

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

61 W H
106062
1
DEC 20 8 03 PM '66
FOR OC/IT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY **DECLASSIFIED**

Info:

STATE 106062

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NODIS

NLJ 00-229

cb: NARA Date 10-27-00

1. Davies December 20 brought Israeli Minister Evron uptodate re current status Macomber negotiations Amman. Said King a) wished accept our offer of advanced loan of six F-104s and b) appeared understand no significant augmentation our equipment offer possible. Noted that Ambassador Macomber believed agreement close on other elements proposal but convinced pressures on King were real. Had asked for instructions regarding increase in Jordan army force levels which was principal remaining question.
2. Davies said that in considering this question our aim was to keep size of Jordan army within authorized budget levels. If we decided some increase in force levels necessary, we would seek to keep this to minimum and attempt cut back later. Re equipment offer, King apparently felt our package adequate. Jordan would probably have difficult time, however, at December 24 Cairo UAC meeting when King's representative must try to defend King's right to determine what goes on in Jordan and it important that ~~Ki~~ Hussein be able to demonstrate he making real effort strengthen Jordan's defenses. Davies emphasized we had not yet reached agreement but felt elements of agreement were there.

Drafted by:

NEA:ARN:ALathertones:av 12/20/66

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Davies

Clearances:

s/s JFW Mr. Walsh

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Classification

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Classification

3. Evron commented that Foreign Minister Eban particularly disturbed by possibility of any increase in Jordan army manpower and asked whether Jordanians had indicated how large an increase they wanted. Davies replied GOJ thinking in terms of 5,000 men, noting JAA presently under strength in many ~~units~~ units. In response Evron query how USG could effectively exercise control over size of JAA, Davies pointed out additional costs would affect our budget support of GOJ development program, in both of which we have legitimate interest. We would prefer to see army reduced rather than increased in size and hoped any increase would be temporary.

4. Evron noted that early publicity re our offer could be expected in view forthcoming ~~XXXXX~~ Cairo meeting. Davies said we would ask GOJ for 24-hour advance notice re publicity in order assure full consideration. We would be in touch with GOI and Congressional leadership in this matter. Evron expressed concern that details our military package for Jordan would be revealed by GOJ in Cairo and subsequently become public. Davies replied that we doubted King would reveal details to UAC at this time.

GP-3

END

RUSK

62
104756

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Dec 18 2 16 PM '66

Info:

STATE 104756

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BARBOUR

2
Rostow

Macomber's first session with King Hussain December 17 left him encouraged although we do not yet have a deal. As result discussions, King now has understanding problems facing us in connection his request and, Macomber believes, recognizes the logic of our concerns. On other hand, he and Khammash still obviously concerned about limited nature our response and conditions implicit therein. On advance loan of F-104s, Hussain "sleeping on" offer at suggestion ~~104756~~ Macomber who urged him not ask us proceed unless he absolutely certain its importance to him. Many problems remain, negotiations proceeding Sunday.

Above passed Evron by Davies Saturday night.

GP-1

END

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229
By CB, NARA Date 10-27-00

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA/RPD Davies:atm

Tel. Ext.

2108

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Brown

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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80
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
INFO: USUN
Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy LONDON

63
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DEC 8 8 03 PM '66

STATE 99531

EXDIS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

1. Israeli Amb Harman ~~recalled Barbour's conversation reported in the~~
December 8
requested urgent meeting/with Acting Asst Secy Handley.
2. Harman recalled Barbour's conversation Nov 22 with Foreign Minister Eban in which Barbour said it possible some additional arms aid would be given to Jordan for psychological reasons. At that time Eban had mentioned impact on area arms balance and Israel's security if there should be any significant new arms aid to Jordan. In agreement of March 10, 1965, US had undertaken keep Israel informed of all arms deals with Jordan, and during last year and half US and Israel had remained in close touch on this matter. Thus, Israel had not reacted when told USG was sending small number jeeps to Jordan and speeding up training for 104's. Subsequently,

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Telegraphic transmission and
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NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walker

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however, Israel had learned through its own sources that Genl Khammash was in Washington to discuss arms request. Foreign Minister Eban would be arriving New York tonight and obviously would wish to know what USG had decided.

3. Harman said he therefore wished continue Davies' conversation with Evron last night ~~(STATE)~~ since it appeared USG under pressure from Jordan to supply significant additional arms and that decision imminent. He hoped it not correct decision imminent. Moreover, it appeared MAP for Jordan already larger than Israel had known and that US considering making increases in this program. Israel also had impression US might decide supply offensive weapons to Jordan, which would be very serious matter. In discussions leading to March 1965 sales agreement Israel had been led believe Jordan would receive only 100 tanks but found out by accident later that 96 tanks also going to Jordan under MAP. In view this past experience with MAP to Jordan, Israel would have to take into account GOJ wants additional offensive weapons under MAP.

4. Handley responded there had been no intention to deceive Israel with regard to tanks. This had been honest misunderstanding as Ambassador well aware. It is true Khammash is here for discussions of new Jordan arms request. We are considering this request in context

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all our interests in area -- such as present position Jordanian regime, Jordan relations with other area states, Jordan economic situation, etc. We are trying determine what would be minimum response that would protect various interests as we see them. We have in mind current pressures on King, situation in GOJ Army, and fact latter is essential support of regime. We have to consider what would happen if GOJ should go to Soviets or to radical Arabs for arms. Our basic concern is for peace and stability of area. Nov 13 raid unfortunately had changed situation. We must now decide what it will take to put Humpty Dumpty together again.

5. Handley emphasized decision not yet taken and there no specific time frame for decision. USG will certainly bear in mind fact Eban in US and that Israel interested in this matter. We are considering all factors bearing on situation. Consequences go far beyond Jordan. There was question of our relations with Shah and other leaders who will be watching whether or not we properly support Hussein. This is front page news around world. For this reason we decided earlier speed up certain items to Jordan, such as jeeps and advancing delivery date of two training planes. This was nothing dramatic but was designed give psychological boost to Hussein and JAA.

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6. Harman said request now being discussed with Khammash apparently went way beyond what Israel had heard before. Israel hoped and believed USG would on no account make decisions that would upset arms balance. Could he so understand? Handley replied that concern for stability in area is central to US policy.

7. In subsequent discussion of present situation in Jordan, King's position, and evaluation of threats from Damascus and Cairo, Handley reminded Harman that our evaluations of situation sometimes differed; for example, as to effects on Jordan of something like Nov 13 raid. History would record whose evaluation was right. Nevertheless, we do not differ on proposition that peace, security of area and integrity of Israel ~~/MXEN~~ important. In these crucial matters there is no difference among us. It was true Hussein appeared on top of situation at present, but in maintaining his position he had been forced unfortunately to take measures that in long run might further alienate elements of population whose support he needs.

8. Harman noted that following Nov 13 raid Jordan had announced finding of huge cache of terrorist arms in Jordan, which would seem indicate lesson Israel had wished teach had been learned and Jordan now trying root out terrorists. Handley observed that Jordan had been taking similar measures before Nov 13 raid, as we had in fact been telling

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Israelis.

9. Harman then made further plea for details about Jordan request and possible US decision saying otherwise he would be forced face Eban without any facts. Israel had not been left in dark in this way before. He was confused and wondered what he could tell Eban. Was there chance US would make up UAC contribution, for example?

10. Handley repeated that we are deeply concerned by situation ourselves. We had spent much on GOJ over years and have no desire provide any additional arms. We would rather spend on econ development. We have made no fundamental decisions yet. What Ambassador had said would be part of input for our ultimate decision. It not clear whether UAC would come through with payments to Jordan or whether certain Arabs would make up UAC contribution, but our previous sales to Jordan had been for cash. We have made no decisions on new request, but undoubtedly we would have to provide some assistance. What we did would be in context of QTE minimum necessary UNQTE.

GP-3

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ACTING KATZENBACH

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ITGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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CATE: ☐ COLLECT
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ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Amembassy AMMAN
USUN
Amembassy LONDON

Dec 8 1 29 PM '66

STATE 98895

EXDIS

REF: 98894

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

1. In absence Davies, Evron followed up with Dept officer discussion of Jordan arms request reported in reftel.
2. Evron said Amb and he after reflecting on statements made by Davies were very troubled and wished be certain USG understood grave view Israel would take of situation if significant new quantities of hardware are put into Jordan. In particular, QTE Israel could not take quietly UNQTE sending of any offensive hardware to Jordan. This should be clearly understood by USG.
3. Evron asked if it is anticipated decision will be reached by weekend. Dept officer said he did not know. Although Khammash scheduled depart by weekend, this did not necessarily mean final decisions would have been reached. FYI: It is in fact our hope be able provide Khammash with something concrete before his

rafted by:
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Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

clearances:
NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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departure, which could conceivably be further delayed. END FYI

Evron again stressed Israel wished be kept informed of decisions as they are made because of serious bearing on Israel's security.

4. Evron said Amb. Harman was considering requesting appointment with senior official of Dept to repeat in stronger terms Israel's views on this matter but would defer such call if Dept officer would bring Israeli views to attention higher levels. Dept officer assured Evron this would be done.

GP-3.

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KATZENBACH

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Origin
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
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DEC 8 1 26 PM '66

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

2

EXDIS

1. Dept officer (Davies, NEA) asked Israeli Minister Evron come in Dec 7. Davies said he wanted to keep GOI abreast of USG problems in Jordan to extent he could. As Evron aware, General Khammash is in Washington. King Hussein sent him to make sure his own apprehensions re area situation clearly understood by USG.
2. Davies said USG studying what it can do to reprogram MAP for Jordan. This is proving very difficult matter, as would be expected. There is no decision yet on any additive elements. Uppermost in our minds is economic problem, i.e., need to keep Jordan on promising economic development path and not let this program be scuttled by overwhelming military burden. One problem even before Nov 13 had been question of long overdue pay increase for Jordan Army. This was now more urgent. Wage increases

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NEA - William J. Handley

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S/S - Mr. Walsh

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generally in Jordan have caused JAA enlisted pay scales to be seriously overtaken. We will probably have to go along on army pay increase.

3. Davies continued that GOJ's fears and beliefs are such that USG may not be able to come up with enough to prevent King from looking for other solutions. We could see one possible Arab solution in form of military funding from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia but this might be pretty flimsy. Alternatively, King might seek some sort of UAC effort to strengthen his army. Another possibility is turning to Soviets for arms, but whether King would be this foolish we do not know. In any event, King certainly regards Samu raid as biggest thing since 1956 and is convinced that substantial elements of his military establishment distrust his own policies.

4. Davies continued that he hoped situation has evolved to point where more rational look at situation and Jordan's needs can be taken by GOJ, but he was not sure this was so. Noted that King has been following traditional policy for coping with internal opposition, e.g., by forbidding proposed assembly/^{of} Palestinian notables. King knew his country and people better than we and we would not presume second-guess him, but Davies personally felt this action has widened gulf between regime and Palestinians. Davies concluded that Gen. Khammash would

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probably be going home this weekend.

5. Evron asked if he understood correctly that there would likely not be any additive equipment in our package for Jordan. Davies replied that whether there will or will not be additive equipment he could not say because there is no decision as yet. There might be some, but no decision has been reached.

6. Evron asked what fields additive equipment would be in, if provided at all. Davies replied that he could not say. He noted that NEA Bureau position is that anything that might be decided upon should be such as not to add seriously to the economic/budgetary side of Jordan's problem.

7. Evron expressed his personal view that granting of enlisted JAA pay increase sounded reasonable in the situation. He then concluded that any additive equipment QTE would cause another problem for us INQTE.

GP-3.

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ACTING

KATZENBACH

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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96223

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41

Origin

88

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE

96223

REF: Tel Aviv A-263

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229

By cb NARA Date 10-27-00

DEC 3 1 50 PM '66
DEC 3 1 50 PM '66

1. Your discussion with Eban Nov 2 suggested possibility somewhat greater Israeli give on problem reassuring UAR that Israel not working toward nuclear weapons capability. In effort zero in on this problem, it might be desirable try to focus on safeguards question at your coming meeting with Eshkol and Eban putting aside other aspects arms control such as missile initiative for subsequent meeting.
2. Eban once again indicated GOI rejects IAEA safeguards as means reassuring Arabs. Yet reasons set forth for this attitude by Eban as well as other Israeli officials reveal such serious inconsistencies and misconceptions as to way IAEA operates that we consider it worth making another determined effort review case for IAEA. If GOI misconceptions sincerely held, we believe we can clear them up to GOI's satisfaction. If on other hand they merely rationalizations for deeper reasons for not accepting safeguards, then we should uncover that fact in interest moving discussion onto more fertile ground.
3. Principal GOI objection to IAEA appears center around fear that inspections would provide information to Israel's enemies that would be prejudicial to

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:MStern:dl:12/2/66

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4523

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

UAR - Mr. Bergus (draft)

IAI - Mr. Welle (in draft)

ACDA - Mr. Gleysteen

G/PM - Mr. Trippe (draft)

ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (draft)

S/S Mr. Williamson

SCI - Mr. Trevithick (draft)

NEA - Mr. Davies (draft)

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Israeli security. We note with some concern Eban's remark "it most important Egyptians not learn locations of Israeli nuclear facilities and their specific function". We would like PM and FonMin to expand on this consideration. Surely UAR already knows location and specific function of facilities at Dimona and Nahel al-Soreq. Are there others? If so, we would like to know about them. If not, we do not see that there is any information disclosure of which GOI need fear.

4. Eban's comments also seem to display misconception about type of information that IAEA inspections are expected produce. Under IAEA safeguards there is no need give inspectors either information of military significance or commercial secrets. As for GOI concern possibility of sabotage, only effective protection will be proper physical security measures such as fences, screening and escorting visitors, etc.

5. In addition, great deal of effort has been devoted in developing IAEA safeguards system to avoid any burden or disadvantage to country being inspected.

GOI well aware of this since current procedures were approved in September 1965 by entire membership of IAEA, including Israel. One of key features is ~~provision for~~ ^{provision for} ~~consultation on designation of inspectors which is designed provide opportunity reject~~ ~~from to host country of exercising with agency that inspectors not be of hostile~~ ~~national of unfriendly country without embarrassment to country being inspected,~~ ~~nationality. Israel could, for example, ask that inspections be carried out exclusively~~ ~~by agency inspectors of American or friendly European nationality.~~ This would provide Israel with substantially same security that it possesses now. Additional security could be obtained by escorting inspectors, which is host government's right.

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6. Although not raised by Eban on Nov 2, GOI officials have in past expressed unhappiness at failure Israel be elected to seat on IAEA Board of Governors. If this is brought up in next meeting you may say that while we recognize Israel's legitimate interest in gaining seat on Board, we regard this as minor issue not detracting from weighty arguments in favor of Israeli acceptance IAEA safeguards. There is no interaction between Board members and IAEA inspections staff. Composition of Board, therefore, will not affect manner of inspections or use to which information put.

7. In sum, we come back to fairly simple proposition that if Israel's nuclear facilities are indeed entirely devoted to peaceful purposes, as GOI claims, Israel has nothing to lose and great deal to gain by making this fact known in most convincing manner to outside world. It remains our conviction that IAEA is most effective vehicle for doing this. Only an international agency of world-wide scope can establish safeguards in which all other states -- friends and enemies alike -- can have confidence. Special bilateral or third party arrangements are far less satisfactory for precise reason they are special arrangements with no assurance to outsiders that universally accepted standards of inspection and accountability are being followed. Credibility such arrangements therefore much lower.

8. We would therefore like to urge GOI give renewed and dispassionate consideration advantages IAEA system in conveying assurance which Eban says GOI now sees to be in its advantage. We are of course always ready to consider any GOI ideas.

9. If favorable opening to pursue discussion of missiles arises, you should pursue our initiative along lines Department's CA-12335 and your remarks to Eban in refair.

GP-3

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91636

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~/EXDIS02
Nov 25 955P80
Origin
55
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV

INFO AmEmbassy AMMAN
AmConsul JERUSALEM
USUN

EXDIS

STATE 91636

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-299
By ics NARA, Date 10-9-02

F 5

1. During call by Israeli Minister Evron twenty-fifth, Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies reviewed current pressures on GOJ including reports of continuing demonstrations in Jordan-held Jerusalem and anticipated demonstrations in Amman. Evron complained Brady's story in New York Times made matters worse by playing up effectiveness of Shuquird and FLO. Davies stated GOJ regime made increasingly nervous by actions being taken by IDF on Israeli side of ADL, despite USG explanations to GOJ that these represented efforts to increase ADL security.

2. Davies stated we need make some gesture of support for King Hussein. Therefore, to meet GOJ request for military equipment, we planning take following actions with equipment already programmed for Jordan:

a) Deliver 106 MM recoilless rifles mounted on fifteen quarter-ton jeeps scheduled for delivery later this fiscal year, for use in public security patrolling;

b) Accelerate delivery schedule of first F-104's from mid-September to mid-July 1967. Jordanian Air Force morale is ^{principal} ~~unpleasant~~ problem troubling

Drafted by: NEA/ARN/LIKinsolving:jh 11/25/66	Tel. Ext. 3235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA- Rodger F. Davies
Clearance:		

NEA/IAI- Mr. Wolla (draft)

NEA/ARN- Mr. Atherton

DOD/ISA -Mr. Barringer (subs.) ~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Mr. Shaver

IO - Mr. Campbell (substance)

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Jordanian regime since sending Hawker Hunters against modern jets is like murder. We have asked Hussein not to give out numbers ^{publicly} ~~publicly~~; however, he will want to inform his own military ^{Davies} ~~and~~, possibly, his people of expedited ^{deliveries} ~~deliveries~~.

3. ~~Davies~~ stated none of above equipment would be additive to that already programmed for GOJ military establishment. With respect to stated need for additional equipment, we hope when psychological atmosphere in Amman permits to point out to GOJ economic consequences any major increase expenditures for military equipment. GOJ ~~realizes~~ realizes it can never match military strength of GOI but hopes develop capability deter raids. We hope GOI will take additional static defense measures and that we can then persuade GOJ to take similar measures rather than build-up arms on West Bank. We remain in contact with ranking officers of GOJ and are trying to maintain their perspective.

4. Davies noted UN Security Council about to vote on resolution ~~concerning~~ ~~cerning~~ Israel but we trying to maintain some reference to acts of violence across ADLS in preamble of draft resolution. However, burning issue remains whether Jordanian regime can withstand pressure. Evron stated GOI assessment of ~~xxx~~ situation same as that of USG but a "little more optimistic" about GOJ ability to survive.

5. Davies noted Cairo radio as well as PLO have opened up on GOJ in reaction to Wasfi Tel's press conference pin-pointing UAR failure to provide air cover, allegedly in violation of UAC agreement; however, no attack yet on Hussein personally. Evron replied Nasser trying to

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undermine Hussein's position by giving rein to Shuqairi and thus force Hussein into dependence on Cairo

6. Evron stated that while he understood what we attempting he was terribly concerned by effect knowledge of USG speed-up of deliveries of military equipment to GOJ, combined with censure of Israel in UNSC, would have on Israeli public and supporters of Israel in US. Suggested Israeli Embassy might be helpful through its own private comments to latter. He gloomed that a "spirit of Masada" might develop in Israel after SC resolution. Davies reminded him worst thing that could happen to Israel in present situation would be fall of Hashemite regime in Jordan. Evron urged that we stress in any public comment that action was acceleration of previously agreed equipment and not addition.

7. In response to Evron's question, Davies stated we had no rpt no indications that Hussein preparing to abdicate, and that we have made it clear to both friendly and not-so-friendly governments that interests of all would be impaired if chaos should develop in Jordan.

8. Davies continued important objective now is to reduce Hussein's apprehension about GOI motives so that he can concentrate on internal security. Evron hoped that even though USG feels it cannot deliver message from GOI, USG can give GOJ clear assessment of what it knows about GOI motives. Davies replied GOJ had itself called on GOI to take increased security measures in frontier areas. However, GOI movements of troops in full sight of Jordanians not best way to calm public opinion in Jordan, particularly in view of emotionalism in Army and West Bank.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

91607

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Origin
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 91607

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

Nov 25 8 29 PM '66

REF: Tel Aviv A-263

By ju, NARA, Date 5-31-00

EXDIS

1. Department has studied with interest record of your November 2 conversation with Eban on arms control. Although we cannot yet be certain to what extent Eban's remarks reflect real shift in GOI position, we are encouraged by his apparent candor. We find especially encouraging his remark that GOI now questions wisdom of keeping Nasser uncertain about Israeli nuclear intentions and hopes find "middle ground" whereby UAR could be reassured without disclosure of information prejudicial to Israel's security.

2. Department would like to see this promising beginning followed up at ~~earliest~~ early opportunity to preserve sense of continuity in discussions. Material now being prepared which we hope will be useful in your next talk with GOI. Because of importance USG attaches these discussions, and because they involve decisions which can be made only at highest level of GOI, we consider it preferable that discussions be pursued with Eshkol and Eban together rather than with FonMin alone. Eban will have to check out everything with PM in any case, procedure which at best will waste time and at worst could provide GOI with built-in mechanism for delaying tactics.

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:MSerner:dl:11/25/66

Tel. Ext.

4523

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

IAI - Mr. Wollé (draft) IAI - Mr. Symmes (subs) NEA - Mr. Davies
UAR - Mr. Bergus (info) SCI - Mr. Trevithick (draft) AEC - Mr. Staebler (subs)
ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (draft) White House - Mr. Wiggins (subs)
S/S - Mr. Shaver

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3. Recommend therefore that you request through Eban early appointment to meet with him and Eshkol for purpose taking up discussion where it left off November 2. At same time you should inform Eban that in line with our understanding with GOI concerning visits to Dimona at roughly six-month intervals, AEC team is now prepared to visit Dimona at any time during next 3 weeks. We hope GOI will let us know as soon as possible when visit would be convenient during this period. As FonMin will recall, it is now almost eight months since last visit which took place in early April of this year.

4. Material for your next discussion with Eshkol and Eban on overall arms control problem will be cabled by ^{Dec. 1.} ~~XXXXXX~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV

Nov 22 10 24 AM '66

INFO: " AMMAN
USUN

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STATE 88940

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

Secretary saw Ambassador Harman morning 21st to convey through him President's concern over Israeli raid into Jordan and its impact on King Hussein's position in Jordan. Secretary said we aware dilemma faced by Israel in coping with terror incidents but that the raid was disproportionate to problem. It was launched without consultation with us although just two weeks earlier we had stood firmly with Israel in the Security Council on this very problem. Israel's action has put Jordan Government under heavy pressure and both our interests and Israel's have been adversely affected. Secretary made clear that a recurrence of action across armistice lines could bring re-examination of our decision to sell certain military equipment to Israel.

Secretary said he welcomed statement by Prime Minister Eshkol as carried Monday's newspapers that Israel would seek to strengthen border security measures to prevent infiltration. Israel faces basically police problem, and police measures rather than disproportionate military attacks were the answer.

F
S

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NRA:RPD:bw 11/21/66	2107	classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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White House

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #313
By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

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Harman said President's thoughts would be conveyed immediately to Jerusalem. He had however just received message from Prime Minister concerning USG distress over November 13 incident which he then read. Message opened with statement relief at news President's swift and resilient recovery and expression appreciation for meaning President's leadership for cause world peace and advancement human welfare. Noted Prime Minister's distress at course which events have taken since disturbances of November 12 and 13 and stated USG views being studied with utmost respect. Following lengthy recapitulation events in Israel and Security Council which led to Israel's decision to take action in response to November 12 incident, Prime Minister stated he felt refusal to act would not only demoralize his people but also open way for new attacks by terrorist groups. What was planned as limited local action turned out differently owing to arrival of Arab Legion infantry who unexpectedly engaged Israeli unit at close range. Repeated details attack as given by General Rabin to Barbour (Tel Aviv's 1742). In regard to future Prime Minister wished President to know he has ordered study be made and action be taken in regard methods of improving Israel's static defense. Prime Minister stated central point is that Israel's basic policy has not changed. It stands by armistice agreement, supports status quo, and sovereignty and integrity of existing states. Prime Minister invited understanding of President for dilemma in which Israel found itself. Message closes with strong appeal for US support to prevent SC resolution which utterly ignores Israel's losses, anxieties and difficulties.

Following Harman's presentation Secretary stated he still could not understand how Israel so misread situation as not to realize even limited action would seriously

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~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

endanger Jordan Government and moderate policies it pursued. That Israel's action got out of control and escalated brought to his mind three incidents where escalation had or could have occurred. First occurred last year when infiltrators crossed from Pakistan-held territory into Indian-held Kashmir to harass area. Action taken by GOP without consultation with us brought move into Pakistan-held territory by Indian forces, again without consultation with us. Rate of escalation such we had no means to use our influence with either party. When cease-fire agreement finally came we were "fifteen minutes" from Congressional resolution which would have barred all further aid to India and Pakistan.

In matters involving U.S. we have practiced restraint in order to avoid escalation to extent possible. Despite heavy infiltration of North Viet Nam forces into south we waited five years before ordering bombing of supply points and routes in north. In effect, there was a five-year pause during which we sought other solutions. At present, almost every week, there are armed forays from Cambodia against us in Viet Nam. We know Prince Sihanouk does not condone actions and that he lacks military force to prevent them. Yet, because of position in which he would be put, we do not strike at our enemy in Cambodian territory.

Secretary noted that recently when six U.S. soldiers killed south of demilitarized zone in Korea we did not launch retaliatory action against north. Restraint is essential to avoid escalation and to build up prospects of peace. And yet, restraint and moderation are the most difficult of postures for any government to assume.

Ambassador Harman said Israel faces most difficult problem. Terror incidents occur on doorstep rather than miles away as in Kashmir. Its 800-mile frontier ~~extends~~ ~~across~~ across

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

extremely difficult terrain is guarded by only small conscript army. Government had increased length military service to make more men available for security patrols. Frontier villages employing night guards at their own expense. All this created "siege atmosphere" and made for most difficult way of life for Israeli citizens. Arab actions seem indication of policy of total aggression. Secretary did not agree this the case and again noted measures taken by Jordan to control terror groups. He said "what you have done in the name of your security seems in fact to have undermined Israel's security."

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

69a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Nov. 22, 1966

BKS:

Recommend we clear as quickly as possible. This telegram reports the Secretary's conversation with Harman yesterday and is only being cleared with us because it includes the Secretary's passing the President's message to Eshkol, which he did faithfully.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

Hal
HHS

Ret'd 10:05

Called Daniel sfs
10:10 11/22 RB

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

5216

696

MS

Nov. 21, 1966

Date

1 Wiggins
2 Ret'd

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Tel Aviv for the
Ambassador only.

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING;

BY DCIT ON 4-30-82

AnEmbassy TEL AVIV

INFO: " AMMAN
USUN

EXDIS

STATE _____

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

Secretary saw Ambassador Harman morning 21st to convey through him President's concern over Israeli raid into Jordan and its impact on King Hussein's position in Jordan. Secretary said we aware dilemma faced by Israel in coping with terror incidents but that the raid was disproportionate to problem. It was launched without consultation with us although just two weeks earlier we had stood firmly with Israel in the Security Council on this very problem. Israel's action has put Jordan Government under heavy pressure and both our interests and Israel's have been adversely affected. Secretary made clear that a recurrence of action across armistice lines could bring re-examination of our decision to sell certain military equipment to Israel.

Secretary said he welcomed statement by Prime Minister Eshkol as carried Monday's newspapers that Israel would seek to strengthen border security measures to prevent infiltration. Israel faces basically police problem, and police measures rather than disproportionate military attacks were the answer.

NEA:RPDavies:hw
S/S -

11/21/66

2107

The Secretary

White House -

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, Vol. 18, #343

By h2 NARA. Date 5-30-00~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Harman said President's thoughts would be conveyed immediately to Jerusalem. He had however just received message from Prime Minister concerning USG distress over November 13 incident which he then read. Message opened with statement relief at news President's swift and resilient recovery and expression appreciation for meaning President's leadership for cause world peace and advancement human welfare. Noted Prime Minister's distress at course which events have taken since disturbances of November 12 and 13 and stated USG views being studied with utmost respect. Following lengthy recapitulation events in Israel and Security Council which led to Israel's decision to take action in response to November 12 incident, Prime Minister stated he felt refusal to act would not only demoralize his people but also open way for new attacks by terrorist groups. What was planned as limited local action turned out differently owing to arrival of Arab Legion infantry who unexpectedly engaged Israeli unit at close range. Repeated details attack as given by General Rabin to Harbour (Tel Aviv's 1742). In regard to future Prime Minister wished President to know he has ordered study be made and action be taken in regard methods of improving Israel's static defense. Prime Minister stated central point is that Israel's basic policy has not changed. It stands by armistice agreement, supports status quo, and sovereignty and integrity of existing states. Prime Minister invited understanding of President for dilemma in which Israel found itself. Message closes with strong appeal for US support to prevent SC resolution which utterly ignores Israel's losses, anxieties and difficulties.

Following Harman's presentation Secretary stated he still could not understand how Israel so misread situation as not to realize even limited action would seriously

3

TEL AVIV

~~SECRET/NOIS~~

endanger Jordan Government and moderate policies it pursued. That Israel's action got out of control and escalated brought to his mind three incidents where escalation had or could have occurred. First occurred last year when infiltrators crossed from Pakistan-held territory into Indian-held Kashmir to harass area. Action taken by GOP without consultation with us brought move into Pakistan-held territory by Indian forces, again without consultation with us. Rate of escalation such we had no means to use our influence with either party. When cease-fire agreement finally came we were "fifteen minutes" from Congressional resolution which would have barred all further aid to India and Pakistan.

In matters involving U.S. we have practiced restraint in order to avoid escalation to extent possible. Despite heavy infiltration of North Viet Nam forces into south we waited five years before ordering bombing of supply points and routes in north. In effect, there was a five-year pause during which we sought other solutions. At present, almost every week, there are armed forays from Cambodia against us in Viet Nam. We know Prince Sihanouk does not condone actions and that he lacks military force to prevent them. Yet, because of position in which he would be put, we do not strike at our enemy in Cambodian territory.

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Ambassador Harman said Israel faces most difficult problem. Terror incidents occur on doorstep rather than miles away as in Kashmir. Its 300-mile frontier ~~extends~~ across

4

TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDLS~~

extremely difficult terrain is guarded by only small conscript army. Government had increased length military service to make more men available for security patrols. Frontier villages employing night guards at their own expense. All this created "siege atmosphere" and made for most difficult way of life for Israeli citizens. Arab actions seem indication of policy of total aggression. Secretary did not agree this the case and again noted measures taken by Jordan to control terror groups. He said "What you have done in the name of your security seems in fact to have undermined Israel's security."

GP-1

END

70
84604
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

40

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Amembassy AMMAN
USUN NEW YORK

02

Nov 15 12 17 PM '66

STATE 84604

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

EXDIS

In conversation with Hare reported in separate message, Harman said Israel had appreciated helpful dialogue with Jordan through US channels. At beginning that dialogue Hebron area had been mentioned. King had noted he was worried about Hebron area, and yet he had done nothing to stop terrorist activity coming from there. More could have been done and should have been done.

In subsequent discussion it was stressed to Harman that nature of dialogue (State 76248/) as we understood it led us to expect Israel would have furnished evidence of villagers' activity for transmittal to Jordan to give GOJ chance to take action itself.

If there was such evidence, GOJ could have acted on it. If there was no such evidence, enormity of Israeli raid on these villagers loomed even larger.

RUSK

GP-3

End

Drafted by:
NEA:IAI:HMSymmes:fah:11/15/66

Tel. Ext.
2942

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

83785

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

Nov 13 3 25 PM '66

INFO.: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
Amembassy CAIRO PRIORITY
Amconsul JERUSALEM PRIORITY
Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY
CINCSTRIKE PRIORITY

REF.: Tel Aviv's 1652

E X D I S

STATE

83785

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #332

By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

1. You should inform Bitan and higher levels as ~~appropriate~~ appropriate that USG deplores Israeli attack on Jordan this morning. As we have said frequently, we cannot agree to or condone such retaliatory action. Moreover, timing of action particularly embarrassing to King, who this morning is host to President Ayub. This retaliation coming a few days after the U.S. made a major ~~effort~~ effort over weeks of deliberation in the Security Council puts us in a particularly difficult position. Action can only make objective which we, Israelis and Jordanians alike seek of putting end to border raids more difficult to achieve. It will (a) place heavy domestic and external political strain on King Hussain's regime; (b) raise pressures for more militant posture toward Israel;

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

IO:JSisco/NEA:RPDavies/ARN:ALatherton

Classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

IAI:MSterne:IAI:HMSymmes:lab 11/13/66

NEA - Amb. Hare

White House - Mr. Wriggins (informed)

IO - Mr. Sisco

USUN - Amb. Goldberg (substance)

S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~ /EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ / EXDIS

(c) make much more difficult or impossible GOJ's carrying out anti-terrorist campaign in Palestinian areas of Jordan.

2. We deplore terror attacks inside Israel and recognize domestic pressures for action created but we do not agree that incidents in which three Israeli soldiers killed left GOI with no recourse except retaliatory military action across ~~ADL~~ ADL.

3. We are not willing deliver Israel's message to King Hussain. We have served as intermediary between Israel and Jordan in the interests of peace -- not in the interests of facilitating or explaining Israel's policy of retaliation. Given extraordinary efforts GOJ root out terrorist nets of which we have kept Israel informed, our relaying message now could connote to Jordanians some justification in our minds for Israeli action. That action has seriously undermined credibility our efforts exert restraining influence, particularly in Jordan. We suggest Israelis pass sanitized explanation for raid to Jordan through General Bull or UNSYG.

4. You should note our feeling that moral and diplomatic support Israel garnered by recent Security Council debate has now been seriously affected. Those Afro-Asians and others who viewed Israel's restraint favorably and recognized terrorism resulted primarily from Syria's irresponsibility will undoubtedly take less sympathetic view Israeli case. Syria, for its part, can take comfort from Israeli strike

~~SECRET~~ / EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

against Jordan citing it as vindication SARG claim of non-responsibility for terrorist activities.

5. Ambassador Goldberg has passed essence of above to Comay.

FOR AMMAN

FYI. Having in mind GOJ's previous assertions of pressures on it to retaliate against Israel, believe you should ~~continue efforts~~ ~~continue efforts~~ forestall thinking along those lines. END/~~FYI~~ FYI.

You may inform GOJ that we deplore ~~XXXXXX~~ Israeli action and will make this clear both publicly and to Israelis, but urge continued Jordan reliance on UNTSO and UN machinery in the area. Despite this backward step, we believe continued efforts eliminate use of Jordan territory for hostile acts against Israel essential for area stability and Jordan's security.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

72
78033

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Nov 3 1 03 PM '66

Reston

FO

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY
INFO: USUN PRIORITY
Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy DAMASCUS
Amconsul JERUSALEM
Amembassy BEIRUT
CINCSTRIKE

STATE 78033

EXDIS

USUN 2001~~XXXXXX~~, State 73494, Amman 1006, (NOTAL)

- 3.3(b)(1)
1. Dept [redacted] following on continuing high priority basis [redacted] Israeli activities suggesting preparations for attack on Syria and/or Jordan. We recognize Israeli frustration over current SC debate coupled with serious terrorist incident involving loss of life could precipitate retaliatory raid at any time, but Jordanian interpretation [redacted] as indicative Israeli attack imminent seems somewhat exaggerated. Dept inclined evaluate other recent [redacted] reports concerning Israeli air force activities as certainly indicative continued active contingency planning for retaliation but not necessarily immediate plan raid Syria. Nevertheless, in circumstances we see considerable value in Amb Barbour's making approach suggested in USUN 2001 to reenforce both Goldberg statement and earlier statement made by Hare to Harman (para 2, State 67505).

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
NEA: LAI: HMSymmes: fah: 11/3/66	2942	NEA - Raymond A. Hare S/S - Mr. Thompson
Clearances:		
INR/RNA - Mr. Austin IO - Mr. Buffum (subs) NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton		

SECRET

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-300
By *SL* NARA, Date 8-19-03

FORM 1-55 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

2. Suggest addressees repeat all messages bearing on this situation to USUN.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

02

73
68096

82

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

EXDIS

STATE 68096

FOR Ambassador Barbour from Secretary
substance oral

Request you deliver/following/message from me to Foreign Minister Eban.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

OCT 18 4 37 PM '66

1. I was most happy to have the opportunity to meet with the Foreign Minister in New York. Our limited time did not permit us to discuss everything we might have wished, but I am impressed at the ground we did cover. For me the exchange of views was both interesting and useful. Once again I want to express my appreciation for the constructive contribution he attempted to make on Vietnam in his UNGA speech. I would also like to say that we are gratified at the way the Israeli Government has handled the latest terrorist incidents on its borders. In my opinion his government's restraint and its decision to take the matter to the United Nations displays statesmanship of a high order.

2. I had hoped to have a second meeting with the Foreign Minister while he was in the US to discuss a subject to which I continue to attach the greatest importance -- arms control, and particularly actions that might be taken to prevent the escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race into the sophisticated and nuclear field. The Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister Eshkol

Drafted by: NEA/LAI:MSternner:d1:10/18/66	Tel. Ext. 4523	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
Clearances: NEA/LAI - Mr. Symmes S/S - Mr. Thompson	NEA - Mr. Davies	NEA - Ambassador Hare

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

are aware that this is a problem very high on the list of US concerns. What we achieve in the Arab-Israel context, or conversely what we fail to achieve, could have ~~the~~ vital consequences for the security of the Near East and important implications for our global arms control efforts as well. Unfortunately, a second meeting was impossible because of the Foreign Minister's return to Israel and my imminent departure ^{for} ~~the~~ the Far East. I nevertheless hope that the dialogue between our two governments can continue. I am asking Ambassador Barbour to pursue the subject on my behalf at an early occasion.

3. Please convey my best wishes to the Foreign Minister.

GP-3

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

74
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

6 2 7 7 4

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

50-40

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SS

Info:

OCT 10 12 39 PM '66

NSC

STATE 62774

Please deliver immediately following message from Walt
TX Rostow, White House, to Mr. Abe Feinberg, staying at Hilton
through 10 October: BEGIN QUOTE

White House will announce 10 October approval of Export-
Import Bank loan of \$6 million to the Industrial Bank of Israel.
This comes on heels of 28 September approval of \$5.6 million loan
to help finance El Al Airlines' seventh Boeing jet.

President wished you to be notified. END QUOTE
Please confirm delivery.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: WH:HSaunders:sb	Tel. Ext. 7741	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - John P. Walsh
Clearances:		

White House - Bromley Smith

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

10/10/66

Sent to State via LDX
101134

To: Sit Room

Please LDX attached message to State
Secretariat.

7/10

74b

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 10, 1966

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

Please deliver immediately following message from Walt Rostow, White House, to Mr. Abe Feinberg, staying at Hilton through 10 October:

White House will announce 10 October approval of Export-Import Bank loan of \$6 million to the Industrial Bank of Israel. This comes on heels of 28 September approval of \$5.6 million loan to help finance El Al Airlines' seventh Boeing jet.

President wished you to be notified.

Please confirm delivery.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

10/10
sent to Press office
for Fleming

74c

Mr. Rostow

October 10, 1966

MEMO FOR BILL MOYERS
BOB FLEMING

Jake Jacobsen phoned to
Brom Smith the President's approval
of the attached White House Press
Release.

Wall

W. W. Rostow

Att: Proposed Press Release - New Eximbank Loan for Israel

74d

PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE

October 10, 1966

NEW EXIMBANK LOAN FOR ISRAEL

The sale of \$6 million in American goods and services will be financed by a relending credit authorized by the Export-Import Bank of Washington to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel. The Israeli bank will re-lend proceeds of the loan to medium-sized private Israeli manufacturers who need United States machinery and equipment.

The new loan brings to some \$250 million the Eximbank's total assistance to Israel since the country became independent in 1948. About \$230 million of this total has been in the form of direct loans to governmental and private enterprises in such fields as agriculture, industry, power and transportation. All repayments have been made as scheduled.

It is expected that the new loan will further assist industrial development in Israel, which in recent years has attained an average annual growth rate of some 15 percent. It will be repayable in 16 semi-annual installments after a grace period of approximately two years. Interest on the loan will be at an annual rate of six percent.

This is the third Eximbank loan for Israel since the beginning of the new US fiscal year July 1. On September 28, the Bank authorized a loan of \$5,598,000 to assist El Al Israel Airlines in purchasing its seventh Boeing jet aircraft. On August 4, the Bank authorized a loan of \$1.3 million to American-Israeli Paper Mills, Ltd., for purchase of paper-making machinery in the US.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

He
S'

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 11, 1966

WWR:

Attached confirms that Barber was able to deliver your telegram to Feinberg on the Exim loan before he left Tel Aviv. I understand he will return to New York Wednesday.

Bob Fleming plans to put the release out this morning, so I guess this one is wrapped up.

Hal
HHS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

74F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ED

EHA565

1966 OCT 11 09 00

OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 2840857
ZNY CCCCC
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
O 110801Z OCT 66
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO YBCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 437
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 1221

REF: STATE 62774

MESSAGE DELIVERED.

DECON 10/6/66 BARBOUR
B

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By DCA On 4-20-81

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

55565

75

45

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

IMMEDIATE

SEP 28 11 19 AM '66

NEA

Info:

STATE 55565

SS

G

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

Ambassador Barbour please convey following Presidential message to Dr. Benjamin Weizmann, Weizmann Institute Rehovot:

QTE I was saddened to learn ~~XXXX~~ of the death of your mother, Mrs. Chaim Weizmann, whose long partnership in marriage with your late great father has been an inspiration to the Israeli nation and the world. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you our deeply felt condolences.

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQTE

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
NEA/LAIMsterner:dl:9/26/66

Tel. Ext.
4523

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Symmes

S/S -

Mr. Thompson

White House - Mr. Saunders

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

MEMORANDUM

25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

75a 3460
S/S informed
9/28/66
10 35 AM
for Jensen
by
SMW
Tuesday/2:30 pm
September 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message of Condolence to Dr. Weizmann

For the second time this month we have occasion to send condolences on the death of a private Israeli citizen. Mrs. Chaim Weizmann, widow of Israeli's first President and one of its greatest founding fathers, died Saturday.

Since Israel is holding a state funeral for her, I believe it would be appropriate for you to send a message to her son. If you approve, we will ask Ambassador Barbour by telegram to convey the following:

OKS
"I was saddened to learn today of the death of your mother, Mrs. Chaim Weizmann, whose long partnership in marriage with your late great father has been an inspiration to the Israeli nation and the world. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you our deeply felt condolences."

W. A. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____



14476

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1966

75b *3466*
1. Wiggins
2 Ret

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message of Condolence to
Dr. Benjamin Weizmann

Mrs. Chaim Weizmann, the widow of Dr. Weizmann, Israel's first President and one of its greatest founding fathers, died on September 24. A state funeral will be held September 27.

The Department believes it would be an appropriate gesture for the President to send a message of condolence to her son, Dr. Benjamin Weizmann. A proposed message is enclosed.

Shirrodson Lane
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary *for*

Enclosure:

Proposed message.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

75c
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

STATE

Ambassador Barbour please convey following message to Dr. Benjamin Weizmann, Weizmann Institute Rehovot:

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XXX

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

Drafted by: NEA/IAIMster:dl:9/26/66

Tel. Ext. 4523

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Symmes

S/S -

White House -

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

76

CAP CABLES

VZCZCEEA691
00 WTE10
DE WTE 2818

Received Washington CommCen
8:58 A.M. Tuesday 27 December 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH60811

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
9:40 A.M. Tuesday 27 December 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

FIRST REACTION IN ISRAELI PRESS TO JORDAN ARMS DEAL IS
ON THE WHOLE HELPFUL AND CLEARLY THE PRODUCT OF GOVERNMENT
BRIEFING.

(REPEAT ATTACHED, TEL AVIV 2186)

TEL AVIV 2186

ARMS TO JORDAN

1. COMMENT IN WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS WHICH FEATURE ARMS STORY
GENERALLY RESTRAINED AND UNCRITICAL. ACTION BY U.S. SEEN AS
QUOTE POLITICAL UNQUOTE, IN CONTEXT EFFORTS STRENGTHEN MODERATION
IN JORDAN AND NEW GOJ. FONMIN EBAN'S CAVEAT TO CABINET DEC
25 REPORTED: QUOTE OBLIGATION UNQUOTE (NOT STATED WHOSE)
EXISTS TO CORRECT ANY CHANGE IN AREA'S ARMS BALANCE.

2. SAMPLE EDITORIALS:

A. DAVAR (SEMI OFFICIAL, HISTADRUT): QUOTE WASHINGTON HAS
MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT IT WANTS TO SHORE UP PRESENT REGIME
IN JORDAN, AND THIS TIME MERE DECLARATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY
NOT HAVE DONE JOB. ISRAEL, WHICH DOES NOT INTERVENE IN INTERNAL
ARAB AFFAIRS, CAN HAVE NONQUARREL WITH THIS PURPOSE; ITS
POSITION IS ONE WHICH APPLIES TO ALL ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARAB
STATES: WHAT MATTERS IS WHETHER THEY AFFECT ISRAELI ARAB ARMS
BALANCE, AND IF THEY DO, STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO RE ESTABLISH
EQUILIBRIUM UNQUOTE.

B. HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) QUOTE IT IS CLEAR THAT US-JORDAN
ARMS DEAL AND UNUSUAL PUBLICITY GIVEN TO IT ARE PART OF PRICE
WE HAVE TO PAY FOR OUR INCURSION IN HEBRON HILLS...THE ARMS
DEAL SHOULD...BE REGARDED NOT ONLY FROM ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW,
BUT ALSO IN LIGHT OF INTER-ARAB DISSENSIONS...WE SHOULD KEEP
WATCH OVER BALANCE OF POWER IN AREA...BUT OUR REACTION SHOULD
BE COMMENSURATE TO SERIOUSNESS OF CHALLENGE, AND NOT GO
BEYOND IT UNQUOTE.

C. MAARIV (INDEPENDENT): QUOTE ARMS ARE ARMS WHATEVER LABEL
SUPPLIER MAY STICK ON THEM...IF ARMS CONSIGNMENTS UPSET THE
STATUS QUO IN AREA, WE MUST DEMAND REDRESS IMMEDIATELY.
DISTURBANCE OF STATUS QUO IS NO LESS SERIOUS BECAUSE OF ORIGIN
OF ARMS (AMERICAN NOT SOVIET), OR EVEN BECAUSE OF THEIR
DECLARED PURPOSE UNQUOTE.

3. CORRESPONDENTS:

A. ELI AYAL, HAARETZ U.S. CORRESPONDENT QUOTES DEC 26 WASHINGTON
POST EDITORIAL AS CONCLUDING QUOTE...IN VIEW OF FACT THAT
HUSSEIN IS RATHER ISOLATED IN ARAB WORLD WHEN HE SPEAKS ABOUT
MODERATION, GRANTING OF AMERICAN ARMS TO JORDAN IS JUSTIFIED
AND IS TO BE SUPPORTED UNQUOTE.

B. I.L. KENEN, JERUSALEM POST (INDEPENDENT, ENGLISH LANGUAGE)
FROM WASHINGTON: QUOTE ONCE AGAIN WASHINGTON IS TAKING A
CALCULATED RISK - IN HOPE OF PRESERVING BALANCE OF OPINION AS
WELL AS BALANCE OF ARMS IN REGION...U.S. DIPLOMATS STRESS THAT
U.S. WOULD PREFER TO EXTEND ECONOMIC RATHER THAN MILITARY AID
UNQUOTE.

C. HAARETZ MILITARY CORRESPONDENT QUOTES MILITARY OBSERVERS
AS SAYING THAT SINCE VALUE OF NEW U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES IS NO
MORE THAN FIVE MILLION DOLLARS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ARMS
BALANCE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DISTURBED. HE OBSERVES THAT COSTLY
PATTON TANKS OR RADAR INSTALLATIONS COULD HARDLY BE INCLUDED
AT THIS PRICE, AND FACT THAT A GOOD DEAL OF CONSIGNMENT IS TO
BE AIRLIFTED INDICATES THEIR COMPARATIVELY LIGHT WEIGHT.
CONCLUDES THAT EARLIER SUPPLY OF ALREADY PROMISED PLANES IS NOT
THOUGHT SIGNIFICANT, SINCE CRITICAL FACTOR IS JORDANIAN AIR
FORCE'S ABILITY TO ABSORB THEM.

BARBOUR

DTG: 271458Z DECEMBER 1966

sent Rusk
WH 60 8/11

12/26/66

78

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

First reaction in Israeli press to Jordan arms deal is
on the whole helpful and clearly the product of government briefing.

(repeat attached, Tel Aviv 2186)

78a
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1966 DEC 27 13 49

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INFO RUQMG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 175
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 200
RUEIVC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 154
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 160
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 204
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 29
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 33
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 128
RUFJG/AMEMBASSY PARIS 103
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*Further reaction
Gus Wall Kotow
First reaction in
Israeli press to
Jordan arms deal is
that the whole
deal is a product of
Washington
and clearly the product of
government briefing.*

ARMS TO JORDAN.

1. COMMENT IN WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS WHICH FEATURE ARMS STORY
GENERALLY RESTRAINED AND UNCRITICAL. ACTION BY U.S. SEEN AS
QUOTE POLITICAL UNQUOTE, IN CONTEXT EFFORTS STRENGTHEN MODERATION
IN JORDAN AND NEW GOJ. FONMIN EBAN'S CAVEAT TO CABINET DEC

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 2186 UNCLAS

25 REPORTED: QUOTE OBLIGATION UNQUOTE (NOT STATED WHOSE)
EXISTS TO CORRECT ANY CHANGE IN AREA'S ARMS BALANCE.

2. SAMPLE EDITORIALS:

A. DAVAR (SEMI-OFFICIAL, HISTADRUT): QUOTE WASHINGTON HAS
MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT IT WANTS TO SHORE UP PRESENT REGIME
IN JORDAN, AND THIS TIME MERE DECLARATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY
NOT HAVE DONE JOB. ISRAEL, WHICH DOES NOT INTERVENE IN INTERNAL
ARAB AFFAIRS, CAN HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THIS PURPOSE; ITS
POSITION IS ONE WHICH APPLIES TO ALL ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARAB
STATES: WHAT MATTERS IS WHETHER THEY AFFECT ISRAELI-ARAB ARMS
BALANCE, AND IF THEY DO, STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO RE-ESTABLISH
EQUILIBRIUM UNQUOTE.

NEBOX LEOW CRICK COLE

B. HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) QUOTE IT IS CLEAR THAT US-JORDAN ARMS DEAL AND UNUSUAL PUBLICITY GIVEN TO IT ARE PART OF PRICE WE HAVE TO PAY FOR OUR INCURSION IN HEBRON HILLS...THE ARMS DEAL SHOULD...BE REGARDED NOT ONLY FROM ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW, BUT ALSO IN LIGHT OF INTER-ARAB DISSENSIONS...WE SHOULD KEEP WATCH OVER BALANCE OF POWER IN AREA...BUT OUR REACTION SHOULD BE COMMENSURATE TO SERIOUSNESS OF CHALLENGE, AND NOT GO BEYOND IT UNQUOTE.

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 2186 UNCLAS

C. MAARIV (INDEPENDENT): QUOTE ARMS ARE ARMS WHATEVER LABEL SUPPLIER MAY STICK ON THEM...IF ARMS CONSIGNMENTS UPSET THE STATUS QUO IN AREA, WE MUST DEMAND REDRESS IMMEDIATELY. DISTURBANCE OF STATUS QUO IS NO LESS SERIOUS BECAUSE OF ORIGIN OF ARMS (AMERICAN NOT SOVIET); OR EVEN BECAUSE OF THEIR DECLARED PURPOSE UNQUOTE.

3. CORRESPONDENTS:

A. ELI AYAL, HAARETZ U.S. CORRESPONDENT QUOTES DEC 26 WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL AS CONCLUDING QUOTE...IN VIEW OF FACT THAT HUSSEIN IS RATHER ISOLATED IN ARAB WORLD WHEN HE SPEAKS ABOUT MODERATION, GRANTING OF AMERICAN ARMS TO JORDAN IS JUSTIFIED AND IS TO BE SUPPORTED UNQUOTE.

B. I.L. KENEN, JERUSALEM POST (INDEPENDENT, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE) FROM WASHINGTON: QUOTE ONCE AGAIN WASHINGTON IS TAKING A CALCULATED RISK - IN HOPE OF PRESERVING BALANCE OF OPINION AS WELL AS BALANCE OF ARMS IN REGION...U.S. DIPLOMATS STRENGTHEN THAT U.S. WOULD PREFER TO EXTEND ECONOMIC RATHER THAN MILITARY AID UNQUOTE.

C. HAARETZ MILITARY CORRESPONDENT QUOTES MILITARY OBSERVERS AS SAYING THAT SINCE VALUE OF NEW U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES IS NO

PAGE FOUR RUQMVL 2186 UNCLAS

MORE THAN FIVE MILLION DOLLARS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ARMS BALANCE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DISTURBED. HE OBSERVES THAT COSTLY PATTON TANKS OR RADAR INSTALLATIONS COULD HARDLY BE INCLUDED AT THIS PRICE, AND FACT THAT A GOOD DEAL OF CONSIGNMENT IS TO BE AIRLIFTED INDICATES THEIR COMPARATIVELY LIGHT WEIGHT. CONCLUDES THAT EARLIER SUPPLY OF ALREADY PROMISED PLANES IS NOT THOUGHT SIGNIFICANT, SINCE CRITICAL FACTOR IS JORDANIAN AIR FORCE'S ABILITY TO ABSORB THEM.

BARBOUR

BT

REBOX FROM JERICHO COLE

WHY
RET ROMAN
TEN
ABG FINCHMAN
DO NOT WANT
THIS - UNLTS
THEY WANT
AN ENEMY

ISRAEL
79

EEA524
OO WIE 10
DE WIE 2612

Received: Washington CommCen
6:13 PM Thursday 8 December 1966

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP 661223

Received: LBJ Ranch CommCen
6:52 PM Thursday 8 December 1966

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW
INFORMATION

FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED AND YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW ZEROING IN ON OUR PROPOSED SMALL MILITARY AID PACKAGE FOR JORDAN. AMBASSADOR HARMAN WAS IN TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON AND CONVEYED THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT ANYTHING WE DO FOR JORDAN WILL UNSETTLE THE DELICATE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE AREA. WE WILL BE SENDING YOU MORE FORMALLY IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON JORDAN. DEFENSE STILL HAS NOT QUITE WRAPPED UP ALL THE DETAILS, BUT IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE PACKAGE WILL BE MINIMAL AND WILL NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN MILITARY BALANCE. HOWEVER, WE WILL HAVE TO RECKON WITH AN ISRAELI REACTION NO MATTER WHAT WE DO. WE ARE ON FIRM LOGICAL GROUND IN SAYING THAT WE WOULD BE DOING NOTHING MORE FOR JORDAN THAN ALREADY PLANNED IF THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT RAIDED ON 13 NOVEMBER. AFTER ALL, WE ARE ONLY PICKING UP THE PIECES IN A MESS THEY CREATED. BUT REGARDLESS OF HOW FIRMLY WE TAKE THAT LINE, THE ISRAELIS HAVE REGAINED THEIR COMPOSURE AND ARE GOING TO BE PRETTY TOUGH TO DEAL WITH.

WE WILL INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE PROBLEM WHEN WE SEND OUR FINAL PROPOSAL TO YOU. HOWEVER, I WANTED YOU TO BE FOREWARNED OF THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM IN CASE SOMEONE SHOULD TRY TO REACH YOU AT THE RANCH.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #359

DTG: 09/0013Z DECEMBER 1966

By fw, NARA, Date 5-30-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SENT
WHCAEEA215
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 2229

1966 NOV 13 21 31

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP666983~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT

AN ISRAELI FORCE OF MEN, TANKS AND JET PLANES CROSSED THE JORDANIAN FRONTIER AT DAWN THIS MORNING. AFTER HALF-DESTROYING SEVERAL VILLAGES AND BRIEFLY ENGAGING JORDANIAN FORCES SENT AGAINST IT, THE ISRAELI FORCE WITHDREW. ALL IS NOW QUIET ON THE FRONTIER.

THIS ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST AN ARAB COUNTRY FOLLOWED A NUMBER OF RAIDS COMING FROM SYRIA AND JORDAN, AND IS THEREFORE UNDERSTANDABLE. HOWEVER, JORDAN HAS BEEN A MODERATE AMONG THE ARABS AND ISRAEL'S ACTION IS LIKELY TO HOT UP TENSIONS IN THE AREA AND MAY PROVOKE FURTHER ARAB ACTION.

WE HAVE BEEN CAUTIONING ISRAEL AGAINST JUST SUCH A STEP AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THROUGH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, IS LODGING A STRONG PROTEST WITH THE ISRAELIS AT THE UN.

THE JORDANIANS ARE EXPECTED TO TAKE THE ISSUE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW.

DTG: 132050Z NOV 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

From: Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: Joke Jacobsen for the President

80a

~~for the Ranch:~~

An Israeli force of men, tanks and jet planes crossed the Jordanian frontier at dawn this morning. After half-desroying several villages and briefly engaging Jordanian forces sent against it, the Israeli force withdrew. All is now ^{quiet} ~~quite~~ on the frontier.

This ~~was an~~ Israeli retaliation ~~against~~ against an Arab country ^{ry} followed a number of raids coming from ~~for previous raids~~ ~~in~~ Syria and Jordan, and is therefore understandable.

~~xxx~~ However, Jordan has been a moderate among the Arabs and Israel's action is likely to hot up tensions in the area and may provoke further Arab action. ~~There has~~ ^{we} have been cautioning Israel against just such a step and the State Department, through ^{Ambassador} Goldberg, is lodging ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ a strong protest with the Israelis ^{at the UN.} ~~The~~ The Jordanians are expected to take the issue to the Security Council tomorrow.

~~WJR~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

By inf NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, November 3, 1966
6:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to Abe Feinberg
for your signature (Tab A).

Also attached (Tab B) is a memorandum
and draft press release on the \$6 million for
the Israeli power plant, for your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Dear Abe:

I want to bring you up to date on three projects that are of interest to you; i. e. , desalting, the U. S. assistance program for Israel, and the Haifa power plant loan.

On desalting, Ambassador Bunker has made real progress. He will meet with Mr. Ben Artzi, his Israeli counterpart, on November 9. This is a general exploratory session, taking advantage of Mr. Artzi's presence here on business for the El Al Airline.

In addition, Ambassador Bunker plans to accept the invitation of Ambassador Harmon to go to Israel in mid December. The purpose of his visit would be to hear firsthand the divergent views within the Israeli government as to the best way to proceed with desalting.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Bunker has been busy talking to all elements within our Government involved in desalting -- the Interior Department, AEC, AID, the Interagency Desalting Committee, my science adviser Dr. Hornig, and the State Department. These talks have given him a full grasp of the problem. He also plans to tap the best authorities outside the Government.

This preliminary work, which I expect to have completed for me by the end of January, is necessary because of the many unanswered economic questions about desalting projects. Our studies of the New York and Los Angeles water problems have been pioneering analyses. The proposed Israeli project ranks with them in the effort to find our feet firmly in this new field.

Second, I am attaching for your personal use an unclassified summary of what the United States Government has done for Israel over the past three years. The depth and breadth of these programs are impressive. So is the fact that our

total aid to Israel last year was higher than in any previous single year because of significant military credits.

Third, I have agreed to make available the \$6 million from the old Haifa power plant loan. We are confident, as usual, that Israel will make good use of this money.

Sincerely,

Mr. Abraham Feinberg
American Bank and Trust Company
70 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005

November 2, 1966

US HELP FOR ISRAEL
1964 - 1966

Perhaps the best way to characterize US-Israeli relations in this period is to say that they are closer today than ever. As Foreign Minister Eban himself said in July:

"We stand at a high point in the evolution of American-Israel friendship. . . . President Johnson has contributed in abundant measure to the reinforcement of Israel's strength and spirit. He has inspired our confidence in the sincerity of the American commitment to Israel's security. He has shown a perceptive understanding of our need to develop our defensive strength. He has maintained a constructive interest in Israel's economic progress and in all of this he shows a sensitive regard for the principle of international peace and for the preservation of small states."¹

The breadth and depth of US help for Israel, even more than aid levels themselves, are impressive:

1. The US economic aid program in Fiscal Years 1964, 1965 and 1966 has totaled \$134 million. This breaks down as follows (in \$millions):

	<u>FY 1964</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>
Development Loans	20.0	20.0	10.0
EXIM Bank Long-term Loans	--	4.0	*--
Food Aid	19.9	33.9	26.6

*\$10 million in EXIM credit was offered, but the Israeli Government did not use it within the Fiscal Year. However, in the first four months of FY 1967 EXIM loans totaling \$12.9 million have been made to three Israeli firms or institutions.

These three years, 1964-66, cap a total of \$1.1 billion in public grants, loans, and credits on concessionary terms which the US has extended to Israel from 1948 through FY 1966.

2. In addition to this economic aid, the US made important sales to Israel of tanks and combat aircraft in 1965 and 1966. This decision was taken after long and careful consideration to prevent development of a destabilizing arms imbalance in the area. We do not intend to become a major arms supplier there, but we have recognized legitimate

defensive needs. The sales were made on liberal credit terms. Costs are classified by both governments, but in general one can say that our total economic and military aid in FY 1966 was higher than in any single previous year. In addition we have allowed commercial purchase of other equipment.

3. These aid levels stand out against the background of general aid policy designed gradually to phase out concessional aid in countries like Israel which have moved impressively toward self-sustaining growth. Israel's per capita GNP of \$1400 in 1965 was about 75% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, 110% of Austria's, 125% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Our aid policy has grown out of the pressures of low appropriations and our belief that it is healthy for nations to push away aid props just as soon as possible.

4. These gross figures, impressive as they are, do not nearly convey the breadth of US activity in Israel. From US-owned local currency accumulated principally from PL-480 food sales, the US makes loans and grants which play a major role in Israel's economy:

- a. The US is now supporting scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 US Government agencies supporting some 350 science projects in fields ranging from health and education to weather and vocational rehabilitation. We have spent at least \$18 million on such projects FY 1964 - FY 1966. These programs are a substantial contribution to keeping an already outstanding scientific community constructively employed.
- b. The US Government has also aided the Israeli Development Budget in grants and loans in the last three fiscal years to the extent of \$61.5 million in Israeli pounds. The significance of this program is apparent from a breakdown of the FY 1967 program which has just been put in final form in Tel Aviv. Note that the sums to be loaned represent substantial percentages of the total Israeli government expenditures for these purposes:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>Equivalent Amount in \$</u>	<u>% of Total Israeli Expenditures for this Purpose</u>
Development of Agriculture	\$1.3 million	59%
Improvement of Telephone Services	10.5 million	35%
Development of Railways	1.3 million	58%
Construction of Schools	3.3 million	64%
	<u>\$16.4 million</u>	

c. In FY 1964 - FY 1966 we loaned Israeli pounds worth \$7.9 million to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel (IDBI), which re-lends the money to Israeli firms under its own criteria.

d. In addition, in FY 1966 alone the US Government loaned the equivalent of \$5.0 million to 4 Israeli institutions of higher learning and the American-Israeli Cultural Institute. Similar loans totaled \$14.1 million FY 1964 - FY 1966.

e. We have also loaned \$8.5 million in Israeli pounds (Cooley loans) over these years to support private American investors in Israel.

5. On February 6, 1964, President Johnson stated in a speech before the Friends of The Weizmann Institute in New York City that the US would begin discussions with representatives of Israel on cooperative research in the field of desalting. During Prime Minister Eshkol's visit that June, we outlined a program. Since that time, the US and Israel have completed a 14-month study of the technical feasibility of building a nuclear-fueled desalting and electric power plant capable of producing, by the early 1970's, 100 million gallons of fresh water daily and 175-200 megawatts of electricity. On October 13, the President appointed Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to review progress to date, recommend next steps and begin discussing remaining problems with an Israeli counterpart.

6. On the diplomatic front, President Johnson reaffirmed publicly during the 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and again during the August 1966 visit of President Shazar the US commitment to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. In addition, our presence in key Arab countries has enabled us to work usefully for peace and moderation. We have produced no final solutions for any of the Arab-Israel problems but our activities have:

- Safeguarded access to Israel's fair share of the Jordan's waters.
- Helped reduce tensions and incidents along Armistice lines.
- Preserved effective UN peacekeeping machinery.
- Supported Israel, where warranted, in the United Nations.
- Tried to make progress on the refugee problem.
- Encouraged more realistic Arab attitudes toward the Arab-Israel dispute.

7. In addition to this diplomatic activity, the US has given full financial support (\$87.3 million since 1949 and \$25.3 million FY 1964-FY 1967) for the elaborate peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders and has helped support over a million Arab refugees at a cost of some \$71 million 1964 - 1966 (over \$387 million since 1948).

DRAFT 11/3/66

Dear Abe: ~~(President addresses him)~~

I want to bring you up-to-date on three projects that are of interest to you; i. e., desalting, the U. S. assistance program for Israel, and the Haifa power plant loan.

On desalting, Ambassador Bunker has made real progress. He will meet with Mr. Ben Artzi, his Israeli counterpart, ~~on the desalting discussions on~~ November 9. This is ^{a general ~~appellatory~~ session,} ~~a get-acquainted meeting,~~ taking advantage of Mr. Artzi's presence here on business for the El Al Airline.

In addition, Ambassador Bunker plans to accept the invitation of Ambassador Harmon to go to Israel in mid December. The purpose of his visit would be to ^{hear} ~~here~~ first-hand the divergent views within the Israeli Government as to the best way to proceed with desalting.

^P Meanwhile, Ambassador Bunker has been busy talking to all elements within our Government involved in desalting -- the Interior Department, AEC, AID, the Inter-agency Desalting Committee, my science adviser Dr. Hornig, and the State Department. These talks have given him a full grasp of the problem, ^{He ~~is~~ also ~~plans~~ to} ~~and an idea as to how to proceed in~~ tapping the best authorities outside the Government, ~~to participate in this study.~~ ^{any analysis of all aspects of the desalting problem,}

^P ⁷ ~~The~~ preliminary work, which I expect to have completed for me by the end of January, is necessary because of the many unanswered economic questions about desalting projects. Our studies of the New

family / field.

York and Los Angeles water problems have in many ways been pioneering analyses. The proposed Israeli project is so significant as to rank with these other two as a next step in the analytical process. ^{them} ~~in the effort to find our feet in this new~~ In a narrow sense, ^{important new} ~~some of these~~ questions must be answered before we ^{can} ~~could possibly~~ decide on methods of financing a project of this kind if it ^{is} ~~proved~~ workable. In a broader sense, they must be answered before we as a Government know how to proceed with our overall desalting program.

Second, I am ~~also~~ attaching for your personal use an unclassified summary of what the United States Government has done for Israel over the past three years. The depth and breadth of these programs are impressive. So is the fact that our total aid to Israel last year was higher than in any previous single year ² ~~because of the~~ significant military credits ².

The most important point is that we have treated Israel as a special case. We have done this because of our deep national commitment to Israel's survival and prosperity. I personally have had a hand in determining each year's aid level and in conveying the breadth of our commitment to Israel's leaders.

However, I fear some people too often use aid levels as a measure of the US-Israeli relationship. ~~In a sense, I am fostering this misuse~~ ^{I have underlined to you the fact} by pointing out that our aid level last year was higher than in any previous single year, ~~I do so not only because the fact itself is im-~~ ^{also} ~~pressive, but~~ because of what lies behind it. What is really important

is the reason for that high aid figure -- we decided to prevent a serious arms imbalance from developing between the Arab states and Israel. While we do not intend to become a major arms supplier in the Middle East, we have demonstrated that we will act when necessary.

Beyond these important military sales, the attached summary indicates a range of activity -- from extensive support in maintaining Israel's technological superiority to careful diplomatic work among its potential adversaries -- that alone makes clear the breadth and depth of our commitment.

We have said many times that Israel is an economic success. We point out how favorably its progress compares with ~~Holland~~ ^{the Netherlands}, Austria, Japan, Greece or Italy. The main point in saying this is not just to explain why it is harder and harder to help Israel with AID dollars ~~but~~ ^{rather} it is to point out that the problems Israel faces today are those of a nearly mature economy. So, while the depth of our commitment to Israel will not change, our relationship is changing -- and for the better because in this kind of atmosphere we ~~actually~~ accomplish more of interest to both parties. This is, in a sense, the same kind of change that has taken place in our relationship with Western Europe since 1945.

What I think will emerge from these changes will be a happier ^{more} and ^{more} mature two-way relationship. Instead of measuring the relationship by the old dollars-and-cents ~~yardstick~~ ^{yard}, we will be ~~worrying~~ ^{working} with Israel about trade and its evolving association with the Common

Market. Equally important, Israel will be worrying with us about how we right^{our} own imbalance of payments while pressing global programs designed to build a world where both of us will be more comfortable. I should think the Israelis themselves would find new confidence in their independence of special aid.

Third, I have agreed to make available the \$6 million from the old Haifa power plant loan. ~~You will realize that this again is an exception to the usual AID procedure, made because we do see this as part of a past promise.~~ We are confident, as usual, that Israel will make good use of this money.

Sincerely,

Mr. Abraham Feinberg
American Bank and Trust Co.
70 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005

81a

→ Mr. Rostow

orig sent up.
Nov. 26 signed
for you by me.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker's Progress Report

Ambassador Bunker was not available to write his own report to you this afternoon. However, my staff has been working right along with him, and he agreed by phone that these are its main elements:

1. He has now been in touch with all elements within our government involved in desalting--Interior, AEC, State, AID, the Inter-agency Desalting Committee, and Hornig. This has given him a grasp of the problem and a notion of how he should proceed in tapping the best non-governmental analysis.

2. We have helped him line up a first-rate independent research team, headed by a young fellow from MIT who has worked with Gardner Ackley and was involved in both the Los Angeles and New York desalting studies. Bunker will spend Friday with him plotting their course, and I will meet with both of them. As I have mentioned before, I view this study as crucial in determining our next steps in desalting, so I am pleased that Bunker has landed our top candidate for the job.

3. Ambassador Harman has invited Bunker to go to Israel just for orientation. Bunker is tentatively planning this in mid-December. He sees advantage in hearing at first hand all of the divergent views within the Israeli Government--they are as divided as we--before he makes his recommendations to you. He also feels the trip would help politically by showing movement.

4. He will meet Mr. Ben Artzi, his Israeli counterpart for the first time on 9 November. The Israelis announced their appointment shortly after your announcement. This is strictly a get-acquainted meeting taking advantage of Ben Artzi's presence here on business. He is president of El Al Airline, was formerly director general of Israel's water authority, and will be a formidable man to deal with.

Bunker's target, according to the schedule which you approved, is to have for you by the end of January his recommendation on our next

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75c 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

steps--either a proposal for further study if he feels there are still too many important gaps or a US negotiating position.

I have a letter ready to go to Feinberg explaining in general terms how we plan to proceed and will send it immediately unless you prefer some other channel.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

816 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~MEMORANDUM FOR WWR~~

November 1, 1966

M ~ President.

SUBJECT: A Package of Israeli Aid Items

F

Attached for immediate action are two items ~~you~~ requested by wire from Hawaii *for availability on arrival*

1. Tab A: Letter to Feinberg with an impressive summary of our aid to Israel over the past three years attached. *This has been drafted for my signature, but it could easily be redrafted for yours.*
2. Tab B: Draft press release on the \$6 million under a covering memo for ~~the President's~~ *your* approval ~~(if you still need it)~~. This explains how we'll clear with Congress under the 10-country limitation in the new Foreign Assistance Act.

One additional less urgent item is the letter at Tab C to the President of Utah State University. We succeeded in getting Paul MacAvoy to work with Bunker. He has asked to have Dean Peterson, formerly Don Hornig's water expert, now Dean of the School of Engineering at Utah State, work with him on the hydrological and engineering aspects of his report. They worked together on the New York study, and we agree that this is a good team. Peterson has agreed to do the job and is pretty much master of his own time. But he needs a White House letter for the record to square himself with his president.

Bunker and MacAvoy have an appointment with you Friday (4 November). Its chief purpose is for you to talk to MacAvoy economist-to-economist and give him your sense of what we need from him.

Redraft Feinberg letter for my signature

Sign it

Hold

Release \$6 million

Hold \$6 million

See me

Hal
Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By sig, NARS, Date 9-16-81

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

81c
November 2, 1966

Dear Abe: ?

I want to bring you up to date on three projects that are
~~The President has asked me to fill you in on several developments~~
~~in matters that interest you, i.e. desalting, U.S. assistance~~
program for Israel and the Haifa power plant loan.
First of all, I want to explain in some detail what he has in mind
on the desalting project. Quite frankly, the US Government position
needs sorting out, and this is Ambassador Bunker's first job.

There are still many unanswered economic questions about any
project of this kind. Our studies of the New York and Los Angeles
water problems have in many ways been pioneering analyses. The
proposed Israeli project is so significant as to rank with those other
two as a next step in the analytical process. In a narrow sense,
some of these questions must be answered before we could possibly
decide on methods of financing a project of this kind if it proved
workable. In a broader sense, they must be answered before we as
a Government know how to proceed with our overall desalting program.

To help Ambassador Bunker, the President has authorized us to
employ one of the most experienced economists in this new field,
a young man who has been involved in both the Los Angeles and the
New York studies. He will be working over the next three months to
relate the Israeli project to knowledge already gained from these
domestic studies and will try to point out the gaps that need to be
filled before we can move ahead sure-footedly. He is meeting this
week with Ambassador Bunker and me.

We hope this preliminary work will be done by the end of January.
Meanwhile Ambassador Bunker is busy touching base with all
elements within our Government and with non-governmental experts
involved in this complicated business. He is also considering an
informal trip to Israel in December. This is not definite yet, and
he will want to judge its usefulness when he is farther along in his
work. But he does see merit in understanding fully Israeli views
before he stakes out his final recommendations for the President.
He will not, of course, be prepared to hold any more than a get-
acquainted meeting with Mr. Ben Artzi before then, but even that
will be helpful.

So in January we expect to know better where we stand. It is too early now to say what course formal talks might take after that. The purpose of the next three months' work is to lay a foundation so that when Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Ben Artzi start talking, their work will be as productive as possible.

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The most important point is that we have ~~clearly~~ treated Israel as a special case. We ~~have~~^{have} done this because of our deep national commitment to Israel's survival and prosperity. ~~As you know, the President personally has had a hand in determining each year's aid level and in conveying the breadth of our commitment to Israel's leaders.~~

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Beyond these important military sales, the attached summary indicates a range of activity--from extensive support in maintaining Israel's technological superiority to careful diplomatic work among its potential adversaries--that alone makes clear the breadth and depth of our commitment.

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What I think will emerge from these changes will be a happier and maturer two-way relationship. Instead of measuring the relationship by the old dollars-and-cents yardstick, we will be worrying with Israel about trade and its evolving association with the Common Market. Equally important, Israel will be worrying with us about how we right our own imbalance of payments while pressing global programs designed to build a world where both of us will be more comfortable. I should think the Israelis themselves would find new confidence in their independence of special aid.

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Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Mr. Abraham Feinberg
American Bank and Trust Company
70 Wall Street
New York, N. Y. 10005

81-d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, November 3, 1966 -- 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Release on \$6 million for Israeli Power Plant

Attached (Tab 1) is a press release turning loose the \$6 million Feinberg has been after us about. We don't expect this to make a big splash because the Israelis feel it was part of the 1963 aid level we promised. However, making it available after they failed to use all of the original loan is a concession and should be worth something to the insiders.

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This is just the public indication that you intend to go ahead. AID will still have to go through the legalities required by the new law -- asking you for a waiver for lending to any country not on the list of the top ten aid recipients and notifying Congress. AID will be sending a memorandum to us in a few days covering this matter.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75C 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

HS:WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81e
November 2, 1966

US HELP FOR ISRAEL
1964 - 1966

Perhaps the best way to characterize US-Israeli relations in this period is to say that they are closer today than ever. As Foreign Minister Eban himself said in July:

"We stand at a high point in the evolution of American-Israel friendship. . . . President Johnson has contributed in abundant measure to the reinforcement of Israel's strength and spirit. He has inspired our confidence in the sincerity of the American commitment to Israel's security. He has shown a perceptive understanding of our need to develop our defensive strength. He has maintained a constructive interest in Israel's economic progress and in all of this he shows a sensitive regard for the principle of international peace and for the preservation of small states."

The breadth and depth of US help for Israel, even more than aid levels themselves, are impressive:

1. The US economic aid program in Fiscal Years 1964, 1965 and 1966 has totaled \$134 million. This breaks down as follows (in \$millions):

	<u>FY 1964</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>
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EXIM Bank Long-term Loans	--	4.0	*--
Food Aid	19.9	33.9	26.6

*\$10 million in EXIM credit was offered, but the Israeli Government did not use it within the Fiscal Year. However, in the first four months of FY 1967 EXIM loans totaling \$12.9 million have been made to three Israeli firms or institutions.

These three years, 1964-66, cap a total of \$1.1 billion in public grants, loans, and credits on concessionary terms which the US has extended to Israel from 1948 through FY 1966.

2. In addition to this economic aid, the US made important sales to Israel of tanks and combat aircraft in 1965 and 1966. This decision was taken after long and careful consideration to prevent development of a destabilizing arms imbalance in the area. We do not intend to become a major arms supplier there, but we have recognized legitimate

19

defensive needs. The sales were made on liberal credit terms. Costs are classified by both governments, but in general one can say that our total economic and military aid in FY 1966 was higher than in any single previous year. In addition we have allowed commercial purchase of other equipment.

3. These aid levels stand out against the background of general aid policy designed gradually to phase out concessional aid in countries like Israel which have moved impressively toward self-sustaining growth. Israel's per capita GNP of \$1400 in 1965 was about 75% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, 110% of Austria's, 125% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Our aid policy has grown out of the pressures of low appropriations and our belief that it is healthy for nations to push away aid props just as soon as possible.

4. These gross figures, impressive as they are, do not nearly convey the breadth of US activity in Israel. From US-owned local currency accumulated principally from PL-480 food sales, the US makes loans and grants which play a major role in Israel's economy:

- a. The US is now supporting scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 US Government agencies supporting some 350 science projects in fields ranging from health and education to weather and vocational rehabilitation. We have spent at least \$18 million on such projects FY 1964 - FY 1966. These programs are a substantial contribution to keeping an already outstanding scientific community constructively employed.
- b. The US Government has also aided the Israeli Development Budget in grants and loans in the last three fiscal years to the extent of \$61.5 million in Israeli pounds. The significance of this program is apparent from a breakdown of the FY 1967 program which has just been put in final form in Tel Aviv. Note that the sums to be loaned represent substantial percentages of the total Israeli government expenditures for these purposes:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>Equivalent Amount in \$</u>	<u>% of Total Israeli Expendi- tures for this Purpose</u>
Development of Agriculture	\$1.3 million	59%
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Development of Railways	1.3 million	58%
Construction of Schools	3.3 million	64%
	<u>\$16.4 million</u>	

- c. In FY 1964 - FY 1966 we loaned Israeli pounds worth \$7.9 million to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel (IDBI), which re-lends the money to Israeli firms under its own criteria.
- d. In addition, in FY 1966 alone the US Government loaned the equivalent of \$5.0 million to 4 Israeli institutions of higher learning and the American-Israeli Cultural Institute. Similar loans totaled \$14.1 million FY 1964 - FY 1966.
- e. We have also loaned \$8.5 million in Israeli pounds (Cooley loans) over these years to support private American investors in Israel.

5. On February 6, 1964, President Johnson stated in a speech before the Friends of The Weizmann Institute in New York City that the US would begin discussions with representatives of Israel on cooperative research in the field of desalting. During Prime Minister Eshkol's visit that June, we outlined a program. Since that time, the US and Israel have completed a 14-month study of the technical feasibility of building a nuclear-fueled desalting and electric power plant capable of producing, by the early 1970's, 100 million gallons of fresh water daily and 175-200 megawatts of electricity. On October 13, the President appointed Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to review progress to date, recommend next steps and begin discussing remaining problems with an Israeli counterpart.

6. On the diplomatic front, President Johnson reaffirmed publicly during the 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and again during the August 1966 visit of President Shazar the US commitment to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. In addition, our presence in key Arab countries has enabled us to work usefully for peace and moderation. We have produced no final solutions for any of the Arab-Israel problems but our activities have:

- Safeguarded access to Israel's fair share of the Jordan's waters.
- Helped reduce tensions and incidents along Armistice lines.
- Preserved effective UN peacekeeping machinery.
- Supported Israel, where warranted, in the United Nations.
- Tried to make progress on the refugee problem.
- Encouraged more realistic Arab attitudes toward the Arab-Israel dispute.

7. In addition to this diplomatic activity, the US has given full financial support (\$87.3 million since 1949 and \$25.3 million FY 1964-FY 1967) for the elaborate peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders and has helped support over a million Arab refugees at a cost of some \$71 million 1964 - 1966 (over \$387 million since 1948).

Please return to
HHSaunders, Rm. 396 EOB
when signed

November 2, 1966

Dear Abe:

The President has asked me to fill you in on several developments in matters that interest you.

First of all, I want to explain in some detail what he has in mind on the desalting project. Quite frankly, the US Government position needs sorting out, and this is Ambassador Bunker's first job.

There are still many unanswered economic questions about any project of this kind. Our studies of the New York and Los Angeles water problems have in many ways been pioneering analyses. The proposed Israeli project is so significant as to rank with those other two as a next step in the analytical process. In a narrow sense, some of these questions must be answered before we could possibly decide on methods of financing a project of this kind if it proved workable. In a broader sense, they must be answered before we as a Government know how to proceed with our overall desalting program.

To help Ambassador Bunker, the President has authorized us to employ one of the most experienced economists in this new field, a young man who has been involved in both the Los Angeles and the New York studies. He will be working over the next three months to relate the Israeli project to knowledge already gained from these domestic studies and will try to point out the gaps that need to be filled before we can move ahead sure-footedly. He is meeting this week with Ambassador Bunker and me.

We hope this preliminary work will be done by the end of January. Meanwhile Ambassador Bunker is busy touching base with all elements within our Government and with non-governmental experts involved in this complicated business. He is also considering an informal trip to Israel in December. This is not definite yet, and he will want to judge its usefulness when he is farther along in his work. But he does see merit in understanding fully Israeli views before he stakes out his final recommendations for the President. He will not, of course, be prepared to hold any more than a get-acquainted meeting with Mr. Ben Artai before then, but even that will be helpful.

So in January we expect to know better where we stand. It is too early now to say what course formal talks might take after that. The purpose of the next three months' work is to lay a foundation so that when Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Ben Artzi start talking, their work will be as productive as possible.

Second, I am also attaching for your personal use an unclassified summary of what we as a government have done for Israel over the past three years. The depth and breadth of these programs are impressive. So is the fact that our total aid to Israel last year was higher than in any previous single year (because of the significant military credits). But I want to make some purely personal observations which put these thoughts into realistic perspective.

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However, I fear some people too often use aid levels as a measure of the US-Israeli relationship. In a sense, I am fostering this misuse by pointing out that our aid level last year was higher than in any previous single year. I do so not only because the fact itself is impressive but because of what lies behind it. What's really important is the reason for that high aid figure--we decided at the highest level to prevent a serious arms imbalance from developing between the Arab states and Israel. While we don't intend to become a major arms supplier in the Middle East, we have demonstrated that we will act when necessary.

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We have said many times that Israel is an ~~amazing success~~. We point out how favorably its progress compares with Holland, Austria, Japan, Greece or Italy. The main point in saying this is not just to explain why it is harder and harder to help Israel with AID dollars. It is to point out that the problems Israel faces today are those of a nearly mature economy. So while the depth of our commitment to Israel will not change, our relationship is changing--and for the better because in this kind of atmosphere we actually accomplish more of interest to both parties. This is, in a sense, the same kind of change that has taken place in our relationship with Western Europe since 1945.

What I think will emerge from these changes will be a happier and maturer two-way relationship. Instead of measuring the relationship by the old dollars-and-cents yardstick, we will be worrying with Israel about trade and its evolving association with the Common Market. Equally important, Israel will be worrying with us about how we right our own imbalance of payments while pressing global programs designed to build a world where both of us will be more comfortable. I should think the Israelis themselves would find new confidence in their independence of special aid.

Third, the President has agreed to make available the \$6 million from the old Haifa power plant loan. You will realize that this again is an exception to the usual AID procedure, made because we do see this as part of a past promise. We are confident, as usual, that Israel will make good use of this money.

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70 Wall Street
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

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SUBJECT: Press Release on \$6 million for Israeli Power Plant

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I'm also attaching (Tab 2) an impressive summary of our aid to Israel over the past three years. I'm sending a copy to Feinberg but thought you might find it handy.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 715C 8-18-81 letter
By irp, NARS, Date 9-16-81~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

\$6 Million Loan to Israel for Power Plant

The President has announced his intention to provide some \$6 million for expansion of electric power facilities in Tel Aviv. This brings to \$37 million total US assistance in this field.

These funds remain from a \$17 million loan made by the Agency for International Development in 1963 for a 125 megawatt power generator for Haifa, Israel's Mediterranean port city. The Government of Israel has proposed that these remaining funds be used in conjunction with Export-Import Bank lending to increase power generation in Tel Aviv.

This will be the sixth US loan for power generation in Israel. The Export-Import Bank in 1963 authorized an \$11.2 million loan for a second generator at the Haifa plant, and in 1950 and 1961 made two other loans for general expansion of facilities to the Palestine Electric Corp. Ltd. totaling \$6.2 million. In addition to the loan for the Haifa plant, AID has also provided a \$2.4 million credit for a combined power and desalting plant in Eilat, Israel's port on the Gulf of Aqaba. That plant came into operation earlier this year.

Israel's electric power production has almost doubled since 1961 in response to steadily increasing demand. Israel's industrial requirements have grown rapidly, and sharp increases in the availability of electrical appliances for consumer use have also contributed heavily to demand.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The U. S. has furnished a total of about \$1.1 billion of economic assistance to Israel since 1949. The Agency for International Development has made grants and loans in excess of \$500 million. About \$375 million of food assistance has been provided under the PL 480 program, and the total of Export-Import Bank assistance is close to \$250 million.

Under the provisions of the new Foreign Assistance Act the President will notify Congress that it is in the national interest to provide assistance for the Tel Aviv power project.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

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1964 - 1966

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Please return to
HHSaunders, Rm. 396 EOB
when signed. 816

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Release on \$6 million for Israeli Power Plant

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By isf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

Dear President Chase:

President Johnson has requested a review of data on Israel's water supply before deciding what steps the U.S. Government should take on proposals for a large electric power and desalting plant there.

Dr. Dean Peterson of your faculty is uniquely qualified to contribute to the study now under way, and I am writing to ask whether you might make his services available for a limited time. My understanding is that he would not have to be away from the campus for more than two weeks and would need only a day a week for the project on campus. The deadline for this study is the end of January.

The President has said that he is determined to have a major breakthrough in desalting during his term of office if at all possible. This analysis of the Israeli proposal is in the same league with recent domestic studies of water problems in Los Angeles and New York City. It is crucial in determining our next steps in desalting to have as imaginative a review of the Israeli project as we can muster. Therefore, he would be most grateful if Dr. Peterson could take part.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

President Daryl Chase
Utah State University
Logan, Utah

cc: Dr. Dean F. Peterson
Utah State University
Logan, Utah

Mr. Rostow

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Logan, Utah

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Utah State University
Logan, Utah

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File 82
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 1966

BKS:

The attached is OK with me.
However, I understand that S/S
has already sent this out. So I
guess we send it back for their
files.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

By if NARS, Date 9-16-81

Hal
HHS

Do we know how Feldman
was authorized?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Smith,
Through Hayes Redmon,
per Art McC. — alive

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

3822

82a

October 20, 1966

Date

HS
1 Wiggins
2 Ret.

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Sm

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Cable to Amembassy TEL AVIV.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY pw ON 5-31-00

826

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISRAEL

Ambassy TEL AVIV

STATE

President Johnson has authorized Meyer Feldman extend his best wishes to PriMin Eshkol and others assembled at forthcoming dedication John F. Kennedy Building at Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center. Pertinent telegrams from Canberra being repeated for your information.

GP-3

END

ACTING

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

NEA:IAI:WDWolle:dl:10/20/66 4422

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

S/S -

White House -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Ruth

82c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47-41

Action

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Info

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CANBERRA 2 126

PASS MEYER FELDMAN FROM PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

QUOTE

By inf, NARS, Date 4-16-81

IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO EXTEND MY BEST
WISHES TO PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL AND TO ALL OTHER ASSEMBLED
FOR THE DEDICATION OF THE JOHN F. KENNEDY BUILDING
AT THE HADASSAH-HEBREW UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER.

I UNDERSTAND THE BUILDING WILL BE USED AS AN INFORMATION
AND RECEPTION CENTER. IT WILL BE A PLACE TO WELCOME
VISITORS FROM EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE, AS WELL AS A PLACE
FOR THE DISSEMINATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE.
IT IS AN APPROPRIATE MEMORIAL TO A PRESIDENT WHOSE LIFE
WAS DEVOTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BEYOND CONVEN-
TIONAL FRONTIERS AND WHO PROVIDED A COMMON BOND OF INSPIRATION
TO ALL THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD. PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHO GAVE
SO MUCH OF HIMSELF TO THE CAUSES OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITY WOULD
HAVE BEEN, I AM SURE, PLEASED WITH THE CONCEPT OF THIS
BUILDING. IN THE YEARS AHEAD IT CAN SERVE AS A FORCE FOR PEACE,
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BARRIERS BETWEEN PEOPLES, AND FOR CONSTANT
INSPIRATION TO THE STEADY STREAM OF VISITORS FROM ALL OVER
THE WORLD. IT IS ANOTHER STRUCTURE IN THE GREAT HADASSAH-
HEBREW UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER COMPLEX THAT HAS ALREADY
DONE SO MUCH TO ADVANCE WORLD MEDICAL PROGRESS AND TO
STRENGTHEN THE BONDS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.

I HAVE ASKED MR. FELDMAN TO EXTEND, ON MY BEHALF
AND ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, OUR HOPES FOR THE
FULFILLMENT OF THE PROMISE THE BUILDING REPRESENTS.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE

CLARK
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 11:32 a.m., October 20.
Passed White House at 11:45 a.m., October 20.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo's & Misc.



S/S 12341

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Background Note on Shmuel ("Sam") Tamir,
Israeli Member of Parliament

I understand you recently met Mr. Shmuel ("Sam") Tamir, a visiting member of the Israeli parliament, and are interested in his ideas. Department officers had lunch with Tamir recently and found his ideas on a settlement of the West Bank problem refreshingly radical, envisaging as they do the transformation of Israel into a binational secular state. We do not, incidentally, know of any other prominent Israeli political figure who has expressed support for such a plan. I attach a letter to Embassy Tel Aviv which reports the gist of what Tamir had to say.

The following comments on Tamir may be useful:

Tamir is a former member of the right-wing (usually Opposition) Herut Party, who led a revolt against party leader Beigin over the past year. This resulted in his expulsion from Herut and his establishment of a splinter new party, with only 3 seats in the Knesset. A lawyer by profession, Tamir had won considerable renown (and notoriety) even before turning politician, for his defense of Herut's causes and those of the terrorist organization Irgun of Mandate times. He boasts of his role in Irgun and deportation to Kenya by the British. He is mistrusted by many of Israel's more established politicians. At the same time, he is proud of having defended several Israeli Arabs in court, mainly in cases protesting Military Government measures or Government land expropriation.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of Official-Informal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date 5-31-00

Report # 1271845

84a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICIAL-INFO

Heywood Stackhouse, Esquire
American Embassy
Tel Aviv, Israel

Dear Stack:

Your piece on GOI pleasure at the comportment of Israel's oriental Jews in the war (A-612) was particularly interesting to several of us here and represents the kind of reporting that we greatly appreciate at the moment. Several of the airgrams by John and Mark, too, have been of good use, even when they are based primarily on press sources. I cite in particular A-788, 789, 791, and 793. Since a final GOI position on elements of the settlement does not appear forthcoming at this time, we urgently need more raw material as well as Embassy analyses on the internal political jousting, which may provide clues on alternatives acceptable to the Israelis.

Along this line, Roy, David Korn, and I were intrigued a few days ago to learn from Shmuel Tamir that he favors a plan to integrate the West Bank and Gaza and give full rights of citizenship to the Arab inhabitants thereof. Although Tamir qualified his idea by explaining that the obtaining of citizenship might take some time (which he professed to feel should be the case with new Jewish immigrants as well), we were struck by how revolutionary it is in the modern Israeli scheme of things for people such as Tamir to be putting out these thoughts. It leads one to believe that the Israelis may possibly be toying in sincere fashion with a "big-think" solution to some of the area problems, not just producing bargaining gambits for the international bazaar. Some high hopes have been raised in high places around the USG, and it would be too bad if they foundered as a result of Israeli lack of imagination or generosity.

So much for that. Please thank John for steering Tamir to us, and Ofelia for her poignant newspaper clippings (with their trenchant comments) from time to time. Hope your family is fine in Rome (or the U.S.). I got a bit of atmosphere from Lynn Blasch when he passed through recently. Best regards to those still around the sweatshop.

Sincerely yours,

George B. Lambrakis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:eaf:7/7/67

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

By fw, NARA, Date 6-1-80

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

85

June 19, 1967

BKS:

We delayed this in the heat
of the crisis. I suspect it's better
allowed to die now.

Hal
HHS

*Called Jon Jensen
1705 6/19 RAB*



9321

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 30, 1967

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1-Wiggins
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW


THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Condolence to
President Shazar of Israel

I enclose a proposed message of condolence from President Johnson to President Shazar of Israel, on the death of his sister, Mrs. Miriam Rubashov.

On September 9, 1966, the President sent the following message to President Shazar:

"I was saddened to learn of the death of your brother Dr. Abraham Rubashov who was reunited with you in Israel only so very recently. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you and your family our deeply felt condolences."


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed message of condolence.

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SHAZAR

The news of the death of your sister, Mrs. Miriam Rubashov, has grieved me deeply. I know how her loss, coming so tragically soon after the death of your brother, must affect you. Mrs. Johnson and I send our heartfelt condolences to you and your family.

Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson.

⇒ AWR took original to NSC meeting

Wednesday, May 24, 1967
11:55 a.m.

86

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is most unusual.

Minister Evron called me to say that he fears Israeli diplomats are so busy pressing the U. S. Government that they never take the trouble to thank it.

1. He deeply appreciates -- as does his government -- the final form of the Israeli aid package.

2. He fully understands the "terrible dilemma" which you faced yesterday in making a public statement -- wanting both to reassure Israel and permit quiet diplomacy to work. He thought the final result was "wonderful." He wanted you to know that the Israeli Embassy in Washington was flooded with telephone calls from people we both would respect, who were deeply gratified by your statement.

3. He wanted me to convey to you, if I felt it appropriate, his deep personal gratitude.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 6-1-00

May 21, 1967

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ephraim Evron
Harold Saunders

Israeli Minister Evron phoned me at home last evening and asked to see me this morning, saying he had a cable from Foreign Minister Eban which he thought we should be aware of as we consider the President's reply to PM Eshkol. Emphasizing that this should be considered an informal transmittal of views in Jerusalem, he made these points:

1. Mood in Jerusalem. They were disappointed that the President's message of Thursday had not included a restatement of our commitment to Israel's security. They have now received a series of limitations from us--in effect, don't strike without consulting, don't make a public issue of Sharm al-Sheikh. But there has been no word about what we are doing? What exactly are we saying to the Soviets? Do we stand by our previous commitments? What are we prepared to do militarily to implement those commitments if we restate them? What concretely do we plan to do in this situation? In short, Jerusalem is increasingly uneasy and frustration is mounting.

In response, I told him informally that we were urgently considering a reply to PM Eshkol; that it was a mistake to read omission of reassurance from the President's earlier message as intent to back out on well-known assurances; that I personally thought any public restatement of our position might not be desirable until the outcome of U Thant's mission is clearer. However, I emphasized that all these were purely personal reactions since decisions were still in the making.

2. Their hopes for President's reply to Eshkol. In addition to reaffirmation of our commitment, they hope: (a) We will offer to make a public statement or at least explain why we don't think now is the right time and indicate willingness to consider making one if it appears helpful. (b) We will be more precise in our approach to the Soviets and more specific in telling the Israelis what we are doing. (c) We will give them a clearer picture of what our military intentions are. (Comment: While we may not want to address all these points in our message, they hope we might cover them orally in transmitting it.)

3. Near-term goals. They would like to come out of this crisis with: (a) A strong public statement that, as a matter of policy, we oppose the guerrilla-type solution to any problem, including Palestine. He felt we already had the makings of such a statement in U Thant's report to the UN Security Council and Ambassador Goldberg's October speech. (b) Some UNEF presence salvaged--at least one or two posts in Gaza and one at Sharm al-Sheikh. He expressed concern that the PLA in Gaza would soon resume fedayin raids. (c) Restatement of support for freedom of navigation.

Substance of above passed to Messrs. Grey and Atherton immediately after the meeting and to Mr. Walt Rostow in person.

CC: MEV Rostow
Mr. Battle

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

88
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 19, 1967

WWR:

*Memo
May 19, 1967*

The President may be so deeply involved in working out the final answer on the Israeli aid package that you may not want to send up the attached.

However, I want you to be aware of the two new elements in the equation -- French armored cars and Eshkol's formal request for a visit.



H. H. S.

89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 18, 1967

WWR:

This is just to let you know that Harman is seeing Battle today at 5:30 p. m. I had a purely "personal" call from Evron expressing hope that Battle might give them the final word on the aid package. He suggests this because he feels it would be a big boost for morale in Jerusalem at this point.



Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

By isf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~SECRET~~

step

Thursday, May 18, 1967 -- 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have checked personally with Sec. Rusk on the three Israel questions you posed. His answers follow:

1. On the APC's there is a marginal, but only marginal, advantage in making the deal through the Italians; it is not certain the Italians will accept. But we should go that route first. On the other hand, he would like not to make the APC commitment in the midst of the present tension for fear it might push the Syrians over the edge.

2. He is fully in support of Jack Valenti's taking on the desalting job.

3. He does not believe the Vice President should go either to Israel or to the Arab world until the dust settles a bit.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-470

By fw/cb, NARA, Date 5-30-00

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75C 8-18-81 letter~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By rif, NARS, Date 9-16-81

Wednesday, May 17, 1967 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is simply to put on paper what I told you last night.

David Ginsburg called to suggest that:

- We not wait for a visitor to inform the Israelis of our package.
- The channel for communications be normal diplomatic channel -- he suggested Luke Battle to the Israeli Ambassador.

Both he and Abe Feinberg agree that there is double embarrassment in the communication of U. S. Government decisions through private citizens. We have evidence that the Israelis would prefer to get information of this kind through regular diplomatic channels.

As you will have noted, the two Americans are now out of Yemen; and there is a moment -- perhaps no more than that -- of relative quiet on the Israeli-Syrian frontier.

I will be checking today as to whether a very prompt visit of the Vice President to the Middle East would make sense -- or threaten to put him in the middle of a hurricane.

W. W. Rostow

Indication of your decision is required on the table, in the third column, attached to my memorandum to you of May 8, 1967.

P. S. I have now checked with State. The view there is that the Israeli-Syrian situation is still so uncertain that they would recommend against injecting the Vice President into the Middle East at this time.
WWRostow:rlh

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 15, 1967
7:15 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Messrs. Feinberg and Ginsburgh

I am attaching two memos on the Israeli aid package for your reference. The first (Tab A) is the full description of the package. The second (Tab B) is a note describing the disadvantages of urging the Israelis to buy the Italian-made version of our APC.

revised
& re-
submitted
to Pres
5/17/67

You will know how far you want to go in discussing this package with them. Ambassador Harman has simply been told that the package "will substantially meet their requests."

I have put to Gene the question of sending the Vice President to Israel and Egypt. Luke Battle thinks it's a good idea, but Secretary Rusk may not agree. However, we cannot decide until the Egyptians come through on their promise to get our AID fellows out of jail in Yemen and until the threat of war between Israel and Syria lessens.

In hearing their report on their trip to Israel, you may want to ask whether they have any feeling for Eshkol's intention to attack Syria. Border tension mounted sharply over the weekend after Eshkol and the Israeli Chief of Staff threatened an attack if terrorist raids from Syria into Israel continue. The UAR has ostentatiously put its forces on alert.

We sympathize with Eshkol's need to stop these raids and reluctantly admit that a limited attack may be his only answer. However, without preaching, you would be justified in letting these gentlemen know that a miscalculation causing a Mid-East blow-up right now would make life awfully hard for you. We want to make Eshkol think twice without giving him cause to blame us for holding him back if events later prove that a limited attack now would have been the best answer.

W. R.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-228
By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

92 a



926
~~SECRET~~

May 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Italian APCs for Israel

Before you went to Bonn, you will recall that Secretary McNamara raised with the President the possibility of Israel's getting its APCs from Italy. Defense and State had rejected this idea earlier, but at your request Defense took a second look.

They still vote against urging Israel to go down this route. They conclude that the equipment would be available in Italy from normal manufacture in 11 months (18 here unless from inventory) at a price comparable to ours. However, because the Italian APC is identical with ours, they see no great political advantage in urging the Israelis to buy these, ~~down the Italian route~~. We would still have to license the Italian sale; the equipment would not look different from ours to the Arab eye; and we could not provide credit for the purchase without losing dollars.

I would not bother you with this again but for the fact that Harry McPherson told me at noon today he understood from David Ginsburgh that the Israelis are seriously considering the Italian model. I had thought from Goldberg's memo that we were back to American APCs and therefore did not address this issue in our last memo to the President (though I had in an earlier one we did not send). I simply want you to be aware of the facts in case this comes up again.

I am attaching the two relevant Defense memos.



Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLS-S 78001
By ref/ctm NARA, Date 5-28-02

~~SECRET~~

92c





INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 MAY 1967

I-22744/67

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW, THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Military Requests

Israel con
1-Paras
2-Ret.
92d
Att. to WWR copy
of WWR memo to
President 5/4/67
Subj: Israeli Aid Package

At your request, we have re-examined the possibilities of being more forthcoming on the various Israeli arms requests, than is recommended in Under Secretary Katzenbach's memoranda of 4 and 17 April 1967.

RECENT

FAVORABLE ACTIONS

First, the President should be aware, in considering the particular package before him, that the Defense Department has just this month responded favorably to additional Israeli military requests. During Dr. Dinstein's visit to Washington in mid-April, the DoD agreed to the following:

1. Subject only to security considerations, the US will interpose no objection if Israel can arrange contracts with European-Middle East countries (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Iran) for the overhaul and maintenance of aircraft supplied by US MAP or sales.

2. DoD will make every reasonable effort, within existing laws and US policy, to increase its purchase of goods and services in Israel. In this connection, Secretary Vance told Dr. Dinstein that DoD is prepared to consider specific Israeli proposals for offshore procurement of goods and services, even though these might require exceptions to current "Buy America" policies.

3. DoD is prepared to permit Israel to produce for its own use certain components of the A4H Skyhawk aircraft being purchased by Israel (Israeli production of weapons, armament, and ammunition for the A4H will not be permitted).

4. DoD is prepared to encourage Mexico to consider an Israeli proposal for the supply, or overhaul and maintenance, of up to 50 US-origin T-28 trainer aircraft which Mexico needs. Although the Israeli price would be considerably lower than a US firm would charge, the deal could produce over \$4 million in gross income to Israel.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.10
By rg/cbm, NARA, Date 5-28-02

~~SECRET~~

See PR 2-3
on Italian
APC's

~~SECRET~~

5. DoD has authorized the sale in Europe of 200 World War II half-tracks to Israel. The Israelis have over 1,000 of these vehicles; they need the additional 200 for cannibalization, as spare parts are not generally available. This purchase would enable Israel to keep its half-track fleet operating well into the 1970's, and would partially rebut the argument that newer APCs are a necessity.

DIESEL ENGINES
FOR CENTURION TANKS

In addition to the foregoing decisions or positions recently taken to accommodate Israel, DoD is now prepared to approve the Israeli request submitted about a year ago for permission to purchase up to 400 diesel engines to replace the gasoline engines in 385 Centurion (British-origin) tanks. These engines, which would be purchased from Continental Aviation and Engineering Company for delivery after January 1969, are desired by Israel because they will give the Centurions much greater range. (The US agreed in 1965 to provide the materiel and know-how so that Israel could convert tanks of US origin from gasoline to diesel, from M48A1 to M48A3.)

A favorable US decision on this request would represent a considerable concession, as it would more than double the range of the Centurion tank, at relatively small cost to Israel. The result would be an Israeli armored force in the 1969-71 time period comprising 635 first-line medium tanks (M48A2C, M48A3 and Centurion), all with 105mm guns. In addition, Israel would have 550 older but "dieselized" M-4 Sherman tanks, 135 of which also have 105mm guns. Israel would thus have a total medium tank force of about 1200 diesel-powered, heavily armed tanks as compared to an estimated 995 gasoline-powered tanks for the UAR. Even if it is assumed that the smaller Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese tank forces of varying vintages and effectiveness (estimated to aggregate 873 tanks in 1970) could be added and collectively ranged against the Israeli force, the Israeli margin of advantage would still be more favorable than the ratio of 1:2 or 1:3 which the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces (General Rabin) told us in late 1963 was acceptable to Israel.

The State Department has not yet studied the political implications of the proposal to "dieselize" Israeli tanks of British origin, and therefore reserves its position at this time. ISA agrees that this issue should be considered by the NEA/IRG before a recommendation to the President is made.

ITALIAN APCs

On the subject of the grant or sale to Israel of US-origin armored personnel carriers (M-113), the President has received Secretary McNamara's memorandum of 17 April. The arguments therein apply, with scarcely diminished forces, to the proposal of an Italian sale of the M-113 produced in Italy under US license. The Italian M-113 is identical with the US

attached

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

version in external appearance and construction; also, it is common knowledge that military equipment produced under US license cannot be sold to third countries without US consent. Therefore, we would certainly be identified with such a sale. Moreover, Israel would almost certainly treat US permission as a precedent for Israeli procurement of other US military equipment produced in Europe.

It is important that the President understand the range of European alternatives available to Israel if it believes new APCs are essential. The British produce the Saracen armored car, a fully armored vehicle with accommodations for 12 men. The British are also producing the Trojan, a new fully tracked and armored APC which carries 10 men. West Germany makes the HS-30, a fully tracked and armored carrier carrying eight men; it is the standard APC of the West German Army. The West Germans are also currently testing three newer APCs. France produces the AMX-56, a fully tracked and armored APC which carries 13 men. The prices of these European vehicles, except for the Saracen (estimated at \$40,000), are believed to be in the \$55-75,000 range in contrast to about \$41,000 for the US model.

GENERAL
COMMENT

Stepping back from the immediate issues before us, I think we must assume, in addressing all Israeli military requests, the larger Israeli objective of closer military identification with the United States. Israel's representatives have already pressed us well along the road to such identification. There is a serious risk that further, and especially too rapid, moves in that direction will sharpen East-West polarization in the Middle East, making it increasingly difficult for moderate Arab states to continue to have military supply relations with the US, and providing further opportunity for the Soviets to gain influence. By every military measurement, Israel now appears unchallengeable by its enemies, and thus possesses a very strong deterrent force. None of the Israeli requests requires our attention now as a matter of military need.

Townsend Hoopes
Townsend Hoopes
Principal Deputy

~~SECRET~~

92e

Tab A -

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

17 April 1967

See WWR memo to President 4/18/67

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Arms Requests

I believe you are familiar with the recommendation of the Inter-departmental Regional Group for Near East-South Asia (IRG/NESA) that we should not accede to Israel's request for 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), on either a grant aid or sales basis.

I personally support that recommendation, and believe it would be a serious mistake for us to provide APCs to Israel at this time, either 200 or any lesser number. I recognize our interest in the maintenance by Israel of an adequate deterrent against attack by any of its Arab neighbors, but the present and prospective military balance in the Middle East strongly favors Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently confirmed their view that Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years. As presently trained and equipped, the armed forces of Israel are greatly superior in effectiveness and firepower to those of their potential opponents, individually or collectively.

Israeli security is also strengthened by the US policy of maintaining a controlled military supply relationship with those Arab states who show moderation toward Israel and who resist opportunities to acquire Soviet equipment; this helps to avoid a polarization of the Arab-Israeli dispute along East-West lines. Our dramatic airlift of equipment to Jordan last winter was necessary to save King Hussein's regime, which had been badly undermined by the unfortunate Israeli raid against Samu in November. Our failure to act could have led to a rapid deterioration in Jordan, involving the introduction of Egyptian armed forces and Soviet advisers and equipment. Provision of additional APCs to Israel at this time could, in my judgment, only serve to undercut the good effect of what we did for Jordan, to "pay twice" for the Israeli miscalculation at Samu, and to agitate a situation that is now relatively quiescent.

Timing & Secrecy

In the agreement of March 1966 for the purchase of Skyhawk aircraft, Israel explicitly recognized that that sale did not constitute a precedent for future U.S. action, and further agreed "to continue to look to Europe for the bulk of its military requirements and not to regard the U.S. as a major arms supplier." In making its current request for APCs, the Israelis would appear to be disregarding these conditions which they accepted just over a year ago. In my judgment, our recent supplementary aid to Jordan has not altered the validity of these conditions.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #405By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

~~SECRET~~

I therefore recommend that we turn down the Israeli request for APCs, and suggest that they should look to Western European sources if they consider it necessary to purchase APCs at this time.

/s/ Robert S. McNamara

~~SECRET~~

93

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1967

MEMO FOR WALT ROSTOW
HARRY McPHERSON

Since you're both involved in discussing the Israeli Independence Day Parade, you may be interested in the attached cable from London.

Even allowing for the hard feelings of the Britisher involved (Morris), this is an example of the maneuvering that goes on around this "innocent" issue.

One of the saddest facts of our relationship with Israel is that we can't deal with each other completely openly. The reason we can't is just this kind of maneuver. It's our nature just to go to this parade, be friendly and not attach much significance to it. But you can't watch this process without being certain that the Israelis are out to get something.

On this issue, they've lost perspective, I think. The idea expressed to me by Evron that our not going to the parade will provoke a "crisis" in US-Israeli relations is either a silly statement--which isn't characteristic--or an example of the significance they attach to this. With all the help they get from us, it seems to me they're off base to make an issue over something like this.

Hal

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(c)

NLJ 00-228

By cb, NARA Date 10-27-00 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

93a

91-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

NEA

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INFO RUQMGK/AMEMBASSY AMMAN

EUR

RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

IO

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS

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RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USIA

RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK

NSC

ZEN/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

INR

ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

CIA

ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

NSA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 9202

RSR

SUBJ: ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE PARADE

1. FONOFF'S MORRIS (HEAD, EASTERN DEPT) TOLD EMBOFF MAY 5 THAT ISRAELI DEFATT LONDON, IN LETTER TO HEAD OF DEFENSE SALES MOD, RECALLED HMG HAD NOT OBJECTED TO DISPLAY OF

PAGE TWO RUDTCR 9202 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UP-GUNNED CENTURION TANKS IN 1966 INDEPENDENCE PARADE. DEFATT "ASSUMED" NO OBJECTION TO SUCH DISPLAY THIS YEAR EITHER. HEAD DEFENSE SALES REFERRED MATTER TO FONOFF, WHICH OF COURSE KNOWS PRESENCE OF TANKS IN JERUSALEM WOULD CONTRAVENE K/J GAA.

2. MORRIS CALLING ISRAELI MIN ANUG TO VOICE DISPLEASURE OVER CHANNEL OF INQUIRY AND WHAT MORRIS REGARDS AS HEAVY-HANDED TACTIC DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE HMG RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION THAT BRITISH AMB NOT ATTEND PARADE. EMBOFF NOTED IN LATTER CONNECTION MAY 5 LONDON JEWISH CHRONICLE ARTICLE OPINING THAT ESHKOL MAY, IN FACE WESTERN (AND JEE) BOYCOTT, FEEL OBLIGED "SHOW HIS STRENGTH" BY BRINGING MORE TANKS AND TROOPS TO JERUSALEM THAN GAA PERMITS, A LA BEN-GURION IN 1961.

GP-3 BRUCE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

005393

MAY 5, 1967
3:30 PM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *gw*, NARA, Date *6-1-00*

Subject: Israel's Independence Day Parade ⁽⁶⁾ 5/8

I relayed your message to Rostow, but he asked to make sure that this referred to Katzenbach's recommendation to play this matter low key. Did the President approve Katzenbach's recommendation?

yes _____ no _____

Jim J.
5-6-67

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Walt:

Talk this over with David Ginsburg and see if you can get him aboard and have Harry McPherson talk to Evron about it.

LBJ/mf
5-4-67
10:00p

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel's Independence Day Parade

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By gw, NARA, Date 6-1-00

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's second look at whether Ambassador Barbour should attend the 15 May parade in Jerusalem. This is his own concise memo, so I won't summarize here. He still comes out against attending.

The one point he doesn't make is the long-term one that any change in the status of Jerusalem can only come in the context of a larger Arab-Israeli settlement. We want to withhold formal recognition of Israel's position in Jerusalem as leverage for that day--should it ever come.

His memo makes sense. While we don't feel as strongly on this issue as the British, we don't think the Israelis are right in blowing this up as a major issue either. In fact, Wally Barbour reports that some Israeli newspaper editorials are already advising the government to relax. One even suggests that the Foreign Office tailor its invitations so as not to put us on the spot.

If you agree with Nick, I would suggest reading this line back to the Israelis in a low-key way:

- We do not feel this is a major issue and certainly intend no affront by it. Our relationship is based on far more important things.
- While we had hoped we might attend, a wide range of interests have led us on balance to a negative decision. They understand what these interests are.
- We hope they will not make an issue of this. One measure of a genuine two-way relationship is understanding of the other fellow's problems. Given the dimensions of our joint problems in the Middle East today, we just can't see having a fuss over this one and hope they'll agree.

Approve Katzenbach's recommendation _____
See me _____

Walt Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Attendance at Israel's Independence
Day Parade in Jerusalem

Israel plans to hold its Independence Day Parade in Jerusalem on May 15, and has requested that the United States be represented. The British have asked us and the French to agree not to send official representation to the ceremonies. They feel that in spite of the Israeli announcement that the parade will be "within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement," Western attendance would lend support to the Israeli claim that Jerusalem is their capital, thereby weakening the Western position on the international status of the city. The French take a similar position, and also fear political repercussions in Jordan. The Jordanians have protested the Israeli intention in a letter to U Thant on the grounds that it would violate the General Armistice Agreement, and have strongly urged us not to attend.

We found it difficult to justify non-attendance on the grounds argued by the British and French, since our people attended the Independence Day Ceremonies in Jerusalem in 1965 (the parade was held elsewhere) and the Knesset Inauguration there in 1966 without significant effect on our basic position. We therefore tried hard to get them to change their minds, proposing instead that we all attend the parade but on an understanding with the Israelis that this represented no change in our policy and on condition that the parade would not violate the terms of the General Armistice Agreement. They stand firm on their decision and have again urged us not to attend.

Under these circumstances, I do not think the United States should be officially represented. Our attendance would appear as a breach of solidarity with the other Western powers and would isolate us in the eyes of the Arabs just

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-446

By wp NARA. Date 2-6-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

when we are trying to hold the lid on the situation in Yemen and when the Lebanese are worried about their public's reaction to the visit of the Sixth Fleet scheduled for May 26.

RECOMMENDATION:

That I be authorized to inform the Israeli Government that the United States will not be officially represented at the Independence Day Parade in Jerusalem on May 15.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Lo

5/3/67

John Walsh's response to Mr. Rostow's question posed to Ben Read on what our position was on Israeli membership in the EEC:

1. The question of actual membership is a matter for the EEC, and the EEC has indicated that Israel, as a non-European country, is not eligible for actual membership.

2. In respect to associate membership, we would be opposed on the grounds that it would imply preferential trade treatment. Our opposition would not be connected directly to Israel, but rather would be a general opposition to preferential trade treatment.

3. We would favor a non-discriminatory trade agreement between Israel and the EEC.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

96-1

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Action

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UNCLAS TEL AV IV 3419

NSA

ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE PARADE

DOD

REF: TEL AV IV 3415

AID

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY FRONT PAGE STORY FRIDAY AFTERNOON'S MAAR IV
BY PHILLIPE BENN, WASHINGTON DATELINE, UNDER HEADLINE "U.S.
ORDERS ITS AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL NOT TO ATTEND JERUSALEM PARADE".

RSR

QUOTE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS DECIDED NOT ALLOW US AMBASSADOR

PAGE 2 RUQVL 3419 UNCLAS

TO ISRAEL TO OCCUPY HIS SEAT ON GRANDSTAND DURING MILITARY
MARCH - WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN JERUSALEM ON OCCASION INDEPENDENCE DAY - INFORMED AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES SAY.

REASON IS STATE DEPARTMENT'S UNWILLINGNESS "TO MAKE GESTURE
WHICH WILL BE INTERPRETED AS HOSTILE IN EVERY ARAB CAPITAL."
SOURCES QUOTED SAY DEPARTMENT REGARDS SUCH GESTURE AS POOR
POLICY BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE ISRAEL ONLY LITTLE SATISFACTION
AND AROUSE CONSIDERABLE ARAB ANGER. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE
TAKEN PARTICULARLY AMISS IN JORDAN, AND US HAS SPECIAL INTEREST
IN STABILITY OF PRESENT REGIME IN AMMAN.

HOWEVER, SOURCE ADDS, IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT MILITARY ATTACHE
AT US EMBASSY WILL WITNESS JERUSALEM PARADE. BARBOUR
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

ATOR
DUDLER
UDGET
AVIS
INSBURGH
AMHLTON
ESSUP
HNGON
ORDEN
ENY
OMER
OYERS
AYLOR
RIGGINS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

96

File

also
S/S informed 5/1/67

BKS

✓ Inform Saunders
Saunders sent
cc & dtd. by phone 5/1 am

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our Attendance at Israeli Independence Day Parade

We are in the midst of our annual hassle over whether Ambassador Barbour should go to Israel's parade in Jerusalem. He would go if both the French and British ambassadors were going. But London has decided at Cabinet level that its Ambassador should not go this year, and Paris has agreed.

The issue is where we draw the line in lending our presence to ceremonies which further recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. UN resolutions of 1949-50 recommended that Jerusalem be placed under international administration. We have gone along with this position. Although we do business with Israeli government offices in Jerusalem, we have refused legally to recognize it as Israel's capital and have kept our embassy in Tel Aviv. While the conditions that led to our initial position have changed, we don't believe we should change that position unless in the context of some Arab-Israeli settlement. Doing so otherwise would kick off a tremendous Arab reaction.

State really doesn't feel our presence makes that much legal difference because we've been to other such functions in Jerusalem. But it does fear that the Israelis and Arabs would read great significance if we broke with the British and French on the issue. We could probably get Eshkol to promise not to exploit our presence, but we can't stave off some Arab reaction. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has already formally asked us not to attend. He feels that Jordan is especially vulnerable to Arab criticism because of Jordan's close relationship with us.

The issue is not the parade itself but the fact that the Israeli government uses this kind of thing to nibble away at the Western position. The British have decided--at the Cabinet level after two reviews and considerable Jewish pressure--that they must draw the line somewhere and that this is the place. In 1965, they attended a tattoo in Jerusalem after the Israelis assured them they'd make nothing of it and then six weeks later Eshkol cited British and American

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 99-69
By gwl NARA. Date 4-10-00

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- 2 -

presence as a significant step toward Western recognition of Israel's status in Jerusalem. The British were burned up, and there's a good bit of their annoyance in this year's decision.

The Israelis are telling us informally that our refusal to attend will provoke a crisis in our relations. That's nonsense, and we can probably talk them out of that line. But unfortunately they can read our absence as the kind of aloofness that doesn't help you here at home.

Personally, I can't get excited about whether we go to the parade or not, and I think the British may be drawing the line at the wrong place. But they do make one important point. There's no question that every Israeli move like this is calculated "salami tactics." Unhappily, there is no such thing with this tough-minded, always-negotiating government--much as I love the Israelis as people--as just making a nice gesture without having them attach significance to it.

The main issue in this as in the aid package is whether we're now ready to throw open the gates to Israel or whether we're still willing to draw the line somewhere to preserve some balance between our Arab and Israeli policies. They think they've made a breakthrough with you on the tank and planes sales, and they're trying to exploit it to the hilt.

I hate to see something like this cause you trouble, and I think the British have made a wrong decision. But Secretary Katzenbach has decided we ought to go along with them and the French, and if there were no domestic concern, I wouldn't even bother you with this. He has not asked our review, but I asked to put this before you. You can either let his decision stand, or I can ask him to take a second look if you are concerned.

Walt. Rostow

Let the decision stand _____

Ask Secretary Katzenbach to review _____

Done 1 May, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~