

## **ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE**

**You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.**

**The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.**

**December 10, 2003**

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
001	cable	USUN NY 4652 <i>open 2-13-06</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>06/27/64</del>	<del>A</del>
004	cable	Taizz 689 <i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06.95</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>06/01/64</del>	<del>A</del>
006b	list	Chronology of events leading to decision on US vote on Yemen resolution [Sanitized 4/15/92 NLJ 91-436]	<del>S</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
007	cable	USUN NY 4222	S	2	05/22/64	A
008	cable	Deptel 5429 to Cairo <i>open 2-13-06</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>05/21/64</del>	<del>A</del>
009	cable	Taiz 660 <i>open 11/8/06 NLJ 06.95</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>05/20/64</del>	<del>A</del>
010	cable	Jidda 1057 <i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06.95</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>7</del>	<del>05/13/64</del>	<del>A</del>
011	cable	London 5575	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>05/09/64</del>	<del>A</del>
012	memo	Read to Bundy [Sanitized 4/10/02] <i>open 11/8/06 NLJ 06.91</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>05/08/64</del>	<del>A</del>
013	cable	Cairo 2631 <i>open 2-13-06</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>05/08/64</del>	<del>A</del>

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title "Yemen, Vol. I"

Box Number 161

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
014	cable	USUN NY 4041 <i>open 11/8/06 NLW 06.95</i>	G	2	05/07/64	A
016	cable	Deptel 2879 to USUN NY <i>open 2.13.06</i>	C	1	05/07/64	A
022	cable	Taiz 605 <i>↓</i>	C	2	04/30/64	A
023b	cable	A 196 from Aden <i>open 11/17/06 NLW/PAL 06.95</i>	S	4	05/04/64	A
025	cable	Calro 2503 <i>open 2.13.06</i>	C	2	04/25/64	A
027	cable	Deptel 671 to Taiz <i>open 11/8/06 NLW 06.95</i>	S	2	04/14/64	A
028	cable	Paris 4805 <i>open 11/17/06 NLW/PAL 06.95</i>	C	2	04/13/64	A
029	cable	USUN NY 3692 <i>↓</i>	C	2	04/09/64	A
032	cable	USUN NY 3673 <i>open 2.13.06</i>	G	5	04/08/64	A
034	cable	USUN NY 3659 <i>↓</i>	C	4	04/08/64	A
036	cable	USUN NY 3580	C	3	04/01/64	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
038	cable	Deptel 2581 to USUN NY	<del>C</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>04/01/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 2.13.06</i>						
039	cable	USUN NY 3564	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>03/31/64</del>	<del>A</del>
040	cable	Taiz 549	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>03/29/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 11/17/06 NW/RAZ 06.95</i>						
041	cable	Taiz 545	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>03/29/64</del>	<del>A</del>
043	cable	Aden 173	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>03/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
044	cable	Deptel 1807 to all posts	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>03/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
045	cable	Deptel 1806 to all posts	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>03/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
047	cable	London 4618	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>03/20/64</del>	<del>A</del>
048	cable	Deptel 5977 to London	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>03/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>Open 2.13.06</i>						
049	cable	Taiz 501	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>03/01/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 11/17/06 NW/RAZ 06.95</i>						
050	cable	Jidda 839	<del>IS</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>02/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
051	cable	Jidda 831	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>02/21/64</del>	<del>A</del>
open 2.13.04						
052	cable	Taiz 490	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>02/20/64</del>	<del>A</del>
open 11/17/06 NLS/PALOB 95						
053	cable	London 3993	<del>C</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>02/12/64</del>	<del>A</del>
055	cable	Cairo 1722	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>01/30/64</del>	<del>A</del>
open 11/8/06 NLS/PALOB 95						
056	cable	intelligence information cable [Sanitized 1/10/02]	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>01/22/64</del>	<del>A</del>
more info released 8.17.06 NLS/PALOB 89						
057	cable	Jidda 263	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>01/13/64</del>	<del>A</del>
open 11/17/06 NLS/PALOB 95						
058	cable	Taiz 433	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>01/05/64</del>	<del>A</del>
059	cable	Taiz 426	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>01/05/64</del>	<del>A</del>
061	cable	Jidda 690	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>01/02/64</del>	<del>A</del>
062	cable	Jidda 688	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>01/01/64</del>	<del>A</del>
open 2.13.06						
063	cable	Jidda 685	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>12/31/63</del>	<del>A</del>
open 11/17/06 NLS/PALOB 95						

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
064	cable	Jidda 680	S	1	12/31/63	A
065	cable	Jidda 677	S	4	12/31/63	A
066	cable	Taiz 412 <i>open 11/8/06 NLJ 06-95</i>	C	1	12/30/63	A
067	cable	Taiz 410 <i>open 2-13-06</i>	e	2	12/30/63	A
068	cable	USUN NY 2605 <i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>	C	3	12/28/63	A
070	cable	Jidda 655 <i>↓</i>	S	3	12/24/63	A
071	cable	London 2923 <i>open 11/8/06 NLJ 06-95</i>	S	1	12/24/63	A
072	cable	USUN NY 2575 <i>open 2-13-06</i>	S	1	12/23/63	A
074	cable	Deptel 3832 to London <i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>	S	3	12/20/63	A
075	cable	Jidda 641 <i>↓</i>	S	5	12/20/63	A
076	cable	Deptel 1709 to USUN NY <i>open 2-13-06</i>	S	4	12/12/63	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
077	cable	Jidda 621	<i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>	<del>3</del>	<del>12/17/63</del>	<del>A</del>
082	cable	Cairo 1303	<i>↓</i>	<del>11</del>	<del>12/11/63</del>	<del>A</del>
083	cable	Deptel 2590 to Cairo		<del>2</del>	<del>12/10/63</del>	<del>A</del>
084	cable	Deptel 453 to Taiz	<i>open 12-13-04</i>	<del>3</del>	<del>12/09/63</del>	<del>A</del>
086	cable	Kuwait 247	<i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>	<del>2</del>	<del>12/07/63</del>	<del>A</del>
087	cable	Jidda 584	<i>open 2-13-06</i>	<del>1</del>	<del>12/07/63</del>	<del>A</del>
		<i>(Dup # 24, NSR, Telug Koma, "Saudi Arabia - Hard Surface," Box 49)</i>				
088	cable	Deptel 2407 to Cairo	<i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>	<del>3</del>	<del>12/05/63</del>	<del>A</del>
089	cable	Deptel 2496 to Cairo	<i>open 11/8/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>	<del>3</del>	<del>12/04/63</del>	<del>A</del>
090	cable	Jidda 572	<i>open 2-13-06</i>	<del>4</del>	<del>12/04/63</del>	<del>A</del>
		[Dup. #73, Papers of Smith, "NSC Standing Group Meetings Vol. II," bx 28]				
091	cable	London 2615	<i>open 3/12/08 NLJ/RAC 06-97</i>	<del>3</del>	<del>12/04/63</del>	<del>A</del>
		<i>open 11/17/06 NLJ/RAC 06-95</i>				

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
092	cable	London 2587 [Dup. #70, Papers of Smith, "NSC Standing Group Meetings Vol. II," bx 28]	<del>S</del>	4	12/03/63	A
<i>open 2-13-06</i>						
093	cable	Deptel 3413	<del>C</del>	1	12/03/63	A
094	cable	Deptel 434 to Taiz	<del>C</del>	1	12/03/63	A
096	cable	USUN NY 2290	<del>S</del>	2	11/29/63	A
097	cable	Jidda 561 <i>Sanitized 2-7-06</i>	<del>S</del>	6	11/30/63	A
<i>Same sanitization 11/8/06 NW 06-91</i>						
101	cable	Taiz 313 <i>open 2-13-06</i>	<del>C</del>	2	11/24/63	A
102	cable	Taiz 342	<del>S</del>	2	11/25/63	A
105a	list	Chronology of Events <i>open 11/17/06 NW/RAZ 06-95</i>	<del>S</del>	4	04/16/64	A
143	memo	Komer to Bundy [Sanitized 2/8/93 NLJ 91-433]	<del>S</del>	1	12/17/63	A
<i>open (see below)</i>						
113	memo	Komer to Bundy [Sanitized 2/8/93 NLJ 91-433]	<del>S</del>	1	12/17/63	A
<i>open 11/15/06 NW/RAZ 06-96</i>						

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
115a	report	re: Yemen	S	4	undated	A
		<del>Sanitized 9.8.04 NW/RAC 03.198</del> More released NY 18.4, 4/28/22				
118b	memo	Komer to Bundy [Sanitized 1/10/02]	S	3	12/05/63	A

~~Same sanitization 6-20-06 NW 06-90~~  
More released NY 18.4, 4/28/22

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	USUN NY 4652 Confidential	1 p 06/27/64	A
<del>#2 cable</del>	<del>London 6466</del> <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i> <del>secret</del>	<del>1 p 06/26/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#3 cable</del>	<del>London 6112</del> " <del>secret</del>	<del>2 p 06/09/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#4 cable	Taizz 689 secret	2 p 06/01/64	A
<del>#5 cable</del>	<del>London 5949</del> <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i> <del>confidential</del>	<del>2 p 05/31/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6 memo</del>	<del>to Mr. Bundy from Sam Belk</del> <del>confidential</del> <i>open 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i>	<del>3 p 05/29/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#6b List	Chronology of events leading to decision on US vote on Yemen resolution secret <i>sanitized 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	4 p undated	A
#7 cable	USUN NY 4222 Secret	2 p 05/22/64	A
#8 cable	Deptel 5429 to Cairo confidential	1 p 05/21/64	A
#9 cable	Taiz 660 confidential	1 p 05/20/64	A
#10 cable	Jidda 1057 secret	7 p 05/13/64	A
#11 cable	London 5575 confidential	2 p 05/09/64	A
<del>#12 memo</del>	<del>to McG. Bundy from Ben Read</del> <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 1-15-93 NLS 91-436</i> <i>same sanitization per RAC 1/10/02</i>	<del>2 p 05/08/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 cable	Cairo 2631 secret	3 p 05/08/64	A
#14 cable	USUN NY 4041 confidential	2 p 05/07/64	A
#16 cable	Deptel 2879 to USUN NY Confidential	1 p 05/07/64	A

FILE LOCATION

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Yemen, vol. 1

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17 cable	Deptel 706 to Jidda secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	2 p 05/07/64	A
#18 cable	London 5522 secret	5 p 05/06/64	A
#19 cable	Aden 197 secret	2 p 05/04/64	A
#20 cable	London 5454 confidential	2 p 05/02/64	A
#21 cable	Taiz 616 secret	3 p 05/04/64	A
#22 cable	Taiz 605 confidential	2 p 04/30/64	A
#23a cable	New York 3920 secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	2 p 04/29/64	A
#23b cable	A-195 from Aden secret	4 p 05/04/64	A
#24 cable	Aden 194 secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	1 p 04/27/64	A
#25 cable	Cairo 2503 confidential	2 p 04/25/64	A
#26 cable	A-189 fm Taiz secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	7 p 04/22/64	A
#27 cable	Deptel 671 to Taiz secret	2 p 04/14/64	A
#28 cable	Paris 4805 confidential	2 p 04/13/64	A
#29 cable	USUN NY 3693 confidential	2 p 04/09/64	A
#31 cable	London 4950 confidential <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	2 p 04/09/64	A
#32 cable	USUN NY 3673 confidential	5 p 04/08/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#34 cable	USUN NY 3659 confidential	4 p	04/08/64	A
#36 cable	USUN NY 3580 confidential	3 p	04/01/64	A
#37 cable	London 4815 secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	3 p	04/01/64	<del>A</del>
#38 cable	Deptel 2581 to USUN NY confidential	3 p	04/01/64	A
#39 cable	USUN NY 3564 confidential	1 p	03/31/64	A
#40 cable	Taiz 549 secret	2 p	03/29/64	A
#41 cable	Taiz 545 confidential	2 p	03/29/64	A
#42 cable	Aden 173 <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i> confidential	1 p	03/28/64	<del>A</del>
#43 cable	Aden 173 confidential	1 p	03/28/64	A
#44 cable	Deptel 1807 to all posts confidential	1 p	03/28/64	A
#45 cable	Deptel 1806 to all posts confidential	1 p	03/28/64	A
#46 cable	Deptel 146 to Aden secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	2 p	03/27/64	<del>A</del>
#47 cable	London 4618 confidential	2 p	03/20/64	A
#48 cable	Deptel 5977 to London secret <del>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</del>	1 p	03/17/64	A
#49 cable	Taiz 501 confidential	1 p	03/01/64	A
#50 cable	Jidda 839 Top secret (gp 1)	1 p	02/28/64	A

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#51 cable	Jidda 831 secret	2 p 02/21/64	A
#52 cable	Taiz 490 confidential	2 p 02/20/64	A
#53 cable	London 3903 confidential	3 p 02/12/64	A
#55 cable	Cairo 1722 confidential	2 p 01/30/64	A
#56 cable	intelligence info cable <i>sanitized per RAC 1/10/02</i> secret	3 p 01/22/64	A
#57 cable	Jidda 263 secret	2 p 01/13/64	A
#58 cable	Taiz 433 confidential	1 p 01/05/64	A
#59 cable	Taiz 426 confidential	1 p 01/05/64	A
#61 cable	Jidda 690 secret	1 p 01/02/64	A
#62 cable	Jidda 688 confidential	1 p 01/01/64	A
#63 cable	Jidda 685 confidential	2 p 12/31/63	A
#64 cable	Jidda 680 secret	1 p 12/31/63	A
#65 cable	Jidda 677 secret	4 p 12/31/63	A
#66 cable	Taiz 412 confidential	1 p 12/30/63	A
#67 cable	Taiz 410 confidential	2 p 12/30/63	A
#68 cable	USUN NY 2605 confidential	3 p 12/28/63	A

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#69 cable	London 2949 <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i> <del>secret</del>	2 p 12/27/63	<del>A</del>
#70 cable	Jidda 655 secret	3 p 12/24/63	A
#71 cable	London 2923 secret	1 p 12/24/63	A
#72 cable	USUN NY 2575 secret	2 p 12/23/63	A
#73 cable	Deptel 1133 to Jidda & Cairo <del>Secret</del> <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	7 p 12/21/63	<del>A</del>
#74 cable	Deptel 3832 to London secret	3 p 12/20/63	A
#75 cable	Jidda 641 secret	5 p 12/20/63	A
#76 cable	Deptel 1709 to USUN, NY secret	4 p 12/12/63	A
#77 cable	Jidda 621 secret	3 p 12/17/63	A
#78 cable	Cairo 1356 <del>secret</del> <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	6 p 12/17/63	<del>A</del>
#79 cable	Deptel 3707 to London <del>Secret</del> "	4 p 12/13/63	<del>A</del>
#80 cable	Jidda 607 secret "	6 p 12/12/63	A
#81 cable	London 2717 <del>secret</del> "	2 p 12/11/63	<del>A</del>
#82 cable	Cairo 1303 secret	11 p 12/11/63	A
#83 cable	Deptel 2590 to Cairo secret	2 p 12/10/63	A
#84 cable	Deptel 453 to Taiz secret	3 p 12/09/63	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

678

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#85 cable	Deptel 462 to Jidda secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	2 p 12/09/63	A
#86 cable	Kuwait 247 secret	2 p 12/07/63	A
#87 cable	Jidda 584 secret <i>(dup # 24, NSC, File 7 Komen, "Saudi Arabia Hard Surface" Box 49)</i>	1 p 12/07/63	A
#88 cable	Deptel 2497 to Cairo secret	3 p 12/05/63	A
#89 cable	Deptel 2496 to Cairo secret	3 p 12/04/63	A
#90 cable	Jidda 572 secret <i>[Dup. # 73, Papers of Smith, "NSC Standing Chp. Vol. II" Box 28]</i>	4 p 12/04/63	A
#91 cable	London 2615 confidential	3 p 12/04/63	A
#92 cable	London 2587 secret <i>[Dup. # 70, Papers of Smith, "NSC Standing Chp. Vol. II" Box 28]</i>	4 p 12/03/63	A
#93 cable	Deptel 3413 confidential	1 p 12/03/63	A
#94 cable	Deptel 434 to Taiz confidential	1 p 12/03/63	A
#95 cable	Deptel 440 to Jidda secret	9 p 11/27/63	A
#96 cable	USUN NY 2290 secret	2 p 11/29/63	A
#97 cable	Jidda 561 <i>sanitized per F.R.U.S.</i> secret	6 p 11/30/63	A
#98 cable	Taiz 319 <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i> secret	4 p 11/29/63	A
#100 cable	Taiz 314 secret	2 p 11/24/63	A
#101 cable	Taiz 313 confidential	2 p 11/24/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
Yemen, vol. 1

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

778

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#102 cable	Taiz 312 secret	2 p 11/25/63	A
#104 memo	to McG. Bundy from Ben Read top secret <i>open 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	1 p 05/26/64	A
#104a letter	to Dean Rusk from D. A. Greenhill <i>open 12-15-03 top secret exempt 4-15-92 NLS 91-436</i>	5 p 05/25/64	A
#105a list	chronology of the events leading to the decision on the US vote on Yemen resolution secret	4 p 4/16/64	A
#107 note	to Mr. Bundy from Sam <del>possible classified info</del>	1 p undated	A
#107a memo	to Mr. Bundy from Sam Belk <del>exemption upheld per NLS 91-433 appeal</del> <i>open 12-15-03 top secret exempt 4-15-92 NLS 91-433</i>	4 p 04/10/64	A
#108 memo	to the President from McG. B[undy] <i>open 4-22-94 NLS 91-433 appeal</i> <del>possible classified info exempt 4-15-92 NLS 91-433</del>	2 p 04/09/64	A
#109 memo	to Mac from RWK <i>open 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i> secret	1 p 04/02/64	A
#111 memo	to President from R. W. Komer secret	1 p 01/31/64	A
#112 memo	to McGB from RWK secret	1 p 12/19/63	A
#113 memo	to McGB from RWK secret <i>sanitized 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i> <i>sup #26, NSF file, Komer, "Yemen" Box 54</i>	1 p 12/17/63	A
#114a memo	to President from McG. Bundy & R. W. Komer secret <i>open 2-8-93 NLS 91-433</i>	1 p 12/11/63	A
#114b memo	to President from Dean Rusk secret <i>open 1-15-93 NLS 91-436</i>	1 p 12/11/63	A
#114c report	re: Yemen secret	4 p undated	A
#115 memo	to President from Dean Rusk secret	1 p 12/11/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
Yemen, vol. 1

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838

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#115a report	re: Yemen secret	4 p undated	A
#115b letter	proposed letter to Crown Prince Faisal from Pres. Johnson secret <i>open 2-8-93 NLJ 91-433</i>	4 p undated	A
#115c letter	duplicate of #115b "		
#116 report	re: Yemen secret <i>duplicate of #117 + #118C open 1-15-93 NLJ 91-436</i>	5p undated	A
#117 report	re: Yemen secret <i>open 1-15-93 NLJ 91-436</i> [duplicate of #116] and #118C	5 p undated	A
#118 Note	by R. W. Komer <i>open 2-8-93 NLJ 91-433</i> secret	1 p 12/06/63	A
#118a memo	to McGB from R. W. Komer " secret	1 p 12/06/63	A
#118b memo	to McGB from R. W. Komer <i>dup # 32, NSF, Files 3 Komer "Yemen" Box 54</i> secret <i>sanitized 2-8-93 NLJ 91-433</i> <i>same sanitization per RAC 1/10/02</i>	3 p 12/05/63	A
#118c report	re: Yemen <i>open 1-15-93 NLJ 91-436</i> secret <i>duplicate of #116 and 117</i>	5 p undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File  
Yemen, vol. 1

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**S. Yemen*

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DE RUEHDT 795 27/2130Z

P 272110Z ZEA

FM USUN NEWYORK

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQSJD/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

STATE GRNC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 4652 INFO CAIRO 258  
JIDDA 189 TAIZ 181 FROM USUN JUNE 27, 5 PM

SUBJECT: UNYOM

BUNCHE INFORMED US TODAY THAT SAUDIS HAD JUNE 25 FORMALLY AND IN WRITING NOTIFIED SYG THAT WHILE THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUANCE UNYOM THEY WOULD NO LONGER PAY FOR IT AFTER JULY 4 BECAUSE OF FAILURE UAR TO CARRY OUT WITHDRAWALS.

SYG HAD INFORMED BAROODY WHEN NOTE PRESENTED THAT HE HAD PLANNED TO REPORT TO SC JULY 4; THAT HE INTENDED TO DISSOLVE UNYOM BY SEPTEMBER 4, IF THERE WERE NO SUBSTANTIAL UAR WITHDRAWALS BY THAT TIME. THIS, HE FELT, WOULD CONSTITUTE STRONG WARNING TO UAR.

BAROODY PROMISED TO COMMUNICATE AT ONCE TO FAISAL SYG'S PROPOSED ACTION AND INQUIRE WHETHER OR NOT THIS MADE ANY DIFFERENCE IN FAISAL'S INTENTION NOT TO SUPPORT UNYOM DURING NEXT TWO MONTHS.

GP-3

STEVENSON

BT

CFN 4652 258 189 181 27 5 25 4 4 4 GP-3

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *gls*, NARA, Date *2706*

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

54

~~SECRET~~

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DE RUDTLN 760C 26/1745Z  
R 261630Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN  
STATE GRNC  
BT

025705

1964 JUN 26 PM 2 38

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 6466 INFO ADEN 150 CAIRO 231 JIDDA  
197 TAIZ 156 USUN 723 FROM LONDON JUNE 26, 6PM

REF: EMBTEL 6442

WHEN INTRODUCING COMMANDER CASSIDY, USN, TO BRENCHLEY THIS MORNING, HE ALSO ALLUDED TO INTELLIGENCE REPORT SUMMARIZED REFTEL. SAID MOST IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT ADDED BY THIS LATEST REPORT IS THAT UAR OFFICERS ARE SAID TO BE ESCORTING ILLICIT ARMS CRAVANS INTO SAF TERRITORY. BRITISH ARE ANXIOUS CATCH ONE OF THESE UAR OFFICERS IN BELIEF SUCH CAPTURE WOULD ALLOW MORE EFFECTIVE PROTEST TO BE MADE TO UN. BRENCHLEY NOTED THESE UAR OFFICERS ARE REPORTEDLY IN RADIO CONTACT WITH THEIR BASE IN BAIDHA. HE THOUGHT AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS UAR DOING UTMOST SPARK AT LEAST ONE OTHER TRIBAL REVOLT IN SAF. HE REITERATED FONOFF VIEW THAT YAR LEADERS ARE AS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PRESENT SUBVERSION IN SAF AS ARE UAR MILITARY CHIEFS.

BRENCHLEY ANTICIPATES THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE SAF AND COLOFF PRESSURE TO BRING THIS LATEST REPORT OF UAR SUBVERSION TO ATTENTION OF UN. HE IS RELUCTANT DO SO WITHOUT HARDER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE, AND HAS ASKED COLOFF ASCERTAIN SOURCE OF THIS LATEST INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

GP-3. BRUCE

BT

CFN GP-3

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *kg* NARA. Date 3-31-92

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

NARA. Date 3-31-92

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RR RUEHCR  
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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
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1964 JUN 9 PM 1 58

~~SECRET~~ 6112 JUNE 9, 6 P.M.

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OTHER MATTERS YESTERDAY, SANDYS IN STRONG BUT SOMEWHAT RAMBLING PRESENTATION TO UNDER SECRETARY BALL, SAID HE WISHED TO BE SURE HMG HAS CONTINUED US SUPPORT RE ARABIA. HE COMPLAINED THAT HMG HAS AT TIMES FELT A BIT UNHAPPY AT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS OUR "DETACHED ATTITUDE". HE SOUGHT TO EQUATE BRITISH POSITION IN ADEN WITH US CONCERN OVER CUBA. HMG, HE CONTINUED, IS FACING A DIFFICULT SITUATION. ARMS AND MINES ARE BEING SMUGGLED INTO SAF. HMG AND THE SAF ARE BEING ATTACKED OFN 6112 9 6

PAGE 2 RUDTLN 247C ~~SECRET~~

ON RADIOS CAIRO AND SANA. IMAGE IS BEING PROJECTED IN SAF THAT US FRIENDSHIP WITH NASSER AND SUPPORT OF YAR IS MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN WHAT UK IS DOING FOR SAF. HE HOPED US MIGHT BE SYMPATHETIC RE ADEN NOT ONLY IN PRIVATE, BUT ALSO IN PUBLIC.

US POSITION RE ADEN SHOULD BE "A LITTLE MORE ROBUST". HE HOPED USG WOULD NOT MERELY TAKE IMPARTIAL POSITION BETWEEN TWO SIDES. HE EXPRESSED BRITISH CONCERN OVER DOUBLE STANDARD THAT PREVAILS IN UN. UN FREELY CRITICIZES HMG, BUT DOES NOTHING TO STOP UAR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD CONSIDER TRYING TO GET A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE UAR EVEN IF WE GET VOTED DOWN IN THE PROCESS. HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN USG MIGHT ALSO BE ADOPTING DOUBLE STANDARD WHEN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ITS POLICY RE CUBA AND UK'S POLICY IN ADEN.

UNDER SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH NASSER BASED ON BELIEF THAT THERE IS SOME VIRTUE IN BEING ABLE MAINTAIN LEVERAGE. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE EXERCISE AT LEAST SOME RESTRAINT ON HIM. IF THERE WERE MARKED CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARDS NASSER, HE WOULD FEEL HE HAD NOWHERE TO GO BUT THE USSR. THIS WOULD PLACE ALL OF US IN A WORSE POSITION. UNDER SECRETARY ALSO POINTED OUT US HAS SUPPORTED HMG ON HARIB RESOLUTION AND IN COMMITTEE OF 24. OFN 24

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 6112, JUNE 9, 6 PM FROM LONDON

PAGE 3 RUDTLN 247C ~~SECRET~~

UNDER SECRETARY NOTED VERY REAL PROBLEM BRITISH RETALIATION ON HARIB HAD POSED FOR US. WE FOUND OURSELVES BEING ACCUSED OF REVERSAL OF POSITION WE HAD TAKEN RE ISRAELI RETALIATION. UNDER SECRETARY STRESSED US AID TO YAR IS LINKED LARGELY TO ROAD PROJECT WHICH REPRESENTS CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY OF YEMEN. UNDER SECRETARY SAID HE NEVERTHELESS UNDERSTOOD SANDYS' POINT.

COMMENT: LATER, WHEN SANDYS HAD LEFT, BUTLER TOLD JERNEGAN HE FELT SANDYS HAD SPOKEN INAPPROPRIATELY IN THUS CRITICIZING US POSITION RE ADEN.

GP-3. BRUCE

BT

QFN GP-3

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen**4*~~SECRET~~53  
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VV EUB928HEB104  
RR RUEHCR RUEHDT  
DE RUQSTZ 002 01/0850Z  
R 010800Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY TAIZZ  
TO RUHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
RUEHCR/AMCONSULATE ADEN  
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
RUEHDT/USUN/NEW YORK  
RUEPCR/DEPTAR WASHDC  
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~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT (689) INFO LONDON, 288 ADEN 275  
CAIRO 342 JIDDA 238 USUN 177 DEPTAR 135 12 N TWENTY  
EIGHTH.

NOFORN.

LIMDIS. DEPTAR FOR ACSI

GERMAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME MAY 28TH HE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM  
VISIT TO ADEN WHERE HE HAD MEETING WITH SHERIF OF BEIHAN AND MUHAMMAD  
FARID, SAF MINISTER EXTERNAL RELATIONS. FARID HAD SENT WORD TO  
AMBASSADOR STEFFEN HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM DURING ONE OF HIS VISITS  
TO ADEN.

FARID TOLD STEFFEN HE AND OTHER FEDERATION ARABS VERY  
ANXIOUS HAVE PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH YARG BUT THAT EGYPTIAN  
PROPAGANDA AND EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE TO DISSIDENTS MAJOR OBSTACLE.  
HOWEVER, HE SAID WHEN LAST IN NEW YORK HE OBTAINED FROM UAR  
REPRESENTATIVE WRITTEN ASSURANCE UAR WILLING RECOGNIZE SAF  
INDEPENDENCE WHEN LATTER REACHES AGREEMENT THIS REGARD AND  
THAT UAR ALSO AGREEABLE TO SAF RENTAL ARRANGEMENT FOR  
BRITISH ADEN BASE.

FARID SAID HE ANTICIPATES VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITH  
BRITISH WITH REGARD TO CONSTITUTION AND INDEPENDENCE ISSUE.  
STATED HE IS DETERMINED TO FORCE BRITISH AGREE TO DATE WHEN  
INDEPENDENCE WILL BE GRANTED. STEFFEN'S CONVERSATION WITH  
FARID WAS PRIVATE. HIS SEPERATE TALK WITH SHERIF HUSSEIN NOT  
PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT

COMMENT; SINCE ADEN ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER  
ADEN CHRONICLE OF MAY 21 CARRIED ARTICLE ON PAGE 10 WHICH  
STATED UAR DELEGATE TO UN HAD ASSURED FARID OF UAR DESIRE SEE

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By rel, NARA, Date 11-13-06



~~SECRET~~

-2- 689, MAY 28, 12 N, FROM TAIZ

SAF INDEPENDENT, UAR STAND ON THIS ISSUE WILL SOON BE KNOWN ALL OVER YEMEN WHILE SHAFEIS PROBABLY PLEASED BY THIS PROSPECT, MANY PROMINENT ZEIDIS WILL BE DISMAYED BY WHAT THEY WILL CONSIDER EGYPTIAN DOUBLE-CROSS AS UAR POSITION SAWS OFF YEMEN CLAIM TO SAF REAL ESTATE. THIS MEANS MORE YEMENIS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT WILL DEVELOP ANTI-EGYPTIAN SENTIMENTS AND STANCE. IN BRIEF MORE COMPLICATIONS FOR NASSER IN YEMEN.

GP-3

CORTADA

BT

CFN 689 288 275 342 238 177 135 12 28TH 21 10

NOTE: MESSAGE DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NII 91-436

By *410* NARA. Date *4-1-92-5*

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INFO ADEN 129 FROM LONDON 1

CORRECTION ISSUED  
5/31/64, 9:15 SYB

25119

MAY 30 AM 10:44

DEPT (5949) LAIZ 145

IN TALK WITH STEWART ROBERTS (HEAD, ADEN DEPT, COLOFF) JUST PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE ON THURSDAY FOR ADEN WE DISCUSSED ONCE-PLANNED MEETING BETWEEN CORTADA AND NIGEL FISHER, COLOFF PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY, WHICH HAD ABORTED WHEN FISHER'S EARLIER TRIP POSTPONED. EMBOFF SAID HE HAD NO AUTHORITY OF COURSE MAKE ANY COMMITMENT AND CORTADA HAD SPOKEN OF MAKING TRIP TO SANA EARLY IN JUNE, BUT WONDERED IF SUCH MEETING WITH FISHER MIGHT BE USEFUL  
CFN 5949 145 129 30 3

PAGE 2 RUDTLN 760C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO COLOFF IN PROVIDING FIRST HAND ASSESSMENT OF RECENT YEMENI DEVELOPMENTS. IF SO, WOULD BE PREPARED RAISE MATTER WITH DEPT AND TAIZ. ROBERTS SAID HE THOUGHT FISHER WOULD PROBABLY BE TOO BUSY WITH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS.

TODAY HOWEVER EMBOFF RECEIVED URGENT CALL FROM COLOFF DUTY OFFICER WHO EXPLAINED HAD JUST RECEIVED IMMEDIATE MESSAGE FROM FISHER IN ADEN. MESSAGE INDICATES FISHER WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO MEET WITH CORTADA IF IT WERE CONVENIENT TO CORTADA AND IF MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE. ACCORDING MESSAGE, FISHER PLANS LEAVE ADEN LATE AFTERNOON JUNE 3. WE REITERATED OUR INABILITY MAKE ANY COMMITMENT, BUT AGREED URGENTLY CONVEY TO DEPT AND TAIZ FISHER'S INTEREST IN MEETING WITH CORTADA. SAID CORTADA WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE SEND WORD THROUGH AMCONSUL ADEN WHETHER SUCH MEETING CONVENIENT FOR HIM.

COMMENT: WE AWARE INCONVENIENCE SUCH LAST MINUTE SUGGESTION POSES FOR CORTADA AND POSSIBILITY OTHER PLANS MAY PRECLUDE HIS VISITING ADEN AT THIS TIME. SAME TIME WE WOULD EMPHASIZE POTENTIAL VALUE HAVING SOMEONE AS KNOWLEDGEABLE AS CORTADA GIVE UK MINISTER FIRST HAND ASSESSMENT CURRENT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 5949, May 30, 3 p.m. from London

PAGE 3 RUDTLN 760C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
YEMENI SITUATION WHICH COULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON BRIT  
THINKING VIS-A-VIS YAR AND OFFSET SOME OF ANTI-YEMENI  
ADVICE WHICH FISHER CERTAIN RECEIVE FROM ADEN AND SAF  
OFFICIALS.

GP-3. BRUCE

BT

CFN GP-3  
\* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO SSO 11:07 5/30/64.

NOTE: PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE 11:35 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

May 29, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: "Postmortem" on the Yemen and the Role of the  
U. S. in the Security Council

You will recall that on April 10, the day following our unfortunate experience with the Yemen problem in the Security Council, we both agreed that a postmortem was in order so that we could see clearly how things got out of hand; who was responsible for letting them get out of hand, and why. Accordingly, I requested that the Secretariat prepare a chronology of events leading up to the Council Meeting which would bring in all areas concerned -- USUN, UKUN, EUR, NEA and IO. In making the request of the Secretariat, I was informed that the Secretary also had asked for a thorough postmortem so that we could see what lessons could be learned by the experience and make sure that such a situation never developed again. On informing you of the Secretary's request, we decided not to do a postmortem from the White House but, rather to wait and see what the Department produced. I so informed the Secretariat -- Ben Read and John McKesson, his deputy -- and prodded them gently over the next two weeks.

Finally, on April 27, the attached chronology came over to us -- exactly what I had requested on April 10 -- but it contained no entry after IO took the draft text of the Resolution to the Secretary at mid-morning on April 9. It was at this point that the entire exercise had shot into the "stratosphere" with the subsequent involvement of the Secretary, Lord Harleck, George Ball, the President, Adlai Stevenson, Lord Hume and yourself. The chronology has none of this in it, and contains no analysis.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-433

By fw, NARA, Date 2-3-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Yemen*  
*Sam:*  
*If they don't want*  
*to learn from*  
*experience, we can't*  
*force them. The*  
*moral for us is clear -*  
*we have to watch that much*  
*more closely / mclB*



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

As I told you at the time, officers in the Department from the Secretary on down were appalled that things happened as they did, involving so many high-ranking personalities, and I think there now is a deliberate effort to push the whole matter aside and try very hard to forget it. Ben Read did not take up the plan for a postmortem with the Secretary before the latter left for the SEATO conference nor was it mentioned to him in the period between the SEATO conference and the NATO meeting. Read has made it clear to both Bill Brubeck and me that he is convinced the Secretary is not interested in pursuing the matter further because of the personalities involved; also the fact that the tempers that used up the day on April 9 are now cooled and to postmortem the day would only give rise to perhaps serious disagreements and tempers would rise again.

|| What do you suggest as a next step?

Additional Note:

In retrospect it seems to me that most of the following elements emerge as contributory to the unfortunate situation that developed on April 9:

(a) The fact that we have a highly individualistic head of mission in New York who unfortunately is not always held under control by the Secretary of State.

(b) There existed a wide difference of view between UKUN and London and this was not revealed until the day of the Council meeting.

We should be sure hereafter that high-level soundings always are taken in London well in advance of a Council meeting in addition to the information we get from UKUN.

(c) We should always be sure that Stevenson and the Secretary resolve their differences before the last minute or, if this is impossible, the differences should be aired at the White House in an orderly manner. (In the case of Yemen, however, all

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

indications point to an agreed approach by Stevenson and the Secretary until the latter got a call from Lord Harlech at mid-morning on April 9.)

(d) Is it possible that the British planned to hit us hard at the last moment on the theory that there would be no time for planning and they could more easily enlist our support?

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Sam".

Sam Belk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~ Enclosures

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT


April 27, 1964

2235

S

6a

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read   
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Chronology of the U.S. Vote  
on Yemen Resolution.

Enclosed is a chronology of  
the events leading to the decision  
on the United States vote on the Yemen  
resolution. Mr. Belk had requested  
a record of these events.



Enclosure:

2 copies of  
subject paper.

~~SECRET~~ Enclosures

68

~~SECRET~~

- March 17, 1964 - Secretary expresses to British Ambassador USG concern that increasing British-UAR/YAR tensions in Southern Arabia posed threat to joint US-UK interests.
- March 19, 1964 - British Embassy asks us to deliver note to YAR protesting against Yemeni air incursions of South Arabian Federation territory. (Note delivered on March 26 - British Embassy advised delay inevitable owing communication difficulties with Taiz which made worse in this instance by telegraphic garbles.)
- March 20, 1964 - HMG informs us RAF authorized shoot down Yemeni aircraft crossing frontier.  
- UK informs SC of Yemen attacks and reserves "full liberty to take necessary measures" in case of new attacks.
- March 26, 1964 - Department official warns HMG in London US may not be able to continue representing HMG in Yemen if UK launches retaliatory raids.
- March 27, 1964 - British Embassy informs us of UK cabinet decision to authorize air strike at Jebal Bulaiq in retaliation for machine gun attack by YAR helicopter morning of March 27.  
- Department expresses serious concern at repercussions of retaliation on Libyan base problems.
- March 28, 1964 - RAF jets attack fort in Harib area.  
- UK informs Security Council in letter of March 28 "counter-attack" on grounds HMG "felt bound to take measures of defense of SAF."
- April 1, 1964 - Yemeni delegate asks SC for urgent meeting.  
- UKUN official says British would not oppose resolution which specifically mentioned Harib within general reference to all incidents. USUN believes such resolution to be expected.  
- DEPT informs USUN that resolution should not be condemnatory or fix blame. If the UK agreed, we could live with resolution which deplors all incidents and specifically mentions Harib. USUN instructed work closely with UKUN. We would hope that non-permanent members of SC could take lead in introducing mild resolution to head off unacceptable Arab resolution.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 06-95  
By il, NARA, Date 11-13-06



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-2-

- April 2, 1964 - In Security Council Yemen charges British aggression and asks for an end to UK presence in South Arabia.
- UK states they were acting in defense of SAF and asks for D/Z.
  - Cleveland informs Plimpton that Secretary wishes US role at UN played in full consultation with the British.  
"This doesn't mean, of course, that we have to come out in favor of retaliatory raids, but it does mean that we ought to make every effort not to cross up British tactics..."
  - Plimpton told Yemeni not to expect US support of condemnation.
  - USUN encourages UKUN to see Norway as key 7th vote.
  - USUN informs DEPT UK made poor defense in SC and should expect some kind of reproof.
- April 3, 1964 - UK gives us draft resolution "deploring all incidents" (but not specifically mentioning Harib) and asking for establishment of demilitarized zone. Dean informs Plimpton London could only accept balanced paragraph in resolution which equally deplored or regretted Yemeni attacks or provocations and the UK action.
- USUN informs British US prefers not to take the lead in negotiations of a resolution but would support UK effort to encourage initiative by non-permanent members.
  - USUN reports British not acting either rapidly or effectively in defense of their interests; their work with non-permanent members limited.
  - Moroccan invites non-permanent members to meet with him; USUN fears that unless UK moves, Morocco may have six votes lined up and start dickering for seventh.
- April 4, 1964 - UK Embassy (Greenhill) asks us to take initiative on resolution; DEPT informs him we are reluctant to take lead; we suggest British again work on the Norwegians.
- British gave USUN new and stiffer draft resolution which they also gave to Brazil and Norway.
  - British urge Norway to push UK resolution; otherwise they may be asked to cast 7th vote for Arab resolution.
  - USUN says it will caution Bolivia, Brazil and Ivory Coast not to accept too hurriedly the Arab draft.
- April 6, 1964 - Moroccan circulates draft resolution which would condemn UK action at Harib, call on UK to pay compensation and cease interference in Yemen affairs.

~~SECRET~~

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-3-

- Bolivian representative, carrying out promise made April 5 to USUN officer, arranges for meeting with Brazilian, Norwegian, Moroccan, Czech and Ivory Coast delegates to discuss possibility of alternative to Arab resolution unacceptable to UK.
- In the Security Council Governor Stevenson's speech supports UK suggestions for keeping peace on frontier and suggests constructive element wanted by UK: role for SYG. Draft speech shown to the UK representative before delivery.

April 7, 1964 - DEPT affirms to UK Embassy we will work to avoid condemnation of UK but it might be impossible in resolution to escape some mention of Harib among other incidents. We agree to support UK request for constructive action such as border demarcation or stationing of frontier observers.

- Non-permanent member drafting group (Bolivia, Norway, Ivory Coast) produces draft resolution which would "condemn reprisals" and "deplore UK military action at Harib," (but not mention action by other side). UK official described it as "hopeless."
- Bolivia and Brazil agreed Moroccan could table draft but indicated they were not committed to support it. Norway appears to be wavering in its position; the Norwegian delegate indicates with some slight changes there is a chance he will receive instructions to vote for it.
- USUN asks UKUN if resolution would be acceptable if it condemned both "attacks" and "reprisals" and referred to frontier incidents "including Harib." Sir Patrick Dean said that would be tolerable. (Throughout exercise harder line being taken by UK Embassy here in discussions with Burdett than Dean with Stevenson and Plimpton-- indicated differences of view between the UK foreign office and UKUN). Dean also indicated, however, that he did not want USUN to try to negotiate these changes because he was afraid resolution would be changed just enough to win seven votes, but not enough to make it acceptable to UK. Plimpton therefore tells Moroccan US cannot support resolution.

April 8, 1964 - Norwegian delegate urges Arabs successfully to drop compensation claim paragraph from resolution. He said he has instructions to try to water down resolution to make it more acceptable. In view of UK explicit request,

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-4-

US did not urge Norwegian to continue these efforts. Ambassador Plimpton did say, however, that all paragraphs of the resolution must be evenly balanced between Yemeni and UK.

- As a result of Norwegian approach, Morocco agrees to put in additional paragraph which would "regret all incidents...in area," thus giving balance to resolution and retaining a role for SYG as UK wanted.
- UK indicates to us resolution still unsatisfactory, and notes displeasure with Norwegian efforts (UK seemed to prefer more extreme resolution).
- Plimpton tells Norwegian that their resolution still unbalanced.
- Norwegian picked up ball with Arabs. Convinced Arabs agree to change "regrets" to "deplores" all incidents in order to bring it into balance with "deplores UK military action at Harib."
- Morocco introduces the resolution about 5 p.m.
- Sir Patrick Dean agrees resolution "not a bit bad" for UK, but said London attitude was different. He said the resolution would get eight votes, and hoped UK would not be abandoned by its friends. UKUN says it will urge London to agree to abstention.

- April 9, 1964
- USUN strongly urges we vote in favor of resolution because it has been watered down enough to be a fair disposition of an awkward matter which, in the opinion of UKUN, should not be seriously objectionable to UK. Mission also cites our previous positions on retaliatory raids and says our reputation for integrity and independence depends on our standing by our convictions.
  - US Embassy in London strongly recommends we "at least abstain" to avoid public split with UK on matter on which HMG feelings are running very high.
  - 10:00 a.m. UK Ambassador informs Secretary cabinet decision to abstain on resolution.

IO:UNP:SJCampbell:lg 4/16/64

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*7*

53  
Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

TOOEMEHEL SVVVZCZCETD877  
RR RUEHCR RUDTLN  
DE RUEHDT 877 22/2125Z  
R 222115Z ZEA  
FM USUN NY  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 4222 INFO LONDON 985, 018838  
MAY 22, 5:15 PM

L I M D I S

1964 MAY 22 PM 5 45

UK-YAR TALKS

LONDON 5764.

DEAN (UK) TODAY DESCRIBED TO YOST ONLY, EMPHASIZING GREAT SENSITIVITY, CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH AL-AINI (YEMEN) MAY 20. AL-AINI HAD CREATED FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON DEAN IN RESPECT TO SINCERITY AND GOOD WILL AND DEAN RECOMMENDED TO LONDON HE BE AUTHORIZED RESUME CONVERSATION WHEN AL-AINI RETURNS FROM YEMEN, WHICH HE TOLD DEAN WOULD BE IN ABOUT TEN DAYS. BUNCHE HAD MENTIONED TO DEAN, HOWEVER, THAT AL-AINI IN FAREWELL CALL ON SYG HAD GIVEN IMPRESSION HE MIGHT NOT BE COMING BACK AT ALL.  
CFN 4222 985 22 5:15 5764 20

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 877 ~~SECRET~~  
IN CONVERSATION WITH DEAN AL-AINI HAD PRESENTED LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF YEMENI POSITION TO GENERAL EFFECT (1) YEMENIS ARE UNHAPPY WITH EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION BUT NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT AT PRESENT TIME, (2) EGYPTIANS ARE STIRRING UP TROUBLE ON SOUTHERN FRONTIER BUT YEMENIS HAVE NO DESIRE ENGAGE IN CONFRONTATION WITH UK AT THIS TIME AND RECOGNIZE ADEN IS BROADLY SUPPORTED "WESTERN POSITION", (3) PRESENT YEMENI GOVT IS BEST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND BRITISH SHOULD NOT LOSE OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH IT AND CONSOLIDATE IT, (4) YEMENIS ARE MAKING AN EFFORT ALSO TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS, (5) AL-AINI HIMSELF IS TAKING SOME RISKS IN ENGAGING IN THIS CONVERSATION AND MATTER SHOULD BE VERY CLOSELY HELD.

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NLJ/RAC 06-95  
By *isl* NARA, Date *11-13-06*

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-2- 4222, MAY 22, 5:15 P.M., FROM USUN NEW YORK

DEAN REPLIED THAT (1) HMG DESIRES MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH YEMEN, (2) FIRST STEP SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND PUT IN UN OBSERVERS, (3) LATER FRONTIER SHOULD BE DEMARCATED AT LEAST TO EXTENT OF RE-CONFIRMING 1934 AGREEMENT, (4) THERE MUST BE NO PRE-CONDITION TO CONTINUANCE THESE CONVERSATION. TO LATTER POINT AL-AINI REMARKED THAT YEMENIS ARE NOT INSISTING ON DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION BY UK AT THIS TIME. HE SAID HE WOULD SEEK HIS GOVT'S VIEWS ON POINTS RAISED BY DEAN AND HOPED TO RESUME CONVERSATIONS WHEN HE RETURNS TO NY.

DEAN ENCOURAGED BY CONVERSATION BUT EXPRESSED OPINION AL-AINI REPRESENTS VIEWS ONLY SOME MEMBERS OF YEMENI AND THAT OTHERS MAY PROVE TO BE LESS ACCOMMODATING.

SUBSEQUENTLY, DEAN PHONED YOST TO SAY HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FURTHER MESSAGE FROM FONOFF EMPHASIZING ONCE AGAIN EXTREME SENSITIVITY THIS QUESTION AND VITAL IMPORTANCE FACT THAT CONVERSATIONS TOOK PLACE NOT LEADING OUT.

GP-1. STEVENSON

BT

CFN GP-1.

~~SECRET~~

11848

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53

Origin  
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NSA

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5429  
 INFO USUN New York 3014  
 Amembassy LONDON 7651  
 Amembassy JIDDA 720  
 Amembassy TAIZ 718  
 Amconsul ADEN 186

MAY 21 7 44 PM '64

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *g/jc* NARA, Date *2-7-00*

Benhima (Morocco) informed Yost that spirited meeting was held among Arabs and that he, Benhima, has convinced his colleagues and the UAR that latter should defer pressing for SC meeting on Aden for at least time being. Benhima apparently told UAR and Arabs that they could not get what they wanted in early SC session.

If Embassy has not yet made demarche pursuant to DEPCIRTEL 2161, you should refrain from doing so.

~~GP-3~~ FYI. Arab dels decision stop call for meeting conveyed to UAR Ambassador Kamel by Jernegan following earlier ~~meeting~~ meeting in which points in Depcirtel had been discussed with Kamel. He had agreed support our approach, but on hearing news from New York indicated he would probably do nothing if his own delegation confirmed our info. END FYI

GP-3

END

Drafted by:

IO:JJSisco:ebb 5/21/64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NSA - John D. Jernegan

NE - Mr. Symmes

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

9

57  
Action  
NEA  
  
Info  
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USIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
OSD  
NAVY  
AIR  
RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 16398  
Rec'd: May 20, 1964  
2:14 p.m.

FROM: Taiz  
  
ACTION: Secstate 660

INFO: Cairo 329  
Jidda 227  
London 278  
USUN 171  
Aden 264  
DEPTAR 128

DATE: May 19, 11 p.m.

DEPTAR FOR AGSI

In conversation with senior UAR intelligence officer May 18, latter stated British Ambassador in Cairo and UARG officials started discussions May 16 on easing of UK-UAR conflict arising from Aden situation. He pointed out Cairo radio had ceased attacks on British. He was hopeful UK-UAR crisis would be resolved in next ten days or so.

Comment: We have no way of confirming from Taiz accuracy of UAR officers observations. However, we have noticed no reference in BBC radio broadcasts since May 16 to military operations in Radfan area.

GP-4.

CORTADA

FP/17

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 06-95  
By int, NARA, Date 10-26-06

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

10

34

~~SECRET~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

9837  
MAY 13, 1964  
10:18 AM

Action

NEA

FROM: JIDDA

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1057, PRIORITY  
USUN 242, PRIORITY

G

SP

INFO: ADEN UNNUMBERED

L

BAGHDAD 68

H

CAIRO 340

SAL

DHAHRAN 830

EUR

LONDON 286

IO

TAIZ 267

PR

AID

DATE: MAY 12, 6 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

P

USIA

NSC

EMBTel 1052

INR

CIA

FAYSAL-NASIR MEETING; SAUDIS REQUEST IDEAS RE YEMEN:

NSA

OSD

ARMY

AT CLOSE OF DINNER PARTY MAY 11 GIVEN BY LOCAL BUSINESS FAMILY IN HONOR FAYSAL, ACTING DEPUTY FONMIN MOHAMMED MAS'UD DREW ME ASIDE TO SPEAK WITH PRINCE SULTAN MODA. MAS'UD WAS TRYING TO CRYSTALLIZE SULTAN'S PLANS TO VISIT U.S. HE INDICATED FAYSAL VISIT CAIRO WOULD "APPARENTLY" NOW TAKE PLACE IN AUGUST. SULTAN, HOWEVER, STEERED DISCUSSION AT ONCE INTO OTHER RPT OTHER CHANNELS. DURING FOUR HOUR SESSION WHICH ENSUED ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY, SULTAN SOLICITED MY PERSONAL VIEWS REGARDING OUTLOOK IN YEMEN AND WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. AS HE HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE AND SEEMED OPEN-MINDED I MADE POINTS SUMMARIZED BELOW:

NAVY

AIR

NIC

RMR

1. NEW GOVT YAR PRIVATELY DISASSOCIATING SELF FROM NASIR'S ANTI-BRITISH LINE AND SHOWING OTHER SIGNS INDEPENDENCE. SALLAL NOT LIKED EVEN BY NASIR. ON ROYALIST SIDE I WOULD NOT BE TELLING SULTAN ANYTHING NEW IF I WERE TO POINT OUT THAT BY NO MEANS ALL ROYALISTS WERE LOYAL TO AL BADR. WHEN ONE MADE COMPARISON REMARKS THESE ROYAL-

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By isl, NARA, Date 11-13-06

119  
124



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1057, MAY 12, 6 PM, FROM JIDDA (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ISTS WITH COMMENTS MANY YAR LEADERS SAN'A AND NEW YORK PARALLELISM INCREASINGLY APPARENT. THIS RAISED NATURAL QUESTION WHY PARTIES SHOULD NOT GET TOGETHER AT SOME NEUTRAL SPOT FOR QUIET CONVERSATIONS. IN FACT A ROYALIST, WHOSE NAME I PREFERRED NOT MENTION, HAD PROPOSED TO ME PRIVATELY SOME TIME AGO THAT JUST SUCH MEETING TAKE PLACE ON NEUTRAL GROUND, CONCEIVABLY BEIRUT, PREPARATORY TO ASSEMBLY OF ALL PRINCIPAL YEMENI LEADERS AT POINT IN YEMEN WELL SEPARATED FROM EGYPTIAN TROOPS TO FORM BASES NEW GOVERNMENT, WITH UNDERSTANDING ALL INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING UAR AND SAG WOULD ACCEPT RESULTS IN ADVANCE. MEETING WOULD BE HELD UNDER UN MONITORSHIP AND PROTECTION FROM EGYPTIAN OR OTHER INTERFERENCE OR USE OF FORCE. ASSEMBLY MIGHT LAST FOR SOME TIME. IT NOTABLE THAT ROYALIST PROPOSAL DID NOT REQUIRE UAR TROOPS EVACUATE YEMEN PRIOR TO SUCH ASSEMBLY. (THIS OBVIOUSLY SURPRISED SULTAN.) LOCATION COULD BE ANYWHERE IN YEMEN. POSSIBILITY OF IBB RPT IBB HAD BEEN MENTIONED.

SPEAKING NOW ENTIRELY FOR MYSELF, NOT FOR US GOVT, I HAD SOME REFINEMENTS TO ADD TO THIS IDEA. UN TROOPS, IN NO GREAT NUMBER, MIGHT PHASE IN TO REPLACE, UNIT BY UNIT, THE LARGER EGYPTIAN FORCES WHICH WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY PHASE OUT WHILE ASSEMBLY TAKING PLACE. ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE WOULD BE THAT NOBODY SHOULD INSIST IN ADVANCE NEW GOVT RESULTING FROM ASSEMBLY BE LABELED "REPUBLIC" OR "IMAMATE". IT MIGHT BE CALLED "DOWLAT AL-YEMEN" ("STATE OF YEMEN") AS USED BY KUWAIT. GOVERNMENT WOULD RETAIN UN FORCE AFTER DEPARTURE UAR TROOPS ONLY AS LONG AS IT WISHED. PURPOSE OF UN FORCE WOULD BE TO PROTECT NEW STATE AGAINST OVERTHROW BY ANY TRIBAL OR OTHER ARMED UNITS. LIKELY ANTAGONISTS TO SUCH NEW REGIME WOULD BE (1) IMAM AND HIS ENTOURAGE WITH VERY GREAT SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS WHICH HAD BEEN SHIPPED TO THEM BY SAG BEFORE DISENGAGEMENT AND (2) ELEMENTS WITHIN YEMENI REPUBLIC ARMY WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO SEIZE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1057, MAY 12, 6 PM, FROM JIDDA (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

POWER DURING TRANSITION. NEW GOVT NEEDED HAVE PROTECTION AGAINST BOTH TYPES OF THREAT UNTIL ITS POSITION WELL CONSOLIDATED. THIS MIGHT MEAN UN FORCE MIGHT HAVE TO STAY AROUND AWHILE. I HAD REASON FEEL SPINELLI SYMPATHETIC FOREGOING IDEA. THERE WOULD BE COMPLETE AMNESTY UPON ESTABLISHMENT THIS NEW GOVT.

2. ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE SEEMED CLEARLY TO BE FAYSAL-NASIR MEETING WHICH NOT ONLY I BUT WASHINGTON GREATLY HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE VERY SOON. THIS COULD LAY GROUNDWORK IF BOTH PARTIES COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON ONE MATTER. BOTH WERE TIRED OF WAR IN YEMEN AND BOTH WERE PREPARED TO TELL RESPECTIVE YEMENI CLIENTS WAR WAS BAD FOR ARABS AND THEY MUST GET TOGETHER AND WORK OUT POLITICAL SOLUTION. ONLY BY SUCH DECISION WOULD YEMENIS CEASE COUNTING ON RESPECTIVE CHAMPIONS AND BEGIN TO THINK LESS IN TERMS OF VICTORY AND MORE IN TERMS OF TALKING PROBLEM OUT. THERE WAS PRECEDENT IN ARAB HISTORY FOR SUCH APPROACH. WHEN TRIBAL LEADERS SO BITTERLY HOSTILE THAT THEY COULD ONLY SHOOT AT EACH OTHER, DECISIONS HAD BEEN CONTRIVED THAT THESE LEADERS STAND ASIDE WHILE THOSE WHO HAD FOUGHT AND BLED UNDER THEM THEN CAME TOGETHER TO REACH END OF FIGHTING. IT OBVIOUS THAT AL BADR ON ONE HAND AND SALLAL ON OTHER COULD NEVER TALK ACROSS TABLE AND MUST BE LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT. SAME TRUE OF SOME OF THEIR IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGES, LIKE MEMBERS HAMID AL DIN AND FEW PEOPLE AROUND SALLAL, WHO LIKE HIM EVEN WANTED UNION YAR WITH EGYPT. AT THIS POINT SULTAN BROKE IN WRYLY TO SAY THAT HE COULD DEARLY WISH THAT YEMEN AND UAR MIGHT HAVE COMPLETE UNION, IMPLYING THAT THEY DESERVED EACH OTHER.

SULTAN ASKED HOW ONE COULD SELECT REPRESENTATIVE ROYALISTS TO ATTEND SUCH PRELIMINARY MEETING. I SAID THIS WAS PROBLEM IN WHICH SAUDIS MIGHT BE HELPFUL, BUT THERE CERTAINLY WERE ROYALISTS WHO FELT IT LESS IMPORTANT TO CARRY IMAM'S

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-4- 1057, MAY 12, 6 PM, FROM JIDDA (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

BANNER TO VICTORY THEN TO PATCH UP TORN AND BLEEDING YEMEN.  
SAME TRUE ON OTHER SIDE, WHERE DESIRE TO BE RID OF  
SALLAL AND GET EGYPTIAN TROOPS OUT WAS INCREASINGLY OBVIOUS.

HART

BAP

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

34  
Action

Control: 9728  
Rec'd: MAY 13, 1964  
8:51 AM

NEA  
Info

FROM: JIDDA

SS  
G

ACTION: SECSTATE 1057 PRIORITY  
USUN 242

SP  
L  
H  
SAL  
EUR  
IO  
PR

INFO: BAGHDAD 68  
CAIRO 340  
DHAHRAN 830  
LONDON 286  
TAIZ 267  
ADEN UNNUMBERED

119

124

AID  
P

DATE: MAY 12, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

USIA

NSC

EMBTel 1052

INR

CIA

FAYSAL-NASIR MEETING; SAUDIS REQUEST IDEAS RE YEMEN;

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

RMR

SULTAN THEN CRITICIZED SPINELLI FOR NOT HAVING TALKED WITH ROYALISTS, WHEREUPON I TOLD HIM SPINELLI HAD INDEED TALKED WITH SOME ROYALISTS. SULTAN THEN INSISTED SPINELLI SHOULD VISIT ROYALIST LEADERS WITHIN YEMEN. I RESPONDED THIS IMPOSSIBLE AS ONLY YAR SAT IN UN. SULTAN THEN SAID THAT LEAVING AL BADR AND SAYF AL ISLAN AL HASSAN ASIDE, WHAT WOULD BE POSITION OF YOUNG PRINCES OF HAMID AL DIN, WHO WESTERN-MINDED AND LEADING ROYALIST TROOPS IN BATTLE. SOME WERE MEN OF REAL TALENT, LEADERSHIP AND DRIVE. I REPLIED THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THEY WERE INDIVIDUALLY PREPARED ACCEPT PEACEFUL ROLE IN DEMOCRATIC DOWLAT AL YEMEN AND FIND THEIR OWN NICHE IN ITS SOCIETY OR WHETHER THEY INSISTED ON RESTORING HAMID AL DIN AS GOVERNING CLIQUE. LATTER WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE, NO MATTER WHAT "CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS" WERE PROMISED AND WOULD NEVER GET EGYPTIAN TROOPS OUT OF YEMEN. HE SEEMED TACITLY TO ACCEPT THIS. I POINTED OUT THAT FAYSAL-NASIR MEETING WOULD NOT REQUIRE EITHER PARTY TO TAKE POSITION OF DISAVOWING ANYONE, SUCH AS AL BADR ON ONE HAND OR SALLAL ON

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-2- 1057, MAY 12, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM JIDDA

OTHER. FAYSAL AND NASIR WOULD SIMPLY AGREE ELEMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES BELOW TOP LEVELS SHOULD MAKE CONTACT, I WOULD NOT THINK ROYALIST DELEGATION COULD INCLUDE MEMBERS HAMID AL DIN.

3. AS TO FUTURE OF DOWLAT AL YEMEN; ONCE ESTABLISHED AND WITH UAR TROOPS GONE, WHATEVER FORM IT TOOK WOULD BE NO ONE'S BUSINESS. IT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE LIKE IMAMATE OF OLD NOR PROBABLY LIKE REPUBLIC OF PRESENT.

4. AS FOR US GOVT POSITION, I COULD ASSURE HIM OF JUST ONE THING AND THAT MOST CATEGORICALLY: U.S. WAS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OPPOSED TO CONTINUATION THIS WAR IN YEMEN. MILITARY SITUATION IN NORTH WAS NOW REASONABLY QUIET. USG WANTED IT KEPT THAT WAY AND ANY RENEWED FLARE-UP OF MILITARY ACTIVITY WOULD FIND NO SYMPATHY WHATEVER IN THE UNITED STATES. WE WANTED END TO THIS FIGHTING JUST AS WE WANTED UAR TROOPS OUT. SULTAN SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS, BUT IN SILENCE. I BORE DOWN ON POINT USG WAS FULLY CONVINCED THERE COULD BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION YEMEN.

RETURNING TO MY PROPOSAL THAT FAYSAL AGREE WITH NASIR TO ENCOURAGE RESPECTIVE YEMENI CLIENTS TO MEET, SULTAN ENDEAVORED TO ARGUE THAT ONLY UAR WAS INVOLVED IN YEMEN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SAUDI AND UAR POSITIONS COULD NOT BE EQUATED. SAG WAS NOT INTERFERING OR INVOLVED IN YEMEN. I REPLIED THAT WHILE EXTENT SAUDI INVOLVEMENT NOT COMPARABLE IN SIZE AS THAT UAR, SAG NEVERTHELESS WAS NOT UNINVOLVED RPT UNINVOLVED. ROYALIST LEADERS WERE FREELY COMING AND GOING BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND NORTH YEMEN. I ASSUMED MONEY BEING GIVEN TO THEM. ONE WOUNDED LEADER HAD BEEN HOSPITALIZED AND RETURNED. "ENCOURAGEMENT" OF ROYALISTS BY SAG HAD BEEN TESTIFIED TO BY U THANT. NOW ARTICLE ONE OF BUNKER AGREEMENT OBLIGED SAG NOT TO ALLOW ROYALISTS TO USE COUNTRY AS BASE. ONE COULD THEREFORE ARGUE EFFECTIVELY THAT SAG WAS IN VIOLATION THIS ARTICLE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1057, MAY 12, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM JIDDA

SINCE SAG WAS THEREFORE INVOLVED IT HAD AN OBLIGATION:  
TO DO ITS PART TO ENCOURAGE ROYALISTS TO MEET  
REPUBLICANS AND FURTHER PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

5. MAS'UD ASKED HOW PROPOSAL FOR UN GUARDS COULD BE  
ARRANGED. WHAT WERE DETAILED MECHANICS MY PROPOSAL.  
I REPLIED THAT IF UAR AND SAG COULD AGREE, YAR COULD  
PROPOSE IT TO SYG BY LETTER. IF PROPOSAL WAS  
SUPPORTED BY THESE PARTIES AND BY LARGER POWERS IN SC RPT  
SC IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR USSR RPT USSR TO VETO.

AT END OF MEETING SULTAN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURSUING DIS-  
CUSSION AGAIN BEFORE HE LEFT JIDDA FOR RIYADH SOME DAYS HENCE.

COMMENTS:

1. I SUSPECT SULTAN WILL REPORT TO FAYSAL AND THAT  
HIS APPROACH TO ME RESULTED FROM RECENT DISCUSSION AMONG  
PRINCES AS PRINCE MIYSH'AL, AMIR OF MECCA, EARLIER SAME EVENING  
EXPRESSED WISH TO CALL ON ME IN NEAR FUTURE AT MY OFFICE.  
THIS IS UNUSUAL.

2. SULTAN'S AND MAS'UD'S ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT CONVER-  
SATION WAS INQUIRING RATHER THAN ARGUMENTATIVE. THEY  
APPEARED EAGER TO HAVE ME DEVELOP PRACTICAL MECHANICS OF  
MY PROPOSAL, WHICH I TRIED TO KEEP AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE,  
STRESSING THAT PARTIES SHOULD NOT ALLOW SELVES TO BE TRIPPED  
UP BY DETAILS, SEMANTICS AND SYMBOLS BUT KEEP EYE ON MAIN  
OBJECTIVE.

3. SELLING A POINT OF VIEW TO SULTAN DOES NOT MEAN  
SULTAN WILL SELL IT TO FAYSAL, EVEN IF HE LIKES IT.

4. DEPT MAY WISH SHARE RPT SHARE SUBSTANCE THIS REPORT  
WITH SAQQAF.

GP-3.

HART

HMR

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*11*

34  
Action

SS  
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

007057

1964 MAY 9 AM 10 33

EIB422A797EMB 319  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUDTLN 222C 09/1340Z  
R 091320Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

037

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT. 5575 INFO TAIZ 126  
ADEN 102 FROM LONDON MAY 9, 2 PM

LIMDIS

TAIZ 630

FULLY APPRECIATE GREAT EMBARRASSMENT CAUSED FOR CORTADA BY CUBBON'S UNFORTUNATE AND UNVERIFIED STATEMENT. BUT WE SHOULD VIEW IT FOR WHAT IT WAS, A REGRETTABLE BIT OF FOLLY DONE UNDER STRESS OF CONFLICT. RESPONSIBLE HMG CIRCLES ARE ACUTELY EMBARRASSED BY STATEMENT. PRIMIN HAS ALREADY APOLOGIZED TO COMMONS FOR IT, AND HAS STATED STEPS TAKEN TO CFN 5575 126 102 9 2 630

PAGE TWO RUDTLN 222C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PREVENT RECURRENCE. WHEN STATEMENT FIRST APPEARED, WE AT ONCE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO FONOFF RE HARMEFUL EFFECT IT COULD HAVE ON EMBASSY TAIZ'S RELATIONS WITH YAR. THIS FACT FULLY APPRECIATED HERE AND HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO ATTENTION UK MINISTERS.

NOTWITHSTANDING CUBBON'S ACTION, WE STRONGLY URGE THAT WE NOT CEASE REPRESENTING HMG IN YEMEN MERELY BECAUSE CUBBON MADE FOOLISH STATEMENT OR FAILED VERIFY FACTS. SUCH ACTION WOULD SCARCELY BE FRIENDLY ACT BETWEEN TWO CHIEF ALLIES AND BY THUS FURTHER UNDERSCORING UK/US DIFFERENCES RE SOUTHWEST ARABIA, IT WILL SERVE NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS. IN PRESENT ATAVISTIC MOOD IN SOME QUARTERS HERE, IT WOULD LEND CREDENCE TO BELIEF THAT US IS BASICALLY UNFRIENDLY TO BRIT INTERESTS IN ADEN AND THAT BRITS HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO GO IT ALONE. OUR CAPABILITY COUNSEL MODERATION WOULD BE APPRECIABLY DIMINISHED. QUITE FRANKLY, AT THE MOMENT OUR FRIENDS IN FONOFF WHO FAVOR AND COUNSEL MODERATION NEED ALL THE HELP THEY CAN GET TO PREVENT HMG FROM OVER-REACTING. THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT BE HELPED BY OUR DISENGAGING FROM CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 06-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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By 201, NARA, Date 11-13-06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 5575, MAY 9, 2 PM: FROM LONDON

WE WOULD HOPE THAT EXCELLENT RAPPORT WHICH CORTADA SO  
VFN UK/US RE

PAGE THREE RUDTLN 222C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OBVIOUSLY HAS WITH YAR OFFICIALS WILL HELP IN SURMOUNTING  
PROBLEMS CREATED IN YAR BY CUBBON'S STATEMENT. IF IT WERE  
OF ANY USE, SEE NO REASON WHY CORTADA SHOULD NOT IDENTIFY  
FEDERAL GUARD POST AT THUMAIR AS SOURCE OF REPORT. WOULD  
ALSO HOPE THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION BY DEPT IN PUBLICIZING  
DENIAL, AND OUR OWN EFFORTS TO DISSEMINATE DENIAL HERE,  
MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN PERSUADING YAR THAT US OFFICIALS HAD  
NO HAND IN CUBBON REPORT. WE HERE WILL CONTINUE PRESS  
BRITS NOT TO OVER-REACT, AND WILL ALSO KEEP THEM ALIVE TO  
NEED TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POSSIBLE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON US RELATIONS  
WITH YAR IN ELECTING SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION TO COPE WITH  
FRONTIER INCIDENTS AND SUBVERSION IN SAF.

WITH ALL OF THIS SAID, FACT REMAINS THAT BOTH SIDES IN  
WRETCHED SOUTHWEST ARABIAN CONFRONTATION SHARE HEAVY BLAME  
FOR PRESENT SITUATION. THOUGHT OCCURS TO US THAT GREATEST  
COUP WITH YAR MIGHT SCORE AT THIS MOMENT WOULD BE IF IT  
COULD PERSUADE ITS RADFANI FRIENDS TO PRODUCE AT LEAST BODIES  
OF TWO MISSING BRITONS, HOPEFULLY UNMUTILATED. AS LONG  
AS THESE BODIES ARE STILL MISSING, SPECTER OF DECAPITATION  
REMAINS AND EVEN PARLIAMENTARY OPPONENTS OF PRESENT BRIT  
CFN YAR SAF

PAGE FOUR RUDTLN 222C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
POLICY IN SOUTHWEST ARABIA ARE RELUCTANT CALL FOR RADICAL  
REVISION HMG'S PRESENT MILITARY ACTION IN SAF/YAR FRONTIER  
AREA. PRESSURES FOR CHANGE IN POLICY CAN BEST BE BROUGHT INTO  
PLAY BY SOME TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION INVALIDITY CURRENT HMG  
ESTIMATE OF THREAT TO SAF AND OF ALLEGED YAR HOSTILITY TO  
BRITS IN ADEN.

GP-3. O'SHAUGHNESSY  
BT  
CFN SAF/YAR HMG GP-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

S/S-6761

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1964

 1. ~~Komer~~  
 2. Ret

12

 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
 THE WHITE HOUSE

 Subject: Rising Tensions among Officials in Aden  
 and Latest Report on European Mercenaries  
 Fighting with Yemeni "Royalists"

Our Consul at Aden reports that local conservative Arab leaders, as well as British colonial officials, have been rudely awakened by the revelation that they stand isolated and insulated from the currents of world opinion. The recent Security Council vote following the British attack on Harib and the recent resolution of the anti-colonialist Committee of 24 have been contributing factors. This, added to an almost pathological fear of infiltration from Yemen, has brought on what our Consul characterizes as "local jitters". The trouble is that rather than inducing the British officials to accommodate themselves increasingly to the forces of change at work in South Arabia, there has been an intensification of their garrison mentality. A demand for immediate independence by two of the leading Shaikhs, whose territory borders Yemen, derives purely from a desire for more drastic retaliatory action across the border. Since it is not clear how the removal of the British colonial umbrella would enable them to perform such action with impunity, it is probable that their demand for independence is designed as a stratagem to get the British to take more drastic retaliatory action.

Our Consul believes that U.K. policy in South Arabia has been one of "temporizing and muddling through". He notes that nothing has been done to seek to reconcile opposing factions inside the South Arabian Federation and that former plans for "constitutional advance" for Aden have been shelved. In our Consul's view the best way for the British to preserve their base in Aden is to accelerate the process of "constitutional advance" leading to self-government.

Meanwhile,

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-91

By nl, NARA, Date 10-27-06

GROUP 3

 Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
 not automatically declassified.
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MAY 11 1964

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Meanwhile, a principal reason for the intensification of pressures on the British position in Aden is illustrated by a report just received from Cairo. It states that U.A.R. intelligence has documentary evidence that the number of European mercenaries recruited and organized by a British reserve officer for service with the Yemeni "royalists" is now forty-two.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

13

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Control: 6226  
Rec'd: May 8, 1964  
1:47 p.m.

FROM: **Cairo**  
  
ACTION: **Secstate 2631**  
  
INFO: **London 159**  
**Taiz 206**  
  
DATE: **May 8, Midnight.**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
*Authority* FRUS Vol. XX1, #336  
*By* g *NAHA, Date* 3-1-05

**Reference:** Department Circular telegram 1990.

I had intended devoting major part of upcoming interview with Nasser to situation in Yemen and Aden, with statement of US position as set forth in reference telegram. Shortly before appointment finally set Departmental instructions received concerning another topic whose importance seemed overriding. I therefore elected to deal extensively with second topic (which could only be presented to President) and leave Yemen-Aden for discussion with FONMIN Mahmoud Riad, who has followed question closely while Delegate to UN.

President Nasser received me 1930 May 7. After completing major presentation I stated that I had intended to discuss Yemen with him and set forth USA position, but now proposed to do this with FONMIN Riad. President Nasser said that this would be a good move since Riad thoroughly conversant with matter and he was trying to make FONMIN effective center for Ambassadorial representation. I noted that Riad would doubtless be busy during Khrushchev visit but that I needed to see him during coming week, the earlier the better. President Nasser responded that his FONMIN "would not be very busy with Khrushchev" and indicated that he would see to it that Riad would be available. The President then briefly and on his own initiative made the following remarks on the Yemen-Aden situation.

/1. Major

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-2- 2631, May 8, Midnight. From Cairo.

1. Major purpose of President's Yemen trip was to set forward urgently needed reorganization of YAR Government. As he had told me many times in past, YAR Government has been "hopeless", beset with inexperience, inefficiency, personal rivalry, and tribal differences. Sallal has lost much support although he is a "good but sick man". When Nasser went to Yemen he requested Sallal to take with him Yemen expatriates in UAR such as Jaifi and Noman, who, while critical of Sallal, might provide a center of popular support. While in Yemen Nasser produced a new constitution and government structure in discussion with Yemenis, this including Vice President's who, while under Sallal, were in fact to be effective administrators of government. He also arranged for popular assembly and overhaul of Political Bureau. When organization completed on paper, Yemenis requested five days for study and reaction but Nasser said that with something of an impish smile, "I gave them only 24 hours and they accepted it." President admitted that paper structure of government is useless without competent operators but believed that some progress toward more stable and popular government has been made.

2. President's attack in Yemen on British position was generated by the fact that UAR has "completely reliable and convincing evidence" of British arms, money and military support to Yemeni dissidents flowing across Southern border. President said, "because of this our men are being killed and I cannot accept this, hence my attack on the British".

3. In general, the present UK Government under Lord Home seems to have reverted to the Eden outlook. MacMillian honestly tried to make a fresh start, letting bygones be bygones. Ever since Ottawa speech it has been clear to UAR that Home's Government has turned its back on conciliatory MacMillan policy and is now acting in Eden mood.

4. Butler's deliberate publicity of UK request for cut in American aid particularly irritated Nasser. He said that UK /was publicly

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-3- 2631, May 8, Midnight. From: Cairo.

was publicly uttering threats against UAR and "if they can threaten, we can threaten also". This, he said was natural extension of "harsh" policy to which he would continue strongly to react.

I pointed out to the President that it appeared to me unrealistic to expect that a government so near election as the Home Government could take any effective steps altering major UK policy. Nasser admitted this was true but emphasized again that when attacked he would respond in kind.

The President then requested that I review entire situation with the FONMIN as suggested at opening of interviews.

Comment: It is interesting that Nasser chose to give me above details in light of my statement that I had not come to discuss Yemen-Aden and would make my presentation thereon to FONMIN. I assume President's evoking topic partly due to extended discussions I have had with him on this throughout past year but more particularly to defensive mood wishing to register directly with me his alleged objectives. It is interesting that when mentioning UK request for curtailment US aid he did not ask what the American reaction had been or what we intended to do. It seemed to me that his obvious assumption was that request had been fruitless.

President Nasser was obviously under the weather, looking gray and drawn and perspiring frequently. He said that ever since his return from Yemen he had been ill and was still taking heavy doses of antibiotics. On May 1 when he delivered his fighting speech against Britain he had some fever and felt particularly sick.

Gr-3.

BADEAU

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

42

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COMITE OF 24 - ADEN

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IRAQI PERMREP, ACTING IN ACCORDANCE DECISION ARAB GROUP MAY 6  
MADE STATEMENT MAY 7 IN COMITE 24 RECOMMENDING RENEWED COMITE  
CONSIDERATION ADEN QUESTION ON BASIS RECENT UK MILITARY ACTION  
IN RADFAN. COMITE AGREED MEET MORNING MAY 8 WHICH TIME IRAQI  
PERMREP SAID HE WOULD PRESENT RESO. TEXT OF WHICH REFTEL (USUN  
4027) HE CIRCULATED TO SOME COMITE MEMBERS. STATES HE DID NOT  
WISH REOPEN ENTIRE QUESTION ADEN RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY COMITE BUT  
WANTED TO FOCUS ON RECENT ACTIVITIES CLAIMING THAT THEY NOT  
AIMED AGAINST "INFILTRATORS FROM YAR" BUT AGAINST LOCAL  
TRIBESMEN AND THAT ACTION PROVED CONTINUATION ADEN BASE  
PREJUDICIAL TO PEACE.

CFN 4041 53 237 919 165 176 24 4027 6 7 24 8 4027

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 171 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UKREP SAID UK MIL MOVE NECESSITATED BY ACTIONS INSPIRED AND  
LED BY PERSONS FROM YAR AND UAR AND THAT IT WAS NOT MATTER FOR  
COMITE CONSIDERATION YAR CHARGE SUBMITTED LETTER ASKING TO  
PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSION AND TOLD MISOFF HE PLANNED BRIEF  
STATEMENT. STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT HE NOT INITIATOR  
OF ARAB GROUP ACTION ON ADEN, BUT SIMPLY GOING ALONG.

ASAF GROUP NOW SCHEDULED TO MEET AFTERNOON MAY 8 AND  
WILL CONSIDER ADEN QUESTION AT REQUEST  
ARAB GROUP. NOT YET CERTAIN  
ARABS WILL PROPOSE LETTER BY ASAFS TO SC PRES ASKING FOR SC  
MEETING. IF THEY DO, SAUDIS, ACCORDING TO SUGAIR, WILL NOT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-95

By *id* NARA, Date *10-26-06*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 4041, May 7, 10 p.m., from New York

SIGN IT, MAINTAINING STAND THEY TOOK DURING SC CONSIDERATION HARIB ATTACK WHEN THEY BLOCKED ARAB GROUP LETTER TO SC CONDEMNING HARIB ATTACK BY REFUSING SIGN.

COMMENT: COMITE 24 WHERE ONLY IRAQIS, TUNISIANS AND SYRIANS ONLY ARABS AND WHERE ANTI-COLONIAL MAJORITIES ARE EASY IS OBVIOUS PLACE TO START. AS FOR SC, ARABS, WHO HAVE BEEN SENSITIVE SINCE CAIRO MEETING ABOUT REVEALING SPLITS IN THEIR RANKS, MAY BE SEEKING ASAF MEETING IN ORDER 1) CALL ATTENTION WIDE GROUPING OF COUNTRIES TO UK ACTION; 2) ENSURE THAT ANY LETTER CALLING FOR SC MEETING WILL HAVE WIDE SUPPORT; 3) CAUSE ABSENCE OF SAUDIS FROM ANY REQUEST FOR SC MEETING TO BE LESS CONSPICUOUS.

CFN 8 24 1 2 3

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 171 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FOL POINTS SHOULD BEAR UPON US VOTE ON DRAFT RESO AND IN ANY US STATEMENT OR EXPLANATION OF VOTE:

1. RESO CLEARLY ONE-SIDED, IGNORING NATURE OF AREA AND EASE OF GUN-RUNNING AND SUBVERSION ON YAR-SAF BORDER. BELIEVE US SHOULD OPPOSE RESO RATHER THAN ABSTAIN. POSSIBLE THAT IF WE DO AND OUR POSITION KNOWN WELL IN ADVANCE, ITALY AND AUSTRALIA, AND POSSIBLY DENMARK WILL OPPOSE. OTHERWISE, THEY LIKELY ABSTAIN.
2. BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN EXPLAINING US VOTE, STATING THAT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS ONE OF INTERNAL LAW AND ORDER AND UK HAS CERTAIN RECOGNIZED RESPONSIBILITIES. WE WOULD ADD THAT PROBLEM CLEARLY CONNECTED WITH EXISTING TENSION IN AREA BETWEEN UK AND YAR BUT THAT SYG ALREADY SEIZED OF THIS ON BASIS APRIL 9 SC RESO. WE COULD EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE HIS EFFORTS ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES, OBSERVING THAT DZ OR OBSERVERS WOULD BE HELPFUL, AND IN THIS WAY PERHAPS HELP DETER SUBSEQUENT ARAB EFFORT BRING ISSUE TO SC.
3. WHEN INTRODUCING DRAFT RESO TODAY, PACHACHI (IRAQ) SAID THAT, AS USREP COULD VERIFY, UK GENERAL INCORRECT IN CLAIMING DECAPITATED BRITISH HEADS DISPLAYED IN TAIZ. AGAINST POSSIBILITY THIS STATEMENT AGAIN ADDRESSED US MORE DIRECTLY IN FORM QUESTION, WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER DEPT WISHES US RESPOND AND IF SO WHAT IT WISHES US SAY.

GP-4 PLIMPTON

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*15*

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RUQPS/AMEMBASSY TAIZ  
RUFKVU/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
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005363

1964 MAY 7 PM 5 58

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 4027 INFO LONDON 909 ADEN 52 TAIZ 164 CAIRO  
236 FROM USUN SEVENTH

SUBJECT: ADEN

FOL IS TEXT DRAFT RES FOR COMITE 24 BEING INFORMALLY CIRCULATED  
BY IRAQI PERM REP:

"RECALLING GA RES 1949 (XVIII) AND RES OF COMITE ADOPTED 9 APR  
64 ON QUESTION OF ADEN AND ADEN FEDERATION.

"CONSIDERING ARMED ACTION UNDERTAKEN RECENTLY BY UKG AGAINST  
PEOPLE OF TERRITORY IS INCONSISTENT WITH DECLARATION IN UNGA  
RES 1514.

"BELIEVING RECENT BRITISH MILITARY ACTIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN  
AREA HAVE ENDANGERED INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.  
CFN 4027 909 52 164 236 24 1949 (XVIII) 9 64 1514

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 152 UNCLAS

" CONDEMNS MILITARY ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY BRITISH AUTHORITIES  
IN ADEN AGAINST PEOPLE OF TERRITORY.

2. URGES UKG CEASE FORTHWITH ALL MILITARY MEASURES AGAINST  
PEOPLE OF TERRITORY IN CONFORMITY WITH PARA 4 OF DECLARATION IN  
UNGA RES 1514.

3. CALLS ATTENTION OF SC TO DANGEROUS SITUATION PREVAILING IN  
AREA AS RESULT OF RECENT BRITISH MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST PEOPLE  
OF TERRITORY."

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-2- 4027, MAY 7 FROM NEW YORK

FYI PARA 4 OF DECLARATION IN UNGA RES 1514 READS AS FOLLOWS:

"4. ALL ARMED ACTION OR REPRESSIVE MEASURES OF ALL KINDS DIRECTED AGAINST DEPENDENT PEOPLES SHALL CEASE IN ORDER TO ENABLE THEM TO EXERCISE PEACEFULLY AND FREELY THEIR RIGHT COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE, AND INTEGRITY OF THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY SHALL BE RESPECTED."

PLIMPTON

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

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ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK 2879

INFO: Amembassy, LONDON 7292

" TAIZ 700

" CAIRO 5198

" JIDDA 704

Amconsul, ADEN 176

Nov 7 7 21 PM '64

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE OF 24: ADEN.

USUN requested to vote against Iraqi draft res on Aden if it is tabled in Committee 24. This consistent with earlier US votes on resolutions referred to in draft. We do not believe we need make any statement during debate or give any explanation of vote.

Re Taiz 626 to Dept (rpt 162 to USUN) you may give UK Del complete briefing on Yemeni attitude toward Aden question, but without indicating Spinelli as source this info.

END

RUSK

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By gje, NARA, Date 2-7-06

Drafted by:

IO: UNP: SJCampbell: NMB 5/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

IO - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances:

UNP - Mr. Buffum  
NE - Mr. Seelye  
(in substance)

UNP - Mr. Hennes  
BNA - Mr. Judd  
(in substance)  
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NEA - Mr. Talbot  
(in substance)

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Yemen

MAY 7 9 08 PM '64

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-436

NARA. Date 3-31-92

AmConsul DHAHRAN 398

By ing NARA. Date 3-31-92

We are somewhat concerned at possibility that as aftermath Nasser's

speeches Yemen Faisal may be tempted jeopardize his detente with UAR by resuming

aid to royalists or at very least by allowing Saudi Arabia be used as channel

for possible future British aid to royalists. Accordingly, suggest at your

discretion you make following points ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ with Faisal at appropriate

opportunity.

1. Since concern for security of Saudi Arabia was fundamental reason

US became involved in advancing disengagement agreement Yemen, we particularly

pleased that SAG renewed support for UNYOM and continues to eschew sending

aid to royalists. Full availability SAG resources for sustaining progress of

development and reform program is doubtless best investment for security of

country against subversive attacks.

2. In view increasing friction on Yemen's southern border and treatment

of that conflict in much of Arabic press and radio as part of Arab liberation

movement, security concerns Saudi Arabia would seem particularly served by

continuing scrupulously avoid any implication involvement (i.e., assistance to

NEA:NE:GCMoore:cfh:5-7-64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: **N**

NEA:NE - Rodger P. Davies

BNA - Mr. Judd

UNP - Mr. Campbell (substance)

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO**

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royalists) which would doubtless be interpreted in Arab world in fashion detrimental to Saudi regime.

3. We understand that recent governmental changes in Yemen may bring into office persons who command wider Yemeni support, including perhaps ~~XXXX~~ northern tribes. We hope Faisal will encourage royalists to keep open mind to possibilities of compromise with republicans.

4. Renewal SAG-UAR relations has opened way for more stable and fruitful development in area; would be shape if momentum this direction gained at time Amer, Sadat visit Riyadh were allowed lapse. We realize that events connected Nasser's trip Yemen may have discouraged Faisal from making contemplated journey Cairo. However, our own dealings with Nasser may have relevant parallel: while we frequently have not agreed with UAR policies and actions, we have ~~AM~~ found it of continued benefit to maintain dialogue with Nasser, leaving avenue open to explore areas of mutual interest.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen**18*

58

~~SECRET~~

Action

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQSJD/AMEMBASSY JIDDA ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

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ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 1964 MAY 6 PM 4 52 030

Info

RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK

NJ 91-436

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By

NARA, Date 3-31-92

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JIDDA 155 CAIRO 171 USUN 600 FROM LONDON MAY 6, 7 PM

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1. EMBOFF TODAY DISCUSSED SUBJECT REFTEL WITH BRENCHLEY OF FONOFF. FIRST OUTLINED TO HIM JERNEGAN REPRESENTATION TO KAMEL REPORTED DEPCIRTEL 2022. (FONOFF ALREADY HAD REPORT FROM UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON.) THEN SUMMARIZED AT LENGTH CAIRO'S 2585. AND PARTS OF CAIRO'S 2586. FINALLY, TOLD BRENCHLEY OF PROPOSED NEW US DEMARCHE TO NASSER RE IMPORTANCE OF ADEN TO US-UK INTERESTS AND URGING HIM TO END DRUM-BEATING RE BRIT POSITION THERE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, EMBOFF STRESSED GREAT IMPORTANCE OF HMG NOT OVER-REACTING AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE TO NASSER'S SPEECHES AND OTHER ACTIONS. INSTEAD, A COOL AND MEASURED RESPONSE CLEARLY OFFERED BEST PROSPECT DEFUSING PRESENT VOLATILE SITUATION. ALSO STRONGLY URGED THAT BRITS TAKE UP MATTER DIRECTLY WITH HIGHEST UAR AUTHORITIES.

2. AFTER HEARING US OUT, BRENCHLEY EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR DEPT'S DEMARCHE TO KAMEL WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MOST HELPFUL. HE WAS ALSO GRATEFUL FOR NEW DEMARCHE CAIRO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH MUCH OF ANALYSIS ADUMBRATED CAIRO'S 2585, ALTHOUGH CONCLUSIONS HE DREW FROM SITUATION PERHAPS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THOSE DRAWN BY CAIRO. HMG, HE INSISTED, IS NOT OVER-REACTING TO NASSER'S SPEECHES. SOME OF THESE SPEECHES HAVE INDEED EXERCISED PARLIAMENT AND SOME ELEMENTS OF BRIT PRESS. HMG'S ACTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ARABIA, HOWEVER, ARE DIRECT RESULT OF MAGNITUDE OF UAR/YAR-INSPIRED SUBVERSIVE THREAT IN SAF. THIS IS WHAT PROMPTED MILITARY OPERATION NOW BEING PURSUED IN RADFAN. HE HOPED MR BUTLER HAD MADE CLEAR EXTENT OF SUBVERSIVE THREAT, RATHER THAN NASSER SPEECHES, IS GOVERNING BRIT REACTION TO UAR PROVOCATION.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH RADFAN OPERATION, BRENCHLEY ACKNOWLEDGED IT IS PROVING HARD GOING. ADEN-DHALA ROAD HAS BEEN OPENED, BUT RADFANI REBELS HAVE TAKEN TO HILLS. GOC, MIDDLE EAST FORCES, IS DAILY REVISING UPWARD HIS ESTIMATE OF TROOP REQUIREMENTS. BRIT AIM IS SECURE AREA UP TO DHALA. UNLIKE PREVIOUS SKIRMISHES WITH RADFANIS, THEY HAVE NOW

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-2- 5522, MAY 6, 7 PM, FROM LONDON (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

APPEARED EQUIPPED, UNIFORMED AND LED BY WHAT ARE OBVIOUSLY TRAINED OFFICERS ON A SCALE NOT BEFORE ENCOUNTERED. MOREOVER, DANGER OF ERUPTION OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS ELSEWHERE IN SAF AS A RESULT OF UAR SUBVERSION IS RATED HIGH. HMG MUST BE GUIDED BY BEST ESTIMATES ITS MILITARY COMMANDERS IN DETERMINING TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO ADEN. BRENCHLEY ASKED IF AMCONSUL ADEN IS NOT REPORTING EXTENT OF SUBVERSIVE THREAT. WE SAID HAD SEEN NO SUCH REPORT FROM HIM. (DOES DEPT WISH US USE WHEELLOCK'S ESTIMATE THAT SUBVERSIVE THREAT LESS THAN BRITS CLAIM?)

4. BRENCHLEY CONTINUED UK AMBASSADOR BEELEY HAS ALREADY BEEN INSTRUCTED ASK FOR APPOINTMENT WITH NASSER, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE FRIDAY. HE WAS NOT SURE BEELEY WILL GET IT. BUT IF HE DOES, HE IS TO SPEAK TO NASSER ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

AS PRIMIN TOLD COMMONS RECENTLY, HMG HAS NO WISH TO QUARREL WITH EITHER YAR OR UAR (EMBASSY A-2858). HOWEVER, IT IS DETERMINED TO DEFEND ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. HMG IS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND UAR ATTACKS ON BRIT POSITIONS IN CYPRUS, ADEN AND LIBYA. AS FAR AS ADEN IS CONCERNED, HMG IS WELL INFORMED OF DEGREE OF UAR INVOLVEMENT IN ENCOURAGING DISSIDENCE IN SAF. IT AWARE GENERAL MORTAGHI PERSONALLY STIMULATED MUCH OF THIS SINCE HE ASSUMED COMMAND. UAR HAS ALLOCATED THOUSAND OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, MINES AND AMMUNITION FOR SUBVERSION IN SAF. UAR HAS SUPPLIED SOPHISTICATED RADIO EQUIPMENT TO ALLOW CONTROL OF REBEL OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION TO RADFAN, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF UAR ENCOURAGEMENT OF REBEL ACTIVITIES IN HAUSHABI, YAFI, AULAQI, DATHINA, AND ELSEWHERE. UK HAS RECOVERED QUANTITIES OF SUCH SUBVERSIVE EQUIPMENT. UAR/YAR RADIO BROADCASTS APPEALS TO SAF TRIBESMEN TO COME TO YAR FOR MONEY TO CARRY ON DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES. UAR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN TAIZ, BAIDHA, AND QATABA TO COORDINATE AND DIRECT THESE ACTIVITIES. UK HAS NAMES OF THESE OFFICERS AND OF SAF DISSIDENT LEADERS WITH WHOM THEY HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH.

NEVERTHELESS, HMG REMAINS READY REDUCE TENSIONS ON BASIS SC RESOLUTION. IT FAVORS DEMILITARIZED ZONE OR DELIMITATION, BUT THIS OF NO VALUE UNLESS NASSER CALLS OFF SUBVERSION. FAILING THIS, UK WILL BE COMPELLED DEFEND ITSELF.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 5522, MAY 6, 7 PM, FROM LONDON (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

BEELEY IS ALSO TO TELL NASSER THAT CONTRARY HAIKAL'S PRESS ASSERTIONS, UK IS NOT AIDING YEMENI ROYALISTS. BRITONS THERE HAVE GONE IN PRIVATE CAPACITY. NOR DID BUTLER URGE US CUT OFF AID TO UAR. HE MERELY CAUTIONED US THAT IF NASSER PERSISTS ALONG PRESENT COURSE, AN EXPLOSION IN MIDDLE EAST IS INEVITABLE. (SIC)

5. BRENCHLEY WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT NASSER WOULD ORDER HALT TO SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN IN SAF. HENCE, HMG HAS TO PREPARE TO MEET IT. IT IS PLANNING COUNTER-SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN OF ITS OWN IN BAIDHA AND QATABA WHERE ANTI-EGYPTIAN SENTIMENT IS BELIEVED TO BE RAMPANT. HE THOUGHT BRITS HAD REASONABLE CHANCE TO DISRUPT UAR SUBVERSIVE BASES IN THESE TWO AREAS. WE POINTED OUT SUCH COURSE WILL MERELY ESCALATE AREA TENSIONS. WE NOTED GILES RECENT SUNDAY TIMES ARTICLE SUGGESTING THAT

OSHAUGHNESSY.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

58  
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NNNNEIB276DTA446  
PP RUEHCR RUEHDT  
DE RUDTLN 152C 061832Z  
P R 061758Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQSJD/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK  
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1967 MAY 6 PM 4 53

031

~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 5522 INFO ROUTINE  
JIDDA 155 CAIRO 171 USUN 600 FROM LONDON MAY 6, 7 PM

DEPCIRTEL 2064

PRESENT UAR/YAR SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN SCARCELY SUFFICIENTLY  
POTENT TO OUST BRITS FROM ADEN. BRENCHLEY CLAIMED EXPERTS  
ARGUE SITUATION MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN GILES OR LIKE-MINDED  
CRITICS OF BRIT POLICY REALIZE.

6. WE ALSO ASKED BRENCHLEY FOR CLARIFICATION BRIT POSITION  
RE AID TO YEMENI ROYALISTS. BRENCHLEY THOUGHT THIS WAS  
PERHAPS NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON. UK MINISTERS,  
IN WAKE OF NASSER'S SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN, HAD DECIDED THEY  
WILL NOT ALLOW YEMENI ROYALISTS TO LOSE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN  
FONOFF BELIEVE YEMENI ROYALISTS LIKELY TO WIN. NOR DOES  
IT PRECLUDE YEMEN COALITION GOVERNMENT. AT THE MOMENT,  
BRENCHLEY THOUGHT THERE WERE NO SIGNS THAT YEMENI ROYALISTS  
ARE LOSING. HENCE, NO BRIT AID IS NECESSARY. BRENCHLEY  
STRONGLY DENIED SUGGESTION THAT BRITS HAVE BEEN FINANCING  
YEMENI ROYALISTS. HE SAID IF THIS IMPRESSION PREVAILS IN  
WASHINGTON AS RESULT RECENT TALKS, IT WILL HAVE TO BE CORRECTED.

IN THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED THAT BOTH AHMED AL-SHAMI  
AND SHAIKH HAFIZ WAHBA HAD CALLED ON HIM AND CRAWFORD  
RESPECTIVELY FEW DAYS AGO TO URGE THAT HMG OPENLY  
DECLARE FOR YEMENI ROYALISTS. WAHBA HAD SPOKEN OF FAISAL'S  
CARRYING BURDEN ALONE UP TO NOW AND HAD URGED ACTIVE BRIT  
SUPPORT FOR YEMENI ROYALISTS. ACCORDING BRENCHLEY, BOTH  
REQUESTS DECLINED. IF, HOWEVER, YEMENI ROYALISTS SHOW SIGNS  
OF LOSING AT ANY TIME, BRITS WILL PROVIDE THEM WITH  
MONEY THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA IN ORDER TO PREVENT THIS. UP TO

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-2- 5522, MAY 6, 7 PM FROM LONDON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

NOW, HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN NO PERTINENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SAG, AND SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE HELD ONLY IF THERE IS DANGER OF YEMENI ROYALISTS LOSING.

7. WE REITERATED DEPT'S VIEWS AND AGAIN URGED STRONGLY THAT BRITS NOT OVER REACT. WE ASKED THAT US VIEW BE COMMUNICATED SOONEST TO UK MINISTERS. BRENCHLEY SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE DO SO. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IF US IS ASKING UK CHANGE ITS PRESENT POLICY, HE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS IN THE CARDS. HE DOUBTED THAT UK MINISTERS WOULD LOOK AT MATTER AGAIN UNTIL BUTLER RETURNS AND REPORTS PERSONALLY ON HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON.

GP-1. OSHAUGHNESSY

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*30  
Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~Control:  
Rec'd:1621  
May 4, 1964  
9:19 AM

FROM: Aden  
ACTION: Secstate 197 Priority  
INFO: Cairo 65  
Taiz 151  
London 93  
Jidda 60  
DATE: May 4, 10 AM

036

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *ing*, NARA, Date 3-31-92

LIMDIS

Reference: CONTEL 188 to Department (not sent Cairo or Jidda)

From Deputy High Commissioner Watts and Middle East Command sources it appears current stepped up British operations against Radfan dissidents reported Reuters and BBC represent all out effort crush dissidence this area.

British have added some 850 men from First East Anglican Regiment and 45 Royal Marine Commando to Second Battalion Federal Regular Army (about 2,000 men) previously engaged Radfan. British troops being replaced garrison duty Aden by 600 men Kings own Scottish Borderers arriving by air from UK at request Federation. Force has received permission and is using aircraft attack rebel positions. British have captured uniforms and equipment which have convinced them rebellion abetted and rebels trained Yemen. Also claim heads two British casualties being displayed Taiz on poles. Have clear impression one reason for use British troops is uncertainty over Federal Army stomach for continued tough fighting against Radfan Arab brothers.

This strong attack against dissidents apparently represents major London decision and use of aircraft against population Radfan represents reversal former policy (see reference telegram) which

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-2- 197, May 4, 10 AM, from Aden

should present Cairo with excellent material for current anti-British propaganda campaign.

Watts informs Sherif Beihan and friends have now withdrawn request for immediate independence Federation reported reference telegram leading Consulate believe speculation accurate that this request was mere play goad British take stronger action against dissidents.

Comment: Realize current gratuitous UAR anti-British campaign makes it difficult advise British slow down at present but cannot help believing current policy hate Yemen and get tough with natives will have ultimate effect speed forced British withdrawal South Arabia. Perhaps we should give current British tough tactics limited time achieve dramatic success Radfan then if tactics not quickly and obviously successful make serious effort influence British review whole South Arabian policy.

GP-3.

WHEELLOCK

AD

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

20

54

Action

NEA

Info

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHDT/US MISSION TO UN  
RUQSJD/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
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1964 MAY 2 AM 10 10

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *ij* NARA, Date 3-31-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 5454 INFO JIDDA 150  
TAIZ 118 CAIRO 164 USUN 588 FROM LONDON MAY 2, 1 PM

WHILE LUNCHING YESTERDAY WITH SAUDI AMBASSADOR, SHAIKH  
HAFIZ WAHBA, HE TOLD EMBOFF:

1. FAISAL HAS URGENTLY SUMMONED AHMAD AL-SHAMI AND PRINCE  
ABD AL-RAHMAN TO COME TO RIYADH. SHAMI PRESENTLY HERE AND  
PLANS EMPLANE FOR SAUDI ARABIA TODAY. ADB AL-RAHMAN IS  
IN PARIS, BUT HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF FAISAL'S WISH. WAHBA  
SPECULATED FAISAL'S PURPOSE IS TO OBTAIN THEIR ASSESSMENT  
OF EFFECT OF NASSER'S RECENT VISIT TO YEMEN ON ROYALIST  
CFN 5454 150 118 164 588 2 1 1.

PAGE TWO RUDTLN 054C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CAUSE AND TO OBTAIN CURRENT READING YEMENI ROYALIST LINE  
AND DEMANDS PRIOR ANY MEETING WITH NASSER.

2. FAISAL WILL AGREE EXTEND UNYOM FOR ANOTHER TWO MONTHS.  
SOME DETAILS HAVE YET TO BE WORKED OUT WITH UNSYG. SAUDI  
RATIONALE IN DOING SO IS THAT AT SMALL COST SAUDI ARABIA  
LOSES NOTHING, WHILE UAR BECOMES INCREASINGLY BOGGED DOWN  
IN YEMEN.

3. ON HEARING NEWS OF HAMUD AL-JAYFI'S INSTALLATION AS  
YAR PRIMIN, AHAMD AL-SHAMI HAD SPOKEN HIGHLY OF HIM.  
WAHBA OPINED JAYFI'S PRESENCE COULD CONCEIVABLY FACILITATE  
COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT IN YEMEN, BUT EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON  
HOW MUCH SCOPE NASSER ALLOWS HIM. WAHBA CLAIMED YEMENI  
ROYALISTS SHOW NO SIGNS OF GIVING WAY AND THAT FAISAL WILL  
NOT PRESSURE THEM TO SURRENDER.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 5454, MAY 2, 1 PM, FROM LONDON

4. IN VIEW WIDELY DIVERSE INTERPRETATIONS BUNKER AGREEMENT, WAHBA SUGGESTED DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER SENDING AMBASSADOR BUNKER TO AREA AGAIN TO CLARIFY HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT PARTIES AGREED UPON. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL MEANS PUTTING PRESSURE ON NASSER.

GP-3. O'SHAUGHNESSY

BT

CFN 2. UAR 3. NO 4. GP-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*21*

45  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 1379  
Rec'd: MAY 4, 1964  
12:04 AM

038

FROM: TAIZ

ACTION: SECSTATE 616 PRIORITY

INFO: CAIRO 305 PRIORITY  
JIDDA 212 PRIORITY  
LONDON 258 PRIORITY  
USUN 159 PRIORITY  
ADEN 245 PRIORITY  
DEPARTMENT ARMY 115

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-436  
By *418* NARA. Date *3-31-92*

DATE: MAY 2, NOON

DEPTAR FOR ACSI

LIMDIS

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 686, EMBASSY TELEGRAMS 600, 602, 605, 608.

ASSESSMENT NASSER VISIT YEMEN REQUIRES EXAMINATION PRIOR HIS ARRIVAL, WHICH MARKED BY TWO MAIN FEATURES:

1. SECURITY SITUATION BETTER THAN AT ALMOST ANY TIME SINCE REVOLUTION. TRIBAL SUPPORT FOR YAR AT ALL-TIME HIGH AND MILITARY INITIATIVE IN HANDS OF YAR-UAR FORCES. CONTRARY TO REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES OUTSIDE YEMEN, THERE NO EVIDENCE MORALE UAR TROOPS NEEDED SUBSTANTIAL BOLSTERING.
2. IN ABSENCE SALLAL AND AL AZRI, YAR POLIBURO, UNDER ZUBAIRI'S LEADERSHIP, HAD BECOME RESPECTED, COHESIVE BODY CLEARLY WORKING TO ISOLATE SALLAL AND LIMIT HIS POLITICAL AUTHORITY. POLITBURO OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY AND OFTEN DEMONSTRATED ITS UNWILLINGNESS ACCEPT UAR TUTELAGE. IT ALSO LET UAR KNOW IT NOT WILLING INVOLVE ITSELF IN UAR DESIGN UNDERTAKE ALL-OUT GAMPAIGN AGAINST SAF AND UK POSITION IN ADEN.

WE BELIEVE

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~~3~~ 616, MAY 2, NOON FROM TAIZ

WE BELIEVE NASSER'S TRIP AIMED AT CAPITALIZING ON THE FIRST FACTOR AND CORRECTING THE SECOND.

DESPITE DISLIKE FOR EGYPTIANS ON PART OF YAR NATIONALIST ELEMENTS WHICH HAS DEVELOPED DURING PAST YEAR, NASSER RECEIVED TUMULTUOUS RECEPTION AND HIS ARRIVAL WELCOMED BY ALL YEMENI REPUBLICAN GROUPS, PARTLY BECAUSE OF MYSTICAL ATTRACTION HE HAS FOR ARABS, PARTLY BECAUSE HE (OR SALLAL BEFORE HIM) RETURNED WITH AL JAIFI AND NUMAN WHICH GAVE RISE TO HOPES THEY WOULD TAKE UP EFFECTIVE POSTS IN A REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT. STRAINS OF DISILLUSIONMENT APPEARED AFTER FIRST SANAA SPEECH IN WHICH NASSER MADE PLEDGE DRIVE BRITISH FROM ADEN. WHILE YEMENIS EVERY BIT AS COVETOUS ABOUT "SOUTH" AS NASSER, RESPONSIBLE REPUBLICAN ELEMENTS REALIZE YAR REMAINS POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY A HOUSE OF CARDS AND CAMPAIGN AGAINST SAF ORIGINATING FROM YEMEN WOULD ONLY INVITE INTERRUPTION OF TRADE WITH ADEN AND COUNTER-SUBVERSION AGAINST YAR AND INCREASED AID TO ROYALISTS. IN BRIEF, ZUBAIRI AND HIS TYPE, PLUS THE SMALL EDUCATED CLASS AND MERCHANT GROUP, WISH TO GET ON WITH CONSOLIDATING THEIR REVOLUTION AND WANT NO PART OF NASSER'S PLANS TO SUBVERT ADEN. SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS BY NASSER AGAINST BRITISH ONLY COMPOUNDED YEMENIS' UNEASINESS.

WHILE EMBASSY HAS NOT YET LEARNED DETAILS OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED PROMULGATION NEW CONSTITUTION AND APPOINTMENT AL JAIFI AS PRIMIN AND NUMAN AS HEAD OF CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL, WE HAVE GOTTEN DISTINCT IMPRESSION NATIONALIST FACTION UNHAPPY THAT UNDER NEW SETUP SALLAL HAS MORE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER THAN BEFORE, SINCE HE CAN APPOINT AND DISMISS PRIMIN, MEMBERS CABINET AT WILL WHILE AT SAME TIME HE OCCUPIES POSITION CLEARLY MORE EXALTED THAN ZUBAIRI, AL IRYANI, SABRA AND OTHER RESPECTED NATIONALIST LEADERS WHO MAY WIND UP ISOLATED FROM EFFECTIVE POWER THROUGH MEMBERSHIP IN CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. IN SUMMARY, OPINION IN SANAA SEEMS TO BE THAT NASSER CAME TO YEMEN TO STRENGTHEN SALLAL'S HAND (AND CONSEQUENTLY HIS OWN) BUT SOLVED RESENTMENT BY BRINGING BACK AL JAIFI AND NUMAN. THERE LITTLE DOUBT NEW GOVERNMENT SETUP AND APPOINTMENTS NASSER CREATION SINCE OFFICER ON

MORTAGY'S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 616, MAY 2, NOON FROM TAIZ

MORTAGY'S STAFF TOLD EMBOFF WHO WOULD BE APPOINTED TO KEY POSITIONS EVEN BEFORE ISSUANCE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDED FOR CREATION THOSE POSITIONS.

ADMITTEDLY NEW CONSTITUTION ALLOWS SALLAL SWEEPING AUTHORITY BUT EFFECTIVENESS NEW GOVERNMENT SETUP WILL DEPEND ON JAIFI'S AND NUMAN'S WILLINGNESS ASSERT THEMSELVES. WHILE EXTREMELY POPULAR, BOTH ARE UNKNOWN QUANTITIES AND THERE SOME DOUBT JAIFI TOUGH ENOUGH TO STAND UP TO SALLAL AND EGYPTIANS. (NOTE: ABOUT ONE MONTH AGO, JAIFI TOLD YEMENI OFFICIAL WHO PASSED THROUGH CAIRO THAT HE NOT ANXIOUS RETURN YEMEN SINCE HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT HIS OWN ABILITIES AND HE WILL AWARE YEMENIS RESENTMENT OF AUTHORITY AND THEIR TENDENCY TURN AGAINST THEIR LEADERS.)

EMBASSY WILL HAVE CLEARER INDICATION WHETHER OR NOT JAIFI WILL HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION WHEN NEW CABINET AND OTHER NEW BODIES FORMED.

ONE OMINOUS RESULT NASSER VISIT IS ENTHUSIASM ON PART UAR OFFICERS TO GET ON WITH CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRITISH. JUDGING FROM CONVERSATIONS EMBOFF HAD THIS WEEK IN SANAA WITH MORTAGY'S AIDE DE CAMP AND HIS INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, UAR COMMAND WILLING TALK ABOUT LITTLE OTHER THAN PLANS TO DRIVE BRITISH OUT OF ADEN.

GP-3

CORTADA

JVC/23

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen*22

50-59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action  
NEAControl: 25501  
Rec'd: April 30, 1964  
4:20 p.m.Info  
SS  
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CIA  
NSA  
OSD  
NAVY  
AIR  
RMR

FROM: Taiz

ACTION: Secstate 605, Priority

INFO: Cairo 298  
Jidda 208  
Amman 13  
Beirut 66  
London 255  
DEPTAR 112  
USUN 155  
Aden 230

DATE: April 30, 4 p.m.

DEPTAR FOR ACSI

President Nasser departed YAR April 28. Joint communique issued containing standard line taken during Yemen trip. That is, pro-Arab unity, pro-Yemen heroic revolution and against imperialism particularly HMG and its base in Aden, Baathists in Syria.

Day Nasser left, YAR announced permanent constitution containing 154 articles. This constitution replaces two previous temporary constitutions. Complete text not available owing slow communications. Yemen media also announced that Sallal has asked Hamoud Jaihi to form new cabinet. As Department will recall, Jaihi YAR Ambassador to Cairo has been out of country most of time since revolution. Jaihi widely regarded as one of most competent Yemenis in government. There have been reports Jaihi does not get along with Sallal, however, we reluctant speculate this situation until more information available and until Jaihi names new cabinet. Mohammed Ahmad Noman (YAR Ambassador to Arab League) reportedly will be Foreign Minister.

Embassy will report further when complete text constitution, names new government available.

Comment:

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 2-6-06~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 605, April 30, 4 p.m. from Taiz

Comment: Return of Jaihi and Noman to Sanaa Government represents coalition of republican elements. Quite possibly this may prove first real step towards establishment responsible YAR government which could in time allow for withdrawal UAR troops. Sallal apparently slated for figurehead position probably living abroad.

GP-4.

CORTADA

TBT/19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



1. ~~Mr. Kanner~~

2. Return to Bromley Smith

23

*Y. J. Smith*

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Romer*  
*W/d* *230*

**B**  
Action  
**SS**  
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 24471  
Rec'd: April 29, 1964  
8:54 p.m.

FROM: New York

ACTION: Secstate 3920 Priority

INFO: London 872 Priority  
Jidda 170  
Cairo 230

DATE: April 29, 8 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-436  
By WJG NARA, Date 4-1-92

EXDIS

Subject: Yemen-Aden

Reference: Department Telegram 2784 and USUN 3903

Re Department telegram, USUN believes that main effort at present time at UN on Yemen-Aden situation should be pursuit of efforts through SYG, under paragraph 5 of April 9 UNSC resolution. Prerequisites of any successful effort use SC check UAR-YAR trouble making in SAF would have to be:

1. Failure of YAR-UK negotiations stemming from continued UAR-YAR refusal of reasonable UK proposals; (2) Absence any attacks from SAF territory on YAR territory, in spite continued incidents provoked from YAR. These necessary to counter balance natural disadvantage UK has in broaching problem in colonial category to SC.

Crawford (UK) told Mission Officer April 29 that YAR "counter proposals" (reference telegram) to UK through SYG on border were not actually counter proposals in formal sense but simply their reaction to UK proposals of DXS and observers. Reaction was that DXS and observers all right if on SAF side only, but this not yet in form of formal reply and UK still pressing SYG have Spinelli obtain this.

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APR 30 1964



~~SECRET~~

-2- 3920, April 29, 8 p.m. From New York

obtain this. Judging by Geghman reaction (reference telegram) formal YAR proposal accepting any observers not likely. UKUN appears aware that any agreed presence of UN observers even on SAF side alone might have some advantage for UK.

Comment: Believe we should encourage UK to continuing pressing YAR through SYG-Spinelli channel with view to obtaining any measures to stabilize frontier or, failing that, improved case to put before SC when needed, and see no reason why we should not also take issue up with SYG in effort to give problem greater emphasis on his part.

GP-3

STEVENSON

RG/17

~~SECRET~~

NEA-5

60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 2 ADEN

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RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
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48	1	
L	513	AID
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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A-195

~~SECRET~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1964 MAY 4 AM 8 04

INFO : LONDON, TAIZ

EM/AN-Francy-1

COPY NO. 112

SERIES B

This document consists of 4 pages  
ANALYSIS SUBMISSION 4 copies, Series A  
BRANCH

FROM : Amconsulate ADEN

DATE: April 27, 1964

SUBJECT: Politico-Economic Assessment (See Page 3 for Policy Recommendations)

REF : CERP C.1, CA-5084, CA-10108

British policy in Aden and the Federation of South Arabia is based on the proposition that the more or less indefinite retention of the Aden military base is vital to British interests in the Middle East. With a view to achieving this end the British have for some years past been groping toward some form of pro-British self-government and eventual independence for the Federation.

The key phrase in the above proposition is pro-British, and therein lies the fatal dilemma in British South Arabian policy. In order to assure that the new Federation is sufficiently well disposed toward British to tolerate the base more or less indefinitely, the British thus far have been extremely timid about relinquishing their control over both Federation and Adeni political institutions, and have tended to rely almost exclusively on the support of a number of semi-feudal sheikhs and more or less hand-picked political leaders of a conservative stripe.

In the politically conscious city-state of Aden they have had to resort to some very fancy political juggling and thus far fairly gentlemanly political repression to keep rampant Arab nationalism swept under the carpet.

The emergence of the Yemen-Arab Republic has dramatized and complicated the position of the British in South Arabia. It emphasizes the anachronistic nature of a British base supported by a still feudal Federation of princes and poses the real possibility of subversion to this Federation.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By ad, NARA, Date 11-13-06

~~SECRET~~

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

PO:JTWheelock/vt 4/25/64

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 4 pages. Number of copies, Serial



During the past year the British have failed to deal effectively with any of the three basic problems facing them in South Arabia, i.e. (a) coming to terms with the YAR, (b) evolving a satisfactory relationship between Aden and remainder of the Federation, and (c) pushing the Federation toward the 20th century and independence.

Our policy with respect to South Arabia to put it baldly seems to be one of acceptance of the British thesis that the Aden military base is sacrosanct, plus a somewhat nervous prayer that the British know what they are doing in their political arrangements in Aden and the Federation.

To deal honestly with British (and American) policy in Aden we must go straight to the fundamental question of the sacrosanctness of the military base here.

The hard truth is that the political cost, both internal and external, of maintaining the Aden base is going up rapidly.

In early April of this year we and the British felt obliged to abstain in the Security Council on a resolution of moderate censure of the British for a retaliatory air raid at Harib in the Yemen. Regardless of the provocations involved and the real merits of the case we were in complete isolation in our Security Council votes.

Internally the British have felt compelled to maintain a state of emergency in the Federation since a bomb attempt on the High Commissioner last December. Fifty-odd opposition leaders were kept in confinement under this decree for two months after the bombing although no evidence has ever been produced linking these leaders with the incident.

Since January of this year about half of the Federal Regular Army has been trying to put down, thus far without success, dissidence in the Radfan area of the Dhala Emirate. The High Commissioner is convinced that UAR-YAR inspired efforts at infiltration and subversion of the Federation including violence in Aden are currently being intensified. During the past two months an unexploded artillery shell was found near the house of an Adeni Minister, a grenade exploded in the house of a member of the Aden LEGCO and a second grenade injured 14 not far from the house of the Federal Minister of Finance.

Regarding Constitutional problems, no significant advance has taken place with respect to the Federation's status during the past year, although there are increasing signs that even the more conservative Sultans are anxious for faster progress. The U.K. Government is still dragging its feet on a Federation request for a modest increase in the rate of capital investment for development purposes. Difficulty still exists between Aden State and the Federation as to Aden's proper role in the Federation. This difficulty was dramatically brought out by the detention by Federal authorities of the Adeni union leadership and some other Aden opposition politicians after the December bombing at Aden Airport. For a time all political factions in Aden were united in demanding the release of these detainees,

and the revision of the Federal Constitution to give Aden complete control over its own internal security. At this writing Adeni and Federal leaders are still at odds over a number of issues including this one.

Finally there is the still unresolved question of whether the well-organized and popular Adeni labor union movement will be brought into the arena of legitimate organized Adeni political life or whether it will continue to refuse to play the political game, organized as it is under British rules which hardly favor the union group.

After two postponements, an Aden LEGCO election has once again been scheduled for the fall of this year on the basis of a new but still highly restrictive franchise which in effect limits the vote to Adeni born males. It is believed that only some 12,000 to 15,000 out of a population of some 250,000 will be eligible to vote in this election. Union leaders have been enigmatic to date as to whether they will participate. If they do not, it must be assumed that they have alternate plans for the disruption of Aden political life, if not for outright acts of violence.

The tie between the ATUC-PSP leaders and possible UAR-YAR infiltration plans is not very clear to the Consulate. The British tend to assume that such links are strong and joint planning thorough. The Consulate inclines to the view that contacts between UAR-YAR officials and Adeni union leaders are fairly casual and to date no very definite joint planning exists. If union officials become further disgruntled with political developments or lack thereof in Aden and the Federation, there would certainly be a strong temptation for them to work and conspire much more closely with the YAR.

All of these factors lead the Consulate to the conclusion that the British are allowing the political situation in South Arabia to drift dangerously. As long as they fail to deal realistically with the external relations of the Federation with the YAR, the internal problem of reconciling Aden State's interests with those of the Federation as a whole, that of channeling the activities of the union movement into a more constructive role, and fail to provide reasonable financial aid and a realistic timetable for the advance of the Federation to self-government and independence, they are courting disaster in the form of the political bankruptcy and collapse of the Federation.

#### Recommendations:

The difficulties of back seat driving on our part are clearly understood. However when the opportunity presents itself we should offer the following suggestions to the U. K. re South Arabia:

1. Instead of inviting infiltration and sabotage by open hostility to the YAR, why not try to take the sting out of YAR-SAF relations by recognition and a genuine attempt to get along.



Virtually all Adeni political leaders including the present Baharoon Government really desire good relations with the Yemen. The more liberal minded Federation leaders do likewise and there is recent evidence that even the hard core reactionaries are beginning to come around to this view.

2. Reevaluate policy on the Aden base to take into account and incorporate into a cohesive political policy for Aden and the Federation the likelihood that the political cost of keeping the base will within the next few years begin to outweigh its usefulness.

The mere fact that it was public knowledge that the base was scheduled to go at some foreseeable future date would take much heat out of this question and could possibly reverse the attitude of the labor movement here toward it.

3. Increase capital outlay at least somewhat for the Federation and announce a date in the near future for complete internal self-government plus possibly a target date in the not-too-distant future for independence.

The rulers are developing schizophrenia because they are told on the one hand to go ahead and run things themselves, then pulled up short by the High Commission for being too independent and too avid for control.

4. Not only allow but encourage the union leaders in Aden to enter actively into the forthcoming election. If they win control of the Aden LEGCO, the High Commission would at least be dealing openly with the real power in Aden, not pretending it doesn't exist.

5. Face up to the need for some special status for Aden if it is to cooperate fully as a willing member of the Federation.

One useful carrot might be to make full agreement between Federal and Adeni leaders on Aden's status within the Federation a pre-requisite to full independence for the Federation.

*John T. Wheelock*  
John T. Wheelock  
American Consul

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*24*

36  
Action  
SS  
Info

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Control: 21797  
Rec'd: April 27, 1964  
12:45 p.m.

FROM: Aden

ACTION: Secstate 194 IMMEDIATE

036

INFO: London 92

DATE: April 27, 4 p.m.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-436  
By ing NARA. Date 4-1-92

Aden High Commissioner Trevaskis today said he is informed Foreign Secretary Butler will tell Secretary Rusk U.K. no longer able maintain non-intervention policy Yemen; will ask U.S. withdraw recognition YAR and inform U.S., U.K. intends pursue policy open and increased AID to Royalists with view force UAR withdraw Yemen. Please protect source.

GP-1

WHEELLOCK

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O 4/27/64 1:11 p.m.

EGL/16

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen*25

36

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control:

21051

Rec'd:

April 25, 1964

9:14 AM

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FROM: Cairo

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ACTION: Secstate 2503

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INFO: Taiz 189

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DATE: April 25, 2 PM

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With publication in this morning's press of second and third speeches delivered by Nasser in Sanaa it beginning to be clear that primary purpose his sudden trip is to restore confidence of both Egyptian troops and Yemenis by means of launching all-out propaganda assault on British. Number of pressures may have built up recently to induce Nasser take this step. Inability of UAR stabilize revolution after year and half with number Egyptian troops as high as ever may be causing increasingly serious morale problem among Egyptian forces. Egyptians may also sense that same inability bring about final resolution has led to wavering Beihan; loyalties to republic. Continuing arms traffic from Beihan to Royalists and great difficulties controlling this traffic has obviously been worrisome and frustrating to Egyptians. Finally Harib raid demonstrated forcibly to both Egyptians and Yemenis that when matters along Yemen-Aden border escalate to point of punitive strikes it is British and not UAR that has last word. Harib may in fact have put Egyptians under same kind of pressure from Yemenis "to do something" that British officials are continually under from SAF rulers. Thus Nasser's personal appearance in front lines and launching of propaganda assault on British from platform in very heart of Arab south may be taken as his political answer to British tactical military superiority.

Visit may have

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-2- 2503, April 25, 2 PM From Cairo

Visit may have another angle as well. On eve of Nasser-Faisal talks Nasser may be seeking put Faisal in something of corner by converting Yemeni conflict, hitherto struggle between "reactionary" and progressive Arab forces, into "anti-imperialist" struggle in which all good Arabs, even Faisal, should join.

Foregoing apart from any relevance visit may have re internal Yemeni policies.

BADEAU

TEK/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# AIRGRAM

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A-189

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AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

COPY NO. 100

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TO : Department of State

INFO : CAIRO, JIDDA, LONDON, ADEN

DEPT Pass: AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, DHAMRAN, CINCSTRIKE - 1

FROM : AmEmbassy, Taiz

DATE: April 22, 1964

SUBJECT: Politico-Economic Assessment, Yemen

REF : CERP, C-1; CA-10108, April 2, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-436

By NARA. Date 4-1-92

## FOREWORD

The Embassy realizes that in terms of US area interests there may be advantages in the continuation of the UAR military presence in Yemen, since it keeps a substantial part of Nasser's military and economic resources tied down and limits his capacity to play a mischievous role in other areas of the Middle East. However, in this report we have focused on Yemen and its relationship with SAG and SAF and the threat to these neighbors from subversion which might originate from within Yemen.

\*\*\*\*\*

## U.S. Objectives in Yemen

Briefly stated, U.S. policy objectives in Yemen are:

1. Its denial to the Soviets or any other power which might use it as a base of subversion against:

- the UK military base in Aden;
- the Saudi monarchy;
- East Africa;
- Free World passage through the Red Sea.

## GROUP-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

RCBlalock:bp  
JNCortada

4/21/64

This document contains information of a confidential nature and is to be controlled as such.

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Page 2  
Airgram A-189  
From TAIZ

2. An independent Yemen capable of maintaining a neutral position on cold war issues.

#### Assessment of Present Conditions

In regard to the above objectives, conditions in Yemen are as follows:

1. The Soviet Union, and to a certain extent other Bloc countries have, through generous military, political and economic support for the YAR, acquired a significant fund of good will in most of Yemen, particularly within military circles. Unless the trend is changed this good will may allow them to establish a position of dominant influence permitting the use of Yemen as a base to carry out any of the forms of subversion in the areas listed above. So far, the pre-eminent position occupied by the Egyptians has prevented the Soviets from converting the good will into substantial influence with respect to internal affairs. Of course it is quite possible that the Soviets may have decided the time has not arrived for an all out push to gain primary influence in Yemen.

However, as apparent from the joint communiques issued in Moscow, Prague and Sofia during Sallal's recent visit to these countries, the Soviets, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were able to obtain agreement to wording which in effect moves Yemen to a position on global foreign policy issues close to that of the Soviet Bloc. The only important failure of the Soviets was their inability to get Sallal to endorse the cause of East Germany. This was due to efforts by the West German Ambassador in Yemen who threatened to close his Embassy if the YAR recognized East Germany.

Furthermore, it appears that in the aid agreement resulting from the visit to Moscow, the Soviets obtained permission to establish a base in Yemen for its trawler fleet operating in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Although the fleet allegedly is to be concerned with the establishment of a fishing industry for Yemeni, the nature of Soviet trawler activities are too well known to leave any doubt as to the true Soviet motives in attempting to gain a firmer foothold in the Red Sea.

Whether Sallal is simply naive or has swallowed the Communist line is irrelevant. The fact remains that the Soviets have been able to obtain his signature to communiques highly favorable to Soviet interests and unfavorable to those of the West. To what extent UAR machinations are involved, we cannot say. Sallal has been so unashamedly a puppet of the Egyptians that it is difficult to believe he signed the communiques as a completely free agent although the possibility cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, whether free agent or not, the effects of the joint statements to the world remain the same.

It should be kept in mind that Sallal adopted positions contrary to the general sentiments of nationalist elements in the YAR Political Bureau. Thus, policy

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implementation may prove to be different from the avowed public statements made by Sallal, despite the respect which the Soviets enjoy in almost all YAR circles.

2. Approximately 30,000 UAR troops plus several hundred Egyptian advisers, teachers and technicians are presently in Yemen. Apart from the objective of furthering a permanent position of influence within Yemen, they represent a policy devoted to the destruction of the British position in the Arabian Peninsula and the House of Saud. In this, UAR and Soviet aspirations are identical.

3. A civil war has dragged on for 19 months with no end in sight. The fighting favors the further strengthening of the Bloc position, since both the UAR and YAR are dependent on the Soviets for military equipment and other assistance. The war provides justification for the continued presence of UAR troops. While the likelihood of escalation of the Yemen conflict into a full scale war between SAG and the UAR has been reduced, the possibility of such escalation still exists.

4. Because of border disputes, territorial claims and attempts to subvert one another's internal situations, conditions between the YAR supported by the UAR and the Soviets, and the SAF -- supported by the UK -- are dangerously near the flash point.

5. A chaotic internal political situation exists. UAR overlordship of the YAR central government prevents the emergence of a representative political leadership, thereby, contributing to the continuance of the civil war.

6. The same for the economic situation. The cost of maintaining a wasteful defense establishment, an inflated civil service, and payment of bakshish to mercenary tribes, combined with an inefficient tax-collection system, have resulted in an estimated \$5,000,000 to \$10,000,000 annual deficit. So far, the YARG has partly covered the deficit through cash and commodity grants and loans from mainly Arab and Bloc states, as well as loans from the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Also the YAR has simply failed to pay its debts and salaries to certain categories of civil servants.

The civil war has resulted in a partial disruption of agricultural activities in the north--and has reduced this area's ability to carry on traditional trade with SAG. No programs have been initiated which lead to a diagnosis of the country's ills or to moving the economy off dead center. Impressive as the Soviet's new aid package may be to the YAR, this new assistance would still be insufficient to affect seriously the country's basic economic stagnation. Likewise the mild boom in the cities of Sanaa and Hodeida is the result of spending by UAR soldiers and some investment of expatriate capital in construction projects. It is essentially temporary pump priming. The fundamental problem of how to increase sharply Yemen's food output and develop fully its agricultural resources has not yet received attention and it seems impossible for the country to make economic headway until this basic situation is effectively dealt with.

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7. The US and its closest ally, the UK, are in conflict over policy towards Yemen. The US recognizes the Republican regime, is carrying out capital projects with a value of over \$25 million, and has for 19 months involved its prestige and that of its Presidents in diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing an end to the civil war, which hopefully would lead to the withdrawal of UAR troops and the removal of the threat which the UK and the House of Saud believe inherent in their presence. The UK, on the other hand, continues to recognize the imamate, and the State of Beihan in the SAF has become a base of operations aimed at subverting the very government which the US recognizes.

Since the US repeatedly assured the UK of its support for the British position in Aden, in view of HMG's admission that it can only partially control the subversive activities from Baihan against the YAR, the US is placed in the uncomfortable position of indirectly supporting an uncertain British position.

#### Prognosis

Unless Yemenis are allowed to negotiate their differences, there is little prospect of a settlement of the internal political problem. There are signs of a series of moves underway to isolate Sallal and undercut whatever policy authority he has. We see the other members of the YAR Political Bureau, less perhaps al Amri, continuing to take advantage of Sallal's absences to consolidate the respect and authority the Politburo has begun to acquire. We believe the Egyptians will come to realize that Sallal is a political liability who will have to be replaced, since he is becoming increasingly unpopular with other republican leaders. The problem for the Egyptians will be to find a personality who enjoys popular support among the northern tribes and who will, at the same time, be amenable to allowing the UAR to continue its pre-eminent role in Yemen. As it will be difficult to find such a person, the UAR may turn to al Amri, who would not satisfy most republican nationalist elements but would be an improvement over Sallal, whose sacking as President is sine qua non for even the beginning of a political settlement.

Unless there is at least some progress towards a settlement there is apt to be further disaffection with the Republic on the part of the northern tribes. This could lead to an intensification of the civil war which might increase the pressures on SAG and SAF to give all-out support for the royalists. In this event, we would again have to reckon with the possibility of escalation. Hopefully, the resumption of UAR-SAG relations will serve to lessen the possibility of military confrontation between those two parties to the Yemen dispute.

The Embassy believes the situation on the southern border at present is potentially much more dangerous than that in the north. Even before the recent UK air strike on Harib, there were indications that the UAR and YAR intended to step up their propaganda and subversive activities against the UK position in SAF. It is clear from the Moscow communique that Soviet moral support and possibly arms shipments are

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readily available to the YAR in its anti-Aden campaign. As a result of the Security Council resolution condemning the UK raid, UAR authorities in Yemen believe they have the British "on the run," and can be expected, with Soviet encouragement, to look favorably on an all-out campaign to undermine SAF and British bases in Aden.

So long as the UK is unwilling to take firm and positive action to prevent the SAF States, and particularly Baihan, from being used as a base for subversive operations against the YAR, it is inviting UAR attacks against these areas and is providing the UAR with the justification it needs to maintain a large military force in Yemen.

Since the present chaotic conditions favor the Soviets and their penetration efforts, any development which contributes to a further deterioration of the security situation would undoubtedly work to their benefit as increased military activity would almost certainly mean greater dependence on the Soviets for Yemen.

The main short-term economic problem Yemen continues to face is one of keeping the central government supplied with enough money to pay civil servants and the army, and to buy the loyalty of key tribes, thereby averting the further disenchantment of these groups with the Republic. If the new Minister of Economics, Abdul Ghani MUTAHAR, is successful in his announced campaign to tighten customs collection procedures and their delivery to the central government and if an effective apparatus can be established for the collection of agricultural taxes in those areas not affected by the civil war, then a significant step will have been taken to supply the required funds. The YAR will still need substantial outside support in the form of commodity loans and budget grants. The burden of this support will probably fall on the UAR and the Bloc, since Iraq, which supplied an estimated \$4 million in grants during 1963, has not indicated it intends to maintain this level of generosity in the future.

If the Soviets undertake the construction of the Hodeida-Taiz road, the YAR is scheduled to receive about \$10 million in commodities which it will be able to sell for riyals. Funds generated by the sale of these commodities are to be earmarked to pay labor costs on the road, consequently the YAR will be able to lighten its present burden by shifting certain government employees to the road project, where the Soviets would be paying the bill.

#### Recommended U.S. Action

In general terms, our diplomacy in Yemen should aim at developing a position of sufficient influence in the country to enable us to achieve our objectives as stated at the beginning of this assessment. Given the size and nature of our present program in contrast to the massive military assistance rendered the YAR by the UAR and the Soviets, we have only limited leverage with the Sallal Government. However, by gradually working on key political figures in Yemen at the same time that we slowly turn our aid and cultural programs in the direction of grass-roots approaches, our basic position in the country has improved since submission of our last assessment. We recommend, therefore, in terms of US-YAR relations that we continue to develop

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From TAIZ

activities designed to obtain wide popular support. Specific courses of action recommended are as follows:

Political

1. YAR-UK Problem

a) Seek HMG agreement to the basic concept that continued USG support for Aden is conditioned on coordination of US and UK policies towards Aden and Yemen. Mere notification to the US by the UK of proposed actions such as the Harib attack is not enough. Agreement from the US must be secured else there should be no unconditional US support for HMG's position in Aden.

b) Explain to HMG that custodianship of British interests in Yemen hampers the US capability to influence the YAR in its conflict with the UK in SAF since the YAR regards the US morally and legally obliged to interfere in the matter. We would be in a better position to help if the US were a free agent and able to condition a good offices role in regard to the YAR on a reasonable Yemen stance. We would be willing to continue assisting the UK informally in respect to British pension and welfare cases in Yemen (very few), travelers, and commercial matters.

c) Continue to impress on HMG at various levels that Free World interests are not served by its present policy of allowing the SAF eastern areas to be a privileged sanctuary for subversion of the YARG. HMG with its present policy is merely inviting counter-subversion by the UAR in those Federation states in which SAF's position is weakest. HMG's and the West's interests in Aden will be more secure with a neighbor dominated by Sanaa than one dominated by Cairo. HMG's policy only invites continuation of the latter situation.

d) Encourage the UN to try to reconcile the YAR-SAF-UK conflict. However, behind the scenes the US should endeavor to persuade the parties involved that a first step should be withdrawal of the YAR and SAF forces to positions occupied on September 26, 1962. The question of delineation of the YAR-SAF border should flow from the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Harib-Beiha area. The present UK approach of putting border delineation first is unrealistic because the YAR will not run the risk of tacit recognition of SAF as a separate entity. Solution of the question of where the border lies is possible but the problem must be approached gradually and with the understanding by both parties that giving up claims on each other's real estate is not involved.

e) Quietly suggest to the UN that the latter attempt to secure an informal agreement between the YAR and the SAF to cease smuggling arms for subversion across mutual borders.

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2. YAR-SAF - Encourage the continuation of UNYOM and continue to counsel SAG to refrain from involvement in Yemen.

3. YAR-UAR - The US should attempt to convince the UAR that the Yemen problem's only hope of solution is to allow the Yemenis themselves to choose their leaders and negotiate their differences with the probable emergence of leaders and policies rather less pro-UAR than Nasser might wish. However, we can reassure the UAR we have no objection to the maintenance in Yemen of an important UAR position of influence and to its training of YAR troops.

Economic, Educational, Military

Unilateral. We should continue our existing capital projects (Taiz-Sanaa Road; Taiz Water System), with close attention to the training of Yemenis for internal supervision and maintenance of these projects. We should enhance the economic and geopolitical impact of the Taiz-Sanaa road by beginning construction of the Taiz-Rahida spur as soon as possible.

Barring unforeseen difficulties, both segments of the road project should be completed at latest by July 1965. At that time, the US should undertake a comprehensive rural public works program, using road project resources to the maximum extent possible, assisting Yemenis in self-help projects along the Rahida-Taiz-Sanaa axis in building feeder roads, developing water sources, and improving agricultural techniques, possibly relying on food-for-work programs.

The above activities should be complemented by continued PL-480 shipments, an expanded educational exchange program, invitations to key Yemeni political and military personalities to visit the U.S., training in the U.S. of small numbers of YAR army officers, and naval visits. School feeding programs should in time be initiated. In response to YAR requests survey teams of various sorts (economic, geological, agricultural) should visit the country on TDY basis. Approaches by the YAR to the IBRD or other Western influenced institutions for help should be sympathetically considered for US support.

These recommendations are admittedly modest. In essence, the Embassy believes the important objective for the foreseeable future is to isolate Yemen and its problems from outside meddling and subversion. We do not propose that the USG should attempt to compete with the Bloc for Yemeni good will. We do believe that by taking steps to prevent the deterioration of the situation in Yemen and the South Arabian Peninsula we have a chance to limit Bloc good will to its present level and perhaps begin to mount a roll back operation.

*James N. Cortada*

James N. Cortada  
Charge' d'Affaires a.i.

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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*Yemen*

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Origin

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INFO : AmEmbassy CAIRO 4790

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YAR Ambassador al-Aini called on Assistant Secretary Talbot April 13

upon return from visit to Yemen. Following thread his earlier conversations with Blalock in Asmara (Taiz A-168), al-Aini stated following:

1. UAR not rpt not looking for Yemen solution but rather seeking pretexts for remaining there indefinitely, including feigning danger of outside attack and fruition of separatist movement in southern Yemen.

2. Alleging threat to Yemen being mounted from south (i.e., SAF), UAR is now transferring locus its military operations from northern to southern Yemen. Settlement with Saudis is consonant therewith. In contrast to unpopularity of military campaign in north, operations in south can be popularized as anti-colonialist. British attack on Harib exactly what Cairo wants.

3. UAR quietly urged Sallal go to Moscow although pretending to US had opposed. UAR then sought depict Sallal trip as evidence YAR propensity turn to USSR, thus justifying countervailing UAR presence in Yemen.

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:TWSeelye:cfh:4-14-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-95

By isl, NARA, Date 10-26-06

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FORM 8-63 DS-322



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4. UAR seeking thwart other foreign economic programs in Yemen, including West German and Kuwaiti. UAR has apprehended Kuwaiti 300,000 KD down-payment on 1 million KD grant aid offer and has told YAR it being used to finance Yemeni share to Arab League.

5. YARG Politbureau wants peace with both Saudi Arabia and Aden and wishes UK to so understand.

6. Time is ripe for US to provide YARG with financial and economic assistance. US can thus make YARG self-sufficient (i.e., less dependent on UAR) and enable YARG stand up to UAR.

COMMENT: Al-Aini, long considered a Baathist, has shown increasing anti-UAR tendencies over past year.

GP-3.

END

BALL

NOTE: Pouched by OCT

ACTING

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Bundy* 28

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EMBTel 4750; DEPTel 5116.

UK EMBASSY (PROTECT SOURCE) HAS GIVEN US FOLLOWING INFORMATION AND VIEWS ON SCENARIO CULMINATING IN FRENCH SC VOTE FOR YEMEN RES NINTH:

1. ACTING PRIMIN AND FONMIN JOXE CONSULTED DE GAULLE SEVENTH ON PROBLEM, FOUND HIM "MORE BRITISH THAN BRITISH". EIGHTH, SOUTOU (QUAI DIRECTOR AFRICA-LEVANT) GAVE UK EMBASSY CATEGORIC ASSURANCES FRENCH WOULD DO NOTHING IN SC AGAINST BRITISH INTERESTS, SHOWED UK EMBOFF SEYDOUX'S INSTRUCTIONS WHICH REFLECTED IN SEYDOUX'S FIRST SPEECH AND "QUITE SATISFACTORY" TO BRITISH. UAR REACTION IN NY TO THIS SPEECH, HOWEVER, STRONGLY NEGATIVE.
2. ACCORDING SOUTOU, RES IN FINAL FORM REACHED PARIS NINTH AT 1830 HOURS LOCAL. JOXE THEREUPON CONSULTED ELYSEE ALTHOUGH FRENCH COULD HAVE ABSTAINED UNDER GENERAL'S PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS. DE GAULLE CONSIDERED ADDITION NEW OPERATIVE PARA DEPLORING ALL ATTACKS ACCEPTABLE AND FELT THAT, WITH FRENCH STATEMENT OF SEVENTH, IT WOULD JUSTIFY FRENCH DELEGATION'S VOTE FOR RES; SEYDOUX INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY.
3. WHEN SEYDOUX CALLED PARIS KNOWING US WOULD ABSTAIN, JOXE REACHED ELYSEE SYG (ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY RESULTING IN DELAY); LATTER, BRITUSH BELIEVE, CONSULTED DE GAULLE WITH RESULT THAT SEYDOUX INSTRUCTED (TOO LATE) ABSTAIN.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NIJ/RAC 06-95

By *id*, NARA, Date 11-13-06

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-2- 4805, APRIL 13, NOON, FROM PARIS

4. BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTED TO LONDON ITS OPINION THAT REASONS ADVANCED FOR DE GAULLE'S DECISIONS INSTRUCT SEYDOUX (A) VOTE FOR RES (B) ABSTAIN, BOTH UNCONVINCING. ON FORMER, BRITISH HEAR THAT JOXE TOLD ELYSEE AT QUAI'S SUGGESTION THAT FRENCH COULD NOT VOTE FOR RES IN VIEW ASSURANCES GIVEN UK EIGHTH. ON LATTER, BRITISH DOUBTS CENTER ON FACT THAT FRENCH ABSTENTION WOULD HAVE PUT DE GAULLE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH ANGLO-SAXONS. QUAI HAS TOLD BRITISH THAT GENERAL'S ORIGINAL DECISION VOTE FOR RES IN NO WAY DUE TO ARAB PRESSURE.

5. PURSUANT VOTE, QUAI ATTEMPTED RETRIEVE SITUATION BY ISSUING STATEMENT (REPORTED SEPTTEL) TO SELECTED CORRESPONDENTS.

6. UK AMB WAS DUE SEE JOXE EVENING ELEVENTH TO REGISTER HMG'S DISPLEASURE THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

GP-3.

CFN 4750 5116 1. 2. 1830 3. 4. 5. 6. GP-3

BOHLEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

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Action

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT **3693** INFO PARIS 253  
LONDON 796 APRIL 9, 9 PM

YEMEN IN SC

SEYDOUX (FRANCE) GAVE FOLL CONFIDENTIAL ACCOUNT OF FRENCH  
VOTING GYRATIONS TO PLIMPTON:

UP UNTIL 2:55 PM TODAY, PARIS HAD AUTHORIZED FRENCH DEL  
TO ABSTAIN ON THE RES. AT 3:00 PM PARIS INSTRUCTED THEM  
TO VOTE FOR RES.

SEYDOUX EXPLAINS THIS CHANGE AS DUE TO ARTICLES IN "LE  
MONDE", WHICH HE HAD NOT READ, COMMENTING THAT GOVT SEEMED  
TO BE SUPPORTING BRIT AGGRESSORS. ALSO, BY REASON OF CLOSE  
TIES OF FRANCE WITH MOROCCO AND IVORY COAST, FRENCH GOVT  
RELUCTANT NOT TO SUPPORT RES SPONSORED BY THEM.  
CFN 3693 253 796 2:55 3:00

PAGE TWO RUEHDT54 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEYDOUX, "HORRIFIED" BY CHANGE IN INSTRUCTIONS, BUT WHEN  
STEVENSON INDICATED US WOULD VOTE FOR RES IF PARA 1 CHANGED  
TO INCLUDE "ATTACKS AND" ETC., THOUGHT THAT ARABS WOULD  
ACCEPT AMENDMENTS AND THAT HE COULD THEN VOTE WITH US IN  
FAVOR OF AMENDED RES. HE REPORTED THIS TO PARIS, WHO  
SAID HE CERTAINLY SHOULD VOTE WITH US.

THEN, TO HIS SURPRISE (COMMENT: HE CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT HAVE  
BEEN SURPRISED), ARABS REJECTED AMENDMENTS. HE THEN CALLED  
PARIS TO ASK FOR CHANGE IN INSTRUCTIONS, HAVING OBTAINED

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NLJ/RAC 06-95

By *nlj*, NARA, Date *11-13-06*

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-2- 3693, April 9, 9 p.m., from New York

20-MINUTE SUSPENSION IN SC MTG. THE SUSPENSION LASTED FOR 45 MINUTES, AT THE END OF WHICH, NOT HAVING RECD ANY MESSAGE, HE HAD TO VOTE FOR RES.

15 MINUTES AFTER THE VOTE, INSTRUCTIONS CAME TO ABSTAIN ON RES.

GP-4. STEVENSON

BT

CFN 1 20 45 15 GP-4.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

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Action DE RUEHDT 49 1070205Z  
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY ADEN  
SS RUFJMR/AMEMBASSY RABAT  
G RUFJGA/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
SP RUDTKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
L RUFKVU/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
H RUQSKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AF RUQPDZ/AMEMBASSY TAIZ  
ARA RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
EUR RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
FE RUQVKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
NEA RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
P RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USIA RUQMFP/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
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CIA UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 3683 INFO RABAT 100 ALGIERS 34 TUNIS 66  
NSA CAIRO 220 KHARTOUM EIGHT TAIZ 151 TAIPEI 92 ADEN 41 JERUSALEM  
OSD 77 KUWAIT SIX PARIS 250 LONDON 793 TRIPOLI FOUR FROM USUN  
ARMY APRIL NINTH  
NAVY SC SESSION ON YEMEN  
AIR FOL IS TEXT OF STEVENSON STATEMENT IN SC TODAY IN EXPLANATION  
RMR OF OUR ABSTENTION ON YEMEN RES:  
QUOTE

1964 APR 9 PM 9 28

MR PRESIDENT:

I HAVE ASKED FOR THE FLOOR TO EXPLAIN BRIEFLY THE VOTE OF THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE US, WHICH I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE NOW ABOUT TO PUT TO THE VOTE.

CFN 3683 100 34 66 220 151 92 41 77 250 793

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 49 UNCLAS  
BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE SPONSORS OF THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION WHO HAVE MADE, WE BELIEVE, A DETERMINED AND SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO PRESENT A DRAFT RESOLUTION ENCOMPASSING THE VARIOUS VIEWS SET FORTH IN THE COUNCIL. WE ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO SEE

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- 2 - 3683, April 9, From New York

IN THE DRAFT THE FOURTH AND THE FIFTH OPERATIVE PARAGRPHS, WHICH PROVIDE POSITIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR REDUCING TENSIONS AND FOR IMPROVING THE SITUATION IN THIS TROUBLED AREA. WE WOULD EARNESTLY URGE THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO OFFER THE SECRETARY GENERAL THEIR FULLEST COOPERATION.

I THINK THAT ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT DISAPPROVES OF PROVOCATIVE ACTS AND RETALIATORY RAIDS IN SITUATIONS SUCH AS THAT BEFORE US. OUR VIEWS IN THIS REGARD ARE IN CONSIDERABLE PART ANSWERED BY THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

WE HAVE STUDIED THE RESOLUTION CAREFULLY AND I FEEL OBLIGED TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON IT BEFORE THE VOTE.

AS THE COUNCIL IS AWARE, THE INCIDENT AT HARIB WAS THE CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF INCIDENTS IN WHICH THERE WERE PREVIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN ARABIAN FEDERATION FROM YEMEN, AND VICE VERSA. WE, THEREFORE, FEEL THAT ANY ACTION THE COUNCIL TAKES SHOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FACTS. IN PARTICULAR, WE FEEL THAT PARAGRAPH 1 SHOULD NOT ONLY CONDEMN REPRISALS, BUT IT SHOULD ALSO CONDEMN ATTACKS WHICH LEAD TO REPRISALS. IF THERE WERE NOT ATTACKS, THERE WOULD NOT BE REPRISALS. THE WORD WOULD HAVE NO SIGNIFICANCE. SURELY, MR. PRESIDENT, ATTACKS ARE AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AS THE REPRISALS THEY PROVOKE. YET THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH 1 TO THE ATTACKS FROM WHICH THE REPRISALS DERIVE.  
CFN 1 1

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 49 UNCLAS

WE HAVE, ACCORDINGLY, SUGGESTED TO THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION TWO AMENDMENTS. THESE WERE IN OPERATIVE PARA 1, TO INSERT AFTER THE WORD "CONDEMNS", THE WORDS "BOTH ATTACKS AND", SO THAT THE PARA WOULD READ: "CONDEMNS BOTH ATTACKS AND REPRISALS AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS".

WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT PARA 2 AND PARA 3 BE REPLACED WITH A SINGLE PARA READING AS FOLLOWS: "DEPLORES THE BRITISH MILITARY ACTION AT HARIB ON 28 MARCH 1964 AND ALL ATTACKS AND INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE AREA."

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- 3 - 3683, April 9, From New York

HOWEVER, THE SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEY CANNOT ACCEPT THESE AMENDMENTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, I AM OBLIGED TO SAY THAT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE RESOLUTION EQUITABLE, THAT IT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE REALITIES AND THE FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN REVIEWED HERE IN THE COUNCIL'S DEBATE, AND, ACCORDINGLY, WE CANNOT VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE DONE HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE AMENDMENTS THAT I HAVE SUGGESTED.

UNQUOTE STEVENSON

BT

CFN 1 2 3 28 1964

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 4950 INFO  
IMMEDIATE USUN 542 FROM LONDON, APRIL 9, 12 NOON

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USUN'S 3673.

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RMR

WHILE APPRECIATING COGENCY OF USUN'S REF MESSAGE, I HOPE THAT ANY DECISION ON HOW US WILL VOTE ON PROPOSED SC RESOLUTION RE HARIB WILL FULLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT A VOTE AGAINST UK WILL CAUSE CONSIDERABLE STRAIN ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. FACT THAT UKUN MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE DONE ENOUGH TO NEGOTIATE AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION IS HARDLY LIKELY TO ASSUAGE DEEP HMG FEELINGS ON SUBJECT. NOR WILL PUBLIC SPLIT BETWEEN USG AND HMG ON HARIB ISSUE FURTHER EITHER OF OUR INTERESTS IN NEAR EAST AREA. CFN 4950 542 09 12 3673

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2 RUDTLN 219C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY DEPLORE HARIB ACTION, WE SHOULD NOT OVER-LOOK SALIENT FACT IT WAS CULMINATION OF A LONG SERIES OF PROVOCATIONS, INCLUDING SUSTAINED CAMPAIGN OF SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM IN ADEN AND SAF IN WHICH BRIT BLOOD HAS ALSO BEEN LOST. THIS IS NOT A MERE MATTER OF SHOOTING UP CAMELS AND SHEPHERDS BY YAR AND UAR. IT IS PART OF A CONSISTENT PROGRAM OF VIOLENCE, INCLUDING ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST BRITISH OFFICIALS, IN ONE OF WHICH THE DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER WAS KILLED. YAR CANNOT ESCAPE LARGE MEASURE OF CULPABILITY FOR THIS SITUATION.

VOTE AGAINST UK WOULD ALSO BE INCONSISTENT WITH NEUTRAL STANCE WHICH DEPT HAS THUS FAR TAKEN ON ISSUE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I UNDERSTAND PRIMIN INTENDS TO REPLY TODAY TO A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION ON WHAT US REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO HMG ABOUT HARIB INCIDENT WITH A CATEGORIC "NONE". AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, THIS IS TECHNICALLY CORRECT.

APART FROM UNDESIRABLE PUBLIC IMAGE OF A FURTHER OPEN US SPLIT WITH HMG ON A SUBJECT ABOUT WHICH FEELINGS RUN SO DEEP WERE, WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT VOTING AGAINST HMG ON

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-2- 4950, APRIL 9, NOON, FROM LONDON

PAGE 3 RUDTLN 219C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS ISSUE IS LIKELY TO LESSEN APPRECIABLY OUR ABILITY TO RESTRAIN BRITS IN ADEN FROM TAKING STRONGER MEASURES IN THE FUTURE TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS THERE. BRITS ARE EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN THEY HAVE IN PAST TO HEED OUR COUNSELS ON MEASURES TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY TO SENSITIVE SOUTHWESTERN ARABIAN AREA IF THEY ARE CONVINCED WE CANNOT BE COUNTED UPON TO APPRECIATE THEIR CRITICAL SECURITY PROBLEMS THERE.

ADDITIONALLY, RATHER THAN ENABLE US RESTRAIN FUTURE YAR AND ARAB INCURSIONS INTO SAF, AS SUGGESTED REFTTEL, VOTING FOR A RESOLUTION PRIMARY FOCUS OF WHICH IS TO CONDEMN HARIB INCIDENT WITHOUT ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF CONTEXT IN WHICH IT DEVELOPED WILL MORE LIKELY ENCOURAGE CURRENT YAR/UAR SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN IN SAF. FINALLY, HAVING IN MIND OUR CURRENT EFFORTS OBTAIN HMG COOPERATION ON VARIOUS OTHER AFRO-ASIAN MATTERS, WE WILL NOT BE HELPED BY THUS FLOUTING A BRITISH CABINET DECISION.

I STRONGLY RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, THAT IN INTERESTS ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION, WE AT LEAST ABSTAIN ON THE PROPOSED SC

PAGE 4 RUDTLN 219C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESOLUTION RE HARIB. WE CAN EXPLAIN ORALLY THAT OUR DOING SO DOES NOT IMPLY USG ENDORSEMENT OF THE ATTACK, BUT, THAT NO INDIVIDUAL SOUTH ARABIAN BORDER INCIDENT CAN PROPERLY BE JUDGED IN ISOLATION. IF PEACE IS TO BE RESTORED, BOTH SIDES MUST EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

GP-3. BRUCE  
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4/9/64, 7:56 AM.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4/9/64, 8:15 AM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (3673) INFO

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ADEN 40 LONDON 792 JIDDA 161 TAIZ 150 CAIRO 219 FROM USUN

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REF: USUN 3657 AND 3646 AND 3670

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1. NEILSEN (NORWAY) CALLED PLIMPTON APRIL 8 STATING HE ABOUT MEET BENHIMA (MOROCCO) TO DISCUSS DRAFT SC RES (USUN 3646 MINUS PARA 3). AFTER MISOFF HAD CONFIRMED WITH CAMPBELL (UK) THAT UK STILL WISHED RES TO REMAIN UNCHANGED AND BE DEFEATED, PLIMPTON RETURNED CALL. WHEN NIELSEN ASKED US VIEWS, SAID US WOULD NOT URGE RES BE NEGOTIATED SINCE RESULT MIGHT BE ONLY PRODUCE RES WHICH WOULD OBTAIN SEVEN VOTES BUT STILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO UK. RECOMMENDED NIELSEN CONSULT UKUN. NIELSEN STATED HE WOULD NOT SUPPORT RES AS IT STOOD BUT HAD INSTRUCTIONS, IN VIEW CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE PARA 4 ON SYG'S GOOD OFFICES, TO SEEK CHANGES TO GET RES WHICH SATISFACTORY CFN 3673 40 792 161 150 219 8 8 3657 3646 3670 1. 3646 3 4

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 43 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO ALL. PLIMPTON STATED THAT IF NIELSEN PLANNED SUGGEST CHANGES TO BENHIMA IN PURSUIT HIS OWN INSTRUCTIONS, IT IMPORTANT THAT BOTH PARAS 1 AND 2 BE BROUGHT INTO BALANCE ALONG SAME LINES PLIMPTON HAD SUGGESTED DEAN (USUN 3657) (AND WHICH DEAN HAD SAID TOLERABLE). PLIMPTON AGAIN STRESSED HE NOT URGING NIELSEN NEGOTIATE.

2. HSUEH (CHINA) CALLED PLIMPTON AND MADE CLEAR THAT HE MAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF BALANCE IN PARA 1. PLIMPTON AGREED BUT SAID BALANCE IN PARA 2 ALSO NECESSARY AND THAT CHINA SHOULD NOT AGREE ACCEPT RES WITHOUT BALANCE IN BOTH PARAS.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *g/c* NARA, Date *2-7-06*



CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 3673, APRIL 8, 8 P.M. FROM: USUN NY.

3. NIELSEN CALLED PLIMPTON FOLLOWING TALK WITH BENHIMA. SAID HE HAD RECOMMENDED THAT PARA 1 "CONDEMN USE OR THREAT OF FORCE AND REPRISALS..." AND PARA 2 "DEPLORE UK ACTION AS WELL AS ALL OTHER INCIDENTS THAT HAVE RECENTLY OCCURRED IN AREA." NIELSEN SAID BENHIMA WOULD ATTEMPT CLEAR LATTER CHANGE WITH ARAB GROUP BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT CHANGE IN PARA 1.

4. UKUN LATER INFORMED USUN THAT RESULT BENHIMA CONSULTATION WAS TO ADD NEW PARA STATING "REGRETS ALL INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY OCCURRED IN AREA" LEAVING PARAS 1 AND 2 (USUN 3646) UNCHANGED. STATED RES STILL UNSATISFACTORY FROM UK VIEWPOINT AND THAT UK NOT IN FAVOR NIELSEN'S ENERGETIC ACTION, WHICH HE FELT WENT BEYOND NORWEGIAN INSTRUCTIONS. DEAN (UK) TOLD PLIMPTON HE DID NOT PARTICULARLY CARE FOR IDEA OF "CONDEMNED ATTACKS AND REPRISALS" IN PARA 1, STATING THAT "ATTACKS" WOULD APPEAR TO APPLY TO UK AS WELL. HE THEREFORE DID NOT ENCOURAGE US TO REMONSTRATE WITH NIELSEN ON THIS POINT. (IN RETROSPECT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT NIELSEN'S LACK OF PRESSURE ON THIS POINT WITH BENHIMA PROBABLY WAS TRACEABLE TO LACK OF UK INTEREST IN IT. UKUN LATER INDICATED TO US THEY INTENDED POINT OUT AFTER SC VOTE THAT "ATTACK" WAS NOT "REPRISAL")."

CFN 1 2 3647 2. 1 2 3. 1 2 1 4. 1 2 3646 1

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 43 C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. DURING SC MTG, BENHIMA, WHO HAD BEEN APPROACHED AGAIN BY NORWEGIANS AND HAD AGAIN CONSULTED ARABS, OFFERED TO ALGARD (NORWAY) TO HAVE PARA 3 BEGIN "DEPLORES" INSTEAD OF "REGRETS" BUT SAID PARA 1 WOULD HAVE TO BE "CONDEMNS REPRISALS" (NOT ATTACKS AND REPRISALS, AS NIELSEN AT OUR SUGGESTION HAD MEANTIME SUGGESTED).

6. DURING SUSPENSION SC MTG PLIMPTON POINTED OUT TO ALGARD (NIELSEN HAVING DEPARTED) THAT PARA 1 UNBALANCED AND ALGARD MADE ANOTHER TRY WITH BENHIMA AT WHICH POINT BENHIMA THREATENED THROW ASIDE RES AND BRING IN HARD ARAB RES. SINCE UK NOT PRESSING THIS CHANGE, PLIMPTON DESISTED BUT PRESSURE HAD MEANTIME PRODUCED CHANGE IN PARA 3 TO READ "DEPLORES ALL ATTACKS AND INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN AREA."

7. MOROCCO THEN INTRODUCED RES IN SC WITH IVORY COAST SUPPORT AND MTG ADJOURNED UNTIL 3 PM AUG 9.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-3- 3673, APRIL 8, 8 P.M. FROM: USUN NY.

8. DEAN (UK) TOLD PLIMPTON LONDON WOULD PRESS HARD IN WASH FOR US ABSTENTION ON RES. PLIMPTON SAID IT WAS REALLY NOT A BIT BAD RES FOR UK. DEAN SAID HE AGREED, BUT THAT LONDON'S ATTITUDE WAS ANOTHER MATTER.

PLIMPTON SAID THERE WAS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR AN INDEPENDENT US ATTITUDE IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THIS, AND THAT US WOULD REALLY BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO HELP THE UK IN SOME OTHER MUCH MORE IMPORTANT MATTER IF US HAD SHOWN IMPARTIAL INDEPENDENCE BY VOTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN JUDGMENT, EVEN IF AGAINST UK. DEAN SAID THAT MIGHT BE AS IT MIGHT BE, BUT EMOTIONS IN LONDON WERE RUNNING VERY HIGH, (PARTICULARLY MENTIONING AMORY'S VIEWS). ALSO, ULTIMATE ISSUE HERE WAS FUTURE OF ADEN, WHICH US AGREED SHOULD REMAIN IN BRIT HANDS. CFN 5. 3 1 6. 1 3 7. 3 9 8.

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 43 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
DEAN AGREED THAT RES WOULD GET EIGHT VOTES, AND HOPED THAT UK WOULD NOT BE ABANDONED AND LEFT ALONE BY ITS FRIENDS. HE MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION BRITISH GUIANA, CUBA, AS AREAS WHERE UK WAS HELPING US. DEAN SAID UKUN WAS GOING TO USE ITS VERY BEST EFFORTS TO GET LONDON TO AGREE TO ABSTENTION.

9. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) TOLD PLIMPTON UKUN HAD ASKED FRANCE ABSTAIN. ARNAUD (FRANCE) SAID HE BELIEVED PARIS WOULD AVOR ABSTENTION BUT HE PARTICULARLY ASKED TO HAVE US POSITION IN ADVANCE OF MTG. HSUEH TOLD PLIMPTON UK HAD ASKED BUT NOT PRESSED FOR ABSTENTION AND THAT CHINA WOULD VOTE FOR RES.

RECOMMENDATION: WE EARNESTLY RECOMMEND THAT US VOTE IN FAVOR OF RES.

RES HAS BEEN WATERED DOWN SO THAT IT REALLY CONSTITUTES A FAIR DISPOSITION OF A VERY AWKWARD MATTER IN A MANNER WHICH, AT LEAST IN OPINION OF UK DEL HERE, IT NOT SERIOUSLY OBJECTIONABLE TO UK.

WE OURSELVES DISLIKE PARA 1 IN THAT IN CONDEMNS REPRISALS BUT NOT THE ATTACKS AND INCIDENTS GIVING RISE TO "REPRISAL" AGAINST HARIB FORT. HOWEVER, UKUN SEEMS BLITHELY UNCONCERNED ON GROUND THAT WHAT THEY DID WAS NOT A "REPRISAL" -- THEY WILL SO STATE IN THEIR EXPLANATION OF VOTE. IF BRITS DO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-4- 3673, APRIL 8, 8 P.M. FROM: USUN NY.

NOT OBJECT TO PARA 1, IT DOES NOT SEEM NECESSARY FOR US TO DO SO, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED PHRASEOLOGY "CONDEMNS ATTACKS AND REPRISALS ACROSS FRONTIERS AS INCOMPATIBLE."  
CFN 9. 1 1

PAGE FIVE RUEHDT 43 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BRITS DO NOT LIKE PARA 2 DEPLORING THE BRIT MILITARY ACTION IN HARIB. IN POINT OF FACT, HOWEVER, WE HAVE DEPLORED IT AND DO DEPLORE IT. FURTHERMORE, NEXT PARA EQUALLY DEPLORES ALL ATTACKS AND INCIDENTS IN THE AREA, AND PROVIDES AS MUCH OF A BALANCE AS COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDE OF RESPECTIVE EXERCISES.

MOROCCO, IVORY COAST AND ARABS HAVE GONE VERY LONG WAY IN ATTEMPTING REACH LANGUAGE SATISFACTORY TO MODERATES, AND ALTHOUGH USUN TOOK ABSOLUTELY NO PART IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM, (WHICH WERE INSTITUTED AND CARRIED OUT BY NORWEGIANS) IT IS CLEAR THAT THEIR REPEATED SOFTENINGS OF THE EARLIER DRAFTS WERE INTENDED TO ATTRACT OUR SUPPORT AS WELL AS THAT OF UNCOMMITTEDS, AS NORWEGIANS, WHO URGING US VOTE FOR RES HAVE POINTED OUT. OUR ABSTAINING ON RES WITH WHICH IT IS FAIRLY EVIDENT THAT WE IN SUBSTANCE AGREE, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS INDICATING THAT WE SUBORDINATE PRINCIPLE TO AN ALLIANCE EVEN WHEN WHAT THE ALLY HAS DONE IS JUSTLY SUBJECT TO DEPLORING.

UK WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPLY DEPT WITH NUMEROUS REASONS WHY US SHOULD STAND WITH UK AND ABSTAIN. HOWEVER, DEPT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT ARABS AND MANY ASAFS SYMPATHETIC TO THEM WILL COMPARE US VOTE THIS RES WITH OUR ACTION IN AUG 1963 IN SC ON ALMAGOR INCIDENT. AT THAT TIME, WE CO-SPONSORED RES CONDEMNING KILLING OF TWO ISRAELIES IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE. FAILURE TO DEPLORE OPENLY ANNOUNCED UK ATTACK WHICH HAD GRAVER CONSEQUENCES, WOULD, WE BELIEVE, SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR ABILITY GAIN COOPERATION MANY THESE DELS ON IMPORTANT UN ISSUES, INCLUDING FUTURE ISSUES IN WHICH UK MAY NEED HELP FROM US.

FURTHERMORE BY SUPPORTING DRAFT RES WE MAY FIND OURSELVES IN POSITION TO EXERT GREATER INFLUENCE TO OPPOSE IN SCGN IN GA, AND WITH ARAB GOVTS, FUTURE YEMENI AND ARAB INCURSIONS INTO

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-5- 3673, APRIL 8, 8 P.M. FROM: USUN NY.

SOUTH ARABIAN FEDERATION WHICH WE PRESUME WILL CONTINUE.  
AT SAME TIME OUR BASIC SUPPORT FOR UK POSITION IN FEDERATION  
WILL BE MADE UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR TOMORROW WHEN WE VOTE IN  
COMITE 24 WITH UK AGAINST ARAB RES DIRECTED AGAINST UK  
PRESENCE IN FEDERATION.

THIS IS CASE WHERE BRITS REALLY MADE MISTAKE. REPUTATION OF  
US FOR INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE WOULD SUFFER IF WE DID NOT  
VOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT REALLY ARE OUR CONVINCTIONS AND  
THE CONVICTIONS OF EVERYONE AT THE UN, INCLUDING, NOT FOR  
REPETITION, UK DEL TO UN.

GOV STEVENSON JOINS IN STRONG RECOMMENDATION THAT WE BE  
AUTHORIZED VOTE FOR RES.

GP-3. PLIMPTON  
BT  
CFN 24 GP-3

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY ADEN

RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

RUQPDS/AMEMBASSY TAIZ

RUFKVU/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS PRIORITY DEPT 3670 INFO ADEN 39 LONDON 791 JIDDA 160

TAIZ 149 CAIRO 218 FROM USUN EIGHTH

SC YEMEN

FOL IS TEXT DRAFT RES SUBMITTED AT 8 APRIL SC MTG BY IVORY COAST AND MOROCCO:

"SC,

"HAVING CONSIDERED COMPLAINT OF YAR RE BRITISH AIR ATTACK ON YEMENI TERRITORY 28 MARCH 1964 (S/5635);

"DEEPLY CONCERNED AT SERIOUS SITUATION PREVAILING IN AREA; CFN 3670 39 791 160 149 218 8 28 1964 (S/5635)

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 37 UNCLAS

"RECALLING ARTICLE 2, PARAS 3 AND 4 OF CHARTER OF UN;

"HAVING HEARD STATEMENTS MADE IN SC ON THIS MATTER:

"1. CONDEMNS REPRISALS AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF UN;

"2. DEPLORES BRITISH MILITARY ACTION AT HARIB ON 28 MARCH 1964;

"3. DEPLORES ALL ATTACKS AND INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURED IN AREA;

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1964 APR 8 PM 9 41

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-2- 3670, APRIL 8, FROM: NEW YORK

"4. CALLS UPON YAR AND UK TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT  
IN ORDER AVOID FURTHER INCIDENTS AND RESTORE PEACE IN AREA;

"5. REQUESTS SYG USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO TRY SETTLE OUT-  
STANDING ISSUES, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE TWO PARTIES."

PLIMPTON

BT

CFN 2 3 4 1. 2. 28 1964 3. 4. 5.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen* 34

44

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Action

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SP STATE GRNC  
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USUN DAILY CLASSIFIED SUMMARY NO. 195

YEMEN--

MOROCCO PRESENT TO SC APRIL 8 YEMEN RESOLUTION (OURTEL 3647) WITHOUT PARA 3 (COMPENSATION) AND WITH MINOR LANGUAGE CHANGES, BENHIMA (MOROCCO) ADVISED NON-PERMANENT COUNCIL MEMBERS FOLLOWING APRIL 7 MEETING.

PEDERSEN (NORWAY) SAID HE AND BERNARDES (BRAZIL) TRIED GET ACROSS TO BENHIMA TEXT UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT SEVEN AFFIRMATIVE VOTES, BUT HE THOUGHT CHANCE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION BE INSTRUCTED SUPPORT SUCH RESOLUTION. HE ALSO REPORTED CASTRILLO (BOLIVIA) BELIEVED FOLLOWING TALK LA PAZ HIS DELEGATION MIGHT BE INSTRUCTED VOTE FOR IT.

ACLAND (UK) DESCRIBED TEXT WITH PARA 3 AS "HOPELESS." ARABS, INCLUDING YEMEN, RELUCTANTLY AGREED GO ALONG WITH DRAFT.

CYPRUS--

RMR

UN (RIKHYE) ASKED FINLAND, IRELAND AND SWEDEN TO CONTRIBUTE ADDITIONAL 200 TROOPS EACH TO UNFICYP, ACCORDING TO COLLINS (UK). RIKHYE ENVISAGED THIS INCREASE NON-UK TROOPS TO 3,700, REDUCE UK TROOPS TO 3,300 AND PROVIDE UN GOAL OF 7,000 MEN.

INITIAL REACTION REPS FIVE COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING TROOPS TO UNFICYP WAS NEGATIVE TO RIKHYE REQUEST THEY EACH PROVIDE 40 POLICE OFFICERS FOR DUTY IN CYPRUS.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *gjc*, NARA, Date *2-7-06*

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- 2 - 3659, APRIL 8, 12:30 AM FROM: NEW YORK

ARTICLE 19--

FROM ALVAREZ (EL SALVADOR) USUN GAINED IMPRESSION HE IS PREPARED SUPPORT US JURIDICAL INTERPRETATION ART. 19, BUT CONTINUES TO FEEL MAJOR POWERS SHOULD DO ALL THEY CAN TO WORK OUT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT BEFORE 19TH GA.

MALDIVE ISLANDS--

DISCUSSIONS WITH UK REPRESENTATIVES REVEALED THEY RESIGNED TO INCREASED LIKELIHOOD MALDIVE ISLANDS BE DISCUSSED BY COMMITTEE OF 24.

BOLIVIA'S ARREARS--

ACCORDING TO VELARDE (BOLIVIA), HIS GOVERNMENT TRYING WORK OUT FORMULA TO PAY UN ARREARS IN FIVE EQUAL PAYMENTS. HE ASSUMED FORMULA BE ACCEPTABLE TO UN.

OMAN--

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON OMAN GENERALLY CONCLUDED IT SHOULD VISIT MUSCAT AND OMAN AND "NEIGHBORING TERRITORIES" AND MIGHT REQUEST US AND NUMBER OF OTHER POWERS TO USE INFLUENCE TO FACILITATE FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM DIRECT APPROACH TO SULTAN OF MUSCAT AND OMAN, CHAIRMAN PAZHWAQ (AFGHANISTAN) INFORMED YATES. COMMITTEE MIGHT ALSO WANT TO SOLICIT VIEWS OF US AND OTHER POWERS HAVING HISTORICAL RELATIONS WITH OMAN AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER THEY COULD PROVIDE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, HE SAID.

ADEN--

REPRESENTATIVES ITALY AND DENMARK SAID THEY WOULD RECOMMEND THEIR DELEGATIONS ABSTAIN IN COMMITTEE OF 24 ON ADEN RESOLUTION. WHITE (AUSTRALIA) EXPECTED HIS DELEGATION VOTE NEGATIVELY.

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3 - 3659, APRIL 8, 12:30 AM FROM: NEW YORK

COMMITTEE OF 24 SUB-COMITES--

REPRESENTATIVES UK AND AUSTRALIA INDICATED THEY ARE INCLINED GO ALONG WITH IDEA OF HAVING INITIAL STATEMENTS BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES ON TERRITORIES TO BE CONSIDERED BY COMITE OF 24 IN SUB-COMITES AND NOT IN PLENARY. NABAVI (IRAN) ADVISED YATES HE INTENDED PROPOSE SUCH PROCEDURE.

1965 SAN FRANCISCO MEMORIAL SESSION--  
MAJORITY REPRESENTATIVES OF CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO INDICATED TO STEVENSON THEY THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE GO AHEAD WITH 1965 MEMORIAL SESSION IN SAN FRANCISCO EVEN THOUGH OFFICIAL PROGRAM LIMITED TO JUNE 25 OR JUNE 26. SYG THANT AND STEVENSON STRESSED TO OFFICIALS MEETING BE COMMEMORATIVE FUNCTION AND NOT GA SESSION AND PROPOSED IT BE HELD ON OR ABOUT JUNE 26 -- ANNIVERSARY SIGNING OF UN CHARTER. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED NUMBER UN SPEAKERS BE RESTRICTED TO 19TH GA PRESIDENT, SYG, AND MEMBERS GENERAL COMMITTEE.

CONTROLLER AGREED PROVIDE SYG WITH DETAILS FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BY JUNE 1.

PANAMA TREATY--

PANAMANIAN UN REPRESENTATIVE (QUINTERO) SUGGESTED IT IS NOT WORTHWHILE ENTIRELY NEGOTIATE NEW PANAMA TREATY SINCE NEW TREATY ON ANOTHER CANAL BE NEEDED AT EARLY DATE. HE WAS PLEASED WITH COMPOSITION US NEGOTIATING TEAM BUT NOT SO ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PANAMANIAN TEAM, DESCRIBING LLUECA AS UNFORTUNATE CHOICE.

DIRECTOR HR DIVISION--

FRENCH DELEGATION FORMALLY PRESENTED TO SYG CANDIDACY MARCEL BOUQUIN (FRANCE) FOR DIRECTORSHIP UN HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION, USUN INFORMED.

TAB RECRUITMENT--

IN OPINION OF COATES (SECRETARIAT), SYG THANT PROBABLY DISAPPROVE ANY REQUEST FROM RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT FOR EAST GERMAN EXPERT ON TA PROJECT. TAB, HE NOTED, HAD NEVER RECRUITED EAST GERMAN NATIONALS.

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+ 4 - 3659, APRIL 8, 12:30 AM FROM: NEW YORK

APPRAISAL OF SC'S WORK--

IN PRESENCE OF MISSION OFFICER, CASTRILLO (BOLIVIA) TOLD GUATEMALAN REPRESENTATIVE HIS EXPERIENCE IN SC HAD BEEN MOST REWARDING. SAID HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY INTENTIONS MAJORITY COUNCIL MEMBERS MAKE UN WORK. HE ALSO COMMENTED ON STEVENSON'S MODERATING AND AFFIRMATIVE INFLUENCE ON SC.

UN BUREAU OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS--

WHILE REPORTING ON PERSONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SECRETARIAT, JULIA HENDERSON, DIRECTOR OF UN BUREAU OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SAID SHE PLANNED TO LEAVE HER POST SOON AS SHE FOUND MORE ATTRACTIVE SPOT. NOTED SHE HAD BEEN DIRECTOR BUREAU FOR 13 YEARS AND BUREAU HAD NOT GROWN WHILE OTHER PARTS OF DEPARTMENT HAD SHOWN SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE.

COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS--

CHAIRMAN CHAKRAVARTY (INDIA) OF COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS INSTRUCTED SECRETARIAT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER MEMBERSHIP OF COMITE AGREEABLE TO SESSION IN SEPTEMBER RATHER THAN IN JUNE AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, PETERSEN (SECRETARIAT) REPORTED.

LA GROUP CHAIRMANSHIP--

IN DISCUSSION WITH USUN ALVAREZ (EL SALVADOR) REVEALED HE WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL 19TH GA AS PERMANENT CHAIRMAN LA GROUP AS DISTINCT FROM ROTATING CHAIRMAN GROUP MEETINGS.

GP-3

STEVENSON

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NSC

Please convey following message from President to Sallal on occasion

'Id al Adha, about April 20:

"Excellency:

On the happy occasion of 'Id al Adha it gives me pleasure to extend congratulations and best wishes on behalf of the American people to you and the people of Yemen.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Have no objection to publication but do not intend to release here.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:GCMoore:cfh:4-3-64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

NEA/P - Mr. Billings

S/S - Mr. Mills

White House - Mr. Komer

U/PR - Mr. Bowers (substance)

F - Mr. McCloskey

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

April 7, 1964

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed are for White  
House clearance prior to trans-  
mission.

*Hamthorne Mills*  
Benjamin H. Read *for*  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Copy of cable to Jidda  
(Message to Prince Faisal)
2. Copy of cable to Jidda  
(Message to King Saud)
3. Copy of cable to Bombay  
(Message to Ruler of Kuwait)
4. Copy of message to Taiz  
(Message to Sallal)

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APR 8 1964



35-6

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NEA:NE:GCMoore:cfh:4-3-64

NE - Mr. Davies

NEA/P - Mr. Billings

S/S -

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F - Mr. McCloskey

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Action

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3580 INFO  
ADEN 30 TAIZ 140 JIDDA 151, CAIRO 209 LONDON 767 FROM USUN  
APRIL 1, 9:14 PM

SC - YEMEN

REF: OURTEL 3581

YEMENI CHARGE GEGHMAN DELIVERED WRITTEN REQUEST TO SC  
PRES HAJEK (CZECH) APRIL 1 (REFTEL) ASKING FOR URGENT SC  
MEETING 6 PM APRIL 1. FOL CONSULTATIONS WITH SC MEMBERS,  
HAJEK SET MTG FOR 10:30 AM APRIL 2.  
CFN 3580 30 140 151 209 767 1 9:14 3581 1 6 1 10:30 2PAGE TWO RUEHDT 51 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
CAMPBELL (UK) TOLD MISOFF UK UNCERTAIN HOW FAR UAR  
WISHES TO PUSH THIS MATTER OR INVOLVE ITSELF BUT INDICATED  
THAT UK HAD SUBSTANTIAL "DOSSIER" RE BOTH YEMENI ACTIVITY  
IN SOUTHERN ARABIAN FEDERATION (SAF) AND UAR INVOLVEMENT.  
SO FAR, UAR HAS NOT REQUESTED TO PARTICIPATE IN SC MTG AND,  
ACCORDING EDWARDSSEN (NORWAY) UAR DEL TOLD HIM THAT MATTER  
IS YEMENI AFFAIR, IMPLYING THAT THEY DO NOT WISH GIVE  
IMPRESSION AT LEAST INITIALLY, THAT THEY IMPORTANT ELEMENT  
IN INCIDENTS.CAMPBELL STATED THAT YEMENIS WOULD HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF  
GETTING "RUDE" RES CONDEMNING UK OBTAIN MAJORITY IN SC.  
THEREFORE, HE CALCULATED THAT IF THEY DESIRED GO BEYOND  
STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD IN SC AND PRODUCE SC RES, IT  
WOULD HAVE TO BE RES WHICH DEPLORED ALL INCIDENTS ON  
YEMENI-SAF BORDER AND ASKED FOR RESTRAINT BY ALL CONCERNED.  
CAMPBELL ALLOWED THAT HARIB INCIDENT MIGHT BE SPECIFICALLY  
MENTIONED WITHIN GENERAL REFERENCE TO ALL INCIDENTS AND  
INDICATED THIS WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED BY UK.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *raj/c*, NARA, Date *2-7-06*



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-2- 3580, APRIL 1, 9:14 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

AS FOR UK SPEECH, CAMPBELL INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIGNED REPLY OPENING STATEMENT BY YEMENIS AND WOULD MAKE CASE THAT SAF IS INJURED PARTY RATHER THAN YEMENIS. CAMPBELL PREPARED DOCUMENT YEMENI INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN SAF AND

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 51 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO POINT OUT THAT CASUALTIES FROM HARIB STRIKE WERE TEN AND NOT 25 DEAD AS YEMENIS CLAIM. CAMPBELL ALSO STATED THAT UK WILL MAKE REFERENCE TO ITS PROPOSALS LAST YEAR FOR DEMILITARIZED ZONE ALONG YEMENI-SAF FRONTIER. UKUN SEEKING LONDON APPROVAL TO RENEW THESE PROPOSALS BUT NOT CERTAIN SUCH CLEARANCE WILL BE FORTHCOMING BY TOMORROW. DOUBTFUL THAT UK WOULD BE IN POSITION BY TOMORROW TO PROPOSE ANY KIND OF OBSERVATION FORCE ON FRONTIER, ACCORDING CAMPBELL, SINCE HE BELIEVES LONDON WOULD FEEL SUCH OPERATION FUTILE UNLESS DELIMITED DZ AGREED ON PREVIOUSLY.

IN RESPONSE CASUAL SUGGESTION BY PLIMPTON YESTERDAY, UKUN HAD ASKED LONDON ITS VIEW OF BRINGING ARTICULATE MEMBER SAF GOVT TO SC AS PETITIONER, CAMPBELL SAID. UKUN MESSAGE HAD EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT WHETHER NECESSARY SEVEN VOTES FOR HEARING PETITIONER COULD BE MUSTERED. HOWEVER, LONDON HAD REACTED FAVORABLE TO IDEA AND HAD SOUGHT REACTION OF AUTHORITIES IN ADEN. (OBVIOUSLY, SUCH PETITIONER COULD ONLY BE OF USE IF SC MTGS EXTENDED INTO NEXT WEEK AS HE COULD NOT BE PRESENT FOR MTG THIS WEEK.) MISOFF OBSERVED THAT WHETHER OR NOT SAF PETITIONER HEARD IN SC HE COULD BE HELPFUL IN CORRIDORS BOTH IN CONNECTION SC MTG AND CURRENT DISCUSSION. ADEN IN COMITE 24.

YEMENI CHARGE TOLD MISOFF IN EVENING THAT ARAB GROUP HAD MET TODAY AND EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN OVER HARIB ATTACK WHICH HE SAID NOW HAD CASUALTY COUNT OF 27 DEAD AND 113 INJURED. ACCORDING GEGHMAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND UAR WOULD REQUEST PARTICIPATION IN SC MTGS.  
CFN 25 24 27 113

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 51 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
YEMENI PRESENTATION TOMORROW WOULD CONCENTRATE ON SEPARATING OUT HARIB INCIDENT FROM SERIES INCIDENTS IN THAT AREA AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 3580, APRIL 1, 9:14 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

ASKING SC CONCENTRATE ON IT IN ISOLATION FROM OTHERS. GEGHMAN STATED THAT SC HAD CONDEMNED SYRIA LAST YEAR FOR INCIDENT RESULTING IN TWO ISRAELI DEATHS FOR WHICH SYRIA HAD NOT ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT THEREFORE CONDEMNATION OF UK SHOULD BE AT LEAST AS STRONG INASMUCH AS CASUALTIES HIGHER AND UK RESPONSIBILITY CLEARLY ADMITTED. GEGHMAN ASKED APPOINTMENT SEE PLIMPTON APRIL 2 PRESUMABLY IN ORDER ASK US SUPPORT CONDEMNATION UK AT LEAST AS STRONG AS CONDEMNATION OF SYRIA THAT US HAD SUPPORTED.

GEGHMAN STATED THAT HE WOULD DENY IN HIS SPEECH THAT YEMENI AIRPLANES HAD ENTERED SAF AIRSPACE AND FIRED ON SAF TERRITORY. HE ATTRIBUTED YEMENI FAILURE TO MAKE SUCH DENIALS SO FAR TO SMALL STAFF AT HIS MISSION. CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN PREPARING LETTER DENYING BRITISH ALLEGATIONS 20 MAR LETTER TO SC AT TIME WHEN BRITISH STRUCK AT HAREB.

COMMENT: SC MTG TOMORROW WILL PROBABLY CONSIST OF YEMENI AND UK PRESENTATIONS AND POSSIBLY UAR REACTION TO UK STATEMENT IF UAR PARTICIPATES. WE AGREE THAT RES CONDEMNING UK NOT LIKELY END RESULT BUT THAT SOME RES OF TYPE MENTIONED BY CAMPBELL SHOULD BE EXPECTED AS ULTIMATE RESULT SC CONSIDERATION.

GP-3. PLIMPTON  
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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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By ~~108~~ NARA. Date 4-1-92

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~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 4815 INFO TAIZ 106 CAIRO 144  
USUN 528 ADEN 85 JIDDA 139 FROM LONDON APRIL 1 6PM

FONOFF (BRENCHELEY) RECAPITULATED FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF  
EVENTS LEADING UP TO RAF RETALIATORY AIR STRIKE AT HARIB:

1. ACCORDING ADEN AUTHORITIES, OUTCRY AMONG SAF RULERS AT  
BRIT FAILURE RESPOND TO MARCH 13 YAR AIR ATTACK ON SAF TERRITORY  
REACHED NEW HEIGHTS. BOTH ADEN HICOM AND C-IN -C ADEN  
STRONGLY URGED RETALIATION AS ONLY MEANS RETAIN HMG INFLUENCE  
WITH SAF RULERS. UK MINISTERS INITIALLY REJECTED THIS  
RECOMMENDATION AND CONFINED THEMSELVES TO ACTION OUTLINED  
CFN 4815 106 144 528 85 139 1. 13 YAR SAF

PAGE 2 RUDTLN 035C ~~SECRET~~  
EMBTCL 4618. UK MINISTERS AGREED REVIEW SITUATION FOLLOWING  
WEEK WHEN GENERAL HARRINGTON (C-IN-C ADEN) WAS SCHEDULED  
VISIT LONDON.

2. UK MINISTERS TOOK UP MATTER AGAIN MARCH 25 WITH HARRINGTON  
PRESENT. HARRINGTON ARGUED ACTION APPROVED THUS FAR INADEQUATE.  
HE POINTED OUT HIS HUNTER AIRCRAFT, BASED ON KHORMAKSAR IN  
ADEN, SCARCELY LIKELY BE ABLE INTERCEPT INTRUDING YAR  
AIRCRAFT IN TIME BRING THEM DOWN. HUNTERS' LIMITED FUEL  
CAPACITY GAVE THEM ONLY TEN MINUTES OR SO FLYING TIME ALONG  
BORDER. HE REITERATED ADEN AUTHORITIES CONCERN ABOUT LOSS  
OF BRIT PRESTIGE AMONG SAF RULERS AND INSISTED STRONGER  
ACTION NECESSARY. THEREUPON, WITH BUTLER ALONE OPPOSING,  
UK MINISTERS DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE THAT RETALIATION SHOULD  
TAKE PLACE WHEN AND IF YAR AIRCRAFT AGAIN TOOK HOSTILE ACTIONS  
IN SAF TERRITORY. AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO, HOWEVER, WOULD  
REQUIRE LONDON APPROVAL.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- 4815, April 1, 6 PM, From: London

3. SIR GEOFFREY HARRISON BRIEFED ASST SECRETARY TALBOT OF UK MINISTERS DECISION FOLLOWING DAY. SAME DAY INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON INFORM DEPT WHICH WAS DONE.

4. NO SOONER WAS DECISION RETALIATE REACHED WHEN MARCH 27  
CFN 4618 2 25 KHORMAKSAR 3 4 27

PAGE 3 RUDTLN 035C ~~SECRET~~

YAR HELICOPTER STRAFING OF JABAL BULAIQ AREA TOOK PLACE. UK MINISTERS THEREUPON APPROVED RETALIATORY RAID ON HARIB FORT AS RECOMMENDED BY ADEN AUTHORITIES. ON UK MINISTERS INSTRUCTIONS, HOWEVER, WARNING LEAFLETS WERE TO BE DROPPED PRIOR TO RAF AIRSTRIKE. C-IN-C ADEN WAS REQUESTED ALLOW AT LEAST HALF HOUR BETWEEN DROPPING OF LEAFLETS AND AIRSTRIKE IF SECURITY OF ATTACKING RAF AIRCRAFT PERMITTED SUCH TIME INTERVAL. C-IN-C ADEN CONCLUDED 15 MINUTE INTERVAL WAS MAXIMUM HE COULD ALLOW WITHOUT EXPOSING HIS ATTACKING AIRCRAFT TO UNNECESSARY RISKS.

5. AIR ATTACK ON HARIB FORT THEN TOOK PLACE. WARNING LEAFLETS DROPPED BY RAF WERE APPARENTLY SLIGHTLY VAGUE AND SIMPLY CALLED ON GARRISON LEAVE "PLACE" IMMEDIATELY. ACCORDING TO INFO WHICH HAS FILTERED BACK TO BAIHAN, YAR GARRISON TOOK LEAFLETS AS A RUSE TO GET IT EVACUATE HARIB FORT FOLLOWING WHICH FORT MIGHT BE OCCUPIED BY SAF FORCES. YAR SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY REFUSED OBEY ORDERS THEIR COMMANDER TO EVACUATE. HENCE, RAF AIRSTRIKE APPEARS TO HAVE RESULTED IN 12 DEAD AND 7 WOUNDED. BRENCHLEY STRESSED THAT CONTRARY YAR PROTEST NOTE, AS TELEGRAPHED BY UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND WHICH APPEARS TO SUGGEST THAT HARIB TOWN WAS ATTACKED, OBJECTIVE WAS HARIB FORT WHICH IS LOCATED  
CFN JABAL BULAIQ 5 12 7

PAGE 3 RUTLN, 035C ~~SECRET~~  
SOME TWO MILES AWAY FROM TOWN.

6. ABOUT ONE HOUR LATER SECOND YAR STRAFING OF JABAL BULAIQ AREA (PARA 2, EMBTEL 4762) TOOK PLACE. BRITS STILL BELIEVE THIS SECOND ATTACK HAD BEEN PLANNED EARLIER AND THAT ITS TIMING HARD ON HEELS OF RAF RETALIATORY STRIKE WAS COINCIDENTAL.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 4815, April 1, 6 PM , From: London

7. BRITS UNDERSTAND YAR REPRESENTATIVE AT UN HAS CALLED FOR SC MEETING. FONOFF HAS ALREADY PROVIDED UKUN WITH MATERIAL FOR SUCH MEETING, INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPHS OF HARIB FORT BEFORE AND AFTER RAF STRIKE. FONOFF IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER UAR WILL SEEK TO BE HEARD IN SC MEETING. IF IT DOES NOT, BRITS DO NOT WISH CITE UAR PARTICIPATION IN PAST YAR AIR RAIDS ON SAF TERRITORY. IF UAR DOES SEEK TO SPEAK, BRITS WILL POINT OUT PILOTS OF YAR AIRCRAFT WHICH ATTACKED SAF WERE MOST LIKELY EGYPTIAN.

8. FONOFF STILL UNCERTAIN WHETHER PAST YAR AIR ATTACKS ON SAF WERE ORDERED BY SANA OR WHETHER THEY REPRESENTED UNAUTHORIZED ACTION BY UAR PILOTS "OUT FOR A LITTLE FUN". LATTER POSSIBILITY NOT RULED OUT.

9. FONOFF VERY MUCH AWARE OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES RAF RETALIATORY STRIKE ON HARIB FORT IN TERMS OF ARAB PRESSURE ON BRIT BASES. WHILE FONOFF WOULD HAVE LIKED TO AVOID SUCH  
CFN 6 2 4762 7 8 9

PAGE 5 RUDTLN 035C ~~SECRET~~  
RETALIATORY ACTION AND HAS FOR 12 MONTHS OR MORE ARGUED AGAINST IT, IT RECOGNIZES HMG NOW HAS NO OPTION BUT TO COPE WITH WHATEVER ARAB FALLOUT DEVELOPS. BRENCHLEY NOTED THERE HAD THUS FAR BEEN NO DIRECT UAR PROTEST TO BRIT AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT, WHATEVER YAR/UAR PUBLIC UPROAR MIGHT BE, RAF RETALIATORY STRIKE ON HARIB FORT WILL HAVE SALUTORY EFFECT ON YAR/UAR AND PUT STOP TO FURTHER YAR AIR RAIDS ON SAF TERRITORY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT COVERT YAR/UAR ACTIVITY IN SAF LIKELY BE INTENSIFIED. SAME TIME HE NOTED SAF RULERS GREATLY HEARTENED BY BRIT ACTION.

GP-3. BRUCE  
BT  
CFN 12 GP-3

~~SECRET~~

00599

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATR

FORM B-63 DS-322

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FRUS, Vol. XL, # 325

3-1-05.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

will respond by pointing to the fact that the UAR has failed to carry out its agreement to disengage and continued Egyptian military presence in Yemen has now given rise to the border incidents. While we would not want to initiate a debate which drags the UAR into the picture, if others have already done so we may wish to find some way of referring to the matter in our statement.

2. Resolution. The general parameters of an acceptable resolution seem to us to be as follows:

blame.

(1) Resolution should not be condemnatory nor fix/~~the blame on the UAR~~

XXXXX A paragraph which deplored the various violent incidents which had taken place without specific mention of one side or the other would seem appropriate. As an ultimate fallback, and providing the British are also prepared to accept, we could live with a resolution which deplored the various incidents on both sides but in which specific mention was made of the British attack of March 27 which precipitated the Yemen complaint.

(2) We doubt the need or desirability at this juncture for injecting a UN presence or field operation of any sort into the situation and presume the U.K. would not want such presence at this time. Furthermore, we foresee a probable reluctance on the part of the SYG to become engaged in the tangled web of U.K.-Arab disputes. If the U.K. could accept, and if there is substantial pressure for involvement of the UN, we could agree to a general request to the SYG to exercise his influence as he deems appropriate with the parties concerned to restore peace and order on the Yemen-South Arabian frontier.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) In its operative paragraphs the resolution presumably would call on the parties to the conflict to cease violent action and attempt to settle their differences. ~~That would be considered in language which was apparently~~  
~~submitted in the UN and would be agreed to by the UN and would~~  
We  
~~also be prepared to see some advantage to having the call made on all~~  
members of the UN to cooperate in avoiding actions which exacerbate tensions and  
broad  
lead to violence in the area. This ~~language~~ language has the merit of embracing  
the UAR and USSR.

(4) We, of course, would not want to introduce a resolution ourselves and presume that this would be done by one or more non-permanent members of the Council, perhaps Brazil or Bolivia. Hopefully such a resolution would dissuade Morocco or others from introducing a strong and unacceptable condemnatory resolution which would have no chance of passing.

GP-3

End

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

*Yemen* 39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Action  
IO

Info  
SS  
G  
SP  
L  
H  
EUR  
NEA  
P  
USIA  
NSC  
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CIA  
NSA  
OSD  
ARMY  
NAVY  
AIR

RMR

DT36  
RR RUEHCR RUQSJD RUDTLN  
DE RUEHDT 36 01/0130Z  
R 010043Z ZEA  
FM USUN NEWYORK  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQSJD/AMEMB JIDDA  
RUDTLN/AMEMB LONDON  
STATE GRNC  
BT

023466

1964 MAR 31 PM 8 37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 3564 INFO CAIRO 207  
TAIZ 138 JIDDA 149 ADEN 29 LONDON 764 MAR 31 7:43 PM

SUBJ: ADEN - YEMEN

YEMENI CHARGE GEGHAAN TOLD MISOFF MORNING MAR 30 HE HAD  
DISCRETIONARY INSTRUCTION CALL FOR SC MTG ON BRIT AIR ATTACK  
HARIB FORT. IN AFTRNOON HE CALLED ON SC PRES AND ASKED FOR  
URGENT SC MTG. PRES TOLD HIM HE HAD TO SUBMIT LTR EXPLAINING  
REASON FOR REQUEST BEFORE LIU COULD CONSULT OTHER SC MEMBERS.  
EXPECT SC WILL CONSULT APR 1 AND PROBABLY AGREE TO MTG.

PRIOR TO YEMENI MOVE, UK SUBMITTED THIRDLTR TO SC ABOUT YEMENI  
AIR ATTACKS IN ORDER, ACCORDING ACLAND, "BUILD THEIR CASE."  
GP-4.  
PLIMPTON  
BT  
CFN 3564 207 138 149 29 764

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *g/p*, NARA, Date *2706*

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*yemen*  
*Bundy* 40

~~SECRET~~

Control: 21788  
Rec'd: March 29, 1964  
10:44 a.m.

35  
Action

SS  
Info

FROM: Taiz

ACTION: Secstate 549 immediate

INFO: Aden 203 immediate  
Cairo 270 immediate  
London 231 immediate

031

DATE: March 29, 3 p.m.

DEPTEL 650

I am shocked at adoption by HMG of Trevaskis anachronistic doctrine of retaliatory bombing by RAF in Yemen at this juncture of history in Middle East and at moment when Soviets have demonstrated keen positive interest in Yemen. Trevaskis tough policy followed since February 1963, British covert support Royalist activities, and effects of HICOM's personal view as expressed to me that confusion in Yemen is good for SAF have been important factors in furnishing UAR with valid excuse remain in Yemen. British cannot escape their share of responsibility for failure disengagement process and by action of recent months have virtually made it impossible for Egyptians consider withdrawing. This development bound to negate any positive effects forthcoming Nasser-Faysal meeting.

For whatever value my views may have, I wholeheartedly agree in terms US interest in Yemen to position expressed third paragraph reference telegram. I particularly urge we cancel our UK representation function. As long as Trevaskis remains as HICOM we can expect only embarrassments ahead for the USG here. In fact our ability to influence YARG in direction of restraint partically nil as result gradual escalations British covert activities in Yemen and actions on border. We probably can be more effective as relatively

disinterested

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAL 06-95

Bv *28* NARA, Date *11-13-06*



~~SECRET~~

-2-549, March 29, 3 p.m. from Taiz.

disinterested party rather than in present role which interpreted by many YARG officials as that of UK lawyer.

GP-3.

CORTADA

JAK

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 11 a.m., March 29  
Passed White House at 12:30 p.m., March 29.

Handled LIMDIS per SS-O.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

41

35

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

NEA

021822

Info

PP RUEHC  
DE RUQPDS 18C 29/1553Z  
P 291425Z

1964 MAR 29 PM 1 36

SS

FM AMEMBASSY TAIZ YEMEN

G

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

SP

INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW RUSSIA

L

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

H

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT

SAL

RUQSDJ/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA

EUR

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND

E

RUEHC/AMCONSULATE ADEN ARABIA

IGA

RUCQHKB/CINCSRIKE MCDILL AFB FLA

AID

RUEPDA/DA WASHDC

BT

P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (545) INFO MOSCOW 17

CU

PRAGUE 2 CAIRO 268 JIDDA 197 LONDON 230 ADEN 201 CINCSRIKE 26

USIA

DEPTAR 97 TWENTY EIGHTH 9 A.M.

NSC

CINCSRIKE/CINMEAFSA FOR POLAD DEPTAR FOR ACSI FROM SANAA

NR

YAR DELEGATION TO MOSCOW RETURNED SANAA MARCH 24 MINUS

CIA

PRESIDENTIAL SALLAL AND MINISTERS DEFENSE, FINANCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NSA

AND PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS WHO ARE VISITING CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

OSD

DEPUTY MINISTER ECONOMICS AHMAD SAEED LISTED FOR EMBASSY

NAVY

OFFICERS AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED ON GRANTS AND LOANS TALLING ABOUT

AIR

65 MILLION QUOTE NEW RUBLES UNQUOTE.

NIC

AGR

PAGE 2 RUQPDS 18C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COM

(A) COMMODITY LOANS \$10 MILLION, PROBABLY FOLLOWING PRESENT

FRB

PATTERN OF SUGAR, CEMENT, MATCHES, TEXTILES, PETROLEUM, SOAP.

INT

(B) LOANS FOR FISH CANNERY CAPACITY 5 MILLION CANS ANNUALLY,

TRSY

CEMENT PLANT CAPACITY 80 - 100 THOUSAND TONS ANNUALLY, 6 OR 7

RMR

MEDIUM-SIZE FISHING BOATS AND ONE TRAWLER, FISH FREEZER CAPACITY

3 - 5 THOUSAND TONS, HODEIDA-TAIZ GRAVEL ROAD, TIHAMA LAND

RECLAMATION PROJECT 9 OR 10 THOUSAND HECTARES AND, FINALLY,

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY. TERMS OF LOAN 15 YEARS NO INTEREST.

(C) GRANTS FOR THREE SCHOOLS CAPACITY 2,000 STUDENTS, 100-BED

HOSPITAL AND CLINIC WITH RUSSIAN DOCTORS AND NURSES.

RUSSIANS AGREED TRAIN YEMENIS OPERATE ABOVE INSTALLATIONS.

SEVERAL HUNDRED YEMENIS WILL TRAVEL MOSCOW FOR TRAINING, IN ADDITION

ABOUT 650 YEMENIS NOW STUDING IN RUSSIA.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *myjc* NARA, Date *2-7-06*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 545, MARCH 28, 9 AM, FROM TAIZ

AHMAD SAEED DID NOT ATTEND MILITARY MEETINGS BUT SAYS RUSSIANS AGREED BUILD AND STAFF MILITARY ACADEMY IN YEMEN. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY MEETINGS IN MOSCOW LARGELY PRO FORMA EXCHANGE. RUSSIANS HAD OBVIOUSLY PREPARED LISTS AND TERMS OF PROJECTS IN ADVANCE.

BUDGETARY AID NEITHER REQUESTED NOR DISCUSSED.

GERMAN EMBASSY SANAA SOURCE TOLD BY MEMBER DELEGATION THAT RUSSIANS AGREED FOUR YEAR PROGRAM, INCLUDING REFUNDING ALL OLD

PAGE 3 RUQPDS 18C C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOANS. HODEIDA PORT TO BE ENLARGED AND IMPROVED. LAND RECLAMATION PROJECT SITED NORTH OF HODEIDA AT WADI MUUR.

FORTY-MAN DELEGATION ENTERTAINED AT BALLET, CIRCUS, BANQUETS. ALL REPORTEDLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT EXPERIENCES IN RUSSIA AS WELL AS RESULTS, ALTHOUGH AHMAD SAEED CLAIMS RESULTS NOT UNEXPECTED.

COMMENT: RADIO SANAA MARCH 25 ANNOUNCED ONLY CANNERY, THREE SCHOOLS AND HOSPITAL, BUT ALL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CIRCLES BY NOW FULLY INFORMED. YAR OFFICIALS NOW EXPECTED LICK THEIR CHOPS AND WAIT FOR AMERICANS TO ANTE UP TO MATCH RUSSIAN AID. WE INTEND BE VERY CAREFUL NOT RPT NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION SUCH WILL BE THE CASE. CORTADA. GP-4

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ *yemen*

57

Action

SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 21678  
Rec'd: March 28, 1964  
4:17 p.m.

42

FROM: Aden

ACTION: Secstate 173 Priority  
London 82 Priority  
Taiz 139 Priority  
Jidda 55 Priority  
Cairo 60 Priority  
CINCSTRIKE Priority  
DEPTAR Priority

52

DATE: March 28, 8 p.m.

LIMDIS

DEPTAR FOR ACSI

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-436  
By sig NARA. Date 4-1-92

Informed at 1930 local time by Bushell POLAD to CINC at least four Hawker Hunters attacked fort within Yemen border Harib area 0915 today March 28 local time with rockets and machineguns. Fort warned of coming attack 15 to 30 minutes in advance by pamphlets dropped Hawker Hunter. Attack was in retaliation for March 13 YAR air strike within Beihan and YAR helicopter machine gun attack on federal army post at Jebel Buraiaq within Beihan yesterday.

Attack made with War Office approval apparently as one shot operation deliberately calculated show YAR and UAR that UK means business and prepared and able defend federation from aggression.

GP-3

WHEELLOCK

AAL/1

Note: Passed CINCSTRIKE, DEPTAR, 3/28/64, 7:30 p.m. AA

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

43

57

Action

55

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 21678  
Rec'd: March 28, 1964  
4:17 p.m.

FROM: Aden

ACTION: Secstate 173 Priority  
London 82 Priority  
Taiz 139 Priority  
Jidda 55 Priority  
Cairo 60 Priority  
CINCSTRIKE Priority  
DEPTAR Priority

048

DATE: March 28, 8 p.m.

LIMDIS

DEPTAR FOR ACSI

Informed at 1930 local time by Bushell POLAD to CINC at least four Hawker Hunters attacked fort within Yemen border Harib area 0915 today March 28 local time with rockets and machineguns. Fort warned of coming attack 15 to 30 minutes in advance by pamphlets dropped Hawker Hunter. Attack was in retaliation for March 13 YAR air strike within Beihan and YAR helicopter machine gun attack on federal army post at Jebel Buraif within Beihan yesterday.

Attack made with War Office approval apparently as one shot operation deliberately calculated show YAR and UAR that UK means business and prepared and able defend federation from aggression.

GP-3

WHEELLOCK

AAL/1

Note: Passed CINCSTRIKE, DEPTAR, 3/28/64, 7:30 p.m. AA

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *gjc*, NARA, Date 2-7-00

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14660

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Yemen

44

57

Origin

ACTION:

CIRCULAR 1807

PRIORITY TO ALL POSTS

Mar 28 1 51 PM '64

NEA

Info:

SS

G

DepCirtel 1806

SP

L

British Embassy informed Dept morning Mar 28 that according

AF

unconfirmed report from Aden, SAF post at Jebel Bulaq again attacked this

EUR

IO

morning by two MIGs and one helicopter. UKUN discussing with FonOff

P

USIA

preparatory to possible action in UN.

NSC

In response query, Embassy Officer said he assumed RAF would take further  
if attack

INR

CIA

retaliatory action ~~at~~ this new ~~attack~~ confirmed.

NSA

OSD

GP 3

RUSK

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

ACTION:

ADEN

AMMAN

BAGHDAD

BEIRUT

CAIRO

DAMASCUS

JIDDA

KUWAIT

LONDON

USUN

TAIZ

TRIPOLI

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By h/j, NARA, Date 2-7-06

Drafted by:

NEA: NE: GMoore/hmh

Telegraphic transmission and

John D Jernegan

classification approved by:

Clearances:

NE - HMSynnes

AFN - Mr. Blake

BNA - Mr. Mead

UNP - Mrs. Hartley

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

✓ 14642

*Yemen*

45

57

Origin

NEA

Info:

SS

G

SP

L

AF

EUR

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

ACTION: CIRCULAR 1806 PRIORITY TO ALL POSTS

MAR 28 11 44 AM '64

British Embassy informed us last night that YAR helicopter had overflown Beihan territory yesterday morning, strafed camel herd and at Jebel Bulaiq attacked SAF Army post/with machine gun fire, afterwards returning Yemen. British Cabinet decided, in light previous warnings issued to YAR, to order retaliatory strike. Strike to be preceded by dropping of warning leaflets.

Dept expressed serious concern at repercussions this retaliation likely to have on present situation re US and UK bases in Libya. British Ambassador said he had raised same point with his Government but had been told decision firm.

Reuters reports today that eight British jets attacked fort in Harib area early this morning. Sandys and Thornycroft authorized attack.

GP-3

ACTION:

USUN

ADEN

AMMAN

BAGHDAD

BEIRUT

CAIRO

DAMASCUS

JIDDA

KUWAIT

LONDON

TAIZ

TRIPOLI

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *reg/c*, NARA, Date 2-7-06

Drafted by: NEA: JDJernegan

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

AF/N - Mr. Blake

BNA - Mr. Judd (subs)

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

14363

*Yemen*

*46*

54

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: AmConsul ADEN 146

INFO : AmEmbassy CAIRO 4511  
" LONDON 6260  
" TAIZ 650

Mar 27 6 33 PM '64

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-436

By *mg* NARA. Date 4-1-92

## LIMITS

On March 27 British Embassy officer gave preview, summarized below, of message from FonSec Butler which HMG Ambassador expects deliver to Secretary on March 31:

UK Cabinet greatly concerned over pressures on British position with South Arabian Federation rulers and in turn on Aden base resulting from YAR/UAR aerial attacks Beihan and heavy UAR propaganda campaign. SAF rulers pressing very strongly for vigorous British reaction and HMG, in order maintain position with SAF, has decided follow policy selective and limited retaliation for any future raids from Yemen. Selection appropriate targets currently under active consideration London. Decision taken in full awareness danger escalation conflict southern part of peninsula and with no intention interfering in YAR-royalist strife.

Department officer gave as "personal unofficial" view that as result such action USG probably would no longer be effective spokesman for HMG with YAR and might have to limit or cancel representation function; that Arab reaction to retaliatory policy would have negative effect on both

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:GCM:ore:cfh:3-27-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA:NE - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

BNA - Mr. Judd

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

UK EM and US positions specifically with respect Libyan bases EM and generally throughout Arab world, particularly in current euphoria of inter-Arab cooperation following Cairo Summit; adverse effect to be expected on UK prestige in UN, which now discussing Aden question. Commented also that retaliation, regardless of intent, would doubtless be interpreted as intervention since targets willy-nilly would be YAR, not royalist, positions and territory.

FYI: From personal comments UK Embassy officer, believe possible that UK Embassy may hope FonOff will be able use our "informal" reaction in attempt modify decision on retaliation. END FYI.

Appreciate telegraphic estimate situation including degree British position would be jeopardized if retaliation policy not adopted.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemeni* 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54

Action

NEA

Info

SS

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INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SCA

SCS

RMR

DE RUDTLN 530C 20/1845Z

R 201828Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQSJD/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

RUEHDT/USUN

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 4618 INFO CAIRO 138 ADEN 77  
USUN 505 JIDDA 132 TAIZ 100 FROM LONDON MAR 20 6PM

IN TALK WITH BRENCHLEY TODAY, HE AFFIRMED THAT UK  
MINISTERS HAVE FOCUSED HEAVILY THIS PAST WEEK ON RECENT  
YAR AIR RAID ON BAIHAN. WHILE THIS IS ONLY THIRD SUCH  
RAID ON BAIHAN IN LAST 18 MONTHS, HE NOTED THERE HAVE  
BEEN AT LEAST 18 ESTABLISHED YAR AIR INTRUSIONS INTO  
SAF TERRITORY. TRUE TO FORM, SAF RULERS AND TREVASKIS  
ARE HIGHLY EXERCISED OVER THIS ATTACK AND HAVE BEEN  
URGING RETALIATION WITHIN YEMEN. SAF RULERS, IN DOING  
CFN 4618 138 77 505 132 100 20 6PM 18 18

PAGE TWO RUDTLN 530C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SO, HAVE INVOKED HMG-SAF DEFENSE TREATY.

ACCORDING BRENCHLEY, UK MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED THAT  
FOR PRESENT AT LEAST HMG'S RESPONSE WILL BE LIMITED TO  
FOLLOWING TWO LINES:

1. PROTEST TO YAR CONTAINED DEPTTEL 6035 CAUTIONING  
IN STRONG TERMS THAT HMG RESERVES FULL LIBERTY REACT  
IN WHATEVER MANNER SEEMS APPROPRIATE IN EVENT OF ANY  
FURTHER VIOLATIONS OF SAF AIR SPACE. UKUN ALSO BEING  
INSTRUCTED SEND LETTER OF COMPLAINT TO PRESIDENT OF  
SECURITY COUNCIL BASED ON FIRST TWO PARAS OF HMG  
PROTEST. UK AMBASSADOR BEELEY BEING INSTRUCTED INFORM  
UAR OF PROTEST AND HAND UAR COPY OF PROTEST NOTE ADDRESSED  
TO YAR ON GROUNDS UAR PILOTS WERE NO DOUBT FLYING AIRCRAFT  
DESPITE LATTER'S YAR MARKINGS.

2. RAF IN ADEN BEING AUTHORIZED SHOOT WITHOUT FURTHER  
WARNING AT ANY INTRUDING AIRCRAFT ENTERING SAF TERRITORY  
FROM YEMEN. AS DEPT AWARE, RAF'S RULE OF ENGAGEMENT  
HERETOFORE HAVE BEEN THAT RAF AIRCRAFT MIGHT FIRE ONLY  
AT INTRUDING AIRCRAFT THAT WERE SEEN TO HAVE COMMITTED  
HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST SAF TERRITORY. BRENCHLEY  
CFN 1. 6035 2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *mgjc*, NARA, Date *2-7-06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 4618, MARCH 20, 6 PM. FROM: LONDON.

PAGE THREE RUDTLN 530C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACKNOWLEDGED NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT COULD RESULT  
IN YAR-UAR AIRCRAFT BEING DOWN. HOWEVER, "HOT PURSUIT"  
NOT SANCTIONED. HE CONFIRMED GENERAL VALIDITY TIMES  
REPORT SENT EMBTEL 4605, ALTHOUGH HE ATTRIBUTED IT TO  
ADEN LEAK AND SAID FONOFF DOES NOT INTEND MAKE ANY  
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. HE  
ADDED UK MINISTERS ALSO CONSIDERED WHETHER UAR SHOULD  
BE SPECIFICALLY WARNED THAT RAF WILL FIRE ON INTRUDING  
AIRCRAFT, BUT CONCLUDED PENULTIMATE PARA OF PROTEST  
NOTE TO YAR (COPY OF WHICH BEING GIVEN UAR) SHOULD GET  
POINT ACROSS TO EGYPTIANS. IN GIVING US ABOVE, BRENCHLEY  
SAID THESE NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT NOT NECESSARILY  
PERMANENT. DEPENDING ON SAF-YEMEN BORDER SITUATION,  
THEY WILL BE REVIEWED IN FEW MONTHS TIME TO SEE IF  
HMG CAN GO BACK TO EARLIER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

BRENCHLEY ALSO SAID THAT BAIHAN AIR ATTACK HAS CAUSED  
EARLIER PROPOSED BUTLER LETTER TO SANDYS (EMBTEL 4353,  
PARA 3) BE SCRAPPED. BUTLER HAS ACCEPTED ARABIAN  
DEPT'S RECOMMENDATION, HOWEVER, THAT COLOFF SHOULD BE  
PRESSED RESTRAIN SHARIF OF BAIHAN AND WILL CONTINUE  
CFN 4605 4353 3

PAGE FOUR RUDTLN 530C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MAKE POINT ORALLY TO SANDYS. BRIT C-IN-C, ARABIAN  
PENINSULA, NOW IN LONDON AND IS EXPECTED MEET NEXT WEEK  
WITH UK MINISTERS AT WHICH TIME BRENCHLEY HOPES BUTLER  
WILL PRESS POINT. HE NOT OVERLY SANGUINE THAT SANDYS  
LIKELY BE RECEPTIVE IN LIGHT PREVAILING SITUATION.

BRENCHLEY ALSO REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S COMMENTS TO  
BRIT AMBASSADOR (DEPTEL 5977) WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED  
AS "VERY SYMPATHETIC". HE AFFIRMED THAT HMG INTENDS  
TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT SITUATION IN SOUTHWESTERN ARABIAN  
AREA AND THOUGHT SUCH RE-EXAMINATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE  
DURING NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OF UK MINISTERS.

GP-3. BRUCE  
BT  
CFN 5977 GP-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

08506

*Yemen*

48

57

Origin

NEA

Info

SS

G

SP

L

EUR

-IO

P

IOP

INR

ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON 5977

Info: AmEmbassy TAIZ 630

AmEmbassy CAIRO 4303

AmEmbassy JIDDA 615

AmConsulate ADEN 141

USUN(pouch)

AmConsulate DHANRAN(pouch)

CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD(POUCH)

Following based on uncleared memcon subject to change on re-view. FYI only, not for Secretary called in British Ambassador March 17 as expression USG con-

cern at threat to joint US-UK interests in southern Arabia posed by in-

creasing British-YAR/UAR friction and (1) suggested re-examination Yemen

situation in light recently restored UAR-SAG relations; (2) noted impressions

created that HMG actively supporting restoration Imamate, inducing YAR-UAR

"go after" HMG in south Arabia; (3) expressed view UAR disengagement from

Yemen would be facilitated if UAR-YAR could be satisfied HMG in Aden offered

no threat; and (4) wondered about possibility and usefulness of another YAR

public statement of desire maintain good relations with SAF.

In response Ambassador (1) stated HMG endeavoring discourage Aden-based

operations in support Yemeni royalists; (2) contended HMG "not necessarily"

anxious restore Imamate; (3) called attention to YAR air attacks over Beihan

March 13 and subsequent demand by SAF Supreme Council for British retaliatory

action; ~~xxx~~ (4) expressed view YAR public statement would not be appropriate situation.

unless HMG on verge of recognizing YARGs and (5) agreed useful re-examine /

Memcon follows.

GP 1

NOTE: Pouched by OCT

NEA:NE:TWSeelye/tws:3/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

RUSK

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Symmes

BIA - Mr. Judd(substance)

S/S - Mr. Baldwin

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 2-7-06

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

49

53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action  
NEA

NNNNVV EUB066QUC092

RR RUEHC

DE RUQPDS 23C 01/1602Z

R 011422Z ZEA

Info

SS

FM AMEMBASSY TAIZ YEMEN

G

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

SP

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO UAR

SAL

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND

EUR

RUQSDJ/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA

IO

RUEPDA/AMCONSUL ADEN ARABIA

IGA

RUEPDA/DA WASHDC

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1964 MAR 1 PM 2 29

USIA

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AIR

NIC

RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT (501) INFO CAIRO 246 MOSCOW 09 LONDON 217 JIDDA 186 ADEN 186 DEPTAR 91 TWENTY NINTH 3 P.M. DEPTAR FOR ACSI. PROTECT SOURCE. GERMAN AMBASSADOR STEFFEN RETURNED FROM SANAA FEBRUARY 26, AND STATED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MUHAMMED ABDUL WASIA NOMAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND A FORMER DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, WITH ZUBAIRI PRESENT, INFORMED HIM THAT RECENTLY THE SOVIETS HAD OFFERED THE YAR TO TRAIN, OUTFIT AND MAINTAIN (INCLUDING WAGE PAYMENTS) AN ARMY OF 40,000 OF WHICH THREE ELITE REGIMENTS WOULD BE TRAINED IN RUSSIA. NOMAN SAID THE YAR POLITICAL BUREAU HAD UNANIMOUSLY TURNED DOWN THE OFFER.

PAGE 2 RUQPDS 23C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ONLY OTHER COMMENT MADE BY STEFFEN WAS THAT WITH AL AMRI AND MUHAMMAD NOMAN (VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL) OUT OF THE COUNTRY CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION CONTINUES IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. ALSO SAID IN BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH SALLAL LATTER SAID HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO GO TO MOSCOW MARCH 15. THE FIRM DECISION WOULD BE MADE UPON AL AMRI'S RETURN SOMETIME IN NEXT 10 DAYS.  
COMMENT: WHILE BRIGADIER GENERAL NOMAN MAY HAVE THROWN A LURE TO STEFFEN IN HOPES STIMULATING FURTHER GERMAN ASSISTANCE, NOMAN HAS IN THE PAST PROVEN RATHER ACCURATE IN REPORTS TO US AND GERMANS REGARDING SOVIET ACTIVITIES. I THEREFORE CANNOT RULE OUT THE PROBABILITY THAT THE OFFER WAS MADE.  
ASSUMING THAT NOMAN'S REPORT IS TRUE, ONE CAN ONLY SPECULATE THAT SOVIETS HAVE ARRIVED AT CONCLUSION UAR DAYS IN YEMEN RELATIVELY NUMBERED AND ARE LAYING BASIS FOR COLLABORATION WITH SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT. SINCE SOVIETS BOUND TO KNOW ORDINARILY UAR WOULD NOT ALLOW YAR PRACTICALLY TURN OVER COUNTRY TO SOVIETS, OTHER INTERPRETATION WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE UNLESS ONE ASSUMES SOVIET-UAR TIE-IN OF MOST INTRICATE NATURE. CORTADA

GP-4

BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By *id* NARA, Date *11-13-06*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen 50*

42-M

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Control:

19470

Rec'd:

February 28, 1964

5:46 a.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Jidda

ACTION: Secstate 839

023

SS

G

INFO: Cairo Unnumbered

SP

Dhahran Unnumbered

EUR

London Unnumbered

IO

Taiz Unnumbered

INR

DATE: February 26, 2 p.m.

RMR

UK Covert Activities in Yemen

I have reviewed with UK Ambassador Crowe information bearing on activities British mercenaries with royalists. Crowe stated Brigadier McClean was definitely MP referred to in Harrison-Talbot conversations this subject (memo conversation January 29). Crowe further volunteered that McClean had received 40,000 pounds sterling from Faysal and King Saud to finance recruitment mercenaries.

GP-1.

HART

HC

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 06-95  
By 128, NARA, Date 11-13-06

~~TOP SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

51

~~SECRET~~

37  
Action

NEA

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QVA075RAA002

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT

DE RUQVRA 2 21/0820Z

R 210750Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RKJVAB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

RUQVDA/AMCONGEN DHAHRAN

RUFIV/AMMISSION GENEVA

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUEHDT/USUN NY

BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 831 INFO BEIRUT 153 CAIRO 290 DHAHRAN 646  
GENEVA 22 LONDON 242 TAIZ 237 USUN 216 FROM JIDDA FEB 21, 1115AM

DEPARTMENT PASS DOD  
GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR TUBBY

SPINELLI VISIT:

MET WITH SPINELLI DURING HIS OVERNIGHT STOP EN ROUTE  
GENEVA, FOR TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 19. FROM GENEVA  
SPINELLI PLANS PROCEED NEW YORK RETURNING TO KINGDOM IN  
LATE MARCH EN ROUTE SAN A. IN ACCORDANCE SAQQAF'S WISHES  
SPINELLI ENGAGING IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH SAUDIS  
DURING PRESENT VISIT JIDDA.

SPINELLI CONFIDENT SAG WILL AGREE TO RENEWAL UNYOM FOR  
FURTHER PERIOD BEYOND MARCH 4 AND THAT THIS WILL PROBABLY  
BE ARRANGED DIRECTLY BETWEEN SYG AND FAYSAL. HE BELIEVES  
FAYSAL UNWILLING STAND IN ISOLATION AGAINST CURRENT UPSURGE  
ARAB SENTIMENT FOR BETTERMENT INTER-ARAB RELATIONS BY  
REFUSING SUPPORT UNYOM RENEWAL, SINCE THIS WOULD BE  
INTERPRETED AS MOVE DISRUPTIVE OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION YEMEN  
CONFLICT. SEES AS ADVANTAGEOUS THAT TIME OF DECISION ON  
RENEWAL WILL COINCIDE WITH VISIT UAR DELEGATION TO KINGDOM.

NONTHELESS SPINELLI CONCERNED LEST INCREASING SIGNS  
SAG MAY TAKE HARD LINE WITH UAR ON SETTLING OUTSTANDING  
PROBLEMS PRIOR TO RECONCILIATION MAY LEAD NASIR TO ABANDON  
PLAN TO SEND MARSHALL AMIR TO RIYADH MARCH 1 AND TO DELEGATE  
LOWER RANKING REPRESENTATIVE WITHOUT AUTHORITY ENGAGE  
IN EFFECTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF SAG-GUAR PROBLEMS. (SPINELLI  
POINTS OUT GUAR HAS NOT YET PUBLICLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO  
SENDING AMIR.) I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO STATEMENT BROADCAST

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By g/k, NARA, Date 2-7-06

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 831, FEBRUARY 21, 11 AM, FROM JIDDA

BY LEBANESE RADIO FEBRUARY 18, ATTRIBUTED TO "SAG SPOKESMAN" (WHO ALMOST CERTAINLY WAS SAQQAF), THAT YEMEN PROBLEM WOULD NOT FIGURE IN UPCOMING UAR-SAG TALKS. THIS INCREASED HIS CONCERN THAT SAG MAY BE SO OVER CONFIDENT ABOUT STRENGTH OF ITS CURRENT BARGAINING POSITION AS TO RENDER AN ACCOMMODATION OF GUAR-SAG VIEWPOINTS ON YEMEN SOLUTION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. WE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SAG MAY BE PURELY FOR TACTICAL PURPOSE BEFORE NEGOTIATORS MEET.

SPINELLI ESTIMATES THAT FROM 1,000 TO 1,500 ADDITIONAL UAR TROOPS HAVE ARRIVED IN YEMEN SINCE JANUARY 1. THESE WERE BROUGHT IN TO COPE WITH RECRUDESCENT ROYALIST MILITARY ACTIVITY (ESPECIALLY CUTTING OF HODAYDA-SAN'A ROAD IN JANUARY) WHICH UAR MILITARY LEADERS SAY HAS MADE UAR TROOP WITHDRAWAL PRESENTLY IMPOSSIBLE. ACCORDING UNYOM CAREFUL ESTIMATES THERE NOW 25,000 UAR TROOPS IN YEMEN. WHEN I SUGGESTED FIGURE MIGHT BE EVEN HIGHER SPINELLI STATED HE THOUGHT NOT AS HIS INDIAN CHIEF OF STAFF HAD MADE CAREFUL ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS. HE FEELS THAT, FOR REASONS STILL UNCLEAR TO HIM, UAR SPOKESMEN ARE PRONE TO INFLATE FIGURES OF THEIR TROOP STRENGTH IN YEMEN.

INFORMED SPINELLI OF DETAILS PROVIDED BY SAQQAF RE RECENT TALKS OF SAMARRAI AND AL-MADANI IN RIYADH WITH FAYSAL AND FILLED HIM IN ON MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH AL-SHAMI CONCERNING HIS THINKING ABOUT NEED FOR ANOTHER CONFERENCE OF YEMENI LEADERS TO DISCUSS FORM OF NEW YEMENI GOVERNMENT (A-283). HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AL-SHAMI'S VIEWS BUT DID NOT VOLUNTEER OPINION ON PRACTICABILITY OF RECONCILIATION OF ROYALIST AND REPUBLICAN ELEMENTS AT PRESENT TIME. I PROMISED TO KEEP HIM INFORMED THROUGH AMBASSADOR TUBBY OF GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING NEXT FOUR WEEKS AS SEEN FROM JIDDA.

HAVE BRIEFED UK AMBASSADOR CROWE ON FOREGOING.

FURTHER DETAILS BY AIRGRAM.

GP-3

HART

BT

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 2/21/64, 7:35 AM.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

52

53-52

Action  
NEA

Info  
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RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 13943  
Rec'd: February 20, 1964  
9:58 a.m.

FROM: Taiz

ACTION: Secstate 490, Priority

INFO: Cairo 242, Priority  
London 215, Priority  
Jidda 184, Priority  
DEPTAR 88, Priority  
CINCSTRIKE 18, Priority

DATE: February 20, 10 a.m.

DEPTAR FOR ACSI

CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

EMBTel 585. DEPTel 5127 to London.

Embassy confirms no evidence presence Algerians in Yemen. UNYOM concurs this assessment.

Spinelli visit covered reference telegram. Only point to add he said Nasser on last visit had asked for names expanded government and he had refused furnish any. I therefore doubt Spinelli will make use British list copy of which I would appreciate receiving.

In this respect wish to stress we have succeeded to great extent dampening YAR suspicions our activities here. If word gets out we are concurring in list prepared by British for UN use which includes Hamid Al-Din family, progress allaying these suspicions will be wiped out and real danger to American families may develop. Fact is Faysal right when he says Yemenis will in time decide on who is going to govern them.

/Neither we,

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By id, NARA, Date 11-13-06

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-2- 490, February 20, 10 a.m., from Taiz

Neither we, UAR, UN or SAG can help matters any by proposing names. Quite the contrary anyone endorsed by U.S., UK, SAG will be suspect immediately. I hope Department may find it possible follow our recommendation avoid proposing possible components future YARG.

GP-3.

CORTADA

FP/9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

53

57

Action

NEA

Info

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AIR

SCA

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RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNNEIC059VDTA129EMB36

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT

DE RUDTLN 309C 12/1950Z

R 121825Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQSVJ/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

RUEHDT/USUN

STATE GR715

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 3903 INFO CAIRO 124 JIDDA 120  
ALGIERS 15 TAIZ 91 ADEN 68 USUN 405 FROM LONDON FEB  
12. 6PM

00840g

1964 FEB 12 PM 4 39

IN TALK WITH BRENCHELY TODAY, FOLLOWING POINTS OF  
INTEREST EMERGED:

1. HE BELIEVES TALBOT-HARRISON TALKS WERE USEFUL.  
ON YEMENI ITEM, HE HOPES BRIT TEAM WAS ABLE GIVE DEPT  
OFFICERS AND OTHERS CLEARER UNDERSTANDING HMG'S PROBLEMS  
AND VIEWS.

2. TWO DEVELOPMENTS RE YEMEN HAVE OCCURRED IN LAST  
FEW DAYS WHICH TROUBLE BRITS. FIRST IS WHAT BRENCHELY  
CALLED "ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE" THAT YAR/UAR WILL STEP  
UP SUBVERSION AND TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IN SAF IMMEDIATELY  
FOLLOWING ID RPT ID. HE READ TO EMBOFF LONG LIST OF  
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SUBMITTED FROM ADEN INDICATING  
YAR/UAR ARMING MORE RADFAN TRIBESMEN AND ALSO ENCOURAGING  
DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN THUMAIR, HAUSHARI AND AMIRI  
AREAS. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT YEMENI TERRORISTS  
PLAN INFILTRATE INTO ADEN, OSTENSIBLY AS REFUGEES  
FROM YEMEN, WITH MISSION OF ELIMINATING ADEN VIP'S.

3. SECOND DEVELOPMENT IS THAT UAR TROOPS IN YEMEN  
NOW APPEAR TO HAVE INCREASED TO 35,000. EGYPTIAN  
JOURNALIST GALLAL TOLD UK AMBASSADOR BEELEY SUCH REINFORCEMENTS  
NECESSITATED BY TRIBAL DIFFICULTIES IN NORTH AND  
SOUTH. BRITS SUSPECT UAR MAY NOW DEPLOY SOME UAR TROOPS  
IN SOUTHERN YEMEN WHICH COULD MEAN DIRECT BRIT UAR  
MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THAT AREA. BRITS ALSO HAVE  
REPORT THAT ALGERIAN CONTINGENT OF 500 MEN AND 12  
OFFICERS DISEMBARKED AT HODAIDA FEW DAYS AGO. 300  
REPORTEDLY GOING TO SANA AND 200 TO BAIDHA.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By 101, NARA, Date 11-13-06

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 3903, February 12, 6 p.m., from London

4. TO PREPARE FOR ANY POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY ARISING OUT OF ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS, BRITISH C-IN-C IN ADEN HAS RECOMMENDED THAT A SECOND COMPANY OF BRIT TROOPS BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST SAF REGULAR ARMY. ONE COMPANY BRIT TROOPS WAS EARLIER MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN COPING WITH RADFAN DISSIDENTS. ADEN HICOM ENDORSED REQUEST, WHICH BRIT JCS CONSIDERED AND APPROVED YESTERDAY. APART FROM THIS PRECAUTIONARY ACTION, BRITS WILL ADOPT WAIT AND SEE POSTURE.

5. BRENCHLEY ALLUDED TO RECENT ARMS CARAVAN FROM BAIHAN WHICH WAS INTERCEPTED BY UAR MILITARY AND HAS BEEN MUCH PUBLICIZED BY UAR AS EVIDENCE BRIT SUPPORT FOR ROYALISTS. HE CLAIMED PERTINENT EVIDENCE ASSEMBLED BY BRITS SUGGEST THESE ARMS WERE INITIALLY SHIPPED FROM SAUDI ARABIA VIA DAR AL-AMIR ROUTE AND ACROSS JAU KHUDAIF TO BAIHAN, WHERE THEY WERE HIDDEN FOR FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. THEY WERE THEN SENT INTO YEMEN WHERE CARAVAN WAS INTERCEPTED. FONOFF PLANS TELL KAMEL ADHM AND PRINCE ABDUR RAHMAN BIN YAHYA, BOTH OF WHOM NOW HERE, THAT SUCH ARMS SMUGGLING THROUGH SAF MUST STOP. REPRESENTATIONS WILL ALSO BE MADE IN JIDDA. FONOFF HAS ALSO ASKED COLOFF PROTEST TO SHARIF OF BAIHAN, COLOFF AND TREVASKIS STILL CONSIDERING REQUEST.

6. YEMENI ROYALIST PRINCE ABDUR RAHMAN ARRIVED IN LONDON YESTERDAY. ACCORDING BRENCHLEY, HE ALSO WISHES VISIT WASHINGTON. ABDUR RAHMAN ALLEGES HE WILL SHORTLY REPLACE AHMAD AL-SHAMI AS YEMENI FONMIN, WITH AL-SHAMI BEING DOWNGRADED TO MINISTER EDUCATION. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS FOR PAST MONTH OR SO THAT BADR DOES NOT ENTIRELY TRUST AL-SHAMI, AND BRENCHLEY SUGGESTED HAMID AL-DIN FAMILY APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED HAVE ONE OF ITS OWN MEMBERS IN IMPORTANT FONMIN SLOT. STRESSING HE SPEAKING PERSONALLY, BRENCHLEY ASKED IF US VISA WOULD BE GIVEN TO ABDUR RAHMAN. WE SAID HE HAD NOT APPLIED. IF HE DID, DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE SOUGHT. BRENCHLEY NOTED DEPT'S COMMENTS ON BRIT PAPER RE PERSONALITIES IN YEMEN HAD BEEN ALONG LINES HAMID AL-DIN SHOULD BE RULED OUT IN ANY YEMENI COALITION GOVERNMENT. HE REITERATED HMG CONTINUES BELIEVE IT IS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 3903, February 12, 6 p.m., from London

A MISTAKE TO RULE OUT ENTIRELY ALL MEMBERS OF HAMID AL-DIN FAMILY AND OPINED MIGHT BE USEFUL IF DEPT OFFICIALS WERE PREPARED INFORMALLY TO TALK WITH ABDUR RAHMAN AS THEY HAD WITH AL-SHAMI.

WILL APPRECIATE HAVING DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS WHETHER VISA SHOULD BE ISSUED TO ABDUR RAHMAN IF HE REQUESTS ONE.

GP-3. JONES

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SOC 4-2 YEMEN

17 **AIRGRAM**

FOR RM USE ONLY

54

RM/R  
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LAB

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5

XMB

AIR

ARMY  
5

CIA

NAVY  
5OSD  
16

USIA

NSA

HEW  
7NSC  
6

A-105

NO.

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AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

FROM : AmEmbassy TAIZ

DATE: JAN. 25 1964

SUBJECT: Yemeni Tea Party Attended by Mrs. Cortada and Mrs. Curran

REF :

There is attached a memorandum prepared by Mrs. Cortada reporting on a Yemeni ladies tea party which she and Mrs. Curran, wife of the Public Affairs Officer, attended on January 10. While the memorandum is devoid of political content, it portrays an interesting aspect of harem life in Yemen.

JAMES N. CORTADA  
Charge' d'Affaires a.i.

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☒ In ☐ OutFORM  
4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

James N. Cortada:bp

1/14/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Page 1 of 2  
Enclosure 1  
Airgram A-105  
From TAIZ

MEMORANDUM

TO : AmEmbassy TAIZ

FROM : Mrs. James N. Cortada

SUBJECT: Yemeni Tea Party Attended by Mrs. Cortada and Mrs. Curran

This afternoon (January 10), I attended a ladies tea party at the home of Mrs. Ahmad MUFARRAH (wife of the Director General, Taiz Foreign Office). I was accompanied by Mrs. R.T. Curran (wife of the Public Affairs Officer), whose Arabic was most useful.

Upon our arrival we were first escorted to a large room where approximately 30 women were seated on the floor with their backs to the walls. The floor was completely covered with rugs and coiled all over these were the long red, yellow, blue and green stems of sixteen (by actual count) Turkish water-pipes, all of which were in use. It resembled nothing so much as a colorful snake-pit. There were several bowls of charcoal on which incense was burning. About half of the women had bunches of qat spread out on their skirts.

Since there was no room for us to sit here, we were taken to another part of the house which was furnished in Western style. Here there were six green and white plastic chairs, two metal tables, a day bed covered with faded cretonne, and pink net curtains at the screened windows. The floor was covered with two unmatched pieces of blue linoleum. Directly over the windows, between the frame and the ceiling were hung pictures - one appeared to be the Imperial Gardens in Peking, another was a lithograph of the Shanghai water-front and the third was of some massive building which seemed to be very modern Egyptian.

Soon after we were seated in this room we were joined by a half dozen of the younger women from the first room. They were a gay and lively lot, all married and each with one child. They spoke no English whatsoever. Three women of fair complexion were from Sanaa, the others with much darker skins were from Taiz.

The women were dressed in the wildest colors and combination of colors imaginable. The older women wore long, ankle length dresses of vivid cotton prints or shiny sateen. They were barefooted. The younger women wore what we would call street-length dresses although somewhat longer than is now the fashion. These were made of cheap brocades, net woven with gold colored threads or incredible prints (one combination of purple, green and yellow was a knockout). Along with these shorter dresses, they wore knee-length nylon stretch hose such as those worn by children in the States. Vivid blue was the favored color, regardless of the color of the dress. ~~It was a very unusual and attractive head-dress. It consisted of an ordinary nylon kerchief (solid or print) tied under the chin. Over this they tied an ornate piece of brocade, folded several times and knotted in back. This they tilted at a rakish~~ The older women wore an unusual and attractive head-dress. It consisted of an ordinary nylon kerchief (solid or print) tied under the chin. Over this they tied an ornate piece of brocade, folded several times and knotted in back. This they tilted at a rakish

/angle and

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Page 2 of 2  
Enclosure 1  
Airgram A-105  
From TAIZ

angle and the effect was quite handsome. The younger women wore nothing on their heads.

However, their clothes were nothing compared to their jewelry. Every woman wore something of gold (bracelets, earrings, chains, rings, watches or pins). Along with several gold pieces (some quite magnificent) they wore glass beads, rhinestone clips, pearls, colored glass pins - in other words, everything they owned at one time.

The younger women did not appear to have been chewing qat nor did they do so while we were there. The older ones had their wad of qat going all the time. We were served hot, spiced tea and a dish of almonds and raisins.

Since I admired the head-dress of the women, several of them removed theirs and tied them on me. They were almost childishly pleased that I was interested. Mrs. Curran took a few photographs of me in these head-dresses. We persuaded some of the children to sit with me but the women stayed well out of camera range.

About an hour later some of the young women began to dance to Yemeni music provided by a tape-recorder. After several dances (all of which looked to be the same and very simple), I volunteered to be taught. This was greeted with cheers of pleasure and in a few moments everyone in the party was standing around to watch. To my consternation, I could not follow this seemingly simple dance. However, the ladies got such a bang out of my clumsiness, that I felt my efforts were well rewarded.

As we left I indicated to several of the ladies that I would be pleased to see them at my house someday. They all demurred and I gathered it was because my house would not be safe - some man might walk in and see them.

I came away from the party with several vivid impressions of the Yemeni woman. First her taste in dress is, by our standards, incredibly atrocious. This I felt was because of the unhappy color combinations with which she surrounds herself. Second, she is a cheerful, out-going person who responds quickly to friendship. There was a great deal of affectionate pushing and shoving around. And one woman who had started to fast for Ramadan one week too early was teased by everyone and called "crazy, crazy". Third, her personal cleanliness leaves much to be desired. Not one woman there had clean fingernails (some used nail polish) and their children were dirty and damp. Fourth, the woman from Taiz is small in stature and of slender build. The woman from Sanaa tends to be very fat and much taller. Several of the women there could only be described as massive. Fifth and most surprising, not one woman there seemed to take any particular pride in her children nor even wish to discuss children. Indeed, the children hanging around at the door, were for the most part ignored.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen**55*

54

Action  
NEA~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Control: 22189  
Rec'd: January 30, 1964  
9:12 AMInfo  
SS  
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L  
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AIDA  
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AIR  
RMR

FROM: Cairo

ACTION: Secstate 1722

INFO: Jidda 164

Taiz 148

USUN 113

DATE: January 30, 2 PM

Italian Ambassador to UAR Magistrati on morning January 30 gave me following account of Spinelli's views as expressed in his recent visit to Cairo.

1. President Nasser more frank, forthcoming, and optimistic than during initial interview of two months ago.

2. Spinelli now recognizes difficulties of Yemen settlement larger and more complex than he originally envisioned but remained optimistic substantial progress can be made.

3. Heart of Yemen solution lies in reconstitution of government. While Royal Family must be excluded from this, non-YAR tribal figures are essential.

4. Sallal remains the only "national" figure on Yemen scene. With all of his liabilities, he still commands wider respect than any other prospective leader. Thus he is probably indispensable to any new government, at least in initial stage.

5. Rapid reduction UAR troop force in Yemen made difficult both by UAR military sensitivity to accusation of precipitous withdrawal and hard realities of Yemen chaos necessitating some continued effective military garrisons. In view of this, Spinelli apparently thinking of arrangements whereby UAR garrisons would be stationed in three or four strategic centers

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-95

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-2- 1722, January 30, 2 PM From Cairo

but largely withdrawn from rest of country.

6. UAR strategy apparently to seek restoration diplomatic relations with SAG and then attack resolution Yemen problem through normal diplomatic negotiation. Spinelli reportedly does not believe Egyptians will insist on clear-cut Yemen solution as pre-condition for restoration of relations.

Magistrati reported Spinelli's onward plans as encompassing brief visits to Beirut, Jidda, and Saana, then return to Rome to meet U Thant for few hours on latter's return from African visit.

GP-3.

BADEAU

GEJ/16

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

*Yemen*  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ROUTINE

*56*

COUNTRY YEMEN

DATE OF INFO. 16 JANUARY 1964

DISTR. 22 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

ROYALIST PLANS FOR OCCUPYING SAN'A

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 03578

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO. NWJ 991

*3.3 (b)(1)*

1. THE <sup>YEMENI</sup> ROYALISTS HAVE ALMOST COMPLETED THEIR PLAN AND PREPARATIONS FOR WRESTING SAN'A FROM REPUBLICAN AND EGYPTIAN CONTROL. AS IT STANDS AT PRESENT, THE PLAN CALLS FOR ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT SALLAL AND A LARGE NUMBER OF HIS AIDES AND LEADING EGYPTIAN FORCES, FOLLOWED BY SIMULTANEOUS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN FORCES AND SUPPORTING SOVIET CONTINGENTS(SIC). THE DAY, BUT NOT THE DATE, FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN HAS BEEN SET AS FRIDAY. DETAILS OF THE PLAN, ACTIONS, AND THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE THUS FAR ARE:

A. TO MINE AND PLANT TIME-BOMBS IN THE FRONT THREE ROWS OF THE GRAND MOSQUE IN SAN'A, AND TO SET THE TIME BOMBS LATE DURING THE NIGHT OF THURSDAY, AFTER ASCERTAINING THAT SALLAL, HIS AIDS AND HIGH-RANKING EGYPTIAN OFFICERS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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CINCPACAFSA

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 06-89  
By *isl*, NARA, Date *5-2-06*



3.3(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

IN 03578

PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~

(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

WERE TO ATTEND THE FRIDAY NOON PRAYERS. ARRANGEMENTS FOR PLANTING THE MINES AND TIME-BOMBS UNDER THE RUGS OF THE MOSQUE HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

B. TO BLOW UP SAN'A RADIO STATION AND PUT IT OUT OF ACTION BY PLANTING TIME-FUSED STICK OF DYNAMITE COMPLETED, ONE OF THE WORKERS AT THE STATION HAS ALREADY VOLUNTEERED TO LOAD A TAPE RECORDER CASE WITH DYNAMITE AND A TIME-BOMB AND TO PLANT IT INSIDE THE RADIO STATION AFTER IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT SALLAL PLANNED TO ATTEND THE FRIDAY PRAYERS AT THE MOSQUE.

C. TO CUT THE SAN'A-HUDYADAH ROAD IN ORDER TO PREVENT LAND REINFORCEMENTS BY EGYPTIAN TROOPS AND ARMORED VEHICLES. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH ACTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

3.3 (b)(1) [REDACTED] WHICH REPORTS PRO-ROYALIST ACTIVITY ON THE SAN'A-HUDAYDHA ROAD.)

D. TO BLOW UP THE SAN'A MILITARY AIRFIELD STRIP. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS ACTION HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.

E. SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK ON EGYPTIAN FORCES AND RUSSIAN SUPPORT CONTINGENTS (SIC) IN SAN'A BY PRO-ROYALIST REPUBLICAN TROOPS IN SAN'A AND PROROYALIST TRIBESMEN OF THE SAN'A REGION. A FORCE OF 3,000 TROOPS (YEMENI) PRESENTLY LOCATED IN SAN'A HAS BEEN SECURED FOR THE ROYALIST ACTION THROUGH THE PROMISES OF THEIR OFFICERS THROUGH PLEDGES TO PRINCE MUHAMMAD IBN AL HUSAYN.

F. OCCUPATION OF JABAL AL NUQM AND OCCUPATION OF KEY GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS IN SAN'A. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE OCCUPATION OF JABAL NUQM. OCCUPATION OF KEY GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS SHOULD NOT PROVE TO BE DIFFICULT AS A RESULT OF THE CONFUSION TO BE CREATED FROM THE PRECEEDING ACTIONS.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 5-63

2096

3.3(b)(1)

MFG. 6-63

(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF [REDACTED] INFORMATION REPORT

3.3(6)(1)

## CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IN 03578

PAGE 3

3.3  
(b)(1)

2. ( ) COMMENT: NUMEROUS REPORTS OF SKILLED MERCENARIES OPERATING WITH THE <sup>YEMENI</sup> ROYALISTS WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM A ROYALIST PLAN FOR THE CAPTURE OF SAN'A. HERETOFORE, THE ROYALISTS HAVE LACKED SKILLED GUERRILLA WARFARE PLANNERS AND OPERATIONS COORDINATORS. WE JUDGE THAT THE ABOVE PLAN DOES EXIST; WHETHER IT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION)

3.3  
(b)(1)

3. ( ) DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL) CINCUSNAVEUR  
CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 5-63 2096

MFG. 8-65

(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF ( ) INFORMATION REPORT

3.3(6)(1)



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen**57*~~SECRET~~43  
Action  
NEAControl: 7403  
Rec'd: JANUARY 13, 1964  
2:41 A.M.

028

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FROM: JIDDA

ACTION: CAIRO 263 PRIORITY  
SECSTATE 728 PRIORITYINFO: ADEN 46  
DHAHRAN 562  
LONDON 219

DATE: JANUARY 12, 6 P.M.

UK INTEREST IN BENNSKY/BROWN MISSION

RMR

UK AMBASSADOR CROWE (PROTECT SOURCE) CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING AND BRIEFED ME ON RECENTLY CONCLUDED POLICY REVIEW IN WHICH HE PARTICIPATED AT FOREIGN OFFICE. AS REGARDS UK-YARG RELATIONS HE ADVISED IT APPARENT THAT UK RECOGNITION IS DEFINITELY OUT OF QUESTION FOR PRESENT. FOREIGN OFFICE IN GENERAL HOWEVER IS APPARENTLY TAKING STAND IN OPPOSITION TO THAT OF SANDYS WHO, CONVINCED BY HIGH COMMISSIONER TREVASKIS, BELIEVES THAT YAR UNDER UAR MILITARY OCCUPATION REPRESENTS SUCH SERIOUS THREAT TO UK POSITION IN ADEN THAT IT MUST BE COUNTERED VIGOROUSLY. IN THIS CONNECTION I RELATED TO CROWE CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PRESENT SCENE IN YAR AS DETAILED TO ME BY BENNSKY AND BROWN DURING THEIR VISIT TO JIDDA WHICH MADE SUCH COLONIAL OFFICE ASSESSMENT APPEAR VERY DISTORTED AND DEGREE OF THREAT TO SAF CONSIDERABLY OVERDRAWN. (BENNSKY AND BROWN DEPARTED EVENING JAN 11 FOR CAIRO.) CROWE EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST AND SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO STOP IN LONDON EN ROUTE WASHINGTON SO THEY MIGHT DISCUSS THEIR OBSERVATIONS WITH FOREIGN OFFICE.

HE BELIEVED THIS MIGHT MATERIALLY STRENGTHEN FOREIGN OFFICE WHICH CONSIDERS TREVASKIS SO "RATTLED" BY ADEN BOMBING INCIDENT HE HAS INFLATED IMAGE YARG CAPACITY TO ACT AGAINST UK INTERESTS IN ADEN. HE ANSWERED THAT I WOULD PASS HIS SUGGESTION TO BROWN AND BENNSKY AND THAT I WOULD STIPULATE NO MENTION BE MADE TO UK THAT CROWE HAD SPONSORED THIS REQUEST.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By *isl*, NARA, Date *11-13-06*~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 728, JANUARY 12, 6 P.M., FROM JIDDA

RECOMMENDATION:

THAT IF POSSIBLE BENNSKY/ BROWN ITINERARY BE REVISED TO PERMIT BRIEF STOP IN LONDON AND CONSULTATION FOREIGN OFFICE. IF THEIR SCHEDULE DOES NOT PERMIT THIS DIVERSION, I SUGGEST THEY EITHER BRIEF BEELEY UK EMBASSY IN CAIRO OR UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

GP-3.

HART

DJS/26

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen*

58

59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action EELV EUB069REE055  
IR RUEHC  
NEA E RUQPDS 18C 05/15242  
R 051403Z

2166

1964 JAN 5 PM 3:18

Info FM AMEMBASSY TAI Z YEMEN/  
SS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
G RUEHC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO UAR  
SP RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY IDDA UAU DI ARABIA  
EUR RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND  
P RUEHC/AMCONSUL ADEN AREBIA  
USIA RUEPDA/DEPTAR WASHDC  
NSC RUEKDL/CINCS TRI KE  
BT

INR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT [433] INFO CAIRO 214 JIDDA 163 LONDON  
CIA 197 ADEN 170 DEPTAR 79 CINCS TRI KE 10 10:00 A.M. FIFTH FROM TAI Z. DEPTAR  
NSA FOR ACSI. CINCS TRI KE/CINCS MEAFS FOR POLAD. EMBTEL 426. SHAFEI SOURCE TOLD  
OSD BENNSKY, BROWN, EMBOFF THAT SHAFEIS AVE PRESENTED THEIR OWN PLAN TO  
NAVY SALLAL FOR REFORM YARG AS ALTERNATIVE TO PLAN REPORTED REFTEL. ELEMENTS  
AIR SHAFEI PLAN ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1. SALLAL REMAINS YAR PRESIDENT. 2. AHMAD  
RMR NOMAN (SHAFEI), ALI MOHAMMED AL ASWADI (SHAFEI), IRIANI (ZEIDI) TO BE  
VICE PRESIDENTS. (TWO SHAFEI VICE PRESIDENTS EVIDENTLY INTENDED BALANCE  
ZEIDI VICE PRESIDENT AND ZEIDI PRESIDENT.) 3. PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL  
REMAINS, WITH MEMBERSHIP SPLIT BETWEEN ZEIDUS, SHAFEIS. TRIBAL SHEIKHS

PAGE 2 RUQPDS 18C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO BE REPRESENTED. 4. MINISTERS REMAIN HEADS EXECUTIVE MINISTRIES. BOTH  
SHAFEIS AND ZEIDIS TO HOLD MINISTERIAL POSITIONS. SAME SHAFEI SOURCE  
REPORTS THAT SHAFEI SHEIKHS HELD MEETING IN TAI Z RECENTLY TO DRAW UP  
SHAFEI DEMANDS. EMBASSY ATTEMPTING OBTAIN COPY PAMPHLET OUTLINING  
RESULTS THIS MEETING. COMMENT: UNLIKE PLAN REPORTED REFTEL, SHAFEI PLAN  
CLEARLY NOT PRESENTED AS PROTEST EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE. INSTEAD, SHAFEI  
PLAN PROTESTS INCREASED ZEIDI DOMINANCE OVER SHAFEIS WITHIN YAR CIRCLES.  
IT SAID THAT TAI Z MEETING OF SHEIKHS CONVENED TO PRESENT SHAFEI DEMANDS  
AS COUNTER TO EFFECTIVE USE BY ZEIDIS OF SIMILAR DEVICE, ALTHOUGH  
SHAFEI SHEIKHS UNIVERSALLY KNOWN TO BE LESS POWERFUL IN SOUTH THAN  
ZEIDI SHEIKHS IN NORTH. GP-3 CORTADA

BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *gjk*, NARA, Date *2-7-00*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action RR RUEHC  
DE RUQPDS 8C 05/1445Z  
NEA R 051350Z

002159

Info FM EMBASSY TAIZ YEMEN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
SS RUJTLN/EMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND

1964 JAN 5 PM 2 02

RUEHC/EMBASSY CAIRO UAR

G RUQVRA/EMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA  
SP RUEPDA/DEPTAR WASHDC  
EUR RUEKDL/CINCSTRIKE  
P STATE  
USLABT

NSC ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 426 INFO LONDON 192 CAIRO 208  
INR JADDA 158 ADEN 165 DEPTAR 75 CINCSTRIKE 6 JANUARY 2, 4PM  
CIA CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD DEPTAR FOR ACSI SEVERAL YARG SOURCES  
NSA IN SANAA CONTACTED IN COURSE BENNSKY BROWN VISIT STATE EFFORTS ARE  
OSD NOW IN PROGRESS ESTABLISH NEW YAR GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AFTER RECENT  
NAVY RESIGNATIONS. THESE SOURCES ALSO CONFIRM THAT RESIGNATIONS OCCURRED,  
AIR USUAL STORY BEING THAT BOTH PRESIDENTIAL AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS  
RMR SENT RESIGNATIONS TO SALLAL BUT THAT SALLAL ACCEPTED ONLY PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNCIL RESIGNATIONS AND ASKED MINISTERS CONTINUE WORK. MINISTERS AND  
MINISTRIES FUNCTIONING IN USUAL FASHION, BUT MINISTER HEALTH  
REPORTEDLY INSISTED ON RESIGNING. AL-AMRI STILL HEADING GOVERNMENT  
OPERATIONS. ACCORDING SAME SOURCES, EFFORTS ESTABLISH NEW GOVERNMENT  
DIRECTED TOWARD FOLLOWING YARG STRUCTURE: 1. PRESIDENT, WHO WILL BE  
SALLAL, WILL HEAD STATE BUT REDUCED POWERS. 2. THERE MAY OR MAY NOT BE  
ANYVICE PRESIDENTS, WHOSE POWERS IN ANY CASE ALSO WILL BE REDUCED.  
3. EFFECTIVE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT WILL BE PRIME MINISTER. HAMOUD AL  
JAIFI AND IRIANI NAMED AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES THIS POSITION. 4.  
PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE FREE HAND IN NAMING MINISTERS. 5. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNCIL WILL BE ABOLISHED. 6. COUNCIL OF SHEIKHS MAY BE RETAINED BUT  
WILL HAVE LITTLE WORK. 7. COMMITTEE OF FIVE MEMBERS WILL BE ESTABLISHED  
TO MEDIATE DISPUTES ARISING BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. THESE  
REFORMS REPORTEDLY BEING SUBMITTED TO SALLAL, WHOSE APPROVAL BELIEVED  
DEPEND ENTIRELY ON EGYPTIAN APPROVAL. COMMENT: APPEARS THAT PRESSURE  
FOR ABOVE CHANGES COMING FROM AMRAN SYMPATHIZERS. ZUBAIRI SAID TO BE  
PREPARED ACCEPT THESE REFORMS EVEN THOUGH HE NOT EXPECTED PARTICIPATE  
IN NEW GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS EGYPTIANS CONTINUE DOMINATE YEMEN'S  
POLITICS. IT WORTH NOTING THAT SHEIKHS APPARENTLY TO BE GIVEN LITTLE  
ROLE IN PLANS FOR NEW GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH JAIFI OR IRIANI WOULD  
PROBABLY HAVE CONFIDENCE OF TRIBES. TWO SOURCES STATE THAT TREND IN  
YEMEN NOW IS TOWARD MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN RULE COUNTRY WITH  
IRON HAND. HOW THIS FITS IN WITH ABOVE REFORMS OR CONTINUED DOMINANT  
ROLE EGYPTIANS IS NOT CLEAR. ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, YEMENI SOURCES  
IN SANAA NOW EXPRESS HOSTILITY TOWARD EGYPTIANS. THOSE SUPPORTING  
AMRAN INITIATIVE ATTEMPTING FORCE ALL MINISTERS RESIGN IN ORDER END  
FICTION YEMENIS GOVERNING COUNTRY AND PLACE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION ON EGYPTIANS. GP3 CORTADA

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By gjc NARA, Date 2-7-06



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

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Control: 1734  
Rec'd: JANUARY 3, 1964  
9:43 P.M.

FROM: NEW YORK

ACTION: SECSTATE 2646

INFO: TAIZ 129  
JIDDA 138  
LONDON 476  
CAIRO UNNUMBERED

DATE: JANUARY 3. (SECTION 1 OF 11).

YEMEN

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF "REPORT BY SYG TO SC ON FUNCTIONING OF UNYOM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TERMS OF DISENGAGEMENT COVERING PERIOD FROM 29 OCTOBER 63 TO 2 JANUARY 64," WHICH RELEASED AT 3 PM TODAY:

QUOTE

1. MY LAST REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE UNYOM WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SC ON 28 OCTOBER 1963 (S/5447, ADD. 1 AND ADD. 2), SHORTLY BEFORE THE SECOND PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS DURING WHICH THE MISSION HAD OPERATED WAS DUE TO EXPIRE. AT THAT TIME, I NOTED THAT WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL APPRECIATION OF THE HELPFUL ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY UNYOM, THE GOVT OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE AN UNDERTAKING TO THE MANDATE GIVEN TO UNYOM IN THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WAS LIMITING AND RESTRICTIVE AND MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE MISSION TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTION TO MAINTAIN AFTER 4 NOVEMBER A CIVILIAN UN PRESENCE IN YEMEN, SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

2. ON 31 OCTOBER, HOWEVER, I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE GOVT OF SAUDI ARABIA INFORMING ME THAT DESPITE THE LACK OF PROGRESS

/IN DISENGAGEMENT

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-2- 2646, JANUARY 3. FROM: NEW YORK. (SECTION 1 OF 11).

IN DISENGAGEMENT, IT HAD DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FINANCING OF UNYOM FOR A FURTHER PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS AS FROM 5 NOV. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE, I ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSION. AFTER CONSULTING INFORMALLY WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE SC, I FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO THE EXTENSION OF THE MISSION.

3. I CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THE MISSION OF MILITARY OBSERVATION WITH ITS LIMITED MANDATE SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY A UN POLITICAL PRESENCE, WHICH, BY EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY A MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION.

4. I THEREFORE ON 4 NOVEMBER APPOINTED MR. PIER P. SPINELLI, UNDER-SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR OF THE UN EUROPEAN OFFICE, TO UNDERTAKE AN ASSIGNMENT AS SPECIAL REP OF THE SYG FOR YEMEN AND HEAD OF THE YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION, WHEN LT-GENERAL GYANI, AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED, WOULD RETURN TO HIS POST AS COMMANDER OF THE UNEF IN GAZA AND SINAI. MR. SPINELLI ARRIVED IN YEMEN ON 9 NOVEMBER. COL BRANKO PAVLOVIC, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY HELD THE POST OF DEPUTY COMMANDER AND WHO HAD TWICE BEEN ACTING COMMANDER, BECAME CHIEF OF STAFF.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE OBSERVATION MISSION.

5. ON 4 NOV, ARRANGEMENTS WERE ALREADY FAR ADVANCED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY COMPONENTS OF THE MISSION. THE DETACHMENTS OF THE YUGO RECONNAISSANCE CO AT SA'IDA AND HARAD IN NORTH YEMEN HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN, WHILE THE LARGER DETACHMENT AT NAJMAN IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN PART OF THE DMZ WAS PREPARING TO DEPART. ALL EXCEPT FOUR OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS WHO HAD BEEN SECONDED TO UNYOM HAD RETURN TO THEIR NORMAL MISSIONS.

/6. WHEN IT WAS

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-3- 2646, JANUARY 3. FROM: NEW YORK. (SECTION -1 OF 11).

6. WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY MISSION, GEN GYANI AND HIS STAFF UNDERTOOK A REAPPRAISAL OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. BECAUSE OF THE CO-OPERATION SHOWN BY THE AUTHORITIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN-YEMEN FRONTIER AND BECAUSE OF THE PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA COVERED BY THE MISSION, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS UN PERSONNEL, IT WAS FELT THAT IT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY UNIT IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THE YUGO DETACHMENT AT NAJRAN CONTINUED, HOWEVER, TO CARRY OUT PATROLS IN THAT AREA UNTIL 25 NOVEMBER, WHILE THE OBSERVER PERSONNEL WAS BEING BUILT UP TO FULL STRENGTH. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, UN MILITARY OBSERVERS AT GIZAN AND NAJRAN MANNED CHECKPOINTS ON THE FRONTIER TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR ABILITY.

7. WITH THE ARRIVAL OF NEW OBSERVERS IN THE LATTER HALF OF NOVEMBER AND EARLY DEC, THE MAIN TASK OF OBSERVATION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT BY A STAFF OF MILITARY OBSERVERS DEPLOYED AS FOLLOWS:

SANA'A	:	HQ STAFF AND 3 OBSERVERS
NAJRAN	:	10 OBSERVERS
GIZAN	:	5 OBSERVERS
SA'DA	:	2 OBSERVERS
HODEIDA	:	1 OBSERVER
JEDDAH	:	1 LIAISON OFFICER

8. THE OBSERVERS, INCLUDING STAFF, COME FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: DENMARK, GHANA, INDIA, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PAKISTAN, SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA.

9. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE OBSERVERS AT NAJRAN AND GIZAN ARE TO MAINTAIN PERMANENT CHECKPOINTS AT THE MAIN BORDER CROSSINGS INTO YEMEN AND TEMPORARY CHECKPOINTS ON AN IRREGULAR BASIS AT THE MORE DIFFICULT CROSSINGS, AS WELL AS PATROLS, IN ORDER TO OBSERVE THE NATURE OF THE TRAFFIC ACROSS THE BORDER. MOST UN

/PATROLS

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-4- 2646, JANUARY 3. FROM: NEW YORK. (SECTION 1 OF 11).

PATROLS AND CHECKPOINTS ARE ACCOMPANIED BY SAUDI ARABIAN LIAISON OFFICIALS, WHO CHECK CARGOES AS REQUESTED BY THE OBSERVERS. OCCASIONALLY, OBSERVERS VISIT ROYALIST AREAS ON THE YEMENI SIDE OF THE BORDER IN ORDER TO CHECK ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH ARMS AND AMMUNITION MAY BE REACHING THEM FROM ABROAD AND THE DEGREE OF FIGHTING OCCURRING BETWEEN THEM AND THE UAR FORCES IN YEMEN. THE OBSERVERS IN SA'DA, SANA'A AND HODEIDA OBSERVE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE UAR FORCES ARE BEING DISENGAGED FROM YEMEN.

10. THE GROUND OBSERVATIONS OF THE MISSION ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY AN AIR TRANSPORT UNIT PROVIDED BY CANADA, WITH TWO CARIBOU AIRCRAFT STATIONED AT SANA'A. THE OTTER AIRCRAFT STATIONED AT GIZAN AND AT NAJLAN IN ORDER TO PERFORM PATROLS IN THE BORDER REGION WERE WITHDRAWN IN MID-DECEMBER, SINCE IT WAS FOUND THAT, AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE YUGO COMPANY, THE CARIBOU AIRCRAFT WERE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE PATROLS IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

11. IN RELATION TO THE PROVISION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT CALLING FOR THE CESSATION OF AID AND SUPPORT BY SAUDI ARABIA TO THE ROYALISTS OF YEMEN, THE SITUATION REMAINS AS BEFORE, NAMELY, THAT NO MILITARY VEHICLES OR MATERIAL HAVE BEEN SEEN NOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR STORES FOUND IN THE CARGOES CHECKED BY UN OBSERVERS. THE RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC ACROSS THE FRONTIER HAS CONTAINED NORMAL CONSUMER GOODS, INCLUDING SMALL QUANTITIES OF KEROSENE AND PETROL. COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED GENERALLY BECAUSE OF FEAR OF AIR ATTACK. VEHICLE TRACKS, SOME OF THEM RECENT, HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE AIR CROSSING THE DESERT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE YEMEN FAR TO THE EAST OF THE DMZ. NO VEHICLES HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN SIGHTED AND DUE TO THE INACCESSIBILITY OF THE AREA IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO STATION CHECKPOSTS THERE BY NIGHT.

/13. AS REGARDS

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-5- 2646, JANUARY 3. FROM: NEW YORK. (SECTION 1 OF 11).

13. AS REGARDS THE PHASED DISENGAGEMENT OF UAR TROOPS FROM THE YEMEN, A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 5,000 TROOPS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED TO EMBARK AT HODEIDA OVER THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER TO 17 DEC. DURING THE SAME PERIOD APPROXIMATELY 1,000 TROOPS WERE OBSERVED TO ARRIVE.

14. WITH REGARD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR FROM THE DMZ EXTENDING 20 KILOMETRES ON EITHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER, UAR FORCES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES AT HARAD AND SOME 5-8 KILOMETRES TO THE NORTH-EAST, COVERING THE MAIN ROUTE OF ENTRY FROM SAUDI ARABIA INTO THE YEMEN, ALTHOUGH THE EXTENT OF THE ZONE HELD HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO KEEP AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNIT IN NAJLAN.

15. THE UAR AIR FORCE HAS CARRIED OUT A NUMBER OF AIR ATTACKS IN THE YEMENI PORTION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. IN ADDITION, IN MID-NOV A NUMBER OF OVERFLIGHTS BY UAR PLANES OVER SAUDI ARABIA OCCURRED IN THE EL KUBA REGION SOME 60 KILOMETRES SOUTH-EAST OF GIZAN; ON 10 NOVEMBER, TWO BOMBS WERE DROPPED IN THE FEFA MOUNTAIN 8-10 KILOMETRES INSIDE SAUDI ARABIA KILLING ONE PERSON; AND ON 21 NOVEMBER TRUCKS IN THE MARKET PLACE AT EL KUBHA 4-5 KILOMETRES INSIDE SAUDI ARABIA WERE ATTACKED WITH 8 ROCKETS AND WITH MACHINE GUN FIRE, RESULTING IN FOUR DEATHS.

YOST

BA/22.

NOTE: PARAGRAPHS NUMBERED AS RECEIVED, CONFIRMED BY ORIGINATOR.

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42

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Action  
IO

DT39

Info RR RUEHC RUQPDS RUQVRA RUDSC  
DE RUEHDT 3904/0200ZControl: 1735  
January 3, 1964  
10:07 p.m.

SS

ZNR

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R 040001Z

SP

FM USUN NEW YORK

L

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

H

INFO RUQPDS/AMEMBASSY TAIZ

AF

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

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UNCLAS SETWO OF TWO ACTION DEPT 2646 INFO TAIZ 129 JIDDA 138

AID

LONDON 476 POUCHD CAIRO FROM USUN THIRD

P

YEMEN

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

16. WITH REGARD TO QUESTION OF PUNITIVE ACTION TAKEN BY UAR FORCES AGAINST ROYALIST FORCES IN YEMEN, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IN THE GREATER PART OF COUNTRY NO MILITARY OPERATIONS OF IMPORTANCE HAVE OCCURRED DURING PAST TWO MONTHS, INCLUDING CERTAIN AREAS TO THE WEST AND NORTH-EAST OF SANA'A WHERE TRIBES HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED AS HOSTILE TO GOVT OF REPUBLIC OF YEMEN. HOWEVER, TRIBES IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS WASH-HA-HAJJA AND TO THE NORTH-WEST AND NORTH-EAST OF SA'DA CONTINUE TO PURSUE A PRO-ROYALIST ATTITUDE AND FROM TIME TO TIME ACTIVELY HARASS UAR TROOPS. UAR AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FREQUENTLY TAKING OFF ON ARMED MISSIONS AND HAVE BEEN OBSERVED OCCASIONALLY BOMBING. ON 15 NOVEMBER TWO UAR PLANES ATTACKED A TRUCK MOVING NORTHWARDS IN YEMEN TOWARD SAUDI FRONTIER NEAR EL KUBA; THE WRECK WAS EXAMINED BY A UN OBSERVER AND FOUND TO CONTAIN COFFEE. ON 21 NOVEMBER, A VILLAGE WAS OBSERVED BURNING SOME 30 KILOMETRES NORTH-WEST OF SANA'A FOLLOWING CONSIDERING UAR ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA. ON 1 DECEMBER, A UAR AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED DROPPING BOMBS IN SAME AREA..

17. IN ADDITION TO MATERIAL OBTAINED THROUGH DIRECT OBSERVATIONS, VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND POSITION OF PARTIES WAS OBTAINED BY MY SPECIAL REP IN COURSE OF HIS EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVTS CONCERNED AND WITH THEIR REPS IN AFFECTED REGION.

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 39 UNCLAS  
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

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-2- 2646, January 3, from New York (SECTION II OF II)

✓ 18. THE OBSERVATIONS OF UNYOM AND THE STATEMENTS OF PARTIES TEND TO CONFIRM CONCLUSION EXPRESSED IN MY PREVIOUS REPORT THAT NO MILITARY AID OF SIGNIFICANCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO ROYALISTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THERE APPEARS TO BE PRIMA-FACIE EVIDENCE THAT SAUDI ARABIAN AUTHORITIES ARE PROVIDING SOME FORMS OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO ROYALISTS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, WITHIN MEANS OF OBSERVATION AVAILABLE TO UNYOM, TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS ENCOURAGEMENT IS PURELY MORAL OR HAS MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS.

19. THE OBSERVATIONS OF UNYOM TEND TO CONFIRM THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NET WITHDRAWAL OF UAR TROOPS FROM THE YEMEN DURING PERIOD UNDER REVIEW, AMOUNTING TO SOME 4,000 TROOPS.

20. ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO FACT THAT GROUND OPERATIONS IN YEMEN HAVE FURTHER DECREASED IN INTENSITY. ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO UAR FORCES CONTINUE IN AREA WASH-HA-HAJJA. UAR AIR ACTIVITY HAD RECENTLY INCREASED AND APPEARS, AT LEAST IN SOME INSTANCES, TO BE DIRECTED AT TARGETS WHICH ARE NOT OF TACTICAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

21. WITH EXCEPTIONS NOTED IN PARA 15 ABOVE, WHICH HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED BY THE UAR COMMAND TO NAVIGATIONAL ERRORS, UAR HAS OBSERVED ITS PLEDGE NOT TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS OVER SAUDI ARABIAN TERRITORY.

22. FROM THESE FINDINGS, I ARRIVE AT THE SAME CONCLUSION REACHED IN MY PREVIOUS REPORT, NAMELY, THAT WHILE DEVELOPMENTS ARE, IN A LIMITED WAY, ENCOURAGING IN THAT SCALE OF FIGHTING CONTINUES TO DECREASE, THEY FALL FAR SHORT OF FULFILMENT OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND REGULARIZATION OF SITUATION WHICH HAD BEEN HOPED FOR. I REITERATE BELIEF THAT SOLUTION OF PROBLEM LIES BEYOND POTENTIAL OF UNYOM UNDER ITS ORIGINAL MANDATE.  
CFN 18 19 4,000 20 21 15 22

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 39 UNCLAS

23. ON OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE, ON BASIS OF EXPERIENCE OF MISSION, ESPECIALLY DURING LAST TWO MONTHS, THAT IT EXERCISES A PACIFYING INFLUENCE ON SITUATION IN THE FRONTIER REGION AND IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SUCH IMPROVEMENTS IN SITUATION IN YEMEN ITSELF AS HAVE OCCURRED. ITS CONTINUED FUNCTIONING AFTER 4 JANUARY SEEMS TO ME, THEREFORE, TO BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE IF SITUATION IS NOT TO DETERIORATE AND IF A CLIMATE IS TO BE CREATED IN WHICH POLITICAL APPROACHES TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM MAY BE ATTEMPTED.

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-3- 2646, January 3, from New York (SECTION II OF II)

24. MY SPECIAL REP IN YEMEN HAS HELD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THREE GOVTS CONCERNED. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN OF AN EXPLORATORY CHARACTER WITH A VIEW TO ASCERTAINING WHETHER THERE WERE AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH MIGHT, THROUGH BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OR OTHERWISE, LEAD TO FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS DISENGAGEMENT AND TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SITUATION IN YEMEN. I DO NOT WISH TO PREJUDICE RESULTS OF THESE EFFORTS, EXCEPT TO STATE THAT THEY HAVE STARTED IN AN ENCOURAGING MANNER, AND THAT I INTEND TO HAVE THEM PURSUED. I BELIEVE ALSO THAT GOVTS CONCERNED ARE ANXIOUS THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE.

25. ACCORDINGLY ON 23 DECEMBER 1963, I ADDRESSED IDENTICAL MESSAGES TO PRIME MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA AND TO PRESIDENT OF THE UAR IN WHICH I INFORMED THEM OF MY CONCLUSION, WHICH SEEMED TO BE GENERALLY SHARED, THAT MISSION CONTINUES TO SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE AND THAT ITS EXTENSION WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS BOTH DISENGAGEMENT AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN YEMEN. IT FOLLOWED THAT I WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXTEND THE UN YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION IN APPROXIMATELY ITS PRESENT STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO SIX MONTHS. IN THAT CASE, I POINTED OUT, MR. SPINELLI WOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE AS MY SPECIAL REP FOR YEMEN AND AS HEAD OF MISSION. I INQUIRED, THEREFORE, WHETHER TWO GOVTS WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO CONTINUATION OF MISSION FOR SUCH A PERIOD UNDER THE PREVAILING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS FINANCING. IN THIS REGARD, I ALSO INDICATED THAT IN VIEW OF RECENT REDUCTIONS IN SIZE OF MISSION, OPERATING EXPENSES HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED.  
CFN 23 4 24 25 23 1963

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 39 UNCLAS

26. ON 27 DECEMBER 1963, I WAS INFORMED BY THE PERMANENT REP. OF THE UAR THAT HIS GOVT WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH SUGGESTIONS MENTIONED IN MY MESSAGE. AFTER I HAD ANSWERED A PRELIMINARY REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION FROM THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVT, I WAS INFORMED ON 2 JANUARY 1964 THAT IT AGREED TO THE EXTENSION OF THE MISSION FROM 4 JANUARY 1964 FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS ENDING 4 MARCH 1964.

27. ALTHOUGH THIS PERIOD IS NOT, IN MY OPINION, SUFFICIENTLY LONG IN WHICH TO ANTICIPATE A FULL SOLUTION OF PROBLEM, I

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-4- 2646, January 3, from New York (SECTION II OF II)

WELCOME DECISION OF TWO GOVTS TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UN OPERATION IN YEMEN AREA AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR DESIRE FOR MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGION AND FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETE DISENGAGEMENT.

28. HAVING ASCERTAINED BY MEANS OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THAT THERE IS NO OBJECTION AMONG MEMBERS OF SC TO THAT COURSE, I INTEND TO MAINTAIN OBSERVATION MISSION IN YEMEN FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER TWO MONTHS AND BEYOND THAT IF THE NEED FOR IT CONTINUES AND TWO GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO DEFRAY ITS COSTS. YOST

BT

CFN 26 27 1963 2 1964 4 1964 4 1964 27 28

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Tencer**61*

45

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~Control: 229  
Rec'd: JANUARY 2, 1964  
4:20 A.M.

FROM: JIDDA

ACTION: SECSTATE 690

INFO: CAIRO 249  
DHAHRAN 530  
GENEVA 18  
LONDON 208  
TAIZ 209  
USUN 196

031

DATE: JANUARY 1, 11 A.M.

LIMDIS

SWISS CHARGE, ERNI, IN DESCRIBING TO ME HIS VISIT TO SWISS-MANNED INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS FIELD HOSPITAL NEAR NEJRAN, STATED THAT HOSPITAL UNIT IS IN FACT AT UKE ON YEMENI SIDE OF BORDER. SWISS DOCTORS HAVE UNDERSTANDABLY BEEN CONCERNED WITH PROBLEM PHYSICAL SECURITY IN REMOTE BORDER AREA AND DECIDED TURN TO LOCAL SAUDI RATHER THAN ROYALIST AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTION. AS RESULT SMALL CONTINGENT SAUDI SOLDIERS NOW ENCAMPED ON YEMEN SIDE NEAR HOSPITAL UNIT FOR SOLE PURPOSE PROVIDING RED CROSS WITH SECURITY GUARD. UN OBSERVERS LOCATED AT UKE ON SAUDI SIDE OF BORDER FULLY AWARE PRESENCE SAUDIS IN YEMEN TERRITORY, BUT SO FAR AS WE AWARE HAVE NOT MADE ISSUE OF MATTER WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES NOR WITH SAG.

GP-3.

HART

BJA:22.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By rg/jc, NARA, Date 2-7-06~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*62*

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action:

Control:  
Rec'd:

113  
January 1, 1964  
10:36 a.m.

FROM: Jidda

ACTION: SECSTATE 688, Immediate

INFO: Cairo 248

Dhahran 528

EUR: Baghdad 28

IO: Kuwait 38

AIDA: London 206

INR: USUN 195, Immediate

Taiz 208, Priority

RMR

DATE: January 1, 4 p.m.

FILE COPY

\_\_\_BUNDY-SMITH  
\_\_\_ALEXANDER  
\_\_\_BELK  
\_\_\_BRUBEN  
\_\_\_CHAS  
\_\_\_DING  
\_\_\_DUN  
\_\_\_ECKE  
\_\_\_FOR  
\_\_\_JOHNSON  
\_\_\_KILDU  
\_\_\_KLEIN  
\_\_\_KOMER  
\_\_\_SAUBER  
\_\_\_SCHLESINGER  
\_\_\_SMITH, WM. Y.

Yemen Disengagement

Saqqaf has informed Embassy Faysal has agreed to extend UNYOM by two months and that word would be cabled to New York today or tomorrow.

GP-3.

HART

HEK/6

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 1/1/64, 10:59 a.m.

Passed White House 1/1/64, 11:05 a.m.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *Hyfr* NARA, Date *2-7-06*

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Lenny

63

39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

19905

Rec'd:

DECEMBER 31, 1963

10:25 AM

Action

NEA

FROM: JIDDA

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 685

G

SP

INFO: GENEVA 17

L

USUN 194

EUR

TAIZ 206

IO

CAIRO 246

AIDA

P

DATE: DECEMBER 31, 3 PM

IOP

INR

RMR

SWISS CHARGE PETER ERNI (PROTECT SOURCE), WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM SPENDING CHRISTMAS WITH SWISS RED CROSS UNIT AT NEJRAN. GAVE ME FILL-IN ON HOSPITAL'S ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS.

SWISS HAVE TEAM OF ABOUT 30 CONDUCTING 50-BED HOSPITAL IN UGD TO EAST OF NEJRAN INSIDE YEMENI BORDER, INCLUDING SIX OR SEVEN SWISS DOCTORS AMONG WHOM IS ONE OUTSTANDING SURGEON PLUS OTHER HOSPITAL PERSONNEL AND SOME EIGHT NURSES. HOSPITAL IS BUSY THOUGH AT PRESENT ONLY 40 PERCENT ITS PATIENTS ARE WAR WOUNDED, REMAINDER BEING RUN OF THE MILL ILLNESSES ENDEMIC TO AREA.

SWISS FACE GROWING PROBLEM AS HOSPITAL'S REPUTATION EXPANDS AND THEY WILL SOON HAVE TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE MEANS SORTING OUT PATIENTS WITH MINOR ILLNESSES FROM THOSE REQUIRING HIGHLY-SKILLED TREATMENT WHICH UNIT CAPABLE ADMINISTERING. OUTSTANDING ELEMENT OF UNIT IS "CLIN-T-BOX" MOBILE UNIT OPERATING ROOM FOR WHICH TRANSPORT TO SAUDI ARABIA SUPPLIED BY USAF (DEPTEL 381). EVEN WITH PRESENT MODEST FACILITIES SWISS ARE BRINGING TO NORTH YEMEN MEDICAL FACILITY OF TYPE UNKNOWN HITHERTO IN AREA. JUSTIFICATION FOR THESE ENDEAVORS MUST REST LARGELY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS ALTHOUGH THEORETICALLY AT LEAST SOME POLITICAL BENEFIT CAN BE ENVISAGED FROM SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATION HUMAN INTEREST ON PART RPT PART WESTERN WORLD AMONG PEOPLE HITHERTO WHOLLY NEGLECTED.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By 121, NARA, Date 11-13-06~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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-2- 685, DECEMBER 31, 3 PM, FROM JIDDA

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOME FORM COULD SIMILARLY SERVE PROVE FUNDAMENTAL U.S. SYMPATHY FOR PEOPLE IN AREA INCLINED NOW TOWARD ANTI-U.S. BITTERNESS BECAUSE OF COMMON MISCONCEPTION THAT U.S. SUPPORTING UAR IN YEMEN.

WE INFORMED IRC HAS ENCOUNTERED GENERALLY TEPID RESPONSE TO APPEALS FOR ASSISTANCE FOR YEMENI HOSPITAL UNIT. BIGGEST PROBLEM WILL BE FINDING REPLACEMENT FOR SWISS DOCTORS WHO CANNOT DEVOTE CAREERS INDEFINITELY TO WORKING IN YEMEN. FUNDS MAY SOONER BECOME ISSUE HOWEVER RATHER THAN PERSONNEL SINCE WE UNDERSTAND SWISS GOVERNMENT WILL IN NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS REVIEW QUESTION AVAILABILITY FINANCES FOR CONTINUANCE OF UNIT.

EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER INFO DEPT MAY HAVE ON AMERICAN RED CROSS CONTRIBUTION TO DATE AND GENERAL ARC ATTITUDE TOWARD WHOLE PROJECT. OUR INCLINATION WOULD BE RECOMMEND ARC CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST FUNDS AND SUPPLIES AS LONG AS SWISS THINK THEY CAN KEEP OPERATION ALIVE. IF ARC FAVORABLY INCLINED BELIEVE IT SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM SUPPLYING PERSONNEL FOR WHAT IS CLEARLY WORTHY HUMANITARIAN EFFORT. ANY DOUBTS OR CRITICISMS FROM YAR OR UAR COULD EASILY BE REBUFFED BY SIMPLE COMPARISON OF VERY MODEST U.S. EFFORT FOR COMPLETELY NEGLECTED POPULATION OF NORTH YEMEN WITH EXTENSIVE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLE OF YAR AND UAR.

GP-4.

HART

BAP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen**64*~~SECRET~~

33  
Action Control: 19631  
Rec'd: DECEMBER 31, 1963  
3:20 A.M.

IO  
Info FROM: JIUDA  
ACTION: SECSTATE 680

SS  
G INFO: CAIRO 245  
SP DHAHRAN 525  
L LONDON 205  
H TAIZ 205  
EUR USUN 193  
NEA

AIDA  
P DATE: DECEMBER 31, 10 A.M.

IOP  
INR LONDON'S 2949 TO DEPT  
RMR

022

CROWE (PROTECT SOURCE) TOLD ME THAT IN MAKING APPROACH TO SAQQAF PURSUANT INSTRUCTIONS MENTIONED REFTEL HE AVOIDED SAYING ANYTHING WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE SPINELLI'S FIGURES ON UAR NET WITHDRAWALS. HE AND I HAVE LONG SINCE AGREED NO ONE ON OUR STAFFS WOULD MAKE COMMENTS REFLECTING ADVERSELY ON SPINELLI'S OR SYG'S ESTIMATES. IN SYG'S LAST TELEGRAM TO FAYSAL HE GIVES HIS OWN ESTIMATE THAT 20,000 TROOPS STILL IN YEMEN BUT ADDS OTHERS CONSIDER THIS TOTAL TO BE LOW.

GP-3.

HART

DLW

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 06-95  
By id, NARA, Date 11-13-06

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Bundy* 65  
827

42

~~SECRET~~

Control: -19611  
Rec'd: DECEMBER 31, 1963  
3 AM

Action

NEA

FROM: JIDDA

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 677 IMMEDIATE  
USUN 192 IMMEDIATE

G

SP

L

INFO: CAIRO 244  
DHAHRAN 522  
LONDON 203  
TAIZ 204

EUR

IO

AIDA

INR

RMR

DATE: DECEMBER 30, 7 PM

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAL 06-95  
By *ral*, NARA, Date *11-13-06*

USUN'S 2605 TO DEPT.

DISENGAGEMENT AND UNYOM RENEWAL

SAQQAF AND PHARAON PROCEEDED RIYADH MORNING DEC 29 WITH GIST REFTEL AS INDICATED EMBTEL 670. ON DEC 28 I MADE PERSONAL RECOMMENDATION TO BOTH THAT SINCE UAR HAD ACCEPTED UNQUALIFIED SIX MONTHS RENEWAL UNYOM, SAG DO LIKEWISE. THEY WERE EXPECTING FULL TEXT SYG'S LETTER FROM BAROODY DEC 28 OR 29. IT DID NOT ARRIVE, HOWEVER, UNTIL THIS MORNING JUST AFTER SAQQAF'S RETURN TO JIDDA. DELAY HAD CAUSED SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO SAQQAF AT RIYADH. HOWEVER SAQQAF HAD MEANWHILE PRESENTED TO FAYSAL PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH "PLEASED EVERYONE," (I ASSUME HE MEANT FAYSAL, PHARAON AND HIMSELF), AND HAD LEFT WARM DRAFT REPLY FOR FAYSAL TO SIGN STATING HE WOULD RENEW UNYOM BUT FOR TIME INTERVAL WHICH SAQQAF LEFT BLANK FOR FAYSAL TO FILL IN.

ON SUMMONING ME JUST AFTER HIS RETURN THIS MORNING, SAQQAF STATED PHARAON, WHO STILL AT RIYADH, HAD JUST PHONED TO SAY SYG'S REPLY HAD NOT BEEN FOUND SATISFACTORY AND "CONTAINED NOTHING NEW." PHARAON HAD PROPOSED SAQQAF DISCUSS TEXT WITH ME. SAQQAF THEN READ ME LETTER IN TRANSLATION WITH REFERENCES TO ORIGINAL ARABIC AS NECESSARY. AFTER REVIEWING IT I STATED EMPHATICALLY I FOUND IT EXCELLENT AND FAR MORE FORTHCOMING THAN WE HAD RIGHT TO EXPECT. IN FACT IT WAS GREATLY BETTER THAN

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 677, DECEMBER 30, 7 P.M., FROM JIDDA

THAN PHRASEOLOGY PROPOSED BY PHARAON TO ME MIDNIGHT DEC 27 FOR SUGGESTION TO SYG AND WHICH HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY SAQQAF AND PRINCE SULTAN.

NOTE: THIS HAD BEEN IN PREPARATION AT EMBASSY FOR TRANSMISSION TO DEPT AND USUN ON DEC 28 WHEN IT WAS SUPERSEDED BY REFTEL AND WAS THEREFORE NOT SENT. IMPORTANT PORTION PHARAON'S PHRASEOLOGY HAD DEALT WITH FAYSAL'S SECOND QUESTION AND READ AS FOLLOWS:

"AS RESULT SPINELLI DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTIES. HIS FINDINGS FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS AND HIS REPORT TO SYG, SYG HAS GREAT HOPE FOR SUCCESS OF RENEWED EFFORTS BY SPINELLI AS HIS PERSONAL ENVOY, SUPPLEMENTED BY EFFORTS OF PEACE-LOVING GOVERNMENTS, IN FINDING POLITICAL SOLUTION TO YEMENI PROBLEM. SYG ESTIMATES PERIOD SIX MONTHS NEEDED TO BRING SUCH EFFORTS TO FRUITION. IT THEREFORE REQUESTS HRH IN HIS WISDOM TO COOPERATE BY AGREEING TO THIS EXTENSION IN ORDER CRYSTALLIZE FRUITFUL RESULTS."

SAQQAF NOTED THAT SYG'S REPLY HAD NOT MENTIONED THAT FINDINGS BY SPINELLI GAVE "GREAT HOPE FOR SUCCESS OF RENEWED EFFORTS" ETC. I SAID THAT IN MY OPINION SYG'S REPLY (TRANSLATION BY SEPARATE MESSAGE) DID FAR MORE THAN THIS. IT WAS ALTOGETHER REMARKABLE DOCUMENT FOR SYG TO HAVE SENT. I THOUGHT IT UNPRECEDENTED FOR SYG IN HIS POSITION TO GO THIS FAR. I DOUBTED VERY MUCH THAT THERE WAS ANY PURPOSE TO BE ACHIEVED IN ASKING FOR A GREATER COMMITMENT BY THE SYG THAN THIS. SAQQAF SEEMED TO AGREE. I THEN ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE AT ALL FOR ME TO PROCEED TO RIYADH AND DELIVER MY INSTRUCTIONS ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENT'S LETTER (DEPCIRTEL 1133) SAQQAF REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS NEGATIVE VIEW REPORTED EMBTEL 669. HE WAS SURE FAYSAL WOULD RENEW UNYOM AND IT WOULD BE BEST TO INDICATE THEREIN NOW NO MORE ROOM FOR MANOEUVER.

AFTER SOME DISCUSSION I THEN SUGGESTED:

/SAQQAF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 677, DECEMBER 30, 7 P.M., FROM JIDDA

SAQQAF INFORM PHARAON (A) I FELT SYG'S LETTER MUCH BETTER THAN SHORT TEXT WE HAD JOINTLY AGREED ON DEC 27 TO REFER TO SYG VIA USUN.

(B) SYG'S LETTER WAS UNPRECEDENTED AND SAG WILL GET NOTHING BETTER, THEREFORE USELESS TO ASK.

(C) USG ATTACHES GREATEST IMPORTANCE FAYSAL'S REPLY.

(D) IF REPLY IS NEGATIVE MATTER WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF US HANDS.

SAQQAF FULLY AGREED AND WANTED TO ADD THAT MY OWN ADVICE TO PRINCE WAS THAT IT WAS UP TO HIM TO DECIDE WHAT WAS TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE. I DEMURRED ON THIS AND INSTEAD SAQQAF DECIDED MAKE THIS HIS OWN RECOMMENDATION, NAMELY, THAT FAYSAL SAY TO SYG A FLAT YES OR NO. IN MY PRESENCE SAQQAF THEN PHONED PHARAON AT RIYADH, TOLD HIM I WAS THERE AND GAVE HIM MY REACTIONS (A) THROUGH (D). IN CONNECTION REACTION (A) PHARAON PROTESTED THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID BY SYG TO EFFECT SPINELLI'S REPORTS ENCOURAGED SYG TO GREAT HOPE FOR SUCCESS OF RENEWED EFFORTS. SAQQAF BRUSHED THIS ASIDE, SAYING I FELT SYG'S LETTER CARRIED ALL OF THIS AND MORE. SAQQAF THEN MADE CLEAR TO PHARAON MATTER WAS IN HANDS RIYADH, NOTHING MORE TO BE SAID FROM THIS END.

ON HANGING UP HE TOLD ME AGAIN HE QUITE SURE FAYSAL WOULD RENEW BUT MIGHT DELAY REPLY SINCE DISENGAGEMENT, AS SYG HAD SAID. DID NOT COME TO END UNLESS DENOUNCED BY ONE OF PARTIES. I SAID THIS WAS NOT QUITE THE PROBLEM. DISTINCTION HAD TO BE MADE BETWEEN DISENGAGEMENT WHICH CONTINUES UNTIL DENOUNCED AND UNYOM RENEWAL, WHICH STILL HAD TO BE FINANCED AT PERHAPS ONE-THIRD PREVIOUS COSTS BY SAG AND UAR. SAQQAF RESPONDED HE THOUGHT FAYSAL MIGHT WAIT DAY OR TWO AND RENEW FOR TWO MORE MONTHS. I OBSERVED THAT IN MEANTIME SYG MIGHT HAVE TO PUBLISH A REPORT. SAQQAF'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THIS REPORT WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO SAY NO ANSWER YET RECEIVED FROM SAG.

/AGAIN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 677, DECEMBER 30, 7 P.M., FROM JIDDA

AGAIN HE SAID ANSWER WOULD NOT BE NEGATIVE AS HE KNEW FAYSAL'S MIND VERY WELL.

RECOMMENDATION:

AT USUN AS MAY BE USEFUL, SHARE FOREGOING WITH SYG AND ADD THAT IT IS MY PERSONAL BELIEF FAYSAL WILL RENEW BUT I AM NOT SURE HE WILL DO SO FOR MORE THAN TWO MONTHS. AFTER THAT HE MAY RENEW AGAIN. TO RENEW NOW FOR SIX MONTHS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO DRAMATICALLY WRITING OFF ROYALISTS AND EASING PRESSURE ON UAR. HE MAY NOT BE READY FOR THIS.

GP-3.

HART

DLW

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:12 A.M., 12/31/63.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4:00 A.M., 12/31/63.

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

*Yemen*

66

53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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NNNNVV EUB067RED060  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUQPRH 26C 30/1410Z  
R 300605Z  
FM AMEMBASSY TAIZ YEMEN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO UAR  
STATE  
BT

019180

1973 DEC 30 AM 11 11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 412 INFO CAIRO 204, DECEMBER 28, 3 PM. EMBOFF HAD LENGTHY CONVERSATION DECEMBER 28 MOHAMMED SAID ABDO RAHMAN. ABDO RAHMAN MEMBER BOARD YEMEN BANK, HAS BA FROM CAIRO, RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED YOUNG MAN. ABDO RAHMAN CLAIMS HE ONE BANK OFFICERS CONCERNED ISSUING PAPER MONEY SOMETIME LATE JANUARY EARLY FEBRUARY. CLAIMS NEW NOTE WILL BE INTERNAL CURRENCY ONLY, VALUED AT TWENTY EAST AFRICAN SHILLINGS. SAME TIME NEW CURRENCY INITIATED, STRICT CONTROLS ON IMPORTS WILL BE IMPOSED SAVE DRAIN ON HARD CURRENCY FROM LUXURY PURCHASES. ALSO, ABDO RAHMAN SAYS ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE PROMOTE WIDER SALE YEMEN COFFEE, COTTON ORDER OBTAIN MORE

PAGE 2 RUQPDS 26C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HARD CURRENCY. SAID PRESENT USE COFFEE COTTON PAY OFF ARMS, DEVELOPMENT CREDITS FROM SOVIET UNION NOT SATISFACTORY. YEMEN HOPES WIGGLE OUT OF THESE AGREEMENTS WITH RUSSIANS. SAID BANK OFFICIALS PARTICULARLY UPSET THAT GOVERNMENT IN SANAA APPROVED PURCHASE RUSSIAN WHEAT AUGUST-SEPTEMBER USING UP LAST BITS YAR HARD CURRENCY RESERVES. EMBOFF REMARKED ECONOMIC PLANS OUTLINED ABOVE SEEMED AMBITIOUS. ASKED WHAT GOVERNMENT WOULD CARRY THEM OUT. ABDO RAHMAN SUPPOSED THAT EGYPTIAN ADVISORS WOULD BE MAIN ADMINISTRATORS AND OBSERVED QUOTE THEY RUNNING EVERYTHING NOW ANYWAY UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, ABDO RAHMAN SAID PEOPLE HIS CIRCLE NOT HAPPY WITH EGYPTIAN PRESENCE SAYING QUOTE EGYPTIANS ARE STUPID SELFISH ADMINISTRATORS. WANT EVERYTHING FOR THEMSELVES UNQUOTE. ABDO RAHMAN SAID HE FELT BEST SOLUTION NOW WOULD BE END PRETENSE, UNIFY WITH UAR, BUT HE INDICATED NASSER WANTED NO PART UNION. GP-4 CORTADA  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 06-95  
By *idc* NARA, Date 10-26-06

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen* 67

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action 163VV EUA28LGD03 I  
RR RUEHC  
NEA DE RUQPDS 33C 30/1410Z  
R 300603Z  
Info FM AMEMBASSY TAI Z YEMEN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
SS INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO UAR  
G RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA  
SP STATE  
IO BT

19372

1963 DEC 30 PM 2:29

E C O N F I D E N T I A L ACTION DEPT 410 INFO CAIRO 202 JIDDA 155,  
DECEMBER 26, 9 AM. DEPTTEL 415; EMBTEL 395. FROM BENNSKY/BROWN.  
AID MERCHANT, BANKING AND GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN ADEN AND TAI Z INDICATE  
P ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH YEMEN, AS GOOD IF NOT BETTER THAN  
USIA PRIOR TO REVOLUTION. CONTINUED USG EXPENDITURES LARGELY RESPONSIBLE  
INR FOR MAINTAINING ECONOMIC LEVEL. IN ADDITION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  
RMR IN SOUTH YEMEN, TIHAMA AND CENTRAL PLAIN (AS FAR NORTH AS DHAMAR)  
REPORTED BETTER THAN ANY TIME IN PAST FIVE YEARS AS RESULT  
UNUSUALLY GOOD RAINFALL. NEVERTHELESS, EXISTENCE IN TIHAMA STILL  
SUB-MARGINAL AND ELSEWHERE IN AGRICULTURAL SECTORS LITTLE BETTER.

PAGE 2 RUQPDS 33C C O N F I D E N T I A L  
TRADE PATTERNS HAVE BEEN ALTERED SOMEWHAT BUT NO INDICATION SOVBLOC  
AND UAR GAINING CONTROL YEMEN FOREIGN COMMERCE DESPITE ATTEMPTS THIS  
DIRECTION. OVERALL VOLUME FOREIGN TRADE APPEARS BE GREATER THAN PRIOR  
REVOLUTION DUE TO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED  
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AND ALSO BECAUSE OF HIGHER IMPORTS SUSTAINED  
BY UAR TROOPS AND PURCHASES BY SOV TECHNICIANS. ON OTHER HAND, GYAR  
FACING INCREASING BUDGET DEFICIT DESPITE PACT CUSTOMS DUTIES  
CONTINUE BEING COLLECTED AND AGRICULTURAL TAXES REPORTEDLY BEING  
PAID IN SOUTH YEMEN. LARGE PORTION THESE REVENUES REPORTEDLY BEING  
USED PAY OFF TRIBES IN NORTH YEMEN, FROM WHICH NO TAXES BEING  
RECEIVED. EGYPTIANS APPARENTLY EXERCISING BUDGETARY CONTROL  
NECESSARY SEE THAT ARMY TAI Z PAID FROM LOCAL REVENUE. CIVIL SERVANTS  
PAY IN TAI Z REPORTED TO BE UP TO THREE MONTHS IN ARREARS. IN EFFORT  
OVERCOME ILL-ADVISED POST REVOLUTIONARY SALARY INCREASES, GYAR HAS  
INSTITUTED PAYROLL TAX AND ACTUAL PAYMENT WHEN MADE APPROXIMATELY  
50 PERCENT OF STATED SALARIES. CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT ECONOMIC  
LEGISLATION HAS BEEN ENACTED BUT VIRTUALLY NONE IS BEING ENFORCED.  
WHEREAS EGYPTIANS HAVE PLAYED PREDOMINANT ROLE IN DRAFTING ECONOMIC  
REGULATIONS AND INITIALLY ATTEMPTED IMPOSE THEIR CONTROL OVER

PAGE 3 RUQPDS 33C C O N F I D E N T I A L  
ECONOMY, IN RECENT MONTHS THEY HAVE EITHER GIVEN UP OR PURPOSELY

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By ghe, NARA, Date 2-7-06

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-2- 410, December 26, 9 a.m. From Taiz

WITHDRAWN AND LEFT TASK OF ECONOMIC CONTROL TO YEMENI S. ECONOMY SOUTH YEMEN, FOR EXAMPLE, VIRTUALLY UNEFFECTED BY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION. EGYPTIANS THEMSELVES APPARENTLY HAVE PLANS FOR MARKETING YEMENI PRODUCTS (I.E., COFFEE, AND SKINS) THROUGH EGYPT AND COMPELLING YEMENI S PURCHASE EGYPTIAN PRODUCTS, NOTABLY TEXTILES AND PETROLEUM. AS INDUCEMENT TO PURCHASE FROM UAR, ALL EGYPTIAN PRODUCTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN 25 PERCENT CUSTOMS REDUCTION. EGYPTIAN APPROACH BEARS DISTINCT TRACES 19TH CENTURY ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM. TO DATE YEMENI MERCHANTS HAVE RESISTED EGYPTIAN PRESSURES AND NO CONCERTED EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO COMPEL THEM TO TRADE WITH UAR. CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS EXISTS IN BUSINESS COMMUNITY, HOWEVER, THAT ACTION MAY BE EVENTUALLY BE TAKEN TO FORCE THEM TO ACCEPT EGYPTIAN PRODUCTS. ALL SOURCES HAVE INDICATED THAT GYAR WILL ISSUE PAPER CURRENCY IN JANUARY. THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS GYAR SEES THIS AS ONLY MEANS MEETING ITS BUDGET PROBLEM. IN ATTEMPT GAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE, TRIBESMEN ACQUIRING PAPER WILL BE GIVEN SILVER IN EXCHANGE ON DEMAND. TOWNSPEOPLE AND MERCHANTS, HOWEVER, WILL BE COMPELLED ACCEPT CURRENCY AND APPLY TO YEMEN BANK RECONSTRUCTION

PAGE 4 RUQPDS 33C C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AND DEVELOPMENT (YBRD) FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE. YBRD TAI Z MANAGER ADMITS THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS TO SUPPORT NORMAL LEVEL FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS. YBRD DOES NOT APPEAR HAVE TALENT REQUIRED MANAGE PAPER CURRENCY ISSUE AND ATTENDANT EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND GYAR OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. INTENTION INTRODUCE PAPER MONEY HAS EXISTED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND FAILURE IMPLEMENT PLAN HAS BEEN DUE TO HESITANCY PROCEEDING WITHOUT ADEQUATE COVER. ATTEMPTS STILL BEING MADE ACQUIRE FOREIGN EXCHANGE FROM KUWAIT. WHILE PRESSURES AND TEMPTATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MEETING BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH ISSUING PAPER CURRENCY, ARE GREAT, POSSIBILITY EXISTS GYAR STILL MAY NOT TAKE STEP WITHOUT PROPER BACKING. IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT ABOVE SUMMARY INFORMATION BASED LARGELY ON DISCUSSIONS WITH SHAFIES. PROCEEDING TO SANAA TO SEE GOVERNMENT, UAR AND ZAI DES  
DECEMBER 26. GP-3 CORTADA  
BT

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

Yemen

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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TO

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OO RUEHCR RUQVRA RUQVDA RUDTLN

Info

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O 280745Z ZEA

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

L

RUQVDA/AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN

EUR

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

BT

STATE GRNC

NEA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (2605) INFO

AIDA

IMMEDIATE JIDDA 133 CAIRO 183 PRIORITY TAIZ 124 DHAHRAN 16

P

LONDON 453 DECEMBER 28, 2:45 AM

IOP

INR

RMR

YEMEN: UNYOM RENEWAL

REF: USUN 2575 AND 2583; JIDDA'S 665 TO DEPT

ON BASIS DORRANCE-DICKINSON TELECON PLIMPTON SAW SYG AND BUNCHE AT 1:00 PM DEC 27 TO CONVEY INFO CONTAINED JIDDA TEL 665. SAQQAF NOT REVEALED TO SYG AS SOURCE. BUNCHE PRODUCED LETTER FROM BAROODY DATED 23 DEC ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT SYG'S LETTER (USUN 2575) AND STATING HE CABLING IT IMMEDIATELY TO FAYSAL. BUNCHE SAID DESCRIPTION "WILD MESSAGES" FROM BAROODY WAS EXACTLY OPPOSITE LINE BAROODY TAKING WITH EVERYONE HERE TO EFFECT UAR BEING EXHAUSTED BY YEMEN CAMPAIGN AND CONTINUANCE UNYOM TO SAG'S ADVANTAGE. SYG AGREED BEST STEP WAS PLIMPTON NOTIFY HART MESSAGE APPARENTLY SENT AND FOR HART HAVE SAQQAF FIND OUT FROM FAYSAL IF RECEIVED DIRECTLY BY HIM.

CFN 2605 133 183 124 16 453 28 2:45 2575 2583 665 1:00  
27 665 23 2575

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 10 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AS PLIMPTON LEAVING, BUNCHE RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM BAROODY WHO SAID MESSAGE JUST IN FROM FAYSAL AND BEING DECODED. ACCORDINGLY, MISSION OFFICER NOTIFIED DORRANCE BY PHONE IT NECESSARY AWAIT REPORT CONTENTS MESSAGE WHICH BUNCHE PROMISED SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By id, NARA, Date 11-13-06~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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-2- 2605, December 28, 3 a.m., from New York

BAROODY CALLED ON SYG TO DELIVER MESSAGE AT 3:00 PM AND BUNCHE THEN SO INVOLVED IN WRITING IMMEDIATE REPLY HE UNABLE SEE MISSION OFFICER UNTIL 6:30 PM AT WHICH TIME HE SHOWED HIM:  
1) LETTER FROM BAROODY DATED 27 DEC TRANSMITTING FAYSAL'S REPLY TO SYG'S LETTER, 2) SYG'S LETTER DATED 27 DEC TRANSMITTING NEW APPEAL FROM SYG TO FAYSAL THROUGH BAROODY, 3) LETTER DATED 27 DEC FROM UAR PERM REP RIAD TRANSMITTING NASSER'S REPLY TO SYG'S LETTER. CONTENTS THREE LETTERS ESSENTIALLY AS FOLLS:

1) FAYSAL LETTER TO SYG: WHILE THANKING YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR GOOD EFFORTS WE WISH ASSURE YOU WE HAVE LIVED UP TO DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHEREAS OTHERS HAVE NOT. BEFORE WE COULD DEFINE OUR POLICY TOWARD RENEWAL OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REPLY TO TWO QUESTIONS: (A) WHAT ARE THE RESULTS WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED FROM DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND (B) IF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT IS RENEWED, WHAT ARE MEASURES WHICH UN INTENDS TO TAKE TO INSURE AGREEMENT CARRIED OUT? IT IS IN LIGHT OF SUCH MEASURES THAT SAG WILL MAKE ITS DECISION.  
CFN 3:00 6:30 1) 27 2) 27 3) 27 1)

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 10 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2) SYG REPLY TO FAYSAL: SYG REEXPRESSES APPRECIATION FAYSAL'S KIND COMMENTS ON UN EFFORTS BUT REGRETS FAYSAL HAS NOT BEEN ABLE AGREE TO EXTENSION UNYOM. SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO TWO QUESTIONS ASKED BY FAYSAL, SYG WISHES SAY: FIRST QUESTION - RESULTS OF DISENGAGEMENT THUS FAR UNSATISFACTORY. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS 11,000 UAR TROOPS WITHDRAWN FROM YEMEN. WHILE MAXIMUM FIGURE IN COUNTRY NEVER KNOWN DEFINITELY, IT SEEMS ABOUT 20,000 REMAIN. UAR REPORTEDLY PLANS FURTHER WITHDRAWALS SOON WITH PLANNED PROGRAM OF PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWALS TO FOLLOW THEREAFTER. MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO ROYALISTS HAS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES STOPPED. AIR ATTACKS ON SA HAVE CEASED AND SUCH ATTACKS ON ROYALISTS DIMINISHED. IT IS NOT QUESTION OF RENEWING DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, WHICH REMAINS IN FORCE UNTIL DISAVOWED BY ONE OF PARTIES. UNYOM, ON OTHER HAND, HAS TIME LIMIT AND MUST BE SPECIFICALLY RENEWED. SECOND QUESTION - STEPS UN CAN TAKE ARE LIMITED. IT CANNOT "INSURE" AGREEMENT CARRIED OUT. IT CAN ONLY OBSERVE AND CONFIRM IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, UNYOM HAS BEEN BENEFICIAL AS HAS SPINELLI PRESENCE. SYG WILL CONTINUE TAKE ALL STEPS HE CAN TO IMPROVE SITUATION AND SPINELLI WILL CONTINUE BE AVAILABLE TO PARTIES CONCERNED.  
CFN 2) 11,000 20,000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3- 2605, December 28, 3 a.m., from New York

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 10 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LETTER CLOSES WITH RENEWED APPEAL TO FAYSAL TO AGREE TO  
EXTENSION OF UNYOM AT PRESENT STRENGTH AND UNDER PRESENT  
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS. (BUNCHE EXPLAINS THAT SYG LETTER  
DATED 23 DEC TO FAYSAL SAID IT WAS PROPOSED CONTINUE UNYOM AT  
PRESENT REDUCED LEVEL AND COSTS.) FAILURE EXTEND UNYOM WOULD  
RESULT IN SERIOUS DETERIORATION SITUATION WITH PROBABLE RESULT  
EXTENSION CONFLICT BEYOND YEMEN BORDERS.

3) RIAD LETTER TO SYG: VERY BRIEF LETTER ACKNOWLEDGES SYG  
LETTER 23 DEC TO NASSER AND STATES NASSER ACCEPTS PROPOSAL  
CONTAINED IN IT.

GP-3. PLIMPTON

BT

CFN 23 3) 23 GP-3

NOTE: HANDLED LIMIT DISTRIBUTION PER SS-0

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Yemen*

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~~SECRET~~

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EMB 24  
RR RUEHCR RUEHDT  
DE RUDTLN 689C 27/1820Z  
R 271757Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1963 DEC 27 PM 203

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *sig* NARA, Date 4-1-92

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT [2949] INFO CAIRO 99 TAIZ 81 JIDDA 046  
101 USUN 261 FROM LONDON DECEMBER 27, 6 PM

IN ADDITION ACTIONS REPORTED EMBTEL 2923, MCCARTHY (ACTING DIRECTOR, ARABIAN DEPT) TOLD US TODAY UK AMB CROWE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY TO SAG THAT, IN HMG'S VIEW, FAISAL'S OWN BEST INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED IF HE DOES NOT RPT NOT RESUME AID TO YEMENI ROYALISTS AFTER JANUARY 4. CROWE WILL ALSO MAKE POINT THAT CONTINUED SAG SUPPORT FOR SPINELLI MISSION OFFERS BEST MODALITY WORK TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN YEMEN. MCCARTHY REITERATED FONOFF'S CONCERN ABOUT FAISAL'S POSSIBLE ADVERSE REACTION WHEN HE DISCOVERS SPINELLI MISINFORMED RE REAL UAR TROOP DRAWDOWN. HOWEVER, FONOFF'S PRESENT THINKING IS IT WILL LEAVE TO UKUN'S DISCRETION WHETHER OR NOT INFORM SYG OF TRUE FACTS UAR TROOP STRENGTH IN YEMEN.

PERTINENT INFORMATION DEPTTEL 3907 ALSO CONVEYED TO MCCARTHY. HE NOTED REPORT AGAIN EMPHASIZES HOW LITTLE YAR IS "MASTER IN ITS OWN HOUSE" AND RAISES DISTURBING QUESTION OF WHAT CHANCE IT HAS OF BECOMING SO. RE PULLBACK, HE SAID WILL PROBABLY BE AT LEAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS BEFORE DUST SETTLES SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW PROPOSAL BE PURSUED FURTHER, BUT REAFFIRMED FONOFF'S CONTINUED INTEREST THEREIN. HE ALSO NOTED UK MILITARY HAS NOT EXPRESSED ANTICIPATED CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFECT OF YAR COUNTER PROPOSAL IN CUTTING ROAD LINK BETWEEN NAGD MARGAD AND WADI AIN (EMBTEL 2717). HE LEFT US WITH IMPRESSION POSSIBLE BRITISH COUNTER PROPOSAL TO YAR MAY NOW BE LIMITED TO YEMENI EVACUATION OF HARIB ALONE RATHER THAN BOTH IT AND HARIB AIRSTRIP. WE ASKED IF YAR COUNTER PROPOSAL IS NOT SIMILAR TO ONE WORKED OUT SOME YEARS AGO BETWEEN ADEN AUTHORITIES

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2949, DECEMBER 27, 6 PM, FROM LONDON

AND SHAMI. MCCARTHY SAID HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW, BUT  
THAT IN ANY CASE YEMENI SITUATION HAS CHANGED SO DRASTICALLY  
IN LAST YEAR THAT WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE SOME  
YEARS AGO IS NOT NECESSARILY SO NOW.

GP-3. JONES  
BT

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*

*70*

48

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 16203  
Rec'd: DECEMBER 24, 1963  
1:33 A.M.

NEA

FROM: JIDDA

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 655 IMMEDIATE

036

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SP

INFO: USUN 185 IMMEDIATE

L

CAIRO 238

EUR

DHAHRAN 509

IO

LONDON 199

AIDA

TAIZ 199

INR

RMR

DATE: DECEMBER 23, 7 P.M.

## LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

REFERENCE: EMBASSY'S TELEGRAMS 624, 651; DEPARTMENT'S CIRCULAR TELEGRAM 1095.

AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA; DISENGAGEMENT; HAVE JUST COMPLETED 4-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE SULTAN, RASHAD PHARAON. SAQQAF PRESENT BUT TOOK LITTLE PART. SABBAGH AND I WERE ONLY OTHERS PRESENT. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN HOME OF SAQQAF IN ORDER HAVE PRIVATE ATMOSPHERE TO MEETING, WHICH WHILE CHARACTERIZED AS "INFORMAL" CARRIED DEEP OFFICIAL UNDERTONE.

## SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

1. FAYSAL HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO RENEW UNYOM BUT IT APPEARS THAT HIS EMISSARIES WITH HIS CONSENT ARE LOOKING FOR MATERIAL TO HELP HIM JUSTIFY ANOTHER EXTENSION.

2. SAUDIS PRESENT SEEMED RECOGNIZE IMPLICIT ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY SAUDI ARABIA AS RESULT COMPLIANCE WITH DISENGAGEMENT AND AS COMPARED WITH UAR, BUT FAYSAL STILL SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES TO RENEW.

/3. SAG DOES NOT

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By *id*, NARA, Date *11-13-06*

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 655, DECEMBER 23, 7 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

3. SAG DOES NOT DISPUTE UAR WITHDRAWAL FIGURES GIVEN BY SPINELLI BUT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER US WILLINGNESS KEEP UP EFFORTS MAKE DISENGAGEMENT WORK AND LENGTH OF TIME THIS WILL TAKE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO PRESSING QUERY BY PHARAON WHETHER IT WAS US POLICY TO LET TIME AND PERHAPS UN EFFORTS TAKE CARE OF YEMEN SITUATION WHILE US WASHED ITS HANDS OF AFFAIR, I REPLIED I KNEW YEMEN PROBLEM HAD ALREADY ENGAGED PERSONAL ATTENTION PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND CONSIDERABLE STUDY GOING ON ABOUT WHICH I EXPECTED HEAR MORE LATER, BUT THAT I COULD ASSURE THEM US SET GREAT STORE BY SPINELLI MISSION WHICH REPRESENTS CHANGE IN UN FROM PURELY PASSIVE OBSERVER AND REPORTING ROLE TO ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING PEACEFUL AS DISTINCT FROM OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE MILITARY SOLUTION.

5. RESPONDING TO COMMENT BY SULTAN THAT FAYSAL HAD BEEN EXPECTING FURTHER COMMUNICATION FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON RE-SPONSIVE TO EARLIER REQUEST MADE TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BEARING UPON US ATTITUDE TOWARD SAUDI ARABIA'S FUTURE AND DEFENSE OF ITS INTEGRITY, I REPLIED I EXPECTED NEXT DAY OR SO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR FAYSAL. I REFUSED TO SPECULATE ON ITS CONTENTS.

6. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION AND ON MY STRONG ADVICE, QUESTION WAS NOT PUT FOR CATEGORICAL REPLY WHETHER US WOULD DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA UNDER ANY AND ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, OR IF AID TO ROYALISTS RENEWED, BUT I MADE REPEATEDLY CLEAR WE WROTE NO BLANK CHECKS AND COULD NOT BE EXPECTED DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA AGAINST PROVOKED ATTACK, AS WOULD BE CASE IF UAR ABANDONED DISENGAGEMENT.

7. EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION SEEMED LEAVE SAUDI GROUP WITH QUALIFIED SATISFACTION AND SULTAN PROPOSED WE MEET AGAIN DECEMBER 26 AT WHICH TIME CONCEIVABLY PRESIDENT'S LETTER MIGHT BE AVAILABLE AND WE WOULD HAVE MORE TO TALK ABOUT WHICH COULD BE USED BY FAYSAL IN JUSTIFYING RENEWAL UNYOM.

/8. PHARAON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 655, DECEMBER 23, 7 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

8. PHARAON SUGGESTED FOLLOWING FORMULA WHICH MIGHT BE USED BY SYG IN RECOMMENDING TO FAYSAL ANOTHER EXTENSION UNYOM. THERE SEEMS TO BE NO REASON WHY USUN COULD NOT MENTION PRIVATELY TO SYG, BUNCHE OR SPINELLI THAT THIS WAS PHARAON'S "PERSONAL" SUGGESTION CONCURRED IN BY ALL SAUDIS PRESENT AND PROBABLY HAVING TACIT SANCTION OF FAYSAL. TEXT FOLLOWS:

"IN VIEW OF APPROACHING EXPIRATION DATE OF THE RENEWAL TWO-MONTH PERIOD OF THE DISENGAGEMENT, AND IN VIEW OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR SPINELLI WHICH INCORPORATES A FEW POSITIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED AIMING AT THE EXECUTION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT ON THE ONE HAND AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE RIGHTS OF YEMENI PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION ON THE OTHER, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE SAUDI ARAB GOVT CONSIDER WITH FAVOR THE RENEWAL FOR A FURTHER PERIOD OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. THE PERIOD OF THIS RENEWAL WOULD ENABLE THE UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS TO REALIZE THE GOALS IN MIND."

PHARAON SUGGESTED THAT IF FORMAL COMMUNICATION FROM SYG TO SAUDI ARAB GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EMBODY ABOVE PHRASEOLOGY FOR ANY PROCEDURAL REASON, SYG MIGHT WISH SEND IT AS PERSONAL REQUEST OR RECOMMENDATION. I DID NOT MENTION TO GROUP THAT SAQQAF HAD PROVIDED ME WITH SIMILAR FORMULA.

ENSUING TELEGRAM WILL SUPPLY DETAILS OF CONVERSATION.

RECOMMENDATION:

THAT USUN PASS FORMULA PROPOSED BY PHARAON TO SYG, BUNCHE OR SPINELLI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH IT IS LIKELY FAYSAL WILL TAKE NO ACTION THEREON UNTIL AFTER OUR THURSDAY MEETING HERE.

GP-3.

HART

NOTE: PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE DECEMBER 24 - 2:34 A.M.  
ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O DECEMBER 24 - 1:58 A.M.

BA:22.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control:

Rec'd:

16888

DECEMBER 24, 1963

3:36 P.M.

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: SECSTATE 2923

INFO: CAIRO 96

JIDDA 99

USUN 249

TAIZ 79

048

DATE: DECEMBER 24, 7 P.M.

FONOFF (BRENCHLEY) TOLD US TODAY:

1. WHILE SLIGHTLY UNEASY THAT SPINELLI MAY BE ALLOWING HIMSELF BE DECEIVED, HMG INSTRUCTING UKUN SPEAK TO SYG URGING THAT SOME SORT OF UN PRESENCE BE KEPT IN YEMAN AFTER JANUARY 4. BRITISH HAVE ALSO HAD REPORTS THAT FAISAL MAY WISH UNYOM REMAIN AND IF SO, THIS FULLY AGREEABLE TO THEM.

2. AS RESULT BRITISH COMMITMENT MADE DURING SECRETARY'S RECENT TALKS WITH BUTLER, FONOFF NOW PREPARING A LIST OF POSSIBLE GROUPS AND PERSONS WHO MIGHT USEFULLY BE INCLUDED IN A BROADLY BASED YEMENI COALITION GOVERNMENT. THEY EXPECT SHORTLY PRESENT LIST TO US FOR COMMENT. LIKE DEPT, FONOFF IS RELUCTANT PRESENT SPECIFIC NAMES TO SPINELLI, BUT BELIEVES HIS MISSION MIGHT BE FURTHERED IF SUCH DATA COULD SOMEHOW BE PROVIDED HIM.

GP-3.

JONES

NAR/22

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 06-95  
By iel, NARA, Date 10-26-06

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Yemen*  
*72*

46

~~SECRET~~

Action

IO

VVVZCZCETD030

Info

RR RUEHCR RUQVRA RUQPDS RUDTLN  
DE RUEHDT 30 24/0225Z

SS

R 240000Z ZEA

G

FM USUN NEW YORK

SP

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

L

INFO RUQPDS/AMEMBASSY TAIZ

EUR

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

NEA

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

P

BT

IOP

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT (2575) INFO JIDDA 131 CAIRO 180

INR

TAIZ 122 LONDON 422 DEC 23 7 PM

RMR

YEMEN

DEPTTEL 1728

YOST SAW SYG AND BUNCHE THIS PM TO INQUIRE INTO CURRENT STATUS YEMEN SITUATION. REFERRING TO LATEST REPORT FROM AMB HART, YOST SAID THERE APPEARED BE ENCOURAGING INDICATIONS, FAYSAL MORE AMENABLE TO CONTINUING UNYOM.

SYG SAID THIS ALSO OPINION SPINELLI AND OF BRITISH AMB TO JIDDA CROWE, WHOM DEAN(UK) REPORTED AS OPTIMISTIC FAYSAL ACCEDE TO EXTENSION.

SYG SAID HE HAD FINAL MTG WITH SPINELLI THIS AM PRIOR LATTER'S DEPARTURE. IN YOST'S PRESENCE HE SIGNED BUT DID NOT READ VERBATIM TO US IDENTICAL LETTERS TO FAYSAL AND NASSER WHICH HE INTENDED DELIVER THIS PM TO SAUDI AND UAR REPS. SYG SAID LETTERS CONTAINED FOL THREE POINTS: (1) STATEMENT HIS BELIEF UNYOM SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN REDUCED FORM FOR SIX MORE MONTHS; (2) REQUEST THAT UAR AND SAG SHARE EQUALLY COSTS THIS REDUCED MISSION WHICH SHOULD BE "SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED" FROM PRESENT COSTS. (SYG NOW ESTIMATES COSTS MAINTAINING UNYOM ROUGHLY AT ABOUT \$70,000 PER MONTH CFN 2575 131 180 122 422 23 7 1728 1 2 \$70,000

PAGE 529 RUEHDT 30 ~~SECRET~~  
BUT UNWILLING COMMIT SELF TO ANY FIGURE IN WRITING NASSER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *rg/jc* NARA, Date *2-7-06*

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2575, DECEMBER 23, 7 PM, FROM: NEW YORK

AND FAYSAL.); (3) HE INTENDS REPORT TO SC ON 31 DEC SO  
HOPED HAVE REPLIES BY 30 DEC. (SYG SAID HE CONSIDERED NECESSARY  
CHECK PROPOSAL WITH SC MEMBERS PRIOR ACTUAL ISSUANCE OF  
REPORT. HE WOULD DO SO BY PHONE AND EXPECTED NO DIFFICULTIES.)

SYG SAID HE HAD HAD APPOINTMENT WITH EL AINY (YEMEN) SCHEDULED  
FOR TODAY BUT LATTER UNABLE COME FROM WASHINGTON BECAUSE  
OF SNOW.

GP-3.

PLIMPTON

BT

CFN 3 31 30 3

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11855

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

51

Origin  
NEA  
Info:

ACTION: CIRCULAR 1133

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Dec 23 8 04 PM '63

SS  
G

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

By lip NARA. Date 4-1-92

SP

Ref: Deptel 1709 to USUN; Deptel 3707 to London, rptd 475 to Jidda; /

2811 to Cairo;

L

CA - 6156

EUR

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

IO

~~Proposed course of action re: Yemen contained in referenced messages.~~

AIDA

INR

~~has been observed at highest level. According to~~ Ambassadors Hart and Badeau  
soon

RMR

should ~~be advised of opportunity~~ meet with Faisal and Nasser respectively for described in referenced messages purpose seeking their full cooperation. While each Ambassador may use discretion re nature and details of presentation to be made, should include points indicated for respective posts in "Recommended Course of Action" (Deptel 3707 to London). Ambassador Hart, however, may adjust in light of talk with Saqqaf as mentioned Jidda's 641. Department suggests following approach:

## A. For Cairo

1. Inappreciable UAR Withdrawals. We deplore failure UAR withdraw substantial number troops from Yemen after six months UNYOM presence. FYI. Best Department intelligence does not rpt not substantiate Spinelli report re substantial withdrawals UAR troops from Yemen. Our estimate is that troop drawdown is at most no more than a few thousand. END FYI. In absence satisfactory UAR performance, USG having increasing difficulties

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:TWSeelye:es:12/21/63

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies  
NR - Col. Bunte  
G/PM - Col. Robinson  
OSD/ISA - Mr. Stoddart  
NEA - Mr. Jernegan

Classification approved by:

IO/UNP - Mr. Buffum  
XXXXX-  
S/S Mr. McKesson  
XXXXXX-  
~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

5. Nasser Faces Serious Dilemma in Yemen. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
Unless

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ UAR finds way to extricate itself, ~~from~~ situation will increasingly take on aspect of occupation. Longer UAR remains there, more Yemeni opposition aroused against UAR presence and thus against YARG. Tribes in north have capability resist central government for many months even without Saudi assistance. Unless UAR now takes ~~advantage~~ advantage opportunities presented, Yemen imbroglio can only go from bad to worse causing instability to entire Arab area and incidentally casting discredit on Arab nationalism and "revolution". Spinelli mission currently offers best hope for UAR in Yemen and Nasser should not let this golden opportunity pass.

B. FOR JIDDA

1. Continued USG Concern for Saudi Integrity. In delivering very confidential letter from President (Deptel 486), you should take special cognizance of President's belief in bed-rock USG-SAG friendship and in fundamental mutuality of USG-SAG interests. (Letter should be closely held and under no circumstances publicly released.) Despite some recent differences over Yemen, should be recalled--as President emphasizes--that US undertook Yemen policy primarily as means protect Saudi Arabian integrity. USG public actions, as well as words, in support of basic integrity Saudi Arabia have deterred both military and subversive moves against the kingdom. USG intends continue this policy of support and prepared, if Faisal desires, make public statement on suitable occasion underscoring USG support for Saudi integrity and for progressive-minded Faisal regime.

2. Disadvantages of Faisal's Re-involvement in Yemen. USG undertaking to stand by Faisal would be adversely affected by resumption Saudi aid to

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Moreover, we strongly doubt resumption Saudi aid to royalists would force Nasser  
withdraw troops from Yemen. Instead, <sup>he</sup> would probably add to his commitment, rely

even more heavily on Soviet assistance and ~~against Saudi Arabia~~<sup>increase pressure against Saudi Arabia.</sup> This could ~~endanger stability of Saudi Arabia as last winter until disengagement agreement worked out.~~<sup>This was case</sup>

~~As you, December 13, 1965, expanded by:~~ UAR-YAR might successfully obtain con-  
demnation of Saudi Arabia's actions by UN. ~~On other hand,~~ On other hand,  
~~we would support Saudi~~ we would support Saudi  
complaint raised before UNSC in event occurrence deliberate and unprovoked UAR  
aggression against Saudi territory.

3. Preferable for SAG Concentrate on Modernization Program and Development Own Defense Capability. Best course for Faisal in strengthening his country--and preserving his regime--against Nasserist danger is avoid exposing Saudi military and other weaknesses to undue stresses. Should concentrate his energies on course already charted in direction: (1) improving SAG military capability to defend itself, (2) strengthening fabric Saudi society. Progress made on these two fronts will reduce threats posed by Nasser both in Peninsula and throughout Arab world. Re (1), USG has completed survey Saudi air defense needs which prepared help SAG <sup>If he wishes,</sup> in fulfilling. /Ambassador may ~~wish~~ deliver summary survey report at this time.

~~and does not express its understanding of such plans or purposes of the Government by any act or~~

**STUDY**



~~SECRET~~

Re (2), would be pity if accomplishments thus far, which have attracted outside admiration and recognition, were dissipated by diversion of funds into fruitless outside adventure.

4. Favorable Saudi Position Vis-a-Vis Yemen. Faisal should take note his excellent vantage point vis-a-vis Yemen. Saudi Arabia is secure. YAR is in effect wooing him. Indications are Yemeni leaders and people would take stiffer attitude toward UAR if assured friendly Saudi posture. Yemenis are increasingly disillusioned with UAR presence. Yemen represents considerable drain on UAR resources.

We believe in Faisal's interests establish contact with YAR leaders and not be bound to only one group in Yemen. If Faisal extends hand of friendship to Yemenis, not rpt not impossible YARG leaders themselves will publicly request UAR to withdraw from Yemen.

5. USG Supports Coalition Effort While Continuing Press for UAR Withdrawals. We continuing to press UAR on withdrawals and have indicated we cannot provide any additional aid until UAR reduces economic drain caused by its Yemeni adventure. Meanwhile, USG placing emphasis on Yemeni coalition effort. Latter appears offer most effective means get UAR troops out and restore measure stability in Yemen. USG fully supports Spinelli initiative and notes Yemeni leaders now understand that national reconciliation and reconstruction will be facilitated if Yemenis settle their problems themselves. Rising Yemeni disillusionment and discontent should hasten Nasser's acceptance of representative regime. We pushing Nasser hard to cooperate fully, showing him this in his best interests. Meanwhile, hope Faisal sees way clear give coalition effort his support.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6. UAR-SAG Detente. USG again urges Faisal appoint high-level Saudi meet quietly with UAR representative for purpose exploring possibilities of SAG-UAR detente. Modus vivendi between two countries, even if only minimal, could be instrumental in attaining objectives which all parties seek of leaving Yemen to Yemenis.

7. Question of Hard Surface. Hard Surface brought to Saudi Arabia for temporary period as outgrowth Bunker Agreement. During some six months' tenure has served both as training mission and as public manifestation USG support for Saudi integrity. Represents only one example of military measure USG can take and must shortly be withdrawn. USG has other forces available in area for deployment at moment's notice in lieu of Hard Surface. USG also prepared to assist in developing and broadening SAG military capabilities. In addition to assisting in Saudi air defense needs we prepared support Saudi requests for conventional military materiel. In this context Secretary McNamara also has indicated that he would like to discuss mutual Saudi-US military matters in Washington with MODA Prince Sultan some time shortly after withdrawal of Hard Surface. Furthermore, USG informing Nasser we stand behind Faisal regime and would ~~not stand idly by~~ ~~not stand idly by~~ if Nasser should carry "battle" into Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we wish set at rest any apprehensions Faisal might have over prospective withdrawal Hard Surface early in 1964.

FYI. Leave to your discretion whether mention January 31 target date but must be clearly understood HS must be withdrawn on that date. Also Faisal must clearly understand Hard Surface or other military support cannot serve as umbrella for resumption of Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists. END FYI.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

INFO: AMEMBASSY TAIZ  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
USUN NEW YORK  
POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN (POUCH)  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV "  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT "  
AMCONSUL ADEN "  
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD "  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT "  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS "

~~SECRET~~