

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

Country File

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Vol. I  
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Deptel 1375 (Tokyo); Ikeda and Ohira talk with LBJ and Rusk
- 2    11/26/63    State ~~8~~ (Gp 3) 4pp. State Ltr 7-7-75  
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Japan ROK Settlement Prospects"
- 3a   12/16/63    State ~~8~~ (Gp 3) 2pp. State Ltr. 7-7-75  
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- 3b   12/16/63    State ~~8~~ (Gp 3) 4pp. State Ltr 7-7-75  
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- 3d   Undated    State ~~8~~ (Gp 3) 4pp. State Ltr 7-7-75  
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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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*Japan*

45-48

Origin ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO 1375  
FE INFO: Amembassy DJAKARTA 596  
Info: Amembassy LONDON 3302  
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Authority STATE 7-7-75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister left this afternoon after conversations with the President and Secretary. According to Ambassador Takeuchi, said this aspect of visit "could not have gone better." Following summary of conversation with Secretary is based on uncleared memcon and is subject to revision.

Discussion of possible times for rescheduling Joint Cabinet Meeting brought out difficulties for US before late January or February, difficulties for Japan between late January and April. It was agreed to announce that meeting would be rescheduled "as soon as possible in next year", while efforts continue to find mutually acceptable date. (As agreed, Ikeda made statement to press to this effect on leaving meeting.)

Secretary reassured Ikeda in strongest terms that we view alliance with Japan as "utterly fundamental", essential to US in own defense and in relation defense of Free World.

Drafted by: FE:EA/J:TWainsworth:car:ac  
11-26-63

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - Robert W. Barnett

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Christensen

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Secretary then emphasized deep concern with which US views possibility and dangerous consequence of violence in Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation and expressed hope Japan would make major effort persuade Sukarno that problems must be settled by peaceful process. Ikeda said whatever anyone thinks of Sukarno it was necessary for sake of peace in Asia to exert leadership over him. Sukarno unlikely start serious trouble, and his objectives relate to control his own people. Possibly economic assistance could be used to overcome his ignorance of economic reality. Japan had established "brotherly" rapport with Indonesia and Sukarno and "promised" consult Japan before doing anything. Ikeda viewed Sukarno as eager to look to Japan for economic help and guidance.

Re Korean settlement Ohira optimistic on fishery issue. Ikeda believed if Pak gets Assembly ~~xxxxx~~ majority normalization soon in sight.

Report of Presidential conversation will follow.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

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FE:EA/J:TWainsworth/j

(Drafting Office and Officer)

17005

Approved in S  
11/29/63

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 26, 1963

SUBJECT: U.S.-Japan Relations; Japan-ROK Settlement Prospects

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese: Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda  
Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira  
Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi  
Counselor Genichi Akatani

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STATE 7.7.75

By IP, NARS, Date 7.22.75

Americans: Secretary Dean Rusk  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Barnett, FE  
Thomas W. Ainsworth, Officer-in-Charge, Japanese  
Affairs, EA/J  
James Wickel, L.S., Interpreter

COPIES TO: See Page 4

Secretary Rusk repeated on a personal basis the gratitude which the President had expressed to the Prime Minister last night for making this visit at this time, particularly after his strenuous election campaign. It had touched the hearts of the American people.

Prime Minister Ikeda replied that it had been sad indeed for the Japanese people to hear the news of President Kennedy's death. He was grateful that he had been able to come here and to meet President Johnson in a friendly and intimate manner.

Secretary Rusk said that no one knew better than President Kennedy that the nation would live on and its work and responsibility would continue. President Johnson and Prime Minister Ikeda were now moving ahead to carry out the unfinished business of their countries. The President hoped that we could re-schedule the Joint Cabinet Committee at an early date. We could not make a specific proposal yet. The Secretary wished to talk with the President after a few days. There were several evident problems in selecting a date. It would be difficult during the thirty-day mourning period and especially as the new Administration reviews the problems it faces. This will take us close to the end of December; State of the Union Message, legislative proposals and budget preparations must be prepared for presentation early in January. The Secretary would be inclined to suggest the end of January or February but this was necessarily tentative because he had no chance yet to talk with the President.

He asked

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-2-

He asked about the Japanese Government's schedule and wishes. It would be advisable to consult soon in order to make an announcement and let our two countries know we intend to go ahead.

Prime Minister Ikeda said that his own considerations pointed to mid or late January. Otherwise because of legislative problems it could probably not be until April.

Secretary Rusk checked his schedule book and asked whether Japan had commitments for visiting foreign dignitaries during January. The Prime Minister replied that the Belgian King and Queen would be there in mid-January. This involved the Imperial family and the Prime Minister but not most of the other Ministers who take part in the Committee. Secretary Rusk said that in view of the pace of the opening of Congress our time would have to be late January but we could consult and find a mutually agreeable date.

Prime Minister Ikeda said he and the Secretary had known each other long and well. He hoped in the future to continue to have frank and full discussions with the Secretary. Secretary Rusk replied that he would value that deeply and had also a high regard for his counterpart, Mr. Ohira. He continued that we have important tasks at present and are on the edge of important world developments. What has happened inside the Communist world is leading to a new situation. It is important that we make an accurate and thoughtful assessment of its meaning avoiding naivete and illusion on one hand and blindness to the significance of developments on the other hand. He thought there had been no period since World War II when discriminating and thoughtful assessment was more necessary. It was not yet possible to see if the developments were for good or bad but they were opening out and we would need to be in close touch.

Prime Minister Ikeda replied that the Secretary had given a very fine evaluation of the situation. Events were moving and it was essential that we observe their directions otherwise there would be bad results. He thought there were many advantages for close observation of the direction events were beginning to flow. The United States as the center of NATO and nations in Europe and Asia was in a fine position to make such an evaluation.

Secretary Rusk went on that this involved a psychological problem. We and our friends feel the situation should be probed to find if there are points of possible agreement, small or large, between the Communist world and the Free World. We are not under illusions and we recognize that time, patience and thought were essential but we must explore on a realistic basis what can be done. We did not anticipate dramatic developments but even the process of exploration tends to leave uncertainty among some of our forty-two allies concerning our commitments to them in terms of security. He wished to assure

the Prime Minister

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-3-

the Prime Minister in the strongest terms that we consider our alliance with Japan as utterly fundamental, not based on philanthropy or amiability but essential to the United States in its own defense and in relation to the defense of the Free World. If there is any anxiety in Japan about the strength of our commitments in the event of aggression in that part of the world we can promptly take steps to clarify the strength of our determination. He believed the Russians understood this also.

Prime Minister Ikeda replied that he should rest easy. Japan did not doubt at all the intent of the U.S. The U.S. had sent a good man to Japan in Ambassador Reischauer. He maintains the best of relations with the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and they regard him as a particular friend.

Secretary Rusk replied that it appeared both countries were well served by their Ambassadors. He then asked what part foreign policy had played in the recent elections in Japan. Prime Minister Ikeda replied that next to former Prime Minister Yoshida, he was known on the Japanese political scene as the closest collaborator with the U.S. He cited the Security Treaty and the nuclear submarine question as examples. He said that the Socialist parties in Japan appear to be changing their attitude to the U.S. The Democratic Socialist Party had become similar in this respect to the Liberal Democratic Party and even the Japanese Socialist party had started such a change, which was a good thing. There had been some consideration of including a Socialist in Japan's UN delegation. On the surface the Socialists opposed it but they would really like to be included. The JSP suffered in the election from the fact that its foreign policy was divorced from reality, according to Japan's press. They will gradually have to change their foreign policy stance. This will be good for U.S.-Japan relations.

Secretary Rusk commented on the Korean situation, a matter of concern to us. Most problems between Japan and Korea appeared to be in sight of agreement, except perhaps fisheries. In the interests of all three, Japan, Korea and the United States, he hoped the situation would soon be restored to normal. Tentatively, he ventured to suggest that the fisheries problem got to an impasse it might be that arrangements for joint exploration and conservation of fisheries resources would lessen the importance of national attitudes. He cited for example the Ruhr where the establishment of the Iron and Coal Community had made national frontiers of much less importance. Would a joint effort in fisheries between Japan and Korea make the political aspects more manageable? He was not an expert in this field but suggested this because we hoped that the discussions could move to a solution as rapidly as possible. He did not know what the political possibilities were in either Korea or Japan but hoped some solution could be found.

Foreign Minister

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-4-

Foreign Minister Ohira, after the Prime Minister had deferred to him, said that perhaps the fisheries problem was not as difficult as the claims issue. Since this had been solved the fisheries should be relatively simple. The Japanese had had similar thoughts on the possibilities for cooperation but the tremendous difference in technological levels presented problems. Japan offered technical aid to improve the Korean fishing industry and had given much attention to the possibility of a joint conservation program. Prime Minister Ikeda observed that as far as domestic public opinion was concerned the majority in Japan except the Japan Socialist Party favored his policy of normalizing relations. The problem was on the other side. If General Pak receives an assembly majority he thought the remaining problems could be solved.

After brief discussion it was decided to inform the press that we expected the Joint Cabinet Committee meeting to be held as soon as possible in the coming year, and on other subjects to be very general.

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Secretary of Defense  
CIA

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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34-32

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

PRIORITY 1537

Info:

Info: CINCPAC  
COMUSJAPAN

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Authority STATE 7.7.75  
By JP, NARS, Date 7.22.75

Dec 16 11 50 AM '63

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Embtels 1718, 1752, and 1763

Press release proposed Embtel 1466 approved as Fifth AF release with

following change: In place of sentence beginning "The aircraft of the remaining F-102 fighter interceptor squadron . . ." substitute

following sentence: "The F-102 interceptor squadron at Itazuke Air Base will be reassigned to the United States."

In view considerations set forth Embtels 1718 and 1763, suggest you propose to GOJ issuance of additional joint statement along following lines:

GOJ and USG in course of discussions mutual defense arrangements have reached conclusion that improved capabilities of Japanese Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan and need for most efficient use of all available resources to meet U.S. responsibilities worldwide make it in common interest of two countries that some of U.S. forces now stationed in Japan be relocated in Japan or transferred elsewhere. Headquarters Fifth Air Force releasing details of planned Air Force moves. However

Drafted by:

FE/EA/J:TWainsworth

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Marshall Green

FE - ~~Edward S. Ryan~~

Clearances:

G/PM: Col. Lindjord (draft)

FE/P: Mr. Lockhart (draft)

P/PG: Mr. Dillon (substance)

S/S-Mr. McKesson R

DOD:OASD/ISA:ADM Blouin (draft)

OASD/PA:Col. Heasty (draft)

White House - Mr. Forrestal

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no radical decrease in overall U.S. forces now planned. Both countries remain fully devoted to mutual defense relationship as set forth in 1960 Treaty.

Recent press reports to effect most of U.S. Forces personnel in Japan would be withdrawn are without foundation.

Reductions in headquarters and non-combatant U.S. personnel and in local employees, described by Secretary of Defense McNamara December 7, will apply in Japan as elsewhere but will not reduce capability of U.S. Forces to carry out responsibilities under mutual defense relationship.

COMMENT: Statement along these lines, ostensibly keyed to shooting down more alarmist press speculation, might serve to give reassuring tone to announcement. Detailed information on units being withdrawn, along lines proposed Embtel 1466, might then follow.

Believe plans to withdraw remaining two F-102 squadrons should not be publicly disclosed at this point, even though conveyed to GOJ.

GRP - 3.

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Info:

INFO: CINGPAC  
COMUSJAPAN

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Authority STATE 7-7-75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

019

Deptels 1374 and 1280; Embtels 1658, 1591 and 1495

We concur Embassy's approach outlined Embtel 1658. You may inform OHIRA following, as basis for consultation on problems involved in working out joint defense posture:

In addition readjustments of forces of which GOJ already informed (Deptel 733, Embtel 951), US now planning to withdraw remaining two F-102 squadrons from Japan by July 1, 1965. US present and prospective high defense budget necessitates most efficient use of all resources available to meet US responsibilities worldwide. Japan and US have previously agreed that it is in mutual interest of two nations for Japan to accelerate its assumption of Japan defense responsibility. US balance of payments problem necessitates effort for additional savings in foreign exchange expenditures in Japan.

We have taken into account the concern expressed by the Japanese, when informed of the F-102 withdrawal at Itazuke, that all-weather defense gap would result from this withdrawal. USG desires consult with GOJ in order to find solution to

Drafted by: DOD:ISA/FER: Mr. Lang

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Marshall Green

FE:EA/J:Twainworth:RWPetree:rwp

FE - Edward E. Rice

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Bacon

DOD:ISA/FER: Mr. Lang (draft)  
Col. Moorman (draft)  
G/PM: Mr. Meyers (draft)

S/S: - Mr. McKesson

White House: - Mr. Forrester  
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solution to this problem. GOJ will recall that we earlier spoke of significantly enhanced ability of US, as F-4C joins inventory and air lift capabilities increase, to introduce rapidly to troubled areas units for air defense as well as tactical fighter role. (In this regard, we are ~~maintaining~~ maintaining Itazuke on DOB status so it will be readily available to accomodate augmentation forces in time of need.) At same time, we spoke of desirability Japan expeditiously developing all-weather capability (Deptel 733). GOJ was aware that we believe Japan is in economic position to take over more of own defense responsibility. In this regard, we have following suggestion to offer.

To assist Japan assume full responsibility for air defense, US would be prepared to sell GOJ F-102 aircraft now scheduled for return to US for air defense missions here. Cost for one squadron of aircraft (on "as is" basis), ground equipment, and spares for two years would be approximately \$11.5 million. (These prices are based on estimates and may be subject to revision, although we do not believe drastically.) Two squadrons would cost approximately \$19.5 million, and three squadrons approximately \$27 million. Supply support assured, since F-102's will continue as part of USAF inventory, at least through USFY 1968 (end of present planning period). FYI. We are continuing to explore possibility of three year credit for aircraft under Section 507 of Foreign Assistance Act. Before F-102's would be transferred, we would need to remove several highly sensitive ECCM items, but this would not greatly reduce their all-weather capability. END FYI.

We estimate training of Japanese pilots and ground crews would be completed in about 15 months, converting F-86D crews to F-102's. Above suggested plan, of course,

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envisages early transition F-86D program to F-102's to extent required to activate proposed JASDF units.

If GOJ considers essential replace interceptor capability Itazuke after April 1, 1964, we would be willing consider providing alert detachment of six US-manned F-102's at Itazuke, to be rotated from augmented interceptor unit at Yokota, on condition GOJ reimburse foreign exchange cost to US (estimated \$1 million per year). US foreign exchange expenditure would be caused by need to augment parent unit by 13 aircraft and about 210 personnel in order to support alert detachment of six aircraft at Itazuke. This plan would extend only until parent unit withdrawn July 1, 1965, but it would provide coverage Western Defense Sector during period JASDF transition to F-102's.

FYI. GOJ may suggest air defense solution rests in giving F-104J's all-weather capability, as originally contemplated in F-104J program. Defense evaluation this possibility not completed, but it clear this solution could not be achieved within time limits facing us and would be very expensive. Preliminary estimates are that development costs would total \$35-40 million, and all-weather modification alone would greatly exceed the \$330,000 per aircraft estimated earlier for much larger numbers of F-104G's and F-104J's. END FYI.

You should assure GOJ we of course remain committed to strong US-Japan defense posture, as does GOJ. Actions leading to withdrawal remaining two F-102 squadrons will not be initiated until we receive benefit of GOJ views on best way to cope with problems of formulation US-Japan defense posture. Essential, however, we begin withdrawal of Itazuke units soonest.

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You may also assure Ohira that redeployment of F-102's is last withdrawal of US units from Japan presently planned. In this connection, seven foreign bases mentioned in McNamara statement of December 12 included only Itazuke as far as Japan is concerned. As Japanese previously told, Itazuke will be maintained in DOB status. FYI. In conveying assurances to Ohira, we would wish to avoid implication that US is precluded from later redeployments, should these be warranted by further studies and after full consultation with GOJ. END FYI.

Severance pay and noise abatement replies to GOJ queries (Embtel 1064) transmitted Deptels 1429 and 1482. We hope to be able to provide GOJ full information USFJ projected MLC employment reductions soon, but cannot provide accurate figures at this time because worldwide reduction in foreign national hire have not been distributed to individual commands. Maximum and Minimum levels within which presently estimated cuts in Japan will be made are as follows:

Army	(10 percent)	Max. 1700	Min. 962
Navy	(20 percent)	Max. 3048	Min. 1800
Air Force	(20 percent)	Max. 4000	Min. 3000 (of which 2265 are intrinsic to unit <del>redeploy</del> redeployments.)

GOJ should also be informed that worldwide cuts US personnel in US military headquarters will result approximately 350-man cut USFJ and subordinate headquarters.

Need for quick mutual agreement on these and other aspects redeployment program becoming obvious (Embtel 1718). Based on above information, we seek urgent consideration of problem and GOJ views soonest.

GP-3.

END.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Dec. 14/63

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

Two Outgoing Tels to Tokyo

*BHX*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

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Ambassador TOKYO PRIORITY

INFO: CINCPAC  
COMUSJAPAN

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Authority STATE 7-7-75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

## JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

Deptels 1374 and 1280; Embtels 1658, 1591 and 1495

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DOD:ISA/PER: Mr. Lang  
FE:EA/J:Twainsworth;RWPetree:rwgDOD:ISA/PER: Mr. Lang (draft)  
Col. Moorman (draft)  
G/PM: Mr. Meyers (draft)Marshall Green  
FE - ~~Edward F. Rice~~  
EA - Mr. Bacon  
S/S: - Miss Moor  
White House: - Mr.  
Klein

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Ambassy TOKYO

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solution to this problem. GOJ will recall that we earlier spoke of significantly enhanced ability of US, as F-4C joins inventory and air lift capabilities increase, to introduce rapidly to troubled areas units for air defense as well as tactical fighter role. (In this regard, we are ~~maintaining~~ maintaining Itazuke on DOB status so it will be readily available to accomodate augmentation forces in time of need.) At same time, we spoke of desirability Japan expeditiously developing all-weather capability (Deptel 733). GOJ was aware that we believe Japan is in economic position to take over more of own defense responsibility. In this regard, we have following suggestion to offer.

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Ambassy TOKYO

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Embassy TOKYO

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You may also assure Ohira that redeployment of F-102's is last withdrawal of US units from Japan presently planned. In this connection, seven foreign bases mentioned in McNamara statement of December 12 included only Itazuke as far as Japan is concerned. As Japanese previously told, Itazuke will be maintained in DOB status. FYI. In conveying assurances to Ohira, we would wish to avoid implication that US is precluded from later redeployments, should these be warranted by further studies and after full consultation with GOJ. END FYI.

Severance pay and noise abatement replies to GOJ queries (Embtel 1064) transmitted Deptels 1429 and 1482. We hope to be able to provide GOJ full information USFJ projected MLC employment reductions soon, but cannot provide accurate figures at this time because worldwide reduction in foreign national hire have not been distributed to individual commands. Maximum and Minimum levels within which presently estimated cuts in Japan will be made are as follows:

Army	(10 percent)	Max. 1700	Min. 962
Navy	(20 percent)	Max. 3048	Min. 1800
Air Force	(20 percent)	Max. 4000	Min. 3000 (of which 2265 are intrinsic to unit <del>deployment</del> redeployments.)

GOJ should also be informed that worldwide cuts US personnel in US military headquarters will result approximately 350-man cut USFJ and subordinate headquarters.

Need for quick mutual agreement on these and other aspects redeployment program becoming obvious (Embtel 1718). Based on above information, we seek urgent consideration of problem and GOJ views soonest.

GP-3.

END.



~~SECRET~~

Ambassador TOKYO

PRIORITY

Info: CINCPAC  
COMUSJAPANDECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE 7-7-75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Embtels 1718, 1752, and 1763

Press release proposed Embtel 1466 approved as Fifth AF release with following change: In place of sentence beginning "The aircraft of the remaining F-102 fighter interceptor squadron . . ." substitute following sentence: "The F-102 interceptor squadron at Itazuke Air Base will be reassigned to the United States."

In view considerations set forth Embtels 1718 and 1763, suggest you propose to GOJ issuance of additional joint statement along following lines:

GOJ and USG in course of discussions mutual defense arrangements have reached conclusion that improved capabilities of Japanese Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan and need for most efficient use of all available resources to meet U.S. responsibilities worldwide make it in common interest of two countries that some of U.S. forces now stationed in Japan be relocated in Japan or transferred elsewhere. Headquarters Fifth Air Force releasing details of planned Air Force moves. However

FE/EA/J:TWainsworth

Marshall Green  
FE - ~~Edward E. Rine~~G/PM: Col. Lindjord (draft)  
FE/P: Mr. Lockhart (draft)  
P/PO: Mr. Dillon (substance)DOD:OASD/ISA:ADM<sup>R</sup> Blouin (draft)  
OASD/PA:Col. Heasty (draft)~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

2

Tokyo

~~SECRET~~

no radical decrease in overall U.S. forces now planned. Both countries remain fully devoted to mutual defense relationship as set forth in 1950 Treaty.

Recent ~~xxx~~ press reports to effect most of U.S. Forces personnel ~~xxxx~~ in Japan would be withdrawn are without foundation.

Reductions in headquarters and non-combatant U.S. personnel and in local employees, described by Secretary of Defense McNamara December 7, will apply in Japan as elsewhere but will not reduce capability of U.S. Forces to carry out responsibilities under ~~xxxxxx~~ mutual defense relationship.

COMMENT: Statement along these lines, ostensibly keyed to shooting down more alarmist press speculation, might serve to give reassuring tone to announcement. Detailed information on units being withdrawn, along lines proposed Zabtcl 1466, might then follow.

Believe plans to withdraw remaining two F-102 squadrons should not be publicly disclosed at this point, even though conveyed to GQJ.

GRP - 3.

END

ACTING



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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44 Action

Control: 13064  
Rec'd: DECEMBER 19, 1963  
2:07 AM

FE  
Info

FROM: TOKYO

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1835

G

DATE: DECEMBER 19, 2 PM

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CU

USIA

INR

RMR

JOINT EMBASSY-USIS

REFERENCE: DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 1475; TOUSI 200

VERBATIM TEXT

TRANSMITTED IS SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE REQUESTED  
REFTEL.

BEGIN TEXT

THE BELLS IN AMERICA AND JAPAN HAVE RUNG OUT THE OLD YEAR,  
AND WE NOW LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEW. IT IS A MOMENT TO TAKE  
MEASURE OF THE ROAD AHEAD.

I AM TOLD THAT IN JAPAN THIS IS THE YEAR OF THE DRAGON --  
A YEAR THAT AUGURS SUCCESS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN THE  
ENDEAVORS OF MAN. WE IN THE UNITED STATES SHALL DO EVERY-  
THING IN OUR POWER TO MAKE THIS ANCIENT AUGURY COME TRUE.  
WE SHALL BE UNCEASING IN OUR QUEST FOR PEACE, SEARCHING  
FOR NEW AREAS OF AGREEMENT TO RELAX WORLD TENSIONS. WE  
SHALL PRESS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS. WE SHALL  
CONTINUE THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND PESTILENCE, IGNORANCE  
AND MISERY. MORE OF OUR YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN SHALL BE GOING  
TO ASSIST THE PEOPLES OF THE LESS DEVELOPED LANDS, AND WE  
SHALL CONTINUE EXTENDING AID SO THAT THESE PEOPLE ALSO MAY  
BUILD STRONG AND INDEPENDENT NATIONS. THE UNITED STATES WILL  
DEMONSTRATE ANEW THAT IT IS A TRUE FRIEND OF THOSE WHO SEEK  
PEACE AND JUSTICE.

I HOPE

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2- 1835, DECEMBER 19, 2 PM FROM TOKYO

I HOPE THAT THIS NEW YEAR WILL SEE US MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING OUR PARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN. WHILE OUR TWO COUNTRIES EACH HAS ITS OWN, INDEPENDENT APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD, I AM SURE THAT WE SHARE A COMMON VISION OF A PEACEFUL COMMUNITY OF INDEPENDENT NATIONS, EACH FREE TO DECIDE ITS OWN FUTURE AND ITS OWN SYSTEM, SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT THREATEN THE FREEDOM OF OTHERS. I FEEL CERTAIN THAT THE YEAR AHEAD WILL FIND US CONTINUING TO WORK TOGETHER IN CLOSE HARMONY TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS COMMON IDEAL. OUR SCIENTISTS HAVE STARTED ON JOINT RESEARCH WHICH SHOULD LEAD TO FRUITFUL DISCOVERY. OUR INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL COMMUNITIES HAVE MET AND ARE OPENING PATHS LEADING TO A BROADER AND RICHER EXCHANGE OF OUR RESPECTIVE THOUGHT AND CULTURE. THE ECONOMIC EXCHANGE THROUGH OUR CABINET OFFICERS -- AN EXCHANGE WHICH HAS BEEN MOST BENEFICIAL IN THE PAST--WILL BE TAKEN UP ANEW IN THE LATTER PART OF JANUARY, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN INCREASING TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND IN DEVELOPING THE INSTRUMENTS OF FRUITFUL ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

THE NEW YEAR, NO DOUBT, WILL BRING NEW CHALLENGES. BUT THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF OUR PARTNERSHIP AND OUR COMMON IDEALS WILL, I AM SURE, PROVE A MATCH FOR ANY CHALLENGE.

MAY I WISH THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.

END TEXT.

IF PRESIDENT CONSENTS TO DELIVER MESSAGE, REQUEST (1) AUDIO AS WELL AS VIDEO TAPE AND (2) CABLED VERSION OF APPROVED TEXT FOR PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

REISCHAUER

HC

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# INC. MING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1963 DEC 26 PM 12 32

SS

FM AMEMBASSY (TAIPEI)

DECLASSIFIED

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

Authority

STATE 7-7-73

SP

INFO RUALO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO

By IP

NARS, Date 7-22-78

L

RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG

H

RUHPA/CINCPAC CAMP H W SMITH HAW

SAL

STATE GRNC

AIDA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 524 INFO

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IMMEDIATE TOKYO 118 HKONG 176 CINCPAC 188 DEC 26 10:30 PM

IOP

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

INR

SCA

FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED TO SEE ME AT 530 PM TODAY TO GIVE ME LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN CHOU HUNG CHING CASE. SAID USHIRAKU HAD EXPLAINED JAPANESE POSITION AND CONFIRMED THAT AFTER THREE DAYS ISOLATION CHOU WOULD BE INTERVIEWED FRIDAY DECEMBER 27 BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FONMIN AND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE TO DETERMINE WISHES. USHIRAKU EXPRESSED HOPE GRC WOULD UNDERSTAND DIFFICULTIES OF JAPANESE POSITION. CFN 524 118 176 188

ORM

RMR

PAGE TWO RUASTP 01 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SHEN SAID HE TOLD USHIRAKU THAT GRC COULD NOT ACCEPT UNILATERAL JAPANESE DECISION TO HANDLE CASE IN MANNER PROPOSED. IF JAPANESE DID SO AND CHOU WAS RETURNED TO COMMUNIST CHINA THIS COULD ONLY FURTHER WORSEN ALREADY BAD RELATIONS BETWEEN GRC AND JAPAN.

SHEN PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT GRC AND GOJ EACH SELECT ONE OF ITS NATIONALS WHICH TWO WOULD AGREEE ON NATIONAL OF THIRD NATION TO FORM IMPARTIAL THREE-MAN COMMISSION IF FIRST INVESTIGATE ANDREPORT ON FACTS OF CHOU CASE AND SECOND , TO INTERVIEW HIM AND HIS WISHES. GRC COULD ACCEPT AND EXPLAIN TO ITS PEOPLE CONCLUSION REACHED BY SUCH COMMISSION EVEN IF CHOU RETURNED TO MAINLAND. (SHEN SAID THIS PREPOSAL APPROVED BY PRESIDENT) USHIRAKU AGREED CABLE PROPOSAL TO GOJ AND DISCUSS ON HIS RETURN TOKYO EVENING DEC 26.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 524, December 26, 10 p.m., from Taipei

SHEN COMMENTED USHIRAKU HAD NO AUTHORITY NEGOTIATE. WAS SENT ONLY TO EXPLAIN JAPANESE POSITION. SHEN SAID INTERESTING SLIP OF TONGUE OCCURRED IN USHIRAKU'S COMMENT ON HIS PROPOSAL. USHIRAKU SAID IT HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO GET CHOU TO AGREE TO POSTPONMENT HIS STAY IN JAPAN BEYOND DEC 20. HE WENT ON TO SAY COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WOULD TAKE TIME AND IT WOULD

PAGE THREE RUASTP 01 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BE HARD TO GET PEKING TO AGREE TO INSTRUCT CHOU TO ACCEPT FARTHER EXTENSION HIS STAY IN JAPAN. SHEN SAID WHEN HE QUERIED USHIRAKU ON HIS REFERENCE TO GETTING PEKING'S AGREEMENT, LATTER REPLIED SOCIALIST PARTY HAD OFFERED SERVE AS CHANNEL BETWEEN GOJ AND PEKING.

SHEN SAID GRC UNDERSTOOD FROM ITS SOURCES IN JAPAN THAT GOJ ALREADY KNEW CHOU'S CHOICE WOULD BE TO RETURN TO MAINLAND AND INTERVIEW BY OFFICIALS WAS MERELY FORM. HE UNDERSTOOD POLISH SHIP STANDING BY TO TAKE CHOU PROBABLY ON DEC 28. ALSO SAID PEKING HAD SPENT MONEY FREELY ON CASE. GRC HAD INTERCEPTED PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF SPECIAL CHICOM MISSION SENT TO WORK ON CHOU CASE AND HIS SUPERIOR IN PEKING WHO INSTRUCTED MISSION STAY IN JAPAN AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO BRING CASE TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. RIGHT WING LDP LEADERS INCLUDING YOSHIDA, KISHI, OHUO, AND FUNADA, WERE MUCH OPPOSED TO GOJ HANDLING OF CASE AND HAD BEEN, WORKING HARD FOR SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO GRC.

I TOLD SHEN US GOVT WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT CHOU CASE NOT LEAD TO WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN GRC AND JAPAN. I WAS AFRAID

PAGE FOUR RUASTP 01 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SHEN'S PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO GOJ AS IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANY GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT INVESTIGATION OF ITS ACTIONS BY OUTSIDE COMMISSION. I ASKED (WHETHER) GRC REACTION TO ELEMINATION OF INVESTIGATIVE FEATURE OF ITS PROPOSAL AND LIMITING FUNCTION OF COMMISSION TO ASCERTAINING CHOU'S WISHES. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THIS WOULD GIVE GRC ADEQUATE BASIS TO EXPLAIN TO ITS PEOPLE IT HAD DONE ALL POSSIBLE TO SEE CHOU'S FREE WISHES WERE IMPARTIALLY DETERMINED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 524, December 26, 10 p.m., from Taipei

I THEN ASKED HOW GRC WOULD REACT IF ONE OR TWO IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS SATISFACTORY TO GRC WERE TO ACCOMPANY TWO JAPANESE OFFICIALS DURING CHOU INTERVIEW AND REVERT BACK HIS EXACT DECISION. I SAID THIS MIGHT ENABLE GRC TO SAY TO ITS PEOPLE DECISION WAS MADE AFTER THREE DAYS ISOLATION AND IN PRESENCE IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS AND ALTHOUGH UNSATISFACTORY WAS FINAL.

SHEN SAID FURTHER DELAY WAS NECESSARY TO NEUTRALIZE TWO MONTHS OF BRAINWASHING BUT I SAID THAT WHETHER WE LIKED IT OR NOT CHOU'S DECISION WAS PROBABLY ALREADY MADE AND ANY CHANGE WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY.

SHEN SAID HE APPRECIATED MY FRIENDLY CONCERN AND RECOGNIZED PROBLEMS OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTION IN HIS PROPOSAL. HE ADDED

PAGE FIVE RUASTP 01 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OF COURSE, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT GRC VIEW WOULD BE UNTIL HE COULD DISCUSS MATTERS FURTHER WITH PRESIDENT. I POINTED OUT TIME ELEMENT IN SITUATION AND SAID I WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT CHIANG AT ANY TIME OR SHEN COULD PASS ON MY VIEWS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF A BREAK.

I EMPHASIZED HOW SERIOUSLY US GOVT WOULD VIEW ANY RUPTURE OF DIPLOMACY OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GRC AND JAPAN AND HOW SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS OF SUCH ACTION WOULD BE TO GRC. I HOPED THAT IF GRC WERE INCLINED TAKE ANY SUCH DRASTIC ACTION, I WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT AND GIVE PRIOR NOTICE TO MY GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT: SHEN WAS NOT NEARLY SO VEHEMENT AND EMOTIONAL AS IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSION THIS CASE WITH ME. HE GAVE IMPRESSION GRC AT THIS POINT GENUINELY LOOKING FOR WAY TO DISENGAGE FROM CASE IF PROVIDED BY GOJ WITH PROCEDURE WHICH WILL SATISFY GRC NEED TO EXPLAIN ITS ACTIONS SATISFACTORILY TO OWN PEOPLE. CURRENT GOJ PLAN WHICH ENTIRELY UNILATERAL GIVES GRC NO OUT IS CERTAIN TO BRING STRONG REACTION. ON BASIS TODAY'S CONVERSATION JUDGE THIS WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT WOULD CERTAINLY SEVERLY STRAIN THEM WITH UNCERTAIN ULTIMATE RESULTS. WITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 524, December 26, 10 p.m., from Taipei

REFERENCE DEPTTEL 521, GRC HAS NOW MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL TO GOJ . IN PRESENT FORM IT IS PROBABLY NOT "REASONABLE PROPOSAL" AS CONTEMPLATED LAST SENTENCE SECOND PARAGRAPH REFTTEL. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE MY SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT A GOJ COUNTER PROPOSAL MIGHT OPEN WAY TO COMPROMISE.

I RECOMMEND EMBASSY TOKYO URGENTLY ASCERTAIN GOJ REACTION TO GRC PROPOSAL. IF AS I EXPECT GOJ CANNOT ACCEPT IF, I RECOMMEND EMBASSY, TOKYO SUGGEST TO GOJ THAT IT PROPOSE TO GRC NAMING ON OR TWO OBSERVERS SATISFACTORY TO GRC (PREFERABLY NON-JAPANESE) TO ACCOMPANY JAPANESE OFFICIALS AT INTERVIEW DEC27. I THINK IT IMPORTANT FOR GOJ TO OFFER GRC SOME OPPORTUNITY TAKE PART IN ASCERTAINING CHOU'S WISHES. THEN EVEN IF GRC STILL SAW MANY UNSATISFACTORY ASPECTS TO GOJ HANDLING OF CHOU CASE IT WOULD BE PROVIDED WITH THE BASIS FOR MODERATING ITS REACTION WHICH I THINK IT IS NOW SEEKING.

GP-3 WRIGHT  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12/26/63, 12:53 PM  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12/26/63, 1:15 PM

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

13616

*Japan*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58

Origin

FE

Info

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1628  
Amembassy TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 534  
INFO: ~~AMEMBASSY~~ CINGPAC FOR POLAD 614  
Amconsul HONG KONG

Dec 28 2 57 PM '63

Tokyo 1913 RPTD TAIPEI 124, Hong Kong 153, CINGPAC 337  
Taipei 529 RPTD Tokyo ~~121~~ 121  
Taippi 530 RPTD Tokyo 122  
Taipei 532 RPTD Tokyo 123

Situation Tapei seems offer some encouragement although outcome obviously still uncertain. Assume present instructions are adequate and that Embassies will continue take appropriate initiatives. If additional instructions needed send recommendations to Department soonest.

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

STATE 7.7.75

By

IP

NARS, Date

7.22.75

HARRIMAN

Drafted by:

EA:ROC AYoder

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA- Leonard L. Bacon

Clearances:

FE- Mr. Green

*mg*

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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14007

Japan

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy TOKYO

IMMEDIATE 1634

DEC 30 6 31 PM '63

FE

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC  
COMUSJAPAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

STATE 7.7.75

By

IP

, NARS, Date

7.22.75

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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Embtel 1634.1932

H

Changes in press release as proposed Reftel approved.

AID

P

Request withhold release until as near five p.m. (local time Japan)

USIA

December 31

NSC

/ as possible, to permit advance information to Congressional leaders.

INR

Latter have not been previously informed, to prevent any possibility

CIA

of leak.

NSA

OSD

ARMY

GP-3.

NAVY

AIR

END.

RMR

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE/EA/J:TWainsworth

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - Leonard L. Bacon

Clearances:

DOD/ISA: Captain Neill (draft)

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Japan

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Action

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUHPA/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1932 CINCPAC 346 COMUSJAPAN  
142 DEC 30 MIDNIGHT

CINCPAC FOR POLAD  
REF: DEPTTEL 1628

GOJ HAS AGREED TO ISSUANCE DRAFT PRESS RELEASE BY FIFTH AIR FORCE (AS APPROVED BY DEPT) WITH FOLLOWING CHANGES: 1) DELETE SENTENCE READCWG QUOTE F-102 INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON AT ITAZUKE AIR BASE WILL BE REASSIGNED TO THE UNITED STATES UNQUOTE: 2) ADD THE WORD QUOTE EFFECTIVE UNQUOTE BEFORE THE PHRASE QUOTE GROUND NOISE SUPPRESSORS UNQUOTE IN PRECEEDING SENTENCE. IF QUESTIONED BY PRESS ON F-102'S GOJ (AS WELL AS EMBASSY AND USFJ) WILL REPLY THAT QUESTION IS NOW SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS. ON NOISE SUPPRESSORS GOJ WOULD EXPLAIN TO PRESS THAT THEY WOULD NOT ONLY BE EFFECTIVE QUALITATIVELY BUT WOULD BE IN SUFFICIENT NUMBER TO SUPPRESS NOISE EFFECTIVELY. IF ASKED WHEN SUPPRESSORS TO BE INSTALLED GOJ WOULD REPLY TO PRESS THAT TARGET DATE IS PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TRANSFER OF EIGHTH TFW TO YOKOTA. (COMMENT: USE OF PHRASE "TARGET DATE" BASED ON GOJ'S RECOGNITION THERE MAY IN FACT BE SLIPPAGE.) ON SEVERANCE PAY GOJ WOULD SAY TO PRESS THAT THIS QUESTION IS UNDER DISCUSSION; THEY WOULD SAY THAT QUESTION OF RETROACTIVE PAY HIKE HAS BEEN SETTLED. (COMMENT: LATTER HAS BEEN SETTLED BETWEEN USFJ AND GOJ.)

GOJ APPROVES JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITHOUT CHANGE EXCEPT THAT LAST SENTENCE OF FIRST PARAGRAPH BECOMES FINAL SENTENCE OF COMMUNIQUE.

EMBASSY AND USFJ CONCUR IN ACCEPTING THESE PROPOSALS SINCE THEY APPEAR TO FALL WITHIN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ALLOWED US BY WASHINGTON. WE HAVE INFORMED FONOFF OUR AGREEMENT TO ISSUANCE PRESS RELEASE AND JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT 1130 HOURS JAPAN TIME DECEMBER 31.

REISCHAUER

BT

CFN F-102'S GOJ USFJ GOJ GOJ EIGHTH TFW YOKOTA GOJ'S GOJ USFJ GOJ GOJ USFJ 1130 31

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 1:15 P.M., 12/30/63

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 1:22 P.M., 12/30/63.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority STATE 7.7-7.5  
By IP, NARS, Date 7.22.75

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1963 DEC 30 PM 1 07 <sup>093</sup><sub>98</sub>

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Japan

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P ~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 1935 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 347

USIA COMUSJAPAN 143 DEC 31, 12 NOON

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CIA

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REFTEL RECEIVED TOO LATE TO POSTPONE DISTRIBUTION TWO RELEASES AND HOLDING PRESS CONFERENCES, BUT EMBARGO PLACED ON PUBLICATION OF NEWS UNTIL 5:00 PM. EMBARGO UNDOUBTEDLY WILL NOT RPT NOT PREVENT LEAKS BUT MAY DELAY REPORTING OF NEWS IN U.S.

GP-3. REISCHAUER.

NOTE: Passed White House 12/31/63, 12:26 a.m.

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 12:19 a.m., December 31, 1963

Note: Relayed OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR 12/31/63

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Authority STATE 7.7.75  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Japan* 10

36

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control: 19621  
Rec'd: DECEMBER 31, 1963  
3:35 A.M.

FE

Info

FROM: TOKYO

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 1937

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DATE: DECEMBER 31

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SUBJECT: JFY 1964 BUDGET ANNOUNCED

GOJ CABINET APPROVED 1964 DRAFT BUDGET: GENERAL ACCOUNT BUDGET YEN 3,255 BILLION (\$9.0 BILLION), AN INCREASE YEN 405 BILLION, OR 14.2 PERCENT, FROM ORIGINAL 1963 BUDGET; LOAN AND INVESTMENT PROGRAM YEN 1,340 BILLION (\$3.7 BILLION), 21 PERCENT INCREASE FROM 1963.

GENERAL ACCOUNT BUDGET INCREASE SMALLER THAN IN RECENT YEARS (24 PERCENT IN 1962 AND 17 PERCENT IN 1963). HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE EVEN THIS INCREASE, MOF FORCED ESTIMATE 26 PERCENT INCREASE TAX RECEIPTS. (MOF ESTIMATE INCREASE TAX RECEIPTS 1962 WAS 22.6 PERCENT AND 1963, 12.9 PERCENT.) MAIN REASON FOR RELATIVELY MODEST EXPANSION GENERAL ACCOUNT IS SUBSTANTIAL DECLINE IN SURPLUS TRANSFERRED FROM PRIOR YEAR (YEN 76 BILLION IN 1964 VERSUS YEN 263 BILLION IN 1963). LARGEST EXPENDITURE INCREASES ARE IN SOCIAL SECURITY (19.2 PERCENT), PUBLIC WORKS (21.3 PERCENT), HOUSING (21.6 PERCENT), AID TO SHIPPING INDUSTRY (383.8 PERCENT), AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES (92 PERCENT); DEFENSE INCREASED 14.1 PERCENT TO YEN 275.2 BILLION.

YEN 600 BILLION INCREASE TAX RECEIPTS ESTIMATED DESPITE PROPOSED INCREASED DEDUCTIONS FOR WAGE AND SALARY EARNERS AND SOME CHANGES IN CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURE FAVORING JAPANESE BUSINESS. TAX AMENDMENTS ESTIMATED DECREASE 1964 RECEIPTS BY YEN 100 BILLION.

/INCREASED LOAN

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-2- 1937, DECEMBER 31, FROM TOKYO

INCREASED LOAN AND INVESTMENT PROGRAM DUE TWO FACTORS: 1) STRONG MINISTERIAL DEMANDS FOR EXPANDED PROGRAMS, WHICH HAD BEEN PARTIALLY DENIED IN GENERAL ACCOUNT BUDGET IN ORDER MAINTAIN SUPERFICIAL BALANCE, HAVE BEEN PLACATED BY ENLARGED LOAN AND INVESTMENT PROGRAM; 2) SEVERAL ITEMS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INCLUDED IN GENERAL ACCOUNT HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO SPECIAL ACCOUNTS AND THEREFORE TO LOAN AND INVESTMENT PROGRAM, E.G., NATIONAL HOSPITAL SPECIAL ACCOUNT.

FIRST REACTIONS FROM BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY FAVORABLE, ALTHOUGH SOME FACTIONS HAVE POINTED INCONSISTENCY LOAN AND INVESTMENT PROGRAM WITH TIGHT MONEY POLICY, SOME COMPLAINT THAT CUT IN CORPORATION TAXES TOO SMALL TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BOLSTERING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE POWER OF INDUSTRY.

IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED, PROPOSED FISCAL 1964 BUDGET SHOULD HAVE AN EXPANSIONIST EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY. DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES AS USUAL HAVE TAKEN PRECEDENCE AND FISCAL POLICY MAY AT LEAST PARTIALLY FRUSTRATE TIGHT MONETARY POLICY WHICH IS PRESENTLY BEING FORMULATED.

AIRGRAM FOLLOWS.

REISCHAUER

DLW

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## TELEGRAM Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE COPY

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO 1759

Jan 13 7 17 PM '64

REF: Embtel 1894, Deptel 1604

DECLASSIFIED

Appreciate Embassy's prompt efforts refdeptel. Authority STATE 7-7-75  
 Department understands difficulties for GOJ in instituting By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

additional restraints on sugar imports in light of developments subsequent to GOJ ~~pledge~~ pledge of cooperation of August 7, 1962, including GOJ's liberalization of sugar imports, upsurge of world sugar prices last spring, exacerbation of consumer price issue in Japan and possible effect present RC - GOJ tension on Taiwan sugar sales to Japan. On other hand Cuban situation continues to call for action on part of Free World to isolate Castro regime and in accordance our basic policy we plan consult with allies concerning appropriate steps to counter renewed Cuban efforts to and trade with Free World.

In full knowledge of foregoing, Department's objective when sending refdeptel was to express its continuing interest in problem and to discourage long-term commitment which might bind GOJ even after/ end of current world market sugar shortage. Department had no intention to request formal written assurances from ~~GOJ~~ GOJ at this time.

Department accordingly recommends that in responding to Nakayama's request Embassy tender informal memorandum containing expression of our:

A. continuing

FD:MSzabo-Pelsoczi  
 lson:sjm 1/10/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
 classification approved by:

FE - Robert W. Barnett

ARA/CCA - Mr. Follestad

ARA/REA - Mrs. Mulliken (draft) EA - Miss Vettel

- Mr. Nehmer

USDA - Mr. Murphy (subs)

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- A. continuing serious concern about Free World - Cuban trade.
- B. appreciation for past and present GOJ efforts minimize imports of Cuban sugar.
- C. strong hope that GOJ will continue efforts/<sup>discourage</sup> commitment for Cuban deliveries beyond mid-1965.
- D. desire for continuing exchange information on subject.

Following may be cited in support our belief sugar shortage may end by mid-1965. USDA in November 1963 (Foreign Agriculture Circular of November 1963 (FS 5-63) estimated world sugar production will rise from 55.0 million short tons in 1962-63 to 58.7 million in 1963-64 as result of 3.9 million ton increase in Free World output; also, "Further increases in production in 1964-65 appear certain as number of key countries already initiated programs produce more sugar". European sugar economist LIGHT rpt LIGHT whose prognostications highly regarded published Dec 19 even higher estimate of 59.8 million short tons for 1963-64 production, revising upward by 917,000 tons early Dec estimate. Licht estimated consumption at 61.5 million short tons with result 1963-64 shortage 1.65 ~~xxx~~ million tons compared with 4.4 million previous crop year. Free World consumption expands by about one million tons yearly and Bloc consumption probably will continue on plateau next few years. Since Free World production responding to high 1963 prices with about 24 months lag, it is reasonable to expect that under normal weather conditions world production and consumption will achieve balance by mid-1965.

Report reaction.  
GP-3

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End.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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1964 JAN 19 AM 12 00

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2081 JAN 16, 6PM

REF: DEPTTEL 1759.

EMBASSY BELIEVES WE HAVE CLEARLY PUT ACROSS OUR VIEWS (EMBT  
1894) INCLUDING POINTS A, B, AND C OF REFTTEL AND THAT NAKAYAMA'S  
REMARKS (EMBT 2065) ARE RESPONSIVE. EMBASSY WILL CONVEY TO  
FONOFF INFO CONTAINED LAST PARA REFTTEL. REISCHAUER.

BT  
CFN 2081 16 6PM 1759 1894 A B C 2065

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Authority STATE 7.7.75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7.22.75

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

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*Japan*

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

1877

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INFO: CINCPAC  
COMUSJAPAN  
COMNAVFORJAPAN  
COMSEVENTHFLT

JAN 20 8 22 PM '64

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Authority STATE 7-7-75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

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Careful consideration within USG of SSN visit question, including GOJ proposal for exchange of memoranda, has led to conclusion following is most appropriate procedure. Level and timing of approach along these lines are entrusted to Embassy's discretion. Believe however that there would be advantages to Ambassador presenting main features directly to Foreign Minister Ohira. We are concerned that presentation to lower levels in Foreign Office may ~~lead~~ lead to further worrying of non-essential points. We will of course fully respect GOJ views on timing of decision and of initial visit, but we believe decision must be made on basis proposed herein.

1. Embassy will provide GOJ memorandum saying that USG has adopted statement on operation of US ~~non-nuclear~~ nuclear-powered warships in foreign ports and quoting statement which follows by VERBATIM TEXT message.

2. GOJ would then reply along lines proposed in connection with its draft memorandum of August 7 (Embtel 436). GOJ acknowledgment should refer to US memorandum as "setting forth statement which would govern operation of US

AEC: Mr. O'Donnell (para 7)

Drafted by: L - Mr. Trippe  
FE:EA/J:TWainworth:cam

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - Robert W. Barnett  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances: G/PM - Mr. Orwick  
L - Mr. Trippe (draft)

Defense: Col. Moorman (draft)

Navy - Lt. Com. Long (draft) DOD:ISA:FMRA: Mr. Bronez (draft)  
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell (informed - in draft)

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US nuclear-powered ~~x~~ warships <sup>in</sup>/Japanese ports."

3. Statement identified in para 1 is one which USG intends use as standard practice in connection with all foreign port visits by SSNs. We accordingly do not regard furnishing it as derogation of our rights under existing treaties and agreements. Standardization of procedure appears to justify exchange of documents with GOJ in spite of disadvantages of form pointed out in Embtel 2957. We recognize that process of long exchange of questions and answers, and position in which it placed GOJ during Diet hearings last spring, may have posed special domestic political problems for GOJ. We hope that GOJ would be willing to accept this as the only statement from the US Government and not further press their interest in our summarizing in aide memoire form the questions and answers previously exchanged. If in judgment Embassy GOJ will require more, you authorized to provide Aide Memoire, text of which being transmitted by second VERBATIM TEXT message. We believe GOJ will recognize qualitative difference in content of Statement and Aide Memoire.

~~If necessary to present~~

4. ~~Representing Statement, and if necessary~~ Aide Memoire, Embassy should orally inform GOJ that furnishing document, however informal, in addition to Statement constitutes special treatment for Japan. We have decided take this step in view of history our discussions this subject to date and in recognition of special sensitivity of this question in Japan. We have carefully considered GOJ draft memorandum proposal, as well as earlier questions, and believe that arrangement we now propose and text of Aide Memoire as transmitted are best we can do to offer assurances on substance of Japanese concerns, on one hand, and to preserve our national security interests (including our ability fulfill our security commitments

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commitments to Japan) on other hand. Changes from earlier drafts of Aide Memoire reflect our effort to make this a document which presents substance of our earlier answers ~~in~~ coherently and precisely.

5. We have following comments on portions of Japanese draft memorandum which not covered in substance in Statement or in Aide Memoire text as revised. You may at discretion draw on this material in oral discussion if GOJ questions changes from Japanese draft in order foreclose further discussions of details.

(a) SSN incidents: We have no objection to GOJ making such use as it desires of official statement previously released by US on Theodore Roosevelt and Thresher accidents. We do not desire include these statements in Aide Memoire. We could add nothing useful to them and they would further disfigure already ~~more~~ unwieldy document. We believe they would give ~~more~~ unhelpful negative tone to this summary of earlier replies. Official US & public statements previously furnished may of course be used and identified as such by GOJ to extent they wish.

(b) Selection of moorings and entry routes. US Statement (paragraph 1 ~~xx~~ above) ~~XXXXXX~~ assures that same safety criteria will be applied in foreign ports as in US ports. In addition Aide Memoire provides US will accept information (concerning areas outside US bases) which GOJ may desire furnish as ~~relevant~~ pertinent to port safety. Selection of moorings must take into account wide variety of factors in addition to such information. With regard to entry and departure routes, as with question of moorings, any special arrangements with Japan will be taken as precedent by other countries SSNs may visit. We do not anticipate any practical differences between Japanese and ourselves on question of entry routes.

However,

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However, we do not feel we can establish precedent of host government's designating navigation routes, which in case certain countries might not be acceptable to us.

(c) Channels for notification in event of evacuation: As noted in Deptel 1032 and Embtel 1276, we do not desire to appear be ~~precluded~~ precluding GOJ from making own decision on this point, which is clearly matter within its responsibility.

(d) Related Matters: As Aide Memoire states, nuclear-powered submarines, with exception of difference in propulsion ~~x~~ systems, are no different from other units of US Navy presently calling at Japanese ports. We have ~~we~~ abided and will continue abide by provisions of security ~~xxxxx~~ arrangements concerning prior consultation. Nevertheless it remains US policy neither to confirm nor to deny presence of nuclear weapons aboard any US warship. This is designed for discomfiture of our enemies, not our allies, and in view of our mutual security arrangements we believe this policy is in best interest Japan as well as ourselves.

6. There is some possibility that GOJ may have been misled by an earlier US Statement that under Public Vessels Act Executive Branch has authority to settle or compromise claims without dollar limitation (46 USC 786). Embassy should make clear that in making this statement USG has not meant to imply that it would not invoke the section of the Public Vessels Act (46 USC 789) making available to it any limitations on liability which may be available to a private shipowner. On the other hand Embassy should be aware that question of application of ship owners' limitation on liability to a ~~xxx~~ nuclear accident has not been tested in the United States Courts. Finally Embassy should point out that it is because of the uncertainties and delays which would probably be involved in settling

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settling claims arising out of a maritime nuclear accident under ~~an~~ existing legislation that the USG has included a reference to the availability of diplomatic channels for taking up such claims in its unilateral statement and the aide memoire. If GOJ desires, we would be willing to omit references to US statutes from Aide Memoire.

We see no need to set forth text of small maritime claims provisions of Exchange of Notes of August 22, 1960 and Joint Committee agreement of September 5, 1961, although we will confirm that these apply to SSN's.

7. FYI. Statement and Aide Memoire texts have been reviewed personally by Atomic Energy Commissioners, Vice Admiral Rickover, Statutory Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards with view to presenting statement which is comprehensive, will be of assistance to ~~the~~ GOJ, and is technically and operationally accurate.

~~Substance of Statement has been approved in accordance with Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State and discussed with Joint Committee~~ END FYI.

GP-3.

END.

RUSK



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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VERBATIM TEXT TEXT

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

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Info:

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## AIDE MEMOIRE

During the past few months, there has been an exchange of information between representatives of the Embassy and representatives of the Gaimusho, relating to the visits to Japan of US nuclear-powered submarines (SSN's). With the exception of the difference in propulsion systems, nuclear-powered submarines are no different from other units of the United States Navy presently calling at Japanese ports and accordingly enjoy the same rights of entry under US-Japan security arrangements. While the entry of these submarines, therefore, is not subject to prior consultation under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the United States Government, aware of the concern of the Japanese people, has chosen to discuss this matter with the GOJ before exercising this right. With respect to matters that do involve prior consultation, the policy of the United States continues to be as stated in the joint US-Japan communique of January 19, 1960, namely that in such matters the United States Government has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government.

Within the statutory and security limitations on the disclosure of information concerning nuclear-powered warships, the United States has made every

Drafted by:  
FE:EA/J:TWainsworth:cam

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA - Leonard L. Bacon

Clearance: G/PM - Mr. Orwick

Defense - Col. Moorman (draft)

L - Mr. Trippe (draft)

(See paragraph 7 Reftel)

Navy - Lt. Com. Long (draft)

DOD:ISA:FMRA:Mr. Bronex (draft)

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AEC - Mr. O'Donnell (informed in draft)

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every possible effort to be fully cooperative and has given answers as set forth generally below to questions on SSN safety, compensation, and related matters.

1. Safety and operational aspects

There have been more than 100 visits of nuclear-powered warships to foreign ports without incident of any kind, and all of these visits have been accepted by the host countries solely on the basis of US assurances as to the safety of the ships involved. Extensive precautions are taken in SSN construction, maintenance, operation and crew selection and training to insure safety of these ships. SSN reactors are so constructed as to be unable to explode like an atomic bomb. Safety features built into these reactors assure shutdown in event of emergency. All SSN crew members receive highly specialized training and carry out their tasks strictly in accordance with operating procedures which have been developed with rigid adherence to high safety standards. The history of the safe operation of naval nuclear propulsion plants indicates that these precautions have been successful. The stringent safety standards applicable to ~~SSNs~~ SSNs make the reliability of their operation at least equivalent to that of land-based reactors.

Information is not releasable concerning differences between SSN power plants and land-based reactors with respect to excess reactivity, rod worth, etc.; nor is information releasable concerning the ~~term~~ <sup>maximum</sup> "~~maximum~~ <sup>used</sup> credible accident"/~~acc~~ for the hazard evaluation of SSN reactors. Throughout the history of operations of US nuclear-powered warships, there have been no accidents that have resulted in damage to reactor plants or any radioactive hazards to the environment.

The same

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The same safety criteria are applied with regard to visits of US SSNs to foreign ports as are applied in the case of their visits to US ports. In this regard, it is understood that the Government of Japan will provide any information which it believes pertinent to safety consideration around ports in Japan to be visited by SSNs.

SSNs are required, in accordance with the United States Navy's radiological procedures and criteria reviewed by both the United States Public Health Service and the Atomic Energy Commission, to limit their radioactive discharges to safe concentration levels and quantities. SSN effluent discharges are wholly consistent with the Japanese laws and standards as well as international standards. As a result of extensive tests made by US public health officials at ports where large numbers of SSNs habitually operate, it has been shown that the SSNs have no effect on the general background radioactivity of the environment including marine life. No contamination has occurred in any port visited by SSNs.

Demineralizer waste is never discharged in ports or near land areas and is therefore not of concern in connection with port visits. Furthermore, it is not discharged anywhere near known fishing areas. In this connection, any information the Government of Japan may wish to provide concerning fishing areas around Japan will be made available to SSN commanders. Solid wastes are transferred by SSNs to US shore or tender facilities for subsequent packaging and burial in the US in accordance with approved procedures.

The Report on Radioactive Waste Disposal from US Nuclear-Powered Ships prepared by the Nuclear Propulsion Division of the Bureau of Ships in January 1959,

a copy

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a copy of which has been made available to the Japanese Government, constitutes an official and authoritative source for information regarding SSN waste disposal and the US Navy's instructions pertaining thereto. In keeping with the principles stated in this report, the Navy's instructions have been revised to reflect new, more conservative, recommendations of the ICRP and of National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 69, rather than Handbook No. 52 as stated in the 1959 report.

It is not contemplated that SSN fuel would be changed or that power-plant repairs would be undertaken in Japan or its territorial waters.

No material exposed to radioactivity is normally removed from SSNs while in ~~for~~ foreign ports. If, under unusual circumstances, material so exposed were to be removed, this would be done in such a manner as not to cause a hazard and in accordance with procedures used in US ports.

It is intended that SSNs call at Yokosuka and Sasebo. If the Government of Japan wishes to make background checks at these ports, the United States authorities would be glad to cooperate.

Entry and departure are accomplished by nuclear power. The use of auxiliary power does not provide sufficient maneuvering power to ~~xxx~~ insure operational safety. Reactors are normally shut down shortly after mooring and they are normally ~~xxxx~~ started up a few hours before departure.

It may be noted that without prejudice to the right of US warships to innocent passage and in accordance with usual practice SSNs would normally transit Japan's territorial waters only when proceeding directly to and from port, utilizing normal channels and navigational ~~xxx~~ aids. Port entry and departure are normally  
accomplished

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accomplished in daylight, although unusual operational requirements might necessitate nighttime movement. It is not necessary to stop normal sea traffic when SSNs enter and depart a port. SSN movements have no more effect on port traffic than other submarines, and they have less effect than larger warships.

It is not considered necessary or desirable that these ships carry special markings or enter and depart port with an escort vessel.

If the Japanese Government desires the establishment of proper channels in advance for immediate notification in the/ <sup>unprecedented</sup> ~~unprecedented~~ event of a requirement ~~For immediate notification in the unprecedented event of a requirement~~ for evacuation, the United States Government has no objection.

The purpose of SSN visits is the same as that for other United States warships, e.g., to provide (a) rest and recreation for crews and (b) logistic support and maintenance.

2. Liability and Compensation Aspects.

Compensation in the event of an accident will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement. To the extent that Japanese Law No. 147 of June 17, 1961 would apply to ships of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, it would be equally applicable under the provisions of Article 18, paragraph 5 (a) of the Status of Forces Agreement, to the handling of claims for nuclear incidents involving US warships where personal injury or death is involved, including sickness or disease caused by radiation contamination. Similarly, the exchange of notes of August 22, 1960 and the Joint Committee Agreement of September 5, 1961 concerning small maritime claims also apply to US nuclear-powered warships.

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warships.

Where the Status of Forces Agreement is not applicable the United States Public Vessels Act, the United States Admiralty Claims Settlement Authority and the United States Foreign Claims Act are available under United States legislation for settling claims arising out of a nuclear accident involving a United States nuclear warship. Under the Public Vessels Act and the Admiralty Claims Settlement Authority a ~~xxx~~ showing of legal liability in maritime law is required. In this regard it may be noted that under the Public Vessels Act the US is liable for acts of its warships to the same extent as private owners are liable for the acts of their <sup>vessels</sup> ~~vessels~~. The US may be sued in personam and the US executive branch may <sup>or</sup> ~~settle/~~ compromise suits under Public Vessels Act for activities of its warships without further dollar limitation.

The Admiralty Claims Settlement Authority authorizes the Secretary of Navy to approve and pay a claim in an amount up to \$1 million. Claims in excess of \$1 million are to be reported to Congress for case by case appropriations. Under the Foreign Claims Act settlement may be made by the Foreign Claims Commission without ~~xxx~~ proof of legal liability, but there must be proof that the damage was caused by the United States. Under this legislation claims up to \$15 thousand may be paid by the Secretaries of the military departments. Larger claims may be referred to Congress for necessary appropriations.

In any event, when the Status of Forces Agreement is not applicable, the United States Government assures its readiness to deal with claims arising out of a nuclear incident involving a visiting US nuclear-powered xx warship through diplomatic

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diplomatic channels in accordance with customary procedures for the settlement of international claims under generally accepted principles of law and equity.

END.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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*Japan*

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Action

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Info

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Control: 19008

Rec'd: January 27, 1964

5:50 a.m. 039

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FROM: Tokyo

ACTION: Secstate SECTO 4

Authority

STATE 7-7-75

By

IP

NARS, Date

7-22-75

DATE: January 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION I OF II)

LIMDIS

THE SECRETARY MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OHIRA ALMOST TWO HOURS AFTERNOON JAN 26. ALSO PRESENT WERE SHIMA, AMBASSADOR TAKEUCHI, SHIMANOUCHI, KIKUCHI, AND DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN AND ASIAN BUREAUS TAKEUCHI AND USHIROKU. AMB REISCHAUER AND BARNETT ACCOMPANIED SECY.

OHIRA ACCORDED CHINA PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER TOPICS, WITH RESULT JAPAN-KOREA SETTLEMENT, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DISARMAMENT AND UN ARTICLE XIX WERE DEALT WITH IN COMPARATIVELY BRIEF TERMS. CFN 27 7PM 26

PAGE TWO RUALOT 509

~~SECRET~~

OHIRA DEPLORED RECENT STRAINS GOJ-GRC RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY GRC REPRISALS FOR CHOU CASE, BUT SAID NOT GOJ RETALIATION CONTEMPLATED. OHIRA AND IKEDA HOPE SEND YOSHIDA SOON ON GOOD WILL MISSION, TO PAVE WAY FOR VISIT BY OHIRA.

OHIRA SAID GOJ HAD EARNEST DESIRE THAT GRC ON TAIWAN DEVELOP PROSPEROUS ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND HAS NO DESIRE SEE TAIWAN ABSORBED BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS. AT SAME TIME JAPAN'S TROUBLES WITH GRC STEM FROM "FICTION" THAT IT EXERCISES SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OVER ALL CHINA. THESE TROUBLES AGGRAVATED BY PARIS-PEKING RAPPROCHEMENT. OHIRA REFERRED JAPAN'S EFFORTS TO DISSUADE DE GAULLE FROM RECOGNIZING AND FACT HE HAD CABLED SHEN URGING HIM "NOT TO MOVE TOWARDS COMPLETE BREAK." IN THIS ANXIOUS PERIOD HE HOPED THE SECY COULD RESPOND TO SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA. FIRST, HE WANTED US INFORMATION ON PERSONALITY, ATTITUDES, AND AMBITIONS OF CHIANG CHING-KUO, WHOSE POSITION APPARENTLY STRENGTHENED WITH RETIREMENT POIMIN CHEN CHENG. SECOND, WHAT WOULD US POSITION BE IF THERE SHOULD BE COALITION BETWEEN TAIPEI AND PEKING WHICH MIGHT BYPASS US PRESENT PRINCIPLE OF DEFENDING TAIWAN AGAINST "LIBERATION" BY FORCE OF ARMS? THIRD, HOW WOULD "INDEPENDENCE" FOR TAIWAN

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~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 4, January 27, 7 p.m., (SECTION I OF II) from Tokyo

PAGE THREE RUALOT 509D ~~SECRET~~

AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 8-MILLION NATIVE TAIWANESE TO THE 2-MILLION MAINLANDERS WHOSE AUTHORITY IS NOW SUPERIMPOSED ON THEM? OHIRA SAID HE HOPED THESE QUESTIONS WOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS SUGGESTING JAPAN'S INTENTION TO RECOGNIZE PEKING OR MAKE IT A MEMBER OF THE UN. NO CHANGE IN ESTABLISHED JAPANESE POLICY WAS BEING CONTEMPLATED BUT THAT POLICY REQUIRED EXAMINATION IN THE LIGHT OF WORLD CONDITIONS.

THE SECY REPORTED THAT CHIANG CHING-KUO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST YEAR BROUGHT NO SURPRISES AND NO INDICATIONS THAT VIEWS DIFFERED FROM THAT OF THE GOC. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS OFTEN DISTURBING SPECULATION ABOUT CHIANG CHING-KUO'S INTENTIONS, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

THE SECY SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE 2-MILLION MAINLANDERS COULD OBTAIN ANYTHING WORTHWHILE IN RETURN FOR SURRENDER OF CONTROL, UNDER WHATEVER GUISE, TO PEKING'S AUTHORITY. WERE COALITION TO BECOME A REAL POSSIBILITY, OUR REGARD FOR THE 2-MILLION MAINLANDERS AND THE FORMOSAN POPULATION WOULD PRESENT THE US WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. THE POSSIBILITY OF COALITION, TODAY, APPEARS REMOTE, IF NOT ENTIRELY HYPOTHETICAL.  
CFN 8 2 2 2

PAGE FOUR RUALOT 509D ~~SECRET~~

THE SECY SUMMED UP WASHINGTON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PEIPING. WE DO NOT REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS, BUT TO ESTABLISH THEM REQUIRES MOVING ON A TWO-WAY STREET. WE FIND NO EVIDENCE IN WARSAW OR ELSEWHERE THAT PEIPING DESIRES IMPROVE RELATIONS. PEIPING INSISTS UPON US RETREAT FROM TAIWAN AS PRECONDITION. IT WILL NOT RENOUNCE FORCE IN TAIWAN STRAITS. IT FLOUTS THE LAOS AND VIETNAM ACCORDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IT HAS ATTACKED INDIA. IT CONSPIRES IN SOUTH AMERICA AND INTRODUCES ITS INFLUENCES INTO AFRICA. SEVEN TONS OF CHINESE EQUIPMENT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN CAPTURED IN VIETNAM. CHINESE MILITANCY, IN DOCTRINE AND IN ACTION, THE SECY SAID, ARE THE THINGS THAT STAND IN THE WAY OF IMPROVED WASHINGTON-PEIPING RELATIONS.

RUSK

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:20 A.M. JANUARY 27, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 1-27-64 - 6:50 A.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO / SECTO FOUR JAN 27, 7PM

OUR POSITION IS NOT TAKEN FOR SENTIMENTAL REASONS. THE US HAS ONE MILLION MEN UNDER ARMS AND SUFFERS CASUALTIES WEEKLY IN FAR EAST. AT A TIME OUR RESOURCES AND BLOOD GO TO SUPPORT OF COUNTRIES THREATENED BY PEIPING, PEIPING SHOULD NOT BE HELPED. FRENCH RECOGNITION PEIPING WILL ENCOURAGE PEIPING IN AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS. THE SECY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR JAPAN'S REPRESENTATIONS IN PARIS AND REASSURED OHIRA THAT ITALY AND GERMANY HAVE ALSO MADE THEM. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE ADVISING AFRICAN STATES NOT TO RECOGNIZE PEIPING.

PAGE TWO RUALOT 509D/2 ~~SECRET~~

EXPLAINING THAT THE FRENCH ACTION WAS MOTIVATED BY WORLD-WIDE CONSIDERATIONS IRRELEVANT TO THEM. FRENCH RECOGNITION WAS NOT THE BEGINNING OF A PARADE. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT CANADA, BELGIUM, GERMANY, ITALY OR THE AFRICAN STATES GENERALLY WOULD FOLLOW SUIT.

THE SECY SAID THAT PRES DE GAULLE WAS NOT ONE TO BE PERSUADED; HE WOULD MAKE UP HIS MIND AND WOULD GO AHEAD WITH RECOGNITION UNLESS THE GRC SITS TIGHT AND COMPELS PEIPING TO RECONSIDER AND IMPOSE CONDITIONS. BOTH PARIS AND PEIPING APPEAR TO BE GAMBLING THAT TAIWAN WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO RUPTURE. ALTHOUGH NO FINAL WORD IS AVAILABLE FROM TAIPEI, PRESS CHIADT\* APPEARS CONVINCED, IN PART BY DE GAULLE'S RECENT LETTER TO HIM, THAT FRANCE WILL NOT CONTINUE RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, AND THAT AS A MATTER OF HONOR, HE MUST BREAK IMMEDIATELY.

OHIRA SAID THAT TOKYO HAD URGED THE GRC NOT TO BREAK. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BREAK, HOWEVER, WERE SUCH, HE SAID, THAT THEY REQUIRED CLOSE AND SERIOUS STUDY. HE PROPOSED THAT JOINT US-JAPANESE GROUPS BE SET UP IN TOKYO AND IN WASHINGTON CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO CONSULT ON DEVELOPMENT AND FORMULATION POLICY ON THIS SUBJECT. THE SECY ACCEPTED THIS

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-2- SECTO 4, JANUARY 27, 7 PM, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM TOKYO

PAGE THREE RUALOT 509D/2 ~~SECRET~~  
PROPOSAL. THE SECY WENT ON TO OBSERVE, HOWEVER, THAT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THE 42 COUNTRIES NOW RECOGNIZING PEIPING WOULD PROBABLY AGREE WITH MANY OF THE 60 WHO RECOGNIZE THE GRC THAT CHINA'S UN REPRESENTATION IS AN "IMPORTANT QUESTION." FAILURE TO MOBILIZE A TWO-THIRDS VOTE FOR A CHANGE OF GRC STATUS AT THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING MIGHT MAKE ARTICLE XIX A MORE ABSORBING AND CRITICAL ISSUE THAN CHINA.

THE SECY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT MOSCOW'S ANXIETY ABOUT PEIPING REVOLVED NOT SO MUCH AROUND DIFFERENCES IN IDEOLOGY AS THE DISTURBING PROSPECT OF 800 MILLION CHINESE BEING ARMED ONE DAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE BELIEVED THAT MOSCOW HOPED THAT THE TEST BAN TREATY COULD BE THE FIRST OF SEVERAL PRESSURES ON PEIPING IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

OHIRA SAID THAT TO VIEW CHINA IN THE FRAME OF INTERNATIONAL TRENDS WAS FOR THE GOVT OF JAPAN DIFFERENT FROM TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDE BROUGHT ABOUT IN EXPECTATION OF FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING. IN ORDER TO HELP GOJ GUIDE ITS PUBLIC OPINION, CONSULTATION IN GREAT DEPTH WITH THE US ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SECY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT JAPAN  
CFN 42 60 800

PAGE FOUR RUALOT 509D/2 ~~SECRET~~  
WANTS A GOOD NEIGHBOR ON THE ASIA MAINLAND BUT MAINLAND CHINA MUST BE A GOOD NEIGHBOR WITH ITS OWN NEIGHBORS IN SOUTH ASIA TO BE TRUSTED. THIS WAS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. IF CHINA LIVED IN PEACE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA, INDIA AND RENOUNCED AGGRESSION IN THE FORMOSA STRAITS, A NEW SITUATION WOULD BE CREATED. UNTIL THEN, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WOULD APPROVE GOVT CAUTION AND NOT REWARD PEIPING FOR ITS MILITANCY.

IN PASSING, THE SECY SPOKE OF SIHANOUK. IF RESULTS COULD BE AGREED TO BEFORE MEETING OF A CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA IT WOULD BE ONE THING; WITHOUT SUCH AGREEMENT, WASHINGTON FORESAW CONFERENCE AS OCCASION FOR ACRIMONY, DISPUTE, AND GENERAL WORSENING OF ALREADY DELICATE SITUATION.

DEPT REPEAT OTHER ADDRESSEES AS APPEARS DESIRABLE. RUSK  
\*AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:41 AM 1/27/64

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 7:00 AM 1/27/64

~~SECRET~~



# AIRGRAM

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RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	4
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
4	1	2
L	FBO	AID
		12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	16	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
16	8	3
NA2	NSP	
3	2	

A-978

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1964 FEB 20 PM 4 29  
For SCI

INFO : Amembassy MOSCOW  
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION  
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO DATE: FEB 19, 1964

SUBJECT : Projected Visit by Soviet Academy Delegation


REF : Embassy's A-167, August 9, 1963

Mr. Katsumi WATANABE (Chief, Research Section, Japan Science Council) informs us that the Council has now received a message from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, stating that a group from the Soviet Academy is ready to visit Japan sometime in March in response to the Council's invitation. The membership of the group is not known as yet, but Watanabe said it would be headed by Academy President KELDYSH.

Watanabe indicated that the Council had been somewhat surprised to receive this word, having been informed previously that the Soviet group would be unable to visit here before fall.

Watanabe said that the Council will time the Soviet visit for the middle or latter part of March, and that there would be no overlap with the visit of US scientists representing the National Academy of Sciences.

For the Ambassador:



John Goodyear  
Counselor of Embassy

"Exempted from automatic decontrol"

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

SciAtt:RWald:ns

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:JGoodyear

Clearances:



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03413 <sup>17</sup>

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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53

Origin

FE

Info:

SS

H

P

USIA

INR

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO PRIORITY 2286

Mar 6 8 00 PM '64

Your 2622

Department understands that former Vice President Nixon tentatively plans depart about March 22 on visit to 10 Far East countries in private capacity as member New York law firm. When Nixon travel plans firm, Department expects be able provide posts advance notice and specifics of any assistance desired.

End.

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:EA/J:JFKnowles:sjm 3/6/64

classification approved by:

EA - Leonard L. Bacon

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Neubert (Draft) ~~XXXXXX~~

P - Mr. Wright (subs.)

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ *Bundy* *Japan* *18*

37

Action

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Control:

19008

Rec'd:

MARCH 25, 1964

10 AM

FE  
Info

FROM: TOKYO

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 2782

G

INFO: SEOUL 246

SP

CINCPAC 488

L

HICOMRY 171

H

FUKUOKA UNNUMBERED

P

KOBE/OSAKA UNNUMBERED

USIA

NAGOYA UNNUMBERED

NSC

NAHA UNNUMBERED

INR

SAPPORO UNNUMBERED

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

DATE: MARCH 25, 7 PM

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE 7-7-75  
By IP, NARS, Date 7-22-75

STABBING OF AMBASSADOR HAS OBVIOUSLY GIVEN JAPANESE NATION ITS WORST SHOCK SINCE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. MAIN THEMES OF MEDIA REACTION, SUCH AS SHOCK, RELIEF THAT AMBASSADOR'S CONDITION NOT CRITICAL, SHAME, FEAR OF ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS UPON JAPAN-US RELATIONS, FEAR OF DAMAGE TO JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTE, DEMAND THAT SOMETHING BE DONE ABOUT INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CRIMES OF VIOLENCE BY YOUNG, ETC., ARE VOICED WITH FREQUENCY AND FEELING BY QUITE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCES (JUST AS STRANGERS STOPPED EMBOFFS IN STREET LAST NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS REGRETS OVER ASSASSINATION), INDICATING EXTRAORDINARY DEPTH AND BREADTH OF IMPACT. SIMILAR REPORTS RECEIVED FROM CONSULATES SHOW THAT REACTION IS NATION-WIDE. EVEN THOUGH STABBING WAS FLUKE, WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL RELATION TO CURRENT ISSUES, IT MAY NEVERTHELESS INFLUENCE BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL CONCERNS, INCLUDING THOSE DISCUSSED BELOW:

1. JAPAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL ON BALANCE PROBABLY BE MADE EVEN CLOSER. JAPANESE NOW FEEL, AS YOMIURI COLUMNIST SAID, AS THOUGH THEY HAD ADMINISTERED SLAP IN FACE TO ENTIRE AMERICAN NATION AND PEOPLE. IN VIEW OF ADDED FACT THAT VICTIM IS

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-2- 2782, MARCH 25, 7 PM, FROM TOKYO

(AS SOME HAVE COMMENTED) BEST-LOVED REPRESENTATIVE EVER SENT TO JAPAN BY ANY COUNTRY, JAPANESE ARE TVERWHELMED BY DESIRE TO APOLOGIZE (AS BETOKENED BY CONSTANT STREAMS OF CALLS AND CALLERS AT HOSPITAL, CHANCERY, AND RESIDENCE, AND AT CONSULATES). THIS FEELING WOULD BE PAINFUL INDEED FOR JAPANESE IF ITS INTENSITY WERE NOT AT LEAST SLIGHTLY RELIEVED BY FACT THAT THIS SORT OF THING CAN HAPPEN EVEN IN US (AS AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT IN HIS VERY GRATEFULLY-RECEIVED HOSPITAL BED STATEMENT EVENING OF 24TH) AND THAT ATTACK HAD APPARENTLY NO POLITICAL MOTIVATION. ALMOST EVERYONE COMMENTING STRESSES LACK OF MOTIVE AND MENTAL DERANGEMENT OF ASSAILANT, WHICH, WHILE NOT EXCULPATING JAPAN, AT LEAST MAKES ATTACK SEEM MORE OF AN ACCIDENT, OR THAN IT WOULD HAVE IF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. (HOWEVER, SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOME DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES TOKYO SEEM SKEPTICAL ABOUT LACK OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION AND MAY BE SO REPORTING TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS DESPITE ABSENCE ANY SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.) ON BALANCE, JAPANESE ARE LEFT WITH STRONG DESIRE TO MAKE AMENDS AND TO SHOW WARMTH OF THEIR FEELING FOR AMERICA (AND FOR AMBASSADOR IN PARTICULAR). THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY HELP TO MUTE ANY ANTI-AMERICAN PROTESTS OR ACTIONS AT THE POPULAR LEVEL, WERE ANY NOW AFOOT OR CONTEMPLATED. IRONICALLY, AS SOME COMMENTATORS HAVE NOTED, PRESENT IS ERA OF GREAT GOOD FEELING TOWARD AMERICA. WHILE EXTREME LEFT AND PROFESSIONAL AGITATORS ARE AS USUAL SEEKING TO EXPLOIT NORMAL NUMBER OF ANTI-JAPAN-ROK, ANTI-F-105D, ANTI-BALL SLOGANS, FOR PURPOSES OF ANTI-AMERICAN-IMPERIALISM STRUGGLE, THERE HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY LESS STEAM IN RATHER LIMP PORTESTS RECEIVED AT EMBASSY RECENTLY. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THESE THOROUGHLY COMMITTED LEFTISTS TO MODERATE THEIR ANTI-US ACTIVITIES IN WAKE OF ATTACK ON AMBASSADOR, UNLESS PEIPING TELLS THEM TO. AKAHATA GAVE INCIDENT MINIMAL AND FACTUAL PRESS COVERAGE TODAY, OBVIOUSLY AWAITING CUE FROM PEIPING. (THIS CONNECTION, ACCORDING FBIS RADIO PEKING HAS NOT YET CARRIED INCIDENT; RADIO MOSCOW SHORT REPORT OF ATTACK IS FACTUAL, CALLS ATTACKER "RUFFIAN" AND STATES MOTIVE BEING INVESTIGATED.) HOWEVER, IF EXTREMISTS DO CARRY

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-3- 2782, MARCH 25, 7 PM, FROM TOKYO

OUT ANY OVERT ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIONS IN PRESENT ATMOSPHERE, THEY WILL MERELY FURTHER ISOLATE THEMSELVES FROM JAPANESE PEOPLE.

2. GOJ POLITICAL STABILITY AS OF NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED, THOUGH TO EXTENT THAT IKEDA'S POSITION HAS BEEN AFFECTED, IT HAS DOUBTLESS BEEN HARMED. PROMPT RESIGNATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSIONER (AND AUTONOMY MINISTER) HAYAKAWA AND FACT IT WAS NOT AT ONCE REJECTED BY PRIMIN IKEDA PRESUMABLY REFLECTS GOVT'S AWARENESS OF STRENGTH OF FEELING THAT FORMAL ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY NECESSARY. (INCIDENTALLY AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED PRIVATELY TO FONMIN AND THROUGH DCM TO VICEMIN SHIMA HIS REGRET OVER REPORTED RESIGNATION.) THIS FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY EXEMPLIFIED BY EVEN SUCH MODERN-MINDED COMMENTATOR AS KAZUSHIGE HIRASAWA (EDITOR OF JAPAN TIMES), WHO POINTED OUT IN EDITORIAL TODAY THAT IN PREWAR JAPAN THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN OCCASION FOR MASS RESIGNATION OF CABINET. POLITICAL RIVALS KISHI AND SATO WILL DOUBTLESS NOT BE AVERSE TO MAKING DISCREET USE OF THIS BLOW TO IKEDA'S PRESTIGE, IF OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF; HOWEVER, HAYAKAWA'S RESIGNATION, PROMPT APOLOGIES AT HIGHEST LEVEL, PARTICULARLY GRACIOUS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN SO FAR APPEAR AS OF NOW TO HAVE AVERTED IMMEDIATE DANGER TO IKEDA'S POSITION. (LATEST REPORTS ARE HAYAKAWA'S RESIGNATION HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO STAND, AND THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER MEMBER OF MIKI FACTION, DIET MEMBER MASAMICHI AKAZAWA.) THREAT TO IKEDA'S POSITION AND TO HIS LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM WOULD BE WORSE IF HE WERE NOW FACED BY DEMAND FROM WITHIN LDP FOR ENACTMENT OF SOME SUCH UNPOPULAR LEGISLATION AS "POLICE DUTIES BILL" (WHICH KICKED UP STORM BEFORE IT WAS DEFEATED DURING KISHI'S TENURE). SO FAR, WHILE MAINICHI EDITORIAL TODAY MENTIONED POSSIBLE NEED TO REVIVE THAT BILL, NO OTHER NOTEWORTHY VOICES HAVE BEEN RAISED IN ITS SUPPORT.

GP-3.

REISCHAUER

BAP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SD008

OO RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 21734 29/1050Z

O 291048Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN BUNDY

O 290815Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE 2817 MARCH 29, 5 P.M.

LIMDIS

REF EMBTEL 2816

AMBASSADOR REMAINS UNDER TREATMENT TRANOMON HOSPITAL IN CONSULTATION WITH US NAVAL MEDICAL OFFICER. FOLLOWING IS LATTER'S MEDICAL STATEMENT IN BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH REFTEL.

IN PAST 12 HOURS PATIENT HAS HAD GASTRO-INTESTINAL TRACT BLEEDING, SITE AS YET UNDETERMINED. VITAL SIGNS STABLE. NO EVIDENCE SHOCK. TREATMENT CONSISTS OF NASOGASTRIC SUCTION, WHOLE BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS, ELECTROLYTE THERAPY AND USUAL SUPPORTIVE MEASURES. CONDITION AS PER ARMED FORCES TERMINOLOGY CLASSIFIED AS SERIOUS. RESPONDING FAVORABLY TO TREATMENT. PROGNOSIS GOOD. REISCHAUER

BT

CFN 2817 29 EPN 2816 12

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WHASA

1964 MAR 29 10 59

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Authority

STATE 7-7-75

By IP

NARS, Date 7-22-75

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

20

026

37

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Action

SS

Info

NNNNZCZCMJA244  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUALOT 68D 02/1040Z  
R 020934Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1500

1964 APR 2 AM 9 02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2877 APRIL 2, 7PM

LIMDIS  
DOCTORS ESTIMATE THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD REMAIN IN  
HOSPITAL FOR ADDITIONAL TEN DAYS OR 2 WEEKS AND THAT HE  
WILL REQUIRE PERIOD OF CONVALESCENCE FROM TWO TO FOUR WEEKS  
AFTER THAT. IN VIEW INEVITABLE PRESSURES OF CALLERS  
AND DEMANDS ON THEIR TIME AND ATTENTION WHICH WOULD BE  
DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING TO RESIST AT RESIDENCE  
AND WHICH MIGHT SLOW RECOVERY, AMBASSADOR AND MRS.  
CFN 2877 2 7PM

PAGE TWO RUALOT 68D  
REISCHAUER WOULD LIKE SPEND RECUPERATION PERIOD HAWAII  
WHERE GENERAL SMART HAS OFFERED THEM PRIVATE QUARTERS AND  
WHERE COMPLETE REST WOULD BE POSSIBLE. GEN. PRESTON  
IS INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY AIR FORCE TRANSPORTATION.  
DEPT CONCURRENCE REQUESTED. REISCHAUER  
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

37

Action

SS

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026

NNNNVV EUA078TEA192  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUAPFD 99 03/0955Z  
ZNR  
R 030945Z  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
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1964 APR 3 AM 7 17

LIMDIS

AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER'S CONDITION REPORT AS OF TEN AM  
FRIDAY APRIL 3.

DR. RALPH FACETT, US NAVAL HOSPITAL YOKOSUKA AMBASSADOR'S  
PERSONAL PHYSICIAN, SUMMARIZED AMBASSADOR'S CONDITION AS  
FOLLOWS: PROGRESS CONTINUES IN SATISFACTORY MANNER. WOUND  
HEALING. IMPROVEMENT OF LEG FLEXIBILITY INCREASES. NO  
EVIDENCE OF GASTRO INTESTINAL TRACT BLEEDING SINCE EARLY  
MONDAY MORNING. INTRAVENOUS FEEDING WILL CONTINUE TODAY  
CFN 2890 3

PAGE TWO RUAPFD 99 UNCLAS

UP TO ABOUT 1000CC'S BUT CHANGE OVER TO COMPLETE ORAL FEEDING  
BEING CONSIDERED&2 FIVE STITCHES REMOVED FROM THIGH WOUND  
TODAY AND FIVE ARE LEFT. THERE IS GREATER RANGE OF MOTION  
IN LEG AND REFLEX ACTION AT BACK OF ANKLE HAS BEEN RESTORED.

EMBASSY WILL HENCEFORTH SEND CONDITION REPORTS AS CONDITION  
REQUIRES. REISCHAUER

BT

CFN 1000CC'S

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

Control: 9466  
Rec'd: APRIL 11, 1964  
5:03 AM

FE

FROM: TOKYO

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 2983

SS

INFO: HONG KONG 261

SVN

G

TAIPEI 239

SP

SAIGON 82

L

MANILA 194

H

PARIS 168

SAL

LONDON 124

AF

MOSCOW 40

EUR

BONN 41

IO

BRUSSELS 47

DAC

GENEVA 62

SCI

STR

DATE: APRIL 11, 2 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11)

E

AID

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

P

USIA

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

NSC

INR

GENEVA FOR GATT AND UNCTAD

CIA

NSA

REF: EMBTEL 2959

OSD

ARMY

FRENCH - JAPANESE MINISTERIAL MEETING

NAVY

AIR

PART I - POLITICAL

NIC

AEC

AGR

CEA

COM

FRB

TAR

TRSY

RMR

DIRECTOR EUROPEAN BUREAU (HOGEN) APRIL 10 INFORMED US POMPIDOU HAD MET WITH IKEDA FOR TWO HOURS APRIL 7 AND COUVE DE MURVILLE WITH OHIRA FOR THREE HOURS APRIL 8. WITH RESPECT TO LATTER MEETING HOGEN SAID POLITICAL SUBJECTS, WHICH CENTERED ON CHINA POLICY AND TO LESSER EXTENT ON VIETNAM NEUTRALIZATION, OCCUPIED ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF DISCUSSION TIME, BALANCE BEING USED FOR ECONOMIC SUBJECTS.

/HOGEN SAID OHIRA

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-2- 2983, APRIL 11, 3 PM, FROM TOKYO (SECTION 1 OF 11)

HOGEN SAID OHIRA OPENED DISCUSSION BY REFERENCE TO FRENCH RECOGNITION OF CHICOMS AND REQUESTED COUVE'S COMMENTS ON FRENCH INTENTIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. IN REPLY FRENCH FONMIN DESCRIBED WELL KNOWN RATIONALE FOR RECOGNITION CHICOMS AND ASSERTED THAT FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR CHICOM ADMITTANCE UN AS REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA IS LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF RECOGNITION. COUVE ALSO ASSERTED THAT CHICOMS SHOULD HAVE FULL UN MEMBERSHIP OCCUPYING SEATS IN GA AND SECURITY COUNCIL. OHIRA STATED THAT AT NEXT UNGA JAPAN HAS NO INTENTION CHANGE ITS PREVIOUS POLICY REGARDING CHIREP AS "IMPORTANT QUESTION". ALTHOUGH COUVE DID NOT DISCUSS FRANCE'S INTENTIONS CONCERNING "IMPORTANT QUESTION", HE SAID FRANCE WOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE IN UN. COUVE ADDED FACT OF GRC'S EXISTENCE SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN UN ACTIONS AND EXPLAINED FRANCE'S RECOGNITION CHICOMS CONTAINED NO COMMITMENT WITH RESPECT TAIWAN; ONLY COMMITMENT WAS TO RECOGNIZE CHICOMS AS GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.

OHIRA POINTED OUT THAT TAIWAN DOES NOT WISH BE GOVERNED BY CHICOMS AND ASSERTED PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE BASIS FOR SOLVING TAIWAN PROBLEM. IN REPLY COUVE REMARKED THAT IF PRINCIPLE SELF-DETERMINATION APPLIED AND IF SEPARATE GOVERNMENTS FOR CHINA AND TAIWAN COULD BE RECOGNIZED, FRANCE WOULD NOT OPPOSE ONE CHINA-ONE TAIWAN SOLUTION. OHIRA SAID JAPAN INTENDS REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE CHICOMS MORE THAN RECOGNITION OF REALITY OF CHICOM GOVERNMENT AS GOVERNMENT OF CHINA; JAPAN DOES NOT INTEND JEOPARDIZE INTERESTS OF TAIWAN. COUVE REPLIED FRANCE UNDERSTANDS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TAIWAN.

IN ANSWER TO OHIRA'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER FRANCE INTENDS ASSIST CHICOMS IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, COUVE SCOFFED AT IDEA AND SAID FRANCE HAS NO INTENTION HELPING ANYONE PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WITH RESPECT INDOCHINA, COUVE SAID FRANCE APPRECIATED US EFFORTS AND MOTIVES IN VIETNAM BUT, IN VIEW OF FRANCE'S EXPERIENCE

/THERE, BELIEVES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3- 2983, APRIL 11, 2 PM, FROM TOKYO (SECTION 1 OF 11)

THERE, BELIEVES IT IMPOSSIBLE SETTLE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM BY FORCE. ONLY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS FEASIBLE, AND THIS NECESSITATES COOPERATION CHICOMS. SOLUTION DEPENDS ON POWERFUL COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN PROBLEM, I.E., US AND CHICOMS.

WHEN WE QUERIED HOGEN SPECIFICALLY ABOUT NEUTRALIZATION NORTH VIETNAM HOGEN CHECKED HIS NOTES CAREFULLY AND CONFIRMED THAT POMPIDOU HAD STATED TO PRESS THAT FRANCE ENVISAGES NEUTRALIZATION OF NORTH VIETNAM AS WELL AS SOUTH VIETNAM BUT THAT COUVE HAD MADE NO SIMILAR CLEAR STATEMENT TO OHIRA. HOWEVER COUVE DID EXPRESS OPINION TO OHIRA THAT CHICOM INFLUENCE STRONG IN NORTH VIETNAM AND THAT LATTER WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING NEUTRALIZATION, THUS IMPLYING COUVE, LIKE POMPIDOU ENVISAGES NEUTRALIZATION WOULD INCLUDE NORTH VIETNAM. COUVE ADDED THAT FRANCE MAY BE TOO OPTIMISTIC RE SUCCESS OF NEUTRALIZATION POLICY; LACK OF REAL GOVERNMENTS IN AREA IS HANDICAP. COUVE ALSO EXPRESSED OPINION (WITH WHICH HOGEN CONCURRED) THAT CHICOMS ARE WEAK, SERIOUSLY HAMPERED IN RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM AND THUS DETERRED FROM ENGAGING IN ACTIVE WAR.

CONCERNING FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS, COUVE SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW AND DENIED ANY SIGNIFICANCE IN RECENT EXCHANGE OF IMPORTANT VISITORS. (IN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO FAURE VISIT TO MOSCOW, COUVE REPORTEDLY REMARKED THAT PEOPLE OFTEN TRAVEL AT DIFFERENT TIMES FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES.)

RE DISARMAMENT, COUVE EXPRESSED OPINION THAT REAL PROGRESS DEPENDS ON US AND RUSSIA AND THAT NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AT CURRENT CONFERENCE.

GP-3

REISCHAUER

LM

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

9460  
APRIL 11, 1964  
4:49 AM

FE

Info

FROM: TOKYO

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 2983

SVN

INFO: HONG KONG 261

G

TAIPEI 239

SP

SAIGON 82

L

MANILA 194

H

PARIS 168

SAL

LONDON 124

AF

MOSCOW 40

EUR

BONN 41

IO

BRUSSELS 47

DAC

GENEVA 62

SCI

STR

E

DATE: APRIL 11, 2 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11)

AID

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

P

USIA

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

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INR

GENEVA FOR GATT AND UNCTAD

CIA

NSA

CONCERNING SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, COUVE EMPHASIZED NECESSITY OF AVOIDING INTERVENTION TO ASSIST EITHER SIDE. HE DOUBTS THAT USSR WAS AS ENTHUSIASTIC AS IT PRETENDED TO BE OVER FRANCE'S RECOGNITION OF CHICOMS AND EXPRESSED OPINION THAT SOVIETS DO NOT REALLY WISH CHICOMS ADMITTED UN.

OSD

ARMY

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DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH HOGEN, WE CALLED ATTENTION TO REPORTED DISSATISFACTION THAT ENGLISH LANGUAGE INSTEAD OF FRENCH WAS USED BY FONOFF IN PREPARING ITINERARIES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOR FRENCH VISITORS. HOGEN APPARENTLY WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS REPORT BUT COMMENTED THAT SCARCITY OF FRENCH LANGUAGE TRANSLATORS IN FONOFF MADE IT VIRTUALLY NECESSARY FOR SOME DOCUMENTS BE PREPARED IN ENGLISH. HOGEN THEN COMMENTED THAT FRENCH EMBASSY

/HAS NOT BEEN

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-2- 2983, APRIL 11, 2 PM, FROM TOKYO (SECTION 11 OF 11)

HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE IN HANDLING PRESS DURING VISIT AND THAT THIS UNDOUBTEDLY ENGENDERED CRITICAL TONE IN SOME REPORTS BY LE MONDE CORRESPONDENT AND OTHERS.

IN SUM, HOGEN SAID FONOFF GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY PROVIDED CHANCE TO OBTAIN FRANCE'S EXPLANATIONS ITS POLICIES TOWARD CHINA AND VIETNAM. HE ADDED THAT POMPIDOU SEEMED UNDERSTAND JAPAN'S CONCERN FOR TAIWAN AND IMPLIED THAT FONOFF REGARDS THIS AS IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT.

FURTHER ON POLITICAL TOPICS DISCUSSED, DIRECTOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU (NAKAYAMA) GAVE US FOLLOWING ADDITION DETAILS:

REGARDING CHIREPS, COUVE SAID THERE MIXED REACTION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES - SOME WILL NOT RECOGNIZE CHICOMS, OTHERS WITH "PROGRESSIVE" GOVERNMENTS MAY, BUT FRANCE DOES NOT INTEND INTERVENE IN THEIR DECISIONS;

REGARDING NORTH KOREA COUVE SAID HE REPLIED TO RECENT QUERY BY ROK FONMIN THAT FRANCE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NORTH KOREA IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT TOWARDS CHICOMS. IN KOREA TWO DISTINCT GOVERNMENTS CO-EXIST; IN CHINA FACT OF ONLY ONE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT LEAVES NO CHOICE.

#### PART 11 - ECONOMIC

NAKAYAMA HAS ALSO GIVEN EMBASSY FOLLOWING SUMMARY OHIRA-COUVE DISCUSSION ECONOMIC QUESTIONS:

OHIRA DESCRIBED JAPAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION. NOTED THAT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JAPANESE GOODS STILL PERSISTED IN EUROPE; FRANCE HAD DISINVOKED GATT ARTICLE XXXV BUT STILL MAINTAINED NEGATIVE LIST. SAID GOJ UNDERSTOOD EEC WOULD TAKE UP QUESTION OF COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY VIS-A-VIS JAPAN. GOJ FEARS COMMON POLICY WILL

/PERPETUATE

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-3- 2983, APRIL 11, 2 PM, FROM TOKYO (SECTION 11 OF 11)

PERPETUATE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JAPAN AND IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WITH EEC ON QUESTION. OHIRA POINTED OUT JAPAN'S ECONOMY GROWING RAPIDLY AND PROVIDES GOOD MARKET. HOPED FRANCE AND OTHERS WILL REDUCE DISCRIMINATION.

COUVE SAID, OBJECTIVELY SPEAKING, FRANCE DID NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST JAPAN. SINCE SIGNING OF COMMERICAL TREATY FRANCE HAD ENDEAVORED TO INCREASE IMPORTS FROM JAPAN AND TRADE BALANCE NOW HEAVILY IN JAPAN'S FAVOR. SUGGESTED GOJ LIBERALIZE FURTHER AND REDUCE BARRIERS TO FRENCH GOODS ENTERING JAPANESE MARKET.

COUVE SAID GOF IS MAKING SERIOUS STUDY OF POSSIBILITY PERMITTING JAPANESE BOND FLOTATIONS IN FRANCE.

REGARDING KENNEDY ROUND OHIRA SAID GOJ'S GREATEST CONCERN IS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS; HOPED SOMETHING WOULD BE DONE ABOUT THESE TO ENSURE THAT CONCESSIONS GOJ RECEIVED WILL BE EQUIVALENT TO THOSE IT GIVES. GOJ WOULD OPPOSE MEASURES THAT WOULD RAISE PRICES TEMPERATE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. WHEN OHIRA COMMENTED THAT KENNEDY ROUND PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS APPEARED TO BE PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY TO FINAL STAGE, COUVE SAID HE HAD VERY DIFFERENT IMPRESSION; THERE WERE STILL SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON DISPARITIES AND AGRICULTURE AND HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON OUTCOME.

OHIRA RAISED UNCTAD. SAID GOJ WISHED TO MAINTAIN "FORWARD LOOKING POSTURE" BUT HAD VERY DIFFERENT POSITION FROM FRANCE ON PRIMARY PRODUCTS AND ORGANIZATION OF MARKETS.

ACCORDING TO NAKAYAMA COUVE DID NOT APPEAR WELL INFORMED ON DETAILS OF KENNEDY ROUND AND UNCTAD ISSUES, BUT NONETHELESS COUVE LEFT GOJ WITH IMPRESSION THAT FRENCH SAW GREAT DIFFICULTIES AHEAD FOR KENNEDY ROUND.

EXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS PUBLISHED LOCAL PRESS TRANSMITTED BY FBIS 100551/Z. GP-3

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While we are of course most appreciative of fine care Ambassador has received at ~~Toronomon~~ Toranomom Hospital, do not repeat not consider it feasible request Presidential or other high level message to hospital. Suggest Embassy issue whatever public statement it considers appropriate on its own behalf.

END

BALL

ACTING

Drafted by: FE:EA:RA Fearey/pmh 4/14/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EA - R.A. Fearey

Clearances:

S/S -Mr. McKeessen

Mr. Smith

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Mr. McKesson would like to talk to you re this.

pay

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*Jpr*

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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I M M E D I A T E

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IMMEDIATE 3005 APRIL 14, 11AM

1. AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY OWE LARGE DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO TORANOMON KYOSAI HOSPITAL FOR SUPERIOR MEDICAL CARE AMB HAS RECEIVED SINCE MARCH 24. HOSPITAL HAS NOT ONLY DEVOTED TOP TEAM OF DOCTORS AND NURSES TO CASE BUT HAS TOLERATED WITH GOODWILL THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF EMBOFFS, PRESS, POLICE, WELL-WISHERS, ETC. AMB IS MAKING PERSONAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO HOSPITAL'S EMPLOYEE WELFARE FUND IN TOKEN OF THANKS BUT FEELS HOSPITAL WOULD APPRECIATE EVEN  
CFN 3005 14 11AM 1 24

PAGE TWO RUALOT 290D  
MORE A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT.

2. REQUEST DEPT CONSIDER WHETHER IT WISHES APPROACH WHITE HOUSE FOR MESSAGE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE I WISH TO THANK THE TORANOMON KYOSAI HOSPITAL FOR THE EXCELLENT MEDICAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER DURING THE PAST THREE WEEKS. I KNOW I SPEAK FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN EXPRESSING PROFOUND RELIEF AND GRATITUDE OVER HIS EARLY RECOVERY, AND I CONSIDER THE HOSPITAL'S THOUGHTFUL AND PAINSTAKING EFFORTS IN HIS BEHALF TO BE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE FRIENDLY AND WARM RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WITH SINCERE THANKS AND BEST WISHES. LJB. UNQUOTE.

3. AMB SCHEDULED DEPART HOSPITAL 1300 HOURS MARCH 15. IF MESSAGE APPROVED, IT IS DESIRABLE DELIVER IT WITHIN 48 HOURS FOLLOWING DEPARTURE. PLEASE ADVISE. REISCHAUER  
BT  
CFN 2 3 1300 15 48

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:08 A.M. APRIL 14, 1964  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4/14/64 - 1:15 A.M.

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UNCLAS TH 314 FROM THREG

SUBJ: PROGRESS REPT NO1.

1. REF MY TH 309 EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, U.S. AXBASSADOR TO JAPAN.

2. CHANGE OF DIAGNOSIS TO ADD HEPATITIS, INFECTIOUS. DIAGNOSIS PRESUMPTIVE AT THIS TIME; CONFIRMATION DEPENDS ON ADDITIONAL LABORATORY STUDIES PENDING. PROGNOSIS: GOOD. PROBABLE DATE OF DISPOSITION: UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME

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*Bundy*

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FROM POLAD

FOR EMMERSON FROM AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER

1. DIAGNOSIS OF HEPATITIS CONFIRMED. WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE MINIMUM ADDITIONAL SIX WEEKS HOSPITALIZATION. TRIPLER SENDING TECHNICAL REPORTS EVERY 72 HOURS TO ARMY SURGEON GENERAL REPEATED INFO DA AND DEPT. TRIPLER AUTHORITIES CONSIDER IT INADVISABLE CHANGE SITE OF HOSPITALIZATION.

2. AP HAS JUST CARRIED REPORT HERE ATTRIBUTED TO TRIPLER

PAGE 2 RUHPA 3368 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMDIS

OFFICIALS STATING PRESUMPTIVE DIAGNOSIS OF HEPATITIS. IT WILL BE IMPRACTICAL FOR TRIPLER AUTHORITIES WITHHOLD CONFIRMATION FOR MORE THAN 48 HOURS AND WE BELIEVE THEY SHOULD ALSO STATE (ONLY IF ASKED) ONE TO TWO MONTHS ADDITIONAL REST AND RECUPERATION MAY BE REQUIRED. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON THIS PRESS LINE ASAP.

GP-4.

BT

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By KR, NARS, Date 6/10/75

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