

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

18/8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
# 3 cable	Cairo 7350 Secret open 9/30/02	05/10/67	A
#4 cable	Cairo 7327 open 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 secret	05/10/67	A
#5 cable	Cairo 7264 secret open 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 more info released 4.13.07 NW do 62	05/0967	A
#6 cable	Cairo 7220 open 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 secret	05/07/67	A
#7 cable	Cairo 7217 secret open 9/30/02	05/07/67	A
#8 cable	Cairo 7210 open 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 secret	05/06/67	A
#9 cable	Cairo 7206 open 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 confidential	05/06/67	A
#10 cable	Cairo 7171 open 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 secret	05/06/67	A
#11 cable	Cairo 7169 secret sanitized 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 same sanitization 4.13.07 NW do 62	05/05/67	A
#12 cable	Cairo 7153 secret sanitized 8/11/03 NLS 02-274 same sanitization 4.13.07 NW do 62	05/05/67	A
#13 cable	Cairo 6720 secret open 9/30/02	04/26/67	A
#14 cable	Cairo 6665 secret open 9/30/02	04/24/67	A
#15 cable	Cairo 6381 secret open 9/30/02	04/15/67	A
#16 cable	Cairo 6253 secret open 9/30/02	04/12/67	A
#17 cable	Cairo 6189 secret open 9/30/02	04/08/67	A
#18 cable	Cairo 6180 secret open 9/30/02	04/08/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File
United Arab Republic, Vol V, 9/66-5/67 Box 160

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

278

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19 cable	Cairo 6082 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	04/06/67	A
#20 cable	Cairo 5937 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	04/03/67	A
#21 cable	Cairo 5823 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	03/30/67	A
#22 cable	Cairo 5738 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	03/28/67	A
#23a cable	Cairo 5031 secret <i>sanitized 10-7-05 NLS 02-277</i>	03/04/67	A
#24 cable	A-735 from Cairo confidential <i>same sanitization 4-13-07 NLS 06-62</i> <i>open 9/30/02</i>	03/03/67	A
#25 cable	Cairo 5036 secret <i>open 10-7-03 NLS 02-277</i>	03/05/67	A
#26 cable	Cairo 5036 secret <i>open 1-20-06</i>	03/05/67	A
#27 airgram	A-736 from Cairo confidential <i>open 9/30/02</i>	03/03/67	A
#28 cable	Cairo 4763 secret <i>open 8/11/03 NLS 02-277</i>	02/23/67	A
#29 airgram	A-676 from Cairo secret <i>open 8/11/03 NLS 02-277</i>	02/16/67	A
#30 cable	Cairo 4218 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	01/29/67	A
#31 cable	Cairo 4212 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	01/28/67	A
#32 cable	Cairo 3753 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	01/09/67	A
#33 cable	Cairo 3630 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	12/31/66	A
#35 cable	Cairo 3600 secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	12/31/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File
United Arab Republic, Vol. 5, 9/66-5/67

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

378

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#36 cable	Cairo 3540 open 4/22/03 NLJ 02-116 secret	2 p	12/27/67 A
#37 cable	Cairo 3510 secret open 9/30/02	2 p	12/24/66 A
#38 cable	Cairo 3498 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 Secret	1 p	12/23/66 A
#39 cable	Cairo 3426 secret open 9/30/02	1 p	12/19/66 A
#40 cable	Cairo 3414 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret	2 p	12/19/66 A
#41 cable	Cairo 3392 secret open 2-2-04 NLJ/RAL 02-260	5 p	12/17/66 A
#42 cable	Cairo 3357 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret	3 p	12/15/66 A
#43 cable	Cairo 3357 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret	3 p	12/15/66 A
#44 cable	Cairo 3356 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret	3 p	12/15/66 A
#45 cable	Cairo 3340 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret	3 p	12/14/66 A
#46 cable	Cairo 3230 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret	1 p	12/08/66 A
#47 cable	Cairo 2999 secret sanitized 10-7-03	5 p	11/28/66 A
#48 cable	Cairo 2478 open 8/11/03 NLJ 02-277 secret sanitized 4-13-07 NLJ 06-62	1 p	11/07/66 A
#49 cable	Cairo 2331 secret open 9/10/02	2 p	10/31/66 A
#50 cable	Deptel 13532 to Jidda open 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422 secret	2 p	07/27/67 A
#51 cable	Deptel 10446 to Jidda " secret	2 p	07/20/67 A

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408

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52 cable	Deptel 193578 to Cairo <i>agen 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i> secret	05/12/67	A
#53 cable	Deptel 192206 to Cairo " secret	05/11/67	A
#54 cable SAMESANI 4-13-07 NLJ 06-62	Deptel 189536 to Cairo Secret <i>sanitized 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i> same organization 81103 0002 274	05/08/67	A
#55 cable	Deptel 189486 to Cairo <i>agen 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i> secret	05/07/67	A
#56 cable	Deptel 187506 to Cairo " secret	05/04/67	A
#57 cable	Deptel 182453 to Cairo " secret	04/26/67	A
#58 cable	Deptel 181932 to Cairo " secret	04/25/67	A
#59 cable	Deptel 173357 to Cairo " confidential	04/12/67	A
#60 cable	Deptel 172116 to Cairo " secret	04/10/67	A
#61 cable	Deptel 171462 to Cairo " secret	04/08/67	A
#62 cable	Deptel 170459 to Cairo " secret	04/07/67	A
#63 cable	Deptel 173904 to Cairo " secret	04/12/67	A
#64 cable	Deptel 169437 to Cairo " secret	04/05/67	A
#65 cable	Deptel 157447 to Cairo " confidential	03/17/67	A
#66 cable	Deptel 147745 to Cairo " secret	03/01/67	A
#67 cable	Deptel 149868 to Cairo " secret	03/06/67	A

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578

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#68 cable	Deptel 142393 to Cairo <i>open 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i> confidential	2 p 02/23/67	A
#69 cable	Deptel 140276 to Cairo " secret	2 p 02/17/67	A
#69b cable	work copy #69 above " Secret	2 p 02/17/67	A
#71 cable	Deptel 110910 to Cairo " secret	2 p 12/30/66	A
#72 cable	Deptel 111035 to Cairo " secret	1 p 12/30/66	A
#73 cable	Deptel 103387 to Cairo " secret	3 p 12/13/66	A
#74 cable	Deptel 60007 to Cairo " secret	3 p 10/03/66	A
#74c cable	work copy of #74 above " secret	3 p 10/03/66	A
#76 cable <i>Exempt 10303 ALL PA 202 261</i>	intelligence information cable <i>Exempt 1120-08 NLJ 06-63</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 91-423</i>	2 p 07/06/67	A
#77 cable <i>Exempt 10303 NOTE</i>	intelligence info cable <i>Exempt 1120-08 NLJ 06-63</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 91-423</i>	3 p 06/22/67	A
#79 cable	To President from Walt Rostow <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-421</i> secret	3 p 03/06/67	A
#81 memo	to Secretary from Thomas Hughes confidential <i>open 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i>	4 p 07/31/67	A
#82 memo	re: UAR & Libya " top secret	1 p 06/30/67	A
#83 memo <i>same sanitization 6-30-03 NLJ/PA 02-262</i>	to Bundy from Spurgeon Keeny secret <i>sanitized 3-29-93 NLJ 91-420</i> same sanitization 6-1-06 NLJ 06-64	1 p 06/20/67	A
#83e report <i>ALL PA 202 303 NOTE PA 202 261</i>	re: UAR & Yemen <i>Exempt 1120-08 NLJ 06-63</i> secret <i>Exempt NLJ 91-423</i>	2 p 06/01/67	A
#83f note <i>same sanitization 6-30-03 NLJ/PA 02-262</i>	to Rostow from Spurgeon Keeny secret <i>sanitized 3-29-93 NLJ 91-420</i> same sanitization 6-1-06 NLJ 06-64	1 p 05/18/67	A

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608

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#83g report	re: Yemen and UAR <i>Exempt 11-20-08 NLJ 06-63</i>		
	secret <i>Exempt 4/12/01 NLJ IRAC 00-160</i>	6 p	05/16/67
#86 memo	to Rostow from Ben Read <i>open 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i>		
	confidential	1 p	05/18/67
#86b report	suggested talking points "		
	confidential	2 p	undated
#87 memo	to Marvin Watson from W. W. Rostow <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-421</i>		
	confidential	1 p	05/11/67
#88 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow		
	secret <i>penalized 3-29-93 NLJ 91-420</i>	1 p	05/10/67
#88a memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read		
	confidential <i>open 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i>	1 p	05/04/67
#88b report	Nasser's May Day Speech "		
	confidential	3 p	undated
#89 memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read "		
	confidential	1 p	05/09/67
#91 memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read "		
	confidential	2 p	04/12/67
#92b bio sketch	Ahmed Hassan El Fikki		
	secret <i>open 9/3/02</i>	2 p	undated
#93 report	special report <i>more info released 11-20-08 NLJ 06-63</i>		
	secret <i>penalized 7-24-92 NLJ 91-423</i>	6 p	03/10/67
#95 memo	to W.W. Rostow from Howard Wriggins <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-421</i>		
	confidential	2 p	02/28/67
#95a cable	Cairo 4857 <i>open 8-6-92 NLJ 91-422</i>		
	confidential	4 p	02/27/67
#97 memo	to Rostow from Howard Wriggins <i>open 1-20-93 NLJ 91-421</i>		
	confidential	2 p	02/28/67
#98a memo	to Rostow from Howard Wriggins "		
	confidential	2 p	02/28/67
#99 memo	to Rostow from Howard Wriggins "		
	confidential	2 p	02/23/67

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

9778

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#101 memo	to WWR from Hal Saunders <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i> secret	1 p 02/17/67	A
#102 memo	to President from W. W. Rostow <i>sanitized 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i> secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	3 pp 02/14/67	A
#103 memo	to John Walsh from Harold H. Saunders confidential <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i>	1 p 02/03/67	A
#104 memcon	re: lunch with Amb. Kamel <i>sanitized 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i> secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	2 p 01/17/67	A
#105a memcon	between Kamel and Rostow <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i> confidential	1 p 01/14/67	A
#106 memo	to Secretary from George Denney confidential <i>open 8-6-92 NLS 91-422</i>	3 p 12/19/66	A
#107 memo	to WWR from Howard Wriggins <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i> secret	1 p 12/02/66	A
#107a memo	to WWR from Wriggins - Saunders " secret	2 p 12/01/66	A
#108 memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read confidential <i>open 7-19-91</i>	1 p 11/27/66	A
#108a memo	to Secretary from Wm. Handley <i>open 8-6-92 NLS 91-422</i> confidential	3 p 11/26/66	A
#109a memo	to Secretary from Raymond A. Hare " confidential	3 p 10/31/66	A
#110 memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read " confidential	1 p 09/22/66	A
#111 report	intelligence report same sanitization 11-20-08 NLS 91-423 secret <i>exempt NLS 91-423</i>	37 p 09/01/66	A
#113 memo	to Walt Rostow from Ben Read <i>same sanitization 2/29/12 per NLS/RAC 11-101</i> confidential <i>open 8-6-92 NLS 91-422</i>	1 p 07/24/66	A
#113a memo	re: Nasser's July 22 speech " confidential	1 p undated	A
#114 memo	to WWR from Hal Saunders <i>open 1-20-93 NLS 91-421</i> Secret	1 p 04/06/67	A

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878

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#114b	cable work copy of deptel to Jidda & Cairo secret <i>open 9/30/02</i>	2 p	04/04/67 A
#114d	cable work copy of deptel to Jidda & Cairo secret <i>open 8-6-92 NLJ 9/1-122</i>	4 p	04/04/67 A
#114f	cable work copy of deptel to Cairo " secret	2 p	04/05/67 A
#114h	cable work copy of deptel to Kuwait & Sanaa secret <i>open 7/30/02</i>	1 p	04/04/67 A
#31	cable Cairo 3014 <i>open 9/30/02</i>	1 p	12/3/66

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NODIS CABLES

2

CAIRO CABLES

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WIT ³

~~SECRET~~

40
Action

2009753

SS
Info

ZIZCEIC805IVA327
RR RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 6350B 1301435
ZNY SSSSS
R 101410Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7350

1967 MAY 10 PM 12 58

EXDIS

REF: JIDDA 4603

IN VIEW CURRENT US-UAR-YARD IMBROGLIO IN YEMEN WE ASSUME
PROSPECTS OUR BEING ABLE MEDIATE UAR-SAUDI DISPUTE
ABSOLUTELY NIL FOR NOW. NES
BT

EX
E

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 9-23-02

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

4

53-40
Action

~~SECRET~~

INRD

CONTROL: 009398

Info

RECEIVED: MAY 10, 0731AM

14

RSR

RR RUEHCR RUFHOL
DE RUEIVCR 7327B 1301100
ZNY SSSSS
R 101045Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY ROME
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SANAA
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7327

ROGER CHANNEL

REF: STATE 189596.

1. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CATALANO RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING AND I REVIEWED WITH HIM APPROACH REFTEL WE WERE MAKING IN ROME.
 2. CATALANO HAD ONLY YESTERDAY RETURNED FROM TWO WEEKS IN ITALY, WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED ON YEMEN DEVELOPMENTS AND HAD NOT AS YET RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS.
 3. DURING CATALANO'S CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD YESTERDAY YEMEN HAD ONLY BEEN RAISED IN CONTEXT OF TENSIONS IN NEAR EAST.
 4. I WILL BE INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF ANY APPROACH TO FOREIGN MINISTER CATALANO MAY MAKE AS RESULT INSTRUCTIONS.
- GP-1 NFS
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By no NARA, Date 7-28-03

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5

9-1

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 7803

May 9, 1967, 5:04 A.M.

INRD

Info

RSR

ZNY SSSSS
O 090835Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

f₉

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7264

ROGER CHANNEL

REF: STATE 189536

1. ON RECEIPT REFTEL LAST EVENING BROMELL AND I DECIDED THAT ON BALANCE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE LIMIT CONVEYANCE OF INFORMATION PARA 2 TO SALAH NASR. I PARTICULARLY WANT TO AVOID UNTIL ACTUAL RELEASE OF LIAPIS AND HARTMAN ANY CONFRONTATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT FROM MY TAKING UP WITH HIM DUPLICITY AND PERFDY OF HIS GOVERNMENT IMPLICIT IN THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST AID OFFICE.
2. THUS FAR BROMELL HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE SALAH NASR AND THERE IS NO CERTAINTY HE WILL BE ABLE TO TODAY.
3. MEANWHILE SITUATION IN TAIZ ITSELF SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CHANGED VERY MATERIALLY BY YARG DEMANDS REGARDING OUR OFFICE THERE AND IN PARTICULAR REGARDING JONES AND GOSSELINK (SANAA 601).
4. WE FEAR THAT NOW WERE EITHER BROMELL OR I TO TAKE UP WITH OUR EGYPTIAN CONTACTS PENETRATION DURING NIGHT MAY 7-8 THIS COULD PLACE JONES AND GOSSELINK AND OTHERS IN TAIZ IN CONSIDERABLE PHYSICAL DANGER.
5. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED WE WILL NOT THEREFORE BROACH THIS SUBJECT. WHAT WE SAY TO EGYPTIANS ONCE LIAPIS AND HARTMAN AND TAIZ STAFF ARE OUT OF COUNTRY IS ANOTHER MATTER AND I WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ON THAT IN DUE COURSE.
6. DEPARTMENT MAY ALSO WISH NOTE THAT INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED END PARA 2 REFTEL WAS CONVEYED VERY EXPLICITLY BY BROMELL TO SALAH NASR ON FRIDAY 5 MAY AND HAS SO BEEN REPORTED

3.3(b)(1)

GP-1. NES
BT

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-62
By isl, NARA, Date 4-2-07

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WA ⁶

53-44
Action

~~SECRET~~

INRD

Info

RSR

00 RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 7220B 1271300
ZNY SSSSS
O 071250Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

f
s

6398
1967 MAY 7 AM 9 12

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7220

ROGER CHANNEL

16

REF. CAIRO 7210

1. DURING THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING SALAH NASR COMMENTED TO BROMELL AS FOLLOWS ON KEY OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
2. PARKER TEAM AND ITS MISSION: YARG CLEARANCE FOR TEAM VISIT TO YEMEN AND **ITS** MISSION WOULD PROBABLY BE CONVEYED TO US HERE THROUGH UAR FOREIGN OFFICE-- PROBABLY TODAY.
3. THE LAPIS AND HARTMAN: WILL BE RELEASED BY 15 MAY PER ASSURANCES GIVEN THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY. HE COULD *NOT* SAY SO PRECISELY WHAT RATIONALE WOULD BE USED BUT ONE WOULD BE FOUND.
4. PACE INTERVIEW WITH YARG INTERIOR MINISTER: WE SHOULD NOT INTERPRET SUCH STATEMENTS AS SIGN OF ANY CHANGE IN UARG ASSURANCES TO US.
5. SALAH NASR ASSURED BROMELL THAT HIGHEST LEVEL ATTENTION BEING DEVOTED TO THIS PROBLEM. HE AGAIN REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO MARSHAL AMIR AS HAVING BEEN MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT AND EMPHASIZED THAT ENTIRE PROBLEM MADE VERY DIFFICULT FOR UARG SINCE ANTHING DONE WHICH WOULD SEEM TO ACCOMMODATE US POSITION WILL BE ATTRIBUTED TO UARG RESPONSE TO US PRESSURE.

NES
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By *us*, NARA, Date 7-28-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

7

1967 MAY 7 10 13

ZHB228
 OO RUEHEX
 DE RUEHC 6367 071012
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 070948Z MAY 67
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
 O 070925Z MAY 67
 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2791
 INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 129
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7217

(Handwritten initials)

cy Saunter

S

EXDIS

SANAA'S 504

1. ALTHOUGH WE AGREE AHNUMI'S REMARKS REPORTED REFTEL ARE ALARMING, WE HAVE ORAL ASSURANCES FROM EGYPTIANS, AND SPECIFICALLY FROM AMER PERSONALLY TO SECRETARY, AND FROM SALIH NASR, THAT LIAPIS AND HARTMAN WILL BE RELEASED. BELIEVE WE MUST GIVE THEM A CHANCE TO MAKE GOOD ON THESE ASSURANCES BEFORE WE REACT. WE PARTICULARLY DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD APPROACH EAST EUROPEANS RE INTERCESSION, GIVEN LACK OF RESULTS TO DATE FROM OUR EFFORTS WITH YUGOSLAVS, INDIANS, ALGERIANS, IRAQIS AND TURKS.
2. HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL GIVE ERIC PACE STORY LOW KEY TREATMENT IN RESPONSE PRESS INQUIRIES.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 72173 ~~SECRET~~

3. DOES THIS HAVE TO EXDIS? SEEMS TO US LIMDIS WOULD SUFFICE.
 NES
 BT

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 State Dept. Guidelines
 By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-23-02

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

8

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

41
Action

INRD

Info

RSR

OO RUEHCR
DE RUEIVCR 7210B 1261710
ZNY SSSSS
O 061704Z MAY 67 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

006244

1967 MAY 6 PM 1 28

16

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7210

ROGER CHANNEL

REF CAIRO 7153

BROMELL RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM SALAH NASR 1730 LOCAL SAYING
NOTHING TO REPORT AS YET AND WISHES SEE HIM 1300 LOCAL TOMORROW.
NES
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By is, NARA, Date 7-28-03

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44
Action

SS
Info

(el)

VZCZCEIC451VV IVA937
OO RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 7206B 1261340
ZNY CCCCC
O 061321Z MAY 67 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2782
STATE GRNC
BT

6138
1967 MAY 6 AM 10 51

S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 7206

LINDIS

REF: CAIRO 7186.

I HAVE NOW RETURNED FROM MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY MOHAMMED RIAD AND FELT THAT IS WAS REASONABLY SATISFACTORY.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD HAD SEVERAL TALKS WITH GENERAL HASSAN AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JUZAILAN DURING PAST FEW DAYS. HE HAD GAINED IMPRESSION THAT APRIL 27 MEETING BETWEEN DINSMORE AND JUZAILAN WAS NOT THE FIRST OCCASION ON WHICH FORMER HAD THREATENED LATTER. THESE TACTICS HAD BEEN USED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST.

3. HAVING MADE THIS POINT, FOREIGN MINISTER THEN REVERTED TO OUR CLAIMS OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY UNDER 1959 BILATERAL. HE HAD STUDIED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTION

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 7206B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THIS AGREEMENT AND HAD HIMSELF DETERMINED THAT WE HAD NO DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WHATSOEVER. WHEREAS OUR ORIGINAL NOTE IN ENGLISH HAD ASKED FOR SUCH IMMUNITY, YEMENI REPLY IN ARABIC HAD IN EFFECT POLITELY REFUSED IT. SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE OF NOTES DID NOT CLARIFY THIS DIVERGENCE OF VIEW BUT MERELY REFERRED VAGUELY TO RIGHTS GIVEN ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD MEAN ANYTHING.

4. LEAVING THIS SUBJECT, FOREING MINISTER PROCEEDED ON NEW TACK AND EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL HOPE THAT WASHINGTON FULLY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJL 02-277
By us NARA, Date 7-28-03

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-2-CAIRO 7206, 061321Z MAY 67

UNDERSTOOD THAT SECRETARY RUSK'S LETTERS MERELY ASKED FOR UARG GOOD OFFICES VIS A VIS YARG AND DID NOT IN ANYWAY IMPLY UA

OKKMENT IN EVENTS IN YEMEN. UARG'S ONLY INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ENTIRE SITUATION WAS IN TRYING TO HELP US AND HE HOPED THIS WAS CLEAR. (#)

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 7206B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH YEMENI AUTHORITIES. IN ANY EVENT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER ASSUMED PURPOSE OF PARKER TEAM WAS TO RESOLVE THESE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND HE HAD DISCUSSED TEAM WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JUZAILAN WHO HAD OPPOSED NO OBJECTION. CLEARANCE FOR TEAM'S VISIT WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO COME DIRECTLY FROM YARG IN SANAA AND THIS MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING TODAY. IN THIS EVENT PARKER AND TEAM COULD PLAN TO LEAVE ON MIDNIGHT PLANE MONDAY MAYS. I SUGGESTED THAT WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH MOHAMMED RIAD ON THIS IN THE LIGHT OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SANAA. FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED.

7. WE NOW COME THE QUESTION OF LIAPIS AND HARTMAN. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE HAD ORAL MESSAGE FROM MARSHAL AMER FOR SECRETARY RUSK ON THIS SUBJECT. MARSHAL AMER WISHED SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH RELEVANT YARG AUTHORITIES AND WAS DOING HIS BEST WITH THEM TO SECURE RELEASE OF TWO AMERICANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE WAS HOPEFUL THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MAY 15 AND THAT

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 7206B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO UNFORTUNATE PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THIS ASPECT OF PROBLEM MEANWHILE. I INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT I DOUBTED WHETHER WE COULD GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFYING INTEREST ON PART OF AMERICAN PRESS IN THE CASE IF IT WERE PERMITTED TO DRAG OUT ANOTHER EIGHT OR NINE DAYS. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR YARG TO RELEAS THEM SOONER SINCE THIS WOULD MERELY SUBSTANTIATE US POSITION IN THE CASE.

8 RETURNING TO PARKER TEAM, FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING ESCORT OFFICER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL TALAH HASSAN WHO WOULD BE GLAD TO DO SO ONCE TEAM HAD ARRIVED IN YEMEN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3-CAIRO 7206, 061321Z MAY 67

9 I CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT IT WAS APPARENT FROM EVERYTHING WE RECEIVING FROM WASHINGTON THAT SECRETARY RUSK DID NOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF OUR AID OFFICES AND THEIR CONTENTS AN ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL BUT FELT VERY STRONGLY AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE WAS INVOLVED.

10. COMMENT: I THINK WE HAVE OBTAINED ABOUT WHAT WE COULD EXPECT ON RELEASE OF LIAPIS AND HARTMAN AND ON SENDING PARKER TEAM TO YEMEN. IT IS CLEAR FOREIGN MINISTER DOES PAGE 5 RUEIVCR 7206B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT WISH AND WILL NOT INVOLVE HIMSELF IN QUESTION OF AID OFFICES AND THEIR CONTENTS AND THAT THIS IS BEING HANDLED IN ANOTHER AREA OF UARG.

11. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON SENDING PARKER TEAM WILL DEPEND ON EVENTS ON THE SPOT TODAY AND TOMORROW. IN THE MEANTIME HE WILL MAKE PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE HERE MIDNIGHT MONDAY.

12. WE SUGGEST DEPARTMENT DECIDE WHAT PORTIONS THIS MESSAGE IT WISHES REPEAT TO SANAA AND TAIZ. WE RELUCTANT TO REPEAT TO THOSE POSTS REMARKS RE DINSMORE CONTAINED PARA 2 BECAUSE THEIR LIKELY EFFECT ON MORALE HARD-PRESSED AND COMPETENT OFFICERS THERE. WE HAVE REPORTED REMARKS ONLY BECAUSE WE THINK THEY ESSENTIAL TO FLAVOR OF CONVERSATION. WE ALSO RELUCTANT REPEAT TO THEM AMER'S ORAL MESSAGE GIVING SPECIFIC RELEASE DATE FOR LIAPIS AND HARTMAN, BECAUSE (A) WE FEAR IT WILL ONLY DEPRESS THOSE TWO AND (B) DATE MAY SLIP OUT IN CONVERSATION WITH YEMENI OFFICIALS AND LEAD TO COMPLICATIONS BECAUSE OF LATTER'S SENSITIVITIES RE WHO DECIDES SUCH MATTERS.

NES
BT

(#)OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMIDEASTFOR,
CINCSTRIKE AT 11:20 A.M. 5/6/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3
Action

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INRD
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OO RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 7171B 1260635
ZNY SSSSS
O 060630Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

Control: 5859
May 6, 1967, 3:57 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7171

ROGER CHANNEL

16

Root

REFERENCE: STATE 189059 AND CAIRO 7169

1. I THINK WE SHOULD GIVE CAIRO ANOTHER TWENTY-FOUR HOURS TO MEET ASSURANCES ALREADY GIVEN US AT HIGHEST LEVEL AND PARTICULARLY ON UNDERTAKINGS CONVEYED BROMELL YESTERDAY (CAIRO'S 7153). (BROMELL HAS APPOINTMENT 6:00 PM THIS EVENING TO RECEIVE WORD AS TO WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AS A RESULT HIS MAY 5 CONVERSATION.)
2. TO PLEAD TOO FREQUENTLY FOR HELP WILL NOT ONLY BE UNPRODUCTIVE IN THAT IT FURTHER DEMONSTRATES OUR IMPOTENCE IN PRESENT SITUATION BUT IS DEMEANING TO US DIGNITY AND POISE.
3. IF WE HEAR NOTHING TODAY AND SITUATION ON GROUND IN TAIZ DOES NOT IMPROVE, I WILL RECOMMEND WHAT STEPS WE MIGHT THEN TAKE IN WAY OF LAST TRY. FOR THIS I WILL NEED PLENTY OF AMMUNITION.

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NLJ 02-277
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

O 052030Z MAY 67 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
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Postcard

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Info

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7169

1967 MAY 5 PM 6 46

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RSR

ROGER CHANNEL

REF: STATE 188341

1. I REALLY DO FEEL FROM FULL ORAL BRIEFING WHICH BROMELL GAVE ME FOLLOWING HIS MEETING SALAH NASR THIS MORNING AND ON READING HIS FULL REPORT [REDACTED] THAT WE HAVE MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR TO UARG THAT PROBLEM IS OUR INABILITY OVER PERIOD DAYS EITHER ENTER TAIZ AID OFFICES OR REMOVE AND DISPOSE OF THEIR CONTENTS. PROBLEM OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATED BY JURISDICTIONAL AND COMMAND CONFUSION IN YEMEN, ILLUSTRATED BY TAIZ 1478 AND 1479. UNDOUBTEDLY AND QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY THERE ARE PERSONAL TENSIONS GROWING OUT OF SITUATION BETWEEN DINSMORE AND JONES ON ONE HAND AND YARG AND UARG OFFICIALS IN SANAA AND TAIZ ON OTHER AS ALSO EVIDENT THESE REFTELS.

3.3(b)(1)

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 7169B ~~SECRET~~

2. BALL IS NOW SQUARELY IN EGYPTIAN COURT ON THREE REMAINING KEY ISSUES: RELEASE OF LIAPIS AND HARTMAN, HONORING OF OUR "RIGHTS OF LEGATION" IN CONNECTION WITH AID OFFICES, AND ACCEPTANCE OF PARKER TEAM.

3. AS WE ALL KNOW OUR LEVERAGE WITH UARG IS NOW FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES ZERO. WE COULD, IT IS TRUE, WAGE A COLD WAR AGAINST PRESIDENT NASSER BY TAKING A NUMBER OF STEPS TO EMBARRASS HIM IN AREA, SUCH AS WITHDRAWING RECOGNITION OF YARG AND INCREASING HIS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT WHAT WOULD THIS ACCOMPLISH?

4. I THINK WE HAVE MADE MAXIMUM EFFORT HERE ON THREE ABOUT ISSUES AND WE MUST NOW AWAIT UARG ACTION OR LACK THEREOF AS PATIENTLY AS WE CAN. TOMORROW WILL DOUBTLESS TELL US A GREAT DEAL AS TO WHETHER NASSER REALLY GIVES A DAMN ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH US OR NOT. I SUGGEST WE ALL GO TO BED AND WAIT.
NES
BT

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-62
By isl, NARA, Date 4-2-07

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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INRD 0 051125Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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STATE GRNC
BT
RSR ~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 7153

16

4 8 2 4
1967 MAY 5 AM 8:39 *at*
or how did we get this?

ROGER CHANNEL.

REF: STATE 187506 AND 187925 AND CAIRO 7133.

1. BROMELL SAW SALAH NASR THIS MORNING AND MADE APPROACH AS INSTRUCTED STATE'S REFTELS, EMPHASIZING EFFECT MOLESTATION AID PREMISES COULD HAVE ON OUR RELATIONS. NASR UNDERTOOK INFORM PRES NASSER IMMEDIATELY, AND MARSHAL AMER AS SOON AS HE COULD REACH HIM, AND TO MAKE SURE THEY UNDERSTOOD GRAVE VIEW WE TOOK THIS MATTER.
2. BROMELL ASKED WHETHER ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO GET JONES OR OTHER EMBOFF ON TO PREMISES TO SET OUR MINDS AT EASE. NASR SAID TENSIONS BETWEEN OUR PEOPLE ON THE SPOT AND YEMENIS AND EGYPTIANS WERE SUCH HE DID NOT THINK THIS POSSIBLE. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD SEND IN SOMEONE FROM OUTSIDE.
3. BROMELL SAID WE WANTED DO JUST THAT, AND HAD REQUESTED

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 7153B ~~SECRET~~
PERMISSION SEND PARKER AND TWO OR THREE OTHER OFFICERS TO YEMEN FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE HAD AS YET HAD NO RESPONSE FROM EITHER UARG OR YARG. NASR SAID HE WOULD FACILITATE AND PARKER AND COMPANIONS SHOULD PREPARE SELVES TO GO TO YEMEN SUNDAY NIGHT. HE WOULD HAVE SOMEONE GET IN TOUCH BROMELL THIS REGARD TOMORROW.

4. NASR ALSO SAID HE WOULD SEND CABLE THIS AFTERNOON TO HIS MAN IN TAIZ TO LOOK INTO MATTER AND WOULD SEND ONE OF HIS PEOPLE FROM CAIRO TO TAIZ TONIGHT.

5. COMMENT: WE FIND NASR'S REACTION HOPEFUL. OF COURSE, EGYPTIANS MAY ALREADY HAVE WHAT THEY WANT FROM AID BUILDING, OR WILL HAVE BY SUNDAY NIGHT, BUT ON OTHER HAND IF SAFES LOCKED AS JONES REPORTS, THEY MAY NOT YET HAVE PENETRATED THEM.

6. [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1)

GP-1. NES

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-62
By *isl*, NARA, Date *4-2-07*

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

13

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Action
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PP RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 6720B 1160835
ZNY SSSSS
P R 260825Z APR 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6720

1967 APR 26 AM 4 33

02

EXDIS

1. EL FEKI TELEPHONES ME LATE YESTERDAY TO SAY THAT IN KEEPING WITH HIS UNDERTAKING TO INFORM ME RE STATUS OUR MEDIATION OFFER, THE SUPREME EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ASU WOULD BE CONSIDERING IT AT ITS NEXT MEETING.

2. COMMENT: AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, COMMITTEE INCLUDES SOME SEVEN MEMBERS REPRESENTING TOP POLICY ADVISORY GROUP. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT CHANCES OF LEAKS WILL BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED BY COMMITTEE'S INVOLVEMENT. MEMBERS ARE PRESIDENT, FIELD MARSHAL AMER, PRIME MINISTER, MUHIEDDIN, HUSSEIN EL SHAFEI, ANWAR SADAT, ALI SABRY.

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Action RR RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 6665B 1141510

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1967 APR 24 AM 10 33

FM EMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC

BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6665

2

EXDIS

1. IN VIEW POSSIBLE EFFECTS YESTERDAY'S UNLEASHING IN YEMEN OF EX-KING SAUD COULD HAVE ON OUR MEDIATION EFFORT, I ASKED FOR APPOINTMENT AND WAS RECEIVED BY UNDER SECRETARY EL FEKI THIS MORNING.

2. REFERRING TO MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD ON APRIL 8 I SAID THAT MORE THAN TWO WEEKS HAD NOW PASSED AND THAT I WAS NATURALLY INTERESTED IN UARG'S REACTION TO OUR PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE. I SAID THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN JIDDA HAD DISCUSSED THESE DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE WITH KING FEISAL ON APRIL 11 AND THAT WE WOULD CONSULT BOTH PARTIES AGAIN AS SOON AS WE HEARD FROM UARG. EL FEKI ASKED WHETHER WE HAD RECEIVED SAUDI REACTION DURING OUR APRIL 11 MEETING AND I SAID THAT WE HAD BUT THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN STRICT IMPARTIALITY IT WOULD NOT OF COURSE BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS KING FEISAL'S VIEWS UNTIL THOSE OF PRES NASSER WERE ALSO KNOWN.

3. AS HE HAD DURING INFORMAL CORNER CONVERSATION WITH ME DURING THE DANISH AMB'S RECEPTION OF APR 18, EL FEKI AGAIN INDICATED OBLIQUELY THAT UARG WAS AWARE IN PART AT LEAST OF KING FEISAL'S VIEWS.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING WHAT, IF ANYTHING, AMB KAMEL HAS BEEN TOLD IN WASHINGTON. WE HAVE HELD ON TO THIS VERY TIGHTLY HERE.

5. AMB EL FEKI SAID HE WAS SORRY THAT HE COULD ONLY SAY OUR PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE WERE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION AND ASSURE ME THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WHEN HE HAD SOMETHING TO SAY. I CLOSED CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT BY SAYING WE WISHED TO GET TO WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT KING SAUD'S YEMEN TRIP WOULD BE HARMFUL TO OUR MEDIATION EFFORT. HE SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT IT WOULD NOT INSOFAR AS HIS GOVT WAS CONCERNED. WE LEFT THE MATTER THERE. NES

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 21, #435

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1967 APR 15 AM 7 15

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RR RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 6381B 1051135
ZNY SSSSS
R 151120Z APR 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6381

2

EXDIS

RE CAIRO 6180 AND STATE 173904.

1. WEEK HAVING PASSED SINCE MEDIATION TERMS REFERENCE PRESENTED FOREIGN MINISTER I CHECKED IN WITH HIS COUNSELOR (MUHAMMED RIAD) THIS MORNING.

2. INFORMED TR STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN PRESIDENCY. IN REPLY QUERY AS TO SAUDI REACTION I SAID ONLY THAT TR DISCUSSED WITH KING FEISAL SEVERAL DAYS AGO AND WE WOULD AGAIN DISCUSS WITH BOTH CAIRO AND RIYADH WHEN UAR RESPONSE RECEIVED.

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RR RUEIVCR 6253B 1021140
ZNY SSSSS
R 121129Z APR 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIBDA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6253

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1967 APR 12 AM 7 03

2

EXDIS

RE STATE 172116.

1. WE THOROUGHLY AGREE ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE COORDINATED IN TIMING AND CONTENT AND HAVE SO INDICATED IN DISCUSSING MEDIATION HERE. WOULD PERHAPS BE HELPFUL HAVE SUGGESTED TEXT NOW FOR DISCUSSION WHEN WE RECEIVE UARG REACTION OUR PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE.

2. RE INFORMING OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES RECOMMEND THIS BE DONE JUST BEFORE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

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17

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82
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ZCZCEIC108 IVA511
OO RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 6189B 0982210
ZNY SSSSS
O P 082205Z APR 67
FM ANEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUQVRA/ANEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6189

1967 APR 8: PM 5 37

EXBIS

STATE 171462

PRESENTATION TO RIYADH MADE BEFORE RECEIPT REFTEL (CAIRO 6189)
TERMS OF REFERENCE AS PRESENTED READ "TO REFRAIN FROM ACTS OR
HOSTILE PROPAGANDA ETC."
WE ELIMINATED ADJECTIVE "AGGRESSIVE" BUT NOT "HOSTILE".
NES
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

18

~~SECRET~~

41
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Info

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PP RUEHC RUQVRA
DE RUEIVCR 6080B 0981459
ZNY SSSSS
P 1400Z PAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY CARIO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WAHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
STATE GRNC

007794

1967 APR 8 AM 10 41

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6180

2

EXDIS

REFERENCE STATE 170459, 170451 AND CAIRO 6142.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD WITH IS CHEF DE CABINET MOHAMMED RIAD PRESENT RECEIVE PARKER AND ME AT 1:30 PM.
2. I SAID I BROUGHT GOOD NEWS, THAT KING FEISAL HAD ACCEPTED OUR OFFER OF US MEDIATION IN PRINCIPLE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND CONSIDERED AMBASSADOR HARE A GOOD CHOICE AS MEDIATOR.
3. ACCORDINGLY THE DEPARTMENT HAD PREPARED DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONSIDERATION BY BOTH PARTIES AND THESE I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT TO THE UARG. OUR AMBASSADOR IN JIDDA WOULD BE MAKING A PARALLEL APPROACH TO KING FEISAL. I WAS AT PRESIDENT NASSER'S DISPOSITION SHOULD HE WISH TO

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 6180B ~~SECRET~~
SEE ME.

4. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE PARA 2 STATE 170459 I OUTLINED BRIEFLY KEY POINTS IN OUR SUGGESTED TERMS OF REFERENCE STATING THAT THEY WERE AS BRIEF AND FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THEY PROVIDED WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE THE BARE MINIMUM OF COOPERATION NEEDED FOR PROGRESS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THIS CONCILIATION EFFORT WOULD BE FOREDOOMED TO FAILURE UNLESS BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE TO SUSPEND HOSTILE ACTS AND TONE DOWN PROPAGANDA DURING THE PERIOD OF MEDIATION.

5. I THEN RAN THROUGH OUR SUGGESTED TERMS AND HANDED THEM TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN INFORMAL MEMORANDUM FORM PER STATE 170451 WITH "AGGRESSIVE" OMITTED FROM SECOND PARAGRAPH. I STRESSED THAT NEITHER PARTY WAS ASKED TO

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-2- CAIRO 6180, APRIL 8

ASSUME ANY UNDERTAKINGS NOT ALREADY INCUMBENT UPON IT IN VARIOUS MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE UN AND ARAB LEAGUE CHARTERS. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE INITIAL REACTION OF BOTH THE UAR AND SAG TO OUR OFFER TO BELIEVE EACH PARTY IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN A REVERSAL OF THE PRESENT DOWNWARD TREND IN THEIR RELATIONS.

6. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING WE ARE ANXIOUS TO GET TO

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 6180B ~~SECRET~~

WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT AMBASSADOR HARE WAS PREPARED TO COME OUT TO THE AREA AS SOON AS THE TERMS OF REFERENCE COULD BE AGREED UPON BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

7. THE FOREIGN MINISTER REFRAINED FROM ANY COMMENT ON MY CORAL PRESENTATION OR ON THE PAPER I HAD GIVEN HIM WHICH HE ONLY GLANCED AT HURRIEDLY.

8. I SAID I WAS AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT NASSER'S REPLY. RIAD SAID HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME. AT THIS POINT PARKER POINTED OUT WE WERE HOLDING THIS SUBJECT VERY CLOSE AND HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO LEAKS. RIAD AGREED. BUT SAID, "OF COURSE, WE WILL WANT TO MAKE STATEMENT ON MEDIATION ONCE EVERYONE AGREES TO IT."

9. WE THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO AND FOLLOWING THE PRECIPITOUS DEPARTURE OF THE UN MISSION FROM ADEN. THIS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

GP-1.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

19

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41
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Info

qib
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RR RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 6082B 0961345
ZNY SSSSS
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 6082

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1967 APR 6 AM 11 34

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FS

EXDIS

REF: JIDDA 4099

YEMEN MEDIATION

WHILE SAUDIS MAY BE HOLDING OUR MEDIATION OFFER CLOSELY TO AVOID LEAKS, EGYPTIANS DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN AS CAREFUL. IT CLEAR THAT OFFER IS KNOWN ABOUT AT VARIOUS LEVELS IN FONMIN, ASIDE FROM FEKI'S OFFICE AND OFFICER NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS. ISMAIL FAHMY OF UN AFFAIRS, FOR INSTANCE, MENTIONED OFFER AT DINNER FOR WAR COLLEGE LAST NIGHT. WE TOLD HIM ONLY TWO OFFICERS IN EMBASSY KNEW ABOUT IT AND WE MOST ANXIOUS THERE BE NO LEAKS. FAHMY SAID NOT TO WORRY, UAR WOULD HOLD IT CLOSELY. WE FEAR HOWEVER THAT EGYPTIAN SIEVE IS GOING TO START LEAKING BEFORE LONG.

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *9-23-02*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action
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Info

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 5937

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1967 APR 3 AM 10 51

EXDLs.

YEMEN MEDIATION.

RE JIDDA'S 4047.

1. AFTER READING FEISAL'S CONDITIONS FOR ACCEPTING MEDIATION, WE NOT SURE WHERE WE STAND. WITHIN POLITICAL BARGAINING FRAMEWORK, CONDITION (A) REGARDING SAUDIS UNWILLINGNESS ACCEPT ANY RESTRAINT ON THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING MEDIATION IS PERHAPPS NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH, PROVIDING RECIPROCAL PRIVILEGE EXTENDED TO EGYPTIANS. IT DOES, OF COURSE, SOUND OMINOUS AS FAR AS RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES CONCERNED, BUT IN PRACTICE MAY NOT WORK OUT TO BE AS BAD AS IT SOUNDS, PARTICULARLY IF ROYALISTS ARE AS WEAK AND DISORGANIZED AS SOME REPORTS INDICATE.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 5937B ~~SECRET~~

2. CONDITION (B) WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO UARG. IT UNREASONABLE EXPECT LATTER, BEFORE ENTERING MEDIATION, TO AGREE IT IS GOING TO LOSE OUT. (INCIDENTIALLY, IT IS UNREASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT UAR INFLUENCE IN YEMEN IS COMPLETELY ERADICABLE FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION EVEN WERE UAR TO ABANDON THE PLACE. FOR BETTER OR WORSE, YEMEN HAS CHANGED. APPRECIABLE NUMBER YEMENIS HAVE BEEN EDUCATED AND HAVE SEEN OUTSIDE WOULD UNDER UAR TUTELAGE. UAR WILL CONTINUE HAVE INFLUENCE IN YEMEN WHETHER IT WANTS IT OR NOT.)

3. CONDITION(C) ALSO UNREASONABLE, AND AMOUNTS TO ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN USG AND UAR. QUESTION OF OUR AID TO UAR REALLY NONE OF FEISAL'S BUSINESS AND FOR US TO ACCEPT SUCH A CONDITION WOULD BE DEROGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY,

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

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By jc, NARA, Date 9-23-02

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-2-Cairo 5937, April 3

. AS KHOULI POINTED OUT ON MARCH 30 - (CAIRO 5823) NASSER HAS ACCEPTED MEDIATION OFFER UNCONDITIONALLY, IF FEISAL IS GOING TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS, EGYPTIANS WOULD PREFER WE TOLD THEM FRANKLY AND FORGET ABOUT WHOLE THING. NEVERTHELESS, WE SUSPECT THAT WHEN WE GET DOWN TO DETAILS EGYPT WILL HAVE ITS CONDITIONS TOO. AT THAT TIME WE MIGHT INCLUDE CONDITION (A) IN TERMS OF REFERENCE SOMEHOW, BUT WE BELIEVE CONDITIONS (B)

PAGE 3 R

UEIVCR 5937B ~~SECRET~~
AND (C) ARE OUT OF QUESTION.

5. PROBLEM IS THAT WE MUST TELL EGYPTIANS SOON WHETHER FEISAL HAS ACCEPTED OFFER AND ANY DELAY OR HEDGING IN OUR RESPONSE WILL BE TAKEN AS EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS IMPOSED CONDITIONS AND WE TRYING TEMPORIZE. EVIDENCE THEIR INTEREST IS FACT DIRECTOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS AL-AISSY ASKED ME THIS MORNING WHETHER SAUDIS HAVE RESPONDED TO OFFER. I SAID WE HAD NOT HEARD YET.

UARG WILLINGNESS BE PATIENT MAY, OF COURSE, BE INDICATION OF SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH IT REGARDS MEDIATION EFFORT, BUT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD TELL EGYPTIANS AT EARLY DATE, "YES, FEISAL HAS ACCEPTED WITH NO SIGNIFICANT RESERVATIONS." WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT DO SO IN THE LIGHT OF FEISAL'S INITIAL RESPONSE, BUT PERHAPS WE CAN FINESSE QUESTION BY SENDING AMBASSADOR HARE TO AREA NOW ON EXPLORATORY MISSION WITH NO DEFINITE TERMS OF REFERENCE TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN DO SOMETHING RESOLVE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE.

5. FOR THE RECORD AND FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION WITH FEISAL, THE NAME OF AMBASSADOR HARE WAS NOT BROUGHT INTO PICTURE INITIALLY BY EGYPTIANS. DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH UNDER SECRETARY AL-FEKI AFTER AMBASSADOR BATTLE'S DEPARTURE, I

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 5937B ~~SECRET~~

MENTIONED ILLUSTRATIVELY AMBASSADORS HARE, BUNKER, MURPHY AND MERCHANT, AS THE SORT OF SENIOR DIPLOMATS WE MIGHT BE

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-3-Cairo 5937, April 3

ABLE TO SECURE FOR A MEDIATION EFFORT. AL-FEKI PROBABLY TOOK THIS AS AN OFFER OF THE SERVICES OF ONE OF THESE MEN AND PREPARED A MEMORANDUM TO THIS EFFECT. THIS WAS THE MEMORANDUM TO WHICH NASSER WAS REPLYING IN QUOTATION REPORTED PARA 5 OUR 5823.

GP-1.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

21

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1967 MAR 30 AM 11 20

PP RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 5823B 0891510
ZNY SSSSS
P 301428Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQVRAX AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 5823

EXDIS

REF: STATE 164618, JIDDA 3989

SUBJ: YEMEN

1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO TERMS OF REFERENCE AND MODALITIES OUR MEDIATION EFFORT, ASSUMING FEISAL ACCEPTS OUR OFFER. AS JIDDA INDICATES WE HAVE NUMBER OF CHOICES. ONE IS TO START AT FURTHEST POINT REACHED BY KUWAITIS. ANOTHER IS TO START FROM SCRATCH AND WORK UP A SET OF PROPOSALS ONLY AFTER CONSULTING PARTIES, AND A THIRD IS TO WORK UP OUR OWN PROPOSALS INDEPENDENTLY AND PRESENT THEM TO THE PARTIES FULL BLOWN BEFORE CONSULTATION. WE MUST ALSO DECIDE WHETHER SCOPE OF MEDIATION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO YEMEN, OR WHETHER IT SHOULD INCLUDE ENTIRE AREA OF UAR.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 5823B ~~SECRET~~
SAG TENSIONS, THE PROPAGANDA WAR, SUBVERSION, ETC., AND WHETHER IT SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE SOUTH ARABIA AS WELL. THERE IS ALSO QUESTION RAISED BY JIDDA OF WHETHER WE ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH KUWAITIS AND IF SO IN WHAT WAY.

2. TO TAKE THESE QUESTIONS IN REVERSE ORDER, WE NOT SURE WE KNOW WHAT JIDDA MEANS BY "WORKING IN TANDEM" BUT FORESEE CONSIDERABLE MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY IN A JOINT US-KUWAITI EFFORT. ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL WE WOULD PREFER SEPARATE US EFFORT, WITH DUE TOUCHING OF BASE IN KUWAIT AT AN EARLY STAGE.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9/23/02

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-2- CAIRO 5823, MARCH 30

3. AS TO THE SCOPE OF OUR EFFORT, WE THINK OPTIMUM SOLUTION WOULD BE ONE WHICH INCLUDED ALL ASPECTS OF INTERRELATED PROBLEMS, I.E. SOUTH ARABIA, SAG-UAR TENSIONS, AND YEMEN. IN VIEW CLOSE CONNECTION ALL THREE, WE SUSPECT SOLUTION ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER WILL PROVE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. YEMEN AND SAG-UAR TENSIONS WOULD SEEM TO BE MORE OF A MANAGEABLE UNIT THAN ALL THREE TOGETHER, BUT NASSER-FEISAL RIVALRY TRANSCENDS MATERIAL ISSUES AND MY BE IRREDUCIBLE, WHILE SOME SORT OF MODUS VIVENDI CAN PERHAPS BE REACHED ON BOTH YEMEN AND SOUTH ARABIA. WE FAVOR INITIAL APPROACH OF WIDEST POSSIBLE SCOPE, WITH SUBSEQUENT NARROWING DOWN TO SOLUBLE ISSUES,

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 5823B ~~SECRET~~

RATHER THAN STARTING ON NARROW FRONTAGE AND EXPANDING. WHILE IN END WE MAY HAVE TO BE SATISFIED WITH SETTLEMENT OF NARROW, ISOLATED ISSUES WITH NO OVERALL SOLUTION, WE THINK LACK OF SUCCESS OF KUWAITI EFFORT RELATES ESSENTIALLY TO FAILURE TO ATTACK ROOTS OF PROBLEM OR TO LEVEL WITH PARTIES AT ISSUE AS TO FULL EXTENT THEIR DISAGREEMENT.

4. AS TO STARTING POINT, WE THINK WE SHOULD USE FINAL STAGE KUWAITI EFFORT AS POINT OF REFERENCE, BUT SHOULD LOOK OVER ENTIRE PROBLEM AND SEE WHETHER WE HAVE ANY FRESH PROPOSALS TO PUT FORWARD, NOT IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF GIMMICKS BUT IN TERMS OF AN ATTACK ON THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM, SUCH AS THE MUTUAL SUSPICIONS OF ALL PARTIES.

5. I INFORMED EL FEKI THIS MORNING OF DEPARTMENT'S POSITIVE REACTION TO OUR TALK OF 28 MARCH AND THAT WE WERE NOW TAKING UP POSSIBLE US MEDIATION WITH SAUDIS. HE MADE NO COMMENT. PARKER ALSO SAW KHOULI THIS MORNING AND TOLD HIM DEPARTMENT PLEASSED WITH NASSER'S POSITIVE RESPONSE AND HAD INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR EILTS TO RAISE WITH FEISAL. WE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER LATTER WOULD ACCEPT MEDIATION BUT WERE HOPEFUL. KHOULI SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL FEISAL ACCEPT MEDIATION WHOLE-HEARTEDLY, UNCONDITIONALLY AND WITHOUT RESERVATIONS. IF HE COULD NOT DO SO WE SHOULD TELL EGYPTIANS FRANKLY AND SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 5823B ~~SECRET~~
MEDIATION. HE THEN READ FROM LETTER OR MEMORANDUM SIGNED

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-3- CAIRO 5823, MARCH 30

BY NASSER SAYING "(1) I ACCEPT THE MEDIATION AND (2) MR. HARE IS THE BEST CHOICE." THIS WAS CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF MEDIATION.

6. PARKER THEN ASKED HOW EGYPTIANS VISUALIZED MEDIATION PROCESS, ASSUMING FEISAL ACCEPTED. WE HAD UNDERSTOOD FEKI'S REMARKS (CAIRO 5738) TO MEAN UAR ACCEPTED MEDIATION IN PRINCIPLE, DEPENDING ON TERMS OF REFERENCE. WHAT DID EGYPTIANS HAVE IN MIND? KHOULI SAID, PENDING FEISAL'S ACCEPTANCE, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DISCUSS TERMS OF REFERENCE IN DETAIL, BUT SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT IF FEISAL ACCEPTED AMBASSADOR HARE SHOULD BEGIN BY HAVING EXPLORATORY TALKS ON THE GROUND TO LEARN WHAT BOTH SIDES WANTED AND THEN FORM HIS OWN PROPOSALS. HE DID NOT THINK THERE NEED BE ANY ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF WHAT PROBLEMS OR PROPOSALS COULD BE DICUSSED. HE THOUGHT FRANKNESS ON PART EVERYONE MORE IMPORTANT THAN RULES OF PROCEDURE.

7. COMMENT: REMAINS BE SEEN WHETHER EGYPTIANS WILL WISH LIMIT SCOPE OF ANY DISCUSSIONS OR WILL CONTINUE BE AS RELAXED ABOUT DETAILS AS KHOULI SEEMS TO BE FOR MOMENT.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 MAR 23 AM 9 26

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 5738

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EXDIS ~~UABU~~*

REFERENCE: CAIRO 5030 AND JIDDA'S 3391 AND 3473.

1. DURING PRESIDENT'S DINNER FOR OULD DADDAH LAST EVENING FOREIGN OFFICE UNDER SECRETARY EL FEKI ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM THIS MORNING WHICH I HAVE JUST DONE.
2. EL FEKI SAID PRESIDENT NASSER HAD BEEN PONDERING MOST SERIOUSLY SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE US MEDIATION UAR-SAUDI DIFFICULTIES MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR BATTLE DURING HIS FAREWELL CALL ON MARCH 4. PRESIDENT NOW WISHED US TO KNOW THAT HE WOULD IN PRINCIPLE ACCEPT AMBASSADOR RAYMOND HARE IN THIS ROLE. IF HE COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE, FINAL DECISION ON MEDIATION WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE REACHED IN LIGHT HIS TERMS REFERENCE AND PARALLEL SAUDI AGREEMENT.
3. I SAID I PERSONALLY WAS GREATLY HEARTENED BY PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO OFFER PUT FORWARD BY AMBASSADOR BATTLE AND KNEW THAT HE WOULD BE ALSO. I WOULD REPORT THIS DEVELOPMENT IMMEDIATELY AND WOULD RECOMMEND PROMPT AND FAVORABLE USG CONSIDERATION.
4. COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST BREAK WE HAVE HAD IN MANY MONTHS OF DETERIORATION US-UAR RELATIONS. I FEEL AMBASSADOR HARE IS LOGICAL AND IDEAL CHOICE AND THAT ASSUMING HE IS ACCEPTABLE TO SAUDIS WILL JUST BY UNDERTAKING TASK GREATLY LOWER TEMPERATURES IN AREA AND GIVE US-UAR RELATIONS MUCH NEEDED BLOOD TRASFUSION.
5. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION SOONES AND IF POSSIBLE PRIOR SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S DEPARTURE FROM CAIRO APRIL FIRST.

GP-3.

NES

*AS RECEIVED.

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Authority FRV 64-68, vol. 21, #429

By jc NARA, Date 9-23-02

~~SECRET~~

✓ HAL SHOULD SEE CAIRO 5031
(ROGER CHANNEL) dated March 4

Return to B. Smith.



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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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1. ~~Roston~~

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3/10/67

1. DURING TIRADE REPORTED SEPARATELY NASSER REFERRED MY LAST CALL ON HIM TO DISCUSS HIS EARLIER CONVERSATION BIRDSALL (CAIRO'S 3300). HE SAID HE HAD HESITATED AT THAT TIME ANSWER MY QUESTION RE REASONS HIS SUSPICION BUT HAD DECIDED IN THIS OUR LAST MEETING THAT HE WOULD WITHHOLD NOTHING FROM ME.

2. [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] NASSER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD DESIRE GET INFORMATION AND AWARE ALL EMPASSIES ENGAGED SUCH ACTIVITY. THIS, HOWEVER, WAS DIFFERENT AND AIMED DIRECTLY AT HIM AND UAR REGIME.

3.3
(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)

NASSER IMPLIED STUDENT EMPLOYED SOME BRANCH UAR GOVERNMENT CONCERNED NUCLEAR ACTIVITY. REACTION UAR. NASSER SAID. WAS TO MINIMIZE NUMBER UAR STUDENTS IN US. [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-62

By isl, NARA, Date 4-2-07

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-2- CAIRO 5031, MARCH 4

3.3 (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

5. HE REMARKED SAUDI CONTACTS WITH EGYPTIAN ARMY, WHICH HE ALLEGED TO BE UNDER OUR DIRECTION, WERE FULLY KNOWN UAR AND EGYPTIANS COMPLETELY AWARE ALL CONTACTS THIS CHANNEL. (SALAH NASIR, HEAD OF GIA, HAS TWICE SAID THIS TO BROMELL, MOST RECENTLY ON MARCH 1.)

6. I TOLD PRESIDENT I WAS SHOCKED INDEED BY WHAT HE TOLD ME, AND THAT I HAD BEEN EXTREMELY DISTURBED INFORMATION HE HAD GIVEN BIRDSALL EARLIER AND FELT IT IMPERATIVE WE GO TO ROOT SUSPICION. WE HAD OFFERED BRING SENIOR CIA OFFICIAL CAIRO TO REVIEW CHARGES AND EVIDENCE. I STILL HOPED THIS POSSIBLE AS IT IMPERATIVE WE ANALYZE BASIS OF CHARGES AS SERIOUS AS THOSE HE APPEARED BELIEVE. MOST EARNESTLY AS IN MY LAST REQUEST TO HIM, I HOPED HE WOULD JOIN WITH US IN FULL EFFORT AIR SUCH CHARGES. I SAID I UNAWARE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING VARIOUS CHARGES AND HAD NO IDEA WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT WITH RESPECT SAUDI CONTACTS IN UAR UNDER US DIRECTION WHICH I FELT HIGHLY UNLIKELY. I WOULD LIKE, HOWEVER, SEE ALL SUCH CHARGES REVIEWED AND LAID TO REST. IF THERE DEVELOPED ANY TRUTH TO ANY OF THEM, I WISHED KNOW IT AND DEAL HARSHLY WITH ANY SUCH ACTIONS WHICH WERE CLEARLY CONTRARY US POLICY.

7. NASSER THEN SAID HE FULLY AWARE FACT THAT I DID NOT KNOW ANY OF FOREGOING. HE ALSO FULLY AWARE THOSE INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS SAW IN UAR AND HAD RECENTLY ORDERED COMPLETE REVIEW ALL ACTIVITIES OF AMERICANS IN CAIRO. I SAID I HOPED AND BELIEVED HIS REVIEW WOULD REASSURE HIM AS I BELIEVED HE WAS MUCH TOO SUSPICIOUS AND THAT CIA ACTIVITY NOT NEARLY AS BROAD IN WORLD AS HE BELIEVED.

3.3 (b)(1) [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] HE ADMITTED I WAS RIGHT WHEN I SAID HE WAS SUSPICIOUS. IT GREW OUT OF HIS BACKGROUND AND HE STILL FOUND HIMSELF NERVOUS ABOUT WRITING DOWN TELEPHONE NUMBERS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HE ALWAYS COMMITTED TO MEMORY. HE ALSO HESITATED ABOUT WRITING LETTERS AND RELUCTANT COMMIT HIMSELF TO PAPER, EVEN IN REPLY CORRESPONDENCE OTHER PRESIDENTS (PRESUMABLY US) WHICH SOMETIMES DELAYED DUE TO HIS SUSPICIOUS NATURE.

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-3- CAIRO 5031, MARCH 4

9. I ASKED AGAIN TO ARRANGE FOR CIA SENIOR OFFICIAL REVIEW EVIDENCE. NASSER REPLIED IT WOULD DO NO GOOD AND PERHAPS ONLY TIME COULD REASSURE HIS GOVERNMENT. HE NOT ONLY MEMBER GOVERNMENT SUSPICIOUS US ACTIONS AS MOST HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS EQUALLY SO.

10. I THANKED PRESIDENT FOR GIVING ME FOREGOING. EXPRESSED EARNEST HOPE WE COULD DEAL WITH CHARGES TOGETHER AND SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE WE TRY ELIMINATE SUSPICIONS AS ILL FOUNDED AND OF AS SERIOUS A NATURE AS HE APPEARED ACCEPT.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : Department

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 9 9 43 AM 1967
ANALYSIS BRANCH

Rostow

FROM : American Embassy Cairo DATE: March 3
SUBJECT : Minister of Treasury Nazih Ahmad Deif's Review of UAR Development Efforts
REF : CAIRO 4857

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-23-02

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR ROSTOW

Mr. Harold Saunders, accompanied by the reporting officer, called on Nazih Ahmad Deif, Minister of the Treasury on 23 February 1967. Mr. Saunders conveyed to the Minister the personal greetings of Mr. Walt Rostow, the respect in which Mr. Rostow held the Egyptian professional economists, and Mr. Rostow's continued belief that economic development should lead to the solution of many of the problems now besetting developing countries. Mr. Saunders then recalled the Minister's discussion of Egyptian development problems with Mr. Rostow last autumn and asked how things were now going. The subsequent discussion turned on the following principal points:

Investment and Allocation of Resources - The Minister said his government had got "control" of expenditures. This problem no longer concerned him. What did concern him was the level of investment. The sense of his remarks was that the cutback in expenditures was bringing down investment to a level that was not compatible with the future requirements of the country. He spoke obliquely of the disparity between the growth targets publicly expounded by his President, with whom he fully agreed, and the means for attaining them. He also spoke of his personally advocating to his President a higher priority to agriculture. He made a persuasive argument on the stability of agriculture in Egypt compared with some of the problems that beset industrial development. He appeared to call into question some of the cost benefit ratios that were now apparently providing the basis for some of the resource allocation to industry. Speaking more generally on development problems

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Drafted by: ECON:OTJ Jones je 2-1-67

Contents and Classification Approved by: ECON:OTJ Jones

Clearances:

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the Minister pointed to the success of the High Dam effort. Equal success in other sectors of the economy called, he said, for dealing with wholly different organizational and planning problems.

Agriculture - The Minister said that an annual increase of only 3% in agricultural production was expected over the next three years. This he indicated by shaking his head was not enough. He spoke of the covered drainage program which he described as the central feature of the current vertical agricultural development effort. This was a three-year program that should increase production by 30% in the areas affected. He left the implication that the mounting of his covered drainage program was not an easy task. He also spoke of the planned increase of land to be reclaimed under current reclamation programs from 56,000 feddans this year to 126,000 feddans next year. This increase, he said, was inspired by an American monograph on agricultural development that he had had translated and distributed within the upper echelons of the UAR government. Notwithstanding these current agricultural efforts the Minister did not see Egypt becoming self-sufficient in food grains. Wheat consumption was rising, and there was a tendency toward a parallel increase in corn consumption as corn production increased. Thus the basic foreign exchange problem for food imports and development purposes would be with Egypt for a long time.

Exports - After reviewing the economy's export prospects, the Minister said that oil offered the only real promise for breakthrough here. There might be increases of exports within the agricultural and industrial sectors, but they will only be modest percentage increases. On oil he clearly was thinking big. While choosing his words carefully and making the usual caveats, he suggested it was not wholly unrealistic to compare Egypt's prospects with the Libyan "curve." If that were applied here, by 1975 Egypt could have annual petroleum exports of LE 260 million.

Import Substitution - Aside from oil, the Minister felt that an alleviation of Egypt's balance of payments problem was more likely to be found in import substitution. Aside from the impact of increased agricultural production, he mentioned specifically here semi-processed raw materials to be obtained from the expansion of the Helwan Steel Plant and from the production of aluminum products. The latter operation should involve the use of the additional electricity to be provided by the High Dam. This additional electricity would also reduce current imports of energy-producing materials. A petro-chemical industry also offered promise in the field of import substitution, but the Minister

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CAIRO A- 735
PAGE 3

did not think that the economy had the know-how to move into this field yet. By 1975, however, he saw the fertilizer industry being an export earner for his country. In balancing these possible gains against the economy's mounting import bill for staple materials, the Minister underlined again the long, hard pull that was ahead.

Population - The Minister was pessimistic about any breakthrough here. His government had launched a very expensive program and had reached thus far only 3 to 4% of the female population. This was more of a cultural than resources problem. It would take a long time. He left the impression that his government didn't quite know how to cope with it.

At no time during the 45-minute meeting was any reference made to the pending UAR request for food from the USG or the current negotiations with the IMF.

This airgram should be read in conjunction with Cairo's 4857 dated 27 February 1967.

BATTLE



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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CORRECTION ISSUED:
3/6/67-2:05 AM (MEC)

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EXDIS

1. DURING MY LAST DAYS CAIRO I HAVE HAD LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS WITH MARSHAL AMER, SADAT, PRIME MINISTER SOLIMAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR ECONOMY ZAKI, HASSAN SABRY EL KHOULY, HEIKAL AND MANY OTHERS. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY VARIOUS FACETS THESE CONVERSATIONS BUT WOULD LIKE IN THIS TELEGRAM TO SUMMARIZE WHAT SEEMED TO ME TO BE ESSENTIAL THRUST ALL CONVERSATIONS.

2. UAR OFFICIALS GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS CHANGED ITS POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST AND IS SUPPORTING CONSERVATIVE AGAINST MORE PROGRESSIVE REGIMES. ARMS SHIPMENTS SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND ISRAEL PLUS SUSPICION BRITISH ACTIONS SAUDI ARABIA SUGGEST WE ARE ALL IN CONCERT TO BRING UAR TO ITS KNEES. SOME BELIEVE WE ARE ATTEMPTING UNDERMINE REGIME OR OVERTHROW IT.

PAGE2 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~SECRET~~
OTHERS. BELIEVE WE ARE PUTTING PRESSURE IN HOPE WE CAN FORCE REGIME COMPLY OUR WISHES (NOT NECESSARILY BY ITS OVERTHROW) AND ACHIEVE OUR OWN DEVIOS OBJECTIVES IN AREA.

3. ALMOST ALL SENIOR PEOPLE HAVE MENTIONED CIA TO ME. STORIES RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE STATES SUPPORT THEIR DEEP AND BASIC CONVICTION CIA IS EVERY WHERE AND ENTIRELY CAPABLE PURSUING ITS OWN POLICY. MOST OFFICIALS. APPEAR CONVINCED I HAD HAD NO CONTROL OVER ACTIVITIES AND KNOW NOTHING ABOUT SUCH ACTIONS AND HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, REFERRED TO POSSIBLE SUPER AMBASSADOR OR REAL BOSS SOMEWHERE IN EMBASSY.

4. THE PL 480 FOOD PROGRAM HAS BECOME MAJOR ISSUE WHICH THESE OFFICIALS TRY NOT TO RELATE TO ANYTHING ELSE GOING ON IN THE AREA. AT LEAST INSOFAR AS REASON/ SUSPENSION PROGRAM. THEY REFUSE SEE ANTHING THEY HAVE DONE TO WARRANT OUR CUTTING OFF SUPPLIES AND THEREFORE BELIEVE IT IS PART OF A

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By is, NARA, Date 9-2-03

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US POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT AND PRESSURE ON REGIME. ISSUE HANDLED IN VARIOUS WAYS BY UAR SENIOR OFFICIALS. SOME SAY THEY DO NOT WANT US WHEAT (NASSER AND HEIKAL). OTHERS SAY THEY WANT IT VERY MUCH AND THAT IT IS SYMBOL COOPERATION US (FAWZI AND ZAKI). OTHERS EXPRESS CONVICTION OUR DELAY IN ANSWERING

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~SECRET~~

THEIR SPRING 1966 REQUEST DELIBERATE EFFORT USE STARVATION AS POLITICAL WEAPON. RELATED THIS IS FEELING UAR HAS OVER-EXTENDED ITSELF IN BROADER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN CASE IF FOOD PROGRAM NEVER BEGUN. OTHERS INDICATE THEY WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF WE GAVE THEM AN ANSWER EITHER WAY BUT ANSWER OVERDUE. THROUGHOUT ALL DISCUSSIONS IS BELIEF WE HAVE DELIBERATELY STRUNG COUNTRY ALONG AND THERE IS LITTLE SENSE THAT UAR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE DIFFICULTIES.

5. NO OFFICIAL HAS REALLY MADE MUCH COMMENT TO ME ABOUT PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES AND HEIKAL'S ARTICLES, BOTH OF WHICH I HAVE CRITICIZED MOST VEHEMENTLY OVER RECENT DAYS. I HAVE EXPLAINED TO ALL THOSE LISTED ABOVE RELATIONSHIP PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES TO RELATIONS US-UAR AND TO CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN US FOR WHICH THEY HAVE LITTLE APPRECIATION. EITHER OUT OF FEAR OR LOYALTY NOT ONE HAS RESPONDED WITH ANY HOPE CHANGE OR REAL BELIEF SPEECHES MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE.

5. GENERAL THRUST ALL CONVERSIONS RELATIVE STRUGGLES BETWEEN NASSER, FEISAL AND HUSSEIN HAS BEEN CONVICTION THAT KING FEISAL AND KING HUSSEIN WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CHALLENGE UAR UNLESS COMPLETELY CONVINCED US

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~SECRET~~

SUPPORT AND/OR URGING. MANY SUSPICIONS US FINANCING JORDAINAN REGIME AND THAT CIA MONEY OR MANIPULATION OIL MARKETS USED TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES US. ARAB-ISRAELI STRAITS HAVE PLAYED RATHER SECONDARY ROLE IN DISCUSSIONS. THIS STEMS PERHAPS FROM FACT EVERYTHING THAT CAN BE SAID HAS BEEN SAID BUT ALSO REFLECTS, I BELIEVE, GENERAL WILLINGNESS NOT EXACERBATE THAT SITUATION, AT LEAST FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

7. THERE IS CONCERN RE ECONOMY UAR, WORRIES ABOUT RELATIONS TO WESTERN FINANCIAL INTERESTS. NERVOUSNESS VARIES, HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON CLOSENESS SPEAKER TO ECONOMIC PORTFOLIOS AND NOWHERE IS THERE DEPTH OF WORRY THAT FACTS WOULD SEEM TO

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INDICATE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BLUSTER TO THE EFFECT, "WE WILL MAKE IT IN SPITE OF YOU," OR PHRASES TO THAT EFFECT.

8. THERE IS SOME CONCERN RE WESTERN CHARGE UAR BECOMING INCREASINGLY BEHOLDEN SOVIETS OR ON VERGE BECOMING COMMUNIST. SEVERAL TOP OFFICIALS HAVE MADE GREAT POINT TO ME THIS NOT CASE AND POINT THEN MADE THEY WILL BOW TO NEITHER RUSSIANS NOR AMERICANS.

9. I HAVE ANSWERED ALL FOREGOING TO BEST OF MY ABILITY. IN ONE OR TWO INSTANCES, I BELIEVE I HAVE HAD SOME MOMENTARY EFFECT.

PAGE 5 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~SECRET~~

BUT THE FOREGOING ARE RAPIDLY BECOMING DOGMAS DIFFICULT TO REFUTE AND MADDENING TO DEAL WITH.

IN ALL INSTANCES OFFICIALS LISTED AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY COURTEOUS TO ME AND I LEAVE EGYPT WITH KINDNESS FROM EVERY QUARTER, MANY EGYPTIAN FAREWELL PARTIES, PRESENTS, ETC. THESE GESTURES ARE PURELY PERSONAL HOWEVER AND ARE CONTRARY TONE ALL OFFICIAL RELATIONS. OUR PROBLEMS ARE REAL AND BASIC. WHILE THEY ARE OF NATURE THAT CAN CHANGE QUICKLY, I FEAR WE ARE IN FOR A PERIOD SERIOUS DIFFICULTY OVER NEXT MONTHS. I REGRET THAT I LEAVE CAIRO AT MOMENT US-UAR RELATIONS IN ONE OF MANY LOW PERIODS. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, AND HAVE SO EMPHASIZED TO EGYPTIANS, BELIEVE THAT ANY MOMENTARY LESSENING OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN US CAN BE TAKEN AS PERMANENT COURSE. WE MUST CONTINUE TRY FIND MORE PERMANENT BASIS FOR MEANINGFUL RELATIONS AND SOME PATTERN OF COOPERATION UAR IN VIEW BASIC INTERESTS AND GOALS US IN THIS AREA AND THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE UAR HAS IN MIDDLE EAST.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS

1. DURING MY LAST DAYS CAIRO I HAVE HAD LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS WITH MARSHAL AMER, SADAT, PRIME MINISTER SOLIMAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR ECONOMY ZAKI, HASSAN SABRY EL KHOULY, HEIKAL AND MANY OTHERS. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY VARIOUS FACETS THESE CONVERSATIONS BUT WOULD LIKE IN THIS TELEGRAM TO SUMMARIZE WHAT SEEMED TO ME TO BE ESSENTIAL THRUST ALL CONVERSATIONS.

2. UAR OFFICIALS GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS CHANGED ITS POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST AND IS SUPPORTING CONSERVATIVE AGAINST MORE PROGRESSIVE REGIMES. ARMS SHIPMENTS SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND ISRAEL PLUS SUSPICION BRITISH ACTIONS SAUDI ARABIA SUGGEST WE ARE ALL IN CONCERT TO BRING UAR TO ITS KNEES. SOME BELIEVE WE ARE ATTEMPTING UNDERMINE REGIME OR OVERTHROW IT.

PAGE2 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~S E C R E T~~
OTHERS BELIEVE WE ARE PUTTING PRESSURE IN HOPE WE CAN FORCE REGIME COMPLY OUR WISHES (NOT NECESSARILY BY ITS OVERTHROW) AND ACHIEVE OUR OWN DEVIOS OBJECTIVES IN AREA.

3. ALMOST ALL SENIOR PEOPLE HAVE MENTIONED CIA TO ME. STORIES RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE STATES SUPPORT THEIR DEEP AND BASIC CONVICTION CIA IS EVERY WHERE AND ENTIRELY CAPABLE PURSUING ITS OWN POLICY. MOST OFFICIALS APPEAR CONVINCED I HAD HAD NO CONTROL OVER ACTIVITIES AND KNOW NOTHING ABOUT SUCH ACTIONS AND HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, REFERRED TO POSSIBLE SUPER AMBASSADOR OR REAL BOSS SOMEWHERE IN EMBASSY.

4. THE PL 480 FOOD PROGRAM HAS BECOME MAJOR ISSUE WHICH THESE OFFICIALS TRY NOT TO RELATE TO ANYTHING ELSE GOING ON IN THE AREA, AT LEAST INSOFAR AS REASON SUSPENSION PROGRAM. THEY REFUSE SEE ANTHING THEY HAVE DONE TO WARRANT OUR QUITTING OFF SUPPLIES AND THEREFORE BELIEVE IT IS PART OF A

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Authority NLS 02-277(25)
By plics. NARA, Date 1-18-06

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-2- CAIRO 5036, MARCH 5

US POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT AND PRESSURE ON REGIME. ISSUE HANDLED IN VARIOUS WAYS BY UAR SENIOR OFFICIALS. SOME SAY THEY DO NOT WANT US WHEAT (NASSER AND HEIKAL). OTHERS SAY THEY WANT IT VERY MUCH AND THAT IT IS SYMBOL COOPERATION US (FAWZI AND ZAKI). OTHERS EXPRESS CONVICTION OUR DELAY IN ANSWERING

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~SECRET~~
THEIR SPRING 1966 REQUEST DELIBERATE EFFORT USE STARVATION AS POLITICAL WEAPON. RELATED THIS IS FEELING UAR HAS OVER-EXTENDED ITSELF IN BROADER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN CASE IF FOOD PROGRAM NEVER BEGUN. OTHERS INDICATE THEY WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF WE GAVE THEM AN ANSWER EITHER WAY BUT ANSWER OVERDUE. THROUGHOUT ALL DISCUSSIONS IS BELIEF WE HAVE DELIBERATELY STRUNG COUNTRY ALONG AND THERE IS LITTLE SENSE THAT UAR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE DIFFICULTIES.

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PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~SECRET~~
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7. THERE IS CONCERN RE ECONOMY UAR, WORRIES ABOUT RELATIONS TO WESTERN FINANCIAL INTERESTS. NERVOUSNESS VARIES, HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON CLOSENESS SPEAKER TO (#) AND NOWHERE IS THERE DEPTH OF WORRY THAT FACTS WOULD SEEM TO

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-3- CAIRO 5036, MARCH 5

INDICATE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BLUSTER TO THE EFFECT, "WE WILL MAKE IT IN SPITE OF YOU," OR PHRASES TO THAT EFFECT.

8. THERE IS SOME CONCERN RE WESTERN CHARGE UAR BECOMING INCREASINGLY BEHOLDEN SOVIETS OR ON VERGE BECOMING COMMUNIST. SEVERAL TOP OFFICIALS HAVE MADE GREAT POINT TO ME THIS NOT CASE AND POINT THEN MADE THEY WILL BOW TO NEITHER RUSSIANS NOR AMERICANS.

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PAGE 5 RUEIVCR 5036B ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
BUT THE FOREGOING ARE RAPIDLY BECOMING DOGMAS DIFFICULT TO REFUTE AND MADDENING TO DEAL WITH. IN ALL INSTANCES OFFICIALS LISTED AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY COURTEOUS TO ME AND I LEAVE EGYPT WITH KINDNESS FROM EVERY QUARTER, MANY EGYPTIAN FAREWELL PARTIES, PRESENTS, ETC. THESE GESTURES ARE PURELY PERSONAL HOWEVER AND ARE CONTRARY TONE ALL OFFICIAL RELATIONS. OUR PROBLEMS ARE REAL AND BASIC. WHILE THEY ARE OF NATURE THAT CAN CHANGE QUICKLY, I FEAR WE ARE IN FOR A PERIOD SERIOUS DIFFICULTY OVER NEXT MONTHS. I REGRET THAT I LEAVE CAIRO AT MOMENT US-UAR RELATIONS IN ONE OF MANY LOW PERIODS. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, AND HAVE SO EMPHASIZED TO EGYPTIANS, BELIEVE THAT ANY MOMENTARY LESSENING OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN US CAN BE TAKEN AS PERMANENT COURSE. WE MUST CONTINUE TRY FIND MORE PERMANENT BASIS FOR MEANINGFUL RELATIONS AND SOME PATTERN OF COOPERATION UAR IN VIEW BASIC INTERESTS AND GOALS US IN THIS AREA AND THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE UAR HAS IN MIDDLE EAST.

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(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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AIRGRAM

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A-736

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department

RECEIVED

MAR 9 9 43 AM '67

Rostow

FROM : American Embassy Cairo

DATE: March 3, 1967

SUBJECT: Minister of Economy Hasan Abas ZAKI's Review of UAR Development Efforts

REF : CAIRO 4857

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-23-02

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR ROSTOW

Mr. Harold Saunders, accompanied by the reporting officer, called on Minister of Economy, Hasan Abas ZAKI, on 25 February. After indicating the respect in which Mr. Walt Rostow held Egyptian professional economists and expressing Mr. Rostow's belief that economic development can lead to the solution of many of the problems facing developing countries throughout the world, Mr. Saunders said that he would be pleased to hear anything that the Minister would care to say about the Egyptian development plans and the present position of the economy. The subsequent discussion turned largely on the following principal points:

The Critical 2-3 Year Period Ahead - The Minister opened up by referring to the recently concluded rescheduling of supplier credits with certain Western European countries. He commented on the importance of this stretch-out in maturities in helping Egypt get over the next two or three difficult years. He went on to speak of a wide range of things that his government is doing in the economic field. This included a series of internal measures having to do, among other things, with internal demand, credit expansion, and the review of government-general organization companies-individual enterprise relationships. The latter exercise was designed to provide more scope for incentives in the development process. While Egyptian enterprises would be working within the Socialist framework of the economy generally, the Minister said that he saw the operation of Egyptian enterprises being no different from enterprise operations under other social systems throughout the world. He spoke of the restrictions in credit which already have

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:
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Clearances:

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occurred, mentioning a figure of LE 30 million. He also spoke of the efforts that his government was taking to reduce the rate of increase of internal demand. He said that the rate of increase had gotten out of hand some years back and that while there should always be a place for a modest increase it should be kept within proportions.

These various internal measures taken together with the rescheduling operations of the external debt were designed to help the Egyptian economy to work through this difficult two to three-year period ahead. Thereafter he believed that rising exports and/or import substitutions should stabilize the situation here. Among the items which he expected to contribute to this improved situation were the exports of oil, increased agricultural production, and increased production of cement, fertilizer, and sugar. It was in the course of this discussion on how to deal with the difficult situation over the next two or three years that the Minister alluded to the importance of possible US wheat assistance and to IMF compensatory cotton export financing. This year's cotton export short fall he put at LE 30 million. He referred briefly to recent exchanges with IMF/Washington following the recent Koch Mission and said that a new Mission headed by John Gunther was now expected to arrive here on/or about 1 April. The problems to which this Mission was expected to address itself were those of repurchase obligations, standby agreement, and compensatory financing for the cotton export short fall.

Growth Rate and Investment - The Minister was asked what sort of an annual growth rate he now envisaged for the Egyptian economy. He indicated a figure of 6½% saying that this would be substantially a continuation of what had been going on before (we having mentioned the 7% during the first 5-Year Plan). He went on to say that he expected an annual investment level of approximately \$350 million. He made rather much of the point that less than 20% of this would be financed through imported resources. Domestic savings were to play a larger role in the investment program going ahead, and this increase in domestic savings was to be accomplished through a reduction in the rate of increase in internal demand. He also said that they expected to be benefiting during the next two or three years from returns thus far not realized on investments previously made.

The 2 Schools of Thought - It was at this point that the Minister turned to his guests and asked what their opinion was concerning the two schools of thought. When asked what he meant by this he said those who advocated a more rapid expansion of the GUAR economy or those who recommended more retrenchment. We commented that this was, of course, not entirely an economic problem and that most development programs throughout the world had to a greater or less degree inflationary forces at work in the course of their implementation. In order to assure an orderly development process,

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CAIRO A- 736
Page 3

however, we suggested that the real answer was one that only he could provide and that the starting point was just what resources they had at their disposal. The Minister said he shared the view that there was more to the development process than pure economics. In his present position he had to be a politician as well as an economist.

Oil - The meeting concluded with a discussion of recent oil developments here. The Minister was asked how these new oil resources would be taken into account in the development process. The Minister felt his way carefully on this. Finally he said, first, that they were being very conservative in their estimates of oil exports for planning purposes. Oil exports of LE 18 million were being projected for next year and LE 28 million for the following year. Thereafter they had no hard estimates although a wide range of suggestions had been made on which they might base their planning. Insofar as the effect of the oil discoveries on the structure of the investment program, the Minister said that at a later date they would be getting into the petro-chemical industry, but for the time being the Helwan steel complex continued to be the central element in their industrialization program.

This airgram should be read in conjunction with Cairo's 4857 dated 27 February 1967.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS

1. AT DINNER PARTY FEBRUARY 21 NASSER CONFIDANTE HEIKAL ASKED ME WHAT I WOULD THINK OF ASSIGNMENT EL FEKI TO REPLACE AMBASSADOR KAMEL IN WASHINGTON. I TOLD HIM QUESTION CHOICE OF AMBASSADOR ENTIRELY UP TO UAR AND NOT MATTER ON WHICH I FELT I SHOULD COMMENT. HE THEN STATED DECISION ALREADY MADE AND EL FEKI WILL BE ANNOUNCED WITHIN TEN DAYS.

2. COMMENT: HEIKAL HAS HAD STRONG DISLIKE FOR KAMEL FOR MANY YEARS AND HAS TRIED FLOAT NAMES WITH ME ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT. FOREGOING COULD BE INACCURATE BUT HAS GREATER RING OF TRUTH THAN EARLIER PRODDING.

GP-3. BATTLE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By *na* NARA, Date 7-28-03

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AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State

COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

FEB 20 8 33 AM 1967

DEPT PASS: TEL AVIV

RS/AR
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy CAIRO

DATE: February 16, 1967

SUBJECT : IAEA Inspection System

REF : Tel Aviv's A-414, January 16, 1967

02
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By us, NARA, Date 7-28-03

EXDIS

The airgram under reference reports a conversation between Foreign Minister Eban and Ambassador Barbour on the question of IAEA safeguards to which the Israelis are reluctant to accede. On reading the memorandum of conversation we are struck by Eban's apparent misapprehensions regarding the Egyptian position on this matter and believe some clarification is needed. The Egyptians voted for the IAEA safeguards resolution at Tokyo on September 27, 1965. They have furthermore made public statements in support of a non-proliferation treaty providing it included an adequate inspection system, e.g. the statement by UAR representative Ismail Fahmy in the First Committee at New York on October 26, 1966 (page 37 of A/C.1/PV.1432). Most recently, in his interview with London Observer correspondent Robert Stephen reported on February 6 of this year, President Nasser said, "We declared that we will sign the nuclear non-proliferation agreement in Vienna, but Israel refused to sign it. As a matter of fact, we are not worried. If the Israelis continue their work to produce an atomic bomb, the final solution would be a deterrent war to repel and liquidate this danger." The Egyptians have not, however, asked for the application of IAEA safeguards to the Inchas reactor, nor have they given any formal document of acceptance of safeguards for future nuclear installations.

On February 8, the reporting officer asked Fahmy for a precise statement of the UAR position on safeguards. Fahmy said the UAR is prepared to accept IAEA safeguards on any new atomic installation

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FORM 4-62 DS-32

In Out

Drafted by: POL:RBParker:ep

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador Battle

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for which it receives assistance either bilaterally or from the IAEA. This is without reference to what Israel does regarding Dimona. The UAR also continues to be prepared to sign a non-proliferation treaty, providing it contains an adequate inspection and safeguards system. He expected such a treaty to be agreed upon this year. Again, he said this was without regard to what the Israelis did, but he added that he did not believe Israel would be able to avoid adherence to such a treaty if it was internationally accepted. With regard to old atomic facilities, i.e., the research reactor at Inchas, it was not of sufficient size to warrant safeguards. However, even were the the UAR able to get the Soviets to agree to a safeguard agreement relating to it (the Soviets having supplied it) the Israelis would not equate this with safeguards on Dimona. He finally remarked parenthetically that the Egyptians were not altogether satisfied with the efficacy of our occasional inspections of Dimona.

Fahmy's remarks are an interesting clarification of the UAR position, i.e., the Egyptians are not waiting for the Israelis to accept safeguards as a sine qua non of their own acceptance. He is prepared to have the Foreign Minister reaffirm this to us if we have any doubt that he is speaking for the UAR. The Egyptians are of course in a much easier position than the Israelis. Having no power reactor and being unlikely to have one any time soon, they can afford to opt for safeguards, knowing they will have little effect on Egypt's nuclear development. We suspect, however, that were we to give the Israelis a power reactor without requiring IAEA safeguards, the Egyptians would refuse to accept safeguards on any such reactor they might acquire. It therefore remains our belief that, short of a nuclear proliferation treaty, our best hope for getting safeguards applied to this area is to tie any nuclear assistance to Israel to acceptance of IAEA safeguards. The Egyptians are unlikely to regard application of bilateral US safeguards to Israel as equivalent to Israeli acceptance of the IAEA system.

As for Eban's remark that the Egyptians are central to the IAEA and have ready access to whatever IAEA inspectors learn about Israel, we would be very surprised if this did not work both ways and if the Israelis would not also know immediately what the inspectors found out about Egypt. If neither country intends to produce nuclear weapons, this should cause no problems.

As for the total environment which Eban speaks of, the experience with UNEF has shown that the Egyptians are interested in a state of non-war if not peace with Israel. They may hope to deal forcefully

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Page 3
Cairo A- 676

with the Israelis some day, but Israeli insistence on retaining the option of a nuclear deterrent, which appears to be the meaning of Eban's words, puts the combat on quite a different plane. As President Nasser's words quoted above indicate, it also risks inviting an act of desperation from Egyptians convinced that the Israelis are about to produce the bomb.



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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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E X D I S

REF: CAIRO 4212

1. LOCAL PRESS THIS MORNING GIVES CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON ABU SHADI YESTERDAY WITH SUMMARY FORMER'S PRESENTATION. APPARENTLY BURCHETT INTERVIEW WAS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND NOT HO CHI MINH AS REPORTED REFTEL.
 2. PRESS MAKES NO RPT NO MENTION AS YET MY CALL. BATTLE
- BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 9.23.02

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS

1. FONOFF UNDER SEC FARID ABU SHADI ASKED ME TO SEE HIM URGENTLY THIS MORNING AND THIS I HAVE JUST DONE ACCOMPANIED BY DCM NES.
2. ABU SHADI REPORTED THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN VISITED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR WHO HAD REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL REPLIES GIVEN BY HO CHI MINH TO QUESTIONS POSED BY AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPERMAN WILFRED BURCHETT DURING RECENT INTERVIEW. QUESTIONS ON WHICH REPLIES BASED WERE NOT PROVIDED.
3. SINCE DEPT PROBABLY HAS FULL TEXT THIS INTERVIEW I WILL NOT ENDEAVOR SUMMMARIZE IT AT THIRD-HAND. STRIPPED OF USUAL PROPAGANDA POLEMICS AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND BOMBING OF NORTH, HO CHI MINH IS QUOTED AS STATING THAT SINCERITY U.S. IN SAYING IT WANTS DIRECT TALKS WITH HANOI

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 4212B ~~SECRET~~
GOVT DOUBTED SO LONG AS BOMBING OF NORTH CONTINUES. IF US REALLY WANTS TALKS MUST FIRST STOP BOMBING UNCONDITIONALLY. TALKS CAN BEGIN ONLY AFTER BOMBING CEASES UNCONDITIONALLY.

4. NORTH VIETNAMESE AMB STATED HE INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY THESE VIEWS AS EXPRESSED BY HO CHI MINH TO BURCHETT OFFICIALLY TO UARG AS DEMONSTRATION HIS GOVT'S WILL FOR PEACE. HE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO REQUEST THAT FRIENDLY GOVTS SUCH AS UAR APPROACH U.S. ON HO'S INTERVIEW WITH BURCHETT. ON SUBSTANCE OF VIETNAM PROBLEM AMB SAID HE WISHED TO CONFIRM HIS GOVT'S POSITION STILL BASED ON FOUR POINTS.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *9-23-02*

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-2-CAIRO 4212, JANUARY 28.

5. I ASKED ABU SHADI WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AMB'S APPROACH AND WHETHER HE HAD FOUND ANYTHING NEW IN IT. ABU SHADI SAID THAT IT WAS FONOFF ASSESSMENT THAT THREE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS EMERGED. (1) THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE TO NLF PARTICIPATION IN ANY NORTH VIETNAM-U.S. DISCUSSIONS. (2) WHILE FOUR POINTS WERE SET FORTH AS NORTH VIETNAM POSITION THEIR ACCEPTANCE BY U.S. WAS NOT MADE A PRE-CONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS. (3) UARG HAD OFFICIALLY BEEN REQUESTED TO SPEAK TO AMERICANS ON HANOI'S BEHALF AND TO OBTAIN U.S. REACTION.

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 4212B ~~S E C R E T~~

6. BOTH DCM NES AND I REVIEWED THESE THREE POINTS CAREFULLY WITH ABU SHADI AND WE SHARED HIS IMPRESSION THAT WHAT HANOI IS TRYING TO TELL US SEEMS TO BE DESIGNED AS RESPONSE TO AMB GOLDBERG'S "RECIPROCAL RESPONSE" PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 31 TO U THANT, NAMELY THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO ENTER INTO DIRECT UNCONDITIONAL TALKS WITH US PROVIDED OUR BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS CEASED UNCONDITIONALLY.

7 AT CL

OSE CONVERSATION ABU SHADI AS AFTERTHOUGHT SAID THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE AMB HAD REFERRED TO NLF REQUEST FOR SEVEN DAY TET CEASEFIRE AND OUR ACCEPTANCE OF FOUR DAYS ONLY. AMBASSADOR HAD SAID THIS VERY IMPORTANT FETE THROUGHOUT VIETNAM AND HIS GOVT HOPED WE WOULD ALSO ACCEPT SEGEN DAY CEASEFIRE.

8. I ASKED ABU SHADI WHETHER NORTH VIETNAMESE AMB'S AND MY CALL AT FOREIGN OFFICE THIS MORNING WOULD BE CARRIED IN LOCAL PRESS. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GENERATE UNFORTUNATE SPECULATION ON VIETNAM AS SUBJECT. ABU SHADI AGREED AND SAID BOTH CALLS WOULD BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

9. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE OR INSTRUCTIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP AS WELL AS FULL TEXT OF BURCHETT INTERVIEW WHICH FOREIGN OFFICE INTERESTED IN SEEING. BATTLE
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NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE AT 10:15 A.M., 1/28/67

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EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY.

S

I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEING MY COLLEAGUE AMBASSADOR KAMEL TOMORROW. IN CONNECTION THIS APPOINTMENT I HOPE YOU WILL READ CAIRO'S 3744 AND 3752 WHICH I TRUST MY OLD FRIENDS IN SECRETARIAT WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOU. I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED AT DRIFT AND DETERIORATION US POSITION STEMMING IN LARGE PART FROM STRONG EGYPTIAN BELIEF WE ARE LONG OVERDUE IN GIVING THEM ANSWER TO THEIR REQUEST OF LAST MARCH FOR ADDITIONAL FOOD. I HAVE SEEN THE REPORT OF THE IRG MEETING OF DECEMBER 19, 1966, WITH WHICH I STRONGLY CONCUR AND URGE YOUR APPROVAL AND THAT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED THERIN. REGARDS.

GP-1.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9-23-02

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EXDIS

REF: CAIRO 3614

SUBJ: JORDAN AIRLIFT

FOREIGN OFFICE AMERICAN DIRECTOR EL EISSY CALLED IN DCM YESTERDAY AND TOLD HIM UARG APPROVED OVERFLIGHTS IN PRINCIPLE. USUAL DETAILS ON EACH FLIGHT SHOULD BE PROVIDED ACCORDING NORMAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES. DCM SUGGESTED AND EL EISSY AGREED THIS COULD BE HANDLED BY OUR AIR ATTACHE WITH GENERAL TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT.

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NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO S/S-O AT 3:21 A.M., 1/3/67

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E X D I S

RE STATE 110910.

I ACCOMPANIED SENATOR SYMINGTON ON CALL DR. FAWZI THIS MORNING. FOLLOWING THEIR CONVERSATION I RAISED QUESTION OVERFLIGHTS IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL. DR. FAWZI REPLIED UAR WOULD TAKE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION AND WOULD GIVE ME REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD URGENCY AND WOULD ATTEMPT EXPEDITE. DCM MADE PARALLEL REPRESENTATIONS TO FOREIGN OFFICE UNDER SECRETARY'S CHEF DE CABINET.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-23-02

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3600

EXDIS

REF: STATE 110167 AND 111035

1. AS 1966 DRAWS TO A CLOSE SEEMS CLEAR FROM MOUNTING EVIDENCE -- NASSER'S 23 DECEMBER "WAR OF STARVATION" SPEECH, HIS THREATS TO MOROCCAN (RABAT 2986 AND LIBYAN (TRIPOLI 2060) REPRESENTATIONS DURING RECENT DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETINGS AND HIS RELENTLESS PROPAGANDA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES AGAINST HUSSEIN, FEISAL, BOURGUIBA, ETC., THAT WE ARE IN FOR CONSIDERABLE HEATING UP OF NEAR EAST POLITICAL CLIMATE.

2. DEPARTMENT HAS ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THAT A CORNERED AND FRUSTRATED NASSER IS A DANGEROUS NASSER AND THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE SITUATION NOW FACING US. WE CERTAINLY AGREE WITH CHERKAOUI'S VIEW THAT SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST IS

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3600B ~~SECRET~~
"EXTREMELY GRAVE". PROBLEM FOR US NOW IS HOW WE CAN PERSUADE OR FORCE NASSER TO CHANGE COURSE ON WHICH HE SEEMS TO BE EMBARKING. IMPORTANT AND SOMETIMES EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE THAT PL480 PROGRAMS GAVE US IS NOT NOW AT HAND. WHETHER POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUTSTANDING UAR FOOD REQUEST WOULD EASE SITUATION IS PROBLEMATIC. IT MAY BE TOO LATE FOR NASSER TO PULL BACK FROM ADVENTURES WHICH HE HAS SET IN TRAIN. I THINK, HOWEVER, WE MUST CONSIDER MOST SERIOUSLY WHAT WE SHOULD DO IF SOVS ARE NOT IN FACT PICKING UP ENTIRE UAR WHEAT SHORTFALL OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS. DO WE WISH TO SEE AN EGYPT REALLY FACING FAMINE CONDITIONS SUCH AS PREVAIL IN PARTS OF INDIA TODAY? IF SUCH CONDITIONS WERE TO DEVELOP HERE, I THINK IT SAFE TO SAY THAT NASSER WILL PULL OUT ALL STOPS AND USE EVERY CAPABILITY AVAILABLE TO HIM TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL VICTORIES ABROAD--I.E. UNDERMINING REMAINING MONARCHIES IN NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND CLEAR CUT MILITARY SUCCESS IN YEMEN. HAPPY NEW YEAR.
BATTLE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3540

E X D I S

1. FAILURE OF NASSER TO MENTION POSSIBLE SOV FOOD ASSISTANCE IN PORT SAID SPEECH OBSCURES FACTS OF REPORT PASSED TO ME BY CANADIAN AMB AND SEEMINGLY CONFIRMED BY GALLAD AND BRIT PRESS ATTACHE. DENIAL BY EL SAYEH TO JONES (CAIRO'S 3454) FURTHER CONFUSES MATTER. I CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT WE LEARN TRUTH SOV INTENTIONS AND ASCERTAIN IF POSSIBLE NATURE ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT RE SOV WHEAT. VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO RAISE MATTER HERE WITHOUT APPEARING OFFER HOPE US WHEAT WHICH, IF SOV OFFER IN RANGE EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND TONS, MAY NOT BE NECESSARY. HOWEVER, THERE COULD BE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND UAR WITH SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS AND ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO CHARGES US USING STARVATION AS WEAPON AGAINST EGYPTIANS, FORERUNNER OF WHICH

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3540B ~~SECRET~~
CONTAINED NASSER'S SPEECH.

2. I SUGGEST TWO POSSIBLE WAYS OF GETTING TO BOTTOM OF MATTER WITHOUT US RAISING OFFICIALLY WITH EGYPTIANS:

A. WE CAN APPROACH RUSSIANS IN WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW AND ASK WHETHER THEY PLAN COVER UAR WHEAT NEEDS. SINCE RUSSIANS WOULD STILL PROBABLY WELCOME US AID THEY MAY TRY TO MINIMIZE SOV WHEAT AVAILABLE.

B. THIS MAY BE MOMENT WHEN WE FOR A CHANGE WANT A PRESS LEAK AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO DEPARTMENT TO EFFECT SOVS WILL UNDERTAKE MEET UAR FOOD REQUIREMENTS OVER NEXT FOUR TO SIX MONTHS. PRESS HAS ALREADY CARRIED REPORTS SOVS PROVIDING SOME WHEAT BUT NO REPORTS HAVE INDICATED AMOUNTS SIZEABLE OR OF MAGNITUDE INDICATED BY NASSER TO CANADIAN AMB SUCH STORY WOULD STIMULATE EGYPTIANS TO REVEAL TRUE FACTS OF SITUATION AND WOULD AT LEAST CLARIFY FOR THEM

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NLJ 02-116
By *ico*, NARA, Date 4-2-03

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-2- CAIRO 3540, DECEMBER 27

AND FOR US TRUE SITUATION. I SUSPECT TIRTH IS SOVS
HAVE OFFERED TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND TONS WITH LARGER
AMOUNTS AVAIL BUT AT TERMS EGYPTIANS FIND UNATTRACTIVE.
NEW SHOPPING AROUND BY EL SAYEK MAY REFLECT DIFFICULT TERMS
SOVS HAVE OFFERED.

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 3540B ~~SECRET~~

3. ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT NEITHER DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIANS
NOR PRESS LEAK, IF WASHINGTON ARRANGES ONE, REVEAL CANADIANS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION OR IN ANY AY SUGGEST INFO OBTAINED
CAIRO.

4. WILL APPRECIATE INDICATION DEPT'S THOUGHTS RE FOREGOING.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3510

021350

1966 DEC 24 AM 10 12

1. FOLLOWING UP RECENT LOCAL PRESS REPORTS OF MEETINGS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD AND SOVIET AND NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADORS ON VIETNAM, DCM CALL

ED ON FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS FATHI RADWAN THIS MORNING.

2. DCM NOTED THESE REPORTED MEETINGS AND ASKED WHETHER ANYTHING NEW HAD COME OUT OF THEM AND IN PARTICULAR REACTION TO AMBASSADOR GOLD'S RECENT APPROACH TO U THANT,

3. RADWAN SAID THAT VIETNAM WAS NOT DISCUSSED DURING RECENT MEEING BETWEEN RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER. NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR'S CALL WAS BASED ON HIS RECENT RETURN FROM HANOI AND CONFINED LARGELY TO HIS EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT OF U.S. BOMBING OF CITY OF HANOI. HE HAD CHARACTERIZED GOLDBERG PROPOSAL AS MORE REITERATION OF

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3510B ~~SECRET~~
OUR 14 POINTS AND HENCE STRICTLY A PROPANGANDA PLOY. NO MENTION WHATSOEVER WAS MADE OF POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING CHRISTMAS TRUCES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. DCM THEN REVIEWED REPORTS OF AL) LEGED U.S. BOMBING OF HANOI AND PROVIDED INFORMATION CONTAINED STATECIRCULARS 103849 AND 104729. DCM ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR ADMITTED TO ANY SAM LANDINGS IN HANOI. RADWAN SAID HE HAD NOT AND AGREED THAT WOULD PERHAPS BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR NON-EXPERT TO TELL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXPLOSION CAUSED BY FALLING SAM AND ONE RESULTING FROM ORDONANCE DELIVERED BY AIRCRAFT.

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State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9.23.02

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-2-CAIRO 3510, DECEMBER 24.

5. RADWAN DESCRIBED SEVERAL MEETINGS HE HAD HAD RECENTLY WITH NEWLY ARRIVED SENIOR NLF REPRESENTATIVE AND EXPRESSED VIEW CONSIDERABLE INDICATION OF GROWING INDEPENDENCE OF NLF FROM HANOI. HE SUGGESTED THIS VERY SIGNIFICANT AND THAT TIME MIGHT COME SOON WHEN NLF REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO WOULD WISH TO TALK DIRECTLY TO AN AMERICAN.

6. CONVERSATION ENDED WITH MUTUALLY EXPRESSED HOPE CHRISTMAS AND TET TRUCES MIGHT THROUGH NEGOTIATION BE EXTENDED INTO LONGER RANGE ARMISTICE WHICH WOULD GIVE BETTER CHANCE OF FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3498

E X D I S

1. BRIT PRESS ATTACHE FLETCHER TELLS US HE HAS VERY RELIABLE REPORT FROM SOURCE HE CANNOT DISCLOSE THAT RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED PROVIDE UAR WITH 26 MILLION BUSHELS WHEAT WHICH WILL LAST EGYPTIANS THROUGH MIDDLE OR LATE SUMMER.
2. COMMENT: BRIT CALCULATE THIS AT 700,000 TONS. WE PRESUME REPORT CAME FROM CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By iso NARA, Date 7-28-03

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3426

EXDIS

1. AT PRESENT JUNCTURE WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER UAR WOULD GRANT CLEARANCES FOR USAF AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO JORDAN. WE WOULD PLAN DISCUSS WITH FOREIGN OFFICE ON BASIS REQUEST FOR BLANKET CLEARANCE FOR OPERATION. DECISION MAY TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS, HOWEVER.
2. WOULD APPRECIATE MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE AND INFORMATION BEFORE TAKING UP HERE.

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By jc, NARA, Date 9-23-02

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3414

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By us NARA, Date 7-28-03

Rostow

E X D I S

1. GALLAD, JOURNAL D'EGYPTE, CORNERED ME AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT. INDICATED MY RECENT CONVERSATION PRESIDENT HAD BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND THEN SAID AS RESULT ORDER HAD GONE OUT TO UAR PRESS ENDING ATTACKS HUSSEIN. ORDER HAD BEEN DELAYED FOR DAY OR TWO SO THAT MY CALL AND RESTRAINT NOT BE RELATED IN PUBLIC MIND ALTHOUGH ALL PRESS AWARE EFFECTIVENESS MY PRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HAD RESULTED IN CURRENT CESSATION ATTACKS HUSSEIN. I MADE NO COMMENT.

2. GALLAD THEN ASKED STATUS US WHEAT AND ASKED WHETHER I STILL HOPEFUL NEW PL-480 AGREEMENT. I REPLIED I WAS ALWAYS HOPEFUL IMPROVING RELATIONS US-UAR SO THAT COOPERATION IN MANY FIELDS, INCLUDING FOOD, WOULD BE POSSIBLE. I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSUMED NO DECISION MADE. MOREOVER,

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3414B ~~SECRET~~
DIFFICULTIES OF WORLD FOOD PICTURE UNDOUBTEDLY FACTOR IN REACHING DECISION WITH RESPECT PROGRAMS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. GALLAD THEN SAID RUSSIANS HAD OFFERED 800 THOUSAND TONS WHEAT BUT THAT PRESIDENT NASSER HAD NOT YET ACCEPTED. FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID FOR IMMEDIATELY AND THE OTHER FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND FINANCED UNDER WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE RELATIVELY SHORT TERM FINANCING.

3. GALLAD REFERRED TO CURRENT IPC PROBLEM AND CLAIMED NASSER EXERCISING GREAT RESTRAINT THIS ISSUE. UAR HAS URGED IRAQ NOT TO NATIONALIZE AND HAS PRESSED SYRIA NOT TO GO TOO FAR IN CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. NASSER DEEPLY CONCERNED SITUATION IN SYRIA AND WILL BE SENDING AMBASSADOR THERE VERY NEAR FUTURE. SYRIANS INFORMALLY SOUNDED OUT POSSIBILITY ACCEPTING FOREIGN MINISTER MAHMOUD RIAD BUT SYRIANS INFORMALLY INDICATED RIAD TOO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED PAST PROBLEMS AND URGED

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-2- CAIRO 3414, 191030Z DEC 66

NEW FACE ON SCENE. HASSAN SABRY EL KHOULY CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION. PRESIDENT CONVINCED HE MUST HAVE SENIOR REP TRUSTED BY HIM IN SYRIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENT: FOREGOING REPRESENTS FIRST CONFIRMATION WE HAVE HAD RE WHEAT OFFER FROM RUSSIANS IN NEIGHBORHOOD EIGHT

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 3414B ~~SECRET~~
HUNDRED THOUSAND TONS. CREDIT I AM RECEIVING FOR UAR PRESS RESTRAINT HUSSEIN AMUSING SINCE SUBJECT NOT EVEN DISCUSSED IN MY RECENT CONVERSATION PRESIDENT. I SUSPECT PRESS HAS ADDED UP ONE AND ONE AND COME UP WITH WRONG ANSWER.

GP-3. BATTLE
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3392 PART 1 OF 2

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EXDIS

RE STATE 103387.

1. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS INDICATED OF REFTEL ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NASSER'S COMMENTS TO THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR WERE TRUE AND THAT WE WILL NOT PROVIDE WHEAT ON CONCESSIONAL TERMS AT THIS TIME.

1.A. THERE IS SUFFICIENT PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT FOOD SHORTAGES FOR NASSER TO HAVE TO REASSURE HIS PEOPLE THAT FOOD AND WHEAT PARTICULARLY WILL BE FORTHCOMING. ALREADY THERE IS A REPORT CIRCULATING ON THE SUFFRAGI NETWORK THAT "NASSER HAS TAKEN CARE OF THE SITUATION" AND THERE IS NO NEED TO WORRY. BUT SOME PUBLIC STATEMENT IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE. THE QUESTION IS THE NATURE OF THAT STATEMENT. IT COULD BE MADE IN OFFHAND FASHION OR IT COULD BE A VIOLENT EMOTIONAL TYPE SPEECH. IF

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3392B/1 ~~SECRET~~

I HAD TO PLACE A BET AT THE MOMENT, I WOULD PREDICT SOMETHING IN BETWEEN - A STATEMENT THAT WHEAT NEEDS HAD BEEN MET BY AN OFFER FROM THE USSR WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTED IN VIEW OF US EFFORTS TO PUT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION. I DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE A VIOLENT ATTACK BECAUSE NASSER WILL KNOW THAT MANY OF HIS PEOPLE WILL BE CONCERNED AT THE ENDING OF THE LAST MAJOR WESTERN TIE AND HE TOO WILL PROBABLY NOT WISH TO EMPHASIZE UNDULY THE RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE AS THE NEED FOR A NON-ALIGNED FACADE IS STILL USEFUL TO HIM.

1.B. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF SYMPATHY AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THERE ARE MANY YEARS AHEAD AND THAT ON BOTH SIDES WE MUST ALWAYS LOOK TO THE FUTURE. LET US REMEMBER THAT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WITH

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC02-260

By *is*, NARA, Date 1-14-04

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CONTROL: 15550

CORRECTION ISSUED: 12/17/66,

-3- CAIRO 3392 PART 1 OF 2, DECEMBER 17 - CORRECTED PAGE THREE 1:30 P.M.

MV

IRAQI OIL, ALSO ABSORB EGYPTIAN OUTPUT. IN ANY CASE, WE ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT EITHER USSR OR UAR WILL INTERFERE WITH PAN AMERICAN OR PHILLIPS UNTIL AFTER THEIR INVESTMENT WELL UNDERWAY AND EQUIPMENT IN AND FUNCTIONING. AT THAT POINT WE SEE DANGER AHEAD.

1.F. IT IS DIFFICULT ASSES IMPACT ON UAR ECONOMY OF POSSIBLE LOSS WESTERN AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FINANCING. RECENT EGYPTIAN OIL STRIKES MAY LEAD SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES TO PLAY ALONG BILATERALLY FOR LONGER TERM STAKES HERE. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WILL BE A SLOWDOWN BUT EXTENT SLOWDOWN DEPENDS IN PART ON WHETHER WESTERN COUNTRIES RESPOND UNIFORMLY OR WHETHER THEIR RESPONSE VARIES BY COUNTRY. ECONOMIC EFFECT COULD BE

PAGE 5 RUEIVCR 3392B/1 ~~SECRET~~

SERIOUS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS EQUALLY SO BUT BOTH DIFISICULT PREDICT AT PRESENT.

2. IN SITUATION OUTLINED WE BELIEVE US SHOULD CONTINUE BUSINESS AS USUAL AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AVOIDING, HOWEVER, MINOR REPRESENTATIONS THAT HAVE LIKELY IRRITATING EFFECT AND NO CHANCE SUCCESS. RESPECTIVE INTERESTS US AND UAR IN MANY AREAS WORLD MAY MAKE POSSIBLE CONTINUATION DISCUSSIONS REGARDLESS FOOD ASSISTANCE. DISCUSSIONS VIETNAM, JORDAN, YEMEN, ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM, ETC., COUL FOR TIME AT LEAST PROBABLY CONTINUE. THOSE ISSUES ON WHICH WE HAVE PRESSED UAR DUE THEIR HOPE FOOD ASSISTANCE WHOULD BE KEPT TO MINIMUM AND OUR EXPECTATION OF ACTION REDUCED ACCORDINGLY. UNFORTURNATELY, HOWEVER, WE LIKELY FIND OURSELVES ON SLIPPERY SLOPE. UAR, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE EAGER MOVE ON DEBT REPAYMENTS, FULL IMPLEMENTATION CERTAIN PROVISIONS PREVIOUS PL 480 AGREEMENTS,

AND ON CLAIMS, THERE MAY IN TIME BE NEED APPLY HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT WHICH IN TURN WILL REMOVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND OTHER MINOR AID ACTIVITIES WITH RESULTANT INCREASE IN OUR DIFFICULTIES COMMUNICATING UAR. ALSO LIKELY UAR SURVEILLANCE OUR AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND HARRASSMENT LOCAL EMPLOYEES MAY BE INTENSIFIED

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS

RE STATE 103387.

QUITE POSSIBLE SUCH DETERIORATION OUR RELATIONS WILL LEAD TO UAR PRESSURE ON US REDUCE MISSION STAFF AND ACTIVITIES ESPECIALLY IN INTELLIGENCE AREAS SUCH AS LARGE SERVICE ATTACHE COMPLEMENT, TWO AIRCRAFT, MATS UNIT, ETC. USIS ACTIVITIES MAY BE SUBJECT NEW RESTRICTIONS. WE SHOULD THEREFORE DO ALL WE CAN TO AVOID DIRECT CONFRONTATION AND TRY TO FIND OTHER PROJECTS AS MEANS KEEPING FOOT IN DOOR. USSR WILLINGNESS PROVIDE WHEAT DOES NOT CHANGE OUR BASIC GOALS IN THE UAR. IT DOES, HOWEVER, WEAKEN CONSIDERABLY CHANCES ACHIEVING THEM.

3. ALL FOREGOING BASED ON ASSUMPTION CANADIAN REPORT CORRECT AND NO CONCESSIONAL SALES WHEAT FROM US. WHILE, AS DEPARTMENT WELL

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3392B/2 ~~SECRET~~
KNOWS, I HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT SEE UAR DEPENDENT TOTALLY ON USSR, LET US NOT OVERLOOK FACT THAT THERE ARE SOME ADVANTAGES IN CURRENT SITUATION. INCREASINGLY US HAVING DOMESTIC POLITICAL TROUBLE CONTINUING FOOD AID HERE AND WORLD SHORTAGE WHEAT IN NEAR FUTURE WILL EXACERBATE THE PROBLEM. I AM NOT ENTIRELY UNHAPPY TO SEE OTHERS ASSUME PART, IF NOT ALL, RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEEDING THIS COUNTRY. IF UAR AND USSR WORK OUT WHEAT AGREEMENT, WE SHOULD NOT PANIC OR GIVE APPEARANCE WE HAVE SUFFERED MAJOR DEFEAT. OUR OWN INACTION HAS MADE SUCH AN AGREEMENT INEVITABLE BUT WE CANNOT LOGICALLY BE CHARGED ALONE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FUTURE EGYPTIAN WHEAT SHORTAGES IN VIEW RUSSIAN

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-2- CAIRO 3392 (PART 2 OF 2), DECEMBER 17

WILLINGNESS ASSUME RESPONSIBLE ROLE EVEN TEMPORARILY. OTHER ITEMS REQUESTED, HOWEVER, WHILE NOT AFFORDING US POSSIBLE LEVERAGE WHEAT WOULD OFFER, NEVERTHELESS WOULD ENABLE SOME US PRESENCE HERE AND WHILE I DO NOT RECOMMEND WE DO ANYTHING ABOUT WHEAT AT THE MOMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE MODEST PROGRAM SUCH AS TOBACCO AND VEGETABLE OIL ALONG WITH SCHOOL LUNCH AND CARE FEEDING CONTINUED. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KEEP OPEN POSSIBLE WHEAT SHIPMENTS, ALTHOUGH WELL IN FUTURE, AND DEPENDENT ON IMPROVEMENT CLIMATE US-UAR RELATIONS AS WELL AS CHANCES

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1. POSSIBILITY HAS ALSO OCCURRED TO US THAT EGYPTIAN ARE PERHAPS NOT TOTALLY ADVERSE TO IDEA OF SHORT LITTLE WAR THAT WOULD TIDY THINGS UP AND GET RID OF HUSSEIN IN PROCESS. AND WE CERTAINLY AGREE THAT CAIRO PRESS AND RADIO HAVE NOT REACTED TO SAMUA CRISIS WITH CAUTION OR FORESIGHT. RATHER, THEY HAVE EXPLOITED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SITUATION WORSE AND HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THAT TENSION IN

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3357B ~~SECRET~~
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2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NASSER HAS DETERMINED WAR WOULD BE IN INTEREST OFUAR. HIS CALCULATIONS WOULD PERHAPS INCLUDE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS FACT UNEF WOULD PROTECT HIM FROM ISRAELI LAND OFFENSIVE, THAT BIG POWERS WUOULD INTERVENE IN A MATTER OF DAYS IF NOT HOURS AND THAT RESULTANT PEACE SETTLEMENT WOULD GIVE ARABS OPPORTUNITY REOPEN PALESTINE QUESTION AND FORCE CONCESSIONS FROM ISRAELIS, PARTICULARLY. IF LATTER STARTED THE FIGHTING, THAT HASHEMITE THRONE WOULD PROBABLY DISAPPEAR IN THE MELEE WOULD BE ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION, AS WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY THAT TENSIONS BUILDING UP WITH WAR WOULD HELP CREATE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA. BRINGING KING SAUD HERE TO RESIDE

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By ALC, NARA, Date 7-28-03

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-2- CAIRO 3357 DEC 15

AND BE A FOCUS OF SAUDI DISSIDENCE WOULD FIT IN WELL WITH SUCH CALCULATIONS. THE ULTIMATE GOAL WOULD BE THE ELIMINATION OF MODERATE REGIMES HOSTILE TO THE UAR PLUS A LITTLE HUMILIATION OF ISRAEL.

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 3357B ~~S E C R E T~~

3. THE ONLY DRAWBACK TO ACCEPTING SUCH CALCULATIONS IS THAT THEY ARE MILITARILY UNREALISTIC AND NASSER, WHATEVER HIS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DELUSIONS, SEEMS TO BE REALISTIC IN HIS APPRAISALS OF UAR MILITARY READINESS. HE HAS REPEATEDLY SAID UAR IS NOT READY FOR WAR NOW, AND HAS PROJECTED A PERIOD OF 10 YEARS AS THAT REQUIRED FOR THE ARABS TO BE READY TO TAKE ON ISRAEL. HE HAS DESCRIBED UNEF AS "ONLY AN OBSERVER FORCE" AND UNDOUBTEDLY HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT ISRAELIS' READINESS OR ABILITY TO CUT THROUGH UNEF IF THEY DECIDED THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRED IT. WHETHER OR NOT UNEF AFFORDED HIM PROTECTION ON GROUND HE PROBABLY REALIZES HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROTECT EGYPT AGAINST ATTACK BY ISRAELI AIR FORCE. HE ALSO KNOWS THAT EGYPT AND NOT SYRIA WOULD RATE AS TARGET NO. 1 IN ANY SUCH CONTEST. ANY AIR RAIDS HE MIGHT MAKE ON TEL AVIV WOULD BE SMALL COMPENSATION TO EGYPTIAN PEOPLE FOR SORT OF DAMAGE ISRAELIS COULD DO TO CAIRO, INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AT HELWAN, AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. THUS, WHATEVER HAPPENED ON GROUND HE WOULD BE FAIRLY CERTAIN TO TAKE A MILITARY DEFEAT

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5. WE DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE STRENGTH OF EGYPTIAN DEATH WISH. NASSER IS QUITE CAPABLE OF FOOLISH MISCALCULATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN CATASTROPHE. BUT WE FEEL ANY HOSTILITIES WHICH ERUPT IN COMING MONTHS WILL BE DUE TO JUST THAT, TO A MISCALCULATION, AND NOT TO SOME LONG-RANGE MACHIAVELLIAN STRATEGY WORKED OUT BY NASSER AND HIS FRIENDS.

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-3- CAIRO 3357 DEC 15

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By iss NARA, Date 7-28-03

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-2- CAIRO 3357 DEC 15

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-3- CAIRO 3357 DEC 15

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Reslow

RE CAIRO'S 3340.

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY FURTHER POINTS INTEREST IN CANADIAN AMBASSADOR'S (PROTECT) TALK WITH NASSER DECEMBER 11:

2. US-UAR RELATIONS. NASSER SAID HE HAD CEASED TO WORRY ABOUT SIXTH FLEET IN ASSESSING SITUATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST. IF HE WERE TO WORRY CONTINUALLY ABOUT US POLICIES IN AREA HE WOULD GET NO SLEEP. HE HAD ALSO CEASED TO WORRY ABOUT NUMEROUS UNFRIENDLY COMMENTS MADE BY AMERICAN PRESS AND CONGRESSMEN. HE REFERRED TO ARTICLE IN AMERICAN PUBLICATION ALLEGING UAR HAD GRANTED SOVIETS MILITARY BASE RIGHTS AND SAID THIS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE. IF EGYPTIANS WERE TO HAVE FOREIGN BASES WOULD PREFER THEM BE AMERICANS SINCE LATTER SPENT MUCH MORE MONEY THAN ANYONE ELSE ON FACILITIES.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3356B ~~SECRET~~
HE THEN MADE INVIDIOUS COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR APPROACH AND THAT OF SOVIETS. SAID AMERICANS ALWAYS TRIED ATTACH CONDITIONS WHEREAS SOVIETS ATTACHED NONE.

3. SOVIET-UAR RELATIONS. RELATIONS NOW EXCELLENT BUT HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN SO. WHEN KHRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN IN POWER RELATIONS HAD BEEN VERY BAD AND HAD EVEN REACHED POINT THAT EGYPTIANS HAD STARTED TO EXPLORE WITH GERMANS POSSIBILITY OF THEIR FINANCING SECOND STAGE OF ASWAN DAM. IN SPITE OF STRAINED RELATIONS, HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAD AGREED FINANCE SECOND PHASE AND CONTINUE WITH PROJECT. NASSER SAID DID NOT REMEMBER EXACT AMOUNT OF UAR INDEBTEDNESS TO SOVIETS BUT IT WAS LESS THAN 600 MILLION POUNDS. (SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD INDICATED TO CANADIAN IT WAS BETWEEN 700 AND 800 MILLION.) NASSER SAID HE HAD NO DOUBTS RE GENEROSITY SOVIET UNION.

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+2- CAIRO 3356 DTG 151115Z DECEMBER

DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, FOR INSTANCE, SOVIETS HAD AGREED REDUCE UAR DEBT BY 200 MILLION POUNDS. THIS WAS OUTRIGHT GIFT. (THIS EXPLAINS STORY OF THE 200 MILLION POUNDS NASSER HAS MENTIONED HIS HAVING "SAVED" DURING MOSCOW TRIP.)

4. UNEF. NASSER CONFIRMED CANADIAN'S IMPRESSION THAT FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD'S REMARKS DURING ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE COUNCIL

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 3356B ~~SECRET~~
MEETING HAD MEANT UAR STILL REGARDED UNEF AS USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. HE DESCRIBED UNEF AS NOTHING MORE THAN OBSERVATION FORCE, HOWEVER, WHICH COULD HAVE NO IMPORTANCE IN UAR CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. AS FAR AS HE CONCERNED FORCE HAD VALUE AS SOURCE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY AND STIMULUS TO BUSINESS IN GAZA. CANADIAN DESCRIBED NASSER'S TONE AS CONTEMPTUOUS AND ASSUMED THIS DELIBERATE.

5. JORDAN. NASSER SAID THERE HAS BEEN APPEARANCE OF STABILITY

IN JORDAN FOR PAST THREE YEARS AND THIS APPEARANCE HAD BEEN HELPED BY SUMMIT MEETINGS. VERY SOON AFTER NASSER HAD ACTED TO ABOLISH (NOT POSTPONE) THESE MEETINGS, SITUATION IN JORDAN HAD BECOME CLEAR. OBVIOUSLY GREAT MANY JORDANIANS WERE NOT CONTENT WITH PRESENT REGIME. NASSER SAID DID NOT BELIEVE KING WOULD BE DEPOSED BUT THOUGHT WASFY TELL MIGHT BE REPLACED. HE AGREED THAT IF HUSSEIN WERE REMOVED THIS COULD LEAD TO ISRAELI REACTION, IN WHICH CASE UAR AND SYRIA HAD AGREED TO BECOME INVOLVED AT ONCE. HE REALIZED THIS WOULD MEAN WAR BUT THERE WERE SITUATIONS WHERE UNPLEASANT CHOICES COULD NOT BE AVOIDED.

6. RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. CANADIAN RAISED QUESTION

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 3356B ~~SECRET~~
OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE PROBLEM, REFERRING BACK TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN NASSER AND MARTIN (CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER) IN OCTOBER 1958 DURING WHICH NASSER HAD INDICATED NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. NASSER REPLIED THAT IF ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT BACK ALL REFUGEES, THUS LOSING ITS CHARACTER OF JEWISH STATE, PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. BUT THE ISRAELIS HAD REJECTED RETURN REFUGEES AND PROBLEM WOULD GO ON FOR GENERATIONS. TRADITION OF VENGEANCE VERY STRONG IN MIDDLE EAST AND ARABS WERE NOT GOING TO FORGIVE AND FORGET UNLESS THERE WAS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN NATURE OF ISRAEL.

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-3- CAIRO 3356 DTG 15115Z DECEMBER

7. YEMEN. NASSER SAID KUWAITI MEDIATION EFFORT STALLED. SAID NUMBER OF UAR FORCES IN YEMEN LESS THAN FORTY THOUSAND AND COSTS OF THESE FORCES REDUCED BY SIXTY PERCENT. SAID HE WAS GETTING BORED WITH WHOLE QUESTION AND THAT HE WAS HAVING MORE TROUBLE WITH BICKERING REPUBLICANS THAN WITH ROYALISTS. THINGS HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEGUN SETTLE DOWN UNDER SALLAL. HE IMPLIED STRONGLY, BUT DID NOT SAY EXPLICITLY, THAT HE SEES ADVANTAGES IN KEEPING UAR FORCES IN YEMEN FOR THE PRESENT AND THAT COSTS OF DOING SO ARE SUPPORTABLE. GP-3. BATTLE
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EXDIS

1. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR (PROTECT SOURCE CAREFULLY) HAS INFORMED ME HIS CONVERSATION PRESIDENT NASSER SUNDAY, DECEMBER 11.

2. PL 480.

AMBASSADOR ASKED PRESIDENT WHERE MATTERS STOOD FURTHZQRRL 480 ASSISTANCE. NASSER SAID HE HAD STOPPED WORRYING ABOUT PL480 AND HE NO LONGER RAISED MATTER IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICANS. UAR'S ACCEPTANCE OF US AID HAD LED TO SOME OF PRESENT DIFFICULTIES UAR EXPERIENCING. PRIOR TO 1959 THERE HAD BEEN NO REPEAT NO US AID. SUBSEQUENTLY THIS AID HAD GRADUALLY INCREASED TO A POINT WHERE IT HAD BEGUN TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN UAR'S ECONOMIC PLANNING. THUS WHEN IT HAD NOT BEEN RENEWED, PLANS DISRUPTED. PERHAPS IT WAS NOT A BAD THING FOR UAR TO HAVE TO PLAN WITHOUT SUCH AID WHICH IS WHAT THEY HAD

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 3340B ~~SECRET~~
HAD TO DO PRIOR TO 1959. IF THEY RECEIVED SUCH AID IN THE FUTURE, THIS WOULD BE TO THE GOOD BUT IT WOULD NO LONGER FORM A FACTOR IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS.

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3. IN ANY EVENT UAR HAD BEEN ABLE TO MEET PART OF THEIR FOOD NEEDS BY ARRANGEMENT WITH RUSSIANS AS HAD BEEN DONE IN SMALLER WAY LAST YEAR. THIS HAD BEEN ONE OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF AMER'S RECENT VISIT MOSCOW. LAST YEAR UAR HAD RECEIVED 300 THOUSAND TONS OF WHEAT FROM RUSSIANS. AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER AMOUNT WHEAT EXPECTED WAS GREATER THAN 300 THOUSAND TONS. NASSER SAID AMOUNT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A SECRET. HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT BY BUYING WHEAT WITH FOREIGN CURRENCY LENT TO THEM BY THE RUSSIANS FOR THIS PURPOSE TOGETHER WITH WHEAT TO BE SUPPLIED BY RUSSIANS, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A TOTAL OF ABOUT 850 THOUSAND TONS.

4. IMF.

NASSER TOLD CANADIAN THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT IMF SUGGESTIONS FOR WHAT AMOUNTED TO DEVALUATION OF 30 PERCENT. WERE HE TO DO SO, WOULD MEAN 55 PERCENT DEVALUATION OF CURRENCY IN SPACE OF FEW YEARS. LAST DECEMBER GOVERNMENT HAS RAISED PRICES CERTAIN BASIC ITEMS, A MOVE WHICH HAD BEEN BADLY RECEIVED BY THE

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 3340B ~~SECRET~~

GENERAL POPULATION. A FURTHER DEVALUATION OF 30 PERCENT WOULD LEAD TO RISE IN PRICES WITH POLITICAL RISKS INVOLVED. NASSER CONFIRMED DEPARTURE MOHIEDDIN, AND OTHERS, HAD BEEN RESULT IN PART THEIR POSITION IN FAVOR IMF PROPOSALS. NASSER SAID HE MIGHT ACCEPT 15 PERCENT INCREASE BUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT 30 PERCENT AND DID NOT BELIEVE DEVALUATION MADE MUCH SENSE WHERE STATE CONTROLLED ALL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS. DID NOT CONSIDER DEVALUATION IN INDIA HAD SOLVED INDIANS' PROBLEMS, AND, ALTHOUGH UAR SITUATION DIFFERENT, DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD SOLVE UAR'S. UAR HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO REDUCE SPENDING AND ELIMINATE UNECONOMIC PROJECTS AND THERE WOULD BE OTHER MEASURES TAKEN TO COPE WITH PROBLEMS UAR FACES.

5. NEXT TWO YEARS WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT LOOKING TO FUTURE POSITION NOT AS BAD AS IT SEEMED. THERE IS NOW SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CALCULATION THAT BY 1970 UAR WOULD HAVE ABOUT EIGHTEEN MILLION TONS OIL PER ANNUM FOR EXPORT. THIS, COUPLED WITH BENEFITS TO BE REALIZED FROM HIGH DAM, AND VARIOUS OTHER PROJECTS, WOULD PLACE UAR IN MUCH BETTER POSITION.

6. FOR THE TIME BEIN NEGOTIATIONS IMF ARE STALEMATED.

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 3340B ~~SECRET~~

IN A SENSE THIS DID NOT WORRY NASSER SINCE ALL THE UAR WOULD DERIVE FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH IMF WOULD BE A FURTHER LOAN IN DOLLARS OF AN AMOUNT ABOUT EQUAL TO THE SUM THEY ALREADY OWED ON PREVIOUS LOANS. (HE REFERRED TO A FIGURE EQUIVALENT TO 25 MILLION EGYPTIAN POUNDS.) NASSER HAD SUGGESTED TO HIS COLLEAGUES THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO FORGET ABOUT A FURTHER LOAN AND SEEK A MORATORIUM ON REPAYMENT EXISTING DEBT TO THE IMF.

7. COMMENT: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR AND I SEE NO REASON FOR NASSER MISLEADING US AT THIS POINT REGARDING AMOUNT OF WHEAT HE CAN TBTAIN WITH RUSSIAN COOPERATION. WE ALSO ASSUME NASSER EXPECTED WORD REACH ME VIA CANADIAN WITH WHOM I AM REGULARLY AND OBVIOUSLY IN CONTACT. PRESUUMABLY SOME PURCHASES WILL BE MADE OUTSIDE RUSSIA AND WHEAT RECEIVED FROM RUSSIA WILL AT LEAST IN PART BE OF CANADIAN ORIGIN. THESE ARRANGEMENTS, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD SEEM TO SUBSTANTIALLY SATISFY UAR ESTIMATE WHEAT REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 1967 HARVEST PER OUT TELEGRAM TOAID 203 (CAIRO 2737).

3. FOREGOING TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATE IN VIEW IRG MEETING TODAY.

GP-3. BATTLE
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~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W.H.

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Action

Cy to Wriggins

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Info

CONTROL: *6980*
RECD: DEC 8, 1966, 7:31AM

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FROM: CAIRO

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ACTION: SECSTATE

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 3230

ROGER CHANNEL

REF: CAIRO 3000

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH MUSTAFA ABDUL AZIZ DEC 7 PARKER MENTIONED HIS NOV 29 CONVERSATION WITH UAR AMBASSADOR BEIRUT ABDUL HAMID GHALIB (REPORTED BY MEMCON) AND NOTED THAT LATTER HAD SEEMED THINK "SOME PERSONS" IN USG WERE PLOTTING BRING DOWN NASSER. PARKER REPEATED DENIAL HE HAD MADE TO CHALIB ON THIS SCORE AND ASKED WHETHER ANYONE IN CAIRO SERIOUSLY BELIEVED WE WERE PLOTTING AGAINST REGIME. ABDUL AZIZ SAID, "NOT NOW, BUT FIVE, NO, THREE MONTHS AGO THERE WERE A LOT OF RUMORS. WE ARE MORE CONFIDENT NOW".

2. THREE MONTHS AGO WOULD BE SEPTEMBER WHEN WE UNDERSTAND NASSER THOUGHT WE MIGHT NOT RESPOND FAVORABLY ON FOOD AND BROUGHT BIRDSALL HERE. WE HOPE ABDUL AZIZ IS CORRECT IN SAYING THAT RUMORS WHICH WERE CIRCULATING THEN ARE NOT NOW BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY BUT WILL NOT FIND OUT FOR CERTAIN UNTIL I SEE NASSER. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED REPLY TO MY REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT.

GP-2.

BATTLE
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-277
By *id.* NARA, Date *7-28-03*

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO CAIRO 2999

Redlow

LYNDIS

1. I ACCOMPANIED SENATOR KENNEDY AND CONGRESSMAN TUNNEY IN THEIR CALL ON PRESIDENT NASSER ON NOVEMBER 26. CALL LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AND TWENTY MINUTES AND WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL THROUGHOUT.
2. SENATOR KENNEDY EXPRESSED PLEASEURE PRESIDENT 'S WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE THEM AND INDICATED KNOWLEDGE OF THE USEFUL EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRESENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT NASSER. NASSER MADE PLEASANT REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THE ESTEEM WITH WHICH HE WAS HELD IN WORLD AND INDICATED PLEASURE OPPORTUNITY MEET WITH SENATOR. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF TOPICS DISCUSSED DURING CONVERSATION:

A. ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION.

SENATOR KENNEDY ASKED PRESIDENT NASSER FOR AN ANALYSIS LIKELY

PAGE 2 RUELVCR 2999/IB ~~SECRET~~
FUTURE TRENDS WITH RESPECT ARAB - ISRAELI TENSIONS AND ASKED, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE PRESIDENT THOUGH PROBLEM WOULD BE IN, SAY, TEN YEARS. NASSER SAID HE SAW LITTLE REASON EXPECT CHANGE IN SITUATION AND COULD NOT FORESEE IMPROVEMENT AS LONG AS ISRAELIS ADHERED THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE RE COMPENSATION AND RETURN REFUGEES. COULD CONCLIEVE OF DIFFERENT SITUATION IF ISRAEL PERMITTED REFUGEES RETURN AND BECOME FULL CITIZENS WITH REPRESENTION IN GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD THEN HAVE SOMETHING VERY DIFFERENT FROM ISRAEL AS WE KNOW IT TODAY. SENATOR ASKED WHETHER THERE COULD BE IMPROVEMENT IF PARTIAL RETURN OF REFGEES PERMITTED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN MANNER TO UNIFY FAMILIES. PRESIDENT SAID HE SAW NO LIKELIHOOD THIS HELPING MATTERS AND IN FACT BELIEVED NO REFUGEES WOULD RETURN UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS TO BE SECOND CLASS CITIZENS ISRAEL. HE THOUGH EFFORTS TO PERMIT FRACTION OF NUMBER GO BACK WOULD NOT HELP MUCH. NASSER REVIEWED HISTORY AND DEEP FEELING

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-62
By *isl*, NARA, Date *4-2-07*

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-2- CAIRO 2999, NOVEMBER 28, 1966 SECTION ONE OF TWO

BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS AND GAVE NO INDICATION HOPE
IMPROVEMENT IN SITUATION. IN RESPONSE SENATOR'S QUESTION
AS TO US POSTURE IN MIDDLE EAST AND WHAT ACTIONS BY US
WOULD HELP CREATE STABILITY IN AREA, NASSER NOTED US SUPPORT

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 2999/1B ~~SECRET~~

OF FORCES OF REACTION WHO SOUGHT ISLAMIC PACT. ALSO COMPLAINED
THAT US ALWAYS TOOK SIDE OF ISRAELIS AND HAD NEVER HAD BALANCED
POSITION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. I INTERJECTED A COMMENT RE
RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES AND STRONG STATEMENTS US HAD
MADE RE ISRAELIS TO WHICH NASSER REPLIED WE HAD TAKEN SUCH
POSITION BECAUSE HUSSEIN WAS INVOLVED. NASSER MADE VERY LITTLE
REFERENCE CURRENT TENSIONS IN AREA BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS AND
TALKED PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF PAST AND FUTURE.

B. VIETNAM

SENATOR KENNEDY AND THE CONGRESSMAN

SENATOR KENNEDY AND THE CONGRESSMAN INDICATED KNOWLEDGE OF
PRESIDENT NASSER'S EFFORTS IN PAST TO HELP BRING ABOUT HONORABLE
SOLUTION AND ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT ACOULD COMMENT ON EXISTING
SITUATION. PRESIDENT BEGAN BY SAYING TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. HE APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT SITUATION
IN FUTURE COULD CHANGE BUT INDICATED GRAVE DOUBT THAT THIS
WAS PROPITIOUS MOMENT REACH SOLUTION. US BOMBING IN HIS
OPINION IS NOT HELPING. IT IS INCREASING NORTH VIETNAMESE
NEED FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND FORCING THEM GO TO CHINESE
WHO WERE WILLING ASSIST BUT DID NOT WANT BRING ABOUT
NEGOTIATIONS. RUSSIANS, HE FELT, WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 2999/1B ~~SECRET~~

NEGOTIATIONS BUT OUR ACTIONS FORCING NORTH VIETNAMESE
INCREASINGLY INTO ARMS CHINESE. OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE
AWARE SITUATION AND WOULD BE COMING FORWARD WITH MASSIVE AID
NORTH VIETNAM. WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY SOLVE SITUATION BY
BOMBING AND ONLY ENORMOUS NUMBERS OF AMERICAN TROOPS, PERHAPS
A MILLION, COULD BRING MILITARY VICTORY IF POSSIBLE AT ALL.
HE THEN REFERRED CONVERSATION I HAD WITH EL FEKI AT FOREIGN

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-3- CAIRO 2999, NOVEMBER 28, 1966 SECTION ONE OF TWO

MINISTRY IN WHICH LATTER INDICATED VIET CONG RESPONSE TO VARIOUS PROPOSAL DIFFERENT IN TONE RE POSSIBILITY THEIR WILLINGNESS HAVE TALKS (CAIRO 1904). AT THIS JUNCTURE HE APPEARED MUCH MORE HOPEFUL RE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIETCONG THAN HIS EARLIER STATEMENT INDICATED AND CERTAINLY APPEARED BELIEVE VIET CONG MORE OPEN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS (POSSIBLY WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS) THAN FOREIGN OFFICE HAS SO FAR STATED TO US. IN DISCUSSING VIETNAM PRESIDENT REMARKED CHINESE SHOULD BE IN UNITED NATIONS AND IT WAS RIDICULOUS IN WORLD TODAY NOT HAVE THEM MEMBERS ORGANIZATION. SENATOR KENNEDY MENTIONED A RECENT SPEECH HE HAD MADE REGARDING TWO-CHINA SOLUTION AND THEN EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT CHINESE REALLY WANTED ENTER UN.

PAGE 5 RUE IVCR 2999/18 ~~SECRET~~

C. SOCIALISM AND MANAGEMENT UAR ECONOMY.

CONGRESSMAN TUNNEY ASKED PRESIDENT TO COMMENT ON NEED FOR GREATER INCENTIVE MANAGEMENT OF KEY INDUSTRIES AND PROBLEM MIDDLE LEVEL MANAGEMENT PERSONNAL. NASSER REPLIED IN SOME DETAIL RE PROBLEMS MANAGEMENT RE COGNIZING NEEDS BUT INDICATING UAR NOT AT PRESENT READY OR IN POSITION INSTITUTE SOME REFORMS ALTHOUGH WELL AWARE PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES. IN CONNECTION THIS DISCUSSION HE INDICATED US OPPOSED ALL FORMS SOCIALISM. SENATOR AND CONGRESSMAN CHALLENGED THIS ATTITUDE SAYING US NOW WILLING ACCEPT NEED FOR EVERY GOVERNMENT CHART ITS OWN COURSE IN MANNER MOST LIKELY BE EFFECTIVE MEET THEIR SITUATION AND NEEDS. NO LONGER TRUE US HAD NARROW POINT OF VIEW ON ALL SOCIALISTIC MEASURES TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND EXPRESSED OPINION PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD BROADENED ATTITUDES OF WASHINGTON THIS RESPECT.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO CAIRO 2999

LINDIS

CONVERSATION TURNED TO WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND GROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RICH AND POOR STATES. PRESIDENT INDICATED US TENDED RAISE MANKIND'S HOPES ABOVE ANY ASPIRATIONS POSSIBLE FOR LARGE PARTS OF THE WORLD. RADIO, TELEVISION, ETC., TEND CAUSE DISSATISFACTION IN VASTS PARTS OF WORLD BY RAISING HOPES TOO FAR TOO FAST, PARTICULARLY WHEN GAPS INCREASING ALL THE TIME. EVEN IF EGYPTIANS COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, DOUBLE THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS, US WOULD BY THAT TIME HAVE MADE SUCH INCREASES AS TO INCREASE GAP. THIS PROBLEM HE FELT WOULD BE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS AND WOULD RANK WITH DISARMAMENT AS MAJOR WORLD PROBLEM.

D. DESALINIZATION.

CONGRESSMAN TUNNEY ASKED WHETHER UAR WISHED HELP IN FIELD

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 2999/2B ~~SECRET~~
OF DESALINIZATION AT WHICH POINT PRESIDENT LAUGHED RATHER BITTERLY AND SAID US HAD MADE PROMISES TO UAR IN THIS AREA. I INTERJECTED THAT NO PROMISES HAD BEEN MADE AND DISCUSSIONS RECENTLY HAD BEEN BETWEEN UAR GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE COMPANIES (WESTINGHOUS AND GENERAL ELECTRIC). PRESIDENT WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE NEEDS FOR WATER AND AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THROUGH SUCH A PROGRAM. HE MENTIONED HIGH DAM AND FACT HE HAD RECENTLY SEEN LAKE NASSER FOR FIRST TIME FOLLOWING HIS TRIP TO ADDIS ABABA. HE REPEATED GREAT HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT DAM WOULD MAKE IN EGYPTIAN ECONOMY.

E. US ROLE MIDDLE EAST.

AT ONE POINT SENATOR KENNEDY RETURNED TO THEME OF WHAT US ROLE SHOULD BE IN MIDDLE EAST AND NASSER MENTIONED CIA SOURCE OF

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-2- CAIRO 2999, NOVEMBER 28, 1966 (SEC II OF II)

GREAT DIFFICULTY FOR US. "THE AMBASSADOR COMES IN AND SAYS ALL THE RIGHT THINGS THAT WE WANT TO HEAR BUT WE HAVE TAPES INDICATING CIA PROJECTING VERY DIFFERENT POSTURE FOR US GOVERNMENT AND IT IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHOM TO BELIEVE". I MANAGED TO GET IN FIRM STATEMENT THAT I WAS ONLY SPOKESMAN FOR US GOVERNMENT. THE SENATOR AND CONGRESSMAN ACKNOWLEDGED CIA HAD NOT PUT AMERICA'S "BEST IMAGE FORWARD" IN

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 2999/28 ~~SECRET~~
MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD.

F. IN ADDITION FOREGOING, CONVERSATION TOUCHED ON MANY LIGHT SUBJECTS AND WAS MOST JOVIAL AND WARM THROUGHOUT MEETING.

G. [REDACTED] VARIOUS STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED BRUCE ODELL WITH RESPECT WHAT US GOVERNMENT WOULD OR WOULD NOT PUT UP WITH. LATTER STATEMENTS GIVEN WIDE PUBLICITY HERE DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE SUMMER.

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H. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

GP-3. BATTLE
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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EXDIS.

DURING BRIEF CONVERSATION ITALIAN AMBASSADOR (PROTECT) HE REVIEWED RECENT FAREWELL CALLS EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING PRESIDENT, ZAKARIA MUHIEDDIN, PRIME MINISTER, INTELLIGENCE CHIEF SALEH NASSER, AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR. SEVERAL REVIEWED US-UAR RELATIONS, EXPRESSING CONTINUED HOPE WHEAT. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HOPE IN TERMS WHEAT FROM "SOME SOURCE", PRESUMABLY INCLUDING RUSSIA AS POSSIBILITY. SALEH NASSER REQUESTED APPOINTMENT AMBASSADOR ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT HAD CONTACTS PREVIOUSLY. INTERVIEW SALEH NASSER CAME FOLLOWING OTHER CONVERSATIONS. WHILE NO OTHERS HAD MENTIONED MATTER, SALEH NASSER EXPRESSED HOPE ITALY COULD PROVIDE ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR CREDIT PAYABLE OVER TEN YEARS WITH OIL FROM PAN AMERICAN *FINDINGS AS SECURITY*. AMBASSADOR INFORMED SALEH NASSER NO SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD HAVE CHANCE SUCCESS UNLESS PAN AMERICAN COMPLETELY IN AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR INFORMED ME HE THOUGHT CHANCES SUCH LOAN VERY SLIM ALTHOUGH ITALIANS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE AGREED TO TRANSACTION A FEW MONTHS AGO. ITALIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS UAR SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE AT PRESENT ALTHOUGH UAR OFFICIALS TOLD AMBASSADOR ITALY "BEST WESTERN FRIEND" UAR.

2. DURING SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH PRESIDENT NASSER, SUBJECT YEMEN DISCUSSED AND EGYPTIANS ASKED AMBASSADOR SUGGEST WAYS FINDING SOLUTION PROBLEM SINCE UAR MUST END THIS DRAIN ITS ECONOMY.

3. COMMENT: INTERESTING TO NOTE UAR GOVERNMENT USED SALEH NASSER APPROACH ITALIANS EVEN THOUGH MANY OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE PRIOR CONTACT AMBASSADOR. SALEH NASSER HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY EVIDENT ON LOCAL SCENE AS MEMBER PRESIDENT'S DELEGATION VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL TRAVELS. LOAN REQUEST MAY BE HIS WAY INCREASING PERSONAL PRESTIGE IF SUCCESSFUL AND ALSO REFLECTS HIS KNOWN DEEP INTEREST ECONOMICS.
BATTLE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-277

By *is*, NARA, Date *7-28-03*

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