

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

45

Origin
NEA

Info:

SS
G
SP
L
EUR
IO
AIDA
INR
SCA
SCS
RMR

~~SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON 3832

INFO: Amembassy JIDDA 495-495
" CAIRO 2832 2832
" TAIZ 486 485
Amconsul DHAHRAN 272 272
USUN NEW YORK 1729 1729
Amconsul ADEN (BY POUCH)

11308

Yemen

74

For DCI use only

Dec 21 3 04 PM '63

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/KAC 06-95
By 28, NARA, Date 11-13-06

Embtel 2829 and USUN's 2543 to Department, repeated 438 to London

Assume Embassy sharing fully with HMG contacts our views and assessments Yemen situation. On suitable occasions subjects outlined this telegram might be developed more fully with Foreign Office.

1. We were surprised to learn HMG still finds validity in idea that withdrawal USG recognition of YAR would have beneficial effect. HMG's consequent loss of USG diplomatic custodial services in Yemen would of course be minor result. USG would be forced, however, to withdraw its AID program, which was conceived as counterpoise to Soviet Bloc foothold in Yemen. We would also lose constructive influence we now enjoy both in Yemen and in councils outside of Yemen. Such action would tend to isolate Yemenis further from Free World ^{and} be conducive to more extremist measures and movements in Yemen. ~~and would be likely to bring about a situation in which the YAR would be roundly condemned by all Arab governments, with possible exception of monarchies.~~ It would be roundly condemned by all Arab governments, with possible exception of monarchies. On other hand, latter might learn to regret withdrawal US recognition as

forcing

Drafted by JMB

NEA: NE: TWSeelye: rmv: 12/20/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Joy

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

BNA - Mr. Judd

UNP - MR. CAMPBELL
Miss Brown

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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FORM DS-322

~~SECRET~~

Classification

forcing YARG more firmly into embrace UAR (and ultimately Soviets).
Clearly it would not in itself serve as pressure on the UAR to withdraw from Yemen but might have opposite effect.

2. HMG view we "being a little hard and unfair to Faisal" appears to us to ignore primary reason USG became so actively involved in disengagement exercise. Fact is we undertook our Yemen policy as means protecting integrity of Saudi Arabia, which we saw as threatened far more by direct military confrontation with Nasser than by whatever happened in Yemen itself. No repeat no question in our minds that Faisal has been strengthened and Saudi Arabia's stability enhanced as result our policy. Despite Faisal's oral protestations to Western diplomats, we believe he fully acknowledges this. Recent messages from Jidda and reports from Spinelli tend bear this out. (See also NYTimes article from Riyadh which appeared December 19).

3. We puzzled by British belief that we set "misguided" conditions for broadened government in Yemen. We have repeatedly made point to all parties that no outside power has right to dictate form or personnel of Yemeni Government. Realities of situation appear to us require that government broadening process must take place while bulk of UAR troops still in Yemen. This offers hope of more viable regime than that presently in power and we have heard no better suggestion that is at same time realistic. British should not overlook prospect that increasing disillusionment and rising Yemeni discontent will hasten UAR acceptance of a more representative regime.

4. Alternatives

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Classification

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4. Alternatives to US-UN favored courses of action pose risks of heightening and expanding Yemen conflict and of damage to major Western interests.

5. Finally, we concerned at remarks attributed to Duncan Sandys (ref USUN tel). While admittedly second-hand and spoken by acknowledged "back-bencher" type, suggestion by responsible UK official that HMG entitled "render all assistance" to Imam after January 4 is disturbing. Accordingly without divulging source you should inform Foreign Office that we have been reliably informed such remarks have been made in official British circles; we are troubled by them and hope they are not true. UN presence ^{expected} ~~will~~/continue in Yemen after January 4 and Spinelli effort offers best hope for present. Active British support of royalists would have catastrophic results and could only increase pressures against British presence Aden which already built up from purely Aden elements. Re remark that royalists in effective control, HMG's attention might be called to Spinelli's observation that UAR now only fighting royalist forces in mountain areas, whereas several months ago royalist forces were fighting near Sana'a (USUN's reftel).

GP-3

END

RUSK

NOTE: FOUCHED BY OCT

~~SECRET~~

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Yemen

75

48

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 13949
Rec'd: DECEMBER 20, 1963
1:39 AM

NEA

FROM: JIDDA

020

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 641 PRIORITY

G

SP

INFO: CAIRO 234

L

DHAHRAN 499

EUR

LONDON 192

IO

TIJAZ 196

AIDA

USUN 181

P

ALGIERS 1

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CINCSTRIKE UNNUMBERED

INR

RMR

DATE: DECEMBER 19, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SPINELLI MISSION

SAQQAF (PROTECT SOURCE) READ ME TODAY TEXT TELEGRAM JUST RECEIVED FROM SAUDI CHARGE SWITZERLAND AND ADDRESSED TO SAQQAF ALONE REPORTING CONVERSATION WITH SPINELLI, WHO HAD ARRIVED FROM EGYPT. CHARGE PARADOXICALLY CHARACTERIZED SPINELLI'S ATTITUDE AS "DISCOURAGED" BUT MAKING POSITIVE PROPOSALS. HE SAID HIS MEETING WITH NASIR HAD BEEN HELPFUL. NASIR HAD SHOWN DISPOSITION TO RENEW UAR-SAUDI RELATIONS. ANTI-SAUDI PROPAGANDA WOULD BE GRADUALLY CUT DOWN. NASIR AGREEABLE TO UAR BILATERAL TALKS WITH SAUDI REPRESENTATIVES AND ASKED ON WHAT PARTICULAR POINT OF ARGUMENT CONVERSATIONS SHOULD BEGIN. SPINELLI HAD REPLIED BOTH PARTIES SHOULD SIMPLY START TALKING AND LET CONVERSATION TAKE ITS NATURAL COURSE. ISSUES WOULD BECOME CLEAR. WHEN SAUDI CHARGE HAD ASKED SPINELLI WHY SUCH TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT ALL AND WHETHER IT NOT MORE APPROPRIATE THAT YEMENI TALK WITH YEMENIS, SPINELLI HAD RESPONDED LATTER WOULD BE FRUITLESS IN ABSENCE PROGRESS ON MEETING OF MINDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 06-95

By *adl*, NARA, Date *11-13-06*

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 641, DECEMBER 19, 7 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM:
JIDDA

BETWEEN CAIRO AND RIYADH. SPINELLI STATED THAT HE COULD NOW CONFIRM UAR HAD WITHDRAWN 5,000 TROOPS NOVEMBER-DECEMBER AND HAD PROMISED WITHDRAW 2,000 MORE IN JANUARY, BRINGING TOTAL IN YEMEN DOWN TO ABOUT 15,000. HE THEREFORE COUNSELED SAQQAF TO RENEW DISENGAGEMENT JANUARY 4. HE PLANNED RETURN IN JANUARY VIA CAIRO TO RIYADH.

SAQQAF POINTED OUT THAT WHEN HE HAD EMPHASIZED TO SPINELLI DURING LATTER'S VISIT JIDDA OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE BETWEEN CAIRO AND RIYADH, SPINELLI HAD SHOWN SUCH GREAT INTEREST THAT SAQQAF ASSUMED THIS MUST HAVE BEEN MAJOR POINT OF DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK BEFORE SPINELLI STARTED HIS TRIP. HIS REPORT FROM SWITZERLAND REFLECTED THIS AS IT ALSO SEEMED TO REFLECT MY IDEAS IN SUGGESTING UAR-SAG TALKS BE WITHOUT AGENDA. HE COMMENTED THAT HE NOW HAD PROBLEM OF MAKING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS PALATABLE TO FAYSAL AND INVITED MY THOUGHTS. I SAID THAT APART FROM BASIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ON WHICH US GOVT'S VIEWS HAD BEEN REITERATED MANY TIMES, NEW FACTOR WAS THAT WHEREAS FAYSAL HAD FORMERLY BEEN ABLE TO SAY WITH SOME CONVICTION UN ROLE WAS PASSIVE AND THEREFORE NOT OF TOP IMPORTANCE TO SAG IN YEMEN DISPUTE, THIS ARGUMENT COULD NO LONGER BE MAINTAINED SINCE SYG WAS NOW TAKING ACTIVE POLITICAL ROLE. SPINELLI VISIT HAD ESTABLISHED SYG'S REAL CONTACT WITH FAYSAL. IN FORTHCOMING REPORT BY SYG TO UNSC SPINELLI ROLE WOULD HAVE TO BE MENTIONED IN SOME FORM AND UN'S OFFICIAL PUBLICITY WOULD HENCEFORTH HIGHLIGHT SPINELLI MISSION, ALONG WITH REPORT OF MUCH BETTER RECORD FOR UAR PERFORMANCE NOVEMBER-DECEMBER THAN WAS CASE END OF OCTOBER. FURTHERMORE WE HAD INDEPENDENT SUPPORT FOR SPINELLI'S REPORT UAR WITHDRAWING TROOPS. OUR PRESSURES WERE OBVIOUSLY OPERATING. IT THEREFORE SEEMED DEFINITELY NOT IN FAYSAL'S INTEREST TO ACT AGAINST THESE CURRENTS AND MAKE SAUDI ARABIA A STAND-OUT AGAINST CONTINUATION DISENGAGEMENT. SAQQAF SAID HE WAS OF COURSE NOT YET SURE WHAT FAYSAL WOULD

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 641, DECEMBER 19, 7 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM:
JIDDA

DO AS HE WAS VERY "DEEP" BUT HE FELT FAYSAL WAS WITH HIM, IN HIS DEEPEST MOTIVATIONS, I.E., HE DESIRED TO LIQUIDATE INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN WAR. RECALLING HE HAD ON EARLIER OCCASION PREDICTED TO ME THAT FAYSAL WOULD NOT RENEW UNYOM, SAQQAF RELATED THAT IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH FAYSAL DURING SPINELLI VISIT HE HAD STRESSED THAT NASIR BECOMING "TIRED" OF YEMEN ADVENTURE WHICH HAD NOT YIELDED INTENDED RESULTS AND IF SAG WAITED SITUATION OUT YEMEN WOULD BE "WITH SAUDI ARABIA". REINVOLVEMENT HOWEVER WOULD ONLY ENSURE RETENTION UAR FORCES. HE THEREFORE TOLD FAYSAL HE WAS SURE HE WOULD BE WRONG IF HE REFUSED RENEW DISENGAGEMENT. FAYSAL HAD QUIETLY ASKED "WHO SAID I WOULD NOT RENEW DISENGAGEMENT?"

HART

GLB/25

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

48
Action

NEA

Info

SS

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INR

RMR

~~SECRET~~

Control: 13941
Rec'd: DECEMBER 20, 1963 020
1:01 A.M.

FROM: JIDDA

ACTION: SECSTATE 641 PRIORITY

INFO: CAIRO 234
DHAHRAN 499
LONDON 192
TAIZ 196
USUN 181
ALGIERS 1
CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD UNNUMBERED

DATE: DECEMBER 19, 7 P.M. (SECTION II OF II)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

RE MATTERS MENTIONED DEPCIRCR 1095, SAQQAF VOLUNTEERED HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO SULTAN AGAINST SEEKING DEFINITE ANSWER FROM ME AT THIS TIME WHETHER US DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS CONDITIONAL OR UNCONDITIONAL. SULTAN HAD INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT AND SAQQAF ASSUMED HE WOULD NOW DISCUSS IT AGAIN WITH FAYSAL. (COMMENT: SULTAN DETAINED AT RIYADH IN ANY CASE BY CIRCUMSTANCES OF PRESENT FAYSAL-KING CONFRONTATION.)

SAQQAF NOTED THAT FIRST RECOMMENDATION RE RENEWAL UNYOM JAN 4 WOULD NOW GO TO FAYSAL IN FORM OF MESSAGE FROM SPINELLI, NOT FROM SAQQAF NOR FROM ME. WE BOTH AGREED THIS WAS ADVANTAGEOUS.

I ASKED ABOUT REPRESENTATIVE OF BEN BELLA AT RIYADH. SAQQAF DID NOT REVEAL NAME BUT STATED HE WAS MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY, CLOSE TO BEN BELLA, AND WAS SPECIAL EMISSARY TO RIYADH TO IMPROVE ALGERIAN-SAG RELATIONS. ALONG WITH OTHER SIGNS IT POINTED TO MODERATION IN BEN BELLA'S POLICIES. I ASKED IF HE WOULD BE USED AS INTERMEDIARY FOR SAG-UAR DETENTE. HE DID NOT KNOW.

/COMMENT:

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-2- 641, DECEMBER 19, 7 P.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM JIDDA

COMMENT:

1. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING AND WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO DEPTELS 475 AND 482, REASON EMERGES HERE NOW WHY WE NEED YET ASSUME UNYOM PRESENCE MUST BE LIQUIDATED JAN 4, AS FAR AS FAYSAL CONCERNED. SINCE ITS VALUE AS CONTROL MECHANISM OVER SAUDI BORDER MOVEMENTS AND OVER DZ IS CLEAR MECHANISM SUGGESTED DEPTEL 482 SEEMS GOOD WAY TO (A) AVOID NECESSITY OF ASKING FAYSAL HIS INTENTIONS (AND THUS RISKING UNSATISFACTORY RESPONSE) AND (B) BREAK PATTERN OF PERIODIC RENEWAL DEADLINES. HENCEFORTH BURDEN WOULD BE ON SAG OR UAR TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO END DISENGAGEMENT. FAYSAL IS LESS LIKELY TO DO THIS THAN WOULD BE TO AGAIN DRAG FEET.

2. I THINK IT DESIRABLE TO NOT (REPEAT NOT) FORCE PACE WITH FAYSAL ON DISENGAGEMENT AT THIS MOMENT BUT LET EFFECT OF SPINELLI'S RECOMMENDATIONS GERMINATE A WHILE WITH SAQQAF'S SUPPORT. BY SAME TOKEN I DO NOT THINK IT USEFUL TO INFORM FAYSAL AT THIS MOMENT WE ARE EXTENDING HARD SURFACE ONLY UNTIL END OF JANUARY. A FEW DAYS FROM NOW I SHALL TAKE ANOTHER READING ON SITUATION WITH SAQQAF AND CAN THEN CONCLUDE WHETHER IT APPEARS NECESSARY AND USEFUL FOR US TO WEIGH IN WITH POINT 2 (A), (B), (C) AND (D) OF DEPTEL 475. IF SYG ACCEPTS SUGGESTIONS EMBODIED DEPTEL 482 (1709 TO USUN) IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD INFORM FAYSAL BY END DECEMBER THAT IN VIEW PROGRESS BEING MADE IN DISENGAGEMENT AND IN VIEW ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN SPINELLI BY PARTIES TO PURSUE HIS EFFORTS, SYG WAS GOING TO ANNOUNCE CONTINUATION OF SMALL ESSENTIAL NUCLEUS OF UNYOM AT UN EXPENSE FOR TIME BEING AND ASSUME BOTH PARTIES WOULD AHERE TO DISENGAGEMENT UNDERTAKINGS.

GP-3.

HART

DLW

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

09629

76

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Yemen

57

Origin

ACTION: USUN, New York 1709

IO

Info:

INFO: Amembassy, CAIRO 2765

SS

" JIDDA 482

G

" LONDON 3763

S P

" TAIZ 477

L

" OTTAWA 517

EUR

YEMEN

NEA

P

IOP

INR

RMR

CINCSTRIKE Dec 18 8 04 PM '63

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 1962-63, Vol. IV, #388

By *ly* NARA, Date 8/1/05

Suggest USUN seek early opportunity discuss with SYG question of continuing UN presence in Yemen. We believe it useful for us if possible to present our ideas/before he receives Spinelli report and makes any definite decisions, even though he will undoubtedly wish to have Spinelli's recommendations before committing himself. However, we would appreciate receiving any information on his tentative thinking since this would be most helpful in planning our own action in area and insuring it will complement UN efforts. We suggest you take ~~following~~ following general line:

1. With UNYOM approaching end of current mandate on Jan. 4, USG has been conducting thorough review Yemen situation and has reached following preliminary conclusions: (These are of course subject to reflection, and especially in the light of Spinelli's eventual recommendations when they become available):
 - (a) Only present hope for solution of problem is in establishment broadly-based and viable YARG. Best chance of accomplishing this

Drafted by: IO:UNP:SJCampbell:c11 12/12/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

IO - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

UNP - Mr. Buffum

NE - Mr. Seelye

NEA - Mr. Jernegan

BNA - Mr. Barrett (substance)

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accomplishing this lies in hands of Spinelli.

does not appear to be making adequate

(b) Nasser is/ ~~making very little~~ progress in fulfilling his

promise to withdraw troops from Yemen, and we doubt whether on Jan. 4
drawn down sufficiently to satisfy Faisal.

UAR forces will be/ ~~much below 10,000 level~~ ~~XXX~~ ~~We are aware of our~~

~~estimates of current UAR troop strength but prefer use of this figure~~

~~XXXXXX~~

~~present level~~ However, we still feel he would like to withdraw all but

training mission as soon as possible if political situation in Yemen
permitted.

(c) Although Faisal will be under heavy pressure to renew arms
and financial aid to Royalists when UNYOM ends on Jan. 4 with/ ^{strong concentrations} UAR troops
still ~~at nearly full strength~~ in Yemen, it may be possible to persuade
him in his own interest to desist.

2. In these circumstances, USG ~~intends~~ currently inclined:

(a) To continue to press Nasser: to withdraw his troops; to
refrain from further bombing attacks on Saudi Arabia; to move toward
general detente with SAG, and to support actively efforts by UN and
others to establish viable coalition govt in Yemen.

(b) To assure Faisal we will continue to press Nasser to
disengage; strongly urge Faisal not to renew aid to the Royalists; seek
his cooperation in efforts to establish viable regime in Yemen; and
/urge him to

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urge him to respond favorably both to UAR overtures for reconciliation and friendly overtures from YAR.

3. We regard Spinelli role, in seeking internal reconciliation in Yemen and in arranging SAG accommodation with UAR and YAR, as crucial. Consequently we believe it of vital importance to continue UN presence along lines in which it has been evolving under leadership of Spinelli. USG will continue to give all possible support to Spinelli's efforts and to take other steps with parties which will help contribute to the success of his mission.

4. We assume that SYG shares our view regarding need to continue Spinelli mission and would be prepared to act affirmatively on basis of general understanding with parties without formal SC action. We would hope in light his position last October he would agree to finance it henceforth out of UN contingency funds and would not find it necessary to set terminal date on mission. It may require some time for Spinelli to work out solution; if no time limit set, this would avoid difficulty UNYOM encountered in working under short deadlines. While SYG will undoubtedly wish report his intentions to SC members, assume he would agree that formal SC meeting neither necessary nor desirable.

5. While many details must be considered in continuing UN presence, we believe one should be taken up as soon as SYG decides continue
/operation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

operation. This involves small Canadian air transport unit without which Spinelli would be severely handicapped, and dependent on UAR, at least for moving about Yemen. In view GOC's possible misgivings about maintaining air transport, we think it would be wise for SYG to seek Canadian agreement soonest to leave at least two-plane unit in Yemen to transport Spinelli and UN observers.

END

BALL

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Yemen

77

48

~~SECRET~~

Action 0 151333Z ZEA

NEA FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

0 1 1 2 7 7

DECEMBER 17, 1963

3:34 A.M.

Info RUJQVDA/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

SS RUJQVDA/AMEMBASSY LONDON

I M M E D I A T E

G RUEHDT/USUN

SP STATE GRNC

000

EUR ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 621 INFO CAIRO 230

IO DHAHRAN 438 LONDON 184 TAIZ 192 USUN 178 FROM JIDDA

INR DECEMBER 16, 10 PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

RMR

FAYSAL PRESSES FOR RESPONSE ON U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD DEFENSE
SAUDI ARABIA

SAQQAF RETURNED FROM RIYADH TODAY AND PHONED ME FOR APPOINT-
MENT AT MY HOUSE. APART FROM OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED HE
(PROTECT SOURCE) INFORMED ME PRINCE SULTAN BEING SENT BY FAYSAL
TO MEET WITH ME AND SAQQAF AND, APPEALING TO ARGUMENT SAG HAS
DONE EVERYTHING USG ASKED IT TO DO, OBTAIN DEFINITE ANSWER
WHETHER US DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOW CONDITIONAL OR
UNCONDITIONAL, THAT IS, WHETHER US GOVT CLEARLY MAINTAINED
ATTITUDE IT WOULD NOT DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA IN EVENT RESUMPTION
AID TO ROYALISTS. SULTAN EXPECTED IN JIDDA TOMORROW AND
MEETING MAY TAKE PLACE TOMORROW EVENING OR NEXT DAY AT SAQQAF'S
HOME. I WAS NOT TO REVEAL TO SULTAN THAT SAQQAF HAD TIPPED ME
OFF AS TO PURPOSE OF MEETING.

UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE I PROPOSE ANSWER ALONG
FOLLOWING LINES:

US GOVT UNDER NEW PRESIDENT MAINTAINS SAME DEGREE
CONCERN OVER AND INTEREST IN INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE
AND WELL BEING OF SAUDI ARABIA AS IN PAST. US GOVT
WITHIN PAST YEAR RATHER DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED
HEIGHT THIS CONCERN BY MONTHLY SHIP VISITS, SPECIAL
VISITS OF USAF AND CURRENT VISIT ON HARD SURFACE. USG
HAS MADE THIS CONCERN PUBLIC AND HAS EMPHASIZED IT IN
PRIVATE TO UAR. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBTS IN SAUDI
MINDS AS TO SINCERITY AND DEPTH LONG-TERM AMERICAN
FRIENDSHIP. NOW FOR SAG TO PUT QUESTION AS HE HAS
STATED IT PLACES US GOVT IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION.

IN EFFECT, WE BEING ASKED TO SAY "BECAUSE YOU HAVE
BEHAVED WELL TO DATE IN EYES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
US AS WORLD OPINION, IF YOU NOW CHOOSE TO FORSAKE

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NJL/KAC 06-95
By *128*, NARA, Date *11-13-06*

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 621, DECEMBER 16, 10 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

THIS COURSE WE WILL **NEVERTHELESS** GUARD YOU AGAINST CONSEQUENCES." I HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED TO FAYSAL, US GOVT WITH DESTINIES OF ENTIRE FREE WORLD AFFECTED BY ITS DECISIONS, CAN HARDLY BE ASKED TO ABDICATE ITS POWER OF DECISION AND WRITE BLANK CHECKS EVEN TO ITS CLOSEST FRIENDS. ON SAQQAF'S SUGGESTION, I WOULD DWELL ON SUPERIOR WAY AND PRACTICAL SITUATION IN WHICH SAG FINDS ITSELF TODAY AS COMPARED TO NINE MONTHS AGO, DUE TO OBSERVANCE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. BY KICKING THIS OVER NOTHING TO BE ACHIEVED BUT BLOODSHED IN YEMEN; JUSTIFICATION FOR UAR TROOPS TO RETURN, AUGMENT AND REMAIN THERE INDEFINITELY; UNFAVORABLE US AND WORLD REACTION INCLUDING THAT FROM MANY ARAB STATES; DIVERSION OF SAUDI EFFORTS FROM DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM AT TIME WHEN REAL HEADWAY ATTRACTING RECOGNITION AND ADMIRATION IN US AND OTHER PARTS OF WORLD. WHY THEN DELIBERATELY RE-IGNITE FIRE WHICH NOW BURNING LOW. HOSTILITIES, AS SPINELLI TESTIFIED, ARE AT MINIMUM; CHANCES FOR RECONCILIATION WITHIN YEMEN STEADILY IMPROVING, BRINGING PRESSURES FOR EGYPTIAN EXODUS; YEMENI LEADERS OF VIRTUALLY EVERY IMPORTANT STRIPE WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAG. ALL THESE THINGS WOULD BE THROWN INTO CONFUSION AND SET BACK. FURTHERMORE, SYG NOW HAS PROBLEM OF YEMEN UNDER POLITICAL PURVIEW OF SPINELLI AND GLARE OF OFFICIAL UN PUBLICITY BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR. SAUDI RECORD NOW SO MUCH SUPERIOR TO THAT OF UAR THAT PRESSURE ON UAR IS BUILDING UP. WHY RELIEVE IT?

I WOULD THEN ADD PERSONAL NOTE: PLEASE DO NOT START OFF RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY MAKING THIS KIND OF IMPRESSION. NASIR HAS EVERY REASON BE CONCERNED OVER BASIC ATTITUDES JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION; DO NOT DELIVER THE GAME TO

(#)

OBSERVATIONS BY SAQQAF:

I MENTIONED TO SAQQAF THAT SPINELLI HAD ATTESTED TO RECENT EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWALS AND THAT I HOPED THIS WOULD ENABLE FAYSAL SEE HIS WAY CLEAR KEEP DISENGAGEMENT. SAQQAF REPLIED HE CONTINUES PRESS WITH FAYSAL THESIS THAT TIME IS WITH SAUDIS IF DISENGAGEMENT KEPT. HE BELIEVES HE HAS MADE DEEPENING IMPRESSION BUT FAYSAL HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT TO SPINELLI OR ANYONE. SAQQAF PERSONALLY CONSIDERS IT SIXTY PERCENT LIKELY FAYSAL WILL REFRAIN FROM SUPPLYING AID TO ROYALISTS; HOWEVER, IF FAYSAL IS NOW ASKED ABOUT RENEWAL UNYOM HIS REPLY WILL BE "GIVE ME SCHEDULE FOR EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWALS." SAQQAF THEREFORE RECOMMENDS STRONGLY AGAINST PRESSING FAYSAL ON CONTINUING DISENGAGEMENT AT THIS MOMENT; INSTEAD HE PREFERS LET REPLY I WILL MAKE VIA SULTAN STNK IN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 621, DECEMBER 16, 10 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

COMMENT: I RECOMMEND AGAINST TRYING TO "NEATEN *
UP" QUESTION ON RENEWAL UNYOM AT THIS INSTANT AND THAT
WE FOLLOW SAQQAF'S ADVICE. OF COURSE IF WE COULD
QUICKLY OBTAIN SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWALS AS PREPARED BY
GAMEL THIS WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP.

BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS TODAY SHOWN ME TELEGRAPHED TEXT
TO DEPARTMENT'S POLICY PAPER ON YEMEN DELIVERED
BY JERNEGAN TO BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON IN PREPARATION
RUSK-HOME CONVERSATION PARIS. TRUST WE SHALL SOON RECEIVE
OUR COPY.

GP-3

HART

BT

* AS RECEIVED, (#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O DECEMBER 17 - 4:00 A.M.
PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE DECEMBER 17 - 4:30 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Yemen 78

39-31

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 11411

Rec'd: December 17, 1963

6:14 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 1356 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), Priority

020

G

EUR

INFO: Paris Priority 32,

IO

Jidda 126,

RMR

USUN 106,

Taiz 117

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *sig* NARA. Date *4-1-92*

DATE: December 17, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

PARIS FOR SECRETARY RUSK

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

NOFORN

Spinelli Mission.

Spinelli arrived Cairo December 13. On December 14 I had hour's conversation with him before he had seen any UAR officials. Following summary of talk should be very closely held since Spinelli naturally sensitive and concerned lest substance or details his observations re Yemen reach UN and SECGEN before he makes his own report.

1. Situation in Yemen. Spinelli stated UAR troop withdrawals proceeding apace, all under UN observation except those air-borne. He predicts UAR will fulfill its announced withdrawal commitment prior to January 4 and places present UAR troop level in Yemen at between 20,000-22,000. On my expressing scepticism re this figure, he said he believed US estimates had been too high and that he would stand by above, with major possibility of error due only to fact departures by air unobservable by UN.

Fighting in Yemen at low ebb in recent weeks and Spinelli does

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-2-1356 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), December 17, 2 p.m., from Cairo

not expect any major flare-up. UAR General Mortaghy informed him that if present conditions persist, not more than 10,000 UAR troops needed to maintain security.

Re bombings, Spinelli accepts UAR claims bombing of El Khuba and similar border incidents genuine navigational mistakes. He states having flown over terrain "not even American pilots" could avoid mistaken identity of territory. When I pointed out that if UAR would keep its planes out of demilitarized zone, such incidents would not occur, Spinelli agreed but said that so long as Royalists have military installations in DZ (principally anti-aircraft batteries) UAR would not desist from bombing. Spinelli reported General Mortaghy had stated headquarters prohibition of bombing outside of Yemen still held and had initialled as correct Spinelli's memo of conversation on this point. As to bombings within Yemen territory, Spinelli stated these primarily directed against recalcitrant tribes and had often been successful in forcing or reinstituting truce. In these circumstances, little hope of persuading UAR to desist.

Spinelli confirmed that perhaps 90 per cent of SAG material support for Royalist forces had ceased. However, he said SAG apparently still in close touch with Badr and royal family, these having "free run" of Saudi territory, passing back and forth across border at will. While in Saudi Arabia (unclear whether Jidda or Dhahran) important member of Imam royal family had been in city at same time. Spinelli pointed out presence of royal family on Yemeni soil with Saudi support a basic obstacle to quieting Yemen situation.

Re Yemeni attitude toward UAR, Spinelli admitted widespread Yemen weariness with occupying Army, similar to that in Italy after opening months of allied Army occupation. However, he reported statements from YAR anti-Nasser personalities, saying if they had to choose between return of royal family and continued presence of YAR, they would "thousand times rather have Egyptians". In fact, little popular enthusiasm for either royal family or present YAR leaders.

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-3-1356, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), December 17, 2 p.m., from Cairo

2. Interview with Faisal. Spinelli reported two hour interview with Faisal which was ~~exceedingly~~ frank but cordial. During interview, Faisal only mentioned Iman Badar once, and entire Faisal presentation based on Saudi concern and seemingly not made "on behalf of "Badr and Royalist position. While Faisal would make no commitments concerning extension UNYOM after January 4 and argued vigorously re UAR non-fulfillment disengagement pledges, at no time was threat made to reinstitute massive SAG aid to Royalists in event UNYOM folded. Personally Spinelli believes chances of SAG agreeing extension UNYOM good since at close of conversation Faisal urged Spinelli to return and talk with him further "as soon as possible". Spinelli argued this means Faisal's mind not closed on extension UNYOM, but admitted his assistant did not fully share this view.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

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Action
NEA

Control: 11344
Rec'd: Dec. 17, 1963
4:25 A. M.

Info
SS
G
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RMR

FROM: Cairo
ACTION: Secstate 1356, PRIORITY (SECTION II OF II)
INFO: Paris 32, PRIORITY
Jidda 126
USUN 106
Taiz 117

020

DATE: December 16, 2 P.M.

PARIS FOR SECRETARY RUSK.

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NOFORN.

3. Outlook for Progress.

In speculating as to future course of Yemen events and best way of continuing disengagement exercise, Spinelli put forward following:

A. Outlook for renewal of UNYOM good. However, if UNYOM not continued, reinstitution of support to Royalists by Faisal should by all means be resisted and UN political presence continued.

B. Most positive influence setting forward disengagement erosive effect of present situation on UAR position. Spinelli reported General Mortaghy as stating that increasing tempo of UAR troop withdrawals not due to disengagement undertaking but to condition tranquility in Yemen permitting UAR to get ahead with reduction of troops in its own interests. Mortaghy and other Senior Officers stated flatly they and their military comrades wanted to see Egyptians out of Yemen as quickly as

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-2- 1356, December 16, 2 P. M. from Cairo. (Section II of II)

possible but of course "we do not make political decisions". From this Spinelli argues that disengagement will best proceed not so much by repeated representations and pressures in Cairo as by cultivating and increasing present situation in which UAR withdrawals possible and obviously in UAR interest. He therefore deprecated any idea that vigorous diplomatic offensive by US at this time could achieve major results.

C. Political readjustment in Yemen will be slow. In Spinelli's opinion, Yemenis outside Yemen (i.e., Al Ainy, Jughman) had little chance of exerting effective leadership and present YAR group, including Iriani, not much more hopeful. Precipitation more stable political regime must come out of Yemeni forces and while this is happening at least minimum UAR presence in country inescapable and possibly desirable.

D. Spinelli particularly urged US cooperation in Cairo and Riyadh "when appropriate moment comes". I responded that I believed past record had shown both Ambassador Hart and myself had been instant in supporting UN approach and we would continue to do so under appropriate USG instructions.

Spinelli then stated he had appointment with Foreign Minister Fawzi for morning December 14 but this had been cancelled due to Fawzi's quick trip with Presidential party to Tunis. Spinelli expected to see Fawzi on 15th. He had not requested meeting with President Nasser but hoped this would take place at latter's invitation. I urged necessity of meeting Nasser if at all possible, saying Fawzi's role in Yemen affair appeared limited to carrying out diplomacy settled by President's policy decisions. Spinelli promised to inform me if and when he had UAR meetings and to let me know if anything significant occurred.

Comment: On afternoon 15th, Italian Ambassador Magistrati called me on Spinelli's behalf, saying Spinelli had seen Foreign

/ Minister Fawzi

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-3- 1356, December 16, 2 P.M. from Cairo, (Section II of II)

Minister Fawzi in morning and then had approximately hour's conversation in afternoon with President Nasser at President's own request. Magistrati said meeting with Nasser had been "particularly good" but gave me no further details. At Nasser's request Spinelli is returning to Cairo on January 2 for second round talks.

I believe Spinelli's estimate of total troop withdrawals probably dependable. However, I have yet to see evidence substantiating Spinelli claim that present UAR troop strength as low as 20,000 to 22,000, this figure being dependent upon estimate of total number of troops before disengagement took place, i.e., disengagement base line.

GP-3.

BADEAU

MBK-17

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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0819

Yemen

79

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Dec 16 7 37 PM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *WJ* NARA. Date *4-1-92*

54

Origin

NEA

Info:

SS

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SP

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EUR

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AIDA

INR

RMR

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON 3707

INFO: Amembassy PARIS TOSEC 35

Deputy Assistant Secretary Jernegan has briefed British Embassy re

tentative plan for course of action re Yemen, making clear plan did not repeat not have ~~Secretary~~ final approval at highest level. Gave Embassy copy of paper entitled "Appraisal and Recommended Course of Action Regarding Yemen", (pouched) and summarized steps which would be undertaken in coming weeks if plan finally approved:

1. Support continuation of UN political presence in Yemen as it has evolved (probably financed by UN) with continued emphasis on UN Representative Spinelli's efforts to bring about broader-based Yemen regime, while agreeing to termination of UNYOM as presently constituted.

2. Use all resources at our disposal to persuade Faisal that it is in his and our best interests that Saudi aid to royalists not be resumed, including:

a. Extension of Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia by another month.

While informing Faisal of this, we would also stress that:

1) Under no circumstances can Hard Surface serve as an umbrella for resumption of Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists.

2) Hard Surface is only one tangible manifestation of USG

support

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:TWSeelye:eae:mac 12/13/63

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

BNA - Mr. Judd

UNP - Mr. Campbell

Mr. Buffum

S/S - Mr. Baldwin

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support for Saudi Arabia and must soon be withdrawn.

3) USG has other forces available in area.

a. Dispatch of Presidential message reaffirming USG support for Saudi Arabia's integrity and once again requesting his support of our Yemen policies.

c. Dispatch of instructions to Ambassador Hart to inform Faisal that USG would support a complaint raised by Saudi Arabia before UN Security Council should deliberate and unprovoked UAR aggression against Saudi territory occur.

d. Public reaffirmation, if Faisal wishes, of USG support for Saudi integrity.

3. Continue to press Nasser:

a. To withdraw his troops from Yemen while recognizing that expeditious UAR troop withdrawals cannot be expected until a viable republican regime is created in Yemen;

b. To support actively development of a broader-based regime in Yemen;

c. To refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia.

4. Promote restoration of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia as an important step toward reaching an accommodation over Yemen. Do whatever is possible to bring about direct contact between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republican leaders.

Jernegan stated he encouraged by (1) recent conversations with UAR Ambassador who has advanced constructive suggestions re Yemen (DEPTEL 3560 to London ~~3560 to London~~), and (2)

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(2) recent indication from Saudi Arabia re its probable willingness continue cooperate with UN mission in Yemen.

~~XX~~ Jernegan expressed hope for UK support our Yemen policy. Failure of HMG to enforce policy of restraint on Aden officials risked impairing Yemen policy.

Killick expressed appreciation for above fill-in and said paper would greatly facilitate briefing Butler in advance meeting with Rusk December 19. He commented HMG concerned Saudis would, despite best US efforts, resume aid to Yemeni royalists in January and wondered what USG would do ^{if} ~~it~~ in these circumstances UAR attacked Saudi Arabia.

Jernegan replied that USG does not have formally approved contingency course of action and much would depend on circumstances at time. For example, nature USG response might differ as between UAR bombing raids directed against supply depots in Jizan and those over Jidda. ^{Probably} ~~XX~~ we would in any case urge Saudis take their case to UN SC.

Killick inquired what additional pressures, if any, USG contemplated bringing to bear in Cairo. Jernegan stated we had carefully studied two alternative courses of action and discarded both. We had concluded that terminating USG aid to UAR would neither succeed in forcing withdrawal of UAR troops in Yemen, nor result in favorable change in Nasser's policy. On contrary, such action would increase Nasser's prestige at our expense, sharply set back our relations with majority of Arab States, and enhance Soviet position in area. Jernegan said cessation aid should be used only as last resort. Nevertheless, ^{will be unresponsive} ~~XX~~ USG responsiveness to further UAR requests for aid ^{so long as} ~~XX~~ will take into account possible drain on UAR economy flowing from UAR Yemen operation continues.

Second

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~~Impending instructions re foregoing planned course of action follow~~

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BEYOND

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END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of Sta.*

Yemen 80

46

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Action

Control: 7877
Rec'd: DECEMBER 12, 1963
1:20 A.M.

NEA

FROM: JIDDA

Info

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By *WJ* NARA. Date 4-1-92

021

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 607 PRIORITY

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SP

INFO: ADEN 40
CAIRO 226 PRIORITY

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EUR

DHAHRAN 475

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LONDON 176

AIDA

TAIZ 190 PRIORITY

P

USUN 174

IOP

INR

DATE: DECEMBER 11, 6 P.M.

RMR

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SPINELLI MISSION

ACCOMPANIED BY HIS ASSISTANT BERENSEN SPINELLI VISITED ME YESTERDAY EVENING AFTER CALL ON SAQQAF. FOLLOWING HOUR'S TALK WE PROCEEDED TOGETHER TO ITALIAN AMBASSADOR'S FOR SMALL INFORMAL DINNER ATTENDED BY SAUDI CHIEF PROTOCOL, UK AMBASSADOR, SWISS CHARGE. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES INNOVATIONS BOTH PLACES. SAUDI TOOK NO PART AND MOST OF TIME WAS NOT WITHIN EARSHOT.

1. NATURE OF SPINELLI MISSION.

SPINELLI BEGAN BY SAYING HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THERE COULD BE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN YEMEN IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ALL PARTIES WERE CAUGHT IN "VICIOUS CIRCLE" AND HE AS YET UNABLE SEE WHAT STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO BREAK OUT OF IT. HE WAS STRESSING TO ALL PARTIES THAT PRESENT ROUND DEVOTED LARGELY TO FACT-FINDING AND HE DID NOT EXPECT BE ABLE TO PROPOSE SOLUTIONS ON PRESENT TRIP. AS HE HAD SAID TO YEMENIS, HE WOULD SAY TO FAYSAL AND LATER TO FAWZI AND NASIR, "YOU MUST FIND WAY OUT OF THIS PROBLEM.

/IF YOU WANT

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-2- 607, DECEMBER 11, 6 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

IF YOU WANT UN'S HELP, HOW CAN YOU HELP ME? DO NOT JUST REPEAT TO ME PUBLIC POSITIONS WHICH I HEARD FOURTEEN MONTHS AGO. I DO NOT WISH TO ARGUE ABOUT RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE PAST. SOMETHING NEW IS NEEDED. WHAT IS PRACTICAL NEXT STEP? MILITARY SOLUTION OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE BY EITHER SIDE."

2. UNYOM RENEWAL AND UAR-SAG TALKS

TO UK AMBASSADOR CROWE SPINELLI REPORTED SAQQAF HAD APPEARED VERY RELAXED AND HAD INFORMED SPINELLI IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR UNYOM TO BE RENEWED, AND SAQQAF THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE. SAQQAF ADDED THAT NASIR HAD NOW COME SOME DISTANCE IN DIRECTION DETENTE WITH SAG AND HAD PROMISED STOP PROPAGANDA ATTACKS COMPLETELY AS SOON AS INFORMED THAT SAG-UAR PRIVATE TALKS WERE DEFINITELY SCHEDULED. SAQQAF SAID HE NOW HAD DIFFICULT JOB PERSUADING FAYSAL TO PERMIT THESE TALKS TO TAKE PLACE ON THESE TERMS.

3. UAR TROOP LEVELS

BASED ON CLOSE OBSERVATIONS HODAYDA SPINELLI STATED AND REITERATED UNDER MY QUESTIONING HE CONVINCED THAT TODAY THERE COULD NOT BE MORE THAN 20,000 UAR TROOPS IN YEMEN. UAR INTENDS REDUCE THIS TOTAL TO 16,000. SINCE ITS ARRIVAL IN YEMEN UNYOM HAS CERTIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF ABOUT 15,000 TROOPS AND BELIEVES THERE HAS BEEN NET WITHDRAWAL OF ABOUT 9,000 SINCE JULY. HE EXPECTS TOTAL TO GO BELOW 20,000 BY END OF YEAR. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND SAID OUR BEST INFORMATION HAD INDICATED PRESENCE OF SOME 30,000 TROOPS STILL IN YEMEN. HE COMMENTED THAT, IF SO, THIS WOULD MEAN THERE HAD ONCE BEEN OVER 40,000 TROOPS AND THIS HE FOUND HARD TO BELIEVE. IT WAS POSSIBLE LARGE AIR ARRIVALS HAD BEEN UNOBSERVED BUT HE DOUBTED IT. UAR WITHDRAWALS WERE GOING AHEAD STEADILY SINCE THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS WITHOUT ACTIVE CONFLICT EXCEPT IN NORTHWESTERN SECTOR. UAR HAPPY TO CONTINUE

/STEADY PULL-DOWN

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-3- 607, DECEMBER 11, 6 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

STEADY PULL-DOWN AS LONG AS MILITARY SITUATION QUIET. HE HAD BEEN WELL IMPRESSED WITH FORTHRIGHTNESS AND REASONABLENESS GENERAL MURTAGHY WHO HAD MADE THESE ASSERTIONS AND INDICATED ONLY TRAINING MISSION WOULD ULTIMATELY REMAIN.

3. "ROYALISTS" AND "REPUBLICANS"

NEITHER GROUP OF LEADERS REALLY REPRESENTED DESIRES YEMENIS AS WHOLE. NEITHER HAD ANY MEANING OR VITALITY WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT. LABELS "ROYALIST" AND "REPUBLICAN" NOT VERY MEANINGFUL, ESPECIALLY "ROYALIST". TRIBAL INTEREST CAME FIRST IN MANY AREAS. THREE-FOURTHS OF COUNTRY OPPOSED TO ANY RETURN OF IMAMAH. REPUBLICANS WERE "MILDER" IN THEIR IDEAS AND DESERVED SUPPORT. THEY WERE "WAVE OF FUTURE." "ALL MY OBSERVERS HAVE BECOME PRO-ROYALIST. I SUPPOSE THIS IS NATURAL SYMPATHY FOR UNDERDOG. THEY REPORT MORALE AMONG ROYALISTS VERY HIGH." YET SITUATION GENERALLY QUIET AND TRUCES PREVAILING MOST AREAS.

4. SAG-YAR RELATIONS

YAR LEADERS HAVE "DEEP DESIRE" FOR NORMAL RELATIONS WITH SAG. HAVE BASICALLY MORE IN COMMON WITH SAUDIS THAN WITH EGYPTIANS. "PREFER SAUDIS 100 PER CENT OVER EGYPTIANS." AS WAS CASE WITH AMERICAN TROOPS IN ITALY AT END OF WW II, EGYPTIANS HAVE WORN OUT WELCOME WITH INHABITANTS. SAUDIS SHOULD MOVE NOW TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS FEELING SINCE TIME WOULD NOT ALWAYS BE ON THEIR SIDE. FOR EXAMPLE, CADET OFFICERS WHEN THEY GRADUATED FROM YEMENI ACADEMY AND HAD FURTHER TRAINING IN UAR IN FIVE YEARS: TIME WOULD HAVE BECOME STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF UAR AND IMPLACABLY AGAINST SAUDI INTERESTS. HE AND BERENSEN BOTH STRESSED THAT WHILE EVEN US MILITARY LEADERS ADMITTED ARMS AID TO ROYALISTS WHOLLY STOPPED (UNYOM ASSISTANTS HAVE NOW CONFIRMED TO ME THAT AUGUST CHARGES BY SYG OF SAUDI VIOLATIONS WERE BASED ON ERRONEOUS YUGOSLAV OBSERVATION), UAR AND YAR POSITION IS THAT SAG

/PERMITTING OF

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4- 607, DECEMBER 11, 6 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

PERMITTING OF ROYALIST LEADERS TO COME AND GO ACROSS SAUDI BORDER AND PROBABLE FURNISHING OF MONEY WERE FACTORS THAT KEPT ROYALISTS GOING. IT WAS MONEY THAT INCITED OCCASIONAL TRIBAL ATTACKS.

5. UAR BOMBINGS

SPINELLI STATED HE HAD STATEMENT SIGNED BY GENERAL MURTAGHY (TO SHOW TO FAYSAL) AFFIRMING THAT RECENT RAID ON AL-KUBA (AL-KHUBA APPARENTLY CORRECT NAME, AS ATTESTED BY UNYOM OBSERVERS ON SPOT) WAS MISTAKE IN NAVIGATION. SO WERE ALL OTHER OVERFLIGHTS AND BOMBINGS SAUDI BORDER AREA SINCE JULY. WHEN SPINELLI HAD PRESSED HIM, MURTAGHY CALLED ATTENTION TO RECENT UAR PLANE LANDING IN SAF AS EVIDENCE NAVIGATIONAL ERRORS WERE EASY AND INEVITABLE IN POORLY MAPPED COUNTRY.

RE BOMBINGS WITHIN YEMEN I EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE THIS HELD FOR FAYSAL AND TOLD HIM OF MY TALK WITH GYANI (A-164). HE HAD NO COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING UAR TO ABANDON THESE OPERATIONS, BUT INSISTED THEY WERE ALWAYS IN RESPONSE TO TRIBAL ATTACKS AND USUALLY WERE FOLLOWED BY RETURN TO LOCAL TRUCES.

6. JAGHMAN

SPINELLI SEEMED SOMEWHAT SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT JAGHMAN HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE YEMEN SINCE HE WAS NOTABLY MORE OUTSPOKEN AGAINST THE UAR THAN OTHER YEMENI LEADERS AND APPEARED TO HAVE BAA'THI TENDENCIES. I BRIEFED HIM AS INSTRUCTED ON CONTENTS OF DEPTTEL 464. HE FOUND ALL THAT JAGHMAN HAD SAID TO JERNEGAN TO BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE HAD HEARD FROM HIM IN YEMEN EXCEPT FOR STATEMENT MADE IN POINT FIVE. ACCORDING SPINELLI AL-AMRI AND IRYANI HAD BOTH STRESSED THERE WAS MASSIVE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR UAR IN CONVERSATION UNDER REFERENCE.

7. UN REFERENDUM

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-5- 607, DECEMBER 11, 6 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

7. UN REFERENDUM AND OUTLOOK FOR SAG RECOGNITION OF BROAD-
ENED YAR

I SUGGESTED SPINELLI CONSIDER FORMULA UNDER WHICH FAYSAL MIGHT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DENY THAT SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN YEMEN HAD TAKEN PLACE ALTHOUGH UAR TROOPS MIGHT STILL BE ON HAND IN SOME STRENGTH: I.E., THERE MIGHT BE UN SUPERVISION OVER TRIBAL CONCLAVES HELD SUCCESSIVELY AT PLACES OUTSIDE UAR-GARRISONED AREA AND WHERE UAR REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT BE PRESENT, SUCH AS AMRAN AND IBB AT WHICH CONSENSUS WOULD BE TAKEN OF ZAYDI AND SHAFAI WISHES RE MEASURES TO BROADEN BASE OF GOVT. IF WELL DONE IT MIGHT BE HARD FOR FAYSAL TO DECLARE RESULTS WERE FALSE. CONCEIVABLY IT COULD BE MATTER OF ADVANCE DISCUSSION WITH FAYSAL AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD PUBLICLY STATE THAT ALL HE DESIRED FOR YEMEN WAS SELF-DETERMINATION; CONSEQUENTLY HE WOULD ACCEPT RESULTS THOROUGH UN-SUPERVISED REFERENDUM; WHEN UAR TROOPS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN HE WOULD NOT ONLY RECOGNIZE WHATEVER GOVT. EMERGED BUT WOULD BE PREPARED ASSIST IT ECONOMICALLY; AND MEANWHILE WOULD CONTINUE REFRAIN FROM MILITARY AID TO ROYALISTS AND MAKE THIS RESTRAINT PERMANENT ONCE DISENGAGEMENT COMPLETE PROVIDED UAR KEPT TROOPS OUT.

8. TACTICS WITH FAYSAL

I SAID THAT SPINELLI'S PRACTICAL APPROACH WAS BEST POSSIBLE ONE. ON BASIS MY EXPERIENCE IT WAS ADVISABLE AVOID APPROACHING FAYSAL FROM STANDPOINT WHAT WAS STATESMANLIKE OR MORAL AND FOCUS ON PRACTICAL CONCRETE STEPS. HE MUST, HOWEVER, BRACE HIMSELF FOR A RATHER TOUGH FAYSAL LINE AT FIRST MEETING BUT NOT TAKE WHATEVER FAYSAL MIGHT SAY AS FINAL POSITION. FAYSAL'S EMOTIONS OVER DISENGAGEMENT COULD PUSH HIM TO EXTREME AND, DESPITE BETTER NEWS SPINELLI BROUGHT ON SAR WITHDRAWALS, FAYSAL CAPABLE RENEWING AID TO ROYALISTS AS LONG AS HE FELT NASIR "LAUGHING" AT HIM, AT UN, AT U.S. AND GETTING BY WITH IT.

/COMMENT: I WOULD

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~~SECRET~~

-6- 607, DECEMBER 11, 6 P.M. FROM: JIDDA.

COMMENT. I WOULD DESCRIBE SPINELLI'S PRESENT FRAME OF MIND AS ALLERGIC TO DECLARATIONS, CHARGES AND EXHORTATIONS. HE IS BOTH IMPATIENT WITH FROZEN POSITIONS OF ALL SIDES IN YEMEN CONFLICT AND BASICALLY AWARE THAT SINCE SITUATION IS IMMENSELY COMPLICATED, HE CANNOT EXPECT TO DISCOVER ANY MAGIC FORMULA TO UNRAVEL IT QUICKLY.

ACCOMPANIED BY BERENSEN AND SAQQAF SPINELLI FLEW TO RIYADH DECEMBER 11 AND WILL RETURN JIDDA EVENING DECEMBER 12 WHEN I EXPECT TO SEE HIM AGAIN. HE GOES TO CAIRO DECEMBER 13 FOR APPOINTMENT WITH FAWZI DECEMBER 14 AND NASIR SOON AFTER.

GP-3.

HART

BA/20.

NOTE: PARAGRAPHS NUMBERED AS RECEIVED.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Yemen

81

53

~~SECRET~~

Action
NEA

Control: 7320
Rec'd: DECEMBER 11, 1963
10:12 AM

Info
SS
G
SP
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RMR

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: SECSTATE 2717

INFO: TAIZ 65
ADEN 46
JIDDA 76
CAIRO 84
USUN 237

DATE: DECEMBER 11, 1 PM

NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-436
By *WJ* NARA. Date *4-1-92*

030

BRENCHLEY TOLD EMBOFF YESTERDAY HMG STILL CONSIDERING YAR COUNTER PROPOSAL ON PULLBACK. PRELIMINARY HMG VIEW IS COUNTER PROPOSAL NOT ACCEPTABLE PRESENT FORM. FIRST POINT WOULD REQUIRE BRITISH EVACUATE SOME FORWARD POSITIONS OCCUPIED SINCE SEPTEMBER 25, 1962, BECAUSE OF YAR INCURSIONS INTO BAIHAN TERRITORY. MORE IMPORTANT, IT WOULD IN EFFECT CUT VITAL ROAD LINKING BAIHANI CUSTOMS POST AT NAGD MARGAD AND WADI AIN. BRITISH WILL (#) ON FAITH.

IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, YAR COUNTER PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE TO HMG, BRITISH INTEND SUBMIT THEIR OWN COUNTER PROPOSAL. THIS MIGHT BE ALONG LINES THAT SINCE YAR IS ASKING BRITISH TO EVACUATE WIDER AREA THAN SUGGESTED IN INITIAL BRITISH PROPOSAL, YAR SHOULD ALSO MAKE COMPARABLE ADDITIONAL EVACUATIONS ON ITS SIDE. PROBLEM THIS POSES IS THAT ONLY ADDITIONAL POSITIONS THAT YAR COULD EVACUATE ON ITS SIDE OF FRONTIER WOULD BE HARIH AND HARIH AIRSTRIP. YAR PROBABLY UNWILLING AGREE EVACUATE THESE POSITIONS. BRENCHLEY HOPED YAR MIGHT THEN COME BACK TO SOMETHING ALONG LINES INITIAL BRITISH PROPOSAL.

WE ALSO MENTIONED CORTADA'S VIEW INSISTENCE ON SAF REPRESENTATIVE ON PROPOSED ANGLO-YEMENI SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE COULD TORPEDO SCHEME. BRENCHLEY DEMURRED. HE SAID THIS NEED ONLY BE

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-2- 2717, DECEMBER 11, 1 PM; FROM LONDON

SO IF YAR LOOKING FOR WAY SCUTTLE IDEA, WHICH HE RATHER THOUGHT MIGHT BE CASE. HMG WILL NOT PUT SAF INTO SECONDARY POSITION VIS-A-VIS YAR. IT WILL PROBABLY INSIST SAF REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATE. (NOTE: IN PONDERING PROBLEM, THOUGHT OCCURS TO US ONE POSSIBLE WAY SOLVE IT WOULD BE URGE HMG USE BRITISH OFFICER SERVING WITH SAF FORCES. SUCH PROCEDURE MIGHT SATISFY BOTH YAR AND SAF SENSITIVITIES. WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH BRITISH, BUT DEPT AND CORTADA MAY WISH CONSIDER WHETHER IN EVENT PULLBACK PROPOSAL REACHES POINT WHERE COMMITTEE NEEDS BE NAMED, SUCH DEVICE MIGHT OVERCOME APPARENT STUMBLING BLOCK INVOLVED IN BRITISH INSISTENCE ON SAF PARTICIPATION.)

NO DECISION YET REACHED RE DEPT'S PROPOSAL APPOINT CONSUL IN YEMEN. IDEA STILL BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN HMG. (NOTE: WE SUSPECT BRITISH WILL TURN DOWN PROPOSAL. SITUATION HAS EVOLVED TOO MUCH SINCE THEY FIRST MADE IT TO US. WHILE BRITISH HAVE BEEN VERY TIGHT LIPPED ABOUT THEIR DISCUSSIONS OF US PROPOSAL, WE SUSPECT THEY WILL COME UP WITH COUNTER PROPOSAL. UNTIL AND UNLESS BRITISH COME UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE COUNTER PROPOSAL, WE THINK IT DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE URGE CONSULAR APPOINTMENT AND ARE DOING SO.)

GP-3.

BRUCE

JTC

(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

39

~~SECRET~~Action
SSControl: 6414
Rec'd: December 11, 1963
9:07 a.m.

Info

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1303, December 10, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

032

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1303, INFORMATION JIDDA 122, LONDON 87,
USUN 102, TAIZ 113.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DEPTEL 2405; EMBTEL 1267

Although Yemen Affairs has turned out to be never-never land past all parties imagining, we assume USA objectives have remained unaltered. These are (A) inhibiting spread of conflict into general Arab world conflagration; (B) safeguarding stability SAG from both external attack and internal stress created by its involvement in Yemen; (C) checkmating Soviet attempts use Yemen either for securing permanent position in Red Sea or binding UAR more closely to its charity wheel.

Thus questions posed by current status Yemen affair basically strategic. Should our next moves be based (A) solely on specifics UAR, SAG and USA commitments under Bunker agreement, or (B) on adaptation to hard realities present situation, with special attention to overall US interests in Near East?

There is much to be said for basing strategy on solemn international commitments. Nor can consequences of letting down a ruler who has largely kept pledged word be lightly dismissed. But Faysal in his insistence that continued presence of substantial number of UAR troops on Yemen soil justifies his resumption of aid to Royalists and in his endeavors to force USG maintain protective umbrella over such activities is asking too much. Possibly Faysal's real objective is irreparable rupture of present US-UAR

/relations

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 06-95

By isl, NARA, Date 11-13-06

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1303, December 10, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) from Cairo

relations with mistaken belief cut-off US aid to Egypt will force Nasser accept defeat in Yemen or even destroy Nasser regime in Egypt. Yet cold fact remains that USG cannot bring about withdrawal of UAR forces from Yemen in numbers and according to timetable acceptable to Faysal except by use of US Armed Force.

We do not believe our permitting Bunker agreement to lapse will raise serious doubts as to US steadfastness in most Arab countries. Arab world generally and "liberated Arab states" in particular have been indifferent to Yemen conflict. While SAG has made serious effort to comply with letter of one part of Bunker agreement (cessation of arms traffic) since posting UNYOM in July its record of compliance with other parts (e.g. denial of Saudi territory to Yemen royal family) as well as its breach of spirit of disengagement (stepping up of military assistance after US recognition of YAR; frantic stockpiling in Yemen during two month period between conclusion Bunker agreement and arrival of UNYOM on scene; present stockpiling activities in Saudi Arabia as well as connivance with Sherif of Beihan and other pro-Royalists) have all served to tarnish Saudi claim to approach court of world opinion with clean hands. Neither Arabs nor others would have grounds for complaint at USG refusal protect SAG if it persists in inviting YAR-UAR attack on its territory by resuming flow arms and money to Royalists.

Moreover, Bunker agreement enables UAR to avoid facing up to its own responsibilities. Egyptians interpret Bunker presentation as US recognition of UAR "right" to protect Nascent YAR. Rather than viewing all implications to them of continued Yemen situation Egyptians tempted to temporize and to use tactics of high school debate and clumsy efforts to deceive (i.e. "numbers game" re troop withdrawals) with US and UN which Bunker agreement interposed into situation.

Both SAG and UAR are in political and military morass of their own making. Bunker agreement, based as it was on assumptions since proven unrealistic (e.g. that YAR would achieve acceptance and stability quickly as soon as Saudi arms stopped flowing; that Yemenis ripe for capable of self-determination) has probably

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-3- 1303, December 10, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) from Cairo

served to thicken the morass. Both sides need some shock treatment. Abrogation of Bunker agreement would provide this.

BADEAU

REE

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State~~SECRET~~54
Action

Control: 6305

SS

Rec'd: December 10, 1963
8:43 A.M.

Info

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1303, December 10, 10 A.M. (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

032

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1303, INFORMATION JIDDA 122, LONDON 87,
USUN 102, TAIZ 113.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S.

USG should not despair of results which have been achieved as result of its unrelenting diplomatic pressure on UAR over past 15 months. Yemen struggle has not spread to Arab world generally but has been contained. Saudi regime and US material interests in Saudi Arabia have not been seriously threatened. UAR now fully aware of depth and risk of USG concern (Department telegrams 2432 and 2497 are eloquent testimony of this) and is casting about for new approaches and means of improving its relations with Saudi Arabia. Egyptian representatives both here and in US virtually admit their lack of ability to work with Yemenis in establishment of broadened and more stable government and await Spinelli proposals with some eagerness.

At same time UAR has given indications that if USG wishes make Yemen life-or-death issue as regards US-UAR relationship, UAR will pick up gauntlet, albeit reluctantly. We do not share belief expressed in Jidda's 561 to Department that Nasser's mischief-making capacity has become limited to point it no longer need seriously concern us. Number of stable regimes in Arab world has decreased rather than increased since 1956-1958 period. Destructiveness is one of few easy policies to implement in this area.

It is useful to inventory pressures we can bring to bear on UAR:

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/ 1. ABROGATION
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-2- 1303, December 10, 10 A.M., From Cairo (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

1. ABROGATION OF BUNKER AGREEMENT. As stated above, Egyptians have tended consider Bunker Agreement as element insulating them from consequences of their own acts. They have also used it as instrument with which to belabor USG for not forcing Faysal and UK to accept revolutionary Yemen. We believe abrogation of agreement with implication that USG intends let parties stew in juice of their own making will be viewed very seriously by UAR and put it into more constructive frame of mind.

2. REFERENCE TO UN. UAR would probably have mixed feelings over prospect of slugging it out with SAF in UN forum. Egyptians have highly flattering opinion of themselves and advocates of their own cause in international organizations. In Security Council they could count on Russian veto. Saudi disengagement record is neither so untangled nor so pure as to prevent successful Egyptian obfuscation of their own failures to comply with their obligations. On other hand, naturally secretive and hypersensitive Egyptians would not relish so much dirty linen, a great deal of it their own, being washed in so public a forum. We note UAR delegation to UN has sought to avoid substantive discussion of Yemen problem in SC in past (we therefore conclude that prospect that Yemen problem will be discussed exhaustively and substantively in UN should encourage Egyptians to be on better behavior.

3. US RECOGNITION OF YAR. Most bone-chilling threat we could make to Egyptians at this juncture would be indication US might withdraw recognition of YAR. Implications of such withdrawal would be: A) Cessation of US acceptance of UAR thesis re its right to support friendly legitimate government; B) dashing of UAR hopes that US and West will eventually take over large part of UAR administrative and economic burden in Yemen; C) USG acquiescence in subsequent attempts SAG and UK might make to overthrow YAR. Effect on public opinion among thinking Egyptians would be profound; their apprehensions that Yemen will suck more blood from Egypt for indefinite period would be intensified. UAR regime would not relish prospect of being alone with Soviets in Yemen under circumstances where Egyptian

/ "nonalignment"

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-3- 1303, December 10, 10 A.M., From Cairo (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

"nonalignment" gamesmanship would be meaningless. We should not of course make this threat unless we are prepared to carry it out. From view point international law, withdrawal of recognition could easily be justified. There at least twice as many foreign troops bolstering up YAR now than there were at time of US recognition. YAR Government, such as it is, probably controls less rather than more territory than it did in December 1962. Major problem involved in US withdrawal of recognition is of course risk Soviets would move into vacuum created by removal US presence to point where Yemen became outright Soviet satellite. We would defer to view of professional Sovieticians on this point, but we do not believe Soviets have means or desire commit Yemenis or themselves to such a state of affairs in this remote and poor country.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

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Action

Control:

6973

Rec'd:

December 11, 1963

3:17 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Cairo

ACTION: Secstate 1303 (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

032

INFO: Jidda 122

London 87

USUN 102

Taiz 113

DATE: December 10, 10 a.m.

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4. US propaganda. In our discussions of Yemen with Egyptians over past months we have detected some very vulnerable pressure points on UAR body politic. What we have in mind is overt but subtle and unattributed propaganda campaign waged by authoritative US sources against UAR. There are certain themes that could serve to force high level UAR reappraisal of what Yemen situation as it now stands is doing to image of regime both abroad and internally. Among examples of such themes:

A. The Egyptian protectorate over Yemen. Parallels with the British occupation and protectorate over Egypt.

B. Nasser as the heir of Mohamed Aly (repeat Mohamed Uly) and Ibrahim Pasha. Latter two were unable think of other Arabs politics (Sudanese, Palestinians, Lebanese, Saudis) except in terms of military conquest and occupation. Egypt as traditional imperialist.

C. Inability of Egyptians to treat other Arabs as equals (comparison of Yemen situation with failure of Syrian merger 1958, abortive tripartite unity talks 1963, et cetera).

5. US aid. This Embassy has already recommended that USG refuse discuss new aid projects for UAR until USG satisfied

that

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-2- 1303, December 10, 10 a.m. (SECTION III of IV) from Cairo

that economic drain of UAR Yemen operation is being curtailed. We also believe in continued usefulness USG position that expanded aid to YAR cannot be proffered until YAR has achieved degree of acceptance and stability make optimum use of such assistance. Threat of total withdrawal of US aid to UAR has not been ultimate decisive weapon which many had fondly imagined. But aid has been and will continue to be a useful, if limited, means of pressure. As previously indicated (EMBTEL 1117), we believe Gruening Amendment, by depriving us of subtlety, has lessened rather than enhanced value of aid as a means of political persuasion. But there is possibility that we could make virtue of necessity imposed by Gruening Amendment by pointing out that unprovoked UAR military attack on Saudi territory would have almost automatic effect of qualifying UAR as aggressor in terms of amendment. (We assume that Saudi Arabia is country "receiving aid" insofar as wording by Gruening Amendment is concerned.).

6. Military implications for US. This Embassy does not accept Faysal position that SAG's own security requires him to resume assistance to Royalists so long as UAR troops remain in Yemen. At same time, we are not so naive as to believe we can persuade Faysal that mere compliance with usual norms of international behavior will in itself best preserve integrity of his country. In fetid imbroglios of intra-Arab politics, maxim that "virtue is its own reward" has little appeal. Faysal has right to expect that if he in fact (perhaps subject to US verification) continued to abstain from aiding Yemeni Royalists, USG will effectively implement its assurance to support Saudi Arabian independence and integrity. UAR must be made to realize that there are limits beyond which it acts as its own mortal peril. Perhaps "hard surface" is not appropriate US course of action in present situation. (We are confused by indication in DEPTTEL 2405, paragraph II, I, C that if SAG resumes aid to Royalists, "hard surface" will be withdrawn; that if SAG does

not

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-3- 1303 December 10, 10 a.m. (SECTION III of IV), from Cairo

not resume aid, "hard surface" will be withdrawn anyway).

We believe most persuasive line we can take with UAR re US military response to UAR military action on/or over Saudi territory would be following:

(A) USG committed to military defense of Saudi independence and integrity;

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control:

6957

Rec'd:

December 11, 1963

SS

3:50 a.m.

Info

FROM: Cairo

032

ACTION: SECSTATE 1303 (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

INFO: JIDDA 122

LONDON 87

USUN 102

TAIZ 113

DATE: December 10, 10 a.m.

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B) Future clear violations by UAR will bring this commitment into play.

C) Once B) occurs, political questions are subordinate to military considerations. USG would not shrink from military requirement to destroy bases in Yemen from which UAR aggression was mounted.

D) Above US policy is conditioned on continued SAG abstention from assistance to Royalist. However, US will determine whether SAG has violated its pledge. ~~Ex~~post facto accusations by UAR would not be acceptable.

Conclusion. Failure of Bunker agreement to achieve all results sought while hardly happy event should not lead to undue despondency re US policies and interests in Near East. Yemen mess daily assumes more realistic proportions as nagging but peripheral problem in this difficult and tedious area. It is minor compared to other problems such as: Prospect indefinitely continued weakness and instability in Iraq; impending Israel diversion of Jordan waters; upcoming US decision to get in or get out of Palestine refugee problem; question as to whether UAR can keep abreast of its own development program and population pressure or is driven into increasing foreign adventure by failure at Home-~~ala~~ ~~la~~ CHICOM pattern in East Asia.

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/Foregoing

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-2- 1303, December 10, 10 a.m., from Cairo, (SECTION 4 OF 4)

Foregoing together with comments Jidda, Taiz, London, USUN provide basis for formulation US position against likelihood UNYOM will not be extended beyond January 4. We would like to be able inform UARG in reasonably near future of US intentions in post-UNYOM period.

GP-1.

BADEAU

SYT

100 1303, 10 a.m., from Cairo, (SECTION 4 OF 4)

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin	ACTION:	Amembassy CAIRO	2590
NEA	INFO:	USUN NEW YORK	1667
Info:	INFO:	Amembassy JIDDA	466
SS		TAIZ	457
G		LONDON	3560
SP		AMMAN	VIA POUCH
L		BAGHDAD	" "
EUR		BEIRUT	" "
IO		DAMASCUS	" "
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P		KUWAIT	" "

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DEPTEL 2497 to Cairo

Following discussion with Fawzi in New York, Ambassador Kamel today gave Jernegan revised list of points which he personally thought could serve as basis for solution Yemen problem, and which he said had received Fawzi's agreement.

New list of suggestions is:

1) Immediate cessation of harmful propaganda by all parties (UAR, SAG, UAR, UK and ~~YAR~~ SAF).

2) Quick effort to form broad government in Yemen, principally through UN representative Spinelli.

3) Normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and UAR and between Saudi Arabia and YAR.

4) If possible, normalization of relations between UK and YAR.

5. Cessation

Drafted by:

NEA:JDJernegan:cae

12/10/63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Symmes

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *rgjr*, NARA, Date *2-7-00*

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5. Cessation of all aid by Saudi Arabia (including money) to Yemeni Royalists: in exchange for this, UAR and YAR to refrain from any action (bombing, infiltration) against Saudi territory.

6) Continued presence of UN in Yemen until whole question definitely settled.

7) Withdrawal of UAR troops according to reasonable, practical schedule.

Ambassador emphasized these points still had no repeat no standing but said Fawzi had promised discuss them with Nasser, and he (Kamel) intended write letter about them to Nasser today or tomorrow. Said he would like to have our reaction soon.

Jernegan commented that proposed course of action, if accepted by UARG, seemed to hold good promise for progress. Pointed out that much would depend on reestablishing confidence among several parties ⁱⁿ ~~with~~ each others good faith and also on timing of definite steps. Said he would consult others in Department and look forward to further ^{discussions} ~~discussion~~ with Kamel soon.

Request post comments.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

04272

Yemen

84

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Origin

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ACTION: AmEmbassy TAIZ 453
" JIDDA 464

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Dec 9 8 31 PM '63

INFO : AmEmbassy CAIRO 2567
" LONDON 3537
AmConsul ADEN 103
" DHHRAN 255
USUN NEW YORK 1662

050

YAR Ambassador al-Aini, accompanied by his ^{UN} deputy Jaghman (who returned US from Yemen December 6) called on ~~Yemeni Ambassador to the US~~ Jernegan on December 9. With Jaghman doing bulk of talking, they made strong plea for US playing "more effective role" in Yemen by using its influence to obtain SAG-YAR ~~ARM~~ detente and ultimate recognition YAR by Saudis. This move, which in interest peace and welfare whole area, would clearly remove "threat in north", thus giving Yemenis solid basis for requesting UAR troop withdrawal. Emphasized ^{US} opinion that Nasser does not desire solution in Yemen and that/working directly on Egyptians to obtain their withdrawal is fruitless exercise. Describing current situation Yemen in support this view, Jaghman made following points:

1. No tribes in north or south are basically opposed to republican regime; those fighting are primarily motivated by anti-Egyptian sentiment. However, major tribes (Khawlan, Hashid, Arhab) reluctant take stand against UAR presence in view potential chaos should Saudis intervene after UAR withdrawal. Yemenis, even Hamid al-Din princes who frequently cross into Saudi Arabia, are convinced that royalists cannot return to power.

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:GCM:bore:cjh:12-9-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Symmes

IO - Mr. Buffum (substance)

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NLJ/RAL 06-95

By *isl*, NARA, Date 11-13-06

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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2. Nasser, for reasons power, prestige, defense, clearly does not want Yemen settlement which would require removal his presence. Thus UAR forced YAR take antagonistic tone in first formal written communication to Spinelli and at same time launched bombing raid on Saudi village. While this going on, Nasser was hypocritically telling Iryani in Cairo that he favored all YAR moves toward peaceful solution country's problems.

3. UAR opposes attempts YAR establish good relations with other countries. YARG recognition North Viet Nam and North Korea and agreement exchange Consuls with East Germany was done at behest UAR only. Latter caused Federal Republic of Germany postpone consideration granting DM 25 million assistance to YAR.

4. UAR thwarts beneficial administrative improvements in YAR. Proposed Yemen governmental changes mentioned Embtel 362 characterized by Jaghman as move planned for benefit of country but vetoed by UAR in form originally proposed by Iryani in Cairo. Have now been distorted by Egyptians into change in form only, not substance.

5. Predicted Spinelli report to SYG would underline popular opposition to UAR and would specifically note that presence UAR troops prevents administrative reforms and improvements in Yemen. (Jaghman acted as interpreter when both al-Amri and Iryani told latter to Spinelli.)

6. YAR-UK Beihan area pullback being blocked by UAR. Jaghman claimed YAR trying handle matter secretly, that formal YAR reply to British counter-proposals was prepared ^{without} ~~with~~ knowledge Egyptians.

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al-Aini

Both ~~himself~~ and Jaghman emphasized that no purpose now served by exerting pressure directly on UAR to bring about solution Yemen problem and his withdrawal of troops. In support this thesis, al-Aini reported/recent conversation in New York with UAR ForMin Fawzi concerning US-UAR relations. Fawzi said US cannot ignore our (UAR's) position in the Middle East; if US desires exert pressure on M us over Yemen to point where our relations break down and hostility arises again between us, it is not of importance.

In commenting on the above, Mr. Jernegan said that we had been urging Faisal to not to interfere in the Yemen and that we had been encouraging him to meet with YARG representatives. While no reply yet forthcoming on latter, perhaps time ripe for further approach.

~~FOR JIDDA: Suggest you brief Spinelli on foregoing, omitting Fawzi's~~

~~6/2/68~~

~~END~~

In response to query on what would be Yemeni position if problem taken to UN Security Council, al-Aini said YAR would have to follow lead UAR.

FOR JIDDA: Suggest you brief Spinelli on foregoing, omitting Fawzi's remarks.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

04102

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Yemen

~~SECRET~~

55

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy JIDDA

462

IMMEDIATE

Dec 9 6 20 PM '63

SS

Info

INFO : AmEmbassy CAIRO

2563

" TAIZ

452

" LONDON

3525

AmConsul DHAHRAN

253

USUN NEW YORK

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

Embtels 561 and 572

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-436

By lig NARA. Date 4-1-92

After careful review field comments, we considering modifying course of action outlined in Deptel 440. Modifications include (1) continuing use Bunker Agreement as reference point for disengagement and (2) leaving Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia until end January assuming SAG does not resume support of royalists.

Re Embtel 561, we doubt whether situation requires our now rpt now directly challenging UAR on Yemen issue in public (UN) forum. Moreover, we do not rpt not believe time has come deliberately "take some real risks" with basic US-UAR relationship in order force UAR adhere to letter disengagement agreement as end in itself. US interests in Saudi Arabia and in Peninsula as whole are not currently endangered nor are they likely to be as long as Faisal stays out of Yemen. Obviously, toughest job ahead is persuade Faisal of this fact.

Furthermore, we believe to raise issue in UN now would tend to undercut

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:TWSeelye:cfh:12-9-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Symmes

OSD/ISA - Mr. Quinn

IO - Mr. Sisco

UNP - Mr. Campbell

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Spinelli. We should also keep in mind fact that any accusation leveled against UAR in UN over Yemen must enjoy YARG backing in order evoke favorable response in most UN circles. Otherwise, UAR could make much of argument it had responded to appeal by government now recognized by UN and which was threatened by foreign-backed political force of reactionary coloration. (YARG UN representatives have told us that in event Yemen case comes up before SC they are certain their instructions would be to support UAR) Your proposal re dispatch small UN military force to cover cities of Sana'a and Saada during period of referendum and as UAR troops withdrawn might be considered at later date, especially should YARG request it. However, bitter Congo experience and current shortage UN funds tend militate against likelihood UN acceptance this proposal, and we would think that if any external forces are necessary Arab League should be explored as first potential source.

We recognize that course of action as now modified may still be difficult to sell Faisal but hope you can support it as best of possible alternatives in context our overall Near Eastern policy. If you should nevertheless consider it necessary proceed to Washington in accordance last para Embtel 572, please advise immediately.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Yemen

86

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Action NNNNVV EUA100VB099 CRA57

PP RUEHCC RUEHDT

NEA DE RUQVKW 13 07/0830Z

P R 070825Z ZEA

Info FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO RUSHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

SS INFO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

G RUQVDA/AMCONGEN DHAHRAN

SP RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

L RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK

H STATE GR400

BT

EUR ~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 247 INFO PRIORITY JIDDA 60

IO DHAHRAN WIE LONDON 85 TAIZ 14 USUN 23 CAIRO UNN (BY POUCH)

E FROM KUWAIT DECEMBER 7, 12 NOON.

AID

P

IOP FONOFF UNDER SECRETARY ATEEGI STATED IN SUBSTANCE, DURING CALL
NSC BY CONGEN HORNER AND DCM:

INR 1. YAR LOAN 1 MILLION KD FOR BUDGET SUPPORT. YAR AND PEOPLE
CIA IN DIRE STRAITS AND KUWAIT CANNOT STAND IDLY BY AND WATCH PATIENT
NSA DIE BECAUSE DOCTORS DISPUTING OVER TREATMENT. SAG MAY BE UNHAPPY,
OSD BUT NOT SERIOUSLY; AS AWARE THIS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL RELIEF NOT
ARMY CFN 247 60 83 85 14 23 7 12 1. 1

NAVY

AIR

RMR

PAGE 2 RUQVKW 13 ~~SECRET~~

MILITARY AID. LOAN MERELY LATEST OF SERIES AID MEASURES.

COMMENT: SEEMED IMPLY THAT SAG MIGHT BE PLEASED WITH THOUGHT
THAT GOK FINANCIAL SUPPORT COULD FACILITATE UNION COALITION
YEMEN ELEMENTS.

2. DANGER UN OBSERVER'S WITHDRAWAL JANUARY 4 LESS IMPORTANT
MATTER THAN LIKELIHOOD YEMENIS WILL CONCERT AND REQUEST UAR TO
EVACUATE. UNITED YEMENIS WILL EVENTUALLY ATTACK UAR FORCES IF
THEY DO NOT DEPART SOON. FEELING AGAINST THEM GROWING ON ALL
SIDES. IN EVENT RESUMPTION SAG MILITARY SUPPLY ROYALISTS,
NASSER WOULD NOT ATTACK SAUDI ARABIA, OTHER THAN NUISANCE RAIDS
FRINGES AREAS AS IN PAST. SA TOO VAST FOR UAR TO CONQUER AND
"YOU AND ARAB NAIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT HIM TO ATTACK JIDDA AND
RIYADH OR SERIOUSLY THREATEN SAG EXISTENCE."

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By gjc NARA, Date 2-7-06

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-2- 247, DECEMBER 7, NOON FROM KUWAIT.

COMMENT: THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION ATEEGI BITINGLY ANTI NASSER'S FOREIGN POLICIES. NOT CLEAR WHETHER HIS VIEWS RE YEMENI COALITION PRODUCT RECENT VISIT BY YAR ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE, AND OTHER YEMENI SOURCES, OR WISHFUL THINKING.

3. ALTHOUGH KUWAIT AND SAG DO NOT COMPLETELY SEE EYE TO EYE RE YEMEN. THEY GOOD NEIGHBORS AND BROTHERS WITH MANY COMMON INTERESTS. NEUTRAL ZONE DIVISION AND BORDER SETTLEMENT BEING WORKED OUT
CFN 2. 4. 3.

PAGE RUQVKW 13 ~~SECRET~~
BY TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND ARBITRATION CLAUSE. AGREED ON TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTES. GOK GIVES FULLEST SUPPORT FAISAL AND HIS PROGRAM FOR SAG. THIS BEST AVAILABLE LEADER AND PROGRAM FOR SAG. BEST THING ANY FRIEND OF SAUDI ARABIA CAN DO IS SUPPORT FAISAL TO HILT.

COMMENT: (1) THIS APPEARED EITHER SERMON URGING USG SUPPORT FAISAL MORE STRONGLY OR DECLARATION KUWAITI SUPPORT FAISAL WHICH HOPEFULLY HORNER WOULD RELAY FAISAL, OR BOTH. (2) IN EARLIER CALL, SAG CHARGE AFFIRMED AMIR AND GOK STRONG, SINCE SUPPORTERS SAG AND VICE VERSA, BUT COMPLAINED KUWAIT PRESS UNIVERSALLY UNFRIENDLY SAG.

GP-3.

COTTAM

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Yemen

87

42

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 4688

Rec'd: DECEMBER 7, 1963
12:43 AM

SS

Info

FROM: JIDDA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 584, DECEMBER 6, 2 PM

041

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DEPTEL 450

IN ABSENCE SUFFICIENT UAR WITHDRAWALS TO MAKE PERSUASIVE CASE THAT DISENGAGEMENT OPERATION RESUMED, CONTINUED PRESENCE HARD SURFACE COUPLED WITH STRONG SUPPORT BY US OF SAG CASE IN UNSC (USUN'S 2345) COULD AND PROBABLY WOULD BE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PERSUADING FAYSAL TO POSTPONE RESUMPTION AID TO ROYALISTS. TOGETHER THEY WOULD GIVE ME SOMETHING TO WORK WITH AND I BELIEVE I WOULD HAVE SAQQAF'S FULL SUPPORT. FAYSAL WOULD NOT WANT TO LOSE HARD SURFACE NOR PLAY INTO NASIR'S HANDS BY PLACING SELF IN OPPOSITION TO US AND UN PUBLIC OPINION. FURTHERMORE, COMBINATION THESE TWO FACTORS WOULD BE IMPRESSIVE TO HIM AS FIRST CONCRETE INDICATION ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, I. E. LATTER'S RECOGNITION THAT SAG HAS EARNED HIS SUPPORT BY ITS RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH DISENGAGEMENT. IF UNYOM REMOVED AND THIS COMBINATION OF SUPPORT NEVERTHELESS REMAINED FAYSAL WOULD BE ALL THE MORE IMPRESSED BECAUSE UNYOM HAS CONSTITUTED GUARANTEE WHICH USG ORIGINALLY SOUGHT ON PRINCIPLE THAT IMPARTIAL OBSERVATION WAS MORE PERSUASIVE THAN FAYSAL'S WORD IN BACKING USG TO GET UAR COMPLIANCE. WITH UN OBSERVERS LARGELY OR COMPLETELY GONE FAYSAL WOULD BE PUT ON HIS HONOR AND I THINK HE WOULD BE SENSITIVE IN PRESERVING IT. HOW LONG THIS SITUATION COULD BE MADE TO LAST WOULD DEPEND ON PROGRESS WE AND UN MAKE AND PROSPECT OF UAR CEDING TO COMBINATION PRESSURES.

GP-3.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-95
By id, NARA, Date 10-26-06

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CJ/25

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DEPTELX TO CAIRO 2496 INFO JIDDA 453

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-95
By isr, NARA, Date 10-26-06

In follow-up to conversations with Talbot and Jernegan, Ambassador Kamel December 4 told Davies/he instructed to make known to highest levels USG UARG earnest desire continue close and friendly relations. In responding to reiteration by Davies ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ of urgent need for UAR action to relieve strain on policies imposed by continued UAR involvement Yemen, Kamel said Nasser has decided seek reestablish diplomatic relations Saudi Arabia as one step toward resolution Yemen problem.

As complementary actions he, Foreign Minister Fawzi and Arab League SYG Hassouna were pressing following program:

- 1) US-UAR efforts to persuade UK agree in principle recognize YARG.
- 2) Spinelli's mission and his forthcoming recommendations to receive full support all governments concerned.
- 3) USG to continue pressure on Faisal to maintain status quo on Yemen border and to prevent infiltration in either direction.

Drafted by: NEX:NE:RPDavies:av 12/5/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Jernegan

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4) If above objectives attained, UARG to provide written commitment to UN and US covering withdrawal UAR combat forces from Yemen within specified time.

In discussion points Kamel said Nasser risking his posture as opponent feudal Arab regimes in seeking rapprochement with SAG but willing do so to react positively to USG requests for UAR action to get disengagement process moving forward. UARG was vigorously pushing for reconciliation forces within Yemen and its role essential, for Yemenis inherently unable reach agreement among themselves. Hopefully, Saudi Arabia would eventually be brought to recognize Yemen regime.

Davies noted effort resume relations with SAG would abort unless proper atmosphere created for negotiations and cited as parallel careful preparations both sides in advance 1933 US recognition of USSR. Kamel agreed and said he sending personal appeal to Nasser through special channel enclosing excerpts from UAR clandestine broadcasts handed him by Talbot to end anti-Saudi campaign. Noted VOAN operation not closely supervised, not heard in Cairo, and he personally convinced Nasser unaware of content.

Kamel indicated Nassouna would be involved in contacts with Saudis.

Kamel said it important to convince Nasser of importance Spinelli as key to solution. Accordingly on return Cairo Fawzi would follow line that UAR should discuss fully and frankly with him its requirements in Yemen solution but be prepared go along with his recommendations to the SYG even if these did not fully square with them. He would argue that UAR posture in UN would be weakened by any failure cooperate fully with Spinelli and SYG. Kamel thought Ambassador Badeau could be helpful by making this point in his conversations with UAR officials.

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Kamel asked that above information be closely held inasmuch as he did not have Fawzi's authorization to discuss with us as yet. Kamel in NY today for further talks with Fawzi.

GP-3.

END

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By mg/jr, NARA, Date 2-7-06

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In further discussion US-UAR relations with Assistant Secretary Talbot December 3, UAR Ambassador Kamel recapitulated points made earlier. Kamel stressed UAR desire good relations with US, UARG's growing irritation at lectures on Yemen situation, and incomprehension why Yemen now such prominent factor US-UAR relations. Reiterated assertion that emotional thunderhead over Yemen had developed because of "strange combination Zionists and supporters SAG, including ARAMCO". Expressing concern implication Jernegan's remarks December 2 that UAR not working toward broadened political base, said UAR working day and night toward this end. In his view Spinelli mission offered best promise. Also thought be helpful if Saudis and YAR got together and some arrangement reached between Yemenis and British over South Arabian Federation.

Reaffirming US desire maintain good relations with UAR, Talbot said we saw problems and opportunities in Near East in four categories:

a) Domestic development and stability: Providing aid help countries

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:FMDickman:mrs:12-4-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

NE - RPDavies

NEA- Mr. Jernegan

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focus on domestic problems and help reduce domestic pressures for external adventures.

b) Arab-Israel issue: We striving find ways in which peoples area could inch forward toward processes that would diminish tension, especially on refugees.

c) Inter-Arab disputes: We tried to avoid involvement unless their consequences seemed likely affect US vital interests.

d) Communist bloc activities: We sought avoid development conditions which would bring about increased Soviet influence in area or US-USSR confrontation in Near East.

After noting implications escalating arms race in area, particularly effect of costly sophisticated weapons, Talbot said immediate problem was Yemen where appeared UAR even more deeply entangled than at time of Bunker agreement. We wondering whether present trend toward tragic denouement unalterable or if some other direction UAR could pursue.

We agreed best hope is full support Spinelli efforts. Also much to be gained by renewed YAR contacts with Saudis and British in South Arabian Federation. Could UAR not urge YAR approach Faisal and encourage YAR agree our proposals for British-Yemeni pull-back in SAF border area? We pleased hear UAR ready resume relations with Saudis but this involved satisfactory climate. Could UAR not end propaganda attacks (new examples of which conveyed to Kamel)?

Addressing himself question why Yemen loomed so large, Talbot said would be mistake for UAR believe this mere consequence Zionist propaganda or lobbying by

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oil companies. In recent years USC had adopted policy of cooperation with UAR; Yemen problem provided first real test that policy. By working for Nasser's agreement to Bunker proposals, USC had involved its prestige in UARG performance. Failing disengagement, whatever the reason, USC under fire for having misplaced its confidence. Thus Yemen had assumed larger place in US-UAR relations than either country had anticipated; thus US had own interest in progress disengagement. (Memcon pouched).

GP-3.

END

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
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Rec'd: DECEMBER 4, 1963
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FROM: JIDDA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 572, DECEMBER 4, NOON



PRIORITY

032

ACTION DEPARTMENT PRIORITY 572, INFORMATION CAIRO 213, DHAHRAN
448, LONDON 167, TAIZ 180, USUN 169.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

COMMENTS ON DEPTTEL 440 RE PROPOSAL FOR NEXT STEPS, YEMEN
SUMMARY:

WHILE CONCURRING FULLY WITH OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED PARA 11 (B)
I CANNOT REGARD STEPS PROPOSED 11 (C) AS AFFORDING MEANS OF REACHING
THEM. ON CONTRARY I AM CONVINCED THEY WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGE
OUR RELATIONS WITH SAG, VIRTUALLY ENSURE ESCALATION SAG-UAR
CONFRONTATION AND WEAKEN OUR ABILITY INFLUENCE YEMEN SITUATION
CONSTRUCTIVELY. THUS WEAKENED WE WOULD THEN HAVE TO FACE SAME
SITUATION, MUCH ENFLAMED, IN UN.

DISCUSSION:

1. MOST DISTURBING ASPECTS OF REFTEL ARE:

A) ABSENCE OF REAL COURSE OF ACTION, APPARENT WILLINGNESS
WRITE OFF BUNKER UNDERTAKINGS AND LET HUMAN FRAILTIES TAKE THEIR
COURSE. WE DO NOT GRAPPLE WITH RESULTS. IT IS NOT CONVINCING TO
REFER TO "FACTORS BEYOND OUR CONTROL" (11.C1A).

WE ARE OF COURSE EXASPERATED WITH FAYSAL THAT HE DOES NOT
SEE HIS NATIONAL OR DYNASTIC SECURITY INTERESTS AS WE SEE THEM,
BUT IT IS A FACT OF LIFE HE DOES NOT. IF WE WRITE OFF BUNKER

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AGREEMENTS THEN BURDEN OF DEFAULT IS ON US. IT WILL UNDERMINE OUR POSITION HERE AND WILL MAKE FAYSAL LESS WILLING, NOT MORE, TO HEED OUR ADVICE. ON UAR SIDE, IF OUR PAST ADMONITIONS HAVE MEANT LITTLE OR NOTHING TO NASIR (AND I HAVE NO RECORD HERE WHICH SHOWS THEY HAVE MEANT VERY MUCH), WHAT STRENGTH WILL THEY CARRY WHEN WE WITHDRAW HARD SURFACE? THIS ACTION WILL SPEAK LOUDER THAN ANY WORDS WE USE AND WE CAN DEPEND UPON IT THAT HIS BOMBINGS THIS TIME WILL NOT STOP AT BORDER AREAS BUT EXTEND TO TAIZ, RIYADH AND PERHAPS INCLUDE GROUND THRU TS* AT JIZAN. THEY WILL HAVE POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY MOTIVATION BEHIND THEM. IS OUR GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY PREPARED TO SEE THIS HAPPEN? IF NOT, THEN I MUST DISAGREE WITH INDICATION IN CONCLUDING COMMENT REFTEL THAT PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION IS DESIGNED PRECLUDE BOMBINGS. IN FACT IT VIRTUALLY ENSURES THEM.

AS FOR SPINELLI'S ASSESSMENT (TAIZ 299) THAT IN END FAYSAL WILL CAVE IN AND RENEW UNYOM BECAUSE IT KEEPS UAR TROOPS TIED DOWN FOR ONLY \$100,000 PER MONTH, I MUST SAY I WISH THIS WERE TRUE, BUT I AM CONVINCED IT IS NOT.

B) ONE-SIDEDNESS OF OUR PROPOSED (NOT PRESENT) HANDLING OF CONTENDING PARTIES: UAR AND SAG. (1) THE LATTER OF COURSE IS THE WEAKER CONTESTANT. ITS INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONARY YEMEN WAS TO US BAD STATESMANSHIP, BUT SAG'S FEAR OF NASIR'S REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM IS REAL AND THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER UAR MILITARY HELP HAD BEEN PROMISED AND WAS ACTUALLY EN ROUTE. IT WAS DEFENSIVELY INSPIRED, WITH A YEAR OF UNREMITTING UAR PROPAGANDA WARFARE AGAINST SAG AS ITS BACKDROP. BY CONTRAST, UAR INTERVENTION CANNOT BE SAID TO BE MOTIVATED BY DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF ANY KIND. (2) WE THINK OF PRESENT UAR OCCUPATION AS LEGITIMIZED BY YAR INVITATION, BUT WHEN INITIATED YAR WAS NOT YET RECOGNIZED BY US NOR BY UN. (3) WE INFER THAT SAG'S REKINDLING FIRES OF WAR (II C AND E) JUSTIFIES OUR TELLING FAYSAL WE CANNOT STAND BEHIND HIM. ATTACKS HE WILL HAVE PROVOKED BECOME INFERENTIALLY LEGITIMATE, A SANCTION EARNED. BUT WE HAVE NO SANCTION EVEN OF PUBLIC REBUKE TO OFFER AGAINST UAR NAPALM AND TOXIC GAS ATTACKS ON YEMENI VILLAGES, RECENT

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-3- 572, DECEMBER 4, NOON, FROM JIDDA

BOMBINGS SAUDI BORDER REGION, NOR UAR REFUSAL ABIDE BY SOLEMN UNDERTAKING TO US. NOW, IN RETURN FOR NEARLY FIVE MONTHS OF ATTESTED OBSERVANCE OF DISENGAGEMENT IN FACE UAR NON-COMPLIANCE AND AIR INTRUSIONS, WE WOULD OFFER NOTHING TO SAG BUT GOOD ADVICE PLUS THREAT OF CONDEMNATORY ACTION IN UN IF IT RESUMES DEFENSE OF ITS SECURITY -- AS IT SEES IT -- VIA HELP TO ROYALISTS. SIMULTANEOUSLY WE OFFER NO MEANINGFUL DETERRENT TO NASIR. WE ADMONISH HIM IN PRIVATE AND HOPE FOR THE BEST. MEANWHILE HE WORKS TO BRING DOWN HOUSE OF SAUD. I CAN ASSURE YOU SAG'S BITTERNESS AT THIS TREATMENT WILL REACH THE EXTREME.

C) LACK OF REALISM IN URGING FAYSAL TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING SAUDI MILITARY CAPABILITY AND STRENGTHENING FABRIC SAUDI SOCIETY, WHILE FORGETTING UAR MILITARY (ESPECIALLY AIR) PRESENCE IN YEMEN, AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, I HAVE URGED THIS ON HIM COUNTLESS TIMES. BUT FAYSAL CANNOT BUILD UP EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE FOR YEARS AS WE WELL KNOW. MEANWHILE HE IS FIGHTING WITH ONLY TOOLS HE KNOWS AGAINST FOE WHO SWORE DESTROY HIM YEAR BEFORE YEMENI REVOLUTION AND WHICH BOMBS HIS BORDERS WHILE HE OBSERVES DISENGAGEMENT. HIS CONCENTRATION ON STRENGTHENING FABRIC OF SAUDI SOCIETY NEEDS NO EXHORTATION FROM US, ONLY OUR CONTINUING HELP AS WE CAN GIVE IT. AN INDEFATIGABLE WORKER, HE IS DOING WHAT HE CAN TO BROADEN HORIZONS OF CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY OF SAUDI POPULATION AND TO SET IN MOTION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WHICH IN YEAR OR TWO PROMISE TO CAPTURE ATTENTION OF THIS ENTIRE REGION. HOWEVER, WITH A JEALOUS AND RESENTFUL KING TRAVELING AMONG THE BEDU AND IDLE AND CORRUPT SONS OF SAUD WHISPERING OF FAYSAL'S "SUBSERVIENCE" TO AMERICAN COMMAND, FAYSAL CANNOT IGNORE HIS OWN STATURE AMONG THOSE WHO CONSTITUTE HIS MAIN SUPPORT. POPULAR REPROACHES FOR TOLERATING ONE-SIDEDNESS OF DISENGAGEMENT ARE NOT POSSIBLE TO SUPPRESS, AGGRAVATED AS THEY ARE BY ROYALISTS AND SYMPATHIZERS NOT JUST IN RIYADH BUT ELSEWHERE IN SENSITIVE AREAS OF KINGDOM. FACT THAT COMPLAINERS ARE NARROW OR SELF-SEEKING OR HOPING FOR ILLEGAL PROFIT ON ARMS DELIVERIES AS HAS APPARENTLY OCCURRED IN PAST, DOES NOT ABATE THIS PRESSURE ON FAYSAL. FAILURE OF MUTUALITY OF DISENGAGEMENT THREATENS HIS LEADERSHIP AS WELL RESUMPTION OF AIR AND OTHER ATTACKS

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-4- 572, DECEMBER 4, NOON, FROM JIDDA

TO WHICH HE HELPLESS TO REPLY. HE IS ON HORNS OF ACUTE DILEMMA AND ONLY ACTION BY UAR OR BY US WITHIN UN CAN AFFORD RELIEF.

2. I THEREFORE COME BACK TO MY PROPOSALS SUBMITTED EMBTEL 561. IF NO COURSE CAN BE FOLLOWED OTHER THAN THAT APPROXIMATING WHAT IS SET FORTH IN REFTTEL THEN I RESPECTFULLY ASK I AT ONCE BE GIVEN AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON TO PERSONALLY STATE MY CASE BEFORE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN WHICH I DEEPLY FEEL WILL THREATEN U.S. BASIC INTERESTS IN THIS REGION.
GP-3.

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JIDDA 72 TAIZ 60 ADEN 39 USUN 229 FROM LONDON DEC. 4, 3 PM

DEPTEL 3413.

WE SHARE DEPT'S VIEW IT IN HMG'S INTEREST TO ADOPT REASONABLE
POSTURE TOWARD YAR AND HAVE BEEN URGING THIS FOR MONTHS.VARIOUS FACTORS HAVE LIMITED EXTENT TO WHICH BRITISH WILL GO
IN THIS REGARD AND THESE ARE LIKELY TO PERSIST, VIZ:(1) FACT THAT HMG DOES NOT RECOGNIZE YAR AND, IF ANYTHING,
IS MOVING AWAY FROM RECOGNITION IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE;

CFN 2615 79 72 60 39 229 4 3 3413 (1)

PAGE TWO RUDTLN 90C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2) BRITISH ARE LESS PERSUADED THAN WE THAT YAR LEADERS,
WHOSE CAPACITY AND INTERNAL FOLLOWING IN YEMEN THEY SERIOUSLY
QUESTION, REALLY WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH HMG ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE
TO HMG, NAMELY SOME SORT OF RECOGNITION OF SAF. THEY FRANKLY
REGARD SOME OF YAR ACTIONS ON ADEN FRONTIER AS BELYING YAR
COMMENTS TO US, E.G. RETENTION DAR AHL BA TUHAYF; SPORADIC
HARRASSING FIRE ACROSS BORDER; YAR SUPPORT FOR PROTECTORATE
DISSIDENTS, INCLUDING GRANTING ASYLUM TO MANY OF THEM; REPEATED
VIOLATIONS ADEN AIRSPACE, ETC.; (3) HMG AND PARTICULARLY
COLSEC SANDYS, COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT SAF IN FACE WHAT IS CONSTRUED
HERE AS POTENTIAL THREAT FROM YAR. (INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH,
LABOR PARTY LEADER DENIS HEALEY, WHO HOLDS SHADOW DEFENSE BRIEF
AND WHO LAST YEAR STRONGLY CRITICIZED ADEN FEDERATION, RECENTLY
TOLD EMBOFFS HE GRATIFIED HOW WELL IT HAS WORKED OUT.)

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(4) ADEN HICOM TREVASKIS' STRONG PRO-ROYALIST VIEW. (5) GENUINE CONCERN THAT YAR REPRESENTS NO MORE THAN A UAR MILITARY BASE IN ARABIAN PENINSULA. (6) CONVICTION IN MANY OFFICIAL CIRCLES HERE THAT BRITISH KNOW YEMENIS BETTER THAN WE DO AND THAT LONG EXPERIENCE HAS PROVEN PROPITIATION OF YEMENIS (OF ANY COMPLEXION) SELDOM PRODUCES DESIRED RESULTS. CFN (2) DAR AHL BA TUHAYF (3) (4) (5) (6)

PAGE THREE RUDTLN 90C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUGGESTED POINTS TO "CLEAR AIR" ARE VALID, BUT AS DEPT KNOWS THEY HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN MADE. RE FIRST, NEITHER SANDYS NOR ADEN HICOM IS LIKELY TO MAKE VIGOROUS EFFORT CURB SHARIF'S FREE-WHEELING ACTIVITIES AS LONG AS THEY BELIEVE SHARIF IS NOT SIMPLY BEING MISCHIEVOUS (AS WE THINK), BUT HAS GENUINE GRIEVANCE, E.G., CONTINUED NON-PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION FOR BAIHANI BOMBINGS, ETC. THEY ARE LIKELY TO RESTRAIN HIM ONLY TO EXTENT THAT HE NOT COMPROMISE HMG POLICY OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN DISPUTE, BUT WILL INTERPRET LATTER SOMEWHAT LIBERALLY, E.G., SAF NOT BECOMING BASE FOR ROYALISTS OPERATIONS. SECOND POINT HAS REGULARLY BEEN MADE BY FONOFF TO YEMENI ROYALISTS, AND WE CONFIDENT BRITISH WILLING DO SO AGAIN AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. SHOULD BEAR IN MIND HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME DIVERGENCE USG AND HMG VIEWPOINTS RE WHAT IS CONSIDERED "BROADENED YEMENI GOVERNMENT" AS REPORTED EMBTEL 2604. WE HAVE ALREADY PRESSED FOR EXCHANGE OF CONSULS, BUT WERE TOLD AGAIN TODAY PROPOSAL STILL BEFORE UK MINISTERS AND HAS EVOKED LIVELY INTER-DEPARTMENTAL DEBATE. THUS, PROBLEM WE FACE IN SEEKING SHAPE REASONABLE HMG POSTURE TOWARD YAR IS THAT AT VERY TIME WE ASKING HMG BE MORE FORTHCOMING, YAR WEAKNESSES BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT AND CONTRARY IMPRESSION ALSO DEVELOPING
CFN 2604

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-3- 2615, DECEMBER 4, 3 PM, FROM LONDON.

PAGE FOUR RUDTLN 90C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN SOME CIRCLES HERE THAT YAR BECOMING MORE TRUCULENT.
ILUYSHIN AIR INCIDENT OF TWO DAYS AGO (EMBTel 2590) RECEIVING
CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY HERE.

NOTWITHSTANDING ABOVE OBSTACLES, WE SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS
BRITISH HARD ON THIS ONE, BUT REALISTICALLY. IN DOING SO,
WE SHOULD ARM OURSELVES WITH FIRMEST POSSIBLE SUPPORTING DATA
FOR OUR CONVICTION THAT YAR GENUINELY WANTS FRIENDLY RELATIONS
WITH HMG/SAF IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF MAKING IMPACT ON
BRITISH. OF GREAT IMPORTANCE WOULD BE YAR ACCEPTANCE OF
BRITISH PULLBACK PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD GO LONG WAY TOWARD
REASSURING BRITISH THAT YAR MEANS WHAT IT SAYS TO US ABOUT WISHING
GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM. TAIZ 336, RPTD LONDON 149, JUST
RECEIVED AND IS ENCOURAGING. WE SHOULD ALSO AVOID GIVING
IMPRESSION USG BECOMING APOLOGIST FOR YAR MISDEMEANORS.

ONE POSSIBLE EARLY HIGH LEVEL OCCASION TO REITERATE REFTel
POINTS WOULD BE SECRETARY'S REPLY TO BUTLER'S LETTER CITED
EMBTel 2604 WHICH WE ASSUME DELIVERED BY NOW. SUBJECT MIGHT
ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR DISCUSSION WHEN SECRETARY AND BUTLER
MEET DURING FORTHCOMING NATO MEETING. WE WOULD CAUTION,
HOWEVER, THAT IF POLICY PROPOSED DEPTel 3365 SHOULD BE ADOPTED,
PROSPECTS ARE THAT BRITISH WILL ADOPT STIFFER RATHER THAN MORE
UNDERSTANDING POSTURE TOWARD YAR. GP-3. BRUCE
BT

CFN 2590 336 149 2604 3365 GP-3

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FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2587, DECEMBER 3, 1 PM

PRIORITY

028

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 2587, INFORMATION JIDDA 68, CAIRO
76, TAIZ 57, USUN 223,

DEPTEL 3365.

FOLLOWING SENT IN RESPONSE DEPT'S REQUEST FOR EMBASSY'S
VIEWS RE SUBJECT OF REFTEL:

1. WE APPRECIATE INTENSELY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AND FRUSTRATIONS
POSED BY YEMEN SITUATION, BUT QUITE FRANKLY ARE DEEPLY
TROUBLED BY SOME ASPECTS PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION SET FORTH
REFTEL. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, ESSENCE OF NEW PROPOSAL IS THAT
USG NOW DISENGAGE IN ALL BUT NAME FROM ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR
DISENGAGEMENT. WE WOULD CONTINUE URGE SAG-UAR DETENTE AND
ENCOURAGE SPINELLI WORK FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT IN YEMEN.
LAST TWO ACTIONS STILL CLEARLY DESIRABLE; FIRST HAS DIS-
QUIETING IMPLICATIONS. AS SEEN FROM HERE, AT STAKE ARE
CORRECTNESS US ASSESSMENTS YEMENI AND UAR SITUATIONS (WHICH
HAVE SO FREQUENTLY BEEN QUESTIONED ABROAD) AND, EVEN MORE
SIGNIFICANT, CREDIBILITY US WILLINGNESS STAND BY ITS COMMITMENTS
IN MIDDLE EAST (WHICH HAS THUS FAR NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY
CHALLENGED). TAKEN CUMULATIVELY THESE ARE MEASURE OF US
INFLUENCE IN AREA AND ON AREA PROBLEMS. UNLESS OBLIGATORY
CHARACTER UAR COMMITMENT TO USG TO DISENGAGE IS MAINTAINED
AND PRESSURE IS CONTINUED, WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF ANY PROSPECTS
OF EARLY UAR TROOP WITHDRAWAL. WITHOUT PROGRESS ON DIS-
ENGAGEMENT SPINELLI'S ENDEAVORS DEVELOP ANY POLITICALLY SOUND
YEMENI COALITION GOVERNMENT ARE CRIPPLED. JETTISONING BUNKER

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By: gjc NARA, Date 2-7-06

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AGREEMENT NOW WILL ONLY ENCOURAGE NASSER PURSUE POLICY OF INTRANSIGENCE IN YEMEN (AND ELSEWHERE) AS BEST MEANS HAVE HIS WAY. WHATEVER NASSER'S MERITS, AND HE HAS MANY, ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT CAN HARDLY REDOUND TO OUR LONG TERM ADVANTAGE OR CONTRIBUTE TO AREA STABILITY.

2. LIKELY BRITISH REACTION IS PREDICTABLE, THOUGH IN SUBMITTING SAME WE DO SO NEITHER AS SOLE NOR AS GOVERNING CONSIDERATION. DESPITE THEIR DISCLAIMER OF BEING DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN YEMEN PROBLEM, BRITISH REMAIN SIGNIFICANT FACTOR THEREIN. THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION ESSENTIAL IF STABILITY IS EVENTUALLY TO RETURN TO THAT AREA. IF ADOPTED, COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED REFTEL WILL COME AS A SHOCK HERE, EVEN IF NOT AN ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED ONE. BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE BRITISH CIRCLES WILL VIEW IT AS CONFIRMATION OF WHAT HAS LONG BEEN CHARGED LOCALLY, NAMELY FAILURE OF US POLICY IN YEMEN. THEIR DISPOSITION FOLLOW OUR LEAD IN FUTURE WILL BE APPRECIABLY REDUCED. BRITISH RECOGNIZE PROBLEM WE FACE IN GETTING UAR TROOPS OUT OF YEMEN AND, WHILE THEY MAY CARP, CAN TOLERATE OUR LIMITED SUCCESS. HOWEVER, ANY USG ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO NASSER, AS IS NOW PROPOSED, THAT EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST WHICH PRECLUDE EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL UAR TROOPS FROM YEMEN AS SOLEMNLY PROMISED TO USG, EVEN IF COUPLED WITH CAVEAT WE STILL FAVOR DISENGAGEMENT, WILL MOST CERTAINLY BE HIGHLY DISTURBING TO BRITISH. CONSCIOUS AS THEY ARE OF THEIR OWN PAST MISTAKES, THEY WILL SEE IT AS APPEASEMENT OF NASSER AND AS SACRIFICE OF PRINCIPLE FOR EXPEDIENCY. THEY WILL ALSO REGARD SECURITY THREAT TO SOUTHWEST ARABIA AS HEIGHTENED AND CONSIDER WHAT STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO MEET IT. THOUGH THEIR CAPABILITY IS LIMITED, APART FROM EGYPTIANS, THEY ALONE HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY FORCE IN BEING IN SOUTHWEST ARABIAN AREA.

3. IF, AS EXPECTED, FAISAL RESUMES AID TO YEMENI ROYALISTS AFTER JANUARY 4 AS RESULT OF UAR FAILURE HONOR BUNKER AGREEMENT, HIS DOING SO WILL EVOKE GREAT SYMPATHY HERE. NOR, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN POSSIBILITY BE EXCLUDED SO LONG AS PRESENT TORY GOVERNMENT IN OFFICE THAT HMG WILL AUTHORIZE ADEN HICOM, AS HE REPEATEDLY REQUESTS, GIVE SOME AID TO YEMENI ROYALISTS OR THAT HMG WILL DROP PRESENT RELATIVE RESTRAINT IN MEETING BOTH YAR BORDER INCURSIONS AND UAR OVERFLIGHTS. LAST FEW DAYS HAVE ALREADY SEEN STIFFER BRITISH STAND IN ADEN AREA.

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-3- 2587, DECEMBER 3, 1 PM; FROM LONDON

THUS, AS SEEN FROM HERE, PROPOSED POLICY OUTLINED REFTEL LIKELY AT BEST ALLOW YEMEN PROBLEM DRIFT AND AT WORST LEAD TO ITS FURTHER DETERIORATION. IT WILL NOT ADVANCE SOLUTION.

4. WE RECOGNIZE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION REQUIRES SOME POLICY CHANGE. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, MUCH MORE FORTHRIGHT AND CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY EVOLUTION WOULD BE ALONG GENERAL LINES RECOMMENDED JIDDA'S 561, RPTD LONDON 166. SUCH ACTION WOULD RESTORE MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE IN US LEADERSHIP IN MIDDLE EAST. WE APPRECIATE POSSIBLE RELUCTANCE HAVE SC DEBATE ON YEMEN. NEVERTHELESS, HOWEVER MUCH ONE MIGHT LIKE TO AVOID IT, A CONFRONTATION WITH UAR IN UN CONTEXT AND IN DEFENSE OF A COMMITMENT TO WHICH HIGHEST LEVELS OF USG HAVE PLEDGED THEMSELVES SEEMS JUSTIFIED, EVEN NECESSARY, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

WE ALSO RECOGNIZE POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECT ADOPTION SUCH COURSE OF ACTION COULD HAVE ON USG-UAR DIALOGUE WHICH WE HAVE SO PATIENTLY AND PAINFULLY SOUGHT TO DEVELOP. WE TRUST DIALOGUE CAN WITHSTAND STRESSES RESULTING FROM WHAT SHOULD NOT BE AN UNEXPECTED US DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLE IN THIS FASHION, ALL MORE SO SINCE IT IS BEING NOURISHED THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL AID PROGRAM. IF IT CANNOT, IT IS PERHAPS TIMELY THAT WE BE VERY CLEAR ON DIALOGUE'S LIMITATIONS AS MEANS SAFEGUARD AMERICAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST.

ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, ACKNOWLEDGED RISK INHERENT IN TAKING MATTER TO UN APPEARS WARRANTED BOTH IN ORDER TO PROTECT LONG TERM US INTERESTS AND, IN SHORT TERM, TO PRESERVE IMAGE OF IMPARTIALITY AND FAIR PLAY THAT USG HAS STRIVEN TO FOSTER IN AREA. A SHOW OF DETERMINATION NOW WITH UAR MIGHT PREVENT A MORE SERIOUS CONFRONTATION LATER. FROM HMG VIEWPOINT, AND NO DOUBT OTHER GOVERNMENTS AS WELL, SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD BE COMMENSURATE WITH PRESENT SCOPE OF YEMENI PROBLEM CAUSED BY UAR'S CONTINUED FAILURE HONOR DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.

5. IF POLICY OUTLINED REFTEL IS ADOPTED, WE SHALL DO UTMOST PUT BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON IT HERE. WE SHALL HAVE TO EXPECT BITTER CRITICISM. WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO RECKON WITH BRITISH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 2587, DECEMBER 3, 1 PM; FROM LONDON

FEELING IMPELLED ADOPT MORE INDEPENDENT LINE RE PROTECTION
THEIR INTERESTS IN ARABIAN PENINSULA, AS THEY SEE THEM,
THAN THEY HAVE HERETOFORE.

GP-3.

BRUCE

JTC

Note: Distribution coordinated with S/S-0

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Yemen

Dec 3 8 17 PM '63

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Origin

NEA

Info

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AIDA

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ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON 3413

INFO : AmEmbassy CAIRO 2440

" JIDDA 447

" TAIZ 435

AmConsul DHAHRAN 242

" ADEN 94

USUN NEW YORK 1606

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Authority FRUS. 42-43, Vol. XVIII, #378

By *g* NARA, Date 4-3-105

USG has increasing evidence YARG leaders desire a good relations with both SAG and HMG/SAF, partly no doubt as result increasing revulsion against UAR occupation Yemen. Accordingly, tangible HMG gestures in direction propitiating YARG over coming weeks would appear be in HMG's overall interest. HMG agreement to Aden border pullback is step in this direction. Would be most helpful in addition if HMG could "clear air" further by: (1) making more vigorous effort circumscribe free-wheeling activities Sharif of Beihan (FYI. we remain a unconvinced Aden authorities doing their utmost this regard. END FYI); (2) passing word to royalists HMG fully supports Spinelli effort obtain political compromise in order spike royalist belief they enjoy HMG moral and--potentially material--support; and (3) agreeing to exchange Consuls with YARG in order establish useful line of communication with YARG and to get USG off embarrassing hook of seeming endorse series of HMG representations to YARG. Request your comments as to appropriateness

GP-3. making above points to HMG at this time.

RUSK

GP-3.

END .

Drafted by:

NEA: NE: TWSeelye: cfh: 12-3-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies *JMS*

BNA - Mr. Judd *J*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
NEA
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy TAIZ 434

PRIORITY

Dec 3 5 41 PM '63

INFO : AmConsul ADEN 93

SS
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FonOff through British Embassy requests you remonstrate with YARG over following:

EUR
INR
SCA
SCS
RMR

"On December 1 two unidentified single piston engined aircraft, whose description tallies with that of the YAK 11 were sighted by Federal Regular Army ground observers in Wadi Manawa at 1000 hours local time, at about 8,000 feet. At 1010 hours they flew over observers at Baihan at about 6,000 feet, and at 1015 hours they flew over Ain army camp heading south-west into the Yemen. The path of the aircraft took them over the army camps at Wadi Manawa, Baihan and Ain: they twice circled the Baihan camp. This violation was clearly deliberate and in the nature of reconnaissance.

"On December 2, at 0745 hours local time, an IL 14 with Yemen Arab Republic markings and with Egyptian crew and passengers, landed at Lodar Airstrip in the Federation of South Arabia. The aircraft and the Egyptian personnel are at present in the Federation. An investigation is in progress.

"On December 2 between 1300 and 1400 hours local time a Yemeni IL 14 penetrated Federal airspace for at least 10 miles in the Lodar area. When intercepted by F Hunters it re-crossed the frontier to land at Baidha in the Yemen."

GP-3.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA: NE: TWSeelye:cfh:12-3-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NE - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *gjc*, NARA, Date 2-7-06

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
SS

Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy JIDDA 440
" CAIRO 2405
" TAIZ 428
" LONDON 3365
USUN NEW YORK 1580

Dec 1 2 36 PM '63

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

NEXT STEPS IN YEMEN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XVIII, #373
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-23-02

I. Introduction

Department has carefully reviewed Jidda's 506, 523 and 525 and has noted in particular:

A. Importance Embassy places (a propos prospective Spinelli visit to Jidda and talks here with Pharaoun) on continuing emphasize to SAG primacy of UAR troop withdrawals when discussing Yemen.

B. Embassy Jidda's suggestion President dispatch personal message to Faisal in lieu Embassy's earlier proposition we submit to Faisal unequivocal USG statement re withdrawal Hard Surface if Faisal resumes aid to Yemeni royalists.

C. Faisal's illusion USG insisting broadened Yemeni regime exclude Hamid al-Din family and Jidda Embassy's view broadened YARG must include some representative royalist leaders in order be acceptable to Faisal.

D. Faisal's statement to French Ambassador Saudi friendship with US "unshakeable" although our interests may occasionally diverge; and equivocal French response to Saudi request for specific indications French assistance

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:TWSeelye:cfh:11-27-63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

UNP - Mr. Buffum

NR - Mr. Felt
Col. Bunte

EG/PM - Col. Robinson

OSD/ISA - Mr. Quinn

ID - Mr. Sisco

White House - Mr. Komer

S/S - Mr. Christensen

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in defense Saudi Arabia.

Department has following comments re foregoing:

to USUN, rptd 2134 to Cairo, 404 to Jidda, 367 to Taiz, 3145 to London).

A. We have instructed Cortada caution Spinelli this regard (Deptel 1438 /

Same time we must consider whether time may not have arrived begin prepare Faisal for unpleasant fact appreciable draw-down UAR troops may not occur by January 4, 1964. Our best estimates are that despite Nasser's promise 6,000 UAR troops would be withdrawn by November 1, 1963 and his belief another 5,000 would depart by January 1, 1964, current UAR troop strength remains--and will probably continue 32,000.

remain--at about 32,000. View foregoing, problem is how long we can ~~continue~~ tell Faisal ~~that we expect imminent appreciable UAR troop withdrawals~~ and hold him to Bunker agreement. (For this reason in talk with Pharaoun November 18 Talbot refrained from indicating belief ~~we~~ we expect "important progress" re UAR troop withdrawals, contrary to Embassy Jidda's recommendation.)

B. We agree Presidential messages to Faisal should not be reserved for emergency stages. Same time believe should insofar as possible reserve such messages for matters considerable import. Thus, we have in mind Presidential message only in circumstances described below (C, 1, f).

C. We gratified Embassy has taken steps disabuse SAG of belief USG insisting broadened YARG must exclude members Hamid al-Din family (Embtels 506 and 525). Obviously decision up to Yemenis; informal Departmental views expressed to Shami represented realistic assessment of situation, not USG preferences. Same time appears clear to us that Faisal, despite his contention, emotionally attached to Yemeni royalist cause and stating own preferences rather than known

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Yemeni attitudes.

D. We welcome Faisal's reaffirmation of bed-rock USG-SAG friendship and fundamental mutuality US-SAG interests. Dilemma is how make Faisal understand we fully share these sentiments and that our Yemen and UAR policies wholly consonant therewith. How do we get across to Faisal basic truth that while meddling of UAR and Saudi Arabia in Yemeni internal affairs harms both parties-- each in somewhat different way--USG less concerned with harm Yemen conflict causing UAR than possible adverse consequences to Saudi Arabia of its Yemeni involvement?

II. Plan for Consideration of Addressees

A. In consideration of foregoing Department contemplating plan of action re Yemen which flows from following premises:

1. Present UNYOM mandate will end January 4, 1964 but UN will maintain political presence and possibly small group observers.
2. UAR will not have withdrawn appreciable number of troops from Yemen by January 4, 1964.
3. In absence of satisfactory UAR compliance with disengagement agreement, Faisal determined resume his aid to royalists January 4, 1964, regardless existence Bunker agreement; and in retaliation UAR will be tempted resume series air attacks over Saudi territory.
4. Spinelli effort assist in developing broadened Yemeni regime will not have borne fruit by January 4, 1964 (although his report should provide basis for new emphasis on coalition effort as precursor to UAR troop withdrawals.)

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B. Our objectives in Yemen remain as before, i.e.:

1. Termination of foreign military intervention in Yemen permitting self-determination and measure of internal stability.
2. Prevention of escalation and spread of conflict.
3. Protection of US interests in entire Arabian Peninsula.
4. Prevention enhancement of Soviet influence and position in Yemen.

C. Recognizing realities of premises in "A" while not losing sight of objectives in "B", Department proposes following course of action re Yemen for consideration of addressees:

1. In Jidda inform Faisal:

- a. Bunker agreement succeeded in preventing SAG-UAR military confrontation which was primary objective. It is now clear, however, various factors beyond our control have obstructed our undertaking to Faisal ~~as~~ to obtain "expeditious" withdrawal UAR troops during six-month period of UNYOM's official presence (ending January 4, 1964). While there have no doubt been extenuating circumstances causing UAR foot-dragging, from any vantage point UAR performance in fulfilling disengagement agreement has been ~~unsatisfactory~~ unsatisfactory. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ In view of foregoing and Faisal's decision resume aid to royalists January 4, 1964 (as transmitted by Pharaoun to Talbot November 18), USG considers Faisal is relieved of his commitment to us under terms of this agreement rpt under terms of this agreement and that time has come develop new strategy ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

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b. This does not mean USG has ~~has~~ abandoned concept of disengagement in its efforts to get UAR troops out of Yemen. USG continues seek return Yemen to Yemenis and believes no external parties have right to speak for Yemeni desires ⁱⁿ respect to kind and composition their government. While continuing to press UAR on withdrawal, USG placing emphasis on Yemeni coalition effort, which if comes to fruition would appear offer most effective means get UAR troops out and restore measure stability in Yemen.

c. In view our and UN support Yemeni coalition effort and our recognition YARG, USG would regret resumption Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists. In fact, view Faisal's decision resume such aid USG has determined it best withdraw Hard Surface from Saudi Arabia in late December 1963 in order USG not be placed in unacceptable position of appearing offer protective umbrella to ~~endanger~~ Saudi ^{intervention} ~~aggression~~ in Yemen. In any case, Hard Surface sent to Saudi Arabia on temporary basis and by year's end will have been there some six months. Faisal can rest ~~see~~ assured that USG stands behind him in defense his nation against aggression, provided of course he does not rpt not resume arms shipments to Yemen. In latter contingency and in event such action invites UAR air attacks against Saudi Arabia, F Faisal must understand USG disposition stand by him will be adversely affected and international community might very well seek condemnation SAG actions by UN. (FYI. Security Council might actually condemn hostile acts by both sides/)

END FYI.

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d. Still our view best course for Faisal in strengthening his country--and preserving Saud regime--against Nasserist danger is ^{to} ~~an~~ avoiding exposing Saudi military and other weaknesses to undue stresses. If Faisal resumes aid to Yemeni royalists, Saudi weaknesses will be exposed as result retaliatory UAR action, with further danger weakening whole structure Saud regime. Better tactic is for Faisal to concentrate his energies on course he has already charted in direction:

- (1) improving SAG military capability to defend itself;
- (2) strengthening fabric Saudi society.

Progress made on these two fronts will reduce threats posed by Nasser both in Peninsula and throughout Arab world. If Faisal continues to withhold support ^{time} to royalists while pursuing courses in (1) and (2) we consider ~~unwise~~ on his side in view of serious problems UAR already facing by virtue its commitments to Yemen.

e. While USG cannot be expected pull Faisal's chestnuts out of fire which he appears intend rekindle in Yemen, it can and will continue assist him in both (1) and (2) above. Re (1) USG about to submit comprehensive plan for shoring up Saudi air defenses and in this connection disposed sell Saudi Arabia certain types modern military armaments and equipment.

f. If SAG should reconsider its decision to resume aid to royalists and undertake avoid meddling in Yemen for indefinite period, President prepared dispatch message to Faisal (which could be published if Faisal desired) underscoring not only USG support for Saudi integrity (as in President Kennedy's October 1962 message) but for Faisal regime which moving in direction of reform. We visualize that latter ^{kind} action US might take through UN and on our own might also get into specifics of ~~reconsidering our position~~ to come to military support

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SAG if externally attacked in unprovoked fashion. We would expect that affirmation of US support would be in lieu of continued deployment of Hard Surface.

g. Meanwhile USG again urges Faisal in his best interests to appoint high level Saudi meet secretly with UAR representative for purpose exploring possibilities of SAG-UAR détente. Modus vivendi between two countries, even if only minimal, could be instrumental in attaining objectives which all parties seek of leaving Yemen to Yemenis.

2. In Cairo tell Nasser:

a. We consider failure UAR withdraw any, or any appreciable number, troops from Yemen after six months UNYOM presence forces USG consider Dunker agreement at end as of January 4, 1964. USG can no rpt no longer expect Faisal fulfill his part of bargain in absence satisfactory UAR performance, extenuating circumstances notwithstanding. USG so informing Faisal, stating its best efforts secure "expeditious" UAR troop withdrawals in vain.

b. Nevertheless, USG continues adhere to disengagement concept as in best interest all parties and will continue urge both SAG and UAR abide by concept-- though not on basis any previous commitment. Only difference now is neither side "committed" to USG to abide by specific disengagement agreement and we in effect acknowledging impossibility of bringing about "expeditious" UAR troop withdrawals. Regrettable aspect in new turn of events is lessening of USG capability impose restraint on Saudi activities in Yemen. However, despite lessened leverage available to us, we will continue do all possible restrain Faisal with some expectation we will succeed in this endeavor.

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c. Nasser should clearly understand that USG has important interests in Saudi Arabia and has pledged its support to reformist-minded Faisal regime. USG would continue take exceedingly dim view of UAR air attacks against Saudi Arabia--whether or not UAR considers it has adequate provocation--and would remind Nasser that while USG seeks maintain cordial relations with UAR and would wish avoid UAR-USG confrontation, we cannot do so if price is imminent threat to Saudi integrity and disappearance of Faisal regime at Nasser's hand. USG will not stand idly by should Nasser carry "battle" into Saudi Arabia. ^{Moreover, ~~issue~~ might be likely to go} to UN where UAR would not be in defensible position, particularly in view its failure to disengage. If SAG resumes aid, proper response of UAR and YAR might be complaint to UN SC.

d. USG placing increased emphasis on development coalition regime in Yemen and again urges Nasser in strongest terms cooperate fully in this endeavor. Creation some semblance viable YARG is best prospect for solving difficulties now being encountered by all sides. ^{There have been} reports ^{which suggest} YARG actively discouraging indigenous Yemeni efforts broaden base YARG. We believe international community will expect all external parties to Yemen dispute to respect idea of Yemen self-determination and Yemen for the Yemenis.

e. US continuing press SAG agree send representative meet with UAR secretly for purpose clearing air between two countries. Discontinuation UAR propaganda against Saudi Arabia still appears key to bringing about such meeting.

f. Nasser must open eyes to dilemma he faces in Yemen. We question whether "revolutionary" ardor of Yemenis will a long continue unless UAR finds way to extricate itself. Longer UAR remains there, more Yemeni opposition aroused against UAR presence and thus against YARG. Tribes in north have capability resist central

~~SECRET~~

government for many months even without Saudi assistance. USG has endeavored and will continue endeavor help UAR extricate self from Yemen without loss prestige. Unless UAR now takes statesmanlike advantage opportunities presented, Yemen imbroglio can only go from bad to worse causing instability to entire Arab area and incidentally casting discredit on Arab nationalism and "revolution". Spinelli mission currently offers best hope for UAR in ~~then~~ Yemen and Nasser should not let this golden opportunity pass.

D. Concluding Comment

Questions left unanswered are (1) what USG does if after we have withdrawn Hard Surface from Saudi Arabia Nasser x bombs Saudi Arabia and (2) what further actions might be taken by UN after January 4, 1964 in advancing Yemeni solution. Foregoing plan of action designed preclude first eventuality; if occurs, we have several alternatives open to us which we shall have to face when time comes. We are still canvassing possible courses of action through UN and recognize that substitute to Bunker agreement (pegged to Spinelli report or some specific Security Council action) must be devised as framework for modified disengagement and for continued UN presence in Yemen.

Request urgent views of addressee posts.

~~DEXX~~

~~DEXX~~

FOR JIDDA

Department would appreciate your views above suggested courses of action prior commenting your 561 which just received.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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CLASSIFICATION

S/S 95a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Informed
OK to send

11/30/63


Date

with added

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Sentence
BKS

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Message to Amembassies JIDDA,
CAIRO, TAIZ, LONDON, and USUN
NEW YORK

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY act ON 7-26-70

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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SECRET

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Action

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~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT (2290) INFO CAIRO 170 JIDDA

122 TAIZ 114 LONDON 414 NOVEMBER 29, 9:00 PM

IOP

UNYOM

INR

RMR

YOST INQUIRED OF BUNCHE THIS MORNING WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW REPORTS FROM SPINELLI. BUNCHE REPLIED NONE OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE. BOTH AGREED IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MUCH DESIRED POLITICAL SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED BEFORE JAN 4. WE ASKED WHAT SYG AND BUNCHE PROPOSED TO DO IF NO SOLUTION HAS BEEN FOUND BEFORE THAT DATE. BUNCHE REPLIED HE HAD NOT GONE INTO THIS WITH SYG BUT HIS VIEW IS THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT TO RENEW UNYOM AFTER THAT DATE BUT THAT UN POLITICAL PRESENCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. WHEN ASKED AS TO COMPOSITION OF CFN 2290 170 122 114 414 29 9:00 4

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 49 ~~SECRET~~

THAT PRESENCE, BUNCHE REPLIED IT WOULD CONSIST OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH SMALL STAFF PLUS PERHAPS A FEW MILITARY OBSERVERS. THESE OBSERVERS WOULD NOT BE FOR PURPOSE OF OBSERVING DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, SINCE UNYOM WOULD NO LONGER BE IN EXISTENCE, BUT WOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THE SPOT FOR SUCH EMERGENCY DUTIES AS SYG OR POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT INDICATE. THIS POLITICAL PRESENCE WOULD OF COURSE BE PAID FOR BY UN.

WE INQUIRED WHETHER, IF ALREADY MEAGER ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY FOR DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WERE TO BE WITHDRAWN, FAISAL WOULD NOT RENEW LARGE-SCALE AID TO ROYALISTS AND GENERAL FIGHTING IN AREA BREAK OUT AGAIN. BUNCHE DOUBTED THAT FAISAL WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO PROVOKE RESUMPTION SUBSTANTIAL HOSTILITIES, SINCE IN FACT THERE

1963 NOV 29 PM 8 58 8

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By SP/K NARA, Date 2-7-06

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2290, NOVEMBER 29, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

HAD BEEN NO HOSTILITIES ON ANY CONSIDERABLE SCALE FOR QUITE SOME TIME. HE THOUGHT IT EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL, ON OTHER HAND, THAT FAISAL WOULD AGREE TO RENEWAL OF UNYOM SINCE UAR OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT INTEND TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN YEMEN SUBSTANTIALLY AT THIS TIME. BUNCHE

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 49 ~~SECRET~~

NOTED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM UNYOM THAT 1500 UAR TROOPS HAVE JUST DEPARTED AND UAR OFFICERS HAVE ASSURED UNYOM THAT THESE TROOPS WILL NOT BE REPLACED. HOWEVER, THIS IS ONLY PART OF WITHDRAWAL UAR HAS PROMISED BEFORE JAN 1 AND FAISAL WOULD CLEARLY BE UNSATISFIED EVEN IF ALL PROMISED WITHDRAWAL WAS CARRIED OUT.

BUNCHE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE FROM US ANY SUGGESTIONS WE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE CONCERNING COURSE TO FOLLOW AFTER JAN 4, BUT AS FAR AS UN CONCERNED, HE HIMSELF SAW NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THAT OUTLINED ABOVE.

GP-3. PLIMPTON

BT

CFN 1500 1 4 GP-3

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

✓ Bundy
yemen

52

Action
NEA

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Control: 19933
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 30, 1963
1:21 PM

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Info
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FROM: JIDDA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 561, NOVEMBER 30, 1 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 561, INFORMATION PRIORITY DHAHRAN 441,
LONDON 166, USUN 168, CAIRO 212, TAIZ 179.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DISENGAGEMENT: THE DECISIVE DAYS

DEPT CIRC 971

PENDING INSTRUCTIONS RE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION BEING DEVELOPED
IN DEPARTMENT I FEEL IMPELLED MAKE NOW FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH I HAD PLANNED TO DISCUSS WITH AMB.
BADEAU AND MINISTER CORTADA AT ASMARA DEC 1:

COMMENTS:

1. DISENGAGEMENT IS NOT SUCCEEDING. UAR TROOPS NOT ONLY ARE
NOT BEING WITHDRAWN BUT PROCESS IS NOW REVERSED AND ACCORDING
MOST ESTIMATES UAR HAS AS MANY TROOPS IN YEMEN AS AT ANY TIME
PREVIOUSLY. THERE IS NO REAL PROSPECT REDUCTION TOTAL TO 21,000
BY END DEC AS OFFERED IN OCTOBER BY NASIR, WHO HAS IN ANY CASE
JUGGLED FIGURES SO OFTEN AND IMPEDED UNYOM EFFORTS TO VERIFY
DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS TO DEGREE THAT CERTIFIED WITHDRAWALS
BEFORE JAN 4 MUST CONSIDERABLY EXCEED 5000 IF WE ARE EVEN TO
GET BACK WHERE WE THOUGHT WE WERE NOV 4. INSTEAD UAR APPEARS
TO HAVE MADE DECISION KEEP LARGE MILITARY FORCES IN YEMEN
FOR YEARS. (BRITISH AMB. CROW HAS JUST SHOWN ME COPY REPORT
FROM BEELY IN CAIRO OF OCT. 31 CONVERSATION WITH ANWAR SADAT WHO
MADE THIS REMARK TWICE.)

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-91

By isl, NARA, Date 10-27-06

~~SECRET~~

-2- 561, NOVEMBER 30, 1 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM JIDDA

2. THIS IS IN DEFIANCE OF COMMITMENT MADE TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY VIA AMB. BUNKER AS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD HERE AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY FAYSAL. BUNKER ON INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH MY FULL SUPPORT PROMISED FOR PRESIDENT EFFECTIVE APPLICATION SUCH US INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE AS MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO GET UAR TO COMPLY. I HAVE REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED WE WERE APPLYING PRESSURE. IF WE HAVE NOW DECIDED WE CAN NO LONGER EXERT NECESSARY LEVERAGE THEN MY INFLUENCE WITH FAYSAL IS DECISIVELY UNDERMINED. BY SAME TOKEN IF WE CONTINUE TO TRY BUT ARE ABLE ACCOMPLISH NO SUBSTANTIAL AND VERIFIED RESULTS BEFORE JAN. 4, THEN I SEE NO PRESENT BASIS ON WHICH I CAN ARGUE FAYSAL INTO ANOTHER RENEWAL OF UNYOM. HIS STOCKPILING OF ARMS IN SOUTH HAS BEEN INCREASED [REDACTED] THAT I AM THEREFORE 90 PERCENT SURE OF FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, US GOVT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO PRESSURE NASIR INTO COMPLIANCE WHILE WE CONTINUE MASSIVE AID PROGRAMS TO UAR CANNOT BE MADE CREDIBLE TO SAG. IT CAN ONLY MEAN WE UNWILLING.

3.3
(b)(1,6)

3. THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL HARDSURFACE WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE FAYSAL AGAIN RENEW UNYOM IN ABSENCE UAR COMPLIANCE. FAYSAL PREPARED TAKE HIS POUNDING ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE WORSE THAN HE SUPPOSES. RESENTMENT AGAINST US FOR WITHDRAWING HARDSURFACE WILL SURELY BE HIGH. I AM SURE FAYSAL'S POSITION WILL BE WEAKENED BY THESE ATTACKS AND BY FACT WE WILL HAVE FAILED HELP HIM IN HIS DEFENSE. NEVERTHELESS HE WILL TAKE HIS CHANCES ON BASIS REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF DEFENSE AS HE SEES THEM.

4. FAILURE UAR WITHDRAW TROOPS APPEARS TO BE GENERATING SOME ANTI-UAR REACTION IN RESPONSIBLE YAR CIRCLES. UAR MILITARY PRESENCE NOW SERVES UAR AND NO OTHER INTEREST.

5. IF, AS INDICATED DEPT 428 TO MADRAS, DEPT NOW FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS PRIMARILY ON SEEKING ESTABLISHMENT BROADER BASED GOVT IN YEMEN, SUCH A COURSE, WHILE UNQUESTIONABLY NECESSARY AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED, IS OPERATIONALLY TOO SLOW OF REALIZATION TO PRESERVE DISENGAGEMENT AND PEACE BY JAN 4. ESTABLISHING SUCH GOVT IN NEXT FOUR WEEKS NOW APPEARS QUITE UNREALIZABLE EVEN IF IT HAD FULL UAR BLESSING, WHICH NO LONGER APPEARS BE

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-3- 561, NOVEMBER 30, 1 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM JIDDA

THE CASE, GIVEN UAR FEARS THAT BROADENED YAR MAY BE ANTI-EGYPTIAN. NASIR HAS APPARENTLY MADE DECISION* FORCE RETURN TO YEMEN OF SALLAL, A MAN WHO DOES NOT WANT TO GO BACK, WHOSE SUPPORT IN YEMEN HAS ERODED, WHO HAS LONG KNOWN HIS ONLY BULWARK WAS EGYPT (AND, IF POSSIBLE, UNION WITH IT) AND WHOSE RETURN WILL OPERATE DECISIVELY AGAINST SAG RECOGNITION OF YAR OR EVEN AUTHORIZATION OF DISCUSSION WITH YAR DELEGATION REPRESENTING SALLAL.

6. FROM HERE IT IS APPARENT QUIET DIPLOMACY HAS NOT EVOKED ANY MEANINGFUL UAR RESPONSE. INSTEAD IT HAS BEEN MET BY TEMPORIZATION WITH SUCCESSIVE ATTEMPTS PLACE BLAME ON SAG FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF DISENGAGEMENT (UNSUPPORTED BY UNYOM), ON BRITISH INTERFERENCE FROM SOUTH, ON SAG "MORAL" SUPPORT OF ROYALISTS AND FINALLY ON SAG STOCKPILING OF ARMS IN SOUTHERN SAUDI TERRITORY. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT US SHOULD NOT PLACE US-UAR RELATIONS ON LINE BECAUSE OF YEMEN. IN FACT, IT IS NASIR, WITH EVERY INDICATION HE HAS TAKEN FULL MEASURE OF OUR UNWILLINGNESS "CONFRONT" HIM, WHO HAS PLACED THOSE RELATIONS ON THE LINE, NOT REALLY OVER YEMEN BUT OVER SAUDI ARABIA. THIS IN COOL DEFIANCE OF MOST ABLE AND VIGOROUS PRESENTATION BY AMBASSADOR BADEAU END OF OCTOBER. UAR HAS NOT HEEDED OUR REPEATED REQUESTS TONE DOWN ANTI-FAYSAL BROADCASTS OR "ENEMIES OF GOD" PROGRAM AND HAS BEEN HEARD NOV. 27 TO ATTACK PRESIDENT JOHNSON. QUIET DIPLOMACY WITH FAYSAL HAS ALSO ABOUT RUN OUT. WITH LATEST UAR OVERFLIGHTS AND BOMBINGS OF SAUDI TERRITORY IT HAS CEASED TO HAVE REAL MEANING. ON NOV. 28 PRINCE HISH'AL, JUST BACK FROM RIYADH, MADE THIS CLEAR. WE MAY NOW HAVE TO TAKE SOME REAL RISKS WITH UAR-US RELATIONS IF WE ARE TO KEEP THE PEACE. AS I SEE IT WE HAVE NO CHOICE. WHEN PEACE COLLAPSES WE SHALL FACE THIS PROBLEM IN WORSE FORM. IN ABSENCE VERY SIZEABLE WITHDRAWALS UAR TROOPS BEFORE JAN. 4 WE MAY NOT BE ABLE SAVE PEACE AT ALL BUT WE HAVE A CHANCE IF WE LAY FULL RECORD ON DISENGAGEMENT BEFORE UN. OUR PUBLIC EXPOSITION SHOULD BE A FULL AIRING OF ALL ESSENTIAL FACTS WITH A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION. UAR WILL NOT LIKE IT BUT JUDICIOUS STATEMENT OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE UAR COULD HAVE PLAYED - AND MIGHT STILL PLAY - IN YEMEN WOULD APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL. SOME OF MATERIAL IN USIS MIDSTON CABLE NUMBER 3 "PEACE IN YEMEN" WOULD BE USEFUL.

HART

LLN/22

* AS RECEIVED

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INCOMING TELEGRAM*Department of State*

52

Action
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~~SECRET~~Control: 19939
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 30, 1963
1:33 PM

FROM: JIDDA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 561, NOVEMBER 30, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 561, INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 212,
DHAHRAN 441, LONDON 166, TAIZ 179, USUN 168.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

EXPERIENCE 1952-61 US-UAR RELATIONS IN WHICH I HAD CLOSEST UNINTERRUPTED CONTACT SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY NASIR HAD EARLY CHANCE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH US BUT CHOSE BRING THEM ALMOST TO POINT OF BREAK IN 1956-58. HE RECOILED FROM BREAK WHILE THROWING ENTIRE PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE MACHINERY OF UAR AGAINST US INTERESTS AND US FRIENDS IN AREA WITH ALMOST ENTIRE ARAB (EVEN SAUDI) POPULAR SENTIMENT HEAVILY ON HIS SIDE. NEVERTHELESS HE FAILED SERIOUSLY TO IMPAIR SINGLE IMPORTANT US INTEREST AND WITH HIS ENEMIES IN ARAB WORLD NOW FAR MORE NUMEROUS THAN IN EARLIER YEARS I DO NOT BELIEVE HE CAN DO SO TODAY.

HISTORY OF US-UAR RELATIONS OVER THIS PERIOD ALSO SHOWS THAT NASIR HAS REPEATEDLY TESTED OUR INTENTIONS FOR FIRMNESS. IF WORDS AND THREATS OF DIMINISHED AID ARE INSUFFICIENT WE ARE LEFT, AS I SEE IT, WITH THE PUBLIC FORUM. LIKE ANY OTHER LEADER WITH DESIRE FOR WIDE ACCLAIM HE CHERISHES HIS IMAGE. I AM NOT SUGGESTING WE DESTROY IT BUT RATHER WE LET HIM KNOW THAT PRIVATE COUNSEL HAVING REPEATEDLY FAILED, WE ARE NOT FEARFUL OF HIS REACTION AS WE MAKE PUBLIC A PROGRAM TO PRESERVE THE PEACE WHICH GOES AGAINST HIS OWN STRATEGY AND SPLASHES HIM WHERE HE EARNED IT. BY SAME TOKEN A FAIR EXPOSEE WILL NOT LEAVE SAG ENTIRELY UNBLEMISHED, BUT IT WILL LET SAG KNOW WE ARE NOT ELLYING* AND ARE PREPARED FACE UAR IN OPEN DEBATE. SAG WILL

/BE MORE

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-2- 561, NOVEMBER 30, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM JIDDA

BE MORE INCLINED PRESERVE ITS OWN RELATIVELY GOOD RECORD AND WEIGH DISADVANTAGES OF RENEWAL AID TO ROYALISTS. I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE THIS COULD SUCCEED.

7. WE HAVE A BARE 3 WEEKS AT MOST BEFORE UNGA DISBANDS UNTIL AFTER JANUARY 4. SPINELLI IS TAKING HIS TIME, AS NO DOUBT HE MUST. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE AT ONCE ON ACTION IN UN SINCE IT MAY INVOLVE REFERENCE TO PRESENT GA BEFORE IT RECESSES.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. USG TAKE POLICY DECISION AT HIGHEST LEVEL TO PRESERVE DISENGAGEMENT BEFORE IT LAPSES JANUARY 4. THIS SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN US-UAR US-YAR AND EVEN US-SAG RELATIONS AT PRESENT JUNCTURE.

2. USUN CONSULT AL-AYNI IN NEW YORK AND VIA MINISTER CORTADA YAR LEADERSHIP IN TAIZ SAYING THAT YAR MUST BE BROADENED IF US AND OTHER FREE WORLD HELP TO BE FORTHCOMING. URGE YAR* (USING US CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHANNELS IF NEED BE RATHER THAN THOSE OF UAR*) TO INSTRUCT AL-AYNI TO COOPERATE WITH USUN IN REQUESTING UN UNDERTAKE SOONEST SUPERVISION OVER-REFERENDUM, WITHIN YEMEN OF TRIBAL AND OTHER LEADERS TO SET UP NATIONALLY-BASED GOVERNMENT INCLUDING ALL MAJOR TRIBES NOW DISSIDENT. UAR TO QUICKLY WITHDRAW SIZEABLE FORCE AND REGROUP REMAINDER TO ENSURE AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH THIS REFERENDUM.

3. IF FEASIBLE AN ADJUNCT TO 2 ABOVE, YAR BE ASKED TO APPEAL FOR SMALL UN FORCE TO COVER KEY CITIES SAN'A AND SA'ADA DURING PERIOD OF REFERENDUM, THUS RELIEVING UAR TROOPS WHICH WOULD BE TOTALLY WITHDRAWN. FACT OF UAR TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND PROSPECT OF REFERENDUM SHOULD SERVE TO ABATE ROYALIST ATTACKS (WHICH ALREADY AT LOW LEVEL) AND MAKE TASK OF UN MILITARY FORCE RELATIVELY SAFE ONE. IT IS REALIZED THAT YAR SUPPORT WOULD BE MINIMUM REQUIRMENT IF RESOLUTION IS TO CARRY, AND THAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MAY RULE IT OUT. NEVERTHELESS, IDEA SHOULD BE STUDIED.

/4. REGARDLESS

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-3- 561, NOVEMBER 30, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM JIDDA

4. REGARDLESS OF YAR REACTION TO PROPOSALS 2 OR 3 ABOVE, USUN MIGHT INITIATE PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS WITH UK DELEGATION AND OTHERS FRIENDLY TO SUCCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT AND THEN, PREFERABLY WITHIN FIRST WEEK DECEMBER, INITIATE DISENGAGEMENT DEBATE IN USUN BY REFERENCE TO SYG'S LAST REPORT. USUN COULD SAY ALL PARTIES FAVORED LATEST EXTENSION UNYOM, HOPING FOR PROGRESS IN REDUCING THREAT TO PEACE. SYG'S REPORT HAD CITED UNSATISFACTORY COMPLIANCE BY ONE PARTY. MONTH HAVING PASSED, WE REGRETTED TO NOTE THAT COMPLIANCE BY THAT PARTY NOW WORSE AND DISENGAGEMENT FAILING. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER THREAT TO PEACE OF AREA TO BE FAST APPROACHING AND LIKELY OVERTAKE UN DURING CHRISTMAS RECESS. WE WOULD LAY BARE MOST ESSENTIAL FACTS RE BUNKER AGREEMENTS AND STATUS OF COMPLIANCE BY PARTIES IN THOROUGH EXPOSEE, LET THE CHIPS FALL WHERE THEY MAY. USUN MIGHT STATE BELIEF POSITIVE UN ROLE IN YEMEN NOW URGENTLY REQUIRED AND WOULD VOICE NEED FOR UN-SUPERVISED REFERENDUM AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. WE COULD REFER TO US WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO ENGAGE WITH UN AND FREE WORLD COUNTRIES IN COORDINATED LONG-TERM PROGRAM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO BEGIN ONLY WHEN UN-SPONSORED REFERENDUM COMPLETED AND UAR TROOPS WITHDRAWN.

WE MIGHT THEN CIRCULATE DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL UAR TROOPS, MAINTENANCE DISENGAGEMENT BY SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS, AND UN-SUPERVISED REFERENDUM. IF VETOED BY USSR, WE COULD STILL SEEK ACTION IN UNGA UNDER UNITED FOR PEACE PROCEDURES BEFORE CHRISTMAS RECESS.

CONCLUSION:

IT IS REALIZED FOREGOING COURSE PRESENTS DIFFICULTIES AND RISKS. WE MAY GET NO HELP FROM INDECISIVE OR WEAK YAR. WE MAY LACK VOTES IN UN FOR OUR RESOLUTION. WE MAY HAVE TO FACE CHARGE US "INTERFERING" TO PROTECT "FEUDAN SAUDI INTERESTS." I SEE NO WAY OF AVOIDING THESE RISKS, AND FIND NO COURSE BUT TO FACE THEM. BY EARLY PUBLIC AIRING OF THIS VERY REAL THREAT TO PEACE, WE MAY FORESTALL BREAKDOWN OF DISENGAGEMENT. OTHERWISE I SEE NO WAY TO DO SO IN MONTH WHICH REMAINS.

GP-3.

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*AS RECEIVED, WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Yemen

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Action

Control: 18937

NEA

Rec'd: November 29, 1963

Info

10:26 a.m.

SS

FROM: Taiz

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TO: Secretary of State

SP

NO: 319, November 28, Noon

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PRIORITY

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By 1-8 NARA, Date 4-1-92

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ACTION DEPARTMENT PRIORITY 319, INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 142, JIDDA 109, LONDON 135, USUN 93, ADEN 107, DEPTAR 38.

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On November 27 had one hour meeting in Sanaa with Spinelli. Also present were Berendsen, Spinelli's POLAD, and Blalock.

Following principal points discussed:

1. USG Yemen policy: Told Spinelli USG saw solution Yemen problem evolving in following manner:

A. Broader based YARG, the form of which Yemenis themselves must decide. This hopefully would result in cessation military operations.

B. Reduction UAR military force to level of training mission (500-1,000 troops) made UAR advisors, doctors and teachers which would permit UAR to retain position of influence, while permitting YARG control its own destiny. We inclined believe SAG would not adverse UAR presence this magnitude.

C. Well thought out multi-national economic and technical assistance effort which would serve help stabilize internal political

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-2- 319, November 28, Noon from Taiz

political situation. This could only be put into effect after steps A and B carried out.

I stated USG told by President Nasser and other senior UAR officials that UAR anxious extricate itself from Yemen mess and we going along on assumption UAR truly desires this. Asked Spinelli his impression attitude UAR officials Sanaa this regard. He replied position as stated to him by General Mortagy and UAR liaison officers is that UAR realizes presence large number Egyptian troops Yemen unpopular and anxious withdraw, but that they wish maintain military training mission as well as civilian advisors. I asked whether he thought UAR prepared accept broader based YARG which might include personalities who have acquired anti-UAR labels. Spinelli replied he has not discussed this with UAR officials Sanaa, considering it subject best to discuss in Cairo. In brief he appears to be under impression UAR Sanaa officials will cooperate with him in seeking political solution although Berendsen pointed out some evidence to contrary.

2. SAG-YAR talks: Briefed Spinelli on favorable YAR response my approach to Al Amri regarding possibility talks between SAG and YAR on neutral ground. Added my belief UAR military officials Sanaa also appeared favor such talks. I said USG believes SAG-YAR meeting could prove important and suggested Spinelli play principal role with USG offering strong support. Emphasized we have no indication what SAG reaction might be to proposal and that I had made this point clear to Al Amri.

Spinelli agreeable our suggestion as best way deal with this subject which he would regard as part his mission seek political solution. He agreed SAG-YAR talks would be important development and said he would raise matter with Al Amri; assuming favorable YAR response, he would try with SAG. He pointed out that while talks should nocestricted* by agenda, if they assumed purely anti-UAR flavor, they would serve no useful purpose.

At his

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-3- 319, November 28, Noon from Taiz

At his request, agreed that it would be best for Spinelli not mention initially to Al Amri possibility of eventual Royalist representative participating. In Spinelli's judgment, if preliminary talks satisfactory and cordial, question of Royalist participation would be natural development.

Repeated our willingness support Spinelli in every way possible and our desire be kept informed his soundings. Same time if we had inkling probable SAG reaction to proposition would let him know. Urged utmost caution and secrecy in dealing with this gambit.

3. Disengagement: Told Spinelli USG concerned that unless UAR demonstrates intention comply with disengagement agreement there danger SAG may be unwilling agree to extension UNYOM beyond January 4. In this regard I placed strong emphasis on need for UAR to; withdraw significant number of troops by January 4; stop indiscriminate and largely ineffective bombing and strafing of northern areas; and stop rotating troops in and out of Yemen, which give impression UAR using Yemen as military training area. Expressed hope he would do everything possible help achieve these results.

Concerning troop withdrawals, Spinelli said UNYOM has UAR commitment for withdrawal 4,000 troops during December. As for bombing and strafing, Spinelli said he had discussed matter with Mortagy, but that situation has gotten worse rather than better. UNYOM has unverified reports of air strikes against Saudi villages and targets inside DMZ, as well as bombings practically within sight of Sanaa.

4. UK proposals for pullback in Beihan-Harib area: Spinelli indicated he had planned visit Aden for discussion Yemen with former HICOM Johnson, with whom he worked closely in Jordan. However, upon learning Johnson replaced as HICOM, he re-considering. I encouraged Spinelli visit Aden, since, in assessing overall Yemen problem, it would be useful have views Travaskis, who unusually knowledgeable about Yemen-SAG border affairs.

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-4- 319, November 28, Noon from Taiz

affairs.

I briefed Spinelli on background recurring flareups in Beihan-Harib area. Also explained HMG proposals for pullback this area. Told him we consider them step in right direction towards stabilizing situation along southern border. Suggested Spinelli might wish re-enforce our efforts this direction with Al Amri, which he agreed to do on next occasion he sees Vice President. I also mentioned we expected YAR would make counter-proposal based on their assessment of where YAR and UK forces positioned before revolution. Stressed our role strictly that of friend trying help two parties settle dangerous local conflict and that we neither arbiters nor lawyers for either side.

Told Spinelli I returning Taiz November 28 but expected return Sanaa end of first week in December at which time we would discuss any new developments USG-UN efforts. Made no reference, of course, to forthcoming meeting in Asmara.

Spinelli planning remain Sanaa until approximately December 10.

Comment: In respect SAG-YAR talks suggest we wait until my return from Asmara before planning next steps so I can coordinate with Ambassadors Badeau and Hart. In meantime, hopefully Spinelli will have talked with Al Amri and picked up ball. Therefore, unless algfjsmos* matter with me between now and my departure for Asmara, will make no further approach to YAR.

GP-3.

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KEA:19

* As received, correction to follow.

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THE PRESIDENT -

State Answered

THE WHITE HOUSE

IN ASSUMING THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES IN ASSUMING THE GREAT
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THESE TRAGIC DAYS OF DEEP GRIEF AT THE
LOSS OF THE LATE PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY I EXTEND ON BEHALF
OF THE PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY AND OUR BEST WISHES FOR YOUR SUCCESS IN
LEADING YOUR GREAT NATION

FOR PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

MOHSIN A ALAINI AMBASSADOR OF YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC.

FORM 805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Yemen

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Action

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PP RUEHC RUEHDT

DE RUQPDS 6C 24/1602Z

SS P 241444Z

G FM AMEMBASSY TAIZ

SP TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

EUR RUQVU/AMEMBASSY CAIRO UAR

IO RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA

INR RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND

RMR RUEHDT/USUN NYK

RUEPDA/AMCONSULATE ADEN ARABIA

RUQVDA/AMCONGEN DHAHRAN SAUDI ARABIA

RUEPDA/DEPTAR WASHDC

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1963 NOV 24 PM 3 24

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-436

By mg NARA. Date 4-1-92

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (314) INFO PRIORITY CAIRO 140 JIDDA 107 LONDON 134 USUN 92 ADEN 106 DHAHRAN 27 DEPTAR 37 NINE A.M. TWENTY FOURTH FROM TAIZ. DEPTAR FOR ACSI. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION CIRC 887, EMBTEL 306. NOV. 20, EMBOFFS BLALOCK AND SIZER HAD SESSION WITH YAR UN DEPUTY YAHYA JAGHMAN DURING WHICH THEY MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. AS RESULT OUR MANY RECENT TALKS IN SANAA, TAIZ, REGARDING DISENGAGEMENT, FELT A LITTLE CONCERNED THAT SOME ONE MIGHT SUSPECT UN AND US SEEKING ANTI-UAR SOLUTION IN YEMEN OR TAKING SIDES IN YEMEN DISPUTE. FOR PURPOSE DISPELLING ANY SUCH IDEAS, WE THOUGHT IT USEFUL EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT WHILE USG SUPPORTS UN EFFORTS SOLVE POLITICAL IMPASSE, IT EXPECTS SOLUTION TO BE FAIR TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. WE ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH UAR, SAG AND YAR AND HAVE NO INTENTION DEALING WITH ONE BEHIND BACK OF OTHERS.

2. CONCERNING EMBOFF'S AGREEING TO INFORM DEPT OF HIS WISH THAT AL AINY BE APPRAISED OF VIEWS REPORTED EMBTEL 306, JAGHMAN INFORMED THIS WOULD BE AT DISCRETION OF DEPT AND HE SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET AS AGREEMENT PROVIDE CHANNEL BETWEEN HIM AND AL AINY.

CONCERNING POINT 1, JAGHMAN SAID HE UNAWARE ANY SUCH IMPRESSION ON PART YEMENIS; HE HAS NOT ATTEMPTED IMPART SUCH IMPRESSION AND CERTAIN SPINELLI HAS NOT. PROBLEM IS THAT YEMENIS SEE USG AS ONLY COUNTRY WITH ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO BRING ALL PARTIES TO YEMEN DISPUTE INTO AGREEMENT. EMBOFF INTERJECTED USG CONSIDERS UN, IN PERSON SPINELLI, EMINENTLY QUALIFIED ACT AS MEDIATOR AND WE SUPPORTING WHOLEHEARTEDLY.

AS FOR POINT 2, JAGHMAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT US COULD NOT PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS LINK BETWEEN HIM AND AL AINY. HE ONLY HOPED THAT, IN EVENT AMBASSADOR CALLS ON DEPT, LATTER'S REPRESENTATIVE, IN REVIEWING YEMEN DEVELOPMENTS, MIGHT INFORM AL AINY VIEWS EXPRESSED REFEMLTEL, WITHOUT NECESSARILY ATTRIBUTING THEM TO JAGHMAN. JAGHMAN THEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

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-2-, 314, NOVEMBER 24, 9 a.m., FROM TAIZ

1. ON TWENTIETH, YAR MODA INFORMED THAT UAR AUTHORITIES WILL IN FUTURE HANDLE PAYMENTS TO YAR MILITARY. UAR WILL DRAW NECESSARY FUNDS FROM YAR FINANCE MINISRTY. JAGHMAN SAID THIS JUST ONE MORE INDICATION UAR WANTS COMPLETE CONTROL IN YEMEN. ALSO WILL GIVE CHANCE PURGE YAR ARMY OF ANTI-UAR ELEMENTS.

2. ASKED ABOUT RECENT TRIBAL CONFERENCE IN MENAKHA, JAGHMAN SAID THIS ONE SEVERAL CONFERENCES ORGANIZED BY EGYPTIANS DRAW A ATTENTION AWAY FROM AMRAN CONFERENCE. OTHER SUCH CONFERENCES JAGHMAN MENTIONED ARE: RAUDHA, ASHA, AND DHAIFAN. AT LATTER CONFERENCE, TRIBES DECLARED THEY CONSIDER NASSER, NOT SALLAL, PRESIDENT OF YEMEN. EGYPTIANS PASSED OUT ARMS AND MONEY. AFTER EGYPTIAN SPONSORS LEFT PARTICIPANTS RECONVENED AND TOOK SOLEMN OATH TO USE ARMS AGAINST EGYPTIANS.

3. IN RESPONSE QUERY TO WHO INTERPRETS FOR SPINELLI, JAGHMAN SAID UNYOM HAD NOONE WHO SPOKE ARABIC; THEREFORE, HE (JAGHMAN) INTERPRETS FOR SPINELLI, EXCEPT WHEN LATTER SEES EGYPTIANS.

4. HE HAS RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM ZUBAIRI PROPOSING THEY MEET ON TWENTY SECOND. ASKED WHERE ZUBAIRI IS AT PRESENT, JAGHMAN REPLIED HE UNAWARE WHEREABOUTS, BUT EXPECTS IT WILL REQUIRE THREE-FOUR HOURS REACH ZUBAIRI. (NOTE: WE LEARNED FROM OTHER SOURCES ZUBAIRI IN HUTH; HIS ABSENCE FROM SANAA PARTIALLY DUE HIS FEAR EGYPTIANS, PARTLY HIS EFFORTS CONSOLIDATE TRIBES.)

CONVERSATION THEN PASSED TO UK PULLBACK PROPOSALS WHICH BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. GP-3 CORTADA

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Yemen

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1963 NOV 24 PM 7 23

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SS FM AMEMBASSY TAIZ

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SP RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND

EUR RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA

IO RUEHDT/USN NYK

P RUEPDA/DEPTAR WASHDC

IOP STATE

NSC BT

INR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 313 INFO LONDON 133 CAIRO 139
 CIA JIDDA 106 USUN 91 DEPTAR 36 NINE A.M. TWENTY FOURTH FROM TAIZ. DEPTAR
 FOR ACSI. FROM BLALOCK, SANAA. DEPTAR 370. WHILE YAR NOT YET
 NSA PREPARED OFFICIALLY ACCEPT, REJECT, OR MAKE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS,
 OSD ITS INITIAL REACTION NEGATIVE TO SPECIFIC UK PULLBACK PROPOSALS
 NAVY BECAUSE THEY WOULD LEAVE SOME TERRITORY IN HANDS FEDERATION MILITARY
 AIR NOT HELD BY FEDERATION FORCES BEFORE REVOLUTION. AL AMRI HAS TURNED
 RMR MATTER OVER TO BRIGADIER AHMED AL ANASI, YAR CHIEF OF STAFF, WHO
 FORMERLY COMMANDED GOY FORCES HARIB AND KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT HARIB-
 BEIHAN AREA. AL ANASI STUDYING PROPOSALS WORKING CLOSELY WITH NAHM
 SHEIKH SANAN ABU LUNUM, WHO SPENT TWO YEARS AS GUEST SHARIF BEIH

AND SALAH AL ASHWAL, WHO HEADS YAR PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL'S COMMITTEE
 ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. EVENING NINETEENTH, SAW ACTING YAR FOMIN AHMED
 MUFARIH, WHO HAD JUST LEFT MEETING WITH AL AMRI, ALSO ATTENDED BY AL
 ANASI, ABU LUNUM, AL ASHWAL AND YAHYA JAGHMAN, YAR DEPUTY AT UN.
 ACCORDING MUFARIH, GROUP HAD NO MAP OF AREA, BUT SCRIBBLED MAP ON
 BACK ENVELOPE WHICH CONTAINED OUR NOTE. DISPUTE AROSE BETWEEN AL
 ANASI AND ABU LUNUM AS TO LOCATION SEVERAL POINTS REFERRED TO IN UK
 PROPOSAL. AL AMRI DECIDED UNLESS WE ABLE PROVIDE MAP SHOWING ALL
 POINTS, BEST THAT AL ANASI, ABU LUNUM, JAGHMAN, AND USG REP TRAVEL
 TO HARIB BY HELICOPTER FOR PURPOSE MAPPING DMZ. AS OUR MAPS (D.
 SURVEY, WAR OFF AND AIR MIN, 1957, 1:250,000) DO NOT SHOW ALL POINTS,
 I AGREED INFORM MINISTER CORTADA AL AMRI'S PROPOSAL I TRAVEL HARIB ON
 TWENTY SECOND. GAVE MUFARIH OUR MAPS FOR AL AMRI'S REFERENCE. MORNING
 TWENTIETH WENT TO FONOFF FOR MEETING WITH MUFARIH, ABU LUNUM AND AL
 ASHWAL, ALL OF WHOM HAD MET WITH AL AMRI EARLIER SAME DAY. ABU LUNUM
 AND AL ASHWAL TOLD ME UK PROPOSALS UNREASONABLE SINCE POINTS FROM
 WHICH YAR AND FEDERATION FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW ALL YEMENI AND
 PROPOSED DMZ ENTIRELY WITH YAR BOUNDARIES. THEY SAID ONLY FAIR
 SOLUTION RETURN TO PRE-REVOLUTION STATUS QUO, WHEN JEBEL SHUQAIR WAS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By 14/c NARA, Date 2-7-06~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 313, November 24, 9 a.m., from Taiz

DMZ AND YEMENIS OCCUPIED HUSH SHUQAIR AND AL SAWDA WHICH WOULD BE OCCUPIED BY FEDERATION FORCES IF UK PROPOSAL ACCEPTED. I POINTED OUT PULLBACK SCHEME HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH PRE-REVOLUTION SITUATION NO DID IT AFFECT CLAIMS WHICH EITHER PARTY HAD TO OTHERS TERRITORY. FACT IS YAR AND FEDERATION FORCES LOOKING DOWN ONE ANOTHER'S GUN BARRELS AND IN SUCH SITUATIONS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE AVOID INCIDENTS. PULLBACK SCHEME INTENDED ESTABLISH DMZ BETWEEN FORCES IN HOPES AVOIDING FURTHER INCIDENTS, WHICH PROBABLY WOULD REDOUND TO DISADVANTAGE YAR. SUGGESTED THAT RATHER THAN CLOSE MINDS TO UK PROPOSALS, YAR LEADERS SHOULD DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER AND, IF NECESSARY, GO TO HRIB, CONSULT WITH MILITARY COMMANDER THERE, AND, PERHAPS, WITH UAR MILITARY OFFICERS. THEY AGREED ABU LUNUM AND AL ANASI SHOULD VISIT HARIB AND PROPOSED THAT I ACCOMPANY. I TOLD THEM QUESTION AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD TRAVEL HARIB BEING STUDIED BY EMBASSY TAIZ. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH JAGHMAN (MOST OF WHICH REPORTED EMBTEL 370) I TOLD HIM YEMENIS WITH WHOM I HAD TALKED APPARENTLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND RATIONALE PULLBACK IDEA, SINCE THEY EQUAT WITHDRAWAL TO CESSION OF TERRITORY. JAGHMAN AGREED AND SAID, UNFORTUNATELY, PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT STAND FOR YAR ENTERING INTO ANY AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAVE YEMENI TERRITORY, WHATEVER LITTLE STRATEGIC VALUE IT MAY HAVE, IN HANDS FEDERATION FORCES. FURTHER, ROYALISTS COULD USE THIS TO GREAT PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE, SINCE OLD REGIME'S CLAIM TO FAME IS TENACITY WITH WHICH IT DEFENDED BORDERS. COMMENT (FROM CORTADA): I AM NOT TOO DISTURBED OVER PRELIMINARY YEMENI REACTION. IN FACT MAIN REASON I DID NOT GO TO SANAA TO START THE BALL ROLLING WAS MY FEELING THAT THERE WOULD BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF HEMMING AND HAWING BEFORE WE GOT DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. I BELIEVE AL-AMRI IS FOLLOWING TACTIC ALLOWING HIS ASSOCIATES SPIN AROUND ON THIS ONE AND AT OPPORTUNE MOMENT WILL SEIZE THE PROBLEM HIMSELF AND EITHER ACCEPT THE DEAL AS PRESENTED OR MOST PROBABLY MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, AS YEMENIS HAVE NO RELIABLE MAPS OF THE AREA, I WOULD FIND IT HELPFUL IF I WERE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO USE THE MAPS ON THE WAY IN TALKS WITH EITHER BRIGADIER AL-ANASI OR AL-AMRI. GP-4 CORTADA BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Yemen 102

~~SECRET~~

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59

Action

NEA

VV EUB004QUB010

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Info

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SS

~~FM AMEMBASSY TAIZ YEMEN~~

G

O RUEHC/ ECSTATE WASHDC

SP

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO UAR

L

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA

EUR

RUQVKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT

IO

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND

AIDA

RUQVDA/AMCONGEN DHAHRAN SAUDI ARABIA

P

RUEPDA/DEPTAR WASHDC

IOP

STATE

INR

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RMR

~~SECRET~~ ACTION (DEPT 3/2) INFO JIDDA 105 KUWAIT 8 LONDON 132 USUN
 90 DHAHRAN 26 CAIRO 138 DEPTAR 35 ADEN 105 TWENTY THIRD FROM TAIZ.
 FROM BLALOCK, SANAA. DEPTAR FOR ACSI. DEPTTEL 37. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
 DURING CONVERSATION WITH SPINELLI ON TWENTY FIRST HE RAISED QUESTION
 SAG/YARG TALKS, MENTIONING MOST YEMENIS WITH WHOM HE HAS MET INDICATE
 THEY ANXIOUS SEE SUCH TALKS. HE ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT SAG SENTIMENT
 AGREES WITH YEMENI. I REPLIED I HAD NO INDICATION WHETHER SAG FOR OR
 AGAINST TALKS WITH YEMENIS, BUT THOUGHT TALKS WOULD BE USEFUL,
 PARTICULARLY IF BETWEEN TRADITIONAL YEMENI TYPES SUCH AS AL IRYANI,
 ZUBAIRI, OR SABRA, AND THEIR SAUDI COUNTERPARTS. SPINELLI AGREED

PAGE 2 RUQPDS 8C ~~SECRET~~

THAT TALKS, IF THEY TAKE PLACE, SHOULD BE BETWEEN SUCH TYPES AND NOT
 BETWEEN AL AINY AND BAROODY. TOLD SPINELLI THAT FIRST ORDER OF
 BUSINESS, AS FAR AS SAG CONCERNED, THAT UAR CARRY OUT ITS PART OF
 DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BY MAKING SIGNIFICANT TROOP WITHDRAWALS.
 SPINELLI SAID HE PRESSING EGYPTIANS THIS REGARD, BUT CONSIDERS
 POLITICAL PROBLEM EQUALLY IMPORTANT. I DID NOT PRESS SPINELLI ON
 WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. WILL TRY TO DETERMINE FROM UNYOM MILITARY TYPES
 WHETHER UAR IN FACT WITHDRAWING TROOPS. THEN RAISED QUESTION UAR
 RADIO ATTACKS AGAINST SAG AND SAID UNLESS ATTACKS MODERATED OR STOPPED
 THERE LITTLE HOPE OF UAR/SAG DETENTE, WHICH PART AND PARCEL OF YEMEN
 SOLUTION. SPINELLI SAID THIS NO MEAN CHORE SINCE "NASSER'S PROPAGANDA
 HIS LIFELINE--HIS BLOOD." DREW ON REFTTEL AND POINTED OUT HOW SPINELLI
 MIGHT APPROACH UAR ON BASIS 1958 "GOOD NEIGHBOR" RESOLUTION. I ASKED
 WHETHER HIS MISSION INCLUDES MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS IN AREA ECONOMIC

ASSISTANCE WHICH UN MAY WISH SPONSOR ONCE POLITICAL SOLUTION ARRIVED
 AT. SPINELLI SAID HE HAS BEGUN OUTLINE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL
 ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH HE WILL PRESENT TO SYG. HE OFFERED TO DISCUSS

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 312, NOVEMBER 23, FROM TAIZ

PLAN WITH US WHEN ITS CONTENT BECOMES MORE MEANINGFUL. I SPECULATED IT MUST BE DIFFICULT COME UP WITH COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS SINCE THERE SUCH A DEARTH OF INFO AVAILABLE ON YEMEN'S ECONOMY, INSTITUTIONS,

PAGE 3 RUQPDS 8C ~~SECRET~~

ETC., THEN ASKED IF SPINELLI HAD ECONOMIST ON HIS STAFF. SPINELLI REPLIED PLAN HE WORKING ON SO SIMPLE IT DID NOT REQUIRE FULL TIME ECONOMIST. I SAID THERE INDICATION USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WILLING PARTICIPATE IN MULTINATIONAL AID PROGRAM TO YEMEN ONCE POLITICAL SOLUTION ACHIEVED, BUT SUCH PROGRAM CANNOT BE FORMULATED UNTIL AT LEAST BASIC ECONOMIC DATA COLLECTED AND COMPILED. SPINELLI REPLIED 'TWENTY-FOUR UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL WILL ARRIVE YEMEN NEXT FEW DAYS. FOUR ARE PUBLIC ADMIN EXPERTS; PERHAPS THEY CAN HELP COLLECT NECESSARY INFO. REPEATED OFFER FULL COOPERATION TAIZ, CAIRO AND JIDDA EMBASSIES. HE REPLIED MAIN THING HE ASKS OF USG IS TO BE KEPT INFORMED ACTIONS WE TAKING YEMEN PROBLEM SO HE CAN SUPPORT US. I MADE NO COMMENT. OTHER POINTS MADE BY SPINELLI:

1. FLEW TO NEJMAN AND JIZAN TWENTIETH, MAINLY TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH AREAS.

2. HAS SEEN MOST YAR

LEADERS. PLANS TO SEE EACH SEVERAL TIMES. PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS MEET WITH AL IRYANI, PRESENTLY IN CAIRO, AND ZUBAIRI, WITH NORTHERN TRIBES.

3. DOES NOT PLAN TO LEAVE SANAA BEFORE DECEMBER FOUR. MAY REMAIN UNTIL SEVENTEENTH, ASKED ABOUT DEADLINES, SAID HE HAD ONLY ONE --CHRISTMAS IN GENEVA. COMMENT; SPINELLI TAKING HIS TIME, UNWILLING

PAGE 4 RUQPDS 8C ~~SECRET~~

GO TO RIYADH OR CAIRO UNTIL HE CONSIDERS HIMSELF FULLY INFORMED YEMENI VIEWS AND POSSIBILITIES COMING UP WITH MEANINGFUL PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION

FROM HERE IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL WE WILL BE MUCH BEYOND FACT-GETHERING STAGE BY JANUARY FOUR. CORTADA

GP-3

NOTE: Message delayed in transmission.

~~SECRET~~

103

Rusk to Butler ltr
5/25/64

104 2867
Isb Jones
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~TOP SECRET - PERSONAL~~
~~LIMIT DISTRIBUTION~~

May 26, 1964
Komer
Cr 5/27
not a problem

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

I am attaching for your information a copy of a TOP SECRET Personal letter to Secretary Rusk from Foreign Secretary Butler dated 5/25/64 which related the contents of a private conversation between Sir Patrick Dean and Mohsin al Aini, Yemini Permanent Representative to the UN regarding the YEMEN SITUATION.

Attachment:

As stated.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-436
By *ing* NARA. Date 4-1-92



~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

W.H.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 25, 1964.

S/S # 7831

Dear Mr Secretary,

The Foreign Secretary has asked me, in the Ambassador's temporary absence from Washington, to let you know, for your personal information, of a private conversation which Sir Patrick Dean had in New York on May 20 with Mohsin al Aini, the Yemeni Permanent Representative to the United Nations. You will remember that Mr. Butler referred to suggestions that the Yemeni Republicans might be wishing to get in touch with us, during his conversation with you at The Hague on May 11, and that he promised to keep you informed.

The meeting was arranged at the United Nations Headquarters, after U Thant had suggested to al Aini
/that

The Honourable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

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NLJ 03-180
By is, NARA, Date 12-3-03

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that it might be useful for him to have an informal talk with Sir Patrick Dean, and after al Aini had agreed to this provided that any meeting should be held in absolute secrecy and without commitment by either side. Al Aini opened the conversation by giving an account of the background to the Yemeni revolution in 1962, and was highly critical of the part he alleged the United Arab Republic had taken in preventing the regime from consolidating its support. He believed that the Egyptians had wanted to intervene in the Yemen from the first, and even suggested that they had been instrumental in organizing Badr's escape to provide an excuse for intervention and to create difficulties for the new regime. He also accused the Egyptians of having used propaganda and other means to provoke the tribes, and of having done everything possible to create a situation in the Yemen which would make military intervention and a subsequent military presence necessary.

Al Aini said that the new Republican Government was the best that the Yemenis could be expected to produce from the point of view of establishing true independence, but he believed that Nasser wanted the government to fail, and for this reason had taken steps

/to

~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

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to bring about a deterioration of relations with the United Kingdom and of the situation in South Arabia. He believed that if the present Republican Government did not succeed in establishing better relations with the United Kingdom and in strengthening its position internally it would either be forced to knuckle under to the U.A.R. or would be replaced by a puppet regime subservient to Cairo. He described the aims of the present regime as first, to preserve Yemeni independence; secondly, to establish good relations with Saudi Arabia and Britain, and with the U.A.R.; and thirdly, to concentrate its main efforts on the internal problems of the Yemen.

Al Aini said that the new Republican Government recognized the Aden Base to be a Western installation not directed against the Yemen, and, as regards the Federation, he said that the Yemenis regarded this as a problem for the people of the area concerned who were, in the Yemeni's view, capable of deciding this problem for themselves. On the question of a demilitarized zone, he attempted to correct the impression which Yaacoub, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, had given in Cairo a year ago, that the Republicans were against /such

such a zone. He denied that this was the case.

Sir Patrick Dean told al Aini that Her Majesty's Government had not intervened in the internal affairs of the Yemen and that it had no desire to intervene there. He told al Aini that we would like to see the Yemeni people reach a settlement themselves on how they should be governed, and that we would like to have friendly relations with the Yemenis; at the same time, we did not wish to have unfriendly relations with the U.A.R. He explained our determination to protect the integrity of the Federation and reminded al Aini that we had welcomed the recent Resolution in the Security Council which called on the Secretary General to use his good offices to bring about a settlement in the area. He explained our position on the question of observers, demilitarisation, and demarcation, and stressed the importance of pacifying the whole area between the Yemen and the South Arabian Federation.

Al Aini referred critically to the alleged supply of arms from Beihan to the opposition forces in the Yemen, and argued that the Republican Government was powerless to act independently of the U.A.R. so long as they were threatened on their southern border.

On the question of the smuggling of arms and grenades

from the Yemen into the Federation, al Aini said that this was being authorized and carried out by U.A.R. Intelligence Officers without the consent of the Republican Government. Sir Patrick Dean pointed out that it would be much easier to regulate these matters if United Nations observers were on the ground.

The conversation lasted approximately one hour, and al Aini, who did most of the talking, appeared to be friendly and sincere. He told Sir Patrick Dean that he intended to return to New York in about ten days (although he subsequently told U Thant that he was not sure that he would in fact be returning at all) and said that he would like to have a further conversation.

yours sincerely
Dennis Greenhill

(D. A. Greenhill)

~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

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~~SECRET~~ Enclosures

April 27, 1964

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Chronology of the U.S. Vote
on Yemen Resolution.

Enclosed is a chronology of
the events leading to the decision
on the United States vote on the Yemen
resolution. Mr. Belk had requested
a record of these events.

24/28

Enclosure:

2 copies of
subject paper.

~~SECRET~~ Enclosures

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- March 17, 1964 - Secretary expresses to British Ambassador USG concern that increasing British-YAR/YAR tensions in Southern Arabia posed threat to joint US-UK interests.
- March 19, 1964 - British Embassy asks us to deliver note to YAR protesting against Yemeni air incursions of South Arabian Federation territory. (Note delivered on March 26 - British Embassy advised delay inevitable owing communication difficulties with Taiz which made worse in this instance by telegraphic garbles.)
- March 20, 1964 - HMG informs us RAF authorized shoot down Yemeni aircraft crossing frontier.
 - UK informs SC of Yemen attacks and reserves "full liberty to take necessary measures" in case of new attacks.
- March 26, 1964 - Department official warns HMG in London US may not be able to continue representing HMG in Yemen if UK launches retaliatory raids.
- March 27, 1964 - British Embassy informs us of UK cabinet decision to authorize air strike at Jebel Balaiq in retaliation for machine gun attack by YAR helicopter morning of March 27.
 - Department expresses serious concern at repercussions of retaliation on Libyan base problems.
- March 28, 1964 - RAF jets attack fort in Harib area.
 - UK informs Security Council in letter of March 28 "counter-attack" on grounds HMG "felt bound to take measures of defense of SAF."
- April 1, 1964 - Yemeni delegate asks SC for urgent meeting.
 - UKUN official says British would not oppose resolution which specifically mentioned Harib within general reference to all incidents. USUN believes such resolution to be expected.
 - DEPT informs USUN that resolution should not be condemnatory or fix blame. If the UK agreed, we could live with resolution which deplores all incidents and specifically mentions Harib. USUN instructed work closely with UKUN. We would hope that non-permanent members of SC could take lead in introducing mild resolution to head off unacceptable Arab resolution.

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-2-

- April 2, 1964
- In Security Council Yemen charges British aggression and asks for an end to UK presence in South Arabia.
 - UK states they were acting in defense of SAF and asks for D/Z.
 - Cleveland informs Plimpton that Secretary wishes US role at UN played in full consultation with the British.
"This doesn't mean, of course, that we have to come out in favor of retaliatory raids, but it does mean that we ought to make every effort not to cross up British tactics..."
 - Plimpton told Yemeni not to expect US support of condemnation.
 - USUN encourages UKUN to see Norway as key 7th vote.
 - USUN informs DEPT UK made poor defense in SC and should expect some kind of reproof.
- April 3, 1964
- UK gives us draft resolution "deploring all incidents" (but not specifically mentioning Harib) and asking for establishment of demilitarized zone. Dean informs Plimpton London could only accept balanced paragraph in resolution which equally deplored or regretted Yemeni attacks or provocations and the UK action.
 - USUN informs British US prefers not to take the lead in negotiations of a resolution but would support UK effort to encourage initiative by non-permanent members.
 - USUN reports British not acting either rapidly or effectively in defense of their interests; their work with non-permanent members limited.
 - Moroccan invites non-permanent members to meet with him; USUN fears that unless UK moves, Morocco may have six votes lined up and start dickering for seventh.
- April 4, 1964
- UK Embassy (Greenhill) asks us to take initiative on resolution; DEPT informs him we are reluctant to take lead; we suggest British again work on the Norwegians.
 - British gave USUN new and stiffer draft resolution which they also gave to Brazil and Norway.
 - British urges Norway to push UK resolution; otherwise they may be asked to cast 7th vote for Arab resolution.
 - USUN says it will caution Bolivia, Brazil and Ivory Coast not to accept too hurriedly the Arab draft.
- April 6, 1964
- Moroccan circulates draft resolution which would condemn UK action at Harib, call on UK to pay compensation and cease interference in Yemen affairs.

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-3-

- Bolivian representative, carrying out promise made April 5 to USUN officer, arranges for meeting with Brazilian, Norwegian, Moroccan, Czech and Ivory Coast delegates to discuss possibility of alternative to Arab resolution unacceptable to UK.
- In the Security Council Governor Stevenson's speech supports UK suggestions for keeping peace on frontier and suggests constructive element wanted by UK: role for SIG. Draft speech shown to the UK representative before delivery.

- April 7, 1964
- DEPT affirms to UK Embassy we will work to avoid condemnation of UK but it might be impossible in resolution to escape some mention of Harib among other incidents. We agree to support UK request for constructive action such as border demarcation or stationing of frontier observers.
 - Non-permanent member drafting group (Bolivia, Norway, Ivory Coast) produces draft resolution which would "condemn reprisals" and "deplore UK military action at Harib," (but not mention action by other side). UK official described it as "hopeless."
 - Bolivia and Brazil agreed Moroccan could table draft but indicated they were not committed to support it. Norway appears to be wavering in its position; the Norwegian delegate indicates with some slight changes there is a chance he will receive instructions to vote for it.
 - USUN asks UKUN if resolution would be acceptable if it condemned both "attacks" and "reprisals" and referred to frontier incidents "including Harib." Sir Patrick Dean said that would be tolerable. (Throughout exercise harder line being taken by UK Embassy here in discussions with Bardett than Dean with Stevenson and Plimpton--indicated differences of view between the UK foreign office and UKUN). Dean also indicated, however, that he did not want USUN to try to negotiate these changes because he was afraid resolution would be changed just enough to win seven votes, but not enough to make it acceptable to UK. Plimpton therefore tells Moroccan US cannot support resolution.

- April 8, 1964
- Norwegian delegate urges Arabs successfully to drop compensation claim paragraph from resolution. He said he has instructions to try to water down resolution to make it more acceptable. In view of UK explicit request.

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-4-

US did not urge Norwegian to continue these efforts. Ambassador Plimpton did say, however, that all paragraphs of the resolution must be evenly balanced between Yemeni and UK.

- As a result of Norwegian approach, Morocco agrees to put in additional paragraph which would "regret all incidents...in area," thus giving balance to resolution and retaining a role for SYU as UK wanted.
- UK indicates to us resolution still unsatisfactory, and notes displeasure with Norwegian efforts (UK seemed to prefer more extreme resolution).
- Plimpton tells Norwegian that their resolution still unbalanced.
- Norwegian picked up ball with Arabs. Convinced Arabs agree to change "regrets" to "deploras" all incidents in order to bring it into balance with "deploras UK military action at Harib."
- Morocco introduces the resolution about 5 p.m.
- Sir Patrick Dean agrees resolution "not a bit bad" for UK, but said London attitude was different. He said the resolution would get eight votes, and hoped UK would not be abandoned by its friends. UKUN say, it will urge London to agree to abstention.

- April 9, 1964
- USUN strongly urges we vote in favor of resolution because it has been watered down enough to be a fair disposition of an awkward matter which, in the opinion of UKUN, should not be seriously objectionable to UK. Mission also cites our previous positions on retaliatory raids and says our reputation for integrity and independence depends on our standing by our convictions.
 - US Embassy in London strongly recommends we "at least abstain" to avoid public split with UK on matter on which HMO feelings are running very high.
 - 10:00 a.m. UK Ambassador informs Secretary cabinet decision to abstain on resolution.

IO:UNP:SCCampbell:lg 4/16/64

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Orig. Rusk 4/28
APR 27 1964LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by CENTO Ministers During 12th CENTO
Ministerial Council Session, Washington, D.C.,
April 28-29, 1964

You have agreed to receive the four CENTO Ministers and the CENTO Secretary General on Wednesday, April 29, at 11:00 a.m. I will accompany them.

The recent meetings of the major CENTO Committees (Economic and Military) have been marked by a considerably improved spirit of cordiality, cooperation, and constructive endeavor. Pakistan has participated fully in the creation of the improved atmosphere and has given indications of a new willingness not to use its bilateral problems with India to obstruct consideration of the broader Alliance issues. On the other hand, deep Turkish concentration on the Cyprus issue is beginning to influence its reaction to CENTO issues. Iran continues a high degree of cooperation in Alliance matters.

We are hopeful that this general spirit of increased cooperation will carry over into the Ministerial Session, which will conclude on the day you meet the Ministers. It would be useful if you could contribute momentum and direction to the forward movement by expressing satisfaction with the progress that is being made, warning against relaxation, emphasizing the need to concentrate on mutual priority goals of meeting the Communist threat, and pledging continuing United States support. Relevant talking points are enclosed.

I am enclosing brief biographical sketches of the four Foreign Ministers: Qolam Abas Aram of Iran; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan; Feridun Cemal Erkin of Turkey; Richard A. Butler of the United Kingdom; and the Secretary General, Abbas Ali Khalatbary. You will recall having met Mr. Butler on several occasions; Messrs. Erkin and Khalatbary at the time of your visit to Ankara in 1962; Mr. Aram in Tehran on the same trip; and Mr. Bhutto in Karachi the previous year (he was then Minister of Information). You saw Messrs. Aram and Bhutto again at the time of President Kennedy's funeral.

To/ Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points.
2. Biographical Sketches.

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TALKING POINTS

1. Need for CENTO to concentrate on the primary task of countering the Communist threat and to avoid weakness by distraction with differences. While it is natural that we have had differences about the role of the Alliance in regard to regional threats, we welcome the trend in recent meetings to recognize the need to concentrate on the Communist threat that we all face. (FYI: In our view the regional members--particularly Pakistan--have frequently tried to focus CENTO on their regional antagonists (i.e., Pakistan on Indians, Iran on Arabs, and Turkey on Greek Cypriots) at the expense of action directed against the primary Communist threat. This difference in interpretation of objectives is the most important issue confronting the Organization, but you will want to bear in mind that recent meetings, including the just completed Military Committee meeting, indicate a possibility that the regional members may now be less insistent on their regional problems being given precedence over cooperation on means for meeting the Communist threat. END FYI.)

2. No aggression against CENTO countries in the first decade of the Organization.

3. CENTO as a useful instrument for building cohesion and strength in the three exposed regional countries. CENTO has proved to be a useful, though limited, international instrument for political discussion, for military planning and exercises (i.e., the recently completed United States-Iranian air-drop and naval exercise, DELAVAR, and the large-scale combined naval exercise, MIDLINK, in the Arabian Sea in the fall of 1963), and for cooperative endeavor in building economic infrastructure (i.e., roads, the 270-mile railroad linking Iran and Turkey, telecommunications facilities).

4. Need for CENTO to continue and intensify its work. Despite some relaxation of tensions, the Soviet and Chinese Communist threats remain very real, and the Organization will continue to be a positive factor, both in deterring Communist aggression and contributing to the strength of its members, individually and collectively. We prize our special relationships in the Organization, and the countries in the region can count on our continued effective support in meeting the Communist threat.

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Biographical Sketches

Qolam Abas ARAM -- Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Aram has served as Foreign Minister in six different Cabinets, beginning in 1939. He is a career diplomat with service in Washington as Minister and is very friendly toward the United States. He is considered one of Iran's most able and enterprising officials.

Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO -- Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs

At 36, Bhutto is the youngest member of the Pakistani Cabinet. He was graduated from the University of California at Berkeley, and his background is in law. Although he is intelligent, aggressive, and eloquent, he is regarded as an egotistical opportunist and has been a strong advocate of strengthening Pakistani ties with Communist China and the Afro-Asian bloc.

Richard A. "Rab" BUTLER -- U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Butler became Foreign Secretary when Sir Alec Douglas-Home formed his government in October 1963. Previously he served in Cabinets under Churchill, Eden, and Macmillan, and he has held all major Cabinet posts with the exception of the premiership. He has been a loyal Tory politician during his thirty-four years in Parliament. Butler is a man of great intellectual vigor and is regarded as pro-American.

Faridun Cemal ERKIN -- Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs

Erkin, Foreign Minister since March 1962, is a career diplomat who has served as Ambassador to both Washington and London. He is genuinely pro-Western and has been closely allied with Prime Minister Inonu for many years. He is a proud man, conscious of protocol, and likes to be told that he is doing a good job.

Abbas Ali KHALATBARY -- Secretary General of CENTO

Khalatbary has been Secretary General since 1961 and will probably be selected for another three-year term. He has done a creditable and energetic job in this post. He is an Iranian career diplomat and is friendly toward the United States.

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Note for Mr. Bundy

The attached was prepared by Joe Seisoe and me with the former in full consultation with ECR.

You should know that the Department is very sensitive on this matter -- especially Gen. Ball -- and a full post mortem is in progress in the Department.

I hope this will suffice for the moment.

Sam

EC

Yemen
107a

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: British Attitudes Leading up to Security
Council Action on Yemen, April 9, 1964

In view of the shortness of time for preparation, you should consider the following "post-mortem" as most preliminary. I believe, however, that the salient points are set forth and that a longer study of the matter, if it is desired, will bear this out.

The Secretary saw Lord Harlech shortly after the Harib raid and assured him there was no substance to the Flora Lewis report that the US had complained to the UK regarding the Harib incident. During this conversation he also told Lord Harlech he had issued strict instructions that the Department was not to criticize the UK. He added that if Foreign Minister Butler was asked, he could say that there had been no such expression of US views.

Instructions were sent to USUN on April 1 indicating the Department view that the resolution should not be condemnatory nor fix blame. We had in mind a paragraph which would be as even-handed as possible. We requested our Delegation to work closely and in concert with the UK delegation. In conversations with Stevenson and Plimpton, we made clear our desire to pursue tactics in full consultation with the UK.

We worked

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By ilo, NARA, Date 12-3-03

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-2-

We worked closely with the UK delegation. It became apparent that there was a difference of views between the UK delegation in New York and HMG regarding what in practical terms we might expect the Security Council to do. We were aware of the strong emotional involvement in London on this issue emanating largely from the long standing feelings of the Tory back-benchers on Middle Eastern problems dating back to the time of Suez and British domestic political requirements.

As part of our cooperation with the UK, we made a good speech and we played it tactically as they desired, i.e., we avoided the usual lead role of the US in negotiating a resolution. As informal consultations proceeded behind the scenes, the British on April 7 made representations to the Department emphasizing two points: (1) that the resolution avoid any condemnation of the British or any mention of the Harib incident (although the British could accept a sentence in the resolution deploring all incidents); and (2) that the resolution include some positive element for the future. We assured the British we would work to avoid condemnation, but indicated further it might be impossible to avoid some mention of Harib among other incidents. We also assured them we would work to try to get positive elements included in the resolution.

The UK and the US delegations in New York shared a common view all the way along as to the realities of the negotiating situation and what might prove feasible in the end. After indicating in our speech the desirability of getting the Secretary General involved, we were able to influence the smaller powers on the Security Council who were developing a resolution that this element should be included. The UK was pleased with this.

Our role

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Our role was primarily one of influencing the smaller powers to work out a resolution acceptable to the UK.

By the 7th of April the resolution was crystalizing and the key remaining questions related to paras 1 and 2, which referred to the reprisals and specifically mentioned Harib. When USUN asked the UK Delegation if a resolution which mentioned both attacks and reprisals and referred to frontier incidents, including Harib, would be acceptable provided a paragraph calling for UK compensation was omitted, Pat Dean answered "this would be tolerable". At the same time, we asked whether he wanted us to try to negotiate any of these changes, and Dean asked us not to do so. We, therefore, refrained. Our impression was that the UK preferred a harder rather than a watered-down resolution, on the assumption that this would be less difficult for a number of the Council members, including ourselves, to stay with them in this position.

The Norwegians, who apparently were disposed to accepting an Arab draft unacceptable to the UK, picked up the ball and began to negotiate the resolution with a view to making it more acceptable to the UK. What resulted was the text which we were confronted with yesterday.

In sum, during the proceedings in New York the US and UK cooperated closely. The resolution was not firmed up and submitted until about 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday evening. As of late Wednesday night our time, the UK had taken no position on the final text and referred the matter to London. At this time, Dean told Plimpton we could expect London would press hard in Washington for the US abstention, even though he, Dean, did not really think it was a bit bad resolution for the UK. Dean also agreed that the resolution would get 8 votes and hoped that the UK would not be abandoned and left alone by its friends.

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As of Wednesday night, we did not know whether the UK would decide to veto the resolution or whether the UK would decide to abstain. The UK Ambassador called the Secretary early Thursday morning informing him of the tough sledding Butler had had in the Cabinet and the decision to abstain on the resolution and urging the US to do similarly. Early Thursday morning we received a recommendation from USUN that we vote affirmatively on the resolution in light of our overall interest and a recommendation from our Embassy in London that we abstain or otherwise it would cause a serious domestic row in London. Until the question of how we would vote on the final resolution in light of Thursday morning's UK Cabinet decision, there was no reason to anticipate top-level involvement.

When the resolution was taken to the Secretary, IO, USUN and the NEA Bureaus agreed that the United States should support the resolution. Bob Komer and I agreed. At this point, it appeared that the matter would be easily decided in the Department and, on this assumption, I planned to give you a situation report before one o'clock. However, as you know, when the resolution was taken to the Secretary, the situation changed. You are better aware than I of what transpired subsequently.



Samuel E. Belk

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-433 appeal

By ing, NARA, Date 4-12-94

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Yemen
Mr. Pomaroy
108

April 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Resolution on the British-Yemen Air Strike

The disputed resolution on the British-Yemen air strike has three parts. The first condemns reprisals in general as contrary to the Charter. The second deplores the British attack on the fort at Harib on March 28. The third deplores all other actions by any party which led up to the British attack.

Stevenson argues that we must support the resolution because: (1) we have a consistent record of opposition to reprisals and strikes of this sort; (2) this particular strike was out of all proportion to the provocation, although the provocation was real; (3) the impact of abstention will be very severe in the Middle East and in the UN where we need support from many of those who will be most outraged -- especially Africans, Arabs and Asians; (4) Stevenson has already spoken against the British action, with State Department approval, and his own moral position (a matter of deep interest to him) will be affected.

Rusk argues equally strongly the other way: (1) Rab Butler has fought a determined fight against the hard-liners in the British Cabinet to prevent a veto and to secure a British abstention; (2) the provocation is more sustained and serious than Stevenson recognizes; (3) the U. S. itself may have to respond to provocations of a more serious but technically similar sort either in Cuba or in Vietnam; (4) We have other business pending with Sandys which makes this no time for a Suez-type reaction from hard-line British Tories.

My own reluctant but clear recommendation is as follows: (1) we should abstain; (2) we should go in very firmly to Home to say that this is a one-time act of loyalty which we could not repeat in parallel circumstances, because in our view the reaction, on which we were not consulted, was excessive and imprudent; (3) we should find a way of making it known that we have abstained in order to help prevent a veto, in order to support the wise Butler against the foolish Sandys, and because of an underlying feeling that these resolutions totally miss the real issues involved.

We should also seek to have the "good British" help us somewhat by explaining that their abstention indicates less of a sense of righteousness than a veto would have done, since they are in fact accepting passage of the motion.

Ref. B.

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DECLASSIFIED

April 2, 1964

E.O. 12956, Sec. 3.4

Mac -

NLJ 91-433

By ju, NARA, Date 2-3-93

Yer

109

Yemen. The UK retaliatory attack on Harib, designed to counter repeated UAR/YAR peanut air raids along the border (designed in turn to warn off the longstanding UK clandestine support of Yemeni royalists) will result in quite a stink before we're through.

Gyppos will make maximum propaganda of this "assault on Arabism", of which the SC complaint is only a foretaste. They'll publicize UK covert activities in Yemen, focus spotlight on Aden, encourage other Arabs to cause trouble, etc. Though UAR assures us Wheelus won't be attacked, we'll inevitably suffer. Whole Yemen disengagement question, and US/UK differences over Yemen, will also be raked up (Rusk was quite irked over leak to press that we were unhappy with Harib raid; he accused NEA of it and is probably right).

I'm afraid that once again Sandys-Trevaskis gunboat diplomacy is going to turn out a net loss--a loss we'll share. Do we really make time with London by not bridling at this sort of thing?

Mac, there are already ample signs that Home government is going to launch an attack on our Arab policy quite analogous to the one on Malaysia. They've already urged we cut aid to Nasser as means of pressure re Libyan bases. Now they want us to back them on Yemen. I suspect Tories think LBJ team an easier mark than New Frontier. I think they're wrong, if LBJ is clued on bidding. But unless we bite back, we're going to be under gradually increasing pressure (at least till Labor gets in).

RWK
RWK

110

~~TOP SECRET~~ (Attachments)

February 5, 1964



TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

2/6
Attached for the information and files
of Mr. Komer are copies of memoranda of con-
versation between:

- 1) Mr. T. Frank Branchley and Mr. Davies
regarding Alleged British Support for
Yemeni Royalists, dated January 28.
- and 2) Sir Geoffrey Harrison and Mr. T.
Frank Branchley regarding British
Covert Activities in Support of
Yemeni Royalists, dated January 29.

Attachments:

As stated.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (Attachments)

SECRET

January 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Yemen. This is merely to inform you that we have quietly and successfully redeployed our miniscule jet fighter force (8 planes) out of Saudi Arabia. Defense has been panting to do so for months and you'll recall we finally agreed to leave them there till 31 January only to make sure Faysal extended the disengagement rather than re-opening the Yemen war.

Your 19 January letter to Faysal clinched his adherence, and he raised no objection at all when we told him we were withdrawing above "training" mission. His subsequent friendly letter to you didn't even raise the question (we're preparing a suitable reply).

In fact, our best guess is that the Yemen flap is about over (there's been little fighting for months), and a UAR/Saudi reconciliation in the cards. I may be wrong but I think we can keep this messy little problem off your list of trouble spots.

R. W. KOMER

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-433
By ju, NARA, Date 2-3-93

Yemen ✓ 112

~~SECRET~~

December 19, 1963

McGB:

While 4 January draws ever nearer, we are stymied on our Yemen policy till LBJ gives some sign. We submitted Yemen paper to him Tuesday the 10th and hoped that he'd sign on at Wednesday meeting (cancelled), and then by means of approving Faysal letter.

Meanwhile State is more or less sitting on its hands, awaiting LBJ signal. Moreover, messages to Faysal and Nasser were to be our opening guns. I've indicated LBJ has read Yemen paper, and raised no objection but this isn't good enough.

I realize Faysal message is held up because of possible Shriver visit, but it should go now regardless of Shriver's plans. We may have to spend next two weeks convincing Faysal, so present letter is merely opening ploy. I've tried three times to break it loose--this is now urgent!

RWK
RWK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-433

By ju, NARA, Date 2-3-93

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✓ Yes in 113

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December 17, 1963

McGB -

Yemen. Reading the tea leaves makes me faintly optimistic we won't have much of a Yemen crisis come New Years.

Saqqaf (Deputy Foreign Minister and only Twentieth Century man in Saudi Arabia) says 60% chance Faysal won't resume aid to royalists. Nasser has made overtures to Saudis to restore relations. Ben Bella is trying to mediate. UAR is apparently pulling out some troops, and is worried about our attitude (Faysal too must be wondering about LBJ). In any case, our willingness let UNYOM quietly disappear means we don't have to twist Faysal's arm to cough up some more dough for it. Instead monkey is on his back to risk positive step of resuming aid (and thus lose our air umbrella).

Last but not least, the UN's man Spinelli is pouring oil on troubled waters with some success.

In fact, biggest risk may be if that fool Saud wins out over Faysal. Then we'd be in the soup.

✓
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/PAC 06-96
By id, NARA, Date 10-5-06

RWK
RWK

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114

Send back to Bundy....

Bill Moyers/yb

12/16

8:05p

114a

~~SECRET~~

December 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a paper from Dean Rusk briefly explaining our Yemen policy. We face a minor crisis over Yemen shortly, because UAR failure to withdraw enough troops from Yemen will probably lead to the demise of the UN observer force. The Saudis did carry out their engagement not to supply the royalist side, so now want us to come down on their side. But we doubt that further US pressure would get Nasser to play ball; more likely it would have the opposite effect.

So State recommends that we keep trying to make disengagement work, keep the Saudis and UAR apart, and promote a compromise regime in Yemen acceptable to both. As an incentive to Faysal not to resume aid to the royalists, we'd agree to keep our small jet fighter force there for another month or so.

We also urge you send a long, warmly worded letter to Faysal restating the policy of your Administration on this issue. As in most letters to Arabs, its very length is regarded as a mark of esteem.

We could take up Yemen briefly at the end of your India meeting Thursday at 11.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-433

McG
McGeorge Bundy

RWK
R. W. Komer

By *ju*, NARA, Date *2-3-93*

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

242
114-8
Yemen

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-436
By *ju*, NARA, Date 1-13-93

December 11, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Yemen

Enclosed is an appraisal of the Yemen problem and a recommended course of action, together with a proposed letter from you to Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The appraisal represents the consensus of the National Security Council Standing Group at its December 6 meeting. The appraisal and the letter, which is in implementation of one of the recommendations embodied in the appraisal, were drafted in consultation with a member of the White House Staff.

I recommend that you approve the proposed course of action and that you sign the letter to Crown Prince Faisal.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Appraisal and Recommended Course of Action Regarding Yemen.
2. Proposed Letter to Crown Prince Faisal.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

Appraisal and Recommended Course of Action Regarding Yemen

Another turning point in our Yemen policy is approaching.. The UAR has not pulled out a substantial number of troops as it is committed to do under the Bunker agreement. The UN Observer Mission (UNYOM) will not be extended after its terminal date of January 4, although a UN presence will continue. If Prince Faisal should carry out his threat to resume covert aid to the royalists after January 4, we could be faced with a major crisis in our relations with both Saudi Arabia and the UAR.

Background. Our concern throughout has been not Yemen itself but keeping the civil war from escalating into a Saudi-UAR fracas. In such a conflict the Saudis would look impotent (even if they did not collapse), and they would try every way to drag us in. So to protect our oil interests in Saudi Arabia we have tried to convince Faisal of the folly of his taking on Nasser. We also want to avoid wrecking our relations with the UAR and the attendant risk of a possible US-UAR military confrontation. We do not want to risk reversing the substantial decline in Soviet penetration of the Middle East by leaving the Soviets as the UAR's only outside contact.

The disengagement scheme, which Ambassador Bunker developed with the UAR and Saudis, ~~and then with the UN,~~ had a sweetener for Faisal. We sent a squadron of eight US jets (Hard Surface) as a symbol of our support (though we did so only after the Saudis agreed to halt aid to the Royalists). We thus bought nearly a year of time in which we have kept the two sides apart.

Our dilemma. But the disengagement scheme has stalled, and the UNYOM buffer probably cannot be again extended in its original form: (1) With 30,000 troops still in Yemen Nasser has not lived up to commitment for phased withdrawal--he has the bear by the tail and can't let go; (2) Faisal, who is under increasing criticism from the Saudi royal family, feels he cannot afford to stick to the bargain any longer and also sees a chance to get at Nasser through us; (3) U Thant is in no position to press for a continuing full-blown UN presence. (He will, however, probably be amenable to a continuing UN political presence whose prime task will be to seek reconciliation of the various factions in Yemen.)

Our aim is to keep the Yemen affair from blowing up before some kind of political compromise can be patched up (which both the Saudis and UAR can accept). We (and UN) have been trying to promote a broader-based coalition regime, still under UAR influence (so UAR troops would leave) but independent enough that Saudis and UK could live with it. However, it may take months for such a regime to emerge.

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While buying time to work out such a compromise, we want to continue protecting Saudi Arabia from the consequences of a direct confrontation with Nasser which would almost certainly develop if Faisal resumed aid to the royalists. Convincing Faisal that this is in his interest has led to a growing crisis of confidence between us. With his Arab sense of honor and a long-standing grudge against Nasser, he feels strongly that because he carried out his disengagement pledges, while Nasser did not, we should now join him against Nasser. We must persuade Faisal to follow our advice.

The Stakes. What Faisal wants would mean abandoning, over so minor an issue as Yemen, the gradual influence over certain UAR policies we feel we achieved under President Kennedy. So long as the UAR does not trespass on our vital interests, the limited understanding we have achieved is of real value in our area wide policy. To break openly with Nasser now over Yemen would: (a) increase the danger of an Arab-Israeli explosion; (b) destroy our ability to get anywhere on Arab refugee or Arab-Israeli arms control issues; (c) nullify our influence with the key Arab state just when the Jordan Waters issue is heating up, and (d) cause the UAR to turn more to the Soviets, as it did when it alleged we reneged on the Aswan Dam.

Role of Hard Surface. We also want to avoid getting our small US deterrent force (8 jet fighters) unnecessarily involved in an inter-Arab war. We have consistently warned Faisal that we will not allow them to be used as an umbrella for resuming aid to the royalists. Our reasoning has been that this might cause the UAR to resume bombing the supply points inside Saudi Arabia, which in turn would lead to Saudi appeals for help. With our planes there, we would either have to respond or look like paper tigers to both sides.

But if we now pull out the squadron, the risk goes up too. Hard Surface is a symbol of our intentions to both sides. Nasser could conceivably also take its withdrawal as a signal that he can bomb Saudi Arabia at will. We would seem to be deserting our Saudi friends. If we flatly warn Nasser not to resume bombing, but he nevertheless does so, we must either react strongly or look like paper tigers in this case too.

One alternative would be to take a much harder line toward Nasser at this point, including either (a) ceasing US aid to the UAR--mostly PL-480 food; or withdrawing our recognition of the Yemeni Republic (YAR). But we estimate that neither course would succeed in forcing withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen or a favorable change in Nasserist policies. On the contrary, such actions against the nation which has half the population of the entire area would increase Nasser's prestige at our expense, sharply set back our relations with the majority of other Arab states, and enhance the Soviet position in the area.

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Withdrawal of US recognition from the YAR, as suggested by Senator Hickenlooper as well as by some senior US oil executives, would require us to close our diplomatic and AID mission in Yemen and withdraw completely from the country. It would certainly constitute a slap in the face to Nasser but would accomplish none of our objectives.

So the preferred alternative remains that of working to keep the Yemen war damped down, while seeking to reduce Egyptian influence in the Yemen to a level tolerable to Faisal and the British without disrupting our relations with the UAR in the process. Given time, this can be achieved. The Egyptians are increasingly unpopular in the Yemen, among the republicans as well as others. The Yemen operation, while possibly not as costly as we had estimated earlier, nevertheless is straining Egyptian capabilities. We have given Egypt a clear signal that no new aid commitments can be expected until the Yemen situation improves; this will further strain the Egyptian economy and strengthen the voices of Nasser's economic advisers vis-a-vis his military commanders. Further dragging out of the Yemen imbroglio will also erode still more Nasser's already depreciated prestige in the area.

Recommended Policy Decisions. In the coming weeks we believe we should, therefore:

1. Support the continuation of a UN political presence in Yemen as it has evolved (but financed by the UN) with continued emphasis on UN Representative Spinelli's efforts to bring about a broader-based Yemen regime, while agreeing to the termination of UNYOM.

2. Use all resources at our disposal to persuade Faisal that it is in his and our best interests that Saudi aid to the royalists not be resumed, including:

- a. The extension of Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia by another month (until January 31, 1964). While informing Faisal of this, we would also stress that:

- 1) Under no circumstances can Hard Surface serve as an umbrella for the resumption of Saudi aid to the Yemeni royalists.

- 2) Hard Surface is only one tangible manifestation of USG support for Saudi Arabia and must soon be withdrawn.

- 3) The USG has other forces available in the area.

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b. The dispatch of a Presidential message reaffirming USG support for Saudi Arabia's integrity and once again requesting his support of our Yemen policies (see attached draft).

c. The dispatch of instructions to Ambassador Hart to inform Faisal that USG would support a complaint raised by Saudi Arabia before the UN Security Council should deliberate and unprovoked UAR aggression against Saudi territory occur.

d. Public reaffirmation, if Faisal wishes, of USG support for Saudi integrity.

3. Continue to press Nasser:

a. To withdraw his troops from Yemen while recognizing that expeditious UAR troop withdrawals cannot be expected until a viable republican regime is created in Yemen;

b. To support actively the development of a broader-based regime in Yemen;

c. To refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia.

4. Promote the restoration of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia as an important step toward reaching an accommodation over Yemen. Do whatever is possible to bring about direct contact between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republican leaders.

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DEC 11 1963

Yemen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Yemen

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I recommend that you approve the proposed course of action and that you sign the letter to Crown Prince Faisal.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-436

By *fw*, NARA, Date *1-13-93*

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Appraisal and Recommended Course of Action Regarding Yemen

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Our dilemma. But the disengagement scheme has stalled, and the UNYOM buffer probably cannot be again extended in its original form: (1) With 30,000 troops still in Yemen Nasser has not lived up to commitment for phased withdrawal--he has the bear by the tail and can't let go; (2) Faisal, who is under increasing criticism from the Saudi royal family, feels he cannot afford to stick to the bargain any longer and also sees a chance to get at Nasser through us; (3) U Thant is in no position to press for a continuing full-blown UN presence. (He will, however, probably be amenable to a continuing UN political presence whose prime task will be to seek reconciliation of the various factions in Yemen.)

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Authority N418-4
By CTE, NARA, Date 1/1/60

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While buying time to work out such a compromise, we want to continue protecting Saudi Arabia from the consequences of a direct confrontation with Nasser which would almost certainly develop if Faisal resumed aid to the royalists. Convincing Faisal that this is in his interest has led to a growing crisis of confidence between us. With his Arab sense of honor and a long-standing grudge against Nasser, he feels strongly that because he carried out his disengagement pledges, while Nasser did not, we should now join him against Nasser. We must persuade Faisal to follow our advice.

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- 4 -

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c. To refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia.

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115-6

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-433

By gaj, NARA, Date 2-3-93

Proposed Letter to Crown Prince Faisal

Since assuming the Presidency on the tragic death of President Kennedy I have reviewed, as a matter of priority, the several messages which the late President exchanged with Your Highness over the past months. I know that the President welcomed this direct communication and the candor which characterized it. While I repose the utmost confidence in Ambassador Hart--as did the late President--I too welcome this kind of direct and forthright exchange.

As I look back over United States-Saudi relations from the time of President Roosevelt, I see them characterized by basic cordiality and consistent United States support of the Saudi Kingdom, a pattern of mutual understanding marred only by some recent differences over Yemen. I think it important to note that, despite these differences, the United States has not wavered in its support of the basic integrity of Saudi Arabia; we have deployed our naval vessels, combat aircraft, and even paratroops when we thought it necessary to show our solidarity with you. We believe that our actions as well as our words have deterred both military and subversive moves against your Kingdom. I assure you I intend to continue this policy of support.

While we may have different approaches to the problem of the Yemen, the important thing is that we not let them obscure the basic reality of our relationship. On this I believe we are as one. Let me assure you also that we undertook our Yemen policy as a means of protecting the integrity of Saudi Arabia, which we saw as threatened far more by a direct military confrontation with President Nasser than by whatever happened in Yemen itself. I believe we were right in doing so.

I am well aware that you may differ with our assessment. I also know how you have abided honorably by the disengagement agreement, while the UAR performance has been far from satisfactory. Yet, as I take up the burdens of the Presidency, I ask you as a friend to join me in looking forward to the future rather than backward to the past.

As I do so, I am impressed by three facts. First, the UAR's policy in Yemen has brought it mostly headaches, plus considerable drain on its resources, while Saudi Arabia has used the time to strengthen itself internally and to increase its international stature. The events of the last year suggest that the UAR will have

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great difficulty winning popular support in Yemen, and that no matter what happens there is unlikely to develop in Yemen any government with enough power and cohesion to be a real threat to Saudi Arabia. Yemen will not constitute a threat to its neighbors at any time in the foreseeable future. It is also clear that no foreign power is going to be able to control the country for long without unacceptable costs. In many ways, Yemen can prove a trap to those who would dominate it.

Second, we have carefully examined alternative actions which might increase the likelihood of rapid UAR withdrawal. We have considered whether cutting off aid to the UAR would serve this purpose. I will tell you frankly that we think such a course would fail; it would only set Nasser against us, increase his prestige at our expense, destroy our influence with him and increase that of the Soviets, be unpopular with most Arabs, and make Yemen an issue on which he would fight to the end.

I must say that in the larger interest of minimizing Soviet influence in the Arab world, which we see as your interest as well as ours, we see no value in applying overt pressure unless we are confident it will succeed. We do not regard Nasser as a Communist, but he has shown that he will seek Soviet aid when denied other alternatives. We see our aid as giving him an alternative; if it were removed he would probably move much closer to the Russians.

By the same token, we strongly doubt that resumption of Saudi aid to the Yemeni royalists would force Nasser to withdraw. Rather we think that he would add to his commitment, rely even more heavily on Soviet assistance, and resume bombing attacks. So your re-involvement in the Yemeni conflict would, I fear, lead to events which would play into the hands of the UAR and endanger the stability of Saudi Arabia. Given its present predicament in Yemen, the UAR might welcome the resumption of your country's aid to the Yemeni royalists in order to be able to shift to your shoulders what is now its clear burden of responsibility.

Thus, we do not see how your cause would be advanced by a flare-up in the fighting.

Third, at a time when we and the United Nations are moving the UAR--however slowly--toward a political compromise and accelerated withdrawal from Yemen, we want to avoid precipitating a far more undesirable political solution that might commit Nasser to stay in Yemen, whereas now we see him as trying to draw down his commitment.

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For these powerful reasons, we see no better course than continuing to press Nasser to disengage, meanwhile counting on the disillusionment and rising discontent of the Yemeni to hasten his acceptance of a representative regime. This course limits the risks inherent in a renewal of active fighting, and promises to lead to a political outcome which serves your interests and ours. In fact today, more than at any time since the beginning of the conflict some fifteen months ago, there is hope for a political solution of this conflict. I am impressed by evidence that many Yemeni leaders now understand that national reconciliation and reconstruction will be facilitated if Yemenis settle their problems among themselves. Let us see if they can do so.

Meanwhile I can assure you that we will keep up our pressure on Nasser. We have already made clear to him that we cannot provide any additional aid beyond present programs until the UAR reduces the economic drain caused by its Yemen adventure. But we cannot afford to take irreversible steps until we see overriding advantage to doing so.

We will assist the United Nations in finding a political solution in Yemen and in working toward an improvement of relations between your country and the UAR. Here I reiterate our firm intent, which is identical to that of Your Highness' Government, to help create conditions permitting the people of Yemen to achieve self-determination. We have no interest in dictating what form of government the Yemeni people should agree upon and believe no other foreign state has the right to do so.

Accordingly, Your Highness, I urge that you continue a policy of statesmanlike patience and not risk actions which would cause an expansion of the Yemen conflict. You are well off as things now stand in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is secure. Given time, the inexorable flow of events will result in an independent Yemen ruled by Yemenis. The Yemen Arab Republic is in effect wooing you. We have strong indications that its leaders and people would take a much stiffer attitude toward the UAR if they were assured of a friendly attitude on your part. Yemenis are increasingly disillusioned with the UAR presence. You are building for the Saudi name a reputation for integrity, wisdom and respect for your commitments.

I recall the late President's letter to you of November 1962, in which he noted Your Highness' program of modernization and reform and affirmed our determination to support the integrity of Saudi Arabia. In endorsing Your Highness' dedication to the internal development of

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So in the memory of your great father, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, and that of my illustrious predecessors, Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, let us carry forward with a renewed sense of purpose the happy and productive relationship which our two great nations have hitherto enjoyed. Let us not allow this relationship and, equally important, your and our interests to be impaired by transient differences over Yemen.

I ask you to believe in the firmness of our support, and to give me the help I need at this time when I assume global responsibilities for the peace and security of free men everywhere. In turn, you have the assurances of my sincere personal friendship and my support for your endeavors to bring an ever better future for your noble people and country.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-433

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By pal, NARA, Date 2-3-93

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Lyndon B. Johnson

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Yemen

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YEMEN

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By fw, NARA, Date 1-13-93

PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT:

Efforts to resolve the Yemen problem before the termination of UNYOM on January 4 are meeting with little visible success. Very few UAR troops have been withdrawn and it is doubtful that many more will be removed in the coming month. Ambassador Spinelli's efforts to find the basis for a Government that would substantially broaden elements of Yemeni society seem to be moving slowly.

Prince Faisal is extremely unhappy with the slowness of the disengagement of Egyptian troops. He believes he has a U.S. commitment to get the Egyptians out of the Yemen. He is anxious to cash this commitment, preferably in a way that would pit the United States against Nasser. For all these reasons he is highly unlikely to agree to a further extension of UNYOM. He is also strengthening his capability to resume support to northern Yemeni tribes after January 4, and seems to have the intention of doing so. In these circumstances, we must anticipate the probable end of UNYOM on January 4 although a UN presence will remain.

This raises several questions:

- (a) Are there steps beyond those we have taken which would stand a better chance of persuading the UAR to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Yemen expeditiously?
- (b) Should Hard Surface be continued in Saudi Arabia or be withdrawn before or when UNYOM is wound up?
- (c) Is the Yemen problem sufficiently central to U.S. interests so that it should dictate our posture toward the UAR and other Arab states?

Yemen by itself is peripheral to our over-all national interests in the Near East. It has, however, become a crucial issue between Saudi Arabia and the UAR. To the monarchs of the region--Faisal, Hussein, the Shah--and to Israel, the security and stability of all of whom we support, it has come to signify Nasserite imperialism. For these reasons Yemen has evolved into an important factor in our relations with the region generally. In particular, our next steps in the Yemen relate intimately to our next steps with the UAR.

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In the past several years the United States has gradually achieved a limited U.S.-UAR understanding and a degree of influence over certain, though not all, UAR policies. So long as the UAR does not trespass on our vital interests, this understanding is of great importance to the prosecution of U.S. policies in the Near East. Its abandonment could be expected to stimulate Nasser in directions likely to:

- (a) Increase the danger of an Arab-Israeli explosion;
- (b) Destroy our basis for working toward ultimate progress on Arab refugees or Near Eastern arms control;
- (c) Nullify our influence with the key Arab state at the moment when Israel is about to begin withdrawing Jordan waters; and
- (d) Tend to force the UAR to turn increasingly to the USSR.

Moreover, we estimate that neither a withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen nor a favorable change in Nasserite policies would result from cancellation of existing aid commitments or a diplomatic break. On the contrary, such actions against the nation which has half the population of the entire area might well increase Nasser's prestige at our expense, sharply set back our relations with the majority of other Arab states, and enhance the Soviet position in the area.

Our object, therefore, is to reduce Egyptian influence in the Yemen to a level which should be tolerable to Faisal and the British without disrupting our relations with the UAR in the process.

Given time, I believe this goal can be achieved. The Egyptians are increasingly unpopular in the Yemen, among the republicans as well as others. The Yemen operation, while possibly not as costly as we had estimated earlier, nevertheless is straining Egyptian capabilities. We have given Egypt a clear signal that no further aid commitments can be expected until the Yemen situation improves; this will further strain the Egyptian economy and should strengthen the voices of Nasser's economic advisers vis-a-vis his military commanders. Further dragging out of the Yemen imbroglio will also be likely to erode still more Nasser's already depreciated prestige in the area.

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To let these pressures on Nasser build up effectively, time is needed. This is what Faisal finds it so hard to understand or to accept. We have a major task, therefore, to persuade him of this. A Presidential communication, and possibly a Presidential Emissary, might be useful.

Next steps in Yemen should accord with and strengthen the four basic objectives of our Yemen policy: (a) to protect US interests in the entire Arabian Peninsula; (b) to prevent escalation and spreading of the conflicts; (c) to bring about a situation in Yemen that will include a measure of internal stability, self-determination in Yemeni terms, and the termination of foreign military intervention; and (d) to check Soviet influence in Yemen.

(It is worth noting that the disengagement policy, anchored in the Bunker agreement, has in fact during the past year contained the conflict, protected basic US and Saudi interests, and to a limited extent checked Soviet influence in Yemen.)

In the coming weeks we believe we should focus our efforts on:

1. Keeping a UN presence in Yemen and, in particular, supporting Spinelli's efforts to bring about a broader-based and more viable Yemeni regime;
2. Persuading Faisal to resist temptations to resume his aid to the Yemeni royalists (since his doing so would invite UAR air attacks, lay bare Saudi weaknesses and weaken the whole structure of the Saud regime);
3. Keeping pressure on the UAR to cooperate actively in Spinelli's efforts to create a viable regime; to withdraw its troops from Yemen at a faster pace than heretofore; to refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

We propose undertaking the following course of action over the next fortnight.

1. In New York:

Urge the UNSYC to maintain a UN political presence and a small group of military observers in Yemen for an indefinite period and at UN expense after January 4.

COMMENT: UN Under Secretary Bunche has already indicated, subject to the SYG's approval, a readiness to carry on in Yemen in the above fashion, at least initially.

2. In Cairo:

a. Continue to build up pressures on Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen, while recognizing that "expeditious" UAR troop withdrawals cannot be expected until a viable "republican" regime is created in Yemen.

b. Seek to induce Nasser to sponsor and support actively the development of a broader-based regime in Yemen, stressing that the Spinelli mission currently offers the best hope for the UAR to extricate itself from Yemen.

c. Stimulate the UAR to create conditions, including stopping its propaganda attacks against Saudi Arabia, that would make possible restoration of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia as an important step toward reaching an accommodation over Yemen.

d. Tell Nasser if there are UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia we will give the Saudis our full support in UN Security Council. (This presupposes Faisal's withholding aid from royalists.).

COMMENT: The UN has reported some recent UAR troop withdrawals, but not enough to make a difference. We have also been told that Nasser intends promptly to propose to Saudi Arabia a restoration of diplomatic relations.

3. In Jidda:

a. Inform Faisal that, although it is true we have been unable to obtain "expeditious" withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen, our efforts to get the bulk of UAR troops out of Yemen as soon as possible will continue. We would spell out in detail our reasons for believing that pressures that we have induced and those inherent in the situation will, given time, force Nasser to withdraw UAR troops. We would document as an example the overwhelming Yemeni sentiment in favor of UAR troop withdrawals.

b. Tell Faisal the USG will fully back the Spinelli effort, as the best hope to get a fully representative government. Urge Faisal to cooperate in this effort and to refrain from setting conditions re Yemeni self-determination.

c. Stress to Faisal the importance of Saudi Arabia's refraining from renewed intervention in Yemen, pointing out the consequences of his re-involvement, including the fact that this would weaken the USG ability to stand by him. Say that if he continues to refrain from aiding the Yemeni royalists, the USG will: (1) leave Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia for a further short period after UNYOM ends; (2) support a complaint by Saudi Arabia before the UN Security Council should deliberate UAR aggression against Saudi territory occur; and (3) reaffirm publicly USG support for Saudi integrity.

d. Urge Faisal to respond favorably to UAR overtures for reconciliation with the SAG and to overtures of amity from the YAR.

COMMENT: Faisal will be the toughest nut to crack but he should understand the basic truth that the US supports him, that it does not support the meddling of the UAR, and time will bring a result in Yemen more satisfying to Saudi Arabia than will Saudi Arabia's involvement in a war by proxy or direct hostilities after January 4. Our chief concern remains the adverse consequences to Saudi Arabia that would stem from renewed Yemeni involvement.

4. In London:

Seek to enlist HMG support at a high level for the foregoing course of action.

5. In Washington:

a. Make a decision to keep Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia until February 1, 1964.

b. Explore the possibility of using USG assets to influence favorably the course of broadening the base of the Yemeni regime.

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Talbot
NEA - Mr. Jernegan
NE - Mr. Davies
IO - Mr. Sisco
UNP - Mr. Campbell
G/PM - Col. Robinson
NR - Mr. Walsh

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YEMEN

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-436

By ju, NARA, Date 1-13-93

PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT:

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This raises several questions:

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G/PM - Col. Robinson
NR - Mr. Walsh

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December 6, 1963

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RECAP OF MAIN ISSUES FOR SG

- I. Bowles proposal (key issue is to get OK in principle)
 - A. Should we go for multi-year commitment if we can get what Bowles proposes?
 - B. Annual size of MAP (DOD reluctant go above \$50 million.)
 - C. Supersonics for Pakistan and India
 - D. Tactics and Timing (per Delhi 1757)
- II. Taylor brief (big issue is Bowles proposal above)
 - A. Tone (not too apologetic)
 - B. Joint planning vs. unilateral description of US capabilities.
 - C. Joint exercises
- III. Yemen (next steps since UNYOM dies shortly)
 - A. Can we afford to shift to pro-Saudi course?
 - B. How can we get Faysal to hold off resuming aid?
 - C. What to do about our squadron.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-433

R. W. KOMER

By jm, NARA, Date 2-3-93

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McGB:

December 6, 1963

The brief for Taylor's India-Pakistan visit is also on SG agenda for today. Only issues worth discussing are:

1. Taylor's Tone in Pakistan. We've been too apologetic to Paks, especially in volunteering all sorts of reassurances. Now, with LBJ's reaction to Chou visit as our guide, Taylor should rebut vigorously Pak pressure treatment he'll inevitably get. We should do like UK did to Bhutto last October, e. g. Indian threat is "nonsense". A little pep talk useful here.

2. Reassurances. Instead of offering these as "concessions," we should cite them as "examples" of how we mean it when we say we'll defend Paks if Indians attack!

1. Joint planning. Taylor prefers Harriman/Komer line of unilateral description of US capabilities including Ninth Fleet rather than actual joint planning against India. He should describe this at SG.

2. Joint exercises. We plan a few of these to show Paks how we could get out in a hurry.

3. Ninth Fleet. We should build up our description of how helpful it could be.

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By *gw*, NARA, Date *2-3-93*

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December 5, 1963

McGB -

Yemen. Problem for SG Friday is that we're now at another periodic crisis over our Yemen policy, since: (1) latest extension of UNYOM expires 4 January; (2) UAR seems unlikely to have pulled out enough troops, etc. to justify Faysal's consenting to another extension; (3) indeed Faysal has told us he'll resume aid to Royalists unless UAR performs; (4) we've threatened Faysal in turn to pull out our jets if he resumes aid. So this crisis is more serious than the last.

Background. We've always regarded what happened in Yemen itself as less important than keeping the civil war from escalating into a Saudi-UAR fracas. If so, the Saudis would look impotent (even if they didn't collapse), and would try every way to drag us in. So we've tried to protect Saudis from the consequences of their own folly, while still not wrecking our relations with the UAR. We don't want to thrust UAR or YAR wholly into hands of Russians either.

Thus we devised disengagement scheme, and sold it to UAR and Saudis, then to UN. It's bought us a year of time in which we've kept the two sides apart. But the UNYOM buffer we got SYG to put in probably can't be kept there any longer: (1) Nasser hasn't lived up to commitment for phased withdrawal--not because he doesn't want to, but because he has the bear by the tail and can't let go; (2) so Faysal, who's under increasingly heavy criticism at home, feels he can't afford to stick to the bargain any longer either; (3) U Thant is discouraged and won't press for continuing UNYOM, especially since Canadian and Yugo contingents want to pull out.

The Dilemma. Our interest remains the same as ever--to keep Yemen affair from blowing up until some kind of political compromise regime can be patched up (which Saudis and UAR will buy). Since it became apparent to us that YAR was a flop, we (and UN) have been trying to promote a broader--based coalition regime, still under UAR influence (so UAR troops would leave) but independent enough that Saudis and UK could live with it. However, it may take months for such a regime to emerge--certainly we can't get one by January. So we want to keep Yemen damped down till then.

We have other compelling reasons for doing so. If Faysal resumes aid to Royalists, UAR will almost certainly step up harassment of Saudi Arabia, probably including renewed bombing. It may try to upset rickety Saudi regime. If our planes are still there (or we send more) this will be a deterrent, but there's a real chance UAR will seek to test whether we'd actually react. So risk of incident goes up.

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But if we pull out planes, as we've said we'd do, risk goes up too. As Hart says (Jidda 572), Nasser will take this as a signal we're letting him bomb at will. We will seem to be deserting Saudis (even if for a cause). If we flatly warn Nasser against new bombing, and he nevertheless does so, then we have to send planes back, and more, or look like paper tigers.

Possible courses (basically three):

1. Pro-Saudi course. The UK, Saudis, Zionists, oil companies, and Hart in Jidda feel we've been too pro-Nasser in the first place. Now Saudis have lived up to disengagement and Nasser hasn't. Ergo, let's lean to Saudi side. Hart says US should seek full UNSC debate on how to continue disengagement, pinning rose on UAR for non-compliance and seeking public pressure on Nasser to comply. If we thus took Nasser on publicly: (a) he might weaken; (b) Saudis might be willing to delay aid resumption; (c) if so, we could keep jets there.

State points out obvious flaws. UAR would mount vigorous campaign in UN against reactionary Saudis, UK, US. Far from delaying aid resumption, Faysal might be even more encouraged to go ahead. Soviets would veto in SC, and we couldn't get GA majority.

2. [redacted] a new "hands off" policy: (a) US pulls out of Yemen completely, saying YAR not viable any more; (b) we tell UAR we still want good relations; (c) we tell Saudis we can defend main Saudi cities but not south (Najran, Jizan) where aid flowing. But this gives the UAR and Saudis [redacted] a free hand to fight it out over Yemen; it promotes escalation, not damping down. And it would work only if we could keep "hands off": (a) if Saudis were losing they'd scream for US help; (b) if Nasser were losing he might pull desperate actions here and elsewhere. So we'd be under great pressure to re-engage. Also, US withdrawal from YAR would leave Soviets (and UAR) a free hand.

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3. Third course is suggested by State in attached. Essentially it calls for trying to keep affair damped down and moving toward disengagement via: (a) continued UN presence; (b) continued pressure on Nasser to disengage; (c) continued effort to promote new compromise YAR regime; (d) effort to get Faysal to hold off resuming aid, offering as chief bait retention of jets in S. Arabia a while longer.

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Chief flaw is how do we convince Faysal yet again to hold off aid, and do we want to keep jets there? I doubt if even offer to keep jets after UNYOM leaves will sell Faysal. We'd have to tell him anyway we'd pull out jets if he resumed aid (we're practically committed here). Yet this is worth a try!

Another weapon is Gruening Amendment. If Nasser starts bombing Saudis again, how can LBJ resist Hill calls for aid suspension? So why not tell Nasser we don't want to do this, but will literally have to if he attacks Saudis.

State's course seems least of all evils, but it needs more sweetener for Faysal and more muscle for Nasser if it's to work.



R. W. KOMER

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1/EA Davies

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YEMEN

PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT:

Efforts to resolve the Yemen problem before the termination of UNYOM on January 4 are meeting with little visible success. Very few UAR troops have been withdrawn and it is doubtful that many more will be removed in the coming month. Ambassador Spinelli's efforts to find the basis for a Government that would substantially broaden elements of Yemeni society seem to be moving slowly.

Prince Faisal is extremely unhappy with the slowness of the disengagement of Egyptian troops. He believes he has a U.S. commitment to get the Egyptians out of the Yemen. He is anxious to cash this commitment, preferably in a way that would pit the United States against Nasser. For all these reasons he is highly unlikely to agree to a further extension of UNYOM. He is also strengthening his capability to resume support to northern Yemeni tribes after January 4, and seems to have the intention of doing so. In these circumstances, we must anticipate the probable end of UNYOM on January 4 although a UN presence will remain.

This raises several questions:

(a) Are there steps beyond those we have taken which would stand a better chance of persuading the UAR to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Yemen expeditiously?

(b) Should Hard Surface be continued in Saudi Arabia or be withdrawn before or when UNYOM is wound up?

(c) Is the Yemen problem sufficiently central to U.S. interests so that it should dictate our posture toward the UAR and other Arab states?

Yemen by itself is peripheral to our over-all national interests in the Near East. It has, however, become a crucial issue between Saudi Arabia and the UAR. To the monarchs of the region--Faisal, Hussein, the Shah--and to Israel, the security and stability of all of whom we support, it has come to signify Nasserite imperialism. For these reasons Yemen has evolved into an important factor in our relations with the region generally. In particular, our next steps in the Yemen relate intimately to our next steps with the UAR.

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NLJ 91-436

By fw, NARA, Date 12-20-93

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In the past several years the United States has gradually achieved a limited U.S.-UAR understanding and a degree of influence over certain, though not all, UAR policies. So long as the UAR does not trespass on our vital interests, this understanding is of great importance to the prosecution of U.S. policies in the Near East. Its abandonment could be expected to stimulate Nasser in directions likely to:

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- (a) Increase the danger of an Arab-Israeli explosion;
 - (b) Destroy our basis for working toward ultimate progress on Arab refugees or Near Eastern arms control;
 - (c) Nullify our influence with the key Arab state at the moment when Israel is about to begin withdrawing Jordan waters; and
 - (d) Tend to force the UAR to turn increasingly to the USSR.

Moreover, we estimate that neither a withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen nor a favorable change in Nasserite policies would result from cancellation of existing aid commitments or a diplomatic break. On the contrary, such actions against the nation which has half the population of the entire area might well increase Nasser's prestige at our expense, sharply set back our relations with the majority of other Arab states, and enhance the Soviet position in the area.

Our object, therefore, is to reduce Egyptian influence in the Yemen to a level which should be tolerable to Faisal and the British without disrupting our relations with the UAR in the process.

Given time, I believe this goal can be achieved. The Egyptians are increasingly unpopular in the Yemen, among the republicans as well as others. The Yemen operation, while possibly not as costly as we had estimated earlier, nevertheless is straining Egyptian capabilities. We have given Egypt a clear signal that no further aid commitments can be expected until the Yemen situation improves; this will further strain the Egyptian economy and should strengthen the voices of Nasser's economic advisers vis-a-vis his military commanders. Further dragging out of the Yemen imbroglio will also be likely to erode still more Nasser's already depreciated prestige in the area.

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To let these pressures on Nasser build up effectively, time is needed. This is what Faisal finds it so hard to understand or to accept. We have a major task, therefore, to persuade him of this. A Presidential communication, and possibly a Presidential Emissary, might be useful.

Next steps in Yemen should accord with and strengthen the four basic objectives of our Yemen policy: (a) to protect US interests in the entire Arabian Peninsula; (b) to prevent escalation and spreading of the conflicts; (c) to bring about a situation in Yemen that will include a measure of internal stability, self-determination in Yemeni terms, and the termination of foreign military intervention; and (d) to check Soviet influence in Yemen.

(It is worth noting that the disengagement policy, anchored in the Bunker agreement, has in fact during the past year contained the conflict, protected basic US and Saudi interests, and to a limited extent checked Soviet influence in Yemen.)

In the coming weeks we believe we should focus our efforts on:

1. Keeping a UN presence in Yemen and, in particular, supporting Spinelli's efforts to bring about a broader-based and more viable Yemeni regime;
2. Persuading Faisal to resist temptations to resume his aid to the Yemeni royalists (since his doing so would invite UAR air attacks, lay bare Saudi weaknesses and weaken the whole structure of the Saud regime);
3. Keeping pressure on the UAR to cooperate actively in Spinelli's efforts to create a viable regime; to withdraw its troops from Yemen at a faster pace than heretofore; to refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia.



RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

We propose undertaking the following course of action over the next fortnight.

1. In New York:

Urge the UNSYC to maintain a UN political presence and a small group of military observers in Yemen for an indefinite period and at UN expense after January 4.

COMMENT: UN Under Secretary Bunche has already indicated, subject to the SYG's approval, a readiness to carry on in Yemen in the above fashion, at least initially.

2. In Cairo:

a. Continue to build up pressures on Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen, while recognizing that "expeditious" UAR troop withdrawals cannot be expected until a viable "republican" regime is created in Yemen.

b. Seek to induce Nasser to sponsor and support actively the development of a broader-based regime in Yemen, stressing that the Spinelli mission currently offers the best hope for the UAR to extricate itself from Yemen.

c. Stimulate the UAR to create conditions, including stopping its propaganda attacks against Saudi Arabia, that would make possible restoration of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia as an important step toward reaching an accommodation over Yemen.


d. Tell Nasser if there are UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia we will give the Saudis our full support in UN Security Council. (This presupposes Faisal's withholding aid from royalists.).

COMMENT: The UN has reported some recent UAR troop withdrawals, but not enough to make a difference. We have also been told that Nasser intends promptly to propose to Saudi Arabia a restoration of diplomatic relations.

3. In Jidda:

a. Inform Faisal that, although it is true we have been unable to obtain "expeditious" withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen, our efforts to get the bulk of UAR troops out of Yemen as soon as possible will continue. We would spell out in detail our reasons for believing that pressures that we have induced and those inherent in the situation will, given time, force Nasser to withdraw UAR troops. We would document as an example the overwhelming Yemeni sentiment in favor of UAR troop withdrawals.

b. Tell Faisal the USG will fully back the Spinelli effort, as the best hope to get a fully representative government. Urge Faisal to cooperate in this effort and to refrain from setting conditions re Yemeni self-determination.

c. Stress to Faisal the importance of Saudi Arabia's refraining from renewed intervention in Yemen, pointing out the consequences of his re-involvement, including the fact that this would weaken the USG ability to stand by him. Say that if he continues to refrain from aiding the Yemeni royalists, the USG will:
// (1) leave Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia for a further short period after UNYOM ends; (2) support a complaint by Saudi Arabia before the UN Security Council should deliberate UAR aggression against Saudi territory occur; and (3) reaffirm publicly USG support for Saudi integrity. 

d. Urge Faisal to respond favorably to UAR overtures for reconciliation with the SAG and to overtures of amity from the YAR.

COMMENT: Faisal will be the toughest nut to crack but he should understand the basic truth that the US supports him, that it does not support the meddling of the UAR, and time will bring a result in Yemen more satisfying to Saudi Arabia than will Saudi Arabia's involvement in a war by proxy or direct hostilities after January 4. Our chief concern remains the adverse consequences to Saudi Arabia that would stem from renewed Yemeni involvement.

4. In London:

Seek to enlist HMG support at a high level for the foregoing course of action.

5. In Washington:

a. Make a decision to keep Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia until February 1, 1964.

b. Explore the possibility of using USG assets to influence favorably the course of broadening the base of the Yemeni regime.

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Talbot \$
NEA - Mr. Jernegan \$
NE - Mr. Davies \$
IO - Mr. Sisco \$
UNP - Mr. Campbell \$
G/PM - Col. Robinson \$
NR - Mr. Walsh \$