

87

Memo's & Misc.

*file* *88*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1967

WWR:

On re-checking with AID about Tony Taylor going to Jordan, I find that the Jordanians have not met their own schedule and will not need Taylor for another three months or maybe even more. Therefore, let's let the attached rest for the moment.

For the record, AID reaffirms that Taylor is not promoting himself. He is very definitely the man for the job. Unfortunately, when he goes it will be very difficult to keep some mention out of the papers, though we could try.

*Hal*

HHS

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Check who's priority  
has or item  
keep out of paper*

88a

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1967

*Rec'd 22, 1967  
note 18p*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

You will remember that your brother-in-law went to Jordan about a year and a half ago to advise on the development of handicraft industry there. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back. Because the press last time noted his relationship to you and tabbed him as some kind of arms merchant, AID wants to be doubly careful not to embarrass you. Therefore, they are asking whether we have any objections.

My own feeling is that we should let him go about his business. Tourism is Jordan's main resource, and the Jordanians are doing a remarkably good job of developing it. Secretary Udall's recent visit was a conspicuous boost, and now it is time for men like Taylor to move in and help with the followup details. These are projects we can be proud to be associated with, and everyone feels that Taylor can do an excellent job. State agrees that we should go ahead as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction.

Therefore, unless you have any personal reason for wanting to see this delayed, I propose to tell AID we have no objections to their going ahead according to their own schedule.

*W. Rostow*

No objection \_\_\_\_\_

See me ✓

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-374  
By ju, NARA, Date 1-24-93

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March 21, 1967

WWR:

About a year and a half ago, Antonio Taylor, the President's brother-in-law, went to Jordan to advise on development of their handicraft industry. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back.

Last time, the press noted his relationship to the President and tabbed him as being some kind of arms merchant. As a result of that episode, Bill Macomber before leaving his old job was uneasy about seeing Taylor go out into the current tense Middle East atmosphere.

My own feeling is that this is something quite constructive that we want to be fully associated with. Tourism is Jordan's main resource and the Jordanians are doing a remarkably good job of developing it. Secretary Udall's recent visit was a far more conspicuous boost, and the National Park Service team he's sponsoring there will be a tremendous help in developing the sites of what are undoubtedly some of the greatest tourist attractions in the world. Therefore, I think we ought to let Taylor go as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction.

AID says Taylor is highly qualified to do the job, and the job is well worth doing. Rodger Davies in State agrees that we should go ahead.

However, because of Taylor's relationship with the President, I have agreed to take soundings here. Since this is a sound operation which stands on its own merits, you might think it unnecessary to bother the President. Nevertheless, I've drafted the attached in case you'd like to just keep him informed.

*Hal*  
HHS

Go ahead \_\_\_\_\_

I'm sending your note to the President; let's wait to see whether he reacts \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By RG/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

90

4/7/67

Ruth -

For your file?

Louise W.



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Amman, Jordan

February 16, 1967

Mr. W. W. Rostow  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rostow:

Although Ambassador Burns is currently out of the country, (he is returning on February 19), I can assure you that he and all members of our staff welcome Mr. Saunder's visit to Jordan and look forward to his arrival here in Amman on March 6.

We have extended our welcome directly to Mr. Saunders by a telegram dispatched yesterday.

Sincerely yours,

*J. Wesley Adams*

J. Wesley Adams  
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY  
PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN AND AMBASSADOR  
FINDLEY BURNS, JR. ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EXDIS

02

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
will grant to non-diplomatic personnel assigned or attached  
to the American Embassy in Amman the same privileges and  
immunities as are accorded comparable personnel by the  
Government of the United States of America.

W. Tell

Findley Burns Jr.

Amman, January 24, 1967

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED BY FINDLEY BURNS, JR.,  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, AND  
CONCURRED IN ON BEHALF OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN  
BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-60  
By us NARA, Date 12-28  
12

It is agreed and understood regarding the United States Government  
F-104 aircraft, which will be located in Jordan in the near future,  
that:

1. These aircraft will not engage in combat except when they are  
the object of an unprovoked attack and when in the pilot's judgment  
there is no alternative (e.g., evasion) for survival except to return  
fire in self-defense.

2. United States Government concurrence must be obtained on a  
mission-by-mission basis before an aircraft is made available to the  
Royal Jordanian Air Force for any use other than for training.

3. The United States Government in its national interest  
reserves the right to withdraw these aircraft from Jordan. The  
decision to withdraw will be made only at the highest levels of the  
United States Government.

4. United States Government temporary duty personnel assigned  
to Jordan in connection with the deployment of USAF F-104 aircraft,  
whether United States Air Force or contract civilians normally  
associated with squadron operations, will have the same status and  
privileges as personnel of comparable rank of the non-diplomatic  
personnel permanently assigned to the United States Defense Attache  
Office.

W. Tell

Findley Burns

~~SECRET~~

Amman, January 9, 1967.



MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY  
PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN AND AMBASSADOR  
FINDLEY BURNS, JR. ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EXDIS

03

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
will grant to non-diplomatic personnel assigned or attached  
to the American Embassy in Amman the same privileges and  
immunities as are accorded comparable personnel by the  
Government of the United States of America.

W. Tell

Findley Burns, Jr.

Amman, January 24, 1967

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916

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED BY FINDLEY BURNS, JR.,  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, AND  
CONCURRED IN ON BEHALF OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN  
BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL

It is agreed and understood regarding the United States Government F-104 aircraft, which will be located in Jordan in the near future, that:

1. These aircraft will not engage in combat except when they are the object of an unprovoked attack and when in the pilot's judgment there is no alternative (e.g., evasion) for survival except to return fire in self-defense.

2. United States Government concurrence must be obtained on a mission-by-mission basis before an aircraft is made available to the Royal Jordanian Air Force for any use other than for training.

3. The United States Government in its national interest reserves the right to withdraw these aircraft from Jordan. The decision to withdraw will be made only at the highest levels of the United States Government.

4. United States Government temporary duty personnel assigned to Jordan in connection with the deployment of USAF F-104 aircraft, whether United States Air Force or contract civilians normally associated with squadron operations, will have the same status and privileges as personnel of comparable rank of the non-diplomatic personnel permanently assigned to the United States Defense Attache Office.

W. Tell

Findley Burns

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-60  
By sj, NARA, Date 3-1-06

Amman, January 9, 1967.

092

92

~~Secret~~



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

JORDAN'S ARMED FORCES

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-45  
By iss, NARA, Date 6-30-04





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
17 January 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Jordan's Armed Forces

Summary

The turmoil stirred up among Jordan's Palestinians by Israel's raid on three Palestinian towns on 13 November 1966 has underscored the decisive importance of Jordan's armed forces in sustaining King Husayn's regime. The army was first the humiliated victim of the Israeli assault and then was called upon to put down the ensuing Palestinian demonstrations against the regime. These developments have put a severe strain on the army's confidence in itself as an effective military force and have raised a question as to its reliability as a political instrument. The future security of the regime will depend largely on Husayn's success in retaining the loyalty of East Bank urban and northern elements who have acquired increasing responsibilities in the armed forces. The bedouin, who traditionally have been dominant, are a declining but still key factor. The Palestinians, who comprise two-thirds of the population, have been denied positions of power in the military and, because of their general antagonism toward the regime, will continue to be viewed with suspicion.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

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#### The Army as a Military Force

1. The Jordan Arab Army is the lineal descendant of the bedouin Arab Legion which was recruited, organized, and subsidized by the British in the mandated territory of Trans-Jordan after World War I. It fought well against Israel in the Palestine War of 1948-49 and denied the Israelis complete control of Jerusalem and the surrounding Palestinian plateau. The creation of Jordan, following the 1949 armistice, through a merger of this area with Trans-Jordan produced a drastic change in the character of the Hashemite monarchy. Its population was tripled by the addition of the settled and more sophisticated Palestinians, who largely disapproved of their subordination to a bedouin-oriented regime.

2. In the upsurge of pan-Arab nationalist feeling that developed in the 1950s, direct British influence was eliminated. King Husayn and the other Jordanians who were trained in British military schools, nevertheless, have perpetuated the traditions and techniques developed under British tutelage. Their pride in the army's record and capability as a military force apparently is shared by most of the east Jordanians, who as a group are predominant in it. This pride remains one of the army's present strengths.

3. [redacted] it is adjudged superior in quality, unit for unit, to any other Arab army. [redacted]

[redacted] Jordan's army, if given a firm policy decision to fight, probably could hold parts of the West Bank against an Israeli attack for a short time. It would be at a serious disadvantage if the Israelis also launched a sustained air attack against the defending Jordanian force.

4. The army's assets include mobile, fairly up-to-date equipment, its small unit training is good, and its individual soldiers are rugged. It is hampered by its small size, has had insufficient

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combined arms training, lacks experience in air-ground operations, and does not have an air defense

[redacted] The logistical shortcomings would limit its effective period of full-scale combat operations to about one week.

5. Morale and discipline were good until Israel's 13 November raid. The humiliation and resentment among all ranks over that debacle was accompanied by widespread criticism of the defense policy and leadership of the King and his senior army leaders. As a result, the low morale of Jordan's armed forces constitutes their most serious present weakness and is a major concern of the regime.

6. Jordan's armed forces have a personnel strength of 50,875 of which about 5,000 are officers.

7. The army has traditionally been a volunteer organization, but during the Palestinian disturbances in late November, when the Palestinians were agitating for a larger role in defending the West Bank, the government announced a decision to introduce conscription. Nonetheless, it is clear that conscripts will be carefully screened in order to eliminate potential subversives, and that the

8. The over-all military budget for the last nine months of 1966 was \$40 million. This was 27 percent of the total budget and eight percent of the gross national product. US aid is provided under the Military Assistance Program, and the UK also provides some assistance. Equipment procurement plans and the programmed expansion of the army's force level have created financial problems

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which are complicated by the fact that payments due Jordan from the Cairo-dominated United Arab Command (UAC) are in arrears and are not likely to be received unless there is an improvement in inter-Arab relations.

9. Jordan has successfully resisted pressure from the UAC to procure Soviet arms and, encouraged by the recent US decision to accelerate aid shipments, now shows every intention of adhering firmly to the position that it should continue to seek arms and equipment only from Western sources. The army's US-supplied equipment includes medium tanks, self-propelled 105-mm howitzers, 155-mm guns, antitank weapons, small arms, trucks, and armored personnel carriers. British equipment includes light artillery pieces, armored and scout cars, and Landrover vehicles.

10. The air forces has mostly obsolescent British Hawker Hunter jet fighters but soon will have part of a squadron of US F-104s. The remainder of the squadron will be received later this year. Jordan also has an option to buy two additional F-104 squadrons. The Coast Guard has equipment largely of British origin which has been acquired through purchase or aid since 1952. Three US patrol craft were purchased in 1965.

11. Leadership of Jordan's armed forces is nominally vested in the commander in chief, Field Marshal Habis Majalli, but he has been a figurehead since a reorganization in 1965 stripped him of most of his authority. The reorganization involved the dismissal, over his objections, of a large number of uneducated and incompetent officers and improved the morale of younger, better-trained officers. It also paved the way for the development of a more effective, modern fighting force.

12. The effective head of Jordan's armed forces is the army's deputy commander in chief, Major General

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Sharif Nasir [REDACTED]

13. Major General Amir Khammash, chief of staff of the army, shares effective power in the army with Sharif Nasir. The 42-year-old Khammash is Jordan's most experienced and best-trained officer in modern weapons and tactics and is highly respected at all levels in the army. [REDACTED]

#### The Army as a Political Instrument

14. Khammash is the archetype of officer upon whom the regime is increasingly dependent for capable and reliable leadership of the armed forces. He and most of the officers in this category come from towns in the northern sector of the East Bank. As a group they are balanced against the tribal-oriented bedouin from the central and southern areas on the East Bank who have been the traditional supporters of the monarchy.

15. Bedouin still comprise about a third of the army. More importantly, they make up about 70 percent of the personnel in the two armored brigades and about 50 percent of the royal guards brigade--the key units in the army from the standpoint of the regime's security. In four of the 27 regular infantry battalions they constitute roughly 70 percent of the total complement. Personnel from

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the urban and northern areas of the East Bank are about 40 percent of the army's total strength. Thus, East Bankers--bedouin or urban-northerners--are numerically predominant in the army as a whole, though altogether they are only a third of the country's population.

16. The Palestinian two-thirds of the populace is represented by only 28 percent of the armed forces' total strength. Most of these are in the technical services; there are fewer in the artillery and fewer still in the infantry. Virtually none are in the armored units. [redacted]

17. Husayn would like to win the allegiance of the Palestinians, and he has made efforts to do so. The endeavor probably is futile, however, since to most of them he is an anachronism [redacted]

[redacted] The King's hopes for appeasing the Palestinians received a sharp and perhaps permanent setback when the 13 November Israeli raid discredited his moderate policy toward the Israelis.

18. The Palestinians' demonstrations against the King in the wake of the Israeli raid forced him to use army troops against them. Although the army has been called upon to suppress civil disturbances in the past, in this instance the action was particularly unpopular among many of the troops. This, together with their dissatisfaction over the regime's ineffectiveness against Israel, caused considerable grumbling. [redacted]

19. It is not uncommon in the Middle East for armies to seize power after defeat on the battlefield and following a period of internal unrest during which civilian authorities have relied on armed forces to maintain themselves in power. This

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has happened in both Syria and Egypt, for example. Armed coups also have occurred when popular dissatisfaction can find no peaceful means of forcing a change in the regime. Present conditions in Jordan are somewhat different, however, Jordan's defeat by Israel on 13 November was suffered in a limited engagement and the subsequent unrest has subsided. Moreover, the Palestinian portion of the populace in Jordan which is acutely dissatisfied has been denied direct access to key positions in the army from which it could move most effectively against the King.

20. The regime's security, thus, is largely dependent on the continued loyalty of the armed forces as they are now constituted and on its resistance to radical appeals for the overthrow of Husayn. The bedouin, by and large, seem certain to stand firm for the King. The real key may well be in the army's East Bank urban and northern elements which have assumed increasingly responsible positions in the military hierarchy. The King's conviction that Jordan had to have new equipment in order to satisfy his army's demands for modern arms was essentially a response to this group.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

JAN 7 PM 2 33

6 January 1966

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 1-66

SUBJECT: Jordan's Dilemma on Supersonic Aircraft

SUMMARY

King Hussain is under pressure from the United Arab Command (UAC) to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft, specifically MIG-21s. Hussain would prefer to buy Western planes -- F-104, Mirage III, or Lightning -- but the much higher Western prices would require him either to find substantial funds over and above those allotted by the UAC or settle for far fewer planes than his quota. He has been told that he can expect no US help to make up the difference, and it is not even certain that money from the Egyptian-dominated UAC would be available if he elects to buy from the West the smaller number of aircraft.

Either choice carries risks for Hussain. If he buys MIG's, he jeopardizes the annual US subsidy which has been essential to Jordan, and invites the unwelcome presence of Soviet or Egyptian trainers in Jordan. If he refuses, he will be vulnerable to Arab charges that he is a Western stooge failing to do his share against Israel. His Arab enemies -- inside and outside Jordan -- could if they chose use this issue to create political trouble for him which might conceivably endanger his throne. We believe that he will try to postpone any final decision, and may succeed in doing so for some time. If forced to choose, we think the odds are close but at least even that he would reject the MIG's rather than risk the loss or perhaps curtailment of US aid. However, this is by no means certain, and he might decide otherwise as a result of Arab pressures, disappointment at the US, or belief that in the last analysis the US would not in fact cut off financial aid to Jordan.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 02-45

By iss, NARA, Date 6-30-04

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



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#### DISCUSSION

1. Jordan's King Hussain is under pressure to buy supersonic aircraft as part of his country's contribution to the Arab build-up against Israel. His difficulties in this regard stem from the first Arab Summit Conference of January 1964, at which the Arab states pledged \$42 million a year for a number of years, to help enlarge and equip the armed forces of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. At Summit Conference II, the pledge was increased to \$56 million per year.\* Drawing on its share of these sums, Jordan has been able to get a substantial number of M-48 tanks from the US and to fill other commitments to the UAC. But the UAC continues to insist that Jordan acquire supersonics, though it has agreed to reduce Jordan's quota from 60 to 36 aircraft.

\* Principal contributors are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq, but all states contribute something. Principal recipients of this money are Jordan (about \$15 million yearly for arms purchases and \$4.5 million for maintenance of enlarged forces), Syria, Lebanon, and the UAC command. Money is paid to the UAC in Cairo, and we have evidence that at least some of that disbursed to Jordan was transferred in sterling through international banking channels. We are fairly confident that all 1964 contributions have been paid, but there are reports that contributions in 1965 have lagged.

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2. The UAC, dominated by the Egyptians, has urged Jordan and Lebanon to acquire Soviet equipment, arguing that it is available at far less cost than Western material and that it would standardize the equipment of the armies on Israel's borders. Although the UAC and the Arab summits have agreed that Jordan and Lebanon might seek arms from their traditional suppliers, the UAC funds for aircraft have been allotted on the basis of the price the USSR charged for MIG-21s. Hussain would rather have the US F-104, the French Mirage IIIC, or the British Lightning, in that order, but these cost about double the amount the UAC has allotted. The US has recently told Hussain that he cannot expect any assistance to buy Western aircraft.

3. At the same time, the US has indicated to Hussain that if he buys MIG-21s, he risks the cutoff of all US aid. This amounts to about \$45 million in the current fiscal years, \$30 million of which (equal to 25 percent of the Jordan government revenue) goes directly to budget support. Hussain is disturbed by the US attitude. He considers that a year ago the US made a commitment to help him with money to keep Soviet and/or Egyptian military equipment and instructors out of Jordan. He appears to have told the Arab heads of state that he could get

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help in buying Western aircraft. He probably does not believe that the US, which has provided about \$470 million in aid since taking over in 1957 the burden of keeping Jordan in existence, would completely cut him off. However, his dependence on US help is so great that he would be hesitant to take any risks of its loss.

4. Hussain is thus in a difficult position. The funds allotted by the UAC, if applied to the purchase of Western aircraft, would pay for only about half the number required to meet the UAC quota. There is some chance that he might not get any UAC funds at all for such a purchase. In any case, failure to meet this quota would subject him to attacks from Cairo and Damascus that he was not doing his part against Israel. These troubles would probably be reflected in disorders within Jordan, and though Hussain could probably contain them, he might have to resort to severe repression.

5. If, on the other hand, Hussain buys the MIG's, and US aid is terminated or drastically curtailed, he would be left critically short of money for normal governmental operations, and would find himself at the uncertain mercies of other Arab governments, some of which strongly dislike and distrust him. He

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would be concerned at the prospect of Soviet or especially Egyptian personnel training Jordanian pilots. He would probably find Nasser and others, such as Iraq and Syria, ready to offer money, but he can have little confidence that they would support Jordan for very long. Moreover, such contributors would be likely to require political concessions to nationalist elements in Jordan, which Hussain would find most unwelcome. Hussain's fellow monarchs in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and conceivably Libya are another possible source of funds, and one or more of them might be persuaded to furnish a subsidy. However, such funds would probably not be adequate for Jordan's needs, nor is it likely that Hussain himself would have great confidence in the willingness of the Saudis or Kuwaitis to support him indefinitely.

6. Although Hussain stresses the urgency of the matter, he can probably put off his decision for some time, perhaps until the next Arab Summit scheduled for September 1966, and maybe longer. Meanwhile, certain conceivable developments might help him either to postpone his decision or to fuzz the issue. For example, the UAR might undertake, in return for PL-480 food, not to attack Hussain too vigorously. It is possible that an outbreak of intra-Arab quarrels might halt the flow of contributions to the UAC which would give him a reason for further

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delay. Or he might be able to get Britain or France to give him better terms, sufficient, say, for 24 aircraft, and to succeed in finessing the matter of a third squadron indefinitely.

7. One critical factor in his judgment will be his estimate of whether the US would in fact cut off or curtail financial support to him. We cannot be sure how Hussain regards US intentions. In the present delicate situation, a principal danger is that Hussain might conclude that the US was letting him down, and make his decision as part of an emotional reaction rather than in cool calculation of long-term consequences. For all practical purposes, the decision is up to him personally, and while he is normally a prudent man with an acute awareness of his dependence on the West, he has occasionally shown himself disposed to despair or recklessness, and in certain circumstances he might in this case.

8. If and when Hussain is forced to make a definite choice, we think the odds are close, but at least even, that he would reject the MIGs, though this is far from certain. Either decision involves risks for Hussain. Antagonism to Israel and the need to arm against it are popular themes in Jordan. Failure to subscribe to them or to appear to do his share could result in

- 6 -

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serious trouble. Political stability in Jordan is tenuous at best, and though it has been relatively quiet for almost three years, the accumulated tensions and pressures could easily break out. As noted above, the extent of the adverse reaction would depend to a considerable extent on how much trouble Nasser chose to stir up.

9. If worse came to worse, Hussain would have a better than even chance of riding out such trouble as can now be foreseen, at least in the short term, but the dangers for him would be great. He would probably feel impelled to permit a little more contentiousness along the Israeli border, and to be extremely sticky on water allocations from the Yarmuk River into Israel. If he had miscalculated the loyalty of his army, it could mean his overthrow, with all its attendant uncertainties, including some risk of an Israeli move into Western Jordan aimed against the emergence of a pro-Nasser regime in Amman.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

  
SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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Bromley  
Smith

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

File  
94

Jan. 12, 1967

TO MR. MARVIN WATSON



Please note and return.

Bromley Smith



# 61

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1967

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to note and return

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Dispute Between John Mecom and the  
Government of Jordan

The enclosed memorandum sets forth the facts of a dispute between John Mecom, an independent Texas oilman, and the Government of Jordan. Mr. Mecom has previously communicated with White House officials on this subject and may do so again. We are, therefore, forwarding the enclosed memorandum for your information.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum with Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By RG151, NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Dispute Between John Mecom and the  
Government of Jordan.

A lingering dispute between the Government of Jordan and John Mecom has become a disturbing element in our relations with Jordan.

In 1964 Mecom entered into an agreement with Jordan under which he received exclusive exploration and drilling rights for the entire Kingdom. The contract specified that he would drill at the rate of 20,000 feet per year prior to discovery of oil. Mecom did a certain amount of exploration and some drilling and then ceased effective operations. After a period of eight months of inaction, he indicated his intention to terminate the agreement.

The Jordanians do not dispute Mecom's right to terminate the contract. They have, however, asserted a claim against him of approximately \$425,000 for failure to comply with the drilling requirement under the agreement. Based on this claim, the Jordanians have refused to clear for export Mecom's equipment in Jordan.

Mecom recognizes that the Jordanians have a claim (his representatives have confirmed that the amount of the Jordanian claim is essentially correct), but he considers the failure to allow him to remove his equipment is a violation of the agreement and that the Jordanians should first release his equipment and then he will deal with them concerning their claim.

Mecom's representatives have negotiated with the Jordanians and on one occasion apparently reached agreement only to have it disavowed by Mecom. Recently, discussions have focused on a settlement under which Jordan would take over Mecom's equipment and a financial payment would be made representing the difference between the value of the equipment and the Jordanian claim. The Jordanians believe that a fair valuation of the equipment in question is in the neighborhood of \$1 million. Mecom, on the other hand, claims that the equipment is worth \$1.5 million. The

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By RGK, NARA, Date 7-13-01

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Jordanians believe that Mecom is placing an unreal valuation on the equipment as a means of wiping out the Jordanian claim against him. The Jordanians have indicated that they would accept a third-party valuation of the equipment.

The negotiations to date indicate that the Jordanians believe they cannot deal with Mecom's representatives since Mecom has demonstrated that he is not bound by their actions. On the other hand, Mecom has failed to meet with Jordanian authorities who have attempted personal contacts for the purpose of discussing a settlement.

As is noted in the most recent cable from Amman dated December 22, the Jordanian official concerned has indicated deep pessimism regarding the dispute and fears that the Jordanian Government will be pushed to extreme action, noting that the patience of the King is near an end.

While recognizing that the dispute is a private one involving purely commercial interests, the Department has endeavored to be of assistance to the parties in resolving the dispute. The best information we have been able to obtain suggests that Mecom is being difficult and avoiding negotiations with the Jordanians designed to reach a fair and prompt settlement. The equipment itself is subject to deterioration while the dispute continues. We are concerned, of course, as a result of the adverse impact of the dispute on our relations with Jordan, as well as on Jordanian attitudes toward American business interests.

Attachments:

Telegrams from Amman -  
1134, 1351, 1402, 1578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*11N* *94c*

4  
Action

SS

Info

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LIMDIS

RETURN TO LEGAL  
ROOM 6417 STATE

15111

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 1134

1966 NOV 17 AM 1 10

SUBJECT: MECOM OIL DISPUTE

FOR WILEY NEA/ARN

LIMDIS

REF DEPTTEL 82528

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH ECON COUNSELOR, OMAR ABDULLAH DOOKHAN STATED HE WILLING ACCEPT THIRD PARTY EVALUATION LARGE RIG AND/OR SMALLER EQUIPMENT SUCH AS DRILLS.
2. HE HOWEVER RELUCTANT ACCEPT THIS PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TWO SMALLER RIGS WHICH HE DOES NOT WANT. WOULD ACCEPT THESE ONLY IF PRICE SUFFICIENTLY LOW TO MAKE IT WORTH HIS WHILE.
3. DOOKHAN FEELS HE NOT COMPELLED TO TAKE ALL MECOM EQUIPMENT AS PACKAGE FOR SETTLING DISPUTE.
4. DOOKHAN, HOWEVER, CONFUSED INASMUCH AS HE RECEIVED CABLE FROM MECOM TWELFTH REQUESTING CLEARANCE FOR REMOVAL ALL EQUIPMENT WITHIN

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 200A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TEN DAYS AND STATING THAT "OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING AGREEMENT WILL BE RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION...." IN RESPONSE TO A CALL FROM DOOKHAN, JOE SHERIDAN, MECOM NEGOTIATOR, ARRIVED AMMAN THIRTEENTH TO DISCUSS THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT.

5. SHERIDAN VISITED EMB NOV 13 AND GAVE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION PRESENT STATUS MECOM-GOJ DISPUTE. GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT REACHED IN ROME MEETING MID-SEPT BETWEEN MECOM AND OMAR ABDULLAH DOOKHAN APPEARED BE SOUND BASIS ON WHICH SETTLEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED SOON. AS TOKEN OF GOOD FAITH ABDULLAH DOOKHAN AGREED ARRANGE PERMISSION FOR MECOM WITHDRAW TWO HELICOPTERS FROM JORDAN, MECOM HAVING ALWAYS DEALT WITH KING HUSSEIN, HAD NEVER BEFORE MET DOOKHAN

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-2- Amman 1134, 161534Z November 66

ALTHOUGH HE IS GOJ OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR OIL EXPLORATION.  
HE LATER CONFIDED TO SHERIDAN THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH DOOKHAN'S

APPARENT COMPETENCE AND COOPERATIVENESS. THE ROME AGREEMENT  
AMOUNTED TO AN INFORMAL COMMITMENT BY DOOKHAN TO ACCEPT CERTAIN  
ITEMS OF MECOM'S EQUIPMENT IN CONSIDERATION FOR CANCELLATION OF  
GOJ'S CLAIM OF \$425,000 AND TO PAY MECOM THE EXCESS OF THE VALUE  
OF THAT EQUIPMENT OVER THE SIZE OF THE CLAIM. AMOUNT TO BE PAID  
BY JORDAN WAS TO BE DETERMINED BY AN INVENTORY AND EVALUATION OF  
EQUIPMENT DESIRED BY GOJ.

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6. UPON RECEIPT OF RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION, COMPLETED DURING  
PAST FOUR WEEKS, DOOKHAN OFFERED TO PAY MECOM APPROX \$575,000, TO  
CANCEL GOJ CLAIM OF \$425,000 AND PERMIT MECOM EXPORT BALANCE OF  
EQUIPMENT. MECOM, HOWEVER, BELIEVES EQUIPMENT WAS UNDERVALUED.  
SHERIDAN POINTS OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE EVALUATORS--MAINLY  
JORDANIANS--HAVE SOME COMPETENCE FOR THE TASK, THEY PROBABLY  
ERRED IN JORDAN'S FAVOR. UPON LEARNING OF THE \$1 MILLION  
EVALUATION SHERIDAN SAID HE EXPRESSED TO DOOKHAN HIS OPINION  
THAT ALTHOUGH EQUIPMENT IS OLD, ITS VALUE WAS ENHANCED BY ITS  
LOCATION IN JORDAN AND BY FACT THAT IT ESPECIALLY INTEGRATED FOR  
REQUIREMENTS IN JORDAN AND THAT MECOM WAS WILLING ASSIST IN  
SETTING IT UP AGAIN FOR USE BY GOJ. SHERIDAN CONFIDED TO  
EMBASSY THAT DOOKHAN PROBABLY IS SINCERE IN HIS EFFORTS TO SETTLE,  
BUT HE CANNOT READILY OVERRULE GMQ-APPOINTED EVALUATORS TO ACCOUNT  
FOR SUCH INTANGIBLES. SHERIDAN ALSO FEELS THAT THOMPSON, NATIONAL  
AGENT BEIRUT, GIVING DOOKHAN INACCURATE ADVICE AS TO VALUE  
MECOM'S EQUIPMENT HERE. NATIONAL RIG HERE IS IN GOOD CONDITION  
HE SAID, DESPITE ITS 12 YEAR AGE. ACCORDING SHERIDAN (PROTECT  
SOURCE) THOMPSON TOLD OMAR THIS RIG WORTH ABOUT \$350,000 BUT IN  
CONFIDENCE TOLD SHERIDAN \$650,000. BY DISCOURAGING SETTLEMENT

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 200A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"IN KIND" THOMPSON'S PROSPECTS SELL NEW EQUIPMENT GREATER.  
SHERIDAN ESTIMATES VALUE ALL EQUIPMENT HERE AT \$1.8 MILLION.

7. EMBASSY ADVISED SHERIDAN THAT IT HAD RECOMMENDED TO DOOKHAN  
THAT AN IMPARTIAL THIRD PARTY CONDUCT AN EVALUATION. HE AGREED  
THAT THIS HAD MERIT AND SAID HE WOULD URGE ACCEPTANCE. MECOM'S  
CABLE TO DOOKHAN OF TWELFTH, HOWEVER, AT VARIANCE WITH HIS  
SAL FOR IMPARTIAL EVALUATION CONVEYED BY CONGRESSMAN

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-3- Amman 1134, 161534Z November 66

1. THOMPSON IN REFTEL. SHERIDAN SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED DOOKHAN TO WITHHOLD ACTION ON THIS LATEST MECOM CABLE FOUR DAYS TO ENABLE HIM CONFER WITH MECOM. DOOKHAN AGREED WAIT UNTIL NINETEENTH.

8. DOOKHAN SAID THAT IF SHERIDAN UNABLE CLARIFY SITUATION HE INCLINED ANSWER MECOM CABLE TO EFFECT THAT ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE RELEASED PROVIDED MECOM PROVIDES BANK GUARANTEE FOR PAYMENT \$425,000 AGREED SETTLEMENT.

9. SHERIDAN SAYS HE WILL ATTEMPT DISABUSE MECOM OF SEEKING ARBITRATION OWING HIS WEAK LEGAL POSITION AND POSSIBILITY JORDAN WOULD THEN SEEK STRICTEST CALCULATION ITS CLAIM ON BASIS ACTUAL COST OF DRILLING UP TO 17,000 FEET AT \$59 PER FOOT. GOJ MIGHT ALSO AUGMENT CLAIM FURTHER BY THAT PART OF FIRST YEAR'S DRILLING

PAGE 5 RUOMKG 200A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REQUIREMENT WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT IN SEARCH OF WATER INSTEAD OF OIL.

10. APPROACH WHICH SHERIDAN PLANS PROPOSE TO MECOM IS: (A) SEEK THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION; (B) VISIT OR SEND HIS SON TO JORDAN TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT WITH GOJ; (C) ENCOURAGE MECOM TO DEAL WITH DOOKHAN AND MINISTERS RATHER THAN KING IN BELIEF PRIVATE DEALS WITH KING ARE RESENTED BY GOJ OFFICIALS; (D) SUGGEST THAT MECOM SEEK ADVICE OF DEPT'S LEGAL OFFICE BECAUSE HE FEELS THAT MECOM HAS RECEIVED MISLEADING ADVICE FROM HIS CURRENT LEGAL COUNSELOR.

11. SHERIDAN REQUESTED THAT HIS COMMENT CONTAINED THIS CABLE AND ESPECIALLY PARA 6 AND 11 BE PROTECTED AS TO SOURCE. IF MECOM SENDS RADFORD BYERLY, HIS FAMILY ATTORNEY, TO DISCUSS CASE WITH DEPT, SHERIDAN CAUTIONS DEPT TO CAREFULLY RECORD CONVERSATIONS AND SECURE BYERLY'S INITIALS TO TRANSCRIPT. HE ADDED THAT IN HIS OPINION JOE LEWIS, MECOM COMPANY ATTORNEY, IS BETTER INFORMED ON FIRM'S OPERATIONS AND COULD BE COUNTED ON TO CONVEY AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF DEPT'S LEGAL ASSESSMENT TO MECOM.

12. IF, AS SHERIDAN FEELS, MECOM IS UNDULY OPTIMISTIC AS TO OUTCOME OF ARBITRATION, WE BELIEVE AN OBJECTIVE LEGAL ASSESSMENT

PAGE 6 RUOMKG 200A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
IF HIS CASE BY DEPT COULD SERVE TO PROTECT HIM AGAINST INSTANTLY GREAT CLAIM. THIS COURSE MIGHT ALSO EXPEDITE SETTLEMENT BY PROMOTING A CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON AN OPEN BASIS AND BY AVERTING A HARDENING OF POSITIONS.

CP-3. BURNS

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Action

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1966 DEC 1 PM 12 35

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 1331

LIMDIS  
AMMAN'S 1134

MECON DISPUTE

FOR MARSHALL WILEY, NEA/ARN

1. APPARENT STALEMATE RE VALUATION MECON EQUIPMENT IN JORDAN CONTINUES REMAIN PRINCIPAL FACTOR DELAYING SETTLEMENT DISPUTE. EMBASSY BELIEVES IMPORTANT PART OF PROBLEM QUESTION COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MECON AND GOJ. MECON REPRESENTATIVE SHERIDAN HAS INFORMED EMBASSY THAT MECON MIGHT BE WILLING ACCEPT VALUATION \$1.5 MILLION, WHICH ONLY \$500,000 ABOVE GOJ FIGURE. MOREOVER, MECON CONSIDERING PACKAGE SALE COVERING ALL EQUIPMENT, WHEREAS GOJ VALUATION EXCLUDES TWO SMALL RIGS WHICH DOGHAN DOES NOT WANT. WE BELIEVE GOOD POSSIBILITY COMPROMISE SOLUTION IF MECON OR FULLY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE CAME TO JORDAN. THIS SHERIDAN HAS ALLEGEDLY PROPOSED TO MEMCOM.
2. MEANWHILE, SHERIDAN HAS DEVELOPED ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO MECON WHICH HE BELIEVES HAS GOJ APPROVAL. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL MECON WOULD: (1) SELL GOJ EQUIPMENT IT DESIRES FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 017A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
\$1 MILLION; (2) ENTER INTO CONTRACT WITH GOJ TO WORK OFF 17,000 FEET DRILLING OBLIGATION IN CAPACITY DRILLING CONTRACTOR. PAYMENT BEYOND 17,000 FEET WOULD BE MADE BY GOJ AT MUTUALLY AGREED UPON RATE. TO PROVIDE INCENTIVE FOR SERIOUS DRILLING GOJ WOULD OFFER GIVE MECON 25 PERCENT GAS OR OIL DISCOVERIES. SHERIDAN BELIEVES THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS. THUS FAR NO REACTION BY MECON TO PROPOSAL.

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-2- AMMAN 1351, DECEMBER 1

3. DOQHAN OBVIOUSLY BECOMING CONCERNED OVER DELAY IN REACHING SETTLEMENT. FEELS THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT AND THAT HE MUST SOON TAKE ACTION IN OBTAINING SUITABLE EQUIPMENT FOR DRILLING OPERATIONS. HAS STATED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS HIS WILLINGNESS GO ANYWHERE TO SEE MECOM IN EFFORT SETTLE DISPUT.

4. ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONTAINED IN OUR MEMCON DATED NOV. 26, COPIES OF WHICH WERE TRANSMITTED NEA AND LEGAL ADVISOR.

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RETURN LEGAL  
ROOM 6417 STATE

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: MECOM DISPUTE

FOR MARSHALL WILEY NEA/ARN AND WEHMEYER L/NEA

1. DIRECTOR-GENERAL NATURAL RESOURCES AUTHORITY OMAR ABDULLAH DOQKHAN TOLD EMBOFFS HE PLANS MEET WITH MECOM IN PARIS ON DEC 7 AND 8 IN FINAL EFFORT SETTLE LONG-STANDING DISPUTE SHORT OF ARBITRATION. PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT UNCLEAR OWING TO CONTINUING GAP BETWEEN GOJ AND MECOM EVALUATION MECOM EQUIPMENT STILL IN JORDAN.

2. DOQKHAN STATED THAT IN HIS OPINION MECOM KNEW EQUIPMENT WORTH NO MORE THAN GOJ FIGURE, BUT IS SETTING HIGHER VALUE AS MEANS WASHING OUT \$425,000 TENTATIVELY AGREED UPON BY BOTH PARTIES; AS REASONABLE SETTLEMENT MECOM'S FAILURE MEET DRILLING OBLIGATION UNDER CONCESSION.

3. IN CONVERSATION WITH MECOM DOQKHAN PLANS TWO APPROACHES. IF MECOM UNWILLING AGREE GOJ EVALUATION OF \$1 MILLION ON MECOM EQUIPMENT, WILL SUGGEST DRILLING CONTRACT FOR OIL AND/OR WATER TO WORK OFF DRILLING NOT PERFORMED UNDER CONCESSION.

4. IF MECOM AGREES TO OIL DRILLING CONTRACT, DOQKHAN PREPARED ACCEPT DRILLING COST OF \$50 PER FOOT. MECOM WOULD THEREBY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 108A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ONLY NEED DRILL ABOUT 8,000 FEET TO FULFILL OBLIGATION UNDER CONCESSION. HOWEVER, IN CASE WATER DRILLING CONTRACT MECOM WOULD BE EXPECTED DRILL FULL 17,000 FEET DEFICIENCY UNDER CONCESSION.

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NLJ-S 98001

By RG/L NARA, Date 7-13-01

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-2- AMMAN 1402 DECEMBER 6.

5. DOQKHAN SKEPTICAL ABOUT GIVING MECOM, AS INCENTIVE SHARE OF ANY OIL OR GAS DISCOVERED. INSTEAD, HE PROPOSES OFFER MECOM FIRST OPTION NEW CONCESSION AGREEMENT IN EVENT DRILLING INDICATES PRESENCE PETROLEUM DEPOSITS.

6. IF NO AGREEMENT REACHED ON EITHER ALTERNATIVE DOQKHAN PLANS TELL MECOM HE CAN NO LONGER WAIT AND WILL PROCEED PURCHASE OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR DRILLING OPERATIONS. IN THIS EVENTUALITY, ARBITRATION WOULD APPEAR ONLY REMAINING RECOURSE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE IN ABSENCE WILLINGNESS MECOM PAY GOJ CLAIM \$425,000 IN MASH.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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DE RUQMK3 367A 3561520  
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R 221507Z DEC 66  
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STATE GRNC  
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AMMAN 1578

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LIMDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 1402

1. OPTIMISM EXPRESSED BY OMAR ABDULLAH DOQKHAN EARLY DEC PRIOR MEETING SCHEDULED DEC 8 IN PARIS WITH JOHN MECOM APPEARS TRANSFORMED EXTREME PESSIMISM AND SIAPPOINTMENT DUE LATTER'S ALLEGEDLY UNEXPLAINED FAILURE APPEAR. ABDULLAH MIFFED ALSO BY LACK RESPONSE TO HIS RECENT DRILLING CONTRACT PROPOSAL DESCRIBED REFTEL AND INTIMATED GOJ UNABLE ABIDE FURTHER DELAY IN SETTLEMENT ITS CLAIM AND IN PROCEEDING WITH OWN DRILLING PROGRAM. HE BELIEVES ARBITRATION TOO LENGTHY AND SEQUESTRATION OR EXPROPRIATION DISTASTEFUL, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW SHLL SIZE GOJ CLAIM BUT HE CONCERNED THAT PM OR KING WHOSE PATIENCE NEAR END, MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TAKE ONE OF THESE STEPS. EMBASSY WILL VANTINUE URGE GOJ RESTRAINT AND KEEP CHANNELS OPEN FOR NEGOTIATION.

2. WHILE IN PARIS DOQKHAN SAYS HE ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE MORE THAN

RECONFIRM GOJ OFFER OF APPROX \$1 MILLION FOR EQUIPMENT AND DISCUSS DRILLING CONTRACT PROPOSAL WITH MECOM REPRESENTATIVE. HE BELIEVES MECOM HOLDING OUT FOR \$1.5 MILLION IN EFFECT TO "WIPE OUT" \$425,000 GOJ CLAIM. HE ADDED THAT GOJ WILL LOST INTEREST IN MECOM EQUIPMENT IF DISPUTE PROLONGED FURTHER DUE ITS DETERIORATION AT AQABA. HE COMPLAINED THAT AGAIN MECOM'S AGENT APPEARED HAVE NO DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY NEGOTIATE OR SIGN SETTLEMENT. EFFORTS TELEPHONE MECOM FROM PARIS FRUSTRATED BY RESPONSE THAT HE NOT AVAILABLE.

3. DOQKHAN UNCERTAIN OF WHAT DO NEXT AND INQUIRED IF EMBASSY

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-2- AMMAN 1578, DECEMBER 22

COULD ASSIST IN SECURING RESPONSE FROM MECOM. EMBOFF OFFERED PASS HIS INQUIRY TO DEPT BUT SUGGESTED HE ALSO TRY AGAIN CONTACT MECOM THROUGH CABLE OR LETTER. EMBOFF ALSO QUEIRED WHETHER DOQKHAN WOULD CONSIDER "SPLITTING DIFFERENCE" IN ONE FINAL EFFORT AT SETTLEMENT, SINCE SUCH COMPROMISE MIGHT IN ANY CASE BE OUTCOME FROM ARBITRATION. DOQKHAN DOUBTED THAT HE COULD DO THIS BECAU U IN THE EVENT DISPUTE ARBITRATED GOJ WOULD CLAIM DAMAGES TOTALLING NEARLY \$1 MILLION AND COMPROMISE FROM THIS FIGURE MIGHT WELL EXCEED PRESVT CLAIM OF ONLY \$425,000.

4. ACCORDING EMBASSY VIEW DOQKHAN CAUGHT IN HIGHLY EMBARRASSING

POSITION BETWEEN WHAT TOP GOJ OFFICIALS EXPECT HIM TO ACCOMPLISH AS SETTLEMENT AND WHAT HE CONSIDERS MECOM'S LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS.

5. WOULD

APPRECIATE ANY CONSIDERATION DEPT MIGHT GIVE TO REVIEWICW LEGAL ASPECTS THIS CASE WITH MECOM AND URGINGEARLY SETTLEMENT.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

FS 95

December 20, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Handling of public relations on the Jordan package

1. The package for Jordan is taking shape. A 2,000-man increase is the preferred position; 3,000 would be a fall back. The cost of the pay raise would be shared between ourselves -- usling PL 480 dinars -- and the Government of Jordan. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will be tapped by Hussein, with our support. The cost of the pay raise and the manpower increase are easy to carry for 1967. We are retaining our option for a rigorous review of our share for 1968, when UAC funds may not be available.
2. The P.R. position is as follows:
  - (a) A telegram has already gone to Amman alerting them to our special problems in New York, calling for at least a 24-hour delay and a coordinated announcement.
  - (b) State is preparing a talking paper for Doug McArthur to use on the Hill. Nick will be clearing it.
  - (c) Hal's earlier talking paper covers points for your talks with the Jewish community. I also attach a draft framework for a backgrounder in case this is something you would want to handle here. If you would prefer to have State deal with the press, Bob McCloskey could cope. I do not include references to Hussein's statements regarding Israel being there to stay, for this is truly anathema in the Arab world (though I am pursuing this in the event you still want them).
3. I am in close touch with Roger Davies and will keep you informed.

SECRET

December 14, 1966

95a

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS  
BRIEFING ISRAEL'S FRIENDS ON THE JORDAN PACKAGE

Purpose--To reassure our friends by putting the new Jordan package in proper perspective on a confidential basis. We want to convince them that we support Israel fully and anything we do for the Arab countries is done with Israel's interests in mind.

1. The President wanted me to have this talk about our Israeli affairs because he feels that many friends of Israel are insufficiently aware of our real policies. As a result of misinformation, they have sometimes brought undue (and often counter-productive) pressure on the Administration when it seeks to preserve US--and even Israeli--interests elsewhere in the Near East.

2. No one who has an insider's view of the many aspects of our Israeli relations could contest the proposition that the US is 100% behind the security and wellbeing of Israel. We are Israel's chief supporters, bankers, direct and indirect arms purveyors, and ultimate guarantors. This has been US policy since 1947, but has reached a new level since 1964. There is no question that Israel regards us as its best friend.

3. A cardinal principle of our Middle East policy is to create an environment in which Israel can survive and prosper. We do a number of things to affect this environment:

--We have spent since 1949 \$87 million for the elaborate UN peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders.

--We have helped support over a million Arab refugees, who are the recruiting pools for terrorist organizations, at a cost of over \$387 million.

--Our aid to a number of other Arab countries is given with an eye to stability on the Arab-Israeli front. Moscow and Peking are violently pro-Arab and use the Arab Israeli issue for their own purposes. It serves Israeli interests if we keep the Soviets and Chicom from attaining undue influence.

4. A most important part of stabilizing this environment is to foster a sound regime in Jordan. Israeli officials are the first to say that this is also a major objective for them. They point out that King Hussein has realistically accepted the existence of Israel and has admitted the emptiness of Arab threats to drive Israel into the sea. He has also

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worked hard to create a Jordanian national entity which would meld the East and West Banks, thereby extinguishing Palestinian nationalism.

5. To date we have spent \$550 million to build stability in Jordan-- with outstanding results. We have bought a decade of relative peace on Israel's longest border and have turned Jordan from a nation without hope into a nation with hope of standing on its own feet and resisting pressures to become a pawn of the radical Arabs. Our help has been mainly economic, but it has also included a small on-going military assistance program as well as two special sales of military equipment. We have fully informed the Government of Israel on all of these, and it has shown its understanding of our purpose. Israeli officials tacitly admit that our economic program serves Israeli interests.

6. The Israeli raid on Jordan has severely undercut King Hussein. It deeply humiliated his army--his main support--and sharpened long-standing discontent among the Palestinians on Jordan's vulnerable West Bank. The radical Syrian government is encouraging this discontent and has stepped up terrorist infiltration against Jordanian targets. The raid also increased pressure on him from other Arab governments to accept stationing non-Jordanian troops in Jordan--a move aimed at his possible overthrow, which would place hostile forces on Israel's most vulnerable border. To resist these pressures and to retain the loyalty of his army, he feels he must improve Jordan's defenses against repetition of the 13 November raid or abdicate his responsibilities as Jordan's leader.

7. We believe this is a political-psychological problem--not chiefly a military one, as Hussein sees it. We have Israel's firm assurance that the 13 November raid does not constitute a change in Israel's policy toward Jordan--that it was a response to terrorism and not the first step in seizing the West Bank. Nevertheless, we must meet Hussein's political problem--in our interests and in Israel's. While Hussein has asked for an extravagant \$200 million of new military equipment, we have responded with a package worth less than 4% of that designed to:

- Prevent diverting resources from economic development.
- Improve pay and equipment enough to preserve army loyalty.
- Not upset the military balance to Israel's disadvantage.

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- 3 -

8. I want to underscore that this is an effort to meet problems which both we and the Israeli government feel must be solved. This package will not affect the military balance because it is not primarily a military program. It is the starting point for what will undoubtedly be a long series of general aid negotiations which will be required to help Hussein resist Arab pressures to move into the West Bank and retain the respect of the army and security forces which alone can restrict anti-Israeli terrorist activity from Jordanian bases.

9. Meanwhile it is possible that many of you do not realize the extent to which we have helped Israel over the years and continue to do so:

a. US public grants, loans and sales on concessional terms have totalled \$1.1 billion through FY 1966. This has helped Israel achieve probably the highest sustained growth rate in the world (10-11% per annum for the last twelve years). Their foreign exchange reserves are up from around \$280 million at the end of 1961 to over \$600 million now. It is a real success story.

These aid levels stand out against the background of general aid policy designed gradually to phase out concessional aid in countries like Israel which have moved impressively toward self-sustaining growth. Israel's per capita GNP of \$1400 in 1965 was about 75% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, 110% of Austria's, 125% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Our aid policy has grown out of the pressures of low appropriations and our belief that it is healthy for nations to push away aid props just as soon as possible.

b. We have made quite sure that Israel could meet its minimum military aid requirements, either here or from other Western sources. Our JCS regularly review the situation and still estimate that Israel can defeat any likely Arab combination, now or in the next few years. The Israelis believe the same thing.

--So long as Israel could meet its arms needs from France, the UK (or for a time Germany), we sought to avoid becoming major direct suppliers in order to: (1) fend off Arab pressures; (2) forestall excessive Arab requests; (3) avoid driving the Arabs to Moscow and Peiping for even more. This policy makes sense, and in fact has given Israel better arms cheaper than it could get them from us.

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- 4 -

--But in those cases where Israel could not meet legitimate defensive needs elsewhere, we've helped quietly and directly. In 1962 we sold 5 HAWK batteries, and in 1965 and 1966 we sold tanks and combat aircraft. These decisions were made after long and careful consideration to prevent development of a destabilizing arms imbalance in the area, and the sales were made on liberal credit terms. Also, most people don't know that we've provided 106 mm. recoilless rifles, armored half tracks, extensive electronic equipment, C-97s, and other items over the years. We've trained over 300 Israeli military here.

c. We do a great deal to enhance Israel's technological edge over the Arabs--which is in many respects its secret weapon. We gave a nuclear research reactor and we now support scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 USG agencies supporting some 350 science projects. These programs are a substantial contribution to keeping an already outstanding scientific community constructively employed.

d. To help preserve and develop vital water supplies, we have given quiet assurance that we will help Israel maintain access to its share of the Jordan waters. We have also engaged in discussions with Israeli representatives on cooperative research in the field of desalting, and the President has appointed Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to recommend next steps in this program.

e. On the diplomatic front, President Johnson reaffirmed publicly during the 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and again during the August 1966 visit of President Shazar the US commitment to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. In addition, our presence in key Arab countries has enabled us to work usefully for peace and moderation. We have produced no final solutions for any of the Arab-Israel problems, but our activities have:

- Safeguarded access to Israel's fair share of the Jordan's waters.
- Helped reduce tensions and incidents along Armistice lines.
- Preserved effective UN peacekeeping machinery.
- Supported Israel, where warranted, in the United Nations.
- Tried to make progress on the refugee problem.
- Encouraged more realistic Arab attitudes toward the Arab-Israel dispute.

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December 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM

95-16

SUBJECT: Hussein on the existence of Israel -- accentuating the positive.

1. On November 17 King Hussein said to all Diplomatic Chiefs of Mission that Israel's action has been not a retaliatory raid but "an act of war." His subsequent remarks were to the effect that:

"although the Arabs tended to make extravagant and bombastic statements, all that any Arab leader really aimed for was to attain a military balance between all the Arabs on the one side and Israel on the other."

While he did not say so, put another way, this sounds very much like an admission that Israel is here to stay and we must recognize that hard fact. But the Israeli action at El Samu makes it very hard to believe that they want only a balance, so we must build up our strength (the text of Amman's 1154 is attached, see paragraph 6).

2. The second citation, which is more to the point, is from James Murray's interview with Hussein, reported in the Sunday Express, December 11, 1966. It went as follows:

"And one day we hope the Jews will see sense and learn that the real enemies here are the barren mountains and the deserts which we all have to try to control for the good of all our people."

"It makes me sad to have to spend money on arms and planes when there are so many other things we could do."

"It is a tragedy for humanity here. And yet there have been times when the Jews and the Arabs have lived peacefully. Common sense might come again."

HWriggins:lw



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
RUQMLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1154

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1966 NOV 18 AM 4 38

BATOR  
BOWDLER  
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DAVIS  
GINSBURGH  
HAMILTON  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
JORDEN  
KEENE  
KORNER  
MOYERS  
TAYLOR  
WILLIAMS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN.

1. KING SUMMONED ALL DIPLOMATIC CHIEFS OF MISSION  
RESIDENT IN AMMAN TO PALACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEPARTURE  
AYUB KHAN THIS MORNING.

2. FLANKED BY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, KING  
SPOKE IN ENGLISH IN ORDER THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF THOSE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 228A ~~SECRET~~  
PRESENT WOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT HE HAD TO SAY.

3. KING BEGAN BY STATING JORDAN HAD DONE ALL SHE COULD  
TO LIVE UP TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IT WAS WELL  
KNOWN JORDAN HAS CONSISTENTLY STRIVEN TO PREVENT ANY  
ACTION WHICH WOULD THREATEN QUIET ON THE ARMISTICE LINE.  
THE ISRAELI HAD NOT LIVED UP TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT,  
PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD  
TO POLICING THE BORDER. THE KING NOTED THAT POLICING  
THE BORDER WAS AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK FOR ONE SIDE ONLY.  
THE BORDER WAS NEARLY 650 KILOMETERS LONG, AND BECAUSE  
OF THE WAY IT WAS DRAWN, OFTEN RIGHT THROUGH THE CENTER

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1154, 171757Z NOV 66

OF A VILLAGE, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO POLICE. THE JOB COULD NOT BE LEFT TO ONE SIDE ALONE, AS HAD IN EFFECT BEEN THE CASE.

4. KING STATED THAT NOVEMBER 13 ISRAELI ATTACK WAS NOT A RETALIATORY RAID BUT AN ACT OF WAR. THE SIZE OF THE FORCES EMPLOYED, THE USE OF TANKS AND AIRCRAFT, AND THE TAKING OF PRISONERS, WAS PROOF THIS WAS NO RETALIATORY RAID. IN SAMOU THE MOSQUE, THE SCHOOL AND THE CLINIC WERE ASSAULTED -- ARE THESE TERRORIST NESTS, ASKED THE KING.

PAGE 3 RUOMKG 228A ~~SECRET~~

5. NOVEMBER 13 ACTION WAS NOT THE END BUT THE BEGINNING. IT WAS THE OPENING MOVE IN AN ISRAELI PLAN TO TAKE THE WEST BANK.

6. ALTHOUGH THE ARABS TENDED TO MAKE EXTRAVAGANT AND BOMBASTIC STATEMENTS, SAID THE KING, ALL THAT ANY ARAB LEADER REALLY AIMED FOR WAS TO ATTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN ALL THE ARABS ON ONE SIDE AND ISRAEL ON THE OTHER. ISRAEL, SAID THE KING, REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A MILITARY BALANCE AND WAS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE AREA. NOW THAT THE ARABS HAVE COME CLOSER TO APPROACHING MILITARY PARITY WITH THE ISRAELIS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED THEY MUST HAVE THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION.

7. THE NOVEMBER 13 ISRAELI ATTACK WAS THE INITIAL ISRAELI EFFORT TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT WITH JORDAN IN PURSUIT OF THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVE-- THE TAKING OF THE WEST BANK.

8. IT HAS BEEN ONLY THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF THE UTMOST RESTRAINT THAT JORDAN HAS NOT RETALIATED AGAINST ISRAEL.

PAGE 4 RUOMKG 228A ~~SECRET~~

BUT MAKE NO MISTAKE, SAID THE KING, IF ISRAEL ATTACKS US AGAIN, FOR WHATEVER REASON, JORDAN WILL STRIKE BACK. ISRAEL IS TRYING TO FINISH US AND IT IS BETTER THAT WE DIE FIGHTING THAN SUBMIT. QUOTE THERE ARE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE PUSHED, NO MATTER WHAT THE MILITARY ODDS INVOLVED MAY BE UNQUOTE.

~~SECRET~~



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-3- AMMAN 1154, 171757Z NOV 66

9. THE KING SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF EVERY POWER WHOSE REPRESENTATIVE WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING SHOULD REGARD THE SITUATION ON THE JORDAN-ISRAEL BORDER WITH THE GRAVEST CONCERN. THE NEXT ISRAELI ATTACK WOULD SET IN TRAIN EVENTS WHICH WOULD END UP ENVELOPING ALL OF US.

10. STATING THAT THE PLACING OF UNEF FORCES ALONG THE BORDER WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, THE KING ASKED THOSE PRESENT TO URGE THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO APPLY PRESSURE QUOTE MORAL AND PHYSICAL UNQUOTE ON ISRAEL TO RESTRAIN HER FROM FURTHER HOSTILE ACTION.

11. COMMENT: (A) ALTHOUGH IN THE PAST AFTER BORDER INCIDENTS THE KING HAS CONVOKED MEETINGS OF ARAB AMBASSADORS, THIS IS THE FIRST OCCASION ON WHICH IN THIS CONNECTION HE HAS CONVENED THE ENTIRE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. (B) IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE KING WOULD SAY IN THE PRESENCE OF ARAB AS WELL AS NON-ARAB AMBASSADORS THAT IN EFFECT, ARAB THREATS TO PUNCH ISRAEL INTO THE SEA ARE EMPTY. THE KING SEES THE FUTURE SO GRIMLY THAT HE IS NOT WORRYING VERY MUCH ABOUT OBSERVING AT LEAST THIS ARAB SHIBBOLETH. (C) I IMAGINE THE WORDING REPORTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE IS AS FAR AS GOJ WOULD EVER GO IN PUBLICLY REFERRING TO THEIR EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS TERRORISTS. IN FACT, PRIME MINISTER TELL INDICATED TO ME AFTER MEETING HE THOUGHT EVEN THIS STATEMENT IF REPEATED PUBLICLY MIGHT BE GOING TOO FAR FOR ARAB NEIGHBOR CONSUMPTION.

GP-3. BURNS

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:12 A.M., NOVEMBER 18.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, USIA, NSA 6:12 A.M., 11/18/66.

~~SECRET~~



95-d

December 20, 1966

Draft Backgrounder for use with the press on  
Emergency Assistance to Jordan

1. Hussein badly shaken by the raid on El Samu.

(a) His army's loyalty weakened by:

- (i) exposure of Jordan's vulnerability to Israeli attack;
- (ii) his policy of moderation toward Israel, which is in such contrast to the hostility and anti-Israeli agitation of UAR and Syria.

(b) Elements among West Bank Palestinians again actively oppose the regime. After El Samu they turned their anger

- (i) first against Israel as the historic cause of their difficulties, and
- (ii) then against Hussein and his army for their inability to defend them against Israel.

(c) The Arab extremists in Syria and the UAR took advantage of Hussein's difficulties and provoked further disorders amongst Palestinians, egging them on to demand the end of the regime. Infiltrators crossed from Syria into Jordan to sabotage. The Palestine Liberation Organization is openly agitating for his downfall. Hussein believes Soviet military assistance goes to his Arab neighbors in order to promote local conflict.

2. It is to Israel's interest that Hussein remain in power.

(i) Hussein is working toward a Jordanian nation which will provide opportunity and outlet for West Bank Palestinians, if he is given a chance. His policy toward Israel has not been extreme, like that of the radicals.

(ii) He has conscientiously worked for stability in the area.

(iii) Those who know official Israeli opinion are aware they do not wish to bring down Hussein.

(iv) A collapse in Jordan could precipitate open warfare between Arabs and Israel, and this would be to no one's advantage.

3. Our assistance to Hussein is designed to help Jordan improve its defensive capability.

- (i) Frontier control will be improved, mobility and communications will be stepped up.
- (ii) Equipment will be largely that already in the pipeline, with delivery dates accelerated. Six of the F-104's already approved, will be delivered promptly. No additional planes or tanks are involved.
- (iii) A pay raise, long under study, will be put into effect promptly; there will be a limited increase in forces to bring units up to strength.

This package will not alter present balance of forces in the Near East. It is not of an importance comparable to sales of planes or tanks. /FYI - If we down play it too much, the Arabs will feel they got nothing; if we up-play it too much, the friends of Israel will be unduly alarmed. The above, therefore, may be the best way to handle it. /

4. We are confident that Jordan's intention is the continued stability of the area. King Hussein will bend his efforts to defend the territorial integrity and independence of Jordan and to prevent the use of Jordan territory for activities directed against its neighbors. Our urgent assistance is to help make this possible.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 20, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow  
FROM: Howard Wriggins  
SUBJECT: Arms for Hussein

F<sub>3</sub>

Hussein and Macomber are bargaining hard.

Hussein welcomes the McNamara package, believes that the drama of the airlift will be very helpful, as will 6 F-104's in advance. He will do all in his power to prevent the stationing of non-Jordanian Arab troops in Jordan; he will continue his moderate policy toward Israel.

Now remains at issue his force level. Macomber has pressed hard for no increase but for a substantial improvement in quality. General Khammash wants an increase of 10,000 from the present 50,000 on deck to 60,000. However, Macomber believes the King is under pressure to increase numbers as well as quality -- his generals do not find it credible that they can meet the threat from both Israel and Syria without a numerical increase. (NOTE: The United Arab command's plans for Jordan implied a total strength of 75,000 including an 8,500 national guard. The Government of Jordan has authorized a strength of 55,000, but had not gone farther than 50,000, a level we had never formally agreed to.) Macomber believes a 2,000-man increase is reasonable to absorb the new equipment we are adding. He hopes to hold the line at that. But if he can't, he feels the pressure is strong enough to warrant taking out a small insurance policy by accepting a 5,000-man increase, but for one year only.

On budget costs, we and they had reached agreement on the Jordanian defense budget of some \$54 million. We have been providing a declining level of budgetary support (\$37 million in 1962, \$32 million in 1966). We have told Congress that we are continuing to reduce this support. And we had planned cuts of \$5 million a year beginning this year.

DoD estimates that apart from the costs of the McNamara package, the add-on costs are as follows:

1. pay raise	\$ 6 million
2. 2,000 men to handle new equipment	2.5 "
3. 3,000 men to 55,000 total	13.5 "
	<hr/> \$12.0 "

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Authority FRUS, Vol XVIII, #342

By h NARA, Date 7-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Where will this \$12 million additional come from?

1. Khammash says he can cover these costs for one year out of UAC funds (though we are somewhat skeptical).
2. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could be tapped by Jordan, with ~~our~~ our backing, in the event the UAC contribution does not come through (but we're already expecting them to pick up the \$70 million balance from the tank and plane sales and therefore can't expect much more).
3. We ourselves could scratch our \$5 million cut in budget support, and might put in some additional contingency fund if necessary (though this would undercut the important goal of shifting Jordan to development funding).

I assume the President would prefer to satisfy them with a bit more cash in the form of budget support than have a new crisis on his hands.

Have you any reaction to the above before I join in a State-Defense meeting at 10:45?



*Mr. Smith*

~~Secret~~

*S* 97

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~~#123 - work~~ *Dest 12/15*  
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#125 - *Pit. Ren.*  
#126 - *Dest'd 12/15*



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Palestinian West Jordan*

~~Secret~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ001-146-3-13  
By Y NARA, Date 7-2-01

15 December 1966  
No. 1700/66

**Secret**

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## **WARNING**

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GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
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**Secret**



~~SECRET~~

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Background of the Problem

1. Palestine became a problem for Jordan in 1948, before Husayn and Nasir came on the scene. Then it was Husayn's grandfather, King Abdullah, who was in the storm center. The 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine had included what now is west Jordan in the proposed Arab sector. In 1948, after the birth of Israel and the beginning of its war with the nearby Arab states, the UN's mediator for Palestine, Sweden's Bernadotte, recommended that that part of the Arab sector still remaining in Arab hands be combined with Abdullah's kingdom in Trans-Jordan, across the Jordan River. Abdullah welcomed the proposal. His Arab Legion had moved into the west bank area when the war began and was facing the Israelis in Jerusalem and southwest and northwest of the city. Iraqi troops manned the front farther to the north (see map).

2. Israel opposed Bernadotte's recommendation, as did the other Arab states, led by Egypt. They accused Abdullah, the friend of Britain, of "deserting" the Arab cause in July 1948 and of keeping his Arab Legion on the defensive while Israel was attacking successfully on the Egyptian and Lebanese fronts. These Arab states then recognized a shadowy "Government of All Palestine" headed by the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, a wartime collaborator of the Nazis.

3. During this period Abdullah had been in direct touch with Israel's Ben-Gurion through an American correspondent in Israel who shuttled between Tel Aviv and Amman as a personal intermediary. These contacts led on 30 November 1948 to a cease-fire in the Jerusalem area between Abdullah's Arab Legion and the Israelis. On the following day, a congress of 2,000 Palestine Arab delegates was convened at Jericho to acclaim Abdullah "King of All Palestine." In response, the other Arab states, a number of Asian and Latin American states, and the Soviet bloc combined in the UN General Assembly to defeat a British resolution to unite Arab Palestine with Trans-Jordan, which by then had adopted "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" as its official name.

4. The Egyptians, ignoring the contribution of their own intrigues against Abdullah to Arab disunity,

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took the Jerusalem cease-fire as new proof of Abdullah's "desertion," but proceeded, nonetheless, to sign the first Arab armistice with Israel on 24 February 1949. This paved the way for Israel's separate armistice agreements with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria later that year.

5. Jordan's armistice negotiations with Israel, which had come to a standstill in early March 1949, were hastened when Iraq broke ranks. The Iraqis, who had refused themselves to negotiate with Israel but had agreed to be bound by any armistice signed by Jordan, decided to withdraw their forces in central Palestine before Israel attacked them again. The Iraqi withdrawal forced Abdullah's Arab Legion, already overextended, to extend itself further to cover its exposed northern flank. The Israelis threatened to renew hostilities against the Arab Legion if Abdullah did not pull back some two miles along this 55-mile front. Abdullah agreed to this in March at a secret meeting with Israeli emissaries. This agreement relieved for the Israelis the construction of a salient reaching into the coastal plain north and east of Tel Aviv and gave them unimpeded control of the strategic main road to Galilee in the north. It also separated a considerable number of Arab villagers from their lands, and left them destitute, a circumstance used later by Abdullah's Arab enemies in propaganda against him. In the Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement which followed on 3 April 1949, Jordan received in return only minor territorial concessions in the Hebron area.

6. Later, in 1950, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to internationalize Jerusalem despite opposition by both Israel and Jordan. During this period Israel apparently accepted as a basis for negotiations a proposal by Abdullah for a five-year non-aggression pact under which trade and travel would be freely allowed across the existing armistice line, while a free port zone at Haifa would give Jordan its much-needed Mediterranean outlet. Contradictory reports emanating from Israeli sources about the prospects for an agreement stimulated new Arab opposition to Abdullah in Egypt and Syria and within Jordan itself. The Jordanian Government resigned over its opposition to a settlement with Israel and some prominent Jordanians went into voluntary exile in Cairo.

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In the spring of 1950 Egypt seized on Abdullah's negotiations as grounds for a movement in the League of Arab States to exclude Jordan from membership. These negotiations, however, had been abruptly suspended, and Jordan in April agreed to an Arab League declaration that forfeiture of membership should be the penalty for making a separate agreement with Israel.

7. Later, on 24 April, Abdullah formally annexed Arab Palestine--exclusive of the Gaza Strip, which was occupied by Egypt. Contrary to Egyptian and Syrian propaganda at the time, there is some evidence that a substantial number of Palestinians favored the union since it gave them the support of a stable government and army. On the other hand, some Trans-Jordanians feared they would be dominated by the more numerous and better educated Palestinians. Israel refused to recognize this annexation and declared the status of "the Arab areas west of the Jordan" to be an open question. In 1951 Abdullah was assassinated by an agent of his rival for the leadership of Palestine, the ex - Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Husayn was a youthful witness to the crime.

#### West Jordan Under Husayn

8. Husayn, since he ascended the throne in 1952, has had to bear the burden of his grandfather's alleged betrayal of the Palestine cause. In the eyes of his Arab enemies, who include many if not most of his Palestinian subjects, Husayn has added to this record of perfidy by his own efforts to avoid trouble with the Israelis. In recent years Palestinian terrorist incursions into Israel from west Jordan prompted Husayn to take preventive measures against the terrorists in an effort to avoid Israeli reprisals. Meanwhile, the Cairo-based Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was agitating for a free hand to arm and organize Jordan's Palestinians. Husayn has viewed the PLO, with considerable justification, as a subversive threat and has been adamant in resisting its pressure. He has been aided by the fact that in west Jordan the PLO has had little success in selling itself. This relatively favorable situation, from the King's point of view, was abruptly altered by Israel's large-scale reprisal on 13 November against three Palestinian towns

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suspected of harboring terrorists. The Israeli raid and Husayn's failure to respond with force have stirred up greater Palestinian antipathy toward the King and have breathed new life into the PLO's prospects in west Jordan. Palestinian support for the organization has increased. Even the prominent, well-established old families on the west bank who used to cooperate with the King to protect their interests now see a greater Israeli threat to those interests than they thought existed, and have turned against him.

9. The social as well as political difficulties inherent in trying to absorb west Jordan are immense and perhaps impossible to overcome. In annexing it, Jordan immediately tripled its own population by the addition of the 400,000 original inhabitants of the area and almost half a million refugees from Israel. Discontent and frustration among the refugees, most of whom still live in camps supported by the UN, were inevitable. Moreover, the Palestinian Arabs had experienced great cultural changes during the nearly three decades of Britain's mandate in Palestine. Schools, hospitals, and industrial enterprises had been established, urban development intensified, and modern middle and urban working classes had begun to emerge. Many Palestinians learned something of the principles of modern administration, and many more developed a political consciousness which reached beyond the limits of village or even regional experience. In short, Jordan had to try to absorb professional, social, and political elements which, as a group, were much more sophisticated and Westernized than the largely rural and partially nomadic population of the Trans-Jordanian east bank.

10. The urban elements among the Palestinians have tended to view the east bank population as ignorant and backward and have resented the entrenched position and conservative policies of the east bank leaders. The literacy and technical ability of the Palestinians have made them strong claimants for positions of prestige and authority. They have been dissatisfied with the largely secondary role they have been forced to play while Trans-Jordanians have continued to dominate the key positions of political power and to control the army. East bank Jordanians in turn have been stung by the superior attitude of the newcomers.



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11. There has been little progress toward eliminating this rivalry, but the Palestinians have, nonetheless, assumed an increasingly larger role in the administrative and commercial affairs of the country as a whole. As a consequence, there has been a continuing shift of population toward the capital, Amman. From a population of 30,000 in 1948, the capital has burgeoned to almost a quarter of a million and now is, in many respects, a Palestinian city. Slightly more than half of Jordan's population of almost two million now lives in east Jordan, and more than a fifth of the inhabitants there are Palestinians. The Palestinians still constitute about two thirds of the country's total population, the bulk of them refugees or the children of refugees. As of 30 June 1966, according to statistics UN officials admit are inflated, Jordan's total refugee population was 706,568. A large proportion of these people live in camps located on both sides of the river.

12. The west bank has most, though not the best, of Jordan's cultivable land. It also has 60 percent of the country's industries employing 44 percent of the industrial labor. The area, with its holy places, is the feature attraction in Jordan's tourist industry, which altogether earns one and a half times the foreign exchange Jordan derives from tangible exports and 30 percent of all foreign exchange receipts from goods and services. On the other hand, while the Dead Sea's substantial resources of mineral salts are accessible from the west bank, potash extracting operations are to be developed on the eastern shore, and the country's abundant high-grade phosphate deposits are in east Jordan. US aid for the East Ghor irrigation scheme, utilizing water from the Yarmuk River, presently benefits only land on the east bank, although an extension to the west bank is in the planning stage.

13. Complete separation of the Palestinian west bank from the east thus would entail severe social and economic dislocations. This would be the case particularly in east Jordan if the quarter million Palestinians now living there were to return to the west, although a remnant regime in Amman would still stand to benefit from the trade and communications facilities a separate Palestinian entity would require through east Jordan.

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14. Despite these obvious drawbacks, King Husayn's patience with the Palestinians has worn thin before to the point where he has at least considered setting them adrift. On such previous occasions, however, the Palestinians were essentially an irritant. Now they pose not only a greater threat, but also, as a result of the growing participation in the life and trade of east bank Jordan itself, a greater problem in effecting any amputation.

-7-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
15 December 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Palestinian West Jordan

Summary

Palestinian west Jordan--2,100 square miles of hilly plateau between the west bank of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea on the east and the Israeli frontier on the west--was a bone of contention between Israel's Arab neighbors even during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 when these neighbors ostensibly were allies. From the time of Jordan's formal annexation of the area in 1950 it has been a thorn in the side of the Amman government because its Palestinian inhabitants have never fully accepted Amman's authority.

West Jordan is both a bone of contention and a thorn because it is Palestinian and therefore a focal point of Arab hostility toward Israel. For radical Arab Palestinians it is the territorial base which they must use to recapture their lost lands in Israel and the nucleus for an eventual independent Palestinian state. The problem for King Husayn has been to restrain these radical Palestinians without antagonizing them to the point where they would openly revolt. Husayn's problem was greatly exacerbated by Israel's 13 November 1966 raid into west Jordan; the raid exposed his de facto modus vivendi with Israel as a failure and thus revived Palestinian antagonism toward his rule.

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NOTE: This memorandum was produced by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Current Intelligence.





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BOSTON'S OFFICE

*Jordan*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file*

December 14, 1966

*98*

Mr. President:

Here are the draft instructions for Ambassador MacComber who leaves tonight for Amman to discuss the military package with King Hussein.

The specifics of the package have already been communicated through military channels to the embassy in Amman. These instructions for the Ambassador make the essential additional points necessary. They have been worked out jointly between State and Defense. I recommend that you approve them as they stand.

*W. A. R.* Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See Me \_\_\_\_\_



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 13, 1966  
6:30 p.m.

SECRET

WALT,

Jordanian package - Keeping Hussein calm.

Hussein's Chief of Staff is taking off tonight a deeply disappointed man, since his package is not yet confirmed. He was impressed by McNamara, but bewildered that we couldn't decide after two weeks what we wanted to do. When he reaches London early tomorrow London time, he will doubtless telephone the King (they have a secure radio-telephone link from London). Khammash will inevitably communicate his disappointment to Hussein.

Accordingly, it would save Hussein's nerves - and surely prevent him from doing something foolish - if, after your discussions today, you were in a position to instruct the Sit Room to call Jock Stoddard, ISA's man in London, who will meet Khammash at the airport tomorrow, and give him the following message for Khammash :

THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED THE PROPOSALS  
YOU DISCUSSED WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA.  
AMBASSADOR MACOMBER WILL COME SHORTLY TO  
DISCUSS THEIR ECONOMIC AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS.

I know the chances of this are slim, but we play on narrow margins here, and no harm in trying!

Howard

not used

100  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~-- NODIS

Y Tuesday, December 13, 1966  
9:50 a.m.  
Rec'd 12-13-66  
1052

Mr. President:

Our Amb. Burns in Jordan filed this off-beat, speculative cable.

It is worth reading, because, when Hussein says the Israelis must have been out to get him, this is precisely the scenario and rationale he has in mind.

Incidentally, Eban, in talking with me yesterday, referred to this general theory; said he was aware it was held by some Jordanians; and said it was not Israeli policy.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~  
Amman 1474

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 98-501  
By is/ky NARA, Date 7-5-01



SECRET - EXDIS

100a

Tuesday, December 13, 1966

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS (Amman 1474)

As the Department is aware, I have spent many years in State Department administration. There is an abundance of machiavellian minds in administration, and this no doubt accounts for my proneness to wonder if the motives of Middle Eastern states are all they seem to be.

With this caveat, I should like to express a few additional thoughts on the subject. I ask especially for the indulgence of Ambassador Barbour, whose indication that we in Amembassy Amman could be letting our thinking get too byzantine could be correct, though I am afraid we are not cured yet.

It seems to me that the UAR, Syria, and Israel, at least, could be less worried about the consequences of an Arab-Israeli war and the end of Jordan than we might think, and certainly less worried than we are. I suspect they count that an Arab-Israeli war would not be permitted by the U.N. and the great powers, including the USSR, to last but a few days. In the event of a short Arab-Israeli war, which would be stopped before anybody, with the exception of Jordan, got too badly hurt, the UAR, Syria and Israel may calculate they could end up ahead of the game.

For Israel there would be the neutralization of the West Bank in some form or other. And for Cairo and Damascus there would be a Jordan Arab Republic on the East Bank, or perhaps dismemberment of the East Bank.

A short Arab-Israeli war could even take some of the heat off the radical Arab leaders with regard to the Palestine problem. If the West Bank, for example, should end up under some form of U.N. control, this might provide the "out" for the radical Arab leaders that U.N. Emergency Force forces appear to have done on the UAR-Israeli border.

I am not trying to imply that the Israeli attack on Samu was part of a dark plot to set in train an Arab-Israeli war or cause the liquidation of the Hashemites. I still subscribe to the belief that Samu was related to terrorism. Nor do I discount the attractions for Israel and for the UAR

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Authority NLT 98-500

By 123/5 NARA, Date 7-5-01

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in retaining the present set-up in Jordan and for peace on the Arab-Israeli border. They must know well enough that once one starts tampering with the status quo, events could get out of hand in unexpected ways. Thus, while I do not think Tel Aviv or Cairo are formally set upon a course to unseat the Hashemites or have a war, there could nonetheless be strong policy considerations working against their instincts for caution. Neither Samu, nor radio Cairo, are exactly reflective of a cautious approach. And Damascus evidences even less caution.

If there is any substance in the speculations expressed above, then the continuation of a moderate Jordan, as former Ambassador to Jordan Macomber once told me, is "the stopper that keeps the dirty water from running out of the bathtub."


Interestingly enough, I suspect that if there could be a short, controlled Arab-Israel war at the expense of Jordan, the Arab-Israeli problem would be further along the road towards solution, and the remainder of that road might well be a peaceful one.

The problem, of course, is how could a change in the status quo in Jordan, with the attendant possibility of an Arab-Israeli war, be accomplished in a controlled manner? Could an Arab-Israeli clash, should it occur, be stopped in a few days? And what, contrary to expectations, if the Soviets did not want to stop it?

There are too many "ifs" in this equation for comfort. The status quo in Jordan, fragile as it is, is vital to the continued balance of the Middle East as we know it today. It would seem far safer to stick with the "known" and unstintedly to take the steps necessary to preserve a moderate regime in Jordan, than not to respond favorably to Jordan's request for assistance, or to respond with too little, too late, which could set matters on another course.

5237  
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. ~~Reslow~~

(2) ~~Wingate~~  
③ ~~Rel.~~  
We are sending this Memorandum to  
you at the request of the Director of  
Central Intelligence. 101

  
Sherman Kent  
Director  
National Estimates

14 December 1966  
(DATE)

6.2(c)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-45  
By isa, NARA, Date 6-30-04



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101a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

13 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Jordan Regime: Its Prospects and the Consequences  
of its Demise \*

I. THE CURRENT SITUATION

1. King Hussain has stayed on his throne in Jordan despite slender domestic political support, military weakness relative to his enemies, and the hostility of radical Arabs who regard him as a Western puppet. His survival has been due in part to his own courage and resourcefulness and to US support. But it has been

the Arab radicals generally tolerated

Hussain's rule as an alternative to conflict with Israel for which they knew they were unprepared. As a consequence Jordan served as a kind of political buffer between irreconcilable opponents and to an important degree kept the unstable elements in the area in equilibrium.

\* This memorandum has been produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine Services.

EO 12958  
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downgrading and  
declassification.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

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By ius, NARA, Date 6-30-04

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2. During the past few months, a series of events has put the future of Jordan in question and has thereby threatened this precarious modus vivendi. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),\* led by Ahmed Shuqairi, became more violent in its criticism of Hussain for his refusal to admit its military forces to Jordan and to station them on the Israeli frontier. A clandestine terrorist organization, Fatah, stepped up its sabotage raids into Israel, mostly through Jordan, which tried to prevent them. The increasingly radical Syrian government was the prime backer of Fatah and announced open support for it. As terrorist raids continued, Tel Aviv, on November 13, made an unprecedentedly large reprisal strike, directing this strike, not against Syria, the source of the trouble, but against Jordan.

---

\* The PLO is a radical organization, established by agreement of the Arab rulers during the recently ended period of Arab harmony. It functions as a kind of government-in-exile for the whole of Palestine, not only Israel but that part which fell to Jordan, commonly known as the West Bank. The PLO has trained a "liberation army" of Palestinians in Egypt and sponsored terrorist activities in Israel. There are other terrorist organizations, however, which are independent of the PLO. The most active of these is called the Fatah.

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3. The Israeli raid has badly shaken King Hussain and his government and humiliated the Jordan army. Palestinians in Jordan have always disliked Hashemite rule anyway and consider Hussain a US stooge who is "soft" on Israel. But they assumed that his amenability to US influence at least brought tranquility -- since they believe that Israel is in Washington's pocket also. In the aftermath of the 13 November raid, Hussain appeared to his subjects, to his neighbors, and perhaps even to himself to have been badly let down by the US. The Palestinians have agitated and demonstrated against him and his government for over three weeks. They have been enthusiastically egged on by the Syrian government and by UAR-based PLO propaganda campaigns. Disaffection in the Jordanian armed forces -- the mainstay of the king's position -- has grown greatly. Hussain is aware of his weakened position at home. He probably believes that the threat from Israel is greater than he had calculated, and has probably lost faith in the modus vivendi. He is also deeply concerned lest the US fail to give him firm support.

4. Hence, his first priority is to demonstrate to the Jordanian army and citizenry that he continues to enjoy the full backing of the US. He has asked the US for a large

- 3 -

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additional supply of arms to help him allay dissatisfaction in the armed forces. Beyond this, he probably hopes that a show of heightened defense activity will keep pressures manageable. The Israelis are probably willing to cooperate by refraining from reprisal raids on Jordan in all but the most serious circumstances.

5. Meanwhile, Hussain was put under severe pressure at the Arab Defense Council meetings last week in Cairo, and he agreed to the stationing, within two months, of Saudi and Iraqi forces in Jordan. Implementation of this plan is likely to be slow, however, and Hussain is certainly averse to it. He probably hopes that if extensive US aid buttresses his army, the presence of other Arab troops will be unnecessary.

6. Hussain obviously fears that the US may not come through with military aid in the magnitude he wants, and that the stationing of Iraqi and Saudi forces may not suffice to keep matters under control in Jordan or to dampen down the criticism, agitation, and subversion coming from Damascus and Cairo. He is therefore examining the possibility of recommending to his brother Arab leaders that they collectively take over the

- 4 -

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defense of West Bank. This would amount to abandoning political control over the most populous part of Jordan and would at least foreshadow the emergence of a radical Arab state in Palestine. Hussain may be threatening this step in order to scare off his Arab critics. He would actually take it only as a move of desperation, designed either to save his throne in Jordan or in case he decided to abdicate.

## II. OUTLOOK FOR THE REGIME

7. Steady agitation and pressure on Hussain by the UAR, Syria, and PLO could wear down the staying power of the regime over a period of time. Although demonstrations in the West Bank area have been brought under control for the present, Shuqri senses that Hussain is in serious trouble and will keep all the pressure he can on him. The PLO's efforts will probably stimulate coup plotting against the monarchy. We know of at least two groups in the Jordanian armed forces working separately against the regime, one of Palestinians, one of East Bankers. There may be others.

8. The intention and tactics of Nasser and Syrians are among the most important variables in the situation. The

- 5 -

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Syrians can be expected to keep up harassment and subversive efforts against Hussain's regime in almost any circumstances. Nasser's role is not so easily predictable. He is personally and politically hostile to Hussain and everything the Hashemites stand for, and no words of sympathy for the Jordanian regime can be expected to emanate from Cairo. On the other hand, Nasser has, in the past, shown considerable awareness, in practice, of the comparative advantages of the modus vivendi, and the dangers and uncertainties involved in upsetting it -- including the risks of the UAR having to fight the Israelis. If Nasser chose, he could do something to suppress the activities of Shuqairi and to calm down the popular turbulence on the West Bank, though his control is far from complete. We believe that he might come to see the advantages of moving in this direction, though in Cairo's present mood this is far from certain. In any case, if he made such efforts, they would necessarily be quiet and discreet; public pronouncements by him on these questions pretty much have to be militant against both the Israelis and Hussain, especially in view of Syrian competition.

9. The US response to Hussain's request for aid will be an important factor in the situation. A military aid package,

- 6 -

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if it included prompt delivery of some showy items, would help the king greatly. A US refusal to extend aid, or to give only token amounts of it, would weaken his position and discourage him. Hussain himself already entertains some suspicion that the US and Israel are collaborating against him, and he would feel that these suspicions were confirmed. Although no amount of US aid could guarantee Hussain's tenure, prompt and substantial assistance could help him to maintain political control. It will not bring him increased support among the Palestinians. Over the long term, the mutual distrust he and they have for each other is certain to increase.

10. In sum, Hussain's chances of surviving this crisis depend on a number of variables, nearly all of them outside his control. It is clear that he is in deep trouble, and that there are significant dangers to him and to the modus vivendi, which has helped maintain an uneasy peace in the area. Nevertheless many of the forces or considerations which have heretofore helped keep him on the throne are probably still there; these include the loyalty of much of the army. Moreover, the awareness among some of his neighbors that the collapse of his regime would introduce great risks and uncertainties has probably not entirely disappeared.

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III. CONSEQUENCES OF HUSSAIN'S FALL

11. If Hussain's rule came to an end as a result of assassination or abdication, he might be succeeded by his brother, the 19-year old Crown Prince Hasan. The regime in that case would probably present about the same face to the world that it does at present -- seeking to keep its neighbors at bay and to maintain quiet along the Israeli border and looking to the US for money and arms.

12. Hussain is far more likely to fall in circumstances which would bring a radical regime to power in Jordan. In such a government, Palestinians would probably have an important role. Cairo and Damascus would compete for influence over it, with the Syrians taking a more radical, militant line. Nasser, while claiming credit for a great victory for the forces of Arab nationalism would face serious problems as well. A radical government in Amman, or even on the West Bank alone, would make appropriate Arab nationalist noises, but it would also be certain to badger Nasser for money and other forms of support. Moreover, it would probably not be totally under Cairo's control, and thus could embroil the Egyptian government in unwanted confrontations with Israel.

- 8 -

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13. A radical regime would almost certainly turn to the Soviets for economic and military aid. It would probably be faced with immediate problems of replacing the \$45 million annually in grants and loans it has been getting from the US. The USSR would probably provide considerable military aid and some economic assistance, though the Soviets usually do not provide budgetary support to nations they are assisting. Jordan's impressive economic progress of the last several years would almost certainly be halted, or at least slowed drastically.

14. The existence of a radical regime in Jordan might in itself be taken by the Israelis as enough of a threat to their security to require military action to deal with the situation. They would almost certainly take such action if the radical Jordanian regime stationed sizeable armed forces on the West Bank or mounted terrorist operations into Israel. Such an Israeli move would carry the risk that other Arab states might become embroiled. It would assuredly bring on a major international crisis, involving considerations of US prestige, the position of the USSR, the longevity of other states friendly to the West, and perhaps major Arab-Israeli hostilities.

- 9 -

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15. The US is clearly identified as the chief backer of the Jordanian regime and would stand to lose considerable political influence and prestige should that regime, into which it has put half a billion dollars in the past decade, be overthrown. The effects would be especially felt in the pro-Western states of the Middle East, which would tend to attribute Hussain's collapse to US failure to support him. There would be one less voice arguing the side of moderation and caution in Arab councils. The more pro-US states in the area would be alarmed and discouraged, seeing the event as tipping the whole balance in the Arab world in favor of radicalism supported by the USSR and the UAR. They might be disposed to adjust their policies to take some account of this development. However, we do not believe that Hussain's fall would be followed by the similar collapse of other conservative Arab states. At present all are relatively well entrenched; none face any serious radical threat at home. The appearance of a radical regime in Jordan would increase the degree of polarization between the US and the USSR in the Arab world, with the Soviets standing to gain from their consistent support of the winning radical forces. The

- 10 -

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~~SECRET~~ -- NODIS

Tuesday, December 13, 1966  
9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Our Amb. Burns in Jordan filed this off-beat, speculative cable.

It is worth reading, because, when Hussein says the Israelis must have been out to get him, this is precisely the scenario and rationale he has in mind.

Incidentally, Eban, in talking with me yesterday, referred to this general theory; said he was aware it was held by some Jordanians; and said it was not Israeli policy.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1474

WWRostow:rlh

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Authority NLS 98-501  
By is/B NARA, Date 7-5-01

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

103

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to Jordan

I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement.

1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling \$6 to \$7 Million.

2. We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did.

3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend

a. We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4's). Bob McNamara has no objection to this

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Authority FRUS Vol. XVII # 365  
By S NARA Date 7-5-01



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
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commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date.

b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.)

Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community.

Respectfully,

  
Acting Secretary

attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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*104*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, December 12, 1966

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick's recommendations on Jordan.  
He asks for two approvals.

The top memorandum summarizes the defense package Bob McNamara and Nick recommend. Arthur Goldberg has concurred in it word for word. Bob hopes to hear from us early enough to be able to tell the Jordanian Chief of Staff at 11:00 A.M. tuesday of your decision before Bob goes off to Paris shortly after noon.

The second is a letter from you to Hussein which would tell him of your concern and open the door for Bill Macomber to discuss with him our conditions for the package, and see if anything else may be necessary to keep him in business.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W.W. ROSTOW

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to Jordan

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1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling \$6 to \$7 Million.
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3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend
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Authority NEF 9 PRUS, Vol. XVIII  
By ly NARA, Date 7-5-01



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
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commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date.

b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.)

Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community.

Respectfully,

  
Acting Secretary

attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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104-8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Jordanian Request for  
Additional Military Equipment

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed letter to King Hussein informing him that we have agreed to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

In a meeting this morning with the Vice President, Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow, we agreed to recommend to you that our response to King Hussein's request for additional military assistance be conveyed in a letter from you to the King, rather than in a letter for my signature as suggested in my memorandum of December 10. We also agreed that the military package we offer Jordan should be augmented by 36 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and that a substantial portion of this package should be airlifted to Jordan for maximum psychological impact. We would also further accelerate the delivery of the F-104 aircraft we have agreed to sell to Jordan.

The package we now propose still falls substantially short of what King Hussein has asked us to provide. In order to derive maximum benefit from our response, we propose in the enclosed letter that you offer to send a high-ranking emissary to Amman to discuss the broader implications of Jordan's proposed military build-up. We have in mind Ambassador Macomber of AID, who as former Ambassador to Jordan is personally and favorably known to the King. Specifically we feel we must seek assurances that there will be no significant increase in the force levels of the Jordanian military establishment, that Jordan's moderate military policies, including efforts to control terrorism, will remain unchanged and that no

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NLJ-S 98001  
By RG/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01

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non-Jordanian Arab military forces will be stationed on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Your letter to King Hussein will be transmitted telegraphically to Amman. The signed original will be handed to General Khammash tomorrow by Secretary McNamara.

  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein

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Your Majesty:

My Government and I continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in the Middle East. We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance. I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash. While this response does not meet your request in full, it is, I believe, a substantial and significant one. In addition, and with a view to making this special support as helpful to you as possible, I have asked that every effort be made to ensure that the equipment reaches you with as little delay as possible. To accomplish this a substantial portion will be air lifted.

I understand that you will, of course, continue your wise policy of restraint and will continue the measures you have previously adopted to enhance stability in the

His Majesty  
Hussein I,  
King of the Hashemite  
Kingdom of Jordan.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By RG/JL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

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area. I trust, also, that this will enable you to resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

We have not had time to consider adequately the full budgetary and economic implications of a build-up in Jordan's military establishment. While this has not prevented our acting promptly and affirmatively, I am seriously concerned over these implications; and I would like to send an emissary to discuss with you the force levels of Jordan's army and related economic problems of concern to both of us. The emissary would have my highest confidence and would be a person well known to you.

We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you and the difficulties you have faced as a result of it. We have sought to be helpful. I have great admiration for the manner in which you are facing these problems and for your policy of moderation. I know this to be the course of wisdom and I wish to assure you of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 11:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: King Hussein's Problem

At this morning's breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King's problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package.\* The conclusions were as follows.

1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King's essential political needs.

2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance-technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well.

3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F-104's presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propeller anti-aircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the \$4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness -- which you have already seen -- should also be airlifted.

4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a

\* He had gone to New York to clean with Goldberg. We'll hear later in the afternoon.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XVIII, #303  
By *Ag* NARA, Date 7-5-01



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base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan.

5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o'clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein's future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage.

6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we'll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel's friends here sit tight.

7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way.

8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F-104's within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4.

9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein's defense problem.

10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature. It could be carried back by the King's emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14.

Walt Rostow

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105a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Saturday, Dec. 10, 1966  
6:30 pm

Walt:

Here is the package for King Hussein I talked to you about late Saturday. Nick has approved and the military package was designed in DOD. Nick tells me he thinks the package is too small. If there are to be any changes from his point of view, therefore, it should be larger.

In considering it, we should remember that Jordan now faces not only Israel but Syrian hostility.

McNamara will see Khammash at 11 a.m. on Tuesday before leaving for Paris. Since our response is so small, we need all the prestige of a McNamara to try to make it go down as easily as possible.

W.H. Wriggins



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to King Hussein's Military Equipment Request

We can't come close to meeting Hussein's \$200 million request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development.

So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale. It includes only \$4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of \$3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army.

This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason.

If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message and may have to step in again later.

No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.

I recommend you approve.

Check this out first  
W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

N

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 98-501  
By W/S NARA, Date 7-5-01





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Grant of Military Equipment to  
Jordan

Recommendation:

That you approve the sending of the enclosed letter from Acting Secretary Katzenbach to King Hussein which agrees to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The Israeli raid of November 13 on Samua village in Jordan damaged the nation's sense of security, jeopardized the morale of the Jordan Arab Army and weakened the King's prestige. In an attempt to restore his standing with the army and vindicate his policy of relying on the U.S. for support, King Hussein sent his Chief of Staff General Amir Khammash to Washington with a request for:

1. A grant of \$130 million worth of military equipment.
2. An agreement that the USG pay future installments on contracts previously signed with the USG for military jet aircraft and military ground equipment in the total amount of approximately \$70 million.
3. U.S. assent and support for an increase in the annual military budget of Jordan by \$28 million per year.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NI 798.500  
By 62/4 NARA, Date 7-5-01

~~SECRET~~

2

The Secretary of Defense and I agree that we should meet the request by offering a modest additional amount of military equipment to Jordan by reprogramming approximately \$4.7 million in MAP funds from lower priority needs. These items will be in addition to an existing MAP of \$3.5 million to Jordan for this fiscal year. The additional equipment was selected so as to increase mobility, firepower and effectiveness of communications for the Jordan Arab Army while minimizing additional manpower requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that even a significantly larger amount of additional equipment would have no appreciable effect on the military balance in the area.

We may receive some reaction from the Government of Israel. We are dealing with this reaction by keeping the Israelis generally informed and explaining to them that this grant, by strengthening King Hussein, would be in their interest. We have also spoken to several Congressmen and will continue our congressional briefings.

We believe that this grant may fail to satisfy King Hussein. If it appears likely that Hussein will take drastic action inconsistent with our relationship with Jordan, we intend to send a team to Amman headed by a high ranking official to listen to the King's views. In any case, we expect to have a difficult series of negotiations with him soon on the future level of our aid programs to Jordan.

The letter to King Hussein would be sent telegraphically.

  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein from  
the Acting Secretary

~~SECRET~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

105-d

~~SECRET~~

Your Majesty:

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. We have been grateful, too, for the presence here of your distinguished Chief of Staff. Through him we have been able to gain, at first hand, a fuller appreciation of the problems you are facing.

Let me say at the outset that we understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you, both as to the adequacy of your defense and the wisdom of your policy of moderation. However, we continue to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israel's previous policy. This is an element in our calculations which I believe it important to underscore. At the same time we can well appreciate the unfortunate effect which the raid of November 13th has had on your nation's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Arab Army. This is, I assure you, a matter of concern to us, as we fully recognize the important role the Jordan Arab Army plays today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security.

We recognize, too, the importance of that stability and security to the achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as you have often emphasized, so much in the long run depends. It is for this reason that in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we recognize the importance of a Jordan military assistance program.

As General Khammash will report to you, however, we are very seriously concerned by the long-term financial and economic implications of the current and projected force goals and of the indicated equipment requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in the pay of all enlisted ranks is likely to be essential in the very near future.

We feel that action with respect to an increase in force levels requires more thorough and thoughtful consideration than it has been

possible

His Majesty  
Hussein I,  
King of the Hashemite  
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLT 9-110  
By isp/4 NARA, Date 7-5-01



~~SECRET~~


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possible to give in the short time available. Hopefully, a few weeks hence and in more tranquil circumstances, both of our governments will be in a better position to engage in a useful discussion respecting the longer-term implications of the problems now facing us in the Middle East. The United States would welcome at that time an opportunity to discuss the relationship of recent events to the limits on your budgetary expenditure as set forth in the several United States-Jordan agreements, the appropriate size of the Jordanian armed forces and the nature of their equipment, the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and what role the United States might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

Meanwhile we are very much aware that your attention and energies must for the present continue to be focused on the immediate problem of surmounting your internal difficulties. We on our part are most anxious, without waiting for the discussions I have mentioned, to take additional steps now to help you meet the immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of the equipment needs which General Khammash has outlined. Details are being provided to General Khammash. This is a substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by the need which the Jordan Arab Army feels for an upgrading of firepower and an improvement of its mobility and communications. When this equipment is in place (and delivery over the next few months is feasible), we believe it will have a significant effect in improving the defensive capabilities of the army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have an immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

Your Majesty, my government continues to watch closely events now unfolding in the Middle East. In reiterating our admiration for the manner in which you are facing the problems these events have created for Jordan, let me also renew our assurances of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

(2) Sunday, December 11, 1966  
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this rather ominous cable from Jordan.

I'll be in touch with Nick and others about it and make sure you get recommendations soon.

*Walt*  
W. W. Rostow

Amman 1456, 2 parts

~~SECRET~~ -- EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ91-124

By ip/s NARA, Date 7-5-01

cy to Wiggins 106a  
~~SECRET NOFORN EXDIS~~

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Q 111723Z DEC 66  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO WHITE HOUSE  
O R 111320Z DEC 66  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUDAC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1045  
INFO RUDTOR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 169  
RUEHPSA/CINCSSTRIKE  
RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD  
RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 214  
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 283  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 206  
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 231  
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 219  
RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 156  
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 138  
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 159  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1456 SECTION ONE OF TWO

EXDIS

NOFORN

1. I WAS CALLED TO SEE THE KING LATE YESTERDAY EVENING AT HOMAR, THE KING'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE OUTSIDE AMMAN. EMBOFF ACCOMPANIED ME.

2. THE MEETING WITH THE KING LASTED ONE HOUR. I HAVE NEVER SEEN HIM SO GRIM OR SO OBVIOUSLY UNDER PRESSURE. IT WAS

PAGE 2 RUQWKS 191A ~~SECRET~~

APPARENT THAT HE HAD TO USE THE UTMOST IN SELF-RESTRAINT TO KEEP HIS EMOTIONS FROM ERUPTING OPENLY. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION HE HAD TEARS IN HIS EYES. THEN HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS OF DISCONTENT IN THE FORM OF DEMONSTRATIONS HAD ABATED, PRESSURES UNDER THE SURFACE WERE IN FACT BUILDING UP. THE DISCONTENT ON THE WEST BANK IS DEEPER THAN HE HAD IMAGINED. "THE GROWING SPLIT BETWEEN EAST BANK AND WEST BANK HAS RUINED MY DREAMS." THE ONLY THING THAT BINDS THE ARMY TO HIM, HE SAID, IS TRADITIONAL LOYALTY, BUT THIS TIE IS DAILY GROWING WEAKER. "THERE IS NEAR DESPAIR IN THE ARMY AND THE ARMY NO LONGER HAS CONFIDENCE IN ME. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT THE ARMY IS OVER-EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL SECURITY, AND THIS IS CAUSING THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE TO BECOME INCREASINGLY FED UP, AN OBVIOUS OBJECTIVE OF THOSE OPPOSED TO THIS REGIME." THE KING

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLT 98-500  
By ics/8 NARA, Date 7-5-01



OBSERVED THAT HE IS BESET ON ALL SIDES BY ENEMIES, OUTSIDE JORDAN AND WITHIN JORDAN, WITH SYRIA OPENLY CALLING FOR IS OVERTHROW, PUBLICLY OFFERING ARMS FOR THE PURPOSE, AND COVERTLY INFILTRATING ARMS AND TERRORISTS INTO JORDAN TO

~~PAGE 3 RUOMKG 191A S E C R E T~~  
HELP ACHIEVE THE PURPOSE.

4. THE KING SAID HE SIMPLY MUST HAVE WASHINGTON'S DECISION ON HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. NOR COULD HE LONGER FOREGO THE PRESENCE AND HELP OF GENERAL KHAMMASH IN AMMAN AT THIS CRITICAL TIME. GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON FOR NEARLY TWO WEEKS, AND AS YET HE HAS BEEN GIVEN NO ANSWER. KHAMMASH'S APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAS BEEN TWICE POSTPONED, AND THE APPOINTMENT IS NOW SET FOR WEDNESDAY. THE KING IS AWARE THAT THE ISRAELI FORMIN IS VISITING WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK, BEFORE WEDNESDAY. THE KING WISHES GENERAL KHAMMASH TO LEAVE WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY EVENING, AND WHATEVER ANSWER GENERAL KHAMMASH IS GIVEN BEFORE HE LEAVES WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE KING AS THE FINAL ANSWER. TIME IS RUNNING OUT OF HIM, SAID THE KING, AND HE CAN NO LONGER DELAY MAKING DECISIONS ON THE COURSES OF ACTION HE MUST TAKE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES A TEMPORIZING ANSWER TO KHAMMASH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS A NEGATIVE ANSWER.

5. IF GENERAL KHAMMASH RECEIVES AN ANSWER "WHICH IS NOT RESPONSIVE," THE KING WOULD NOT GO TO WASHINGTON, AS, UNTIL

~~PAGE 4 RUOMKG 191A S E C R E T~~

RECENTLY, HE HAD CONTEMPLATED DOING SHOULD KHAMMASH FAIL TO GET A SATISFACTORY ANSWER. THE KING SAID HE GREATLY ADMIRES PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND IT WOULD GIVE HIM GREAT PERSONAL SATISFACTION TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY. BUT THE PRESSURES BUILDING UP ON HIM ARE SO GREAT, HE SAID, THAT THERE IS NO LONGER TIME FOR A TRIP TO WASHINGTON. NOR, IF KHAMMASH IS UNSUCCESSFUL, WOULD A TRIP BY HIM, HE REFLECTED, WITH ITS ATTENDANT PUBLICITY, SERVE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER OF US. FOR A DECADE, THE KING SAID, WE AND HE HAVE BEEN PARTNERS. AND IN THIS CRITICAL HOUR WE ARE THE ONLY FRIEND TO WHOM HE CAN TURN. IF WE CANNOT HELP HIM, HE SAID, THEN HE MUST MOVE QUICKLY TO AN ALTERNATE COURSE. "THE RIGHT ANSWER FROM THE US WOULD ENABLE ME TO JUSTIFY MY PAST POLICY TO MY ARMY, TO MY PEOPLE, TO THE PLO, AND TO EVERYONE ELSE. IF I DO NOT GET THE RIGHT ANSWER, EVEN I MUST CONCLUDE MY PAST POLICY HAS BEEN A FAILURE."

6. SINCE HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING POSTPONEMENT OF THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO, THE KING SAID, AND SINCE KHAMMASH HAS NOT GOTTEN AN ANSWER FROM US, THE KING HAD FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MAKE A CONCESSION TO

~~PAGE 5 RUJNKG 191A SECRET~~

THE PRESSURES HE WAS SUBJECTED TO AT THE CAIRO MEETING. FRIDAY HE HAD HAD TO INSTRUCT HIS DELEGATION IN CAIRO TO AGREE TO THE STATIONING OF SAUDI AND IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN. THE KING SAID THAT THREE BRIGADES OF THESE FOREIGN ARAB TROOPS WOULD BE INVOLVED. IN RETURN FOR THIS CONCESSION THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL HAD AGREED TO MEET JORDAN'S DEMANDS, WHICH INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, THE STRENGTHENING OF EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE ISRAELI BORDER AREA (PRESUMABLY SINAI). THE STATIONING OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS IN JORDAN WOULD NOT COME ABOUT FOR A LEAST TWO MONTHS, SAID HUSSEIN, SINCE A GREAT DEAL HAD TO BE WORKED OUT FIRST. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER IN THE EVENT THE US WERE RESPONSIVE TO HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE HE WOULD NONETHELESS HAVE TO GO THROUGH WITH THE STATIONING OF IRAQI AND SAUDI TROOPS IN JORDAN. THE KING REPLIED THAT HE SUPPOSED HE MIGHT SOMEHOW BE ABLE TO HEAD IT OFF DURING THE COURSE OF THE TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO COME IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TO SEND TO HIS DELEGATION IN CAIRO.

7. THE KING SAID THAT IF THE US CANNOT BE RESPONSIVE TO HIS

~~PAGE 6 RUJNKG 191A SECRET~~

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, HE SAW THREE COURSES OPEN TO HIM.

8. THE FIRST COURSE WAS TO TURN TO THE EAST. "I WILL NOT TRY TO MISLEAD YOU, NOR TO BLACKMAIL YOU, BY TELLING YOU I WILL TURN TO THE EAST. I CANNOT AND WILL NOT DO SO. MY REIGN HAS BEEN DEVOTED TOWARDS BUILDING JORDAN TO BE A SELF-SUFFICIENT, MODERATE, EVOLUTIONARY STATE. I HAVE ALL MY LIFE FOUGHT THE EAST. IF IN THE END JORDAN FEELS SHE MUST TURN TO THE EAST, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER SOMEONE ELSE, NOT WITH ME."

9. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, SAID THE KING, WAS TO "BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES AND TAKE ON EVERYONE WHO IS WORKING AGAINST ME AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME." THIS WAS A COURSE WHICH TEMPTED HIM, SAID THE KING, BECAUSE HE WAS READY FOR A FIGHT AND HE DID NOT CARE ABOUT HIS OWN FATE. BUT, HUSSEIN SAID, "THE DECK IS STACKED AGAINST ME AND I DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO COMMIT THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN LOYAL TO ME TO A COURSE WHICH WOULD LIKELY MEAN THEIR DOOM."

GP-3. BURNS  
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OO RUEHEX

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INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE

O R 111320Z DEC 66

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1046

INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 170

RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE

RUEKDA/DEFENSE OSD

RUEIVCR:AMEMBASSY CAIRO 215

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 284

RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 207

RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 232

RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 190

RUQTBG/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 157

RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 139

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 160

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1456 SECTION TWO OF TWO

EXDIS

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10. THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE, SAID THE KING, IS THE ONE WHICH COMMENDS ITSELF TO HIM AS THE BEST. HE WOULD DECLARE THE WEST BANK A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE" AND CALL ON ALL ARAB STATES, AND THE PLO, TO FURNISH FORCES TO BE STATIONED ON THE WEST BANK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THAT AREA. JORDAN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 192A ~~SECRET~~

WOULD LEAVE ON THE WEST BANK ITS PRO RATA CONTRIBUTION OF FORCES, AND WITHDRAW THE REMAINDER OF ITS FORCES, NOW STATIONED ON THE WEST BANK, TO THE EAST BANK. THE KING WOULD NOT, HE SAID, MAKE THIS AS AN OFFER, TO BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED BY THE PALESTINIANS AND BY THE OTHER ARAB STATES. HE WOULD SIMPLY ANNOUNCE THIS IS WHAT HE HAS DECIDED TO DO, AND IF OTHER ARAB STATES DO NOT FURNISH THE NECESSARY DEFENSE FORCES, THAT WOULD JUST BE TOO BAD. AT LEAST THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A REDOUBT OF THE EAST BANK, HE SAID, AND "THIS MIGHT OFFER ME ONE LAST CHANCE TO SERVE MY CAUSE." THE KING OBSERVED THAT PRIME MINISTER TELL THOUGHT OF THE "MILITARY DIRECTORATE" IDEA AS A MEANS OF CALLING THE BLUFF OF PALESTINIANS AND OF OTHER ARAB STATES. HUSSEIN INDICATED HE DIAGNOSES THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AS MORE CRITICAL THAN DOES TELL. HE INDICATED FURTHER THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT ESTABLISHING A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE," AND NOT AS A MEANS TO CALL A BLUFF. THE KING SAID HE WAS QUITE AWARE THAT IF THE WEST BANK WERE TRANSFORMED INTO A "MILITARY DIRECTORATE". MUCH AS HE ENVISAGES, ISRAEL MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HE SAID THIS WAS A CHANCE HE AND ALL THE ARABS WOULD SIMPLY

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PAGE 3 RUQMKG 192A ~~SECRET~~

HAVE TO TAKE. TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN THE FACE OF AN UNFAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE.

1. COMMENT: THERE WERE MANY INDICATIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION THAT THE KING HAS BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF US MOTIVATIONS AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN. HE IS PERTURBED THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO GIVE GENERAL KHAMMASH AN ANSWER DURING THE FIRST WEEK THE GENERAL WAS IN WASHINGTON. I GATHER HIS APPREHENSIONS ARE TWOFOLD: (A) THAT, AS HE SEES IT, WE ARE SO CLOSELY TIED TO ISRAEL, AND THE ISRAELIS CAN SUENATE SUCH PRESSURE ON US, THAT THIS IS A POWERFUL INHIBITING FACTOR IN OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE KING'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE; (B) THAT THE KING BELIEVES THE US DOES NOT HAVE FULL APPRECIATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION CONCERNING JORDAN OR OF WHAT THE KING CONSIDERS THE POTENT DESIRES OF OTHERS TO REPLACE OUR INFLUENCE IN JORDAN, OR EVEN TO LIQUIDATE JORDAN.

12. I THINK WE CAN TAKE AT FACE VALUE THE KING'S STATEMENT THAT WE MUST GIVE GENERAL KHAMMASH AN ANSWER BY WEDNESDAY AND THAT THE ANSWER WE GIVE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE KING TO

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 192A ~~SECRET~~

BE THE FINAL ANSWER.

13. I REGRET I CANNOT SAY WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WHAT THE KING AND GENERAL KHAMMASH WOULD CONSIDER TO BE A "SATISFACTORY RESPONSE." SINCE GENERAL KHAMMASH IS IN WASHINGTON, AND HE IS THE KEY MAN IN THIS REGARD AND THE KING WILL LIKELY ABIDE BY KHAMMASH'S JUDGMENT, THE DEPARTMENT IS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN EMBASSY AMMAN TO PROBE THE ANSWER. I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THE PACKAGE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TEL 1415 REPRESENTS MINIMUM, AND I CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT EVEN THAT PACKAGE IS UNDERSHOOTING WHAT KHAMMASH AND THE KING CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM.

14. THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINE ENTITY IS NOT A NEW IDEA WITH THE KING; HE WAS TURNING OVER SOMETHING OF THIS SORT IN HIS MIND LAST SUMMER IN POLITICAL RAHER HAN MILITARY TERMS AS A MEANS OF COPING WITH HIS WEST BANK PROBLEM.

15. THE KING SAID HE HOPED THE VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING LAST EVENING COULD BE BROUGHT TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3. BURNS  
BT

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2  
107  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(2)  
~~TOP SECRET~~-- SENSITIVE

Monday, December 12, 1966  
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President: 15

You should read this quite extraordinary  
revelation by Hussein.

Among experts there is some doubt as to  
its truth; but it could be that the contacts existed  
in a very narrow circle and were not known to  
the whole government or to the Israeli military.  
In that case, as they faced heavy pressure to  
retaliate, those who had the contacts would have  
been in a most difficult bind.

The final warning about secrecy is justified.

Walt Rostow

Amman 1457

~~TOP SECRET~~-- SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, Vol XVIII, #364  
By g NARA, Date 7-5-01



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

107a

Action

CONTROL : 9566  
RECD : DECEMBER 11, 12:09 PM

Info

FROM : AMMAN  
ACTION : SECSTATE IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~ AMMAN 1457

NODIS

REFTEL AMMAN'S 1456

DEPARTMENT PASS TO TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR BARBOUR.

1. THE KING DISCLOSED TO EMBOFF O'CONNEL AND ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE HAS BEEN IN SECRET CONTACT WITH ISRAELI LEADERS FOR PAST THREE YEARS THROUGH SECRET CORRESPONDENCE AND DIRECT PERSONAL CLANDESTINE MEETINGS. THROUGH THESE DISCUSSIONS AND EXCHANGES, AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WERE REACHED WHICH, SAID KING, WERE TO HAVE INSURED PEACE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL AND EVENTUALLY, WITH HOPE, TO HAVE ACHIEVED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

2. THESE REVELATIONS CAME ABOUT IN THE FOLLOWING FASHION. TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL, THE KING SAID HE WONDERED WHAT MORE HE COULD HAVE DONE TO HAVE AVERTED WHAT HAS HAPPENED. HE THEN SAID QUIETLY THERE WAS ONE ELEMENT AFFECTING THE WHOLE PICTURE WHICH NO ONE IN HIS COUNTRY, EXCEPT HIMSELF, KNEW ABOUT.

3. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN WAR AS A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, HE SAID. HE HAD CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED A COURSE OF MODERATION ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PALESTINE IN THE HOPE THAT REASONABLE MEN COULD ONE DAY NEGOTIATE A JUST SETTLEMENT. HE HAD DONE HIS UTMOST TO ELIMINATE TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ACROSS JORDAN'S BORDER. THE U.S. KNEW ALL THESE THINGS AND SO DID THE ISRAELIS. THE ISRAELIS KNEW IT, HE SAID, BECAUSE "I TOLD THEM SO PERSONALLY."

4. "FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS," THE KING SAID, "I HAVE BEEN MEETING SECRETLY WITH GOLDA MEIER, EBAN AND OTHERS. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE PROBLEMS AT LENGTH AND AGREED ON ALL ASPECTS OF THEM. I TOLD THEM, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT I

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 98-502

By 2/6 NARA, Date 7-5-01



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1457 NODIS DEC 11

COULD NOT ABSORB OR TOLERATE A SERIOUS RETALIATORY RIAD. THEY ACCEPTED THE LOGIC OF THIS AND PROMISED THERE WOULD NEVER BE ONE. MOREOVER, IN ADDITION TO THESE SECRET PERSONAL MEETINGS, I HAVE MAINTAINED A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERS. THESE EXCHANGES HAVE SERVED TO "UNDERSCORE AND REINFORCE OUR UNDERSTANDINGS."

5. "THE LAST MESSAGE I RECEIVED FROM THE ISRAELIS WAS FURTHER TO REASSURE ME THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING JORDAN. I RECEIVED THE MESSAGE ON NOV. 13, THE VERY DAY THE ISRAELI TROOPS ATTACKED SAMJ'." THE KING ADDED THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNSOLICITED, AND HAD BEEN DESPATCHED PRESUMABLY 24 TO 48 HOURS BEFORE HE RECEIVED IT.

6. "AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED THIS ATTACK WAS A COMPLETE BETRAYAL BY THEM OF EVERYTHING I HAD TRIED TO DO FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE, STABILITY AND MODERATION AT HIGH PERSONAL POLITICAL RISK. STRANGELY, DESPITE OUR SECRET DISCUSSIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE, DESPITE SECRET AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND ASSURANCES, I NEVER FULLY TRUSTED THEIR INTENTIONS TOWARD ME OR TOWARD JORDAN, IN ASSESSING ISRAELI INTENTIONS I ASK YOU TO PUT MY EXPERIENCES WITH THEM INTO YOUR EQUATION."

7. "YOU WILL EXCUSE ME," HE ADDED "IF I FIND IT IRONIC THAT THE SAME EBAN WHO EXPRESSED TO ME SUCH UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS HERE AND GAVE SUCH FIRM ASSURANCES IS NOW ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON TO TELL YOU, I AM SURE, THAT JORDAN'S NEEDS SHOULD NOT BE MET."

8. THE KING CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING BITTERLY: "THIS IS WHAT ONE GETS FOR TRYING TO BE A MODERATE, OR PERHAPS FOR BEING STUPID."

8. THE KING ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE BY THE MOST LIMITED NUMBER OF PEOPLE. (IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT HUSSEIN'S GRANDFATHER, KING ABDULLAH, WAS ASSASSINATED BY A PALESTINIAN WHEN IT BECAME KNOWN ABDULLAH HAD CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS.)

GP-1

BURNS

NOT PASSED TEL AVIV BY OCT.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, December 11, 1966  
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this rather ominous  
cable from Jordan.

I'll be in touch with Nick and others  
about it and make sure you get recommenda-  
tions soon.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1456, 2 parts  
~~SECRET~~-- EXDIS

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 91-124

By lip/s NARA, Date 7-5-01

~~SECRET~~

MR Wriggins has seen  
this. MR Rostow has some  
other papers re this cable.  
MR Rostow has not seen  
this cable.

MR Smith has not seen this  
cable

I think it should go to MR  
Rostow.

File

Overtaken by events -

not to be used BCS



~~SECRET-EXDI~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
December 10, 1966

109a

FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House  
FROM: *B. Shortell*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

The attached cable is for the attention of Mr. Wriggins. It is directly related to a Memorandum to the President which is being delivered to you at the same time.

Attachment:

Telegram to Embassy Amman.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

BY *hw* ON 11-1-91

1098

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

December 10, 1966

FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

The attached cable is for  
the attention of Mr. Wriggins.  
It is directly related to a  
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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 11-1-91

~~SECRET~~

Ambassador AMMAN

STATE

EXDIS

1. Following is text of letter from Acting Secretary Katzenbach to King.

QUOTE Your Majesty:

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. We have been grateful, too, for the presence here of your distinguished Chief of Staff. Through him we have been able to gain, at first hand, a fuller appreciation of the problems you are facing.

Let me say at the outset that we understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you, both as to the adequacy of your defense and the wisdom of your policy of moderation. However, we continue to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israel's previous policy.

NEA/ARN:MMWiley:es:12/9  
AID/NESA-Mr. Macomber  
G/PM - Mr. Wolf  
NEA - Mr. Davies  
White House -

3236

The Acting Secretary

DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes  
NEA - Mr. Handley  
S/S -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01



29

AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

This is an element in our calculations which I believe it important to underscore. At the same time we can well appreciate the unfortunate effect which the raid of November 13th has had on your nation's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Arab Army. This is, I assure you, a matter of concern to us, as we fully recognize the important role the Jordan Arab Army plays today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security.

We recognize, too, the importance of that stability and security to the achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as you have often emphasized, so much in the long run depends. It is for this reason that in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we recognized the importance of a Jordan military assistance program.

As General Khammash will report to you, however, we are very seriously concerned by the long term financial and economic implications of the current and projected force goals and of the indicated equipment requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in the pay of all enlisted ranks is likely to be essential in the very near future.

We feel that action with respect to an increase in force levels requires more thorough and thoughtful consideration than it has been

3

AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

possible to give in the short time available. Hopefully, a few weeks hence and in more tranquil circumstances, both of our governments will be in a better position to engage in a useful discussion respecting the longer-term implications of the problems now facing us in the Middle East. The United States would welcome at that time an opportunity to discuss the relationship of recent events to the limits on your budgetary expenditure as set forth in the several U.S.-Jordan agreements, the appropriate size of the Jordanian armed forces and the nature of their equipment, the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and what role the U.S. might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

Meanwhile we are very much aware that your attention and energies must for the present continue to be focused on the immediate problem of surmounting your internal difficulties. We on our part are most anxious, without waiting for the discussions I have mentioned, to take additional steps now to help you meet the immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of the equipment needs which General Khammash has outlined. Details are being provided to General Khammash. This is

~~SECRET~~



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AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

a substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by the need which the Jordan Arab Army feels for an upgrading of firepower and an improvement of its mobility and communications. When this equipment is in place (and delivery over the next few months is feasible), we believe it will have a significant effect in improving the defensive capabilities of the army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have an immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

Your Majesty, my government continues to watch closely events now unfolding in the Middle East. In reiterating our admiration for the manner in which you are facing the problems these events have created for Jordan, let me also renew our assurances of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary UNQUOTE

2. If opportunity arises when letter is presented you may, at your discretion, express to King our agreement that some increase in salaries for enlisted men probably necessary. As a next step we believe we should discuss details of proposed pay raise with appropriate officers of JAA.



5

AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

FYI. Although we now willing accept necessity of pay raise in principle we are concerned over impact of raise on GOJ budget. Perhaps raise could be less than 25% or could be adopted in two or more stages. END FYI.

3. If King raises question of increased force levels you may reply that this will be covered in suggested talks. Without prejudging this issue, however, we believe that additional equipment and increased pay scales will help restore Army's morale.

4. If King's reaction to letter is strongly negative and in your judgment there is definite danger King will take drastic action inconsistent with our relationship with Jordan, you are authorized to tell King that USG would be willing send team headed by high ranking official to Amman to listen to King's views.

5. FYI. Our strategy is to offer King augmented MAP program and our assent to pay raise while delaying discussion of economic aid levels until immediate crisis is passed. AID funds next year will be severely limited. We expect we may have difficult negotiations with Jordan on supporting assistance level for JFY 68. This is not repeat not time to undertake these discussions if they can possibly be postponed. END FYI.

EXXLY

KNDX

ACTING

6

~~SECRET~~

**ACTING**

~~SECRET~~

December 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

INFORMATION

Forewarned is forearmed and you should be aware that the

Israelis are now zeroing in on our proposed small military aid package for Jordan. Ambassador Harman was in to see me this afternoon and conveyed the clear message that the Israeli Government is very much concerned that anything we do for Jordan will unsettle the delicate military balance in the area. We will be sending you more formally in the next day or two a specific proposal on Jordan. Defense still has not quite wrapped up all the details, but it is fair to say that the package will be minimal and will not seriously affect the Israeli-Jordanian military balance. However, we will have to reckon with an Israeli reaction no matter what we do. We are on firm logical ground in saying that we would be doing nothing more for Jordan than already planned if the Israelis had not raided on 13 November. But regardless of how firmly we take that line, the Israelis have regained their composure and are going to be pretty tough to deal with.

We will include recommendations for handling the Israeli side of the problem ~~proposal~~ when we send our final proposal to you. However, I wanted you to be forewarned of this aspect of the problem in case someone should try to reach you at the Ranch.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By RC/SL NARA, Date 7-13-01



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

✓ III  
FS

Mr. Rostow

I talked with Howard early this morning regarding Burns' request for a reaction by 8:00 AM Washington Time to Hussein's plea that we permit him some increase in troop level.

Howard asked that I tell you a message was sent at 2:00 AM stating that the Dept. can not get an answer for him by that time. Burns is to tell Hussein he had not yet received an answer but hoped the meeting could be postponed by one day. An answer is expected to be formulated by 5:00 PM the 21st, his time.

Art

W. Riggan

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1545

EXDIS

REF EMBTEL 1537

FROM MACOMBER

1. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BURNS I HAD FURTHER LENGTHY MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN EVENING DEC19. IN FIRST HOUR WHEN HUSSEIN ALONE WAS PRESENT, I WENT THROUGH ONCE AGAIN, STEP BY STEP, ALL ELEMENTS OF OUR PACKAGE MAKING SURE HE UNDERSTOOD PRECISELY WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO AS WELL AS THE CONDITIONS AND UNDERSTANDING TO WHICH WE HAD TO HAVE HIS ASSENT BEFORE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROCEED. I ALSO EXAMINED WITH HIM THE BASIC FIGURES IN THE PROJECTED '67 AND '68 GOVERNMENT BALANCE SHEETS SO THAT HE COULD CLEARLY SEE THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF A FURTHER ESCALATION OF TROOP STRENGTH.

2. I CAN NOW REPORT THAT HUSSEIN UNDERSTANDS AND WITH ONE MAJOR EXCEPTION "GOES ALONG" WITH ALL THAT WE ARE ASKING HIM TO DO IN RETURN FOR THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE. HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS OUR EQUIPMENT PACKAGE WILL NOT BE AUGMENTED TO THE EXTENT THAT HE HAD HOPED (ALTHOUGH I INDICATED TO HIM THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 310A-~~SECRET~~

INCREASED BY ADDITION OF SOME OF SMALL ARMS GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD REQUESTED IN OUR FIRST MEETING). WITH RESPECT TO KEEPING FOREIGN TROOPS OUT OF JORDAN, THE COMMITMENT HE IS PREPARED TO MAKE IS THAT HE WILL DO "EVERYTHING HE CAN" TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. AS SUGGESTED IN MY EARLIER REPORTING, I BELIEVE THIS TO BE ADEQUATE IF HE DECIDES TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-60  
By us NARA, Date 12-23-02



3. THE KING WISHES TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER OF AN ADVANCE LOAN OF THE SIX F-104S AND HE DEFINITELY BELIEVES THAT THEIR PRESENCE, TOGETHER WITH OUR WILLINGNESS TO AIRLIFT A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE INTO HIS COUNTRY IN THE NEXT 30-60 DAYS WILL BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO HIM.

4. THE REMAINING ISSUE BETWEEN US, WHICH IS CLEARLY A VERY DIFFICULT ONE FOR HUSSEIN, IS THE US INSISTENCE THAT THERE BE NO ESCALATION IN HIS CU

ESNT "ON BOARD" TROOP STRENGTH OF 50,000. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS WHY WE ARE PRESSING THIS BUT HE ALSO, AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, FEELS GREAT PRESSURE FROM HIS ARMY TO EXPAND TROOP LEVELS AND IS SERIOUSLY WORRIED THAT HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO DO SO WILL, IF COUPLED WITH HIS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT FOREIGN TROOPS INTO JORDAN, WEAKEN THE ARMY'S LOYALTY TO HIM IN THE CRITICAL DAYS AHEAD. I CONTINUED TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT US IS NOT WILLING TO MAKE AVAILABLE EXTRAORDINARY AND DRAMATIC ASSISTANCE ENVISIONED IN THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE UNLESS HUSSEIN WAS DEFINITELY PREPARED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO US THAT HE WOULD NOT PERMIT FURTHER TROOP INCREASE. I ARGUED THAT THE DRAMATIC

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 310A ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NATURE OF US RESPONSE SHOULD OFFSET THE ARMY'S DISAPPOINTMENT, AND I CONTINUED TO STRESS THE BUDGETARY LOGIC OF OUR POSITION. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH I FINALLY SAID I THOUGHT POINT HAD COME WHEN HE WOULD JUST HAVE TO MAKE UP HIS MIND WHETHER HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT OUR TROOP ESCALATION LIMITATION OR SACRIFICE THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE. HUSSEIN AVOIDED DIRECT RESPONSE TO THIS AND EACH TIME I SUBSEQUENTLY MENTIONED IT HE WOULD COUNTER BY SAYING THAT WHILE MCNAMARA EQUIPMENT WOULD BE OF ENORMOUS BENEFIT TO HIM IN HIS CURRENT SITUATION, WAS IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO MAKE MY GOVERNMENT UNDERSTAND THAT THE US POSITION ON TROOP STRENGTH WOULD UNDERMINE MUCH OF THE EXTRAORDINARY BENEFIT OF PROPOSED EQUIPMENT PACKAGE.

5. AFTER OUR CONVERSATIONS HAD CONTINUED ALONG THIS LINE FOR SOME TIME, WE WERE JOINED BY PRIMIN TELL AND GEN KHAMMASH, AND IN THE SUBSEQUENT HOUR'S DISCUSSION CONTINUED TO GO OVER THE SAME GROUND. THESE THREE JORDANIANS AND I HAVE BEEN FRIENDS FOR A LONG TIME AND WHILE I THINK THEY MAY BE EXAGGERATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TROOP LIMITATION PROVISION I AM CONVINCED THAT THEY WERE SPEAKING FROM HEART. SOMEWHERE ALONG IN OUR DISCUSSIONS HUSSEIN TURNED TO ME AND ASKED IF I HAD ANY IDEA OF HOW PERSONALLY UNPLEASANT THIS WAS FOR HIM TO BE PUSHING ME AND PUSHING THE US GOVERNMENT FOR A CONCESSION REGARDING TROOP LEVELS AFTER THE US ALREADY HAD COME FORWARD WITH SUCH A GENEROUS AND DRAMATIC



PAGE 4 RUQMKG 310A-~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

OFFER OF SUPPORT. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THEIR REASONING AND THE GENUINENESS OF THEIR FEELING BUT THAT WE JUST DID NOT AGREE. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT THEIR VIEWS TO WASHINGTON BUT I COULD NOT HOLD OUT ANY REAL HOPE OF A CHANGE IN OUR POSITION. THIS PORTION OF CONVERSATION ENDED WITH MY URGIN AGAIN AS I HAD THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSION THAT THEY NOT ALLOW THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT OR CONCERN OVER THE TROOP LEVEL LIMITATION TO GO SO FAR AS TO JEOPARDIZE THEIR RECEIVING THE INVALUABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE OF THE MCNAMARA PACKAGE.

6. THE KING THEN DISCUSSED THE KEY DECISIONS WHICH HE MUST MAKE IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. WITH RESPECT TO THE UAC MEETING IN CAIRO THIS COMING SATURDAY, HE BELIEVES THERE IS NO WAY HE CAN REALLY STALL THE SITUATION. THEREFORE AT THAT TIME HE WILL DEFINITELY HAVE TO SHOW HIS HAND. HE SAID THAT IF ON HIS INSTRUCTIONS, GEN KHAMMASH REFUSES TO ACCEPT FOREIGN TROOPS INTO JORDAN (ON THE GROUNDS OF SIGNIFICANT AND IMMEDIATE SUPPORT BEING SECURED FROM THE US) THIS WILL TOUCH OFF A NEW EFFORT TO TRIGGER DISORDERS IN JORDAN AND A MARKED STEP-UP IN EFFORTS TO PULL DOWN HIS REGIME. FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT HE IS THINKING OF GIVING GENERAL KHAMMASH SUCH INSTRUCTIONS, BUT HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD NOT FINALLY DECIDED WHETHER OUR PACKAGE, WITH ITS CONDITIONS REGARDING TROOP LEVELS, WOULD PLACE HIM

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 310A-~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

HIM IN A STRONG ENOUGH POSITION TO TAKE ON THIS TYPE OF RENEWED ONSLAUGHT BY HIS ENEMIES.

7. HE NEXT MENTIONED THAT IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO HE WOULD HAVE TO "DO SOMETHING ABOUT WASFI", I.E. SUSPEND CONSTITUTION AND TAKE OVER THE PREMIERSHIP HIMSELF. PRIMIN TELL INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD BE DONE BEFORE THURSDAY.

8. FINALLY, THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS MEETING AT APPROX 5 0' CLOCK TOMORROW WITH MOST OF SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF HIS ARMY AND AT THAT TIME HE WISHED TO PREPARE THEM FOR WHAT HE WOULD BE DOING AND WHAT HE WOULD BE FACING IN DAYS AND WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. HE SAID THAT IT WAS OF IMPORTANCE FOR HIM TO KNOW, BEFORE HE STARTED FOR THAT MEETING, WHETHER THERE WAS POSSIBILITY OF ANY "GIVE" IN THE US POSITION REGARDING TROOP LEVELS. IN ANY EVENT SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE BEFORE HE GOT INTO THAT MEETING WHETHER HE WAS GOING TO ACCEPT THE US OFFER, FOR IF HE WAS, THIS WOULD BE THE OCCASION WHEN HE WOULD WANT TO LET HIS OFFICERS KNOW OF THE DRAMATIC AND SIGNIFICANT NATURE OF OUR SUPPORT.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



9. COMMENT: IN THE PAST THREE DAYS I HAVE BEEN GARGAINING VERY HARD ON TROOP LEVELS ISSUE AS I HAVE FELT FUNDAMENTALLY (EXCEPT FOR ADDED 2000 MAN ARTILLERY REQUIREMENT) THAT OUR POSITION, WHEN COUPLED WITH THE EXTRAORDINARY SUPPORT WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE, IS A LOGICAL ONE. ON THE OTHER HAND, LOGIC IS NOT ALWAYS

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 310A ~~S E C R E T~~

CONTROLLING, AND IN THIS INSTANCE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES WITHIN ARMY WHICH ARE NOW BEARING DOWN ON KING AND HIS SENIOR COMMANDERS ARE, I CONCLUDE, A VERY REAL FACTOR HERE. AS SUGGESTED ABOVE I CANNOT SAY THAT OUR PROPOSAL AS IT NOW STANDS WILL BE REJECTED. NOR OBVIOUSLY CAN I PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY THAT PRESSURES FOR EXPANSION WILL, IF DENIED, CAUSE AS SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AS KING FEARS. BUT ON BALANCE IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT WE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED IN CURRENT SITUATION TO TAKE OUT RELATIVELY MODEST INSURANCE POLICY IN FORM OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO ACQUESCE IN ARMY'S INCREASING ITS STRENGTH FROM 50,000 UP TO ITS CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF 55,000. OF THIS ADDITIONAL 5,000 TROOPS, 2,000 WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY BATTALIONS ENVISIONED IN MCNAMARA PACKAGE. REMAINING 3,000 WOULD BE USED FOR EITHER FOURTH INFANTRY COMPANIES OR TO BEING EXISTING UNITS CLOSER TO FULL STRENGTH, WHICHEVER KING AND HIS ADVISORS DETERMINE IS MOST HELPFUL IN SITUATION. IN AGREEING TO THIS WE WOULD STIPULATE THAT OUR ACQUIESCENCE WAS FOR ONE YEAR ONLY AT WHICH TIME QUESTION OF CONTINUING NEED AND AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS WOULD BE REEXAMINED. IN MAKING THIS SUGGESTION I HAVE IN MIND KHAMMASH ASSURANCE TO ME AND TO HUSSEIN THAT, EXCEPT FOR ADDED COST (APPROX \$500,000) STEMMING FROM PROJECTED PAY RAISE, HE NOW HAS UAC FUNDS ON HAND TO COVER EXPENSES OF THESE ADDITIONAL 5,000 MEN FOR ONE YEAR.

PAGE 7 RUQMKG 310A ~~S E C R E T~~

10. I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING REACTION TO FOREGOING BY 3 P.M. AMMAN TIME DEC 20 BUT RECOGNIZE THIS MAY BE VERY DIFFICULT IN VIEW OF TIME DIFFERENCES. IF I SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD RESPONSE BY TIME I HAVE TO TALK WITH KING BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR HIS MEETING WITH HIS OFFICERS, I WILL BEGIN BY OFFERING ONLY ONE CONCESSION ON FORCE LEVELS, I.E. 2,000 ADDITIONAL MEN TO MAN NEW ARTILLERY AND WILL OTHERWISE HOLD THE LINE. IF I FIND A SITUATION DEVELOPING, HOWEVER, WHICH APPEARS DEFINITELY TO BE GOING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTION THAN WE WOULD LIKE, I WILL WITHIN SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE LIMITS OF MY INSTRUCTIONS DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THINGS ON RIGHT TRACK.

GP-1. BURNS  
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~  
EXDIS



~~SECRET~~

December 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

FROM: Wiggins - Saunders

SUBJECT: Your Talk with General Khammash

After Khammash's talks today with you and Bill Macomber, we will have to decide how to respond to King Hussein's incredible shopping list. Your job is not to give him answers but to help put him in a frame of mind where Defense can talk sense with him. Our main purpose is to give Hussein's emissary a sympathetic hearing at high levels.

His request is out of our ballpark. He wants us to pay \$130 million for new equipment; the \$70 million balance of the tank and plane sales since it now looks as if the UAC will default on further payments; and \$28 million in recurring annual costs of the buildup. Bill Jordan's memo (Tab A) details these requests.

But we can hardly give him a flat no and expect to hold our position in Jordan. Defense will try to devise a realistic package, but before they can get into details, they have to get him into our ballpark. Secretary Rusk began laying the groundwork (Tab B), and we're counting on you to follow up.

Our main difference with Hussein is that we do not see this as a military problem. It's really a problem of how to improve the organization, armament and pay of the armed forces enough to assure their continued loyalty to the King. Without stating this proposition quite so baldly to Khammash, we want to persuade him that his government is misreading the external threat and is ignoring or underestimating the increased internal threat that would result from the proposed massive buildup. You might take this line:

--We were shocked by Israel's raid, and, as the President's message said, are deeply concerned for the King's survival and strength.

--Khammash's request will receive thorough study. We will look into ways to improve the army's efficiency and control of the borders.

--However, you would like to talk about Jordan from your perspective: A nation with little hope for viability a few years ago now has a chance. The Jordanian government can ruin that chance by building a defense establishment beyond any reasonable ability to support it.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 7-13-01

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- 2 -

You would hate to see this happen and believe the King would thereby lose his main long-term claim for popular support.

--Although you know how hard it is for Khammash to accept this point, we don't believe Israeli invasion is the main threat to Jordan. The Israeli government has assured us that it doesn't intend invasion and will do what it can to rebuild a base for peaceful coexistence with Jordan. Although you recognize that King Hussein must keep the army's loyalty, you believe the most important military job is to find a way to control the borders--not to build a large defense establishment. Terrorism and internal economic weakness are the main threats.

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112a



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 1, 1966

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

A

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Jordan's Military Requirements

General Khammash has furnished us with an incredible shopping list for Jordan's defense buildup. Although not yet fully priced, the contents of the list (equipment for two field artillery battalions, 2 tank battalions, 2 engineer battalions, 2 anti-aircraft battalions, 200 armored personnel carriers, 3500 miles of barbed wire, 3000 radio sets, etc.) will total perhaps \$120 - 130 million, without spares and transportation costs.

Khammash has orally described the increased Jordanian forces to use this equipment as follows:

	<u>Nov</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1968</u>
<u>ARMY</u>		
Infantry brigade	9	9*
Armored brigade	2	2**
Royal Guards brigade	1	1
FA battalions (25 lb)	6	9
FA battalions (105)	1	2
FA battalions (155)	1	2
AAA battalions (40mm)	1	2
AAA battalions (50 cal)	0	1
Static Guard battalion	1	1
Engineer Regiments	1	3
Total Army strength	47,000	64,500

\* Each brigade headquarters will add an armored infantry company (in armored personnel carriers), Tank company, anti-tank platoon, recon platoon and anti-aircraft platoon to serve as a mobile reserve against limited enemy raids. In addition, each infantry battalion will add a fourth rifle company.

\*\* 100 M48 tanks are requested to replace a like number of Centurions and M47s.

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DECLASSIFIED  
State Guidelines  
Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By Mj, NARA, Date 7-6-01

~~SECRET~~

	<u>Nov</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1968</u>
<u>NAVY</u>		
Small patrol craft	12	12
Armored boats	0	4
Total Navy Strength	100	?
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
Hawker-Hunter Squadrons	1	1
104 squadron	0	3
Transport/heli squadron*	1	1
Total Air Force Strength	1800	450?

\* Khammash has asked for 6 additional helicopters for this squadron.  
Border Village National Guard

Total strength 0 4500

In addition to all this good news, Khammash brings the word that the UAC has defaulted on its September maintenance payment to Jordan and that no further payments from that source are anticipated. Consequently, Jordan will have to ask the U. S. to pay the remaining \$65-70 million due on the large purchases in 1964 and 1965 for the ground forces and the F-104s (this sum assumes that Jordan will obtain all three of the F-104 squadrons which we agreed earlier to sell them). Khammash says that Hussein believes he can eventually get Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to pay these equipment costs so that the U. S. can ultimately be repaid from Saudi and Kuwaiti contributions.

The total one-time cost of the Jordanian buildup which the U. S. is being asked to supply, therefore, is of the order of magnitude of \$200 million. Khammash estimates that the increase in annual costs from the buildup will be about \$28 million, all of which Jordan expects to obtain from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait inasmuch as each of those countries has promised to pay directly to Jordan the roughly \$5 million which each formerly contributed to the UAC. This \$28 million increment represents about a 50 per cent increase in the current military budget.

The U. S. contribution to Jordan's defense establishment is now \$3.5 million of military assistance and \$30 million of budget support. In the coming year we had planned to phase both these grants down, MAP to \$1.9 million and budget support to \$25 million. It is possible to reprogram some low priority items out of prior and current year MAP to meet some of the high priority items on General Khammash's list, but such

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reprogramming will probably be on the order of \$1 or \$1.5 million. Even if MAP were not cut next year but were continued at the current level, or even increased by a million or two, and even if we spread our aid to the buildup over a three year period, we would still be able to accommodate less than 10 per cent of Jordan's new total "requirement."

Khammash's list can be trimmed, for it is obviously bogus in some respects (the so-called requirement for mines and explosives, for instance, is a simply doubling of the quantities that have already been ordered from us); it has some items which are so outlandish that they can easily be knocked down (for example, the field artillery target acquisition battalion which is superfluous to their needs and high sophisticated and expensive -- about \$4 million); many items are just not available (for example, the 40mm anti-aircraft battalions and 20 tank recovery vehicles); and the quantities requested are in some cases obviously non-sensical (for instance, 1300 trucks and 200 searchlights). After these obvious cuts are made, however, there will still be a tremendous disparity between what Jordan wants and what we might be prepared to offer.

Since the Jordanian concept of adding firepower and mobility to their units and of creating combined arms teams is militarily sound, it will be difficult to argue Khammash out of the hard residual. We may be convinced that we are addressing a psychological rather than a military problem but we can hardly expect Khammash to agree with us. There is undoubtedly a large margin for bargaining in the total request and probably even in a request pared as indicated in the preceding paragraph. We have not, however, gotten far enough in our talks with Khammash to find the minimum improvement in organization, pay, and armaments which will help assure the loyalty of the Jordanian forces to the King and preserve a moderate, pro-Western Jordan.

Although we have not yet decided what kind of measures we would be prepared to support, it is clear we cannot make a merely token response. As a minimum, we should agree to help with a long overdue pay increase for enlisted men, perhaps some marginal increases in personnel strength, a small gain in mobility and firepower, and an augmentation in border and village defense, to include surveillance and warning systems, anti-tank measures, small arms and communications.

On November 23, prior to receipt of General Khammash's new list, Ambassador Burns and the Defense Attache in Amman sent in their estimate of minimum U. S. actions to satisfy immediate Jordanian needs. This comprised about \$4 million in MAP and \$16 million additional annual budget support to cover personnel increases and an enlisted man's pay raise.

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Somewhere between this estimate and General Khammash's list we will have to find the answer to his constantly reiterated question, "How much is Jordan worth to the United States?"

At this stage in the dialogue we are continuing to listen sympathetically but are pointing out the dangers of over-reacting to November 13th. Bill Macomber (at 1000 today) is stressing the economic pitfalls of the kind of buildup Jordan contemplates. You might underline and explicate this point for we have to deflate Khammash expectations a great deal before we can talk sense with him.



AMOS A. JORDAN, JR.

Colonel, USA

Director

Near East and South Asia Region

~~SECRET~~



# GOING TELEGRAM Department of State

1126  
93329

~~SECRET/EXDLS~~

ACTION: Ambassador AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO: Ambassador TEL AVIV  
USUN NEW YORK

Nov 29 9 56 PM '56

STATE  
EXDLS

1. Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. Memcon is unclear and subject to amendment upon review.
2. In meeting with General Khamash afternoon Nov 29, Secretary expressed distress at situation which had brought Khamash to Washington, stated President and he have devoted much time to this problem and said he grateful for King's message, which Khamash delivered. UEC well aware of details Nov 13 Israeli raid and had made known in both Israel and SC our view that Israeli action was wrong and misguided.
3. Khamash said as Chief of Staff it difficult be absent from Jordan at this time, but King Hussein felt it important convey GOJ view of situation and corrective measures needed. Israeli raid, largest since 1956, had revealed Jordan defenses inadequate and adversely affected morale of Army. He had initially thought Israeli attack was beginning of invasion and had considered ordering return strike. If he had, area could have been plunged into war.
4. Khamash said while GOJ could cope with present demonstrations, they were

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S/S - RBrace

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most serious Jordan had experienced and revealed depth of popular feeling. Jordan now subject propaganda attacks from Syria, UAR and PLO. Public opinion in Jordan was convinced Israel attacked Jordan because Syria, which Israel had earlier held responsible for terrorism, was strong militarily and protected by USSR. In this situation Jordan was turning to its friend the United States. Must be understood that Nov 13 incident unlike incidents in past and situation would not return to normal if nothing was done. If USG unable to help, King faced with choice of (a) dying in battle with Israel rather than at hands of own people, (b) becoming hero by turning to Soviets for military equipment or (c) abdicating. If Jordan received equipment requested and money to pay for enlarged Army, all would be well. This connection Khammash asserted Jordanian officers sufficiently sophisticated to tell difference between real and token help.

5. In response Secretary's question whether opinions differed between East and West Bank in this matter, Khammash replied sense of defeat equally strong among all Jordanians. Only difference was that East Bank less vulnerable to Syrian, UAR and PLO propaganda. Jordan had been subject to such propaganda before but situation created by Nov 13 attack had made elements of population more responsive than previously.

6. Secretary was enquired re King's personal safety. Khammash said King for present could depend on loyalty of armed forces. If nothing done, however, Nov 13 might in time become Jordan's new national day.

7. Secretary stressed he could not overstate gravity with which we viewed Israeli attack. Another such attack would have most serious consequences and there no doubt in Israel about this. At same time, he wanted emphasize two points: in our view attack (1) did not reflect Israeli scheme to seize West Bank and (2) was not aimed at King Hussein.

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therefore could not comprehend how Israel failed to foresee consequences for King. Secretary continued that US has strong fraternal feeling for His Majesty and interest in well being of Jordan. We would take a year look at Jordan's request. While he could comment in detail pending consultations with Defense colleagues, there was no question about our policy ~~position~~ of support for Jordan.

Secretary said he now frankly more concerned about Syria and UAR than Israel. Did Khamash see any connection between recent Syrian-UAR security pact and current situation? Khamash said in his view it was USSR which brought those two countries together. Secretary commented that, while we had not discussed latest incident with them, we had held discussions with them regarding Near East in UN context and he had discussed possibility of slow-down in arms race with Gromyko. We had, however, and no interest on Soviet side.

Secretary emphasized President deeply concerned re Israeli attack Nov 13 and had conveyed his views to Israel through more than one channel. Khamash responded that high GOJ officials do not doubt USG position but Jordan public disillusioned. It seemed to GOJ that only Jordan, which had longest frontier with Israel, was victim of "balance of strength" policy. Israel could get military equipment it wanted from various sources and UAR, Syria and Iraq etc could get theirs from Soviets. USG must now it won't let its friends down. Having already invested over one-half billion dollars in Jordan, USG must now judge how much Jordan is worth to it.

Secretary expressed hope Jordan's ~~security~~ security problems could be met without interfering with GOJ development program. At this point he could only say we would have to see what can be done and would be as responsive as possible. Secretary

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noted that, just as Israel found it difficult guard against terrorism, Jordan undoubtedly realized that complete security not easy to guarantee. Khamash concurred, saying principal need was increased mobility and firepower to improve defense. Secretary said we were looking into possibility that techniques developed in Viet Nam might be applicable in detecting intrusions across Jordan-Israeli border. Khamash replied GOJ list included early warning system but equipment could not be too sophisticated in order permit rapid assimilation by Army.

12. Khamash noted GOJ had been subjected to repeated USG inquiries regarding stationing tanks on West Bank--a restriction not applicable to Israel. This had had unfortunate effect and he hoped subject would not be brought up again. Secretary said he appreciated problem and would give it further thought. In conclusion, Secretary assured Khamash we felt sense of solidarity with Jordan and would give GOJ request most serious attention.

GP-3

END

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11/29/66

*Jordan*  
*OK*  
*113*

FROM W. W. ROSTOW

TO THE PRESIDENT

*Info: Neo Christian*

You may have seen AP and UPI ~~reports~~ *reports* today to the effect that

"The US is sending 36 F-104 Star Fighters to strengthen the forces of King Hussein of Jordan, ~~as the Jordanian sources report in Jordan~~

The new element in these stories is the accurate identification of types and numbers of planes. When we let the Jordanians announce the sale on 2 April 1966, they specified only "a number of military jet aircraft." ~~You will recall that~~ The deal you approved in February included "up to 36" planes, 12 to be bought then for late 1967 delivery and 24 more available for order around 1 January 1967 for delivery 1968 and after. This is a dollar sale. All that has been done so far in the current crisis is to speed up delivery of the first planes by a couple of months.

The State Department will continue to refuse comment on details, but we long ago acknowledged this sale, thus there is no reason to be concerned by appearance of these stories. Our main job right now is to bolster Hussein, and the stories help, though they are nothing new. Chances are the details slipped out through release of letters exchanged between the Jordanian military and the United Arab Command.

There may be more stories of this kind since General Khammash, Hussein's chief of staff, ~~arrived~~ *is* here ~~yesterday~~ and is ~~holding talks in~~ *Talking to* State and Defense ~~today~~ *Officials*. He ~~is seeing~~ *saw* Secretary Rusk ~~this~~ *yesterday* afternoon and may remain ~~here~~ *our rolling* for ~~as long as~~ two weeks going over his requests for new equipment. Rolling out the red carpet for him is one way to help ease Hussein's regime through this tense period. *#*

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*Mr. Smith*  
*File* *114*



2 December 1966

No. 2205/66

Copy No. **118**

*#119 - Wiggins*  
*#120 - Pitt. Rm.*  
*#121 - ~~File~~ Cy*  
*#122 - Saunders*

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

PALESTINE ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NLT001-146-3-17

By 4 NARA, Date 4-2-01

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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No. 2205/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
2 December 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Palestine Arab Terrorist Organizations

1. The tradition of terrorism in Arab-Israeli relations extends back into the 1920's and '30's. Before the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, terrorism was the principal weapon of both Arabs and Jews in harassing the British authorities in Palestine. In the early 1950's, the Arab governments organized paramilitary commando groups -- fedayeen -- which undertook raiding and sabotage missions into Israel. Israel's invasion of Sinai was in large measure a retaliation for this fedayeen activity, and the terrorist raiding ceased after the 1956 Sinai campaign.

The PLO

2. As official support of terrorist operations ceased, many Palestinian Arabs became increasingly frustrated at the relative lack of aggressiveness toward Israel on the part of Arab governments. There was persistent agitation among Palestinians throughout the Arab world for some kind of representative organization, and this culminated in 1964 in the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO received the formal sanction of the League of Arab States at an Arab summit meeting that year.

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NOTE: This memorandum has been produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

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3. The organization is a kind of Palestinian government in exile, but it has been careful to avoid such a designation because of King Husayn's well-founded suspicion that it posed a threat to his authority in west Jordan. The PLO's activities are mainly political and military; it has tried, for example, to form a "Palestine Liberation Army" around a core of Palestinian units which had been formed over the years in the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi armies. Nasir exercises considerable influence over the PLO, though he does not completely control its leaders. The organization's "Voice of Palestine" broadcasts emanate from Cairo. The PLO is led by a dynamic super-orator, Ahmad Shuqayri, a Palestinian who at various times has been a UN representative for Syria and Saudi Arabia.

4. The PLO's long-range plans for opposing the Israelis initially omitted sponsorship of terrorist operations into Israel. PLO leaders and sponsors recognized that such operations would provoke Israeli retaliation, and very possibly lead to a war for which the Arab governments are still not ready. This policy was a source of frustration to many activist Palestinians, and it led to the emergence of the present generation of terrorist groups. The PLO has failed to persuade these groups to submit to over-all PLO direction, and, to meet their competition, has within the past few months felt compelled to undertake such activities on its own. The "Organization of Heroes of the Return" (to Palestine) is the group which appears to be the new PLO terrorist arm. Some of its members clashed with Israeli forces near the Lebanese border in mid-October.

#### Fatah

5. The most prominent of the terrorist groups is Fatah (a reverse acronym of the Arabic for "Palestine Liberation Movement"). Fatah is sometimes also known by the name of its commando arm, Asifa (Storm). Fatah appears to be descended from a clandestine Palestinian organization -- now inactive -- which was formed in the mid-1950's. Some of its members had connections with the Muslim



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Brotherhood, a conservative, strongly anti-Nasir politico-religious movement. Fatah also may have had links with the Arab Higher Committee of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, with whom the Brotherhood collaborated in regard to Palestine affairs.

6. In its present incarnation, Fatah emerged publicly in January 1965, when it claimed responsibility for terrorist incidents in Israel. Its leaders had previously participated in the organization of the PLO, but had become disenchanted. They are also disgusted with the continuing inability of most Arab governments to act decisively toward Israel, and are wary of any official control which might curtail Fatah's operations.

7. Syria, the most bellicose of the Arab states, is the one government whose policy comes closest to Fatah's violently anti-Israeli line. Damascus supports Fatah by providing it with a base for its operations, training facilities, and a propaganda outlet. The infiltrations into Israel, however, have been undertaken from Jordanian and Lebanese territory, since those borders are more easily traversed. This has occurred without the approval of either the Jordanian or the Lebanese government. Most of Fatah's financial support comes from wealthy Palestinians living in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

8. The number of people who participate in Fatah, as well as in other terrorist organizations, is unknown and probably fluctuates. Many of the terrorists are professional thugs or smugglers, and some were active against Israel in 1955-56. The Israelis say Fatah has been responsible for 61 sabotage incidents. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban recently stated, however, that Fatah had been inactive for about six weeks.

The PLF

9. A rival Palestinian terrorist organization called the "Palestine Liberation Front" (PLF) has been credited by the Israelis with the 12 November

road mining incident which triggered the Israeli raid into Jordan the next day. Jordanian officials also suspected the PLF of having perpetrated that incident, and they had begun a search for those responsible at the time Israel attacked. Little is known about the PLF. Like Fatah, it apparently aims at provoking a general Arab-Israeli war, but it is reputed to be more skilled in its operations. PLF members are said to regard Fatah as an organization of publicity seekers.

10. Some "terrorism" in Israel is more or less spontaneous. For years, Arab smugglers and cross-border operators have occasionally clashed with Israeli security forces. Incidents of this sort have been much reduced as the Israelis' security measures have been tightened. The organized, professional terrorism of the Fatah, the PLF, and of the PLO's new arm, poses problems for Israeli authorities that have no easy solution.



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