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#1 memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>open 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i> 1 p Secret	11/29/67	A
#1a memo	Rostow for the President " 1 p Secret	11/29/67	A
#2 cable	State 80567 <i>open 1-17-92</i> 2 p Confidential <i>NLS 91-430</i>	12/06/67	A
#3 memo	duplicate of #1 <i>open 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i>		
#3a memo	duplicate of #1a "		
#4 cable	duplicate of #2		
#4a draft	work copy for #2 <i>open 14-706</i>		
#5 memo	Saunders to Rostow 2 p Secret <i>open 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i>	11/07/67	A
#6 cable	Aden 567 <i>exemption upheld 1-29-93 NLS 91-430</i> 2 p Secret <i>exempt NLS 91-430</i> <i>appeal</i>	11/11/67	A
#7 cable	Aden 214 3 p Secret <i>exempt NLS 91-430 exemption upheld 1-29-93 NLS 91-430 appeal</i>	08/24/67	A
#8 memo	No. 1368/67 6 p Secret <i>sanitized 8-20-92 NLS 91-431</i> <i>open 11/28/11 per NLS/RAC 11-78</i> none submit section per AAG NIT is 11/10/01	07/24/67	A
#9 cable	Aden 47 2 p Secret <i>exempt NLS 91-430</i> <i>exemption upheld 1-29-93 NLS 91-430 appeal</i>	07/12/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, COUNTRY File, South Arabia, Vol. I

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November 29, 1967

SECRET

WWR:

We should probably let the President know how we're handling South Arabian independence. He'll get a recommendation in a week or so on recognizing, but the attached would cover in the meantime.

Brom → Secretary Rusk's recommendation to recognize (in about two weeks) could provide an excuse for a review in the NSC of the whole situation in the Arabian Peninsula; the balance of Communist, Nasserist, moderate forces and what recognition of the new South Yemen would do to them.

Hal
HHS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-433
By pw, NARA, Date 2-3-93

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-433
By ju, NARA, Date 2-3-93

1a

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: South Arabia Independent Today

Just a word on what we're doing about the independence of South Arabia--the new People's Republic of South Yemen. British negotiations with the National Liberation Front concluded in Geneva yesterday, and for the first time we have a fairly clear picture of the post-independence government.

We are not recognizing immediately. Today and tomorrow we'll respond to press queries by welcoming South Yemen to the family of nations. Then if the NLF continues in firm control for a week or two and acknowledges its international obligations, Secretary Rusk will recommend to you that we recognize. We want to be more sure first of Saudi views and of the ability of the NLF to act like a government.

The new government will take the usual anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, suspicious-of-the-West line. We expect it will proclaim a Nasser-style or Algerian-style "socialism", but so far don't have any evidence of extensive Communist ties. The NLF itself probably doesn't know yet what its policies will be. Its only policy so far has been to get the British out and win power.

The government will face two main problems--staying in power and keeping afloat economically. South Arabia is still a collection of tribes--not a nation--and is vulnerable to a number of disruptive influences. The Saudis may exploit tribal opposition. The pro-Egyptian nationalists, who lost to the NLF in the final drive to power, may fight on. The South Arabian Army has backed the NLF so far, but it could turn to opposition. We still don't know what kind of continuing aid the British have agreed to, but that will be crucial in determining whether the new government has to look to Cairo or Moscow.

The situation is still uncertain--and a good target for Moscow--but Nasser's pullout in Yemen has made the transition to independence easier than we thought it could be earlier this year. We don't look to the new government for much, but this is probably as good an outcome as we could have hoped for.

W. W. Rostow

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 STATE 80567

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ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO EUR 20, IO 15, SSD 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03, SC 01,
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RSR 01, /110 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP: LFDINSMORE
APPROVED BY: U- THE UNDER SECRETARY
NEA/P- MR BROWN
P- MR BARTCH
L/NEA- MR NEUMANN
NEA/ARP- MR BREWER
NEA- MR DAVIES
S/S- MR MEEHAN
NEA/EX- MR PERCERI
WHITE HOUSE- MR SAUNDERS

O R 062346Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL ADEN IMMEDIATE 0114
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0265
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1566
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0428
USMISSION USUN NY 1122

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-430

By ug, NARA, Date 1-15-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 80567

ADEN 680 (NOTAL)
PLEASE DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS DEC 7.
1. CONGEN INSTRUCTED CALL ON FONMIN DHALAI ON DECEMBER 7 REPEAT
7 AND CONVEY FOLLOWING QUOTE... AND HAS THE HONOR TO EXTEND
RECOGNITION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SOUTHERN YEMEN AND TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 80567

ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ITS GOVERNMENT. CONGEN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE MINISTRY THAT US REPRESENTATION IN ADEN IS RAISED TO AN EMBASSY AND WILLIAM L. EAGLETON, JR., IS APPOINTED CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM. UNQUOTE.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 80567 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. DEPARTMENT CONTEMPLATES ISSUING BRIEF STATEMENT TO PRESS NOON SAME DAY SIMPLY RECORDING FACT OF OUR RECOGNITION. PLEASE INFORM WHEN APPOINTMENT WITH FOMIN ARRANGED. GP-3. RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LETECKVW

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1967

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-433

WWR: By gd, NARA, Date 2-3-93

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-433

By fw, NARA, Date 2-3-93

Walt Rostow

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PAGE 01 STATE 8056

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INFO E 0, TO 5, SSO 00, NSCE 00, STE 00, SP 0, SS 0, 7PM 03, SC 0,
NSC 0, SC 0, L 03, H 0, P 04, CT 04, IN 0, NS E 00, DOD 01, MM 01,
RSR 01, /110 R

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SUMMARY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-15-06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 80567

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amconsul ADEN IMMEDIATE

INFO : Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy TEHRAN
USUN NEW YORK

STATE

Aden 680 (NOTAL)

1. Congen instructed call on FonMin Dhalai on December 7 repeat 7 and convey following QUOTE ... and has the honor to extend recognition to the People's Republic of Southern Yemen and to establish diplomatic relations with its government. Congen has been instructed to inform the Ministry that US representation in Aden is raised to an Embassy and William L. Baglton, Jr., is appointed Charge d'Affaires ad interim. UNQUOTE
2. Department contemplates issuing brief statement to press noon same day simply recording fact of our recognition. Please inform when appointment with FonMin arranged.

GP-3.

END.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 3-15-06

NEA/ARP:LFDinmore:bnk:12/6/67 5655

U - The Under Secretary

NEA/P - Mr. Brown
P - Mr. Barth Datch
L/NEA - Mr. Neumann
NEA/ARP - Mr. Brower

NEA - Mr. Davies
White House -
S/S -
NEA/RK - Mr. Peceri

FORM DS-322
8-65

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-433

By ju, NARA, Date 2-3-93

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November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: South Arabia Moves Toward Independence

The British Cabinet decided last week that, come what may, British forces will pull out of South Arabia sometime November 22-30. No one--least of all the Brits--pretends to know what will follow. But this will at least describe the main elements in the situation.

The intelligence community's guess today is that the National Liberation Front (NLF) has the best chance of taking over. This is the most home-grown of the nationalist groups, having opposed both the UAR-backed FLOSY and the Saudi-backed South Arabian League. The NLF has already taken over fairly easily in most of South Arabia, and in the past week's fighting continues to appear stronger than FLOSY in Aden. Nasser's pullout in Yemen apparently weakened FLOSY's base.

This would mean a short-term victory for one nationalist group rather than establishment of the broader coalition which Nasser and Faisal envisioned at Khartoum. South Arabian nationalist leaders have been in Cairo trying to negotiate the composition of a post-independence government. But the NLF in Aden seems to have pre-empted. Renewed fighting between the NLF and FLOSY and the army's announcement yesterday that it will back the NLF in forming a government probably make any Cairo agreement meaningless.

The army remains the big question mark. Until now it has played a mediating role, trying to enforce a cease-fire on all contending groups. As long as it kept on that tack, its leaders were able to keep its own contending factions together. The next couple of days will tell whether the army is mainly pro-NLF or whether it will split into substantial factions that will end up on opposite sides in a civil war. If the army stands firm, then we may have seen the worst of the bloodshed. If it splits, the fighting in Aden could be severe, and even the up-country sultans might be tempted to reclaim the domains which the NLF has recently taken over from them.

No one--including the British--is sure that the NLF can form a viable government, or how such a government will act. Having fought rather than negotiated its way to near-power, it will be vulnerable to continued opposition. The survival of any government will depend for a time on outside aid, and the British have suspended any decision on continuing aid until after they see what government they're dealing with.

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- 2 -

Others appear to be waiting too. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran and probably the USSR all appear to be waiting for the dust to settle before doing anything. Faisal, despite his feeling that the British have dumped his up-country conservative friends, will probably stand aside for fear of creating any excuse for Nasser to delay his withdrawal from Yemen. Faisal's final position will depend on which faction of the NLF appears to have come out on top--the radicals or a relatively moderate group.

We and the British had hoped to line up an impressive string of early friendly recognitions for the new state, but we're temporarily stymied by the absence of any government to recognize. State has contingency plans for recognizing and getting an ambassador out, but they're holding back too. They may have to evacuate our people instead.

Despite the potential disruption and danger to our people, we shouldn't ignore the positive elements in this situation. Much as we may hate to admit it, the June war has probably made the South Arabian transition easier for us and our friends. Nasser's role there is diminished, and we long ago decided--as we thought Faisal would, too--that we could live with any regime that did not have his hand in it. The new government may well be hostile to us, but unless there is an unexpected amount of Communist activity we can probably ride it out.



John W. Foster



Harold H. Saunders

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*cc - Rostow
Laundrea*



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

South Arabia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By *isl* NLJ/RAC 11-78
NARA, Date 11-18-11

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24 July 1967
No. 1368/67

No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

WARNING

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 July 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

South Arabia

Summary

Britain has taken the first step toward forming a representative government to succeed the South Arabian Federation government. On 5 July the Supreme Federal Council, the governing body of the federation, appointed an Adeni moderate, Husayn Bayumi, as prime minister - designate to form a caretaker government until independence, now scheduled for 9 January 1968. According to present plans, elections will then be held and a permanent government established. British carriers will be stationed offshore for six months to ensure that the fledgling state is not overthrown by the Egyptians in Yemen.

Despite the anarchy of recent months, the British hope not to leave behind "another Congo." The vital question, however, is whether it is not already too late to achieve any kind of order out of the present chaos of tribal feuds, ethnic prejudices, social backwardness, and political machinations by other Arab states such as Egypt.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA for the use of the CIA representative on the Interdepartmental Regional Group, Middle East. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services.

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1. Aden is today an armed camp, with assassination and terrorism commonplace. In June there were 445 incidents in Aden alone, compared with 376 in April and a peak figure of 80 per month last fall. Known casualties due to incidents in Aden for the first half of 1967 are 116 killed and 527 wounded.

Egyptian Involvement

2. The force behind this terrorism is the Egyptian intelligence organization in Yemen. Egypt's proclaimed purpose was to eject the British from Aden, but Cairo has continued its operations even though London has long since announced its intention to grant independence by 1968. Although Egypt has asserted that the terrorism is punishment of the British for their tyranny, the great majority of casualties have been Arab. Egypt has also boasted that Britain will no longer grow wealthy on Aden's trade. Terror and destruction have almost reached the point where Aden will soon have no trade, nor will it have the bankers or traders needed to revive commerce after peace is restored.

The Terrorist Groups

3. Now even the Egyptians appear to have lost control of the situation. Cairo deserted its original terrorist group, the National Liberation Front (NLF)--which it had used earlier in back-country dissidence--for a more broadly based group backed chiefly by the Aden labor movement, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), when the target of terrorism was switched to the city of Aden in 1965. The NLF, however, continued to be strong in the 16 other states of the federation, as well as in the federation army, the federal guards, the police, and many workers of back-country origin employed in Aden. Despite the lack of Egyptian support, the NLF fought a bloody back-alley war with FLOSY, and at present seems to hold a slight edge in Aden and a definite advantage in the hill states.

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4. Not much is known about the amazingly successful leadership of the NLF, even by British intelligence in Aden. It is known, however, to have ties with the Arab National Movement (AMM), another successful terrorist movement with branches in many Arab countries. The AMM is supposedly supported by the Egyptian Intelligence Service (EIS), but on several occasions has bucked the EIS with impunity. Occasional reports link leading AMM members with Arab Communist movements.

5. Both FLOSY and the NLF have refused to talk with the British, or even with the UN Mission to Aden, about taking part in any independent government which Britain might be able to establish. Furthermore, FLOSY has taken the extreme view that it alone speaks for the people of South Arabia. Consequently London has been left to deal with the existing federation government--made up primarily of hill-country sultans despised by most liberal Adenis.

Efforts to Resolve Differences

6. When conditions in South Arabia began to deteriorate swiftly, all parties involved began to search for some compromise solution. Several states tried to intervene and the UN sent missions to assess the situation, all to no avail. With the onset of the Arab-Israeli war, the situation became even more murky. Many South Arabians, believing that Britain and the US were behind Israel's success, were even more antagonistic about negotiating with Britain.

7. On 19 June the British Foreign Secretary announced that independence, long scheduled for the end of 1968, would take place on 9 January 1968. He said that London would increase its commitments of military aid to about \$168 million over a three-year period and would station a naval force for six

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months and a bomber force for perhaps longer to protect South Arabia against "open external aggression." London said it fully supported the present government and welcomed its intention to form a caretaker government "if and when cooperation with others makes this possible." On 5 July Bayumi, an Adeni moderate with shadowy connections with the NLF, was appointed prime minister - designate. He announced on 18 July the formation of an eight-man interim administration--five Adenis and three from other states, whose ability and affiliations are not impressive.

8. These actions are remarkable especially because they were carried out during open mutiny by the South Arabian security forces and during the Arab-Israeli war. The real time of testing for the administration is yet to come, however, and numerous problems remain.

Attitudes

9. The blood feuds engendered by the terrorism have built up a residue of bitterness, and there are many scores to settle. With arms readily available, public security will be exceedingly difficult to restore, particularly the stable type which had made Aden almost unique in the Middle East. Nasir, moreover, has not yet given any solid evidence that he is prepared to cooperate in building a viable state in South Arabia, and the EIS may be capable of subverting any new state, with or without the assistance of the present nationalist groups. Finally, disillusionment and apathy have set in, and those who could once have ensured South Arabia's future viability are giving up. The Somalis, Hindus, Jews, and British who built and carried on Aden's trade are leaving, and the present situation does not encourage new investment.

10. Britain's role is a critical factor. London has been trying to encourage those Adenis who might be able to salvage something. The continued recalcitrance of all parties, however, has hampered British efforts to establish a successor government.

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At the time of the uprising in the Crater district, there was strong sentiment in Britain for pulling out early. Even if London hangs on until 9 January, as now seems likely, the successor government may well take on an increasingly pro-Nasir tinge. Britain might in that case reconsider contributing \$168 million to arm a pro-Nasir army in South Arabia, whatever commitments may have been made.

11. The lack of British assistance and trade would sharply limit the future of South Arabia. Egypt does not possess the economic strength to fill the vacuum, however easily it may fund and supply the large-scale terrorist campaign. To date no other state has shown any interest in bailing South Arabia out of its political and economic mire, and the UN is unlikely to accept large-scale responsibility there.

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