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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment) 1, Cooper
J. R. Bates

January 14, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attached for the information
and files of the White House is a
copy of a memorandum of conversation
between William P. Bundy and Ambassador
Kim dated January 11, regarding:

1. Sato Visit and Korea-Japan Relations
2. Pak Visit to the U.S.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 11, 1965

SUBJECT: 1) Sato Visit and Korea-Japan Relations
2) Pak Visit to the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-156

By is, NARA Date 3-15-99

PARTICIPANTS: Hyun-chul KIM, Korean Ambassador
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State, FE
Daniel A. O'Donohue, International Relations Officer, EA/K

COPIES TO: FE - (3cc)
EA - 4 (3cc)
INR - 8
G - 1 (Mr. Hackler)
S/S - 2

White House - 1 (Mr. Thomson)
Amembassy Seoul - 2
Amembassy Tokyo - 2

The Sato Visit and Korea-Japan Relations

Ambassador KIM said that the newly arrived Korean CIA Director, KIM Hyong-uk (on a 10-day tour of the U.S.) brought with him ROKG assurances that it will push through a full Korea-Japan settlement by this spring at the latest. Under its new schedule the ROKG expects to reach agreement in the negotiations by the end of March with parliamentary ratification following shortly. Ambassador Kim commented that although there were still some in the Government who advise going slow, President PAK himself had decided to push through to a full agreement. (Kim also noted that there has been a feeler from the Japanese for a partial normalization approach, establishing diplomatic relations and reaching an agreement on "fishing rights" while leaving until later the formal question of the Peace Line.)

In view of the Korean Government's firm determination to reach an early settlement with Japan, Ambassador Kim requested that the President and the Secretary, in their talks with Prime Minister Sato, emphasize the necessity of a settlement and urge him to push the Japanese negotiators to reach a spring agreement.

Mr. Bundy said that he understood Mr. Green had previously told Ambassador Kim that we would be talking to Prime Minister Sato about Korea-Japan relations but only in general terms. We would, of course, urge the necessity of an early Korea-Japan settlement, which point Mr. Sato already realizes, and express our own strong support for Sato's energetic approach to the negotiations.

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
Intervals: not
automatically declassified

GPO 865971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

While assuring Ambassador Kim that the Korea-Japan negotiations would be discussed with Prime Minister Sato, Mr. Bundy explained that there was still some question as to whether the joint communique would refer to Korea-Japan relations. The Japanese feel that an explicit reference would give the impression in Japan that the U.S. was exerting pressure to force a settlement.

Ambassador Kim replied that, whether the communique refers to Korea-Japan relations or not, the Korean Government would understand that it was discussed. Ambassador Kim said that another matter of concern to the Korean Government was Sato's insistence on increasing trade with Communist countries, particularly North Korea. Increased trade with North Korea and possible establishment of a trade mission in P'yongyang would be of grave concern to the Korean Government and cause serious difficulties in its relations with Japan.

Mr. Bundy said that we would be discussing with Sato the problem of Japanese trade with Communist China and in that context we would also be noting the problem of trade with North Korea.

The Pak Visit

Ambassador Kim again raised the question of the timing of a visit by President Pak to the U.S. He pointed out that a Pak visit would be of great help in the Korean Government's drive to reach a Korea-Japan settlement this spring. Such a visit would be a clear indication to the Korean people of U.S. support for President Pak and his effort to reach a settlement with Japan. Ambassador Kim suggested that a public announcement of the approximate month of the visit without tying it to specific dates would be a big psychological boost to the Korean Government.

Mr. Bundy noted that in view of the renewed determination of the Korean Government to push ahead to a spring settlement we would try to look again at the timing of a Pak visit. As Mr. Bundy had mentioned before, it seemed best to schedule a Pak visit at the time it would have the most helpful impact on the Korea-Japan settlement, perhaps after agreement in the negotiations and before ratification. He further noted that in discussing the visit in terms of Korea-Japan relations we were, of course, trying to time it to be most useful to all sides. However, we would not be anxious to see public comment which gave the appearance that we were pressuring the Koreans by making a settlement the condition of a visit. Mr. Bundy expressed the hope that as much as possible both sides avoid public comment on the visit for the present. We would in the meantime be looking hard at the timing of the visit, and he personally would discuss the question further with the Secretary.

Kim expressed understanding of our desire to avoid harmful press speculation but said that press reports on a Pak visit were already appearing in the Korean press and a long public silence would give the impression that the U.S. was in fact withholding an invitation to President Pak because of the Korea-Japan negotiations.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sato
memo 57

Note for Mr. Bundy:

Here is an advance copy of the memcon reporting the President's private meeting with Sato. It is based on the notes of James Wickel, our interpreter. State is sending over a final version through S/S this afternoon.

Please note the one brief reference to the Japan-Korea settlement on the bottom of page 9.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

J. Wickel
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-349
By ig, NARA Date 3-14-96

~~SECRET~~

✓ 57a
January 12, 1965
Office of the President
The White House
Time: ~~11:30~~
11:30

SUBJECT: Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems

Participants: Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Consul General of Japan at
Los Angeles, (interpreter)

The President

~~Mr.~~ Lloyd Hand, Newly designated Chief of Protocol
~~Mr.~~ James Wickel, Department of Language Services

Suggested Distribution: *Mr. Okamoto, USIA Photographer*

The President showed several photographs to the Prime Minister.

He said that the photographer, Mr. Okamoto, was of Japanese
extraction. The Prime Minister was curious whether the was a nisei.
The President showed a photo of his ranch and photographic portraits
of his daughters, Linda Baines and Luci.

The President said he would not show his entire album but did
wish to demonstrate what a fine job the photographer had done. He
showed a picture of Secretary of Defense MacNamara, with Generals
LeMay and Wheeler which had been taken at ^{his} the ranch. He said that
Secretary McNamara had asked him to find out if the Prime Minister
had a few billion dollars extra. The President commented that Mr.
McNamara needs more money for defense. The Prime Minister jokingly
^{asked} ~~sidestepped the issue by asking~~ if the President had some funds
hidden in his pocket.

The Prime Minister expressed his gratification to the President
for the warm reception he had been given at the White House.

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The President said that he had an enduring friendship for the Japanese people and their government, especially this one. He noted that Ambassador Reischauer's reports are all good and reflect favorably upon Japan. He commented that the Prime Minister is a pragmatist, like himself.

The Prime Minister said that Japan is a democratic nation, as the President knows, and as a politician he would understand that it is important to consider the people.

The President reminisced about his boyhood in Texas. He said that he was raised near San Antonio, and the Prime Minister commented that he had visited there as a young man. The President said that he had always looked west. He recalled that his grandfather had had to look east, to New York, for money in those days. Our government leaders are proud of our European allies in NATO, to the east, but we also wish to develop another strong alliance with Japan where we turn our heads toward the sun as it sets in the west. He had tried to convey this thought in his welcoming remarks this morning. It is not a habit with us to look always east to Europe; we look as well to other parts of the world.

The President said that a number of items were listed for discussion and he wondered what were the Prime Minister's interests. The list included the Ryukyu Islands; Bonin Islands graves visits; the Saylor amendment; Japan-ROK Normalization; Communist China and Taiwan; Pacific area defense; and South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. The President asked the Prime Minister to mention any other issues

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in which he had an interest. The President said that he also was anxious to hear the Prime Minister's views on the Pacific area.

He wanted to get a feeling for the Prime Minister's opinions, and afford the Prime Minister the same opportunity to sound out his views, after which these matters could be discussed more profitably.

The President said that he and the Prime Minister were the ones who ^{had} ~~have~~ to take the blame when anything ^{went} ~~goes~~ wrong.

The Prime Minister said that the greatest problems center around Communist China and South Viet-Nam, and an exchange of views is need^{ed} on those issues. He added that a new problem has arisen as a result of President Sukarno taking Indonesia out of the United Nations. The Prime Minister then asked the President to explain the position of the United States with reference to holding the 38th parallel in Korea^{and} ^{regarding} the defense of Taiwan. He ~~inquired~~ whether the President could make a commitment not to withdraw from South Viet-Nam.

The President said, first, that the Prime Minister could depend on us fully for defense in the Pacific area. He said it is clear that Japan relies on the United States for defense, or else Japan would be creating its own independent defense systems. Second, he said that the Prime Minister could rely on the United States to consult closely with Japan before making any crucial decisions ⁱ ~~in~~volving policy changes on the China problem and matters of comparable importance. The President

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expressed a desire to discuss these issues with the Prime Minister and understand fully the problems involved before taking action.

The President said, that the main problem involving the Republic of China's retention of its U.N. seat is that the Nationalist Chinese not get angry and walk out of the U.N. If the Nationalists do not walk out then the Chinese Communists will not soon gain admission to the U.N. The Presidents said that what we want to do is keep down the Nationalist Chinese blood pressure, so that they won't do something rash that might enable the Communist Chinese to enter the U.N. So long as we are successful the present situation of two China's will ^{obtain} ~~remain~~.

At that point, photographer Okamoto entered the office and was introduced by the President as his friend. The President asked whether he was born in the United States or Japan. Mr. Okamoto said that he had been born and raised in this country, and that his home is Bronxville, New York. His father is in Japan, in his home town near Yokohama, his mother is in New York, her home town is Kyoto. He has no brothers or sisters in Japan, but he said he has been told that he has many uncles.

Continuing his comments on the China situation, ~~the President~~ ~~said that what we want to do~~ which he remarked is a problem for him as it is for the Prime Minister, the President said that what we must

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do is to keep the Nationalist Chinese from upsetting the situation, or to forestall their doing that as long as we can. We don't want them to walk out in order to keep the Chinese Communists from walking in. He affirmed that the United States and Japan should have the closest consultation on this ~~matter~~ ^{matter,} and commented Ambassadors Reischauer and Takeuchi are already devoting their attention to this matter. He said that he had asked Ambassador Reischauer to remain at his post and to keep the Prime Minister conversant with developments.

The President said that attention would have to be given to problems related to China trade as well in order to cope with economic aspects of this nation of over 600 million people. The President noted that Japan regards trade and political relations with Communist China as separate matters.

The Prime Minister confirmed that politics and trade are differentiated in Japan's contacts with mainland China. He said that Japan cannot ignore the mainland's propinquity and the long history of cultural contact with the Chinese. Therefore, Japan has developed trade relations with the mainland. However, Japan maintains diplomatic and treaty relations with the Republic of China. He said that Japan is in the same boat as the United States, and does not wish to anger CHIANG Kai-Shek.

The President solicited the Prime Minister's analysis of the China situation as it might emerge in two or three years.

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The Prime Minister reiterated that it is essential that we consult closely on this matter. We cannot deny that a situation might develop in which Communist China could be admitted to the U.N. This possibility puts us in a critical position. He said that the Communist China question is of an even more urgent nature than the Viet-Nam problem.

The President emphasized our hope that the Communist Chinese *will* leave their neighbors alone and turn their attention to internal affairs.

The Prime Minister said that this would be difficult for them to do, since they are communists. However, MAO Tse-Tung will not live forever. On the other hand, Chiang may not live too much longer either. He said that we should not be unduly hasty with respect to Communist China lest we create new problems. He observed that Communist China will continue to pose serious difficulties until it has completed its revolutionary phase. This evolutionary process has been witnessed before in the history of China. The Shin and Mongol dynasties provide examples. The Prime Minister said that 40 years have past since the Soviet revolution, during which time the regime has matured and changed. But only a decade and a half have past since the Chinese Communist revolution which is still in an early stage.

The President agreed. He said that this is a great problem for the Prime Minister and himself.

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The President said that Viet-Nam is another major problem, and it could worsen if no stable government can be established. If this fails we could be out tomorrow. But the President stressed what he said in his State of the Union Message: we intend to stay in Viet-Nam and we will do more rather than less. The President asked how hopeful the Prime Minister was about the situation in Viet-Nam.

The Prime Minister said that the United States must hold out and be patient. The United States is an outsider who has sent in troops, whereas the opposition is native. He said that the United States should work for the establishment of a liberal atmosphere that would enable the government to gain the support of the people. Above all, popular sentiment must be understood and channelled in politically constructive ways.

The Prime Minister indicated that the U.S. should not think in terms of pursuit to the north which he rejected, but should rather lend its efforts to such ventures as the establishment of model communities in South Viet-Nam, especially around Saigon. He said that the biggest headache for the U.S. is the absence of leaders who could form a reliable government.

The President interposed that our headache is bigger than that. He said we intend to stay in Viet-Nam so long as our assistance is sought by the Vietnamese people. The answer^w_A to the Prime Minister's earliest question as to whether the U.S. is committed not to withdraw

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from Viet-Nam is yes.

The Prime Minister applauded the U.S. determination to maintain a firm stand in Viet-Nam and reiterated his desire that we hold out.

The President said in reply to a question the Prime Minister ph^rased about defense, that, since Japan possesses no nuclear weapons, and we do have them, if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the U.S. would stand by its commitments and provide that defense. The President asked whether that struck at the heart of the Prime Minister's qu^estion. The Prime Minister confirmed that that is what he would like to ask ~~about~~ but said that he is unable to say so publicly. The President said that his reply on the defense of Japan is affirmative, adding that this exchange is befitting ~~statesmen~~ of the type we would like to be ^{in the interest of our peoples}

The President asked whether the Prime Minister wished to discuss any foreign policy matters other than China, Viet-Nam, and security arrangements. The Prime Minister replied that he is concerned about developments in Malaysia and Indonesia.

The President explained that Sukarno's character is ^a crucial element in the situation. He is impulsive and impetuous, and if he gets too upset we are fearful that he will create even more serious problems. He said that the U.S. is lending its influence to ameliorate this problem in every way possible.

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The Prime Minister cautioned that we should avoid actions which would drive Sukarno, and with him Indonesia, into the hands of Communist China.

The President said that the U.S. is exercising extreme forbearance in trying to ^{prevent} ~~avoid~~ this. He said that Sukarno had insulted the U.S. recently but the President was prepared to overlook this in the light of our larger interests. The week following Sukarno's statements the U.S. delivered food valued at several million dollars to Indonesia under the terms of an agreement reached three years ago.

^{Kennedy}
[The] President [^] had been severely criticized in the Senate when he executed this agreement. The President said that the U.S. is following a policy of conciliation in regard to the Indonesian problem and is trying not to be inflammatory.

The Prime Minister said that Japan is still on speaking terms with Indonesia, and is willing to do what it can.

^{indicated}
The Prime Minister ~~said~~ that Indonesia might be an area which consultations with Great Britain might be desirable. The President ^{replied that} ~~said~~ [^] any contributions to a solution would be welcomed.

The Prime Minister said that he wished to refer to one major problem in which the prospects were somewhat brighter. He said that a settlement between Japan and South Korea should be forthcoming soon.

He noted that internal political considerations in Korea seem to be the only barrier to an early settlement. ^{The President said yes, he understood.}

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The Prime Minister ~~then~~ raised the question of whether the President would be interested in visiting Japan. The President indicated that he hopes very much that he would have an opportunity ^{to do so.} He characterized Japan as a country that excites and interests ^S him. He ^{noted} ~~added~~ that many members of his Cabinet family had been there, including the six Cabinet members who were en route to Japan at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. In time, such a Visit could be worked out.

The Prime Minister asked whether he could reply to a question in his press conference that he had asked the President about making a trip to Japan. The President ^{expressed his approval and confirm} said that he would ~~volunteer~~ ^{confirm} that the Prime Minister did extend an invitation ^{during one of his own press conferences.} The President said that he is most interested in being a close friend to Japan. He commented that six of his Cabinet members have have been there; Secretary Udall went mountain climbing in Japan; and these and other Americans have all reported that Japan is a wonderful country. He expressed the hope that he would be able to visit the Prime Minister during his ^{Presidential} ~~term~~ ^{term} of office.

The Prime Minister said that Foreign Minister Shiina would proceed to London following the present talks to participate in a regular British-Japanese consultation. Since Britain is one of the nations which recognizes Communist China, the Prime Minister wondered whether it would be useful to have the Foreign Minister consult with the British to gain their assistance with respect to the Viet-Nam question.

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The President said that he would speak to Secretary Rusk about this, but that we have already made strong appeals to our friends to do all they can. But it seems that all of our friends are under the bridge[/] or hiding in caves. It would be useful if they would take some constructive action. Even a strong speech would help. The U.S. has 25,000 men in Viet-Nam and we ~~don~~^{need} dollars to continue this assistance. Some^{persons}₁ would like us to withdraw but we will not do so.

The U.S. will be dealing increasingly with major powers such as Britain, Japan, and Germany in trying to resolve the Viet-Nam and other crisis situations in Asia. With respect to Japan's security, Japan need not give even a second thought to the dependability of its American ally. If Japan is attacked, the U.S. will contribute to its defense. Similarly, the U.S. will abide by commitments to its other allies. The U.S. shall remain in Viet-Nam as long as the situation permits. It would be very helpful, however, if the President were able to point out to the American people tangible assistance extended to Viet-Nam by our friends, such as money or the medical task force which Japan has sent there. The U.S. investment in Viet-Nam is four or five billion dollars. We seem to be alone, and the President wondered where are Britain, Japan, and Germany.

The President said that he would summarize his statements in conclusion because the others^{are}₁ waiting in the Cabinet Room and they would also like to talk with the Prime Minister. The U.S. is conciliatory^y toward Indonesia. When Sukarno told us off, the President turned the other cheek. When he told us to go jump in the lake, we sent him food.

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We have no desire to drive Sukarno into the hands of Communism. If he does go, he will do so out of his own decision.

The Prime Minister ~~said~~ that Japan will do all she can to assist in these problems, and noted the success of the medical task force which Japan had sent to south Viet-Nam.

The President said he understood that this contribution cost Japan \$1.5 million. He appreciated dispatch of the medical task force and said that it would be helpful if Japan could show the flag. If Japan gets in trouble, we would send our planes and bombs to defend her. We ~~xxx~~ are now in trouble in Viet-Nam and ask how Japan can help us. He indicated that the Prime Minister need not publicize these views at home. The President said, however, that he himself would do so with the members of the Senate. Any statement of support by the Prime Minister would, of course, ^{be useful.} ~~help.~~

The President said that he hears a lot about trade problems between our two countries, related to cotton textiles, woolen goods, television sets such as Sony, and other things the Japanese produce so efficiently. He has also been informed of the Japanese desire to extend their air routes. He invited the Prime Minister's views on the ^{major outstanding bilateral} ~~big~~ trade problems, ^{between the two countries.} ~~that exist between us.~~

The Prime Minister said that, in his view, the major problem is to sustain the prosperity of the U.S.

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The President said that textile representatives in the U.S. are extremely concerned about the import of Japanese woolens.

The Prime Minister indicated that he preferred to reserve the discussion of textiles and civil aviation problems for his meeting with Secretary Rusk.

The President observed that while we have worked out the problems of cotton textiles we now have a problem with woolen textiles. The President said that he daily confronts a number of Senators who jump down his throat because of problems arising from Japanese imports. He said we have to watch that and exercise restraint. He said that RCA is fussing with him about Sony television sets. He commented that, nevertheless, he had some Sony television sets and led the Prime Minister into his private study where he showed him three miniature Sony television sets, each tuned to a different network. He demonstrated for the Prime Minister a control device by which he could tune in on the audio portion of any of the three. He said that he has these sets on constantly.

With respect to trade with Japan, he said the U.S. wants to trade and considers its commercial relationship with Japan to be extremely important. Japan buys American cotton. On the other hand, Japanese woolen exports to the U.S. create difficult problems because the industry is depressed. The President said that he would appreciate anything Japan could do to help alleviate this situation, for he has

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50 Senators after him on it.

The Prime Minister said he wondered why such a relatively small export item as woolens should be such a problem when Japan buys so much from the U.S.

The President said this is because the industry is badly depressed. When a baby does not get milk he cries.

The Prime Minister said that he still found it difficult to understand complaints about Japanese trade, particularly those which originate in areas of soy bean production, since Japan purchases \$100 million worth of soy beans from the U.S. and exports only \$1 million worth of woolen textiles.

The President said that if the situation were reversed ~~he is sure~~ he is sure he would hear about it. As a politician the Prime Minister can understand why he would hear complaints from those in a depressed industry.

The Prime Minister said that since President Johnson is from Texas, a cotton-producing state, in contrast to President Kennedy, who was from a textile-manufacturing state, he had anticipated a different attitude with respect to textile problems. He said that he hoped the President could handle these problems, which he ^{believed} ~~indicated~~ stem fundamentally from domestic considerations in the U.S. rather than from Japan's actions.

The President said he appreciated this point, but every day he sees representatives of the textile industry and since he gets so

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much criticism from this area he hoped that the Prime Minister could do something at his end to alleviate the situation. Every morning he received calls from textile manufacturers complaining about Japanese textiles. The President said he did not wish to make this a major point of the discussion, but he must live at home just as the Prime Minister must. The Prime Minister said that representatives of the woolen textile industry in Japan had told him prior to his departure for the U.S. not to raise the issue of woolen textiles in Washington.

The President commented in a [↓]lighter _↑vein that textiles and civil aviation could probably be discussed all day. The Prime Minister made the point that civil aviation is a different matter because Japanese air lines use American planes exclusively. The President said that the American air line companies do not manufacture aircraft and this point is lost on them.

The Prime Minister expressed his understanding of that situation.

The President said that both he and the Prime Minister were the new leaders of great nations which have promising futures and that problems between us could be resolved through give-and-take discussions on the basis of fairness and justice. We must understand that it is essential that we communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in a friendly manner. He said that he would be available later in the visit to discuss any problem the Prime Minister wished to raise.

The President expressed his appreciation and pleasure at the warm

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treatment accorded American Cabinet officers who had visited Japan.

He said he was proud of the manner in which Japan has rebuilt itself over the past 20 years. He said that he could understand the problems a new Prime Minister might face and offered to help to the extent possible. The President cautioned the Prime Minister to exercise care in his statements about outstanding problems between the United States and Japan that might make it more difficult for the President to cope with U.S. domestic pressures on these issues.

The Prime Minister referred once again to his invitation to the President to visit Japan. The President reiterated how much he would like to make the trip. He cited his great interest in the people and the country and confirmed that he would like to visit at an appropriate time during his term of office. The Prime Minister remarked that the President's term of office will undoubtedly be eight years and it would be too long to wait until the latter part of this period to have him visit Japan.

The President said that a very good friend of his, Mr. Youngman, an insurance company executive presently working in Japan, would be at dinner. He wanted to introduce him to the Prime Minister because Mr. Youngman, just as many other Americans, speaks very favorably of the people of Japan.

The President asked whether the Prime Minister had any other matters to discuss confidentially before joining the 20 people

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waiting in the Cabinet Room.

The Prime Minister said that it was not necessary to add to what had already been said.

The President said that he felt he had gotten to know the Prime Minister and hoped that the Prime Minister also felt that they had gotten their personal relationship off on a good footing.

The President said ^{that} they now had their own private treaty which is just as binding as any treaty ratified by the Senate.

He then escorted the Prime Minister and other members of the group into the Cabinet Room.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

December 16, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

not Henderson for

Attached for your information and files is Part III of V of a memorandum of conversation between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Shiina of Japan dated December 3 regarding Visit by Prime Minister Sato to Washington.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

1. Bundy to note P. 2
2. Cooper
3. Lit BKS

Approved in S
12/9/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SecDel/MC/10
December 9, 1964

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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, December 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-133

By ju, NARA, Date 7-16-92

Date: December 3, 1964

Time: 1:00 p.m.

Place: Waldorf Astoria
Hotel

Part III of V

Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Sato to Washington

Participants:

Japanese: Etsusaburo Shiina, Foreign Minister of Japan
Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan
Akira Matsui, Japanese Ambassador to the UN
Takeshi Yasukawa, Director General Affairs
Bureau, Foreign Ministry
Masao Kanazawa, Counselor of Embassy
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Consul General, Los
Angeles (Interpreter)

U.S.: Secretary Rusk
Assistant Secretary Cleveland
Ambassador Plimpton
Robert A. Fearey, Director for East Asian Affairs
Richard W. Petree, Officer-in-Charge, Japanese
Affairs
James L. Wickel, OPR/LS (Interpreter)

Distribution:

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Before going in to their working luncheon, Secretary Rusk drew Foreign Minister Shiina aside for a private discussion of a visit by Prime Minister Sato to Washington. Secretary Rusk explained to the Foreign Minister that the period January 5 to 15 is the worst period in the year for the U.S. Government to undertake an additional function as important as a visit by Prime Minister Sato. During that period the President is concerned with the preparation of four major messages: The Budget Message, the State of the Union Address, the Inaugural Address, and the Economic Message. He explained to the Foreign Minister that it consequently would be extremely difficult to undertake a full visit, welcoming Prime Minister Sato to Washington in the manner that would be appropriate.

Secretary Rusk suggested, however, that it might be possible to arrange a working visit involving a two-hour business meeting with the President, a White House luncheon, and discussions with Secretaries Rusk, Dillon and McNamara, who would be at the Prime Minister's disposal, but with little or no protocol activities. If Foreign Minister Shiina felt that Prime Minister Sato would be interested in such a working visit, the Secretary said he would be happy to ask President Johnson whether such a brief informal visit could be arranged during the forepart of January. The Secretary said he felt that even such a brief meeting would be better, if it could be arranged, than postponing the visit until May or June. Mr. Shiina indicated agreement.

Secretary Rusk excused himself and telephoned President Johnson. On his return he said that the President was unwilling to be in a position of discourtesy to the Prime Minister. The President said that in addition to a working session, he would wish to give a dinner at the White House in the Prime Minister's honor. The Secretary asked Mr. ~~Kearey~~ to consult Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House concerning the President's schedule during the first half of January. The Secretary hoped that a mutually agreeable time could be found, and that the abbreviated visit could be made as profitable as possible. He said that the President was unwilling to compress the visit too much but was very anxious to have an early meeting with the Prime Minister. The President did not wish to postpone the visit until May or June if it could be avoided. The Secretary asked for a precise range of dates in January within which Prime

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Minister Sato would find it possible to visit Washington.

Ambassador Takeuchi confirmed that the Prime Minister had indicated the period January 5 to 15 as being feasible. The Ambassador said, however, that he would want to reconfirm the feasibility of this period with the Prime Minister. He personally believed that the Japanese side would not find much difficulty in agreeing to a date for a visit within that period.

Mr. Yasukawa, looking at a calendar, said that he believed that the Prime Minister could leave Japan as early as January 3, which is a Sunday. In that case the business meeting with President Johnson and other U.S. leaders could be scheduled as early as January 4. It was likely that the Prime Minister would have to return to Japan at the latest on January 16. Therefore, the effective period for consideration might be January 4 to 15.

Secretary Rusk suggested that the Prime Minister might enjoy other activities while in the United States, either before or after his Washington visit. He might wish to visit Cape Kennedy or some other part of the U.S. Ambassador Plimpton asked whether the Prime Minister would plan to visit New York and the General Assembly. Ambassador Takeuchi said that he was not sure what the Prime Minister would want to do.

The Secretary told Foreign Minister Shiina that he was glad to have the matter moving toward a favorable decision. He would confirm a specific date for a visit by Prime Minister Sato as soon as possible.

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