, Date 5-31-00

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## AIRGRAM

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A-414

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: CAIRO

COPY NO. 02 SERIES BRS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE: January 16, 1967

SUBJECT : IAEA Inspection System; Ambassador's Conversation with  
Foreign Minister Eban, January 10, 1967

REF : Tel Aviv's 2338

The memorandum of the Ambassador's conversation with Foreign Minister Eban on Israeli accession to the IAEA inspection system, which took place at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem January 10, and was summarized in the referenced telegram, is enclosed.

BARBOUR *JS**out*  
Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-229  
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

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Drafted by:

POL:HHSackhouse/lf

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

(in draft) AMB:W Barbour

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ENCLOSURE



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Encl. No. 1  
Page 1  
Amembassy Tel Aviv  
A-414

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Israeli Accession to IAEA Inspection System

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Moshe Bitan, Assistant Director General,  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
The Honorable Walworth Barbour, American Ambassador  
H. H. Stackhouse, Political Officer

The Ambassador noted that his last conversation on this subject with the Foreign Minister had taken place November 2, a long while between meetings on a subject we considered very important. On that occasion the Ambassador said he had been encouraged by the Foreign Minister's remarks that Israel's policy now is to find the middle road that would provide adequate assurance of the peaceful nature of the GOI's atomic energy program and at the same time protect Israel's security. We welcomed this expression by the Foreign Minister and wanted to do what we could to facilitate this process. On the same occasion, the Ambassador continued, Mr. Eban had referred to Israeli nuclear facilities in the plural. There had been a question raised, after the receipt of the Ambassador's report, as to what facilities the Foreign Minister was referring to. Were there others than Dimona?

Mr. Eban said that his reference had been to the various components of the Dimona complex. When people visited that complex they acquired detailed knowledge of its layout; they learned where the cafeteria was and they learned where other things were. The Israeli feeling was that the less detailed knowledge there was about the location of the various facilities at Dimona the better for Israeli security. There are no others.

The Ambassador expressed appreciation for this clarification. He said that the main subject he wished to discuss was the matter of IAEA safeguards. We thought that we could clarify the extent to which the safeguards system would serve, if Israel were to accede to them, to protect Israel against any violation of its security.

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not automatically declassified:

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Page 2

Amembassy Tel Aviv

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The Foreign Minister interjected that Israel did not agree that it should be subjected to an inspection system not generally and internationally based, an inspection system that Egypt had not agreed to. All this seemed to imply that Israel owed Egypt something; in fact, Egypt owed Israel something. Israel had to consider the total environment in which it existed. The Egyptians were constantly speaking of fedayeen; they were constantly threatening the existence of Israel. Under these circumstances some people in Israel had felt that the less the Egyptians knew about Dimona the better.

The Ambassador said that we were convinced that the IAEA safeguards system need not entail any danger to Israeli security or any risk that Israeli commercial secrets would be compromised. Israelis could accompany IAEA inspectors. As Mr. Eban was aware, the procedures approved in September 1965 were the result of extensive efforts to develop a system that would not be a burden or disadvantage to the country being inspected. A country whose facilities were being inspected could consult quietly and without embarrassment with those concerned in the designation of the IAEA inspectors. This system permitted the rejection of an inspector who might be found objectionable. We agreed with Israel's right to seek a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors but as we all knew this had been a difficult thing to achieve. The important thing was that the functioning of the IAEA safeguard system was not such that absence of an Israeli representative on the Board of Governors meant that Israeli security would thereby be endangered if Israel agreed to IAEA inspection.

Mr. Eban said that the advice of Israel's representatives in Vienna have been sought in this matter. The fact was that the Egyptians were central in the IAEA organization. Anything known tonight by the IAEA inspectors will be known tomorrow morning to the Egyptians in IAEA. The Foreign Minister asked rhetorically why Israel should be subject to requirements and risks that the UAR was not. He wondered whether the United States Government was not doing too much to increase the range of assurance to Egypt without giving sufficient consideration to Israeli concerns.

The Ambassador said he wanted to make it quite clear that we did not consider that Israel owed the UAR something or owed us something. We were convinced it was in Israel's interest to do the things we were suggesting. Assurance would be given thereby, not only to the UAR but to

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Encl. No. 1

Page 3

Amembassy Tel Aviv

A-414

the world as a whole. We were not asking Israel to do anything that we wouldn't ask the UAR to do. Egypt didn't have nuclear facilities or at least didn't have much; therefore the problem was partly academic. Our argument was that it was in Israel's interests as well as in ours that it accede to the IAEA safeguard system. We didn't see anything better than the IAEA to serve the purpose we had in mind. We knew that Israel did not want to stir up trouble on this matter but was seeking to find a middle ground. We welcomed any ideas the Israelis had.

The Foreign Minister responded that Israel did not want to create doubts or apprehension in this matter; this was the opposite of its intentions.

It wanted to establish clearly its peaceful intentions. It was possible to find in recent Israeli actions a number of efforts to do this. Israeli policy was not as "alarmist" as it had been perhaps two or three years ago. In Israel's participation in the UN General Assembly it had given expression to its peaceful intentions. Mr. Eban himself in his interview with the French magazine Realite and in his Meet the Press interview had similarly tried to clarify Israeli intentions. He wondered if after these recent statements there was really a feeling that Israel was trying to create a form of atomic deterrent by playing on doubts of what Israel's real intentions were. He noted that Israel, in spite of some misgivings, had responded favorably when the British proposed a conference of non-nuclear powers. Israel had expected to be designated for preparatory commission for the conference, but this had not happened. The Arabs, Mr. Eban said, sought to keep Israel out of every international body considering these problems. There was a question of national dignity involved here, and this was not an entirely abstract concept. In the light of all these circumstances, Mr. Eban continued, Israel's current thinking was that the best course was to keep as close to international discussions of this matter as possible rather than put too much stock in unilateral or bilateral actions. This was not a question of bargaining on Israel's part, but a matter of conviction.

Mr. Eban continued, In addition to considerations of national dignity there were the specific issues of national security that were involved to which he had already alluded. The best advice from Israeli experts in Vienna and in Israel was that accession to the IAEA system opened Israeli secrets to Egypt at a time when that country continued to speak openly of a war of liberation against Israel. In spite of these objections the Foreign Minister

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Encl. No. 1  
Page 4  
Amembassy Tel Aviv  
A- 414

said that he would talk to people in the Israeli Government about some of the ideas the Ambassador had presented. Neither he nor the Ambassador were experts in the technical aspects of these problems and frequent reference to the experts was necessary.

The Ambassador reiterated that we thought it in Israel's interest to take the measures we were suggesting. We felt strongly that in the equation of the Middle East armaments race the nuclear variable lent a new dimension. By taking some step in the direction we indicated Israel would gain much in the eyes of peace-loving peoples everywhere. It seemed to us that if Israel was not building nuclear weapons it had nothing to lose by taking the steps we were suggesting.

The Foreign Minister affirmed that he would take up the matter with Israeli experts. He suggested that in the next stage of discussions with the Ambassador some of our thoughts in these matters might be put in writing.

The Ambassador suggested that in the current stage of discussions it might be best not to formalize procedures too much; if it were necessary to put things in writing a *bout de papier* procedure might be best. The Foreign Minister agreed.

The Ambassador said that the Department of State, knowing the central role that the Prime Minister played in these decisions, both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, had suggested that the Ambassador meet with both Mr. Eban and the Prime Minister on this matter. Mr. Eban said that he would speak to the Prime Minister about this idea as well as about the substantive proposals that had been discussed.

The Foreign Minister referred to a feeling Israel had detected at the UN that real progress was being made toward achieving a general non-proliferation treaty. He said it was a pity that Israel was not in the UN body discussing these matters.

The Ambassador replied that there were some encouraging signs regarding a general non-proliferation treaty but we could not rely on it solely as the answer to the problem in the Middle East.

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Page 5

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Mr. Eban commented that Israel got discouraging impressions in contacts with the Soviets about any Soviet willingness to be helpful in the Middle East arms problem. He gathered that Mr. Davies' remark to Evron (to the effect that though there might be a Soviet/US dialogue going elsewhere in the world there was not one in the Middle East) was a correct assessment.

The Ambassador replied that this was certainly his impression. We had tried three or four times to talk to the Soviets on the subject of Middle East arms control without success.

Mr. Eban said that in his talk with Gromyko, Gromyko had denied that Soviet arms shipments to Egypt had anything to do with Israel; their purpose was to help Egypt cope with the imperialist threat. He agreed with the Ambassador that only long years of experience in the Soviet diplomatic service would enable a man to make statements such as these.

The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador if the US Government had considered the attitude of the Israeli people in this matter. How could the GOI say to Israelis that it had accepted something that might entail risks to Israeli security while Egypt had done nothing? Where was national equality here? The Foreign Minister said he had done a lot of reading on the subject of arms control and he noticed that every treaty carried a preambular provision to the effect that the "contracting parties will undertake to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the other contracting parties".

In reply the Ambassador said that Israel had in recent times maintained consistently that its objective was to maintain peace. It was obvious already that Israel was ahead of its neighbors with respect to its intentions regarding the subject under discussion. Steps such as we were suggesting would be a logical continuation of this policy and a further demonstration of Israel's peaceful motives. The Ambassador, saying he was giving these opinions off the top of his head, could not help but believe that the Israeli public would understand very well.

The Foreign Minister again reviewed Israeli statements, its efforts in the UN and its permitting a "third party" to be in a position to give additional assurances to the UAR. Altogether, Israeli contributions were

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Encl. No. 1  
Page 6  
Amembassy Tel Aviv  
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completely disproportionate to any return it had gotten from Egypt.

The Ambassador said that though, of course, we would hope eventually to see a pact between Israel and the UAR, it might be just possible that in the current stage the Israeli public would understand a unilateral GOI step better than a formal agreement with Nasser.

Mr. Eban said he wished to speak briefly about Ambassador Bunker's visit. Ambassador Bunker had made a very good impression and the meetings had been fruitful. The Foreign Minister wanted us to know with respect to the desalting project that the Israelis felt water was the essential rather than the means by which the water was obtained. It didn't matter to the Israelis whether nuclear energy was used for this purpose or not. When Ambassador Bunker asked the Israelis how they wanted to get the additional water they replied by any means that were technically feasible.

The Ambassador said it was his impression the visit of Ambassador Bunker had gone well. He said he wanted the Foreign Minister to know that his understanding was that, even though Cupid had hit the target in Katmandu, Ambassador Bunker would continue his work on this project.

The Ambassador closed with a further expression of hope that this subject would receive the careful attention from the GOI that it deserved. Mr. Eban said that after discussion in the GOI he would be in touch.

  
POL:HHStackhouse/lf 1/10/67

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27

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

SS

Info

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DE RUQMVL 2249 0030911  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 030909Z JAN 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
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1967 JAN 3 AM 4 51 000332

*Return*  
02

E X D I S

REF: STATE 111019.

1. I HAVE BEEN PURSUING MATTERS OF DIMONA VISIT AND CONTINUED DISCUSSION GENERAL ARMS CONTROL ON EACH OF NUMEROUS RECENT OCCASIONS WHEN I HAVE SEEN FONMIN EBAN AND OTHERS CONCERNED.
2. RE DIMONA I AM ASSURED THAT INVITATION FOR VISIT WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITH WHAT ISRAELIS REGARD AS MINIMUM DELAY. I HAVE MADE ALL POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL THIS REGARD NOT ONLY WITH EMPHASIS BUT, I BELIEVE, WITH VEHEMENCE. WHILE GOI DOES NOT DISPUTE VALIDITY OUR POSITION, THEY CONTINUE TO ARGUE DIFFICULTIES VISITS POSE FOR GOVT, PRINCIPALLY ON FAMILIAR GROUND THAT ISRAELI ACCESSION OUR REQUESTS SUCH VISITS, ALTHOUGH DESIRABLE AS POLICY, DEROGATES FROM GOI SOVEREIGNTY. FIRM CONFIRMATION AUTOMATIC PROCEDURE FOR VISITS AT SIX MONTH

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 2249 ~~SECRET~~  
INTERVALS CONSEQUENTLY SO FAR NOT FORTHCOMING.

3. AS TO GENERAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS, EXPECT MEET EBAN THAT SUBJECT NEXT FEW DAYS.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *fw*, NARA, Date *5-31-00*

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28

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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42  
Action

SS

Info

VV QMA328  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 2007 3441059  
ZNY SSSSS  
P R 101046Z DEC 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUEHDT/USUN  
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 2007

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN: ARMS TO JORDAN

REF: STATE 98894, 98895 AND 99531

1. FONOFF DIR GEN (LEVAVI) ASKED ME TO LUNCH YESTERDAY. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ARGOV. AFTER I SAID I HAD RECEIVED REPORT DAVIES-EVRON CONVERSATION DEC 6 AND REPORT LATER CONVERSATION EVRON WITH DEPT OFFICER, ARGOV SUMMARIZED SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS OF HARMAN AND HANDLY (STATE 99531 RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT THIS CONVERSATION) AND WALTER ROSTOW, REPORTS OF WHICH HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED BY GOI. LEVAVI SAID P.M. HAD SEEN TELEGRAM ON DAVIES-EVRON MEETING AND HAS ASKED LEVAVI TO EXPLAIN FURTHER GOI VIEWS.

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2. GOI BELIEVES HUSSEIN HAS SITUATION IN JORDAN PRETTY WELL UNDER CONTROL, THAT ARMY HAS REMAINED LOYAL TO HIM, AND THAT EFFECTS OF SAMUA RAID ON KING'S POSITION INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED. WHILE NASSER AND SYRIANS ARE THREATENING, GOI THINKS THEY DETERRED ACTION AGAINST JORDAN MORE BY APPREHENSION OF ISRAELI REACTION IF THEY OVERTHROW KING THAN BY KING'S OWN MILITARY POSTURE. AS TO PROVISION OF ARMS TO JORDAN, LEVAVI NOTED US CRITERIA HAD ALWAYS INVOLVED CONCEPT OF BALANCE BETWEEN ARAB CAPABILITY AND ISRAELI DEFENSIVE STRENGTH, THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE CONCERNED AT ANY AGGRESSIVE ARMS GIVEN JORDAN, AND THAT GOI DISTURBED AT POSSIBILITY US ACCELERATION DELIVERIES ARMAMENTS TO JORDAN

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-229  
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00



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-2-TEL AVIV 2007, DECEMBER 10.

BUT WOULD BE MORE SO AT ANY AGREEMENT ADDITIVE TO PRESENT PROGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH GOI IN HARRIMAN-KOMER TALKS.

3. I REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS I KNEW DECISION IN MATTER HAD NOT BEEN MADE, THAT I FELT USG EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN RESPONDING TO JORDANIAN REQUESTS, THAT I WAS SURE US WOULD WISH TO FURNISH MINIMUM NECESSARY TO PROVIDE KING WITH WHENWITHALL WITH WHICH TO RETRIEVE SITUATION CREATED BY SAMUA. OBVIOUSLY OUR POLICY OF

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AVOIDING ARMS ESCALATION, MAINTAINING BALANCE, AND NOT BECOMING MAJOR SUPPLIER WOULD NOT CHANGE. HOWEVER, OUR ASSESSMENT RESULTS OF SAMUA DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF GOI. THERE NO RPT NO QUESTION RAID HAD HAD DEEP EFFECT ON JORDANIAN MILITARY BOTH AS TO OFFICERS' ATTITUDE TOWARD HIGH COMMAND (KING) AND SOLDIERS' CONFIDENCE IN OFFICERS. SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO RESTORE STABILITY OF REGIME AND IT HAD TO BE DONE BY US TO AVOID HUSSEIN'S TURNING TO OTHER SOURCES WHICH NO DOUBT WOULD BE PREPARED PROVIDE ARMS IN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE AND ON CONDITIONS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS TO MAINTENANCE OF BALANCE. I SAID THAT IT INEVITABLE ISRAEL'S POSITION THIS TIME WOULD NOT RPT NOT AROUSE THE SYMPATHY IT COULD HAVE EXPECTED IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. I NOTED THAT, ASIDE FROM CONSIDERATIONS I HAD ALREADY MENTIONED, USG OBVIOUSLY UNHAPPY AT ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC STRAINS ON JORDAN INVOLVED IN WHATEVER WE SHOULD DECIDE TO DO AND THAT I COULD MAKE CASE FOR HANDING BILL TO GOI. AT ANY RATE, I ASSURE LEVAVI THAT ALTHOUGH IT MANIFESTLY DESIRABLE KHAMASH TAKE SOMETHING HOME WITH HIM FOR REASONS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, I WAS CONFIDENT US DECISION WOULD NOT BE ARRIVED AT IN HASTE AND WITHOUT CAREFUL THOUGHT AND WOULD BE MINIMUM WE ESTIMATE

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TO COPE WITH PROBLEM.

4. LEVAVI SAID THERE TWO ASPECTS PROBLEM A) SHORT RANGE PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUE AND B) LONG RANGE EFFECT ANY US ACTION ON AREA BALANCE. HE URGED THAT WE KEEP BOTH IN VIEW AND REITERATED GOI ARGUMENTS TENDING TO PLAY DOWN SHORT RANGE

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-3-TEL AVIV 2007, DECEMBER 10.

PROBLEM AND GOI APPREHENSIONS AS TO LONG RANGE CONSEQUENCES FOR GOI'S DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF ANY ADDITIONS TO ALREADY AGREED PROGRAM. FINALLY, HE EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S FIRM HOPE THAT FONMIN EBAN TALKS SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY IN WASHINGTON WOULD PRECEED US DECISION. I AGREED WITH DESIRABILITY THIS SEQUENCE BUT SAID UNABLE ASSURE HIM THAT SCORE IN VIEW OF PRESSURE OF EVENTS WHICH DICTATE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ACTION.

5. WHILE GOI OBVIOUSLY DISTURBED THIS CONSEQUENCE ITS ACTION AT SAMUA WHICH NOT RPT NOT IN ORIGINAL GOI SCRIPT FOR RAID, I BELIEVE THAT, IF, AS DEPARTMENT INTENDS, OUR RESPONSE TO JORDANIAN REQUEST IS MINIMUM NECESSARY IN OUR VIEW TO OVERCOME KING'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND ALSO AVOIDS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE PROVISION OF GLAMOUR HARDWARE ONLY JUSTIFIABLE AS MAJOR INCREMENT TO JORDANIAN LONG RANGE CAPABILITIES. ISRAELIS CAN NOT RPT NOT MAKE CONVINCING OBJECTION.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

CONTROL: 16174 ~~SECRET~~  
RECD: DEC 19, 1966, 1:59PM

Info

FROM: TELAVIV

ACTION: SECSTATE

*Restow*

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N O D I S

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-229  
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

REF: STATE 104409 AND 104756

1. FOFMIN EBAN AND BITAN SPOKE TO ME LAST EVENING RE MILITARY AID OFFER TO JORDAN AS FORECAST FIRST REFTEL. THEY ALSO HAD REPORT OF MACOMBER'S FIRST SESSION WITH KING PASSED TO EVRON AS NOTED SECOND REFTEL.

2. EBAN'S POSITION SAME AS PRESENTED BY HARMON. GOI CONCERNED AT MORTARS AND HOWITZERS WHICH INCREASE JORDANIAN POTENTIAL FIREPOWER AGAINST ISRAEL. HOPE PACKAGE IS CEILING. IF SO, EBAN SAID, GOI NOT RPT NOT TOO DISTURBED AND CAN LIVE WITH IT. APPREHENSION WOULD BECOME SERIOUS IF TANKS OR PLANES ADDED.

3. EBAN'S MAIN EMPHASIS WAS ON THESIS THAT IT U.S. ENDEAVOR MAINTAIN BALANCE IN M.E. AND IF U.S. UPSETS BALANCE IN ONE DIRECTION AS THIS DEAL WILL DO IT SHOULD ANTICIPATE HAVING TO REDRESS SITUATION IN SOME MANNER. I PROTESTED U.S. NOT RPT NOT UPSETTING BALANCE, GOI HAD. ANYWAY THIS INCREMENT JORDANIAN STRENGTH TOO SMALL TO AFFECT BALANCE ANY APPRECIABLE EXTENT. EBAN THEN SAID HE HAD MORE IN MIND THE QUOTE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNQUOTE BALANCE THAN HARDWARE. HE REFERRED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AS PRIMARY ELEMENT OF IMBALANCE AND ADDED THAT U.S. POSITION IN COUNCIL DEBATES AND OTHER PUBLIC CONDEMNATION ISRAEL HAD ACCENTUATED IMBALANCE.

4. I SAID I HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO DAVIS' COMMENTS TO HARMAN AS TO U.S. POSITION RE MILITARY AID TO JORDAN. I NOTED WE DETERMINED KEEP PACKAGE AT MINIMUM NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE. AS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE, WE HAD MADE OUR OPPOSITION TO RETALIATORY RAIDS CLEAR IN ADVANCE, AND GOI SHOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED OUR REACTION. WE HAD WORKED HARD AT SC AND RESOLUTION BEST WE COULD GET. EBAN REMARKED THAT AT ANY RATE GOI WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY HANDLING EFFECTS OF SITUATION AND REITERATED IMPORTANCE PACKAGE NOT RPT NOT BE INCREASED. HE SAID IT HELPFUL THAT PROPOSAL HAD BEEN WORKED OUT BY U.S. ALONE IN THIS INSTANCE AND NOT RPT NOT DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH GOI.

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-2- 2102 FM TELAVIV

HE ADDED, AGAIN, HOWEVER, THAT GOI REGARDS IT AS ESSENTIAL IT BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR FROM NOW ON.

5. CONVERSATION WHICH WAS IN PART WITH BOTH EBAN AND BITAN PRESENT AND IN PART WITH EACH SEPARATELY WAS ALTOGETHER OF CONSIDERABLE LENGTH, SOMEWHAT PHILOSOPHICAL AND INCONCLUSIVE. GOI POLICY MAKERS OBVIOUSLY IN SITUATION INVOLVING NUMBER FACTORS, SOME CONTRADICTORY IN THEMSELVES. THEY AGREE WITH US IT IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS MAINTAIN HUSSEIN'S REGIME, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL ASSESSES HIS POSITION AS BETTER THAN WE DO. THEY, THEREFORE, RECOGNIZE SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE TO HELP HIM. AT SAME TIME, THEY CANNOT BUT BE CONCERNED AT ANY INCREASE IN ARAB HARDWARE, THEY HAVE CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT THEY HAVE BEEN OVER-CHASTIZED FOR ACTION THEY REGARDED AS NECESSARY AT SAMUA AND ARE SMARTING UNDER SUCH CHASTIZEMENT, AND, AS THE SMOKE CLEARS, THEY GENUINELY ANTICIPATE BEING GIVEN A HARD TIME BOTH INTERNALLY POLITICALLY AND ALSO FROM MILITANTS IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES ABROAD AT ANY SIGN THAT THE ARAB LONG RANGE MILITARY POSTURE WILL BENEFIT AS A RESULT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS.

GP-3.  
BARBOUR  
BT

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R REP AF

ARA EUR FE

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L FBO AID

AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

A-336

NO.

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO Amman, Jerusalem

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dec 15 12 43 PM 1966

RS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_ SERIES B

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE: December 13, 1966

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF :

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC DD-298  
By us, NARA, Date 5-5-03

EX DIS

In a conversation with the Army Attache and the reporting officer, Colonel Carmon, Deputy Chief Intelligence, divulged several interesting Israeli impressions and evolved further the official line on the Samua attack and its consequences. He began by remarking that he had just been with Chief of Staff Rabin and had explained to him that the Syrians and Egyptians were cooperating in working out a new scheme for terrorist activities in Israel. By using terrorists from one country to cross the border into Israel from another country and by changing the origin of attack from one Arab state to another the Syrians and Egyptians had been able to create so confused a situation that Israel would not now have a plausible target for reprisal raids.

He then remarked that as far as Jordan was concerned the Samua attack had only hastened the inevitable process of disintegration and should not be considered too seriously. The reporting officer replied that we had given Jordan a large amount of aid in the last 15 years, that its economy had shown signs of marked progress and that we had hoped its development would progress to the point that internal stability would be reached. Returning to the Samua raid, Col. Carmon then stated that the American reporting from Amman had shown signs of panic. He explained his remarks by making three particular criticisms, namely, that our officers in Am-

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~FORM  
4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

DCM:WNDale

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Cleared in Draft: AMB:W Barbour

Clearances:

Coordinated: ARMA: Col. Whitmore



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Tel Aviv A-336

2

man took too seriously what the King told them; second, that the reports of conversations were not analyzed sufficiently so that the effects of the Samua raid could be put in perspective and third, that our reporting on the riots had not reflected sufficiently the fact that the rioters were chiefly school children and inciters. He claimed it was particularly noteworthy that the middle class had not contributed to the riots, a fact which he also alleged was not covered adequately in our reporting. After a futile remark as to the Colonel's sources, the reporting officer replied that if the present situation was not what the Israelis had desired to bring about in Jordan then we had our strong reservations about Israeli intelligence as well.

Col. Carmon defended Israeli intelligence vigorously. He said that his advice to try a day raid was correct because the Jordanian troops would have been in position by night and casualties (presumably Israeli) would have been higher. He added he could only make such an estimate because of his long service in the adjacent area. He claimed he had foreseen that the King would be in a difficult position but that he would survive without great trouble. The Colonel did concede that it had not been foreseen how much the Syrians and Shuqairy would take advantage of the situation. This error, however, was not that of the military.

Colonel Carmon claimed that King Hussein was now taking advantage of the situation created for him by the Israeli attack to obtain as much extra assistance from the US as he possibly could. While he individually favored our making some concessions in this matter, he hoped that we realized that the King was simply making the most of his opportunity in a calculated fashion. The reporting officer objected, stating that the situation was not as easy as the Israelis were now saying. As to the aid we would consider only the minimum required in our judgment to preserve the King's position. We respected the Israeli analysis as a valuable supplement but we have to make our judgment on the basis of our own estimate. In this connection, we hoped the Government of Israel would not use its resources to try to prevent us from making this minimum effort, whatever it might turn out to be. To do so would be bringing pressure to force us to act on an analysis of Arab reactions with which we could not agree. Colonel Carmon reiterated his belief that we should provide enough help to counter Shuqairy's growing influence in Jordan. He remarked, "Of course, you have already sent something."

Subsequently, Col. Carmon remarked that he understood that the US was not prepared to help Israel with the detection information and equipment needed

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in order to intercept terrorists. The Army Attache explained to him that he thought the Colonel must be referring to side-looking airborne radar and Infra Red concerning which the Department of the Army had recently refused to provide information to the Director of Military Intelligence. The reporting officer added that we were prepared to be forthcoming with respect to ground detection.

Returning to the current situation between Israel and Jordan, Col. Carmon said that according to his information, the USG now maintained that the decision to attack Jordan was a military one and that civilian control in Israel had weakened. He added that General Rabin was greatly concerned about this opinion which had been reported to them by their people in Washington on several occasions. The reporting officer denied flatly any such reporting on the part of this Embassy and said we would be glad to reassure the Chief of Staff personally on this score. Moreover, he added, we had no information from Washington which indicated a belief that a breakdown of civilian control had occurred. The reporting officer then asked Colonel Carmon whether the Foreign Ministry input with regard to decisions of this type was more or less persuasive since the change of government last year. Col. Carmon interpreted this to be a question as to whether Abba Eban was as effective as Mrs. Meir or more so and replied that "although Mrs. Meir, being a woman, is hysterical from time to time, she had character and would stick to her views and there was none of this switching around from one side to the other."

After telling Col. Carmon he had not been referring to individuals but to the role of the Ministry, the reporting officer asked what they would do if there were serious incidents along the Jordanian border in the near future. Col. Carmon said he hoped there would be no serious attack from Jordan in the next few months because they could not set up a strengthened system of border patrols until the additional manpower made available by lengthening the period of conscription actually became available. He added that Israel would not react against Jordan now "no matter what happened for the next 60 days." When asked about another incident originating from Syria, Colonel Carmon replied, "We would take care of Syria neatly in a way you'd never guess." Also he claimed that he personally wished Israel had "hit Syria instead of Jordan."

COMMENT: An Israeli correspondent gave the reporting officer a somewhat similar, although more general, critique of our reporting on December 11. He remarked casually that he received his information from the USUN as though this were a frequent source. He too claimed the USG had panicked and should not use so serious a view of the situation as we now appear to have as a basis for action.

BARBOUR

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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02

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Action

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1966 DEC 10 AM 7 19

EXDIS

TEL AVIV 1845

WHEN I LEARNED FEW DAYS AGAO EBAN DEPARTING TO U.S. AND EUROPE I URGED THAT BEFORE DEPARTURE HE OBTAIN PRIMIN'S RESPONSE MY REQUEST FOR ANOTHER VISIT TO DMINA, POINTING OUT THAT THREE WEEKS PRIOD DURING WHICH AEC TEAM PREPARED MAKE VISIT RAPIDLY NEARING END. TO MY REGRET I WAS INFORMED THAT IT IMPOSSIBLE OBTAIN REPLY IN TIME AVAILABLE PARTICULARLY SINCE PM MUST CONSULT COLLEAGUES. HOWEVER, EBAN AGREED PURSUE MATTER URGENTLY UPON RETURN NEXT WEEK.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-00

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32

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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2

Action

SS

Info

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Control: 6824

Rec'd: December 8, 1966  
5:09 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

ACTION: Secstate

Tel Aviv 1990

02

December 8

EXDIS

State's 96223

Before Eban's departure for U.S. and Europe yesterday I informed him I now in position to continue earlier discussions re arms control. He assured me he would be prepared do so promptly on his return next week.

GP-2.

BARBOUR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

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*Wingman*

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 RUEPCR/NSA  
 RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE  
 RUEHDT/USUN  
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 INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 161  
 RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 173  
 RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 141  
 RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 147  
 RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 30  
 RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 26  
 RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 00  
 RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 109  
 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 14  
 STATE GRNC  
 BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1942

LIMDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN'S FUTURE

REF: STATE 93317

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLI 00-229**  
**By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00**

1. (A) CHANGE IN ISRAELI POLICY RE HUSSEIN'S REGIME. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. GOI WAS

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 1942 ~~SECRET~~  
 CLEARLY APPALLED AT INTERNAL JORDANIAN CONSEQUENCES SAMU RAID  
 AND AT SIGNS HKJ WAS INTERPRETING RAID AS INDICATOR BASIC SHIFT  
 IN ISRAEL'S POLICY RE JORDAN. FONMIN EBAN REITERATED  
 ASSURANCES TO CODEL ROYBAL THURSDAY ISRAEL DID NOT WANT CHANGE  
 BORDER WITH JORDAN. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SAY  
 THAT PEACE OF AREA WAS DEPENDENT ON STABILITY OF HUSSEIN'S



REGIME BUT CLEARLY THINKS REGIME BEST ALTERNATIVE IN PRESENT SITUATION. EBAN SAID ISRAEL HAD MUCH RESPECT FOR KING FOR NATION BUILDING EFFORTS, IN MORE IMMEDIATE PAST FOR DOMINATING POST-SAMU OPERATION, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY FOR "NOT GIVING IN IDEOLOGPOALLY" TO HIS ARAB ENEMIES, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL.

(B) WE BELIEVE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS CONCLUSION ISRAELI POLICY RE HUSSEIN HAS UNDERGONE NO BASIC CHANGE. WE HAVE REPORTED THAT ISRAELI MILITARY DISPOSITIONS AS BEST WE CAN OBSERVE THEM INDICATE NO INTENT TO EMBARK ON AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST JORDAN AT THIS TIME. IN SPITE OF SOME INEPT EX POST FACTO RATIONALIZATIONS TO EFFECT SAMU SOMEHOW HELPED HUSSEIN, IT OUR DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELI PRESS, PUBLIC AND OFFICIALDOM GENERALLY HAVE EMERGED FROM EVENTS LAST THREE WEEKS WITH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL OF

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 1942 ~~S E C R E T~~  
OF MODERATE, STABLE JORDAN. AS DEPT AWARE IN WAKE SAMU ISRAELIS TOOK NUMBER STEPS HELP STABILIZE SITUATION: IT HAS GIVEN MUCH MORE EMPHASIS TO DEFENSIVE MEASURES AS RESPONSE TO CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS; IT SUSPENDED JERUSALEM-TEL AVIV NIGHT RAIL SERVICE FOR FEW DAYS WHILE ANTI-INFILTRATION FENCE AND OTHER DEFENSIVE MEASURES BEING EFFECTED; IT HAS GIVEN MINIMUM PUBLICITY TO SINGLE POST SAMU JORDAN BORDER INCIDENT (TEL AVIV 1317); IT POSTPONED SCOPUS CONVOY AND MADE SPECIAL ONE TIME CONCESSIONS TO LET UN VEHICLES CONDUCT OPERATION.

(C) IN SUM, THOUGH SOME ISRAELI OFFICIALS STILL PUT ON BRAVE FACE WHEN TALKING ABOUT SAMU AND ALLEGE U.S. AND OTHERS OVER-REACTED, IT QUITE CLEAR GOI CHASTENED BY CONSEQUENCES. IN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO REPRISAL RAIDS EBAN TOLD CODEL ROYBAL THAT THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF CERTAIN TECHNIQUES IN DEALING WITH TERRORIST OPERATION AGAINST ISRAEL HAD PROVEN TOO SERIOUS TO ENVISAGE THE UTILIZATION OF THESE TECHNIQUES EXCEPT IN "EMERGENCY SITUATIONS" AFFECTING ISRAELI SECURITY. WE EXPECT GOI IN NEAR FUTURE TO EXERCISE GREAT RESTRAINT--EXCEPT IN FACE MOST FLAGRANT PROVOCATION--AND TO BE PARTICULARLY CHARY OF ANY STEP THAT MIGHT DISTURB STABILITY HUSSEIN REGIME.

PAGE FOUR RUQMVL 1942 ~~S E C R E T~~

2. (A) JORDAN AS A BUFFER AGAINST ISRAEL. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW ISRAEL'S OTHER ARAB NEIGHBORS ARE IN ANY WAY PROTECTED BY JORDAN. TO A LARGE EXTENT ISRAEL DISCOUNTS JORDAN AS A MILITARY FACTOR, THOUGH OBVIOUSLY FOR GEOGRAPHIC REASONS IT REMAINS IMPORTANT. AS EBAN PUT IT, ISRAEL'S MILITARY POSTURE HAS ALWAYS BEEN LESS RELATED TO JORDAN THAN TO UAR. HE NOTED THAT WHEN ISRAEL SOUGHT U.S. AIRCRAFT TO COUNTER-BALANCE JORDANIAN ACQUISITIONS IT SOUGHT TYPES AIRCRAFT ~~NOT~~ APPROPRIATE FOR DEALING WITH UAR MENACE, NOT JORDAN. <sup>Most</sup>



(B) IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT JORDAN, IF IT IS NOT A BUFFER, IS A LIGHTNING ROD. MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO THIS IN CASE SAMU WHERE ONLY REAL ALTERNATIVE TARGET WAS TOPOGRAPHICALLY MUCH MORE DIFFICULT SYRIA. EBAN'S REMARKS AGAIN INSTRUCTIVE. HE SAID ISRAEL'S REACTION IN CASE SAMU WAS "HONEST" ONE DIRECTED AT AREA WHICH HAD LAUNCHED TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL. HE NOTED PERIOD QUIET SEVERAL WEEKS ALONG SYRIAN BORDER AND SAID EVENTS MIGHT BE PROVING THAT IF ISRAEL HAD DECIDED TO ATTACK SYRIA AND A "MAJOR WAR" HAD RESULTED ALL THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN TOTALLY UNNECESSARY.

(C) HAVING SAID THIS MUCH RE LIGHTNING ROD THEORY, WE WOULD

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NOTE THAT RECENT CONFIGURATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNLIKELY TO BE DUPLICATED, AND AS POINTED OUT IN EARLIER PARAS, ISRAEL NOW WILL BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL ABOUT DOING ANYTHING THAT WOULD DISTURB JORDANIAN STABILITY.

3. CHANGES IN INTERNAL BALANCE JORDAN. GOI UNDERSTANDING INTERNAL BALANCE JORDAN IS SPOTTY. COOLER ISRAELI ANALYSIS RECOGNIZES THAT SAMU RAID COULD EVENTUALLY HAVE DEEP EFFECT ON STABILITY OF REGIME THAT HAS BEEN STEADILY IMPROVING FOR PAST DECADE. BUT, AS DANGER IN JORDAN SEEMS TO BE DECREASING RATIONALIZATIONS THAT SAMU GOOD THING ARE INCREASINGLY HEARD: E.G., SAMU HAS GIVEN KING OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY AND CRACK DOWN ON ENEMIES. THOSE WHO PROPOUND SUCH IDEAS OFTEN HAVE THROUGH EXCELLENT GOI INTELLIGENCE FULL AWARENESS DANGERS INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO REGIME BUT AT SAME TIME HAVE HIGHER OPINION HUSSEIN'S STAYING POWERS UNDER STRESS THAN WE DO.

4. JORDAN'S POSITION IN POLARIZATION. CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL SPLIT IN ARAB WORLD HAS LITTLE INTRINSIC INTEREST TO GOI. WHAT IT IS INTERESTED IN SEEING IS GROWING STRENGTH OF THOSE STATES WHOSE POLICIES DO NOT POSE A THREAT TO ISRAEL; THE IDEOLOGICAL ALLEGIANCE OF ARAB STATES IS OF SECONDARY

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IMPORTANCE. HUSSEIN'S REGIME HAS BEEN AND IS CONGENIAL TO ISRAELIS BECAUSE IT IS MODERATE, STABLE AND MILITARILY WEAK.

GP-1. BARBOUR  
BT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

NNNN



34

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

SS  
Info

NNNNVV QHA559VLA532  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 1845 3331027  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 291025Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1845

02

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1966 NOV 29 AM 6 14

*Rystow*

E X D I S

REF: STATE 91607

IN MEETING WITH EBAN LAST EVENING, SUBSTANCE OF WHICH REPORTED SEPARATELY, I ALSO REFERRED TO ARMS CONTROL ACCORDANCE PARA 3 REFTEL. I NOTED THAT WE ENCOURAGED BY HIS REMARK TO ME ON NOV 2ND THAT GOI NO LONGER BELIEVES DESIRABLE KEEP NASSER IN DARK ABOUT ISRAELI NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND HOPES FIND QUOTE MIDDLE GROUND UNQUOTE, STILL PROTECTING ISRAELIS SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. EBAN CONFIRMED THIS GOI POLICY. I SAID THAT IN CIRCUMSTANCES, NEXT WEEK AFTER CURRENT DELUGE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS HAS PASSED, I WOULD HOPE HE AND I CAN GET TOGETHER WITH PRIMIN TO PURSUE DISCUSSION. HE THOUGHT THIS GOOD IDEA AND WILL ENDEAVOR ARRANGE APPOINTMENT. I ADDED THAT IN MEANTIME IN LINE OUR UNDERSTANDING WE WOULD LIKE TO

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 1845 ~~SECRET~~

HAVE ANOTHER VISIT TO DIMONA AND THAT AEC TEAM IS PREPARED TO DO SO ANY TIME DURING NEXT THREE WEEKS. I COMMENTED THAT IT ALMOST EIGHT MONTHS SINCE LAST VISIT. EBAN SAID HE WILL SPEAK TO PRIMIN AND GIVE ME REPLY EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

GP-3. BORBOUR  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 18, #352

By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

35

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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00 RUEHC RUEHDT

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RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

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RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 1796

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REF TEL AVIV 1795

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SUBJECT: MOUNT SCOPUS CONVOY

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1966 NOV 24 AM 2 15

22316

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

1. AM NOW INFORMED CONVOY PROBLEM SATISFACTORILY SOLVED WITH UNISO AND CONVOY WILL NOT RPT NOT PROCEED AS INDICATED TO ME YESTERDAY. FONMIN EBAN HAS JUST TALKED WITH GEN BULL AND IT AGREED CONVOY'S FUTURE SCHEDULE WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THEM IN NEXT FEW DAYS. BULL AT FIRST SPOKE IN TERMS OF FORTNIGHTS POSTPONEMENT BUT FINALLY AGREED TO MINIMUM OF ONE WEEK DURING WHICH SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE. BULL AGREED ARRANGE SUPPLIES FOR SCOPUS OUTPOST AS NECESSARY.

2. PREVIOUSLY, FONMIN EBAN CALLED TO SAY COS TAKING LEGALISTIC VIEW AND NOT PREPARED ENTERTAIN ISRAELI SUGGESTION POSTPONEMENT ON GROUNDS DECISION AS TO CONVOY MATTER HIS PREROGATIVE AND VIEWS ONE OR THE OTHER PARTIES NOT GERMANE. GAVE IMPRESSION NOT RPT NOT GREAT IMPORTANCE WHETHER CONVOY PROCEEDED OR NOT. SINCE OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT NO FURTHER INFLAMMATORY ELEMENT BE INTRODUCED CURRENT SITUATION BY ISRAELIS TRAVERSING JORDAN, THIS LEGLASITIC UNISO ATTITUDE RAISED QUESTION WHETHER GOI OFFER POSTPONE CONVOY OF VALUE GOI HAD ESTIMATED. I TOOK LINE IT SEEMED TO ME FOR CONVOY TO PROCEED THIS TIME OBVIOUSLY NOT COURSE OF WISDOM AND STRONGLY URGED LEGALISTIC NICETIES BE CIRCUMVENTED. IT SEEMS THEY HAVE BEEN.  
BARBOUR  
GP-3  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:20 A.M. NOVEMBER 24, 1966  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, 11/24/66- 2:20 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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36

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DE RUEHC 20821 3270035  
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P 222316Z NOV 66  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHJS/DOD  
RUEPCR/NSA  
RUEHLG/CIA  
RUEHIA/USIA  
P 222009Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 665  
INFO RUEHDT/USUN PRIORITY 117  
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 135  
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 152  
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 125  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 134  
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 101  
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 80  
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 164  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1730

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FR 56468.01.18.434

By ju, NARA, Date 6-1-00

REF: STATE 88408; TEL AVIV 1741

1. IN MTG THIS AFTERNOON, AFTER DISCUSSING SITUATION IN SC REPORTED SEPTEL, I TOLD FONMIN EBAN THAT I ASSUMED THERE NO NECESSITY FOR ME TO EMPHASIZE FURTHER THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE ISRAELI NOV 13 RAID, PARTICULARLY IN SO FAR AS ITS CONSEQUENCES IN JORDAN. I SAID

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 1730 ~~SECRET~~  
THAT IN WORST EVENT HUSSEIN'S REGIME WILL BE DISPLACED AND AT BEST DAMAGE OF INESTIMABLE MAGNITUDE HAS BEEN DONE TO HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL AND HIS ESTIMATE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. THIS SITUATION ABUNDANTLY CLEAR AND I WOULD SPARE HIM REPETITION.

2. EBAN ACKNOWLEDGED FULL COMPREHENSION ON PART GOI NOW AND ITS APPREHENSIONS. HE SAID THIS UNDERSTANDABLY WAS REASON HE SOUGHT MTG. HAVING CONSULTED AT LENGTH WITH PM ESHKOL, HE WISHED TO GIVENTGX SOME OF GOI'S THINKING AS TO FUTURE. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN AND GRATITUDE FOR BASIC FOUNDATION OF US-GOI RELATIONS. HE CITED HELP OF U.S. IN SECURITY FIELD AND ITS ASSISTANCE IN UN REFUGEE AND SYRIAN DEBATES AS COMPONENTS IN MAKING THIS A QTE GOOD YEAR UNQTE FOR ISRAEL AND A HIGH POINT IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS. HSES0.25 9, 5 -5 ESSENTIAL NOW IS TO GET OVER CURRENT DIVERGENCE. BASIC FACTOR WHICH HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION IN RECENT TIMES WAS CONCEPT OF QTE POPULAR WAR UNQTE. THIS HAD GIVEN SCOPE TO NON-GOVERMENTAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS HITHERTO UNDER WRAPS. ATTACKS ON ISRAEL'S CAPITAL (ROMEMA DYNAMITING) AND ON RAILWAY BETWEEN CAPITAL AND MAIN CITY ADDED NEW

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 1730 ~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



PAGE THREE RUQMVL 1780 ~~SECRET~~

DIMENSION TO SECURITY PROBLEM. GOI HAD REACTED AGAINST HARBOURERS OF AGENTS INVOLVED. HE ADMITTED AFFECT ON JORDANIAN REGIME NOT AS ANTICIPATED AND DANGEROUS SITUATION HAD RESULTED.

3. PM HAS NOW APPROVED AS BASIC GOI POLICY THE REESTABLISHMENT OF STABILITY IN JORDAN. GOI WILL WELCOME ANY IDEAS AS TO MEASURES WHICH WILL PROMOTE THIS PURPOSE. MEANWHILE, PM HAS ORDERED QTE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT UNQTE. THIS MEANS NO REACTION TO FURTHER PPPULARLY INSPIRED INCIDENTS. OF COURSE, IN EVENT OF MAJOR MILITARY ATTACK, GOI WILL DEFEND ITSELF. (HERE EBAN CITED REPORT EARLIER TODAY OF INTENTION OF COMMANDER OF JORDANIAN BRIGADE TO TAKE MATTERS INTO OWN HANDS. I REPLIED WE HAD REPORT APPARENTLY ON SAME ITEM BUT MARKEDLY DIFFERENT IN MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT NAMELY THAT COMMANDER IN QUESTION WAS GOING TO PETITION THE KING FOR AUTHORITY. THIS SEEMED TO REASSURE HIM).

4. IN IMPLEMENTATION THIS POLICY GOI WILL ENDEAVOR FIRST TO MINIMIZE CONTACT. SCOPUS CONVOY SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW WILL NOT GO. TRAINS ON JERUSALEM-TEL AVIV ROUTE WILL NOT RUN AT NIGHT. FENCES WILL BE CONSTRUCTED IN JERUSALEM AREA AT TWO POINTS ALONG RAILWAY. I ASKED ABOUT CULTIVATION ON SYRIAN BORDER

PAGE FOUR RUQMVL 1780 ~~SECRET~~

IN DZ. HE SAID GOI ATTEMPTING THROUGH BULL TO GET INFORMAL THREE POWER - ISRAEL, SYRIA AND UN - NEGOTIATIONS GOING TO SETTLE FIELDS ON BASIS OF STATUS QUO.

5. OF MORE CONTINUING IMPACT, PM HAS INSTRUCTED THAT MAJOR EFFORT BE MADE TO IMPROVE STATIC DEFENCE IN HOPE THAT EVEN IF IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEAL BORDERS ENTIRELY AT LEAST INFILTRATION CAN BE MADE QTE LESS EASY UNQTE. GUARDS WILL BE INCREASED AND TECHNICAL DEVICES SOUGHT. ANY U.S. IDEAS WILL BE WELCOME.

6. EBAN WONDERED WHETHER U.S. HAD ANY INFLUENCE WITH EGYPTIANS WHICH MIGHT BE UTILIZED TO ASSIST KING. ISRAELI IMPRESSION IS THAT SUBVERSION BEING FOMENTED IN NABLUS IS PLO INSPIRED AND ALTHOUGH SHUQUAIRY NOT NASSER AGENT HIS ORGANIZATION IS IN EGYPT. I NOTED OUR STOCK WITH NASSER NOT HIGH BUT IT POSSIBLE HE ALSO MIGHT NOT BE ANXIOUS OVERTHROW HUSSEIN THIS TIME AND MIGHT EXERCISE MODERATING INFLUENCE ON HIS OWN.

7. FINALLY, EBAN SAID KING COULD BE ASSURED IN FIRMEST TERMS THAT ISRAELI POLICY AS TO JORDAN AND ITS DISINTEREST IN ACQUIRING WEST BANK HAS NOT CHANGED. RAID WAS NOT PRELUDE OR REHEARSAL FOR INVASION. IT MERELY GOIT OUT OF HAND.

PAGE FIVE RUQMVL 1780 ~~SECRET~~

8. CONVERSATION CONFIRMS THAT PM AND OTHER MEMBERS GOI DEEPLY SHAKEN BY JDEVELOPMENTS. ALSO SHOCKED BY REVELATION OF DEGREE OF PRECARIOUSNESS OF HUSSEIN REGIME WHICH, ALTHOUGH THEY ADMIT WE TOLD THEM REPEATEDLY, THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COMPREHEND. YTHEY PROBABLY HAVE FURTHER TAUGHT THEMSELVES IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL OF HASHEMITE DYNASTY, IDEA WHICH THEY ADOPTED INTELLECTUALLY BUT LESS THAN WHOLEHEARTEDLY. LESSON MAY BE WORTHWHILE.

PRESERVATION COPY



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RUEHLG/CIA  
RUEHIA/USIA  
RUEPCR/NSA  
P 211045Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 650  
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK PRIORITY 109  
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 127  
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 143  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 126  
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 155  
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 117  
RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 97  
STATE GRNC  
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*Wingfield  
Sullivan*

*Reston*

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1742

1. AT DINNER MY HOUSE NOVEMBER 20 IDF CHIEF OF STAFF RABIN WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO GIVE DCM AND DATT HIS VERSION OF NOV 13 ATTACK ON SAMUA. HAVING STATED THAT HE WAS IN CHARGE OF ENTIRE OPERATION FROM HEADQUARTERS LOCATED ON ISRAELI SIDE OF BORDER, RABIN STATED THAT FIRST ISRAELI ARMORED EQUIPMENT TO REACH AREA CAME AT ABOUT 5 A.M. AND THAT HE WAITED FOR FULL HALF HOUR AFTER HE WAS READY TO ATTACK IN ORDER TO PROVIDE WARNING TO JORDANIANS.

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HE WANTED THEM TO UNDERSTAND PARTICULARLY THAT THIS WAS AN ARMORED COLUMN WHICH WOULD BE USELESS TO RESIST. HE ALSO WISHED TO GIVE ADEQUATE WARNING TIME FOR VILLAGERS TO RUN AWAY. RABIN STATED THAT HIS FORCE CONSISTED OF "400 MEN PLUS 20", 8 CENTURION TANKS AND 50 HALF-TRACKS AND OTHER SUPPORTING VEHICLES. HE DID NOT SEND MIRAGES INTO ACTION AT FIRST BUT USED TWO CURAGONS TO FLY COVER AND KEEP TRACK OF GROUND SITUATION. IN ORDER MINIMIZE CASUALTIES, RABIN ORDERED THESE PLANES NOT OPEN FIRE. IT WAS ONLY WHEN JORDANIAN HAWKER HUNTERS APPEARED THAT MIRAGES JOINED FRAY AND THEY DID NO AIR TO GROUND ATTACKS OF ANY KIND INCLUDING BOMBING.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-298

By *us* NARA, Date 5-5-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



2. RABIN OBSERVED THAT VILLAGERS, BY AND LARGE, DID RUN AWAY BUT ARRIVAL OF JORDANIAN REGULAR FORCES WHICH HE STILL CALLS "THE LEGION" WAS SURPRISE. RABIN SAID HE COULD HARDLY BELIEVE THAT "THOSE STUPID PEOPLE" WOULD DELIBERATELY TAKE ON AN ARMORED COLUMN, BUT IMPORTANT FACT WAS THEY DID. HE ORDERED HIS OWN SOLDIERS TO STOP FIRING AT JORDANIAN FORCES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE DESTROYED

~~PAGE THREE RUQMVL 1742 S E C R E T~~

ENTIRE BATTALION. HE ADDED THAT DUE TO MOVEMENT OF SO MANY VEHICLES, WHOLE AREA WAS DUSTY AND SOME ERRORS WERE DUE TO DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT WAS HAPPENING.

3. AS IDF UNDERSTANDS IT, ONLY THREE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED AND SEVEN INJURED WHILE FIGURE OF 14 JORDANIAN SOLDIERS KILLED APPEARS ABOUT RIGHT. RABIN CLAIMED EARNESTLY THAT HE HAD DONE EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO AVOID CASUALTIES. HIS PLAN HAD BEEN TO GO IN QUICKLY, ACCOMPLISH HIS MISSION IN THE VILLAGES AND RETURN TO ISRAELI SOIL AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. HE DID NOT WISH TO SEIZE WEST BANK NOR TO TOPPLE HUSSEIN REGIME AND HOPED KING UNDERSTOOD THAT. ARRIVAL OF JORDANIAN TROOPS HAD UPSET HIS PLAN BUT HE STILL CONSIDERED THAT, IN MILITARY SENSE, HE HAD DONE IT ABOUT AS WELL AS WAS POSSIBLE.

4. IN DISCUSSION DECISION TO MOVE AGAINST JORDAN, RABIN SAID THREE ALTERNATIVES FACED HIM IN ADVISING PRIME MINISTER. FIRST WAS TO DO NOTHING, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PERMIT INACTION. SECOND ALTERNATIVE WAS TO ATTACK SYRIA. RABIN MAINTAINED THAT HE PERSONALLY FELT THAT SYRIA SHOULD BE THEIR MAIN TARGET IN COMBATING

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TERRORIST RAIDS AND, AS US EMBASSY MUST BE AWARE, HE HAD SPOKEN PUBLICLY TO THAT EFFECT. DIFFICULTY HERE WAS THAT NOV 12 MINING ATTACK TOOK PLACE TOO FAR SOUTH AND SYRIAN INVOLVMENT TOO INDIRECT TO LAY BLAME ON SYRIANS. THEREFORE, THIRD ALTERNATIVE, ATTACK ON JORDAN, WAS ONLY CHOICE LEFT.

5. RABIN MENTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT SYRIAN AGENTS MAY HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN RECENT FATAH TYPE ATTACKS ORIGINATING IN THAT AREA BUT AS FAR AS ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE COULD DISCERN, JORDANIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SHOULD CARRY MUCH OF BLAME FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS SINCE THEY DID NOT CARRY OUT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S ORDERS TO ARREST AND IMPRISON TERRORISTS (HE MENTIONED MUSTAFA HAMIS AS CASE IN WHICH JORDAN GOVERNMENT HAD ARRESTED KNOWN INSTIGATOR AND THEN PERMITTED HIM TO LEAVE PRISON AFTER VERY FEW WEEKS).



5. FCMOFF DIRECTOR GENERAL LEVAVI ADDED A FEW ADDITIONAL DETAILS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS ONLY AT CABINET MEETING DAY BEFORE (NOV 20) THAT ISRAELI CABINET HAD BEEN INFORMED OF DETAILS OF ACTUAL SIZE OF ISRAELI OPERATION AND EVEN THEN INFORMATION WAS DIVULGED RELUCTANTLY. HE SHOWED SOME IRRITATION AT GENERAL BULL'S REPORT WHICH HE SAID CONTAINED

~~PAGE FIVE RUQMVL 1742 S E C R E T~~

HIGHLY EXAGGERATED REPORTS OF SCOPE OF OPERATION. FOR INSTANCE, SAID LEVAVI, FIGURE 80 FOR TANKS MUST HAVE BEEN COMPOSITE OF ACTUAL NUMBER, NAMELY 8, AND ZERO, LATTER FIGURE REPRESENTING NUMBER OF PATTON TANKS INVOLVED. LEVAVI MAINTAINED THAT PRIME MINISTER MADE DECISION TO ATTACK ABOUT NOON ON NOV 12 AND THAT TREMENDOUS EFFORT HAD BEEN REQUIRED TO PREPARE ATTACK ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. HE MENTIONED THAT MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR TO WATCH NOW WAS LOYALTY OF JORDANIAN OFFICER CORPS TO KING. HE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE DISSATISFIED AND EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE THAT REGIME WOULD FIND WAY TO STAY ON TOP OF SITUATION.

6. SINCE RABIN WAS OBVIOUSLY GIVING STORY OF ATTACK FRANKLY AS HE SAW IT, DCM AND DATT DID NOT QUESTION HIS ACCOUNT. FORMER, HOWEVER, DID TAKE EXCEPTION TO RABIN'S ASSUMPTION THAT JORDANIAN FORCES COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO AVOID BATTLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE BOUND TO ATTEMPT DEFENSE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY AND IN FUTURE WOULD REACT MORE STRONGLY. HE NOTED THAT EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD COME ACROSS THIS INTERPRETATION OF JORDANIAN MILITARY BEHAVIOR BEFORE AND THAT WE COULD NOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY ITS ERRONEOUS NATURE.

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DCM ADDED FINALLY THAT FUTURE ATTACKS OF THIS TYPE COULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE EVEN MORE TRAGIC AND COSTLY CONSEQUENCES, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MATERIALLY.

7. ON SAME OCCASION RABIN CATEGORICALLY AND EMPHATICALLY AFFIRMED TO ME IN RESPONSE TO QUERY THAT NO RPT NO PATTON TANKS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN RAID. DECISION NOT RPT NOT USE THEM HAD, HE SAID, DELAYED HIS TIME OF PENETRATION SOME HALF HOUR, BECAUSE IT TOOK THAT MUCH LONGER TO BRING UP CENTURIONS. FINALLY RABIN OPINED THAT HE HOPED SITUATION WAS NOW BEEN STABILIZED. I COMMENTED THAT MAYBE SO MILITARILY BUT POLITICALLY THINGS SEEMED TO ME TO BE IN A SERIOUS MESS AS A RESULT THIS RAID.

GP-3. BARBOUR

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUTCK COPY

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Info

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DE RUQMVL 1698 3211239  
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P R 171237Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
RUEMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM  
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUEHDT/USUN  
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE  
STATE GRNC

15501

1966 NOV 17 AM 8 04

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 1698

EXDIS

REF: STATE 85451 AND AMMAN 1118

UPON RECEIPT 2ND REFTEL WE CHECKED THROUGH FONMINISTRY REPORT

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 1698 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
THAT KOL ISRAEL HAD REFERRED TO EXCHANGES BETWEEN GOI AND GOJ  
ON CONTROLLING FATAH. WE WERE ASSURED CATEGORICALLY THIS  
MORNING THAT NO SUCH REFERENCE WAS MADE IN ANY KOL ISRAEL  
BROADCAST, INCLUDING FOREIGN LANGUAGE BROADCASTS. THERE NO  
QUESTION ABOUT GOI REALIZATION OF SENSITIVITY THESE EXCHANGES,  
WHICH WE HAVE AGAIN STRESSED MOST STRONGLY.

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 5-31-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

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Action

SS

Info

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NUNVV QMA252VV VVV VLA877

02

FM RUEHC

DE RUQMV 1660 3181249

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R 141047Z NOV 66

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1660

EXDIS

STATE 83785

12131

1966 NOV 14 PM 1 24

1. I INFORMED BITAN ORALLY THIS MORNING CONTENTS PARAS ONE THROUGH FIVE DEPREFTEL IN CLOSE AND DETAILED PARAPHRASE. BITAN AGREED PASS URGENTLY TO FONMIN AND PRIMIN. HE ASSUMED WE DID NOT WANT HIS IMMEDIATE OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION WHICH I CONFIRMED. HE ASKED WHETHER USG CONTEMPLATED ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ADDITION TO THOSE MADE IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK TO WHICH I REPLIED I HAD NO INDICATION.

2. IN ADDITION, FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, I TOOK OCCASION TO STRESS TO BITAN AND HIS SUPERIORS MY PERSONAL AGREEMENT WITH MY GOVT'S CONDEMNATION THIS UNWISE ISRAELI ACTION.

3. BRITISH AMBASSADOR HADOW TELLS ME HE ALSO HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPRESS DIM VIEW UK TAKES THIS RAID ALTHOUGH SINCE FONOFFICE LONDON UNABLE CONTACT MINISTERS AT MOMENT, UK VIEWS ARE TO BE EXPRESSED AS HADOW'S OWN. IN FACT, HADOW PERSONALLY TAKES EVEN STRONGER EXCEPTION ISRAELI RAID THAN SUGGESTED BY FONOFFICE. HIS LINE IS IN ESSENCE THAT ISRAELI FAILURE TO STRIKE MAIN TARGET SYRIA ON WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY PLACING BLAME FOR TERRORIST ACTIONS AND INSTEAD CLOBBERING LIGHTLY DEFENDED JORDAN IS ACT OF BULLY. HE ADDS POINT THAT MORAL SYRIANS WILL DRAW IS VALUE OF SOVIET PROTECTION IN PROVIDING IMMUNITY FROM CONSEQUENCES SYRIAN HARASSMENTS.

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *fw*, NARA, Date *5-31-00*

# AIRGRAM

DEF 121 NEAR E

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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AGR	COM	FRB
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TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

20

A-263

NO.

~~SECRET~~

TO : Department of State 1966 NOV 7 AM 9 00

HANDLING INDICATOR

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COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_ SERIES B

RE/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

02

9

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE: November 5, 1966

SUBJECT : Sophisticated Weapons in the Middle East

REF : Tel Aviv's <sup>NC</sup> 1540

EXDIS

Enclosed herewith is the more detailed record of the conversation between Foreign Minister Eban and Ambassador Barbour on November 2 concerning the control of sophisticated weapons in the Middle East.

BARBOUR

WMD

Enc: Memcon of Nov. 2 a.m.m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-229

By cb, NARA Date 11-27-00

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

DCM:WNDale:mk:11/3/66

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

AMB:WBarbour (draft)

1966 NOV 7 AM 12

COPYFILE-PER

11/27/00



~~SECRET~~

Page 1, Enc. No. 1  
T Aviv A-263

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: Nov. 2, 1966

SUBJECT: Sophisticated Weapons in the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Abba Eban, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Moshe Bitan, Assistant Director General, Foreign Ministry  
Ambassador Barbour  
William N. Dale, DCM

EXDIS

Ambassador Barbour opened the discussion, which took place at lunch at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, by giving substance of the oral message from Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Eban concerning the Secretary's interest in preventing the introduction of sophisticated weapons into the Middle East (Department's wire 68096). Ambassador Barbour stressed that the Secretary had wished to have a second conversation with Mr. Eban in New York to discuss this subject but the Secretary's approaching trip to the Far East and the Minister's imminent departure had made it impossible.

The Foreign Minister said he had not interpreted the omission of this subject from their October 7 discussion to mean that the Secretary attached any less importance to it but the fact was they had so many more immediately pressing subjects to talk over that they could not get to it. He went on to say that the GOI had been devoting considerable attention to the question of the spread of nuclear weapons too as we would learn from Gideon Raphael's speech in New York on the subject that day. The GOI was taking a strong position in support of the anti-proliferation treaty and would give it extra moral support as well. Although he believed February to be too optimistic a date, Eban said he was hopeful about the treaty's chances for success before too long a time.

Switching to the Israeli-Egyptian aspect of the problem, the Foreign Minister stated that he thought Nasser was now quite relaxed about Israel's intentions. As evidence he mentioned the opinions of Israeli

DCM:WNDale:mk:11/3/66

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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~~SECRET~~

Page 2, Enc. No. 1  
Tel Aviv A- 263

-2-

experts who meet their Egyptian counterparts in Vienna and at various IAEA conferences from time to time, intelligence sources and such Americans as Mr. Anderson. The Minister then enumerated Nasser's distracting problems, including an economic situation in which his credit has declined to zero, continued involvement in the Yemen, quarrels with the Arab states, growing separatism in the Arab world and difficulties with the US.

As an aside, Mr. Eban mentioned that like the Prime Minister when faced with requests for more money than the government could afford, the US could now say to the Egyptians, "We can give you six reasons why we can't give you any more wheat but the first one is we haven't got it." The Minister finally observed that he understood from Mr. Anderson that whole conversations with Nasser now took place in which the word "Israel" was never mentioned.

Mr. Eban recalled the Prime Minister's statement that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area and referred to the five visits made by American nuclear experts to Israeli atomic facilities. He stated further that the Prime Minister was now convinced as a result of President Johnson's arguments that it was dangerous for Israel to try to keep Nasser in a state of uncertainty as to Israel's intentions about making nuclear weapons because the Egyptians would then be more rather than less likely to try to acquire their own. He said he did not agree with the recent speech advocating mystery on this point made by Shimon Peres in the Knesset. The Ambassador pressed Mr. Eban on this point and the Minister reaffirmed the Israeli position stating that if it had been otherwise, the PM would not have permitted us to pass on certain conclusions made as a result of our visit to the Egyptians. The Minister added, however, that the Egyptians should realize the Israelis were a year or two ahead of them in scientific nuclear development.

He expanded this idea by pointing out that as the Egyptians doubtless had deep-laid plans for sabotage in Israel, it was necessary for Israel to find some middle ground between scaring them into a panic on the one hand and telling them everything on the other. He said that he would revert to his subject later but would say then that IAEA controls were no answer.

Returning to the international aspect of nuclear controls, the Minister remarked that at the recent discussions in Vienna there was a strong movement among nuclear have-not countries who favored the non-proliferation treaty, particularly Brazil, to demand in return certain

~~SECRET~~



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-3-

guarantees from countries already possessing nuclear weapons. He mentioned security guarantees, guarantees against manufacture of additional nuclear weapons and the right of non-nuclear countries to adjust their status. The Minister stressed the strength of feeling among small countries on this matter. He said that it would be preferable for Israel to be included along with other non-nuclear countries in a generalized treaty rather than to be singled out in some special arrangement which would be contrary to its sovereign status.

Ambassador Barbour commented that, although he could agree with much that the Minister had said, he could not agree with his last point. In the first place, the non-proliferation treaty was not now a fact and, much as we supported it, it was not certain when it would become so. Secondly, we live in a far from perfect world in which there are many suspicious people -- particularly the Arabs of the Middle East, but also others. People such as these would not believe an Israeli statement just because the Prime Minister gave it and Israel owed it to itself to make some gesture renouncing nuclear weapons which would be convincing, not so much for us because we've been here and seen for ourselves, but for the world. The Ambassador commented further that the acceptance of IAEA controls would be the best way to do this. The Foreign Minister objected at this point and the Ambassador went on to say that there were other ways of dealing with the matter too. There might be an arrangement by which the absence of nuclear capability in Israel and in Egypt could be verified by a third country. Perhaps Mr. Eban could suggest something helpful that we could say to Nasser who has already made his own lack of intentions regarding nuclear weapons known to us. The Ambassador suggested that there was still another way which would help indirectly, and that was for Israel to invite some foreign scientists to participate in research projects going on at Dimona. Israel could do this as a sovereign act and we would be perfectly content to read about it in the press. He pointed out to the Minister that if Israel had abandoned its policy of uncertainty, it made no sense to spend around IL 15,000,000 a year maintaining Dimona as a secret operation running at 10 percent capacity. The Ambassador remarked that in raising this possibility he was adverting to a suggestion along this line made by Eban in an earlier conversation.

The Ambassador then referred to the discussions of missiles the Prime Minister had had with the President in 1964 and with him this last spring. He recalled that during the first of these, Mr. Eshkol had said Israel might acquire "two dozen, maybe one dozen more or less" after a couple of years and that therefore he had been instructed to take the matter up

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Page 4, Enc. No. 1

Tel Aviv A- 263

-4-

again last spring, which was about two years later. Then the Prime Minister had said Israel would not have missiles for at least two years and that if Egypt would abandon its program, Israel would too. The Ambassador also mentioned the Prime Minister's jocular remark that he might have said three years, but why give away a year with nothing in return. Mr. Bitan confirmed the Ambassador's account of the conversation. Mr. Barbour added that the subject of missiles is inseparable from nuclear weapons, since the missile provides the natural vehicle for the nuclear warhead (even though the Israelis said the contrary as far as their missiles were concerned). Arrangements covering both were therefore of importance. The Ambassador said the question is how does the GOI expect to know the point at which Nasser abandons his program. Would the GOI rely solely on its own intelligence or could a diplomatic arrangement be devised to verify such abandonment?

Mr. Eban commented that he was unacquainted with the history of these discussions and would have to talk about missiles later. He referred again to IAEA controls, saying that in establishing some middle ground as far as Egypt was concerned, it was necessary to maintain security. Since the Egyptians were active at all levels of the IAEA apparatus, the Israelis could not afford to join it. Similarly, it was most important that the Egyptians not learn the locations of Israeli nuclear facilities and their specific functions. He also mentioned that US experts should be particularly careful with the detailed information they have received on their visits here. In this connection, the Ambassador strongly reiterated our wish that these visits be continued on the six-monthly schedule that had originally been envisaged, but which had slipped each time we made a request.

Mr. Eban stated that, although there might be a possibility of political controls involving Israel and the UAR, the recent speech by the Egyptian UN delegate concerning the anti-proliferation treaty made the Israelis less convinced than before that the Egyptians were willing to accept political controls. Mr. Eban described the Egyptian position on the anti-proliferation treaty, pointing out the tie-in they try to make between this treaty and general disarmament. He stressed again that Israel, too, was interested in being included in a general agreement as it did not like to be considered unique and to have to be subjected to a special arrangement.

The Ambassador replied that because of its scientific skills Israel was in fact unique and that this was just the point. Next to Sweden, Israel was considered by our experts as the most qualified nation in the nuclear field among those nations not possessing nuclear weapons at this time. Therefore, it merited special arrangements. Mr. Eban questioned whether

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-5-

India was not further advanced but the Ambassador said he was repeating the experts' opinion.

The Foreign Minister commented finally that he would review the points made in today's talk with the Prime Minister and would then be in touch with the Ambassador as he considered the day's meeting as part of a continuing discussion.

## GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

41

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Action

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VV QMA044V VLA624  
PP RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEHDT RUEIVCR  
DE RUQMVL 1563 3081123  
ZNY SSSSS  
P R 041121Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUQMG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM  
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK  
RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE/MEAFSA POLAD  
STATE GRNC  
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1966 NOV 4 AM 7 05

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1563

EXDIS

REF: STATE 78033

I WAS UNABLE THIS MORNING LOCATE EBAN WHO NOT IN JERUSALEM AND SO SPOKE TO ASSISTANT DIRGEN BITAN ALONG LINES REFTEL. HE SAID REPORT OF COMAY-GOLDBERG CONVERSATION (USUN 2001) HAD BEEN READ BY FONMIN AND ISRAELIS HAD RELAYED ASSURANCES TO USUN THAT TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE NOT UNDER WAY. I SAID THIS WAS

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 1563 ~~SECRET~~

NOT WHAT WE TRYING GET ACROSS; WE WANTED ISRAELIS TO BE AWARE THAT USG WOULD REGARD ANY SUCH MOVEMENTS AS MOST UNWISE AT THIS JUNCTURE. BITAN GOT THE POINT.

GP-3. BARBOUR

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

~~SECRET~~



## INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

42

~~SECRET~~

Action

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VV QMA869VV VLA563

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1966 NOV 3 AM 4 39

RR RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 1540 3070857  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 030855Z NOV 66  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 546  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 1540

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, p. 331

ju. NARA. Date 5-30-00 02

E X D I S

REF: STATE 68096

1. AFTER DELAYS CAUSED PRIMARILY BY SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF ISRAELI COMPLAINT AGAINST SYRIA RE FATAH, FONMIN EBAN AND I FINALLY HAD OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS TOGETHER ARMS CONTROL IN ME AT LONG LUNCH SESSION ON NOV 2. HAVING HEARD ME OUT ON SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL, EBAN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. HE HAD NOT FOR MOMENT THOUGHT THAT LACK OF REFERENCE THIS SUBJECT AT HIS OCT 7 MEETING WITH SECRETARY INDICATED ANY LOSS OF INTEREST ON OUR PART.

B. GOI TOO HAS PUT CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT ON THIS MATTER. AS REFLECTED IN RAPHAEL NOV 2 SPEECH IN NEW YORK GOI STANDS SOLIDLY BEHIND ANTI-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND WILL GIVE IT

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 1540 ~~SECRET~~  
ACTIVE PUBLIC AND MORAL SUPPORT.

C. FROM ALL EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO GOI, EGYPT NOW FAIRLY RELAXED AS TO ISRAELI INTENTIONS RE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

D. IN FACT, PM HAS BEEN CONVINCED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT EFFORT KEEP NASSER UNCERTAIN AS TO ISRAELI INTENTIONS IS NO LONGER WORTH RISK OF EGYPTIAN WEAPONS' ESCALATION.

E. HOWEVER, DUE EGYPTIAN PREDILECTION FOR SABOTAGE AND PLOTTING, GOI MUST FIND MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN LETTING EGYPTIANS BE ASSURED GOI NOT MANUFACTURING BOMBS AND GIVING THEM FULL INFO AS TO ISRAEL'S SCIENTIFIC NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

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-2- TEL AVIV 1540, NOVEMBER 3

F. THEREFORE, GOI CANNOT ACCEPT IAEA SYSTEM OF CONTROLS TO WHICH EGYPTIANS HAVE ACCESS AT ALL LEVELS AND, FURTHERMORE, IT WISHES BE SURE WE (AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS) DO NOT PASS ON TO EGYPTIANS SPECIFICS AS TO LOCATION OR FUNCTIONS OF ISRAELI INSTALLATIONS.

G. POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT SOME KIND OF POLITICAL CONTROLS CAN BE WORKED OUT BUT RECENT EGYPTIAN SPEECH IN VIENNA MAKES ISRAELIS LESS CONVINCED OF EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS.

H. ISRAELIS TOO HAVE HOPES OF BEING INCLUDED IN GENERAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY BEFORE LONG WHEN THEY WOULD PREFER TO BEING SINGLED OUT IN SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT IN WAY CONTRARY ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGN STATUS.

2. I POINTED OUT THAT TREATY NOT YET A REALITY AND, MUCH AS WE ALL SUPPORT IT, WE DO NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL BE. FURTHERMORE, THIS BEING IMPERFECT WORLD, ISRAELI GESTURE TO ASSURE ITS SUSPICIOUS NEIGHBORS THAT IT NOT MOVING TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD PROMOTE PEACE OF AREA. ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA CONTROLS WOULD BE BEST WAY ACCOMPLISH THIS. I SUGGESTED THAT ALTHOUGH MY INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT GO THIS FAR, IF ISRAEL CANNOT SEE ITS WAY CLEAR ACCEPT THESE, VERIFICATION SCHEME INCLUDING ISRAEL AND EGYPT WITH THIRD COUNTRY IS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY. STILL ANOTHER WHICH WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF BEING UNILATERAL ACT OF SOVEREIGN STATE WOULD BE GOI INVITATION TO SCIENTISTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECTS AT DIMONA.

3. THEN I BROUGHT UP MAY 24 CONVERSATION WITH PM IN WHICH HE STATED MISSILES WERE AT LEAST TWO YEARS AWAY (EMTEL 1229 TO WASHINGTON) AND SUGGESTED THAT SINCE UAR RUNNING INTO DIFFICULTIES IN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT, THIS TYPE OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY TOO SHOULD BE SUBJECT CONTROL ARRANGEMENT.

4. EBAN SAID HE NOT INFORMED ON HISTORY OF MISSILE DISCUSSIONS AND WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS POINTS MADE IN OUR CONVERSATION WITH PM AND WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH GOI DOES NOT APPEAR ANY CLOSER NOW THAN IT EVER WAS TO ACCEPTING IAEA CONTROLS, I THINK WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT EBAN NOW SAYS PRESIDENT WAS SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING PM THAT TACTIC OF KEEPING NASSER IN STATE OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO GOI INTENTIONS WAS DANGEROUS. ALSO, IT HOPEFUL SIGN THAT GOI IS SUPPORTING ANTI-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THAT EBAN FOR FIRST TIME APPEARS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN KEEPING DIALOGUE GOING ON THIS SUBJECT. AIRGRAM WITH FURTHER REPORT CONVERSATION FOLLOWS.

GP-3. BARBOUR

~~SECRET~~



43

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ZCZCQMA859VV VLA211  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL ZCEE A 0730929  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 140927Z  
FM AMEMBASSY (TEL AVIV)  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 899  
STATE GRNC  
BT

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1966 MAR 14 AM 5 12

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~~SECRET~~ MAR 14

E X D I S

EMBTEL 868

1. FONMIN EBAN CALLED ME IN SATURDAY EVENING TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE GOI (READ PM ESHKOL) ATTACHES TO REPRESENTATIONS BEING MADE PARALLEL BY HARMAN TO HARE RE LATEST REVISION DRAFTS OF DOCUMENTS TO BE EXCHANGED TO CONSUMMATE PLANE DEAL.
2. EBAN SAID GOI HAD ACCEPTED SUBSTANTIVE U.S. POINTS PREVIOUSLY AT ISSUE BUT THAT, ALTHOUGH GOI'S CURRENT PROPOSALS THEREFORE LARGELY STYLISTIC, THEY OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. GOI DISTURBED

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 133A ~~SECRET~~  
THAT SUBMISSION U.S. REVISION TO HARMAN BY LETTER FROM HOOPES HAD OVERTONES OF "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT". FROM STANDPOINT PRESENTATION TO ISRAELI POLITICANS AS WELL AS EVENTUAL HISTORICAL RECORD IT ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS REFLECT ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGN STATUS AND NOT RPT NOT DISPARITY IN SIZE AND POWER OF TWO COUNTRIES. IN ESSENCE, THIS MEANS CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALE PLANES AND VARIOUS ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OTHER FIELDS NOT OPT NOT ACCEPTABLE. GOI WILL TAKE RELATED ACTION ON BASIS ITS INDEPENDENT DECISIONS.

3. MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE THIS THINKING IS THAT NUCLEAR REFERENCES MUST BE RELOCATED IN DOCUMENTS AND NOT DESCRIBED AS "CONDITIONS." ESHKOL SAYS HE WILL CALL OFF DEAL RATHER THAN OPEN SELF TO CHARGE THAT HE SOLD GOI COMMITMENT NOT BE FIRST INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AREA AND DIMONA VISITS FOR 48 AIRPLANES. EBAN ADDED THIS ALSO NOT CHRONOLOGICAL FACT ANYWAY. ALSO FOR REASONS PRESENTATION AND HISTORICAL RECORD ESHKOL WANTS EMPHASIZE DEAL GROWS OUT OF TALKS LAST FEBRUARY AND MARCH RE GENERAL SECURITY POSTURE OF ISRAEL BY PLACING SECURITY REFERENCES AT OUTSET. ADDITIONAL FACTOR THIS REGARD IS THAT SHIMON PERES MEMBER GOVT THAT OCCASION AND HIS CRITICISM MAY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-229

By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 899, March 14, from Tel Aviv

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 133A ~~SECRET~~  
THUS BE TEMPERED.

4. I AM SURE DEPT REALIZES THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE REAL FROM WHERE PM SITS AND THAT, WHILE PERHAPS WE MIGHT BE INCLINED BELIEVE OUR ACTION SELLING PLANES ITSELF OF ORDER OF IMPORTANCE TO RELEGATE ISSUES THIS TYPE TO BACKGROUND, SENSITIVITIES OF PM HEADING COALITION GOVT OF SMALL COUNTRY UNDERSTANDABLE. I DO NOT SEE THAT ANY MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS ARE RAISED BY GOI PROPOSALS AND CONSEQUENTLY URGE WE ACCOMMODATE OURSELVES TO PM'S CONCERNS.

5. FOREGOING DRAFTED SUNDAY MORNING. SUBSEQUENTLY HAD OPPORTUNITY BRIEF TALK WITH EBAN AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY FOR PRES SHAZAR SUNDAY EVENING. IT APPEARS THAT GOI MUCH REASSURED AS RESULT MEETING HARMAN WITH HARE ET AL SATURDAY. THIS CONFIRMED BY BITAN THIS MORNING. BITAN SAYS HARMAN BEING TOLD NOT WORRY TOO MUCH ABOUT PARTICULAR LANGUAGE PROVIDED MAIN CONCERNS SET FORTH ABOVE SATISFIED AND THAT HE IS PRINCIPLE NEGOTIATOR, I. E., FONOFF DOES NOT WANT TIE HIM TO ITS DRAFTING ON THIS END WHICH WILL ONLY CONFUSE MATTERS NEEDLESSLY. UNDERSTAND U.S. VIEWS MAY BE GIVEN HARMAN THIS AFTERNOON.

GP-3. BARBOUR

PRESERVATION COPY



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21-2751

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JUN 19 11 33 PM '67

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Origin

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Info:

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USIA

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NSA

DOD

AID

RSC

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV (PRIORITY)

INFO: Amembassy ATHENS (PRIORITY)

STATE 212751

Subject: Nixon Trip

Reference: Tel Aviv 4204

1. Nixon's Washington representative Ellsworth met with Ambassador

Harmon today concerning Nixon Tel Aviv visit.

2. Harmon conveyed following:

- (a) Israeli Fonoff will handle Nixon hotel reservations which will depend on whether Prime Minister in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.
- (b) Fonoff will coordinate closely with Embassy.
- (c) Ambassador's luncheon June 22 (reftel) most desirable.
- (d) GOI arranging meetings with Primin, Defmin and Ben Gurion.
- (e) General program would be to have appointments on Thursday and leave Friday free for travelling, e.g., visit to hospital and Arab areas (Harmon said Jordan west bank was possibility).
- (f) Agreed with Ellsworth suggestion that Nixon give public speech during visit; thought university forum undesirable and suggested foreign policy association group.

Drafted by:

AF:AFI:WKCrowwell:par 6-19-67

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Roger P. Davies

Clearances:

H -  
S/S - O:RHWenzel

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. We do not believe it desirable that former Vice President travel to west bank at this time although his presence in Jerusalem might be constructive. Suggest Ambassador and/or Country Team arrange briefing for Nixon immediately after arrival Tel Aviv June 21 and that this be coordinated with GOI.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow  
45  
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SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 189225

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BARBOUR

MAY 5 8 13 PM '67

Harry McPherson, Special Counsel to the President, plans to visit Israel June 5-8. He will be flying in by commercial airline from the Far East and his onward travel will also be by commercial airline. McPherson will be writing to you directly about the purpose of this trip in the next few days, but in meantime you may wish to make arrangements for his accommodations.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By inf, NARS, Date 4-16-81

Drafted by: S/S: BHR read: jmj 5/5/67

5381

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Read

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Battle

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

46  
187589

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42  
Origin: ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV  
SS INFO: Amembassy AMMAN  
Info: CINCSTRIKE

MAY 4 12 31 PM '67

STATE 187589  
EXDIS

~~XXNDIS/XXXXXX~~ 187589

REF: Amman's 3311

1. Dept concurs Amman recommendation that in this instance  
Tel Aviv should pass appropriate Israeli authorities  
contents para 1-3 reftel.  
matters
  2. Suggest/this type henceforth be treated EXDIS.
- GP-3.

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-00

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:WDWolle:fah:5/3/67

Tel. Ext: 4422

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

IO/UNP - Mr. Paolozzi

NEA/ARN - Mr. Gamon

S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED  
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

47  
175751  
APR 14 6 40 PM '67

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 175 751

EXDIS

02

REF: Tel Aviv ~~XXXX~~ 3259

1. Re para 2 reftel, Department would prefer GOI not link team visit to desalting. In first place, such linkage, should it appear in Israeli press, would expose team to questions concerning trip upon return to US. qte No comment unqte posture would not be ~~convincing~~ if visit had in fact been concerned with this above-board activity. Secondly, desalting linkage likely give rise to erroneous impression within Israel that USG had reached new stage in consideration Israeli desalting project. We see no need for this subterfuge when GOI can say visit part of routine and continuing exchanges between US and Israeli scientists in atomic energy field. Beyond this we would prefer GOI avoid ~~XXXXXX~~ comment.

GP 1

END

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 4-10-00

KATZEPAD

Drafted by:  
NEA/IAI:MSerner:ef:4/14/67

Tel. Ext.  
x4523

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

IAI - Mr. Welle

SCI - Mr. Zook (subs)

AEC - Dr. ~~XXXX~~ Reichardt (subs)

S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

2

48  
172115

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

STATE 172115  
EXDIS

APR 10 7 21 PM '67

RE: State 171360

1. Team has reservations on TWA 840 arriving Tel Aviv 1800 April 20.  
Departing Tel Aviv for Rome TWA 41 at 0900 April 24.
2. Outgoing flight is direct from New York which should minimize  
Team  
possibility last-minute changes in schedule. ~~NEVERMIND~~ Team will  
be instructed inform Embassy FLASH in event unavoidable change.

GP 1

END

KATZENBACH

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-00

Drafted by:  
NEA/LAI:MSterner:ef:4/10/67

4523

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

LAI - Mr. Atherton  
SCI - Mr. Zook (subs)  
AEC - Dr. Reichardt (subs)  
ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (subs)  
INR - Mr. Austin (subs)

S/S - LWalker

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS



49  
171360

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

2

APR 7 9 10 PM '67

81  
Origin  
SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 171360  
EXDIS

Ref: Tel Aviv 3020

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju/rq, NARA, Date 4-13-00

1. You should tell Bitan that while USG remains disappointed at long GOI delay in setting date for Dimona visit we accepting offer send team for this purpose April 22. AEC has selected following members:

- A. Floyd Culler, Jr.; Assistant Director Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
- B. Donald Erb; Chief of Water Reactor Branch, Division Reactor Development and Technology, AEC
- C. George Pleat; Assistant Director Reactor Products Branch, Division of Production, AEC; formerly Deputy Director AEC Division of Intelligence.

2. Culler and Erb will be known to GOI since they were members team on last visit Dimona. Pleat's former assignment should be make known to GOI, so they cannot later protest use of former AEC intelligence officer.

3. Stipulations para 2 refel satisfactory. No contact will be made with Israeli Embassy here.

4. While April 22 date agreeable, you should request GOI agreement that should team feel they need more than one day at Dimona, they will

Drafted by: NEA/IAI:MSterners:ef:4/7/67

4523

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

~~SECRET~~  
Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Davies (draft)  
IAI - Mr. Wollé (draft)  
SCI - Mr. Pollack  
ACDA - Dr. Rochlin  
ACDA/IRCGleysteen

INR - Mr. Austin  
AEC - Dr. Reichardt  
S/S - Mrs. Davis



5. We assume GOI will prepare schedule for visit at Dimona. As in past, would appear desirable spend previous night Beersheva so as to give team full day at site. Team has no present plans visit other sites but this possibility should be kept open in any discussion this aspect of visit with GOI. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

7. Embassy requested coordinate with GOI in making hotel reservations for indicated dates.

CR 1

END



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET-KDIS~~

148938

50

2

MAR 3 8 26 PM '67

80

Origin

55

Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN  
USUN  
Amconsul JERUSALEM

STATE: 148938  
KDIS:

REF: Tel Aviv's 2750

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-229

By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

1. Department continues to believe that from Jordanian viewpoint time is inopportune for secret ~~GOI~~ GOJ talks of nature envisaged by Sasson, and therefore does not wish transmit such suggestion to Jordanians. In any case we fail to see any real substance in message Sasson proposes we pass Jordanians.
2. We think it advisable to correct Sasson's impression of Davies' suggestion to Evron reported Deptel 134413. Idea was that Israeli communication to UNSYG on latter's November 29 proposals might be used as umbrella for or airing in MAC context putting to him/some of GOI's specific suggestions on LIMAC. There was no suggestion this communication could somehow form umbrella for direct GOI-GOJ talks.
3. If GOI still wants somehow to engage Jordanians in discussion UNSYG's proposals and/or measures for practical improvement LIMAC functioning before communicating itself with UNSYG, we believe appropriate channel would be for Israeli MAC delegate to sound out Daoud, ~~using~~ UNSYG's November 29 note to Security Council members as peg for approach. While admittedly there

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI - WDWolle:pas:3/2/67

Tel. Ext.

4422

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

IO/UNP - Mr. Campbell

NEA/ARN - Mr. Wiley

S/S - Mr. Brown

~~SECRET-KDIS~~



~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

little likelihood of positive Daoud response to any Israel suggestion for working out practical MAC improvement measures & even if tied to "outstanding matter of business in form of U Thant's November proposals", this may be worth a try and certainly is proper channel for such initiative. Another possibility might be for GOI consult with IJMAC chairman and ask him use his initiative and experience to promote specific MAC improvements. We recall both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (Tel Aviv's 2316, Jerusalem's 538) have suggested greater use of chairman in this respect. In any event, we see no point our getting in middle of this one, and we recall even Sasson on two occasions stressed that once USG took initial soundings with Jordan GOI would go forward without involving us further as intermediary (Tel Aviv's 2316 and 2454).

4. Department's basic position remains as expressed State 123171 that chances of progress with Jordan on Israeli proposals would be much improved if GOI could be reasonably forthcoming on UNSYG's proposals.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

1 4 2 7 1 1

51 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

FEB 23 6 54 PM '67

STATE

142 711

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #391

EXDIS

By fw, NARA, Date 5-30-00

FROM SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR

Your A-478 describing conversations with two Israeli contacts suggests Israel could be much closer to nuclear weapons capability than we had supposed. We are requesting urgent assessment these and other recent reports by Washington intelligence community. While we will reserve judgment pending outcome that assessment, potential implication these reports makes it even more pressing to obtain response from Eshkol on our request for visit to Dimona. You will recall that on January 16 he promised invitation would be forthcoming QTE within a few weeks UNQTE. You should inform Prime Minister that highest levels of USG are aware you requested GOI agreement to visit as long ago as November and are frankly disturbed at

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:MSterner:fah:2/21/67

4523

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Davies

NEA - Mr. Handley

S/S - Mr. O'Donohue

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (subs)

SCI - Mr. Trevithick (subs)

White House - Mr. Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Lack of GOI response. We hope Prime Minister will be able set date for visit in very near future.

GP-1.

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

605  
51a

OK  
80  
1-11 Higgins  
2-11  
3-11 2/23/67

February 23, 1967  
Date

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

old 5/5, Jan 1967  
2/23  
ame 5:30

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS ENCLOSURE  
CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy TEL AVIV

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #391By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

STATE

EXDIS

FROM SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR

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NEA:IAI:MSterner:fah:2/21/67 4523

The Secretary

NEA - Mr. Davies  
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton  
SCI - Mr. Trevithick (subs)

NEA - Mr. Handley S/S -  
ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (subs)

~~SECRET~~



2

TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

lack of GOI response. We hope Prime Minister will be able set dates  
for visit in very near future.

GP-1.

End

52

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

138639

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

8/1  
55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV  
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN  
Amconsul JERUSALEM

FEB 16 5 41 PM '67

02

STATE 138639

EKDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ig, NARS, Date 4-16-81

Refs: Amman 2045, Tel Aviv 2659

1. Dept officer passed substance paras 1 through 3 of Amman 2045 to Israeli Embassy Minister Evron Feb 14. Evron said he would reassure GOI no tanks included in present Jordan arms package. (We have now seen Feb 12 JERUSALEM POST photo and agree both items shown appear be self-propelled 40-MM AA guns.)
2. Evron again asked if it would not be possible for GOJ to stop publicizing airlift deliveries. This connection Israeli-Counselor, in subsequent conversation, expressed concern re reports from Amman in Feb 15 Israeli press that F-104 armament includes air-to-air missiles. Dept officer reiterated to both Evron and Counselor that GOJ publicity was essential and expected element in this exercise and advised GOI be relaxed about it.

GP-3

End

ACTING ; MATZENBACH

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:ALAtherton, Jr:fah:

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

2/15/67

DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes (info)  
NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton

S/S - MR. THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

53  
134413

500002

87  
Origin  
SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV  
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN  
USUN  
Amconsul JERUSALEM  
Amembassy BEIRUT

FEB 9 7 37 PM '67

STATE

134413

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-229

By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

REF: Tel Aviv 2610

1. Davies conveyed to Israeli Minister Evron Feb 8 gist Hussein's reaction to Israel's proposals strengthen ISMAC (para 1 through 3 Amman 1878). Davies thought Hussein's reactions not completely negative and suggested Embassy Tel Aviv would be in touch with Foreign Office on matter. Suggested also that since King indicated acceptance SYG's proposals strengthen UNTSO might be QTE first step UNQTE, might be useful explore possibility using these broader SYG proposals as umbrella for some of Israel's suggestions on LJMAG.
2. Re para 4 Amman 1878, Davies noted only that King considered Israeli proposals for QTE confidant UNQTE and direct telephone

Drafted by: NEA:RFDavies:  
NEA:IAI:ALAtherton, Jr:fah:

Tel. Ext.  
2942

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

2/9/67

NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton  
IO/UNP - Miss Brown

S/S - Mr. Morris

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

contact too risky at this time.

3. Embassy requested follow up with GOI along lines Davies remarks to Evron. You should avoid going into details of King's comments reported para 4 Amman 1878.

GP-3

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



DEPT. OF STATE  
ORIGIN ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 7 ISR  
ISRAEL 54

Original to be Filed in \_\_\_\_\_ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CA-5897.

HANDLING INDICATOR

NO.

TO : Amembassy Algiers, Amembassy Amman, Amembassy Baghdad, Amembassy Beirut, Amembassy Cairo, Amembassy Damascus, Amconsul Jerusalem, Amembassy Jidda, Amembassy Khartoum, Amembassy Kuwait, Amembassy Taiz, Amembassy Tripoli, Amembassy Tunis, Amcongen Dhahran, Amcongen Aleppo, Amconsul Aden, Amcongen Alexandria, Amembassy Tel Aviv, Amembassy London, Amembassy Paris, Ottawa

FROM : Department of State

DATE: FEB 7 10 57 AM '67

SUBJECT : Ben Gurion Visit to United States

REF :

David Ben Gurion, former Prime Minister of Israel, is scheduled to visit the United States and Canada in March in connection with celebrations of his 80th birthday. He will be in the U.S. March 1-20 and Canada March 20-21. In the U.S. he will visit New York City, Miami, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston.

Mr. Ben Gurion's trip has been privately arranged by American Jewish groups and many of his appearances will be in connection with fund raising for State of Israel bonds and the Israel Education Fund. Washington is not on his itinerary and there are no plans for him to hold discussions with U.S.G. officials.

The above information may be used by the addressee posts to answer possible queries from Arab officials or private individuals.

RUSK

COPYFLO-PBR

1967 FEB 7 PM 12 13

## POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
AMB/PO			
DCM			
POL			
ECON			
CONS			
ADM			
AID			
USIS			
FILE			

Action Taken:

Date:

Initials:

UNCLASSIFIED

For Department Use Only

☐ In ☒ Out

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:MSterner:dl

Drafting Date:

2/2/67 4523

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

IAI - Mr. Atherton

S/S - Mr. Morris

White House - Mr. Wriggins

NEA/P - Mr. Brown

EUR - Mr. Beneville

AF - Mr. Garland

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

379

1-4/11/67  
2-1/11/67  
3  
H.S.  
5/12

February 3, 1967

Date

Called Randy Beach  
1340 2/6 MS

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

BHR(TRS)  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Airgram to Algiers, Amman,  
Baghdad, etc.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION



## UNCLASSIFIED

Amembassy Algiers, Amembassy Amman, Amembassy Baghdad,  
 Amembassy Beirut, Amembassy Cairo, Amembassy Damascus,  
 Amconsul Jerusalem, Amembassy Jidda, Amembassy Khartoum,  
 Amembassy Kuwait, Amembassy Taiz, Amembassy Tripoli,  
 Amembassy Tunis, Amcongen Dhahran, Amcongen Aleppo,  
 Amconsul Aden, Amcongen Alexandria, Amembassy Tel Aviv  
 Amembassy London, Amembassy Paris , Ottawa  
 Department of State

## Ben Gurion Visit to United States

David Ben Gurion, former Prime Minister of Israel, is scheduled to visit the United States and Canada in March in connection with celebrations of his 80th birthday. He will be in the U.S. March 1-20 and Canada March 20-21. In the U.S. he will visit New York City, Miami, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston.

Mr. Ben Gurion's trip has been privately arranged by American Jewish groups and many of his appearances will be in connection with fund raising for State of Israel bonds and the Israel Education Fund. Washington is not on his itinerary and there are no plans for him to hold discussions with U.S.G. officials.

The above information may be used by the addressee posts to answer possible queries from Arab officials or private individuals.

UNCLASSIFIED

NEA/IAI:MSterner:dl

2/2/67

4523

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

IAI - Mr. Atherton

S/S -

White House - Mr. Saunders

NEA/P - Mr. Brownack

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

55  
132614

2

80  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

State

FEB 7 3 06 PM '67

REF: Tel Aviv 2553 2614

EXDIS

1. Entire range outstanding Israeli requests for military and economic assistance presently under urgent USG consideration.
2. Meanwhile, you may wish correct Dinstein misapprehension (para 3 reftel) that \$10 million already agreed upon under US-Israel tank agreement. Last outstanding balance of \$7 million for FY 67 under that agreement already obligated ~~for~~ procurement. Possibly Dinstein thinking of two tranches of requested by Israelis \$5 million credit each for FYs 1968 and 1969/but not acted on by DOD pending Israeli clarification its specific utilization. Ambassador Harman was in this regard informed by DOD Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes on October 17, 1966, of USG reasoning that further credit cannot be granted for follow-on spare parts. This was reiterated by Mr. Hoopes Jan. 27. on ~~XXXXX~~. Subsequent request for \$14 million credit on Hawk terms, of which \$10 million for tank parts, would appear supersede this and other requests.

GP-3

END.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By inf, NARS, Date 4-6-81

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:d1:2/7/67

Tel. Ext.

4967

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger ~~XXXXX~~

Clearances:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

NEA/RA - Col. Fredricks (draft)

S/S - Mr. Thompson

DOD/OSD/NESA - Col. Jordan (draft)

DOD/ILN - Mr. Manolas (subs)

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

56  
1 2 6 4 5 8INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Origin

SS  
Info:ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV  
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN

JAN 27 10 28 AM '67

STATE 126458

DECLASSIFIED

2

EXDIS

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #385

COLLEGE RUN

By ju NARA. Date 5-36-00

1. Dept officer informed Israeli Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron Jan 26 that USG had now completed certain plans related to our earlier decision to accelerate F-104 deliveries and training for Jordan. In next few weeks we would be sending 6 F-104s to Jordan on temporary basis. These would be US Air Force planes, would be maintained by US Air Force personnel and would be withdrawn as Jordan's own F-104s were delivered. We were taking this step within context our effort achieve maximum psychological impact in Jordan through rapid and visible response to King Hussein's request for assistance. While in Jordan, aircraft would be used for training Jordanian pilots and ground crews.

2. Dept officer stated that this action would be presented publicly as integral part of our December commitment to

Drafted by:

1/26/67

NEA: IAI: ALAtherton, Jr; fah:

Tel. Ext.

2942

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton  
DOD - Mr. Hoopes (info)

S/S - Mr. Thompson

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

accelerate training and delivery F-104s for Jordan. We did not intend to initiate publicity and would not comment on status of aircraft or details our arrangements with GOJ. We wanted GOI to know, however, that USG had taken every precaution to assure that there would be no incidents involving these aircraft; specifically, they would not be flown in border areas. Dept officer stressed that this and other details being very closely held and requested GOI do likewise.

3. Ambassador Harman said this information would be helpful to Prime Minister Eshkol in calming fears which presence these aircraft in Jordan might arouse. At same time, noting GOI's concern re publicity currently being accorded to airlift in Jordan, Harman urged that arrival of F-104s be kept in low key. In addition, he urged early favorable response to GOI request for delivery of eight rather than presently scheduled four A-4F's to Israel in December (Katzenbach-Harman Memcon Jan 18); such decision would help counteract potentially adverse reaction in Israel to arrival F-104s in Jordan.

GP-1

End

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

123171

57

42  
Origin  
55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV  
Amembassy AMMAN

JAN 21 2 39 PM '67

INFO: USUN NEW YORK  
Amembassy BEIRUT  
AmConsul JERUSALEM

STATE 123171  
EXDIS  
SUBJECT: IJMAC

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-229  
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

1. Re strengthening UNTSO Israelis have been most unclear about their intentions and what action they hoped from us. Tel Aviv's 2316 (para 5) said Israelis left QTE impression UNQTE on Jan. 8 that they awaiting news from US of Jordanian reaction to their points before replying to SYG's proposals. On Jan. 10, however, (State's 116174) Evron told Buffum Eban writing SYG QTE within next few days UNQTE with several specific suggestions on IJMAC. There was absolutely no suggestion ~~XXXXXX~~ Eban's letter would be held pending our report of GOJ's reactions. This/attempt to sort out telegram situation.

2. FOR AMMAN: Ambassador should through channel he deems appropriate describe proposals which Israelis outlined at Jan. 8 dinner. Without taking position on merits these proposals, Embassy should

Drafted by: 1/20/67  
UNP: SJ Campbell/GPaolozzi:cap  
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Mr. Wolle  
UNP - Miss Brown  
S/S - Mr. Bruce  
NEA/ARN - Mr. Kinsolving  
IO - Mr. Buffum

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

inform Jordanians USG will report back to Israelis any comments GOI wishes to make. Embassy may also say it our understanding that if agreement appears possible, GOI would propose its ideas through UNTSO or MAC channels (para 3 Tel Aviv's 2316).

If Jordanians inquire about Israeli reaction to SYG's proposals, you may say we have not received definitive response but believe suggestions mentioned above give partial idea of direction of Israel's thinking. Department leaves to Embassy discretion whether it wishes to probe for information about Daoud as suggested in para 2 (a) of Tel Aviv's 2316.

3. FOR TEL AVIV: Re Embtel 2405, if queried by GOI, you should note there has been some delay as a result of confusion about Israeli intentions but add that Embassy Amman will outline Israeli proposals to the GOI as soon as suitable occasion presents itself.

However, you should make clear to GOI that, while we see merit in Israeli suggestions, we cannot regard them as substitute for SYG's more basic proposals of November 29. We believe chances of progress with Jordan on Israeli proposals would be much improved if GOI could be reasonably forthcoming on some of SYG's proposals. For example, if GOI could agree to most of suggestions made by SYG insofar as they apply to IJMAC, we believe these improvements might be mixed in with some of Israel's ideas as part of overall IJMAC strengthening operation.

~~SECRET~~

END  
RUSK



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

58  
116225

40

Origin

35

Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

JAN 11 10 34 AM '67

STATE 116225

002

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BARBOUR FROM SECRETARY

Tel Aviv's 2249

Please inform Eban that it has become most important for us to make another visit to Dimona this month preparatory to Top Secret discussions with the Joint Atomic Energy Committee on non-proliferation matters. Accordingly, we request invitation to visit facility January 21 or 28. You should ask that information on discussions be very closely held.

GP-3      END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 5-31-00

Drafted by: NEA:RPD Davies:d1:bw	1/10/67	Tel. Ext.: 2107	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
-------------------------------------	---------	--------------------	--

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley    SCI - Mr. Trevithick    ACDA - Dr. Rochlin    S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~WHITE~~ White House - Mr. Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

PRIORITY

JAN 17 9 17 PM '67

Info:

STATE 120440

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #382  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-80

1. Following is text of QTE piece of paper UNQTE delivered January 16 by GOI Embassy to White House, described as message from Premier Eshkol to President Johnson but bearing no salutation or signature line:

QTE: Today I took a most difficult decision - not to authorize a military reaction to the brutal Syrian provocation which took place yesterday morning. Terrorists from Syria mined the village of Dishon and put anti-personnel mines on a football ground. A young man was killed and others wounded. This outrage came as a climax to a period of sustained Syrian aggression which included the following acts over the past ten days: wholesale penetration of the Israeli side of the frontier; attacks with light arms on our farmers inside and outside the Demilitarized

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:MSterner:WDWolle:fah

Tel. no. 4523

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

1/17/67

NEA - Mr. Davies  
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton  
IO - Mr. Buffum (draft)

~~SECRET~~

S/S - Mr. Walker  
White House - Mr. Rostow  
NEA - Mr. Handley



Page 2 of telegram to TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

Zone; bombardment of Israelis on sovereign Israel territory with tank shells; laying of mines in roads and fields, and totally unprovoked shooting on Israeli vessels on Lake Tiberias which is Israeli territory.

Through all this period we kept our reaction to the minimum and tried to avoid escalation. The country is seething with indignation. It seems that Syria wishes to appear as the champion of anti-Israel militance, and to embroil it in the aggressive policy.

If we have decided not to act today it is because we still hope that Syria will understand the danger of her present course.

Since we agreed to be in close and frank contact I felt bound to share my deep concern with you. UNQTE

2. Embassy should deliver following message in response either through Foreign Ministry or Prime Minister's office. Message should be prepared in style similar to GOI text, i.e., on plain paper without salutation or signature lines. Text follows:

QTE: Thank you for writing to me candidly about the present difficult situation on ~~XX~~ Israel's northern border. I respect the courage you have shown in dealing with it.

I was saddened to learn of the fatality caused by the mine explosion at Dishon. We share Israel's sorrow about this senseless and brutal act.

~~SECRET~~



Page 3 of telegram to TEL AVIV**SECRET**

I want you to know how fully I appreciate the painful dilemma that you and your colleagues face in coping with continuing acts of terrorism along Israel's borders. No government can be expected to adopt ~~xxx~~ a ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ <sup>passive</sup> attitude toward incidents that threaten the lives and properties of its citizens. The tragedy is that the search for security can lead to actions which, perversely, threaten to destroy chances for the permanent peace we all seek and which thus in turn pose a serious dilemma for this Government. I am therefore particularly gratified by your decision not to authorize military retaliation. I say this, believe me, in full appreciation of how difficult that decision must have been for you. I am convinced, however, that there are, fortunately, alternatives to military retaliation that in the long run will provide Israel with a greater measure of security. Your government and mine are already engaged in discussions concerning possible ways in which technology we are developing might help strengthen the capability of the Israeli border forces to intercept infiltrators. I believe this to be a promising approach, and I can assure you of our continuing interest in seeing this program go forward.

I earnestly hope that your government will continue to meet the present situation with the same high statesmanship which it has so frequently displayed in the past under trying circumstances. We believe

**SECRET**



Page 4 of telegram to TEL AVIV~~SECRET~~

that the evidence from years past demonstrates that military retaliation is not the answer to this problem. We have already seen enough of the present pattern of events in the Middle East to realize that armed reprisals not only fail to put a halt to terrorism, but on the contrary, strengthen the radical and irresponsible forces in the Arab societies that provide a favorable climate for terrorist activities.

I am encouraged by the initiative of Secretary General U Thant in calling attention to the present dangerous situation along the Israel-Syria border and asking both the Israeli and Syrian Governments to agree to an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. I welcome your government's initial favorable reaction to his proposal. I hope that your government will be flexible about the details of the emergency meeting in the interest of furthering the overall objectives of relieving tension on the border.

We have instructed our Ambassador in Damascus to approach the Syrian Government urgently to call attention to the dangers of the situation, to stress our belief that acts of terrorism within Israel are a major factor threatening the peace, and to urge full cooperation with the Secretary General's appeal.

Let me once again assure you of my personal close attention and deep concern for Israel's security. UNQTE

GP-3.

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

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ACTION: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Embassy TEL AVIV

EXDIS

STATE

111019

1. Department hopes you will seize earliest opportunity follow up our request for visit to Dimona as well resumption talks on overall arms control problems.

2. Re former you should inform Eban that USG increasingly disturbed at pattern which USG-GOI exchanges on Dimona appear to be taking. Our desire make sixth visit to Dimona could not have come as surprise to GOI since principle of visits at six-monthly intervals long ago established. Yet each time visit falls due GOI delays in responding to our request to set date causing sour note be struck in US-Israeli relations. We see no reason why US-Israeli relations should be subjected to this periodic strain. We urge ForMin to give us early date for visit lest lack of GOI responsiveness be misinterpreted within USG and begin to color other aspects of US-Israeli relations. We would hope ForMin would agree with us as to desirability making visits, beginning with present one, automatic six-monthly procedure.

GP-3

END.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #375

By JWS, NARA, Date 5-30-01

RUSK

Drafted by:  
NEA/IAI:MSterner:dl:12/23/66

Tel. Ext.  
4523

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

SCI - Mr. Trevithick (subs) ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (subs) NEA/IAI - Mr. Welle  
White House - Mr. Wiggins (info) NEA - Mr. Davies S/S

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

- Mr. Williamson



~~SECRET/EX~~ ;  
CLASSIFICATION  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

5339

60a

December 23, 1966

Date

*L. C. Gray*  
*2- Rel. J*

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*ABT*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~ ENCLOSURE  
CLASSIFICATION

2027  
Rec'd 1/20

## TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

5339  
WORK COPY  
~~SECRET~~  
606~~SECRET~~/EXDIS~~SECRET~~ Embassy TEL AVIV

EXDIS

STATE

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GP-3

END.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #375  
By JW, NARA, Date 5-30-80

RUSK

NEA/LAI:MStern:dl:12/23/66

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NEA - William J. Handley

SCI - Mr. Trevithick (subs) ACDX - Dr. Rochlin (subs) NEA/LAI - Mr. Wollé  
White House - Mr. [illegible] NEA - Mr. Davies S/S~~SECRET~~/EXDIS