

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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49

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27625

42
Action

SS
Info

EIB380VV IVA053
 RR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFUBE RUMJIR RIIMTBK RUSBAE 1966 OCT 31 PM 1 24
 DE RUEIVCR 2331B 3041430
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 311426Z OCT 66
 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
 RUFUBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 2331

J N A R

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 State Dept. Guidelines
 By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-23-02

E X D I S

VIETNAM

REF: CAIRO 2304

1. EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR THIS MORNING CALLED ON DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY FATHI RADWAN TO ASCERTAIN UARG REACTION TO MANILA COMMUNIQUE. RADWAN SAID HE HAD JUST COME FROM MEETING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER EL-FEKI DURING WHICH EL -FEKI HAD POSED TO THE VIETNAMESE THE QUESTIONS

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 2331B ~~SECRET~~

WE RAISED AT THE DEPT'S INSTRUCTION ON OCTOBER 29. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON BOTH THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE AND THE DELHI COMMUNIQUE WAS WELL KNOWN. HE HAD NO COMMENTS TO ADD TO IT.

2. RADWAN SAID NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION OF CHANGE IN POSITION OR NEW DEVELOPMENTS ARISING FROM DELHI OR MANILA MEETING. VIETNAMESE HAD HOWEVER ATTACKED VERY STRONGLY BOTH TITO AND MRS. GHANDI FOR THIER POSITIONS AT DELHI AND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH DELHI COMMUNIQUE WHICH DID NOT CHARACTERIZE AMERICANS AS AGGRESSORS AND WHICH DID NOT IDENTIFY VIET CONG AS SOLE REPRESENTATIVES SOUTH VIETNAM PEOPLE. VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN VERY LAUDATORY HOWEVER ABOUT PRESIDENT NASSER AND HAD MADE NO REFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

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-2- CAIRO 2331, OCTOBER 31

TO NASSER'S PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT REGARDING WITHDRAWAL
NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WHICH MIGHT BE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. IT INTERESTING THAT EGYPTIANS TOOK OUR QUESTIONS
LITERALLY AND SUMMONED VIETNAMESE TO ASK THEM OF HIM.
THIS INDICATES UAR CONTINUES TAKE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ON
VIETNAM SERIOUSLY AND WOULD LIKE TO HELP.

GP-3.

BATTLE
BT

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2025 DECLASSIFICATION
EO 13526, SEC 2.2
DECLASSIFIED

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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15

PAGE 01 STATE 13532

42
ORIGIN INRD 10

INFO ES 06, RSC 01, /017 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:WDBREWER
APPROVED BY: U:THE UNDER SECRETARY
U:MR. SIEVERTS
DOD/ISA: MR. BARRINGER
NEA: MR. BATTLE
S/S: MR. WALSH
INR/DDC: MR. TRUEHEART

R 271753Z JUL 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-422
By sig, NARA, Date 7-30-92

~~SECRET~~ STATE 13532

ROGER CHANNEL

JIDDA 281

1. APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS REFTEL. YOU CORRECT DEPT HAS NO OBJECTION TO EMBASSY'S DISCREET EFFORT BROADEN CIRCLE OF YEMENI ROYALIST CONTACTS, ON PERSONAL BASIS.
2. WHILE RECOGNIZING USEFULNESS TO FOREGOING EXERCISE OF PROVIDING ROYALISTS WITH 20,000 GAS MASKS, WE CONTINUE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT MANIFEST DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH ANY YEMENI FACTION AT THIS STAGE. ICRC MAY BE INTERESTED OBTAINING SOME MASKS, PERHAPS 20,000 WHICH WE UNDERSTAND PROBABLY AVAILABLE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 13532 ~~SECRET~~
IN BONN. THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE NO OBJECTION TO ROYALISTS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 13532

OR SAUDIS PURCHASING MASKS ON OPEN MARKET HERE. SPOT CHECK INDICATES ORDER MAGNITUDE 3000-5000 POSSIBLY AVAILABLE JULY-AUGUST, AFTER WHICH NONE AVAILABLE UNTIL MARCH 1968. IF ROYALISTS OR SAUDIS INTERESTED LIMITED COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION, WE PREPARED LEND ASSISTANCE ON DETAILS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND MASKS COMMERCIALY AVAILABLE SWEDEN AND ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE.

3. VIEW LARGE YEMENI POPULATION, DIFFICULTY PREDICTING GAS TARGET AREAS AND EXPECTATION ILLITERATE YEMENIS WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY USING MASKS CORRECTLY, WE QUESTION WHETHER PROVISION SMALL NUMBER MASKS WOULD IN ANY CASE BE EFFECTIVE, EXCEPT AS USEFUL PROPAGANDA MEASURE. ADDITIONAL PUBLICITY BY ROYALISTS OF ATTACKS TO DATE, IN ORDER TO BRING PRESSURE ON EGYPTIANS TO SUSPEND THEM, MIGHT BE MORE HELPFUL IN SEEKING PREVENT FURTHER INHUMANE ACTION THIS NATURE.

GP-1. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Copy sent Saunders
R. Stogor
010446
W 10 51

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

88-82

ACTION: Amembassy JIDDA

JUL 20 8 03 PM '67

Origin
INRD
Info:
ES
RSC

STATE 10446

ROGER CHANNEL

Jidda 202

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By ing NJJ 91-422
NARA, Date 7-30-92

17

1. As result further examination possibility assisting Yemeni groups (State 2384, Jidda 182 and 202), Dept has concluded no positive action should now be taken.
2. In reaching this decision, account was taken of fact there are several competing opposition groups in field. If we limited our help to only one, this might be misinterpreted locally, involving USG in arcane internal Yemeni tribal rivalries. Moreover, significant level opposition activity has been sustained for some years without USG support, and this situation seems likely continue. In fact, there are indications certain powers increasing their help to Royalists. This regional activity could be embarrassed by direct USG involvement.
3. Despite periodic conclaves various Yemeni elements, their ability join in sustained, united action against Sallal regime not yet demonstrated. In addition Royalist efforts, other

Drafted by: NEA/ARP: WDBrewer: bmk: 7/20/67	Tel. Ext. 5655	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S - The Secretary
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Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Battle
U - The Under Secretary

INR/DDC - Mr. Trueheart
Trueheart
Wec

S/S - Mr. Kelly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

tribal elements will no doubt continue opposition in their own areas but only considerably smaller numbers these tribes believed available for operations further afield. In any case, increased foreign-supported opposition might cause Egyptians to up the ante themselves, rather than hasten UAR departure.

4. View these considerable uncertainties, we have concluded that direct help to any group opposing YARG not repeat not now in our overall interest. If you feel direct response to Muhammad ibn Hussein is required, you should be guided by State 8882 in noting we unfortunately not in position be responsive his requests at this time.

GP-1.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

WH

193578

52

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

84-1

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

MAY 12 6 43 PM '67

INRD

Info:

INFO: Amembassy SANAA
Amembassy Office TAIZ

16

STATE 193578

ROGER CHANNEL

State 192206; Taiz 1518

On basis para 3 reftel, we forced conclude UAR has penetrated vault.

Failure find chron file telegrams where C&R personnel told ~~him~~ Fernald

it was is particularly damning. Assume effort may have been made replace
inside vault

files after examination or photographing, but feel pretty thorough job

has been done.

GP-1.

END.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-422

By sig, NARA, Date 7-30-92

NEA/ARP: WDBrewer; bmk: 5/12/67

5655

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

INR/DDC - William McAfee

Clearances:

INR/DDC - Mr. Gardner

NEA - Mr. Davies

~~SECRET~~

*1/20/68
Rt BKS*

192206

53

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

13

MAY 11 3 42 PM '67

90
Origin
INRD
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO
INFO: Amembassy SANAA
Amembassy Office TAIZ

STATE 192206
ROGER CHANNEL
Cairo 7348 (NOTAL)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-422
By *ing* NARA, Date 7-30-92

1. Taiz 1510 indicates main area of compromise lies outside vault area. On basis interviews here and subject detailed findings Parker team, following are main items normally kept ~~mask~~ outside vault area:

a. Hamer's own safe (which is missing) contained following: correspondence with Charge re Harriz contract extensions; copies of contracts; discussions of future placement (this appears to have been "chrono file" on Harriz); material re aircraft contract; personnel files including performance ratings; and material through Confidential on general administrative and logistics problems, such as whether pay locals for time in jail and customs problems re Michelac's guns. There was no decrypted material in safe and none Secret or above.

b. Program Officer's safe contained classified material covering program-related aspects of AID projects as well as planning documents such as first draft AID/Y strategy statement on Yemen, AID 1965 or 1966 strategy

Drafted by: *NEA/ARP:WDBrewer:hmk:5/11/67* Tel # **5655** Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: **INR/DDC - William McAfee**

Clearances:
AID/NESA - Mr. Flint *FD*
INR/DDC - Mr. Gardner

~~SECRET~~

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statement for Middle East and classified chron file. Some of foregoing material was exposed when officer forced leave building at time April 26 riot.

c. Personnel office contained ~~and~~ unclassified personnel files, including background and bio data on Yemenis and USG employees.

GP-1.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

189536

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

54

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

15

4-44

MAY 8 11 29 AM '67

Origin ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE
Info: INFOR Amembassy SANAA

STATE 189536

ROGER CHANNEL

S

State 187506; Cairo 1753; Sanaa 600

1. We do not believe current operation could have been mounted without prior knowledge Marshal Amer, if not Nasser himself. Furthermore, operation seems already to be well advanced (Taiz 1493). In circumstances question whether useful purpose served by making special effort get new message to Nasser and Amer along ^{precise} lines you suggest. (NOTAL)

2. Following important points should be made in no uncertain terms to key Egyptian contacts, including Salah Nasr, so that there can be no question of their understanding our assessment situation:

-- our Embassy Branch in Taiz has reported evidence of penetration AID office at time when it was being guarded by UAR military. This is of course entirely unacceptable and should be terminated.

-- It is not "local tensions" that causing problem but fact that local Egyptian authorities Taiz have throughout refused give our senior diplomatic representative in Taiz access to ^{USG property} ~~the compound~~ (State 138341).

-- As GUAR ~~know~~, we have just acquired a report indicating Taiz ~~incident~~ incident was caused by tribal raid on evening April 25 which came from

Drafted by: WMB
NEA/WRP:WDBrewer:lmk:5/8/67

Tel. Ext. 5655

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: WMA
INR/DDC - William McAfee


Clearances:
NEA - Ambassador Battle WMB
NEA - Mr. Davies
INR/DDC - Mr. Gardner WMB

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-62
By isl, NARA, Date 4-2-07

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direction AID campsite. There was no American connection with this raid on which GUAR no doubt also has reports.

3. Foregoing will serve ^{our position} put on record (Cairo 7228), particularly since Salah Nasr certain report his superiors. In approach to him, should be made clear these views reflect thinking of highest levels ~~of HCG~~ (FYI - Ingoing to Salah Nasir we assume Embassy giving weight to undesirability giving impression  particular interest).

3.3
(b)(1)

END

GP-1.

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

55

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

189486

~~SECRET~~

44
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy Cairo IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-422
By sig NARA. Date 7-30-92

Info: Amembassy Sanaa PRIORITY
Amembassy Branch Office TAIZ PRIORITY

MAY 7 1 30 PM '67

EXDIS
~~LEADS~~
STATE

189486

2

Ref: Cairo 7186, 7217; Sanaa 584, 585

1. Pass following soonest via FonMin to Field Marshal Amer from Secretary:

QUOTE I have received your oral message of May 6 which you passed to me through Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. I am grateful for the efforts which you have been making and for your expression of belief that the two Americans presently unjustly detained in Taiz can be released by May 15. This is good news. However, I must call to your attention that YARG Minister Interior Ahmudi in an interview with NY Times correspondent Eric Pace in Sanaa on evening May 6 has stated that Liapis and Hartman are guilty and will be brought to trial. I would point out that any such development would be contrary to my understanding of your message to me. We realize that Ahmudi's remarks may have been ill-considered and assume they do not reflect the true intent of all officials concerned with this problem. His statement is nevertheless bound to heighten American public indignation re the unfounded accusations which have been brought against ^{our two officials} ~~them~~

Drafted by:	NEA/UAR:DCBergus NEA/ARP:DKora:WDBrewer	Tel. Ext.	5655	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	The Secretary
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NEA - Ambassador Battle *JOB*

S/S - Mr. Shostal

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

and render much more difficult our mutual efforts to avoid adding fuel
 to the flames. This development, as well as the ^{May 6} statement on UAR TV
 rpt UAR TV by YARG ~~Embassy~~ Vice Premier Juzaylan, alleging "US subversive
 acts in Taiz", hardly reflects the desire to avoid publicity which you
 mentioned to me and ~~which~~ which I fully share. While I welcome your
 assurance regarding our two officials, your government is no doubt aware ^{that an}
 actual trial, even if it were only a device to allow for their subsequent
 release, would have serious repercussions on American public opinion with
~~XXXXXX~~
 resultant/adverse effect on our relations with UAR.

QUOTE Our most energetic efforts to obtain YARG authority to have
 access to our property on AID premises in Taiz have so far ~~been met~~
 with no satisfactory response. I therefore welcome the ~~same~~ information
 that your government is facilitating the sending to Taiz of a team from
 our Embassy in Cairo to receive ~~our~~ our AID records. I bespeak your
 continuing assistance on this matter to assure that the integrity of
 USG official correspondence and other property is maintained until it
 can be returned to the custody of appropriate American officials.

QUOTE I hope that we can keep in close touch until this entire
 situation can be resolved to our mutual satisfaction. With personal
 regards, DEAN RUSK. UNQUOTE

FYI Because of extreme sensitivity May 15 date, addressees are
 instructed to reveal no rpt no knowledge of it either to YARG officials
 or to the detainees themselves. END FYI

END

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RUSK

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

187506

56

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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45-42
Origin
INRD
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

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DECLASSIFIED

MAY 4 9 40 AM '67

STATE 187506

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422

ROGER CHANNEL

By *[Signature]* NARA. Date 7-30-92

11/16

1. After consultation with Nes, Brommell should approach Saleh Nasser and pass following message. We leave to discretion Nes and Brommel exact phrasing of message so that most effective presentation can be achieved.
2. Begin message: "Saleh Nasser's assurances that Liapis and Hartman would be released have been reported to Washington. These assurances well received as men are innocent and enjoy diplomatic immunity. However there is another/serious problem.
3. USG officials have been denied access to AID buildings Ta'iz for more than one week. While denial access has been in name YARG authorities, inescapable / ~~unescapable~~ fact is AID building under effective control of UAR military authorities. Our people in Yemen have clearly observed that guard detachment comprised of/military police commanded by UAR officer.
4. AID building in Yemen was considered by us as part of our diplomatic mission to that country and was treated as such. Consequently it contains archives and other US diplomatic papers. We frankly concerned that UAR authorities may seek to exploit this situation and attempt major penetration US interests.

Drafted by: NEA:UAR:DCBergus:av 5/3/67	Tel. Ext. 5092	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: INR/DDC - William McAfee
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Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Battle
NEA - Mr. Harris

INR/DDC - JRGardner

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5. We wish to make it clear that any attempt at penetration will raise serious doubt as to intentions and motives of UAR.

6. If the UAR believes it in its own interest to avoid such a situation, it should at once facilitate arrangements whereby the property and ~~XXXXXX~~ archives of the United States can be returned, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ uncompromised, to safekeeping by authorized representatives of the United States."

GP-3

END

RUSK

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182453

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE

Apr 26 2 13 PM '67

INFO: Amembassy JIDDA PRIORITY

STATE 182453

EKDIS

REF: State's 181932, Cairo's 6747

Yemen Mediation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-422
By 1-8 NARA Date 7-30-92

1. We are frankly not too impressed by Fekki's statement that UAR response to draft US terms of reference being held up pending meeting Supreme Executive ASU. After all, this small select group is composed of individuals having practically daily contact with Nasser. We fail see valid reasons why it should take over two weeks for GUAR come to decision deal with this matter by formal procedure which will consume further time.
2. At same time we recognize that you are on the spot and are in best position exercise judgment as to significance this development.
3. We concerned lest GUAR have impression it can keep USG on string indefinitely while it acts as it sees fit in Yemen, e.g. surfacing of ex-King Saud. It is essential that GUAR be disabused of notion that it can retain control of timing of mediation effort while paying no heed to need for suitable atmosphere for mediation. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Drafted by: NEA/UAR:DCBergus:cff 4/26/67

5092

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - L. D. Battle

Clearances: NEA/ARP - Mr. Brewer

S/S - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Mr. McCall

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~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

181932

58

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Origin
Info: SS

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

PRIORITY

APR 25 5 54 PM '67

INFO: Amembassy JIDDA

STATE 181932

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-422

By lig NARA, Date 7-30-92

EXDIS

Ref: Cairo's 6665, Jidda's 4389

02

Yemen Mediation

1. View unhelpful and dilatory nature El-Fikki's response to Nes approach and unsettling effect of GUAR-sponsored trip of ex-King Saud to Yemen, we believe Charge should seek earliest opportunity make following points to UAR Fommin Riad:

a) Offer of USG to assist in mediatory role in UAR-SAG dispute over Yemen, made by Ambassador Battle in his farewell call on President Nasser, was based on a desire to help parties directly concerned avoid what could be an increasingly dangerous situation. We believed then as we believe now that USG could not hope to be of any assistance unless both Saudi Arabia and UAR voluntarily and wholeheartedly accepted our offer of assistance and were prepared to work with us.

b) We were therefore heartened by GUAR's preliminary and affirmative response to our offer. Matter has subsequently been followed with

Drafted by: NEA/UAR:DCBergus:cff 4/25/67	Tel. Ext. 5092	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Iarcus D. Battle
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Clearances:

NEA/ARP: Mr. Brewer

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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interest at high levels USG.

- c) Identical terms of reference were delivered both to SAG and GUAR over two weeks ago. King Feisal immediately gave us his initial reaction to these terms of reference. Fomina will understand why it would be inappropriate for us to discuss details of SAG response with GUAR at this time. Proper procedure is for USG to await substantive response of GUAR to terms of reference after which it can make another simultaneous approach to both capitals.
- d) We are concerned at delay in GUAR response to US draft terms of reference. Document is brief, simple, contains no hidden meanings, and requires parties to assume no obligations beyond those already incumbent upon them through various multilateral undertakings such as UN and Arab League charters. We believe that 17 days which have elapsed since April 8 have been ample for GUAR to prepare a position on terms of reference.
- e) Our concern is heightened by recent surfacing of ex-King rpt ex-King Saud in Yemen. Though it was Sallal rather than GUAR leaders who hailed Saud as QUOTE legal King of Saudi people UNQUOTE, we do not wish to get into such legal niceties. Fact remains ~~that~~ Saud was taken to Yemen in official GUAR airplane and in company of some of highest Egyptian officials. SAG has not complained to us about this behavior on part GUAR. Nor does USG propose insert itself into legal or political effects of this

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incident on UAR-SAG relations. We are, however, concerned at its effect on prospects for our own mediation proposal. Actions such as this make it more difficult for USG to be helpful.

f) USG has felt throughout that without some degree of cooperation and responsiveness from both parties, there would be little point in pressing mediation effort. We have no desire elbow ourselves into situation in absence desire of both sides to work with us.

g) We would appreciate the GUAR's considered views on these matters.

2. FYI re para 4, Cairo's 6665. Ambassador Kamel has been informed by Cairo of US offer and UAR acceptance of US mediation. He has been told by us that terms of reference have been delivered both in Cairo and in Jidda. In response to his ~~his~~ questions re Feisal's reaction he has been given line contained in State's 173904, i.e. it would be inappropriate for USG to discuss SAG response until GUAR responds and USG can make simultaneous approach to both capitals. Kamel has accepted this as proper diplomatic procedure and has not rpt not pressed for details. END FYI.

GP 1

KATZENBACH

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

173357

59

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90

Origin
NEA
Info:
SS
GPM
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CPR

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO PRIORITY
STATE 173357
REF State's 172876
SUBJ YOUNES VISIT

APR 12 1 21 PM '67

*Cancelled
Mr Rostow out of town*

1. Younes meeting Walt Rostow now scheduled 10:30 a.m. April 26.
2. We scheduling his meeting Handley 12 noon April 27 prior lunch, leaving afternoon April 26 free for Younes see Woods if he so desires.

GP-3

END

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-422
By sig NARA Date 7-30-92

KATZENBACH

Drafted by: NEA/UAR:GMBennsky/cls:4/12/67	Tel. Ext. 5598	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/UAR - Mr. Bergus
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Clearances:
WH - Hsaunders (subs)
NEA - EPDayies
S/S - Mr. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Walsh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

172116
60

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET - EXDLS~~

82
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO
Amembassy JIDDA

APR 10 7 21 PM '67

STATE 172116

EXDLS

Cairo 6180; Jidda 4167.

Yemen Mediation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-422
By mg NARA, Date 7-30-92

1. Re public announcement Hare Mission, Dept had been thinking that most appropriate format would be statement prepared in Washington, cleared in advance with UAR and SAG and issued simultaneously in three capitals concerned. Accordingly, in addressees further discussions this subject with host governments, latter should be specifically enjoined against unilateral public announcements which could only complicate fundamental question of seeking restore modicum of confidence between parties.
2. FYI. Dept also very much aware desirability that others, such as SYG, HMG, GOK and possibly YARG, should be informed in advance of contemplated new USG effort. Premature public revelation Hare Mission would adversely affect USG relations with foregoing entities, thus prejudicing their full cooperation with conciliation endeavor. END FYI.

GP-1.

END.

KATZ

Drafted by: <u>W</u> NEA/ARP:WDBrewer:bnk:4/10/67	Tel. Ext. <u>5565</u>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - <u>Rodger P. Davies</u>
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Clearances:
NEA/UAR - Mr. Bergus AB
NEA - Mr. ~~Dantes~~ Battle
S/S - JPWalsh

White House - Mr. Saunders OW

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

171462

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

61

41
88

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE
Amembassy JIDDA IMMEDIATE

2

APR 8 1 16 PM '67

STATE 171462

REF.: Cairo's 6142; Jidda's 4149

SUBJECT: Yemen Mediation

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-422

By ~~128~~ NARA Date 7-30-92

1. Concur para 1 Cairo reftel approach FonMin Riyadh.
2. Re alteration phraseology Terms of Reference, believe Cairo suggestion has merit. Accordingly addressees should drop both repeat both adjectives and modify Terms of Reference to read QUOTE to refrain from acts/~~of~~ ^{and} propaganda UNQUOTE in numbered paras 2 and 3 State 170451. Presentation must be identical. Cairo should therefore immediately notify Jidda in event presentation to Riyadh made prior receipt this message and word QUOTE hostile UNQUOTE thus retained before QUOTE propaganda UNQUOTE.
of course
3. Re para 2 Jidda's 4149, you may/~~reiterate~~ reiterate that departure UAR troops remains overriding USG objective. It was our intention you would draw on numbered paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 State 170460 in making your presentation, and ~~you will note this~~ point contained numbered para 2.

Drafted by: NEA/ARP:WDBrewer:lab 4/8/67	Tel. Ext. 5655	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - XXXXXXXXXXXX	Lucius D. Battle
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Amb. Hare
WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Saunders (informed)
NEA/UAR - Mr. Bergus

S/S - Mrs. Davis
NEA - Mr. Davies

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

failure mention in Cairo
4. We recognize/~~lack of mention~~ suspension UAR bombings north Yemen villages may cause problem. We felt, however, inclusion this point would be regarded by UAR as intervention internal affairs YARG. If question is raised, you may say that we did not feel it would be appropriate include specific reference this point in presentation to UARG, since Cairo would no doubt regard this question as ~~not~~ falling within purview of UAR-YARG relations and internal affairs YAR.

Multiplicity UAR bombings of such nature would of course be factor Special Representative's in/~~specific representation~~ consideration whether acts had occurred which might prejudice his efforts. However, we believe we should not be too specific at this stage regarding various ~~new~~ acts which could complicate conciliation effort, lest effort bog/~~down~~ down in illustrative refinements ~~refinement~~ at outset. Obviously, all such matters would be considered Special Representative by/~~specific representation~~ as they might arise, view broad latitude given him under Terms of Reference to consider all developments which might adversely affect his mission.

END

GP-3

ACTING

KATZ

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

170459

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422

By ijp NARA, Date 7-30-92

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Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

APR 7 12 27 PM '67

INFO Amembassy JIDDA

STATE 170459

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EXHIBITS

1. By separate telegram we are sending to Cairo and Jidda draft terms of reference for delivery to and consideration by both parties. While we would, of course, prefer their delivery directly to President Nasser, to parallel Ambassador Eilts' demarche to King Faisal, we fully understand nature of protocol obstacles to a meeting between Charge' and President. For this reason we suggest draft terms of reference be presented to GUAR through usual channels, ie, Fikki at Foreign Office and el-Khouli at Presidency. Charge' might in his discretion wish mention to el-Fikki that draft being presented Faisal personally by Ambassador Eilts and that Charge' is at Nasser's disposition if latter desires parallel gesture.

2. In presenting this draft you should point out that Dept has sought to keep terms of reference as brief and flexible as possible. We have borne in mind comments made by el-Khouli (Cairo's 5823) in this connection. Stipulations of terms of reference establish what we believe is bare minimum of requirements from all parties concerned to create necessary atmosphere for progress on substantive issues. We believe conciliation effort foredoomed

Drafted by: WEA/UAR:DCBergus/clc:4/5/67

Tel. Ext. 5092

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ The Secretary

Clearances:

WEA - Ambassador Battle
 WEA/ARF - Mr. Brewer
 Ambassador Haxe
 S/S - Mr. Walsh

The White House - Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

unless both sides accept proposition that aggressive acts against each other be suspended during conciliation period and that provocative propaganda similarly must be toned down. In case of ~~Saudi~~ ^{Saudis} this would include further support to royalists other than food. UAR, on its part, should agree avoid renewed bombings and support for harassment actions inside Saudi Arabia. It will be noted that no party is expected to assume undertakings other than those already incumbent upon them in various multilateral arrangements such as UN and Arab League charters.

3. We believe that in interest of all concerned that interested parties get to work on substantive issues involved as quickly and as effectively as possible. Response of both UAR and SAG to our original suggestion has encouraged us to hope that both governments are genuinely interested in reversing present downward trend in their relations. We would like to get down to work as ~~quickly~~ ^{quickly} as possible and Ambassador Hare is prepared to visit the area as soon as terms of reference can be agreed upon among all three parties. We ask that the GUAR keep these considerations in mind as it considers draft terms of reference.

CP-1

END

KATZ

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE

APR 12 7 01 PM '67

INFO.: Amembassy JIDDA PRIORITY

~~REPEAT JIDDA PRIORITY~~
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

EXDIS

STATE 173904

REF Jidda's 4221

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-422
By ing NARA, Date 7-30-92

We believe it essential Egyptians not be informed of substance Saudi comment on terms reference until after rpt after they have presented their own response to us. Accordingly, if queried by Egyptians as to Faisal reaction, you should reply only that text of terms reference has been presented Faisal. USG plans make next substantive approach to both Cairo and Riyadh simultaneously and will not do so until DAR comments received and studied by USG.

GP-1

KND

KATZ

Drafted by: NEA/UAR:DCBergus/clis:4/12/67	Tel. Ext. 5092	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - RPDavies
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Clearances:

ARP - Mr. Brewer (subs)

S/S - Mr. Walker

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422

By king NARA. Date 7-30-92

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~~SECRET~~

169437

APR 55 77 SEP 1967

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Origin
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Info

ACTION:

CAIRO

STATE 169437

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Following summary memo on FYI only and NCFORN. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.

NASSER

1. Following are highlights conversation Secretary and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil April 5 concerning Nasser.
2. Secretary asked whether Caglayangil had any comments on Nasser and whether there was anything GOT could do to moderate his attitude.
3. Foreign Minister said Nasser now in a deadlock and going through the most difficult period in his political life; he has serious economic problems and is deeply involved in Yemen and Aden. Opinions varied as to whether he could be trusted; certainly Iran and Saudi Arabia fought against every move to assist UAR, and US public opinion distrustful of Nasser. Diplomats, however, must act on rational basis. Syria was now under heavy Soviet influence. Should we leave Nasser to his destiny or try to detach him from the Communists? Much depended on course US decided to follow. If US decided try draw Nasser to "our" side perhaps Turkey could help.
4. Secretary said we had two main problems with Nasser: His disregard for public opinion here and fact that most of his Arab neighbors were afraid of him.

Drafted by:

NEA:SWRockwell:av 4/5/67

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. O'Donohue

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Diplomats could act on rational basis but they could not get Congress and public to agree to help a man who regards US as a cow which will continue to give milk despite the fact that it is kicked every day. Nasser's speeches have lost him many millions of dollars, Secretary said.

5. In Secretary's opinion Nasser should draw conclusions from other leaders who have neglected their people for foreign adventures--Ben Bella, Sukarno and Nkrumah.

Foreign Minister said he had discussed with Nasser need to respect regimes of other countries. Egyptian President had denied stories of his plotting and said he didn't have money to waste on such schemes, although King Faisal apparently was under no such restriction. ~~XX~~ Nasser also charged US with policy of starving Egyptian people.

6. Secretary said US would prefer to assist Nasser if he would give us a chance. Foreign Minister replied that this was rational choice. Perhaps if US, by pre-arrangement, made public statement re desire to improve relations with UAR, Nasser might respond and GOT could be helpful. Secretary said we had had many frank and private discussions with Nasser, to no avail. One good point was that his relations with some of our top business people were quite good.

7. Caglayangil said Turkish Ambassador Cairo had suggested GOT invite UAR Foreign Minister visit Turkey. If visit takes place GOT would like US suggestions at that time re points to be made. Secretary said we would be glad provide. Caglayangil felt we should not leave Nasser to his own destiny.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

MAR 17 11 19 AM '67

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REF: LIMDIS
Cairo's 5368

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422

by *sig* NARA Date 7-30-92

Ex-Governor Saunders Visit

1. Saunders is prominent American. He has been selected by management Coca Cola talk about several matters mutual interest with Nasser.
2. Coca Cola, which itself prominent American business enterprise, requested top levels Executive Branch ~~USG/Amembassy~~ for assistance arranging Nasser appointment.
3. Since UARG sees merit Nasser receiving American business executives on Amer's Easter Week public relations visit, seems to us no question substantive meeting Nasser and Saunders merits special attention. Our understanding Saunders carrying proposition which would require ~~top-most~~ top-most UARG decision.
4. Ambassador Kamel has been carrying ball but your discreet, persuasive assistance obviously required now.

GP 3

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/UAR:GMBennsky:cff 3/17/67	Tel. Ext. 5092	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/UAR - Donald C. Bergus
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Clearances:

White House - Mr. Wiggins (substance)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

MAR 2 8 49 PM '67

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STATE 147745

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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM HANDLEY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-422

by WJH NARA, Date 7-30-92

During last several months we have had under review at highest levels our military supply policy for India and Pakistan. This matter will undoubtedly come up for discussion during your visits with our missions in Rawalpindi and Delhi. Purpose of this message is to let you know how things stand.

1. As you know we have had military relationship with India and Pakistan since early fifties. In Pakistan a major arms assistance program has totaled \$720 million. Until 1962 India purchased considerable amounts of military equipment and after Chicom attack we undertook military assistance program. A follow-on Memorandum of Understanding in 1964 envisaged a program of U.S. assistance of \$100 million annually for five years, half credit and half grant, coupled to an Indian undertaking to limit foreign exchange component of its defense budget.

Drafted by: NEA/INC:DHeck:dmm 3/1/67	Tel. Ext. 4703	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley
Clearances:		

PAF - Mr. Spain
 SIG - Mr. Miller

S/S - Mr. Shostal
 U - Mr. Katzenbach

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to CAIRO

~~SECRET~~

2. At outset of India-Pakistan war in 1965 we suspended military assistance programs to both countries. We are still continuing our policy of suspension of deliveries of lethal spares and end items to both countries from U.S., or from third countries in cases where we exercise control over items involved. Meanwhile we have resumed credit sale of nonlethal items. In last six months India has put in orders for approximately \$25 million of equipment. Pakistan is also turning to credit sales arrangements and we have just approved approximately \$8 million in Pak orders for jeeps and jet trainers which fall in nonlethal category. Further, we have licensed cash sales of nonlethal items amounting to about \$14 million for India and \$8 million for Pakistan.

3. During most of 1966 we have had military supply policy under review. Our objective has been to evolve a policy which would strengthen our hand with both Governments in seeking a limitation on arms expenditures and avoiding an arms race. During this review we have sought advice of Ambassadors BUNKER and DEAN as well as Ambassadors BOWLES and LOCKE, who have also probed the matter at highest levels of GOI and GOP.

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4. Ambassador Bowles has repeatedly advised that relaxation our present policy toward Pakistan would adversely affect our interests in India and has recommended that any such action be deferred at least pending outcome of Indian elections. Elections are now over and answer is overdue to AYUB's repeated request for lethal spares to maintain previously supplied US. MAP equipment.

5. Matter was considered by SIG on February 14. Consensus was that U.S. should consider a package which aimed at limiting arms race and encouraging allocation of national resources to agricultural and economic development. Other suppliers such as U.K., France and Germany should be urged to follow similar restraint. (These countries currently maintain no restrictions comparable to ours on cash sales of lethal end items or spares). The exact mix of this package has not been finally resolved but it is expected to include (a) removal of our military missions in both countries and their replacement by some category of defense adviser on Ambassador's immediate staff; (b) approval of sale of U.S. origin or licensed military equipment by third countries over which we have any controls only in those cases where it meets our objectives of arms limitation; (c) credit sales program to both countries for nonlethal items ^{when it contributes to arms limitation;} (d) sale of spares for lethal items ^{when there is a clearly established} ~~when it is clearly established~~

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Page 4 of telegram to CAIRO

~~SECRET~~

critical need and when such sales contribute to arms limitation;
~~and to the extent possible to provide for (e) limited CONUS training.~~

6. No repeat no decision on this package has yet been reached.

~~It is expected to go to the President shortly.~~ However it comes out,
 grant military assistance is a thing of the past.

7. This proposal meets most of AYUB's needs. We recognize it will cost us something in India and we are sensitive to Ambassador Bowles' concerns on this point. However we believe that by now, a year and a half after September 1965 war, our present military supply posture has become increasingly artificial: it keeps us out of step with other Western arms suppliers, complicating prospects for cooperation with them in joint arms limitation efforts; it leaves Soviets and Chicom free to enhance their influence at our expense; and it forces us to deal piecemeal with such continuing questions as military credit and third country sales to both India and Pakistan. Considering that our proposed policy relaxation would clearly not rpt not be a first step toward resumption of our pre-1965 military supply relations, but rather a measure to normalize, ~~and~~ ^{to} get in line with other Western suppliers, ~~we would expect Indian reaction to be~~ and to give us influence toward reduced arms expenditures, we would hope to contain Indian ~~reactions to manageable~~ ^{reaction} proportions.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

149868

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

DECLASSIFIED

MAR 6 9 09 PM '67

SS
Info

STATE 149868

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-422

EXDIS/NOFORN

By mg NARA. Date 7-30-92
DeptOff

1. At luncheon today UAR Ambassador Kamel recounted/long history of dire predictions he had made re US-UAR relations in event USG not responsive UAR overtures re wheat and other matters. He regretfully concluded history had proved him right. Said he had just received highly secret indications from Cairo that matters would probably become much worse unless USG acted at once. Kamel hinted he had been instructed refrain from further representations re wheat. (Comment: Kamel has told us this before. This time, however, we wonder whether he may have received instructions based on Nasser-Battle conversation of March 5. Cairo's 5030)

2. Kamel said malevolent forces around Nasser had not only persuaded him that future US-UAR relations were black but had practically convinced Nasser that he had nothing to lose and possibly much to gain by proceeding create crisis in US-UAR relations. Kamel felt that only QUOTE offensive UNQUOTE on part of USG could provide necessary shock treatment to bring Cairo to its senses.

3. As was to be expected Kamel's QUOTE offensive UNQUOTE contained such

Drafted by: NEA/UAR:DCBergms 3/6/67

Tel. Ext. 5092

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Morris

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

well known elements as (a) US initiative in mediating Yemen dispute to be taken despite possible negative responses by UAR and SAG to US probes on this matter; (b) USG should QUOTE surprise UNQUOTE Nasser and discomfit enemies of US in Nasser's entourage by moving quickly on wheat request; (c) US should use influence toward constructive overall settlement between GUAR and IMF; (d) US should take wholesome attitude re UAR request for rescheduling of debt.

(Comment: Tone and urgency in which Kamel put above was such as to lead Dept. Officer to believe Kamel may have had intimations from Cairo that his days as UAR Ambassador to US are numbered unless he can produce and produce quickly.)

GP 1.

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: **Amenbassy CAIRO**

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STATE 142393

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422

by lig NARA, Date 7-30-92

1. Former Governor Georgia Carl Saunders planning visit Cairo on behalf Coca Cola in next two to three weeks seeking prevent boycott action against company. Saunders and Company Vice President Ohlert have discussed visit with Ambassador Kamel who they state is endorsing visit in Telegram to UARG and urging ~~request~~ that President Nasser receive Saunders.
2. In discussions with UARG officials Saunders will: a) convey Company's offer to build concentrate plant in Egypt to supply Near Eastern states; b) offer technical assistance in fields related to canning, bottling and distributing citrus products; c) explain ^{felt} that company ~~forced~~ to complete deal in Israel despite ~~max~~ importance Arab markets ~~because~~ because of pressures that could be developed against sales in United States; d) imply that if boycott/implemented, ^{implemented,} ~~implemented,~~

Drafted by:

NEA:RFDavies:ef:2/23/67

Tel. Ext.

2107

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA:Rodger P. Davies *RPD*

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Starnes *WS*

UAR - Mr. Bergus *WS*

White House - Mr. Wriggins (info) *WS*

E - Mr. Allen (subs) *WS*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Company's large US organization would find it difficult defend this and other Arab actions publicly.

3. Embassy requested lend appropriate assistance.

END

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

140276

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin
NEA ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO PRIORITY
Info: Amembassy JIDDA PRIORITY
Amembassy KUWAIT PRIORITY

FEB 18 7 35 PM '67

SS INFO: Amembassy LONDON
GPM Amembassy BEIRUT
SP Amembassy SANAA
SC Amembassy AMMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

SAH STATE 140276

NJ 91-422
By sig NARA, Date 7-30-92

L Ref Cairo 4649

- 1. Department agrees that continued deterioration Saudi-UAR relations makes it increasingly desirable for US direct offer of good offices or mediation, perhaps sooner rather than later. Whether this ultimately should take form of high level (probably Bunker) US statesman/visiting both capitals, promotion of Saudi-UAR meetings in Europe (Jidda 3314), or some other technique depends on further developments and recommendations addressees. Would appreciate receiving Amb Battle's proposed scenario for approach to Nasser offered para 8 reftel.
- 2. Final tour d'horizon with Nasser would, we believe, be useful in any event.
- 3. Although chances Kuwait mediation are fading, believe we should do all possible promote GOK efforts at least in interim until we decide act ourselves. Further GOK activity in any event not incompatible with US moves. Since Saqqaf visit Kuwait still scheduled for Feb 21, best hope lies in facilitating meeting at that time with al-Khouli or other appropriate UAR official. For that purpose request following action:

Drafted by: NEA/ARP:GCMoore:gcb 2/17/67	Tel. Ext. 5655	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U - Nicholas deB Katzenbach
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Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Davies NEA/UAR - Mr. Bergus s/s - Mr. Bruce
White House -
Mr. Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

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A. For Jidda - Recognize need for King's approval Saqqaf-Egyptian discussion and assume there no use pressing Cairo send al-Khouli until certain King would not oppose talks. Request you ascertain King's views soonest.

B. For Cairo - Request you strongly urge UAR respond to Kuwait "direct question" (Kuwait tel 835) that it in fact wants continuation GOK mediation. If it is clear by the time you make this approach that Faisal has no opposition Saqqaf-al-Khouli discussion, you should urge UAR take advantage Saqqaf presence Kuwait to initiate dialogue.

C. For Kuwait - If Faisal sanctions meeting, you should urge Kuwaitis invite al-Khouli meet with Saqqaf under GOK auspices.

END

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ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(c)


February 18, 1967

Date

BY DCH ON 7-19-91

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure: Tel to Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait
drafted NEA:GMOore:2/17/67

*Cleared by Wriggers over phone to S/S
on Sat at 4:55 P.M.*

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

56369-6~~SECRET~~

Ambassy CAIRO PRIORITY
 Embassy JIDDA PRIORITY
 Embassy KUWAIT PRIORITY

INFO: Embassy LONDON
 Embassy BEIRUT
 Embassy SANAA
 Embassy AMMAN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422By Wig NARA, Date 7-30-92

STATE

Ref Cairo 4649

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NEA/ARP:GCMoore:geb 2/17/67

5655

U - Nicholas deB Katzenbach

NEA - Mr. Davies

NEA/UAR - Mr. Bergus

S/S

White House

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy CAIRO, JIDDA, KUWAIT PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

- A. For Jidda - Recognize need for King's approval Saqqaf-Egyptian discussion and assume there no use pressing Cairo send al-Khouli until certain King would not oppose talks. Request you ascertain King's views soonest.
- B. For Cairo - Request you strongly urge UAR respond to Kuwait "direct question" (Kuwait tel 835) that it in fact wants continuation GOK mediation. If it is clear by the time you make this approach that Faisal has no opposition Saqqaf-al-Khouli discussion, you should urge UAR take advantage Saqqaf presence Kuwait to initiate dialogue.
- C. For Kuwait - If Faisal sanctions meeting, you should urge Kuwaitis invite al-Khouli meet with Saqqaf under GOK auspices.

CP-3

END

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

139176

70

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

91

Origin
NEA

ACTION: **Ambassy CAIRO**

FEB 17 11 08 AM '67

Info:

SS
GPM
NSC

STATE 139176

ATTN PARKER

Amb Kamel tells Saunders he cabling Fawzi, Riyad, Zaki and Deif concerning latter's visit to UAR. Kamel also talked about laying on visit to Aswan including a factory. Saunders said any arrangements Kamel suggesting to UARG should be coordinated with you.

GP-3

END

ACTING

KATZENBACH

Drafted by: NEA/UAR: GMBennsky/cls:2/17/67	Tel. Ext. 5598	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/UAR: Mr. Bennsky
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Clearances:

WH - Hal Saunders (subs)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

110910

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

71

2 DEC 30 7 23 PM '66

82
Origin
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ACTION: AmEmbassy Cairo
Info AmEmbassy Amman
Amembassy DAMASCUS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-422

By *sig* NARA. Date 7-30-92

S

STATE 110910

EXDIS

REF: CAIRO 3426

1. We believe most desirable route for airlift military equipment to Jordan is Wheelus via UAR to Aqaba.
2. We concur your recommendation that request should be in terms blanket authorization for entire operation.
3. Please request such authorization from Foreign Minister or other appropriately high level official. Prompt response needed so we can make alternative arrangements if UARG refuses permission.
4. Khamash told DAT Amman that he did not raise question of overflights at Dec 26 UAC meeting in Cairo and King Hussein has indicated his preference that USG make first approach.
5. Specific number sorties and time period not yet finally determined. If UAR authorization granted we anticipate minimum of 80 round trip flights in largest transport aircraft with approximately 20% of these and during first half January with remainder during last half January and early February. Following GUAR authorization, specific requests for clearances including tail numbers and other relevant information

NEA/ARN

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA- Rodger P. Davies

MMWiley/jh December 30, 1966

3236

~~NEA/ARN- Rodger Davies~~

Clearances:

- DOD/ISA- Col. Jordan
- NEA/UAR- Mr. Bergus
- NEA/ARN- D.L. Gamon
- S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

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would be made through established channels.

6. FYI At Cairo meeting, Khamash probably exaggerated size of package Jordan receiving from USG and UAR may thus have exaggerated idea number of sorties required. END FYI

GP 1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

72

111035

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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81
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: **Ambassy CAIRO**
STATE 111035
EXDIS

DEC 30 9 05 PM '66

We have carefully considered proposals set forth your 3540. Consensus here is that direct approach to Russians would not be fruitful and could be used against us. Your subsequent 3584 would seem bear this out. We see certain advantages to idea of press leak and will explore this possibility, bearing in mind caveats in para 3 reftel.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-422
By sig NARA, Date 7-30-92

RUSK

Drafted by:	NEA/UARDCbergusdf 12/30/66	Tel. Ext.	5092	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	NEA -	Rodger P. Davies
Clearances:	EUR/SOV - Mr. Toon				S/S - Mrs. Walsh	

~~SECRET~~

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At same time we wonder if Nasser can resist temptation make dramatic reference this development in public speech, perhaps at Port Said on December 23.

b. Our preliminary reaction is that it in our interest this issue not be allowed surface dramatically so long as GUAR feels likewise. Moreover it might well be in our interest continue maintain position of sympathy for UAR's food problem and hope conditions could improve to point where we could assume more active role. By what means could this best be done?

c. Nasser's comments on IMF lead us to believe that UAR-IMF stabilization agreement not very likely in immediate future. Does Embassy feel, however, that we should continue to urge Egyptians to come to terms with IMF or could this have negative effect on relations? (FYI Kamel may approach Genter soon for memo for cable Nasser re stabilization agreement. This could be opportunity get before Nasser positive politico/economic aspects IMF proposal. END FYI)

d. From what Nasser said in refel and other indications we gather it possible that GUAR, while continuing acknowledge indebtedness to IMF and other Western creditors, both government and private, will in effect unilaterally postpone and reschedule repayments to conform its foreign exchange situation. GUAR doubtless aware of and intends to exploit widespread abhorrence Western community to idea of declaring sovereign independent country bankrupt. Also it must be clear to GUAR there no unanimity among Western creditors on how handle Egyptian debt to them.

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e. GVAR apparently feels that despite worsening relations with Western creditors it can maintain a situation where Western capital for financing oil development will continue to be forthcoming. While we would not in abstract necessarily quarrel with this view, we wonder whether Soviets would in long run tolerate a situation whereby a natural bridge of mutual economic interest was being built up between Egypt and West.

f. Does Nasser realize impact on UAR economy of possible loss Western and international institution financing - i.e., further slowdown, dislocation and unemployment in already depressed economy? What would be likely political implications of lower levels economic activity and development that could be maintained with communist country help alone?

2. Finally, even assuming that there is for the moment mutual disposition avoid burning bridges on wheat matter, we wonder how long a fairly normal relationship between US and UAR can be maintained. Required activity on our part such as pressing for resolution claims and repayment matters, both public and private, conversations and other commitments under ^{past} PL 480 agreements, and the like could provide a steady stream of irritants, accumulation of which could risk a blow-off. This connection what is Embassy's view as to number of representations we make to GVAR on area matters in which we interested, for example, Jordan, Yemen, Arab-Israel question etc.? Should we continue on business-as-usual basis, pointing out as appropriate overall common interest in area stability, or should we deliberately attempt to reduce encounters with

GUAR over difficult matters?

3. XJCKJ FYI. Next IRG meeting on UAR wheat scheduled for December 19. END FYI.

GP-1

END

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ACTING

17 APR 77 10:00 AM

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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60007

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

82

Origin

ACTION: **Amembassy CAIRO**

NEA

Info:

STATE 60007

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-422

By KIP NARA. Date 7-30-92

Highlights Deif's Washington Discussions

1. With USG

- a. Gaud Sept. 26: Brief courtesy call; Deif said cabinet change would result no change UAR policy.
- b. Hare Sept. 27: Deif stressed UAR definitely wanted reach agreement with Fund and prepared with or without stabilization agreement implement virtually all Fund proposals except devaluation (exchange transfer tax) which considered lack economic utility and be politically disruptive. Hare pointed up importance agreement with Fund to UAR economic relations West and commented generally on major factors US-UAR relations.
- c. Macomber Sept. 29: Deif told no decision yet taken re new PL 480 agreement but we hoped would be possible make positive decision timing of which not predictable. Also given briefing at his request on US grain supply situation. Macomber pointed up need settle American private claims and restrictive provisions US legislation, specifically one re trading with North Vietnam in

Drafted by: - 10-3-66 NEA:UAR:GMBenasky:cff Clearances:	Tel. Ext. 5819	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Raymond A. Hare
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NEA:UAR - Mr. ~~Benasky~~ E:OMA - Mr. Courtney (sub)
 AID:NEA - Mr. ~~Benasky~~ (sub) ~~White House - Mr. Saunders (sub)~~
 Treas - Mr. Chiardi (sub) DF - Mr. Dale (sub)

Thompson
 S/S - Mr. ~~Benasky~~
 White House - Mr. Saunders
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Agricultural Appropriations Act.

d. Hare Sept. 29: Arranged for El Sayeh alone at his request. He felt strongly UARG not able accept 30 per cent "devaluation" for political reasons and if some face-saving way not found out of impasse with Fund could result serious repercussions. He said Nasser upset by everyone ^{pressuring} (IBRD, USC, other Western governments) ~~pressuring~~ UAR agreement with Fund as precondition any assistance to UAR from them. El Sayeh felt some cooperation from US, IBRD and Fund more urgent than heretofore. Hare disabused El Sayeh of notion any political motivation ~~XXXX~~ much less concerted plot involved and noted realities and limitations ~~XXXXXXXX~~ governing US assistance UAR.

Walt

e. /Rostow Sept 29: Deif said UARG recognized importance coming terms Fund but disagreed about importance devaluation. Rostow said, while could not judge merits UAR or Fund positions devaluation, he knew some sort reasonable agreement essential establish UAR's future credit-worthiness. Hour of warm and frank discussion also covered UAR economic problem and US grain situation and food assistance.

2. With IBRD Oct. 1: Woods made following points:

- a. Bank's economists agreed with Fund's experts on X substance stabilization agreement. Bank proceeding on basis agreement will be reached.
- b. Given shortage funds Banks loans should go highest priority activities and be catalyst bring in private money. Deif said agriculture (land reclamation) highest priority.

~~SECRET~~

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- c. Importance settlement remaining outstanding nationalization claims and giving priority economic development.
- 3. With IMF Sept. 30: Schweitzer made following points:
 - a. Deif's anti-devaluation speech that morning unfortunate and unhelpful. It appeared say LDC's such as UAR will inevitably run balance payments deficits about which nothing could be done which same as indicating to creditors unwillingness take balance payments measures necessary repay them. Stabilization agreements have be approved Board Executive Directors on which creditors represented.
 - b. Gunter will return Cairo on "staff visit" for talks with new cabinet. (UAR delegation preferred this visit not be considered Fund mission.) He plans arrive about Oct. 11.

~~SECRET~~

4. Memcons via airpouch.

GP 1.

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~

74a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BKS: S

Recommend we clear. No need to bother WWR.

The one paragraph that reports WWR's talk with the UAR comes right from my memcon, which he approved.

HHS
HHS

OK

Inform S/S

Cleared by Sanders

*S/S informed
Cordery Klotz
10/15/66
say
to
AM*

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

3602
HS
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2-Rit.
74.8

October 4, 1966
Date

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

↙
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to CAIRO

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY QCH ON 7-11-91 ~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO

STATE

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NJ 91-422
 By lig NARA, Date 7-30-92

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10-3-66

NEA:UAR:GMBennsky:cff 5819

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

NEA:UAR - Mr. Bergus E:OMA - Mr. Courtney (sub) S/S -
 AID:NESA - Mr. Flint (sub) White House - Mr. Saunders (sub)
 Treas - Mr. Ghiardi (sub) IMF - Mr. Dale (sub)

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~~SECRET~~

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Ambassy CAIRO

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4. Memcons via airpouch.

GP 1.

75

CIA CABLES

CAPS

UAR

LL

RECEIVED WASHINGTON COMMCEN:
7:21 AM Monday 6 March 1967

29

EEBO40
OO WTE10
DE WTE 254

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-421
By *llp*, NARA, Date 1-12-93

RECEIVED LEJ RANCH COMMCEN:
10:21 AM Monday 6 March 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67111

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

MARCH 4, 1967

FRESH FROM HIS STOP IN CAIRO, HAL SAUNDERS OF MY STAFF WHO IS QUIETLY TOURING THE MIDDLE EAST HAS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING

1. NASSER SHOULD BE TOLD SOON ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ABOUT WHEAT. IT HAS COME TO SYMBOLIZE OUR FUTURE INTENT TOWARD HIM AND HIS REGIME.
2. HELP ON THE IMF NEGOTIATIONS IS NEARLY AS IMPORTANT. OFFICIALS ARGUE THEY'VE CUT EXPENDITURES, HAVE MADE REAL ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS. THEIR SELF HELP PERFORMANCE IS "RELATIVELY POSITIVE."
3. NO ONE IN CAIRO BELIEVES THE SOVIETS AND NASSER ARE WORKING HAND IN GLOVE. THERE IS PARALLELISM OF POLICY, BUT CAIRO WANTS TO AVOID SOVIET CONTROL.
4. BECAUSE THE UAR IS THE CHIEF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND MODERNIZING RAPIDLY, SAUNDERS BELIEVES WE SHOULD BUILD SOME KIND OF NEW RELATIONSHIP.
5. HE DOUBTS THIS CAN BE DONE UNLESS YOU AND NASSER MEET SOMEWHERE TO DEFINE YOUR AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST AND DISAGREEMENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGES THE RISKS, BUT HOPES WE WILL CONSIDER THIS CAREFULLY, SINCE CAIRO PERSISTS IN SEEING EVERYTHING WE DO IN THE AREA AS DIRECTED AGAINST HIM -- THOSE NOT ACTIVELY WITH HIM MUST BE AGAINST HIM. (WWR COMMENT: PERHAPS A LETTER FROM YOU COULD DO THE JOB).
6. HAL COMMENDS A CAUTIOUS BUT REVITALIZED POLICY TO REBUILD OUR POSITION IN CAIRO, AVOIDING EQUALLY THE OVER-ENTHUSIASM OF THE EARLY 1960'S AND THE DISTRUST OF TODAY.

COMMENT

WE'VE SHOWN THIS TO NICK KATZENBACH ONLY. HE PLANS TO PURSUE WHEAT FOR THE UAR A BIT FURTHER ON THE HILL BEFORE MAKING A RECOMMENDATION TO YOU. PROBABLY A SMALL AMOUNT AS A GIFT, ABOUT MATCHING THE SOVIET UNION'S 250,000 TON GIFT (WHICH ELLENDER, AMONG

PRESERVATION COPY

OTHERS, SEEMS TO PREFER OVER A CREDIT SALE!). WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ON THE TIMING, BECAUSE IT MAY BE SEEN BOTH IN EGYPT AND ARABIA AS A REWARD FOR RAISING HELL. BUT THIS WILL BE LOOKED INTO BEFORE THE RECOMMENDATION COMES TO YOU.

HAL WILL BE BACK IN TEN DAYS, WHEN WE CAN GO INTO THE COMPLEX OF MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH A FRESH LOOK.

FM HAROLD SAUNDERS 8693

TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW AND HAROLD WRIGGINS

FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS MY INTENSIVE TALKS IN CAIRO WITH FOREIGN MINISTER, TREASURY AND ECONOMY MINISTERS AND OTHERS BEAR ON YOUR WHEAT DECISION.

FIRST. WE OUGHT TO SAY SOMETHING TO EGYPTIANS ABOUT WHEAT SOON ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. DRAGGING OUT LINE THAT WE HAVE FOOD REQUEST "UNDER CONSIDERATION" REAPS ALL DISADVANTAGES OF NEGATIVE ANSWER WITHOUT GAINING ADVANTAGES OF KEEPING DOOR OPEN. MONTHS OF AMBIGUITY PLUS OTHER EVENTS MID EAST HAVE CONVINCED EGYPTIANS WE HAVE CAST OUR LOT WITH OTHER SIDE AND FOR THAT REASON HAVE DECIDED AGAINST WHEAT AID. THEY SAY BITTERLY THAT EVEN DULLES GAVE THEM AN ANSWER.

SECOND. WHEAT DECISION UNFORTUNATELY MORE THAN EVER SYMBOL OUR FUTURE INTENT BECAUSE IT INVOLVES BOTH DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN REQUIREMENTS. WE WOULD BE A LOT BETTER OFF IF WE COULD GET OFF THIS WICKET BUT FOR MOMENT IT LOOKS AS IF WHEAT ALONE CAN BREAK STALEMATE. I THINK WE MIGHT GET AWAY WITH DOLLAR SALE AS LONG AS GRACE PERIOD LONG ENOUGH TO COVER NEXT THREE YEARS WHICH EGYPTIANS SEE AS PERIOD OF REAL ECONOMIC PINCH. AFTER THAT, THEY NOT EUPHORIC BUT DO SEEM HAVE REASON HOPE OIL AND OTHER SLOWLY INCREASING EXPORTS PLUS IMPROVED IMPORT SUBSTITUTION WILL BEGIN PAY OFF.

THIRD. TO ECONOMIC INSIDERS, HELP IN NEW IMF NEGOTIATIONS ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS FOOD DECISION. MAIN POINT MADE TO ME BY NAZI DEIF AND HAMED EL SAYEH WHOM YOU MET LAST FALL IS THAT THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING EXPENDITURES UNDER CONTROL IN SIX MONTHS SINCE IMF TALKS BEGAN. THEREFORE NEW SITUATION EXISTS HERE AND GUNTER MISSION MUST COME END MARCH WITH SOME GIVE ITS POSITION.

FOURTH. DESPITE POLITICAL SYMBOLISM BOTH THESE ISSUES AND CONTRARY CONCEPTION CREATED BY USUAL INTRA-USG JUSTIFICATION OUR AID PROGRAM IN UAR, THIS FAR FROM PURELY POLITICAL PROGRAM DESIGNED BRIBE NASSER KEEP OUT OF OUR UAR. WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY THE PRESS AND CONGRESS, BADLY NEEDS UNDERSTAND THAT UAR NOT JUST PROVERBIAL RATHOLE DOWN WHICH WE POUR OUR AID. ALL WASHINGTON FULLY AWARE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BIND. POINT NOT WIDELY APPRECIATED IS DEGREE TO WHICH THIS A PLACE OF REAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SOUND PLANNING. I NOW UNDERSTAND WHY WORLD BANK RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC DESPITE GAPS IN EXECUTION. I WELL KNOW WEAKNESS THIS ARGUMENT IN OFFSETTING NASSER'S POLEMICS, BUT IT IMPORTANT PRESIDENT KNOW THAT SELF-HELP CASE RELATIVELY POSITIVE.

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FIFTH. I FOUND NO ONE CAIRO WILLING ASSERT THAT NASSER AND SOVIETS WORKING HAND IN GLOVE. SOVIET-LIKE POLITICAL MODEL ADOPTED FOR PRAGMATIC REASONS SINCE WESTERN STYLE DEMOCRACY NOT SUITABLE NASSER'S STYLE. HARD EVIDENCE ANY FIRM MOSCOW-CAIRO UNDERSTANDING LACKING. SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PARALLELISM INTERESTS SUBSTANTIAL. BUT EGYPTIAN DESIRE AVOID SOVIET CONTROL IS UNANIMOUS IMPRESSION.

SIXTH. BECAUSE EGYPTIANS ARE MAKING HONEST DEVELOPMENT EFFORT AND DO NOT LOOK LIKE COMMUNIST TOOLS, BELIEVE IT STILL POSSIBLE BUILD SOME KIND US-UAR RELATIONSHIP IF WE CONSIDER IT WORTHWHILE. AFTER SEEING ENERGY WITH WHICH EGYPT MODERNIZING, I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN DO OTHERWISE, THOUGH I RECOGNIZE DOMESTIC PRESSURES MAY TIP JUDGMENT OTHER WAY. COMMON ARGUMENT FOR RELATIONSHIP IS THAT NASSER CAN CAUSE US SO MUCH TROUBLE ELSEWHERE. THIS TRUE BUT IN MY VIEW MISSES SIMPLER MAIN POINT THAT EGYPT CLEARLY CHIEF POWER MODERN MIDDLE EAST.

SEVENTH. IF WE DO WANT TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM US POSITION CAIRO, ONLY SOUND FOUNDATION I CAN SEE IS EVENTUAL MEETING BETWEEN NASSER AND PRESIDENT. BECAUSE OUR CONTRADICTION INTERESTS IN NEAR EAST WILL ALWAYS FEED EGYPTIAN SUSPICION WE WORKING AGAINST THEM, ONLY WAY ESTABLISH ACCURATE PICTURE LIMITS OUR OBJECTIVES IS FOR TWO PRESIDENTS REACH UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER'S PURPOSES AND AGREE ON INEVITABLE AREAS DISAGREEMENT. I COULD SEE THIS WORKING OUT MUCH AS PRESIDENT'S UNDERSTANDING WITH AYUB. I REALIZE HARD THOUGHT NEEDED WEIGH RISKS FOR PRESIDENT AGAINST DISADVANTAGES, BUT I AM CONVINCED AS NEVER BEFORE THAT WIDE GULF MISUNDERSTANDING UNLIKELY BE BRIDGED ANY THEIR WAY. AMBASSADOR BATTLE ESSENTIALLY AGREES, THOUGH HE WISELY CAUTIOUS WE SHOULD NOT TRY THIS UNLESS WE WILLING SUSTAIN FOLLOWUP.

MY MAIN REASON FOR ARGUING THIS CASE IS THAT OUR BIGGEST PROBLEM IN CAIRO TODAY IS THAT NO AMOUNT OF LOGIC SUFFICIENT PERSUADE EGYPTIANS THAT EVERYTHING WE DO IN NEAR EAST NOT DIRECTED AT THEM. IT AMAZING WHAT SHREDS OF EVIDENCE THEY HAVE WOVEN TOGETHER TO PROVE THIS TO THEMSELVES. THESE NOT JUST DEBATING POINTS. EVERY OFFICIAL I TALKED TO FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ON DOWN OBVIOUSLY SINCERELY BELIEVES THIS. MAIN THREAD THIS FABRIC OF ILLOGIC SEEMS BE PHILOSOPHY THOSE NOT HELPING THEM MUST BE AGAINST THEM.

UNFORTUNATELY, THERE JUST ENOUGH TRUTH THEIR EVIDENCE TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT REFUTE. FOR INSTANCE, EDITORIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS THAT GET MOST PLAY MADE BY PEOPLE WHO HAVE IN FACT CHOSEN SIDES HERE. BEEN MORE DAMAGING, MCNAMARA STATEMENT THAT TENSIONS IN MIDDLE EAST "SPARKED BY UAR" CONSIDERED COUP DE GRACE IN ARGUMENT THAT WE VIEW CAIRO AS THE ENEMY.

THEREFORE, IF WE WISH STOP DRIFTING THIS PART OF WORLD ONE MAJOR ILLAR REVITALIZED POLICY MUST BE SOME EFFORT REBUILD IN CAIRO. LAST FIVE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US NOT GO TOO FAR TOO FAST OR EXPECT TOO MUCH. FORTUNATELY INTERNATIONAL TOOLS AT HAND IN IMF AND WORLD BANK STUDY AND NOT IMPOSSIBLE TRY MOVING GRADALLY TO POSITION WE SHOOTING FOR IN 1961-62.

DTG 061321Z MARCH 1967

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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Memo's & Misc.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note -635 81
July 31, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

By *ing* NARA. Date 7-30-92



Subject: Nasser Damns Soviet Policy with Faint Praise

The devious language used by Nasser in his recent account of the role played by the USSR during the Arab-Israeli conflict suggests that he considers Moscow to be at least partially responsible for his current troubles. But the criticism of Soviet policy contained in his major speech of July 23 is stated by implication and innuendo rather than directly; Nasser obviously does not wish to complicate his relations with Moscow at a moment when the Arabs need every bit of the qualified support the Soviets are willing to give them.

Nasser Suggests But Does Not Charge Collusion. In reviewing the events leading up to the conflict, Nasser repeated the account he had given on earlier occasions about the role of the Syrians and the Soviets in warning him in mid-May of Israel's alleged imminent intention to attack Syria. He also repeated how both the US and the USSR appealed to him almost simultaneously and almost in identical language not to strike the first blow, and how both sides told him they were also making a similar appeal to Israel. Nasser refrained from charging that the actions of the US and the USSR were the result of collusion, but the audience is left free to draw that conclusion. He did, however, charge the US with duplicity in agreeing to high-level talks with the UAR at the very moment it was allegedly involved in Israel's plan to launch a surprise attack.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

It will be recalled that Haykal had advanced in his al-Ahram article of June 15 the theory that the US had hoodwinked the Soviets by persuading them to restrain Nasser. Thus Nasser continues to develop the theme that the UAR was misled into feeling a false sense of security, at a time when the US was hatching its plot with Israel. In this way, the USSR emerges somewhat tarnished and deserving of reproach because it showed itself willing to act jointly with the US, even though the US is represented as the principal villain. The circumstance that it got outsmarted by the US in no way diminished its original sin. And the spectacle of the US and the USSR closeted in Glassboro and working together in the closing hours of the GA session and agreeing on a compromise resolution incorporating features totally unacceptable to the radical Arabs must have reinforced the suspicions of the latter that the Soviet Union was prepared to support the Arabs only as long as this policy did not threaten to involve it in a confrontation with Washington.

Future Soviet Support Left Vague. Nasser's discussion of how the Soviet Union aided the Arabs during the conflict and in the post-conflict period was revealing in its omissions, its elliptical language, and its use of formulations that invited analysis for hidden meanings. Nasser acknowledged that the USSR "supported us politically, helped us economically, and endeavored to strengthen our armed forces." He handled Moscow's failure to intervene by denying that he wanted or expected such intervention or the participation of Soviet troops in the conflict. Nasser thus not only sidestepped the question of whether Moscow would have intervened in the event of prior intervention by the West, but implied that he did not welcome the idea of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

"Red Army" present and fighting on Arab soil. He may also have been telling Arab militants that they could not expect Soviet military intervention but must depend on Arab efforts alone. He omitted entirely Moscow's role in the UN, noting only that "US pressure" was mainly responsible for the ESGA's failure to adopt a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Nor is Moscow likely to misunderstand the identity of the powers Nasser had in mind when in conclusion he declared that "no power can impose peace" and charged that "they" wanted Arabs to "surrender in the name of peace."

A study of Nasser's speech by Soviet officials must have confirmed their fears that dealing with Nasser will continue to be difficult because of his need to maneuver with an eye on his more militant rivals in Algeria and Syria, as well as the disillusioned members of his own establishment.

Moscow's Comment: Selective Treatment; Praise for Priorities.

On July 25 Pravda published a commentary on Nasser's speech by Yevgeniy Primakov, its prestigious Cairo correspondent. It portrayed Nasser -- with obvious approval -- as opting for a moderate course in dealing with the problems of Israeli aggression, and characterized his speech as a "rebuff to adventurism which refuses to take the actual state of affairs into account." Although the "adventurers" were not further identified, Pravda apparently was referring to the

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- 4 -

"hawks" within the UAR as well as to the militant regimes in Algeria and Syria. Primakov's highest praise was reserved for the portions of the speech expressing the determination of Nasser to push forward with the political cleansing and social reconstruction of the UAR, including his proposal to strengthen the Arab Socialist Union. The analysis of the speech was prefaced by a long account describing the grave economic situation and signs of increasing activity by reactionaries in the UAR. This had the effect of demonstrating the correctness of the priorities established by Nasser, which emphasized the overriding importance of the task of stabilizing the home front and of broadening the domestic revolution over any pursuit of immediate "revenge." In this commentary as in others, Moscow reported that Nasser praised the USSR for helping Arabs, but did not dwell on this sensitive topic in any great detail.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1967

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-422

UAR Pressure on Libya

NARA. Date 7-30-92

Under Secretary Rostow called in Canadian Ambassador Ritchie on June 30, summarized the current picture in Libya, and explained that on instructions he was asking whether Canada would pass on to high levels in the UAR the message: "Leave Libya alone".

Mr. Rostow said we are not specifying carrots or sticks, but we mean the message in all seriousness and it should be so conveyed. There is a newer indigenous Arab nationalist feeling in Libya, but Cairo radio, and Egyptian infiltration of the air force, army and security forces are the real danger to the regime in Libya, and hence Tunisia as well.

Mr. Rostow said we have a good impression of the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo and would rely on his judgment of how and when to put the message. He should choose whom to pass it to in the UAR Government; he might, however, wish to use the Italian Ambassador in Cairo as an intermediary. If asked the source of the message, he should say simply: "The U.S. Government". To any other questions, the response should be: "Ask the Americans".

Ritchie said he would arrange it.

Distribution: Secretary of State
Mr. Katzenbach
Mr. Eugene Rostow
Mr. Kohler

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

White House - Mr. Walt W. Rostow

DRAFTED BY E. ROSTOW

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Attachment Classification

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NO
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EXTREMELY SENSITIVE

1967 JUL 5 PM 1



RECEIVED
STOW'S OFFICE

TO: *Memorandum*
FROM: *re. UAR Pressure*
NUMBER: *on Libya*
DATE: *5*
COPY # 5

FOR: WH - Mr. Rostow
(Please initial)

The attached document is of the highest sensitivity and no additional distribution may be made without the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of State.

This document should be returned in a sealed envelope to my office, Room 7224, by hand, within 48 hours of receipt.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

THIS COVER SHEET WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT
SHOULD BE HANDLED AS CONFIDENTIAL

N O D I S
NO
DISTRIBUTION

Attachment Classification

~~SECRET~~

June 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: UAR's Use of Nerve Gas

In connection with our discussion last Friday as to how we should deal with the UAR's use of nerve gas in Yemen, I would like to call your attention to another aspect of this problem. When the fighting started, I was concerned that in desperation the UAR might attempt to use nerve gas against the Israelis. As you probably know, there was a certain amount of intelligence which indicated that the UAR was making last-minute efforts to improve its defenses against nerve gas while the fighting was going on. Looking to the future, there is at least a remote possibility that if fighting should resume, the UAR might attempt to score a dramatic success by the shock effect of introducing nerve gas. I believe that the focusing of world attention on this problem would help to reduce the possibility of this development.

I also trust that we have a good contingency statement for Goldberg in the event the Israelis make a major charge against the UAR on this subject. Such an Israeli charge is a real possibility since the UAR reportedly had stocks of nerve gas in Sinai which the Israelis probably captured.

I am also attaching for your information the following documents which may be of interest:

1. Exchange of correspondence with the UN on Saudi Arabia's protest against the UAR's use of gas (Tab A).
2. The statement by the International Red Cross on June 2 (Tab B).
3. The [REDACTED] reports identifying the agent as nerve gas (Tab C).

3.3
(b)(1)/s/
Spurgeon Keeny

cc: Mr. Rostow - w/atts.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-64
By iol, NARA, Date 5-2-06

~~SECRET~~

83a

TAB

"A"

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

83-8

S/7842
6 April 1967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SAUDI ARABIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Pursuant to the request made on 5 April by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, His Excellency, Mr. Jamil M. Baroody, the Secretary-General is circulating the following communications from Ambassador Baroody and their enclosures, and the replies to them.

1. Letter dated 22 March 1967 and enclosures from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General

Your Excellency will recall that upon instructions from my Government I informed you orally and subsequently in writing about United Arab Republic aircraft having employed lethal gas in Northern Yemen, as a result of which over one hundred persons perished and many were injured.

You will also recall your having informed me in a cable dated 21 February 1967 "of the prompt and firm denial of the Government of the United Arab Republic that any lethal or poison gas has been employed by their aircraft as alleged". Such was the reply of the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations when, upon my request, you kindly raised this question with him.

On 22 February 1967, I cabled you to please note that the "last word on this matter has not yet been said". I also had mentioned to you on 20 February 1967 that "it is indeed far-fetched to expect those resorting to lethal gas to confess its use".

If I have not resumed communicating with you earlier than today on this deplorable subject, it was because I endeavoured to obtain for you the conclusive proof that lethal gas was used by the afore-mentioned aircraft in Kitaf, Northern Yemen, on 5 January 1967. I am thereby furnishing Your Excellency with the facts which no denial can refute.

67-07572

/...

As you may know, the International Red Cross has a mission which has been functioning for quite some time in Northern Yemen. When Kitaf was subjected to the lethal gas raid by United Arab Republic aircraft, all the members of that mission fled and took refuge in the town of Najran inside Saudi Arabian territory. Certain members of the mission declared that acts of genocide were being perpetrated on the Yemeni people.

Suffice it to say that the International Red Cross mission had, on many previous occasions, witnessed United Arab Republic aircraft raids in which conventional explosives were employed. When this was the case, members of the mission valiantly kept to the attacked sites and administered medical aid and other forms of relief to the wounded. The raid on Kitaf, however, was different as lethal gas played havoc with the population, killing them by asphyxiation and rendering seriously ill those persons who were even lightly contaminated. In consequence, members of the International Red Cross mission had no choice but to flee from the region and take refuge in Saudi Arabia. Not only their declarations of what actually happened were duly recorded, but they also found it imperative to use the telecommunication facilities in Najran to cable their organization to supply them with gas masks before they could return to the Northern region of Yemen. A copy of their cable in German is attached for your perusal.

Approximately two hundred patients of those who fled to Najran after having survived the lethal gas attack were admitted to the Najran hospital. Their medical examination revealed the following symptoms:

1. Difficult breathing accompanied by intense coughing.
2. Vomiting with foam mixed with blood issuing from the mouth.
3. Haemorrhage from the nose and mouth.
4. Congestion in the face and eyes.
5. Haemorrhage from the throat.
6. Low blood pressure.
7. Some of the patients unable to walk or move.
8. Some patients totally unconscious.
9. Some patients with swelling around the neck and the chest.
10. Some patients had blood in their urine.
11. Some patients suffered from subcutaneous haemorrhage.
12. Some patients had blood in their faeces.

Amongst these patients were twelve in a very critical condition which necessitated their transfer to the military hospital in Taif in order to resume their treatment.

All the patients were suffering from the effects of poison gas with which they were attacked by United Arab Republic aircraft.

The medical report in connexion with these patients has been signed by five physicians. A copy of this report in Arabic is attached herewith for your inspection .

Beside the human casualties referred to above, it must be mentioned that a number of animals were found dead as a result of the lethal gas attack with apparent symptoms similar to those which were manifest in the persons killed by that gas. Furthermore, even all vegetation including trees contaminated by the gas were affected to the extent that grass and foliage withered away.

The report of the Department of Legal Medicine released by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health indicates that the specimens of clothing and animal tissue as well as the blood analysis of certain patients have proven by extensive chemical tests that both compounds of chlorine and phosphorous gases have been employed in the attack on Kitaf. These gases were contained in thin encasements which were not of the destructive type when exploded since their use was only a vehicle for spreading the gas over a given area. Hence, it becomes evident that these gases were employed to carry out genocide on the population without having to destroy their abodes.

I do not have to quote all the particulars adduced in the report of the Department of Legal Medicine as I am enclosing a copy of same to enable you to have a first-hand clear picture.

But this is not all, since other technical reports are in the process of being prepared as a result of various exhaustive tests that are being made outside Saudi Arabia.

Needless to say that neither my Government nor myself would wish to jeopardize the most laudable humanitarian services the International Red Cross has been rendering in Yemen and elsewhere by disclosing at this juncture additional evidence. Do not the pertinent facts I have so far given to you speak for themselves? Would it have been necessary for Your Excellency and myself to have

witnessed personally what happened in Kitaf on 5 January 1967 to avow that lethal gas was used on that date?

Lucky indeed are those who were not there at the time, for their life might have been snuffed out.

If the Government of the United Arab Republic may derive some secret solace that they could consider the use of lethal gas justifiable on the grounds that it has been employed by others elsewhere, let whoever resorts to the extinction of the human species be indicted not only in the United Nations but before the whole world at large.

What a travesty of justice that anyone could get away with mass murder in this manner when the horror of nazi gas oven atrocities still abide with us. What a mockery it is to keep repeating in the United Nations that everyone has the right to life.

These are the facts. I lay them before you. Would anyone be astonished if those who have used lethal gas do not confess their act? For it is by confessing they declare themselves guilty.

My dear U Thant, may I draw your attention that in your capacity as Secretary-General, to a large extent you epitomize the conscience of the United Nations.

Denials cannot negate the facts which are no longer in sharp dispute.

If no warning is sounded that the use of lethal gas constitutes an act of genocide and should be forbidden under all circumstances in wars whether declared or undeclared, there henceforth shall be no deterrent for ultimately plunging mankind into suicide.

Whilst awaiting your reply, I do sincerely hope that you can see your way to do what you think is necessary under these circumstances to stir the conscience of all before it may become too late.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Jamil M. BAROODY
Ambassador

Translated from Arabic

MEDICAL REPORT

26 Ramadan 1386 (8 Jan. 1967)

A medical examination has been given to approximately 200 Yemenis in the town of Najran who are suffering from gas poisoning following the dropping of poison gas bombs by enemy aircraft on Yemeni territory. They were taken for first aid treatment to Najran Hospital, where the symptoms of the gas poisoning were diagnosed as follows:

1. Difficulty in breathing, with acute coughing;
2. Vomiting and the issuing of blood-flecked foam from the mouth;
3. Haemorrhage from nose and mouth;
4. Congestion of the face and eyes;
5. Haemorrhage of the conjunctiva;
6. Lowering of the blood pressure;
7. In some cases, incapacity to walk or move;
8. In some cases total unconsciousness;
9. In some cases swelling around the neck and chest;
10. In some cases blood in the urine;
11. In some cases subcutaneous haemorrhage;
12. In some cases bloody stools.

The Najran Hospital provided first aid treatment and they were admitted to the Hospital. We took twelve acute emergency cases to the Military Hospital at Taif to be treated there. All were suffering from poisoning as a result of the poison gas dropped on them by the enemy aircraft on 24-25 Ramadan 1386 (6-7 January 1967).

Dr. Nasir Mahmud Khan
(Signature)

Dr. Nizam ad-Din
(Signature)

Major 'Abd ar-Rahman An-Najawi
(Medical Corps)
(Signature)

Dr. Wazir 'Abd ar-Rahman
(Signature)

Approved: Major 'Isam ad-Dawidi
(Medical Corps)
(Signature)

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Health
District Health Office

No. 43866 (?)
Date
Enclosures

FORENSIC MEDICAL REPORT

1. Description of the patients' symptoms as stated in the report of physicians at the Military Hospital in Taif (report attached)

Symptoms complained of: body pains, difficulty in breathing, coughing, dizziness, a burning sensation in the body and, in some cases, coughing with expectoration of blood from the lungs.

Latent symptoms:

- (1) Inflammation of the conjunctiva;
- (2) In a few cases, inflammation of the throat with oedema;
- (3) In a few cases, erythema;
- (4) Oedema of the lungs;
- (5) The pressure was low and the pulse was rapid (80-110 per minute) and regular;
- (6) The blood pressure was low (100 millimetres of mercury, systolic). Diastolic pressure was less than 60 millimetres of mercury;
- (7) The patients were unable to walk unaided and complained of dizziness.

2. Specimens sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory

- (1) An aluminium can containing bomb splinters and some tightly twisted scraps of fabric, yellow in colour and partly burned;
- (2) The carcasses of four ruminants, comprising one medium-sized white sheep; one white lamb; one medium-sized black sheep; one black goat;
- (3) A small bottle containing blood from the patient 'Abd ar-Rahman 'Amir al-Yamani.

3. Results of the analysis of the bomb splinters and the scraps of fabric

The splinters appeared to be from the light type bombs used for tear gases and other kinds of gas, and analysis of the remnants revealed traces of carbon, nitrate and chloride. Analysis of the fabric revealed traces of organic phosphoric compounds which laboratory examination showed to have the effect of reducing blood choline esterase. This is one of the poisonous groups of organic phosphoric compounds.

4. Result of the analysis of the animal carcasses

They appeared to have no external injuries; the orifices of the nose and mouth were stained with bloody discharges; and they were in a state of partial putrefaction. Dissection of one of the carcasses (the white sheep) revealed the lungs to be acutely congested and the pectoral cavity to be filled with bloody serum in a state of putrefaction. On dissection of the carcass of the black goat, the pectoral cavity was found to be filled with a bloody whey-like fluid, and from an analysis of the blood of the black goat we found that the proportion of organic phosphorus was 21 milligrams per 100, which is a very high percentage, for, as is generally known, the proportion of whole phosphorus (organic and inorganic) in normal ruminants is between 3 1/2 and 6 milligrams per 100 (according to the FAO report). In the case of the medium-sized white sheep, the proportion of whole phosphorus (organic and inorganic) in the blood was found to be 52 1/2 milligrams per 100, which is an extremely high proportion in relation to the normal average for ruminants.

5. Analysis of the blood of 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn 'Amir al-Yamani

The proportion of whole phosphorus in the blood was found to be 13 1/2 milligrams per 100 (including 10 milligrams of organic phosphorus), whereas the normal proportion of whole phosphorus for a human being is 3 to 4 1/2 milligrams per 100.

Conclusions

From the foregoing, it is evident that the symptoms appearing in the victims and the death of the animals were probably the result of the absorption of or contact with organic phosphoric compounds. This view is supported by the following evidence:

(a) The laboratory analysis of the sample of fabric which was sent with the bomb splinters showed beyond any doubt that it was impregnated with organic phosphoric compounds having the effect of reducing choline esterase.

S/7842
English
Page 8

(b) The high proportion of organic phosphorus in the blood of the victim 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn 'Amir al-Yamani and in the blood of the animal carcasses.

Muhammad Ayyub Sadiqi
(Signature)

Chemist, Food Section

Anwar Bey Shughtai
(Signature)

Chemist, Drugs Section

Ghassan 'Abd al-Karim ash-Sharid
(Signature)

Chemist, Biochemistry Section

'Abd al-Halim Mali Bey
(Signature)

Chemist, Section of Forensic Medicine

Dr. Muhammad ash-Shuri
(Signature)

Director of the Central
Laboratory and the Blood
Bank

Translated from German

The members of Yemen Unit 2 of ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) reply to your cable of 14 January 1967 as follows:

We would revert to the question of your decision and we continue to maintain that:

- (1) You were at Cairo from 2 to 7 January. The gas bombs were dropped while you were there.
- (2) We continue to maintain that Dr. Liechti was not at the scene and that the team which remained at the scene for the longest time was not consulted at all.
- (3) The assurance from the highest quarters and your assumption of responsibility are no guarantee for our safety, when the Geneva Convention has been violated previously.
- (4) The only realistic protection is masks, which we therefore suggest should be awaited.
- (5) In view of what we have observed, our remarks are not based on fear.

Najran, 14 January 1967

Dr. Kamer, Stucki, Frank, Escher
Radio Osel
Inf. Krause, Arnold, Greminger, Derungs
Cand. med. Wagner

Translator's note: The meaning of the abbreviated title "Inf." is not clear. "Cand. med." apparently means "Medical student".

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English
Page 10

2. Letter dated 23 March 1967 from Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia

The Secretary-General has asked me to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 22 March 1967. The attachments to this letter are in process of being translated in order that they may be properly considered.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Ralph J. BUNCHE
Under-Secretary

/...

3. Letter dated 30 March 1967 from the Secretary-General to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 22 March 1967 and its enclosures. The latter have now been translated into English from the original Arabic and German languages, and I and some of my colleagues have been giving them careful study.

In this latest letter you repeat your wish that the Secretary-General take some action beyond what has already been done by him. The situation is that your Government has made an allegation against another member Government which that Government has flatly, firmly and repeatedly denied. Here, permit me to repeat what I have said to you earlier, namely that the information you have submitted to me might best have been presented to the competent deliberative organ of the United Nations. But, for reasons best known to yourself, you have not wished to seek action by the Security Council. On the basis of information presented by one Government alone, which though not questioned is not substantiated by information from other disinterested sources, I am convinced that the only useful action I can take under the circumstances and at this stage is this time also to convey the new information you have sent to me to the representative of the United Arab Republic and to invite his Government's reaction to it. In this connexion, before I proceed any further, I would be grateful if you would let me know whether the cable from the Red Cross doctors, as well as the documents from the Najran medical authorities, may be properly handed by me to the representative of the United Arab Republic for transmittal to his Government. To this question, of course, the manner in which the cable has been obtained would seem to have relevance.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

4. Letter dated 1 April 1967 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General

This is to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter dated 30 March 1967 in reply to my communication of 22 March 1967.

I have the honour to draw your kind attention to the following points:

1. When I raised the question of the use of lethal gas in Kitaf by United Arab Republic aircraft, you will recall that after your having apprised the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic of my complaint and he subsequently denied the facts relating to this question, you asked me for evidence to support my Government's claim before you saw fit to take any further action.

2. In consequence, I requested my Government to furnish me with substantiating proof to present to you so as to enable you to evaluate the facts embodied in the medical reports and other documents pertaining to this question.

I gather from your letter that you seem to consider that it is necessary to substantiate the documents I sent to you "by information from other disinterested sources".

Inasmuch as one of the documents consists of the cable which was sent by members of the International Red Cross through the Saudi telecommunication facilities in Najran, you yourself know as I do from past experience that it is not the practice of the International Red Cross to divulge their own reports, lest such reports might be used for political purposes and thereby jeopardize the humanitarian mission of this organization in any given area.

Far be it from my Government or myself that we should in any manner attempt to prejudice the activities of the International Red Cross. However, in view of your repeated requests for substantiating proof, I had no choice but to submit to you the text of the cable sent by the International Red Cross from Najran.

With reference to the physicians who have treated about 200 Yemeni patients affected by the lethal gas in Kitaf, needless to say, each one of these physicians before he was licensed to practise his profession had taken the oath to conscientiously uphold the high moral code of his profession.

The 200 Yemeni patients admitted to the Najran Hospital had fled from Kitaf and the report of the afore-mentioned physicians constitutes more than adequate proof of their symptoms and the cause thereof. The medical report signed by these five physicians is tantamount to a deposition.

3. I have no objection to your supplying the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic with copies of the documents I furnished you with my letter of 22 March 1967, but I wonder whether his Government, when presented with these documents, will reverse their denial or maintain a deep silence as they had done on similar occasions. This is why I must reiterate what I had mentioned to you time and again that it is not expected of the party that had resorted to the use of lethal gas to admit having done so. Therefore, it stands to reason that this party shall take refuge in denials. Nevertheless, if you think that the Government of the United Arab Republic should be confronted with the facts, as they obtain from the said documents, by all means let them have copies of same.

4. I must draw your attention to the fact that the Secretary-General himself in a situation like the present one, cannot possibly have circumstantial evidence of what had taken place in Kitaf, nor could he possibly have witnessed the patients in the hospital of Najran, because after all, the Secretary-General resides at the Headquarters of the United Nations. Under such circumstances, the Secretary-General has no means other than relying upon substantiating proof which can be verified by various channels open to him. Consequently, I do believe that the denial of one party cannot be judiciously considered as being in sharp dispute with the substantiating evidence supplied by the other party.

Furthermore, such a case as this should in my view be assessed on the merit of what actually occurred which cannot be refuted by denials.

The fact that 200 Yemeni patients were hospitalized in Najran need not make the information reported about them by attendant physicians as emanating from an interested source. In other words, these patients should in no way become victims of neglect because there happens to be a political dispute between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia in regard to Yemen.

The plight of these victims, leaving aside those who perished in Kitaf, should be judged strictly on a humanitarian basis.

5. I have seen fit to approach the Secretary-General on this question of lethal gas because I consider him as being above politics in questions of this type, whereas if at this juncture I were to seek action by the Security Council, I would not be so sure that no political capital would be made of this human tragedy.

6. It is for this reason that I did not associate the use of lethal gas in Kitaf with the dispute arising from the situation in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic.

I hope I made it quite clear to the Secretary-General why I am requesting him to do what he thinks is necessary, more so, because the Secretary-General has not kept silent on a situation in the Far East when another human tragedy has touched his heart and indeed the hearts of all of us, deeply concerned about the scourge of war in that region.

Human suffering is one and indivisible wherever it may occur.

7. I see no reason whatsoever why the Secretary-General who has manifested great courage in the past, should not make a statement to decry the use of lethal gas in any region of the world, without necessarily implicating himself by naming those who, unfortunately, had used it. Such a declaration need not be in the spirit of an indictment, for incrimination will serve little purpose against a sovereign State. However, a warning by the Secretary-General, who to a large extent reflects the conscience of mankind, will serve as a deterrent against the use of lethal gas in the future.

I assure you, my dear U Thant, that this has been my objective in laying before you the case of lethal gas in Kitaf.

If God forbid, should lethal gas be used in another region of the world, no United Nations representative should keep silent.

8. I venture to say one last word to you based on my long experience with the United Nations and from having been a witness of the League of Nations before the Second World War. The tendency has been always present to rationalize one's inaction on the grounds of legal niceties or juridical intricacies whence the better part of valour takes refuge in caution and prudence. The United Nations can no longer afford such a policy, for if it does, there is no assurance that it will not founder like the League of Nations had done before it.

9. It is the generosity of your heart and the loftiness of your ideals which encouraged me to write to you in this frank and outspoken vein, hoping that in so doing, I would convey to you my own thinking on various questions without resorting to any other manner which may be open to various conflicting interpretations.

Whilst awaiting your reply at your early convenience, please accept, etc.

(Signed) Jamil M. BARODY
Ambassador

5. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the Secretary-General to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 1 April 1967.

The views and suggestions set forth in your letter have been fully noted.

In view of your consent, the information submitted as enclosures with your letter to me of 22 March 1967 will be presented to the Representative of the United Arab Republic for transmission to his Government for their reaction.

In numbered paragraph 7 of your letter you suggest that the Secretary-General might make a general statement decrying the use of lethal gas. In view of the fact that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in being faithful to the ideals and principles of the United Nations, is necessarily against war and all warlike acts, including the use of lethal gas anywhere by anyone, and since, as you well know, I have repeatedly given expression to this attitude, I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served in acting on this suggestion at the present time.

Other than the foregoing, I have nothing to add to what was communicated to you in my last letter.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) U THANT

6. Letter dated 5 April 1967 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 3 April 1967.

Inasmuch as I have consented to your suggestion that the documented information I furnished you with my letter of 22 March 1967 be handed to the Representative of the United Arab Republic "for transmission to his Government for their reaction", I do not anticipate that the Government of the United Arab Republic would reverse their repeated denials of having employed lethal gas in Kitaf, Northern Yemen. It simply does not stand to reason that they should do so.

As I am not hopeful that you will receive any other than a negative reply from the Government of the United Arab Republic in this connexion; and whereas you gave me to understand in your last letter that at this stage you do not seem to be able to do anything further in your capacity as Secretary-General; and considering that substantiating proof of the use of lethal gas by United Arab Republic aircraft cannot be refuted by mere denials in the face of 200 Yemeni patients who fled from Kitaf across the border into Saudi Arabia and sought treatment in the Najran Hospital, not to mention those who perished in Kitaf and could no longer raise their voices to the high heavens as to how they met their death; and taking into account that if the United Nations is not apprised of that sad tragedy, there is no assurance that lethal gas may not be used again in the future.

Those who met their death by asphyxiation in Kitaf can no longer be resurrected nor can most of the afore-mentioned 200 Yemeni patients that were affected by the lethal gas lead the same normal life. However, if protests are expressed about their plight it is with a view that these victims should not have died or suffered in vain, provided, of course, the United Nations will affirmingly decry the use of lethal gas in any conflict.

Furthermore, since the employment of lethal gas may create a situation of tension among States, which could threaten international peace and lead to war, my Government had no choice but to approach the Secretary-General with what actually happened in Kitaf.

Should the Government of the United Arab Republic persist in their denials, I am sure my Government would welcome an investigation by a neutral representative who could interview many of the patients and each of the physicians that treated

them in Najran. Such a neutral representative could also visit the site of the attack to question fortunate survivors who escaped and eventually returned to Kitaf.

Noting what you had mentioned in your letter of 30 March 1967, namely, that the information I have submitted to you might best have been presented to the competent deliberative organ of the United Nations, I am conforming to your suggestion and forthwith request you to circulate to the President and members of the Security Council all the exchange of correspondence between Your Excellency and myself on this question, starting with my letter of 22 March 1967 together with the three substantiating documents attached thereto, and ending with this communication. Needless to say, I request all these communications to be circulated in their totality as a Security Council document.

Having requested you at this stage to kindly see to it that the said circulation be effected as soon as possible, this shall in no way deter me from contacting you again personally if and when my Government send me additional corroborating evidence which may enable you to take some sort of action on this question.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Jamil M. BAROODY
Ambassador

7. Letter dated 6 April 1967 from Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia

In the absence of the Secretary-General, who as you know is now in Geneva, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter to him of 5 April 1967.

The Secretary-General has been informed of the substance of your letter and in accordance with your request, he has authorized the circulation as a Security Council document of your letters to him of 22 March 1967, 1 April 1967, and 5 April 1967, with their enclosures. In view of this request, the Secretary-General is similarly circulating his letters of reply to you of 23 March 1967, 30 March 1967, 3 April 1967, and this one.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Ralph J. BUNCHE
Under-Secretary

83-b-1

TAB

"B"

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUEIVCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

RUQVLM/AMEMBASSY SANAA

RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK

RUQNGK/AMEMBASSY AMMAN

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

RUQVAF/AMCONSUL ADEN

RUQPRY/CHUSMTH DHAHRAN

RUEDPSA/POLAD CINCSTRIKE/HEAFSA

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS GENEVA 4062

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ICRC PRESS RELEASE JUNE 2 ENTITLED
"THE ICRC AND THE YEMEN CONFLICT"

BEGIN TEXT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
HAS AGAIN RECEIVED FROM ITS DELEGATES IN THE YEMEN REPORTS
OF BOMBING BY TOXIC GAS.

A MEDICAL TEAM, LED BY THE HEAD OF THE ICRC MISSION IN THE
YEMEN, WENT ON MAY 15 AND 16 TO A VILLAGE IN THE NORTHERN
PART OF THE COUNTRY TO ATTEMPT TO GIVE AID TO THE VICTIMS
OF BOMBING HAVING TAKEN PLACE SOME DAYS PREVIOUSLY AND AS
A RESULT OF WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE SURVIVORS, MANY
INHABITANTS HAD DIED OF ASPHYXIATION.

DELAYED BY AN AIR RAID OF WHICH THEIR CONVOY WAS VICTIM,
THE ICRC DOCTORS ON ARRIVAL AT THE SITE IMMEDIATELY GAVE
TREATMENT TO SOME OF THE WOUNDED AND COLLECTED VARIOUS
INDICATIONS POINTING TO THE USE OF POISON GAS.
EXTREMELY DISTURBED AND CONCERNED BY THESE METHODS OF WAR-
FARE WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN BY CODIFIED
INTERNATIONAL AND CUSTOMARY LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
AT ONCE COMMUNICATED ITS DELEGATES' REPORTS TO ALL
AUTHORITIES CONCERNED IN THE YEMEN CONFLICT, REQUESTING
THEM TO TAKE THE SOLEMN ENGAGEMENT NOT TO RESORT IN ANY
CIRCUMSTANCE WHATSOEVER TO THE USE OF ASPHYXIATING GASES
OR ANY OTHER SIMILAR TOXIC SUBSTANCES. END TEXT.

TUBBY

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/2/67 4:50 PM

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AND USIA 6/2/67 5:35 PM

UNCLASSIFIED

- SS
- GPM
- SP
- SC
- SAH
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- H
- EUR
- NEA
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- USIA
- NSC
- INR
- CIA
- NSA
- DOD
- NIC
- ACDA
- SCI
- AID
- SCA
- SCS
- HEW
- OST
- RSR

83-d

TAB

"C"

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

83-f

May 18, 1967

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

Nat Davis suggested that you would like to see the [REDACTED] report on the UAR use of nerve gas in Yemen.

3.3(b)(1)

Note the reference on page 2 that some of the fragments, including the detonating mechanism, have Cyrillic markings.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att.:

[REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-64
By iol, NARA, Date 5-2-06

D. Moore

Press Department
Embassy of the United Arab
Republic
Washington, D.C.

TEXT OF PRESIDENT NASSER'S STATEMENT AT
PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN CAIRO
on MAY 28, 1967

I feel dutybound to lay open the true picture of our situation which might mean peace or war to the entire Arab nation, with subsequent effects and reactions outside the Arab world.

The real problem was not that of the Tiran Straits or the withdrawal of the UNEF for these are only instant symptoms of a greater and graver problem namely that of the aggression which occurred and still continues against the homeland of the Arab nations in Palestine, and the continuous threat accruing therefrom against all Arab homelands. This is the original problem and those who believe that causes involving the fate of nations can die down through the passage of time fall in grave error. It is not a question of a passing aggression but of one which occurred and continues to exist, indeed expands every day with the expansionist ambitions of the Zionist and Israeli aggressors. We completely reject that interest be limited to questions of the Tiran Straits or withdrawal of the UNEF for both are indisputable matters.

The Tiran Straits are Egyptian territorial waters over which Egypt has exercised her sovereignty rights. No power whatever its might can infringe upon Egyptian sovereignty rights and any such attempt shall be regarded as aggression against the Egyptian people and the Arab nation at large and shall cause unimaginable damage to the aggressors.

As to the UNEF question, the U.N. Secretary-General responded honourably to our request for their withdrawal because their presence depended upon our consent which we withdrew. This question is thus definitely closed and is no longer open to discussion. The circumstances leading to the United Arab Republic's request for the UNEF's withdrawal were basically the threats against Syria from Israel and the plans for its invasion at a

/ certain time

We couldn't remain silent before the menace of the Syrian invasion or of similar threats against any other Arab nation. Thus it was necessary that the United Arab Republic Armed Forces advance to positions where they could effectively repel aggression.

Israel disregarded completely all United Nations Resolutions of 1947, 1948 and 1949 as well as the Truce Agreement occupying parts of Palestine territory after the Truce Agreement; most flagrant example was its occupation of the Arab position of El-Rashra on which Israel built the Port of Elat. The truce was signed in February, 1949, while occupation of that Arab post occurred in March, next in violation of the Truce Agreement. Moreover when Israel planned to occupy Al-Auja in 1955 it revoked the truce supervision agreement, arrested U.N. supervisors and knocked them out of their positions. Then Israel's role in the 1956 Tripartite Aggression is well known and on record.

Answering the C.B.S correspondent as to whether the President's confidence in confronting Israel was due to his readings of the international situation or his confidence in the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, the President said that in 1956 Egypt did not fight Israel but its partners in the Tripartite Aggression, namely Britain and France. Today we are alone face to face with Israel, so if they wish to try today we welcome the challenge. He pointed out that the Israeli Prime Minister set the timing for the confrontation and that the United Arab Republic is ready for it. Answering the second question by the same correspondent as to whether it was true that America, through its Ambassador in Cairo, warned Egypt that interference with navigation through the Tiran Straits would be considered an act of aggression that will be opposed by America by all means. The President said this report was not correct. After expounding the fact that whether territorial waters were three, six, or even twelve miles, passage through Tiran in all cases happens within Egyptian territorial waters as ships have to pass only one mile from Egyptian shores. What is being said differently is indeed an act of aggression against our sovereignty which we shall oppose with all our strength. "I believe that if the United States interfered with our sovereignty we shall resist such interference with all our strength," the President declared.

/Answering

questions about the possibility of using Arab oil as a weapon in battle, President Gamal Abdel Nasser said this matter is left to the Arab peoples of the oil producing countries. The only contact in this connection was with Kuwait's Foreign Minister who visited Cairo and informed the United Arab Republic Government that in the case of war, Kuwait shall stop oil production altogether. "I believe that all weapons must be used in this battle; whether by governments or by the people," the President said.

Asked whether he conceived any way for a peaceful co-existence with Israel, the President answered negatively asserting that it was necessary to restore the rights of the Arab people in Palestine.

As to whether the great powers would or would not allow the destruction of Israel, the President declared we are not under trusteeship of any great power. In addition he said, we Arabs must know our friends and our enemies. Those who side with Israel are our enemies.

Answering questions about Canada's role, the President said that Canada has taken a very partial stand favouring Israel, which we deem as a hostile action against us.

Asked by Reuters correspondent why he has chosen this very moment for requesting the UNEF's withdrawal, the President said he did not choose the time. Israeli Premier Eshkol made that choice when he threatened to invade Syria.

The President also declared that no foreign troops, pertaining to Uniations or otherwise, shall be allowed to return in any form to United Arab Republic territory. Similarly he pointed out that the United Arab Republic's decision of banning Israeli shipping in Aqaba was absolutely irrevocable.

Referring to the United Arab Republic - United States relations, the President said, that we have no cause to quarrel with the United States over its biased stand in supporting Israel, we have no direct problems with the United States Government or the people. But the United States Government, instead of acting as the greatest power in the world, fairly and justly, it prefers

/ to take

sides with Israel against the Arabs, ignoring Arab rights.

Answering a question about the possible effect of war on the Suez Canal, the President said if it was war between us and Israel there shall be nothing the matter with the Suez Canal, but if a third country interferes there shall be no Suez Canal, clearly and frankly.

President Abdel Nasser said he could not predict the far reaching consequences of a possible armed interference on the part of the United States, but it would constitute a flagrant aggression against the United Arab Republic and all Arab nations. And the United Arab Republic shall defend its sovereignty regardless of anything.

Finally, answering a question by the Economist magazine as to how he viewed Israel's disregard of repeated U.N. Resolutions concerning the return of Arab refugees supported every year by Britain and the United States but remaining unheeded by Israel, the President said this fact shows that Britain and the United States pay lip service to the Arab cause in the Uniations but they never exercised pressure on Israel to respect the Uniations Resolutions. It shows they actually side with, and are committed to, Israel.

* * * * *

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

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OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAY 23 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House 20501

SUBJECT: General Accounting Office (GAO) Published Report to the Congress
on Effects of Foreign Currency Sales on Commercial Sales of
Wheat to the United Arab Republic, Title I of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (commonly known as
Public Law 480).

The Acting Comptroller General of the United States transmitted
to the President of the United States on March 11, 1966, a copy of the
subject named report to the Congress.

For your information a copy of the Agency's reply to the
Comptroller General is enclosed.


Frederic Chapin
Executive Secretary

Enclosure: a/s

MAY 23 1966

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAY 17 1966

The Comptroller General
of the United States

Dear Mr. Staats:

We have reviewed the Acting Comptroller General's report to the Congress entitled "Effects of Foreign Currency Sales on Commercial Sales of Wheat to the United Arab Republic," dated March 1966. We believe that our comments (reproduced in Appendix V) on the draft report are valid with respect to the final report. We note, however, the statement on page 39 that A. I. D. has not tried to reconcile the use of PL 480 programs to assist economic development in the UAR with the decline in commercial wheat sales as PL 480 Title I programs increased. References to the UAR's acute balance-of-payments difficulties which led to the reduction in commercial sales of wheat are discounted on the basis that the UAR's foreign exchange holdings did not change materially in FYs 1961, 1962, and 1964. Figures for these years are included on page 35 of the report, but the source of the data is not cited.

According to International Financial Statistics, published by the International Monetary Fund, net foreign exchange holdings of the UAR's central bank and commercial banks at the end of 1961 were about half of the amount held in 1960. From 1962 through 1964, foreign liabilities exceeded foreign assets and at the end of 1964, the deficit was more than 50 per cent greater than the preceding year. Gross foreign exchange holdings plus gold reserves held by the central bank (which more nearly approximate the General Accounting Office's figures) did not change materially from 1961 through 1963, but they were at extremely low levels and in any case did not take account of foreign liabilities. These data are summarized in the enclosed table.

We believe that this supplementary information supports our previous position that the PL 480 Title I sales of wheat to assist the UAR were justified.

Sincerely yours,



David E. Bell

Enclosure

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: Gold and Foreign Exchange Holdings
of Central Bank and Commercial Banks

<u>End of Period</u>	<u>Gold Reserve</u> ----- (million dollars) -----	<u>Foreign Exchange Holdings</u> (million dollars equivalent)	
		<u>Gross</u>	<u>Net</u>
1959	174	330	272.7
1960	174	168	150.1
1961	174	120	77.2
1962	174	115	-68.3
1963	174	112	-66.2
1964	139	234	-101.9

International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
April 1966

a/ Converted at rate of \$1=2.838 LE for 1959 through 1961;
thereafter at rate of \$1=2.30 LE.