

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

122

Saturday, December 10, 1966 -- 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

After thanking Abe Feinberg for his peaches, he volunteered the following.

The Jewish community is troubled by the UN censorship resolution. If this is followed by an arms move on behalf of Jordan which appears to tip the balance, we may have real political trouble with the Jewish community in the U.S. He added that Max Fischer, a substantial figure in the Detroit Jewish community, is now working with Romney and is bad news in this matter.

He says that he understands fully what our problem is but hopes we handle it in a balanced way that keeps the local Jewish community from defecting.

I said that in quieting Jordan down we were doing Israel's work. We had no intention of upsetting the arms balance. But Israel cannot yet take the stability of Jordan for granted.

I also said Ellsworth Bunker would be going out to Israel on the 16th for his first sessions.

W. W. Rostow

ISRAEL
Mr. Rostow

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file

9 December 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As instructed, I called Abe Feinberg pronto. I told him I wanted to clue him privately so he could head off a developing problem which, otherwise could cause nothing but trouble all around.

The situation in Jordan was still very dicey. We were working day and night to overcome a crisis which Israel itself had created. As usual, we had to pick up the pieces. It was imperative--in our own interest, in Jordan's, and above all in Israel's--that we strengthen Hussein's position and his support from his army. This would almost inevitably require expediting some arms already contracted for, and quite possibly some added sweeteners.

But when we told Israel's Embassy this, we had gotten a lot of backflap about why we hadn't consulted Israel first before talking with Jordan, about bad faith if we sold new arms to Jordan, etc. I wasn't up on these matters any more, but wanted him to know that such rejoinders had caused much high level annoyance here.

So I urged that Abe tell his friends to keep their shirts on, and not start telling us how to handle Jordan again. Their credentials were hardly very good on this subject; the very time when we were being forced again to clean up their mess was no time to start hitting us from the flank and souring relations. Abe should pass this word in spades, as coming from a friend.

Abe said he'd see Eban (now in New York) pronto. But he wondered whether more arms to Jordan would create a new arms imbalance; in this case he urged a formula to help Israel out too. I retorted that asking us to compensate Israel would leave a very bad taste just now. In any case I doubted that any significant military imbalance was likely; we weren't foolish. The problem was rather one of preventing the truly major imbalance which would result if Jordan went sour.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #360

~~SECRET~~

By SW, NARA, Date 5-30-00

~~SECRET~~

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Abe wanted me to know the "domestic political angle." The entire US Jewish community felt it was isolated after Israel's censure by the US. To add another pinprick by announcing arms to Jordan alone wouldn't sit well. I said I'd pass on this message, but urged he pass on the full flavor of mine. This was just the wrong time to "rock the boat"; Evan would be wise to pour oil on troubled waters.

| S/

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel - Jordan This Week

We've moved this week into the second phase of our effort to put together the pieces after Israel's 13 November raid. Hussein is still on top of his security situation. Although the army has stuck with him in putting down demonstrations, morale is still a serious problem. We must now show enough movement in improving Jordan's defenses to satisfy his military over the longer term.

He sent his army commander, General Khammash, here Monday with a stupendous \$200 million request for equipment, army expansion and budget support. Secretary Rusk and I have both received him in an effort to make Hussein feel he is getting a fair hearing.

We will have to whittle Khammash's request down to keep Hussein from ruining Jordan economically, but we probably can't get off scot free. We'll have to put together some kind of package and will try to gear it to streamlining existing forces and improving border control. We don't agree with Hussein that this is chiefly a military problem because we don't believe--as he does--that the Israeli attack was the first step in grabbing West Jordan. We are holding Secretary McNamara in reserve to sell our final proposition to Khammash when we have a clearer idea what we can do.

The Israelis have recovered their composure enough to take us to task mildly for supporting last week's UN Security Council censure of Israel. They claim the UN action gives a blank check to the Arab governments backing the terrorists. We're pressing them to beef up their own border control effort and to help improve the UN machinery there. They're willing to talk about improving their own system, but we'll have to press hard before they will be willing to see the UN beefed up. Nevertheless, we still feel the least that ought to come out of this mess is a system that will be a serious deterrent to continued terrorism.

We will be back to you with a formal proposal later.

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Authority FRUS 64-168, vol. 18, #355

By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

~~SECRET~~

W. Rostow

125 Israel
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To: Brom Smith

From: Howard Wriggins

Subject: Cable summary for the President, November 26, Israel/Jordan

King Hussein may have weathered the worst of the riots which, when they occur, are usually most severe on Fridays when crowds gather for prayers and are excited by fundamentalist sermons. But his troubles are far from over.

1. In the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, Jordanian security forces fired on crowds excited by sermons during morning prayers. Three civilians were killed and a number of others seriously wounded. A curfew has been imposed.

2. UAR and Amman radios are blaming each other for Jordan's poor defensive response to the Israeli raid. In an effort to shift responsibility to the United Arab Command (UAC), Jordan's Prime Minister Tal claims the UAC should have provided air cover. But Cairo says air cover was the responsibility of the country attacked and blames Jordan for refusing to allow troops of other Arab states to be stationed in Jordan, even though Jordan feared just such an attack from Israel.

3. A cross section of the substantial citizens of Jerusalem, Hebron and Ramallah have petitioned Hussein (a) to provide greater military protection to west bank villages, (b) to allow troops of other Arab countries to be stationed in Jordan and (c) to stop interfering with infiltrator raids into Israel.

4. The leaders of the Palestinian Liberation Organization are

spreading rumors of impending sabotage and assassination attempts on Jordanian cabinet members. In the supercharged atmosphere these might precipitate adventures.

~~(5) At the UN, Jordan's complaint against Israel by a 14-0~~

~~New Zealand abstaining~~

~~PAPERWORK, PAPERWORK, PAPERWORK, PAPERWORK~~

(5) At the UN, Jordan's complaint resulted in a strong censure of Israel by a 14- 0 vote, New Zealand abstaining. But CIA estimates this will have little affect on Jordan's disorders, since the organizers want to bring down at least the Cabinet, and perhaps the King himself.

Goldberg believes we should capitalize on whatever credit we may now have with Jordan and leverage with Israel if we should help with border sealing technology to press both sides for more collaboration with UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commission.

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By mmg, NARS, Date 12/22/77~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 26 NOVEMBER 1966
SITUATION IN JORDAN
(AS OF 12:00 EST)

1. SO FAR TODAY THE SITUATION IN JORDAN IS QUIET, ALTHOUGH SOME PRESS REPORTING REFERS TO DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH APPARENTLY TOOK PLACE ON FRIDAY. NEITHER THE EMBASSY NOR CIA HAS REPORTED ANY DISTURBANCES.

2. TODAY KING HUSAYN ANNOUNCED THAT CIVILIANS IN FRONTIER VILLAGES WILL BE ARMED AND FORTIFICATIONS BUILT AT POINTS ALONG THE FRONTIER. BOTH MEASURES WILL BE CAREFULLY SUPERVISED BY THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. SIMULTANEOUSLY, A NEW DRAFT LAW FOR MILITARY SERVICE HAS BEEN PROMULGATED.

3. CAIRO'S "VOICE OF PALESTINE" CONTINUES ITS ATTACKS ON THE JORDANIAN REGIME AND CALLS FOR HUSAYN'S OVERTHROW.

4. A STRINGENT CURFEW EXISTS IN JERUSALEM AND TELEPHONE SERVICE IS CUT OFF; OTHER WEST BANK TOWNS WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SCENE OF RIOTS HAVE BEEN SEALED OFF.

5. HUSAYN HAS UNDERCUT THE RADICAL PALESTINANS ON THE JORDAN WEST BANK BY TELLING THEM THAT IF THEY WANT AN ENTITY OF THEIR OWN UNDER CAIRO BACKED PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION LEADER SHUQAYRI THEY COULD HAVE IT. THE WEST BANK REPRESENTATIVES QUICKLY ASSURED HIM THAT WAS THE LAST THING THEY DESIRED.

6. ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL, STUNG BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL, HAS BLAMED THE "BIG POWERS" FOR PRESENT MIDDLE EASTERN TENSIONS.

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM

November 24, 1966

WALT, State's Strategy on Israel-Jordan

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We seem to be making some progress. There are ~~four~~ elements to State's present approach.

1. They have been beating the Israeli's to be sure they don't provoke further worries, and if Jordan should have to attack, there will be no Israeli hot pursuit.
 2. The President's letter will have served to reassure Hussein somewhat (Roger Davies thinks a good deal; I'm more skeptical that words alone will do it).
 3. Walter Harris' channel will be sending a careful assessment of Israeli actions and intentions, as we read them. (This will be based in part on what Eshkol asked us to communicate to the Jordanians, but we will be putting this material in as our own assessment, since Eshkol's credibility at this stage is slight.
 4. The speed-up of the military aid package, which a message is being prepared today. Within seven days, we can airlift 15 jeeps with 106 mm. recoilless rifles which can be used for both internal security and anti-tank purposes.
Within ~~seven days~~ 30 days we can ship
 - 6 106 ~~mm.~~ self-propelled howitzers.
The schedule for delivering F-104's will be speeded up.
- I believe this token of our interest will make a substantial difference to Hussein's nerve and may help him stand off his own hawks.
5. They are now working on a scenario on frontier stabilization, which may include a Goldberg statement at the UN and a technical US mission to visit both countries, with Macomber to go to the Jordan side. DOD is pressing ahead on alternative packages of frontier surveillance and warning devices which will meet Hussein's real security worries better than much of the heavy hardware he's asking for.

Comment: If we weather this weekend, we'll probably be in the clear enough to push ahead strongly on Para. 5.

Howard Wiggins

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 11-108

By UKB

NARA, Date 05-14-2012

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MEMORANDUM

Nov. 24, 11:30 .a.m

To: W. W. Rostow

From: Howard Wriggins

Subject: Israel/Jordan situation

1. Hussein maintains an outward calm. But some of his advisors argue that Israel is preparing a new attack, ~~report~~ general mobilization in Israel and other exaggerations which may derive from Israel's improved efforts to patrol its own frontiers, steps we have long urged the Israeli's to take. But Hussein remains very jittery about Israeli intentions.

State [] attempting to deal with this aspect of the problem by sending out [] a detailed intelligence assessment, [] in the hope this will bring new pressure for calm to bear on the King and his harrassed advisors.

2. [] UAR has pressured the Syrians to instruct their General Staff to stop all cross-border ~~raids from~~ ~~incursions~~ into Israel.

3. Riots are continuing in various parts of Western Jordan, but they seem to be less in intensity. In Ramallah, students demanded that the populace be armed and that the army attack Israel immediately. Our Consul General reports fears that riots may break out in Jerusalem itself, but these have not yet erupted, as of Nov. 24 a.m. our time. The riots appear to be in part engineered by PLO with UAR support and are in part spontaneously ignited from a sense of dismay that the King's army could not defend helpless villagers.

4. The King received the President's letter this morning. According to Amman "The King was clearly pleased with message. Asked me to convey his thanks immediately to President and commented "it is good to know that your friends are with you during such times." Said he would be answering the President in writing as soon as possible."

MEMORNADUM

November 24, '66

WALT,

Amman's recommendation on upping military sales by \$2.4 million to Jordan, and upping military support by \$16 million annually.

Amman's 1231 gives the most detailed rationale for substantially upping our programmed military sales and support. In sum, it argues:

1. Jordan is at a crossroads, and so are we in our relationship with Jordan.
2. The critical point is how promptly we respond to the King's urgent request for a substantial increase in military assistance;
3. The King, and our MATT office feels he needs additional stuff ~~xxxx~~ in order to assure himself and his people that there won't be another Sanu. Unless he can give such an assurance for the future, he loses his army and his people.
4. They estimate he needs about ~~2x~~ \$2.6 million one-time grant for equipment and \$16 million annually to cover increased army pay and an expansion of army personnel.
5. He can get these added resources from (a) the US, (b) arab neighbors or (c) the Soviets. He has turned to us first.
6. Admittedly his regime is weaker than we thought, for a number of reasons spelled out in para. 9. But he and his regime have major advantages from our point of view (para. 10).
7. If he were replaced, would the radical Arab successor be adverse to our interests? Yes, because it would bring threat and disorder to that much longer Jordanian-Israeli frontier, similar to Israel's problems with the much shorter Syrian border.
8. ~~With xxx~~ We've already put a billion and a half \$ into Jordan. By comparison, a relatively small increment now would be considerable insurance for another five to ten year period.
9. State thinks he overdoes it. AID is totally uninterested. DOD is responsive at the working level. Burns is right that if we niggled here, ~~xxx~~ Hussein fell and the Middle East caught fire, we'd be in for much heavier expenses than this would require. Yet, ~~xxx~~ the real

for much heavier costs than this program requires. Yet the real issues are: What other steps, political, economic and other, can Hussein take to broaden his support at home? and what steps can both he and Israel, with our help, take to stabilize that frontier. We shouldn't entirely foreclose examination of Burns' proposal, but its doesn't attract much support as yet.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF THREE AMMAN 1231

*Important in
Hussein's request for
aid & why we
should -*

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REF DEPTTEL 83169.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-229
By CB, NARA Date 10-27-00

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 354A ~~SECRET~~

1. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT JORDAN IS AT A CROSSROADS, AND WE
ARE AT A CROSSROADS WITH JORDAN.

2. I AGREE WITH THE DEPARTMENT THAT QUOTE MAGNITUDE GOJ
MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUEST AND PLANS FOR JAA BUILD-UP
CLEARLY INDICATE NEED TO DEFINE NATURE OF PROBLEM WE MUST
DEAL WITH. UNQUOTE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE PROB-
LEM OF FURTHER MILITARY AND FINANCIAL AID TO JORDAN BY
LOOKING AT THE TOTAL PICTURE NOW AND MAKING A FINAL DECISION
NOW. EITHER WE DO ALL THAT IS REQUIRED OR WE SHOULD WRITE
JORDAN OFF AND DO NOTHING. HALF MEASURES WILL NOT BE
EFFECTIVE. IT WOULD JUST BE THROWING MONEY AWAY.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. THE REQUEST BY THE GOJ FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS SUBMITTED IN HASTE AND OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT BEING THOUGHT THROUGH. I ASSUME THAT SHARIF NASSER SIMPLY DUSTED OFF SOME ROSEATE LIST WHICH HAD BEEN IN JAA FILES FOR MONTHS, IF NOT YEARS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN GOING OVER THE LIST TO REFINES IT, HOPEFULLY DOWNWARD, BUT THEY ARE SO WROUGHT-UP NOW ONE CANNOT BE SURE.

4. THE ISRAELI ATTACK DEMONSTRATED TO THE JORDANIANS

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 354A ~~SECRET~~

THAT THERE IS A NEW SCALE OF ISRAELI MILITARY INCURSION. FOR THE OLD TYPE OF INCURSION, THE BLOWING UP OF A FEW HOUSES OR AN ATTACK ON A POLICE POST, THE PRESENT JORDANIAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WAS ACCEPTED AS GENERALLY ADEQUATE. AGAINST FULL SCALE WAR WITH ISRAEL, JORDANIANS KNOW THEY CAN NEVER HAVE AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AND THAT THEY MUST RELY UPON THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS FOR ASSISTANCE. BUT AGAINST AN ATTACK SUCH AS THAT OF NOVEMBER 13--RELATIVELY LARGE SCALE AND QUICK--JORDANIANS FEEL THEY HAVE ONLY SUCH DEFENSE FORCES AS ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN JORDAN TO DEPEND UPON. AND THE JORDAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS INADEQUATE FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE ARMY FEELS MORE STRONGLY ABOUT THIS THAN ANYONE. AND NO JORDANIAN WILL BELIEVE THAT AN ATTACK SUCH AS SAMU COULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. NOR WILL ACTION IN UN, STRENGTHENING OF UNTSO, ETC., CHANGE THEIR THINKING IN THIS REGARD. SOOTHING WORDS FROM US WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. THEY WOULD HAVE NO FAITH IN A GUARANTEE FROM US, OR ISRAEL, THAT THERE WILL NEVER BE ANOTHER SAMU. IN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 354A ~~SECRET~~

FACT, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MOST RADICAL HERMETICAL SEALING OF THE BORDER, WE CANNOT GUARANTEE, ABSOLUTELY AND CATEGORICALLY, EVEN TO OURSELVES THAT THERE WILL NEVER BE ANOTHER SAMU.

5. WHEN THE DUST SETTLES, WHAT WE BELIEVE THE JORDANIAN ARMY WOULD BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR IS AN INCREASE IN THEIR CAPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST A POSSIBLE FUTURE SAMU.

6. OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE HAS ESTIMATED THIS REQUIREMENT IN SEPARATE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. THE ESTIMATE IS \$2.6 MILLION ONE TIME AND \$16.1 MILLION IN ANNUALLY RECURRING COSTS. TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE WE HAD BETTER COUNT ON AT LEAST \$3.5 ONE TIME AND \$17 TO \$18 MILLION ANNUALLY. THERE WILL BE INCREASED EXPENSES FOR FORTIFYING BORDER VILLAGES AND FOR IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS TERRORISTS. THESE FIGURES ARE PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION--AND IT IS CERTAINLY NOT A FIRM ONE--THAT UAC CONTRIBUTIONS WILL CONTINUE. (SEE OUR A-120 OF SEPT. 26.) IF UAC FUNDS STOP, AND THE JORDANIANS ARE UNABLE TO GET THE MONEY

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 354A ~~S E C R E T~~

ELSE WHERE, WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR A REQUEST FOR THAT MONEY, TOO. AND IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EVEN IF UAC CONTRIBUTIONS DO CONTINUE, MAINTENANCE CONTRIBUTIONS WILL STOP IN 1973. YET MAINTENANCE EXPENSES WILL CONTINUE.

7. THE DECISION AS TO WHAT TO DO SHOULD BE MADE WITH OUR EYES WIDE OPEN. THERE FOLLOW CONSIDERATIONS WHICH APPEAR PERTINENT TO ME.

8. JORDAN IS AN ARTIFICIAL STATE AND BY VIRTUE OF THIS THE REGIME HAS ALWAYS BEEN A FRAGILE STRUCTURE.

9. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS, WHICH WERE APPARENT BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 13 ISRAELI ATTACK, WEAKENED THE REGIME:
(A) FAILURE TO EFFECT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS;
(B) CORRUPTION IN HIGH PLACES; (C) EVIDENCE OF DISCONTENT WITH THE REGIME AMONGST AT LEAST A SMALL GROUP OF ARMY OFFICERS; (D) AS TIME HAS MARCHED ON AND EDUCATION AND SOPHISTICATION HAVE BECOME MORE WIDESPREAD, THE APPEAL OF A TRIBAL ARAB MONARCHY HAS COME TO HAVE INCREASINGLY LESS HOLD ON EVEN THE TRANS-JORDANIANS; (E) THE REGIME'S CLOSE TIES WITH THE US ARE NOT POPULAR IN THOSE CIRCLES

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 354A ~~S E C R E T~~

WHICH WOULD PREFER JORDAN TO ADOPT A QUOTE MORE ARAB POSITION UNQUOTE; (F) THE POLARIZATION OF THE ARAB WORLD, TO WHICH THIS REGIME HAS MADE ITS CONTRIBUTION, HAS LEFT THE REGIME MORE VULNERABLE TO ITS ENEMIES: PLO, UAR AND SYRIA; (G) THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, AND ANY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME HAS BY ITS VERY NATURE CERTAIN BUILT-IN WEAKNESSES. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ARE RIGGED AND THERE IS THE MOST CIRCUMSCRIBED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. I AM NOT TRYING TO MAKE A MORAL JUDGMENT. I AM TRYING TO SAY THAT AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME ENJOYS LESS WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT THAN DOES, FOR EXAMPLE, A WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY. AND I AM UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT SHOEVER RULES JORDAN IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE WILL HAVE TO DO SO BY AUTHORITARIAN METHODS, WHETHER HE LIKES AUTHORITARIAN METHODS OR NO.

10. WHAT, THEN, HAS THE REGIME GOT GOING FOR IT? IT HAS:
(A) STABILITY, ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE. NOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN, HOWEVER, THAT SOME SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HOLD THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BECAUSE IT BRINGS WITH IT QUOTE THE REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF THREE AMMAN 1231

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UNQUOTE CONTRIBUTES AS MUCH TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY
AS TO POLITICAL STABILITY; (B) GOOD INTERNAL INTELLI-
GENCE AND A FAIRLY EFFECTIVE POLICE FORCE; (C) A

*Hussein's
virtues - &
limitations*

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 355A ~~SECRET~~

HITHERTO LOYAL ARMY, FROM WHICH PALESTINIANS ARE
LARGELY EXCLUDED, AND (D) KING HUSSEIN HIMSELF. IT
IS MY CONCLUSION, BASED ON THE FEW MONTHS I HAVE BEEN
IN JORDAN, THAT HUSSEIN IS A MORE SENSIBLE PERSON THAN
MANY OF HIS MINISTERS. HE IS NO INTELLECTUAL, BUT HE
HAS GOOD INSTINCTS, AND HE CAN BE DECISIVE. IF HE
WORKED HARDER AT HIS JOB, HIS REGIME WOULD BE BETTER
OFF THAN IT IS TODAY. NOT ONLY DOES THE PLAYBOY IN
HIM KEEP HIM AWAY FROM THE OFFICE, BUT IT HAS TAR-
NISHED HIS IMAGE AND REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
CHARISMA HE UNDOUBTEDLY POSSESSES.

11. THAT THE REGIME IS FRAGILE IS AMPLY PROVEN BY THE
EVENTS WHICH HAVE FOLLOWED THE NOVEMBER 13 ISRAELI
ATTACK. THE ATTACK, LARGE SCALE AS IT WAS, WAS HARDLY
OF SUCH PROPORTIONS, IT SEEMS TO ME, AS TO HAVE SENT A
HEALTHY REGIME TEETERING. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY HAD
MADE THE REGIME LOOK TO BE STRONGER THAN IT REALLY
WAS. AND THE ISRAELI ATTACK HAS EAKENED IT EVEN MORE,
PARTICULARLY IN THE VITAL AREA OF THE ARMY.

12. BLAME FOR LACK OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS TO MEET

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 355A ~~S E C R E T~~

THE NOVEMBER 13 ATTACK IS PLACED PARTICULARLY ON THE KING. IT IS SAID BY MANY THAT HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO HAVE OTHER ARAB FORCES STATIONED IN JORDAN OR TO TURN TO THE SOVIETS FOR MILITARY AID, COMBINED WITH HIS POLICY OF MODERATION TOWARDS ISRAEL, HAVE BEEN PURSUED ONLY BECAUSE OF A SELFISH DESIRE TO SAVE HIS THRONE.

13. IF HUSSEIN IS TO KEEP HIS THRONE, HE WILL HAVE TO REMEDY WHAT ALL JORDANIANS, AND PARTICULARLY THE ARMY, REGARD AS AN INADEQUATE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. IF HE CANNOT DO SO, HIS CHIEF PROP, THE ARMY, CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMOVE HIM AND TRY TO DO SO ITSELF.

14. HUSSEIN HAS THREE PLACES TO GO TO GET FUNDS AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO SATISFY HIM, HIS PEOPLE AND HIS MILITARY: (A) THE US; (B) HIS ARAB NEIGHBORS; AND (C) THE SOVIETS.

15. HUSSEIN HAS TURNED FIRST TO US, AND IF WE CANNOT SATISFY HIM, PRESUMABLY HE WILL GO NEXT TO HIS ARAB NEIGHBORS. THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS MIGHT HELP HIM, BUT THEIR PERFORMANCE SINCE NOVEMBER 13 COULD NOT BE REASSURING TO HUSSEIN. AND THE QUOTE RADICAL

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 355A ~~S E C R E T~~

STATES UNQUOTE, IF THEY COULD SCRAPE TOGETHER THE WHEREWITHAL TO HELP HIM, WOULD DOUBTLESS WISH TO CHARGE A HEAVY POLITICAL PRICE.

16. I AM QUITE UNABLE TO ASSESS WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO FURNISH HUSSEIN WITH THE MILITARY AID HE SEEKS. IF THE SOVIETS DO HELP HUSSEIN, THEY WOULD HAVE TO COUNT ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE US WOULD TERMINATE AID TO JORDAN, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO PICK UP THAT TAG TOO.

17. IF HUSSEIN CANNOT PRODUCE, AND I DO NOT IMAGINE THE ARMY IS IN A MOOD TO GIVE HIM AN UNLIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME IN WHICH TO TRY, I WOULD EXPECT THE ARMY TO REMOVE HIM AND TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT THEMSELVES, POSSIBLY BEHIND A CIVILIAN FACADE. THE ARMY COULD IN THE END BE SO MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN HUSSEIN IN OBTAINING MILITARY AID, BUT THEY WILL THINK THAT BY DETHRONING HUSSEIN THE CHANCES FOR OBTAINING WHAT THEY WANT, AT LEAST IN QUOTE RADICAL UNQUOTE CIRCLES, WILL BE IMPROVED.

18. IF HUSSEIN IS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING HELP FROM THE US, OR FROM THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS, EVEN SO THERE

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 355A ~~SECRET~~

IS NO REAL ASSURANCE THAT HIS REGIME WILL LAST INDEFINITELY. THERE ARE MANY FISSURES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE REGIME, ALTHOUGH BY PLACATING THE ARMY HE WILL HAVE REPAIRED THE MOST DANGEROUS FISSURE. WHETHER HUSSEIN CAN BE PREVAILED UPON TO REMEDY THE OTHER FLAWS REMAINS TO BE SEEN. .

19. IF HUSSEIN GOES AND THE ARMY TAKES OVER, THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE REGIME CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ITS POLITICAL COLORATION FROM THE COUNTRY WHICH HELPS FINANCE IT.

20. WHAT WOULD BE THE THREAT TO US INTERESTS IF JORDAN BECOMES A RADICAL ARAB STATE? THERE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A LOSS TO OUR PRESTIGE, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULAR. I DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT A RADICAL ARAB GOVERNMENT IN AMMAN COULD AFFORD TO FOLLOW A MUCH MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL THAN HAS HUSSEIN. THE JORDAN-ISRAEL BORDER IS 652 KILOMETERS LONG, AND IN MANY AREAS IS NOT TOPOGRAPHICALLY DEFENSIBLE, AT LEAST NOT NEARLY SO MUCH SO AS IS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE MUCH SHORTER SYRIAN BORDER, AND IF EFFECTIVE

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 355A ~~SECRET~~

INTERNATIONAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO INSULATE THE ARAB-ISRAELI BORDER AGAINST STRIFE, THERE WOULD BE EVEN LESS CHANCE OF TROUBLE.

21. IN DECIDING WHETHER TO GIVE THE PRESENT GOJ THE ASSISTANCE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE, I RECOGNIZE THAT WASHINGTON WILL HAVE TO TAKE A GREAT DEAL INTO CONSIDERATION. AMONG THE CONSIDERATIONS ARE:

22. WHAT EFFECT WOULD THIS ACTION HAVE ON OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AN OVERALL BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN THE AREA, TO SAY NOTHING OF OUR EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THIS BALANCE?

23. WILL ISRAEL FEEL THREATENED TO THE POINT OF WAR IF JORDAN, WITH OR WITHOUT HUSSEIN, LINKS UP WITH THE QUOTE RADICAL UNQUOTE ARAB STATES OR WITH THE SOVIETS?

24. EVEN IF A CHANGE OF REGIME IN JORDAN IN A RADICAL DIRECTION DOES NOT INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL, HOW MUCH IS US INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE IN JORDAN WORTH ON ITS OWN MERITS?

25. I AM AWARE I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO OFFER FINAL JUDGMENTS ON THESE AND OTHER EQUALLY GERMANE QUESTIONS.

BJRNS
BT

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 356A ~~SECRET~~

26. IT HAS COST US HALF A BILLION DOLLARS DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS TO ACQUIRE OUR POSITION IN JORDAN. AS A BUSINESS PROPOSITION, AT LEAST, IT WOULD SEEM UNECONOMICAL TO LET THIS GO FOR A MANAGEABLE ADDITIONAL INCREMENT. IT WAS NOT SO MANY YEARS AGO WE WERE GIVING JORDAN \$45 MILLION PER YEAR IN BUDGET SUPPORT ALONE, AS COMPARED TO \$25 MILLION NEXT YEAR. FAILURE TO HOLD OUR POSITION IN JORDAN WOULD, I SHOULD JUDGE, BE A SERIOUS LOSS TO OUR PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HAVE A DISTINCTLY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR INTERESTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULAR.

27. IF HUSSEIN SURVIVES THE CRISIS THAT IS STILL IN PROGRESS, HE COULD NONETHELESS GO SOONER OR LATER ANYWAY, EVEN IF WE DO GRANT HIM ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOW. BUT IF WE DO GRANT THE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE NOW, WE WOULD HOPEFULLY BE ABLE TO RETAIN OUR POSITION AND INFLUENCE WITH THE NEW REGIME. THE NEW REGIME WOULD LIKELY BE ARMY DOMINATED, AND IT WOULD BE AS MUCH TO THE ARMY AS TO HUSSEIN THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING OUR GRANT NOW.

GP-1. BURNS
BT

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RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 143

RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA UNN

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 203

RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 136

RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 148

RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 134

RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 98

RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 77

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 97

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BT ~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF THREE AMMAN 1231

EXDIS

FROM THE FACTS AVAILABLE TO ME, HOWEVER, I RECOMMEND WE GIVE JORDAN THE MONEY AND EQUIPMENT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE, AND DO IT FAST.

127
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Nov. 23, 1966 F9

WWR:

Since you keep close tabs on
all the players in the Israeli picture,
you might just want to be aware of
this one.

Hal

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM

November 18, 1966

TO : The Under Secretary
THRU : S/S
FROM : NEA - William J. Handley
SUBJECT: Congressman Ogden Reid's Interest in Arab-Israel Situation

Information Memorandum

In connection with the November 13 Israeli raid into Jordan, I wanted to inform you of the interest of Congressman Reid in the current situation and his offer (which he has also made directly to the President) to do anything he can that might help to ease tension. Congressman Reid (R. NY) was formerly our Ambassador in Tel Aviv. He has a large Jewish constituency in his upstate New York district.

Congressman Reid called the Department on November 15 from Puerto Rico, where he is vacationing, to express his concern over the Israeli raid and to obtain our reading of the situation. The Israeli affairs desk officer with whom he spoke gave him a thorough briefing, stressing our concern at the possible damage that might have been caused to King Hussein's position. Congressman Reid expressed appreciation, then said "I'm afraid my former clients haven't been very helpful. Let me know if I can be of assistance in any way with my constituents or colleagues in Congress." We in turn expressed the Department's appreciation.

The Congressman's offer might be kept in mind in case we need any help on the Hill in the days ahead.

Clearances:

IAI - Mr. Symmes
NEA - Mr. Davies

Copies to: H - Ambassador MacArthur
ARM - Mr. Atherton
White House - Mr. Saunders
IO - Mr. Buffum

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By if, NARS, Date 9-16-81

NEA/IAI:MSterner:dl:11/18/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

128
S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE November 19, 1966

WWR:

The attached is well worth your taking a few moments to digest--with all its implications for the current Jordan-Israel clash. You might even want to pass it on to someone like Feinberg.

The point is that there have always been opponents of the policy of retaliation in Israel and, with the retirement of Ben Gurion and Golda Meir, they may have a new lease on life. Our job is to make Israeli leaders (if we can) face up to the consequences of their present course and listen to the prophets of reconciliation.


Hal Saunders

Att: Tel Aviv A-217, 10/19/66

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AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
INFO : Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE: October 19, 1966

SUBJECT : New Alignment Journal Features Moshe SHARETT on Israel-Arab Relations

REF :

It is undoubtedly of some significance that the initial number of OT (Sign) the new ideological journal of the Mapai-Ahdut Avoda Alignment (A-216), should give pride of place to a speech delivered in 1957 by the late Moshe SHARETT at the Mapai activist school of Beit Berl on the general subject of Israel-Arab relations (see enclosure for text). Subsequently reprinted by a number of local newspapers, including prestigious Haaretz (independent), this speech has provoked considerable comment amongst thinking Israelis.

And well it might. For in it the highly-respected and beloved former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister who yielded to none in his life-long devotion to Zionism called into question the historical approach which Zionism had taken in its relations with the Arabs, and pointed out what he considered to be Israel's grave underestimation of the traumatic effect the establishment of the Jewish State has had upon the Arabs. In his opinion, Zionists have all along failed to take into sufficient account the dignity of the Arabs as well as the Arab sense of national consciousness. "We have been so completely conscious of the justice of our historical rights, that we did not consider the relativity of that justice from the point of view of the other side. Furthermore, we failed in

Decontrol in 8 years

Enclosure: "Israel and the Arabs," by Moshe Sharett, OT, September, 1966

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:JDLeonard/osv 10/17/66

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:HHStackhouse

Clearances:

the psychological understanding of the problem in that we did not give sufficient thought to the depth of national consciousness and emotion in the Arab world."

As a result of this tragic conflict between Jewish and Arab nationalism Sharett saw little real chance of peace until the Arab generation which has experienced the traumatic effects of this struggle has disappeared. Despite this conclusion, however, he felt strongly that Israel had an active role to play in either hastening or postponing the arrival of this era of peace. She has it within her means to influence the all important political climate of the area.

Sharett then cited the two basic Israeli approaches to relations with the Arabs: the one based upon the assumption that the only thing the Arabs understand is force, the other that in the interest of peace, Israel should always act with restraint as regards her neighbors. Without declaring himself a proponent of one or the other thesis, the former Prime Minister showed his hand by asking this question: "Has it ever been proved that reaction in force solved current security problems?" And further on he inquired whether the developments leading to the 1956 Sinai Campaign were inevitable. Did not Israel herself contribute to the creation of the events surrounding this Campaign?

Comment: As zealous a patriot as any of his generation in the defense of the "rights of the Jews to return to their land," Sharett distinguished himself from most of his "activist" colleagues by his great respect for Arabs and his soul-searching quest for an approach which would lead to Jewish-Arab peace. Rejected by the Ben-Gurion establishment, this psychological heritage may he said in general to have been more or less assumed by the present Foreign Minister and certain of his lieutenants. Its public resurrection in the first issue of the Alignment's ideological journal would seem to indicate that there are broader circles within the Alignment to whom this approach remains attractive and meaningful.

BARBOUR 

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Enc. 1
Page 1 of 6
Tel Aviv A- 217

ISRAEL AND THE ARABS by Moshe Sharett

I want to devote my talk, this time, to the question of one of the most important problems of Israel's foreign policy: the problem of our relations with the Arab world surrounding us. This problem is older than the State. It is as old as our endeavor to return to this land and to take roots in it again. One cannot say that the Zionist Movement has not given it thought. But it seems to me that the Zionist Movement as a whole, the masses in the world, the settlers in the country, have not arrived at sufficient understanding of that problem with all its complexities and difficulties. This is not an indictment or accusation against anyone. I am pointing out a psychological phenomenon, a situation of consciousness, that has its reasons. But in the same way as a certain fact has reasons, it also has certain results.

I have already mentioned that the Zionist Movement has given the problem thought. From time to time certain concepts have crystallized in Zionist policy as to how to solve that problem, how to arrive at a modus vivendi between us and the Arab world. These concepts, although based on far reaching and daring thought, failed to penetrate the psychological side of the problem. There were two things: We have been so completely conscious of the justice of our historical rights, that we did not consider the relativity of that justice from the point of view of the other side. Furthermore, we failed in the psychological understanding of the problem in that we did not give sufficient thought to the depth of national consciousness and emotion of the Arab world.

I do not think I have to explain the basic Zionist consciousness of its righteousness: Our history, the distress of the diaspora, the right for assembly, concentration and independence. Since we learned that one can explain these things also to non-Jews, it seemed to us that one could also explain it to the Arabs. Among other things we said that the Arab world is big and wide; it has tens of millions of inhabitants; it has many hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory - what loss would it be to the Arab world, if such a tiny piece of its territory would lose its Arab character and would get absolute Jewish character? What is that tiny weight on the scales of history for the future of the Arab world? But this argumentation did not hit the mark. It is difficult to assume that someone might come to a country such as France, or England, or one of the Scandinavian countries, and tell them that for the sake of the solution of an international problem they ought to sacrifice a minute portion of their territory; that any small district in the south of France should cease to be French and should become Spanish, for that is essential for the solution of an international problem; for it is just and right that the French should make that concession. How would the French react? It is hard to assume that anyone would regard France's refusal as a sinister revelation, reactionary, unreasonable.

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The other thing to which we have not given sufficient thought, is the national emotional consciousness. Here a strange picture may be seen. Zionism is built entirely on national consciousness. It is not based on economic benefit for the Jewish people. It is not based on a thorough change of Jewish social structure. These are concomitant phenomena. If Zionist aspirations are realized, if the national problem of the Jewish people is solved, its economy would be put on its feet as a matter of course; and as a matter of course it would result in a thorough change of its social structure. But neither of these two phenomena are the roots of the Zionist enterprise, nor its motivation or prime mover. However, when Zionism approached the Arabs in this country, for some reason it expected them to consider their economic advantage and the chance for sociological progress, completely ignoring the national problem.

What was our outlook throughout all those years before the establishment of the State? We did not foresee that suddenly two thirds of the Arab community in this country would up and vanish from this territory. We foresaw co-existence with them as a matter of fate. We said, we are bringing them blessings. Jewish settlement is expressed in raising their economic standard of living. The financial means flowing into the country make wider and better public services possible. They (the Arabs) would become a more educated community; they would enjoy advanced medical supervision and care; their children would have better chances; the standing of the woman is different. We appeared so to speak to the Arabs as economic-social contributors; we expected them to sell us their "national right of the first-born," in this country for a dish of economic and social "lentils." If I say these things to you I am speaking from the point of view of the Arab. In these matters the Arab honor has been insulted. A great part of our publicity is based on the assumption, either outspoken or implied, that since the Arabs are on a low level from the economic, social and cultural point of view, they have no understanding for national values. As if being an Arab, the member of a nation, does not play an important part in his life. But this is not so. A long time ago it became clear to people who studied that subject and can voice an objective opinion, which also includes the Arab sector, that this is not so. Our traditional argumentation defeats rather than achieves its purpose. It does more harm than good, provokes negative emotions based on the feeling of insult, by regarding them as inferior beings, incapable of national feelings, only interested in their piece of bread and in better medical services.

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By the time of the latter part of the Mandate, the Arabs of Palestine - and not of Palestine alone - were, whatever their differences of opinion and allegiance to competing groups and leaders might be, preoccupied with the besetting problem of the country's national identity. They were painfully aware that where once, not so long ago, everything had been Arab, there now were whole areas where they felt as strangers; and it was an awareness which had an extremely irritating effect.

That was perhaps the most relevant aspect of the Arab state of mind at the time of the War of Independence.

Israel's Jews came out of the war with high hopes. The basic political conditions were not unpromising - far better than they had been in November, 1947: The Partition, in the form it eventually took place, would have given the Jewish State 55% of the area of Palestine, divided into three triangles which touched at one point; and the population of the State would have included 45% of Arabs. The end of the war found Israel holding 80% of the country's area in one continuous piece, with an Arab population of barely 15%. This result, and the fact that the Arab States formally signed the Armistice Agreements with Israel which confirmed it and which were regarded as preliminaries to a peace treaty, was a clear political achievement of the first rank for the young State. Indeed, everyone believed peace was around the corner, even if it might take the Arabs a few years to face the realities of life.

This proved an illusion, based on a failure to understand what was going on in the Arab mind. The misunderstanding was to last. To give only one instance, the illusion that peace was around the corner seems, to judge by the press, to have stuck up its head again just after the Sinai campaign: It was then widely believed that Nasser, heavily beaten, would acknowledge defeat. That was a psychological mistake. Peace is not a matter of reason or interests, but primarily a matter of will, or at least of the absence of a will to the contrary.

Israel, as it turned out, had gravely underestimated the shock to Arab consciousness produced by the establishment of the State. That this was partly the fault of the way the Arab mind had been educated politically, and that another community would have overcome the shock much sooner and more easily, is irrelevant: Israel must deal with the Arabs as they are. Arab opinion had long underestimated the strength of the Zionist impulse and believed that, if necessary, it would be easy enough to overthrow the Jewish State by military means, even if it should unexpectedly prove viable. That these beliefs proved to be illusions, may have deterred Arab leaders from going to war again at this or that given moment, but the resulting trauma has not allowed them to develop the mental attitude necessary for peace.

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A change in this basic Arab attitude is not a matter of years, but of decades: As long as the generation which underwent this trauma as a personal experience lives, is active, decides and has influence, there is hardly any chance, or at best a weak one, of the mental thaw without which there can be no peace.

Stating this does not preclude two possibilities: that peace may -- and in fact could in the past have been -- brought nearer; and that it may be postponed even further. At any rate, I do not come to the conclusion that there is nothing to be done, or that it does not matter what we do. I do not believe that we are entitled to sit on our hands until that whole generation has finished passing away. What Israel does, matters -- in a positive or in a negative sense.

What Israel must and must not, can and cannot do in the face of Arab opposition and enmity, is something on which there is more than one opinion. But there are some basic points on which there is a consensus within and among all parties.

Security comes first. Israel's territorial integrity, the life of its citizens, their property, their freedom of movement, work and development must be defended at all costs.

On the refugee question the national consensus is less categorical, but one may say that on the whole it is opposed to the refugees' return. To go into the whole question and the short-range and long-range justification for this consensus would be a lecture in itself; but Israel has never said that not a single refugee will under any conditions be allowed to return; all that has been said is that repatriation of the refugees cannot be resorted to as a solution of the problem. The family exchange plan might be expanded on an individual compassionate basis. But Israel does not recognize any refugee's absolute right to return. It is not prepared to assume the burden of reintegrating them in the economic and social life of the country.

The third point on which there is a consensus, which even included Herut, is that Israel's ultimate aim is not endless war but peace with the surrounding nations.

But this consensus is not enough of a guideline for solving issues as they arise from day to day. Within it, there can be -- and it seems there are -- two different basic attitudes.

The one is the attitude which assumes that the Arabs only understand force, and that Israel must from time to time prove that, small as it is, it can and will resort to force when necessary: if it does not do so, it will be swallowed

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Enc. 1
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up. The proponents of the thesis regard peace as dubious and at any rate remote: if it comes, then it will be only because the Arabs are convinced that Israel cannot be defeated, and this conviction is more likely to result from force than from talk about Israel's sincere desire for peace. From this viewpoint, the peace aspect is no restraining factor in deciding for or against forcible action; nor is concern for adding fuel to Arab hate -- which by ~~definition~~ is being fuelled anyhow.

The other approach holds that, without discounting current security needs, the peace aspect must always be taken into account. This means that reactions will always have to be restrained. Incidentally, has it ever been proved that reaction in force solved current security problems?

According to the first approach, any attack must always be followed up by a reaction, and the reaction can only be military, and there is an inherent escalation problem. The question is whether this is being kept in view, or whether thinking in terms of military reaction has become a routine.

According to the first approach, the developments of the last few years were inevitable, and without forcible reactions the situation would be even worse for Israel. Without certain lines of action, Israel would not have obtained arms from, say, France; and without certain operations the security situation could not have been kept in mind. If the hope that a heavy beating would force the enemy to sue for peace, was defeated, one can only regret it. The situation is admittedly serious; but considering the circumstances, remarkable achievements have been made.

The achievements are hard to deny. But it remains possible to argue that with another method, without Kibya, Gaza, etc., developments on the other side might have been different. Perhaps Nasser would not have been forced into the Czech arms deal and the soil would not be as favorable for Soviet penetration.

I... am not sure that I do justice to either approach... I am not even sure that later historians will be able to decide who was right... I cannot arrive at any summing up or decision. I merely note that there are these two equally possible attitudes. Perhaps there should have been a synthesis, or perhaps a clear-cut decision either way. As a lecturer who should present clear-cut conclusions, I must disappoint. As a politician or former politician, I cannot disregard the built-in complications of the problem.

I have been asked whether the Sinai campaign was worth while. In the given situation, one might be justified in holding that the Sinai campaign saved

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Page 6 of 6
Tel Aviv A- 217

Israel. But the real question is: was the situation which made the Sinai campaign inevitable, inevitable? What led to the Egyptian buildup and the Egyptian attitude which produced it? There was some development here, and in all modesty I do not want to deprive the State of Israel of the credit and the honor of having actively participated in it. We have been an active factor in this development, from Gaza and Khan Yunis to the trial in Egypt.

I do not say that it is my opinion, but it is possible to hold that there is some value in Israel having the reputation of being a small but strong country. But one is also entitled to ask whether such a reputation is really an asset for Israel. One may feel that reference to the prophetic heritage, to the vision of justice, compassion and truth can be overdone. But Israel acknowledges them and owes something to the fact that they exist, even if that should mean some sacrifices. Otherwise, it works it self into an impasse from which there is no moral and in the long run no political way out.

Israel must on no account make concessions for the sake of peace: peace cannot be bought with concessions. But it can be bought at the price of mutual benefits. Such a benefit would, for instance, be a free port area for Jordan in Haifa Port (not Haifa as a free port!), which would detract nothing from Israel's sovereignty; or right of rail transit from Egypt to Lebanon.

The real question is that the political climate which surrounds the question: in a given political climate, peace can be obtained without concessions. To deny that Israel can affect the climate, is to deny that Israel is an active factor in the Middle East. Obviously the Big Powers play an important role. Under the Mandate, the Arabs thought they could get farther by pressures on the British than by compromising with the Jews. At this moment (in 1957), Ben Gurion is quite right in saying that only the Powers are capable of relieving the tension. Still, I do not feel that Israeli policy can be absolved from all responsibility. We will do well not to underestimate ourselves. What we do, has some value. Even what we say, has some value. The situation, I admit, is complicated, and far be it for me to make wholesale accusations. But we shall not get out of a complicated situation by disregarding its complicated nature.

Translated by:
FS Ls D. Saraph and M. Ravor

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By WJ, NARA, Date 6-1-00

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: A Constructive Posture Toward Israel

The President may never be in a stronger position vis-a-vis Israel. Elections are two years off, and he has an open-and-shut case that the Israelis have severely damaged our interests.

Our job is to turn this advantage into specific gains. No one claims this will be easy--or even possible. However, we ought to try to use this blowup--the biggest since 1956--to seal off Israel's Lebanon-Syria-Jordan border. We ought to set our sights high.

The first step is to spell out what we want. The minimum is to insure that this doesn't happen again. Possibilities include:

--An Israeli guarantee that it will not attack Jordan on such scale again. We might try to rebuild the Jordan-Israel relationship.

--Strengthening the UN group all along the border.

--Improving border-control machinery bilaterally.

The second step is to develop the leverage we need. Our moral position is one asset--they've really done us harm and cost us money. We can suspend military shipments or the Bunker operation. We might encourage American Jewish leaders to add their pressure. We can add all this up in the President's letter to Eshkol.

The third step is to justify this course to American Jewish leaders. We might take this line: We've invested energy and treasure in stabilizing Israel's borders. Now Israel has deliberately destroyed the fruits of that investment and raised the costs to us besides. We can't go on investing unless Israel itself begins moving toward long-term coexistence with the Arabs. Without that movement, we'd be investing without hope.

The most helpful thing you can do with the Secretary is to press the line that this is an opportunity--not just a disaster. We may not have so much to work with again (and we don't want more!). State is working on parts of this skeleton but still isn't thinking big. The President wants to make progress on the Arab-Israeli stalemate, and we can't let this pass.


Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

130
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WWR:

11/17

Attached rundown of Middle East cables seems the best way to give you the flavor general reaction to Israel's Sunday attack.

Hal
Hal Saunders

130a

From Wriggins - Saunders

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1966

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs

CABLE SUMMARY FOR PRESIDENT

Israel - Jordan

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2. Embassy Amman [] indicate that Israel's Sunday attack may have begun a dramatic shift of sentiment in the Jordanian Army --heretofore Hussein's main support--against the King. Some observers feel the King can only salvage his position by allowing a retaliatory raid on Israel. (Amman 1120 []) Other reports of anti-government demonstrations with anti-US overtones in Hebron near the attacked town tend to confirm embassy fears. (Jerusalem 381)

3. Ambassador Burns in Jordan recommends (a) a clear condemnation of Israel in the UN Security Council and (b) early announcement that we are suspending all military credit and sales to Israel pending review of the situation (Amman 1120). Our ambassadors in the UAR, Syria and Lebanon also support a strong US stand against Israel in the UN (Cairo 2646, Damascus 600, Beirut 4396).

4. The UK government (London 4097) will support condemnation of Israel, and the Iraqi government has made a formal demarche requesting us to do so (Baghdad 912). Ambassador Goldberg spoke strongly against Israel in the Security Council yesterday and is working for a stiff resolution.

5. Ambassadors in several Middle East posts report widespread Arab tendency to blame us for encouraging Israeli attack, or at least for failure to restrain Israel. (Amman 1120, Cairo 2693, Baghdad 1966, Kuwait 473).

6. Ambassador Barbour feels the Israeli government is "chastened and chagrined at an operation that 'went wrong'" because the Israelis did not expect to run into the Jordanian army. "I detect a considerable measure of embarrassment and uncertainty in retrospect as to the wisdom of their action." However, he feels the Israelis still do not comprehend the extent of the damage they have done. He thinks our most effective approach is

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 11-108

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By LLH NARA, Date 05-14-2012

130a

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to help increase effectiveness of control along the borders to end terrorist attacks. (Tel Aviv 1687)

7. Eshkol made a rather weak speech to parliament justifying the raid and throwing responsibility on Syria and Jordan. (Tel Aviv 1690).

SECRET

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

16 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Warning the Israelis. I promptly called Abe Feinberg to pass the blunt word that Israel was "going too far" in striking Jordan and had better lay off. Feinberg was quite receptive, and said he'd just had a meeting with Jack Herzog of PM Eshkol's office, who admitted that the strike had proven "unexpectedly violent;" the original plan was just "to blow 40 houses." I replied that they should have thought of such risks before they acted, not after.

Feinberg asked if he should call Harman. I told him I'd do that myself, but that you hoped he as a special friend would get the word direct to Eshkol through his own channels. He agreed to do so.

I gave Ambassador Harman the same pitch this morning, stressing that I was speaking privately and unofficially. I added that, while I was no longer up on Arab-Israeli affairs, it seemed to me that Israel's ill-considered and grossly excessive strike might have utterly disproportionate repercussions in Jordan. Moreover, how could we supply tanks to Israel if it was going to use such armor against Jordan, and after we'd asked the Jordanians at Israel's request to keep their armor out of the frontier zone Israel had now struck. I told Harman that in the event of any more such strikes we were determined to "re-examine" our supply of arms to Israel, regardless of whether contracts had been signed or not. The Israelis had put in jeopardy our whole policy of promoting Arab-Israel stability by subsidizing an independent Jordan.

I asked Harman not to give me the standard reply, as I was no longer in the business. But he did ask me to convey privately to you that Eshkol was under heavy pressure "from his own conscience," because as PM and Defense Minister he couldn't even assure his own people that they could travel safely in their own country or sleep safely in their own homes at night. If Israel didn't strike back when repeatedly provoked, other Arabs besides those in Hebron might conclude that it was "a sitting duck."

I told Harman that you fully understood Israel's problems, but that use of force was dubious at best and use of such disproportionate force--against Jordan to boot--was folly indeed. It undermined the whole US effort to maintain Jordanian stability, which was so much in Israel's own interest that Israel's action was almost incomprehensible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 18, 4336
By gwl/rq NARA. Date 4-13-00

131
R. W. Komer~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

40

132

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel - Jordan Clash at Today's Lunch

I'm concerned that we haven't reacted strongly enough against Israel's massive raid into Jordan. I suggest discussing this with Secretary Rusk at lunch.

I'm not suggesting our usual admonition against retaliation. We'll maintain that posture, but I can sympathize with the Israelis' answer that they can't ignore increasing cross-border raids of Arab terrorists which generate strong pressures on the Israeli government to defend its border citizens. The coalition government can't stand up indefinitely to these pressures.

But retaliation is not the point in this case. This 3000-man raid with tanks and planes was out of all proportion to the provocation and was aimed at the wrong target.

In hitting Jordan so hard, the Israelis have done a great deal of damage to our interests and to their own:

--They've wrecked a good system of tacit cooperation between Hussein and the Israelis. We had his tacit agreement to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan, and he had made an honest effort to round up terrorists in Jordan. Continuing this kind of cooperation will be all but impossible now.

--They've undercut Hussein. We've spent \$500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing factor on Israel's longest border and vis-a-vis Syria and Iraq. Israel's attack increases the pressure on him to counter attack not only from the more radical Arab governments and from the Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army, which is his main source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its Sunday losses.

--They've set back progress toward a long term accommodation with the Arabs. It makes even the moderate Arabs feel fatalistically that there is nothing they can do to get along with the Israelis no matter how hard they try. It puts a premium on extreme Arab chauvinism.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 18, #333

~~SECRET~~

fw/ing. NARA. Date 4-13-00

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

--They may have persuaded the Syrians, who are the main troublemakers, that Israel didn't dare attack Soviet-protected Syria but could attack US-backed Jordan with impunity.

It's important that we strengthen the hand of those within the Israeli Government who feel this is not the proper way to handle the problem. Even members of the Israeli military now doubt that retaliation will stop the cross-border raids, though they see no better solution.

We've already laid the groundwork for a sharp reaction, but this by itself doesn't go far enough. Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement in New York deploring the attack. We refused to pass an Israeli message to King Hussein justifying the raid. We will probably support Jordan if it goes to the UN (though we'll also have to deplore the Jordan-based road-mining incident that killed three Israelis and provoked this attack). Ray Hare gave Ambassador Harman a pretty hard time this afternoon. (Harman was more embarrassed than defensive.)

To stimulate discussion, you may want to raise the following possibilities with Secretary Rusk:

--You could send a message to Eshkol restating our interests and making clear that Israel has undercut those interests as well as its own.

--We could leak the main points of such a message to the press or in UN corridors to rebalance our image with the moderate Arabs.

--We could slow down military deliveries to Israeli inconspicuously but just enough to make our point. Vietnam priorities could be an overt excuse.

--We might begin putting out the line with our Jewish friends here that the US can't go on supporting Israel's interests in the Middle East unless the Israelis themselves show some intent over the long run to reach an accommodation with the Arabs. This, after all, is what we are trying to do with the Indians and Pakistanis.

--The most constructive thing we could do looking to the future would be to offer help either through the UN or bilaterally to make available the latest techniques in border security. Many new simple devices have been successful in Vietnam and have been available on the open market.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

This is delicate business, but you've put a high priority on finding new ways to get at the Arab-Israeli stalemate. This kind of Israeli move makes progress impossible. We've felt that, with Eban's appointment, the winds in Israel might begin to shift away from the old timers' idea of "fortress Israel" to the younger men's hopes for some kind of break in the impasse. We ought to come down on the side of accommodation where we can. If we don't this time, no one will ever believe we care.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OK
W

133
sent to Rostow
by wire 11/11/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 10, 1966

From Walt Rostow
TO
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Bunker - Ben Artzi get-acquainted meeting went well. Ben Artzi is personable, shrewd and experienced in both water and power fields, though his main job now is running El Al Airline. Little of substance discussed, but Bunker did say he plans to go to Israel mid-December. Looks like a promising start.

#

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By if N. RF. Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

133a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

Ambassador Bunker's get-acquainted lunch for General Ben Artzi
came off very well yesterday.

Ben Artzi will obviously be a formidable man to deal with, although a pleasant one. He is small, smiling, disarmingly personable and modest. But when he starts talking about the economics of electric power or of airline operations, he is a shrewd economic analyst.

His direct experience with water in Israel dates back some time, but he knows a lot about both water and power. He was in charge of building one of the early diversion pipelines and also worked with the Israeli water authority a dozen years ago. Since, he has been on the board of the Israeli Electric Company and obviously knows a lot about the power side of this equation.

Ambassador Bunker claimed that he had only just got into the problem, having been sworn in the previous day. When Ben Artzi asked how he would like to proceed, he said simply that he would be in touch through Ambassador Harman. He did tell Ben Artzi he hoped to visit Israel in mid-December and Ben Artzi said he would be delighted to show him everything he wanted to see. The substantive discussions did not go much beyond that except for a few general comments by Ben Artzi in response to questions MacAvoy and I asked about the overall research and planning on the water side.

Although there is nothing of substance to report to the President, it might make him more confident that we're moving to let him know that this initial meeting came off well and that Ben Artzi and Bunker seemed to get on well together. A paragraph for you to send to the President along these lines is attached.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75c 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81



Hal Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 14, 1966

7:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We're quite discouraged over Israel's Sunday morning 3000-man raid into Jordan--by far the largest since the 1956 Suez attack. They demolished most of one town, caused at least 30 civilian deaths and gave the local Jordanian army unit a bad mauling.

We've reacted sharply. Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement in New York deploring the attack. We refused to pass an Israeli message to King Hussein justifying the raid. We will probably support Jordan if it goes to the UN (though we'll also have to deplore the Jordan-based road-mining incident that killed three Israelis and provoked this attack). Ray Hare gave Ambassador Harman a pretty hard time this afternoon. Harman was more embarrassed than defensive.

We understand the pressures on Eshkol to protect Israel's border citizens and his fear that the recent sharp increase in sabotage is a new phase in Arab policy. Israelis argue they must strike at Arab civilians in force to induce them not to cooperate with Arab raiders using Jordan despite King Hussein's effort to prevent them.

But we've consistently urged the Israelis not to retaliate--especially against Jordan where King Hussein has made an honest effort to crack down on raiders and runs the most moderate of the Arab regimes. Although it's hard to argue wholeheartedly that the Israelis should not use their superior strength to protect themselves, every time they strike back it sets back chances for long range accommodation with neighboring states. This time, they've destroyed much of the international support they gained in the UN Security Council last month and--judging from Hussein's initial reaction--have just about killed promising tacit cooperation with Hussein. Hussein is trying to be more independent of Cairo, but such pressures from Israel only make this harder for him.

We will continue urging Hussein not to strike back. We are also looking at longer range measures to help the Israelis seal off their borders by using radar fences and other simple techniques successful in Vietnam. This is the only way to get at the root of the problem.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-81

By sig, NARA, Date 3-3-93

W. A. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Release on \$6 million for Israeli Power Plant

Attached (Tab 1) is a press release turning loose the \$6 million
Feinberg has been after us about. We don't expect this to make a
big splash because the Israelis feel it was part of the 1963 aid level
we promised. However, making it available after they failed to use
all of the original loan is a concession and should be worth something
to the insiders.

Approve for release _____ See me _____

This is just the public indication that you intend to go ahead.
AID will still have to go through the legalities required by the new
law--asking you for a waiver for lending to any country not on the
list of the top ten aid recipients and notifying Congress. ^{AID} They will
send over in a few days a catch-all memo on this and a handful of
other leftover projects to clean up most of this old business with one
shot. *Is sending ~~a memo~~ a memorandum to us in a few days
covering this matter -*

~~I'm also attaching (Tab 2) an impressive summary of our aid
to Israel over the past three years. I'm sending a copy to Feinberg
but thought you might find it handy.~~

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tell him to cable Abe I nberg
if he's over there.

LBJ/JJ/mf
10-8-66
11:00a

done
gg
10-8

~~136~~
File
Cable Sent
Feinberg
WH Release to me
made Tues a.m.
BLS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday/9:30 am
October 7, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Another Israeli Loan

The Ex-Im Bank Board has just approved the last of the three loans for Israel that it will process this fall. This one is for \$6 million to be loaned to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel for relending to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers. All of this money will be spent in the US for American machinery and equipment.

Again, I have saved first option on the announcement for you just in case you feel the time is riper now. Apart from the Bunker-desalting announcement and the left-over \$6 million, this is the last such Israeli aid move we anticipate before November 8th.

The attached press release could be put out from the White House, rounding up total Ex-Im help for Israel and underlining our role in Israel's significant industrial development. Since Ex-Im machinery operates pretty much in the open, the Israelis will know that this loan should have been approved about now. So if you don't feel announcing here would help you, we might as well let Ex-Im make a routine announcement so we don't appear to be blocking it.

Walt W. Rostow

Approve WH release ☒

Let Ex-Im make routine announcement ☐

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 715C 8-18-81 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

\$6 MILLION OF U. S. EXPORTS TO ISRAEL
TO BE FINANCED BY NEW EXIMBANK LOAN

The sale of American goods and services valued at \$6 million will be financed by a relending credit authorized by the Export-Import Bank of Washington to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel. Proceeds of the loan will be relent by that bank to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers who require United States machinery and equipment.

The new loan brings to some \$250 million Eximbank's assistance to Israel authorized since the country became independent in 1948. About \$230 million of this total has been in the form of direct loans to governmental and private enterprises in such fields as agriculture, industry, power and transportation. All repayments have been made as scheduled.

It is expected that the new loan will further assist industrial development in Israel, which in recent years has attained an average annual growth rate of some 15 percent.

Eximbank's new \$6 million loan will be repayable in 16 semi-annual installments after a grace period of approximately two years. Interest on the loan will be at an annual rate of six percent.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday/9:30 am
October 7, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Another Israeli Loan

The Ex-Im Bank Board has just approved the last of the three loans for Israel that it will process this fall. This one is for \$6 million to be loaned to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel for relending to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers. All of this money will be spent in the US for American machinery and equipment.

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Approve WH release ☒

Walt W. Rostow
in Israeli
C of Finberg Cable him

Let Ex-Im make routine announcement ☐

By phone
from Jacobsen
at the Ranch
BIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment revised and sent to Moyers + Fleming by W. Rostow memo of 10/10/66.

Saunders informed
Action to be taken
Monday

138
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓ WMR:

This is the last chance to
do something Israeli--except for
Bunker--before elections.

Do you want to give the President
a crack at it?

Hal
HFD

**\$6 MILLION OF U. S. EXPORTS TO ISRAEL
TO BE FINANCED BY NEW EXIMBANK LOAN**

The sale of American goods and services valued at \$6 million will be financed by a relending credit authorized by the Export-Import Bank of Washington to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel. Proceeds of the loan will be relent by that bank to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers who require United States machinery and equipment.

The new loan brings to some \$250 million Eximbank's assistance to Israel authorized since the country became independent in 1948. About \$230 million of this total has been in the form of direct loans to governmental and private enterprises in such fields as agriculture, industry, power and transportation. All repayments have been made as scheduled.

It is expected that the new loan will further assist industrial development in Israel, which in recent years has attained an average annual growth rate of some 15 per cent.

Eximbank's new \$6 million loan will be repayable in 16 semi-annual installments after a grace period of approximately two years. Interest on the loan will be at an annual rate of six percent.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

138a
Please review
to H. S. S. S.
where
signed
Friday/9:30 am
October 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Another Israeli Loan

The Ex-Im Bank Board has just approved the last of the three loans for Israel that it will process this fall. This one is for \$6 million to be loaned to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel for relending to private medium-sized Israeli manufacturers. All of this money will be spent in the US for American machinery and equipment.

Again, I have saved first option on the announcement for you just in case you feel the time is riper now. Apart from the Bunker-desalting announcement and the left-over \$6 million, this is the last such Israeli aid move we anticipate before November 8th.

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W. W. Rostow

Approve WH release _____

Let Ex-Im make routine announcement _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

~~SECRET~~

November 20, 1966

FOR PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

The Israel-Jordan border situation remains explosive. Last Sunday's raid weakened King Hussein's ability to control terrorists operating into Israel from Jordan because he no longer has full cooperation of the army, which Israel badly mauled. Another Israeli strike in retaliation for new incidents that could happen would force Hussein to counter attack.

I. Our first job, therefore, is to keep Israel from attacking again.

Secretary Rusk recommends a tough message to Eshkol which says we would have to reassess our last year's decision to supply military equipment if Israel attacks again. Since we have already sent a number of tough signals, he hesitates to recommend unqualifiedly that you send this message and volunteers to deliver it himself via Harman if you prefer. (The last paragraph is our suggestion to which working levels at State are agreeable. There has been no time to get it to Secretary Rusk.)

I recommend you send it yourself for Ambassador Barbour to pass orally to Eshkol for three reasons:

1. Sunday's attack badly damaged our ability to go on stabilizing Israel's Jordanian border. Ambassador Harman now understands this, but we're not sure Israeli leaders in Jerusalem do. Asking Barbour to deliver it there will have greater impact. The Israelis have gravely damaged the unspoken truce we've helped them build with Hussein--including possibly the agreement in return for our plane and tank sale not to station Jordanian armor on the west bank of the Jordan near Israel. They've upset your delicate and successful balancing act in selling jets to Jordan to keep the Soviets out. He is now reported to be receiving Soviet equipment offers and is making requests to us for substantial

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority State Dept. Declass. lists
By gwl/cb, NARA. Date 4-10-00

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

additional equipment. The Israelis must be made to realize that if they retaliate again, in response to anything short of a major attack, our ability to stabilize the area may be ^crippled.

2. Bringing home to them that they've undercut your policies will strengthen your hand for whatever we may have to ask Israel to do later to re-stabilize the situation.

3. We also want to use this opening to jolt Israeli leaders into realizing that they can't go on looking to us for protection over the long haul unless they make some effort of their own to coexist with their neighbors. In view of your stance that reconciliation not aggression is the way to solve problems, we can't miss this opportunity to challenge a policy that is leading us all up a dead-end street in the Middle East. Many of Israel's new leaders doubt that the old retaliation policy of Ben Gurion is wise and believe Israel can only survive by working toward accommodation with the Arabs. Their bad mistake last weekend will sharpen debate over this issue. This message from you laid before Eshkol personally would bring them up short and may help the moderates turn the corner.

← II. Our second job is to put Hussein back on his feet. His regime has been severely shaken and he has asked us for substantial additional amounts of military equipment. He wants some of it to be airlifted for dramatic impact to undercut critics who charge that he is incompetent to defend Jordan. We do not want to feed his belief that his only response is to build a defense establishment he cannot afford, but we will have to try to meet his problem of demonstrating to his people that he's doing all he can.

One way to do this is to speed up a few items in the military aid pipeline. We don't like this, but the alternative again is to stand by and watch the Egyptians

~~SECRET~~

3

and Soviets happily pour the stuff in. The sensible long-term approach is to send a mission or possibly missions to work out effective ways to seal off the Israel-Jordan border. That's the real problem, and the sooner we divert his attention to that, the better. I suggested the idea to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. They are exploring possibilities along these lines.

If we speed up Jordan's pipeline, we will have to tell Israel ^{ask} why and/~~ask~~ them to restrain critics here. We would also have to offer similar border-control help to Israel because, in all fairness, they can only give up retaliation if they find some other way to deal with Arab terrorists.

We will push staff work on this today and be back to you quickly with a concrete response to Hussein. But the most immediate need is to restrain Israel and lay a strong bargaining base for whatever long-range scheme we can work out.

I also think it would be a good idea for me to spell out our thinking to Feinberg as soon as we have ourselves lined up. We may have to look like we're making some anti-Israeli gestures before we're done, and a little pre-emptive briefing might help.

Approve message for direct transmission to Eshkol via Barbour_____

Ask Secretary Rusk to deliver it_____

Talk with Feinberg_____

Not now_____

[Keep last paragraph_____

Delete last paragraph_____

138c

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL

"You are aware of our concern at the events of November 13 and their impact on the stability of the regime in Jordan. I am sympathetically aware of the painful dilemma posed by your need both to protect Israel's citizens and to promote peace with your neighbors. Just two weeks ago we made our position on terror incidents mounted from across your border clear beyond question in the Security Council hearings on your complaint against Syria. But while recognizing your problem, I must recognize also that the fact of the raid on Jordan and its magnitude have raised threats to United States interests and, I believe, to those of Israel.

Sunday's raid has set in motion developments in Jordan the outcome of which at this juncture we cannot fully assess. But the position of King Hussain's Government and United States interests have been gravely affected. Another such action, no matter what the cause, could bring on irreparable damage. The implications of such action for Israel's security and for area stability would therefore be serious indeed.

Continued application of the policy of military retaliation by Israel raises concern here as to the supply of some categories of United States military equipment to

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS


~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

- 2 -

Israel. You will recall that it was only after exhaustive consideration of the military situation in the Middle East that we agreed last year to an exception to our long-standing policy on arms sales. This decision was not easily arrived at. It was taken in the belief that it would contribute to stability in the area. In full candor, I must make certain you are aware that further punitive forays by Israel across armistice lines in the Near East could bring a reassessment of the premises on which our decisions regarding military supply to Israel were based.

These are troubled times, Mr. Prime Minister, when peace is fragile and stability more necessary than ever. Just as there have been events that disturb the peace, there may be in the future more such events. In these circumstances it is the hardest and highest task of government to hold fast to course of moderation and reason. It is because I know you share with me these views that I know I can count on you not only to recognize the peril but also to have the determination to avoid it.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS



~~SECRET~~

Beyond this present situation, there is also the need to look toward Israel's eventual coexistence with its neighbors. I well know from my own country's experience ~~how~~ along its long borders how difficult ~~this~~ --but also how essential --this is. It has also ~~been~~ part of our experience that out of a crucible such as the present crisis can come small but sound steps toward a more stable and secure future."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JK 139
File
October 17, 1966

BKS:

I sent you earlier a text of the attached. However, this original, which I just received from the State Department, should undoubtedly go in the President's files. No reply is needed since this is just an acknowledgment.

HHS



WEIZMANN HOUSE
REHOVOT
ISRAEL

139a
כ"ח תשרי
ה'תשנ"ו
1966

October 4, 1966

H. E. Walworth Barbour
American Ambassador
Embassy of the United States of America
Tel Aviv

Your Excellency:

It was indeed kind of President and Mrs. Johnson to send condolences on the death of my mother and I would ask you to convey to both of them the gratitude of my family and myself for their thoughtfulness. I am grateful to you for your good services in this connection.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Weizmann

139b

The White House
Washington

1966 OCT 11 AM 8 38

M ITT-1 OCT 11 1966

TELAVIVJAFFA 17 1045 11

WALT ROSTOW THE WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTONDC

RECEIVED MESSAGE PLEASE THANK PRESIDENT FOR HIS
THOUGHTFULNESS IN SENDING IT

ABE

Abraham Feinberg

139c

The White House
Washington

1966 OCT 11 AM 8 38

M ITT-1 OCT 11 1966

TELAVIVJAFFA 17 1045 11

WALT ROSTOW THE WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTONDC

RECEIVED MESSAGE PLEASE THANK PRESIDENT FOR HIS
THOUGHTFULNESS IN SENDING IT

ABE

140 ~~Chenail~~
~~Wick~~

September 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

Walt Rostow asked me--in response to your request--to give you an unclassified rundown of the significant things we have done for Israel. You can give this to Abe Feinberg, since all of the numbers are available from open sources.

I'm also attaching an unclassified chart which compares Israel's economy with that of four other leading countries. It's impressive to see how far ahead it is. This is a simple fact many friends of Israel don't realize when they keep pressing us for aid.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. Rostow

1400

HOW THE US HAS HELPED ISRAEL

1. US aid through 30 June 1966 totaled \$1.1 billion in public grants, loans, and credits on concessionary terms. The total aid in Fiscal Year 1966, including a classified amount for the military sales, was the highest annual total ever.

- During peak years before FY 62 our aid averaged consistently among the highest annual per capita rates in the world (\$28).
- It far surpassed aid to individual Near Eastern Arab states both in annual average and in absolute totals.
- Since FY 1962 economic aid alone has totaled more than \$300 million. In addition, there have been important military sales in 1962, 1965 and 1966.
- The result of this, other aid and Israel's own efforts has been one of the highest growth rates in the world (10-11%) and a per capita GNP of \$1250 (70% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, equal to Austria's, 130% of Italy's, 200% of Greece's).

2. We have completed a technological study of a desalting-electric power plant and are actively studying next steps.

3. On the diplomatic front, President Kennedy on 8 May 1963 publicly committed the US to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. President Johnson has reaffirmed that policy. We give full diplomatic and financial support for the elaborate peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders.

4. We support scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 USG agencies supporting 350 science projects in fields ranging from health and education to weather and vocational rehabilitation. On top of that, we loaned another \$6.7 million to four Israeli universities and technical institutes over the past year.

5. Support for over a million Arab refugees at a cost of over \$350 million has helped Israel.

Before Sayer

141

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/29

Walt:

I stopped Ex-Im on the Israeli loan by asking them to send us a draft press release today. This will give us control.

Since Ex-Im machinery operates pretty much in the open, the Israelis will know—or surmise—that the Ex-Im board has approved this loan.

So if we want to squeeze anything out of this one, we ought to do it sooner rather than later. I'll get the press release and then do you a memo for the President to cover it.

We might take the line that this is nothing exceptional but the President might as well take advantage of it because it's cheap. We're just dressing up something that would go through the mill in due course anyway.

Hal

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

141a
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5
September 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR.

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Israeli Finance Minister Sapid, 10:00 am Thursday

Sapid's main point will be that Israel still has economic problems-- despite our glowing picture of its success. He describes his economy as a "picture of lights and shadows." He seems to be using the soft sell on this trip and may not make a straight pitch for more aid this year. But he will certainly be laying the groundwork.

Your easiest tack is mostly to listen, but taking the following general stance in conversation would keep our defenses up:

1. You can commend Sapid for his new forward-looking program to get at Israel's basic economic problem--the trade deficit and heavy dependence on large capital inflows from German reparations and US Zionist investment.

2. Israel's economic problems are those of a nearly developed--not an underdeveloped--economy. Some fairly say that the era of mass consumption has begun in Israel. The market for many of the consumer goods Israel produces for itself is almost saturated, and Israel must keep the wage-price level down to make them competitive for export. This is the element of Sapid's program which arouses the toughest political opposition.

3. We are ready to help where we reasonably can, but we expect Israel to think twice about our global responsibilities before it asks for more concessional help.

One concrete issue he may raise is whether we can't buy phosphates in Israel for our Korean aid program for 50% Israeli pounds and 50% dollars. Since the phosphates would otherwise come from the US market, no dollar purchase would make sense to us. But Israel's prime interest is to get a foot into the Far Eastern market, so Bill Gaud is reconsidering a possible purchase for 100% Israeli pounds. All you need say is that you are sure Gaud will give us an honest reading.

The above is all you need. But if you have time, attached are good short descriptions of (1) Sapid's reform policy; (2) Israel's problems; and (3) Israel's basic economic situation.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 6-1-00

Hal
Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~



14553

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israel's "New Economic Policy" and The Problems
of Success: The Israeli Economy

As requested by your office, attached are two papers
dealing with information on the Israeli economy. These
papers are furnished in connection with Finance Minister
Sapir's visit on Thursday, September 29, 1966.

Shurad McCall
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary *for*

1413 3488
HHS
1- Papadopoulos
2-RIT.
original
attached to
HHS memo
to WWR.
9/28

Israel's "New Economic Policy"

The Israeli Government has been publicly groping toward a new economic policy since early 1966. The pressure for change stems from the realization by government leaders that Israel cannot expect its persistent deficit on trade and services to be covered indefinitely by large capital inflows. However, the GOI is divided internally over the urgency of reform, as Israel expects to enjoy a handsome surplus on capital account at least through the 1960s.

Finance Minister Sapir has led in demanding reform. Prime Minister Eshkol has supported him against his cabinet opponents, who have objected in varying degrees to Sapir's program. Cabinet opposition, especially from Marxian-socialist Mapam, has succeeded in watering down the original proposals.

Sapir had demanded a two-year freeze in wages, with wage increases after 1968 to be tied to advances in productivity. He further called for ending the automatic link between wages and the consumer price index, arguing that changes in the cost of living should be only one factor in collective bargaining. The automatic cost-of-living raises have fueled a persistent inflation (10% in 1965). Long tolerated as necessary to a high growth rate, inflation is now identified as a chief obstacle to the major expansion of exports which Israel so ardently desires.

Sapir won the consent of the Trade Union Federation to forgo the semiannual cost-of-living raise due in July 1966. He then proposed that five percentage points' increase in the consumer price index be discounted in determining whether wages should rise automatically in January and July 1967. This proposal was rejected.

After protracted negotiations, the new program has been announced. Its major points are: (1) only half the automatic wage increases payable in the next two years will be paid; (2) production norms will be raised; (3) the capital gains tax will rise from 25 to 30 percent; (4) allowable tax-deductible business expenses will be reduced; (5) the foreign currency allowance for travel abroad will be reduced from \$500 to \$350; (6) exports will be stimulated through tax remissions to exporting firms and by making available cheaper credit.

Aside from the capital gains levy, no change in the subsidy structure or schedule of income taxes was made. Direct subsidies to exporters were rejected by Sapir, though favored by others in the cabinet. Devaluation has been at least temporarily ruled out, perhaps until the automatic link

between the consumer price index and wages can be weakened. There are indications that the GOI considers the last devaluation in 1962 to have been a partial failure, as prices and wages rose sharply after devaluation was announced.

The measures proposed fall short of a full program of reform. In-
flation is likely to continue, but at a reduced rate. Prime Minister
Eshkol has warned that additional measures will be taken if the present
ones do not suffice.

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The Problems of Success: The Israeli Economy

The economic development of Israel is one of the dramatic success stories of recent times. Over the last ten years, Israel's GNP grew at an average annual rate in excess of 10%, one of the highest sustained growth rates in the world. The principal factors in this performance have been: (1) an exceptional labor force; (2) strong entrepreneurship; (3) large capital inflows, primarily from the United States and West Germany. By 1965 Israel had attained a per capita GNP of \$1400, and qualified in many important respects as a developed country.

Prosperity has trickled down. In recent years there have been dramatic gains in ownership of consumer durables. By the end of 1965, 78% of Israeli families owned an electric refrigerator, 85% a gas stove, 28% a washing machine, 90% a radio, 30% two radios, and 22% a phonograph. Private automobiles are still a luxury, with only 60,000 in the country in March 1964, but the market is just opening up: both Ford and General Motors are actively pushing plans to open assembly plants.

Although Israel's economic performance has been outstanding, her economic leaders have professed themselves discontent. In part this is a calculated pose designed for potential aid-givers, and in part it represents the aspirations of its more highly educated citizens, who have known a European standard of living.

In support of his plea for aid, Finance Minister Sapir may allude to the following problems, which are briefly discussed.

1. Inflation is built into the Israeli economy (10% in 1965) by the automatic linkage of almost all wages and salaries to the consumer price index. Israel has tolerated inflation as necessary to high growth, and does not appear to have suffered severely from this unorthodox policy. Recently Sapir has led in advocating unpopular deflationary measures which have slowed economic growth to 7% per year, while moderating the historically excessive growth in private consumption (down from 11% in 1964 to 8.3% in 1965), and improving the balance of payments.

2. Overvaluation of the Israeli pound is reliably estimated at about 15%, and endemic inflation tends toward increasing it. Devaluation will probably be necessary at some point, but Sapir apparently desires to defer it for a few years until after the automatic link between wages and the consumer price index has been weakened or eliminated.

3. Exports have expanded from 20% by value of imports in 1953, to 33% in 1958, to 52% in 1965. This is not good enough, Israelis say. Israel is worried about being shut out of its main market in Europe by the EEC, and

may make a pitch for freer access to the U.S. market. (Israel is already seeking associate member status in the EEC.) Overvaluation of the currency is an important reason for the recent slow-down in export expansion. The GOI is upset over a recent AID decision (on balance-of-payments grounds) not to allow them to bid on chemical fertilizers for Korea and Vietnam bought with AID funds, especially as Israel has large stocks of unsold potash.


4. Unemployment has reached 3-4%, which alarms the GOI as it tends to discourage much-desired immigration. The GOI hopes to divert the redundant labor (particularly from building trades) into export industries. Labor immobility is a problem.

5. Heavy debt service payments are often mentioned by the GOI. At the end of 1965, Israel had a foreign debt payable in foreign currency of \$1,226 million, of which \$532 million (43%) was Independence and Development Bonds and \$570 million (47%) was other medium- and long-term debt. In 1966 Israel will need \$241 million for debt redemption and \$25 million for payment of interest on the foreign debt. (Of the \$241 million, \$65 million is to redeem Development Bonds, while \$100 million is for short-term loans expected to be renewed. Sales of Development Bonds are expected to be about \$100 million.) Against this is to be put the Bank of Israel's gold and foreign exchange holdings of \$643 million at the end of 1965, up six-fold since 1958. The total inflow of unilateral transfers and capital imports was about \$600 million in both 1964 and 1965, and is expected to hold up. While the foreign debt is high in relation to its resources, Israel is "bankable" and can roll over its old debts at maturity with little difficulty.

6. The burden of arms purchases is always cited by the GOI in support of its aid requests. In this connection Sapir may allude to the "Dillon commitment." The Israelis contend that then Acting Secretary Dillon undertook a commitment in a conversation on September 20, 1960, with then Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, that the U.S. would consider economic aid to Israel in the light of the burden of arms purchases. The USG has consistently maintained that it is necessary to take Israel's total economic situation into account in determining its eligibility for economic assistance. We have sold arms to Israel only with the greatest reluctance, at their urgent behest. We recognize no commitment to "offset" these Israeli purchases, although DOD has undertaken to increase off-shore procurement an unspecified amount (perhaps to \$3 million) from its present half-million-dollar level.

Israel's economic leaders face problems, but they are the problems of success. The era of mass consumption has begun. We foresee no difficulties which threaten the upward trend, though it seems clear that growth in the future will be less fevered. The significance of the present economic adjustment in Israel is that it marks Israel's transition to a developed state.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Percent Increase over Previous Year

141c

~~SECRET~~

INFORMAL VISIT OF PRESIDENT ZALMAN SHAZAR OF ISRAEL

BACKGROUND PAPER

The Flourishing Israeli Economy: 1966

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981

By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

Friends of Israel in this country as well as Israeli officials have expressed concern over possible effects on the economy of Israel of the continued arms burden and the termination of German reparations payments. The situation of neither peace nor war between Israel and its Arab neighbors has unquestionably imposed burdens on the Israeli economy. The location of industrial sites, alertness against possible attack, and a defense expenditure amounting to a fourth of the national budget or 11% of the Gross National Product (GNP) are among the problems raised by continued Arab hostility. Yet, in spite of this defense burden, the Israeli economy in 1966 is impressive by any standards. Today Israel commands very large inflows of capital, adequate not only to finance its economic growth and security needs but also to build up substantial foreign exchange balances.

As the attached charts show, in many important respects, Israel is a developed country. Its per capita GNP was about \$1,417 in 1965, higher by far than any other developing country in the world, and higher than such countries as Japan and Italy. The rate of increase in GNP has exceeded 10% per year for the last decade, but slowed to about 9% in 1965. Moreover, the benefits of economic development have been widely disseminated, owing to the traditional egalitarianism of Israeli society.

Israel has made dramatic progress toward paying its way internationally. Exports as a percent of imports rose to 52% in 1965, up from 20% in 1953, and 33% in 1958. The continuing trade deficit has been offset by large capital inflows. U.S. Government aid to Israel since 1948 has totaled over \$1.1 billion. On a per capita basis, Israel received \$50 in economic and military aid in FY 1966. This was twice as much as Jordan received the same year, and about 15 times as much as Pakistan received in FY 1965. Moreover, German reparations and personal restitutions have exceeded \$2 billion. German reparations as such have ended but restitutions are expected to increase to \$165 million in 1966, up from \$65 million in 1958 and \$134 million in 1964. The increase in restitution payments together with promised West German loans (\$37.5 million in 1966) will more than offset the loss from the ending of reparations payments. In addition, inflows of capital from private sources such as the United Jewish Appeal are expected to remain at a comparatively high level.

The Israeli foreign debt is technically very large, around \$1 billion at the end of 1965. However, about half of this debt represents Israeli development bonds. Although carried as a dollar debt, experience has shown that most of these bonds are rolled over or redeemed in Israeli pounds. Moreover, Israel's official accumulation of gold and foreign exchange reserves has steadily risen, reaching \$643 million at the end of 1965, up 6-fold since 1958.

These trends are expected to continue through the 1960s. The ability to accumulate sizeable foreign exchange reserves while maintaining a high rate of internal growth, is a powerful argument for the health of the Israeli economy.


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Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
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ISRAEL- -ECONOMIC COMPARISONS

ITEM	ISRAEL	JAPAN	MEXICO	PAKISTAN	NETHERLANDS
GNP PER CAPITA 1965	\$1,417	\$856	\$474	\$85	\$1,504
GNP GROWTH ANNUAL RATE 1960-1965	10.7%	9.7%	5.9%	5.4%	4.7%
DEFENSE EXPEND. AS PERCENT OF GNP	11.3%	1.1%	0.6%	3.1% (BEFORE KASHMIR)	4.0%
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS PERCENT OF 1965 IMPORTS	92%	23%	31%	23%	36%
DEBT OF CENTRAL GOV'T AS PERCENT OF GNP	Develop. Bonds 18% Other 47% 65%	5%	9%	24%	32%



Walt ✓

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Information on the 11:45 appointment with
Abe Feinberg.

Marvin
9/28

Israel

JACOB M. ARVEY
BARNET HODES
LOUIS M. MANTYNBAND
GEORGE L. SIEGEL
WILLIAM J. COSTELLO
SIDNEY R. ZATZ
HOWARD ARVEY
J. HERZL SEGAL
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MALCOLM S. KAMIN
SHERMAN D. FOGEL
STUART C. NATHAN

LAW OFFICES

ARVEY, HODES & MANTYNBAND

ONE NORTH LA SALLE STREET

CHICAGO 60602

TELEPHONE CENTRAL 6-9760

September 26, 1966

WASHINGTON, D. C. OFFICE
1200 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N.W.

CABLE ADDRESS
"ARHOMA"

COUNSEL
JOSEPH H. WRIGHT

Mr. W. Marvin Watson
Special Assistant to
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Watson:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation I enclose herewith xerox copies of letter from Mr. Philip Klutznick dated September 19, 1966 to Mr. Abraham Feinberg and Mr. Feinberg's reply dated September 21, 1966. Mr. Feinberg will be in Washington on Wednesday of this week and will be in touch with you.

With warm regards, I am

Sincerely,

J. M. Arvey

Encls.

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ABRAHAM FEINBERG
CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

September 21, 1966

Mr. Philip M. Klutznick
401 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear Phil:

I have your letter of the 19th and, since you have given me permission to do so, I am sending a photostat of it to Arthur.


I could not agree with you more as to the need for the President to set up some apparatus which will provide a continuing relationship between him and the Jewish Community.

Since all great minds run in the same direction, I passed this thought along to Bill Moyers the day after the Goldberg meeting. I did caution him that, if the President was favorable to the idea, some time should be allowed to elapse so that it would not appear that he was reacting to current pressures. Since Bill is presently in mourning after the death of his brother, I have not called him this week.

I am grateful to you for expressing yourself in such an articulate manner and I am sure that, after Arthur has digested what you wrote, one or both of us will want to talk to you when you next get here.

With my best to everybody at home, I am

Sincerely,



Abraham Feinberg

AF:JK

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PERSONAL

September 19, 1966

Mr. Abraham Feinberg
American Bank and Trust Company
70 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005

My dear Abe:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I sent to Arthur today. I cannot help but conclude that the whole thing was an unnecessary foul-up not unlike the rhubarb over the Jewish War Veterans interview. The latter worried me a great deal more than the former.

Since you are so intimately connected with most of the activity, I am taking the liberty of giving you a few of my thoughts about the relationship between the White House and the American Jewish community. This last flare-up and embarrassment was not at all necessary, but probably points up an essential weakness in communication which, if continued, could prove very embarrassing at critical times when a cushion of support is necessary. Let me outline some of my ideas for what they may be worth:

1) In recent years the White House contacts with the American Jewish community have been generally the following types:

- a) Informal receptions to delegates at the request of the organization involved;
- b) Delivery of a few speeches and the acceptance of some medals;
- c) Direct relations on consequential matters especially involving American-Israel relations has been limited to notable American Jews within the Administration (principally Ambassador Goldberg) and one or two outside who have from time to time been actively interested in the President's image.

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Mr. Abraham Feinberg
September 19, 1966
Page Two

2) If the Administration, as for example the Eisenhower Administration, had a reasonably innocuous or at times antagonistic policy toward Israel and a milk and water policy toward matters of general interest to the American Jew, the preceding approach would be as good as any. It provides a protection for negative attitudes and cover for an unwillingness to act.

3) However, when an Administration adopts as favorable a stance on matters that concern the American Jewish community as the Johnson Administration has, and follows the present communications approach, it can reap the worst of all worlds. It does not get adequate credit for its good deeds, and it inherits the whirlwind when an incident such as the Jewish War Veterans matter arises in which there are legitimate differences in the total community.

4) One must conclude that either the President is protecting himself from the American Jewish community or downgrades its importance except in situations of crisis. Israel is a matter of deepest concern to the overwhelming majority of Jews, but it is far from the only matter which can irritate or please them. But even on the positive attitude of the Johnson Administration toward Israel there is better knowledge in Israel than there is in the American Jewish community.

While it is troublesome and time consuming, the President's advisors might give consideration to an adaptation of the procedure followed at the time of the Hawk decision. If a sense of participation is developed by a broad spectrum of the leadership of the American Jewish community when helpful attitudes are being initiated, it tends to give pause to that same leadership when it gets ready to be critical. These people would hold their fire where they are kept informed in good things when some things that are not so good arise.

5) The American Jewish community has been sensitive about a number of matters in addition to American-Israel relationships. Correctly or incorrectly, a large number of American Jewish leaders and people active locally are in-

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Mr. Abraham Feinberg
September 19, 1966
Page Three

creasingly disturbed by the affairs in Asia. It should be considered a compliment to the support they have given the President that so few, aside from certain religious leaders, have spoken out in opposition to the policy even though they are tremendously disturbed. The President knows of the split in the Jewish community on federal aid to private schools and especially parochial schools. There will be more problems involving civil rights as the Negro position loses public ground temporarily because of the recent violence. There is always something in which our American Jewish community is at least peripherally if not directly involved.

6) I would suggest that periodically a subcommittee of the Conference of Major Jewish Organizations should meet with one or another of the President's assistants to get some information and to give some views. Whether it is McPherson or someone else, a continuing sense of relationship would be valuable in moments of crisis.

For example, a continuing relationship might have avoided what I think was an unnecessary aggravation in the Jewish War Veterans matter. You know my loyalty to the B'nai B'rith, but I question whether it was wise to call on Bill Wexler and Jay Kaufman on the eve of a scheduled meeting with a Conference of Major Jewish Organizations to be held with you and Arthur. With all due respect to both Arthur and you, I am not certain that it would not have been wiser to have asked Prinz to get a representative committee to meet with McPherson. I am sure that Arthur and you smoothed over a lot of ruffled feathers, but I am not certain that this is a good technique to continue into the future.

From your own personal point of view I would urge you to protect your rear end by getting some kind of easy and informal liaison developed with the totality of the community.

In any event, for better or worse, I felt it essential that I write you these thoughts. I was tempted to send a copy to Arthur but decided that it's better just between the two of us.

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Mr. Abraham Feinberg
September 19, 1966
Page Four

If you want to share this with Arthur, it is entirely up to
you.

Cordially,

Philip M. Klutznick

PMK:jb

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1966

WWR:

Here's a different view of
whether the smart money goes on
regionalism or nationalism.

The source and the judgment
will both interest you!

Hal

Hal Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-18-81 letter

By rip, NARS, Date 9-16-81

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1066 SEP 21

INFO : ADDIS ABABA, TEL AVIV, LUSAKA, LONDON, ACCRA,
CAIRO, KAMPALA

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy NAIROBI

DATE: September 21, 1966

SUBJECT: Israeli Policy in Africa

REF : Addis A-145 (NOTAL) of September 14, 1966

POL 15-1 ETH AF

Moshe Bitan, new Assistant Director General of the Israeli Foreign Office who is in charge of African Affairs, visited Kenya in mid-September. I had an hour with him and the Israeli Ambassador Zev Levin September 13. The theme of the conversation was Israeli policy in Africa and, given Israel's capabilities and interests, the emphasis the Israelis are putting on small impact projects on a country by country basis.

Bitan said the principal points and methods of Israeli operation in Africa were: pragmatism, small programs on an austere basis for maximum impact purposes in each country where they can operate, and cutting back of aid projects which they are finding too expensive. We did not tally figures, but it seems that the same or a smaller budget for Africa is being spread over more countries. It was specifically said that the Israelis put no emphasis on regional projects, both because of the cost and because of their political estimate that individual nationalism is the main trend.

In the security field, Bitan said Israel was ready to do what it could, but it found the British very sensitive. He said the program in Uganda would continue in spite of the expense as Israel's contribution to keeping the Russian influence down. In Lusaka, the GRZ wanted to talk but the Israelis were proceeding slowly because of HMG.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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☐ In ☐ OutFORM
4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: CHARGE:JRRuchti:in

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-229

NARA Date 10-27-00

10-27-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Bitan, who was formerly Ambassador in Ghana, said that country is in a mess. He said it was poorly led in that the regime has no policy or concept. It is slowly sinking. He saw no stabilization point or group on which the malaise could be stopped and a new beginning made.

Bitan made no effort to take a careful reading in Nigeria with the Nigerians, saying it was too early to see where that situation would go.

On Kenya, Bitan had little to add to clarify the Israeli position. It is largely a commercially profitable association with the GOK with Israel providing a loan to the GOK for the Kenya share. The social workers training center will continue. No real concern over the UAR was indicated as the UAR has made little progress here.

RUCHTI
JRR.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 21, 1966

WWR:

S

Within the limits of Israel's own interests, the attached suggests that Eban is not deaf to our message--or at least not blind to that part of Israel's bread that has US butter on it.

This is another in the series of signals we've been getting from high-level Israelis to show they're sympathetic and trying to work their way around their internal obstacles.

Hal

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MSC 8-18-81 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-16-81

Att: Tel Aviv 984, 9/20/66

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
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REF: STATE 45447 AND TEL AVIV 948

VIET-NAM/ISRAEL

1. POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT INDEPENDENT HAARETZ SEPT 18, ATTRIBUTES FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO FONMIN EBAN: QUOTE ISRAEL MAY RECONSIDER ITS DECISION NOT TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIET-NAM IN LIGHT OF THE ELECTIONS IN THAT COUNTRY. MASS PARTICIPATION IN THESE ELECTIONS CAME AS A SURPRISE TO MANY. IT NO DOUBT OBLIGES US TO CONSIDER THE MEANING AND WEIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. THE MATTER REQUIRES STUDY AND EXAMINATION UNQUOTE. HAARETZ' POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT COMMENTS

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 984 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
QUOTE IT IS THOUGHT THAT MATTER (OF ESTABLISHMENT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS) MAY BE PLACED ON CABINET AGENDA IN FEW WEEKS' TIME AFTER RETURN OF FONMIN FROM U.S. UNQUOTE.

2. EMBOFF ASKED FONMINISTRY. DIRECTOR ASIAN AFFAIRS LEWIN WHETHER IT FAIR ASSUMPTION CORRESPONDENT'S COMMENT WAS CORRECT. LEWIN SAID IT WAS. HE CONFIRMED ACCURACY HAARETZ QUOTE OF EBAN.

3. IN SPITE THIS ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT PATH OF ISRAEL-SOUTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS OF LATE HAS NOT BEEN EASY. LEWIN SAID SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAD NOTIFIED ISRAELIS THEY UNABLE PROVIDE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter MAR 19 1981
By ing, NARS, Date 4-16-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- TEL AVIV 984, SEPTEMBER 20

CANDIDATES TO FILL AGRICULTURAL TRAINING SLOTS ISRAELIS HAD OFFERED IN ISRAEL. SOUTH VIET-NAM THROUGH ITS AMBASSADOR IN BANGKOK HAD COUNTER PROPOSED A VISIT TO ISRAEL BY A SOUTH VIETNAMESE CABINET MINISTER. LEWIN THOUGHT THIS WAS RUSHING MATTERS A BIT AND WOULD IF IT TOOK PLACE ACTUALLY HINDER RATHER THAN HELP BRING CLOSER SOUTH VIET-NAM-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

4. COMMENT: WE AGREE SOUTH VIET-NAM PROPOSAL RE CABINET LEVEL VISIT COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. SUCCESS OF ELECTIONS SEEMS TO BE HAVING GREATER IMPACT ON HIGH LEVEL ISRAELI THINKING RE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIET-NAM THAN ANY SUCH VISIT

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 984HD ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OR OTHER EFFORT OF THIS NATURE WOULD HAVE.

5. EMBOFF SUGGESTED TO LEWIN AND ARGOV (ACTING DIRECTOR US DIVISION) THAT HELPFUL STATEMENT ON VIET-NAM DURING GA SESSION (STATE 45503) WOULD BE APPRECIATED. NEITHER MADE ANY COMMITMENT THIS REGARD AND BOTH INDICATED WITH FONMIN NOW AT UN THAT WOULD BE BEST PLACE TO BROACH THIS POSSIBILITY.

6. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ISRAELI POLICY RE RELATIONS WITH VIET-NAM SHOWS SOME SIGNS OF SHIFT, WE BELIEVE ISRAEL WILL BE VERY CAREFUL IN TAKING ANY POSITION ON VIET-NAM IT THINKS COULD CAUSE IT DIFFICULTIES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED STATES. STILL FONMIN'S PRESS STATEMENT WAS FORTHCOMING AND WE MAY EXPECT ISRAELIS TO BE REASONABLY HELPFUL ON VIET-NAM IN UNGA.

GP-3. BARBOUR
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file 145

September 19, 1966

✓
WWR:

You may have some more refined notions as a result of your own talks with the Jewish leaders.

However, the attached will at least give you the basic facts on the Palestine Liberation Army.

Hal

Hal Saunders

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY WILSON

September 19, 1966

We naturally appreciate Congressman Tenzer's desire to help the President in his current difficulties with American Jewish leaders.

However, we have reservations about anyone's going too far in developing the analogy between the Viet Cong and the Palestine Liberation Army. I assume his line would be that the PLA is a potential Middle Eastern Viet Cong and that friends of Israel should back the US in Vietnam because Israel may face a similar threat one day. Our reservations stem from these considerations:

1. The analogy between the PLA and the Viet Cong is inaccurate. I'm attaching an unclassified description of the PLA for your information. As you'll see, it's now largely a paper organization struggling for status. While it could become increasingly troublesome, it is not now a threat to Israel and is even opposed by some of the Arab governments. In any case, it is very much under Cairo's thumb; and we doubt that most Arab leaders really think they can upset Israel by military means. So the PLA looks more like a pawn on the Arab political chessboard than like a serious military organization.

2. The Arabs (and the Chinese Communists) are backing the Palestine Liberation Organization's effort to achieve wider recognition and support. We and the Israelis have tried to block recognition, hoping the PLO will die from lack of support. To have any group, even domestically in the US repeatedly referring to the PLA as a going concern and a serious threat gives it status which it doesn't deserve and shouldn't achieve. So I wouldn't encourage the Congressman to make too much of this.

3. It doesn't serve our interests in the Middle East to foster the notion of impending conflict between Arabs and Israelis. Every friend of Israel knows about Arab hostility toward Israel. What we want to encourage among both Arabs and Israelis is thinking about how they can learn to coexist over the long run. In strictly Mid-East terms, it does not help us to have friends of Israel stirring each other up against the Arabs. We have to keep a foot in the Arab camp, too, so we don't want to create an even tougher domestic anti-Arab lobby than we already have.

I admit there are conflicting interests here. Strictly from the viewpoint of persuading American Jews to back us in Vietnam, there might be some virtue in privately taking the line Congressman Tenzer proposes. Moreover, any thoughtful friend of Israel might reasonably worry about

- 2 -

the potential of the PLO. However, on balance, I don't think it helps either from Israel's viewpoint or ours to play up this angle. It seems to me the only analogy that one need make between Israel and Vietnam is the one the President has validly made--that these are small countries with general need for US support against aggression.

15/Walt
W. W. Rostow

The Palestine Liberation Army

1. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) is a product of the most recent Arab efforts to provide tangible political and military expression for Palestinian Arab hostility against Israel. The PLA is the military arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was established in 1964 by the League of Arab States.

2. Thus far this "army" essentially exists only on paper. It is being organized primarily as a commando force. There are some units--reportedly totaling about 8,000 troops--in the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq which have been officially attached to the PLA, which is nominally under the command and operational control of the Egyptian-dominated United Arab Command of the Arab League. These lines of command are fuzzy, however, and the PLA-designated units still appear to be integral parts of their host armies.

3. The PLA does not presently threaten Israel except as a reservoir for potential saboteurs and terrorists. Even in this respect, it has not been involved in incidents along the Israeli border as have other unrelated and more aggressive Palestinian groups, such as the Syria-backed "Fatah" terrorists. Indeed, the status and plans of the PLA have become subjects of dispute among the Arab states, especially between Egypt and Jordan.

4. Jordan opposes the PLO and its plans for organizing separate Palestinian army units in Jordan, arguing that Palestinians there already are serving in the Jordanian Army. King Husayn essentially views the PLA as a potential subversive threat to Jordan rather than as a menace to Israel, even though, as an Arab leader, he supports the general Palestinian claim against Israel.

5. Both the PLA and its parent organization, the PLO, receive budget support through the Arab League from contributions by member states. According to the Jordanian press, in September 1964 the League allocated some seven million pounds sterling (nearly \$20 million) to the PLA. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are the PLA's most active individual supporters, but the extent of their aid is unclear. At various times Shugayri has publicly criticized delinquent Arab states for failing to contribute. The PLO also is endeavoring, with little evident success, to levy a "liberation tax" on all Palestinians, including the more than one million refugees who are scattered among the Arab states. Shugayri has stated that the PLO hopes to transform the refugee camps into military training centers.

6. Outside of the Arab world, the PLO has solicited support--presumably financial as well as political and material aid--from the Soviet Union and Communist China, and from "nonaligned" states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Only Peking appears to have responded in a substantial way, however. The PLO claims that some of its army personnel have received guerrilla training in China. Earlier this year Shugayri announced that Palestinians would also be trained in Vietnam, where they would study the tactics of the Viet Cong. Shugayri clearly envisages the PLA as a force which should be developed along the lines of the Viet Cong.

16 September 1966

145c
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/14/66

Lois,

FYI. Congressman Tenzer had to go to committee so could not take our call when we returned it this morning. However, his AA said that Tenzer had talked to Bill Jorden this morning, and that the gist of what he had to say is this:

Tenzer wanted to be helpful in any way he could in connection with news sitements about Jewish affairs and the war in Vietnam.

He passed on suggestion to Mr. Jorden that there has not been too much publicity about the Palestine Liberation Front, and he thought if anything could be said on the subject, it would have a tremendous impact on Jewish people.

If there are any statements (on general subject of Goldberg meeting, or Palestine Liberation Front, etc.) that Mr. Rostow would like to have put into the Congressional Record, Tenzer would be glad to do so.

HW
what the hell
is it?

WJ

MEMORANDUM

145d

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1966

TO: Walt Rostow

FROM: Henry H. Wilson, Jr.

Herbert Tenzer says that in the current atmosphere of criticism of the President by leading Jews, we should remember that Tenzer is the only Orthodox Jew in the Congress and that he stands ready to help in any way we see fit.

He says that a source of subject matter for the President to use himself would be data concerning the Palestine Liberation Army.

This has been much discussed in Anglo-Jewish newspapers, but practically not at all in this country.

He says he is certain that most Jews in this country are not informed about it.

I did not ask him what the Palestine Liberation Army is or how the President can claim credit for it, but I trust you know about it or can learn about it.

I will not get back to Tenzer until I hear from you.

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 THE WHITE HOUSE

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines WASHINGTON

By JW, NARA, Date 6-1-00

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 13, 1966
11:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT: Re the Israeli Problem

K

1. We got to Evron in New York who was able either to hold his cable or promptly to follow it with a stop signal.
2. We do not have the impression that he had much time to tell his friends in New York. If he did talk, he has had a chance to indicate a hold.
3. State is holding, without being informed of the reasons.
4. Except for the \$6 million additional for a new power plant, neither Harry nor my people can come up with anything solid, capable of moving fast. We shall look further but are not hopeful because these enterprises take time and careful staff work to develop.
5. There is a special advantage in the \$6 million, because the Israelis are holding up their application to the Ex-Im Bank for the power plant to see how we decide on the \$6 million. The problem, however, is that, as we said in our scenario paper of September 2, this will be an insider's move, with little publicity.
6. Therefore, the Bunker announcement remains our best bet; it is again flexibly in your hands; and we see no broken crockery. Moreover, it is a sound foreign policy move on its own.
7. ^{urgent} We ~~want~~ your instruction.

W. A. Rostow

FYI. The trouble arose as follows:

- I told my man, from notes made on the Sequoia, that we were to get a draft statement; bring it to you; bring over Bunker; get in Bill Moyers; and organize a quick White House announcement.
- He and State were working off the scenario you cleared on the basis of our memo of September 2, which had this line: "We ought to let the Israelis know far enough in advance so they could make a parallel announcement of their man if they wanted."

SECRET

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-- Evron was told and shown the draft -- as a draft -- so that we could keep that part of the original scenario, even if we moved fast.

-- The fault was mine: I should have explicitly told my man to forget about keeping the Israelis in step on the basis of your new instruction. I was just as surprised as you at the news that Evron had been told.

W. W. R.

147
2 Pres file~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Friday
September 2, 1966
6:40 pm

SUBJECT: Timing Israeli Aid Moves

We have two actions that we could take almost any time in the next 2-5 weeks. The announcement of Bunker as desalting coordinator will attract considerable public attention. Release of the \$6 million left over from the FY 1963 loan for another power project will attract little. However, it would at least win credit with Feinberg and other Jewish leaders as a sympathetic special gesture.

Since Bunker's appointment is much more important, I would move that first. I would also like to get it out soon to cut the risk of a leak, which will increase now that Bunker is at work.

Feinberg suggested holding until after the New York Democratic gubernatorial candidate is chosen (September 7-8). He thought your possible visit to the Old Folks' Home 2 October might be a good time. I would shoot for about 15 September because I fear waiting too long. Bunker has no objection to this target.

We ought to let the Israelis know far enough in advance so they could make a parallel announcement of their man if they wanted. They will probably want a joint announcement. I'd like to stave off a hassle over that because separate announcements will cause less furor in the Arab countries. We do not want to bill this as the beginning of negotiations because that is not Bunker's job yet. Eban's idea was simply to appoint two trusted men to sort out this complex problem and bring our governments to the point of negotiation and decision.

If we were deciding on purely non-political grounds, I would suggest a White House press release rather than announcement in a speech. Since Bunker's job is to firm up our position and then to discuss unanswered questions with the Israelis, we don't want to pre-judge his recommendations by creating a public impression that you have appointed him to conclude negotiations. However, if you feel a speech announcement would better suit political requirements, I'm sure we could couch it in general enough terms to preserve Bunker's freedom and minimize Arab reaction. Also, announcing it in a speech would be one way of avoiding a joint release.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date *6-1-00*

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If you approve, I would tell Feinberg at the end of next week that we expect to announce about 15 September but haven't decided where or how yet. I will be guided by your feelings on whether you want to do this in a speech (which will determine the date) or a release. We would still have time to backwater if they have some constructive ideas.

I would recommend holding the \$6 million until after the Bunker announcement has settled, say about 10 October. The Israelis are not pushing hard, and we don't think another 4-5 weeks will do any damage.

W. W. Rostow

Approve your timetable ✓

White House press release on Bunker OK ✓

Prefer announcing it in a speech; look for a
suitable opening about 15 September

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~~SECRET~~

NO 1944/66
DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 1966
COPY NO

2

ARAB - ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY

1 SEPTEMBER 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUL 2003

PREPARED IN COOPERATION WITH
INR (DEPARTMENT OF STATE) AND DIA (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 174AC 14-105
By 4618 NARA, Date 09-10-2014

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
No. 1944/66
1 September 1966

ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY

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
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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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Map

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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1 September 1955

ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY

I. Introduction

A. This preliminary study presents quantitative and qualitative descriptions of armaments and military capabilities of the 13 Arab states and Israel. It examines five major categories of equipment--armor, artillery, aircraft, missiles and naval ships--as a basis for projecting the future requirements of these states and comparing their capabilities.

B. This study also attempts to measure with numerical relationships, the relative effectiveness of specific weapons in the hands of the forces considered and to evaluate the key factors of maintenance, logistics and training as they relate to overall item and force effectiveness. It is recognized that the ultimate determination of relative effectiveness for the same or comparable items of equipment in the hands of opposing forces lies in two areas not within the practicable province of this initial report. One is the complex area of war gaming which treats by tailored scenario a wide variety of situations which would determine the outcome of a conflict as well as force effectiveness in specific cases. The other is the more concrete but controversial technical evaluation--as opposed to description--of the relative effectiveness of Soviet vs Western and Western vs Western arms.

C. This paper consists, first, of a summary analysis of the main characteristics of real and potential antagonists in the Near East, including reflection of the patterns of Communist and Western military assistance. An assessment of the probable attitudes of arms suppliers, other than the US, during the period up to 1970 is appended. These texts serve to introduce the charts.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY

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D. Tables Ia, Ib, and Ic provide consolidated comparisons of the 1960, 1966, and projected 1970 inventories of the six major Arab States and Israel; it includes indications of the relative effectiveness of the individual and grouped forces. Tables II through VIII describe the 1960-1970 inventories of six major Arab States and Israel show how much of what type of equipment has been or is expected when and from where. Projected inventories include, as a guide to future strength ratios, estimates of when and why key items of equipment are expected to require replacement. The current inventories of the six major Arab States and Israel include an evaluation of the effectiveness of each item of equipment in the areas of maintenance, logistics, and training as well as an overall effectiveness factor. Table IX outlines the 1966 inventories of the remaining seven Arab States and the relative effectiveness of their forces.

II. Summary

A. Arab-Israeli Comparison

1. Israel retains qualitative superiority over any of the various combinations of Arab states with which it could be expected to come into direct conflict. In addition, Israel possesses the industrial capability to improve and alter armored vehicles and to rehabilitate aircraft. As shown in Table Ib, the six Arab states--UAR (Egypt), Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia--which are most likely to come into direct major hostilities with Israel have a two-to-one numerical superiority in tanks, three-to-one in major naval units, two-to-one in fighter aircraft and ten-to-one in bombers.

2. In armor, the Arab numerical superiority is offset by Israel's maintenance and training excellence as well as by factors of distance. For example, it is doubtful that Iraqi tanks could be sent across the Syrian desert quickly enough to play a meaningful role in conflict with Israel. This applies equally to self-propelled weapons.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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3. Whatever the comparable technical qualities of the aircraft flown, the Israelis' better training, greater aggressiveness and superior maintenance give them a good chance of coping with the Arab threat. The Israelis' limitations include the small number of airfields and the short scramble time available to its aircraft because of the fact that all parts of Israel are within a few minutes' flying time of its neighbors.

4. The accelerating arms race is involving both the Arabs and Israel in advanced weapons development, particularly in the missile field. The Israelis probably will be able to deploy a French-built surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 270 nautical miles by 1967-1968; the UAR may be able to deploy a few considerably less sophisticated missiles of slightly less range by 1970. Neither Egypt nor Israel is likely to have nuclear weapons by 1970.

5. The Egyptian Navy presents the only significant sea threat to Israel, which has taken the calculated risk of not building up a comparable naval force. The Israelis believe that their air power can neutralize the sea threat.

6. During the period through 1970, it is unlikely that any major change in procurement patterns will occur. Israel will continue to look to Western sources. The danger of Jordanian and Lebanese acquisition of Soviet-built weapons seems to have been averted for this period. Both Syria and Egypt will continue to rely on the USSR for their equipment. Although Iraq will acquire major items from the USSR under its May 1966 arms agreement, it will probably continue to procure some items--artillery and possibly aircraft--from Western sources.

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B. Country Analyses

1. Israel

a. By 1970, Israel will have more than enough armor--1,255 tanks--to equip its 28 brigades, most of which are now at cadre strength. Most of the tanks are modern and the Israelis are expected to increase their range and to upgun them. The Israelis are rated excellent* in maintenance, logistics and training and can be expected to retain their high standards.

b. The Israelis are reducing their heretofore heterogeneous mix of artillery and increasing its mobility. They have used their M-4 tanks as the chassis for the 155mm self-propelled howitzers. They will require new mortars, but they have a native capability to produce a 160mm model. New antiaircraft guns will have to be procured by 1970. The Israelis' proficiency in artillery is excellent, but their antiaircraft performance is only rated good.

c. Israel's acquisition of the US A4 Skyhawk will enhance its air capabilities as will the expected delivery of additional French Mirage IIIs. Tel Aviv can be expected to renew its quest for aircraft if and when it estimates that Arab receipt of newer Soviet aircraft puts it at a disadvantage. Israeli airmanship in all fields is expected to remain excellent.

d. Israel's anticipated receipt of the French-made MD 620 surface-to-surface missile will put it ahead of the Arabs in the missile field, unless the Soviets agree to provide the latter with SSMs. At the present time the Israelis' proficiency in the Hawk surface-to-air system is rated only good.

* Discussion of the terms "excellent," "good," etc. appears in Section IV below.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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2. UAR (Egypt)

a. Egypt will continue to have the largest and best equipped forces in the Arab world with the USSR as its supplier. Western armor is expected to be largely phased out by 1970. By that time, more modern Soviet tanks, including the T-54, T-55 and possibly newer models, will have replaced the T-34s first acquired in 1955. Egyptian logistic, maintenance and training proficiency is below that of the Israelis but is still rated good.

b. The Egyptians have a wide variety of Soviet artillery, some of which will require replacement by 1970. Their proficiency is rated good to excellent in artillery.

c. The Egyptian Air Force has steadily improved since it began to receive Soviet aircraft in the mid-1950s. The Soviets have replaced the obsolescent MIG-15 (FAGOT) and MIG-17 (FRESCO) jet fighters with MIG-21 (FISHBED) aircraft and Egypt is soon to obtain SU-7 (FITTER) tactical fighters which will increase its ground support capability. Pilot proficiency and maintenance capabilities in the air force have increased considerably during the last few years and are steadily improving. The overall effectiveness rating shown on Table III reflects inadequate training and maintenance on recently acquired, more sophisticated aircraft and weapons. The air force has achieved a high serviceability rate in Yemen despite a considerable logistic problem, primitive working conditions, and long communication lines. Most of the air and ground crews have had at least one tour of duty in Yemen.

d. The Egyptians have had problems with their native production of surface-to-surface missiles and are not expected to have many operational by 1970.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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e. The Soviets are replacing naval vessels, and the Egyptian Navy, in spite of its relatively poor proficiency, will continue to be the largest Arab naval force with clear numerical superiority over the Israelis. Capabilities of the navy have improved; however, the "SKORYY" class destroyers and most of the "W" class submarines are old and spares for these ships are difficult to acquire. Until these ships are replaced the navy will continue to have a limited effectiveness.

3. Syria

a. As a whole, the Syrian forces have only a fair to good effective factor. They may receive new materiel from the USSR but their capabilities are not expected to improve materially not only because of poor standards in training, logistics and maintenance but also because of the preoccupation of their officers with political affairs.

b. Their overall effectiveness in artillery is rated only fair. Because of the favorable terrain, however, the Syrians have the tactical advantage along the Israeli frontier and have inflicted damage to border settlements from emplaced artillery positions.

c. Losses suffered in engagements with the Israelis during the summer of 1966, reflect the poor capabilities of the Syrian air force.

d. Although the Syrian navy may acquire additional Komar guided missile patrol boats, its capabilities are poor and it does not pose a serious threat.

4. Iraq

a. Combat experience in the Kurdish conflict has not materially improved the capabilities of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Their overall effectiveness is considered no better than good, and, as previously noted, the geographical separation of Iraq from Israel would preclude Iraq from providing little more than token support to the other Arab states.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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b. Iraq has both Soviet and British tanks; of the latter only the Centurions are expected to remain in inventory by 1970. The 105 T-55 medium tanks recently ordered from the USSR are expected to replace obsolescent tanks.

c. Artillery is of Soviet, US and UK manufacture. It is probable that the Iraqis will acquire most of their artillery from the Soviets in the future, but some heavier pieces may be sought from Western sources.

d. The May 1966 arms agreement provides for a sizable increase in the air force by 1970. It calls for delivery of 17 more MIG-21 FL all-weather fighters and 34 SU-7s by 1969. The receipt of these aircraft will considerably improve the capability of the air force although it will encounter difficult training, morale and maintenance problems.

e. The delivery of eight minesweepers, one subchaser and eight guided missile patrol boats which is to begin in 1967 and to be completed by 1970, will in effect create a new Iraqi naval force in the Persian Gulf. The receipt of these ships will cause concern among Iraq's neighbors in the Gulf. Iran in particular will increase its already extensive efforts to obtain naval as well as air equipment.

5. Jordan

a. Jordan has the best trained Arab force. The receipt of modern US tanks will increase the size and materially improve the quality of the armored force. New artillery has been acquired from the West.

b. At the present time, the air force has well-trained pilots and with the receipt of US F-104 fighters it will become an effective though small force. With a total of three fighter squadrons, it will be able to perform ground-support missions.

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6. Saudi Arabia

a. Saudi Arabia is in the process of establishing professional, career forces but will continue to encounter serious organizational and training problems. Its traditional tribal armies remain an effective internal force.

b. The small armored force is to receive light and medium tanks from the US by 1970. Should the government decide further to increase this force, it will seek equipment from other Western sources. Whatever the size of the force, its training, maintenance and logistic standards will remain poor.

c. Saudi Arabia probably will try to procure heavier artillery than it now has, but considerable time would be required to develop proficiency.

d. The US-UK aid defense package of 1965 provides for the upgrading of the air force, but the Saudis will have to depend on foreign assistance in all fields--operations, training, maintenance and logistics--for some time to come. This also applies to surface-to-air missiles.

e. Saudi Arabia is planning to establish a naval force in the Persian Gulf. This force probably will have only a limited coastal defense capability.

7. Lebanon

a. The small but well-trained Lebanese forces will improve considerably with the anticipated delivery of new tanks, artillery and aircraft.

b. By 1970, the armored force will have more light tanks, presumably US M-41s, and still have operable British tanks. Although the Communist countries apparently are willing to provide materiel, Lebanon prefers Western equipment.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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c. Artillery holdings will be increased by delivery of US and Swiss guns. The Lebanese effectiveness factor in both the armored and artillery fields is variable.

d. Proficiency in the Hawker Hunter is good but the small air force has only a limited capability, which will improve somewhat with the expected receipt of a squadron of French Mirage IIIs by 1969.

e. Lebanon is negotiating for US Hawk surface-to-air missiles. If supplied, they would not become operational before 1970.

8. Other Arab States

a. Detailed information on the other seven members of the Arab League--Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Kuwait and Yemen--has not been provided since they would probably be only indirectly involved in an Arab-Israeli conflict. They have been involved in local disputes, such as the latent Algerian-Moroccan feud, and would be unlikely to send major forces to an Israeli front.

b. Algeria has the largest forces of the seven countries considered and the Soviet Union appears willing to continue to be its supplier. Yemen also has Communist equipment but its forces are ineffective and will require considerable training and support from foreign sources. The other five countries all depend primarily on Western sources and there is little likelihood that this situation will change in the foreseeable future.

III. Likely actions of arms suppliers (other than the US) to the Near East in the next five years.

A. Communist Positions

1. The USSR is likely to remain the principal arms supplier to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The Soviets probably believe that their military aid program has brought them major benefits--some political leverage, considerable prestige, and a visible weakening of Western influence and presence throughout

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the area. So long as Nasir remains in power and attempts to eliminate the special Western position in the area, the Soviets are unlikely to discontinue their program of build-up and maintenance of Egypt's military forces. Rather, they are likely to continue to provide Cairo with substantial quantities of equipment, including planes, tanks, SAMs, and submarines. On the other hand, we do not believe that the USSR will reverse its long standing policy of refusing to provide either nuclear weapons or strategic missile systems.

2. The Soviets will also probably provide arms to other Arab regimes which they consider friendly. However, the flow of arms to such countries as Syria and Iraq is likely to be affected by the degree to which their policies are acceptable to the USSR. In the past the Soviets have used slowdowns or cutoffs in deliveries and delays in negotiating supplementary agreements to express displeasure at policies of which they disapproved, and they would probably do so again. Moreover, the Soviets will probably offer, from time to time, to supply arms to Western-oriented and newly independent Arab regimes, both to gain an entree now largely denied them, and to weaken the Western position in those states. Large-scale Soviet military aid to very conservative Arab monarchies such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia will remain unlikely, however. Arab states such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to accept arms from the USSR as long as they remain oriented toward the West and can get them from that quarter.

3. Communist China is unlikely to become a significant military supplier in the Near East in this period. It will probably provide token amounts of arms aid and training to such entities as the Palestine Liberation Army. However, severe inhibitions including requirements in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, prior commitments of considerable military aid to Pakistan, and domestic shortages of most advanced military equipment will serve to keep China from becoming a major arms supplier in the area.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY
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B. Western Positions

1. Unlike the leaders of the Fourth Republic, President De Gaulle does not publicly emphasize French backing and support of Israel. However, he has not abandoned France's policy of liberally supplying the Israeli armed forces. Nor is he likely to do so; rather, France probably will continue to be Israel's principal source of military equipment. In particular, France will continue to sell Israel short-range missiles, supersonic aircraft, and other types of highly sophisticated military hardware.

2. However, there are limits beyond which France is not likely to go. We do not believe that France will provide Israel with nuclear weapons. Though French sales of arms and aircraft to Israel will be considerable, they are unlikely so to satisfy Tel Aviv as to lead it to seek no further arms from any other source. There appears little likelihood of France becoming a significant supplier of arms to any of the Arab states, but there may be some token sales.


3. The UK is likely to continue to be a significant supplier of arms to those Arab countries, e.g. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Libya, with which it has close ties. It is also likely to sell spare parts, maintenance and some new equipment to such countries as Iraq which were formerly supplied completely by the UK. London is also likely to sell some equipment to the Israelis. In all the above cases, the UK will probably coordinate its arms supply policies closely with the US.

4. Other Western countries are not expected to become major suppliers during the period of this study.

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PAGES 12 THROUGH 36 HAVE BEEN WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY UNDER
SECTIONS 3.3(b)(1) AND 6.2(c) OF E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED 2003.

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 9, 1966

SUBJECT: Ambassador Harman's Call on Mr. Walt Rostow
4:30 p.m. 8 December 1966

Ambassador Harman began his presentation by recalling that on November 22 Ambassador Barbour had mentioned to Foreign Minister Eban that the US would send a quick impact shipment of military equipment to Jordan. Later Ambassador Harman had been informed here of the general content of that package. Israel had not reacted at that point because it understood our objective. This week, however, Ambassador Harman had learned "from his own sources" that the Jordanian chief of staff is in town and that we are contemplating additional military equipment for Jordan. He had tried to get details from State but had not been given them.

When he is left in the dark like this, he said, he necessarily begins to speculate about what he does not know. He recalled, for instance, that during the Komer negotiations in 1965 Komer had mentioned 100 tanks for Jordan in the new sales deal but had not mentioned the 100 already included in the military assistance program. So any talk of a new package about which he is kept in the dark makes him uneasy. He could not help but feel that any package we might put together would seriously affect the military balance between Israel and Jordan and he wanted us to know of his government's grave reservations about it.

Mr. Rostow responded by pointing out in general that we had to face a very serious situation in Jordan created by the Israeli raid of 13 November. He said he had not seen the details of the package we are considering for Jordan and therefore could not obviously convey them to Harman. However, he could explain the elements which will go into our decision:

--The King depends on his military for the stability of his regime. The military has been deeply disillusioned and humiliated as a result of the Israeli raid. Whatever we do must be geared primarily to helping the King maintain the loyalty of his army.

--Anything we do will be designed to do the least possible damage to Jordan's promising economic development program.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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By CB, NARA Date 10-27-00

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--Our package will also be designed to help the King improve his capacity to police the borders.

--We are fully aware of Israel's concerns about the military balance--they are ours, too--and will have them very much in mind.

Ambassador Harman responded by saying that he was afraid this military package would have somewhat the same effect as the UN Security Council vote in New York. It would encourage the Arab side to think that it could further hem in Israel by terrorism and the fruits of terrorist raids.

Mr. Rostow said he did not feel the Israeli government fully appreciated the extent to which its raid was a traumatic experience for Jordan. He said as he had watched the cables over the past few weeks he was deeply aware of how close the King had come to losing his position. While it was easy for Harman and the Israeli government to say that Jordan had no choice but to turn to us for help, Mr. Rostow said he was not at all sure that the King would not turn to the Soviets for help in the last analysis.

The interview ended with Mr. Rostow's assurance that he understood the Israelis' message and that their concerns would be taken into account.

Harold H. Saunders
Harold H. Saunders

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