

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 4

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
011	cable	Amman 1878 <i>sanitized 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	2	1/29/67	A
012a	memo	Memo of Agreement (dup. #91a and #91c) <i>OPEN 57-06</i>	S	1	1/9/67	A
014	cable	Amman 1841 <i>Exempt 10-4-02 NLJ/RAC 02-42</i>	S	2	1/25/67	A
016	cable	Amman 1807 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	2	1/21/67	A
020	cable	Amman 1735 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	3	1/16/67	A
021	cable	Amman 1711 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	3	1/11/67	A
024	cable	Amman 1683 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	2	1/9/67	A
025	cable	Amman 1651 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	4	1/3/67	A
026	cable	Amman 1650 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	7	1/3/67	A
028	cable	Amman 1627 <i>OPEN 8/7/02 NLJ/RAC 02-43</i>	S	1	12/29/66	A
030	cable	Amman 1577 <i>OPEN 8/7/02 NLJ/RAC 02-43</i>	S	2	12/22/66	A
033	cable	Amman 1569 <i>OPEN 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	2	12/22/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Vol. III

Box Number 146

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12958 governing access to national security information.
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Page 2 of 4

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
035	cable	Amman 1560 open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	S	3	12/20/66	A
036	cable	Amman 1538 open 8/7/02 NJT/RAL 02-43	S	2	12/19/66	A
040	cable	Amman 1458 open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	S	7	12/11/66	A
041	cable	Amman 1415 (sanitized 4/22/03 NJT/RAL 02-42)	S	4	12/6/66	A
044	cable	Amman 1367 (sanitized 4/22/03 NJT/RAL 02-42)	S	3	12/3/66	A
045	cable	Jerusalem 497 open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	C	3	12/24/66	A
046e	cable	Amman 3612 open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	S	4	5/18/67	A
051	cable	State 122794 to Amman (sanitized 4/22/03 NJT/RAL 02-42)	S	2	1/20/67	A
052	cable	State 118950 to Amman open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	S	2	1/16/67	A
053	cable	State 118733 to Amman (sanitized per NJT/RAL 02-43 8/7/02)	S	2	1/13/67	A
054	cable	State 118159 to Amman open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	S	2	1/13/67	A
055	cable	State 114665 to Amman open 12-30-02 NW 02-60	S	4	1/7/67	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
060	cable	State 106795 to Amman- <i>open 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	2	12/21/66	A
079	cable	CAP 661244- <i>open 4/22/03 NLJ 02-61</i>	S	3	12/17/66	A
080	cable	CAP 661155 (dup., #81)- <i>open 4/22/03 NLJ 02-61</i>	S	3	12/3/66	A
081	cable	dup., #80- <i>open 4/22/03 NLJ 02-61</i>	S	3	12/3/66	A
085	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 10-99, NLJ 001-146-3-9 <i>Same sanitization 7-20-04 NW/RAC 02-45</i>	S	4	12/24/66	A
086	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 10-99, NLJ 001-146-3-10 <i>Same sanitization 7-20-04 NW/RAC 02-45</i>	S	3	12/29/66	A
091a	memo	dup., #12a and #91c- <i>open 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60</i>	S	1	1/9/67	A
091c	memo	dup., #12a and #91a <i>open 3-7-00</i>	S	1	1/9/67	A
092	memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Sanitized 7-20-04 NW/RAC 02-45</i>	S	9	1/17/67	A
093	memo	Intelligence Memorandum - Sanitized, 10/99, NLJ 001-146-3-12 <i>Sanitized 7-20-04 NW/RAC 02-45</i>	S	7	1/6/66	A
101	note	to Walt Rostow <i>Sanitized 7-20-04 NW/RAC 02-45</i>	PCI	1	12/14/66	A
101a	memo	Intelligence Memorandum - Sanitized, 10/99, NLJ 001-146-3-15 <i>Same sanitization 7-20-04 NW/RAC 02-45</i>	S	11	12/13/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
111a	cable	Amman 1545	S	4	12/20/67	A

open 12-30-02 NLJ 02-60

Collection Title National Security File, Country File**Folder Title** Jordan, Vol. III**Box Number** 146

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3497A 1331015
ZNY SSSSS
R 131000Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/ SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMGU/ AMEMBASSY ANKARA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3497

013510

1967 MAY 13 AM 6 56

2

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3157

1. PURSUANT HIS CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH ON APRIL 20 REPORTED PARA 2 REFTTEL, AMBASSADOR HAS NOW RECEIVED A NOTE FROM KHAMMASH DATED MAY 11 WHICH REPORTS HIS FOLLOW-UP CORRESPONDENCE WITH JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA, MAJOR GENERAL MAHIR, ON SUBJECT REFTTEL.
2. CORRESPONDENCE RECALLS THAT, AS SPECULATED IN PARA 4 REFTTEL, MAHIR'S DEMARCHE REPORTED ANKARA'S 5048 WAS IN FACT A FOLLOW-UP TO REQUEST PUT TO THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN JANUARY FOR PERMISSION FOR JORDANIAN AIR FORCE C-47 TO OVERFLY TURKISH AIR SPACE AND LAND AT INCIRLIK FOR PERIOD OF ONE YEAR BEGINNING JANUARY 15. MAHIR DESCRIBES KHAMMASH'S LETTER TO HIM AS HAVING "EXPLAINED THE CONFUSION."
3. BELIEVE WE CAN CONSIDER MATTER CLOSED. GP-3. BURNS
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH 2

~~SECRET~~

3

Action

SS

Info

VZCTCQMA541VV KGA792
RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3489A 1311814
ZNY SSSSS
R 111655Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

011848

1967 MAY 12 AM 3 00

02

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3489

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3488

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES

SUBJ: SYRIAN MILITARY EXILES IN JORDAN

1. DEPT WILL RECALL THE UNEASINESS WITH WHICH THE PROPOSAL FOR MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE GOJ IN CONNECTION WITH ITS PLANS FOR THE SYRIAN MILITARY EXILES WAS RECEIVED LAST OCTOBER (AMMAN 772, PARA 5).

2. I BELIEVE THAT BY MAINTAINING THIS CONTACT, WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH EMBOFF O'CONNELL, WE HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN HELPING PERSUADE THE JORDANIANS TO BACK AWAY FROM WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN AN EXTREMELY MESSY INVOLVEMENT IN SYRIAN AFFAIRS. SINCE LAST OCTOBER O'CONNELL HAS LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO VARIOUS GOJ LEADERS' PLANS FOR AND PROBLEMS WITH THE SYRIANS WHILE DEFTLY BUT CONSISTENTLY PLANTING THE SEEDS OF DOUBT ON THE WISDOM OF JORDAN'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE EXILES.

3. I HIGHLY COMMENT O'CONNELL FOR A DELICATE TASK WELL DONE.

GP-3 BURNS

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By ROHL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

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~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

40
Action

SS

Info

VV QMA481VV KGA014

PP RUEHC

DE RUQMG 3157A GQQQQWWP

ZNY SSSSS

D 211200Z APR 67

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3157

E X D I S

REF: ANKARA 5049; STATE 178508; ANKARA 5097

1. SINCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY ARE JORDANIAN HOLIDAYS AND GOV OFFICIALS ARE SCARCE, IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FROM HERE TO UNRAVEL AMBASSADOR MAHER'S REPRESENTATIONS TO GOT.

1. I MANAGED TO GET HOLD OF CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. IF ANYONE KNEW ABOUT THE MATTER HE SHOULD, AND HE SAID HE WAS TOTALLY IN THE DARK.

3. THIS MORNING I LOCATED FOMIN SALAH AT HIS HOME. KHAMMASH HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SALAH TO ASK WHAT HE KNEW ABOUT WHAT AMBASSADOR MAHER WAS DOING. SALAH WAS ALSO IN THE DARK. SALAH AGREED TO SEND AN URGENT TELEGRAM TODAY TO AMBASSADOR MAHER IN ANKARA STATING THAT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT NECESSARY FOR AMBASSADOR MAHER TO PURSUE THE MATTER OF F-104 SUPPORT FURTHER WITH GOT AND THAT HE SHOULD DESIST FROM FURTHER ACTION. I

PAGE TWO RUQMG 3157 ~~SECRET~~

TOLD SALAH I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE MAHER WAS NOT ACTING ON AN INSTRUCTION GIVEN HIM FROM AMMAN LONG AGO AND NOW FORGOTTEN. I DID NOT REPEAT NOT DIVULGE THE FYI SECTIONS OF ANKARA'S 5097.

A. IN VIEW OF ANKARA'S 5097, COULD IT BE THAT AMBASSADOR MAHER WAS ACTING ON AN INSTRUCTION WHICH AMMAN MIGHT HAVE SENT HIM LAST JANUARY WHEN CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO HAVING A JORDANIAN PLANE SUPPLY COLLEGE RUN (SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, STATE 118532, JANUARY 14 ?

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/AL NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

021255
1967 APR 21 AM 8501

2

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 3157, APRIL 21

5. NEXT FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH, DRAFTED BY COLONEL STARNES, CO IN JORDAN OF COLLEGE RUN, PROVIDES HANDY SUMMARY OF HOW F-234 PARTS ARE NOW SUPPLIED TO COLLEGE RUN.

6. NO STOCK OF F-104 SPARE PARTS IS MAINTAINED AT INCIRLIK. ONLY F-104 PARTS SUPPORT CURRENTLY FLOWING THROUGH TURKEY FOR COLLEGE RUN IS FROM CONUS SUPPLY DEPOTS. SINCE SYRIA ON APRIL 1 DID NOT RENEW THE OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES FOR SCHEDULED WEEKLY USAF SUPPORT FLIGHTS TO JORDAN, ETHIOPIA AND SAUDI ARABIA, REROUTING VIA IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WAS REQUIRED. USAF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WITH F-104 PARTS NORMALLY ARRIVES INCIRLIK FOR REFUELING AND DEPARTS VIA OVERFLIGHT OF IRAN AND LANDS DHAHRAN, AS REQUIRED BY NOT PRIOR TO COMING HERE.

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3157 S E C R E T
SOME SUPPORT ITEMS SUCH AS FOOD FOR COLLEGE RUN PERSONNEL AND LIQUID OXYGEN ARE AIRLIFTED FROM USAF RESOURCES AT INCIRLIK ON THE SAME FLIGHT. COLLEGE RUN SUPPORT PERSONNEL ARE ROTATED FROM EUROPE IN THE SAME MANNER.

7. INCIDENTALLY, WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY LEBANESE RESTRICTION ON OVERFLIGHTS AIRCRAFT DESIGNED JORDAN. CURRENT ROUTING OF COLLEGE RUN SUPPORT FLIGHT FROM INCIRLIK VIA IRAN AND DHAHRAN NECESSITATED BY SYRIAN HOLDUP ON PERMISSION FOR SCHEDULED WEEKLY OVERFLIGHTS AND NOT BY ANY LEBANESE RESTRICTIONS.

Gp-3

BURNS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

NNNWZCZCMA 973VV KGA727

PPRUEHC

DE RUQMKG 2568A 07R1205

ZNY TTTT

P 191129Z MAR 67

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUQML/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ AMMAN 2568

NODIS

REF: AMMAN-S 2566

A RE-READING OF OUR TEL 1457 OF DECEMBER 11 EXPLAINS
HUSSEIN-S CONTINUING DISILLUSIONMENT RE ISRAELI INTENTIONS.

GP-2. BURNS

BT

018925
1967 MAR 19 AM 8.12

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RGDL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

RIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEF 19-8 US-Jordan

AIRGRAM

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R REP AF

ARA EUR FE

NEA CU INR

E P IO

L FBO AID

AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

A-307

~~SECRET~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXDIS

FOR ATTENTION OF ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER FOR TREATY AFFAIRS

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: March 2, 1967

SUBJECT : Memorandums of agreement regarding F-104 aircraft and privileges and immunities

REF : Department's A-21, January 31, 1967

As requested in the referenced airgram, enclosed are the signed originals of the memorandum of understanding signed January 9, 1967 and the memorandum of agreement signed January 24, 1967.

BURNS

Enclosures:

as stated above.

opens copy with and
send to S/S via tube
3/7/67
under
script
PS 470906

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RG/L, NARA, Date 7-13-01

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:R Murphy:af 2/28/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM:JW Adams

Clearances:

~~SECRET~~

1967 MAR 7 PM 2 59

COPY FLO-PBR

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

1967 FEB 22 AM 2 354

10
Action

SS
Info

DEKVZCZCQMA769KGA608
RR RUEHC RUEIVCR
DE RUQMKG 307A 0521703
ZNY SSSSS
R 211636Z FEB 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQVDA/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2137

L I M D I S

1. PRIME MINISTER TELL TOLD AMBASSADOR FEBRUARY 21 THAT GOJ BELIEVED IT HAD A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF RECEIVING KUWAITI ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR DAM CONSTRUCTION. HE DOUBTED GOK WOULD BE WILLING

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 307A ~~SECRET~~
TO HELP FINANCE JORDAN'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT PURCHASES.

2. TELL ALSO COMMENTED THAT IT LOOKED AS IF SAG WOULD PROVIDE CONTINUING AID TO THOSE PROJECTS INITIATED BY THE ARAB SUMMITS. HE NOTED THAT THE JORDANIANS, DURING THE KING'S VISIT TO RIYADH, DID NOT DWELL ON THEIR NEED FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR KHALED (MUKHEIBEH) DAM, PREFERRING TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR MILITARY BUDGET NEEDS. IN ANY CASE, THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED, THE GOJ DID NOT FACE IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH BUILDING THE DAM; IT HAD ENOUGH MONEY IN HAND FOR ANOTHER YEARS WORK.

3. TELL STATED THAT THE ASSISTANCE PLEDGED BY QATAR, BAHREIN AND ABU DHABI HAD NOW BEEN RECEIVED IN FULL AND THE SAUDI CONTRIBUTION WAS EXPECTED SHORTLY. HE CONFIRMED ALL THE FIGURES WHICH COURT MINISTER JUMA HAD GIVEN CHARGE FEBRUARY 16. (AMMAN 2076).

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2- Amman 2137, 211636Z February 67

4. TELL DID NOT APPEAR OPTIMISTIC THAT QATAR, BAHREIN AND ABU DHABI COULD BE RELIED UPON FOR CONTINUING CONTRIBUTIONS.

5. LOCAL PRESS HAS NOW PUBLISHED SUMS RECEIVED FROM BAHREIN, QATAR AND ABU DHABI, WHILE ONE PAPER REPORTED FEBRUARY 20 THAT SAG HAD PLEDGED BETWEEN 4 AND 4.5 MILLION DINARS TO GOJ TO FINANCE SUMMIT CONFERENCE PROJECTS.

GP-3. BURNS

BT

SECRET

INCOMING TELETYPE DEPARTMENT 21916

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1

11

~~SECRET~~

Action

SS

Info

NNNNVZCZCQMA771XGA609
RR RUEHC RUEIVCR
DE RUQMG 305A 0521650
ZNY SSSSS R 211622Z FEB 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2135

020033
1967 FEB 22 AM 2 15

L I M D I S

SUBJ: GOJ-LIBYAN RELATIONS

1. PRIME MINISTER TELL TOLD AMBASSADOR FEB 21 THAT GOJ NOW HAD BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MANEUVERING BEHIND GOL REQUEST THAT HUSSEIN POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO LIBYA. GOJ HAS LEARNED THAT KING IDRIS HAD WISHED HUSSEIN VISIT TO OCCUR AS SCHEDULED

PAGE 2 RUQMG 305A ~~SECRET~~
BUT HAD BEEN OPPOSED BY LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER. LATTER, WHO NOT UNFRIENDLY TO JORDAN, SPOKE FOR THOSE IN GOL WHO WERE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT ADVERSE UAR REACTION SHOULD HUSSEIN VISIT LIBYA.

2. TELL STATED THAT GOJ WOULD SHORTLY SEND A LETTER TO THE GOL BY SPECIAL EMISSARY DETAILING JORDAN'S FINANCIAL STRAIGHTS. AMBASSADOR INQUIRED HOW MUCH AID JORDAN HOPED TO RECEIVE FROM LIBYA. TELL REPLIED THAT THE GOJ HAD NO CLEAR IDEA WHAT IT COULD EXPECT FROM THE LIBYANS AND SAID IT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY ASSISTANCE.

GP-3. BURNS
BT

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/LJ, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

8

2

Action

QMA 742 KGA 195

PP RUEHC

DE RUQMG 189A 0451500

ZNY CCCCC

Info

P R 141447Z FEB 67

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN-CORRECTED COPY

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

INFO RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 2045

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

REF: STATE 135803, TEL AVIV 2659

SUBJECT: JORDAN PUBLICITY PHOTOS OF AIRLIFT

1. WE DO NOT YET HAVE COPY OF 12 FEB. ISRAELI JERUSALEM POST, BUT HAVE EXAMINED ALL SIMILAR PHOTOS THAT APPEARED IN LOCAL PRESS SAME DATE WHICH INCIDENTALLY ARE ONLY PHOTOGRAPHS OF AIRLIFT WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN JORDANIAN PRESS TO DATE. ALL PHOTOS SHOW TWO US M-42-A1 TWIN 40MM SP AAA GUNS; ONE BEING OFFLOADED AND ONE PARKED BESIDE AIRCRAFT. BEIRUT DAILY STAR PHOTO 12 FEB. IS AP WIREPHOTO WHICH WE ASSUME IDENTICAL TO PHOTO CARRIED IN ISRAELI JERUSALEM POST.

2. CAPTION BELOW BEIRUT WIREPHOTO STATES JORDANIAN SOLDIER

PAGE 2 RUQMG 189A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EMERGES WITH A TANK FROM AN AMERICAN PLANE AT AMMAN AIRPORT. ARABIC CAPTION EBELOW SIMILAR PICTURE IN JORDAN PAPER READS "JORDANIAN OFFICERS INSPECT HEAVY WEAPONS ARRIVING IN JORDAN FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY AIR PRIOR TO OFFICIAL RECEIPT."

3. NO RPT NO TANKS INCLUDED IN THIS AIRLIFT, AND WE CAN CONFIRM FROM COMPETENT US ARMY EYE WITNESSES PRESENT AT ALL OFF LOADINGS THAT NO REPEAT NO TANKS OF ANY TYPE HAVE BEEN ANYWHERE NEAR AMMAN AIRPORT WHERE OFF LOADING HAS TAKEN PLACE.

4. DURING RECENT WEEKS ONLY THREE TYPES ARMORED VEHICLES HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

CORRECTION ISSUED:

2:45 A.M., 2/15/67

KGG

12491

FEBRUARY 14, 1967

12:54 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- AMMAN 2045, FEBRUARY 14

BEEN OFF LOADED FROM AIRCRAFT AT AMMAN AIRPORT INCLUDING ABOVE MENTIONED 40MM SP AAA GUNS, M-113 APC'S, AND M-52 105MM SP HOWITZERS.

5. WITHOUT EXAMINING REFERENCE PICTURE, WE UNABLE DETERMINE POSSIBILITY THAT PHOTO DELIBERATELY DOCTORED TO SHOW TANK, HOWEVER REPEAT THAT ALL PHOTOS APPEARING IN ARAB PRESS SHOW TWO 40MM SP AAA GUNS.

6. INFORMATION CONTAINED PARA. 4 IS NOFORN.

GP-3. ADAMS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

9

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

QMA 742 KGA 195

PP RUEHC

DE RUQMKG 189A 0451500

ZNY CCCCC

P R 141447Z FEB 67

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUQMVU/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

INFO RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 2045

12491

FEBRUARY 14, 1967

12:54 P.M.

2

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

REF: STATE 135803, TEL AVIV 2659

SUBJECT: JORDAN PUBLICITY PHOTOS OF AIRLIFT

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2. CAPTION BELOW BEIRUT WIREPHOTO STATES JORDANIAN SOLDIER

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 189A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EMERGES WITH A TANK FROM AN AMERICAN PLANE AT AMMAN AIRPORT. ARABIC CAPTION EBELOW SIMILAR PICTURE IN JORDAN PAPER READS "JORDANIAN OFFICERS INSPECT HEAVY WEAPONS ARRIVING IN JORDAN FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY AIR PRIOR TO OFFICIAL RECEIPT."

3. NO RPT NO TANKS INCLUDED IN THIS AIRLIFT, AND WE CAN CONFIRM FROM COMPETENT US ARMY EYE WITNESSES PRESENT AT ALL OFF LOADINGS THAT NO REPEAT NO TANKS OF ANY TYPE HAVE BEEN ANYWHERE NEAR AMMAN AIRPORT WHERE OFF LOADING HAS TAKEN PLACE.

4. DURING RECENT WEEKS ONLY THREE TYPES ARMORED VEHICLES HAVE

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/L, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- AMMAN 2045, FEBRUARY 14

BEEN OFF LOADED FROM AIRCRAFT AT AMMAN AIRPORT INCLUDING ABOVE MENTIONED 40MM SP AAA GUNS, N-713 APCJJSJN* AND M-52 105MM SP HOWITZERS.

5. WITHOUT EXAMINING REFERENCE PICTURE, WE UNABLE DETERMINE POSSIBILITY THAT PHOTO DELIBERATELY DOCTORED TO SHOW TANK, HOWEVER REPEAT THAT ALL PHOTOS APPEARING IN ALAZ*PRESS SHOW TWO 40MM SP AAA GUNS.

6. INFORMATION CONTAINED PARA. 4 IS NOFORN.

GP-3. ADAMS
BT

* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELETYPE Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

10

41
Action

88
Info

~~SECRET~~

024786

1967 JAN 29 AM 7 21

RR RUEDPSA RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 291A 0291040
ZNY SSSSS
R 290950Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUQML/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1808

002

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DATT/USIS MESSAGE

REF STATE 126458 NOTAL, AMMAN 1808

COLLEGE RUN

1. IN LIGHT AMBASSADOR HARMON'S COMMENT ON PUBLICITY PARA 3 STATE 126458, WE WISH TO CONFIRM THAT LOCAL PUBLICITY BEING ACCORDED THE U.S. AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO JORDAN HAS BEEN TO DATE MINIMAL. THERE HAVE BEEN NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF EQUIPMENT AND NO EDITORIAL COMMENT PERTAINING TO SHIPMENTS.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO PRESS PUBLICITY OF ANY KIND SINCE JAN 21. ARTICLES APPEARED IN ALL PAPERS JAN 20 AND 21 (AMMAN 1808) GIVING BRIEF FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF ARRIVAL OF FIRST SHIPMENTS. PRESS ALSO REPORTED AT THAT TIME THAT THESE SHIPMENTS WOULD

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 291A ~~SECRET~~
CONTINUE UNTIL LATE FEBRUARY.

3. WE DO NOT EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOJ WILL ALLOW THE ARRIVAL OF THE F-104'S TO GO UNNOTICED HERE.

GP-3. ADAMS

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

11

~~SECRET~~

3

Action

SS

Info

VZCZCQMA489VV KGA392
RR RUEHC RUDHDT
DE RUQMKG 289A 0291020
ZNY SSSSS
R 290940Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
BT

024784

1967 JAN 29 AM 7 12

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1878

EXDIS

STATE'S 123171, TEL AVIV 2316, AMMAN 1716

1. IN COURSE OF MEETING WITH KING JANUARY 27, EMBOFF
DESCRIBED ISRAELI PROPOSALS AS OUTLINED TEL AVIV 2316.

2. KING LISTENED CAREFULLY TO PRESENTATION. AT CONCLU-
SION HE COMMENTED THOUGHTFULLY THAT WHILE HE IS AS
ANXIOUS AS ANYONE ELSE TO ADOPT ANY IMPROVEMENT OF
PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY
ALONG THE BORDER, THIS COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED AGAINST
A BACKGROUND OF RELATIVE MUTUEL TRUST AND SINCERITY.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 289A ~~SECRET~~

THIS, HE COMMENTED, WAS HARDLY POSSIBLE WITHIN TWO MONTHS
OF SAMU'. FOR THIS REASON HE CONSIDERED THE ISRAELI
PROPOSALS UNREFLECTIVE AND ILL-TIMED. HE DID NOT DISCOUNT
THE FACT THAT MUTUALLY AGREED IMPROVEMENTS IN MAC PRO-
CEDURES MIGHT BE DESIRABLE AND POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE
BUT THIS COULD ONLY BE AFTER THE ISSUE HAD BEEN REMOVED
FROM THE FRONT PAGE AND A QUOTE SATISFACTORY RECORD
UNQUOTE OF ISRAELI GOOD INTENTIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.
IF, THE KING REMARKED, THE ISRAELIS HAD SOMETHING LIKE
THIS IN MIND, QUOTE THEY SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT IT
BEFORE DREAMING UP SAMU' UNQUOTE.

3. THE KING NOTED THAT JORDAN HAD PROMPTLY ACCEPTED THE
SYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING UNTSO WHICH
AMBASSADOR BURNS HAD RAISED WITH PRIME MINISTER TELL.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By us, NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1878, 290940Z JAN 67

THE USRAELIS, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, HAD NOT. THIS, HE CONSIDERED, WAS THE FIRST STEP ALONG THE ROAD THE ISRAELIS HAD IN MIND.

4. HUSSEIN COMMENTED SPECIFICALLY ON ONLY TWO POINTS IN THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL: (A) [REDACTED]

3.4

(b)

(1,6)

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 289A-~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (B) DIRECT TELEPHONIC CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS. REGARDING THE FORMER, HUSSEIN SAID THIS WAS AN QUOTE OLD SAW UNQUOTE WITH THE ISRAELIS [REDACTED]

3.4

(b)

(1,6)

[REDACTED] REGARDING A TELEPHONE LINK, HUSSEIN SIMPLY SAID, QUOTE AS THE ISRAELIS SHOULD WELL KNOW, THE POLITICAL RISK OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT MAKES IT OUT OF THE QUESTION AT THIS TIME UNQUOTE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUS IN THEIR DESIRE TO IMPROVE UNTSO THEY WOULD FIRST HAVE TO SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME ESTABLISHING THEIR BONA FIDES.

GP-3. ADAMS
BT

~~SECRET~~

ORIGIN/ACTION

5-26

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 17-2 JORDAN-US

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

20

A-247
NO.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

HANDLING INDICATOR

02

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 3 PAGES
NO. 1 OF 8 COPIES, SERIES A"

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: January 26, 1967

SUBJECT: Privileges and Immunities

REF : Embtels 1807^{NC} and 1823^{NC}

COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

Enclosure 1 contains the text of the Memorandum of Understanding referred to in paragraph 1 of our telegram 1807. Please note that this Memorandum of Understanding is "Secret."

Enclosure 2 contains the text of the Memorandum of Agreement referred to in our telegram 1823. This Memorandum of Agreement is "Unclassified."

Burns
BURNS

Enclosures: *ul. m. m.*

1. Memorandum of Understanding dated January 9, 1967.
2. Memorandum of Agreement dated January 24, 1967.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By *RG/L*, NARA, Date *7-13-01*

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

AMB:FBurns, Jr.:af 1/24/67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

1967 JAN 31 AM 11 08

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SECRET

~~SECRET~~

120
Page 1
Enclosure 1
A-247 from Amman

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED BY FINDLEY BURNS, JR.,
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, AND
CONCURRED IN ON BEHALF OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL

It is agreed and understood regarding the United States Government F-104 aircraft, which will be located in Jordan in the near future, that:

1. These aircraft will not engage in combat except when they are the object of an unprovoked attack and when in the pilot's judgment there is no alternative (e.g., evasion) for survival except to return fire in self-defense.
2. United States Government concurrence must be obtained on a mission-by-mission basis before an aircraft is made available to the Royal Jordanian Air Force for any use other than for training.
3. The United States Government in its national interest reserves the right to withdraw these aircraft from Jordan. The decision to withdraw will be made only at the highest levels of the United States Government.
4. United States Government temporary duty personnel assigned to Jordan in connection with the deployment of USAF F-104 aircraft, whether United States Air Force or contract civilians normally associated with squadron operations, will have the same status and privileges as personnel of comparable rank of the non-diplomatic personnel permanently assigned to the United States Defense Attache Office.

/S/ Wasfi Tell

/S/ Findley Burns, Jr.

Amman, January 9, 1967

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 02-60
By SJ, NARA, Date 3-1-06

~~SECRET~~

12b

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1
Enclosure 2
A-247 from Amman

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY
PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN AND AMBASSADOR
FINDLEY BURNS, JR. ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will grant to non-diplomatic personnel assigned or attached to the American Embassy in Amman the same privileges and immunities as are accorded comparable personnel by the Government of the United States of America.

/S/ Wasfi Tell

/S/ Findley Burns, Jr.

Amman, January 24, 1967

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

13

CORRECTION (~~SECRET~~)

/ Action

Control: 18364

Rec'd: January 23, 1967

SS

Info

FROM: AmEmbassy Amman

03

ACTION: SecState

The MRN of this telegram received as 1808 should be corrected to read 1809.

EXDIS

Subject: Convention of Diplomatic Relations.

LRL/January 24, 1967

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RG/D NARA, Date 7-13-01

CORRECTION (~~SECRET~~)

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15

~~SECRET~~

3
Action
SS
Info

02

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKGECWQOA 0241030
ZNY SSSSS
P 241025
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

019437
1967 JAN 24 AM 5 58

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN, 1823

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 123957

PRIMIN TELL AND I HAVE TODAY SIGNED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
TEXT IN ACCORDANCE REFTTEL. PRIMIN STATES THIS AGREEMENT HAS THE
FORCE OF LAW AND, IN MY PRESENCE, ISSUED THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE SEVERAL GOJ MINISTRIES CONCERNED.
BURNS
BT

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RGD/L, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

16

~~SECRET~~

2

42
Action

55
Info

N NNNVZCZCQMA556VV KGA103
PP RUEHC
DE RUQNK G 202A 0211720
ZNY SSSSS
P 211703Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

017916

1967 JAN 21 PM 2 46

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1807

EXDIS

REF: OURTEL 1711, DEPTTEL 1179759

1. WORDING OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REPORTED OURTEL 1683 HAS BEEN AMENDED SO THAT QTE OBJECT OF AN ATTACK UNQTE NOW READS QTE OBJECT OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK UNQTE.

2. MINJUSTICE HAS ADVISED PRIMIN THAT HE CANNOT SIGN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WHICH FOLLOWS TEXT OF PARA 1, DEPTTEL 118159, SINCE, EVEN IF PRIMIN DID SIGN IT, AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO VALIDITY IN JORDAN SINCE (A) AGREEMENT REFERS TO VIENNA CONVENTION WHICH JORDAN HAS NOT SIGNED, AND (B) GOJ LEGISLATION MAKES NO RPT NO RPVOISION OF IMMUNITY FOR NON-DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND AGREEMENT COULD NOT SUPERCEDED LEGISLATION (THE PRIMIN AND I FOLLOW THE JUSTICE MINISTER'S LATTER POINT BUT NOT HIS FIRST).

3. PRIMIN AND MINJUSTICE PROPOSE AGREEMENT WITH FOLLOWING WORDING: QTE THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WILL GRANT TO NON-DIPLOMATIC

PAGE 2 RUQMK G 202A ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN AMMAN THE SAME PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AS ARE ACCORDED COMPARABLE PERSONNEL BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WILL UNDERTAKE TO CONFORM THE LAWS OF THE HASHEMIIE KINGDOM OF JORDAN TO THE GRANT OF THESE IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES UNQTE.

4. MINJUSTICE STATES THAT THE ONLY LEGAL GROUNDS GOJ WOULD HAVE FOR EXTENDING IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES TO US NON-DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL BEYOND WHAT IS NOW ACCORDED WOULD BE ON BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By us NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 1/21/71
TO: 1500 25 70
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-2-AMMAN 1807, January 21

5. I RECOMMEND WE BUY THE WORDING PROPOSED IN PARA 3 ABOVE. IT WILL TAKE CARE OF THE AIRMEN AS WELL AS ALL NON-DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY. IT WILL, OF COURSE, LEAVE THE FAMILIES OF SUCH PERSONNEL IN THE SAME SITUATION AS THEY ARE IN WASHINGTON, AND IN THE SAME SITUATION AS THEY ARE HERE NOW. PRESUMABLY, HOWEVER, FAMILIES OF NON-DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL HERE WOULD CONTINUE TO ENJOY DE FACTO IMMUNITY AS THEY HAVE ALWAYS DONE.

6. I WOULD NOT WISH TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT COVERING ONLY USDAO NON-DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. THIS WOULD CREATE FIRST-AND SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS IN THIS EMBASSY AND WOULD BE DELETERIOUS TO STAFF MORALE.

BURNS
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

17

44
Action

~~SECRET~~

017851

Info

VZCZCQMA548VV KGA096
RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 190A 0211455
ZNY SSSSS
R 211447Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEKDA/DOD
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 JAN 21 AM 11 47

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1735

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 1735

SUBJECT: JAA FORCE LEVELS

KING HUSSEIN INFORMED ME TODAY THAT HE WAS POSTPONING INDEFINITELY CREATION OF FOURTH RIFLE COMPANY. HE DID, HOWEVER, PLAN TO STRENGTHEN EXISTING COMPANIES AND TO FORM THE NECESSARY NEW UNITS TO HANDLE THE EQUIPMENT USG IS FURNISHING. KING ASSURED ME HE WOULD ADHERE TO 53,000 FORCE LEVEL.

GP-1. BURNS
BT

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

18

80

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

QMA903KLH472

RR RUEHC RUEIVCR
DE RUQMKG 054A 0091200
ZNY SSSSS
R 091030Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTEVE WASHDC
INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUQVRA/ AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN AMMAN 1632

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 113444

1. YESTERDAY AMBASSADOR RELAYED INFORMATION CONTAINED REFTTEL TO COURT MINISTER JUMA AND CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH. NEITHER DEMURRED.

2. TODAY AMBASSADOR RELAYED THE SAME INFORMATION TO PRIME MINISTER TELL. TELL SAID THAT GOJ WOULD NOT EXERCISE OPTION UNTIL MID-MARCH, UNLESS KING'S TRIP TO ARABIAN PENINSULA PROVED MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN NOW ANTICIPATED, IN WHICH CASE

OPTIONS WOULD BE EXERCISED WHEN KING RETURNS FROM ARABIAN PENINSULA IN MID-FEBRUARY.

3. PRIME MINISTER ALSO TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT ON HIS ARABIAN PENINSULA TRIP KING WOULD ATTEMPT *TO GET* FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM GULF STATE RULERS, FOR ANY PURPOSE THESE RULERS MIGHT DESIGNATE, BE IT FOR MILITARY OR CIVILIAN USE (REF LONDON'S 5339).

GP-3. BURNS
BT

005933

JANUARY 9, 1967

2:49 P.M.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 93001

By RG/JL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

19

40

Action

~~SECRET~~

015422

SS

VZCZCQMA250KGA975

1967 JAN 19 AM 8 02

Info

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMG 168A 0191115
ZNY SSSSS
R 191105Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
INFO RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
STATE GRNC
BT

0 2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1778

EXDIS

REF AMMAN 1651; TRIPOLI 2348

1. WE BELIEVE THE GOJ WOULD RECEIVED A PROPOSAL FOR POSTPONEMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S TRIP TO LIBYA WITH DISMAY. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO PRESS PLAY ON THIS PROPOSED VISIT SINCE THE ORIGINAL ANNOUNCEMENT LAST OCTOBER (AMMAN 927), THE PALACE IS CONFIDENTLY EXPECTING THAT THIS TRIP WILL OCCUR IN MARCH.

2. WE WOULD NOTE THAT THIS TRIP WAS SCHEDULED PRIOR TO JORDAN'S DECEMBER CONFRONTATION WITH THE UAC AND SUBSEQUENT GOJ DECISIONS TO CALL FOR A NEW ARAB SUMMIT AND TO BOYCOTT SUBSUMMIT MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY. THE LIBYAN TRIP, AS ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED WAS DESIGNED, IN OUR OPIONION, TO ESTABLISH CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO KINGDOMS AND TO ELICIT LIBYAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT. JORDAN'S DESIRE FOR CLOSER RALTIONS IS UNCHANGED, AND ITS DESIRE FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMG 168A ~~SECRET~~

WINNING FINANCIAL SUPPORT HEIGHTENED BY THE DRYING UP OF UAC SOURCES AND THE NECESSITY TO PAY FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT, IT HAS PROMISED ITS ARMED FORECES.

GP-1. BURNS

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RUJL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

20

~~SECRET~~

011619

1967 JAN 16 AM 4 21

3
Action

SS
Info

VZCZCQMA700TUTYA7;; (&-771
RR RUDTCR RUEHC RUEKDA
DE RUQMKG 120A 0160830
ZNY SSSSS
R 160815Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1735

EXDIS

STATE 118733, 117565; AMMAN 1650

1. PRIOR TO RECEIPT JAN. 14 OF STATE 118733, WE HAD ALREADY UNDERTAKEN DISCUSSION WITH GEN. KHAMMASH TO RENEW OUR EXPRESSION OF CONCERN (AS SUGGESTED STATE 117565) OVER ANY INCREASED FINANCIAL BURDEN TO GOJ THROUGH MILITARY BUILDUP.

2. EMBOFF IN CONVERSATION WITH KHAMMASH JANUARY 13 GAINED IMPRESSION THAT KHAMMASH HAD COOLED OFF CONSIDERABLY FROM THE EMOTIONAL STATE IN WHICH AMBASSADOR MACOMBER FOUND HIM DURING THEIR LAST MEETING IN AMMAN DECEMBER 21. KHAMMASH WAS APPARENTLY IN AN EVEN MORE SOBER AND REALISTIC MOOD JAN 13 THAN AMBASSADOR HAD FOUND HIM IN THEIR CONVERSATION DECEMBER 31 (AMMAN 1650). KHAMMASH STATED TO EMBOFF THAT, RECOGNIZING THE TIGHTNESS OF THE JORDANIAN BUDGET, HE HAD NOW DECIDED IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ADD THE FOURTH RIFLE COMPANY TO THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS. HE WAS, HE ADDED, ALREADY ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS AND WAS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 120A ~~SECRET~~
MAXIMUM THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO DO WOULD BE TO TRY TO WORK TOWARDS BRINGING THE EXISTING COMPANIES MORE NEARLY UP TO STRENGTH. THE COMMANDERS, HE REPORTED, WERE NOT HAPPY ABOUT THIS DECISION BUT HE BELIEVED THAT HE COULD CONVINCE THEM THEY MUST ACCEPT IT. HE ASSURED EMBOFF THAT HE WAS AS CONSCIOUS AS ANYONE ELSE OF THE NEED TO KEEP JORDAN'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO A MINIMUM. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE MORALE AND STABILITY OF THE JORDANIAN MILITARY AND, IN ANY DISAGREEMENT

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By 100 NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1735, JANUARY 16

ON THIS ISSUE, HE FELT HE WAS BETTER INFORMED THAN HIS COLLEAGUES AND WAS THEREFORE DUTY BOUND TO PRESS HIS VIEWS WITH ALL CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY HIS SUPERIORS.

3. KHAMMASH SAID THAT THE FORCE LEVELS FOR THE JAF WOULD BE AT THE 53,000 LEVEL. HE NOTED THERE WERE AND WOULD ALWAYS BE FLUCTUATIONS IN THE OVERALL TOTAL, OWING TO THE VARYING RATES OF RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION.

4. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE KING AND THE PRIME MINISTER POSE TWO OBSTACLES TO KHAMMASH'S BEING ABLE TO BREACH THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE KING AND AMBASSADOR MACOMBER ON FORCE LEVEL LIMITATIONS.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 120A ~~SECRET~~

A. THE KING. HUSSEIN'S CONCURRENCE WOULD BE NEEDED FOR A FORCE LEVEL ABOVE 53,000 AND THIS HAS CERTAINLY NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. (KHAMMASH FEELS STRONGLY THAT THE KING DID NOT FULLY REALIZE THE PROBLEMS FACING THE ARMY IN ABSORBING THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE WHEN HE AGREED THAT THE FORCE LEVEL SHOULD NOT EXCEED 53,000).

B. THE PRIME MINISTER. WASFI TELL HAS AGREED TO INCREASE THE INDIGENOUSLY FINANCED MILITARY BUDGET BY ONLY JD ONE MILLION WHILE KHAMMASH HAS PRESSED FOR JD 3.5 MILLION. (BY OUR CALCULATIONS, AS REPORTED AMMAN 1650 PARA 4A, ROUGHLY JD THREE MILLION IS NECESSARY TO COVER BOTH THE PROPOSED PAY RAISE AND THE ADDITIONAL 3,000 MEN BRINGING THE FORCE LEVELS TO 53,000). THIS CONFLICT HAS YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THE KING.

5. WE WOULD NOTE THAT NONE OF THE NEW EQUIPMENT, WHICH KHAMMASH WILL BE SEEKING IN LONDON NEXT WEEK, WOULD REQUIRE INCREASED PERSONNEL IN THE JAF. HE HAS APPARENTLY A SET OF CREDIT TERMS IN MIND TO PROPOSE TO THE BRITISH WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD PERMIT HIM TO MAKE THESE PURCHASES WITHOUT ADDITIONALLY BURDENING HIS BUDGET.

6. ACCORDINGLY IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE ARE BUILT IN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 120A ~~SECRET~~

SAFEGUARDS OPERATING HERE WHICH WILL, ALBEIT GRUDGINGLY TO KHAMMASH, KEEP THE JORDANIANS TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- AMMAN 1735, JANUARY 16

STRUCK BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MACOMBER AND THE KING ON DECEMBER 21. IN FACT, PRIME MINISTER TELL'S PARSIMONY HAS PREVENTED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAY RAISE, ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED, AND PRACTICALLY PROMISED TO THE TROOPS, FOR JANUARY 1, 1967.

7. KHAMMASH IS NOT A UNIQUE PHENOMENON IN THE MILITARY WORLD FOR CHAFING AGAINST A DECISION OF HIS CIVILIAN SUPERIORS THAT GIVES HIM LESS THAN HE WANTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH THE SITUATION CAREFULLY, BUT WE DOUBT THAT THE GOJ WOULD, OR COULD, CONTEMPLATE TRYING FOR A HIGHER FORCE LEVEL THAN 53,000 UNLESS THE KING SHOULD BE ABLE TO SECURE MAJOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN FROM HIS FORTHCOMING WRITING, THE REACTIONS OF OUR EMBASSIES IN JIDDA, KUWAIT AND TRIPOLI DO NOT APPEAR TO US TO HOLD OUT *MUCH* HOPES THAT THE KING WILL BE THAT SUCCESSFUL.

8. I SHALL BE HAVING A MEETING WITH HUSSEIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND WILL STRESS ONCE AGAIN OUR CONCERN THAT THE JORDANIAN MILITARY BUILDUP NOT BE PERMITTED TO THREATEN THE KINGDOM'S PROGRAMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THAT WE COUNT ON THE MACOMBER AGREEMENT BEING ADHERED TO.

GP-1. BURNS

BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JAN 11 AM 8 40

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1711

EXDIS

REF DEPTTEL 114805

1. REFTTEL WAS RECEIVED SHORTLY BEFORE 10 PM LOCAL TIME JAN 9, AND SEVERAL HOURS AFTER PRIME MINISTER TELL HAD SIGNED AND RETURNED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

1. WORDING OF QUOTE PARA 4 OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WAS PHRASED THE WAY IT WAS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT OFFICIAL STAFF OF THE EMBASSY WHO ARE NOT DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS ENJOY SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME IMMUNITIES AS DO DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH THEY FORMALLY ENJOY LESS PRIVILEGES

3. I HAVE HAD THIS CHECKED OUT IN DETAIL, INCLUDING WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. TO MY AMAZEMENT I LEARN THAT AMERICAN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE EMBASSY WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC LIST TECHNICALLY ENJOY NO IMMUNITIES WHATSOEVER. THIS SITUATION HAS EVIDENTLY EXISTED EVER SINCE THE EMBASSY WAS ESTABLISHED, AND THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE HAS NOT ARISEN IS BECAUSE DE FACTO IMMUNITY HAD BEEN GRANTED IN PAST YEARS.

4. I TRIED TO REACH THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH HIM (HE IS NOW ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER), BUT SINCE RAMADAN HOLIDAY HAD BEGUN I WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN LOCATING HIM. I DO NOT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 092A ~~SECRET~~
ANTICIPATE IT WILL BE FEASIBLE TO TRY TO DO BUSINESS WITH HIM BEFORE MONDAY, JANUARY 16.

5. WHEN I DO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER, I PLAN TO PROPOSE THAT HE SIGN THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT: QUOTE IT IS AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN WILL, IN THE ABSENCE OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT, GRANT THE SAME IMMUNITIES TO PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN AMMAN, WHO ARE NOT NATIONALS OF OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS OF THE RECEIVING STATE, AND TO MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS, AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By iso, NARA, Date 12-23-02

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-2- AMMAN 1711, JANUARY 11

STATES GRANTS TO COMPARABLE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN IN WASHINGTON.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EXTENDS THE IMMUNITY OF THE CHIEF OF A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN WASHINGTON TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE MISSION, INCLUDING THE OFFICIAL STAFF WHO ARE NOT DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS, AND TO MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS. UNQUOTE

6. THE PHRASE "IN THE ABSENCE OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT" IS USED BECAUSE WE DO HAVE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH GOJ REGARDING THE IMMUNITIES OF USAID PERSONNEL.

7. AS A *FALLBACK* POSITION, TO BE USED ONLY IN EXTREMIS, I WOULD PROPOSE THAT HE SIGN THE FOLLOWING: QUOTE IT IS AGREED AND

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 092A ~~SECRET~~
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN WILL, IN THE ABSENCE OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT, EXTEND TO PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN AMMAN, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES FORMING PART OF THEIR RESPECTIVE HOUSEHOLDS, THE IMMUNITIES PROVIDED BY THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF 1961. UNQUOTE

8. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE VIENNA CONVENTION PROVIDES SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME IMMUNITIES TO OFFICIAL STAFF WHO ARE NOT DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS AS DO MOST OF OUR STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS.

9. ASSUMING THAT THE GOJ WILL AGREE TO SIGN ONE OF THE TWO AWY* PROPOSED MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING--AND I THINK THEY WILL--THEN I SEE NO NEED TO CHANGE THE WORDING OF QUOTE PARA 4 OF THE *MEMORANDUM* OF UNDERSTANDING REPORTED OURTEL 1683.

10. THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE IN AMMAN CURRENTLY CONSISTS OF FIFTEEN AMERICAN PERSONNEL. THE DEFENSE ATTACHE (LT.COL) AND TWO ASSISTANT DEFENSE ATTACHES (MAJORS) ARE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC LIST. NONE OF THE OTHER AMERICANS, AND THIS INCLUDES FIVE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND BELOW, ARE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC LIST. THE WORDING PROPOSED IN REFTEL

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 092A ~~SECRET~~
FROMQUOTE PARA 4 WOULD, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE, HAVE IN OUR OPINION THE SAME EFFECT AS OUR ORIGINAL WORDING. IN FACT, THE WORDING PROPOSED IN REFTEL COULD BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT OFFICERS OF THE RANK OF MAJOR AND ABOVE SHOULD ENJOY NOT ONLY THE SAME

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-3- AMMAN 1711, JANUARY 11

IMMUNITIES BUT ALSO THE SAME PRIVILEGE AS OFFICERS ON THE DIPLOMATIC LIST. THIS COULD RAISE PROBLEMS ON PRIVILEGES WHICH WE GET AROUND VERY NEATLY NOW IN A DE FACTO WAY.

11. THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN HAVING THE WORD "UNPROVOKED" INSERTED BEFORE THE WORD "ATTACK" (PARA 1 REFTEL). I SHALL RELAY ORALLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN I SEE HIM MONDAY THE SENSE OF PARA 3, REFTEL.

12. I SHALL APPRECIATE RECEIVING PRIOR TO MONDAY THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON THIS MESSAGE, AND PARTICULARLY ON THE PROPOSED TEXTS OF THE TWO MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING QUOTED IN THIS TELEGRAM.

GP-3. BURNS

BT *AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PROCESSING NOTE

Document #22 (Quito 2890) had been misfiled in the National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Volume III, Box 146, by the White House staff. When the file was processed, I transferred the document to the National Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Volume I, Box 53, where it has been renumbered as Document #204 in that file.

There is no longer a Document #22 in the National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Volume III.

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 17 JORDAN GERW

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-234

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HANDLING INDICATOR

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RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

23

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: BONN, LONDON, CAIRO, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT,
JIDDA, SANAA, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, ALGIERS, RABAT, TRIPOLIJAN 10 8 52 AM 1967
JORDAN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: January 5, 1967

FROM : Amembassy Amman

SUBJECT : GOJ-FRG Relations

COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

REF : Amman's 1086, November 12, NOTAL

In a recent conversation with an Embassy Officer, King Hussein said he was tempted to move soon on recognition of West Germany. He admitted however that some of his advisors were counseling him against this move since they were reluctant to add any further irritant to Jordan's relations with the "progressive" Arab states.

Comment: We have no other indication that Jordanian leadership may be contemplating an early reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn.

BURNS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

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FORM 62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:RWMurphy:mas

Contents and Classification Approved by:

JRJohnstone

Clearances: The Ambassador

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1683

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF DEPTTEL 114665

1. WE GREATLY PREFER WORDING FOR PARAGRAPH 3(D) AS PROPOSED IN REFTEL.

2. SINCE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL CLOSE FOR RAMADAN FEAST JANUARY 10 THROUGH JANUARY 15, AMBASSADOR GAVE PRIME MINISTER TELL THIS MORNING FOLLOWING DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, EXPLAINING ORALLY THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY ANY SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD ARISE IN WHICH USG WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW THE AIRCRAFT OR NOT MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR MISSIONS BY QUALIFIED RJAF PILOTS. AMBASSADOR ALSO DISCUSSED THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 055A ~~SECRET~~
YESTERDAY WITH COURT MINISTER SA'D JUMA AND CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL KHAMMASH:

QUOTE

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED BY FINDLEY BURNS, JR., AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, AND CONCURRED IN ON BEHALF OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By isa, NARA, Date 12-23-02

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-2- AMMAN 1683, 091100Z JAN 67

QUOTE

IT IS AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD REGARDING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT F-104 AIRCRAFT, WHICH WILL BE LOCATED IN JORDAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THAT:

QTE 1. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT ENGAGE IN COMBAT EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE THE OBJECT OF AN ATTACK AND WHEN IN THE PILOT'S JUDGMENT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE (E.G. EVASION) FOR SURVIVAL EXCEPT TO RETURN FIRE IN SELF-DEFENSE.

QTE 2. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONCURRENCE MUST BE OBTAINED ON A MISSION-BY-MISSION BASIS BEFORE AN AIRCRAFT IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ROYAL JORDANIAN AIR FORCE FOR ANY USE OTHER THAN FOR TRAINING.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 055A ~~SECRET~~

QTE/3. THE UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT IN ITS NATIONAL INTEREST RESERVES THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THESE AIRCRAFT FROM JORDAN. THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW WILL BE MADE ONLY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

QTE 4. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO JORDAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF USAF F-104 AIRCRAFT, WHETHER UNITED STATES AIR FORCE OR CONTRACT CIVILIANS NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH SQUADRON OPERATIONS, WILL HAVE THE SAME STATUS AND PRIVILEGES AS PERSONNEL OF COMPARABLE RANK OF THE NON-DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE. UNQUOTE

3. TELL, JUMA AND KHAMMASH UNDERSTAND WHY WE WANT THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AND ALL CONCUR IN THE WORDING.

4. KING HUSSEIN IS VISITING MILITARY UNITS AND NOT AVAILABLE YESTERDAY OR TODAY FOR APPOINTMENT, BUT TELL WILL SEE HIM AT AN IFTAR THIS AFTERNOON. PRIME MINISTER WILL CLEAR MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE KING, AND WILL SIGN DOCUMENT ON BEHALF OF GOJ THIS EVENING FOLLOWING IFTAR.

GP-3. BURNS

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:55 A.M., JANUARY 9.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 7:05 A.M., JANUARY 9.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUEIVCR/AMEMBAURY CAIRO
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/OSD
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQIBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
RUQIDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN AMMAN 1651

EXDIS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 016Z ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

REF: OURTEL 1649

JORDAN GRAPPLES WITH FINANCING PROBLEMS FOR US MILITARY EQUIPMENT

1. IN DECEMBER 28 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, THE KING SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE GOJ DEBT TO THE USG FOR GROUND AND AIR MILITARY PACKAGES AND ABOUT THE TIMING FOR EXERCISE OF THE OPTION FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD SQUADRONS OF F-104 AIRCRAFT. HUSSEIN REMARKED HE HAD LITTLE HOPE FOR OBTAINING ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ANY PURPOSE FROM THE UAC, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE IS NOW IN THE POSITION OF REJECTING UAC DEMANDS TO STATION FOREIGN ARAB TROOPY

M JORDAN. HUSSEIN

SAID HE PLANNED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO OBTAIN SAUDI FUNDS, BUT THE LOW LEVEL OF SAUDI COMPREHENSION AND INTEREST IN HIS PROBLEMS DID NOT ENCOURAGE

ME. TO BELIEVE THAT THE SAG WOULD BE WILLING TO

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By iso, NARA, Date 12-23-02

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-2-Amman 1651, January 3

PICK UP MUCH OF THE TAB. (PRIME MINISTER TELL, COURT MINISTER JUM'A AND CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH ARE EVEN LESS SANGUINE OF GETTING MONEY FROM KUWAIT, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON, AS THEY PUT IT, THAN THE KUWAITIS WILL BE TOO AFRAID OF OFFENDING NASSER.) THE KING SAID THAT IF THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB FRIENDS DID NOT HELP OUT HE WOULD BE IN A SERIOUS POSITION AND WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE USG FOR HELP.

2. OTHER CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH GOJ LEADERS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE GOJ CONSIDERS THE UAR IS CERTAIN TO OPPOSE JORDAN'S REQUEST

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 016A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
FOR A SUMMIT MEETING, A MEETING WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE A PREREQUISITE TO SECURING MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES IF THE GOJ ALSO CONSIDERS THAT THE UAR IS EFFECTIVELY DEAD AS AN ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH GOJ BELIEVES CAIRO WILL TRY TO KEEP THE UAR CORPSE AROUND TO EMBARRASS JORDAN.

3. IN MY MEETING WITH TELL, JUM'A AND GENERAL KHAMMASH DECEMBER 31, I ASKED TELL WITH A SMILE ABOUT THE PRESS REPORT THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ALREADY AGREED TO GIVE JORDAN SOME 50 MILLION POUNDS STERLING FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES AT A MEETING IN AQABA. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT OF COURSE THE REPORT WAS FALSE AND ADDED RUEFULLY, "I WOULD WALK EVERY FOOT OF THE WAY TO AQABA TO GET EVEN ONE-TENTH OF THAT AMOUNT."

4. I NOTED THAT ABOUT \$69.4 MILLION REMAINS DUE TO THE USG ON THE AIR AND GROUND PACKAGES BETWEEN NOW AND 1975, AND OF THIS TOTAL MORE THAN 50 PERCENT FALLS DUE IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS (\$24.4 MILLION IN 1967 AND \$21.1 MILLION IN 1968). I SAID THEY WERE AWARE THAT WASHINGTON EXPECTED THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THESE PACKAGES TO STAND. CASH PAYMENTS IN ADVANCE WERE PREREQUISITE FOR DELIVERY. FURTHERMORE, WHATEVER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE JORDAN MAY BE ABLE TO ARRANGE FROM OTHER ARAB STATES MUST FIRST BE APPLIED TO JORDAN'S

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 016A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
OBLIGATIONS TO THE USG FOR THESE PACKAGES BEFORE BEING USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE, SUCH AS FINANCING THE JAA.

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-3-Amman 1651, January 3

5. FOLLOWING UP ON AMBASSADOR MACOMBER'S STATEMENT, THAT USG WAS PREPARED TO HELP GOJ IN ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FUNDS BILATERALLY, I ASKED THEM ABOUT JORDAN'S PLANS FOR APPROACHING OTHER ARAB STATES FOR AID. I NOTED THAT WE WERE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT ANY AMERICAN APPROACH IN RIYADH, KUWAIT OR TRIPOLI SHOULD FOLLOW THE INITIAL JORDANIAN ONE. THEY DISAGREED, AND ARGUED THAT JORDAN WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF GETTING ARAB ASSISTANCE IF THE USG, IN CONCERT WITH THE UK, WOULD APPROACH THE SAUDIS, KUWAITIS AND LIBYANS BEFORE THE KING ARRIVED FOR HIS STATE VISITS. (IN THIS CONNECTION THEY SAID THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED WORD FROM THE SAUDIS THAT THE KING WOULD BE WELCOME IN RIYADH ON FEBRUARY 13, AT THE END OF HIS TOUR TO KUWAIT AND THE GULF STATES SCHEDULED TO BEGIN FEBRUARY 1. THE KING'S VISIT TO LIBYA IS STILL SCHEDULED FOR EARLY MARCH.) I TOOK THIS OPENING TO CAUTION THEM ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY APPROACHED THE KUWAITIS, DRAWING ON A LETTER I HAD RECEIVED FROM AMBASSADOR COTTAM IN WHICH HE OBSERVED THE KUWAITIS RESENT THE JORDANIANS IMPLYING THAT KUWAIT'S MONEY BELONGS TO THE "ARAB NATION". KHAMMASH AND TELL ASSURED ME THE KING AND GOJ OFFICIALS HAD ALWAYS BEEN MOST

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 016A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

CAREFUL IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE KUWAITIS TO AVOID APPEARING AS IF KUWAIT WAS OBLIGATED TO HELP JORDAN FINANCIALLY. THE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE ADVICE, HOWEVER, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME UNOFFICIAL JORDANIANS MAY HAVE BLUNTLY TOLD THE KUWAITIS THAT AID TO AMMAN WAS "AN INSURANCE PREMIUM" FOR KUWAIT. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AT TIMES THE GOJ ITSELF WAS OVERLY INFLUENCED BY WHAT HE CALLED "THE PALESTINIAN APPROACH", I.E. APPEARING TO EXPECT GIFTS JUST BECAUSE ONE IS POOR.

6. F-104 OPTIONS. RETURNING TO OUR DISCUSSION OF THE GOJ'S IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, I URGED TELL AND KHAMMASH, ON THE ASSUMPTION THEIR FUNDS WERE SHORT, TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE ADVISABILITY OF NOT PICKING UP DURING JANUARY THE GOJ OPTION ON THE REMAINING TWENTY FOUR F-104 AIRCRAFT. TELL, HENSDED BY JUM'A, AGREED CURRENT BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS MADE A DELAY DESIRABLE. KHAMMASH THEN TOOK THE FLOOR TO SAY THAT HE WOULD AGREE TO A DELAY IN PICKING UP THE OPTION ON CONDITION THAT THIS WOULD NOT DELAY DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE GENERAL SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PAPER WORK INVOLVED IN PREPARING THE WHOLE TRANSACTION WHICH MIGHT BE STARTED UPON IN THE MEANTIME. HE BELIEVED THAT, BY LATE MARCH,

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-4-Amman 1651, January 3

JORDAN'S PROSPECTS OF PAYING FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD SQUADRONS

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 016A ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
OF F-104'S WOULD BE MUCH CLEARER. I WAS ASKED FOR ASSURANCES THAT IF THE OPTIONS FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD SQUADRONS WERE NOT PICKED UP UNTIL LATE MARCH, THIS DELAY WOULD NOT AFFECT THEIR DELIVERY DATES TO JORDAN. I SAID I COULD NOT GIVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE BUT WOULD REPORT THE MATTER TO WASHINGTON.

7. KHAMMASH, TELL AND JUM'A ALL SAID THE REGIME WOULD FIND ITSELF IN A GRAVE SITUATION IF IT IS IN THE EVENT UNABLE TO PICK UP THESE OPTIONS. THE GENERAL PUBLIC, THE JORDANIAN MILITARY, OTHER ARAB STATES AND EVEN THE UAC COMMAND BELIEVE THAT JORDAN IS TO GET 36 SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT, AND US NEWS ARTICLES TO THIS EFFECT HAVE BEEN CARRIED IN THE AREA PRESS. KNOWLEDGE THAT THE SECOND AND THIRD SQUADRONS ARE A QUESTION OF OPTIONS IS TIGHTLY HELD WITHIN THE GOJ. TELL SECONDED KHAMMASH'S COMMENT THAT IT WOULD BE A DISASTER WERE THE ARMY AND THE JORDANIAN PUBLIC TO LEARN THAT JORDAN HAS ONLY 12 AIRCRAFT FIRMLY IN THE PIPELINE.

8. I CONCLUDED MY DISCUSSION OF THE FINANCING PROBLEM WITH TELL, JUM'A AND KHAMMASH BY STRESSING THAT THEHIOJ MUST EXERT GREAT EFFORTS TO RAISE THE MONEY AND TO PRESENT A CONVINCING CASE TO THE OTHER ARAB STATES FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THEY ASSURED ME THEY HAD EVERY INTENTION OF SO DOING.

9. WILL APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT ADVISING RE DELIVERY DATES OF F-104'S IF OPTION NOT EXERCISED UNTIL MARCH. GP-3. BURNS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD
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RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQMII/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUQMLV/AOSMBASSY TEL AVIV
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1650 SECTION ONE OF TWO

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PAGE 2 RUQMKG 019A ~~SECRET~~
REF OURTEL 1649

GOJ MILITARY BUDGET AND FORCE LEVELS

1. U.S. RESPONSE TO KHAMMASH MISSION

A. IN MY MEETING DECEMBER 31 WITH PRIME MINISTER TELL, COURT MINISTER JUM'A AND CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH, I SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME EXPLAINING U.S. CONCERN THAT THE GOJ NOT INCUR MILITARY EXPENSES TO THE POINT WHERE GOJ WOULD HAVE TO SACRIFICE ITS PROGRAMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AS BACKGROUND, I REVIEWED THE DIFFERENCES IN ASSESSMENT BY OURSELVES AND THE GOJ OF AREA TRENDS. I STATED THAT WE SAW NO CHANGE IN BASIC ISRAELI INTENT TOWARDS JORDAN; THAT WE BELIEVE THE USSR DESIRES TO AVOID A CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST; THAT WE BELIEVE NASSER, DESPITE FACT HIS AIMS AND THOSE OF SOVIETS SOMETIMES COALESCE, IS NEITHER A CRYPTO-COMMUNIST NOR A SOVIET PUPPET; AND THAT SYRIA, THOUGH ANARCHIC, HAS NOT BECOME A SOVIET SATELLITE. I OBSERVED ALSO THAT WHEN WE PUT TOGETHER OUR RESPONSE TO THE GOJ

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By in NARA, Date 12-23-02~~SECRET~~

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-2-Amman 1650, January 3 (SECTION I OF II)

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, WE HAD TO HAVE IN MIND THE NEED TO AVOID STIMULATING A NEW ISRAELI APPROACH FOR ARMS.

B. I NOTED THAT THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS HAD INFLUENCED OUR RESPONSE TO THE RECENT KHAMMASH MISSION. I STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FACT WE DIFFERED IN OUR INTERPRETATIONS OF AREA TRENDS DID NOT MEAN WE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 019A ~~SECRET~~

WERE TRYING TO ARGUE THAT JORDAN FACES NO THREATS. WE FULLY REALIZE THAT THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING JORDAN ARE REAL ONES WHICH DEMAND SERIOUS, OFTEN COSTLY, SOLUTIONS. I WAS WELL AWARE THERE HAD BEEN A FEELING IN CERTAIN GOJ CIRCLES THAT OUR RESPONSE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT IN ALL RESPECTS. OUR RESPONSE HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO EASE THE PRESENT CRISIS RATHER THAN TO DEAL WITH WHAT THE GOJ (BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE US) SAW AS A LONGER TERM THREAT. WE FELT WE HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING, WE HAD MADE AN EARNEST RESPONSE, AND THERE SHOULD BE NO UNCERTAINTY IN JORDANIAN MINDS ABOUT OUR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN STRONG GOJ-USG RELATIONS OR THAT WE STOOD SOLIDLY WITH JORDAN. I ASSURED THOSE PRESENT THAT JORDAN'S PROBLEMS HAD HAD THE CLOSE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT, AND OF SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA, AND THAT JORDAN'S PROBLEMS WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THEIR PERSONAL ATTENTION.

2. FORCE LEVEL. I OBSERVED THAT WHAT CONSTITUTED ADEQUATE DETERRENCE WAS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT EQUATION TO WORK OUT WITH EXACTITUDE. INDEED, I HAD RECEIVED EXPERT MILITARY ADVICE THAT IF EVERY ABLE-BODIED MALE IN JORDAN WERE ENLISTED INTO THE ARMY, IT WOULD STILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DETF ANOTHER ATTACK ON THE SCALIOF SAMU', SINCE THE ADVANTAGE WAS SO DEFINITELY WITH THE ATTACKER IF THE ATTACK WERE HIT AND RUN AND NOT DESIGNED TO HOLD TERRITORY. HOWEVER, AS JORDAN'S

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FRIEND, WE DO FEEL WE ARE ON SURE GROUND IN MAINTAINING THERE IS A LIMIT TO WHAT JORDAN CAN AFFORD TO PAY FOR HER ARMED FORCES AND AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF HER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AND IF JORDAN CANNOT MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF HER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, I SAID, SHE WILL HAVE HAD IT. I COMMENTED THAT IN ANY GOVERNMENT A COMPROMISE WAS NECESSARY BETWEEN THE COMPETING DEMANDS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS. SUCH A COMPROMISE INEVITABLY IS NEVER FULLY SATISFACTORY TO EITHER PARTY. (FROM THE REACTIONS OF TELL AND

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-3-Amman 1650, January 3 (SECTION I OF II)

KHAMMASH, I SAW I CLEARLY WAS TOUCHING ON A SORE NERVE.)

3. BUDGET CEILING. I MENTIONED I HAD RECENTLY SEEN STATISTICS IN THE LOCAL PRESS PROVIDING FOR AN INCREASE IN THE INDIGENOUSLY FINANCED MILITARY BUDGET FROM JD 19.2 MILLION TO JD 20.2 MILLION. (COMMENT: JD 20.2 MILLION REPRESENTS 29 0/0 OF THE PROPOSED 1967 JORDANIAN BUDGET. US PRESS ARTICLES HAVE PLAYED THIS UP AS IF IT WERE A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE. IN 1964/5 THE INDIGENOUS MILITARY BUDGET WAS 39 0/0 OF THE PROPOSED BUDGET; IN 1965/6, 32 0/0; AND IN 1966, 28 0/0.) I SUGGESTED THAT WE MEET SOON TO REACH FORMAL AGREEMENT ON A NEW INDIGENOUS MILITARY BUDGET CEILING WHICH WOULD COVER THE PAY RAISE AND THE 3,000 MAN INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS. TELL AND KHAMMASH STATED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE NEEDED WITHIN THE GOJ, I.E.,

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 019A ~~SECRET~~

BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM AND THE KING, BEFORE THEY COULD USEFULLY DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH ME.

4. COMMENT ON BUDGET CEILING.

A. THE KING INFORMED EMBOFF ON DECEMBER 28 THAT KHAMMASH AND TELL WERE AT DAGGERS' POINT OVER THE ARMY BUDGET. KHAMMASH WAS INSISTING THAT HE NEEDED A MINIMUM OF JD 3.5 MILLION INCREASE FOR THE ARMY BUDGET, WHILE TELL ASSERTED THAT HE COULD PROVIDE NO MORE THAN A ONE MILLION DINAR INCREASE. (OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE ESTIMATES ROUGHLY JD 3 MILLION IS NECESSARY TO COVER PAY RAISE AND ADDITION TO FORCE LEVEL OF 3,000 MEN.) THE KING HAS ASKED TELL AND KHAMMASH TO REACH A COMPROMISE OVER THEIR DIFFERENCES.

B. HUSSEIN COMMENTED TO EMBOFF THAT FUNDS ARE SO SHORT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SQUEEZE BOTH A PAY RAISE AND THE COST OF ADDITIONAL UNITS OUT OF THE BUDGET. THE KING SAID HE WAS CONCERNED OVER THE PROSPECT THAT MINIMUM ARMY NEEDS MIGHT NOT BE MET AND REMARKED THAT THE ARMY IS INSISTING ON AN INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS BOTH TO ACCOMMODATE THE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE NEW EQUIPMENT AND THE CREATION OF A FOURTH RIFLE COMPANY IN EVERY INFANTRY BATTALION. (OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE ESTIMATES THIS WOULD REQUIRE AN INCREASE OF 5,000 MEN ABOVE THE PRESENT 50,000 FORCE LEVEL, FOR FULL STRENGTH

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-4-Amman 1650, January 3 (SECTION I OF II)

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 019A ~~SECRET~~

IMPLEMENTATION; OR AN INCREASE OF 3,800 FOR MINIMUM UNDERSTRENGTH IMPLEMENTATION.) THE KING PREDICTED HE MIGHT HAVE TO SACRIFICE OTHER PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE ARMY, SINCE ARMY MORALE WAS CLOSELY BOUND UP WITH FORCE LEVEL INCREASES AND IT WAS TOO DELICATE A MATTER TO TAMPER WITH MORALE. INDEED, ON DECEMBER 20 KING MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO THE ARMY TO PROVIDE FOR A PAY RAISE; THE BATTALIONS REQUIRED FOR NEW EQUIPMENT; AND THE FOURTH RIFLE COMPANY. KING HAS ALSO COMMITTED HIMSELF TO US NOT TO INCREASE FORCE LEVELS BY MORE THAN 3,000 MEN. HE HAS A PROBLEM, BUT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROBABLY THE ECONOMICS OF THE SITUATION ALONE WILL FORCE HIM TO RESTRICT THE INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS TO 3,000 MEN.

GP-3. BURNS

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-7-AMMAN 1650, JANUARY 3 (SECTION I OF II)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 020A 0031745
ZNY SSSSS
R 031650Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMMD/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1650 SECTION TWO OF TWO

E X D I S

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 020A ~~SECRET~~
REF OURTEL 1649

GOJ MILITARY BUDGET AND FORCE LEVELS

C. WASFI TELL CAN BE COUNTED ON, SO LONG AS HE IS IN POWER, TO ACT AS A BRAKE ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND TO PREVENT THEIR IMPINGING ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. I SUSPECT TELL THINKS THE JORDAN ARAB ARMY IS SOMETHING OF A LUXURY WHEN ITS TROOP STRENGTH EXCEEDS THE NUMBER NEEDED TO SIT ON THE PALESTINIANS AND TO QUASH TERRORISM. HE WAS, INCIDENTALLY, THE COOLEST HEAD WHEN, AFTER SAMU', PRESSURE WAS ON THE KING TO COUNTER ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL. HE IS A COMPLETE REALIST ABOUT ISRAEL, AND I THINK HE WOULD COUNSEL AGAINST A JORDANIAN COUNTER ATTACK IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER SAMU', THOUGH IN SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE HE MIGHT WELL BE THE LONE VOICE FOR RESTRAINT IN RULING CIRCLES. IT NEVER CEASES TO ASTOUND ME THAT TELL, WHO IS SO PRACTICAL AND INTELLIGENT ABOUT MANY THINGS, CAN BE AN ABSOLUTE NUT IN CERTAIN AREAS--NOTABLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE HAS, FOR EXAMPLE, CONCOCTED THE ASTOUNDING THEORY THAT THE RECENT BOMBS IN AMMAN (OURTELS 1604 AND 1611) WERE SET OFF NOT BY CAIRO, NOT BY THE PLO, NOT EVEN BY DAMASCUS,

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-2-Amman 1650, January 3 (SECTION II OF II)
BUT AT THE INSTIGATION OF EX-PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI.

D. KHAMMASH, INCIDENTALLY, HAS INDICATED TO EMBOFF HE MAY RESIGN, HE IS SO FED UP WITH BEARING "SUCH IMPOSSIBLE BURDENS." THE KING

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 020 ~~SECRET~~
WILL PROBABLY BE ABLE TO TALK KHAMMASH OUT OF RESIGNING. THE KING'S UNCLE, DEPUTY C-IN-C SHARIF NASSER, WILL LIKELY BE ALL FOR GETTING RID OF KHAMMASH, BUT THE KING BELIEVES THAT KHAMMASH IS ONE OF THE ABLEST MEN IN JORDAN AND THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO DO WITHOUT HIM.

5. SURVEY MISSION. I INFORMED TELL, JUM'A AND KHAMMASH THAT WASHINGTON WAS WILLING TO SEND A SURVEY TEAM TO HELP THE GOJ EXAMINE THE WHOLE FORCE LEVEL-BUDGATARY RELATIONSHIP. AFTER I OUTLINED IN GENERAL TERMS THE SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE MISSION, KHAMMASH AND TELL REPLIED THEY DID NOT DESIRE THIS MISSION. KHAMMASH RECALLED A PREVIOUS MISSION WHICH VISITED JORDAN AND SAID THAT JORDANIAN EXPERIENCE HAD BEEN LESS THAN HAPPY IN CONNECTION WITH THE EARLIER MISSION. (I THINK, TOO, THAT THE GOJ IS SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT A US MILITARY MISSION AT THIS TIME MIGHT BE USED AGAINST GOJ BOTH BY HOSTILE AREA PROPAGANDISTS AND BY ELEMENTS IN JORDAN HOSTILE TO THE REGIME.)

6. BUDGET SUPPORT. I TOLD THE GROUP THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO FACE THE FACT THAT AVAILABILITY OF US AID WORLDWIDE WAS DECLINING RELATIVE TO DEMAND. I SAID THAT, IDEALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH THEM THE LEVEL OF OUR BUDGET SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL FEW YEARS WE THINK THAT, AS OF NOW, BUDGET SUPPORT WILL BE NEEDED. UNFORTUNATELY,

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 020A ~~SECRET~~
WE ARE UNABLE TO GIVE SUCH A MULTI-YEAR COMMITMENT. (THE PRIME MINISTER COMMENTED A MULTI-YEAR COMMITMENT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL SINCE JORDAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MUST BE PLANNED ON A MULTI-YEAR BASIS.) HOWDBJR, I DID GUARANTEE FULL CONSULTATIONS IN A FEW MONTHS TIME WITH THE GOJ REGARDING THE LEVEL OF BUDGET SUPPORT FY 1968 WHICH THE MISSION WOULD RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON. I NOTED THAT THE MISSION AND THE GOJ MIGHT WELL DISAGREE ON THE LEVEL OF BUDGET SUPPORT TO BE RECOMMENDED, BUT AT LEAST THE GOJ WOULD KNOW EXACTLY HOW THE MISSION ARRIVED AT ITS RECOMMENDATION. I ADDED THAT THE MISSION WAS READY RIGHT NOW TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOJ WAYS IN WHICH THE GOJ MIGHT HELP ITSELF BY DEFICIT FINANCING, INTERNAL LOANS, AND

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-3-Amman 1650, January 3 (SECTION II OF II)

CENTRAL BANK ISSUANCE OF DINARS AGAINST FUNDS WHICH MIGHT BE
BLOCKED IN A SPECIAL LETTER OF CREDIT. TELL SURPRISED ME BY THE
DEGREE OF EQUANIMITY WITH WHICH HE RECEIVED THIS LAST STATEMENT.
HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MOVING AHEAD WITH SUCH PLANS
AND MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THAT HE HOPED TO ISSUE DINARS AGAINST
FUNDS UNLOCKED BY SPECIAL LETTER OF CREDIT.

GP-3. BURNS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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DE RUQMKG 015A 0031540
ZNY SSSSS
R 031517Z JAN 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE/USCINCEAFSA
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/OSD
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQMII/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
RUIDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
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EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 108441

ON DECEMBER 31 AMBASSADOR AND CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION MURPHY HAD TWO HOUR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TELL, COURT MINISTER JUM'A AND CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH FOR DISCUSSION OF A WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFECTING GOJ-USG RELATIONS AND GOJ RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL. ON FOLLOWING DAY AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED SENATOR SYMINGTON TO SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH KING AND PRIME MINISTER. INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THESE CONVERSATIONS, AUGMENTED BY DECEMBER 28 SEPARATE INTERVIEW BETWEEN KING AND EMBOFF, WILL BE TREATED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THREE TELEGRAMS. TOPICS DISCUSSED INCLUDED:

- A. BUDGET PROBLEMS WITH WHICH GOJ IS GRAPPLING FACED WITH RISING COMPETITION BETWEEN DEMANDS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS;
- B. FORCE LEVELS FOR JORDANIAN ARMY;
- C. CONTINUING PRESSURES FOR ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO JORDAN;

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By RG/JL NARA, Date 7-13-01

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-2- AMMAN 1649, JANUARY 3

D. GOJ DEBTS TO USG FOR AIR AND GROUND PACKAGES AND HOW KING'S FORTHCOMING TRAVELS WILL ATTEMPT TO RAISE FUNDS TO MEET THESE OBLIGATIONS;

3. PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL OF ARAB SUMMITRY;

F. CONTINUED GOJ MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM;

G. INTENTIONS TOWARDS JORDAN OF ISRAEL, UAR, SYRIA, IRAQ AND THE PLO.

GP-3. BURNS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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DE RUQMKG 425A 3631550
ZNY SSSSS
R 291537Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
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1966 DEC 29 AM 11 27

EXDIS

OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE

REF DEPTTEL 109556

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. DATT ASKED CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH DECEMBER 29 WHETHER HE HAD RAISED ISSUE OF CLEARANCE FOR USAF AIRLIFT OF EQUIPMENT SCHEDULED FOR JORDAN DURING COURSE OF UAC MEETING IN CAIRO. KHAMMASH REPLIED THAT TIME HAD NOT BEEN PROPITIOUS DURING DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS IN CAIRO TO DISCUSS CLEARANCES FOR THESE AIRCRAFT AND SAID HE HOPED USG WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING MATTER WITH GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

GP-1. BURNS
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By Sj NARA, Date 85-02

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 376A 3571035
ZNY SSSSS
P 231030Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQMV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1584

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E X D I S

REF: DEPTELS 106924 AND 107002; AMMAN 1572

1. WE CONTACTED APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES EVENING DECEMBER 22 TO REQUEST THE TWO TEXTUAL CHANGES CITED IN DEPARTMENT REFTELS. ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH WAS BROADCAST ON 0500 GMT DECEMBER 23 ARABIC LANGUAGE NEWSCAST, REFLECTED BOTH CHANGES.
2. IN PARA 2 OF ANNOUNCEMENT, ATTRIBUTED TO "JORDANIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN," TEXT AS IT CAME OUT ON RADIO CONTAINED FURTHER, ESSENTIALLY MINOR, CHANGES IN ORIGINAL JORDANIAN TEXT SUBMITTED IN AMMAN 1572. PRINCIPAL CHANGE CONSISTED OF ASSERTION THAT EQUIPMENT BEING PROVIDED LARGELY FILLED JORDAN'S DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AGAINST ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT AND ARMOR.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 376A ~~SECRET~~
COMMUNIQUE AND MILITARY SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT WERE BROADCAST FOLLOWING NEWS ITEM ON DISSOLUTION OF JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT AND READING OF TEXTS OF LETTERS EXCHANGED BY PRIME MINISTER TELL AND KING ON OCCASION OF TELL'S SUBMISSION OF HIS CABINET'S RESIGNATION AND KING'S DESIGNATION OF TELL TO FORM NEW CABINET. LATTER SUBJECTS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

GP-1. BURNS
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PP RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEKDA
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ZNY SSSSS
P R 221350Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEKDA/DEFENSE/OSD
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
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1966 DEC 22 AM 10 43

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1577

REF DEPTTEL 106070 (NOTAL)

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. OUR STATEMENT ON GOJ DEFENSE BUDGET/JAA FORCE COSTS (AMMAN 1552 PARA 2C) WAS INCLUDED AS ONE ASSUMPTION BEHIND OUR ANALYSIS OF USES TO WHICH JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES (JAF) HAS PUT UAC MAINTENANCE MONEY. IT WAS BASED ON KHAMMASH STATEMENT TO DATT 19 DEC TO EFFECT HE COULD MEET COSTS OF 55,000 MAN JAF AT PRESENT PAY SCALE THROUGH END FY 1967 (PARA 3, EMBTEL 1538).

2. GOJ REQUESTED INCREASE IN BUDGET CEILING OCTOBER 1965 TO RESTORE CUTS IN APY ALLOWANCES FOR TROOPS RECRUITED BETWEEN PERIOD 1 OCTOBER 1964 THROUGH 30 NOVEMBER 1965 (ALLOWANCES

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 364A ~~SECRET~~
WERE REESTABLISHED FOR ALL PERSONNEL EFFECTIVE 1 DECEMBER 65).

3. THROUGHOUT PERIOD OF JAF EXPANSION THAT BEGAN UNDER UAC AUSPICES IN 1 (#), THE TRUE JAF BUDGET HAS BEEN DRAWN FROM MANY SOURCES INCLUDING THE GOJ DEFENSE BUDGET, US MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE, UAC MAINTENANCE X NDS, AND UAC ARMAMENT AND BUILDING FUNDS. GENERAL KHAMMASH HAS JUGGLED HIS ACCOUNTS IN WAYS THAT ONLY HE KNOWS; HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO PAY ALL BILLS TO DATE.

4. RE STATEMENT PENULTIMATE ECNTENCE REFTTEL, KOTMMASH IMPLIED TO DATT 19 DECEMBER THAT HE COULD ESTABLISH FORCE OF 55,000 PAT PRESENT JAA PAY SCALE IF ASSURED CONTINUED PAYMENT OF \$8.9 MILLION UAC MAINTENANCE MONEY. HE ADDED HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD

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NOTE: Handled as EXPI 1/15.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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By Sj, NARA, Date 8-5-02

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-2 -AMMAN 1577 DECEMBER 22

NOT RPT NOT PAY THE CONTEMPLATED 25 PERCENT ENLISTED PAY
RAISE OUT OF THESE FUNDS. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE UAC
HAS EXERTED CONTINUOUS AND HEAVY PRESSURE ON JORDAN TO INCREASE ITS
FORCESEVEN ABOVE DTT, \$55,000, USING CONSCRIPTS PAID AT MUCH
LOWER RATES TO EFFECT THE INCREASE WITHIN BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS.
JORDAN HAS PREFERRED TO LIMIT HER VOLUNTEER REGULAR ARMY FORCE
LEVEL TO THAT MANAGEABLE WITHIN FUNDS AVAILABLE RATHER THAN

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 364A ~~SECRET~~

GO TO CONSCRIPTION AND LOWER PAY. THE LOWER PAY EXPERIMENT TRIED
DURING 1965 WAS A TOTAL FAILURE. THE GOJ FEARS CONSCRIPTION
FOR ITS REGULAR ARMY WOULD LEAD TO AN UNACCEPTABLE CHANGE IN
THE BALANCE OF PALESTINIANS VERSUS EAST BANK JORDANIANS IN THE
JAF, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE JORDANIAN
MILITARY VIS-A-VIS THE REGIME.

GP-1. BURNS
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(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS

FROM MACOMBER

1. IN DISCUSSING JORDAN TACTICS FORTHCOMING CAIRO MEETING, HUSSEIN INDICATED HE TENTATIVELY PLANNING USE TWO LINES OF ARGUMENT. FIRST WOULD BE THAT US RESPONSE TO ARMS REQUEST HAS MARKEDLY ALTERED AND STRENGTHENED JORDANIAN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. SECOND WOULD BE THAT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS FROM ISRAEL WERE ALREADY MAKING CLEAR THAT INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOP INTO JORDAN COULD BE CASUS BELLI. THUS SMALL FOREIGN TROOP CONTINGENTS NOW PLANNED FOR JORDAN COULD TRIGGER FIGHTING BUT BE FAR TOO LOW IN NUMBERS TO BE OF REAL HELP. CONSEQUENTLY INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS AT THIS TIME (UNLESS IN LARGE NUMBERS--WHICH OTHER UAC MEMBERS WILL NOT PRODUCE) WILL SET BACK RATHER THAN ADVANCE ARAB CAUSE. IN VIEW OF THIS, JORDAN WILL INSIST ON NEW SUMMIT MEETING TO REVIEW

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 360A ~~SECRET~~
WISDOM OF FOREIGN TROOP ENTRY INTO JORDAN AT THIS TIME.

2. RE US OVERFLIGHTS (DEPTEL 104755), KING WILL INSTRUCT GENERAL KYUMMASH TO ADVISE SATURDAY UAC MEETING THAT US WILL BE REQUESTING SYRIAN AND/OR UAR OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND URGE THAT THESE BE GRANTED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

GP-1. BURNS
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By R6/JL NARA Date 7-13-01

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AIV PRIORITY 234
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1572

EXDIS

FROM MACOMBER

REF DEPTTEL 106068; EMBTEL 1570

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE WORKED OUT WITH KING HUSSEIN. FIRST PARAGRAPH WILL BE PUT OUT IN BOTH CAPITALS. SECOND PARAGRAPH WILL BE PUT OUT IN AMMAN ONLY. HUSSEIN BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO GET THIS ANNOUNCEMENT OUT AS FAR IN ADVANCE OF WEEKEND CAIRO MEETINGS AS POSSIBLE. HE WOULD LIKE TO ISSUE IT HERE FRIDAY MORNING AMMAN TIME. (GMT PLUS 2) EMBASSY WILL CONFIRM EXACT HOUR. IF DEPARTMENT HAS OBJECTION TO EITHER CONTENT OR TIMING PLEASE ADVISE EMBASSY SOONEST.

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS: PARAGRAPH ONE QUOTE AT THE REQUEST OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 353A ~~SECRET~~

HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE UNDER ITS EXISTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CERTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. THIS ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS BEING PROVIDED AS A MEANS OF ENABLING JORDAN TO ASSURE ITS SECURITY, AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO THE STABILITY OF THE AREA. A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE AIRLIFTED TO JORDAN OVER THE NEXT 30 TO 60 DAYS. IN ADDITION TO THESE DELIVERIES, THE SHIPMENT OF F-104 INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT, PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED BY JORDAN, WILL BE EXPEDITED. UNQUOTE

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By RG/TAHARA, Date 7-13-01

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3. PARAGRAPH TWO QUOTE A JORDANIAN MILITARY SPKESMAN SAID IN AMMAN TODAY, THAT THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT MENTIONED IN THE JOINT JORDANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE IS BOTH CONSIDERABLE IN IMPORTANCE AND SIZE. THAT MILITARY SECURITY WOULD NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DIVULGE THE NATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT IN DETAIL AND THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF IT, THAT WILL BE ARRIVING IN JORDAN OVER THE NEXT THIRTY TO SIXTY DAYS, WILL BE ARRIVING IN A MASSIVE AIR LIFT. UNQUOTE

4. AS SUGGESTED BY LANGUAGE IN SECOND PARAGRAPH PROPOSED STATEMENT KING CONCURS WITH WASHINGTON'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC

~~PAGE 3 RUOMKG 353A SECRET~~

MENTION OF AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE EXTENT HE WOULD FEEL HE WOULD HAVE TO REVEAL NATURE AND CONTENT OF MCNAMARA PACKAGE AT SATURDAY'S CAIRO UAC MEETING, GENERAL KHAMMASH HAS INFORMED US THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PLAY THIS BY EAR AT THE MEETING, BUT THAT HE WOULD REVEAL NO MORE OF THE DETAILS THAN THE EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MEETING MIGHT REQUIRE.

GP-1. BURNS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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EXDIS

FROM MACOMBER

REF EMBTEL 1517

1. IN COURSE OF OUR FINAL MEETING DECEMBER 21, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT ON REFLECTION HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO SUSPEND CONSTITUTION OR SERVE AT THIS TIME AS HIS OWN PRIME MINISTER. I SAID THAT I, TOO, HAD BEEN DOING SOME THINKING SINCE HE FIRST MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF THESE STEPS. INDICATED THAT I TOO HAD COME TO SIMILAR CONCLUSION, NOTING THAT THESE WERE ACTIONS BETTER RESERVED FOR MORE IN EXTREMIS SITUATION THAN IT SEEMED TO ME HE WAS FACING AT MOMENT. KING AGREED, BUT SAID REASON HE HAD EARLIER CONSIDERED THESE ACTIONS WAS THAT SOMETIMES IT BETTER TO TAKE DRASTIC MEASURES BEFORE LAST-DITCH SITUATION ACTUALLY WAS UPON HIM.

2. KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAS NOW PRETTY WELL MADE UP HIS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 350A ~~SECRET~~
MIND TO RETAIN WASFI TELL AS PRIME MINISTER. IN COURSE OF OUR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, KING SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT WASFI HAD MANY ENEMIES BUT HE ASSERTED THAT ON THE OTHER HAND A GREAT MANY PEOPLE RECOGNIZED TELL'S ABILITY, DYNAMISM AND DEVOTION, AND THAT THEY SUPPORT HIM. HUSSEIN RECOGNIZED, PARTICULARLY AS HE WOULD CONTINUE TO CALL SHOTS IN EITHER CASE, THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR RESHUFFLE THAT WOULD KEEP WASFI IN SENIOR POSITION IN GOVERNMENT, WHILE INSTALLING IN PRIME MINISTERSHIP SOMEONE LESS ABRASIVE TO SO MANY FACTIONS IN COUNTRY. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ANY CHANGE AT THIS TIME MIGHT TEND TO WEAKEN RATHER THAN STRENGTHEN SITUATION.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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By *102* NARA, Date *12-23-02*

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-2- AMMAN 1569, DECEMBER 21, 1966

3. KING DOES, HOWEVER, PLAN TO MAKE CHANGES IN CABINET. HE INDICATED THAT ONLY FOUR OR FIVE CURRENT MEMBERS WERE REALLY GOOD MEN AND THAT THE OTHERS WOULD BE REPLACED.

4. KING INDICATED THAT HE IS PREPARED TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT IN THE LIKELY EVENT THAT IT WILL NOT COOPERATE FURTHER WITH TELL. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT NEW ELECTIONS DID NOT HAVE TO BE CALLED UNTIL FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT, AND HENCE QUESTION OF SUSPENDING THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT HAVE TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 350A ~~SECRET~~
BE FACED FOR SOME TIME YET.

5. FINALLY, THE KING SAID THAT HE WOULD, PERHAPS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, CALL TOGETHER AN ASSEMBLY OF NOTABLES FROM ALL PARTS OF JORDAN, INCLUDING LEFTIST ELEMENTS, FOR A FRANK DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

GP-1. BURNS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

34

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Action

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1966 DEC 21 AM 6 52

Info

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DE RUQMKG 338A 3551105

ZNY SSSSS

O P 211101Z DEC 66

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1561

E X D I S

ASSUME YOU ARE ANSWERING STATE 106019. BURNS.

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

35

~~SECRET~~

83
Action

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Info

O P 201800Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1560

017725

1966 DEC 20 PM 4 24

EXDIS

REF EMBTEL 1553.

SUBJECT: STATIONING OF FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS IN JORDAN.

1. THE SAMU' ATTACK HAS CONVINCED THE KING, HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS ARMY THAT THEIR PRESENT FORCES LEVEL OF 50,000 MUST BE RAISED TO AT LEAST 60,000. WE UNDERSTAND THAT COMPETENT MILITARY ADVICE WOULD SAY THAT THE 60,000 LEVEL IS MILITARILY DESIRABLE TO FILL OUT JORDAN'S DEFENSES IF THE THESIS IS ACCEPTED THAT A SAMU' SCALE ATTACK COULD OCCUR AGAIN. JORDAN SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH SLACK IN HER PRESENT FORCES TO MAN HER FRONTIERS WITH ISRAEL AND PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST A SECOND SAMU'. IT IS OF INCIDENTAL INTEREST THAT THE PAKISTANI MILITARY DELEGATION, SENT HERE AS PROMISED BY PRESIDENT AYUB, HAS MADE AN INCREASE IN THE FORCE LEVEL ITS FIRST RECOMMENDATION.

2. THE KING FELT OBLIGED TO AGREE AT THE RECENT ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING TO THE STATIONING OF SAUDI AND IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN. (THE PROPOSED NUMBER OF UNITS TO BE STATIONED TOTALS 10,000 MEN.) HUSSEIN DID NOT LIKE GIVING HIS CONSENT; HE STILL DOES NOT LIKE IT; AND HE SEES HIS OWN INTERESTS AS BEST SERVED BY FINDING SOME WAY TO GET OUT OF THE AGREEMENT IF THE POLITICAL RISKS OF DOING SO DO NOT APPEAR TOO GREAT.

3. IN OUR OPINION, THERE COULD BE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF THE KING CHOOSES FLATLY AND OPENLY TO REVERSE HIMSELF AT NEXT SATURDAY'S UAC MEETING IN CAIRO. WE ARE EXERTING GREAT PRESSURE ON THE KING TO PRECLUDE HIS INCREASING HIS FORCE LEVEL TO 60,000. IF HUSSEIN ACCEPTS OUR POSITION ON HIS FORCE LEVELS, HUSSEIN'S REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT, THEREFORE, BE ABLE TO SAY THAT HUSSEIN HAS NOW DECIDED TO FOREGO FOREIGN TROOPS BECAUSE HE IS RAISING THE NECESSARY FORCES HIMSELF.

4. WE DOUBT THAT THE KING CAN WRIGGLE OUT OF HIS COMMITMENT WITHOUT AN OPEN CONFRONTATION AND CLASH, WITH THE ATTENDANT INTERNAL PROBLEMS SPELLED OUT IN OUR TELEGRAM 1553 AND PREVIOUS MESSAGES. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS REGARDING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF TERRORIST ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE REGIME ARE NOT REASSURING. WE RE-

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By us, NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1560 DECEMBER 20

CALL THE NUMBER OF WARNINGS WE RECEIVED FROM ARMY AUTHORITIES WHILE THE WEST BANK DEMONSTRATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS A FEW WEEKS AGO. THEY THEN CAUTIONED THAT THE ARMY DID NOT LIKE THE JOB OF SUPPRESSING DEMONSTRATORS AND SAID THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT IF THE DEMONSTRATIONS PERSISTED TOO LONG THE ARMY MIGHT EVENTUALLY FIND ITSELF TOO MUCH IN SYMPATHY WITH THE AIMS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS TO ACT AGAINST THEM.

5. IF HUSSEIN ADHERES TO HIS ORIGINAL AGREEMENT TO ADMIT FOREIGN TROOPS, THIS ACTION WOULD GIVE A MATERIAL BOOST TO RESTORING HIS POPULARITY AMONG HIS PEOPLE AND HIS ARMY. IN MILITARY TERMS, ADMISSION OF THESE TROOPS WOULD IMMEDIATELY FILL THE CURRENT MANPOWER GAP. EVEN IF HE SHOULD SHOW THE MOST SERIOUS INTENT TO BUILD UP HIS OWN FORCES BY 10,000, SUCH A BUILD UP WILL TAKE HUSSEIN CONSIDERABLE TIME, AT LEAST AS LONG AS ONE YEAR. TO ADMIT FOREIGN TROOPS WILL ALSO BE A POPULAR MOVE IN THOSE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CIRCLES WHICH DEPLORE THE CURRENT STARK POLITICAL ISOLATION IN WHICH JORDAN FINDS HERSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD. PART OF THIS ISOLATION IS OF HER OWN MAKING AND PART IS OWING TO THE ENMITY OF THE QUOTE PROGRESSIVE UNQUOTE ARAB STATES. BUT WHATEVER THE CAUSE, THE PRESENT REALITY IS A SOURCE OF DEEP CONCERN TO MANY JORDANIANS.

6. IF THE KING SHOULD NOT RESIST THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO JORDAN, THERE IS, OF COURSE, ALWAYS THE CHANCE THAT THE IRAQIS AND SAUDIS WOULD THEMSELVES GET COLD FEET, OR INTRODUCE FORCES IN LESS NUMBER THAN ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED. HUSSEIN WOULD NONE- THELESS HAVE GAINED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY.

7. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MEASURES THE GOJ COULD TAKE TO MINIMIZE THE THREAT THAT FOREIGN TROOPS MIGHT POSE TO THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF THE REGIME, AND WE ARE SURE THE GOJ WOULD BE MOST CAREFUL TO TAKE THESE STEPS.

8. THE MAJOR CONCERN IN STATIONING FOREIGN TROOPS IN JORDAN, AS WE SEE IT, IS THE ISRAELI REACTION. WE DOUBT THAT THESE FOREIGN TROOPS, MANY OF WHICH THE GOJ MIGHT PLAN TO PLACE ON THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN ARMISTICE LINE, WOULD IN FACT BE ANY LESS CAUTIOUS THAN JORDANIAN TROOPS. WE CAN ONLY HOPE, AS WE SUGGESTED FOUR WEEKS AGO IN EMBTEL 1181, THAT IF FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS ARE INTRODUCED INTO JORDAN THE ISRAELIS COULD BE CONDITIONED TO TOLERATE THE SITUATION UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HUSSEIN MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO GET RID OF THEM.

9. ON BALANCE, IT IS THE EMBASSY'S OPINION THAT IN THE SITUATION

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-3- AMMAN 1560 DECEMBER 20

HUSSEIN FINDS HIMSELF

TODAY IT COULD BE SAFER FOR HIM-- AND, IT COULD BE ARGUED, FOR STABILITY IN THE AREA--IF HE DOES NOT OPENLY AND FRONTALLY OPPOSE THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS AT THIS TIME. AND IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD SIT STILL FOR IT, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS IS LESS OF A DANGER TO HUSSEIN'S REGIME AT THIS TIME THAN KEEPING THEM OUT.

FROM MACOMBER:

10. FOREGOING EMBASSY ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ME AND MY COMMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:
IF THE ISRAELI REACTION TO FOREIGN TROOPS COULD BE HANDLED, AND IF NUMBERS OF UAC GROUND TROOPS ACTUALLY COMING TO JORDAN TURNED OUT TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS THAN PLANNED, AND IF UAC SUPERSONICS WERE KEPT OUT OF JORDAN, I WOULD AGREE THAT THIS SITUATION WHILE OBVIOUSLY NOT A DESIRABLE ONE, COULD TURN OUT TO BE MANAGABLE. BUT THESE ARE, OF COURSE, SERIOUS QUOTE IF'S UNQUOTE, AND I AM ~~SOMEWHAT~~ MORE CONCERNED THAN IS EMBASSY OVER BOTH SHORT AND LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS TO AREA STABILITY OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN JORDAN. I THEREFORE BELIEVE IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE U.S. OBJECTIVE TO KEEP THESE TROOPS OUT ACW THATUQN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ASK HUSSEIN TO DO ALL HE CAN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. I HAVE HOWEVER SPECIFICALLY INDICATED TO HIM THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR HIS PLAYING A WAITING GAME PARTICULARLY IF HE FELT THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE IRAQIS IN THE END BACKING OUT. I RETURNED TO THIS POINT IN OUR MEETING LAST EVENING AND ASKED HIM IF HE COULD NOT FIND A WAY--STILL WITH THE INTENTION IN THE END OF KEEPING FOREIGN TROOPS OUT OF JORDAN--OF TAKING AN EQUIVOCAL POSITION AT NEXT SATURDAY'S CAIRO MEETING. AS OF LAST EVENING HUSSEIN DID NOT SEE HOW HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO BUT THIS IS A MATTER I WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH HIM FURTHER WHEN WE MEET TOMORROW. IN CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE WAY I HAVE WORDED THE CONDITION ON THE FOREIGN TROOPS WITH RESPECT TO THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE IS THE CORRECT ONE BUT IF IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE DEPARTMENT THINKS OTHERWISE, PLEASE ADVISE.

GP-1. BURNS

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:32 PM 12/20/66

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

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Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED

12/19/66 5:30 PM JRB

NNNNZCZRLDD 79VV DKA150QMA663
00 RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEKDA
DE RUQMKG 302A 3531535
ZNY SSSSS
OR 191525Z DEC 66 ZDG CORRECTED COPY

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEKDA/DEFENSE/OSD
RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
STATE GRNC

016480

1966 DEC 19 PM 12 48

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1538

EXDIS

REF DEPTTEL 104754 (NOTAL)

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. IN SEPARATE MEETING WITH DATT 19 DEC JAA C/S MG AMER KHAMMASH CLARIFIED JORDAN ARMED FORCE (JAF) STRENGTHS AS FOLLOWS:

A. UAC FORCE GOAL FOR JORDAN SPECIFIED UNITS TO BE ADDED RATHER THAN ANY PARTICULAR TOTAL FIGURE, BUT IMPLIED A TOTAL ULTIMATE JAF STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 75,000. THIS STRENGTH GOAL WAS BASED ON RETENTION OF THE 8,500 MAN NATIONAL GUARD AND ADDITION OF MANY NEW REGULAR ARMY UNITS.

B. THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF THE JAF AS PRESENTLY ORGANIZED IS

55,000. THIS INCLUDES THE PRESENT 12-BRIGADE ARMY, THE SMALL COAST GUARD, AND THE AIR FORCE THIS WAS THE JAF FORCE GOAL PRIOR TO SAMU AND ALTHOUGH IT NEVER SATISFIED THE UAC, IT WAS THE LIMIT THE GOJ FELT IT COULD SUPPORT WITH THE INDIGENOUS DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE UAC FUNDS.

C. THE CURRENT ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF THE JAF IS 50,000 I.E., 5000 SHORT OF AUTHORIZED FULL STRENGTH.

COMMENT: THE BREAK-

DOWN CITED IN REFTTEL IS ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE AS TO CURRENT PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTHS OF THE THREE SERVICES AND IS BASED ON DATT ESTIMATES WHICH ONLY 800 MEN OVER KHAMMASH FIGURE.)

2. KHAMMASH STATED QUOTE I DESIRE TO MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-43

By Sj NARA, Date 8-5-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 2538, DECEMBER 19

UNQUOTE THAT PRESENT REQUIREMENTS FOR INCREASE OF JAF STRENGTH BY 5000 MEN AS OUTLINED BY KING HUSEDIF TO AMB MACOMBER IN DEC 18 MEETING WERE FOR 5000 MEN OVER AND ABOVE THE CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 55,000. HE IN FACT ASKING FOR 60,000 MAN ARMED FORCE.

3. KHAMMASH STATED THAT HE MUST BRING PRESENT UNITS UP TO AUTHORIZED STRENGTH (I.E. 55,000) AND THAT HE COULD ABSORB THE COSTS INVOLVED THROUGH THE END OF CSE1967. HOWEVER, HE REQUIRED AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM THE ADDITION OF 5000 MORE

TROOPS ABOVE THE 55,000 TO ACTIVATED THREE NEW ARTILLERY BATTALIONS TO MAN EQUIPMENT OFFERED IN THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE AND TO REESTABLISH THE FOURTH RIFLE COMPANY IN EACH INFANTRY BATTALION THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO MINIMUM DEFENSE OF THE LONG BORDER AND TO SATISFY INTENSE PRESSURES THROUGHOUT ALL STRATA OF THE ARMY FORCES IN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. HE PLANS TO ABSORB THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT OFFERED IN EXISTING UNITS, BUT COULD NOT ELIMINATE ANY EXISTING UNITS TO ACTIVATE THE THREE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS WHICH HE BADLY NEEDS. HE ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE COULD ABSORB THE COSTS OF BRINGING PRESENT UNITS UP TO STRENGTH (I.E., FROM 50,000 TO 55,000), HE HAD NO FUNDS TO FINANCE THE REQUIRED INCREASE FROM 55,000 TO 60,000

GP-1. BURNS
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE 12/19/66, 1:30PM.
CORRECTED PORTIONS PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE 6:00PM

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

37

3

Action

SS

Info

SECRET

NNNNVV QMA420VV KGA705

RR RUEHC

DE RUQMKG 287 3530955

ZNY SSSSS

R 190938 DEC 66

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1524

EXDIS

REF OURTEL 1523

1. IN COURSE OF SECOND HUSSEIN-ACOMBER MEETING YESTERDAY,
KING INFORMED US THAT GENERAL KHAMMASH' INSTRUCTIONS WOULD
REFLECT KING'S UNDERTAKING CITED EMBTEL 1517, PARA 3().

GP-3. BURNS

BT

016092
1966 DEC 19 AM 6 02

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RG/JL NARA, Date 7-13-01

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

38

81
Action

~~SECRET~~

002

Control:

16682

Rec'd:

December 19, 1966

5:17PM

SS
Info

FROM: AMMAN

ACTION: DEPARTMENT

AMMAN UNN

DECEMBER 19

IMMEDIATE

REFERENCE: DEPARTMENT 104831

HEREWITH REQUESTED CLARIFICATION PARA 3(A) OF AMMAN
TELEGRAM 1517:

PARA THREE (A) BEGINS AT: (A) OUR CONDITION THAT KING
STRIVE.....AND ENDS AT "WHILE THIS GOVERNMENT WAS IN OFFICE."

BURN

MD/1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
RCJSL NLJ-S 98001
By ~~713~~ NARA, Date 7-2-01

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

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Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 232A 3481415
ZNY SSSSS
O R 141410Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
BT

1 2 2 8 0

1966 DEC 14 AM 10 09

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1489

EXDIS

REF STATE 102121 AND 102122

1. HAVE SEEN THE KING AND INFORMED HIM OF AMBASSADOR MACOMBER'S MISSION. KING LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MACOMBER SATURDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 17. KING UNDERSTANDS THE DESIRE THAT AT THIS FIRST MEETING ONLY HE, AMBASSADOR MACOMBER AND I BE PRESENT.

2. IF AGREEABLE TO AMBASSADOR MACOMBER, FRIDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 16, WILL BE DEVOTED TO MEETING WITH KEY MEMBERS OF EMBASSY STAFF, FOLLOWED BY A WORKING (STAG) DINNER WITH SAME GROUP AT MY HOUSE.

3. FYI: ROYAL JORDANIAN FLIGHT 401 ARRIVES AMMAN AT 11:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, SINCE THE FLIGHT STOPS FIRST AT JERUSALEM.

GP-4. BURNS

BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 10:25 AM, 12/14/66.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RGJL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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48

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~000551028
1966 DEC 17 AM 10 28

VV VVGA30MA406
00 RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEKDA RUEIVCR
DE RUQMKG 191A 3451340
ZNY SSSSS
O R 111320Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUDAC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
RUQTGN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1456 SECTION ONE OF TWO

EXDIS

NOFORN

1. I WAS CALLED TO SEE THE KING LATE YESTERDAY EVENING AT HOMAR, THE KING'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE OUTSIDE AMMAN. EMBOFF ACCOMPANIED ME.
2. THE MEETING WITH THE KING LASTED ONE HOUR. I HAVE NEVER SEEN HIM SO GRIM OR SO OBVIOUSLY UNDER PRESSURE. IT WAS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 191A-~~SECRET~~
APPARENT THAT HE HAD TO USE THE UTMOST IN SELF-RESTRAINT TO KEEP HIS EMOTIONS FROM ERUPTING OPENLY. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION HE HAD TEARS IN HIS EYES. THEN HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS OF DISCONTENT IN THE FORM OF DEMONSTRATIONS HAD ABATED, PRESSURES UNDER THE SURFACE WERE IN FACT BUILDING UP. THE DISCONTENT ON THE WEST BANK IS DEEPER THAN HE HAD IMAGINED. "THE GROWING SPLIT BETWEEN EAST BANK AND WEST BANK HAS RUINED MY DREAMS." THE ONLY THING THAT BINDS THE ARMY TO HIM, HE SAID, IS TRADITIONAL LOYALTY, BUT THIS TIE IS DAILY GROWING WEAKER. "THERE IS NEAR DESPAIR IN THE ARMY AND THE ARMY NO LONGER HAS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By us, NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

-2-Amman 1456, December 11 (SECTION I OF II)

CONFIDENCE IN ME. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT THE ARMY IS OVER-EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL SECURITY, AND THIS IS CAUSING THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE TO BECOME INCREASINGLY FED UP, AN OBVIOUS OBJECTIVE OF THOSE OPPOSED TO THIS REGIME." THE KING OBSERVED THAT HE IS BESET ON ALL SIDES BY ENEMIES, OUTSIDE JORDAN AND WITHIN JORDAN, WITH SYRIA OPENLY CALLING FOR HIS OVERTHROW, PUBLICLY OFFERING ARMS FOR THE PURPOSE, AND COVERTLY INFILTRATING ARMS AND TERRORISTS INTO JORDAN TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 191A ~~SECRET~~
HELP ACHIEVE THE PURPOSE.

4. THE KING SAID HE SIMPLY MUST HAVE WASHINGTON'S DECISION ON HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. NOR COULD HE LONGER FOREGO THE PRESENCE AND HELP OF GENERAL KHAMMASH IN AMMAN AT THIS CRITICAL TIME. GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON FOR NEARLY TWO WEEKS, AND AS YET HE HAS BEEN GIVEN NO ANSWER. KHAMMASH'S APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAS BEEN TWICE POSTPONED, AND THE APPOINTMENT IS NOW SET FOR WEDNESDAY. THE KING IS AWARE THAT THE ISRAELI FORMIN IS VISITING WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK, BEFORE WEDNESDAY. THE KING WISHES GENERAL KHAMMASH TO LEAVE WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY EVENING, AND WHATEVER ANSWER GENERAL KHAMMASH IS GIVEN BEFORE HE LEAVES WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE KING AS THE FINAL ANSWER. TIME IS RUNNING OUT RPT OUTON HIM, SAID THE KING, AND HE CAN NO LONGER DELAY MAKING DECISIONS ON THE COURSES OF ACTION HE MUST TAKE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES A TEMPORIZING ANSWER TO KHAMMASH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS A NEGATIVE ANSWER.

5. IF GENERAL KHAMMASH RECEIVES AN ANSWER "WHICH IS NOT RESPONSIVE," THE KING WOULD NOT GO TO WASHINGTON, AS, UNTIL

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 191A ~~SECRET~~
RECENTLY, HE HAD CONTEMPLATED DOING SHOULD KHAMMASH FAIL TO GET A SATISFACTORY ANSWER. THE KING SAID HE GREATLY ADMIRES PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND IT WOULD GIVE HIM GREAT PERSONAL SATISFACTION TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY. BUT THE PRESSURES BUILDING UP ON HIM ARE SO GREAT, HE SAID, THAT

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-3-Amman 1456, December 11 (SECTION I OF II)

THERE IS NO LONGER TIME FOR A TRIP TO WASHINGTON. NOR, IF KHAMMASH IS UNSUCCESSFUL, WOULD A TRIP BY HIM, HE REFLECTED, WITH ITS ATTENDANT PUBLICITY, SERVE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER OF US. FOR A DECADE, THE KING SAID, WE AND HE HAVE BEEN PARTNERS. AND IN THIS CRITICAL HOUR WE ARE THE ONLY FRIEND TO WHOM HE CAN TURN. IF WE CANNOT HELP HIM, HE SAID, THEN HE MUST MOVE QUICKLY TO AN ALTERNATE COURSE. "THE RIGHT ANSWER FROM THE US WOULD ENABLE ME TO JUSTIFY MY PAST POLICY TO MY ARMY, TO MY PEOPLE, TO THE PLO, AND TO EVERYONE ELSE. IF I DO NOT GET THE RIGHT ANSWER, EVEN I MUST CONCLUDE MY PAST POLICY HAS BEEN A FAILURE."

6. SINCE HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING POSTPONEMENT OF THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO, THE KING SAID, AND SINCE KHAMMASH HAS NOT GOTTEN AN ANSWER FROM US, THE KING HAD FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MAKE A CONCESSION TO

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 191A-S-E-C-R-E-T

THE PRESSURES HE WAS SUBJECTED TO AT THE CAIRO MEETING. FRIDAY HE HAD HAD TO INSTRUCT HIS DELEGATION IN CAIRO TO AGREE TO THE STATIONING OF SAUDI AND IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN. THE KING SAID THAT THREE BRIGADES OF THESE FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS WOULD BE INVOLVED. IN RETURN FOR THIS CONCESSION THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL HAD AGREED TO MEET JORDAN'S DEMANDS, WHICH INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, THE STRENGTHENING OF EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE ISRAELI BORDER AREA (PRESUMABLY SINAI). THE STATIONING OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS IN JORDAN WOULD NOT COME ABOUT FOR A LEAST TWO MONTHS, SAID HUSSEIN, SINCE A GREAT DEAL HAD TO BE WORKED OUT FIRST. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER IN THE EVENT THE US WERE RESPONSIVE TO HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE HE WOULD NONETHELESS HAVE TO GO THROUGH WITH THE STATIONING OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS IN JORDAN. THE KING REPLIED THAT HE SUPPOSED HE MIGHT SOMEHOW BE ABLE TO HEAD IT OFF DURING THE COURSE OF THE TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO COME IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TO SEND TO HIS DELEGATION IN CAIRO.

7. THE KING SAID THAT IF THE US CANNOT BE RESPONSIVE TO HIS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-Amman 1456, December 11 (SECTION I OF II)

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 191A ~~SECRET~~

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, HE SAW THREE COURSES OPEN TO HIM.

8. THE FIRST COURSE WAS TO TURN TO THE EAST. "I WILL NOT TRY TO MISLEAD YOU, NOR TO BLACKMAIL YOU, BY TELLING YOU I WILL TURN TO THE EAST. I CANNOT AND WILL NOT DO SO. MY REIGN HAS BEEN DEVOTED TOWARDS BUILDING JORDAN TO BE A SELF-SUFFICIENT, MODERATE, EVOLUTIONARY STATE. I HAVE ALL MY LIFE FOUGHT THE EAST. IF IN THE END JORDAN FEELS SHE MUST TURN TO THE EAST, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER SOMEONE ELSE, NOT WITH ME."

9. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, SAID THE KING, WAS TO "BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES AND TAKE ON EVERYONE WHO IS WORKING AGAINST ME AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME." THIS WAS A COURSE WHICH TEMPTED HIM, SAID THE KING, BECAUSE HE WAS READY FOR A FIGHT AND HE DID NOT CARE ABOUT HIS OWN FATE. BUT, HE SAID, "THE DECK IS STACKED AGAINST ME AND I DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO COMMIT THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN LOYAL TO ME TO A COURSE WHICH WOULD LIKELY MEAN THEIR DOOM."

GP-3. BURNS

BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 12:00 p.m., December 11.
Passed White House at 12:55 p.m., December 11.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

02

48
Action

SS
Info

QMA407 KGA326
OO RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEKDA RUEIVCR
DE RUQMKG 192A 3451410
ZNY SSSSS
O R 111320Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD
RUEIVCR:AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUQNVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
RUQTBN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
DT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1456 SECTION TWO OF TWO

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1966 DEC 11 AM 11 41

EXDIS

NOFORN

10. THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE, SAID THE KING, IS THE ONE WHICH COMMENDS ITSELF TO HIM AS THE BEST. HE WOULD DECLARE THE WEST BANK A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE" AND CALL ON ALL ARAB STATES, AND THE PLO, TO FURNISH FORCES TO BE STATIONED ON THE WEST BANK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THAT AREA. JORDAN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 192A ~~SECRET~~
WOULD LEAVE ON THE WEST BANK ITS PRO RATA CONTRIBUTION OF FORCES, AND WITHDRAW THE REMAINDER OF ITS FORCES, NOW STATIONED ON THE WEST BANK, TO THE EAST BANK. THE KING WOULD NOT, HE SAID, MAKE THIS AS AN OFFER, TO BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED BY THE PALESTINIANS AND BY THE OTHER ARAB STATES. HE WOULD SIMPLY ANNOUNCE THIS IS WHAT HE HAS DECIDED TO DO, AND IF OTHER ARAB STATES DO NOT FURNISH THE NECESSARY DEFENSE FORCES, THAT WOULD JUST BE TOO BAD. A LEAST THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A REDOUBT OF THE EAST BANK, HE SAID, AND "THIS MIGHT OFFER ME ONE LAST CHANCE TO SERVE MY CAUSE." THE KING OBSERVED THAT PRIME MINISTER TELL THOUGHT OF THE "MILITARY DIRECTORATE" IDEA AS A MEANS OF CALLING THE BLUFF OF PALESTINIANS AND OF

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-2-Amman 1456, December 11 (SECTION II OF II)

OTHER ARAB STATES. HUSSEIN INDICATED HE DIAGNOSES THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AS MORE CRITICAL THAN DOES TELL. HE INDICATED FURTHER THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT ESTABLISHING A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE," AND NOT AS A MEANS TO CALL A BLUFF. THE KING SAID HE WAS QUITE AWARE THAT IF HE WEST BANK WERE TRANSFORMED INTO A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE". MUCH AS HE ENVISAGES, ISRAEL MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HE SAID THIS WAS A CHANCE HE AND ALL THE ARABS WOULD SIMPLY

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 192A-~~SECRET~~

HAVE TO TAKE. TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN THE FACE OF AN UNFAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE.

1. COMMENT: THERE WERE MANY INDICATIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION THAT THE KING HAS BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF US MOTIVATIONS AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN. HE IS PERTURBED THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO GIVE GENERAL KHAMMASH AN ANSWER DURING THE FIRST WEEK THE GENERAL WAS IN WASHINGTON. I GATHER HIS APPREHENSIONS ARE TWOFOLD: (A) THAT, AS HE SEES IT, WE ARE SO CLOSELY TIED TO ISRAEL, AND THE ISRAELIS CAN SUENATE SUCH PRESSURE ON US, THAT THIS IS A POWERFUL INHIBITING FACTOR IN OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE KING'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE; (B) THAT THE KING BELIEVES THE US DOES NOT HAVE FULL APPRECIATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION CONCERNING JORDAN OR OF WHAT THE KING CONSIDERS THE POTENT DESIRES OF OTHERS TO REPLACE OUR INFLUENCE IN JORDAN, OR EVEN TO LIQUIDATE JORDAN.

12. I THINK WE CAN TAKE AT FACE VALUE THE KING'S STATEMENT THAT WE MUST GIVE GENERAL KHAMMASH AN ANSWER BY WEDNESDAY AND THAT THE ANSWER WE GIVE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE KING TO

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 192A-~~SECRET~~
BE THE FINAL ANSWER.

13. I REGRET I CANNOT SAY WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WHAT THE KING AND GENERAL KHAMMASH WOULD CONSIDER TO BE A "SATIS

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-3-Amman 1456, December 11 (SECTION II OF II)

FACTORY RESPONSE." SINCE GENERAL KHAMMASH IS IN WASHINGTON, AND HE IS THE KEY MAN IN THIS REGARD AND THE KING WILL LIKELY ABIDE BY KHAMMASH'S JUDGMENT, THE DEPARTMENT IS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN EMBASSY AMMAN TO PROBE THE ANSWER. I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THE PACKAGE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TEL 1415 REPRESENTS MINIMUM, AND I CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT EVEN THAT PACKAGE IS UNDERSHOOTING WHAT KHAMMASH AND THE KING CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM.

14. THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINE ENTITY IS NOT A NEW IDEA WITH THE KING; HE WAS TURNING OVER SOMETHING OF THIS SORT IN HIS MIND LAST SUMMER IN POLITICAL RAHER HAN MILITARY TERMS AS A MEANS OF COPING WITH HIS WEST BANK PROBLEM.

15. THE KING SAID HE HOPED THE VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING LAST EVENING COULD BE BROUGHT TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3. BURNS

BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 12:02 p.m., December 11.
Passed White House at 12:57 p.m. December 11.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

80
Action

SS

Info

EIC534QMA541

PP RUEHC

DE RUQMKG 125A 3401750

ZNY SSSSS

P R 061735Z DEC 66

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA

RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD

INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1415

EXDIS

NOFORN

DISAFFECTION IN THE JAA

- 1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)
1. [REDACTED] THE NATURE OF THE DISAFFECTION IN THE JAA IS THREEFOLD, AND THE DISAFFECTION AFFECTS THE MAJORITY OF ARMY OFFICERS AT ALL LEVELS, BELOW THE MOST SENIOR. FIRST IT IS HELD THAT THE KING AND THE REGIME ARE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ENGAGING ISRAEL MILITARILY IN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 125A ~~SECRET~~
THE EVENT OF ANOTHER ISRAELI ATTACK, AND ARE, FURTHERMORE, UNWILLING TO TAKE EVEN MODEST DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST AN ISRAELI INCURSION. SECOND, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE KING IS BASICALLY INTERESTED IN RETAINING HIS OWN THRONE AND THAT HE VIEWS HIS ARMY AS THE PRIMARY INSTRUMENT TO SECURE HIS CONTINUED REIGN. THIRD, IT IS CONSIDERED THE KING FEARS THAT INCIDENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS MIGHT ESCALATE AND THAT THIS COULD COST HIM HIS THRONE. THE CONCLUSION IS THAT KING HUSSEIN IS QUITE WILLING TO SACRIFICE THE DEFENSE OF HIS COUNTRY FOR

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-42

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

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-2- AMMAN 1415, DECEMBER 6

THE SAKE OF HIS THRONE.

2. DEGREE OF DISAFFECTION - WE ESTIMATE THAT DISAFFECTION IN THE MILITARY EXTENDS TO NEARLY

ALL PALESTINIANS IN THE OFFICER CORPS, AND TO PERHAPS FIFTY TO SIXTY PERCENT OF NORTHERN AND URBAN OFFICERS FROM THE EAST BANK. THE ONLY GROUP WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR TO SHARE THIS CONCLUSION ABOUT THE KING ARE THE OFFICERS FROM THE SOUTHERN BEDOUIN TRIBES, A GROUP WHICH COMPRISES ABOUT 20 PER CENT OF THE ARMY.

3. DISAFFECTION IN THE ARMY IS NOT NEW. THE SAMU' INCIDENT SERVED ONLY TO REINFORCE THE ABOVE CONVICTIONS AND HELPED PERSUADE MANY FENCE SITTERS THAT THIS VIEW WAS CORRECT.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 125A ~~SECRET~~

THE SUBSIDENCE OF DEMONSTRATIONS HAS NOT REDUCED THE CONVICTION OF THE DISAFFECTED. (THE ONLY BENEFIT THAT SUBSIDENCE OF DEMONSTRATIONS MAY HAVE HAD IS TO REMOVE AN IRRITANT, SINCE THE ARMY HAS BEEN UNHAPPY ABOUT PLAYING THE POLICE ROLE WHICH IT HAS BEEN FORCED TO PLAY DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS.)

4. KHAMMASH MISSION - IF KHAMMASH RETURNS FROM WASHINGTON WITH NO PACKAGE AT ALL, OR WITH ONLY A TOKEN ONE, THE REGIME AND THE ARMY WOULD CONSIDER HIS MISSION A FAILURE. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THE REGIME WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO TURN ELSEWHERE, REGARDING THIS AS A BETTER GAMBLE THAN CONTINUING WITH THE STATUS QUO. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE REGIME AND THE ARMY WOULD THEN BE CONVINCED THAT IT COULD NEVER AGAIN RELY ON THE U.S. FOR ARMS.

5. THE CRISIS, IN TERMS OF DISAFFECTION AMONG THE MILITARY, HAS NOT ABATED SINCE KHAMMASH DEPARTED JORDAN. IT IS MISLEADING TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FROM THE KING'S RECENT CONFIDENT APPEARANCE; THIS REPRESENTS NOTHING MORE THAN A POSE HE IS STRIKING IN AN EFFORT TO APPEAR STRONG IN THE FACE OF THE ATTACKS UPON HIM. HIS POSTURE HAS NO EFFECT

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 125A ~~SECRET~~
ON THE INTERNAL CAUSES OF DISAFFECTION.

6. THERE IS A CONVICTION AMONG SOME OF THE DISAFFECTED IN THE

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-3- AMMAN 1415, DECEMBER 6

MILITARY THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION IS TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME AND ESTABLISH CLOSER POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIES WITH THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. ALSO, THERE EXIST THROUGHTOUT THE ARMY STRONG PRESSURES TO BUILD UP JORDAN'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AS WELL AS TO REDEPLOY EXISTING CAPABILITY FOR THE NATION'S DEFENSE. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THESE PRESSURES HAVE NOT CRYSTALLIZED INTO DEMANDS FOR SPECIFIC ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT. NONETHELESS, THE ARMY AS A WHOLE IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING

EQUIPMENT OF A DEFENSIVE NATURE, SUCH AS ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY, MINES, MEDIUM ARTILLERY AND IMPROVED AIR CAPABILITY. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO MAN THE DEFENSES AND PROVIDE SOME RESERVE FORCES FOR A COUNTER-ATTACK ARE ALSO DESIRED. SINCE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP TO PRESERVE THE REGIME AND, EQUALLY, TO FOSTER A PRO-WEST ORIENTATION IN ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME, THE LEADERSHIP WILL ALMOST INEVITABLY BE DRAWN FROM THE MILITARY, WE RECOMMEND THAT WE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO THE KHAMMASH MISSION:

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 125A ~~SECRET~~

(A) FURNISH THE JAA WITH PACKAGE OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT-- COSTING APPROXIMATELY 20 MILLION DOLLARS;

(B) INCREASE ANNUAL BUDGET SUPPORT BY A LEVEL OF 16 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE THE NECESSARY DEFENSIVE BUILDUP.

(C) FOLLOW THROUGH WITH DELIVERIES OF PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED GROUND AND AIR PACKAGES ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED WILL DO THEIR UTMOST TO OBTAIN REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE U.S. EITHER THROUGH THE UAC OR SAUDI/KUWAITI BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

(D) AGREE TO NEGOTIATE LATER ON THOSE ITEMS UPON WHICH WE CANNOT REACH AGREEMENT. THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF FUTURE PRESSURES, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ON THE GOJ, DICTATES THAT, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE SHOULD LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. THE DEVELOPING ABILITY OF THE JAA TO ABSORB ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS ALSO A FACTOR WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

(E) FINALLY, THE USG WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT IN DISPOSITIONS ALONG THE WEST BANK. THIS IS A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR THE KING IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE HE IS AT LEAST AS SERIOUS ABOUT DEFENDING

~~SECRET~~

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-4- AMMAN 1415, DECEMBER 6

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 125A ~~SECRET~~
HIS COUNTRY AS HE IS HIS THRONE.

7. IT IS NOT OUT OF PLACE HERE TO NOTE THE TRUISM THAT WHILE ALL PLOTTERS ARE DISAFFECTED, NOT ALL DISAFFECTED ARE PLOTTERS. FURTHERMORE, SHOULD THESE OFFICERS TAKE OVER THE REGIME, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THEY WOULD PURSUE A MORE MILITANT POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL. A BASIC DESIRE WITH THEM, INsofar AS WE CAN DETERMINE, IS TO HAVE A GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN THAT IS MORE SERIOUSLY DEDICATED TO THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY THAN THE PRESENT REGIME APPEARS TO THEM TO BE.

GP-1. BURNS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET

Action

JNNVVV QMA653VV KGA972

PP RUEHC RUEKDA

DE RUQMLG 090A 3391800

ZNY SSSSS

Info

P 051752Z DEC 66

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUEKDA/DEFENSE/OSD PRIORITY

RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1392

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1966 DEC 6 AM 4 54

02

EXDIS

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS EVENING. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN WAS WITH HIM.

2. THE KING SAID HE HAD HEARD VERY LITTLE FROM GENERAL KHAMMASH. HE PRAYED FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE KHAMMASH MISSION. HE, AND HIS ARMY, WERE UNALTERABLY DETERMINED TO IMPROVE JORDAN'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY "AT ANY COST."

3. THE ARAB LEAGUE JOINT DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING WHICH CONVENES IN CAIRO WAS PRESENTING THE KING WITH A GREAT PROBLEM. (OURTEL 1382). HIS EFFORTS TO POSTPONE THE MEETING

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 090A ~~SECRET~~

WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, HE SAID, AND HE WAS THEREFORE INSTRUCTING HIS REPRESENTATIVES TO USE DELAYING TACTICS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT HIS HAND BEING FORCED UNTIL THE OUTCOME OF THE KHAMMASH MISSION IS KNOWN. HE WAS UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE FROM THE WEST BANK, FROM THE ARMY, AND FROM CERTAIN OF HIS ARAB NEIGHBORS. THE OUTCOME OF THE KHAMMASH MISSION WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN HOW HE WILL BE REQUIRED TO HANDLE JORDAN'S AFFAIRS INTERNALLY AND VIS-A-VIS OTHER ARAB STATES.

GP-3. BURNS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By R661, NARA, Date 7-13-01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43

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Action

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NEA RR RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEHCR RUEIVCR RUEKDA

1966 DEC 4 AM 7 53

Info ZNY CCCCC

R 031628Z DEC 66

SS FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

GPM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

SP INFO RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

SC RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SAH RUEKDA/DEFENSE/DIA

L RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

H RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SAL RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

SAE RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AF RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

EUR RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

IO RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

P RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

USTIA RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT

BT STATE GRNC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 1398

INR

CIA KING'S RADIO ADDRESS

NSA

AID

RSR PAGE 2 RUQMKG 064A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. ON EVENING DECEMBER 2, KING HUSSEIN BROADCAST AN EMOTION-
PACKED SPEECH TO "THE NATION AND ALL ARABS." THE 55 MINUTE
ADDRESS FEATURED AN ALL-OUT ATTACK ON THE UAR, THOUGH WITHOUT
ONCE MENTIONING UAR OR NASSER BY NAME. HE REJECTED, FOR THE
PRESENT, BOTH TERRORISM AS AN ARAB WEAPON AGAINST ISRAEL AND
THE IDEA OF BRINGING ARAB FORCES INTO JORDAN. HE AFFIRMED THAT
ISRAEL DESIRES TO ANNEX THE WEST BANK.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT THEME REITERATED THROUGHOUT THE SPEECH
WAS HUSSEIN'S UNMISTAKEABLE CONDEMNATION OF THE UAR FOR ITS
CONTINUING ATTACKS ON JORDAN. (REFERENCES TO YEMEN AND UNEF
LEFT NO DOUBT OF HIS TARGET.) KING NOTED EARLY IN HIS TALK
THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITH REGRET ABOUT THE "ATTACK, NOT THE
ATTACK OF THE ENEMY, BUT THAT OF THE ARAB BROTHERS AND THEIR
OFFICIALS. SOME ARAB FACTIONS ARE TRYING TO DESTROY JORDAN,
AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE ENEMY WANTS. (THE ARAB FACTIONS)
WANT THE PALESTINE PROBLEM LIQUIDATED AT THE EXPENSE OF JORDAN."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RGJL NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- AMMAN 1378, DECEMBER 4

LATER IN HIS SPEECH, HUSSEIN MENTIONED "REGIMES FAILING IN THEIR PROMISES AND TREATING JORDAN AS IF SHE WERE THE REAL ENEMY." KING RECALLED THAT "THESE REGIMES" HAD BOASTED THEY HAD SUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT TO "ECLIPSE THE SUN FROM THE ENEMY'S SKIES," BUT THAT

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 064A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN SECRET MEETINGS OF ARAB LEADERS, THESE REGIMES HAD ADMITTED THEY HAD NOT ENOUGH PLANES TO PROTECT THEIR OWN AIRSPACE AND THEREFORE COULD NOT SEND PLANES TO JORDAN. THIS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH GROUND FORCES, WHICH ARE BEING SENT TO MOSLEM ARAB COUNTRIES TO "FIGHT ARAB BRETHREN" AND WERE NOT BEING DISPATCHED TO THE REAL BATTLE FRONT. THUS THESE ARAB REGIMES WERE CLAIMING THEY WERE RENDERING A GREAT SERVICE TO COMRADES IN A SIMILAR CAUSE, I.E. TO SOCIALISTS AND REVOLUTIONARY COMRADES. SUCH IS THE VIEW OF "BIASED PERSONS WHO HIDE THEIR HEADS IN THE SAND AND FEEL PROUD OF THEIR EVIL." THEIR PURPOSE IS TO RENDER JORDAN A SCRAPEGOAT, AND THEIR PLANS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE "REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST COMRADES, (WHO ARE) THEIR MASTERS" (READ USSR). THE KING FURTHER THREATENED TO UNMASK THOSE ARAB LEADERS IN WHOM JORDAN HAD PLACED HER CONFIDENCE, BUT WHO, IN FACT, WERE NO MORE THAN "SKILLFUL TRAPEZE PLAYERS AND ACROBATS."

3. THE KING DESCRIBED TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT DESIGNED BY HIS ARAB ENEMIES TO BRING ISRAELI RETALIATION TO DESTROY JORDAN. HE REPEATED HIS PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT THAT

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 064A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TERRORISTS SHOULD BE GIVEN EXTENSIVE TRAINING AND USED AGAINST THE ENEMY ONLY ON THE EVE OF THE "DECISIVE BATTLE."

4. HUSSEIN REVIEWED THE BACKGROUND OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, PRAISED THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES, DENIED THAT ANY FACTS REGARDING THE SAMU ATTACK HAD BEEN KEPT SECRET, AND ONCE AGAIN SAID FLATLY THAT THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVE WAS JORDAN'S WEST BANK.

5. THE KING CONCLUDED BY CALLING ON HIS PEOPLE TO RETURN TO THEIR JOBS, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR THE "HYSTERIA" WHICH HAD RECENTLY AFFECTED SOME PARTS OF JORDAN TO END. HE SAID ALL TROUBLEMAKERS WOULD BE FIRMLY SUPPRESSED. HUSSEIN URGED HIS LISTENERS TO SUPPORT HIM MORALLY AND PHYSICALLY BECAUSE "I AM STAYING HERE AND WILL NOT WITHDRAW UNTIL THE DANGER OF THE ENEMY IS ERADICATED AND THE RIGHT OF MY PEOPLE RESTORED."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- AMMAN 1378, DECEMBER 4

6. COMMENT: IN ADDRESSING HIMSELF DIRECTLY TO AN ARAB AUDIENCE, HUSSEIN HAS GIVEN FREER REIN TO HIS EMOTIONS THAN HE DID IN HIS RECENT ENCOUNTERS WITH US CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS AND THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS. THIS, WE CONSIDER, WAS THE STRONGEST AND MOST DIRECT ATTACK ON THE UAR WHICH HUSSEIN HAS YET MADE, INCLUDING

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 064A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THOSE REFERENCES TO THE UAR IN HIS JUNE 14 AJLUN SPEECH (IN WHICH SYRIA HAD BEEN THE PRIMARY TARGET.) ALSO RUNNING THROUGHOUT THE SPEECH IS THE THEME OF JORDAN AS A LONELY BASTION, BESEIGED ON ALL SIDES NOT ONLY BY ISRAEL BUT ALSO BY CERTAIN OF HER ARAB NEIGHBORS.

GP-4. BURNS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2

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2

Action

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Info

VV QMA317VV KGA814
PP RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEKDA
DE RUQMG 049A 3361732
ZNY SSSSS
P R 021726Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQMV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQIDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUEKDA/OSD WASHDC
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1367

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1966 DEC 3 AM 1 53

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY MESSAGE1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

REF STATE 94213; AMMAN 1231, 1232, 1259 AND 1273

KHAMMASH MISSION

1. WE BELIEVE ESTIMATE CONTAINED OURTEL 1273 TO BE THE
LIKELIEST MINIMUM PACKAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOJ. THIS WOULD
BE DOLS 20 MILLION TO COVER NEW EQUIPMENT REQUESTED, DOLS 16
MILLION ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS FOR AN ADDITIONAL FORCE OF 10,000
AND, IN THE EVENT NO MORE UAC MONEY OR BILATERAL SAUDI/KUWAITI

PAGE 2 RUQMG 049A ~~SECRET~~

AID BECOME AVAILABLE, DOLS 70 MILLION TO COVER PAYMENTS FOR
EQUIPMENT ALREADY NEGOTIATED (THIS INCLUDES ALL THREE
SQUADRONS SUPERSONICS.) THIS IS THE PACKAGE KHAMMASH HIMSELF
DESCRIBED (OURTEL 1259).

2. OUR ORIGINAL AND LOWER ESTIMATE, SET FORTH IN OUR 1232,
WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE GOJ WITH EQUIPMENT TO COUNTER
A SAMU TYPE OF ATTACK. THIS PACKAGE DIFFERS FROM THAT
DESCRIBED IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPH ONLY IN THAT WE ESTIMATED
DOLS 4.8 MILLION (DOLS 2.6 MILLION US AND DOLS 2.2 MILLION UK) FOR
EQUIPMENT OVER AND ABOVE THAT NOW IN SALES PIPELINE, AS
OPPOSED TO DOLS 20 MILLION MENTIONED ABOVE. IT HAS BECOME
CLEAR SINCE OURTEL 1232 WAS SENT THAT THE REGIME CONSIDERS
IT MUST PREPARE FOR THREATS FROM ALL SIDES. IN THE REGIME'S
OPINION, FOR EXAMPLE, SYRIA LOOMS AS A THREAT, IF FAR LESS

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-42

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~SECRET~~

-2- Amman 1367, 021726Z DEC 66 1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

POTENT THAN ISRAEL. [REDACTED] THE GOJ'S SENSE OF ISOLATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH HERE OF A "FORTRESS JORDAN" CONCEPT, REINFORCED BY THE ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE RESPONSES WHICH THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS HAVE MADE TO JORDAN WHEN SHE FELT IN GREATEST NEED OF THEIR HELP.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 049A ~~SECRET~~

3. WE THINK IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD KHAMMASH TO HIS OWN FIRST ESTIMATE (OURTELS 1259 AND 1273), EVEN THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE IT WAS MADE HASTILY. WE HAVE NOW STUDIED A COPY OF THE LIST KHAMMASH TOOK TO WASHINGTON. IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THE JAA WOULD TAKE SEVERAL YEARS TO ABSORB EFFECTIVELY ALL THE EQUIPMENT ON THIS LIST. (WOULD NOTE THAT THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH KHAMMASH, OR WITH THOSE OF HIS STAFF WHO HELPED DRAW UP THE NEW ARMS LIST, BEFORE THE GENERAL LEFT FOR WASHINGTON.)

4. DIFFICULTY, HOWEVER, IS HOW TO BRING KHAMMASH TACTFULLY SO FAR DOWN FROM HIS NEW AND UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH LEVEL OF REQUESTS. PROBLEM IS ESSENTIALLY WHAT JORDANIANS THINK THEY NEED AND NOT WHAT WE MAY THINK THEY NEED. WE CONSIDER THE REGIME DOES FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT MUST BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE POPULACE IT HAS NOT MISPLACED ITS FAITH ALL THESE YEARS BY RELAYING ON THE WEST (AND PARTICULARLY ON THE USG) FOR ITS MILITARY SUPPLIES. REGIME ALSO NEEDS SOME SORT OF ASSURANCE THAT SPEEDY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN ON THIS REQUEST. WE ESTIMATE THAT IF THE REGIME CAN OBTAIN A PACKAGE ON THE ORDER OF THAT DESCRIBED PARA 1, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE PRESSURE WILL

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 049A ~~SECRET~~

BE OFF US FROM THE REGIME AND OFF THE REGIME FROM ITS OFFICERS. A GUARANTEE THAT EQUIPMENT ALREADY NEGOTIATED WILL KEEP COMING, EVEN THOUGH THE USG MAY HAVE TO PICK UP THE TAB, IS ALSO ESSENTIAL. ABOVE ALL, THE REGIME NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO CONVEY TO ITS PEOPLE, AND TO ITS ENEMIES, THAT THE USG IS SYMPATHETIC TO ITS MILITARY NEEDS AND WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

5. WE CANNOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE EXPECTS KHAMMASH TO RETURN FROM WASHINGTON WITH EVERYTHING HE HAS SOUGHT. THE REGIME MIGHT EVEN WANT TO DESCRIBE THE DOLS 20 MILLION TO ITS PEOPLE AS A "FIRST TRANCHE", EVEN THOUGH GOJ WOULD KNOW IT IS UNLIKELY THEY COULD GET MORE. [REDACTED] WE DO FEEL STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THAT THE LONGER NEGOTIATIONS ARE SPUN OUT, THE

~~SECRET~~

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-3- Amman 1367, 021726Z DEC 66

HIGHER THE TOTAL BILL, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE GREATER WILL BE THE RISK THAT FRUSTRATION COULD BUILD UP TO THE POINT THAT THE JORDANIANS MIGHT SEVER NEGOTIATIONS WITH US AND TURN TO THE EAST. WE ARE KEENLY AWARE THAT MANY JAA OFFICERS ALREADY SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT THE USG WILL BE WILLING TO OFFER JORDAN ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY AID BECAUSE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH ISRAEL. THIS PRE- DISPOSES THE JAA TO BE IMPATIENT AND TO PRESSURE THE KING AGAINST FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH US.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 049A ~~SECRET~~

6. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, KHAMMASH HIMSELF WILL HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN DECIDING WHAT GOJ WOULD SETTLE FOR. WE CONSIDER THAT THE KING IS LIKELY TO ACCEPT WHATEVER KHAMMASH RECOMMENDS TO HIM.

GP-3. BURNS

BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 2:45 a.m., December 3, 1966

NOTE: Passed White House at 2:45 a.m., December 3, 1966

Per S/S-0

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52

Action

SS

Info

P R 241119Z DEC 66
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUQMVU/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
BT

21318

1966 DEC 24 AM 8 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JERUSALEM 497

DEPT 107079, DAMASCUS 731(NOTAL)

US OFFICIALS ONLY

LIMIDIS

1. DCOS JOHNSON (PROTECT) BELIEVES PROBLEM WITH BULL IS NOT SO MUCH THAT HE OPPOSES ASSIGNMENT OF US PERSONNEL TO ISMAC AS IT IS A CASE OF INDECISIVENESS. BULL HAS BEEN ILL AND HIS USUAL TEMPORIZING MAY HAVE BEEN AGGRAVATED BY SICKNESS. JOHNSON NOT AWARE THAT BULL HAS IN PAST RESISTED APPOINTMENT OF AMERICANS

PAGE 2 RUQMJR 510 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OR TREATED US PERSONNEL DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER NATIONALS, ALTHOUGH WE RECALL SOME TIME AGO THERE WERE INDICATIONS BULL MIGHT LIKE TO REPLACE AMERICANS IN KEY UNTSO POSITIONS WITH SCANDINAVIANS.

2. IT APPEARS TO US THAT BUNCHE MAY BE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING CLOCK. IN TELEGRAM OF OCT 17 BUNCHE TOLD BULL HE "INCLINED OPPOSE ASSIGNMENT OF ANOTHER US OFFICER" TO ISMAC FOR TIME BEING (JERUSALEM 319). BULL DID NOT REPLY UNTIL DEC 21. AFTER APOLOGIZING FOR HIS REMISSNESS, BULL SAID HE WANTED TO DISCUSS ENTIRE UN PERSONNEL SITUATION, INCLUDING PNG PROBLEMS, WITH SYRIAN COS SWEIDANI AND TO SUGGEST TO SWEIDANI THAT OBJECTION TO MAJOR HAGERTY SHTR D NOT AFFECT OFFICERS OF SAME NATIONALITY. SIGNIFICANTLY, BULL ADDED THAT HE INTENDED (PROVIDED BUNCHE AGREED) TO TELL SWEIDANI OF HIS DESIRE TO APPOINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE ONE OR TWO US OFFICERS TO ISMAC AS UNMOS. (AN AMERICAN - MAJOR BLINKINSOP IS SLATED TO RELIEVE MAJOR DAY AS ISMAC OBSERVER IN FEBRUARY(;;)) BULL MADE EXCUSE THAT SWEIDANI HAD BEEN SO BUSY IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By 122 NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-JERUSALEM 497, DECEMBER 24.

ARRANGE MEETING DURING PAST TWO MONTHS. (UNDERSTAND BULL ALSO INTENDS DISCUSS SYRIAN CULTIVATION WITH SWEIDANI AS

PAGE 3 RUQMJR 510 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JOHNSON HAS BEEN URGING HIM TO DO. JOHNSON DISAPPOINTED THAT BULL HAS NOT BEEN MORE RESPONSIVE TO ISRAELI INITIATIVE THIS SUBJECT.)

3. JOHNSON FEELS VIEW OUTLINED PARA 2 OF REFDEPTEL, WHICH WE SUMMARIZED FOR HIM, IS UNDULY PESSIMISTIC. ALTHOUGH BOTH BULL AND BUNCHE MAY HAVE HONEST DOUBTS AS TO WISDOM OF REPLACING HAGERTY WITH AMERICAN, JOHNSON DOES NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD APPLY TO ENTIRE UNTSO PERSONNEL OPERATION.

4. GIVEN THE SUBSTANCE OF PARA 3 OF REFDEPTEL JOHNSON'S COMMENT WAS "SPLENDID, I HOPE A FORECEFUL PRESENTATION WILL BE MADE".

5. ACCORDING JOHNSON, FOLLOWING UNKNOWN ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT IN CURRENT SITUATION (A) RECENT USUN-BUNCHE TALKS IF ANY (B) FRENCH INFLUENCE (FOR THIS READ SPECIAL ADVISER VIGIER AND INFORMATION OFFICER GRAND) (C) BULL'S ACTIVITIES (JOHNSON FEELS GENERAL HAS BEEN INACTIVE BUT IS NOT ENTIRELY CERTAIN) E.G. MAY HAVE BEEN PRIVATE BULL-BUNCHE CORRESPONDENCE. JOHNSON BELIEVES BUNCHE IS MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT AND HAS EXPRESSED HOPE DEPT CAN INFLUENCE

PAGE 4 RUQMJR 510 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HIM BENEFICIALLY.

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH BULL DECEMBER 21 (REPORTED OUR A-67) I MENTIONED MATTER OF HAGERTY'S REPLACEMENT, TO WHICH BULL REPLIED "WE WILL TAKE OUR TIME BUT THAT ONE". HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO MESSAGE TO SWEIDANI WHICH ACCORDING JOHNSON (PARA 2 ABOVE) HE HAD SENT THAT SAME DAY. SHOULD BE RECALLED HAGERTY SERVED IN ISMAC AS ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER, NOT UNMO, AND UNTSO MAY THEREFORE HAVE IN MIND A COMPRO-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-JERUSALEM 497, DECEMBER 24.

WISE WHEREBY ONE OR TWO AMERICANS WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ISMAC AS OBSERVERS ONLY. IN ANY EVENT STATEMENT BY DAMASCUS ISMAC SOURCE THAT BULL OPPOSING ASSIGNMENT OF AMERICANS EITHER TO ISMAC HEADQUARTERS OR AS OBSERVERS WOULD APPEAR EXAGGERATED.

GP-3 WILSON

BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA, CIA, DOD, NSA, CINCSTRIKE
AT 11:45 A.M., 12/24/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

1967

46

85

Origin

Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

MAY 20 4 12 PM '67

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Amembassy CAIRO
Amembassy JERUSALEM

STATE - L I M D I S 198899

AMMAN 3612

1. Dept approves line you took with King as reported reftel.
2. In addition to carrying out approach to GOJ described
Deptel 197664, you should inform King you instructed reiterate
assurances contained President's letter of November 23 (State
90603). You may also advise King you have been instructed to
inform him A) USG still stands by President Kennedy's statement
of May 8, 1963 and B) USG estimate Israeli intention towards
Jordanian regime has not changed.

GP-3

End

RUSA

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/ARN:MMWiley:dmg 5/19/67	3236	classification approved by: NEA/RPDavies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - RBHoughton
NEA/IAI - ALAtherton

s/s - Mr. Brown
White House - Mr. Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET~~

By RG/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File 46a
S/S informed
cleared
May 20, 1967
5/20/67 BK9

WWR:

Recommend we clear the attached provided
it conforms to decision at your meeting with
the President yesterday evening. (Copy of
President's November letter to Hussein attached.)
This is part of our effort to reiterate our
commitments.

On other fronts:

- Message to Eshkol being drafted in NEA.
We'll want to take a close look at it to
avoid annoying pitfalls of State drafting.
- No decision on 6th Fleet. NEA counting on
Secretary to take up with President last
evening.
- U Thant's trip announced but he's not going
till Monday evening. (Probably hopes
trouble will be over by then.)
- No change in military situation on the
ground.


Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~ ~~JN~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1924

1-Professors
2-Phil.
46b

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

May 19, 1967

Date

BY mw ON 11-1-91

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

CB for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Cable to Amman.

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Amembassy CAIRO
Amembassy JERUSALEM

STATE - L I M D I S

AMMAN 3612

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GP-3

End

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

NEA/ARN:MMWiley:dmg 5/19/67 3236

NEA/RPDavies

NEA/ARN - RBHoughton
NEA/IAI - ALAtherton

S/S
White House

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

November 23, 1966

46-d

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

Your Majesty:

Words of sympathy are small comfort when lives have been needlessly destroyed. I do, however, want to convey to Your Majesty a sense of the sorrow and concern the military action by Israel in the Hebron area has raised in me and in this country generally. My disapproval of this action has been made known to the Government of Israel in the strongest terms. Our support of condemnation of this action by the Security Council and Ambassador Goldberg's statement during the Security Council hearings demonstrate the depth of my feelings and those of our country.

This action has placed Your Majesty in a difficult position. I am certain that with your demonstrated courage, wisdom and moderation, your difficulties will be overcome. For our part, I assure you that this government maintains its interest in the peace and security of Jordan and in the economic progress and well-being of its people. I have ordered an urgent review of measures which the United States Government could take to assist you during this difficult period. We will continue to be in touch with your government on this question.

Finally Ambassador Burns has informed me of Your Majesty's concern that Israel's policies have changed and that Israel now intends to occupy territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River. While I can

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XVIII, #346
By 4 NARA, Date 7-3-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

understand the reasons for this concern, I have good reasons to believe it highly unlikely that the events you fear will in fact occur. In this connection my government's opposition to the use of force to alter armistice lines or borders in the Near East has been made unmistakably clear to all parties concerned.

The strong private representations we have made in Israel as well as our forthright public statements make clear that should Israel adopt the policies you fear it would have the gravest consequences for United States - Israel relations. There is no doubt in my mind that our position is fully understood and appreciated by the Israelis.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46-2

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Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

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PP RUEHC RUEHDT RUDTCR
DE RUQMKG 3612A 1381530
ZNY SSSSS
P R 181505Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/ SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQTBG/ AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
RUEIVCR/ AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUQMJR/ AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
RUEHDT/ USMISSION USUN
RUEDPSA/ CINCSRIKE
RUQVRA/ AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQMBE/ AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQMDM/ AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUDTCR/ AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMLV/ AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
BT

019078

1967 MAY 18 PM 3 23

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3612

LIMDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 3596

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH HUSSEIN RE PRESENT SITUATION IN
MIDDLE EAST

1. IN DISCUSSING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HUSSEIN OBSERVED THAT THE APPARENT TARGET FOR POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK IS SYRIA. IF THE UAR DOES NOT REACT MILITARILY TO AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIA, JORDAN WILL STAND STILL. IF, AS IS MORE PROBABLE, NASSER MUST AND DOES REACT, IF ONLY NOMINALLY, JORDAN WILL HAVE TO TAKE SUFFICIENT ACTION TO KEEP FROM BEING A CONSPICUOUS SCRAPEGOAT, BUT THIS WOULD NOT ENTAIL A DIRECT ARMED CLASH WITH ISRAEL SO LONG AS AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIA

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3612A ~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS
WERE OF LIMITED DURATION.

2. THE KING FEELS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IS IN FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF SERIOUS TROUBLE. HE VIEWS THE FACTORS AND ISSUES INVOLVED AS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED THEN THEY APPEAR ON THE SURFACE. HE CONSIDERS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT INFILTRATION IS ONLY SYMPTOMATIC OF THE UNDERLYING SITUATION. HE BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL CONCERNED WILL KEEP THE ENTIRE PICTURE IN THE BROADEST POSSIBLE FOCUS TO INSURE THAT ALL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By us NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

-2-AMMAN 3612, 5/18/67

OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED, BOTH SHORT AND LONG RANGE, ARE PROPERLY AND ACCURATELY CALCULATED. IN THIS CONTEXT HE NOTED THAORN WHILE SYRIA MIGHT LOGICALLY BE THE NEXT TARGET OF ATTACK, JORDAN IS JUST AS LIKELY A TARGET IN THE SHORT RUN AND, IN HIS OPINION, AN INEVITABLE ONE IN THE LONG RUN. IN SUPPORT OF THIS HE SAID THAT HE IS NOT AT ALL CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACCEPTED THE STATUS QUO AS A PERMANENT SOLUTION. ISRAEL HAS CERTAIN LONG RANGE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS AND CERTAIN TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS AND HISTORIC ASPIRATIONS WHICH IN HIS OPINION THEY HAVE NOT YET SATISFAIED OR REALIZED. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THESE GOALS CAN BE ACHIEVED, HE SAID, IS BY AN ALTERATION OF THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN. THUS IN THE KING'S VIEW IT IS QUITE NATURAL FOR THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPPORTUNITY AND FORCE ANY SITUATION WHICH WOULD MOVE THEM

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3612A-~~SECRET~~-LIMDIS
CLOSER TO THIS GOAL. HIS CONCERN IS THAT CURRENT AREA CONDITIONS PROVIDE THEM WITH JUST SUCH OPPORTUNITIES--TERRORISM, INFILTRATION AND DISUNITY AMONG THE ARABS BEING THE MOST OBVIOUS. THE PRESENT STATE OF TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PROVIDES A COVER, SO TO SPEAK, FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON ANYONE OF THEIR CHOOSING. HUSSEIN POINTED OUT THAT IN 1956 ISRAEL WAS THREATENING JORDAN BUT IN FACT ATTACKED EGYPT; IN NOVEMBER 1966 IT WAS THE SYRIANS WITH WHOM ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WERE AT A NADIR YET IT WAS JORDAN WHO WAS ATTACKED. ADMITTEDLY, SAID HUSSEIN, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A CASUS BELLI FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST JORDAN, SUCH AS A TERRORIST INCIDENT IN ISRAEL ACROSS FROM THE JORDANIAN BORDER. IN SUCH EVENT ISRAEL MIGHT ATTACK JORDAN ALONE, OR JORDAN AND SYRIA TOGETHER. THE JORDANIANS ARE MAKING THE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO INTERDICT TERRORISTS, BUT, HE OBSERVED, THERE ALWAYS EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY A TERRORIST WOULD GET THROUGH WHO WOULD DO SERIOUS DAMAGE. OR, HE ADDED, AN INCIDENT COULD BE MANUFACTURED IF THE RISKS AND GAINS APPEARED WORTH IT.

3. I CHALLENGED HUSSEIN'S THESIS AND IN ADDITION POINTED OUT TO HIM THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ISRAEL WAS PLANNING TO ATTACK JORDAN AND THAT ALL FACTORS AND INDICATORS ARGUED AGAINST THE ISRAELIS DOING SO. HUSSEIN REMAINED UNCONVINCED,

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3612A-~~SECRET~~-LIMDIS
ARGUING THAT NEITHER HE NOR WE COULD AFFORD TO RULE SUCH AS POSSIBILITY OUT OF OUR OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS. HE CONCEDED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT SUCCESSFULLY ANNEX THE WEST BANK IN ONE ACTION, BUT ANY MOVE WHICH WOULD TEND TO NEUTRALIZE THE

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~~SECRET~~

-3-AMMAN 3612, 5/18/67

WEST BANK OR WEAKEN ARAB CONTROL OVER IT WOULD PUT ISRAEL A STEP CLOSER TO A GOAL WHICH WAS IN HER LONG-TERM STRATEGIC INTEREST. THE TEMPORARY SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF A PIECE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY WOULD PLACE ISRAEL IN A POSITION TO EXTRACT A PRICE FOR WITHDRAWAL, SUCH AS, POSSIBLY, DEMILITARIZATION OF THE WEST BANK OR SOME FORM OF UN CONTROL OVER THE WEST BANK. ISRAEL COULD MAKE AS MUCH OF A CASE FOR SUCH ACTION ON GROUNDS OF SECURITY AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE AS SHE DID IN SUEZ. HIS REGIME COULD NOT PAY A PRICE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND STILL SURVIVE. HUSSEIN SAID THAT IF ISRAEL LAUNCHED ANOTHER SAMU-SCALE ATTACK AGAINST JORDAN HE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RETALIATE OR FACE AN INTERNAL REVOLT. IF JORDAN RETALIATES, ASKED HUSSEIN, WOULD NOT THIS GIVE ISRAEL A PRETEXT TO OCCUPY AND HOLD JORDANIAN TERRITORY? OR, SAID HUSSEIN, ISRAEL MIGHT INSTEAD OF A HIT-AND-RUN TYPE ATTACK SIMPLY OCCUPY AND HOLD TERRITORY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. HE SAID HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THESE POSSIBILITIES FROM HIS CALCULATIONS AND URGED US NOT TO DO SO EVEN IF WE FELT THEM CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN LIKELY.

4. IN ANY EVENT, ASKED HUSSEIN, WHAT WOULD THE US DO IF HIS HYPOTHESIS PROVED CORRECT? HE HAD BEEN ASSURED ON COUNT-

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3612A ~~SECRET~~ LMD IS
LESS OCCASIONS BY US OFFICIALS THAT THE US WOULD NOT PERMIT THE ISRAELIS TO ALTER THE STATUS QUO. HE HAD BEEN TOLD WHEN LAST IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID, THAT JORDAN DID NOT NEED ADDITIONAL ARMAMENT BECAUSE THE SIXTH FLEET WOULD PROTECT HIM.

5. I REPLIED THAT THE US STOOD BY ITS DECLARATIONS (TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, EISENHOWER REAFFIRMATION OF NOVEMBER 9, 1955, EISENHOWER DOCTRINE AND KENNEDY STATEMENT OF MAY 8, 1963) THAT THE US WOULD NOT ACQUIESCE IN CHANGES OF THE BORDER BY FORCE. JUST WHAT FORM US ACTION WOULD TAKE WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED AT THE TIME IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES THEN EXISTING.

6. HUSSEIN REPLIED: YES, I KNOW THOSE DECLARATIONS. IN SUCH AS CONTINGENCY AS I HAVE DESCRIBED THERE WOULD BE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE US ASSISTANCE TO FORCE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE OTHER ARAB STATES WOULD NOT HELP JORDAN, AND IT WOULD TAKE TOO LONG FOR THE UN TO ACT. I PREDICT THAT IF THE ISRAELIS REMAIN IN JORDAN FOR ANY EXTENDED LENGTH OF TIME, THE PRESENT REGIME HERE WOULD FALL. THE SAME THING WOULD HAPPEN IF THE ISRAELIS SUCCEEDED IN EXTRACTING SIGNIFICANT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-AMMAN 3612, 5/18/67

CONCESSIONS AS THE PRICE FOR WITHDRAWAL. AS YOU KNOW, I NO LONGER BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS HAVE A STAKE IN MY REGIME, SO THAT ITS DEMISE WOULD NOT DETER THEM FROM SUCH ACTION. IN MY OPINION, THE CHANCES OF THE CONTINGENCY WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT ARISING WOULD BE PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED IF THE ISRAELIS WERE CLEARLY ON NOTICE YOU WOULD FORCIBLY INTERVENE."

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3612A ~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

7. COMMENT: WHATEVER HUSSEIN'S BELIEFS, HE DOES NOT WANT TO TANGLE WITH ISRAEL AND WILL BE GUIDED BY PRUDENCE. IF, HOWEVER, A SERIOUS TERRORIST INCIDENT SHOULD OCCUR IN ISRAEL ACROSS FROM THE JORDANIAN BORDER, I DEFER TO JUDGMENT OF EMBASSY TEL AVIV BUT I WOULD IMAGINE THAT, GIVEN THE PRESENT TENSE ATMOSPHERE AND THE PRECEDENT OF SAMU, NO ONE COULD RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAEL MIGHT HIT JORDAN. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THE JORDANIANS WOULD IN SUCH EVENT COUNTER-ATTACK. THE KING REALIZES A COUNTERATTACK WOULD COURT ESCALATION, BUT HE IS CONVINCED THAT NOT TO COUNTERATTACK WOULD MEAN THE END OF HIS REGIME THROUGH INTERNAL UPEHAVAL. I WOULD GUESS THE COUNTERATTACK WOULD FOLLOW SWIFTLY UPON THE ATTACK, AND BE OF LESSER SCALE THAN THE ORIGINAL ATTACK.

8. I PLAN TO SEE THE KING AGAIN IN A FEW DAYS TO REVIEW THE SITUATION WITH HIM. I WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE HIM IN HIS PRESENT COURSE OF PRUDENCE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY VIEWS OR REASSURANCES THE DEPARTMENT WOULD WISH TRANSMITTED TO HUSSEIN. GP-3.

BURNS

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

139218

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91

Origin
NEA

Info:

SS
GPM
SAB
IO
NSC

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
Amconsul JERUSALEM
Amembassy TEL AVIV

FEB 17 12 44 PM '67

STATE

139218

Ref: State 136694, Jerusalem 630

1. Following is modification travel itinerary Harold H. Saunders of White House staff.
2. Saunders welcomes opportunity briefing at UNTSO Headquarters and by Consulate General preferably morning March 9. He suggests leaving Amman early March 8, arriving Old City that afternoon following stop on route. Would prefer overnight in Old City, through Gate crossing early March 9. Tel Aviv could pick him up late that morning for lunch or similar meeting with Foreign Ministry officials. We suggest he be put up American Colony Hotel if possible.
3. Saunders plans enter Israel using regular passport No. DB 605600 originally issued Washington March 28, 1963 which contains no Israeli visa or other markings. Also holds

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:GBLambakis:fah:2/17/67	Tel. Ext. 4967	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/IAI - Alfred L. Atherton Jr.
Clearances: White House - Mr. Saunders (subs) NEA/RA - Mr. Ernst (subs)		

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Diplomatic passport X 020547 issued Washington September 2, 1964 which contains Jordanian visa. Saunders born Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, December 27, 1930.

4. Letter Saunders to Wilson coming by pouch.

Exempted from Automatic Decontrol.

End

ACTING

KATZENBACH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

139218

48

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Origin
NEA

Info:

SS
GPM
SAB
IO
NSC

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
Amconsul JERUSALEM
Amembassy TEL AVIV

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Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA/IAI - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Saunders (subs)
NEA/RA - Mr. Ernst (subs)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AMMAN

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Exempted from Automatic Decontrol.

End

ACTING

KATZENBACH

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

1 2 3 9 5 7

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80
Origin
55
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

JAN 23 8 23 PM '67

STATE 123957

EXDIS

AMMAN 1807 and 1808

Bring to attention of action officer at opening of business January 24.

1. Re privileges and immunities point we prefer text proposed by Primin and MinJustice set forth para 3 Amman 1807 providing they willing end statement with period following QUOTE US Government UNQUOTE and omitting text QUOTE and will undertake to conform the laws of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the grant of these immunities and privileges UNQUOTE.
2. We believe up to Jordanians decide what they may need do internally to give effect international agreement but inappropriate and unnecessary include such details in agreement itself. Our assumption and understanding is that GOJ is able and willing ensure necessary privileges and immunities on de facto basis and we do not wish to weaken our position by appearing qualify this situation by accepting Jordanian undertaking re conforming laws to grant such immunities and privileges. If Primin and Min Justice indicate they intend seek such legislation, believe you should inquire how long this will take and whether they would foresee political obstacles such legislation which might adversely affect status US personnel. You should ~~emphasize~~ emphasize that we cannot accept situation where personnel being sent Jordan under such special circumstances

Drafted by:

L/NEA:DAWehmeyer:acs 1/23/67

Tel. Ext.

5895

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

L/O - Mr. Harris

DOD - Mr. Barringer

S/S - ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Mr. O'Donohue

NEA/ARN - Mr. Wiley

SAF/GC - Mr. Kent

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLI-S 98001

By RGDL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

are not extended full privileges and immunities envisaged.

3. Subject agreement make above change, you authorized exchange notes confirming foregoing undertaking. ¹²³⁹⁵⁷

GP-3

END

RUSK

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

1 2 3 1 6 2

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET-XXXXDISX~~

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42
Origin

SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
INFO: CINCSTRIKE

JAN 21 1 58 PM '67

STATE
EXDIS
JOINT STATE/DOD/USIA

2

REF: AMMAN'S 1777; DOD 3993 Jan. 18

ix

1. We believe that GOJ should have primary responsibility for local publicity on deployment F-104 aircraft as they in best position to judge reaction Jordanian public. We wish minimize USG role in controlling operation of these aircraft in Jordan. Communique issued in name of GOJ therefore preferable to joint communique. At same time GOJ should coordinate with Embassy to assure content Jordanian publicity generally in accordance with this message and Deptel 107544.
2. In view of unfortunate publicity received as result F-104 G crashes in Germany, we will prepare brief factual press handout designed allay fears that F-104's are quote flying coffins unquote and send to post ASAP.
3. Purpose of college run has been left ambiguous in public

Drafted by

NEA/ARN:MMWiley:csl 1/20/67 3236

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA:RPDavies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
DOD/ISA - Mr. Barringer

USIA/IAN - Mr. Ruggiero

SS - Mr. Bruce

P - Mr. Phillips

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET-XXXXDISX~~

NLJ-S 98001

RM DS-322

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET/EXXIS~~

announcements as we do not wish present this operation to Arab countries as training and familiarization only. If this were case US markings would be left on aircraft. We wish create impression without directly saying so that these planes have role as element in Jordan's air defense capability in addition to role in training and familiarization Jordanian personnel.

4. Embassy and appropriate military personnel should be supplied with contingency guidance to answer press inquiries. In preparing this guidance you may draw on following as appropriate.

a. Statement of exact role US personnel should be avoided if possible. If pressed you may say they in Jordan primarily for purposes training and familiarization Jordanian personnel. If pressed further, stand on previous response.

b. If asked, you should reply US has no intention establishing military base in Jordan, and US personnel will be withdrawn when Jordanian personnel are adequately trained.

c. We wish give impression again without saying so directly that these aircraft are initial deliveries under sales agreement. Consequently, college run operation should be ~~xxx~~ presented as deployment F-104's carried out in connection with our earlier commitment to speed up deliveries of F-104's purchased by Jordan and to expedite

~~SECRET/EXXIS~~

~~SECRET/EXXIX~~

related training Jordanian pilots and ground crew. ~~Specific~~ ^{Specific} reference
to legal ownership these six F-104's should be avoided.

GP-2

END

RUSK

~~SECRET/EXXIX~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

122794

51

80
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

55
Info:

INFO: Amembassy DAMASCUS

STATE 122794
EXDIS

JAN 20 7 29 PM '67

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED]

We believe

such tactics serve no useful purpose and will contribute to further intensification of conflict between SARG and GOJ. In circumstances we believe you should approach GOJ [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] and express USG concern drawing on following as appropriate:

a. We aware of provocations recently carried out by terrorists in Jordan, apparently with support from SARG.

b. We will continue to support GOJ's efforts to control terrorism and would be willing to discuss any new suggestions which GOJ might have on ways USG could strengthen this support.

c. We believe, however, that GOJ should concentrate its efforts on controlling terrorism within Jordan. USG is opposed

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MMWiley/1 1/20/67

Tel. Ext. 3236

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA:RPDavies

NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
AID/NESA - Mr. Flint

S/S - Mr. Bruce

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-42

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

to terrorist activities ~~ex~~ especially when controlled and directed by one government in territory of another.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1) d.

[REDACTED] Rather than discourage Syrian terrorism, we fear GOJ activity will increase Syrian determination to carry out sabotage in Jordan.

e. To the extent that USG is publicly identified with regime in Jordan, GOJ-sponsored terrorism in neighboring countries ~~a~~ implicates USG.

GP-2

END

RUSK

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

118950

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

46

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

JAN 16 11 00 AM '67

STATE

118950

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By iss, NARA, Date 12-23-02

REF: Amman 1711

1. Order avoid differentiation between non-diplomatic personnel of Embassy if possible you should seek obtain following agreement from Prime Minister: QUOTE The Govt of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will extend to non-diplomatic personnel permanently assigned to the Embassy of the US in Jordan together with members of their families forming part of their respective households, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in Jordan, the privileges and immunities specified in Arts 29 to 35 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. UNQUOTE

2. Should PriMin inquire re ^{reciprocity} connection above proposal, you may inform him we able give full reciprocity all Jordanian non-diplomatic personnel assigned their Embassy here with respect both privileges and immunities but we not rpt not in position extend any privileges or immunities to families such personnel.

3. If PriMin indicates he only willing make commitment re USDAO

Drafted by: L/O: JHarris/
L/NEA: DAWehmeyer: dsw 1/12

Tel. Ext. 5895
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Roger P. Davies

Clearances:
NEA/ARN - Mr. Wiley
s/s - Mr. Walsh

DOD - Mr. Barringer

SAF/GC - Mr. Kent

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

personnel at Embassy, you should obtain following agreement.

QUOTE The Govt of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will extend to non-diplomatic personnel permanently assigned to the US Defense Attache Office, together with members of their families forming part of their respective households, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in Jordan, the privileges and immunities specified in Arts 29 to 35 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. UNQUOTE.

4. You should not rpt not agree alteration above alternative texts without Dept approval since issue involves highly technical legal problems.

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

118733

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

80
Origin
55
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

INFO.: Amembassy LONDON

Jan 13 9 49 PM '67

STATE 118733

EXDIS

1. We have become increasingly concerned over the indications that Chief of Staff Amir Khammash has not accepted the agreement entered into between Ambassador Macomber and King Hussein on the force level limitations for the Jordan Arab Army. Even more troublesome are the indications that he is working actively to undermine the agreement, the latest of which appeared in DIA Report No.

IR-6-010-3001-67. If Khammash is, in fact, telling

3.4(b)(6) [redacted] that on 53,000 man force level he does not accept the US/GOJ agreement, he is undermining the ceiling King as well as ourselves. We believe that it is now advisable to make clear within GOJ that we stand behind our agreement with Jordan and expect GOJ to do the same.

2. We would appreciate your comments on how this may best be done given problems of possible compromise of sources and need

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MWWilley:lab 1/13/67

Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton
DOD - Mr. Barringer

AID/NESA - Amb. Macomber (subs)
S/S - Mrs. Davis

~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-65 DS-322

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-43
By SJ, NARA, Date 8-6-02

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy AMMAN

~~SECRET-XXXX~~

not further exacerbate General Khammash.

END

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET-XXXX~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

118159

54

80

Origin

55

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

2

JAN 13 5 48 PM '67

STATE

118159

EXDIS

REF: Amman 1711

1. We agree it necessary supplement para 4 Memo of Understanding sent Embtel 1683. If possible would like avoid creating situation where differentiation exists between non-diplomatic personnel of Embassy arising from F-104 operation. Order expedite conclusion necessary arrangements you should seek obtain following agreement from Prime Minister: QUOTE The Govt of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will extend to non-diplomatic personnel permanently assigned to the Embassy of the US in Jordan together with members of their families forming part of their respective households, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in Jordan, the privileges and immunities specified in Arts 29 to 35 and 36(1)(b) of the ¹⁹⁶¹Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. UNQUOTE

2. Should PriMin inquire re reciprocity connection above proposal, you may inform him we able give full reciprocity all Jordanian non-diplomatic personnel assigned their Embassy here with respect both privileges and immunities but we not rpt not in position

Drafted by:

L/O: JHarris/

L/NEA: DAWehmeyer:dsw 1/13

Tel. Ext.

5895

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA, ARN - Mr. Wiley

DOD - Mr. Barringer

SAF/GC - Mr. Kent

S/S - Mr. Walsh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-60

By is NARA, Date 12-23-02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

extend any privileges or immunities to families such personnel.

3. If PriMin indicates he only willing make commitment re USDAO personnel at Embassy, you should obtain following agreement: QUOTE

The Govt of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will extend to non-diplomatic personnel permanently assigned to the US Defense Attache Office, together with members of their families forming part of their respective households, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in Jordan, the privileges and immunities specified in Arts 29 to 35 and 36(1)(b) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. UNQUOTE

4. You should not rpt not agree alteration above alternative texts without Dept approval since issue involves highly technical legal problems,

End,

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

114665

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

2

55

ACTION: Arembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

Jan 7 8 09 PM '67

INFO.: CINCSTRIKE

STATE 114665
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
EXDISDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By us NARA, Date 12-23-02

1. Embassy has already been notified via DATTT channels of arrival Sunday January 8 of USAF survey team, accompanied by designated US CINCMEAFSA representative Colonel Starns.
2. Starns is carrying provisional draft USAF-RJAF Memorandum of Understanding on deployment of six USAF F-104's. We hope to clear final version incorporating number of minor changes on Monday, January 9, prior departure from Washington of Mr. Grant Reynolds of Air Force General Counsel, who scheduled arrive Amman Wednesday morning, January 11. Principal provision in Memo of Understanding still not agreed upon is language of Para 3 (d) dealing with problem of later transfer limited operational control of F-104's to RJAF. We now have under consideration following language as possible alternative to that contained in draft carried by Starns:

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	NEA - Rodger P. Davies
NEA/ARN:ALatherton/MWWiley/	5617		XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Clearances: DOD/PBarringer/GReynolds:lab			
1/7/67			

DOD - Col. Jordan

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
S/S - Mr. Shostal~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

(a) QUOTE 3. (d) In the interest of flight safety, the aircraft will initially be solely under the operational control of United States authorities. Maintenance will be a US responsibility throughout the period that the aircraft are stationed in Jordan. After training of Jordan personnel has been underway for a period, the two governments at the diplomatic level will jointly evaluate the progress of that training and the general capability of the RJAF to conduct operational missions with the F-104 A/B. From such time as the two governments agree that RJAF pilots have reached a state of proficiency sufficient to permit them to conduct operational missions, the RJAF can request the aircrafts' use by qualified RJAF pilots in carrying out missions selected by RJAF. When so used, the aircraft will be under the operational control of the RJAF. For flight training beyond the training-only period, the appropriate RJAF authorities and the USAF Detachment Commander will jointly agree on the number of flying hours to be allocated for such training. Sufficient flying hours, as determined by the USAF Detachment Commander, in accordance with applicable USAF regulations, will be allocated for proficiency flying by USAF pilots. In all cases where training involves US personnel in the air during flight, the aircraft will be under the operational control of United States authorities. UNQUOTE.

3. Alternative version in para 2 above would need to be supplemented by firm understanding with King along following lines:

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

(a) Aircraft will not engage in combat, except when the object of an unprovoked attack and when in the pilot's judgment there is no alternative (e.g. evasion) to returning fire. FYI. This understanding required for both training stage, when RJAF personnel will fly solo in single-seat F-104 A, and during subsequent operational use by RJAF, if there is any. END FYI.

(b) Para 3 (d) requires USG concurrence on a mission-by-^{mission}~~mission~~ basis before aircraft can be made available to RJAF for any use other than training, but this concurrence will not be unreasonably withheld.

(c) It is highly unlikely that any set of circumstances would arise in which USG, in its national interest would have to withdraw the aircraft or not make them available for missions by qualified RJAF pilots, precisely because U.S. is fully committed to support GOJ. Nevertheless, this possibility must be recognized, and King's assurance that he accepts U.S. right to do so be obtained. You may, in turn, assure him that decision to withdraw or withhold aircraft will be made only at highest levels in USG. In addition, in view of foregoing arrangement, King should probably be requested instruct his negotiators to accept proposed language of 3 (d).

4. Foregoing sensitive but critically important understandings would need to be recorded, preferably in form of exchange of ^{aides}~~aide~~ memoire. If version of draft carried by Starns is adopted, understanding along lines of para 3 probably still required but may be delayed until

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

subsequent agreement on change of aircraft status negotiated. If version in para 2 adopted, then understandings should be reached before USAF-RJAF agreement is signed and must be reached before aircraft arrive.

5. Request your views on relative merits on two alternative wordings of para 3 (d), and on understanding with King by opening of business Washington time Monday, January 9.

6. Second matter on which government-level understanding is required is status of personnel in Jordan in connection with deployment of USAF F-104s. USAF-RJAF draft agreement provides that personnel will have status and privileges of personnel permanently assigned to USDAO. While we see merit in this provision, which will be known to the military, we doubt the ~~xxxxxxx~~ authority of the Armed Forces to assure such status to our personnel and we consider it important that it be paralleled by agreement with FonMin. Therefore, request you reach informal but written understanding with FonMin that U.S. personnel in Jordan in connection with deployment of USAF F-104s will have same status and privileges as personnel of comparable rank on ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ permanent assignment to USDAO.

END

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

113444

~~SECRET~~ - ~~NOFORN~~

56

81
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

REC 2

JAN 5 8 13 PM '67

INFO: CINCSNAKE
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy TRIPOLI

Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy CAIRO
Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 113444

EXDIS NOFORN

EMBTEL 1651

1. If GOJ delays exercising option for 24 additional F-104s to a date not later than April 15 it would have no appreciable effect on delivery of six of the 24 optional aircraft. It might, however, result in corresponding delay in delivery of the last eighteen.

FYI

2. You should inform King or GOJ of above. / Although we would not now refuse accept option if GOJ insists, we feel strongly that it preferable that GOJ not exercise option until sources of funds become clarified. END FYI

GP-3

RUSK

Drafted by:
NEA/ARN:MMWiley:acs 1/5/67

Tel. Ext.
3236

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD:ISA:Barringer (subs)

AID:NESA:WEMacomber, Jr.

NEA/ARN:DLGamon

S/S - Mr. McCall

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~ - ~~NOFORN~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

109556

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

2

S

57

82
Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy Amman

65
Info:

Dec 28 7 18 PM '66

STATE 109556

EXDIS

SUBJECT: OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES

Before taking further action on overflight clearances for
airlift of military equipment to Jordan, Department requests
reading on Khammash efforts obtain approval for overflights
from other Arab countries at December 25 UAC meeting.

GP 1

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN/WWiley:jh 12/28/66	Tel. Ext. 3236	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell
---	-------------------	--

DOD- Mr. Barringer
S/S - Mr. Walsh

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RGL/NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

107002

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

58

Dec 22 2 15 PM '66

40
Origin
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Info:ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN FLASH

STATE 107002

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN's 1572

2

Change last sentence first paragraph press release as follows: QUOTE

The shipment of F-104 interceptor aircraft UNQUOTE to read QUOTE some

F-104 interceptor aircraft UNQUOTE.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN MWiley:es: 2/22/66
Clearance:Tel. Ext. 3236
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. DaviesDOD/ISA - Mr. Barringer
S/S - R. Walker

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/L, NARA, Date 7-13-01~~SECRET~~

106924

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

59

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Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: AMEMBASSY AMMAN

FLASH

DEC 22 12 19 PM '66

STATE 106924

EXDIS

02

REF: AMMAN'S 1572

Because of press deadlines here, we wish release first paragraph here at 10 P.M. December 22 (3 A.M. December 23 GMT), This would be preceded by backgrounding selected reporters. Request deletion word "massive" as descriptive airlift in second paragraph.

GP 1

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:RPD Davies: jh 12/22/66

Tel. Ext.:

2107

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA- Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN- A.L. Atherton

P - Mr. Donnelly (subs)

U - Mr. Katzenbach (subs)

S/S -

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

FORM DS-322
8-65

By RGL NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

106795

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

2

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Origin

ACTION: AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

SS
Info:

INFO: AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

DEC 21 8 09 PM '66

STATE 106775

EXDIS

AMMAN FOR MACOMBER

REF: AMMAN'S 1553; 1560; 1517

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-60
By iss NARA, Date 12-23-02

Redlow

1. We endorse position on foreign Arab troops you outlined in Embtel 1517.
2. Introduction non-Jordanian Arab troops into Jordan would have unpredictable consequences and could become destabilizing factor for entire area. Risk to Hussein's regime of non-Jordanian forces such that we question whether he in fact prepared to honor commitment which GOJ has publicly indicated is conditional.
3. We do not believe there is military justification for foreign troops in Jordan any more than there is for increase in JAA force levels. Neither shopping list presented by King nor UAC forces could assure absolute defense against preponderant Israeli military power. Furthermore, since force level and foreign troop questions have been linked by King, our concurrence in admitting non-Jordanian forces could be used by him to argue that we had in principle agreed on need for larger Jordanian military establishment.
4. We seriously doubt Israel could be "conditioned to tolerate" foreign Arab

Drafted by: <u>MMWiley:jh 12/21/66</u>	Tel. Ext. <u>5617</u>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <u>NEA- Rodger P. Davies</u>
NEA/RPD: NEA/ARN:AL: Atherton/		
Clearances:		
DOD- Colonel Jordan		
NEA- Mr. Handley (Subs)		
S/S - Mr. Walker		

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

troops in Jordan even with Hussein's assurance to us that he would eventually get rid of them. Since positioning non-Jordanian troops in Jordan has been cited as one of two *casi belli*, we believe GOI, and particularly IDF, would make major issue over ¹⁰⁶⁷⁷⁵ introduction even token number troops. We note Iraq and Saudi Arabia have never signed armistice agreements with Israel and question of stationing such forces in Jordan already a public issue in Israel. While not unmindful that failure honor commitment to UAC may well cause difficulties for King in Jordan, we believe there is strong possibility King's acceptance UAC troops would bring on major area crisis.

5. You should, therefore, continue to press Hussein to do all he can to keep non-Jordanian troops out. We believe ~~him~~ ^{him} is going to Cairo well armed to make case that situation has changed dramatically as result USG equipment offer, crash delivery by airlift, and speedup in delivery F-104's and pilot training. Seems to us he can make strong argument that, by time effective UAC force could be positioned, JAA will be well along toward significant improvement in fire power, mobility and communications capability.

6. Embassy Tel Aviv's comments requested.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

106091

61

80

Oct 20

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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN
INFO AmEmbassy BEIRUT

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

DEC 20 002 9 31 PM '66

STATE 106091

ENDIS

FOR MACOMBER

Unless Cotter's continued presence Amman essential, he should return Washington soonest, allowing few hours layover Beirut for Embassy briefing. Cotter urgently needed here to prepare for briefing of Israelis in Washington early next week.

GP 1

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
NEA/ARN/ALatherton:jh 12/20/66

Tel. Ext.
5617

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD/ISA: Mr. Barringer

S/S - Mr. Walker

DECLASSIFIED
EEO 12888 Sec. 535
NIA 5-80001

~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-65 DS-322

RG 652 NIA 5-80001 7-13-01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

106070

62

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Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN

PRIORITY

002

Dec 20 8 38 PM '66

STATE 106070

EXDIS

REF Amman's 1552

Request Embassy confirm information contained paragraph 1C reftel.

This seems to us to conflict with statements made by Jordanians one year ago when they requested increase in budget ceiling from J.D. 18.6 to J.D. 19.2 in order to provide funds necessary to support Jordan Arab Army at then existing force levels which we believe to have been under 50,000 men. At that time Jordanians expected receive UAC maintenance funds of \$8.9 million per year as part of JAA revenues. We also understood that JAA had established higher force levels of 55,000 men on assumption that maintenance cost of \$8.9 million per year would be adequate only if Jordan paid enlisted men at the much lower rates paid to the enlisted men in UAR and Syria. Clarification requested.

GP 1

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
NEA/ARN/MWwiley:jh 12/20/66

Tel. Ext.
3236

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA- Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD- Mr. Hoopes (subs.)
NEA/ARN- A.L.Atherton
s/s - Mr. Walker

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RG/JL NARA, Date 7-13-01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

000008

63

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Origin
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Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO: " TEL AVIV

002
DEC 20 8 28 PM '66

STATE 106068

EXDIS

FOR MACOMBER

1. If King accepts U.S. proposal, news of agreement airlift military equipment Jordan and advance delivery F-104's will have significant impact domestically and, possibly, serious repercussions in Israel. It is highly important we moderate these reactions to extent possible. This will require close cooperation by, and coordination with, Jordanians. You should, therefore, make clear to King and Tell we will require at minimum 24 hours notice before release any information by GOJ. Our expectation is that type equipment involved and numbers will not be released by either party. We would envisage release of short statement by either or both governments along lines "The USG at the request of the GOJ has agreed to provide under its existing military assistance program certain items of equipment to augment These are designed to enable the GOJ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ to assure the defensive strength of the Jordan armed forces, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ security of its frontiers, and thus to contribute further to the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ stability of the area. Delivery of a substantial portion of the equipment by air will take place over the next 30 to 60 days. In addition, delivery of a small number of F-104 interceptor aircraft previously purchased by Jordan

Drafted by:	NEA:RPD	12/20/66	Tel. Ext. 2107	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	U - Mr. Katzenbach
Clearances:	S/S - Mr. Walker	White House - Mr. Wriggins			
	USIA - Mr. Nevins	DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes			
	NEA/P - Mr. Brown	P - Mr. Raight	P/ON - Mr. McCloskey	H - Amb Torbert	

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET~~

NEA - Mr. Davies

~~SECRET~~

will be expedited."

2. Suggest you attempt get agreed text from King.
3. Would be helpful know from GOJ soonest and by December 23 at latest, extent to which General Khammash intends reveal nature and content McNamara package during Chiefs of Staff meeting Cairo. FYI. We have informed Israelis of likelihood as early as this weekend of announcement or leak and will continue our Congressional briefings on the proposed action. END FYI.

GP-1 END

RUSK

005

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

106069

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

DEC 20 8 32 PM '66

STATE 106069

EXDIS

REF.: Amman's 1545 and 1552

FOR MACOMBER

1. We recognize desirability of not forcing Hussein to choose between McNamara package with ceiling of present 50,000 force level and no deal, though we continue to believe any expansion unwise. Further we have doubts whether it is politically realistic to assume future rollback of any manpower or budget increases.
2. Nevertheless, if you deem essential we are prepared to accept the additional 2,000 implied by our equipment package. As fallback, you are authorized to accede to another 1,000 if you personally convinced this absolutely necessary. Within these totals Jordan should have flexibility in assignment of additional troops. U.S. strongly believes any expansion Jordan force beyond 53,000 would not be responsible act, and U.S. could neither countenance nor contribute to financial support of such expansion. To clarify our position, we would be prepared

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MWwiley/NEA:RPDavies/

Telegraphic transmission and

DOD/ISA:Thoopes:lab 12/20/66

classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

DOD - Mr. Hoopes

AID - Mr. Farr

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG5L, NARA, Date 7-13-01

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Wriggins

S/S - Mr. Walker

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~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

participate in joint expert examination of entire force level-budgetary relationship after we get past current crisis. FYI. Foregoing concessions on force levels should get us by immediate psychological problem in Jordan and enable King avoid introduction of foreign troops. END FYI.

3. In meeting increased budgetary costs of agreed force build-up we would expect share burden with GOJ. We also expect to continue long-term aid strategy of effecting gradual annual reductions in supporting assistance insofar as possible. Based on information submitted Amman's 1552, net shortfall for 2,000 man increase is \$2.2 million, assuming available UAC funds of \$5 million are applied to budget costs, or \$7.2 million if such UAC funds are used to meet GOJ obligations under U.S. purchase contracts. As our contribution to burden-sharing, we would consider reducing our JFY 67 budget support cut from \$5 million to \$2 or \$3 million. FYI. As you know, you authorized yield entire \$5 million cut if absolutely necessary your judgment. We could also agree ~~release~~ release some PL 480 local currency deposits for general budget use if authorized budget support not adequate. We trust, however, you recognize world-wide funding stringency here and desirability of maintaining GOJ awareness high cost of planned build-up. END FYI.

4. Foregoing burden-sharing offer applies only to JFY 1967. We will need further discussions at later date to consider burden-sharing for

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

JFY 1968 and beyond, when much larger budgetary problem is expected.

5. For perhaps wholly understandable reasons, your reporting thus far totally silent on Jordanians view of how they propose finance balance of ground equipment package (purchased under 1965 agreement) and initial aircraft package (purchased under 1966 agreement). It remains strong position here that terms of agreements cannot be altered, but that we willing give vigorous diplomatic support to GOJ effort to obtain necessary funds from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and possibly others. You should make clear U.S. expectation that any funds obtained from such sources or from UAC would be applied first to meeting GOJ obligations under U.S. purchase agreements, and would be available for budget support GOJ forces only after U.S. obligations met.

6. GOJ right to exercise option on or about January 1, 1967 for purchase 24 additional aircraft poses special problem. In view of present psychological climate Amman, it probably unwise to refuse GOJ exercise of option, but you should, ~~to extent you deem feasible, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ to extent you deem feasible, discourage this action until financing possibilities much clearer. As GOJ knows, schedule calls for \$2.8 million payment on first squadron in January. If option is exercised, additional \$2.9 million payment required same month, for total of \$5.7 million. In exploring this subject, you should advise King that we not ^{repeat not} prepared to recede from terms of

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

agreement; accordingly, we would have to insist that necessary part of available UAC funds (\$5 million) be applied to January obligations. In this connection, GOJ has paid in \$10 million on aircraft of which \$3.2 ~~million~~ million applicable to second and third squadrons. Therefore, if GOJ does not repeat not exercise option, that \$3.2 million would constitute credit applicable to January payment on first squadron. FYI. We aware this U.S. posture puts to King difficult choices relating to desired mix of aircraft buy and Army manpower increases, ~~/*****~~ but we wish make clear that GOJ financial responsibility is essential ingredient of U.S.-Jordan relationship and also an imperative for long-term maintenance of King Hussein's regime. END FYI.

END

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

105432

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~65
2

DEC 20 2 02 AM '66

Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy AMMAN

IMMEDIATE

SS
Info:

State 105432

EXDIS

Ref: Embtel 1545

1. We are sure you appreciate that response to question raised para 10 reftel has potentially far reaching implications for magnitude and nature our future financial support for Jordan. We simply cannot provide properly ~~staffed~~ staffed out guidance, either pro or con line you propose to take, in ^{frame} short time/~~frame~~ exposed reftel. We must therefore ask that you (1) inform King you have not received instructions in time give him ~~maxwillingness~~ answer on our willingness support increased force levels before his 5 p.m. meeting with senior officers, and (2) urge he postpone that meeting. We will undertake provide response by 5 p.m. Amman time following day, December 21.
2. Meanwhile, to assist us providing guidance you request, would be most helpful have more precise estimate ongoing costs of higher force levels suggested reftel.

GP-1

Drafted by:

NEA:ALAtherton

Tel. Ext.:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA - Roger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes
S/S-O:MICCheshw

NEA - Mr. Handley

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001~~SECRET~~By RG12, NARA, Date 7-13-01

104755

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

66

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN
INFO: AmEmbassy CAIRO
Info: AmEmbassy DAMASCUS
CINCSTRIKE

DEC 18 2 16 PM '66

STATE/04755
EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR MACOMBER

Given large number flights involved in projected airlift of equipment to Jordan (possibly as many as 350 sorties) we giving thought to problems involved in obtaining clearance for overflight Syrian and Egyptian territory. We speculate Syrian clearances may be difficult or impossible obtain. At appropriate time in your talks, request you explore with King possibility Jordan Government obtaining clearances through UAC channels if delays encountered in our approaches through diplomatic channels. Addressee comments requested.

RUSK

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.:

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA-RPD:evies

classification approved by

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes

S/S - Mr. Brown

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

FORM 8-65 05-322

By: RG/L, NARA, Date 7-13-01

104754

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

67 2

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

IMMEDIATE

Dec 18 2 15 PM '66

STATE 104754EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR MACOMBER

REF: Amman 1517

1. On the whole we share your encouragement. King's response appears reflect a recovery of self-confidence and sense of proportion. Indeed our frank concern is that having now successfully engaged US sympathy he and Khammash may now try to run away with game.
2. Apparently talks with King have not yet focused on the critical and pervasive questions of how GOJ expects to finance a pay increase, the operations and maintenance costs of larger forces, and the capital costs of present and projected equipment purchases. We note with some concern your belief we may have to give on force levels up to UAC goal of 54 thousand, and we see some disjunction between a US concession of that magnitude and your later statement that US will have to forego only a part of the planned \$5 million cut in budget support in FY 68. In our estimate a concession

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:ALAtherton:MWiley
DOD/ISA:THoopes:atmTelegraphic transmission and
classification approved

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

U - Mr. Katzenbach (substance) ~~XX~~
AID/NESA - Mr. Farr (substance) ~~XX~~

S/S - Mr. Walsh

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Wriggins
(substance)DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5~~SECRET~~

NLJ-S 98001

By RGJL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~

on force levels to 54 thousand plus a pay raise would increase GOJ military budget by \$20 million (assuming maintenance payments from UAC are terminated). We judge this would create immense pressures for additive US budget support. Therefore, it very important that you thoroughly explore financial implications of force buildup and ask GOJ where it thinks money is coming from.

3. On this point we need clarification of present force levels. According best information here Army stands at ^{48,400;} ~~42,500~~ Air Force at ^{2,300;} ~~2,000~~ Navy at ^{100.} ~~200~~ Grand total is ^{50,800.} ~~38,800~~ We would like to know whether these figures are correct and whether UAC goals of 54,000 apply to total GOJ forces or to Army alone.

4. With respect to proposed add-ons to McNamara package, we can accommodate the machine guns of both calibers and communications wire, and we have no objection your offering this addition in your discretion. 81 mm mortar sights not available for but we are checking on alternatives. two years and exorbitantly expensive, / Our calculations have assumed that 40 mm guns and 105 mm howitzers will include radios.

5. On other hand, we consider it premature to yield on tank upgunning for several reasons: (1) the GOJ position on the critical financial and budgetary issues remains to be explored; (2) if you offer the small arms, then tank upgunning would be the only authorized add-on remaining to you; (3) we need further time here to sort out the political and technical implications.

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Introduction of new tanks into Jordan could raise political problems; on other hand, carrying out the work in-country would be technically difficult and time-consuming (27 months); (4) before we concede on this substantial item, we need much firmer and clearer GOJ assurances on reasonable force goals, budget levels, and prohibition on other Arab troops in Jordan.

6. We think your cautious approach to advance loan of F-104 aircraft is perceptive and helpful. While we fully prepared go ahead in accordance with Secretary McNamara's statement to General Khammash, there are technical and administrative problems and perhaps, political problems.

7. We are pleased King understands value US offer to airlift equipment in 30-60 days. Believe you should emphasize and re-emphasize this dramatic evidence of US support and its direct contribution to psychological problem of loyalty in JAA.

You can tell King this would involve up to 350 sorties (6-8 arrivals per day) of large US transport aircraft. This will cost US about \$3 million in operating costs.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

104569

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

80

Origin

55

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy BEIRUT

2

DEC 16 8 42 PM '66

STATE: 104569

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: STATE 104568

Mr. Cotter, Defense expert on anti-infiltration technology currently in Amman, should be available if feasible to return via Beirut to brief Embassy and perhaps Lebanese officials if deemed desirable.

GP-3

END

KATZ

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA/NEA/IAI:WDWolle:pas:12/16/66 4422

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Dr. Evans
NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton
OSD/DDR and E. - Col Duffy
S/S - JFWalsh

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SI, NARA, Date 7-13-01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

4
104409

69

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

DEC 16 7 43 PM '66

Restow

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

STATE 104409

NODIS

1. Ambassador Harman met with Davies Friday to impart initial reactions to our military aid offer to Jordan. He indicated Foreign Minister scheduled to talk to you Sunday by which time military experts will have studied implications for Israel's security which will be passed to you.
2. As he had anticipated to Acting Secretary there was considerable worry about the amount of additional firepower and range of certain weapons. There was very strong hope that the figures imparted represented ceilings which would not be reached.
3. Davies noted that we were interested in keeping package to minimum needed achieve objectives. However ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ JAA required firepower for defense/against possible incursions from the north. We viewed the howitzers and mortars primarily in terms of a deteriorating situation on Syrian frontier. Since we have no way now of knowing how negotiations will go, whether these are ceilings only cannot be determined.
4. Ambassador Harman said the Foreign Minister had underlined two points: first, he had understood from the Acting Secretary that there would be no

Drafted by:

NEA:RPDavies:bw 12/16/66

Clearances:

S/S - JPWalsh

Tel. Ext.

2107

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: The Acting Secretary

U - Mr. Morris

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET~~

Classification

By RG/L, NARA, Date 7-13-01

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~
Classification

tanks or additional aircraft provided and, second, he asked Harman stress satisfaction that we are now in close touch. He hoped they could be kept abreast of Macomber's negotiations in Amman.

5. Davies said he understood Acting Secretary to say there were no tanks or additional aircraft included in our current proposal. We hope this situation will hold. While the Department had hoped initially to make a small psychological gesture, the risks were such that more than this had been deemed essential. We hope that this will do the job but as the Acting Secretary said there was some feeling within the USG that what we are offering will be too little to attain our objectives. Mr. Katzenbach had made clear to Mr. Eban that we did not like having to do what we must do and we appreciated that Israel would not like some of the things we were doing. Some indication from the Israeli side of understanding the situation into which we had been put would be helpful.

6. The Ambassador requested that you be informed of developments in Amman so that you could keep Foreign Minister informed stressing that the GOI has great interest in not getting caught by surprise. Davies said we would try to be helpful.

GP-3

END

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

103151

70

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

02 DEC 15 3 16 PM '66

INFO.: Amembassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

~~Amembassy DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE~~

~~Amembassy MOSCOW IMMEDIATE~~

Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE

Amconsul JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE TOSEC 246

STATE 103151

EXDIS

1. White House and Department strongly desire keep publicity and speculation regarding current Macomber visit to Jordan at absolute minimum. Ideal would be no mention whatever of trip in public media.
2. If presence Jordan becomes known to local and area press and Department spokesman or officers asked specifically to confirm, will reply: QUOTE Mr. Macomber who is AID Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia is on a visit to Jordan in connection with his AID responsibilities. UNQUOTE.
3. If asked whether visit has any special purpose or in any way connected with Jordanian request for military assistance, will reply: QUOTE I do not think it would serve any useful

Postow
more

Drafted by: NEA/P:JTWheelock/NEA/ARN:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Clearances: ALAtherton:lab 12/15/66 NEA/P - Mr. Brown S/S -Mr. Thompson White House-Mr. Saunders	ARN - Mr. Atherton P/ON -Mr. Bartch	DOD - Mr. Barringer (subs) AID/NESA - Mr. Farr (subs)
SECRET /EXDIS		

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

purpose for me to go into detail on Mr. Macomber's plans. I think it is reasonable to assume that he will look into the whole AID picture in Jordan. UNQUOTE.

4. In unlikely event we are queried re presence of DOD reps who arriving Jordan with Macomber, will reply: QUOTE Travel of USG personnel to Amman is common ~~EVENT~~ occurrence in connection with long-standing USG program in Jordan. UNQUOTE.

5. If pressed further, will add: QUOTE I can only say that I have no more information but will check further. UNQUOTE.

6. Addressees if specifically asked about Macomber visit should take similar line. ~~Nothing is to be said about the fact that Macomber is a member of the~~

7. In Washington, Defense will refer any queries to Department.

GP-1.

END

ACTING

KATZ

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

102795

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

2 71

DEC 14 7 46 PM '66

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: CINCSTRIKE

USUN NEW YORK

STATE 102795

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

EXDIS

Following are talking points for use as appropriate by Ambassador Macomber in discussing GQJ arms request and USG reply with King.

a. The discussions with General Khammash were useful. Through him appropriate officials in Washington were able to gain at firsthand fuller appreciation of problems King faces.

b. We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused His Majesty and the difficulties faced as a result of it. We continue to have strong reason to believe that this action does not presage a change in Israel's policy. This is an element in our calculations which it is important to underscore.

c. At same time we appreciate unfortunate effect which November 13 raid had on Jordan's sense of security and on morale of Jordan Arab Army. We fully recognize important role of Jordan Arab Army in maintenance of Jordanian stability and security. We also understand the threats to this stability and security from other quarters.

d. We recognize importance of stability and security to achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as King has often

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:ALatherton/MWiley/
NEA:RPDavies:lab 12/14/66

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

THE ACTING SECRETARY

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley
DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes
S/S - Mr. Walsh

AID/NESA - Mr. Macomber
WHITE HOUSE - ~~Mr. Wiggins~~
Mr. Wiggins

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

emphasized, so much in long run depends. It is for this reason that, in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we have provided military assistance to Jordan.

e. We are at same time seriously concerned by long-term financial and economic implications of current and projected force goals and of indicated equipment requirements of Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in enlisted men's pay will be essential in very near future. We agree in principle that some increase in salaries for enlisted men is necessary. FYI We wish to work out with appropriate officers of ^{the Jordanian} ~~the Jordanian~~ Government how the pay raise can be made with least adverse impact on the GOJ budget. Perhaps the raise could be less than 25% or could be adopted in two or more stages. The additional equipment and increased pay scales will have considerable effect on army morale. In any case we feel that qualitative improvement of the Jordanian armed forces through better organization and improved mobility and fire power within present force levels is the practical course to pursue. END FYI

f. The President has requested Macomber to visit Amman to give King benefit Washington deliberations re Jordanian request in perspective longer-term implications of problems now facing us in Middle East. This connection, would welcome opportunity to discuss (1) relationship of recent events to limits on GOJ budgetary expenditure as set forth in several U.S.-Jordan agreements, (2) appropriate size of Jordanian armed forces and nature of their equipment, (3) levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and (4) what role U.S. might usefully play in Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states

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which have important stake in continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

g. Meanwhile, being aware that King's attention and energies must for present continue to be focused on immediate problem of surmounting internal difficulties, we were anxious to take additional steps now to help meet King's immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of equipment needs which General Khamash outlined. This is substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by need which Jordan Arab Army feels for upgrading firepower and improving of mobility and communications. Delivery over next few months is feasible and, when this equipment in place, we believe it will have significant effect in improving defensive capabilities of army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

h. Our response is maximum feasible within current budgetary and equipment ~~availability~~ availabilities. As Secretary McNamara made clear to General Khamash there are three major restraints on our capabilities to respond to Jordan's request. These are (1) the availability of equipment, (2) the costs to the USG -- the appropriations by the Congress have imposed stringencies on our MAP capabilities, and (3) the enormous costs to Jordan implied in the projected manpower increases and equipment maintenance. We view our relationship with Jordan as a partnership; a partnership which involves mutual responsibility. We believe it would be irresponsible on our part if we did not frankly warn ^{King} ~~him~~ of the dangers we see in a projected course of action which would lead to unmanageable financial burdens.

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~~SECRET~~/KXDIS

Nevertheless, we may be able to find within our present budgetary limits and equipment availabilities some additional small arms. FYI As fallback we could consider upgunning up to 50 of Jordan's M-48 tanks to 105mm gun in the FY'68 MAP. END FYI.

1. Macomber will ^{also} explore the possibilities of improving Jordan's frontier ~~is~~ considering sending a technician to take a hard look at what can be done.

J. In short, we are prepared to be helpful to Jordan along the lines recommended by Secretary McNamara but understand that the GOJ will seek to maintain present force levels, continue the wise policies of restraint and measures previously adopted to enhance stability in the area, and will resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

k. We note that GOJ intends proceed with ~~purchase~~ ^{purchase} of ground equipment and aircraft under U.S.-Jordan agreements of 1965 and 1966. U.S. is fully prepared to honor these agreements, provided GOJ can continue to meet payments on schedules from funds provided by sources external to Jordan. This is in accordance with terms of both agreements. In this connection, U.S. is prepared to give strong diplomatic support to Jordan's efforts to obtain necessary funds from sources such as the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We cannot contemplate a change in the terms of the contract.

1. Ambassador Macomber is authorized to indicate that, subject to Congressional appropriations, we are prepared to recede from all or part of our proposed cut of an additional five million dollars for the coming year in order to support in part the increase in pay for enlisted men of the Jordan armed force. (He will seek to hold

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~~SECRET~~/EKDIS

to a figure of a \$2 million reduction in order to maintain our policy of continual reduction of direct budgetary support.)

FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS: While we prefer not become engaged in detailed discussion prior Macomber's presentation, you may draw on these as you deem necessary to hold line with GOJ pending Macomber arrival.

GP-3

END

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~/EKDIS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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102961

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Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO.: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

DEC 14 10 57 PM '66

STATE 102961

EXDIS

1. Ambassador Macomber will be accompanied by Lt. Col. H. J. Godfrey, Lt. Col. E. H. Kregloh, and Mr. D. R. Cotter on his trip to Amman.

2. Their itinerary is as follows:

Washington to London - TWA 704 - Arriving 8:00 a.m.

December 15.

London to Beirut - BOAC 918 - Leaving 11:45 a.m. and arriving 7:55 p.m. December 15.

Beirut to Amman - Royal Jordanian 401 - Leaving 9:00 a.m. and arriving 11:30 a.m. December 16.

3. Mr. Cotter does not have Jordanian visa in his passport. Request Embassy assistance in obtaining one upon arrival at Amman airport.

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MMWiley:lab 12/14/66

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton
AID/NESA - Mr. Macomber

S/S - Mr. Bruce

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RGL/NARA Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

4. Ambassador Macomber will travel as Mr. Macomber, ~~and if at all~~ and desire ~~we/they~~ avoid any publicity about their mission.
5. Contingency press guidance for use in case of leak will follow.

END

CP-1

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

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102122

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

80
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

Dec 13 9 35 PM '66

STATE 102122
EXDIS
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ACTING SECRETARY

F 9
02

FYI 1. By separate telegram you will be receiving report on
Khammash

McNamara-~~XXXXXXXX~~ meeting including McNamara's recommended
response to GOJ's military request.

2. Since GOJ requests involve economic and budgetary implications
of most serious nature, the President is asking Ambassador
Macomber to make special visit to Jordan both to convey our
formal response to King and discuss these implications as they
affect basis of continuing US-Jordanian partnership. Macomber
is, of course, anxious, as are we, that you accompany him in all
discussions with King. He is hopeful that, in first key meeting,
you can arrange for only Hussein, yourself and Macomber to be
present. He also anxious that you delay first meeting with King
until after he has adequate opportunity for careful consultation
with you and key members your staff.

3. Macomber, probably accompanied by senior military

representative

Drafted by: NEA:WJHandley/WBMacomber	Tel. Ext.:	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Acting Secretary
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Clearances:
White House - Mr. Wriggins S/S - Mr. Bruce

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy AMMAN

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

representative, tentatively planning arrive 10:30 Friday morning
via Royal Jordanian Flight 401.

~~XX~~

GP-3

END FYI

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

102121

74

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Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

STATE 102121

EXDIS

DEC 13 9 34 PM '66

02

Fg

Deliver to Ambassador Opening of Business December 14

1. Khammash had appointment with Secretary McNamara morning December 13. We have sent to you by septel through Defense channels substance of response given Khammash at that meeting. Response presented to Khammash as package having SecDef approval but not yet cleared throughout USG. We anticipate King will receive message from Khammash early December 14 reporting discussion. Khammash was very disappointed/amount equipment under consideration and King may have similar reaction.
2. You should seek immediate audience with King and inform him President is sending Ambassador Macomber as his special emissary to give King full benefit USG views re GOJ request. President requests that King receive Ambassador Macomber, whom he has designated both as person favorably and personally known to King and as one who has been intimately involved in Washington deliberations this subject.
3. Macomber arrival now planned for Friday, December 16, and we prefer postpone discussions on force and equipment levels of JAA and economic and budgetary matters until he arrives Amman. Talking points for ~~Ambassador~~ Macomber

Drafted by: EA/ARN:AI Atherton/MWWiley:es:12/13

Tel. Ext. 5617

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Acting Secretary

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Handley
S/S - Mr. Bruce

AID/NESA - Mr. Macomber DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes (subs)
White House - Mr. Wriggins (in subs.)

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By RG/JL NARA, Date 7-13-01

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will be sent septel.

4. It essential that King not take action inconsistent with existing relationship between US and Jordan as emotional reaction to report received from Khammash. If you have any reason believe that King will take steps toward establishment Military Directorate for West Bank or other action detrimental our objectives, you should advise him that we believe this would have very serious consequences for Jordan and might seriously complicate US-Jordan relations.

5. FYI. Package we are offering GOJ represents both painful and substantial effort on our part, including diversion from other country programs in present extremely tight MAP funding situation. We aware it falls far short of King's request, but hope Macomber mission with your help will forestall drastic reaction damaging to our own and GOJ interests while we endeavor persuade King of necessity adopting more realistic course. To this end, our approach is to offer prompt delivery of significant equipment package and our assent to pay raise while sending Macomber to discuss USG concern re longer term implications for aid levels and Jordan's economic future which larger program, particularly increased force levels, would involve. END FYI.

GP-1.

END

ACTING

KATZEN

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

15
97275

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

2

80
Origin
55
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

DEC 6 4 21 PM '66

STATE
EIDIS

97275

Department

Dec 5

1. Requesting this info be closely held, ~~Department~~ officer ~~ready~~ filled in UK Embassy Officer (Everett) re dimensions GOJ military assistance request:

- (a) approximately 130 million dollars of grant military equipment;
- (b) USG acquiescence in and support of an increase of approximately 28 million dollars per year in annual Jordan military budget and
- (c) USG agreement "take care of" approximately 70 million dollars in future payments on military aircraft and ground equipment previously contracted for with USG since GOJ no longer expects receive these funds from UAC. Dept officer said USG not yet decided how to handle this request although general opinion was that amounts requested were completely unrealistic. Meanwhile, we had ^{given Khammash} prompt and high level reception and, without indicating what our response would be, had emphasized importance to Jordan of not sacrificing economic development for excessive military buildup. Difficulty, ~~was~~ however, was judging how much less than GOJ requesting would be acceptable to it. Dept officer also said that (a) we now speculating on possible courses action GOJ might follow if it considers USG response inadequate and (b) we would welcome informal Foreign Office views in this respect.

2. Everett said

Drafted by:

NEA:ARN:MWWiley:mwh

12/6/66

Tel. Ext.

3236

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton

S/S - Mr. Walsh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/INFORM~~

2. Everett said Khamash had been in London on personal matters during the week following Israeli raid. He did not ~~aka~~ call on anyone in HMG but sent word to Foreign Office that JAA needs more infantry equipment from West. More recently GOJ had been in touch with HMG and asked for 3 or 4 Hawker Hunter aircraft to replace aircraft lost in recent months. In original approach GOJ/~~said~~ ^{said} HMG would receive regular request through normal channels but this not yet received. GOJ also requested that HMG put diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for financial assistance to JAA. In addition, GOJ requested that HMG reduce charges on pilot training which were increased recently for all foreign nations following HMG defense review. Everett also said UK Ambassador in Amman had been instructed to inform GOJ that up to 4 Hawker Hunters could be made available in 3 to 4 months time. UK Ambassador not to discuss price but has been told by foreign office on FYI basis that gross price excluding spares and rehabilitation would be on order ~~for~~ of 120,000 pounds sterling per aircraft. On question of requested build-up for JAA, Everett said HMG agrees on desirability bolstering moral JAA but is also concerned over effect such increase on country's economic development. ~~XX~~ HMG would hope build-up could be limited to some relatively modest assistance in equipment plus speed up in deliveries of MAP items. Foreign Office also considering approaching Saudi Arabia and Kuwait but has reservations since such approach might be counter productive.

GP-1

END

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET/INFORM~~

96

CAP CABLES

77

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

EEA627
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2740

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661289

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

RECEIVED: WASHINGTON COMCENTER
9:30 AM THURSDAY 22 DECEMBER 1966

RECEIVED: LBJ RANCH COMCENTER
1:30 PM THURSDAY 22 DECEMBER 1966

DECEMBER 22, 1966

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH FOUR MESSAGES FROM JORDAN.

1. THE PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE ON JORDAN PACKAGE.
2. A WARM PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM HUSSEIN TO YOU.
3. A CABLE DESCRIBING THE LAST STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATION.
4. AN EVALUATION FROM TEL AVIV OF THE ISRAELI PROBLEM.

I SAW FEINBERG YESTERDAY, WHO ASKED THAT WE TELL HARMON, BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR ISRAEL, ROUGHLY WHAT WE TOLD FEINBERG IN NEW YORK ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, IN ORDER TO DISARM THE OPPOSITION WHOM HE WILL SEE. I INFORMED NICK WHO WILL PROBABLY SEE HARMON TOMORROW.

FEINBERG WILL WORK ON THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.

WE HAVE WARNED THE JORDANIANS ABOUT LEAKING AND HAVE DESIGNED ABOUT AS GOOD A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AS CAN BE MANAGED.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1572

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NW 98-483
By W/L NARA, Date 7-3-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

FROM MACOMBER

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE WORKED OUT WITH KING HUSSEIN. FIRST PARAGRAPH WILL BE PUT OUT IN BOTH CAPITALS. SECOND PARAGRAPH WILL BE PUT OUT IN AMMAN ONLY. HUSSEIN BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO GET THIS ANNOUNCEMENT OUT AS FAR IN ADVANCE OF WEEKEND CAIRO MEETINGS AS POSSIBLE. HE WOULD LIKE TO ISSUE IT HERE FRIDAY MORNING AMMAN TIME. (GMT PLUS 2) EMBASSY WILL CONFIRM EXACT HOUR. IF DEPARTMENT HAS OBJECTION TO EITHER CONTENT OR TIMING PLEASE ADVISE EMBASSY SOONEST.

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS: PARAGRAPH ONE QUOTE AT THE REQUEST OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE UNDER ITS EXISTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CERTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. THIS ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS BEING PROVIDED AS A MEANS OF ENABLING JORDAN TO ASSURE ITS SECURITY, AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO THE STABILITY OF THE AREA. A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE AIRLIFTED TO JORDAN OVER THE NEXT 30 TO 60 DAYS. IN ADDITION TO THESE DELIVERIES, THE SHIPMENT OF F-104 INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT, PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED BY JORDAN, WILL BE EXPEDITED. UNQUOTE

3. PARAGRAPH TWO QUOTE A JORDANIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID IN AMMAN TODAY, THAT THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT MENTIONED IN THE JOINT JORDANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE IS BOTH CONSIDERABLE IN IMPORTANCE AND SIZE. THAT MILITARY SECURITY WOULD NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DIVULGE THE NATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT IN DETAIL AND THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF IT, THAT WILL BE ARRIVING IN JORDAN OVER THE NEXT THIRTY TO SIXTY DAYS, WILL BE ARRIVING IN A MASSIVE AIR LIFT. UNQUOTE

4. AS SUGGESTED BY LANGUAGE IN SECOND PARAGRAPH PROPOSED STATEMENT KING CONCURS WITH WASHINGTON'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC MENTION OF AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE EXTENT HE WOULD FEEL HE WOULD HAVE TO REVEAL NATURE AND CONTENT OF MCNAMARA PACKAGE AT SATURDAY'S CAIRO UAC MEETING, GENERAL KHAMMASH HAS INFORMED US THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PLAY THIS BY EAR AT THE MEETING, BUT THAT HE WOULD REVEAL NO MORE OF THE DETAILS THAN THE EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MEETING MIGHT REQUIRE.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1571

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S DECEMBER 21 LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

2. MR. PRESIDENT: I WISH TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE RETURN TO WASHINGTON YOUR SPECIAL EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR MACOMBER TO CONVEY TO YOU THE DEEP GRATITUDE WHICH I FEEL AND WHICH IS SHARED WITH ME BY MY GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES FOR YOUR SYMPATHY AND YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN OUR AFFAIRS AT THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD OF CRISIS. OUR GRATITUDE IS BOUNDLESS FOR THE HELP AND ASSISTANCE OF OUR FRIENDS AND I CAN ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT IN THE WAY IN WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO FACE IN THE PAST MANY A CRISIS WHILE FIGHTING TO MAINTAIN OUR FREEDOM AND THE COMMON IDEALS WE SHARE WITH YOU, WE CAN BUT DO OUR BEST ONCE AGAIN, IN THE FACE OF GREAT ODDS, AND HOPE THAT ONCE MORE WE MAY BE SUCCESSFUL.

3. I WOULD WISH HERE TO REITERATE THE CRITERIA THAT I HAVE SET OUT WHILE DEVELOPING THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF JORDAN: FIRSTLY, THAT THESE FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO FIGHT THE BATTLES OF FREE PEOPLE AND OF FREEDOM IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE NEED ARISES. SECONDLY, THAT THEY MUST HAVE THE HIGHEST DEGREES OF ABILITY TO FACE THE CHALLENGE, SUCH ABILITY, TO BE IN PART THE RESULT OF THE BEST POSSIBLE TRAINING. THIRDLY, THAT THESE FORCES BE AS WELL EQUIPPED AS POSSIBLE WITH THE MOST MODERN AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT TO ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE MINIMUM MAN-POWER, MAXIMUM FIRE POWER AND MOBILITY.

4. AT THE SAME TIME I WOULD LIKE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE AND SHALL ALWAYS ATTEMPT WHILE STRIVING TO MEET THIS CRITERIA, TO MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT JORDAN CONTINUES ON A STEADY, RAPID PATH OF PROGRESS IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A SOUND ECONOMY THAT WILL ENABLE US TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE BETTER FUTURE WE SEEK IN THIS AREA, FOR ALL, AND TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM.

5. THE CHALLENGE THAT CONFRONTS US AT THIS TIME IS INDEED GREAT, WHILE WE STAND IN THE FACE OF A COMMON ENEMY AS WELL AS IN THE FACE OF OTHER THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF JORDAN BUT AT THIS CRITICAL TIME YOUR SYMPATHY, CONCERN AND PROMPT ACTION IN OUR SUPPORT HAS NOT ONLY BEEN APPRECIATED BUT, WE HOPE, WILL BE INSTRUMENTAL IN OUR OVERCOMING THE CRISIS.

6. IF WE HAVE BEEN SO ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN A LITTLE MORE THAN YOU HAVE BEEN KINDLY ABLE TO PROVIDE US WITH, POSSIBLY MAKING A NUISANCE OF OURSELVES IN THE PROCESS, THIS WAS ONLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT THIS CRISIS REQUIRED IT, AND THAT THE LITTLE EXTRA HELP SO BADLY NEEDED NOW COULD MAKE THE GREATEST DIFFERENCE WHEREAS A GREAT DEAL MORE AT LATER DATE MAY BE TOO LATE. HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND YOUR OWN DIFFICULTIES, MR. PRESIDENT, AND WE APPRECIATE ALL THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO DO FOR US. WE

KNOW THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO FIGHT FOR OUR BELIEFS, AND FOR SO MUCH THAT IS AT STAKE IN THIS AREA, WITH OUR LIVES, WITH COURAGE AND DETERMINATION AS WELL AS WITH ALL THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO US.

7. WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND TO YOUR FAMILY FOR A MERRY CHRISTMAS AND A HAPPY NEW YEAR.

(SIGNED)

HUSSEIN.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1570

1966 DEC 21 PM 9:28

FROM MACOMBER

1. CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN AFTERNOON DECEMBER 21. IN COURSE OF THIS AND EARLIER MEETINGS WE HAVE COME TO FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDINGS:

2. KING DOES NOT AGREE WITH OUR BELIEF THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO BASIC CHANGE IN ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD JORDAN. HE UNDERSTANDS, HOWEVER, THAT US RESPONSE IS PREDICATED ON THIS ASSUMPTION AND AIMED PRIMARILY AT EASING CURRENT SITUATION, RATHER THAN DEALING WITH LONGER TERM THREAT OF REVISED NATURE.

3. HIS MAJESTY UNDERSTANDS VERY DIFFICULT POSITION FACING US SHOULD IT TURN OUT THAT DRAMATIC EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN JORDAN ARMY ALONG LINES OF MCNAMARA PACKAGE WAS HAPPENING IN APPARENT CONJUNCTION WITH INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS INTO JORDAN. WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR USG, HE ALSO FEELS THAT INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH JORDAN'S OWN INTERESTS. HE CANNOT GIVE AN ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP FOREIGN TROOPS OUT OF HIS COUNTRY BUT HE DOES GUARANTEE TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WILL DO ALL HE CAN TO KEEP THEM OUT.

4. THE KING HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO HOLD INCREASE IN CURRENT ACTUAL FORCE LEVELS (50,000) TO AN INCREMENT OF 3,000. HE WISHES PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT HE UNDERSTANDS AND SHARES US CONCERN FOR ESCALATING TROOP STRENGTH. HE ASKS HIM TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT SOME INCREASE AT THIS TIME IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. HE ALSO WISHES TO PERSONALLY ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY HE WILL TRY TO CUT BACK HIS TROOP STRENGTH. HE HAS SPECIFICALLY AGREED ONE YEAR FROM NOW TO REEXAMINE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL 3,000 TROOPS IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THAT TIME.

5. KING INTENDS TO CONTINUE HIS MODERATE POLICIES AND MEASURES TO ENHANCE AREA STABILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, JORDAN WILL PERSIST IN ITS EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

6. KING HUSSEIN UNDERSTANDS THAT USG IS FULLY PREPARED HONOR US-JORDANIAN SALES AGREEMENTS OF 1964 AND () PROVIDED GOJ CAN CONTINUE TO MEET PAYMENTS ON SCHEDULE FROM FUNDS OBTAINED FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO JORDAN. HE UNDERSTANDS ALSO THAT US NOT PREPARED TO ALTER TERMS OF THESE AGREEMENTS. HE KNOWS WE ARE WILLING TO GIVE VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO GOJ EFFORT OBTAIN NECESSARY FUNDS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. HE IS FULLY AWARE, TOO, OUR POSITION THAT ANY FUNDS OBTAINED FROM SUCH SOURCES, OR FROM UAC, WOULD BE APPLIED FIRST TO MEETING GOJ OBLIGATIONS UNDER US PURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR GENERAL SUPPORT OF GOJ FORCES ONLY AFTER US OBLIGATIONS MET. (IN EARLY FEBRUARY KING PLANS TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT IN SEARCH OF FUNDS; AND IN MARCH WILL GO TO LIBYA FOR SAME PURPOSE)

7. WITH RESPECT TO OPTION TO PURCHASE 24 ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, KING UNDERSTANDS THAT WE ARE PREPARED INTERPRET QUOTE ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 1 UNQUOTE LIBERALLY AND THAT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE WAIT TO EXERCISE THIS OPTION UNTIL HE HAS, WITH OUR SUPPORT, OBTAINED NECESSARY FUNDS FROM SAUDI ARABIA OR KUWAIT. IN ANY EVENT, HE UNDERSTANDS IF GOJ EXERCISES OPTION IN JANUARY, PAYMENTS TOTALLING 5.4 MILLION WILL HAVE TO BE PAID IN JANUARY TO USG AND THAT THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD HAVE PRIOR CLAIM ON UAC FUNDS OVER THEIR USE TO FINANCE ANY INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS.

8. KING UNDERSTANDS THAT WE ACQUIESCE ON ENLISTED MENS' PAY RAISE OF MAGNITUDE OF TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT. IN OUR AGREEING TO THIS, HE UNDERSTANDS THAT WE WILL TAKE RAISE INTO ACCOUNT IN LATER NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CEILING IN JORDANIAN MILITARY BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES TO REPLACE CURRENT 19.2 MILLION DINAR LIMITATION.

9. I HAVE INFORMED KING THAT UNDER DIFFICULT POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCE HE FACING USG WILL NOT PROCEED WITH ALL \$5 MILLION PROJECTED CUT IN OUR BUDGET SUPPORT FOR FY 67. I HAVE THEREFORE INDICATED THAT, SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS, OUR BUDGET SUPPORT PAYMENTS FOR THE COMING YEAR WILL BE REDUCED TO \$27 MILLION RATHER THAN TO \$25 MILLION. I ALSO INDICATED THAT IN RESTORING A PORTION OF OUR CUT I WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ALL OUR BUDGET SUPPORT FOR FORTHCOMING YEAR WOULD BE SUBJECT TO 57 PERCENT SPECIAL LETTER OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENT AS WE HAD EARLIER INFORMED HIS GOVERNMENT.

10. ON BASIS OF FOREGOING I HAVE ALSO TOLD HUSSEIN THAT WE WILL DELIVER THE EQUIPMENT LISTED IN MCNAMARA PACKAGE AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AIRLIFT A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THIS EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN IN NEXT 30 TO 60 DAYS. I HAVE INDICATED THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO AUGMENT PACKAGE TO EXTENT HE AND GENERAL KHAMASH REQUESTED IN OUR FIRST MEETING, BUT HAVE GIVEN HIM LIST OF MACHINE GUNS, RADIOS AND COMMUNICATION WIRE, AS SPELLED OUT DEPTTEL 104754, NOTING THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ADD THESE ITEMS TO INITIAL MCNAMARA LIST FOR KING EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT PACKAGE STILL DID NOT INCLUDE UPGUNNING OF M-48 TANKS. HE UNDERSTANDS, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE THIS REQUEST CAN BE CONSIDERED ON ANOTHER, LATER OCCASION, IT IS NOT PART OF OUR CURRENT PACKAGE.

11. WHILE INDICATING DISAPPOINTMENT THAT OTHER ITEMS HAD NOT BEEN ADDED TO MCNAMARA PACKAGE, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT PRESENT PACKAGE DRAMATICALLY FLOWN IN TO JORDAN WILL HELP SITUATION HERE QUOTE VERY, VERY MUCH. UNQUOTE

12. KING BELIEVES THAT ADVANCE LOAN OF SIX F-104'S, AND THEIR PRESENCE HERE WILL BE MOST HELPFUL. I HAVE CONFIRMED THAT WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DELIVER THEM TO JORDAN IN COURSE OF JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY. KING UNDERSTANDS THAT WHEN AMERICAN PILOTS ARE PILOTING THE PLANES THEY WILL BE USED ONLY FOR TRAINING OF JORDANIAN CO-PILOTS. HE HAS ALSO GUARANTEED THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO AVOID THESE PLANES COMING INTO COMBAT WITH ANY OF JORDAN'S NEIGHBORS AS LONG AS THEY ARE BEING SERVICED ON GROUND BY US PERSONNEL, EVEN WHEN THEY ARE BEING PILOTED BY JORDANIANS. ADDITIONALLY, HE IS AWARE THAT IF OTHER FOREIGN AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE STATIONED IN JORDAN WHILE THE F-104'S ARE STILL HERE ON LOAN BASIS, WE WILL HAVE TO REEXAMINE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEY SOULD REMAIN.

13. WE HAVE AGREED ON PROPOSED TEXT FOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF PACKAGE ALONG LINES SUGGESTED DEPTTEL 106068, WITH PARAGRAPH ADDED FOR USE IN JORDAN ONLY. (TEXT BEING SENT SEPARATELY.) HUSSEIN WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT FRIDAY MORNING AMMAN TIME AND AGREES WITH US THAT NUMBERS AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED PUBLICLY.

14. IN COURSE MY FINAL MEETING WITH HUSSEIN ON DECEMBER 21, WE ALSO DISCUSSED TACTICS OF FORTHCOMING CAIRO MEETING AS WELL AS KING'S CURRENT THINKING WITH RESPECT TO CHANGES IN HIS GOVERNMENT. THESE DISCUSSION REPORTED IN EMBTEL 1569.

15. AFTER RETURNING OFFICE AND DICTATING FOREGOING, I RECEIVED CALL FROM PRIME MINISTER TELL WHO SAID AND GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD TALKED TO KING RE AGREEMENT WHICH WE HAD REACHED AND MUST SEE ME AT ONCE. WE MET AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE AND MEETING BEGAN WITH MY REVIEWING POINT BY POINT ALL KEY LANGUAGE OF AGREEMENT SPELLED OUT PARA 2-12 IN THIS TELEGRAM. PRIME MINISTER AND KHAMMASH, IN AN INTENSE AND EMOTIONAL EFFORT, MADE IN THE NEXT TWO HOURS ONE LAST TRY TO OBTAIN FURTHER CONCESSIONS. WHILE MUCH OF OLD GROUND AGAIN GONE OVER, MAIN THRUST TELL-KHAMMASH ARGUMENT WAS THAT U.S. RESPONSE WAS NOT ENOUGH AND THAT BY OUR FAILURE TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING WE WERE DENYING JORDAN MINIMUM NECESSARY SUPPORT NEEDED AT THIS CRITICAL TIME. THEY ASSERTED THAT KING'S SENSE OF COURTESY MASKING DEPTH OF HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND THAT THEIR OWN DISAPPOINTMENT WAS QUOTE MANY TIME GREATER UNQUOTE THAN THE KING'S.

166 TELL ARGUED PAY RAISE, WHICH KING PRETTY MUCH COMMITTED TO AFTER MEETING WITH OFFICERS PREVIOUS EVENING, WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. (I WENT OVER FIGURES TO SHOW THAT IT WOULD BE.) TELL ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HEAD OFF PRESSURES FOR TROOP BUILD-UP BY DECIDING NOT TO TAKE U.S. PACKAGE AND INSTEAD GOING AHEAD WITH PLANS TO ACCEPT FOREIGN TROOPS INTO JORDAN. KHAMMASH FELT KING, AFTER LAST NIGHT'S MEETING WITH OFFICERS, WAS ALSO COMMITTED TO MUCH LARGER TROOP BUILD-UP THAN WOULD NOW BE POSSIBLE. KHAMMASH, IN VERY EMOTIONAL STATE SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE CARRY ON. (UNLESS HE CALMS DOWN, I SUSPECT HE MAY RESIGN IN NEXT DAY OR SO, AS HE DID ONCE BEFORE ON A SIMILAR OCCASION. IF SO, I BELIEVE KING WILL BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM WITHDRAW RESIGNATION.)

17. THROUGHOUT MEETING I MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT WHILE RECOGNIZING SINCERITY OF THEIR APPEAL WE HAD COME TO THE END OF THE LINE. I ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THEIR COMMENTS, I THOUGHT I SHOULD CONTACT HIS MAJESTY TO SEE WHETHER HE WAS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT WE HAD REACHED. AT THAT POINT TELL INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT GOING BACK ON THE DEAL, THAT IT HAD BEEN MADE AND IT WAS TOO LATE NOW FOR IT TO BE UNMADE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WHEN TELL AND KHAMMASH FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO MORE GIVE IN MY POSITION MEETING ENDED.

18. WHILE I HAVE NO DOUBT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SINCERITY IN THIS ELEVENTH HOUR EFFORT ON THE PART OF PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF, I BELIEVE THAT HUSSEIN WHILE DISAPPOINTED IS NOT AS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AS THEY ARE SUGGESTING. FURTHER I BELIEVE THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE MADE ABOUT THE RIGHT DEAL.

19. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE OFFICE I FOUND WAITING FOR ME TO CARRY BACK TO WASHINGTON A VERY COURTEOUS AND APPRECIATIVE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM KING HUSSEIN. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

20. MY CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE NOW WILL ONLY RAISE FALSE HOPES THAT THERE IS IN FACT FURTHER GIVE IN MY POSITION. I HAVE SAID GOODBYE TO KING AND WILL BE LEAVING AMMAN FOR WASHINGTON MORNING 22ND.

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 2142

1. WE AGREE WITH MACOMBER THAT POSSIBILITY HANDLING ISRAELI REACTION TO ENTRY OTHER ARAB TROOPS INTO JORDAN IS QUOTE BIG IF UNQUOTE. FOLLOWING ARE CONSIDERATIONS WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE WEIGHED IN ESTIMATING LIKELY GOI RESPONSE.

2. GOI'S REACTION TO DATE POSSIBILITY INTRODUCTION ARAB FORCES HAS REFLECTED ITS DETERMINED EFFORTS SINCE SAMU TO MAINTAIN MODERATE STANCE. IT HAD UNTIL ALLON SPEECH (TEL AVIV 2113) NOT ADDRESSED ITSELF PUBLICLY TO SPECIFIC PROBLEM INTRODUCTION FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS. WHEN ALLON'S REMARKS MADE STATEMENT NECESSARY EBAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE COMMENTS DID NOT COMMIT GOI TO SPECIFIC ACTION IN EVENT FOREIGN TROOPS INTRODUCTION. INTENT THIS FORMULATION VERY LIKELY WAS TO REMIND HUSSEIN AND PARTICULARLY OTHER ARABS WHO MIGHT PUT PRESSURE ON HIM THAT ISSUE INCENDIARY AS FAR AS GOI CONCERNED, WHILE AT SAME TIME NEITHER PROVOKING PUBLIC CONFRONTATION ON ISSUE IN SPECIFIC TERMS THAT COULD ONLY RINDER HUSSEIN'S POSITION MORE DIFFICULT, NOR RESTRICTING COURSES OF ACTION THAT GOI MIGHT TAKE IF EVENT COMES TO PASS. COOLNESS OF GOI REACTION TO DATE PROBABLY REFLECTS ALSO ITS CONFIDENCE IN BEING ABLE TO COPE WITH PROBLEM'S MILITARY ASPECTS IN ITS PRESENT FORM. GOI HOLDS IN LOW ESTEEM FIGHTING QUALITIES IRAQI AND SAUDI FORCES. IT FURTHER RECOGNIZES THESE TROOPS COULD TAKE UP STATIONS IN JORDAN AT POINTS WHERE THEY WOULD NOT CONCEIVABLY POSE THREAT TO ISRAEL. FINALLY, GOI SEEMS TO ESTIMATE THAT HUSSEIN HAS VARIOUS TACTICAL POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE TO STALL ACTUAL ENTRY ARAB TROOPS INDEFINITELY AND THAT, SINCE HE OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT WANT SUCH TROOPS IN JORDAN, HE WILL SO MANEUVER AS TO PREVENT THEIR ARRIVAL.

3. IN SPITE OF FOREGOING ESSENTIALLY SHORTRUN CONSIDERATIONS, WE ARE OF OPINION THAT AELIS' ESTIMATE OF LONG RUN FACTORS WOULD BE CONTROLLING DETERMINING THEIR REACTION PROPOSED INCREASE IN SIZE JORDANIAN ARMY (APPARENTLY BY TWENTY PERCENT) WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE SEVERE ADVERSE RESPONSE HERE OF ITSELF, EVEN IF NO FOREIGN TROOPS WERE INVOLVED. IMMINENT OR ACTUAL MOVEMENT FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS INTO JORDAN TO EFFECT INCREASE WOULD CAUSE VEHEMENT REACTION AND MIGHT WELL BE CONSIDERED INTOLERABLE. ISRAELIS WOULD COME QUICKLY TO VIEW IT AS FIRST STEP ON SLIPPERY SLOPE BY HUSSEIN THAT SLANTS TO A JORDAN UNDER CONTROL OF RADICAL ARAB FORCES, SERVING AS BASE FOR INTENSIFIED QUOTE WAR OF LIBERATION UNQUOTE AGAINST ISRAEL. ESHKOL GOVERNMENT ALREADY UNDER HEAVY CRITICAL FIRE AT HOME BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND TO LESSER DEGREE ITS MISHANDLING SAMU OPERATION WOULD, WE EXPECT, ALSO BE TAXED SORELY BY MILITANT ZIONISTS ABROAD IF IT DISPLAYED LACK OF RESOLUTION AND BOLDNESS IN COPING WITH THIS NEW THREAT TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE.

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OR ANY LIKELY SUCCESSOR COULD, EVEN IF IT WISHED, DO OTHER THAN RESPOND ENERGETICALLY IF INTRODUCTION FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS INTO JORDAN ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE OR SEEMS TRULY IMMINENT UNDER CONDITIONS THAT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS POSING AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO ISRAEL AND/OR SETTING PRECEDENT FOR SUBSEQUENT ENLARGED FOREIGN ARAB MILITARY PRESENCE IN JORDAN. PRECISE FORM OF ISRAELI RESPONSE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING. OF ONE THING I BELIEVE WE CAN BE SURE: GOI WOULD INTERPRET SUCH ARAB ACTION AS DIRECT CHALLENGE TO CREDIBILITY OF ITS DETERRENT AND WOULD BY THE MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL PRESS US TO HELP RESTORE THAT CREDIBILITY. THUS INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS INTO JORDAN COULD ULTIMATELY BE AN EXPENSIVE PROPOSITION IN MONEY TERMS FOR USG; IN FACT WE MIGHT HAVE TO PAY FOR SAMU TWICE.

DTG: 22/1530Z DEC 1966

SECRET

EXDIS

GPS 3570 IMI 3570

EEA544
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2659

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661248

Received: Washington CommCen
6:03 PM Sunday 18 December 1966

Received: LBJ Ranch CommCen
6:49 PM Sunday 18 December 1966

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING IS FROM BILL MACOMBER ON HIS MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN AND PRIME MINISTER KHAMMASH.

1. IN SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH KING AND HIS SENIOR STAFF, GENERAL KHAMMASH, IN BEHALF OF GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN, URGED A SERIES OF SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED MCNAMARA PACKAGE. IN ESSENCE KHAMMASH REPROPOSED MUCH OF ORIGINAL REQUEST SUBMITTED TO WASHINGTON, BUT FOR SOME ITEMS CUT AMOUNTS REQUESTED SUBSTANTIALY.

2. EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO SEEK TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM WASHINGTON FOR RELATIVELY MODEST ADDITIONAL INPUT BUT EMPHASIZED THAT MAJOR INCREASE OF KIND REQUESTED BY KHAMMASH NOT FEASIBLE.

. ADDITIONALLY, KHAMMASH AND KING HUSSEIN BOTH PRESSED FOR U.S. AGREEMENT EITHER TO UPGUN M-48 TANKS IN COUNTRY, OR AGREE TO EXCHANGE THEIR M-48 TANKS FOR 50 EACH OF THE M 483 FROM THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. THIS REQUEST HAS LONG HISTORY, AS WASHINGTON AWARE, AND I RECOMMEND THAT I NOW BE AUTHORIZED TO ACQUIESCE IN IT, PROVIDED THAT I CAN REACH SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON OTHER MAJOR MATTERS AS SPELLED OUT REFTEL.

4. I ALSO RECOMMEND, AGAIN SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF MATTERS DISCUSSED REFTEL, THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT MCNAMARA PACKAGE BY ADDITIONAL SMALL ARMS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AS FOLLOWS: 600 ADDITIONAL MACHINE GUN CAL. 30 M 1919 W/MOUNT M2 (TOTAL 900 INCLUDING 300 OFFERED ON MCNAMARA LIST); 50 ADDITIONAL MACHINE GUN CAL. 50 BROWNING M2 W/MOUNT M (TOTAL 250 INCLUDING 200 OFFERED ON MCNAMARA LIST); 100 MOUNT TRIPOD M FOR 100 CAL. 50 MACHINE GUNS PREVIOUSLY DELIVERED ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE SALES CASE UBM; 250 SIGHT M53 FOR 81MM MORTARS ALREADY IN INVENTORY; RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR M 421 40MM SP GUN, AND M 52 105MM SP HOWITZER BATTALIONS; AND WIRE FOR COMMUNICATIONS BORDER GUARD COMMO NET.

DTG: 190003Z DEC 1966

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3
NLJ-S 98001
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

79

Jordan

EEA540
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2652

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP661244

Received: Washington CommGen
8:07 PM Saturday 17 December 1966

Received: LBJ Ranch CommGen
10:55 PM Saturday 17 December 1966

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WE SHALL BE FORWARDING IN TIME RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM THIS NEGOTIATION, BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WANT A FEEL FOR HOW IT GOES AT EACH STAGE. IT SO FAR SEEMS TO GO QUITE WELL.

THE FOLLOWING IS FROM BILL MACOMBER

1. AMBASSADOR BURNS AND I MET ALONE WITH KING HUSSEIN AT NOON ON DECEMBER 17. AFTER ONE HOUR DISCUSSION WE WERE JOINED BY PRIME MINISTER, GENERAL KHAMMASH, COURT MINISTER JUMA AS WELL AS OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY AND WASHINGTON STAFF FOR FURTHER TALK LASTING ADDITIONAL HOUR.

2. ON THE WHOLE I AM ENCOURAGED. WE DO NOT HAVE A DEAL YET, BUT I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE WAY TOWARDS ONE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSION IN EARLIER PRIVATE MEETING, KING NOW HAS UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS FACING US IN CONNECTION WITH HIS REQUEST AND I THINK HE RECOGNIZES THE LOGIC OF OUR CONCERNS. I ALSO THINK HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SENIOR ADVISERS, ALTHOUGH INHIBITED BY THESE CONCERNS, GENUINELY DESIRE TO HELP HIM PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH RESPECT TO HIS PRESENT PREDICAMENT. HE IS NOTICEABLY HEARTENED BY THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND WHILE UNDERSTANDING REASONING BEHIND OUR LIMITED RESPONSE TO THE KHAMMASH LIST, AS WELL AS CONDITIONS WE ATTACHING TO THIS RESPONSE, HE IS OBVIOUSLY STILL CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH.

3. AS I SEE IT, FOLLOWING IS WHERE WE STAND AS OF MOMENT WITH RESPECT TO WHAT I NOW IDENTIFY AS MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS:

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NLJ 02-61
By us, NARA, Date 3-18-03

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(A) OUR CONDITION THAT THE KING STRIVE TO KEEP OTHER ARAB TROOPS OUT OF JORDAN: I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT UNITED STATES WOULD BE IN UNTENABLE POSITION IF IT ENDED UP MAKING CRASH EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN JORDAN ARMY ALONG LINES ENVISAGED BY MCNAMARA PACKAGE IF THIS WERE HAPPENING IN APPARENT CONJUNCTION WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO JORDAN -- ESPECIALLY IRAQI MIGS. THE KING UNDERSTANDS FULLY THE UNACCEPTABLE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND CLEARLY FEELS THAT SUCH A MOVE ALSO TOTALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS OWN INTERESTS. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP FOREIGN TROOPS OUT, BUT HE ADDED, HOWEVER, HE WOULD ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT HE WOULD DO "EVERYTHING I CAN THINK OF TO KEEP THEM OUT". I REGARD THIS AS A SINCERE ASSURANCE AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT AS OF THIS MOMENT HE THINKS HE CAN FIND A WAY TO KEEP THEM OUT. IN THIS CONNECTION, HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO PLAY SOME BRINKMANSHIP. HE HAD INDICATIONS THAT LATELY THE IRAQIS WERE POSSIBLY GETTING COLD FEET ABOUT COMING INTO JORDAN AND IF IT APPEARED THERE WAS A REAL CHANCE THEY WOULD BACK OUT HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO TAKE THEM OFF THE HOOK BY PREMATURELY ANNOUNCING HIS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THEM. KING WHILE OBVIOUSLY DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SITUATION IS IN FAR LESS DESPAIRING AND FAR MORE AGGRESSIVE MOOD THAN HE WAS LAST WEEKEND. HE HAS CLEARLY GIVEN UP, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, ANY IDEA OF ABDICATING PART OF HIS AUTHORITY TO A PALESTINIAN DIRECTORATE. INSTEAD, FACED WITH A PARLIAMENT WHICH WILL NOT KEEP TELL IN OFFICE AND WITHOUT A SUITABLE SUCCESSOR AVAILABLE (ONE WHO IS FORCEFUL BUT NOT CORRUPT OR A REPUDIATED OLD GUARD TYPE OF POLITICIAN), HE IS NOW SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING DISSOLVING PARLIAMENT, SUSPENDING THE CONSTITUTION AND SERVING AS HIS OWN PRIME MINISTER. (WASFI TELL, INCIDENTALLY, WOULD STAY IN THE GOVERNMENT). IN DISCUSSING THIS MOVE, KING SAID HE WOULD NOT GIVE IN TO PALESTINIAN DEMANDS UNDER PRESSURE, BUT THAT AT A LATER DATE, WHEN THINGS QUIETED DOWN, HE WOULD PROMULGATE A NEW CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SOME OF THE GRIEVANCES OF THE WEST BANK. KING ALSO NOTED THAT DISMISSING PRESENT GOVERNMENT MIGHT GIVE HIM EXCUSE TO REPUDIATE AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS INTO JORDAN, MADE WHILE THIS GOVERNMENT WAS IN OFFICE.

(B) FORCE LEVELS-THIS IS STILL AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE. WHILE UNDERSTANDING (AND I NOW THINK AGREEING WITH) LOGIC OF UNITED STATES POSITION THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL BE HELD, HE IS STILL WEIGHING EXTENT TO WHICH HE CAN GO ALONG IN FACE OF UNCERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL MOOD OF HIS ARMY. WHILE I BELIEVE NOW WE CAN GET AN AGREEMENT WHICH STOPS CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF KHAMMASH'S TARGET, I MAY HAVE TO END UP GIVING A BIT HERE -- PERHAPS UP TO THE EXISTING UNITED ARAB COMMAND GOAL OF 54 THOUSAND. I WILL HOWEVER CONTINUE TO RESIST THIS IF I CAN.

(C) CONTINUATION OF MODERATE POLICIES AND MEASURES TO ENHANCE AREA STABILITY -- THIS REQUIREMENT UNDERSTOOD BY HUSSEIN WHO RECOGNIZED IT CONSISTENT WITH HIS BASIC INTERESTS.

(D) MCNAMARA PACKAGE-KING AND KHAMMASH PRESSING FOR INCREASES IN PACKAGE. I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. KHAMMASH PRESSING FOR MORE EXTENSIVE ADDITIONS THAN KING. MY RECOMMENDATION RE RELATIVELY MODEST INCREASE IN PACKAGE CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

(E) RE 30-60 DAY DELIVERY, THIS PROPOSAL VERY HEARTENING TO KING AND I THINK IS TURNING OUT TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN STRENGTHENING HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN HIS ABILITY TO RIDE OUT CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.

(F) ADVANCE LOAN OF F104'S - HUSSEIN GRATEFUL FOR THIS SUGGESTION AND STRONGLY INCLINED TO ACCEPT. I POINTED OUT HOWEVER, COMPLICATING FACTORS BOTH FOR HIM AND FOR UNITED STATES IN GOING AHEAD WITH THIS PROPOSAL. URGED HIM TO SLEEP ON IT AND NOT ASK US TO PROCEED UNLESS HE IS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO HIM. PRIM MINISTER TELLS IMMEDIATE REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL WAS, "GOOD, THIS GIVES US THE EXCUSE TO TELL THE IRAQIS TO STAY OUT." IF HUSSEIN ACCEPTS OFFER, I WILL EMPHASIZE THAT IF IN FACT IRAQI PLANES EVER DID GET INTO JORDAN, WE WOULD HAVE TO REEXAMINE AT ONCE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE LOANED 104'S SHOULD REMAIN.

(G) LEVEL OF BUDGET SUPPORT - I SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME STRESSING TO HUSSEIN BOTH UNIQUENESS OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN AND SERIOUS BUDGETARY REPERCUSSIONS GROWING OUT OF CURRENT NEED FOR PAY RAISE AND DISAPPEARANCE OF UNITED ARAB COMMAND SUPPORT FOR OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE COSTS. MADE IT CLEAR WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO FOOT BILL FOR ALL THIS NOR FOREGO CONTINUED ANNUAL DOWNWARD TREND IN OUR BUDGET SUPPORT PAYMENTS. HAVING GONE OVER FIGURES, HOWEVER, I AM REGRETFULLY CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO FOREGO A PART OF PLANNED \$5 MILLION CUT PROJECTED FOR NEXT YEAR. I HAVE SUGGESTED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THIS PROVIDED WE CAN REACH SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING ON OTHER KEY ELEMENTS OF OUR CURRENT DISCUSSIONS.

(H) IN DISCUSSION WITH HUSSEIN TOMORROW I EXPECT TO EXPLORE QUESTION OF OPTIONS FOR PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS AS WELL AS PROBLEMS RE CONTINUING PAYMENTS UNDER PREVIOUS NEGOTIATED SALES AND CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS. THESE MATTERS TOUCHED ON ONLY INDIRECTLY IN TODAY'S MEETING.

DTG: 180207Z DECEMBER 1966

~~SECRET~~

CD 1020 IMT 1020

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SENT
WHCA

1966 DEC 3 14 05

EEA442
DD WTE 10
DE WTE 2511

FROM: HOWARD WRIGGINS
TO: WALT ROSTOW
CITE: CAP661155

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-61
By us NARA, Date 3-18-03

*Sent 80
9:05AM
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~~SECRET~~

THIS DRAFT PAPER IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY SINCE SECRETARY RUSK HAS NOT YET APPROVED IT. IT SUMMARIZES STATE'S AND DEFENSE'S THINKING ON HOW TO DEAL WITH HUSSEIN.

DECEMBER 2, 1966

TO: THE SECRETARY
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: NEA - WILLIAM J. HANDLEY
SUBJECT: TOPIC FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT --
JORDAN'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

JORDAN'S PROBLEM

KING HUSSEIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S ATTACK INTO JORDAN NOVEMBER 13 INDICATES A NEW ISRAELI POLICY: THE TOPPLING OF HIS REGIME TO REDUCE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS AND, POSSIBLY, MAKE EASIER AN ISRAELI EXPANSION INTO THE WEST BANK. THUS, HE SEEKS QUICKLY TO BOLSTER JORDAN'S MILITARY STRENGTH BOTH TO RESTORE MORALE IN THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES AND AMONG HIS PEOPLE AS WELL AS TO MAKE MORE DIFFICULT FUTURE ISRAELI ATTACKS. WE DISAGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT OF A CHANGED ISRAELI POLICY AND BELIEVE MAJOR INCREASES IN EQUIPMENT AND FORCE LEVELS OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY WOULD PLACE AN INTOLERABLE BURDEN ON JORDAN'S ECONOMY UNLESS SUPPORTED ALMOST ENTIRELY BY OUTSIDE SOURCES. JORDAN'S PROBLEM, AS WE SEE IT, IS PSYCHOLOGICAL. THUS, A GOOD CASE CAN BE MADE FOR SOME ADDITIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH AS A MEANS OF RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE KING AND ARMY LEADERSHIP.

SIZE OF JORDANIAN REQUEST

MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH, CHIEF OF STAFF, JORDANIAN ARAB ARMY, HAS RAISED WITH YOU, WALT ROSTOW, AND OTHERS IN THE DEPARTMENT AND DEFENSE, JORDAN'S REQUEST 1) FOR APPROXIMATELY \$130 MILLION IN EQUIPMENT; 2) U.S. ASSENT IN AND SUPPORT FOR AN INCREASE IN THE ANNUAL DEFENSE BUDGET OF AROUND \$28 MILLION; AND 3) U.S. ASSISTANCE IN "TAKING CARE OF" AROUND \$70 MILLION IN PAYMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT AND GROUND EQUIPMENT CONTRACTED FOR WITH THE U.S.G. THE GENERAL BELIEVES THESE FUNDS WILL NOT NOW BE FORTHCOMING FROM THE UNITED ARAB COMMAND BECAUSE OF THE QUARREL WHICH HAS ENSUED AS A RESULT OF CURRENT ARAB RIVALRIES.

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POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF OBJECTING REQUEST

THE KING SAYS HE HAS ALTERNATIVES. THESE ARE: 1) TO ATTACK ISRAEL; 2) TO REQUEST ARMS FROM THE U.S.S.R.; AND 3) TO ABDICATE. OF THESE WE BELIEVE IT MOST LIKELY THAT HE WOULD TURN TO THE U.S.S.R. BEFORE DOING THIS, HOWEVER, HE WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT AND "ARAB SOLUTION" WHICH COULD INVOLVE EITHER (A) A CLOSER MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ALLIANCE WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, OR, (B) A TURNING TOWARD THE MORE RADICAL ARAB STATES WITH A CONCOMITANT READJUSTMENT OF JORDAN'S POLICIES. EITHER OF THESE "ARAB SOLUTIONS" MIGHT INVOLVE STATIONING FOREIGN MILITARY TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT IN JORDAN. ANY OF THESE ALTERNATIVES WOULD INVOLVE A THREAT TO THE REGIME AND OUR INTERESTS. JORDAN IS A KEY STATE INsofar AS AREA STABILITY IS CONCERNED AND IN THE INTEREST OF STABILITY WE HAVE INVESTED SOME HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN THE COUNTRY SINCE 1957.

IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THOUGH WE FEEL CONTINUANCE OF THE STATUS QUO IN JORDAN IS IN OUR INTEREST, THE KING ALSO NEEDS US IF HE IS NOT TO EXPOSE HIMSELF TO WHAT SEEMS TO US UNACCEPTABLE RISKS. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT U.S.G. FAILURE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING COULD LEAD THE KING TO TAKE RECKLESS ACTIONS, THE NET RESULT OF WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE A MOVE OF JORDAN TOWARD THE RADICAL ARAB STATES AND A FUNDAMENTAL REALIGNMENT OF U.S.-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. EVEN SO, WE QUESTION WHETHER THE POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS JUSTIFIES MEETING THE GOJ'S EXORBITANT REQUEST FOR AN ARMS BUILDUP. IN FACT, IF THE SITUATION IS SO DESPERATE AS TO REQUIRE A BUILDUP OF THE DIMENSIONS HUSSEIN SUGGESTS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT EVEN SUCH A BUILDUP WOULD SALVAGE THE HASHEMITE REGIME AND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IT FOR LONG.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OUR THINKING IS STILL TENTATIVE, BUT IS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

1. A SMALL INCREASE IN MAP (CURRENTLY PROGRAMMED FOR \$3.5 MILLION) TO PROVIDE INCREASED MOBILITY AND BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AT EXISTING FORCE LEVELS. WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN AN INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY \$1 TO \$2 MILLION.
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3. CONTINUE EFFORTS TO PERSUADE KING HUSSEIN THAT ISRAEL'S POLICIES AND POSITIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED, THAT A BUILDUP CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON MILITARY GROUNDS. DISCIPLINE IN THE SECURITY FORCES HAS HELD DURING THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS. EVEN IF WE SUPPORT THE REQUESTED BUILDUP, JORDAN COULD NEVER ENGAGE ISRAEL OR ITS ARAB ENEMIES SUCCESSFULLY IN MAJOR HOSTILITIES. TO CONVINCE THE KING THAT HIS PROPOSALS PLACE JORDAN'S SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN JEOPARDY, WE MIGHT SEND A MISSION HEADED BY A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL KNOWN FAVORABLY TO THE KING TO TALK TO HIM.

4. JORDAN SHOULD LOOK TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT TO MEET THE SHORTFALL IF UAC FUNDS ARE CUT OFF. IN THIS CASE THE U.S.C. MIGHT CONSIDER SUPPORTING JORDANIAN REQUESTS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, URGING THEM TO SUPPLY THEIR UAC CONTRIBUTIONS DIRECTLY TO JORDAN.

CLEARANCES: NEA/ARN - MR. ATHERTON DOD/ISA - MR. HOOPES (DRAFT)
AID/NESA - MR. MACOMBER (DRAFT)

NEA:RPDAVIES:BW 12/2/66
NEA/ARN:MWILEY

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 031238Z DEC 66

81

Jordan

Received Washington CommCen
6:38 AM Saturday 3 December 1966

EEA442
OO WIE 10
DE WIE 2511

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
8:05 AM Saturday 3 December 1966

FROM: HOWARD WRIGGINS
TO: WALT ROSTOW
CITE: CAP661155

(Handwritten initials)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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DECEMBER 2, 1966

TO: THE SECRETARY
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: NEA - WILLIAM J. HANDLEY
SUBJECT: TOPIC FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT -- JORDAN'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-61
By iw, NARA, Date 3-18-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SIZE OF JORDANIAN REQUEST

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CLEARANCES: NEA/ARN - MR. ATHERTON DOD/ISA - MR. HOOPES (DRAFT)
AID/NESA - MR. MACOMBER (DRAFT)

NEA:RPDAVIES:BW 12/2/66
NEA/ARN:MWILEY

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 031238Z DEC 66

~~SECRET~~

82
Jordan
RECEIVED
WEDNESDAY 30 NOV 1966 10:10 A.M.

00 WTES AUSTIN
DE WTEQP 069

EEA 37
00 WTE10
DE WTE 2440

FROM: W. W. ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
SITE: CAP661107

~~SECRET~~

YOU MAY HAVE SEEN AP AND UPI REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT
"THE US IS SENDING 36 F-104 STAR FIGHTERS TO STRENGTHEN
THE FORCES OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN."

THE NEW ELEMENT IN THESE STORIES IS THE ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION
OF TYPES AND NUMBERS OF PLANES. WHEN WE LET THE JORDANIANS
ANNOUNCE THE SALE ON 2 APRIL 1966, THEY SPECIFIED ONLY
"A NUMBER OF MILITARY JET AIRCRAFT." THE DEAL YOU APPROVED
IN FEBRUARY INCLUDED "UP TO 36" PLANES, 12 TO BE BOUGHT THEN FOR
LATE 1967 DELIVERY AND 24 MORE AVAILABLE FOR ORDER AROUND 1 JAN-
UARY 1967 FOR DELIVERY 1968 AND AFTER. THIS IS A DOLLAR SALE.
ALL THAT HAS BEEN DONE SO FAR IN THE CURRENT CRISIS IS TO
SPEED UP DELIVERY OF THE FIRST PLANES BY A COUPLE OF MONTHS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO REFUSE COMMENT ON DETAILS,
BUT WE LONG AGO ACKNOWLEDGED THIS SALE, THUS THERE IS NO REASON
TO BE CONCERNED BY APPEARANCE OF THESE STORIES. OUR MAIN JOB
RIGHT NOW IS TO BOLSTER HUSSEIN, AND THE STORIES HELP, THOUGH
THEY ARE NOTHING NEW. CHANCES ARE THE DETAILS SLIPPED OUT THROUGH
RELEASE OF LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN MILITARY
AND THE UNITED ARAB COMMAND.

THERE MAY BE MORE STORIES OF THIS KIND SINCE GENERAL KHAMMASH,
HUSSEIN'S CHIEF OF STAFF, IS HERE AND IS TALKING TO STATE AND
DEFENSE OFFICIALS. HE SAW SECRETARY RUSK YESTERDAY AFTERNOON
AND MAY REMAIN FOR TWO WEEKS GOING OVER HIS REQUESTS FOR
NEW EQUIPMENT. OUR ROLLING OUT THE RED CARPET FOR HIM IS ONE
WAY TO HELP EASE HUSSEIN'S REGIME THROUGH THIS TENSE PERIOD.

DTG: 301519Z NOVEMBER 1966

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By RG13, NARA, Date 7-13-01

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DEFENSE CABLES
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CIA CABLES

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 66127

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GROUP 1
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CITE

DIST 24 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY: JORDAN/ISRAEL/ARAB STATES

DOI:

SUBJECT: JORDAN ASSESSMENT

OF ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL

DECISION TO SEND OTHER ARAB

TROOPS TO JORDAN AND PROPOSALS

JORDAN INTENDS TO MAKE TO

UNITED ARAB COMMAND ON 24

DECEMBER REGARDING THIS DECISION

ACC:

SOURCE:

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-45
By jis, NARA, Date 6-30-04

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

1. ON 22 DECEMBER 1966 THE KING CHAIRED A LENGTHY MEETING OF HIS TOP POLITICAL, MILITARY

AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISORS TO DECIDE ON THE POSITION THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION, HEADED BY CHIEF OF STAFF AMIR KHAMMASH, SHOULD TAKE AT THE 24 DECEMBER UAC MEETING IN CAIRO ON THE ENTRY OF OTHER ARAB TROOPS INTO JORDAN. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WAS A REVIEW OF ALL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON THE SUBJECT. SEVERAL REPORTS, CONSIDERED RELIABLE, INDICATED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE IN COLLUSION WITH THE UAP, SYRIA AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION IN UTILIZING THE ENTRY OF IRAQI FORCES TO UNDERMINE INTERNAL SECURITY WITHIN JORDAN. AMONG OTHER THINGS THERE IS REPORTEDLY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY TROOPS WEARING IRAQI INSIGNIA AMONG THE IRAQI CONTINGENTS. ON THE BASIS OF THIS INFORMATION THOSE WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY FELT THAT JORDAN COULD LIVE WITH IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN ALTERED THEIR POSITION AND IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO RESIST ENTRY REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES

2. IT WAS ALSO AGREED, MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF OVERT INFORMATION, THAT THERE WAS BETTER THAN A 50-50 CHANCE THAT ISRAEL WOULD REACT MILITARILY IF FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS WERE STATIONED IN JORDAN.

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3. WHILE IT WAS THUS CONCLUDED THAT THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS MUST BE PRECLUDED IT WAS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT A FLAT TURN DOWN OF THE UNANIMOUS ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL DECISION COULD RESULT IN A MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS FOR THE REGIME. IN A EFFORT TO HAVE THEIR CAKE AND EAT IT THE FOLLOWING PLAN WAS DEvised. KHAMMASH WILL INSIST TO THE UAC, WITH SUPPORTING EVIDENCE, THAT THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS WILL SERIOUSLY RISK AN ISRAELI ATTACK AND PERHAPS ALL OUT WAR. TO INSURE PROPER PREPAREDNESS ON THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND IN THE GAZA STRIP, WHERE HOSTILITIES WILL BE CONCENTRATED, JORDAN INSISTS ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF MUCH LARGER FORCES THAN PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED. SPECIFICALLY, KHAMMASH WILL INSIST ON THE PRESENCE OF FORCES FROM ALL THIRTEEN ARAB STATES IN SUFFICIENT FORCE TO MAKE A MAJOR DEFENSIVE EFFORT. JORDAN WILL COMMIT ALL OF ITS FORCES. KHAMMASH WILL FURTHER PROPOSE THAT UAC HEADQUARTERS BE TRANSFERRED TO THE WEST BANK AND ALL ARAB FORCES THERE BE PLACED UNDER THE DIRECT COMMAND OF THE UAC. THESE PROPOSALS WILL BE PRESENTED AS NEW POSITIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE MILITARY REALITY OF THE SITUATION, AND NOT AS A CONDITION TO PRIOR DECISIONS

4. IT IS PREDICTABLE THAT THE UAC WILL DISCLAIM AUTHORITY TO UNDER TAKE SUCH ACTION AND INSIST THAT THE DEFENSE COUNCIL DECISIONS BE IMPLEMENTED. KHAMMASH IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE LACK OF UAC AUTHORITY TO ACT ON THESE PROPOSALS AND FOR THIS REASON TO PROPOSE AN IMMEDIATE SUMMIT

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MEETING OF THE ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE, THE ONLY BODY AUTHORIZED TO MAKE SUCH DECISIONS, TO CONSIDER JORDAN'S PROPOSALS. IF THE UAC REFUSES TO SUPPORT THIS RECOMMENDATION KHAMMASH WILL INSIST ON ALL PRESENT TO SIGN COPIES OF THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING FOR THE RECORD. JORDAN WILL FORWARD ITS RECOMMENDATIONS IN A FORMAL MESSAGE TO THE ARAB LEAGUE REQUESTING IMMEDIATE ACTION. IF REQUIRED TO COMBAT SUBSEQUENT PROPAGANDA ATTACKS THE RECORD OF THE MEETING AND THE LETTER TO THE ARAB LEAGUE WILL BE PUBLISHED.

25X1X 5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE IS TO BE MORE ARAB THAN THE REST, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE UAR IS NO MORE INTERESTED IN A WAR WITH ISRAEL THAN ANYONE ELSE. IF THIS ASSUMPTION IS FALSE WE ARE ALL IN FOR TROUBLE ANYHOW, BUT AT LEAST JORDAN WILL NOT BE THE SCAPE-
GOAT. 6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT [REDACTED])

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COUNTRY: JORDAN/ISRAEL/ARAB STATES

DOI:

SUBJECT: JORDAN'S REQUEST TO ARAB LEAGUE FOR SUMMIT MEETING
OF ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ) SENT A LETTER TO THE ARAB LEAGUE REQUESTING AN URGENT ARAB SUMMIT MEETING. THE LETTER SUGGESTED JORDAN AS THE VENUE. IT WAS POINTED OUT IN THE LETTER THAT THE REQUEST WAS BASED ON TWO CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WERE BEYOND THE COMPETENCY OF ANY ASSEMBLY OTHER THAN THE ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE. FIRST, THE RECENT ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL DECISION TO STATION OTHER ARAB TROOPS IN JORDAN INVOLVED A CLEAR RISK OF WAR WITH ISRAEL. THE GRAVITY OF THIS RISK TO ALL ARAB

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STATES MADE IT IMPERATIVE THAT THE RESULTANT CONSEQUENCES, ALTERNATIVES AND PREPARATIONS BE FULLY CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST ARAB LEVEL. SECOND, ANY EFFECTIVE MILITARY ALLIANCE, SUCH AS THAT ENVISAGED BY THE UNITED ARAB COMMAND (UAC) AGAINST ISRAEL, MUST BE PREDICATED ON A MEASURE OF POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. THE LETTER CONTINUED THAT IT WAS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT ANY EFFECTIVE ARAB MILITARY ALLIANCE COULD BE FORGED AGAINST ISRAEL UNTIL THE PRESENT POLITICAL ANTAGONISMS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD WERE RESOLVED. THIS, THE LETTER CONCLUDED, COULD ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH A MEETING OF THE ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE.

2. [] COMMENT: []

TOLD JORDAN CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMIP KHAYMASH IN CAIRO LAST WEEK THAT THE UAC WOULD NEVER BE AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY INSTRUMENT UNTIL ARAB POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WERE ELIMINATED OR DRASTICALLY REDUCED. [] THE CONTENTION THAT COMMON POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, IF NOT PHILOSOPHY, WERE A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY MILITARY ALLIANCE WAS A MAJOR THESIS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY INSTRUCTORS UNDER WHOM

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[REDACTED] SENIOR UAR OFFICERS HAD STUDIED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE DID NOT ACCEPT ALL SOVIET DICTA HE CONSIDERED THIS ONE A TRUISM. [REDACTED] GOJ KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ACCEPTED UAR MILITARY CONCEPT, IN PART, PROMPTED THE GOJ TO THROW IT BACK AT THEM, CONFIDENT THEY COULD NOT SINCERELY REFUTE IT.)

3. THE GOJ LETTER SUGGESTED THAT UNLESS AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING WERE ARRANGED JORDAN COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT CERTAIN PRINCIPAL ARAB STATES WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT SERIOUS IN THEIR INTENTIONS OR RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING ISRAEL. IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE GOJ SAW LITTLE VALUE IN ATTENDING FUTURE SUPORDINATE COUNCIL MEETINGS FOR STERILE DISCUSSIONS ON PROBLEMS WHICH THE PARTICIPANTS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO SOLVE. [REDACTED] COMMENT:

[REDACTED] IF THE REPLY WERE NEGATIVE JORDAN WOULD PROBABLY NOT ATTEND FUTURE UAC AND ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETINGS.)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCPACAFSA (ALSO SENT [REDACTED])

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